

ISSN 2448-3915 | e-ISSN 2448-3923

BRAZILIAN JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES

Revista Brasileira de Estudos Africanos



Brazilian Journal of African Studies	Porto Alegre	v. 8	n. 15	p. 1-163	Jan./Jun. 2023
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ABOUT THE JOURNAL

The Brazilian Journal of African Studies is a biannual publication, in digital format, dedicated to the research, reflection and propagation of original scientific articles with emphasis on the analysis of International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations and Schools of Thought. RBEA is essentially academic, linked to the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

The RBEA has as target audience researchers, professors and students interested in the specificities of the African continent and its international insertion. Alongside such perspective, the Journal intends to expand the debate about the Brazilian projection world widely, the Brazilian cooperation efforts (including in the Defense field) with the African countries in the South Atlantic perimeter and the construction of a regional identity in face of a scenario of geopolitical transformations.

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This work was supported by the Journal Edition Supportive Program (PAEP) - UFRGS



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BRAZILIAN JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES

Revista Brasileira de Estudos Africanos



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Editorial supervising: Michele Bandeira

Cover: Fernanda Chiodi de Castilho

Graphic design: Janaína Horn

Layout: Fernanda Chiodi de Castilho

Proofreading: Felipe Raskin Cardon and Marcos Viola Cardoso

Artwork: Tiago Oliveira Baldasso

The *Brazilian Journal of African Studies* is available online both in English and Portuguese at www.seer.ufrgs.br/rbea

CONTACT INFO

Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul

Faculty of Economics

52 João Pessoa Avenue – room 18C – 1st floor

ZIP Code: 90040-000 - Centro - Porto Alegre/RS - Brazil

Phone: +55 51 3308.3272 / 3308.3348

E-mail: cebrafrica@ufrgs.br

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ufrgs.br/cebrafrica

CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION (CIP)

Responsible: Gládis W. do Amaral Library, Faculty of Economics, UFRGS

Revista Brasileira de Estudos Africanos / Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas, Centro Brasileiro de Estudos Africanos. – Ano 8, n. 15 (jan./jun. 2023). – Porto Alegre : UFRGS/FCE/CEBRAFRICA, 2023 -

Semestral.

ISSN 2448-3907.

e-ISSN 2448-3923

1. África. 2. Relações internacionais. 3. Integração regional.
4. Segurança internacional. 5. Política de defesa.

CDU 327

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira

June/2023

The predominant view in the Western political and academic narrative on Africa portrays the continent as permanently unstable. Although from an apparently critical perspective, the resumption of Africa's strategic importance has been discussed from the idea of a "new partition". It is undeniable that the African continent has regained its strategic importance after the lost decades in the 1980s and 1990s, strengthening nation-states, their institutions, and regional organizations. Certainly, levels of instability are a reality, but much more complex. The potential for growth and development has placed African states in a relevant position to act positively on the significant systemic international disputes, which oppose antagonistic projects by the Great Powers ("militaristic" West vs. "developmental" East). In addition, it is important to observe the mechanisms that these states use to deal with the impacts produced by international instability.

We have recently witnessed a new escalation of conflict in Sudan (April 2023), exploited by analysts as another illustrative moment of African "disorder". When analyzing the conflict between the two military groups, it becomes clear that the dispute for power and resources does not occur in isolation, but is linked to international interests and the antagonistic projects mentioned, as well as the intended pattern of international cooperation. At the same time, positive processes, such as attempts to protect national models against destabilizing threats in the Sahel (Hybrid Wars, Color Revolutions, Regime Changes, and waves of terrorism, for example), are little analyzed. Furthermore, the actions taken by African leaders to propose a peace plan to both Russia and Ukraine were insufficiently investigated. The peace plan received a favorable response from the Russian president but was rejected by the Ukrainian counterpart. In a bold diplomatic move, seven African heads of state, representing their regions, formed the African Peace Initiative delegation.

African states have thus been presenting themselves as important actors that, individually or in multilateral forums, have indicated a possible majority around constructing a stable international order that allows the developing world favorable conditions for the coexistence of different national projects. This issue of the BJAS presents seven articles by authors from Brazil, Cuba, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Kenya. The texts discuss relevant topics such as international cooperation, security issues, and economic and political development.

In “Asia’s growing global influence: a study of India’s Africa Policy”, Hamdy A. Hassan discusses the role of soft power in Asia-Africa relations, focusing on India’s policy towards the African continent. Yoslán Silverio González, in the article “Contemporary terrorism: a theoretical perspective”, analyzes terrorism as an expanding trend that has a significant impact on global security. According to the author, the majority of analyses conducted by Western academics regarding these matters are permeated by an approach that associates terrorism with “jihadism”, “Islamism” or, more problematically, that fail to differentiate between armed movements with social or territorial claims and actual terrorist groups. “The evolution of UN peace operations from a human security perspective: the dilemma in the issue of Western Sahara” is presented by Guilherme Moreira Dias, José Maria Sydow de Barros, and Túlio Pires Barboza. The authors approach the topic of Western Sahara through the lens of human security and the development of UN peace operations within the framework of an expanding international security agenda.

Subsequently, two analyses of Mozambique are presented from a political and security perspective. Ercílio Neves Brandão Langa, in the article “Situation analysis of the Chissano government: domestic transitions and economic pragmatism in Mozambique (1986-2004)”, analyzes the political conjuncture of Mozambique during the Chissano Government. Fátima Chimarizeni Papelo discusses “Emerging challenges and opportunities in humanitarian assistance in Mozambique: a case study from Cabo Delgado”. According to the author, international humanitarian agencies operating in Cabo Delgado have taken on roles within the humanitarian domain that subject them to ambiguous circumstances and pose challenges for coordinating humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, the Mozambican state needs to redefine its strategy and adopt a proactive national stance.

In their article titled “The local economic impacts of railways: Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway (SGR)”, Nancy Githaiga and Hailay Shifare examine the SGR project and highlight its varied economic effects. According to the

authors' findings, throughout the planning and construction phases of the SGR, there was a notable increase in land and property values, alongside a rise in commercial activities along the route. These changes can be attributed to shifts in land distribution and alterations in land use patterns. In addition, Kenya and China should jointly address the issues of employment and skills transfer. Finally, in the article "Brazil's military-technical cooperation with Namibia: aspects of a strategic partnership", Kamilla Raquel Rizzi, Naiane Inez Cossul, and Patrick Bueno analyze how Brazil's African policy consolidation and its aspirations to strengthen its geopolitical position in the Strategic Surroundings serve as motivating factors for pursuing technical-military cooperation with Namibia, with a particular emphasis on strategic defense.

The BJAS publishes a bilingual electronic version in both Portuguese and English. Thus, we welcome contributions from colleagues in Brazil and abroad, aiming to establish connections that foster the expansion of knowledge and the development of a Southern perspective regarding the African continent and its relationships with other nations.

We would like to thank the Editorial Assistant, Mariana Vitola, and the support of Gabriela Bonness, Guilherme Geremias, Henrique Moura, Isabela Marcon, Isabella Cruzichi, Lucca Medeiros, Rafaela Serpa e Vinícius Baldissera. We would also like to thank the CEBRAFRICA team, who worked on the revision and translation of the articles.

ASIA'S GROWING GLOBAL INFLUENCE: A STUDY OF INDIA'S AFRICA POLICY

Hamdy A. Hassan¹



Introduction

The 21st century could become an Asian and African century, which will result in a radical global transformation of the world. Thus, the past decade has witnessed a large Asian presence in Africa, especially, China, India, Japan, and South Korea. Not surprisingly that the rise of Asia in global politics has worried the traditional Western powers. Analyzing contemporary Asian approaches to Africa should be performed through their historical contexts, in particular the history of competition and rivalry between Asian rising powers. It is no secret that this point has not been adequately addressed in previous studies on African-Asian relations (Iwata 2019). This state of rivalry is reflected in the African policies of major Asian countries. For example, the Sino-Indian conflict and the Sino-Japanese conflict, in addition to the Taiwan issue, have definitely affected these countries' interactions with Africa. In contrast to European policies towards Africa after the founding of the European Union, there is no consensus framework for Asian international relations. The experience of struggle against colonialism and engagement in the Non-Aligned Movement represented the most prominent components of the mutual relations between Asia and Africa, especially since the Bandung Conference in 1955 (Adem 2017). When the Cold War ended, Asian countries began to achieve high and rapid rates of economic development. Hence, the Asian countries that previously received development aid have become among the most important international donors. This means that the concept of "donor powers" has undergone a major change that it is not limited to Western industrialized countries (including Japan). Perhaps all of this requires studying and analyzing Asian-African relations.

¹ Department of International Affairs and Social Sciences, Zayed University. Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Email: Hhamdy21@yahoo.com. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1930-9561>.

This study assesses Indo-African relations by understanding its non-material aspects as reflected in soft power. Specifically, it aims to determine the nature and role of India's soft power in Africa. Based on the current debate on the relationship between soft power and hegemony in the international system in the post-Cold War era, the study seeks to discover and crystallize the role of soft power as an intangible aspect of hegemony. It adopts a few important theoretical approaches created by writers like Nye (2017) and Waltz (2010). Drawing on the case study of India between 2000 and 2019 in the subsequent sections, it examines the concept of soft power in taking stock of variegated power outcomes, and focusing on a non-Western context, in order to advance a theoretical model for soft power. This study seeks to examine the following questions: (1) What are the most prominent intellectual and theoretical approaches that determine the nature of the relation between soft power and hegemony? (2) Is there a link between them? How does India's soft power manifest in Africa? (3) Will Asian soft power lead to a decline in traditional Western hegemonies or will it lead to the formulation of new models of soft hegemony?

This study mainly relies on qualitative approaches to international relations with a specific focus on the concepts of hegemony and soft power. It is difficult to quantify the non-material aspects of hegemony. Therefore, this study relies on the ideas and observations drawn based on prevailing theories (such as neorealism and neoliberalism). A general observation in the literature on the relation between soft power and hegemony is that it started mostly from a Western conceptual framework, especially following Joseph Nye's approach to neoliberalism. Soft power has been analyzed at two levels: the source of power and its tributaries, and the behavior and instruments involved in its implementation.

The literature on soft power presents three key trends. The first focuses on the soft power of Western powers, especially the United States (Nye 2004b, 16-20; Machida 2010, 351). This trend states that the rise of Asia in Africa is mainly due to the preoccupation of the United States with its war on terror and the decline of its soft power in favor of hard power (mainly military) (Tella 2016). The second trend uses quantitative and qualitative comparison, as many studies have tended to compare the soft power of some Asian countries and the United States (McGiffert and Bean 2009). The third trend is of a behavioral nature as it focuses on studying some of the governmental phenomena and behaviors of the major Asian powers, which prompted some scholars to say that Asian soft power is on the rise, especially in its African field (Malaviya 2019; Cloke 2020; Cheru and Obi 2010; Gwatiwa 2012). With regard to the Indian case, we find a great division among researchers

in assessing Indian soft power. There are those who admit that India is a great soft power and that it has enormous potential in this area, while others see that there are many obstacles that prevent India from benefiting from its capabilities in the field of soft power (Thussu 2020; Das 2020). Perhaps this imposes the need for further analysis and study of Indian foreign policy from the perspective of soft power.

The review of this literature will help us understand the nature of the relationship between soft power and hegemony in international relations, which means increasing reliance on the non-material side of force in the international arena. On the other hand, studying the policies of the major Asian powers in Africa will help us understand the alternatives to development and the options available to African decision-makers. Perhaps this may ultimately mean the retreat of the traditional hegemonic powers in Africa in exchange for the formulation of new models of hegemony or the achievement of partnership by Asian powers.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The first part reviews the major approaches in the study of hegemony and soft power in the literature on international relations. The second discusses the history of Indo-African relations. The last five parts focus on Indian soft power capabilities and policies in Africa before concluding the paper.

From hegemony to soft power

Hegemony has been a central concept in the literature on international relations for a long time. It can be noted two basic works that are the cornerstone of the theorizing process of the concept, the first of which is what Thucydides wrote about the war of the Peloponnese and the hegemony of Athens in the context of the ancient Greek city-state system, and the second is what Nicola Machiavelli wrote in his book *The Prince* on the issue of hegemony and control of the state (Nye 2002). Whatever the case, the concept is used in contemporary international relations literature to study and analyze situations, strategies, dynamics, and entities that focus on the traditional components of international politics, namely the individual, the state, and the international system. Nevertheless, the distinguishing feature of the concept of hegemony in the literature of international relations in all its various approaches is that it implies a great deal of influence or control over the structure of the international system and the behavior of its component units. And excludes from this concept the control or influence resulting from

the occupation of the lands of others by force and usurpation, which means that hegemony differs from the concept of colonialism.

Research is divided between two pivotal theories of hegemony. The first is the theory of hegemonic stability, which relies on realistic, liberal, and historical structural approaches in international relations. This theory argues that the stability of the liberal economic system depends on the existence of a single hegemonic power, considering that the distribution of power among states is the main determinant of the character of the international economic system (Antoniades 2018, 595). The hegemonic stability theory is based on two main assumptions. The first states that the system in international politics is created by one dominant power, and the second indicates that maintaining this system and its stability requires the presence of a dominant power capable of extending its leadership through its military and economic hegemony (Waltz 2009; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008). In contrast to the theory of hegemonic stability advocated by many Western writers, the hegemonic instability theory focuses on the risks of dominating the security system in the international system. The processes of international competition and scramble between the dominant powers and the forces opposing them have led to the transformation of many political disputes into violent ones, which is embodied by the African reality in the post-Cold War era. By the end of the Cold War, five main factors contributed to the emergence of the soft power theory: economic globalization, the rise of transnational actors, the spread of technology, the new wave of democratization, and the growth of international organizations which makes cooperation much easier (Gallarotti 2011; Nye 2017; Waltz 2010).

The concept of “soft power” was coined by Joseph Nye in his (1990) book, “Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power”. He then published a series of articles and books on the same topic. Nye says:

[...] sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without tangible threats or payoffs. The indirect way to get what you want has sometimes been called “the second face of power.”. A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries admire its values, emulate its example, aspire to its level of prosperity and openness. This soft power—getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than coerces them (Nye 2004a, 5).

Thus, soft power means wooing people instead of forcing them. Soft power is the ability to shape the preferences of others without resorting to the use of coercion, force, or violence. Many leading countries the world over have

built their influences through international broadcasting, cultural activities and institutes, education, and scholarships as well as through foreign aid and support in disaster-affected areas. An example of this is China's recent international offer of free personal protective equipment (PPE) to help fight the COVID-19 virus. This health crisis opened up a new window of opportunity to promote China's narrative and its international ambitions.

There are two types of sources for soft power: domestic sources, where Nye notes, "How [a nation] behaves at home can enhance its image and perceived legitimacy, and that in turn can help advance its foreign policy objectives" (Nye 2004a, 56-57). The internal sources fall under the framework of the inherent power of culture and political institutions. The second type, international sources, indicates the need for the state to respect international law and international norms and institutions. There is no doubt that both domestic and international sources of soft power clearly reveal the new liberal face of the analysis, where the focus is always on policies and procedures that reflect the orientation towards justice, the common collective concern, and the rules of fair play. In this context, we find the prevalence of the principles of political liberalism in all sources of soft power.

In 2008, the Anholt Ipsos Nation Brands Index was developed to measure each nation's reputation along six dimensions of national competence: Exports, Governance, Culture, People, Tourism, Immigration, and Investment. And in 2015, the Soft Power 30 methodology was created by Jonathan McClory to consider the following factors when ranking a country's soft power strength: enterprise, culture, digital, government, engagement, and education.

However, soft power is an extremely complicated process and not entirely a matter of government policy. It could be made by spontaneous incidents as much as by official projects. Winder claims that:

soft power had two different meanings. On the official and conscious level, it was a government project designed to cultivate good relations overseas. But it was also something deeper: a nation's overall glow. The government could take the helm and trim the canvass, but was the pilot, not the ship - and certainly not the ocean (Winder 2020, 6).

Based on the study of previous theoretical trends in the literature on international relations, it becomes clear to us that soft power, which is the intangible side of power, is an important factor in consolidating the foundations of hegemony and control at the international level (Winder 2020). The literature has also shown that soft power that is based on persuasion and gai-

ning minds and hearts contributes to legitimizing hegemony, and thus it is a necessary condition for achieving control in light of the chaotic international system. However, internal sources prefer the style of Western democracies, which makes these criteria a subject of controversy in many countries of the global South (Gallarotti 2011). As Nye indicated, many Western values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive and have become part of the attraction of soft power (Nye 2017).

India and its soft power in Africa: a historical perspective

Indo-African ties can be traced back to the pre-colonial period, particularly the movements of migration and trade in the eighteenth century (Beri 2003; Banda 2020). India, like China, had historical, cultural, economic, and political relations with the African continent, especially its eastern coast, where there is a large and stable Indian community. Colonial policies led to the fall of India and many parts of Africa under the yoke of British colonialism, which led to the presence of Indian communities in many parts of Africa. During the time of colonialism, many Indians were taken as indentured laborers in the sugar colonies of the Caribbean, Oceania, and Africa. India's independence in 1947 inspired African liberation movements, as India had become a model of decolonization and national liberation. The charismatic leadership of the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, and his role in fighting imperialism, colonialism, and *Apartheid*, were embodied by the spirit of the Bandung Conference in 1955. Nehru's activism and cooperation with other international leaders like Joseph Tito (Yugoslavia), Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt), and Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) were the driving forces in establishing the Non-Aligned Movement and supporting the principle of South-South cooperation as part of India's foreign policy. The circumstances of the Cold War era and India's preoccupation with its internal development efforts prevented the development of Indo-African relations.

To a considerable extent, India and African countries have shared over the years a mutual understanding of many global issues (Trigunayat 2020). They have been on the same side in global negotiations to make the international economic order more equitable to the global South (Sachdeva 2020). India realized after the end of the Cold War, especially with the independence of Namibia and the end of the *Apartheid* regime in South Africa, that the ideological and political component that united it with Africa became irrelevant. Issues of non-alignment and disarmament no longer go beyond the rhetorical and symbolic aspect, which imposed on India the necessity to shift from the

sterility of ideology to the capacity of pragmatism. Indeed, in the wake of India's economic openness policy in 1991, its foreign policy became more realistic and pragmatic, and accordingly, the Indo-African relations in the post-Cold War era were governed by political and economic considerations.

However, the comparative advantage enjoyed by India in its relations with Africa and its distinction from other international powers, especially China, is the presence of a large Indian diaspora in Africa, in addition to sharing the experience of belonging to the British colonial empire. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has ruled India uninterruptedly since 2014, has recognized the untapped potential of India's large diaspora network and has put in tremendous effort to connect with them. In its foreign policy agenda, it was stated: "The people of Indian origin living abroad are an asset, which the BJP would try to utilize to the fullest extent to foster relations of friendship and cooperation between the countries of their residence and India" (Modi and Taylor 2017, 918). The prime minister of India, Narendra Modi, has shown a great interest in what is termed People of Indian Origin in Africa. According to a survey of 450 business owners in Africa, almost half the respondents of Indian origin had taken on African nationalities (with most of the other half retaining their Indian nationality), compared with only four percent of firm owners who were of Chinese origin (the other 96% had retained their Chinese nationality) (Modi and Taylor 2017, 924). It is not surprising that India relies heavily on these Indian communities to achieve economic and trade cooperation with African countries.

It is true that energy security represents one of the major drivers of India in Africa, and some scholars may refer to the Indo-Chinese competition in Africa. However, the beginning of the new millennium witnessed a major shift in India's African policy as New Delhi focused on bilateral and regional cooperation in Africa. India has established a dialogue with many African economic groupings and obtained observer status in some of them, as is the case for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In 2008 India institutionalized its relations with Africa by organizing the India-Africa Summit Forum (Beri 2011).

Some literature has indicated a similarity between Indian and Chinese behavior in Africa, which has led to the neologism "Chandia"². The Indian economic rise requires more markets and investment opportunities.

2 India has followed the Chinese example and emulated the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) by developing its own Africa-India Forum Summit to change the world's perception of India from being a recipient to being a donor.).

The competition with Chinese companies in Africa is one of the sources of interest for the Indian decision-maker. Perhaps all of this drives the increase in the pace of competition between India and China, as they are among the emerging powers in the international system who wish to gain wealth and influence. According to one of the Indian scholars, India has been busy trying to catch up with China in Africa, as in recent years it is working hard to engage in Africa seriously (Taylor 2012).

Whatever the case, the Indian presence in Africa, although not different from the presence of other major powers in terms of its aspiration to obtain natural resources and trade, represents a model that can be emulated by many African countries. The Indian model based on respecting the values of pluralism, secularism, and democracy while liberalizing the economy provides important lessons for African countries wishing to achieve stability and sustainable development.

Assets of India's soft power

India possesses enormous capabilities of soft power according to Joseph Nye's neoliberal analysis. Since the early 2000s, India has been consolidating its soft power sources both at home and abroad. Tharoor states:

“[...] when India's cricket team triumphs or its tennis players claim Grand Slams, when a Bhangra beat is infused into a western pop record or an Indian choreographer invents a fusion of Kathak and ballet, when Indian women sweep the Miss World and Miss Universe contests or when Monsoon Wedding wows the critics and Lagaan claims an Oscar nomination, when Indian writers win the Booker or Pulitzer prizes, India's soft power is enhanced” (Tharoor 2008, 40).

Over the past decade, a large number of writers (such as Tharoor (2012) and Blarel (2012) have begun to focus on studying India's soft power and its potential for use in its IR. The sources of Indian soft power are numerous, including sports, music, arts, and literature. In addition to this list, there is India's anti-colonial history, its defense of the values of national liberation, and its strong civil society that believes in the values of secularism and pluralism. As well as its nuclear capabilities, economic advancement, its advantage in the field of information and communication technology, and so forth. India may seek to achieve multiple goals by using its soft power, including compensating for the lack of hard power, easing international con-

cern about the rise of India, improving India's image, honoring the legacy of the founding fathers, attracting foreign investment, and defining India's position on various issues (Mazumdar 2018).

The indirect nature of India's soft power is surely more difficult to ascertain. However, India has gained global attention based on its soft power qualities. We can refer to a number of indicators that can be measured and push Indian values and culture to become more open and attractive: (1) Obtaining the Nobel Prize in Literature (won by the great Indian poet Tagore in 1913). (2) Indian films won international awards. India's support for the "Bollywood" film industry has gained great fame which led to its global outreach. Both Amitabh Bachchan and Shah Rukh Khan won important international awards. (3) The presence of prominent sports stars at the global level. And here it is worth noting the legendary cricketer Sachin Ramesh Tendulkar. (4) The presence of a large and influential Indian diaspora. According to some statistics, the number of Indian Diaspora is estimated at thirty million people (Wagner 2019).

Africa accounts for about 9.11% of the total Indian diaspora in the world. The largest groups are in South Africa (1.5 million), Mauritius (855,000), Réunion (220,000), Kenya (100,000), Tanzania (100,000), and Uganda (90,000) (Wagner 2019, 13). The diaspora in the island states of the Indian Ocean represents a substantial proportion of the total population. In Mauritius, the proportion of the population of Indian descent is over 60%, in Réunion 31% and in Seychelles about 6% (Wagner 2019, 13). The Modi government is trying to establish closer ties with countries that have large Indian communities by reviving historical sea routes in the Indian Ocean and by promoting cultural initiatives. India is also trying to use the financial and cultural capital of its diaspora in Africa by granting overseas Indian citizenship. It does this to reinforce their ties with their "motherland" (Venkatachalam and Modi 2019). India continues to rely on Mahatma Gandhi's legacy to develop Indo-African relations.

As for space exploration, the Indian Space Research Organization is one of the six largest government space agencies in the world, as it has succeeded in launching a trip to the moon and another to Mars. It is noted that India has used the India-Africa Forum summit that was held in India for the first time in 2008 to lay down a general framework for cooperation between the two sides, as expressed in the Delhi Declaration document issued by the first summit. Areas of cooperation include human resources, science, and technology, industrial growth, especially in small and medium enterprises,

minerals, the health sector, information and communication technology, security, and judicial reform (Modi 2017).

It is clear that India is trying to portray its international interactions in Africa as a major power fulfilling its responsibilities, and this may come through its active and effective contribution to the international peacekeeping forces operating in Africa. Statistics indicate that India has contributed about 8,000 people to African peacekeeping operations³. Despite some criticisms directed at its policy in Africa, India is trying to use its cultural arms to win the hearts and minds of Africans, among these arms is The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), which was established in 1950 by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in order to manage India's foreign cultural policies, including cultural exchange issues. ICCR has five branches in Africa as follows: Egypt, Mauritius, Tanzania, and South Africa (with two centers, one in Durban and the other in Johannesburg). The objectives of the ICCR are: "[...] to actively participate in the formulation and implementation of policies and programs pertaining to India's external cultural relations; to foster and strengthen cultural relations and mutual understanding between India and other countries; to promote cultural exchanges with other countries and people, and to develop relations with nations" (ICCR 2020).

Trade exchange between India and Africa

Trade exchange between India and Africa during the period from 2001 to 2014 witnessed remarkable growth. The volume of bilateral trade between the two parties rose from USD 7.2 billion in 2001 to USD 78 billion in 2014 (Gulati and Das 2020, 4). This increase in trade was partly facilitated by adopting policies like the 'Focus Africa' program by the Indian government in 2002. However, the volume of trade decreased to USD 62 billion in 2018. Experts attribute this decline in trade volume in the post-2014 period basically to factors such as a fall in commodity prices and the slowing down of the global economy (Gulati and Das 2020, 5). India is currently Africa's third-largest trading partner (Godara et al. 2019, 93). According to available

3 India has participated in most of the UN peacekeeping missions on the continent, beginning with the Congo (1960-64). Subsequently India participated in missions to: Namibia (1989-90); Angola (1989-1995); Mozambique (1992-94); Somalia (1991-94); Rwanda (1993-96); Sierra Leone (1999-2001); and Ethiopia- Eritrea (2006-08). Currently Indian peacekeepers are deployed in UN peacekeeping missions in: Liberia (since April 2007), Côte d'Ivoire (since April 2004), the Democratic Republic of Congo (since January 2005) and South Sudan (since April 2005).

statistics, African exports to India increased by 32.2 percent annually, while Indian exports to Africa increased by 23 percent annually. Perhaps an interesting observation is that the annual growth rate of African exports to India reached (41.8%) during the period from 2005-2011, which is higher than that achieved by African trade with China (28%) (WTO 2013). In 2018, this percentage reached 13.76%. It was decided in the meeting of trade ministers in the African Union with the Indian Minister of Trade and Industry, in Johannesburg, South Africa on October 1, 2013, to establish four continental institutions agreed upon at the first India Africa Summit: India-Africa Institute of Foreign Trade (IAIFT), India-Africa Diamond Institute (IADI), India-Africa Institute of Education Planning and Administration, and India-Africa Institute of Information Technology (Arnaud and Guennoun 2019, 8).

In recent years, India's dependence on oil resources has increased and remains a priority for Indian investments abroad. The increasing pressure of India's demography requires more energy imports. Energy holds a large share in trade flows between India and Africa. In 2017, oil and gas accounted for 60% of African exports to India. Over the past 20 years, Indian investments in the continent have seen robust growth, allowing the country to become a strategic partner for African development. Given India's awareness of the challenges related to investments in Africa, the country coordinated efforts between the government, banking institutions, and the private sector (Arnaud and Guennoun 2019, 8).

According to the Ministry of External Affairs of India (2022), India's bilateral trade with Africa has grown significantly, reaching US\$ 89.5 billion in 2021-22 compared to USD 56 billion in the previous year. With a cumulative investment of US\$ 73.9 billion from 1996-2021, India is one of the top five investors in Africa. India has opened its market to African countries through the Duty-Free Tariff Preference (DFTP) Scheme, which grants duty-free access to 98.2% of India's total tariff lines. Currently, 33 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Africa are entitled to receive benefits under this scheme. India sees Africa as a promising market for its businesses, particularly in the manufacturing industry, including textiles, pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and light machinery (Gopaldas 2022). Additionally, Africa presents opportunities in the resource and energy sectors, which have been areas of concern for India in the past. The African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (AfCFTA) that came into effect in 2021 is expected to provide a platform for Indian companies to further expand and enhance their business footprint in Africa.

Indian public diplomacy in Africa

The development of a positive narrative, projection of soft power, guest hosting, digital diplomacy, image and branding, broadcasting, home front, coordination, and strategic communications are among the most essential elements of India's approach in trying to advance the public diplomacy agenda. This mission is carried out by the following agencies: the department of Overseas Indians Affairs (OIA), External Publicity and Public Diplomacy (XPD), and the Development Partnership Administration (DPA) (Mazumdar 2020, 25).

Tharoor presented a detailed picture of the general features of Indian thinking with regard to soft power and public diplomacy, which, he noted, differs remarkably from Chinese practice, which differs in some ways remarkably from Chinese practice (Tharoor 2012). However, leaders in India, like Chinese leaders, are conscious of the growing importance of soft power in global politics. During the past decade, India has invested in public diplomacy initiatives. The Indian Council of Cultural Relations plays an active role in promoting cultural diplomacy through its sponsored festivals inside and outside India. In this context, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has made extensive use of social media since the establishment of the Public Diplomacy Department (PDD) in 2006; this is in order to clarify and explain Indian foreign policy⁴. Other public diplomacy formulas have also been strengthened, such as the publication of India Perspectives magazine, which is available in seventeen languages and distributed in 162 countries around the world (Natarajan 2014). India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is using digital public diplomacy very effectively. Thussu states that MEA:

was one of the early adopters of social media platforms to connect with diasporic communities. Though MEA's twitter account @IndianDiplomacy was set up in 2010, since Modi took over in 2014, the Ministry has been using social media more effectively, promoting a positive cultural narrative for 'Brand India'. The MEA India Facebook page, created in 2012, is also widely followed in diplomatic and diasporic circles. It also maintains two YouTube channels and has accounts on various platforms including Instagram, Soundcloud, Flickr, LinkedIn as well as a Google+ channel. India's Foreign Missions have twitter accounts and Facebook pages. Such digital diplomacy has been spurred on by Modi's own considerable social media presence (Thussu 2020, 118).

⁴ This division aims to inform and influence foreign public opinion and attitudes in order to advance its foreign policy goals.)..

Perhaps what is striking in the Pax Indica debate is that India's pattern of public diplomacy is based on presenting a model of pluralist democracy, in contrast to the unilateral model of control and control of information adopted by China. In 2018, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi approved the opening of new Indian missions in 18 African countries a four-year period between 2018 to 2021⁵. This move will increase the number of resident Indian missions in Africa from 29 to 47 (Roche 2018). According to India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), "India has made twenty-nine visits to African countries at the level of President, Vice President, and Prime Minister since 2014. And in terms of ministerial-level visits, all 54 African countries have been covered by the Indian government. From the African side, over thirty-two heads of African countries have visited India from 2016 to 2019" (Gulati and Das 2020, 4).

India has made a significant shift in its narrative on India-Africa relations. During the second Africa India Forum Summit, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that:

The objective of our partnership is to cooperate with all the countries of Africa, within the limits of our capacities and capabilities, in their efforts towards achieving economic vibrancy, peace, stability, and self-reliance. Towards this end, it is our intention to become a close partner in Africa's resurgence (Singh 2008, n.p.).

However, the third India-Africa Summit in 2015 witnessed a narrative shift in India's Africa policy. PM Modi in his address to the summit has shown that Africa can contribute to India's development. As an example, PM Modi stressed that "African energy helps run the engine of the Indian economy, its resources are powering our industries; and, African prosperity offers a growing market for Indian products" (India Times 2015). It is to accomplish such a goal of Prime Minister Modi that India's public diplomacy has recently been used more systemically through the PDD.

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to the postponement of the fourth India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS-IV). However, this has not hindered diplomatic relations between India and Africa. Instead, the first Indo-Africa Virtual Summit was organized by the IMC Chamber of Commerce and Industry in

⁵ According to the Ministry of External Affairs of India (2022, February 11), there are currently forty-three operational Indian Missions in Africa, which include Embassies, High Commissions, Permanent Missions, Permanent Delegations, Assistant High Commissions, Consulates, and Representative Offices. Out of the eighteen targeted missions since 2018, only fourteen have been opened so far.

November 2020, with the aim of enhancing bilateral ties and increasing trade and investment between India and African nations. On March 23rd and 24th, 2021, the IMC Chamber of Commerce and the Africa Business News Group (ABN Group) joined forces again for the 2021 Indo-Africa Virtual Summit. This summit explored sectors such as Power & Renewable Energy, Knowledge, Skill & Education, Automobiles (2-wheelers & EV), Agriculture and Food Processing, Resources: Mining, Oil & Gas, and Health Infrastructure (Indo Africa Summit 2021).

Indian diplomacy is developing its own approach to South-South cooperation as a hallmark of Indian public diplomacy that benefits from the legacy of its democratic institutions and its experience in achieving economic growth. Usually, an emphasis is placed on a shared colonial history and seeking to build relationships through development partnerships. There is a set of initiatives on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the auspices of the Economic and Technical Cooperation Program. The presence of these initiatives under the auspices of the Ministry of External Affairs undoubtedly indicates the way in which India links technical assistance programs with public diplomacy. The focus of these initiatives is on training and capacity building, benefiting a wide variety of professionals, including those working in information technology, rural development, and election monitoring, as well as diplomats and parliamentarians.

India has made public diplomacy a key part of its efforts to represent India as a 'brand state' and to contribute to India's positive image outside its borders (Natarajan 2014). In sum, India is trying to gain the hearts and minds of Africans by emphasizing partnerships and transferring knowledge and skills while always reminding the experience of a common colonial history. India also seeks to highlight this image directed at the African people by training local workers to work on development projects and manage them instead of Indians, in contrast to the general Chinese practice of using Chinese labor.

Development assistance

The Indian Economic and Technical Cooperation (ITEC) Program of the Ministry of External Affairs has been the official arm of the Indian government in pursuing technical cooperation with the outside world since 1964 (ITEC 2020). Since then, India spends about \$12 million annually on program activities. The cumulative size of this spending amounted to 2.8 billion US dollars, of which about one billion dollars was allocated to Africa.

The Indian development aid provided to Africa includes a set of interrelated activities such as assistance provided to projects, capacity-building, institutions, and scholarships (Saran 2012, 4). The projects account for the lion's share (40%) of the economic and technical cooperation budget, as the focus is on small and medium industrial projects that may include the processing of agricultural products, carpentry, the plastics industry, and small engineering units. The Indian Cooperation Program usually provides assistance and advice in the stages of project identification, feasibility and implementation, and training of local cadres to eventually take over the management functions.

In the area of capacity building, the ITEC program helps African partners through (1) the offer of technical training in the very large network of vocational and human resource development institutions across India; (2) the Indian experts' trips to African countries to train local cadres, impart specialized skills and know-how in different fields; and (3) the facilitation of study visits to India by senior political leaders and decision-makers from African countries. To illustrate the strategic importance of ITEC, Prime Minister Modi confirmed in 2017 that: "Thirteen current or former Presidents, Prime Ministers and Vice Presidents in Africa have attended educational or training institutions in India. Six current or former chiefs of armed forces in Africa trained in India's military institutions" (Dhoot 2017, 8).

The Indian government attaches immense importance to building institutions to benefit from its development experience. And if training foreign employees and holding workshops at the expert level brings some advantages, then the long-term solution lies in building appropriate institutions in the countries receiving assistance. Therefore, at the second India-Africa Forum Summit held in 2011, the Indian government committed \$5 billion for lines of credit, \$700 million for new institutions and training programs, and \$300 million for the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway line (Bhatia 2011).

To enhance development cooperation, India also relies on loans and subsidies provided to developing countries by the state-owned Export-Import Bank. In recent years, India has continuously expanded its financial commitment to include South-South Cooperation, and in 2014/15 recorded a total of 194 credit lines to sixty-three countries, valued at US\$11.7 billion (Wagner 2019, 18). The bulk of the financial support went to African countries. Between 2006 and 2015, African countries accounted for about 58 percent of all loans and credits (Wagner 2019, 18). These funds were used mainly to strengthen economic ties with India and to support Indian companies' activities in Africa. For example, facilitating the export of Indian goods to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). India is

also interested in supporting infrastructure projects in Africa. For example, Indian companies laid a pipeline from Khartoum to Port Sudan in 2009 and supported the establishment of pan-African institutions with many projects.

In the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), which has been launched in 2017, India partners with Japan to connect Asia and Africa and develop Africa's capabilities. It is based on four major pillars: (1) Development and Cooperation Projects, (2) Quality Infrastructure and Institutional Connectivity, (3) Enhancing Capacities and Skills, and (4) People-to-People partnership. The AAGC prioritizes development projects in health and pharmaceuticals, agriculture and its processing, disaster management, and skill enhancement. Regarding connectivity, it emphasizes quality infrastructure, which is aligned with Japan's infrastructure export policy, which it has promoted since 2015 (RIS 2017).

Furthermore, India has cooperated militarily with a number of African countries for many years. Since the 1960s, it has been training officers from English-speaking African countries in Indian institutions. Under the ITEC program, the Indian Army has also sent trainers to the armed forces in a number of African countries, such as Botswana, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Zambia. India helped these countries improve their infrastructure. For example, the Indian Army has been involved in establishing defense academies in Ethiopia and Nigeria (Wagner 2019, 22).

The Modi government has once again given greater priority to security cooperation with Africa. In light of the threat posed by terrorist groups, India has chosen closer cooperation in combating terrorism with many African countries. India has also planned to establish a military base in Seychelles in response to increased Chinese activity in the Indian Ocean. However, the plan failed in 2018 after the Seychelles Parliament protested it (Wagner 2019, 23).

In another context, India and 50 African countries adopted the 'Lucknow Declaration' in February 2020. Both sides committed themselves to fighting against terrorism by not allowing their land to be used by any such outfit. The Indian government offered to scale up military supplies to African nations, including offshore patrol vehicles (OPVs), fast interceptor boats, unmanned aerial vehicles, military aircraft, and other arms and ammunition (India Times 2020).

The declaration also stated that all member countries "encourage enhanced cooperation between India and Africa on the evolving concept of Indo-Pacific and welcome the AU (African Union) vision for peace and security in Africa that coincides with India's vision of SAGAR (Security and

Growth for all in the Region)” (Kaushik 2020, n.p.). To achieve this goal, the two parties also called for deeper cooperation in the defense industry through investments and joint ventures, among other things.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, India has used health diplomacy as a tool of soft power to establish itself as a reliable and compassionate partner to African nations (Mol et al. 2022). India's health diplomacy towards Africa has resulted in significant outcomes, such as the establishment of telemedicine centers and improved access to healthcare facilities. For instance, under the Pan Africa e-Network (PAeN), Indian medical institutions were connected with medical institutions in 53 African countries to improve the healthcare system. Additionally, India has provided financial assistance to African countries affected by major public health concerns, such as HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Ebola. In 2016, India provided one tonne of medicines as a grant in aid over three years to help achieve the health targets outlined in Namibia's “Harambee Prosperity Plan”. Private Indian hospitals, such as Apollo Hospitals, have also been providing consulting services and training medical doctors from 24 African countries. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, India's health diplomacy has been evident through its provision of medical aid and support to African countries, including the supply of medicines and vaccines under the Vaccine Maitri or Vaccine Friendship Initiative (Sharun and Dhama 2021). As of January 2021, India has provided the Indian-made Covaxin and Covishield vaccines to several African countries, such as South Africa, Ghana, and Angola, further strengthening the ties of solidarity, friendship, and cooperation between India and African nations.

Conclusion

It is clear that India, which is the largest democracy in the world, is setting itself apart in capacity building and training for Africans. Given the variable of history and shared experience, India is more of an inspiration than a donor. Accordingly, India has resorted in its engagements with Africa to the use of its soft power tools. It relied on its cultural heritage and the influence of the Indian diaspora in Africa, in addition to its knowledge and technical expertise needed to help African countries.

In general, the increasing influence of Asian powers in Africa faces many challenges, especially with regard to the possibility of it replacing Western hegemony. It is noted that India is trying to preserve the nature of the international system that raises the values of pluralism, secularism, and

democracy, which stands in the way of the possibility of a strategic alliance between India and China in the face of the United States. It is clear that the population of India exceeds a billion and a fourth billion people, many of whom suffer from extreme poverty, and thus the issue of distribution and social justice is placed on the list of its development priorities. Also, the pragmatism in the foreign policies of Asian countries, which is reflected in their adoption of a selective character towards global issues, has hindered the crystallization of a unified ideological stance towards the outside world. For example, we find that India is developing economic and political relations with the United States, and at the same time, it maintains close relations with rebellious countries in the international system according to American standards.

According to the concept of hegemony in the international system, Asian powers represent economic hegemony, but they need to convert their increasing economic power into military capabilities to achieve this hegemony, but in this case, this trend could negatively affect soft power.

In any case, the process of development cooperation effectively practiced by Asian powers with African countries differs greatly from that of traditional donors. And that in several aspects. First: the Asian presence in Africa, especially in exercising its soft power, depends on the principle of historical opportunity and the belief that the twenty-first century is the century of Africa and Asia. Perhaps a review of the political discourse in India shows that it fully expresses this content. The African policy of India, on the other hand, depends on historical ties, especially the presence of effective Indian communities in Africa. Second, the pattern of Asian aid to Africa expresses a kind of sympathy based on shared identity and experience. India shares with Africa in terms of its colonial past and in terms of belonging to the countries of the South. Therefore, Asian-African cooperation usually adopts the slogan of solidarity between the countries of the South as its slogan. Third: Asian-African relations are based on mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs. Therefore, the Asian model of cooperation represents an alternative pattern to the Western Washington consensus model, which emphasizes the concepts of political conditionality. Therefore, Asian countries do not set political preconditions for democratization and human rights, which explains their cooperation with recalcitrant or Westernized countries because of their record in human rights. Fourth: cooperation and development between the two sides depend on the concepts of partnership in order to achieve mutual benefit or common profit. In line with this thinking, the flow of development cooperation from major Asian countries to Africa is closely linked to trade interests and investment. It is no secret that these competing countries are

trying to access African natural resources to help them achieve their energy security. Therefore, the process of defining the concept of development aid to these countries appears to be difficult to achieve due to its overlap with considerations of supporting trade and investment. Fifthly: the rising Asian powers, including India, possess knowledge and experience in the fields of developing poor societies, which gives them a comparative advantage over Western knowledge that expresses superiority. Asian countries offer a model for cooperation that relies on developing capabilities in the recipient country. It appears that India relies on the principle of assistance on demand or need by African countries, which implies a more equitable approach to the relationship between donor and recipient countries. However, the major problem lies in the lack of human competencies in some African countries to be able to determine the type and nature of development aid provided by Asian countries.

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ABSTRACT

The growing influence of Asian powers in Africa has been subject to extensive debate in the literature on international relations. Hence, this study aims to evaluate Indo-African relations to understand the role of soft power. Are we gradually witnessing a potential geostrategic shift in favor of emerging Asia? This study attempts to discover the role of soft power in Asian-African relations by applying some of the prevailing theoretical approaches in the field of international relations by focusing on India's Africa policy. The study concludes that India, which aspires to be a global hegemon by the end of the 21st century, seeks to provide a third way in Africa different from the rising Chinese and the traditional American influences. India relies on its shared cultural and civilizational heritage and the influence of its diaspora in its relations with African countries, in addition to its knowledge of their developmental needs.

KEYWORDS

Soft Power. Hegemony. India. Indian Diaspora. Africa.

*Received on August 31, 2022
Accepted on December 02, 2022*

CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Yoslán Silverio González¹



Introduction

Studying the impact of terrorism on international relations is of vital importance due to the implications not only local and regional but also within the international system. The phenomenon of terrorism is not exclusive to a region or a country, it can affect everyone in indirect ways. In this sense, it crosses borders and does not understand nationalities. The most dangerous thing is the treatment given to it in international forums, multilateral organizations, and the media since it is presented as a threat to security, but to legitimize military actions by Western powers or to delegitimize governments “not prone to the West”.

This article is based on a conceptual proposal that helps to understand the phenomenon of terrorism from a non-Western perspective, criticizing the positions of the United States in this regard. The main objective is to deepen the debate around the concept of terrorism, its erroneous link to Islam, and to nationalist and/or revolutionary movements. It is also pertinent to see how it has been legally defined by international law, through resolutions, conventions, and protocols of different multilateral organizations, including the African Union (AU).

Terrorism: an epistemological debate without consensus

There is a vast literature called “Studies on Terrorism” that has tried to develop a theory in this regard, reach a consensus about its definition, address its typology, its links with religion, get deep into the causes behind this phenomenon and how to carry out analysis of statistical data, etc. The heterogeneity of the sources ranges from the definitions provided by scholars and official

government documents. In the academic field, there is a group of Western experts, from different disciplines – political science, law, history, and international relations – including Alex P. Schmid, Ajai Sahni, Tore Bjorgo, Erica Chenoweth, Ekaterina Stepanova, Jeffry Simon, Harjit Sandhu, Lucien van Liere, David Rapoport, Jeffrey Kaplan and Jean E. Rosenfeld, among others, who synthesize a good part of the scientific production regarding terrorism. In this epistemological debate are also located the definitions assumed by state institutions such as those of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the European Union, as well as the postulates of multilateral organizations: the United Nations (UN), the AU or the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

Ajai Sahni, Director of the Institute for Conflict Management in New Delhi (India), refers to terrorism as a method that can adopt a wide range of objectives and ideologies, without being linked to any of them in particular (Schmid 2013, 1). For the Swiss historian and political scientist, Alex Schmid – a researcher at the International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), terrorism is a technique and a method, by which defenseless and unprepared civilians are assassinated, in order to influence, harm and exert pressure on a third (Schmid 2013, 18-19, 23). However, the breadth of the concept means that many analysts from various disciplines express different ideas when they talk about terrorism and even more dangerous when they link it to “political violence.” There are many manifestations, forms, and types of political violence, of which terrorism is a subcategory. Terrorism must be seen as a type of violence that deliberately (not accidentally or as collateral damage) uses civilians and non-combatants as military targets. As a tactic, method, or form of direct action, terrorism can be used by various actors (Schmid 2013, 5-6).

According to Schmid (2013), within the basic typology of terrorism are: religious groups, ethnonationalism, separatism, racist and right-wing groups, anarchist groups and left-wing revolutionaries, state sponsors of terrorism, isolated groups, and the so-called “lone wolves”. As a trend, several authors speak of revolutionary and/or nationalist movements as terrorists. A criticism about it will be deepened afterward.

A set of myths, fallacies, and misinterpretations have been built around the phenomenon of terrorism. According to the Russian specialist Ekaterina Stepanova, from the National Research Institute of World Economy & International Relations (IMEMO) in Moscow, there is a propensity to use terrorism as a synonym for almost all forms of violence in the world and to degrade terrorism to banal criminal activity or overestimating their level of integration with organized crime. At the same time, there is a marked

tendency to equate Islamism or Islamic radicalism with terrorism. Among other elements on which some moderation should be exercised is the idea that terrorists may have access to non-conventional materials or weapons of mass destruction, as well as overestimating the volume of resources they obtain for their financing (Schmid 2013, 17). This issue of financing is controversial, especially in groups with a local impact and less internationalized like Al Qaeda or the Islamic State.

In psychological terms, there is no profile of the archetype of a terrorist, who can be a believer or an atheist, from the “left” or right-wing, an opponent or not of the state. It can be a dictator, a director of a secret police service, a leader of a death squad linked to the secret services, or an undercover local rebel. That’s why there is no “terrorist personality” (Schmid 2013, 18-19). Here, as is already recurring, controversial elements are introduced, such as classifying rebel or leftist movements as terrorists. However, terrorists do not accept this label and often call themselves “freedom fighters” – another highly controversial term –, “holy warriors”, “soldiers of God”, Jihadists, or Mujahedins. Returning to the debate on the relationship between “freedom fighters” and terrorism, Jeffry Simon, from the Department of Political Science and an expert in security issues at the University of California (UCLA), states that:

What one sees as a terrorist is seen by another as a freedom fighter. The biggest difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is that guerrillas usually include (...) large groups of armed fighters to overthrow a government or gain control of a section of the country through a campaign of rural attacks that include direct confrontation with the national armed forces. While terrorism – such as the assassination of government officials – is a tactic of the guerrilla insurgency, which is not its main tactic or means to achieve its objectives, while for a terrorist group it is (Schmid 2013, 20).

However, in the introduction of the book coordinated by Professor Schmid, he outlines the question of what the relationship between terrorism and the national liberation struggle/freedom fighters or resistance against foreign occupation is. In this regard, those interviewed responded that legally there is no relationship since they are different concepts. International Humanitarian Law prohibits attacks against civilians and civilian targets regardless of the cause or justice underlying the conflict.

Another opinion cited by the author is that terrorism is a tactic that violates the rules of warfare and that not all freedom fighters choose to use terrorism. He concludes that this dilemma reflects the highly politicized

nature of discussions around terrorism (Schmid 2013, 20). The example that is always given regarding this controversy is the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but in the Sahel, it is made even more complex by the number of armed groups that operate in the north of Mali, not all of which use terrorism as a method, but every military action reported is classified as such.

In this regard, the Indian analyst, Harjit Sandhu, former Coordinator of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council for the case of Liberia and former Interpol Officer on anti-terrorism issues, stated:

The freedom fighters have as their point of view the tyrants and their agents. On the contrary, a terrorist spreads fear among the masses and kills indiscriminately to terrorize everyone. Terrorists are usually not fighting for anyone's freedom. Instead, they are fighting for their own chance to be tyrants, hence their disregard for the lives of the people they claim to be liberating (Schmid 2013, 21).

On terrorism, more than 250 proposed definitions have been collected and identified from the most diverse historical contexts (since the 19th century) and that respond to the most diverse political positions. Within the period of the “fourth wave” of terrorism and particularly between 1999 and 2010, Joseph J. Easson and Alex P. Schmid compiled 84 definitions on the subject (Schmid 2013, 99-148), among them those of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the OIC, the US State Department, the EU and from other various scholars.

It is in this context from which the complexity of establishing a single concept on terrorism derives, due to the lack of consensus on the part of the international community and depending on the political position and ideology of who is assessing it. In this respect, in the report prepared by Special Rapporteur Kalliopi K. Koufa, in 2001, it is stated that the term terrorism carries an important emotional and political charge. It is usually accompanied by an implicit negative judgment and is used selectively. Thus, definitions are confused with value judgments. Violent activity or behavior to which a certain actor opposes is classified as terrorism. On the other hand, the classification of terrorism is rejected when it refers to situations with which an actor sympathizes (Informe del Consejo Económico y Social 2001, 11).

In the multilateral framework, both the OAU and the OIC were among the first instances that defined their position against terrorism, since 1999. The OIC, in its 26th session, held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, from June 28 to 1 July 1999, approved the Convention of the Organization

of the Islamic Conference for the Fight against International Terrorism. In the first article of the Convention, terrorism is defined as:

Any act of violence or threat thereof, regardless of its motives or intentions, perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or endanger their life, honor, liberties, security or rights or exposing the environment, occupying or seizing any public or private facility or property, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States (Organization of African Unity 1999, 2).

It also stated in Article 2 that: “the struggle of peoples, including the armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered a crime of terrorism” (Organization of African Unity 1999, 3). This is an important clarification and, like the OAU, this distinction is going to be made between terrorism and the struggle for liberation. At the ninth session of the Islamic Summit (Qatar 2000), the OIC reiterated its support for the high-level international conference on terrorism and underlined again the OIC’s concern about the need to clearly distinguish terrorism from the struggle of the people for national liberation and the elimination of foreign occupation and colonial hegemony, as well as to recover the right to self-determination.

In the context of United Nations agencies, 19 anti-terrorism conventions and several Security Council resolutions have been adopted. In particular, resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1566 (2004) indicate that, whatever its motivation, no act of terrorism is justifiable. There is also Resolution 1373, of September 28, 2001, which established the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee. Professor Francisco J. Bariffi, from the Carlos III University of Madrid, points out in this regard that despite the constant references to “terrorist acts”, this resolution was unable to determine their meaning, leaving their classification to the States themselves (Bariffi 2008, 128). Bariffi also points out that resolution 1566 (2004), although it did not have the purpose of defining “terrorism”, urged States to cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism and, in this way, prevent and punish acts that meet these three characteristics:

a) Acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury or to take hostages; and b) Acts committed, regardless of any justification for considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, with the intention of causing a state of terror in the general population, in a group of people or in certain person, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to carry out an act, or to refrain from carrying out it; and c) acts that constitute crimes defined in the international conventions and protocols related to terrorism and included in their scope (Bariffi 2008, 128).

In the same report prepared by Special Rapporteur Kalliopi K. Koufa, analyst Walter Laqueur, president of the International Research Council of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., is quoted as defining terrorism as:

the use of violence covered up by a group for political purposes; it is directed against a government, but it is also used against ethnic groups, classes or parties. The objectives can range from grievances to the overthrow of a government and the seizure of power (...). Terrorists aim to cause political, social and economic disruption and, to this end, commit planned or indiscriminate killings (Informe del Consejo Económico y Social 2001, 29).

In 1984, the United States Congress released a definition that was recorded in military codes and in US law that stated that “every terrorist act is one (...) that has the intention of intimidating or coercing a civilian population, influencing government policy through intimidation and coercion, affecting government conduct through assassination or kidnapping” (Rad Cliff 2011, 105).

For its part, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defined international terrorism as:

the illegal use of force or violence by a group of people (...) who have some connection with a foreign power or whose activities transcend national borders, against persons or property, to intimidate or coerce a government, or the civilian population to achieve social and political objectives (Rad Cliff 2011, 106).

These two perspectives show a clear contradiction between the way in which the foreign policy of the USA itself is managed and its behavior in regions such as the Middle East.

Islam and terrorism: a necessary deconstruction

One of the most widely spread myths about terrorism is its alleged and almost exclusive direct link with religion. Similarly, the positions are divided. According to the academics interviewed by Alex Schmid, some argue that there is no direct relationship between terrorism and religion, or at least that there is not necessarily a connection (Schmid 2013, 23). Others claim that since terrorism is a method of achieving a final goal, that goal can be described in religious terms. Therefore, religious beliefs can be a motivational force for terrorists (Schmid 2013, 23).

Professor Lucien van Lier from the Department of Religious and Philosophical Studies at Utrecht University discusses the role of religion as simplifying and magnifying today's violent conflicts. According to him, it seems impossible to avoid discussing its role. From religious fundamentalism to the phenomenon of terrorism, the use of religious language in conflict zones contributes to instigating violent conflicts. Religion seems to function more as a tool that gives meaning to people within a complex socioeconomic and political context. If social tensions increase, fear increases and violence lurks, generating a religious conflict (Liere 2012).

Therefore, religion can provide a motivation to sacrifice everything, including one's life. Terrorism can be religious, ideologically, and socially motivated, or a combination of these elements. Above all, religious terrorism would be the deadliest because its actions are guided by a supreme power and seen as a way of serving God's will. Religion contains in its texts traditions, symbols, rituals, and myths that are often manipulated to mobilize people. It is also suggested that religious discourse is one of the most important factors for the recruitment of Salafi-jihadist movements (Schmid 2013, 24-25), in what has been called the theory of the "fourth wave" of global terrorism.

This theory was developed by the professor of Political Science at the University of California, David Rapoport, according to which this fourth wave refers to religious terrorism between 1970 and the present time (Rasler and Thompson 2011, 13-17). According to his method of analysis, this stage began with two important events: the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979-89), which mobilized Muslims,

on one hand, to export the revolution from the ayatollahs and the other, to mobilize them against the “infidels”, which will later be transformed into “attacking” US targets to withdraw from the Middle East. Other American professors such as Jeffrey D. Simon, Jeffrey Kaplan, and Jean E. Rosenfeld, who focus on the study of religious terrorism, terrorism, and political violence, also add to this approach (Rosenfeld 2011, 1-10, 44-84). Therefore, the fourth wave of terrorism assumed an essentially religious orientation and was centered on Islam, thus introducing the problem of linking terrorism with this religion.

However, Jeffrey Simon later developed his “fifth wave” theory where he argues that there will not be a single type of ideology that will dominate this new stage, where the influential role of technology will be its defining characteristic. This is why Simon calls it the “technological wave” and establishes the internet as the necessary precondition for modern terrorism. Simon points out that no type of terrorist movement has a monopoly on the use of technology and that competing ideologies will achieve their definitions by taking control of it (Walls 2017, 59). In part, this process has been evidenced by the use that groups such as the Islamic State have made of social networks on the Internet, to spread their “message” about Islam.

Islam as a system of beliefs, values, and codes of conduct is not a homogeneous religion. As it spread from the 7th century, it adopted the characteristics of the cultures of the peoples that became Islamized. At present, the initial Arab component has remained as a minority within the Islamic community: UMMA. Therefore, there is no single Islam within the Shiite world, much less within the Sunni variant, which is even divided into four great Koranic schools and multiple Sufi brotherhoods, etc.

This leads to suggest that there are different political tendencies within Islam or within what can be called political Islam. Also, within the Islamic fundamentalist, there are great nuances that range from the reformists – Muslim Brotherhood or the Justice and Development Party of Turkey – to other more radical variants such as Wahhabism, which became the official policy of the Saudi Kingdom or the conservative variant promoted by Iran’s Shiite ayatollahs. Therefore, Islamists are not a single or monolithic group (Halverson, Goodall, and Corman 2011, 32), and many of them pursue different ideological goals through political participation and social activism, rather than violence (Halverson, Goodall, and Corman 2011, 6).

Other variants within conservative Islam are made up of minority groups that have no political power and become forces against established governments. These extremist-leaning groups call themselves defenders of an

“authentic” and “legitimate” Islam that they must implement in the societies in which they operate. Its main feature is the use of violence as a fighting method. In this regard, Halverson, Goodall, and Corman define extremists as:

a group of political actors who seek to impose an Islamist ideology through physical intimidation, coercion and revolutionary violence, against any State or civilian objectives, who do not share the same vision of the ‘true’ path of Islam, which is typically ultra-conservative and puritanical in nature (Halverson, Goodall, and Corman 2011, 6).

These American authors also state that “in their most radical ‘jihadist’ or extremist form, Islamists adopt the same violent revolutionary strategies that nationalists had done before them” (Halverson, Goodall, and Corman 2011, 32). Here the main criticism lies in the term “revolutionary violence” because it is directly associated that revolutionary movements are negative processes or, what is worse, it indirectly links extremist or radical groups with revolutionary groups. All this becomes even more complex when the concepts of Islamists, extremists, jihadists, or radicals are used as a synonym for terrorists.

In the Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, extremism is defined as a form of political expression with the aim of achieving its objectives by any means up to political violence. They may have a far-left, far-right, or religious fundamentalist orientation. In the same way, they include leftist movements within this process, an aspect that is contradictory, reductionist and lacks solid arguments. Then they define religious extremism as a variant of radicalism (Schmid 2013, 630). According to Frank Buijs, Professor of Radicalization Studies at the University of Amsterdam:

extremism strives for a desired idyllic society, absolutizes the contradiction between the forces of good and evil, and propagates a specific reading of jihad, mainly that it is the duty of every Muslim to use all possible means to fight evil. Extremists are characterized by the idea that there is an irreconcilable contradiction between true believers and apostate rulers, which needs to be resolved through armed struggle (Schmid 2013, 630).

Returning to Halverson, Goodall, and Corman’s analysis of Islamic extremism, they also suggest that radical Islamist discourse is linked to certain cultural narratives that indicate how the members of such an extremist group should organize themselves, what goals or objectives they should pursue in line with what they believe and what makes them true followers of the

Prophet Mohamed (Halverson, Goodall, and Corman 2011, 12). Following this logic, extremists claim that the world is corrupt and that the Arab nations and the Islamic world have deviated from the path of true Islam to enter a stage of *jahiliyyab* or pre-Islamic ignorance.

Thus, they define all the leaders of the Arab and Islamic world as “apostates” and enemies of God. This narrative also defines the West – particularly the United States – as the enemy that can only be eliminated by militant jihad. All of this serves as a way to recruit into an ideology that promotes love of death and inevitable victory through martyrdom (Halverson, Goodall, and Corman 2011, 13). With these ideas, it is assumed that, for Halverson, Goodall, and Corman, extremists are synonymous with terrorists, and to a certain extent there is a very fine invisible line that separates both tendencies that do not always have to be related.

Russian analyst E. Stepanova identifies some characteristics shared by most religiously based terrorist groups. Among them is that: terrorist activity depends on the blessing of a spiritual guide; their actions are justified by direct references to the sacred text, which can also be used by more moderate forces. In turn, it identifies religious radicalism as a reaction against cultural modernization, secularization, and westernization, perceived as a threat to Muslim identity. For this reason, for her, there is a relationship between religious/extremist radicalism and terrorism (Schmid 2013, 25-26). But, as other authors have suggested, this relationship does not have to be direct.

According to Israeli academic Assaf Moghadam, Director of Terrorism Studies, in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point Military Academy, religious radicalism (extremist) groups that use terrorist methods are motivated, supported, or justified according to one interpretation of the Islamic concept of jihad. While “jihadist Islamic terrorism” has become the main form of transnational terrorism in recent decades, that does not mean that all Islamist movements (radical Islamists) include jihad as their first priority and are ready to use violence, particularly against civilians (Schmid 2013, 25).

Another controversial concept has been that of associating jihad with terrorism. The term jihad can be translated as fighting vigorously or making an individual effort. It also refers to fighting for the path of Allah and is often used with the synonym of holy war, which occurred at the beginning of the expansion of Islam (years from 750 to 1258) to convert different peoples. Then in the 19th century, there was a jihad movement in West Africa that sought to purify Islam (Batan 2010, 619-640).

In modernity, the term jihad has been controversial because there are different ways of interpreting it. For example, there is the term “great jihad” (*jihad al-akbar*) which is used to refer to the individual struggle of Muslims to do what is right according to Islam: the jihad of the heart and the fight against their own instincts and temptations. There is also the “jihad of the tongue” (*jihad al-lissan* or *da’awah*): speaking in the name of good and avoiding evil. Another meaning is the “spiritual jihad” or intellectual (*jihad al-kabir*): expanding the knowledge of divine revelation through Allah and his prophets. However, jihad as a non-violent spiritual struggle is not found very explicitly in the hadith, while there are 199 references in the sense of war.

This has been interpreted to refer to individual or group armed struggle to propagate Islam against infidels or kafir: “jihad of the sword” (*jihad as-sayf*). Traditionally, this variant is used to describe armed struggle against non-Muslims, not necessarily for purely religious reasons but to defend or liberate Muslims from oppression or offensive jihad to conquer territory and establish Islam. The doctrine of jihad was reinvigorated in the 1980s with the work of Palestinian professor Abdullah Azzam in proclaiming that jihad would become an individual rather than a collective obligation and that every Muslim had to participate in it, morally or financially (Schmid 2013, 651).

Therefore, jihad began to be referred to directly as jihadist terrorism. In this regard, an Indian professor based in the United Kingdom, Sajjan Gohel, from the Department of International History at the London School of Economic and Political Science affirms that:

terrorists, as well as extremist clerics and radical elements, have labeled the word terrorist as jihad, suicides as martyrs, transforming a violent criminal action as a sacred religious duty (...) who will be rewarded in paradise for their sacrifice. Using religion as a motivational factor have [sic] allowed terrorists to have a reason for their indiscriminate violence (...) and impose fundamentalism as a way of life (Schmid 2013, 27).

Although the narrative of the leaders of terrorist organizations with an ideological basis in the form of a radical interpretation of Islam states that they are carrying out a holy war or jihad, this does not mean having to associate terrorism, as a method of struggle, with jihad, since there are many ways of doing it, like that of the Palestinians. All these stereotypes, misinterpretations, and epistemological confusions have been exacerbated by the politicization of terrorism since the 21st century and the strengthening of Islamophobia through the media.

One of the most used adjectives – misused – to characterize it, has been “Islamic” terrorism, after which most of these events began to be associated with Islam and therefore (dis)qualifying it as a violent religion. Although the main terrorist organizations have had Islam as their ideological and cultural foundation, most of their victims have been the Muslim populations of the countries where they have operated. In practice, the religious precepts with which they intend to legitimize their methods constitute a violation of the principles of Islam and many of its leaders manipulate these foundations to recruit followers, in a context marked by socioeconomic impoverishment, the undervaluation of their culture, and foreign interference.

The positions from Africa regarding the conceptualization and adoption of legal instruments to confront terrorism have been very significant. From the Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations, where extremism and terrorism were denounced (Organisation of African Unity 1994, 252-253), to the Convention on the Prevention and Combat of Terrorism in 1999. This document was a milestone, as it was the first legislative instrument prepared to combat terrorism in Africa. The main contribution of this concept is the distinction between acts of terrorism and the struggle for self-determination.

In the words of Martin Ewi, an expert on terrorism issues at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) of South Africa, and Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Director of the Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, of Ghana, this declaration was a starting point in relation to terrorism since it established the initial bases not only to condemn it but to criminalize it. This was the first attempt, at a continental level, to identify the causes of terrorism and thus initiate a process of inter-state cooperation to deal with this problem (Ewi and Aning 2006, 36). Both authors classify the Convention as:

a political victory for Africa and a complementary legal instrument for judicial and mutual cooperation, as well as a binding commitment on the part of African countries to take charge of their own security problems and combat the phenomenon of violence and organized crime (Ewi and Aning 2006, 37).

Conclusion

Since the events of September 11, all these theoretical approaches and misinterpretations that linked Islam and jihad with terrorism have increased. This long period of promotion of Islamophobia sought to legitimize military actions by Western powers in areas of geostrategic interest. This military response, after 20 years of “fighting terrorism”, has not produced any real results. On the contrary, it has caused the expansion of terrorist activism to areas and countries that had not been affected, such as the Sahel and Burkina Faso, in the last eight years. Since the beginning of this problem, African leaders have increased their political commitment to confronting terrorism, since the Dakar Summit in 2001.

One year later, the Action Plan for the Prevention and Combat of Terrorism was approved at the High-Level Intergovernmental Summit held in Algeria in 2002. The Action Plan sought to give concrete expression to the commitments and obligations of African countries, to combat terrorism and improve their access to the necessary resources for their confrontation. It was intended to provide sound guidelines and strategies for collective and individual state action against terrorism. All these previous conventions, protocols, and agreements constitute the legal framework on which the different security mechanisms on the continent continue to act, including the AU Peace and Security Council.

In 2004, the Protocol to the OAU Convention for the Prevention and Combat of Terrorism was adopted. In this way, the different anti-terrorist policies are articulated, from the continental and national levels. The problems would come later in its implementation in the face of specific events, lack of financial resources, national positions and policies, as well as the interference of Western powers from the military point of view. African leaders continued to implement their own counter-terrorism mechanisms. The next step was the efforts to prepare what they called the Comprehensive African Anti-Terrorism Model Law. This is an attempt to legislate from the AU crimes related to terrorism, a phenomenon that has been increasing in the last decade in the region. All these legal efforts within the African integration and coordination mechanisms have been examples of the search for their own approach, following the rule of solving African problems with the African perspective. Another important element in this sense was the conceptual vision of separating terrorism from other legitimate forms of struggle, which constitutes an epistemological break with the dominant Western tendencies.

Recommendations

- To continue deepening theoretical approaches to terrorism from an African perspective that does not follow Western narratives.
- Deepen the legal aspects established by the different instances and agencies within the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities.
- Promote academic meetings between African intellectuals, politicians, and analysts to contribute to this process of epistemological deconstruction from an African interpretation.
- Promote critical analysis of the problems related to terrorism in Africa – in particular in the Sahel region – and the objective reasons why anti-terrorist policies, dominated by the strategies of France and the United States, have not given concrete results as an increase in terrorist actions has been seen in the Sahel region.

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism has maintained an expansion trend, with only small periods of contraction, which is why it continues to be one of the main global problems in terms of security. Most of the analyzes on these issues by Western academia are permeated by an approach that associates terrorism with “jihadism”, with “Islamism” or worse, does not distinguish between armed movements with social or territorial claims and terrorist groups. Similarly, the focus of the fight against terrorism continues to prioritize the military approach, which has not yielded real results. For this reason, it is necessary, once again, to return to the conceptual theoretical debates on terrorism, but from an alternative perspective to the Western academic tendencies that study it, in general, in a biased way. In this sense, the debate focuses on separating terrorism from Islam and from other forms of armed political struggle. In regions such as the Sahel, where there is a multiplicity of non-state armed actors involved, there is a tendency to characterize all forms of political violence as terrorism, which constitutes a conceptual and methodological mistake. From this derives the importance of continuing the conceptual studies that allow adjusting the strategies to be followed and the correct identification of which actors should be considered as terrorists.

KEYWORDS

African Union. Islam. Jihad. The Sahel. Terrorism.

*Received on May 23, 2023
Accepted on June 21, 2023*

THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS FROM A HUMAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVE: THE DILEMMA IN THE ISSUE OF WESTERN SAHARA

Guilherme Moreira Dias¹

José Maria Sydow de Barros²

Túlio Pires Barboza³



Introduction

The question of Western Sahara, “Africa’s last colony”, is quite peculiar in the context of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, when compared to other ongoing missions, and it is also quite unique from a geopolitical point of view since the international community differs regarding this territory (Barros 2020).

In this context, this article seeks to address the following issue: why didn’t the evolution of UN peace operations, which occurred after the expansion of the international security agenda and the emergence of the concept of human security, provide any significant change in the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)? We will consider the hypothesis that, although there is a consensus at the international level on the importance of the concept of human security, there has been no significant change in MINURSO’s mandate, such as the incorporation of new assignments, due to Morocco’s close relationship with some permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), namely France and the United States.

Therefore, in order to answer the proposed question, the second section initially addresses the concept of human security. Then, we analyze the evolution of United Nations peace operations in the context of an expansion of the international security agenda, until the establishment of the principle of responsibility to protect. In the fourth section, we approach the question of Western Sahara from the perspective of human security. At the end of the

study, in the conclusion, relevant aspects of the proposed problem will be addressed.

The rise of the human security issue

Before approaching the concept of human security, it is important to understand the international situation which promoted it. The traditional concept of security, centered on state sovereignty and territorial integrity, obtained through the strengthening of each nation's military apparatus, had dominated theoretical debates during the Cold War until the mid-1970s, when nuclear tension between the superpowers matured, allowing for the emergence of questioning of this traditional approach to security (Buzan and Hansen 2009).

As Walt (1991) points out, from the 1970s and, mainly, in the 1980s, debates on the issue of security intensified, marking, for the author, the “renaissance of security studies”. At that time, security theorists disagreed about the broadening and deepening of the international security agenda beyond political and military expressions, rejecting the centrality of the State as an agent of security (Buzan and Hansen 2009).

In this scenario, peace studies stood out, especially Johan Galtung's propositions, introducing new concepts for peace, security, and violence. According to the author, there are two forms of peace: negative and positive. Negative peace is characterized by the absence of violence, while positive peace is characterized by a stable social balance, in which the emergence of a new conflict has no possibility of escalating to violence and war (Galtung 1969). Thus, as highlighted by Oliveira (2009, 69), “in order for security to be durable, it must be equated with a stable or positive peace structure, which is much more than just the absence of war” (our translation)⁴. Positive peace provides the reduction of conditions that prevent the development of individuals, such as poverty, social inequality, and totalitarian regimes, among others.

In normative terms, the construction of the concept took advantage of a series of previous discussions of freedom in relation to fear and in relation to necessity. According to Gilder (2021), as soon as the 1941 Atlantic Charter, it was already possible to identify the first references to such freedoms as well as an indirect focus on the individual, in terms of the security agenda. It

4 In the original: “para que a segurança seja durável, ela deve ser equiparada a uma estrutura de paz estável ou positiva, que é muito mais do que somente a ausência de guerra” (Oliveira 2009, 69).

was the first document with guidelines that aimed to shape the international order to be instituted after World War II in case of an Allied victory.

It was not until 1980 that this discussion on both ideas of freedom would be resumed at the international level. The Brandt, Palmer, and Brundtland Commissions produced reports in which they address the link between peace and development, the role of cooperation from a global vision of security as a possible response to the emergence of new threats, and the idea of sustainability as a response to the climate crisis and its possible interurrences that could potentiate conflicts (Gilder 2021).

In the 1990s, concurrently with these new proposals and theoretical formulations, the concept of human security was developed. The term was formally presented in 1994, in the Human Development Report, commissioned by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which, according to Dias (2018, 39), suggested a “passage from military security to human security, acknowledging that there is only peace to the extent that people have guarantees of security in their daily lives”⁵, thus redefining the logic of the threat by stating that:

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people. The superpowers were locked in an ideological struggle-fighting a cold war all over the world. The developing nations, having won their independence only recently, were sensitive to any real or perceived threats to their fragile national identities. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. With the dark shadows of the cold war receding, one can now see that many conflicts are within nations rather than between nations (UNDP 1994, 22).

In addition, the UNDP report defines human security based on two main aspects: the concept is used in a more limited view to refer to people’s freedom from threats such as hunger, epidemics, or repression (freedom from want), and in a broader view to refer to the consequences of conflicts, genocides, ethnic cleansing (freedom from fear) (UNDP 1994). As Rocha

5 In the original: “*passagem da segurança militar para a segurança humana, reconhecendo que só há paz na medida em que as pessoas tenham garantias de segurança em seu cotidiano*” (Dias 2018, 39).

(2017a, 56) points out, the logic of this approach is that “by guaranteeing the absence of physical threats, it is possible to guarantee the development agenda and vice versa”⁶, safeguarding the human security of individuals. In addition, the document establishes the following dimensions of human security: economic, dietary, sanitary, environmental, personal, community, and political. From these seven dimensions, the report presents six probable threats to human security, namely: transnational terrorism, drug trafficking and crimes, economic inequality, population displacement, environmental degradation, and demographic issues (UNDP 1994).

Along with the emergence of this concept, a series of criticisms emerged about its formulation and practice. In this sense, Paris (2001, 88), argues that the conception lacks precision, remaining uncertain “whether the concept of human security can serve as a practical guide for academic research or formulation of government policies” (our translation)⁷, since, according to the author:

Existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied (Paris 2001, 88).

Despite this, it is fair to say that the concept of human security, although controversial and polemic, was adopted by several actors in the international system (states, international/regional organizations, NGOs, and others). As Rocha (2017, 105) points out, “there is a constant debate regarding its relevance, meaning, and definition, but the concept has already been incorporated in academic and political circles” (our translation)⁸.

At this point, it is important to highlight that the UNDP report was the result of a process that began with the release of the Agenda for Peace, which marked the beginning of the evolution of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, as will be discussed below.

6 In the original: “ao garantir a ausência de ameaças físicas, é possível garantir a agenda de desenvolvimento e vice-versa” (Rocha 2017a, 56).

7 In the original: “se o conceito de segurança humana pode servir como um guia prático para pesquisa acadêmica ou formulação de políticas governamentais” (Paris 2001, 88).

8 In the original: “o debate em relação a sua relevância, significado e definição é constante, mas já está incorporado nos círculos acadêmicos e políticos” (Rocha 2017, 105).

The evolution of UN peacekeeping operations

It has become common to divide the evolution of peace operations into different generations. However, there is no consensus on the exact timeline of these generations, nor on the usefulness of this taxonomy (Kenkel 2013). Therefore, for the purpose of this study, it is relevant to address the division of peace operations into traditional and multidimensional, according to the classification carried out by Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2004) based on the analysis of the objectives established in the mandate of each peace operation approved by the UN Security Council (SC), thus disregarding the timeline criterion (the idea of a division into different generations).

In this sense, during the Cold War, traditional peacekeeping operations were systematically implemented, when the lack of consensus among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, especially between the US and the USSR, imposed a time of near ineffectiveness for this collective security system. In this scenario, in general, operations were implemented in the period between the establishment of a ceasefire and the formalization of a political agreement between the parties in conflict, seeking to develop some degree of trust between them. In addition, they can be classified in Chapter VI of the UN Charter and were composed of lightly armed or unarmed forces, since they did not aim to solve the conflict by their own means, serving basically as a buffer between the belligerents to prevent the re-escalation of the conflict violence (Bigatão 2015; Valença and Affonso 2018).

It is also essential to understand that traditional peace operations are based on a trinity of principles: **the consent** of the host nation, **the impartiality** of the organization towards the parties in conflict, and **the non-use of force** by UN troops, except for self-defense (Bellamy et al. 2010 *apud* Kenkel 2013, highlighted by the authors).

At this point, it is important to highlight the Agenda for Peace as an important normative instrument that marked the beginning of the evolution of peace operations conducted by the United Nations post-Cold War. Presented in 1992 by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then Secretary-General of the UN, the document addressed the need for UN action in three essential dimensions: preventive diplomacy, peace agreements, and peacekeeping. In this context, multidimensional peace operations, implemented based on the guidelines of that document, began to hold mandates with a variety of objectives (provision of humanitarian aid, protection of civilians, administration of territories, repatriation of refugees, among others), which demanded, in addition to a military contingent, also police and civilian contingents, in order to enable

the execution of services in conflict areas. In this sense, as highlighted by Bigatão (2015, 37), “if between 1947 and 1987, 14 peacekeeping operations had been authorized; between 1988 and 1999 that number expanded to 39 new missions” (our translation)⁹. To a large extent, this was a consequence of the debates on the expansion of international security issues, which allowed for a new understanding of what would be characterized as a threat to peace and security, from the perspective of the UN.

Therefore, it appears that *pari passu* to the expansion of the international security agenda and, consequently, to the emergence of the concept of human security, there was an expansion in the demand for United Nations action in intra-state conflicts of a complex and diffuse nature, which Kaldor (1999) defined as “new wars”, characterized by the existence of issues such as revolutionary processes and civil wars, terrorism, drug trafficking, ethnic conflicts, genocides, epidemics and natural catastrophes, and the flow of refugees.

However, it is important to highlight that such events were already happening before; however, during the Cold War, they were put aside, in view of the dynamics of power disputes of the bipolar period. When such conflicts began to impact beyond national boundaries, crossing borders, they began to receive greater attention from both the scientific community and from policymakers (Duarte 2015).

Since then, based on the guidelines of the Agenda for Peace and in line with the emergence of the concept of human security, UN peacekeeping operations have undergone successive reforms. Thus, peacekeeping mission mandates have begun to encompass new responsibilities, such as the protection of civilians, the provision of humanitarian assistance and human rights, repatriation of refugees, among others, putting into practice the transition from the traditional model of operations to multidimensional operations (Bigatão 2015).

However, this transition and the expansion of peacekeeping missions observed in the early 1990s imposed a series of difficulties on the UN to remain effective and the organization went through a period of crisis, especially after the failures that occurred in Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia. Consequently, there was a withdrawal of operations and the subsequent loss of credibility of the UN regarding the ability to act in these new scenarios. Thus, if in 1993 it is estimated that more than 70 thousand

9 In the original: “se entre 1947 e 1987 foram autorizadas 14 operações de paz; entre 1988 e 1999 esse número cresceu para 39 novas missões” (Bigatão 2015, 37).

peacekeepers were deployed under the UN flag, by 1996 this number had been reduced to less than 20 thousand (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004).

In order to seek to overcome the failures that occurred in the 90s, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in 2000, commissioned a report to a group of experts with the objective of carrying out a deep analysis of peacekeeping operations. Thus, in August 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations was published, which became known as the Brahimi Report, as it was chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria. The document constitutes a milestone for the reform of UN peacekeeping operations. Regarding the Brahimi Report, Dias (2018) notes that:

What we see at this point is a step towards the flexibility of the three principles of peacekeeping operations – consent, impartiality and use of force only for self-defense – in addition to operational propositions in order to more efficiently integrate the mission's civil and military components, speed up the deployment of troops after the approval of the mandate and develop more in-depth reconstruction strategies (Dias 2018, 49, our translation)¹⁰.

Following the evolution of peace operations, and in the wake of political and academic debates, it is important to emphasize the institution of the principle of responsibility to protect (or R2P). Based on the concept of human security, R2P emerged in 2001, when the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), a Canadian institution linked to the UN, published the study “The Responsibility to Protect”, after a series of debates between diplomatic representatives of States, non-governmental organizations and international institutions. R2P establishes that:

sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states (ICISS 2001, VIII).

¹⁰ In the original: “O que se vê neste momento é um passo em direção a flexibilização dos três princípios das operações de paz – consentimento, imparcialidade e uso da força apenas em autodefesa – somado a proposições operacionais no sentido de integrar de modo mais eficiente os componentes civil e militar da missão, agilizar o envio das tropas após a aprovação do mandato e desenvolver estratégias mais aprofundadas de reconstrução” (Dias 2018, 49).

Thus, the approval of the principle of R2P, in 2005, at the UN General Assembly, according to Duarte (2015, 131), defined the world population as an object of international security, while “establishing facilitating mechanisms for the execution of measures with the objective of containing manifestations of violence that occur within national boundaries and that have repercussions in conflicts that promote international instability” (our translation)¹¹. In other words, it was established as an instrument that confers legitimacy to the implementation of United Nations peacekeeping operations with mandates specific to act in this new scenario.

The human security dilemma in Western Sahara

The beginning of UN involvement in the issue of Western Sahara occurred in 1963, when the organization classified it as one of the territories included in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, with the Saharawi people having to exercise their right to choose and decide between its independence, becoming a sovereign state; free association with Spain; or integration to Spain. In order for this to happen, it would be imperative to hold a referendum, in which the population itself would decide on its future (Menezes, Morais, and Carvalho 2018).

However, the idealized referendum never took place. From the 1950s onwards, when the independence processes of the European colonies began, Morocco, which was liberated from France in 1956, understood that the Moroccan empire extended beyond its territorial limits, forming the “Great Morocco”, which covered, in addition to its own territory, all of Western Sahara, Mauritania, the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as part of Algeria and Mali (Ferreira 2018).

Nevertheless, on May 10, 1973, a revolutionary political movement was created, the *Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro* (POLISARIO Front), which had a very specific objective: the independence of what was then Spanish Sahara and the formation of an independent Sahrawi State (Cobo 2011 *apud* Menezes, Morais, and Carvalho 2018).

Thus, in 1975, even with an opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stating that Morocco did not have the right to claim Saharawi territory, King Hassan II issued a national statement calling on Moroccans to

11 In the original: “estabeleceu mecanismos facilitadores para a execução de medidas com o objetivo de conter as manifestações de violências que ocorrem dentro do espaço nacional, e que repercutem em conflitos que promovem instabilidade internacional” (Duarte 2015, 131).

march towards the territory belonging to Spain, in order to retake the plundered lands and free the population from Spanish colonization (Daudén and Suzin 2011). In this way, in a movement that became known as the “Green March”, approximately 350 thousand Moroccans occupied the northern region of Western Sahara.

On November 14, 1975, unable to face a war against Morocco, Spain secretly signed an agreement with Morocco and Mauritania, which is considered to have triggered the conflict in Western Sahara: the Madrid Agreement, through which Spain divided the administration of the Saharawi territory, leaving part with Morocco and another part with Mauritania (Estrada 2014).

Immediately after the occupation of the territory by Morocco and Mauritania, POLISARIO Front launched intense combat against the two countries, using guerrilla tactics and starting the war itself (Estrada 2014). On February 26, 1976, Spain officially withdrew from the territory and, the following day, the POLISARIO Front declared the independence of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), in order to give international legitimacy and claim sovereignty over Western Sahara.

In 1979, Mauritania withdrew from Western Sahara, in view of the distress caused to its troops by the guerrilla warfare implemented by the POLISARIO Front. However, after the Mauritanian withdrawal, Morocco extended its occupation, deepening the conflict with the POLISARIO Front (Menezes, Morais, and Carvalho 2018). Between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the POLISARIO Front obtained a certain advantage in the political and military fields, having received growing recognition from the international community and, also, having gained control over important locations in Saharawi territory (Barata 2012).

Consequently, in the political field, in response to the official recognition of SADR as a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the present-day African Union, Morocco left the organization in 1984. In the military field, in the period from 1981 to 1987, Morocco built a fortified defensive line, composed of an immense wall of sand and stone, protected with minefields, known as The Berm, which divided Western Sahara into two zones: the Occupied Zones, dominated by Morocco, which are located on the western side of the wall and occupy approximately 85% of the territory; and the Liberated Zones, about 15% of the territory, controlled by the POLISARIO Front, located on the eastern side of the wall (Duarte 2016). Aside from isolating the Sahrawi population in the territory controlled by the POLISARIO Front, the wall poses a major threat to the population, due to the various minefields in the area.

During the conflict itself, which took place between 1975 and 1991, the Sahrawi population migrated across the desert toward the border with Algeria, where they settled in refugee camps in the Tindouf region. Sahrawis fled mainly because of the intense Moroccan napalm air strikes, arbitrary arrests, and other forms of violence against the civilian population. During their displacement towards Algeria, for example, Sahrawis occupied some temporary camps, built by the POLISARIO Front in strategic places, located in Guelta Zemmur, Oum Dreyga, Amgala, and Tifariti, where there were water wells and fortifications abandoned by the Spaniards. However, Moroccan forces carried out air attacks on the fields of Guelta Zemmur, Tifariti, and, later, on Oum Dreyga, which resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties (Cobo and Menéndez 2006).

Thus, in 1984, the UN decided to intervene in the negotiations between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front, which were being conducted by the OAU. As a result, in 1988 the parties to the conflict agreed on the proposal to put into effect a ceasefire, which was made official in 1991, one year after the approval of the Settlement Plan, a plan included in the UN Secretary-General's Report (S/21360, of June 18, 1990), which provided for the actions to be implemented for the effective holding of the self-determination referendum of the Saharawi people (Barros 2020).

Also in 1991, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was created, with a mandate to implement the following actions:

- a. monitor the ceasefire; b. verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the territory; c. monitor the confinement of Moroccan and POLISARIO Front troops to designated locations; d. take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners or detainees; e. oversee the exchange of prisoners of war; f. implement a program to repatriate refugees of Western Sahara; g. identify and register qualified voters; h. organize and guarantee a free and fair referendum and proclaim the results (UN 2015, 22).

Since then, the main point of divergence has been found in the lack of consensus regarding who would have the right to vote in the self-determination referendum. On the one hand, Western Sahara requires that the electorate be composed according to the census carried out by Spain in 1974, while Morocco defends the expansion of the electorate, since, from 1975 onwards, there was a considerable increase in the number of Moroccans in the territory as a result of the "Green March" (Estrada 2014).

Since the establishment of MINURSO, the UN has made efforts on several occasions seeking to resolve the impasse in the issue of Western Sahara, exclusively in the diplomatic field. However, all attempts at an agreement failed, such as the Houston Agreement (1998), Baker Plan I (2001), and Baker Plan II (2003), which were rejected for not reaching a consensus between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front (Barros 2020).

Seeking a solution to the conflict, in 2007, the UN called on the parties to negotiate directly, under the monitoring of the organization. On that occasion, Morocco presented a proposal for Western Sahara, the Saharan Autonomous Region, based on the concession of autonomy, however, inserted in a framework of Moroccan sovereignty. On the other hand, the POLISARIO Front presented its own proposal, underscoring its desire for self-determination and independence (Duarte 2016). Consequently, negotiations did not succeed.

It should be noted that, as discussed earlier, although numerous risk situations encompassed by the concept of human security are present in the issue of Western Sahara, surprisingly, MINURSO is one of the few UN missions in progress whose mandate does not assign the responsibility of developing an action guided by the concept of human security and the principle of R2P. In light of this, Ban Ki-Moon, at the time Secretary-General of the UN, emphasized in his report on the situation in Western Sahara, dated April 2010:

The United Nations has no staff on the ground to address human rights issues, since MINURSO does not have a specific human rights mandate and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has no presence in the Territory or in the refugee camps in Tindouf. Nonetheless, the United Nations recognizes its duty to uphold human rights standards in all its operations, including those relating to Western Sahara. Both parties to the conflict often accuse each other, in communications with the United Nations or in the media, of human rights violations (UNSC 2010, 12).

In this context, Mr. Sangqu, the South African representative during the 6523rd SC Meeting, held on April 27, 2011, emphasized that it is inconceivable that MINURSO is the only mission in African territory that does not include the issue of human rights in its mandate, potentially creating “the impression that the Security Council does not care about the human rights of the people of Western Sahara” (UNSC 2011).

In this scenario, in 2010, an event occurred that gained great international repercussions. Approximately 20 thousand Sahrawis settled in Gdem Izik, near Laayoune, where they set up a camp to protest against the economic and social conditions of the Sahrawi population in Western Sahara. A few days after the protests began, Moroccan soldiers invaded the camp and violently repressed the population, with some Sahrawis being arrested and tortured. On the other hand, Morocco defends the version that the troops were received with violence by the Saharawis, informing that among the 12 (twelve) deaths that occurred in the event, 10 (ten) were Moroccan soldiers (Beristain and Hidalgo 2012).

Still in this context, it is possible to verify numerous reports of violations, whether of the dimensions of human security or the principle of R2P, reported mainly by NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. In a report presented by Amnesty International in 2015, 173 cases of torture and ill-treatment against the Sahrawi population are listed, in the period between 2010 and 2014, allegedly practiced by Moroccan forces, which was immediately denied by Morocco, with no action in this regard having been taken (Anistia Internacional 2015).

Still from the perspective of human security, it is convenient to highlight that, according to Estrada (2014, 129), “the SADR functions today as a *sui generis* Republic, due to the fact that it acts as a State in exile that administers the lives of refugees in the semi-autonomous territory granted by Algeria” (our translation)¹². However, although SADR is recognized by approximately 80 countries, the fact is that it does not have official recognition in the international system. In this way, it appears that the Sahrawi population, which currently lives in refugee camps near Tindouf, in Algeria, is completely vulnerable to possible threats to human security.

Regarding the stalemate in Western Sahara, within the scope of the SC, the support received by Morocco is noteworthy, especially from France and the USA. Since 1963, when Morocco claimed Saharawi territory, France supported the Moroccan claim, even after the release of the ICJ opinion, in 1975, which established that Morocco did not have any rights over Western Sahara (Fuentes 2014).

Moreover, French support is not only configured in the field of rhetoric, since it involves concrete actions in various aspects of power. This support materialized in the military field, when, during the conflict, France

12 In the original: “a RASD funciona hoje como uma República *sui generis*, pelo fato de atuar como um Estado em exílio que administra a vida dos refugiados no território semi-autônomo concedido pela Argélia” (Estrada 2014, 129).

provided substantial military support to Morocco, supplying weapons and even sending French troops to fight against the POLISARIO Front (Menezes, Morais, and Carvalho 2018).

However, the greatest French support for Morocco's demand in relation to Western Sahara appears in its activities with the UN Security Council. Since the creation of MINURSO in 1991, France has used its position as a permanent member of the SC to influence the decisions and resolutions of that organization in favor of Moroccan interests (Ferreira and Migon 2015). One can mention, as a clear example of this influence, the French opposition to the inclusion, in the mandate of MINURSO, of an international mechanism for the protection of the Sahrawis under the focus of human security and the principle of R2P (Duarte 2016).

In this sense, as highlighted by Mr. De Revière, French representative at the 8890th Meeting of the SC, held in October 2021, "France considers Morocco's 2007 autonomy plan as a serious and credible basis for discussions with a view to resuming dialogue. We encourage all of the parties to pursue peace", underlining the strong French support for Moroccan pretensions (UNSC 2021, 3).

Another important Moroccan ally in the SC is the USA. First, from a historical point of view, it is important to highlight that Morocco was the first country to recognize the independence of the USA, being, therefore, one of its oldest allies (Solà-Martín 2009). In addition, it is important to remember that the conflict in Western Sahara emerged during the Cold War, when the USA based its actions on mutual security agreements and military assistance with states considered to be geopolitically relevant to its interests, trying to contain the USSR's area of influence (Barata 2012).

In the period from 1975 to 1990, coinciding with the Moroccan conflict against the POLISARIO Front, Morocco received more than 1/5 of total US aid to Africa, with more than 1 billion dollars in military assistance and 1.3 billion dollars in economic aid. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the US renewed its interests in the Maghreb region due to two main reasons: 1) economic and political interests related to the demand for energy (oil and natural gas) and the regionalization of the Maghreb as a potential for the US corporate market; and 2) military and security interests, related to the need to monitor/control issues such as Islamism, terrorism and democratization (Zoubir 2009 *apud* Estrada 2014). In the context of the Global War on Terror, Morocco sought to associate the POLISARIO Front with international terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda Maghreb, aiming to consolidate

even further the North American opposition to any Saharawi claim (Ferreira and Migon 2015).

In 2013, the US signaled support for the inclusion of an international human rights monitoring mechanism in MINURSO. However, Morocco immediately suspended its joint military exercise with the US, the African Lion, intensifying its lobby with US policymakers with diverse interests in the Maghreb region, culminating in the US withdrawal from including any mention of human security and R2P in the resolution passed by the SC on April 29, 2014 (Khakee 2014).

As it did with France, the 2007 Moroccan autonomy plan for Western Sahara has gained US support since its announcement. In this scenario, on December 10, 2020, then-President Trump recognized “that the entire Western Sahara territory is part of the Kingdom of Morocco” and also stated that the US saw the Moroccan proposal, the Saharan Autonomous Region, as “the only basis for a just and lasting solution to the dispute over the Western Sahara territory” (UNSC 2020, 2). Furthermore, President Trump emphasized that:

The United States believes that an independent Sahrawi State is not a realistic option for resolving the conflict and that genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution. We urge the parties to engage in discussions without delay, using Morocco’s autonomy plan as the only framework to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution. (UNSC 2020, 2).

However, the French and American position, favorable to the Moroccan cause, is not a consensus at the international level. Russia, another permanent member of the SC, on the occasion of the 8246th Meeting of the SC, abstained from voting on Resolution 2414 (2018), stating that the “process of drafting and agreeing the decision was neither transparent nor consultative (...). As a result, the text remains unbalanced (...)”. Furthermore, it criticized the lack of impartiality of the resolution, stating that its main emphasis was “placed on such shaky and contradictory categories as practicability and realism, which could open the way for all kinds of equivocal interpretations” (UNSC 2018, 3).

Also, during the 8518th SC Meeting, Mr. Safronkov, representing Russia, in reference to the actions of the USA and France in support of the Moroccan cause, gave a speech to justify Russia’s abstention in the approval of Resolution 2468 (2019), stating that:

Our arguments for correcting the imbalance were blatantly ignored, although what we were asking for was a restoration of the previously agreed wording. That has once again raised questions about the penholdership system on country-specific subjects in the Council (UNSC 2019, 16).

During the meeting that approved Resolution 2414 (2018), China abstained from the vote and criticized the way in which the draft resolution was prepared, which did not allow for proper discussions among SC members to seek consensus. On the contrary, according to the Chinese, “to take hasty action on a draft resolution when there are still differences affects the unity among Council members” (UNSC 2018, 4).

In this same critical tone, in addition to P5 members Russia and China, other countries that occupy a rotating chair in the SC have, on countless occasions, expressed their dissatisfaction with the unilateral and non-inclusive way in which the texts and projects related to MINURSO are prepared, generally conducted by US penholders, who are usually in charge of this matter.

Moving forward in the analysis of the positions taken on the UNSC, other nations took a stand on the conduct of the Sahrawi issue during various Council meetings, sometimes criticizing the Council’s performance. In this context, during the 8518th SC Meeting, South Africa, through Mr. Matjila, abstained from approving Resolution 2468 (2019), stating that:

[...] regrets that the Council continues to resist a human rights monitoring mandate for MINURSO, despite the fact that many around this table eagerly propose such mechanisms in other mandates, without exception. We have not seen the same vigour or determination in terms of MINURSO, which creates the impression that the human rights of the people of Western Sahara are not held in the same regard as those of other peoples elsewhere in the world (UNSC 2019, 4).

Furthermore, the South African delegation added:

We want to reiterate that the Council’s working methods on this matter, whereby it delegates responsibility to the Group of Friends of Western Sahara, remain a serious source of concern for South Africa. We have consistently raised this issue as problematic, particularly given the unrepresentative nature of the Group, which does not include a single African member of the Council, despite the fact that this is an African issue. This is yet another example of an African issue being decided by non-Africans. It is unjust. (UNSC 2019, 4).

In the same line, in 2021, on the occasion of the 8890th SC Meeting, the Mexican representative, Mr. De la Fuente Ramírez, spoke on the occasion of the approval of Resolution 2602 (2021), stating that:

Nevertheless, we regret the unwillingness, during the negotiations, to include in the resolution important proposals that had the backing of several delegations. I am referring in particular to proposals for more frequent briefings in the light of the significant deterioration of the situation with regard to human rights violations and the collapse of the ceasefire (UNSC 2021, 3).

In this way, after analyzing the positioning of the USA and France, as well as some of the other members of the SC, it is interesting to observe that MINURSO is an exception in terms of most of the ongoing missions on the African continent currently, in which the mandates are increasingly robust and the correlation with the promotion of democracy, development and building stability is the practice.

Conclusion

The concept of human security developed from an intense debate about expanding the international security agenda, especially in the post-Cold War period. Thus, despite the polemics and controversies that accompany the concept until the present day, it is indisputable that it has been incorporated by the various actors of the international system, resulting in the broadening of the security agenda. In this context, there were developments in UN peace operations influenced by the emergence of this concept, which became the basis for the formulation of the principle of R2P, a guiding principle to the various peace missions conducted by the UN.

With regard to the conflict in Western Sahara, which began exactly in the midst of the debate about the centrality of the state as a security agent, and about the expansion and deepening of the international security agenda beyond political and military expressions, it was found that, when MINURSO was set up, in 1991, there was a very clear objective established for the mission: to conduct the self-determination referendum, which has not been carried out until the present moment.

Regarding the situation in Western Sahara, the impasse can be explained in light of Realism, centered on the State, its sovereignty, and its geopolitical and economic interests, reflected in the decision-making dynamics of the

UN Security Council. In this way, through the support received by Morocco from the USA and France, two of the five permanent members of the SC, who use their veto power in favor of their state interests, it is clear that the SC resolutions on the Saharawi question are the result of a superficial discussion, limited to the annual renewal of MINURSO's mandate, without any measure or concrete action that would enable the solution of the deadlock.

Furthermore, although the concept of human security and the principle of R2P have achieved a position of relevance in the international system, it is observed that when guiding the UN's action in Western Sahara, the SC itself ignores these concepts, basing its decisions on an absolutely realistic view of its permanent members, not allowing for the implementation of any change or adjustment in UN's position in face of the conflict in Western Sahara.

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ABSTRACT

The present article intends to analyze the question of Western Sahara from the perspective of human security. For this, after a brief introduction, the concept of human security was presented, explaining the context in which it emerged. In the third section, the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations was analyzed within the context of expanding the international security agenda. Then, an approach to the issue of Western Sahara was carried out from the perspective of human security and, finally, in the final considerations, relevant aspects of the proposed problem were presented.

KEYWORDS

Western Sahara. UN. Peace Operations. Human Security.

Received on September 27, 2022

Accepted on October 10, 2022

Translated by Isabella Cruzichi

SITUATION ANALYSIS OF THE CHISSANO GOVERNMENT: DOMESTIC TRANSITIONS AND ECONOMIC PRAGMATISM IN MOZAMBIQUE (1986-2004)

Ercílio Neves Brandão Langa¹



Introduction

This article analyzes the political situation of Mozambique during Chissano's Government between 1986 and 2005, as well as the internal and external factors that contributed to the fulfillment or unfulfillment of the government's objectives. Political, economic, and historical events are observed in order to evaluate the Chissano Government. Situation analysis is a plural methodology that allows interpreting events, facts, and causes, as well as describing the behavior of the actors involved, the correlations of force, and the internal and external interests that influence the course of politics. Another aspect that justifies using this tool is the historical time involved – 18 years between the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century – characterized by transformations, transitions, and distinct domestic, regional, and international political-economic changes. The situation analysis proved to be an effective tool to reach a broader and deeper perspective of the Chissano Government and the national and international context in which it developed. This methodology requires historical knowledge of the object of study, its context and political dynamics, the organization of local society, its behavior patterns and social values, as well as its political groups, their objectives, and interests. The text constitutes a subjective perspective, a point of view on the “Chissano era”, a political, economic, and social period in the history of Mozambique. It is an *ex-post-facto* analysis, as it is written decades after the events have occurred, and although it limits its scope to a short period of time, it nonetheless covers long and complex socio-economic transformations. Despite systemic changes in Mozambican

society, the structure of the country's politics has remained almost the same, led by the party-state.

Mozambique entered international society in 1975 as an independent state called the People's Republic of Mozambique, governed by FRELIMO in a one-party regime marked by authoritarianism. Two years later, in 1977, the state adhered to Marxism-Leninism, starting to cooperate with the European socialist bloc, China, and Cuba. The Mozambican state was the target of external pressure by the Western world in the form of international blockades and aggression from Ian Smith's Rhodesia and *Apartheid* South Africa. Fifteen years later, in 1990, already under the Chissano Government, the state reinserted itself with another perspective, calling itself the Republic of Mozambique (RM) and adopting the liberal-capitalist model and a multi-party system.

The phenomenon under study is the Chissano Government and its domestic and international actions. In order to elucidate it, a bibliographical survey was carried out, along with document research and the situation analysis as a central tool of the article. As theoretical contributions, the logic of the two-level game and the intermestic perspective that combines the interactions between the domestic and the international environment were discussed. The article is organized into six parts. First, the methodological and theoretical contributions are discussed. The second topic describes the rise of the Chissano Government in relation to national, regional, and international contexts. The third part outlines the first Chissano Government and the fourth part approaches the general peace agreement of 1992. In the fifth topic, the second Chissano Government is evaluated. In the sixth and last segment, its foreign policy is analyzed.

Methodology

The article adopts the method of political situation analysis based on the proposals of Souza (1984), Vieira (2015), Ayerbe (2016), and Pereira (2020) authors who have developed different perspectives of this tool in order to assess the Chissano Government. In his pioneering work, Souza (1984) argues that situation analysis mixes knowledge and discovery, constituting a special reading of reality that is carried out due to either necessity or interest. According to the author, there is no neutral or disinterested situation analysis. There is always a certain point of view regarding the meaning and course of events. In his view, there are two ways of reading the situation:

starting from the position or point of view of the dominant power or starting from the position or point of view of popular movements, the subordinated classes, and the opposition to the dominant power. The sociologist points out the following categories of situation analysis: events, scenarios, actors, power relations, and the articulation between structure and conjuncture. Events, scenarios, and actors are part of the conjuncture, which is related to the structure. These categories generate a situation and define the conjuncture, and they do not occur in a vacuum. They are related to history, to the past, to social, economic, and political relations established over the course of a long process (Souza 1984).

Starting from a historical perspective, Vieira (2015) points out that the study of social phenomena – whether from the present or from the past – is broadened, amplified, and deepened if it starts from a situation analysis. In this view, the situation is characterized by chained events that explain the historical process directly related to the historical fact. According to the author, the continuity or change of conjuncture results from the historical process. Its time scope is given by the studied phenomenon, for it is what determines the necessary timeframe. The ideal scope is a few decades.

From another perspective, Ayerbe (2016) analyzes the situation with a focus on factors of stability and disorganization in the structure of international relations. He argues that events, actors, and interests are useful tools for developing a political situation analysis in international relations. In parallel to the representative case studies of situations of order and disorder in global governance, this International Relations scholar analyzes the historical dimension with comparative approaches to the orderings of past periods and their repercussions as a reference for the present debate. His analysis seeks to unravel how events and actors are articulated in order to attribute meaning to a specific scenario within a given historical context (Ayerbe 2016).

Lastly, Pereira (2020) analyzes the situation from an economic perspective, which facilitates the reading of indicators and the interpretation of statistical data aimed at the market. His work constitutes a manual aimed at those interested in economic sciences, teaching the principles of situation analysis, the construction of scenarios, and the analysis of economic and political risks. He emphasizes the role of economics in situation analysis. In this perspective, the conjuncture constitutes a way for companies and investors to analyze the economy, to evaluate it in order to make decisions. The author states that it is a mistake to call situation analysis a method, instrument, or theory. He considers it a mix of those, since the analysis of the situation encompasses different scientific tools aimed at the analysis of events, faci-

litating the understanding of the interactions between actors, which can be families, government, companies, and the external sector. Situation analysis would be the set of scientific knowledge used in the interpretation of a certain situation or event. According to the author, methodologically, the analysis of the situation needs to go through three phases: the description of the actors and variables, the interpretation and analysis of the situation, and the synthesis of the inferences found (Pereira 2020).

As a rule, the economic situation analysis is carried out or commissioned by large companies and foreign investors, who intend to enter and invest in a new market. This type of analysis demands the existence of knowledge and the construction of economic scenarios, as well as the interpretation of economic and market indicators. It is usually done by economists and related professionals. The financial situation analysis encompasses short and long terms between six and twelve months, which implies an analysis almost at the time of events. Thus, the present article is not interested in analyzing the economic conjuncture, as 18 years have passed since the Chissano Government. At most, it includes a description of the economic agenda. Thus, a political, historical, and social situation analysis is more adequate. To understand the conjuncture of Chissano's Government, the perspectives of the aforementioned scholars were followed, which proved to be complementary and fruitful when combined, allowing for a reading of the main events, actors, and correlation of forces, taking into account the international relations, the historical period observed and even the economic reality.

I consider the tragic death of President Samora Machel the event that gave rise to the Chissano Government². The death of the first president of Mozambique constitutes a landmark used in the popular periodization of the country's history, marked by a distinction between the time of Samora and the time of Chissano. In this context, we have as internal actors in correlation of forces, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO, in Portuguese), the party-state that governs the country since its independence in 1975, and

2 Samora Machel, the first president of Mozambique, died on October 19, 1986, in a tragic airplane accident in the town of Mbuzini, South African territory, which killed 34 people, all high-ranking members of the Mozambican state, including ministers, diplomats, advisors, interpreters, translators, journalists, photographers, the Russian airplane crew, etc. The death of Samora and part of his government left Mozambique orphaned by cadres of its political-administrative and ideological machine. The official causes of the accident have never been explained, and there are several interpretations of it, which include: an attack by the *Apartheid* regime that lured the plane out of its route; a human error by the pilots, involving alcohol consumption, insufficient fuel on the plane and outdated flight plans; suicide mission of Soviet pilots in the service of Moscow in the face of the possibility of Mozambique abandoning socialism, etc.).

the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO, in Portuguese), opposition movement that engaged in a civil war against the Mozambican state and constitutes the largest opposition party, as well as the Christian churches that constituted an important sector of civil society. Besides these, there were external actors, such as the Soviet Union and the USA, the two great world powers in the bipolar world scenario of the Cold War, the friendly neighboring states, such as Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and the opponents, such as the *Apartheid* regime of South Africa, Malawi, and Kenya, which exerted pressure on the Chissano Government in the regional scenario. The Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), and the Western European States, which became the largest donors of foreign development assistance, were also important actors at the political and economic levels. These states and international organizations had distinct interests, ending up influencing the destinies of the Mozambican conflict and the Chissano Government.

Theoretical movements

In order to understand the domestic and international political-economic situation during the Chissano Government, Putnam's (2010) two-level game logic was used. This author has shown that domestic politics and international politics are inextricably linked and that the theories that existed until then did not take this link into consideration, particularly those that placed the state at the center and as the main actor of foreign policy. In his view, in order to obtain an international agreement, the heads of state and government reconcile the interests of domestic politics with those of international politics, which the author calls a "two-level game", a metaphor to explain the interactions between the domestic and international dimensions. Putnam (2010) emphasized the role of preferences, alliances, institutions, domestic practices, negotiators' strategies and tactics, uncertainties, domestic repercussions of external pressures, as well as the chief negotiator's particular interests.

As a rule, each negotiator believes that his interests are the interests of the state and that everything he or she does is for the good of the nation. Good agreements are those that successfully combine domestic and international pressures. Partial analyses, purely domestic or purely international, do not account for the reality of states. Only general equilibrium and medium-range theories that combine the interaction of domestic and international factors – the two-level game – are capable of understanding the reality experienced by States (Putnam 2010).

The political struggle in international negotiations can be understood as a two-level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their goals by pressuring the government to adopt policies favorable to their interests – inputs. At the same time, at the international level, governments seek to maximize their own abilities to satisfy domestic pressures – outputs and minimize the adverse consequences of external constraints. Neither of the two levels can be ignored by decision-makers because their countries remain simultaneously interdependent and sovereign. Each national political leader plays on both boards: the international (level 1) and the domestic (level 2). On the domestic board and behind the leader are political parties, parliamentarians, representatives of national interest and pressure groups, and political advisors of the leader himself. On the external board, meanwhile, are foreign counterparts, diplomats, and other international advisors (Putnam 2010).

From this perspective, one should not separate domestic affairs from international affairs. More important than thinking about the dichotomy or knowing whether it is the domestic level that influences the international level or vice versa, is to understand when one sphere influences the other and what are the impacts. It is necessary to analyze the process and the specific case. Even so, Putnam (2010) underscores the domestic level, which is formed by pressure groups with different interests and perceptions, which tend to pressure the government through various actions. Sometimes the demands and interests of pressure groups – inputs – may coincide with those of the government/chief negotiator at the international level and at other times they may have opinions contrary to those defended by the chief negotiator. Hence the importance of understanding which actors are involved and their interests.

Thus, it can be stated that the domestic level has its importance since the signed international agreements need to be accepted and ratified in the domestic sphere by interest or pressure groups. For, it is the domestic level that provides support and employment to the rulers and negotiators. The more successful it is at the domestic level, the more chances the negotiator/government will have of reaching a good deal at the international level and a set of wins – winsets (Putnam 2010). The agreements and decisions signed at the international level reverberate at the domestic level and vice versa. Hence, each negotiator must seek a balance between the two levels, as well as understand which are the actors involved and their interests.

The proposal of the two-level game by Putnam (2010) is supported by Figueira (2011) in her intermestic perspective. The author argues that decision-making processes in foreign policy take into account actors,

institutions, preferences, leadership characteristics, and decisions on international matters. As a public policy, foreign policy is characterized by an interactive dynamic between the domestic and international environments of a given country. It would be the result of the interactive dynamics between the domestic and international environments – intermestic level – and seeks to understand the decision-making processes and the way through which those decisions are made (Figueira 2011).

Adopting the two above-mentioned perspectives, the present situation analysis understood the political-economic performance of the Chissano Government from the interaction between the domestic and international levels. External factors such as regional security, strategic alliances with allied states such as Tanzania, Zambia, and the USSR, economic interdependence with South Africa, and the influence of international financial organizations were fundamental to understanding the international performance of the Chissano Government. On the other hand, the political and government system, the civil war, individual and collective freedoms, national, state and regime security, structural adjustment policies, the personality of the leaders, the decision-making processes, general elections, political-party disputes, and pressure from civil society circumscribe internal factors that influenced government action.

Chissano and the national, regional, and international conjuncture

Less than a month after Samora's death in 1986, Chissano was appointed president of Mozambique by FRELIMO in a direct succession within the party-state. Until then, Chissano held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Samora's government and was not one of the most prominent figures in the state, being one of the most discreet. The Mbuzini airplane crash that killed Samora's presidential delegation was an unforeseen event that changed Mozambique's destiny. After independence in 1975, Mozambique was the target of aerial bombings by Ian Smith's Rhodesia and, later on, of land and air attacks by *Apartheid* South Africa, as well as the civil-military war developed by RENAMO. These conflicts developed in the context of proxy wars between capitalist and socialist regimes in Southern Africa and reflected the international and regional geopolitics of the Cold War between the USA and the USSR. Southern Africa was the last region to be conquered and susceptible to the influence of the two world powers.

Apartheid South Africa had an interest in Samora's physical disappearance or in the elimination of his regime. Likewise, Western governments such as the Carter and Reagan administrations in the USA and Great Britain under Margaret Thatcher had interests in a structural change in Mozambique, whether in the removal of the Samora Government, in the weakening of his regime, or even in the abandonment of the socialist model. These governments economically supported the South African *Apartheid* regime, the regional hegemon, which in its turn supported RENAMO. The USSR was also interested in maintaining a socialist regime in Mozambique, as long as it was faithful to the Soviet model. From 1983 onwards, Samora began to distance himself from Soviet socialism and suggested a profound reform by starting negotiations for Mozambique's accession to the BWIs, and in 1984 he visited the Western European States, such as Mário Soares' Portugal, Thatcher's Great Britain, the headquarters of the European Community in Brussels, as well as Reagan's USA. Machel's approach to the West made the Soviets furious, and they were certainly interested in placing in Mozambique a leader loyal to their development model.

Chissano's appointment to the Presidency of Mozambique was unforeseen, as were the drastic political-economic reforms he implemented. Chissano's continuation in power and the political-economic reforms promoted by his government can be considered a black swan, according to the perspective of Ayerbe (2016), due to the improbability and the fact that this event is beyond the calculation of possibilities and impacts of his nomination for the future of Mozambique. Despite the constant threats from *Apartheid* South Africa and RENAMO to the security of the Mozambican state and the FRELIMO regime, through aerial bombing, land attacks, and civil war, no one anticipated or considered the possibility of Samora's death and a successor. Mozambique was a popular socialist republic, governed by a one-party regime, with a presidential system and without a prime minister. Samora was charismatic and the Constitution of Mozambique said nothing about the succession of the president.

Machel's death generated the phenomenon that Ayerbe (2016) calls a critical conjuncture, which provided a relaxation in the structure, operated as a gap that facilitated other positions with clear interests, whether of crisis, disorder, or opportunity, as well as a transition to a new order or stability. Forcing regime change in socialist countries was a part of the US foreign policy strategy to combat communism in Latin America, Asia, and Africa between the 1960s and 1990s. The US achieved success in this strategy from the 1980s onwards, with the ebb of armed struggles, the beginning of demo-

cratization processes, and the gradual replacement of nationalist economic policies by economic liberalization agendas (Ayerbe 2016).

Machel's death and Chissano's nomination to the position of president provided an opportunity to change the political-economic paradigm in Mozambique and the opening for talks with RENAMO to end the civil war. The accession of the Mozambican state to the BWIs in 1984, the adoption of IMF/WB structural reforms in 1987, the abandonment of the socialist model of development in 1990 in the country and in other states in the region, and the Rome Peace Agreement with RENAMO in 1992, which put an end to the civil war in Mozambique, pointed to a victory for the Western capitalist model against communism in Southern Africa. Even so, the Western capitalist bloc had lost its main ally, the South African *Apartheid* regime.

It is worth highlighting an important event in the national conjuncture during the Chissano Government: the trial of the coup attempt, in June 1991. In the previous year, around 24 Mozambican citizens had been accused of attempting a *coup d'état* against President Joaquim Chissano. Out of the 24 citizens, 21 were arrested and 15 went on trial in the Supreme Court, accused of attempted *coup d'état* against President Joaquim Chissano. Among the accused were military personnel, historical veterans of the liberation struggle against Portuguese colonization, and high-ranking figures in the Samora Government, such as the former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, generals, lieutenants, brigadiers, and family members of Samora Machel himself, tried for crimes against state security (A Semana 1991; Moçambique 1992).

The plot had been discovered by the National People's Security Service (SNASP), the secret services, and among those accused were the former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Colonel General Sebastião Mabote, the Minister of the Interior, Colonel Manuel António, General José Moiane, and about 8 other army officers, including Major Belo Amaral Felipe, head of anti-aircraft defense; Major Fernando Manhiça, military commander of the Moamba district; Major Alberto Mucavel, commander of the 6th tank brigade; Major José Mutame, commander of the Manhiça Military Training Center; Captain Albano Bila, political commissioner of the Moamba district; Sergeant Malaque Machel, an instructor at the Manhiça Center; Major Osório Pelembe, an official at the Ministry of Defence; and Afonso Nuvunga, head of the artillery battalion. There were also 4 civilians: the businessman Boaventura Machel; the electrician Orlando Machel; Estevão Manhiça, a server at the Presidential Palace; and the telephone operator Beatriz Manuel. Among the civilians, 3 were brothers of the late President Samora Machel, and 5 people had been released for lack of evidence: 4 military personnel

and 1 cook (A Semana 1991; Moçambique 1992). This remarkable event of the internal situation of the Chissano Government has not been addressed or has been ignored in studies about the contemporary history of Mozambique. The alleged coup attempt can be included in the scenario of systemic political-economic changes that occurred in Mozambique, in which part of the political-economic and military elite lost its power and prestige. The coup could be an attempt to regain their place in society.

In 1990, the US had managed to impose in Southern Africa a political order favorable to its ideology and interests, as all states in the region had become free market economies and had operated changes in their Constitutions to adhere to liberal democratic systems, as was the case in Mozambique. The transformations in Southern Africa were directly related to the crisis of the socialist bloc and the fall of the Berlin Wall, which left the governments of Mozambique and Angola orphaned. At the same time, the existence of the *Apartheid* regime and its bellicose discourse as a buffer state against the advance of communism in the region ceased to make sense. This situation contributed to the ceasefire agreements in the civil wars in Mozambique and Angola.

In the same period, there were profound political-economic changes in the international and regional scenarios with the collapse of the Soviet socialist bloc, the Washington Consensus, the end of the Cold War, and the dismantling of the *Apartheid* system in neighboring South Africa. Then, gradually, Mozambique normalized diplomatic relations with South Africa, Malawi, Kenya, Indonesia, Morocco, and Israel. With Chissano, Mozambique became one of the largest recipients of international development aid in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to those mentioned above, other internal and external factors have also influenced the posture of the Chissano Government and its foreign policy.

The 1st Chissano Government (1986-1994)

Chissano became President of the People's Republic of Mozambique on November 6th, 1986, succeeding Samora Machel, in a direct transition within FRELIMO. Chissano became president in the midst of the worst crisis in Mozambique's history: the death of Machel. The country was torn apart by the fratricidal war with RENAMO, its social and economic infrastructure was completely destroyed and there wasn't any support from the socialist world,

which was experiencing an unprecedented crisis. Upon coming to power, Chissano appointed new ministers, either comrades from the independence struggle or young technocrats who identified with FRELIMO. Important ministries were occupied by comrades of the armed struggle and FRELIMO members with whom he maintained friendly and close relationships (Chissano 2011).

According to Tollenaere (2006), Machel's sudden death brought Chissano to power, and even though he was less charismatic, he was more diplomatic and pragmatic. Upon succeeding Samora, Chissano led the transition from war to peace, the country's opening to foreign investment, and the incorporation of RENAMO into national political life. In Brito's (2016) perspective, the Chissano Government gave in to pressures within FRELIMO itself to abandon the socialist programs of "creating the new man" and "killing the tribe to give birth to the nation", in order to adopt another conception based on the recognition of diversity – particularly the cultural and linguistic diversity – of the Mozambican people. However, in the political sphere, the recognition of this diversity never took effect. Under pressure, Chissano developed a policy of co-opting and promoting cadres from the Center and North provinces, as demanded by the combatants (Brito 2016). In terms of diplomacy, there was a gradual replacement of Marxist thinkers by new capitalist cadres. Gradually, the ambassadors and representatives of Mozambique abroad who had been appointed during the Samora Government were recalled to Maputo and replaced by others trusted by Chissano (Ferrão 2007; Ndelana 2016).

Over time, FRELIMO's historical-ideological wing was confined to the party's Central Committee (CC), being gradually removed from the political life of the country and the government. In this scenario, some historical FRELIMO members were still handed positions in development programs and projects in provinces far from the capital, while others took control of privatized state companies, transforming themselves into "successful entrepreneurs". The change of the political-economic system from socialism to capitalism, as well as from one-party to multi-party, represented an important leap towards the inclusion and participation of social segments previously excluded from economic and political life, such as businessmen, opposition political parties, and civil society. However, at the same time, it was a traumatic process for part of FRELIMO's political elite, which had been in power since the country's independence and lost its political leading role and social prestige. Some survived by reinventing themselves economically as "successful entrepreneurs", as well as in the banking sector, while others opened law firms, or simply disappeared from the political scene.

The Chissano Government was characterized by the political-economic opening of Mozambique. There was greater participation of civil society organizations in the political and social life of the country, with emphasis on the Catholic and Protestant churches, which exerted pressure for the end of the armed conflict and were directly involved in the negotiations for peace agreements. At the same time, there was an expansion of individual and collective rights, and relaxation of external tensions with the Western world through the approval of the new Constitution in 1991, which provided for freedom of individual and collective association, creation of associations, political parties, non-governmental organizations of different kinds, etc.

From the second half of the 1980s, the Washington Consensus became hegemonic. In Africa, the lost decade was characterized by negative growth, aggravation of conflicts, and the crisis of socialist regimes. The structural adjustment policies of the BWIs were implemented, and access to credit and international aid was decided according to the willingness and capacity of African countries to implement the IMF/WB reforms. The broadening of the notion of human rights, the demand for democracy, and the protection of private property were *sine qua non* conditions for the efficiency of Western economic reform programs. Mozambique did not escape these demands and accepted them in exchange for economic and financial help. In this way, it was one of the most praised African States by BWI donors and officials for its determination to implement political-economic reforms (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996).

The period from 1987 to 2000 was marked by structural adjustment and the implementation of BWI policies in Mozambique. While the nationalization of enterprises and of important sectors of the economy had been a priority of the Samora Government for the transformation of Mozambique into a socialist economy, during the Chissano Government the opposite happened. The privatization of almost all economic sectors and of small and large enterprises became a priority for the transformation into a competitive capitalist economy. The small and medium companies were transferred to national entrepreneurs while the large companies went into the hands of foreigners.

In 1988, Pope John Paul II, an anti-communist, visited Mozambique and held a mass open to the public in the country's largest stadium, which was understood as a sign of openness by the Maputo regime, given that after independence the state had declared itself as a Marxist-Leninist. In addition to opening new diplomatic missions in the United Kingdom, Sweden, West Germany, and Kenya, the Mozambican state established new alliances and

signed a series of regional agreements and international treaties, such as joining the Commonwealth, the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP), etc. The new diplomatic strategy brought credibility to Mozambique in international society, which led to it being removed from the USA's "black list" (Siteo, Kassotche, and Pereira 2005). Chissano sought new economic partners and new political alliances and took pragmatic political-economic decisions. He established diplomatic relations with previously unlikely states.

The 1992 General Peace Agreement

The General Peace Accords (GPA) between the Mozambican State and RENAMO was signed in Rome on October 4th, 1992, putting an end to almost 17 years of civil war in the country. The GPA was mediated by the Community of Sant'Egidio, a religious organization of the Catholic Church with extensive experience in conflict mediation around the world. Early mediation efforts began in 1984 with the first dialogues between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO, through the Catholic and Anglican Churches that constituted the Christian Council of Mozambique. However, it was only in 1988 that there was a favorable signal from the Government of Mozambique for the negotiations to advance. The Italians were considered the most impartial mediators since the delegations from various countries involved, such as Portugal, the USA, Germany, Kenya, Malawi, Botswana, and Zimbabwe were considered either pro-RENAMO or pro-FRELIMO (Lalá 2002). The Community of Sant'Egidio developed a parallel diplomacy to that led by the USA and Western European States, as a religious non-governmental organization specializing in conflict resolution (Soriano 2015).

The Mozambican state was represented by President Joaquim Chissano and RENAMO was represented by Afonso Dhlakama, both leaders of the belligerent parties. The GPA was attended by representatives of neighboring states that had interests and direct or indirect participation in the Mozambican conflict, who served as witnesses. It was presided over by the Italian Government and its Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by high-ranking figures from Mozambique's neighboring states: the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, Roelof Botha; the presidents of Zimbabwe and Botswana, Robert Mugabe and Ketumile "Keith" Masire; the Vice-President of Kenya, George Saitoti; the Minister of the Presidency of Malawi, John Tembo; the Deputy Secretary General of the OAU, Ahmed Haggag. The mediators were: Mario Raffaelli, representative of the Italian Government and coordinator of the mediators; Dom Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of the Catholic Church

in Beira, the second largest city in Mozambique and RENAMO's zone of influence; Professor Andrea Riccardi and Bishop Matteo Zuppi, both from the Community of Sant'Egidio. Also, there were representatives of international observers: James Conah, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Ambassador Herman Cohen, Under-Secretary of State for the US Government; Ambassador Philippe Cuvillier, representative of the Government of France; José Manuel Durão Barroso, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Portugal; and Patrick Fairweather, representing the United Kingdom Government (Awepaa 1992). The GPA consisted of seven protocols dealing with the fundamental principles of the Agreement: the formation and recognition of political parties; electoral law; military issues; guarantees; ceasefire; and donor conference.

In this geopolitical frame, the communities of Sant'Egidio and Italy were accepted by both FRELIMO and RENAMO due to their neutrality and history of interventions for peace in the world order since the 1970s. Created in 1968, the Community of Sant'Egidio, an association of lay religious members, has become an international mediator and expert in conflict resolution (Soriano 2015). Before the Rome talks, there were different secret negotiations about the Mozambican conflict that took place in Portugal, Germany, France, and the USA, all without success. RENAMO had advisors and think tanks from the USA and Great Britain on its side, who often made more credible peace proposals than those of the FRELIMO party-state³. For both FRELIMO and RENAMO, the priests of the Community of Sant'Egidio were the perfect mediators because of their track record in conflict mediation and impartiality, since they did not represent either side.

The two-level game at the GPA

A The two-level game described by Putnam (2010) was eventful in the GPA negotiations between the Mozambican state and RENAMO. At the domestic level, President Chissano had to negotiate with the ideological and historical wing of FRELIMO, which refused to recognize RENAMO as an opposition movement, while at the same time balancing himself in the face of demands from RENAMO itself and pressures from Mozambican society

³ Between 1976 and 1988, Renamo received economic support from North American and British conservative groups and lobbyists, linked to the US Republican Party in the Carter and Reagan administrations, as well as to Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Party. In addition to these, there were the think tanks that produced research, analysis, and reports such as Chatham House, and Human Rights Watch. Some of the think tanks helped the belligerent parties – Frelimo and Renamo – with their expertise and produced partial analyses, pending on one side or the other.

to put an end to the war. At the international level, Chissano had to deal with pressures from external mediators: from neighboring Southern African states such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, from Western European States and the USA, the main donors of international aid, and from the priests of the Community of Sant'Egidio.

In the GPA both belligerents, FRELIMO and RENAMO, had to adjust their political positions and advantages. At the domestic level, Chissano managed to “pacify” RENAMO and to maintain a political and government system favorable to FRELIMO, which made it possible to win the first multi-party elections as well as the subsequent ones, in a zero-sum game in which whoever wins the presidential and legislative elections gets everything and governs alone, without any kind of opposition. At the international level, the Chissano Government was able to bargain for international aid and for the total waiving of Mozambique’s foreign debt with its main Western donors during the Paris Club negotiations between 1997 and 2000. RENAMO also benefited from the Accords: its guerrillas were pardoned for crimes committed during the armed conflict, it achieved national and international recognition as an opposition movement to the Mozambican state, it forced FRELIMO to abandon socialism and the one-party regime, to sit at the negotiating table to discuss peace, to adhere to the democratic system and to the liberal economy, as well as to hold multi-party elections. For having forced FRELIMO to open up to a multi-party system and a democratic regime, RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama called himself the “father of democracy” in Mozambique. In light of the GPA, RENAMO’s ruling elite moved to the capital city, having received houses and a permanent party fund from the Mozambican state.

However, even with the GPA and the multi-party elections, the wounds of the war never healed, and the political mistrust between FRELIMO and RENAMO persisted. Contrary to the successful experiences in post-Apartheid South Africa, Mozambique did not create a national truth and reconciliation commission as an alternative for reflection on the civil war, acknowledgment of committed atrocities or requests for pardon, nor conciliation among Mozambicans.

Internally, the GPA was seen as a diplomatic victory for Chissano, who knew how to balance between the radical wing of FRELIMO, the demands of the RENAMO guerrillas and pressure from the international community. During the Chissano Government, Mozambique achieved high rates of economic growth, around 7% per year, something that was used by the ruling elite as a flag to obtain external support from the international community,

arguing that the positive performance in international cooperation contributed to peace (Lalá 2002).

The GPA allowed for the emergence of new political-economic agendas in Mozambique, such as democratization, demilitarization of the country, and the concentration of efforts on poverty reduction, and economic and social development. After the GPA and the first multi-party elections, there was disinvestment in the armed forces and in the defense of the Mozambican territory. The liberal peace model was better matched to economic growth and democratization. The external agendas imposed on the Government had as priorities the reconstruction of the country, the fight against poverty, investment in infrastructure, agriculture, education, healthcare, the strengthening of democratic institutions, etc. The Chissano Government was pressured by the international community with the idea that peace was only possible if the country had weak armed forces. There was pressure to dismantle the armed forces and the government was unable to counteract the pressures from international development aid donors. Thus, there was a reduction in the military capabilities of the Mozambican state that, three decades later, the country would resent in the face of new threats: control of land and maritime borders, international trafficking, smuggling, and terrorism.

The GPA was a victory for the “Sant’Egidio method” and the “Italian formula” and its peacemaking, a way of peace negotiations based on goodwill and mutual trust, instituted by the priests and teachers of the Community of Sant’Egidio. After years of failed negotiations that involved European and North American diplomats in secret meetings inside and outside the country – in African and European capitals such as Nairobi, Blantyre, Harare, Lisbon, Berlin, and London – the diplomacy of the Italian priests proved to be effective in order to reach a peace agreement in Mozambique.

The 2nd Chissano Government (1994-2004)

In his second presidential term, following the first multi-party general elections in Mozambique in 1994, Chissano surrounded himself with young technocrats from the state, who had university degrees and had assimilated the IMF/WB booklet. The criterion for choosing ministers and high-ranking authorities continued to be that of trust, either at a personal or party-political level, as his autobiography points out (Chissano 2011). The technocrats in the Chissano Government were members of the FRELIMO party, but not necessarily ideological militants. Some were sympathizers who identified with the revolutionary era, but who did not make a living from politics; they were civil servants, university professors, NGO collaborators, and private-sector

businessmen who were invited to take part in the government. Part of the technocrats were chosen because they stood out in some way, had innovative ideas, or were liberal and pragmatic.

According to Plank (1993), FRELIMO's abandonment of its socialist principles and adherence to the IMF/WB developmental approach was accompanied by a dramatic erosion of domestic authority, as donors, foreign consultants, and NGOs took responsibilities previously reserved for the state. In the author's view, Mozambican leaders were forced to withdraw in the face of external agencies' ever-increasing influence in domestic policy choices, in order to maintain the flow of aid and avoid economic collapse.

The deterioration of the state was not in question. Mozambique's extreme dependence on foreign aid posed a dilemma not only for those in power but also for donors. The Mozambican state's partial relinquishment of control over its economic and social policies implied potentially uncomfortable new responsibilities for the major aid agencies (Plank 1993).

At some moments there were clear ideological clashes between the historically convinced Marxists of FRELIMO and the young neoliberal technocrats. Examples of these clashes occurred in the discussion of the Land Law, in which the young technocrats argued for the flexibility of access or even the sale of land, particularly to large foreign investors and multinational companies, while the ideological radical wing defended that the land should remain the inalienable property of the state, which should only grant the right to use and benefit from the land (DUAT) to citizens, companies, and investors, as it had been doing since independence.

There were other clashes of ideas between the two wings regarding the liberalization of economic sectors not yet privatized, such as civil aviation, ports and railways, telecommunications, and postal services, which continued to be monopolized by the state. The collision course between the "liberators of the homeland" and the "technocrats" became clear. In the view of the liberators, the youngest was not to be trusted, as they could sell the country to foreigners in a short time. Such criticism catapulted the candidacy of Armando Guebuza, a historic, hard-liner and liberator of the homeland. With the ascension of Guebuza to the post of FRELIMO's Secretary General in 2003, and until the end of the Chissano Government's term in 2005, a catharsis within the political party began, with strong criticism and pressure on the Chissano administration, accused of "corruption", "bureaucratism" and "letting go".

Mozambique changed its economic system and the Constitution by adhering to multipartyism, but there were no significant political changes.

The political elite remained in power, transforming itself into a political-economic elite. The former socialist “comrades” became the “new bosses” in capitalism by taking over the former public companies through privatization. The wave of privatizations without entrepreneurs transformed former leader-comrades of FRELIMO into new bosses. A Mozambican middle class was born, resulting from the privatization of state-owned companies and banks, whose economic capital came from economic-financial scandals and the appropriation of goods and services from the former socialist state. The attempt to create a Mozambican business class failed. In its place emerged a bourgeoisie that had no savings, whose capital came from the looting and plundering of now privatized public companies. Mozambique became a “country that produces rich people instead of producing wealth”, to cite a famous phrase by writer Mia Couto.

In addition to corruption in every sector, there was excessive inflation and wages remained low. As a result of the situation, civil servants stole their own work materials and inputs in order to resell them in the parallel market. Others used state resources – such as machines, automobiles, tractors, tools, etc. – in personal businesses. The structural adjustment policies and the peace agreement brought prosperity to a minority – the leaders, politicians, and deputies – who paraded around the city in sumptuous houses, cars, and restaurants. Thus, a small class of nouveau riches was created (Hanlon 1997).

The Chissano Government was also marked by countless strikes in the productive sector, by private semi-collective transporters known as “chapa-100” and by bakers, due to high fuel prices. Workers from various sectors and companies organized themselves into unions to defend their rights, disassociating themselves from the FRELIMO party. In this way, divorce was sealed between, on one side, the party of the comrades, and on the other side the workers and mass organizations, with emphasis on the mutation of the Mozambican Workers Organization (OTM), formerly a political mobilization arm of FRELIMO, which became a trade union central, renamed OTM-CS. It was in the Chissano Government that the “bread revolts”, which take place annually, began, in which the population, workers, chapa-100, bakers, etc., went on strike due to the high cost of living experienced in Mozambique.

These pressure groups, and even the Catholic Church, had interests distinct from those negotiated by the Chissano Government with the BWIs which resulted in fiscal austerity policies. The international agreements signed with the IMF/WB and the structural adjustment policies that seemed to be beneficial for the Mozambican economy reverberated negatively in the

domestic sphere, being the target of fierce opposition from national interest groups.

The bankruptcy of banks – Commercial Bank of Mozambique, *Banco Austral* – and of small and large privatized companies managed by party members, as well as assassinations of journalists and tax auditors who were investigating financial leaks, were another hallmark of Chissano's time⁴. Even so, after the end of his second term and having “voluntarily” relinquished power, Chissano was awarded the Mo Ibrahim Good Governance Award in 2007, which recognizes African leaders for excellence in political leadership and good governance. Chissano received the award in its first edition from the hands of former UN Secretary Kofi Annan, who recognized his contribution to creating a stable democracy and economic progress in Mozambique.

Little noticed when compared to regime changes in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa, Mozambique's transition from socialism to Western democracy was turbulent, but without having experienced government collapse. Meanwhile, the privatization program of the Mozambican state led by Chissano was considered the most successful in Africa. The peaceful conclusion of the first two general elections suggested that the chances of democratic consolidation were as good as privatization and better than in the rest of the African countries (Pitcher 2002). The author considers that although privatizations had altered state institutions, the process and result of these did not eliminate state power, only redirected it. The government abandoned the direct state management of companies and factories, opting instead for dependence on the private sector, foreign investment, and bank loans. Mozambique has served as a model idealized by neoliberal prescriptions, to be followed by others.

The state puritanism of the Samora Government was not continued in the Chissano Government, it was replaced by state neopatrimonialism. The Chissano Government was associated with the apex of corruption in Mozambique and the illicit enrichment of the business elite. Corruption was endemic in all sectors and recognized by international organizations in various reports. The economic-financial aid injected by the IMF/WB for privatized small and medium Mozambican companies was never reimbursed. The financing ended up in the hands of companies managed by individuals from the ruling party. The national businessmen went to the banks and

4 I am referring to the murder of Carlos Cardoso, investigative journalist and editor of *Jornal por fax Metical*, and of António Siba-Siba Macuácuá, an economist and tax auditor of the Bank of Mozambique, the Central Bank, who was investigating financial fraud in the management of *Banco Austral*; both assassinations occurred in the year 2001.

asked for loans and, as a guarantee, presented the membership card of the party in power.

At the end of his mandate, the Chissano Government became famous for unpopular decisions by strictly following the economic and financial recipes of Bretton Woods, whose consequences were successful for the economy, but terrible for the Mozambican social fabric. The structural adjustment and privatizations were considered successful by the international community, but internally they resulted in the bankruptcy of industries, commerce, and national companies, in mass layoffs due to the resizing of companies, low salaries, increases in the cost of living, and fiscal austerity.

Foreign policy

Mozambique's foreign policy – considered radical during the Samora Government – turned softer under Chissano. The country began to play a key role in important issues and as a mediator between Western countries and Southern African states. Relations with the USA improved significantly and the state adapted to the demands of the BWIs. During the VI Congress in 1991, FRELIMO abandoned its role as a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, and a proposal for a new Constitution was voted on. The Government initiated a transition from a centrally-planned economy to a more liberal market economy (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994).

With a more decentralized state and diffused power among ministers and ministries, the Chissano Government experienced the last years of the Cold War, characterized by the forced distancing of the USSR due to the situation of crisis in Soviet socialism and by the easing of tensions with the Western world, which came to be seen as a partner for Mozambique's development. After a decade of cooperation with the USSR, it became clear that Moscow had not sent enough economic and financial aid, heavy weaponry, military officers, and technicians, nor had trained enough troops to guarantee the defense of Mozambican territory in the face of attacks by the *Apartheid* regime, when compared with Soviet support given to the Angolan State. Allied to this fact, in the early 1980s, Moscow had vetoed Mozambique's entry into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), something that made it impossible for the Mozambican state to access financial resources from this socialist organization⁵.

⁵ COMECON was an organization created in 1949 that integrated states of Eastern Europe. Later it was enlarged, allowing the adhesion of Socialist Bloc countries from other continents, such as Latin America, Asia, and Africa. It was a Soviet response to the creation of the Marshall Plan, aimed at economically supporting the countries of the Socialist Bloc.

Cabrita (2013) argued that although the Mozambican state had defined itself as a Marxist-Leninist country in 1977, expecting in return the attribution of the same status that Cuba enjoyed at the level of COMECON, the USSR rejected this claim with the argument that Mozambique was not a socialist country, but only a socialist-oriented country. Long before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the economic reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev, the USSR leader had recommended that countries like Mozambique should diversify their international economic relations since the Soviet economy had reached the point of exhaustion and could no longer support the kind of relations that it had been maintaining with Third World countries, nor serve as a model for them. Even before Gorbachev came to power in April 1985, the USSR was already showing signs of economic fragility by vetoing the accession of Mozambique and other countries to the financial and economic institutions of the Soviet Bloc (Veloso 2007; Cabrita 2013).

From Gorbachev's (1988) point of view, African nations had the legal right to freely choose their development paths. Thus, the Soviet leader condemned attempts to intervene in internal African affairs and stated that the USSR no longer had interests in Southern Africa. In his opinion, all nations had the right to choose their own path to development, to dispose of their own destiny, their territory, and their human and natural resources (Gorbachev 1988).

In this context, Chissano's foreign policy was characterized by Mozambique's economic opening to international trade and the implementation of IMF/WB policies. With Chissano, cooperation with Western world institutions became effective. The foreign policy agenda became driven from the outside in, dictated by international aid donors, and based on liberal economic development. Mozambique projected itself internationally as an example of pacification and alignment with the Western world, being considered the "pretty IMF boy" in Southern Africa, for having strictly adopted the guidelines of the BWIs and of its main international donors.

With regard to Mozambique's external engagement, Siteo, Kassotche, and Pereira (2005) point out that the country has become largely dependent on external resources for its development and that much of the aid and external debt relief provided were linked to particular conditions. On the other hand, Mozambicans felt concerned about the government's sovereignty and capacity to define its own priorities and design its own development programs. In the perspective of these authors, Mozambique adjusted its internal and external policy according to the objective circumstances of the world and taking into account the pressures imposed by international actors. In this

way, Mozambican diplomacy successfully adjusted to the new circumstances. This redefinition of policy and strategy led FRELIMO to identify a new vision of its relationship with citizens, committing itself to the principles of human rights and democratization.

Macamo (2003) states that the country was the target of external intervention, economic-financial disciplining, and of the totalitarian violence of structural adjustment. Thus, Mozambique ceased to be a subject, an actor, a society, a political system, and an economy with its own agendas to become an object of IMF/WB intervention. It was through the structural adjustment programs that Mozambique normalized itself, that is, it voluntarily submitted to the powers of the BWIs without being aware of this process (Macamo 2003).

In his analysis of the post-war reconstruction process, Hanlon (1997) pointed out that IMF/WB blocked all reconstruction efforts in the country and Mozambicans did not benefit from peace. The IMF/WB formula determined that investing too many resources in post-war reconstruction would generate inflation. Thus, it was first necessary to contain inflation and impose limits on state spending, causing reconstruction projects – such as the reopening of roads, bridges, stores, schools, and health posts – to be delayed or postponed. Banks had strict orders from the IMF to restrict access to credit and only lend money to large companies and established merchants. Agriculture was considered a high-risk activity, without agricultural credit.

Several scholars have pointed out that the collapse of the socialist project and its replacement by a free market economy was the predictable result of the West's persistent and conscious efforts to undermine Frelimo's revolutionary agenda and subject the country once again to the demands of global capitalism (Pitcher 2002). Thus, issues such as fiscal conservatism, economic development, combating poverty, and regional integration in Southern Africa became the main items on the political-economic agenda of the Chissano Government. The Government was more concerned with its international image, as well as with pleasing the IMF/WB and Western partners in exchange for external economic aid than with responding to the inputs, the domestic demands, and the demands of Mozambican civil society. The privatization of important industrial sectors, the faithful adoption of the neoliberal booklet, and the economic and cooperation relations with unlikely partners, such as Indonesia, Israel, and Morocco, made clear that there was a change in Mozambican foreign policy from the ideological field to economic pragmatism, with emphasis on the developmental and poverty reduction discourse.

Conclusion

The article analyzed the political-economic situation in Mozambique during the Chissano Government, highlighting events, the national and international actors involved, as well as their interests. Joaquim Chissano was the longest-serving president in the history of Mozambique, totaling 18 years in power. He succeeded Samora Machel after his death, in a direct election within the FRELIMO party without the participation of the population or civil society. Chissano had political experience. He was president of Mozambique between 1986 and 1994, during the one-party period, and from 1995 to 2005, in the multi-party period. The political conjuncture of his government was marked by political-economic transitions and profound changes, the end of socialism, structural adjustment policies, adherence to a market economy, and a multi-party model imposed by the BWIs and the Western world in exchange for economic aid. There was a political opening, expansion of individual and collective rights, as well acceleration of negotiations with RENAMO. The end of the armed conflict and the peace agreement between the Mozambican state and Renamo was the defining event of the Chissano Government. The transformations in the international and regional system influenced Chissano's domestic and foreign policy, which distanced itself from the USSR, the only actor to leave the scene and not participate in the negotiations for the resolution of the Mozambican conflict.

The transition to capitalism, the 1990 Constitution, and the multi-party system represented a greater participation of businessmen, political parties, and civil society in Mozambican society, at the same time that part of the political elite that came from one-party socialism lost power and political prestige, hence the supposed *coup d'état* attempt in 1991. With Chissano, the Mozambican state presented more flexible ideological positions, relaxed tensions and began to dialogue with the Western world, and established diplomatic and cooperation relations that were previously unthinkable. There were paradigm shifts in Mozambique with the liberalization of the economy and the adoption of a multi-party regime. With the end of the civil war, the domestic and foreign policy agendas changed. Mozambique focused on reconstruction, development, fiscal conservatism, fighting poverty, investing significantly in agriculture, healthcare, and education, as well as regional integration. Mozambique's strong political positions in the region were weakened, while regional economic integration gained prominence, with Mozambique becoming South Africa's main partner in an asymmetrical interdependence relationship. The state took economic advantages from submission to the IMF/WB, while at the same time, it became more

dependent on international aid. Western states have become Mozambique's main trading partners and donors of development aid.

At the domestic level, the Chissano Government became associated with multipartyism and the introduction of economic liberalism, the expansion of individual and collective freedoms, but also the privatization of the main sectors of the economy, the capitalist and political rationality of *laissez-faire* and millions of unemployed citizens resulting from the structural adjustment programs. Chissano stood out for his diplomacy, and negotiation skills for peacekeeping. In international relations, he achieved prominence for convincing donors to support the state and for his political-economic pragmatism. However, the attempt to create a Mozambican middle class through the privatization of state companies, as well as the transformation of the governmental political elite into a national business class failed due to a lack of management experience and ended in economic-financial scandals and widespread corruption due to promiscuous relations between the party and the State.

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ABSTRACT

The article analyzes the political situation of Mozambique during the Chissano Government. It uses a two-level logic and the intermestic perspective as theoretical contributions and the methodology of situation analysis. Chissano governed Mozambique in the midst of domestic and foreign transitions: the passage from socialism to capitalism, changes in the Constitution, the peace agreement with RENAMO and the first multi-party elections. The international and regional conjuncture was marked by the Washington Consensus, the end of the Cold War and South African *Apartheid*. The distancing from the Soviet Bloc, the break with socialism, the introduction of economic liberalism, individual and collective freedoms, the easing of regional and Western tensions were hallmarks of Chissano's domestic and foreign policies. The *laissez-faire* policy and the attempt to create a Mozambican middle class led to financial scandals and widespread corruption. Chissano sought other ideologies, negotiated with unlikely partners, and adopted economic pragmatism. Surrounded by technocrats, he strictly followed the IMF/WB recipes, with unpopular decisions that led to social upheavals: structural adjustment, privatizations and millions of unemployed. The peace agreement and the total waiving of foreign debt were his great diplomatic achievements. At the end of his government, Mozambique had lost its regional political leading role, had subordinated to external agendas and was increasingly dependent on international aid.

KEYWORDS

Mozambique. Chissano Government. Situation Analysis. Internal and external politics.

Received on December 22, 2022

Accepted on March 20, 2023

Translated by Gabriela Gampe Bonness

EMERGING CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN MOZAMBIQUE: A CASE STUDY FROM CABO DELGADOS

Fátima Chimarizeni Papelo¹



Introduction

This paper aims to analyze the emerging challenges and opportunities derived from the humanitarian assistance actions applied in Cabo Delgado in the context of violent extremism that has been ravaging the province since 2017. This topic is relevant because the traditional concept of humanitarian assistance presupposes support for victims of a disaster caused by nature or man-made, and the province of Cabo Delgado presents a growing demand for humanitarian assistance due to the ongoing prolonged violent conflict. In Cabo Delgado, there are victims of a violent, unconventional, low-intensity conflict. More than 1 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, of which more than 50% are women and children (OCHA 2021). Along with terrorism, climate disasters, such as Cyclone Keneth in 2019, and the COVID-19 Pandemic, which began affecting Mozambique in 2020, are exacerbating the state of vulnerability of humanitarian victims. Combined, these events force non-state humanitarian actors to operate in an environment characterized by uncertainty, insecurity, and unpredictability. Nevertheless, these humanitarian actors may operate beyond what is defined by traditional humanitarian principles, which concern saving lives and alleviating the suffering of humanitarian victims, including developmental actions that may result in the reduction of state power in the humanitarian space and that lead to the implementation of political action by external forces. If prolonged, this scenario may accentuate the weakening of state power. Given this context, one wonders what challenges and opportunities are derived from the humanitarian support process in Cabo Delgado.

This paper seeks to reflect on the emerging challenges and opportunities arising from the humanitarian assistance process in Cabo Delgado. Specifically, it sought to a) define what humanitarian assistance is; b) analyze the emerging challenges for humanitarian actors in Cabo Delgado; and c) analyze the emerging opportunities for humanitarian actors within the process of humanitarian assistance in the region. We started from the hypothesis that the problem of the humanitarian assistance process in the context of violent extremism creates emerging challenges and opportunities for non-state humanitarian actors that are linked to human security, management, and coordination of humanitarian actions.

It is important to emphasize that this article does not close the debate on humanitarian assistance in Cabo Delgado, but it is a step forward in terms of developing a reflection on the problem and the probable solutions that can arise from the processes underway to create relief and well-being for populations affected by terrorism. This article, likewise, does not ignore the existence of development-related projects conducted by non-state actors but simply analyzes the activities of these actors in a context characterized by violent extremism.

Therefore, to answer the research question, a bibliographic review of the topic of humanitarian assistance was conducted. Based on the historical period covered, the evolution of humanitarian paradigms is presented and the phenomenon of terrorism in Cabo Delgado is historically described. The static data presented was sought in reports from humanitarian agencies. The reading of the humanitarian assistance theme is done in light of the neo-liberal theory. In this sense, the methodology used in this research is qualitative.

Humanitarian assistance

Humanitarian assistance is a practice resulting from a humanitarian emergency. A humanitarian emergency occurs when a disease, conflict, or natural disaster places thousands of people in a situation of vulnerability. This vulnerability is manifested by the inability of a given population to access the basic resources on which their survival depends. Humanitarian assistance, in this sense, arises to provide the minimum resources necessary to individuals affected by a humanitarian emergency, whether they are refugees, internally displaced persons, victims of epidemics or natural disasters.

According to Mena and Hilhorst (2022), humanitarian action must be employed flexibly in order to respond to the priority needs that result

from conflict or disaster and the humanitarian agencies have multiple tools and policies to facilitate it. Hendrickson (1998), considers that the principles guiding humanitarian action are linked to the International Red Cross Movement and consist of a combination of two elements: i) providing emergency assistance and ii) protecting without carrying external agendas, whether political or religious. This interpretation suggests that there are goals and values that characterize humanitarian intervention that translate into saving lives and reducing suffering. Additionally, the author considers that the traditional operational principles that guide humanitarian action consist of universalism, neutrality, and impartiality.

Influence of humanitarian actors in the redesign of the humanitarian paradigm

The agents responsible for providing humanitarian assistance can be state and/or non-state actors. Humanitarian assistance is provided on a voluntary basis. As a result, non-state actors, such as International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and United Nations Agencies (UNAs), are at the forefront, together with state institutions, in the provision of humanitarian assistance in regions where humanitarian emergencies occur. According to Gilberto Safarti:

Humanitarian assistance occurs in the context of interdependence between states. In this sense, the increase in dependence and interdependence creates a link in international communication, humanitarian aid and also in commercial arrangements. This is due to the growing relations between states culminating in increased trade dependence between countries to the same extent as the internationalization of economies, creating a symbiotic relationship of interests (Safarti 2005, 162, our translation)².

There is a consensus that the end of the Cold War marked an evolution in humanitarian actions, with greater interaction between state and non-state actors (UNAs, INGOs, and NGOs). This phenomenon resulted

2 In the original: “A assistência humanitária ocorre no contexto da interdependência entre os Estados. Nesse sentido, o aumento da dependência e interdependência cria uma ligação na comunicação internacional, na ajuda humanitária e também em arranjos comerciais. Isto deve-se ao incremento das relações entre os Estados que culmina com o aumento da dependência comercial entre os países ao passo da internacionalização das economias, criando uma relação simbiótica de interesses” (Safarti 2005, 162).

from the increase in new armed conflicts occurring at the domestic level in states, which demand a growing number of humanitarian assistance missions to attend to the victims of these conflicts (Nascimento 2014). So much so that traditional state principles such as sovereignty and non-interference have become diluted. Nevertheless, during the 1990s, a high level of criticism emerged around humanitarian assistance actions, according to which traditional humanitarian principles were not being respected in practice in humanitarian spaces. This criticism gained many supporters and was sustained by evidence linked to the conflicts in Somalia, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia that demonstrated failures that had an unsustainable impact on humanitarian actions, such as the lack of professionalism and efficiency, and the fact that they culminated in the increase of conflict due to the misuse and misallocation of resources.

Furthermore, security risks emerge in humanitarian spaces that in turn constrain the success of humanitarian aid. Some reports point out that humanitarian organizations in Somalia, Yemen, and Syria, in order to provide humanitarian assistance to populations in need, have ended up allocating money to armed groups. Al-Shabaab's Humanitarian Office in Somalia forced aid agencies working in its area of operation to pay "registration fees" of up to 10,000 USD (Darden 2019). Additionally, the flow of NGOs and foreign assistance into humanitarian spaces can provide cover for terrorist activities through the infiltration of terrorist groups into existing organizations or the creation of new organizations to camouflage terrorist financing under the facade of charitable actions (Darden 2019). These aspects raise the criticism around humanitarian assistance exposing the weaknesses of humanitarian agencies, a fact that contributes to the withdrawal of humanitarian aid in crisis regions.

Some authors suggest that due to insufficient resources or lack of interest in acting, certain states refrain from providing direct humanitarian assistance, which translates into humanitarian disengagement. Hendrickson (1998) states that in the post-Cold War context, the strategic rationale for aid has been associated with disengagement in regions of crisis by wealthy countries and the adoption of policies that seek to contain the crisis. One evidence of this strategy consists in the increase of humanitarian militarism, that is, the presence of military personnel in relief, peacebuilding, and development activities, which raises serious doubts about the fulfillment of traditional humanitarian values. Another piece of evidence is the increasing relevance of national and mostly international NGOs in humanitarian spaces (Ryfman 2007). In this sense, Hendrickson (1998) and Nascimento (2004) observe that non-governmental organizations and international humanitarian agen-

cies are the main organizations through which donor states channel their aid. The diagram below illustrates the paths followed by humanitarian aid from its origin to its final destination.

Figure 1: Humanitarian Assistance Channeling Scheme.



Source: elaborated by the author.

Consequently, some critics say that humanitarian agencies, through this new model of channeling humanitarian aid, are being co-opted to cover the absence of political action (protection of nationals by the state). And in some cases, humanitarian assistance action is conditioned to long-term political objectives that imply the provision of development assistance programs directly linked to the resolution of the conflict that led to the provision of humanitarian assistance. The convergence of aid and politics gives legitimacy to non-state actors.

According to Curtis (2001), Duffield believes that this convergence centralizes an emerging liberal system of governance. Contrary to certain assertions, globalization and the emergence of non-state actors and private associations illustrate a response by “metropolitan” states of a new way of governing through non-territorial public-private networks. The reunification of humanitarian and political aid is an example of the tendency of exercising the “metropolitan” authority (Curtis 2001). This tendency highlights the emergence of the new humanitarian paradigm on which humanitarian actions are based, as the table below demonstrates.

Table 1: Humanitarian Paradigms

	Classical Paradigm	New Paradigm
Appearance	19th Century	Post-World War II
Principles	Universalism, Neutrality, Impartiality, Independence	Traditional Humanitarian Principles are not respected
Guiding Legal Instrument	International Humanitarian Law, 1949's Geneva Convention	Human Rights Law
Goals	Short-term: saving lives and alleviating suffering	Long-term: Peacebuilding, Protection, Promotion of Human Rights and Development
Criticism	The precedence of legal instruments is questioned	The combination of humanitarian action with political action causes the absence of neutrality and autonomy in humanitarian action

Source: elaborated by the author, based on Nascimento (2004).

The new humanitarian paradigm emerged when traditional humanitarian principles began to be highly challenged and criticized for their short-term objectives. Called the “New Humanitarianism”, this humanitarian paradigm is characterized by long-term objectives such as peacebuilding, protection and promotion of human rights, and, in the last phase, development. This humanitarian paradigm, despite having faced several challenges including apparent but limited success, marked a change in the approach of humanitarian action, which started to include conflict resolution, development of institutions, and tools that could lead to violence reduction and conflict prevention, instead of focusing only on humanitarian assistance (Nascimento 2004). However, this new paradigm is also criticized because it combines humanitarian issues with political action, which places it far from being neutral, as it calls into question the autonomy of humanitarian actions and places it as a substitute or complement to democratic liberalism.

According to Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri (2005), the paradigm shift implied the adoption of an approach that advocates for the respect of human rights, in which the demand of the people for the respect of their rights and the identification of the provider of law – the state – that has the duty to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights of its citizens. This perspective has been positively received by humanitarian actors such as ActionAid and Care. According to Curtis (2001), humanitarian aid is becoming an integral component of a comprehensive donor strategy that aims to transform conflict,

reduce violence, and lay the foundations for liberal development. Examples of this strategy include the forced repatriation of refugees, the attempted conflict resolution linked to humanitarian aid, and the withdrawal of aid to achieve political objectives. This strategy highlights a combination of foreign and security policies in the donor countries of humanitarian aid.

Consequently, ethical issues emerge especially for donor states where the question is to what extent aid agencies and individuals can provide independent forms of humanitarian assistance activities or to what extent the new paradigm does not question the essence of humanitarianism and humanitarian assistance (Curtis 2001; Nascimento 2004). While many humanitarian agencies argue that humanitarian action cannot be politicized, that is, used to respond to political interests in line with the foreign policy of donor states, reality shows that humanitarian values have been challenged.

Challenges of humanitarian assistance in Cabo Delgado

The province of Cabo Delgado in the northern region of Mozambique has been affected by violent extremism since October 2017. Violent attacks perpetuated by Al Sunnah wa Jama'ah have made over 858 incidents, causing over 2,811 deaths and over 745,000 internally displaced persons (Chingotwane et al. 2021; OCHA 2022). Assumptions about the nature of the conflict indicate that there are both domestic and external motivations behind it. Ethnic marginalization among Makondes and Mwanis, differential treatment between local and foreign oil workers, the reduced presence of the Mozambican state, Islamic fundamentalism (international jihadism), proxy war funded by Mozambique's competitors in the gas market (Qatar, Saudi Arabia), the instability created by private military companies, and links to African organized crime syndicates for arms provision are some catalytic factors for the conflict (Mangena and Pherudi; Chingotwane et al. 2021).

The increasing radicalization of youth in northern Mozambique has been associated with the penetration of radical clerics from neighboring countries like Tanzania and Kenya, and individuals sent to study at madrassas in countries like Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. In this sense, madrassas and mosques became recruiting grounds for extremists in the region (Habibe et al. 2019). Extremists began to challenge local leaders and imposed traditional Islamic practices handed down by Kenyan extremist Aboud Rogo Mohammed (Chingotwane 2021). However, the government of Mozambique responded militarily to the conflict by sending its military to Cabo Delgado.

While foreign forces from SADC and Rwanda have, since 2021, participated directly in combating terrorism, the European Union and the U.S. have provided indirect support to the Mozambican government in combating it.

Since the year 2017, Cabo Delgado has been immersed in this unconventional conflict scenario that has already caused thousands of humanitarian victims. OCHA (2022) estimates that by August 2021 there were about 642,404 internally displaced persons in Cabo Delgado. Of this total, about 10,800 were elderly, 3,800 were unaccompanied children, and 3,400 were pregnant women and more than 800 people were disabled. About 27% were women and 52% were children. Essentially, 80% of the people were in host communities and the remainder were in humanitarian assistance centers. The COVID-19 pandemic and climate disasters have exacerbated the needs of humanitarian victims. Thus, the communities hosting humanitarian victims were concentrated in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, Palma, Quissanga, Nangade, Metuge, Montepuez, and Mueda. By the end of September 2021, 66 humanitarian organizations were providing humanitarian aid to these victims, of which 38 were international NGOs, 20 national NGOs, and 8 UN Agencies among which are the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Program (WFP)

In general, areas in conflict are characterized by the high prevalence of poverty, disorderly markets, and lack of access to healthcare (Mena and Hilhorst 2022); conflict creates internal displacement, leaving people highly exposed to danger. In addition, the absence of good governance, lack of political will, destruction of infrastructure, and lack of priority given to humanitarian disasters compared to other problems undermine the ability of states to respond to these disasters, thus creating conditions conducive to the emergence of challenges in humanitarian assistance.

In Cabo Delgado, specifically, due to the nature of the conflict, manifested by violent extremism, several challenges arise related to human security, the management of humanitarian assistance, and the coordination of humanitarian actions. These challenges occur in the context of unconventional conflict: terrorism. While conventional wars are fought by conventional armies and have strategic and military targets, factionalized struggles/unconventional wars are often opportunistic. Groups seek to exploit and control a significant portion of the civilian population in order to sustain themselves in the conflict. So that the distinction between combatant and non-combatant erodes (ODI 2021).

It is noted that the military interventions by Rwanda and the troops of the Southern African Community for Economic Development (SADC) Military Mission, which began in July 2021, led to a reduction in insurgent attacks (ACAPS 2022). This has contributed to improved security by allowing humanitarian access to more regions. Nevertheless, the nature of the conflict in Cabo Delgado, coupled with the new humanitarianism, brings emerging challenges that concern human security.

Human security

Contrary to the situation of the occurrence of a climate disaster in which there is foresight and consequently preparation of responses to a possible humanitarian emergency, it can be seen that the nature of the conflict in Cabo Delgado calls into question the safety of humanitarian actors. Related to this, humanitarian action in the context of violent extremism puts the physical safety of humanitarian actors at risk. If humanitarian activity continues in this scenario for a long period, the risk will also be prolonged.

Whereas, a large part of the population remains in the conflict zones, in hiding, without access to humanitarian assistance centers. Most of the health units in the northeast of Cabo Delgado have been attacked, looted, or destroyed, and the medical and nursing staff have moved to Pemba, Mueda, or Montepuez, making it impossible to treat the wounded and sick in the districts most affected by the fighting (OMR n.d). Consequently, it is difficult to reach the needy populations, who are subject to food insecurity, mortality, morbidity, and the possibility of being forced to join armed groups.

Humanitarian aid management

The dynamics of low-intensity conflict are an obstacle to the success of humanitarian support. In this scenario, the state becomes fragile and the capacity of the local authority to control certain regions is minimal or ineffective. Consequently, the provision of basic goods and services is irregular or fragmented causing, along with levels of violence, high rates of migration of people seeking safety outside their localities, regions, or countries, resulting in a complicated situation for the provision of humanitarian assistance (Mena and Hilhorst 2022). Moreover, difficulties in sustaining relief provisions in

prolonged crises are evident since humanitarian aid was not designed to solve the problems it is expected to solve nowadays (Hendrickson 1998).

In this context, the challenge for humanitarian actors in Cabo Delgado is to provide comprehensive humanitarian assistance in a context conditioned by volatile conflict dynamics. The conflict in Cabo Delgado has sporadically created humanitarian casualties, leading to an increased flow of internally displaced people. Meanwhile, humanitarian assistance has been underfunded. Underfunding of humanitarian agencies has forced humanitarian actors to distribute half of the rations since August 2021 (OCHA 2021). If aggravated, this could lead to the occurrence of food insecurity.

In this sequence, the humanitarian disaster response consists of the provision of goods that victims need, which includes food, medical and drug assistance, water, sanitation, and shelter in order to prevent food insecurity, gender-based violence, mortality, and morbidity. However, it is observed that the needs are greater than the available resources and capacities. The funds made available to humanitarian agencies, for example, do not reach half of the amount they need, which compromises their activities.

Furthermore, the nature of the conflict means that humanitarian actors are targeting a larger number of individuals than originally planned. The question that arises is how the actors working in this context decide where, for whom, and how to deploy their limited resources. According to humanitarian principles, resources should be allocated where the need is greatest. Therefore, humanitarian organizations operating in conflict countries are expected to redirect their resources to disaster-affected areas when needs suddenly emerge (Mena and Hilhorst 2022).

Humanitarian aid coordination

With the increase of humanitarian actors in the humanitarian space as a result of globalization, it becomes evident that the coordination of their actions is a challenge. The existence of several humanitarian actors with different roles and purposes raises serious challenges to the harmonious coordination of their activities since they all aim to achieve an efficient aid formula in the humanitarian space. In Cabo Delgado, the provision of aid is not coordinated among partners (Issufo 2021), a fact that results in asymmetry in the provision of assistance, and creates a fertile ground for the emergence of tensions and conflicts in humanitarian assistance centers.

Another challenge concerns risk assessment by humanitarian actors. It is difficult in a prolonged conflict scenario for international humanitarian agencies to choose priorities between short-term humanitarian imperatives and long-term objectives linked to sustainability and peace. Lack of clarity about priorities and principles can have negative consequences on humanitarian operations. Humanitarian actors are expected to take responsibility as experts in development and conflict resolution. However, they have neither the skills nor the resources to respond to these demands which are mostly the responsibility of the state. Therefore, the new humanitarianism creates increased roles for humanitarian actors, a fact that can have negative implications on their neutrality and impartiality, illustrating a clear situation of ambiguity with direct implications on the coordination of humanitarian assistance.

Emerging opportunities

Given the scenario described above, it can be observed that, in addition to the emerging challenges, the new humanitarianism is also characterized by the emergence of opportunities for the different humanitarian actors. Next, the opportunities that arise for the Mozambican state are presented, considering that the state assumes the role of coordinator of humanitarian actions in humanitarian spaces and acts in a complex context in which it seeks to safeguard its legitimacy in regions affected by violent extremism.

Strategy redefinition

In the context of violent extremism, the multiplicity of humanitarian actors within a state creates problems for itself in achieving a coherent policy to respond to the humanitarian emergency. In Mozambique, policymakers responded to a humanitarian emergency of a conflictual nature with the transformation of the National Institute for Disaster Management (Instituto Nacional de Gestão de Calamidades, in Portuguese) into the National Institute for Disaster Management (Instituto Nacional de Gestão de Desastres, INGD, in Portuguese) in 2020. Through Presidential Decree No. 41/2020 of December 28, this entity began managing humanitarian emergencies caused by natural disasters, but also emergencies resulting from conflicts.

INGD has worked with international humanitarian agencies in Cabo Delgado, which highlights the extension of public aid management techni-

ques into a new public-private aid network. This transformation has highlighted the redefinition of the humanitarian crisis management strategy in Mozambique, an opportunity that has emerged driven by violent extremism. Nevertheless, this new reality suggests a connection based on the ambiguity that humanitarian assistance presents. In this sense, for Mozambique, it is necessary to adapt to the emerging challenges by adopting contextual, comprehensive, and specific responses to the humanitarian crisis that demand the involvement of all national institutions in the design and implementation of solutions to violent extremism.

Strategic articulation

Essentially, there is no guarantee of success for humanitarian assistance actions in a conflict region, mainly due to the ambiguities that humanitarian actors are subject to. Therefore, in a scenario of interconnection between humanitarian action and political action, where the Mozambican state tends to lose legitimacy in regions of humanitarian emergency before international humanitarian agencies, it becomes urgent for the Mozambican state to invest in the definition of comprehensive, integrated, and inclusive policies in order to involve the whole society in the resolution of the conflict. In this way, all national institutions and society as a whole assume a relevant role in managing the conflict and eliminating signs of conflict escalation. At the same time, the legitimacy of the state becomes less likely to be diluted, a fact that automatically contrasts with the scenario of the dominance of humanitarian agencies in humanitarian spaces.

Considering, therefore, that there will be a separation between humanitarian assistance and development and that humanitarian agencies will have no responsibility to provide development in the humanitarian space. Finally, it is noted that it is urgent to act on the deep-rooted and international causes of conflicts, at the same time as acting on the domestic ones, by means of integrated and comprehensive domestic policies. This fact demands a higher level of engagement by the Mozambican state with the root causes of conflict (internal and international).

Conclusion

The conclusion of this article is that humanitarian activities are now implemented by other humanitarian actors (UN agencies and NGOs) in addition to traditional agents. Consequently, traditional humanitarian principles nowadays tend to be subordinated to political principles, which translates into the submission of humanitarian action to political wills. The increasing interdependence of states in a growing globalized world tends to elevate the role of non-state actors in humanitarian spaces, leading to the emergence of long-term political objectives that defend the protection of human rights in humanitarian spaces, instead of the traditional humanitarian objectives of meeting the immediate needs of humanitarian victims. In the medium and long term, this can compromise humanitarian success and reduce state legitimacy.

In Cabo Delgado, humanitarian challenges emerge in a context characterized by the new humanitarianism in which UN agencies and NGOs stand out in the provision of humanitarian assistance, but face challenges of a different nature. Nevertheless, opportunities also emerge in Cabo Delgado for the Mozambican state to circumvent probable socio-political implications resulting from the inherent ambiguities of humanitarian actions motivated by its own foreign policy agendas and materialized by non-state actors with their own international agendas that interfere in the management of the humanitarian crisis through the adoption of a proactive national positioning.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article focused on understanding the effects of political transformations in the International System through a reflection on the role of non-state actors in humanitarian issues and their influence on the reduction of state power, considering that traditional humanitarian principles have been challenged. This contestation takes the name of new humanitarianism - a humanitarian stance that is concerned with resolving conflict and creating development in the humanitarian space, which contrasts with the traditional humanitarian stance of alleviating suffering and saving lives. The main objective of this article was to reflect on the emerging challenges and opportunities resulting from the humanitarian assistance process in Cabo Delgado. Based on a qualitative approach, a literature review was conducted on the theme of humanitarian assistance combined with the theme of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado. The results of this article indicate that international humanitarian agencies in the region have assumed responsibilities in the humanitarian space that place them in ambiguous situations and create challenges for humanitarian assistance, which concern human security, the management of humanitarian assistance, and the coordination of humanitarian actions. However, opportunities also emerge for the Mozambican state to redefine its strategy and strategic articulation, which requires the adoption of a proactive national positioning.

KEYWORDS

Humanitarian Assistance. Humanitarian Paradigm. Cabo Delgado.

Received on February 27, 2022

Accepted on March 16, 2023

Translated by Isabela Marcon Ciceri

THE LOCAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF RAILWAYS: KENYA'S STANDARD GAUGE RAILWAY (SGR)

Nancy Githaiga¹
Hailay Shifare²



Introduction

The interest of transport economists is in how to solve the economic problems of the movement of goods and people (Button 2010). Transport has long been acknowledged as a vital determining factor of the economic activity location, and therefore, the policy instrument for economic development (Leeson 2014). A major and significant assumption is that transport infrastructure leads to positive socio-economic development in a country. When transport infrastructure is reliable and efficient, it creates several economic and social opportunities and benefits that result in positive multiplier effects such as better accessibility to markets, employment, education, health, and additional investments (Knaap and Oosterhaven 2002). In First World countries, these transport infrastructures were part of the economic development planning which took place during the industrial revolution in the 19th and early 20th centuries, a model that continues to this day, in which transportation planning and investments are associated with the estimated economic development goals of a region (Rashidi and Amir 2012; Rostow 1959). Like several other socio-economic activities that are infrastructure intensive, the transport sector is an essential element of the economy with an impact on development and the welfare of the people (Rodrigues et al. 2011).

Consequently, railway transport has attracted significant investment all over the world and specifically in Africa in the recent past. Railways are regarded as an avenue of socioeconomic development since they link regions, places, people, and economic activities (Banister and Berechman 2001). Researchers have argued that transport and especially railways have one of the highest potentials for job creation. Transportation upgrades have the potential

to significantly alter the population density and employment structure of the domestic economy. When a location is linked to a domestic or international transportation network, its market access increases in comparison to other neighboring locations. Greater market access encourages people and businesses to relocate because there is a greater supply of consumer goods and a higher demand for products. As a result, population density is often higher around transportation access sites such as seaports, airports, railway stations, and highway junctions. However, the benefits of increased access to transportation may not be the same in many regions. Some areas may lose people and jobs to larger or more productive locations. The amount of 'reorganization effects' and 'growth effects' is a prominent problem in both scholarly literature and policy debates (Alvarez et al. 2016). Research on the impacts of the railway on land property values has resulted in mixed findings, both in terms of the total effect on the value of a property as well as differences between properties located nearer and those located far away from a station. As it is commonly believed, the accessibility advantage due to the railway should be reflected in the value of the property (Bowes and Ihlanfeldt 2001; Debrezion, Pels, and Rietveld 2007; Githaiga 2021).

Until recently, Kenya was entirely served by the Kenya-Uganda railway, which was constructed by the colonial government in the early 1890s. Railway extensions in Kenya served white settlers and once that objective was achieved, the government stopped railway constructions (Githaiga 2021). Over the years, Kenya's railway network has been much dilapidated due to poor maintenance and inadequate technological development hence becoming almost obsolete in urban areas and the country at large (Mairura 2010; Mustapha and Greenhill 2017). To address the challenges of railway transport, the Government of Kenya, in collaboration with the Government of the People's Republic of China, undertook the construction of a modern Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) to modernize Kenya's railway transport (Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure (MTI) 2014). The 609 km modern railway line is the largest infrastructure project in Kenya for Cargo and Passenger transportation from Mombasa (the largest Port in East Africa) to the capital city, Nairobi, and is a flagship project of Kenya's Vision 2030 (Mustapha and Greenhill 2017). The Phase 1A railway project construction began in 2013 and was completed and launched in 2017 ("Kenyan President Launches..." 2016) and it was the main focus of this study. This study, therefore, sought to focus on the following research objectives: to establish the employment impacts of the SGR in Kenya; to examine the effects of the SGR on land and property values; and to make policy recommendations.

The role of infrastructure in Africa's development

Infrastructure investments are crucial to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Clark et al. 2022). Multiple studies have documented the positive impact of infrastructure on economic growth and inclusive social development at length (Khan et al. 2020; Pradhan et al. 2021; Owusu-Manu et al. 2019). As a component of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) formation and input to the production function of other sectors, infrastructure has a direct impact on productivity and output. For Africa to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations (UN), Agenda 2063 of the African Union (AU), or the High Five Goals of the African Development Bank, high-quality infrastructure is a prerequisite (AfDB 2022). High-quality infrastructure is essential for increasing economic productivity and sustaining economic expansion. Infrastructure has direct and indirect effects on economic growth (AfDB 2018). It directly increases total factor productivity (TFP) because infrastructure services are inputs to production and have an immediate impact on the productivity of businesses. As a result, it promotes total economic output given its contribution to GDP. Africa is a continent of small, open economies where trade, regionally and internationally, is critical as a growth engine. Infrastructure development is therefore crucial for the region's integration (Asche 2021).

Generally, Africa lags behind the rest of the world in terms of infrastructure extent and quality (Lakmeeharan et al. 2020). Researchers point to Africa's lack of infrastructure as a major obstacle to the continent's progress. Water, electricity, and transportation are just a few examples of the essential services that cannot be provided to a population without first establishing a solid foundation in the form of an adequate infrastructure. The proportion of funds allocated to infrastructure was drastically reduced by African governments and their partners in development in the 1980s and 1990s, owing to structural adjustment programs, the majority of African nations adopted in accordance with the Washington Consensus (Jackson and Jabbie 2021). Recent projections from the African Development Bank (AfDB) indicate that the continent's infrastructure is in need of \$130–170 billion annually, with a financing gap between \$67.6 billion and \$107.5 billion (AfDB 2018). Further, the gaps in funding and resources worsen the situation. Given the rate at which infrastructure must be constructed, many governments in Africa are struggling to secure sufficient funding to meet demand (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2019). While governments, particularly those in developing countries such as Africa, require access to a portion of the global capital markets due to tight public sector budgets, private investors are discouraged

from investing in infrastructure due to the numerous risks involved, such as the complexity of permitting and the possibility of construction delays, as well as the length of time before assets generate cash flow and produce a return on investment (OECD 2015). Moreover, just like most developing countries where the majority of the world's infrastructure gaps exist, African countries frequently lack the human resources with the necessary skills to plan, deliver, and manage sustainable, resilient infrastructure at the scale required to meet demand (AfDB 2018). Further, a number of governance barriers exist to the development of sustainable infrastructure, including election-cycle-induced short-termism in policy development, a lack of appropriate legislation, codes, and standards, and a lack of capacity (Economist 2019). Given the large sums of money at stake, lack of transparency and corruption are frequently associated with the development of infrastructure assets (Appiah, Onifade, and Gyamfi 2022). Even if no outright graft is involved, the motivations of those developing infrastructure and competing priorities often shape it. The World Bank estimates that, in Sub-Saharan Africa, closing the infrastructure quantity and quality gap relative to the world's top performers could increase annual GDP per capita growth by 2.6% (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2019).

Although infrastructure deficits are not unique to Africa, they must be addressed if the continent is to achieve sustainable development. Africa will need to tap into global capital markets through innovative finance and attract more private investors in the infrastructure sector (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2019). As they increase their focus on more capital, they must improve their spending by improving planning and procurement (Githaiga 2021). Transparency and open procurement are essential if governments are to persuade the private sector to invest in infrastructure; capacity-building initiatives can also improve transparency in some cases. Generally, improving the economic and social well-being of the African population is dependent on resolving the infrastructure gap that plagues so many African countries.

The background of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) and China's role

China has played a key role in Kenya's infrastructure development through funding as well as the expertise of Chinese construction firms (Githaiga 2021). As China gains access to new markets, the region is benefiting through the reduction of its enormous infrastructure gap. With the

launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is a cornerstone of China's global ambition, China's involvement in the region's infrastructure development gained more traction (Githaiga et al. 2019). The SGR project is a major infrastructure project in Kenya aimed at upgrading the country's railway system and was implemented as part of China's Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure investment and development strategy aimed at boosting trade and economic ties between China and other countries (Githaiga et al. 2019). The project was initiated in 2013 with the aim of connecting the port city of Mombasa to the capital city of Nairobi, and later extending to other major cities in the country.

This SGR runs parallel to the Uganda Railway, which was built during British colonial rule in 1901 (Githaiga and Bing 2019). At the time of its launch, the SGR was one of Kenya's most expensive infrastructure projects, worth US\$3.6 billion (Githaiga 2021). The China Road & Bridge Corporation (CRBC) was the main contractor while China Communications Construction Company, which is a holding of CRBC, was contracted to operate the line for its first five years. As of 2020, railway operation expenses exceeded revenues. In October 2019, an extension from Nairobi to Suswa was completed, bringing the total length of the line to around 578.8 kilometers (359.6 mi). The Export-Import Bank of China funded 90% of the first phase of the SGR from Mombasa to Nairobi. The Kenyan government covered the remaining project costs. The Exim bank advanced the financing in two loans: concessional loans amounting to \$1.6 billion (KSh136 billion) and a preferential commercial loan of \$1.63 billion (KSh139 billion) (Economy 2014). The East African Railway Master Plan calls for the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR to connect with other East African Community SGRs linking landlocked South Sudan, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and finally Ethiopia, which will then connect directly with Djibouti, providing direct access to the Indian Ocean (Moore 2014).

China's involvement in the Kenya SGR project is claimed to be part of a larger strategy to insert itself into the economic and political landscape of the African continent (Basu and Janiec 2021). China has been investing heavily in infrastructure projects throughout Africa, including Kenya, in order to secure access to natural resources and markets for its products and services (Kelley 2011). Moreover, China aims to establish itself as a major player in the development of African infrastructure, consequently strengthening its strategic position in the region (Yu 2017).

The Kenya SGR project is regarded as a success story of China-Africa cooperation, as it has contributed to the improvement of Kenya's trans-

portation infrastructure and the acceleration of its economic development (Githaiga and Bing 2019). However, concerns have been raised over the economic viability of the project (Wissenbach and Wang 2016); corruption (Taylor and Zajontz 2020); debt accumulated by Kenya in order to finance the project (Sanghi and Johnson 2016), as well as the perceived lack of local gains in terms of employment and knowledge transfer (Plummer 2019).

Overall, the Kenya SGR project is a crucial component of China's insertion strategy into the African continent, as it indicates China's commitment to investing in African infrastructure and contributing to the region's growth.

Railway transport and employment creation

Transportation improvements have the ability to drastically alter the domestic economy's population density and job structure. When a location is connected to a domestic or international transportation network, it gains market access in comparison to its neighbors. Increased market access encourages people and businesses to relocate as the supply of consumer goods and the demand for products increase. As a result, population density is frequently higher in areas with easy access to transportation, such as seaports, airports, railway stations, and highway interchanges. However, the benefits of expanded transit availability may vary by region. Certain areas may lose residents and jobs to larger, more productive areas. The magnitude of 'reorganization effects' and 'growth effects' is a contentious issue in both academic research and policy debates (Alvarez et al. 2016; Githaiga et al. 2019).

Researchers have argued that railways have one of the highest potentials for job creation. Research done in Brazil shows that the railway accounted for 37 thousand potential direct jobs and 110 thousand total jobs, and R\$ 70 billion in investments (Corre et al. 2017). However, they also noted that job creation in this sector tends to have a low to medium level of sustainability since most of the workforce is dismissed after the completion of the construction project, requiring fewer people for operation and maintenance. According to Matovu (2012), when the government gives transport infrastructure priority, the impacts on growth become significant as a result of improved household productivity, which leads to the positive externalities linked with sound infrastructures such as employment and markets. Williamson and Canagarajah (2003) added that efficient railways, agriculture, roads, and waterways might lead to higher employment returns and the creation of

income, alleviating poverty as well as promoting economic development. Ajayi (2005) adds that the railway has a significant role in socio-economic development through the generation of employment. In a report by Michael Reilly investigating the economic growth effects of California's High-Speed Railway, it was concluded that the railway led to modest state-wide increases in employment and population (Reilly 2007).

Based on forecasts, estimation of railway construction effects often indicates considerable gains, which provides an argument in support of building railway infrastructure. For instance, the cross-rail plan proposed to link North England and London by 2026 would lead to the creation of more than 22,000 direct and indirect jobs in a span of five years after ground-breaking (Eyles 2013). The planned Paris-Bordeaux-Vitoria-Madrid was estimated to create 100,000 jobs – 40% direct jobs, 30% indirect jobs, and 30% from induced effects (Fernández-Macho et al. 2012) – while in California, the estimated number of jobs to be created by 2020 through a planned High-Speed Railway would be between ten thousand to sixteen thousand jobs (Administration 2012). Using an input-output model from fieldwork among the employees and businesses involved in the building of the SEA railway line connecting Bordeaux and Tours in France, Fouqueray, and Manceau (2016) found out that the project led to the creation of about 14,000 jobs, 755 Million Euros in value addition and 1.6 Billion Euros in production in the three regions where construction took place; 18%-25% of the total gains were from induced effects (Fouqueray and Manceau 2016). In Kenya, the colonial railway is seen to have positively contributed to employment creation (Clayton and Savage 1974). Focusing on the productivity of the economy of the United States of America (U.S.) between 1948-1987, Munnell (1990) observed that transport infrastructure and economic development are indirectly connected concerning employment creation. During this period, the study revealed that multifactor productivity fell to 1.1% between 1969-1987, yet the previous growth of the same between 1948-1969 was 2.5%. This decrease in labor productivity growth was credited to insignificant investment in the transport sector during this period, both in new infrastructural projects and the maintenance of the existing ones.

These positive impacts of railway transport on employment, however, cannot be generalized. Different researchers have obtained varying results. Using the difference-in-difference technique (Brage-Ardao, Graham, and Melo 2013) observed no substantial difference in the growth rate of employment between areas with and without rail links. There were also no differences before and after the construction of the rail lines. In France, there was no correlation between the growth of employment and the extension of the

railway (Yves 2016). Generally, investing in transport infrastructure leads to job creation through the implementation of projects that require manual labor. Thus, having significant impacts on labor demand (Kreciglowska 2018).

This review of the employment effects of railway projects leads to some points. First, if the area under construction is large, the direct economic impacts will be weightier because the tendency for local consumption will be stronger. Second, though some skills developed by employees or businesses during project implementation can later be used in successive jobs, the economic benefits are usually temporary. Considering the effects on economic development and job creation, Kenya could benefit from stimulating investments in infrastructure as a whole. The selection of specific projects to be prioritized should rely on a holistic and systematic approach, even though job creation potential is a critical factor as it may help alleviate some of the country's infrastructure bottlenecks, driving costs down, and helping overcome the current economic downturn.

Railway transport and land and property value effects

Research on the impacts of the railway on land property values has resulted in mixed findings, both in terms of the total effect on the value of a property as well as differences between properties located nearer and those located far away from a station. As it is commonly believed, accessibility advantage due to railway should be reflected in the value of the property (Bowes and Ihlanfeldt 2001; Debrezion, Pels, and Rietveld 2007).

Railway stations serve as nodes in transportation networks as well as locations in urban environments. They have accessibility and environmental effects that affect property value (Debrezion, Pels, and Rietveld 2007). A study by Debrezion, Pels, and Rietveld (2003) revealed that different kinds of rail stations have different impact magnitudes on the value of property; commuter rails have moderately higher impacts on the value of properties. More so, rail stations are different in terms of the quality and level of facilities, and thus, the higher the quality and level of facilities, the more significant the impact on the nearby properties. In their research, Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001) carried out an analysis of the impacts of light rail on economic development through examination of the effects on changes in local crime rate, the value of the property, as well as local retail businesses, increase. Their research revealed that there was an interplay of all three variables with local development more so in the regions near the rail stations. Additionally, there

was an overall positive impact on the values of the property as a result of the proximity to the stations. However, the property's proximity to the Central Business District (CBD) more significantly determined the level of the impact. Property that was close to the station but far from the CBD were on average, more impacted than those of relatively similar distance to the station but nearer to the CBD (Garrett 2004). The basic theory of real estate prices is as follows: demand rises when a site's features make it more attractive, and bidding drives up prices. The project's transportation savings benefit property next to the investment region (railway stations). Price curves should slope downward as we go away from the station. In general, railway stations have a greater impact on commercial properties than residential ones within a short distance (Cervero and Duncan 2002a; Cervero and Duncan 2008).

The influence of a railway station on residential properties is greater, while the impact on commercial properties is limited to the immediate vicinity. There is also evidence that railway stations affect business properties more than residential dwellings (Cervero and Duncan 2002b). Railway stations, being hubs of commerce, boost commercial property prices. A railway station's impact on property value is also influenced by demographic factors. Because low-income households rely on public transportation, residing near a train station has a higher value in low-income neighborhoods than in high-income neighborhoods (Bowes and Ihlanfeldt 2001).

The urban economic theory, however, contends that proximity to tracks and rail stations is associated with negative externalities. This includes the adverse effects on the value of properties due to noise and vibration increase from the rail network (Weinberger 2001). This is echoed by Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001) who argue that the noise effect from the stations negatively affects the prices and value of houses. The price and value of property and houses increase as one moves away from the station and along the tracks as a result of the noise effect at the stations and along the railway (Debrezion, Pels, and Rietveld 2006).

Moreover, rail station effects on commercial property are different from those on residential property; the effect on the value of commercial property happens at short distances. The area range impacts of Railway stations are higher for residential properties while the impact on commercial property is restricted to the areas directly adjacent to the stations (Debrezion, Pels, and Rietveld 2007; Debrezion, Pels, and Rietveld 2003).

Additionally, some researchers hold that closeness to the rail stations increases the chance of criminal activities taking place in a particular area since criminals have both a higher number of targets (train users) as well as

the freedom of movement in the surroundings (Bowes and Ihlanfeldt 2001; Cervero and Landis 1997). This negatively affects the value of a property as well as the choice of commuters on where and how to use the train while boarding (Kim, Ulfarsson, and Todd Hennessy 2007). Further, as the prices of real estate in cities close to the railway increase, their attractiveness for the industry setup decreases resulting in an economic geography based on specialization by function from one based on specialization by sector level (Puga 2001; Chen and Silva 2013). Thus, for the property directly next to the railway line, the property value is not always positively affected as argued by Arndt et al. (2009). Instead, the most substantial impacts are found in areas near the stations as rail accessibility increases the value of the nearby property.

Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001) conclude that the different results on the land and property value are due to the interplay of four different factors, two of which may increase the value of a property, and the other two may lower the value of the property. Firstly, Rail transit leads to an accessibility effect, and secondly, an increase in accessibility and higher value of the property may lead to the attraction of new commercial activities, especially retail businesses to a region. These two positive effects are countered by two negative factors, i.e., the noise and crime effects. The interaction of these factors and the degree of one in comparison to another determines the overall effect of rail transit on property and land value (Bowes and Ihlanfeldt 2001).

Railway stations have a varying effect on the value of various property kinds. Railway stations, on average, are predicted to have a more favorable influence on commercial properties than on residential properties within a short distance of the stations. Commuter railway stations, of the four types of railway stations, are predicted to have a greater impact on property prices.

Transport Economics Theory

In 1959, John R. Meyer developed the transport economics theory. The theory explains how transportation sector resources are allocated and the resulting effects. In his book titled "Transport Economics Theory", Diaz (2007) posits that activities in transport entail individuals and goods movement both in space and time; hence, transport production analysis entails resource assignment for the generation of trips between various spatial points in different times.

The theory contends that there are costs, benefits, and opportunity costs associated with transport infrastructure that is essential to transport pro-

jects and policy evaluations, both economically and otherwise. Opportunity costs and indirect internal costs are difficult to observe and quantify, but they can be quantified in monetary terms based on choice behavior. In addition, transport infrastructure has societal externalities; these developments have an impact on the safety and well-being of others in the form of air quality through emissions, traffic accidents, noise, land, and water pollution, wildlife, and endangered species, among other effects. Transport infrastructure has an impact on emissions, which alters travel patterns and influences land use and property value. The permanency of transport infrastructure has an effect on land use, land values, and wages (Button 2010). Transport improvement results in changes in accessibility and mobility, which have subsequent effects on business and residential choices and, consequently, on land and property values.

In this theory, mobility and accessibility are two key concepts that describe the relationship between transportation and location. Mobility is concerned with efficiency and movement scope, particularly in terms of distances and travel speeds. Accessibility refers to the ease with which one can reach quality destinations, which reflects both the attractiveness of potential destinations and the ease of reaching them (Srouf, Kockelman, and Dunn 2002). Investments in transport, especially rail, are often perceived as triggers for economic regeneration in central cities (Ryan 1999). Such perceptions have made decisions on transport investment heated debate topics amongst policymakers.

Research methodology

This research employed a mixed research method, which creates a synergy between quantitative (questionnaire) and qualitative (interviews, observation, document analysis) methods. The combination of the two methods enhanced the validity of this study. The research design adopted in this research was descriptive in the form of a survey. Quantitative and qualitative data from both primary and secondary sources were used. Quantitative data was collected through questionnaires and analyzed through SPSS, while qualitative data was collected through interviews, observation, and document analysis. The target population was inhabitants along the SGR route, with a particular emphasis on coastal provinces, where the SGR begins, and which form the bulk of the SGR route. It has an estimated population of 3.325 million people.

This research used Yamane's (1967) sampling formula $n = N/(1 + Ne)$ for the sample size determination, where "n" represents the size of the sample, "N" represents the size of the population, and "e" represents the marginal error, for example at 95% level of confidence. As per the formula, the sample size for ordinary train users was calculated as follows:

$$\text{Sample size} = 3,325,000 / (1 + 3,325,000(0.052)) = 399$$

A stratified sampling technique was employed to divide the respondents' sample size into five strata for the five main routes covered by the SGR in coastal provinces: Mtito Andei, Mombasa, Voi, Mariakani, and Miasenyi. Each had 80 respondents. Simple random sampling was then used to select the respondents. In this method, every member of the sample population has a known and equal chance of being selected (Kothari 2004). Those identified and selected filled and submitted the questionnaires voluntarily. Purposeful sampling was also used to select 30 residents for interviews from these areas.

Response rate

343 of the 399 questionnaires distributed to respondents were found to be valid and complete for analysis, representing an 86% response rate. In addition, thirty locals were interviewed. The high response rate indicated that sufficient data was collected to conduct the study (Field 2005).

Objective 1: Employment Creation

Results

Regarding the effects of SGR and employment creation in Kenya, the items revealed a small deviation from the mean, indicating that the responses were close to the mean (homogeneity) – see Table 1. According to the findings of the study, the majority of passengers believe that the SGR has created sufficient direct and indirect jobs for Kenyans (mean=2.09). However, they are dissatisfied with the quality of jobs offered to Kenyans (mean=1.94) and the level of Kenyan involvement in the management and operation of the SGR (mean=1.99). Additionally, a majority (mean=3.52) disagreed that there is sufficient technology transfer from the SGR. The researcher also observed that the majority of the train's employees were Kenyans, while the drivers and

supervisors were notably Chinese. Even though Kenyans are satisfied with the direct and indirect jobs created by the SGR, they are less pleased with the extent of involvement, transfer of skills, and quality of jobs provided to locals. One respondent in an open-ended question responded

...As a Kenyan, I am happy that the SGR has created jobs for many jobless Kenyans. I am happy because my son now works at the SGR too. However, the Government of Kenya must ensure that Kenyans get quality jobs and take charge of the operations of the train. I see Chinese drivers every time I use the SGR. Kenyans have gradually attained the required skills and competencies through the training in Chinese universities, and I believe they can take charge.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for employment creation

	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.
SGR has created enough direct jobs for Kenyans	343	1	5	2.09	.813
Insufficient quality of jobs provided to Kenyans	343	1	5	1.94	.731
Inadequate involvement of Kenyans in the management and operations	343	1	5	2.09	.813
SGR has created sufficient indirect jobs for Kenyans	343	1	4	1.88	.609
There is sufficient technology transfer alongside the employment	343	1	5	3.52	1.216
Valid N (list-wise)	343				

Source: elaborated by the author, based on Nascimento (2004).

Discussion of results

The majority of respondents believe that the SGR has created sufficient direct and indirect employment opportunities for Kenyans. These findings are in agreement with Corre et al. (2017) who argued that railways have one of the highest potentials for job creation and poverty reduction leading to economic development, while Ajayi (2005) adds that railway has a great role in socio-economic development through generation of employment. Previous research showed that investors from China in various sectors of the economy in Kenya employ a majority of locals in their projects (Sanghi and Johnson 2016; Githaiga and Bing 2019). Overall, infrastructure spending can create

jobs by implementing construction projects that are built using manual labor. It can have a substantial impact on the demand for labor (Kreciglowa 2018). To put the current findings into context, according to the Kenya SGR Project Social Responsibility Report 2017/2018, more than 46,000 Kenyans were employed in the construction of the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR, and approximately 1,000 locally sourced suppliers were contracted for various services or products, such as construction materials (KCETA 2018). Besides, there was an indirect creation of employment through various opportunities in entrepreneurship resulting from the need for goods and services by the SGR workers and travelers including entertainment, catering, etc. (Githaiga and Bing 2019). In addition, the SGR trains have approximately 52 wagons with a maximum capacity of 4,000 tonnes, or 216 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) (KCETA 2018). This results in employment opportunities for loaders and unloaders, as well as retail and wholesale distribution services for end users. This should enhance the basic social welfare of Kenyans with jobs and their families. In addition, Kenyans are continually trained to become experts in train operations and services, and some have already been absorbed into train operations and are undergoing field training under the supervision of Chinese experts (Githaiga and Bing 2019). CRBC established railway operations, management, and engineering training programs in Kenya (Li 2016). In addition, data shows that CRBC has sponsored approximately 100 Kenyans to pursue engineering and railway-related studies at Beijing Jiaotong University in China (Mutethya 2018). This is being done to promote local skill development and close the local skills gap.

On the other hand, the majority of respondents were dissatisfied with the level of Kenyan involvement in the management and operations of the SGR, as well as the quality of the jobs provided to Kenyans. Previous research shows that job creation in railway construction has a low to moderate level of sustainability, as the majority of the workforce is let go after the completion of the construction project, and fewer people are needed for operation and maintenance, which could leave both the workers and the locals aggrieved (Corre et al. 2017). Allegations in Kenyan media in July 2018 could partially explain why the respondents are dissatisfied, including allegations that Kenyan-trained employees lack opportunities to utilize their talents and that Chinese personnel is in charge of the operations (Wafula 2018). Though the government strongly refuted these allegations, they may have affected Kenyans' perceptions of the type and quality of jobs that the SGR has provided for Kenyans, as well as their participation in day-to-day operations and management; it has often been claimed that the type of jobs offered to Kenyans, despite their abundance, are of poor quality because the

majority are casual and unskilled (Githaiga and Bing 2019; Githaiga 2019). During the research, respondents claimed, for instance, that Chinese drivers are in charge of the trains instead of Kenyans, despite the latter's training.

The majority of respondents also noted that the SGR's level of technology transfer is insufficient. This corroborates the research findings of Wang, Mao, and Gou (2014), who concluded that although Chinese investment brings with it massive employment creation, there are limited technology transfers to the host economies for two major reasons: first, the skills acquired by the locals during Chinese-funded project implementation do not always correspond to the work required in operations' sustenance, and second, language barriers hinder Chinese investments' technology transfers. Therefore, direct supervision by Chinese managers is inevitable (Wang, Mao, and Gou 2014).

Taking everything into account, given that the SGR is a modern form of transport infrastructure in Kenya and Africa as a whole, it is essential to note that Kenyan engineers may not possess the necessary and adequate skills to manage such a project. As a result, it is necessary for Chinese engineers to oversee the gradual training of the locals. In this regard, it was determined that China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) in conjunction with Kenya Railways has established a joint training program for training the Kenyan workforce in Chinese universities to familiarize them with operating the SGR system and attain the skills and expertise required in SGR trains' operations, as Kenya prepares to fully take over the train's operations in 2027 according to the current schedule. China has played a significant role in training Kenyans to operate and manage the railway, but the two countries should make more concerted efforts to eliminate any skill gaps.

Objective 2: land and property value effects

Results

On the impacts of the SGR on land and property prices during the SGR planning and construction, the means for the individual items were below 2.5 on a 5-point Likert scale, indicating that all the items had a strong impact – see Table 2. Besides, the items revealed a small deviation from the mean which is an indicator that the responses were homogenous. The results reveal the respondents agreed that there were positive changes in land use patterns and distribution ($M=2.03$), as well as an increase in prices of land ($M=2.10$) and property ($M=2.10$). On average, the participants also agreed that

there were increased business activities along the route and near the railway stations ($M=1.87$). On the impacts of the SGR on land and property prices after the SGR construction (see Table 3), the respondents disagreed that there has been an increase in the prices of land ($M=3.52$) and property ($M=3.62$). On average, the participants also disagreed that there were increased business activities along the route and near the railway stations ($M=3.54$).

The opinions of the interviewees were divided regarding positive and negative changes to the value and prices of land and property along the SGR route. During the planning and construction phase of the SGR, 62% of respondents observed an increase in land and property prices. They attributed this to the government's haste to provide compensation while the increase in land demand was a result of speculation. In addition, they observed that residential and commercial real estate prices increased more near train stations than in other areas along the railway. However, when asked the same questions about the effect on property after the construction of the SGR, 82% of respondents indicated that the effect on land and property prices was negative. They cited factors such as noise for those living close to the SGR line and a decrease in demand for land and real estate, which led to a sharp decline in prices.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Land and Property Prices during the SGR planning and construction

	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.
There are changes in land use patterns and distribution due to the railway	343	1	5	2.03	.711
Land prices have increased	343	1	5	2.01	.741
Property prices have increased	343	1	5	2.10	.804
Increased business activities along the route and near the railway stations	343	1	5	1.87	.678
Valid N (list-wise)	343				

Source: elaborated by the authors.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Land and Property Prices after the SGR construction

	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.
Land prices have increased	343	1	5	3.52	1.216
Property prices have increased	343	1	5	3.62	1.190

	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.
Increased business activities along the route and near the railway stations	343	1	5	3.54	1.20
Valid N (list-wise)	343				

Source: elaborated by the authors.

Discussion of results

During the planning and construction of the SGR, land and property values increased as a result of changes in distribution and land-use patterns, as shown in Table 2. These findings are in line with research by Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001), who concluded that there was an overall positive benefit in property values resulting from proximity to rail stations. Additionally, enhanced accessibility of a region is an essential factor in property value increase, though it is not sufficient on its own; other factors are also responsible for property value increase. The impacts of enhanced accessibility rely on both the magnitude of investment and on the contribution of the new railway to the transport network of a region (Martínez and Viegas 2007). Research shows that Commuter railways have a relatively high impact on property value and the high population activity in the local vicinity promotes the growth of retail operations, resulting in benefits on the worth of commercial assets (Debrezion, Pels, and Rietveld 2003). Contextually, land and property values along the route increased as a result of the SGR's construction. For example, Kapiti Plains in Kajiado County, located off Mombasa Road and along the SGR route, has been used for grazing cattle for many years. Due to the development of the SGR and the area's proximity, it is currently a desirable location for real estate investors. Individuals and institutions purchased real estate in these regions. According to one of the local newspapers, residents reported that, depending on the region, the price of an acre rose from 400,000 to 3.5 million Kenyan shillings (Wainaina 2016).

Numerous factors, including speculation, government compensation, and high demand for commercial space, contributed to a significant increase in land value. Along the Mombasa-Nairobi highway, which is part of the SGR route, multiple hardware stores selling construction materials as well as various ongoing construction projects, particularly buildings, were spotted during fieldwork. However, this construction was concentrated around train stations, and as the distance from the stations increased, construction activities decreased. All of these are indicators of a thriving real estate market. This corroborates previous research by Michaels (2008), who concluded that the advent of the U.S. Interstate rail network caused counties along those

routes to experience increased activities related to trade, such as retail sales. Inferentially, rising property and land prices will encourage consumer spending and wealth redistribution across the economy, resulting in increased economic growth and development in Kenya.

In contrast, the results indicate that after the construction of the SGR, land and property prices decreased, as did economic activity along the route and in the vicinity of the railway stations. According to urban economic theory, proximity to railroad tracks and stations is associated with negative externalities which have a negative impact on property values due to increased noise and vibration from the rail network; the noise effect from the stations has a negative impact on home prices and values (Weinberger 2001). In addition, as real estate prices in cities adjacent to railroads rise, their attractiveness for industry setup declines, resulting in an economic geography based on specialization by function as opposed to one based on specialization by sector level (Puga 2001; Chen and Silva 2013).

Both positive and negative effects on land and property values resulted from the construction of the SGR. Numerous strategies could be used in the mitigation of the negative effects, balancing the positive and negative impacts, and protecting land and property values in the affected areas such as railroad operators installing noise barriers along the railway line to lessen the impact of noise on residents and property values; landscaping and beautifying the area surrounding the railroad to increase the area's aesthetic appeal and property values, and involving the local community.

Conclusion

The results suggest that the SGR project had mixed economic effects in Kenya. The SGR has generated sufficient direct and indirect employment for Kenyans. Nevertheless, there was widespread discontent with the level of local participation in the SGR's management and operations, as well as the caliber of jobs offered to Kenyans. Additionally, it was acknowledged that the level of technological transfer was insufficient. During the planning and construction of the SGR, land, and property values, as well as commercial activities along the route, increased in response to changes in distribution and land-use patterns. However, after construction was completed, land and property values and commercial activities decreased significantly.

Kenya struggles with high unemployment rates, especially among its youth. Through skilled and semi-skilled labor opportunities associated with the operation, management, and maintenance of the rail line, as well as the transportation of passengers and goods, the construction and operation of

the SGR have created significant employment opportunities for locals. As envisioned in Vision 2030, employment creation is essential for Kenya's socioeconomic growth and development, particularly in terms of enhancing the living standards of local residents and reducing poverty. In addition, the increase in property and land values along the SGR route will stimulate consumer spending and wealth redistribution throughout the economy, leading to increased economic growth and development in Kenya. Because the SGR is a public good, any improvement to public transportation is beneficial to the entire community.

Kenya and China must focus their efforts on resolving employment issues that have arisen since the completion of phase one of the project. China has been instrumental in preparing Kenyans to operate and manage the train. Additionally, Kenya should make a concerted effort to address any skill gaps. Kenya could accomplish this by equipping some of its academic institutions with modern facilities and infrastructure for modern railway technology in order to train more Indigenous personnel, and by mandating in-service training for current railway engineers and academicians who lack skills in modern railway technology. In addition, Kenya could fund more locals to study railway technology at Chinese and other international institutions, thereby expanding the country's railway workforce. This will help close the skills gap and supplement the workforce that is already being trained in China. As the project progresses, it will not only address immediate concerns but also long-term ones, as it will give Kenya a future competitive advantage in sourcing skilled labor as SGR construction continues in other African nations. Staffing and skill transfer issues must be carefully addressed to avoid hostility between local employees and their Chinese counterparts, as well as a public backlash against foreign investments in Kenya. While attempting to alleviate Chinese investors' employment concerns toward the local people, many sociocultural perspectives must be considered. Employment practices can benefit both Kenyans and Chinese through shared learning and the convergence of diverse cultural beliefs and practices. More jobs are expected as the project's future phases are implemented, empowering thousands of households and alleviating poverty.

Generally, the SGR represents the modernization and growth of Kenya's transportation industry and society as a whole. In addition, Kenya's growing industrialization and urbanization are likely to create new transportation challenges that can only be effectively addressed by modern rail networks such as the SGR. Broadly speaking, the local economic implications of the SGR in Kenya are multidimensional, and the success of the project in

promoting sustainable economic development will depend on a thorough evaluation of both its negative and positive impacts.

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ABSTRACT

The interest of transportation economists is how to solve the economic problems of the movement of goods and people. Transportation has long been recognized as a vital determinant of the location of economic activity and therefore a policy tool for economic development. This study, hence, focused on Phase 1 of Kenya's SGR to examine its impacts on employment as well as its effects on land and property values. The study sampled 399 respondents through questionnaires and 30 through interviews, using a mixed research approach and a descriptive research design. From the data, the SGR project in Kenya has mixed economic effects. SGR generated

enough direct and indirect jobs for Kenyans. However, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the level of local participation in the management and operations of the SGR, as well as the caliber of jobs offered to Kenyans. As the number of qualified Kenyans increases, so should their involvement in SGR operations. Indisputably, SGR represents the modernization and growth of Kenya's transport industry and society as a whole.

KEYWORDS

Kenya. SGR. Economic Impacts. Railway. Infrastructure.

Received on August 25, 2022

Accepted on February 23, 2023

BRAZIL'S MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH NAMIBIA: ASPECTS OF A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Kamilla Raquel Rizzi¹

Naiane Inez Cossul²

Patrick Bueno³



Introduction

Brazil's African policy is a fundamental element in the creation, in the South Atlantic, of a concept of regional cooperation that allows Brazil and the African countries a space for autonomous maneuver in times of international crises. The rise of new power poles and the consolidation of economic blocs are evidence of the global transformations of the 21st century, leading the world system towards a new multipolar order.

In this context, the South Atlantic is once again viewed from a geostrategic and geopolitical perspective by Brazil, as a consequence of the relevance of the discovery of energy resources for national development in its jurisdictional waters, and due to its role as a means of communication with Africa. Thus, one can perceive a movement of Brazilian power projection within the scope of regional cooperation, particularly on the African continent, with claims of defense of national interest and regional security. Given that

¹ Department of International Relations, Universidade Federal do Pampa. Santana do Livramento, Brazil. PPGRI, Federal University of Santa Maria, Brazil. E-mail: kamillarizzi@unipampa.edu.br ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8462-7497>.

² Department of International Relations, Ritter dos Reis University Center. Porto Alegre, Brazil. E-mail: naianecossul@hotmail.com ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9006-9607>.

³ Department of International Relations, Universidade Federal do Pampa. Santana do Livramento, Brazil. E-mail: patrickbuenopinto@gmail.com ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7236-9825>.

[a] defense cooperation in the strategic environment is crucial for Brazil. Cooperation in this area is the best deterrent. Investing in this cooperation is not an act of generosity. It is the most effective (and probably the least costly) way to protect our interests and our integrity (Amorim 2016, 312, our translation)⁴.

In this way, it is understood that technical-military cooperation is a tool for power projection, as well as an opportunity to strengthen the relationships already established between countries. At the same time, military-technical cooperation can provide reciprocal gains, despite the asymmetries between countries, and allow the exchange of know-how between states. In view of this, this paper proposes to analyze why Brazil's military-technical cooperation with Namibia can be classified as strategic in the South Atlantic. As an initial hypothesis, the study starts from the assumption that the consolidation of Brazil's African policy and the intentions to strengthen its geopolitical position in its Strategic Environment was the major motivating factors for the military-technical rapprochement with Namibia and that this defense cooperation is of a strategic nature due to factors related to (a) Brazil's African policy, coupled with its defense policy, (b) the potential consumer market for the Brazilian defense industrial base and (c) the revaluation of the South Atlantic as an area of peace and cooperation.

Regarding the specific objectives, the article initially aims to analyze the geopolitical dynamics of the oceans and highlight their importance for the socioeconomic development of countries, examining the results of the relationship between Brazil and Namibia, especially the technical-military cooperation between Brazil and Namibia from 1991 to 2019. Thus, it can be stated that the research assumes a descriptive-explanatory character. With regard to procedures, the research will make use of the bibliographical review, with extensive research and documentary analysis of primary (official documents, speeches, among others), secondary and press sources. Methodologically, we opted for a qualitative research approach, in which the interpretation developed by researchers facing the case study predominates since this approach is concerned "with aspects of reality that cannot be quantified, focusing on understanding and explaining the dynamics of social relations" (Córdova and Silveira 2009, 32).

4 In the original: "[a] cooperação em defesa no entorno estratégico é crucial para o Brasil. A cooperação é, nesse âmbito, a melhor dissuasão. Investir nessa cooperação não é um ato de generosidade. É a maneira mais eficaz (e, provavelmente, a menos onerosa) de proteger nossos interesses e a nossa integridade" (Amorim 2016, 312).

Ocean: geostrategy, maritime power, and national defense

The current conjuncture of geopolitical changes in the international system reveals a tendency of disputes for the control of areas rich in strategic natural resources. Together with the logic of the capitalist interstate system and the high economic and demographic growth of certain countries, such as China and India, the oceans represent alternative sources in the geopolitical game of energy resources in the world. Besides this geostrategic role, the oceans play the role of communication routes between countries and are sources of immeasurable biodiversity. In this sense, being a vital source for the preservation of life on Earth, the oceans have been instrumentalized by humankind to supply its needs and accentuate human vehemence, directly compromising marine diversity.

According to Silva (2021), the 21st century has reaffirmed three trends related to maritime spaces: (a) the growing importance of the oceans in economic globalization and international politics; (b) the increase in tensions derived from the process of demarcation of maritime borders regulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); and, (c) as of 2017, the official return of competition between the great powers, announced in the U.S. National Security Strategy, published that year. Thus, the oceans are stages of conflict and cooperation in the current century. This is affirmed in Mahan's (1987) view on the control of the sea, being an influential factor in the economy and security of states.

If the dispute for the control of areas rich in strategic natural resources is currently moving forward, in parallel, according to Brozoski and Padula (2016), there are still two geopolitical movements that can be identified: the first, verified since the second half of the twentieth century, consists in the adoption, by central countries, of a foreign policy focused especially on the control of areas rich in strategic natural resources, raising the energy security policy as its main determinant; the second movement consists in the recent action of great powers and some emerging countries in order to ensure the dominance of oceanic mining zones.

With this, one can see that the oceans play a fundamental role not only for the population living on their shores but also for the national economy since this role becomes more relevant with the increase in competition between the powers in relation to energy resources and by the logic of economic globalization. Besides oil, there are other natural resources found at the bottom of the oceans, whose demand has been growing sharply by countries. This is because metals found in these reserves can contribute to

the development of strategic industries of important world economies. With the advance of technological development in deep waters and the possible exhaustion of mineral reserves on land, it can be said that a new frontier of global mining is emerging. This is a concerted maneuver between governments and large corporations to secure access and dominance over the still existing and abundant raw material reserves (Brozoski and Padula 2016).

In this geopolitical context, the Atlantic Ocean, more specifically its southern part, has historically been a peripheral portion in economic globalization and international politics. However, according to Silva (2021), this aspect is being attenuated, mainly due to its role in providing natural resources for more developed countries, either as an energy source or as a means of transportation, and by the intensification of the dispute between the great powers to conquer markets, influence, and gain the support of countries in the region. In addition, according to Pereira (2013), the ocean regained its importance due to two external events: (a) the oil crisis in the 1970s, which promoted the debate on delimited maritime borders and the exploitation of its natural resources; and (b) the inability of the two current intercontinental passages - Suez and Panama - to support larger vessels, resulting in increased pressures in the region.

In this sense, as verified, the South Atlantic has regained geo-economic and geopolitical importance due to the revaluation of its natural resources and the change of political geography's axis towards the South. For this reason and among others, cooperation on strategic issues and the development of political-strategic concertation mechanisms at the regional level become crucial for this region to remain cooperative and peaceful. In this sense, regional bodies such as the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (*Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul*, ZOPACAS in Portuguese), the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (*Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa*, CPLP in Portuguese) stand out with the aim of safeguarding sovereignty and maintaining dialogue among its member states.

Thus, the instrumentalization of the sea and inland waters is understood as elements of political and military action, as well as factors of economic and social development, aiming to conquer and maintain national objectives (Fortuna 1983). In this way, maritime power linked to economic interests and national security becomes indispensable, because, for Silva (2017):

Sea power as the ability of a state to exploit or influence the range of sea-related activities in the political, economic, social, environmental, and military domains (Silva 2017, 238).

However, there is a set of efforts necessary for the concreteness of an effective Maritime Power: the existence of norms and guiding principles of the state, in all sectors of maritime activities, identifying objectives and discriminating the essential means to achieve the relations between Nation and sea (Fortuna 1983). If we apply Mahan's (1908) four factors to frame a state in maritime power (positioning and physiography, territorial extent, psychosocial aspect, and government policy), we conclude that Brazil and Namibia can be classified as maritime countries, in varying degrees of historical-economic potential.

Given the incapacity of the military forces of some countries in the South Atlantic region, as well as the inadequate military strategy regarding regional maritime security, these countries become vulnerable to the penetration of external forces and international organized crime - piracy, and drug trafficking. To deal with these challenges and maintain the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and cooperation, South Atlantic countries have sought answers within the framework of technical cooperation at the South-South level.

For Brazil, the South Atlantic is a priority area for its national interests. The turning point for a more pragmatic attitude towards the region was the discovery of the pre-salt layer in Brazilian waters in 2007. From that moment on, the country dedicated internal and external efforts to adequate action for the protection and exploitation of this reserve. Thus, it relaunched the Brazilian maritimity to strengthen its African policy. In view of this, the country has developed projects and agreements to ensure this region of peace and cooperation, as expressed in the 2020 National Defense White Papers:

Brazil has a special interest in the peace and security of the South Atlantic. This ocean has strategic areas that are relevant and of vital importance for world and national trade. For this reason, it pays special attention to building a cooperative environment in the South Atlantic under the aegis of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS). The increase in incidents of piracy and robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, for example, highlights the importance of strengthening the ZOPACAS, with a view to contributing to the development of the capabilities of the coastal states of that Gulf to provide maritime security and stability in the region. The cooperation maintained in the scope of ZOPACAS extends to environmental and sustainability issues (Brasil 2020, 17, our translation)⁵.

In this sense, the historical and cultural ties between Brazil and its African neighbors acquire new aspects as international relations become more complex with the emergence of new security and political challenges, as well as the interference of extra-regional powers in the regional agenda. By means of political-regional concertation and the strengthening of South-South Cooperation, these countries seek answers to the new emerging challenges of the current 21st century. Thus, the sum of joint efforts and the common responsibilities assumed characterize this region, which seeks to maintain peace and cooperation.

Military-Technical Cooperation between Brazil and Namibia

The third update of the National Defense Policy (*Política Nacional de Defesa*, PND in Portuguese), of 2012, and the National Defense Strategy (*Estratégia Nacional de Defesa*, END in Portuguese), of the same year, mentioned the regional environment and Brazil's strategic environment, in which the country visualizes an environment that goes beyond the South American region and includes the South Atlantic and the countries bordering Africa. Thus, for the first time, the Brazilian government expressed its strategic

5 In the original: "O Brasil tem especial interesse na paz e segurança do Atlântico Sul. Esse oceano possui áreas estratégicas relevantes e de vital importância para o comércio mundial e nacional. Por isso, dedica especial atenção à construção de um ambiente cooperativo no Atlântico Sul, sob a égide da Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul (ZOPACAS). O aumento de incidentes de pirataria e roubo no Golfo da Guiné, por exemplo, evidencia a importância de fortalecimento da ZOPACAS, com vistas a contribuir para o desenvolvimento das capacidades dos Estados costeiros daquele Golfo de prover a segurança marítima e a estabilidade na região. A cooperação mantida no âmbito da ZOPACAS estende-se a temas ambientais e de sustentabilidade" (Brasil 2020, 17).

interest in the African continent in a public policy in line with a strategy. However, cooperation in the area of Defense with African countries dates back to the release of the PND and the END of 2012, this is because the first cooperation agreements of this military nature were established in 1994, with the signing of commitments with Namibia and Cape Verde (Brasil 2012).

In turn, the relationship between Brazil and Namibia precedes the independence of this African country, since President José Sarney received the Namibian leader of SWAPO (South West African People's Organization), Sam Nujoma, in 1987, which can be considered the first step towards future bilateral cooperation. Since the beginning of Namibia's struggle for independence, Brazil supported the favorable position in the UN. The declaration of ZOPACAS itself, of Brazilian initiative, stressed the importance of eliminating the *Apartheid* regime from the shores of the South Atlantic to ensure peace and regional cooperation. This position gave Brazil important diplomatic prestige in its future relations with Namibia.

In the field of Defense, the cooperation between Brazil and Namibia is the longest-running cooperation executed by Brazil on the African continent. In the field of activities conducted by the Brazilian Navy, cooperation allowed for the structuring of Namibia's naval force, the training, improvement, and specialization of personnel in Brazilian military schools, the implementation of a military education model based on the Brazilian one, the adoption of a military ceremonial, and uniforms and equipment derived from those of the Brazilian Navy. In relation to the Brazilian Army, cooperation was of much lower intensity and for a brief period. In general, an institutional model was exported to a country in Brazil's strategic environment. Moreover, it enabled a closer relationship between the two nations, increasing trust (Pereira et al. 2021).

The Naval Agreement between Brazil and Namibia symbolizes a historic milestone between the two Navies, as well as a strategic collaboration between the two signatory countries. The first formal step between the two parties in the naval sphere was the joint communiqué signed by Namibian President Sam Nujoma and President Fernando Collor on September 13, 1991, when the then Brazilian president traveled to the African country. According to the document, the presidents agreed to create a joint cooperation commission to consider, among other issues, the proposal of "a protocol on Maritime Cooperation" (Almeida 2012).

The relationship intensified in 1994 when the Naval Cooperation Agreement between Brazil and Namibia was signed. This agreement provided

for some goods and services supplied by Brazil, through the Brazilian Navy, to the Namibian Ministry of Defense:

1. Execution of a complete hydrographic survey or update of existing surveys of the Namibian coastline [...].
2. Deployment of a navigation aid system [...]
3. Delimitation of the limits of the territorial sea and jurisdictional waters [...] and assistance to the Government of Namibia during negotiations for the establishment of maritime lateral boundaries [...].
4. Determination of the safest routes for coastal navigation.
5. Organization, within the Naval Wing of the Ministry of Defense, of a Maritime Patrol Service, for the purpose of protecting the national interests of the Republic of Namibia in its territorial sea and jurisdictional waters [...]. Such service shall also ensure the maintenance of law and order in those waters.
6. Provision of ships appropriate to the needs of the Naval Wing [...].
7. Planning and developing the appropriate infrastructure to host and logistically support such ships (Almeida 2012, 40, our translation)⁶.

As for financial responsibilities, the Brazilian Navy was responsible for the total costs of training officers and enlisted personnel in Brazil, while Namibia was responsible for travel expenses and salaries. Thus, the training of personnel took place at various levels, totaling 466 vacancies, of which forty-eight were for officers and 418 for enlistees. In the same year, the Brazilian Mission in Namibia was created on May 2, 1994.

6 In the original:

1. “Execução de um levantamento hidrográfico completo ou atualização dos levantamentos existentes do litoral namibiano [...].
2. Implantação de um sistema de auxílio à navegação [...]
3. Delimitação dos limites do mar territorial e das águas jurisdicionais [...] e assistência ao Governo da Namíbia durante as negociações para o estabelecimento das fronteiras laterais marítimas [...].
4. Determinação das rotas mais seguras para a navegação costeira.
5. Organização, dentro da Ala Naval do Ministério da Defesa, de um Serviço de Patrulha Marítimo, com o propósito de proteger os interesses nacionais da República da Namíbia em seu mar territorial e águas jurisdicionais [...]. Tal serviço deverá, também, garantir a manutenção da lei e da ordem naquelas águas.
6. Provimento de navios apropriados às necessidades da Ala Naval [...].
7. Planejamento e desenvolvimento da infraestrutura adequada para sediar e apoiar logisticamente tais navios” (Almeida 2012, 40).

The Naval Projects Management Company (*Empresa Gerencial de Projetos Navais*, EMGEPRON in Portuguese), a public company created on September 9, 1982, is linked to the Ministry of Defense through the Brazilian Navy Command, acting in project management, contracted by the Brazilian Navy and began to participate in the negotiations and execution of the following stages. With the Brazilian Naval Mission in Namibia (*Missão Naval Brasileira na Namíbia*, MNBN in Portuguese), activities related to the education and training of Naval Wing personnel in Namibia began. In 1997, the Brazilian Navy sent a delegation to Namibia that included representatives from EMGEPRON to analyze the hydrographic survey and the development of logistical support infrastructure. That same year, the hydrographic vessel “Sirius” performed the surveys required to update the nautical chart of the Namibian port, and this service was provided free of charge to Namibia. The Directorate of Civil Works (DCM) also contributed to the initial design of the Walvis Bay Naval Base (*Base Naval Walvis Bay*, BNWB in Portuguese) (Almeida 2012).

Due to the Asian crisis, in 1997, and the Russian crisis, in 1998, Brazil and Namibia faced certain difficulties in fulfilling the goals of the Naval Agreement. For this reason, a new agreement was proposed in 1999, which did not include a clause on the cost of courses by Brazil. In 2001, a new cooperation agreement was signed, in which the costs are the responsibility of the executing agencies, intensifying bilateral cooperation. From this new agreement, the Brazilian Navy proposed to provide Namibia, as expressed in Article II, paragraph 1: “the parties will cooperate with each other in order to create and strengthen the Naval Wing of the Government of the Republic of Namibia” (Brasil 2003, our translation)⁷.

Thus, the Brazilian Navy has committed to providing the Government of Namibia with the following goods and services under this Cooperation Agreement (Brasil 2003):

1. To assist in the organization, within the Naval Wing of the Government of the Republic of Namibia, of a Maritime Patrol Service to protect the national interests of the Republic of Namibia in its internal waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, especially with regard to the protection of the living and mineral resources of the continental shelf;
2. Vessels capable of meeting the needs of the Naval Wing of the Government of the Republic of Namibia;

⁷ In the original: “as partes cooperarão entre si com o objetivo de criar e fortalecer a Ala Naval do Governo da República da Namíbia” (Brasil 2003)..

3. Assist in the planning and development of an appropriate berthing and logistical support infrastructure for such vessels (Brasil 2003, n.p., our translation)⁸.

Also in 2001, a contract was signed between EMGEPRON and the government of Namibia for the execution of the Continental Shelf Survey (*Levantamento da Plataforma Continental*, LEPLAC in Portuguese). This company directed the entire service, resulting in the submission of Namibia's request to the United Nations Boundary Commission, in May 2009. In the same year, 2002, EMGEPRON signed with the Namibian Ministry of Defense the contract for the construction of the Patrol Vessel, when the first payment of the financing occurred (Almeida 2012).

In 2003, Brazilian foreign policy began to strengthen South-South relations, allowing for greater dialogue between the two nations and convergence between diplomatic initiatives and the fulfillment of the goals of the Naval Agreement. That year, Brazil donated the corvette "Purus" to the Namibian government, which was transferred to the country in 2004 (Seabra 2014). It is important to note that Namibia analyzed the possibility of establishing an agreement with other countries, including the United States, Israel, and Norway, but the reason that led the Namibian government to choose Brazil was due to its pacifist vocation, distance from international conflicts and the stage of development of the Brazilian Navy (Scofiel *apud* Almeida 2012).

The major obstacle to the sale of patrol vessels (*navios-patrolha*, NP in Portuguese) and the construction of the BNWB was the limited financial resources of the Namibian Navy. The acquisition of the first NP would take place in 2004, while the construction of the BNWB would be carried out by a Chinese company. In addition to the financial limitations of the Namibian government to acquire Brazilian naval assets and equipment, the Namibian government has taken a stance on requesting external financing to acquire Brazilian-made products. Recently, offers of goods and services under conces-

⁸ In the original:

1. "Assistir na organização, no âmbito da Ala Naval do Governo da República da Namíbia, de um Serviço de Patrulha Marítima, para proteger os interesses nacionais da República da Namíbia em suas águas internas, mar territorial e zona econômica exclusiva, especialmente no que se refere à proteção dos recursos vivos e minerais da plataforma continental;
2. Embarcações capazes de satisfazer às necessidades da Ala Naval do Governo da República da Namíbia;
3. Assistir no planejamento e desenvolvimento de uma infraestrutura apropriada à atracação e suporte logístico para tais embarcações" (Brasil 2003, s.p.).

sional conditions have been presented by foreign powers, especially China, whose operations on the African continent deepen every year: in the case of Namibia, China provides regular support to “[...] Namibia’s Air Force, which already operates Chinese training aircraft and fighter jets [...]” and in the naval area, there was the acquisition of the NAPLog Elephant, a logistics support ship of over 2,500 tons, built in Wuhan Shipyard, China (Almeida 2012, 16).

As of 2006, the Technical Support Group was incorporated into the Brazil-Namibia relationship, with the objective of assisting in the creation of the Marine Infantry Battalion. The submission of the Namibian bid, with Brazilian support, to the UN Commission on the Limits of Continental Platforms (CLCS), in 2009, proposed the extension of jurisdictional waters (UN 2009).

In 2009, a new agreement was signed between the two countries on cooperation in the sphere of defense, whose terms follow those established in the 2001 agreement. In the same year, the Grajaú-class patrol vessel Brendan Sinbwaye, built by the Ceará Naval Industry (Indústria Naval do Ceará, INACE in Portuguese), was delivered to the Namibian Navy, as well as two Marlim-class patrol boats: the HPB20 Terrace Bay and HPB21 Möwe Bay. As part of the organization of the Namibian Navy, the Brazilian Navy activated the Naval Advisory Mission (Missão de Assessoria Naval, MAN in Portuguese) in Namibia itself. This MAN composition was an evolution of the organization previously adopted with the Technical Support Groups (TSG) in 2006. In the period from 2006 to 2009, the Brazilian Navy deployed six TSGs with several different compositions and attributions (Freitas 2009).

In 2010, the 1st Naval Advisory Mission was activated in order to provide military, technical, and administrative advice to the Namibian Navy, with the purpose of contributing to the structuring and growth of the Namibian Navy. Also in 2010, another action was taken in the area of Navy organization, with the activation of the Marine Corps TSG, headed by a Sea and War Captain, with three other officers and eight enlistees, in order to develop the Namibian Marine Corps (Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais da Namíbia, CFN-N in Portuguese). The tasks that corresponded to this TSG were: the formation of the Marine Infantry Battalion; the creation of the Marine Soldier Training Course; and the development of the Namibian Marine Ceremonial (Freitas 2019).

In the period from 2012 to 2014, MAN’s main activities were advisory services in the areas of preparation of publications and procedures; implementation of the planned maintenance system concept; structuring of the new pier at the new Naval Base; conducting training sessions on board the Namibian Navy’s resources; and contributing to the implementation of

the Sailors Training Course. Furthermore, assistance was provided for the Operational Inspection of the NApLog Elephant (Freitas 2019).

In the period from 2009 to 2019, Namibian military personnel took the Sailor Training Course (Curso de Formação de Marinheiros, C-FMN in Portuguese), the Specialization Course (Curso de Especialização, C-Espc in Portuguese) - training of military personnel to the rank of corporal, and the Special Qualification Course for Sergeant (Curso Especial de Habilitação a Sargento, C-EspHabSG/Ap in Portuguese), which qualifies military personnel to the rank of third sergeant. For comparison purposes, in the period from 1998 to 2008, the annual average of Namibian military personnel attending the Admiral Alexandrino Instruction Center (CIAA) was twenty-eight per year, while in the period from 2009 to 2019, the average was fifty-seven. At the Admiral Sylvio de Camargo Instruction Center (CIASC), 139 military personnel were trained for the CFN-N from 2009 to 2019 (Freitas 2019). Between 2003 and 2013, a total of 1,933 African defense officers, among which 1,897 Namibian Navy officers, were trained at specialized institutions such as the Naval College (EM), Naval War College (EGN), and the Almirante Alexandrino Instruction Center (Seabra 2014).

As part of the activities developed in Namibia, the first Infantry Specialization Course for the training of corporals was held in 2013, as well as the first special operations basic training (Feitas 2019). On July 22, 2016, the Namibian Marine Corps (CFN-N) was officially activated, symbolizing a symbolic act in the field of cooperation between Brazil and Namibia and excellent Brazilian work in relation to its contribution to the development of the Namibian Navy (Brasil 2016).

In 2014, Agrale, a Brazilian company, signed an agreement to sell 141 units of the Marruá vehicle to Namibia. These vehicles are used by the Brazilian Armed Forces, as well as by the armies of Argentina and Ecuador (Agrale 2014). In the same year, a Cooperation Agreement was signed between the Brazilian Army and the Namibian Army, which means a thickening of technical cooperation between the two countries in the field of Defense. Thus, the presence of Brazilian instructors at the Namibian Military Academy was recorded, as well as the sending of Namibian military personnel to conduct courses in Brazil (Freitas 2019).

With regard to the vessel supply axis, there has been considerable intervention from the Chinese presence. In 2012, the Namibian Navy received the NApLog Elephant ship from the Chinese Navy.

In 2016, the Chinese government donated two patrol vessels, the C12 Daures and the C13 Brukkaros, which were incorporated into Nami-

bia in 2017. According to Almeida (2012), the difficulty of obtaining credit directed to Namibia by Brazilian government agencies would result in the delivery of the ship offered by Brazil. In February 2013, the then Minister of Defense, Celso Amorim, stressed the strengthening of relations between the two countries in the field of defense, extending to areas of aeronautics and the Army as had occurred in the field of the Navy (Almeida 2012; Freitas 2019).

With regard to the supply of vessels, according to Freitas (2019), it can be seen that Brazil has not found an efficient way to sell its products to the Namibian government, due to its inability to sensitize the political level in making it easier to obtaining credits for Brazilian banks. It would be substantial at the political level to rethink the provision of credits, through BNDES (*Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social*, in Portuguese) or another source, for soft financing.

In the scope of planning and development assistance, according to Almeida (2012), although Brazil has several contractors with the necessary expertise to execute the works, the difficulty of financing by Brazilian banks did not allow the construction of the base, leaving it to Chinese construction companies.

In order to better understand the results of the military-technical cooperation between Brazil and Namibia, the following chart was prepared:

Box 1: Military-Technical Cooperation between Brazil and Namibia (1991/2019)

Date/Period	Activity
13/09/199	Joint communiqué between the presidents, Sam Nujoma, Namibian president, and Fernando Collor, Brazilian president. The document stressed the intention to create a joint cooperation commission to consider, among other issues, the proposal of “a protocol”. On that occasion, the Brazilian president traveled to Namibia.
04/03/1994	Naval Cooperation Agreement between Brazil and Namibia signed.
1994	Visit of the Frigate Niterói to the port of Walvis Bay.
1994	South Africa hands over the Port of Walvis Bay to Namibia
1994	Creation of the Brazilian Naval Mission in Namibia (MNBC). Training of human resources, at various levels, totaling 466 vacancies, forty-eight for officers and 418 for enlistees.
1994/1998	First phase: first military personnel in the instruction centers of the Brazilian Navy (RJ): instruction in Portuguese.

Date/Period	Activity
1997	The Brazilian Navy sent a delegation that included representatives from EMGEPRON to analyze the hydrographic survey and logistical support infrastructure development.
1997	Contribution of the Directorate of Navy Civil Works (DCM) in the initial design of the Walvis Bay Naval Base (BNWB).
2001	New Cooperation Agreement between the two governments. In addition to maintaining the objectives of the 1994 agreement, it included assistance to the organization of the Maritime Patrol Service, the supply of vessels, assistance for the planning and development of appropriate infrastructure for berthing and logistical support for vessels, and the establishment of the Brazilian Naval Mission in Namibia. The costs of the military training in Brazil are now borne by Namibia.
2001/2015	Contract between EMGEPRON and the government of Namibia for the execution of the Continental Shelf Survey.
2003	Brazil donated the corvette "Purus" to the Namibian government, transferred to the country in 2004.
2003/2013	A total of 1,933 African defense officers, among them 1,897 Namibian Navy officers, were trained at specialized institutions such as the Naval College (EM), the Naval War College (EGN), and the Admiral Alexandrino Training Center.
1998/2004	Second phase: a growing number of military students in Brazil - more than eight hundred professionals. Beginning of payment for courses in 1999.
2004	Creation of the Namibian Navy and scheduled reduction of courses in Brazil.
2006	Incorporation of the Technical Support Group, whose objective was to assist in the creation of the Marine Infantry Battalion
2009/2016	Establishment of the Naval and Navy Training Schools (military and technical) in Walvis Bay.
2009	Submission of the Namibian bid to the Continental Shelf Boundary Commission
2009	New Agreement signed between the two countries, whose terms follow the same as those established in the 2001 agreement.
2009	Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim's visit to Namibia.
2009	The Brendan Sinbwaye Patrol Ship, of the Grajaú class, built by the Ceará Naval Industry, and two patrol boats, of the Marlim class, were delivered to the Namibian Government.

Date/Period	Activity
2009	Activation of the Naval Advisory Mission by the Brazilian Navy in Namibia. 2010: First Naval Advisory Mission was activated in order to provide military, technical and administrative advice to the Namibian Navy.
2006/2009	Six Technical Support Groups have been sent to Namibia by the Brazilian Government.
2010	Activation of the Marine Technical Support Group, headed by a Sea and War Captain, with a call-up of three more officers and eight enlistees.
2013	The first Infantry Specialization course for training corporals and the first basic special operations training was held.
2012/2014	The main activities developed by MAN were the advisory services in the following areas: elaboration of publications and procedures; implementation of the planned maintenance system concept; structuring of the new Naval Base pier; conducting on-board training sessions with Namibian Navy resources; and contributing to the Sailors Training Course.
2014	The Brazilian company, Agrale, has sold 141 units of the Marruá vehicle to Namibia.
2014	Cooperation Agreement signed between the Brazilian Army and the Namibian Army. A Portuguese School was created at the Osona Base - Okahandja, with nineteen students, five for AMAN.
2016	Namibia's Marine Corps has been officially activated.
2016	Fifty students at the Portuguese School, eleven of them for cartography. The MRE (Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Portuguese acronym) materialized the study program for civilians (62 students, with training for civilian decision-makers and a great general business environment) (EMBRAER/Abílio Diniz).
2009/2019	Namibian military personnel have taken the Sailor Training Course (C-FMN), the Specialization Course (C-Espc) - training military personnel in the rank of corporal, and the Special Qualification Course for Sergeant (C-EspHabSG/Ap), which inhabits military personnel in the rank of third sergeant.
1998/2008	The annual average of Namibian military personnel attending the Admiral Alexandrino Training Center (CIAA) was twenty-eight per year.
2009/2019	The average number of military personnel attending the Admiral Alexandrino Training Center was fifty-seven per year.

Source: prepared by the authors, based on Almeida (2012), Seabra (2014), and Freitas (2019).

Table 1 above shows that the training of human resources (first in Brazilian territory and then in Namibian territory) is one of the main features of the cooperation, along with projects and technical support actions (maintenance of vessels and facilities), advisory services, and logistical support. The main challenges are Namibia's financial constraints on the purchase of goods and equipment from the Brazilian industrial base and competition with products from other countries.

The main actions of the Brazilian Navy in Namibia involved the creation of the Naval Advisory Mission (MAN) and the Marine Technical Support Group. It also conducted the mapping of the port of Walvis Bay, in 1994, in addition to continuous professional training courses. The donation of a corvette to the Namibian Navy, the acquisition of an NPa-200 and two patrol boats (being the first importing country of this product) by Namibia, technical support for the construction of the New Naval Base, and the acquisition of uniforms. The permanent maintenance of ships, by means of advice and parts, advice on communications, the start of Namibia's Military Agreement with the Brazilian Army in 2014, and the creation, in 2016, of the Technical School of the Namibian Navy. There was also the acquisition of 200 Marruá (Agrale) vehicles, various combat equipment via EMGEPRON, the inauguration of the CFN Training Center, and the creation of the 1st Infantry Battalion in July 2016, with the presence of the Brazilian Ambassador and the COMGER (as collected in Almeida (2012); Seabra (2014); Freitas (2019); Pereira et al. (2021). For Teixeira et al.,

Naturally, the most consistent reflexes can be observed in relation to the cooperation implemented by the Brazilian Navy. After 24 years of exchanges, most of the decision-makers in the Namibian Navy have gone through Brazilian training, specialization, or improvement schools. Virtually the entire high command of the Force went through Brazilian Navy schools, and most of the Namibian officers speak Portuguese. But it is in relation to the insertion of Brazilian defense products that aspects of interest are observed (Teixeira et al. 2021, 90, our translation)⁹.

9 In the original: *"Naturalmente, é em relação à cooperação posta em prática pela Marinha do Brasil que se observam reflexos mais consistentes. Após 24 anos de intercâmbios, grande parte dos elementos em posição de decisão na Marinha da Namíbia passaram por escolas de formação, especialização ou aperfeiçoamento brasileiras. Praticamente todo o alto-comando da Força passou por escolas da Marinha do Brasil e boa parte da oficialidade namibiana fala a língua portuguesa. Mas é em relação à inserção de produtos de defesa brasileiros que se observam aspectos de interesse"* (Teixeira et al. 2021, 90).

In particular, the market for defense products operates autonomously, and it is up to the states to determine the rules for opening their respective defense markets to foreign competition. Therefore, we agree with Soares (2015) that “the state, in addition to the fundamental role played in making commercialization financially viable, must play a commercial promotion role as an agent of political guarantee in operations related to defense products” (Soares 2015, 52, our translation)¹⁰. The intention to expand the market for Brazilian products by the Brazilian Navy has been observed since the beginning of activities under the Naval Agreement with Namibia. However, as previously reported, there were internal impediments that made it impossible to sell a larger number of naval equipment (Almeida 2012), in addition to localized Chinese competition in this sector.

As a result of the systemic changes that occurred in the post-Cold War period, it was observed that the “power vacuum” in the South Atlantic allowed Brazil to present itself as a viable partner for the young African nation. Together with Namibia’s posture of staying away from international conflicts, Brazil was configured as a partner country to guide the Namibian Navy to progressively obtain autonomy in the fulfillment of its tasks. For Brazil, the Naval Agreement presented itself as an opportunity to project the Brazilian Navy as a reliable and professional institution before the international community, especially to South Atlantic countries..

Conclusion

This paper sought to analyze why Brazil’s technical-military cooperation with Namibia can be classified as strategic in the South Atlantic. Through documentary analysis as a methodological procedure and supported by bibliographic research, the three independent variables of the initial hypothesis were corroborated, since (a) Brazil’s African policy combined with its defense policy, (b) the potentiality of the consumer market for the Brazilian defense industrial base, and (c) the revaluation of the South Atlantic as an area of peace and cooperation are the legitimizing factors of this action.

Since 2005, Brazil’s African policy has been progressively combined with its defense policy, a process that has been empirically evidenced in the implementation of the concept of the strategic environment and the activi-

¹⁰ In the original: “o Estado, além do papel fundamental exercido na viabilização financeira da comercialização, compete desempenhar funções de promoção comercial como agente da garantia política nas operações ligadas a produtos de defesa” (Soares 2015, 52).

ties focused on it since then - a clear case of the cooperation under analysis. The demand for the expansion of the Brazilian defense industrial base, also present in the country's defense documents, served as another driving force for this cooperation, in the sense of opening the market to Brazilian products, as a first step towards the subsequent expansion of demands. It was noticed that Brazilian foreign policy, through diplomacy and a non-interventionist stance, opened ways for the private sector, such as the service provided by EMGEPRON, as well as its technical work.

However, attention should be paid to its still incipient character, besides the constant Chinese competition on the African continent. At first glance, the figures provided by Brazil may seem small. However, one must consider the context of a nascent economy, as was the case with Namibia. We see that military-technical cooperation plays the role of an instrument for the promotion of defense products, capable of boosting sales of national products. Through military-technical cooperation and contact with foreign military personnel and the governments of other states, the promotion of these products was boosted. In general, the longevity of the cooperation made it possible to establish a certain level of influence at the highest decision-making levels of the Namibian Navy and provided gains for Brazil.

Added to these variables is the international political situation of the first two decades of the 21st century, which has revitalized interest in the South Atlantic as a geostrategic area, whether for countries bordering the Atlantic or for extra-regional countries. The exploitation of the potential of maritime resources becomes vital to safeguard the interests and promote the national development of states. For this reason and others, the South Atlantic is configured as a priority area for Brazil, providing a large platform of possibilities for development and cooperation. Consequently, Brasilia's actions indicate its intention to maintain this area as a zone of cooperation and peace, ensuring that no country can interfere with its integrity and national sovereignty.

It was observed that, in the context of the Brazilian Navy, technical cooperation enabled the structuring of Namibia's naval force, and the training and specialization of Namibians in Brazilian military schools, based on Brazilian know-how. In turn, the cooperation allowed Brazilians to technically approach a country that is part of Brazil's Strategic Environment. In this sense, a motivating factor for technical-military cooperation with Namibia is confirmed, since we observe a movement of Brazilian power projection in the context of regional cooperation, particularly on the African continent, with claims of defense of national interest and regional security.

The purpose of Brazil's policy for the South Atlantic has been to maintain it as a zone of peace and cooperation, free from extra-regional threats, a desire shared by the African countries bordering it, as configured in the ZOPACAS declaration. Since this is a predominantly maritime space, naval power becomes an essential instrument in supporting that policy. In July 2014, Namibia became an Associated Observer of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), a fact that symbolizes the intention of that country to get qualitatively closer not only to its neighbors Angola and Mozambique but to all Member states of the Community, such as Brazil. Therefore, Brazil-Namibia cooperation in the area of defense, besides being bilateral, has the potential to become multilateral.

Finally, the Naval Agreement between Brazil and Namibia symbolizes a triumph of political, diplomatic, and military value to the Brazilian foreign and defense policies, for its longevity and for the concrete results, therefore, it concludes, of strategic value. The trust and cooperation between the two sides of the South Atlantic only reinforce and consolidate peace and cooperation in this region. Thus, the agreement provided reciprocal gains, allowing Brazil greater insertion in West Africa, while giving Namibia the structuring of its naval force and marines, as well as the survey of its continental shelf, which was taken to submit to the United Nations the claim of expansion of Namibian jurisdictional waters.

The theme opens new research opportunities and the need to disseminate, through scientific knowledge, the mutual gains that South-South Cooperation can provide to countries, since it has been confirmed that the relationship between Brazil and Namibia has generated reciprocal gains, despite its asymmetries.

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ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes why Brazil's technical-military cooperation with Namibia can be classified as strategic in the South Atlantic. As a hypothesis, the study starts from the assumption that the consolidation of Brazil's African policy and the intentions to reinforce its geopolitical position in its Strategic Environment were the main motivating factors for the military-technical rapprochement with Namibia and that this defense cooperation has become strategic due to factors related to (a) Brazil's African policy combined with its defense policy, (b) the potentiality of a consumer market for the Brazilian defense industrial base, and (c) the revaluation of the South Atlantic as an area of peace and cooperation. Based on the hypothetical-deductive method and the document analysis and bibliographic survey procedure, it can be verified that cooperation between Brazil and Namibia has significantly contributed to guaranteeing the sovereignty of the Namibian state. In turn, the Naval Agreement between Brazil and Namibia symbolizes a triumph of unquestionable value to Brazilian foreign policy.

KEYWORDS

Brazil. Namibia. Defense cooperation. South Atlantic.

Received on April 26, 2023

Accepted on May 12, 2023

Translated by Henrique Leal de Moura