The US foreign policy to the Middle East (2003-2011) and the rise of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

Abstract

This article analyses the relationship between US foreign policy in the Middle East between 2003 and 2011 and the emergence of the terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in June 2014. Therefore, it will use the concept of "Blowback" formulated by Johnson (2000) to explain unexpected consequences of certain US foreign policy decisions. Thus, it defends the hypothesis that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 provided a power vacuum in the region. This fact, together with the stance adopted by the US on the developments of the Arab Spring in 2011, would have provided the necessary conditions for the creation of ISIS. In order to be achieved this goal, it will use the method of causal inference in International Relations. Thus, it will be taken as a dependent variable the creation of ISIS in 2014; and as an explanatory variable, US foreign policy in the Middle East between 2003 and 2011. The intervening variables are: the Iraq war in 2003 and the Arab Spring in 2011.