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ABOUT THE JOURNAL

The Brazilian Journal of African Studies is a biannual publication, in digital format, dedicated to the research, reflection and propagation of original scientific articles with emphasis on the analysis of International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations and Schools of Thought. RBEA is essentially academic, linked to the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

The RBEA has as target audience researchers, professors and students interested in the specificities of the African continent and its international insertion. Alongside such perspective, the Journal intends to expand the debate about the Brazilian projection world widely, the Brazilian cooperation efforts (including in the Defense field) with the African countries in the South Atlantic perimeter and the construction of a regional identity in face of a scenario of geopolitical transformations.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira

June/2024

The end of the Cold War presented a set of overlapping and multifaceted crises, the epicenter of which we are currently experiencing. The current crisis is quite peculiar, mainly due to the simultaneity of various events that converge towards conflicts and wars – a deep economic crisis (intensified by the pandemic); the progressive deterioration of international political systems, regimes and organizations; the decline of the West as a civilizational model; the rapid decline in international political and strategic stability. The emerging multipolarity is still unstable. However, new alignments are quickly emerging, revealing a new balance of international power. In this sense, the West has contributed with its internal crises and destructive international politics.

Africa, in turn, is no longer merely a space for the supply of raw materials. The continent's economic growth has expanded its role in the global economy. The African economy has become an increasingly organic and significant component of the world economy, connected to its dynamics, but also to scientific and technological progress. The systemic changes in the position of the African continent, as a geopolitical and geoeconomic space, followed the development of African partnerships within the framework of South-South Cooperation, in parallel with the gradual weakening of the West's five-century political and economic monopoly.

Undoubtedly, Africa is moving towards the defense of the adequation of the international order to the realities of the 21st century. However, it was up to the so-called “emerging” countries to identify the changes and promote a new pattern of international relations. Brazil quickly and intensely revived its African policy in the early 2000s, but given the peculiarities of Brazilian politics, this project was not sustainable in subsequent governments. Russia, with less visibility and more firmness, has discreetly and progressively resumed and consolidated its African policy, and today it is a strategic partner for African states. China and India have maintained stable patterns of relations with Africa, although with particular characteristics. However, the position

and development conditions of African countries will still be conditioned by the level of awareness of the ongoing international changes and by a more assertive behavior in controlling and using their power resources.

The BJAS' 17th issue presents eight articles and a review. The authors, in addition to national institutions, are affiliated to academic institutions in Angola, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria and Portugal. Rômulo Neves and Paulo Visentini, in the article *Crisis and integration: Regional Economic Communities and African integration*, argue that, after the entry into force in 2019 of the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement, African integration would have entered its final stage. The initial assumption is that the reality is more complex, with significant challenges to the implementation of the agreement, such as the different stages of development of the various state bureaucracies and the definitions of the scope of integration.

In *State-building in post-1991 Ethiopia: EPRDF's pseudo federalism and reincarnating authoritarian centralisation, an overview and critique*, Habtamu Wondimu Hibiso and Solomon Gebre Weldeananiya analyze the post-1991 state-building in Ethiopia, carried out by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). According to the authors, the results indicate that the EPRDF implemented a combination of pragmatic and ideologically oriented policies to build Ethiopia. However, for the authors, the EPRDF repeated war strategies and disciplines for state building and contributed to the authoritarian reincarnation and new centralization of power. In *Mediation dynamics and commitments for peace in Mozambique (1989-2019)*, Cremildo de Abreu Coutinho and Eduardo Munhoz Svartman assess the negotiation that culminated in the signing of the 1992 peace agreement, preceded by a 16-year civil war between the government of the Mozambique Liberation Front and the former rebel movement, the National Resistance of Mozambique. However, despite significant advances in the democratization of the country, the authors observe setbacks motivated by exclusion and the absence of effective national reconciliation.

Still on Mozambique, Robson Dias da Silva and Thaysa Cunha, in the article *Sino-Mozambican relationship and the role of megaprojects in Mozambique's territorial development*, discuss China-Mozambique cooperation and the role of megaprojects in Mozambique's territorial development plan during the 2000s. The authors seek to identify the main social and economic effects related to the implementation of Chinese infrastructure megaprojects in the country to understand whether it is possible to point to the strategy adopted by Mozambique as a true form of transformation and socioeconomic development. Next, there are three articles on Nigeria. Abimbola Oyarinu analyzes

the role of British and Nigerian political elites in shaping Nigeria's destiny. Based on the eventuality of the Nigerian civil war and using the historical analytical method of qualitative research, the article *The amalgamation of 1914 and the Nigerian Civil War: the burden of blame* traces the origin of Nigeria's socioeconomic problems to the British pronouncement of 1914.

In *Nigeria's Oil Complex: the tragedy of the commons*, Ekpotuatin Charles Ariye and Green Kevwe Abenabe examine how Nigeria's abundant oil reserves have positioned the nation as a major player in the global energy arena. However, according to the authors, beneath the surface of this wealth of resources lies a complex web of challenges that have attracted international attention. Thus, they explore the multifaceted dynamics of Nigeria's oil industry through the lens of the "tragedy of the commons". Finally, in *The challenges of transhumance and internal security in Nigeria: implications for food security in the South-South geopolitical zone*, Endurance Nogiomwan Aigbe and Joseph Aihie analyze the nature of transhumance and the level of humanitarian damage, along with its impact on food security in the South-South geopolitical zone. According to the authors, the government must create an effective mechanism by mapping out a holistic security architecture and adopt alternative dispute resolution methods through dialogue with herders and farmers in the communities.

Furthermore, Serge Noel Ouedraogo and Boubacar Sambare, in the article *To stay or to go back: the cornelian dilemma of the burkinabe diaspora in Ghana*, discuss the dilemma faced by migrants from Burkina Faso living in Ghana. According to the authors, in contrast to the return flows of migrants and descendants of migrants from Burkina Faso living in Côte d'Ivoire, there are few reverse migration flows between Ghana and Burkina Faso. In this sense, to identify the aspirations and decisions of migrants and their descendants, the study relies on bibliographic resources and empirical data. Primarily, qualitative research was conducted with skilled individuals in Ghana and Burkina Faso. As a conclusion to this issue, Gilson Lázaro presents a review of the work *Governing in the shadows: Angola's Securitised State*, by Paula Cristina Roque.

The BJAS publishes a bilingual electronic version (Portuguese and English). Thus, we welcome contributions from colleagues in Brazil and abroad, with whom we seek to establish connections to deepen knowledge and build a Southern perspective on the African continent and its relations.

We thank the Editorial Assistant Gabriela Gampe Bonness and the CEBRAFRICA team, who worked on the translation and revision of the articles. We would also like to thank Augusto Camatti, Augusto Esposito, Henrique Leal, Isabella Cruzichi, Lucca Medeiros, Mariana Vitola, Matheus Xavier, Pedro Zandoná, Rafaela Serpa and Vinicius Baldissera for their collaboration in the translation and revision of the texts in English.

CRISIS AND INTEGRATION: REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES AND AFRICAN INTEGRATION

Rômulo Milhomem Freitas Figueira Neves¹

Paulo Gilberto Fagundes Visentini²



Introduction

The economic integration process in Africa is theoretically in its final stage, marked by the settling of the agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area. Signed in Kigali, in 2018, by 44 of the 55 African Union members, the agreement came into effect in April 2019 after the 22nd signatory country approved the document. As of June 2024, Eritrea was the only country that had not signed the agreement, while 47 AU members, including the Sahrawi Republic, had endorsed it. Madagascar, Somalia, Benin, Libya, Liberia, Sudan, and South Sudan were the remaining countries yet to ratify. Thus, the agreement is fully in effect, following the ordinary steps for its consolidation. A dedicated secretariat, reporting directly to the African Union Executive Council, has been established in Accra. However, the situation on the ground is much more complex, with overlapping regional communities, varying stages of sub-regional integration, and state bureaucracies with significant disparities in development, as well as a considerable number of ongoing internal and international conflicts.

Therefore, this article aims to synthesize, based on historical analysis — with a particular focus on global and regional economic crises — and the use of aggregated data from international organizations, the processes of

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sub-regional integration in Africa. This will provide a clear understanding of the different stages of integration and the involvement of various countries in the existing pathways. The priority will be to understand the role of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) defined by the Abuja Treaty of 1991, which established the African Economic Community and designated them as the foundations of the integration process outlined in the agreement. A complementary goal is to provide a basis for more detailed and specific future analyses by other researchers, to better understand the role and classification of each sub-regional integration process. To this end, the article offers a brief history of the African integration process, starting with the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 and the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 as responses from newly independent countries to the global crises of the 1970s, as well as a summary of the distribution of countries across various initiatives.

Young nations in crisis

Regardless of the different paths taken during the independence process, and despite the economic growth experienced throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the newly independent African countries began to face severe economic difficulties starting with the first oil crisis in 1973. The second crisis in 1979, along with the restrictive reforms implemented in the United Kingdom and the United States throughout the 1980s — coupled with the view in several World Bank reports at the time that many of Africa's problems were internal and that restrictive measures were the best solution — exacerbated the economic stagnation observed during that period. The Lomé Convention — a set of four documents, the first of which was in 1975 — provided preferential access for products from ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific) to the European market, as an attempt to show solidarity with former colonies. However, its results were limited and did not succeed in reversing the emerging crisis.

The prolonged and widespread economic crisis on the continent was multifaceted and impacted countries in various ways. However, based on data from IMF trade reports, Paris Club debt negotiations, UN population growth statistics, and other international organizations' documents, several factors can be identified that, combined, produced a devastating effect on African economies:

- i) the substantial population growth, rising from 270 million in 1970 to 359 million in 1980 — a 33% increase over a decade — elevated domestic demand for food and affected exports;
- ii) the exponential increase in the cost of oil, the primary import for many African countries — the price per barrel rose from \$3 to \$11.60 between 1973 and 1974;
- iii) the decline in international prices for various minerals, with an average decrease of 7.1% during the 1970s;
- iv) the significant reduction in export revenues, with an average annual decline of 1.6% across sub-Saharan countries;
- v) the decline in Africa's share of exports, excluding fuels, within the group of developing countries, which fell by half over 18 years — from 18% in 1960 to 9% in 1978. During this period, oil exporters and the Asian Tigers captured much of the market previously held by African nations, even though African exports had grown by an average of 5.3% per year between 1960 and 1970;
- vi) the significant exposure of African economies to foreign trade, which on average accounted for about 25% of these countries' GDP;
- vii) the export agenda concentrated, in most cases, on just two or three primary commodities;
- viii) as a result of the oil crisis, U.S. interest rates rose from 12% in 1979 to 21.5% in 1982, significantly increasing the external debt of African countries already weakened by the ongoing crisis. This rise in interest rates was mirrored in the United Kingdom, a traditional financier of African nations, whose rates increased from 12% to 18% in 1980;
- ix) the rapid increase in debt had significant effects on the already limited investment capacity in health, education, and transportation, despite slight improvements in some basic indicators in these sectors, such as life expectancy, enrollment rates, and infant mortality. Between 1979 and 1989, 12 countries suspended their external debt payments, with some countries doing so more than once during this period.
- x) at the same time, due to the rise in interest rates in the U.S. and the U.K., there was a decline in foreign investments in the continent;
- xi) the majority of the population worked in the primary sector, primarily agriculture — at that time, almost no African country

had less than 70% of its active population engaged in agriculture, with much of this devoted to subsistence farming, which had low added value.

Besides economic problems, and in some cases due to them, fourteen countries experienced major conflicts between 1979 and 1989, including civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, and international disputes such as those involving Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, Egypt and Libya, Mauritania and Senegal, all of which had negative effects on already fragile economies.

Integration as a response to the crisis

In 1980, in response to the economic crisis, the Organization of African Unity, established in 1963, adopted the Lagos Action Plan in partnership with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), founded in 1958, with the aim of increasing regional trade cooperation. The goal of the plan was to replicate in other regions the experience of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established by the Lagos Treaty in 1975, with 15 member countries and initially headquartered in Lagos, later moved to Abuja. The effects of the crisis were profound, and without adequate resources, the plan had limited impact. By 1981, only two initiatives had been established: i) the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), with 18 members, which became the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1994; and ii) the Central African Economic Community, which remained ineffective until 1998. The East African Community, created in 1967, had even been dissolved in 1977 and was only reestablished in 2000.

The 1980s, known in Brazil as the lost decade, was the decade of famine in Africa. The crisis in Ethiopia from 1983 to 1985 gained the most global attention, with around 300,000 deaths. However, the problem affected numerous countries, with over 30 million people facing severe food insecurity across 24 nations, according to the United Nations Office for Emergency Operations in Africa, established in 1984 (McCarthy 1986, 58). The effects of the economic crisis extended into the following decade. The growth rate of sub-Saharan Africa between 1989 and 1999 was only 24%. With the dissolution of the USSR, several countries that had relied on the Soviet bloc faced additional acute challenges, such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe. From 1991 to 2001, 15 countries requested relief from external debt payments, a

number greater than in the previous decade. Despite the end of apartheid, which had been a central issue for the pan-African movement, African institutional fragility increased during the 1990s. The term “failed state” was coined initially to describe Somalia but came to refer to several African countries facing both economic crises and political instability, jeopardizing their institutional existence. This concept introduced a form of political analysis known as “afropessimism”, a diffuse set of ideas about the perceived inability of black nations to self-manage.

Nevertheless, just as with the Lagos Plan of 1980, Africans again turned to economic integration as a strategy to overcome the crisis. In 1991, the Abuja Treaty was signed to establish the African Economic Community, modeled after the European Economic Community (EEC). The African agreement would not come into effect until 1994 — by that time, the EEC had already become the European Union (EU) in 1993.

The end of apartheid happened during the same period, in 1994, generating a sense of hope across the continent. In early April 1994, the 7th Pan-African Congress was held in Kampala, Uganda, just a few weeks before Nelson Mandela’s election as President of South Africa, marking the end of decades of institutional combat against the policy of segregation. Political optimism was evident, but the Congress leadership’s priority was to address and overcome the economic crisis. The event also focused on advancing the integration project, with discussions centered on the implementation of the African Economic Community.

The Abuja Treaty had outlined a gradual integration plan, culminating in the establishment of an African common market by 2025 and monetary integration by 2028. This plan included creating regional communities in areas where they did not yet exist, as well as establishing intermediate free trade areas and customs unions (Organization of African Unity 1991). On the final day of the event celebrating African unity, however, a genocide began in Rwanda, just about 500 kilometers from Kampala, which would claim the lives of 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus by July of that year. This crisis added to the eight ongoing civil wars: in Liberia since 1989; in Niger since 1990; in Sierra Leone, Algeria, Djibouti, and Somalia since 1991; and in Congo-Brazzaville and Burundi since 1993.

The massacre in Rwanda, although controlled by the end of that year, triggered a sequence of events with lasting consequences. The attacks led to the flight of Tutsis into the territory of the DRC, and shortly after the Tutsis took power, another wave of refugees, this time 2 million Hutus, followed. Tensions in the border region between the two countries increased, with

Rwandan Tutsi troops conducting incursions in search of fleeing Hutus. In 1996, the situation escalated into open conflict with the invasion of the DRC by troops from Uganda and Rwanda. The DRC opposition used the war to depose the long-standing dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997, who had been in power since 1965. Mobutu went into exile in Morocco. The new government, with military support from Angola and Zimbabwe, reached an agreement with Rwanda and Uganda for their withdrawal from Congolese territory in 1998. The assassination of the new president in 2001 reignited the conflict in the DRC with troops from Rwanda and Uganda. The conflict was only resolved in 2002 with Rwanda and in 2003 with Uganda. Elections were held, and the country appeared to stabilize. In 2008, the DRC and Rwanda even cooperated to combat Hutu rebels in Kivu, a region contiguous to Rwanda and Uganda. The area also housed Congolese Tutsi separatist rebels, but government forces managed to neutralize their leadership. In the peace agreement of March 23, part of the group, led by Bosco Ntaganda, was integrated into the Congolese armed forces.

Instead, starting in 2012, Ntaganda organized his own militia — the M-23, named after the date of the agreement — composed of Congolese Tutsis, and began military operations against the government. Initially, Rwanda openly supported the movement, but international pressure forced the country to suspend its support for the M-23. Despite Ntaganda's surrender, the group has remained active, carrying out particularly brutal military offensives against the civilian population, which have resulted in at least 2.5 million refugees, of whom nearly 1.2 million are still displaced today, according to UNHCR. This situation represents one of the most severe humanitarian crises in Africa today. There is suspicion that Uganda and Rwanda continue to support the M-23. The DRC, which received the first UN peacekeeping operation on the continent in 1960, continues to face greed for its mineral wealth — Kivu is particularly rich in gold, diamonds, and thorium, among other resources.

The post-colonial African state was pushed to the limits of viability by the economic crises of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The model of stability, based on the ability to distribute power and benefits to clientelist networks that ensured internal peace, could not be sustained in the face of resource shortage. The decline in income intensified competition among political elite groups benefiting from national systems, leading to an increase in coups d'état. Between 1970 and 1999, there were 120 attempted coups, 56 of which were successful. In the extended period from 1950 to 2024, there were 221 attempts in 45 countries, with 109 being successful in 37 countries (Duzor and Williamson 2023). In many cases, conflicts became regionalized due

to the spillover of internal disputes. In addition to civil wars fueled by the economic backdrop, Africa also witnessed the emergence of hybrid crises driven by both economic and identity factors, including rebel movements and clashes between ethnic and religious groups. These issues remain active today in Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Mozambique, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Ethiopia, the Sahrawi Republic, and Mauritania, as well as in Somalia and the DRC.

Any peace would only be possible with the resumption of growth, which began to occur by the late 1990s, with a significant increase in demand and, consequently, in mineral prices and export revenues. Between 1996 and 2001, mineral prices rose by an average of 45%, and precious metals by approximately 20% (Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman 2003, 1232). Oil prices, on the other hand, increased by 200% between 1998 and 2000. This period also marked a rise in investments in mineral exploration in Africa. At the beginning of the decade, the sector received less than \$100 million annually in foreign investment. By 1998, this amount had risen to \$800 million, with the continent accounting for 16.5% of global investment in the sector, compared to 4.5% in 1991. With economic stabilization and the onset of growth, internal conflicts were resolved, except for those in the DRC, which reignited due to the Rwandan genocide, and the ongoing conflict in Somalia. Even conflicts that began during this period were resolved in a relatively short time, such as the civil war in Guinea-Bissau from 1998 to 1999 and the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998 to 2000. By 2003, Africa was generally stable, with the exception of the DRC and Somalia.

Regional Economic Communities

Also during the crisis of the 1990s, as part of the process of advancing commercial integration outlined in the Abuja Treaty, Regional Economic Communities were established or revitalized to complement ECOWAS, which had been active since 1975. In 1992, the Southern African Development Community, SADC, was established; by 1994, the Preferential Trade Area, PTA, created in 1981, had transformed into COMESA, and the Arab Maghreb Union, AMU, was formed. In 1996, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD, was established with the countries of the Horn of Africa. In 1998, the Economic Community of Central African States, ECCAS, was revitalized, and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, CEN-SAD, was created with just six countries, a number that has since grown to more than 20. CEN-SAD was revised in 2013 and reopened for each country to confirm

its continued participation in the agreement. Finally, in 2000, the East African Community, EAC, was reestablished, having been dissolved in 1977. All countries were integrated into the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) recognized by the African Union — although the RECs are older than the AU itself and have always operated autonomously in matters of security, with the coordination of joint missions, a practice that continues even after the AU's creation. For Africa's economic integration process, these are the eight groups recognized by the AU:

ECOWAS, Economic Community of West African States, established in 1975;

COMESA, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, initially established as a PTA in 1981 and renamed in 1994;

ECCAS, Economic Community of Central African States, established in 1981 and revitalized in 1998;

SADC, Southern African Development Community, established in 1992;

AMU, Arab Maghreb Union, created in 1994;

IGAD, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, established in 1996;

CEN-SAD, Community of Sahel-Saharan States, created in 1998; and

EAC, East African Community, established in 1967, dissolved in 1977, and reestablished in 2000.

The division of countries into RECs was not exclusive, as states were allowed to participate in more than one entity. For instance, Somalia and the DRC are members of four of the eight community arrangements; only five countries have historically participated in just one group — Algeria, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea. Four others — Cape Verde, Liberia, Guinea, and São Tomé and Príncipe — did not renew their participation in CEN-SAD in 2013 and remain only in ECOWAS. Another five, led by South Africa, expanded their range of possibilities with the Tripartite Agreement, launched in 2015, which will potentially bring together the countries of COMESA, EAC, and SADC, discussed in the following pages.

In various sources, a map showing the divisions of Africa among the different RECs is presented, but the complexity is such that, for clarity, it has been found that the best format for understanding and visualizing this internal division is a table, presented later. None of the consulted materials, however, had presented the impact of the Tripartite Agreement on this division, which is included in the following material. Despite the synthesis,

it is important to highlight that the integration regime of the African space involves additional variables and subgroups, which makes its understanding quite complex. This complexity often leads to confusion in various articles and texts, even those well-structured, about the concept of CERs compared to other groups and subgroups, including, at times, comparisons between entities of different categories. These misconceptions, however, stem from the following factors:

- (i) In addition to countries participating in multiple RECs, leading to numerous overlaps, the stages of integration vary significantly. There are communities at advanced stages, with visa elimination and the existence of a substantial common market, such as ECOWAS, and others that are only semi-integrated, such as IGAD;
- (ii) The slow pace of finalizing country accession processes — and announcements that do not materialize — creates overlapping information about initiatives that are only announced versus those that are actually implemented, making it challenging to identify the most current information;
- (iii) There are well-established subgroups within some regional communities, whose institutional frameworks often surpass those of newer or less integrated communities. For example, the West African Monetary Union is part of ECOWAS and comprises 8 of its 15 member countries. Within this subgroup, the West African CFA franc circulates as a unified currency. This generates confusion as well, since within the Central African Community, six of the 11 countries organize themselves into another monetary union subgroup and use the Central African CFA franc in a unified manner. While the Central African CFA franc has the same value as the West African CFA franc, there is no interoperability between them. The other ECOWAS countries, with the exception of Liberia and Cape Verde, signed an agreement in 2003 to adopt a common currency among them. This agreement has been postponed several times and has not yet been implemented. Finally, in 2019, the monetary unification project of the community was launched, aiming for the adoption of the Eco, which would replace all national currencies within ECOWAS, including the CFA franc, issued by France. The CFA franc is subject to high monetary obligations, such as depositing 50% of foreign reserves in the European country — which limits

the economic sovereignty of the African countries using the currency. The process has made little progress due to internal disputes over its implementation and the instability caused by coups in the region. France, in opposition to the Eco, has also begun a partial withdrawal of monetary obligations to reduce the CFA franc's ties to its neocolonial policies. Another example of highly institutionalized subgroups is the Southern African Customs Union, SACU, which includes 5 of the 16 countries in the SADC, under the strong leadership of South Africa;

- (iv) Despite the overlap between ECOWAS and the West African region in the official mechanism used by the AU for the political rotation of its institutional framework, the boundaries of other economic communities do not align with the regional divisions established by the AU. There is significant overlap between the SADC and the Southern Africa region, as well as between the ECCAS and the Central Africa region, though these overlaps are not fully congruent. It is common to find articles comparing AU-recognized groups with subgroups, often employing these divisions in an indiscriminate and imprecise manner. Furthermore, neither of these regional divisions aligns with the UN' classification, which consists of five regions used for consolidating general statistical data about the continent;
- (v) There are subgroups with a long history of integration in various sectors such as trade, defense, and security. Examples include the Council of the Entente, which has brought together six countries from West-Central Africa since 1959; the Lake Chad Basin Commission, established in 1964, currently comprising six members and four observers; the Mano River Union, which originally united Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1973 and later included Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire; the Indian Ocean Commission, established in 1984, consisting of Madagascar, Comoros, Seychelles, and Mauritius; the Liptako-Gourma Authority, which includes Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger since 1970; the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries, including Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda since 1974, though currently less active; and other more recent but equally significant initiatives, such as the Gulf of Guinea Commission, established in 2001 and currently comprising nine members; the Nouakchott Process, initiated in 2013, now stalled but involving 11 members; the G5 Sahel Group, created

in 2014; and the Accra Initiative, launched in 2017 with five member countries and two observers;

- (vi) The fact that the Arab Maghreb Union, AMU, is almost entirely integrated — except for Mauritania, which is in the process of joining — into the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) within the framework of the Arab League diminishes the significance of the exclusively African subregional entity for its members. Through GAFTA, they have access not only to the markets of other African countries in the group, along with Somalia, which is in the process of joining GAFTA, but also to the broader Arab nations.

Regional Economic Communities often overlap with other political or economic divisions and subdivisions, which also have an impact on and consequences for the African integration process. The intricate nature of these subdivisions, coupled with a pervasive assessment of their limited efficacy, has propelled the advancement to subsequent stages of integration, such as the reconvention of the Sahara-Sahel Community (CEN-SAD) treaty in 2013. This community rapidly evolved, with the stabilization of the continent, from six founding members in 1998 to 29 members in 2009, of which 24 reconfirmed their participation in the agreement in 2013, which needed to deepen the mechanisms of integration. The expansion occurred with the accession of countries from the West African Community, ECOWAS, and the Central African Community, ECCAS.

An important milestone in the evolution of the RECs was achieved in 2015 with the launch of the Tripartite Free Trade Area in Egypt. This agreement unified the member countries of COMESA, EAC, and SADC, creating a potential bloc of 29 countries following the recent expansion of these groups. The agreement would come into effect once ratified by 14 signatories. As of June 2024, 22 countries had signed and 12 had ratified the agreement. The initial deadlines for ratification were postponed several times, but as of that date, 7 eligible countries had not yet signed: Mozambique, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Lesotho, Somalia, South Sudan, and Tunisia. The eventual new Tripartite Free Trade Area would add to the revised CEN-SAD space as broader intermediate processes beyond the initial regional communities.

It is within this context that, in 2018, the Agreement to establish the African Continental Free Trade Area was signed, representing a new effort to advance the continental economy through regional integration. The share of intracontinental trade in Africa's total trade flow has historically been low, and in 2022, it accounted for only 13.5% of the continent's total trade flow.

This contrasts with intraregional trade in Asia and Europe, which constitutes approximately 60% and 70% of their respective total trade flows. In 1975, the year the ECOWAS was established, intraregional trade in Africa represented 5% of the continent's total trade flow. During the crisis period, this share fell to just 3.7% by 1979. Since then, it has gradually increased, but only reached 10% of the total flow by 1996. The historical peak of this participation was reached in 2015, at 16%, although it has since decreased gradually.

Despite the potential benefits of full integration, there are numerous practical difficulties in its implementation. This, in fact, is the reason for Eritrea's refusal to sign broader agreements, as it adopts a pragmatic stance, preferring to deepen basic regional integration based on a realistic assessment of its resources and capabilities. The country's position is not without merit, as the institutional history of the AU reveals several initiatives with low implementation rates. Even within the more structured communities, there are significant challenges, such as the barriers imposed by Kenya on Tanzanian rice, and Tanzania's decision to withdraw from COMESA when the bloc's liberalizing measures began to affect its tax revenues. The Tripartite Agreement has yet to come into effect but remains a viable option, even with the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area, as it may advance more swiftly through the structures of the participating communities. It is important to note that the continental agreement itself excludes certain areas that are more comprehensively addressed by the RECs, including state aid, public procurement, environmental regulations, and labor market legislation (Assis, Ribeiro, Garcia 2022, 148).

The table below summarizes these processes. The table should be read from the two rightmost columns, which indicate the ongoing intermediary projects: the reconstitution of the CEN-SAD and the Tripartite Agreement. Together, these have the potential to cover 50 of the 54 African countries, in addition to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. However, they currently cover only 42 countries due to the lack of signatures from eligible members of the involved communities for the Tripartite Agreement and the absence of confirmation from some eligible members of CEN-SAD, as highlighted in yellow in both cases. The table also includes the total number of potential countries for each agreement, with the number of pending memberships in parentheses. Additionally, it shows the number of initiatives each country participates in, with a notation indicating non-renewal of CEN-SAD or uncertain participation in the Tripartite Agreement.

Distribution of African Countries by Regional Economic Communities as of June 30, 2024.

In December 2023, the Sahel States Alliance, AES, was established, comprising Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. This was followed by their announcement of withdrawal from ECOWAS. The new bloc reconstitutes the Lip-tako-Gourma Authority, which has formally existed since 1970. The first formal summit of the group took place in July 2024 in Niamey, Niger. The first formal summit of the group took place in July 2024 in Niamey, Niger. The AES was formed in response to the ECOWAS's opposition to the coups d'état that brought the new governments to power in these countries. All were suspended and subjected to sanctions by the regional community, leading them to opt for withdrawal. Formally, however, they are not yet excluded, as the ECOWAS treaty stipulates a one-year notice period for member states' withdrawal. The AES members are highlighted in yellow in the ECOWAS column.

After the announcement of withdrawal, ECOWAS even revised some of the imposed sanctions in an attempt to keep the three countries within the bloc — without success so far. Regarding the economic integration process, the exit of the three countries would have little impact if CEN-SAD evolves, as all of them are part of the broader community. Politically, however, the AES fits into a broader context of criticism towards regional communities and the African Union itself, with efforts to seek new narratives or reformulate existing ones. The new Pan-Africanism represents one such reformulation. While rooted in the symbolism of unity, this new framework is emerging from a critical assessment of what has been accomplished so far. This is exemplified by the movements behind the organization of the 9th Pan-African Congress, scheduled to take place in October in Lomé, Togo, with the theme: “The ambition of pan-africanism: mobilizing resources, uniting energies, and reinventing to act”.

The reinvention of Pan-Africanism is the agenda of leaders dissatisfied with the current state of African governments and institutions, among the most vocal is Togo's Foreign Minister, Robert Dussey, who, in addition to committing to organizing the continental event, is leading the currently informal initiative of the African Political Alliance, APA, launched in 2023. The group's announced goal is to advocate for greater representation of Africa in the global system and to overcome the alleged inertia of the AU, and regional communities. In addition to Togo, countries such as Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, the Central African Republic, Angola, Libya, Namibia, and Tanzania have been participating in discussions surrounding the APA.

Is integration a response to crisis?

The first decade of the 21st century was characterized by profound optimism in Africa. This era saw the emergence of the African Renaissance movement, the strengthening of the AU, the launch of the NEPAD, a renewed engagement with the diaspora, a resurgence in investments, a boom in exports, expanded operations by the African Development Bank, and numerous investment projects, with several African nations leading global economic growth statistics. Between 2002 and 2010, there were only four requests for debt payment suspension. In the 1980s and 1990s, there had been 12 and 15 requests, respectively. From 2001 to 2010, 6 out of the 10 fastest-growing economies were African — Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique, and Rwanda —, leading to speculation about the rise of the “African Lions” in comparison to the “Asian Tigers”. In the following decade, however, the African context began to once again face the negative effects of a globalized economy and geopolitical disputes. Slowing growth, increasing instability, and difficulties in implementing the plans conceived during the period of prosperity started to generate criticism toward national governments and African institutions.

The 2008 economic crisis, although not immediately affecting all African countries, had medium and long-term impacts on nearly all of them. By 2009, African exports had already decreased by 15.2% compared to the previous year. In 2008, countries with sovereign wealth funds and operations in international financial markets — Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, and Botswana — experienced negative impacts on their financial outcomes. By February 2009, 12 countries — excluding Zimbabwe, which had already entered a spiral of hyperinflation — experienced currency devaluations exceeding 20%, surpassing the Euro’s decline during the same period and exacerbating their external deficits.

International prices for key export commodities saw significant declines: a 65% drop in oil prices, which at the time accounted for over 90% of exports from Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Congo, and Angola; a 40% decrease in platinum prices, whose largest global exporter is South Africa; a 32% drop in copper prices, which made up more than one-third of export revenues for Zambia and the DRC; and a 23% decline in coal prices. The average decline in prices for non-energy commodities, which account for over 80% of exports from seven African countries, was 38% during the first six months of the crisis alone (IMF 2024, adapted). At the same time, unilateral remittances from the diaspora, investment flows, and resources from cooperation projects

decreased. Without an anti-cyclical cushion, even with relatively low financial integration, Africa would still feel the effects of the crisis through various indirect transmission channels — such as the political crises in North Africa, which began with protests over rising living costs.

In 2010, in an effort to return to a growth trajectory, the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) was launched and finally approved in 2012, outlining investments of \$360 billion by 2040. After a brief recovery in 2011 and 2012, African exports experienced a significant decline, reaching, by 2016 — in inflation-adjusted terms — the same level as in 2004, thereby losing much of the growth observed in the previous decade (Luke 2023). Even with the growth of the global economy and without adjusting for inflation, African exports in 2020 had the same nominal value as in 2008, reflecting a significant retracement. From 2014 to 2016, sales to the USA, for example, fell 37%, a result caused by the replacement of oil imports from that country, which dramatically increased its production from shale oil reserves, reaching 2014 as the largest global producer. However, the decline in exports also impacted relations with major trading partners — including China, India, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and even Brazil. The most significant drop occurred between 2014 and 2016, with a 23% decrease in both intra-regional trade and extra-continental exports.

Starting in 2011, with the advent of the Arab Spring, the economic crisis escalated into a political crisis, marked by the overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt, and the assassination of Gaddafi following internal turmoil and the invasion of Libya. In this conjuncture, the governments that did not fall tightened the repression. Between 2011 and 2020, there were 37 attempted coups across the continent, 8 of which were successful. The data indicates a decrease in the average duration of unconstitutional governments following the adoption of the diplomatic clause and the use of suspension measures by the AU, as well as the coordination of efforts to normalize crises (Souaré 2014, 86; Thyne, Powell, Parrott, VanMeter 2018, 1421), however, this indicates at best only partial success in achieving political stabilization. In addition to the ongoing wars in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which had spanned the previous decade, new conflicts emerged from 2011 onwards in Libya, Mali, Cameroon, and the Central African Republic. Furthermore, Nigeria experienced widespread violence, with Boko Haram's insurgency and regional clashes resulting in over 50,000 deaths since 2009.

Although both the economic and political crises are multifactorial, the widespread perception was that the AU had not adequately responded to the continent's needs and, in its 50 years of existence, had failed to overcome

its operational challenges — challenges that are also faced by the governments themselves. In 2013, during the entity's 50th anniversary Summit titled “Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance”, the idea of developing a streamlined agenda with a long-term goals plan was introduced. The document, “Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want”, was officially finalized in 2015, outlining 16 objectives to be achieved over the next 50 years, some with defined deadlines, across areas such as security, democracy, and integration, among others. It represented a significant effort to synthesize and attempt to reverse the adverse trends that were beginning to emerge.

The challenges that Africa needs to overcome appear to extend far beyond the mere process of trade integration. The average share of GDP allocated to investments is less than 1%, which undermines progress in priority sectors capable of generating exports, such as agriculture and industry, due to the insufficiency of domestic resources. Low levels of industrialization, in turn, hinder the initial spark of internal exchanges, as a significant portion of countries are exporters of minerals and raw materials, with few countries possessing an industrial base capable of absorbing even a portion of the raw materials from their continental partners. This is why South Africa, with the most developed industrial base on the continent, was responsible for importing approximately 23% of all goods that other African countries sold to their continental partners in 2022.

The lack of investment capital compounds other structural issues. The percentage of extreme poverty, according to the World Bank, remains around 30% in 2023. In absolute terms, the number of Africans living on less than \$1.90 a day is approximately 430 million. Despite the rapid pace of urbanization, the rural population, which is more vulnerable to extreme poverty, is around 800 million out of the approximately 1.48 billion people living on the continent. However, agricultural productivity remains low, and most African countries are net importers of food. According to the FAO, the proportion of the population experiencing severe food insecurity is 20.2%, nearly the same as in 2003, when it was 20.7%—after reaching a low of 15.8% in 2015. This amounts to 300 million people in that condition on the continent. When including those in a moderate state of food insecurity, the estimate rises to 61%, the highest among all continents.

The issue of external debt is another concerning challenge, not only because it is a persistent problem but also because it indicates historical structural issues, partly stemming from post-colonial arrangements. These issues result in trade deficits, insufficient public budgets, and, in many cases, dependence on foreign capital for the basic functioning of the economy.

The annual aggregate trade deficit in Africa is approximately \$65 billion, an amount not covered by the sum of foreign investment, development aid, and individual remittances (Luke 2023, 2-4). Profit remittances, facilitated by preferential investment agreements, also impact the availability of reserves. Repaying the debt through traditional means is, in the vast majority of cases, infeasible, with few exceptions such as Zambia, Chad, Ghana, Botswana, and the DRC. The issue of debt has become even more complex due to the recent changes in its structure. Until the last decade, much of the debt was official, involving state or intergovernmental institutions. However, in recent years, Africans have incurred debts with Chinese private institutions, which do not participate in the arrangements of the Paris Club negotiations. As a result, integrated relief measures, which involve partial or total debt forgiveness — the only form acceptable to creditors without them feeling disadvantaged — are rendered infeasible.

In terms of extra-regional trade, African countries collectively engage in differentiated market access agreements with the European Union and the United States; however, the impact of these agreements remains limited. In the case of the EU, the Samoa Agreement, effective from this year, replaces the Cotonou Agreement, which regulated preferential trade and expired definitively in 2021. The new agreement, valid until 2044, introduces more restrictive conditionalities and places less emphasis on development and trade aspects — such as the removal of the European Development Fund from its scope. Its negotiation was closed in 2021, but was only signed at the end of 2023. In the case of the United States, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), established in 2000, revised in 2015, and valid until 2025, provides preferential market access for products from specific sectors in 32 countries. In both cases, coverage is limited, reflecting the global trend toward increasing protectionism and excluding some of Africa's key export products. According to UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), in 2022, only 13 African countries reported trade surpluses. Current exports to the US remain at pre-AGOA levels, while exports to Europe have stagnated (Luke 2023, 9).

While Africa exports minerals — some critical for the low-carbon revolution, such as cobalt, manganese, chromium, copper, vanadium, as well as graphite, lithium, and niobium to a lesser extent — the import agenda consists of medium and high-value-added products. Examples include smartphones, which are expected to total approximately 680 million on the continent by 2025, and automotive industry products, which were responsible for a \$39 billion trade deficit in 2020. In 2003, the percentage of the population with access to the Internet in Africa was just over 1%, while in 2023 it exceeded

30% — however, in Somalia, the rate remains at 2%. Exposure increases the circulation of information — the digital blackout is one of the first measures in large-scale protests, and Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Senegal were among the countries with the highest number of internet shutdowns in 2023 — but it also exacerbates the trade deficit. The annual growth rate of e-commerce is 8%, with a significant portion consisting of imports, the highest among all continents. Due to the shortage of human resources, this increase in connectivity has not yet spurred either foreign or domestic investments in technology, except for a few local hubs. Notable examples include Nairobi, with its M-Pesa mobile payments system — developed locally in 2007 and now present in 10 countries — and Casablanca, Johannesburg, Dakar, and Lagos, where nascent local automotive industries are emerging, such as the Innoson motor company. Additionally, there are Mobius in Kenya, Wallys in Tunisia, Kantanka in Ghana, Kiira (an electric car manufacturer) in Uganda, and SNVI (a bus manufacturer) in Algeria.

On the side of foreign investments, China's involvement in the African economy has deepened in recent years. Since the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, China has been involved in the construction of over 100,000 kilometers of roads and 13,000 kilometers of railways, including urban transportation systems in Lagos, Addis Ababa, and Kampala. The situation in the infrastructure sector is mirrored in other areas such as health, education, sanitation, and technology. While the impact of China's involvement is substantial, it is crucial to evaluate the data within a broader context. Between 2000 and 2021, China's total foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 54 African countries amounted to \$58 billion. In contrast, the United Kingdom and Germany together received more than double this amount during the same period, totaling \$120 billion in Chinese investments. Even with the increase in Chinese investments over the past decades — though slowed since the pandemic — the country has not yet surpassed the investment stock of former colonial powers such as France and the United Kingdom, as well as the Netherlands (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2023). However, it has surpassed the investment stock of the United States, from which some companies, such as Microsoft, have been withdrawing from the region since 2017. European companies have also exited, including Shell, Bayer, Sanofi, Diageo, Unilever, Kimberly-Clark, GlaxoSmithKline, Société Générale, Bolt Food, Galp e Procter & Gamble.

Conclusion

The African integration process represents both an effort by African leaders to address the continent's structural crises, which are largely driven by global factors, and a response to the opportunities afforded by these very structures. Regional integration aims to promote development, particularly through the enhancement of intraregional trade, which has peaked at a mere 16% of Africa's global trade flow. In this context, the Lagos Plan of Action was adopted in 1980 with the aim of replicating the experience of the ECOWAS in other regions of Africa. Adherence was low and only in 1991, with the Abuja Treaty, in force from 1994, did the concept of Regional Economic Communities become one of the pillars of the integration process. All African countries were thus integrated into one of the eight communities recognized by the AU, the last in 2000. Several of the countries even joined more than one of the communities.

With highly disparate integration processes, the RECs are still subject to criticism, and broader intermediate processes have been considered. These include the expansion of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, CEN-SAD, with a 2013 reconvention of the initial agreement, and the signing of the Tripartite Agreement in 2015 among the members of COMESA, SADC, and EAC. In 2018, another step towards continental integration was taken with the signing of the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement, signed by 53 of the 54 African countries and ratified by 47 AU members, including the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. The challenges for its implementation are numerous, and the RECs remain important platforms for advancing continental integration, albeit in a staggered manner. Thus, a clear understanding of their composition and role in this process is necessary.

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ABSTRACT

The African economic integration process is theoretically in its final stage, following the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement in 2019. However, this article's initial premise is that the reality is more complex. Significant challenges remain in implementing the agreement, including varying stages of development among state bureaucracies and uncertainties regarding the scope of integration. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are crucial mechanisms for advancing African integration, even if progress remains gradual until full continental integration is achieved. This article aims to synthesize the understanding of these regional entities, providing a brief historical overview of their development in relation to various global and regional crises and their impact on African integration. The African Union recognizes eight RECs as part of the economic integration process. However, understanding these communities is complex due to the presence of other regional mechanisms and initiatives, as well as various political subdivisions, such as those employed by the African Union for the geographic rotation of its positions or by the United Nations for regional statistical reporting. The history of the Regional Economic Communities dates back to 1967 with the creation of the East African Community, which was dissolved in 1977. The concept of RECs took its current form in 1975 with the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States. In 1980, the Lagos Plan of Action attempted to replicate this model across other African regions but saw limited adoption. It was not until 1991, with the Abuja Treaty, which established the African Economic Community, that RECs became a fundamental aspect of African integration. Between 1991 and 2000, all African countries joined one of these groups, with most joining multiple communities, as there are no limits on membership.

KEYWORDS

Regional Economic Communities. African Integration. Intra-regional Trade.

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STATE-BUILDING IN POST-1991 ETHIOPIA: EPRDF'S PSEUDO FEDERALISM AND REINCARNATING AUTHORITARIAN CENTRALISATION, AN OVERVIEW AND CRITIQUE

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Introduction

EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front), which captured state power in 1991, restructured the state along ethnic federalism to answer the 'nationalities question'. Ethiopia's federalism is designed to share constitutional power with regional states. Ethiopia's federal exercise under EPRDF (1991-2018) resembles pre-1991 centralist regimes, except for unitary and assimilationist policies aimed at nation-building. Hence, EPRDF's state-building through federalism accommodated diversity, except for political participation and decision-making within the regions' jurisdiction. Andreas, one of the architects of Ethiopia's federalism and a legal philosopher, boldly argues that Ethiopian regional units with strong self-rule over their regions checked on the misuse of centralised power and the illegitimate application of government's power (Andreas 2010).

Andreas' assertion was, at best, narrowly interpreting the right and relative freedom of units in comparison to the pre-1991 political order, and

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at worst, legitimising the federal order from the guardian of jurisprudence. Arguably, compared to the pre-1991 order, power was shared between the centre and periphery, albeit theoretically. However, as far as the theory and praxis of federalism are concerned, there have been no such practices that warrant Andreas' assertion and other scholars vying to substantiate the constitutional practice of federalism. This has sparked political and theoretical debates, except among the pro-EPRDF camp.

States, whether they are small or big, homogeneous or heterogeneous, adopt federalism, considering their local context. In Ethiopia, federalism was adopted to save the country from disintegration, which had elements of holding together (Assefa 2013; Andreas 2013). Enfranchising Ethiopian nations and nationalities and rectifying historical injustices justified Ethiopia's federalism (Clapham 2013). Despite this objective of Ethiopia's federalism, the reality was that it strengthened the political centre's control over the periphery, far from answering the nationalities' questions. This has been a breeding ground for discontent, rivalries, and ethnic tensions, which undermined democratic state-building and constitutional order. Amidst scant scholarly works on the cause for the creeping of authoritarian and highly centralised rule in EPRDF's ethnic federalism, since most scholarly works focus on the effects and limitations of ethnic federalism, this paper examines why federalism lost its stated objective of democratic and constitutional empowerment of nations in post-1991 Ethiopia's state-building.

EPRDF argued that society should be conscious, organised, and empowered to decide its future. To this end, EPRDF sought dominant party status to transform Ethiopia, achieve middle-income status, and create a conducive environment for social or liberal democracy. Despite the EPRDF's objectives, no scholarly work has been produced that connects a dominant party, development, and authoritarian rule in Ethiopia's state-building. Furthermore, there had been major discontent between academia and the government since the latter sought the former to focus and highlight the need for a vanguard party for Ethiopia's transformation and development, which the late PM Meles Zenawi (2011) identified as one area where national consensus was required.

This article contends that the EPRDF's transition to a developmental state model, as well as its desire to become a development-oriented dominant party, forced it to adopt authoritarian elements, though Lata (1999) contends that northerners have embedded authoritarian and hierarchical political culture. EPRDF argued that its strong control over both federal and regional governments enabled it to craft uniform development policies across

the country, implying authoritarian re-centralisation of power at the expense of regional states' self-rule and autonomy. Given this, this article raises two interconnected questions: What ideological and pragmatic considerations/factors influenced the EPRDF's state-building in ethnically and culturally polarised post-1991 Ethiopia? Why did the EPRDF's state-building and alleged federalism fail, resulting in authoritarian re-centralisation and a *de facto* one-party system?

This article explores the intricate nature of post-1991 Ethiopia's state-building process through ethnic federalism, which has significantly impacted Ethiopia's socio-economic and political structure. EPRDF's state-building has led to the "territorialization of ethnicity" (Clapham 2017, 73) and an ethnocratic regime and political economy, concentrating power and economic benefits in the dominant ethnic group of a specific region, marginalizing non-titular residents (Kefale 2012; Clapham 2017). Such a political economy has been sensitive and exacerbated ethnic tensions. Still, no redemptive measure is being taken to rectify the problems nor will have solutions soon. Moreover, the EPRDF's state-building efforts were criticized for encouraging rivalries and unequal distribution of political power and resources, as well as subordinating regions to the federal government. Therefore, it is vital to examine the ideological and pragmatic conditions that led to the authoritarian centralisation of power following the overthrow of the repressive *Därgue* regime in 1991, as well as the failure to address the country's fundamental contradictions through federalism, a new approach to state-building. Therefore, the article critically reviews EPRDF's state-building based on this background.

The article is organized in four sections. The first section situates the rationale for post-1991 Ethiopia's ethnic federalism. The second section discusses ideological and pragmatic factors that contributed to the reincarnation of authoritarian rule in the EPRDF's state-building. The third section presents a critical review of EPRDF's state-building. The last section provides a concluding remark.

Literature review

State-building in pre-1991 Ethiopia

Ethiopia has been a multinational and multicultural state since the late nineteenth century. According to Migdal (2004) the term "nation-states" implies people play a significant role in establishing and maintaining the

state. He argues that in multinational states, it was common for members of one sub-group to view others as dangerous, not fellow citizens (Migdal 2004). In pre-1991 Ethiopia's state-building, diversity was denied and considered a predicament. Bereket (2018, 23) argues that *It'ṣop'ṣawināt* "Ethiopianism" was made the only identity marker. Pre-1991 Ethiopia's state and nation-building objectives, which focused on winning loyalty and creating a cohesive society through assimilation and centralisation, failed and led to the nationalities question (Markakis 2011; Clapham 2017).

The 1974 Ethiopian revolution ended the 800-year-old "Solomonic Dynasty" due to the nationalities' question and failure to address "Land to the Tiller." The military *Därgue* "committee", which assumed power on the pretext of safeguarding the revolution, turned itself state-builder and adopted socialism. In both imperial and *Därgue* regimes, state-building was synonymous with central control, unitarism, and nation-building. Peripheral peoples had to adopt Amharic and integrate into the mainstream national culture of a single ethnic group (Markakis 2011). However, this ambition lacked the necessary cultural, political, economic, and social institutions (Andreas 2010).

Justifying post-1991 Ethiopia's new State-building: Ethnic federalism

Därgue's downfall in 1991 led to the breakdown of the centralized state machinery that had been in the making since 1889 (Clapham 1994). EPRDF introduced federalism and restructured Ethiopia ethnically. Constitutionally guaranteed federalism is Ethiopia's third state-building model after the imperial model of pre-1974 and *Därgue's* socialist model from 1975-1991 (Markakis 2011). EPRDF presented political and historical evidence for ethnic federalism (Clapham 2013). Ethiopia's federalism aimed at addressing political and structural issues of pre-1991 Ethiopia (Lata 1999). In sharp contrast to post-colonial African states, which made the sanctity of the state sacrosanct and built the newly independent states from above, in post-1991 Ethiopia however, federalism, diversity, multiculturalism, and ethnicity have been recognized as the foundation of state-building from below (Clapham 2017). Hence, balancing ethnic demands with the continuity of the state became the agenda of post-conflict Ethiopia's state-building (Andreas 2010). It was from this pragmatism and historical perspective that ethnic federalism was adopted as a panacea to Ethiopia's basic contradictions and a new approach towards state-building.

Proponents of ethnic federalism argue that the old Ethiopian Empire focused on nation-building centred on the socio-cultural aspects of a single

dominant ethnic group. Ethiopia's attempt at centralisation and assimilationist policies starting from the promulgation of the 1931 constitution resulted in high centre-periphery tension and conflict culminated in the outbreak of the 1974 popular revolution and the seventeen-year civil war for self-rule and self-determination, which proved centralisation and assimilationist policy ultimately unsuccessful (Kefale 2003; Markakis 2011). However, the EPRDF's state-building focused on creating a "new Ethiopia" as a home for diverse nations and respecting their identities with their sovereign right to self-rule. Hence, since 1991 ethnic federalism has been seen as a deconstructive strategy aimed at creating a state of nations rather than nation-building (Nahum 1997; Vaughan 2003).

The July 1991 Peace and Democracy Conference and institutionalization of self-determination

At the London conference on May 27, 1991, EPRDF, EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front), and OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) agreed to hold an inclusive transitional conference (Berhe 2020). Despite the OLF's unsuccessful attempt to persuade EPRDF to hold a referendum on Oromo self-determination, it agreed to participate in the two-year transitional period (Shinn 2009; Berhe 2020).

In the transitional conference, sixteen armed liberation movements participated (Berhe, 2020). Lyons (1996) notes that being ethnically based movement was laid as a condition for participation. Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON), multinational and pan-Ethiopianist parties, were excluded from the transitional conference since they refused to renounce armed struggle. Instead, they formed the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF) abroad and organized a conference for a transitional government (Berhe 2020). An agreement with MEISON was unsuccessful due to MEISON's rejection of EPRDF's demand for ethno-nationalities' right to self-determination and secession (Gebbru 2014). The introduction of self-determination, including secession, was considered to undermine pan-Ethiopian patriotism and identity (Lata 1999).

The transitional period failed to maintain pluralistic political views between pan-Ethiopianist and ethno-nationalist forces due to political intransigence, short-term gains, and necessity; though, power was already slanted to the latter. Abebe (2014) argues that multinational forces were systematically excluded from the transition process to prevent them from challenging the new *status quo*. MEISON and EPRP, despite their weak organizational and

military capacities, should have participated in the transitional process and interim administration until the people rejected their political agenda (Gebru 2014). Ethno-nationalists' dominance of the transition created discontent among political elites and discredited and delegitimized the Transitional Conference.

The Transitional Conference made self-determination a key point, addressing the root cause of Ethiopia's national contradiction and conflict, marking the end of the war and "peace-building" in post-conflict Ethiopia (Lata 1999). Lata argues that the transitional peace and democracy conference and the charter recognized self-determination as a crucial roadmap for peace and peace-building. Specifically, EPRDF argued that addressing armed liberation movements' demands and ensuring peace in Ethiopia required ensuring their right to self-determination (Bereket 2018). EPRDF argued that it was in this context that Eritreans held a referendum, and the right to self-determination is explicitly included in the Transitional Charter (Art. 2) and the current FDRE (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia) constitution (Art. 39). The EPRDF regime prioritized peace and democratization as the pillar of the Ethiopian state, aiming to prevent disintegration after the Därgue regime's downfall (Bereket 2018).

The Transitional Conference was a missed opportunity for a consociational approach and democratic state-building. It disregarded this imperative and the fundamental reality by primarily focusing on the 'right of nationalities' or the victors and ignoring pan-Ethiopian nationalism that had been developing (Abebe 2014). EPRDF excluded multinational parties since it believed that the *Därgue's* defeat in the battle validated its strategy of placing the cause of Ethiopian nationalities on the right track of the struggle (Young 1996). This had bolstered and hardened the TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front)/EPRDF's stance to repeat its military strategy and discipline in the realm of state-building. Consequently, EPRDF's state-building hindered Ethiopian nations' autonomy and self-rule, resulting in an authoritarian and centralist regime in a different form and structure.

The Transitional Charter and restructuring of the State along ethnicity

The 1991 Transitional Charter marked a significant shift towards democratic constitutional deliberation, involving diverse political forces, civil society, and independent individuals, excluding pan-Ethiopianist and multinational organizations. The political culture of Ethiopia, before this, involved the sovereign issuing laws through *awaj* or "proclamation". Lata

(1999) contends that the Transitional Charter's four principles: rule of law, coalition government, democratic state restructuring, and just peace, served as an 'earthly principle' to control the government for the very first time in Ethiopia's political history. He also argues that the democratic discussion of the Transitional Charter made the Oromos and southern peoples feel like partners in constructing the "new Ethiopia." Consequently, a coalition government with diverse political views was formed and run, the first of its kind in Ethiopia.

The Transitional Charter reconstructed the Ethiopian state based on the victor powers' political platform. The Charter sought to end hostilities, heal wounds, realize just peace, and establish a democratic system as a "categorical imperative" for "new Ethiopia's" state-building. The Charter in its preamble explicitly stipulated that:

The overthrow of the military dictatorship...presents a historical moment, providing the peoples of Ethiopia with the opportunity to rebuild the country and restructure the state democratically;... the demise of the military government marks the end of an era of subjugation and oppression thus starting a new chapter in Ethiopian history in which freedom, equal rights, and self-determination shall be the governing principles of political, economic and social life and thereby contributing to the welfare of the Ethiopian Peoples and rescuing them from centuries of subjugation and backwardness (Transitional Period Charter 1991).

The Charter is the first political and legal document that stipulated and affirmed the nationalities' question. The Charter explicitly in its Art. 2 says, "The right of nations, nationalities, and peoples to self-determination is affirmed" (Transitional Period Charter 1991). Furthermore, it stipulated that "each nation, nationality, and people is guaranteed the right to exercise its right to self-determination of independence when the concerned nation/nationality and people are convinced that the above rights are denied, abridged or abrogated" (Transitional Period Charter 1991). (Art.2 (c)). It also provided for the establishment of local and regional governments based on nationality (Art.13) (Transitional Period Charter 1991).

To facilitate Ethiopian nations' and nationalities' right to self-rule and reconfigure the state, a boundary commission delineated administrative borders between regions, which restructured Ethiopia into ethnically defined federal states (Vaughan 2003). The commission used maps and ethnic classifications from the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities (ISEN), established in 1984 by the *Därgue* regime. Finally, Proclamation

7/1992 established the new “National Self-Governments” in January 1992 (Vaughan 2003).

Method of data collection and analysis

This article applied a qualitative exploratory methodology to critically review EPRDF’s state-building in post-1991 Ethiopia. The rationale of this methodology was to examine what factors contributed to the creeping of authoritarianism and centralisation of power in a *de jure* federalized Ethiopia’s second republic. Hence secondary sources or pieces of literature related to the topic were used for empirical data sources and analysis. The data collected for this study were analyzed using techniques of qualitative data analysis. Hence, the data from the secondary and primary sources were studied through thematic and content investigation. The authenticity and validity of the data were verified by cross-checking various sources and documents. This helped to identify the basic themes for analysis and reach a conclusion.

Results and discussions

This part of the article explores and analyzes the intricate factors that contributed to EPRDF’s authoritarian state-building and the centralisation of political power at the expense of regional states.

The Oromo Liberation Front’s (OLF) withdrawal from the transition

The transitional period was Ethiopia’s first democratic opening, and different political forces participated in it (Lata 1999). However, the opposition had left the transitional process to undermine its legitimacy (Assefa 2012). The following section discusses the Oromo Liberation Front’s (OLF) withdrawal and its repercussions on the democratization of the country in general and the centralization of power by the EPRDF in particular.

The pulling out of OLF, the second powerful entity, from the regional and local elections and the coalition government in 1992 discredited the Transition. Hence, OLF’s withdrawal was one of the challenges of the Transition and it partly contributed to the authoritarian nature of EPRDF since OLF’s social base in Oromia was put under EPRDF’s OPDO (Oromo People’s Democratic Organization).

OLF withdrew from the coalition government and boycotted the 1992 elections due to EPRDF's intimidation (Lata 1999; Shinn 2009). Despite democratic transition systems being established, political divisions among Ethiopian elites led to challenges in prioritizing short-term goals over long-term state development (Berhe 2020). The OLF's withdrawal from the transitional government, due to differing objectives and suspicion vis-à-vis EPRDF, hindered the democratization process of the country. OLF's basic objective has been to realize the Oromo people's right to self-determination³. The OLF claimed that the Oromos constitute half of Ethiopia's population⁴. So, it demanded political power that would be commensurate with the Oromo population (Shinn 2009; Clapham 2017). This was a strategic mistake of EPRDF since OLF was popular among the peoples of Oromo and it could be a real partner in the democratization of the country.

OLF too, made a political mistake, fell into EPRDF's political trap, and finally vacated the political arena to the latter. OLF resorted to an armed struggle that challenged the government's stabilization efforts (Berhe 2020), which gave EPRDF a chance to clear the road for dominance. Lyons (2013) argues that consolidating political power rather than power sharing and reconciliation dictates political transitions following rebel triumphs.

The withdrawal of OLF from the Ethiopian government was also rooted in disagreement with the EPRDF over peace, security, and democratization. Clapham (2017) notes that the EPRDF rejected the OLF as the legitimate Oromo representative, preferring the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation (OPDO) to administer Oromo. The OLF's weak organization, incoherent policy, and difficult demands tested the EPRDF's willingness to collaborate with autonomous groups. Moreover, EPRDF and OLF had mutual suspicion and couldn't get along, according to EPRDFs' self-appraisal (Gebru 2014; Clapham 2017; Berhe 2020). Berhe also notes that:

In many ways, the EPRDF believed that the discipline of its army, its leadership's diligence in leading the nation towards peace and stability, and its progressive agenda for transforming the nation towards development had set a standard against which the other political actions could be measured. The EPRDF, for example, believed the OLF during the transition period could show the people of Oromia what it could do. In a short period, the OLF assembled over 30,000 armed personnel mainly from the defunct army of the [*Därgue*, which] the people knew for its brutality (Berhe 2020, 180).

³ OLF's political programme (2012) emphasises self-determination for the Oromo people and others in Ethiopia as the key criterion for collaboration with other political parties.

⁴ Based on the 2007 population census, Oromo constituted 36.7% of Ethiopia's population.

According to Lata (1999), despite the democratic credentials of the Peace and Democracy Conference and the formation of the TGE, the EPRDF ultimately restored one-party *Därgue* rule instead of the envisioned pluralistic order. The OLF's withdrawal was a setback for Ethiopia's democratization and the establishment of genuine power-sharing mechanisms. OLF's departure in 1992 led to the EPRDF's dominance and undermined the constitutional empowerment of Ethiopian nations and nationalities. Subsequently, the EPRDF-led government suffered legitimacy losses, which it tried to compensate for by bringing peace, stability, and development internally, and collaborating in the fight against terrorism externally.

In transitional societies and politics, the role of the opposition parties is enormous. The absence of a strong opposition implies the absence of governmental accountability and checks and balances within different benches of government. Generally, the Ethiopian opposition parties because of different factors failed to participate in the transitional process, which in this aspect contributed to the authoritarian re-centralisation of power.

Revolutionary democracy: The Ethiopian version of democracy

The EPRDF (1991-2018) adopted revolutionary democracy as Ethiopia's version of democratic revolution. Meles Zenawi, chairman of TPLF, EPRDF, and Ethiopia's PM (1991-2012), authored Ethiopia's revolutionary democracy, which was adopted as the foundation of EPRDF's state-building efforts in post-1991 Ethiopia. According to Meles, revolutionary democracy was the appropriate doctrine should Ethiopia embark on sustainable economic development (Berhe 2020). Lenin's opposition to capitalist ideology resulted in the concept of revolutionary democracy, which served as a link between pre-capitalist and socialist societies. Many countries adopted it during the Cold War but then abandoned it (Bach 2011). Bereket Simon, the second ideologue of revolutionary democracy after Meles, argues that revolutionary democracy in Ethiopia uprooted the ruling classes' oppression, paving the way for democracy and peoples' rights (Bereket 2018).

EPRDF's revolutionary democracy faced internal and external challenges. Externally, EPRDF faced the challenge of reconciling revolutionary democracy with the prevailing neoliberalism (Berhe 2020). EPRDF had pragmatically renounced its Marxist-Leninist ideology⁵ and accepted liberal economic and political reforms and principles to lessen pressure from Wes-

5 Bereket Simon (2018) provides details on the EPRDF's pragmatic shift from socialism to a market system benefiting Ethiopians (Bereket Simon 2018, 33-42).

tern powers (Bach 201; Gebru 2014; Berhe 2020). The EPRDF utilized its hybrid democracy and structure, specifically designed for military conflict, to establish a government without fundamentally altering its revolutionary democratic beliefs (Gebru 2014). During the transitional period, liberal institutions were appropriated by EPRDF to support its revolutionary democracy, which was “neither revolutionary nor democratic” (Bach 2011, 643, 653). Accordingly, liberal democracy secured external support and legitimacy, while revolutionary democracy remained the core ideology of EPRDF (Abbink 2011).

Internally, given the EPRDF's strong adherence to Marxism-Leninism and the pressure exerted by its armed fighters, it demonstrated a commitment to socialism. The EPRDF implemented revolutionary democracy due to these circumstances. This helped to convey to the West that the EPRDF abandoned socialism and practices Western-style democracy, despite revolutionary terminology (Henze 1990; Gebru 2014). Accordingly, when the EPRDF took power, revolutionary democracy became the guiding paradigm of state-building, but liberal democratic values were integrated into the Transitional Charter, though contrasted with each other.

EPRDF adopted revolutionary democracy despite Ethiopians' desire for Western-style liberal democracy. Some argue that the EPRDF adopted revolutionary democracy due to its Marxist influence, while others assert it was borrowed from Albanian democracy, favoured by Meles, and wanted to replicate its authentic socialist philosophy, as opposed to Soviet imperialism and Chinese “national bourgeoisie” (Henze 1990; Berhe 2009). However, Meles Zanawi's discussion with Samuel Huntington, who was in Ethiopia in 1993 to assist the Ethiopian Constitutional Commission, may have influenced and theoretically advised the EPRDF's insistence on revolutionary democracy, which it believes best suits Ethiopia's socioeconomic realities. In a discussion with Huntington (1993), Meles asked:

Professor Huntington, I have read your book *The Third Wave*. According to your analysis, countries become democratic after they have become wealthy. Ethiopia is an extremely poor country, very far from having a high level of economic development. Does that mean that democracy is impossible in [Ethiopia]? (Huntington 1993, 2).

Huntington's response was the overall balance of economic, social, and other conditions in Ethiopia was not favourable to democratization. ‘Does this mean that democracy of any sort is impossible?’ Not necessarily. So, he advised Meles:

Conceivably, [...] other types of democratic systems could be created in Ethiopia. Whether it is or not depends overwhelmingly on the extent to which political leaders want to create an Ethiopian democracy. Political regimes are created not by preconditions but by political leaders (Huntington 1993, 3).

Huntington's suggestion made EPRDF firmly embrace revolutionary democracy, deeming it more suitable for Ethiopian conditions than liberal democracy. Tronvol (2009) supports this and argues that "liberal democracy is a misfit" given Ethiopia's social, economic, and political circumstances.

Patriarchal traditions in Ethiopia may influence the adoption of revolutionary democracy. The ruling party, which was all-knowing, must guide its social base, rural society, in what is best for it. Former PM Hailemariam Desalegn once said that "due to poor education and illiteracy, the Ethiopian public is too underdeveloped to make a well-reasoned, informed decision, and so revolutionary democracy is the political bridge through which the 'enlightened leaders' can lead the people to democracy (Global Security 2018).

Difference between revolutionary democracy and liberal democracy

In *Sovereignty and Democracy in Ethiopia*, Gebru Asrat (2014) contrasts revolutionary and liberal democracy. Revolutionary democracy is class-based, segregates citizens into allies and adversaries, denies oppressors' rights, and advocates vanguard party control. In contrast, liberal democracy prioritizes individual interests, equality for all citizens, and the leadership of competent and qualified citizens in political, economic, and social activities (Gebru 2014).

There are two key differences between liberal and revolutionary democracy: liberal democracy prioritizes individual rights, while revolutionary democracy focuses on the advancement and protection of collective rights. Revolutionary democracy rejects representative and parliamentary systems of administration in favour of real people-power (Bach 2011). Berhe, citing Meles, argues that liberal democracy is based on zero-sum politics and electoral short-termism, transforming political parties into patronage machines while failing to address society's core concerns (Zenawi 2006 *apud* Berhe 2020). Revolutionary democracy, on the other hand, prioritizes the disenfranchised majority's political rights over the wealthy elite's interests (EPRDF 2001 *apud* Berhe 2020).

In the words of Vaughan (2011), revolutionary democracy calls for a direct “coalition with the public”⁶ as opposed to the covert “coalitions” between politicians that multi-party pluralism is characterized by. This is the reason why EPRDF negates parliamentary democracy since it does not represent and empower the people. So, EPRDF created a coalition of forces among the state, the party, and the grassroots people as a “developmental army” (Berhe 2020, 231). Finally, EPRDF's policy divided citizens into friends and enemies, as capitalists, bureaucrats, chauvinists, narrow thinkers, anti-people, anti-development, anti-peace, and other appellations and labelling were used to deny citizens' basic rights, such as political power through contested elections in urban areas and land or other services in rural areas (Gebru 2014).

Dominant/vanguard party

Another distinguishing feature of EPRDF's state-building, perhaps resulting from revolutionary democracy, is its rejection of political pluralism and multi-party systems in favour of the vanguard party model. Bach (2011) asserts that revolutionary democracy was utilized as a “discursive instrument” to exclude and marginalize political opponents. According to Abbink (2011), the Vanguard party is a direct result of revolutionary Marxist-Leninist doctrine and opposes the concept of transferring power through elections, even if elections have been held. Elections in post-conflict states like Ethiopia serve as part of legitimizing the process (Bach 2011) and bolstering authoritarian governments rather than state-building through liberalization (Lyons 2013). Without the threat of electoral defeat, dominant parties may feel they “own” the political system and strive to constrain other centres of power. Political criticism is often viewed as “irresponsible and divisive” (Handley, Murray and Simeon 2008).

Ethiopia has held elections since 1992, although they have not followed Western norms. According to Zakaria, Ethiopian democracy is one of the “illiberal democracies” (1997, 23), since the “popularly elected” government committed a series of constitutional breaches and violations of fundamental rights and liberties. As a result, critics claim that EPRDF's revolutionary democracy is undemocratic and dismissive of alternative viewpoints. Clapham (2017) notes that Ethiopians must accept the regime's hegemony to participate in government. This state-building strategy angered urban

6 Sara Vaughan interviewed Meles in 1994 and he said that “in agricultural areas, we do not make coalitions with elites: the only coalition we want to make is with the people” (Vaughan 2011, 622).

intellectuals, political parties, and groups that embraced democratic ideals and expected the EPRDF to be more democratic than previous regimes.

The EPRDF's refusal to commit to parliamentary democracy or Western-style liberal democracy is understandable, as Hopkinson (2017) argues that "multi-party elections do not guarantee democracy afterward". He argues that "society requires a continuous voice to ensure government accountability" (Hopkinson 2017, 45). Thus, taking genuine societal interests as a measure of democracy, rather than frequent administration changes through multiparty or parliamentary democracy, makes it logical why EPRDF insisted on being Ethiopia's vanguard party.

Ethnic federalism

The federal formula in post-1991 Ethiopia's state-building approach was necessary to prevent the disintegration of the highly centralized Ethiopian empire (Assefa 2012). The introduction of ethnic federalism has effectively resolved the country's identity-based armed conflicts, which were threatening its territorial integrity (Berhe and Gebresilassie 2021). The federal state-building dispensation has granted previously marginalized groups and minorities unprecedented political and institutional recognition (Andreas 2010). Pan-Ethiopianism forces however argued that ethnic-based federalism could encourage ethno-nationalists to separate from the Ethiopian state.

EPRDF claimed to restructure Ethiopia to address structural and historical causes of conflict and meet ethno-nationalities' quest for self-rule and self-determination. However pan-Ethiopianist forces and unionist organisations have been questioning the true motive of the federal initiative. Temesgen (2015) asserts that the EPRDF utilized ethnic federalism as part of its "divide and rule" policy to maintain power and institutionalize minority dominance. However, Kefale (2003) contends that the EPRDF leadership cannot use Ethiopia's federal experience to maintain power. However, with the twin goals of establishing a democratic political system and a fully decentralized federal administration, expecting these in a country lacking such experience is problematic.

Opponents of ethnic federalism have been arguing that the government's suppression of unity over diversity increases the risk of interethnic violence and national disintegration (Mennasemay 2003; Selassie 2003; Temesgen 2015). However, given the alignment of ethno-nationalist forces, ethnic-based politics was inevitable during the transitional period. Fesesha (2010) contends that any constitution that deviates from the trajectories of

past mistakes should recognize ethnicity. Ethiopian ethnic federalism has the potential to solve Ethiopia's political crisis (Nahum 1997). Hence, ethnic federalism was the only way to ensure Ethiopia's stability and continuity (Fiseha 2012).

Andreas boldly claimed back in 2010 that Ethiopian federalism has addressed two fundamental goals, without which it is difficult to pursue other public goods⁷. These are "Ethiopia's survival and the establishment of legitimate political authority" (Andreas 2010, 43). He further claimed that because of federalism, nations, nationalities, and peoples are convinced that instead of rejecting Ethiopia, they should collaborate to create an authentic system of government for harmonious relations and unity.

Ethiopia's ethnic federalism, despite fear from unionist and pan-Ethiopianist forces, ensured the continuation of the Ethiopian state. The EPRDF's centrist nature allowed this, though component units' *de jure* rights to self-determination up to secession are guaranteed (See Art. 39). However, the regime exercised *de facto* and unconstitutional power by controlling both the federal government and regional states, compromising regional states' constitutional prerogatives. Consequently, the centralist and authoritarian rule of the EPRDF allowed for the unity and territorial integrity of the Ethiopian state despite the condition of secession. The promising economic growth registered through EPRDF's leadership could also be seen as a factor in making unity attractive along with ethnic federalism, despite opposition.

Asafa Jalata, an Oromo nationalist who subscribes to the colonial thesis, opposes the benefits of federalism in the survival of the country and argues that Ethiopian federalism is a continuation of Abyssinian (northerners) colonial efforts against southern Ethiopians under the guise of "promoting democracy, federalism, and national self-determination" (Jalata 2009, 207). He believes that federal discourse is irrelevant to the emancipation of Ethiopian nations and nationalities from northerners' colonialism and state terrorism and that the benefits of federalism in the survival of the country are not significant.

The developmental State model

Ethiopia attempted the "developmental state" from 2001-2018. A developmental state has been needed to address poverty in Ethiopia since 2001 (Gebresenbet 2014). In EPRDF-led Ethiopia, development was secu-

⁷ These include: democratic values and practices, culture of peace, the rule of law, secularism, a free press, competitive political parties, and free associations (Andreas 2010, 43).

ritized and failure to develop Ethiopia would be an existential threat to the Ethiopian state and the equal rights of Ethiopia's nations and nationalities (Fana 2015). EPRDF, unlike its predecessors, identified poverty as the sole enemy of Ethiopia, and tackling it should be one area of national consensus to be reached, and rapid economic development centred on the benefits of the people should be the pillar of Ethiopia's national security policy and strategy (FDRE 2002; Zenawi 2011). Meles believed that lasting peace or the likelihood of a sustainable political community is unlikely unless rapid development and breakdown with starvation and enduring poverty is made (Andreas 2013).

The EPRDF regime recognized the pitfalls of the neoliberal development model, highlighting market failures and poverty traps in developing countries, prompting concerted political action (Zenawi 2011) than transforming Ethiopia into development through the minimalist and “night watchman” role of the state. Meles argued that the active role of government should be focused on enhancing the economy's capacity for value creation and assisting the private sector in becoming more competitive (Berhe 2020).

The remarkable development achievement in East Asia—principally in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan—and the major role of the state in these countries have facilitated the emergence of the developmental state (Zenawi 2011). The features of the East Asian developmental state i.e. rapid economic growth, the high degree of state intervention in the economy, and the state's focus on industrialization somehow characterize the Ethiopian developmental state (Hauge and Chang 2019).

The developmental state is a political economy that encompasses anti-neoliberal economic models. A developmental State is characterized by a highly interventionist approach, distinct from neoliberalism or *laissez-faire* political economic principles. Simply in the developmental state, it is the state that manages the market and plays a developmental role (Zenawi 2011). The state's primary objective is economic growth through industrialization (Hauge and Chang 2019). The developmental state has four basic attributes. These are (1) capable, autonomous (but embedded) bureaucracy; (2) development-oriented political leadership; (3) symbiotic relationship between some state agencies and key industrial capitalists; and (4) successful policy intervention that promotes growth (Routley 2012).

Legitimacy, a crucial concept in developmental states, is primarily secured through economic growth and development, rather than through popular elections. According to Mkandawire (2001, 289), a “developmental state has two components: one ideological and the other structural.” The ideological dimension refers to the mission of the state which brings sustain-

nable development, which helps win legitimacy. The structural one refers to the national capacity to execute national economic policies effectively, which is conditioned by institutional, technical, administrative, and political factors. The concept of legitimacy through development has not prevented the developmental state from escalating into authoritarianism (Hauge and Chang 2019).

However, Johnson (1999) argues that the legitimacy of developmental states should not be explicated by the state-society relation of the Western countries. EPRDF argued that Ethiopia's diverse society is not conducive to authoritarian rule, as it has adopted all features of the developmental state but its authoritarian nature. It argued that Ethiopia cannot afford to become undemocratic and authoritarian like Asian societies that are more or less homogeneous (Bereket 2018). EPRDF claims Ethiopia cannot afford authoritarian rule but has imposed it, violating federalism and self-rule. The developmental state promotes a pro-dominant party system, requiring a single party to hold power for extended periods of time in order to achieve economic development and sectoral transformation. In this regard, Zenawi (2006) argued that in a democratic system, there is always some degree of uncertainty about policy continuity. More harmful to development, politicians will be unable to think beyond the next election. As a result, it is argued that the developmental state must be undemocratic to retain power long enough to achieve successful development (Zenawi 2006). The EPRDF's ambition for economic development and transformation drove it to maintain power through repeated elections, resulting in the erosion of democracy and the consolidation of authoritarian rule.

Politicized bureaucracy

The developmental state requires strong state institutions and a competent bureaucracy headed by autonomous civil servants to guide the private sector toward economic growth (Hauge and Chang 2019). Peter Evans calls this "embedded autonomy" that implies that the bureaucracy to be called "developmental had to be effectively 'embedded' in society through a concrete set of connections that link the state intimately and aggressively to particular social groups with whom the state shares a joint project of transformation" (Evans 1995).

EPRDF's revolutionary democracy-based state-building model is challenging to classify as developmental due to its use of party members and cadres for State bureaucracy rather than merit-based appointment. Oqubay (2015) argues that the bureaucracy inherited from *Därgu's* authoritarian rule

was politically hostile to the new EPRDF-led government, necessitating its rebuilding with political indoctrination and professional competencies. He also argues that the EPRDF's power, organizational structure, and leadership had to be used to address bureaucratic shortcomings. However, it has been observed that EPRDF's revolutionary democracy was discriminatory and alienated highly educated people from the bureaucracy, while the educated elites were also ethnically aligned and politically antagonistic to the regime, cementing the authoritarian tendency of the regime.

The alienation of educated elites was in direct opposition to the principle of participatory governance, the developmental state, one of whose distinguishing features is the need for broad support for its development agenda, and the EPRDF's insistence on fighting poverty through development, which, according to Zenawi (2011), requires widespread support and national consensus. Furthermore, the mechanism of "criticism and self-criticism," wherein the lower, middle, and upper leadership, including civil servants, had to pass through a series of evaluation procedures based on party lines and platforms (Vaughan 2003), was a contributing factor in alienating the bureaucracy.

The 1-5 household arrangement

EPRDF's authoritarian nature was reflected in the 1-5 household or neighbourhood arrangement, which the regime dubbed "a development army". This politico-social arrangement facilitated communal economic activities. But, in addition to its economic and development aspects, the political one is significant because the regime used its lower administrative tiers to spy on and control the EPRDF's rural social base. The arrangement was used for political indoctrination, strengthening grassroots structures, and implementing development policies. Kefale (2003) notes that the lowest tiers of Ethiopia's administrative structures, *Wäräda* and *Käbäle*, were pivotal in executing policies and raising the political consciousness and control of the people.

Ethiopia's political culture

EPRDF is the result of the Ethiopian Students' Movement (ESM) and the radical revolutionary elites who still believe in zero-sum politics, which resulted in many casualties and losses for the state just because of tactical differences, not ideological ones. Particularly, the long-held political culture of northerners is accustomed to authoritarian and hierarchical rule (Lata 1999), which the EPRDF cannot eschew. The EPRDF leadership was hierarchical,

rigid, and procedural, limiting democratic freedom for its members. Even its leadership had to follow democratic centralism and wait for directions for political, social, and economic decisions. It can be argued that democratic deliberation only worked for the top EPRDF's politburo members, who used to take long days to deliberate on national issues and come to decisions either through consensus or majority decision.

The fight against terrorism

After 9/11, the EPRDF regime presented itself as a trusted and viable partner in the fight against global terrorism and combating jihadist forces in the Horn of Africa. This convinced the US government not to pressurize the Meles-led EPRDF regime to undertake political reforms and widen the democratic environment. Therefore, a blend of internal and external factors contributed to the creeping of authoritarian rule in 27 years of EPRDF rule.

Critique of EPRDF's State-building

EPRDF's State-building can be criticized from political, social, and economic aspects. Politically, contrary to what Andreas (2010) claimed, Ethiopia's federal experience under the EPRDF's State-building did not cultivate political pluralism as it succeeded in cultural aspects. It has caused massive political inequality and instability. Ethiopia's federalism neither succeeded in the creation of one political community, as stipulated in the preamble of the FDRE Constitution, nor achieved national cohesion, solidarity, freedom, and equality with the constituent units, let alone amongst Ethiopians, except for the upper echelon of the ruling elites who were tied up to the party through the party's democratic centralism and consensus-making on political issues.

EPRDF's federalism-based state-building has been criticized for its lack of democratization and empowerment of the periphery, as it has established a strong authoritarian bureaucracy and state structure under the guise of federalism. Moreover, EPRDF's federal state-building, based on ethnic federalism, is criticized for deviating from its founding principles.

EPRDF's state-building through ethnic federalism and the principle of self-determination has had far-reaching consequences. Ethnic federalism and self-determination have led to a rise in "we" and "they" politics among ethnic groups and the general population. Abebe (2014) notes elites' social, economic, and political interactions become more ethnically aware, resulting

in stronger prejudice and bias. Inter-ethnic hostility and distrust are visible even at grassroots levels, as decades of social capital and inter-communal peace have collapsed. Ethnic entrepreneurs can exploit this by exploiting ethnicity's instrumentalist values for perceived economic and political purposes.

The perceived economic and political disparities in the country due to the ethnocratic nature of the country's federal experience continue the vicious circle of conflict in Ethiopia that creates social inequality, regional disparity, and a step backward in the transformation of Ethiopia, complementing the existing socio-economic crisis and complicating efforts of reconciliation and peace-building. As a result, the prevalence of social and economic inequality downsizes public participation in social, economic, and political realms and creates a conducive environment for authoritarian rule. According to Pelke (2020), authoritarian governments do not worry about economic inequality as a reason for anti-regime mobilization.

Socially, the very federalism intended to promote unity and diversity has instead fuelled ethnic tensions, rivalries and intensified social cleavages, fostering animosity and disunity among Ethiopians. In the economic arena, the economic progress was promising and registered some double digits. However, genuine development and transformation have become secondary since the system created ethnocratic elites, who benefited from patronage systems and were primary beneficiaries, though quite a few of them were labelled as "rent collectors," and even some of them penetrated deep into the state, achieved state capture, and contributed to the 2018 political reforms. EPRDF's federal experience deviated from theory and praxis and created a strong authoritarian centralized polity, which in the end swallowed the very party that created the system.

Finally, in EPRDF's state-building, what was practised was the reversal of the principles EPRDF claimed to stand for and that of the Transitional Charter and the FDRE constitution's preamble, Art. 8 (sovereignty of the people); Art. 9 (supremacy of the constitution); Art. 10 (human and democratic rights); Art. 25 (right to equality); Art. 39 (rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples); Art. 52 (powers and functions of states); all these had been explicitly and implicitly violated, slanting power to the centre, otherwise made weak by the constitution. It can be argued that EPRDF's practices set a precedent for successors to evade constitutional federalism, perpetuating repression and further centralisation at the expense of regional States.

Conclusion

Since 1991, Ethiopia has undergone significant political restructuring under EPRDF, leading to ethnic federalization. This was aimed at addressing the “nationalities’ question” mitigating centre-periphery conflict and enfranchising Ethiopian nations and nationalities’ quest for recognition and self-rule. Unlike the previous unitarist regimes, EPRDF also introduced the Ethiopian nations’ right to self-determination including secession, arguing that Ethiopia should be built voluntarily rather than through coercion. Proponents of the new state-building dispensation argue that without the 1991 Transitional Charter and multinational federalism, the story of post-1991 Ethiopia would have been different.

The Transitional Conference in Ethiopia was the first democratic opening in the country’s political history, though it was dominated by the victors of the armed struggle, the EPRDF and OLF. It also produced the Transitional Charter, empowering Ethiopian nations and nationalities’ rights to autonomy and self-rule. It was argued that despite this provision and political empowerment, the EPRDF, which claimed to be champion of the nationalities’ cause and federalism, turned to authoritarian centralisation, undermining the principle and praxis of federalism. Many factors contributed to the EPRDF’s authoritarian centralisation of power. The OLF’s withdrawal, which represented the second largest constituency, not only harmed the transitional government and the democratization process of post-conflict Ethiopia but also contributed to EPRDF’s authoritarian rule. Ethiopia could have experienced true power-sharing and consociational democracy had the OLF not withdrawn.

EPRDF-led Ethiopia’s state-building has implemented policy frameworks such as self-determination, ethnic federalism, revolutionary democracy, and the developmental state since 2001. Despite internal and external challenges and criticisms, the EPRDF aimed to create a strong and united Ethiopia where the aspirations of Ethiopian nations and nationalities would be realized, building a democratic and federated Ethiopia. To this end, EPRDF assumed itself to be the vanguard party of the country by winning elections repeatedly. It argued that to bring rural transformation, industrialization, and a middle-class urban society, it would be imperative for the EPRDF to win elections so that it can execute development policies uninterrupted. Furthermore, it argued that its revolutionary democracy and developmental line lay the future social base for social or liberal democracy. However, the EPRDF has been criticized for its ambitious plan to achieve economic transformation

through a dominant party, which has made Ethiopia a *de facto* one-party state, limiting the participation of other parties in the country's politics.

EPRDF's discourse on revolutionary democracy and developmental state prioritized peace and development, but the regime had subordinated democracy and built an authoritarian order. This has led to dissenting voices and forced citizens to seek alternative means of change. For example, the Oromo youths, *Qerro*, have challenged the regime unconstitutionally since 2016, forcing political reforms in 2018. The Oro-Mara coalition (a tactical alliance between Oromo and Amhara elites within the EPRDF's coalition) halted TPLF/EPRDF's 27-year dominance, shifting political power and state-building discourse to the south.

Finally, the Ethiopian people's demand for radical change caused the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution. The *Därgue*, which hijacked the revolution, adopted the "Land to the Tiller," Ethiopian Students' slogan, and issued a land proclamation, allowing Ethiopia's tenants to own land, except their produce. In 1991, the EPRDF's armed struggle successfully overthrew the dictatorial *Därgue* regime, providing another opportunity for people's political empowerment. EPRDF committed itself to addressing the remaining issues facing Ethiopian peoples, including democracy, self-rule, and political empowerment. However, EPRDF again hijacked the people's struggle and reincarnated authoritarian centralisation by introducing pseudo-democracy and federalism. The question is where does the state go amidst ongoing political turmoil? Is it democracy or anocracy of another round and in different forms?

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ABSTRACT

This article deals with post-1991 Ethiopia's state-building crafted by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a guerrilla movement turned state-builder. EPRDF captured state power in 1991, introduced federalism, and restructured the state along ethnic lines to answer the nationalities' questions. Ethiopia designed federalism to share constitutional power with regional states, albeit theoretically. A critical review of Ethiopia's federal exercise showed that EPRDF did not share power with component units per federalism's praxis. Rather, it reincarnated authoritarian power centralisation under the guise of federalism. A regime that claimed to be a champion of addressing oppressed nations' quest for recognition, self-rule, and autonomy ended up being authoritarian and characterized as one of the most highly centralized governments the country has ever seen. A qualitative exploratory approach was employed to examine what factors contributed to the creeping of authoritarianism and power re-centralisation in a de jure federalized Ethiopia's second republic. The findings indicated that EPRDF implemented a combination of ideologically-oriented cum pragmatic policies to build Ethiopia. Accordingly, revolutionary democracy, dominant party, ethnic federalism, developmental state model,

politicized bureaucracy, 1-5 household arrangement, Ethiopia's political culture, the opposition's withdrawal, the fight against terrorism, and EPRDF's determination to repeat wartime strategies and disciplines to state-building contributed to authoritarian reincarnation and power re-centralisation.

KEYWORDS

Authoritarian re-centralisation. Consociational democracy. Democratic centralism. Developmental State. Ethiopia. Revolutionary democracy.

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MEDIATION DYNAMICS AND COMMITMENTS FOR PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE (1989-2019)

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Introduction

In the period immediately following the proclamation of independence, a civil war broke out in Mozambique, with the main belligerents being the government of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)³ and the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO)⁴, an insurgent movement made up mostly of FRELIMO dissidents who disagreed with the direction the country was taking. According to Nowak (2012), conflicts and desires for peaceful relations coexist in human nature. It was in this context that, after a negotiation process, the Rome Agreement was signed in 1992, with the objective of achieving peace. According to Galtung (1995), this is a phenomenon characterized as a framework in which conflict manifests itself in a non-violent and creative way.

The vast literature available on the peace process in Mozambique focuses on the analysis of the leading role of the two main belligerents. There

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³ In the original: “*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO)*”.

⁴ In the original: “*Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO)*”.

is a gap in the detailed understanding of the commitment of mediators and observers to achieving sustainable peace. To this end, the first stage of the article is reserved for addressing the dynamics of mediation between the various levels of actors, supported by the theory of multi-track diplomacy which, according to McDonald (2012), is a paradigm that seeks to identify and understand the causes of conflicts within a nation, and seek to develop mutual understanding between the parties in conflict, through multifaceted diplomacy, with the involvement of both government actors and private institutions, using multiple channels of communication, aiming at reconciliation and pacification of the nation. Subsequently, the commitment to peace on the part of the FRELIMO government and the former rebel movement, RENAMO, is analyzed. Thus, the research has the following guiding question: how has mediation occurred and what is the commitment to peace between the belligerents?

The approach to mediation dynamics may allow us to understand the trajectories of the peace process in the face of contradictory ideologies, not only in the pretexts that determined the civil war (1977-1992), but also in how the Rome Peace Agreement was possible. Understanding the phenomenon suggests the obedience of path dependency, a mechanism that consolidates the understanding of the present, following the paths that determined the present itself. Associated with the political culture rooted in the heart of the main proponents, the data presented will allow us to understand the success or failure of the thirty years of implementation of the Rome Peace Agreement, which, from a formal point of view, brought a series of social and political reforms.

The civil war and the stalemate on the battlefields

Two years after independence, Mozambique was immersed in a war. The government led by FRELIMO called it a war of destabilization, while its opponent, RENAMO, characterized it as a war for democracy. However, given the *modus operandi* of the conflict, the most appropriate name is civil war. In the first half of the 1980s, the Mozambican government showed itself unwilling to negotiate with the insurgents who, in official discourse, were considered armed bandits and reactionaries to independence. This unwillingness was due to the fact that FRELIMO was convinced that it would be possible to achieve a military victory, similar to the paths that created the conditions for the proclamation of independence in 1975. Thus, it was believed that the triumph of socialist ideology would be possible and that

Mozambique would be one of the tombs of capitalism. On the other hand, the RENAMO insurgency believed that capitalism and liberal democracy would be achievable. However, the means used to achieve these irreconcilable objectives proved ineffective.

Faced with the impossibility of a military victory, the Mozambican government had to change its strategy. It was in this context that it began negotiations with the South African government, which, during the apartheid regime, supported RENAMO, both in military training and logistics. According to Langa (2021), the negotiation process in question resulted in the signing of the Nkomati Agreement on March 16, 1984, which called for an end to support for RENAMO and, in exchange, the Mozambican government would no longer provide shelter to militants of the African National Congress (ANC), one of the organizations fighting against racial segregation in South Africa, and its armed wing, *Umkonto we Sizwe*⁵.

This diplomacy took place after the Mozambican government supported the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU - PF) and its armed wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), in the fight for the independence of Southern Rhodesia, achieved in 1980. It is worth noting that, according to Fernando (2021), RENAMO was created by Mozambicans, but supported by the Secret Services of Rhodesia, a country that after the Lancaster House agreements in 1979, followed by the proclamation of independence a year later, became known as Zimbabwe. Until then, the diplomacy carried out by the Mozambican government aimed to weaken and break RENAMO's sources of funding. However, it is said that these two national sovereignties were not the only ones that supported the Mozambican insurgent movement, but only part of multiple supporters, notably some Western countries.

Diplomacy also demonstrated that it was believed that the Mozambican insurgency was driven from abroad and that these lines should be blocked, creating conditions for its dismantling and consequent stabilization of the country. On the other hand, and in agreement with Mazula (1995), this diplomacy revealed the difficulty of the FRELIMO government in recognizing the insurgent movement as a relevant actor in the Mozambican political process. According to data highlighted by Vines (2013), the last move in this direction occurred in September 1988, when Joaquim Chissano, then president of Mozambique, met with South African president Piter Botha, in Songo, Tete province, where it was reinforced that the South African government should commit to the Nkomati Agreement. Despite this meeting, the actions

5 "Spear of the Nation" in isiZulu language.

carried out in the war theater, throughout almost the entire country, proved that a military solution to the war was almost a utopia. Therefore, both the guerrilla strategy used by RENAMO to destabilize the government, as well as the attacks on RENAMO bases and the defensive position of government forces, proved ineffective in proclaiming victory. There was an inability to achieve military victory.

Gujamo (2016) calls this dilemma conflict maturation, which is characterized by the perception of a mutually painful stalemate, where the pursuit of a unilateral solution reaches unacceptable levels among the parties in conflict, generating motivation and willingness to negotiate, as well as optimism regarding the results of the negotiation. Gentili (2013) explains that, in the preliminary phase, the belligerents agreed that countries previously involved in supporting one side or the other of the conflict, including all those involved in the various phases of the struggle for independence or suspected of supporting one side to further its own agenda, should be excluded from the mediation platform. Here are included countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Portugal, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (USA).

There is no evidence of Kenya's direct involvement in the civil war in Mozambique. However, during the colonial war for independence, many FRELIMO dissidents, considered reactionary by this independence movement, emigrated to Kenya as a refuge. Among the dissidents, it is worth highlighting the murderer of Filipe Samuel Magaia, then commander of the Defense Department of this libertarian movement, on October 16, 1966. The murderer was Lourenço Matola, who, after being discovered and following the decision to be executed by the guerrillas, was later handed over to the Tanzanian authorities⁶. However, he managed to escape and take refuge in Kenya, where he died in 1989, after being run over by a car that failed to stop (Nkomo 2004).

Furthermore, it is said that the then Kenyan president, Daniel Arap Moi, had some close relationship with the RENAMO leadership. In fact, in February 1989, Moi, in coordination with the then Malawian president, Hasting Kamuzu Banda, hosted the first official meeting attended by Raul Domingos and Vicente Ululu (representatives of RENAMO) and Mozambican clergy, namely Cardinal Dom Alexandre dos Santos, Dom Jaime Gonçalves, Dom Dinis Sengulane and Pastor Ozias Mucache, who brought a letter from

6 FRELIMO used Tanzanian territory as a safe rearguard for training its guerrillas and logistics during the war for independence (1964-1974). Many incursions into the interior of Mozambique were planned from this neighboring country (Pereira 2016).

the Mozambican government, creating the initial basis for the decisive stages of peace negotiations for the country (Raul Domingos, in an interview with Media Mais TV, October 5, 2020). However, although Kenya was the host that sowed the seeds that culminated in the 1992 Rome agreements, this country still did not have good relations with Mozambique because, like Malawi, it is believed that it had hosted many FRELIMO dissidents since the times of the struggle for independence.

It should also be clarified that during the 1980s, the Malawian authorities led by Hasting Kamuzu Banda were accused by the Mozambican government of providing shelter and support to the RENAMO insurgency. For example, on September 11, 1986, after repeated complaints against Malawi about RENAMO incursions from this neighboring country, Samora Machel, then president of Mozambique, in the presence of Robert Mugabe and Kenneth Kaunda, presidents of Zimbabwe and Zambia, respectively, presented a dossier full of evidence of military, logistical and training support from Malawi and the South African government to the RENAMO rebels (African Roots 2021). Gujamo (2016) also confirms that during the period of friction with Malawi, there is evidence that the then South African government negotiated and agreed with Malawi the use of some posts, through which logistical support would be made available to RENAMO. Machel later threatened to place missiles along the border with Malawi for a preemptive strike against that country if it continued to support the rebel movement. The agreement between Malawi and South Africa should also be seen as a ploy and an attempt to gain sympathy with South Africa so that, in the event of an invasion, South Africa would have guaranteed support from that country. However, on October 19, 1986, just over a month after this meeting with Kamuzu Banda, Samora Machel died in a plane crash in the Mbuzini Hills, South Africa. The circumstances of which remain unknown.

While Kenya and Malawi had affinities with RENAMO, Zimbabwe and Tanzania provided military support to the FRELIMO government during the civil war. Gujamo (2016) states that, in 1982, a thousand Zimbabwean soldiers were initially sent to Mozambique, a number that gradually grew to ten thousand. No data has been found on the number of Tanzanian soldiers who fought in Mozambique. However, it is known that in December 1988, Tanzania decided to withdraw its soldiers due to the high cost of operations and their low effectiveness, with Zimbabwe also beginning the withdrawal process in 1989 and completing it in 1993 (Vines 2013). Zimbabwe's support is not a coincidence. Just as Tanzania did in relation to the fight for Mozambican independence, during the war for Zimbabwe's independence, the Mozambican border territory served as a safe rearguard for ZANU-PF guerrillas. It

was there that they prepared incursions to attack the Rhodesian government of Ian Smith, who, in response, also attacked the interior of Mozambique, using as pretext targets that they believed to be ZANU-PF military bases. These attacks continued until the eve of Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.

Portugal's lack of direct involvement in the peace negotiations in Mozambique was due to the fact that this former colonizing power had strong ties to Orlando Cristina and Jorge Jardim, some of the founders of RENAMO, and who were on the list of those considered reactionary to the independence led by FRELIMO. Similarly, the US and Russia could not have direct involvement in the peace process. However, both Portugal and the US, as well as Russia, participated as observers in the final phase of the negotiations that culminated in the Rome Peace Accords in 1992. It is worth noting that both the US and the USSR, a bloc of which Russia was a part, were directly involved in the logistics and ideological aspects of the civil wars, not only in Mozambique, but also in many countries around the world during the Cold War. The consummation of *Perestroika*, a policy of government reform and economic restructuring initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR in 1985, and the consequent harbinger of the end of the Cold War that was consummated and symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, also had direct impacts on many national sovereignties, including the processes that culminated in the end of multiple conflicts at the time.

The civil war in Mozambique resulted in approximately one million deaths, thousands of internal and external displaced persons, and the destruction of housing, railway, road and agricultural production infrastructures, among others, in a context in which the government did not have control over the majority of the national territory, being basically confined to urban centers and towns. Therefore, the continuation of the civil war would be unsustainable, hence the intensification of the creation of negotiation mechanisms aimed at ending the conflict.

Involvement of African and non-African actors in the peace negotiations in Mozambique

In a context in which the conflict had already matured and the country was devastated by the dynamics of the civil war, the belligerents concluded that the differences that created the conditions for war would only end through a negotiated solution, as later occurred. The process that culminated in the Peace Agreements in Mozambique encompassed the involvement of national,

regional, African and non-African actors, including government and religious entities and international organizations, both in mediation and observation, as well as in aspects related to the logistics for the operationalization of the peace agreements.

Involvement of African governments

The negotiations that culminated in the peace agreement in Mozambique involved the participation of countries from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), such as Malawi, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Kenya, which is a member of the African Union and, like Mozambique, is also part of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, also joined the group.

As previously mentioned, like Tanzania, Zimbabwe believed that a military solution to the conflict would be possible, as was the case during the fight for its independence. As the civil war in Mozambique matured and after gradually abandoning a military solution, some countries in the region began to promote an end to the civil war through a negotiated agreement. It is in this context that, according to data highlighted by Gentili (2013), Mugabe, president of Zimbabwe, allied himself with Arap Moi of Kenya and Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, both friends of RENAMO, to promote African mediation for the conflict. Zimbabwe, the country that had previously been proposed as host of the negotiations by the government of Mozambique, has always been present in the process, but as an observer. In an initial action, the Zimbabwean president promoted a meeting with Afonso Dhlakama that took place in Botswana in July 1992, in the presence of the host president Quett Masire (Gujamo 2016). Branco (2011) then adds that Mugabe was also instrumental in the meeting between Joaquim Chissano (president who replaced Samora Machel after the plane crash and death in 1986) and Afonso Dhlakama in Botswana, which served to agree on the creation of a commission to supervise the security services and the presence of the United Nations (UN) in monitoring the agreement.

In the case of Malawi, despite tense relations with Mozambique, similar to apartheid South Africa, which was accused for years of providing shelter to RENAMO, a fact that led the Mozambican government to consider a military invasion of that country, under the pretext of dismantling hypothetical hiding places that were supposed to exist, the country also played an important role in the negotiation process for peace in Mozambique. In addition to providing the corridor that allowed the first meeting between the RENAMO delegation and the Mozambican clergy to take place in Kenya

in 1988, in November 1990 it hosted a meeting in which the mediation group met with Dhlakama in order to break the impasse that was preventing the ceasefire agreement from being reached, whose foundations had been laid at the Botswana meeting. This particular meeting was attended by Tiny Rowland, an English businessman and president of the *Lonrho* conglomerate with economic interests in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, who offered his good offices and logistics to facilitate the negotiations and also to protect his investments in the region (Gentili 2013; Branco 2011).

After 1994, the year in which ONUMOZ's mandate ended⁷, the SADC countries were only contacted again in 2014, through the Military Observation Team for the Cessation of Military Hostilities (EMOCHM), after the signing of the agreement to end military hostilities between RENAMO and government forces (between 2012 and 2014). This agreement was preceded by more than one hundred rounds of negotiations between representatives of RENAMO and the government in Maputo, also mediated by Mozambican clerics. However, the mandate ended in a context in which many RENAMO military bases had not yet been deactivated. The military hostilities that occurred in the period following the Rome peace agreements reveal porosities in the reconciliation process between the former belligerents.

Intervention of non-African actors in the peace process

In addition to the involvement of African governments, the mediation process was complemented by several actors from the African diaspora. Branco (2011) highlights two that were particularly active, namely Italy and the United States of America. Italy became one of the main interlocutors in the process through the Catholic organization Santo Egídio and Dom Jaime Gonçalves, bishop of Beira. Coleman *et al* (2011) explain that, through successful contacts and efforts, it was possible to arrange the visit of the President of Mozambique, Samora Machel, to the Vatican in 1986. They add that, on the other hand, the Santo Egídio organization managed to organize a secret visit by Dom Jaime Gonçalves to the RENAMO headquarters in 1988, a year that coincided with the visit of Pope John Paul II to Mozambique. These meetings also became turning points in the peace process that led to the signing of the General Peace Agreement in 1992.

As a result of this turning point, in July 1990, the Community of Santo Egídio was accepted by both parties as a mediator in the process,

7 ONUMOZ was the UN operation established by Security Council Resolution 797 of 16 December 1992, and included political, military, humanitarian and electoral objectives.

and formal negotiations began in Rome. In this process, the Italian government was represented by Mario Raffaelli who, in coordination with the Santo Egídio organization, provided a venue and logistical, moral and financial support. Nevertheless, Branco (2011) states that in addition to the Santo Egídio organization, represented by Andrea Riccardi and Dom Matteo Zuppi, the negotiation round also included the presence of Mozambican churches through the Episcopal Conference, represented by Dom Jaime Gonçalves. He also highlights that, in the first phase, these institutions had observer status. However, they later became mediators and remained intact until the end of the negotiation process, with Zimbabwe and Botswana playing the role of observers.

The first stage of the negotiation was important due to the mediation of the Vatican, through the organization Santo Egídio and the Italian government. In the next stage, the process was transferred to the UN. The involvement of US diplomacy was essential to ensure the presence of the UN in the operationalization of the security agreement, guaranteeing the connection with the Security Council (Branco 2011, 98).

The involvement of both regional and non-African actors was not by chance. Mozambique's location in the eastern region of Southern Africa is strategic. Consequently, the instability of this country directly affects countries in the region, especially Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, not only due to the flow of refugees who migrated to these national sovereignties, but also, as a country with a long coastline on the Indian Ocean, it serves as a corridor for the flow of goods that arrive on the coast, destined for the hinterland. As for non-African countries, even those that are also members of the UN, they have contributed to peace in several countries. While Italy entered the process under the influence of the Catholic organization Santo Egídio, the USA and Russia have always been present in Mozambique in the antagonistic context of the Cold War, hence after the normalization of this ideological conflict, which also had an impact on the national policies of several countries, their presence as observers was inevitable. Portugal's presence as an observer was due to its strong historical and cultural ties with Mozambique, given that it was the former colonizing power.

The commitment to peace among national actors

More than thirty years have passed since the Rome Peace Agreement was signed. Given the long-term nature of the agreement and the occurrence of political phenomena that contribute to political instability in Mozambique, it is key to analyze the degree of compliance with the agreement and

the commitment to peace, not only by the main political actors, but also by society as a whole.

The fundamental principles of the agreement stated that the Government undertook not to act in a manner contrary to the terms of the Protocols that were established, and not to apply laws that might contradict the signed agreement. On the other hand, RENAMO undertook, from the entry into force of the ceasefire, not to fight by force of arms, but to conduct its political struggle in compliance with the laws in force in the existing State institutions and in compliance with the conditions and guarantees established in the General Peace Agreement (Boletim da República 1992). The Bulletin also clarifies that, in general terms, the agreement called for a ceasefire, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), the introduction of multiparty democracy, principles of electoral law, donors' conference and reconciliation.

In this chapter, the analysis focuses on the triad of electoral processes, DDR and reconciliation, both during the period in which the peace process was under ONUMOZ's monitoring and in the subsequent phase. ONUMOZ had a two-year mandate and was dismantled in December 1994, in a context in which, according to Reisinger (2009), the objectives for which it was founded had been achieved and, also, it was believed that the conditions for effective reconciliation and peace had been created. At the time, it was assumed that consensus, cooperation and sincerity guided the process that culminated in the signing of the peace agreement.

Nonetheless, since the official end of the civil war in Mozambique, several challenges still need to be overcome. For example, despite the apparent stability, RENAMO's disarmament was only officially completed in June 2023. Incidents of political violence are frequent, especially during election periods, and an authoritarian political culture is prevalent in relevant sectors of Mozambican society. These realities contradict what was established and signed in the Rome Peace Accords of 1992, an act that reinforced the guidelines of the 1990 Constitution, which has been gradually improved over time in line with the dictates of the ongoing democratization in Mozambique. However, there are two aspects that need to be clearly differentiated: one thing is to write a constitution that emanates democratic principles, and another is to have a political culture that respects democratic principles taking into account the social contract, with principles of justice, equality and freedom in a multi-party context.

Although Mozambique claims to be a multi-party democracy, the reality that dominates the arena of government management continues, in

many aspects, to be centralized, similar to the time when it was officially guided by single-party governance. For example, there is a deep-rooted culture in the civil service that, if someone wants to be successful professionally, they must be a member and sympathizer of the FRELIMO party, the organization that has governed the country since independence. The possibility of sympathizers of opposition parties and civil servants occupying prominent positions in many areas of activity in the country is almost non-existent. The few who do are those who were democratically elected by universal suffrage, such as the mayors of some municipalities, some members of the Municipal and Provincial Assemblies and deputies of the Assembly of the Republic.

Another process that is foreign to the premises and principles of multi-party democracy is the frequent political violence. Although it is a reality that tends to decrease as the years go by, the phenomenon continues to be present in Mozambican political processes. According to news reports from Rádio Moçambique, Voz da América and Jornal Savana, in the period immediately following the signing of the Rome peace accords, it was dangerous for a FRELIMO member or sympathizer to express this position in an area of RENAMO influence, such as in the interior of Maringue, Gorongosa, Inhaminga and Marromeu. The opposite also happened very frequently. For example, it was practically dangerous for a RENAMO member or sympathizer to express this position in a FRELIMO stronghold, such as Gaza province. In both situations, the citizen was considered an enemy, rather than a simple political adversary.

Citizens in these conditions were more likely to suffer reprisals and constant threats. In extreme cases, cases of murder have been reported simply for belonging to a different party. Despite a significant reduction, these incidents continue to be present in some political circles in Mozambique. Political intolerance demonstrates a lack of a political culture of multi-party democracy. This phenomenon does not only occur between the two parties with the greatest representation in Mozambique, but also targets other groups, including the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), a party with a significant presence in the national political arena.

Another reality that requires reflection is the context in which peace was celebrated and the fact that ONUMOZ concluded its mission before the complete fulfillment of key issues in the peace process, such as the DDR. This specific issue showed that the sentiment and commitment to the clauses of the agreement were apparent. Consequently, there were fissures that only thirty years later seem to have been corrected. Proof of this is that, for example, the last 5,200 armed men from RENAMO were demobilized and

reintegrated between 2021 and 2023. Hence the following questions: why has RENAMO remained armed over the last thirty years? Why is violence recurrent during election periods? And why is intolerance still present in political processes in Mozambique?

The common denominator is that the will to end the conflicts is present. Still, the concealment of what was agreed in the agreement makes it clear that the belligerents, or one of the parties, did not have sufficient ethics and morals to comply. This is determined by the culture of violence, as a means of resolving the conflict, combined with the authoritarian and centralizing culture rooted throughout the Mozambican political processes.

During the mediation of the aforementioned actors, it appeared that there was a spirit of sincerity among those involved. However, the process lost sight of the intentions and uncertainties that were hidden among the belligerents, which only time revealed. According to Gentili (2013), mediations are more likely to be successful if there is adequate institutional support based on up-to-date information and effective lines of communication with all interested parties. Yet, mediators have no control over attitudes and processes that take place outside the negotiating platform. These are the paths that led to the shaking or the attempt to conceal the Rome peace agreement under unilateral pretexts and not out of respect for what truly reconciles sensibilities.

This is where the challenge of reconciliation in Mozambique comes in, in a context in which the interlocutors remain bound by the dictates that, for example, determined the divisions that embodied the civil war (1977-1992), as well as the rekindling of the armed conflict (2013-2019), whose end was symbolized by the signing of the definitive peace agreement on August 6, 2019, a process signed by Filipe Nyusi, current president of Mozambique, and Ussufo Momad, current president of RENAMO. It is worth noting that the last peace process was conducted without third-party mediation. The model consisted of informal and secret meetings with the direct involvement of the leaders who signed the agreement. The details would only become public later. This negotiation model has drawn criticism from key players in national politics and some academics, who consider it to be a non-inclusive process and, on the other hand, for being a platform that could lead to political exploitation, despite the agreement aiming at social well-being, with sustainable peace as its starting point.

Conclusion

The peace process in Mozambique was complex, given that, at first, the belligerents believed that it would be possible to end the conflict through a military victory, with the support of some countries in the southern region of Africa. The civil war in Mozambique was also fueled by the dynamics of the Cold War, given that the FRELIMO government was supported ideologically and logistically by the Eastern Bloc led by the USSR, and RENAMO was supported basically by the West, led by the USA. Nevertheless, as the conflict matured, combined with the changes that were occurring around the world with the harbinger of the end of the Cold War, the technical conditions for militarily defeating its opponent in the civil war were increasingly remote.

The belief in a hypothetical military victory that never came, combined with the fact that, at first, the Mozambican government did not want to negotiate directly with RENAMO, having opted for talks that culminated in the signing of the Nkomati Agreement with South Africa, although an attempt to break the support that this country gave to RENAMO, also delayed the process of pacification in the country. After the awareness of the need for a negotiated peace, the study reveals that the other crucial step was the identification and creation of a credible platform of mediators for the implementation of negotiations that would culminate in a peace agreement and its respective operationalization in the country.

The data collected, described and analyzed reveal that the process was mediated by several stakeholders, both informally, in a context in which the first contacts were still secret, with the direct involvement of some religious figures with the leadership of RENAMO and, in the next stage, which consisted of formal negotiations, with the involvement of mediators and observers from African and non-African governments, religious institutions and international entities linked to the UN, who played leading roles in the process. While the African mediators provided legitimacy in the process, non-African mediation, in addition to reinforcing legitimacy, provided material incentive for the implementation of the peace process in Mozambique.

In the more than thirty years since the signing of the Rome Peace Accords in 1992, there have been setbacks and advances in the peacemaking process. Advances are mainly limited to the ongoing democratization of Mozambican institutions, despite some challenges that need to be improved, especially in aspects that led to setbacks in the implementation of the signed peace agreements, such as the relative continued partisanship of the State, the late disarmament of the RENAMO guerrilla group, and the prevalence of

violence between political opponents, with a greater incidence during election periods, which shows that some clauses of the peace agreement are not being fully complied with. This also shows that the points of disagreement were not sincerely acknowledged, which justifies the sequence of more than thirty years of unstable peace. However, it is worth clarifying that, since the peace agreement signed in 2019, the country has been experiencing relative stability.

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ABSTRACT

The negotiations that culminated in the signing of the 1992 peace agreement were preceded by a 16-year civil war and the belligerents were the government of the Mozambique Liberation Front and the former rebel movement, the National Resistance of Mozambique. The pretext for the war was the demand for the implementation of multi-party democracy, in a context in which the government had defined

Mozambique as a Marxist-Leninist state. The peace process was mediated by national and international actors, including clergy, diplomats and government representatives. However, despite significant advances in the democratization of the country, there were also setbacks caused by exclusion and the lack of effective national reconciliation. The research is based on a bibliographic review and supported by the theory of multi-track diplomacy, taking into account the intervention and interdependence of various levels of actors and, consequently, the intersection of multiple synergies and strategies in the conflict resolution process. The above time limit is between the beginning of negotiations that culminated in the signing of the Rome Peace Accords in 1992 and the signing of the last peace agreement in 2019.

KEYWORDS

Conflict mediation. Reconciliation. Sustainable peace.

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SINO-MOZAMBIKAN RELATIONSHIP AND THE ROLE OF MEGAPROJECTS IN MOZAMBIQUE'S TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT

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Introduction

China's expanded and deeper involvement in the African continent has led to significant changes in the international order and enabled a new attractive alternative to foster economic growth in African countries. China was considered one of the largest trading partners, investors, and sponsors of African countries in the early 21st century (i.e., in the 2000s), particularly for countries located in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Mozambique. The country was the largest investor in Mozambique in 2016; since the end of the civil war – which undermined the national infrastructure of the African country –, infrastructure mega-projects (such as the construction of bridges, roads, dams, airports, commercial establishments, and tourism) were built by Chinese companies and/or with funding and donations from the Chinese government. Furthermore, since colonial times, Mozambique and China have had a close commercial relationship, which included the supply and training of the Mozambican army, the provision of humanitarian aid, the granting of scholarships to Mozambican students, and the sending of doctors and teachers, as well as the development of technological centers in Mozambique.

This article, based on Master's thesis research, aims to identify new opportunities, potential, and the threats and weaknesses that Mozambique must overcome to achieve fair economic and social development, reversing

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its history marked by civil conflicts, social inequality, and poverty. In addition, it analyzes China's strategic role in the territorial development and infrastructure strengthening processes observed in Mozambique; it can also be used to help studies focused on promoting policies based on megaprojects aimed at regional development.

The present research sought to answer the following guiding question: can one consider that Chinese investments in infrastructure megaprojects could drive economic growth and support production and social development in Mozambique? Two hypotheses were raised to help answer this question: a) megaprojects work as means to increase national and international competition among large cities in order to attract investments; and b) the adoption of development policies backed up by megaprojects is shaping the future of large cities at different scales. Furthermore, it can have a dynamic effect on the economy through the expansion of both job positions and income generation in the local economy. However, these hypotheses are not always applicable to the specific case of Mozambique. Thus, it is essential for Mozambique to make massive investments in training and qualifying its citizens, among other measures, so they can benefit from the job positions created, which are generally capital-intensive and require skilled labor.

The aims of the current study were a) to analyze the post-Civil War social and economic dynamics of Mozambique; b) to address the national and international literature focused on investigating megaprojects as development strategy; c) to investigate features (opportunities and challenges) of the role played by China in Mozambique, mainly in the construction and reconstruction of local infrastructures.

The methodological structure of the current article comprises three topics, in addition to the introduction and the conclusion. It adopted the literature review procedure, whose first section addressed the historical, political, and economic context of Mozambique, from its colonial period to present days. This contextualization process enables readers to better understand the paths "taken" and the main challenges faced by the country in the pursuit of development and economic growth. The main theories in the megaproject literature will be discussed in the second section, based on academic articles and journals. The third section aims at investigating the role played by China in Mozambique, as well as the historical context, the current Chinese territorial expansion strategy applied in Africa, and its main effects and results.

Historical context of Mozambique

Mozambique is located in Southwestern Africa. The country has a coastline along the Indian Ocean that spans 2,515 km² and a total land area of approximately 801,590 km². It shares borders with Tanzania (to the North), Malawi (to the Northwest), Zambia and Zimbabwe (to the West), as well as with South Africa and Swaziland (to the Southwest). The country is one of the sixteen members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and is also part of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (*Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa*, CPLP, in Portuguese).

Libânio and Castigo (2021) divided Mozambique's economic and social formation process into four different periods. The first one refers to the colonial period, which started at the time of the great voyage by Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama, who, on his way to the Indies, discovered the island of Mozambique in early March 1498. After Portugal established its political and administrative control over Mozambique, it started exploiting Mozambican natural resources in order to meet its economic interests. Among the actions taken by the Portuguese government was leasing land to foreign companies that had acquired rights to use Mozambique's natural resources and were authorized to control the African citizens living there. In addition, Mozambican lands were converted into plantations and farms focused on growing commercial crops, such as sugar, sisal and cotton, which turned them into sources of profit for the Portuguese government (Mondlane 1975). The colonial government has gradually increased the "imports" of settlers from the metropolis to the province, through incentives to Portuguese civil servants and officials. This was done to expand its territorial domain by populating and strengthening the "new Portuguese territory". Consequently, the trading and exploitation of Mozambican slave labor became the most profitable commercial activity in the country, as well as the initial development pattern of the colony (Cabaço 2007; Mondlane 1975).

After slave labor was abolished in 1807, Mozambican labor gradually started to be used within the continent in the form of forced labor. This shift led to the creation of transport and supply systems connecting Mozambique to other countries, as well as strengthening internal connections, such as the Port of Lourenço Marques and the first railway line connecting South Africa to Mozambique, which were established to meet production-flow needs (Visentini 2012; Cau 2011). Mozambican citizens' migration towards South African gold mines and former English colonies' plantations also worked as a relevant source of foreign exchange for Portugal (Isaacman and Isaacman

1983). This regime has deepened the subordinate condition of prejudice against and exploitation of the Mozambican population; moreover, it turned the country into a large “migrant workforce-reserve pocket” (Saraiva 2007, 216) for South Africa.

The pillar of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique, among other African colonies, was featured by a “dualist essence” defined by an European society and culture that stood in opposition to black society and culture (Cabaço 2007). Job positions available in the most modern sectors during the colonial period were taken by Portuguese individuals, whereas Africans were left with secondary job positions without any prestige. The marginalization and submission imposed on African individuals, the countless humiliations, the constant feeling of inferiority, the practice of mandatory labor, and the denial of rights to education, health, land, and basic services comprise a set of injustices committed by Portuguese authorities in colonial Mozambique. These injustices contributed to the unification of various social groups aimed at fighting against Portuguese oppression (Cau 2011).

The second period concerns the years of struggle for African independence and the era of centrally planned economy. At that time, after witnessing the exploitation of Mozambique’s labor and natural resources without reinvestments at local level or on behalf of the Mozambican population, the country formed the guerrilla group called Mozambique Liberation Front (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*, FRELIMO, in Portuguese) and started a war against the Portuguese State in the Cabo Delgado Province, on September 25, 1964. FRELIMO was built through the merge of three nationalist organizations instituted by immigrant Mozambicans in neighboring countries, namely: the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), which was founded in Kenya, in 1961; the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (*União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique*, UDENAMO, in Portuguese), which was founded in Southern Rhodesia (currently, Zimbabwe), in 1960; and the African National Union of Independent Mozambique (*União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente*, UNAMI, in Portuguese), which was founded in Nyasaland (currently, Malawi), in 1961 (Brito 2019). Although the group was determined to achieve independence by peaceful means, it was convinced that a war would be necessary to achieve its goals. FRELIMO believed that the Mozambican population only had two options: continuing to live indefinitely under repressive imperial rule or finding a way to effectively use force to hurt Portugal without ruining itself (Mondlane 1975).

The armed struggle lasted approximately ten years. The first official attack on Chai’s administrative post, in Cabo Delgado province, started in

September 1964 and only ended in September 1974, after a ceasefire granted by Portugal. During this period, FRELIMO's leadership remained in the hands of two leaders, namely: Eduardo Mondlane (from 1962 to 1969) and Samora Machel, who led the group for approximately sixteen years (from 1970 to 1986), after Mondlane was murdered.

The signing of the Lusaka Agreement, in 1974, ended the struggle for Mozambique's independence; thus, the power of the new Mozambican State was unconditionally transferred to the guerrilla group. According to Visentini (2012), the adverse internal scenario in Portugal — i.e., the Carnation Revolution held in 1974, which overthrew Salazar's authoritarian regime and triggered a time of political instability in the country, as well as economic losses due to increased military expenses, and military contingent reduction — has favored the end of the war and enabled the African country to conquer its independence. Interestingly, Portugal also had to deal with two other liberation fronts — one from Angola and the other one from Guinea-Bissau —; at the same time, it had to maintain its repression forces in São Tomé, Cape Verde, Macao, and Timor, in order to avoid losing its overall control over the colonies (Mondlane 1975).

During the transition from colony to independent country, a transient government was established with the main goal of creating a favorable political and economic environment for Mozambique's independence. Samora Machel took Office as the president of Mozambique on September 25, 1975. At that time, FRELIMO was influenced by the Marxist-Leninist political ideology and Mozambicans gradually became free to cultivate their lands, to get involved in political debates, and to make their own decisions. However, the void left by Portuguese colonizers, the destruction of local infrastructure, and the exclusion/marginalization of social groups (such as religious or traditional leaders who started to have their powers revoked; and the rural population, which was threatened by FRELIMO's ideals, according to whom, communal villages and rural zones were backward places and, consequently, should be combated) gradually led to the dissatisfaction and discontentment of part of the population.

As the dissatisfaction of some Mozambican citizens increased, the country slowly collapsed and a new political movement, which resulted from internal (Mozambican military from the Portuguese Army Special Forces and Portuguese settlers who left Mozambique and lived in Rhodesia) and external (intensification of diplomatic relations between Mozambique and its neighboring countries, i.e., Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, where Samora Machel had declared his support to the constitution of black major-

rity governments in Africa and to anticolonial movements in neighboring countries) factors, led to the creation and strengthening of the Mozambican National Resistance (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*, RENAMO, in Portuguese). From that time onwards, the country plunged into a bloody and prolonged civil war against two political parties aimed at conquering and taking power over Mozambique (Visentini 2012).

This group often took violent actions to attack and destroy different infrastructures in the country; these actions, in association with the effects of the natural disasters taking place in that period and with Mozambique's weak government policies, contributed to further impoverish the population, worsen the hunger issue and increase the number of refugees and migrations to neighboring countries. As Mozambique plunged into a civil war, FRELIMO's weak political and ideological system became increasingly evident (Visentini 2012) and the country faced real economic chaos, deterioration of cities, buildings, streets and businesses, and its production — mainly the agricultural one — was also affected (Saraiva 2007).

It was only on October 4, 1992, when the General Peace Agreement was signed, that the Civil War period was ended and the Democratization process in the country began, based on the implementation of the Constitution of the Multiparty Republic. Increased vulnerability, penury, and a feeling of poverty were the consequences of the long period of conflicts in Mozambique. Some of the factors contributing to the end the civil war in Mozambique encompassed a) acknowledging Southern Rhodesia as a Sovereign State, in 1980, when its name changed to Zimbabwe; b) RENAMO's weakening after the death of its leader, André Matsangaissa, in Sofala province; and c) Mozambique's economic weakness due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the lack of financial and military support.

The third period addressed by Libânio and Castigo (2021) refers to the transition from socialist-type economy to liberal economy, which took place under the structural adjustment plans carried out in the country from 1987 to 1997. At that time, Mozambique implemented a program to restructure its economy, namely: Economic Restructuring Program (*Programa de Reestruturação Econômica*, PRE, in Portuguese). PRE was promoted by the IMF and the World Bank; it focused on presenting the main changes to be carried out in the Mozambican economy to achieve economic growth.

Some propositions in this plan were based on establishing a more market-friendly constitution (through the advancement of privatizations) and on food market liberalizations (food production remained as basis for Mozambican economic development, whereas industries were the economy's

driving factor). The reforms introduced in the country focused on reducing the centralization of and direct interventions in the economy. In order to do so, the following measures were adopted: a) currency devaluation; b) spending cuts to stop economic deficits caused by the country's reconstruction process; c) increased investments (Visentini 2012). Although PRE did not achieve its intended results in the most remote areas (mainly in those affected by civil conflicts), it managed to restore the economic growth, mainly in the main cities (Visentini 2012). However, it was also used as a program to transfer resources and initiatives from the public to the private sector; in other words, PRE enabled Mozambique to change from planned economy to market economy, a fact that worsened its negative effects on the national social fabric and increased the prevalence of poverty in Mozambique (Barbosa 2021). Poor urban families and dwellers, whose wages were unable to meet their basic needs, were the ones mainly affected by PRE (Visentini 2012).

Finally, the fourth and last period covers the 2000s. The Mozambican economy performed well throughout the first years of the new century; it recorded high Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates, which was mainly driven by the expansion of megaprojects based on external financing, as well as by large aid flows that were higher than, or close to, 8%. However, the economic expansion cycle declined from 2015 to 2020 due to a series of shocks caused by political and internal security instability, the fall in the price of raw materials, adverse weather conditions, as well as the "suspension of external support by cooperation partners to the State Budget and the Balance of Payments, and the suspension of the International Monetary Fund program in Mozambique after the discovery of undisclosed public debt" (Garcia 2020, 117).

The flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) jumped from US\$ 139 million in 2000 to US\$ 2.2 billion in 2019, with emphasis on 2013, when its value exceeded US\$ 6.1 billion or 36% of Mozambique's nominal GDP (UNCTAD 2021). The biggest investors in the country comprise the Netherlands (it accounts for approximately 37.7% of investments), South Africa (22%), and Italy (13.5%). China accounted for approximately 0.6% of the total amount invested in Mozambique in 2020. In terms of sectoral distribution, extractive industries receive 84.1% of total FDI. 74% of it was absorbed by companies belonging to the category of megaprojects linked to the oil and gas sector (Banco de Moçambique 2020).

With respect to the country's export agenda, Banco de Moçambique (2020) has emphasized the sale of mineral coal, dried or in-grain vegetables, cashew nuts, heavy sands, aluminum cables, petroleum-derived oils, soy, elec-

tric power trading, natural gas, raw aluminum exports, seeds and oleaginous fruits, natural sands, coal, sawn wood, crustaceans, cotton, sugar, tea and dried fruits. On the other hand, according to Banco de Moçambique (2020), 30% of products imported by the country refer to intermediate goods (inputs), which are followed by consumer goods (27%), capital goods (18%), among others (24%). Thus, it is possible to conclude that the composition of Mozambique's export agenda is based on the export of commodities (agricultural and energy), whereas the country depends on importing high added-value products. This feature is typical of backward countries and economies, which not only hinders the development, but also worsens the underdevelopment in these nations.

Although colonial Mozambique experienced a long period of backwardness, the Mozambican economy in the early 21st century was featured by a substantial economic growth that determined the country's position as one of the largest economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Such a position resulted from the country's high and consistent growth rates, in association with improvements in its institutional framework and governance. Accordingly, Libânio and Castigo (2021) have emphasized that the current discovery of energy resources, such as coal and natural gas, both accounts for and is a "hope" for the country's continuous strengthening and development processes. However, the aforementioned authors have also warned that, as the increased Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in Mozambique are mostly allocated to the exploitation of energy resources, they are linked to the construction of megaprojects that require the implementation of capital-intensive technology in a country with surplus labor and low technical qualification. Thus, "the number of job positions generated by these megaprojects is insignificant. These aspects reveal the continuous marginalization of most of the population, so that agriculture remains the activity supporting them" (Libânio and Castigo 2021, 45).

Therefore, the fight against poverty and extreme poverty is, if not the biggest, one of the biggest challenges faced by Mozambique nowadays, since it is not just a current issue, but a historical and structural one. Furthermore, another factor jeopardizing the country's growth and development refers to its current political instability associated with attacks carried out by extremist groups in the Northern and Central regions of the country. Besides destroying the country's infrastructure and agricultural production fields, and forcing migrations to other regions, such instability contributes to increase the population's vulnerability, as well as fosters and worsens social inequality (Libânio and Castigo 2021).

In light of the foregoing, it is necessary to adopt development plans to cover the largest (and poorest) part of the population; these plans must be oriented and aligned to each other in order to ensure the country's security and political-economic stability, to diversify its productive matrix, to increase its income and employment levels, and to expand the population's access to basic infrastructure, health, and education. This is because, as the country advances in the development and construction of large industrial and infrastructure complexes, it is necessary to train the population to be absorbed into the various types of created job positions. Otherwise, Mozambique would experience more of the same, namely: increased inequality, poverty and extreme poverty rates, increased number of internal conflicts, and Mozambique's permanence as a source of natural resources and profitability for developed countries.

Literature review: concepts and brief discussion about the literature on megaprojects

The approach to megaprojects is not a recent phenomenon emerging from the new economic dynamics of the globalized world. It refers to a “new phenomenon capable of reproducing features of the past” (Silva 2015, 36, our translation³), since the “new” matches the conflict scale and its dimension in contemporary times (Silva 2015).

A significant number of studies and research on megaprojects is available in the English literature. Flyvbjerg is one of the great authors focused on investigating this topic. The aforementioned scholar is an international expert in the management and planning of urban megaprojects, with emphasis on the management and planning of projects focused on infrastructure/public works, financing and risk management, and cost-benefit analysis. According to him, the definition of megaprojects is associated with large-scale complex projects that cost US\$ 1 billion or more and that demand long-term planning involving both the public and private spheres. In addition, they ambitiously change the structure of society, affect (either positively or negatively) millions of people, require high technology levels, and are justified by the ideology of generating several benefits for society, such as the creation and maintenance of job positions and improvements in productivity. Besides, these project types increase competitiveness, since they enable reducing production costs (Flyvbjerg 2014).

3 In the original: “*novo fenômeno que reproduz características do passado*” (Silva 2015, 36).

On the other hand, Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez (2002) have emphasized that megaprojects are part of the development logic, according to which their implementation and the marketing emerging from them help project cities at an international level; therefore, they work as necessary means to continuously generate economic growth and to attract new investments. However, the aforementioned authors have also warned that, as the construction of megaprojects expands across large urban centers, they tend to meet the demands of elites, making them less democratic. This can lead to real estate speculation and increased polarization and socioeconomic inequality in regions receiving these investments.

Gellert and Lynch (2003) focused on defining megaprojects as both creative and destructive phenomena. Throughout their approach, they emphasized that these projects transform both landscapes and the environment around them, and that they can also lead to the displacement of either individuals or entire communities. Similar to Flyvbjerg (2014), the aforementioned authors have also emphasized the use of high-tech equipment and the need of coordinated capital and State power applications to make these constructions viable. The difference observed in the approach by Gellert and Lynch (2003) lies on megaprojects' classification into 4 different types, namely:

1. Infrastructure Projects: construction of harbors, railways, water and sewage systems, among others;
2. Extraction Projects: extraction of mineral resources, oil, natural gas, and coal;
3. Production Projects: industrial tree plantations, export processing zones, manufacturing parks, and large industrial complexes and hubs;
4. Consumer projects: construction of large tourist facilities, theme parks, shopping malls, among others.

The current study adopted the concept of megaprojects by Crosby (2017) for the specific case of Mozambique. According to the author, megaprojects are defined as projects budgeted in millions (or billions) of dollars that require long-term and complex planning, that are capable of attracting public and/or political attention and that are highly endowed with new technologies and cutting-edge engineering. Given their complexity, they are susceptible to pressure from different parties to minimize adverse impacts during construction and post-construction stages, as well as to mitigate effects on the quality of life of the local population and on the environment (Capka 2004).

Othman (2013) has evidenced 4 challenge types to be overcome in the process to implement megaprojects in both developed and underdeve-

loped countries. The first type involves the engineering challenge, which is attributed to the use of outdated materials that can be replaced by newer technologies available in the market during the project construction, the lack of research and business innovation capacity, inadequate levels of scientific and technological knowledge, lack of professional experience, and disregard for consulting experts during decision-making processes. Human development challenges are associated with lack of skilled workers at the site where the project is implemented in, as well as with lack (or low quality) of professional training and education programs. Managerial and political challenges are associated with factors such as unfavorable regulatory framework, bureaucracy, corrupt practices, weak governance and political tension. Finally, the last challenge refers to sustainability, which encompasses the naive or inadequate risk analysis of projects' consequences (mainly of the environmental risks and preservation of historic spaces), lack of national policy for the resettlement of people affected by the construction of these projects, and lack of social complexity management in terms of project acceptance by the community it is intended to serve.

On the other hand, Flyvbjerg (2005b) has emphasized that challenges to planning large infrastructure projects (which may extend to others) are associated with a high level of misinformation about the costs and benefits that decision-makers face when deciding whether or not to build them. In summary, the aforementioned author has pointed out that the problems to be faced have the following features: i) they are highly risky projects due to their long planning time and complexity; ii) the technology used in them is often non-standard; iii) decision-making and planning often involve several actors with conflicting interests; iv) the project's scope or ambition level can significantly change overtime. In addition, events that were not mapped and, therefore, that were not accounted for during the project planning process can result in inadequate budgets and lead to misinformation about costs, benefits and risks, which, in their turn, can lead to budget overruns and/or benefit reduction.

Studies carried out by the aforementioned author (Flyvbjerg, 2005a) also contradict the idea that local growth and development can be boosted by the construction of large projects capable of generating job positions and other local economic benefits insofar as, according to this expert, the jobs created are temporary and filled by workers who will have their contracts terminated as the construction works are complete. In addition, Flyvbjerg has also highlighted that these job positions demand highly skilled workers, as well as that vacancies in underdeveloped countries with history of low-skil-

led workers are not filled by locals. Thus, workers qualified to take these job positions can even be “imported” from developed countries (Flyvbjerg 2005a).

Infrastructure megaprojects and China’s role in Mozambique’s territorial development process

The Chinese presence in Mozambique is not a recent phenomenon, as indicated by Feijó (2012) and Garcia (2020), who reported that this is a long-standing relationship and that the first records of rapprochement between the two countries date back to late 19th century, when Mozambique was still a Portuguese colony. According to the authors, there are records on the establishment of Chinese migrant workers in Lourenço Marques and Beira cities at that period. They provided qualified labor, which was cheaper than European labor, to build infrastructures, public buildings, railways, and sea ports, among other ventures.

However, the Sino-Mozambican relationship got stronger around 1960, during the struggle for Mozambique’s independence, since China provided diplomatic and military support (guerrilla training and formation) to the country’s liberation movement (Roque and Alden 2012; Feijó 2012). The Asian country was the first to acknowledge Mozambique’s conquered independence, to formalize their diplomatic ties through support agreements, as well as through technical and financial cooperation to build infrastructures, and to provide assistance to Mozambique to deal with the effects of famine, in 1983 (Garcia 2020; Roque 2009; Ilhéu 2010).

In the 2000s, Sino-Mozambican relations gained new impetus through the launch of FOCAC (Forum on China Africa Cooperation). China’s presence in Mozambique was reinforced through a set of diplomatic relations based on political and economic motivations, which led to increased number of diplomatic visits and exchanges among legislative bodies, political parties and government agencies; to foreign policy coordination on regional and international issues; to economic and trade cooperation development in sectors such as infrastructure, agriculture and natural resources’ extraction (Feijó 2012; Roque and Alden 2012); to increased number of loans and foreign direct investments; to Mozambican debts’ cancellation; to technical cooperation and infrastructure projects; and to grants for public works⁴ (Ilhéu 2010).

4 For example: the construction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Joaquim Chissano Conference Center and National Parliament buildings in Maputo, by Chinese company Sogeco.

Chinese FDI in Mozambique increased from US\$10 million in 2003 to US\$60 million in 2007, when China became the 6th largest investor in Mozambique (Roque and Alden 2012). China was the largest investor in Mozambique in 2011 and 2016, as shown in the table below. The justification for this event lied on the combination between favorable political and macroeconomic environments in recent decades, the abundance of natural resources (mineral, forestry and fishing resources), the country's strategic geographic position (due to its access to the sea and the African continent's hinterlands) and, finally, on political elites that have promoted an economy type aimed at increasing foreign direct investments in the country (Barbosa 2021; Ekman 2012).

Table 1 - Main FDI's countries of origin in Mozambique (2010 - First half of 2016)

Ranking	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
1	Portugal	China	United Arab Emirates	South Africa	United Arab Emirates	France	China
2	South Africa	South Africa	Portugal	China	Mauritius	China	South Africa
3	Italy	Portugal	South Africa	Portugal	South Africa	United Arab Emirates	Mauritius
4	Belgium	Mauritius	Mauritius	Switzerland	Portugal	Portugal	United Kingdom
5	China	United States	China	Germany	China	South Africa	Portugal
6	Spain	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	United Arab Emirates	United Kingdom	India	Turkey
7	United Kingdom	United Arab Emirates	Brazil	Uganda	Macao	Mauritius	Italy
8	Singapore	Norway	India	Mauritius	Turkey	Singapore	India
9	Kenya	Australia	Italy	Italy	Kenya	Australia	Spain
10	Sweden	India	Lesotho	United Kingdom	France	Turkey	United States

Source: Massangaie 2017, 171.

Although Mozambique has attracted FDI for large mining and energy projects⁵, Chinese foreign direct investment focuses on building Special Economic Zones (SEZs) — industrial zones, and science and technology parks — that follow the Chinese model, in order to attract and capture foreign investment (Roque and Alden 2012; Roque 2009). Moreover, China also sponsors projects aimed at rebuilding Mozambique’s national infrastructure, which was destroyed by struggles for independence and worsened by the civil war that undermined the country’s development and that made it deficient and more vulnerable. Thus, the construction of Chinese infrastructure projects has been followed by the discourse that they are crucial to help leveraging Mozambique’s development and economic growth. Chinese construction companies gained room in the country and intensified their participation in the reconstruction of roads and public buildings, as well as in the construction of stadiums, airports, conference centers, hydroelectric plants, and low-cost housing projects in Mozambique. However, one cannot forget that behind the advancement of diplomatic relations between the two countries, China’s cooperation in Mozambique mainly focuses on projects that are not financed by “traditional” donors due to pre-conditions established by these donors, such as the IMF and the World Bank. This is exactly the reason why China is appreciated by the Mozambican political elite (Chichava 2012).

The table below lists some of the infrastructure megaprojects built in partnership with the Chinese government and/or companies in Mozambique.

Table 2 - Chinese construction works in Mozambique (2003-2018)

Construction work	Year	Price (US\$)	Region	Funding agencies	Sector
Joaquim Chissano Conference Center	2003	5 million	Maputo	Chinese government	Infrastructure
Building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2004	12 million	Maputo	Chinese government	Infrastructure
Mphanda Nkuwa Dam	2006	2.3 billion	Zambezi River	Export-Import Bank of China	Infrastructure

⁵ Such as: MOZAL — aluminum foundry; Kenmare — heavy sands; SASOL — natural gas; the coal mines in Moatize; and the Corridor Sands Titanium Project.

Moamba Major Dam	2006	300 million	Maputo	Export-Import Bank of China	Infrastruc-ture
Maputo International Airport	2007	75 million	Maputo	Export-Import Bank of China	Transport and Storage
Attorney General's Office	2007	40 million	Maputo	China National Complete Plant Import & Export Corporation	Infrastruc-ture
Zimpeto National Stadium	2011	70 million	Zimpeto	Chinese govern-ment	Infrastruc-ture
Maputo-Katembe Bridge	2012	1.1 billion	Maputo	Export-Import Bank of China	Transport and Storage
Maputo Ring Road	2012	300 million	Maputo	Export-Import Bank of China	Transport and Storage
Gloria Hotel	2014	300 million	Maputo	Partnership between Mozambi-can government and Chinese company AFECC	Infrastruc-ture
Xai-Xai Air-port	2017	70 million	Gaza	Non-specified Chi-nese government institution, govern-ment agency	Transport and Storage
Maputo-Katambe Bridge	2018	700 million	Maputo	Export-Import Bank of China	Transport and Storage

Source: elaborated by the author, based on Garcia (2020), Roque and Alden (2012), Jansson and Kiala (2009), Roque (2009), Schiere and Rugamba (2011), Wan (2018), Moçambique (2015), “Com apoio da China...” (2018), Banco MAIS, Moçambique (2017), Secretariado Permanente do Fórum para a cooperação econômica e comercial entre a China e os países de Língua Portuguesa (Macau) (2021).

The construction of roads and bridges through Chinese support is so significant that Schiere and Rugamba (2011), in their article titled “Chinese Infrastructure Investments and African Integration”, have estimated that Chinese contractors account for having built approximately one third of the total road extension (which would approach 600 km of roads) built in Mozambique. They have also emphasized that companies operating in the construction sector were also involved in the rehabilitation of urban water supply systems in the cities of Beira and Quelimane, in the reconstruction of Maputo's water system, and in the construction of housing projects in Zim-


peto City; all of these projects played a key role in the process of establishing basic infrastructure in the country.

According to Barbosa (2021), since 2006, China has conquered relevant positions within the construction sector in Mozambique. According to data from the China Global Investment Tracker, between 2008 and 2017, China invested approximately US\$6 billion in infrastructure projects (transport and construction); China Communications Construction and China State Construction Engineering are the main multinational companies operating in this sector. The aforementioned author also highlighted that China adopted a strategy focused on its comparative economic advantages to overcome the strong competition with Western and South African companies operating in Mozambique, “[...] i.e., through low-cost offers based on the use of cheap labor and low managerial costs” (Barbosa 2021, 89, our translation⁶). In order to guarantee its space in the African market, the Chinese government also uses symbolic and economic diplomacy “based on broad diplomatic attention and on support to prestigious and development assistance projects implemented through low interest rates and direct donations” (Barbosa 2021, 89, our translation⁷).

6 In the original: “isto é, na oferta de baixo custo, por meio da utilização de mão de obra barata e custos gerenciais baixos” (Barbosa 2021, 89).

7 In the original: “concretiza através de uma ampla atenção diplomática, apoio a projetos de prestígio e assistência ao desenvolvimento por meio de juros baixos e doações diretas” (Barbosa 2021, 89).

Graph 1 – Chinese investment in the infrastructure sector in Mozambique in US\$ million (2008-2017)




Source: China Global Investment Tracker (2022).

One must acknowledge that the rehabilitation of Mozambique's infrastructure plays a key role in strengthening the tourism sector — which is a potential sector, since China has listed the country as a tourist destination, in addition to supporting and recommending it as a vacation destination for Chinese citizens —, in food flow, transport and logistics processes, in promoting regional integration in the country, in reducing logistics costs, as well as in rehabilitating urban water supply systems in the cities of Maputo, Beira and Quelimane (Garcia 2020).

The next graph shows the geographical arrangement of Chinese investments in Mozambique. It is possible to see the allocation of most FDIs to the capital Maputo, as well as the concentration of investments in the Southern region of the country, since Maputo and Gaza provinces (Southern region) appear as the largest FDI recipients, with approximately 82% of investments being concentrated in this region. Together with provinces such as Sofala and Zambézia (Central region) and Cabo Delgado (Northern region), they form the five largest FDI recipients in Mozambique. Consequently, one of the effects resulting from the concentration of Chinese investments in the Southern provinces of the country lies in worsened regional inequalities between Southern and Northern Mozambique.

Graph 2 - Chinese FDI distribution per province, in Mozambique in US\$ million (2006-2017)



Source: Barbosa (2021).

According to Garcia (2020), Chinese ambassador in Maputo, JSuJian, has confirmed China's intention to keep investing in Mozambique; he also believes that Chinese foreign direct investment in Mozambique is likely to increase in the coming years. His belief is based on several other projects listed in a memorandum signed by the Mozambican government in 2017, which covers several priority needs, such as the construction of industrial parks, roads and ports, agriculture, and the exploitation of natural and energy resources.

Chinese investments in the reconstruction of Mozambique's infrastructure appear to be an excellent opportunity for both countries. On the one hand, Mozambique can benefit from the provision of several Chinese construction projects at more competitive costs to enable the country's modernization and integration (through bridge, road and highway constructions), as well as reducing its dependence on the aid from Western countries. On the other hand, China can increase its profitability and soft power in Mozambique, as well as reinforce a new form of South-South Cooperation under the discourse of mutually shared gains and benefits for both governments and actors involved in it.

However, it is necessary to take into consideration the full details of the Sino-Mozambican diplomatic relationship. Robinson (2012) has emphasized that, according to Large (2008), China is mostly motivated by resource extraction and that it is not concerned with Africa's long-term economic prosperity. In addition, Chinese aid projects aimed at serving China's own interests, since it sees Mozambique as an opportunity to expand the market for Chinese products and as an excellent way to build large projects to provide employment for Chinese workers. It is so, because these projects require hiring Chinese contractors and companies in order to be built. The adopted strategy is based on the fact that Chinese labor is cheaper, and it enables Chinese contractors to operate "at a minimum profit rate of 3%, as opposed to the European 15%" (Visentini 2014, 46, our translation⁸).

The Chinese territorial expansion in Mozambique can be interpreted as the key moment of Chinese economic growth, as the Asian country seeks raw materials and energy sources beyond its borders to continue expanding its internal accumulation (Ribeiro 2010). This also symbolizes the decline in diplomatic relations and in the relevance of Western countries and institutions in Mozambique, reflecting changes in the global power balance (Visentini 2014). However, Ribeiro (2010) also believes that the Chinese expansion on the African continent, which reflects the new face of economic imperialism featured by increased Chinese presence in Mozambique, has led to anti-China and anti-Chinese sentiments that, according to Feijó (2012), "refer to movements, oftentimes with populist nature, that compare the Chinese presence in Africa to neocolonial processes and that blame it for the exploitation and degradation of local economies" (Feijó 2012, 145, our translation⁹).

If one assumes that the expansion of investments in Mozambique is profitable and important for the Chinese government, challenges and obstacles must be faced to enable the Chinese cooperation process to progress. Durán and Chichava (2012) have emphasized difficulties in the relationship between Mozambicans and Chinese, which emerged from, and were exacerbated by, the language barrier. The aforementioned authors have also highlighted difficulties in establishing good working relationships, cooperation, and technical exchanges, as well as distrust and weak connections

8 In the original: "*a uma taxa de lucro mínima de 3%, ao contrário dos 15% europeus*" (Visentini 2014, 46).

9 In the original: "*Trata-se de movimentos, por vezes de pendor populista, que comparam a presença chinesa em África a processos neocoloniais, responsabilizando-a pela exploração e degradação das economias locais*" (Feijó 2012, 145).

between Chinese and African workers, mostly due to cultural and linguistic differences.

There are also reports that local workers are hired by Chinese companies, which do not act in compliance with Mozambican labor standards and disregard both the laws and the regulations in place in the country. Among the issues observed in this scenario, one finds wage difference; unequal treatment between foreign and national workers; lack of safety systems and equipment in the work environment (which can lead to several work-related accidents); precarious working conditions for Mozambicans; resilience and lack of payment of vacation and overtime allowances leading to discontentment, protests and strikes; and lack of formal employment contracts for Mozambican workers (Chichava 2012; Nielsen 2012; Garcia, Kato and Fontes 2012).

Accordingly, Chichava (2014) has stated that Chinese projects do not benefit the local population and that they only meet the needs of Chinese elites and investors (the author mentioned the Wanbao¹⁰ investment called “land grabbing” by China, as an example of it). He also highlighted that:

Mozambican workers, however, see Chinese managers as rude and authoritarian individuals who think that their ideas are better and who believe they work harder than Mozambicans. However, the Chinese see Mozambicans as: (1) thieves who steal materials and equipment; (2) lazy and slow workers who do not like to work overtime even when they are promised to be paid; and (3) irresponsible because, once they get paid in the end of the month, they disappear and only come back after they have spent their wages, and they care little about supporting their families (Chichava 2014, 4).

Robinson (2012) has also emphasized that, besides social issues, the Chinese expansion can pose risks to both the environment and sustainable development, since Chinese projects can accidentally and/or intentionally cause destruction by ignoring environmental impacts or through activities, such as predatory deforestation, which can get worse due to the ambiguity or lack of clarity in the interpretation and enforcement of Mozambican laws. In addition, it is worth emphasizing that the encouragement and promotion of development in specific regions (such as the capital Maputo, which concentrates a large part of Chinese FDI) worsens regional inequality in an extremely unequal country.

¹⁰ Project financed through the partnership between the Wanbao Company and Mozambique, which aims at increasing agricultural yield, namely: irrigated rice production in Lower Limpopo irrigation region, Gaza province.

Conclusion

The infrastructure deficit caused by the civil war made the Chinese expansion into Mozambican territory both timely and convenient for Mozambique. The construction of new infrastructure projects enabled access to financial, transport, hotel and basic infrastructure services in the country. However, Mozambique has to deal with potential threats and overcome internal obstacles so that the Chinese presence in the country can lead to socio-economic development and benefit the Mozambican population.

The first obstacle to be overcome lies in the fact that Mozambique has precarious facilities for Chinese companies to operate in the country. In addition, Mozambique lacks qualified professionals capable of dealing with Chinese technology due to precarious access to quality education by part of the African population, especially by the poorest. With respect to the low use of Mozambican labor in Chinese projects developed in the country, the language barrier hinders knowledge and techniques' exchange between Mozambican and Chinese workers, whereas cultural clashes hamper their relationship¹¹. On the other hand, it is necessary to overcome criticisms about the low quality of Chinese construction works (which may result from lack of specific knowledge about the location and/or from low-quality inputs used in the construction process), lack of compliance with labor (such as overtime pay, labor formalization based on contracts, better working conditions, work equipment supply) and environmental laws, adequacy and respect for the local culture, as well as requirement and compliance with the minimum (although sufficient) amount of local manpower in order to contribute to the development of the investigated region.

Thus, there is a lack of planning and national political projects to favor the economic growth and development of Mozambique, since the country is seen as a large consumer market for Chinese products; consequently, Sino-Mozambican relationships are gaining room and tend to increase in the coming years. Moreover, the country has diverse, and broad access to natural resources (mainly when it comes to the exploitation of energy resources and to the access to productive lands in Mozambique) capable of serving Chinese interests. Identifying and understanding how to take advantage of opportunities, as well as addressing weaknesses and threats, is essential for Mozambique to undergo a major structural transformation and to reduce

¹¹ Chinese people have a culture of extreme dedication to work; they work more than eight hours a day, from Monday to Saturday. Mozambican workers, on the other hand, do not share the same culture; therefore, they can be labeled as lazy or unwilling to work.

poverty, extreme poverty, and the social and economic inequalities it has faced over time.

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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the analysis of the China-Mozambique cooperation and the megaproject's role in the territorial development plan of Mozambique during the 2000s. Its objective is to answer the question: is it possible to assume that Chinese investments in megaproject's constructions can increase economic growth and result in productive and social development in Mozambique? In this regard, the paper proposes to identify the main economic and social effects related to the implementation of Chinese infrastructure megaprojects in the country to understand if it's possible to appoint the strategy adopted by Mozambique as a real kind of transformation and socioeconomic development.

KEYWORDS

Mozambique. Megaprojects. Sino-Mozambican Relation.

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THE AMALGAMATION OF 1914 AND THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR: THE BURDEN OF BLAME

Abimbola Oyarinu¹



Introduction

Some pundits and scholars have identified Lord Lugard's amalgamation of northern and southern Nigeria as a remote cause of the Nigerian Civil War. The origins of this civil war have been linked to the 1914 amalgamation of Southern Nigeria and Northern Nigeria by the British government (Uche 2008, 114). Colonial legacy has been blamed for the intermittent crises that rocked independent Africa (Taylor 2018, 27). While scholars like Uche (2008), Falola & Heaton (2018), Doron (2022) have exaggerated the role colonial policies played in the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War, colonial policies cannot be completely exonerated from the underdevelopment and internal strifes in most post-independent African states. In understanding colonial policies' role in Africa, the Nigerian Civil War will be examined to substantiate the viewpoint of two popular schools of thought. On one side of the pendulum — Bernhard *et al.* (2004), Roger (2022), Thompson & Fernandes (2020) argue that British colonial legacies are not responsible for the crises and civil wars in Africa. This group argues the view that Africa is going through a phase in its development that, like Europe in the 18th century, it is bound to fight wars. The other school blames the British policies for the wars in Africa. The Nigerian Civil War has been hinged on the colonial legacy of the British, the amalgamation of 1914, indirect rule, and the divide-and-rule

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policy, just to mention a few. None of these advanced arguments are totally correct. Like the interpretation of creationists, every kind of interpretation can find its promoters.

Theoretical consideration

For this study, the theory of Structural Political Economy (SPE) will be adopted. Political economy is often divided between two main approaches: one being instrumental rationality, which focuses on means-ends action and rational choices. The second approach borders on the division of labor. While the former lacks internal constraints, the latter lacks action. The theory of Structural Political Economy bridges these gaps by combining insights from both approaches (Newmann 2016, 10).

SPE has two interdependent parts: firstly, the models of division of labor, which not only understand material relations but also the heuristics for uncovering the configuration of interests within the polity. Secondly, the economic actions of actors are central to SPE. The theory problematizes who the relevant actors are and how they visualize their objectives and constraints (Caporaso and Levine 1992, 172).

Lastly, SPE recognizes that systemic conditions for viability exist. For SPE, the pursuit of a particular interest must be balanced by the systemic interest in keeping the entire economy viable. The unsustainable pursuit of narrow interests can undermine the overall health of the polity. For a balanced health of the polity, some conditions are crucial: balancing interest, resource constraints, institutional framework, feedback mechanisms, resilience and adaptability, social cohesion and trust, and lastly, avoiding path dependence (Caporaso and Levine 1992, 179).

Nigerian political elites displayed attributes contrary to the systemic conditions for viability, as expressed in the comments of Obafemi Awolowo; “the name Nigeria is a geographical expression and not a single country” (Kindness 2020). His position highlights the heterogeneous nature of Nigeria, emphasizing that the amalgamation of 1914 did not necessarily create a unified nation but rather merged distinct territories. Similarly, Ahmadu Bello, during a heated debate on the floor of Parliament in 1953 declared: “The mistake of 1914 has come to light, and I should like to go no further.” (Anele 2020). According to Frederick Forsyth, Bello’s conviction “runs right through northern political thinking from the end of the Second World War to independence” (Forsyth 2001, 190).

Pre-independence: colonial implications

Colonialism, as a historical and ideological phenomenon, has been variously interpreted. To the subject peoples, it has meant humiliation, oppression, degradation, alienation, and economic exploitation (Fanon 1952, 15). But among the colonial powers, they felt strongly that much good had thereby been done for Africa and that theirs was the “white man’s burden” to “civilize” the “savage blacks” (Ankomah 1970, 130).

In his research on the Nigerian Civil War, Kirk-Greene claimed that:

[...] in seeking the genesis of the Nigerian Civil War it is possible to locate it in a variety of different sources and levels. The origins may, for instance, be explained in terms of political competition, of inter-regional economic rivalry of elitists in-fighting (Kirk-Greene 1975, 4).

For Kirk-Greene, colonial legacy did not play a major role in the outbreak of the civil war, rather, it was post-independent crises that led to the war. G. O. Olusanya (1980) was also optimistic about the British colonial legacy, one of which was the creation of Nigeria. In their treatises, Dudley (1982) and Olusanya (1980) challenged the idea that the peoples of the Niger area were strange bedfellows before the amalgamation of 1914, puncturing the theory of strange bedfellows in the making of the Nigerian state. They both argued that there were a series of contacts between the different tribes of the Niger area; therefore, the amalgamation represented a finalization of a process already in motion. Put differently, they maintain that the emergence of a state such as Nigeria would have occurred even in the absence of the colonialists. Olusanya (1980) maintains that the emergence of a state such as Nigeria would have occurred even in the absence of the colonialists. While this is historically plausible, there is no disputing the existence of pre-colonial relations. Olaniyan (2009, 522) further argued that the frequency of pre-colonial exchanges indicated that Nigerians were not completely alien to themselves before the arrival of the British.

On the other end of the pendulum were historians, leaders, and observers who resented the 1914 amalgamation. Professor Tangban (2014, 379) opined that the British colonial authorities pretended to care about the unity of Nigeria, as unity as such was not achieved through the 1914 amalgamation. Despite the amalgamation, the Southern and Northern Protectorates “continued to develop along different lines — politically, socially and economically” (Osaghae 1998, 32). Claude Ake (1981) however, held a slightly different point of view from Osaghae (1998), who blamed the Nige-

rian political elite as well as the British colonial apparatus for the problems facing post-independent Nigeria. According to Ake (1996), the nation's leaders at the time of independence had every chance to reverse the effects of colonialism, which were detrimental to long-term democracy, growth, and unity. However, they wasted these opportunities because they saw the state as a vehicle for furthering their agendas.

Being a Parliamentary Private Secretary in the 1960s, Smithers (2007) recognized that the British had good intentions in the creation of Nigeria. The British intended to create a large and powerful state, rich in resources of many kinds, which would be an element of stability amidst numerous small African states resulting from the dissolution of the French Empire. Smithers however admitted that on the surface it seemed like a reasonable idea but the British officials in-charge of speeding up independence in Africa did not have the experience of the problems associated with multi-racial states, which had long since manifested in the former USSR and Yugoslavia. Smithers further acknowledge the wrong the British did by creating Nigeria and that it would have been better to create smaller states. To add to it, Smithers hinted that there was no independence struggle in Nigeria or in any other colonies in Africa, what was in place was independence negotiation. For Smithers, the Metropolitan states did not see any reason to hold on to the colonies after the Second World War, as it was no longer lucrative. So Britain actually appointed officials to speed up the decolonisation process in Africa (Smithers 2007).

British political and economic colonial

Although managing Northern and Southern Nigeria jointly made administrative sense, it didn't seem to make sense in practice. This was because, while there was proximity, their peoples, customs, and faiths were distinct. One of the primary motivations for the colonial government's 1914 merger of Northern and Southern Nigeria was to use the surpluses from Southern Nigeria to lower the colony of Northern Nigeria's subsidy. The Nigerian state that Lugard created had strong regional administrations and a weak core because of the stark contrasts between the regions. By doing this, the North was successfully shielded from influences from the South (Uche 2008, 114). The British colonial authority further separated Southern Nigeria into East and West areas in 1946, and because it was spared, the North continued to be the region with the largest landmass and population (Ameachi 2022). Due to this, there was an imbalance, which has continued to hold development and progress hostage to this day. The vast, untouched, and underdeveloped

north, has failed to educate its citizens, making them pawns and ready tools for retrogressive politicians. They have become willing tools in the hands of northern political elites, which has been the source of the power of northern politicians in detriment of the development of the Nigerian state.

Moreover, the implementation of the indirect rule system failed to establish a unified nation (Ameachi 2022). Local administration was centralized, hence, it was easy for the British to use their local political structure to control the populace, which is why the system worked so well in the North. In the West, indirect rule had some success; in the East, it failed blatantly. The British purposely dissuaded nations building and national cohesion (Tamuno 2009, 22).

The educational policy implemented by the British is indicative of a divide-and-rule strategy; for example, J.G.N Onyekpe argued, “while the south was exposed to western education, the north was, as a matter of British deliberate policy, protected from the ‘adulterating’ influences of Western civilisation” (Onyekpe 1997, 232). Also, parliamentary politics began in southern Nigeria in 1922, and it was not until 25 years later in 1947 that it began in northern Nigeria, which paints a somber illustration of the divide-and-rule tactics of the British (Onyekpe 1997, 233). The British dominated the nation under this political structure, which sowed the seeds of division rather than unity.

The Land and Native Rights Ordinance of 1910, which created different regulations for landowners in the North and South, helped make evident ethnic division and instill ethnic identity (Amaechi 2022). As a result of such practices, southerners in the north were separated from the indigenes, and that is the reason why in Kaduna, Plateau and Kano to this day, you have indigenes and settlers living separately in most cases.

Despite the perceived mistake of 1914, the British made several efforts to correct it, not by reversing the mistake but by making it work. This can be seen in the many constitution reviews that were conducted before 1960. The British settled for a regional system, whose elements were first introduced by Richards’ constitution of 1946 (Awasom 1998).

On the economic front, the British colonial legacy laid the foundation for economic disequilibrium between the North and South thereby creating an environment of fear, suspicion and discontent. Another legacy the British left that created a structure that gradually made the recourse to war inevitable was the revenue-sharing formula. The colonial government set up a commission headed by Sir Jeremy Raisman and Professor Ronald Tress to review the federal fiscal structure. The commission altered deriva-

tion as a sharing principle among the region in 1958/9. Furthermore, the discovery of oil in the Eastern region marked a turning point in the history of Nigeria, that combined with the alteration of the derivation principle, led to an increase in the struggle for national revenue rather than encouraging the regions to take advantage of their social and economic circumstances and design appropriate revenue-generating schemes (Uche 2008, 115).

Emergence of regionalism

The Richards Constitution introduced the concept of regionalism, dividing Nigeria into three regions: Northern, Western, and Eastern, the regions were thus granted more autonomy (Akanji 2021, 39). The Richards Constitution established a central legislature for the entire country and three regional houses of assembly for the three provinces. Although the shelf life of the constitution was billed to last for nine years, political agitation by a few educated Nigerians resulted in its early abolishment barely two years after its implementation (Ekundare 1973, 45).

The colonial government had been parasitic in its dealings with its colonies in Nigeria. This, however, significantly changed in the post-1945 period following some structural changes that triggered development. For example, the British colonial economic strategy shifted from classical *laissez-faire* to constructive development, laying the groundwork for indigenous political participation beginning in the 1950s. The ideology of decolonization was primarily responsible for the change in Britain's approach towards Nigeria's economic growth, which began in 1945 (Lawal 2010, 43).

The 1946 Richards Constitution set up three separate Regional Councils with powers to advise on laws affecting their areas and to control the spending of the money to be collected or allocated to that area. This was more than what had been permitted before and was a real advance. For the first time, the groups of provinces were formally called 'Regions', under lieutenant governors who lived in Kaduna, Ibadan and Enugu (Ekundare 1973, 44).

Indeed, the Richards Constitution gave Nigerians for the first time the opportunity to have a say in the laws which would apply to them, in the money which would be spent in the region and in choosing the people who would represent them in the Legislative Council in Lagos (Niven 1961). The Macpherson Constitution of 1951, strengthened regional autonomy and gave Nigerians a greater say in policy formulation and the direction of executive government activity. The constitution established representative governance in Nigeria (Ekundare 1973, 45). As a result, the Action Group, the Western

region's political party and the region's focal point for political and economic growth, was formed because of the constitution's expanded regional autonomy. The party leveraged the 1951 constitutional provision to establish itself as a development agency in the Western Region (Lloyd 1955, 697).

The most crucial factor responsible for the nascent development of the region was the preparedness of its indigenous political class to succeed in the necessary quest for nation-building. This was evident in the activities of the newly sworn-in legislators after the 1951 elections, introduced by the Macpherson Constitution. They promulgated laws for establishing public enterprises as instruments of socio-economic production of goods and services but within the purview of the British colonial economic policy. The three existing Regions embarked upon state-led development with the creation of the post of Premier in each one of them (Ugbogu 2012, 49). Regional Finance Corporations later became Regional Development Corporations (Inah 2011, 74).

The need for more autonomy at the regional level necessitated a more specific definition and delineation of roles between the central and regional governments, prompting two constitutional conferences in 1953 and 1954, held in London and Lagos respectively. As a result, a new constitution establishing a federal system of government went into effect in 1954. The new federation constituted the Western, Eastern, and Northern regions on one hand, and established the federal territory in Lagos and the quasi-federal area of Southern Cameroon (Ojiako 1981, 4). Following Lyttleton's declaration that Lagos' status as the seat of power be sustained, the Premier of Western Region, Obafemi Awolowo was furious at the news and threatened to secede, cutting the Western Region from the rest of Nigeria (Mathews 2002, 22).

Without a doubt, the decade (1950-1959) saw the establishment of a regional government in 1951 and self-government in 1954. Following the introduction of the Lyttleton Constitution, as it allowed Nigerian politicians greater participation in the socioeconomic development of their respective regions, it also ushered in an age of mechanization and scientific agriculture, including implementing an aggressive agricultural strategy aimed at increasing agricultural growth in the three regions (Mathews 2002, 34).

By 1949, as regional governments began to gain more power, development efforts were continually regionalized. The Nigeria Local Development Board was split up into Regional Development Boards, each of which had £1,250,000 in total capital that could be lent to Nigerian businesses. Additionally, Regional Production Development Boards were formed, and the Produce Marketing Boards gave them the first of their £4,300,000 allotment

to finance programmes for the growth of the producing industries as well as the financial security and well-being of the producers. The Regional Development Boards and the Production Development Boards (on both of which there were majorities of Nigerians) were managed regionally (British Archive 1949a). The initial steps in the regionalization of the principal Departments, the creation of Regional Loan Development Boards and Regional Production Development Boards made it necessary to strengthen the regional governments (British Archive 1949b).

The development boards were originally set up for strictly limited purposes, which were defined in the Regional Production Development Boards Ordinance (No. 27 of 1951). A board might only use its money for schemes which are of direct benefit to crop producers that are appropriate for the produce marketing board (British Archive 1953).

For example, the Western Region Marketing Board was inaugurated in 1952 but began operation in 1954, with its headquarters in Ibadan. It was a statutory company established as part of a political restructuring that increased the administrative capacity of Nigeria's regions. The boards were responsible for purchasing and distributing export products from their various regions for transportation to the ports for sale (Tamuno 2009, 56). In 1961, these boards dominated the Nigerian economy, accounting for 63% of the country's foreign exchange earnings (Colonial Office 1958). The regional marketing system created monopolies as the boards were the only authorized commodity buyers of Cocoa, Groundnut, Palm and Cotton in the 1950s and 1960s. This system was replaced in 1977. In Southern Nigeria, the boards expanded their stabilization role of acting as trustees for the farmers, to tax the producers' income to fund government programmes (Ajayi *et al.* 2017, 73).

Also, palm oil and kernel exports doubled the 1948 figure so that by 1951, it was 17,500 tons and 27,000 tons respectively, such that the colonial state made about £120,000,000 from overseas exports of agricultural produce in 1952. The idea of single-commodity production at the regional level was a success. Earnings from the export of groundnut and palm produce increased to around seven times the tonnes generated before World War II, and much more important was the revenue from cocoa, which was around eight times as much (Baker-Beall 1953, 10).

The above demonstrates that the marketing boards were mutually beneficial to both the producer and the colonial state. In reality, the metropole benefited the most from the initiative because it was primarily intended to aid Britain's economic recovery. In the circumstances faced by the British government at the time, it is hardly surprising that they took this opportu-

nity to exploit colonial producers to shore up the crumbling sterling and the imperial economy (Ejamah 2014).

Another view of the marketing boards holds that the colonial economies were rooted in the exploitation of exportable goods, with no internal infrastructures designed for transformation purposes, rendering the continent deeply vulnerable to the vagaries of the global economy. Thus, the need for a marketing board's support (Ajayi *et al.* 2017, 75).

Whichever way the boards were perceived, the Colonial Office offered its reasons for pursuing such policy and two justifications were offered. The first contended that a regulated marketing system, wherein the government set crop prices for each season and licensed purchasers to shield farmers against abuses, would be advantageous to the producers. Secondly, the boards utilized their funds to protect against short and mid-term price volatility in the global market. Budgets were also set aside for other objectives of general benefit to farmers and industrialists like research funding, disease eradication, and rehabilitation of unhealthy trees (Ajayi *et al.* 2017, 75).

When the regions transferred power to regional governments, the marketing boards were reconstituted and the boards became the main funding sources for government development spending. The drop in prices of exported goods from 1955 led to a cut in the profit of marketing boards and inadvertently diminished the regional government's cash flow (Badia-Miró *et al.* 2015, 35). The Western Region was able to weather the storm and embarked on a series of developmental projects at the time. The Northern and Eastern regions were adversely affected and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) government in the east had to discontinue its free education programme, which the Western Region pursued with remarkable success (Oyarinu 2020, 63).

The Board was involved in the agricultural/agro-allied and industrial development of the regions. There was cocoa, rubber, kola nuts and palm oil as the major agricultural products in the west. Cocoa and kola nuts were grown in Yoruba west; palm oil in the Midwest. On the industrialization side, the organization collaborated with multinational companies like UAC Group, UTC and AG Leventis, that engaged in basic manufacturing industries (Oyarinu 2020, 63).

The Ikeja Industrial Estate was set up in the early 1950s and Oba Akran, Ikeja and Lagos was the nerve center of this industrial set-up. The government also had shares in these companies ranging from 30% to 40% and sometimes 45%, thus allowing the expatriates to have a slim majority.

In some cases, the government monetised land as its equity contribution (Oyarinu 2020, 64).

The regional boards were poised to ensure speedy development of the region and achieved this by collaborating with indigenous banks. Loans were granted to foster the development of private capital and promote entrepreneurship, as the banks gave loans at a favorable interest rate. Regional financial corporations were created out of the regional development boards in 1956, with the primary mandate of granting loans and undertaking equity investments in industrial projects, forestry/sawmills, radio/recreational facilities and communal projects (especially market extensions). A large chunk of the funds available to the board was spent on transport development, mainly passenger bus transport (Falola 1987, 124). In the early 1950s, a group of intelligent and industrious Ado-Ekiti residents and business owners made the decision to seek for a loan in order to launch the Ekiti Youth Transport Service, a transport company with an office located at 32 King's Market Square in Ado-Ekiti. Through the Ekiti District Officer, the loan application was sent to the Secretary of the Western Regional Development Board in Ibadan (Falola 1987, 124).

Post-independence mismanagement

The foundation for the social tensions that were to precede the civil war had been laid in the environment of fear and uncertainty created by the politics of ethnicity, the British divide-and-rule policy. Many people think that there were many anomalies in the 1962 general census, and the Eastern region rejected the results. Even after the second census of 1963, significant doubts were expressed about the results. In the meantime, the people living in the Northern Middle Belt region had become extremely resentful of the NPC's (Northern Peoples Congress) control. The Tiv, a prominent tribe in the Middle Belt, engaged in open rioting from 1962 to 1965 (Kirk-Greene 1975).

In 1963, the Western Region was reduced in size upon the creation of the Mid-Western Region (Ekundare 1973). Also, the region was then homogeneous since other non-Yoruba elements became incorporated into the newly created Mid-Western Region. The Western Region was politically active in the First Republic. It is incontestable that the political log jams in the region during the First Republic reshaped the political structure of Nigeria in such a way that it fecundated the crises that led to the demise of the First Republic. It has to be noted, however, that the Western Region contributed immensely to

the attainment of Nigeria's independence. Under the leadership of Obafemi Awolowo, the Action Group called for the immediate termination of British rule in Nigeria. Awolowo accomplished development through the promotion and creation of several public welfare initiatives, such as expanding access to primary education for all children, improving health care in rural areas, broadening the economic base of the Western Region, and democratizing local administration (Ojiako 1981).

The largest crisis of all materialized with the 1964 general election. It was said that the election lacked both fairness and freedom (Diamond 1988). Even the Electoral Commission Chairman acknowledged the existence of verifiable anomalies. In view of these accusations, President Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe declined to name a prime minister. Both the President and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister, were requesting the assistance of the armed forces. This was the armed forces' first foray into politics. The country anxiously awaited the announcement by the President that Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the current prime minister, would be leading a broad-based government for four days. The 1965 election in the Western Region was not comparable. It was said that the election's manipulation and anomalies were more blatant and despicable. Law and order broke down completely, leading to an almost complete state of anarchy. Political parties were said to have hired a private army of goons, and they went on the rampage, burning and killing with reckless abandon. This created an environment of fear as people feared for their lives and property (Kirk-Greene 1975).

Following the January 15 1966 coup, "as an immediate cause, it might be claimed that the explosion of that day could be traced back along the powder trail to the fuse lit at the time of the Western Region election of October 1965." (Madiabo 1980). The aim of the coup plotters were poised to establish a corrupt-free, strong, unified, and developed nation (Osaghae 2018). A shift in the political landscape occurred as a result of the misguided and ill-advised coup. Except for one political figure and one senior Army officer from the Midwest and the East, respectively, every slain politician and senior military officer was from the Northern and Western regions (Madiabo 1980).

The coup hastened the collapse of Nigeria. From independence to January 1966, the country had been in a serious turmoil, but the coup generated an even greater situation. Since the majority of the coup plotters were from the East, the Northerners perceived it as a calculated attempt of the Igbos to dominate them. Ironsi did not display sensitivity to the North when

he reeled out his policies, the most disdainful being the Unification Decree – Decree 34 (Oshigbo and Oshigbo 2019, 72).

The “wait and see” approach adopted in some quarters of the north quickly turned into anger, culminating in the May 1966 riots in the north, during which the majority of easterners living there were hunted, leading to a *pogrom* (Oguh, n.d). Consequently, military men of northern extraction launched a counter-coup six months after the first coup, with the intent, first, to revenge, and secondly, to secede. However, following the advice of some foreign diplomats and powerful Nigerians, the secession was shelved. Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, the head of state, and numerous other high-ranking officers of Eastern descent were assassinated. Following a three-day period marked by anxiety, uncertainty, and the lack of a centralized authority, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon — the highest ranking officer of northern descent and the Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Army at the time — emerged as the new political leader of Nigeria (Siollun, n.d). The second coup’s lack of organization and spiteful intentions were evident in the turmoil, disarray, and widespread executions of easterners across the country. As a result, the perpetrators of the coup were unable to contain the overall anarchy, chaos and unfettered looting and killing that swept across the north beginning on September 29, 1966 (Atofarati 1992, 23).

By 1967 regionalism was abolished. The goal was to forestall the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War. When General Yakubu Gowon became the Head of State of Nigeria, following the counter-coup of 29th July 1966, state creation became politically expedient. Although debates on the creation of more states were intensified during the early part of Gowon’s administration, because he reverted to a federal system of government that his predecessor, Aguiyi-Ironsi, had abolished, the political tension at that period became a major propeller. Nevertheless, the timing of the creation of these states was appropriate because it succeeded in weakening secessionist tendencies that almost disintegrated the country. Gowon, in May of 1967, used the strategy of state creation to weaken Ojukwu’s influence and authority in the Eastern Region. He succeeded in gaining the support of other minority groups in Nigeria (Oyarinu 2020, 74).

After the war, which was declared no winner, no vanquish, General Gowon’s led military government initiated the 3Rs (Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation) to fix the destruction caused by the war and to reintegrate the warring faction into Nigeria. Ironically, most of the awarded reconstruction projects were done in areas where physical fighting did not occur (Mbara and Gopal 2021). This points to the mutual hatred and distrust

of one group against the other, and power is seen as an avenue to mete out unjustifiable neglect and injustice against other groups within a geographical entity.

Conclusion

It is evident that as long as Nigerians keep running away from the fundamental questions that shape their collective destinies, the amalgamation of 1914 will continually seem like a mistake, a mistake the British seem to have fixed as Nigeria had been set on the development path before 1960. The questions of: do Nigerians want to be together, why are they together, and how should they live together? must be deliberated upon to formalize the terms of engagement. Nigeria's political, economic and social development has followed the trajectory drawn up for it since the colonial days. British colonial legacies were not all negative. British colonial policies created a platform that made war inevitable. While states like Rwanda have used their civil war experience as a springboard for development, Nigeria has struggled to shake off the negative consequences of the war and the implication of the war still threatens the foundation of the Nigerian state.

In all, it is clear that while the British created the basis for the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War owing to the 1914 amalgamation, the British should not take the bulk of the blame for the war. The Nigerian political class at independence should be blamed for how they managed the country from 1960. The recklessness of the first-generation political and military elite in Nigeria has remained an indelible dent that has clogged the wheel of progress to this day.

Nigeria's political elite of the first republic operated the realist principles of zero-sum, self-interest (in this case ethnic interest) and power. The Nigerian state was their own international arena. They applied the same principles as though they were playing international politics. Power arrogance was at the center of all relations among them and no one was concerned about the state because the idea of patriotism was in relation to ethnic consciousness and not to the state.

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ABSTRACT

In the face of daunting challenges facing the Nigerian state, in terms of civil unrest, poverty, under-development, terrorism, militancy, etc, there is more than enough evidence to show that the foundation of these problems was cast long before Nigeria's independence. This perhaps sheds immense light on the origin and complexity of the Nigerian problem. However, the ruling class is repugnant to open the Pandora box, so as not to divide a country, which is already divided. The study adopts the structural political economy theory to understand the role of the British and Nigerian political elites in shaping Nigeria's fate. Using the eventuality of the Nigerian civil war with recourse to the historical analytical method of qualitative research, this paper traces the origin of Nigeria's problem to the British and British pronouncement of 1914. It further argues that if the issues of our union as a nation are not treated, there will be more internal strife, corruption and underdevelopment in Nigeria.

KEYWORDS

Civil war. Amalgamation. Colonialism. Regionalism. Political economy.

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NIGERIA'S OIL COMPLEX: THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

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Introduction

Nigeria, often referred to as the “Giant of Africa,” has long been a focal point of global attention due to its vast reserves of oil and natural gas. The nation’s oil complex is not only a source of significant wealth and economic potential but also a complex web of challenges and controversies. At the core of this multifaceted issue lies a concept deeply ingrained in environmental and resource management literature: the tragedy of the commons. The tragedy of the commons is a situation in which a group of individuals, acting in their own self-interest, behaves contrary to the collective good by depleting or degrading a shared resource through their cumulative actions. This can happen because there is an incentive for each individual to consume the resource as much as possible, even though this will harm the group in the long run.

The tragedy of the commons is a challenge that is faced in many parts of the world, including the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta is a region of Nigeria that is rich in oil and gas resources. However, the region is also home to a large number of people who live in poverty, environmental degradation and conflicts. This has led to a situation where many people in the Niger Delta

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are exploiting the region's natural resources in order to survive, even though this is harming the environment and the long-term interests of the region.

This research delves into the intricate dynamics of Nigeria's oil industry, aiming to uncover the extent to which the tragedy of the commons phenomenon is at play in this critical sector. By examining the historical, political, economic, environmental, and social dimensions of Nigeria's oil complex, this study seeks to shed light on the sustainability and governance challenges facing one of the world's most oil-rich nations.

Conceptual clarification

To begin with, it is essential to state that the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is paradoxical in nature: while it is endowed with vast natural resources, particularly large deposits of crude oil, it remains one of the most underdeveloped areas in the country (Wangbu 2018).

Scholars have examined this phenomenon through various conceptual lenses, including the "Dutch disease", the "resource curse", the "paradox of abundance", and the "tragedy of the commons". The concept of "Dutch disease" refers to the negative economic consequences that can result from a country's dependence on a single natural resource, such as oil. Named after the economic troubles faced by the Netherlands following the discovery of natural gas in the 1960s, "Dutch disease" occurs when a resource boom leads to an appreciation of the local currency, which in turn makes other sectors of the economy less competitive. In the context of the Niger Delta, the oil sector has become the dominant force in the economy, leading to the neglect of other vital sectors like agriculture and manufacturing. This overreliance on oil has contributed to the region's economic underdevelopment and high levels of unemployment (Auty 1993).

Relatedly, the "resource curse" theory posits that countries rich in natural resources often experience less economic growth and worse development outcomes than countries with fewer resources. This counterintuitive phenomenon is linked to several factors, including poor governance, corruption, and conflict. In the Niger Delta, the abundance of oil has not translated into widespread prosperity for the local population. Instead, the region has been plagued by corruption, environmental degradation, and social unrest, all of which have stymied development efforts (Ross 2001).

In addition, it is pertinent to state that the "paradox of abundance" is closely related to the resource curse and describes the irony that regions

or countries with abundant natural resources often suffer from economic stagnation and poor development. In the Niger Delta, the wealth generated from oil has largely benefited a small elite, while the majority of the population lives in poverty. The paradox lies in the fact that, despite the region's vast oil wealth, the local communities lack basic infrastructure, healthcare, and education (Sachs and Warner 1997). The oil wealth has not been reinvested into the region in a way that promotes sustainable development, leading to widespread discontent and instability.

Resultingly, the discovery and exploitation of oil in the Niger Delta have also contributed to geopolitical instability in the region. The competition for control of oil resources has fueled conflict among local communities, militant groups, and the government. This instability has further exacerbated the region's underdevelopment, as ongoing violence and insecurity deter investment and disrupt economic activities (Watts 2004). The presence of multinational oil companies has also complicated the situation, as these companies are often seen as complicit in the exploitation of local resources and the marginalization of the local population.

This research will apply the concept of the “tragedy of the commons” to analyze how the Nigerian state, particularly its elite, has exploited the Niger Delta's oil resources in a manner that has intensified poverty in the region. The “tragedy of the commons” is a concept that describes the overexploitation of shared resources due to individual self-interest, leading to the depletion or degradation of the resource for everyone. In the Niger Delta, the common resource in question is the environment. The region's oil wealth has led to widespread environmental degradation, including oil spills, gas flaring, and deforestation. This environmental damage has had devastating effects on the livelihoods of local communities, who rely on the land and water for farming and fishing. The “tragedy of the commons” in the Niger Delta illustrates how the pursuit of short-term gains by various stakeholders — whether oil companies, government officials, or local elites — has led to long-term environmental and economic decline (Hardin 1968).

Brief overview

To begin with, Nigeria's pre-crude oil economy was characterized by a diverse range of economic activities, primarily agrarian in nature. Agriculture played a significant role in sustaining the livelihoods of the population, with the cultivation of crops such as yams, cassava, and cocoa being prominent

(Ibaba 2008). Additionally, Nigeria had a thriving trade network that existed long before the discovery of oil. The trans-Saharan trade route, for instance, facilitated the exchange of goods like salt, textiles, and metals, further enriching the pre-oil Nigerian economy.

Moreover, the mining sector was vital, with tin mining in Jos and coal mining in Enugu being notable examples. These resources contributed to Nigeria's economic development by generating revenue and providing raw materials for industries. The pre-oil era also saw the emergence of a budding manufacturing sector, primarily centered on processing agricultural products and local crafts (Ikein *et al.* 2008). In terms of governance and political structure, Nigeria was divided into various ethnic groups and kingdoms, each with its own economic systems and trade networks. This diversity contributed to the richness and complexity of the pre-crude oil Nigerian economy.

However, since gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria has experienced a significant transformation driven by its crude oil economy. The discovery and exploitation of oil reserves in the country have had a profound and multifaceted impact (Smith 2005). One of the most notable benefits has been the substantial revenue generated from oil exports, which has provided a reliable source of income for the government (Adams 2012). This revenue has been channeled into critical sectors such as infrastructure, education, and healthcare, fostering economic development and growth (Adams 2012).

The oil sector itself has emerged as a cornerstone of Nigeria's economy, contributing significantly to the country's GDP (Brown 2018). This growth has attracted foreign investments and facilitated economic diversification and industrialization (Jones 2017). The influx of foreign exchange earnings from crude oil exports has bolstered the stability of Nigeria's currency, easing international trade and strengthening the country's position in the global market (Davis 2019). Moreover, the oil industry has played a pivotal role in infrastructure development (Robinson 2016). The government has directed oil revenue toward improving transportation and logistics, enhancing connectivity across the nation. This has resulted in the construction and upgrading of roads, bridges, airports, and ports, ultimately benefiting businesses and citizens alike (Green 2015).

One of the less visible yet critical impacts has been the creation of employment opportunities (Lee 2013). The oil sector has generated jobs both directly, through roles in exploration, production, transportation, and support services (Smith 2005), and indirectly, as downstream industries like petrochemicals and refining have expanded (Jones 2017). This has contributed significantly to reducing unemployment and poverty in Nigeria (Adams 2012).

The positive influence of the crude oil economy extends to social programs aimed at poverty alleviation (Brown 2018). Income from oil has facilitated initiatives such as conditional cash transfer schemes and commodity subsidies, improving the standard of living for many Nigerians (Davis 2019). Furthermore, investments in education and research have been made to develop a skilled workforce for the oil industry (Lee 2013), leading to advancements in education and technology (Robinson 2016). In addition to these domestic benefits, Nigeria's status as a significant oil producer has elevated its international standing (White 2014). The country has leveraged its oil wealth to engage in diplomacy and partnerships with other nations (Green 2015), opening up opportunities for cooperation and trade.

However, it's essential to acknowledge the challenges associated with the crude oil economy, including vulnerability to oil price fluctuations, corruption, environmental degradation, and economic inequality (Jones 2017). To ensure sustained positive impacts, Nigeria must continue its efforts to diversify the economy by investing in non-oil sectors and implementing reforms in the oil and gas industry (Adam 2012). In doing so, the nation can build on the advantages of its crude oil resources while mitigating the associated risks to achieve long-term, sustainable development (Brown 2018).

A critique of Nigeria's Oil Complex

The Niger Delta oil has a major influence on the Nigerian economy, but it has also caused significant damage and underdevelopment. The oil is a source of national unity, but it also creates division. The Niger Delta people are subject to unfair extraction and exploitation of their oil resources. As a result, people and groups in the Niger Delta states can both endanger stability and promote peace in an ever-changing environment. This reliance has created a rentier state, in which all issues are resolved through a patronage system funded by crude oil (Falola 2021). In other words, the Niger Delta oil is a paradox. It is a source of great wealth for Nigeria, but it is also a source of conflict and poverty in the region. The oil industry has caused environmental damage and has not benefited the people of the Niger Delta as much as it could have. This has led to resentment and anger, which have sometimes erupted into violence.

In retrospect, the Adaka Boro 12-day insurrection was a rebellion against the Nigerian government that took place in 1966. While it was officially declared to be a secessionist movement, it is now understood that one

of the main reasons for the rebellion was the exploitation of the Niger Delta's resources without any benefit to the local people, who suffered the consequences of environmental degradation and underdevelopment (Ikporukpo 2018). The impression that the region's population was in minority and without due consultation could use and abuse its resources as the commonwealth for the majority of other regions, clearly underlines the deep issues which calls for address (Igoni 2020). This Commonwealth mentality, which is best described as "the oil belongs to all of us", has further the clog in the wheel of integrating the Niger delta people, who view it as a deliberate ploy to continue the exploitative activities in the region.

For instance, at the peak of Olusegun Obasanjo's administration in 1999, the clamor and agitation for resource control soon nose-dived to litigations on who should receive accrual of revenues from onshore-offshore dichotomy exploration in the region. While the state governors and the people felt the lands and water adjoining belong to them, thus, should control its resources in line with true federalism, the federal government, in tandem with the majority of stakeholders in non-oil producing states, differed. The federal government asserted that it is not obliged to pay to the coastal states revenue derived from offshore oilfields, insisting the resource of the Niger delta region was the commonwealth of the nation, albeit recognized the need to cater for and develop the region and protect its environment.

Accordingly, in 2001, the federal government filed a suit seeking the interpretation of the Supreme Court on the issue of offshore revenue. In April 2002, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the federal government, deciding that the seaward boundary of the coastal states ran along the low-water mark, rather than extending to the edge of Nigeria's territorial waters. About 40 percent of Nigeria's oil is produced offshore (Human Rights Watch 2002). In addition, in a bid to solve the issues of the Niger Delta and rising occurrences of unrests, armed resistance and vices in the region, and its impact on an economy which solely depends on crude oil economy, the convening of the sovereign national conference created another avenue to dialogue on the issues of resource control.

Some of the contentious issues that emerged at the conference included rotational presidency, derivation principle/resource control/fiscal federalism, devolution of powers, ban on former military head of government/military administrators from politics, use of electronic voting machine for elections, immunity clause for president, governors and their deputies, state creation (especially for the South East), and tenure of the office of the president and governors. The Obasanjo conference disintegrated after the Sou-

th-South delegates staged a walkout on June 14, 2005 over the contentious derivation principle and stayed away from further proceedings. The delegates from the oil-rich zone demanded an irreducible minimum of 50% derivation but accepted in the interim 25% derivation with graduated increase to attain the 50% over a period of five years. However, the northern delegates were opposed to it thereby splitting the conference into two opposing camps.

It is noteworthy that due to the government's inability and the failure of the conference to achieve consensus, the already tense atmosphere worsened. Frustrated by the lack of progress in addressing their grievances through peaceful means, militant groups in the Niger Delta intensified their activities. Attacks on oil installations, kidnappings, and violent clashes with security forces became more frequent, disrupting oil production and distribution. This heightened militancy in the Niger Delta had a severe impact on Nigeria's economy. Oil production, which serves as the backbone of the Nigerian economy, significantly declined due to attacks on pipelines and installations. This reduction in oil production resulted in decreased government revenue, fiscal challenges, and increased budget deficits. Additionally, the period from 2005 to 2009 experienced fluctuations in global oil prices. The combination of reduced oil production in the Niger Delta and volatile international oil prices further strained Nigeria's economy, rendering it susceptible to economic shocks. The insecurity and instability in the region discouraged foreign direct investment (FDI) and impeded its economic development. The absence of a comprehensive resolution to the crisis created uncertainty for businesses and investors, constraining opportunities for economic growth.

Furthermore, it has been observed that the Nigerian state and the Oil companies, in a conspiratorial manner, plunged the commonwealth of the region into a state of extreme poverty and environmental degradation. Major oil and gas operators such as the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) have been accused of procuring arms and creating their own securing outfit, coupled with connivance with Nigerian security outfits to suppress the agitations of the people. Accordingly, Mr. Eric Nickson, a former executive officer of Shell International, confirmed that Shell had indeed purchased arms on behalf of the Nigerian police due to insufficient funds to equip themselves (Banigo 2012). The inherent irony in this situation is significant. Instead of prioritizing the welfare of the region and the well-being of its inhabitants, the Nigerian nation seems to place foreign interests above the concerns of its own citizens. The perceived bullying due to the minority status of the Niger Delta has further validated the agitation of its people. The collaboration between multinational companies and the state security

apparatus, as highlighted earlier, serves as a notable example, emphasizing the suppression of peaceful protests and the insistence on dialogue.

Additionally, the government employs tactics such as the use of significant financial resources to delay legal proceedings, frustrating litigations brought by Niger Delta communities seeking redress and justice in court. This raises a crucial question about whose interests the Nigerian government should prioritize and protect.

For instance, the tragic events of the Jesse and Idjhere fire disaster in 1998, claiming the lives of over 1000 indigenous community members, underscore the government's tendency to side with multinational companies. Before investigations into the burst pipeline had even commenced, Shell accused the community of sabotage. During a visit to the site, the then military ruler Abdulsalam Abubakar concurred with this verdict, attributing the outbreak to the people who were allegedly attempting to scoop fuel. Responsibility for the disaster was solely placed on the community, despite evidence indicating that the pipelines were outdated and rusty, leaking and prone to an eventual explosion. Furthermore, these pipelines were constructed on farmlands, exposing the people to risk from the outset. The period between 1998 and 2000 in Urhoboland of the Niger Delta witnessed similar disasters in over nine communities, including Egborode, Adeje, Ekakpamre, Elume, resulting in destruction to the delicate ecosystem, homes, aquatic life, farmlands, and pollution of air and drinking water. Comparable incidents occurred in other parts of the Niger Delta, notably in the community of Ogoni. Once again, the government aligned itself with the interests of multinational companies. The eventual descent into crisis clearly underscores the justification of this discourse.

It is noteworthy that the perceived superiority complex of the Wazobia ethnic groups, characterized by their assertive behavior and occasional overt claims of ownership over the crude oil resources in the region, raises questions about the true intentions of the majority. Nigeria comprises over 300 ethnic nationalities, all of whom are still striving to attain a sense of nationhood. However, the focus of the majority ethnic groups, namely the Yorubas, Hausa, and Igbos, on the resources of the Niger Delta region reveals a bias in addressing the issues facing the region. There have been instances where the rhetoric from the majority suggests a tendency to claim geographical affiliation with the Niger Delta at the slightest opportunity, driven primarily by the presence of crude oil. For example, in 2014, a prominent speaker at the Northern Leaders Conference openly argued that it was unjust for any state to assert itself as an oil-producing region because 72% of the country's

total landmass belonged to the North. He further contended that according to international law, it was only the North that had the legitimate right to claim ownership. He emphasized that the vast landmass of the North was the basis for extending territorial rights into the ocean, including the entitlement to resources within 200 nautical miles or more offshore (ChannelsTv 2014).

Moreover, the leader of the banned Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Nnamdi Kanu, has criticized the delineation of the Niger Delta and South-South regions in Nigeria. He contends that such terms were fabricated to sever their historical connections with the Niger Delta. This sentiment echoes the stance taken by the South-South Progressive Coalition, which cautioned the Indigenous People of Biafra and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) against incorporating the Niger Delta region in their secessionist aspirations and urged them to refrain from seeking to secede with the crude oil resources of the Niger Delta (Nairaland Forum 2017).

Relatedly, Owoko (2022) argues that it is morally unjust for Nigeria's leaders, with their assertive demeanor, to selectively seize the most valuable resources of a specific region while allowing other regions to exclusively benefit from their resources. He asserts that the federal government has unfairly appropriated the oil in the Niger Delta region by claiming ownership for itself, using legislation such as the Obnoxious Petroleum Act of 1966, which is now incorporated into section 44 (3) of the 1999 constitution, to justify this illegitimate action. This grants the federal government ownership and authority over all petroleum resources located in, on, or beneath any land or water within the country. This contradicts international standards, where local communities, states, and regions typically own their resources and pay taxes and royalties to the government.

More so, it is clear that projects and institutions that could potentially benefit the economy of local communities have also been mired in controversy due to the actions of government officials and vested regional interests seeking to relocate these entities and exploit the resources of the Niger Delta populace. During the tenure of former President Yar'dua, efforts were made to transfer the Federal University of Petroleum Resources, Effurun, to Kaduna. However, these plans were halted after pressure from stakeholders and activists from the Niger Delta region.

Furthermore, upon the discovery of gold in states like Zamfara and Osun, governors from the South-South region expressed disapproval at how swiftly the federal government, along with governors and stakeholders from the Northern and Western regions, established frameworks for these states

to manage their mineral resources. This stands in contrast to the call for genuine federalism, which promotes resource control. This longstanding demand from the region has yet to receive the required attention (Premium Times 2020). This outcry could be summed up from The Coalition of Riverine Deltans, when they contended that:

Do they think we are fools in Niger Delta, if Zamfara state owns the gold, which is a natural resource or mineral resource in their land and government is requesting them to bring N5 billion gold, then, the federal government should also allow Niger Delta to supply it crude oil, whatever quantity they want since we own the oil (Amaize 2020, n.d).

In the same vein, it is worth noting that during the period when groundnut, cocoa, and palm produce served as Nigeria's primary economic exports, the regions where these commodities were predominantly cultivated – namely the North West and East – each received 50% of the revenue in accordance with the derivation principles outlined in the 1963 constitution. This stands in stark contrast with the government's hesitance to reassess the 13% derivation, which falls significantly short of the resources required for the region's development and fostering a sense of inclusion within the Nigerian State. Such reluctance highlights a clear agenda of sectional interests aimed at diverting the wealth of the Niger Delta region to benefit elites and other regional factions. Moreover, the Urhobo people, a significant ethnic group residing in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta, are increasingly vocal about their discontent with their lack of representation within the leadership of the oil and gas industry. This frustration stems from a belief that they are not reaping the benefits their land contributes.

Most recently, the Urhobo Oil and Gas Nationality (UOGAN), acting as a representative body, argues that despite the substantial contribution the Urhobo people make to the oil and gas sector, they are systematically excluded from holding key decision-making roles. As evidence, UOGAN points to the leadership structure of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the state-owned oil giant. They claim a staggering imbalance, with 36 out of 55 top executive positions held by individuals from Northern Nigeria, while a mere 16 represent the entire Southern region, which encompasses the Niger Delta. This lopsided distribution of leadership roles has a significant impact on the Urhobo people (Urhobo Today 2024). The Niger Delta region, where oil extraction takes place, is essentially left to compete for a limited number

of remaining positions. By implication, the Urhobo themselves see even fewer opportunities for advancement within the industry they live alongside.

From a political standpoint, UOGAN's argument goes beyond simple dissatisfaction with career prospects. It highlights a deeper issue of equity in the distribution of benefits and resources associated with the oil and gas industry. The lack of representation in leadership positions raises concerns about the influence the Urhobo people have over decisions that affect their communities, their access to expertise within the industry, and ultimately, the economic benefits that could flow to the Urhobo people as a whole. UOGAN's voice adds to a growing chorus calling for a more balanced and inclusive approach to leadership within Nigeria's oil and gas sector, with the potential to address regional tensions and ensure a fairer distribution of the wealth generated by this critical resource.

Considering these shared experiences, the Urhobos' case can be seen as representative of a larger tragedy of the commons unfolding in the Niger Delta. Multiple ethnic groups are likely suffering from a lack of control over their resources, inadequate representation within the industry, and the negative environmental consequences of oil extraction. Unless addressed through a more inclusive and equitable approach, this situation threatens to perpetuate resentment and potentially lead to further instability in the region.

Conclusion

In summary, the paper contends that the situation in the Niger Delta region is intricate, with the national resources intended for the region's benefit often being diverted to serve the interests of sectional, elitist, political, and economic factions, both internally and externally. This dynamic has profound and detrimental consequences for the region. Essentially, it illustrates a paradox of the "tragedy of the commons", where despite the political fragmentation and sectional interests within the Nigerian state, these elites remain united in exploiting the region's resources for their own gain. Noteworthy is the fact that the region holds an estimated 25% of the country's oil reserves, embodies the stark contradiction of the "paradox of plenty". Despite immense resource wealth, the Delta grapples with widespread poverty, environmental degradation, and social unrest. This complex phenomenon exposes how abundance can, ironically, hinder development. Instead of fostering prosperity, oil wealth in the Niger Delta has fueled poverty. Unemployment remains high, exceeding the national average, while basic necessities like clean water

and reliable electricity remain elusive. This disparity arises from the unequal distribution of resource benefits. Oil revenues often circumvent local communities, enriching elites and multinational corporations while leaving little for local development and addressing community needs.

It is recommended that both the government and stakeholders demonstrate genuine commitment to addressing the challenges facing the region. A crucial step toward the development of the region lies in revisiting and reevaluating The Petroleum Industry Bill. Expedited consideration of this bill should prioritize the development of oil-producing communities, thereby benefiting the states in which they are situated. The full implementation of the bill would serve as a significant catalyst for the development of not only the Niger Delta region but also other regions aiming to harness their natural resources for progress.

Recommendation

This research highlights the importance of ensuring more inclusive political participation for the Niger Delta people within Nigeria. To effectively tackle the region's complex challenges, a comprehensive approach is necessary. The government should focus on resource control, transparency, and accountability in managing oil revenues. Additionally, investing in human capital, infrastructure, and environmental sustainability is vital for the region's advancement. Oil companies must prioritize corporate social responsibility, environmental protection, and active collaboration with local communities. Meanwhile, the Niger Delta communities should also work on strengthening their unity, diversifying their economies, and engaging in constructive dialogue with stakeholders. Collaboration among these groups is key to achieving a more equitable and sustainable future for the region. However, it is crucial to emphasize that while political participation and development plans are essential, the determination to implement these projects is equally important. The commitment to execute these developmental agendas cannot be overstated.

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ABSTRACT

Nigeria's abundant oil reserves have positioned the nation as a major player in the global energy landscape. However, beneath the surface of this resource wealth lies a complex web of challenges that have garnered international attention. Through an analytical and descriptive approach, this research delves into the multifaceted dynamics of Nigeria's oil industry through the lens of the "tragedy of the commons". By examining historical, economic, environmental, and social dimensions, this study seeks to unveil the extent to which the "tragedy of the commons" phenomenon operates within Nigeria's oil complex. It explores the consequences of resource mis-

management, environmental degradation, and social inequalities that have emerged as a result. This research aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the sustainability and governance issues facing one of the world's most oil-rich nations and to provide valuable insights for policymakers, scholars, and stakeholders concerned with the future of Nigeria's oil industry.

KEYWORDS

Tragedy. Commons. Niger Delta. Resource. Crude Oil.

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THE CHALLENGES OF TRANSHUMANCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOOD SECURITY IN THE SOUTH-SOUTH GEOPOLITICAL ZONE

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Introduction

Transhumance has induced a varying degree of internal conflict and insecurity in the Northern part of Nigeria and has consequently moved to the Southern part through the North-Central region. Across the country today, newspapers and media houses are awash with diverse stories of arson, kidnapping, indiscriminate shooting at unarmed farmers, and killings of different magnitudes. These dastardly acts are perpetrated primarily by unscrupulous herdsman or herdsman militias who go about with guns and other sophisticated weapons (Aigbe and Akenzua 2020). Although cattle rustling and theft have not accentuated the process of reaching a truce between the clashing parties, the herdsman, who are major aggressors in the conflict, have resorted to using gruesome means to unleash terror on civilian farmers. The implication of this is that scores of casualties in terms of deaths are being recorded.

In 2018 alone, the death toll resulting from the clash between herdsman and farmers was six times greater than the number of deaths caused by

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the Boko Haram terrorist group within the same period. Between January and September 2018, the death toll was set at 1,750. This figure surpassed the 1,229 deaths in 2014, when the crisis was at its peak (Global Terrorism Index 2015). Also, more than 62,000 people, including children, were internally displaced within the same period in Kaduna, Benue, and Plateau (Kwaghga 2018). According to the European Asylum Support Office (EASO 2021, 46), the menace has killed over 10,000 people in the last decade. Within this period, 4,000 individuals were killed between 2016 and the whole of 2017 and 2018. Also, 616 fatalities were documented in 2020 and 549 in the previous year, 2019. Beyond clashes with farmers, the transhumant elements also perpetrate acts of brigandage and gruesome violence on civilians. According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED 2020), criminal militias perpetrated 602 incidents of violent attacks on civilians: 307 in 2018, 102 in 2019, and 193 in 2020. These attacks constitute other forms of organised crime in the form of robbery attacks on communities, intimidation and causing fear, rape, kidnapping, and so on.

These violent and gruesome attacks by criminal herders on farming communities have prevented crop farmers from accessing their farm lands for cultivation, thereby increasing poverty and hunger, which results in food insecurity. In an age where agriculture is seen as a veritable alternative to economic diversification, issues like this can only serve as a clog in the wheel of progress, despite numerous agricultural policies being formulated. According to Nwozor, Olanrewaju, and Ake (2019, 10) “the key thrust of Nigeria’s agricultural renaissance is to diversify its economy by making agriculture the hub of economic growth while also achieving a hunger-free country (a hunger-free country is one that is food secure)”. Food security has been prioritized as an imminent national policy framework in the country, considering the fact that a huge part of its 200 million population is food insecure (FMARD 2021). Despite its favorable agro-ecological endowments, food insecurity is still of great concern to the government due to its prevalence in the country.

As Fadare *et al.* (2019, 29) observed, “Nigeria has a total landmass of 92.4 million hectares, out of which only about 32 million hectares, or 34.63 percent, are being cultivated”. With this observation alone, it can be deduced that the country already lacks the wherewithal to meet the nutritional needs of its people, thereby making food unavailability the order of the day. According to Food and Agricultural Organization (2017), “between 2004 and 2006, the total number of undernourished Nigerians due to their inability to access food was 9.1 million”. Between 2016 and 2018, the figure had risen to 25.6 million (Nwozor, Olanrewaju, and Ake 2019). This obviously is a downward

trend in terms of development, and the implication is that there is a huge gap between the demands for food and the supply of it.

Until 2018, the conflict between farmers and pastoralists was primarily confined to the North-Western, North-Eastern, and Middle Belt zones of the country. However, from late 2017 to early 2018, the conflict had expanded to the South-West, South-East, and South-South of Nigeria (EASO 2021). To date, it keeps spreading like wildfire and has therefore become a national menace. Farmers are scared of going to their farmlands due to the high level of insecurity being perpetrated by transhumant elements. Numerous scholarly attempts to provide insight into this menace have revolved around land tenure, ethnicity, resource scarcity, climate change, and other causes. Those who have made attempts to relate the issue to food security were particularly interested in the North-East and North-Central sub-regions of Nigeria. It is against this backdrop that this study sought to assess the level of humanitarian damage caused by farmers-herders crisis and its impacts on farming activities in South-South Nigeria. Also, it examined the nature of stakeholders' response to quelling the feuds between farmers and herders towards ensuring food availability in Nigeria. In light of the above objectives, the research interrogated questions such as, to what extent has the humanitarian damage caused by farmers-herders conflict impacted farming activities in the South-South? Secondly, how have the stakeholders responded to quelling the feud between farmers and herders so as to ensure food availability with references to the South-South geopolitical zone? Furthermore, the research hypothesized on the one hand that there is no relationship between transhumance and food insecurity in the South-South zone of Nigeria. On the other hand, it hypothesized that there is no relationship between insecurity and farming activities in the South-South, Nigeria. The reverse of these hypotheses is also tested in the study.

Transhumance and internal security: a conceptual and theoretical underpinning

Transhumance and internal security are omnibus concepts that are not amenable to a singular definition. This is due to the fact that the concepts independently possess wider coverage while providing linkages in various aspects. For instance, Akpen (2019, 53) argued that "there are varied conceptual issues (mobility, modernization and stimulus paradigm) that catch our intellectual curiosity which can be used to describe transhumance". To this

extent, transhumance is defined as the practice or action of moving livestock from one grazing location to another in a seasonal cycle typically to low lands in the winter and high lands in the summer (FAO 2017). According to Ayantunde *et al.* (2011), transhumance can be seen as a livestock production system characterized by seasonal and cyclical movement of varying degrees between complementary ecological areas. This movement is majorly inspired by unfavorable climate change that exposes nature's parsimony in terms of rainfall distribution. That is why Akpen (2019, 45) argued that "transhumance is a response to ecological, agricultural, health and socio-cultural challenges".

Internal security on the other hand constitutes another intellectual voyage that has attracted numerous attempts at a definition. This is so because the term 'security' is a broad concept that is not amenable to a singular definition. That is why Degaut (2015, 9) argued that "defining security is not an easy matter, since the term has had many different meanings to different people in different places and different times over the course of human history". Traditionally, the term security was conceived as comprising military, economic and political capacity of a state to defend itself against external insurrections. However, with the emergence of new world order and liberalism, security tends to transcend the conventional state-centric approach to a more humanistic approach. To this extent, the term security is subdivided into two distinct forms, which are: national security and human security. The former constitutes the whole gamut of military power and capacity while the latter constitutes parameters that measure human capital development and societal growth in terms of economic, health, environmental, food security, etc.

Thus, concerns for the common man now drive the concept of security. By implication, Adams (2019, 221) contends that "internal security must be related to the ability of the state to perform the function of protecting the well-being of its people". To Prakash (2016), internal security can be defined as the act of keeping peace within the borders of a sovereign state or other self-governing territories generally by upholding the national law and defending against internal security threats. Nwoli (2008) corroborated this view when he asserted that internal security entails the security agencies of a nation being able to combat armed robbery, religious and ethnic riots, communal and community clashes, armed insurrection, rebellion, insurgency, terrorism, natural disaster, etc.

The relationship between transhumance and internal security challenges cannot be over emphasized. Besides the hordes of vicious, violent and virulent group formations within the Sahel, some people have attributed

the prevalence of violence in farmers/community and herders conflicts to gruesome transhumant migrants who continually arrive in greater numbers in central and southern Nigeria majorly through the northeast. According to Ikelegbe (2019), “these transhumant migrants are perceived to be more aggressive, impatient and brutal while crimes perpetrated by them tend to be more indiscriminate, atrocious, horrendous and destructive”. Other scholars (Agbu, Musa and Zhema 2020) believe that transhumant migrants are majorly the remnants of war-ravaged Libya and other Sahelian countries of which Nigeria is a victim. Their migration to the country and the consequent spread to Southern Nigeria is aided by porous borders, thereby leading to the formation of armed groups and loosely available illicit arms for the perpetration of violence and criminality. This situation does not allow for an easy understanding of the nature of transhumance that is well known to communities and other farming areas. The notion now is that the current crop of herders does not in any way represent traditional nomads that are well known for moving about with sticks and cattle.

Rather, the new ones constitute strange elements with despicable characters such as: wielding AK47 ammunition, lawlessness (Ikelegbe 2019), leading herds into major streets and public places like schools and markets and using herds to block highways for brigandage (Eke 2018; Aghedo 2017). The horrendous grazing activities of transhumant elements that result in wanton destruction of crops and farmlands have led to violent confrontation between the warring parties. Also, the herders are hardened by the harsh conditions of their occupations and lifestyles and the relative deprivation, isolation and the lack of basic amenities that they endure. Furthermore, there is a wide contention that the perceived oppression and marginalization by the herders is further accentuated by the continuous depletions of their cattle stock through cattle rustling, insecurity and declining grazing routes. The resultant effect of this accusation and counter accusation is the ravaging farmers-herders conflict that has resulted in the loss of lives and properties.

Theoretically, several conceptual strands have been used to explain the conflict of transhumance. A lot of them have focused on and revolved around the intellectual tradition of neo-Malthusianism which places emphasis on resource use, environmental scarcity and population growth factors (Homer-Dixon 1994; Moritz 2010). This reductionist tradition has posed a critical theoretical and methodological issue in a situation where the phenomenon is contagious regionally (Nwangwu, Mbah and Ezugworie 2020). Against this backdrop, this research adopted the theory of Structural-Functionalism.

Structural-functionalism is a theory that tends to explain the society based on the existence of structures and the roles they perform. Historically, it can be traced to the work of Talcott Parson, in the 18th century, and was later developed by other scholars including Bronislaw Malinowski and Radcliffe Brown. It was Parson who argued that society consists of four structures, with each of them performing a specific role. The structures according to Parson include: economy; polity; law and social control; lastly, cultural and motivational commitment. Each of these structures is destined to perform specific functions viz: adaptation, goal attainment, integration and pattern maintenance (Varma 1975, 200).

Since Parson's analysis of structures and the roles they perform in the sustenance of the system, other scholars have provided their own perspectives about the functionality of the social system. Beyond Gabriel Almond and David Easton who introduced the functional analysis into the domain of political science through the systems theory, Radcliffe-Brown also gave insight into the explanation of structural-functionalism.

According to Turner (2012), in Radcliffe-Brown's explanation of function, the idea of structure is included. This structure comprises numerous entities which maintain the continuous existence of social order. To this extent, he made three basic summaries of his own approach to the functional theory. The assumptions are:

1. Minimal integration and coordination of a society's parts represent the only criteria for its existence.
2. The term function encompasses those interactions that facilitate the maintenance of this required integration.
3. In each society, structural features can be said to contribute immensely to the maintenance of necessary integration.

Radcliffe-Brown perspective of the theory beams its searchlight on the prerequisites under which social structures are maintained. To this extent, he suggested that certain laws regulate the functioning of societies. He then provided little modification to the idea of need and replaced it with 'necessary conditions' for the existence of human societies. As such, these conditions can be discovered by proper scientific means of knowledge acquisition or science. He argued that the organic analogy should be used in a careful manner among scholars. Basically, the tenet of structural-functionalism is that society is made up of interconnected parts in terms of structures. The interdependence and interaction of the structures, in terms of the functions they perform, helps to ensure the smooth running of the society and to ensure its unity.

When this is brought to the domain of transhumance, it creates a web of three units of analysis, which in this context are the structure. They are: the herders' institutions, the farmers' institutions and the government. These various structures exist to perform varied roles and functions. While the herders are known for harnessing livestock and animal husbandry for the provision of skin and herds, the farmers function to provide cash and food crop for commercial or subsistence purposes of the good of the society. Also, the government as a structure exists to provide social amenities to ensure the smooth running and performance of the other two structures. It also functions to minimize frictions between other structures by ensuring security of lives and properties and ensuring the ease of doing business among these other structures. In the event of distortion, the structure is able to absorb stress and return to equilibrium when each part performs its functions effectively. However, the crisis of transhumance in Nigeria has lingered due to the inability of the units to perform their role. There is a continuous trespassing of the functions of each structure that tend to heat up the nadir part of the social structure. This explains the incessant clashes between farmers and herders.

Methodology

This study utilized the cross-sectional/survey research design with a combination of both quantitative and qualitative research strategies. The population of the study was 1,780,579 while the sample size was about 1200 using the multistage sampling technique. This sample, derived from Taro Yamane formula, was spread across nine local government areas (three each) in three South-South states of Edo, Delta and Rivers states. While the questionnaire constituted the major instrument for data collection, the in-depth interview (IDI) was also used to elicit information from farmers, security officials (police and vigilantes), herders and others who are privy to the menace of transhumance. The information gathered from both the questionnaires and the in-depth interview were complemented with data from secondary sources which include: journal articles, online sources, books, monographs, annual reports, etc. Furthermore, the hypotheses were tested using the Pearson's correlation coefficient with the aid of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).

The research is focused on the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria. The region is given attention because it is closest to the North-Central and thus constitutes a pathway through which transhumant elements

migrate southward. Also, the South-South zone possesses favorable weather conditions, with the highest annual rainfall. According to Adewole & Serifat (2015, 100), the region boasts an average annual rainfall of 737.84 millimetres, compared to the second-placed South-East at 442.36 millimeters. These statistics render the South-South a fertile ground for herdsmen to graze their cattle due to its abundant rainfall for grass production. Within the South-South Geopolitical zone, Edo, Delta, and Rivers states represent the domain of case study analysis and springboard. This is because, according to The Guardian (2020), Edo and Delta states are the worst hit by the onslaught of herdsmen activities and brigandage, while Rivers State was selected based on its arable and fertile agricultural land. This could be partly due to the fact that Edo State is the first point of call from North Central and therefore serves as a migratory route.

Testing of Hypotheses

Hypotheses 1

H₀₁ - There is no significant relationship between transhumance activities and food insecurity in the South-South.

H₁₁ - There is a significant relationship between transhumance activities and food insecurity in the South-South.

Table 4.53		Correlations	
		Transhumance Activities	Food insecurity
Transhumance Activities	Pearson Correlation	1	.751**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	1039	1039
Food insecurity	Pearson Correlation	.751**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	1039	1039
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).			

There is a statistically significant relationship between the two variables ($p < .001$). The direction of the relationship is positive. There exists a strong positive relationship between transhumance activities and food

insecurity, meaning that these variables tend to increase together. Thus, the positive increase in transhumance activities leads to a corresponding increase in food insecurity in the South-South. Hence, the study rejects the null hypothesis and accepts the alternate hypothesis that states that there is a significant relationship between transhumance activities and food insecurity in the South-South region.

Hypotheses 2

Ho2 - There is no significant relationship between insecurity and less farming activities in the South-South.

Hr2- There is a significant relationship between insecurity and less farming activities in the South-South.

Table 4.54		Correlations	
		Insecurity	Less farming activities
Insecurity	Pearson Correlation	1	.723**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	1039	1039
Farming activities	Pearson Correlation	.723**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	1039	1039
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).			

There is a statistically significant relationship between the two variables ($p < .001$). The direction of the relationship is positive. There exists a strong positive relationship between insecurity and farming activities, meaning that these variables tend to increase together. It therefore means that an increase in insecurity leads to a corresponding increase in less farming activities. Thus, the study rejects the null hypothesis and accepts the alternate hypothesis that states that there is a significant relationship between insecurity and less farming activities in the South-South.

Discussion of findings

On the nature of transhumance induced conflict between farmers and herders and its impacts on food security in the South-South region of Nigeria, the study revealed that farming activities have reduced in the South-South zone of Nigeria due to the crisis of transhumance which has metamorphosed into food insecurity in the region. Thus, the study established that there is a strong positive relationship between transhumance activities and food insecurity in the South-South region with 0.712 (71% correlation) @ ($p > 0.001$) significance level. To affirm the position of this study, Erunke and Aku (2022, 23) observed “that the low level of agricultural production, due to attacks from herdsmen, for example, coupled with a rising population growth rate in Nigeria, is likely to lead to a food crisis and a higher unemployment level”. Their study examined the implications of Farmers-Herders Conflict on Food Security in Benue State, North Central Nigeria. Aso, Udosen (2021, 17), asserted “that the Nigerian herder-farmer crisis can be interpreted as an issue of obtaining land for economic survival”. The implication of this is that there is endemic political, economic, and environmental tensions in the nation and severe food insecurity, particularly in the Middle Belt and Southern parts of Nigeria since the return of democracy in 1999. Also, Gordon (2000) claims that the conflicts are brought on by the herdsmen’s cattle destructively destroying farmlands. Herdsmen, of course, are nomads who travel from their customary homes in quest of more fertile pasture for their herds of cattle.

This view was corroborated by an interviewee who lamented:

[...] those people are wicked. They just enter our farm in this community and use their cow to destroy our crops. If you talk, they will say they are the ones that own Nigeria and they cannot do them anything. There was a day they killed one man here and cut another person’s hand with machet on another occasion because the person argued and fought with them. We don’t even know what to do now. Me for example, I am scared to go to the farm because of fear. My children are not here, nobody will fight for me (IDI 2 2023)³.

Interrogating further on the nature of the conflict between farmers and herders that has contributed to food insecurity in the region, a 58 years old man supported the earlier view when he stated that:

³ In-Depth Interview. Are responses that were generated from interviewees in the course of interviewing them during the research.

My son, my production has really gone down. In fact, we are suffering in this village. All these Fulani people are very harmful to us. Last year, I planted vegetables, corn and melon. As they were growing, they brought their cow and destroyed everything. That period, I didn't get one harvest. We used to take some to the market to sell but that year, not even one was harvested (IDI 2 2023).

To investigate on how the conflict has affected their crop production whether for sale or personal consumption, the first interviewee posited that:

Before, I used to harvest cassava and yam for sale because that's what I farm. But now, to even get the yam to eat is hard. My income has reduced because of it and things are now very expensive (IDI 1 2023).

Exploring the level of humanitarian damage caused by farmers-Herders crisis and its impacts on farming activities in South-South Nigeria, the study established that the internal security challenge posed by farmers-herders conflict discourages people from embarking on agriculture which has led to constant hike in the prices of crop and livestock production in the South-South. With the correlation co-efficient of 0.723 @ ($p < .001$), the study revealed that there is a strong positive relationship between insecurity and less farming activities in the South-South region.

This result was further buttressed by a 36 years old man who posited that:

In our village, we cannot go to the farm. We cannot go at all. We always get attacked and sometimes, our women get raped too. One day, my mum was raped in the farm by them because she was the only one. We have even taken a protest march to the government so as to complain but no answer. Since then, our food production has reduced (IDI 3 2023).

In the same vein, another interviewee asserted that:

[...] there was a day I was going to the farm and I saw some people running back that those people were robbing people that were in the farm. Sometimes, in this community, traders do go to the farm to buy produce and get vehicle to pack them. That day, Fulani cow people were in the bush robbing them so we were told to go back home from farm (IDI 5 2023).

Ezemenaka e Ekumaoko (2018) observed that over the last decade, there has been incessant reportage of the high level of humanitarian damage of farmers-herders conflict across the states in Nigeria. The surge in farmer-s-herders witnessed a different dimension from 2013 when the herdsmen began to unleash terror through guns and machetes on armless farmers, which have led to scores of people fleeing their homes and farmlands. From this period, Nigeria became used to newspaper headlines such as scores killed as herdsmen attack some communities in Nigeria. According to the statistics provided by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) (2014), 63 people were killed from clashes between farmers and herders in 2013. By 2014, this figure tremendously increased to 1229 casualties (GTI 2015). The spate of insecurity occasioned by herdsmen is alarming in Nigeria to the extent that a day hardly passes by without news of attacks. In June 2018, the country woke up to the news that rampaging Criminal Herdsmen had attacked eleven (11) communities in Barkin Ladi local government area of Benue state. This particular attack left Eighty-six (86) toll with Fifty (50) houses burnt in the process (Ezemenaka and Ekumaoko 2018).

Due to this unprecedented level of security challenge, food prices have risen beyond measure as a result of the country's obvious insecurity challenges and the significant decline in food output. Many individuals are at risk of famine as a result of the 253% and 123% price increases in key staples food like beans and tomatoes since July 2020. In addition, Nigeria's food import cost has increased by 140% since the country's rising food demand cannot be met by current production levels (Fadare *et al.* 2019). This is why Udosen (2021) argued that given the numerous constraints on food production, investors and entrepreneurs are advised against entering the agricultural sector, particularly in regions plagued by insecurity problems. This resulted in property destruction, crop damage, attacks on cattle, livestock rustling, and live cattle killings in Benue State. According to reports, some of the main causes of conflict and violence between farmers and herders are population expansion, climatic change, environmental degradation, government policies, and insurgency activities (Dimelu *et al.* 2017).

Conclusion

The study concluded that transhumance and farmers' violent conflicts have created food insecurity and humanitarian crisis across many communities in Nigeria. Many have died, many have been displaced, and a large number of properties in the form of crops, animals, vehicles, etc. have

been destroyed. Farmers, though, have occasionally been involved in carrying out attacks or reprisal attacks against the Fulani herdsmen, have been seen to be mostly at the receiving end of the conflicts. They count more losses than the herdsmen. Thus, the research established that there is a significant relationship between transhumance and food insecurity in the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria.

The herder-farmer conflict has become more significant in the last two decades in Nigeria. Although the government had in the past taken some measures to address this phenomenon, the increasing desertification and the effects of climate change have further increased the drive for the herdsmen to move further south in search of grazing land and pasture for their livestock. These southward movements always pitch them against farmers and the host community, whose crops are regularly invaded and destroyed by the cattle during this seasonal movement. The result of this is increased conflict, death, displacement and the total destruction of properties. However, because the phenomenon is a human security issue, there is a need for a concerted effort at state, national, regional and international levels to address the challenges, especially since there is no specific legislation that is dedicated to addressing the peculiar needs of herders and farmers in the country. Thus, the study revealed that there is a positive relationship between ethnic identity and the crisis between farmers and herders in the South-South region.

Undoubtedly, the internal security challenges caused by the threat of transhumance have significantly affected the production and accessibility of food in the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria. The consequences of this disaster are a significant food security crisis coupled with an increasing cost of living. This research has helped to inundate the relationship between transhumance, internal security, and food security in Nigeria, with an emphasis on the South-South Geopolitical zone. It established that people (particularly those farmers in rural areas) are discouraged from embarking on the planting of crops. Those who summon the courage to do so often resort to violence in order to defend their crops from being eaten up by herds. The research also pointed out that successive governments over the years have done their parts to weather the storm. However, there has not been political will to implement the policies that have been formulated. To this extent, the actors in the crisis have not felt the impacts of the government's attempts to remedy the situation.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has not also aided in the process of reaching a truce among the critical actors in the menace. As one of the interviewees pointed out during the course of the research, a

lot of the herds are owned and controlled by prominent members in some of the communities, and they most often pay deaf ears when cases of violent clashes are reported. This, by implication, suggests that there are internal sponsors who would want to leave no stone unturned so as to shield their herds from destruction.

Based on the findings and conclusion above, it is mandatory and quite expedient that the government should put in place an effective mechanism through mapping of a holistic security architecture to curtail the negative operations of the transhumance and the influx of herder into communities in Nigeria. As the study revealed, enough measures have not been put in place to checkmate the activities of transhumant elements. In most cases, as some of the interviewees revealed, farmers resort to self-help in order to protect their crops and their farmlands from being destroyed. Also, the herders asserted that their herds are either poisoned or taken away through the activities of cattle rustlers. Therefore, leaders of the South-South zone should formulate and adhere strictly to a joint security effort so as to protect farming communities and the farm lands from being invaded. This can be achieved by establishing regional security networks that will collaborate with the federal forces and local security framework with express permission to carry sophisticated ammunition coupled with high grade intelligence gathering to deal with criminal elements. When the people begin to get the confidence that their lives are safe, the discouragement to work in the farm will be eliminated, which will witness a geometric rise in the production of crops. The resultant effect will be an increase in and access to aliments, which will consequently lead to food security in the South-South geopolitical zone.

The government should adopt alternative dispute resolution through dialoguing with the herders and the farmers in the communities. As the study revealed and echoed by one of the IDIs, not all transhumant are criminally minded and as such, a lot of criminally bent herders have infiltrated the good ones. Also, as noted by a particular herder, activities of cattle rustlers have not facilitated the process of reaching a truce between the conflicting parties. Therefore, there is a need for the South-South zonal leaders and with the help of local government and other community leaders to seek political settlement measures in which all the various stakeholders (including the representatives of both farmers and herders will converge. The purpose of the convergence will be to reach an agreement for everyone to stop harboring criminal elements. While the farmers can do their part by revealing any known cattle rustlers, the herders, in turn, will reciprocate by reporting criminal elements among them instead of harboring them due to primordial affiliation. When this is sincerely done, the tendency for insecurity to reduce is high while the

impediments to farming are removed. This will in turn lead to a huge supply of farm produce that will consequently bring down prices.

As the study revealed, numerous attempts have been made by the various governments of the South-South zone with not much from the central government. However, there has been no strict cooperation from the leaders of the region to collaborate in the implementation. For instance, as revealed in the work, the leaders of the South-South zone came together to agree on a policy framework which was named “Asaba Declaration”. As part of its resolution, it was agreed that all the states in the region should ban open grazing of herds. Till date, not all the states have implemented the agreement. Those that have commenced implementation do not have the will to enforce it. As some of the farmers who participated in the in-depth interview asserted, herds move about their farm lands both day and night without recourse to extant laws. When they are reported, the issues are trivialized. Therefore, for there to be food security in the South-South zone, there must be strict adherence to policy implementation that will nip the security challenges in the zone in the bud.

Furthermore, the government should intelligently investigate the sponsors of the criminal herders in the country and bring them to justice. According to the popular parlance which says “there is no smoke without fire”, the study has revealed that a lot of the criminal elements among the herders are being sponsored by some influential individuals within and outside the communities. This view was corroborated by an IDI participant that stated that when the issue of destruction of herds is reported, it is most times swept under the carpet while the security forces instantly release arrested culprits after claiming to have received instructions from above. The leaders of the geopolitical zone should, as a matter of urgency, do everything within their power and under the confine of the law, fish out those unscrupulous elements that are responsible for fanning the embers of discord among farmers and herders. It is not just enough to fish out, such people must be prosecuted and appropriate punishment given as established by the law. When that is done, it will ring a bell of determination on the part of the leaders while other potential perpetrators back off.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons should be nipped in the bud for peace and tranquility in the communities. As the study unveiled, the increase of both have only helped to exacerbate the tension between farmers and herders. These weapons are made readily available to those criminal elements among the herders, who begin to use them to commit all sorts of atrocities. The South-South leaders should as a matter of urgency

collaborate with the federal government on the issue of arms control. By this, anyone who is caught with the possession of illegal firearms should be extremely punished without recourse to legal processes.

Another major issue that this study addressed is the fact that there is an existing negative perception of herders by the indigenous communities. There is therefore the need for mindsets restructuring so as to eradicate this ill perception. The research found that there has been a persisting mindset by those in the South-South, which created a perception of the criminality of the herders. A positive change of mindset will help to move the strained relationship from hostility to rapprochement. This will also help to ameliorate the debacle of intolerance and ethnic bickering.

The study also revealed that the crisis of transhumance is further accelerated by the fact that there are no pathways for herds and a definite place to be stationed. As such, the study recommends that states within the South-South zone should create grazing routes for herds and establish cattle ranches. This will facilitate the process of effective implementation of the Asaba declaration, which necessitated the ban on open grazing. The implication is that there will be no room for the invasion of farmlands and crops belonging to farmers. When the ranches are created, it will generate an avenue whereby the owners of herds have to register their businesses with corporate social responsibilities. This will further create a revenue base for governments within the zone while making more funds available for good and quality implementation of agricultural policies for more food security.

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ABSTRACT

The research examined the nature of transhumance and the level of humanitarian damage coupled with their impact on food security in the South-South geopolitical zone. Relying on the Structural-Functionalism theory, the study utilized the survey research design as well as the qualitative and quantitative research strategies as the methodological tool. To this end, the multistage/stratified sampling technique was used to derive the population of the study which constitutes some states in the South-South zone, while the Taro Yamane formula was used to scientifically derive the sample size from the population. The study revealed that farming activities have reduced in the South-South region of Nigeria due to the crisis of transhumance which has metamorphosed into food insecurity in the region with 0.712 (71% correlation) @ ($p > 0.001$) significance level. Also, the study found that the internal security challenge posed by farmers-herders conflict discourages people from embarking on agriculture, which has led to constant hike in the prices of crop and livestock production in the South-South with 72% relationship @ $p < .001$. It concluded that transhumance has created food insecurity and humanitarian crisis in the South-South zone of Nigeria. The study thus recommended that: an effective mechanism through mapping of a holistic security architecture should be put in place, the government should adopt alternative dispute resolutions through dialoguing with the herders and the farmers in the communities, there should be a strict adherence to policy implementation.

KEYWORDS

Transhumance. Internal Security. Food Security. Challenges. South-South.

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TO STAY OR TO GO BACK: THE CORNELIAN DILEMMA OF THE BURKINABE DIASPORA IN GHANA

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Introduction

Ghana is a major destination for Burkina Faso migrants. Immigration towards Ghana emerged and flourished as a result of the combination of structural and cyclical causes. Political, economic and psycho-social reasons have various levels, governed the initiation and maintenance of migration from Burkina Faso to Ghana³. As a result, there is a large number of Burkinabe diaspora living in Ghana. According to official sources in Burkina Faso, there are between 1.5 and 3 million of them. In recent years, Burkina Faso has adopted a national migration policy (known as the national migration strategy) and has created a ministry responsible for Burkinabe living abroad within its government structure, with the aim of protecting its diaspora, involving it more closely in the development of the country and encouraging voluntary returns.

In Ghana, this policy towards the diaspora was confronted with the effects of the expulsions of foreigners without residence permits between

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³ These include, for example, the differences in economic development between the two territories, labour shortages and Ghana's quest for migrant workers, the motivation of young people or the incentive for young people to undertake temporary, seasonal or multi-annual migration.

1969 and 1971. While the Burkinabe diaspora in Ghana thought they were well integrated, the expulsions came as a shock to the migrants' families. Having escaped to these expulsions for various reasons, even several decades later, migrants' families are still living with a dilemma: to stay in Ghana or to go back to Burkina Faso? Psychological and sociological factors play a decisive role in the aspects of migration that we want to study. We understand the family in the sense of a household, in other words a group formed by a man and/or his wife (wives) and their children. In this context, members of the same family "recognise the ties of kinship and marriage between them. But these ties also define economic relations (consumption, production, management of the family budget), legal relations (for example, inheritance) and hierarchical relations (authority of the head of the family)" (Gruenais 1981, 3).

We are therefore focusing on ties based on marital-type and parental-type relationships within a group of individuals. In migrants' families, the aspirations and decisions to "stay, return or move" come under both collective and individual levels. Surveys and observations show that in the families of Burkinabe migrants in Ghana, the tendency is generally towards the diptych "stay or go back". Distinct patterns lead to these two antinomic ambitions in interdependent individual or collective logics within the families. Several studies have been carried out on migration and the Burkinabe diaspora in Ghana. They describe the paths taken and the migratory networks exploited (Rouch 1956, 33-196), life in immigrant neighbourhoods in Accra (Schildkrout 1978, 303). Some authors have analysed the relatively good socio-cultural (Tonah 2005, 331), economic (Skinner 1965, 60-84) and legal (Ouedraogo 2019, 77-97) integration of migrants and their descendants. This paved the way to changes in their identity (Schildkrout 1975, 167-179) and more or less important looseness of their relationship with Burkina Faso, their country of origin (Koudougou 2011, 77-112). The question of the chieftaincy of ethno-diasporic communities has also been studied (Schildkrout 2006, 587-601; Koudougou 2019, 77-112). However, the coming back migration and the arrival in Burkina Faso of descendants of migrants born in Ghana have attracted little attention from researchers.

Information was gathered through individual interviews and focus groups. These primary sources were obtained from resource persons of several generations and socio-professional strata, taking gender into account. These included immigrants, returning migrants and diasporic community leaders, in fourteen localities in Ghana and six in Burkina Faso. We focused on older heads of household, descendants of migrants, diasporic community leaders and consular officials at the Burkina Faso embassy in Accra and the consulate general in Kumasi to gain a better understanding of aspirations

to stay, return or continue. To this end, we used interview guides containing direct and/or semi-directive questions. Intentions to return or stay were measured in mainly qualitative surveys. We also drew on a bibliography of books and scientific articles on migration, integration and identity.

Based on this observation, this study aims at taking a closer look at how migrants' families are torn between the host country and the country of origin. Basically, we are asking ourselves this question: Why and how do families within the Burkina Faso diaspora in Ghana express wishes and resolutions aiming at staying in Ghana or coming back to Burkina Faso?

From this main research question flow the following secondary questions: How is returning a legitimate aspiration and family decision among first-generation Burkinabe migrants? How is staying an aspiration and a decision motivated by the weight of the family and the identity reconstruction of the new generations of migrants?

For this study, which is at the confluence of theoretical and fundamental research and fieldwork, we are planning first to paint a picture of Burkinabe immigration to Ghana and their families' aspects. We will then examine the aspirations and decisions to return of the first generations of migrants. Finally, we will analyse the weight of the family and identity reconstruction on the intentions and resolutions to stay among the new generations of migrants and the descendants of migrants.

Burkinabe immigration to Ghana and its family issues

The migrations of Burkina Faso nationals to Ghana have a family dimension. This can be seen both in the decision to emigrate in the country of departure and in the organisation of the immigrant life in the host country.

The context of immigration from Burkina Faso to Ghana

European colonisation, from the end of the 19th century to the second half of the 20th century, gave a particular dimension to this immigration through migration to escape the constraints of French colonisation and labour migration. In addition to these political and economic reasons, there are also psychosocial ones.

Migration towards Ghana predates the one towards Cote d'Ivoire. They subsequently increased before being supplanted by the latter in terms of the size of the flows thanks to the Ivorian "economic miracle" in the mid-

1940s. Other major migratory flows have taken some Burkinabe to Senegal, to French Sudan (current Mali), to Gabon, etc. Since the independence of Ghana (former Gold Coast) in 1957 and Burkina Faso (former Upper Volta) in 1960, migration flows have continued for essentially economic reasons. Depending on the period, migratory flows towards Ghana oscillate between reversibility and irreversibility. The reversibility of flows is reflected in seasonal and multi-annual circular migrations. Irreversibility is at the root of the formation and growth of the Burkinabe diaspora in Ghana and/or of the Ghanaian community of Burkinabe origin. Gradually, then, during both the colonial and post-colonial periods, Ghana became home to a strong Burkinabe diaspora.

The migration phenomenon studied takes place between the territories of Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta)⁴ and Ghana (formerly Gold Coast)⁵. It was accentuated during the French colonisation of Upper Volta and the English colonisation of the Gold Coast, in a context of demand and supply of labour on both sides under the effect of repulsion-attraction. Located south of Burkina Faso, Ghana has a more developed economy, with primary and secondary sectors centred on plantation agriculture (mainly cocoa and coffee), logging and mining (Ouedraogo 2017, 31). Tropical agriculture during the rainy season and the relative idleness of rural populations during the long dry season have motivated temporary labour migration (Ouedraogo 2017, 140-146) from Burkina Faso to Ghana. Multi-annual or quasi-permanent migration has led to a strong diaspora⁶.

Families often influence decisions to migrate, as young people migrate partly in order to acquire the cash needed to pay their parents' capitation taxes, or to relieve their parents of their material and financial worries. This is how parents encourage them to emigrate temporarily in order to bring back resources.

4 The territory of present-day Burkina Faso was called Upper Volta during French colonial rule from March 1, 1919 to August 5, 1960. On August 2, 1984, Upper Volta became Burkina Faso.

5 Ghana, formerly known as the Gold Coast, was a British colony from 1874 to March 6, 1957.

6 According to Ghana's 2010 general census of population and housing, it comprises 30,664 individuals, and according to Burkinabè sources, 9,609 registered with consular services. Over time, thanks to integration, there are more Ghanaians of Burkinabè origin than Burkinabè in Ghana.

Major family characteristics of the Burkinabe diaspora in Ghana

Several features characterise immigrants' families within the Burkinabe diaspora in Ghana. These characteristics are essentially perceptible through three aspects: religion, matrimonial regime and the form of organisation of ethno-diaspora communities. The Burkinabe diaspora in Ghana is highly Islamised. Whether migrants and their descendants are long-standing Muslims or recent converts, membership of the Muslim community ("umma") fosters their socio-cultural integration, particularly in the Zongo neighbourhoods⁷. Conversion to Islam is also part of an integration strategy rather than a deep-seated conviction: "The Christians Mossi, rather than putting up with the mocking bullying of the Muslims on the coast, prefer, when they are in the Gold Coast, to side with the Muslims and outwardly follow Islamic rites" (Rouch 1956, 167).

Within the Burkinabe diaspora, Islamised families are often polygamous. Husbands enter into several matrimonial unions, often diversifying the origins of their wives. As a result, there are families of immigrants from Burkina Faso who are the product of intra- or inter-community marriages. Some immigrants who arrive in Ghana young and single use matrimonial unions with nationals as part of their integration strategy. Within the diaspora community, there are families made up of Burkinabe immigrants and Ghanaian nationals, while others were formed by immigrants of Burkinabe origin exclusively.

The main form of structuring the diaspora is the formation of ethno-diasporic communities. Under this form of organisation, while belonging to the Burkinabe diaspora, individuals and families are first and foremost members of their ethnic groups of origin, notably Mossi, Bissa, Fulbe, Bobo, etc. Within the ethno-diasporic communities, led by chiefs, individuals of different status, gender and age contribute to peaceful cohabitation both within the communities and with other communities. Under the influence of their families, migrants aspire to and decide either to stay in Ghana or to go back to Burkina Faso and, more rarely, to move towards other horizons.

⁷ The Hausa term *zongo* originally referred to places on the outskirts of towns or villages where trans-Saharan traders rested their camels and conducted their trade. Later, it came to refer to the areas where foreign communities made up of migrants from the Sahel countries and the north of the country settled, in other words, the foreigners' neighbourhoods located in urban areas.

Returning: A “legitimate” aspiration and decision for the first generations of migrants

For the first generations of migrants, returning to their country of origin is a profound aspiration. The decision to return is premeditated, from the outset of migration, and sometimes maintained at the cost of a great deal of effort and consequently implemented.

Returning: the essence of temporary migration

Labour migration is most often part of reversible migratory flows. This includes seasonal migrations and, above all, multi-annual migrations. They are organised, if not endorsed, by the social body itself, which allocates a part of its human resources to migration, while the sedentary part of the population maintains and cultivates the region of origin (Domenach and Picouet 1987, 475-476). In this context, the desire to go back and the decision to do so seem obvious. Migrants before the expulsions of 1969-1971, attached to their country of origin and to their relatives living there, have a nostalgia for Burkina Faso. What's more, they dread the painful expulsions from which they escaped. Evoking the popular wisdom, “a tree trunk may have been in water, but it will never become a crocodile”, they assert that they are Burkinabe and that for life, since they can never be expelled from there. So, they are planning to go back one day and they are active with this intention.

Attitudes do not allow a male head of household to return unaccompanied after spending a certain amount of time outside the country. His aspiration and his decision to return home cannot be solitary. His probable return to the country can only be concomitant with the return of his spouse(s) and the arrival of his children, particularly those who are minors. The adult children and sometimes minors for whom their parents have found a guardian, may stay in Ghana for some time or for good. So, the aspirations and decisions of the head of the family are more or less those, intrinsic or conditioned, of virtually the whole family.

While women, more or less evoke their will to go back, they recognise that the decisions of the head of the family are theirs. Our efforts to ensure that they evoke their sovereign decisions were in vain and sometimes irritating. The widowhood of some women accentuates their desire to return. This desire is even greater when their financial and material situation, and that of their children, is bad. Salimata⁸ wanted to go back home right up until

⁸ Interview conducted on 13 August 2011 in Alaba/Kumasi.

her recent death. The decision to return involves consultations between the migrants and the members of their families. The hardest people to convince are not the migrants' wives, but rather their children. Binta believes that "women have no choice, they live where their husbands want them to live"⁹. The head of the family's desire to return is likely to influence collective decisions to return or cascading returns.

In the life-long pattern, i.e. the absence of migrants from their places of origin throughout their working life, generally between the ages of 20 and 60 (Chatelain 1963, 2), they express their aspirations to return by making savings or investments in their country of origin. In some particular cases, the return of the father and mother of the family, because of their reluctance, is negotiated at length by their children living in Burkina Faso with the intervention of resource people. This confirms the idea that "it is with dignity that we manage to leave, but it is thanks to courage that we go back home" (Camara 2018, 13). Other reasons motivate aspirations and decisions to go back.

Return to not get lost

The aspiration and decision to return in order 'not to get lost' raise questions about the psycho-social causes of migration. They therefore concern both the individual and the social group to which he or she belongs. However, it is more about the migrants' community of origin than of their ethno-diasporic groups.

Many, but not necessarily all, Burkina Faso migrants living in Ghana dream of returning one day. They are nostalgic for their ancestral lands. Having a strong emotional bond with their country of origin, migrants use to say: "(...) Even if I was obliged to leave due to the bad conditions of life, I still have my country of origin in my heart" (Peressini 1993, 44). For many migrants, one must never forget one's origin. These nostalgic migrants see Burkina Faso as their "ba-yiri" or "faso"¹⁰. Ghana is referred to by the terms "weoogo" or "tunga", meaning a bush or foreign land. As far back in 1965, the Upper Volta ambassador in Ghana noted that: "(...) Many of them [voltaic immigrants] claim their original nationality and never give up hope of going home one day"¹¹.

⁹ Interview conducted on 31 July 2014 in Ho zongo.

¹⁰ Terms from the Moore and Dioula national languages meaning homeland.

¹¹ D.A.D. M.A.E.C.R., 2A2 MAE78: Report n° 9/AG/HV/CONF from the ambassador of Upper Volta to Ghana to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Upper Volta of 2 March 1965.

With the project of coming home one day, men find it good getting married before migrating. They also choose to come back in order to get married with wives in their homeland. Respecting this view of coming back one day, they prefer also to marry descendants of Burkinabe migrants living in Ghana. These matrimonial strategies, which aim at avoiding marrying Ghanaian women, contribute to the desire to return one day. In families where both the head of the family and the wife or wives are migrants, there is often nostalgia for the country of origin. Inter-community marriages, i.e. those between immigrants and natives or between Burkinabe immigrants and other immigrants, were often avoided in the past in order not to “get lost”. In other words, so as not to run the risk of dragging on. Thus, the ways in which households are constituted influence aspirations to return.

The aspirations and decisions to return of some migrants are sometimes shaped by their responsibilities within the clan or extended family. Having become patriarchs, they cannot shirk their obligations as clan elders and must return to take up their rightful positions. The needs of the land chieftaincy and the associated cult of the land in traditional African religions are a requirement that justifies the obligation of some migrants to return. A sense of duty or fear of the consequences of shirking one’s duty motivates aspirations and decisions. Some migrants were living alternatively in both the host country and the source one¹². In Africa, and particularly in rural communities where traditions still hold sway, the responsibility of patriarch of a lineage or legitimate chief of a canton or village cannot be transferred to any other person. The weight of custom, of the ‘never seen before’, of the likely wrath of the ancestors, discourages any ‘usurpation’ of status, especially of seniority. As a result, even when migrating, within or outside the country, the probable legitimate holder of the position is obliged to assume it. They must then, without further ado, return to their families¹³.

Failing to consider their return, some migrants try to influence the intentions and resolutions of their offspring. Doomed to live definitively in Ghana due to his age, Amadu repeats to his two sons: “Go back home so that we are not all lost”¹⁴. When well thought out, aspirations and decisions to return lead to “a well-planned return, i.e. a return that is considered to carry out at the appropriate moment” (Gubry *et al.* 1996, 133). When the aspiration

¹²This is the case of Salifu who, during the year, sometimes lives in Effiduasi in central Ghana, sometimes in his home village in southern Burkina Faso.

¹³Shared views of migrants and returnees in Ghana and Burkina Faso respectively, gathered during discussion groups.

¹⁴ Remarks made during an interview on 31 July 2014 in Ho zongo.

and the decision to return are individual, they either end up being blunted, or they must have a family dimension before they are implemented, or they involve all or part of the family later on. As a result, the idea of returning is more akin to wishful thinking than a real intention. Socio-cultural constraints relegate wives to an almost insignificant level of decision-making. While the older generations of Burkinabe migrants aspire and decide to return, the new generations and especially the descendants of migrants are more committed to the prospect of staying.

Staying: The weight of the family and rebuilding identity

For most migrants and descendants of migrants from Burkina Faso in Ghana, staying or leaving is the only alternative. A host of factors relating to individuals, their families, social groups and the socio-economic and political contexts in both Ghana and Burkina Faso motivate the desire and decision of migrants and their descendants to stay.

Staying or the thwarted “search for shoes” among the older generations

“Looking for shoes” is an expression used in several national languages in Burkina Faso to literally illustrate the desire to say goodbye to one’s interlocutors. In the specific context of migration, this expression refers to the desire to return one day to the country of departure. In some cases, the “search for shoes” expresses a pious wish rather than a real desire.

Families sometimes directly or indirectly thwart the aspirations and decisions to return of many migrants formerly settled in Ghana who, despite their nostalgia for Burkina Faso, cannot go back. Inusa¹⁵, who spent his entire working life in Ghana by maintaining links with his home country, has repeatedly expressed the desire to come back. His project to come back has been thwarted by his children. He says that it is against his will that he is still living in Ghana: “My body is in Ghana but my mind is not there, it’s back home”.

Initially taken as a temporary migration, some migrations endure despite the aspirations to come back. Many of the migrants were intending to have a few months or years stay: “I’m leaving tomorrow, the day after

¹⁵ Interview conducted on 22 August 2014 in Sukuumu (Brong Ahafo Region).

tomorrow, next month, but alas, here I am again”¹⁶. Wahabu¹⁷, who says he came to Ghana to stay for three months to buy a bicycle, is still living in Kumasi 60 years later. Reluctantly, most of the migrants say they are still in the bush (weoogo), i.e. abroad. One of them fatalistically said: “God has not given me the road back yet” or “I’m looking for my shoes”¹⁸.

When the migrant’s spouse is indigenous, in other words Ghanaian, the desire to stay is much more obvious than the one to go back. Indeed, spouses are rarely involved in visits to Burkina Faso. As a result, they are more or less conditioned to aspire to stay in Ghana with their husbands and children, and even more so after the death of the migrant heads of household.

With the flow of time and the increase in family size through the birth of children, migrants’ families see their aspirations to return gradually reduced. Families are finding their bearings in the host country, while at the same time their ties with Burkina Faso are weakening. As a result, they feel less able to go back. Therefore, migrants’ families develop a feeling of being less foreign in Ghana than in Burkina Faso. As a long-term migrant puts it: “After fifty years here, I’m not a foreigner in Ghana, it’s perhaps in Burkina Faso that I can be a foreigner”¹⁹.

So, for the people surveyed, the decision to stay seems easier to take than the decision to go back. The desire to make migration reversible expressed by the idea of “looking for shoes”, seems to be betrayed by the fact that nothing is being done to implement it. This gives the impression of a feigned will rather than a real desire.

Staying: between identity reconstruction of migrants and the obvious choice of “tabuuse”

Life in the multi-ethnic microcosm in the Zongo neighbourhoods in the southern half of Ghana leads to identity changes. As the Zongo areas are home to a major intermingling of migrant populations from a variety of backgrounds, several identities coexist, overlap and influence one another. The socio-cultural features of the Haoussa people, who are the majority immigrant group, imposed their influence on other immigrants, especially the descendants of migrants. In addition to conversion to Islam, the Hausa

¹⁶ Hamidou, interview conducted on 18 August 2011 in Alaba / Kumasi.

¹⁷ Interview conducted on 15 August 2011 in Moshizongo/Kumasi.

¹⁸ Remarks by Salifu during an interview on 22 August 2011 in New Zongo (Saabu Zongo)/Kumasi.

¹⁹ Remarks by Mahamudu in Moshie Zongo (Kumasi) on 22 August 2011.

language and the patronymic system, characterised by the use of the father's first name in place of the original surname, are helping to rebuild the identity of migrants and their descendants. They are now more inclined to stay in Ghana than to return to Burkina Faso, so far away, so different and so little known. This is reflected in the words of a migrant: "In Ghana, I am something. So, why should I go where I am nothing"²⁰ (Schildkrout 1978, 45).

Post 1969-1971 migrants, i.e. those who had not experienced the expulsions of foreigners, were less and less inclined to return. They consider that these expulsions are further events that cannot happen again. To all intents and purposes, they opt for their identity rebuilding. This reconstruction of identity, particularly for the younger generations, involves combining the need to assert an identity with the request of full integration. Migrants adopt the African wisdom that "an individual's true country is where he feels at ease".

The *tabuuse*²¹, in other words the descendants of migrants of both sexes, whether single or married, consider Ghana to be their home. This country is their "homeland" where they aspire to live. This is justified by the fact that they feel socially, economically, culturally and legally well integrated. They see Burkina Faso as their "fathers' land". In this sense, their fathers' country of origin is not theirs, and they have no desire to go and live there, except in the specific context of visiting or working there. This feeling can be observed in almost all the descendants of migrants. The migrants' parents understand it. It is justified by the virtual absence of relations between many descendants of migrants and Burkina Faso. Very few of them have already stayed there. They consider themselves entirely Ghanaians: "Burkina Faso is my father's land. But I know nothing about it. I'm Ghanaian" (Koudougou 2011, 95). The descendant of migrants, Hamid, proclaims: "Ghana first"²². This brings to mind Amin Maalouf's idea that: "I do not have several identities, I have only one, made up of all the elements that have shaped it, according to a particular 'dosage' that is never the same from one person to the next" (Maalouf 1998, 10).

Many migrants and descendants of migrants are reinforced in their decision to stay in Ghana by experiences of stigmatisation. Depreciated nicknames such as "Master" or "Ghana boy", made them feel like foreigners in their own country, if not second-rate citizens. They then propagated the idea

20 "In Ghana, I count. So why should I go where I am nothing." Remarks made by Mahamudu on 22 August 2011 in Moshizongo/Kumasi.

21A term derived from moore (Burkina Faso's main national language) which literally means uprooted.

22 Interview conducted on 16 August 2016 in Nima/Accra.

that Burkina Faso was an unwelcoming country for Burkinabe living in Ghana. Some of their compatriots living in Burkina Faso use to make comments that could be perceived as stigmatising comments towards their compatriots living in Ghana²³. However, they temper this by saying that the intention is not to offend sensitivities but to point out obvious differences, such as the particular accent²⁴ of their compatriots from Ghana.

In the minds of some migrants who fled to the Gold Coast during the difficult times of French colonisation or during periods of food crisis, Burkina Faso remains “a country of constraints, hunger and misery” (Ouedraogo 2017, 147). There is thus a fixation on the context in which these migrants left, which inhibits any desire to return. Some migrations are the result of unspeakable social acts, such as banishments, kidnapping of women and cattle rustling. This type of migrant has no intention of coming back. The migrant then chooses to “burn his vessels” behind him and no longer aspires to return (Medam 1993, 61).

According to a common mentality in Burkina Faso, the failure of a migratory project and a fruitless return is a disgrace. But “death is better than shame”. Thus, many failed migrants aspire and decide to stay in Ghana, even in great poverty, rather than return home empty-handed. Amadu realises that coming to Ghana was a mistake, but ashamed to turn back empty-handed, he can only contemplate staying in this land of pitfalls for him²⁵. This idea is shared by Abdulai²⁶ who dissuades would-be immigrants towards Ghana when he says: “I’m not going back because I’ll be ashamed. If one of my brothers wants to leave Bilayanga like me to come here, I’ll prevent him from coming”. Abdul Salam²⁷, a migrant who has been living in Ghana since 1969, is divorced and destitute in the Ho zongo, and categorically refuses to return home, even if someone were to meet all the conditions and come and get him. So, despite being in a situation of failure, some migrants think that their life is now in Ghana. Such a conception of migration calls to consider the African wisdom according to which, “when you take one leap into the fire, it means that you still have another leap to take”. Disillusioned migrants like Amadu feel trapped and unable to make the “second leap”. Nor do they resolve to circulate, in accordance with Lobi wisdom, which states that: “It

23 Augustin, interview conducted on 7 April 2018 in Ouagadougou.

24 The stigma stems from the fact that these descendants of migrants speak the national languages with an accent that shows they have lived in Ghana.

25 Interview conducted on 22 August 2014 in Moshizongo/Kumasi.

26 Interview conducted on 1 August 2014 in Agbo Kofe (Volta Region).

27 Interview conducted on 31 July 2014 in Ho zongo.

would be foolish for a Lobi to stay or even to linger in a place that only generates incidents, evils or misfortunes” (Fieloux 1980, 111). Amadu makes a point of raising the awareness of would-be emigrants: “I would advise those who want to come here for adventure to stay and fight in Burkina Faso. If life could be turned back, I would have stayed at home”²⁸.

Conclusion

The motivations that lead to the intentions and the decisions to return or to stay are diverse and vary according to the generations of migrants and their descendants. The memory of the expulsions of foreigners in 1969-1971 and the level of legal integration of migrants and their descendants influence aspirations and decisions to return or to stay in Ghana.

The first generations of Burkinabe migrants, particularly those who witnessed the expulsions of foreigners in 1969, aspire more to go back to the country, even at the twilight of their lives they do not wish to die abroad. They are in line with the logic of lifetime migration. With the agreement of their families, some migrants who have doubts about a peaceful stay in Ghana decide to go back to their country of origin. The weight of families leads some migrants from the first generations, and almost all migrants from the new generations, to consider their host country as theirs. The relatively good level of socio-cultural, economic and legal integration of these migrants’ families encourages them to aspire to remain in Ghana, their host country and even, in some cases, their country of adoption in the circumstances where their members are naturalised Ghanaian.

While the first generations of migrants have relatively strong aspirations to return, the new generations, particularly the descendants of migrants, generally aspire to stay in Ghana. The first generations, beyond their aspirations, more or less take the decision to go back, while the new generations decide to stay. They plan to bring themselves up to date by acquiring a residence permit. These are the most determined hopes to achieve legal integration by becoming Ghanaians. As the generations go by, the links between migrants and their descendants on one hand and with Burkina Faso on the other hand crumble (physical, written and telephone links with their relatives living at home are getting weak due to the distance or to the death of the first migrant, unfortunate experiences of stigmatisation, lack of interest in Burkina Faso nationality) and aspirations and decisions to stay

²⁸ Remarks made during an interview on 31 July 2014 in Ho zongo.

predominate over those to go back. The successful integration of migrants and their descendants encourages aspirations and decisions to stay.

This study did not take into account the communities in which migrants' families live and their communities of origin in Burkina Faso. The opinions and attitudes of these communities are likely to influence on the intentions and decisions of migrant families. The study of intentions and decisions to go back or to stay provides an idea, even a vague one, of the actions or inactions of Burkina Faso migrants and their descendants in going back to Ghana or settling there definitively.

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ABSTRACT

“Stay, return or move” is the dilemma facing migrants from Burkina Faso living in Ghana. In contrast to the return flows of both migrants and descendants of Burkina Faso migrants living in Côte d’Ivoire, there are few reverse migration flows between Ghana and Burkina Faso. This is somewhat puzzling. This article therefore sets out to analyze why, among the Burkinabe diaspora living in Ghana during both the colonial and post-colonial periods, the tendency is to “stay” rather than “return”. On the face of it, this could be justified by the gradual loosening of migrants’ ties with their relatives back in Burkina Faso, and their successful socio-economic and legal integration. The language barrier between the English spoken in Ghana and the French spoken in Burkina Faso could explain the strong propensity of descendants of migrants to stay. To identify the aspirations and decisions of migrants and their descendants, this study draws on bibliographical resources and empirical data. Mainly qualitative surveys were carried out with resource persons in Ghana and Burkina Faso. Whether or not they are married to Burkinabè women, whether or not they have children, migrants of both old and new generations, and less so their descendants, are faced with a painful dilemma. Families and the reconstruction of identity are the reasons why migrants stay. In general, the more integrated migrants are, the more they wish and decide to stay. As a result, the desire and the decision to return become rarer.

KEYWORDS

Migrants. Return. Stay.

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REVIEW OF “GOVERNING IN THE SHADOWS: ANGOLA’S SECURITISED STATE”, BY PAULA CRISTINA ROQUE¹

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“Governing in the Shadows: Angola’s Securitised State” is a book published in English by Hurst & Company, in London, by Paula Cristina Roque. Paula Roque is a Portuguese-Angolan independent researcher who works in the crisis group of the Southern African Institute for Security Studies, based in South Africa. In “Governing in the Shadows³”, Paula Roque deepens and condenses the work she has been doing as a security and international relations researcher, building her corpus based on interaction with key sources belonging to the security apparatus: intelligence officers and the military. The book suggests that Angola’s security apparatus is the basis of the power maintenance structure of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*, MPLA, in portuguese), the party that has ruled the country for almost five decades.

In essence, Paula Roque’s argument is that the security apparatus of the Republic of Angola holds the real power over the country’s destiny, associated with the other internal and party spheres. The security house of the Presidency of the Republic controls the defense, security and intelligence sectors, and has unlimited financial resources under its wing, such as the loan

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3 This book has comments on the back cover from some academics: Tony Hodges, Antonio Tomás, Jocelyn Alexander and Jakkie Cilliers.

4 In the angolan political lexicon, the word “shadow government” was used for a long time by the UNITA party. It was Jonas Savimbi who introduced this term into the angolan lexicon. Currently, UNITA maintains an administrative structure called the “shadow government”.

made by China to Angola. In other words, control of power is fundamentally exercised through the ability to distribute economic and social benefits to other internal sectors (the Presidential Guard Unit, internal, external, military and paramilitary intelligence services) and external sectors (politicians, journalists, judges, diplomats, professional associations and civil society).

The book's cover image depicts an angolan policeman inside the Coqueiros Stadium in Luanda, in front of a crowd awaiting the arrival of Pope Benedict XV, who visited Angola on March 21, 2009. In terms of structure, "Governing in the Shadows" is a book divided into six chapters.

The first chapter, entitled "The component parts", outlines the composition of the parts of the angolan security system. In essence, the chapter portrays the way in which the angolan security apparatus was constituted. Paula Roque announces right at the start that the focus of her approach is the security apparatus itself, and not the MPLA, the party that has supported the government since 1975, nor former president José Eduardo dos Santos. The chapter talks about the MPLA, the presidency of the republic, and the others, the other parts of the apparatus involving various sectors of angolan society. In her account of the parts that make up the security apparatus, the author discusses Angola's transformations over the last 45 years, such as the internal struggles and the social actors involved in them: the MPLA, the death of Savimbi and the affirmation of Isaías Samakuva at the head of UNITA, the emergence of the *Convergência Ampla de Salvação de Angola* (Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola) - Electoral Coalition that brought together dissidents from UNITA, the MPLA, the Social Renewal Party (PRS) and other small parties anchored in the figures of Abel Chivukuvuku and André de Mendes Carvalho 'Miau', contestants in the 2012 elections. The chapter also portrays the position of the historic political parties in the field of political dispute, the position of the churches and the role of the media, both public and private, in maintaining the system, as Jon Schubert (2017) called it in his book entitled "Working the System: A Political Ethnography of the New Angola".

The second chapter, entitled "A strategy of securitized hegemony: outmanoeuvring the Enemy", presents the country's historical circumstances between the 1990s and 2000s, a period in which the security apparatus was consolidated. The chapter also deals with the most uncertain periods in the history of the angolan armed conflict, discussing the political and military agreements (Bicesse in 1991 and Lusaka in 1994) between the government and UNITA and the internal and external actors involved - the *Troika* of Observers (UN, Russia, Portugal and the USA). In essence, the chapter discusses how the war and the military victory in favor of the MPLA were fundamental

factors in the consolidation of the angolan security apparatus. Both internal (the formation of the AAF, the integration of senior UNITA officials into the defense and security bodies and the death of Jonas Savimbi) and external (the availability of mineral resources, business opportunities with national and foreign companies from central capitalist countries) factors contributed to this.

The third chapter entitled “The shadows government: guarding the guardians” addresses the structures that make up the security apparatus, as Paula Roque called it. In this chapter, the author develops her argument by describing how the ‘shadow government’ was effectively created in the period that corresponded with the end of the Angolan civil war in 2002, in which President José Eduardo dos Santos, with paternal power, welcomed the insurgents and organized two fundamental sectors around the presidency: the military house – also called security – and the civil house. There are also two structures which, in the author’s view, operate in parallel and outside the formal control mechanisms: parliament, the courts, the council of ministers and society in general. Also in this chapter, Paula Roque tells how the Constitution approved in 2010 strengthened the powers of the president of the republic and, consequently, of the two parallel structures that guarantee the reproduction of power by governing in the shadows. They are, in essence, where the negotiations of real angolan power take place, as the author sees it.

The fourth chapter entitled “The Angolan Armed Forces: a strained national pillar” portrays the long history of the Angolan Armed Forces, especially during the two decades of military peace. The chapter also discusses the lines of command of the Armed Forces, their internal composition and their role in the defense of national territory, as well as the power relations they maintain with Angola’s military allies. In this chapter, Paula Roque seeks to highlight the missions that the Angolan Armed Forces have undertaken, especially in the conflicts in the Great Lakes region, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The chapter deals with the current president’s time as defense minister under José Eduardo dos Santos. The chapter also highlights the role that the Armed Forces have played in the management of natural resources, especially in the control of mining areas, and the economic benefit that senior officers have accumulated in terms of wealth. In other words, the military structure is a pillar of Angola’s governance apparatus and is also part of the benefits.

The fifth and penultimate chapter, entitled “Changing the guard: João Lourenço’s Presidency”, deals mainly with the changes that took place in the structure of Angola’s security apparatus with the succession of José

Eduardo dos Santos by the current president, João Lourenço. The chapter essentially tells the story of before and after September 2017, when João Lourenço replaced Eduardo dos Santos, and the changes he made to the defense and security agencies, as well as the recovery of intelligence figures who had been discredited. These include Fernando Garcia Miala and others within the security apparatus. The chapter also looks at the changes made to the presidential guard unit, the Angolan Armed Forces and the National Police, where Lourenço sought to remove all those who maintained a relationship of loyalty with José Eduardo dos Santos as a condition for his staying in power.

The sixth and final chapter, entitled "The times of monsters: Angola's response to Covid-19", looks at how the angolan authorities are dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic and the measures adopted to deal with its spread. The chapter also deals with the pressures that João Lourenço's presidency experienced during this pandemic period, with a scandal inside the security house, which led to measures and the removal of figures close to the president, as well as the pressures coming from society through street protests, the president's attitude towards the fight against corruption, defended as the main banner of his government. In the shortest chapter of the book, Paula Roque gives an overview of João Lourenço's government and the effects of his changes within the security apparatus.

Our critical reading of "Governing in the Shadows" suggests four points based on the sociology of the angolan political field, as well as supported by the concept of "history by analogy" by Mahmood Mamdani (1996) in his book "Citizen and Subject. Contemporary Africa and the legacy of Colonialism". History by analogy consists of making the analysis and explanation of the angolan security state dependent on the comparison made with the historical reality of Russia. Also based on the perspective of Carlos Cardoso, Elísio Macamo and Nelson Pestana (2002) in their text entitled "*Da possibilidade do político na África lusófona: alguns subsídios teóricos*", we understand the Angolan political field as a process in the making, corresponding to specific perceptions of the political.

The first critical point is the attempt to understand the empirical *corpus* from which Paula Roque draws up her approach to theorizing about the angolan security apparatus. There is a series of interviews that can be seen spread over the six chapters of the book that allow us to follow the author's sources of information. These interviews vary in terms of the sociodemographic profiles of the interviewees and the year in which they were conducted. Overall, Paula Roque presents a book with around four dozen interviews ranging from 2004 to 2020. Most of them took place in 2004, 2015 and

2019. The first group consists of interviews with former UNITA combatants conducted in the city of Huambo, in the period immediately following the end of the civil war between the Angolan Armed Forces (AAF) and the residual UNITA forces. The second group includes interviews with former military intelligence officers, some belonging to UNITA, civilians, journalists and angolan opposition politicians. The third group consists of interviews with intelligence officers between the cities of Luanda, Angola and Lisbon, Portugal. There are also records of testimonies, also known as *testemunhos*, which are suggested to have taken place in 1998, 2004 and 2019. The interviews were conducted in 2008, 2012, 2014 and 2020, the latter being the year of the Covid-19 pandemic.

The second critical point has to do with the ambiguities in the empirical *corpus* of “Governing in the Shadows”. Paula Roque codifies the profile of her interviewees in a general way, although she reveals the characteristics of a few interviewees, such as the former president of UNITA, Isaiás Samakuva. In other words, the way in which the interviewees are presented can be a relevant factor in making the information gathered plausible, but at the same time it makes it difficult to understand their empirical universe. Despite the fact that this is a sensitive subject, the sociodemographic profiles of Paula Roque’s interviewees have the potential to cause interpretative distortions in the empirical *corpus*.

The third point of criticism is argumentative and concerns the use of the analogy between the security apparatus of Angola and Russia. “Governing in the Shadows” suggests an overvaluation of the security apparatuses of countries like Cuba, Russia and China, which have important relations with Angola, and the fact that these countries, especially the first two, have played a crucial role in providing training, technical assistance and military equipment to Angola over the last four decades. In other words, the fact that Russia’s secret services have played a crucial role in maintaining power in that country, ruling in the shadows, is an analogy with Angola because of the influence and characteristics observable in the relationship between political power and the defense and security services. The fear expressed towards Russia’s secret services is by extension the same as that expressed towards Angola’s intelligence apparatus. They are presented as being omnipresent and omniscient. Their efficiency results from the way they operate in society and the degree of secrecy they produce.

History by analogy consists of importing the Russian model for the purpose of analyzing the intricacies of the angolan security apparatus, which is said to have played an important role in keeping José Eduardo dos

Santos in power for 38 years. It so happens that at least half of this period took place during wartime. War, here, has the potential to weigh in as an analytical variable in maintaining political power in the hands of Eduardo dos Santos, as a result of a combination of political and military factors and the availability of resources. In other words, the political economy of power must be taken into account. An analysis focused solely on the role played by the angolan intelligence services in maintaining political power could run the risk of ignoring equally relevant variables. The maintenance of power in the hands of José Eduardo dos Santos was helped by more forces than just the internal and external intelligence services, as well as, to a certain extent, by the domestic, regional and international political and economic context that was favorable to him.

The fourth point of criticism concerns the fact that the book gives more prominence to military structures - such as Hélder Vieira Dias and José Maria - to the detriment of civilian ones, and that it overlooks the role played by the so-called *futunguistas*⁵ in building up the angolan security apparatus throughout the 1990s.

"Governing in the Shadows: Angola's Securitised State" has the merit of presenting a theoretical contribution to the social sciences, african and security studies, when it tries to explain the intricacies of the angolan defense and security apparatus. More than confirming the omnipresent power of the security apparatus, Paula Roque's book provides an opportunity to think about ways of scrutinizing the actions of this body in angolan society.

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5 They are senior civil servants in the angolan political apparatus (presidency) who worked in José Eduardo dos Santos' most restricted circles. Some of them would later head strategic sectors of the government.

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