O PAPEL DO CONGRESSO NACIONAL E DO TRIBUNAL DE CONTAS DA UNIÃO NA FISCALIZAÇÃO DAS AGÊNCIAS REGULADORAS: ABDICAÇÃO OU DELEGAÇÃO DE PODERES?

Abstract

This article analyses the accountability of Brazilian regulatory agencies, specifically, in the control performed by the Brazilian Congress, through "Tribunal de Contas da União". Brazilian literature argues that the regulatory agencies control occurs almost, exclusively, through Executive power, since it possesses more direct institutional control mechanisms. It is also argued that the National Congress would have abdicated this control function from these institutions. In this article, I argue that the Legislative power delegates its power to control regulatory agencies to the "Tribunal de Contas da União" (TCU). This authority transfer of control over regulatory agencies, according to the theory of delegation, would not represent an abdication of the legislative power to supervise and control the agencies, but only a process about the delegation of power. The results of a research conducted with the judgments made by TCU are discussed. Those judgments are the result of auditory activities of regulatory agencies.