MOZAMBIQUE IN THE INTEGRATION PROCESS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)

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Introduction

During the Mozambican national liberation struggle carried out by the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), this liberation movement established friendly relations with other movements that had been sheltered in Tanzania as a country where they prepared their fighting actions in their respective territories.

In this context, FRELIMO has established contacts with the African National Congress (ANC), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and others, even during the time of the national liberation struggle. It was during this struggle that FRELIMO established that Mozambique’s independence would only be effective if the other countries of the region were free from colonial domination and by racist regimes still in the region, notably in South Africa under the apartheid regime, in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) under a minority and illegal regime led by Ian Smith and still in Namibia, illegally occupied by South Africa.

With the independence of the British, French and Belgian colonies in West, Central, East and Southern Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the independent African countries united in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) established in 1963 through of its Liberation Committee, started channeling support to the liberation movements in order to enable the
liberation of the part of the continent that was still under colonial domination or minority and racist regimes.

In this context, leaders of the independent states in the vicinity of the conflict zone designed initiatives to channel the necessary support to the liberation movements that were fighting against the last bastions of colonialism in Africa, which were located in Southern Africa. The United Republic of Tanzania provided a space for the establishment of bases for political-military preparation for the liberation movements, and also contributed to the process of unification of nationalist movements and the creation of united fronts against the colonizers, as was the case with FRELIMO.

Other independent countries such as Botswana under the leadership of Sir Seretse Khama and Zambia led by Keneth Khaunda made concerted efforts to support the movements in struggle for their independence and formed the embryo of the Association of Frontline States, which came to be strengthened with the accession of Mozambique and Angola after achieving independence in 1975 under the leadership of Samora Machel and Agostinho Neto, respectively.

Therefore, starts a process of integration of the countries of Southern Africa, based on the quest for the independence of the countries of the region that resulted in the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, when the independent states of the region moved to a more advanced stage of coordination of its efforts not only in the area of defense and security but also in the economic area. It is within this context that we attempt to analyze the role of Mozambique in the region of Southern Africa, from the time of reaching its independence on June 25, 1975.

The Organization of States of the Front Line

In the early 1970s, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana joined in an informal alliance to support the anti-colonial struggle for independence in Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. This organization became known as Frontline States. After gaining their independence, Mozambique, Angola and later Zimbabwe joined this alliance.

The achievement of Mozambique’s independence in 1975 opened up the possibility of Mozambique’s participation in the efforts already being made by independent African countries to eradicate the last bastions of colonialism and domination by minority regimes in Africa. The Southern Africa region still has a large presence of minority regimes, notably in Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia, illegally occupied by South Africa.
Collaboration between the liberation movements in southern Africa had begun in Tanzania, and in the case of Zimbabwe the opening of the Tete Front in 1968 by FRELIMO had enabled the establishment of ZANU bases in the liberated areas of FRELIMO, in addition to strengthening collaboration between these liberation movements. Mozambique began to work more closely with those countries that had acted more directly in support of their liberation struggle in an informal alliance that was called Frontline States.

This alliance, consisting of Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania, was strengthened in the mid-1970s with the participation of Angola and Mozambique, former Portuguese colonies in Southern Africa. As Mozambique is the closest country to the theater of operations both in relation to Zimbabwe and in relation to South Africa, this country would play a crucial role in supporting the movements that fought for the liberation of those countries from the domination by minority regimes. It was in this context that Mozambique welcomed a large number of ZANU, ZAPU and ANC guerrillas and was deeply involved in finding a solution to the problems of those territories dominated by minority regimes.

According to Matusse (2009), the confrontational environment in Southern Africa contributed to the formation of the Front Line States, an informal forum that has been constituted by Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, as well by the liberation movements of the region, namely the ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) from South Africa, and SWAPO from Namibia. According to this author, the Lesotho Prime Minister, Leabua Jonathan, later forged ties with the ANC and refused to recognize the independence of the Transkei and other Bantustans, joining the Frontline States in 1977.

It was within the Frontline States that Mozambique played a major role in the process of liberation of the countries of the region that were still under the domination of minority regimes. Indeed, Frontline States played a decisive role in coordinating political, diplomatic and military actions for the liberation of Southern Africa. It was the Front-Line States who made efforts that led Zimbabwean nationalist leaders, Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU and Robert Mugabe of ZANU to come together in a united Front, the Patriotic Front, before Britain through diplomatic efforts for the independence of Zimbabwe.

The following pressure from the Frontline States along with Britain and the international community at large, talks were held to end the illegal regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia and the negotiations leading to Zimbabwe’s independence were opened and to the establishment of a regime of black majority, directed by the ZANU, Patriotic Front, of Robert Mugabe through the Agreement of Lancaster House, signed the December 21 of 1979.
Frontline States also played a decisive role in the liberation of Namibia and the overthrow of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Cooperation developed within the Frontline States served as a basis for the creation of Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980.

Soon after the creation of the Front Line Alliance, FRELIMO opened its 750-mile border with Rhodesia to the Zimbabwean insurgents, inviting ZANU and ZAPU to establish joint military bases. On the other hand, it transferred a substantial amount of modern weapons to ZANU-based forces in Mozambique, and resettled over 150,000 Zimbabwean refugees in refugee camps (Christie 1988).

According to Matusse (2009), for at least a year, Mozambican reconnaissance forces operated within Rhodesia with Zimbabwean guerrillas. The Mozambican government has also tried to fill the gap between the two nationalist movements by encouraging the formation of the Patriotic Front, a tentative alliance of ZANU and ZAPU. The informal Front Line States organization was to be dissolved on 30 June 1994 but its structure for defense and security matters, the Inter-State Committee for Defense and Security (CIEDS) remained in operation later been incorporated into SADCC.

Mozambique also belonged to the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), another regional organization established in 1982. This was a preferential trade area founded with the aim of promoting trade, customs policy and economic cooperation between the member countries of South and Southeast Africa. In addition to the SADC countries (except South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana and Democratic Republic of Congo), East African states: Ethiopia, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Comoros, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda belonged to the PTA, which in 1993 was renamed the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Mozambique withdrew from COMESA in 1997, and only belonged to SADC.

The Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)

According to Murapa (2002, 157) the transition period from the 1960s to the 1970s was marked by massive political upheaval on the African continent. It was the time of decolonization and independence, and this movement occurred relatively quickly in most of Africa. However, in southern

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3 Murapa, Rukudzo, Deputy Chancellor of Africa University (Zimbabwe), Consultant to UNDP, World Bank and other International Agencies. www.africa.edu.vc@syscom.co.zw.
Africa, where the presence of the colonizer was considerable, there was resistance to decolonization.

As a result of this resistance, the struggle for independence took on an entirely different strategy, from political negotiations to military confrontation in countries such as former Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique), Portuguese West Africa (Angola), South Africa and Namibia.

Consequently, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) decided to establish a Liberation Committee based in Dar-es-Salaam and led by Tanzania. In fulfilling its responsibilities as the basis of the Liberation Committee, Tanzania brought together states that became known as Frontline States (countries bordering on resistance) and took on the responsibility of mobilizing international support for liberation movements (FRELIMO, ZAPU, ZANU, MPLA, SWAPO, ANC and PAC).

With the independence of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, the leadership of the Frontline States felt the need to address economic issues in the region. Tanzania’s President Julius Nyerere convened a consultative meeting in Arusha, Tanzania in 1979 to discuss the idea of an economic alliance between the growing number of Frontline States to coordinate and harmonize their economic policies. The meeting was attended by the Front Line States as well as the leaders of the liberation movements of countries in the region that had not yet reached majority rule.

Indeed, according to Abrahamson and Nilsson (1994) with the independence of the Portuguese colonies in 1975, the political situation and the balance of power in Southern Africa have undergone a radical transformation. With the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, another “bumper-to-bumper” state disappeared that the white minority regime in Pretoria considered necessary for protection against black Africa.

Abrahamson and Nilsson (1994) further claim that, in the same year, Frontline States formed the SADCC with a view to changing the economic realities of the region. Political hopes of lessening dependence on the West in general and on South Africa in particular through greater regional cooperation would finally be realized. The background behind this was the efforts of the

4 Portuguese acronym, Movimento Popular para a Libertaçaão de Angola.
5 The following States were founding members of SADCC: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania. Namibia joined after its independence in 1990. The organization was formally changed to SADC under the Windhoek agreement in 1992. South Africa joined in 1994, Mauritius in 1995, the Republic of Seychelles and the DRC in 1997.
Frontline States to find an alternative to South African hegemony and to their dominance strategy presented in CONSAS.

The CONSAS project was reintroduced in May 1979 in an attempt by South Africa to establish its regional ownership. At the same time, however, the five Frontline States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) decided to initiate alternative regional cooperation under the name of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). This decision was followed by a new conference in Arusha, Tanzania, in July of the same year in which several potential donors were invited.

However, as Abrahamson and Nilsson (1994) found, for both organizations (CONSAS and SADCC) to succeed, independent Zimbabwe participation was needed. As well as being the most developed country in Southern Africa after South Africa, Zimbabwe was located in the middle of the region and was therefore a major transit country for all intercontinental transport.

Thus, South Africans had hoped until the end that independent Zimbabwe would be led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who had declared support for CONSAS, while the Frontline countries, in their struggle against the white minority regime in South Africa, were dependent on the support of the patriotic front, which was a political alliance between ZANU and ZAPU. As ZANU won the 1980 elections, Zimbabwe’s entry into the SADCC front-line countries could be formally established in April 1980, and the conditions for the existence of CONSAS were completely destroyed, at least for the time being (Abrahamson and Nilsson 1994, 186).

In order to achieve national priorities through regional action, each Member State has assumed responsibility for coordinating one or more sectors. This involved proposing policies, strategies and priorities for the sector and implementing projects for inclusion in the sector program, monitoring their progress and reporting to the Ministerial Council.
Table 1 – Distribution of Sectors of Activities by SADCC Member States in 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Energy Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Agricultural research, animal production and animal disease control;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Environment, land and water management;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Culture, information, sports, Committee on Transport and Communications;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Fisheries, forestry and wildlife;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Development of human resources;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Industry and Commerce;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Employment, labor and mining;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Agricultural production, food, agricultural and natural resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nsekela (1981, ix)

The Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) emerged at the meeting held in Arusha in 1979, followed by a conference held in Lusaka (1980). According to Nsekela (1981), at the end of the Lusaka Conference, the leaders of nine independent Southern African states issued a statement summarizing their discussions and setting out the four development goals they identified and pledged to pursue through coordinated actions, including:

a) the reduction of economic dependence, particularly but not only, in relation to South Africa;

b) strengthening links to create genuine and equitable regional integration;

c) mobilizing resources to promote the implementation of national, inter-state and regional policies;

d) concerted actions to ensure international cooperation within the instruments of economic liberation strategies.

It should be noted that the emergence of the SADCC relied heavily on international donors because, as Abrahamson and Nilsson (1994) argue, the
prevailing international political economy was favorable. For these authors, the Western world analyzed the regional development in Southern Africa and its conflicts in a west/east perspective and through a great support to the organization it was wanted to conserve the political, economic and military influence in the region.\(^6\)

The enthusiasm for success in the political cooperation between Frontline States that led to the intensification of ZANU’s fight and eminent victory in Zimbabwe led the leaders of Frontline States to believe that a similar coordination dynamic would be achievable on the economic front (Nsekela 1981; Matusse 2009). For SADCC leaders, SADCC has acquired a particularly important role in attracting international support and a financial source for a number of urgent national development projects (Abrahamson and Nilsson 1994).

For Abrahamson and Nilsson (1994), the Nordic countries played a very important role in financing the SADC investment program. According to these authors, in the late 1980s they accounted for about 1/4 of total international support to SADCC. This support was seen as a condition to reduce the dependence of the Frontline countries on South Africa by the Nordic countries as well as by most Western European countries.

Indeed, according to these authors, funding from the Nordic countries and from the European Economic Community (EEC) enabled the implementation of several research projects and seminars in SADCC. This funding was primarily targeted at the transport and communications sector, which was considered very important for SADCC because of the positive influence that the reconstruction and reinforcement of transport

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6 According to Abrahamson and Nilsson (1994, 186) there are different opinions about the background to the SADCC constitution: Some observers argue that it was in fact the Western world that took the initiative to form the SADCC by, colonial system of transport, there are stronger links between the countries of the Front Line and the Western world, thereby preventing an increase in Soviet influence in the region. One justification for this interpretation is that the entire international financing of SADCC is done by the Western world. The Soviet Union never contributed to the organization’s funding. Other observers go even further and emphasize the interest of the Western world and South Africa to expand the organization so that it will include not only the more radical Frontline States but also countries that have traditionally been more favorable to cooperation, such as Malawi, for example, in order to reduce SADCC’s foreign policy profile. These authors refer us, among others, to Leys, Roger & Tostensen, Arne in “Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: The SADCC”, Review of African Political Economy 23: 52-82. They also refer to Amin, Samir, Chitala, Derrick & Mandza, Ibo, “SADCC-Prospects for Disengagement and Development in Southern Africa”, Zed, London, 1987.
infrastructure has on the internal member countries’ dependence on the South African transport system.

In relation to Mozambique, there was a need to calculate the future possibilities to increase foreign exchange earnings resulting from the transport operations that were expected to be the result of the investments made. It should also be noted that during the colonial period considerable transport infrastructures were established in Mozambique to link the mines and plantations of inland countries with the Indian Ocean.

In this context, important international ports were built in Maputo, Beira and Nacala with the respective railways in the west-east direction. Through these infrastructures, two-thirds of Rhodesia’s trade went through Mozambique during the 1950s and 1960s, and about one-third of Mozambique’s total foreign currency revenue originated from the use of the country’s traffic lanes. (Nelson and Nilsson 1994).

For Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Zambia and Malawi, the natural transport routes to the world market passed through Beira and Nacala. Meanwhile, Mozambique’s accession to the UN sanctions against South Rhodesia, thus closing its border with this country considerably reduced the flow of goods through Beira, as Rhodesia began to transport its goods through the South African ports.

Nevertheless, after the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the border was opened and the traditional transport routes through Mozambique would resume their important role and a program of total reconstruction of the transport infrastructure began within SADCC. Mozambique thus resumed its traditional role in regional transport and its transport system has gained greater significance for SADCC member countries.

It was in this context that, within the framework of sectoral coordination of activities at SADCC, Mozambique was primarily responsible for identifying, implementing and coordinating transport programs. A special and regional coordinating commission was created for this purpose, the Southern Africa Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) whose secretariat was in Maputo.

According to Abrahamson and Nilsson (1994), during the 1980s around 200 different projects in the region were identified in the amount of about 6 billion American Dollars and funding was secured for 4 billion dollars. Of this amount, about 2.5 billion were destined to the reconstruction of ports and railways of the region, with the Mozambican part of around one billion dollars.
However, the SATCC investment program for Mozambique was based exclusively on the need to rebuild and equip the three transportation corridors that, in colonial times, gave Mozambique considerable revenues in foreign currency. No part of this investment program covered the reconstruction of the road network linking those transport corridors with other parts of the country. No investment plans have ever been drawn up to strengthen the conditions for increased intra-regional trade through the expansion of transport infrastructure between the different member countries (Abrahamson and Nilsson 1994).

According to these authors, despite the effort undertaken at SADCC level to reduce member states’ dependence on both the West and South Africa, it grew especially during the 1980s. The region’s internal trade is very low. On the other hand, during the same period the trade of SADCC member countries with South Africa increased, especially during the last years (Abrahamson and Nilsson 1994).

The lack of complementarity between the economies of the SADC States is considered as the justification for this situation, since trade in the countries consists essentially of agricultural products and raw materials, and the demand for them is rather limited in the region. Their imports consist of fuels, agricultural inputs, capital goods and consumer goods, which are manufactured in very small quantities by the SADCC member states.

For Abrahamson and Nilsson (1994), the increase in regional trade has also not been stimulated by government initiatives. Very few investments were made to modify the colonial production structures which were mainly aimed at exploitation according to the needs of the colonial powers. On the contrary, the macroeconomic imbalances of member countries with large balance of payments deficits and their debts have increased the significance of export earnings from traditional production structures.

Therefore, even with the creation of SADCC, the dependence of the countries of the region on South Africa has continued. The low intraregional trade and the lack of complementarity between the economies of the countries of the region are factors that contributed greatly to this failure. It should be noted that most SADCC member countries are specialized in the production of primary products (mainly mineral and agricultural products), not having the capacity to offer the manufactured products needed to increase intraregional trade.

It should be noted, however, that the leaders of the region’s nine independent states have had to overcome difficulties related to national economic interests and differences of opinion in favor of the creation of
SADCC. The dependency situation of Southern African States during the period of the apartheid regime in South Africa can be characterized as described by Nsekela (1981, ix)

Southern African States needed to broaden their freedom of choice because there was a need to choose transport routes and communication channels, energy sources, markets and suppliers, investment sources and business partnerships; the Southern African States needed to develop programs to reduce reliance on one side and increase the options for national economies and governments. This was a priority and urgent need in Southern Africa where fragmentation of economies and their forced integration into the Republic of South Africa had created excessive national and regional dependence, which it was now intended to reduce with the creation of SADCC.

It should be noted, however, that the Southern African states had initiated coordination actions for their development even before the creation of the SADCC. According to Nsekela (1981), following the unilateral (illegal) declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia in 1965, Zambia faced a transport crisis. As a result, Zambia’s joint effort with Tanzania, aided by a wide range of external partners including China, the World Bank, Italy and the United States of America, has led the region to have nowadays from the road from Lusaka to Dar-es-Salaam, the Zambia-Tanzania Road Service Company, the Tanzania pipeline, the Tanzania-Zambia Railways (TAZARA) railway line, and Zambian support for the expansion of port facilities in Dar-es-Salaam and Mtwara, as well as Mtwara Airport.

Angola and Zambia worked together on rehabilitation plans for the Benguela Railway Line; Zambia and Botswana cooperated to ensure a land route between the two countries that did not cross the former Southern Rhodesia. Mozambique coordinated the development of national transport and route use with Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia (Nsekela 1981).

It is worth emphasizing, however, that according to Nsekela (1981) the coordination of activities between the States of the Southern African region prior to the creation of the SADCC was manifested essentially bilaterally and had numerous difficulties stemming from the war against the minority regimes of South Africa. South and Southern Rhodesia and in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique.

It is important to mention, as Nsekela (1981) points out, that when SADCC was created, the need for increased intraregional trade was reaffirmed, with models that could lead to increasing gaps between strong and weak
states that could undermine mutual trust and lead to the dissolution of the organization. According to this author, there was a belief in the possibility of increased intra-regional trade, as many of these countries had already experimented with the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyassaland, the East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Customs Union (SACU) which, although organizations created by the colonial powers, had contributed to the creation of trade in the region.

It should also be noted that identifying the need for infrastructure development as a key area for the region’s development remains a key strategy in Mozambique’s contemporary participation in the region. As Lhalbahadur and Otto (2013) note, in the immediate postwar era, Mozambique’s regional participation enabled it to provide its neighbors with competitively priced alternative access to ports. With one of the lowest cross-border trade costs in the region, at 60% of the average cost for imports and exports in sub-Saharan Africa, Mozambique has proven to be a cost-effective option for many of its neighbors including South Africa.

The establishment of development corridors and spatial development initiatives has encouraged cross-border trade and is promoting local agriculture, in what is considered as a subsidiary feature of Mozambique’s involvement with other countries in the region.

**Consequences of the creation of SADCC for Mozambique**

An analysis of the history of the Southern African region is relevant to understanding the current dynamics of regional integration, as well as to devising any regional economic development strategies and deepening political cooperation among the States of the Southern African region. The creation of SADCC in 1980 has brought numerous economic and political consequences, the consequences of which continue to be felt both within States and in relations between States.

The dependence on South Africa and the accumulation of resources that this country had as a result of the exploitation of the advantages that had been attributed with the incorporation of the other States of the region, together with the innumerable natural resources that this State possesses, made it in the Most developed state in the region. As Abrahamson and Nilsson (1994, 92) argue, South Africa interpreted Zimbabwe’s independence and the formation of SADCC as a threat to the country’s ability to maintain its apartheid system. Increased regional co-operation between Frontline States
would lessen their dependence on South Africa and this was against South African political interests. Thus, the threat of international sanctions against South Africa could be rejected by the apartheid regime on the grounds that such sanctions would primarily affect the supply of neighboring countries.

As a result, actions against South African destabilization took place against the neighboring states, with the main targets being the transport infrastructure of these countries. Military actions have affected Angola and Mozambique in a particularly serious way, although Zimbabwe and Botswana have also suffered destabilization. Analyzing the situation in Mozambique during the ensuing and systematic destabilization process carried out by South Africa under apartheid, Stephens (1991) apud Abrahamson and Nilsson (1994, 193) states that:

During the period between 1982 and 1989, 308 locomotives, 662 carriages, 35 bridges and 244 km of railway line were destroyed in Mozambique. The cost in foreign currency of destroyed material is estimated to be approximately 259 Million US Dollars, in addition to unrealized freight revenues that were lost. These destruction actions aimed at creating the discredit of the users of the Mozambican transport and communications system by the exporters / importers in the region. On the other hand, South African state-owned companies have used an unusually aggressive trading strategy to persuade exporters and importers in neighboring countries to use the South African transport network by allocating considerable freight subsidies to customers which, despite the transport distance being choose to ship their cargo through South Africa.

This created a distortion of trade in the region, which added to the historically created traditional distortions, which placed South Africa’s neighbors as sources of supply in the country for labor and markets for the generation of employment and income for its economy, as well as the destruction of the human and material resources necessary for the construction of the states of the region, especially Angola and Mozambique.

According to Abrahamson and Nilsson (1994), South African destabilization was facilitated because its political objective of preventing neighboring countries from using the Mozambican transport network coincided with the corresponding commercial interests of the region’s transport buyers. Often, they themselves preferred to ship their cargo through the South African transport system because of the structural transformation that the region’s transport market suffered during the 1980s, essentially based on the introduction of containers into the freight system.
This structural transformation has resulted in cheaper and more efficient transportation, but also a growing concentration of activities in shipping agents and more efficient shipping companies. Thus, the competition situation in the ports was strengthened and many had to abandon this activity when they were not able to attract the cargo flow (Abrahamson and Nilsson 1994).

As far as Mozambique is concerned, the destabilization actions carried out by the South African defense forces were directed mainly at the transport and communications systems, reaching railroads, roads, bridges, means of transport and other projects vital to the development of the country. In this way, the destabilizing actions of the apartheid regime have increased the destruction of Mozambique, initiated by the Rhodesian regime due to the unconditional support that this country gave to the Zimbabwean liberation movements.

Indeed, Mozambique’s accession to the UN sanctions against the Rhodesian regime, which led to the closure of the border with that country in 1976, contributed to the reduction of international traffic of goods, one of the main sources of foreign currency: “The losses resulting from the sanctions and aggressions of Rhodesia were estimated by the Government at about 16,500,000 contos from 1976 to 1980” (Mosca 2005, 146). In addition, this author states that:

Internationalism and solidarity with the struggles against the colonial rules (Zimbabwe) and occupation (Namibia) and apartheid situations represented, for Mozambique, high economic and human costs: for example, South Africa abruptly reduced economic relations with this country, with a double strategy: a) mechanization of mining production and reinforcement of the recruitment of labor in other countries of the region; b) implementation of aggressive trade policies so that the countries of Southern Africa diverted flows of goods that had previously been disposed of through the ports of Mozambique (Mosca 2005, 146).

It can therefore be seen that the destabilization of the economies of the countries of southern Africa by the minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa has greatly contributed to the continued dependence of these countries on South Africa and the countries of Europe West. Studies by Stephens (1986) and Macintosh (1986) cited Fly (2005) on transport strategies in southern Africa suggest some causes that contributed to that Mozambique had lost its importance in the transport system of the region, can be highlighted:
a) the war that had as one of the objectives to prevent the flows through Mozambique in the framework of the strategy of destabilization, due to the economic importance that they represented in the revenues in foreign currency;

b) South Africa has developed a set of commercial actions with the firm intention of diverting traffic from Mozambique, such as not complying with tariff agreements with the Mozambique Railways and subsidizing the transportation of some products from the region;

c) the technological evolution of container transport has not been accompanied by Mozambique causing it to lose competitiveness due to the advantages for both cargo owners and shipping companies;

d) the containerization of transport has led to the formation of monopolies in the brokerage firms and the connections of South African capital and Southern Rhodesia, which remained after Zimbabwe’s independence, hampering attempts by the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) to reduce dependence on South Africa.

The economic and military destabilization of South Africa in the independent states of the region thus exacerbated the economic distortions inherited from the colonial period and contributed to the minimization of the efforts made by SADCC to minimize the efforts made by SADCC to reduce its dependence on that apartheid-dominated state.

Like Mozambique, Angola was particularly affected by the destabilization of South Africa in an attempt to cut off the support that this country gave to SWAPO fighting for Namibia’s independence, but also because of the need to put a favorable government in that country. This would allow South Africa to have access to the many mineral resources (mainly oil) that South Africa might need if international sanctions were effective and lasting. Thus, invoking also the “communist threat” represented by the MPLA and its leader Agostinho Neto, a major destabilizing offensive was launched in that southern African country, still on the eve of its independence.

Illustrating the effects of destabilization and based on data provided by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Davies (1990) presents estimates indicating that at least 1.3 million Angolans and Mozambicans died between 1980 and 1988 as a result direct or indirect wars of destabilization moved by Pretoria. The losses suffered by the economies of the SADCC
member states in the same period were estimated at US $ 60.5 billion, more than triple the joint foreign debt of the nine countries of this organization.

Without intending to analyze in depth the process of destabilization of Angola by South Africa, whose proportions were greater than those in the other countries of the region, it is pertinent to affirm that the invasion of that country by South Africa shortly before the proclamation of independence brought a new momentum to the situation of this region. Indeed, in response to this invasion, Cuba sent thousands of soldiers from October 1975, which ensured that when independence was formally declared in November 1975, the MPLA was in control of the capital where the “People’s Republic” was proclaimed and its leader Agostinho Neto as President.

From then on, Angola became the scene of a confrontation that went from the regional scope to the context of the Cold War, with the involvement of several external actors, including the Soviet Union and the United States. However, over the course of a few months, Cubans ensured control throughout the country. US support for UNITA came to a halt following the Clark Amendment that barred support for any of the Angolan factions (a manifestation of the post-Vietnam attitude at that time in the US). This left South African forces alone and forced the South African government to withdraw its forces beyond the Namibian border in April 1976 (Davies 1990).

As Rothchild (1997) argues, the military challenge posed by internal and external antagonists to the Angolan Government between 1976 and 1980 has become impossible to manage. A low intensity conflict began to see an escalation from 1981 when South Africa launched Operation Protea, the largest incursion of its forces into the Cunene Province.

However, as Davies (1990) argues in the second quarter of 1988, there were some alterations and changes in the content of South African regional policy that did not represent a change in intentions on the part of decision-makers but were the result of profound changes in the objective circumstances in which the decisions were taken. However, by that time there was still a great deal of enthusiasm from South Africa to continue the aggressions in Mozambique and Zimbabwe as well.

Yet, according to Davies (1990), the battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1988 and the confrontation in the Calueque dam represented a turning point in two aspects: First, they indicate an important change in the strategic balance of the forces present. Air superiority on the part of the Angolan armed forces supported by the Cuban forces undermined the South African pretensions of military invincibility in the region and showed the capacity of the Popular

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7 Portuguese acronym, União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola.
Liberation Forces of Angola (FAPLA\(^8\)) to maintain the City and the Airport of Cuito Cuanavale, as strong opponents in their own territory.

Second, the high costs of the war had contributed to a sense of worthless war within the MPLA regime and the direct and indirect actors. The losses of the South African Defense Forces (SADF) on airplanes and men (including hundreds of black soldiers and at least sixty white soldiers) brought new skepticism and sensitivity in civil circles about the victims and financial costs of the war.

Under these circumstances, according to Davies (1990) at the same time as the battles of Cuito Cuanavale undoubtedly produced the most decisive of the emerging “realities” at the regional level, developments in the other sources of regional destabilization also had a significant impact. In the case of the Mozambican rebels, Pretória’s well-known involvement with RENAMO\(^9\) began to threaten to increase its international isolation. On the other hand, the extreme brutality of RENAMO’s actions illustrated by the widely publicized massacres of Homoine, Manjacaze and Taninga/Maluana prevented any international support that the rebels might otherwise have mobilized.

For Davies (1990), although the technical basis of the war is undoubtedly partly stemming from the “Reagan doctrine,” the brutality of RENAMO assaults in the context of the active diplomacy of the Mozambican government has even led the US administration to distance itself from them. At an emergency donor conference held in Maputo in April 1988, Deputy State Secretary Roy Stacy accused RENAMO of provoking one of the most brutal holocausts against simple humans since World War II.

According to Davies (1990), a report presented by the US State Department estimated that the MNR had been responsible for the deaths of at least 100,000 civilians. This report, written by Robert Gersony, was based on interviews with two hundred informants in Mozambique and neighboring countries. Gersony’s informants said they themselves had witnessed six hundred shootings, knives, axes, bayonets, life burns, beating, suffocation, starvation, and drowning.

On the other hand, attacks against anti-apartheid activists were often carried out in “hit and miss” incursions in the neighboring countries of South Africa as happened in Bulawayo in January 1988 and in Botswana where a raid failed but it has wounded a police officer who helped to have South Africa

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8 Portuguese acronym, Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola.
9 Portuguese acronym, Resistência Nacional Moçambicana.
declared a “terrorist state” in the United States. Similar situations occurred in Mozambique with lightning attacks in areas suspected of harboring ANC militants, as occurred in Matola on 30 January 1981 (Davies 1990).

However, the collapse of the “total strategy” adopted by the Botha regime when it came to power in 1978 was implicitly recognized by state strategists during the period of popular action escalation between September 1984 and June 1986. The most direct and immediate response of the regime to the deepening of the crisis in this period was the intensification of the repression under the state of emergency imposed in 1986 at the national level. However, deep crises have given rise to a significant reformulation of the political component of state strategy within the institutions of the National Security System.

Shortly afterwards FW De Klerk’s rise to the leadership of the National Party in power in South Africa and then to the leadership of the regime in which he appeared as the representative of a bloc of forces (standing out among them the domestic monopoly capital) giving priority to reducing international isolation and seeking “a political solution” to the apartheid crises. According to Davies (1990), the forces grouped around De Klerk seemed to have recognized that these objectives would not be achieved without credible constitutional negotiations, involving not only existing allies but also the well-known representatives of the oppressed majority, including the ANC.

In this context, the De Klerk regime made important strategic changes in the conduct not only of its domestic policy but also of the regional level. This was evident in the measures announced on February 2, 1990 – the lifting of the ban on the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and other anti-apartheid organizations followed by liberation, on February 11, by Nelson Mandela. These concessions, although partial, were significant in relation to the calls for the creation of a climate conducive to negotiations through the normalization of political life and represented a great departure from the rigidly followed positions in the Botha regime.

The most significant steps were taken, which culminated in the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the harbinger of a democratically elected majority regime in that country. This led to the end of another backward regime which, since the late 1940s, had been a source of political and economic instability in the southern African region, in addition to the inhuman and cruel treatment of the black majority and other groups minorities in South Africa. The prospects of a democratic and multiracial South Africa’s participation in regional integration projects and in the concert of nations were opened.
It is also necessary to mention that the civil war that lashed sixteen years for Mozambique came to an end with the celebration of the General Peace Agreement signed in Rome, Italy, on October 4 by the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO. A new stage was thus opened for the political and economic development of Mozambique, which held its first democratic and multi-party elections in 1994.

The Mozambican Government, legitimized by universal, direct and secret suffrage, was thus able to concentrate on the definition of policies and strategies aimed at promoting the economic and social development of this country and to promote its full insertion in the region and in the world. In Angola, however, the conflict took on a number of dimensions and continued even after the end of the Cold War in a miscellany of problems ranging from ethnicity, foreign greed in relation to the innumerable resources existing in the country, to the exacerbated ambition of power evidenced by the representative elites of different socio-cultural spaces in Angola.

The Angolan conflict would only end with the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi on February 22, 2002, thus opening the way for Angola’s economic and social development and its full participation in the process of regional integration and their insertion in the international community.

The creation of SADC and the role of Mozambique in this Organization

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was created on August 17, 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia, when the Declaration and Constitutive Treaty were signed at the Summit of Heads of State and Government. In this way, SADCC was transformed into SADC. In addition to the nine founding states of SADCC, after gaining independence, Namibia joined SADC in 1990. With the end of the apartheid regime, South Africa joined in 1994, Mauritius in 1995, the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997, the Seychelles in 2000 and the island of Madagascar\textsuperscript{10} in 2005.

\textsuperscript{10} Due to the instability in Madagascar since 2009, Madagascar has been suspended from membership of SADC. Indeed, in 2009 a series of anti-government demonstrations culminated in the military involvement and seizure of power by opposition leader Andry Rajoelina, driving President Marc Ravalomanana out of the supreme state leadership. This action constituted an unconstitutional act and an attack on the democratic values defended by SADC, which led this Organization to suspend this country as a member. However, once constitutional legality was restored, Madagascar was reinstated as a full member in 2014.
After long years of civil war following the proclamation of Mozambique’s independence in 1975, the country stood out in its strategic role in the fight against minority regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and was therefore targeted of an ongoing process of political, military and economic destabilization. He was a member of the Informal Organization of Frontline States since his independence, being a founding member of SADCC in 1980 and later in SADC in 1992.

The reforms introduced in the late 1980s to accommodate the market economy and the multiparty democracy system occurred simultaneously with the country’s active participation in the process of regional integration in SADC. Thus, the regional integration of Mozambique began to occur simultaneously with the implementation of structural adjustment measures initiated with the country’s accession to the international financial institutions in 1984 and the implementation of the structural adjustment program called the Economic Rehabilitation Program (PRE) in 1987 which evolved into Economic and Social Rehabilitation Programs (PRES) in 1990.

The economy of Mozambique in the colonial period was characterized by its long-term connection to the economy of the Southern Africa region as a service provider because of its strategic location. Relations between Mozambique and South Africa date from the colonial period and were characterized by labor migration to the gold, diamond and coal mines, supply of electricity from the Cahora Bassa dam, use of the ports of Maputo, Beira and Nacala by the countries of the interior. Thus, Mozambique played an important role in providing services to South Africa and the former British colonies of Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This role was played thanks to the complex hinterland-oriented communications and transport infrastructure and its strong links with South Africa.

Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (AGP11), which ended a long civil war in the context of political, economic and military destabilization by the South African apartheid regime and Renamo, a process of democratization and national reconciliation took place, with regular elections taking place and consolidating democratic institutions.

In the economic sphere, economic stability resulted from the implementation of capital-intensive projects such as the “mega-projects” of the Aluminum plant (MOZAL), natural gas exploration by SASOL, and projects in Tete coal mines through which mobilized a large influx of foreign capital. In this way, Mozambique maintained macroeconomic growth rates between 7 and 10%, as well as levels of inflation under control.

11 Portuguese acronym, Acordo Geral de Paz.
In the context of its participation in the regional integration process, Mozambique joined the SADC Trade Protocol (PC-SADC) in 1999 and implemented it as of September 2001. Similar to the other States that acceded to the protocol, Mozambique submitted to the Secretariat SADC’s offer to reduce tariffs. According to MIC (2005) PC-SADC is one of the main instruments that guide the process of regional integration in the commercial area.

This protocol was signed in August 1996 by eleven SADC member states, namely: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Angola subscribed to the commercial protocol in 2003 and began to prepare its tariff reduction offer. Madagascar acceded to the Protocol in 2005 and presented its tariff reduction offer in 2006, as well as the instrument for initiating implementation. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is not a signatory to the SADC-PC.

The PC-SADC entered into force on January 25, 2000 and is being implemented since January 2001 by the eleven countries mentioned above and had the purpose of creating a Free Trade Area in 2008. The objectives of this protocol were the following:

a) promote the liberalization of intra-regional trade in goods and services on the basis of fair, balanced and mutually beneficial trade agreements, supplemented by protocols in other areas;
b) ensure effective production within SADC, reflecting the current and potential comparative advantages of its Members;
c) contribute to the improvement of an environment conducive to national, cross-border and foreign investment;
d) increase economic development, diversification and industrialization of the region;
e) establish a Free Trade Area (FTA) in the SADC region (MIC 2005).

The process of economic integration in SADC is based on the principle of asymmetry, which is the differential treatment of countries according to their level of development. In the specific case of SADC this aims to ensure the interests of the least developed countries. Thus, it is assumed from the outset that more developed countries should disarm their tariffs sooner and more rapidly than developing countries and these, in turn, sooner and more rapidly than the least developed countries.
It should be noted that, according to MIC (2005), Mozambique was one of the first States to enact all the necessary instruments for the implementation of the SADC-PC, having ratified it in December 1999 and started its implementation in January 2001. Regulations on rules of origin and their certification and implementation mechanisms were published in the Boletim da República in October 2001, with the fact that it was the only country in the region that published in its entire disarmament calendar tariff.

Like all other countries in the region (except South Africa), Mozambique presented two offers of tariff reduction, namely a basic offer, addressed to South Africa, as a proposal for a more protectionist tariff disarmament. The other tariff reduction offer was called a differentiated offer to other member countries (except South Africa), taking into account the asymmetry in trade liberalization under the SADC-PC.

Mozambique was considered one of the most enthusiastic countries in the implementation of the SADC-PC, having reached high levels of market opening under the SADC-PC. These levels of opening the domestic market to South Africa in the period up to the end of 2007 were around 28.10% (remaining protected at about 71.9%), 92.5% in the period from 2008 to the end (about 7.5% protected), and 99.57% from 2015 onwards (keeping only 0.43% protected) (MIC 2005).

In relation to the other countries in the region (without South Africa), the opening levels of the Mozambican market under the SADC-CP were 30.4% by the end of 2007 (remaining protected at 69.96%), around 93.93% in the period from 2008 to the end of 2014 (remaining protected at around 6.07%) and from about 2015 onwards (MIC 2005).

The economic impact of Mozambique’s accession to the SADC-CP consisted in the emergence of new economic ventures with capital in the region, with great weight in the national production, of which: A Sasol (50% South African capital) Pande natural gas exported to South Africa; Mozal (15% South African capital), focused on the production of aluminum; The heavy sands of Chibuto (with part of South African capital).

There were also acquisitions of Mozambican companies that were paralyzed, of which the most noteworthy were: The metallurgical company CIFEL; the Industrial Company of Matola, dedicated to the production of pasta, crackers, milling; the companies Cervejas de Moçambique and the soft drink factory Coca-Cola; the textile company Texmoque and the sugar mills.

In the area of services, the Port of Maputo was granted. In the area of commerce, large supermarkets were opened by South African capitals, namely Shoprite, Game and Mica, as well as the establishment of Banco
Austral and Standard Bank. These investments have an influence on the creation of an environment conducive to regional integration, since they contribute to the utilization of existing potentialities in the country and also to the qualification and capitalization of small and medium companies that provide services and products to established enterprises. Thus, South Africa has become Mozambique’s largest investment partner in the Southern Africa region.

It should be noted that the concept of integration for development adopted in SADC, which consists of sectoral and infrastructure integration, has historical roots since the countries of this region generally benefited from systems and relations established by the colonial powers as well as the regime of apartheid in South Africa, such as road and rail systems (Mair 2001).

Natural resources such as water and biodiversity established beyond conventional borders facilitate regional integration by enabling neighboring countries to share their benefits. Therefore, water, energy, transport systems and biodiversity are factors that facilitate integration in the SADC region. Like Angola, Mozambique is a country with a vast hydrographic network sharing the main river basins with the other countries of the region, namely in the Rovuma, Zambezi, Limpopo, Incomati and Maputo rivers. It also shares Lake Niassa on the northwest border with Tanzania, and Malawi.

The importance of water resources for the integration and development of the region is recognized by the member states. Therefore, in 1995 the region adopted the Protocol on Shared Water Systems, revised in 2003, to regulate the management and use of scarce regional water resources given its importance in economic development, the environment, food security and poverty alleviation (Erasmus 2003).

In the energy sector, Mozambique also has a great potential, due mainly to the existence of numerous water resources, coal, natural gas, biomass and high levels of solar energy. The Cahora Bassa dam is the main source of hydroelectric power, whose potential is estimated at 14,000 Megawatts, of which only 2,075 are currently being explored (EIA 2005).

The Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric Power Plant supplies energy for domestic consumption and supply to South Africa and Zimbabwe. In 2003, Mozambique successfully competed for the supply of energy to Malawi for 20 years from 2004 with supply of over 300 MW from Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric Power Plant in Songo (EIA 2005).

In the area of energy, SADC has approved an Energy Protocol which came into force in 1998 to regulate the management and use of energy in the region. SADC Power Pool plays a key role in this area, with South African...
energy company ESCOM initiating penetration in each neighboring country to maximize energy use (EIA 2005).

A 536-mile gas pipeline was installed in February 2004, supplying natural gas from the Temane fields in Mozambique to Secunda in South Africa. The project, installed by SAZOL, establishes the integration between Mozambique and South Africa and corresponds to 1.2 billion dollars.

The establishment of development corridors linking the country with neighboring countries in the framework of the Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) concept aims to increase intra-regional trade, creating complementarities within the country’s economic strategies and strengthening the level of integration regional.

It should be noted in this regard that Mozambique has three main corridors. The Nacala Development Corridor, in the northern Nampula Province, established to link Mozambique to the inland countries of Malawi and Zambia. This corridor was privatized in 2000 and is currently at an advanced stage of development with the acquisition of new locomotives and restoration of the railway line that already allows the connection between Nampula and Lichinga, capital of Niassa province.

The Beira Development Corridor is another corridor inserted in these initiatives, having two lines: The Machipanda line, linking the Port of Beira to Zimbabwe, consisting of about 3000 kilometers of road, railway line and an oil pipeline; The other is the Sena line, linking Beira to the Moatize coal mines in Tete and Malawi, with about 600 km. The updating of the infrastructure rehabilitation and procurement project for locomotives and other inputs was partially financed by the World Bank (Muagerene 2005).

The Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) was the first of the SDIs to be implemented in 1995 and links South Africa’s Gauteng Province to Maputo port in Mozambique. The corridor system includes the motorway, the railway line, the border post and the Port of Maputo. From 2004 the MDC includes a gas pipeline and has an industrial free zone where the megaprojects of MOZAL and SAZOL are located. As of 2005, visa requirements were abolished to facilitate the process of regional integration (TRALAC 2005).

Developments along the corridor focused on the rehabilitation and modernization of traditional trade and transport links as a basis for comprehensive economic development. The road, railways and infrastructure and operation of the port were concessioned in Mozambique. According to SADC Hoje (2006), private sector participation plays an important role in the corridor, particularly in the investment in the construction of a toll road.
linking Withbank in South Africa to Maputo (the toll road N4) and operation of railways and ports in Mozambique.

Other large private sector investments located along this corridor include the Mozambican aluminum plant (MOZAL), the Maputo iron and steel plant, the Beluluane Industrial Park and several projects in the natural gas industry. It is estimated that developments in the corridor have already created some 15,000 jobs (SADC Hoje 2006).

According to Lhalbahadur and Otto (2013), the Maputo Corridor Logistics Initiative (MCLI) was launched in 2004 as a public-private partnership to create greater awareness and use of the corridor. For these authors, MCLI has emerged as one of the most vibrant inclusive institutions led by the private sector in Southern Africa and manages the port infrastructure in Maputo. The authors conclude that this is a significant example of cooperation between Mozambique and South Africa, particularly in economic development and integration.

For Lhalbahadur and Otto (2013), the Mtwara Development Corridor involves the territories of Malawi, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. The Corridor is traversed from the port of Mtwara in the east to Mbamba Bay to the west on Lake Malawi. Transport projects include the expansion and modernization of the port of Mtwara, the ports of Mbamba Bay and Manda, both situated on Lake Niassa. Other projects include the modernization of Mtwara Airport and various road and railway infrastructures.

The Unit Bridge inaugurated in May 2010 by the Mozambican Heads of State of Tanzania and going through Rovuma, will significantly contribute to improving the connectivity of the road network in the region. Also important are the Mchuchuma Thermal Power Station, the Mtwara-Mbamba Bay Petroleum Viaduct and the Songo Gas Project (SADC Hoje, 2006). According to official sources, the road linking Tanzania to the Unity Bridge is already paved and, on the Mozambican side, it is said that the necessary resources have already been made available for the asphalting of the road (Lalbahadur and Otto 2013).

Mozambique also has great potential in the area of tourism, associated with transboundary fauna including national parks and game reserves, as well as innumerable beaches of regional and international renown. To this end, the country signed important regional agreements, the first of which was an International Agreement on the Transfrontier Park of the Greater Limpopo, signed with South Africa and Zimbabwe in November 2000. Another agreement with similar dimensions is Protocol Between Mozambique,
South Africa and Swaziland for the Libombos Transboundary Conservation Area, which was signed in June 2000. These initiatives are considered as having the potential to promote tourism as well as convergence in the region (Muagerene 2005).

As far as political development is concerned, Mozambique is considered a young democracy in the same way as other SADC countries. The country adopted the democratic system in 1990 and made progress in establishing democratic institutions and consolidating the regularity of democratic elections since 1994. The need for improvements in judicial reform as well as respect for the rule of law to meet the needs introduced through the process of economic reforms have been identified as the main constraints of the process.

However, Mozambique has great potential to play an important role in regional integration and to benefit from the opportunities that this process offers for its economic and social development. The advantages resulting from its geographic location and natural resource endowment contribute to the acquisition of benefits as a result of its involvement in the integration process in Southern Africa.

Important actions have been taken in the area of diplomacy by Mozambican leaders such as the mediation of the political conflict in Madagascar carried out by former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano through the mandate of SADC. The former Mozambican statesman was charged with mediating the political conflict in Madagascar that emerged when Andry Rajoelina dismissed the incumbent Marc Ravalomanana in a coup in 2009. This action that resulted in the suspension of Madagascar from the AU and SADC by an unconstitutional change of government fell within the SADC mandate to resolve it. Despite the heavy nature of the mediation process, Chissano’s efforts were commendable.

Meanwhile, the political crisis in Madagascar was adequately managed by SADC, gradually bringing the main and legitimate stakeholders to the negotiating table in a win-win approach that would benefit only all Malagasy citizens, contrary to the militaristic approaches the crisis was experiencing at its outbreak and at certain times during its course. This crisis is currently resolved and constitutional legality has been a response in Madagascar thanks to the commitment and dedication of SADC and the mediator appointed by this organization, Joaquim Chissano, former President of the Republic of Mozambique.

The mediation efforts of the former President of Mozambique were also recognized in 2012 when he was given the mandate to mediate a border
dispute between Malawi and Tanzania. The two SADC member states differed on the delimitation of Lake Malawi-Lake Niassa, a dispute that threatened to take violent contours. However, everything indicates that the dispute is under control, following its procedures for a resolution by peaceful means.

According to Lhalbahadur and Otto (2013) Mozambique has also been involved in a commitment that has been highly praised in the region. This is the Zambia-Malawi-Mozambique Growth Triangle (ZMM-GT), a trilateral initiative to promote trade and investment in the three neighboring countries through leveraging of resources through private sector participation and the creation of developed infrastructures.

According to Lhalbahadur and Otto (2013) the ZMM-GT aims to strengthen the capacities of small producers and expand their potential market for the promotion of trade activities, production and investments in value chains across borders. According to these authors the project has broad ambitions to harmonize trade and international policies while also paying attention to visa, housing and security issues, but has had difficulty obtaining financial support.

Lhalbahadur and Otto (2013) also state that Mozambique successfully embarked on a trilateral security cooperation agreement with Tanzania and South Africa under the auspices of SADC to contain the threat of piracy along its vast coast. As maritime activity will increase as the various development corridors become fully operational, there are concerns that piracy may intensify in the region. However, according to these authors, while there are concerns that the measures put in place are insufficient (only one South African frigate to patrol the coast), there is general agreement that cooperation between the three countries is working well.

Final Considerations

It is clear that Mozambique has, over time, played a major role in the process of regional integration in Southern Africa. This role has gained particular importance during the period of minority regimes in the region to which Mozambique has committed itself in a self-sacrificing manner. Support for liberation movements in the context of the Organization of Frontline States, participation in the creation of SADCC as one of the main actors in the quest to reduce regional dependence on South Africa and elsewhere, as well as its involvement in various peacekeeping missions by peaceful means.
for the region are actions that put the country on the pedestal of efforts to promote regional integration in SADC.

This leading role in promoting regional cooperation was an additional factor in placing Mozambique as a major enemy of the minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, creating enormous costs for this country. However, the geo-strategic position of Mozambique, serving as a gateway to the sea in neighboring countries such as Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia and Swaziland remains an encouraging factor for its involvement in regional integration efforts.

Indeed, the existence of important ports in Maputo, Beira and Nacala, as well as the existence of a service-oriented transport and communications infrastructure makes Mozambique a potential beneficiary of regional integration efforts. Cooperation efforts are also being carried out with other countries in the region such as Botswana, a country interested in a partnership for the construction of a deepwater port in Techobanine, Maputo province.

It should be recalled that SADCC’s efforts in restoring the existing transport network in Mozambique have been considered as a pillar in efforts to establish links that could contribute to the facilitation of intra-regional and international trade. As part of its foreign policy in the region, the re-establishment of relations with South Africa, which were largely conditioned by the existence of apartheid policy in that country, was one of the priorities of Mozambique’s foreign policy in the post-civil war period, in that country, of a majority regime, democratically elected in 1994.

Former allies since the time of exile in Tanzania, FRELIMO and the ANC found a conducive environment for strengthening their friendly relations and formal cooperation between parties in power in independent and sovereign states. Thus, democratic South Africa became the largest regional investor and Mozambique’s largest trading partner in the region.

Co-operation in the area of security against cross-border crime, consisting of vehicle theft, trafficking in small arms and drugs, poaching and other types of crime, are the subject of the joint actions being taken by the two countries in this area. On the other hand, in cooperation with Tanzania under a tripartite agreement, patrolling actions have been carried out on the maritime coast in order to protect the signatory countries from the attacks of sea pirates, illegal immigrants and other actors who may attempt against the sovereignty of these countries of the Indian coast.

The foreign policy of Mozambique has been characterized by a major role in regional affairs, which has made it stand out in several stages of regional integration. Despite a diversified foreign policy aimed at “seeking
more friends and partnerships” at the international level, it is in the SADC region and on the African continent that most of Mozambique’s diplomatic representations are located.

Regional integration is one of the main pillars of Mozambique’s foreign policy from which it expects to take advantage of its comparative advantages due to its geostrategic location and abundance of natural resources as well as having a large capacity to supply electricity to most countries in the region through the Cahora Bassa Dam, the largest hydroelectric dam in the region, which is still underutilized. The historic role played by this country in the liberation of the countries of the region which were still under the domination of minority regimes gives it a prominent place in regional politics.

In addition to playing important roles in the political management of the regional organization, Mozambique has been committed to fulfilling its obligations to SADC, an organization of which it is a founding member and in which it engages with great enthusiasm. Under the SADC Trade Protocol which called for the creation of a Southern Africa Free Trade Area in 2008, Mozambique was exemplary in fulfilling tariff disarmament schedules and in approving legal instruments aimed at opening up the domestic market to the region’s partners. He has held presidency mandates at the SADC and the Policy, Defense and Security Cooperation Summits and has led initiatives to strengthen or maintain peace in some states in the region.

As part of the search for mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflicts, in addition to the commitment shown by President Joaquim Chissano and his continuation as Armando Guebuza’s presidency, Mozambique was enthusiastically involved in finding solutions to the political crises in Lesotho, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Madagascar, and the potential conflict that threatened to erupt between Malawi and Tanzania in dispute over Lake Malawi / Niassa. This role has been equally evident in the actions being carried out by Filipe Nyusi, President-elect in 2014, who has also been enthusiastically involved in the affairs of the region through his active participation in SADC.

It should also be noted that Mozambique made an important contribution to SADC through the former Minister of Finance, Dr. Tomaz Salomão, who served for two terms as Secretary-General of this organization. The involvement of senior Mozambican officials in technical and managerial tasks of various SADC departments and departments has been a recurring and undeniable fact.

Despite this, it should be noted that in recent years Mozambique has been cautious about regional integration and has postponed its accession
to the SADC-COMESA-EAC tripartite trade zone. The need for a more careful assessment of the benefits to be derived from this tripartite regional integration process has been pointed out as the factor that has led to the postponement of Mozambique’s accession to this agreement.

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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to analyse the role of Mozambique in the region of Southern Africa. Without making an exhaustive analysis of the integration process in SADC, the article seeks to understand Mozambique’s contribution to the political, economic and social development of the SADC region. The advantages resulting from its geostrategic location and its commitment to the cause of the liberation of countries that were under the domination of minority regimes were factors that contributed to Mozambique’s performance of a crucial role in developments in the Southern African region.

KEYWORDS
Mozambique; Regional integration; Southern Africa.

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