Interest groups and the regulation of disinformation in Brazil

The dispute surrounding Bill No. 2630/2020 (2022–2023)

Abstract

The study seeks to understand how interest groups – parliamentarians from different ideological spectrums and digital platforms – influence the debate on the regulation of disinformation in Brazil through Bill 2630/2020 (the “Fake News Bill”). A qualitative approach was adopted, including a literature review, document analysis, and content analysis of two urgency votes on the bill (April 2022 and April 2023), and an examination of the positions taken by Big Tech companies. Results reveal strong polarization: opponents frame the proposal as censorship, while supporters emphasize its protective effects against the harms caused by disinformation. The findings also indicate the strategic actions of digital platforms to preserve a lucrative and opaque advertising market, which contributed to postponing the final vote. The study concludes that the absence of a regulatory framework leaves Brazil vulnerable to disinformation and that inequalities in informational resources among actors hinder legislative consensus.

Keywords: Disinformation; Internet Regulation; Interest Groups; Bill 2630/2020; Brazil.