Critical Contribution To A New Theoretical Framework Of Standing On Civil Procedure

Abstract

The essay presents a critique of doctrinal conceptions about standing on civil procedure, especially with regard to the inclusion of the capacity to be a party in its theoretical structuring, proposing a new configuration, which allows new specific protections to flourish and carry out, without discrimination or arbitrary exclusions, the constitutional principle that judicial control cannot be removed (art. 5, XXXV, Brazilian Federal Constitution). To do so, it begins by honing the basic concepts that involve standing as a procedural requisites, distinguishing it from similar categories of substantive law. Following, it makes a brief passage through the theme in comparative law. With this preliminary material, it goes on to present the reasons that justify the elimination of the capacity to be party as a procedural requisite, to then outline a new theoretical configuration of the standing in civil procedure, with a view to building a more democratic and inclusive civil procedure.