The individual budget amendments and the effect on the electoral performance of federal representatives in the 54TH congress (2011-2014)

Abstract

The article deals with the strategic allocation of individual amendments to the Union budget and the electoral effect on the performance of federal representatives who served in the 54th congress. It is argued that politicians already in office who are running for reelection direct the Union's budget resources conquered through individual amendments to succeed in their municipal votes. In these terms, the three hypotheses to be tested are that the higher the values ​​of individual amendments approved for the municipality, the greater the parliamentary vote; the federal deputies approve their amendments in municipalities with a lower level of Municipal Human Development Index, since the electoral return on votes is larger; and the municipalities in which the author of the amendment is from the same coalition as the mayor are preferred for sending resources. The techniques used were descriptive statistics, Pearson's linear correlation, multiple linear regression and chi-square test. It is concluded that the individual amendments allocated in municipalities explain approximately 22% of the votes obtained by candidates for reelection, leaving 78% of the parliamentary vote to be investigated through other variables that directly influence the political strategy for the federal representatives to obtain electoral success.