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ABOUT THE JOURNAL

The Brazilian Journal of African Studies is a biannual publication, in digital format, dedicated to the research, reflection and propagation of original scientific articles with emphasis on the analysis of International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations and Schools of Thought. RBEA is essentially academic, linked to the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

The RBEA has as target audience researchers, professors and students interested in the specificities of the African continent and its international insertion. Alongside such perspective, the Journal intends to expand the debate about the Brazilian projection world widely, the Brazilian cooperation efforts (including in the Defense field) with the African countries in the South Atlantic perimeter and the construction of a regional identity in face of a scenario of geopolitical transformations.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira

December/2023

African nations are taking on more prominent roles in global affairs, with the continent becoming a pivotal strategic arena for evolving global interactions. Indeed, certain leaders and governments are engaged in political projects that demonstrate the need to overcome the constraints of “old” and “new” Western neo-colonialism. Perhaps one of the most emblematic examples of the continent’s relevance was the African Union (AU)’s inclusion as a permanent member at the G20 summit held in New Delhi, India, in September 2023. It’s fair to say that the organization exhibited signs of strain as a forum for meaningful dialogue, offering primarily rhetorical backing for developing nations.

However, since the 2008 financial crisis, the G20 has regained its prominence as an important space for global discussion, largely due to the rising influence of emerging economies, thereby diminishing the dominance of the G7. The most recent international changes therefore reveal the symptoms of a fracture in the international economic order upheld by the “elite club”. It is possible to say that a new international divide is emerging and producing significant realignments evident within the renewed international organizations.

The African Union’s entry into the G20, advocated by important states that make up the geopolitical South, was formalized under the Brazilian presidency. Joining the G20 will provide Africa with an important platform for communicating and coordinating macro-financial policies with the world’s major economies. It also presents a new opportunity to forge qualitatively different relationships with nations whose influence on the continent has waned, such as France and the USA. It will thus be up to the African Union to articulate awareness of the economic and political importance of its states. New poles of power are striving for collaborative development, and African countries have acquired enhanced positions in the international arena as a result.

The entry of the African Union as a permanent member is a major challenge for the organization. The AU will need to engage in discussions and position itself not only on African matters but also on global issues. It must define coordinated global political responses to contemporary economic challenges. To achieve this goal, establishing a unified African agenda will ensure that the continent fulfills its role as one of the primary axes of international power. Resources will be readily available to support this endeavor.

The BJAS' 16th issue features nine articles and a review by Africanists from Brazil, Cameroon, Gambia, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Uruguay. In the article "Resurgence of military coups in Africa: can the African Union and regional organizations defend and consolidate democracy?" Joshua O. Bolarinwa investigates the implementation of the African Union's methodology regarding the utilization of the Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) mechanism, along with other metrics. Luqman Saka explores Franco-African relations and the evolution of French military involvement in post-colonial Africa in "*Françafrique*: Examining Franco-African Relations and French Military Presence in Post-Colonial Africa". In "The future of Japan-Africa cooperation: TICAD", Habib Badawi highlights the importance of Japanese-African relations in comprehending Japan's strategy in Africa, underscoring the distinctions from the Western approach. Tatiana Raquel Reis Silva and Leandro Chaves Batista, in the paper "Atlantism under maintenance: a review of the partnership between Brazil and Cape Verde during the Dilma Rousseff governments (2011-2016)", seek to analyze the main cooperation and diplomatic initiatives between Brazil and African countries, focusing particularly on the Cape Verde archipelago.

In the article "Government, State, and National Wars in Africa", Nathaly Silva Xavier Schütz and Hernán Olmedo González discuss the extent to which the existence of national wars in African states, from the end of the Second World War until 2015, has been conditioned by levels of government entrenchment and levels of "statehood". In Jean-Marie Kasonga Mbombo's paper, "Skimming the East African Community regional force in the Kivu: another test case of 'African solutions to African problems'" based on the Community's Treaty and Protocols, the author assesses the regional willingness to transform itself into an intervention force.

Felipe André Angst and Hermenegildo Alberto Machoi, authors of the article "The problematics of resettlements: a literature review", examine

the challenges associated with involuntary resettlement resulting from development projects, explore the economic, social, and environmental effects on affected communities, and seek viable solutions. In “The colonial invention of Mozambique: from African Empires to overseas colony and province,” José Alejandro Sebastian Barrios Diaz delves into Mozambique’s historical evolution, tracing its formation from the colonization period. The study identifies significant historical milestones in the shaping of Portuguese colonization efforts, spanning up to the first half of the 20th century. Finally, in the article “Bu/Mbengkas Rice Cooperative Society Limited and Laimbwe’s economy (Cameroon), 1973-2014”, Therence Kefih Kai and Henry Kam Kah examine the Bu/Mbengkas Rice Cooperative Society Limited (BMRCS Ltd) in relation to the living sustainability of Bu and Mbengkas, the Laimbwe-speaking people of Menchum and Boyo Divisions in northwest Cameroon. According to the authors, the cooperative society has led to socio-economic changes, especially in Bu, but not in Mbengkas. This issue also features a review of Isaías Barreñada’s “*Breve Historia del Sahara Occidental*” by Adriano Alberto Smolarek.

The BJAS publishes a bilingual electronic version in both Portuguese and English. Thus, we welcome contributions from colleagues in Brazil and abroad, aiming to establish connections that foster the expansion of knowledge and the development of a Southern perspective regarding the African continent and its relationships with other nations.

We would like to thank the Editorial Assistant, Mariana Vitola, and the support of Gabriela Bonness, Henrique Moura, Isabella Cruzichi, Lucca Medeiros, Rafaela Serpa e Vinícius Baldissera. We would also like to thank the CEBRAFRICA team, who worked on the revision and translation of the articles.

RESURGENCE OF MILITARY COUPS IN AFRICA: CAN THE AFRICAN UNION AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEFEND AND CONSOLIDATE DEMOCRACY?

Joshua O. Bolarinwa¹



Introduction

The military's takeover of political power, irrespective of the methods adopted, represents a rejection of civilian authority (Gutteridge 1985). Since the conclusion of World War II, there have been instances where militaries across the globe have taken part in the removal of elected political leaders, dissolution of democratic regimes, or establishment of autonomous operations within nominally democratic political systems. These actions have been carried out without the consent, oversight, and control of elected civilians. These actions are achieved through coups and other unconstitutional methods of altering the status quo (Kuehn 2017). In the pre-1990 era, military coups served as the predominant method for instigating government transitions in a significant number of African nations. Since the advent of post-colonial Africa, the continent has witnessed a cumulative total of 88 instances of successful coups. The initial *coup d'état* transpired in Egypt in July 1952, whereas instances of such political upheavals transpired in Guinea-Bissau and Mali in April and December of the year 2012, respectively. Based on the research authored by Issaka K. Souaré, Africa has had a total of 73 instances of military coups, as documented over some time. Out of the entire dataset, 63 occurrences were recorded before the year 1990, while the remaining 10 cases were reported after the ratification of the Lomé Declaration in July

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2000 by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), an organization that is since defunct (Souaré 2014).

The Lomé Declaration enacted a prohibition on military coups and implemented sanctions against governments that attained power through such actions. The significance of the recent surge in coups in Africa cannot be overstated, despite the efforts of a limited number of analysts to do so. According to a report by The Wall Street Journal, the occurrence of military coups has surged to unprecedented levels since the end of the colonial era, following the coup that took place in Sudan in October 2021. Although hyperbolic in tone, the departure of the year 2021 from recent history has been noteworthy enough to merit a comparison with the era of independence (Faucon, Said, and Parkinson 2021). As per The Economist, the count of coups that transpired in the year 2021 has exceeded the cumulative count of coups that transpired in the preceding five years (The Economist 2021). Recently, there was a worldwide celebration of the decline of coups, not only in Africa but also globally. During the autumn season of 2015, New African magazine presented a query regarding the decreasing pattern of coups.

In their 2017 work, Powell, Reynolds, and Chacha (2021) cited a report by Schiel et al., which stated that as of September 2017, Africa had not undergone any attempted coup in the past two years and had successfully avoided one for almost three years. Kamissou Camara, a former Foreign Minister of Mali, stated that the era of coups had ended one month after the event, despite her brief tenure during a coup. Upon preliminary analysis, it is evident that this marks the lengthiest duration without a *coup d'état* in Africa since the decolonization era. Numerous endeavors have been undertaken to elucidate this transition, encompassing the formation of more lucid political frameworks and the involvement of external entities such as the African Union (AU) and regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Despite the political upheaval witnessed in November 2017 with the ousting of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, coups d'état have been generally regarded as events of limited consequence in the years that followed.

The Council on Foreign Relations has put forth a statement that corroborates Jonathan Powell and his colleagues' claim that conventional coups, which involve military personnel attempting to take over, have been supplanted by incumbent officeholders resorting to manipulative tactics to maintain their hold on power. Since August 2020, significant political changes have occurred in various African countries, such as successful coups in Chad, Guinea, and Mali, and attempted coups in Niger and Sudan, with

varying levels of success. The rise in the frequency of this phenomenon has generated significant discussion regarding its fundamental causes, possible correlations, and feasible remedies. The focus of the article revolves around the possible influence of regional organizations, such as the African Union and other regional economic communities, in effectively tackling this phenomenon. Since the year 1950, African nations that have attained independence have encountered over 200 instances of coup attempts, with a success rate exceeding 100 (Powell, Reynolds, and Chacha 2017).

This research evaluates the contemporary increase in military coups in Africa and analyses the effectiveness of the African Union (AU) and other regional institutions in safeguarding and promoting democratic government following existing frameworks and policies. The African Union's framework for Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) and its subsequent execution have faced significant problems in response to the recent revival. The African Union has garnered commendation for its stance in opposition to military coups. Nevertheless, it has been noted that the organization has exhibited inadequate engagement and delayed responsiveness in addressing instances of the unconstitutional exercise of power. Numerous historical figures have exhibited a proclivity for disregarding established institutions that have played a pivotal role in facilitating their ascent to positions of authority.

Frequently, this phenomenon has led to a subsequent decline in public backing, serving as either a direct catalyst or a cosmetic rationale for the overthrow of increasingly authoritarian incumbents. Another pertinent issue concerns the African Union's demonstration of a similar attitudinal inclination as its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), regarding coups and attempted coups. As a result, the governmental measures implemented in response to a coup are insufficient in addressing the fundamental causes of the coup, thereby potentially setting a precedent for future coup attempts (Krausa 2020). Furthermore, a noteworthy issue pertains to the insufficient determination demonstrated by the international community in proficiently tackling those individuals who partake in coups and the countries that are vulnerable to such occurrences, to deter analogous conduct from transpiring in subsequent times.

Conceptualizing and Contextualizing Democracy, Regime Change, and Military Coups

Democracy

The popularity of democracy as a system of government in the contemporary world is subject to argumentation. Over the past three decades, there has been a notable rise in the global demand for this particular political system. While it is widely acknowledged that democracy does not possess the capability to address all of humanity's challenges, it is equally important to recognize that numerous predicaments cannot be effectively resolved in the absence of democratic principles. The prevalence of this particular system of administration in contemporary society has led to its widespread acceptance and underscored the need for its implementation and long-term viability. Various scholars have formulated diverse conceptualizations of democracy (Bolarinwa and Adeleke 2020).

In his thought-provoking piece, Adelaja Odukoya posited that the concept of democracy may be interpreted diversely, including several notions such as a methodology, a procedural framework, a societal structure, an ideological construct, a platform for competing for power, and notably, a manifestation of class conflict. According to the author, democracy has undergone a significant transformation from its original classical concept, which was based on the principles of governance by the people, the pursuit of the common good, the rationality of individuals, and the simultaneous pursuit of liberty and equality. Classical democracy has faced criticism due to its philosophical inconsistency, abstract character, and lack of empirical evidence supporting its premise, particularly regarding the rationality of human nature. The aforementioned restrictions have had detrimental effects on democratic theory, as they embody distinct attitudes towards the democratic endeavor and present significant challenges for democratic practices (Odukoya 2007).

According to Michael Coppedge (2002), democracy is widely regarded as one of the most intricate concepts within the field of political science. This phenomenon's comprehensive and multifaceted nature has yet to be quantified and may remain unmeasurable. There exist numerous other systems of governance that encompass various patterns, subtypes, and variations of decision-making procedures that have also been categorized as democratic, hence posing challenges in maintaining clarity and understanding. The

diverse application of this principle results in a proliferation of distinctions and certifications. Traditionally, democracies can be categorized into many types, including liberal or republican, direct or representative, consensual or majoritarian, and market or socially orientated. In recent times, additional forms of democracy have gained importance, including participatory, deliberative, and grassroots democracies. Furthermore, alternative models such as demarchy, skewed democracy, and nonpartisan democracy have also emerged. Ultimately, when examining the global evolution of democracies, it is worth contemplating the potential for a distinct Islamic transformation of democracy or the emergence of socialist and anarchist approaches to democratization. These possibilities have the potential to broaden the conceptual boundaries of democracy in the future. In any given setting where democracy is present, two interrelated factors must precede the emergence and subsequent progress of the democratic concept. The first aspect pertains to the historical resolution of the conflict between democracy and representation. The second aspect involves the broadening of this term beyond its application solely to the categorization of state and government, to encompass the characterization of a specific societal structure as well.

While we have seen how democratic systems developed distinctively early in the nineteenth century, in each country, region, and continent, the Anglo-American brand stood out for its liberal aspects. France and other countries in Continental Europe remained more strongly connected to the republican tradition. Thus, if presidential democracy is dominant today in North and South America (and in Eastern Europe more recently), in Western Europe parliamentary governments have been prevalent (despite some ill-fated hesitations and interruptions in Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). There are still effective normative concepts of democracy, emphasizing, for example, justice or its bond to human rights. It seems inevitable today that the empirical reality and variety of democratic institutions and societies is accompanied by renewed critical normative reflections on the concept given that not only the best form of democracy is an object of dispute but also its chances and risks in the context of globalization (Coppedge 2002).

Regime Change

The study of regime change, particularly the process of “democratization,” is often regarded as a highly significant and intellectually stimulating area of investigation within the realm of current comparative politics (Kern 2023). Over the last five decades, particularly during the 1980s, several

authoritarian governments throughout the globe have seen a decline in their power and influence, but not always to the point of complete collapse (Wiebrecht 2023). The region that has seen the most significant transformations is Eastern Europe. In regions such as southern Europe and some parts of Latin America, the process of democratization has seen significant advancements. Similarly, in Asia, countries like the Philippines and South Korea have undergone comparable democratic transitions.

Authoritarian regimes in Africa persist as the prevailing form of governance and are expected to maintain their dominance for the foreseeable future. However, increasing discontent with the dominance of a single political party has given rise to a surge in calls for the establishment of more diverse and inclusive political structures (Fishman 1993). According to Fishman, a regime is defined as a more enduring structure of the political organization in contrast to a particular administration. To enhance precision, it is important to note that a regime may persist, akin to the state, while the dynamic process of political power inside the state fluctuates between governing and opposition parties.

To provide further clarification, it is worth noting that while there may be a series of diverse governing bodies, the state and regime typically remain unchanged since these different governments wield authority within the confines of the established regime, without disrupting the fundamental structure of the state (Fishman 1993). This phenomenon is evidently relevant to political regimes that possess a strong historical background of adhering to constitutional principles and have established mechanisms for the peaceful transfer of power, often via popular elections conducted in accordance with the regulations and protocols of the governing regime.

In these instances, a transition of political power does not always imply a change in the fundamental structure of the constitution. The concept of regime is intricately connected to the principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law (Grant 2017). In contrast, a regime is primarily concerned with how power is used, rather than the mere possession of power itself. A regime may be defined as the component of the political system that establishes the manner, circumstances, and constraints under which state authority is exerted. To clarify, the notion of regime pertains to the specific manner in which governance is exercised by Chazan *et al.*, in “Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa” (Chazan 1992).

As a consequence, the regime further establishes the procedures by which governments are established and fulfill their duties, while also defining the grounds for their legitimacy and the degree to which they are authorized

to wield power. In essence, regimes serve as the embodiment of the norms and principles that regulate the political structure of a state, delineated by the established rules and procedures that guide governmental operations.

Military Coups

The occurrence of military coups has been a persistent phenomenon in both contemporary global politics and historical events. The scholarly investigation of the involvement of military forces in politics has been a topic of interest for numerous decades. There are various concepts about the integration of military forces in the governance of a nation in different capacities. Morris Janowitz has identified four distinct models of political-military elites in his work. These models include the aristocratic, democratic, totalitarian, and garrison state models. The establishment of an effective democratic system that observes, controls, and manages the armed forces can be a viable means of preventing military dictatorship, in addition to accounting for variations in models (Janowitz 1957). Achieving the necessary conditions is the ultimate and optimal goal that a democratic government can strive for to fully exercise authority over military forces and prevent their seizure of power or interference in state affairs. In reality, several states face difficulties in attaining the aforementioned optimal level, particularly during times of crisis or prolonged state issues. The topic of military coups or attempted military coups continues to be relevant within the field of political and security studies (Chazan et al. 1992).

As per Josef Krausa's analysis, military coups have played a crucial role in initiating political regime alterations throughout history. During the 20th century, a multitude of military coups and attempted coups occurred, not solely in developing countries, but also in Europe. Scholars and experts have extensively analyzed military coups, exploring their objectives, classifications, contextual factors, procedural aspects, and probability of success. There are various theoretical frameworks available that examine the involvement of military forces in political matters, to classify and evaluate these efforts based on their goals and fundamental factors. The aforementioned variables increase the probability of a military coup and establish the basis for developing an early warning system (EWS). The author has elaborated on the notion of *coup d'état* as an unconventional approach to the transfer of state leadership, which involves the use of illegal means by the military or other privileged factions, drawing inspiration from the works of Powel and Thyne. This procedure may entail the utilization of coercion or the mere

intimidation of it; however, it does not inevitably culminate in any mortality. In the context of a discourse on a military coup, one could posit that the involvement of armed forces constitutes an indispensable element. A *coup d'état* may entail the involvement of a heterogeneous range of military units, rather than a singular armed force (Krausa 2020).

Singh's definition of a coup attempt, as referenced by Josef Krausa (2020), characterizes it as a purposeful endeavor executed by a fraction of a state's military, police, or security forces to overthrow the current government. Coup attempts often entail the convergence of heterogeneous military factions. In contrast, the modification of a governing body takes place without significant participation, thus distinguishing coups from revolutions. As per Galula's seminal literature, the terminology "plot" is utilized interchangeably with "coup" in the milieu of political turmoil. A plot is a clandestine operation carried out by a group of insurgents to overthrow the top leadership of a particular country. This particular form of undertaking lacks inclusivity towards the wider population and is distinguished by meticulous and protracted strategizing and arrangement, culminating in an abrupt and concise implementation. The phenomenon of regime changes that involve military participation is commonly observed. The military possesses the necessary capabilities, hierarchical organization, and obedience to authority that typically facilitate the successful execution of a *coup d'état*. In numerous instances, they might be the only entity with the capacity to execute said action.

Nonetheless, the mere capacity of a military to carry out a coup does not inevitably indicate its inclination to participate in such an endeavor. There must be valid rationales for the integration of military forces in political matters in such a manner. Many scholars are motivated by a militaristic drive to carry out a coup. The dominant viewpoint regarding this issue posits that military establishments tend to intrude into the realm of politics when their institutional concerns are not being satisfactorily catered to or are being jeopardized by the prevailing governing regime. The argument suggests the presence of a negative correlation between the budget allocated for defense and the incidence of coups. Specifically, a higher probability of coups is associated with lower defense budgets, whereas states that allocate a greater proportion of their budget towards military spending are less susceptible to coups. Putschist armies, which are military factions that aim to overthrow a government, often resort to violent confrontations and hold differing strategic and tactical perspectives from civilian leadership.

The aforementioned phenomenon may be associated with the military's self-perception as a unique social entity or its inclination towards social

differentiation. Taking a broader perspective, it is relevant to contemplate not only economic necessities but also wider values. In scenarios where the dominant political regime's principles do not align with those of the lower-ranking officials, the latter may feel compelled to champion the interests of their particular societal group.

Furthermore, the preconditions and rationales for coups d'état entail the confluence of various circumstances. Notwithstanding the military standpoint, there exist numerous issues involving economic, political regime, social, strategic, and military dimensions. The economic approach focuses on examining the likelihood of coups in nations facing poverty and the potential impact of trade openness on the chance of a coup attempt, intending to mitigate economic stagnation or decline. The regime perspective examines the potential decrease in the probability of a *coup d'état* occurrence in nations where the government enjoys significant public backing. Additionally, it explores the influence of the political system's characteristics (e.g., democracy, non-democracy, or military rule) and the timing of elections as crucial factors in this regard (Ndubuisi 2021).

Geopolitical Competition between USA & NATO versus Russia & China in Africa

During the 1990s, a notable surge in democratization occurred in several African states after the conclusion of the Cold War (Vanhanen 1997). During this historical era, several authoritarian governments saw a decline in power, while simultaneously seeing the emergence and growth of democratic movements. The transitions towards democracy were bolstered by the help of foreign players, with a particular focus on Western nations and international organizations. The help provided often manifested as diplomatic coercion, monetary aid, and the surveillance of electoral processes. Anticipation grew that Africa would undergo a "third wave of democracy" a phenomenon previously experienced in several other areas.

Nevertheless, the mechanisms of regime transition in Africa have undergone a significant transformation in the 21st century. The complicated geopolitical environment has emerged as a result of key global entities, such as the United States and its NATO allies, as well as China and Russia, actively pursuing their geopolitical objectives (Friedman 2012). The continent of Africa has become a contested arena for several nations because of its abundant natural resources, advantageous geographical position, and

promising economic prospects. Mkandawire wrote that: external actors have used many strategies to exert influence over political transitions and sustain their sway in African nations. These strategies include various methods such as conspiracies and overthrow attempts, whereby clandestine activities aim to establish administrations that are in line with foreign agendas, possibly leading to the destabilization of states and impeding the advancement of democratic processes (Mkandawire 2002).

The provision of assistance to or management of revolutionary movements has also resulted in changes of political regimes, motivated by alignment with geopolitical objectives (Thandika 2002). Moreover, the use of key resources, such as oil and minerals, has been employed as a means to exert pressure to smooth transitions in governance and sustain political power. Infrastructure investments, especially those made by China, are reciprocated with political allegiance, therefore guaranteeing the acquisition of valuable resources and market opportunities. These strategies give rise to apprehensions over their influence on democratic processes, possibly bolstering authoritarian regimes, weakening grassroots democratic movements, and prolonging political instability.

Thus, in reality, coups were frequent in Africa before the end of the Cold War due to rivalries and competition among the global powers, especially between the West and other powers like Russia and China. At the end of the Cold War, particularly, at the advent of unipolarity which led to the emergence of the USA as the sole power and the 'last man standing,' which made most African nations do its bidding and less resistance, there was relative stability in governance and less regime change in Africa.

In other words, unipolarity led to a reduction of coups in Africa as there was less or no major powers' rivalry on the continent. Unfortunately, however, the resurgence of coups in Africa in the 21st century has been attributed to many factors like poverty, bad governance, poor leadership, and corruption, but more importantly, a return to the period when coups, revolutions, and regime changes were used as instruments of geopolitical competition and rivalry between USA & NATO versus Russia & China on the African Continent.

Democratization and regime change in Nigeria

In the context of Nigeria, two main types of regime transition have occurred during its historical development, ultimately resulting in the esta-

blishment of a democratic system (Bratton 1998; Falola 2005). Nigeria has experienced numerous occurrences of political transition, marked by transitions from civilian rule to military authority. On January 15, 1966, a notable occurrence unfolded, characterized by the orchestration of a *coup d'état* by a faction of military personnel. This incident led to the removal of the First Republic, which was under the leadership of Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and ceremonial president Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. The inception of the administration transpired after a forceful *coup d'état* masterminded by Major Chukuma Kaduna Nzeogwu on January 15th, 1966.

The coup led to the downfall of prominent political personalities inside the country, namely those hailing from the Northern region. This included Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa, who held the position of Prime Minister, and Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Governor of the Northern Region. It is crucial to recognize that the military's participation in Nigerian politics was not without underlying motivations. Following the aforementioned events, the military regime led by General Yakubu Gowon (15th July 1966 – 29th July 1975) came into being. The appointment of General Gowon as the Head of State was a consequence of a nonviolent coup, which diverged from the customary military tradition of selecting the highest-ranking officer for the position. Brigadier General Ogundipe had the most superior military rank inside the armed services, surpassing all other military officers.

From July 29th onwards, and leading up to the announcement of the assassination of the Head of State, he undertook the role of governing the nation. On August 1, 1966, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon was designated as the Head of State and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, after thorough discussions inside the Supreme Military Council. The successive military administrations in Nigeria encompassed the tenure of Generals Murtala Ramat Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo, spanning from July 29, 1975, to October 1, 1979. During this period, General Olusegun Obasanjo relinquished power to Shehu Shagari, who became the first democratically elected president.

Regrettably, the aforementioned period was curtailed due to the military intervention led by Major General Muhammadu Buhari, occurring between December 31, 1983, and August 27, 1985. The subsequent military administration was headed by General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida, commencing on August 27, 1985, and concluding on August 27, 1993, at which point he relinquished power to an Interim Transitional Government under the leadership of Chief Earnest Shonekan until November 17, 1993. Following the aforementioned events, the military administration led by General Sani

Abacha assumed power from November 17, 1993, to June 8, 1998. Finally, the military administration led by General Abdulsalami Abubakar ensued, spanning from June 8, 1998, to May 29, 1999. The successful execution of General Abdulsalami Abubakar's transition plan resulted in the restoration of democratic governance in the nation on 29 May, 1999, marking the beginning of the existing Fourth Republic. This achievement was accomplished within a timeframe of eleven months. This event signified the conclusion of a sixteen-year era distinguished by successive military administrations. The military coups frequently employed corruption, ethnic strife, and political instability as rationales for their operations.

Nigeria has witnessed numerous examples of shifting from a military dictatorship to a civilian democracy. In 1979, a significant event took place when General Olusegun Obasanjo transferred power to the inaugural Executive President. A significant and recent transition took place in 1999, when the military regime, led by General Abdulsalami Abubakar, transferred authority to a civilian administration. This occurrence marked the commencement of the Fourth Republic, characterized by the implementation of periodic electoral procedures and the establishment of democratic institutions. Nigeria has had numerous democratic transitions facilitated through electoral mechanisms, symbolizing the shift from military rule to civilian governance.

It is imperative to recognize that Nigeria's political history has been marked by a series of shifts in government and periods of transition, frequently prompted by many factors including political instability, ethnic tensions, and demands for democratic rule. The fluctuation between civilian and military forms of rule has exerted a substantial impact on the political and socio-economic trajectory of the nation.

AU Frameworks and the challenge of unconstitutional changes of government

The African Union (AU) was established in 2001 as a successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Since its inception, the AU has adopted a proactive approach to tackling governance and human security concerns among its member states. The establishment of the Organisation of African Unity, a former pan-African agency, occurred in the year 1963. Nevertheless, it was found to be insufficient in its endeavors to effectively suppress the spread of military dictatorships that arose following the process of decolonization. Over more than thirty years, the OAU demonstrated

a notable disregard for the domestic affairs of its member states. The OAU demonstrated unwavering commitment to the core principles that were first formed throughout the 1960s.

The fundamental focus of the organization's policy was to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the newly formed African nations. Moreover, an additional objective was to eradicate all instances of colonialism in Africa, as delineated in Article II of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963. The Organisation undertook the duty of protecting sovereign states, even if it meant neglecting the well-being of common citizens. This specific position led to the unfavorable portrayal of the OAU as the "Heads of State Club."

The process of transitioning from the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union was marked by the recognition that member states must no longer maintain a stance of indifference towards the numerous breaches of human rights and inadequate governance observed in adjacent regions. The aforementioned trend can be ascribed to the shared developmental goals and the transboundary character of disputes. The African Union has implemented various legal frameworks in order to facilitate and protect democratic transitions, while also promoting their long-term viability and stability. The attribution of the establishment of legislation for the methodical transfer of authority can be ascribed to the Decision on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, which was promulgated by the OAU in July 1999. The decision was formulated in preparation for the organization's forthcoming transition to the African Union (AU). The resolution urges governments that have acquired power through illegitimate means to restore constitutional legitimacy. The Declaration about the Framework for an Organisation of African Unity Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government was officially ratified at the 36th OAU Assembly, which took place in Lomé, Togo in July 2000. The aforementioned Declaration serves to reinforce the prohibition on unconstitutional modifications of government, which includes military coups, armed rebellions, and the failure of the incumbent government to transfer power to a successful political faction following impartial, fair, and regular elections. This is consistent with the implementation of the Continental Early Warning Systems across the African continent (ACDEG 2007).

The aforementioned claims were additionally supported by the Constitutive Act of 2001 of the African Union. According to Article 3(g) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, member states are obligated to advance democratic principles and institutions, encourage citizen participation, and uphold efficient governance. The assertions outlined before were further

supported by the Constitutive Act of 2001 of the African Union. As per the provisions outlined in Article 3(g) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, member states are under a binding obligation to promote democratic ideals and institutions, foster citizen engagement, and uphold effective governance.

Article 4(p) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union explicitly prohibits any illicit modifications in governance, thereby emphasizing the firm stance of the continent against military coups that jeopardize democratic governance. According to the provisions outlined in Article 7(h) of the PSC convention, countries that acquire power through unconstitutional methods may be liable to face potential sanctions. The AU launched the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2003 to promote democratic practices and improve governance in its member countries through a voluntary self-assessment methodology. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (ACDEG) was officially instituted in January 2007 during the 8th African Union Summit. It was designed as a follow-up initiative to the previous declarations and commitments articulated in the AU Constitutive Act. The Comprehensive and Actionable Assistance on Political Transition of the African Union was developed to deliver comprehensive and pragmatic support concerning issues of political transition. However, the current body of knowledge is deficient in providing a complete analysis of the phenomenon of mass uprisings. As per the provisions outlined in Article 23 of the ACDEG, any attempt to overthrow a democratically elected government through:

1. Any attempt to overthrow a democratically elected government through a putsch or *coup d'état*.
2. The potential occurrence of an intervention by mercenaries to replace a government that has been democratically elected.
3. The overthrow of a democratically elected government by armed dissidents or rebels.
4. Criterion number four pertains to the incumbent government's refusal to cede power to the victorious party or candidate following a free, fair, and routine election.
5. Criterion number five concerns any alteration or modification made to the constitution or legal instruments that violates the principles of democratic transfer of power (ACDEG 2007).

The African Commission on Democracy and Governance (ACDEG) has identified a governance concern over the modification or adjustment of constitutional or legal frameworks in specific nations, specifically Rwanda under the leadership of Paul Kagame and Cote d'Ivoire under Alassane Ouattara. The aforementioned action is commonly seen as a transgression

against the fundamental tenets of democratic government concerning the transfer of political power. The development highlighted above serves as a clear demonstration of the African Union's steadfast dedication to facilitating seamless and reliable transitions of political authority. As per the provisions delineated in Article 28 of the ACDEG, the AU is vested with the power to enforce sanctions and institute legal proceedings against individuals found to have perpetrated unconstitutional alterations to governmental frameworks (ACDEG 2007). Moreover, the AU can effectively execute suitable measures aimed at expediting the process of extraditing individuals (Ndubuisi 2021).

African leaders approved the African Governance Architecture (AGA) in January 2011. Its main goal is to make it easier for member states, regional economic communities (RECs), and the African Union to coordinate initiatives related to democracy and good governance on a continental level. The aforementioned claim relates to the African Union's AGA framework, which seeks to advance democracy and good governance across the continent. The AGA is an add-on project for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The latter was established at the July 2000 AU Assembly in Lomé, Togo. This initiative's main goal is to strengthen and promote cooperation between African countries in the fields of security and peace. The aforementioned Declaration aims to fortify the ban on unconstitutional changes to the government, including military takeovers, armed uprisings, and the inability of the ruling party to hand over power to an elected political party after elections that are considered free, fair, and regular. Coordinated interdependent initiatives are implemented at the national, regional, and continental levels to attain the aforementioned goal.

At the national level, African institutions' democratic procedures and governance frameworks are observed through the AGA. The AU houses the Secretariat of the African Governance Architecture (AGA), which is responsible for creating annual evaluations on the state of democracy and governance across the continent. The principal aim of this endeavor is to augment the process of identifying and propagating the best practices among the African Union member states, while simultaneously cultivating adherence to democratic values. The AGA founded the African Governance Platform (AGP) to provide a forum for important African players to engage in dialogue on issues pertaining to democracy and governance.

The founding declarations of the AU, the ACDEG, and the AGA have encouraged a greater regional commitment to addressing overt violations of democratic ideals by armed and military groups (Ndubuisi 2021). Following its founding in 2001, the African Union has continuously voiced

its opposition to military takeovers in several African countries, including the Central African Republic (2003), Guinea-Bissau (2003), São Tomé and Príncipe (2003), Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005), (2008), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), Niger (2010), Ivory Coast (2010), Mali (2012), Egypt (2013), Burkina Faso (2014), (2015), Zimbabwe (2017), Sudan (2019). And, since 2020, a series of coups have also occurred. On August 18, 2020, the military orchestrated the ouster of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in Mali, subsequently leading to the establishment of a transitional government in October. In April 2021, the military of Chad assumed control of the government after the demise of President Idriss Deby during his visit to troops engaged in combat against rebel forces in the northern region. On May 24, 2021, a military intervention took place in Mali, resulting in the arrest of the president and the Prime Minister. Subsequently, Colonel Assimi Goïta assumed the role of transitional president and was installed in June. The military regime has pledged to restore civilian governance subsequent to the elections slated for February 2024.

On September 5, 2021, a military coup resulted in the removal of President Alpha Condé in Guinea. Colonel Mamady Doumbouya assumed the presidency on October 1st. The military has committed to restoring governance to democratically elected civilians by the conclusion of 2024. On October 25, 2021, a military intervention occurred in Sudan, as General Abdel Fattah al-Burhane and his forces displaced the transitional civilian leaders. These leaders were entrusted with the responsibility of guiding the nation towards democratic governance following a prolonged 30-year dictatorship under Omar al-Bashir, who was himself removed from power in 2019. Since April 15, 2023, a conflict arising from a power struggle between General Burhane and his former subordinate Mohamed Hamdane Daglo has resulted in a casualty count of no less than 5,000 individuals throughout the nation.

On the 24th of January, 2022, the military of Burkina Faso removed President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré from office. Subsequently, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba assumed the presidency in February. In Burkina Faso, a subsequent event occurred eight months later on September 30, 2022, when Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba was relieved of his duties by the military under the leadership of Captain Ibrahim Traoré. Captain Traoré assumed the role of transitional president until a presidential election, slated for July 2024.

On July 26, 2023, the Nigerien military issued a statement declaring the successful ousting of President Mohamed Bazoum. General Abdourahmane Tiani assumed leadership as the new authoritative figure in the nation.

Concurrently, amidst global deliberations, particularly within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), regarding strategies to address and resolve the *coup d'état* in Niger, another coup transpired in Gabon on August 30, 2023. In this instance, a faction of Gabonese military officers proclaims a seizure of power and invalidates the recently declared election results, citing concerns over their perceived lack of credibility. The aforementioned declaration was made close to the pronouncement by the state electoral authority affirming President Ali Bongo Ondimba's re-election for a third term in office amidst the contentious nature of the elections.

In addition, the previously stated organization (AU) has openly denounced the efforts in 2014 and 2015 to topple the governments of Lesotho and Burundi, respectively. The interesting finding is the correlation between the frequency of successful and failed efforts to change government in a way that is not permitted by the constitution and the normative stance on political transitions that the African Union has taken.

The African Union's condemnation of illegitimate administrations, although seemingly routine, reveals the organization's reluctance to embrace situations that compromise democratic values and imperil the stability of the continent. When a coup occurs, the African Union has generally adhered to its policy of excluding the affected countries from its activities until a legitimate government has been reinstated. The statement above is consistent with the guidelines found in Article 30 of the Constitutive Act, which states unequivocally that governments that have come to power via unlawful methods are not permitted to participate in the Union's initiatives (Constitutive Act 2000). If the restoration of a constitutional framework is not followed, certain punishments might be applied to the ruling body. According to Article 23 of the African Union's Constitutive Act, these penalties may include denying visas, limiting commerce, prohibiting intergovernmental contacts, and taking other steps.

The African Union's Constitutive Act has provisions that provide the organization the right to step in and defend democratic values should unlawful developments occur. The African Union's Constitutive Act, Article 4(h), describes the organization's power to interfere in a Member State under certain circumstances. Serious situations like war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity are among these circumstances, along with a serious danger to lawful government. Nonetheless, the African Union Assembly must pass a resolution authorizing such involvement. Article 4(h) of the African Union permits the organization to engage in proactive and interventionist actions in political circumstances, including where there are unlawful chan-

ges in government. It is believed that these actions pose a serious danger to the current judicial system. The African Union Assembly has the authority to approve an intervention into a member state of the organization, provided that a two-thirds majority is achieved.

In compliance with the provisions delineated in Articles 4(h) and 4(j) of its charter, the African Union has undertaken peacekeeping operations within its member nations, having obtained appropriate authorization from the relevant stakeholders. The aforementioned regulations provide member nations the right to look for outside help to bring about peace and stability. As part of its initiatives to support democratic processes, sub-regional organizations working within the framework of the APSA have taken action to resolve situations of unlawful government transitions. With the backing of the AU, the ECOWAS firmly condemned the violation of democratic principles by former Gambian President Yahya Jammeh, who led the country for twenty-three years. After a seemingly consistent commitment to the values of freedom, justice, and regularity throughout the 2016 elections, Yahya Jammeh had shown a reluctance to relinquish his position of power to the duly elected President Baro (Constitutive Act 2000).

Despite the need for protection against unauthorized changes to the government, some leaders continue to use constitutional instruments to obstruct legitimate transitional processes. Analyzing African countries where there have been large-scale revolutions reveals that the governments in these countries were able to hold onto power for longer than ten years. This was accomplished by the use of coercive measures, changes to constitutional limitations, and the adoption of rigged election processes. If it weren't for the public's unwavering involvement, the aforementioned deposed presidents could have been able to hold onto their posts forever due to their tenacity in the face of several flawed election processes. Many African leaders claim to support democracy, yet they often use authoritarian forms of government. The continent's overall democratic ratings have declined as a result of a sizable portion of the African people continuing to live under authoritarian governments, according to the 2019 Democracy Index. Many African governments show clear patterns of changing their constitutions and tampering with election processes. Many African nations have had success with their constitutional amendments, including Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Chad, Djibouti, and Equatorial Guinea. It has been shown that the previously described amendments are associated with the retention of the existing leadership, a phenomenon that has been related to insurgent activities, the inciting of civil disturbance, and other changes that violate constitutional norms.

President Denis Sassou Nguesso has ruled the Republic of Congo for thirty-three years. That being said, the constitution was changed for him to remain president beyond March of 2016. With the electoral triumph, the incumbent president of Chad, Idriss Déby Itno, was elected to a fifth term in office. The result indicated above is a direct result of a 2005 constitutional change that essentially did away with term restrictions. In the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, where he has held office since 1979, President Teodoro Obiang Nguema was re-elected in April 2016 with 99.2% of the votes cast, and again in 2022, with 97% of the votes. The current 81-year-old president is in office as a result of the term constraints being lifted in 2011 and the opening up of the prospect of reelection. It is anticipated that the current tenure will last for seven years. In African nations, the main problem is not whether governing regimes can last. This investigation's main concern is the inability of illegal governments to maintain public order and provide basic services, which leaves room for political unrest and power conflicts that might potentially result in instability.

Several factors, such as the lingering effects of colonialism and imperialism, poor administration, and developmental shortcomings, limit the state's ability to provide public goods. The legacy of colonialism has had significant effects, chief among them the erection of colonial borders and the ensuing lack of a unified national identity. It is also crucial to emphasize that post-colonial African governments still depend on market systems that are mostly dominated by Western powers and that foreign aid is their main source of income rather than resources developed domestically. Many factors, including the propensity of many African leaders to exhibit ineptitude and emphasize self-promotion, may be ascribed to the political instability that has been experienced on the continent. The leaders of many African countries have acted in their self-interest, which has prevented them from developing economies that can support themselves. To further their own goals and preserve their networks of patronage, the persons in question have mostly relied on foreign aid and easily accessible money sources, such as oil (Constitutive Act 2000). Through the technique of abusing national resources, some have produced false declarations and grandiose initiatives to gain international recognition and obtain funding from outside sources.

Several factors combined to drive the uprising in Sudan, including a failing economy, despotic rule, and long-standing structural injustice. Maintaining citizens' democratic rights is a significant undertaking given the many challenges to democratic administration. When there aren't enough channels for people to air their complaints and governments don't deliver on their promises, people in Africa are more and more resorting to collective

action as a last resort. However, there are several difficulties with this method. Authoritarian African governments that oppress opposition organizations may unintentionally fuel the growth and spread of insurgency movements that are prepared to use all means necessary to topple these regimes. There is an ongoing discussion on how people might break social contracts and topple a government that oppresses its people and doesn't protect their property. Unfortunately, the ACDEG of the African Union does not specifically mention the process of transitioning via peaceful public uprisings to overthrow existing regimes.

Niger Coup

The military coup, which occurred on 26 July 2023 in Niger, resulted in the removal of President Mohamed Bazoum and the subsequent installation of General Abdourahmane Tchiani as the new leader. This event is part of a series of military takeovers that have taken place across the African continent since 2020. Regarding the recent coup in Niger, it is noteworthy that President Mohamed Bazoum was apprehended by Niger's presidential guard. The leader of a new military junta and transitional administration was declared by General Abdourahmane Tchiani, the commander of the Presidential Guard. The closure of the country's borders, suspension of the constitution and governmental institutions, and declaration of a curfew were implemented by the presidential guard troops. The ex-president, Bazoum, who has declined to step down, remains under detention. The military personnel asserted that they assumed control "in response to the ongoing decline in the security landscape, inadequate economic and social governance" within Niger (ECOWAS 2023). The former president, who was removed from power, faced allegations of aligning with Western interests, which occasionally resulted in a decline in domestic support.

Some Nigeriens had the belief that the coup plotters may have been driven by ulterior reasons. This speculation stemmed from additional claims that the previous president was gradually altering his security appointments and allegedly intended to replace the leader of his presidential guard. Niamey has seen considerable social and political turmoil after the coup. The military dictatorship has received support from Niger's armed forces, as confirmed by the country's army. In 2021, Mohamed Bazoum had been victorious in Niger's inaugural peaceful and democratic transition of power after its independence from France in 1960.

The coup has been criticized by various international organizations such as the ECOWAS, the AU, the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN), as well as by influential countries such as the United States, France, Russia, and China. The concerns of Nigeria extend beyond regionalism and are closely tied to its national security. Nigeria possesses an extensive border that it shares with the neighboring country of Niger. Significantly, on either side of the divide, the influential ethnic groups of Hausa and Fulani are present. The groups originate from southern Niger and northern Nigeria. The presence of cultural homogeneity on both sides of the boundaries has significant security implications for the states involved.

Moreover, it is imperative to note that violent extremists and rebel groups have been active in the vicinity of the shared border between the two states. The eastern section of the border has witnessed significant activity from the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram. Bandits are also observed inside the vicinity. For an extended period, Nigeria has engaged in collaboration with Niger under the framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission to combat terrorism through civilian oversight. The present analysis posits that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, in his capacity as the incumbent chairman of the ECOWAS, is taking appropriate actions. However, it is imperative to acknowledge that the organization has effectively acknowledged the occurrence of coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and notably, Chad. This implies that established legal decisions have been made. The primary factor contributing to ECOWAS' hesitance in employing military intervention within the Niger Republic is as follows.

The Economic Community of West African States, a regional institution, has officially proclaimed a policy of “zero tolerance” against *coup d'états*. The regional bloc issued a statement asserting its intention to employ all necessary actions to reinstate constitutional order if its stipulations were not fulfilled within a week. These conditions encompassed, among other things, the unconditional liberation of the previous head of state, the reinstatement of the former president, and the provision of sufficient security for the deposed president and his family. The organization issued a cautionary statement to the military junta in Niger, indicating that in the event of non-compliance with their requests, a series of significant actions would be implemented. Potential actions could involve the implementation of coercive tactics, and high-ranking military officials promptly convened to strategize for an intervention. However, the utilization of force was temporarily suspended in favor of engaging in extensive dialogue and ongoing negotiations between representatives from ECOWAS, experts such as former Head of State General Abdusalami Abubakar, and the government officials of Niger

(ECOWAS 2023). The bloc has declared the prompt implementation of an aerial exclusion zone above Niger, prohibiting all commercial aircraft. Furthermore, the closing of all land crossings with the country and the introduction of financial sanctions against the junta were announced.

The African Union (AU) promptly responded to the coup by suspending Niger from its various activities. This decision was made in light of the military coup that occurred in the country. Additionally, the AU advised its members to refrain from engaging in any actions that could potentially legitimize the ruling junta. As previously stated, the Economic Community of West African States has been engaged in negotiations with the junta. However, ECOWAS has expressed its preparedness to deploy military forces to Niger to reinstate constitutional governance should diplomatic endeavors prove unsuccessful. This stance is further reinforced by the AU, which, within its framework, explicitly opposes any unconstitutional alteration of governance in African nations.

The *communiqué* issued by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union acknowledged the decision made by the Economic Community of West African States to activate a standby force. Furthermore, the AU Council requested the AU Commission to evaluate the potential economic, social, and security consequences associated with the deployment of this force. Additionally, the organization stated that it had formally requested the African Union Commission to assemble a comprehensive roster containing the names of individuals affiliated with the junta and those who endorse their actions. This compilation would serve as a basis for implementing focused sanctions and the enforcement of particular punitive measures (AU 2023).

The Economic Community of West African States has already implemented comprehensive sanctions against Niger, a measure that has received the endorsement of the African Union. The organization has restated its demands for the prompt release of President Mohamed Bazoum, who was democratically elected and has been held in custody since the occurrence of the coup. Additionally, the AU urges the coup leaders to retreat to their military bases. The military regime has exhibited resilience in the face of demands to relinquish power and has put up a proposal outlining a three-year timeframe for the organization of elections. However, this plan has been met with disapproval by the ECOWAS.

Niger holds strategic importance due to its role as a military base for both U.S. and French forces engaged in counterterrorism operations against Islamist extremist organizations in the surrounding area. Additionally, Niger's status as a major global uranium supplier further enhances

its relevance. White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan restated the imperative of releasing Bazoum and expressed the United States' commitment to further consultations with ECOWAS. "We are actively engaged in collaborative efforts with all of our allies, including France, to diligently pursue the preservation of democratic principles in Niger" (The White House 2023)².

The AU has expressed its firm opposition to any form of external intervention in the region, whether it be from non-African actors or countries. This includes the involvement of private military groups, such as the Russian mercenary outfit Wagner, which is known to operate in the nearby country of Mali. It is noteworthy to acknowledge that France sources almost one-third of its uranium from Niger, a country that contributes 5% to the global aggregate of uranium production. Niger accommodates military forces from France and the United States, along with two United States drone bases, with a primary objective of addressing Islamist insurgencies within the area. The demonstrators in favour of the revolution were observed displaying Russian flags, while the Wagner Group of Russia asserts that the coup "demonstrates Wagner's efficacy in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region" (The Nation 2023).

Russia's foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, characterised the coup as "unconstitutional". According to official statements from the White House, there is a lack of convincing proof supporting Russian involvement. Additionally, it is worth noting that one of the key individuals involved in the coup attempt, specifically the leader of Niger's Special Forces, has significant connections to the United States. However, it is widely argued by numerous experts that there is a resurgence reminiscent of the Cold War period, characterised by geopolitical struggle and rivalry involving the United States, NATO, Russia, and China in Africa, which has resulted in instances of regime transitions and coups. One intriguing observation is the American training received by Goita in Mali, Traore in Burkina Faso, Doumbuya in Guinea, and presently Tchiani in Niger (The Guardian 2023).

The ongoing political ramifications of the coup in Niger are yet to completely manifest, however, several potential repercussions are anticipated, encompassing both domestic and foreign spheres. These consequences necessitate cautious and deliberate handling. The coup has resulted in

2 Jake Sullivan. September 2023. Remarks and Q&A by US National Security Advisor on the Coup in Niger, release of the former president Bazoum and the United States' commitment to further consultations with ECOWAS and Its engagement in collaborative efforts with all US allies, including France; in order to ensure stability in Niger.

heightened levels of instability and uncertainty within the domestic sphere. The nation is currently confronted with a multitude of issues, encompassing rebel groups and organizations, persistent and widespread poverty, as well as limited economic opportunities and wealth. The occurrence of a coup has the potential to exacerbate the country's instability and pose additional obstacles in effectively addressing the numerous concerns at hand.

The coup has had a detrimental impact on Niger's diplomatic connections with neighboring countries and international partners, notably Nigeria and the European Union. Consequently, these nations and the EU have promptly terminated diplomatic relations and suspended the provision of aid to Niger. Niger is an active participant in the G5 in the Sahel, a regional security coalition dedicated to addressing the issue of terrorism within the area. The occurrence of the coup has resulted in a significant deterioration of the diplomatic ties between Niger and the remaining constituents of the G5 Sahel, impeding the effective coordination of counterterrorism endeavors. The World Bank, the ECOWAS, the African Union, and the United Nations have terminated their relationships with Niger. In response, the junta of Niger Republic has severed its connections with Nigeria, as well as its former colonial power France, Togo, and the United States.

The coup has had a comparable impact on Niger's diplomatic ties with the European Union. The EU plays a significant role as a contributor to Niger, and the occurrence of a coup has the potential to result in a reduction in financial assistance provided by the EU. The potential consequences of this situation on Niger's economy and its capacity to tackle existing difficulties may be adverse. According to data provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Niger, the second largest beneficiary of foreign aid in West Africa following Nigeria, got a total of \$1.8 billion in aid just in the year 2021 (OECD 2021).

The coup has precipitated alterations in governmental policy. The potential divergence in priorities between the incumbent government and its predecessor may exert an influence on the governance of Niger. The occurrence of the coup has resulted in a decline in foreign investment. The potential apprehension regarding the stability of Niger may lead to a decreased inclination among foreign investors to engage in investment activities within the country. The occurrence of the coup has resulted in a notable escalation of societal unrest. The occurrence of a coup has the potential to incite demonstrations or alternative manifestations of social disorder, exacerbating the existing state of instability inside the nation. The occurrence of the coup has prompted inquiries over the durability of democratic governance

in Niger and its establishment within the broader regional context. Ensuring the sustenance of democratic institutions and procedures in Niger and the broader region is of paramount significance in mitigating the likelihood of future *coup d'états*.

Conclusion

The African Union is unique among continental organizations due to its possession of a framework that incorporates multiple measures aimed at addressing unconstitutional changes of government (UCG), setting it apart from other similar entities. The framework presented herein functions as a guiding tool for African nations in their endeavors to address coups and other illegitimate means of government alteration. The recurrence of coups in the year 2021 highlights inadequacies within the framework of the AU. The text highlights the African Union's inconsistent approach towards coups and other forms of illegitimate power transitions. Additionally, it sheds light on the AU's restricted ability to exert control over governments that arise from coups, thereby discouraging future attempts at seizing power through such means. It could be advantageous for the African Union to extend the implementation of its policy on Unconstitutional Change of Government beyond *coup d'état* scenarios, to strengthen its institutional framework. Had the African Union implemented its UCG policy in response to Ibrahim Boubacar Keita's bid to prolong his tenure in Mali, it is plausible that the 2020 coup could have been prevented, and a more impactful signal would have been sent to other heads of state who aspire to abolish constitutional term limits.

President George Weah of Liberia has provided his perspective on the recent decision made by ECOWAS to suspend Guinea following the coup against Alpha Conde. The speaker has underscored the importance of not solely denouncing military coups, but also delving into the root causes that precipitate these illicit seizures of power. Is it conceivable that we are neglecting our political responsibilities by not adhering to the stipulated term limits as specified in our respective constitutions? The adoption of a more vigilant approach and the implementation of pragmatic measures are crucial for the African Union to address the increasing threats to constitutional governance in Africa.

The efficacy of the punitive measures delineated in the African Union's Uniform Charter on Governance (AU UCG) in compelling coup plotters to relinquish authority may be constrained. The African Union

underscores the significance of coordination and collaboration with other relevant entities in tackling occurrences of coups. The extent to which such collaborative endeavors take place is uncertain. The act of being suspended from the academic institution commonly referred to as AU is regarded as a punitive measure. The impact of the punitive measure on the suspended state is unclear, especially if it continues to maintain its diplomatic relations with other countries.

The effectiveness of sanctions, visa bans, and asset freezes on individuals involved in a *coup d'état* is dependent on their degree of affiliation with other African countries. Enhancing collaboration, which includes both organized and unorganized forms, between the AU and organizations that have closer connections with the state impacted by a coup, could potentially serve as a more effective approach for applying pressure on governments that have arisen from coups to surrender their authority. What are the projected results of the Elders Forum/Panel of the wise, composed of former presidents who have previously served as military commanders or employed constitutional manipulation or amendment to retain power? The inclusion of non-state actors, civil society organizations, and non-governmental organizations in the electoral and democratic process is crucial for the preservation and enhancement of democracy in Africa.

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ABSTRACT

Since the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) transformed into the African Union (AU), the continental body has abandoned the non-interventionist tenet in favor of non-indifference. It also adopted the Unconstitutional Changes of Government

(UCG) framework as well as other measures to protect and strengthen democracy. The UCG and other current frameworks are challenged by the recent uptick in military coups and coup attempts, which also shows a democratic backsliding and poses a significant danger to the consolidation of democracy in Africa. Since achieving independence, the African continent has been consistently afflicted by instances of coups and attempted coups. Contrary to popular opinion, the return of coups over the last ten years suggests that enhanced democratic practices do not always result in fewer instances of coups or coup attempts. Even while the AU and other regional organizations in Africa are politically determined not to reward military governments or those that have emerged from extra-constitutional arrangements by allowing them to join the community of nations, the plague persists. This essay examines the application of the AU's methodology for using UCG together with other metrics. It also makes an effort to provide other hypotheses for the recurrence of this phenomenon. The study suggests that it is time for the AU to properly apply its UCG strategy outside of coup events to successfully preserve and consolidate democracy. The AU has to have the guts to investigate what leads to these illegitimate coups and pay more attention to the rising danger to democracy in Africa.

KEYWORDS

Military. Coups. Coup Attempts. African Union. Democracy. UCG.

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FRANÇA-FRIQUE: FRANCO-AFRICAN RELATIONS AND FRENCH MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA

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Introduction

France has had a long history of association and relationship with Africa, dating back to the 17th century. France's first permanent and occupied territory was the settlement of Saint-Louis, also known as "Ndar", in Wolof, the most prominent African language in Senegal. Following the Berlin agreement formalizing the partitioning of Africa, France consolidated its claims on territorial possessions at the coast of Senegal and other coastal areas and inland across West Africa and the Sahel. Much as France's colonial possessions in Africa might have expanded after the partition, the Four Communes (*Quatre Communes*) — comprising Dakar, Goree, Rufisque, and Saint-Louis —, all in present-day Senegal, were special among colonial territories in *Afrique Occidentale Française*, AOF (French West Africa) (Bawa 2013). Indeed, for years, Saint-Louis was the administrative headquarters of both colonial Senegal and the adjoining colonial territory of Mauritania.

Following the end of the Second World War and with the contributions of French African colonies to the war efforts, France further entrenched its policy of maximal economic exploitation of the colonies through political and military domination. However, given rising agitation in French Indochina and the Algerian War of Independence, along with the realization of the costs of these military engagements on the empire, it became increasingly clear that forceful domination of French colonies in Africa could not be peacefully achieved and weren't administratively sustainable in the long term (Yates 2012). Even with the strong French military conquest, the domination of

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the colonies, as well as the subjugation and cooptation of African traditional institutions through the policy of ‘association’ and emerging African elite through ‘assimilation’, French colonial officials were not oblivious to the growing wind of change and how it would affect French colonial interests in Africa.

In the quest to assure a degree of dominance while assuaging the feelings of those calling for complete political independence, President Charles de Gaulle proposed granting autonomy and self-rule to former colonies in the context of *Communauté française* (Franco-African Community) in 1958. The nationalist leaders in the colonies initially agreed to this arrangement, with the exception of Sekou Toure of Guinea, who opted for independence in 1958 (Yates 2018a). However, as the call for full independence became louder across colonies in Africa and some of the most loyal emergent African leaders turned their backs on the Franco-African community, de Gaulle and his advisers realized that full political independence could no longer be delayed. To this end, in 1960, France granted independence to all the colonial possessions in West Africa as separate sovereign nations. Nonetheless, each of the newly independent nations signed agreements that established new forms of political, economic, and military relations with France.

While independence meant that France lost control over its former colonies, it held tenuously to the privileges it had enjoyed in these colonies through the context of asymmetric political, cultural, economic, and military relations. Under President de Gaulle, a crafty system of bilateral agreements was struck between France and its former African colonies. These bilateral agreements covering trade, education, natural resources extraction, currency, financial system, defense, and security, amongst other areas of national life, were formalized in a series of cooperation accords granting France opportunities to exert effective control over the political and economic systems in the newly independent African States (Yates 2018a; 2018b). The asymmetric relationships that evolved out of these agreements were contextualized within the premise of the policy of *Françafrique*.

Through the instrumentalities of bilateral agreements and accords to drive the policy of *Françafrique*, French political leaders and the French State were able to evolve deep diplomatic and political relationships with the emergent political elites in Africa. These alliances were maintained through a series of bilateral and multilateral engagements between African States and France, in which the latter’s interests remained pre-eminent. In the economic sphere, French business and commercial interests were deepened with Africa, especially in the areas of natural resource extraction (crude oil, Ura-

nium, and other important natural resources) and the provision of services by French business entities (automobile, telecommunication). In military and security issues, French military leaders were able to entrench their military presence through the instituting of military agreements, defense pacts, and the securing of bases and airfields. These military agreements aided the entrenchment of French military assets, being maximally deployed to effect change of regimes that were deemed hostile to French interests and to defend regimes perceived as friendly and loyal in Africa. Of all instruments of foreign relations, the deployment of the French military in pursuit of French interests in Africa has been the most dominant in the discourse of France's engagement with, and presence in, Africa since the 1960s (Luckham 1982).

To this end, this article engages in the discussion of France's security policy, especially in the context of French foreign relations and military engagements in Africa. It discusses how France has maximally deployed its vast military assets in Africa to promote and project power, as well as advance and protect French national interests on the continent. The article argues that a cursory look at the military elements that underpin France's complex relationships with former colonies in Africa might appear to be resistant to change. However, the tactical continuities in France's Africa policy especially in the military realm have concealed ongoing strategic evolution and change. That said, and as earlier averred by Roddy, Roger, and Roy (1996), these changes neither redefine the roles played nor alter the power structure that serves as the foundation for pre-existing pacts, accords, and agreements between Paris and the various national capitals in Africa.

Consequently, the article is organized into six sections. Following this introductory section, the article engages in a re-assessment of French colonialism and France's imperial grandeur in Africa. Section three of the article is devoted to the discourse on the policy of *Françafrique* and French engagements in post-colonial Africa. The fourth section x-rays France's new pragmatic approach and policy of multilateral military engagements after the debacles in Rwanda, the Central African Republic, and the former Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). In the context of the discussion on France's attempts at multilateralism as a policy thrust to drive its current military cum security engagements in Africa, the fifth section discusses operations Serval and Barkhane. In particular, the discussion highlights how Operation Serval and its successor, Operation Barkhane, served as the new template of France's security framework in Africa, especially in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel. After this comes the conclusion.

In the shadow of the empire: French colonialism in Africa

Discourse on France's engagement with Africa would unarguably start with the French conquest and the colonial domination of territories on the continent. While France has had a long history of association and relationship with Africa dating as far back as the 17th century, French colonialism in this continent got into full swing during the late 19th century. Starting with the conquest of Algeria in 1830 and the conquest of other territories in Africa's Sahel, French imperial domination in Africa spanned more than a hundred years, lasting until 1960, when most of France's colonies in Africa attained independence (Yates 2018a). At the height of its colonial glory in Africa, France exerted direct political control over a swath of territories in West, Central, and North Africa. Their colonial possessions were classified into French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, French North Africa, and possession on the Indian Ocean. *Afrique-Occidentale Française*, AOF (French West Africa), was a collection of eight French colonial territories in West Africa that included Mauritania, Senegal, French Sudan (now Mali), French Guinea (now Guinea, Conakry), Ivory Coast, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Dahomey (now Benin Republic), and Niger. Togo was later added after World War I, when the territory was stripped from Germany and handed over to France to be administered as a League of Nations' mandate 'Trust Territory' (Zambakari 2021; Mann 2005, 411).

French Equatorial Africa (*Afrique-Equatoriale Française*, AEF in French) was the collection of French colonial possessions in Equatorial Africa. This territory extended from the Congo River and into the Sahel of Africa and comprised Chad, the Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, and Gabon. Like Togo, French Cameroon was added to France's possessions in the Equatorial as a League of Nations mandate 'Trust Territory'. In the North of the continent, French territories were headquartered in French Algeria (administered as part of Metropolitan France) and comprised most of Africa Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia, and the Kingdom of Morocco. In East Africa and the Indian Ocean, there was French Somalia (Now Djibouti), the Island of Malagasy (now Madagascar), and Reunion Island, administered since 1946 as France Overseas Department/Region.

As was often the case with all colonial powers, French colonial officials in Africa faced the dilemma of how to categorize the populations in their colonial possessions and what ought to be the administrative approach for administering the colonies and their population. One, should African territories be administered as part of France and their population accorded

citizen status? Or were the territories to be administered as colonies and their population treated as subjects? In the attempt to fulfill its civilizing mission (*La Mission Civilisatrice*), the colonial authority strove to create 'Black Frenchmen' out of the population of territories that were incorporated into the Republic and administered as France's overseas departments. It was in the context of *La Mission Civilisatrice* that the French policy of assimilation evolved (Zambakari 2021; Yates 2018a). This policy was applied to the administration of Dakar, Goree, Rufisque, and Saint-Louis (the *Quatre Communes*), all part of colonial Senegal (Idowu 1969; Labouret 1940).

The policy of assimilation was not limited to culture alone; it played out in multiple arenas, too. Politically, the population of the four Senegalese communes was granted representation in the *Chambers des Députés* in 1848. Residents of Saint-Louis and Goree were granted French citizenship, including voting rights in 1848 (Idowu 1969). These African elites became known as the *originaires* and/or *evolue* (Zambakari 2021). The *originaires*, if literate in French and familiar with French customs, could work in administrative institutions and participate in the political and social life of the colony. However, this policy was substituted in the early part of the 20th century with the policy of 'association', as 'assimilation' proved difficult to implement across all colonial possessions on the continent.

Accordingly, French colonial Governor-generals and administrators executed a policy summersault and began the practice of cooptation and cooperation with traditional authorities and religious institutions (Sufism and Sufi scholars) that they had shunned decades earlier. To this end, Zambakari (2021) noted that the shift in France's colonial administrative policy from assimilation to association also necessitated a reframing of the colonial ideology of conquest. By the reframing, Africans were conceived as subjects, not citizens, with duties and few or no legal and constitutional rights. In reaction to this, Conklin (1997) averred that colonial statecraft was, in large part, an act of state-sanctioned violence. Mamdani (1996) also captured this phenomenon as it relates to the British indirect rule system in its colonies in Africa.

As the decades rolled by and having firmly entrenched its authority all over the colonies at the coast, the hinterland, and the Sahel, French colonial authority started to cultivate a small crop of educated Africans, who were needed to fill administrative and other lesser positions in the administration of the colonies. These crops of early educated elites ended up becoming the inheritors of political power and privileges afforded the colonial officials under French colonial rule. By the end of the Second World War and given

the contributions of French-African soldiers in numerous conflict theaters, there emerged a growing political consciousness among the colonial subjects throughout French colonies in Africa. The most important political turning point in the decolonization processes, especially in French West Africa, was the passage of the *Loi-Cadre* (Reform Act) policy passed by the French National Assembly on June 23, 1956. The *Loi-Cadre* policy, as it was popularly referred to, was the first step in the series of actions directed at the establishment of the 'French community'. Through the policy, the French political authority in Paris granted more autonomy to the colonies and, thus, initiated the path towards political independence for the colonies (Overseas territories, *Territoires d'outre-mer*) and their people (Ginio 2016; Shipway 2015). Paris equally granted the right to establish territorial legislature, territorial executive, independent civil service, and universal adult suffrage for each of the colonies in West Africa (Cooper 2014).

While the autonomy granted under the policy was relatively extensive, the colonial authority in Paris still retained power over important areas of national life, such as foreign policy, defense and security, communication, and higher education across the territories. Effectively what *Loi-Cadre* did was to establish some sort of Franco-African Federation (Shipway 2015). By 1958, the French authority in Paris introduced the policy giving effect to the establishment of a *Communauté française* that would coordinate the relationship between France and the colonies (Overseas Territories), largely within the context of the *Loi-Cadre* framework. The idea was that this arrangement would prevent the African territories from seeking full independence. To effect the new political arrangement, referenda were conducted across the overseas territories where the 'yes' votes were secured except for Guinea under Ahmed Sekou Toure which returned a 'no' vote in the referendum of September 28, 1958, thus securing outright independence (MacDonald 2015; McNamara 1989; Hodgkin and Schacter 1960). However, by 1960, there emerged growing dissension, and thus, reluctantly, France, under President de Gaulle, granted independence to its colonial possessions in Africa.

***Françafrique* and French engagements in post-colonial Africa**

The conduct of international politics and diplomacy is highly dynamic and pragmatic, making international diplomacy ever-evolving. To this end, while much can be said to have changed in the arena of global politics and

diplomacy between the decade of Africa's independence and now, the vestige of the past still impacts France's relations with Africa and the conduct of its foreign policy and diplomacy on the continent. Starting with the promulgation of the *Loi-Cadre* in 1956, the attempt at instituting the *Communauté française* in 1958 and the eventual granting of independence to colonies in Africa in 1960, France and the French ruling elite had always exhibited paternalism in their relationship with Africa and Africa's ruling elite. From the Presidency of Charles de Gaulle through to Mitterrand, Sarkozy, Hollande, and Macron, elements of paternalism mixed with pragmatism have consistently defined France's relations with Africa (Barrios 2010).

To remain effectively in control as it relates to diplomacy, politics, economy, military, and other aspects of national life in its former colonies, France under President de Gaulle struck a series of bilateral agreements and accords with post-independence political leaders in Africa. These agreements were solidified within the framework of France's policy of engagement with post-independent Africa, known as '*Françafrique*' (France in Africa). General de Gaulle, the architect of French relations with post-independent Africa, and his advisor for African affairs, Jacques Foccart, initiated the policy sequel to General de Gaulle's return to power as President of France, in 1958. The term *Françafrique* was borrowed from the vocabulary of Felix Houphouët-Boigny, the first President of Ivory Coast, and by far, the most ardent pro-French post-independent leader in West Africa. President Boigny was of the view that the newly independent African States (former French colonies) needed to maintain closer ties with France (Yates 2018a). However, this did not mean a total and exclusive promotion of French interests in the former colonies to the detriment of the national interests of the newly independent States (Ginio 2016). Within the framework of *Françafrique*, President de Gaulle and Jacques Foccart cultivated and maintained dense networks of Franco-Africa political leaders, businessmen, and military elites/commanders that became instrumental to the evolution of political power and economic policies in France's former African colonies (Al-Jazeera 2014; Bovcon 2011; Chafer 2005; 2002).

Françafrique constitutes the core of France's policy engagement with its former colonies in West and Central Africa and, by extension, the rest of the continent in the post-colonial era. The policy was fashioned to be Paris's instrument of engagement with a continent seen by France as the main theater of its national influence. The centrality of the policy of *Françafrique* becomes significant given Africa's prominent role in France's attempt at projecting its national image as a major power in the context of global politics and diplomacy. *Françafrique* was thus significant as a policy instrument for France to continue its projection of power and continuation of the logic of

French domination and resource extraction in post-colonial Africa (Bovcon 2011; Chafer 2002).

The need to project the image of a major global power, remain a *primus inter-pares* among major powers as it relates to influence in Africa, and retain its position of importance are cardinal issues in the contextualization of *Françafrique*. However, the operationalization of the policy was anchored on the advancement of some key national objectives and interests in the context of France's relations with post-colonial Africa. Key among these was the need to advance the interests of longstanding French businesses and commercial entities in Africa. The advancement of French commercial interests would be better promoted in the context of regional political stability and economic development (Hansen 2008; Whiteman 1997). To this end, France committed resources to the maintenance of effective diplomatic engagements and a robust military presence in Africa. Indeed, it is through the instrumentality of its strong military presence and the willingness to deploy military resources that one strongly encounters France and its apparatus of the State in Africa.

Starting from the decade of independence (the 1960s), France has carried out numerous decisive military operations in Africa. While motivations for these military interventions were varied, most of the operations were deployed to support or advance core French economic, commercial, and political interests in Africa. Even for those operations couched in the robe of humanitarian interventions and peace missions, there was always France's economic, political, or other national interests serving as underlying motivations for intervention. For instance, on April 15, 1974, the French military stationed at a base in Niger Republic looked the other way as Lt. Colonel Seyni Kountche, an ex-sergeant in the French colonial army, staged a successful coup d'état against the civilian regime led by then-President Hamani Diori (Ginio 2016). The crime of President Diori, a staunch ally, was his call for a renegotiation of the commercial agreement underlying the French Uranium mining concession in the Niger Republic.

More than any other colonial power, France and its military establishment with support and funding from the business elite class have planned, underwritten, and funded the conduct of numerous military operations and interventions in Africa (Griffin 2007). Indeed, within the context of the *Françafrique* policy, France engaged with and supported authoritarian regimes, facilitated and aided corruption by friendly regimes, supported regimes implicated in human rights violations, gave assistance and support to dictators and dictatorial regimes, engaged in the elimination of progressive national leaders, tactically supported and facilitated weapons smuggling and conduc-

ted breath-taking secret intelligence missions and brazen military operations in Africa (Al-Jazeera 2014). All of these were carried out through a dense network of personal political connections between Franco-African power elites (serving in the political, intelligence and military fields) that revolved around Jacques Foccart and subsequent specially designated African advisors and institutional networks lubricated through the instrumentality of the French Ministry of Cooperation (Chafer 2005; 2002). In short, *Françafrique* contained the good, the bad and the worst of French relations with Africa in the post-colonial era. These relations were largely underwritten by African wealth derived from the extraction of Africa's natural resources and nurtured through intricate networks that connected business interests, Franco-African power elites, bureaucrats and military commanders/advisors and which was secured through the deployment of French troops (*legionnaires*) stationed in bases scattered across the continent (Chafer 2005; Yates 2018b).

French military engagements in Africa (1960-1990) in the context of *Françafrique*

As colonies in Africa began to gain independence in 1960, France committed the newly independent countries to sign bilateral military treaties, security agreements and defense pacts (Leboeuf 2018, 16). Though the contextualization of these treaties and agreements may vary from one country to another, at the core of the agreements is the objective of strengthening bilateral relations as it deals with military cooperation and support. One of the commitments made in these treaties was to allow French military bases in the territories of the former colonies. These bases have served as launch pads for all of France's covert and overt military operations in former Africa's colonies starting from the 1960s till present time. The bases continue to serve as strategic operations forward bases in Africa for France and its allied Western power (Lersch and Sarti 2014; Jowell 2014; Hansen 2008).

The history of *Françafrique* as a national policy direction in Africa and the evolution of French military bases serving as platforms to launch numerous military interventions to secure and advance France interests in Africa in the immediate post-independent era was the brainchild of General de Gaulle and his main advisor Jacques Foccart (Whiteman 1997). De Gaulle's main rationale behind *Françafrique* was that independence should not necessarily result in the severing of close links that had existed between the colonies and Paris. He viewed the granting of independence devoid of

the bloodshed that characterized decolonization in Algeria and Indochina as the price for securing closer cultural, economic, diplomatic and military ties with Africa.

In the course of political preparation and negotiation for the independence of the colonies in West and Equatorial Africa, France, under the prodding of President de Gaulle and his African affairs advisor, Jacques Foccart, pushed for the signing of cooperation accords between Paris and newly independent African States. The signing of the accord was made a condition for continued French support for individual African States (McNamara 1989; Hodgkin and Schacter 1960).

In quick succession and within the framework of bilateral cooperation, France signed eight defense accords with Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Comoros, Djibouti, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Togo. The content of these accords, as well as duties and responsibilities of parties, were couched in official secrecy. Aside from secrecy, the interpretation of responsibilities was also the preserve of the French Presidency. As a consequence of these accords, the presence of prepositioned French troops was maintained in Djibouti (3,000 troops), Gabon (600), Côte d'Ivoire (550), Senegal (1,100), and Chad (700). In furtherance of deepening French (imperial) military reach on the continent, France also signed defense accords of technical assistance with the former colonies of Algeria, Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Niger. These were aside similar defense accords with States that were colonized by other European powers such as Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda, all former colonies of Belgium, and Equatorial Guinea, the only Spanish colony in sub-Saharan Africa (Yates 2018a; 2018b; Biyogo 2011; Bourgi 1979). In some of the countries where technical assistance (defense) accords were signed, the agreements also entailed the stationing of a small contingent of French troops tasked to perform varying duties.

While account and tallies of France military interventions in Africa within the framework of *Françafrique* and through the instrumentalities of French troops (*Legionnaires*) stationed in bases across Africa differ, there are some numbers to work with. For instance, Griffin (2007) notes that France launched 37 major military interventions in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa between 1960 and 2006. Yates (2018a; 2018b) puts the figures for major French military interventions in Africa between 1960 and 2005 at around 46 missions. Starting from the military intervention to prop up the regime of Leon Mba in Gabon, in 1964 ("Abortive Military Coup..." 1964; The New York

Times 1964), French military interventions in Africa include the following missions/operations:

Table 1: French unilateral military interventions in former African colonies since the 1960s

S/No	Operations/Missions name	Country	Year
1	Bison	Chad	1968-1972
2	Limousin	Chad	1969
3	Lamantin	Mauritania	1977
4	Tacaud	Chad	1978
5	Leopard	Zaire	1978
6	Barracuda	Central African Republic	1979
7	Manta	Chad	1983-84
8		Togo	1986
9	Epervier	Chad	1986-2014
10	Oside	Comoros	1989
11	Requin	Gabon	1990
12	Noroit	Rwanda	1990-93
13	Verdier	Benin	1991
14	Godoria	Djibouti	1991
15	Baumier	Zaire	1991
16	Addax	Angola	1992
17	Iskoutir	Djibouti	1992-93
18	Simbleau	Sierra Leone	1992
19	Oryx	Somalia	1992-93
20	ONSUSOM II	Somalia	1993
21	Balata	Cameroon	1994
22	Amaryllis	Rwanda	1994
23	Turquoise	Zaire/Rwanda	1994
24	Azalee	Comoros	1995
25	Almandin	Central African Republic	1996-97
26	Pelican	Congo-Brazzaville	1997
27	Licorne	Côte d'Ivoire	2002
28	Artemis	Democratic Republic of the Congo	2003

Source: author's compilation from multiple sources.

Similarly, France had also led multilateral military missions/operations in Africa that include:

Table 2: France's multilateral missions in Africa

S/No	Operations/Missions name	Country	Year
1	EUFOR-Tchad	Chad	2007-08
2	Atalante	Djibouti	2008
3	Harmattan	Libya	2011
4	Serval	Mali	2013-14
5	Sangaris	Central African Republic	2013-16
6	Barkhane	Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger)	2014-22

Source: author's compilation from multiple sources.

The operations and missions listed above are prominent examples of the intervention, operations, counter-insurgency missions, combat support operations, peacekeeping interpositions, peace security operations, and non-combatant evacuations conducted under the French tricolor (Stefano 2020; Yates 2018a; 2018b; Luckham 1982).

For more than thirty years, the policy of *Françafrique*, and the regimes of personal and commercial/business networks — on which French relations with Africa's political, business and military elites were anchored — were sustained. For the period it reigned supreme, the policy and the networks were mutually rewarding for all parties. On the one hand, the policy assured France's great power posture on the international stage. In return, France and its power elite guaranteed regime protection to the African power elite based on their loyalty to the network and protection of French national interest (Chafer 2002, 344). However, the policy of *Françafrique* ran into political storms starting from the early 1990s. The factors that forced policy reassessment and change of direction in France, as it relates to the advancement and protection of French national interests in Africa, are both external/systemic and domestic in nature (Bovcon 2011; Chafer 2002).

On the international stage, a number of factors — the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of bigger Eastern Europe state structures such as the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, and France's integration into the European Union — worked to undermine the importance of Africa in France's foreign policy and diplomatic calculations. More importantly, the integration of France into the European Union, and the need for greater

transparency and accountability, greatly undermined and constrained France's capability and the ability for maneuverability, them being essential to the continuation of its opaque African policy. These systemic international issues underscored the need for France to reassess its geostrategic and geopolitical interests and calculations about Africa (Bovcon 2011; Chafer 2002).

On the domestic level, several other factors undermined *Françafrique* and the regime of patronage networks it was built upon. Important among these factors are: public criticism of the corrupt nature of the *Françafrique* policy, which was supported by numerous legal investigations into the affairs of some leading figures of African networks and France's business interests (such as the famous 'elf saga'); the increasing fragmentation of *Françafrique* patronage networks into various individual business lobbies; and, the death of some pivotal *Françafrique* figures, such as Foccart, Mitterrand and Houphouët-Boigny (Chafer 2002). However, for many within Europe and Africa, the major turning point was the role of France in the 1994 Rwanda Genocide in securing ease of passage into Zaire and the escape out of Africa for Rwanda's State officials implicated in the genocide. Also, important as a major turning point was France's spirited but failed attempt at keeping President Mobutu of Zaire in power. The controversy that characterized France's intervention in the Central Africa Republic also complicated and soiled France's reputation and political goodwill in Africa and within the wider international community (Chafer 2005; 2001; Krosiak 2007; Prunier 1995).

Multilateralism and French military engagements in Africa from the 1990s

Following the end of the Cold War, the increasing relationship between the European Union (EU) and former Communist States in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as the EU eastward expansion, France's political, diplomatic, corporatists and economic interests in Francophone Africa began to wane (Chafer 2002). Franco-African relations commenced on shaky notes and with clear signals that imminent change was in the offing. On the economic front, 1994 came with the 50 per cent devaluation of the single currency of the two Francophone zones, the CFA franc tied to the French franc since 1948. Upon France joining the Eurozone and the abolishment of the French franc, CFA franc was subsequently tied to the Euro, thus becoming the guarantor of the CFA franc. There was also the 'Abidjan Doctrine', in which France announced that budgetary aid to Francophone Africa would

be conditional upon the IMF and World Bank regulations moving forward. These two conditions effectively highlighted that France's policy towards Africa henceforth would be more aligned with the general EU policy direction (Chafer 2002). But there would be numerous exceptions, as events that had unfolded since the late 1990s had shown.

Aside from the above, there is also a consistent decline in France's merchandise exports and imports to Africa. For instance, French exports and imports to Africa declined from 7.73 and 9.08 per cent in 1960 to 2.82 and 2.05 per cent respectively in 2011. That said, it is still important to note that sub-Saharan Africa remains an important market for French logistics corporations, especially in the areas of service, telecoms, and infrastructure. More significant in French economic diplomacy is that sub-Saharan Africa remains an important supplier of oil, uranium, and metals, with Gabon and Niger Republic central to France's resource needs. Notwithstanding the changing economic and diplomatic environments, France still wields a considerable level of influence in Francophone Africa that it cannot command elsewhere (Melly and Darracq 2013). It is within the context of the considerable diplomatic, economic, financial, and military muscle that France still pulls in Africa amidst the changing political environment that one can better appreciate France's military and security posture on the continent in the 21st century.

Following the electoral victory and commencement of Jacques Chirac's presidency in 1995, France evolved a new strategic approach in its security doctrine and military operations in Africa. The new posture entailed the acceptance of the delegation of peacekeeping operations and other military interventions in Africa to multilateral organizations, notably the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) and African Union (AU). This was largely a policy position directed at preventing France from being sucked into civil wars and ethnic conflicts in Francophone Africa, a concern that arose following France's experiences in Rwanda in 1994 and Central African Republic in 1995. The change in military doctrine was also informed by heightened budgetary concerns, changes in strategic diplomatic and security climate, structural changes in the French Armed Forces that included a steep reduction in the size of the military and closures of bases in Africa. These factors and the changes they induced meant that France had to rethink its security policy in Africa. The rethink forced France to jettison the culture of unilateral military interventions in conflicts and crises in Francophone Africa under the *Françafrique* policy, adopting a more multilateral approach, albeit with exceptions as dictated by circumstances (Melly and Darracq 2013; Barrios 2010).

In the context of the new strategic approach and within the framework of continued technical assistance, the joint-exercise Reinforcement of Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) programme was conceived by the French military strategists as an important platform for continued military operational engagement with the military institutions and by extension the States in Francophone Africa. Through the RECAMP, the French armed forces helped train African troops for UN peacekeeping operations within Africa and engaged in the conduct of joint military exercises (Edinger 1998; Malan 1998). Aside from technical assistance through training afforded by RECAMP, another major doctrinal security posture was the decision to deploy French military assets in support of UN mandates of which the French troop's contribution to the mission in Côte d'Ivoire since 2003 was important (Melly and Darracq 2013, 4). In the context of continuing reform, France under President Sarkozy also promised to deploy French military assets in Africa to help Africans build their collective security system and make Europe 'a major African partner in the matter of peace and security' (Yates 2012, 328).

Although the change in strategic military thinking and budget constraints forced France to close some of its military bases, as well as reduce the scale of its military presence in Sub-Saharan Africa, by virtue of the strategic locations, values and importance of its remaining assets, France's ability to project military might remain preeminent in Africa. At present, French military personnel are stationed in four bases in Africa: Senegal (350), Côte d'Ivoire (900), Gabon (350), and Djibouti (1,450). Aside from the pre-stationed forces in these bases, France also deployed additional 5,100 personnel for Operation Barkhane which also included military personnel from Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad (Ministère des Armées 2020a). The multilateral nature of Operation Barkhane and the earlier Operation Serval demonstrate France's emerging commitment to multilateral security and military engagements in Africa as against unilateral interventions of the past.

From Operations Serval to Barkhane: France's new commitment to multilateral military interventions in Africa

The overriding objectives that drive Franco-African relationships is that of continued resource extraction, expanding the scope of the French service industry in Africa, defense of French assets, and the projection of French power, all in the context of the unequal metropole-periphery relations. However, the nature and dynamics of the relationship have undergone changes, especially at the institutional level. The pattern of patrimonial networks that

French businesses, political, bureaucratic, and military elites (the power elite) struck with the ruling elite in Africa might still be important in understanding the pattern of Franco-African relations. However, Franco-African relations in the 21st century have become more institutionalized, and France has resorted more to the multilateral approach in its engagements with ruling regimes on the continent, inclusive of its military interventions in crisis situations. The multilateral nature of Operation Barkhane, by far France's largest military deployment in the Sahel, and the manner it deployed its military logistics scattered across bases in Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, and Gabon to strengthen the counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel is highly instructive of the new doctrinal posture that currently underpins France's military interventions in Africa.

To start with, it is important to note the multilateral military deployment against insurgency in the Sahel. Operation Barkhane is largely an offshoot of an earlier French intervention code-named 'Operation Serval'. Unlike the more complex and multilateral nature of Operation Barkhane, Operation Serval was largely a unilateral French military intervention directed at curtailing the southward expansion and take-over of Southern Mali, inclusive of the capital Bamako, by an alliance of rebel and Al-Qaeda affiliated Islamist groups. The rebellion that swept through Northern Mali and resulted in the take-over of important cities, notably Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal, broke out in January of 2012. The rebellion was led by the Tuareg nationalist group, also known as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). The Tuareg rebellion of 2012-2013 was often blamed on spill-over of civil strife in Libya and the 2011 Arab Spring, as well as the influx of returning Tuareg veterans from the Libyan army and the availability of small arms and light weapons, which were also a result of Libya's implosion. However, it is important to note that the Tuareg rebellion has been a constant issue in the political evolution of the State in Mali (Mangan and Nowak 2019; Boeke 2016; Spet 2015).

Thus, the rebellion that started in January 2012 was but a continuation of the long history of Tuareg and Northern Mali's nationalist struggle against state authority based in the South. As the mainly Tuareg-based MNLA rebel fighting forces recorded successes against the State armed forces and captured cities and towns in the North, they struck an alliance with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and two other indigenous Islamist movements, Ansar Dine and a much smaller but deadly terrorist-inclined Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) or (MUJAO). By mid-2012, Ansar Dine, AQIM and MUJWA abandoned their alliance with MNLA and formed a new Islamists alliance that comprised the three terrorist groups.

The new Islamists alliance then turned on the MNLA, routing its fighters from their bases across the North (Boeke 2016; Spet 2015). Before the end of the year, the Islamist groups had seized control over the whole of Northern Mali, displaced the Tuareg based MNLA and effectively ensured the partition of Mali into a South-North division (Shurkin 2014).

Before the January 10th, 2013 offensive by the Islamist groups directed at capturing the Southern cities inclusive of Bamako, French policy was anchored on avoiding unilateral intervention. Indeed, France intended to work through multilateral international organizations, notably the UN and ECOWAS. The strategy was that of aiding the assembling of a multinational force that would be deployed against the Islamist threats in Northern Mali. However, the audacious offensive launched by the Islamist groups in their attempt to gain a foothold in the South and control the whole of Mali led to a change of strategy. Given the difficulties of rapid assembling a multinational force, France reconsidered the deployment of a rapid intervention force to curtail the Islamist assaults on Southern Mali, hold the ground and, then, assembled a coalition force to recapture Northern Mali (Boeke 2016, 16-17). Prior to the commencement of Malian intervention, France had no pre-stationed force in Mali. However, there are ample military assets nearby at bases in Dakar, Senegal; troops and jet fighters based at Ndjamen, Chad; pre-positioned forces at base in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, and a Special Operations Forces (SOF) deployed for counterterrorism mission, 'Operation Sabre', based in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso (Shurkin 2014).

The central objectives underlying France's intervention in Mali, as announced by President Hollande, were threefold: to stop the terrorist aggression, to secure a country in which there are many thousands of French people, and to permit Mali to recover its territorial integrity and possibly secure the release of French and other European citizens taken as hostages by the terrorist groups (Spet 2015). Starting from January 15th, 2013, France went on the offensive against the Islamist insurgency and began moving north. The military strategy was, first, to secure the south and, subsequently, to advance north and to seize control of the River Niger Bend and its two important cities of Timbuktu and Gao, which are by far the largest towns in northern Mali (Boeke 2016). Taken together with the larger administrative regions, Timbuktu and Gao host 94.8 percent of northern Mali's population, according to the 2009 census. As France forces advanced north, they were also coordinating the assembling of a growing number of allied African forces, the largest and most important contingent being the Chadian troops. At the peak of military deployment for Operation Serval, the French forces topped out at 4,000, while the combined African forces reached 6,400, of which

2,300 were Chadians. While Operation Serval was largely a unilateral French intervention when the mission commenced in January 2013, that France was able to coordinate the deployment of troops by its African allies in the region and thus turn the mission into a multinational force partly attest to France's intent at promoting multilateral intervention in Africa. This formed the background for the initiation of Operation Barkhane between France and the Sahel Group of Five. France was also highly instrumental in the deployment of multilateral peacekeeping missions, first being the African-led International Support Mission to Mali, AFISMA, and later a more robust United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, MINUSMA (Boeke 2016; Spet 2015).

Following the termination of Operation Serval in 2014, France and its allies in the Sahel launched Operation Barkhane. The mission objective for Operation Barkhane was largely that of countering the rising and audacious activities of Islamist terror groups in the Sahel. While France took the lead and deployed its vast military assets already stationed in the region (inclusive of assets far afield in Djibouti), the Sahel Group of Five (G5S) — Burkina-Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger —, the African partners, also provided critical military infrastructure, logistics and troops necessary for the effectiveness of the mission (Melvin 2019; Sandberg 2019). Operation Barkhane was largely anchored on the cooperation and partnership agreements between the G5S (Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel) to coordinate activities in two main areas of border control and counter-terrorism operations. Driving the cooperation and supporting the mission of Barkhane was France's assistance in coordination, logistic support, military intelligence, and air power necessary to overcome the capability gaps of the Sahel allies (Sandberg 2019). There are few similar multinational counter-terrorism missions in Africa (Shukri 2019; Onah 2015).

The mission's operational headquarters was situated in Ndjamená, Chad, which has evolved as an important strategic hub of France's military assets in the Sahel. In Chad, the mission also has troops positioned at bases located in Faya-Largeau and Abeche. Also, of strategic value, especially for information and intelligence gathering across the Sahel, are France's air assets at the base in Niamey, Niger. The Niamey air base is significant, given that it plays host to France's military reconnaissance drones that have been deployed for intelligence gathering across the Sahel in support of Operation Barkhane's mission objectives. The base in Abidjan reinforced Operation Barkhane, serving as the mission's logistics hub as it is the point of offloading for equipment from the naval base in Toulon for onward distribution to assets scattered across the Sahel. The mission also has a detachment of

French Special Forces based in Ouagadougou, troops in Kidal, Tessalit and at Gao all in Mali and Atar, Mauritania. These assets, especially those at the heart of the Sahel, are strategic, serving as departure points for tracking jihadist fighters, monitoring the transportation of supplies and logistics of jihadist groups as well as their other related activities (Sandberg 2019).

Operation Barkhane represents a military demonstration of France's commitment to the war on terror in the Sahel. This commitment becomes significant given the longstanding historical connection between France and sub-Saharan Africa and the understanding that destabilization of the region will be detrimental to France's national interest and that of its allies both in Africa and outside the continent. To this end, Operation Barkhane was meant to serve the strategic objectives of interdicting jihadist movements from the Sahel to the coast, disrupting terrorist groups' logistics and communication networks, destroying their bases across the Sahel, eliminating known jihadist kingpins, and, in all, disrupting their operational activities. The objective was to reduce, if not eliminate, jihadists threats to the States and their people in the Sahel, particularly, and West Africa, in general. Operation Barkhane also supports the United Nations mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by providing heavy firepower and intelligence as deemed necessary (Ministère des Armées 2020b, 8; Boeke 2016).

The strategic operational concept of Operation Barkhane and the G5 Joint Forces that it was meant to complement delineates a two-prong approach to addressing the security challenges of the Sahel region. The first phase entails ensuring border security in three strategic sectors spread across the territories of the Sahel Group of Five States. These sectors are along the borders of Mali and Mauritania (West Sector); in the Liptako-Gourma region along the borders of Burkina-Faso, Mali, and Niger (Central Sector); and along the border between Chad and Niger (East Sector). The second phase of the operation's strategic concept is directed at ensuring that the G5S joint force can conduct centralized operations in one or more locations within the territories of the five participating Sahel States. Specifically, it is envisaged that the joint force with support from France, through the framework of Operation Barkhane, will be able to stage a full-fledged force operation throughout the Sahel, with the core objective of neutralizing terrorist groups, criminal organizations and other non-state armed elements (Ministère des Armées 2020b; United Nations Security Council 2017).

Given the context of its operations as a multi-sectoral force, its multinational nature (France and the G5S) and large areas of its operation (the greater Sahel region), Operation Barkhane can be said to have achieved rela-

tive successes. The mission has been able to dismantle terrorist groups operational networks; minimize the ability of terrorist groups, criminal networks and other armed elements to mount sustained coordinated attacks aimed at capturing and retaining territories; and secure the borders of the participating Sahel States against cross border attacks. While stand-alone terror attacks continue to be recorded in the territories of the G5S and Côte d'Ivoire, Operation Barkhane, as a demonstration of an innovative approach at combating asymmetric threats in the Sahel, has been remarkable (Pryce 2017). The mission has also conducted numerous training programs directed at enhancing the operational capability as well as troop's readiness of the Sahel Group of Five States Joint Force. More importantly, the continued protection of Niger's Uranium mines at Arlit and Akoka, that provides 20 percent of fuel for France's nuclear reactors and mines by French-owned Areva, is a significant success of the mission from the purview of France's strategic national interest (Boeke and Shuurman 2015). That the Uranium mines have been subjected to sporadic attacks by terrorist groups operating from within and outside of Niger underlies the significance that the terrorist groups attach to the objectives of decimating the mines, thereby disrupting supply of fuel to France's reactors and destabilizing French electricity supply.

Despite the relative successes of Operation Barkhane, there are emerging challenges. In recent months, the number of terror attacks in Mali has risen and the number of Malians joining terrorist groups is also on the increase. The continued rise in attacks has created dissatisfaction among Malians who are of the view that France is not doing enough to curtail the terrorist insurgency. The 2020 military coup in Mali and the failure of the junta to abide by the promise to hold early elections also brought the ruling junta on a collision course with authorities in Paris. Aside these two issues, the involvement of mercenaries from the Russian Wagner group in Mali's counter insurgency operations on the invitation of the ruling military regime also contributed to the worsening relations between Bamako and Paris. In the context of the deteriorating relationship, Paris announced the phased withdrawal of French forces in the Operation Barkhane stationed in Mali (Hird 2022; Mielcarek 2022). There is also rising tension and dissatisfaction with continued French military presence among the population in Burkina Faso. In all, it seems Operation Barkhane is running into troubled waters amidst rising insurgent and terrorist violence in the Sahel.

Conclusion

Unlike any other European State that was a colonial power in Africa, France's political, diplomatic, economic, and military relations with former colonies in Africa have been enduring such that they have withstood the vagaries of times, changing nature of politics and the dynamics of power relations between the power elite in France and their counterparts in Africa. From a paternalistic framework built on patronage networks that sucked in power elites in France and their counterparts in Africa and anchored on the policy of *Françafrique*, the French policy in Africa has undergone structural and institutional changes. Without doubt, French foreign relations with its former colonies in Africa continues to be informed by the logic of resource extraction and power projection.

Consequently, to achieve its national interest in Africa, France's power elites have maximally deployed French military assets strategically scattered across Africa to the cause of the empire. Up till when it ran into stormy waters in Rwanda, in 1994, Central African Republic, in 1995, and Zaire, in 1997, French military assets and troops stationed in bases across Africa had been deployed for the task of effecting regime stability and regime change as interest dictated. With funding from business interests, notably from Elf, France had deployed its military assets and engaged in unilateral armed intervention in former colonies, either to depose belligerent African leaders or defend compliant leaders and their regime.

However, with the negativities and image crises shadowing its actions in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the failed attempt at protecting the dictatorial regime of President Mobutu of Zaire, France's policy in Africa underwent structural and institutional changes. The public scrutiny that came after the Elf scandals and the death of important figures in the *Françafrique* patronage network also contributed to the change in Franco-African relations. An important dimension of the change in the nature and dynamics of France-Africa relations, especially in the area of security policy, was the jettisoning of unilateral military intervention and the adoption of the multilateral approach to address security concerns in crisis situations on the continent. Aptly demonstrating this new approach to security cooperation between France, its European allies and African partners was France's efforts at building multinational coalitions, as was the case for Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane. While it is on record that France's intervention in Mali to halt the southward push by Ansar Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO, directed at capturing southern Mali, was unilateral in nature, it was anchored on request

from a legitimate national authority in Bamako and sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council.

The request from a recognized authority in Bamako and UNSC seal of approval accorded international recognition and support for the intervention as against France's previous interventions in Africa in decades past. More importantly is the fact that the military operations were conducted with the approval and military support from Mali's neighbors, with Chad contributing military assets and troops for the operation. Following the termination of Operation Serval and the initiation of Operation Barkhane, the same multilateral approach was essentially adhered to. While this, among others, signify an important shift in France's foreign and security policies direction in Africa, it is also important to clarify that the shift should be seen as a representation of change in the context of continuity. Crucial for power brokers and entrenched interests in Paris, as it relates to France-Africa relations, is the rising wave of anti-French sentiment in West African Sahel States of Mali and Burkina Faso following recent military coups and political unrest.

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ABSTRACT

France has had a long, deeply embedded and often controversial history of engagement with Africa. As a former colonial power, France continues to exert strong influence over the politics, diplomacy, finance, military affairs and other aspects of national life of former African colonies. France's influence is anchored on '*Françafrique*' policy with military relations at the heart of the policy engagement. While there are continuities in the manner of France's paternalistic engagement with former African colonies, there are observable changes characterized by the former colonial master's new found pragmatism. To this end, this article discusses Franco-African relations and France's military engagement in post-colonial Africa paying attention to the shift in the nature and dynamics of the relationship. It explores how the embedded network of French military assets was deployed to effect unilateral military interventions in the decades after independence as the central plank to advance European nation's interests in Africa. Following policy re-assessment, the article discusses how France's military assets were deployed in the context of multilateral military engagements as represented by operations Serval and Barkhane. The article highlights how the new found pragmatism and multilateralism serves as the new template of France's security framework in Africa especially in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, albeit in the context of continuities.

KEYWORDS

Africa. France. *Françafrique*. Unilateralism. Multilateralism.

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THE FUTURE OF JAPAN-AFRICA COOPERATION: TICAD

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Introduction

Africa will remain relevant to Japan as a necessary means to achieve some of its long-term political, economic, and strategic goals. Additionally, Japan seeks to expand its relations with the continent. However, it is difficult to view Japan's participation in Africa as part of an integrated policy or a well-thought-out long-term strategy, but only as a set of goals and some of the tools and mechanisms used to achieve those goals. This is largely reflected in Japan's failure to prioritize its economic and political interests in its relationship with Africa. While Japan views Africa primarily through an economic lens, it has other major political interests.

As Japan strives to bolster the dynamism of its ongoing development, production, and trade through a manufacturing and trade strategy designed to adapt to circumstances and mitigate crises, the nation has concurrently heightened its ambition for strategic hotspots, including resources and wealth. This is evident in its keen interest in the African continent and the ongoing competition between European and American powers for control over it.

The historical background of Japan-African relations

In 1922, a significant milestone in Japan's diplomatic history was marked by the establishment of relations with Egypt, underscored by Japan's recognition of Egypt's newfound independence (MOFA 2022a). However, Japan's engagement with the African continent at large did not witness substantial growth until the latter part of the 1970s. During its initial phases,

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Japan's diplomatic interactions with Africa remained primarily confined to nations that had recently gained their independence. Notably, it was the wave of liberal revolutions in the late 1950s that served as a catalyst for the expansion of Japanese-African relations (Adem 2010). However, it was not until the early 1970s that a pivotal juncture emerged, characterized by Japan's proactive establishment of diplomatic and consular channels across multiple African nations.

It is noteworthy that Japan has consistently exhibited a proclivity for initiating developmental projects within the African context. Nevertheless, historical records indicate that Japanese corporations approached investments in African countries with a degree of circumspection. This caution was particularly palpable, save for instances where the countries boasted significant reserves of primary resources.

In a contemporary context, the year 2005 serves as a watershed moment in Japan's involvement with the African continent. As a preeminent donor nation, Japan assumed a pivotal role by orchestrating a robust program aimed at augmenting official assistance to African nations. This endeavor was manifested through a concerted commitment to doubling aid provisions, thereby catalyzing comprehensive development initiatives across the African landscape (Sato 2005).

The beginning of Japan's diplomatic relations with Egypt was exemplified by the acknowledgment of Egypt's newly acquired sovereignty. The subsequent decades saw a gradual but steady evolution of Japan's engagement with Africa, culminating in a surge of diplomatic activities during the 1970s. Although Japanese investments in Africa initially exhibited caution, Japan's role as a prominent donor nation since 2005 has profoundly shaped the continent's developmental trajectory. This multifaceted narrative underscores the nuanced and dynamic nature of Japan's relationship with Africa, reflecting both historical underpinnings and contemporary strategic imperatives.

The Japanese perspective on Africa

Japan's presence in Africa is the most consequential development on the continent at the beginning of the new millennium, as its growing presence reflects its priorities in economic and political terms. The main approaches are:

1. Ensure Japan's trade superiority and economic development, which requires the acquisition of strategic raw materials. Japan's

growing economic presence in Africa, specifically sub-Saharan Africa, over the past two decades has attracted a great deal of attention (Pajon 2020). Its rapid increase in financial involvement and political presence in Africa is considered the continent's most significant development since the end of the Cold War. Japan is a giant economy and an emerging power, and there is a strong tendency to make moral judgments while assessing its presence on the continent. It is Japan's quest for natural resources and its support of African efforts to improve the economy and build a sustainable future that are laying the foundation for long-term economic development. Japan's growing role in Africa is part of a new international rivalry for economic opportunities and strategic resources, especially oil and some minerals.

2. Japan's political ambitions in Africa have come to challenge Chinese influence in the region (Bartlett 2022). Access to resources plays an increasingly significant role in Japan's economic engagement with Africa. However, it is not the only explanation for its relations with the region, which are very different from what this might suggest.

Contrary to the traditional perception that Japan cares only about Africa's natural resources, Japan's interests in Africa encompass several dimensions: political, economic, and commercial. As a reflection of international developments and changes, competition has shifted from its traditional ideological form to economic and political competition. However, the traditional and new parties competing for Africa's wealth are still able to compete through wartime confrontations. International changes, mainly represented by the end of ideological conflict and the international trend towards economic competition at the beginning of the nineties, influenced Japan's orientation. This was as it took the political and economic initiative towards Africa, which for some time was among the marginal areas of Japanese foreign policy concerns. Several conditions have been created for Asian penetration, especially Japan, in Africa. The most prominent of these was the conditionality imposed by Western donor countries on their assistance provided to African countries. Despite some African countries' attempts to establish reforms in a democratic direction, they have not received enough of the promised assistance. The threat of stopping aid became a means of imposing a kind of isolation and blockade on regimes that did not follow the (Western) democratic approach, which became known as "political conditionality," and then the beginning of the nineties witnessed a noticeable decline in the volume of Western aid directed to the African continent (Lekvall 2013).

Japan, recognizing sensitivities both in Africa and the West regarding intervention, has strategically utilized these dynamics. Consequently, Africa has increasingly opened its doors and facilitated Asian investments. This shift is attributed to the fact that the Asian partner distinguishes itself by embracing an economic perspective on the interests underlying economic cooperation relations, in contrast to the Western political perception that occasionally seeks to intervene in the affairs of African states. This distinction is further highlighted by the Western political perception that views neocolonialism as an integral part of the “globalized world order” (Niblett 2014). African countries must rely on themselves for success in democratic transition. This is because Western aid, in any case, is only one-tenth of what they need. It is only an argument for controlling the fate and the future of the continent. After the end of the Cold War, European countries and the United States began to support the economic construction of Eastern European countries, which resulted in a decline in aid to Africa. Furthermore, the refugee and displaced persons crisis has become more acute due to the rise in ethnic and racial conflicts on the African continent. Under these circumstances, the Japanese strategy in Africa revolved around the following:

1. Addressing the weak economic performance of the African partner: The Japanese strategy in Africa is generally based on addressing the weak economic performance of the African partner and helping it achieve development; growth indicators indicate the development deficit in these countries (Kato 2013).
2. Adopting the concept of “human security”: Japan was the first to adopt the concept of human security as the basis for its internal or foreign policies, which means adopting the concept of freedom from fear and need (Hynek 2012). The concept of “human security” allows it to facilitate its penetration and extend its influence under the pretext of achieving global security, addressing the dangers that Africa faces, and not allowing it to extend beyond its borders (Clausen 2009).

The African standpoint towards Japan

A distinction must be made between the political, economic, and commercial aspects of the discussion of African gains. From a political point of view, Japan’s approach to non-interference in the internal affairs of African

countries and the non-imposition of any arbitrary conditions on borrowing countries makes dealing with Japan attractive.

Economically, African economies face a chronic lack of basic energy, transport, and communications infrastructure. In 2018, the World Bank estimated that the annual amount needed to fill Africa's infrastructure gap was \$130–\$170 billion a year (AfDB 2018). African countries have neither government revenues nor foreign exchange to invest in major infrastructure projects of this magnitude. Western lenders and investors have also not been interested in financing such projects.

The World Bank and other Western donors, which in the past provided infrastructure loans, have focused heavily on loans linked to programs and social sectors such as health and education rather than infrastructure. African governments, for their part, have been keen to capitalize on Japan's willingness to finance major infrastructure projects in the region.

Thus, the growth of commodity substitution loans is not only a result of Japan's efforts to secure energy supplies and raw materials but also of Africans' desire to develop their infrastructure. African governments have been able to use their natural resources to obtain infrastructure and finance other projects from Japan (Floyd 2019).

African governments welcome additional foreign exchange revenues and government revenues resulting from increased exports of oil, gas, and minerals abroad. This helps ease the balance of payments and budget constraints.

In general, it would be a mistake to ignore the role of Africans' will in explaining Africa's growing commitment to Japan through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) initiatives. Although Japan's interests are the most significant factor in its economic existence in Africa, this growth is unlikely to be so rapid were it not for Africa's complementary interests.

It is dangerous to reproduce Africa's old relationship with European colonial powers by selling raw materials to Japan while buying manufactured goods and services from it. In 2020, Africa's exports to Japan stood at US\$8.6 billion, while African imports from Japan were about \$7.9 billion (Nyabiage 2022). This makes the trade balance more favorable for Japan at the expense of African economies, which remain unstable.

Since the Western World became a major importer of raw materials in the early twenty-first century, prices have experienced upward trends that have strongly boosted the growth of exporting countries for more than a decade but have also experienced their abyss as prices collapse, with dire

social and political consequences. The export strategy contributes negatively to the ambition of some African countries to industrialize and diversify their economies and to develop a value-added industry that will support domestic demand and create wealth and jobs (Adesida 2011).

The arrival of emerging powers such as Japan will give African countries more room to maneuver in terms of conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the United Nations, which are dominated mainly by Western powers. It has come to offer a more appropriate alternative at the political, economic, commercial, and social levels. Africa's priorities for future cooperation with Japan are:

1. It is imperative to close Africa's infrastructure gap, a key pillar of Agenda 2063 (Tella 2018). Japan's influence on the G7's "Build Back a Better World" (B3W) initiative could help free up funds while keeping debt low (Zhu 2021).
2. Value conception. This requires Japanese companies to invest in their value chains to improve the quality of African exports (Ighobor 2017).
3. Operationalize the African Standby Force mechanism as a tool that can contribute to conflict resolution. Japan has pledged to support the AU's "Silence the Guns" initiative (Musau 2020). Supporting dispute resolution efforts in five designated geographical regions — Africa, the Sahel, Sudan, and South Sudan — are central features of this effort.

Cooperation for African Development (TICAD)

Japan's policy developed in line with the post-Cold War situation, and its role was initially limited to providing aid, but by the late eighties, it announced a revamped policy based on three axes: aid, cultural exchange, and peacekeeping.

1. **Tokyo International Conference on African Development, 1993:** the first Tokyo International Conference on African Development was held in Tokyo, Japan, from October 5–6, 1993, with the participation of about 50 African and Asian countries (MOFA 1993b). This was at the request of the Japanese government at the time to discuss issues related to development and find effective solutions for the advancement of the African continent. The plan

was done so that the continent could support itself. Accordingly, it was just the beginning that opened the door for more Japanese investments and cooperation between the two sides, thus beginning a brand-new phase in the history of Japanese-African relations (MOFA 1993a).

In the early nineties, Japan actively worked to support development on the African continent and to draw the attention of the international community to Africa after a period of marginalization, including its call for the convening of TICAD I in 1993 to embody the beginning of a new phase in the history of Japanese-African relations. During the conference, 48 African countries, 12 donor countries, and 8 international organizations adopted the “Tokyo Declaration on African Development”, which represents the general framework for development: on the one hand, African development for itself, and on the other, African development for others (Eyinla 2018).

2. **Tokyo International Conference on African Development, 1998:** near the beginning of the third millennium, international institutions witnessed a change in dynamics in favor of supporting development in Africa. The Second Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) was hosted in the Japanese capital from October 19–20, 1998, to guide the concrete implementation of the policy by African countries and their partners towards African development in the 21st century (MOFA 1998b).

The conference, which was held with the participation of 80 countries and more than 60 official and informal international organizations, culminated in the Japanese government’s commitment to the goals agreed upon during it and the start of their implementation, which included areas of social development such as education and health, industrial and agricultural economic development, and foreign debt.

The conference adopted the “Tokyo Plan of Action for African Development in the Twenty-first Century” as a strategic framework, aimed at achieving two main goals: preserving poverty rates and integrating Africa into the global economy. The plan also refers to the need to pay attention to the areas of social development related to education, health, and disease control as well as economic development (MOFA 1998a).

Japan aimed to contribute to achieving development on the African continent in all its dimensions as a power (MOFA 1998c). This includes improvements to the standard of living of its people, through Japan’s announcement of intention to cancel debts owed to struggling African countries (Nakamu 2022).

3. **Tokyo International Conference on African Development, 2003:** TICAD 3 was held from September 29 to December 1, 2003, in Tokyo, with the presence of about 90 African and Asian countries (MOFA 2003b) to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the revised Japanese initiative towards Africa (MOFA 2003c). The joint efforts and discussions resulted in the Japanese government extending a helping hand to the advancement of the African continent through the decision of the then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to allocate an amount of up to one billion dollars in aid and supplies for the development and assistance of the countries of the continent (MOFA 2003a). Japan announced its revised directions to help African countries achieve development by consolidating security and peace. As a result, the Japanese Government announced that one billion dollars would be allocated to countries in Africa within five years. This would be in the areas of water, health, and education.
4. **Tokyo International Conference on African Development, 2008:** This edition of the Tokyo International Conference differed slightly from its predecessors after it was announced that it would be held for the first time outside Tokyo, in the city of Yokohama, located on the main island of Honshu, from May 28 to 30, 2008 (MOFA 2008a). The conference, which was held with the participation of more than 50 African countries, and in the presence of representatives of 30 Asian countries, culminated at the end of its activities with the Japanese government doubling the aid allocated to the development of the African continent, and allocating about \$ 4 billion in aid to develop the infrastructure of the most suffering countries.

Japanese-African relations entered a transitional phase with the holding of the fourth session of TICAD in 2008, in which a set of measures was announced to strengthen ties between the two parties, the most prominent of which was to increase Japanese aid to African countries, and \$ 4 billion was placed in loans for infrastructure development.

The Yokohama Plan of Action presented actions to be taken over five years: promoting economic growth; achieving the Millennium Development Goals; consolidating peace and effective governance; resolving climate change and environmental issues; and broadening engagement with the African continent (MOFA 2008b).

5. **Tokyo International Conference on African Development, 2013:** From May 31 to June 3, 2013, the Japanese city of Yokohama hosted the Tokyo International Conference in its fifth edition under the theme “Hand in Hand with a More Dynamic Africa” (MOFA 2013). The conference addressed three main points relating to the development of African countries: Japan’s efforts to resolve the problems of the countries of the continent to gain the confidence of the international community; the restructuring of the United Nations Security Council; and the climate change issue.

The conference, which was attended by representatives of 60 African and Asian countries and representatives of international and regional organizations, resulted in the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) allocating funding to support and accelerate infrastructure development in the countries of the continent, enhance human resources by training African citizens in the field of industrial development, and improve the learning environment for African children (JICA 2018). TICAD 5 was linked to the achievement of three main goals:

1. Japan’s assertion, as a responsible member of the international community, that it is working to solve Africa’s problems to gain confidence in the international community.
2. Japan must strengthen its economic relationship with Africa, a promising market with high growth rates, abundant natural resources, and a growing population.
3. Cooperation with African countries is essential to solving other global issues, including the restructuring of the UN Security Council and climate change. It is clear from the above that Japan focuses its relationship with African countries on the economic aspect and uses several tools, the most relevant of which are:
 - **Investment in the private sector:** Japanese companies are present in all 54 African countries, led by companies such as Toyota Tsusho, Rakuten, Sony, Nippon Steel, and Ajinomoto. The number of Japanese companies in Africa has increased from 169 in 2013 to 259 in 2019 (Junius 2022).
 - **Mining sector:** Japan spent \$220 million but fell short of its two-year budget of around \$800 million due to the global collapse of metal prices (Obayashi 2015).

Among the most influential countries with which Japan maintains trade relations are Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ghana, and Zambia. These countries

export primary raw materials, such as cotton, metals, and timber, and import from Japan industrial machinery and equipment, such as cars.

6. **Tokyo International Conference on African Development, 2016:** the sixth edition of the conference was held for the first time outside Japan, which hosted the previous five editions. TICAD 6 was hosted by Kenya in its capital, Nairobi, from August 27 to 28, 2016 (MOFA 2016a). The conference focused renewed attention on measures to ensure that Africa's economic growth is sustainable. The Nairobi Declaration agreed upon at TICAD VI was themed "TICAD Partnership for Prosperity: Advancing Africa's Sustainable Development Agenda" (MOFA 2016b).

TICAD 6 was held in the presence of representatives of African and Asian countries and international and regional organizations, resulting in the signing of several memorandums of understanding and trade agreements between Japanese and African companies, amounting to 73 agreements, which aimed to move towards manufacturing raw materials on the African continent instead of just exporting them, and the Japanese Prime Minister announced the allocation of investments amounting to \$ 30 billion over the next three years (Takenaka 2016).

7. **Tokyo International Conference on African Development, 2019:** the summit conference was held again in Yokohama, but this time under the co-chairmanship of Japan and Egypt, considering the Egyptian presidency of the African Union (MOFA 2019). The TICAD 7 Summit aimed to develop the continent by facilitating and promoting high-level political dialogue between African leaders and development partners on issues related to economic growth, trade and investment, sustainable development, human security, peace, and stability.

TICAD 7 focused on the potential of digitization and innovation by young African entrepreneurs, as confirmed by the theme of "Advancing Africa's Development through People, Technology and Innovation" (JICA 2022).

8. **Tokyo International Conference on African Development, 2022:** TICAD VIII, the first since the COVID-19 pandemic, was held in Africa again, in Tunisia from 27 to 28 August 2022 (MOFA 2022b).

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida joined the meeting via video conference after he tested positive for COVID-19, stating that "the public and private sector in Japan will work to provide (support to African countries) about \$ 30 billion over the next three years." "This support, which extends over

the next three years, concerns several areas, including green growth, health, education, human resources, agriculture, and investment encouragement, especially for startups,” he added. “It wants to be a partner for Africa to grow with and work with to overcome challenges,” he said. “Japan will adopt its approach with a focus on people or human resources to achieve a resilient African society”. Eventually, Japan announced support for African countries with \$ 30 billion (McDowall 2022).

Japan's goals from TICAD

The African continent has become an attractive environment for foreign investment, which explains the new wave of scrambling for its natural resources; in this area, global investment data shows an intensifying global competition between international companies, European, American, Chinese, Japanese, etc., to share the African natural wealth (UNCTAD 2022).

The Japan External Trade Authority, through a survey of African markets, found substantial motivation among Japanese companies operating in Africa to expand their businesses. This was based on 24 countries, including South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Kenya, Nigeria, and Cote d'Ivoire. The survey period was extended to September and October 2019.

A total of 423 companies participated in the survey, representing 74.5% of the total Japanese companies in Africa. Despite fears of political instability, Japanese companies are looking to expand their operations in Africa. For example, in Mozambique, which is expected to grow rapidly due to natural gas production, it was just under 70%. About 60% of them are in Morocco, where efforts are being made to attract companies by developing free zones. In Kenya (59.5%), Egypt (58.6%), and Nigeria (54.5%), there was an intention to make substantial developments in the field of next-generation business development (JETRO 2020). Mainly, Japan focuses on the following targets:

1. African voices at the United Nations: Japan is seeking to increase its international standing and aims to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Kral 1999). For this strategic ambition, Tokyo needed the support of African countries that Japan had hoped to receive in exchange for the financial assistance negotiated during these summits. In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the Japanese did not understand the economic feasibility of investing in Africa. Therefore, the

development of trade relations with other Asian countries was sufficient for Japan.

2. Catching up with other Asian and Western players in the African market: when African countries began to experience rapid growth in the late 2000s, driven by Chinese, Indian, and Western investment, Japan realized that it lacked the engine to bring them back to the forefront of the African race. Since then, Japan has been trying to cast a shadow over China in Africa (Kuwamura 2022). Japan has adopted the rhythm of its summits every three years at the request of African countries, which have said that this is what China does. Tokyo has also agreed to hold its summits in African countries, as China has done. TICAD conferences were traditionally held in Japan until 2016.
3. Integrating Africa into a free and open Indo-Pacific: this builds on the vision of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who deliberately embedded Africa in Japan's broader strategy for the region (Taylor 2015). This concept is based on four main pillars: the promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation and free trade, the pursuit of economic prosperity, and the guarantee of peace and stability. Shinzo Abe has also made four official visits to Africa, an unprecedented record for a Japanese prime minister. Africa has become one of his government's strategic priorities. Abe intended to celebrate Japan's return to the international stage through intense diplomatic activity. Investing in Africa is worthwhile for several reasons. It was Japan's initial target.
4. Shift to private investment policy: under Shinzo Abe's government, Tokyo has sought to move away from a policy focused on official development assistance, whose budget is constantly shrinking, to a private investment-based approach. Therefore, mobilizing the Japanese business community has been key to expanding Japan's economic presence in this promising market while also continuing to secure strategic energy and mineral resources. Since 2012, Japan has been very keen to discuss public-industry cooperation to encourage companies to invest in Africa (Kaori Kaneko 2013).

Developing Japanese interests in Africa

Despite that, Japanese strategy in Africa is influenced by economic interests. Africa is a reservoir of energy and natural resources. Japan is one of the most industrialized countries in the world based on the number of its imports represented by energy resources. To do this, it needs many natural resources that are not available on its territory, for example, petroleum, natural gas, and mineral resources such as iron and phosphate. Therefore, we note:

1. The increasing interest and international competition on the African continent are because the continent is a major source - in addition to energy - of all wealth, as it produces 80% of the world's platinum, more than 40% of the world's diamonds, 20% of gold and cobalt, and is rich in significant quantities of natural resources (Matthysen 2009). In general, Japan's growing interest in Africa and the intense competition between international powers over it are due to several considerations, most notably:
2. Geopolitical location: Africa has strategic trade crossings and seaports on the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, making it a very influential region in all dimensions.
3. Energy sources: oil discoveries on the continent have recently increased, which represents a significant opportunity for Japan within the framework of its strategy to bring and provide oil needs, as the continent occupies an increasingly significant position on the map of global oil production. According to the estimates of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, about 13% of the world's natural gas reserves are in Africa, and the continent could supply Europe with around 30 billion cubic meters of gas in a decade. The massive global expansion of gas could jeopardize efforts to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius (Chakamba 2022).

Africa represents a vast consumer market, being home to approximately 700 million people. This weakens the ambitions of China's competitors both regionally and internationally. While the economic approach may mitigate the intensity of diplomatic and political competition between the two countries and potentially overcome historical tensions, it's crucial not to overlook the global competition between them, particularly for a permanent seat on the Security Council.

Conclusion

The importance of TICAD for Japan may vary depending on the circumstances and the nature of its participation in the region. In this section, it is useful to distinguish between two main categories of interests that have led Japan to engage with all its weight in the region. Geopolitical and diplomatic goals include isolating Beijing, gaining allies for diplomatic support in international forums, increasing Japan's soft power in the region, and presenting it as an alternative to China. On issues ranging from human rights to UN reform, regional security, and Japan's core national interests, Tokyo looks forward to Africa always being on its side. Furthermore, geo-economic objectives, include the security of energy supplies and mineral and agricultural resources on the one hand, and the commercial objectives related to the consumer market that it provides to its manufacturers and companies in the private and public sectors, to promote exports, support the international expansion of Japanese companies and reduce dependence on trade with China on the other hand.

There is debate within Japan about whether political interests or economic interests should be Tokyo's top priority in its relationship with Africa. Despite the political importance of Africa, Japan has raised financial considerations to a much higher level in its domestic and foreign agenda. This is the direct result of its diversification strategy and an effort to enhance its legitimacy through the achievement of sustainable development in the Third World.

Japan's economic activities in Africa were mainly driven by Japan's development agenda and focused on providing development assistance to African countries to build diplomatic relations. The focus of Japan's foreign policy shifted to supporting domestic economic development, and this shift directly led to a gradual adjustment of Japan's priorities in its Africa policy from aid to "mutually beneficial commercial cooperation," from assistance to the promotion of "contracts for services, investment, and trade." The theory of "the use of both domestic and international markets and resources" prevails in Japan's foreign business relations.

Africa's rich energy reserves, minerals, and raw materials directly feed Japan's quest for natural resources to boost its domestic economic growth. Africa is the second-largest continent in the world, with an area of 30 million square kilometers and 1.2 billion people, and it contains a huge number of natural resources. This trait, along with its relatively low population density and small manufacturing sector, has made Africa a major target

for Japan's imports. Africa also ranks first or second in abundance in the world for minerals such as bauxite, cobalt, diamonds, phosphate rocks, platinum minerals, coltan, vermiculite, and zirconium. In addition, many other minerals are present in large quantities, such as gold, copper, coal, oil, etc.

Thus, raw materials are at the heart of the economic relationship between Japan and Africa. This is reflected in the composition of its imports and the main sectors in which its companies invest. Although the sources vary widely in their estimates of the size of Japanese companies' investments in oil and mining in Africa, they all agree that these sectors are the most relevant in terms of Japanese investment in the region.

While Japanese projects and loans are not solely focused on extractive industries, they are indirectly connected to the sector through the extensive utilization of loans. These loans are often used to finance infrastructure projects in the region. There is also the importance of trade considerations such as access to the local market, the benefit of African trade agreements, low production costs, and the availability of raw materials in the investment decisions of Japanese companies on the continent. Japan has been keeping an eye on Africa for its market potential. This is because Japan's manufacturing industries are characterized by the production of textiles, electronics, and other products at a globally competitive price, which suits the less developed African market.

Japan's growing presence in Africa reflects its priorities, both economically and politically. The objective is to ensure Tokyo's trade superiority and economic development. This development, both internally and externally, requires the provision of strategic raw materials. Second, politically, although the African continent is of only limited importance to Japan's foreign policy agenda, it plays a largely supportive role in its grand strategy. Rather than viewing Africa as an end or priority, Africa is seen as a tactic on which Japan's broader strategic ambitions are built.

Japan pursued a strategy of indirect and gradual action, and its involvement in the African continent can be considered a "tactic," among others, the purpose of which was not only to respond to its immediate and growing economic needs but also to pave the way to quickly reach the top of international politics, economic and political weight, and commercial and geostrategic influence.

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ABSTRACT

Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) aims to “promote high-level political dialogue between African leaders and development partners”. Japanese-African relations are significant for understanding the Japanese strategy in Africa, confirming that its approaches are different from the Western approach, identifying the manifestations of eternal competition in Africa and the opportunities for Japan there, and embodying the framework of cooperation for development in Africa. The topic will be approached according to a theoretical framework that explains Japan-Africa relations due to their focus on the economic dimension of international relations. The study also proceeds from a basic assumption: that Japanese interest is linked to the system of economic interests that Tokyo seeks to achieve in Africa more than claims of development on the African continent.

KEYWORDS

TICAD. Japanese Studies. African Studies. Economy. International Relations.

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ATLANTISM UNDER MAINTENANCE: A REVIEW OF THE BRAZIL-CAPE VERDE PARTNERSHIP DURING THE DILMA ROUSSEFF ADMINISTRATIONS (2011-2016)

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Introduction

From a holistic perspective, Brazil's foreign policy towards the African continent has historically been marked by moments of greater proximity and others of relative distance. Authors such as Barriviera (2016) and Costa (2015) claim that there's been a downturn in Brazil-Africa relations since Dilma Rousseff became president. It is essential to situate the relations established between Brazil and the various African nations as a phenomenon integrated into the logic of South-South Cooperation (SSC), a segment of International Development Cooperation (IDC) that encompasses political, diplomatic and commercial ties between developing countries, guided by the principle of horizontality, with an emphasis on mutual benefits. With regard to the cooperation established with the archipelago of Cape Verde, it is important to note that it is supported by a basal document: the Basic Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, signed in 1977.

At the outset, it is pertinent to point out that the "atlantism" referred to in the title of the article is a tool for direct dialogue with Saraiva (2012), who recognizes Brazil's efforts to get closer to African countries in the South Atlantic as a discursive venture that enables strategic relations. The term

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“maintenance” will be explained at the end of the article, but it is worth mentioning that it has a direct connection with the subject under study.

The text is structured as follows: first, there is a characterization of the international position of former president Dilma Rousseff through her speeches at the United Nations General Assemblies (UNGA), material collected from the National Library of the Presidency of the Republic. Then, it is discussed what place the African continent occupied on the president’s foreign policy agenda, with emphasis on cooperation activities (Ipea 2016; 2018; ABC-MRE 2021) and presidential trips (Brazil 2021). Finally, the level of the Brazil-Cape Verde partnership during the period, listing the practices that were developed was mapped.

Brazil’s international profile under Rousseff’s administration

The use of Charles Hermann’s theoretical tools has been common in the analysis of the foreign policies of various governments, notably the article entitled “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy”, published in 1990. In this text, Hermann seeks to understand the different levels of self-corrective change in foreign policy caused by factors such as: leadership, bureaucratic demands, domestic restructuring or external shocks. The changes associated with these factors can be: (1) of adjustment, when the change occurs in the level of effort of a given policy, without altering the purpose of the action; (2) of program, when the change occurs in the methods or means by which the objectives are achieved; (3) of problem or objective, when the purpose of the action is replaced throughout management; and (4) of international orientation, when there is a broad redirection in the perception of the actor (state leader) regarding its role in the international system (Hermann 1990).

Some of the literature on Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa during the Dilma Rousseff administration has shared the view that, during this period, Brazilian diplomacy underwent a change of adjustment (Cornetet 2014; Albanus 2015; Costa 2015; Oliveira 2015). These authors agree that there was a decline in the intensity of Brazil’s relations with the African continent, manifested above all in the reduced presidential visits and diminished cooperation initiatives made during her administration, when compared to the previous administration of Lula da Silva. It’s important to point out that this reduction didn’t just occur in the Brazil-Africa agenda,

but was part of a movement towards a retrenchment of Brazilian foreign policy as a whole during the Rousseff years. The elements of continuity are the maintenance of relations within the South-South axis, albeit with a lower profile; the demand for social justice in multilateral organizations and the defense of human rights.

Considering the centrality and importance of the United Nations (UN) in consolidating international peace and security, the object of analysis is the speeches given by the former president at the five general assemblies of the body in which she participated, particularly between 2011 and 2015. It is possible to map the existence of six recurring themes in these speeches:

1. *The promotion of a multilateral world - reforming international organizations*: multilateralism was the guiding principle of Dilma Rousseff's discourse. For her, this was an aspect that should be reframed, or rather expanded, so that developed and emerging countries promote coordinated actions, and that the forums for dialogue expand through political and macro-economic cohesion³.

The stateswoman was incisive about the institutional reform of multilateral organizations, establishing it as a way for emerging countries to increase their participation in the decision-making processes of institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and, in Brazil's case, the United Nations Security Council. On several occasions, Rousseff has pointed out the importance of a Security Council that is "[...] more representative, more legitimate and effective" (Brazil 2015, our translation)⁴. This last aspect, "effective", is an implicit criticism of the fact that the UN has found it difficult to promote peaceful conflict resolution in territories such as Libya and Syria, opening the way for unilateral (and unauthorized) interventions by other states.

In the year 2014, the BRICS member countries achieved a greater degree of institutionalization of cooperation with the consolidation of the

³ Regarding Brazil's multilateral character, Saraiva (2014) points to the existence, under the Dilma I government, of a minilateralism oriented towards emerging countries, notably through arrangements such as BRICS, a grouping of five emerging market countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) created in 2009. Unlike an economic bloc, the coalition acts as a platform for dialogue and cooperation (economic, political and military) based on the principles of autonomy, solidarity and mutual assistance. During her time as head of the Brazilian executive, Dilma Rousseff took part in five BRICS summits (editions III to VII).

⁴ In the original: "[...] *mais representativo, mais legítimo e eficaz*" (Brasil 2015).

New Development Bank (NDB)⁵ and a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). Until then, the coalition was restricted to expressing the common desires of the member countries, such as strengthening multilateralism, defending the reform of international organizations, condemning terrorism, and taking a stance towards sustainable development, among other issues. However, with the NDB, the emerging countries' arrangement gained an important element: an international financial institution that emerged as an alternative SSC tool to organizations such as the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund, hegemonized by the developed countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

2. *The importance of Rio+20 for setting agendas*: as a way of emphasizing the relevance of sustainable development in the 21st century, Rousseff mentioned several times the outcomes of Rio+20 (the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development held in June 2012 in Rio de Janeiro), namely the signing of a commitment between nations to reduce gas emissions. According to the former president, the event was anchored in the “grow, include, protect and preserve” paradigm, with a focus on “poverty eradication, the conscious use of natural resources and sustainable patterns of production and consumption” (Brasil 2012, our translation)⁶.

Endorsing the viability of sustainable development, Dilma Rousseff highlighted Brazil's stance on the issue: “Between 2010 and 2013, we stopped releasing an average of 650 million tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere each year. [...] In the last 10 years, we have reduced deforestation by 79%, without giving up economic development or social inclusion” (Brasil 2014, our translation)⁷. This is a way of emphasizing Brazil's performance in terms of sustainable development, ratifying its commitment to the issue. Besides being aligned with the environmental cause, particularly with the challenges posed by climate change, this event represented an important driver of international multilateralism.

5 Aimed at financing development and infrastructure initiatives targeting emerging countries, “the NDB was founded with authorized capital of \$100 billion and initial capital of \$50 billion, with contributions distributed equally among the five founding members (\$10 billion each).” (Brics Policy Center 2018, our translation). For more information on the bank, see its official website at <<https://bricspolicycenter.org/new-development-bank/>> Accessed July 20, 2022.

6 In the original: “*erradicação da pobreza, no uso consciente dos recursos naturais e nos padrões sustentáveis de produção e consumo*” (Brasil 2012).

7 In the original: “*Entre 2010 e 2013, deixamos de lançar na atmosfera, a cada ano, em média, 650 milhões de toneladas de dióxido de carbono por ano. [...] Nos últimos 10 anos, reduzimos o desmatamento em 79%, sem renunciar ao desenvolvimento econômico, nem à inclusão social*” (Brasil 2014).

3. *“Responsibility to protect” - criticism of military interventionism*: this premise grants the intervention processes, respectful paradigms about the sovereignty of nations. Regarding international negotiations on political, social and institutional crises, Rousseff reiterated that Brazil is a nation that advocates dialogue rather than violent solutions. Her position on collective security, in the context of general assemblies, usually included appeals to the international community, condemning policies of brutal repression (seen as vectors of terrorism), claiming that they were harmful to civilian populations and indicating the use of force only in extreme circumstances.

Despite not using an overt strategy (in military terms) to deal with the crises in the Arab World, Dilma Rousseff was more critical of autocratic governments in the region than her predecessor Lula da Silva, who mainly prioritized the maintenance of trade relations with countries like Libya and Syria. Rousseff’s position was aligned with the emphasis given to human rights on her diplomatic agenda. One outcome of this was the alignment, in the United Nations Human Rights Council, “[...] with the United States in the appointment of a special rapporteur to monitor the humanitarian situation in Iran.” (Casarões 2012, 49, our translation)⁸. Beyond this particular event, the Brazilian government adopted a mild stance on violations against Arab civilian populations, restricting itself to issuing statements condemning autocratic governments and using the principle of “Responsibility to Protect” to avoid taking more effective action.

4. *Building a Latin American space*: one of Brazil’s main international projection strategies is to join forces to make itself a potential representative of South America, or even Latin America as a whole, in international forums. In this sense, Dilma Rousseff reinforced Brazil’s commitment to building a peaceful, prosperous, democratic and social justice-promoting region along with its neighboring countries (Brazil 2012).

The importance of strengthening the regional mechanism, according to the former president, is mainly to combat social inequalities, ratify the democratic roots of the southern nations and promote “a fairer, more inclusive and sustainable economic growth” (Brazil 2014, our translation)⁹. Returning to Brazil’s desire to be a representative of its region, Rousseff’s speeches reinforce the country’s credibility through the success of the income distribution policies implemented since the Lula governments. This is a discursive strategy that gives Brazil greater international prestige, given the

8 In the original: “[...] aos Estados Unidos na designação de um relator especial para monitorar a situação humanitária no Irã.” (Casarões 2012, 49).

9 In the original: “um crescimento econômico mais justo, inclusivo e sustentável” (Brasil 2014).

country's ability to combat unemployment, minimally promote the social wellbeing of its population, and consequently gain a foothold in diplomatic forums. On the subject of regional integration, Cervo and Lessa (2014) identified a hesitant attitude on the part of Latin American countries during the first Rouseff administration, due to a lack of strategic consensus and a transience between regional and extra-regional trade¹⁰. In other words, there is no alignment of integration conceptions/worldviews between the countries of the region, due to the heterogeneity of internal development models.

5. *Support for Palestine*: in four of the five assemblies, Brazil's support for Palestine's entry into the United Nations was notable. In the words of Dilma Rouseff, recognizing Palestine's sovereignty and self-determination is a way of contributing to peace in the Middle East: "Only a free and sovereign Palestine will be able to meet Israel's legitimate aspirations for peace with its neighbors, security on its borders and political stability in its regional environment" (Brazil 2011, our translation)¹¹. For the former president, this was a way of promoting a minimally peaceful coexistence between Palestine and Israel.

6. *Defense of the right to digital privacy*: at the beginning of July 2013, the scandal of US electronic espionage in Brazil¹² came to light in the international community, which led to a worsening of bilateral relations between the two countries. Dilma Rouseff made her comments on the episode at the UN, pointing out that the interception of business and diplomatic data violated international law and affronted the sovereignty of countries. The former president condemned the American activity, mentioning the participation of private companies in the espionage, and associated the right to privacy with

¹⁰ Considering the centrality of Mercosur, Desiderá Neto (2017) points to some of the body's institutional obstacles as an argument for the low level of Latin American integration during the Dilma Rouseff governments: lack of relevance of the Mercosur Parliament (Parlasur) as a supranational body, merely protocolary participation of civil society in the bloc's decision-making, irregular distribution of resources for the Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund (Focem) and Brazil's low institutionalality with regard to the regional process, given its leadership position in the bloc.

¹¹ In the original: "*Apenas uma Palestina livre e soberana poderá atender aos legítimos anseios de Israel por paz com seus vizinhos, segurança em suas fronteiras e estabilidade política em seu entorno regional*" (Brasil 2011).

¹² US espionage in several European and Latin American countries was publicized by former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) technical assistant Edward Snowden, who revealed secret US security information and details of the surveillance programs used in the country. In a June 2013 interview with The Guardian, the whistleblower said: "[...] I can't in good conscience allow the US government to destroy privacy, internet freedom and basic liberties for people around the world with this massive surveillance machine they're secretly building" (Snowden apud Greenwald et al 2013).

the promotion of freedom of expression, opinion and democratic principles (Brazil 2013).

In order to prevent recurrences of illegal interception, the stateswoman guaranteed that Brazil would redouble its protection mechanisms and demanded a UN position on the issue, emphasizing that telecommunication and information technologies should not be used as weapons of war between nations, but rather as resources for diplomatic consolidation. In this sense, the former president proposed the establishment of a multilateral civil framework for the governance and use of the internet, based on principles such as freedom of expression, respect for diversity and privacy, net neutrality, among others¹³.

In contrast to Lula da Silva's governments, characterized by a fruitful alignment with then foreign minister Celso Amorim over eight years, Dilma Rousseff did not establish a cohesive dialogue with regard to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) – over the course of her five-year term, three diplomats led the ministry: Antonio Patriota (2011-2013), Luiz Alberto Figueiredo (2013-2015) and Mauro Vieira (2015-2016).

Regarding the operationalization of Brazilian diplomacy, from a consultation on the portal of the Centre for Selection and Promotion of Events (CESPE) of the University of Brasilia (UNB), it was possible to verify, when compared to the Lula da Silva governments, a significant reduction in the number of vacancies offered by the Rio Branco Institute during the Dilma governments: 2003 (35); 2004 (35); 2005 (32); 2006 (105); 2007 (105); 2008 (115); 2009 (105); 2010 (108); 2011 (26); 2012 (30); 2013 (30); 2014 (18); 2015 (30); 2016 (30) (Cespe-UNB 2022).

¹³ These principles were best discussed and applied to the theme of the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the future of Internet Governance - NETmundial - which took place in São Paulo in April 2014. The event brought together representatives from various regions of the world and different sectors, and had as its central objective the promotion of an open, democratic, free, multistakeholder and multilateral Internet. On the initiative of the Ministry of Justice's Legislative Affairs Secretariat in partnership with the Center for Technology and Society at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) in Rio de Janeiro, a normative document on digital governance in Brazil was drawn up: the Brazil Civil Rights Framework for the Internet (Marco Civil da Internet, in Portuguese). Law No. 12.965, of April 23, 2014, established guidelines for the actions of the Federal Government, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities on the subject. The general principles of the Marco Civil Law of the Internet are: guaranteeing net neutrality and freedom of expression; protecting citizens' privacy; and prohibiting third-party access to correspondence and data.

This reduction in the number of vacancies represents a Brazilian stance that is less eager to strengthen and/or improve its diplomatic corps and, consequently, moves away from a possible optimization of its international insertion. In this sense, it is ideal to refer to the notion of decline attributed to the first Dilma government by Cervo and Lessa (2014). In their analysis, the authors found that Brazil's international relations became weak due to two factors: the lack of strong ideas (*ideias-força*)¹⁴ that could mobilize coordinated strategies for external action and the loss of efficiency of the logistical paradigm (a strategy that corresponds to the effective articulation between the state and non-governmental agents for joint actions). In general, the foreign policy program of the period focused on maintaining previously established initiatives, giving a perfunctory character to this public policy and causing the scrapping of Itamaraty.

Africa's place in the Dilma governments

With regard to diplomacy and cooperation with the African continent, there was a continuation, to a lesser extent, of the partnership implemented by the Lula da Silva governments (2003-2010). The foreign policy agenda during this period was aligned with the premise of respect for the sovereignty and self-determination of peoples. It is important to understand the use of the logic of "solidarity diplomacy" as part of a culturalist discourse which, in order to strengthen relations with African nations, highlights Brazil's ethnic and cultural similarities with this continent. As Paulo Visentini (2016) points out, Brazil's establishment of trade relations with Africa is intertwined with three elements: political discourse (prestige diplomacy), economic interest ("soft imperialism"); and the association between the two peripheries of the world system, in search of development (South-South Cooperation).

One of the main modalities of Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (*Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional*, Cobradi, in Portuguese) is technical cooperation (TC), a category marked

¹⁴ According to Cervo & Lessa (2014), strong ideas (*ideias-força*) are understood as the premises established by a government in order to guide its actions through a simple language that achieves popularity. In Dilma Rousseff's case, what happened was the discontinuation of Lula da Silva's strong ideas, namely: a) conflict has an owner, not solution (as a justification for conflict mediation); b) everyone has the right to three meals a day (the basis for promoting public policies aimed at the areas of agriculture, food, health and education); c) reciprocity of benefits between nations (defense of multilateralism) and d) it's good for Brazil (a factor in dialogue with the business community in order to internationalize the Brazilian economy through investments abroad).

by the sharing of knowledge, techniques and successful experiences at the national level, the training of individuals and the strengthening of foreign institutions in partner countries. In general, TC is carried out on a non-commercial basis, with no direct flows from Brazil to abroad, but rather the mobilization of professionals to meet the most varied demands, whether between countries or between a country and an international body. In Brazil, technical cooperation is coordinated mainly by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), but also by federal public administration bodies.

According to the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea) (2014; 2017), between 2011 and 2016 the Brazilian federal government spent around R\$323.7 million on international technical cooperation via the ABC. In the same period, federal public administration bodies spent a total of R\$3.8 billion on TC. It's important to note that of this total expenditure by government bodies, R\$3.2 billion was spent by the Secretariat for International Affairs of the Ministry of Planning, Development and Management (Seain/MP) and the Secretariat for International Affairs of the Ministry of Finance (Sain/MF) in the 2014-2016 triennium alone. With regard to the African continent, between 2011 and 2016, R\$116.1 million was allocated to technical cooperation initiatives.

The Ministry of Social and Agrarian Development (MDS) was responsible for sharing experiences in social development and the fight against hunger with technicians and specialists at events (conferences, debates, missions, workshops, among others), and organizing the delegations with representatives from African, South American, European and Asian countries. Authorities from African nations such as Angola, Sudan, Botswana, Ivory Coast, Mozambique, South Africa, Senegal, Mali, Tunisia, among others, came to Brazil to deepen their knowledge on topics such as credit policies, social protection, food and nutrition security, as well as policy management, monitoring and evaluation of policies. The Brazilian effort to present the MDS's main public policies, such as the Family Welfare Program (*Bolsa Família*, in Portuguese), the Unified National Database (*Cadastro Único*, in Portuguese) and the Brazil without Poverty Plan (*Plano Brasil sem Miséria*, in Portuguese) (Ipea 2014; 2017), is noteworthy in this context.

As far as agricultural research is concerned, Brazil's technical cooperation is carried out by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), a public institution that plays an important role in developing technologies that contribute to the sustainability of agriculture. Embrapa coordinates training, capacity-building and technical exchange activities with countries in Asia, Africa, Oceania, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean.

In the time frame studied, some of the initiatives developed with the African continent were: technical assistance and short-term training for Angolan researchers; training for Mozambican technicians in the collection and conservation of insects and pests and in the production of vegetables; a course on the practice of rice cultivation for Senegalese technicians and rice producers; training technicians from the Togolese Agricultural Research Institute (Itra) in cassava production and processing; developing parasitic plants management techniques in Ethiopia's highland vegetable production system; training in genetic improvement and eucalyptus cloning in Tunisia, among other activities in different countries (Ipea 2014; 2017).

Brazil's TC in public health is expressed through the convergent action of the Ministry of Health (MS), through its International Affairs Office (*Assessoria de Assuntos Internacionais*, Aisa/MS, in Portuguese), with foundations: Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), the National Health Foundation (*Fundação Nacional de Saúde*, Funasa, in Portuguese); and with autarchies: the National Health Surveillance Agency (*Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária*, Anvisa, in Portuguese) and the National Supplementary Health Agency (*Agência Nacional de Saúde Suplementar*, ANS, in Portuguese). It is worth noting that during the Dilma Rousseff governments, some of the main activities carried out in this segment were: implementing neonatal screening and laboratory and imaging diagnosis of sickle cell disease in Angola; training Congolese health technicians in HIV prevention and in raising awareness among young people about the issue; strengthening the health surveillance system and reinforcing the analytical capacity of laboratories in Burkina Faso; strengthening the program to combat tuberculosis in São Tomé and Príncipe, as well as other initiatives (Ipea 2014; 2017).

In addition to technical cooperation, Brazil's educational partnership with African countries during this period remained fruitful and was characterized by a broad organic structure involving more than a hundred Brazilian higher education and research institutions, the Division of Educational Issues (DCE/MRE), the Secretariat for Higher Education (Sesu/MEC), the Coordination of Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (*Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior*, Capes, in Portuguese) and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (*Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico*, CNPq, in Portuguese). In general terms, this type of cooperation has focused on maintaining the Exchange Program for Undergraduate Students (*Programa de Estudantes-Convênio de Graduação*, PEC-G, in Portuguese) and the Postgraduate Student/Covenant Program (*Programa de Estudantes-Convênio de Pós-Graduação*, PEC-PG, in Portuguese), both aimed at enabling African students to access Brazilian

higher education institutions, as well as granting scholarships and other aid. Countries such as Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique stand out as the African nations that received the most aid during this period (Ipea 2014; 2017).

These activities, as included in official Ipea documents, reflect Brazil's stance as a potential promoter in the sharing of experiences among its partners in the global south. In order to better visualize the degree of Brazilian cooperation with the African continent, it's effective to catalog a set of initiatives implemented during Dilma Rousseff's administration, available on the Brazilian Cooperation Agency's website. Evaluating the table of ABC projects implemented during the Dilma governments on African territory, it's possible to identify a sector with the largest investments: agriculture. According to the table below, this segment received 35 cooperation projects, corresponding to around 22% of the total of 155:

Table 1: Quantitative of Brazil-Africa cooperation initiatives in agriculture (2011-2016)

		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	TOTAL/SUB-SECTOR
Sub-sector	Supply Chain					1		1
	Family Farming	9	3	1		1		14
	Agroecology	1		1		1		3
	Cooperatives	1	1					2
	Cotton Farming		1		2	1		4
	Annual Crops	1						1
	Plant Health Protection	1						1
	Rural Extension	1						1
	Fruit Growing	1	1					2
	Horticulture			1				1
	Irrigation	1						1
	Research	2	1					3
	Public Policies	1						1
	TOTAL/YEAR	19	7	3	2	4		35

Source: Projetos de Cooperação Sul-Sul entre Brasil e África (ABC-MRE). By the authors.

As indicated in the table above, one of the agricultural sub-sectors received the most emphasis during the period studied: family farming, in which 14 projects were initiated during the period (40% of the agricultural category of Brazil-Africa cooperation). The others represented a smaller number, with one to four projects. Some of the initiatives were: the establishment of community banks of Creole seeds in South Africa and Mozambique (Family Farming); the implementation of the Integrated Sustainable Agroecological Production (PAIS) in Senegal (Family Farming); the support for the cultivation of Kivu Coffee in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Agroecology); the transportation of materials, translation and laboratory supplies to cassava, tropical fruit and vegetable production projects in Nigeria (Research); the implementation of a cashew stalk and other tropical fruit processing unit in Guinea Bissau (Fruit Growing), among other projects.

Agricultural cooperation between Brazil and African countries has therefore continued throughout the Rousseff administration, particularly by sharing experiences in different areas of the sector. This is a way of using new cultivation techniques and/or improving existing ones in order to optimize results. In addition to agriculture, a series of initiatives were launched in 19 other sectors, the distribution of which is outlined below:

Table 2: Other areas covered by the Brazil-Africa agenda between 2011 and 2016

GROUP	SECTOR	QUANTITY
GROUP I (over ten initiatives)	Defense	25
	Health	15
	Education	14
	Technical Cooperation	11
	Public Administration	10
GROUP II (four to six initiatives)	Sport	6
	Environment	6
	Fisheries	6
	Social Development	5
	Public Security	5
	Justice	4
	Culture	4

GROUP	SECTOR	QUANTITY
GROUP III (one or two initiatives)	Industry and Commerce	2
	Transport	2
	Science and Technology	1
	Communications	1
	Livestock	1
	Planning	1
	Labor and Employment	1

Source: Projetos de Cooperação Sul-Sul entre Brasil e África (ABC-MRE). By the authors.

In summary, 155 cooperation activities (including projects, missions and training) were launched during the Dilma Rousseff administration (2011-2016), with the following distribution: 80 in 2011; 39 in 2012; 9 in 2013; 8 in 2014; 11 in 2015; and 8 in 2016. The gradual decrease in the number of initiatives in this time frame is due to two factors: the establishment of activities that require medium or long-term execution and the fall in spending by Brazil's main cooperation management body, the ABC, at the start of the first Dilma administration:

Table 3: Brazilian federal government outlay with the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (2010-2016) in R\$


2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
77,633,782	59,857,297	45,683,440	45,914,223	48,827,943	63,014,836	60,480,602	40,412,123

Source: Relatórios Financeiros: Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional (Ipea 2016; 2018). By the authors.

In addition to the budget shortfall, a second constraint on the ABC is that, although it is formally designated as an agency, it is a subsidiary department of the MRE and therefore does not have much administrative and financial autonomy. Another important indicator in the study of foreign policy is the international trips made by the head of state, conferring relevance to the concept of Presidential Diplomacy, which refers to the "[...] personal conduct of foreign policy issues, outside the mere routine or *ex officio* attributions by the president or, in the case of a parliamentary regime, by the head of state

and/or the head of government” (Danese 2017, 67, our translation)¹⁵. Dilma Rousseff’s diplomatic trips to the African continent over the course of her two presidential terms are characterized by their incongruence. A total of eight trips were made to Africa, concentrated in the first half of her term in office (2011-2013). The following graph illustrates the limited number of trips made by Rousseff to Africa in comparison to other global regions:

Graph 1: President Dilma Rousseff’s trips around the world during her two terms in office (2011 - 2016)



Source: Brasil, Viagens presidenciais internacionais Dilma Rousseff. By the authors.

From the graph above, it is evident that Rousseff’s administration was marked above all by a regionalization of the travel agenda, since South America was visited in every year of her administration, as well as an inclination towards Europe, which was unvisited solely in the year of 2016. To a greater or lesser extent, diplomacy with South American countries was emphasized, especially with Mercosur countries, restricting the aspirations that Brazil once had to promote South Atlantic integration and the consequent inclusion of African countries in an equitable manner. With regard to the latter, they were sparsely included in Dilma Rousseff’s travel plans, with visits made to South Africa, Angola, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, and Nigeria.

The reasons why the countries mentioned were on the president’s travel agenda were as follows:

1. **October 2011:** visit to South Africa (V Summit of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum – IBSA); Mozambique (ceremonies marking the 25th anniversary of death of the former president Samora Machel) and Angola (negotiations to strengthen bilateral cooperation);

2. **February 2013:** visit to Equatorial Guinea (III South America-Africa Summit - ASA) and Nigeria (discussions on the strategic dialog mechanism between the two nations);
3. **March 2013:** participation in the 5th BRICS Summit, held in South Africa;
4. **May 2013:** visit to Ethiopia to take part in the celebrations of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity (OAU);
5. **December 2013:** participation in the official funeral ceremony of former South African president Nelson Mandela.

Dilma Rousseff's diminutive itinerary towards Africa represents a reduction of the Brazilian presidential diplomacy presented by the previous government. As part of his globalist orientation, Lula da Silva traveled to the African continent in all of his eight years in office, between 2003 and 2010, visiting 22 countries with a balanced distribution of one to two trips to the continent per year, compared to the number of eight countries visited by his successor. Furthermore, although Dilma Rousseff's trips to the eight African countries were concentrated in just two years, 2011 and 2013, it is important to note that the comparison made here is not technically proportional: while Lula da Silva was president for 8 years, Rousseff held this position for 5 years and 243 days. It is therefore possible that the stateswoman would (or would not) have made more trips to the African continent by the end of 2018, had she not been removed by the impeachment process in mid-2016.

During the 50th anniversary of the African Union in 2013, Dilma Rousseff announced that the Brazilian government would cancel or renegotiate around US\$ 900 million in foreign debt owed by African countries, as a way of strengthening economic relations with the continent. Among the beneficiary countries were Congo-Brazzaville, Tanzania, Zambia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Republic of Guinea, Mauritania, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sudan and Guinea Bissau (BBC News Brazil 2013).

It's worth noting that, despite being disguised in a discourse of solidarity based on the argument of mutual gains among countries in the Global South, this initiative was an effort to encourage the internationalization of Brazilian companies on the African continent, since legislation prevents benefits from being granted to nations with debts in arrears with Brazil:

The meaning of this negotiation is this: if I can't negotiate, I can't have relations with them, from the point of view of investment, of financing Brazilian companies in African countries as well as commercial relations that involve greater added value. So it's a two-way street: it benefits African countries and it benefits Brazil (BBC News Brasil 2013, n.p., our translation)¹⁶.

In this way, the practice of canceling or renegotiating debts is an important contribution to the establishment of oil companies, mining companies, construction companies and contractors in African countries, via financing from the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) (Azevedo 2013). The decision was approved by the Economic Affairs Committee in 2016.

The renegotiation of African countries' debts made it possible, for example, for Senegal to buy three Super Tucano planes from Embraer and two patrol ships from Emgepron (*Empresa Gerencial de Projetos Navais*. In English, Naval Projects Management Company), acquisitions that were financed to the tune of 120 million dollars by BNDES; and for the infrastructure company Andrade Gutierrez to build two highways and carry out urbanization works in Brazzaville (Congo). In an interview with *Folha de São Paulo*, diplomat Roberto Abdenur pointed out that with the discounts "You're zeroing out the debts of countries that haven't paid us in order to open up new credits that will have to be forgiven. Countries in these conditions will continue to be bad payers"¹⁷, representing a critical stance on the practice of opening up credit to defaulting countries (Fleck 2013).

Brazil-Cape Verde cooperation

After the first two decades of the 21st century, it has become clear that the South Atlantic is an important geostrategic area for Brazil's international projection plans. This importance can be identified in the rhetoric of the Lula and Rousseff governments, regarding cooperation among the countries of the global south. Cooperation initiatives still have an intermit-

16 In the original: "O sentido dessa negociação é o seguinte: se eu não conseguir estabelecer negociação, eu não consigo ter relações com eles, tanto do ponto de vista de investimento, de financiar empresas brasileiras nos países africanos e também relações comerciais que envolvam maior valor agregado. Então o sentido é uma mão dupla: beneficia o país africano e beneficia o Brasil" (BBC News Brasil 2013, n.p.).

17 In the original: "Você está zerando a conta de países que não nos pagaram para abrir novos créditos que terão de ser perdoados. Países nessas condições continuarão a ser maus pagadores" (Fleck 2013).

tent character, that is, they vary according to different contexts and they are directly related to economic or political interests, so “[...] one cannot naively consider cooperation or development aid as a social benefit, based on moral and humanitarian values” (Furtado 2013, 225, our translation)¹⁸.

In an effort to contemplate the historical significance of the South Atlantic for Brazil’s international relations, José Flávio Sombra Saraiva (2012) coined two pertinent concepts that underpin the country’s actions in this region. The first is Brazilian Atlanticism (*Atlantismo Brasileiro*, in Portuguese), which refers to the strategy of entering into partnerships with the countries of Atlantic Africa based on a discourse of valuing the ethnic contribution of Africans to the formation of the Brazilian people. The second concept, strongly intertwined with the first, is that of partner Africa (*África parceira*, in Portuguese), which in order to establish fruitful interactions with the continent sees it as a strategic region with opportunities for Brazil’s international projection. Both use a historical relational perspective between the two regions to reinforce the idea of Atlantic rapprochement. Brazil’s partnership with Cape Verde is part of this logic.

Brazilian cooperation with the archipelago after its independence in 1975 were related to issues such as: water resource management, technical training in various Cape Verdean institutions; support for the development of agricultural activities, such as goat and sheep farming and horticulture; the establishment of a human milk bank; training diplomats, among others. It is necessary to look at the partnership implemented during the Rousseff governments (2011-2016) from this broader panorama of cooperation, understood as a *continuum* over the last few decades.

Table 4: Evolution of Brazilian federal government spending on international technical cooperation in Cape Verde (2010-2016) in R\$:


2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
2,976,507	1,259,199	462,827	625,850	533,942	504,959	171,430	6,534,714

Source: Relatórios Financeiros: Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional (Ipea 2016; 2018). By the authors.

The table above shows a gradual decrease in Brazilian investment in technical cooperation with the Cape Verde archipelago. However, despite the drastic reduction in spending, substantial initiatives to strengthen the partnership were carried during the period in question, specifically 21 activities. The following graph shows the distribution of the Brazilian Cooperation

Agency's budget to each of the sectors covered by the partnership with Cape Verde between 2011 and 2016.

Graph 2: Budget distribution of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), by sector, in the institutional framework of initiatives with Cape Verde (2011-2016)



Source: ABC-MRE, Sumário Executivo das Iniciativas de Cooperação junto a Cabo Verde. By the authors.

During the period studied, it's possible to identify that education was the sector with the biggest increase in cooperation. Having made this quantitative assessment, it is important to focus on the content of the cooperation developed during the period:

Education: three classes of the diplomatic practice course from Rio Branco Institute were initiated, with places offered to members of the chancelleries of partner countries, including Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, among others; in addition, a prospecting mission was carried out in Cape Verde in order to negotiate technical cooperation projects in the area of education, involving Brazilian institutions such as the Federal University of Juiz de Fora (UFJF) and the University of the International Integration of Afro-Brazilian Lusophony (UNILAB); and, finally, the project to train the staff of Cape Verde's Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Innovation, which led to the creation of the National Higher Education Evaluation System (SINAES) in the archipelago.

Health: two projects were initiated, one to strengthen primary healthcare in Cape Verde by training professionals and improving mental health and epidemic control actions; another aimed at strengthening the Agency for the Regulation and Supervision of Pharmaceutical and Food Products (ARFA)

through practices such as drawing up strategic quality plans and training human resources. In addition to these projects, two prospecting missions were carried out: the first to assess the demand and infrastructure for telemedicine and the second to negotiate the revision of the Human Milk Bank project.

Defense: during the time frame analyzed, three courses of military training were held alongside Cape Verdeans, in 2012, 2013 and 2014. The activities consisted of sharing defense knowledge and techniques (strategic planning and local operations) with Cape Verdean military personnel through exchanges in the Brazilian Armed Forces.

Technical Cooperation: two missions were carried out, the first by the Ministry of Culture (MinC) to negotiate technical cooperation projects with the Cape Verdean government in the areas of civil aviation, environment, information technology, housing, cultural heritage, promoting the inclusion of people with disabilities and agricultural statistics. The second consisted in the presentation of the study entitled: “*Um Programa de Transferência de Renda para Combater a Vulnerabilidade Social em Cabo Verde*” (in English, “An Income Transfer Program to Combat Social Vulnerability in Cape Verde”), by the Institute for Applied Economic Research (*Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas e Aplicadas*, IPEA, in Portuguese), the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC/UNDP) and the United Nations Program Office in Cape Verde.

Public Administration: carried out in two phases, the first between 2011 and 2012 and the second between 2012 and 2018, the institutional strengthening of Cabo Verde’s Bank involved training Cape Verdean technicians through study missions at the Central Bank of Brazil. Some of the exchange’s focal areas were: human resources, monetary policy, settlement and payment systems, among others.

Other sectors: in communications, the institutional strengthening of the Public Key Infrastructure of Cape Verde’s National Communications Agency (*Agência Nacional das Comunicações*, ANAC, in Portuguese) was carried out; in the environment sector, a feasibility study of the handicraft and waste recycling areas in the city of Praia was started in order to subsidize fundraising for the development of production chains; in the public safety sector, civil aviation inspectors were trained in the areas of operational safety and infrastructure; and finally, in the labor and employment sector, a training course entitled “*Contextos e desafios para a conquista do trabalho decente*” (in English, “Contexts and challenges for achieving decent work”) was held, with activities linked to international labor standards and the promotion of quality employment and social dialogue.

In general, Brazil’s presence on the African continent, especially in Cape Verde, should be understood as part of a project to internationalize the country’s

political and economic influence in the Global South. Nevertheless, the extreme relevance of the cooperation practices developed as part of these interests should not be overlooked. While Africa has proven to be a promising region for partnership opportunities with Brazil, African countries are also looking to adopt Brazilian “good practices”, particularly in the realms of social programs and technical training. This indicates that the strategic aspect should not overshadow the merit of activities conducted within the framework of South-South Cooperation.

Conclusion

Having presented the main data obtained in the research, it is crucial to revisit the commitment stated at the beginning of this article: to justify the use of the term *maintenance* to complement Brazilian Atlanticism during the Rousseff governments. This position is expressed by alluding to the challenging context that characterized the former president’s domestic policy, notably the combination of economic problems (falling GDP, deindustrialization and reprimarization of Brazilian exports) and political problems (the involvement of domestic bourgeoisie members in Operation Car Wash weakened the alliance established by the Workers’ Party (PT) with both the country’s masses and the bourgeois fractions). In this sense, “maintenance” relates to the fact that Rousseff continued to cooperate with countries of the Global South even in an unfavorable domestic scenario.

Concerning Brazil’s partnership with the African continent, the intensification of diplomatic ties with the Global South carried out by Lula da Silva’s administration was continued by Dilma Rousseff. Notwithstanding, this continuity was less vigorous due to the factors mentioned above. Technical cooperation was maintained with countries such as Mozambique, Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, among others, especially in two selected areas: agricultural research and public health, through institutional training and sharing experiences.

Finally, when analyzing the level of cooperation with Cape Verde, it was possible to conclude that the archipelago has remained a strategic region for Brazil’s expanding sphere of influence in the South Atlantic. One of Brazil’s cooperation mechanisms with this African country is Lusophony, which enables cohesion in the execution of activities such as the institutional strengthening of the Bank of Cape Verde; diplomatic practice courses; military training, among others.

The retraction of the executive's active stance in conducting the country's foreign policy, namely presidential diplomacy, could be identified from Rousseff's short itinerary to Africa. During her time in office, she only visited the continent in the years of 2011 and 2013, unlike her predecessor, who visited African countries in all eight years of his government. This suggests that Dilma Rousseff's presidential diplomacy on the African continent can be characterized as restrained or reactive, since it was mainly focused on resolving domestic issues.

The research enabled the mapping and systematization of several cooperation policies developed between Brazil and the African continent, especially with Cape Verde. However, it leaves room for numerous concomitant studies, such as on partnerships in areas other than agriculture, as shown in Table 02; on the effects and results of cooperation projects in Cape Verde (which would require a diversification of research sources, expanding ties with official executing agencies); or even the development of an analysis of the gradual retraction of Brazil's African policy in the transition between the Rousseff and Temer governments, aligning it with a more pragmatic and neoliberal perspective.

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to understand the main cooperation and diplomacy actions between Brazil and countries on the African continent, especially the archipelago of Cape Verde. The study encompasses the years 2011 to 2016, corresponding to Dilma Rousseff's administration in the Federative Republic of Brazil. This period was characterized by the continuation of the African policy previously established during Lula da Silva's government (2003-2010), albeit with a noticeable inflection. The documentation used includes data from the portal of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), especially with regard to the projects implemented; the Cobradi financial reports, drawn up by the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea), in relation to the Brazilian federal government's spending on cooperation; the National Library of the Presidency, particularly presidential trips and diplomatic speeches; and, of secondary importance, the executive summary of Brazil-Cape Verde initiatives, made available by the ABC. Through the characterization of the partnership between Brazil and Cape Verde, exploring the technical cooperation developed, it can be inferred that Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa during the Rousseff years produced activities relevant to the context of syncretic governance in the Global South, although with less vigor.

KEYWORDS

Dilma Rousseff. Cooperation. Brazil-Cape Verde.

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GOVERNMENT, STATE, AND NATIONAL WARS IN AFRICA

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Introduction

To what extent were internal wars in African countries after World War II conditioned by their limited levels of governmental entrenchment and statehood? This is the central issue guiding the following research, which focuses on African countries in the post-World War II period, a period in which the system of sovereign States — with its origins in modernity and formally in Europe with the Peace of Westphalia treaties of 1648 — reached the vast majority of the international system. To achieve this objective, the following article is structured as follows.

The first section aims to present, in the first instance, empirical information about the relative weight that internal national wars had on the international system in general and in Africa in particular, followed by a presentation of the different propositions about the conditioning factors of this type of war in the international system and African States, and, finally, establish guiding hypotheses for the empirical research of the study. The second section describes the methodological project followed to test the hypotheses defined in the first section. The third section presents the empirical results of the research and the data analysis. Finally, the article develops a conclusion that systematizes the main aspects of the study.

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Conditions for National Wars in the International System

Regarding internal national wars, it is possible to argue that they are a type of armed conflict³ that meets two requirements: they occur exclusively within the national borders of a State; do not involve the participation of other external States supporting either side of the conflict. In simplified terms, these wars can be called national wars. As shown in Table 1 below, national wars have been predominant in the international system since the end of World War II, accounting for 52% of the total wars in the system compared to other types of wars. If we reduce the global data and restrict it exclusively to the African continent during the same period, as shown in Table 2, national wars have also been predominant, with the same relative weight of 52% as they have in the international system.

Table 1: Frequencies and percentages of war onset by type in the international system 1946-2015

Years	Intrastate					Totals
	Interstate	Extrastate	Internationalized	National	Non-State	
1946-1955	4	7	0	12	4	27
1956-1965	7	3	8	14	1	33
1966-1975	9	3	7	20	3	42
1976-1985	7	2	13	18		40
1986-1995	6	1	7	32		46
1996-2005	5	4	7	27	1	44
2006-2015	1	1	9	9		20
Total	39	21	51	132	9	252
%	15	8	20	52	4	100

3 According to the Correlates of War, a war is a militarized conflict between groups with the power of force that results in at least 1,000 combatant deaths in a one-year period among all involved parties in the conflict (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010: 39-75). Based on this definition, it is possible to identify three broad categories of war - international, national, and non-State - and within them, different and more specific subtypes. Within the structure of international wars, we can find interstate wars, exclusively fought between States on both sides of the conflict; intrastate wars, fought within a State system, with one side directly supported by another State in the international system; and finally, extrastate wars, fought by a State or a coalition of States against an armed group that is not a member of the interstate system. National wars are wars fought exclusively within one state, and the conflicting parties do not receive support from any State in the international system. Non-State wars are wars fought between groups that are not members of the interstate system.

Source: By the authors. Based on data from Sarkees and Wayman (2010), Dixon and Sarkees (2016).

Tabela 2: Frequencies and percentages of war onset by type in Africa:

Years	Intrastate					Totals
	Interstate	Extrastate	Internationalized	National	Non-State	
1946-1955		2		0		2
1956-1965		3	2	5	1	11
1966-1975	1	1	2	5	1	10
1976-1985	2	0	7	3		12
1986-1995		0	3	10		13
1996-2005	1	0	6	14	1	22
2006-2015		0	3	2		5
Total	4	6	23	39	3	75
%	5	8	31	52	4	100

Source: By the authors. Based on data from Sarkees and Wayman (2010), Dixon and Sarkees (2016).

Based on these data, national wars, both in the International System and in Africa in particular, constitute a type of social conflict that deserves to be investigated in terms of possible causal factors. It is worth noting that, although this type of war has been the most frequent in the International System, scientific development on the pathology of war and its causal factors has shown more progress in favor of the study of wars between States. However, this does not mean that theoretical and empirical scientific study of this type of war has been neglected, as it is possible to identify a series of theories and studies on this type of war that, with emphasis on political, economic, and social aspects, have sought to explain the fundamental causes of the pathology of national war in the State system. In general terms, theoretical approaches that addressed the study of conditioning factors of what we call, in this study, national wars can be organized into five perspectives: modernization; grievances; greed; State capacity; global power distribution.

One of the theoretical references for the *modernization* approach was Samuel Huntington ([1968] 1997). According to this author, the combination of poverty and social mobility can be a factor of instability, especially in developing countries. As a central proposition, he argued that if the level of participation is higher than the level of institutionalization, conditions for

instability and the emergence of internal conflicts are created. In this sense, he argued that the most important political difference between countries is not their form of government, but the degree of governance they have. The differences between democracies and dictatorships are not as great as those between countries whose political systems are based on a general consensus that gives them legitimacy and those that do not have these qualities. Totalitarian, communist or liberal countries belong to a category of states that are efficient in how they exercise governance and authority, as opposed to weak states that have major problems in exercising authority.

The theoretical perspective known in the field as the grievance perspective focuses on explaining these types of wars in terms of socio-economic, ethnic, or even religious and racial conditions. These approaches conjecture that states with high levels of underdevelopment, inequality, low levels of economic growth, and low levels of education face the greatest risks of internal conflict (Collier et al. 2003; Ballentine and Sherman 2003). To a large extent, this explanation contrasts with the classical explanation of relative deprivation developed by Gurr (2011 [1970]), who argues that the most unstable states are not those with large disadvantaged sectors but those where a privileged part of the population experiences frustrated improvements according to their redistributive references. Within the scope of these approaches, there is also the proposal of Mary Kaldor (2001), who asserts that the new wars, many of them of a national nature, are characterized by being associated with the emergence of groups that, through conflicts, express interests of a religious, ethnic or racial nature.

A third general approach to the conditioning factors of national wars has been termed the greed-centered approach. These approaches assert, as a proposition, that internal armed conflicts within countries are conditioned by the low cost of rebellion for certain resource-predatory groups with high market value natural resources. Through the control and trade of these resources, which can take different forms such as diamonds, oil, illicit drugs, etc., rebel groups finance their attempts to become monopolizers of violence in a given territory and, in this sense, constitute groups that challenge the internal sovereignty capacity of States. Much of the conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and some countries in Latin America can be explained by this dynamic (Keen 1998; Grossman 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Ross 2006).

A fourth theoretical approach focuses on State capacities. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argued that politically weak states, those that have recently gained independence, have limited levels of political entrenchment, and are often under the tutelage of foreign governments, are the most prone to insta-

bility and internal war. From the same perspective, Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch (2001) provide empirical evidence that clearly identifies that anocratic political regimes, that is, less consolidated political regimes, are more likely to experience internal wars than democratic or autocratic regimes. DeRouen and Sobek (2004) focused on the effects of bureaucratic quality and army size on the duration of internal war, identifying that effective bureaucracies, rather than government army size, reduce the probability of rebel group victory in a conflict. Peksen, Taydas, and Drury (2008) identified that weak states are more prone to internal wars, while those with high taxation rates and redistribution capacity are less likely to suffer internal conflicts.

A fifth approach, with less relative weight than the previous ones, on the phenomenon of internal wars focused on the distribution of global power. From this perspective, it is argued that states in the international system with lower levels of relative distribution of international power are more likely to initiate internal wars. Under this perspective, power inequality makes it very difficult for weak states to ensure internal security and well-being. In this sense, what happens at the local level is the result of the distribution of capacities at the international level; these factors prevent weak states from strengthening themselves to ensure greater stability (Hironaka 2005). After analyzing the main approaches and empirical findings on the conditioning factors of intrastate wars, we present, below, an analysis of the main contributions on the conditioning factors of this type of conflict in Africa.

The conditioning factors of national wars in Africa

The issue of security in Africa is closely tied to the question of the State itself. The concept of the State is, in many cases, strongly related to the region's major security problems. Indeed, in some ways, the failure of the Westphalian-based system of government is one of the factors fueling the region's security problems. According to McLean (2001), there is a clash between the pressures of the traditional Westphalian model and the regional needs of current models that would work in Africa. One of the central issues is the concept of borders and its perception as a guide for decision-making. In the African case, however, borders do not necessarily correspond to the traditional patterns of population behavior or the security realities of citizens.

Security problems in Africa, as Buzan and Waeber (2003) refer, exist at both the internal and interstate levels. However, the source of these problems are, above all, internal issues, such as refugee flows and civil wars.

Söderbaum (1998) shares the view of the authors that the main source of insecurity in Southern Africa is internal conflict. As Herbst (2000) notes, the formation of the State in Africa follows a different path than that in Europe theorized in Tilly's work (1996). Unlike the context of conflict and war as a mechanism for state-building, cooperation characterizes the state-building process on the African continent. The occurrence of wars between states is, therefore, much rarer.

However, as Kelly (2007) points out, care must be taken when using security and integration theories in developing countries, especially in Africa. The main concern lies in the different problems and concerns faced by African countries. In this regard, the concept of a common enemy, as we saw above, is not always what will guide African countries' approach to security. Therefore, it is useful to refer to Job's (1997) concept of an 'internal security dilemma.' According to the author, some states face internal problems that threaten the stability and ongoing power of the government in question; these would be states classified by classical security theories as weak or failed. In Job's words:

The fundamental interest of those in power in these states is the survival of the regime and the maintenance or restoration of the status quo. Thus, in the international context, their main concern is to ensure the principles of non-interference in domestic affairs, maintenance of territorial integrity, and strengthening of sovereignty. International institutions will be attractive to them as long as these institutions adopt these norms and are capable and willing to mobilize on their behalf (Job 1997, 181).

Thus, the focus is on intrastate conflicts to the detriment of interstate conflicts. In this regard, Ayoob (2002, 35) argues that the decolonization process and the consequent need for state-building, in an environment much more vulnerable to external interferences than the one in which European states were built, is the explanatory factor for most of the conflicts in these countries. The new states "redefined the very notion of the security dilemma, making it essentially an internal phenomenon and not interstate." Many African countries continue to face problems in asserting their sovereignty, especially at the internal level. This fact, as Kelly (2007) reminds us, makes issues of internal security much more important than external ones, causing interstate wars to be very rare in these countries; these countries do not intend to conquer the territory of their neighbors, on the contrary, they want to cooperate to contain internal threats, which are very similar.

The concept of security, according to Francis (2006), is highly contested, but can generally be understood as the condition of feeling safe from dangers; it is, therefore, related to survival. However, the idea of security that should be adopted, according to the author, is its non-traditional conception, which includes not only military threats but also new security issues such as economic, health, and environmental concerns. Security, in this sense, would imply peace, development, and justice, as the absence of these would create conditions for conflict and armed violence.

The African context, according to Francis (2006), where states are still in the process of strengthening and building, and economies are developing, is a clear demonstration that there is a strong relationship between peace, development, and security. The historical development of the continent, especially in the post-colonial era, according to the author, would show why it is imperative to address these three aspects together when it comes to Africa; armed conflicts, both intrastate and interstate, and the instability they generate, worsen the socio-economic situation of countries, making security and development inseparable issues.

According to Ibekwe and Adebayo (2012), the democratization process in Africa began in the 1990s, influenced by the end of the Cold War – from a systemic perspective – and by the dissatisfaction of political elites with internal and external military interference – from an internal perspective – and at the regional level, the transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in the early 2000s also contributed to this process, through the possibility of suspending non-democratic leaders, something that was not possible before.

Regarding the relationship between democracy and conflict, traditional liberal theories, such as Doyle's Democratic Peace Theory (1983), mention the positive connection between democratic regimes and peaceful relations. The absence of democracy could, therefore, be seen as a contributing factor to conflict. For Nkiwane (2001, 286), however, "the spread of liberal democracy and consumer capitalism has not resolved many of Africa's contradictions; on the contrary, in many cases, it has exacerbated internal sociopolitical disputes". Thus, African conflicts would have much more to do with socio-economic problems than the absence of liberal democracy.

Nkiwane (2001, 287) further asserts that "democracy, therefore, is not necessarily the main factor that prevents war in African international relations; in fact, it may promote war." Undoubtedly, there can be a multitude of factors conditioning the existence of intrastate wars, both globally and, particularly, in Africa. In this sense, based on existing theoretical and

empirical scientific knowledge, this study aims to investigate the effect of political, economic, and social factors on the existence of national wars in African states. For this purpose, this research is oriented towards testing two main hypotheses, formulated as follows:

1. Since the end of World War II, the probability of African states experiencing national wars has been inversely and significantly associated with the levels of governmental entrenchment.
2. Since the end of World War II, the probability of African states experiencing national wars has been inversely and significantly associated with the levels of sovereignty.

Research Structure

To empirically test the stated hypotheses, a quantitative study was conducted based on the creation of a panel-format database that includes African countries as units of analysis from 1946 to 2015. This approach allows capturing not only the years when national wars of African states began but also the years when these wars were active. This enables a quantitative study that not only combines spatial and temporal dimensions but also involves a large number of observations on variables related to the units of analysis, providing empirical consistency to the data analysis. Regarding the units of analysis for the study, the following criteria were applied for their selection.

The first point to emphasize is that the units of analysis for the study were chosen based on the following three criteria. The first criterion was to consider African states that meet the five requirements defined by the Correlates of War for a political unit to be considered a sovereign state⁴. The second criterion is the inclusion of a temporal dimension, considering the post-World War II period until 2015. The third criterion is associated with the empirical information collected for each variable considered in the study; specifically, the units of analysis included in the study were those that had empirical information on all variables considered, both independent and dependent, as well as control variables. Thus, the units of analysis for the study are African states-year pairs for which, from 1946 to 2015, in corresponding periods, it

⁴ The five requirements applied by the Correlates of War to consider a political unit as a State in the interstate system are as follows: 1. Territory, the existence of a geographical space on which the political unit is based; 2. Diplomatic recognition, since 1919, belonging to the League of Nations or, later, the United Nations, or the political unit receiving diplomatic accreditation from the two great powers of the interstate system; 4. Sovereignty, implying control of its political institutions through the monopoly of force; 5. See: Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 19).

was possible to obtain quantitative empirical information on all considered variables. In total, the study was based on 2190 units of analysis.

To test the first hypothesis, four multivariate logistic regression statistical models were applied, all considering government entrenchment as the independent variable and national wars as the dependent variable. In the four models applied, a series of control variables were included to reflect political, economic, and social aspects of African countries. These variables include the level of relative material capabilities of each African State in each specific year considered, economic potential measured by economic growth rates, prosperity level measured by the GDP *per capita* of each country, and the development level measured by life expectancy. To test the second hypothesis, a bivariate logistic regression model was applied, where the independent variable was the level of sovereignty and the dependent variable was national wars. It's important to note that the sovereignty level is an indicator derived from the combination of government entrenchment, material capabilities, economic capacity, prosperity level and development level.

The dependent variable for both hypotheses, national wars, was measured based on the presence or absence of an active national war in the African state-year under consideration. Operationally, when an active national war was observed in the analyzed unit, the value 1 was assigned; if no active national war was observed in the unit of analysis, the value 0 was assigned. It is important to note that national wars are understood as those occurring within a State without involving the participation of any foreign State. According to the Correlates of War definition of war types, national wars are considered those that are intrastate in their various specific subtypes but do not involve foreign states; hence, interstate, extrastate, or non-State wars are not considered for hypothesis testing. The sources of information used to systematize this information are those developed by Sarkees and Wayman (2010) and Sarkees and Dixon (2016).

Regarding the independent variable corresponding to the first hypothesis, government entrenchment, the first thing to note is that, in this article, government entrenchment is understood as a quality analogous to the institutionalization of the political regime. This implies that the higher the levels of government entrenchment or institutionalization of the political regime, the higher the levels of state authority. This perspective coincides with the approach of the Center for Systemic Peace, as in its qualitative classification, both democratic and autocratic regimes register higher levels of institutionalization compared to anocratic regimes. In other words, democratic and autocratic regimes exhibit higher levels of government entrenchment com-

pared to anocratic regimes. In this sense, according to Huntington ([1968] 1997), there are no significant differences in the governing capacity of democracies and autocracies; the fundamental difference lies in how they exercise authority. Democracies exercise their authority through the rule of law, while autocracies exercise their authority through the use of force. However, both types of political regimes exhibit higher levels of government entrenchment or institutionalization of the political regime than anocratic countries, which are characterized by significant weaknesses in the exercise of authority.

To measure this variable, the Center for Systemic Peace conducted a reclassification of the index of institutionalization of political regimes in its 5.0 version⁵. Since, for this database, the values of institutionalization of political regimes range on an axis from -10 to 10, a new scale was devised to measure this variable, comprising eleven values from 1 to 11. The value 1 is assigned to countries whose regimes have the lowest level of entrenchment, or 0 on the Center for Systemic Peace scale, and 11 is assigned to those with the highest level of entrenchment. For example, if one country has a value of 8 in a given year and another country has a value of -8, they are assigned the same government entrenchment value, even if their political regimes are different in nature. Note that in years when the political regime of a State experienced an interruption, interim period or transition according to the measurements of this database, the value acquired by the country in the last year before the interruption, interim period or transition was applied

⁵ The Center for Systemic Peace 5.0 provides quantitative information about the level of institutionalization of political regimes. For this purpose, it designed a continuous scale of 21 points ranging from -10 to 10. Political regimes between -10 and -6 are considered autocratic, and the closer to the extreme -10, the more institutionalized this type of regime is. Regimes between -5 and 5 are categorized as anocratic, exhibiting low levels of autocratic or democratic institutionalization. It should be noted that regimes between -5 and 0 contain more autocratic attributes, while regimes between 0-5 are more democratic. Similarly, regimes between 6 and 10 on the scale are those where higher levels of institutionalization of democratic institutions can be observed. To access the Center for Systemic Peace information on the institutionalization of political regimes, see: <https://www.systemicpeace.org/csprandd.html>.

as a measure of institutionalization in the measurement of this variable⁶. The matrix below shows the scores assigned to this variable based on the information provided by the Center for Systemic Peace regarding the institutionalization of political regimes.

Table 3: Center for Systemic Peace values to measure government entrenchment:

Values of the Center for Systemic Peace	Values of government entrenchment
0	1
1/-1	2
2/-2	3
3/-3	4
4/-4	5
5/-5	6
6/-6	7
7/-7	8
8/-8	9
9/-9	10
10/-10	11

Fonte: by the authors.

In regards to the independent variable of the second hypothesis, the level of sovereignty, the first thing to mention is that sovereignty is understood as the material capabilities of states in the international system to exercise authority and promote the well-being of the population. This notion, in some dimensions, aligns with the proposal of the Center for Systemic Peace, which

⁶ Note that, in the Center for Systemic Peace database on the institutionalization of political regimes, interruptions are recorded as -66, interregnums as -77 and transitions as -88. Interruptions occur when a country is occupied by foreign powers during a war, leading to the collapse of the old system of government and the formation of a new system of government after foreign occupation. Interregnums occur when there is a complete collapse of central authority, mainly as a result of internal conflicts. Transition periods occur when new government institutions and policies are created. For more information, see Marshall, Monty, and Gurr, Ted (2017) "Polity 5. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018. Data Users' Manual". Center for Systemic Peace. Available at: <https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p5manualv2018.pdf>.

posits that State fragility or strength is related to the states ability to manage conflicts, develop and implement public policies, provide essential services, maintain internal cohesion, promote quality of life and the progressive development of the population (Marshall and Elzinga Marshall 2017). However, the concept of the State proposed here differs in some aspects from the proposal of the Center for Systemic Peace. The first difference lies in the fact that the ability to manage conflicts is seen, in this article, as a consequence of the state's condition and not as an inherent property. From the perspective developed in this article, it is possible to propose that the higher the levels of sovereignty of states, the less likely they are to suffer conflicts.

A second difference is that the concept of the State developed here takes into account the relative material capabilities that states have in the international system, thus incorporating an international relational dimension into the notion of the State. A third difference is that, concerning the political dimension, the concept of the State developed here is restricted exclusively to governmental integration or the levels of institutionalization of the political regimes of states. A fourth difference is that, regarding the economic dimension, the concept of the State proposed in this investigation empirically addresses its study through the economic growth and per capita GDP of states. Regarding the social dimension associated with the quality of life, the notion of the State is measured exclusively through life expectancy. That said, it is evident that the concept of the State proposed here is a multidimensional one, however, the variables inherent in each dimension are fewer than those proposed by the Center for Systemic Peace.

That said, the measurement of the level of the State results from the combination of government entrenchment with the control variables used to test the first hypothesis. As each variable provides quantitative information with different units of measurement, to normalize the variables and aggregate them into a single unit of measurement, each variable was normalized through the z-score process. Subsequently, the data for each variable for each unit of analysis were grouped and divided by the number of variables. The index records values between -3 and 3, with values below -3 or above 3 are considered outliers. Analytically, the units recorded higher levels of the State as the index increased, and vice versa. The formula applied for calculating the index was as follows:

$$\text{Statehood} = \text{zenraigub} + \text{zcmateriales} + \text{zcrececon} + \text{zpibpercap} + \text{zesperanzavida} / 5$$

estatalidad = statehood

zenraigub = governmental entrenchment

zcmateriales = material capabilities

zcrececon = economic growth

zpibpercap = GDP per capita

zesperanzavida = life expectancy

5 = number of variables

With regard to the control variable material capabilities, this variable shows the relative percentage of power registered by each African state, year by year, throughout the considered period. The indicator used to collect this information was the Composite Indicator of National Capabilities in its 6.0 version, developed under the Correlates of War framework. This indicator is constructed by combining six variables into an arithmetic mean, each of the six variables showing the relative percentage of each country in the system of states in interannual periods. The six considered variables are: 1. the % of each State in global military expenditures; 2. the % of each State in global military personnel; 3. the % of each State in global energy consumption; 4. the % of each State in global steel and iron production; 5. the % of each State in global urban population; 6. the % of each State in the global total population. Once the percentages for each State are obtained for each variable year by year of the period considered, version 6.0 covers the 200 years 1816-2016, they are additively summed and divided by the number of variables.

Regarding the control variable indicating the economic potential of each state year by year, we took into account the levels of economic growth at current prices based on data provided by the World Bank. Concerning the control variable representing the prosperity levels of states from year to year, the data series of GDP per capita provided by the World Bank was considered. Finally, regarding the level of development, the control variable considered to measure this dimension was the data series provided by Our World in Data in terms of life expectancy measured in years.

Analysis results

After a preliminary descriptive statistical analysis of the empirical systematized information in this investigation, the inferential statistical analysis of both hypothesis testing models through the application of logistic regression models will be based on four aspects, namely: 1. the type of relationship between variables evidenced by both models; 2. the presence or absence of statistical significance between the independent and control variables with the dependent variable of the models; 3. the interpretation of the coefficients of the models, also referred to as odds ratios; 4. the goodness of fit of the models. Regarding the descriptive information, in Table 2, about the seven variables of the model applied to 2190 units of analysis, it illustrates the following aspects.

In Table 4, it is identified that, concerning material capabilities, the average of these, considering all observations, was 0.128%, with a minimum extreme value of 0.002% and a maximum of 1.05%. In terms of government integration, the average value was 6.786, with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum of 11. Economic growth shows an average of 8.665%, with a minimum value of -83.974% and a maximum of 305%. GDP per capita has an average of 1106.974 US dollars, with a minimum value of 36,157 and a maximum of 19849 US dollars. In terms of life expectancy, the average value is 53.4 years, with a minimum value of 14.1 and a maximum of 75.7 years. Regarding the statehood variable, the average value was -0.000, the minimum value was -1.859, and the maximum value was 3.51. Finally, concerning the dependent variable, 144 units of analysis, out of a total of 2190, recorded wars, meaning that 6.57% of the units of analysis registered wars and 93.4% did not.

Table 4: Description of variables

Values	cmateriales	Enraigub	crececon	pibpercap	esperanza- vida	estatali- dad	Wars	
Minimum value	0,002	1,000	-83,974	36,157	14,100	-1,859	0,000	No war: 2046
Median	0,052	7,000	7,098	448,667	53,000	-0,084	0,000	With war: 144
Average	0,128	6,786	8,665	1106,974	53,401	0,000	0,066	
Maximum value	1,050	11,000	305,158	19849,718	75,700	3,516	1,000	

Fonte: by the authors.

Regarding the analysis of the models presented in Table 5, four of them are multivariate, and the fifth is bivariate. The first one includes all the variables considered in the study, and it can be observed that the only variable showing a positive relationship with war is the material capabilities variable, which means that the greater the material capabilities, the greater the wars; the remaining variables exhibit a negative relationship, indicating that higher levels of government entrenchment, economic growth, GDP per capita and life expectancy, the fewer the wars. However, it's noteworthy that, at a 99% confidence level, the variables showing a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable are material capabilities, government rooting and life expectancy. The variables economic growth and GDP per capita do not show a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. Focusing the analysis on the coefficients of the variables with a statistically significant relationship in the model, Table 5 shows that for each additional percentage point of material capabilities, the probability of an African State being at war is multiplied by 22 times. Regarding government entrenchment, since the coefficient is less than 1 (0.82), the probability of a war year for an African State is reduced by 18% for each increase in this variable. Concerning life expectancy, given that the coefficient is less than 1 (0.86), the probability of an African State being at war decreases by 14% for each increase in this variable. Regarding the adequacy of the model in Table 6, the chi-square test indicates that, at a 99% confidence level, the model is significant.

Model 2 considers only the variables that presented a statistically significant relationship by applying Model 1. As seen in Table 4, Model 2 confirms the positive association between material capabilities and the pre-

sence of war in African states, as well as the negative relationship between government entrenchment and life expectancy with war in African states, all at a 99% confidence level. If we look at the coefficients of these variables in Model 2, with slight nuances, Table 5 again confirms what was reflected in Model 1: for each increase in material capabilities, the probability of a national war in an African State is multiplied by almost 22 times. Regarding government entrenchment, the coefficient again has a value of 0.82, implying that the probability of war in an African state-year decreases by 18% for each increase in government entrenchment. Concerning life expectancy, Model 2 also registers the same values as Model 1 in its coefficients. Regarding the adequacy of the model in Table 6, the chi-square test indicates that, at a 99% confidence level, Model 2 is significant.

Model 3 is a model that analyzes only the political nature variables explaining both government entrenchment and material capabilities of African states, year by year, during the considered period. Table 4 confirms once again the statistically significant and directional relationship between, on one hand, material capabilities, and on the other hand, government entrenchment, and the occurrence of wars in African states. Analyzing the coefficients, Table 5 shows that, for Model 3, for each increase in material capabilities, the probability of an African state-year having a national war increases by 5.27 times, while for each increase in government entrenchment, the probability of an African State having a national war decreases by about 10%. Regarding the adequacy of Model 3 in Table 6, the chi-square test indicates that Model 3 is significant at a 99% confidence level.

Given the influence that material capabilities have on whether an annual African State registers a national war or not, the fourth model omits this variable and only includes the remaining variables from the model. In this regard, as shown in Table 4, the variables government entrenchment and life expectancy exhibit a statistically significant negative relationship with the presence of a national war in an African state-year. The variables economic growth and GDP per capita, although showing a negative relationship with the dependent variable, are not statistically significant. If we examine the coefficients of Model 4 for these two variables, we find that for each increase in government entrenchment, the probability of an African State in a war year is reduced by 16%, while for each increase in life expectancy, the probability of a national war in an African State in a given year is reduced by 12%. Once again, as for the goodness of fit of Model 4 in Table 6, the chi-square test indicates that this model is significant.

Finally, a fifth model was constructed and tested, which, despite having the particularity of being bivariate, the independent variable emerges from the combination of the remaining variables, accounting for the levels of statehood. Model 5 shows a statistically significant negative relationship between the levels of statehood and the presence of wars in an annual African state. Analyzing the coefficient of the variable, given that it is less than 1 (0.4), the probability of war reduces by 60% for each increase in the sovereignty level variable. As for the goodness of fit of Model 5 in Table 6, the chi-square test indicates that, at a 99% confidence level, this model is also statistically significant.

Table 5: Model comparison

Dependent variable:				

guerra				
Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)

cmateriales	3.10***	3.07***	1.66***	
	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.32)	
enraigub	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.10***	-0.17***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
crececon	-0.01		-0.005	
	(0.01)		(0.01)	
pibpercap	-0.0000		0.0001	
	(0.0001)		(0.0001)	
esperanzavida	-0.15***	-0.15***		-0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.01)		(0.01)
estatalidad				-0.91***
				(0.20)

Constant	5.49***	5.47***	-2.30***	4.78***	-2.74***
	(0.81)	(0.76)	(0.25)	(0.77)	(0.09)

Observations	2,190	2,190	2,190	2,190	2,190
Akaike Inf. Crit.	900.26	897.81	1,037.34	955.93	1,043.51
=====					
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01				

Table 6: Odds ratios by models

Model 1	(Intercept)	cmateria- les	enraigub	crececon	pibpercap	esperanza- vida
	241,88	22,21	0,82	0,99	0,99	0,86
Model 2	(Intercept)	cmateria- les	enraigub	esperanza- vida		
	237,41	21,59	0,82	0,86		
Model 3	(Intercept)	cmateria- les	enraigub			
	0,1	5,27	0,91			
Model 4	(Intercept)	enraigub	crececon	pibpercap	esperanza- vida	
	119,02	0,84	0,99	1	0,88	
Model 5	(Intercept)	estatalidad				
	0,06	0,4				

Table 7: Chi-square tests by model

Model 1: guerra ~ cmales + enraigub + crececon + pibpercap + esperanzavida				
Model 2: guerra ~ 1				
#Df	LogLik	Df	Chisq	Pr(>Chisq)
1	-444.13			
2	-531.10	-5	173.94	< 2.2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1				
Likelihood ratio test				
Model 2: guerra ~ cmales + enraigub + esperanzavida				
Model 2: guerra ~ 1				
#Df	LogLik	Df	Chisq	Pr(>Chisq)
1	-444.9			
2	-531.1	-3	172.4	< 2.2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1				
Likelihood ratio test				
Model 3: guerra ~ cmales + enraigub				
Model 2: guerra ~ 1				
#Df	LogLik	Df	Chisq	Pr(>Chisq)
1	-515.67			
2	-531.10	-2	30.869	1.98e-07 ***
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1				
Likelihood ratio test				
Model 4: guerra ~ enraigub + crececon + pibpercap + esperanzavida				
Model 2: guerra ~ 1				
#Df	LogLik	Df	Chisq	Pr(>Chisq)
1	-472.96			
2	-531.10	-4	116.28	< 2.2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1				
Likelihood ratio test				
Model 5: guerra ~ estatalidad				
Model 2: guerra ~ 1				
#Df	LogLik	Df	Chisq	Pr(>Chisq)
1	-519.75			
2	-531.10	-1	22.701	1.893e-06 ***
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1				

Based on the results obtained from constructing the models and their respective tests, it can be concluded that both hypotheses are confirmed. It is evident that government entrenchment is a variable that has a statistically significant inverse relationship with the existence of wars in African states, while material capabilities, understood as a political variable, and life expectancy, the latter understood as a variable that reflects social aspects, also have a statistically significant relationship with our variable to be explained, the first a positive relationship, the second a negative or inverse relationship.

Similarly, the State variable, resulting from the combination of political variables (material capabilities, government embedding), economic variables (economic growth, GDP per capita) and social variables (life expectancy), also has a statistically significant and inverse relationship with the variable of the existence of wars in African states. In this sense, it can be stated that the existence of wars in African states since the end of World War II is largely explained by the influence of political factors and, to a lesser extent, social factors, although economic factors had an inverse influence that was not statistically significant.

Conclusion

The objective of this research was to investigate the influence that government entrenchment and levels of statehood had on the existence of national wars in African countries after the end of World War II. To this end, two hypotheses were formulated to guide empirical research, and their contrasts were tested through the design of logistic regression models. Based on the conception of four multivariate logistic regression models, it was found that since the end of World War II, the probability of African states experiencing national wars is inversely and significantly associated with levels of government entrenchment. In other words, based on the results of this study, it can be stated that higher levels of government rooting, the lower the probability of national wars in Africa.

In turn, based on the design of a bivariate logistic regression model, where the independent variable, governance levels, is derived from the combination of the remaining political, economic, and social variables considered in this study, it was also found that since the end of World War II, the probability of African states experiencing national wars is inversely and significantly associated with governance levels. In other words, based on the results of

this study, it can be stated that the higher the level of statehood, the lower the probability of the occurrence of national wars in the African continent.

Although the research does not propose to analyze specific cases but rather seeks a general relationship between State constitution and institutionalization with the occurrence of war, some specific observations deserve to be made. The statistical test aligns with the theoretical discussions presented at the beginning of this article: State institutionalization (or lack thereof) is directly related to instabilities in the security sphere, especially when it comes to conflicts that are not interstate.

It is relevant that the hypothesis test found a positive relationship between material capabilities and the occurrence of wars, which translates into the issue of maintaining political groups in power and the existence of conflicts. As highlighted by Job (1997) and Ayoob (2002), the issues of state-building – stemming from the decolonization process – and institutional structuring lead to the ‘dilemma of internal security.’ The political forces in power, once they have the material capabilities to do so, will potentially use violent means to maintain the *status quo*. This was the case, for example, in Angola during the almost 30 years of civil war.

Similarly, it is worth highlighting the statistical conclusion that economic variables, although influential, are secondary. This inference corroborates the relationship between development and peace. There is no way to expect that in a conflict environment, socioeconomic development will advance. Nor is it possible to aspire that specific improvements in economic aspects can have significant impacts in a context of insecurity.

Finally, it is pertinent to revisit the basic premise that guided this research from the beginning: there is a relationship between the existence of wars and the level of statehood. African states, in many cases, are still undergoing the process of building and strengthening their internal sovereignty. It is expected, therefore, that as these states progress in the construction of their institutions and sovereignty, the frequency and intensity of conflicts will decrease.

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ABSTRACT

The following article aims to investigate to what extent the existence of national wars in African states, from the end of World War II until 2015, was conditioned by levels of government entrenchment and levels of statehood. Based on the design and application of five logistic regression models, the study essentially shows that higher levels of government entrenchment are associated with a lower probability of internal wars in African states, and higher levels of statehood are associated with a lower probability of national wars in African states.

KEYWORDS

Africa. State. War.

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SKIMMING THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY REGIONAL FORCE IN THE KIVU: ANOTHER TEST CASE OF 'AFRICAN SOLUTIONS TO AFRICAN PROBLEMS'

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Introduction

Regional integration is premised on the principle of subsidiarity enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations Organisation which empowers regional bodies to resolve conflicts in their jurisdictions (Chapter 8, Article 52). It implies cooperation among states sharing a geographic proximity. In Africa, such regional organisations include the Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Common Market for East Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), and Southern African Development Community (SADC) to name but a few. However, the end of the Cold War witnessed the rise of intrastate conflicts worldwide, which many analysts associated with donor fatigue toward aid-dependent states (Thomas and Mazrui 1992; Bayart 2009; Bates 2008; Solomon 2015). These new wars of the 1990s were more pronounced in resource-rich countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kaldor 2006; Collier 2008). As a result, many economic communities established relevant protocols to boost regional integration and foster peace on the African continent: ECCAS Protocol of Peace and Security; ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security (1999); SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security (2001); EAC Protocol on Peace and Security (2013).

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Of particular interest in this paper is the East African Community (EAC). The leaders of newly independent countries of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania first met in Kampala and agreed to revive the then British protectorate with the establishment of EAC on June 6, 1967. Ten years later, however, this noble initiative collapsed for several reasons, and at the end of the Cold War, the trio states revitalised it with the ratification of its Treaty on November 30, 1993. The following year, the Great Lakes Region of Africa (GLR) plunged into chaos as a result of the genocide in Rwanda. Many survivors of the Tutsi/Hutu saga sought refuge in neighbouring countries. In particular, the influx of Hutu refugees in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the ensuing manhunt of the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Force quickly transformed refugee camps into slaughterhouses (Meredith 2006; Stearns 2011). Driven by economic interests in the mineral-rich Kivu provinces, invading troops from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda engaged the loyalist forces and allies (Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe) in what became the African World War between 1996 and 2001, leaving behind a myriad of armed groups to fuel the war economy and terrorize local population (Coleman 2007; Bates 2008; Prunier 2009).

In the GLR, the geo-strategic position of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) places it at the crossroad of regional communities. The process of integration began with the creation of the Central Bank for Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi in 1927 by the Belgian colonial authority, after Germany's defeat in World War I. On September 20, 1976, in Gisenyi (Rwanda), the tripartite renamed this colonial project the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC). In 1983, DRC became a member of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Searching for strong allies to fight the war of aggression imposed by its eastern neighbours, it turned south and joined the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in February 1998. It is worth noting that the DRC was also instrumental in the creation of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in 2003 to find African solutions to armed conflicts in the region, in collaboration with the United Nations (UN). ICGLR is made up of the DRC's neighbouring countries, namely Angola, Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania.

Following the admission of Rwanda and Burundi into the EAC on July 1, 2007, ECGLC became redundant, and as a result, the DRC turned out to be a choice destination for external armed opposition crossing its eastern border. It is observed that "neighbouring Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi pursued their enemies and their economic interests in the restive region, taking advantage of its enormous natural resources" (Sawyer 2022). On its

part, Kinshasa continuously condemned Kigali for being the brain behind insecurity in the region through the illegal exploitation of natural resources at gunpoint for more than three decades, a claim refuted by the latter but largely supported by UN experts as well as the US and the EU. Repeatedly, Kigali justified the presence of Rwandese troops as a pre-emptive attack against the Democratic Force for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) that had supposedly found a haven in the Kivu region since 1994 (ICG 2020).

Meanwhile, an intervention force serving under the United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) that later became the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has been largely stationed in the conflict zone (Ituri, North, and South Kivu) since 2001, with the Security Council mandate to stabilize the country. This impressive multinational force comprises more than 17,000 armed personnel and has an annual budget exceeding one billion US dollars (UN 2010). In 2013, it teamed up with the Special Brigade set up by the African Union, operating under the commands of Tanzania, to dislodge the remnants of National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). Defeated, many CNDP fighters retreated to Rwanda and Uganda before reappearing in November 2021 as the M23 rebellion. The nickname refers to March 23, 2009, a day when secret deals were reached between these aggressed forces and the Kabila government. According to the Mapping Report of the UN and subsequent fieldwork accounts of various international bodies, the proliferation of armed groups operating in DRC has been orchestrated in particular by Rwanda and Uganda (UNHCR 2010).

Despite the presence of multinational forces in the region, particularly MONUSCO, the M23 fighters continue to defy the international community's call for a ceasefire, seizing chunks of the territory and threatening to invade the commercial hub of Goma (van de Walle 2020; Russo 2022). It is within this context of mounting mistrust among regional leaders that the DRC applied to join the East African Community, aspiring to benefit from the Common Market. On April 8, 2022, Congolese President Felix-Antoine Tshisekedi signed the EAC Treaty at the State House in Nairobi, Kenya, in the presence of President Uhuru Kenyatta (Chair), Ugandan President Kaguta Yoweri Museveni, and Rwandan President Paul Kagame. At face value, the DRC's membership in EAC is another attempt to find "African solutions to African problems" (Figuremariam 2017). It is particularly interesting as it raises several questions. Does economic integration necessarily espouse collective security? Why does the protracted armed conflict in eastern DRC defy regional and international initiatives for peace? What is the way forward in the pacification of the Great Lakes region of Africa?

Guided by the Dependency Theory of Integration, this paper attempts to address these research questions by adopting the content analysis approach around the EAC Treaty and Protocols and unveiling some counterforce to regional integration. The argumentation is organised around five sections. After a brief background on the perennial instability in the Great Lakes Region of Africa stemming from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the study adopts the theoretical framework of integration to lay the ground for the analysis of the EAC Treaty and Protocol in view of appreciating the contribution of regional economic communities in resolving conflicts. Against the backdrop of finding 'African solutions to African problems', the paper proceeds with an evaluation of the East African Community Regional Force in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The study's findings are discussed in detail before reaching a modest conclusion.

Theoretical framework

In the field of International Relations (IR), competing theories explain the behaviour of state actors in the international system. For instance, Realism stresses the anarchical nature of the international system in which the unfettered pursuit of self-interest by autonomous states makes interstate conflicts unavoidable (Bull 2012; Dune and Schmidt 2011). On the other hand, integration theorists, under different labels, challenge the realist assumption of bellicose states being the sole actors in IR and paint a more sophisticated picture of contemporary global politics around the concepts of interdependence, cooperation, integration, functionalism, and intergovernmentalism, among others (Garza 2006). In particular, International Integration is premised on interdependence and cooperation among states in their joint efforts to avoid unhealthy competition that is likely to result in a military confrontation. However, this study makes use of the Dependency theory to highlight the dysfunction of regional integration stemming from the perennial power imbalance which characterises the relationship between rich and poor nations (Munro 2023).

The Dependency theory, propounded by Raul Prebisch and his colleagues in the 1950s, explains the situation of inequality existing between the rich and poor countries, which the neoclassical model has engendered. In this model, usually known as "trickle-down" economics, the poor countries are latecomers and their people are often blamed for being lazybones. Theorists of Dependency in IR contend that economic interdependence among nations is a forced integration that is designed to benefit the centre to the detriment

of the periphery. According to them, the widening gap between rich and poor nations is not due to the latter not being integrated into the world system, or not 'fully' integrated, as is often argued by free-market economists, but because of the way they are integrated into the system (Garza 2006). They should embark on massive programmes of import substitution and self-reliance construed as a policy of controlled interaction with the world economy (Ferraro 2008). Like individual spokes in a bicycle tire, poor states converge to the hub and make it strong, but once detached from the periphery, the centre falls apart (Adedeji 2002). That is why any attempt coming from peripheral nations to resist this interdependency results in economic sanctions, military invasion, and control, coming from the centre (Garza 2006).

Even though there is no consensus as to what Dependency theory means, theorists converge on at least three core arguments:

1. dependency characterises the international system as comprised of two sets of states, described with the binaries dominant/dependent, centre/periphery, or metropolitan/satellite;
2. external forces (multinational corporations, international commodity markets, foreign assistance, communications, and the likes) are of singular importance to the economic activities within the dependent states;
3. the relations between dominant and dependent states are dynamic because the interactions between the two sets of states tend to not only reinforce but also intensify the unequal patterns (Ferraro 2008).

In short, an overt imbalance characterises this two-way dependency between the centre and the periphery: poor nations supply raw materials and cheap labour; they serve as a repository for outdated technology and maintain open markets for manufactured goods. The profits from these goods contribute to the economies of wealthy nations, enabling them to sustain the standard of living they currently enjoy. Such a Marxist theory of forced integration remains valid as long as the mainstream lexicon is yet to discard the divisive paradigms of rich and poor, developed and developing, core and periphery, north and south. It begs the question as to whether the integration of rich nations carries the seeds of division among poor nations. How far does the politics of hub and spokes influence the EAC in particular, as far as the promotion of peace and security in the Great Lakes region of Africa is concerned? These and similar questions are addressed afterwards, but before it is important to establish the connection between economic communities

and resolution of international conflicts by skimming the EAC Treaty and Protocol.

Analysing the EAC Treaty and Protocol

The East African Community traces its beginning back to the construction, under the British colonial authority, of the Kenya-Uganda Railway (1897-1901), the establishment of the East African Currency (1905) and of the Customs Union between Kenya and Uganda in 1917, among other things. The project of regional integration expanded when the German colony of Tanganyika was turned over to Great Britain after the First World War. As independent nations and bona fide members of the United Nations, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania advanced the cause of economic cooperation with the creation in 1967 of East African Cooperation in the light of the 1945 UN Charter, especially in Chapter 8, article 52. But for a decade, this economic cooperation suffered a setback as a result of political meddling in internal matters of member states, notably the Uganda-Tanzania War that led to the overthrow of President Idi Amin in 1979 and the accession to power of warlord Yoweri Museveni on January 26, 1986 (Meredith 2006). The dissimilarity in political economy amongst the pro-capitalist Kenya, socialist Tanzania and militarist Uganda made economic cooperation obsolete (Muenda 2010).

However, the end of the Cold War ushered in a new area of cooperation, beginning with the signing of the Agreement for the Establishment of the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Co-operation, on November 30, 1993 in Kampala. Since then, important milestones along the way to regional integration have been registered: the launching of EAC Secretariat in Arusha, Tanzania (1996); the introduction of a draft document for the Establishment of the EAC Treaty; and a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Defense Matters (April 30, 1998). Signed on November 30, 1999, the Treaty entered into force on July 7, 2000. The following year, at the first EAC summit, the EAC was formally launched at the Sheikh Amri Abeid Stadium in Arusha on January 15, 2001. The same day also witnessed the signing of Protocols which defined Rules of Procedure for the Summit of Heads of State and Rules of Procedure for the Admission of other countries to the East African Community.

The expansion of EAC materialised with the admission of Rwanda and Burundi on July 1, 2007. They both joined the Customs Union five days later. At the tenth Anniversary celebration (November 20, 2009), EAC

partner states signed a Common Market Protocol which entered in force after ratification by all the parties on July 1, 2010. The Republic of South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo officially joined the EAC on September 5, 2016 and April 8, 2022 respectively (EAC 2022). Visibly, economic cooperation constitutes the backbone of the EAC. As it is stated in the Treaty Preamble:

Member states are determined to strengthen their economic, social, cultural, political, technological and other ties for their fast balanced and sustainable development by the establishment of an East African Community, with an East African Customs Union and a Common Market as transitional stages to and integral parts thereof, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation (EAC 2006).

Divided into 29 Chapters and 153 Articles, the 2001 Treaty, whose duration is perpetual, (Article 144) aims at promoting regional cooperation in all areas of common interests, including: Trade Liberalisation; Investment and Industrial Development; Monetary and Financial Cooperation; Infrastructure and Services; Human Resources, Science and Technology; Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Rights of Establishment and Residence; Agriculture and Food Security, Environment and Natural Resources; Health, Social and Cultural Activities; and Political Affairs. Of particular interest in this study is the clause of Consensus contained in the decision-making process, whether at the Council of Ministers or at the Summit of Heads of State and Government (Articles 12.3 and 15.4). It means that important decisions must be made by the unanimity of votes rather than a majority vote or a decision of a selected group of people.

As far as the cooperation in Political Affairs is concerned, the adoption of common foreign and security policies (art. 123.2) suggests the implementation of collective security within EAC has the vocation to becoming a Political Federation. However, given some vested interests among community members, it can be cumbersome to arrive at a consensus regarding the withdrawal, suspension and expulsion of a member (art. 145, 146, 147) even though the views of penalised parties are not considered during deliberation (art. 148). What is also problematic in this chapter of political cooperation is the lack of an enforcement mechanism through which partner states relinquish some prerogatives (sovereignty) for the attainment of a truly Political Federation.

It is also important to glance at the Protocol on Peace and Security, which Ministers of Partner States signed on February 15, 2013, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (EAC 2013). In its preamble, peace, security and strong political relations are spelled out and they constitute the foundation stones for regional cooperation, which is the catchword that runs through the 2013 Protocol in various areas of common interest, including:

- (a) conflict prevention, management and resolution (art. 4);
- (b) prevention of genocide (art. 5);
- (c) combating terrorism (art. 6);
- (e) peace support operations (art. 8);
- (g) management of refugees (art. 10);
- (h) control of proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons (art. 11);
- (i) combating transnational and cross-border crimes; including drug and human trafficking, illegal migration, money laundering, cybercrime and motor vehicle theft (art. 12).

Even though the Protocol provides for cooperation whenever a Partner State is victim of external aggression (art. 3), such an intervention package collides with the principles of respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of Partner States bequeathed from the UN Charter and the AU Constitutive Act. As of 2017, according to the Chair of EAC Council of Ministers, not all Partner States have ratified the Protocol. Consequently, the Community records a delay in setting up the EAC Security Council, the Stand-by Force, the Panel of the Wise and related institutional capacities and structures. More importantly, the question as to what must be done in case of non-compliance to the agreed Protocol by any Partner State is not clearly spelt out. In short, both EAC Treaty and Protocols lack internal enforcement mechanisms to deal with defaulters, especially with regards to the resolution of conflicts within the Community. In the next section, the adhesion of the Democratic Republic of Congo into the EAC is worth considering in order to make sense of the disconnect between economic integration and collective security.

Democratic Republic of Congo in EAC: another false start?

The stability of the DRC remains fragile despite the country's accession to various regional communities. In particular, the perennial armed

conflict in the eastern part of the country constitutes a thorn in the flesh of the GLR. The ratification of the EAC Treaty in Nairobi, Kenya, by President F.A. Tshisekedi in 2021 marked a step in the direction of finding lasting solutions to security problems, in addition to economic gains stemming from the Customs Union. Having passed the admission test, the new Partner State (DRC) would share the vision of founding fathers to establish an economic community that is expected to transmute into a political federation in the near future. According to the then Kenyan President, the DRC has satisfied all the conditions under Articles 3 and 4 of the EAC Treaty and “To get to this point, it has taken strong leadership, commitment to the ideals of the EAC integration agenda and a clear understanding of the shared benefits that come with working together” (Owaka 2022). In the same vein, President Museveni of Uganda reminded the audience of the three tenets of regional integration, namely “prosperity for people and their families through bigger markets; strategic security and brotherhood among the people of the region” (Owaka 2022). The same scholar reports that President Kagame of Rwanda, who was eager to witness the enlargement of the Community, urged his counterparts “to get down to implementing the commitments they have made so far to enable the bloc to realise its objectives.” On July 11, 2022, DRC became the seventh full-fledged member of EAC, but the news of Rwanda-backed M23 in the DRC continued to make headlines while EAC partner states kept silent.

During several summits and diplomatic trips abroad, the Congolese President has sounded the same clarion call for action against the regime of Paul Kagame of Rwanda, but here and there his rhetoric seems to fall on deaf ears. The latter enjoys special relationships with Great Britain, France and the European Union, especially in the area of military support and development aid. Whether at the African Union summits in Addis Ababa or similar regional organisations to which DRC is a member (Economic Community of Central Africa, Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Southern African Development Community), the implication of the hub-and-spokes policy is such that no country has openly condemned the presence of the Rwandan troops in Eastern Congo. Instead, in a bid to fashion African solutions to African problems, regional leaders are busy calling the DRC to dialogue with the terrorist M23.

The international community warmed to the appointment of Angolan President João Lourenço of Angola as mediator and the Luanda talk on July 6, 2022, brought Tshisekedi and Kagame face to face. It produced a roadmap for the pacification of eastern DRC which includes among other things: establishment of a climate of confidence between the states of the Great Lakes Region; immediate cessation of hostilities; immediate withdrawal of the positions

occupied by M23 movement on Congolese territory in accordance with the Nairobi final communique; creation of conditions for the return of refugees and establishment of regional mechanisms to combat the illegal exploitation of natural resources. At the 77th UN General Assembly on September 20, 2022, President Tshisekedi sought once again the condemnation of Rwanda by openly accusing the latter of repeatedly masterminding rebellions in eastern DRC since 1996 in order to loot natural resources at a higher cost of destruction of civilian populations and their livelihoods. He supported his claim with credible reports of UN Experts and NGOs in the region (UN 2022).

Meanwhile, the Luanda talks moved to Nairobi on November 28, 2022. According to Hoinathy (2023), "The two initiatives have different but complementary formats. While Nairobi focuses on armed groups, Luanda addresses the DRC-Rwanda political dimensions – a reminder of the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the region, which has not been implemented." In Bujumbura, under the rotational presidency of Mr Evarist Ndayishimiye, EAC Partner States agreed to individually contribute combat troops to be deployed in the DRC with an offensive mandate, alongside MONUSCO and the Force Intervention Brigade it absorbed in 2013. As one analyst observes, "this is the first time the EAC is sending troops to a member state. It will be a litmus test of the bloc's ability to handle complex political and security challenges" (Sawyer 2022). The six-month mandate of East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) has been extended to September 2023 but the M23 fighters continue to defy the AU solemn Declaration of "Silencing the Guns" by the year 2020 (AU 2016).

In the face of a military stalemate, foreign fighters are still occupying several localities in North Kivu, brutally murdering hapless population on their way and under the watch of the said international forces. For the conflict-affected DRC, whose membership in regional economic communities is multiple, the display of inaction by the EACRF raises doubts about the legitimacy of an economic community to resolve conflicts, keeping in mind the problematic composition of the force itself. It seems to suggest that the adhesion of DRC to EAC is another false start after decades of the UN Stabilisation Mission in the country. To make sense of the bystander's attitude of external actors is the focus of the discussion below.

Discussion of findings

The foregoing has shed light on a number of pressing issues stemming from the question why the multiple membership of DRC in regional economic communities does not adequately address its main challenge of peace and security deficit, particularly in the East. Focusing on the East African community, the study has found that the consensus-based decision-making process not only impinges on the EAC progress toward a political federation but also keeps the doors of regional economic communities open to external engineering and control, strategic partnership, regional mistrust, and lack of political will, among other things. First, **external meddling and control** over poor countries have outlived colonisation and rendered regional integration redundant. The unification of post-war nations in Europe (one flag, one currency, common market and immigration policies) does not translate into the unity of Africa even though it may have inspired post-independent leaders to form regional communities.

In particular, the creation of the African Union, formerly the Organisation of African Unity (1963) was designed to bring post-colonial entities together and constitute a common front in the negotiation processes with sister organisations. Since then, however, the metropolises have left the umbilical cord uncut. In other words, donor countries hold the control of regional organisations in Africa by way of bankrolling projects and shouldering annual budgets. As goes the saying, he who pays the piper calls the tune. Stapel and Soderbaum (2020) map out external funding to these organisations in the field of security and governance, which comes mostly from the EU, USA and China. They argue that this increasing financial support to Regional Organisations reflects geostrategic interests and it should not be seen as neutral. As they point out in their concluding paragraphs, “a growing body of literature alludes to potentially problematic effects, with excessive donor dependence resulting in diminished Regional Organisations’ effectiveness, implementation gaps and the failure of member states to comply with decisions and budget targets.”

Close to three decades, the presence of foreign troops in eastern DRC has placed Rwanda and Uganda in the position of middlemen in the global market. Behind these countries operate multinational companies interested in strategic minerals that are found mainly in the Kivu provinces (OCHA 2001). As reported by Carroll (2001), “A scramble for gold, diamonds, cobalt and copper by army officers, government officials and entrepreneurs from Congo and neighbouring African countries had generated billions of dollars

which found its way to mining companies and financial institutions.” Therefore, to keep the war economy flourishing is good for the suppliers of raw materials and multinational corporations. Whether at the local, national and regional level, any initiative to break the supply chain is bound to fail, given the hub-and-spokes relationship that ties poor and rich nations together and therefore turns regional economic cooperation into cosmetics.

Second, maintaining **special partnerships** between powerful nations and individual member states of regional organisations (ROs) is a stumbling block for effective integration. Yesterday, Ugandan President, Y. Museveni was the darling of Western capitals and sponsor of many rebellions in the region that culminated in regime changes in Rwanda (1994) and Zaire (Bayart 2009). After the genocide, Paul Kagame of Rwanda earned the sympathy of donor countries that rallied around to fund 40% of the national budget (CNN 2004). Since then, the landlocked country in Central Africa has remained the major beneficiary of military and development aid for decades, the highest donor aid per capita in East Africa. Even though the United States and the European Union have issued official statements to condemn the ignoble aggression of DRC by a neighbouring country, they fall short of formulating disciplinary sanctions against Kigali. Instead, the Biden administration continues to honour its strategic partnership with Kagame (US 2022). As many critics contend, the guilty conscience has blinded mature democracies (USA, France and Britain) to the obvious descent into dictatorship of the Kagame regime, thus sacrificing human rights and freedoms on the altar of infrastructural development.

Recently, the EU decided to reinforce the military capability of Rwanda in maintaining peace in the region to the tune of 20 million Euro, thus compromising its credibility in the stability of the DRC. The same destabilising effect of strategic partnership in Africa can be found in the decision of the then British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, in April 2022 to illegally repatriate unsuccessful asylum-seekers to Rwanda in exchange for £120 million in funding to the Kagame regime, without considering the fact that this poor nation is in dire need of land for its teeming population. As one observer contends, “With France and the UK closely embedded in Kagame’s regime and not applying diplomatic pressure on its new ally, the hope for peace in eastern DRC remains unlikely” (Realfonzo 2022). Not only does the overt backing of donor countries to Rwanda sends a strong message to African leaders to keep mute if they want to remain recipients of Overseas Development Aid (ODA) but it also undermines the credibility of Western countries toward sustainable peace in the region. Instead of sanctioning the M23 fighters and their sponsors, the international community, AU and

regional leaders amount pressures on the Congolese government to open political dialogue with the enemy even though such dialogue witnessed, in the recent past, the proliferation of armed groups in the Kivu provinces and a high level of infiltration of foreign fighters in the civil service, the army and police.

Third is the prevailing climate of **regional mistrust**. The three founding states of the EAC (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) were former British colonies and are presently Commonwealth nations. With the admission of Rwanda and South Sudan in this international grouping (EAC), a strong faultline has been created within the Community and it was later reinforced by the accession of Rwanda into the Commonwealth at the November 2009 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Trinidad and Tobago (Dyar 2010). Consequently, within EAC, five Anglophone members out of seven share common bonds with London. With former Belgian colonies (Burundi and DRC) out of the Commonwealth of nations, the ensuing outcome is that unwritten laws may apply from the centre (Westminster) to peripheries. If the heads of States and government gathered around the then Prince of Wales between June 20 and 25, 2022, in Kigali (close to the conflict zone), ignore the ongoing violent conflict in the Kivu region, which has continued to claim thousands of deaths across the Rwandan border, it is unlikely that a single member of the Commonwealth, and in particular EAC as a whole, would, on its own terms, speak openly against the aggression of Rwandan patriotic force (RPF), being accused of perpetrating atrocities in the Kivu (CHOGM 2022).

The prevalent climate of mistrust among EAC political leaders undermines the emergence of a political federation that rests on mutually-beneficial cooperation. For instance, in 2000, both Uganda and Rwanda displayed rival interests over the pillage of natural resources in a six-day war in Ituri that claimed thousands of civilian deaths and the destruction of local communities (Stearns 2011). In a war of words, the position of Tanzania to lead a Multi-national Joint Task Force into the DRC set Dodoma against Kigali, whose troops were accused of perpetuating the mineral conflict in the Kivu region as far back as 2013. On her part, Rwanda accused Burundi of sheltering the genocidaires, while Bujumbura blamed Kigali for masterminding the 2015 failed coup (Genet 2013). Some analysts have observed an entrenched *modus vivendi* in the GLR whereby “Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi all have resorted to supporting armed groups operating in Eastern DRC as a means to fight via proxies and track their respective enemies” (Verweijen and Vogel 2023). Recently, in a press conference on April 17, 2023 in Cotonou (Benin), Mr Kagame made his expansionist ambition known by stating that the M23 issue

was related to the claiming of Rwandan heritage by the Congolese government. As he puts it: "The borders drawn by colonisation divided the people, with one part of Rwanda given to the East of the DRC and the other to the South of Uganda" (APA 2023). This is an African way of finding a solution to an African problem that has the potential to engulf the entire continent into protracted border conflicts, but it is "a doctrine close to Rwandan President Paul Kagame's heart" (ICG 2023).

Fourth, the **lack of political will** is apparent in most African initiatives. Regional actors are divided on critical issues such as sovereignty, democracy, good governance, human rights and freedom. As far as EAC is concerned, it is unlikely that leaders that came to power through military coups and elongated their terms in office by changing constitutions would accept to share sovereignty. The Expert Report on the EAC Political Federation reveals that one of the most manifest challenges is the issue of sovereignty and the attendant notions of loss of national identity, political power, decision-making and loss of flexibility in exercising power. Other pressing issues include the bitter experience of the collapse of the former EAC, which still influences people's attitude and raises apprehension about political integration; the disparities in the practice of democracy, good governance, human rights, constitutionalism and the rule of law that generate concerns on how to prevent conflicts, embark on political reform and achieve social justice between the partner states, among other things (Harelimana 2011). For a constituted authority to open up to the enemies of the Republic (M23 terrorists) and eventually share power in the logic of "African solutions to African problems" amounts to the violation of the DRC Supreme law.

Regional communities are established with the purpose of economic cooperation rather than fighting interstate wars. The membership of many communities overlaps and, at the same time, exposes African countries to endemic conflicts of interest, but the 1945 UN Charter explicitly prohibits the transformation of economic communities into peace enforcement instruments: "No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council" (Chapter 8, art. 53). Following the decision to deploy EACRF in eastern DRC, Kenya was the first country to dispatch a Defense Force (KDF) in Goma on November 16, 2022. It was later joined by troops from Burundi, Uganda and South Sudan. But more than a year after their arrival, the M23 terrorists and ADF still control many localities in North Kivu and Ituri, under the EAC watch (Russo 2022). Noticeable is the lackadaisical attitude of the Force Commandant to walk the talk in line with what both the Luanda and Nairobi peace roadmap raises. Meanwhile, the reality on the ground is such that:

The EAC force has been unable to break the political impasse, even though the main objective of its military deployment has been to facilitate political solutions. Despite Kinshasa's repeated requests, the force has refused to militarily engage the M23 in order not to antagonize Rwanda, an EAC member (Verweijen and Vogel 2023).

Obviously, the EACRF has adopted the double principle of neutrality and impartiality that has been guiding the MONUC for decades and, behind the veil of inaction, is hidden the principle of promoting national interests involving a supreme sacrifice on the parts of the military personnel. Except for hired fighters who are ready to die for profit (mercenaries), the principle states that soldiers are not expected to fall on the battlefield in pursuing other objectives rather than the defence of national interests, be it at home and abroad (McFate 2019; Gross 2008). Simply put, the supreme sacrifice of regular army personnel does not accommodate humanitarian intervention. Granted that fighters will not willingly lay down their weapons and embrace peace unless they are overpowered and coerced, the deployment of foreign troops in conflict zones can be interpreted as window dressing strategy to dissuade the enemy. That is why the mandate of intervention forces is constantly renewed and modified to conceal logistic errors.

It is worth mentioning that SADC leaders gathered at the May 19, 2023 Summit in Windhoek (Namibia) decried the friendly approach of EACRF toward M23/RPF fighters and agreed to deploy an offensive Force equipped with attack helicopters and artillery, to enforce peace and security within the framework of the SADC Standby Force in support of a member state (DRC). Whether the decision of SADC will see the light of the day and overrun EACRF in the near future remains to be seen (Fabricus 2022). In the past, the success of ECOWAS in stabilising Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone can be attributed to the creation of the Nigeria-led ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), presently the ECOWAS Standing Force (ESF). Faced with the rise of military takeover in West Africa (Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea Conakry and now in Niger), ECOWAS has resorted to economic and financial sanctions. It remains to be seen if this economic community, already fractured, will enforce democracy in a member state (the Republic of Niger) as the Abuja meeting suggests an intervention force (Olafusi 2023). As one analyst contends:

No matter how popular the phrase 'African solutions to African problems' may be, the fact of the matter is that Africa's states, RECs, sub-regional and regional organisations are currently not able to conduct any sustained or long-term peace support operations on the continent without the requisite economic, logistical and political commitment and technological capacity of external donors, such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the European Union (Solomon 2015, 69).

The failure of regional communities to enforce peace in conflict zones reflects the dictate of rich nations on the poor ones. It is therefore politically incorrect for regional economic communities to migrate into multinational forces when the political will of member states is in short supply. In the absence of a standby force in the likeness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation that guarantees the security of member states, the maintenance of peace and security remains the prerogative of individual Partner States in conformity to the mainstream tradition of power politics (NATO 2018).

Conclusion

The *raison d'être* of regional integration is for countries to pool their resources together and address common challenges, such as infrastructural development, free movement of people, goods and services facilitated by the Customs Union and Common Market, among other things. Like fruits that grow on a tree, the many benefits of economic communities are rooted in the provision of Peace and Security within the region. This paper has skimmed the EAC Treaty and Protocol, aiming to make sense of the correlation between economic cooperation and resolution of conflicts. In the light of the Dependency Theory, it is argued that international cooperation does not translate into a level-playing ground which is beneficial for the poor nations to break the traps of dependency. Instead, the dominant hub and spokes' relationship that has outlived the colonial policy of divide and rule impacts negatively on regional initiatives in Africa. Consequently, the protracted armed conflict in eastern DRC is relegated to internal matters, even though various reports of the UN have named Rwanda and Uganda as major sponsors of armed groups. The study has found that the consensus-based decision-making process impinges on the EAC progress toward a political federation. The lackadaisical attitude of intervening troops in DRC veils a number of things: bilateral mistrust, external funding and coercion, strategic partnerships with powerful nations, and conflicting foreign policies being perceived as a lack

of political will, among other things. The *déjà-vu* call for a political dialogue with armed non-state actors (M23) appears to be the only game in town, but it amounts to a violation of the country's Supreme Law. Whether SADC has the political will to overrun the EASTRF in eastern Congo remains to be seen in the coming months. All things considered, the maintenance of peace and security remains a state-bound initiative and it is contingent on the capacity of national armies to defend the territorial integrity of their respective countries in the self-help world of power politics.

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ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War witnessed the decline in interstate conflicts but it also caused many poor countries to fall from within. Even though many economic communities were established to boost regional integration and foster peace on the African continent, externally-backed armed conflicts have continued to defy regional initiatives for peace and security. This desk study is concerned with the perennial conflict in the Great Lakes Region, going back to the 1994 Rwandan genocide as it affected many countries, particularly the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It intends to address the question as to whether the adhesion of DRC into the East African Community (EAC) will improve the country's relationships with its eastern neighbours and support peace in the sub-region or if it is another false start. Using the theoretical framework of international cooperation, the paper adopts a content analysis method of available documents (EAC Treaty and Protocols) to make sense of this regional community's disposition to mutate into an intervention force. It has been found that the consensus-based decision-making process and the absence of enforcement mechanisms constitute major stumbling blocks to the political federation and they reflect the traditional hub-and-spoke relationship between rich and poor nations. Given that economic integration does not imply the silencing of guns within the community, each member state must strengthen its defence system against aggression.

KEYWORDS

Integration. Dependency. Force. Intervention. East Africa. M23.

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THE PROBLEMATICS OF RESETTLEMENTS: A LITERATURE REVIEW

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Introduction

One of the problems faced by Mozambican society in recent years is the management of the resettlements created by the implementation of mega-projects involving the exploitation of natural resources and the construction of major undertakings (roads, bridges and other infrastructure). The aim of this paper is to briefly review the literature on the subject of resettlement, with the objective of devising a future model that can be applied to Mozambican society, respecting the specific characteristics of each community, based on the problems identified.

It is extremely important to study resettlement processes in Mozambique, as they have become a phenomenon with harmful consequences for the lives of local communities, as mentioned by Machel (2014), Silva (2018), Marques, Giondo, Cruz and Mendes (2018). According to Castro (2016) and Marques *et al.* (2018), the resettlement process causes major changes in daily life, associated with uncertainty about the future of the resettled populations. Marques *et al.* (2018) also point out that these processes cause changes in the environment and in the lives of those affected.

According to Silva (2018), Manuel (2019) and Azevedo *et al.* (2018), involuntary displacement forces people to uproot themselves from their places to live in other lands. This process always creates inconvenience for the

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affected populations, which can only be minimized if it is accompanied by integration and adaptation policies that are appropriate to the particularities of each population group.

It is in this sense that Manuel (2019) states that the change of territory brings with it the need for those affected to reconfigure the way they communicate. This means rebuilding the social environment, which can be a slow process, especially if governments fail to play their social role.

According to Marques *et al.* (2018) and Azevedo, Santos and Oliveira (2018), both the displaced families and those who remain in the resettlement process suffer the destruction of the social and political fabric. This is because nothing goes back to the way it was before; the forced displacement, whether total or partial, of the community affects the social base built up over the course of history.

The weight of the changes is felt to a large extent by those affected in aspects such as mental health, identity and the representation of the territory for people. Because human beings, by their nature, remain in permanent connection with their surroundings, becoming an integral part of it (Marques *et al.* 2018, 31).

The debate on the concept of resettlement by various international organizations – World Bank (WB), African Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IBRD), among others – aims to respond to problems generated by political conflicts, natural disasters and calamities, economic and social development, among others. However, there is still not much consensus on the concept, due to a diversity of interpretations and possible meanings (Machel 2014).

The regulation on the Resettlement Process Resulting from Economic Activities in Mozambique (*Processo de Reassentamento Resultante de Atividades Económicas*) has a definition of resettlement inspired by the World Bank (WB) directive, in which resettlement is considered to be the displacement or transfer of the affected population from one point of the national territory to another, accompanied by the restoration or creation of conditions equal to or above the previous standard of living.

The aforementioned concept is suitable for this work, as it aims to address issues of the resettlement process arising from economic development, where populations are displaced to make way for mega-projects. According to Sousa (2016), people currently emigrate for various reasons, including the following: economic, political and environmental. Mobility has always characterized human life.

According to Corrêa and Souza (2018), the African continent is a culturally and environmentally rich place, and throughout its history several states have developed strategies of exploration and territorial occupation to this day. Mozambique is part of this continent and is no exception. It has lived through this global scenario that often affects innocent populations, especially when it comes to the wealth of natural resources. According to Lamas (2018), economic growth in Mozambique has been driven to a large extent by the flow of investment in the implementation of mega-projects in the extractive sector, which accelerated its development from the 2000s onwards. For his part, Tsuje (2017) states that the exponential development of the extractive industry in Mozambique is seen as a beneficial factor because it is considered that it will boost the economy.

The exploitation of mineral and energy resources in Mozambique dates back to the last century, albeit timidly. However, the 2000s marked the start of major exploration, with the entry of mega natural gas exploration projects in Temane, in the province of Inhambane, with South African capital in 2004, followed by heavy sand ore exploration in Moma, in Nampula; the entry of the mega mineral coal exploration project by the Brazilian company Vale do Rio Doce; and the signing of contracts with several multinationals to start oil exploration and production in the Rovuma basin, in the province of Cabo Delgado (Bihale 2016). According to the same author, it is estimated that there are more than 150 companies or projects in the mineral and hydrocarbon extraction industry.

The exponential increase in the interest of large multinationals in the exploitation of natural resources has forced countries to improve their legal frameworks to meet this dynamic, which the current legislation did not address. The areas where the mega-projects for the exploitation of natural resources are located belonged to certain populations who were forced to leave them through the process of involuntary resettlement. The majority of these populations were farming communities, with few financial resources and a low level of education, according to data from the 2017 population census. The low level of education, lack of financial resources and lack of support from the companies that own the projects and the government put this population at a disadvantage when it comes to enjoying the benefits brought by this booming industry.

According to Sousa (2016), involuntary resettlements are a global phenomenon that needs special attention from decision-makers and academia. It must be recognized that this phenomenon negatively affects the lives of the affected population, which is often not brought into the discussion

of this process, despite being an integral part of the process and the most sacrificed.

The World Bank's operational policy recommends that any financial investment project, whenever possible, should avoid involuntary displacement. If it deems it unavoidable, it should be accompanied by mitigating measures, as the opposite can cause serious problems, such as: economic, social and environmental risks; impoverishment due to loss of assets or source of income; settlements in places with less productive capacity, which can increase competition over resources; dispersal of families and cultural identity, etc. Those affected must also be guaranteed compensation and beneficiaries of the project must be guaranteed support to re-establish a standard of living similar to or higher than the one they previously enjoyed.

The World Bank's policy is only a guiding instrument. Countries must adopt their own domestic policies, framing their legislation in a way that responds specifically to the concrete problems of their communities.

In the same vein, Scudder (2005), following Cernea's (2003) critique, proposes that development projects should have policies aimed at mitigating the risks associated with resettlement, especially with regard to the acquisition of new land and productive means that guarantee sustainable income. Sousa (2016) points out that, in Mozambique, the fact that the state appears as the agent that causes resettlements and, on the other hand, is responsible for social protection, has complicated several processes.

Authors such as Sousa (2016), José and Lino (2016) and Osório and Silva (2017) state that economic growth derived from the exploitation of natural resources brings with it various problems for resettled families. In our opinion, there is a need to adopt post-occupation management policies accompanied by social work that facilitates the adaptation of those affected to their new homes.

The resettlement processes have been accompanied by various problems (Tsuji 2017; Azevedo, Santos and Oliveira 2018). Even the legal instruments approved by the government, in the name of reducing the suffering of local communities, are not responding to the problems caused by economic development, and if concrete and urgent measures are not taken, economic growth will always come at a high cost for disadvantaged and directly affected populations.

According to Azevedo, Santos and Oliveira (2018), Selemene (2016), Magalhães (2018) and Lamas (2018), the resettlement processes have worsened the lives of the populations, through the allocation of land unsuitable

for farming, homes built without observing safety standards, including disparities in compensation amounts.

The episodes experienced by the populations of the places that have undergone resettlement processes lead us to believe that communication, in many cases, is always poor in these processes, in various parts of the world. Perhaps this is because the owners of the large economic enterprises are the same ones who are expanding their companies across borders.

Methodology

In order to carry out this work, we used an analytical literature review of studies on this subject, including scientific articles, dissertations and thesis on involuntary resettlements. To begin the work, a search was made on the internet for studies on resettlements, from which 25 were selected, the inclusion criterion being research carried out from 2016 to 2020 that pointed out aspects that impacted on the lives of the populations. However, Pedro's dissertation carried out in 2011 was also included, as it was a study in the province of Tete, in Mozambique, a place with reports of the suffering of the populations after the implementation of mega coal mining projects. When processing the data, we triangulated aspects affecting family income (economy), the environment, culture and social coexistence of the affected communities.

Results

After reviewing the national and international literature, we found that the phenomenon of resettlement causes suffering in the populations affected by the projects, whose implementation causes involuntary displacement of local communities. Tavares *et al.* (2018), Oliveira *et al.* (2019), Herrera, Arcanjo, Nathany and Silva (2019) consider that resettlement phenomena change the dynamics of the lives of those affected, as well as the host community. Whenever a resettlement takes place, there is increased pressure on resources. This situation does not only affect the resettled populations, and in many cases local authorities are not prepared for this phenomenon.

Manhique (2020) carried out a study to analyze the impact of resettlement resulting from economic development projects on the social rights of local communities. It was found that:

1. Infringements on social rights contribute to the impoverishment of local communities by jeopardizing access to basic services such as health, education, electricity, water supply, social assistance, among others;
2. economic growth is not accompanied by development, as this requires a series of qualitative institutional improvements aimed at providing well-being for communities.

This situation shows that there is a need to improve support for those affected in the various stages of resettlement, in order to reduce the obstacles that affect progress in the communities affected by development projects. On the other hand, an administrative structure must be set up to ensure the continuity of the services allocated.

If the characteristics of each community are rigorously observed, taking into account the guidelines of the World Bank's policy, combined with fair and equitable legislation, resettlement processes can be an opportunity rather than a problem, as has been the case in most situations so far.

In general, this process provokes in communities a feeling of betrayal on the part of the companies and the government due to the failure to fulfill promises made during the process. Coutinho and Santana (2016), Tavares *et al.* (2018) Lamas (2018), Manuel (2019; 2017), Wamir *et al.* (2017), Cavalcanti *et al.* (2020); Bernardo (2019), and Ribeiro and Mendes (2019) report that, in most cases, there is a lack of effective follow-up, in addition to the failure to restore the standard of living that those affected had in their former homes. Even in cases where there have been some improvements in the provision of basic services (education, health and water supply) to families, compared to previous conditions, authors such as Coutinho and Santana (2016) Pedro (2011) and Bernardo (2019) point out that there are difficulties in allocating all the promises made during the project.

In this case, it can be concluded that there is poor monitoring of the communities affected by resettlements in the process of implementing various projects by government authorities and other bodies that have an obligation to look after the well-being of the populations in their jurisdictions. For their part, the companies do little or nothing to guarantee a continuous improvement in the lives of the communities once they have been implemented.

Social sphere

This area deals with aspects that affect the population in terms of work, health, education, social security and housing. According to Scudder and Colson (1982), quoted by Filipe Bocade (2020), resettlement plans should be designed taking into account the phases that the whole process goes through, such as:

1. Initial demand characterized by the formulation of resettlement plans by decision-makers, whether or not they can consult/inform those affected;
2. Transition is the phase in which those affected learn about their resettlement fate;
3. Potential development is usually the adaptation phase, in which the reconstruction of the resettled people's economy and social networks begins. This is the critical phase because it requires a great deal of assistance to establish their livelihoods;
4. Incorporation, referring to the last phase characterized by the integration of the resettled into the host area. In this phase, resettled people's representatives are encouraged to take on leadership roles so that they feel at home.

The same author proposes that development projects should have policies aimed at mitigating the risks associated with resettlement, especially in terms of acquiring new land and productive means to guarantee sustainable income. Resettlements need to be resized beyond economic rationality, with a focus on the social fabric of these populations, especially the solidarity networks that support them, since it is these that, in times of crisis, bring balance, the disruption of which will never be fairly compensated (Cernea 2003).

Housing generally undergoes changes, whether they are improvements or deteriorations, because they are almost always due to cultural aspects, which force those affected by resettlements to adapt to new building models and spatial configurations. Authors such as Pedro (2012), Chaves *et al.* (2017), Tavares *et al.* (2018), Magalhães (2018) and Azevedo *et al.* (2018) have pointed out problems with the quality of the homes of the resettled families, with the studies by Pedro (2011) and Bernardo (2019) showing the de-characterization of the homes in terms of the traditional homes of these communities. This has implications for the perception of the house, because in rural areas in Mozambique, most houses are built using local resources (reeds, sticks, grass and other materials that nature provides), but in this case

the biggest problem is the lack of quality in the houses built, as they soon began to show cracks (Pedro 2011).

In the same sense, Magalhães (2018), Alves and Mendonça (2019) point out that there is a violation of human rights, such as the right to a decent home, as this right is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Experiences show that in most disadvantaged communities, where houses are built with local materials, there are improvements in housing models as conventional construction begins, which in a way can be an improvement, but technical problems in construction take away all the merit of a better house compared to previous houses.

Coutinho and Santana (2016), Pedro (2011), Silva (2018) and Manuel (2019) in their studies found an increase in insecurity in resettlements. Often, in the places where displaced populations are resettled, police units are not upgraded or built, in cases where none existed, given that an increase in population implies new needs, and conditions for food security are not created.

Silva (2018), Pedro (2011) and Manuel (2019) state that the resettlement process increases the distance people have to travel in search of certain services to meet their daily needs, coupled with the difficulties pointed out in the transportation system. Even if the construction of access and communication routes is observed, it must be remembered that increasing the distance means increasing the financial burden on the resettled populations, who in most cases have low incomes and depend on agriculture to support their lives. Silva (2018) and Oliveira *et al.* (2019) point out that the projects do not include equipment for practicing physical and other leisure activities, which has an impact on the quality of life of this group in need of care from various sectors.

According to Macedo (2017), Bernardo (2019) and Manuel (2019), resettlements cause territorial dispersion which can culminate in the loss of emotional, professional and institutional ties, in addition to the disconnection from the territory of origin. Marques *et al.* (2018) and Barbosa, Giongo and Mendes (2018) warn that resettlements can have effects on the mental health of those affected. The worries and disappointments caused by the resettlements, associated with the failure to fulfill promises made, can contribute to a deterioration in mental health.

Melo, Reis, Silva and Silva (2018), Wamir, Tedim and Ntumi (2017), Bernardo (2019), Manuel (2019) and Oliveira *et al.* (2019) point out that resettlements cause changes in social representations, as well as cultural values, which alters the meanings and affective value that those resettled

had of their space, their traditions, habits and customs. According to Chaves, Monzoni, Mario and Artuso (2019) and Bernardo (2019), one of the aspects that most frustrates the populations is the fact that the companies do not disclose information more clearly and comprehensively about the benefits that positively affect their lives. This causes those affected to create false expectations. For example, when people talk about an increase in the workforce, they often don't mention that, during the operational phase, specialized labor will be needed, which doesn't include the majority of those affected, as in most cases they have a low level of education. We can consider that there is a need to improve communication before, during and after the resettlements, so as not to make abrupt changes, but also to improve the quality of life of the people affected in terms of a decent house with technical quality, so that they have a long life.

Economic sphere

People's daily lives are directly linked to their main income-earning activity, since in many cases this defines their trajectory and alternative means of survival. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that any change of place of residence increases or decreases the distance from the place where the income activity is carried out and, in some cases, removes or alters it. Muaga (2021), in his studies, found that the promises made by the company and the government in the process of public consultation and listening to the communities for resettlement have faded over time, a situation which often compromises the relationship between the parties due to the failure to keep promises.

The studies by Tavares *et al.* (2018) and Manuel (2019) point to changes in diet as a result of the scarcity or absence of products that formed the food basis in the old areas, which were derived from agriculture, the main activity in the areas of origin and the most affected by the expropriation of the spaces that gave way to the mega-projects (Viera 2019), so that the supermarket became the place to look for food products in the new areas. Pedro (2011), Alves *et al.* (2018) and Manuel (2019) point to improvements in access to basic services. This can have both immediate and long-term benefits, as populations come to realize the need for primary medical care in conventional services, as well as a reduction in illiteracy rates. This leads to improvements in the human development index in the areas in question.

On the other hand, Pedro (2011), Alves *et al.* (2018), Jesus *et al.* (2018), Melo *et al.* (2018), Wamir *et al.* (2017) and Lamas (2018) reveal that some improvements have cost communities the loss of cultural identity, as well as profound changes in survival strategies, which has the consequence of impoverishing some families who cannot keep pace with the new reality. In turn, Lamas (2018) points out that inequalities have also increased.

In the same vein, Viera (2019) states that, although it is considered that companies need labor for their implementation, this does not guarantee sustainable employment for those affected in rural areas. This is because a large part of the workforce required in the operational phase requires some level of schooling, in some cases even specialized. The data shows that in rural areas, the illiteracy rate is high.

The communities affected are forced to rebuild, which is often not easy, as it requires adapting to the conditions found in the new locations. In order to reduce the suffering of the resettled populations, local authorities and other social actors are called upon to develop post-resettlement integration and follow-up programs.

According to Tavares *et al.* (2018) and Lamas (2018), resettlements have a negative impact on the economic life of families. Tavares *et al.* (2018) and Cardoso *et al.* (2018) also point out that resettlement causes a decrease in productive activities in the areas of origin, which results in an increase in families who are unable to maintain a sufficient monthly income compared to the period before resettlement.

Alves *et al.* (2018) state that quality housing programs in resettlements must take into account not only the housing structure itself, but also what is or isn't around it (the surrounding neighborhoods, leisure facilities, etc.). Aspects such as increased distance, unproductive land and the cost of new services (water, electricity, etc.) require a financial response. However, in many cases, these challenges are not accompanied by increases in income, which has further complicated the lives of resettled people.

Environmental sphere

Starting from the premise that resettlements cause spatial displacements, it is extremely important to understand their consequences on human beings in order to delve deeper into the needs involved in their projection (Cardoso *et al.* 2018; Alves *et al.* 2018). On the other hand, it is necessary to realize that in this process there are impacts that can negatively affect the

lives of populations for a long period, causing a variety of undesired effects. According to Alves *et al.* (2018), International Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is highly dynamic internationally and varies depending on the situation in which it is applied. The International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA 2016) considers impact assessment as the process of identifying the future consequences of an action.

It is in this line that governments and other international organizations have created a series of legal instruments (legislations) aimed at preserving or ensuring the maintenance of a balanced environment. In the specific case of Mozambique, Resolution No. 5/95 of August 3, which approves the Política Nacional do Ambiente (National Environmental Policy), published in Mozambique's Official Gazette on December 6, 1995 (Series I, No. 49), assigns the state the task of ensuring ecological balance, nature conservation, and preservation.

Manuel (2019) argues that it is important to establish a system that guarantees communities access to natural resources such as clean water, agricultural inputs, schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure, thereby increasing food insecurity. The absence of means of livelihood can degrade environmental conditions and exacerbate problems for communities already living with various economic limitations. Despite the existence of various legal instruments, research conducted in areas where involuntary resettlement processes have occurred reveals that, in many cases, environmental preservation has been neglected and placed last on the agenda (Cardoso *et al.* 2018; Wamir, Tedim, and Ntumi 2017; Tavares *et al.* 2018; Alves *et al.* 2018; Alves and Mendoca 2019).

Come *et al.* (2021), in their studies aiming to analyze socio-environmental conflicts associated with mining in the province of Tete, found several socio-environmental conflicts arising from population resettlements. On the other hand, affected communities and various human rights organizations point out that the resettlement did not rigorously adhere to current legislation and disregarded human rights.

The State and companies should work towards improving population resettlement processes to reduce the perception that companies diminish well-being. Moreover, creating a mediation space is important as an alternative to reduce conflicts between the involved parties.

The study by Tavares *et al.* (2018) on the *Reassentamento Urbano Colectivo Novo Milénio I and II* (New Millennium Collective Urban Resettlement) in Babaçulândia (TO) revealed a series of environmental problems, including inadequate sanitation, lack of sewage collection and treatment,

and absence of water treatment. This situation was considered to place the population in a vulnerable position. Cardoso, Doula, and Neto (2018), in their studies, found that climate preservation at the location where the displaced were resettled was not given significant importance during the government intervention planning phase.

Alves *et al.* (2018) in their research on urban resettlement in Brazil revealed that negative impacts accounted for 76%, while positive impacts were 24%, distributed across three categories (biotic, physical, and human-induced). Among these, the inadequate disposal of solid waste in the resettlement ($V = -9$; S : Average) was noted, concluding that environmental and socio-economic impacts persisted, emphasizing the need for the implementation of public policies aimed at their elimination.

Conclusion

The interest in writing an article on the problem of resettlements stems from the need, in the future, to devise a resettlement model suitable for Mozambican communities, respecting their specific characteristics based on the problems identified in previous projects. The bibliographical survey enabled the following to be verified:

1. The resettlement processes culminate in profound changes in the lives of those affected, regardless of the geographical area, especially when associated with the failure to fulfill promises made during the implementation of the projects.
2. In societies like Mozambique, where traditional power plays an important role in rural society and forces the creation of new power hierarchies, as well as the introduction of new dynamics in relations between the inhabitants and the state.
3. A feeling on the part of the communities that the government is an integral part of the companies, as it often appears as a facilitator in the process of land expropriation, as well as being, in some cases, the patron of the projects.
4. Deficiencies in the monitoring of affected communities by government authorities and other bodies that have an obligation to look after the well-being of the population. However, companies do little to improve the lives of the affected communities once they have been set up.

5. The affected communities tend to reinvent ways of acting and living based on pre-existing reciprocal support networks and create other forms of daily interaction, which allows for survival and social reproduction.
6. In these processes, populations lose their basis for sustainability and the social relationships built up throughout their history and culture are affected, in addition to the frequent environmental problems caused by spatial changes. In some cases, the operation of the projects also has a negative impact on the environment.
7. Development projects must adopt policies aimed at mitigating the risks associated with resettlement, especially when it comes to acquiring new land and productive means that guarantee sustainable income.
8. The abuses committed in resettlement processes are a vehicle for poverty in local communities, as they jeopardize basic services such as health, education, electricity, water supply and social assistance.
9. The economic growth brought about by development projects does not create qualitative progress in the lives of communities, as it is often not accompanied by socio-cultural policies to promote well-being.
10. There is an urgent need for governments and society as a whole to pay more attention to the populations affected by development, whose histories are altered and whose hopes are destroyed. This must be done through clear integration policies and follow-up programs, aimed at implementing appropriate resettlements, taking into account the specificities of each population group and preserving the environment.

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ABSTRACT

The last few decades have been marked by economic growth which has involved the exploitation of mineral energy resources, the construction of other infrastructures (roads, viaducts, industries) and consequently the growth of cities. This scenario brings with it problems in the communities where the projects are implemented and generally leads to involuntary resettlement of local populations. The aim of this paper is to understand and analyze the problems of involuntary resettlement caused by development projects and to put solutions into perspective. In order to carry out this work, we used a bibliographical review of 25 works on this subject, including scientific articles, dissertations and theses. The results revealed that involuntary resettlements caused by development projects always create profound changes in the lives of those affected in various ways: economic, social and environmental. On the other hand, in the majority of resettlements the companies do not keep their promises, a situation which makes it urgent to adopt and implement policies to support the communities directly and indirectly affected by the resettlements in order to minimize the suffering of the communities and preserve the environment.

KEYWORDS

Resettlements. Affected communities. Social change. Environment.

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THE COLONIAL INVENTION OF MOZAMBIQUE: FROM AFRICAN EMPIRES TO OVERSEAS COLONY AND PROVINCE

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Introduction

Mozambique, a country situated in southeastern Africa, lies between South Africa and Tanzania, washed by the waters of the Indian Ocean, forming the Mozambique Channel with the island of Madagascar. Like all African countries, it inherited borders from colonization and forged its national identity based on the premise of combating colonial occupation. The country's historical formation resembles an "African mosaic" with a "scent of the Indian Ocean" resulting in a pronounced multiculturalism (Liesegang 1996). Capela (1996, 9) emphasizes the "civilizational and cultural heterogeneity of the peoples summoned to constitute the nation" and suggests that "approaching this fragmented reality cannot be done on the assumption of a sociologically nonexistent national unity".

Therefore, it is a country whose territory in the 19th century, still as an Overseas Province, was undetermined, being an "area without certain limits or defined borders" (Lobato 2008, 15). Administratively, there was a Governor-General assisted by District Administrators. After its independence in 1975, it became a sovereign state within the borders defined by colonial powers.

In this sense, Mozambique is a modern invention from the late 19th century and represents a "significant break with the set of previous identity representations and perceptions" before the colonial project (Meneses and Ribeiro 2008). Since then, the reconstruction of this region has been based on the Portuguese colonial imagination.

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Therefore, investigating Mozambique implies “thinking of a territory full of ancient diversities reflected in a set of identity tensions whose cartography is far from linear or even visible”, a territory understood as “a meeting point between cultures and people” that refers to “millenary maritime and continental routes” (Meneses and Ribeiro 2008, 7). For the poet Eduardo White, Mozambique is a “window to the East.”

It should be noted that, for Portugal, the shaping of Mozambican territory meant the expansion of its wealth and borders, a process that lasted until the last quarter of the 20th century, in 1974. For the indigenous peoples, it meant the suppression of the kingdoms of Monomotapa or Gaza, and other great states like the Great Zimbabwe, the Kingdom of Manica, Barué, Danda, Butua-Torua, Teve, the State of Rundos, Changamires, Carongas, Undis, the sheikdom of Quitangonha and Sancul, the Sultanate of Angoche, and other peoples who lived in defined territorialities before the advance of colonization.

In a broader consideration of Portugal's place in global colonialism, Rodney (2012) understands that:

Europeans used the superiority of their ships and cannon to gain control of all the world's waterways, starting with the western Mediterranean and the Atlantic coast of North Africa. From 1415, when the Portuguese captured Ceuta near Gibraltar, they maintained the offensive against the Maghreb. Within the next sixty years, they seized ports such as Arzila, El-Ksar-es-Seghir and Tangier, and fortified them. By the second half of the 15th century, the Portuguese controlled the Atlantic coast of Morocco and used its economic and strategic advantages to prepare for further navigations which eventually carried their ships round the Cape of Good Hope in 1495. After reaching the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese sought with some success to replace Arabs as the merchants who tied East Africa to India and the rest of Asia. The 17th and 18th centuries, the Portuguese carried most of the East African ivory which was marketed in India; while Indian cloth and beads were sold in East and West Africa by the Portuguese, Dutch, English and French (Rodney 2012, 103).

In that sense, understanding the history of Mozambique means comprehending the history of a collection of peoples and cultures who share the common experience of Portuguese colonization. Therefore, Ngoenha (1992, 11) acknowledges that “the origins of Mozambique do not lie in ethnic or human reasons, but in ideas of one man's domination over another, in the name of a presumed superiority”.

According to Fonseca and Moreira (2007, 13), two realities were in continuous conflict in Mozambique: the colonial society and the African

society. In this regard, the existence of a territory called Mozambique is due to the process of formation of the modern world, in which the colonization of the African continent is a central piece. Mozambique is a modern concept, and if its history is understood through this lens, its creation was associated with an imperial political project that marked the identity of the territory.

In this panorama, the concept that underpins the discussion of Mozambique's history in this article is colonialism. One way to understand colonization or colonialism is as the historical process of transforming power structures, knowledge, and life, which varied depending on the location and the metropolis². According to Badejo (2008, 17), colonization involves the exploitation of human and natural resources in territories called colonies in favor of the interests of the metropolis. Césaire (2000) sees the colony as a “safety valve” for the imperial projects of modern societies.

For Mudimbe (2013, 7), the phenomenon of colonialism implies the “transformation of non-European areas into fundamentally European constructs”, whose result is not only political and economic domination but, above all, the colonization of knowledge structures. Additionally, according to Baró (1979, 92), there are general characteristics of a colony. It can be understood as territorial occupation characterized by the political subjugation of natives, foreign appropriation of natural wealth, expropriation of accumulated profits, utilization of the native population as the primary workforce, the creation of a market geared towards foreign industry supplied by that same industry, and the lack of capital accumulation in the hands of natives.

There existed an ethos of colonial power. Within the framework of the colonial conception of power, the main element was the need to maintain order, which was to be established from the outside in, a process characterized by Fanon (1963, 32) as a violent method that, beyond economic and political domination, was cultural, psychological, and physical. In Africa, generally, colonial politics manifested as “indigenous policy” and involved the entire continent in a colonial network based on common ideas and beliefs, such as the discourse of civilizing mission and the articulation between State, Church, and commercial interests (Betts 2010, 375).

Mozambique became independent in 1975 after the national liberation struggle led by the Mozambique Liberation Front (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*, FRELIMO, in Portuguese) between 1964 and 1974, marking the commencement of the national state-building process. Subsequently, the

2 In the case of Portugal, between the 19th and 20th centuries, Imperial Charters were issued to commercial companies in exchange for the responsibility of maintaining “law and order,” as will be explained further (Cabaço 2009, 45).

country plunged into a civil war that antagonized the FRELIMO regime and the Mozambican National Resistance (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*, RENAMO, in Portuguese) between 1977 and 1992, when the Peace Accords were signed. However, it is a fact that the attainment of political independence by a colonial territory did not signify, nor does it signify, the total elimination of dependency relations (Mazrui 2010).

The aim of the paper is to examine the historical formation of Mozambique based on the colonization process and to identify historical milestones in the shaping of Portuguese colonial action until the first half of the 20th century. Through an interpretative-analytical approach, grounded in the review of literature on Mozambique's history, the article seeks to answer the questions: What kingdoms inhabited this territory before colonialism? How was the colonial process in shaping Mozambique? What role did colonialism play in the invention of Mozambique?

At the core of the reflection proposed in this article lies the relationship between colonial power and the formation of national territory. In the case of Mozambique, this occurred through a process whose tensions were never peaceful, requiring an independence war between 1964 and 1975 to end centuries of foreign, colonial domination. Thus, the relationship between these two processes harks back to a long history that began with the imperial occupation of this territory.

Therefore, the importance of a historical perspective for the proposed interpretation must be recognized. History serves as the instrument to question the reality of the relationships between colonial power and the formation of Mozambique. The aim is to comprehend these phenomena based on their significance, context, and connections to broader issues of power relations. Hence, two concepts of colonialism are brought into dialogue with the proposed argument.

Following Meneses (2019), broadly speaking, colonialism is a political project based on violence that erased the history of dominated peoples and, in many ways, persisted beyond the end of colonial empires. In the case of the African continent, for instance, Mudimbe (2013) indicates how Africa remains the object of Eurocentric knowledge through a set of concepts, discourses, and paradigms resulting from the political appropriation of colonial projects – the colonial library.

For this author, the colonial organization of a territory implies the articulation of three devices: (i) the domination, distribution, and exploitation of the territory (domination of space); (ii) policies of acculturation of natives (reforming of minds); and (iii) the implementation of new modes

of production, i.e., capitalist modes oriented toward the metropolis market (integrating local economic histories into Western perspectives) (Mudimbe 2013, 7). Thus, during the period of shaping the modern world, colonialism and imperial domination connected most of the world, establishing the most fundamental relationships between Europe and the rest of the world.

The working hypothesis is that the process of historical formation of Mozambique resembles an African mosaic, constituted by multiple peoples, states, and empires that inhabited distinct territorialities and were historically marked by the Portuguese colonizing structure/action, encompassing the physical, human, and cultural aspects of the experience of domination and exploitation. This process is part of the broader framework of the constitution of the modern-colonial world.

To achieve this, the text is divided into three parts. The first delves into the subject with a historical consideration of the African kingdoms that inhabited the current territory of Mozambique before colonization. The second part presents the broad strokes of Portuguese colonization in the African country, emphasizing the process of territorial conquest. The third part addresses the consolidation of colonial policy in Mozambique in the first half of the 20th century.

Kingdoms and African empires in Mozambique

According to Meneses and Ribeiro (2008, 10), the “Indian Ocean was, since the 10th century, a place of a complex trade network, dominated by Arabs and Swahilis until the 15th century, and later by the Portuguese from the 15th century onwards.” This commerce took place along routes connecting the Asian coasts of the Persian Gulf, India, and the East to the eastern coast of the continent, extending to the south of Mozambique. It’s worth noting that in the 19th century, Portuguese presence was still limited to the coasts, organized in isolated trading posts, interconnected solely by sea (Boxer 1969). According to Abdul Sheriff:

the sea was a pathway for contacts and interaction with the outside world. Hence, one of the main aspects of the history of the eastern coast of Africa over the last 2000 years was not isolation, but the intermingling of two cultural currents that formed a new amalgam, the Swahili coastal civilization. The vehicle for this process was trade, which facilitated the integration of the East African coast into the international economic system (Sheriff 2010, 627, our translation)³.

According to Ferreira (1999, 50), the settlement of populations from the Persian Gulf, one of the main trade centers in the Indian Ocean, on the eastern coast of the African continent took place between the 9th and 13th centuries. With the expansion of trade and the advent of Islam, political communities such as sheikhdoms and sultanates were established, later suppressed by the Portuguese.

Continuing with Ferreira (1999), there is evidence that, since the 8th century, the northern coast of Mozambique was part of the Swahili world, where Islamic conceptions and practices were shared. Even in the south of the country, in the present-day province of Inhambane, there were locations operating within the sphere of Islamic culture and economy. In the 15th and 16th centuries, Angoche, Sofala, Cuama, and the island of Mozambique were under the rule of the Kilwa king, who controlled all the gold and ivory trade with Great Zimbabwe. From 1505 onwards, the Portuguese occupied these regions, leading to the decline of Swahili enclaves in the central and southern parts of Mozambique.

Before colonial occupation, there was the coexistence of various peoples in the territory that now encompasses Mozambique, such as the matrilineal tradition of the Maconde people in the northern territory, the Macuas, the Yao, among many others. Along the coast, there were predominant small Afro-Islamic kingdoms formed from the 16th century by Islamic dynasties originating from the Swahili centers located north of the Rovuma River, notably Kilwa and Zanzibar. In the central Zambezi valley, various peoples resided, including the Chuabo, Sena, and Nhungué.

South of the Zambezi River were the patrilineal tradition peoples, the Shona, inhabiting the present provinces of Sofala, Manica, and Tete, heirs of the old power structure of the Monomotapa, the Tsonga, prevalent

3 In the original: *“o mar foi uma via de contatos e de interação com o mundo exterior. Portanto, um dos aspectos principais da história da costa oriental da África durante os últimos 2000 anos não foi o isolamento, mas a interpenetração de duas correntes culturais que constituíram um novo amálgama, a civilização costeira swahili. O veículo deste processo foi o comércio, que facilitou a integração da costa oriental africana no sistema econômico internacional”* (Sheriff 2010, 627).

throughout the region south of the Save River, the Chope and Bitonga, and the Nguni. Furthermore, in the south, mention should be made of the Changané, Mundaús, and Chenguas.

There were, therefore, multiple African states in this territory, many of them in competition. The Gaza State had a period of expansion and organization between 1821-1845, extending from the Incomati River in the south to the Zambezi in the north (Rodney 1971). In 1895, the administrative center of Gaza was burned by the Portuguese, and Ngungunyane, the last emperor of the Gaza Kingdom, was captured in Chayimite near Chibuto on December 28, 1895.

The period between 1895-1900, according to Serra (2000), marked the process of destruction of the political unity of the old states, which progressed with the appointment of rulers, a way of classifying the authority of “tribal chiefs” or Portuguese colonizers who occupied the region. In Maputo, Moamba, Matola, and Tembe, the rulers were members of the old royal lineage but became part of the colonial administration. In Gaza, the appointment of “*régulos*” continued with members of the royal lineages that had dominated before the arrival of the Nguni until the disintegration of the Gaza State. In 1897, Mouzinho de Albuquerque established negotiations with the South African Republic regarding migratory labor, aiming to benefit through regulating emigration to South African mines.

The contradiction is that Mousinho de Albuquerque became a national hero for leading the campaigns of 1895, and the armed resistance of Mozambique Africans was considered a rebellion (Albuquerque 1935). However, it was only between 1900 and 1930 that Portuguese colonial power was consolidated in southern Mozambique (Boxer 1969).

The Portuguese colonial action in Mozambique

Henriques (2004, 16) defines three key aspects of the Portuguese colonial action in Mozambique. Their strategy consisted of (i) establishing forts or trading posts in coastal regions to ensure the establishment of commercial relations and use these installations as a source of knowledge about the interior. They also had a clear goal of defending the territory and protecting traders, missionaries, and navigators, so the forts faced both inland and outward; (ii) the strength and impact of European techniques applied to ships, firearms, production techniques, agriculture, construction, and trade were employed to ensure the continuity of Portuguese presence in the occupied

territories; and (iii) the structuring of hierarchical relations between men and women, organizing the African territory in a significant operation of social and cultural landscape transformation, with the introduction of patriarchy.

Within the context of colonization, trade is characterized not only by its economic dimension but as a political operation, influenced by civilizational logics aimed at ensuring control of the colonial space. In this scenario, Portuguese trade imposed the logic of mercantilist commercial organization, based on the exploitation of African populations.

Furthermore, Portuguese settlement was grounded in the religious character of the Catholic faith. By settlement, we can understand the establishment of “a population of European origin that guaranteed Portuguese sovereignty” in the territories that are now called Mozambique (Capela 2010, 118). It’s worth mentioning that Portuguese attempts to introduce sufficient armed forces to support their claims of sovereignty began during Vasco da Gama’s time, who reached the Mozambican coast in 1498 on his voyage to India.

Another important factor to consider in Portugal’s colonial history is that its independence, since the first half of the 12th century, arose from two military conquests: (i) the Portuguese expelled the Arabs and Berbers who occupied the land of the Iberian Peninsula, and (ii) they maintained an “attack-defense policy” regarding Castilian threats, a situation only resolved in 1385, at the Battle of Aljubarrota, with the support of the Burgundy dynasty, which brought the Avis Dynasty to power that same year (Henriques 2004).

In the history of Portuguese colonization, the sea emerged as a platform for the articulation of worlds. Previously, in Europe, mere reference to the sea provoked fear. According to Delumeau (1978), the sea only assumed a recreational function from the 18th century, and sailors were recruited from incarcerated criminals. In Medieval Europe, the prevailing geography taught that Africa was a “torrid zone”, uninhabited and uninhabitable.

This fear of the sea was partially overcome through the Portuguese colonial experience. Bartolomeu Dias’ voyage in 1488 opened the route to the East, and the settlement of the Cape Verde Islands occurred during the reign of Afonso V (1438-1481) when Portuguese elites were interested in occupying (present-day) Morocco. At that time, São Tomé and Príncipe had no indigenous population and were settled by Africans, but land usage was adapted and determined by the European continent (Serra 2000).

The history is well known: the Portuguese navigated the African coast between 1430 and 1490, discovering the route around the Cape of Good Hope; between 1490 and 1520, they sailed from Europe to India, Indonesia,

and China. Christopher Columbus, a Genoese serving Spain, married the governor of Porto's daughter, from where he traveled to the Gold Coast in the Gulf of Guinea (modern-day Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria). Portugal also explored North America, the River Plate, the coasts of Madagascar, the Arabian Peninsula, and the islands of the Indian Ocean.

In this regard, colonization connected all peoples – Africans, Americans, Asians – with Europeans in hierarchical structures that were never peaceful. The violence of colonization and slavery was formative in the history of the modern world's formation, including Mozambique.

A historical milestone at the onset of Portuguese colonialism was the military conquest of Ceuta in 1415, ending the eight-century Muslim control in the Iberian Peninsula. The expedition departed from Porto in August 1415, comprising over a hundred boats, guided by twenty royal galleons carrying 19,000 men (Davies 1964).

In 1433, the King Dom João I was succeeded by his son, Dom Duarte I, and Dom Henrique persuaded the new king to mount an attack on Tangier that, if successful, would grant Portugal control of Moroccan territory. The expedition set off in 1437 but ended in disaster, and the king's son, the Infante Don Fernando, was abandoned as a hostage in the hands of the Arabs. However, by the late 1470s, after Dom Henrique's death, Portugal controlled four cities in Morocco (Boxer 1969).

Thus, with the gradual establishment of the Portuguese in Africa, the program of voyages and conquests that fueled the phenomenon of colonization began to take shape. According to Henriques (2004, 75), the conquest of Ceuta established the idea that "the military reputation of individual gentlemen could be very profitable". In the following century, during the reign of Dom Sebastião between 1557 and 1578, the perception was renewed that "Portugal's real destiny was the crusade in Morocco". In 1578, Dom Sebastião invaded Morocco with an army of twenty thousand men and perished in the Battle of Alcácer Quibir. The crown passed to Cardinal Henrique, the last male descendant of Dom João I.

In fact, the initial contacts of the Indian coast of Africa with Europe were Vasco da Gama's aforementioned journey in search of the route to the East. It is known that Vasco da Gama reached the region of Natal, present-day South Africa, passing through the island of Mozambique on this first occasion. Since its establishment in the 16th century, the Portuguese crown had two sources of income in Mozambique: customs duties from the island of Mozambique and, to a lesser extent, from Quelimane, and trade (Serra 2000). The accumulated wealth was directed to India or Lisbon.

According to Meneses (2009, 9), the major administrative change in Mozambique occurred in 1752, with the removal of the Mozambique government from the authority of the Portuguese State of India, introducing metropolitan municipalism in some settlements: Inhambane, Sofala, Tete, Quelimane, the island of Mozambique, and Ibo. In 1818, the capital, the island of Mozambique, was elevated to city status, with five thousand inhabitants. The Captain of Mozambique, Sofala, Rios de Cuama, and Monomotapa were elevated to the category of Captain-General (Boxer 1969). From an official standpoint, the General Captaincy of Mozambique, independent of Goa, became a colony.

Portuguese trade was not always a consistently high-volume activity. Liesegang (2000, 149) establishes two phases of foreign trade before 1800: between 1550-1750, there was irregular and low-intensity trade, based on the exchange of ivory for Indian textiles, and between 1750-1800, with the regular arrival of Dutch and English ships, ivory became the primary export product. However, in the second half of the 18th century, the demand for slaves to work in the French islands in the Indian Ocean (Mascarenhas, Bourbon, Reunion, and Mayotte), and especially in Brazil, surpassed the demand for gold and ivory (Rocha 1991). Indeed, the introduction of capitalism in Mozambique occurred in the large plantations in the last decade of the 19th century.

The Mozambican territory was politically organized under the concept of Crown Land Grants, one of the early models of the colonial state in the Zambezi River Valley region, based on the 17th-century idea that lands inhabited by Portuguese belonged to the Crown and were leased for a period of three generations, with the right to levy local taxes and exploit resources (Dinerman 2006, 90).

According to Mondlane (1976, 12), the *Prazos* system in Mozambique dates back to the 17th and 18th centuries. The *prazeiros* were settlers and landowners of Portuguese territories and represented the embodiment of colonial authority. The Crown Land Grants were the material and structural basis for the formation of a patriarchal society in Mozambique. Along the way, a stratification was established, with the *muzungos* (lords) or *donas* (in cases where the authority was a woman) situated at the top, while the rest of society, the slaves, were distributed across various hierarchized orders (Capela 1996). The deadline system in Mozambique gave way to concession companies and lasted until 1942, only replaced by a more direct colonial administration (Mondlane 1976). The decree of August 13, 1832, abolished the Crown Land Grants, the lordships, and the “Alcaidarias-Mores”, but it did little to change the reality. In 1854, a new decree again abolished the deadlines

in the province of Mozambique. The shack tax was created, followed by land concessions to the majestic companies (Isaacman 1972).

It's worth noting that Portuguese colonialism was financially dependent on England, especially in the plantation sector, navigation, and railways, such as the regular monthly maritime connection services to Europe through the Suez Canal, opened for navigation in 1869, or via the Cape and with Asia through Zanzibar, guaranteed in 1874 by English companies (Ribeiro 2002).

An example of English presence in this region was the telegraph lines between Portugal and Mozambique, which began construction in 1875 and were set up by an English company (Kennedy 1971). The railways that linked Lourenço Marques to Pretoria were built between 1886 and 1894 with English capital, as were the lines from Beira to Southern Rhodesia. The two existing banks in Beira operated with English capital: the Standard Bank of South Africa and the Bank of Africa, while the press was limited to the Beira Post, an English newspaper (Silva 2001).

The emergence of Lourenço Marques as the capital and center of the country is linked to phenomena such as the growth of intensive elephant hunting, which increased ivory exports around 1850, the export of labor to the British colony of Natal, and the start of capitalist agricultural projects such as cotton and sugar plantations, and the construction of the port of Durban (Macdonald 2014).

According to Serra (2000, 40), between 1870-1875, the capital was still a "small colonial establishment," with a population of less than a thousand inhabitants where colonial authority was limited. In the 19th century, the fundamental change to understand the emergence of capitalism in Mozambique was the conjunction of two axes related to capitalist economy in Southern Africa in general and the strengthening of economic ties between Mozambique and the British colonies in particular: (i) the opening of the diamond mines in Kimberley demanded workforce migration, and (ii) the gold exploitation in Lydenburg, in eastern Transvaal, associated with the growth of commercial enterprises in the capital such as warehouses and hotels, and the expansion of the commercial network in the interior of the Portuguese colony.

Between 1885-1900, the opening of new gold mines in the South and center of Transvaal (Witwatersrand), the construction of railways, and the emergence of other industries also impacted the formation of Mozambique. The South of the country became the major supplier of labor for the South African mining industry, and the capital was one of the places that received the most revenue from Witwatersrand goods (Cabaço 2009).

It is important to note that the exploitation of the Portuguese colony was carried out with patronage granted to international capital and reproduced through a game of concessions and alliances with other colonial powers. This patronage and game of alliances corresponded to the stage of evolution of Portuguese capitalism in the 19th century. According to Vail (1976), Portugal conceded two-thirds of the territory of Mozambique to concession companies. The Mozambique Company occupied of the territory, the metropolitan government received 7.5% of all total profits, and in return refrained from taxing the areas under private concession.

At the end of the 19th century, to consolidate the occupation and exploitation of the territory that constitutes the current country, the Mozambican territory was divided into four concession zones: (i) the Northern region under the concession regime of the Niassa Company; (ii) a strip extending south of the Zambezi River, a portion acquired by the Mozambique Company and the Zambezia Company; (iii) in the center of the region, also under the Mozambique Company, and (iv) the District of Mozambique, administered directly by the Portuguese government (Vail 1976).

From a global perspective, the advancement of global colonialism was crowned when in 1884 the representative of Germany in England requested an audience with the Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, to formally deliver a message from Chancellor Bismarck, requesting a meeting involving France, Portugal, among other countries, to discuss the issues and direction of colonial occupation in Africa. The well-known Berlin Conference, held between November 15, 1884, and February 26, 1885, institutionalized the right to occupy African territories, and this event took place in that city (Uzoigwe 2010).

According to Atmore and Oliver (2005, 118), the Berlin Conference, or the partition of Africa as it became known, changed the face of the continent. Until 1879, 90% of the region was controlled by Africans themselves. The initial stages of the partition of Africa involved demands regarding navigation along the coasts and rivers, and the establishment of the principle that only national firms/companies were authorized to exploit a specific territory. By the early 20th century, the partition had been completed, and colonialism had increased, although in Portuguese spaces, the most effective occupation dated from the post-World War II period.

The main impact of this Conference on Portuguese colonialism was that despite the increased administrative control over the territories from 1850, the settlements from the metropolis were only systematically organized after 1885. Effective occupation of territory was a vital principle at the

Berlin Conference. Portugal did not sign the Berlin Act as it reasserted its “historical right” over a vast territory connecting Angola and Mozambique, of which the Pink Map was representative (Cabaço 2009). This Portuguese project to link Angola and Mozambique, passing through the territories of Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi, displeased the British and created a dispute between the empires over these territories (Silva 2001). Portugal succumbed to British pressure through the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1891.

Particularly, the Portuguese Empire utilized all available techniques to effectively occupy its colonies: trade was used as a weapon, white settlers enslaved populations, missionaries acted as “pacifiers”, and military forces occupied the coast; later integrating the “natives” into colonial society but with an inferior status (Mondlane 1976, 34).

It’s important to note that the English contested the territory of Mozambique with Portugal. Portuguese sovereignty over Delagoa Bay, later named Lourenço Marques (now Maputo), was only recognized in 1886 by the Boer Republic of Transvaal, as it provided exclusive access to the sea without British oversight. There was a reaction from the British Imperial Government, and the case was taken to the international arbitration of the President of France, Marshal Mac Mahon, who legitimized Portugal’s claims on July 24, 1875 (Ferreira 1999).

Only after the conquest of the southern region could Portugal focus its efforts in northern Mozambique, where the metropolis was yet to establish its military presence in the early 20th century. The conquest of the Makonde people in the current District of Cabo Delgado only occurred in the 1920s (Dinerman 2006).

António Enes, the first Portuguese High Commissioner for Mozambique, revived the Crown Land Grants through the decree of November 18, 1890, to promote industrial agriculture in the region. He also argued in 1893 that, given their natural inferiority, Africans should be compelled to work on plantations (Lourenço 2010).

António Enes was appointed the Regio-Commissioner of Mozambique in 1895 and became the founder of the Colonial State school. According to Marcello Caetano (1948, 573), António Enes should be “the cornerstone of all study of modern Portuguese colonial administration.” In his memoirs, Enes (1945) comments:

At the time of my arrival in Lourenço Marques, Portuguese authority was not exercised throughout the district, except in the capital and along the railway line (...). The railway line was in danger, and only the city could be considered safe, thanks to its European garrison. It was secure, but still wary. Via telegraph, news from Lourenço Marques warned that a band of “rebels,” estimated at three thousand, had assaulted the railway line and attacked Europeans (Enes 1945, n.p., our translation)⁴.

Aires de Ornelas, Minister of the Navy, who stood out in the conquest campaigns of Mozambique and was one of Enes’ disciples, introduced the administrative career in Mozambique in 1910, strengthening colonial policy. Following the establishment of the Republic in Portugal in 1910, the Ministry of the Colonies was created. It is worth noting that the civil administration in Mozambique was a repressive apparatus to enforce forced labor or migration to neighboring territories.

From colony to overseas province

The Portuguese occupation of the 20th century was significantly marked by the involvement of Mozambique in the First World War. At the war’s outbreak, the Portuguese had not yet occupied a large part of the territories of Cabo Delgado or Niassa in the north. However, there was a possibility of German troops from Tanganyika invading the northern region of Mozambique, which led to an increased Portuguese military presence in the territory (Meneses 2011).

A German military column led by General Von Lettow crossed the Rovuma River into Mozambican territory in 1914. For nine months, German troops were on Mozambican soil and attacked Portuguese garrisons. Due to German interests in the northern territories of Mozambique, on August 24, 1914, a German attack destroyed a Portuguese military outpost located on lands owned by the Niassa Company. The Lisbon government took immediate military measures, sending a military expedition led by Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Francisco Massano de Amorim. However, according to Freire (2014,

⁴ In the original: “À data da minha chegada em Lourenço Marques, a autoridade portuguesa não era, pois, exercida, em todo o distrito, senão na capital e na linha férrea (...). A linha-férrea estava em perigo e só a cidade podia considerar-se segura, mercê de sua guarnição europeia. Estava segura, mas continuava desconfiada. Por telégrafo, uma notícia de Lourenço Marques avisava que um bando de “rebeldes” calculados em três mil assaltaram a linha férrea e atacaram europeus” (Enes 1945, n.p.).

12), there is “no historiographical record of any further military action at the border initiated by either party until the declaration of war in March 1916”. It is noteworthy that Germany declared war on Portugal in 1916.

In April 1916, the Portuguese reclaimed Quionga, a settlement near the southern bank of the Rovuma River, which had been captured by the Germans in 1894. This was Portugal’s only acquisition in the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 (Freire 2014). These actions led the northern border of the colony to the banks of the Rovuma, also recognized by the Treaty of Peace of Versailles on June 28, 1919. Germany lost Tanganyika to England.

At the end of 1918, two English expeditionary forces disembarked from Nyasaland and Rhodesia, consisting of soldiers from West Africa (Nigeria, Gambia, and the Gold Coast). The significant presence of British soldiers aimed primarily to safeguard strategic positions in the context of the war’s conclusion negotiations.

The Mozambican colony, bordering German East Africa, became involved in the war, which had a profound impact on the consolidation of modern colonial policies. The colonial administration institutionalized forced labor and transformed power relations between the metropolitan society and the colonized society, reinforcing the division between ‘civilized settlers’ and ‘native barbarians’.

According to Meneses (2014), in a context of a shortage of European soldiers, the metropolis turned to Africans and introduced *chibalo*⁵, a regime of forced labor critical in transforming peasants into carriers who would assist in transporting people and military equipment. In 1914, with the war’s onset, the Portuguese colonial administration trained between twenty to thirty thousand Africans. At this time, Portugal controlled the south of the colony while companies controlled the central and northern territories, each equipped with its own defense forces.

Following the war, an incipient import substitution industry emerged in Mozambique, producing goods for the small settler population, such as cement, maize flour, cigarettes, soap, and, of lesser importance, mineral water and ice. This marked the formation of the first layers of the Mozambican proletariat. The railway and port workers were numerically the most significant urban labor force and played a central role in the struggle against labor exploitation (Ngoenha 1992).

5 The *chibalo* is understood as the colonial policy to minimize costs and increase control over the colonist. For Zamparoni (1998, 93) “it was on *chibalo* that economic growth in Mozambique was basically based”.

The occupation of Mozambique progressed in the 20th century in line with changes in the institutional and territorial organization of the colony. In 1907, Ayres de Ornelas, Minister of the Navy and Overseas, introduced the Administrative Reform of Mozambique, modernizing the institutional organization under a Governor-General and dividing the territory into districts, each with its District Governor. The districts were divided into smaller precincts forming councils, overseen by an administrator. Districts constituted the primary administrative units where traditional leaders were incorporated into the local level of colonial authority.

Before the Estado Novo (1933-1974) formally defined itself constitutionally, Salazar crafted the decree that reorganized the political project for the colonies. The “Colonial Act” of 1930 renewed colonial policy, characterized by an imperial phase and the “indissolubility of the empire”, which lasted until the end of 1951.

The Colonial Act (Portugal 1930) was a legal instrument that reaffirmed Portugal’s historical right and vocation to its possessions, clarifying that the overseas territories were called colonies and constituted the Portuguese colonial empire (article 3). It emphasized that this empire was “in solidarity” with its “parts” and “with the metropolis” (article 5), restricting the “alienation” of territories (article 7), reserving to the State the “administration” and “exploitation” of the colonies (article 11), providing remuneration for the work of “natives in the service of the State” (article 19), and assigning the “defense” and “protection” of indigenous peoples to the State (article 15).

The Indigenous Labor Code of 1928, which introduced compulsory work for public purposes as a replacement for slavery, the Colonial Act of 1930, and the Constitution of 1933 were instruments that shaped the legal framework of the new policy for colonial territories during the most centralized phase of the regime (Freire 2014). In 1953, another colonial mechanism, the Statute of Portuguese Indigenous People in Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique, the last legal device before the abolition of the *indigenato*⁶ in 1961, was the instrument of colonial policy regarding assimilation. Assimilation was part of Portuguese colonial policy, whereby an “indigenous” person would gain the legal status of a citizen by becoming Portuguese. The Portuguese concept of assimilation had an ethical and Catholic dimension. The mission was a process of acculturation of the colonized, enhancing the Portuguese side while diminishing the African part. It was more of a cultural genocide.

According to Castelo (1998, 30), the new colonial policy of the 20th century broke from the past in three directions: the centralization of metro-

6 Law that aimed to assimilate “indigenous” people into Western culture.

politan power exercise; the replacement of foreign capital with nationalization; and the development of the colonies in favor of the “integration of the empire.” The policy was formulated by Armindo Monteiro, Minister of the Colonies between 1931 and 1935, who conceived the empire as a “timeless” and “indissoluble” entity, above all interests.

Another characteristic of this period was the replacement of the term “colony” with “overseas provinces,” which corresponded to a declaration of national unity between the metropolis and non-contiguous territories. Some may argue that the term “overseas province” would be less contentious than “colony”, but according to Capela (1996, 167), the transformation of colonies into provinces was “devoid of any degree of true political autonomy; it was cosmetic and morphological”⁷.

It’s worth noting that throughout history, the territory of Mozambique had various designations: Captaincy of Sofala (1501-1752), administratively linked to Portuguese India; Captaincy-General of Mozambique, Sofala, and Rios de Sena (1752-1836), which was linked to Lisbon until its independence in 1975; Province of Mozambique (1836-1891); State of East Africa (1891-1893); Province of Mozambique (1893-1926); Colony of Mozambique (1926-1951); Province of Mozambique (1951-1972); State of Mozambique (1972-1975); and finally, the Republic of Mozambique from 1975 onwards (Cruz 2008).

However, the concept of an overseas province refers only to the period between 1951-1972 when the designation ‘Portuguese Colonial Empire’ was abolished, attempting to depersonalize Portugal as a colonizing country in international forums. The concept of an overseas province considered this territory no longer as a colony but an inseparable and integral part of Portugal, a ‘Multiracial and Pluricontinental Nation’.

For Ribeiro (2002), the 1951 revision was mainly triggered by international and domestic pressures that transformed Portuguese imperialism. Thus, in an attempt to silence centuries of domination, a colonial society became ‘pluricontinental’, and “a history of five centuries of colonization was converted into five centuries of relations between different peoples and cultures” (Castelo 1995).

7 However, by 1663, the expression overseas provinces was already being used in official documents, and that’s how the Portuguese Territories were referred to in the Constitutional Charter of 1821. Title X of the 1832 Constitution was titled “Regarding the Overseas Provinces”. As early as 1612, the Council of the Indies had already established this principle that these territories were “neither distinct nor separate from this Kingdom”. Was not new, therefore, the affirmation of unity between the center and its “parts”.

The Colonial Act was replaced by the Organic Law of the Portuguese Overseas in 1953. After World War II, Portugal sought to erase the vestiges of the imperialist conception in which overseas territories were colonies. Another significant legal instrument was the “Statute of Natives of the Provinces of Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique” approved in 1954.

Particularly, its chapter “On the extinction of the status of native and the acquisition of citizenship” defines the legal conditions that allow Africans to acquire Portuguese citizenship, namely: being over 18 years old, speaking Portuguese, working, owning property, displaying good behavior, and “acquiring habits” to apply “public and private law” (Portugal 1953).

In 1961, the colonial war began in Angola, and the Indian Union (present-day Republic of India) occupied Goa, Daman, and Diu, the last Portuguese territories in India. Internationally, Portugal found itself increasingly isolated, with numerous declarations within the United Nations condemning Portuguese colonialism. Salazar’s reaction was to adopt new measures concerning the colonies, such as sending troops and military equipment to Angola and altering legislation related to African populations, revoking the Statute of Natives.

At the border with Angola, the Congo became independent in June 1960, bringing the wave of decolonization to Southern Africa. At that time, Afro-Asian decolonizations were a significant force in international relations, and the first movements of resistance and armed struggle emerged in Mozambique. Throughout the fight for independence, these movements created conditions leading to the end of colonialism (Barrios Díaz 2022).

In essence, Portugal’s colonial action was based on the concept of colonies as overseas provinces, that is, as part of the metropolitan territory. The Portuguese aimed to preserve the unity of the Empire by all means. This Empire had two distinctive characteristics: sub-imperialism, as Lisbon operated under British dependence since the 18th century, and fascism since 1926.

This context persisted for many decades, and indeed, Portugal had no intention whatsoever of granting independence to its colonies but sought to integrate them into a complex relationship with the metropolis. Portugal propagated the myth of a new civilizing mission in the midst of the 20th century, presenting itself as a unitary, universal, and non-colonial state. This narrative positioned Mozambique to remain as a province, with Africans holding the status of Portuguese citizens.

Conclusion

The article identified the historical antecedents in the formation of Mozambique over centuries of the establishment of African empires and states, along with the Portuguese colonization. Firstly, it situated the African peoples who had diverse historical experiences in this territory, which, in many ways, became homogeneous with Portuguese colonialism, encompassing the entire territory from the 20th century, but with a presence along the coast dating back to the 16th century. These peoples organized states that were subsequently conquered by Portugal.

Next, the work presented how the Portuguese sought to control this territory from various settlements along the coast, through a colonization effort that intertwined state, church, and market interests. From the mid-18th century, the slave trade to the Indian and Atlantic Oceans became increasingly significant, impacting the respective regions differently. Portuguese colonialism was established through military campaigns, territorial dominance, such as the Crown Land Grants, and concession of parts of the territory to concession companies, highlighting the central role of colonization in the modern formation of the country. When these concessions ended in 1942, the colonial state developed direct administration throughout the territory, headquartered in Lourenço Marques (Maputo).

Lastly, the work aimed to contextualize the changes implemented by the Empire in the 20th century to maintain the colonies, even though they were masked as overseas provinces. The article underscored the central role of Portuguese colonization while also pointing out the rise of national liberation struggles in the former Portuguese colonies in Africa, equally significant in the creation of Mozambique.

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ABSTRACT

Modern colonialism denied the history of dominated peoples and, in many ways, persists beyond the end of colonial empires as a political project based on violence. In the case of the African continent, it remains an object of Eurocentric knowledge through a set of concepts, discourses, and paradigms resulting from the political appropriation of colonial projects. In this sense, discussing the history of Mozambique refers to a set of peoples and cultures that share the common experience of Portuguese colonization and the multiple processes of anti-colonial resistance over the centuries. The objective of this article is to examine the historical formation of Mozambique based on the colonization process and to identify historical milestones in the shaping of Portuguese colonial action until the first half of the 20th century.

Through an interpretative-analytical approach grounded in the literature review on Mozambique's history, the article aims to address questions such as: Which peoples inhabited this territory before colonialism? What was the historical process of Mozambique's formation? What role did colonialism play in the invention of Mozambique?

KEYWORDS

Mozambique. Colonization. Empire.

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BU/MBENGKAS RICE COOPERATIVE SOCIETY LIMITED AND LAIMBWE'S ECONOMY (CAMEROON), 1973-2014

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Introduction

The reunification of British Southern Cameroons with the Cameroun Republic on 1 October 1961 to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon of two equal states of West and East Cameroon eventually necessitated the initiators to introduce political and socio-economic reforms for the country's socio-economic advancement (Ngho 1987, 243-259). Ahidjo introduced the Five Years Development Plans in 1960 to transform the country and also launched the "Green Revolution" in 1973 with the main objective of reviving agriculture, especially food production in Cameroon (Ngho 1987, 270-271). This government action was felt in the Menchum Division when with the collaboration of the German government, the Cameroon government created the Wum Area Development Authority (WADA) in 1975 (Kai 2018, 110). The work of WADA led it to help set up the BMRCS Ltd. to help improve the lot of Laimbwe rice farmers³.

Laimbwe is a matrilineal kinship group spread across the Menchum and Boyo Divisions including Bu, Mbengkas, and Baiso. Other matri-kin groups in the Menchum and Boyo Divisions are Kuk, Kom (the largest of them all), Aghem, Bafmeng, and other groups in the Fungom area. This study on the Laimbwe people is premised on this key question: How successful

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³ BMRCS Ltd Archives, Rice Processing Project BMRCS Wum Central Sub-Division, Menchum Division North West Province, 2006, 1.

was BMRCS Ltd in promoting socio-economic development in the Laimbwe villages of Bu and Mbengkas? The question will be addressed at the end of this paper. We begin the paper by conceptualising and contextualising relevant concepts.

Conceptual framework

Cooperative as a concept is derived from cooperation meaning joint operation, action, or practice of cooperating. It is used differently in different contexts. Although scholars of integration have used cooperation and integration interchangeably there is a fundamental difference between the two. Integration refers to a much more formal arrangement involving some political and economic sacrifices as well as commitments, concessions, processes, and political will to redefine participation in the national, continental and international economy (Axline 1979, 23). Cooperation on the other hand may be employed to identify loose forms of inter-state activity designed to meet some common needs of a particular society (Adetula 2004, 4-5).

Cooperative involves joint activity or action of two or more groups or organisations with the aim of initiating change or development in a given economy within a given period of time (Chambers Universal Learners Dictionary 1980, 325). It also means working with others to attain a common goal, benefit, or accommodate differences for an agreement (Macmillan English Dictionary 2002, 119). In the context of this study, a cooperative is a jointly owned agricultural or commercial enterprise usually organised by farmers or consumers to produce and distribute goods and services. It is run for the benefit of its owners or partners and those making use of its services.

The concept of ethnic group is derived from the Greek word *ethnos* meaning “more precisely” and Latin *ethnicus* virtually meaning the same thing (Tonkin et al 1989, 11-17). In the mid-19th Century, the word ethnic became associated with pagan or heathen. The term took on a meaning comparable to the concept now expressed as an ethnic group, mostly translated as “nation people”. The terms ethnic group and ethnic character were first recorded in 1935 and 1952 respectively and became part of the Oxford English Dictionary in 1972 (Ronald 1978, 379). Ethnic group has had multiple definitions and it is historically and culturally a related group or community of people with the same conviction, common identity and common fate. It addresses issues related to origin, kinship ties, tradition, cultural uniqueness, a shared history, and possibly a shared language (Alex 2011, 61). In this sense, an ethnic group

is a nation including the Bamileke, Bamoun, Bakweri, Bakossi, Bali, Bafut, Ewondo, Kom, Douala, Nso, Mankon, Aghem, and Laimbwe among others in Cameroon (Fanso 2017, 24).

The word Laimbwe literally means “I say or I am saying” and does not only refer to the ethnic group but also to the language spoken by people of the three villages of Baisso, Bu, Mbengkas, and to a lesser extent satellite ethnic groups like Mughom, Teitengem, Endeng, Mbongkesso and Aguli (Kah 2013, 65). A centralised system or a state political organisation is a society with a recognized ruler or paramount at the centre who holds power and welds supreme political authority (Fanso 2017, 1-2). This political organisation constitutes a defined geographical territory, sovereignty, or an independent government and an administration made up of a chief, King, or some paramount ruler who controls the executive, legislative, and judicial structure of government. A matrilineal system is one where inheritance and succession are from father to uterine brother(s) and to the sisters' son or nephew with preference given to the eldest. The family lineage is traced from the mother's line and sons succeed their maternal uncles and not their fathers (Kah 2015).

Situating Laimbwe ethnic group

The Laimbwe ethnic group is located in the Northwest region of Cameroon. The polity is spread across the boundary between Menchum and Boyo divisions. It is made up of three villages namely Bu, Mbengkas, and Baisso. The Laimbwe ethnic group is bordered to the north and northeast by Aghem and Kuk, to the east and southeast by Mmen (Bafmeng), Kom and Mughom, in the west and southwest by Esimbi and Bafut ethnic groups. The population of the Laimbwe ethnic group is more than 20,000 inhabitants with Bu having a population of more than 12,000 people (Kai 2018, 20). Laimbwe polities are endowed with lots of exploitable forests and numerous resources. The territory also has extensive attractive grassland scenery where cattle and sheep rearing takes place, raffia palm bushes in valley groves, natural palm trees, fertile alluvial valleys, and numerous rivers and streams rich in fish, tadpoles, sand, and stones. The extensive undulating terrain is backed by a moderate climate congenial for cattle herding and market gardening (Kah 2013, 60). Laimbwe was part of Bamenda Division during the mandate period (1922-1946) and part of Wum Division during the trusteeship era (1948-1961). When divisions were created and others renamed in 1968 during the Federal Republic, Bu and Mbengkas were administered

as part of Menchum. Mbengkas came under the suzerainty of Njinikom when a sub-division was created in 1972 with headquarters in Njinikom. The territory was later administered from Fondong when the headquarters was moved from Njinikom and in 1992 with the creation of Boyo Division from Menchum Division; Mbengkas remained under the new division and sub-division.

The Laimbwe, like other ethnic groups in the Northwest Region of Cameroon, are semi-Bantu-speaking people (Ewi 2007; 2008, 8). They belong specifically to the Tikar-speaking people who trace their origin to Ndobo and Bankim in the North (Adamawa Region) of Cameroon, their ancestral home (Amaazee 1964, 54-56). The socio-political structure of Laimbwe villages is centralised and it is a matrilineal kinship with inheritance traced to the woman. It is similar in many respects to that of the matrilineal fondoms of Kom, Kuk, and Bafmeng. *Laimbwe* as a language of the people is spoken in Bu, Mbengkas, and Baisso, the three main villages that make up the Laimbwe ethnic group (Kah 2013, 59). The language is also spoken in other villages that share boundaries with the Laimbwe villages including Mughom, Endeng, Teitengem, Aguli, and Mbongkesso. While the neighbouring villages of Mughom, Endeng, Teitengem, and Aguli speak a variant of the Widikum language, Mbongkesso blends *Laimbwe* and *Itanghi-Kom*. This is a result of the settlement of Laimbwe and Kom people here which is at the edge of the Kom/Wum Forest Reserve. The Laimbwe people cultivate food and cash crops like maize, cocoyams, rice, beans, bananas, coffee, etc. They also engage in related activities like hunting, pig and goat rearing, lumbering, and fishing.

Origin of the BMRCS Ltd

The desire by Ahidjo's government to encourage the decentralisation of agricultural projects to provinces, divisions, and ethnic groups of the then United Republic of Cameroon through the launch of Five Years Development Plans eventually led to the creation of the BMRCS Ltd. The launching of the Green Revolution and the first agricultural show in Buea in 1973 (Ngoh 1987, 249) also facilitated the process. It was aimed at encouraging farmers to compete to increase food production.

The BMRCS Ltd was created in 1975 barely two years after the launch of the "Green Revolution" by President Ahmadou Ahidjo. At the time Chu Mbonghekan was Fon of Bu and Kei Fon of Mbengkas (Kah 2012, 148). It survived the tempest in Bu after the death of Chu Mbonghekan through David

Bwai Awah, Bonghezee II, and Ndo Muam's competition for village headship. Other cooperative societies opened around the same time as the BMRCS Ltd, including Esimbi, Esu, Yemngeh, and Aguli-Ebiate. All these were affiliates of WADA whose headquarters was in Wum. The BMRCS Ltd was officially registered in 1994 following registration No. NW/CO/011/94/179 of 25th July, 1994. It was also registered in the North West Provincial Register of the Ministry of Agriculture as (COOP/CIG) No. NW/CO/01/94/179 on the 14th February 1994⁴. This was in compliance with Law No. 92/06 of 14th August 1992, relating to cooperative societies and common initiative groups with the decree of application No. 92/455/PM of 23rd November, 1992⁵.

The active farming population of Bu from the creation of the BMRCS was 7,000 and that of Mbengkas was 3,762. Annual output was over 780,100 kg of rice but registered members of the cooperative were only 145 including three workers, eight board members, and five supervisors⁶. The first chairman was Mr. Koi Clement Chembei, ably assisted by Messrs Ngeh Pius and Akou Nathaniel (Akuh 2018). The cooperative had a manager to manage its day-to-day operations, a board of directors, supervisors, and committee members who performed assigned tasks. The term of office for positions was three years with unlimited renewable. Executive board meetings are held every three months and general sessions annually⁷.

Choice of Laimbwe land for Rice Cooperative Society

Paddy rice cultivation and other food and cash crops are the main economic activities of the Laimbwe people. The rice belt extends along the Meteh and Menchum River valleys to include other settlements like Obang, Mughom, and Aguli. Prior to the creation of the BMRCS Ltd, upland rice farming was in Bu by 1953 (Kah 2015, 226).

The origin of BMRCS Ltd was a result of the fact that the territory was endowed with natural resources like good climate, fertile soils (alluvial, hydro-morphic, clay, lateritic, silt, ferruginous, loam, ferritic, and sandy soils), friendly topography, good drainage system, vegetation and relief (Kah 2001, 2-61).

⁴ BMRCS Ltd Archives, Report on the Evaluation Workshops Held in Bu- Mbengkas Rice Cooperative Society Limited Head Office Bu, 30th June 2001, 1-20..

⁵ BMRCS Ltd Archives, File No. 01, Registration Certificate/ Provincial Register (COOP/CIG) No. NW/CO/01/94/179 on 14th February 1994, Bamenda, 1994.

⁶ Ibid., 3.

⁷ Rice Processing Project, BMRCS, 4.

All the rich natural resources, especially soil, enabled rice farming among other local and cash crops. Rice cultivation policies in Laimbwe between 1953 and 1975 were outstanding and this encouraged the Cameroon government to extend the Green Revolution to this part of the country through WADA.

The concretization of the creation of this institution in Laimbwe land was the result of Ahidjo's economic development plans of the 1970s and the Green Revolution of 1973 (Fanso 2017, 34). The Cameroon government wanted to revive Cameroon's economy through increased food production and also to encourage a competitive spirit among farmers and promote sustainability in agriculture. This was done through the organisation of regular pastoral shows. The first was in Buea in 1973. President Ahidjo created a farmers' bank, the National Fund for Rural Development (FONADER in French). It granted loans to farmers at a low-interest rate of 8% and the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) championed agricultural projects. Through WADA, pastoral shows were organised in Wum town, and Laimbwe products at these shows necessitated an extension of the rice industry to the area.

The objective of this cooperative from inception was to receive quality paddy rice from members or users, weigh, and hull. It was also to market the rice produced by members at the most profitable price, enhance rice production through the supply of farm inputs such as improved seeds and fertilisers in the form of credits to members, and provide infrastructures like dams, canals, roads, stores, warehouses, among others within the limits of available funds⁸.

Furthermore, the creation of BMRCS Ltd was to increase the investment and income level of Laimbwe indigenes especially farmers through rice processing (Ngoobi 2018). The increasing demand for rice in and out of Cameroon also encouraged the Cameroon government to use WADA and decentralise its agricultural industry (Ambei 2018). This was simply because rice was becoming a fast, easy, and common food in the nation and the world at large. The rice brand was also used for animal feed, especially for pigs, goats, fowls, and other domestic animals and birds.

The establishment of BMRCS Ltd was for the acquisition and installation of new rice species and the brand. It was also to recruit and build the capacity of members on management skills and operation of the new rice huller⁹. Laimbwe people were to be encouraged to massively engage in rice farming and later on skilled labour would be made available to step up

⁸ BMRCS Ltd Archives, Article of Association for Bu-Mbengkas Rice Cooperative Society Ltd.

⁹ Rice Processing Project BMRCS, 8.

rice production in this area. There was a need to increase rice production through mechanisation schemes. In an interview with Ndangoh Mathias, he intimated that:

[...] Bu Rice Farmers Cooperative (BRIFACOOOP) was set up as a process of marketing a warehouse for storage, processing, and marketing of rice in Bu/Mbengkas, Wum Central Sub-Division with the support of local farming groups in Partnership with WADA and the Cameroon government led by the ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development and International Fund for Agricultural Development (FIDA), a UN Agency [...] (Ndangoh 2018, n.p.).

The desire to create a warehouse in order to preserve rice in Laimbwe land for future use through distribution to meet local needs encouraged agricultural experts from WADA to oversee the creation of the BMRCS Ltd. This rice cooperative also came into being as a way of encouraging cooperative farming in the Menchum Division, particularly in the Wum area under the supervision of WADA. This scheme would promote solidarity and sharing of expertise between farmers to increase output. This could go a long way to help Laimbwe people apply for loans, invest in farming, take care of daily needs, and develop their villages.

The Cameroon government working with WADA set up the rice cooperative in Laimbwe land to create jobs and encourage farmers to obtain shares and membership in agribusiness and register in the National Employment Fund (Towah 2018). It was also to ensure easy collection of taxes and to raise money for loans for projects as deemed necessary by the General Assembly, Executive Committee, and Board of Directors of the cooperative. There was equally the need to construct farm-to-market roads, especially from the rice valley to ease the evacuation of rice and other crops. Above all, the establishment of the BMRCS Ltd was to decongest the hauling mills in WADA and facilitate the processing of rice in other parts of the Menchum Division.

Organization and evolution of BMRCS Ltd

The BMRCS Ltd was structured into the General Assembly, Management, Executive, Operational, Supervisory committees, and farming groups. The General Assembly was made up of shareholders and farmers. It held meetings once annually and in June. During the meeting, there was an evalua-

tion of activities of the previous years and projections for the coming seasons and years. Elections were also conducted during the General Assembly during the election year. The Management Committee was made up of a lead manager, a board of directors of 9 members, and 5 supervisory committee members. All members of this committee were drawn from Bu and Mbengkas (Ndang 2018).

The executive committee consisted of the president and vice, secretary, treasurer, board members, technical advisers, and a legal officer. The executive bureau had a mandate of 3 years renewable without limit¹⁰. Members of the executive committee were charged with day to day activities of the cooperative, making sure that the needs of farmers, shareholders, customers, partners, and the entire Laimbwe community were met. Board meetings were held every 3 months to deliberate on the functioning and impact of the cooperative. There was an extraordinary meeting in December to evaluate and plan for the coming year¹¹.

The operational committee consisted of the board of directors or management committee, animation committee, operators, marketing agents, and the supervisory committee¹². This committee repaired and maintained possessions of the cooperative like the warehouse, offices, drying plateau, hauling mill, farming equipment, proposed projects, and managed funding, marketing, expenditure, and income of the cooperative. The supervisory committee had five members who monitored, evaluated, and controlled the material and financial transactions of cooperative activities during each farming season. They also collaborated with other cooperative development partners of BMRCS Ltd and shareholders, farming groups, and individual farmers in Laimbwe land to ensure that the objectives of the cooperative were met.

The organisational structure notwithstanding, the cooperative operated from 1975 to 2014 under a well-defined leadership. It collapsed for several reasons. The table below shows the leadership of the cooperative from the beginning to its collapse.

¹⁰ BMRCS Ltd Archives, Minutes of Bu-Mbengkas Rice Cooperative General Assembly Meeting, 2nd January 2013, by Toh Denis Koi, Secretary.

¹¹ Report on the Evaluation Workshops, 1.

¹² Ibid., 2.

Table 1: Exco members of BMRCs Ltd, 1975-2014

Year/Term of Office	Post/Function	Name	Origin/ Village
1975-1978	President/Chairman	Koi Clement Chembei	Bu
	Vice President/Chair	Amaazee Michael	Bu
	Secretary General	Muh Andrew Songhi	Bu
	Treasurer	Martin Mbah	Bu
	Manager	John Fangha	Bu
	Legal Officer	Amaazee Anthony Amah	Bu
	Technical Adviser/ Board Member	Kenguh Isei Amaazee	Bu
1978-1981	President/Chairman	Kenguh Isei Amaazee	Bu
	Vice President/Chair	Ngobi Bamenda	Bu
	Secretary General	Muh Andrew Songhi	Bu
	Treasurer	Toh Gabriel e Elias Ngowei (Vice)	Bu
	Manager	Akuh George Ngong	Bu
	Legal Officer	Amaazee Anthony Amah	Bu
	Technical Adviser/ Board Member	Ambei John, etc.	Bu
1981-1984	President/Chairman	Ambei John Fangha	Bu
	Vice President/Chair	Kang David	Bu
	Secretary General	Muh Andrew Songhi	Bu
	Treasurer	Bong Ben Kenwah	Bu
	Manager	Akuh George Ngong	Bu
	Legal Officer	Amaazee Anthony Amah	Bu
	Technical Adviser/ Board Member	Wanjuh Alfred, Esah Samson Ngong, etc.	Mbengkas e Bu
1984-1990	President/Chairman	Wanjuh Alfred	Mbengkas
	Vice President/Chair	Esah Samson Ngong e Akuh George Ngong	Bu
	Secretary General	Ngeh Pius Ndang	Bu
	Treasurer	Bah Mathias	Bu
	Manager	Towah Joshua Che, Ndang Ebenezer Fung	Bu
	Legal Officer	Amaazee Anthony Amah	Bu

	Technical Adviser/ Board Member	Towah Joshua Che	Bu
1990-1993	President/Chairman	Kamsang Martin Ngeh	Bu
	Vice President/Chair	Ngeh Pius Ndong	Bu
	Secretary General	Toh Denis Koi	Bu
	Treasurer	Bah Mathias	Bu
	Manager	Toh Zacks Kelah	Bu
	Legal Officer	Amaazee Anthony Amah	Bu
	Technical Adviser/ Board Member	Towah Joshua Che	Bu
1993-1996	President/Chairman	Towah Joshua Che	Bu
	Vice President/Chair	Muam Abel	Mbengkas
	Secretary General	Ngeh Pius Ndong	Bu
	Treasurer	Kah Elias	Bu
	Manager	Toh Denis Koi	Bu
	Legal Officer	Amaazee Anthony Amah	Bu
	Technical Adviser/ Board Member	Muh Griffith Kang, Chi Aaron, Wabi Paul, Wango Christina, Amei Clement	Bu e Mbengkas
1996-1999	President/Chairman	Wango Stephen Fang	Bu
	Vice President/Chair	Ngoh Jonathan Mbwai, Kamsang Martin Ngeh	Bu
	Secretary General	Muh Griffith Kang	Bu
	Treasurer	Ndong Eric, Kah Andreas Mungang, Ngam John	Bu
	Manager	Ndong Ebenezer Fung	Bu
	Legal Officer	Amaazee Anthony Amah	Bu
	Technical Adviser/ Board Member	Mbi Marcel, Koi George, Songhi Pus, etc.	Bu
1999-2002	President/Chairman	Ndong Johnson Ndong	Bu
	Vice President/Chair	Ngoh Jonathan Mbwai	Bu
	Secretary General	Toh Zacks Kelah	Bu
	Treasurer	Koi George Kui	Bu
	Manager	Ndong Ebenezer Fung	Bu
	Legal Officer	Amaazee Anthony Amah	Bu

	Technical Adviser/ Board Member	Afuh William Kui, Ngong Jonathan Ngum, Mbi Marcel e Kamsang Martin Ngeh	Bu e Mbengkas
2003-2009	President/Chairman	Kamsang Martin Ngeh	Bu
	Vice President/Chair	Toh Denis Koi	Bu
	Secretary General	Toh Zachs Kelah	Bu
	Treasurer	Ngum John	Bu
	Manager	Ndang Ebenezer Fung	Bu
	Legal Officer	Amaazee Anthony Amah	Bu
	Technical Adviser/ Board Member	Kui William	Bu
2010-2013	President/Chairman	Ngong Mercy	Bu
	Vice President/Chair	Abkou Nathaniel	Mbengkas
	Secretary General	Toh Denis Koi	Bu
	Treasurer	Koi George Kui	Bu
	Manager	Akuh George Ngong	Bu
	Legal Officer	Amaazee Anthony Amah	Bu
	Technical Adviser/ Board Member	Ngong Jonathan e Ngong Jonathan	Bu e Mbengkas
2013-2014	President/Chairman	Muh Griffith Kang	Bu
	Vice President/Chair	Muh Samuel	Bu
	Secretary General	Toh Denis Koi	Bu
	Treasurer	Tchi Belina	Bu
	Manager	Toh Zachs Kelah	Bu
	Legal Officer	Amaazee Anthony Amah	Bu
	Technical Adviser/ Board Member	Akuh George Ngong e Kui William	Bu

Source: BMRCS Ltd Archives, File No. 01, Minutes of Meeting 17th February 1981; Minutes of Meeting 18th December 1981, Minutes of Board Meeting 10 November 1982; Minutes of the General Administration, Minutes of the Cooperation Development Meeting at the Extension Service Wum, 18th February 1987; Registration Certificate/Provincial Register (COOP/CIG) No. NW/CO/01/94/179 on 14th February 1994 Bamenda; Interview with Towah Joshua Che, Ndang Ebenezer Fung and Akuh George Ngong (Former Managers of BMRCS Ltd) Bu, 27th July, 2018.

Projects and partnership

Projects of BMRCS Ltd were initiated by board members, the executive committee, management committee, shareholders, partners and WADA. These were aimed at transforming agricultural produce in Laimbwe land. The logical framework of BMRCS Ltd projects took into consideration global and specific objectives, activities and expected results, indicators, resources and partners. The global objective was to raise income levels of members of the BMRCS Ltd through the processing of rice¹³. In more specific terms, the cooperative was to acquire and install new rice machinery, build capacity of members on management techniques, increase rice production to about 2000 tons annually, increase quality of rice hulled from 360 tons to about 1,000 tons annually, and rice brand from 8 to 12 tons per year.

From creation in 1975, the first project was to establish the head office of BMRCS Ltd building, hulling mill, a warehouse and a drying plateau. Other projects were to train farmers, equip them with farming tools, grant loans, and initiate partnerships with external and internal agricultural agencies, other cooperatives and farming groups¹⁴. There was also a plan to construct a motorable road to the rice farm, provide farmers with seeds and fertilisers, promote mass participation of Laimbwe indigenes in agriculture, increase processing, management, marketing and income of the cooperative. Some projects of the BMRCS Ltd between 1996 and 2006 included operating SATAKE rice huller worth 1,800,000 FCFA, road maintenance in Bu village, 7,500,000 FCFA, support for Mbengkas road maintenance project worth 200,000 FCFA, construction of a laboratory building in the Bu Health Centre, 20,600,000 FCFA and water supply to Bu village, 2,000,000 FCFA¹⁵.

To realize these projects, BMRCS Ltd signed partnerships with external and internal agricultural institutions, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, other cooperatives, farming groups and individuals. Some internal and national partners were Laimbwe individual farmers (shareholders), farming groups, Esimbi, Yemngeh, Esu, and Aguli-Ebiate Cooperatives, WADA, Aghem Cooperative Credit Union Limited¹⁶, Bamenda Accounting and Management Centre (BAMCCIG), Menchum Integrated Rural Development Project (MIRUDEP), Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, National Employment Fund (NEF), the Centre for Agribusiness

¹³ Rice Processing Project BMRCS, 6-10.

¹⁴ Ibid., 12.

¹⁵ Ibid., 3.

¹⁶ Report on the Evaluation Workshops, 2.

and Rural Development (CARD), *Projet d'Appui au Développement des Filières Agricole/Commodity Value-chain Development Support Project (PADFA)* (Ndangoh 2018) and *Appui aux Stratégies Paysannes et à la Professionalization de l'Agriculture/the Support Programme to Farmers Strategies and Professionalization of Agriculture (ASPPA)*¹⁷.

International partnerships included the International Fund for Agricultural Development (FIDA), the International Development Fund (IDF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It should be noted that MIRUDEP, NEF, ASPPA and UNDP were the main partners that financed projects and trained farmers of BMRCS Ltd. According to recommendations of the service organization of BMRCS Ltd:

[...] we strongly recommend that ASPPA assistance to the cooperative be restricted to punctual intervention to accompany the cooperative in the implementation of the resolutions of the Evaluation General Assembly of 30th June 2001. It is essential that the service organisation retain works closely with the cooperative to implant group commercialisation of rice using the loan from the Aghem Credit Union [...]¹⁸.

Furthermore, Mr Ngeh Martin (Chairman of BMRCS Ltd) recognized the support and services of MIRUDEP, National Employment Fund and UNDP by stating that:

[...] thanks to MIRUDEP in partnership with BMRCS Ltd. The creation of agricultural post which has [sic] greeted with a sigh of relief by the farming population. Our sincere thanks to UNDP Bafoussam for granting us a rice huller for quality clean rice and mass production. Our special thanks to the National Employment Fund for playing [sic] a lion share for mass production of quality rice in our region in agricultural sector. Like an infant who will suck the mother's breast and still need water to drink [...]¹⁹.

¹⁷ BMRCS Ltd Archives, File No. 015, Description Project of IDF/ASPPA, December 2000, Consulted on 28th July, 2018.

¹⁸ Report on the Evaluation Workshops, 4.

¹⁹ BMRCS Ltd Archives, A Welcome Speech Presented by the Chairman of Board of Directors (Kamsang Martin Ngeh) of BMRCS Ltd on Behalf of the Entire Farming Population of Bu/Mbengkas on the Maiden Handing over of Farming Equipment to Farmers of Bu and Mbengkas, 13th December, 2007.

The reaction of the Chairman of the BMRCS Ltd revealed that in spite of several national and international partners who supported the cooperative, there was a need for more.

Budgeting, funding, marketing, processing, income/revenue

The main sources of funding for BMRCS Ltd came from hulling charges, sale of rice bran, registration, and purchase of shares, grants from individuals, national and international partners, loans from credit unions and credit from loans. For instance, to be a member, an individual registered with 500 FCFA and shares ranged from 1,000-5,000 FCFA annually. Farmers also took loans from the cooperative ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 FCFA payable in kilograms of rice at the end of each farming season (Akuh 2018).

On 6th November 2003, the chairman of the cooperative applied and obtained a loan of 350,000 FCFA from the Aghem Cooperative Credit Union with the aim of servicing and purchasing some spare parts of their hulling machine in preparation for the peak harvesting season in December 2003²⁰. The BMRCS Ltd had a credit account No. 566 in the Aghem Cooperative Credit Union Ltd, created in 1991. Another account No. 3709 was created on September 24 2007²¹. Other accounts included No. 5433 created with Aghem Cooperative Credit Union Ltd, and a current account No. 100230001000111000009 12 with Union Bank Bamenda on 5 February 2013²².

In 2006, the total budget of BMRCS Ltd was 5,741,000 FCFA, and UNDP contributed 4,070,000 FCFA while BMRCS Ltd raised the remaining amount of 1,671,000 FCFA²³. The cooperative had an annual budget that ranged between 2 million and 6 million FCFA.

The marketing of BMRCS Ltd produce was done within and out of the Laimbwe ethnic group. A majority of rice and rice brands were sold in Wum and Bamenda towns. About 35 and 8 bags of rice were bought by ASPPA in

20 BMRCS Ltd Archives, An Application for a Loan Presented by Ndong Johnson Ndong to the Aghem Cooperative Credit Union, 6th November, 2013.

21 BMRCS Ltd Archives, UNDP Funding Project Document Ref. No. 7A/P/95/06/06 AND Ref. No. CMR 50/048/09/07/CRB of 31st August, 2007.

22 BMRCS Ltd Archives, Attestation of Account Number Presented to the Assistant Manager of Aghem Cooperative Credit Union Limited, Kedzi Gerald Kom by the Manager of BMRCS Ltd, Akuh George Ngong on 5th February, 2013.

23 Rice Processing Project, BMRCS, 16.

1999/2000 and 2000/2001 respectively²⁴. Between 1999 and 2001, 224 and 185 tons of rice were processed respectively. In 1991 and 1996, BMRCS Ltd realised a profit at an interest rate of 1, 1252,140 and 2,600,008 FCFA respectively. Again in 2001 and 2005, the income was 1,028,125 and 755,000 FCFA respectively²⁵.

Expenditure

The income obtained from the turnover of BMRCS Ltd was used on maintenance, funding some projects, giving loans to members especially shareholders and taking care of wages of workers. Some were used for fuel, stationery and documentation, space, rice purchase, transport and travelling expenses, entertainment, raw materials and store consumption, sundry expenses cleaning, overtime, audit fees, feeding and board allowances, hired labour, debts, scale tax charges and purchase of farming equipment²⁶. Total expenditure from 1999-2001 for instance was 4,448,800 FCFA, while from 2002 -2005, it decreased to 502,355 FCFA due to effective management. In support of this idea Mr Towah stated that:

[...] during my time as manager, my best presidents or chairmen were Wanjuh Alfred and Kamsang Martin Ngeh both from Mbengkas. During the reign of Wanjuh Alfred, they raised about 2.6 million FCFA within 2 years as compared to the 9000 FCFA cash balance that was brought forward by the predecessor, Ambei John Fangha [...] (Towah 2018, n.p.).

This explains why Wanjuh Alfred and Kamsang Martin Ngeh served two mandates each as presidents of BMRCS Ltd. After these two, the cooperative could not raise the money they've previously raised.

²⁴Report on the Evaluation Workshops, 4.

²⁵ Ibid., 5 and BMRCS Ltd, Annual Budget for the Year 2004 and 2005 Presented by Ntang Ebenezer Fung, Manager.

²⁶ BMRCS Ltd Archives, Financial Statement as from 31st May 2004 to 31st May 2005, Presented by Ntang Ebenezer Fung, Manager, on Hulling and Rice Brand.

The cooperative in Laimbwe economy

The establishment of the BMRCs Ltd in the Laimbwe economy in 1975 by the Cameroon government through WADA was a blessing to Bu and Mbengkas villages in particular and other villages and towns in general. Activities of the cooperative led to an increase in production and transformation. For instance, the cooperative experienced an increase in production from 8 to 35 tons of rice between 1999 and 2000 and 224 to 300 tons in 2001²⁷. By 2006, the production rose to about 2000 tons of rice annually. The quantity of rice hulled also increased from 360 to 960 tons and rice brand from 8 to 12 tons per year²⁸. Capacity-building seminars and training were also organized for farmers on modern farming techniques.

Other benefits farmers got included rice hullers, modern farming equipment, seeds, drying plateau, and credit from the cooperative for workers, members and shareholders. The cooperative benefited from hulling machines, a building (head office), a warehouse, a workshop, chairs and wheelbarrows from their partners. Supporting this view Mr. Ndeh Richard (2018) said that:

[...] WADA gave 2 hulling machines, big and small for the start and struggled that the BMRCs Ltd be a multipurpose cooperative but to no avail. WADA also struggled to train the operator and manager of the hulling machines. In case of breakdown, people went to WADA and Aguli to hull their rice. I supported the cooperative with 4 wheelbarrows to fill the foundation of the cooperative [...] (Richard 2018, n.p.).

The cooperative obtained two hulling machines from WADA, bought in England and Japan called Sateke (Towah 2018). Through these rice mills, people no longer pounded rice in mortars with pestles but hulled it. The hulling distance was also reduced as people used to hull rice in WADA more than twelve kilometres away from home.

Members of the cooperative obtained farm tools and other materials like hoes, spades, cutlasses, three fingers, raincoats, boots, dig axes, bags of rice, seeds, fertilisers, buckets, and loans (Sang 2018). Farmers obtained loans and refunded them with bags of rice which cost 5,000 FCFA each. Registered members hulled rice at the rate of 10 francs per kilogram and bought rice brand at a reduced rate of 15 francs per kilogram as compared to 15 and 20

²⁷ Report on the Evaluation Workshops, 4.

²⁸ Rice Processing Project BMRCs, 7-8.

francs per kilogram for non-members for hulling and rice brand respectively (Ndang 2018). Members with shares obtained free dividends, fertiliser, and farming tools and attended board meetings annually (Akuh 2018). Seeds were also given to members each farming season to extend their farm sizes to increase production, income, and the standard of living.

The establishment of the cooperative created employment opportunities especially in the farming sector in Laimbwe land. People were employed over the years to serve as managers, secretaries, treasurers, supervisors, officers, hullers, operators, trainers, selling and distribution agents, and contractors. Pioneer members included Koi Clement Chembei, Flengei Christopher Kah, Muh Andrew Songhi, Ambei John Fangha, Ache Lucas, Wanjuh Alfred, and Kamsang Martin Ngeh. From its creation in 1975 to its collapse in 2014, more than 8,000 jobs were created directly and indirectly by the cooperative (Towah and Akuh 2018). Wages paid workers ranged from 9,000 to 30,000 francs²⁹.

Solidarity through group farming was encouraged especially in Bu and Mbengkas. Farming groups that emerged benefitted from the loan scheme offered by the cooperative. Among these groups were Kpwe Wei Solidarity Farming Group, Eufueh Women Farming Group, Progressive Farming Group II Bu, Green Valley Farming Group, Watchman's Rice Cooperative Farming Group, Bu Hunger Strikers CIG Farming Group, Neighbours Common Initiative Group, Bu Young Farming Group among others³⁰. The loans obtained were used to increase output and provide education, clothing, health, food, shelter, and other basic needs for family members.

Furthermore, the cooperative engaged in infrastructural development. Its head office was constructed in the Bafren quarter in Bu village. A rice drying slab was also built to help farmers dry rice before hulling. The roads to rice fields and Wum town were constructed and upgraded respectively. The farm-to-market road was hardly used because of a very difficult topography (Ache 2018). In 1999, Mbengkas benefited from a project of road maintenance worth 200,000 FCFA. Mr. Towah Joshua in describing these activities said:

29 BMRCs Ltd Archives, An Employment Attestation Received by Ndang Ebenezer Fung as Manager of BMRCs Ltd, 7th April, 1998.

30 BMRCs Ltd Archives, Loan Payment Situation for Groups under the Paddy Rice Programme in Menchum Division, 2000/2001.

[...] during our period, the Wum-Bu-rice valley road was constructed at the cost of 800, 000 FCFA, which was in proper used. We inherited two machines that were given by WADA, one from England which later got bad and another one was later purchased from Japan called Sateke. There was a project for a transportation car but [...] (Towah 2018, n.p.).

A motorable road and a car to transport rice produced in Laimbwe land was a necessity but the car was never bought. Over 2 million from 1996 was also budgeted for the development of pipe-borne water. The cooperative also assisted in the construction of a laboratory workshop in the Bu Health Centre. This laboratory cost the government over 20, 600,000 FCFA³¹. It also initiated collaboration with other cooperatives such as those of Esimbi, Yemngeh, Esu, Aguli-Ebiate and Aghem. Through WADA it initiated national and international partnerships with organisations like FIDA, IDF and UNDP, microfinance companies, banks and ministries like that of Agriculture and Rural Development. In spite of this, the cooperatives faced several challenges.

Challenges

The Bu/Mbengkas cooperative faced a number of challenges. In 2002, the cooperative was the only primary industry operating in the Menchum Division out of the several that WADA had supported like Esimbi, Yemngeh, Esu, and Aguli-Ebiate³². The collapse of WADA in 1983 was a big blow to the survival of the cooperative because this rural development structure served as a key pillar of the cooperative. The Bu/Mbengkas cooperative began with two hulling mills thanks to WADA who also provided a visiting operator. It also assisted in the training of two operators and farmers on agricultural techniques, and construction of the head office and supported the digging of the road from Bu to the rice valley.

Another factor that led to the collapse of BMRCS Ltd was the leadership fuss in Bu in 1981 after the death of Fon Chu Mbonghekan (Kah 2008, 165). The death of Chu Mbonghekan in 1981 created a power vacuum because his successor, Bwai David Awah (1984-1994), was not welcomed by some Bu indigenes (Kai 2018, 108) neither was Emmanuel Bong Muam nor the father Andrew Ndo Muam. This chieftaincy crisis divided Bu people and affected the working and loyalty in the cooperative society. When Bwai David

³¹ Rice Processing Project BMRCS, 3-4.

³² Report on the Evaluation Workshops, 2.

Awah died in 1994, the other claimant to the throne Fon Bonghezee II (Bong Emmanuel Muam) was also not loved by a cross section of the population. This throne was also contested by his father, Ndo Andrew Muam on the basis of legitimacy. The situation was compounded when two development associations emerged; firstly Bu Cultural and Development Association (BUCADA) and then the Bu Village Development Council (BVDC) (Ewi 2007/2008, 36-45). These associations seemingly operated along the lines of the brewing leadership scuffle. The continuation of this leadership fuss split cooperative Exco members, workers, and farmers and by 2014 it had collapsed.

The administrative reorganisation of Cameroon into smaller units was to become a problem that affected the cooperative. The creation of new divisions and subdivisions in 1992 which went operational in 1993 saw Mbengkas come under the Funding subdivision of Boyo Division (Cheng 2003, 1). Bu remained part of the Wum Central Sub-Division of the Menchum Division (Kai 2018, 105). Mbengkas people began to intensify efforts to create their own cooperatives. They felt that the Bu people had dominated the cooperative with little budget to develop Mbengkas.

The domination, marginalisation, and arrogance in leadership and allocation of projects by the cooperative management also contributed to its collapse. Table 1 shows how for close to forty years of existence of the cooperative two persons (Wainjuh Alfred Kamsang Martin Ngeh) from Mbengkas occupied the post of chairman out of eleven chairmen, two were vice Presidents, one treasurer, and one adviser (Towah 2018). This clearly shows an imbalance in the leadership or administration of the cooperative from its creation to its collapse. Besides, in the allocation of projects, Bu was privileged over Mbengkas. For instance, the head office of the cooperative was constructed in Bu, and a rice drying slab, and a road from the cooperative to rice farms and Wum were constructed and upgraded (Ache 2018). It was in 1999 that Mbengkas benefited from a project of road maintenance with a budget of only 200,000 FCFA. Pipe-borne water worth 2 million FCFA, and a laboratory workshop costing over 20, 600,000 FCFA (with a substantial amount from the cooperative) were all constructed in Bu³³. All these among others made Mbengkas people feel cheated. Some of them boycotted the cooperative and took their rice to Obang in Bafut Subdivision to hull it.

Another challenge the cooperative faced was the lack of enough hulling machines and the constant breakdown of the few that were given by WADA. Engineers like John Taiti and Dobgima came for their repairs and this was costly to the cooperative (Towah 2018). The situation was compou-

³³ Rice Processing Project, BMRCs, 3-4.

ned by the scarcity of spare parts and in relation to these challenges, Mr Ebenezer Ndong (2018), a former manager said that:

The highest problem was with farmers. When I borrowed money (18 million FCFA) to give as loan to buy a machine to install in Mbengkas [...] I took from the National Employment Fund (NEF), and I was imprisoned in a cell for a night. Few farmers paid and we bought a hulling mill at Mbengkas for 3.7 million FCFA with the money I borrowed, the money was also used to arrange the valley road from Mbengkas, I also repaid the hulling mill in Bu [...] (Ndong 2018, n.p.).

The manager of BMRCs Ltd tried to handle the problem of the rice mill and a motorable road to Mbengkas. He reduced congestion in the cooperative and borrowed money from NEF for a machine in Mbengkas. But due to mismanagement, the machine could only last for long.

Furthermore, embezzlement, mismanagement, favouritism, corruption, bribery, and non-accountability caused the cooperative to face serious challenges which hindered it from attaining set objectives. This was one reason that led to the collapse of the cooperative. By 1996, more than 2 million FCFA had been illegally embezzled from the cooperative by some unscrupulous workers. According to a complaint written by Wango Stephen Fang (2018) (Chairman of the Board of Directors) to the state counsel in the Court of First Instance in Wum, he stated that:

[...] I Mr. Wango Stephen Fang, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bu/Mbengkas Rice Cooperative Ltd pleads sir, that you use your high office to help my society recover the debts listed below. These debtors were given reminder letters and only up to April 30th as date line for the payment of their debts. But they have voluntarily refused to pay. I have also attached a copy of the reminder letters [...] ³⁴.

The complaint presented by the Chairman of the Board of Directors of BMRCs Ltd to the state counsel in Wum had 89 persons who were debtors of the cooperative. This money was not recovered and the cooperative was in a budget deficit and collapsed. Similarly, in 2001 under the leadership of Ndong Johnson Ndong and Ndong Ebenezer as Manager, 119 persons were documented to owe the cooperative a total debt of 2,960,280 FCFA³⁵.

³⁴ BMRCs Ltd Archives, A Complaint Presented by the Chairman of the Board of Directors, BMRCs Ltd, Wango Stephen Fang to the State Counsel of the Court of First Instance in Wum Central Sub-Division, 24th April, 1996.

³⁵ Report on the Evaluation Workshops, 5-7.

According to an audit of the Management-Accounting, Audit, and Consultative (MAAC) Group, about 35 members were owing and embezzled over 1, 232,070 FCFA between 31st December 2005 and 31st August 2008³⁶.

Visible signs of the irredeemable cooperative were from 2010 when Ngong Mercy (2010-2013) took over as Chairwoman and was succeeded by Muh Griffith Kang (2013-2014). The two chairpersons did not inherit a reasonable account (Akuh and Ntang 2018). From 2010 to 2014 therefore, they could not manage the cooperative, especially the hulling mill to meet the needs of farmers. The financial statement presented during the extra-ordinary meeting of 2010 indicated that the total income was 1,391,00 FCFA and after a deduction of debts owed UNDP, the balance on deposit was -57,000 FCFA. The unconvincing reason given was that the board had not met in three years. The situation did not change as the cooperative registered a further deficit of -474,200 FCFA in the 2011 financial report³⁷.

Conclusion

In this paper we have shown that President Ahmadou Ahidjo introduced reforms to revive Cameroon's agricultural sector through Five Years Development Plans. This led to the establishment of several supporting structures across the country to have a dream realised. It was on this basis that WADA was created which among other things was to modernise agriculture in Menchum and beyond.

The eventual establishment of the BMRCs Ltd in 1975 was thanks to the outreach activities of WADA. Its main aim was to transform in different ways the economy of the area. There was enthusiasm at the beginning but in later years the cooperative became a failure. Several projects were carried out but mostly in Bu with little done in Mbengkas. Mismanagement, exclusion, carelessness, and negligence led to animosity, slander, bitterness, intransigence, and thus the collapse of the lofty initiative in 2014. Considering the importance of the rice economy on the livelihood of the Laimbwe people, other institutions succeeded the BMRCs Ltd. These were PADFA (2015 – 2018) and then ASPPA but a laudable initiative had collapsed with attendant consequences. Besides, these institutions were not as inclusive and

³⁶ BMRCs Ltd Archives, MAAC Group, Audit Report to the Members of Cooperative Society, Reg. No. NW/29/00/3076 of 27/01/200, P.O. Box 978 Bamenda N.W.P. Republic of Cameroon, 31st August, 2008.

³⁷ BMRCs Ltd Archives, Financial Report, 24th June, 2011.

grassroots in mobilisation as the BMRCS Ltd. Lessons need to be learned from this failure for success in the future.

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ABSTRACT

This work examines the Bu/Mbengkas Rice Cooperative Society Limited (BMRCs Ltd) in livelihood sustainability of Bu and Mbengkas, Laimbwe-speaking people of the Menchum and Boyo Divisions of the Northwest Region of Cameroon respectively. We have employed mainly the qualitative research method in data collection and analyses. Published papers, theses, minutes of meetings, and archival material including reports, speeches, and letters have also been gleaned and analysed. Some interviews were conducted with actors and participants. The need to revive Cameroon's economy led President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon in the 1960s and 1970s to introduce agricultural reforms through the Five Years Development Plans and the

“Green Revolution.” Through this, Laimbwe benefited from the establishment of a rice cooperative in the 1970s through the agency of the Wum Area Development Authority (WADA). The cooperative society led to socio-economic changes especially in Bu but not Mbengkas. A lot more would have been achieved but for mismanagement, greed, arrogance, domination, exclusion, and marginalisation. The result was the collapse of a laudable initiative in 2014.

KEYWORDS

Cooperative. Ethnic Group. Laimbwe. Economy. Society. Cameroon.

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REVIEW OF “*BREVE HISTORIA DEL SAHARA OCCIDENTAL*” BY ISAÍAS BARREÑADA¹

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Introduction

The unresolved conflict in Western Sahara can be considered one of the most complex and that puts a strain on contemporary international dogmas, values, and institutions. The book “*Breve Historia del Sahara Occidental*” (A Brief History of Western Sahara), published in 2022 by Editorial Catarata, highlights precisely this aspect. Not that it wasn’t already noticeable: those who study the dynamics of self-determination and the “Intractable Conflicts” can easily understand the intricate relationships that permeate the deterioration and the lack of international interest in resolving the conflict.

Although the book is entitled “*Breve Historia*” (A Brief History) and provides the historical elements that are essential for understanding the subject, it breaks away from the manual and historiographical approach that characterizes “historical” publications on the subject. It goes far beyond historicism. It offers views based on political theory, the international institutions involved, the economic dynamics that justify its maintenance, and the political resistance and reluctance of the actors involved. It is a wide-ranging analysis that combines theory and practice, an up-to-date and accurate view that allows anyone interested to understand the current geopolitical importance of the conflict.

Six chapters are presented. They cover Spain’s position on Western Sahara and the recent – and ongoing – bilateral crisis with Morocco. It reveals that there are a series of political disturbances surrounding the

¹ Barreñada, Isaías. 2022. *Breve Historia del Sahara Occidental*. Madrid: Catarata.

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issue, even though almost 50 years have passed since the Moroccan occupation and the 1975 Madrid Tripartite Agreement. The chaotic process of territorial maintenance on both sides is still alive and kicking. Themes relating to colonialism, failed decolonization, occupation, and war are addressed as keywords capable of translating the conflict process from its antecedent environment. This is the historical heart of the work.

A theoretical articulation shows the possibility of fitting the conflict into the international model of "Intractable Conflicts", taking into account the multilateral impossibility of offering a plausible solution. The author makes an interesting counterpoint in relation to the dynamics of the Palestinian conflict, based on axes such as its long duration, transformation, asymmetry, fragmentation, the relevance of occupation and annexation, and the construction of national identities around the conflict. Key theoretical and conjunctural factors for understanding the panorama.

In addition, we look at conjunctural issues through the impact of the strategy of both parties (Morocco and the Polisario Front), but above all, we expose the clear ineffectiveness of international organizations, especially the UN, in mediating and conducting a resolution strategy, with the complicity of the international community. This process ends up allowing the *status quo* to be maintained, clearly favoring Moroccan interests. It also reveals the strategic facet of the attempt to legitimize the occupation and Moroccan oppression of the Saharawis through economic investment, be it through the phosphate booty, solar energy, fishing banks or even direct financial investment by the Moroccan state, which urgently needs to "Moroccanize" occupied Western Sahara. Finally, the brave Sahrawi popular resistance in the occupied territory and beyond is discussed.

The work reflects an exercise in extreme clarity in a highly complex context. A "*Breve Historia*" of immense contributions and greatness.

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