Selective Incentive Mechanisms in the Union Voluntary Assistance and their Implications for Equity in the Brazilian Federalism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17648/fineduca-2236-5907-v7-68615Keywords:
Education funding. Union Assistance. Equity. Federalism.Abstract
The paper analyzes the effect of selective incentive mechanisms adopted in transfers from the Union’s voluntary assistance between 2004 and 2014 in view of the purposes of greater equity in the distribution of resources between federal entities. The study combines descriptive statistics and content analysis of FNDE [National Education Development Fund] resolutions that regulated the technical and financial assistance of the Union to subnational federated entities, regarding the neo-institutionalist approaches in the field of federalism. The results point to the limits of the mechanisms used in face of the deep territorial inequality that marks the Brazilian federation.
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