TRUST IN POLITICAL POWER AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE: 2014-2018

Kátia Sara Henriques Xavier Zeca[1]

Introduction

Thinking about the state in the African context is a challenge, considering that it arises under the influence of conflicts, advances and setbacks, in addition to identity construction. The debate in Africa is heavily influenced by nationalist movements and struggles for self-determination. The colonies imbued and linked to the colonial government were devoid of autonomy and autonomous capacity to build and develop their ideals. The processes of state formation are closely linked to the processes of self-determination. Politics in Africa is usually seen from the top to the bottom. Political scientists focus their analysis on the individual, in this case, on the presidents or members of the government (Ministers and Prime Minister, in the case of Mozambique). Political development can be summed up as the distinction between national institutions and the dominant single party or armed intervention system (Bratton 2013).

Bratton (2013) argues that interest in social issues and political rights arises among scientific analysts almost 30 years after independence, around the first decade of the 21st century. Aspects such as civic associations, the informal economy, street protests, and the emergence of political opposition are beginning to gain some strength and relevance in some societies. In Mozambique, there is much research carried out by the Institute of Economic and Development Studies (IESE, in Portuguese) (Brito 2007, 2011; Forquilha 2017) in which various topics related to political behavior, political participation, abstention, decentralization or institutions of the political power, matters of extreme importance to think the state in Mozambique.

1 Social Sciences and Languages Department, Universidade Joaquim Chissano. Mozambique, Maputo. E-mail: ksarahxavier@gmail.com

In Bratton's *Voting and Democratic Citizenship in Africa* (2013), the author brings a debate about what is happening in Africa in terms of voting. What are the motivations that lead voters to the polls? A number of issues are raised and discussed in this work. In order to legitimize their political actions in the eyes of the population, African leaders were forced to implement multiparty rules for the exercise of power. However, the literature points to manipulation of electoral processes, patronage, violence and party domination at the institutional level.

Speaking of state building, in Africa this phenomenon is also associated with elections, which tend to be contested due to corruption and the existence of a clientelistic elite. Political parties are often personalists, dominated by an elite, and internally undemocratic, thus forming national assemblies that are little or nothing representative and far from popular demands (Bratton 2013).

Other authors, such as Shaapera (2012) discuss some conceptions of the state, its emergence, its purpose and functions, using Nigeria as an example. One aspect to reinforce is that the author defends the need to think the state, taking into account the satisfaction of basic needs, as found in Sen (2000) and Inglehart and Welzel (2009). This perspective becomes relevant because, in some of these states, democratization processes emerge at a time when it is at the heart of the debate on the development and capabilities of the individual.

Shaapera (2012) also defends that the state in the Third World must be thought taking into account the basic needs of man. In this case, the main objective is access to infrastructure, drinking water, goods and services, transportation and communications networks, regular energy, safe and quality homes, health and quality education. These are concerns of a specific state, but with some similarity to other African states, such as Mozambique or Angola. There is no consensus in defining the origins of the state, there are several theoretical perspectives, divine theories (São Tomás de Aquino), social, natural state theory or Social Contract Theory (Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau) or the state as the result of a natural evolution.

The post-colonial state emerges from a situation of conflict and operates as a form of instrument of domination, in which political power is maintained, generating a weak and underdeveloped state with a relative degree of development. Looking at the latest data on the Human Development Index (HDI), it can be seen that countries with a low HDI are mostly African, such as Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Mozambique, Angola, São Tomé and Príncipe, among others (UNDP 2015).

Mozambique is a state that resulted from a negotiation and transfer of command from colonial power to the recognized liberating movement, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO, in Portuguese), and which is in consolidation of its democratization processes. It is also important to emphasize that the debates around the state by theorists have some gaps, but this is not to say that they do not exist. Researchers are concerned with analyzing society, institutions, participation processes and electoral behavior that currently govern a society. The dominant elite, at the same time as the state thought, built the Rule of Law and these two processes happen simultaneously.

Thinking about the state in Mozambique is, at the same time, reflecting on its construction process, very marked by external forces and internal turbulences (colonial period and civil war). With just over 40 years old, he still has many challenges to face, in social, economic, political and cultural aspects. However, the experiences lived by other countries are an essential tool to analyze the young state, and from there draw lessons that allow to perceive and analyze the same (Xavier-Zeca 2019).

The purpose of this article is to understand voters' confidence in the institutions of political power in Mozambique. The question that arises is what is the level of voter confidence in the institutions of political power? For the purposes of this research, the following political institutions were considered: Assembly of the Republic, National Election Commission (CNE, in Portuguese), Police, Army and Judicial Courts. Throughout the text, the CNE is emphasized because it is the institution responsible for managing the entire electoral process. And because the article is based around the issues of trust and democratization, some concepts will be discussed here that will support the conclusions presented: institutions, democratization, consolidated democracy.

In methodological terms, the article favored the use of documentary review, complementing it with a descriptive analysis of data from the Afrobarometer[2] round 6 (R6) 2014-2016 to analyze the electorate's confidence in the institutions of political power. Likewise, this method is used to analyze the

---

2 Afrobarometer is a project that was founded by three independent survey research researchers, without affiliation or party color, Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and Gyimah--Boadi, from Michigan State University, South African Institute for Democracy (Idasa) and the Center for the Development of Democracy in Ghana. The first round took place in 2000, with only 12 countries (Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe), currently counting 36 countries (Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Cape Verde, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, Benin, Madagascar, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo and Tunisia).

electorate's confidence in relation to the institutions of political power with a focus on their leaders and on the pillars of understanding about democracy and also the degree of voter satisfaction with democracy.

The article has some limitations regarding the difficulty in accessing information and bibliographic material on the web that focuses on Africa, which to some extent makes research difficult not being in the place of study. It was intended to support the article taking into account the perspective of African theorists who can give their point of view on a reality that is familiar to them.

Theoretical approaches around the concepts of institutions, public opinion, democratization and democratic consolidation

Institutions have an integrating role in society, since they are the ones that enable collective coexistence (North 1991). The role of institutions in society is essential and crucial to protect the citizen. Dissatisfaction with democratic institutions can be a problem for political stability. According to Easton (1965), the perception of the functioning of institutions does not always match the expectations that citizens have about them, which can lead a democratic regime to high levels of discontent with political institutions and even questions about the democracy as a regime. It is in this sense that addressing the role of political institutions becomes relevant in the sense that it is up to them to maintain political stability.

Another of the fundamental concepts of the article is that of *public opinion*. This concept started to be addressed in the studies of Arendt (2007), in her work *The human condition*. Despite not addressing the concept itself, it starts the debate on the public and private spheres, in which they arise in a context of the Greek polis, with no room for public opinion.

The concept of public opinion has evolved in historical terms over time. It is important to mention that this is not something new or a trivialization of the concept, associated only with opinion polls (Ferreira 2015; Figueiredo and Cervellini 1995), but their approaches go back to Locke, Kant, Burke or Bentham, being one of the concepts themselves of Political Science. Ben Hermet, Badie, Bienebaum and Braud (2014), based on Bourdieu's definition, present a concept of public opinion associated with a social construction, which intends to represent what a given population thinks about a given subject. Considering these authors as something manufactured to justify the politician's action, this is just one of the controversies that the authors reinforce. However, they recognize the relevance of this term and the evolution it

has undergone, dropping the discredit associated with the conceptualization of public opinion, recognizing that this evolution has contributed a lot to its scientificity.

Despite the difficulty and debates around the concept, it is present in opinion polls in Political Science, which has its validity for making use of a methodology that allows analyzing and systematizing the results obtained. In this sense, the results of the Afrobarometer survey result from opinion polls and have their scientific and academic relevance for understanding political phenomena.

In the case of Mozambique, a country that is part of the 3rd wave of democratization and that started its process in the 1990s, it becomes pertinent to understand what *democratization* will be then. According to Huntington, democratization involves: "[...] the end of an authoritarian regime; installation of a democratic regime and the consolidation of the democratic regime" (1994, 44). Thus, democracy arises from an evolutionary process that goes through different phases, whose the core is in the transition that will occur and the ultimate goal is its consolidation. Here in this pillar is the great challenge, to consolidate regimes that sometimes become fragile in the process of cohesion of the internal order.

In short, democratization involves moving from one undemocratic regime to another. The author warns that democratization will not always be total, at some point it may be partial. It is not certain that transitions lead to democratic regimes, although it is desirable (Dahl 2001; Huntington 1994; Mainwaring 1989). Often ending an undemocratic regime can lead to another undemocratic regime, as there is no formula to indicate that the transition will lead to democracy.

It can be concluded that the transitions do not always lead to democratic regimes, mainly because each country, at the moment it started this process, was in different stages of evolution and political and economic organization. Huntington, in his definition, mentions the issue of consolidation as one of the aims of the democratization process. Linz and Stepan present the concept of complete democratic transition and consolidated democracy, which is considered to be important for a brief discussion.

According to Linz and Stepan (1996, 3), consolidated democracy can be defined taking into account the following precepts:

> A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct results

of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when executive, legislative and judicial generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*.

In this definition, it is necessary to highlight three essential points that characterize a complete democratic transition: governments democratically elected by vote, *de facto* authority of the governors and a legislative, executive and judicial body with *de jure* power. This definition also allows us to understand the distinction that must be made between liberalization and democratization. For even in non-democratic states there can be some liberalization of markets without necessarily being democratic or in some process of democratization. This requires more contestation over the rights of political control and one of the crucial points is the existence of free and competitive elections, the result of which will dictate who governs. It is concluded that there can be liberalization without democratization (Linz and Stepan 1996).

In many cases, after the democratic transition is complete, there are some issues that need to be complemented, conditions that must be established, attitudes and habits that must be cultivated before democracy is considered consolidated (Linz and Stepan 1996). It is not enough to go through a transition process and to implement new rules for the organization of the state. Another aspect to keep in mind is that the fact that a regime is consolidated does not mean that it cannot return to the previous stage. Consolidation is not taken for granted and eternal. These breaks can also be associated with the weaknesses of the transition process itself. There is no single format for democratic consolidation. There are studies that analyze the variation of consolidated democracies.

Consolidated democracy is assumed to have a pre-established state. And if that state works, there are five other necessary and interconnected conditions for democracy to be consolidated: free civil society; autonomous and valued political society; Rule of Law that ensures the legal guarantees of citizens in terms of freedom and independence of association; state apparatus that will be used by the new democratic government and an economic society (Linz and Stepan 1996).

Civil society means self-organized groups, movements and relatively autonomous individuals from the state, who survive in an attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarity in their own interest (civil society encompasses various types of organizations, minorities, women's groups, intellectuals, among others). *Political society* is when politics itself exists to challenge the legitimacy of the exercise and control of public power and the state apparatus. The compositions and consolidations of a democratic policy must imply thinking

and action on the development of a positive normative policy of the fundamental instances of a democratic political society (political parties, elections, electoral system, political leadership, inter-party alliances and the legislature).

Political parties are part of this process of democratic consolidation and there is a need for a healthy dialogue between the state and civil society, and there must be independence between the two. It is in this context that the important role of the *Rule of Law* comes in, in which there must be a commitment to accept the established rules. Linz and Stepan (1996) consider civil society, political society and the Rule of Law to be the prerequisites for democratic consolidation.

State apparatus: modern democracies need a state capable of responding to the demands of individuals and making it functional. In this perspective, the citizen has rights and duties and it is up to the state to guarantee its execution. For this, the state needs the capacity to exercise its activities legitimately within the territory.

Economic society encompasses socioeconomic characteristics and is not a pure market economy. The authors believe in a duality of the concept, hence they use the term "economic society". Social and political regulation is needed, hence the name economic society.

Democracy is more than a regime, more an interplay of economic, political, social, individual needs and rules that need to be interconnected with each other, and for the system to work it needs support. It is in this sense that the concepts of institutions, public opinion, democratization and democratic consolidation have in common the fact that they allow the democratic state to be thought in the light of its assumptions. The state is composed of institutions. The voter, through various survey mechanisms, expresses his opinions and, finally, the states went through democratization processes that, to some extent, will have led them or not to democratically consolidated societies.

Voters' perception of trust in institutions of political power and the level of political participation of voters

State-building in Africa

Thinking about the state in Africa is always a challenge, always in an attempt to build a thought that distances itself from the ex-governing elites, marked by the thought of the colonial period of retraction and the absence of the state in the modern perspective. After the declaration of Independence, on

June 25, 1975, Frelimo triumphed as a legitimate political force and began to exercise power in the national territory. With Samora Machel as president of the People's Republic of Mozambique, he started to adopt a Marxist-Leninist political line.

According to art. 1st of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique of 1975, the state is then the result of the liberation struggle, and it is "sovereign, independent and democratic" (Mozambique 1975). Until the end of the colonial period, according to the definition of the Modern state, Mozambique did not exist. If we understand that one of the elements of this concept presupposes the establishment of relations with other states or even the ability to enter into international agreements with other states, Mozambique did not have such a prerogative. Any possibility of representing Mozambique, which until then (1975) was an overseas province, belonged to the colonial government.

The new constitution traced the new legal framework for the organization and structuring of the governing machine, an organization of a socialist nature. The post-colonial period was marked by the implementation of a series of programs aimed at stabilizing the country's economy, which was weakened. This paradigm shift was not intended to look at the state itself, but at economic issues. The social issues and implications of this perspective were not taken into account. It was not questioned which state is intended and what would be the best form of organization for Mozambican society. Every thought about the state, which begins to develop in this period, has the characteristics of a socialist State adapted to the prevailing reality and based on Marxist-Leninist thinking. Above all ideology, there was a need to build a unified nation-state.

Machel (1974) argued that power belonged to the popular masses. He had a speech very influenced by Eastern Europe. The new leadership considered that the structures were democratic in that the people could choose their representatives. Socialism in Africa was seen as a form of economic progress, so it became easy to enter the ideology that came from the Soviet Bloc. For this reason, after June 25, 1975, the country embarked on a single party line. This was considered the only possible way to achieve national unity. During this period, the country benefited greatly from aid from Eastern Europe, in the face of insufficient infrastructure and staff, caused by the end of colonialism and the return of skilled labor to Portugal. It was in this context that the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO, in Portuguese), as a way of imposing itself against the direction the country had taken, started an armed conflict against Frelimo. This conflict devastated the country and, as always, was marked by the struggle for power and a strong challenge to the established regime.

Alden and Simpson (1993) argue that one of the reasons that hindered the resolution of the conflict in Mozambique was the position of external

actors, the USA, South Africa and the former USSR. The scope of the conflict began to change as soon as both Frelimo and Renamo were ready to negotiate. In 1984/5 the non-aggression pact was signed between Mozambique and South Africa, the famous Nkomáti pact.

After the death of Samora Machel in 1986, Joaquim Chissano succeeds him, and with him Mozambique gradually moved away from the ideology of the countries of Eastern Europe, in order to obtain economic aid from the West. At the 5th Frelimo Congress in 1989, led by Joaquim Chissano, Marxism-Leninism was abandoned (Hall and Young 1991; Alden and Simpson 1993). The commitment is made to create a new Constitution and to prepare the first multiparty elections. By the end of the 1980s, the conflict with Renamo had already destroyed and weakened the country, creating a context in which talks were essential between Renamo and Frelimo. Talks with this movement gradually began to take another course, as if it were a light at the end of the tunnel. Peace began to be an attainable truth, not a utopia.

In July 1990, the two movements met in Rome, with the community of Santo Egídio and the Archbishop of Beira as observers of the General Peace Agreement process. The meeting assumed the commitment to introduce a multiparty system, with regular elections based on universal suffrage, while also guaranteeing freedom of expression, worship and the press, as well as the independence of the judicial system. The negotiations took place in October 1990 in Rome, and internal factors played a major role (the dimension that the conflict was taking was only leading the country to ruin, not to mention that both Renamo and Frelimo were losing the support that came from the great powers). On the other hand, the economy was in a chaotic situation, which led the country to implement the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), advocated by structural adjustment programs (Alden and Simpson 1993).

The long period of negotiations culminated in the signing of the Peace Accords on October 4, 1992, ending 16 years of civil war. Thus, the path towards democratization began. After the signing of the Peace Accords, a commitment is made to hold multiparty elections, under the supervision of the United Nations (UN). The armed opposition (Renamo) accepted the agreement and consented to organize itself as a political party. After that period, the country moved from a one-party logic to a renewed democratic network. Then new political parties were created and elections were scheduled for 1994, which were held under the control of international UN observers. It is also important to emphasize that many of these new parties were small nationalist movements that had not had much weight or relevance in the liberation struggle against Portugal. From 1994 to 2019, the year of the last general elections, Frelimo

remains in power both within the scope of the Presidency of the Republic, as well as in the majority of the Assembly of the Republic.

The decolonization process in Mozambique allowed the Rule of Law to be created. State building is influenced by endogenous and exogenous factors. On the one hand, a growing nationalism, greatly influenced by Eduardo Mondlane's struggles for self-assertion, which led him to engage with the various existing movements in the fight against colonial rule. On the other hand, the pressures that Portugal suffered from the international community and at the time when the liberation of the oppressed peoples were advocated, were factors that gave rise to the formation of the state in Mozambique, in the post-colonial context.

The democratization process in Mozambique was marked by the intervention of external forces. That is, through the international community, Mozambique benefited from support in order to allow the construction of the democratic process. It was during this period that donors began to provide support for the state budget, whose main objective was to finance projects that would allow better performance by the new democratic institutions. It is important to emphasize that, despite the concern with democratization, other cross-cutting sectors have been included in the external aid package (among them, legal, political support and the media). Mozambique started the democratization process in the 1990s. This democratic transition was greatly influenced by the international situation and international pressures (end of the Cold War, growing hegemony of the USA and the growing need to democratize states) (Lalá and Ostheimer 2003).

The political transition process in Africa and its electoral processes have been characterized by indices of political violence before, during or after electoral campaigns, at the time of the publication of electoral results. The experience of democratic elections in Mozambique has been marked by the double challenge of establishing peace, after a long period of armed conflict, and creating economic development policies that satisfy the minimum needs of the population. Although there are many political parties in the race, in reality there are two groups that face each other in the elections: Frelimo, the party currently dominant in power, and Renamo.

The role of political institutions in electoral processes: the National Election Commission (1994-2015)

Discussions and uncertainties about the National Election Commission (CNE) go back to the first electoral law and Protocol III of the General

Peace Agreement (AGP, in portuguese). After these discussions, the definition of the first composition of the CNE was reached, according to Mazula (1995, 40):

> The government was to have 10 members, Renamo seven members, and political parties, excluding Frelimo and Renamo, three members. The President should be a person appointed by the President of the Republic, on the recommendation of members of the CNE [...] and the Vice President should be assisted by two vice-presidents.

According to this first formation of the CNE, the partisanship that was to begin and which is now being taken and fought for a less partisanized CNE has already been demonstrated. In the context of trust and mistrust that was experienced during this period, the need for an increasingly vigilant organ was perceived. Thus, it may have been this spirit that characterized the first formation of this electoral supervisory body.

It was also in the initial formation of the CNE that the Technical Secretariat for State Administration (STAE, in Portuguese) was appointed as the operative body. This would be composed of a general director assisted by two deputy general directors (Mazula 1995). The CNE in this period, in addition to being partisan, had a representation of the United Nations operation that could observe all the processes, without the right to vote in its sessions.

During this period, the electoral court was also created, the entity responsible for settling electoral disputes. This court was made up of foreign judges who should demonstrate suitability and experience in the post (Mazula 1995). Initially, its activities were of a provisional nature, it worked *ad hoc*, only in the moments preceding an electoral moment. After the investiture and presentation of the reports, the body was extinguished (Mozambique 1993; 1997; 1999). Its great role is as an organ that supervises the registration and the electoral acts, in an independent and partial way. Decisions taken by this body are subject to appeal to the Constitutional Council (CC) (Mozambique, Assembly of the Republic 2002). Although the CNE is an autonomous body in its management, it has a clear connection to the CC, and there is no full autonomy as an institution that organizes and directs electoral processes.

According to law 20/2002, the CNE became a permanent body with a five-year term. However, with Law 6/2013 the number of terms changed from five to six years. In terms of composition, the CNE started with 21 members, then suffered a drastic reduction to nine members. Remember

that in these two moments of its creation, they were organs that functioned only in the electoral periods[3], being the later extinct. The CNE legislation from 1993 to 2014 has undergone significant changes in terms of content and explanation of the rules. From 1993 to 2002, the legal text referred to the creation of the CNE, leading to the belief that it would always be in creation, however, it resulted from changes that it underwent each legislature. Thus, the legislation from 2007 to 2017 addresses its content and operation in a clear and more descriptive way. It is important to emphasize that from Law 3/97 to 9/2014 there has been a satisfactory jump in terms of drafting the text, taking into account the explanatory form of its contents. The current legislation is more detailed and explanatory about the law and its content and each of the articles. Especially in terms of the composition, organization, competence and functioning of the CNE. These issues may, to some extent, contribute to a negative analysis of the performance of the CNE as an organ that has a determining role when talking about the electoral process and create distrust among voters around it.

In a context in which the institutions responsible for the supervision and coordination of electoral acts are fragile, it becomes a challenge to strengthen these institutions, so that they inspire confidence to resolve electoral conflicts. There is always suspicion about the decisions taken by this body. In the 1999 and 2004 legislative elections, the CNE continued to have an excessive number of members, mainly from political parties. During this period, there was a debate about the reduction of political parties as members of the CNE in order to make it more professional. The CNE has been composed mostly of political parties with parliamentary representation, as set out in article 5 of laws 4/99, 20/2002 and 8/2007 respectively. The excess of political parties in the composition of the CNE has been one of the criticisms made against this body. Another aspect to be taken into account is the fact that the legislation does not clarify the number of members per party representing the Assembly of the Republic (AR). Laws 6/2013 of February 22 and 9/2014 of March 12 are more specific with regard to the composition of the CNE, clearly indicating how many members per party, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and other entities appointed by the government.

The CNE has followed a path that sometimes seems to be on the path to professionalization, less represented by political parties. From an organ with an excessive number of members coming from political parties, one moves towards a CNE with less party representation, where a large part of the mem-

---

3 15 days before the electoral registration began and ended 15 days after the electoral results were released.

bers begins to emerge from civil society organizations (CSOs), although this path is marked by advances and setbacks (Table 1). Law 8/2007 "aimed to make the CNE a less partisan body, through the integration of members from civil society, and to strengthen its professionalization in accordance with the principle of impartiality" (Mozambique, Constitutional Council 2009, 4). From this moment on, a new stage in the structuring of the CNE begins.

Table 1: Composition of the CNE from 1994 to 2014

Legal table	Party composition	Other bodies	Civil society organizations (CSOs)
4/99 February 2nd	15 members appointed by parties with seats in the Assembly of the Republic (AR)	2 members appointed by the government	-
20/2002	18 members appointed by parties with AR seats	-	1 President suggested by CSOs
8/2007 February 26th	5 members appointed by parties with AR seats	-	8 Members proposed by CSOs
6/2013 February 22nd	5 Frelimo members 2 Renamo members 1 MDM member[4]	1 Judge appointed by the CSMJ[5] 1 Attorney appointed by the CSMMP[6]	3 CSO members
9/2014 March 12th	5 Frelimo members 4 RENAMO members 1 MDM member	-	7 Members from CSOs

Source: Prepared by the author

Thus, one of the challenges that can be posed is a CNE closer to reality and greater attention to the exercise of this body. Because of the importance it has, there is no justification for the lack of clarity about its performance and high level of distrust on the part of the electorate. Despite being an organ foreseen by the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique (CRM) of 1990, since its creation until today it has been shown to be poorly consolidated.

---

4 Democratic Movement of Mozambique, MDM in Portuguese.

5 Superior Council of the Judiciary, CSMJ in Portuguese.

6 Superior Council for the Public Prosecution Service, CSMMP in Portuguese.

Analysis and interpretation of Afrobarometer data

After more than 25 years of democracy in Mozambique, it is important to understand the relationship of the electorate with the institutions of political power, as well as their understanding of democracy. It is in this context that, based on the opinion polls made by Afrobarometer in Round 6 (R6) 2014-2015, observing some indicators, it was possible to obtain some of the perceptions that respondents have regarding democracy. To this end, voters' perceptions of trust in institutions of political power, the respondents' understanding of democracy, as well as their degree of satisfaction in relation to democracy in Mozambique were analyzed.

The sample consists of 2,400 cases, of which 56.4% are female and 43.6% are male. Of the sample population, 35% live in urban areas and 65% in rural areas (Afrobarometer data 2018). It is important to make this reservation because, according to the National Statistics Institute of Mozambique (INE, in Portuguese), the Mozambican population is mostly rural. To analyze the confidence that the voter has in a given institution of political power, the following variables were selected: Assembly of the Republic, National Election Commission, Police, Army and Judicial Courts. The answers are grouped according to the following scale: do not trust anything; trust just a little; trust reasonably; trust too much; or don't know/haven't researched enough.

When asked about their understanding of democracy, the data show that, although around 55.9% of respondents understand its meaning, there is still a high number of people who do not understand the word or the question (36.4%) (Table 2). However, it should be noted that awareness campaigns are often conducted in local languages, but it may not be enough to create some understanding among voters.

Table 2: Perceptions of the electorate on Democracy

		Frequency	Valid percent
Valid	Missing	19	0,008
	Understood Democracy	1342	55,9
	Needed translation into local language	165	6,9
	Did not understand the word or question	874	36,4
	Total	2.400	100

Source: Prepared by the author

When analyzing the degree of democracy in Mozambique, the majority of respondents (around 55%) agree that there are some problems in relation to it. Only 11.5% are sure that the country is a democracy (Table 3). This perception may be fundamental to understand the results[7] of Freedom House[8], when they say that Mozambique is not a democracy and is partially free. Although the fundamentals are based on political rights and the issue of civil liberties, there are aspects that make the country fall into this category. These perspectives serve to make a reflection taking into account the question of the voter's understanding of political processes to the detriment of institutional issues.

Table 3: Degree of Democracy in Mozambique

		Frequency	Valid percent
Valid	It is not a democracy	225	9,4
	Democracy with big problems	621	25,9
	Democracy with small problems	736	30,7
	A complete democracy	277	11,5
	Do not understand democracy/ what is a democracy	150	6,3
	Don't know it	391	16,3
	Total	2.400	100

Source: Prepared by the author

When it comes to perceiving the level of satisfaction in relation to democracy, it appears that about 58% are not satisfied and only about 22% are satisfied (Table 4). This satisfaction can be associated with several factors and one of them associated with the mistrust that exist in relation to the institutions that manage the electoral processes.

---

7 Freedom House is mentioned because it is an institution that has presented data on democracy around the world and in which it mentions the fact that the country is not a democracy. In this way, it serves to substantiate and support the data also presented by Afrobarometer.

8 Freedom House is a non-governmental organization, based in the USA, that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom and human rights. This institution works to defend human rights and promote democratic change, with a focus on political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House's catalysts for freedom are a combination of analysis, advocacy and action. Its analyzes are based on 12 central issues: authoritarianism, declining democracy, electoral integrity, equality and human rights, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, responsibility and transparency of government, freedom of the press, promotion of leadership, strengthening of civil society, religious freedom and technology and democracy. Available in: https://freedomhouse.org/issues

Table 4: Level of satisfaction in relation to Democracy

		Frequency	Valid percent
Valid	Mozambique is not a democracy	66	2,8
	Not at all satisfied	432	18,0
	Not very satisfied	968	40,3
	Pretty much satisfied	289	12,0
	Very satisfied	249	10,4
	Don't know it	396	16,5
	Total	2400	100,0

Source: Prepared by the author

However, it is noted that, for the same question, "Mozambique is not a democracy" (Tables 3 and 4), respondents present different answers. It is important to keep in mind that the questions are asked independently and at some point, due to the language or exhaustion of the respondents, their answers do not match 100% on similar questions. Another aspect to be taken into account is that in Table 3 it was questioned about the degree of democracy and in Table 4 about the level of satisfaction. In the case of a survey, in many cases the answers will not be exactly the same, but will depend on the context in which it is questioned.

It can also be seen that, in relation to the 2014 general elections, 76.9% of the respondents considered that they were free (Table 5). Electoral processes are often characterized by several incidents, some of which can lead to violence or distrust on the part of voters.

Table 5: How do you think the 2014 elections were

		Frequency	Valid percent
Valid	Neither free nor fair or with any problem	555	23,1
	Completely free and fair	1845	76,9
	Total	2400	100,0

Source: Prepared by the author

In relation to trust in the institutions of political power, opinions are divided between not trusting anything, little, reasonably or trusting a lot. In general terms, it can be concluded that, in relation to the Assembly of the Republic (AR), opinions are divided and, although there is some confidence in this body, there is a not insignificant percentage of mistrust or low confidence, as the respondents affirm who trust little (20%) or trust reasonably (23%), and only 28% trust this organ a lot. In relation to CNE, the confidence scenario does not differ much from what happens in relation to AR. But, in the case of this body, the level of distrust is around 19.5% and those who have a lot of confidence are in the 25.6% (Table 6).

Table 6: Trust in the institutions of political power

	Trust in AR		Trust in CNE	
	Frequency	Valid %	Frequency	Valid %
Trust nothing	354	14,8	469	19,5
Trust just a little	482	20,1	492	20,5
Trust reasonably	541	22,5	518	21,6
Trust a lot	676	28,2	615	25,6
Don't know/Didn't research	347	14,5	306	12,8
Total	2400	100	2400	100

Source: Prepared by the author

When it comes to trust in the Police, Army and Judicial Courts, opinions do not differ much from the bodies previously analyzed (CNE and AR). There is a balance when asked to respondents about their confidence in the various organs of political power. On average, for the three bodies mentioned above, respondents trust a lot (23%), and do not trust anything (22%) (Table 7).

Table 7: Trust in the institutions of political power

	Trust in Police		Trust in Army		Trust in judicial courts	
	Frequency	Valid %	Frequency	Valid %	Frequency	Valid %
Trust nothing	621	25,9	497	20,7	435	18,1
Trust a little	584	24,3	593	24,7	575	24
Trust reasonably	461	19,2	515	21,5	486	20,3
Trust a lot	534	22,3	552	23	579	24,1
Don't know/ Didn't research	200	8,3	243	10,1	325	13,5
Total	2400	100	2400	100	2400	100

Source: Prepared by the author

Taking into account the role of the institutions (AR, judicial bodies, CNE) and, since the holders of power ascend in different ways (in some cases, from the delegation of powers, election or appointment to positions), the lack of trust or the low levels of trust in these bodies can pose a problem for political stability, as well as for the process of democratic consolidation. Recalling that democratization does not necessarily lead to stable democratic states.

Conclusion

It is important to emphasize that the debates around the state and its construction are new in Africa, and are associated with the process of independence and the period of democratization. The modern state in Mozambique itself is just over 40 years old and the creation of democratic institutions that refer to democratization processes dates back to the early 1990s.

Three main concepts were discussed in this article: institutions, democratization, democratic consolidation and public opinion. *Institutions* have a pivotal role in maintaining a state's political stability. *Democratization* presupposes the transition of a regime and the ultimate goal is the consolidation of a new one. Democratization is not always easy or could culminate in a state that is constantly consolidating democratic institutions. The great challenge is to consolidate regimes that are sometimes fragile in the process of cohesion of the internal order. And because part of the article refers to data that result from *public opinion,* it brought this concept to clarify.

It is associated with social construction and intends to express what a certain population thinks through surveys around a given subject. And finally, *consolidated democracy*, which is assumed to have a pre-established state and, if that state works, there are five other necessary and interconnected conditions for democracy to be consolidated: free civil society; autonomous and valued political society; Rule of Law that assures the legal guarantees of citizens in terms of freedom and independence of association and state apparatus. These elements are at some point complemented with each other without the five being achieved simultaneously.

Based on the descriptive analysis of Afrobarometer data in Round 6 (R6) 2014-2015, some conclusions can be drawn: more than 50% understand what democracy is, however there is still a worrying number that does not even know the meaning of that word (36.4%), although at times the surveys are conducted in the local language as well as election campaigns.

Despite some discrepancies in the questioning about democracy, when it comes to the answer option "Mozambique is not a democracy", in which one of the questions was asked about the degree of democracy and in another about the level of satisfaction, the respondents provide answers many different. In this sense, it is important to keep in mind that the questions are asked independently and at some point, due to the language questions or exhaustion of the respondents, it is possible that their answers do not match. It is unanimous that there are some problems in democracy in Mozambique and there is a high number of respondents who are not satisfied with democracy. Of the respondents, 76.9% believe that the last elections were free.

Regarding the institutions analyzed, the Assembly of the Republic, the CNE, the Police, the Army and the Courts, opinions are divided between not trusting anything, little, reasonably or trusting a lot. The confidence levels for both AR and CNE, in general terms, are between 25% and 28%. When it comes to trust in the Police, Army and Judicial Courts, opinions do not differ much from those of the bodies previously analyzed (CNE and AR). There is a balance when asked to respondents about their confidence in the various organs of political power. On average for the three bodies, respondents trust a lot (23%), and trust nothing (22%). And, if we want to talk about fully consolidated societies, it is important that there is some level of social cohesion as well as confidence in the institutions.

Despite the country having gone through six electoral processes (1994 to 2019), Mozambique still has a long way to go on understanding this process. It denotes an effort made by national and international institutions to make voters understand and participate in the elections. However, there

is still some ignorance and distrust on the part of voters, when it comes to trust in institutions or even in the democratic process itself. The fact that the experience and democratic institutions are recent thus creates a path for constant changes in matters that are not yet consolidated.

Even though elections are considered free and fair, there is a certain understanding on the part of the electorate that those elections are not fair. In general terms, the confidence levels in relation to the institutions of political power are situated on an average of satisfaction not exceeding 50%. In order to achieve a consolidated state, one of the premises is that political institutions function. Thus, it is important to analyze the context of the new societies to understand their dynamics. Several challenges are imposed on the institutions of political power in order to achieve the full democratic transition.

Returning to the question that guides the article: what is the level of voter confidence in the institutions of political power? It can be clearly concluded that the level is quite low, not reaching 50%. Ideally, there would be greater confidence around the organs of political power, as this may compromise the state's democratic consolidation process.

Recommendations

- For future research, it is recommended to emphasize the study of institutions separately;
- it is important to have an analytical look around the parliament; and
- it is important to analyze CNE and STAE independently, which are the institutions for managing the electoral process and technical operation.

References

Afrobarometer. *Our history*. 2018. http://afrobarometer.org/about/our-history.

Afrobarometer data. 2018. *Moçambique, Ronda 6*, 2014-2015.

Alden, Chris and Mark Simpson. 1993. "Mozambique: A Delicate Peace. Journal of Modern." *African Studies*, [s. l.], v. 31, n. 1, p. 109–130.

Arendt, Hannah. 2007. *A condição Humana*. 10ª ed. Tradução de Renato Raposo. Rio de Janeiro: Forense editora. https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/1130009/mod_resource/content/1/A condição humana- Hannah Arendt.pdf.

Bratton, Michael (ED.). 2013. "Voting and Democratic Citizenship in Africa: an Overview." In: *Voting and Democratic Citizenship in Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Brito, Luis De. 2007. A Democracia à Prova das Urnas: Elementos para um Programa de Pesquisa Sobre a Abstenção Eleitoral em Moçambique. In: *Conferência Inaugural Do Iese: Desafios para a Investigação Social e Económica em Moçambique, Maputo*. Anais... Maputo

Brito, Luis. 2011. *Revisão da Legislação Eleitoral, algumas propostas para o Debate*. Disponível em: <http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/livros/des2011/IESE_Des2011_4.RevLes.pdf>. Acesso em: 3 jun. 2018

Cabaço, José Luis.1995. "Capítulo 2. A longa estrada da democracia moçambicana."In: *MAZULA, Brazão, Carlos Machili, and Juarez da Maia (coordenação) (EDS.)Eleições, Democracia e Desenvolvimento*. Maputo. p. 79–114.

Dahl, Robert A. 2001. *Sobre a democracia*. Tradução Beatriz Sidou. Brasília: Editora UnB. http://revistaseug.ugr.es/index.php/acfs/article/viewFile/1080/1278.

Easton, David.1965. *The system analysis of political life*. New York: Wiley.

Ferreira, Fernanda Vasques. 2015. "Raízes históricas do conceito de opinião pública em comunicação." *Em Debate, Belo Horizonte*, v. 7, n. 1, p. 50–68. http://opiniaopublica.ufmg.br/site/files/artigo/7-Janeiro-15-OPINIAO-Fernanda-Vasques-Ferreira-H-A.pdf .

Figueiredo, Rubens and Silvia Cervellini. 1995. "Contribuições para o conceito de opinião pública." *Opinião pública*, [s. l.], v. III, n. Opinião Pública, p. 171–185. http://disciplinas.stoa.usp.br/pluginfile.php/50629/mod_resource/content/1/figueredo_cevellini.pdf.

Hall, M. and Young, T. 1991. "Recent Constitutional Development in Mozambique." *Journal of African Law*. [s. l.], v. 35, n. 1/2, p. 102–115

Hermet, Guy et al. 2014. *Dicionário de Ciência Política e das Instituições Políticas*. Tradução Emanuel Pestana. Lisboa: Escolar Editora.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1994. *A Terceira Onda: A democratização no final do século XX*. São Paulo: editora ática,

Inglehart, Ronald; Welzel, Christian. 2009. *Modernização. Mudança Cultural e Democracia: a sequência do desenvolvimento humano*. Tradução Hilda Maria Lemos Pantoja Coelho. São Paulo: Editora Francis e Editora Verbena.

Lalá, Anícia, and Andrea E. Ostheimer. 2003. *Como limpar as nódoas do processo democrático? Os desafios da transição e democratização em Moçambique (1990–2003)*. [s.l: s.n.]. http://nuevaweb.iepala.es/IMG/pdf/kas_4372-544-1-30.pdf.

Linz, Juan L., and Alfred Stepan,.1996. *Problems of Democratic transitions and consolidations*. London: The John Hopkins University Press.

Machel, Samora. 1974. *Estabelecer um poder popular para servir as massas*. Lisboa: Publicações Nova Aurora.

Mainwaring, Scott.1989. *Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: theoretical and comparative issues*. [s.l].

Mazula, Brazão.1995. "Capitulo I. As eleições moçambicanas: Uma trajectória da Paz e da Democracia," In: *Mazula, Brazão, Carlos Machili and Juarez da Maia (coordenação) (Eds.). Eleições, Democracia e Desenvolvimento*. Maputo. p. 25–78.

Moçambique. Assembleia da República. 2002. Lei 20/2002. *Havendo necessidade de introduzir alterações legislativas para garantir um aperfeiçoamento da legislação eleitoral-*. Boletim da República, 10 out. Seção I Série-número 41, p. 76–90.

Moçambique. Conselho Constitucional. 2009. Acórdão 30/CC/2009. *Validação e Proclamação dos resultados das eleições Presidenciais, Legislativas e das Assembleias Provinciais de 2009*, Maputo, 27 dez. p. 1–44.

Moçambique. 1993. *Lei 4/93. Estabelece o quadro jurídico para a realização das primeiras eleições gerais multipartidárias. no. 4/93, de 28 de dezembro : estabelece o quadro jurídico para a realização das primeiras eleições gerais multipartidárias*. Maputo.

Moçambique. 1997. *Lei 4/97 cria a Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, Maputo.

Moçambique.1999. *Lei 4/99. Cria a Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, Maputo.

North, Douglas C. 1991. "Institutions." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5(1), 97–112.

Sen, Amartya. 2000. "Introdução: Desenvolvimento como Liberdade." In: *Desenvolvimento como liberdade*. São Paulo: Editora Schwarcz, 2000. p. 135–187.

Shaapera, Simon Aondohemba. 2012. "Theories of the state : Perspectives on the Nigerian Variant." *European Scientific Journal*, [s. l.], v. 8, n. 20, p. 11–27.

UNDP. Relatório do Desenvolvimento Humano 2015: *O Trabalho como Motor do Desenvolvimento Humano*. New York. Disponível em: <http://www.br.undp.org/content/brazil/pt/home/library/idh/relatorios-de-desenvolvimento-humano/relatorio-do-desenvolvimento-humano-200014/>. Acesso em: 14 out. 2018.

Xavier-Zeca, Kátia Sara Henriques.2019. "Debate em Torno da construção do Estado em África, os Movimentos Sociais na Construção da Identidade moçambicana." *Revista África* (s), [s. l.], v. 6, n. 11, p. 44–67.

ABSTRACT

Having held six general elections (1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019), challenges are faced in the Mozambican democratic process, including understanding voter confidence in government institutions. The purpose of this article is to understand voters' confidence in the institutions of political power in Mozambique. Using a documentary review, through a theoretical approach that will make it possible to understand the issues of democratization in a broader sense, with a focus on Mozambique in the period from 2014 to 2018. We intend to use data from the Afrobarometer, from round 6 (R6) 20014 -2015 to analyze the electorate's confidence in relation to the institutions of political power as well as their leaders, the understanding of democracy and the degree of satisfaction in relation to democracy. It is noteworthy that more than 50% of respondents agree on how there are some problems in relation to Democracy in Mozambique and there is a need to improve the processes around some electoral management bodies.