FROM ARAB PETRO-POLITICS OF 1973 TO RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM SANCTIONS AS AGENCY OF COERCION?

Abstract

Drawing on diverse sources, this paper two interrelated issues, namely what makes a seemingly interstate war assume multilateral character, and to what extent can targeted actions by a state or a coalition of states extract expected compliant behavioral response in the context of belligerency. The paper deconstructs the weaponization through the imposition of oil embargo by Arab states in 1973 and the western-led sanctions against Russia in the current dispensation. The paper finds that although the conversion of oil into an economic weapon had far-reaching implications on the global economy, it failed to elicit compliant behavior from the US and its allies. In the same vein, one year of sanctions against Russia by the US-led coalition is yet to result in capitulation and return to status quo ante in Ukraine.