TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN SECURITY & DEFENSE: BRAZIL’S PRESENCE IN AFRICA

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Introduction³

This article aims at reviewing the dynamics of foreign relations between Brazil and Africa, especially in terms of technical cooperation in Security & Defense⁴.

Pari passu with the increase of foreign action, in a multipolar and asymmetric international environment, Brazil has been taking the role of prominent emerging country and has been seeking to participate in a more active way in the global security agenda. In this sense, its strategic surroundings constitute a priority area, where the country takes technical-military cooperation initiatives, such as military exchanges, Defense agreements and actions for peace enforcement and maintenance under the aegis of the United Nations⁵. Such actions can be conformed as tools

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³ According to a recent orientation by The Scientific Electronic Library Online (SCIELO/ FAPESP), the kind of participation of each author is specified as follows: author 1 took part in the conception of the research, in data collection, analysis and interpretation, as well as in the preliminary and final version of the text. Author 2 participated in the conception of the research, critical review and final version of the text.
⁴ For a better understanding of the term Defense, we suggest the conceptual analysis of Rudzit et Nogami (Rudzit and Nogami 2010). As for the term Security and its wider definition, we suggest works such as that of (Buzan and Hansen 2012).
⁵ Authors understand the actions taken in the scope of the United Nations as technical cooperation, as pointed out by (Valler Filho 2007) and ambassador (Soares 2015), in lectures
of Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP) to achieve the country’s insertion in the international scenario, as seen in the political (MD (Ministério da Defesa) 2012c) and strategic (MD (Ministério da Defesa) 2012a) planning as well as in public communication of the state to Brazilian society (MD (Ministério da Defesa) 2012b).

Africa is part of the Brazilian strategic surroundings, which is why it receives so much attention from state planning (Kenkel 2013; Gabrielli 2010; Acioly and Moraes 2011; Teixeira da Silva, Oliva Neto, and Torre 2014; Coutinho 2014), and why it has been increasingly considered as part of the national research agenda, especially in the area of Security & Defense (S&D) (Migon et al. 2014; Visentini, Pereira, and Migon 2014; Aguilar 2013; Pereira and Migon 2014; Martins, n.d.; Kenkel 2013). It is a strategic space with future perspectives (Ahlers, Kohli, and Sood 2013; Cilliers, Hughes, and Moyer 2011) and potential consequences for Brazil (Abdenur and Neto 2014). In terms of the S&D dynamics, it is important to consider that the region was hit as no other by the transformations of the world economy and politics6, reason why the issue of security has become of primary importance for the continent (Penna Filho 2004b; Freitas and Araújo 2014) and even for the southern Atlantic space as a whole (Vaz and Migon 2013; Coutinho 2014).

In this sense, the worsening of the economic crisis and the withdrawal of international support to some regimes have resulted in a boost in African conflicts and the deepening of its economic crisis. With the escalation of these crises and with the almost live television broadcasts, the international community was forced to respond. The African situation was particularly affected by the deliberate retreat both by the United States and by former colonial Metropolitan states. Therefore, some of these responses are closely related to S&D, to the point that many of them have been taken as actions of Military Diplomacy.

This work intends to approach the actions of the Brazilian state in terms of technical cooperation for Security & Defense included in its agenda for the African continent. We will initially make a brief explanation of our scientific-methodological perspective, after which we will present aspects of the Brazil-Africa relations and of the African continent security agenda. In the end, the technical cooperation actions for Security & Defense will be analyzed in light of the agenda of the researched geographic space.

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6 Particularly in the post-Cold War period, as acknowledged by (Penna Filho 2004a; Visentini 2013a)
Epistemological and methodological considerations

The scientific perspective taken transversally in this research was Complexity theory (Waldrop 1992; Mitchell 2009). It means that it is understood, on the first place, that the object of analysis displays the characteristics of a “complex system” (Newman 2009), that is, a reality with multiple actors, who interact and improve their behavior and decisions throughout time, making it difficult to establish direct and deterministic relationships of cause and effect. In other words, we suggest that the analysis of a complex reality should take into account not only the actors themselves, but also their relationships, including in terms of its dynamics throughout time.

In epistemological terms, it is about an effort to find a more encompassing view of social phenomena, going beyond the study of parts and seeking a better overall understanding. It seems to be the most adequate perspective when we (re)remember that social phenomena have a vast diversity of structures, interactions and agents and that from their inter-relationship emerge structures, learning, actions and reaction dynamics, changing processes etc. As a consequence, we verify that the reality of the complex systems cannot be described by a single rule, nor reduced to a single level of explanation.

More than a theory of the natural sciences, the possibilities of interpretation and the philosophic-scientific consequences of the paradigm that establishes that the whole is more than a sum of the parts offers the opportunity of a new world-view to a vast array of scientific areas, especially in the case of this article, to the Humanities and Applied Social Sciences (Byrne 1998; Bousquet 2009; Richardson, Mathieson, and Cilliers 2000; Richardson and Cilliers 2001).

In methodological terms, this is a qualitative research, supported by a systematic review of bibliographic and documentary references, which have been objects of qualitative content analysis (Bardin 1977). The time frame has not been rigid, but most attention was dedicated to the 20th and 21st centuries. The place of analysis was fixed as Brazil and its strategic places of interest in Africa, which is in a way a very wide a concept but allows for connecting different perspectives such as that of South Atlantic and that of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), for example.
Brazil-Africa relations

Brazil's relations with the African continent are relevant in terms of Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP) and Brazilian Defense Policy (Corrêa 2014), although, when a larger time frame is observed, it becomes imperative to emphasize that Brazil-Africa rapprochement shows more contours of discontinuity and alternation than continuity and progression, as one can conclude from the retrospective made available by Amorim Neto (2011). Such relations benefit from shared aspects, such as a colonial past, and from different points of arrival, such as Brazil's rise as a major economy with a medium power status and a different situation in the case of African countries.

Between the 16th and 19th centuries, there were strong links connecting Brazil and Africa, such as slave trade, which made Brazil the “second African nation”. After some time, and with the end of the slave trade, these ties would cease to exist. From the independence of African states, which happened especially throughout the 20th century, Brazil resumed this rapprochement, reaching its peak many years later (VISENTINI, 2013b).

Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy made an effort to internationalize Brazil and take it closer to new actors, having been planned during the Vargas and Kubitschek governments. From 1967, Brazil's African policy gained consistency. So, the Costa e Silva and Médici governments formulated a strategy for a Brazilian insertion in Africa in a politically independent way, which is exemplified by Brazilian recognition of Angola's independence (O. D. A. Melo, n.d.). Especially through economic and commercial partnerships (Santana 2003; V. D. S. de Melo 2011), Brazil-Africa relations acquire relevance as national foreign action.

During the 1970s, there was a certain degree of universality which allowed for Sub-Saharan Africa to be integrated to national strategic interests, a period that became known as Brazil's “Responsible Pragmatism”. During the 1980s, the constant economic crises that struck Brazil discouraged the momentum of the rapprochement with Africa, which was left with no more than the remaining spaces of the national agenda, a situation reversed on the following decades (Migon and Santos 2013). On the beginning of the 1990s, the rise of neoliberalism inaugurated a new phase of distance in the relations with Africa. On that time, the strategic view of the Washington Consensus followed by Brazilian elite attributed more importance to North-South relations than to South-South relations, keeping Africa in a secondary place (Santana 2003)(Visentini 2013b, 92).

During Itamar Franco's government (1992-1994), there was
again a sort of articulation with the African continent, an action of chancellors Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Celso Amorim. At that time, some countries were prioritized in terms of diplomatic efforts, such as South Africa, Angola and Nigeria. In 1993, the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) was reactivated and there was support for the reconstruction of some African countries through the participation in Peacekeeping Operations, especially in Angola (Coutinho 2014; Vaz and Migon 2013; C. O. Ribeiro 2008). More concrete cooperation initiatives with a security agenda appeared from then.

Still modest in the following government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), Africa’s place in Brazilian Ministry of External Relations counted with relevant initiatives and a relative change on FHC’s second mandate. From 1995, Brazilian Armed Forces participated in a more robust way on peacekeeping missions in Angola (UNAVEM III) and Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (Nasser 2012; Oliveira Junior and Góes 2010; Lannes 1998; Freitas and Araújo 2014).

It could be observed that the Brazil-Africa relationship has gone through moments of varying intensity. It could also be considered that Africa’s emergence in Brazil’s Ministry of External Relations happened when Brazil was focusing on its own internal problems and its development limitations, especially until the end of the last century. Until then, there was a prevalence of a rapprochement with South America and the appreciation of the terrestrial stand. As a consequence of political and economic stability, allied to Lula’s government’s vision, a resuming of African ties took place under the axis of the “South-South dialogue”. Such rapprochement was established under the incentive of a political stand and economic component, having been initially more focused on commercial trade itself than on the economic development of African partners (Migon and Santos 2013; Rizzi et al. 2011).

With its initial success and the increase of reciprocated awareness, the rapprochement dynamics was spilt to other sectors, such as partnerships in the area of healthcare, education, agriculture and security and defense. Territorial proximity, language convergence and a greater cultural similarity facilitated the option for Africa in Brazilian foreign relations. Many characteristics of Africa drove the attention of the Brazilian government, particularly from the time of Lula as president, who expanded the country’s relations with Africa as part of his logic of a Logistic State (Cervo and Lessa 2010). The existence of a promising consumer market, the lack of services, the need for infrastructure and the availability of workers constitute some of the examples of aspects that motivated growing interest from the Brazilian government.
There was a considerable increase on the amount of government action, which included presidential diplomacy, without, however, effectively integrating such reality to the formal national policies and strategies, especially in the area of security and defense. However, there were some initiatives in this sector, which will be approached in the current paper.

The African Security Agenda

As we have seen, Africa was one of the most affected regions of the world by the recent shifts in world economy and politics. Until the end of the Cold War, there was still a political and strategic interest in the continent, which raised hopes of resolution for the region’s problems. Subsequently, such interest decayed and the continent was left to its own devices, entangled in an almost generalized insolvency situation. The security issue then became of utmost importance. Given the state of deep political and economic uncertainty, African states could not solve its issues through institutional negotiation. Thus, a political crisis composed of destabilizing elements led to the employment of violent means of resolution, often bringing instability to a whole region (Penna Filho 2004b).

This context’s immediate consequences were disastrous for the African security agenda. It was characterized by the interference of neighbor countries on internal conflicts, the destruction of the continent’s already weakened economic structure, environmental devastation, death, huge population displacements, poverty perpetuation, low level of development of productive forces and an increase in the large gap between Africa and the developed world. One could state, thus, that the rise in African conflicts in the 1990 decade was clearly associated to the end of the Cold War.

At the same period, the international security studies’ concepts expanded in scope. Such concepts had emerged from post-World War II studies that discussed ways of protecting states against internal and external threats. Although difficult to define concisely, these studies focused on four structuring axes: a state-centered approach, the analysis of both external and internal threats, the expansion of security beyond the use of strength and the military dimension and the linkage between threats, dangers and urgency (Buzan and Hansen 2012).

After the collapse of the “real socialism” and the fall of the Berlin wall, along with the advance in the globalization process, the interest for anything related to Africa sunk. Naturally, the superpower involvement in African affairs typical of the world power balance fell brusquely. Africa’s situation only deteriorated with the worsening economic crisis and the withdrawal
of international support to some regimes. Such a complex scenario, that transcended the military field, validated the expanded concept of security brought up after the end of the Cold War.

The escalation of civil wars, the widespread ethnic killings, and the live transmissions made by CNN made urgent a response by the international community. It was carried through within the United Nations system, with the creation of numerous peace missions and a rise in humanitarian aid, developed by UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In fact, the UN’s participation in peacekeeping missions (with the employment of troops) in Africa rose from five cases in 1988 to its triple in 1994. The missions’ economic expenditure is also revealing: the values went from US$ 230 million in 1988 to US$ 3.6 billion in 1994 (Penna Filho 2004b). However, despite the role enacted by the United Nations in the continent, the results were not very encouraging. In fact, better results were not possible due to the way the UN executed the missions and the complexity of the conflicts, which generally had multiple and associated causes.

Africa shows a complex security structure (E. de B. Ribeiro 2010; Escorrega 2010; Santos 2011). Besides UN intervention, some African leaders tried another practice of conflict resolution. In this sense, regional African organizations, like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), implemented collective security measures. Since the end of the 1980s, Western Africa was strongly affected by internal conflicts with third party countries interference, which conferred them a much more complex scenario. The civil war in Liberia7 launched yet another model for conflict resolution which up to then had only been used in the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, executed under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS) and sponsored by the United States, in a very different context.

Therefore, considering the developed countries’ lack of interest for African affairs, regional leaders were impelled to seek solutions to the local challenges. Regionalism, in its security dimension, emerged as a viable solution for the entire African continent and for most peripheral regions of the world experiencing conflict. Such facts have arisen as the constitution of regional forces could become an extremely useful element for political stability and regional peace (Buzan and Wæver 2003).

Once created, regional security schemes relieved the economic burden related to military expenditures that relied upon a few states, decreased the possibilities of coups d’état, and rapidly became inhibitors to violent

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7 Liberia is a small-proportioned state - 111,369 km2 and 2.7 millions inhabitants – and singular in African history for having been a pole of attraction to North American former slaves.
seizure of power by rebel political or ethnic groups. Furthermore, for the coming into effect of an international force which would have, for example, a greater knowledge of the local reality and a greater speed to take action, one of the requirements was a relatively long time for operationalization, which was often mentioned as one of the biggest obstacles of United Nations peace missions.

However, extremely sensitive issues arose when considering the creation of regional forces for interventions of any kind. Such a measure might have an opposite effect to the desired one, since it could raise suspicions against the action of regional powers, fueling differences and creating a climate conducive to regional instability. In addition, there were a number of other aspects pertinent to the theme, that generally were not considered when intervention actions took place. One was the question of the legitimacy of intervention: under what conditions can a regional organization intervene in a given country? Furthermore, what makes this intervention legitimate? The first intervention sponsored by an African regional grouping occurred on 24 August 1990 with the deployment of troops from the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in order to try to contain the crisis in Liberia. ECOMOG, the military component of ECOWAS, was employed on two more occasions: in an attempt to resolve conflicts in Sierra Leone (1997) and in Guinea-Bissau (1998).

In consideration of all these obstacles, bilateral and/or multilateral initiatives have been seen as good solutions to optimize the complex security agenda of the African continent. Brazil, for reasons already explained, was able to take advantage, in both the bilateral and multilateral plans, and intervene in the security agenda of the African continent, which was part of its strategic environment. These initiatives will be dealt with in the next section.

Technical Cooperation in Security & Defense: Brazil’s presence in Africa

With the rise of decolonization in the 1960s, armed conflicts broke out in search for the political independence of the colonized societies of the African continent. Such disputes have provoked destabilization in the region, as seen previously. As a result of this process, a greater number of national states emerged, increasing the participation of Africa in the international system.

Brazilian participation in Africa’s agenda has occurred for about five

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8 ECOMOG was a multilateral Armed Force, composed of ECOWAS member states. For more information, the authors suggest consulting Berman and Sams (2000).
decades based on a national strategy approach, rather than on intermittent or opportunistic initiatives. This relates to the fact that Brazilian participation in the continent has remained regardless of which political groups took power. However, it is necessary to emphasize that although constituting strategic long-term actions, the initiatives had some particularities depending on the situational political project. Following this approach, it might be important to highlight the paradigm of the Logistic State, in which the economic aspects of the process have been privileged over safety issues (Cervo 2003), a policy that seems to be reversed within the scope of the CPLP, especially in light of the existing proposals in the National Defense Strategy of Brazil (Miyamoto 2009).

However, Security and Defense cooperation initiatives have emerged. In this context, the Brazilian initiative for the establishment of a Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic, ZOPACAS, proposed in the United Nations General Assembly in 1986, deserves to be mentioned. ZOPACAS is composed of 24 countries on both sides of the Atlantic. This initiative sought to expand cooperation in various fields, including defense (Miyamoto 1987). The UN General Assembly formalized the practice through Resolution 41/11, even with the abstention of the United States of America. This mechanism has gained momentum since 2007 with a meeting in Luanda. The process of revitalizing the organization continued during the VII Ministerial Meeting held in Montevideo on January 15, 2013, which approved a statement on international policy issues and a plan of action.

In considering that ZOPACAS should dispense with extra-regional actors to guarantee an environment of peace and cooperation, it became necessary for the region’s states to hold the means needed to guarantee those objectives, precisely in order to minimize the possibility of interference. Under these circumstances, the existence of naval powers adequate for regional actions against neo-traditional threats, as well as the good relationship of Brazilian and Argentine navies, was fundamental. Issues regarding the use of space and the use of the sea were also effectively discussed with the African states. The use of the sea, being of more pragmatic relevance, was debated not only within the context of ZOPACAS, but also, in a broad way, in the sphere of the CPLP, within which the “strategy for the oceans” was launched.

One of the great contributions to the optimization of the African security agenda took place in the scope of the United Nations.9 In the 1960s, Brazilian contribution was limited to the assignment of military personnel.

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9 According to Soares (2015), the Ministry of Defense understands Brazil's participation in Peace Operations as one of the country's most important vectors of cooperation and projection in the international scenario, in particular regarding the Brazilian Defense and Foreign Policies.
- notably the deployment of troops to operate in Egypt (UNEF I) and the provision of air support services in the Congo (ONUC). Since the 1990s, Brazilian contribution has gained new impetus, since it has made available to the organization military, civil, and police personnel, in addition to the regular assignment of military personnel - mainly through the deployment of troops to Angola (UNAVEM III) and Mozambique (ONUMOZ). According to Kenkel (2013), in order to signal interest in UN issues and demonstrate democracy and status credentials, Brazil has gradually increased its deployment of troops to United Nations Operations in the 1980s and 1990s, including large contingents in Mozambique and Angola. It is noticeable that the Brazilian state considers Peace Operations as an element of the country’s international projection, conferring to Africa a certain priority, due to regional fragilities that demand such operations as well as to the intentionality and synergy of foreign and defense policies regarding a national strategic area of interest (Campos 2015; Rito 2013).

According to Rocha and Góes (2010), when analyzing the profile of Brazil’s actions in the most recent peace operations, three aspects stand out: special attention to development cooperation, especially in missions governed by Chapter VII of the UN Charter, i.e. when the use of force is authorized to restore order; consideration of regional issues, cultural ties and the possibility of involving group diplomacy; and once the decision to participate is taking, privileging the means based on personnel, supply and transportation, in spite of financial contributions. Such facts were notorious in the Brazilian participation in Peace Operations in Africa. This is also in line with the long-term objectives of Brazilian foreign policy, which seeks to strengthen Brazil’s leadership status in the world, particularly among developing countries.

There are currently nine UN interventions underway in the African continent: UNMISS (in South Sudan), UNISFA (in Abyei), UNAMID (in Darfur), MINUSCA (in the Central African Republic), MONUSCO (Congo), UNOCI (in Côte d’Ivoire), UNMIL (in Liberia), MINURSO (in Western Sahara) and MINURCAT (in the Central African Republic). Noteworthy is the fact that there are only sixteen missions of this nature in the world, that is, more than half of these operations take place on African soil. Brazil participates in six of such missions: those in South Sudan, Abyei, Liberia, Western Sahara, Côte d’Ivoire and Central African Republic. Additionally, it partook in the now extinct missions in Uganda, Rwanda, Mozambique, Angola, among others. There is therefore a greater presence in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as a preferential deployment of Military Observers, under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.¹⁰

¹⁰ For more detailed information on the Brazilian participation in peacekeeping missions in Africa, like personnel figures and time periods, we suggest consulting Ferreira (2016).
In terms of technical-military cooperation, it is worth highlighting a significant increase in formal instruments between Brazil and the countries of the region in the period between 2003 and 2013. A total of nine defense cooperation agreements in general were signed with partners such as Angola (2010), Guinea-Bissau (2006), Mozambique (2009), Namibia (2009), Nigeria (2010), Sao Tome and Principe (2010), Senegal (2010) and South Africa (2003) (Seabra and Seabra 2014). The naval partnership with Namibia and South Africa is particularly remarkable, as well as some academic exchanges with Mozambique, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe and Cape Verde. In addition, there are specific defense agreements signed with these countries and also with Equatorial Guinea, Senegal, Cape Verde and, jointly with the CPLP organization, Guinea-Bissau (Abdenur and de Souza Neto 2013; Barroso 2010). Brazilian trainers and specialized troops cooperate with several African countries in the area of humanitarian demining (Borlina 2015) and in the fight against maritime pollution, while multilateral exercises have been conducted within the framework of the CPLP, namely the FELINO Exercise. In Cape Verde, the Air Force takes part in the assistance of air and sea surveillance (Migon and Santos 2013).

As to the defense industrial sector, Brazil’s presence took place through companies, such as Embraer and Engepron, with a predominantly commercial approach, although there are joint projects, such as the hydrographic survey of the Namibian continental shelf. This is yet another way through which Brazil has developed initiatives aimed at reducing the problems of the complex security agenda of the African continent.

Final considerations

Africa’s security agenda is widely complex and was strongly influenced by the end of the Cold War, the same period of reemergence of International Security studies on the academy (Buzan and Hansen 2012). The wider scope adopted in these studies fit perfectly the African continent, since it presented many of the components of a new security framework.

The relationship between Brazil and Africa is quite old and has gone through times of greater and lesser exchange. From slavery, through the rapprochement conducted by the military governments, the typical stagnation of the 1980s, the ascension of the 1990s, and the peak during President Lula’s administration, Brazil has made itself present in a continent that not only shares a common colonial history, but is also part of its strategic environment.

The variety of colonizers, the hasty and ill-conducted process of decolonization and typical Cold War circumstances all led to the emergence
and deepening of conflicts throughout Africa and its consequences. All parts of the African society consequently suffered with decades of isolation and institutional failure. Naturally, all these happenings had a brutal effect on the continent’s security agenda.

This article has brought up both bilateral and multilateral Brazilian initiatives in the security and defense sector taken in order to cooperate with the African security agenda. It can be concluded, however, that these initiatives were hardly expressive. Should there be a political interest in it, more concrete and systematic actions would be necessary, like signing new multilateral agreements, strengthening already existing ones and developing new cooperation initiatives. Brazilian foreign policy has generally demonstrated caution regarding the expansion of its military diplomacy and its participation in conflict mediation in Africa.

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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to review the dynamics of the Brazil-Africa relations, specifically regarding technical cooperation in Defense, emphasizing the 20th and 21st centuries. As part of Brazil’s strategic surroundings, Africa attracts the attention of Brazil and has been increasingly considered as part of the national research agenda, especially in the Security & Defense area. In this sense, it should be noted that the region has been struck like no other by the changes in world economy and politics; for that reason, such issues have become central to the continent and South Atlantic area as a whole.

KEYWORDS
Security & Defense; Brazilian Foreign Policy; National Defense Policy; Brazil-Africa Relations.