THE AMBIGUITY TOWARDS PORTUGAL’S
AFRICAN COLONIES (1953-1985):
DEFINING ASPECTS OF BRAZIL’S
AFRICAN POLICY

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Introduction

The Portuguese colonization, throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, was the first bond established between Brazil and the African continent, and it was especially deepened by the slave trade. With the Brazilian independence in 1822, as well as with the end of the slave trade across the Atlantic, between 1845 and 1850, there was a gradual movement away from said continent, once the imperial foreign policy axis was now directed towards the River Plate, to the South, as well as to England, Western Europe and the North of the global system. In the 20th century, along with the two World Wars, the creation of the United Nations, and the Cold War, Brazil’s international projection was drawn according to the opportunities presented in this new world system.

The aim of the present paper is thus to analyze the ambiguity between Brazilian political discourse and foreign practice with regard to the Portuguese colonies. The research problem consists in identifying which aspects have exerted an influence on the definition of Brazil’s African policy. As a research question, it is assumed that Brazil, since the Independent Foreign Policy (IFP), with its discourse of non-alignment with the powers of the world system, the identification with the Third Worldist theses, and based on the politics of the “3Ds” (development, decolonization and disarmament), supported the anti-colonial principle and was an advocate for the self-determination

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of peoples. However, an ambiguity was evident by the official political alignment with Portugal, due to the 1953 Treaty of Friendship and Consultation.

In 1974, this ambiguity officially came to an end, with the independence of the Portuguese colonies in Africa and their recognition by Brazil, within a pragmatic and universalist framework of foreign policy. Methodologically, the research is classified as descriptive-explanatory in relation to its objectives. It applied the quanti-qualitative approach with the hypothetical-deductive method, since, according to Popper (1975), science is hypothetical and provisional, not a definitive knowledge. Based on the identified research problem, the research-generating question (hypothesis) was formulated, which in turn was tested through the procedures of bibliographic and documentary analysis of primary, secondary and press sources. After analyzing the results, the previously elaborated generating question was evaluated and eventually corroborated.

From 1951 to 1964: from the nationalist bargain to the IFP, nuances of African policy

Brazilian history is also based upon aspects from African cultures and societies, as slavery and the slave trade are two of the bonds responsible for building this relationship, which lasted from the 16th until the end of the 19th century, within the logic of the capitalist system and the international division of labor, which framed the Brazilian colony in a matrix of European liberalism, based on the monoculture of large areas of land. Brazil’s withdrawal from the African continent, from its independence until the first half of the 1940s, reflects the sum of two aspects of the historical process of foreign policy, according to Saraiva (2012): the ideological, marked by the role of the Brazilian elite of the time, which sought to build a nation according to “modern and Western nations”; on the other hand, the material aspect, which stood out for the irrelevance of economic and commercial relations with Africa. In addition, it is important to emphasize that the policy of domination of the colonial powers had made international relations of the African continent impossible up to that point.

Domestic and structural changes in the world system since the inter-war period and in the post-World War II led Brazil to revise the axis of its foreign policy, as a result of changes in the country’s options for international projection. The Cold War shaped the world system and Brazilian foreign policy was again linked to Washington during Dutra’s administration. The
role played by Raul Fernandes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) was conservative in essence and deeply linked to US interests, which were often contradictory to those ones of Brazil. In turn, Osvaldo Aranha, then president of the United Nations General Assembly and head of the Brazilian delegation to the United Nations, perceived that the foreign policy of Brazil being the United States’ preferred ally did not exist, since Washington’s interests were directed to other regions of the globe.

According to Vizentini (2008), Vargas’ second government represented a rupture with the diplomatic aspects of Dutra’s government, marking the beginning of a new conduct for Brazilian foreign policy, which would reach its peak in 1961, with the Independent Foreign Policy (IFP). The idea of Vizentini (2004b) is used when analyzing the IFP since 1951, because “[...] it is closely linked to an industrial development model by import substitution, which, both in its economic and political-diplomatic aspects, presents a certain unity between 1951 and 1964” (Vizentini 2004b, 31).

However, the first contacts with Africa in this new phase of rapprochement took place in the commercial-political sphere, with the aim of strengthening the competitiveness of African and Brazilian primary products in the international market, especially the commercial partnership with South Africa. According to Penha (2011), Brazil’s first concerns with Africa were grouped into three orders: economic (by the aspects already mentioned), political (in the dialogue with Portugal and in the creation of the Luso-Brazilian community), and strategic (with the process of decolonization of Africa, a space of interest for Brazilian action in the South Atlantic region).

The 1950s brought the agenda of national struggles for independence in the African continent to the world system. In Brazil, industrial modernization and urban growth led up to the emergence of new political actors and new demands in the consolidation of the so-called Developmental State. The presence of an emerging middle class and business interests brought new aspects to foreign policy. Development became more acute as a vector in this period, with diplomacy being used as a useful tool to ensure new spaces that would favor foreign investment for the national project. On the other side of the South Atlantic, African nationalism would flourish, being strengthened by its identification with the Third World. The Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955, according to Venâncio (2009), represented a boost to the struggle for independence of African countries, as well as an encouragement to the leaders of the movements against both European colonialism and the inferiorization of the black man. Later, in 1958, the 1st Conference of Independent States of Africa was held in Accra (Ghana’s capital), which
took up Bandung’s principles, strengthening support to African peoples still under colonial rule, and also encouraging African union (Venâncio 2009). In 1963, the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) crowned this movement.

In the second Vargas government (1951-1954), foreign policy was evidently noted as an instrument of national defense to achieve the developmental project. The international context put Vargas in a limited position to manoeuvre. Through the nationalist bargaining, the President sought to diversify his partners, and Africa’s place in his policy belonged to the set of less developed areas of the world system. However, the Brazilian abstention in the face of the decolonization of Africa stands out. According to Vargas, the development of the colonies would occur with the continuing of the colonization, and the rule of João Neves da Fontoura in the MRE judged the conditions of economic development in the relation between colony and colonizer.

However, with the ministerial reform of 1953, the idea of preserving metropolitan interests in the African colonies became more acute with the appointment of the UDN-linked conservative Vicente Ráo to the MRE. It was at this time that the initiatives on Brazil’s side were presented, as well as the last observations that were necessary to give birth to the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation with Portugal in 1953. Such a treaty would deeply establish bilateral connections through mutual consultation on international policy issues, with the exception of issues affecting American and Iberian territories. According to Pinheiro (1989), there were two explanatory reasons for this support: on the one hand, the existence of a Portuguese lobby in Brazilian society, representing the most traditional Portuguese interests; and, on the other hand, the strategic interests of both countries over the South Atlantic (Pinheiro 1989 *apud* Rizzi 2014). In addition, according to Cervo (2011):

> [...] His main intention was to resolve the antagonism between the two countries because of the incompatibility between Brazilian foreign policy, guided by national development and the logical support for decolonization, on the one hand, and the Portuguese foreign option of maintaining its late colonialism, on the other hand. The treatment will fundamentally exercise the function of perpetuating sentimentality in bilateral relations (Cervo 2011, p. 48).

For Portugal, the Treaty represented a political need to sustain the regime of António de Oliveira Salazar, as well as reaffirming the Portuguese status in the world system: since democracies emerged victorious from the
Second World War, it was appropriate for non-democratic countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Brazil to adapt to the new world order in accordance with the West. To this end, Vargas convened elections and established democracy in 1945. In turn, Salazar continued to maintain his regime. However, the hardships that Portugal encountered in maintaining its image in the West, as well as in integrating with the United Nations, led its diplomacy to seek mechanisms in favor of maintaining its status. It then sought to integrate with multilateral institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to strengthen relations with Atlantic countries, such as the United States and Brazil (Cervo 2011).

Portugal felt threatened by the commitment assumed by the United Nations to give political autonomy to the peoples submitted to colonial rule (and by the process initiated by the British independence to the Indians), factors that led it to be concerned with the maintenance of its colonies in Asia and Africa. For this reason, Brazil started to be seen as a strategic ally of Lisbon in terms of defending its colonial empire. From this context, the political need to re-establish the historical and cultural ties between Brazil and Portugal, and the creation of the Luso-Brazilian community generated the 1953 Treaty.

In the government of Café Filho (1954-1956), Raul Fernandes’ conservative stance in Itamaraty reoriented the axis of foreign policy towards the North, re-approaching the USA. In the ensuing government, of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1960), foreign policy was characterized by the association of nationalism with foreign capital. Africa received the Brazilian discretion and disinterest for its national struggles under the effervescence of great changes in the African continent. Brazil’s silent stance towards the first independent nation of sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana, in 1957), along with the independence movements that flourished, represented an awakening of Africa after the Bandung Conference, in 1955, which would be the first steps that would converge, only in 1963, in the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OUA).

Kubitschek’s central concern was the developing economic relations between Europe and Africa, without taking into account the status of overcoming or not the colonial situation. With the creation of the European Common Market (ECM) in 1957, a clause certifying the integration of African countries into the European market through the protection of their products was incorporated. For Brazil, Africa’s indirect participation in the ECM became a commercial threat (Cervo 2011). The concern of Brazilian foreign policy makers was based on the suspicion that international financing for the development of countries such as Brazil would be directed to
Africa, in addition to being based on the restriction of Brazilian products to the MCE, because the fear was that African products could be favored (due to exemptions from trade tariffs for African products and the low price of the African labor force). Furthermore, Cervo (2011) mentions that, for Brazil, the association of African and European economies, for preferential trade reasons, could affect the Brazilian development project by limiting the entry of Brazilian products to the European market. In addition to the creation of the ECM with the African association, the possibility of US and European investments in Brazil being threatened was also considered. For this reason, the possibility of the Pan American Operation (OPA) was, to a certain extent, a response to this situation.

In 1957, in the IV Commission of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Brazil supported project A/C.4/L.404, whose content mentioned that the Portuguese overseas provinces would be called non-autonomous territories, still belonging to Portugal. However, this stance did not receive unanimous support of Brazilian society and of Itamaraty itself. Political and intellectual leaderships advocated for the rapprochement with Africa, as they understood that the changes in the world system required a reform in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy (Rizzi 2014).

The foreign policy under the government of Jânio Quadros (1961), in accordance with the guidelines of the IFP, had a discourse of non-alignment with the powers of the world system, was identified with the Third Worldist theses, and supported the anti-colonial principle, being Brazil an advocate of the self-determination of peoples. However, that ambiguity was still evident in the official Portugal-Brazil political alignment. It is noticeable that the IFP is the phase of Africa’s reintroduction into the external agenda and the gestation of Brazil's African policy, as well as being an outcome of the independence processes of most African countries between 1957 and 1960.

Brazil’s rapprochement with Africa was based on “... the idea that both economic development and the ability to exert a certain regional influence should evolve in the same direction” (Penha 2011, 151). The first nuances of Brazil’s African policy were based on the search for new political and commercial partners, and it provided new opportunities for Brazil’s international insertion. The strategy used to reshape the country’s role in the world system represented the establishment of relations with socialist countries in Europe and Asia, likewise with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Cuba, and the revision of relations with the USA. Thus, “Africa began to be seen as a new space for Brazil to exercise influence in the South Atlantic region” (Penha 2011, 151).
The IFP’s guidelines represented a milestone in Brazilian foreign policy, as they were universal and non-exclusive, since the new possibilities allowed Brazil to assert itself as an influential actor in the world system. In this sense, it was sought to use foreign policy as an instrument for the international projection of the country, and the principles that guided the IFP were defined at the economic-political level. The search for new international markets and the intensification of trade relations with other partners turned foreign policy into a mechanism to achieve the economic development of the country. On the other hand, in the political sphere, the promotion of dialogue for conflict resolution, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, self-determination of peoples, and emphasis on international law was identified. What was noted was the attempt to take Brazil up to a level of autonomy in a pragmatic strategy.

In line with what Jaguaribe (1979) states, it is understood that the post-World War II world system was marked by relations of two orders: the one between the superpowers (US and USSR), characterized as complex relations of cooperation and conflict, and the ones between the center and the periphery, within each imperial system. The level of autonomy of the system is based on “a complex network of interrelated interests within a profoundly asymmetrical framework, which privileges the center over the periphery” (Jaguaribe 1979, 95). Such asymmetry was based on the economic-technological and political-military superiority of the United States, which ensured its interests in the world system.

As for states, they need national viability and international permissibility to hold a greater degree of autonomy in the global system. The national viability is subordinated to the historical-geographical and socio-cultural circumstances and to the availability of human and natural resources (Jaguaribe 1979). In this sense, it can be seen that the period studied presents an interesting margin of national viability, with different degrees in each government. In the Jânio government (and later in the Geisel government), there was a high degree of national viability, because Brazil had an expanding economy.

The international permissibility, besides being of more abstract specification, approaches the internal and external capacity to neutralize the risks arising from third parties in the world system (Jaguaribe 1979). It should be noted that the Cold War conjuncture offered Brazil a considerable level of international permissibility (between 1961-63 and between 1974-85, espe-

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3 According to the author, the level of autonomy can only be clearly perceived within the scope of the North American empire, in whose orbit Brazil was located.

4 Our translation.
cially), allowing it to act in the world system questioning, to a certain extent, the current order and the inequalities between the central and peripheral states.

Autonomy, national viability and international permissibility are key concepts in understanding the characteristics of Brazil’s African policy, which emerged in 1961 and was consolidated in the 1970s. It was the combination of the analysis between the possibilities and internal demands with the external possibilities identified, within a pattern of conduct based on the “3Ds” of Araújo Castro, that overcame the obstacles of the forming aspects of African politics in this period of the Cold War, within the consolidation of the Brazilian Developmental State.

Brazil’s support for the principle of self-determination of the peoples in Africa, as well as the use of foreign policy as a means of fighting against racism and colonialism, did not mean Brazil’s adherence to the Third World bloc. Quadros argued that Brazil’s African policy would be a “modest reward” for Brazil’s immense debt to African peoples. However, the power vacuum left by the colonial powers was seen as an opportunity for Brazil’s projection towards the African continent.

In terms of foreign trade, the Quadros and Goulart governments opted to approach African governments directly. The main concern was to undo the image created in previous decades of unfair competition between African and Brazilian products in the ECM. The new Africanist inclinations of Brazilian diplomacy received strong opposition. At the international level, the African policy of Quadros received the disapproval of Portugal, which considered it contradictory to Portuguese interests in Africa. Luso-Brazilian relations represented the first obstacle to his anti-colonialist policy. However, in the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations the ambiguity in the Brazilian discourse was strengthened. At first, the Brazilian delegation voted in favor of the project “Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Peoples and Countries” presented by Asian and African countries. On the other hand, Brazil voted against the resolution that requested Portugal to present social, economic, and political information about its colonies. Moreover, it

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5 According to Penha (2011), Brazil sought to regulate its relations with Africa with the following initiatives: 1) the Brazilian request at the United Nations Assembly in 1961 and 1962 for a review of the institutional structure of international trade because it was unfair to developing countries. The discussions resulted in the First International Conference on Trade and Development (INCTAD) in Geneva (1964). 2) the signing of the International Coffee Agreement, implemented in 1963, to constitute a policy of controlling production and promoting exports at profitable prices.
was pointed out that Brazil has always argued that such Portuguese territories were not dependent, but provinces of a unitary state (Brasil 1960, 14-15).

Internally, the National Democratic Union (UDN) and the military did not support the IFP as they believed that African policy and dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe and Cuba meant an alignment with communist regimes. It is important to mention the role of the Portuguese lobby that questioned the Brazilian government when its attitudes were contradictory to Lisbon’s interests, emphasizing the principles of the Luso-Brazilian community.

It is important to highlight the bilateral relations with South Africa during this period, since this country was a Brazilian trade partner. Pretoria, in turn, guided its relations with Brasília under a more political-strategic bias, since it sought support for its incorporation into the world system. According to Penna Filho (2010), Brasília-Pretoria relations had some practical implications for the Brazilian government. In the first place, it meant the expansion of Brazil’s foreign trade at the time when the industrialization process began. Secondly, the relation with South Africa represented an opportunity for Brazil to project into a region of strategic importance. In the third place, this relation evidenced the filling of a void in the field of Brazil’s foreign relations after its departure from Africa. However, the author highlights two events that were responsible for the cooling of relations between Brazil and South Africa: the illegal South African occupation of Southwest Africa (currently Namibia) and the regime of racial segregation. Brazil’s was against the annexation of the territory of Southwest Africa, as it supported the independence of this colony alongside the United Nations.

The opportunity for Brazil to show the principles of the IFP at the United Nations occurred when the topic at hand was the Angolan issue. However, Brazil’s ambiguity and difficulties in breaking with its commitments to Portugal were noticeable. The war for liberation in Angola worsened in the 1960s, gaining space in international discussions. In 1961, the conflict was brought to the United Nations by independent African countries. In July, Ghana announced the closure of ports and airports to Portuguese vessels and aircrafts. Senegal then announced the breaking of diplomatic relations with Portugal. In addition to the African countries, England and the USA also positioned themselves against Portugal. On the Brazilian side, when the issue was the Angolan problem, the country presented itself as a silent spectator, abstaining from voting in the United Nations. The ambiguous discourse of Afonso Arinos, who reproduced his support for Portugal to lead Angola’s independence, stands out here. However, the vote in favor
of the Resolution 1.742 presented in the United Nations by initiative of 44 Afro-Asiatic countries, had the goal of creating institutions under the power of the Angolan people. This episode demonstrated the non-compliance with Portugal, as well as the vote for the gradual independence of Angola. Such actions by Arinos reflected the anti-colonialist values that guided the IFP but were questioned by the Senate.

The Government of João Goulart (1961-1964) sought to deepen the IFP through the multipolar route, trying to diplomatically articulate relations with small and medium powers. The stance in favor of African decolonization was understood, internally, as a means of expanding communism in the Brazilian territory, because the African independence movements were seen as products of this ideology. The IFP began to be questioned by the conservative and military sectors of Brazilian society, as well as receiving coercion from Portuguese diplomacy, and Brazil was going through a time of crisis, with the IFP gradually losing its effectiveness. Subsequently, the military coup in 1964 caused African politics and Third World discourse to be replaced by an ideological conception of combating the advance of communism.

From 1964 to 1985: from the “automatic alignment” to the “responsible pragmatism” that consolidated African policy

According to Rizzi (2014), African policy, in the first two military governments, took a more conservative pro-Portugal bias under a geopolitical view of relations with the continent; the following governments, especially from 1970 onwards, positioned Africa in Brazilian foreign policy, somewhat systematizing the future Brazilian presence in newly independent states. During this period, Brazil’s African policy did not advance compared to the IFP period, but it did not mean an abandonment. Instead, political-economic cooperation was replaced by a geopolitical aspect followed by the associated liberalism of the Castello Branco government in the face of the struggle against the communist threat, which defined the new guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy from 1964 to 1969.

The Castello Branco government’s Diplomacy of National Interest (1964-1967) was aimed at a rapprochement with the United States, invoking a discourse more linked to Portugal. According to Penha:

The government [...] insisted on the idea that Brazilian policy towards Africa should take into account Brazil’s traditional affection for Portugal and advocated the formation of an Afro-Brazilian community as a
“first window” to affirm Brazil’s leadership in the South Atlantic (Penha 2011, 162).

The new conduct deepened the internal atmosphere in which African liberation movements seemed to be linked to communism, identifying South Africa as the only reliable partner. Thus, a triangular space was created in the Atlantic, where the three “free” and Western capitals (Brasília-Lisbon-Pretoria) built an alliance against the threat of communism in other African nations (Saraiva 1996).

According to Vizentini (2004a), African politics in the Castello Branco government was characterized by two impulses: first, a cordial greeting to Third World delegations in world forums; and the search for new markets. However, such impulses were annulled by Westernism and by commitments with the ex-metropolis, as Brazilian strategists feared the installation of communist regimes on the Atlantic coast of Africa. The solution adopted was to break the diplomatic discourse of the previous government, as well as to strengthen the link with Portugal, supporting Portuguese colonialism as the best way to prevent the establishment of communist regimes.

In this sense, the Castello Branco government’s ambiguity towards Africa was in its condemnation of colonial rule, while unconditionally supporting the positions of the Salazar government and, on the other hand, in its condemnation of the Apartheid regime, while considering South Africa as the main economic partner in sub-Saharan Africa. However, according to Penha (2011), the explanation could be in the Brazilian posture of maintaining the ideological alignment with the USA. This ambiguity will gradually diminish as Brazil’s influence in the South Atlantic increases.

The “Diplomacy of Prosperity” of the government of General Arthur da Costa e Silva (1967-1969) meant the gradual resumption of the subject of development and the adoption of a multipolar bias for diplomacy, in a perspective of South-South relations, previously evidenced in the IFP. African policy followed the economic and commercial interests of conquering new markets and supplying the national demand for oil. The consolidation of geopolitical perceptions is noticeable, since “[...] it was a matter of maintaining the Brazilian influence in the Atlantic by economic means and by a peaceful policy, without the direct interference of external powers and without the collective security pacts” (Saraiva 1996, 128-129).

The projection of Brazil was marked, in the government of General Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969-1974), by the new commercial partners, as a result of the consolidation of a new look towards Africa. Foreign policy was oriented towards the objectives of a new regional power, in which the South Atlantic was incorporated as a facilitating space for navigation, as well as a geostrategic environment for national development, because “[...] security issues were subordinated to those of development” (Saraiva 1996, 130).

It is worth noting that the Natal-Dakar distance was mentioned during the government as an aspect of easy communication with the African continent – the distance of 1,600 miles made it possible to build commercial maritime corridors, enabling exchange actions at lower costs. In addition, another strategic measure was the extension of the Brazilian territorial sea to the 200 nautical mile range in 1970. According to Saraiva (1996), the involvement of the African countries of the Atlantic coast in consenting to the decision of the Médici government was another purpose of this measure. In 1968, MRE Minister Magalhães Pinto announced that Brazilian society, as well as his government, repudiated the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa and around the world, and stressed that the government supported all efforts to combat racial discrimination in Africa. There is an important change of attitude, since the Castello Branco government had not spoken out on African issues.

In the world system, anti-colonialism was perceived in two ways: “[...] the metropolises preached that colonial countries should first develop to achieve independence, while the colonies argued that before development came independence” (Vizentini 2004a, 178). For Dávila (2010, 4), decolonization changed this scenario shaped by the African diaspora, besides having a significant impact on Brazilian thinking and its connections with the national development project. In its broadest sense, this transformed the Brazilian state’s responses to the Cold War, creating a space for Brazilian diplomats to propose alternatives to the logic of an “iron curtain” dividing East and West. On the Brazilian side, there were frictions with Portugal, the USA, European colonial powers, and South Africa, which exercised a blockade on the development of Brazilian diplomacy for Africa. At the United Nations, Brasília voted with Lisbon on the question of overseas provinces, along with Washington, London, Madrid, and Pretoria.

However, Brazil preferred to adopt a silent stance. Nonetheless, Geisel and Delfim Neto, president of Petrobras and Finance Minister respectively, suggested Brazil’s entry into the African continent through the Portuguese Overseas Provinces, taking a different path:
To separate metropolitan Portugal, with whom the development of bilateral relations, cultural, and commercial exchanges, convention on rights and duties was sought, from colonialist Portugal, with whom Brazil should avoid political, military or commercial involvement, and who should be denied support for the theory of legal fiction of overseas provinces (Visentini 2004a, 179).

With the effects of the Brazil-Portugal relation, the Brazilian discourse was marked by the absence of the term “overseas provinces”, with the use of such an expression being avoided in official documents and business plans. In addition, Brazil shied away from consulting Portugal on Angolan oil exploration, as well as opening up commercial networks between Angola and Mozambique. The trip (1972) under the leadership of Chancellor Mario Gibson Barboza was the target of Portuguese opposition and suffered internally from the divergence between the Ministry of Finance, whose desire was the approximation with the Portuguese colonies, and the Itamaraty, whose preference was directed to the independent countries.

Hence, the 1970s represented a deep projection of Brazil towards Africa, differing from previous years, in which the discourse was based on solidarity between peoples. At this moment, the continent started to represent the strategic-commercial space for the expansion of Brazilian products, as well as for the exchange of oil. With the two oil crises, in 1973 and 1979, according to Rizzi (2014, 83), this product was “the first responsible for the attraction that Africa exerted on Brazil, due to the Brazilian energy needs”. That is why Brazil’s maneuver was to get closer to new partners: Angola, Nigeria, Gabon, Congo, and Zaire. This is the key point of Brazil’s African policy, national viability and international permissibility.

Trade with South Africa continued, but Brazil gradually positioned itself against Apartheid. Brazil-Portugal relations continued to be privileged when, in May 1973, Médici visited Portugal. However, the contradiction in Brazil’s stance in international forums remained, while the country gradually systematized its position against colonialism and racism. This stance was perceived at the XXVI General Assembly of the United Nations, in 1972, where Brazil was in favor of the adoption of Resolution 2.278, whose purpose was to legitimately consider the liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde/Guiné-Bissau (Rizzi 2014).

President Ernesto Beckmann Geisel’s “Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism” (1974-1979) launched the II National Development Plan,

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7 It covered Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Ghana, Togo, Daomé (Benin), Nigeria, Cameroon, Zaire, and Gabon.
deepening the process of industrialization through import substitution. The diversification of Brazil’s international relations was solidified; with Chancellor Antônio Azeredo da Silveira, the subject of African decolonization was put on the agenda, as his management sought to “harmonize national interests” (Azeredo Da Silveira 1974a *apud* Rizzi 2014) with African countries. In 1974, Azeredo da Silveira exposed Brazil’s new policy for Africa, based on three aspects:

a) increased cooperation, in the South-South modality, for the benefit of mutual development; b) respect for the principles of sovereignty and self-determination of States and the economic independence of societies; c) rejection of colonialism and racial discrimination, with support for the independence of Namibia and the black majority government of Zimbabwe [...] and to the newly independent Portuguese States (Cervo and Bueno 2008, 422).

It is important to highlight, as a segment in the Brazil-Africa trade during the 1970s and 1980s, that the sale of Brazilian arms made Brazil the largest supplier of arms to the African continent, because both of the military production capacity that the country began to develop and of the denunciation of the 1977 Treaty of Friendship and Consultation with the USA (according to Penha, 2011). From 1974 on, when the Brazilian war industry advanced, it recognized spaces to export, whose main destinations were Nigeria (mainly), followed by Gabon, Morocco, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Zimbabwe. However, the problem generated was the supposed inconvenience for some sectors regarding the export of other industrial goods, but “[...] the truth is that the politicization of arms sales in the period was never proven, except later (1988), in the case of US pressure against the sale of one billion dollars in arms from Brazil to Libya” (Penha 2011, 173).

The desire to change the country’s position in the hierarchy of the world system led to replacing the ideology of “communist danger” and “Western security” with a strategy of rapprochement with Africa, since the continent was incorporated in the “renegotiation of Brazil’s dependence” on the world economy, especially with regard to the USA. Thus, it can be seen that Brazil’s projection onto the South Atlantic, through African politics, did not foster the ideological struggle against communism, but rather fed the conquest of future markets (Saraiva 1996).

The Portuguese ideological discourse of “civilizing mission” and “lusotropicalism” continued with the replacement of Salazar by Marcelo Caetano in 1968. However, the Carnation Revolution in April 1974 represented
the end of that “mission” and its greatest result was the independence of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. Furthermore, “the ambiguous position that for more than 20 years brought Brazil closer and further removed it from Africa, in an oscillating policy, was closed” (Rizzi 2014, 84).

Although in November 1973 Brazil was the only Third World country that did not vote for Bissau-Guinean independence at the UN, on July 16, 1974 Brazil finally recognized the independence of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, unilaterally declared in September 1973. The year 1975 was marked by great changes: Brazil installed a Special Representation in Luanda in March and officialized another one in Maputo – which ended up not opening; on June 25, Mozambique proclaimed its independence 8; Cape Verde, on July 5; São Tomé e Princípe, on July 12. Subsequently, the country was the first to recognize the independence of the People’s Republic of Angola under the government of the Movement for the Liberation of Angola on November 11, 1975. According to Rizzi (2014, 85), “… this prestige towards the independence of all the PALOP (Portuguese-speaking African countries) countries must be interpreted as part of the Brazilian strategy to place itself as a bridge country between the interests of the First and Third World”. For Penha (2011), the recognition of the Marxist governments of Angola and Mozambique meant a rupture of the ideological conception that led foreign policy to the South Atlantic and Africa, and in so being, the beginning of a new stage of African politics. After these recognitions, President Geisel and Itamaraty were criticized by the press, civil society, public opinion, and the military. This posture not only influenced Brazil’s African politics, but also had positive consequences on the relations with the Third World, in addition to the country’s disengagement from the image of support for Portuguese colonialism and consolidating its African policy.

The African policy of the João Baptista Figueiredo Government (1979-1985) continued the bases of the Geisel administration. According to Cervo and Bueno (2008), on the one hand, Africa represented an alternative to protectionism and customs barriers by rich countries and their exports, and, on the other hand, Brazil meant for Africa a new source for the supply of goods and services, replacing its independence from former metropolises. Figueiredo was the first Brazilian president to visit Africa between November 14 and 21, 1983 (Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Algeria).

In this context, African policy was consolidated during the government of Figueiredo, systematizing a “pioneerism-reciprocity-respect” (Saraiva Guerreiro apud Rizzi 2014), with a preferential look at the Portuguese-spe-

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8 Brazil was not invited to participate in the Mozambican independence party.
aking countries, without neglecting the other African regions. It should be noted that during this period, economic and cooperation relations intensified. The 1980s were characterized by changes in the world system and in the internal sphere; in fact, Chancellor Ramiro Saraiva endeavored to maintain Brazil’s autonomy through a universalist foreign policy, upholding the principles of Responsible Pragmatism.

Despite the effects of the “lost decade” and of the war in Southern Africa, Brazil’s African policies followed a line of action in the political, economic, and cultural fields, with emphasis on the rapprochement with Angola and on criticism of Apartheid. It is interesting to clarify that economic cooperation with African oil-exporting partners has taken place through the expedient of countertrade, since this method is preferred when there is a shortage of foreign exchange and surpluses in goods and services between trading partners.

The relationship between Brasília and Pretoria, in the 1970s, was characterized by distance and, in the 1980s, by a near freeze. According to Penna Filho (2011), some factors explain it: the first is due to the end of the contradiction of the African policy of Brazil after the Portuguese decolonization that leveraged decision making; the second, the criticism of the international community against the Apartheid regime, especially the Afro-Asian countries; the third, the diversification of trade partners in the 1970s. It is agreed that the proximity with Pretoria was “based on a strategic calculation of commercial and economic relations”, becoming a “conscious pragmatism” (Penna Filho 2001, 81).

The impulse of the relations with Africa, legitimized by cultural ties, allowed the conquest of new markets, since the continent was primordial for the national development project, given the category of lesser relative development of the African countries. In addition, it led to the emergence of technical partnerships that engaged in technology transfer, human resources training and the possibility of providing Brazil with primary products. It is worth mentioning the opening of African countries to the entry of Brazilian companies providing services, especially those focused on the construction of public works and infrastructure, as well as oil exploration (Santana 2003).

As it has been shown, since 1974, there had no longer been any way to sustain an ambiguous policy that tried to sustain sentimental ties with Portugal and the attempt to further approach African peoples. The oil crises, the Carnation Revolution in Portugal and its consequences on Brasília-Lis-

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9 Brazil started to sign general cooperation agreements with all the PALOP countries and most of the African countries from then on.
bon relations, the changes that occurred in the world system, as well as the effectiveness of Geisel’s method of “ecumenical and responsible pragmatism” provided Brazil with a more active and autonomous change of position on the African continent.

Conclusions

It was sought to verify that the ambiguity between the Brazilian political discourse and foreign practice towards the Portuguese colonies between 1961 and 1985 was evident in the official political alignment between Portugal and Brazil, due to the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation, of 1953. After the application of the hypothetical-deductive method and the analyses, the research question was corroborated and it was concluded that the aspects that exerted influence on the definition of African policy in Brazil were the 1953 Treaty and the relations with South Africa. In this point there is agreement with Saraiva, when he points out that Brazil initially had two African policies: on the one hand, there was the “general policy of rapprochement” to the continent, whose strand was based on political solidarity to decolonization, and, on the other hand, there was the “policy of admissibility of the continuation of colonialism in the case of the Portuguese colonies in Africa” (Saraiva 1996, 88). Brazilian support for Portuguese colonialism has established an initial blockade since the 1950s to consolidate its African policy, which is forming as the African agenda progressively increases Brazil’s foreign agenda (politics and trade).

In addition, we agree with Penna Filho (2010), who identifies that the two obstacles to the development of African policy were Brazil’s support for Portuguese colonialism, already commented, and relations with South Africa, due to its policy of racial segregation: both Portugal and South Africa were not accepted by most African states, resulting, thus, in a difficulty in bringing Brazil closer to African governments. As it turned out, only with the end of the Portuguese decolonization process in the 1970s, Brazil was projected to Africa under a pragmatic and autonomous bias. The permissible international conjuncture of the first half of the 1970s and the national viability allowed the country to finish the ambiguity at the time when the independence of the Portuguese colonies in Africa officially occurred. In addition, it is also understood that African policy is consolidated precisely at a time when the political-strategic aspects of Africa and the South Atlantic are fully incorporated into Brazilian foreign policy, in a two-way, complex process.
The consolidation of Africa in the Brazilian foreign policy agenda in the 1970s and 1980s was the result of the ideological rupture, which began to have less and less weight in Brazil’s international projection, and of the internal and international possibilities, caused by the oil crisis of 1973. This period represented a deep projection of Brazil towards Africa, differing from previous years, in which the discourse was based on solidarity between peoples. Until the end of the Military Regime, the African continent began to represent a strategic-commercial space for the expansion of Brazilian products, shaping the African policy of Brazil.

Therefore, it is understood that this ambiguity between the discourse and practice of Brazilian foreign policy resulted in the formation of a specific profile of African policy, in which Portugal and the PALOP countries and South Africa continue to play a leading role, for the reasons previously identified. Then, as a result of African policy, in the 1980s, Brazil assertively projected itself into the South Atlantic, aiming to make this area a zone free of bipolar tensions, by the autonomous mechanism without the interference of the great powers, with the creation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) in conjunction with neighboring countries. This Brazilian proposal at the United Nations General Assembly revealed the importance that Brazil attached to newly independent African countries and South American neighbors. It is also observed that Brazilian foreign policy for the South Atlantic was mapped by geostrategic tones, since it ensured a multilateral cooperation space where the flow of energy products became vital to Brazilian interests. Thus, Brazil’s African policy is the result of internal possibilities combined with the challenges of the world system, leading to a permanent agenda for Brazilian foreign policy and more consistent and pragmatic decision-making, which has been maintained with moments of progress and setbacks since then.

References


ABSTRACT

The objective of the article is to analyze the ambiguity between the political discourse and the Brazilian external practice in relation to the Portuguese colonies in the period between the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation with Portugal, through the Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) and the Military Regime (total period 1953 to 1985). Methodologically, the research uses the quantitative-qualitative approach applying the hypothetical-deductive method, while it is classified as descriptive-explanatory regarding the objectives. In relation to the procedures, the bibliographic revision, the documentary analysis of primary, secondary and press sources was used. It is a generative question that Brazilian support for Portuguese colonialism established an initial blockade to consolidate its African policy, which will gradually form as the African agenda increases in the political and commercial agenda of Brazil in the 1970s. It is preliminarily identified that the Brazilian support to the Portuguese colonialism established an initial blockade to consolidate its African policy, that is being formed as the African agenda progressively increases in the external agenda of Brazil (political and commercial) in the decade 1970.

KEYWORDS

African policy of Brazil; Portuguese colonies; Decolonization.

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