BRAZILIAN JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Africanos

Porto Alegre, v. 3, n. 5
Jan./Jun. 2018

UFRGS
UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL
DO RIO GRANDE DO SUL

FACULDADE DE CIÊNCIAS ECONÔMICAS
U.F.R.G.S

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ABOUT THE JOURNAL

The Brazilian Journal of African Studies is a biannual publication, in digital and printed format, dedicated to the research, reflection and propagation of original scientific articles with emphasis on the analysis of International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations and Schools of Thought. RBEA is essentially academic, linked to the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

The RBEA has as target audience researches, professors and students interested in the specificities of the African continent and its international insertion. Alongside such perspective, the Journal intends to expand the debate about the Brazilian projection world widely, the Brazilian cooperation efforts (including in the Defense field) with the African countries in the South Atlantic perimeter and the construction of a regional identity in face of a scenario of geopolitical transformations.

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Volume 3, Number 5 (Jan./Jun. 2018)

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira
Paulo Fagundes Visentini

July/2018

The BJAS, in its third year, has consolidated as a meeting place for africanists of various continents, who contributed a great volume of analyses and informations. Without doubt, the Journal has been building a research and reflexion agenda around new themes, approaches and comprehensions on Africa. The contribution of African academics/researchers reveals, also, an open space to discuss the "African perspective" not only about Africa, but also about global issues.

In this number, new important themes are approached. First, an original African analysis of the historiography of International Relations offers a perspective from the continent about the theme. In the same innovative path, the polemic issue of the Lusotropicalism in the days of Brazil's foreign policy overture towards Africa is explored, promoting a critical reevaluation. This is followed by two papers from African academics about security issues, one of continental reach (evaluating the APSA), and the other regarding the border contest between Nigeria and Cameroon, with both discussing Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding.

Regarding the Nigerian politics, the formation of political parties and their difficulties to promote national integration because of the ethnic-religious cleavages, and the role of religious groups in the country are discussed. They instigate social fragmentation and criticism towards the Federal Government on its ability to assist the citizens. These undoubtedly represent relevant contributions to the comprehension of Nigeria's contemporaneous impasses.

On the matter of the recent political crises in Southern Africa, in Zimbabwe and South Africa, two papers are presented approaching the issue from an original point of view. Despite many mainstream specialists insisting on the extreme fragility of both political systems, it is observed that

the forced resignation of both presidents did not implicate a regime break, nor alterations of its political and socio-economic structures. In Zimbabwe, Mugabe's exit was carried out in a negotiated fashion, as well as Zuma's in South Africa. Evidently, the problems that fomented the crises have not yet been overcome.

Another innovative issue on this BJAS' number is the subject of education, namely in Cameroon and Mozambique. The first one discusses the clash in the state's superior education system about the bilingual system and its practical impacts. On Mozambique's case, on the other hand, the focus is the relation between education and socioeconomic development, a matter relevant not only to the African continent, but to the entire developing world. Thus, the elements the Journal explores to comprehend the African reality are expanded.

Finally, three book reviews are presented about books on historical and contemporaneous themes of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Southern Africa. These are works that allow us to deepen our analysis and empirical knowledge on the continent.

The BJAS publishes bilingual (Portuguese and English) electronic and printed versions. We thus, invite the contribution of colleagues from Brazil and abroad, with whom we intend to establish bonds to the deepening of the knowledge and the building of a vision from the South about the African continent and the relations with it.

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AFRICA AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Akinbode Fasakin[1]

Introduction

Brian Schmidt's (2013, 21) call for a research on the history and historiography of the field of International Relations (IR) brings to the fore the need to reflect deeply and more broadly on IR's history in Africa. Although Schmidt questions the field historiography, calling for a critical review of what currently exists as the field's origin or something like a detailed capsule history that covers the different discourses in the evolution of the discipline, his call makes reflection on Africa's place in such a review necessary. This requires at least figuring out what discourses exist in Africa in relation to the study of IR in order to rethink truly IR's dominant and coherently offered evolutionary narratives. Such exercise could certainly enhance our understanding of the discipline in other places, away from the mythical great debates that dominate the field's history (Kahler 1997), and possibly take cognisance of obscured views, discourses and theories, researchers and theorists that self-consciously profess IR as their discipline, and institutions (universities and nations) that contribute to the development of IR where they exist. This essay aims to use some of these criteria, as provided by Schmidt and supported by Duncan Bell to comment on the evolution of IR in Africa and use that in turn to propose a direction for the future of the discipline in Africa (Bell 2009)[2].

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2 According to Bell (2009, 4), "disciplinary history writing should be complemented, and possibly complicated, by the study of 'histories of the global' – histories, that is, of the multiple ways in which global politics (or aspects of it) has been conceptualized across a variety of institutional sites, including universities, research laboratories, think-tanks, philanthropic foundations and government agencies". I also consider relevant in this study Hoffman's (1977, 41) categorisation of IR as an autonomous part of Political Science.

Although the dominant rendition of IR's historiography appears a simplification of a more complicated history, an appropriation of a discipline whose origin, evolution and development cover a more detailed account across regions, time and space, it is argued that using some criteria helps throw light on IR evolution in these different time and areas. This study does this rendition in Africa to show how the discipline developed as a distinct field that is concerned with global politics and designed to serve national interests abroad or blend policy makers' so-called national interests with those of researchers, driven by personal experience, disciplinary goals and career objectives, what Hoffman (1977, 47) calls a "remarkable chronological convergence". Therefore, although Schmidt problematized the prevalent interpretations of the field's development, contending that IR's history is both more complicated and less well known than typically portrayed, I show why such dominant narrative of IR's historiography holds sway, particularly in relation to Africa (Schmidt 2013, 4). It is against this background that this paper explores how we might think about IR in Africa and IR historiography around the world in general, especially for it to accommodate developments in different scholarly communities and for those communities to make inputs beyond the usual challenge to American dominance.

The essay begins by showing why American influence remains prevalent and indelible in the field and the rendition of its history; essentially making the claim that IR developed within the parameters and agenda set by the United States, albeit with contributions from Europe – especially the United Kingdom. Evidences of American influence on the field, in terms of theoretical contributions, the global spread of American developed and backed theories and methodologies and the acceptance of the mythical rendition of IR's historiography provided by American scholars are not just mere justifications for this claim but also form the basis for American IR to acquire the 'scientific' edge over others. American views were thus not only eventually adopted by many scholars abroad and the field in general, taking for instance IR's introductory texts and the narration of the mythical debates within them, but also by statesmen from many other countries, especially those from Africa, who began to pattern their policies after America in neglect of their former colonial governments' styles. It is plausible to say that IR as a discipline benefited first from Europe before America made its contributions and that some of America's contributions are from those that are in fact originally Europeans (such as Nicholas Spykman, Hans Morgenthau and Stanley Hoffman among others).

However, America further leveraged on its newly acquired post-World War II status and circumstances to entrench its place in the study of IR. As a

world power, its view carried much weight than any other country or region of the world and its scholars' propositions simply became canons and standards by which other scholars measure their contribution, particularly in the era of the debate over the scientific nature of the discipline. It is along this line of reasoning that one may observe that since the emergence of China as a major power around the world, Asia has begun to count as contributing to global affairs and debates, while scholars working on Asia, who are not necessarily Chinese, are gaining more prominence. The corollary of this is that they could emerge as "distinct IR voices" if they project Chinese policies and canonise these ideas if China overtakes the US (Waever 1998, 688).

As Europe, America and Asia each has something to say about how they initially used studying the world out there to reflect their contributions to the field, this study thus explores that of the African continent and its scholars in the development of the field in section that follows. In my concluding remarks, I argue that while the contests over IR's historiography is a new, fledgling and budding area of research, it is reasonable to think about incorporating IR varied regional and theoretically experiences, where they verily exist, or yet to be known, in rewriting IR's historiography. The call for (political and/or intellectual) scholarly will to do so is crucial. Even if this would not guarantee a consensus on IR's historiography, it could at least provide an avenue for conceding to and documenting some of the inherent errors in what currently serves as IR's historiography and lend voice to the previously ignored contributions that could help provide a robust and standard account of the discipline's history. More importantly, the need for Africa to take advantage of this revision to make specific contribution in the IR field by reflecting its experiences and events, which had already begun with the postcolonial theory, in the reorientation process of the IR field preoccupies the penultimate section of the paper, while the last section concludes the paper.

IR as an American Social Science?

One of IR's clichés is Stanley Hoffman's IR as an American Social Science. Even though the first IR Chair was endowed in Aberystwyth, Wales, United Kingdom earlier in 1919, "it was in the United States that international relations became a discipline" prior to and more deeply after the Second World War (WWII) according to Hoffmann (1977, 42). It was in the United States that "foreign policy was [first] put under domestic checks and balances, [and] knew no career caste, and paid little respect to the rules and rituals

of the initiated European happy few" (Hoffmann 1977, 43). By this time, America had developed as a relatively democratic society with intellectuals that had come from different walks of life settling in the US. Subsequently, IR "the convergence of intellectual predispositions, political circumstances, and institutional opportunities", the discipline and profession of IR specialists happen to be predominantly American (Hoffmann 1977, 45-46). Drawing on the nature of a precise science of politics, given the empirical methodology gaining ground in American social sciences as well as the need to explain previous events and wars, including the rise to global prominence of America after WWII, American self-identified IR scholars set the tone that led to the development of a social science field of IR. These scholars did not only evolve a field that justified American leaders quests for deeper engagements in world affairs, in an incipient, perhaps well-crafted, Cold War environment they had framed, but also provided rationalisations to rally public support around these leaders in the pursuit and acquisition of national interests and state power (Booth 1997). Clearly, internal conditions within the discipline and external contexts have worked together to develop a social science IR in America, giving it some influence and later hegemonic status around the world.

Only few IR historiographers find this claim, or Hoffman's delivery to be controversial. Although they believe there was IR in other places, especially in Europe where we often refer to the state system as Eurocentric and the systematic study of the behaviour of these actors existed before the Americans studied IR (Watson 1992; Buzan & Little 2000; Bull and Watson 1984), many scholars contend that Hoffman rendered a brilliant account of the American hegemony and supremacy in the IR discipline. For example, Schmidt asserts that despite the influence of a great many European-born IR scholars, the discipline evolved into an American social science (Schmidt 2013). Duncan Bell (2009, 4) posits that the United States and its researchers have acted as the centre of gravity in the so-called evolution and developments of the IR discipline, suggesting that Americans contributed to the development of the field and remain hegemonic within it. Without contesting this assertion, even though he challenged the sociology of such a not so international discipline, Waever (1998) provides rationale for such a dominance. According to him, IR's reflection on its development and progress make mainstream IR enthusiastically integrates with theories peculiar to the United States, which are furthermore attractive due to the distinctively American ideals of social science, especially the need to have an "objective" study international politics. According to Waever (1998), Hoffmann's brilliant and convincing insights about why IR emerged as a full-size discipline in the United States, accounts for why it took the form it did, often setting the tone for others in the field to follow.

It may thus be see, as Schmidt (2013, 5) believes that "presentism, which involves the practice of writing a history of the field for the purpose of making a point about its present character" and "contextualism, which assumes that exogenous events in the realm of international politics have fundamentally structured the historical development of IR as an academic field of study". Consequently, contextualism, or American IR writers' interpretation of major world events and significant changes in America, including America's foreign policy options and directions, became directly responsible for the rise and fall of different theories, methodologies, and foci areas in the field. While the cumulative nature of knowledge later propelled these theories, providing justifications for their development, states with power after the major events such as the World Wars merely employed the development of a discipline to form knowledge around global affairs. This pattern, which was not in any way dissimilar from the processes by which the Europeans power of the pre-American era undertook in the course of universalising their ideas and establishing its dominance, enabled them to illustrate what they consider as global problems through their points of view (Seth 2011, 170).

When what became dominant theories of IR (Idealism and Realism), which emerged between the First and the Second World Wars, developed, these states and their thinkers took stock of these developments in the world, thus deciding both the identity and concerns of IR. It was not until after the WWII, and the during the Cold War in particular, that these theories developed much further, dominating the field's landscape and providing insights to social scientists and practitioners of the science of international politics[3]. IR's original thoughts mimicked writings in Philosophy, History, Political Science and International Law but much less Economics. The desire to have its own science and meet up with the methodology of social science as in Economics resulted in the adopted their "scientific" method. Clearly, earlier IR experts before American writers emerged took theorising in this particular manner for granted and merely took stock of 'world' events as though they were documenting history, professing solutions as they deemed fit in relations to the same problems of the causes of war and the nature of man within the international system that American realists identified. If the progenitors of the English school of IR that now became labelled as "utopians" were anything to go by, then it is little surprise that IR at the point merely sought to solve specific (inter)national problems from a particular perspective.

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3 Kenneth Waltz was particularly significant in this respect. His seminal text, *Theory of International Politics,* became influential in constructing a science of international politics.

Consequently, by first adopting explanatory methods used in history and philosophy and later taking on the (natural) scientific methods, IR, which had attempted to understand the nature of international politics among states, came to an inevitable and desirable maturation for many American writers in the social science field of study. This was the process of the professionalization and subsequent hardening of IR immediately after the First World War as well as during the interwar years by liberal thinkers but more firmly later on by realists and scientists in the post-1945 world. By the time realist provided what seemed as a consensus in the burgeoning IR discipline, interwar contributions by liberals, Realism had carefully re-scripted liberal ideas to reflect utopianism, setting forth the first debate that would provide legitimacy to the birth of a discipline. This carefully crafted realist reflection of the field, would go on to pitch them against idealists in the intervening years in what became popularized as the first great debate. Realists "triumph" pitched them against scientists (behaviourists) in the second debate. The story went further to show how traditionalists and postmodernists also engaged in a third debate. While the third debate created an IR field of study that is pluralist in nature, it is significant in that it highlights the amount of developments that the field has experienced from the period of its first established chair in Aberystwyth. This is significant in that one of the notable features and of course weaknesses of the popular rendition of the debates is the desire for the field to acquire a scientific status. Consequently, rather than measure progress in the Khunian paradigmatic sense, advancements in IR took the form of challenging, not upturning, previous theories and providing alternatives in line with contexts. This quest for scientific IR however undermined many issues that contributed to the evolution of IR and put IR theories in clusters of 'paradigms'.

IR is not necessarily an American social science, only that America's influence remains indelible in the field. Evidences, including the two rationale for American influence on the field are sufficient justifications for the dominance of American, its mainstream theory, Realism, as well as the mythical rendition of IR's historiography provided by these scholars. This approach was not eventually only adopted in writing the historiography of IR but by statesmen in other countries whose policies are designed to build reflect an American IR scholarship, some of them imitating American leaders' policies. Nevertheless, it could be said that although IR is a discipline that has benefited from and developed out of the evolutions in the social sciences, its growing appeal to government and scholarly impulses to meet expectations of government and sponsors in America more than anywhere else remains a point to reference while thinking about IR's evolution. It should be borne in mind that American dominance in IR's historiography

could not have been otherwise, especially given the above circumstance. American colossal and overbearing influence over most parts and on near total presence on global issues after the Second World War placed the country and its IR scholars on the world stage, as the cynosure of thinking, writing and practice within the field. Many scholarly fields of study within American social sciences, including Economics and Political Science, appear to benefit also from this overbearing reach and influence.

Although the rationales provided for US hegemony in IR may seem to simplify the historiography of IR. Nonetheless, they offer insights to apprehending how IR's historiography remains told the way it is and how it became a model for regions outside of the United States. The paradox apparent from the above is that the rendition of IR's historiography through the American prism is a myth to the rest of the world but America's reality, representing how Americans at state policy and theoretical levels understood the world and studied IR. Therefore, even if the popular narrative of IR's evolution is a mythical story of the great debates, IR specialists', most of whom had been political scientists and domiciled in the United States and Western Europe, were absorbed with developing a field of study similar to those already firmly developed in American social sciences. Additionally, the social and political contexts, especially developments around the world, and the need to meet the demands of audience, including policy practitioner and scholars, drove the efflorescence of a field that was already evolving. As the preferred account of the post war consensus was event driven, key IR theories, especially Realism, offer account of world event through the lens of the nature of man and the state within the structure of an anarchical society. The fact that rewards, in terms of the patronage, followed realists' researches enabled the advancement of this sort of researches. "Realism was doubly favoured: Not only did it benefit from the same research infrastructure, but also its theoretical stance fit with renewed government emphasis on international commitment and on meeting the Soviet threats" (Kahler 1997, 28). This is American science of IR. Although to a number of IR historiographers, this is nothing other than American IR discipline defining mythology, coherently, elegantly and eloquently told, it served its purpose transmitting a particular type of knowledge and visions of American self, scholarship and society and interpretation of the world to the world. It is a different story that this performs various legitimating functions, classifying Realism and the subsequent behaviourist turn as products of intellectual progress and consigning others into the dustbin of history; it was the peculiarity of American IR. As Bell (2009, 5) argues, this myth has been the engine of identity construction, helping to mark and police the boundaries of the discipline, as well as shaping

the self-understandings of scholars. Since it is not all of IR's historiography, it must be seen from its limited point of view. It is perhaps for this sort of appropriation that Bell (2009, 4) calls for the study of the "histories of the global", where one can study differently the histories "of the multiple ways in which global politics (or aspects of it) has been conceptualized across a variety of institutional sites, including universities, research laboratories, think-tanks, philanthropic foundations and government agencies".

A view on the deification of American disciplinary model by researchers in other parts of the world is less explored. To gain regional account of IR's historiography not necessarily included in IR's history, I turn to the institutional development of IR in Africa in the next section (Vitalis 2005, 160-161).

Africa and IR's Historiography

In this section, I examine what one may refer to as Africa's contribution to the history of IR, African IR's historiography, for want of a better phraseology. I begin with two caveats. One, it is apposite to state beforehand that this piece cannot capture the whole gamut of African experiences with the external world; since IR or the writing of its history for that matter is huge and such an exercise is near impracticable if not unimaginably vast to be captured in such a short piece. More so, Africa, and African studies about the world, is not a monolith; it has deep and complex histories, societies, relations, dimensions and writings, too vast and complicated for representation here. I merely identify and cover very few of the highlights of Africans' contributions to IR's historiography and discipline with reference to scholars and works that self-identify as IR writers, institutional affiliation, government established and funded institutions and other cognate features that delineate a professional discipline. Although the work is about African IR historiography, I draw on personal experience as an African researcher, interactions with colleagues and evidence from the literature to make my claim. The study also draws largely from the Nigerian example, even though most of the issues reflect African instances and resonate across the board.

Two, I believe it is important to think about this sort of endeavour by stating that it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine African IR's historiography outside of Africa's history. Africa is a region whose history and place in the world's socio-cultural, economic and political ladder define the interests of its scholars, their understanding of world affairs, their approach and disposition towards the discipline and the kind of contributions they

made to the development of the field; the same way these factors influence African policy-makers. It is, therefore, important to understand and state that although Africans contribute to international relations in general, even as of the period of the formal establishment of the first Chair in IR at Aberystwyth, and the origin of academic institutions studying in the West in the previous decade, African states were yet to be independent actors studying IR. The states were neither independent, capable of making their own diplomatic decisions towards the external others on their own, in the Westphalian state system sense, nor their scholars 'doing' independent thinking about the world from African based institutions. Suffice to say, nonetheless, that although many African countries were under colonial rule in the first half of the 20th century, Africans were aware of the international politics at play globally and in international relations in general as it affected their thinking about their state statuses. They realised that their 'countries' and situation were tied to powers and events outside Africa, hence the birth of liberation movements driven by writings on the travails of the colonies and the evils of colonialism during this period. These writings became precursors to subsequent nationalist agitations in Africa[4]. It is important to reiterate that while this is not to suggest that thinking was not part of the African societies, thinking about and knowing IR as a discipline is undocumented.

IR scholarship would formally begin in Africa about four decades after the first formal Chair in Aberystwyth, when a few African countries had gained independence or at the verge of and started to establish universities and research institutions to study how to pursue their various states' foreign policies and other related issues in international affairs in their countries. Nigeria took the lead in 1956, few years before its independence, when the pre-independent self-governing government presented series of policy measures to the parliament to train future Nigerian diplomats (Aluko 1987). Emergent Nigerian leaders interested in the world out there, who initially took a sublime approach to international relations, maintaining a pro-British combined with a Western posture, sought to understand international affairs by training diplomatic personnel for this job. Meanwhile, Nigerians had studied International Relations up to PhD level in American and British Universities. Shortly after independence, when the government established the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) in 1961, one of them, Lawrence A. Fabunmi, who had studied History but whose thesis entitled: *The*

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4 Although most of the early writers about Africa were blacks in America, their writings were not known as IR writings. They however helped in stirring nationalism agitations in Africa. Writers such as W. E. B. Du Bois (Sociologist and Historian) and Marcus Garvey (Journalist) are notable among others.

Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations: A Case of Power Politics, 1900-1756 was an instance of a classic realist exploration became NIIA's first director. Fabunmi is a product of the University of London. As a research institution, NIIA's core tasks revolve around providing foreign policy advice and directions for the Nigerian government and researching international relations in general as well as acting as a think tank for the then Foreign and Commonwealth Office, later known as the Ministry of External Relations, and now the Ministry of Foreign Affairs[5].

Later on in 1977, the University of Ife, earlier founded in 1962 by the regional government of Western Nigeria, endowed the first Chair in International Relations in Africa under the Faculty of Administration after it had developed and run diploma and postgraduate courses in IR[6]. UNIFE, as it was called then, produced Professor Olajide Aluko, sub-Sahara Africa's first professor of International Relations and a set vibrant scholars whose works were exclusively IR[7]. Although the department was part of the establishment of the Institute of Administration in 1963, previously created at the University of Ibadan before moving to its permanent site in Ile-Ife in 1966, the department did not gain autonomous status until 1970. Since around 1970, following the end of the civil war (1967-1970) and Nigerian government's desire to pursue an effective foreign policy, Ife ran professional and certificate programmes for personnel of the foreign affairs department. Its academic staff, numbering about fifteen, who earned their PhDs largely in Political Science and International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science and UK and American universities, published books and journal articles on Nigeria and its neighbours, foreign policy matters and essentially contributed African perspectives to international affairs. Shortly afterwards, the Amhadu Bello University, Zaria (ABU) started the Department of Political Science and International Studies in 1976, after previously being known as the Department of Government since 1967.

While the University of Ibadan (an affiliate of the University of London and Nigeria's premier university established in 1948) and the

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5 Even though they have slightly dissimilar functions, the NIIA copies the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

6 Although a number of departments identifying with international relations have sprung up ever since in Nigeria, most of them come under History, Political Science and as Departments of Diplomatic and International Studies. Only few Nigerian Universities study and self-identify as international relations as Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife since 1987).

7 Due to these researchers' works, they were dubbed the Ife school of IR. They include Aluko, J. B. Ojo, Oye Ogunbadejo, Olusola Ojo, Amadu Sesay, Ralph Onwuka, Amechi Okolo, Orobola Fasehun and Layi Abegunrin among a host of others.

University of Nigeria, Nsukka (established 1960) offered courses such as comparative government, foreign politics of the Great Powers and African states under Political Science, they did not offer IR as a separate discipline (Aluko 1987, 314). In other African countries such as Egypt, Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania, departments such as Department of Political Science at the University of Cairo, the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS) and Department of Government at Nairobi University and the Departments of Government, Political Science, or Liberal studies respectively engage in IR related scholarship. Scholarly luminaries such as Egyptian Boutros Ghali and Samir Amin, Kenyan Ali Mazrui, Nigeria's Adele Jinadu, Claude Ake and Segun Osoba, most of whom self-identify as political scientist, were among the notably known scholars contributing to African apprehension and analysis of world affairs and the study of IR (Ofuho 2009, 73; Schoeman 2009).

While one may say IR African writers, focused on making contributions related to the diplomatic relations and practices, and foreign policies of their respective countries, their inputs were relevant in making meaning of IR for Africa's sake than partaking in the mainstream debates within the field. Although the Cold War provided the context for their analysis, they reflected more on Africa's place in the world and engaged with this context to improve understanding of African existential realities, some related to the issues that African political scientists and historians had been preoccupied with over time, rather than engaging in a discursive manner through theory and disciplinary development. Although they lack consensus in their view of Africa, approaching it from diverse perspectives, they directed their research on Africa and the world rather than as part of the world of scholarly debates going on in the West. Those that self-profess as African IR scholars did not approach the discipline by the pattern followed as that between the different schools of thought such as between Idealism and Realism, providing a different theory, or in the form of institutional and national locations, as was the case between IR in America and IR in the UK.

Nevertheless, there are at least two ways to apprehend African IR's historiography. One, they provided definitional or conceptual clarification in a way that attempt to set the boundary between IR as a discipline and other disciplines that attempt to study what they study. Early African IR scholars were not in doubt about the definitional obfuscation prevalent in the discipline (Brown 1997). They were also aware of the influence fields like History and Political Science exerted and could exert on IR. This is in fact further necessary for government funding, since IR appeared to have more relevance for government policies and programmes and gained more

of government's funding and attention than Political Science. More so, the IR scholars had established the Nigerian Society of International Affairs (Jinadu 1987). Lastly, the definition is useful in the light of the confusion between international relations as all manners of interactions among various actors on the world's stage and international politics as a synonym meaning either such interactions or the subject's theme or aspects of international relations, often commonly conflated mostly by American writers. For these reasons, early African IR scholars reflected on the definitional and conceptual confusion and provided meaning to IR as a discipline, focusing on what should constitute its subject matter; IR should be about the politics of international relations (Aluko 1987, 312). To this end, Aluko (1987) defines IR as the field that studies the politics within "all forms of ties across national boundaries, ranging from politico-diplomatic, security-military and economic-developmental to socio-cultural", whereas international politics, a relational concept to IR, "refers specifically to the political aspects of such relations". For Ofuho (2009, 71), this definition is not only a "first step towards making IR scholarship more inclusive and truly "international"", but crucial towards analysing the discipline's evolution, developments and dynamics in relations to Africa.

Secondly, Africans approach IR issues, mostly those concerning them within the world, either through the mainstream prisms or through alternative perspectives, albeit using, in both cases, African empirical cases to test Western or imported theories in order to take sides with these theories or challenge them as well as their epistemologies and methodologies. While this suggests that African IR scholars were less reflective of the sociology of the discipline, making no theoretical contribution and lacking any form of assessment of the discipline's template, they copy existing thoughts, believing it to be coming from an already established discipline to interpret African IR. This thinking underpinned the adoption and adaptation of IR, an American social science and Realism, American theory by many early African IR scholars. It was on this basis that they adopted 'IR establishments' from America to design their research agenda, university curricula and foreign policies. For these scholars, IR was not only a discipline whose study originated in Westphalia, the First and the Second World Wars, it was a discipline whose essence Africans researchers assumed to be suitably settled through which what is needed is an interrogation of Africa from these perspectives (Ofuho 2009, 76). One of the pioneers of IR in Ife is of the opinion that "both the theoretical and practical tones concerning IR in Africa are set outside of the continent. African IR researchers merely adapt it to suit African reality. Africans, generally speaking, have not built IR theories or created much theorists in general. Only few can actually identify as theorists or IR theorists.

Our contributions are not about theories but the response and adaptation of existing theories to African realities. This we do from an African perspective" (Ojo 2017).

It is little wonder then that Africans doing IR were reliant on Realism, Marxism, the levels of analysis problem and other approaches developed mostly in America and Europe in studying IR and analysing their respective countries' foreign policies. A good example that illustrates this point is how Nigerian writers, copying American authors and their views of America's role in the American continent, described Nigeria as having a manifest destiny and historic mission. For them, Nigeria is destined to lead Africa and the black race and it must acquire military and economic power use it in order to do so. They also described Nigeria as having three concentric circles of foreign policy, for which Africa is the centrepiece, based on Nigeria's enlightened self-interest (Olusanya and Akindele 1986). Similarly, Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Minister, Bolaji Akinyemi, in line with the realist thinking predominant at the time, nudged Nigeria into convening the Concert of Medium Powers in 1987. This influence happens to be significant that even when African researchers do not subscribe ideologically and theoretically to particular American or Western orientations, they draw inspirations from them in order to analyse Africa and its IR. An instance is a book written to depict the 'failings' of a hegemonic power country after previous realist scholars depict Nigeria as bearing a manifest destiny. Adekeye Adebajo and Abdul Rauf Mustapha, authors that are not necessarily realists by inclination, wrote *Gulliver's Troubles: Nigeria's Foreign Policy after the Cold War* in 2008. Their book follows in the footstep of Stanley Hoffmann's *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* published in 1968, written exactly forty years before Adebajo and Mustapha. Nevertheless, it is not to say that African IR scholars have not brought distinction, ingenuity and their style to scholarship, the point is that there are observable similarities in terms of how they conduct IR scholarship in Africa.

Where Africans scholars do not adopt and adapt dominant Western ideas to represent African IR, they borrow from alternative Western theories, such as Marxism, or import theories from other developing countries, such as Immanuel Wallerstein's dependency theory from Latin America, to explain African IR. Scholars in this category do not merely resent the colonial ancestry of African states but believe dominant theoretical constructs, such as Realism and Liberalism, privilege the Great powers and external forces that are still at play in Africa. Concerned with explaining African socio-economic problems, scholars with this school of thought borrowed from Marx's analysis of class and Wallerstein's exposition of developing countries' reliance on the

developed countries within a skewed world system to contribute to North-South debates in IR. These African critical thinkers, who highlight the role of external constraints on African predicaments, receive criticisms for being too externally focused, leaving aside how internal dynamics constitute the major causes of African predicament. There is also a sense in that, while most of these writers are highly cerebral, they may become accustomed to elegantly rehashing and recycling the theoretical arguments that they subscribe to in analysing Africa IR[8]. Again, like the African realist adherents, they retrograde variants of Western theories by merely testing empirical trends on existing theories (Thakur 2015, 213).

IR in Contemporary Africa: What and How to Contribute to the Discipline

In this section, I explore ways by which African IR scholars can contribute to the field of IR. The fact of their membership of the international system is no least reason why this should be taken seriously. I express three concerns here: due attention must be placed on the lack of research sources that inhibit cutting edge research in Africa; exploration of history, particularly African history as well as events, is crucial to making impacts in IR; and, the reawakening and broadening of African contribution to postcolonial theory is at no other time more urgent than now.

It was Olajide Aluko (1987) who first identified the problem of inadequate research resources for African IR researchers to work with. Inadequate funding from government and private sectors for research in the field, the absence of access to valuable data (most official policy documents are inaccessible or official state secret), and an absence of synergy, or perhaps rivalry as he put it, between the researchers and those involved in African external affairs hamper research even in the 1980s (Aluko 1987, 316)[9]. If this was the case in the 1980s, the problems have magnified exponentially in the 2000s. With the exception of the proliferation of universities, most of which are private educational enterprises, which is inversely proportional to the quality of university education in many African countries, there is an

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8 The scholars I interacted with share this view. To them, the proliferation of rehashed works may have to do with pecuniary benefits. The culture of recognition/promotion based on number of publications is rife in Africa.

9 Akindele (2005, 62-63) mentions the absence of synergy between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the NIIA.

abundance of lack of almost everything valuable a 21st century should have. From skilled, qualified and competent hands to research funding and grants to research collaborations with others to recent academic publications among others, many African universities are behind their counterparts in other parts of the world. Many African topmost universities are shadows of themselves in terms of physical infrastructure, while intellectual engagements such as exchange programmes, workshops, seminars and what have you on national and global affairs, which were vibrant in the first few decades of independence up to the late 1980s, have vanished in most universities. How on earth can a university whose premises are only a few building, few staff, most of whom are recruited on an *ad hoc* basis to pass African universities accreditation exercises behave as the universities of the 1980s?

The problem with the study and practice of IR in Africa is that of poor infrastructural facilities across the universities. This problem crept into Africa under the neoliberal policy of the Structural Adjustment Programme in the 1980s and 1990s. Many African countries have not recovered from the policy that prioritised the rolling back of the state in the provision of essential services including education, health and other essential social services and allow the forces of the market to determine service/product and price and consequently bring about efficiency. As I have point out above, it is foolhardy to expect so much from the private universities because they are the ones who engage mostly in the practices described above. Private universities have not only failed to provide viable alternatives, they have narrowed access to education. On the part of African governments, budgetary allocation is not only small, it is also being systematically stolen by officials. In a recent UNESCO report, the education sector in sub-Saharan African on the average gets only 5% of its gross domestic product (The Guardian 2011).

While these problems may likely persist in the foreseeable future, it will be difficult for Africans to build IR theories. And, the absence of a strong theoretical base from Africa limits how much impact African can make in the discipline. This is connected to the fact that although Africans interact continuously, immersing deeper into world affairs with the hope of bettering their lot, its policy makers are not likely to have clear ideas about how best it should relate with the world on its own terms and from its own theoretical standpoint. This has huge and double effects on African IR scholars whose interaction with IR literature are from Western oriented prism, but most of these theories that Africans engage with are dated. On the other hand, policies makes remain as navigate realists' anarchical world without compass. The proliferation of institutions studying IR in Africa will make no difference if thinkers are not produced to develop original ideas. Unless African IR

thinkers make theoretical contributions, they may continue to play fringe roles, that is if they play any role at all, in the discipline, the same way Africans states would not influence world affairs to its advantage if it does not look within itself for solution to its predicaments. It is important to state categorically that the problem is not of lack of resources, but commitments and will to seek creative ideas and pursue scholarship for the benefit of humanity. In order words, it is crucial for the state to take education as a priority and address some of the already known challenges.

If African governments appear helpless or remain irresponsible, as many have been over the years, are scholars to give up? My answer is no! The rest of this section examines how African IR scholars can contribute to discourses, theories and development of IR not just from an African perspective but a strong theoretical view. First, African IR scholars can tap into the study of History as a discipline as well as the history and events in Africa to make ground-breaking impacts in IR. One of the key lessons IR as a field has taught is its eclectic nature; IR draws from History, Political Science, International Law, Economics, Geography and Sociology and so on. Out of all of these established fields, History as a discipline is particularly important for the study of IR by African scholars because it is a detailed account of the past, where the contexts surrounding all the other subjects can be uncovered. History is crucial because "there is little reason to believe that the current state of historical evidence and judgment is definitive or final" (Smith 1999, 4). It refers to the aggregate of past events in general, or to the train of events connected with a particular place, person, culture, mentality, etc. But history also refers to attempts to represent or re-create those pasts. History may take the form of chronicle, annals, narrative, tale, story, or statistical analysis. History can help interpret "culture and politics with originality and flair" and unearth obscured events. For Africa, this is even necessary because, like the Oriental, there are there are so many prejudices against and myths about African that the study of history can dismantle (Said 1979)[10].

It is therefore important that the IR discipline in Africa should reflect and be coterminous with the "facts on the ground" as they are experienced in a particular space and time. Furthermore, while there are events similar to those that necessitated the emergence of the IR discipline early in the twentieth century in Africa, such as the relevant incidents in the continent as in DRC, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, among others, these events are yet to be accorded the meaning they deserve by African IR scholars (Ofuho 2009, 77). It is abundantly clear that events in Africa can be utilised for the

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10 Said's (1979) work is such a deconstruction of the perception of the Middle East.

purposes of generalisations as well as hypotheses and theory building or highlighting the roles of structures and agency in the making of a modern African continent. It is as peculiar as Africa is from the rest of the world that its theories are supposed to draw from its unique experiences and realities to develop these theories or highlight exploratory researches within IR in ways that explain these peculiarities as well as areas of convergence or hybridity with the rest of the world. Africa's slavery, colonial experience, decolonisation process and post-colonial statehood are sites of unquantifiable raw data. The waves of terrorism, violence, democratisation, and reforms are issues that have the potential to challenge dominant theories and discourses on and of Africa and Africa in relation to the world. It is high time these events gained a pride of place in scholarly endeavours.

The second point, which at the same time serves as an instance of the use of colonialism to develop a theory already in IR, is postcolonial theory. Postcolonial theory serves as a viable and veritable entry point of engagement for African IR scholars to engage. Although the idea of an entry point through the postcolonial theory avenue is not to suggest that this is the only route by which African IR scholars can know IR from an African perspective. The choice of knowing Africa through natural or positivist perspective is a very good one for it would allow African scholars to engage in hypotheses development, making generalisations and engaging in theory building. Many African cases may be useful in this regard. An alternative is increasing use of social constructivist method, such as the sociological piece of work by Fanon, to provide a wide range of exploratory research on the constitutive nature of events in Africa. This is a veritable avenue for many African IR researchers interested in knowing IR to undertake. Moreover, one not-to-be-taken-away benefit of critical theory is its ability not to "recognize the limits of the discipline" but to extensively engage the study of international politics from different points of view taking into account history, context and contingency. "After all, the contemporary politics of the globe is examined in a wide range of fields, including geography, anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, and international law" (Zehfuss 2013, 146). Postcolonial theory as a strand of critical theory is further beneficial in that it addresses many issue areas such as those concerning identity, poverty, underdevelopment, civil wars and so on that are ignored or taken for granted by mainstream problem solving theory. Since the questioning of the validity of the knowledge produced by problem-solving theories and how such knowledge came to be are being scrutinised, critical theory has a lot to offer African IR scholars in unpacking their contributions.

Postcolonialism "analyses and challenges the complex power relationships between what is called the North (or West) and the South" (Zehfuss 2013, 156). Apart from the seeming marginal position of Africa that makes such a perspective appealing, the need to expose all forms and guises of insubordination, exploitation and marginalisation make it all the more relevant. "Postcolonial writings, working at the junction of a keen awareness of this empirical mismatch, on the one hand, and with a receptivity to the linguistic turn and to poststructuralist insights, on the other, have been especially open to the idea that knowledges may serve to constitute the worlds that they purportedly 'represent', 'mirror', 'render' or 'portray'"(Seth 2011, 181). In this regard, Fanon's works serves as a leading exemplar of works to draw from. According to Muppidi (2009, 150), "if international relations is an 'American social science' then Fanon provides a particularly different 'locus of enunciation' for international politics". Fanon's "locus speaks to and for the global majority, the 'wretched of the Earth', who are routinely, and often rudely, summoned to knowledge of international politics through the provincial terms". Muppidi (2009, 150) proceeds that Fanon's distinctive contribution, which is "to speak means to be in a position to use a certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that language, but it means above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization" brings to bear on colonizing imaginations the weight of multiple ways of being human. Clearly postcolonial theory is not only an alternative to mainstream IR theories including Realism, Liberalism and Marxism, but much more indigenous to the Africa than dependency theories imported to Africa in the 1970s.

Conclusion

In this article I have examined the place of Africa in IR historiography. I argue in particular that Africa has merely mimicked studies from "abroad", particularly the United States in how they do IR. While the challenge to the IR as an American Social Science provides an avenue to engage more broadly in discussions about the development of the discipline in IR, I provide avenues through which this can be done. In particular, I make reference to History and the use of African historical and topical events as being sites of raw data that could enhance the capacity to develop African-oriented IR theories as their contribution to the discipline. I argue that the postcolonial theory used in analysing the issue of colonialism and subordination of the Third World provides a good exemplar of how to make such contribution.

On a general note, one of the key takeaways of these turn to the review of IR's historiographical narratives is that IR has attained some measure of academic advancements and standards where different theories explore its meaning and interpretation of reality. This is essential for solidifying IR's robustness and status as an autonomous discipline within the social science. It is crucial to take inquiries into and attempts made to understand the historiography of IR seriously because, although IR may have acquired an autonomous disciplinary status, its history is incomprehensible without taking due cognizance of the interests and power relations that informed how its story has been rendered. It will also help in knowing how the knowledge it has subsequently produced over the years has shaped our world in a particular way. We cannot contribute to the change of the world without engaging these dominant perspectives in details. Interestingly, interests and researches in IR historiography have blossomed since around the 1990s, suggesting that there is more to be unpacked and explained in IR.

Lastly, IR has largely developed as an autonomous discipline but it is capable of utilising an eclectic approach toward understanding the world. This is both beneficial and disadvantageous. Where these external ideas and knowledge exposes social realities in ways that enhances our understanding, we are able to practice IR theoretically and in terms of policies better. However, where there is an over-politicisation of knowledge and knowledge serve private, perhaps commercial interests, it channels the discipline in a wrong direction, sometimes foreclosing opportunity for alternatives. The challenge is that it is always difficult to tell the difference between one and the other in a world where scholars are subjected to institutional, political and financial influences. Nevertheless, we can at least be optimistic that there can be a review of perspectives and since a history of such a field as IR or doing its current research is not an exercise towards reaching a consensus, there will be alternatives and differences. The alternatives would then show what could be done better even when we also know what we are doing right now and how we can achieve a normative as well as ethical theory and world.

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Interviews

Ojo, Olusola on 12 October, 2017.

ABSTRACT

This article examines what it calls Africa's International Relations (IR) historiography, an assessment of African scholars' contribution to the study of IR's history and discipline. This is done based on the myth surrounding IR's historiography, the rather limited role of African contributions and a set of criteria teased out of Schmidt and Bell's works on the writing IR. While they acknowledge Hoffmann's IR as an American Social Science, they suggest that a field's historiography must highlight obscured perspectives, researchers that self-consciously profess IR as their discipline and institutions that contribute to the development of the discipline. Although African IR scholars meet some of these criteria, including institutions and scholars that self-profess as IR scholars, the American hegemony and its European competitor/ accomplice in the field greatly influence African scholars writings and the practices they adopt in the study of international relations. While African scholars bring African perspectives on global affairs to bare on the IR that they do, they mostly respond to theoretical, methodological and practical tones set elsewhere in doing so, some even countering these dominant views from "imported" theories, without necessarily developing African-oriented, philosophically grounded study on IR from the African perspective. Consequently, while African contributions to the discipline and history of IR appear marginal, African IR writers can expand their impacts by exploring the discipline of History – a view representing the eclectic nature of IR – and draw on African history and events to provide philosophical, theoretical and empirical insights to African IR study. While the postcolonial theory is an instance of such reflection, African IR scholars will make significant contributions to the field by introspection rather than reliance on Western-oriented canons.

KEYWORDS

BRAZIL LOOKS TO AFRICA: LUSOTROPICALISM IN THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

Fernando Sousa Leite[1]

Introduction

When becoming President of Brazil, in January 31st 1961, Jânio Quadros set to execute a number of actions in the international stage, through what was called the Independent Foreign Policy (PEI)[2]. The foreign policy of this president intended to, among other measures interpreted as unexpected and original, pursue a continent long overlooked in the foreign relations portfolio of the country: Africa. Differently from his predecessor Juscelino Kubitschek, that defended a "rearguard foreign policy, in opposition to an advanced internal policy" (Rodrigues 1963, 392), Quadros will assume what can be considered an avant-garde position in the foreign scope, even though he developed an internal policy interpreted as conservative.

Despite Jânio Quadros representing a ludicrous character in the national historiography, the idealization of the Africanist strand of his foreign policy was based, overall, on pragmatism. It was about making Brazil's foreign performance meet the demands of that time, an attempt to adjust its actions to the then undergoing set of modifications in the international relations. The way in which this inflexion towards Africa was executed can be criticized under different aspects, but the diagnosis of the necessity of an opening to Africa can be adduced as correct.

The economy dictated the paths to be followed by the foreign policy. In a rational perspective, the addition of the recognition of the independence of the African territories to the international action calculations of Brazil

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2 Portuguese acronym, *Política Externa Independente*.

could bring significant marginal gains, when compared to the maintenance of a cultural diplomacy of sorts, of affective or sentimental tendencies with Portugal. It was opportune to reset the clock of the Brazilian foreign performance in relation to the changes happening in the international stage, and one of these issues related exactly to a stand towards the movement of decolonization in Africa. Even though hesitant in its behavior, the PEI succeeded in at least representing a protocol of intentions to be duly put into practice in time. There was, notwithstanding, the inauguration of a universalist perspective in the history of Brazil's foreign policy, differing from the universality of JK's "regionalizing vision", in agreement with the interpretation of José Honório Rodrigues, which was predominant throughout the first half of the 20th century in the exercise of Brazil's foreign policy. The draft of an African policy, indeed, would gain shape during the civil-military dictatorship established in the country in 1964, as will be seen below.

The PEI suggested a pragmatic logic, according to which it would be necessary to proceed with caution towards a diversification of partnerships. It was about a prospective analysis, a bet to the future, in which the rescue of Brazil's South Atlantic dimension would be inserted in the dynamic of promotion of development, in an autonomous manner and not bound to the ideological orientation of its peers – be it capitalist or socialist, according to the polarization typical of the Cold War. The foreign policy of the last two governments of the populist-natured Liberal Republic defined a new stance to a new international panorama. A new frame was necessary, capable of admitting a new scenario that came to emerge in the international arena.

It is important to examine if the PEI represented a reaction or an innovation. One could argue that the movement of national diplomacy developed by Quadros and Arinos, his chancellor, was elaborated with some reactivity, as well as some innovativity. It was perceived, at last, that the alliance with the United States, which yielded many advantages throughout the Second World War and for a few years after that, had lost its meaning. What had already been pointed out by Raul Fernandes in his famous "memorandum of frustration" seemed to finally receive due attention. Furthermore, the limited results from the Pan-American Operation elaborated by his predecessor, president JK, would definitively bury the alignment with the United States. Alternatively, the PEI represented an adaptation to a new reality, in which new countries emerged and the increasing fragility of Portugal was recognized. It was thus instituted a path for the transition towards a new state of affairs.

It was not certain that this rapprochement with the African aspirations would yield good dividends. However, it was best to expect some gains than to continue promoting relations of a "historic and unconditional" (Salgado

2009, 1) character with a Portugal that maintained its "archaic world view" (Salgado 2009, 11). In addition, the rescue of the South Atlantic dimension of Brazil was underway, after being long relegated to a secondary importance, in a manner that proposed the modernization and updating of this path of which the apex was experienced by the Brazilian Northeast region from the colonial period until the first half of the 19th century.

If it is adequate to nickname Jânio Quadros the "wind sower" and João Goulart the "equilibrist president", as done by Schwarcz and Starling (2015), it is hard to believe that both presidents had the ability and bargaining power to provide effectiveness to the initiatives they set out to advance in the international stage. And that is considering Quadros had obtained the largest amount of votes until then registered in the country for President of the Republic. After all, if foreign policy is also a public policy, it requires, as do all the others, legitimacy for it to be effectively implemented, keeping in mind that "the foreign policy does not begin where the domestic policy ends" (Milani 2015), instead configuring dimensions that relate to each other in a substantial way. As is the case with internal policies, foreign policies are not made only with proposals and good intentions, but with broad articulation and negotiations in various spaces of power.

In the case of Quadros, let us take into consideration, for example, his short mandate, interrupted by a resignation request presented unexpectedly less than seven months after his inauguration. In his case, Goulart had to live, during most of his mandate, with the so-called parliamentary solution, for him to be able to assume the government. In this context of turbulent domestic policy, the foreign policy was used by the public opinion and the Parliament to delegitimize the ticket that won the 1960 election. In summary, "the foreign [policy] would receive the influx of the internal tensions" (Saraiva 1996, 86).

As referred by Mario Gibson Barboza, who was chief of staff of Afonso Arinos in the UN and of San Tiago Dantas when he was State Minister for Foreign Relations, "once again it was configured that the frustrating mark which characterized our actions was the right foreign policy in the wrong administration" (Barboza 1992, 74). It must also be recognized that "the politicization related to the PEI was one of the factors that contributed to the Military Coup carried out by conservative sectors of Brazilian society, with explicit support from the United States" (Visentini 2016, 13).

There have been affirmations that "Brazil did not have and does not have an African policy". The statement is penned by José Honório Rodrigues, in the preface of the second edition of his work *Brasil e África: outro horizonte*, which would be published in 1963. The first circulation of the book, released in 1961, *pari passu* the advent of the Independent Foreign

Policy, expressed optimism in relation to the foreign policy of Jânio Quadros, especially concerning its African aspect. Regarding this dimension of the foreign performance of the Quadros administration, he laments:

> It was thought it would be formulated in the beginning of the Jânio Quadros administration, but it stopped in its initial statements. In fact it was stillborn, when the Mission to Africa was completed with the Mission to Salazar, a thesis and an antithesis, with no synthesis. There also is not a policy on colonial matters, and it dances according to the firmness or laxity of the executors, of the transitory injustices, and as is the national politics the reign of indecision, also is the external one the domain of hesitation, masked as conciliation (Rodrigues 1982, 20).

Saraiva names this same characteristic the "zig-zagging movements or position of the independent foreign policy" or "pendular movement" (Saraiva 1993, 85). The PEI, in this sense, was no more than a draft, a protocol of intentions, a program that did not counted with the capacity to be implemented, considering the political moment. It was not viable to go beyond that, taking into account the internal context itself experienced by Brazil. Even so, it did not fail to approach important aspects, that would later be recuperated, in a more favorable and opportune scenario.

Those that held bright expectations regarding the initiatives presented by the PEI, as Honório Rodrigues, hoped for a more assertive posture of the Brazilian diplomacy in the matters related to the African continent, instead of a reticent position towards the Salazar government, in Portugal. However, what was observed were Brazil's abstentions in the resolutions 1603/1961 of the UNGA on the independence of Angola (Silva 1995), and 1761/1962 against the *apartheid* regime in South Africa, which took place during Quadros successor's mandate (Mallmann 2009).

Thus, Rodrigues clarifies that

> there was an initial push, a passionate interest for Africa, but, an adequate African policy itself was never formulated. [...] The African policy of the Quadros Administration, in its seven month tenure, did not birth anything other than abstention in the United Nations, against Algeria and Angola (...).

The change of the Brazilian foreign policy in its overture process to Africa in the 1960s can be considered an action coherent with what was happening gradually and simultaneously in the internal affairs of the country, namely, the search for identitary values that could explain the national formation

of Brazil. It was therefore necessary to rescue what had been put aside, overall during the 19th century, when Europe represented the model to be followed by the local elites, and the 20th century, when the North-American values began to seem increasingly more like the ones to be adapted by the nationals.

The historical moment in which the recovery – in new molds, surely – of the African dimension happened cannot be denied, when the Afro-Asian decolonization was gaining importance, the Cold War was worsening, and there was a need to find new markets; however, the inexistence of a theoretical framework developed with the objective of supporting the official discourse would possibly impose new obstacles to such an initiative, which itself faced resistance from both Brazilians and Africans from different countries and territories. It is convenient to remember that, in 1939, Getúlio Vargas creates the "Race Day", to be celebrated on June 10th, to commemorate the Brazilian miscegenation. Continuing this effort of valorization of autochthone aspects that define the Brazilian people, in 1963 the "National Samba Day" is created, to be celebrated on December 2nd (Figueiredo 2009). As explains Visentini (2016, 11),

> Vargas, from 1930 to 1945, created the basis for a national development project, that required a national identity. The search for Brasility, to which he recruited artists and intellectuals, rescued the Afro-descendants from the silence they had been relegated and this community's forms of cultural and religious expression. The Brazilian, historically, was the result of a prolonged miscegenation, and this dimension was rescued as one of the basic elements of the national identity.

Lusotropicalism[3] and "Pernambucanidade" in the Rescue of the South Atlantic as a Possible Horizon in the Brazilian Foreign Policy

The works of the Pernambuco sociologist Gilberto Freyre played a clear role in the way Brazil relates to its partners elsewhere, especially Portugal and the African continent, at first being intensely close with the former and, with the emergence of the anticolonial movements, approaching the latter, all the while attempting to maintain positive relations with the Portuguese state.

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3 E/N: We chose to maintain the prefix "luso", meaning "Portuguese" in that language, to maintain the best similarity possible with the concept coined by Freyre, explored in this session.

And, in that scenario, this position showed itself to be the one better suited to the national hopes, as well as the power project pursued by the country. It was necessary to carry out an overture to Africa, in a moment when the import substitution project gained traction and thus, an outlet for Brazilian production in new markets was convenient and, overall, urgent.

The Masters and the Slaves[4], published in 1933, as well as titles that followed it exploring the lusotropicalism, sought to value the miscegenation of the Brazilian society, pinning its success to the characteristics of the Portuguese colonization. Amado Cervo (2000, 278) thus explains Freyre's lusotropicalism concept, developed between the 1940s and 1950s: "the Brazilian sociologist conceived a Portuguese-Brazilian community based on what he called 'luso-tropicalism', the original condition that had led the Portuguese people to promote the racial, linguistic and cultural interpenetration, combining the European culture with the tropical culture".

While *The Masters and the Slaves* payed more attention to an internal analysis of Brazil, researching its own social formation and seeking explanations to the functioning of the national society in the colonial era; *The World the Portuguese created*[5], *A Brazilian man in Portuguese lands*[6] and *Adventure and Routine*[7] were presented related to an external logic, a manner and a discourse that could be explored by the country in its performance in the luso-tropical world.

Considering those who formulate Brazil's foreign policy and the diplomats are part of the intellectual elite, it is no wonder they had contact, at the time, with the theories of those called interpreters of Brazil, among who were, besides Freyre, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda and Caio Prado Jr. In fact, taking into account the impact the ideas of the master of Apipucos had in the Brazilian society, as well as in the self-image the country held itself , it is hard not to assume that this way of interpreting the national formation of Brazil would not exert some influence in its foreign projection. Thus, "the engagement of the Ministry of Foreign Relations [in the African policy of Brazil] was made easier by the studies and approaches that were developing through the dissident voices of the diplomats, politicians and intellectuals that came from the 1950s and were now put in the spotlight" (Saraiva 1996, 64).

The biggest problem and, at the same time, most noteworthy accomplishment of *The Masters and the Slaves* was generalizing a scheme

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4 Portuguese original, *Casa Grande & Senzala*.

5 Portuguese original, *O mundo que o português criou*.

6 Portuguese original, *Um brasileiro em terras portuguesas*.

7 Portuguese original, *Aventura e Rotina*.

identified strictly as a regional history perspective as a characteristic of national history, which led to unfocused interpretative logics, under a geographic point of view. When evoking his Pernambuco heritage, he seemed to reproduce a reasoning typical of the 17th century, namely, the word homeland bearing a "local, not national character" (Corrêa Martins apud Aldé 2008, s/n). What happened now was the opposite: a local analysis was assumed to be national.

In that triangular movement between Brazil, Africa and Portugal, the ideas introduced by the Pernambuco sociologist would be molded and adapted with the objective of coordinating with that which the Brazilian diplomacy meant to advocate, being it either the rapprochement of the Portuguese-Brazilian relationship, as explicitly defended by Freyre, or the right to self-determination of the African people. There was a cultural diplomacy with an affective aspect in the practice of Brazil's foreign policy in its relationship with Portugal, using the lusotropicalist discourse. Thus, this needed only be adapted to Africa, in such a way that the axis would be altered, but the base maintained.

The lusotropicanism is a result of the cultural proximity between Pernambuco and Angola. Freyre recuperates links that faded in Brazil's post-independence. As highlights José Honório Rodrigues,

> Angola was more connected to Brazil than to Portugal. It was Rio de Janeiro that freed it from Dutch domain; of its three deputies to the Constituent Courts, two aligned with Brazil; in 1822 it was in Rio de Janeiro that the proclamations for 'despised Angola' were released and following them the rebel movements of Luanda and Benguela sought to join the country to Brazil (Rodrigues 1963, 24).

This bond is highlighted by Luiz Felipe de Alencastro, that describes that the travel time between Recife and Luanda in the first quarter of the 17th century took 35 days, while from Bahia the same trip to Angola took forty days, and from Rio, fifty (Alencastro 2000), in a way that conformed a "Brazilic Angola", in the historian's understanding. Furthermore, the years between 1648 and 1665 are known as "the Brazilian years of the history of Angola", comprising the administrations of Salvador de Sá, João Fernandes Vieira and André Vidal de Negreiros (Silva Rego apud Alencastro 2000, 262).

The Freyrian stratagem is inserted in a tide of valorization of the nativist sentiment present in Pernambuco, known in our days as "Pernambucanidade" (Aldé 2008, s/n). According to this logic, this Northeastern Brazilian state would be identified as a model of resistance to the Portuguese colonization, even expelling the Dutch invaders. It is important to underline the story of

André Vidal de Negreiros, who, besides governing Pernambuco, would also become governor of Angola, being recognized by historian Francisco Adolfo Varnhagen as a "legitimate representative of the Brazilians in the glorious restoration of the Northeastern land to the whole of the nation" (Pessoa 2009, 8).

In short, the importance of the lusotropicalism was the recuperation of the South Atlantic dimension in the international relations of Brazil. The geography proved to be a fundamental prerequisite to the advent of the PEI. The geographic aspect and the lusotropicalism had to be seen as complementary in this process, justifying one another. A bond that had been severed in the 19th century was meant to be reestablished, in a process adequately described by Honório Rodrigues,

> Made the rupture, around 1855, by British imposition with the acquiescence of Portugal, which from 1847 until 1895 denied us the establishment of a consulate in Angola, our policy was Latin-Americanized and the River Plate came to occupy a more relevant place, besides, evidently, the English prevalence and the increase of the North-American commercial exchange and cultural and political influence (Rodrigues 1963, 25).

It would be in the civil-military dictatorship that the African policy of Brazil would be effectively defined, with the "pioneering trip of Gibson Barboza to nine countries of West Africa – Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Dahomey (currently Benin), Zaire, Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal and Gabon – in November 1972" (Laramao 2007, 46). A rapprochement was evident under both commercial and political terms with Africa, marking a "change in posture of the Brazilian government in regards to the Portuguese colonialism" (Laramao 2007, 46).

The trip of chancellor Gibson Barboza to nine countries of the Western coast of Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, shows the dedication of Brazil to strengthen ties with the continent. The African tour did not include territories that were engaged in bloody struggles against the Europeans, nor Portuguese territories. There was a personal effort by Barboza to convince the Portuguese to facilitate the independence of their ultramarine provinces. An encounter between the Brazilian diplomat and Marcelo Caetano even took place, in an attempt to convince his Portuguese counterpart.

It must still be wondered to what degree the so-called feeling of "Pernambucanidade" got to reflect in the need and importance of seeking Africa. One would have to look into the influence in the PEI of the thought

of the Pernambuco Gilberto Freyre, one of its possible "forgotten roots". The concretization of the foreign policy to Africa, itself, must be identified with the performance of Mario Gibson Barboza, who carried out the African tour, and, according to Lamarão (2007, 43), "opened the doors to the country's presence in Africa". Thus, it must be asked if Barboza being native to Pernambuco would be mere coincidence, with him also having been research assistant to Gilberto Freyre, in the 1930s. As proposed by Alzira Abreu "the life trajectories can become object of analysis and historical interpretation, being possible to articulate the timeframe of one individual's story and the socio-historic time, in other words the articulation between biography and history" (Abreu 2007, 8).

The direct and personal relationship between Mario Gibson Barboza nad Gilberto Freyre is thus examined. When the diplomat was interviewed by the historian Jerry Dávila, he confided to the North-American researcher that he took part in encounters in the sociologist's house, in the 1930s, which he refers to as actual sociology classes, opportunities in which the Africanism constant in the country was discussed. Barboza, at the time, was still a student in the Law School of the Federal University of Pernambuco and, with his academic peers, went on from these meetings to carry out research for the book *The Mansions and the Shanties*[8], of 1938, that followed *The Masters and the Slaves*. Likewise, Gibson confessed to Dávila his participation in the I Afro-Brazilian Congress, organized by Freyre in 1934. He, who would become chancellor under general Emílio Gastarrazu Médici's administration, registers maintaining a friendly relationship with Gilberto Freyre through all his life, with the latter taking part in the arrangements of the diplomatic mission that would be known as the African tour (Dávila 2011).

The historian Cíntia Vieira Souto, who also interviewed Gibson Barboza, confirms the information presented above, as well as including others. The researcher affirms that, in the interview granted to her, Barboza mentions being patron of Gilberto Freyre when he received, for the first time, the title of Doctor *honoris causa*, by the University of Pernambuco. Cíntia Souto also reports that the diplomat talked to Freyre about experiences he witnessed in Africa, attesting the proximity between Africa and Brazil – facts that were unknown to the Pernambuco sociologist. Finally, Barboza refers to his fellow countryman as "old and dear friend" (Barboza 1992, 301).

As Freyre, Mario Gibson Barboza always evoked his origins when presenting himself. In his classic *In diplomacy, the whole stroke of life*[9],

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8 Portuguese original, *Sobrados e Mucambos*.

9 Portuguese original, *Na diplomacia, o traço todo da vida*.

the diplomat, besides bringing in the title of the work a reference to the words attributed to his fellow countryman Joaquim Nabuco, reproduced in epigraph[10], alludes in the second paragraph of the introductory note to his Pernambuco origin: "Primarily I was born in Olinda" (Barboza 1992, 7). In fact, the continuation itself of the space in which he exposes the idea of the "whole stroke of life", Nabuco refers to Pernambuco as a factor always present in his experience:

> I went through this initial years [the first eight years of his life] so remote, however, more present than any other, in a sugarcane mill in Pernambuco, my home province. The land was one of the vastest and most picturesque of the Cabo zone... This background never removes itself from my sight, representing the last distances of my life (Nabuco apud Lafer 2002, 20).

One of the main crafters of the overture of Brazil's foreign policy to Africa confesses: "I feel my deep-seated feeling of Brazility owes much to the very Brazilian character of the city where I was born and raised. On those days, my horizons were limited" (Barboza 1992, 7). When carrying out his African tour, Barboza notices the similarities between Brazil's Northeast and those countries in the other side of the South Atlantic: "me, when visiting these countries, verified that, in certain places of Africa I felt like I was in Bahia or Pernambuco. The beach is the same, the sea is the same, the food is the same". "It is not only a matter of paying a debt of a remorse; it is because the link between Brazil and Africa is unique". And concludes: "and this policy, if you'll allow me some vanity, I am proud to have inaugurated, because I think it is an important moment in Brazil's foreign policy" (Barboza 1992, 28). [...] "This overture to Africa was something that marked my term. Let me say this, not only this, but this was one of the things I consider most important that I had the opportunity to do" (Barboza 1992, 29-30).

When he proposed to president Médici initiatives focused on the African continent, his arguments can be seen to coincide with ideas introduced by Gilberto Freyre:

> when I proposed to Médici beginning an overture of the Brazilian foreign policy to Africa, for the reasons that I explained in the presentations of reasons that I later made to him and that he approved, that is, that Brazil is not a black country, but a mixed country. We

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10 "The whole stroke of like is, for many, a child's drawing forgotten by the man" (Joaquim Nabuco, *My Formation – Minha Formação,* "Massananga").

have, to me, the advantage, the glory of being a mixed country, I think this grants a great richness to the Brazilian civilization. The African coefficient to the formation of our nationality was huge. When the abolition of slavery was declared in Brazil, two thirds of our population was made up of black slaves. This country was built by the black arm, by the arm of the black slave. It was made in the arm of the black slave. This is what built Brazil. We have, in this sense, a moral debt towards Africa (Barboza 1992, 29-30).

The root of the Africanist strand, identified in Freyre, would be recovered and put into effect by Barboza. The history repeated itself, as stated by the character Úrsula, immortalized by Gabriel García Marquez in *One hundred years of solitude*. Similarly to what occurred during the colonial period, when Recife and Angola shared a close bond, carefully and warily watched by Portugal, there was an attempt to recover this historic link, adapted to the modern times, but that still raised suspicions by the reluctant Portuguese colonial power.

Barboza, a central actor through the tenure of the Independent Foreign Policy, witnessed in a privileged position the lack of political tact of the last two presidents of the populist liberal Republic. The "wind sower" and the "equilibrist president" could have had good projects, but their inabilities to implement them were clear. These inabilities could be a result of factors of personal order, as was the case for Jânio, or the political-ideological tensions, in the case of Jango.

Regarding Jânio, Barboza claims that he even authorized the new Brazilian position of voting against the Portuguese colonialism, but that his posture changed when he talked to the president of Portugal. Barboza's report on this episode became iconic:

> - Yes, Minister, I did change. I already promised to the Ambassador that we will vote for Portugal. You know, Minister, the President of Portugal telephoned me, made an appeal, I cried on the phone, we both cried. We were left in tears. We cannot do this with Portugal. No, Minister, do not vote against Portugal".

And reflected:

> Is it true that the President of Portugal telephoned Jânio? I think so. Is it true that he cried? It could be, I don't know. It is possible that he simply gave in to the pressure and decided to offer his Chancellor, well in his style, the appearance of a pathetic, dramatic gesture, in the manner of an explanation. With Jânio Quadros it was always difficult to really know where was the histrionics inserted (Barboza 1992, 237-238).

In turn, regarding Jango, Barboza explained that:

> he had no ability to govern – zero government. I have never seen such inability. If that went on, I am not in favor of the military coup, but if that went on that would have turned into a unionist republic in which who gave orders wouldn't even be him, but that did not agree with him, no. Now, his was a cordial presence (Barboza 2002, 32).

"The right foreign policy in the wrong government", a "zero government", could finally be set in motion, in a more favorable political and economic environment, as was the one in the first half of the 1970s, the years of the so-called economic miracle. The set of initiatives to be executed was well studied, waiting to integrate the foreign policy agenda in an adequate way. That privileged witness of the 1960s, came, in the following decade, to the position of main executor.

Final Considerations

The action of seeking Africa coincided with the effort itself of building the national identity, so very promoted in the first half of the 20th century. The Portuguese path had been well explored as a constitutive element of the Brazilian identity, even because of the strong presence of Portuguese nationals and their descendants, especially in the urban region of the city of Rio de Janeiro. It was necessary, in an alternative and concomitant way, without denying the Portuguese heritage present in the country, to recognize Africa in Brazil's national formation, and that also reflected in the dimension of the foreign relations of the Brazilian state.

The luso-tropicalism of Gilberto Freyre did not cause misinterpretations only in Brazil, but also in Portugal, as evident by the testimony of Mário Soares, "in the presence of Gilberto Freyre himself, in Recife, in March 23rd 1987":

> This theory was badly used in the days of the former regime, but myself attempted to demonstrate that the work of Gilberto Freyre was admired in Portugal, not only by those that were aligned with colonialism, but also by the free, democratic and modern Portugal that I represent; [...] Portugal, regardless the regime, or regardless of political beliefs, is with Gilberto Freyre and understand the greatness of his work and his importance to Portugal, to Brazil, and to what we can call our Afro-Portuguese-Brazilian linguistic unity (Soares apud Chacon 2001, 112).

As did some Brazilian diplomats, active in the middle of the 20th century, Soares also understood "the possibility and necessity of readapting the lusotropicalism according to reasons of state" (Soares apud Chacon 2001, 112). Freyre, as attests Chacon (2001, 85), was target of "political accusations of conservatism and even reactionaryism, 'ideologue' of a false ethnic democracy, 'salazarist', 'defendant' of the Brazilian military regime of 1964, 'longing' after all of the masters against the slaves etc. etc. etc.".

Gilberto Freyre takes part in the process of building of Brazility, which would provoke external consequences, among which is the political projection of the country towards Africa, bringing a new aspect to Brazil's foreign act. As was internally evidenced the contribution of a number of peoples, cultures and ethnicities to the national formation, it externally implied the diversification of partnerships – the notion that the Brazilian diplomacy, due to the diversified composition itself of the people it represented, could globalize or universalize its relationships portfolio.

If the "Pernambuco maestro" – as Fernando Henrique Cardoso (2013) refers to him – conducted a variety of musicians in the orchestra of Brazil's social thinking, it can be said that he lost control of those he conducted when it came to the Brazilian foreign policy. Despite the existence of misinterpretations regarding his ideas, the valorization of autochthone identitary elements to the international projection of the country that followed is evident, in observance to Tolstoy's (apud Chacon, 111) opinion, according to whom "if you want to be universal, talk of your village". In the words of Cardoso (2013, 95), "all of Gilberto Freyre's thought looked into the singularity of social and cultural forms of Brazil". While Brazilians enjoyed the encounter with their own Brasility, they also learned they could universalize their foreign relations, without limitations of any nature, resulting, too, in the overture to Africa.

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to present the Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa, developed in the 1960s and conceived by Janio Quadros and João Goulart, but effectively implemented by Mario Gibson Barboza, during the Brazilian military regime, as being directly influenced by the thought of Gilberto Freyre, especially by the idea of "lusotropicalism". Furthermore, it analyzes the presence of the so-called "pernambucanidade" in the undertaking of the South Atlantic as a dimension of the Brazilian foreign policy.

ASSESSING THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA) FROM AN INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH AND THE DIFFERENCE IT HAS MADE IN AFRICA SINCE 2002

Juliana Abena Appiah[1]

Introduction

The African Union (AU) was formed out of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in July 2002 to tackle the myriad of challenges facing Africa. The 1990s had been marked with several conflicts within the continent, which obviously had disturbed the peace, security and stability in Africa. The new AU was thus borne out of a consciousness of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent, and therefore, there was the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of Africa's development and integration agenda. To that effect, the AU was prepared to commit to strengthening its institutions and providing them with the necessary powers and resources to enable them discharge their respective mandates effectively. Therefore, the AU set up its African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) starting with the Peace and Security Council (PSC) the flagship institution in the APSA, in December 2003. The remaining components, which were added later, were the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (PoW), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the African Peace Fund (APF). In addition, the AU Commission was to provide advisory support to the PSC and the rest of the components of the APSA.

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The APSA is built around structures, objectives, principles and values, as well as decision-making processes relating to the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent. The APSA's work, therefore, is to uphold the AU's rules, norms, objectives and principles on peace, security and stability, and to ensure that the behavior of Member States conforms to them. Within the framework of the neo-Institutionalist theory of integration, and with the use of secondary data, the paper hypothesis that the APSA is disadvantaged as a result of not fairly applying its rules across the board in Member States. The paper assesses the performance of the APSA since its inception. The major objective of the paper is to ascertain whether the APSA has made any difference in the area of peace, security and stability since it came to being. Has the APSA been institutionalized fully? Is it functioning as expected? If not, what are the daunting constraints, and how can they be addressed to enable the APSA function to its full capacity and expectation? The paper is made up of seven sections: Introduction; The New Institutionalist Theory; The AU and the APSA; Analysis of the Legal Framework of the APSA; Assessment of the APSA; The APSA: What Difference in Africa?; and the Conclusion.

The New Institutionalist Theory

The new Institutionalist theory of integration is a build-up of the traditional Institutionalist theory. The former seeks to improve on the latter by prescribing particular ways in which to apply the theory. In political science and international relations, institutionalism was applied to the study of constitutions, legal systems and government structures. Institutionalism emerged as a reaction to the under-socialized character of the dominant approaches in political science. The theory has, over the years, gained grounds in the social sciences, and it is used for analyses of both micro interpersonal as well as macro global systems.

Stephen Bell defines an institution "as a process or set of processes which shape behaviour." He also quotes a dictionary definition of an institution as "established law, custom or practice." According to Bell, institutions matter because laws, customs and established practices in institutional and organizational settings can play a powerful role in shaping the behaviour of individuals. Institutions may be formal or informal, and the most effective institutional arrangements are the ones which incorporate a normative system of informal and internalized rules. Institutionalism therefore emphasizes how institutional constraints in the form of rules, conventions, norms and codes

of behaviour contribute in shaping the power, behaviour and preferences of actors, and which in turn shape policy outcomes. These are the premises on which new institutionalism is built.

There are three major variants of new institutionalism: rational choice, sociological (normative) and historical. However, five core assumptions form the foundation of the whole school of new institutionalism. First of all, institutions create order and predictability such that political actors are constrained to act within the logic of appropriateness. Institutions reflect a polity's character, identity, history and vision, and they provide affinity ties, which bind actors together in spite of the differences among them. Secondly, institutions generate structures, which are translated into political action, and political action in turn results in institutional continuity and change. Thirdly, a collection of institutions, which fit into a coherent system produce political order. Actors organize themselves and act in accordance with rules and practices, which are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated and accepted. Institutions define basic rights and responsibilities of actors, and regulate how advantages, burdens and life-choices are allocated in society. Authority is also created to settle issues and resolve conflicts. The fourth assumption is that institutions give to social relations, reduce flexibility and variability in behaviour, and restrict the possibility of a one-sided pursuit of self-interest. The fundamental logic of action is rule following, that is, prescriptions based on the question of appropriateness. Rules are followed because they are seen by actors as natural, rightful, expected and legitimate. Members are expected to obey and be guardians of the institution's constitutive principles and standards. The last but not the least is that institutions are not static and irreversible. Institutions are defended by insiders and validated by outsiders, and because their histories are encoded into rules and routines, their internal structures and rules cannot be changed arbitrarily. Changes occurring are most likely to reflect the adaptation to local experience and thus be relatively myopic and meandering, rather than optimizing, as well as inefficient in the sense of not reaching a uniquely optimal arrangement.

The AU and the APSA

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was transformed to the African Union (AU) due to the changes in political, peace and security, as well as socio-economic needs of Africa within the context of the broader global changes as a result of the end of the Cold War. The normative and institutional framework of the AU was shaped significantly by the expansion

in the concept of security to encompass not only the narrow traditional (state-centered) sense, but also a broader human-centered conceptualization of security. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was to be the operational structure for the effective implementation of decisions taken on conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. Its mandate also reflects the shift to human security, which is widely accepted at the continental level. It is to deal with issues related to human development, promote democratic practices, good governance and respect for human rights, and humanitarian action and manage disaster. Aside the AU Commission, which is to support its activities, the APSA is made up of five major components, namely; The Peace and Security Council (PSC), The Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS), The Panel of the Wise (PoW), The African Standby Force (ASF), and The African Peace Fund (APF). Aside these, the APSA depend heavily on the AU Commission for administrative support.

The Peace and Security Council

The PSC succeeded the OAU Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the operational body that was mandated to make decisions on matters of peace and security. The PSC is the main pillar of the APSA. Through the PSC, the AU is able to work with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) or Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs) and by that, the RECs/RMs are made a part of the APSA. The PSC also interacts with other AU organs such as the Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, civil society organizations, the United Nations (UN), and other relevant international stakeholders. These interactions have, however, not always been healthy. One source of tension that readily undermines effective cooperation between the AU and the RECs, which needs to be resolved if continental integration would speed up, is the overlap of roles and responsibilities. There is need to clearly restate the roles and responsibilities between the AU, its member States and the RECs. Doing this will ensure a decrease in tensions and so will the accusations of division and sectional conspiracy that often characterize the relationship between the AU and the RECs decrease. Clearly spelling out the different roles, responsibilities, obligations and corresponding institutional architecture in the Constitutive Act of the AU and treaties of the various RECs is also critical to the progress of this relationship. Fortunately, the Heads of State and Government of the AU have sanctioned a review of the Constitutive Act and it is hoped that these areas will be clarified.

Returning to the PSC, it was specifically established to be a collective security and early warning arrangement with the ability to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations. It has the power to recommend intervention in Member States to promote peace, security and stability.

The PSC has fifteen members, who are all elected by the AU Executive Council for endorsement by the AU Assembly. Five Members are elected for three-year terms, usually to take up office on the first day of April, following endorsement by the Assembly. Retiring members are eligible for immediate re-election. Members are elected according to the principle of equitable regional representation and national rotation agreed within the regional groups: Central, Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western Africa. The idea of regional representation, though laudable, has so far not helped the PSC as some countries have taken advantage of this rotation scheme time and again. Nigeria, as a case in point, has served on the PSC since its inception in 2004 and yet has consistently avoided election. Nigeria has succeeded in making itself a *de facto* permanent member of the PSC. This has been made possible due to Nigeria's preponderant power. Again, some member States elected to the PSC have, during their tenure, experienced violent conflicts and yet have remained members of the Council. Others have clearly not respected the principle of constitutionality, human rights, rule of law and good governance in general. All these cast serious doubts on the AU's commitment to democracy and good governance.

The Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS)

The CEWS are responsible for data collection and analysis. It is mandated to collaborate with the UN, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, Research Centres, academic institutions, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Its information is to be used by the Chairperson of the AU Commission to advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa, and recommend the best course of action.

The objective of the CEWS is to anticipate and prevent conflicts on the continent; and to provide timely information on evolving violent conflicts based on specifically developed indicators. It has six information-gathering tools: the Africa Media Monitor, Indicators and Profiles Module, Africa Reporter, CEWS Portal, Africa Prospectus, and the Live-Mon.

The CEWS are established by Article 12 of the PSC Protocol. Per the Protocol, the CEWS is made up of two components. First is the "Situation

Room," an observation and monitoring centre located at the Conflict Management Division of the AU. It is in charge of data collection and analysis. Second are the observation and monitoring units of the RECs/RMs. They are to be linked directly through appropriate means of communication to the Situation Room. They are also to collect and process data at their level for onward transmission to the Situation Room.

In 2006, the Governmental Experts Meeting on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention adopted the Framework for the Operationalization of the CEWS. The Framework was later endorsed by the Executive Council in Addis Ababa in January 2007. The Council requested the Commission to see to the full implementation of the Framework within a timeframe of three years to make the CEWS fully operational.

The Panel of the Wise

The PoW is a critical pillar of the APSA. It is a five-person panel of highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development in the continent. They are to support efforts of the PSC and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention. The first Panel was appointed in December 2007. Members of the Panel serve terms of three years, after which they are eligible for appointment for another term. The PoW reports to the Assembly through the PSC. Members are selected by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, and appointed through a decision of the Assembly. The Panel meets at least three times a year to deliberate on its work programme, and to identify regions and countries to visit. It also organizes annual workshops on issues related to conflict prevention and management to assist in producing a thematic report to be submitted to the Assembly for endorsement.

Article 11 of the PSC Protocol establishes the PoW. Its mandate is to support and advise the Chairperson of the Commission and the PSC in the area of conflict prevention; advise both on issues of impunity, justice and reconciliation, as well as women and children in armed conflicts; use its good offices to carry out conflict mediation and broker peace agreements between warring parties; and help the AU Commission to map out threats to peace and security by providing regular advice and analysis, and requesting the deployment of fact-finding and mediation teams to specific countries.

The African Standby Force

The ASF is established by Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act and Article 13 of the PSC Protocol. The Act gives the AU the right to intervene in Member States in the events of grave circumstances (including war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity). The ASF is to prosecute this agenda through standby arrangements with Africa's five sub-regions.

The ASF is made up of multidimensional capabilities, including military, police and civilian. These personnel are on standby in their countries of origin, ready for rapid deployment. The initial concept of the ASF was that of a quick reaction capacity which would enable Africans to respond swiftly to a crisis, unhampered by any heavy political and instrumental burdens. The functions of the ASF include the following: observation and monitoring of missions; other types of peace support operations; intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state to restore peace and security, in accordance with Articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the Constitutive Act. Other functions are preventive deployment to prevent disputes and conflicts from escalating, an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or states, and the resurgence of violence after parties to conflict have reached an agreement; and peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters. It also performs any other function as may be mandated by the PSC or the Assembly.

The African Peace Fund

The African Peace Fund (APF) was established in June 1993 as one of the operational tools to finance peace and security activities of the AU. It was borne out of a realization that contributions of Member States alone were not sufficient for the OAU to undertake its various responsibilities. The Peace Fund is made up of financial appropriations from the regular AU budget, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from Member States and from other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through appropriate fundraising activities.

Obviously, the AU has, by the APSA, set up institutions and structures to facilitate achievement of its objective to promote peace and security in Africa. What remains is for these institutions and structures to function optimally to deliver on their mandates.

The Legal Framework of the APSA: A New AU Normative Order for the APSA to Police?

The institutionalization of the APSA by the AU stemmed from the realization of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa was a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent. The old OAU had not been granted adequate powers to deal with these conflicts to position Africa on a path of peace and security, as well as socio-economic growth and development. Therefore, there was the need to take steps to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of Africa's development and integration agenda. For that reason, the AU pledged to take all necessary measures to strengthen its institutions and provide them with the necessary powers and resources to enable them discharge their respective mandates effectively.

A study of the objectives and principles of the AU, compared with those of the OAU, reveals a shift from an old OAU normative order designed to safeguard the individual sovereignty of states in Africa to a new AU normative order aimed at addressing not only the security of the African state, but also the security of the African people; from a culture of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States to a norm of intervention and non-indifference. Among others, the objectives of the AU are to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States; promote peace, security and stability in the continent; promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance; and promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments. To these ends, the principles of the AU include prohibition of the use of force or threat of force among Member States; non-interference in the internal affairs of other Member States; the right of the AU to intervene in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; the right of Member States to request intervention from the AU to restore peace and security, as well as respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance.

In all of the above, the APSA has a great role to play to ensure that AU Member State's behaviour conforms to the objectives and principles of the AU. The work of the PSC is inspired by the mandate of the UN Security Council, which is tasked with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, as well as the role the UN Charter assigns to regional arrangements in the maintenance of peace and security.

The PSC Protocol expresses deep concern about the continued prevalence of armed conflicts in Africa, to which it attributes the socio-economic decline in Africa, as well as the suffering of the civilian population. The Protocol, therefore, expresses the determination of Member States to enhance their capacity to address the scourge of conflicts on the continent, as well as ensure the AU plays a central role in the pursuit of peace, security and stability in the continent. To put this determination into action, the Protocol establishes the PSC as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The PSC is expected to be a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. The AU Commission and the four other components of the APSA are to support the PSC in carrying out this mandate.

The mandate of the APSA, per the PSC Protocol, makes the PSC a replica of the UN Security Council for the AU. It constitutes the heartbeat of the AU when it comes to dealing with threats to peace and security in the continent. Like the UN Security Council, the PSC exists to enforce the rules, principles, and norms of the AU in the area of peace and security. To be able to carry out its responsibilities, the PSC is granted some powers by Member States. Among others, the PSC has the power to anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity. The PSC also has the power to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions to resolve conflicts where they have occurred. It also has the power to authorize the monitoring and deployment of peace support missions, and to recommend to the Assembly, intervention on behalf of the AU, in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. Other powers of the PSC are to approve the modalities for intervention; institute sanctions against unconstitutional changes of government in Member States; implement the Common African Defence Policy; implement AU and regional instruments on combating terrorism; and to promote and develop a strong partnership for peace and security between the AU and the UN, and other relevant international organizations.

By endowing the PSC with the powers in Article 7, the AU delegates the PSC to handle issues on the peace and security of the continent, as is the case with the UN and its Security Council. Thus, the PSC is expected to have the massive support of the AU Member States in the execution of its functions aimed at creating and sustaining peace and security in Africa. The PSC is expected to work closely with the AU Commission, which is to perform an advisory role in this area. The PoW is to support efforts of the PSC in the area of conflict prevention. The CEWS are also to support the PSC through

the performance of observation and monitoring functions. The ASF supports the PSC in the deployment of peace support missions and interventions. The Peace Fund is to provide the necessary financial support to the PSC in times of peace support operations and other operational activities related to peace and security. This said, the Peace Fund has so far suffered some donor constraints since its inception. A typical case in point was Japan's behavior during the Mali crisis where the AU was instructed by Japan not to withdraw from the Peace Fund to send troops to Mali for direct combat role except for peacekeeping (Observer Missions). Donors give various prescriptions on what the funds they provide can or cannot be used for. The AU and its PSC may on the other hand deem it necessary to use the fund provided differently, putting them at variance with its donors. Such constraints from donors, therefore, limit the AU and the PSC's reach in fulfilling their mandate.

The APSA: Successes, Progress and Challenges

The performance of the components of the APSA is mixed. While some have been operationalized fully, others have not. Again, even the fully operational components have their own challenges that hinder them from functioning optimally.

The PSC seems to have performed creditably, having convened several meetings to deliberate on issues of conflict and crisis situations far beyond expectation. It has also issued several communiqués and statements relating to Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, and Zimbabwe, among others. The PSC has also authorized sanctions against several Member States. It has authorized the deployment of peace missions in Burundi (2003), Sudan (2004), the Comoros (2006), and Somalia (2007). The PSC has demonstrated ability to draw attention to crisis situations in Africa and continues to function as one of the most important and powerful components of the APSA. The achievements of the PSC so far demonstrate the growing commitment of Member States to tackle conflicts on the continent. It also gives an indication of the fragility of the security situation of some of its members.

Kwesi Aning, however, notes that the PSC has not been able to apply its norms, values and principles equally to all Member States. This is, however, not a surprising occurrence. Examples can be cited of Togo, Mauritania, and Sudan where PSC norms have been applied differently. In

Togo, it took the combined leadership of the ECOWAS and the AU to reverse the palace coup, which took place in February 2005. In Mauritania, however, a 'blanket' application of sanctions after the coup d'etat culminated in an inability to bring the desired change and a reversal of the military takeover. Mauritania proved difficult, in spite of its suspension from the AU and the broader international efforts to return the country to democratic government. Sudan was a very tough one for the PSC. It brought to light a unique challenge about how the AU's developing norms and principles should be applied. The PSC and the wider international community, for a very long time, failed to change the behaviour of Sudan.

Again, the interface between the PSC and similar organs in the RECs/RMs has been limited. Interaction between the PSC and other APSA components has not been optimal. This is partly because some of the components have not been operationalized. Institutional support to the PSC is also limited, although the set of activities have grown exponentially. The PSC Secretariat is overstretched because it supports both the PSC and some of its members with limited capacity in their embassies. The structures in the RECs face similar administrative support challenges.

Further, the CEWS have been able to automate data collection and reporting at an advanced level. However, operationalization is mixed at the level of the RECs/RMs. Whereas the ECOWARN and CEWARN are relatively advanced in automation of data collection and reporting, progress at the CEN-SAD, EAC, and COMESA has been slow. However, impressive progress has been made in the establishment of policy frameworks, specific concepts and approaches to early warning. There have also been moves to get civil society organizations (CSOs) and training institutions with interest in early warning, peace and security on board.

Conflict analysis and development of response options have not been the best. This is because there are a number of challenges with the collection, sharing and distribution of information among stakeholders. A clear collaborative framework needs to be done in strengthening relations between the CEWS at the AU and the early warning systems of the RECs. In terms of infrastructure, although significant effort has been put into the development of systems for the smooth running of the CEWS, there are still issues with the analytic capacity of staff, recruitment and development of the necessary technical expertise, deployment of the necessary tools for data collection and analysis, institutionalization of a standardized early warning system at the RECs, and establishing the necessary system for linking them to the CEWS at the AU Headquarters, as well as the legal and political framework for institutionalized relations with the RECs.

The PoW, on its part, has had several meetings, both formal and informal, with stakeholders in peace and security. It has embarked on some country visits and observation and monitoring in conflict-affected areas. Compared to the other components, not much is known about the details of their activities. The Panel is only expected to issue public statements on its activities, and it has limited communication of its programmes and activities to only the numerous communiques it has issued since its operationalization. Every year, the PoW works with a particular thematic area covered in its mandate: Prevention of Election-Related Violence (2008); Impunity, Reconciliation and Healing (2009); and Women and Children in Armed Conflict (2010). The Panel holds periodic meetings with the PSC on its key thematic areas which inform the decision-making process of the PSC. A special meeting was held on "Women and Children in Armed Conflict in March 2010. The PoW has also organized workshops in Nairobi, Kenya (November 2008), Monrovia, Liberia (May 2009), and Kinshasa, DRC (May 2010).

Although the PoW seems to be on course, there are still a number of issues to take care of. Meetings of the Panel with the PSC are more informal than formal. The two seem to be working parallel to each other, and only meeting in their collaboration with the Chairperson of the Commission. Again, members of the Panel seem to be working in an ad hoc manner, with each engaged in other activities outside the PoW. Sometimes, they are not available when needed to take care of conflict situations. The Panel also seems to be more interested in conflict prevention (that is democracy, governance, rule of law) than management and resolution. This is in spite of the fact that there is already a lot of attention in conflict prevention. The challenge of not knowing its activities in detail also hampers peace efforts. Other stakeholders are not let in on all the happenings in areas of operation of the PoW. To resolve these challenges the Panel must ensure that its conflict prevention activities are properly coordinated with the AU's other institutions that handle peace and security. There must exist a cordial working relationship between the Panel, the PSC, the Department of Political Affairs and the AUC in order to avoid the duplication of roles but ensure efficiency in the delivery of service. The PoW further needs to broaden its scope of operation to collaborate with similar structures and institutions at the RECs as well as civil society organizations in Africa that deal in peace and security.

Further, efforts to operationalize the ASF have registered good progress, albeit, the degree of progress varying from region to region. Progress in the development of a multidimensional concept for the ASF is one of the most remarkable to date. The Military and Police components have been put in place in all the REC's. However, the setting up of the civilian component

remains challenging. With regards to this, the policy development angle has been well covered by the various REC's. What remain problematic are the disparities in the levels of implementation of these policies by the various REC's. There is also no binding framework between the AU and the RECs and their Member States, regarding contribution of troops. The AU would also need an advocacy plan to raise awareness about its existence and activities, as African awareness of the role of the ASF remains poor. It is hoped that lessons from past exercises like the 2010 AMANI and practical experience from peace operations in Darfur (AMIS/UNAMID) and Somalia (AMISOM) will contribute to achieving Full Operational Capability.

An assessment of the Peace Fund reveals that it is small and precarious. In 2007, a high-level Audit of the AU concluded that there was cause for concern regarding the funding of peace operations in Africa. Less than 10% of the regular budget of the AU is allocated to the Peace Fund. This is too small compared with the needs of peacekeeping activities of the continent. The assessed contributions to finance peacekeeping have not been done, and the reimbursement within six months of states contributing contingents to peace support operations, as provided for in the Protocol has not always been honored. Until these challenges are met, the APSA's work will continue to face financial challenges, a situation that perhaps a partnership with the UN and other international organizations can ameliorate. This partnership with the UN and other International Organisations, however, has its own challenges that the AU itself acknowledges. The disadvantages in the over-dependence on donors or foreign partners for financial resources stem from donor restrictions on what such funds can and cannot be applied to in the context of peace and security. Another challenge with the overdependence on donors then becomes the ownership of the peace process on the continent. Can the AU and its member states claim ownership of the peace processes in Africa when foreigners pay to ensure the processes take place? Is the popular mantra of 'African solutions to African problems' then mere talk with no concrete backing financially from African States? The AU at its Special Summit in Tripoli (2009) stated that it was critical that Member States met their financial obligations so the organization's dependency on external aid could be reduced and sustainability and ownership could be guaranteed.

The APSA: What Difference in Africa?

So far, it is obvious that the APSA has been institutionalized, although some challenges persist. Its components have been duly established by the

appropriate legal framework. Its functions are also well known to Member States of the AU. Since they have been established by and with the consent of these Member States, it is expected that they will support the APSA in the discharge of its duties. Support in this sense includes ensuring that their actions or behaviour conform to and do not undermine the rules, principles, norms and values the APSA is tasked to police. Where Member States falter or go contrary to these norms, their behaviour should be seen as unacceptable, and therefore, the APSA should be able to apply the appropriate sanctions as may be determined, also with the support of Member States. What difference then has the APSA made in peace and security in Africa? How effective have its actions been? What have been the outcomes? Do the responses of the APSA in crisis and conflict situations guarantee its continuity? What changes are there likely to happen within the APSA in the future?

The APSA puts the AU in a better posture for tackling conflicts and crisis in Africa than the OAU. The APSA has to some extent facilitated the AU's quest to promote peace and security through interventions ranging from shuttle diplomacy and mediation; observer missions; condemnation of unconstitutional governments; to the deployment of peace support operations. However, the results have not always been the same. There have been successes as well as failures. This section discusses the successes and failures of the APSA as well as what accounts for these outcomes.

In peace operations, the APSA has recorded some remarkable achievements as well as some failures. For example, the operations in Burundi (2003-2004) were said to be very successful, although there were latter challenges with regards to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). Initial UN assessments of the Burundian situation proved the precarious nature of the conflict. However, the pragmatic posture and leadership of the AU culminated in the cessation of violence. The presence of the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) discouraged violence and served as deterrence to the factions in the conflict, until the AMIB handed over successfully to the UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) in 2004. Again, the AU operations in the Comoros were successful, as they contributed to returning the country to democratic rule. The AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC, deployed in 2006) and later the AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES) faced initial challenges due to their small numbers. Somehow, they managed to create the right atmosphere for elections to be held. However, it took a brutal AU military invasion to oust the rebel government, and to return the central government to power.

In Sudan and Somalia, the results were entirely different. In Sudan, the operations proved extremely difficult. Like Burundi, the situation in Sudan

was precarious. However, the mandate of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS, deployed in 2004) was too restrictive to allow for robust peace operations to return the country to stability. The AMIS could also not get the support of both the government and the rebels. Worse still, the AMIS did not have the overwhelming presence or the necessary capabilities to fulfill its mandate. In Somalia, the AMISOM (deployed in 2007) also made very little impact, especially because of accusations of partiality against the AU, which was said to have aided Ethiopia to impose an illegitimate government on the people of Somalia. The AMISOM operations also had the challenge of limited number of troops over a vast area of operation.

On the management of Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCGs), the AU, through the APSA, has shifted from the OAU days of condoning and working with unconstitutional governments. Except for a few cases, the AU appears to have outlawed UCGs, both on paper and in practice. UCGs recorded by the APSA so far include Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), Niger (2010), Libya (2011), and Ivory Coast (2011). Again, in this area, the APSA has not been consistent in its application of the appropriate principles and norms, and for that matter sanctions. In some cases, the AU went out rightly to condemn the UCGs. However, in others, it delayed until after condemnation by other regional bodies such as the ECOWAS, only for it to add its voice in an indirect manner. This has led to accusations of partiality in response to UCGs leveled against the AU. The AU did not come out clearly to condemn the change in the Constitution of Niger by President Mamadou Tandja to allow him further stay in power. However, when the 2010 coup occurred in Niger, the AU was very quick to condemn it. Again in Ivory Coast, the AU delayed and never imposed sanctions on the President Gbagbo government for refusing to relinquish power after the defeat. Zimbabwe has been another dent on the legitimacy of the APSA, as the AU has been opposed to the imposition of sanctions against the Robert Mugabe regime. Appiah draws attention to the fact that although democracy has been accepted as the legitimate form of government in the continent, opposition parties also rarely win elections. Instead, some incumbents have won elections under questionable conditions but have faced no sanctions from the AU and its PSC. She also points to the fact that the APSA was not equipped with the requisite mechanisms to deal with the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as the armed insurrection in Libya. The Libyan case, she posits, saw the AU being blatantly sidelined in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) moves to oust the Muammar Gaddafi regime in Libya. This is evidence of a clash among the institutions of the UNSC and the AU and its PSC. Clearly, the APSA's application of AU

norms on UCGs shows a lot of inconsistencies that need to be addressed to redeem the image of the AU and the legitimacy of its actions to bring peace and security.

Conclusion

In sum, the APSA has made great strides in delivering on its mandate to promote peace, security and stability in Africa. As hypothesized in the beginning of the paper however, the findings support the argument that the AU's inability to apply the rules, principles, values and norms of the AU in a uniform manner to shape the behaviour of Member States puts it at some disadvantage. Neo-institutionalism considers consistency in the application of norms crucial to the predictability of institutions. Again, it is only when there is predictability that continuity and change can be guaranteed. The APSA institution should be able to deliver the expected policy outcomes, that is, peace, security and stability in Africa. Until the many challenges of the APSA are dealt with, so as to put it in a formidable state to tackle all manner of conflict situations, the APSA cannot deliver on its mandate fully. Rather, its capacity and authority will be weakened with time, and would eventually have to fold up. The AU should develop and sustain a keen interest in the technical, human and financial resourcing of the APSA to enable it work optimally to deliver on its core mandate of promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.

After building its capacity to make it an independent institution capable of taking the right decisions for itself and acting pragmatically, the AU should build and strengthen the right partnerships with international organizations interested in peace, security and stability in Africa. This will place it in a position of being accepted and defended by its Member States (the insiders) as well as validated by the rest of the international community (the outsiders).

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ABSTRACT

The Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was instituted by the African Union (AU) in 2002 to uphold the AU's rules, norms, objectives and principles on peace, security and stability in Africa. The APSA was also established to ensure that the behaviour of AU Member States conformed to these principles and norms. The APSA was to be the operational structure for the effective implementation of decisions taken on conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. Its mandate reflected the shift to human security, which is widely accepted at the continental level. The APSA has dealt with issues relating to human development; promote democratic practices, good governance and respect for human rights, humanitarian action and the management of disaster. Within the framework of the neo-Institutionalist theory of integration, and with the use of secondary data, this paper hypothesis that the APSA is disadvantaged as a result of not fairly applying its rules across the board in Member States. The paper assesses the performance of the APSA since its inception. The paper gives an overview of the major components of the APSA, its legal framework as well as its successes, prospects and challenges. The major objective of the paper was to ascertain whether the APSA has made any difference in the area of peace, security and stability in Africa since its establishment. The paper found that despite the great strides made by the APSA in delivering on its mandate to promote peace, security and stability in Africa, its inability to apply the rules, principles, values and norms of the AU in a uniform manner to shape the behaviour of Member States puts it at a great disadvantage. For the APSA to effectively deal with conflicts in Africa, it is recommended that the AU develops and sustains a keen interest in the technical, human and financial resourcing of the APSA to enable it work optimally. The African Union is encouraged to allow the rules to work and applied uniformly to member states when they default. The AU should also continue to build and strengthen its partnerships with international organizations concerned with peace and stability in Africa.

POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING IN A CONTESTED INTERNATIONAL BORDER: THE NIGERIA-CAMEROON BORDER CONFLICT SETTLEMENT AND MATTERS ARISING[1]

Kenneth Chukwuemeka Nwoko[2]

Introduction

The political solution under the Green Tree Agreement which led to the handover of the contested Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon by Nigeria following the International Court of Justice (2002) ruling signaled the end of the protracted Nigeria/Cameroon border conflict, at least on the surface. However, some analysts believed that it marked the beginning of what may result into a future conflict (Agbakwuru 2012; The Guardian 2006). From the analysis of the verdict of the Court, it would appear that while the interests of the two states involved in the conflict appeared to have been taken into cognizance, the interest of the indigenes and inhabitants of Bakassi was not. Apart from alienating these local people from their ancestral homes, cultural sites and livelihood opportunities, activities such as fishing; interstate water transportation, trading etc, which were operated as early as the pre-colonial days by the local inhabitants, appear to have been disrupted, thus, endangering their means of livelihood and survival.

The Anglo-German agreement of March 1913 which the ICJ ruling relied on for its verdict on the Nigeria-Cameroon border conflict represents the earliest milestone in the process of alienation of the inhabitants of the

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Bakassi Peninsula, the *causus bellum*; especially since the kings and chiefs of Old Calabar exercised sovereignty over the Bakassi[3], a title which was subsumed in that part of Nigeria as the sovereign state during the period of this conflict. While the ICJ ruling gave precedence to contemporary western constructions of the notions of boundaries and sovereignty to the detriment of the historical consolidation (Sama & Johnson-Ross 2005-2006, 111), "protectorate treaty made without jurisdiction should not have taken precedence over a community title rights and ownership existing from time immemorial" (Nigerian Information Service Centre 2002; The Guardian 2002, 1-2) In other words, Germany transferred to Cameroon what it did not derive from Britain, since the right to title ownership lay with the kings and chiefs of Old Calabar. The focus of this article is not to delve into the juridical issues relating to legal ownership of the territory since the ICJ ruling had put that to rest. Rather the objective is to analyse matters arising from the settlement that could jeopardise the "cold peace" between the two countries; issues relating to psychological, socio-economic and political fallouts which the method of settlement of the conflict and its application brought on the indigenes and inhabitants of the Bakassi Peninsula as well as proffer recommendations for lasting peace in this troubled region.

Literature Review

Scholarly works abound on the Nigeria-Cameroon border conflict. Most of these studies agree on the colonial origins of the conflict (Nwoko 2012; Aghemelo & Ibhasebhor 2006; Sama & Johnson-Ross 2005–2006). However, there is no agreement as regards the ownership of the contested territory. The trend in the literature seems to have been the analysis of the conflict by engaging with the origin and the course of the conflict and possible implications of the ICJ judgment on both sides of the conflict (Bekker 2003; Tarlebbea & Baroni 2010). Others explored the negotiation processes in the post ICJ ruling (Tarlebbea & Baroni 2010). No matter the level of interpretation of the conflict and the subsequent outcome, one issue stood out; that the interest and the well-being of the Bakassi people were not included for analysis or interpretation both in the ICJ ruling and in the literature. The closest to exploring the plight of the residents of the region is the study by Sama & Johnson-Ross (2005-2006). The study, however, is

3 The treaty of protection between Great Britain and the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar, 10 September 1884.

confined to the impact of the Bakassi Peninsula conflict on the relations between the Anglophone Cameroonian and Nigerian resident populations. While Nigeria used the well-being of the Bakassi people as one of the bases for her claim over the Peninsula (Tarlebbea & Baroni 2010, 206), the same claim appeared to have been jettisoned once she failed to actualize her claim. Indeed, the Green Tree Agreement (2006 *apud* Ngang 2007) provides in Article 3 that "Cameroon, after the transfer of authority to it by Nigeria, guarantees to Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi Peninsula the exercise of their fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in international human rights law and in other relevant provisions of international law". However, this provision appears to have been violated. This amounts to a clear violation of international law by Cameroon, just as the willful neglect of the Bakassi population by Nigeria amounts to irresponsibility and a negation of the law of social contract (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy n.d.).

The process of the implementation of the ICJ ruling and the Green Tree Agreement and the successes recorded by getting the parties to sign them was definitely an indicator of the success of the diplomatic process that produced them (Sama & Johnson-Ross 2005-2006, 119). However, since it didn't comprehensively resolve the Bakassi problem, it therefore was a failure of the conflict resolution approaches deployed since the indigenes were not placated. As a panacea for lasting peace in the region therefore, Kevin Ngang (2007, 28), proposes joint collaboration resembling the example of France, the Netherlands and Sweden, which jointly own the islands of St. Martin and Saint Bathelemy while Baye (2010, 32), believes that infrastructural developments and effective occupation of border areas which checks future incursions can guarantee sustainable peace. But this research hinges lasting peace in the region on only the approach that balances the triangular interest of the Nigeria, Cameroon and the Bakassi indigenes.

Figure 1: The Triangular Process in the Conflict Settlement

Background to the ICJ's Ruling on Cameroon-Nigeria Border

The immediate event that led to the ICJ's ruling on 10 October 2002 was the resurgence of violence between Nigeria and Cameroon in the 1990s. This contested boundary, which extended from the Lake Chad to the Atlantic Ocean, became a recurrent source of irritation and controversy between the two countries soon after their independence in 1960 (Merrills 1997, 676). With several border clashes at various times, each involving loss of life and damage to property on both sides, the Bakassi Peninsula became a peculiar theatre of conflict with far-reaching implications (Merrills 1997, 677).

The government of Cameroon had, on 29 March 1994, filed an application instituting proceedings against Nigeria concerning a dispute described as "relat(ing) essentially to the question of sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula". The application further stated that the "delimitation (of the maritime boundary between the two states) has remained a partial one (that) despite many attempts to complete it, the two parties have been unable to do so". Hence, it was its desire that the ICJ "in order to avoid further incidents between the two countries ... determine the course of the maritime boundary between the two states beyond the line fixed in 1975".

After entertaining arguments from both countries, the Court ruled concerning the sovereignty over the boundary, on October 10 2002 that sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula and the Lake Chad area lay with Cameroon. The Court also upheld the validity of certain colonial arrangements invoked by Cameroon and therefore fixed, by clear majorities, the land boundary from Lake Chad in the north to the Bakassi Peninsula in the south (Bekker 2003, 387). In fixing the portion of the maritime boundary over which it had jurisdiction, the Court agreed with the argument advanced by Nigeria that the equidistant line between the two countries produced an equitable result, though it decline to identify the point off the coast of Equatorial Guinea at which the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria terminates (the "tripoint") (Bekker 2003, 388).

Figure 2: showing the Area of Bakassi

Source: Map No 4247, United Nations department of peacekeeping operation cartographic section (May 2005).

Little over a decade since the ICJ ruling and more than five years since the final handover of the contested Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon on August 13, 2013, it would appear, from recent developments, that the process of settlement excluded the inhabitants of the area. The Bakassi people whose rights, landed properties and means of livelihood were affected the most and who were at the heart of the conflict seemed to have been left out in the settlement. Following the handover, inhabitants of the Peninsula were forcefully displaced and evicted from their homes, harassed, killed and stopped by the Cameroonian gendarmes and soldiers from engaging in fishing and other maritime activities which were their main sources of livelihood (Channel TV News 2013; Vanguard 2013). On the Nigerian side, some of the people who decided to cross back to Nigeria were neglected, abandoned (Duke 2012) and mostly treated as refugees; only temporarily sheltered in designated primary schools and public buildings across Akpabuyo Local Government of Cross River State of Nigeria, before their resettlement in the Ikang area recently (Nigerian Newsday 2013). Significantly, most of these people decried their treatment

as non-Nigerians citing several issues to support their claims. Some of these claims include: that they were no longer allowed to exercise their rights of vote since 2011 on the ground that (1) their area (electoral wards) were transferred to Cameroon (2) their names subsequently could not be found on the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)'s Voters' Register (FGD: Frank 2015). Similarly, attempts to settle these people by the Federal Government of Nigeria were overly fraught with unending controversy.

The major issues arising from the settlement process as alluded to above are multifaceted. First, is the question of the nationality of the Bakassi people and their right to exist in their homeland. Second, is the relevance or appropriateness of post-conflict peace-building mechanism employed; especially how much it protected those affected by the displacement arising from the settlement. It is obvious that the ICJ ruling and application of the political adjudication did not accommodate the triangular interests of all the stakeholders. Third, is the mechanism of smooth reintegration into Nigeria; one that takes cognizance of the protracted constitutional problem of indigene/settler dichotomy -for the Bakassi people are newcomers resettled in a new place away from their ancestral home (Agbese 2013, 379-396). These and much more are some of the issues arising from the process of settlement of the Nigeria-Cameroon border conflict which this article addresses.

This study adopts the qualitative methods and from it, the historical method in terms of data collection, analysis and presentation. The data collection is based on selected primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include oral data from fieldwork, news study reports, Focused Group Discussions, etc. Secondary sources include written sources relevant to the study; policy documents, books, magazine and journal articles, as well as unpublished works, theses and dissertations, seminar and conference studies, amongst others. Oral data for the study were obtained through in-person key-informant interviews and focus-group discussions (FGDs) held in Akpabuyo Local Government Area of Cross River State.

Reactions to the Handover of the Peninsula by Nigeria to Cameroon

The ICJ judgement and the processes that followed, including the handover of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon threw up many unanswered issues which perhaps made Bakassi indigenes to reject the ICJ ruling and the ensuing processes. Under the umbrella of Free Bakassi Association, the indigenes opted for legal redress against the Federal Government of Nigeria.

The group, among others sought an order of *mandamus* to void the Green Tree Agreement (GTA) and compel Nigeria to repossess the Bakassi Peninsula (Agbo 2012, 56). They sought this remedy pursuant to Section 1 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Enforcement and Ratification Act Cap 10), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, as well as Order 34 Rules 1(a), 3(1) and (2) of the Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules, 2007.The litigants saw the GTA as a breach of Articles 1, 2, 20, 21, 22 and 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. They also believed that the Agreement was a violation of Article 1 of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural rights and Article 1(2) of the UN Charter as well as violated the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

The ICJ ruling and the GTA appeared to have been further jeopardised by the stance of Nigeria's National Assembly, that any agreement remains illegal until ratified by the Assembly. According to Section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, "No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law except to the extent to which any such treaty was enacted into law by the National Assembly". The position of the National Assembly was however clarified by the former Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice to the effect that the GTA was never a treaty but a study agreement entered into willingly by the two state parties involved and the Mixed Commission as a witness party for the execution of the ICJ ruling (Nwoko 2012, 30). Despite these agitations, it would appear that the action of the Nigerian government in handing over the territory to Cameroun remains irreversible.

Since the Government of Nigeria relocated many of the returnee Bakassi indigenes to the Ikang area of the state, one of the relocation sites (the others being Kwa Island and Dayspring Islands 1 and 2; the only unceded portions of the Bakassi homeland) with the promises of providing the basic infrastructure and skill acquisition for the Bakassi indigenes, nothing has changed. In most instances, indigenes who had lived their lives as fishermen on the Peninsula were relocated to a landlocked area (FGD: Effiong 2015); suggesting that the government was perhaps insensitive to the needs of her citizens. A more attentive resettlement plan would entail among others, exposing the displaced persons to new skills to help them adapt to their new life away from maritime related economic activities. For the most part, promises of infrastructural development, such as schools, health care centres, police security posts, etc, were not forthcoming, nor the least modest monthly stipends they were promised (FGD: Effiong 2015). The question then is why were these promises not fulfilled and what are the implications? The research reveals that these promises were either not fully kept or not kept at all.

Mechanism and Process of reintegration of Bakassi Indigenes in Nigeria and Cameroon

To facilitate their resettlement, the Cross River State government had, through the State House of Assembly, created additional wards from Ikang area in Akpabuyo Council and added to the remnants of the lost Bakassi to make up the New Bakassi Local Government/Council under Law No 7 of 2007. Between 2009 and 2010, some 4000 Bakassi returnees were evacuated to this area under the supervision of the United Nations Commission for Refugees (UNCR). At this initial stage, the regular basic supplies, including food and water were constant, along with the monthly stipend (FGD: Bassey 2015). The returnees were resettled in Ikang area, in two settlement estates namely; Ekpri Obutong and Ikot Effiom Estates. The estates housed not only the returnees from the Bakassi area alone who were mainly of Efik extraction but also indigenes of other states such as Delta, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo and Bayelsa who lived on the Bakassi Peninsula. Together, these people were, at least on study, allocated buildings, on average of three to five people in a room (FGD: Okon 2015). Those formed the first wave of returnee occupants of the estates who also received a monthly handout of N5000 (about $32 at the time) for their upkeep (FGD: Okon 2015). However, the upkeep allowance was suddenly withheld, just as the team of medical personnel in charge of the medical centre stopped visiting. In the same week that this researcher held a focus group discussion with the Bakassi returnees, one of the participants[4] lost his pregnant wife and the unborn baby due to the absence of maternal care. The only police post in the area right from inception never had a single police officer sent to it (FGD: Frank 2015). Further, the only security operatives present at the new settlement was a group of heavily armed mobile and military police personnel at the entrance of the Bakassi area. These security personnel, however, were often busy extorting money from private commercial vehicle operators flying to and fro Calabar town, than maintaining law, order and general security[5]. Similarly, there were no schools anywhere or any kind of training infrastructure in the resettlement area. The consequence was that children were playing all day without an education or any form of instruction. To compound the already difficult situation in the

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4 Paul Bassey Etim (24 years) lost his wife due to lack of medical care in particular maternal health care.

5 This was witnessed by this researcher first hand on his way to and from Bakassi area on field work on the 25 August 2015. The small cab operators appeared to have devised a way of making block contribution for the security men to forestall any disruption of their daily transport business.

estates, the returnees were often harassed by those security operatives in the guise of searching for 'militants' (FGD: Frank 2015).

These deprivations, to a large extent had huge implications for the reintegration of the returnees into the Nigerian society. First, the failure of the Nigerian government to provide adequate shelter, food, security or introduce them to new skills irked the Bakassi returnees. There were concerns at the time that some of these returnees were returning to the Cameroons and taking up jobs with the Cameroonian gendarmes as spies and informants (FGD: Frank 2015). Others out of frustration actually returned to claim Cameroonian citizenship, by changing their names and identities, at least in jun order to have shelter and basic necessities of life. Yet others were hoping for the possibility of dual nationality. In any case, those situations bred resentment against Nigeria from amongst its own people. This was capable of creating explosive situations of the type that simmered in the neighbouring Niger Delta. To validate this, there were insinuations that some of the Bakassi returnees had joined the Niger-delta militants attacking government and oil installations in the region (Agbo 2012). This perfectly explained the constant harassment of and raids on the returnee inhabitants of the estates by the joint mobile and military police.

Expectedly the manner in which the Nigerian authorities treated its citizens relocated from the Peninsula was widely believed to be responsible for the audacity with which Cameroonian gendarmes maltreated the returnees too. Since 14 August 2008, when the Cameroonians took full administrative control of the ceded territories, economic activities in and around the area were destroyed, or at best, shrunk to the extent that the livelihood of those who returned to the Peninsula was in jeopardy. Indeed, the Cameroonian authorities seemed to have covertly or overtly ignored all the guarantees built into the Green Tree Agreement signed on 12 June 2006. The forceful preclusion of Nigerians in Bakassi from engaging in their traditional vocations appeared deliberate; perhaps to make strong point of victory on the basis of the ICJ ruling. It could also be interpreted as a way of erasing any traces or vestiges of Nigerian presence in the peninsula or to reduce same to the barest minimum. This posturing by Cameroonians appeared to validate the earlier viewpoint that Yaoundé was only interested in the economic opportunities and resources of the territory and nothing more. To corroborate this, Cameroon established government ministries (of fisheries and agriculture) to maximise the exploitation of water resources in the peninsula. The implication was that the activities of Nigerians therefore, appeared to be both a threat as well as competitive affront to Cameroon.

Beyond the disruption of their subsistence and livelihood activities, Bakassi people face arbitrary arrest, rape, arson, torture and extra-judicial

killings in the hands of the Cameroonian soldiers and gendarmes. For alleged minor offences for instance (such as fishing in the upper river or felling of mangrove trees) an offender's boat engine could be confiscated and such offender swiftly taken to Yaoundé, to face possible imprisonment. In some cases, it was a journey of no return (Bassey 2012, 50). Sundry allegations against the Cameroonian security forces which include drowning of Bakassi fishermen caught fishing on restricted areas, confiscation of their fishing boats and nets as well as the imposition of arbitrary levies on the Bakassi residents by Cameroonian gendarmes, raised questions about the future of these Nigerians in Cameroon, either as Cameroonians or as resident aliens. Below was a list of offences and corresponding levies imposed on the Nigerians at a time:

Table 1: Showing Levies imposed on Bakassi residents by Cameroonian Gendarmes

S/No	Offences/action	Levy (in Naira)	In US $
1	Residence permit (per annum)	N 150,000*	$ 937.5
2	Operation of Manual boat	N 15,000	$93.75
3	Operation of engine boat	N 30,000	$187.5
4	Cutting of firewood	N 5,000	$31.25
5	Playing music at odd time	N 2,500	$15.6
6	Smoke tax	N 5,000	$31.25
7	If maggot is found in the fish you are drying	N 30,000	$187.5
8	If you are caught trying to cut down a mangrove tree	N 30,000	$187.5
9	Building permit before building a house	N 50,000	$312.5
10	If there are up to 200 sticks in your house	N 100,000*	$625
11	If your boat passes on your way to Nigeria	N 10,000	$62.5
12	On your way back from Nigeria on boat	N 10,000	$62.5
13	Permission to enter Cameroonian town of Ekondo	N 15,000	$93.75
14	If you have children in Nigerian instead of Cameroon school	N 2,000*	$12.5
		*Annual payments	

Source: *Tell Magazine* (29 October 2012)

Further, the Cameroonian authorities systematically embarked on a mission of forced integration of Bakassi population by cutting them off from their affiliations with Nigeria. Apart from the imposition of outrageous taxes just for living on the peninsula, there were also penalties associated with attempts to relate with Nigeria or even to relate with the mainstream Cameroon. For instance, "If you pass them [the soldiers or *gendarmes*] on the way to Nigeria, you pay a tax of $63, on your way back; you pay same, making a total of $126 each day you leave the peninsula" (Agbo 2012, 55). The Cameroonians also forbade the Bakassi indigenes from buying food from Nigeria, or bringing in fish or livestock from Nigeria into Cameroon (FGD: Edem 2015). In the same vein, people with children schooling in Nigeria, were forced to pay $13 for each of them annually, a punishment for not allowing them attend schools in Cameroon (Agbo 2012, 55).

The Status or Nationality Quagmire

The experiences of the Bakassi returnees since after the handover of the peninsula by Nigeria to Cameroon led to several calls to clarify the status of these people within the context of Nigeria's political framework. This was in response to what Bakassi leaders referred to as hardship, lack of infrastructure (Mbamalu and Akpan 2015) and their treatment as second class citizens especially drawing from their experience during the last general elections of 2015 in Nigeria (FGD: Asuquo 2015). The point was made previously that as a strategy to cater for the remaining 60 percent of the Bakassi residents who chose to return to Nigeria, part of Akpabuyo Local Government Area was carved out to create New Bakassi. Despite this arrangement, there appeared substantive legal complications. For example, the State Law Number 7 of 2007 that created New Bakassi is not yet recognised by the Federal Government (Agbo 2012, 51), whose constitutional responsibility it is to create local government areas. Because it is not recognised by the constitution, it also means that the new local government could not be funded from the federation account. This lacuna created problems during the 2015 general elections when the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) declined to conduct elections in the Ikang area which formed the newly created New Bakassi Local Government, insisting that the law creating the Council must first be ratified by the National Assembly (Mbamalu and Akpan 2015). The implication of this was that so many Bakassi returnees were disenfranchised.

Though some part of the Bakassi Local Government indigenes got their permanent voters cards, (PVCs) and even elected officers as canvassed

by some politician (Ita-Giwa 2015) the returnees argued that these areas concerned were only a few existing wards in the remaining part of Bakassi Akpabuyo area not ceded such as Code 03. The newly created wards especially Code 04 of the New Bakassi were never given PVCs or allowed to vote (FGD: Effiong 2015). This was because their names which were originally registered in the ceded areas presently in Cameroon were yet to be transferred from the ceded territories back to the Nigerian area and it appeared that more than ten years after the transfer of sovereignty to Cameroon, nobody appeared interested about integrating the returnees politically. Consequently, this situation caused friction resulting in litigation pending at the Supreme Court of Nigeria. According to Mbamalu and Akpan (2015),

> Over 6,000 people from Ikang in the New Bakassi that was created from Akpabuyo council have constantly been disenfranchised because INEC has insisted that Ikang does not exist in the map of Nigeria as Bakassi and, therefore, cannot conduct polls there. But the [Cross River State] government has insisted that, with the creation of New Bakassi and the enabling law, Ikang is part and parcel of it in Nigeria and should benefit in all things as any other council in the country.

While the matter remains *sub judice*, as there is a litigation between the State Government and INEC in the Supreme Court of Nigeria, the over 6000 disenfranchised people continue to suffer neglect, deprivation and discrimination even from their host or neighbouring communities as subsequent analysis and exposition below will show.

Relationship between the Bakassi returnees and their host

As stated earlier, the remaining Bakassi land not ceded to Cameroon was the Akpabuyo Local Government, where the returnees were camped and later resettled after the Cross River State Government through the instrumentality of the State Law No 7 created the New Bakassi Local Government. These settlements in the Ikang Area comprised two main estates; the Ekpri Obutong and Ikot Effiom states. However, there was conflict between the returnee settlers and the remnants of old Bakassi of Akpabuyo where the former were resettled. Like the age long phenomenon in Nigeria, the conflict took indigene/settler dimension. While the hosts claimed that their land and available resources were shared with settlers without compensations as promised by the government, their resentment the more was based on the fact that the newcomers were claiming equal

access to resources and power. The situation led to the factionalisation of the New Bakassi into two groups jostling for supremacy. On the one hand, were the remnants of the old Bakassi, comprising Daysprings 1&2 and the Kwa Island assembling under the aegis of the Bakassi Peoples General Assembly (BPGA), while on the other hand, representing the Ikang people carved out to form the New Bakassi was the Ikang Combined Council (ICC) (FGD: Effiong 2015). Those groups engaged in the struggle for power, dominance and access to political largesse and other patronages. The implication was that the development compounded their plight as the feeling of mutual suspicion made it difficult for them to convey a common front in articulating their demands and grievances to the government and the international community.

One major development from this however, was the fact that some politicians took advantage of this schismatic situation for personal enrichment and aggrandisement. In particular, majority of the participants in the focused group discussion all pointed to the establishment of a rival returnee camp established by a particular politician who was accused of assembling "unknown faces and groups" and running an illegal camp since 2013 at Ikot Iyo Primary School in Akpabuyo. With this parallel camp, this politician allegedly diverted some of the supplies and largesse meant for the officially recognised Bakassi returnees at the two estates in the Ikang area (FGD: Effiong 2015). To these people therefore, these politicians constituted more of a problem than solution to their plight (FGD: Etim; Effiong and Ekpo 2015).

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study has unveiled the extent of the implementation of the ICJ ruling and the Green Tree Agreement in the Nigeria-Cameroon border conflict by the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission and its implications on the post-conflict peacebuilding in the region. The analysis offered in the study provides an insight into the situation of hopelessness, deprivation, human rights abuses and the failure of the Mixed Commission to midwife a functional and all-encompassing settlement. The study as well brings to the front burner the need for the adoption of an alternative post-conflict peacebuilding approaches in the face of the ineffectiveness of the extant approaches in fostering positive peace and sustainable development in the region. This has become very critical in a region where identity political movements have increasingly deployed their cultural properties to press home the need for self-determination (Onuoha 2015, 363). Beyond this form

of loyalty, this study has shown that there is an increasing possibility of the construction of a new referent object or a new form of loyalty which could attract the devotion of subjects whose loyalties are not based on ethnicity, state or any other affiliation except on the suffering and injustice identified in this context as the Bakassi Phenomenon. And whom feeling threatened by the abuses of the state parties involved as well as the inaction of the international community to their plight, may recourse to subversive actions to exert their rights and in this case, an external self-determination.

This study offers the following recommendations:

1. That the Nigerian Government should create a new Bakassi Resettlement Committee with representatives chosen from the Bakassi people, not politicians, to see to the full implementation of the resettlement process.

2. That the Nigerian government should effectively integrate the returnee Bakassi people by legitimising the newly created New Bakassi Local Government by the Cross River State Government through the ratification of the Cross River State Law No 7 which created it as well as make the electoral wards in the new local government functional so that elections can hold in these areas not recognised by the Federal Government's document.

3. That due and adequate compensation should be paid by the Nigerian government to the Akpabuyo Local Government from whose area additional territory was carved out for the newly created New Bakassi Local Government.

4. That a state of emergency should be declared by Nigeria in the New Bakassi Local Government, especially in the provision of infrastructure; hospitals, schools, roads and other public works including the maintenance of law and order.

5. That the establishment of a partnership between Nigeria and Cameroon should be pursued by both countries in particular, to harness ecological resources around their redefined common border, and,

6. That as a mechanism for compensating the local population of the Bakassi region who have suffered human rights violation, deprivations and loss of means of livelihood, a bi-national ecotourism should be developed in the region by both countries.

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Focus Group Discussion: Effiong, Antrigha (42 years) Returnee Bakassi Youth leader in Ekpri Obutong Estate, Ikang Area, New Bakasi Local Government Area, Cross River State, 25 August 2015.

Focus Group Discussion: Ekponyong, Bassey (32 years) Returnee Bakassi Youth in Ikot Effiom Estate, Ikang Area, New Bakasi Local Government Area, Cross River State, 25 August 2015.

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ABSTRACT

The objective of this study is to analyse matters arising from the Nigeria–Cameroon border conflict settlement that could jeopardise the "cold peace" between the two countries; issues relating to psychological, socio-economic and political fallouts which the method of settlement of the conflict and its application brought on the indigenes and inhabitants of the Bakassi Peninsula as well as proffer recommendations for lasting peace in this troubled region. In doing this, the study investigates how the process of settlement of the conflict based on the ICJ ruling and the Green Tree Agreement has thrown up more complex issues that encapsulate the interest of the Bakassi people from what should have been a triangular process. The analysis here exposes the damage: psychological, socio-economic and political produced by the peculiar manner in which the method of settlement of the conflict that attached greater importance to the interest of the state parties vis a vis the strategic significance of the Peninsula to the exclusion of its inhabitants. The study brings to the front burner the need for the adoption of an alternative post-conflict peacebuilding approach in the face of the ineffectiveness of the extant approaches in fostering positive peace and sustainable development in the region. It proffers recommendations that would accommodate the triangular interest of the stakeholders: Cameroon, Nigeria and the Bakassi people caught in the web in ways that would advance security and development in West Africa. The study adopts the qualitative methods and from it, the historical method in terms of data collection, analysis and presentation. The data collection is based on selected primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include data from oral evidences from fieldwork, new study reports, Focused Group Discussion (FGD) etc. Secondary sources include written sources relevant to the study; policy documents of Bakassi Local Government Administration, books, magazine and journal articles, as well as unpublished works, theses and dissertations, amongst others. Oral data for the study was obtained through in-person key-informant interviews and focus-group discussions (FGDs) held in Akpabuyo Local Government Area of Cross River State, Nigeria, where some of the Bakassi people are presently sheltered and the various communities around the Peninsula. Oral interview with the spokesperson of the displaced people as well as expert groups already working in this area, rights activists and journalist, were also contacted for the purposes of this study. In analysis and interpretation, the study employs theoretical approaches from relevant disciplines such as history, peace and conflict studies, politics and law, applying them to the historical situation associated with the concerns of the study. In presentation, the study combines the chronological, analytical and descriptive styles.

KEYWORDS

Triangular Process; Post-conflict peacebuilding; GreenTree agreement.

Received on March 2, 2018.
Approved on June 25, 2018.

THE EVOLUTION AND PATTERN OF POLITICAL PARTY FORMATION AND THE SEARCH FOR NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN NIGERIA

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Introduction

The history of the formation of political party in Nigeria dates back to the colonial era, before the advent of colonialism, the whole idea of political party was an alien phenomenon. Ekeh (1983) argued that political party form part of those institutions he referred to as 'migrated social structure', by this he means organisational systems that were literally parceled from metropolitan centres of Europe to Asia and Africa and engrafted in the new Colonial situation (Ekeh 1983). It is therefore impossible to discuss the nature of political party formation in Nigeria without coming to grip with the epochal significance and legacies of British colonial policies. For Instance, the first political party in Nigeria, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) formed in 1923 came into being as a result of the establishment of the Nigerian Legislative Council which extended franchise to Lagos and Calabar under the Clifford Constitution of 1922 (Adebayo 2006). The leading political parties that emerged in colonial and immediate post-colonial Nigeria were provincial in outlook, having drawn their provenance from socio cultural and ethnic based associations and this fitted well into the colonial policy of *divide and rule*. Independence did not obliterate deep seated mistrust and rivalry among the leading political class who perceived themselves first as

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champions and avatars of their ethnic groups rather than statesmen saddle with the responsibility of forging national unity and solidarity.

The crucial role political parties' plays in the overall development and wellbeing of a state, especially in culturally diverse and variegated societies cannot be overstated. The significance of political parties, goes beyond the mere utilitarian function of contesting and capturing or retaining political power. Political parties are necessary and crucial institution in the construction of a stable and participatory political order as well as serving as an instrument for interest aggregation and channeling disparate social groupings into a common socio political platform, thus providing a stabilizing effect to an otherwise fractions society (Cited in Amusan 2011). The history and story of political party formation in Nigeria as this study reveals however run counter to the theoretical and normative role expected of them. Political party formation from the pre independence era took a regional pattern starting with the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) which at formation attempted to be national in outlook, but later came to be perceived as a party principally for the eastern region, the Action Group party (AG) for the western region and the Northern People's Congress (NPC) for the northern region respectively.

Each of these parties therefore regarded their respective geographic regions and ethnic base as bastion and fortress from which 'alien' intruders must be kept at bay. The attempt by the Northern People's Congress (NPC) to extend its reach and make inroad into the western region perceived as the stronghold of the opposition Action Group party through an alliance with a splinter group of disaffected AG members, precipitated political crisis that ultimately culminated in the truncation of democratic rule in 1966 (Sklar 1963). The Second Republic also witnessed similar patterns of party formation with the dominant parties in orientation and leadership a reincarnation of the first republic parties. This scenario, coupled with the electoral heist of 1983 and sundry administrative malfeasance by the dominant party of that dispensation- the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), eventually culminating in the collapse of the Second Republic (Joseph 1999).

The military regime headed by Babangida (1985-1993) attempted to decree elite accommodation with the formation of two government financed political parties, the National Republican Convention and the Social Democratic Party. This experiment did not last largely due to insincerity on the part of the administration. The birth of the current democratic dispensation in 1999 has not exorcised the ghost of elite fragmentation and mobilization along primordial fault lines. The People's Democratic Party (PDP) the erstwhile governing party formed in 1998 with membership that cut across

all the ethnic groups in the country eventually became bogged down by vicious factional wrangling that often assume ethno-religious and regional dimension (Simbine 2014). The emergence of the All Progressive Congress (APC) as the new governing party after the 2015 general election is also not free of accusation of ethnic and religious motivation in its emergence. Why have political parties in Nigeria failed to fulfill their theoretical function of serving as base for national unity and integration? Will the formation of two dominant political parties, the All Progressive Congress and the Peoples Democratic Party help in reversing this negative trend? These questions are what this paper seeks to interrogate.

Conceptual Clarification and Theoretical Understanding

Political party

Political parties constitute an essential component of the modern democratic tradition. This is evident because without political parties, democracy that is based on the liberal model of majority rule would be practically impossible.

One of the earliest definitions of political party was given by Edmund Burke, he conceived of a political party as "a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours, the national interest upon some particular principles in which they all agreed" (cited in Adebayo 2006, 64). There are several other definitions of political party as there are scholars interrogating this concept. For instance Giovani Satori sees a political party as "any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office" (cited in Kopecky & Mair 2003, 29). Satori's definition serves two useful purposes, On the one hand it is precise enough to distinguish political party from other groups in society, as it is only political parties that field and sponsor candidates for election. On the other hand, it is broad enough to include all political parties, whether in non-competitive single party regimes or in competitive multi-party system.

Scholars, in an effort to capture the essential features of a variety of political parties across different eras and regions of the world, have developed varying typologies and classification of political parties. While these classifications were developed essentially to help in building a theory of political party, it is also possible to use them in explaining some of the peculiarities and factional tendencies within these parties. Maurice Duverger

(1954) distinguished between what he called "Cadre Parties", which are led by individuals with high socio-economic status, and the "Mass Party", which according to him, mobilise a broad segment of members through the development of a large and complex organisation. He also identified what he called the "Devotee Party"; these party types are tied to the veneration of a particular charismatic party leader, an example being the Leninist communist party (cited in Anifowoshe 2004). Otto Kircheirmer (1966) advanced four types of party models, namely Bourgeois parties, Class-Mass parties, Denominational mass parties and Catch-all people's party (cited in Gunther & Diamond 2003). Katz and Mair (1995) identified what they called the Cartel Party in which public financing of political parties and the expanded role of the state, induce parties to seek primarily to perpetuate themselves in power and avail themselves of these resources. Gunther and Diamond (2003) identified 15 different variants of political parties and categorised them into three broad spectrums based on; the nature of the party organisation, whether it is elite based or mass based; the programmatic orientation of the parties, whether they are ideological or clientele oriented and their behavioural norm-whether pluralistic and democratic or hegemonic in outlook and operation.

The various types of political parties are not mutually exclusive, in practical reality; political parties are often a hybrid of two or even all three types. This is true of the characters of political parties in Nigeria which have exhibited features similar to some of these categories discussed. What is also true in the Nigerian case is the fact that the contexts of the formation of political parties have had profound impact on the basic nature, outlook and outcome.

National Integration

National Integration involves primarily the wielding of disparate social, economic, political religious ethnic and geographical element into a single nation-state. It refers to a process, strategy and method of constructing a national identity and a sense of shared consciousness and national consensus among disparate groups using the power of the state. Coleman and Rosberg defined national integration in two dimensions, namely political integration- that is; the progressive bridging of the elite–mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and participant political community; and territorial integration- that is, the progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities on the horizontal political community (Cited in Nigel 1971). One of the principal avenues for achieving national integration as outlined in the above definition

is through the formation of broad based political parties. The mobilisation and formation of a political party bring together under a platform political elites whose backgrounds cut across ethno-religious and cultural divide; exhibiting a high level of consensus within their fold, while espousing ideas that are national in outlook will accelerate and drive the quest for national integration. The lack of unity in Nigeria is therefore not so much the welding together of disparate groups and territories, but the failure to forge a cohesive state from the said territories after independence and the political party as an institution is implicated in this failure.

Political Elites and National Integration

Political elites are very important in any political system in the sense that they exert considerable weight in building and influencing state structures more directly than ordinary citizens. The role of and relevance of elites to the discourse on party formation pattern and national integration is therefore very pivotal. Studies on elite behaviour basically focus on the acquisition, use, misuse and consolidation of power by this group.

Proponents such as Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Robert Micheal, and Wright Mills, takes for granted the fact that in every society, there will be homogenous elite who rule because of their members' superior organisational and personal abilities (Varma 1975). Elite fragmentation on the other hand, contends that elite's aspirations do not always cohere. Albert (2012) averred that "elite fragmentation happens largely in the context of absence of well-defined ideological consensus in a political system... it is made more potent by an environment where there are centrifugal ethnic and religious cleavages" (Albert 2012, 4). This assertion aptly captures the Nigerian situation where the ruling and governing elites are neither cohesive nor altruistic; they fan the embers of ethno-religious differences and thus keep the country perpetually unstable and divided.

Political Party Formation Pattern in Historical Perspective

In Africa and indeed Nigeria before the advent of colonial rule, political party was an alien institution. However, nationalist pressures during that era quicken the pace of constitutional development and in turn stimulated the development of political parties (Coleman 1958). Political parties thus form part of what Ekeh called 'migrated social structure', referring to institutions and models almost literally parceled from metropolitan centres of the imperial

west to Asia and Africa and engrafted into the new colonial situation emptied of their moral content and underlying ethics that sustained them in the metropolis (Ekeh 1983). Thus the history and evolution of political parties in Nigeria has been undulating just as the quest for democracy, good governance and national integration has been full of various missteps and unfulfilled expectation.

In discussing the history and evolution of political parties in Nigeria, Ujo (2000) classified political parties into four generations. (Cited in Saliu & Muhammad 2008). The first generation of political parties according to him consists of the pre 1945 parties. These included the Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP) and the Nigeria Youth Movement (NYM) formed in 1923 and 1936 respectively. These parties were localised in their base and their interest covered very narrow and specific policies of the colonial government. This perhaps explains the limited cases of ethnic and tribal politics in this era. While Herbert Macaulay led NNDP won, all seats in the legislative council as a result of the introduction of elective principle by the Clifford constitution of 1922, it was not until 1938 that it was successfully challenged by the NYM.

The second generation consisted of those parties that emerged between 1945 and the end of the first republic. This group, according to this classification was the National Council of Nigeria Citizen, (NCNC) the Northern People Congress (NPC), the Action Group (AG), the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) and the Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU). These parties' major preoccupation was to wrest power from the colonialist, a feat they eventually accomplished. One major flaw that characterised these political parties was their formation pattern and subsequent degeneration into ethnic-based parties and the personalisation of their operations by founders. The cultural influence in the formation of these parties undoubtedly played a significant role in this regard. For instance the Action Group party (AG) which emerged as a response to the growing popularity of the (NCNC) in the western region is traced to the pan Yoruba socio-cultural organisation, the '*Egbe Omo Oduduwa*' (the gathering of the descendants of Oduduwa). After series of meetings and preparation, the cultural organization on March 1951 metamorphosed into a political party and held its inaugural conference in Owo, a town in the present day Ondo state Nigeria (Mackintosh 1966).

The same is true of the Northern People's Congress which emerged from a cultural organisation called *Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa* (Association of People from the North), formed in June 1949. The leaders of the group announced that the objective of the group was to combat idleness and injustice in the northern region. This cultural group eventually transformed into a

political party in October 1951 (Dudley 1968). The cultural and ethnic origin particularly of the NPC and the AG consequently generated conflict between them as each sort to protect its regional enclave while they attempted to make electoral inroad into the political base of the rival party; this strategy only served to inflame ethnic hatred and animosity. Independence was however achieved in spite of these rivalries because of a high degree of mobilization of the citizenry to end colonial rule. However, intra and inter party rivalries characterised these parties after independence leading to their degeneration into ethnic pressure groups, a trend that eventually led to the truncation of democratic rule (Yakub 2004).

The third generations of political parties going by Ujo's classification were the parties of the second republic (1979-1983). The constitutional and political reforms of 1975-1979, moved the definition of political party away from a functional notion to a legal-constitutional one. Political parties were defined more in terms of structure than of functions, with emphasis on structural requirements for political party registration such as national outlook and spread, internal organisation or democracy, recognition and registration by an electoral management body.

The aims of the constitutional and political reforms that preceded the inauguration of the second republic among other things were to de-personalise operations of political parties, and to de-ethnicise and give them a national outlook (Omoruyi 2002). The parties of that era included the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Nigeria People's Party (NPP), the Great Nigeria People's Party (GNPP), the People's Redemption Party (PRP) and later National Advance Party (NAP). What characterised political parties of this dispensation was their degeneration into regional parties. Most of them turned out to be reincarnates of the first republic parties. The NPN, UPN, NPP and the PRP were adjudged to be similar both in leadership and orientation to the Northern People's Congress, Action Group, the National Council of Nigeria Citizen and the Northern Element Progressive Union of the first republic respectively. Intra and inter party rivalries, corruption and the electoral heist perpetrated by the National party of Nigeria (NPN) led to the collapse of the second public (Babarinsa 2003; Joseph 1999).

The fourth generation political parties following Ujo's classification included parties of both the Babangida and Abacha government sponsored and financed parties. The Social Democratic party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC). Unlike the earlier parties, because of the stringent requirement for party registration and government funding of the parties, ethnic and regional rivalries were not pronounced. The evolution of the two political parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National

Republican Convention (NRC), grew out of security and national integration considerations and led to the gradual reduction of ethno-religious and regional politics during that era, as the data from the series of elections held between 1989 and 1993 demonstrated.

Omoruyi (2002), posited that the innovation of the two party systems in 1989 introduced some elements of discontinuity between the past and 1989 in terms of origin, composition, leadership selection, funding and the interest they served. According to him it removed the idea of 'founders' and 'joiners', as all were joiners. It removed the idea of owners, as the government financed the operations of the two parties and provided a level playing field for all those who wanted to stake a political career from either of the two parties.

For instance the SDP had a Muslim-Muslim ticket in M.K.O Abiola and Babagana Kingibe as it's presidential and vice candidates respectively, which clearly violated known balancing act of Christian-Muslim ticket or vice versa; yet Nigerians ignored religious affiliations of the presidential candidate and his running mate and voted for them *en masse*. Also, none of the two parties of that dispensation could be labeled as either belonging to the south or the north.

The two-party system adopted in the truncated Third Republic effectively discouraged the politicisation of religion and ethnicity the twin evil that have bedeviled the polity since the pre independence era. In effect, for the first time in Nigeria's history there were political parties in which no one or group of persons could claim to have founded. The experiment was highly instrumental to the conduct of Nigeria's freest and fairest presidential election of 12th June 1993. Unfortunately the military junta that designed the transition programme never really intended for the experiment to succeed as it annulled the election, and halted the match toward democracy and national integration. The five political parties registered during the Abacha regime, aptly described by Bola Ige, a frontline opposition figure of that era as "the five fingers of a leprous hand" were designed to fulfill the ambition of Abacha transforming into a civilian president and were dissolve after his demise.

The fourth republic has as its take off point after, the death of General Sani Abacha in June 1998. The transition to civil rule programme of the Abdulsalami's administration lasted for only eleven months, the shortest in the country's history and ushered in the fourth republic. Political parties of this dispensation in the words of Nigeria's first executive President, Shehu Shagari "were created in a matter of weeks and prepared for elections in a matter of days" (Cited in Saliu and Muhammad 2008, 163). In other words, parties of this era did not evolve organically to produce a prior long term political association between the various groups and individuals that came together. This has impacted on their operation and performance such that nineteen years after

the return to party politics, with over sixty registered parties, their relevance have remained contested. Even those that have acquired governmental control have not significantly contributed to good governance and better quality of life for the generality of Nigerians nor have they robustly espoused ideas and ideals aimed at strengthening the fragile nationhood; rather, they have violated every known rule of decency and probity both in the management of electoral processes and in the conduct of the affairs of State.

Hence, today political parties mean different things to different people depending on who is assessing their evolution and relevance. Olusegun Obasanjo for example, once described the political party under whose platform he rose to become president - the People's Democratic Party (PDP) as *"a dynamic amalgam of interest groups held together by, if anything at all, the fact that the party is in power and therefore the strong expectation of patronage"(Cited* Anifowoshe 2004, 65). In the same vein, BamangaTukur a former national chairman of the same party was quoted as describing his party as *an amalgam of diverse groups united only by one purpose- to grab power, but not yet fused into a functional political party for development* (This Day 2013).

These assertions by the national leaders of a party that until recently was in charge of managing the affairs of the country captures the essence of national malaise in Nigeria and partly explains why political parties in this dispensation have not fulfilled their role as institutions for national development and integration. The formation in July 2013 of the All Progressive Congress APC by leading opposition leaders and a splinter group from the PDP who collapsed their respective platforms in order to form a broad based party represents a new phase in the democratic evolution of the country. The new party did not only hold a successfully national congress to elect officers to administer the party, it has succeeded in wrestling political power from the former ruling party in the general elections conducted in March 2015. The successes of these two events especially the alternation of political power at the national level have expectedly generated renewed but cautious optimism in the prospect of not only consolidating democracy but also charting a new course for the development of the country.

The Challenges of Political parties as institutions for National Integration

Some of the problems of political parties in Nigeria that have served as hindrance and impediment to the deepening of democracy include the non-institutionalisation of political party, weak party leadership, absence of

party discipline, little sign of an ideologically coherent party system and a narrow conception of the responsibilities that political powers demands are well acknowledged in the literature (Simbine 2002). A closer scrutiny of these factors reveals they also largely account for the inability of political parties to serve as agency for national integration in Nigeria.

Leadership deficit for instance, is an important factor in understanding the Nigerian predicament. It is a widely acknowledged fact that the progress or otherwise of any society depends largely on the quality of leadership such a society or state can muster. This assertion is true with organisations either public or private and crucially applies to political party leadership. If a political party is imbued with strong and purposeful leadership, such a party will not only serve as an effective tool for national integration but will work for the overall transformation of the country.

While colonial amalgamation brought people of different nationalities under a single territorial and institutional framework, the leadership of the country was not sufficiently socialised towards the objectives of evolving a true sense of national identity and commitment to the survival and development of the country. The narrow political ambition and class interest of the political elites who took over from the departing colonialist prevented them from working as united front once independence was achieved and this factor continues to undermine the quest for national integration (Ekanola 2006). Successive political elite have continually resorted to this time tested strategy of the manipulation of primordial cleavages to further deepen the divisive tendencies among the people.

The institution of political party has also remained weak and underdeveloped. Institutionalisation refers to the process by which political party become established and acquire value and enduring stability (Saliu & Muhammad 2008). Prolong military rule have stunted the growth of democratic institutions like the legislature and political party. They are often among the first casualties in the event of a military coup. The authoritarian culture of the military now permeates the psyche of politicians and their conduct within political parties. This has greatly undermined the ability and capacity of the political parties to act as effective pillars of democracy and agents of national integration. Institutionalised parties tend to employ peaceful and democratic means in their quest for power. It is not uncommon in this era to hear party officials boast of their intention to capture particular states during electioneering campaigns. The political parties of the present dispensation have been dominated by retired military officers and ex-service men with a Command mindset, democratisation thus carry with it a high dose

of military flavor (Adekanye 1999). Nigeria is currently having her longest spell of democratic rule which has seen the emergency of dozens of political parties; many of which remain so only in name and visible only during electioneering campaigns with the intent of cutting political deals from the more prominent political parties.

The above challenge dovetails into the problem of the narrow conception of the responsibilities that political power demands. Nigeria political elites have a pathological conception of politics as the super highway to wealth. In a country where the state controls large resources while the productive sectors remain largely underdeveloped, the state power of patronage is enormous. There is therefore, a high premium placed on political office.

All weapons are deployed into the contest, including fanning the embers of ethno-religious and regional sentiments. The motivation for standing for election is not primarily to serve, but to secure public office and appropriate its benefits for personal and group interest. This patron-client relationship in politics is what Joseph, referred to as prebendalism (Joseph 1999). The debilitating effect of this kind of political practice is the weakening of the capacity of the state to deliver social goods to the populace. Citizens are then left with no option than to find succor and relief in their ethnic or religious groupings. The recoil into atavistic enclave has complicated national security challenge with the evidence that over 30 of the country's 36 states of the federation are currently under one form of undeclared emergency or the other. At the base of the problem is the withering strength and influence of the Nigerian state vis-à-vis the rising ferocity of various armed non-state actors challenging the state monopoly of the instrument of coercion. The mushrooming of various violent extremist groups with diverse grievances such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND), Niger-Delta Avengers (NDA), Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra, (MASSOB) Indigenous People Of Biafra (IPOB), and the two most vicious and virulent groups, the Fulani herdsmen and Boko Haram, tells a story of a country reeling under the weight insecurity occasioned by a declining state capacity.

Breaking the Cycle of Ethno-Regional Party Formation Pattern

While historical evidence from the first and second republics revealed that political parties were either formed based on ethno regional affiliations or invariably evolved into regional based parties, evidence from that era also

showed ongoing attempts to forge party alliances and build coalition of like minds across regional lines which if not truncated by military intervention would have culminated in the formation of two broad based and dominant political parties (Akinola 2014). Perceptive and progressive politicians realised early enough the importance of discarding parochial platforms and reaching out beyond narrow confines, but their efforts never really bore fruitful dividend. In the first republic, the second federal elections conducted in 1964 were contested between two broad coalitions of parties. The opposition parties that came together to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) comprised principally of the Action Group party (AG), the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), the Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU) and the United Middle Belt Congress(UMBC).

     While the ruling party, the Northern People's Congress (NPC) formed an alliance with the breakaway faction of the Action Group that had merged with the western wing of the (NCNC) to form a new party known as the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). The coming together of these parties with the ruling NPC resulted in the formation of the Nigeria National Alliance (NNA). It was these two broad political parties that contested the 1964 federal election, though the opposition party boycotted the election in many significant areas. The controversy arising from the conduct of that election coupled with a potpourri of other events culminated in the January 1966 coup (Ige 1995; Akinola 2014).

     The effort at evolving broader and national political platforms was repeated in the second republic (1979-1983) when the National party of Nigeria emerged as the dominant party following the 1979 general election. This scenario compelled the self-styled progressive politicians to attempt to forge an alternative political platform via the Progressive Parties' Alliance (PPA) which comprised of the Unity Party of Nigeria, (UPN) the Nigeria's Peoples Party (NPP) the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) and the Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP). The alliance however collapsed in its formative stage because of rivalry as members were unable to agree on a common candidate for the 1983 presidential election. According to Richard Joseph:

> Although the UPN was actively engaged in the meetings of the "progressive governors" and although it participated in the negotiations which led to the creation of the Progressive People's Alliance (PPA) in March 1982, it did not enter into the subsequent arrangement to have a new party, the Progressive People's Party (PPP) (Joseph 1999, 167).

In the aborted third republic, two political parties were decreed into existence by military fiat, these parties were certainly not as ideologically coherent as their label ostensibly gave the impression, but the Social Democratic Party (SDP) was without doubt closer to progressivism on the ideological spectrum than its opponent, the National Republican Convention (NRC). The experiment collapsed with the annulment of the 1993 presidential election. The country however faced a choice between a broadly conservative party and a roughly progressive party in that election (Bourne 2016).

At the start of the current democratic dispensation in 1999, there was an alliance between the All People's Party (APP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) which succeeded in fielding a joint presidential flag bearer of the APP/AD alliance against Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP in the February 27th 1999 presidential election (Simbine 2002). It is the nucleus and core of the group that midwifed the 1999 alliance between the APP and the AD that eventually merged with other splinter groups to form the All Progressive Congress Party (APC) in 2013. The democratic and political evolution of the country since independence thus partly depicts attempts and movements towards the formation of a two party system. The uninterrupted spell of democracy since 1999 thus provided the opportunity to evolve and consummate two dominant parties to serve the course of democratic consolidation and national integration. The formation of the APC is perhaps a realisation of the political truism that regional and sectional political parties have only served as platforms for the promotion of ethnic chauvinism and regional rivalries and have become unfashionable. The two dominant political parties, the APC and the PDP today boast of a crosscutting membership and support base all over the country thereby breaking the cycle of regionally based Political parties.

The birth of the new party engendered a national debate on the character of the leading members and the promoters of the party and their claim to progressive credentials. While a segment of the commentators and analyst dismissed the merger as simply an alliance of frustrated and aggrieved politicians, other welcomed the emergence of the party arguing that a strong and competitive two party system can only serve as a sinew the nation's democracy (This day 2013). While it may be true that the country's democracy will be better served by two strong parties, what Nigeria does not need are two parties whose only difference are their nomenclature, such that if any political actors loses out in the power calculus in either of the two leading parties, they quickly defect to the rival party in the quest for power. This appears to be the case presently with politicians moving in different directions depending on the power equation and permutations at every round

of election. The APC is certainly not exactly the immaculate progressive party as their name portray, it is at best a motley crowd of discernible element of both progressivism and conservatism. The defeat of the PDP in the last general election and the alternation of power have presented a chance to deepen and consolidate democracy in Nigeria. It is also an opportunity for reformist to insist on internal reforms so as to transform the party (Adeniyi 2017; Abdullahi 2017).

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ABSTRACT

Political parties are crucial institutions in the construction of a participatory democratic order; they provide platforms for developing competing public policy proposals, as well as serving as instruments for channeling disparate social groupings into a common political platform, thus providing a stabilising effect to an otherwise fractious society. The significance of political parties therefore, goes beyond the utilitarian function of contesting or retaining political power to include the ability to provide a unifying force in the face of deep-seated ethno-religious cleavages. The historical trajectory of political party formation in Nigeria however runs counter to this theoretical and normative ideal. Political parties in the pre and post-independence Nigeria have served as sites for the mobilisation of the people along primordial faultlines. This paper argues that the two main political parties in Nigeria today presents an opportunity to break the cycle of regional based parties that have hobbled efforts towards national integration.

PROBING THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF GOVERNMENT AND PHILANTHROPY IN NIGERIA: RELIGION AS A REFUGE?

Mike Omilusi[1]

Introduction and Background to the Study

In Nigeria, as in many other parts of Africa, democracy has had a chequered history, and remains fragile. Part of the explanation has been that dominant political forces constantly undermine the effective involvement of the people as key players in the processes of governance. The character of the Nigerian state has been exploited by the operators of state affairs to achieve sectional interests. Managers of state affairs have often times assumed the position of the state thereby rendering the state paralyzed and in fact subjecting it to their whim and caprice. The situation became more pathetic under military regimes, with their unitary, hierarchical and commanding nature largely affecting the operation of the Nigerian state.

It is affirmed that new democracies, such as Nigeria, face an immediate challenge of survival as governments 'struggle to maintain constitutional rule and electoral processes that are threatened by conflicts, military coups, or aspiring dictators waiting in the wings' (Lewis 2006, cited in Yagboyaju 2015, 166). In addition, all democracies are confronted by several other important tasks. These include 'broadening personal freedoms; encouraging genuine political participation; promoting the accountability of leaders; resolving conflicts; advancing a general rule of law; and building efficient and effective public institutions' (Lewis 2006, cited in Yagboyaju 2015, 166). As posited by Yabi (2015), many Africans have excellent reasons to doubt the usefulness of the "democracy" that was so enthusiastically touted to them at the turn of the 1990s. Threatened by a wide variety of violent conflicts in their countries

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or at their borders, Africans have been kept in poverty by unproductive and unfair economic systems. They have been left in the hands of fate (and their God) by elites that privatise the State and monopolise the lion's share of economic resources and opportunities. Added to these challenges is the uphill task, particularly in societies such as Nigeria and others with long encounters with military rule and abuse of office generally, of achieving quick economic advancement, prosperity and general economic well-being for ordinary citizens, through democracy (Yagboyaju 2015, 166).

In the light of this, the progressive expansion of poverty, ignorance, hunger, disease, unemployment, exploitation, alienation, oppression and dispossession in Nigeria since independence has continued to influence the resort of Nigerians to a search for the spiritual essence of their being. The socio-economic and political adversities in the country provide a fertile ground for the planting, germination, growth and balkanization of all forms of religion. Thus, the only sector that has been experiencing growth and expansion, nearly six decades after independence, is the religious sector (Jaja 2016). Religious institutions constitute the widest and deepest expressions of popular participation in Nigeria (USAID 2006, 24) as manifested in being home to the largest number of Anglicans in the world, having the fourth largest population of Roman Catholics and the fifth largest population of Muslims (Okechukwu n.d.).

Thus, in recent times Nigeria has emerged as one of the most religious countries in the world. As the number of churches/mosques in the country continues to increase and the population of worshipers doubles, so also is the number of mosques and Islamic faithful enlarging. It has been argued that Nigeria has become the number one country globally in terms of the population of religion worshipers and adherents, notably of the two major religions, Christianity and Islam (Falana 2010). The country is now a procreant ground for all kinds of religious movements. From a functionalist perspective, one might argue that religion provides many Nigerians with an identity and a sense of purpose. They also provide a safety net for their followers in the form of food and shelter. This is not unconnected with the fact that, as rightly posited by Nwadialor and Umeanolue (2013, 33), the majority of Nigerians have been experiencing abject poverty many decades after independence. The recent socio-economic situation of contemporary Nigeria has been a symptomatic of the endemic plurality of Nigeria's religious landscape.

Nigeria's population size, ethnic diversity, and deepening sense of insecurity – political, economic, cultural, and medical – combine to create a collective experience of anxiety which, in turn, generates a spiralling need

for religious associations, services, rituals, and solutions. Population growth, urbanization, competition, and the multiple services provided by religious communities make religious associations a significant component of Nigerian social structure. Hence, they are a critical resource for politicians attempting political mobilization on any issue (USAID 2006, 24). Ademola-Olateju (2015) raises deep posers on this topical issue: In a country where good roads, electricity and healthcare facilities are taken to God in prayer, the link between religion and poverty is worth analysing more closely. Why are poor nations the most religious? Why do poor people cling to religion? Do Nigerians turn to religion due to despair, or do people fall into poverty as a result of their religious beliefs? This essay is, therefore, concerned primarily with the intervention of religious organisations in meeting the spiritual and physical needs of many Nigerian citizens – disenchanted and frustrated as a result of government failure. It examines how religion has become a sanctuary of hope and refuge in the face of daunting socio-economic challenges and how, ironically, this pathetic human condition is being exploited by such religious bodies. It also probes into the state of philanthropy by individuals and corporate bodies in the country within the context of African communalism and governance deficit.

On Government's Primary Responsibilities and the Sobering Realities

Governments almost certainly originated with the need to protect people from conflicts and to provide law and order. Why have conflicts among people happened throughout history? Many people, both famous and ordinary, have tried to answer that question. Perhaps human nature dictates selfishness, and people inevitably will come to blows over who gets what property or privilege. Or maybe, as Karl Marx explains, it is because the very idea of "property" makes people selfish and greedy (UShistory n.d.). All governments at all levels do have duties and responsibilities to their citizens. The mark and exemplifier of a good government is in the fulfilment of basic duties and responsibilities of such government in Nigeria and worldwide.

Whatever the reasons, governments first evolved as people discovered that protection was easier if they stayed together in groups and if they all agreed that one (or some) in the group should have more power than others. This recognition is the basis of sovereignty, or the right of a group (later a country) to be free of outside interference. Part of a government's function is to protect its citizens from outside attack. Ancient Chinese emperors constructed a "Great

Wall" to defend the borders of their empire. A country, then, needs to not only protect its citizens from one another, but it needs to organize to prevent outside attack. Sometimes they have built Great Walls and guarded them carefully from invaders. Other times they have led their followers to safe areas protected by high mountains, wide rivers, or vast deserts. Historically, they have raised armies, and the most successful ones have trained and armed special groups to defend the rest. Indeed, in the twentieth century, governments have formed alliances and fought great world wars in the name of protection and order. In more recent years, government responsibilities have extended to the economy and public service (UShistory n.d.).

The Federal Republic of Nigeria emerged as an independent nation from British colonial tutelage in October 1960. More than a century of British imperialism and colonialism in Nigeria brought the commanding heights of the Nigerian economy under the control of primarily British, and other Western firms. Gradual implementation of a decolonisation programme granted Nigerian politicians control over regional governments leaving the colonial government with control over foreign affairs, before finally divesting itself of power in 1960. Not being active in productive activities, those politicians lacked a solid economic base, and with regional political power in their hands they proceeded to use it to compensate for their lack of a solid resource base. Thus, corruption became paramount in the political affairs of the country (Akude 2007, 9). According to Lewis (2007), Nigeria's travails, while hardly unique within the developing world, are surely exceptional in their scope and persistence. Mass poverty, economic stagnation, endemic corruption, political instability, weak institutions, and social conflict can be found in many countries, and viewed in this light, Nigeria might seem unremarkable.

The relative roles of the three tiers of government – the federal government, the state governments, and the local government authorities (LGAs) – in public service delivery has emerged as one of the most important topics of open and vigorous debate in the new democratic climate in Nigeria. The exclusive responsibilities of the Federal Government of Nigeria are broadly in accordance with standard international practice, including matters of national concern such as defense, foreign affairs, regulation, and monetary policy. The responsibility of service delivery in the areas of education, health, infrastructure, agriculture and industry is concurrently shared with states and Local Government Authorities, with the respective assignments apparently derived from the considerations of inter-jurisdictional spillover effects and economies of scale, although there is no formal reference to the underlying principles in the official literature.

Section 14(2)(b) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria states that "the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government; and the participation by the people in their government shall be ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution". With respect to the economic well-being of the people, the Constitution has also imposed a duty on the State to guarantee "the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice, and equality of status and opportunity". To this effect, the State shall direct its policies towards ensuring that "the material resources of the nation are harnessed and distributed as best as possible to serve the common good" and that "the economic system is not operated in such manner as to permit the concentration of wealth or the means of production and exchange in the hands of few individuals or of a group".

In order to ensure good governance and public accountability, the State is under an obligation to abolish "all corrupt practices and abuse of power". Apart from the duty imposed on all citizens to "render assistance to appropriate and lawful agencies in the maintenance of law and order", it is the obligation of the mass media to "uphold the responsibility and accountability of the Government to the people". To eradicate illiteracy and ignorance, the Government shall, as and when practicable, provide "(a) free compulsory and universal primary education; (b) free secondary education; (c) free university education and (d) free adult literacy programme". It is also the duty of the State to protect children, young persons and the aged against any form of exploitation whatsoever and against moral or material neglect (Falana 2015).

Security of lives and property is a dire need for any thriving country. Without security, a country remains exposed to threats, and is vulnerable. In this state, the attainment of such a country's objectives and projects becomes a herculean task (Iregbenu and Uzonwanne 2015, 169). As a matter of fact, a government that cannot protect its citizens and guarantee adequate security of lives and property is a failed Government. Without adequate security of lives and property, the system will be rife with lawlessness, chaos and eventual disintegration. This is why security is considered as a dynamic condition, which involves the relative ability.

In Nigeria, as will be discussed shortly, a vast majority of the citizenry are denied basic human needs and this inadequacy has created a "frustration of rising expectations" which in turn resulted in violence, kidnappings, armed robberies, prostitution, terrorism among others. The spate of deaths and destruction associated with religious killings, political violence, ethnic clashes, kidnappings, armed banditry are insurmountable (Omede 2011, 96).

Amidst the deteriorating security situation in the country, Nigeria is also confronted with daunting developmental challenges which pose serious threat to socio-economic development. These developmental challenges include endemic rural and urban poverty, high rate of unemployment, debilitating youth unemployment, low industrial output, unstable and deteriorating exchange rate, high inflation rate, inadequate physical and social infrastructure, very large domestic debt, and rising stock of external debt (Ewetan 2013). All these are, no doubt, hindrances to good governance in the country.

Good governance has for many years remained elusive in Nigeria's political terrains because of the fact that this worthy aspect of culture, tradition and norms, political vestiges has been abandoned. Rather, despotic and corrupt leaders mostly in uniform have always found their ways into the polity as leaders (Joseph 1987). According to Kukah (cited in Nwankwor 2004, 313), there is a noticeable tendency to trace the performance of democracy as a form of government in Nigeria to the colonial trappings of the state, the nature and character of successive governing elites and their misrepresentation of the purpose of state machinery to the citizenry. Majority of Nigerian leaders since independence, short of rhetorics, have variously shown they have no interest in the future of the country. All Nigeria has to live with are leaders who by some illegal means or the other acquired power, emptied the nation's coffers and restarted the same process by working towards re-election and, where this is not possible, transferred power to their cronies who venture to do worse than their predecessors. They recycled themselves within the corridors of power (Odo 2015).

The main and fundamental problem with Nigeria (and indeed Africa), which has been the country's albatross, rests squarely with bad or poor leadership which cuts across political, religious, traditional, community, ethnic/tribal, labour/union, market and business leaders, as well as other leaders at various levels (military, police and other paramilitary security agencies), who in most cases are always self-serving and self-centred in their approach to handling national issues. Most people in leadership positions – either in Government or out of Government – are usually economical with the truth either because of selfish interests or due to corruptive influences or a combination of both (Kayode 2011). Bad leadership manifested by persistent human rights violation, bad governance, dysfunctional institutions, patronage, electoral fraud, manipulation of ethnic differences, corruption and personalisation of power hinder the prevalence of peace and social justice. Powerful political elites feed on the state, prey on the weak, use national resources for self-aggrandizement, and deprive citizens of collective goods

such as medical care, good education and employment (Burton 1990; Sandole 2001 cited in Mayanja 2013). According to Adujie (2009):

> Nigeria is analogous to a corporation, and our current leaders should be seen as ineffective inefficient managing director and board members. Nigeria is a corporation into which Nigerian citizens are heavily invested. Nigeria should be seen as a corporation which currently has poor return on our investment or no dividends at all. The prudent thing for any smart investor, shareholder to do, in order to earn dividends, profits and return on investment, is to oust the errant managing director and board members.

Over the years, the Nigerian government has failed to harness the vast human and material resources at its disposal to break the cycle of poverty and autocracy that has characterized it since independence in 1960. Thus, the Nigerian state has been constantly struggling between the forces of democracy and authoritarianism, and characterized by 'the push for development and the pull for underdevelopment, the burden of public corruption and the pressure of accountability' (Kesselman et al. 1996 cited in Idada and Uhunmwuangho 2012, 50). The effect of corruption on Nigeria is, of course, unquantifiable. Aside from soiling Nigeria's corporate image in the international community, all the social, economic and political structures in the country have been ruined by corruption. Social services and infrastructure are in a shambles. The people are pauperized as the ordinary people are always the victims. While the people wallow in abject poverty and want, members of the political class and their business class associates bask in stupendous stolen wealth (The Guardian 2016).

It is a common practice in most neighbourhoods across the country for residents to be confronted by challenges like broken down transformers, lack of potable tap water, insecurity and so on. The situation has gotten so bad that most Nigerians have resigned themselves to living in a society where paying taxes doesn't guarantee the provision or steady access to basic public amenities (Ogunsina and Opaluwa 2015). As rightly captured by Segun Quadri (2015):

> Majority of government facilities enjoyed by the masses such as potable drinking water, electricity, good healthcare system, free education etc. are all a story of the past. The common man has even become his own government, providing power, security, water and so on by himself. From 1999, since the civilians took over governance under a democratic arrangement, we have suffered progressive deterioration of not only the country's infrastructural network, practically all our

institutions critical to socio-political and democratic advancement have collapsed. Even governance itself is grinding to a halt.

The poor and disadvantaged suffer in relation to delivery of public services. First, they lack access to those services due to physical, financial, informational, political and other barriers. Second, they lack effective mechanisms for feeding back their complaints, views and requests in relation to those services. As a result, public services to the poor lack transparency, accountability and quality (Gopakumar K et al. 2002). The poor and the disadvantaged are particularly vulnerable as they rely completely on the state for accessing critical services such as drinking water, health and education as enunciated above. Yet, as noted by Diamond (2008), the fundamental purpose of neo-patrimonial, prebendal governments is not to produce public goods – roads, bridges, markets, irrigation, education, health care, public sanitation, clean drinking water, effective legal systems – that increase productivity, improve human capital, stimulate investment, and generate development. Rather, it is to produce private goods for those who hold or have access to political power. Contracts are let not on the basis of who can deliver the best service for the lowest price, but rather on who will pay the biggest bribe. Budgets are steered to projects that can readily generate bribes. Government funds disappear into the overseas accounts of office-holders. Government payrolls are swollen with the ranks of phantom workers and soldiers

Philanthropy and Communalism in Nigeria: An Overview

Africa is a multi-faceted and fascinating continent. With so many different ethnicities and nationalities, one common practice unites all Africans: a culture of giving. Philanthropy, or giving, has long been practiced in Africa. Whether the motivation is to contribute to the growth of the country, give back once business success has been achieved, or support one's neighbours in need, philanthropy serves as the cement that binds communities together and contributes to the development of the continent (Emodi and de Unverhau 2014, 1). Philanthropy is an integral part of the African identity and an inherent characteristic of African family life and community. However, Africans may not recognize the term 'philanthropy', which is a construct of the Global North and is generally associated with the transfer of large amounts of wealth from rich to poor. Many people would use English terms such as 'giving' or 'charity' or 'help' instead (UBS Philanthropy Advisory and TrustAfrica 2014, 32).

Communalism is the principle or system of social order in which, among other things, the supremacy of the community is culturally and socially entrenched, society is hierarchically ordered, life is sacrosanct, and religion is a way of life. In such a community, people are not seen as important in their own right. Each one is an integral part of the whole, and derives his or her place in the context of the community. People in a communalistic community are born into the community. They are not selected into it. Such a community is not created as a result of the coming together of individuals. It is an evolved community whose membership is hereditary. In a communalistic social order, community welfare undergirds actions. Nothing done, no matter how important and useful it is to the individual, is considered good unless it has relevance for the community. No misfortune, no matter how distinctly personal, is left for the individual to bear all alone. The community laughs together and also cries together (Moemeka 1998, 124). Total obedience to the community as an entity that exists for the good of all is demanded not only with respect to physical or material needs, but also with respect to emotional and communication needs. In this setting, religion pervades life in truly communalistic communities (Mbiti 1969), and it is used as a tool for safeguarding social order and protecting social norms and communication rules (Moemeka 1994). Communalism demands that people's lives reflect a solid blend of what is regarded as holy and what is accepted as socially permissible.

Under communalism, the small community was said to be the main unit of government. Every adult participated both in decision-making and also in the execution of those decisions. Each gave according to his ability. There were communal governments where public decisions were openly arrived at, issues were raised and discussed openly. Decision-making was thus a process of the resolution of views among all the citizens (Oyewole 1987, 38).

Nigeria has the region's greatest concentration of High Net-Worth individuals (HNWIs). According to the Nigeria 2014 Wealth Book, in 2013 Nigeria had over 16,000 HNWIs holding USD 90 billion in wealth. The number of HNWIs is forecast to grow by 7% to reach over 18,000 in 2018, while HNW wealth is expected to grow by 27% to reach USD 123 billion in 2018. The 2014 New World Wealth report reflects that Nigeria has 200 Ultra-High Net-Worth individuals, 50 centa-millionaires and four billionaires. Eleven of the HNWIs appearing in the Forbes "Africa's 40 Richest People" in 2012 were Nigerian. Although there is a general belief that the wealth and philanthropy of HNWIs in Nigeria is visible and public, there may be some who prefer to give unseen. In 2012 Forbes published a list of ten Ultra-High-Net-Worth individuals from Nigeria who prefer to retain a low profile

(UBS Philanthropy Advisory and TrustAfrica 2014, 37). Recent literature has sought to highlight the fact that there are different views of philanthropy in Africa (that is, different from how it is seen in other parts of the world), and that very often African philanthropy is characterized by particular practices. There has always been anecdotal evidence to suggest that giving is focused on the extended family and more immediate communities (UBS Philanthropy Advisory and TrustAfrica 2014, 42). On the flip side, there are concerns about the illusory nature of many of Africa's charitable works, which can appear more like public relations gimmicks than sincere efforts to alleviate problems.

The scene in the contemporary Nigeria is one of general loss of qualms of conscience and utter absence of fear of God and disregard for human life and person, giving rise to general moral decadence and existence of various ills and crimes, such as injustice, bribery and corruption, stealing, armed robbery, killing, kidnapping, rape, cultism etc (Osunwokeh 2014, 183). Indeed, it is observed that the level of social injustice currently prevalent in Nigeria is reaching alarming proportions. The overwhelming upsurge of militant and resistant groups in Nigeria today are commonly interpreted as demonstrations against the state resulting from the strains of injustice in the system and as signalling the level of discontent amongst the citizenry (Uchegbue 2013, 141).

Natural resource-rich African countries suffered a severe financial hemorrhage through capital flight over the past decades. Recent estimates suggest that the leakages increased during the resource boom. From 1970 to 2008, Nigeria lost a staggering $296 billion to capital flight. About $71 billion went 'missing' from Angola between 1985 and 2008 (Ndikumana and Boyce 2011). Other oil-exporting countries also suffered substantial capital flight in the last four decades: Côte d'Ivoire ($45 billion), the DRC ($31 billion), Cameroon ($24 billion), the Republic of Congo ($24 billion), and Sudan ($18 billion) (Ndikumana and Boyce 2012, 4). It should be noted that the growth of wealthy individuals does not necessarily lead to an increase in philanthropy and this is very apt in Nigeria. Apart from the formalized philanthropy model – corporate foundations – that exists in the country, wealthy Nigerians, save for a few, do little to use what they have to help the masses. Instead, they transfer their money to foreign banks rather than making it useful for the nation. When these wealthy men want to go on holiday, they travel to United States or Canada, and many migrate to the developed world rather than spend their money in Nigeria.

In the midst of governance failure in the country, Nigerian elites rather live in opulence and splendour, either on their stupendous rentier income, publicly looted funds, or government patronage. A few have indeed

ranked prestigiously among the richest in the world (Odeyemi 2013, 261). Political elites misappropriate considerable public funds for their personal gain, while most of their constituents lack access to potable water. Joseph (2016) once rhetorically asked: Why can Nigerians build and operate mega-churches but not quality public transport, public universities, public energy utilities and other service organizations? Nigeria also illustrates the central dilemma of "Rising Africa": an expanding consumer market and middle class alongside persistent poverty. Inequity in this nation of 175 million is egregious. Many millionaires are spawned as champagne consumption rises and private airplane ownership soars. These excesses, based largely on access to state resources, can be redirected to transformative and sustainable growth (Joseph 2015). The most frustrating reality is that a larger part of looted public funds is not invested in Nigeria but usually dumped in foreign accounts to further enhance the economies of those states.

How Religion Fills the Vacuum: A Variable for Rescue Mission or Exploitation?

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious nation state with over four hundred ethnic nationalities associated with many religious congregations (Aghemelo and Osumah 2009). Nigeria has three major religious identities: Christian, Islam and traditional religions (Omorogbe and Omohan 2005, 557; Osaghae and Suberu 2005, 11 cited in Çancı and Odukoya 2016). Traditional religions are the most politically inactive of the three groups, 'numbering several hundreds of ethnic groups and sub-groups, villages, clans and kin groups; and, involving the worship of different gods and goddesses' (Osaghae and Suberu 2005, 11). The Pentecostal churches form the fundamental division of Christianity in Nigeria which has experienced rapid growth in numbers of followers in the last few years with the majority of adherents, especially the youths, joining the church from the older and more traditional denominations. The church has played an important role in civil society in anti-military struggles and democratisation. This has been made possible through umbrella bodies such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN), and the Catholic Bishops Conference (Osaghae and Suberu 2005, 11).

Religion is probably the most popular phenomenon in contemporary Nigeria. Religion has achieved this pre-eminence due to its overwhelming impacts and contributions in the Nigerian society. As a notable agent of change, religion has undeniably exerted a great deal of influence positively and

negatively on the Nigerian people in many ways (Kitause and Achunike 2013, 51). The 'failure' of the Nigerian political elite to enact good governments, promote national integration and foster good economic progress via thoughtful and pronounced policies (Çancı and Odukoya 2016) has naturally created a vacuum which the religious bodies are, through their policies/ programmes, filling. Many religious groups make significant contributions to human development, through the provision of education, health and social welfare, mainly for their numerous members all over the country. Beyond the similarity of their social contributions, many religious groups share ideals and virtues, and many religious leaders also share a critique of the Nigerian state and its political class (Nolte et al. 2010).

Over the past decade, considerable research has emerged that demonstrates the benefits of religious practice within society. Religious practice promotes the well-being of individuals, families, and the community. Of particular note are the studies that indicate the benefits of Religion to the poor (Fagan 2006). Regular attendance at religious services is linked to healthy, stable family life, strong marriages, and well-behaved children. The practice of Religion also leads to a reduction in the incidence of domestic abuse, crime, substance abuse, and addiction. In addition, religious practice leads to an increase in physical and mental health, longevity, and education attainment (Fagan 2006). Yet, research has also revealed a link between the level of poverty and deprivation that exist in a society with the people's religiosity. It is contended that when people are poor they lean on religion for comfort. Ademola-Olateju (2015), citing other sources, sums up his findings thus:

> In a 2010 Gallup poll of 100 countries, the data showed a strong, positive correlation between strict adherence to religion and privation. In like manner, an independent study by Dr. Tom Rees, published in the Journal of Religion and Society, showed that in places without strong social safety nets to provide people with opportunities for upward mobility, they are more likely to be religious. When suffering becomes a constant in the lives of people, they are easily consoled by visions of the apocalypse, judgement, punishment and hell. Poverty, deprivation and suffering often leads to consolatory beliefs that the world will soon end, with God rewarding the faithful with everlasting joy where there is no want, no toil, no tribulation. The doom and gloom predictions of the rapture and the trials and tribulations that humanity will face, as found in Christian fundamentalism, is thus made popular. The scenario helps perpetuate suffering by attributing a higher purpose to human pain and suffering as part of God's grand plan for absolution among His chosen.

Put differently, in the face of the weakness of the Nigerian state and the inefficiency of its institutions to provide the human good to its citizens, the Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) supplement and complement government's efforts towards improving the standard of living of Nigerians. These FBOs in Nigeria which number over 46,000 are involved in pro-poor, charitable works which alleviate poverty, promote progress, and serve as agents of development (Ogbonnaya 2012, 10). According to Olarinmoye (cited in Ogbonnaya 2012, 10):

> FBOs in Nigeria provide health and educational services through their hospitals, clinics and maternities, schools and colleges, vocational training centers, seminaries and universities. They own economic institutions, such as bookshops, hotels, banks, insurance, mass media and ICT companies and are prominent owners of real estate in the form of sacred cities and prayer camps which cover thousands of hectares of land. The lands on which their hospitals, schools and orphanages are situated also make up part of their real estate portfolio.

As good governance continues to be found lacking by the majority of Nigerians who live without access to basic public services, other organizations have stepped in to fill the void. Religious organizations now provide a range of social services that government generally provides. These problems are symptomatic of a broader, overarching democracy and governance problem in Nigeria, which relates to an oligarchic control of political power, both formal and informal, by unaccountable political elites (USAID 2006, v). Religious Nigerians from different parts of the country share similar views on good governance and development. These are shaped by recourse to Biblical and Qur'anic ideals of justice, equality and 'the fear of God'. They emphasize the importance of infrastructural development, education and health care for all Nigerians. Many religious groups make efforts to provide their members with access to education and other services. Sometimes their services and facilities are open to members of other religious groups (Nolte et al. 2010).

The other explanation for this development can be located in the tendency of Africans to seek spiritual succour in their religion when all things seem to have failed them including government. According to The Lutheran World Federation (2002, 17), spirituality in African religion is described as "values by which a person individually or in community relates to the spiritual realm" (Mbiti). It is born out of a relationship between human beings and other realities which include God, spirits of the departed, divinities, spirits associated with natural objects and phenomena, and nature itself. Africans are extremely aware of the "triangle of reality" as a community in which they

participate and to which they belong. Their spirituality is governed by the sensitivity to this reality of relationships and communication.

Beyond the communal life, however, African religion teaches that spiritual powers exist which can shape and influence individual lives, for better or for worse. Therefore, it is important to seek ways and means to manipulate or control those external powers and agencies which are more powerful than humans, through practicing rituals and magical recipes and charms prescribed by religious authorities to those who feel threatened (The Lutheran World Federation 2002, 19). Thus, it is observable in Nigeria to see more patients in religious centres than hospitals (particularly churches) seeking spiritual healing for one ailment or the other; more of desperate job seekers; workers due for promotion; frustrated congregation in need of financial help through divine connection; pregnant women attending special religious sessions rather than antenatal; numerous other problem-induced congregants/worshippers seek spiritual anointing on many anthropic issues like visa applications, life partners, mobility, defeat of enemies among others[2]. This may have informed the submission of Ademola-Olateju (2015) on the subject matter: Religion offers a sense of hope, and it helps keep the poor from total despair. It thwarts their drive to improve their lot and creates a social disincentive for progress. That is why people under stress are easier targets for evangelism. That is why the soul winning ministries have more success among the poor, and it is the reason they target people going through life-changing events such as illness, marriage, divorce, pregnancy, death in the family, etc. As observed by Larr (2015):

> The trouble no longer ends with robbers and kidnappers going to Church every Sunday to pray for God's guidance and assistance in the execution of criminal and murderous projects. It does not end anymore, with criminals paying stupendous amounts as tithes to their gleefully excited and highly gratified pastors and preachers. Nigerians, do have reasons enough to express gratitude to the self-imposed men of God, whose stock-in-trade is flamboyance and the public display of silver and gold and jets and coats. They show us who they are and save for a few gullible and helpless minds, they are known to everyone else for their insatiable greed for material wealth and larceny based on

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2 This writer has witnessed a lot of these scenes either on research voyage, personal engagement, or invitation by friends and acquaintances. It is usually an unintended transfiguration from empiricism to spirituality in terms of "prayer requests" which ordinarily, in other climes, should be directed to government agencies. Yet, in many instances, people testify to the "power of the Almighty God" in approving these requests! – Obviously affirming an existence between the celestial world (world of God and his angels) and the mundane world (world of the living on earth).

sycophancy. They were not the least, very visible at the seat of power advancing prophetic and treacherously divine justification for all ills and evils in the last political dispensation under the Presidency of Mr. Goodluck Jonathan.

Generally, while religion has contributed in some ways to the process of nation building, the positive impact of religion on Nigeria's democracy has remained negligible. The manipulation of religion by some powerful individuals who hide under the guise of religion to pursue selfish interests remains one of the negative effects of religion on the polity. In addition, greed has crept into the religious terrain to the extent that some religious leaders now patronize corrupt rulers to meet their lust for money and other material gains (Falana 2010). However, it must be observed that while religious entities and FBOs have assisted with provision of healthcare services, education, etc., as earlier identified, to underserved populations, perhaps based on the perceived moral, benevolent, and religious value of altruism, the religious worldview of Africans and their intense spirituality have often been exploited in an unethical manner. This may explain why Uche (2011) sees a contradiction in the present Nigerian society which he describes as one that is so religious; so rather noisy about church, about the Christian gospel, and yet so morally depraved, witnessing daily in higher proportion, evil and crimes against justice and human dignity. Ironically, beyond the ignorant and the poor, such level of religiosity seems to have captured the educated minds too as posited by Ademola-Olateju (2015):

> Religion in Nigeria has become a powerful open trap that exerts tremendous social pressure that is often impossible for the uneducated mind to avoid. In my interactions, I have seen educated people, who were normal in their homes, normal at work and everywhere outside of the Church, become complete fools once inside the Church. One cannot but wonder if the central problem comes from people turning their minds off once they walk through the door of a Church or Mosque. Their minds seem conditioned to do so since they were young. They swallow anything that is said as the truth. It is no longer what the Bible says but what my Pastor says and for the Muslims, every reference is according to this Sheikh and that Imam.

Essentially, the core principles that formed the underlining foundation on which most religions are based include truth, moral uprightness, love and the unity of all humankind, among others (Falana 2010). Ideally, instead of impeding sustainable development, religion ought to promote it, because faith addresses the ultimate concerns of human beings and permeates all aspects

of human life: vital, social, cultural, personal and religious. Religion thus provides an anchor giving meaning to various forms of human experiences, life and actions (Ogbonnaya 2012, 18). Yet, the contradictions embedded in the practice of religion in Nigeria viz-a-viz these values and their supposed attendant transformation of the society remain an interesting study in political sociology as attested to by Ijabla (2015):

> From the professor of medicine who lectures at the prestigious University of Ibadan, to the almajiri destitute who roams the streets of Kano, to the wealthy real estate manager in Port Harcourt, to the lowly nomad of arid Baga, there is one thing that connects these people - religion. Religion permeates every facet of the Nigerian society and influences the collective mindset of its people. Religion supposedly makes people good except that the evidence does not support this claim. What we know is that our society is plagued by all the inequality, injustice and atrocities that one rarely encounters in the godless Scandinavian societies, to use just one example. Our high degree of religiosity has not translated into good governance and prosperity for our citizens.

It can be deduced from the above that the high level of religiosity in Nigeria is nothing more than one of many symptoms of poverty and lack of wellbeing for the vast majority of Nigerians, as it is for other poor countries in the world (Okechukwu n.d). While Nigeria as a whole struggles with the legacy of long military rule and the corrosive effect of its dependence on oil revenue, northern Nigeria has to contend with its geographic weaknesses and a century old, self-imposed isolation from modern education and values. It is against this backdrop that one must observe the spectre of religion and its odious consequences. The harmful effects of religious dogmas and creeds can also be observed in other parts of Nigeria such as Akwa Ibom and Cross River States, where there has been an alarming upsurge in child witch-hunting by evangelical churches, taking advantage of high levels of impoverishment and ignorance (Okechukwu n.d).

In a related development, the menace of materialism in contemporary Christian Churches in Nigeria has become so fertile that most pastors and ministers of the Churches preach prosperity as part of spiritual salvation. It is an often repeated saying that as the human race makes giant strides in science and technology, the tendency is to shift away from religion. However, these days, due to economic hardship and political uncertainties in the society, people appear to be more concerned about using religion to achieve material ambitions. According to Anyaehie (2011), Nigerians only believe in prayers without any physical action whatsoever, which is the result of the stagnant

growth the country is facing today. The citizens spend most of the time praying for things that need efforts and actions. Kukah (cited in Simbine 2011), a scholar and Catholic priest described the leaders of some of Christian congregations as "pastors scavenging for fortunes in the name of leading souls to God through the organisation of endless spiritual trade fairs called revivals and vigils... hood winking and deducing ordinary citizens away from the culture of hard work and the need to develop a truly Christian ethic to wealth.

Government and Citizen Engagement

Citizen and civil society engagement to demand and promote good governance can improve overall effectiveness of good governance and anticorruption programs. Increasingly, citizen engagement is no longer a choice for governments (Bhargava 2014, 6). The extent to which government should be involved in the provision of goods and services that promote citizen well-being is a perennial debate in public policies worldwide. Government is supposed to protect the ability of individuals and social institutions to exercise legitimate authority within their own particular areas of influence without unjust interference from other institutions. It is a truism that, over the years, Nigerians have become deeply frustrated and disappointed over unfulfilled hopes of solving persistent economic crises, social tensions and political instability.

As a new nine-country Pew Research Center survey on the strengths and limitations of civic engagement illustrates, there is a common perception that government is run for the benefit of the few, rather than the many in both emerging democracies and more mature democracies that have faced economic challenges in recent years. In eight of nine nations surveyed, more than half say government is run for the benefit of only a few groups in society, not for all people (Wike; Fetterolf and Parker 2016).

However, this skeptical outlook on government does not mean people have given up on democracy or the ability of average citizens to have an impact on how the country is run. Roughly half or more in eight nations – Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, the U.S., India, Greece, Italy and Poland – say ordinary citizens can have a lot of influence on government. Hungary, where 61% say there is little citizens can do, is the lone nation where pessimism clearly outweighs optimism on this front. Many people in these nine nations say they could potentially be motivated to become politically engaged on a variety of issues, especially poor health care, poverty and poor-quality schools. When

asked what types of issues could get them to take political action, such as contacting an elected official or taking part in a protest, poor health care is the top choice among the six issues tested in six of eight countries. Health care, poverty and education constitute the top three motivators in all nations except India and Poland[3].

The fact that the people directly or indirectly have control of governmental decision is a big factor to the success of democracy. They know that at least they have some say in what goes on, opposed to communist or authoritarian governments where the people have almost no say in decisions. This again helps to create stability within society. It is up to the people to make sure that they voice their feelings to their representatives, so there is no one to blame except themselves if bills or laws are passed that they do not agree within. The fact that the common folk can feel like their thoughts and opinions are heard by people directly involved by the government is an important factor that makes democracy work (Cap 2008). Thus, Institutions and procedures of democracy need to be remedied, especially with regard to competitive, multiparty electoral processes and citizen freedom to exercise their political rights and responsibilities (Gaventa 2006 cited in Mayanja 2013). Ackerman (cited in Mayanja 2013) argues that the 'celebration of free and fair elections is one of the most powerful pro-accountability mechanisms in existence', that ensures that suitable candidates lead the nation. Citizens will express their will and consent on who leads them when the electoral process is not marred by fraud, voter intimidation or persecution of candidates. As rightly canvassed by the then APC Presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari (2015) at Chatham House:

> It is much more important that the promise of democracy goes beyond just allowing people to freely choose their leaders. It is much more important that democracy should deliver on the promise of choice, of freedoms, of security of lives and property, of transparency and accountability, of rule of law, of good governance and of shared prosperity. It is very important that the promise embedded in the concept of democracy, the promise of a better life for the generality of the people, is not delivered in the breach.

Corruption has a dampening effect on the efforts of any nation to achieve political and economic development. For one thing, corruption reduces investment (Barro 2000) because investors see corruption as an unnecessary

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3 These are among the key findings from a new Pew Research Center survey, conducted in nine countries among 10,828 respondents from March 29 to July 9, 2016.

extra cost of doing business (Lipset and Lenz 2000). It also discourages foreign aid as donor countries grapple with how to ensure that aid money does not end up in private pockets (Nwabuzor 2005, 131). Similarly, democracy cannot thrive in a country where corruption is pervasive and consistent. Government at all levels should device appropriate strategies to address the menace of corruption in the polity. Citizens and governments around the world are increasingly concerned with, and willing to confront, poor governance and corruption. Fighting corruption in a country requires actions by ministries and agencies in the executive branch of government, independent institutions of accountability as specified in the constitution of the country, and civil society and media. Thus, the effort of the present administration at fighting corruption is commendable even though the menace is ferociously fighting back in all fronts as attested to by President Buhari.

In view of the fact that corruption particularly affects the poorest and most marginalized, who greatly depend on public services, the on-going revelations about public officials who engaged in corrupt practices become worrisome in a country where the societal burdens of an aging population, health concerns, underemployment and unemployment are supported mostly by extended-family networks and the informal sector. It is a truism that corrupt practices and abuse of power, office or privilege undermine the right to an adequate standard of living for every person and his or her family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. As rightly noted by the United Nations (2007, 59), corrupt practices divert funding aimed at social services. In this manner, corruption undermines the government's ability to deliver an array of services, including health, education and welfare services, which are essential for the realization of economic, social and cultural advancement.

However, fighting corruption requires a multi-faceted and multidisciplinary approaches and strategies which target its political, economic, legal, administrative, social and moral aspects. This requires coherent, consistent and broad-based approaches with long time perspective. It is argued that fighting corruption is fundamentally about addressing poor governance rather than catching the crooks (Campos and Bhargava 2007). But in a developing country like Nigeria- overwhelmed by decades of corruption and culture of impunity- making culprits to account for their past unlawful deeds, in a very determined and aggressive manner as being witnessed now, seems to conform with one of the expectations of many Nigerians.

This essay recommends four key principles, crucial for development-accountability, transparency, participation, and inclusion that have been lacking in Nigeria's governance space. Proponents find in these four concepts

not just intrinsic value but, just as importantly, a natural instrumental logic. State institutions that are accountable to their people will use their resources constructively rather than misspend or steal them. Greater governmental transparency will allow citizens to determine where their political leaders are going astray and exert well-targeted pressure to put them back on track. Increased public participation in governance processes on the local and national levels will provide those institutions with direct input on how to best respond to citizen needs and bring additional information about blockages and inefficiencies into decision-making processes (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014).

Governments quite often failed due to their top-down approach and their inability to consult the citizen, let alone the poor. To remedy this, establishing forums for civil society/state dialogue for monitoring and enhancing the accountability of public services is highly recommended by scholars (Goetz 2001; Paul 2002). There are several good governance outcomes that have been documented when citizen and civil society work together with the state for good governance. These are (i) increased state or institutional responsiveness, (ii) lowering of corruption, (iii) better budget utilization, and (iv)better delivery of public services (Bhargava 2014, 2). Indeed, evidence is emerging that citizen engagement improves access, responsiveness, inclusiveness, and accountability in the delivery of public services such as health, water, education, and agriculture. It also improves transparency, accountability, and sustainability in natural resources management. Thus, achieving greater accountability by governments, greater transparency by state institutions in their handling of public finances, active participation by citizens in development processes that affect their well-being, or meaningful inclusion of disadvantaged groups in socio-economic life will, no doubt, espouse the fundamentals of government and bring succour to the people.

Concluding Remarks

Today, Muslim and Christian communities and organisations are publicly questioning the legitimacy of the secular postcolonial state, while at the same time extending their activities in areas of social provision closely associated with the state, but which the state is no longer able to guarantee, such as education and health (Corten and Marshall-Fratani 2001 cited in Nolte et al. 2009, 7). As pointed out in this essay, religion holds the promise of liberation from suffering. The promise of refuge and peace in exchange for loyalty and unconditional obedience is almost irresistible under the

circumstances highlighted here. As the economic and socio-cultural dejection in Nigeria continues to churn out religious faithful, so is the number of clergymen increasing. With continued governance failure in Nigeria, the commercialization of religion and proliferation of religious centres will continue to increase.

Government can influence the cultivation of character and the strength of social bonds by protecting institutions that help to encourage virtue in society, such as the family or religious congregations, against unjust interference from other institutions, including the state. For Nigeria to properly harness its abundant natural resources, large population and market for multinational companies, it must urgently address its pressing national issues. Disputing elites and their various supporters need to be mobilized in order to achieve national integration, value reorientation and development. According to Akude (2007), the failure of the Nigerian state could not possibly lead to its collapse because it takes a conscious action on the part a disgruntled section of a fragmented elite to bring a state to collapse. The Nigerian political elite is still united in the philosophy of personal enrichment through access to state power, and a conscious attack on the state could possibly deny the elite this opportunity.

To advance the democratic project, the Nigerian public needs to gain confidence in its institutions. The public needs to feel that there are organs of the political system that can guarantee fairness and justice and that are not undermined by wealth through corruption. Common citizens must have recourse to democratic institutions in order to express demands and resolve conflicts. At this point, the public has little to no confidence in turning to any branch of the government to help directly resolve problems without the benefit of wealth. A central concern for building democracy in Nigeria is thus to alter this relationship between the oligarchy and the citizenry, so as to reconnect the state to its citizens in a more responsible and responsive manner. Another emerging opportunity arises from the relations within the elite, where democratic institutions and practices are increasingly used for competition within the oligarchy. The starting point for democratization must thus include not only the formal democratic institutions that have been slowly progressing since 1999, but also the informal system of oligarchs and their subordinates which overlays the formal institutions of government (USAID 2006, 9).

Civil society organisations and the media have important roles to play in terms of promoting civic education, social dialogue, and providing information that would ensure that the electoral and democratic processes are fair and equitable, and that the elected rulers respond to demands made

on them by the electorate. In the final analysis, a lot depends on the re-establishment of trust between citizens and their elected representatives, after emerging from a traumatic past, where trust was betrayed and the people were violated. This would require evolving a new culture of democracy in that can guarantee a radical shift from the present pattern of zero-sum politics to new forms of politics that emphasise inclusiveness, social equity and the opening up of the political space for equal participation, representation and choice-making (Norberg and Obi 2007).

Representative democracy needs to modernise itself and actively involve citizens in decision- making processes. Rather than seeing themselves as 'pure' problem solvers, governments, at all levels, should position themselves as the bodies that articulate the issues faced by society, and then strive to create the right environment for private enterprise and academia to find the solutions, providing the necessary data, policies and funding to support these stakeholders. If our elected representatives were to do this, they would restore the public trust and challenge the sense that little of consequence has actually changed in that time (Soto 2014). Above all else, our leaders must use technology – and their broader expertise – to really understand their citizens' incentives, fears and motivations, and then communicate clearly how considered policies will address these factors. When governments stop being the centre of everything, and the people perceive that they have become the problem solvers, that is when things will change (Soto 2014).

For African philanthropy, it is still regarded as one of the indispensable means of transforming the continent, in spite of its present worrisome state. For a region that has had more than its share of calamities, philanthropy is a powerful expression of uplifting solidarity. Simply put, it is at the core of the ties that bind one of the most diverse human populations on the planet. Yet, the decline it suffers presently in Nigeria, coupled with governance failure in the last decades, has put majority of Nigerians on the survival lane. However, as noted by Spector (2016), "in this future world, accumulating resources in the hands of the few — whether for alleged social good or private benefit — will be recognized as fundamentally unequal, unfair, and unjust". While the government is far from perfect, the resources currently being accumulated by the wealthy few should be redirected into public coffers to build a robust social infrastructure for all (Spector 2016). It is argued that philanthropy, when conducted as results-oriented, investment activities can improve the quality and quantity of economic opportunities available to citizens.

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ABSTRACT

Religion plays a huge role in many societies around the world and this is especially true in Nigeria. Many of the religious groups in the country are united by their critique of the failure of the Nigerian Federal and State governments to deliver welfare to citizens. Thus, as good governance continues to be found lacking by the majority of Nigerians and in the face of the weakness of the Nigerian state and the inefficiency of its institutions to provide the human good to its citizens, religious organizations now provide a range of social services for their numerous members all over the country. How do wealthy Nigerians give and what is their motivation? Is traditional African philanthropic gesture (communalism) fading away in Nigeria? This essay is therefore, concerned primarily with the intervention of religious organisations in meeting the spiritual and physical needs of many Nigerian citizens - disenchanted and frustrated as a result of government failure. It examines how religion has become a sanctuary of hope and refuge in the face of daunting socio-economic challenges and how, ironically, this pathetic human condition is being exploited by some religious leaders. It also probes into the state of dwindling philanthropy by individuals and corporate bodies in the country within the context of African communalism.

THE END OF THE MUGABE ERA IN ZIMBABWE: CHANGE OR CONTINUITY?

Nathaly Silva Xavier Schutz[1]

Introduction

Robert Mugabe's long government, which began with Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, came to an end, almost forty years later, in 2017. Mugabe's downfall is symbolic: while it puts an end to one of the leading anti-colonial leaderships still in power in Southern Africa, it brings, especially in the view of Western countries, the end of an authoritarian regime and the possibility of democratizing reforms.

Zimbabwe has a history of crises and conflicts since its independence. The country's socio-economic development indexes are among the lowest in the African Continent and its political conditions and institutions are often criticized. The country's domestic context, however, is much more complex than the indicators show and it is strongly related to its external interactions.

The end of the Mugabe era brings to light the prospect of change, both political and economic. The end of a long government, as is the case in question, is a central moment in the understanding of the trajectory of a country, both from a historical point of view and as a possible turning point for the future path that will be taken. It should not be forgotten, however, that, despite the change in power, there is the maintenance of the party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF), which points to important traces of continuity.

The objective of this article is to, from a historical analysis, understand the possible factors that conditioned Mugabe's retiring from the government and the possible changes in the political conditions of the country. It is assumed that the country's external relations, combined with the internal

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disputes of ZANU-PF, were the decisive factors in the departure of Mugabe. The article is divided into three parts, in addition to this introduction and the concluding remarks. The first section will deal with the history of crises that the country has presented since its independence, especially the issues related to the elections and the confrontation between the government and the opposition forces. In the second part, the recent crisis, which culminated in Mugabe's downfall, will be addressed. Finally, an analysis will be made of the more immediate effects of this change of power as well as the outlook for the country's political conditions in the short term.

A history of crisis

Zimbabwe was one of the latest African countries to become independent, in 1980. In addition to being late, Zimbabwe's independence, unlike other British colonies in the region, was conflictive and marked by a significant period of struggle between different groups[2]. The context of colonization and decolonization experienced by the country had a significant influence on the emergence of most of the problems faced after independence.

In the words of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002, 110):

> The Zimbabwean post-colonial state was a product of particularly two recent major legacies. Firstly, it was a direct successor of the brutal and authoritarian settler colonial state. Secondly, it was the product of a protracted nationalist armed struggle. [...] The third element that determined the Peace and security perspectives of Zimbabwe was the geopolitical realities of the Southern African region.

The crisis in Zimbabwe began in the late 90s, with the establishment of an opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), consisting, essentially, of members of unions, urban workers and white farmers. The MDC comes as a response to ZANU-PF government's decision to change the Constitution in order to keep Mugabe as head of state. According to Cawthra (2010), a referendum was held to decide on the change in the Constitution and it didn't win. In the 2000 elections, as the MDC won seats

2 Zimbabwe was a British Colony called Southern Rhodesia. In 1965, the white minority declared the country's unilateral independence. What followed, until independence, in 1980, was a long period of confrontation between this white minority, united on the Rhodesian Front, and the nationalist liberation movements, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and its dissent, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by Mugabe.

in the legislative and decided to resume discussions about land, in order to regain the support of ZANU-PF's traditional rural electorate, Mugabe lost much of his support (Alden 2010).

The 2000 elections were accompanied by external observation missions. While Commonwealth and European Union observers declared the election illegitimate, the Organization of African Unity and SADC missions, while acknowledging problems, found that they were insufficient to interfere with the final results (Minillo 2011).

This context of instability was marked by actions of ZANU-PF supporters, initially aimed at expelling commercial white farmers from their land, but it eventually evolved, as well, into the presidential race in 2002. It is important to point out, as Farley recalls (2008), that these violent acts were not suppressed by the government forces, instead, police forces were accomplices of the actions.

These actions were part of a larger context of violence and confrontations that preceded the 2002 presidential elections. The actions of the ZANU-PF supporter groups included not only violent demonstrations, but also a fraudulent voter registration process and even the assassination of opposition parties and their supporters. The conjuncture was, therefore, of great crisis, reflecting, in part, a historical problem, dating back to the period of decolonization, of economic power concentrated in a small white elite (Schutz 2014).

Unlike Western countries, Zimbabwe's neighbors rarely offer public condemnation of the country's internal problems or government policies. This is due, among other things, to historical and structural aspects. As Alden points out (2010), some states in the region, such as South Africa and Namibia, had a very similar socioeconomic and political structure to Zimbabwe, with a strong concentration of land ownership and almost no agrarian reform program implemented after the racial segregation regimes. South Africa's stance, in particular, was rather hesitant. Thabo Mbeki, then president, adopted the strategy known as 'quiet diplomacy', which consisted in quietly advising Mugabe to undertake reforms, but, publicly, supporting his actions[3]. For the other countries in the region, in turn, Mugabe's position could be seen as a mobilization of "regional solidarity campaigns of the recent past" (Alden 2010, 5).

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3 According to Alden (2010), this position was justified in two aspects: the first was economic, since Zimbabwe was South Africa's main trading partner on the Continent and economic sanctions would have a very large impact on South African companies. The second issue involved the regional effects that Mugabe's conviction and possible withdrawal from power could generate, with a large influx of refugees and a destabilization of the region.

Likewise, the main regional institution, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), has always been hesitant in interfering with the crisis in Zimbabwe. Instead, SADC initially took a solidarity stand with the Zimbabwean government. This position was partially altered at the 2001 Summit Meeting, in which there was a declaration of concern about the crisis situation in Zimbabwe and its possible effects on the region. In addition, as Cawthra (2010) recalls, Mugabe was removed from the OPDS[4] Summit Presidency.

In 2004, as Modeni (2014) points out, as a result of SADC recommendations on electoral processes[5], two changes were made in Zimbabwe's legislation. The first was the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act (ZEC), which created a specific commission to deal with electoral matters. The second was the Electoral Act, which replaced the old electoral legislation, with major changes. Noteworthy are: the polling taking place in a single day; counting votes in specific centers; and the creation of an Electoral Court.

The crisis in the country continued to deepen in the following years and, in 2008, at the African Union Summit, it was decided the SADC should formally act as mediator of the crisis in Zimbabwe. At the SADC Summit a few months later, the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, was appointed chief mediator. The appointment, according to Cawthra (2011), generated many criticisms, especially from MDC, which accused Mbeki of being pro-ZANU-PF.

South Africa's mediation, which focused in the dialogue between the opposition and ZANU-PF, hoped to address a wide range of issues, but led to limited results. As Matlosa (2009) points out, minor changes have been suggested in some legislations dealing with elections or related topics, such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act; all involved the need of changes in the Constitution.

In 2008, new presidential elections took place. The first turn occurred without major intercurrences. Between the first and second rounds, however, a number of violent actions were committed by ZANU-PF members and their supporters, against the MDC, culminating in the withdrawal of the

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4 Organ for Politics, Defense and Security.

5 In 2004, the organization released a document entitled SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. In addition to specifically naming the principles that member countries must follow in the conduct of democratic elections, the document also addresses Electoral Observation Missions. The conduction of Electoral Observation Missions and the changes in the political context of the region led to the need to revise the principles agreed upon in 2004. Thus, in 2015, a revision of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections was published.

opposition candidate (Mutisi 2015). In addition, the MDC opposed holding the elections before the changes proposed by SADC mediation and the revision of the Constitution took place. The second round, of course, led to the victory of ZANU-PF. The SADC Electoral Observation Mission indicated that the elections were not free and did not reflect the will of the people of Zimbabwe. Other organizations and states also condemned what happened in the country, intensifying the crisis.

As an attempt to solve the crisis, less than a month after the elections, MDC and ZANU-PF signed a Memorandum of Understanding, creating a power-sharing government. The outcome of this document was what became known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA). The GPA, which was signed still in 2008, would only have an implementation plan in 2010.

A turning point in SADC's stance would be the 2009 Extraordinary Summit, which gave Mugabe time to make reforms in order to hold free and fair elections and to implement the GPA. In practice, however, the change of position did not yield many results, with small concessions from the Mugabe government. It should be noted, however, that, coupled with the GPA, a process of revision and adaptation of legislation began, culminating, in 2013, in the promulgation of a new Constitution (Chirambo and Motsamai 2016).

The proposal for the new Constitution was presented, in 2012, by a Parliamentary Committee. The changes included greater limits to the power of the President and greater independence of the Executive and Legislative branches (Modeni 2014). After a referendum, it was, as already mentioned, enacted in 2013.

In 2013, new elections were held, keeping Mugabe and ZANU-PF in power and ending the government coalition that had been established in 2009 (BTI 2016). MDC leaders once again challenged the results and called for new elections, even though the SADC Observation Mission recognized the elections as legitimate. Clashes between the opposition and government forces continued to take place throughout 2014, aggravated by ZANU-PF's announcement that Mugabe would once again be a candidate in the 2018 elections (International Crisis Group 2016).

The crisis in the country continued to develop with violent actions from all sides and even internal disputes in both the opposition and the government. Reflecting these disputes, a new party was created in 2015, People First, the result of a split within ZANU-PF. One of the main issues of disagreement was the possibility of the First Lady, Grace Mugabe, taking place as presidential candidate instead of her husband.

It is important to note, however, that Zimbabwe had shown signs of a gradual improvement in political conditions since 2016, according to Freedom House[6] data. The organization's reports for 2016 and 2017 showed that both indicators of civil liberties and political rights followed an improving trend. Its index had gone from six to five, thus migrating from non-free to partially free classification. The 2017 report, however, already indicated that, as early as 2016, succession issues were creating conflict and confrontation within ZANU-PF itself. The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), Mugabe's historical ally, withdrew its support for the President, accusing him of being dictatorial and blaming Grace for the country's conflicts (FH 2017).

The fall of Mugabe

The crisis in Zimbabwe gradually became a crisis of leadership for Mugabe. The inner divisions of the party began to accentuate with the matter of the succession. As early as mid-2017, rumors began that Vice-President Mnangagwa would leave the government. Mnangagwa's departure would be a reflection of the division of ZANU-PF into two groups: Team Lacoste[7], which defended Mnangagwa as Mugabe's successor in the upcoming elections; and Generation 40, which would not have a candidate for succession, but would be strong supporters of Grace Mugabe (Africa Confidential 2017).

Throughout the year, tensions within the administration increased, given the proximity of the following elections, expected to take place in 2018, and Mugabe's unlikely continuity in power. The economic crisis, which was not new, was accentuated and used by Mugabe's opponents within the party as a justification for the supposed renewal.

It is important to note that Mugabe was facing problems in his relations with the military. To a large extent, the military was also displeased

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6 Freedom House is an organization that carries out an annual monitoring of the political conditions of the countries in the world, producing a report and pointing out possible trends. It uses indicators of civil liberties and political rights, generating an index ranging from one to seven, one being totally free and seven non-free. According to Freedom House's classification, a free country is one in which there is open political competition, respect for civil liberties, independent civic life, and independent media. In partially free countries, respect for civil liberties and political rights is limited; there is often an environment of corruption and/or ethnic and religious conflict, with a weak rule of law. In addition, there is a political scenario in which a party enjoys domination, despite a degree of political pluralism. Finally, non-free countries suffer from the absence of basic political rights and civil liberties.

7 The name is because of Mnangagwa's nickname, Crocodile.

with the position of Grace Mugabe and her eventual path to her husband's succession. Likewise, the Zimbabwean intelligence agency was also internally divided between supporters of a possible succession by Grace Mugabe and those who supported General Chiwenga as a strong government official and Mugabe's natural successor (Cropley 2017).

In early November, moves for the withdrawal of Mugabe from administration became more evident. General Chiwenga, then Commander of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces, travelled to China to meet the Chinese Defense Minister. The visit aimed to seek support for the takeover and Mugabe's deposition, on the grounds that a party group, supporter of Grace Mugabe, was planning actions to destabilize the armed forces (Africa Confidential 2017b).

Concurrently to Chiwenga's trip, Mugabe disagreed with Mnangagwa, accusing him of provoking divisions in the party. Tensions between Mugabe and Mnangagwa widened, culminating in Mnangagwa's withdrawal from the Vice-Presidency on November 6th. Mugabe stated that the vice-president was taking a disloyal conduct and therefore could not continue in his government.

Mnangagwa's departure from the government was the starting point of a series of events that, in a few days, culminated in Mugabe's downfall. On the one hand, Mugabe fired ministers close to Mnangagwa and threatened Chiwenga of prison when he returned to Zimbabwe. The opposition, in turn, continued to articulate for Mugabe's deposition, including through public statements, such as that of Mnangagwa after his departure (Africa Confidential 2017b).

When he returned to national territory, Chiwenga blamed the party for the country's economic problems and stated that the party's problem were in the posture and actions of members who had not been in the war of liberation, in a clear reference to Generation 40, group supporting Grace Mugabe. At that moment, rumors began that Mugabe was trapped in his house.

On November 15th, General Sibusiso Moyo made a statement saying that Mugabe and his family were safe and well, and that the actions carried out by the country's military were only aimed at arresting the criminals who were supposedly surrounding the President's family and re-establishing order in the country. As of that day, the country would be under the government of the deposed vice-president, Mnangagwa.

Thus, a short period of transition and uncertainty began. For about a week, information on the crisis in Zimbabwe did not indicate a definitive resolution. Mugabe's condition and posture were still unclear, and, although the moves indicated a possible waiver, there were no official statements. Simultaneously, popular demonstrations called for the resignation of the

President. And ZANU-PF members linked to Generation 40, including Grace Mugabe, were expelled from the party (International Crisis Group 2017).

On November 24th, after Mugabe's resignation[8], Mnangagwa officially took over the presidency of the country. Still in 2017, Chiwenga left the leadership of the military and became vice-president. Zimbabwe, thus, began 2018 with a new government and promises of change and reform.

The new government was quickly accepted as legitimate by other states, including the African neighbors. It is noteworthy that SADC (2017b), whose own formation is strongly linked to the figure of Mugabe, recognized the new government in an official communique:

> The Secretariat of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) congratulates His Excellency, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa, on his swearing in as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe. [...] Today's inauguration is significant for the people of Zimbabwe. SADC welcomes the reassuring message President Mnangagwa delivered to Zimbabweans on his arrival in Zimbabwe on 22 November 2017, in which he promised to lead the nation into a 'new and unfolding democracy', underscoring the need for unity among all Zimbabweans in growing the economy and ensuring peace and prosperity in their country.

On the other hand, on the same day, SADC (2017a) also launched a statement praising Mugabe "as a true champion of Pan-Africanism, and in the promotion of regional co-operation, development and integration" and recognizing as a right decision his resignation and withdrawal from power. It is clear, therefore, that if he tried to resist, Mugabe probably would not find support among his neighbors.

Mugabe's departure from power was met with great euphoria by the international community, especially by Western countries. The end of the Mugabe era is expected to bring changes in the country's politics and economy. The changes in leadership, however, do not seem to indicate actual major changes in the country's political condition. It must be reminded that, although Mugabe has been removed from power, ZANU-PF remains the party in government. In addition, the new government took no action indicating any profound change in the way the country is run.

Some actors played a central role in the articulations that would lead to Mugabe's deposition. Mutsvangwa, an ally of Mnangagwa, allegedly articulated

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8 It should be noted that when Mugabe resigned, the impeachment process was already being addressed by ZANU-PF itself, in agreement with the MDC.

the change in power, both leading Mugabe to relent and rehabilitating the image of the armed forces in the country (Africa Confidential 2017c). In return, he would gain a position in the new government. His wife, Monica Mutsvangwa has already taken over the chair of the party's Women's League, which was formerly Grace Mugabe's.

The main figure in this transition of power, however, was Chiwenga, who articulated 'Operation Restore Legacy' for the seizure of power. Chiwenga fulfilled the role of mediator with external forces, securing the support of one of Zimbabwe's main political and economic partners, China. In addition, he mobilized the military forces so that Mugabe's withdrawal could take place.

On an official visit to Mozambique in January 2018, Mnangagwa announced that elections would take place in 4 or 5 months. The President confirmed that Commonwealth observers will be invited, along with UN observers, to follow the electoral process. The announcement of the elections, at first, adds to the idea that this would just be a transitional government until the elections.

As mentioned earlier, the elections are scheduled for August 2018. In addition to ZANU-PF and MDC, main opposition party, two other parties are expected to compete: one led by ZANU-PF's former vice-president, Joice Mujuru; and the other a MDC dissident, led by Elton Mangoma (Africa Confidential 2017c). The undertaking of the elections, however, although already announced by the president, is still nebulous. This is due to the country's own history of political instability and the absence of independent and reliable institutions.

According to Fabricius (2018), Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF would probably win the elections, given the political capital gained from the seizure of power and the opposition's own division, with the weakening of the MDC. Added to that is the death of Tsvangirai, MDC's top leadership and the party's likely presidential candidate.

Mnangagwa, however, is not unanimous, neither in the country nor in ZANU-PF. It must be reminded that the *Generation 40* group remains a point of support for Grace Mugabe, opposed to Mnangagwa's presidency. In some provinces, in which the *Generation 40* has greater insertion, the figure of Mnangagwa is not well accepted. On the other hand, Mnangagwa is supposed to have the support of England. Even though it denies this support officially, the British diplomatic body made visits to Mnangagwa and there are already signs that Zimbabwe would be accepted back into the *Commonwealth*[9] (Fabricius 2018). The return to the *Commonwealth* would be conditional upon

9 The country is indefinitely suspended from the Commonwealth since the 2002 elections, considered illegitimate.

the government accepting an election observation mission, which would, in the eyes of the West, ensure greater credibility to the elections than just an African Union mission. This explains Mnangagwa's statement when he visited Mozambique.

The very context in which Mnangagwa ascended to power adds to these questions. Despite the acceptance of the other countries and the resignation of Mugabe, the process can also be understood as a coup, articulated by the military and with external support, for the overthrow of Mugabe. Aiming, among other things, to get rid of this image, Mnangagwa has maintained a friendly relationship with Mugabe, even making complimentary public statements.

According to Matyszak (2018), Mnangagwa would defend the narrative of 'military-assisted transition', in which the target was not Mugabe, but the criminals who surrounded him, including his wife, Grace. Mnangagwa's aim would not only be to maintain a good image for ZANU-PF voters, but also to avoid condemnation of neighbors and regional organizations, especially SADC and the African Union.

Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe

Mugabe's withdrawal from power, after 37 years in Zimbabwe's government, is undoubtedly a major change. The Mugabe figure represents a generation of leaders who fought against the colonial presence in Africa and against the apartheid regime in South Africa. During the 1980s, he was the great leadership of Southern Africa, a position which, since the 90s, after the end of apartheid, began to be disputed by Mandela. The long history of economic crisis has not prevented Mugabe from continuing to defend his position as the region's legitimate leader and even calling on that historic role as a means of maintaining the support of his neighbors and avoiding public condemnation of his actions.

The implementation of major changes is not the general expectation. In the words of Southall (2017, 83):

> Certainly, Zimbabweans had few illusions that Mnangagwa was intent on launching a transition to democracy, although many had hopes that he would drive sufficient reforms to render life more tolerable than it had been during the last days of Mugabe.

The very fulfilment of elections would be a factor of skepticism among the population of Zimbabwe. While a part of the population recognizes the

importance of the election as a form of legitimization of the mandate, another portion believes that, without the necessary reforms in the legislation, the elections would bring no significant change in the conditions of the country (International Crisis Group 2017).

The figure of Mnangagwa, as mentioned earlier, also does not bring high hopes of changes in the country's leadership. As Southall (2017) points out, Mnangagwa, one of the ZANU-PF's armed wing leaders before independence, was one of the main idealizers of the security state implemented in Zimbabwe. He was the one who commanded the acts of violence and persecution against the opposition in the 2008 elections. It should be noted that before assuming the Vice-Presidency, Mnangagwa was Minister of Defense.

A first indication that Mnangagwa will not carry out significant reforms is the composition of his cabinet. All nominees are members of ZANU-PF; some, even, held positions during the governments of Mugabe. Of note is the appointment of General Moyo as Foreign Minister, one of the first to give public statements supporting military action for the withdrawal of Mugabe. In addition, Mugabe's own withdrawal of power can be understood as a strategy for maintaining the country's structure and conduct, given that Grace Mugabe's influence was not well seen by the party's traditional leadership. Her influence on Mugabe, therefore, would mean an unwanted change (Melber 2017).

For Southall (2017), the cabinet formed by Mnangagwa, rather than indicating continuity, evidences the influence of the military forces on the process and indicates that they will remain present in the government. It should be noted that, besides the indications to the cabinet previously mentioned, the Vice-Presidency was occupied by Chiwenga, confirming this influence.

From an economic point of view, it is possible that some changes, however small, will be made. Obviously, it is not possible to separate the economic sphere from the political sphere and the possible progress Mnangagwa can make economically, especially through external resources, depend on a good progress of this political transition. The starting point should be the holding of elections, free and recognized as such by international observers, still in 2018.

The problem lies in the actions required for elections to occur within acceptable standards. Some minimal reforms that should take place are: measures to ensure the credibility of the voters list, independence of the Electoral Commission and the elimination of the Executive's power to veto observers of the Electoral Observation Missions (International Crisis Group

2017). It is likely, however, that a majority of Mnangagwa's cabinet members will be against such reforms.

The holding of elections, without Mugabe and with possible reforms in the legislation, puts a spotlight on the forces of opposition. The main opposition group, the MDC, is facing internal disputes after Tsvangirai's death. In addition, there are dissident groups, which fragment the opposition, making the way easier for ZANU-PF.

External influences should also be considered in the context of Zimbabwe's crisis. It is important to note that China denies any involvement in the process leading to Mugabe's withdrawal from power. There are no formal statements from any country admitting knowledge of what was being planned in Zimbabwe. In any case, the absence of mentions or accusations of coup in the official announcements of the countries indicates that, possibly, neighboring countries and China itself already had information on the situation and, to some extent, understood Mugabe's departure as acceptable.

China's relationship with Zimbabwe is historic and dates back from before the country's independence, when China supported the liberation movement led by Mugabe. The proximity between Harare and Beijing has thrived over the years. Currently, China is the main foreign investor in the country, with investments in several areas, especially infrastructure and natural resources (Nunoo 2017). In addition, Zimbabwe is China's second largest trading partner in the African continent in absolute terms, only behind South Africa (Hogwe and Banda 2017).

One cannot forget that one of the foundational stones of Chinese foreign policy is non-interference in other countries' domestic affairs[10]. It is this principle that underlies China's relationship with several African countries suffering sanctions from Western countries. One of the main characteristics of China-Africa relations is not to condition economic relations to demands for political change. The exception is the One China policy, namely the need to recognize Taiwan as part of China and not as an independent territory.

This Chinese position, in the case of Zimbabwe, indicates two important conclusions. The first is that it is highly unlikely that Beijing will make any official statement on possible support for the process that removed Mugabe from power. Although China was aware of what would happen,

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10 The outline of China's foreign policy lies in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence established in December 1953, by Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, during the China-India peace talks on Tibet. The Five Principles are mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence.

bearing in mind the visit of Chiwenga a few days before the beginning of the crisis, this fact will not have official confirmation. The second conclusion is that, regardless of who is in power or any changes that may be implemented by Mnangagwa, relations between China and Zimbabwe should remain unchanged.

From the regional point of view, it is important to highlight the position of South Africa. South Africa, as mentioned, acted as a mediator, indicated by SADC, in the previous crises of Zimbabwe. Its performance was marked by a rather hesitant stance, with no public condemnation of the Mugabe government and a quieter action. The reaction of Pretoria to Mugabe's departure from power did not change this history. Accompanying the position of the SADC and the African Union, the South African government recognized as legitimate the transition process led by the military and the new Mnangagwa government. It should be noted that at that time the African National Congress was also experiencing a period of tension, with internal divisions and succession problems that would culminate in the resignation of Jacob Zuma.

Final Remarks

Many African countries are marked by long-term governments of a single leader, as was the case in Angola and Zimbabwe. The impact of this absence of alternation in power is notorious, with clear restrictions on democratic freedoms and frequent internal conflicts. The departure of a ruler from power, however, does not necessarily mean change in the conduct of government. The end of the Mugabe era in Zimbabwe was not the end of the ZANU-PF era.

The fact that the government was taken over by the former vice-president, who also formed a Cabinet with members from the Mugabe government, is an important indication that Zimbabwe's leadership change is unlikely to bring about major changes for the country. ZANU-PF remains in power and with it the vast majority of those who have led the policies of the Mugabe government. Mugabe's own withdrawal of power, led by the military, was orchestrated to keep the traditional forces in power and prevent a possible rise to power of the group led by Grace Mugabe.

The stance of neighboring countries confirms the view that Zimbabwe's institutional conditions will most likely be maintained, at least in the short term. Both South Africa, one of the main leaders in the region, and the regional organizations directly involved – SADC and the African

Union – quickly recognized the new government as legitimate. Such a position indicates not only the acceptance of the process that culminated in Mugabe's resignation, but also the understanding that there is no major break going on, whether positive or not. It is important to remember that South Africa itself is also facing a situation of instability, although there are no indications of institutional problems, with the resignation of Jacob Zuma, after the pressures of the African National Congress.

Thus, despite Western pressures for democratizing reforms in Zimbabwe, especially with regard to electoral legislation, there is no indication that such changes will actually take place. Even if the 2018 elections are confirmed, which is likely to happen, they should not guarantee change. It is important to remember that elections have always been held in the country, although they have often not been recognized as legitimate by external observers. The 2018 election should take place in a context of the strengthening of ZANU-PF by recent events and, once again, fragmentation and weakening of the opposition, with the divisions of the MDC and Tsvangirai's death. The end of the Mugabe era, thus, does not end the control of the former forces in power.

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ABSTRACT

In November 2017, after 37 years, Robert Mugabe's government ended in Zimbabwe. This change in power is a milestone in the history of the country and of the African continent as a whole. The aim of the present article is to analyze the factors that conditioned Mugabe's fall from power as well as possible changes in the country's political context. It is assumed that the country's external relations, combined with the internal divisions of the party, have conditioned the crisis that culminated in the end of Mugabe's rule. The stance of non-interference in domestic affairs of its African neighbors and Zimbabwe's main economic partner, China, had enabled Mugabe to remain in power for nearly four decades, but also allowed that the transition to Mnangagwa, assisted by the military, occurred without major intercurrences. ZANU-PF's internal disputes, fueled by the increasing need for Mugabe to indicate a successor, gradually weakened Mugabe's power and created new alliances. The change in the leading figure of the country, however, does not seem to indicate significant changes in the political conditions of the country, although some changes in the conduct of the economy might occur.

KEYWORDS

Africa; political crisis; Zimbabwe.

DUAL COLONIALISM AND THE FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL STATE: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE

Maximilian Dante Barone Bullerjahn[1]

Introduction

South Africa is certainly one of the few countries that has assimilated in such a significant way two distinct colonization processes, at different times. The trading post of the Dutch imperial fleet on the Cape soon became a space for the occupation of European settlers, who, searching for a homeland, found in the vast lands around the Cape the space for the development of a new civilization. Of a Protestant majority, these new European settlers made of the land their acquired triumph. Between the revolutionary turmoil in France and the Napoleonic imperial appetite, the arrival of the English to the Cape region substantially transformed the socio-political relations in the region. The subsequent exodus of the Boers[2] enabled a cult for their self-assertion, and the South African space was filled by successive battles over the territory between the Boers, the English, and native peoples. At the end of the nineteenth century, the discovery of mineral riches on an unprecedented scale marked the transition from an economy still lagging behind to one with a modernizing foundation, with the development of a sophisticated financial system initially directed at the primary-exporting matrix, which would later on become the anchor for the incipient process of South African industrialization. The formation of the two Boer republics, beyond Afrikaner[3] nationalism, sought to contain the rapid advance of English imperialism in

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2 From *Afrikaans*: farmers. Generic name formerly used to describe Afrikaners.

3 Relative to ethnic group composed mainly by the descendants of the Dutch colonists and Germans of Protestant faith and also French Huguenots; also expresses those who speak the Afrikaans language.

the midst of the discovery of the largest deposits of precious minerals on the continent. After two traumatic wars, a political arrangement emerged: the South African Union (1910), an understanding between English and Boer elites, later on leading up to the federalization of the territories occupied by the Boer republics and the English coastal colonies.

As a founding member of the League of Nations, South Africa began to project itself regionally, assuming a mandate over the territory of South-West Africa, a German colony lost because of the First World War. In the midst of the crisis of liberalism in the old continent, the South African Union continued to centralize its bureaucratic apparatus, also expanding the channels of state intervention in relation to public enterprises and services in general. In the turbulent scenario of the interwar, there also was a stirring of ideological disputes, with, on the one hand, the quest for greater autonomy from British imperialism and, on the other hand, the appropriation of Nazi-fascist, Communist and, vigorously, African nationalist idearies. Despite supporting the allied forces during World War II, internal disputes escalated with the victory of a group opposed to the previous government's pro-English stance. Beginning in 1948, a nationalist project of Afrikaner origin was launched as the winner of the polling disputed by a white minority electorate. What followed was the institutionalization of social conflicts of a racial nature. Apartheid becomes the driving force of the new regime in Pretoria, contestatory on the one side and highly contested on the other.

Although still protocollary linked to English affairs, the Apartheid regime creates a more autonomous political nucleus and, gradually, moves away from Commonwealth tutelage until it joins the republic in 1961. It thus resorts to self-sufficiency, taking on the high costs of international isolation - materially present in UN arms embargoes, in ambiguous relations with Western powers and in the siege of young African countries. The departure of the Portuguese empire from southern Africa in the 1970s coincided with the end of the Bretton Woods pact, presenting new difficulties for South Africans. They were in a troubled process of containment of the nationalist guerrillas in the countries of the region, at the same time that their economy was stagnating with the impossibility of increasing the internal productivity and the significant changes in the international financial system. In the face of the *détente* of the Cold War and the wave of regime changes around the world, South Africa has faced a scenario of insoluble internal conflicts and, seeking to ensure the Apartheid's survival, attempts to reshape it to fit in an order that no longer existed. With the progressive negotiations of the African national opposition headed by the African National Congress (ANC) and the United States, finally, the last Afrikaner government finally faced a process of democratic transition, even sacrificing some of its most ambitious national projects.

From the mercantile trading post in the Cape to the Anglo-Boer wars

South African history manifests itself in the unique aspect of its *sui generis* colonization, which resulted in the contemporary, modern South African state, nominally the Republic of South Africa. Until the arrival of the first Dutch settlers to the Cape, the territory that today comprises the South African geographic space was inhabited by populations of tribal origin, mostly of the Khoisan[4] ethnic group and Bantus[5] peoples. The pre-colonial economy was focused on subsistence, being basically restricted to the agricultural production, the cattle raising and the hunting. There were, therefore, political spaces that were poorly developed and poorly integrated with each other, on the margins of the European mercantile center. In 1652, an expedition of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) settled in the Cape region, which became a supply station for the company. As a result, the region once secluded from greater proximity to the dynamic centers became a relevant trading post, aligning itself with the inaugural phase of international insertion of a European naval power that was in the early stages of its mercantile capitalism.

Initially, the colonization of the Cape was restricted to the immediate interests of the VOC, that is, to the supplying of the vessels. Allocations of Dutch settlers were prioritized for the supply of basic consumer goods, which soon led to interests in land use differing from those advocated by the company. With the arrival of the reformist Simon van der Stel, there was encouragement for the development of a vigorous forestry and agricultural industry. At the same time, there was the "growth of a Calvinist society that saw itself as the chosen people of the Lord, entering the Promised Land" (Evans 1999, 10).

The relations between the *Khoikhoi* tribes present in the Cape region and the VOC were initially peaceful and determined by the barter of beef on the part of the autochthone people and metals and tobacco by the settlers. With the successive expansion of the cultivated land by the so-called free citizens of Dutch origin, there was an increase in tensions between the original peoples and the new settlers, who were not subordinated to the official channel of communication between the VOC and these peoples. Even though "the Khoikhoi-free people were gradually transformed into dependent

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4 It is also spelled as *coisã* or *coissã* and refers to the grouping of two ethnic groups originating in the southwest African, *Khoi* (or *Khoikhoi*) and *San*.

5 With more than 400 subgroups, the Bantu form the largest ethnolinguistic group in sub-Saharan Africa.

workers and cattle ranchers at the service of the whites, [...] in 1658/1659 the VOC began the introduction of slaves in the Cape" (Hagemann 2001, 29-30). Thus, the Cape colony quickly entered the international slave trade, many originated from other Dutch colonial spaces such as Sri Lanka, India, and Indonesia.

In the midst of the decline of the Dutch naval empire, a British flotilla landed on the Cape under the promise of safeguarding the colony's integrity in the face of any French threat, since the French were in the midst of revolutionary turmoil. As early as 1803 England returned the Cape to Holland under the Treaty of Amiens, nevertheless, the departure of the English was very short; with the Napoleonic blockade, the English occupied the Cape definitively (Evans 1999, 10). The Cape colony moved to the orbit of influence of British imperial colonialism. This new reality profoundly transformed social and political relations in South Africa. Disgusted by the English administration, a large contingent of Boers began to leave the Cape colony and migrate north-eastward to the South African plateau. This process triggered the definitive territorial occupation of the South African space, as it is known today.

Outlined by the great rivers that cross the territory, the Boer republics - nominally the State of Transvaal and the Free State of Orange - were established, and recognized by England in 1852 and 1854, respectively. Isolated, these republics were impregnated by a strict Calvinist religious *ethos*. As Evans (1999) points out, the Boers were bothered by the matter of the English giving preference to trade instead of valuing the role of the land, as well as their neglect of the divine status of the white people as superior. Until the mid-nineteenth century, South Africa was a relatively backward economy, almost entirely dependent on agriculture. In short, markets were small, the conditions were difficult, and the progress was slow, which applies both to the economy of the original inhabitants and to that of the European settlers (Feinstein 2005). It is relevant to observe that the triggering of this process of South African territorial colonization was assimilated in the Boer collective imagery in a very peculiar way, which in terms of political culture, well delineates the communitarian spirit that would guide the discourse of the African statesmen to the South African Union - from 1910 on - and the Republic of South Africa - from 1961 on.

In 1866 the world's largest diamond deposits were found in the region where situates the city of Kimberley, and in 1886 the discovery of large amounts of gold in the Witwatersrand transformed the local scene of the Transvaal. Mineral wealth soon attracted the eye of the English, who saw the need to control the territories then under Boer rule. From then on, South African capitalism enters a new stage in which large landowners, especially

gold miners, resort to cruel and inhumane measures to dislodge the native populations from the mineral rich areas. The flow of English capital into this sector stood out. Although mining activity was based on the exploitation of cheap labor and unleashed a model of export of minerals, the South African economy was rapidly dynamized by reinvestment in the mining sector and application in other sectors of local production, still marginalized. It was mainly in South Africa that a racial version of primitive accumulation took shape in the African continent (Cooper 2014, 21).

Amin (1976) states that the predominance of the simple mode of commodity production is rare, being found in New England between 1600 and 1750, in South Africa of the Boers between 1650 and 1880, and in Australia and New Zealand from the beginning of white colonization until the rise of modern capitalism. These societies of small farmers and free artisans converged on a *modus* that had a strong tendency to turn into a fully developed capitalist formation. South Africa's reality was one of plenty of land and a shortage of labor. Through perennial practices of social discrimination, Boer and British colonial spaces kept blacks, mestizos, and Asians generally as a low-cost labor force.

From the First Anglo-Boer War (1880-1881), the immense costs and successive defeats led the British to opt for the armistice with the Boers, agreeing on a Boer self-government in Transvaal under British dominance, to which would be relegated the external and native territories matters. The immense amounts of gold discovered in the Witwatersrand throughout the decade, however, would offset the costs of a possible new war for the British. The Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) must be understood as a war for resources, also considering that it reflected the desire for independence of the African population in relation to the British Empire and England. It is possible to see in the context of war the connection between exploitation of the native population, the interest of the various parties in appropriating enormously valuable gold supplies, the strengthening of the nation-state of England, advancing imperial militarism, and meeting the needs of finance and banking capital based in the city of London (Stander 2014, 186).

The vast territory of South Africa, rich in minerals, allowed an accelerated growth of the South African local economy, as it immediately inserted itself organically in the international market. Foreign capital has allowed the dynamization of sectors not yet fully developed, such as the textile industry and basic manufactured goods. According to Evans (1999, 100), the purpose of the British was to force the Boers to renounce their sovereignty, in a dispute that resulted in the political arrangement of the South African Union, a territory of English colonial rule that ensured greater regional political autonomy to Boers.

South African Union and the construction of national unity

South Africa is an artificial entity created by the British. Today's borders date back to 1910, and like many African countries, South Africa is a product of the colonial heritage of the British Empire (Steward 2014). Until the end of the nineteenth century, there was no unitary, abstract state in the region, with the Boer settlers forming their republics (Osterhammel 2010). This new political unity emerged from an arrangement between Afrikaner and British settlers, who materially constituted the effective military power in the territory. In this political arrangement, there was the formulation of a federative pact, with some administrative autonomy for the four provinces (Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal).

In the midst of rapid economic modernization in South Africa, racial tensions would take on even more severe political dimensions. In 1912, the African National Congress (ANC) was founded, a South African movement of resistance to the political regime founded in 1910. In 1913, the Land Act was enacted, which implied the division of land between the English settlers, the Boers and other African peoples. By racial criteria, the black, mestizo and Asian populations in the South African Union got 13% of the territory, while the remaining 87% were divided among the white, the English-speaking and Afrikaner settlers. This dual colonial reality was manifested by the perception that "antagonisms between Afrikaners and English dominated partisan politics for most of the period" (Simons & Simons 1969, 612).

South Africa underwent a *sui generis* process of modernization on the African continent, after twenty years becoming an industrial nation, forming a new society, which, in addition to the new white economic elite holding the mining capital surplus, included a working class with racially determined subclasses. In the formation of this particular type of capitalism, the economic surplus did not fall into the hands of a self-absorbed aristocracy such as that of the *ancien régime*, but of an incipient Afro-bourgeoisie that became central to the establishment of the economic bases of the future Apartheid regime. Although on the one hand the English reproduced some of the old European social structures, the South African space saw flourish in its four corners a model of state little tied to purely oligarchic relations. Even with the predominance of oligopolistic conglomerates in the mining sector - certainly the most expressive in the young South Africa - the functions of the state already showed to be more aligned with a nascent central bureaucracy, thus not corroborating with the thesis that the Union would properly be an oligarchic state.

With the outcome of World War II, South Africa doubled its GDP per capita (1933-1945) and saw its manufacturing sector skyrocket, allowing

for real wage increases for even African workers. Enjoying a third of world gold production, South Africans soon ceased to be international debtors and began to cover their domestic spending and external debts with ease. The growing state planning was conditioned by the increase in public revenues, made possible by the higher ability to collect taxes during the war years (Natrass & Seekings 2010).

The prevalence of Afrikaner ideology and the institutionalization of Apartheid

The 1948 elections brought to power the National Party (NP), a conservative Christian nationalist political party. The then-sworn in Afrikaner head of government, Daniel Malan, had a history of defending the adoption of a republic for South Africa, instead of the British monarchy (Bloomberg 1990). This can certainly be attributed to a reflection of the memory of the losses in the Boer wars, in which they had suffered, in their point of view, injustices by the English. From the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War in 1902, Afrikaners lamented their loss of political autonomy with the dissolution of their two republics and the consequent incorporation of territories as spaces of the English colonial administration. The restoration of their violated rights was one of the foundations of the new government, which had defeated the South African Party (SAP) of Jan Smuts as a contestation to the South African alignment to the United Kingdom during World War II.

Among its most emblematic measures, the newly elected South African government enforced the deepening of racial segregation and the maintenance of a dependent labor force in the countryside, as well as migrant workers in the gold mines. It escalated repression rather than seeking to co-opt an African elite. The result was the Apartheid (Cooper 2014, 28). While France and England abandoned the colonial domination as an imperial project, South Africa appropriated it as a national project. A racialized capitalism came to support the South African industrialization. The victory of the nationalists, however, should be considered the initial stage of South Africa's own anticolonial revolution, that is, the political and economic control of the South African space exclusively by South Africans, although these were a social minority willing to secure the intensification of racial tensions through legally instituted means.

Due to the participation in the war, though marginal, South Africa had a considerable domestic increase in industrial performance, which led to a massive urbanization throughout the 1940s. Here, a migration took place,

especially of black peasants, until then little inserted in the process of rapid modernization that the country was going through. With more job opportunities, cities became the stage of greater political engagement, due to the urban profile of this new South African reality. An already segregationist South Africa than used more rigid mechanisms to curb these collateral and, from the perspective of the Afrikaner elite, unwanted developments. Among the tougher measures are the laws prohibiting interracial marriage and those that forced black, Asian and mestizo populations to carry a passport within their own country.

With the strikes spreading from the mining sector to the infant industry and with the South African state's difficulty in containing labor movements of the black population, the regime censored the prerequisites of a "modernizing" industrial economy, making a free labor market unviable for its capitalist development. New state controls on labor antagonized South African industrial needs and seriously impeded progress. In the name of defending the interests of the most relevant constituency of NP, nominally rural-based Afrikaners, the government reflected the backwardness of its culture and proved itself unprepared to adapt to the demands of a modern industrial economy (Innes 1994, 168).

In 1958, the new Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd made a public defense of the separate development, a model according to which former territories of the non-white peoples would be returned, conforming to their own societies. Apartheid used the rhetoric of self-determination of peoples as a justification for the formation of enclaves in the national territory, called homelands, which would soon be known as Bantustans. These territories were implemented through the Bantu Self-Government Act and, although they did not enjoy international recognition, the South African government identified the Bantustans as embryonic independent nations. The external pressure for the international non-recognition of the Bantustans was the result of systematic denunciations against South Africa in a UN increasingly balanced by new African states, who saw in these enclaves the deepening of the regime of racial segregation.

The building of the republic and state capitalism

One of the most critical political promises of the NP to its constituency was the adoption of a new South African republic, totally independent from the United Kingdom, that is to say, with a South African head of state. In October of 1960 the government carried out a referendum with the white population and by a slight majority of 52,29% of the votes the option for the

republic prevailed. The remarkable resistance of the electorate came from the province of Natal, where the white majority spoke English. They feared that, away from the United Kingdom, South Africa would be even more vulnerable to communism and pro-rupture African nationalism.

With the adoption of the republic in 1961, South Africa not only departs formally from British tutelage, but also prompts a deeper and daring process of nation-state consolidation from the overlapping Afrikaner identity. The South African tradition was to delegate foreign affairs to Britain, but the NP fixed its eyes on the domestic scene when it came into power in 1948 (Munger 1965, 91) and with the republic it rehearsed the formulation of a foreign policy more identified with the new political reality of the regime led by the less moderate and unfavorable Afrikaner base to the old mediations with the internal pro-British lobby groups. In place of the old conciliation between the English and Boers built by the formation of the South African Union, efforts for a domestic - though never absolute - hegemony became the Republican pillar in the South African context.

The country that until then enjoyed privileged contributions of English capital in the African continent was willing to draw a more autonomous route. By leaving the Commonwealth of Nations as well, the most caustic Afrikaner politicians actually celebrated the resurgence of a Boer republic, now shaped in a post-war reality, at an intermediate stage of industrial development. It is from this period that South Africa effectively consolidates its "national capitalism, understood as the model that is the modern synthesis between nation-states and industrial capitalism, the institutional attempt to manage money, markets and accumulation through a central bureaucracy to the benefit of a cultural community of national citizens" (Hart & Padayachee 2013, 57).

Jackson (1990) and Clapham (1996) point out that the emergence of African nation states from the decolonization of the 1960s was accompanied by the absence of empirical sovereignty. As they lacked absolute internal legitimacy, these states had no monopoly on the government's control over the territory of the state, as well as a certain capacity to defend the territory. Therefore, a significant part of African states existed through legal sovereignty, relegated to merely formal recognition within the international system. There must be a subtle differentiation between the understanding of the formation of African national states as the dismantling of colonial empires in the 1960s - especially English and French - and the reality already established in South Africa. Although it did not match in levels of development the European powers, the new South African republic already showed its unique identity as an effectively sovereign and independent national state on the African continent.

If, on the one hand, for whites, South Africa is an advanced capitalist state in the final stages of imperialism, on the other hand, for the black population it is still a colony (Gordimer apud Stander 2014, 25). This unique identity is expressed through the search for national self-assertion allied to a capitalist development that sees the Western European model as the flagship for modernity, yet filling it up with institutions that are not modernizing or even anti-modernizing. What is clearly observable is the fact that these political and economic developments make Boer South Africa as a "young center", an expression coined by Amin (1976). In other words, in spite of the idiosyncrasies of the regime, which is highly contested morally and politically by the international community, South Africa quickly constitutes the organic nucleus of peripheral capitalism in the international system along with other Third World powers.

The internal and external political costs resulting from the deepening of the Apartheid have not gone unnoticed by the Pretoria authorities. The armed struggle gained place in the political dispute to the regime in South African soil, mainly through acts of sabotage, organized in collaboration between a clandestine ANC and a SACP with close ties to Moscow. From 1960 to 1962 the agitated African continent saw the most expressive process of independence of the former colonies. In Southern Africa, mostly British, there have been several national liberation movements boiling, which would clearly affect South African positions as a regional actor in order to maintain political stability through the *status quo*.

Even if South Africa were to become a regional capitalist pole, its specific type of less dependent capitalism also entailed a gradual withdrawal from traditional western allies, such as England and the United States, which voluntarily joined the arms embargo against South Africa sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council in 1963 (Gennenhuys 1984, 11). Faced with this embarrassment, South Africa was compelled to solidify through its own means a national defense industry that responded to the growing demands of South African defense and security forces in domestic and cross-border operations. According to Cepik (2009), in terms of equipment, due to the embargo, South Africa ended up developing its own industry of armor and artillery that in our days position the country well globally.

South African engagement in the regional scenario

Southern Africa was the space of colonization of two empires, basically the British and the Portuguese. Regardless of which country in Southern Africa one is discussing, the involvement of the Pretoria regime can always

be seen, whether in the occupation of Namibia, in the large-scale aggression in Angola, in the terrorist action in Mozambique or in the assistance to the racist government in Rhodesia (Shubin 2008, 239). It is therefore clear that South Africa was actively engaging from the broader political and diplomatic sense to the strictly military and operational in its region. From a perennially recalcitrant anticommunist rhetoric, South African policymakers exposed the rationale behind the interventions in Southern Africa around the containment of communism and similar liberation movements.

Perhaps at the most Afrikaner moment in South Africa as a sovereign political entity, the Rhodesian elections provide for a consistent political alliance around the Apartheid regime. In 1962, with the victory of the Rhodesian Front (RF), a white local elite gets ahead of the negotiations between the British and the African elite for the independence of the territories in Southern Africa and seeks to circumvent the already real black political participation of the country, using the systematic racial discrimination and guided by a harmful vision of African inferiority with the purpose of securing privileges for the white minority (Mungazi 1998, 131). The result comes in 1965 with the Declaration of Unilateral Independence. Under Ian Smith's leadership, the white minority government of the RF does not achieve significant international recognition, especially from the British government, and maintains substantial ties with Pretoria to deal with the containment of African nationalists and the formation of guerrillas struggling to take immediate power.

Although Rhodesia received massive military support from South Africa since 1967, Vorster saw the need to contain the war in the neighboring country because it anticipated that the situation could escalate into chaos and rupture. In this, an informal alliance was formed with the Kaunda president, paving the way for a regional *détente* (Jaster 1989, 52). US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pressed for the South African government of John Vorster to moderate the climate of negotiations for the transition of power in Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe, which would take place in 1979. On the American part, what they feared was precisely an engagement of the type that came to take place in Angola with the presence of Cuban troops and the extensive support of the Soviets.

After the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, the African continent saw the dismantling of its last colonial empire. With the withdrawal of the Portuguese, room was opened for the political independence of Angola and Mozambique, two large colonies, the first facing the Atlantic and the second, the Indian Ocean. This reality left South Africa without a buffer zone on its northwest and northeast borders (Muiu 2008). Portuguese colonial maintenance in southern Africa until the mid-1970s was very relevant for

South Africa, which had been blocked from fly zones since 1963 by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) member countries.

Stepleton (2010) states that South Africa's national defense forces have learned lessons from the US and France, based on the wars in Vietnam and Algeria. They relied on counterinsurgency theories, which presupposed that insurgent forces could defeat robust conventional military forces. With MK training in Mozambique and Bechuanaland, the South African government saw even more reasons to counter the establishment of a supposedly hostile regime in Maputo, although its greater concern was still the instability in Angolan soil that could easily entail changes in South-West Africa, still under South African tutelage. As Pereira (2010, 52) points out, the increasing isolation of South Africans, not only at the international level, but fundamentally in regional terms after the independence of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, as well as the expenses with the military and maintenance of the state security apparatus, would make the system unsustainable.

South Africa, as a country bathed by two oceans - the Atlantic and the Indian - has always been a highly strategic geographical point. In 1955, England signed the Simonstown Agreement with the South Africans, formalizing its South Atlantic Naval Station, a foothold for the British navy in Commonwealth space. Both navies undertook regular joint operations until 1975, when the agreement was not renewed by the British because of the identification with the Republic of South Africa did more diplomatic damage than presented military advantages. The termination of a 169-year naval tie meant that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for the first time, would have no operational base in the South Atlantic (Roberts 1976, 4). On the other hand, South Africa's own departure from the British Commonwealth and its affairs with the adoption of the new republic would end up implying this scenario of a more significant military decision-making autonomy on the part of Pretoria.

As NATO asserted its military power in the Cold War in the northern hemisphere, there was the counterproposal of forming a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (OTAS), aimed at tackling common aggressors and the "Soviet threat." In 1977 the commander of the Uruguayan navy defended its institutionalization. It would involve South American countries in cooperation with the colonialist regimes of Portugal and racist South Africa. The Brazilian government, in the late 1970s, did not see viability in the proposal and argued that an arms race in the region could come to be due to the agreement. There was, in the midst of the Brazilian retraction, an alliance between South Africa and Argentina, which would soon be replaced by an approximation of the

South Africans to the Chileans - and also Bolivians and Paraguayans - under English auspices, in the midst of the Malvinas War (1982). The alliance would not have relevant practical developments, so Brazil came to see the need to ensure the security of the region. Soon, it started to defend the idea of a zone of peace - later the Zone of Peace of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) - in place of OTAS. This new proposal would take shape in a postcolonial reality in Southern Africa, amid the regime transition processes of both Southern Africa and the Americas (Pereira 2013).

While on the one hand South Africa has consolidated itself as the most relevant regional actor in southern Africa, on the other, because of the chain of events that began with the departure of the Portuguese from their colonies, the regime in Pretoria experienced cumulatively increasing difficulties in maintaining a stable order in the region. The more realistic foreign policy approach throughout the 1970s allowed for some temporary diplomatic victories, which, however, did not prevent the deterioration of Pretoria-West relations. The isolation and arms embargo would lead South Africa to seek new partnerships in the international system. It was, after all, willing to carry out a national project that did not dismiss large national defense capabilities and was not intimidated by the pressures and criticisms on its regime of racial segregation.

From nuclear ambition to the latent economic-military wear

On the African continent, South Africa is considered the only country that has been able to develop a nuclear program and an atomic arsenal. The adoption of a nuclear program evidences the clear attempt to seek South Africa's full political autonomy and consolidation as an effective medium power in Africa. Still in 1961, the first nuclear plant of South Africa was developed and from 1969 onwards the nuclear program took body. Initially the main supplier of uranium to the United States, South Africa played a strategic role in the US nuclear industry. After the discovery of the ore in American and Canadian soil, the US began to depend less on the South Africans.

Although the United States accepted Israel's entry into the nuclear club in 1970, the US government worked tirelessly in the late 1970s for South Africa not to enter. Carter's non-proliferation policy failed to prevent South Africa from acquiring the bomb shortly after Carter left, and successive US bureaucrats failed to stop Israel from helping the Apartheid state develop more advanced components of its nuclear arsenal (Polakow-Suransky 2010,

13). In a rare sign of collaboration between the USSR and the US in 1977, the Soviets shared the satellite data information that indicated the setting up of a site in the Kalahari Desert for the development of nuclear artifacts testing. The regime in Pretoria, through ministers and diplomats, vehemently denied that the site was in any way used for nuclear experiments.

While on the one hand there was concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Third World, there was also the understanding that the restrictions imposed on the technological development of these countries served the interests of the nuclear countries in maintaining, from the perspective of the international political economy, the technology in itself as a power resource for differentiating these states from others. In addition, non-nuclear countries would become buyers of equipment and fuels that would promote the industry and the nuclear market in nuclear countries. Like Brazil and Israel, South Africa did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, demonstrating that nuclear weapons capacity was in fact the ultimate goal of its program.

The isolation of Pretoria led the regime to seek unconventional allies for technical cooperation and strategic program sharing. It approached regimes that also, by some means or another, experienced a certain degree of alienation from the international community, such as the post-67 Israel and Taiwan (Republic of China) after the change of the Chinese seat at the United Nations Security Council in favor of the People's Republic of China (1971). Under such a controversial regime, the UN sought ways to limit South Africa's military potential through embargoes and sanctions aimed ultimately at disarming the apartheid regime as well as the region. The rhetoric for global disarmament derived from pacifist postulations can lead to misleading inferences, as Morgenthau (1997) points out[6].

With the depletion of the industrializing model of import substitution and the end of dizzying economic growth, coupled with the new reality around Southern Africa, South African governments sought to combine internal administrative reforms with a greater concern with their potentially stabilizing role as a regional power. Throughout the 1980s, then-South African Prime Minister Botha embarked on various reforms to resolve the contradiction between capitalist accumulation and popular demands. A new

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6 He states that "reducing the amount of weapons actually or potentially available at any particular time could not have an influence on the incidence of war; it could conceivably affect his conduct. Nations limited in the quantity of weapons and men would concentrate all their energies in improving the quality of these weapons and men. In addition, they would search for new weapons that would compensate for the loss in quantity and assure them an advantage over their competitors" (Morgenthau 1997, 436-437).

basis of consensus would have to be created, implying the restructuring of the political and ideological foundations of Apartheid, transforming the process of accumulation through adjustment in economic policies and relations of state and civil society. The reforms sought to institutionalize consensus and coercion by reshaping the structure of production, distribution, and consumption to revive the economy that was weakening. There were attempts to restructure political institutions to strengthen relations between capital and labor (Muiu 2008, 122). And it was precisely at that time that the holding of power on the part of the South African state underwent a drastic change, when external economic pressures - specifically the American investment boycott - threatened the regime (Hidalid 1994, 136). The US Congress passed a bill in 1986 to freeze American investments in South Africa and bar the sale of arms to Pretoria by US companies.

International Weakness and the Transition to Democracy

The setting of a South African political establishment that to a greater or lesser extent continued to degenerate policies of racial segregation led the country to a state of emergency. Although many of the regime's most controversial laws had been repealed in 1986, internal political deterioration had taken on alarming dimensions at the end of the decade. In addition, the very rapid changes in the outcome of the Cold War and the new independent environment in Southern Africa provided a complete change of scenery, now largely unfavorable to South Africa.

The Botha administration became rather skeptical of Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement" for not having prevented the US Congress from imposing sanctions on South Africa. In response to the deteriorating relations, Botha's rhetoric denounced the West and its policies, in a clear call for South Africa's links with Africa. In a direct speech to the non-aligned states, the President of the state recalled Pan-African cooperation, claiming that the blame for the misery the West had inflicted on Africa and the Third World was hidden behind the campaign against South Africa. He claimed the meeting of leaders of the African continent in Africa to be necessary, not in other continents, for the reflection of their problems and search for solutions. In addition to the rhetoric, this approach evidenced the moment of high tension between South Africa and Western powers as well as a correspondingly distention with some of the neighboring regimes, including Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Jaster 1989).

With the South Africans' negotiated withdrawal from the territory of Southwest Africa by the New York Tripartite Agreement, conditions were established for a peaceful transition with free and monitored elections in Namibia. As in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola, the most formidable national resistance group seized power with ample advantage. Faced with this reality, the international community and the then NP ruler saw the political negotiations with the ANC as the most realistic outcome, since it was the greatest political force within the country, at least in terms of political representation.

The question, however, was no longer merely of an African national majority government as in previous decades, but the establishment of a model of liberal democracy, indeed open to the most varied fields of politics. In this way, the NP also saw the possibility of maintaining, although marginally, a prestigious influence in the constitutional paths of the Republic of South Africa and the ANC, in turn, considered numerous political concessions in order to reach an effective government transition quickly. From the meeting between ANC leadership Oliver Tambo and Gorbachev, it was understood that Pretoria's acts of aggression against other independent African states should cease, there should be independence for Namibia in line with UN resolutions, as well as the removal of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, the "primary cause of the conflict situation in the region" (Shubin 2008).

The question for the ANC revolved around two basic premises: "one man, one vote" and the distribution of income and equalization of opportunities with the maintenance of a more heterodox pact on economic policies. To the ANC it cannot be attributed, therefore, any position of political and economic elimination of the achievements made in the last decades, such as the herculean infrastructure projects that allowed the territorial integration. What was in vogue above all was a post-Apartheid South Africa. The supposedly universal values condemned racial discrimination practices, but did so in a way that the South African state was wholly destined for all who lived there without distinction - at least in official rhetoric.

With increasing political liberalization, the South African space has seen a wide variety of political groups flourish. There were 26 parties involved in the transition process, in the broader discussions aimed at civil society as a whole. The Afrikaner ideology provided room for the proliferation of the most distinct ideologies, widely present in liberal democracies, especially those of the multi-party system. It had become almost imperative for the

ANC, which had been in hiding for so many decades, to make room for a proportional electoral system, even though its old struggle had approached a predominantly majority model that would ensure a large majority government to the ANC.

In the financial field South Africa also faced difficulties, because of the end of the dollar-gold standard in 1971, with the maintenance of the subsequent Bretton Woods institutions in a remodeled concert of world political economy. The exchange rates until then fixed went through stages of flexibility with the adoption of exchange rate bands and floating exchange rates. South Africa, the largest supplier of gold to the world market, has been thrown from seemingly triumphant progress to an agonizing decline. From 1948 to 1973, the country was marked by growth and stability, while from 1973 to 1994 stagnation and inflation predominated (Feinstein 2005, 200-201).

Arrighi & Saul (1973, 50) point to the fact that international capitalism would advance interests in controlling political-economic development processes described as peripheral centers and in particular centers of mineral exploration. And in fact, the new globalizing era pointed to the strict delimitation of the state's role in the economy with the spread of the almost unrestricted opening to international capital and the change in the institutional framework for countries to conform to the order centered on the Washington Consensus.

While the bipolar system allowed non-irrelevant bargaining power on the part of African states, the new reality introduced in the 1990s led the continent to a near-abandonment by those who were the biggest guarantors of governments and regimes in Africa. Instead of the wars of national liberation, several civil wars broke out, and the formally delimited sovereignties were organically fragile, with states that failed to establish a central bureaucracy powerful enough to coordinate territorially national political activity. Despite all of South Africa's effort in this regard, the transition meant an increase in civil violence by sectors of the population cut off from the circle of high negotiations between ANC and NP. Nuisances among the rising African leadership in various territories undermined the path to concerted regime change. While Mandela and Klerk were awarded the Nobel Prize for conciliation in the name of the Apartheid outcome, disorder and law-breaking boiled in places disputed by former Bantustan leaders, extremist Afrikaner groups, and all manner of agitation against the understanding of the party elites.

Final Considerations

As well as attesting to the dual character of the colonization of South African space, it also seems that the modernization of the state, mainly from the South African Union, adopts a dual reality, in which for a restricted and privileged part of the population there is significant state-of-the-art employment with social benefits, and for the majority of the population - racially segregated - there is socioeconomic exclusion and a state that employs violence and criminalization in a systematic way. The relatively transformative capitalist development for a peripheral country in the international system presented in its contradictions the obstacles to full human development and more effective international integration in a post-colonial African reality.

Notwithstanding the different limitations, South Africa, in addition to its mineral wealth, established an effective central bureaucracy, allowing the functionality of state administration, the management of a more autonomous financial system and the indispensable subsidies for its industrialization process. Given its uniqueness, the formation of the South African national state allows for a more integrative and dynamic international insertion in international relations, having in force a functional sovereignty over its territory and its own political domain over its most sensitive decisions. Despite perennial structural problems such as high social inequality and alarming rates of unemployment, South Africa positions itself as an effective regional power on the African continent.

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ABSTRACT

Since the Dutch colonization of the Cape, South African space has become an effective geostrategic point, initially anchored in the mercantilism of the metropolis, and later, with the British arrival, through a process of commercial opening and expansion of territorial colonization of Europeans and of Asian populations secured by the British. After two internal wars, South Africa, in the early twentieth century, arrives at a political understanding, forming the South African Union, which opened up room, after World War II, for the rise of a conservative nationalist regime, responsible for the resurgence of the racial segregation already in place. Recognized as an anti-communist bastion in Southern Africa, South Africa develops military capabilities in the 20th century and a national market economy without equal in the continent. While affirming its national project, the country is limited by the growing discredit of the international community, which, through the UN and the OAS, issues embargoes and boycotts on the South African government.

Translated by Rodrigo dos Santos Cassel.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN THE CAMEROON HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY DEFINITION: A HISTORICAL APPRAISAL

Hyasinth Ami Nyoh[1]

Introduction

The subject of cultural diversity in education has attracted considerable research interest with varying focal points that form the sustenance of this paper. Meier and Hartell (2009, 180) have argued that increasing cultural diversity in educational institutions necessitates that educationists teach and manage learners with cultures, languages and backgrounds that are unknown to them. Du Toit (1995) focusing on the Republic of South Africa takes the view that the opening of schools to all races does not automatically ensure mutual understanding and acceptance between educators and learners and amongst learners themselves. The assertion here is that desegregation *per se* does not lead to predictable and meaningful attitudinal changes of groups to each other and can, in actual fact, lead to the heightening of tension and prejudices within the South African context. O'Neill (2009, 81) sees multicultural education as a process of comprehensive school reform and basic education for all students. He asserts that multicultural education challenges and rejects racism and other forms of discrimination in schools and societies and affirms the pluralism (ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious, economic and gender, among other things) that students, their communities, and teachers represent. In her research on teaching and learning in two desegregated South African high schools, Van Heerden (1998, 110) asserts

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that the process of desegregation in these schools is primarily a case of assimilating black learners into the school and its culture, with the result that the *status quo* is kept intact.

To Burridge and Chodkiewicz (2008), educational institutions, including schools and the academy, must engage in the debates about representations of ethno-cultural diversity, nationhood and identity. According to them, institutions of learning must help to shape these discourses in order to assist civic leaders and policy makers to work with communities to build civil societies based on principles of social justice, equity and social inclusion (Burridge and Chodkiewicz 2008, 14). Their emphasis is that Professional educators, in particular, need to focus their attention on the roles they play in converting the challenges of ethno-cultural diversity into opportunities for all children and young people. These authors converge to the imperatives of multiculturalism in educational policy. They, however, express frustrations on the practise of multiculturalism in education. It is within this frame that this paper resituates the context within which cultural diversity was given consideration in the definition of higher education policy in Cameroon. The paper argues that efforts to sustain reforms that could harness bicultural education at the tertiary level in Cameroon were marred by the problem of diversity in interest by educational stakeholders orchestrated by resource inadequacies.

Cultural Diversity in Cameroon's Educational Context

Educational policy in Cameroon, like elsewhere in Africa, developed from colonial cultures which the African people inherited from their colonial masters. In the case of Cameroon, a bilingual system evolved from the system of colonial administration in which the country developed from 1884 to 1960. It is worth noting that the country was colonised by the Germans in 1884. In 1916, the Germans were ousted from the territory in the course of the First World War by a combined Anglo-French effort. The victorious powers, after a failed condominium, opted to partition the territory for effective wartime administration. According to the terms of the partition, Britain got 1/5 of the territory composed of two discontinuous strips of land of about 90,000 km^2 while France got 4/5 corresponding to about 400,000 km^2 (Echu 2004, 21). These terms were accepted by the post war settlement at Paris out of which was born the League of Nations that was given the mandate to oversee the administration of former vanquish territories. Cameroon being one therefore became a mandated territory under Britain and France. The two portions

of the territory were administered from the cultural background of the administering authorities. At the end of the Second World War, the United Nations' Trusteeship Council took over the responsibilities of the Mandate Commission. Thus, it was within the brackets of the Trusteeship Council that independence was granted to French Cameroon. In the case of British Cameroon, independence was obtained through a UN organised plebiscite whose results implicated loss of British Northern Cameroon to Nigeria while British Southern Cameroon reunited with French Cameroon to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon with a bi-cultural constitution that adopted a bilingual status.

The bilingual status adopted by Cameroon at independence was expressed, among other aspects, through the educational sector according to which two sub-systems of education emerged (English for West Cameroon and French for East Cameroon) at the elementary and secondary levels. For the provision of higher education suitable for the specific needs and realities of the newly independent nation, the federal government established a University Complex in 1961, known as the National Institute for University Studies (*Institute National d'Etudes Universitaires*).

The Institute's activities started in October 1961 with the assistance of the French Government. Its mandate was to prepare students for degrees in Education, Law, Economics and the Arts. Professional training programmes were developed at the same time through the School of Administration, School of Agriculture and the Military Academy. In 1962 the National Institute for University Studies evolved into the Federal University of Cameroon, created to take over the role of training senior cadres in Science, Education and Technology (ADEA 1999, 2). The influence of French presence in the country led to the adoption of the binary system of traditional universities and specialised institutions expressed in French as *grandes écoles*. This system was meant to serve both the English and French-Speaking Cameroonians (Ngwana 2001). This cultural melange became the bases of evolving problems of diversity as the state, while implementing a bi-cultural policy of education, failed to take into consideration the link between language and learning. It was this foiled link as the paper observes, that laid bases for frustrations among those who could not survive in the existing system.

Along similar lines, other establishments were created and attached to the University of Yaoundé by 1967 among which were: the University Centre for Health Sciences (CUSS) and the Institute of Management – *Institut de l'Administration des Entreprises* (IAE) in 1969, *Ecole Supérieure Internationale de Journalisme de Yaoundé* (ESIJY) in 1970, the Institute of International Relations (*Institut des Relations Internationales de Yaoundé*) and the National

Advanced School of Engineering (*Ecole Nationale Supérieure Polytechnique* – ENSP) in 1971 (ADEA 1999, 2). Both the classical faculties and the specialised institutions were all classified as bilingual universities; what Maríe Torres-Guzman (2002) refers to as individual bilingualism which occurs where an institution offers tuition in two languages to the same individual. Considering the demographic superiority of French-speaking Cameroon, they formed a majority of the teaching staff in all these institutions of higher learning. This became the first educational barrier to enhancing cultural diversity, as students who emerged from the Anglo-Saxon styled pre-tertiary education recorded poor performances and low graduate rates which they blamed on language disparity and began pressing for reform in the higher education system.

Higher Education Policy Shifts in Cameroon

The Cameroon university system like others in Africa was faced with a number of policy demands from their very inceptions. It should be noted at this instance that the Cameroon higher education policy was primarily formulated to train national cadres for senior positions in the civil service which was and remain the major employer in Cameroon. According to Chan et al. (2014, 5), higher education provision should take into consideration a wide range of competency and generic skills that includes but are not limited to communication skills, problem-solving skills, self-directed learning skills, the ability to integrate ideas and concepts, and the capacity to work in teams and group environments. Thus, in crafting the Cameroon higher educational policy, policy makers did not adequately consider the prerogative of adapting the policy to suit the needs of Cameroon and Cameroonian students in particular (Chan et al. 2014).

The Association of American Colleges and Universities (2012, 11) identified three goals students should develop by the completion of a U.S. bachelor's degree: (1) be informed by knowledge about the natural and social worlds, (2) be empowered through the mastery of intellectual and practical skills, and (3) be responsible for their personal actions and for civic values. Therefore, the efforts to enhance cultural diversity in the higher education policy making in Cameroon did not adequately integrate the needs for mass education which it opted for and excellence which could translate graduates into self-confident and civic responsible persons empowered by the acquisition/mastery of intellectual knowledge and practical skills since learners were deprived of the opportunity of adequate learning within

the cultural diversity enhancement policy. This need for mass education in Cameroon is illustrated by the fact that when the Federal University of Cameroon opened its doors in 1962, it had an intake of 600 students. This figure rose to 7,000 in 1970, 18,000 in 1984, 32,000 in 1990, 45,000 in 1991 and over 50,000 in 1992 (MINESUP 1993). This rising intake jeopardised excellence and expansionist efforts were made to redress the situation.

At the start of the 1977/78 academic year, the University of Yaoundé comprised ten organisational units comprising of: three faculties, four schools, one specialised centre and two institutes. In spite of this, the student population was rising above infrastructure and staffing viability, orchestrating numerous deficiencies among which was that of language use drawn from the linguistically diverse nature of the country. To address the problem of student numerical explosion, four University Centres were created in 1977 with specific educational mandates: Buea University Centre for languages, translation/ interpretation, and the arts; Douala University Centre for Business Studies and the training of technical education teachers; Dschang University Centre for Agricultural Sciences; Ngaoundere University Centre for Food Science and Food Technology (ADEA 1999, 5). Unfortunately, these centres and specialised institutions could not solve the problem of overcrowding considering that entry positions were few and competitive; based on recruitment opportunities in the public service (Ngwana 2001, 2). Linguistically, a holistic policy to ensure effective teaching through adequate use of both official languages was not taken into consideration. While this was a positive evolution in the higher education training capacity, policy disregarded the problem of lingual diversity among the students these institutions were to train. The result was the feeling of being discriminated among students who could not meet language demands.

The problem of student-lecturer ratio and congestion posed the problem of success rates which in 1992 stood at 30% resulting from congested lecture rooms and linguistic diversity. Within this context the numerical superiority of French-speaking lecturers made things worse as marginalisation was decried by English-speaking students who were disfavoured by the policy of individual bilingualism (Echu 2004, 26). According to Tambi (1973) and Njeck (1992), at the University of Yaounde, 80% of lectures were delivered in French and only 20% in English. In the midst of these disparities, it became common for English-speaking students to blame poor results to the fact that the professors lacked the linguistic competence to properly understand and correct scripts in their second language (Tambi 1973, 38; Njeck 1992, 41). Such cleavages provoked the rise of a series of strikes from English-speaking students which Konings (2004, 174) has termed; "Anglophone nationalist

struggle". As a result of these pressures and other weaknesses suffered by the system, the Cameroon university system was reformed. This reformation gave birth to five additional universities out of which three were made to practise individual bilingualism and the two others were unilingual.

The Diversification of University Models

In response to students' pressure emanating from demographic as well as linguistic difficulties in learning, the state decided in 1993 to reform the inherited higher education policy. In this process, two sorts of universities were established in Cameroon: the bilingual and the monolingual universities.

The Establishment of Bilingual Universities and Emanating Policy Pitfalls

Within the higher education context, the Cameroon educational system adopted a policy of individual bilingualism rather than an integral approach that could generate the interest of nationals into putting bilingualism in practice. Ayafor (2005, 133) asserts that two languages became official languages in Cameroon as a bequeathed colonial policy acclaimed by decision makers at the time of reunification in 1961. These languages were thought to be neutral (considering the existence of a multiplicity of indigenous languages), thus, suitable for the typical political objective of holding the two English and French cultures together. This view illustrates that the need for the integration of the bicultural nation through bilingualism was not intended to be an educational linguistic policy worthy of being defined and pursued in linguistic principles. This is because the bilingual principles seem to have concentrated more on the political integrity of the nation with insignificant considerations (if any) on educational outcomes. Based on the nation's policy makers' objectives of bilingualism; efforts to attain unity in diversity did not receive any reasonable attention in the educational sector which could contextually boast academics. This view is emphasised by Echu (1999) in the following words:

> *En préférant ainsi le français et l'anglais, les autorités camerounaises ont été sûrement influencées par les mêmes critères ayant motivé le choix des deux langues au lendemain des indépendances: résoudre le problème de plurilinguisme existant dans le pays, préserver l'unité nationale dans une nouvelle fédération encore fragile, continuer la politique coloniale en matière de politique linguistique.*

Thus the high concentration on integrative politics in Cameroon exposed leadership to the risk of establishing half-baked language policies in the academia which was not sustained by staff balance such as described by Ngwana (2001, 3):

> Bilingualism as a language policy in the university was not effective since teaching was carried out predominantly in French thereby creating a situation of imbalance between the two languages. The English-speaking students increasingly felt marginalised because this situation also caused them to register very high rates of failure in examinations.

The maintenance of the policy of individual bilingualism had the result that French-speaking lecturers continued to take a bulk of the lectures due to their numerical superiority. Considering their own secondary and high school background as the French subsystem, most of them were largely inapt to deliver lectures as well as evaluate in English. Thus, students who graduated from the English subsystem of education recorded low success rates and consequently dropped out. The problem of French language dominance was further compounded by that of library facilities. With about 80% French-speaking lecturers it can be assumed, mean approximately the same percentage of documents in French in the university libraries. Within this context, the efforts to resolve problems of cultural diversity through the establishment of bilingual higher education structures failed to effectively respond to educational necessities. This was largely a result of non-consideration of imperative principles that could boost effectiveness in bilingual universities.

According to Langner and Imbach (2000), there exist two principles that are imperative for the establishment of a bilingual university, namely: (a) sensitivity to the cultural and linguistic situation of the region, and (b) developing a concept of bilingualism. To them, the first principle ensures that the appropriate language and cultural balance are maintained and promotional principles which include: the promotion of participation by a linguistic minority (where applicable). The second principle ensures that all learners are able to learn (Langner & Imbach 2000, 467). These basic principles were frustrated by the policy of mass education according to which all learners who had successfully completed secondary school were directly qualified to study in the universities. The result was overcrowded lecture rooms making it difficult for lecturers to be student centred; that is if the lecturer was able to manage linguistic diversity. Thus, the language diversity weakness among students and lecturers barred the chances of employing the promotional principles as cited above.

With the effect that there was no policy definition to guide teaching towards the application of linguistically integrating principle, lecturers taught in the language they mastered and evaluated as such. This was consequent to failure in the bilingual policy that was intended to enhance 'unity in diversity' and inspired what Echu like Konings describe as Anglophone Nationalism characterised by the struggle for equality in learning opportunities (Echu 2004, 2). Unfortunately, the inability of policy-makers to immediately redress the situation due to lack of necessary staff instigated widespread discontent among English-speaking Cameroonians, who felt abandoned in the existing status quo and resorted to strikes. In the course of such strikes, the academic environment became unsafe as demonstrating students scared even the administrative staff, resulting in the occupation of the campus by forces of the law and order as it occurred in 1983, 1991, 1992 and 1993. Given these circumstances, the bilingual status of the country and of the academic system which would have served the greater interest of the nation through inculcating civic responsibility among students rather became a basis for which an identity bloc developed to challenge the status quo resulting in disruptions in academic programs.

The development of an identity bloc reflects Echu's (2004, 25) argument that "The Anglophones have remained very jealous about maintaining their geographical territory within the Cameroon state". This, they did by trying to retain the cultural aspects which colonialism bequeathed to them such as the English language and an Anglo-Saxon styled education. It was in this context that they decried French language domination and advocated an Anglo-Saxon educational system in the higher education milieu as it existed in the primary and secondary education levels wherein they hoped to guarantee educational opportunities to their offsprings. Their argument was not judgemental, rather it was constitutional, as the 1961 constitution in its article 1, paragraph 2 made provisions for English and French to be official languages in Cameroon with equal status. This was reiterated in article 1, paragraph 3 of the Cameroon Constitution of January 18, 1996. This struggle, among other non-linguistic exigencies such as the problem of overcrowding, definition of teaching staff career and reformulation of the higher education goals, resulted in the establishment of unilingual universities in Cameroon with effect from 1993.

The Establishment of Unilingual Universities and Emanating Policy Pitfalls

The reforms of 1993, apart from reorganising the Cameroon university system, resulted in the raising of five university centres to universities and introduced two unilingual universities. These were the universities of Buea

and Ngaoundere, which were Anglophone and francophone respectively. Presidential decree No 2010/371 of 14 December 2010 raised the Bambili University Centre, which before had become the Higher Teacher Training College (HTTC) and the Higher Technical Teacher Training College (HTTTC) to a university in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. These developments targeted an increment in students' success rates. According to Ngwana (2001), the birth of unilingual universities actually helped in increasing university success rates in the country. Students' success rate which in 1992 stood at 30% in the then university of Yaounde generally observed an increase as in 1995/96, that of the University of Buea was 70%, University of Dschang 48%, and University of Yaounde one 48%. Thus, the reforms did well in shifting success rates upward (Ngwana 2001, 5). Though the reform succeeded in improving success rates, it actually stifled the achievement of unity in diversity, as young learners in the unilingual institutions remained disconnected from their fellow countrymen of the opposite culture.

The increase in success rate was not however directly translated into increase post-university success rates considering that in the professional institutions which till present are the major access routes to public service in Cameroon were French language dominated. In addition to French-speaking staff dominance in these public service institutions, access was a great problem as competitive entrance examinations into institutions like *Ecole Normale d'Enseignement Technique* (ENSET) Douala and the National Advance School of Engineering were often in French language. Therefore, the policy of introducing unilingual universities did not establish any safe haven towards the enhancement of cultural diversity. It is worthy to emphasise here that students' academic efforts are primarily guided by the need to acquire a better job, to earn a good salary, to gain an appreciation of ideas, and to prepare for graduate or professional school (Chan et al. 2004, 8).

The putting in place of unilingual universities, which in addition to traditional faculties were host to public service institutions, had serious imperfections. This is primarily because the public service schools were expected to receive students from all secondary school backgrounds. Consequently, the need for jobs upon graduation spurred students to seek admission into institutions with opposing language policy. Wherever this occurred, the student in question suffered the consequences of language differences already discussed above. As Du Plooy & Swanepoel (1997, 143) put it, "The learner whose home language is different from that of the dominant group at school is often made to feel that his or her home language is a second-rate language. This leads to poor self-esteem among learners". This lowered self-confidence is easily translated to lowered learning outcomes.

Enshrined in the 1993 reform objectives were the need to: Grant universities more academic and management autonomy by providing basic infrastructure and finances; provide a more conducive environment for teaching and research by creating a better atmosphere for teachers; teaching and research and revive as well as maximise inter-university and international co-operation (ADEA 1999, 9). These objectives were conversely challenged through the establishment of unilingual institutions in two instances. In the first, the introduction of universities with autonomy paved the way for university systems privatisation wherein some institutions were made to be unilingual against state policy of "official bilingualism". In the second, teaching and research became rather complex as young researchers who emerged from these unilingual universities had difficulties to exploit research infrastructure outside their language of university training. This did not encourage cooperation between universities of diverse institutional systems and language policy within the same national territory and especially within the limited resources reserved for education by policy-makers.

Another plague to the unilingual system was quality of teaching. As already mentioned, one of the glitches of higher education in Cameroon prior to 1993 was that of imbalance of lecturers between English-speaking and French-speaking resulting principally from demographic differences. This occasioned the problem of drop-outs especially among English-speaking students. The creation of unilingual universities with emphasis on Anglo-Saxon universities exacerbated this problem as lecturers of French expression were still recruited to teach in these universities and in English language. In the case of the University of Bamenda wherein its creation coincided with mass recruitment into the Cameroon public service about one hundred of the one thousand lecturers recruited in the "operation 25000" public service staff in 2011 were posted to the Anglo-Saxon university of Bamenda. Surprisingly, over 60% of these young recruits were French-speaking and were obliged to lecture in English, a language most of them did not master. In this setting, policy strategies to forge bi-culturalism orchestrated setbacks in learning outcomes as lecturers could not even be of aid to the learners' language needs. In addition to learners employing what Meier and Hartell (2009, 189) call language mixing (code switching), which is a situation where a speaker uses one language and changes to another while in the middle of a sentence, lecturers also got involved. This complex situation of language employment to attain communication goals in the university milieu, bi-culturalism as expressed in the Cameroon higher education policy definition left educational outcomes wanting.

Language weakness on the part of the new recruits obliged some of them to adopt coping strategies. In this way, they prepared lecture notes

and simply dictated them to the students. This method of teaching did not establish close contact between the lecturers and the students, which according to Graham Gibbs is a major dimension of high quality learning. Consequently, cognitive academic engagement, which according to the National Student Forum Annual Report of 2010 requires that "lecturers are trained, supported and incentivised to teach well and be able to inspire and challenge", was not attained (Business, Innovation and Skills, 27). In this way, the goal of teaching was not fully reached by lecturers as they were deprived of expressing acquired as well as desired knowledge due to language barriers.

Relative to the foregoing, quality education, which Hawes and Stephens (1990, 11) define as a process that requires "efficiency in meeting the set goals, relevance to human and developmental needs and conditions, something more in relation to the pursuit of excellence and human betterment", to Bandary (2005, 85) encompasses a range of elements including the level of student achievement; the ability and qualification of staff; the effectiveness of teaching, and the relevance of programmes to the needs of students and the nation in an emerging global knowledge economy among others were not satisfactorily attained. In this pursuit of excellence, education requires communication by way of aptly used and understandable language expressed by both learners and trainers. The policy of training as well as staff recruitment within the unilingual context to satisfy a bilingual state policy particularly in the Anglo-saxon Universities of Buea and Bamenda jeopardised quality learning and outcomes. This derives amplification from the need for apt contact which could drive the lecturer from being a transmitter of knowledge to being a mediator in the construction of knowledge. According to Ombe et al. (2009, 93), "This may enable teachers to become agents for fostering the development of social skills and creating a learning environment that will encourage young people to live together and to become responsible citizens".

Conclusion

Embracing a culturally diverse educational system in Cameroon at independence has remained one of the country's areas of insistent call for reforms. At the level of tertiary education, the country emerged from humble beginnings with hopes that cultural inclusion was a panacea that could need two linguistic cultures together at least within the educational sector. However, considering demographic inequalities between the two cultures and the fact that at the primary and secondary levels the educational system was fragmented into the English and the French subsystems with

quite insignificant efforts to ensure the teaching of the different languages in all educational institutions nationwide, the second language generally became a barrier to inclusive learning at the tertiary level. English-speaking Cameroonians with a smaller population suffered a higher implication of this policy pitfall as very few of them qualified to teach in higher institutions of learning. The consequence was an exaggeratedly low success rate for the English-speaking, who received a greater part of their lectures in French language and had their script marked by French-speaking lecturers who on their part had quite little mastery of the English language. These instances provoked demands for unilingual institutions. Apart from the fact that once established these institutions became a disconnection to cultural inclusion, they served as avenues for emphasising colonial differences which marred the policy-makers' integration desires. While these linguistic barriers were not emphasised in such unilingual universities like that of Ngoundere with French as a working language, the emphases in Anglo-Saxon styled institutions were high growing from admission to teaching and learning policies. These emphases generally resulted in increased success rates with quite little imputation on post-school success, considering that job opportunities in the territory are largely in French-speaking Cameroon. Also, the selective system of admission into these Anglo-saxon institutions which contradicted national policy of mass education generally frustrated graduates from secondary schools who could not get admission into a tertiary system of their own as a result of low grades. Consequently, the failure of inclusion in higher education policy definition has benefitted the Anglophone Cameroonian with self-stabbing opportunities wherein efforts to avoid linguistic barriers actually landed graduates from the English subsystem of primary and secondary education with reduced opportunities to study in a tertiary system of their own. Even where this was possible and with the increased academic success rates they stood to benefit, the linguistic barriers to which they were subjected in the unilingual institutions imposed a low post graduate success rate on them resulting largely to the decry of marginalisation.

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ABSTRACT

The Republic of Cameroon has in addition to its multi-ethnic identities; two main identities that developed from her colonial history. These are the English-speaking and the French-speaking identities established through formal education under British and French administration. At independence, the territory adopted a bilingual educational policy with two subsystems of education known as the English and the French subsystems at the primary and secondary levels. At the tertiary level, the first state university was made bilingual based on the country's bicultural nature. This paper investigates cultural diversity as implemented in the tertiary education policy definition. It examines the bases, practices and pitfalls in the consideration of cultural diversity in the Cameroon higher education policy definition. The paper, based on practices in state universities, argues that an effort to introduce and implement a bi-culturally inclusive educational policy in higher education was marred by varying demands orchestrated by diversity. Exploiting and integrated approach to harness the interrelated issues, the paper concludes that in as much as there was the desire on the part of the state to ensure inclusive bilingualism in the higher education system, what was obtained was exclusivism ranging from policy to practise and outcomes.

RELATIONS BETWEEN EDUCATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE[1]

Hélder Pires Amâncio[2]
Vera Fátima Gasparetto[3]

Introduction

This paper aims to reflect critically on the relationship between research in education and socioeconomic development from Mozambique. To do so, we would like to return to an issue posed by the Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana (2002, 11) in his book *Emoções e Linguagem na Educação e na Política*: "Does current education serve Chile and its youth?" This question resembles those posed by Mozambican philosophers José Castiano (2005), who when reflecting on *As Transformações no Sistema de Educação em Moçambique* asks: "Educate for what?", and by Severino Ngoenha (2000, 199), who, when reflecting on the *Estatuto e Axiologia da Educação*, asks: "What education for Mozambique?"

So, like Ngoenha (2000), Maturana (2002) and Castiano (2005), we also ask: does current education serve Mozambique and its youth? What is education for in Mozambique? What kind of education does Mozambique need? What do we want from education? What is it and what do we want to educate? What country do we want? As you can imagine these questions are

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not easy to answer, the complexity of them demand research in the field of education in the country. It is therefore on this element "investigation" or "research" in education that we will focus in the following pages, seeking to discuss the (in)possibilities of their relationship with socio-economic development, another complex and difficult concept of treatment by the multiplicity of understandings and controversies surrounding it.

Establishing the relationship between research in education and Mozambique's socio-economic development entails researching on one's own research in education – What is it? How to do such an investigation? How to approach this object of study that we call education? It is also a question of what socio-economic development means in the context of Mozambique. To this end, we have had to resort to some of the existing literature on education in Mozambique. One aspect that we do not ignore and which we deem important in this process of research on education research in this context is the history[4] and the trajectory of education in the country. These, from our point of view, are fundamental to understand how research in education can contribute to Mozambique's socio-economic development today. Thus, like Humberto Maturana, we think that:

> ... it is not possible to think of education without, or at the same time, thinking of this thing so fundamental in everyday life that is the country project in which our reflections on education are inserted (Maturana 2002, 12).

In this way, the question that arises is: what country project do we have? Or rather, as Maturana (2002, 12) puts it, "do we have a country project?" If we have a country project, it does not seem very explicit. From the point of view of the discourse the objective is to develop Mozambique and eradicate absolute poverty, but from the point of view of financial and human resources and the daily practice of governmental management there is a difficult institutional response to these challenges.

For the accomplishment of this article we used as a working method bibliographical research on education in Mozambique, the exchange of ideas and conversations, the sharing of texts and perceptions of the realities of the countries where we live. The writing was done in the collective platform *google docs*, which allowed to observe the process of construction of the text

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4 The story as Miguel Buendía Gómez (1999, 15) argues can help to understand the reason for the new present.

in real time. The wiki and hypertext construction in two different types of Portuguese was a challenge that is certainly expressed in the writing result.

Education being one of Frelimo's governance priorities since 1975 and formally considered by the Mozambican government "as a human right and a key instrument for the consolidation of peace, national unity and for the country's economic, social and political development through training of citizens with high self-esteem and patriotic spirit"[5] (Plano Estratégico da Educação 2012, 11), it "needs to be thought in its entirety and within the framework of concrete conditions, in order to identify the dysfunctional moments of the current system, in relation to reality and the social fabric" (Ngoenha 2000, 199). For this, the research in education is fundamental.

However, in order to rethink the issue, we need to reconstruct the history of education in Mozambique, especially in the short periods analyzed and invisibilized, but, above all, "to seek the theoretical basis for projecting in this area a future that surpasses the colonial education project and the time of the construction of socialism, whose substratum, despite some institutional and cosmetic reforms, continues to govern the whole of our educational system" (Ngoenha 2000, 200).

Taking into account the historical dimension means looking at the multiple realities in which education subscribes (cultural, economic and political[6]) and, therefore, not seeing it as a closed study object in itself, because the educational field is structurally conditioned by those dimensions that, without fully constituting education, influence it (Ngoenha 2000, 200).

Our argument in this work is based on the assumption that if socio-economic development means the improvement of people's living conditions (Ngoenha 2000, 203) then research in education, understood as a social production influenced by socio-historical and renovating conditions of the latter, is called upon to contribute to their transformation and improvement (Goergen 1998, 5).

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5 It is curious and we are struck by the fact that no reference is made to the idea of a liberating education, that for Fiori (1967, 11) "is incompatible with a pedagogy which, in a conscious or mystified way, has been a practice of domination".

6 According to Ngoenha (2000, 200) the cultural dimension of the educational phenomenon occupies the first place to the extent that it has its substrate in socially instituted values and norms, that is, to the extent that the whole education project is dependent on the project of society in which it operates. Secondly, the economic dimension insofar as the "quantity and quality of educational structures depend very much on the financial capital that the State and the people are able to invest in this domain" and thirdly, the political dimension of education on which the institutional organization of the educational field depends.

Ngoenha (2000) sees in the last 80 years of the history of education in Mozambique varied objectives, teaching systems and pedagogical methods. The official education system aimed at the Portuguese elite, indigenous schools aimed at those who contributed to the legitimization of the regime, Christian systems with opposing and favorable positions to the regime, Marxist systems aimed at the formation of the new man, liberal systems imposed by the World Bank, aimed at the capitalist ideological formation, private systems directed to the formation of the bourgeoisie, among others.

In the post-independence period there was a curricular change and the number of children that had access to schools increased, although the structure was the same in terms of classrooms and teachers (Ngoenha 2000). From 1986, under determinations from the World Bank, which finances the Ministry of Education (MINED), it restructures the system that starts to go through ambiguities between the education policy that needs to be equated with local/regional and global policies imposed by the structural adjustment programs.

Many experts and social movements denounce the consequences of structural programs and their development models and their implications for the impoverishment of the so-called Third World countries. The values of Mozambican education have resulted from the determinations of these institutions without much questioning (Ngoenha 2000). The result of this is that:

> Mozambique forms in our universities agronomists that do not do field work – which are being occupied by Boers – but they occupy places in the offices; our architects do not improve the housing conditions of Mozambicans who live in inhumane conditions, but they do an aesthetic architecture [...]; one teaches a Portuguese Law – still old-fashioned – that has nothing to do with how people live and understand their collective life; management and computer courses are introduced, a medicine that integrates very little traditional medical knowledge – much appreciated in European universities –, social science research responds more to the imperatives of the Western world than to the real needs of the people they are supposed to serve with their studies and work, etc. For what and for whom do schools, high schools and universities serve? (Ngoenha 2000, 29-30).

In the 1995/1999 Government Program for the Education sector are evidenced the intentions of the Mozambican state to "guarantee peace, national stability and unity, reduce absolute poverty levels, aimed at eradicating them in the medium term and improving people's lives, with an impact on education, health, rural development and employment" (MINED 1995, 11), which are fundamental to revive economic and social activity that can eliminate poverty and promote economic and human development.

The development concept defended in the document is based on the knowledge and application of science and technology where scientific research is a fundamental instrument for the discovery of the most appropriate technologies to Mozambique. It also lists the measures needed to achieve these assumptions (MINED 1995, 11-12), how to promote research capacity (with the necessary human resources and institutions for research for development); encourage scientific research and apply its results in the priority areas of economic and social development; promote exchanges between different sectors, promoting the debate on science, technology and development; cooperate with regional and international science and technology institutions, and coordinate government policies at regional and international levels.

In the preface to the Strategic Education Plan (PEE[7]) (MINED 2012, 13), education is considered as of fundamental importance for the socio-economic return of individuals, families and the nation and has been a priority in national and international development policy agendas: "Education is, by excellence, a crucial tool for fighting poverty, a healthier life, for sustaining economic growth, and for strengthening democracy and the participation of all citizens in national agendas."

The PEE (MINED 2012) announces that improving the quality of education for the teaching-learning process will have as a priority "greater integration of students in the academic process, which includes teaching, research and extension activities", followed by consolidation of the reforms proposed in the Strategic Plan for Higher Education 2000-2010, with emphasis on the implementation of the National Framework for Academic Qualifications of Higher Education. It also includes institutional capacity (physical conditions and new technologies), quality of teacher training (establishing partnerships and research programs and teacher exchange programs). Among the measures is to promote in HEIs a research culture with local, national and international relevance.

For Cruz e Silva (2015) the problem of education has a priority role for development in Africa, anchored in the reflections of Amílcar Cabral, for whom liberation is a cultural act that requires knowledge of concrete reality and education and science are privileged processes for the development of peoples. He also recalls the thinking of Aquino de Bragança, who frequently questioned the role of the sciences and social scientists and advocates a theoretical production that is not "extroverted", "because science and knowledge need to be reflected in public policies" (Cruz e Silva 2015, 269),

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7 Portuguese acronym, *Plano Estratégico de Educação*.

opposing the idea of an "extraverted" science, which produces outward-looking science, concerned with pleasing the hegemonic centers of knowledge production (Hountonji 2008).

When analyzing briefly the situation of research in Social Sciences in Mozambique, Cruz e Silva (2015) offers us some clues to think the whole of research, which is a pillar to think about the educational system. She realizes that during the Portuguese colonial system researches were constrained by regime interests and most were held at the university. In the post-independence period, only one university was created, and only in 1985/86 were created two new public Higher Education Institutions (HEIs).

In the 1980s and 1990s, paradoxically, as the country opened up to democracy, some social groups, especially women, were excluded from access to HEIs, which were marked by business interests, that expanded higher education with the approval of Law 1/93 (Cruz e Silva 2015). This process resulted from the neoliberal impositions that led to the privatization of the Mozambican State:

> In this line of development, education was severely affected and universities were hostage to international funding agencies. Then it is witnessed the accelerated privatization of education and the shifting of resources from public institutions to the private law sphere (Cruz e Silva 2015, 270).

These reforms demanded by the Bretton Woods agencies reflected directly in all spheres of education, and in Mozambique in higher education was evidenced the reduction of public resources that impacted the relationship between teaching and research, quantitative expansion of HEIs (in detriment of qualitative), infrastructure problems, imposition of curricular changes far from the local realities, and absence of the academic community in the processes of changes (Cruz e Silva 2015; Mclaren & Farahmandpur 2002).

These contexts lead Cruz e Silva (2015) to question whether the changes in public higher education in the country meet the Mission during the creation of universities, "since the political imperatives appear above pedagogical imperatives" (Cruz e Silva 2015, 273), affronting academic freedom and to the detriment of citizen participation in the elaboration of public education policies. These barriers and constraints in relation to scientific production transform universities:

> in simple reproducers of knowledge rather than producers, and a visible low quality of teaching, where the threshold of requirements is lowered (leveled below) as the growing weak quality of pre-university

education, which leads the educational system and its various subsystems to enter a vicious cycle difficult to break (Cruz e Silva 2015, 274).

Challenges include funding for research (reduced or absent), lack of infrastructure and appropriate management systems, that can lead HEIs and researchers to stick to market proposals and their research agendas. This implies, according to Cruz e Silva (2015), a loss of the institutional culture of investment in research.

The epistemological foundations of research in education

In this item, our objective is to present some of the epistemological foundations of research in education. Let us start with the concept of research[8], which we understand in general terms as an activity that consists in the search for solutions to one or several problems in the theoretical (scientific) or practical[9] scope. In this sense, when we talk about education research, we understand it as an activity that seeks solutions to the problems posed in this specific sector – therefore it is an action of knowledge (Borba et al. 2013), since the solution of the problem is never definitive, but always provisional, this implies a continuous search for knowledge. The research in education or educational consists of the application of a scientific perspective[10] in the study of the problems of education, as states Donald Ary et al:

> Educational research is the application of the scientific approach to the study of educational problems. Educational research is the way in which people acquire dependable and useful information about the educative process. Educators usually conduct research to find a solution to some problem or to gain insight into an issue they do

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8 Research has long been considered an extremely important activity. Today it has gained more importance given the significant increase in the complexity of phenomena which place the compelling need for interdisciplinary work to advance one's own knowledge and allow for modifications of reality that are more appropriate to the social contexts in which one intervenes (Ludwig 2003).

9 These two scopes go hand in hand, being difficult to delimit the boundaries that separate them or where one ends and another begins.

10 By scientific perspective we refer to the study of solutions to problems using the methods, concepts and systematic theories that seek to produce in-depth knowledge, based on data to support it with consistency and that is distinct from other types of knowledge such as the common sense.

not understand. The ultimate goal is to discover general principles or interpretations of behavior that people can use to explain, predict, and control events in educational situations—in other words, to formulate scientific theory (Ary et al. 2010, 19).

Education research is generally classified into two broad categories: qualitative and quantitative. Each of these approaches employs its own methodology and terminology. The first category is concerned with the understanding of social phenomena. In this perspective, education is seen as the result of human interactions (considered subjective). The second category of research on education uses numerical measures (considered objective) to answer questions or test hypotheses. Thus, these categories of approach result from different philosophical assumptions[11], which shaped the way researchers will construct research problems, produce and analyze information (Ary et al. 2010, 22).

Once the concept of research in education is defined, the following question is: what are the theoretical/epistemological assumptions[12] of this type of research and how is it to be realized? One of these and, undoubtedly, the first presupposition for conducting any research, is the restlessness or dissatisfaction with the explanations given to a certain phenomenon, in this case dealing with the educational field would be the dissatisfaction with the explanations offered for the understanding of the realities inherent in this particular field.

The disquiets or explanatory dissatisfactions with certain phenomena result from different epistemological perspectives, which consequently give rise to different research projects. There are projects that start from the theoretical-methodological assumption that the *real* only makes sense when it becomes *real* thinking, submitted to an abstract and conceptual treatment. In this epistemological perspective, the senses and the experience are considered as obstacles to the reliable knowledge, for the possibility of inducing to the error, not having conditions that assure the knowledge of the reality. The senses are seen as incapable of producing universal information about the real.

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11 Quantitative research originates from positivism, a philosophical view formulated in nineteenth-century Europe. Qualitative research in the educational field gains space in the twentieth century as an alternative to research.

12 It is recurrent in educational research to assume in a non-explicit and uncritical way the theoretical and methodological assumptions that allow the activity of understanding the real. Thus, they "are taken as finished definitions already fully consolidated, which obey formulations canonically defined by the modern process of production of scientific knowledge" (Borba et al. 2008, 13)

Explanatory rationality appears as the only one capable of accounting for reality in opposition to meaningful rationality. In this perspective reason has value in itself and dispenses with any empirical evidence or experience to ensure the explanatory validity of the world, life, and man. "Reason guarantees knowledge about the real, because it protects knowledge from the misunderstandings of experience, of the deceit of the senses" (Borba et al. 2008, 13).

Other research perspectives argue that experience is the best path to knowledge. For this approach it is fundamental to abolish abstract arguments, proper to the method of deductive argumentation, and seek generalizations through empirical experience or inductive method.

> The concern is with the apprehension of information about life, the world and man himself from the encounter with the objective conditions of life itself, the world itself and man himself. The sure knowledge of reality, therefore, is guaranteed by the information produced in the field of experience, with the aid of the senses (Borba et al. 2008, 13).

Perspectives also seek to reconcile the two previous ones (of reason and experience) as an epistemological alternative. For these, both reason and experience are regarded as conditions without which one does not come to the knowledge of reality. Therefore, one does not exclude the other, but rather, both complement each other.

A second assumption is that research in education should be understood as "action of knowledge", meaning that it must be seen as a historical, social, and theoretical reality and not isolated from the context in which it is produced. This assumption is fundamental to us, since the planning of research only makes sense if we take it into account, because the research problem must have to do with the social context on which the research will be carried out. A decontextualized problem leads to the production of equally decontextualized and consequently irrelevant solutions or responses, where research loses its meaning and relevance in improving people's living conditions. Therefore, knowledge is the main basis for conducting any research, it is no exception in research in education (Borba et al. 2008; Ngoenha 2000).

Still on the (un)contextuality of knowledge, Ngoenha (2000) argues that scientific knowledge is a characteristic of modernity, whose rationality has become the criterion and norm to evaluate all other types of knowledge. In contrast to classical science, modern science, says the author, was not only a mark of the independence and autonomy of man (*sic*), but a landmark

"of the impoverishment of the reflection of man on himself", because he neglected the "world of life" (Ngoenha 2000, 90). Thus, modern reason based on objectivity has not been able to face the problem of subjectivity and human existence, throwing them into the field of irrationality as something denotative.

> The rational model of scientific development that prioritizes the economic application of research is incapable of giving meaning to the world of life and places reason as the only acceptable measure, leading to enslavement of the human being in relation to technology and civilization (Ngoenha 2000).

Research in education must be able to overcome this perspective of the rational model in order to dialogue and value local knowledge as an alternative for building knowledge that makes sense and responds to the concrete needs of people's lives in the contexts in which it is developed.

A third assumption of education research we would like to mention is that education is conceived as a complex phenomenon. This characteristic requires that its study uses several methods and the intersection of knowledge of different disciplines (interdisciplinarity) and concepts (intersectionality). These are just some of the fundamental assumptions of research in education, we would not take account of exploring all of them in this short space.

Regarding the question of how to do research in education, we would say that just as the approaches are diverse, the ways of doing research in education are equally so. The research can be done using qualitative (interviews, direct or indirect observation, participant, questionnaire, etc.) or quantitative methods (statistics, tabulations, samples, equations, etc.) or by combining the former with the latter (Ludwing 2003) .

The place of education research in the debate on the socio-economic development of Mozambique

The concept of socio-economic development is approached from different perspectives. However, the term development is generally related to the achievement of economic and social progress by transforming the state of underdevelopment (low production, stagnation, poverty) into countries designated as "poor" or "developing" (Outhwaite & Bottomore 1996, 197) – as is the case in Mozambique.

The debate on development in Mozambique is predominantly economic, privileges a macro-economic approach, is based on statistical data and little explores the microeconomic dimension of people's daily life, ie little interest in how these decisions affect the concrete life of citizens in order to make it better. In this text, we defend the perspective that looks at development as an improvement of people's concrete living conditions (Ngoenha 2000, 203).

Understood in this way the concept of socio-economic development to offer, we believe that research in education can create huge opportunities, considering this scientific production (in the field of education) as a social production, influenced by socio-historical conditions and renovating the latter. This will lead us to understand that the practice of educational research brings with it the socio-historical reality and, therefore, is called to contribute to the transformation and improvement of it. Thus, research in education can not only be analyzed as products of certain circumstances, but also its results should be evaluated in the light of social needs and objectives (Georgen 1998, 5).

Researches on education and reflection on them should not only point to the positive epistemological characteristics of this field, but above all they must "advance towards the clarification of the connection between scientific practice and life, man's needs and activities. It is important not only to ask what the scientific production was in a given period, but also to determine its relevance to social development" (Georgen 1998, 6).

An example of the relevance of educational research for Mozambique's socio-economic development can be drawn from the argument made by Roland Brouwer, Luís de Brito and Zélia Menete (2010) in the text "Education, vocational training and power", according to which:

> A national education system is one of the long-term investments that most influences the development of a nation, since it guarantees the creation of a national critical mass, reinforcing the values of conscious citizenship and, consequently, the capacity for responsible intervention of the individual and the collectivity in the pursuit of socio-cultural and economic development and environmental sustainability.
>
> The education system also determines the relationship that arises between the citizen and the Government, giving space to a debate around the political questions in a common search for solutions of the problems that the Country faces or, on the contrary, leading to a situation in which the citizen remains silent before his Government, nourishing frustration and revolt.

> To speak, therefore, of a national education system is also to speak of power or its absence, particularly when the educational system does not respond to its essential function, which is to increase the capacity of intervention of its citizens.
>
> This capacity can only be enhanced if the education system increases knowledge in society, enhances citizens' capacity for understanding and reflection, reinforces citizenship values, and creates a culture that promotes competence and the use of knowledge and of wisdom within society.
>
> Therefore, we present in this article an analysis of the evolution of the most important components of the National Education System (SNE), in order to identify and analyze the challenges that this evolution brings to the Country and link this analysis to the type of society we want to build and, consequently, to the educational system that provides the solid foundation needed for this construction. This is the basis for reflecting on alternative ways of thinking about education and thus proposing some issues for debate (Brouwer; Brito & Menete 2010, 273).

What we want to emphasize in relation to this argument is that investing in a national education system that guarantees the creation of a national critical mass, that reinforces the conscience and citizenship, is only possible if we invest in research in education, since this is the only one capable to help identify the elements that are pertinent to the constitution of a system that is consistent with the socio-cultural, economic and political reality of the country as shown very well by the end of the excerpt, when the authors sign that they seek to analyze the evolution of the most important components of the National Education System as a way of identifying its challenges to the country and projecting it to the type of society one wants to build. Therefore, research in education reflects the historical circumstances of its production taking into account the social relevance of its realization as we referred to paragraphs above.

Another aspect to be considered is pointed out by Osório & Cruz e Silva (2008) in discussing the predominance of the class approach in researches in Mozambique, but studies on school and gender have been systematically developed in the last 10 years, providing verification of other forms of inequality. This led to the realization that the school does not question and does not create ruptures in the structure of gender inequality, maintaining the social roles that justify the differences in access to rights by boys and girls, for example.

In this sense, the challenge is to deepen researches on education policy, verifying gender asymmetries and their commitments to the implementation of a strategy of building gender equality, not only in schools,

but throughout the social fabric as a whole, especially in the accountability of the state to elaborate, divulge and apply laws that criminalize gender violence in all spaces (Osório & Cruz e Silva 2008).

Final considerations

The main objective of this work was to reflect on the (im)possibilities of relations between research in education and the socioeconomic development of Mozambique, that is, on the interface between these two concepts. To that end, we assume that the concepts are not self-evident, needing to be explained the meanings they assume for the authors of this work. Thus, we define education research as the application of a scientific perspective in the study of the problems of education (Ary 2010) and socio-economic development as the improvement of people's concrete living conditions (Ngoenha 2000). These are the assumptions from which we formulate our argument that research in education can contribute to socio-economic development only insofar as it is understood as a social production influenced by the socio-historical conditions and renewal of the latter (Georgen 1998) and development as the transformation and improvement of people's living conditions.

The reduction of institutional investments in research and the increasing inflow of external resources condition and shape the research agendas and the production of knowledge, leading the HEIs to a gradual decline, which lives its most seriousness today (Cruz e Silva 2015). This situation affects the objectives for which HEIs were created, especially the production of autonomous, critical, constructive, free and socially committed with the public welfare knowledge, which leads to contribute to an endogenous development project, from the realities and needs of the country and its people. "For education and science to truly occupy a privileged place as engines of change in the process of combating African countries' increasing "vulnerability" to the impacts of global change" (Cruz e Silva 2015, 275), disguised as Salvationist development projects.

Thus, we believe that for education research to contribute to the socio-economic development of Mozambique, it is necessary to invest seriously (in financial and human resources) in this component. It is necessary to create and consolidate an institutional culture of supporting educational research in HEIs, as Tereza Cruz e Silva (2015, 273) points out in her text on "The Place of Social Sciences as a Motor of Change: the Case of Mozambique". We also need to expand the approach on the educational field, which according to Ngoenha

(2000, 199) is limited to the pedagogical explanation and the analysis of the relationship between the government and international donors, "for a theoretical component that has no instantaneous election commitments, neither limiting ideological nor compromise with the past."

Ngoenha (2000, 202) points out that "education was the first sector to lose its own autonomy in terms of policy making". Thus, proposes to rethink the Mozambican educational system in its entirety and in line with the reality of the social fabric, extrapolating the circle of government and international donors. However, it proposes to place it in dialogue with the cultural, economic and political realities, which are its constitutive dimensions, and even if it has the capacity to respond to the improvement of living conditions, to what is attributed "the ambiguous name of development" (Ngoenha 2000, 203).

A coherent educational policy needs to rely on "developmental forces that can intervene", while being open to spontaneous dynamism so as not to frustrate society's expectations, including human, cultural, and axiological aspects that must be decided from the interests of societies themselves.

Universities need to be more realistic, more committed to the development of the nation. Programs must face a double challenge: keeping Mozambique in touch with the world's technical development and responding to the real challenges of Mozambican society (Ngoenha 2000, 218). It is possible to see if this is possible in the face of such deeply antagonistic interests that are in tension in this process.

As we have tried to show, education research can also contribute to the analysis and construction of public education policies more suited to the social, economic and political reality of Mozambique, by examining successful and/ or failed initiatives, as well as by identifying obstacles[13] to achieving national objectives in this sector (Cruz e Silva & Osório 2008, 61; Ngoenha 2000).

Research on the state-of-the-art of education research in Mozambique is required, documenting the trajectory of studies and research in education, informing us about trends and alerting us to epistemological limitations and paradoxes (Gamboa 1998).

Finally, research itself should be seen as a way of educating – education through research. Research in education is not an end in itself, it should contribute to the tripod teaching, research and extension. Therefore, it must be critical in order to empower endogenous development models that meet the real needs of societies to bring liberation back to the agenda of history (Mclaren & Farahmandpur 2002).

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13 Such as gender inequalities that constitute a barrier to national development (Cruz e Silva & Osório 2008, 68).

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ABSTRACT

The word relation suggests a connection, link or bond between one thing and another. In this specific case, this communication proposal intends to discuss the nature of the relationship between education research and socio-economic development from Mozambique. Since independence in 1975, education in Mozambique has been at the top of Governance priorities. Education is seen by the Mozambican government "as a human right and a key instrument for the consolidation of peace, national unity and for the country's economic, social and political development through the formation of citizens with high self-esteem and patriotic spirit" (Plano Estratégico da Educação 2012, 11). In order for education to assume this role, research in this area is fundamental and can be pursued in two ways: one conducted by government agencies, which serves to evaluate the education system and verify what needs to be improved in terms of infrastructure and teacher training, and the other, carried out by researchers and professionals of education, concerning the production of theoretical knowledge that is applied in the various situations of the educational process. However, both ways are interdependent. This communication will focus on the second path, seeking to reflect around issues such as: what is research in education and what does it consist of or how is it done? What are we talking about when we refer to socio-economic development, in the particular case of Mozambique? When did education and socio-economic development come to be thought of as interconnected and/or interdependent concepts? How can research in education contribute to the development of Mozambique? These questions will be answered based on an analysis of the literature on the subject.

KEYWORDS

Research in education; socio-economic development; interfaces; Mozambique.

Translated by Vitória Kramer de Oliveira.

BOOK REVIEW

"A PRESENÇA PORTUGUESA NA GUINÉ. HISTÓRIA POLÍTICA E MILITAR, 1878-1926"

by Armando Tavares da Silva[1]

Carlos Alberto Alves[2]

The author of the book is a member of the Lisbon Geographic Society[3], of the Portuguese Institute of Heraldry[4] and the Society of the Independence of Portugal[5]; a retired professor at the Faculty of Science and Technology from the University of Coimbra, since 2002, when he began research in the area of history. *A Presença Portuguesa na Guiné. História política e militar, 1878-1926* a book with thirty-two chapters, with a preface by Nuno Vieira Matias, President of the Academy of the Portuguese Navy[6], granted the author the "Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation Prize" in 2016, awarded by the Portuguese Academy of History[7].

Armando Tavares da Silva, to facilitate the reading of his historical research, elaborated analytical, onomastic, toponymical, geographical and author indexes; the cartography shows the Portuguese paths through Bissau, Oio, Buba, Geba, Cacheu and Canhabac (Canhambaque); and he reproduces pictures of the ships of the Portuguese Armada that sailed in Guinean waters

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1 Silva, Armando Tavares da. 2016. *A Presença Portuguesa na Guiné. História política e militar, 1878-1926*. S/l: Caminhos Romanos, 972 pages.

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3 In Portuguese, *Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa*.

4 In Portuguese, *Instituto Português de Heráldica*.

5 In Portuguese, *Sociedade da Independência de Portugal*.

6 In Portuguese, *Academia da Marinha Portuguesa*.

7 In Portuguese, *Academia Portuguesa de História*.

at that time, namely Corvettes, Steamboats, Gunboats, Motorboat-Gunboats, Tugboats and Cruisers.

When Guinea became an independent province of Cape Verde in 1879, the secretary of the general government, resident of the island of São Tiago, highlighted the lack of human and material resources, positioning himself against the independent government of Guinea. At the ecclesiastical level, for example, that territory had a reduced number of priests, scarce objects of worship, vestments and implements for the churches; the Catholic ministers in Bolama, Bissau and Cacheu were few and those who carried out the missionary activity were from India and Cape Verde.

In 1892, Guinea became an autonomous military district, with a special administrative and judicial regime. The county of Bolama was the district headquarters and the military commands were in Bissau, Cacheu and Geba. The Caçadores' battalion, which was located in the island of São Tiago in Cape Verde, was sent to Guinea in 1879. At that time, the military garrisons were being remodelled, the troops organized in companies, with barracks in Bolama and in Bissau. The book highlights the presence of the exiles in Guinea, where there was no penal colony, with them being "integrated into the military forces of the provinces" (Silva 2016, 45).

The behavior of the soldiers of the Guinean garrison was disturbing, since the soldiers were mostly "from Angola and the deportees who come from Portugal" (Silva 2016, 125). The investigation highlights Guinea's military reorganization, which envisaged the existence of a military artillery and infantry company, including infantry companies made up of natives, native police corps, native cavalry squad for surveillance, as well as the replacement of European soldiers in the mixed company, due to the difficulties of acclimatization, by soldiers from Angola and Cape Verde, and the creation of military posts in Cacheu, Geba and Farim.

Portugal reinforced the relations with the captive-fulas (*fulas-pretos*), residents in the surroundings of the prison of Geba, considered inferior by the freeborn-fulas (*fulas-forros*); the oath of obedience and fidelity to the Portuguese flag made by the chief of Ganadú, Ambucú, who was responsible for the expulsion of Mussá Moló to the Feridú, led the Portuguese to establish relations with other chiefs and to contact in Bolama the envoys of the chief Buducú, Sylaty Mané, with whom a treaty of vassalage was celebrated. A peace treaty was concluded with the rulers of the Forreá and the Futa Djalon during the expedition against the beafadas of jabadá and against the freeborn-fulas of Cadica; the peace treaty with the regents of the Indorné was concluded at a time when the Portuguese were concerned about the peace treaty with

the ruler of Djeta; the peace treaty between beafadas and fulas lasted a short time, due to the attack of a fula village, by the beafadas of Cubisseque, in 1885, which made the Portuguese occupation of Rio Grande more difficult.

The resistance against the Portuguese authorities and the disagreement between the peoples continued until 1883, when a primary school was created in Bissau. In that village, in 1894, there were moments of great tension, because of the rebellion that took place there, which led to the deportation of some cabin boys. In relation to Xerne Bokar, "for preaching rebellion against our sovereignty, abusing its religious preponderance among Muslims" (Silva 2016, 620), he was deported to São Tome and Principe.

France pressed to occupy areas where the Portuguese administration was not established. In this context, the French occupation of Casamansa provoked incidents with the Portuguese authorities in 1884 and two years later, when Portugal was interested in maintaining influence in the territories it controlled, opposing France. This country was present at the tip of Casamansa and intended to establish a trading post at Selho, on the bank of the river of Zeguinchor, because of the trade and the French presence in Carabane. The Paris Convention, to mark the borders, faced Portuguese opposition. The commissioners of Portugal and France arrived in the territory of Guinea to demarcate the border, after the French incited the people against Portugal "to ensure the transfer of Portuguese Guinea to them without great cost" (Silva 2016, 238). The negotiations were held at a time when trade and agriculture went through difficulties.

Despite the incidents caused by the demarcation of the borders with the neighboring territories of Guinea, in 1888 and ten years later, France remained uninterested, because it intended to occupy Zenguichor, so that the Casamansa River would be under its tutelage, in order to establish a military post in Componi, to serve as a communications base with Cadé, in Futa Djalon. The demarcation of borders was resumed in 1902, since the French delegation did not show up in the previous year, as it was established, "claiming the existence of a raging epidemic of yellow fever in Senegal" (Silva 2016, 449). The southern and eastern borders were delimited in 1903 "through exchange of diplomatic notes" (Silva 2016, 449), but the border demarcation between Casamansa and the Cacheu River in 1904 allowed the evaluation of the Cacheu and Casamansa rivers to be the dividing line, in accordance to the Convention of 1886, signed between France and Portugal.

Abdul Injai, a former travelling merchant from Senegal, was arrested for having slaughtered papeis, in Bór, in April 1906. After being deported to S. Tomé, Abdul Injai was authorized by the Portuguese king, in October

1907 (Silva 2016, note 20, 663), to return to Guinea, where complaints piled up against him – he died in January 1921 in Praia, Cape Verde, where he was considered deported "in transit to Mozambique" (Silva 2016, 752). *Abdul Injai, a conquista portuguesa e o levante de 1919 na Guiné- Bissau: manifestação pública de um discurso oculto,* theme of the graduation monograph presented at the Department of History of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, 2016, with 62 pages, by Michelle Sost dos Santos, analyzes the relationship between Abdul Injai and the Portuguese, who according to Michelle dos Santos contributed to the weakening of some groups of the Guineas, such as the balantas, the papeis, the mandingas, the manjacos, among others. Michelle Sost dos Santos, on page 54 of her investigation, concluded that "in the first moment, Abdul Injai saw in the alliance with the Portuguese representatives a means of gaining power in the region, to become lord of the territory".

The Guinean League was created in a natives' assembly of Guinea, in Bissau. The statutes were approved in 1910 and five years later the League was dissolved for not allowing "the pacification of the province" (Silva 2016, 653). In 1911, the Statutes of the Cacheu Republican Education Center and the approval of the indigenous labor regime were presented, in a time when the Portuguese in Guinea did not have sufficient financial means: "Would the Republic resolve these issues now?" (Silva 2016, 595). The increase in taxes on tobacco and alcohol, as well as the imposition of a hut tax of $500 escudos, were measures taken to cover the excess expenditures resulting from the increase in the salaries of civil servants in Guinea, which after an alteration of the administrative division, in 1916, came to include the municipalities of Bolama and Bissau: the constituencies of Geba, based in Bafatá; Farim, Cacheu and Buba, based in Xitoli; Cacine and Bijagós, based in Bubaque; Brames, based in Bula; Costa de Baixo, based in Canchungo; Balantas, based in Encheia.

The first Republic (1910-1926) implemented measures to allow the access of Guinean natives to education, health and justice; the creation of the primary school in the indigenous district of Bissau, as well as the creation of Bolama, Bafatá and Canchingo arts and crafts schools to graduate locksmiths, turners, metal smelters, smiths, boilers, tinkers, drivers, firemen, carpenters, woodworkers, masons, tailors, cobblers, seamen, shipbuilders, caulkers, and farmers.

The Portuguese occupation of Guinea was made possible by the Canhambaque campaign, in 1925, and by operations in the Felupes region, in 1933, in the midst of the Portuguese Estado Novo, an anti-communist,

anti-democratic, anti-liberal, authoritarian and colonialist political regime, deposed in 1974. The reduction of civil districts in half, in 1926, sought to reduce the temporary staff, to reduce expenses, at a time when there were two currents that wanted "the rule of Guinea" and that would "now manifest itself openly" (Silva 2016, 819).

The book gathers immense information deposited in the Portuguese Archives; highlighting the feats of the protagonists, be the Guineans, Portuguese or French. This is undoubtedly a study that assists in finding clues for future researches and also to better understand the Portuguese and French presence and the resistance of the local populations of Guinea, the adjacent territories, rivers, islands, archipelagos, capes and cities that are not part of Guinea. This country attracted the attention of several authors, namely René Pélissier, French historian, author of *History of Portuguese Guinea and Africans in Senegambia (1841-1936)*, published in Portugal in 1989 by Editorial Estampa, in two volumes. This is an inescapable study of Portuguese political and military history, as well as of the African resistance during the Portuguese occupation to establish a relationship of power and domination in the West African country that lasted many years.

Received on April 14, 2018.
Approved on June 6, 2018.

Translated by Camila Ayala.

BOOK REVIEW

"A GUERRA CIVIL EM ANGOLA, 1975-2002"

By Justin Pearce[1]

Gilson Lázaro[2]

A guerra civil em Angola, 1975-2002[3], as was the book published on April 2017 in Portugal by the South-African journalist and researcher Justin Pearce, whose original edition in English presents a diametrically opposed title – *Political identity and conflict in Central Angola, 1975-2002* with double edition in United States of America and in South Africa by the Cambridge University Press. The translation published two years later is interesting to the Portuguese-speaking reader and makes for a pleasant read. The book cover is ostensive, featuring a vibrant red that seeks to antagonize the black rooster symbol of UNITA and the black and yellow star symbol of MPLA. In this edition, differing from the original, the black and yellow star overlaps the black rooster. Its purpose has not gone unnoticed, because the book cover and the gesture of overlapping the political symbols of the two rival movements, besides the colors and title, seems to clash with the content.

The book is the result of some dozens interviews of the author in the Central Plateau of Angola region, with its notably unpretentious original edition featuring on the cover the photography of a former fighter of UNITA in an ex-military area situated in the Bié province, whilst the back cover brings comments of reputable academics of Angola topics[4].

In the Portuguese edition the choice to alter the book title to *A guerra civil em Angola, 1975-2002,* not being this the central focus of the study has the whimsy of misleading the less attentive reader. In a book divided in nine chapters, Justin Pearce dives into the conflict history to question the identities and the political support of the various Angolan social segments to the two warring movements, namely the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA[5]) and People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA[6]). The symmetry established by the author when analyzing the two rival movements throughout the armed conflict, with a focus on the Central Plateau, seems somewhat forced.

Differing from Rafael Marques, the preface author, who was unrestrained in his exaggerated enthusiasm, the author is careful in regards to the temptation of uttering categorical affirmations on the history of the Angolan conflict and its internal and external dynamics. There is not a single mention of the consequences of the heavy colonial inheritance on that which concerns the identity cleavages and constructs.

A first exaggerated commentary from his preface writer is the excerpt where he tries to suggest the pioneering of Justin Pearce on the study of this topic. Such is the importance of the mistake that it is worth highlighting, in first place, the book *The normality of civil war: armed groups and everyday life in Angola*, by Teresa Koloma Beck and the collection *Dynamics of Social Reconstruction in post-war Angola*, Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, 2016. The second mention is of a methodological order, because previously Teresa Beck had held with former combatants of UNITA, shortly after 2002, an investigation on something she designated as *the social engineering project* created by this political-military Angolan organization. The third mention that Marques make about the author's primacy, manifested by the attention granted to the narratives of common citizens, is another half-truth, because when it proved necessary Justin Pearce resorted to UNITA notables to confirm or deny a given situation or information. The division between the pros and cons that the author makes about the interventions of his informants can confirm this perception.

The preface tone reveals that its author is not familiarized with the debate about the Angolan conflict. Such an unrestrained enthusiasm can also be verified on the comment by Ricardo Oliveira on the flap of the book. Being this the only comment of the original maintained in the Portuguese edition, it seems excessive.

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5 Portuguese acronym, *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola.*

6 Portuguese acronym, *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola.*

Actually, Justin Pearce seems to deepen his interest on the identity nuances already linked to UNITA in his first book "*An outbreak of Peace: Angola's situation of confusion*". In an article co-written with Didier Peclard, though, entitled "*L'UNITA à la recherche de 'son peuple'* [The UNITA searching for its people], they work the emic notion of "UNITA people" to explain the strategy woven by the movement founded by Jonas Savimbi to mobilize and articulate the populations that accompanied them, although this seems problematic to us when it is used to explain the identity confluence of a region as complex as is the Central Plateau. This is stressed by the first interview, opening the book, when his anonymous interlocutor, bluntly responds that: "I have been a member of UNITA, but I am now a member of the government" (Pearce 2017, 23). The ambiguity of this answer carries a holistic interest. Under a certain sense people mix up political identity with ethnic and regional policy.

An aspect that seems crucial to us in Pierce's book is that, in the first pages, the author works with the notion of *rebels* applied to UNITA, to further on use it to refer to both UNITA and its rival MPLA, "the conflict politics became a constitutive element of different and incompatible versions of the Angolan nation" (Pearce 2017, 39). It seems to us to be problematic the use of the terminology *rebels,* in regards to UNITA.

In chapter one, the author portrays the antecedents of the independence, the beginning of the armed conflict and a tension between the mutually exclusive Portuguese and Angolan narratives can be clearly noted, and therefore a certain uneasiness of the author is perceived. Examples are the excerpts in which Justin Pearce cleverly avoids an analysis of the drama of the anticolonial war, which opposed the Portuguese armed forces to the national liberation movements, for he fell for the *paternalist discourse* of the time, verifiable in the utilization of the cliché of the badly managed *decolonization a la Portuguese* without granting it a critical exam. The author seems to accept the half-truths that can be found in a certain Portuguese historiographical literature. And in this in particular he uses the term *Portuguese revolution* (Pearce 2017, 44) or, before that, *the Portuguese departure* (Pearce 2017, 37) in an euphemistic tone.

More relevant than this is the acceptance of the discourse that subordinates the independence of Angola to the April 25th of 1974. The criticism made to the hegemonic Cold War narrative imposes itself, in our understanding and in an extensive form, to the myths surrounding the April 25th of 1974, because the independence of Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique were obtained through much bloodshed on all cases. If it is true that the contribution of the events of colonial Portugal is recognized (especially the April 25th of 1974) to the course of history in the former colonies, the inverse is also true, although,

ultimately, the April 25th is more a result of the pressure of the military theater in the former colonies than the contrary.

The chapters III and IV are dense, but the limitation demonstrated in the use of the notion of state constrains the analysis, because the confinement to which the author relegates the *UNITA State* and the *MPLA State,* to the geographical margins of the cities in the Central Plateau, is problematic. In an interpretation opposed to that of the author, we understand that UNITA did not work with a territory-based notion of State. Unlike the MPLA-controlled conventional state that sought to maintain the colonial boundaries, UNITA moved from the idea of an *imagined community,* in the words of Benedict Anderson (2009), that could work both in the cities, on rural zones – said liberated – and in the woods. The Jamba, as a community imagined by UNITA and its last stronghold or *community of suffering* (Ferrão, 2016) – a quasi-state – is an example of this. On the other hand, the problematic of racial identities in the late 1950s and early 1960s colonial context, that enabled the foundation of UNITA and MPLA, didn't receive any mention. Justin Pearce skirts this question and attempts to homogenize the Plateau picking as focus the educated black class and the rural populations that accompanied them.

In chapter III it was interesting to observe the form in which Pearce discusses the demystification of UNITA's *long march,* although he seems sensitive to the discursive performance of this organization regarding the fact it is self-defined as a defender of the peasantry's interests. Throughout the chapter the author perceives the ambiguities of the UNITA discourse, presenting dual justifications to mobilization of the instructed classes (pastors, priests, nurses, professors, administrative technicians, and mission's students) of the plateau's cities and villages, when at the same time it claimed to be the trustee of the rural-based militancy. In this in particular we understand that the notion of peasantry did not deserve from the author a discussion for the reality would not grant it plausibility. The two chapters referred above reinforce in the level of the analysis the bipolarity of the Angolan conflict, but it becomes equally evident the fragility of this scheme as an analytical category when it tries to avoid the traps of the *political identities,* unstable according to the circumstances in the course of the civil war. In the scheme elaborated in the book it is difficult to escape the identitary-political confinement associated to the two liberation movements, as people that lived in the zones under control of both movements had no other options to choose from. Such premise does not escape and seems to us quite coherent with the ethnical classification of the Angolan nationalism produced by the North-American historian John Marcum (1969), that long time ago paved all the historical-political interpretation of contemporary nationalism and has since been a straightjacket for researchers of Angola topics. Despite the author's

justifications, an arbitrary presentation of the interviewees' profiles is noted, not being perceived the choices that based the omission, the replacement for fictitious names and the revelation, in other cases, of the real names. Because of this, the affirmation presented in the preface (Pearce 2017, 9) is in a collision route with the content, because the author differs from his preface writer when we take into account the choice made by him in chapter V, which portrays the trajectory of UNITA in the Central Plateau between the years of 1976 and 1991. The accounts of the interviewees are themselves an individual form of recollection, of dealing with the memories of what happened in the past and that which is chosen to be remembered. The memories aren't free of manipulations, voluntary or not. In fact, the act of remembering certain episodes and not others, more traumatic ones, is in itself an exercise of choice. The recurrent use of the verbs *to remind*, *to remember* and *to reminisce* catches the eye, when facts reported by the respondents are presented, as well as a hierarchical position between the interviewees. The bonds of kinship beyond the geographical locus of the interviewees, as well as their areas of belonging and residence don't seem to have deserved the author's attention when analyzing the identities.

When studying the ideological question, Justin Pearce seems to have neglected this important identity marker in a context of war where the identity borders are blurred. The line that separates a military from a civilian is precarious. A certain imprecision in the use of the notions of *farmer* and *peasant* is also noted. An adequate concept treatment would assist in orienting the reader to the meaning that the author intended to transmit. In chapter VI, the author concentrates in the accounts of his interlocutors to describe the UNITA stronghold located in southeast Angola, a *quasi-state*, mixing in many an occasion propaganda and reality. The lack of alternative sources of information that would allow to the presentation of a more factual Jamba image constrains the analysis.

In chapters VII and XVIII the analyses focus in the 1990s to explain the operation of UNITA and MPLA in the Central Plateau so-called *cities*. In fact, the cities to which the author refers are the administrative centers of Huambo, Cuíto and Bailundo and little more. The war effectively happened in the spaces between the *vila* – usually the administrative and urban center and the surrounding villages, where the borders that separate the urban from the rural or from the *wood* zones are fragile and vary greatly, depending on the local perceptions.

Chapter IX ends the discussion on the final dynamics in some of the epic moments that the war created. It narrates, however, the forms of military recuperation of the national territory carried out by the national army, UNITA's fragilities and loss of military strength, and the death of its founder, as well as the initiatives assumed by military entities that culminated with the signing of the Luena memorandum, marginalizing the civilian actors. In the last chapter Justin

Pierce does not only appreciate the initiatives of religious (COIEPA, Jubileu 2000, Pro-Peace, CICA and others) and civic (Civic Association of Angola and others) organizations, but also draws little consequence from his empirical corpus when analyzing the national reconciliation, relying more on his own impressions about those days' political context than in the accounts of his interviewees.

Despite what was stated above, Justin Pearce's book has the merit of provoking a debate on political and other identities in the context of war both inside and outside Angola.

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BOOK REVIEW

"POLÍTICA EXTERNA NA ÁFRICA AUSTRAL: GUERRA, CONSTRUÇÃO DO ESTADO E ORDEM REGIONAL"

by Igor Castellano da Silva[1]

Camila Santos Andrade[2]

It's noticeable, in recent years, that there was an increase in Brazilian academic interest for Africa, stimulated, largely, by the strengthening of the political and economic relations between Brazil and the African continent in the governments of the beginning of 21st century. The papers that were born into this movement seek to describe, to understand and, beyond that, to avoid African stereotypes, as poverty, hunger and conflict. In this sense, the book *Política Externa na África Austral* approaches a subject of strategic, economic and political relevance, presenting African states as agents of their own regional interactions.

Aiming to analyze Southern Africa foreign policy role from the patterns of cooperation and conflict in Southern Africa, the author utilizes a systemic perspective (including international, regional and domestic factors) to understand the reality which took place between the years of 1975 and 2015. In order to understand this goal, the book is divided in three parts. The first part, which covers chapters 1, 2 and 3, presents a theoretical discussion that leads to the subject of analysis. Aspects as the New Regionalism, Foreign Policy Analysis, the debate among the International Relation theories and the structure of the unities are remarkable points of the discussion. In addition,

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the structure itself of the unities, which have particular interests that drive their actions in the system, is analyzed by Silva through the power transition theory, presenting factors to exemplify the agency beyond power distribution, as the systemic order and the evaluation of relevant actors perception.

Fulfilling the theoretical framework, the author utilizes Historical Sociology to comprehend the continuities and changes in the Southern African Regional System. It is important to stress the methodological resources utilized in the present section to, subsequently, build a theoretical and analytical background in the further chapters, either in analytical categories (international and systemic elements), or theories correlation that presents pertinent theoretical elements to the analysis of Southern Africa region, as state building (approaching theoretical resources as State capabilities and the relation between State and Society) and foreign policy analysis (investigating its origins and execution, particularly the role played by the elites in the definition of foreign policy).

The second part of the book, which covers chapters 4, 5 and 6, focuses on the dynamics of cooperation and conflict in Southern Africa. Utilizing the historical perspective mentioned above, it is possible to observe that the construction process of the South-African state was developed in parallel to the region's construction process, generating the reflex of its internal structure in the regional order. Besides that, one notices the massive presence of extra regional powers in Southern Africa between 1975 and 2015, which illustrates the international system dynamics impact on regional scenario.

The third part of the book is constituted by case studies of South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe, countries selected for being regarded as relevant regional agents for the analysis, being possible to see how the author connects the theoretical resources from the first part of the book (from the analytical categories presented in the first part of the book) with the African reality (from the case studies), evidencing the construction challenge those States with weak/unstructured state capabilities, fruit of colonial period, faced. Furthermore, in this section, the cited countries' historical intersections are more noticeable, that is, as the internal unfolding affects the regional dynamics and vice versa, influencing African elites' decision making.

In this context, South Africa stands out as a key country to understand the notion of state-building in Southern Africa. From the analysis of transformations in patterns of conflict and cooperation, it is possible to understand the connection between South Africa's state-building and the reflection of its domestic process in regional dynamics. In addition, it is

noticed how the countries in the region orbit around South African interests, because of its economic (industrial and mining activities developments), infrastructural and geostrategic primacy, evidencing its regional power role.

Angola, on its turn, rises as the second regional power, with an oscillating participation in the region because of internal conflicts between the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA[3]) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA[4]), central groups in domestic politics. Attracted by strategic interests, the domestic conflict in Angola was influenced by South African and Cuban presences (intermediate powers), in addition to United States, Soviet Union and China (global powers). One point to remark is the Angolan foreign policy for the region, supporting the independence of Namibia (which would prevent external interferences in its borders) and interacting with the African National Congress (ANC) to affect UNITA.

Therefore, since the independence of Namibia corresponded to the interests of Angola and South Africa, the country became an independent territory in 1990, with a political project based in internal stability and external integrity. With the fragility of an independent country, the Namibian state resembles regionally the countries which rely on South Africa influence (economically and commercially), with strategic sites such as the Walvis Bay port.

Causing concerns to South African policies to the region (in an attempt to maintain the order to its favor), Zimbabwe plays the role of a revisionist country. From strategic interests, this state has in its history the struggle against colonialism and the support to its neighbors in internal matters, such as the unfolding of the conflicts in Mozambique and the support to ANC in South Africa. With Mugabe's ascension to power, Zimbabwe became a bigger challenge to South Africa, either as a contention attempt of a multiracial society, or the proximity of a socialist regime in its borders.

Mozambique, directly influenced by South Africa's internal dynamics and by the support of the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO[5]) (opposition to the group in power, Mozambique Liberation Front – FRELIMO[6]), faced a number of processes to restore its state capabilities. Through this process, the Mozambican decision-making focus was in the resolution of the internal conflict and in a bigger independence in relation to South-African interests, thus diversifying its partnerships.

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3 Portuguese acronym, *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*.

4 Portuguese acronym, *União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola*.

5 Portuguese acronym, *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*.

6 Portuguese acronym, *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*.

The differential of this book is that, in addition to the flawless theoretical discussion in the first part of the work, the author worked with primary and secondary sources, utilizing field research in the African continent, which has furthermore enriched the research. In addition, this kind of study stimulates and becomes a theoretical tool to the study of other African regions, besides pluralizing papers about the Global South, frequently marginalized in the mainstream analysis of International Relations.

The thematic choice to study Southern Africa foreign policy fills the systemic gap of studies of African countries, particularly about this region, and of the very documentation/description of the evolution of the relation between the countries selected by the author to write his research. There are books which discuss separated case studies about some of the cited countries, but *Política Externa na África Austral* deals with a wider range of actors, analytical categories and historical elements in order to understand one of the most dynamic regions in matters of cooperation, conflict, politics, economy and society.

Received on March 3, 2018.
Approved on June 6, 2018.

Translated by Eduardo Marquezin Faustini.

PARTNERS

NERINT

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) was the first center dedicated to the study and research in International Relations in Southern Brazil. It was established in August 1999 at the ILEA/UFRGS aiming the argumentative and innovative study of the main transformations within the post-Cold War international system. Since 2014, it is located at the Faculty of Economics of UFRGS (FCE-UFRGS). In parallel, NERINT has sought ways to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options to consolidate an autonomous international presence for the country, from the perspective of the developing world. Brazil's choice of an "active, affirmative, and proactive diplomacy" at the beginning of the 21st century has converged with projections and studies put forward over numerous seminars and publications organized by NERINT.

An outcome of its activity was the creation of an undergraduate degree on International Relations (2004), ranked the best in Brazil according to the Ministry of Education (2012), and a graduate level program, the International Strategic Studies Doctoral Program (2010). Two journals were also created: the bimonthly Conjuntura Austral and the biannual and bilingual Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations. Thus, besides ongoing research on developing countries, NERINT is also the birthplace of undergraduate and graduate programs, not to mention its intense editorial activities.

CEBRAFRICA

The Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) has its origins in Brazil-South Africa Studies Centre (CESUL), a program established in 2005 through an association between the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG), of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its research activities are developed in cooperation with the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT).

In March 2012, CESUL was expanded into CEBRAFRICA in order to cover the whole of Africa. At the same time, the South Africa series, which published five books, was transformed into the African Series, with new titles. The centre's main objectives remain the same as before: to conduct research, to support the development of memoires, thesis and undergraduate works, to congregate research groups on Africa, to organize seminars, to promote student and professor exchanges with other institutions, to establish research networks and joint projects with African and Africanist institutions, to publish national and translated works on the field, and to expand the specialized library made available by FUNAG.

The numerous research themes seek to increase knowledge of the African continent and its relations to Brazil on the following topics: International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations, and Schools of Thought. CEBRAFRICA counts among its partners renowned institutions from Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Senegal, Cape Verde, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Portugal, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, India, and China. Current researches focus on "Brazilian, Chinese, and Indian Presence in Africa", "Africa in South-South Cooperation", "African Conflicts", "Integration and Development in Africa", "African Relations with Great Powers", and "Inter-African Relations".

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1. The Brazilian Journal of African Studies publishes articles and book reviews;

2. The journal is divided in two sections: Articles (Artigos) and Book Review (Resenhas);

3. The research articles must contain a maximum of 50 thousand characters (including spaces and footnotes). Use only the standard format; the book reviews must contain a maximum of 4,5 thousand characters (spaces and footnotes included);

4. The footnotes should be of a substantive and complementary nature;

5. The bibliography must follow the rules of the Chicago system (Author-date or note-bibliography), specifying the used literature at the end of the text;

6. Contributions must be original and unpublished and can be submitted in Portuguese, English or Spanish;

7. Contributions must contain the full name of the author, their titles, institutional affiliation (the full name of the institution) and an email address for contact;

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2. Submitted files must be in Microsoft Word, OpenOffice or RTF (as long as their size is up to 2MB) format.

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