A relevância da noção de infinito na carta 12 do epistolário de Spinoza em seu pensamento e na tradição filosófica ocidental

Abstract

The problem of the infinite is usually understood as related to the question of transcendence, to the systematic reflection on man's relationship with his own finitude and with everything that transcends him regarding his being and existence. In this sense, a transcendentalist philosophy usually has as its object the things that transcend human finitude in the most varied senses, relating to those things with which, even though man may not have direct contact during his existence, he can replace in his thought the real things with which he does relate directly. This paper intends to show that this substitution of real things for beings of reason, according to Spinoza, stems from a misconception of the notion of infinity, which is conceived as a set of parts truly distinct from each other instead of as something infinite by its nature, which not only cannot be conceived this way but also expresses completely, through the being and existence of each individual thing, the being and existence of all things, that is, God and his modes. It is in this sense that, by seeking a specific and in-depth debate on the notion of infinity, Letter 12 complements the contents of the Ethics by enabling one to understand through its causas an error that seems to be present in various ontologies of transcendence, thereby allowing one to understand by its causes what makes men replace in his thought real things by beings of reason.