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ABOUT THE JOURNAL

The Brazilian Journal of African Studies is a biannual publication, in digital and printed format, dedicated to the research, reflection and propagation of original scientific articles with emphasis on the analysis of International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations and Schools of Thought. RBEA is essentially academic, linked to the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

The RBEA has as target audience researches, professors and students interested in the specificities of the African continent and its international insertion. Alongside such perspective, the Journal intends to expand the debate about the Brazilian projection world widely, the Brazilian cooperation efforts (including in the Defense field) with the African countries in the South Atlantic perimeter and the construction of a regional identity in face of a scenario of geopolitical transformations.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira

December/2019

The Brazilian Journal of African Studies (BJAS), in its fourth year of publication, addresses in this issue political, economic, social, security and academic issues in various African countries. These issues are analyzed in cautious studies, such as the peculiar Eritrean case that seeks to understand the particularities of domestic and global politics. Then, the recent political events in South Africa are analyzed, noting also the socioeconomic conflicts. Still on South Africa, follows the analysis of the recent history of the country and its regional relations in the context of the Cold War with emphasis on migratory flows to the South African epicenter.

The challenges of the young Angolan state are analyzed from the point of view of academic education. Such challenges bring to light the difficulties and political obstacles to the consolidation of autonomy in the process of building an organic intellectual category, such as the Agostinho Neto University, the oldest higher education institution in the country.

The dilemma between the exploitation of natural resources for the country's development and the consequent need to relocate the people living on these lands is analyzed in the case study dealing with resettlement in Cateme, Mozambique. This issue also discusses the notions of border and Luso-Africanity from a historiographical analysis of Angola, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau.

The construction of Brazilian foreign policy for the African continent, from Vargas until the end of the Military Regime, is analyzed next. Then, we discuss the socioeconomic challenges of one of the continent's largest economies - Nigeria. The flight of well-qualified professionals to Europe due to recent economic instability, as well as the migration crisis to neighboring countries, reveal the crisis affecting the West African region, the Sahel and Sahara countries.

However, the recent social configuration of a democratized Nigeria is also assessed, without disregarding the problems that impact the country - as well as the balkanization of the conflict against Boko Haram, formation of autonomous militias and vigilante paramilitary groups, which are under the command of antagonistic political forces, are latent problems in the current Nigerian conjuncture.

Finally, an analysis is presented of the growing threat of land bandits in the northwest of the country, whose success is associated with lack of governance in the region. Thus, the Brazilian Journal of African Studies provides a comprehensive and in-depth overview of the current African reality.

The BJAS publishes a bilingual electronic and printed version (Portuguese and English). Thus, we expect the contribution of colleagues from Brazil and abroad, with whom we intend to establish links for the deepening of knowledge and the construction of a vision of the South on the African continent and relations with them.

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We thank the Assistant Editors Camila Taís Ayala and Igor Estima Sardo and the CEBRAFRICA team that worked on the translation of the articles.

BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL POLITICS: THE DETERMINANTS OF ERITREA'S SUCCESSFUL SECESSION

Albano Agostinho Troco[1]

Introduction

Secessionist conflicts are not a novel occurrence in the African continent. Since the dawn of independence in the 1960s, a number of countries have been home to rebellions involving marginalized communities or ethno-linguistic groups demanding territorial separation from existing states with the goal to create new independent states. The list is long and includes territorial units in countries such as Angola (Cabinda), Comoros (Anjouan and Mohedi), The Democratic Republic of Congo (Katanga, South Kassai) Ethiopia (Eritrea, Ogaden, and Oromia, Afar), Mali (Tuaregs), Niger (Tuaregs), Nigeria (Biafra, Niger Delta), Senegal (Casamance), Somalia (Somaliland) and Sudan (South Sudan) only to mention a few amongst others.

Despite the high incidence of secessionist conflicts on the continent, only two cases have succeeded in the establishment of new states: Eritrea in 1993 and South Sudan in 2011. This study advances a number of factors that can help to make sense of Eritrea's formal withdrawal from Ethiopia on 24 May 1993. This event represents an extraordinary development in post-colonial Africa because it was the first time that a territorial unit within an existing African state successfully separated to become a state.[2] In addition, Eritrea's secessionist struggle and independence took place within a conti-

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2 Previous widely reported secessionist attempts in Katanga (1960) and Biafra (1967) failed as they were effectively crushed by the military of their respective parent-state, the Republic of Congo and the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

nental framework that was particularly hostile to the emergence of new states outside the colonial context (Troco 2018, 55)[3].

From this perspective, this study contributes to debates on the determinants of successful secessions with particular reference to the African continent. Its central argument is that the successful outcome of the secessionist struggle in Eritrea is the result of a tight combination of domestic and external factors. These include Eritrea's historical and legal claims for territorial self-determination, the Dergue's policies of alienation, the effectiveness of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front's strategies (EPLF), the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, and the supportive role of the United States of America.

The discussion proceeds in the following manner: the first section provides a theoretical overview of secession; the second section reflects on the root-causes of secessionist demands in Africa; the third section looks at the political geography and history of Eritrea; the fourth section describes the dynamics of secessionist alienation and armed resistance in Eritrea; while the final section expounds on the determinants of Eritrea's successful secession.

Understanding Secession

Secession is a contested concept (Doyle 2010:1). Like most concepts in the social sciences, there is little consensus amongst scholars on the definition of secession (Pavikovic and Radan 2007:4). Anderson (2013:344), for instance, views secession as any case of state formation out of an established sovereign state. From this perspective, the vast majority of former colonies in Africa and Asia would be considered cases of secession. Kohen (2006:1) and Pavikovic and Radan (2007:1) restrict secession to cases of states formed outside the colonial context, while Bartkus (1999) highlights the role of recognition by other states as an essential criterion for statehood.

At the center of the concept of secession is the notion of separation, emanating from the etymology of the word, the Latin verb *secede,* which means, 'to go apart' (Pavikovic and Radan, 2007:5). In this regard, Anderson (2013:345) clarifies that 'secession is synonymous with moving apart or withdrawing'. This notion is clearly reflected in the definition espoused in this study. Accordingly,

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3 The policies of the Organization of African Union (OAU) and its successor the African Union (AU) support and uphold the inviolable character of the inherited colonial borders of African states.

secession is 'the creation of a new independent state entity through the separation of part of the territory and population of an existing state' (Kohen 2006:1).

However, it should be noted that secession is not an instant fact. Scholars have created a number of theories to explain when and why secessions or attempts at secession occur. These theories are categorized into three distinct groups: 1) explanatory theories, which are concerned with the social, political and economic factors leading to or causing secession[4]; 2) normative theories, which focus on the moral and ethical justifications for secession[5]; and 3) legal theories, which confront the rights of people for self-determination and the preservation of the territorial integrity of states outlined on a variety of domestic and international legal documents[6].

Although theoretically relevant, normative and legal approaches to secession limit the analysis of secessionist conflicts to the level of ideas. A useful theory of secession must transcend the realm of ideas and engage germane structural factors such as the social, political and economic context in which secessions or attempts at secession take place. As explained by Keller (2007, 3), 'only in this way theories can provide the roadmap for understanding and even resolving intrastate conflicts that revolve around demands by certain groups to separate'.

Explanatory theories of secession view the phenomenon. First and foremost, as a process directed towards the attainment of independent statehood, often implying in a 'complex series of claims and decisions, negotiations and/or struggle, which may – or may not – lead to the creation of a new state' (Kohen 2006:14). Along the same lines, Premdas (2013:4) comments that 'secession may be conceived analytically as constituted of steps and stages, cumulative and precipitating causes, periodically displaying patterns of accommodation and intransigence'.

In general, secessionist movements and conflicts arise when sub-state ethno-cultural communities, frustrated in their quest for recognition and resources, challenge the state and its territorial definition through the pursuit of independent statehood. Since territorial fragmentation of the state is a threat against the very definition of the state, central governments often attempt to militarily subdue separatist groups leading to the inception of

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4 Wood's (1980) comparative analytical model on secession and Butt's (2017) state strategy theory fall within this category.

5 Buchanan's (1991) Secession: the morality of political divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec illustrates theories in this category.

6 An example of such an approach is Dersso's (2012) International Law and the Self-determination of South Sudan.

civil wars (Pavikovic and Radan 2011:1). These armed conflicts tend to be 'prolonged, punishing, and prohibitively costly and are fought with fanatical intensity and uncompromising stubbornness involving high civilian casualties' (Beary 2008:1).

As in most conflicts, foreign states, with their own interests and agenda, often join the fighting parties adding fuel to the sustenance of the struggle (Premdas 2013:5). This turn external factors, in particular geopolitical considerations, a critical variable in accounting for the development and outcome of secessionist conflicts. For instance, Butt (2017, 2) presents an interesting account about how 'secession negatively alters the balance of power, with respect to both the secessionist ethnic group and existing state rivals'. Horowitz (1985:230) explains this view clearly in his observation that, 'while the emergence of a secessionist movement is determined mainly by domestic politics – the relations of groups and regions within the state; the success of secessionist struggle is determined largely by international politics, the balance of interests and forces that extend beyond the state'.

The final stage in the process of achieving statehood is international recognition. As explained by Wood (1980:133), a '"successful" secession is not complete until it has become institutionalized in a new government, legitimate at home and recognized abroad'. Pavikovic and Radan (2007:10) hold the same view, elucidating that once a territory breaks off from its parent state, recognition by other states completes the process of achieving statehood. Put differently, an entity is treated as a state only if the outside world recognizes it to be one (Sterio 2009:8), a process that is normally informed by political considerations (Ker-Lindsay 2012:7).

The Root-Causes of Secessionist Conflicts in Africa

As outlined in a previous study, the origins of secessionist conflicts in post-colonial Africa are to be found essentially in the specificity of interstate boundaries and issues of governance (Troco 2018, 58-59).

Most interstate boundaries in Africa were demarcated at the Berlin conference in 1884 and have remained virtually unchanged since then. In the words of a prominent Africanist scholar, these boundaries are known to be 'artificial and arbitrary on the basis of the fact that they do not respond to what people believe to be rational demographic, ethnographic, and topographic boundaries' (Herbst 1989:693), and for 'their propensity for bringing together peoples that historically lived under different, if not inimical systems'

(Engelbert *et al.* 2001:1093). However, the nationalist elite agreed to maintain the inherited colonial borders, transforming them into international boundaries between the emerging post-independent states (Hughes 2004:834). Since then, respect for the sacrosanct character of African borders became the official policy of the OAU and later reaffirmed by its successor the AU.

Another issue at the core of secessionist conflicts in post-colonial Africa relates to poor governance. Indeed, dynamics of marginalization lead groups to challenge the state (Ylonen 2013:131). Ndulo (2013) reports that, 'failure of governance leads minority groups to believe that they are not included in running the affairs of the state'. According to Katz (1995:183) 'this frustration often leads to mobilization under ethnic or territory-based identity with the belief that the group's rights would be adequately protected in a self-governed territory'. Bamfo (2012:37) subscribes to this view indicating that ideological and policy differences between a region or ethnic group and the central government might lead to the emergence of separatist sentiment which might or might not develop into a secessionist war.

Political Geography and History of Eritrea

Secession presupposes the existence of a territory inhabited by a potentially secessionist population. Hence, before proceeding with the examination of the determinants of Eritrea's successful secession, it is crucial to start with an overview of the region's geographical location, its people and their history.

Accordingly, Eritrea[7] is situated along the west coast of the Red Sea, north of the Horn of Africa. The country is relatively small compared to other African states, bordering the Sudan on the north and northwest, Ethiopia on the south and Djibouti on the southeast. Although the country has a population of approximately 5.2 million, Eritrea has been described as home to a 'mosaic of diverse communities' (Sherman 1980, 3). This includes the Afar, Bilen, Hedareb, Kunama, Nara, Rashaida, Saho, Tigre and Tigrinya. The last two constitute the major ethno-linguistic groups in the country. Tigre-speaking Eritreans are mostly Muslims and agro-pastoralists, inhabiting the eastern and western lowlands, while Tigrinya-speaking Eritreans are generally Christians and share ethnic ties with Tigrinya-speaking communities in Ethiopia (Mussie 2011, 18).

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7 The Italians named the territory in 1890 after the Roman *Erythraeum Mare*, literally meaning 'red sea' (Fegley 1995: xv).

Political Map of Eritrea

Source: https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/eritrea-political-map.htm

The first recorded allusion to Eritrea was made by the Egyptians in 3000 BCE and narrates maritime commerce between the pharaohs of Egypt and local chiefs on the Red Sea coast of Eritrea (Sherman 1980:4). Mussie (2011:xx) notes that 'Eritrean history is characterized by prevalent conflicts, movements of people and external intervention'. Indeed, between the eighth and the twentieth centuries, Eritrea has successively been under the authority of Arab (Muslim) forces (eighth and fifteenth centuries), Ottoman Turks (sixteenth century), Khedival Egypt (second half of the nineteenth century), Italy (1890-1941), Britain (1941-1952) and Ethiopia (1962-1991).

Eritrea emerged as a modern political entity on January 1, 1890 after Italy established the colony of Eritrea (Fegley 1995, xxxiii). Italian colonial rule over the territory lasted until 1941. During this period, the Italians transformed Eritrea into a settler colony, introducing developments in the areas of public administration, medical service, agriculture, banking, manufacturing, light industry, road and railway system, etc. The colony experienced additional material progress after 1933 as a result of Italy's war preparations against Ethiopia. Italian colonial rule over Eritrea ended in 1941, after the

British-led Allied forces defeated the Italian army stationed in the country during the Second World War.[8]

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Italy was forced to renounce sovereignty over its colonies of Libya, Somaliland and Eritrea, as part of the terms of the Peace Treaty signed with the four major victorious powers (Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union). In relation to Eritrea, the four powers failed to agree on a 'disposal' plan as they held different views on the matter: Britain supported the partition of Eritrea between Sudan and Ethiopia; France was in favour of Italy's return as an administrative power; the US proposed a collective UN trusteeship for ten years followed by independence; while the Soviet Union preferred individual trusteeship (Iyob 1995, 63).

Consequently, the fate of Eritrea was referred to the United Nations. A UN Commission, consisting of representatives from Norway, Burma, South Africa, Guatemala and Pakistan was sent to Eritrea in early 1950 to prepare a report for the UN General Assembly. The Commission was to consider the views of the Eritrean population, their capacity for self-government, regional interests of peace and security in East Africa, Ethiopia's claims that Eritrea be re-joined to its 'Ethiopian motherland' and its need for an adequate access to the sea. Eventually, the Commission was divided in its recommendations: Burma, Norway and South Africa argued for a close association between Eritrea and Ethiopia; while Guatemala and Pakistan recommended full independence. On December 2, 1950 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to federate Eritrea with imperial Ethiopia and on September 11, 1952 the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie ratified Eritrea's constitution, thus establishing the Ethio-Eritrean federation (Iyob 1995, 64).

Secessionist Alienation and Armed Resistance in Eritrea

The rights and responsibilities of Ethiopia and Eritrea within the federal framework were defined in the UN resolution. According to Fegley (1995, xxxviii),

> The UN General Assembly resolution, adopted by a vote of forty-seven to ten, provided that Eritrea should be linked to the Ethiopian Empire through a loose federal structure under the sovereignty of the Ethio-

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8 Subsequently, Eritrea was controlled and administered by Britain until 1952. During the course of the war, the British Military Administration developed Eritrea's industrial complex to meet the needs of a war economy.

pian emperor but with a form of internal self-government. The federal government, in the same way as the existing imperial government, was to control foreign and defence affairs, foreign and interstate commerce, transport and finance. Control over domestic affairs (including police, local administration, and local taxation to meet its own budget) was to be exercised by an elected Eritrean assembly on a parliamentary model. The Eritrean state was to have its own administrative and judicial structures and a flag.

However, during the Ethio-Eritrean federation years (1952-1962), Ethiopia set out to dismantle Eritrea's autonomous federal status through diplomatic, military and extra-legal means. Addis Ababa sabotage of the federal arrangement were attributed to its historical claim over Eritrea (Eritrea was historically part of a 'Greater Ethiopia') and pro-Ethiopian views that, 'Eritrean autonomy was infeasible and that only complete union would serve the needs of both countries'.

Therefore, during the first half of the federation period, 1952-1955, 'Eritrea's façade democracy was gradually eroded by the new administration's collaboration with pro-Ethiopian members of the first [Eritrean] Assembly' (Iyob 1995, 88). Emperor Haile Selassie declared the federal Ethiopian court to be the territory's final court of appeal on September 30, 1952, thus placing the federal Eritrean court on a subordinate position. In July 1953, Ethiopia enacted a law requiring all Eritrean males in urban areas to carry identity cards at all times, effectively restricting their mobility.

After 1955, the violation of Eritrea's autonomous status within the federation became more flagrant as intimidation, coercion, and military might now came into play (Iyob 1995, 89). In July 1955, Tedla Beiru, the highest executive official in the Eritrean government, resigned citing 'excessive interference and pressure from the emperor's official representative in Eritrea' (Sherman 1980, 27). A year later, Amharic (the language of the Ethiopian ruling elite class) was declared the official language of Eritrea, removing Tigre and Tigrinya from that position. In December 1958, a bill was passed discarding the Eritrean flag and the adoption of the Ethiopian flag. A year later, the Eritrean Assembly voted to replace Eritrean laws by the Ethiopian penal code and in May 1960, the Eritrean Assembly changed its name from Eritrean government to Eritrean administration.

The Ethiopian imperial regime also set out to weaken Eritrea's economy, making it dependent on Ethiopian production. To this end, Ethiopian officials discouraged foreign investment and commercial engagements in Eritrea (Mussie 2011, 62). Eritrean industries were forced to either close

down or move their operations to Ethiopia (Keller 2007, 22). These policies had serious impact on the Eritrean working class, as 'higher rates of unemployment resulted in massive migration of Eritrean workers to the Sudan, the Middle East, and Ethiopia in search of jobs' Mussie (2011, 62).

Finally on November 14, 1962, 'with a sizeable Ethiopian army surrounding the Eritrean administration building where the Assembly convened' (Iyob 1995, 94), Eritrean representatives revoked Eritrea's federal autonomous status, thus turning Eritrea into Ethiopia's fourteenth province.

Ethiopia's gradual erosion of Eritrea's autonomy, which culminated in the forced incorporation of the territory in the Ethiopian empire, escalated Eritrean resistance. Organized opposition to Ethiopian domination began in earnest in the late 1950s with three major movements carrying out an armed struggle over Eritrea's independence, namely: the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM)[9], the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)[10] and the Eritrean

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9 The ELM was established in 1958 by Eritrean exiles in the Sudan. The movement sought to mobilize support inside Eritrea and abroad against the growing erosion of the federation (Negash 1997, 148). Primarily the ELM's program of action was the defense of Eritrea's autonomous status against Ethiopian encroachments (Mussie 2011, 63). Later the movement began to advocate for Eritrea's liberation by coup *d'ét*at (Iyob 1995, 101). The movement was eventually disbanded in 1970 after several of its cadres deserted to an emerging movement, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).

10 The ELF was founded in Cairo in July 1960. The movement emphasized armed resistance as the only alternative against Ethiopian domination. Initially, the movement had no clear ideological line, espousing a combination of Islamic fundamentalism and fervent Marxism (Iyob 1997, 110). A more radical Marxist-oriented philosophy arose in the mid-1970s when young cadres returned from training camps in radical Arab countries, China and Cuba (1997, 110). The arrival of the young cadres ignited a power struggle between the new generation and the old leadership, leading to the breakaway of the movement into three groups: the People's Liberation Front (PLF), the Eritrean Liberation Front – People's Liberation Front (ELF-PLF), and the ELF-Ubel. The ELF continued to be ripped apart by the centrifugal forces of ideology, ethnicity, religion and sectarianism while waging war against emerging nationalist groups.

People's Liberation Front (EPLF)[11]. The armed struggle against Ethiopian domination evolved from occasional ambushes and hit-and-run guerrilla operations to large-scale conventional military confrontations between the Eritrean liberation movements and the Ethiopian army.

During the first decade of the conflict, the ELF resorted to rurally based guerrilla tactics due to its strategic disadvantages in open confrontations with the Ethiopian security forces. The group's attacks focused on police stations to capture Ethiopian military hardware (Shairman 1980, 73), the assassination of individuals considered to oppose the revolutionary cause and acts of sabotage against vital infrastructures such as oil storage tanks, roads, railways (Pateman 1990:85), and Ethiopian Airlines' planes (Sherman 198, 78). During this period, material aid for the Eritrean insurgents came from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen and Libya (Heraclides 1991, 188).

The Ethiopian authorities attempted to counter the ELF by exploiting regional and religious rivalries between the populace (a divide and rule strategy) and attacking the ELF zones (military policy) (Pateman 1990, 85). The government of Haile Selassie depended significantly upon the United States and Israel for material military support. In this regard, it has been reported that, 'from 1953 to 1970 the United States provided $147 million in military assistance to Haile Selassie's government. This amounted to almost one-half of the total US military assistance to all African countries during that time span' (Sherman 1980, 75).

The second decade of the Eritrean conflict started with strong Ethiopian military and diplomatic offensive against the Eritrean secessionists precipitated by the ambush and killing of a high-ranking Ethiopian military commander (Sherman 1980, 79). In late 1970, a state of emergency was declared in much of Eritrea, followed by an attack against the ELF-held areas

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11 The EPLF emerged as a breakaway group from the ELF in September 1973 under the leadership of Ramadan Mohammed Nur (General Secretary) and Isayas Aferworq (Deputy General Secretary) (Markakis 1987, 64). The movement's ideological stand has been described as a 'selective, pragmatic (even eclectic), application of Marxist philosophy adapted to the particular context of Eritrea's nationalistic liberation struggle' (Iyob 1995, 123). Strategically, the EPLF proved to be an effective military force attacking the Ethiopian army throughout Eritrea. The movement started out attracting large numbers of recruits, especially among the urban, intellectual and Christian youth (Figley 1995, xli). Two years after its foundation it had approximately 10 thousand fighters in the field. Its cadres encouraged women to join the organization, and by 1991 women constituted one-third of the EPLF army (Mussie 2011, 66). The movement succeeded in establishing political and military alliances with two Ethiopian movements: the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF). This cooperation played a pivotal role in defeating the Ethiopian army (Mussie 2011, 66).

including a bombing campaign by the Ethiopian Air Force, and the implementation of forced resettlement schemes to cut off popular support to the guerrillas (Thomas 2012, 8). Furthermore, the emperor proceeded to fight the Eritreans in the diplomatic arena preventing them from getting further military aid from the Sudan, China and South Yemen (Sherman 1980, 80). This offensive had the immediate effect of not only reducing Eritrean guerrilla operations but also alienating the rural population, causing resurgence in membership for the liberation movements (Thomas 2012, 8).

The period between 1970 and 1974 was marked by the fragmentation of the Eritrean liberation movements and the beginning of a civil war, fought between the ELF and the EPLF. The war ended in 1974, after the Dergue[12] made it an imperative for the two liberation movements to mount a united front against the new regime in Addis Ababa. Nevertheless, the Dergue persisted with Selassie's policy of Eritrea's incorporation into Ethiopia (Heraclides 1991, 182). In 1976, Eritrean forces launched a massive offensive against the Dergue's troops 'amassing victory after victory, in the military arena and liberating most of Eritrea's towns' (Sherman 1980, 87). By early 1978, the ELF and the EPLF controlled the whole of Eritrea (Markakis 1987, 63).

Eritrean military gains during this period coincided with the superpower realignment in the Horn of Africa and the Somali invasion of the Ogaden region. In 1977, the US began to cut off military aid to Addis Ababa while Moscow stepped in to fill the void (Pateman 1990, 88). Moreover, it has been argued that during that period, the Ethiopian government, under Soviet and Cuban patronage, directed its energies against a more serious international challenger, Somalia, turning its attention toward Eritrea once the Somali army had been driven out of Ethiopia (Pateman 1990, 88). This interpretation is supported by the fact that the Ethiopian army managed to retake most of the towns held by the Eritrean secessionists six months after the Ogaden war.[13]

After the 1978 Ethiopian offensive, the Eritrean armed struggle reached a strategic stalemate, which lasted until 1984. This period saw the beginning of a new round of armed confrontations in the Eritrean civil war (1980-1981) ending with the defeat of the ELF and ushering in EPLF hegemony (Markakis

12 The Dergue, officially called the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia, was the military junta that overthrew Selassie's imperial regime. It ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1987. During this period, the junta's spousal of Marxist-Leninist principles alienated the United States (Ethiopia's main external backer under Emperor Selassie), while attracting massive military support from the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc at large.

13 Sherman (1980, 93) notes that 'the 1978 Ethiopian assault was, for most part, engineered by the Soviets and carried out by Ethiopian, Cuban and South Yemeni forces'.

1987, 67).[14] The EPLF continued to gain support from the Eritrean masses and managed to mobilize the Eritreans against the Dergue. Furthermore, a weakened and demoralized Ethiopian army launched several failed attacks against the EPLF, which resulted in the build up of the Eritreans' military arsenal as they captured large amounts of arms and ammunitions from successive abortive campaigns (Tomas 2012, 12).

The military stalemate was broken in 1984 with the EPLF moving into the offensive (Markakis 1987, 68). In March 1988, the balance of power shifted in favour of the Eritreans after their decisive victory at the battle of Afabet (Pateman 1990, 80). Mussie (2011, 68) comments that 'the defeat of the Ethiopian army at the battle of Afabet was an immesurable military loss for Ethiopia, but it remarkably boosted the fighting morale of the liberation army'. Fierce battles continued with the EPLF collaborating with the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Afar Liberation front (Pateman 1990, 94).

In 1990 the EPLF captured the port city of Massawa, followed by the liberation of all major towns of Eritrea (Mussie 2011). On May 24, 1991 the EPLF liberated Asmara while the EPRDF took over Addis Ababa four days later (Iyob 1995, 136). These events led to a regime change in Ethiopia and a *de facto* independence to Eritrea (Thomas 2012, 12). Two years later a UN sponsored referendum was organized and 99.8 percent of Eritreans voted for independence (Iyob 1995:136). Eritrea was officially admitted into the community of states on 24 May 1993.

Explaining the determinants of Eritrea's Successful Secession

The central question arising from the preceding discussion concerns the factors that contributed to the success of Eritrea's struggle for independent statehood successful. This political development is quite remarkable, considering that Eritrean secessionist movements conducted their struggle amidst a number of factors that had prevented previous secessionist attempts in Katanga, Biafra and Casamance, from succeeding. These factors included scarce international recognition of their struggle, restricted supply of military

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14 After years of factional inter-Eritrean conflict, cooperation and uneasy coexistence, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) managed to push the ELF out of Eritrean territory into the Sudan in the early 1980.

equipment and an international consensus on the fear of the 'Balkanization' of the African continent, amongst others.

This section argues that Eritrea's successful secession is the result of a tight combination of domestic and global factors, such as Eritrea's historical and legal claims, the Dergue's policies of alienation, the effectiveness of the EPLF's strategies, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, and the role of the United States of America.

Eritrea's Historical and Legal Claims

The first factor that influenced the successful outcome of Eritrea's separation from Ethiopia relates to historical and legal considerations governing the relations between the two political entities. Eritrea had strong historical and legal foundations for its claim to independent statehood. However, Cold War politics and superpower rivalries favoured Ethiopian interests over those of Eritrea (Iyob 1995, 138). This argument is in agreement with Coggins' theory of state birth, which highlights the interests of great powers and the pursuit of external security as one of the driving forces for state recognition (Coggins 2011, 449).

Haile Selassie's imperial government and the military regime that replaced it argued insistently that Eritrea was not historically a distinct entity, but part of a 'Greater Ethiopia'. The Ethiopians claimed that both entities had been part of the ancient Axumite kingdom that existed between 100 and 940 CE. Hence, Eritrea's incorporation into the Ethiopian empire represented the reintegration of two entities that had been artificially separated by the forces of colonialism and great power politics (Sherman 1980, 29).

In contrast, Eritreans insisted that Ethiopia had no historical claim over Eritrea. The Ethiopian empire had lost that right when Emperor Menelik signed a series of treaties with Italy between 1886 and 1889, allowing the Italians to colonize Eritrea. Menelik's actions granted a *de facto* recognition of Eritrea as a political entity separate from Ethiopia. Thus, Italian colonial rule brought forth 'Eritrea as a multinational state with a definite political and geographical identity' (Sherman 1980, 32).

In addition, Eritreans argued insistently that their struggle was not one of secession, but one of self-determination. Eritrea was entitled to independent statehood because its status as a former colony was consistent with the principles of the OAU (sanctity of inherited colonial borders) regarding the emergence of African states in the post-colonial era. Furthermore, the UN resolution to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia recognized Eritrea as a distinct

political entity, with a separate constitution, a different system of government and separate executive and legislative body. The document made clear that Eritrea was not liable to annexation by Ethiopia. Hence, Emperor Selassie's abolition of the Ethio-Eritrean federal arrangement was not only an open defiance to the UN resolution but also a clear infringement of international law.

The Dergue's Policies of Alienation

Internally, the policies of the Dergue, the military regime that replaced Selassie's monarchical and feudal government, eased Eritrea's path to independence. The Dergue ruled Ethiopia between 1974 and 1987. During this period, the military regime implemented a series of policies that isolated it from groups inside and outside Ethiopia. The activities of these opposition movements precipitated the erosion of the Dergue, paving the way for favourable negotiated settlements on Eritrea's independence.

Upon acceding to power, the Dergue adopted 'Ethiopia First' as the motto of the Ethiopian government. Berhe (2004, 574) explains that, 'this ideology was oriented towards both nationalism and modernization, and was thus "directed against the weakening of the state by secessionist movements"'. Since the Dergue regarded 'Ethiopia as a monolithic society', it proceeded to declare any 'ethno-nationalist grievance or demand for self-determination as contrary to Ethiopian unity and interests' (Berhe 2004, 574).

As a result, nationalist groups demanding any form of self-determination were targeted. Thousands of Ethiopians and Eritreans were imprisoned, tortured or executed in what became known as 'the Red Terror' (Thomas 2012, 9). The Dergue's excesses led to the emergence of many socio-political groups challenging the military government in Ethiopia, including the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The ELPF began a campaign of coalition building with these groups and their coordinated activities proved to be very decisive in the victory against the Dergue.

In addition, the Dergue's espousal of Marxism-Leninism and military cooperation with the Soviet Union made it unpopular amongst Western countries including the United States. In 1976 President Carter's administration cut off military assistance to Addis Ababa evoking amongst other reasons, 'gross violations of human rights, including summary executions' and the conclusion of a $100 million arms deal with the Soviet Union (Sherman 1980, 89). In 1984, the great famine intensified international scrutiny to

the Ethiopian government's internal policies as the catastrophe coincided with the foundation of a communist party along Soviet lines followed by extravagant celebrations. According to Negash (1997, 165), 'the communist ideology pursued by the government and the war in Eritrea, which by this time had extended into the Northern region of the country, were henceforth regarded as the reasons for the famine'.

The Ethiopian government was further criticized by the international community due to the authoritarian manner in which it attempted to resettle thousands of famine stricken families to the more fertile regions of the country. Negash (1997, 165) notes that 'more than half a million people had been forcibly moved, leaving behind them thousands of people dead either on the long journeys to the homes they did not choose or in ill-prepared habitat'.

The policies of the Dergue not only created international hostility towards the government in Addis Ababa but also drove thousands of recruits into the camps of the guerrilla movements. For instance, in 1989 the TPLF had grown to such an extent that the Ethiopian government considered it be a more dangerous threat than the EPLF. By 1991, the TPLF won state power in Ethiopia in the name of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) (Berhe 2004, 569).

The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the End of Cold War

Eritrea's attainment of statehood would have been difficult without the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent realignment of global politics. The fragmentation of the Soviet Union cut off guaranteed military assistance to the Ethiopian regime from the Soviet bloc, it changed the East-West framework from which the superpowers viewed developments in the Horn of Africa, and opened a new window of opportunity for the emergence of new nation-states.

From 1977 to 1991 the Ethiopian government depended considerably on military support from the Soviet Union and its allies. The USSR became Ethiopia's major arms supplier after Washington cut off military assistance to Addis Ababa due to human rights violations. It has been reported that by July 1977 the Soviet Union had agreed to supply $500 million worth of arms including jet fighters and missiles to the Ethiopians (Sherman 1980, 90).

Soviet hardware, Cuban military personnel and other Soviet allies sustained Ethiopia's war efforts during the last quarter of the Cold War.[15]

However, the Ethiopian regime guaranteed support network began to collapse in 1987 after the new leadership in Moscow warned Addis Ababa that they could not count on continuing supply of arms. Soviet authorities informed Mengistu that the Soviet-Ethiopian arms deal would not be renewed after 1990. In that same year Cuban and East German troops began to withdraw from Ethiopia (Schraeder 1992, 165). The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was followed by the capture of Asmara and Addis Ababa by the EPLF and the TPLF respectively, thus signalling the end of Mengistu's rule over Ethiopia.

In terms of global politics, the end of the Cold War led to unprecedented changes in superpower rivalries (Iyob 1995, 124). During the Cold War events in the Horn of Africa and other regions of the world were analysed within the East-West framework, as means of preventing or advancing superpowers sphere of influence. However, the end of the Cold War called into question a series of Cold War rationales and the policies they generated (Schraeder 1992, 571). As a result, political developments in Eritrea began to be viewed in their own right not as an extension of East-West ideological confrontation.

Furthermore, the process of reforming the Soviet Union initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986 infused 'new life into the concept of the right to self-determination' (Negash 1997, 163). As pointed out by Schraeder (1992, 172), Gorbachev's policy approach towards Eastern Europe entailed 'Soviet tolerance for the fall of single-party communist states and a recognition of the need to allow the peoples of Eastern Europe to determine their own political paths independent of Soviet control'. This process called for the reassessment of the international framework governing the emergence of new sovereign states.

It was in this climate of relaxed approach to the principle of state sovereignty that Eritreans were allowed to exercise their right to self-determination. In the words of Iyob (1995, 138) 'the demand of the Eritrean people for self-determination was no longer seen as an isolated case viewed as a dangerous precedent, but one of many cases'.

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15 As previously mentioned, Soviet military assistance was instrumental in ensuring Ethiopia's victory over the Somali army during the invasion of the Ogaden region, the re-conquest of Eritrea from the Eritrean liberation movements in the offensives of 1978, and in subsequent assaults aimed at crushing guerrilla insurgencies in Eritrea and Ethiopia.

The Role of the United States of America

The United States' efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the civil war in Ethiopia in the late 1980s contributed resolutely for Eritrea's successful secession. In this regard, Paquin (2010, 128) notes that the fate of Eritrea had always been linked to the geostrategic interests of the United States of America (US). From 1952 to 1991 successive administrations in Washington DC consistently opposed Eritrea's independence on the basis of maintaining stability in the Horn of Africa. In 1991 the Bush administration reversed this policy after Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Herman Cohen declared US support for a UN-supervised referendum on Eritrean independence (Schraeder 1992, 570).

Starting in 1989, various third parties including Italy and the US attempted to broker peace deals between Eritrea and Ethiopia and between Ethiopia and various opposition movements operating inside the country (Keller 2007, 24). The US engaged on a number of official and un-official talks with Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders, including the failed mediation efforts conducted by former President Jimmy Carter in 1989 (Paquin 2010, 139). The US intensified its level of involvement after Mengistu's departure from power on May 21, 1991. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen was sent to London to mediate between the insurgents and the collapsing Ethiopian government.

According to Schraeder (1992, 570) 'the net result of US involvement was a significant contribution to a transfer of power, which largely avoided the bloodshed and clan conflict still evident in Somalia'. As part of the Agreements, the US authorized the TPLF to takeover Addis Ababa and to establish a broad coalition government there. Moreover, the US also declared its support for a referendum on Eritrea's independence after a two-year transitional period.

American support for a referendum on Eritrea's independence was a political tool to stop the civil war and promote stability in both Ethiopia and Eritrea (Paquin 2010, 140). In the author's own words: 'a denial of Eritrea's right to secede may have caused war to resume in Ethiopia'. American officials also requested the EPLF leadership not to issue a unilateral declaration of independence after they captured Asmara in 1991 because it would further destabilize Ethiopia. The US argued that both the new Ethiopian and Eritrean government needed to consolidate their power to facilitate a stable transition to Eritrea's independence.

Finally, the US affirmed Eritrea's right to self-determination without the previous consent of the OAU, leaving 'the organization with very little

option but to back this policy' (Paquin 2010, 141). This resonates with Coggins (2011, 449) observations that when a Great Power (in this case the United States) confers legitimacy upon a secessionist movement/state its decision initiates a cascade of legitimacy throughout the remaining members of the international system.

The Strategies of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front

The success of Eritrea's struggle for statehood was also facilitated by the military defeat of the Ethiopian regime. The defeat of the Dergue can be attributed to a number of factors including the military and diplomatic tactics of the Eritrean liberation movements. Special attention must be paid to the strategies of the EPLF, as it was the sole movement to engage the Ethiopian government in the last and decisive decade of the armed struggle. The fight against Ethiopian occupation was fought on two fronts: through military campaigns against the Ethiopian army and through diplomatic endeavours aiming at explaining the reasons for Eritrea's independence.

On the military front, the EPLF adopted a number of strategies that proved effective. Firstly, the EPLF counteracted the military superiority of the Ethiopian army by adhering to the practices of guerrilla tactics and protracted warfare (Thomas 2012, 1). Secondly, the EPLF secured massive popular support to the struggle by adopting a number of social reforms in the territories under its control such as land ownership, health, education and gender relations (Sherman 1980, 101-106). Thirdly, the EPLF relied primarily on Ethiopia as source of arms and equipment capturing it on the battlefield and in guerrilla raids on specific targets (Keller 2007, 24). Fourthly, the EPLF put in practice a policy of self-reliance in the liberated zones, setting up industries to manufacture and repair medicines, clothes, vehicles, arms and military equipment. Lastly, the EPLF established alliances with other groups within Ethiopia opposing the Dergue's regime, such as the TPLF and the OLF.

It is worth noting that, in the late 1980's, the various dissident groups fighting the Ethiopian government united under one organization umbrella called the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). As stated by Iyob (1995, 134) the EPLF's alliance with the EPRDF 'was based on the latter's recognition of the Eritrean demand for self-determination and a mutual conviction of the need to rid Ethiopia of the Mengistu regime'. Both the EPLF and the EPRDF coordinated their offensives against the Ethiopian forces. The EPLF focused on the capture of Asmara, while the EPRDF relied on EPLF logistical support for the capture of Addis Ababa. Eventually the two fronts defeated the Ethiopian army becoming the main participants in

the US-led ceasefire negotiations in London. In 1993, Eritrea became independent with the full blessing of the EPRDF government in Addis Ababa.

The fight was equally effective on the diplomatic front. The EPLF embarked on a policy of winning over international public opinion to the cause of the Eritrean people. To this end three main strategies were implemented: firstly, the EPLF reframed the nature of its armed struggle from anti-colonial war to a war for the exercise of the right to self-determination (Negash 1997:163); secondly, the EPLF issued a referendum document stating that Eritreans should be given the option to choose from one of the three alternatives: a) union; b) federation within a regional autonomy framework; or, c) independence; thirdly, the EPLF sought African support for Eritrean self-determination pointing to parallelisms between Eritrea and the historical and legal arguments used the to justify the cases for Namibia and Western Sahara's independence.

The strategy emphasizing the right to self-determination as the primary cause of the war garnered enormous support in Europe and North America. Although, in its proposal the EPLF attributed supervisory role to the OAU and the UN implementation of the referendum option the Ethiopian government dismissed it. The EPLF's proposal was seen as evidence that the movement was trying to find a political solution to the conflict (Negash 1997, 164).

Conclusion

In the course of roughly a century, Eritrea experienced massive political transformations. It was established as an Italian colony (1890-1941), administered by Great Britain (1941-1952), federated and incorporated into Ethiopia (1952-1962), fought for independence (1962-1991), eventually acceding to independent statehood (1993). This study examined the dynamics of secession and the determining factors behind Eritrea's successful accession to independent statehood.

Eritrean sense of a distinct national identity emerged during the decades of Italian colonial rule, intensified during the years of British administration, maturing as a result of the experiences of oppressive Ethiopian imperialism. A series of socio-political and economic grievances against Addis Ababa's systematic dismantlement of Eritrea's federal status led to the rise of secessionist movements in Eritrea and the beginning of nearly three decades of armed conflict, which ended with the defeat of the Ethiopian army. This

last event paved the way for a UN-sanctioned and monitored referendum on Eritrean independence and the territory's accession to statehood.

Since the armed struggle for Eritrea's independence was conducted amidst a number of factors that had prevented previous secessionist attempts from succeeding, this study has argued that Eritrea's successful secession was the result of a tight combination of both domestic and external factors. Domestically, the Ethiopian army was defeated as a result of the Dergue's policies of alienation and the effectiveness of the strategies of the EPLF. Externally, Eritrea's historical and legal claims to sovereignty, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as the mediating role of the United States were decisive in ensuring Eritrea's recognition as an independent state on 24 May 1993.

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ABSTRACT

Contrary to the vast majority of African states that gained independence through processes of decolonization from European colonial powers, Eritrea attained independent statehood by formally withdrawing from an established sovereign African state. This occurrence represents a remarkable political development in post-colonial Africa for at least two reasons: 1) it was the first time that a secessionist movement succeed in its quest for independence; 2) the struggle for independence took place within a continental framework that was particularly hostile to the emergence of new states. Drawing upon secondary qualitative data sources, this study examines Eritrea's secession against the background of scholarship that emphasizes the social, political and economic context in which secessionist struggles take place. It argues that Eritrea's successful secession lies at the intersection of domestic and global politics, combining factors such as the region's historical and legal claims for territorial self-determination, the policies of alienation of the parent-state, the effectiveness of the strategies of the secessionist movements, the end of the Cold War and the supportive role of the victorious superpower. The study adds new and systematic contributions to the debate on the determinants of successful secessions in post-colonial Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA: A NEW DAWN?

Vladimir Shubin[1]

In early July, 1991, the first National conference of the ANC[2] after its political admission took place in Durban. There, the party's new leadership was formed, Nelson Mandela was elected ANC President and Walter Sisulu its Deputy President, both unopposed. However, the race for the next top position, that of Secretary-General, did take place and Cyril Ramaphosa, a long-standing leader of the National Union of Miners (NUM), won by good majority over Alfred Nzo who had occupied this post for 22 years.

I had the honor of addressing the conference and, on the way back home, a very fruitful discussion in the ANC Headquarters in Johannesburg with Joe Slovo, then Secretary-General of the South African Communist Party and member of the ANC National Executive Committee. Slovo was quite happy with the results of the conference and in particular with the composition of the NEC[3]: "We haven't made any canvassing, but it's the best Executive we could have". Comrade Joe, as we usually called him, was of high opinion of the ANC's new Secretary-General: "He is not a member of the SACP[4], but we always cooperated well with him". However, Slovo then stopped for a moment and said: "But we remember that before the NUM he worked for Anglo-American Corporation".

These words of Slovo came to my mind when I read about Ramaphosa's election to the post of the President of the ANC in December 2017 and then of the Republic of South Africa in February 2018. His road to these high positions was not easy. When, back in 1991, Ramaphosa was elected to the post of ANC Secretary-General, none other than Jacob Zuma became his deputy. Moreover, he was second after Nelson Mandela in the list of ANC candidates in the first democratic elections in 1994, and only at the last moment it was decided that the post of deputy president of South Africa would be taken not by him, but by Thabo Mbeki. If this had not happen, he would have every chance

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2 African National Congress.

3 National Executive Committee, the highest organ of the ANC.

4 South African Communist Party.

to become the leader of the ANC back in 1997, and two years later president of the Republic of South Africa.

For two years, Ramaphosa chaired the Constitutional Assembly, and after the adoption of this most important document, he went to the business world, however remaining a member of the ANC's NEC. Moreover, he was elected in 2012 Deputy President of the ANC and, in 2014, the country's Deputy President.

Therefore, after the resignation of Jacob Zuma on February 14, 2019, in accordance with the Constitution of South Africa, Ramaphosa immediately became the acting president and on the next day the National Assembly unanimously elected him president of the Republic of South Africa. Only MPs from the Economic Freedom Fighters party left the chamber at that moment, declaring the illegality of the Parliament, but they also joined the standing ovation after Ramaphosa's "State of the Nation" address the next day.

In his speech, Ramaphosa outlined the program of his government. In essence, it complies with the decisions of the African National Congress (ANC) conference held in December 2017 and provides for a "radical economic transformation", including the possibility of expropriating land without compensation, but without compromising the economy and food security.

At the end of his speech, Ramaphosa quoted the song of the recently deceased South African composer Hugh Masekela "Thina Mina!" ("Send me!") and ended it with the words: "Now is the time for each of us to say "send me". Now is the time for all of us to work together, in honor of Nelson Mandela to build a new, better South Africa for all".

In addition to the slogan "Thina Mina!", symbolizing the willingness to work for the good of the country, another expression took the most important place in the keynote speech of Ramaphosa – "New Dawn": "We should put all the negativity that has dogged our country behind us because a new dawn is upon us." (Ramaphosa, 2018).

However, as we know, the dawn comes after night, so how "dark" was South Africa under the rule of the predecessor of Ramaphosa? This expression seems like a poetic exaggeration, but, so to speak, the "dark spots" on the light background were also considerable. In recent years, the economic situation in South Africa has become more complicated. However, the "darkest" side of the last period of "Zuma's rule" was the growth of corruption, and this directly affected the head of state and his relations.

So, the fight against corruption became the main urgent task facing the new president. However, Ramaphosa has been known since the leadership of the NUM as a person who seeks to solve problems through nego-

tiations and avoid extreme measures. For example, in 2008 he opposed the "recall" of Thabo Mbeki by the ANC's NEC as president, and after the December 2017 ANC Conference he patiently negotiated with Zuma, trying to achieve his (at least outwardly) voluntary resignation, and even arranged a farewell cocktail party in honor of him and his cabinet (Enca 2018).

Therefore, it is not surprising that Cyril Ramaphosa, to strengthen his position, uses, first of all, not administrative measures, but the country's legal system. The Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, headed by Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, began working in Pretoria on August 20, 2018. Zuma, although after many delays, had to agree to form the Commission following the recommendations contained in the report of the then Public Protector Thuli Mandosela, which disclosed the misuse by the state apparatus and state properly, especially by the Gupta brothers who came from India in the early 1990s.

According to authorities, in recent years, 100 billion rand (about $ 7 billion) has been stolen through "state capture" and corruption, and the new president intends to return them to the Treasury (Marrian 2018). At the commission meetings, many facts have been revealed that are harmful to the former president. Although, in accordance with the powers of the commission, information obtained in the course of its work cannot be used as evidence in court, the "normal" South African legal mechanism has again worked with respect to Zuma. Already on April 6, 2018, he appeared before the High Court in Durban on 16 charges, including fraud, corruption and racketeering (Nair 2018), with the prosecutor reporting 207 witnesses (Andersen 2018), although, given South African legal system, it may take many years before his fate is known. For example, at a regular meeting on May 20, 2019, the next meeting was scheduled only for October (Down 2019).

Moreover, Zuma still has many supporters, first of all, in his native province, KwaZulu-Natal, who gathered near the courthouse with signs saying "Hands off Zuma" and "100% innocent," and joined him in thinking his "crown" song – "Umshini wami" ("Bring me my machine gun") (Davis 2018).

Seeking to restore order in the country's governance system, the new president relies on a number of leaders who held public office until Zuma came to power. For example, the special commission "on the assessment of the mandate, potential and organizational integrity" of South Africa's State Security Agency was headed by Sidney Mufamadi, who served as Minister of Public Security (Police) in Mandela's government, and the report prepared by this commission contained sharp criticism of the activities of the country's special services during Zuma's rule: "A key finding of the panel is that

there has been political malpurposing and factionalisation of the intelligence community over the past decade or more that has resulted in an almost complete disregard for the Constitution, policy, legislation and other prescripts." (The Presidency 2019). Another prominent person, Charles Nqakula, who also held that post and then served as Minister of Defense, became the President's security adviser.

As for the economy, Ramaphosa made a public commitment "to generate at least US$ 100 billion in new investments over the next five years". To this end, a group of "the President's Special Envoys on Investment" was created that included prominent economists, in particular Msebisi Jonas, who had been removed by Zuma from the post of deputy minister of finance, has already testified against the Guptas (and in effect against the former president) in the Zondo Commission. According to Ramaphosa, "They will be travelling to major financial centres in Asia, Middle East, Europe and the Americas to meet with potential investors"(The Presidency 2018).

Active work in this direction is carried out by Ramaphosa himself. After Ramaphosa's visit to Saudi Arabia (The Presidency 2018a) and the United Arab Emirates (The Presidency 2018b), $ 10 billion of investments from each of these countries into the South African economy was announced, and after a visit to China, another $ 14.7 billion was announced (Hunter 2018).

On September 21, 2018, Ramaphosa announced "the stimulus and recovery plan", consisting

> of a range of measures, both financial and non-financial, that will be implemented immediately to firstly ignite economic activity, secondly restore investor confidence, thirdly prevent further job losses and create new jobs, and fourthly to address some urgent challenges that affect the conditions faced by vulnerable groups among our people (The Presidency 2018).

The central element of this plan was the reprioritization of spending towards activities that have the greatest impact on economic growth, domestic demand and job creation with a particular emphasis on township and rural economies, women and youth (The Presidency 2018).

The topic of land reform has become extremely sensitive in South Africa in connection with the decision adopted at the ANC National Conference, which provides for the possibility of expropriation of land without compensation. The discussion around the issue was rather hot at the conference and, if to believe press reports, even scuffles broke out inside a closed session (African news agency 2017). Moreover, one of my old friends, a pro-

minent South Africa academic shared with me a rather odd version of the events. He believes that the formula "expropriation without compensation" was put forward by Zuma's supporters who hoped it would be rejected at the conference. Then they would leave the hall and no election of a new ANC president would take place.

The adoption of the resolution on "expropriation" was often interpreted in South Africa and especially abroad as a decision to take land from white farmers. However, the caution with which Ramaphosa and his associates intend to carry out land reform was evidenced, for example, by a statement by the national chairman of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe, who suggested that up to 12 thousand hectares be kept in the possession of one farmer (Mahlase 2018).

Moreover, the land issue in South Africa is more complicated. Apart from a crucial lack of land for urban settlements, a highly contested topic is the Ingonyama Trust[5]. It was established to administer the land "traditionally owned by the Zulu people" by an Act of the legislature of the KwaZulu "homeland" on the eve of the 1994 general elections. It is controlled by the so-called Zulu King, Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu. The High Level Panel on Assessment of Key Legislation and Acceleration of Fundamental Change headed by former president Khalema Motlanthe suggested in its report in 2017 to repeal the Ingonyama Trust Act (Larc 2017), but so far no decision was taken on the issue.

The Trust administers 2,8 million hectares (that is almost 30% of the land in KwaZulu-Natal). The land has to be used "for the benefit, material welfare and social well-being" of the Zulu "tribes and communities" (Larc 2015), but in reality it remains under control of former apartheid regime's collaborators.

Along with a wide public discussion of this topic, Ramaphosa created the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture. Its members include "highly qualified by virtue of academic knowledge and professional experience, social entrepreneurship or activism related to the agricultural economy and land policy", such as, on the one hand, its chairperson Dr Vuyokazi Mahlati, (female) member of the National Planning Commission and president of the Association of African Farmers of South Africa, and on the other hand, Daniel Kriek, a farmer from the Free State province and president of Agri SA, a federation of agricultural organizations, which calls itself "the keeper of all farmers in, regardless of race, religion

5 Ingonyama, lion in Zulu, is one of the names of the Zulu king.

or gender" (Agri SA 2018), but in reality of predominantly white, especially Afrikaner farmers.

The panel produced a detailed (132 pages) report that in particular suggested:

> The different sources of land to address the different demands for land will include different acquisition methods as well as (voluntary) 'donations' from the following:
>
> (a) Churches
> (b) The mining houses
> (c) Land expropriated from absentee landlords
> (d) Municipal land and commonages
> (e) Government land not under beneficial use, including land owned by state owned enterprises
> (f) Urban landlords
> (g) Commercial farmers, including game farmers and foresters
> (h) Agribusinesses
> (i) Land redistribution farms in distress and close to failure (ADVISORY PANEL ON LAND REFORM AND AGRICULTURE, May 4 2019).

By and large, the report was positively received in South Africa. However, it angered the Zulu King. He said that Kgalema Motlanthe's High Level Panel highlighted "the hatred for the Zulu nation" and that the presidential expert advisory panel on land, "also continued to insult him" (Hans 2019). He threatened to go to court "with the aim of protecting KwaZulu-Natal's rural land which was under the Ingonyama Trust Board's control" in South Africa and outside the borders," It is rather peculiar that he referred to his "friends in Britain" who according to him were also concerned about attempts that were made "against my land". Using the "ethnicity card" he claimed that "this Zuluphobia is aimed at questioning the existence of the Zulu nation." (HANS, Sep. 8 2019).

In general, it seems that initially, after Ramaphosa came to the presidency, the ANC largely restored the confidence lost during "Zuma's rule". The test of the ANC's influence after the change of its leadership, as well as of other parties, was the May 8, 2019 elections to the national parliament and legislative assemblies of nine provinces of South Africa.

By this time, a rather difficult situation had arisen on the field of political parties in South Africa. Difficulties were notable in the Tripartite

Alliance in recent years. The leadership of the Communist Party (its number grew to 280 thousand "audited" members in 2017) (SACP, 2018) openly advocated the resignation of Zuma[6], although several dozens of SACP members were members of parliament, and some, including the General Secretary, Dr Bonginkosi ("Blade") Nzimande, were ministers[7].

It is necessary to clarify that they are all elected or appointed to their posts as members of the ANC. But in the last years of Zuma's presidency, proposals to participate in elections independently – and not only in the framework of the Congress – were persistently put forward by the SACP members and especially in the Young Communist League. Criticizing Zuma for refusing to consult with ANC allies on the most important issues, including personnel issues, SACP at its conference in July 2017 raised the question of "reconfiguration" of the tripartite alliance and decided to independently participate in the elections. Moreover, it was tested in practice at the by-elections in November 2017 in one of the municipalities in the Free State Province. The SACP received several mandates there, and after concluding an alliance with the ANC at the local level, her representative became mayor. But in general, this step provoked a negative reaction in the ANC and led to a weakening of the positions of the SACP members in the ANC National Executive Committee: its General Secretary, Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson were not re-elected to it. However, having supported Ramaphosa in the struggle for the highest post, the Communist Party not only did not independently participate in the elections in May 2019, but contributed greatly to the success of the ANC.

There are 400 members in the National Assembly of South Africa, elected according to party lists, and for a party to be represented there it is enough to get just 0.25% of votes. Therefore, it is not surprising that a record number of parties registered for participation in the 2019 elections (parliamentary and provincial) was 48 (Saho 2019) (all in all, 611 parties were registered in South Africa, of which 314 at the national level, and the rest at the provincial level) (Electoral Commission 2019a).

To participate in the elections in South Africa, citizens must first register, and out of about 35 million South Africans who had the right to vote, only 26.79 million people did (Electoral Commission 2019b), but only about

6 Earlier, precisely because of its leadership support to Zuma, a number of the SACP's prominent members had left the party.

7 Shortly before his resignation, Zuma removed Nzimande from the post of Minister of Higher Education and Training, but Cyril Ramaphosa returned him to the cabinet as Minister of Transport, and after the election he was appointed head of the expanded Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology.

two-thirds of them – about 17.76 million – presented themselves at polling stations (Elections 2019).

The election results generally coincided with the forecasts. The ANC gained 57.5% of the vote (Elections 2019), significantly less than in the parliamentary elections five years earlier, but more than in the local elections in 2016. At the same time, the higher share of votes in rural areas of the country was clearly manifested compared to industrial: this party won the highest percentage of votes in predominantly rural Limpopo and Mpumalanga, and the lowest in industrial Western Cape and Gauteng.

The main opponent of the ANC, the Democratic Alliance (DA), gained 20.77% (Elections, 2019), that is, less than in 2014 and 2016. The decrease in the level of support for this party was especially noticeable in its "electoral stronghold" – the province of Western Cape (from 59.4% in 2014 to 52.4%). While the change of the top leadership in the ANC, undoubtedly contributed to its success in the elections, one of the reasons for the failure of the DA was precisely the situation in its leadership. Shortly after the 2016 elections, Helen Zille, a white woman who resigned as DA leader giving way to Mmusi Maimane in 2015, was sharply criticized for speaking out in defense of colonialism. Thereby, considerable damage was done to the desire of the DA to get rid of the image of the party of the white liberals, and Zille was forced to resign from all party posts, although she remained for some time Premier of the Western Cape.

Following this, after allegations of financial misconduct, the mayor of Cape Town, Patricia de Lille, who is coloured, was forced to resign in October 2018 after many months of internal party bickering and even litigation, and then left the DA altogether and announced the creation of a new party with a rather strange name – GOOD Party" (DLULANE, Dec. 2 2018).

De Lille's forced departure weakened the DA's position among coloured people, which make up almost half of the population of Western Cape, and this hardly compensated for the election to the mayor's post of the other colored person, Dan Plato, who had already held this post rather ingloriously.

Unlike the DA, the third most influential party in South Africa, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), improved its results by receiving 10.80 % of the votes (Elections 2019). It is the only successful party formed in South Africa in recent years, is led by the former head of the ANC Youth League, Julius Malema, who initially actively supported Zuma, and then began to

criticize him from the "left", and, better to say, from populist positions[8], advocating "economic freedom" (hence the unusual name of the party) and demanding, in particular, the nationalization of the country's mining industry. It should be noted that Malema himself is not a "proletarian" by the way of life, and the prosecutor's office had charged him for corruption, fraud and racketeering. Besides, serious political accusations were made against the EFF leadership. Baleke Mbete, then speaker of the National Assembly, said: "Those people (EFF) are not working with people of this country alone, they are pawns in a bigger scheme of things where some Western governments are involved" (Mataboge 2015).

Several "small" parties were created immediately before the elections, and at least the leadership of one of them, the African Transformation Movement (ATM) that won two seats, was associated with Zuma's supporters, and the ANC even convened a commission to investigate the participation of ANC leadership members in the creation of this and other new parties.

As to other "small" parties that got seats in the National Assembly, almost all of them scored less than 1% of the vote. The exception is the Inkatha Freedom Party – 3.38% (instead of 2.4%) and the Freedom Front Plus (FF +) – 2.38% (instead of 0.9%) (ELECTIONS, 2019). The rise in their votes can be explained in the first case by the resignation of Jacob Zuma, a Zulu, and in the second case by the crossing-over of some of the DA supporters[9].

The creation of one new party deserves a special attention. In contrast to others, it was initiated by a strong organization, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, that has about 400 thousand members. After harsh criticism of the governmental National Development Plan as a "neoliberal document" the NUMSA's conference decided in 2013 to refuse support for the ANC in the forthcoming elections. The NUMSA leadership announced the creation of several opposition movements initialed the broad-based United Front, the "revolutionary working class" party "based on Marxism-Leninism" and the new nationwide federation of trade unions. The constituent congresses of all three were planned in 2017, however then only the South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU) consisting of unions that were like NUMSA expelled from SACTU or left it, really began to operate.

8 However, when the author began to characterize the EFF in such a way in a discussion with Khalema Motlanthe, he objected: "No, this is a party of narrow nationalism": this term in the ANC refers to tribalists and black racists (Discussion with K. Motlante, Johannesburg, May 30, 2018).

9 It is noteworthy that Peter Mare (a coloured), previously a member of the DA and a number of other parties, was nominated as a candidate for the post of premier of the Western Cape from FF +.

The United Front was moribund, while a new party, practically a competitor to the SACP, was registered in November 2017 under a high-sounding name Socialist Revolutionary Workers' Party, but it was completely defeated in the parliamentary elections, gaining only 0.14% of the vote (The South African 2019) (It means that it was supported by no more than 5% of the members of this union, even less if we take into account members of their families.) However, the schismatic activities of the NUMSA leadership led to a decrease in the ability of trade unions to influence the determination of the country's development course.

A complete disaster was the performance of another "radical" party, "Black First, Land First" that received just 0.11 % of votes (The South African 2019). After the re-election of Ramaphosa and the inauguration that symbolically took place on the Africa Day, the 25th of May, he announced the composition of a new government. The number of portfolios was reduced from 36 to 28, and according to a principle of gender equality, a 50% women's quota was introduced.

Key in the conditions of economic turbulence, the post of Minister of Finance was retained by Tito Mboweni, despite the opposition of trade unions. The market, on the contrary, believed that this 60-year-old professional, who had previously headed the Reserve Bank of South Africa, would be able to strengthen investor confidence and revive the country's economy. The youngest minister was Ronald Lamola, 35, who became the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services. Quite surprisingly, Lindiwe Sisulu was moved to the post of Minister of Human Settlements and Water and the Ministry of International Relations and Cooperation is headed now by Dr Naledi Pandor. A real surprise was the appointment of Patricia de Lille to lead Ministry of Public Works and Infrastructure (South African Government 2019).

With the high prestige of Cyril Ramaphosa and the ANC's success at the election, it looked like the next five years would be years of implementation of the new president's plans. However, pretty soon South Africa faced new economic and political problems.

The economic situation deteriorated due to a new depreciation of the Rand and the ongoing recession in the economy. Moreover, some days after Ramaphosa's inauguration the governmental Statistics South Africa reported that the economy "slumped sharply in the first three months of 2019, contracting by 3,2% with manufacturing, mining and trade the biggest contributors to the fall" (Stats SA 2019).

Under these conditions, the National Treasury headed by Mboweni suddenly published a paper on "Draft Recovery Strategy" that was critically

received by many in the ANC and especially among its allies. The SACP Central Committee emphasized in its statement that

> The paper incorporates capitalist economic policy reformist prescriptions from the "*OECD Economic Surveys: South Africa*" and "*Economic Policy Reforms 2017: Going for Growth*" developed by the elite Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2017 (SACP, Sep. 6 2019).

It continued:

> The national democratic sovereignty of our policy space is sacrosanct. The codification of the OECD economic reforms in the "...economic Strategy for South Africa and the process followed in developing and releasing the paper undermined, first and foremost organizationally, the primary mandating role of the ANC-headed Alliance (SACP, Sep. 6 2019).

The paper was resolutely rejected also by the third Alliance member, COSATU: "This Draft Recovery Strategy makes the government appear incoherent, confused and unreliable. COSATU rejects it and demands that National Treasury withdraws this document immediately". It asked quite relevant questions: "What is the status of this document? Why release a document to the public before it has gone to Cabinet? Who will be responsible for it? What if it is divergent to existing policies"? (Pamla 2019).

The reaction was so critical that the ANC leadership had to meet and issue a statement on September 3 that emphasized the need of discussions in the ANC and its allies:

> The meeting resolved that the structures including branches of the ANC should be engaged and be allowed to make comments on the discussion paper.... The meeting agreed that the ANC Alliance should also be allowed to discuss this discussion paper within their structures. The National Officials resolved that the next meeting of the NEC will table the matter for discussion and consider all inputs as stated above (African National Congress 2019).

Moreover personal problems for Ramaphosa and his supporters arose from several sources, in particular from Zondo Commision and Public Protector Busisiwe Mkhwebane. One of the witnesses at the Commission claimed that a number of the ANC leaders received bribes (either by cash

or by services) from the Bossasa company that provided service to the party. Moreover, Cyril Ramaphosa made a mistake when replying to the question from Mmusi Maimane about 500 thousand rand allocated by this company. He said the money was a payment to his son for the work done, but very soon he corrected himself, admitting that the money was the company's contribution to the CR17, a campaign for Ramaphosa's election to the ANC Presidency (MAHLATI, Nov. 16 2018).

However, this incident allowed Mkwebane to accuse Ramaphosa in violation of the constitution and executive ethics code when he "misled" lawmakers about a campaign donation from Bossasa (Bloomberg 2019). Ramaphosa is challenging her findings in court but the case emboldened his opponents within the ANC and hampered his efforts for tighter control over the party. Besides, her office disclosed the sources of donations to CR17, which included large sums from white-owned companies.

At the same time, Jacob Zuma in his testimony to Zondo Commission and in other public statements accused two prominent ANC members, Ngoako Ramathlodi and Siphiwe Nyanda[10](Dlulane 2019), who had been appointed by him to ministerial positions in being spies of the apartheid regime. Then, he accused another former minister, Derek Hanekom in being an "enemy agent", but lost the case in Durban high court. It ruled that Zuma's "known enemy agent" tweet about Hanekom was "untrue, defamatory and unlawful" and ordered Zuma to remove it and publish an apology on Twitter within 24 hours as well as to pay damages (Broughton 2019).

As if these problems were not enough, in the late August and September 2019 South Africa faced a new disastrous wave of xenophobia directed against African migrants. The ANC, its government and Ramaphosa personally condemned these acts but the image of South Africa suffered a lot, especially on the continent.

As we all know, a dawn cannot be long and a new day comes. What day will it be in South Africa provided Cyril Ramaphosa wins in the inter-ANC struggle and strengthens his party position? There are conflicting opinions about the president's political views. When he was the Secretary General of the National Miners' Union, he openly advocated for socialism, but, as mentioned above, he has become a businessman and one of the richest people in South Africa. When some years ago a journalist asked him if he was still a

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10 Siphiwe Nyanda, well known to the author, was second-in-2 in the command of the ANC armed underground machinery in South Africa (famous Operation Vula), Chief of SANDF and then Minister of Communications. He led a group of the ANC military veterans who insisted on Zuma's resignation.

socialist, he answered: "Yes, I am. But I have coined my own phrase, which in many ways describes what I am. I am a socialist but I operate in a capitalist world. I am therefore a capitalist with a socialist instinct." (Harvey 2015)

Does Ramaphosa still preserve this instinct? Will it influence his policy? So far, no signs of it; for example, it is hard to believe that the notorious paper was published by the Treasury without his knowledge.

But we still have to wait and see.

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ABSTRACT

The article analyses recent developments in South Africa after the non-voluntarily resignation Jacob Zuma and election of Cyril Ramaphosa to the post of President of the Republic. One of the key words in his "State of the Nation" report next day after his election were "New dawn": "We should put all the negativity that has dogged our country behind us because a new dawn is upon us. We must leave behind all the negative that prevented our country, because there is a new dawn above us", he said. So the article evaluates the steps the new president took to keep his promise "to turn the country around", and in particular to eradicate widespread corruption. A special attention is paid to the results of the May 2019 national and provincial elections in South Africa.

THE MIGRATION FLOWS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS IMPACTS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA (1960-2000)

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Yuri Debrai Padilha[2]

Introduction

The end of World War II instituted a new geopolitical structure in international relations, changing the dynamics of these relations in Southern Africa, both by the change of European countries in relation to the countries of the region, and by the acceleration of the liberation processes of the African peoples. This scenario contributed to a change in the migratory processes of this period, still presenting impacts on the current migratory dynamics in South Africa (RSA).

This research aims to investigate the migratory processes that occurred during the long road to freedom of the African peoples, from the 1960s to the early 2000s. Therefore, we investigate the influence of the Cold War bipolar dispute and the reflexes that the peripheral capitalist development of South Africa had for the migration processes of the country. Currently, the state stands out as political and economic leadership in the region and is the destination of many migratory contingents. However, part of this prestige has bases linked to the Apartheid regime, whose "separate development" implied a framework of social inequality, persisting to this day in the country.

The period between the 1960s and 2000s, in Southern Africa, is marked by the presence of anti-colonial liberation movements (formed by parties, unions, religious groups and others) which, in some cases, formed support networks and shelter to resistance groups and migrants from the region (Braga, 2011). This scenario characterized the coming of age of Afri-

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can nationalism and Africanist sentiment, often exposed by the Black[3] and pan-African[4] movements (Visentini; Ribeiro, 2013). The liberation-seeking environment, combined with the acute sense of African nationalism contributed to the strengthening of the Africanist sentiment, whose effects have also enhanced the reception of African immigrants and refugees within their own continent.

The 1960s was marked by the emergence of several independent processes. In Southern Africa, this period marked a series of violent conflicts, many of which lasted until the 1990s (Schütz, 2014). It is observed that many of these independences resulted in new political compositions, with old oppressive and racist practices, motivating armed guerrillas in many Southern African countries (Chanaiwa, 2010).

Still, the 1960s symbolize a radical change in international politics, influenced by the post-World War II environment. In this regard, the signing of the Bretton Woods Agreement (1944), the UN Charter (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights/UDHR (UN 1948) and the rise of the bipolar dispute between the US and the USSR (both anti-colonial) are noteworthy. To the countries of the global periphery, the bipolarity brought profound geopolitical effects, after all, disputes for the balance of international power shifted from the center to the periphery. Thus, the Local Wars, which multiplied over the forty years of the Cold War, became the epicenter of US and USSR disputes.

This political moment was marked by the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a movement that emerged at the Belgrade Conference (1961), influenced by the debate started in Bandung (1955), where a coalition between third-world countries was created. Therefore, in 1961 the principles discussed in Bandung were institutionalized, seeking the independence of these countries, the non-violation of the rights of oppressed peoples (such as the opposition to Apartheid), the balance of markets between nations, and peripheral economic and industrial development (Pereira; Medeiros, 2015).

The debate on third-world economic development, in addition to generating the creation of the NAM, also led to the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the G-77, in 1964. Thus, there is the inclusion of the uneven development agenda

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3 Feeling of blackness is linked to the black movement, the one that aimed to place greater emphasis on the culture of black movement. To learn more, it is suggested to read *Post Colonial Studies: The key concepts*, Ashcroft, Bill *et al.* (2000).

4 For pan-Africanism means the movement that seeks to unify Africa for the sake of their own interests. To learn more, the above reading is suggested.

that, coupled with the issue of the deteriorating terms of trade, has become part of discussions in international organizations (Pereira; Medeiros, 2015).

Aiming at the best development of this research, and to achieve its respective objectives, this work is structured in three sessions. The first evaluates, on a regional basis, the "separate development" in the context of Apartheid and its effects on migration flows in South Africa. In the second part, through the prism of migration to South Africa, the black liberation movements are analyzed, prioritizing the African perspective towards the struggle against English and Portuguese neocolonialism. In the third session, from the South African perspective, the systemic changes that the end of the Cold War represented to Southern Africa and their possible impacts on the region's migratory flow towards South Africa are analyzed.

The separate development of South African Apartheid and the instrumentalization of migratory work

South Africa became a republic in 1961. However, the new political administration did not break with the Apartheid regime, which lasted until 1994 (Pereira, 2010). Before then, in 1948, the South African government approved a series of segregationist laws, which placed the white population of South Africa in advantage to other (African, Indian and other people of non-European origin). This segregation by skin color also reflected on migratory flows to the country, such as the use of the Immigrants Regulation Act (1913), which had a xenophobic and racist character, where the government determined that only white people had the freedom to migrate and made it difficult for black people to come (and leave) the country. In addition, this law was a facilitating instrument for cheap labor in mines and agriculture (Almeida, 2015).

In 1960, with the letter "Called to the Nation", written by the Pan-African Congress (PAC) (1959), a group of black protesters gathered in protest against the Pass Laws[5] and for the increase of the minimum wage. However, the government, armed with firearms and tear gas suppressed the demonstration. This event, known as the Sharpeville Massacre, culminated in the deaths of 72 people and 186 other injuries, representing one of the symbols of Apartheid violence (Chanaiwa, 2010).

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5 Laws that forced blacks from South Africa to carry a booklet in which they reported where they lived, where they could go, who employed them and the tribal group to which they belonged (Mandela 2012).

From this date, the South African government blamed the ANC (African National Congress) and the PAC by the tragedy in Sharpeville, prohibiting the activity of these and other organizations opposing the regime. Until then, the African liberation demonstrations had a pacifist character, however, the establishment of violent state oppression and the prohibition of liberation movements, propelled the emergence of armed branches of resistance. Thus, in 1961, the PAC formed Poqo ("Pure" or "Alone" in Xhosa) while the ANC, led by Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, founded the Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) ("Spear of the Nation") (Braga, 2011). MK's founding year is also recognized as the founding year of the Department of Immigration, a government sector dedicated to encouraging the migration of white people to South Africa, while repelling the arrival of black immigrants, except for their work in mines (Almeida, 2015). In 1962, the RSA abandoned the Commonwealth agreement to strengthen the South African "separate development" project (Chanaiwa, 2010).

Due to Apartheid policies, in 1962, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted resolution number 1761, which suggested some boycott measures (economic, administrative and diplomatic) to the RSA in order to weaken the regime (UN 1962). At this time, the UNGA consisted of 110 States, of which more than thirty were Africans. After the first great wave of independence in Africa, African issues became more visible and representative in international organizations.

Wolpe (1972) presents migratory work as a key part of the South African capitalist arrangement, defined as "separate development". The author claims that this type of migration served as an important tool for the functioning of this system, whose dynamics were based on oppression of blacks – immigrants and natives – and the accumulation of capital in the country. Such a system was fed due to the labor supply presented by the RSA and the lack of employment in the southern region of the continent, which resulted in immigrants coming from the localities to the RSA. Thus, despite the irregular situation in most cases, it is understood that the cheap labor provided

by immigrants[6], ensured the strengthening of South African capital, which in turn changed the balance between domestic production and distribution, as well as undermining neighboring countries, especially affecting their agricultural production. The racial issue involved in this regime had major effects on the country's economy, as labor and movement control laws guaranteed cheap labor for South Africa's rapid economic growth (Wolpe, 1972).

During Apartheid, the urbanization process in South Africa accelerated, a phenomenon that contributed to the increase of migratory flow to the country. Parallel to the issue of immigrants destined for the mine workforce, labor supply in the industrial sector also had the same segregationist characteristics. Thus, Wolpe (1972) notes that many South African industries were set up around homelands (spaces that limited black housing in the country), facilitating the access to industry by black people. The involvement of such workers with the urban environment contributed to the strengthening of their political awareness, where, even in the face of oppression, the identification and relationship with the liberation movements was narrowed.

In the 1960s, RSA's economic growth placed the country among the top ten economies in the world. Thus, the South African economic and industrial development made the country the main economic hub of Southern Africa, establishing a kind of gravitational force on the neighbors. In 1969, the country signed a customs union agreement between Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, creating ties of dependence on neighboring economies to South Africa (Pereira, 2007).

If at the regional level the country was asserting itself with its neighbors, internally, the homelands faced the lack of various services and resources, widening the misery within the richest country in Africa (Pereira, 2007). In social terms, from the brief industrial growth of the country a scenario emerged of economic inequality and demographic transformation, where, while the spaces destined for whites presented greater economic

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6 Most immigrant workers were employed in mines, facing conditions of insecurity to their own health. Many black immigrants were placed in worse working circumstances than whites, because the second group did not accept to occupy the same workspace as the first, refusing to be in such conditions. Thus, the racism imposed by both the government and that manifested by the white society of South Africa meant that blacks were exposed to greater risks and, consequently, were the greatest victims of mine work (a profession that posed many people's health risks, even culminating in deaths). When exposed to work in the mines, workers were affected by diseases caused by contact with dust, such as tuberculosis and other respiratory diseases. Because of this, the South African government repatriated many of the immigrants, who received payments and medicines for such disability. However, the return of these immigrants has resulted in the epidemic spread of tuberculosis in places without medical assistance in the country (Darch 1981).

(and population) growth, the black population was instrumentalized to support this model (Braga, 2011).

In this context, the RSA became the subject of some international sanctions and, to circumvent them, the government aimed at self-sufficiency on the largest possible number of areas (highlighting the military development aiming to support the regime), enforcing the "separate development". However, even in the face of external isolation, the South African economy still depended on international trade, which represented around 50% of South African GDP in the period (Pereira, 2010).

Unlike the government's isolation of white economic development in the country, militants against Apartheid sought external alliances, creating international support networks and also settling outside the territory of South Africa. In this movement, they sought technical, financial, and especially military assistance. Thus, the MK's rapprochement with the USSR and China[7] stands out, from which they obtained political support and military training (Shubin, 2008).

If the 1960s presented an economic leap for South Africa, the same cannot be said for the 1970s and 1980s, characterized by economic decline of Apartheid, contributing to the collapse of the regime (Pereira, 2010). For the international system, the 1970s were marked by the gold standard crisis, breaking with the era of economic growth that had prevailed since the end of World War II. Against this background, the USSR sought to strengthen its global positioning by supporting third-world movements by increasing military, technical and, in some cases, financial assistance to various liberation movements (Oslow, 2013).

The sum of internal and regional challenges led Apartheid to economic stagnation, mainly due to the high production costs in the industry, for the maintenance of the system and the military spending that plagued the country. Economic problems, manifested in the 1970s, coupled with social issues at the domestic, regional and international levels, prompted the debate on the reform of the Apartheid regime. This period reflects the inability of the South African government to manipulate events in the region, especially regarding the impacts of the Carnation Revolution (1974), which led to the fall of the Salazar regime in Portugal. The end of the regime would strengthen the rise of Marxist groups fighting for the liberation of Angola and Mozambique (Visentini, 2016).

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7 At first, because of Sino-Soviet rivalries, Beijing opted for a rapprochement with the PAC, to the detriment of the (Soviet-backed) ANC. However, throughout the 1960s, China came closer to the ANC, which sent members for training in Beijing and Nanjing.

The strengthening of these revolutionary groups, also against Apartheid, implied a more aggressive South African stance towards their opponents. Thus, it is observed that the RSA began to support counterrevolutionary armed movements at the regional level. During this period, the alliances of the South African government with the movements of the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), both in Angola, and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) are noteworthy. Both groups presented themselves as anti-socialists and thus received international anti-Soviet support. If in the 1960s South Africa had good relations with its neighboring countries, in the 1970s, regional geopolitics was changed. In addition to the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Africa, changes in interactions between Washington and Moscow amplified the conflictive trend in the region (Braga, 2011).

In addition to allying itself with armed movements from other countries in the region, the RSA intervened directly in foreign territories, such as in Namibia, where the South African government disregarded the UN's suggestions to vacate the country and no longer administer it. In the territory of Angola, South Africa began to invest heavily in military apparatuses, as it no longer received US military support, aiming to combat resistance groups that received direct support from the USSR and Cuba (Vichinsk, 1987). Such interventions generated budgetary imbalances in South Africa and, in addition, the limitations and the wear of the South African troops put in check its state power, after the regime failed to weaken socialism in the region and exhaust the liberation movements (Pereira, 2007).

Regionally, Apartheid's economic and military shortcomings were recognized, mobilizing the South African civil society to intensify the resistance against the regime. However, in response, the government also intensified domestic violence in the face of anti-Apartheid demonstrations. From 1976 a new wave of revolt spread among several centers of black South African society. This period became known as the "Soweto Uprising" (Braga, 2011).

The economic decline scenario and intensification of civil demonstrations, presented during the 1970s, strengthened in the next decade. In 1983, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was created to increase resistance to Apartheid by mobilizing fronts across the country, prompting the government to declare a state of emergency. Internationally, the 1980s marked the fall in the price of gold in the international market, intensifying the economic crisis that plagued South Africa, where unemployment was rising and reaching the white population of the country, already demonstrating against

the regime. In addition, the 1980s marked the independence of Southern Rhodesia (1980), renamed Zimbabwe (Braga, 2011).

Despite the economic situation that undermined the South African society, the South African government maintained its interventionist policies and assisted some armed groups acting in neighboring countries such as Zimbabwe and Botswana, also encouraging military coups (or attempts) in the region, seeking to dissolve the sovereignty of the other states. Moreover, to destabilize the countries facing Apartheid, the RSA government housed military groups that acted against Frontline States (FLS)[8], financing and providing other types of support to different groups (Pereira, 2007).

In 1988, Apartheid soldiers were defeated by the Popular Liberation Forces of Angola (FAPLA) in the Cuito Cuanavale region, a crucial point for the end of the South African-Angola ceasefire and South African military interventionism in Angola and Namibia, resulting later in the independence of Namibia (1990) (Horing, 2015). A year after the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, F. W. de Klerk takes over the presidency of South Africa, beginning the last Apartheid government in the country.

By taking power, De Klerk begins to loosen the segregation[9] regime. In 1990, Nelson Mandela was released after 28 years in prison. After Mandela's release, the dissolution of the Apartheid regime and the transition to the democratic regime intensified. This transition period was characterized by various political conflicts and even the death of important political leaders of the country. The moment of transition escalated the black-white conflict in South Africa, a delicate period that could culminate in an avalanche of events detrimental to the desired end of Apartheid (Branco, 2003).

During the transitional period (1990-1994) the Aliens Control Act 1991 was passed, which would govern the entry of foreigners into South Africa (Aliens Control Act, 1991). Faced with such legislation, an immigrant coming to South Africa would have to be evaluated by an Immigrant Council, made up of whites who would judge possible cases of residence in the country. It is noted, then, that this law, one of Apartheid's latest manifestations, was created on a segregationist basis and served to limit the access of black

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8 Frontline States is a group formed in 1970 by countries in the Southern Africa region to work with anti-Apartheid policies. The FLS was formed by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.

9 Still in 1989 the government legalized all previously banned anti-Apartheid parties and organizations, in addition to releasing seven political prisoners and invalidating some segregationist laws.

immigrants to the country (Aliens Control Act, 1991). Observing the Aliens Control Act (1991), Almeida (2015) analyzes that:

> The residence requests in South Africa always passed through the Board of immigrants, making the decisions extremely subjective. In other words, the migrant would have to be assimilated by this Council, that is, by the white population. Therefore, the entry of black people in the country was restricted, however, as migrant workers they were often accepted (Almeida 2015, 223).

Still in the context of migrations to South Africa that occurred in the 1990s, it is identified that the country remained the main destination for labor migrations in all of sub-Saharan Africa. It is estimated that in 1992, the sum of the immigrant workforce found in South African mines amounted to approximately 166 thousand, while the agricultural sector employed about 100 thousand immigrants. In addition, it is noted that the low economic strength of neighboring countries such as Lesotho and Swaziland strengthened a relationship of economic dependence towards the South African state (Acosta, 2011).

In November 1993, the negotiations that led to the official end of Apartheid[10] ended. In April 1994 historic elections were held, when blacks, mestizos, Indians and whites voted for the South African presidency, electing Nelson Mandela (by the ANC) as the country's first black president, for the 1994-1998 term. Mandela took on the mission of repositioning South Africa in the regional and international context, and began to dismantle the segregationist barriers in his country, already facing new structural challenges left by the previous regime (Branco, 2003).

Although the Mandela administration signified a new era for South Africa, the country's policy still featured former pro-Apartheid actors with power to influence public policymaking. In this scenario, guided by the dispute between groups against and for the former regime, an Amendment to the Aliens Control Act and the South African Citizenship Act 88 were approved in 1995. From these, an foreigner was defined as any and all person not of South African citizenship. Beginning with Law 88, South African justice interpreted that anyone who did not prove their regular status in the country would be subject to deportation (South African Citizenship Act, 1995). Also, during the Mandela government the new South African Constitution (1996)

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10 The agreement to end Apartheid in South Africa, an African problem solved by African means, resulted in the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to De Klerk and Mandela (White 2003)

was ratified, advancing the defense of the UDHR for all people in South Africa (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). In addition, 1996 represents the date of ratification of the Geneva Convention (1951) on the right of refugees, the same as the date of the African Unity Convention (1969) on refugees (Almeida, 2015).

In 1998, the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa ratified the Refugees Act, in accordance with the Geneva Convention (1951), which defined the issue of refugees and their rights. In addition to the Geneva Convention, the Refugee Act 1998 was also influenced by the Convention of the Organization of African Unity governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969). Thus, in contrast to the 1991 Act and its amendments, the South African government advanced towards international refugee standards (Refugees Act 1998) and a more favorable position on the cause of migration.

After Mandela, Thabo Mbeki (ANC) assumed the presidency of the country in 1999. During this period, South Africa struggled to combat the social, political and demographic inheritances left by the Apartheid regime. It is understood that, despite enjoying the greater economic and industrial development of the region, the country also exposed old and new obstacles to be addressed, such as the spread of HIV and tuberculosis, which compromised much of South African society (Branco, 2003).

Migratory movements in Southern Africa and their relations with African liberation movements: a regional perspective

The previous session provided an analysis of migratory flows in South Africa under Apartheid regime, at which time the country was constituted by segregationist bases and aimed at its "separate development". To deepen the understanding of the migratory flow from Southern Africa to South Africa, the present session is intended to analyze Southern Africa in the light of African liberation movements in the region, especially regarding migrations to South Africa, during the 1960s to the early 2000s. Previously, British rule was characterized by distinct means of domination of African territories, legitimized as an extension of the metropolis. The British sought to dominate African territories through economic and military alliances and the use of force. As a counterpoint to the English presence in the region, there is the strengthening of African liberation movements, which favored the creation

of new countries of autonomous governments, but the economy was still linked to the former metropolis (Ribeiro; Visentini, 2013).

Even giving administrative legitimacy of self-government to the new African states, it is understood that British neo-colonialism maintained its traditional alliances that favored local and British elites. Thus, the English neo-colonialism appropriated its former colonies, aiming at the maintenance of the natural resource exploitation systems with the African countries. An example of this is that the former English colonies in Africa, by becoming independent, joined the economic dynamics of the Commonwealth (1931), maintaining English rule in the region. Moreover, it is clear that the strengthening of post-Cold War economic capitalism intensified the idea that the region would serve as a consumer market for English financial success (Pereira, 2010).

Internationally, South African Apartheid resulted in the alienation of South Africa under the regional arrangement. The rupture in relations that this country had with England impacted with the English support in the independence process of some states of the region. In this sense, one observes London's relationship with the territories of the High Commission, as the extension of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland was called. The strengthening of Apartheid during the 1960s threatened the geopolitical and economic interests of the English crown in Southern Africa. Thus, in 1966, with the support of England, Basutoland (Lesotho) and Bechuanaland (Botswana) became independent. For the population seeking to escape the South African regime, the independence of these neighboring countries presented itself as a place of refuge, especially after the Soweto revolt, which intensified armed confrontations in the country (Chanaiwa, 2010).

Still on independence in Southern Africa, supported by the English, there is the independence of Swaziland (1968), gained in the form of an English protectorate following a constitutional conference organized in England (Darch, 1981). The moderate independence of Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho, the BSL-states, guaranteed sovereignty under English influence in these territories, which would culminate in closer trade relations between the BSL-states, leading them to a customs union agreement signed in 1969 (Pereira, 2007). Such a rapprochement would contribute to the advancement of labor migration policies from the BSL-states to South Africa. These countries served as suppliers of migratory labor to the RSA, along with Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe (Darch, 1981).

The dissolution process of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963) occurs alongside the independence of Zambia (former Northern

Rhodesia), in 1964, which took place under the strengthening of popular mobilization, influenced by the African nationalist movements of the time (Visentini, 2012). With the end of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the political and economic elites of Southern Rhodesia diverged with English proposals, resulting in a referendum on the country's independence, making Southern Rhodesia independent of England in 1964. The new South Rhodesian government was responsible for developing a segregation regime similar to that of South Africa, which oppressed black liberation movements and implemented laws that limited the living space of the black population in the country (Chanaiwa, 2010).

Nevertheless, Southern Rhodesia would go to war against the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), in addition to arresting some of the revolutionary leaders. Thus, oppression in the country would potentiate a guerrilla conflict that would last until 1979. The racist regime would end the following year, when Robert Mugabe was elected to the presidency of Zimbabwe. The country would be governed by the founder of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and also one of the protagonists in the fight against the segregationist regime in his country. This change also presents the time when the country was renamed Zimbabwe[11]. Due to its territorial proximity to the RSA, this state suffered constant armed aggression, which only ceased with the end of South African Apartheid regime (Visentini, 2013).

The political and administrative independence of the Southern African countries did not express the economic and social emancipation expected by the Africans who strengthened the claims for liberation of these peoples. Thus, Chanaiwa (2010) notes that the related liberation movements were characterized by the following points:

- The absolute rejection of imperialism, colonialism, racism and capitalism, as well as its inextricably linked with the principles of self-determination, pan-Africanism, non-alignment and the fundamental rights of the human person;
- Privileged relations with the urban proletariat, the peasant mass and progressive intellectuals, regarded as the revolutionary spearhead of the liberation process;

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11 Considering the oppressive environment of the government, the economic fragility to which the Zimbabwean black people were subjected and the insecurity that the 15 years of armed conflict presented, it can be considered that the flow of immigrants from Zimbabwe to South Africa is turning also access to the labor market (Wolpe 1972).

- The adoption of the theses of Marxist-Leninist scientific socialism in terms of production, distribution, consumption and social relations;
- Refusal to join in the framework of relations of dependence or subordination with other countries and the strengthening of solidarity with the other liberation movements and the other oppressed peoples of the world (Chanaiwa 2010, 319).

In Angola and Mozambique, liberation movements received international support from NAM, the Liberation Committee of the Organization of the African Union, China, the USSR and other global solidarity movements (Chanaiwa, 2010). On the other hand, the colonial elites of these countries, added to the support of the white elites of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, came from support from West Germany, the USA, France and England (Chanaiwa, 2010). In Southern Africa, the first victories of the anti-colonial guerrillas were achieved in the countries colonized by Portugal. The ideals of these movements not only influenced Africans, but also impacted the Portuguese population[12].

In 1974, the international system was facing a time of crisis due to the rise in the price of a barrel of oil. However, this period also marked the end of Salazar's fascism in Portugal in the so-called Carnation Revolution. The fall of the Salazar regime led to the signing of the Lusaka agreements, provisionally recognizing the independence of Angola and Mozambique, both proclaimed independent in 1975, with the support of nationally liberated armed and clandestine movements ideologically influenced by Marxism-Leninism (Acosta, 2011).The independence of these countries has resulted in key effects on the geopolitics of the region and the intensification of conflicts in Southern Africa. In Mozambique, the armed conflict began in 1964, when the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO)[13] decided to militarily combat the white oppression exercised by the Mozambican National Front (RENAMO), party that received support from the South African government, Malawi and Southern Rhodesia. As mentioned, the country's independence

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12 On the effects of colonial wars on the Portuguese population: "By the late 1960s, they (the wars) absorbed about half of their annual budget and, while conservative elements, the army staff, as well as the financial leaders were in favor of continuing the war, public opinion, in turn, had lost enthusiasm."(Chanaiwa 2010, 320).

13 FRELIMO (1962) was the result of the merger of the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO) (1960) with the African National Union of Mozambique (MANU) (1961). The movement consisted of rural and urban workers, businessmen and intellectuals as well. To learn more, it is suggested to read Chanaiwa (2010).

had been achieved in 1975 with the proclamation of the People's Republic of Mozambique (Onslow, 2013).

Regarding the migratory flow from Mozambique to South Africa, it is identified that the Civil War in Mozambique would result in the flight of approximately 350 thousand Mozambicans to South Africa. However, the Mozambican refugees were denied their respective refuge requests. Only in 2000 did the South African government regularize the situation of these migrants by granting them residence permits (Crush, 2008). This flow was characterized by migratory work, where farm workers fled the armed conflict in Mozambique and set off for the RSA (Adepoju, 2008).

The armed conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO ended in 1992, with the peace agreement that would seal the end of the Civil War, through the abdication of Leninist-Marxist orientation in Mozambique, followed by the country's economic opening. The first multiparty elections took place in 1994, when Joaquim Chissano (FRELIMO) was elected, who ruled from 1986 until 2004 (Visentini, 2012). With the end of the Mozambican conflict, it is estimated that around 20% of the population migrating to South Africa would return to their home country, while the rest would remain in South African territory, stimulated by the post-Apartheid context (Crush, 2008). Regarding the liberation process in Angola (1961-2002), it is noted that the movements for the liberation of Angola are identified in three main groups: the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) (1954), the Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) (1956) and the Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (1966). In 1975, due to the Carnation Revolution (1974), a transitional government was recognized between Portugal and the three movements listed above. However, due to the lack of political and ideological cohesion, a Civil War was waged, enhancing the Cold War environment in Southern Africa[14] (Visentini, 2013).

The war in Angola has significant impacts on the region's geopolitics, as it is the richest and most strategic colony of Portugal in Africa, now represented by a rising socialist government. In addition to the regional issue, the conflict in Angola had the direct and indirect participation of international actors, presenting a space of armed conflict with different purposes and interests. As an example, analyzed the intensification of armed conflict

14 Regarding external participation in the light of the Cold War in the conflict in Angola, the following table is identified: The FNLA received support from the US and Zaire, but from the 1970s onwards, China, North Korea and Romania also began to support the movement; while the MPLA was initially supported by China and the USSR, but also supported by Cuba, North Korea and some eastern European countries; while UNITA received support from China, South Africa, Portugal (see Portugal's participation in NATO). To learn more, check out Schmidt (2013).

between South Africa and the guerrillas of the MPLA, supported militarily by Cuba and the USSR (Schmidt, 2013).

The confrontation between South Africa and the MPLA also impacted the liberation movement in Namibia. In this context, the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) was the main armed arm in the pursuit of freedom for its people in the face of South African occupation. The South African government illegally occupied the country, using it in favor of Apartheid, forcing the local population to migrate to the mines in both countries. In view of this, SWAPO received support from the MPLA, as well as from Cuba and the USSR, in the fight against South Africans, which in turn received support from West Germany, the United States, France, England and Israel. However, with the strengthening of international mobilization against Apartheid, boycotts of the RSA were growing, leading to the country's isolation and loss of international support. In this scenario, in 1988, after the defeat of the South African army in Cuito Cuianavale, the Cuban troops were withdrawn from Angola, resulting in the independence of Namibia (1990) (Schmidt, 2013). The conflict in Angola has resulted in the emergence of thousands of war refugees, as well as the increase in trafficking in women and children from that country. However, such a migratory flow did not target South Africa as a destination, as the country was not receptive to black migration (SIHMA, 2014).

In 1991, the ceasefire of the Angolan civil war was being negotiated, but that would only result in pauses in the conflict. Thus, under the UN Security Council, it led to the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) (1997-1999), created by Resolution 1.118 to promote peace and Angolan integrity. The end of this conflict would only occur in 2002, ending the period that represents Angola's most severe economic and social crisis (Visentini, 2012).

South Africa: the post-Cold War reflections and the end of Apartheid for migration flows

As seen throughout this research, many of the African peoples' achievements for freedom came through armed conflict, through guerrilla movements versus governments of severe oppression of the black population. On the issue of migratory movements, in addition to observing the increased flow of war refugees from Southern Africa, it is noted the flow of armed movements in

the border regions, where such groups were housed in neighboring territories, to assist in achieving the objectives of each group's armed struggle.

Even though the present paper is willing to analyze migratory movements from the southern region of Africa to South Africa, it is clear that understanding the political and economic issues in the regional and international contexts is of fundamental importance. In this way, the last session of this study is to examine the reflections of the post-Cold War environment, as well as the end of Apartheid and the last years of the war in Angola and their respective effects on migratory flows directed to the RSA.

As already mentioned, the end of the dollar-gold standard (1971) impact on the economy of Southern Africa, which depended on the exploration of gold. This led to the hiring of more migrants to the South African mines, resulting later in the 1978 Conference on Migration Work to Southern Africa (Darch, 1981). Given South Africa's sub-imperialist role in the region, despite the economic decline of the Apartheid regime, only after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), and the sensitive decline of the USSR, did international pressure increase on the segregationist regime (Chanaiwa, 2010).

With the end of the War, marked by the perception of unipolarity and the spread of liberalizing globalization, the African continent lost strategic importance in the Great Powers foreign and security policy agenda. Thus, the countries of the region lost their bargaining power. Moreover, facing this situation, there was the dismantling of African issues, with the reduction of armed conflicts in the region, although the period is also marked by the growth of poverty and the advancement of epidemic diseases in Southern Africa, such as cholera, HIV, tuberculosis and other lethal diseases (Visentini, 2013). Thus, there was the African marginalization and the neglect of the central countries of the capitalist system towards the continent.

With regard to South Africa in the post-Cold War context, with the end of Apartheid and the election of Mandela, a new South Africa has emerged, focused on UDHR compliance policies and regional and global reintegration. Thus, the South African search for rapprochement with the regional actors in order to achieve an environment of cooperation and solidarity among its peoples, as well as the aim of the regional leadership role in international spaces as a consequence of the potential presented in the new South Africa (Otavio, 2015). In line with the political changes in Southern Africa and the end of Apartheid, South Africa has come to be seen as a new destination for migrants, noting the increase in the number of African immigrants in the country. The South African government estimates that about 160 refuge applicants came to the country during 1994 and 2004

On the other hand, the Aliens Control Act, signed in 1991, would only be radically changed in the following century, in the year 2002. As for legislation to refugees only in 1998 that it would approve the Refuge Act (Refugee Act, 2000[15]) which came into force in 2000, showing that, despite the contrast between old and new South Africa, migration laws and policies would take time to make significant progress (Crush, 2008).

Conclusions

The four decades spanning the period from the 1960s to the 2000s represent a stage of radical transformation for African States and societies. The end of much of the armed conflict and the liberation of the African peoples impacts on the region's progress. Still, this new page in African history brings with it the legacy of over 500 years of exploration (Chanaiwa, 2010). In this sense, it is understood that the new agenda of African countries deals with challenges inherited from the intense periods of white interventions on the continent.

By relating this important moment in African history, as presented in this research, focusing on migratory flows from Southern Africa to South Africa, it is pointed out that the majority of migratory work directed to the referent country. Thus, it is observed that such migration dynamics had impacts on the economy, society and health of South Africa and the region. With regard to the regional economy, it can be pointed out that the flight of workers (mostly rural) to South Africa, would serve as an instrument for the "separate development" of that country, which would later leave the region at a disadvantage facing the advancement of globalization.

Regarding the effects of this period on African society in the region, it should be noted that the post-Cold War had presented the restructuring of African society, given the structural damage left by the Cold War regional conflicts. Regarding the health issue related to the dynamics of migratory work, it is pointed out that the migrant population was left in situations of imminent risk to health, enhancing the expansion of diseases found in the environments to which such migrants were conditioned. In addition, it was visualized the presence of new international actors in the region, such as the approach of South Africa with China, the NAM and a new migratory flow from Southern Africa to that country. Also, it points to the rise of new

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15 To learn more about the Refugee Law (2000), it is suggested to consult the official website of the South African government.

problems for South Africa, such as high unemployment, the epidemics of HIV and tuberculosis, as well as the structural challenges left by the former segregationist regime.

Finally, this research considers that the South African regime oppressed blacks (nationals and migrants) not only for their skin color, but also for the economic class to which they belonged. More than that, Apartheid's logic obeyed an adjustment in the relationship with the country's labor force, contributed to the control of unemployment, wages and the allocation of the workforce. Clearly, the regime has imposed severe social deformations, whether due to the sense of inferiority imposed, as well as the sub-imperialist project that has affected the stability of the entire region. In this sense, it is concluded that the actions of the regime were the main catalyst of transformation that affected the demographics in Southern Africa.

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ABSTRACT

This research investigates the migratory processes that occurred from Southern Africa to South Africa from 1960 to the early 2000s. From this perspective, in the light of migratory flows, we investigate the influences of the Apartheid regime, the bipolar Cold War dispute, African liberation movements, the reflections of peripheral capitalist development in South Africa and the challenges that such events posed for the country.

AGOSTINHO NETO UNIVERSITY: AN ANALYSIS OF CONTEXT AND PROCESS OF SCIENTIFIC WORK PRODUCTION

Paulo Conceição João Faria[1]

Introduction

An analysis of the context, process and production of scientific work requires a well-documented understanding of the existing institutional research environment, based on observable evidence. In particular, this article is aimed at Agostinho Neto University (ANU), to evaluate doctoral training processes at three faculties or organic units (OUs). In doing so, this paper recognizes the crucial connection between the University and the spheres of market productivity. It also recognizes that different countries have different trajectories, patterns and models of development in the Higher Education Subsystem (HES) which can sometimes undermine or make this connection possible. Although this topic is of great importance because of its potential to empirically hinder relevant studies, this article follows a different path, as it aims to explain how context and process influence the production of scientific work at ANU.

As the oldest public university in Angola, the ANU cannot be dissociated from a broader two-sided political and social environment: on the one hand it helps to define ANU as a source of cutting-edge knowledge production and on the other hand, acts as an obstacle to this goal. Despite the negative tone, the ANU is currently experiencing a moment of balance and is seeking its own essence. It needs to reinvent itself, from being merely a passive receptacle of state revenue to a fully integrated institution, regionally and internationally, freeing up its human resources to work with the outside world, either through joint research projects or plans of student mobility within African universities. This requires not only networks and integration, but also a set of policies aimed at extracting its best from the ANU and esta-

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blishing new national higher education management structures, similar to the National Council on Higher Education (NCHE) in South Africa.

Although this article makes reference to this subject, its main purpose is to offer the reader a critical approach about contexts and processes of scientific work production at ANU. This is done in five interrelated sections. The first section gives a brief overview of the bibliography. The second focuses on the issue and gives the reader a personal six-stage account of the research environment that has a negative impact on researcher motivation. The third section underlines the condition of the ANU, as a politically challenged space, by what is understood more as an area or domain of power and control than as an autonomous, innovative and applicable knowledge factor. The fourth section investigates the key points of Angolan government legislation that underpin the provision of higher education for the purpose of producing scientific work. The last section draws on information gathered from the three ANU faculties or OUs to explain the influence of context and process on the production of scientific work in them.

Bibliography Overview

Research contexts and processes are the springboard for the production of scientific works. But this is often based on two intertwined axes: training for scientific research tailored to the research needs of the doctoral candidate and the role of the advisor. The advisor is presented, in the specific academic bibliography dealing with the supervision of scientific works, no longer as a "distant master with the sole responsibility for the quality of the results" (Own Translation) (Mouton 2018), but mainly as a facilitator of the students' walk, apprentice or novice until they reach the master (Bastalich, 2017). The view of the student doing scientific, master's or doctoral work as a permanent learner makes perfect sense when the student is expected to "reflect on a research process and supervisors and others to facilitate the process of research and reflection on the process research to ensure a capacity for future innovation" (Own Translation) (Bastalich, 2017).

The production of scientific work is therefore an increasingly developed integrated process through which providers, beneficiaries, legislators, government institutions and independent higher education bodies play a significant role in ensuring the "discourse of the five policies" which , in Mounton and Frick's view "drives and influences doctoral production in South

Africa – *quantity, transformation, efficiency, quality and internationalization*" (Own Translation) (Mouton and Frick, 2018).

The authors were cautious in mentioning that "trends toward increased doctoral and undergraduate enrollment coexist with tension and contradiction" (Own Translation) (Mouton and Frick, 2018). Simply put, the five policies discourse does act as a guideline for stakeholders involved in HES and underscore the importance of striking the right balance between context, processes and expected outcomes. This should be considered as a conscious measure to avoid or at least reduce the negative impacts of the paradox, which is that "to produce more doctorates, more PhD supervisors are needed, but to have more supervisors, more PhDs are needed" (Own Translation) (McGregor, 2013).

In South Africa, where there appears to be an interaction between policies and practices, there is also an independent body set up to monitor and verify that the global imperatives for scientific research are operating in a coherent and harmonious manner. This works, and it really makes sense in the South African context, where one of the roles of the NCHE and Higher Education Qualification Framework (HEQF) is to audit the policies developed by the ministry of higher education. However in the context of Angola, there is no such independent institution that guarantees the quality of higher education aiming at doctorates, and that verifies the soundness of policies designed by the ministry of higher education. Thus, Bitzer's question of "who verify the verifiers" (Bitzer, 2016) is simply unanswered in this case. The Angolan context is cluttered with legislation, presidential decrees and regulations. But it needs a coherent system that serves the national interest, rather than a system that only advocates and works for the *status quo*.

In short, the main purpose of education or teaching for PhDs is to "prepare students to become researchers" and in this sense "doctoral education structures" (Own Translation) (Matas, 2012) are essential for "quality and efficiency at the highest level of education" (Bastalich, 2017). Two key principles may follow from this discussion. First, the role the advisor plays in bringing to light the hidden talents of his or her students. The second element is based on the recognition of the important role that structures should play in the overall process of education/teaching for doctoral formation. This is the idea of structures based on the belief that practices should be regulated by a sustainable chain of values, principles and procedures that, ultimately, can operate as both cause and condition for the action of HES actors.

The notion of structure, in terms of doctoral education or training, calls for "necessary resources" such as "candidate funding, expertise for tau-

ght components, and supervisory capacity and facilities available for research" (Own Translation) (Frick, 2018). While this is the view, in most societies with an independent, autonomous, advanced HES, the ability to supervise and produce scientific research results can be overshadowed by the daily hustle and bustle. In our case, inefficient supervision is reinforced by the accumulation of production of scientific work. Even when the situation starts to get out of hand, with the increase in doctoral candidates, no one has yet ventured to blame the advisor for "unsatisfactory deadlines and high dropout rates" (Own Translation) (Bastalich, 2017).

Beyond the time trap in which counselors feel tied, research resources, such as access to the internet or libraries, are huge barriers that the investigating student has to learn to live with, using the alternative of researching private media or risking stagnation during the research. PhD training at ANU is predominantly a "professional doctorate that combines classroom work with a supervised research project" (Own Translation) (Matas, 2012). Thus, in opposition to the IAU-ACUP (International Association of Universities and Catalan Association of Public Universities, in english) scenario of optimism about doctoral recognition in Africa, it could be more inclined to clarify that, unfortunately, the PhD title is not yet fully understood. Recognized as an essential asset for contributing to the "knowledge economy" neither the Angolan government "knows how to assess the competencies of PhD holders nor the relevance of what they can contribute to society" (Own Translation) (IAU-ACUP, 2012). Why is it so?

There are, at least, three evidences that support this claim. First, for access to a public sector neither the master's degree nor a doctorate degree puts their holders above the level of their competitors, since the ministry of labor and social security only considers the bachelor's degree. However, both MA and PhD holders may apply for a post, but if they are admitted they cannot expect to earn more than their licensed colleagues. Masters and PhDs are treated fairly at the academy, where they are paid accordingly.

Second, it has to do with cases of movement between the political sphere and the University, which makes it seem as if it were an incubator of ministerial careers in government. For example, under the administration of President João Lourenço of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA, in portuguese) party, the government appointed, under Article 12 (g) of Decree 90/09 of 15th December on HES, ministers for superior education, science, innovation and technology and for fisheries and sea, the rector and the vice-rector of ANU, respectively.

The third evidence is the transformation of the University into partisan territory, willing to bow to higher orders, despite its quality or wisdom, but unable to provide critical thinking and socially applicable knowledge. Under these circumstances, it might be a bit exaggerated to see ANU as a space that is able of:

> generating jobs by balancing and integrating three objectives: first, meeting the practical demand of the labor market, second, producing new knowledge through research by more PhD-level scientists and ultimately producing committed and global citizens through teaching (Own Translation) (Friesenhahn, 2014).

However, there are some positive signs as discussed below. One of these positives has to do with the present government's decision to promote some significant reforms in the HES, as expressed in the National Development Plan (PDN, in portuguese). The PDN aims to achieve four key objectives, namely: "(1) improving the work network of different higher education institutions, (2) increasing courses, graduates, (3) increasing postgraduate offerings, and (4) improve the quality of teaching by strengthening masters and doctorates" (PDN, 2018). However, in order to achieve these goals, the government sets as its main goal "to strengthen higher education with 772 new masters and 125 new PhDs, graduated abroad, by the year 2022" (PDN, 2018).

The plan is ambitious and marked by contradictions. For example, despite the fact that in early January 2019, the council of ministers gave the green light to implement the plan, in fact it will not be possible to have 125 fully-qualified doctorates at the best universities in developed countries by 2022. Let's say the government decides to send candidates in September 2019 to the "most prestigious universities in the world", experience also tells us that PhD students who have English as a foreign language will have to prove their proficiency in that language through a TOEFL (Test of English as a Foreign Language) at US and UK universities. The same requirement for language will apply at French or German universities.

The government could still send students abroad. One thing is certain, however, that it is unlikely that it will reach the goal of 125 doctorates by 2022, even if they were chosen from a group of candidates with the highest levels of foreign language competence. In addition, students will have to deal with some university related culture shocks, and this alone is enough to hinder or delay research efficiency. Another issue that could be pointed out to the PDN is the silence it makes about domestic doctoral candidates. They exist and clutter the system at ANU's faculties of social science (FSS),

economics (FEC), and law (ANULS). Challenges are always beginning to arise when decision-makers and policy-makers assume that formulating a new policy within HES training policies will necessarily imply an absolute start from scratch, as if there were no supply of doctoral courses in Angola. Indeed, the outlook for producing doctoral work at ANU faculties tells us of a reality of institutional neglect and utilitarian measures that make money from doctoral candidates.

Issues and reflections on the research context

The article deals with the question: to what extent do the context and the process affect the production of scientific works at ANU? To address this issue, a small field research was conducted at ANU's DICEP (department for scientific research and postgraduate studies) and at ANU's colleges - FSS, FEC and ANULS, all with PhD courses. The objective of the field research was to collect the most accurate data possible on (1) the number of students, men and women enrolled in doctoral courses; (2) how many doctoral candidates for each advisor; (3) students who successfully presented and defended their thesis in the first and second Issue of the course; (4) number of PhD students working on their PhD projects. However, the field research intended to gene-rate data has turned into a real roller coaster, which is worth reflecting on:

Step One: I had to meet with the director of the ANU's DICEP to get his authorization to access information related to the doctoral programs at FSS, offering the doctorate degree in social sciences; in law school with two courses in public law and private law; and in economics college offering a doctorate in economics and management.

The visit to the director took place on December 20th, 2018. After explaining to him the purpose of the research, the director became aware of its importance. Instead of allowing me to go in the next door to consult the files, he asked me to put in writing what I just explained. I had no choice but to drive me back to the social science faculty, which took me another hour and a half to prepare and send the requested letter.

Step two: The director instructed the secretary to hand me the files with the reports that the OUs were supposed to have sent to him, at the request of his department. "Dr. Paul, I'm afraid we don't have all the infor-mation you need here. For that, you will have to go to the OUs. Anyway, take a look at these files", said the secretary. In fact, most of the files were incom-plete. Therefore, the possibility of contacting OUs to get the data seemed

the best. However, I needed to reduce research to three branches of social science, leaving for further evaluation the engineering and medical schools that have doctoral degrees in chemistry and environmental engineering, and public health respectively. In addition, I noticed that for the social sciences, I would not have to go through tense bureaucratic processes as part of the faculty. Additionally, I would need a service credential that would make it easier for me to access data in law and economics.

Step Three: I returned to the ANU to apply for a credential, basically a research permit stating that "for the purpose of scientific research and to collect data from ANU's OUs, Dr. Paulo, a professor at this University, is accredited. And so that no one impedes you in any way, we pass this credential that is signed and stamped with the stamp of this institution". But to reach this stage I had to address a letter to the Vice Chancellor for ANU's scientific research and postgraduate studies. Luckily, the Vice-Chancellor, also a member of the ruling party's political bureau, the MPLA, was available and ordered her secretary to enter the credential. When the secretary began printing the authorization note for the DICEPs director's credential, she noticed that the printer was out of ink. "At least she can read it anyway," she was referring to the secretary of the director of the DICEPs. The secretary read the note and typed the credential. But neither the director nor the deputy director were available to sign the same credential.

I only got this signature on January 3rd, 2019. When, early in the morning, I called the secretary to ask her if the credential was ready and if I could come and receive it, she replied: "Mister, the document is ready, but we are unable to open the office door at this time. We are still waiting for a colleague with the master key to arrive". I took another hour and a half of driving to the ANU campus to put some pressure on them. I waited over an hour for the master key man. But he could not open the door. The subdirector arrived with the solution.

He walked straight into his office and then appeared with a handwritten sheet of paper for the secretary to copy and type after finding a place for it. She eventually did so in the office of the former vice-dean - appointed minister of fisheries and sea by the president on January 2nd 2019 - and finally brought the credential to the office of the ANU's rector to be stamped. Then the dean's office director said that, before being stamped, the credential needed the deputy's director's signature. The secretary returned to the deputy director, who signed, and only after all this process did I get the credential on January 3rd.

Step Four: At FSS it was a real battle to get the information, without hearing this: "Mister, write here what you need, exactly. We will look for it and bring it to you". In the end, we came to the conclusion that essential data was missing or placed elsewhere or nowhere, so it would be impossible to find it. Thus, I ended up looking for a lot of information that made the best sense possible.

Step Five: At FEC, I first met the head of DICEPs. I identified myself, explained to him the reasons for contacting the department, and evidently showed him the credential in order to have any guarantee. "I can't give you any information without the dean's order," replied the chief. Fortunately, the dean was present, and before I returned to the head of department, he gave me a 50-minute description of doctoral courses, and handed me some copies of documents that he considered to be of great interest to my research. Back in the department, I was given some more information, but I was not provided with data on the number of candidates assigned to each advisor, and no records of the progress of the doctoral students were available.

Step Six: Once again, at Agostinho Neto University Law School (ANULS) in search of information for my investigation, I was told that I had to address a letter to the head of DICEPs for authorization. A letter and copy of my credential were emailed to her on January 3rd, but I never received a reply. I continued to move on until I finally learned that the boss was absent, on medical leave, and that only she could handle my business.

Meanwhile, on January 16th, the chief was back in her office, but she told me that she needed to speak first with the vice-dean for scientific research. "Mr. Paul, please, sit in the reception room while you wait for the vice-dean. He must be on his way", said the lady. I waited almost two hours and the vice-dean didn't show up. Then the boss asked if I had a copy of the email I had sent her. "What for?" I asked. "I wanted to leave a note for the vice-dean," she said. "Colleague, it's been more than two weeks since I sent you an email. Are you telling me now that you haven't even referred him to the vice-dean yet? I remind you that we are civil servants and this kind of bureaucracy shows that we are holding back the University's hopes of moving into the top 100 universities in Africa. One piece of data is an indicator of our public service," I said, venting my frustration. "Unfortunately, this is the situation. Please, let's talk to the vice-dean's secretary".

Once in the office, the secretary said that the vice-dean was absent from meetings and that she would not be able to tell me when he would return. "I just need the information for the research I am doing, and as you well know, I was given a credential for that purpose. So the question is

very simple: either you have the information and you give me access to it as evidence of the quality of the HES or you have to admit that you do not have it. Please pass this on to the vice-dean". Then, kindly, the secretary announced, "Mr. Paul, leave your contact with me so I can let you know when the vice-dean arrives. " She never called me back and I had to go back there on January 23th, 2019.

Fortunately, by the time I met the vice-dean at college, I had some time to forward my request to the college dean, who gave the department the green light to make all the information available. The boss then appointed a department secretary to work with me and openly address all issues related to my research. She showed me all the archives that had information on PhD courses in private law and public law since 2011, some information on PhD candidates and on a cooperation and partnership agreement between ANULS and the Faculty of Law at New University of Lisbon (FLNUL).

The information was there, although not complete. For example, there was not a single record to illustrate both the orientation process, and the applicants' satisfaction with the quality of doctoral training and supervisory experiences at ANULS, but there is only one record of the existing challenges regarding cooperation with FLNUL, in terms of receiving results related to doctorates.

On the one hand, the above account is designed to help the reader gain insight into the research context mired in excessive bureaucracy. This context is also a harbinger of a deeper social stigma and a fear of possible political punishment that, in a way, acts as a barrier to creativity and a kind of public rule for survival and self-maintenance. On the other hand, the reflection on the steps helps to support the view that the doctoral context is very important, because it reveals that ANU has been closed in the political quagmire. Moreover, this article also shows that the university context runs over doctoral processes, which in turn limits the results of the production of scientific works.

ANU: Position beyond politicization

Revolutionary policies and the trajectory of Angola's HES are intertwined and define the broader research context. At this point, one might ask why policies, instead of helping to enable the development of a full-fledged higher education system, on the contrary, lead the ANU to get bogged down in the swamp of the ruling party. In the midst of this fact, the HES is still a

new phenomenon that only emerged a year after independence from Portugal in 1975, with the creation of the University of Angola (UA). The UA became Agostinho Neto University, ANU, named after the country's first president and first rector of ANU, on January 24th, 1985.

President Agostinho Neto thus defined ANU's mission:

> to serve the revolution and to fight against the reminiscences of Portuguese colonialism; to help to establish a just and progressive society; to produce national cadres with a new conscience who will be able to work as agents of a new society that will strive to achieve popular democracy (Own Translation) (Universidade Agostinho Neto, UAN. 1977).

The establishment of a Public University as "part of national higher education systems" (Bitzer, 2016) showed a greater interest in later nationalist purposes than in designing policies that would have promoted quality research in education and subsequently helped to harness "critical thinking skills" (Cyranoski, 2011). Indeed, the ruling party structures continue to set the orientation and also hamper academic freedoms and autonomy. Since then, the context has only gotten worse. For three reasons: First, the higher education teachers' union fought for an agreement with the government of former president José Eduardo dos Santos to establish that "the government should appoint the governing bodies of universities and public academies through a proposal Minister of Higher Education, based on three candidates elected by the assemblies of their respective institutions" (Own Translation) (Decree 90/09, Article 12). The fact is that this proposed legislation never came into effect. Second, the election of the three candidates never took place at the time, and former President Dos Santos called upon himself to appoint the deans and vice-deans of all public universities. This decision was considered by the higher education union to be unconstitutional. Third, HES governance, through presidential decree, equates a conflict between efficiency, stability, and discretionary decision of the president.

The steel fist exerted on HES during President João Lourenço's current administration was believed to end in May 2019, after last year when the president made the decision to allow Angola's 9 public universities and their respective colleges to elect their deans and vice-deans (ANGOP, 2018). Previously, the President, acting under his predecessor's decree, appointed Pedro Magalhães and Maria Antonieta Baptista as Dean and Vice-Dean of ANU for the area of scientific research and postgraduate studies. The caveat here is this: As I mentioned earlier, Maria Antonieta Baptista was recently appointed Minister of Fisheries and the Sea by the President, who at that

time left his position as Vice-Dean at ANU. It is worth remembering that the current minister of higher education, science, technology and innovation, Maria do Rosário Sambo, was formerly the Dean of ANU, appointed by former President Dos Santos, in 2015. Meanwhile, President Lourenço has appointed his Minister, in 2017.

In addition to the promises of relative liberalization of the National Higher Education System (NHES) there are two types of challenges. The first has to do with a huge imbalance between the number of PhD holders from university staff and the growing number of doctoral candidates. According to the higher education statistical bulletin, in 2016, the Angolan HES was composed of 53.1% of graduates, with public institutions employing 1,578, against 3,072 in private institutions. The proportion of staff with master's and doctoral degrees was, respectively, 33.3% and 9.8% with a total of 1,708 in public universities and 1,209 in private institutions. There are, definitely, 601 doctorates at public universities and 237 for all private universities.

The second set of challenges has to do with the public statement by Minister Maria de Rosario Sambo, who, speaking of the national scientific environment, specified that:

> there is scientific research, but it is still weak compared to other SADC (Southern Africa Development Community) countries. We have enormous potential to change this reality if we are able to properly manage human and financial resources and, above all, we should not be megalomaniac. Rather, we must focus on the goal of producing science with pragmatic meaning (Own Translation) (Voz de Angola, 2017).

She further stated: "We need to diagnose bad practices and make an effort to progressively eliminate them with a change in mindset and behavior" (Voz de Angola, 2017).

The minister's remarks underscore a confusion between the root causes and effects. Bad practices clearly originate from the NHES' link to party-political engineering. It will not be possible to produce scientific knowledge, even if it is conducted with pragmatism, if there is a real gap between a range of policies and contexts in which researchers are immersed. In addition, a closer look at ANU reveals an imbalance in available strategies, policies and resources to provide quality training for PhDs. The following section discusses government legislation to ascertain the legal provisions to which the process leading to the award of a doctoral degree is subjected.

Government legislation on PhD formation

NHES' key challenges are not the absence of a set of legislations to regulate the system, but rather the lack of coherent mechanisms to ensure the quality of education at all ANU colleges. In fact, the doctoral research process follows a set of orderly procedures and guidelines on the nature of the doctoral degree, the role of doctoral supervision and the defined objectives and competencies that a doctoral candidate should acquire through the process. This section delves into legislation to find general institutional guidance on teaching or training for doctorates.

The legislation on HES and PhD studies is based on two presidential decrees, 90/09 of December 15th and 29/11 of March 3rd, both establishing the appropriate rules and procedures to regulate universities. Article 24 of Decree 90/09 states that postgraduate studies comprise two categories: academic for masters, doctorates and professional - the last one aims at the technical-professional improvement of the licensee. In addition, the same article sets the maximum time to complete masters degrees in two/three years, and four/five years for doctorates. The PhD is seen as "a process of training and research, which aims to provide a broad and deep scientific capacity to undergraduate or master's degree candidates, culminating in a dissertation whose content constitutes an unprecedented contribution to the universal scientific heritage" (Own Translation).

The Decree of March 3rd 2011 reiterates, in its article 21, the government's overall position on doctoral education as a process of training and research that provides already graduated or masters candidates with broad and profound skills, which will result in an original dissertation that will contribute to world scientific knowledge. In this process, doctoral students are expected to attend classes, lectures or conferences during the first two years of their doctoral studies to acquire research skills and techniques. For this purpose, the different OUs have different types of modules designed according to the nature and objectives of each course. This is the case with doctoral programs in social science, law and economics. However, they share the same processes and procedures regarding the writing of an original dissertation, which happens after the student has successfully defended their doctoral research project.

Furthermore, Article 26 about supervision presents three main procedures: first, for doctoral candidates to produce their thesis, they must be guided by professors or researchers with a doctoral degree in their institution. Supervision or guidance may be provided by a co-guidance system. However,

it is indicated that this model should be clearly stated in the candidate's doctoral project, as well as the strategies for co-orientation. Second, the theses will also supervise the professors and researchers with doctorates from other institutions, according to existing agreements or contracts established by the parties. Finally, the advisor should inform and update, every six months, the faculty scientific council about the fundamental steps and the progress of the thesis.

A clarification of the role and purposes of guidance makes a huge difference when we think of the goals to be met for more doctoral candidates, to complete their training within the PND schedule. As the last section stresses, the outlook for the production of scientific work is negative because, so far, there has not been a single doctoral degree resulting from the doctoral courses offered by the three ANU'S OUs. The underlying causes will be shown to be related to the institution's contexts and bad practices and are ultimately linked to the imbalance between legislation and policy implementation by colleges. There is also, as I mentioned earlier, the lack of an independent body, such as the NCHE and HEQF from South Africa, to oversee and audit policies and ensure efficiency and quality.

Overview of ANU's scientific work production

This section was created from data collected at ANU's faculties of social science (FSS), law (ANULS) and economics (FEC) to illustrate the state of production of scientific work at ANU. The data were compiled together, but from scattered sources of information such as files, internal memos, and conversations with DICEPs staff members from each faculty. Undoubtedly, there is a common feature that covers all data entered in the tables below. However, it would be misleading to suggest that, due to the high fees charged by a doctoral candidate - from AKZ 3,500,000.00 (Angolan Kwanza, Angolan currency), about USD 10,000 - the doctoral candidate has become a kind of chicken of golden eggs. Which leads the faculties to retreat or abandon their main obligation to provide doctoral production.

Tables 1, 2 and 3 try to portray a context of stagnation in the production of doctorates. The tables refer to the following categories: the number of doctoral candidates from the first Issue in 2013 to the second in 2016 (PhD13 & PhD16) for FSS; the first Issue and Issues in 2011 and 2017 of ANULS; and the first, second and third Issues of FEC, respectively in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (PhD15, PhD16 & PhD17). The tables show the number of doctoral

students in terms of gender - female (F) and male (M), the number of theses presented for the corresponding Issue (Ths); *viva voce* or public defense (viva) that took place and number of students assigned to each advisor (Orient) per year of enrollment.

Table 1: Faculty of Social Sciences - PhD in Social Sciences (2013 & 2016)

PhD13		PhD16		Ths 13	Ths 16	Viva 13	Viva 16	Orient13	Orient 16
F	9	F	8	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.
M	14	M	18	3	0	0	0	4-6	ND
F+M	23	F+M	26	3	0	0	0		
Total		49 PhD Students							

Source: Made by the author

The FSS began with PhD studies in Social Sciences in 2013 with about 23 doctoral candidates enrolled for the first Issue and this number rose to 3 years later to 26. The idea was for all candidates to complete their theses within 4 years and if they failed to reach this target during that period, they would be granted an extra year. Generally, applicants are older students who have a full time job in state institutions or in the private sectors - ANU personnel, defense and security, banks etc.

Given that, it is understood that doctoral candidates often have a real struggle to meet the required deadline and this factor coupled with the heavy burden of teaching hours leaves the doctoral student less time to investigate. On the other hand, mentors, according to Mouton, can hardly "help the student become an independent professional researcher and an academic with a set of cognitive and metacognitive skills" (Own Translation) (Mouton and Frick, 2018). Specifically, only 3 students out of the 23 from Issue of 2013 were able to deposit their theses, which indicates that "doctoral *tunnel*" (Bitzer, 2016) is blocked and as a result, the rates of production of scientific work remain low, with a total 20 candidates who could not yet find the PhD's exit door.

The numbers add up to those of doctoral candidates from the second Issue in 2016, despite the fact that 8 out of 26 candidates have successfully

defended their doctoral projects and apparently are working on the theses. The main problem observed concerns the lack of good record keeping on who oversees who, and most importantly, there are no records and no data (ND) to quantify the progress of the candidate's investigation. This practice is just one of many that seem to contradict government legislation on guidance.

Table 2. Faculty of Economics: PhD in Economics (2015) PhD in Management (2016-17)

PhD 15		PhD 16		PhD 17		PhD Sub15	PhD Viva15	Orient15&16
F	5	F	2	F	2			
M	21	M	15	M	18	None	None	ND
F+M	26	F+M	17	F+M	20			
Total		63 PhD Students						

Source: Made by the author

The FEC started doctoral courses, first in economics, in 2015, establishing institutional cooperation with two Portuguese institutes - Portuguese Public University Institute (ISCTE) and the Lisbon Higher Institute of Economics and Management (ISEG). Of the 2015 Issue, only 5 doctoral candidates came to the defense of doctoral projects; in this process 4 students passed and were allowed to write the thesis, while 1 student failed. In addition, there are only 2 possibly close to the presentation, with 1 candidate, according to the college dean, the former transport minister who recently was sentenced to 14 years in prison for corruption and money laundering.

Due to the low demand of candidates for PhDs in economics, the faculty has been focusing, since 2016, on the PhD course in management. By now, the college should have already produced its first doctorate, but the candidate was found guilty of plagiarizing his thesis by the FEC internal review committee before sending it to the ANU dean for public defense (*viva* on board). The student was then advised to start his doctorate from scratch. Similarly, there are no supervisory records or data (ND) from which to infer the quality and progress levels of each candidate.

Quadro 3. Faculdade de Direito: PhD em direito público & direito privado (2011 & 2017)

Public Law 11		Private Law 11		Public Law 17		Private Law 17		Orient/PhD	VIVA
F	3	F	2	F	2	F	3	ND	0
M	12	M	9	M	14	M	19	ND	1
F+M	15	F+M	11	F+M	16	F+M	22	ND	1
Total	64 PhD Students								

Source: Made by the author

The ANULS launched the first PhD Issue in 2011 and has a total of 15 doctoral students enrolled in public law, 3 of whom are women and 12 men. The private law course has a total of 11 candidates, 2 women and 9 men. There are 2 public law candidates working on your thesis; while a total of 8 students – 2 women and 6 men – are writing their thesis in private law.

No information is available on the progress of these candidates, but it is known that although the law program has been in place for almost 8 years, only 1 student of the 2011 course made a public defense (*viva*) on June 20th 2017, but the jury "unanimously decided to recommend that the candidate reformulate it within 6 months" (Own Translation). This information was taken from the defense memorandum (Memorandum da Primeira Defesa Doutoramento, 20 de Junho de 2017), but after almost 2 years, there is not a single reference that explains whether the candidate has been able to carry on the work or is still struggling for progress. In addition, an interesting point that stood out from the memorandum was the candidate's advisor, a professor from the University of Coimbra of Portugal, who attended the defense via skype. However, it is unclear how many times the candidate has been able to travel to Coimbra to meet with the advisor and if he or she has had proper guidance. Most likely, this question will continue without an observable answer.

Regarding the second Issue of 2017, there is an increase in demand for doctoral courses. The doctorate in public law gained 1 more student, but the number of female candidates dropped to 2 compared to the first Issue, while for PhD in private law there was an increase of 1 female student and the number of male students jumped from 9 to 19, in 2017. There are still

a number of 8 students, that is, 5 in private law and 3 in public law who are already working on their doctoral thesis. As in the previous Issue, there is no information available to ascertain if there is supervision/guidance burden in the context of doctoral courses offered at ANULS. Finally, there are a few more points that highlight major discrepancies between the written provisions of the regulations and standards as regards the obligation of supervisors to report to the faculty scientific council every six months on the progress of their students and the existing record of this information on file. This is an outstanding issue that seems to be common to all colleges – FSS, FEC and ANULS.

In general, these faculties share the same challenges: low rates of production of scientific work, at the very least. In addition, there is a clear gender disparity, as can be seen in the three tables, where the number of male candidates is significantly higher in the three OUs. FSS features more women candidates than FEC and ANULS. In addition, ANU colleges also jointly face the challenge of an inadequate information management system (Bitzer, 2016) on who guides whom, the doctoral candidate, and the quality of training and mentoring. This is clearly an issue that an independent NCHE and HEQE-type body would have helped to settle and get the OUs back on track to contribute to the production of doctorates. However, contexts and processes are simply far from favoring the goal of increasing doctoral production across the HES. Above all, when the total number of applicants amounts to 176 in all ANU OUs and this number is likely to increase.

Conclusions

Angola's higher education system calls for far-reaching reforms that can ensure that there is a match between the demand for doctoral studies and the quality of guidance provided throughout the ANU. To this end, a new structure for postgraduate higher schools is needed to give ANU doctoral courses some efficiency and harmony. They would then ensure good practices and constructive approaches to scientific research, making access to information more accessible and a crucial factor for the advancement of scientific knowledge and production, whose successful doctoral rates in OUs are markedly low.

In addition, postgraduate school reforms would help improve mentoring practices, as well as acting as the coordinating body for all ANU doctoral programs and setting criteria for determining the basic skills and knowledge

of doctoral candidates and subsequently find ways to adapt them to the institutional facilities, funding and range of activities that could provide regional institutional mobility. For a context where there are between 4 to 6 students assigned to each advisor, perhaps a one-to-one guidance approach model does not result in doctoral production. The undergraduate college should likewise focus on creating guidance panels set up according to their specialties and research subjects. The undergraduate college should also promote opportunities for partnerships with SADC higher education institutions to expose Angolan doctoral students to modern and increasingly competitive, excellent and innovative centers that could enable applicants to apply for funding, in particular, rather relying heavily on government resources, which are already scarce.

This article was intended to argue that the ANU context and processes currently work to the detriment of doctoral production for a number of significant reasons. The ANU cannot completely dissociate itself from Angola's past and most recent political trajectory. Policy often creates obstacles to ANU's opportunities to become a space for knowledge production through research for scientific work. The process of producing scientific papers is, in fact, codified in presidential decrees and OU's regulations.

On the one hand, the lack of accountability and an independent institution to enforce verification and control mechanisms in NHES, and on the other, the existence of bureaucratic stances and political entanglement cast a shadow over the provision of doctoral production. In addition, the lack of funding puts an extra burden on applicants and faculty who get the money to pay faculty and other doctoral staff from student fees.

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ABSTRACT

The context and process reveal the obstacles that have conditioned the development of Agostinho Neto University (ANU), as an autonomous space for research and knowledge production at the level of doctoral courses in Organic Units (OUs), namely the Faculties of Social Sciences (FSS), Law (ANULS) and Economics (FEC). These obstacles are so widespread that they are associated with the nature of the political regime that prevailed in Angola shortly after the Independence from Portugal in 1975. It should be noted that political transitions have in fact taken on different rhythms and characteristics, for example, the shift from monopartisanship to semi-liberal pluralist democracy, from bureaucratic administrative and economic centralism to a market economy model in the early 1990s. But the rekindling of violent conflict overshadowed the fervor for structural change with real impacts on the exercise of civil and academic freedoms, and the promotion of the rule of law. On the contrary, the authority originating from the constitutional reforms following the end of the civil war became absolute in the exercise of power and structurally personalizing as to the mode of administration of the *res publica*. This paper argues that the ANU - despite the reform efforts of the current administration - is still a sounding board for regime paradoxes that foster weak scientific research and pedagogical megacephaly. More emphasis is given to a type of education that results in low production rates as found in doctoral students in the OUs analyzed.

MINING POLICY AND SOCIO-CULTURAL AND SUSTAINABLE INTEGRATION OF THE RESETTLED IN CATEME-MOZAMBIQUE: 2009-2017

Cremildo de Abreu Coutinho[1]

Introduction

The government of Mozambique has been developing various actions aimed at poverty reduction and the consequent shift towards development. One of the actions taken has been the permission of foreign investment in the country, which, in turn, contributes to gathering foreign currencies which, if used correctly, can contribute to the increase of development. It is in this context that, in 2007, the government signed a contract with Vale Moçambique to start the extraction of coal in the coal basin of Moatize district. Due to the fact that the object in question is located underground in several villages in the aforementioned district, it was essential to move the population from its usual place of residence and consequent resettlement in other locations, including the village of Cateme.

However, during and after the resettlement process, there have been several conflicts between the affected population and the mining company Vale Moçambique, in which there is a resistance to leave the places where they previously lived, the reluctance to receive houses built by the company Vale Moçambique, by the potential resettled people, and later the occurrence of demonstrations that culminated in the blockade by the resettled population of access routes frequently used by the company. These issues gravitate to the following starting question: What are the reasons behind the resettlement conflicts in Cateme? This question opens space for the fulfillment of the general objective of the research, which is to understand the implications of the resettlement of the population in Cateme, whose process followed three methodological steps. In the first, works with content related to the subject

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were read in order to fill the researcher in what has already been written on the subject. In the second stage, the fieldwork was carried out. In addition to the observation, interviews took place at the Cateme Resettlement Center and the Moatize District Government from August 2015 to June 2017. At this stage, 32 informants were interviewed, 31 of them resettled and 1 member of Moatize's government. The ages of respondents range from 21 to 83 years. The choice of this age group is because they are considered to be people who can provide reliable information. Almost all of the interviews were with resettled individuals because they are the subjects who directly suffered the change. The interview with the government official was made because this institution, along with Vale Moçambique, outlined the strategies and implementation of resettlement and was sufficient because it is assumed that all that was transmitted was from the perspective of a spokesperson. The conversations with the informants were made in Portuguese and Nhúngue because both the researcher and the informants communicate in these languages. However, despite several attempts, it was not possible to talk to Vale Moçambique spokesman, an aspiration which was minimized by the availability of its Position Paper (Vale Moçambique, 2013), which clarifies, in a cross-sectional way, the mining company's positions around the resettlement process in Cateme. The third stage was reserved for data processing and analysis.

The present work has as its theoretical framework of analysis Social Management from the perspective of Cansado *et al.* (2011). These authors argue that social management is concerned with the involvement of all in the collective decision-making process without coercion, based on language intelligibility, dialogicity, and enlightened understanding as a process, transparency as a presupposition and emancipation as an end. In agreement with Tenório (2008b, 160), the authors also incorporate the concept of deliberative citizenship, which should intermediate the relationship between the interveners. Therefore, deliberative citizenship means, broadly speaking, that the legitimacy of decisions must originate in discussion processes guided by the principles of inclusion, pluralism, participatory equality, autonomy, and the common good. As an emphasis, social management can be defined as that oriented towards the social (as a purpose) by the social (as a process), guided by the principles of ethics and solidarity (Fischer and Melo 2006, 17). For the decision to be effectively collective, it must be free of coercion and everyone must be free to express what they think (Tenório 2008b, 161). Moreover, decision-making is based on understanding, argumentation, not negotiation in the utilitarian sense of the term. The decision is really collective, coercion is foreign to the process, and understanding (not negotiation) must be its way. This is where said dialogicity emerges as another feature of

social management. Transparency, mentioned above, arises as a necessary condition for the other characteristics, since secrecy and information asymmetry make collective decision-making based on enlightened understanding impossible. In this sense, language must be intelligible to all participants. Based on Freire (1987; 1996; 2001) and Tenório (2008a, 161), there is the emancipation of man as the end of social management, based on previous characteristics, the deliberative democratic process and the full exercise of citizenship. Effective participation in the decision-making process brings growth and maturity to actors (Freire 1987; 1996; 2001), who broaden their view of the world as human beings, endowed with reason and citizens participating in a public sphere.

The theory of Social Management was important for the investigation because the problem under study is related to social conflict. Therefore, tools such as deliberative citizenship, dialogicity, transparency, and emancipation are key to minimizing social conflicts and conflicts caused by involuntary resettlement in particular. Correlatively, the data collected in the field were rigorously analyzed taking into account this theoretical source. Regarding conceptual aspects, three key words stand out: Integration, culture and sustainable development, whose interpretations are illustrated below.

Pires (1999) states that the term integration is correctly used in sociological literature to designate, at the micro level, the way actors are incorporated into a common social space and, at the macro level, the way in which different social subsystems are compatible. For both situations, the concept of integration is related to the dynamics of social change. In turn, Leite and Morosini (1992) define integration from an economist perspective and state that the main purpose of integration is the economic leverage of the participating countries, an objective that must be closely associated with the social and cultural production of the countries involved. Both definitions are complemented by the fact that the former weaves aspects related to the dynamics of social change that lead subjects to incorporate into a common space and the latter by including the integration of citizens as a precondition for transnational experiences.

As for the term culture, Laraia (2001, 14), states that it was synthesized by Edward Tylor (1832-1917) in the English word "Culture", which, taken in its broad ethnographic sense, is the complex that includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, laws, and customs acquired by an individual as a member of a society. In turn, Bosi (1996) argues that culture is a concept that encompasses all material achievements and spiritual aspects of a people. He adds that culture brings together a set of practices, techniques, symbols,

and values that must be passed on to new generations to ensure social coexistence. For Chiavenato (2003), culture is a generic term used to mean two different meanings. On the one hand, the set of customs, civilization, and achievements of a time or a people, and on the other hand, arts, erudition, and other more sophisticated manifestations of human intellect and sensibility, considered collectively and in specific organizational contexts. Here we see the complementarity in the definitions of culture taking into account the valorization of knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, laws, customs of a people, and the essence of relativism.

However, Beyhaut (1994, 15) brings together the concepts of integration and culture. For this thinker, true integration takes place at the level of cultures and one should be wary of the usual explanations that view cultural integration as a vertical social process, i.e. imposed from top to bottom. Therefore, cultural integration presents itself as a very varied, fundamentally spontaneous process, minimally affected by the adoption of government measures, bearing in mind that industrial civilization and the expansion of models spread by Western economy and technology do not imply creating always the same world, without local variations and with minimal participation of dependent societies. Bourdieu (1974) adds a historical perspective in which cultural integration makes the thought schemes of an era truly understandable, enshrining it as habits of thought common to a generation.

The last concept that deserves special attention in the article is the sustainable development that emerged during the Brundtland Commission in the 1980s, where the "Our Common Future" report was produced, when Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland introduced the concept as "How current generations meet their needs without, however, compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Brundtland *apud* Scharf 2004, 19). As early as 1986, the Ottawa Conference (Ottawa Charter 1986) sets out five requirements for achieving sustainable development: integrating conservation and development, meeting basic human needs, achieving equity and social justice, providing social self-determination and cultural diversity, and maintaining ecological integration. For Camargo (2003, 43), sustainable development is a process of transformation in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the direction of technological development and institutional change harmonize and reinforce present and future potential in order to meet human needs and aspirations. From the perspective of Cavalcanti (2003) sustainability means the possibility of continuously obtaining equal or superior living conditions for a group of people and their successors in a given ecosystem. However, in the present article, we used the previously described definitions of sustainable develop-

ment from the perspective of Camargo (2003) and the Ottawa Charter (1986) which, from the researcher's point of view, are more exhaustive definitions. However, other definitions of sustainable development presented illustrate a chain of ideas whose common denominator is the harmony between financial and environmental issues to meet present human aspirations without jeopardizing future generations.The research aims to contribute to a reflection within the scientific community about resettlement motivated by mining and clarify the outline of one of the most commented resettlement processes in Mozambique today because most citizens do not have detailed access to what really happened.

Overview of the context in which resettlement took place

Mining and resettlement should be seen in the light of the long history of human migration dating back to the period when Mozambique did not exist as a country, but a set of autonomous territories such as the Angoche Sultanate, the Mataka Kingdom and the Monomotapa Empire. Independently, they already extracted and traded valuable ores such as gold and precious stones. However, resettlements with near-current characteristics and state-oriented took place in a context in which Mozambique was already an overseas province under the aegis of Portugal.

According to Lillywhite *et al.* (2015, 5) in the mid-1900s, Portugal, along with other colonizing nations, followed a peasant settlement process that involved the clustering of scattered settlements in villages. This practice represented a defensive strategy, politically motivated to contain the nationalist guerrillas fighting for Mozambique's independence, which was achieved in 1975. After independence, the newly formed state continued the strategy of grouping the rural population into villages whose objective was to facilitate state intervention aimed at social development based on socialist assumptions.

Other resettlements with similar characteristics were conducted in compliance with Resolution No. 2 of 23 March, published in the Official State Bulletin, that advocated for Operation Production (1983), which was defined by the FRELIMO Party's Central Committee as that of "production" and of' "strengthening the economy" (Quembo 2012, 67). Thus, many citizens considered unproductive during the raids were captured and sent to rehabilitation camps in Niassa province, such as the Unango district and Zambezia province, where the Caríco rehabilitation camp in the district of Milange stands out. In addition to the resettlement previously presented,

there are other disaster-driven realities such as cyclic flooding in the basins of the Zambezi, Limpopo, and Licungo rivers, which obligates the Mozambican government to relocate populations to spaces considered safe.

Other contents that address the resettlement problem have already been developed by authors such as Carson (1989), The Federal District Government of Brasilia (2008), Selemane (2010), Gustavo (2008) whose essence is fundamentally economics-based and environmentalists, besides works such as those written by the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment (2006), The Ministry of National Integration of Brazil (2008), Pagliarini-Junior (2009), whose phenomenon is directed to infrastructural aspects. Departing from the economics-based, environmentalist, and infrastructural emphasis, the present research differs from the approaches above, in that the object focuses on the integration of resettlers, whose motivation was to achieve the extraction of coal. The research focused on the inherent aspect of socio-cultural framing and sustainable development.

With the huge global energy needs, both current and future, there is no prospect, even in the long run, of dispensing fossil fuels as the energy base of modern industrial society. One of these fossil fuels is coal, which, if all other sources of energy suddenly disappeared, could alone ensure 150 years of consumption, by the methods so far applied and existing world reserves (José and Sampaio 2011, 2). According to data from the International Energy Agency (2014), coal is the second most important source of electricity in the world, accounting for 30% of total production, and projects that the ore will maintain a similar position over the next 30 years.

Mozambique is one of the countries with the largest reserves of coal in the world. Therefore, there are several identified coal basins in different areas of the country, in the provinces of Tete, Niassa, Cabo Delgado, and Manica, some of which are currently being evaluated through research on more than 100 mining titles attributed to various identities (individuals and legal persons) (MEDIAFAX of 22 July 2010, 7). Therefore, in June 2007, the Mozambican Government signed a contract that grants a mining concession to Vale Moçambique, owned by giant Vale, former Vale do Rio Doce Company, a company of the Vale do Rio Doce Group founded in 1942 in Brazil (Selemane 2009, 21). This company is mining coal in the Moatize Carbon Basin in the central Tete province and has from 9 November 2009 to 28 April 2010 transferred more than 760 households (out of 1,313 registered) living in mineral coal production areas in the municipality of Vila de Moatize (Selemane, 2009).

In agreement with Mosca and Selemane (2011) and Fian (2010), communities identified as belonging to urban areas of the village were resettled in the "25 de Setembro" neighborhood. Most of the population living in rural communities, with a focus on residents of the communities of Mithethe, Malabwe, Yagombe, part of the Chipanga community, and Bagamoio neighborhood, were resettled in an area 45 km from the city of Tete (capital city) and about 30 km from the village of Moatize (in Cateme), in a region where Vale Moçambique was in charge of providing the basic conditions for the survival of these communities, with the construction of new housing, supply of one hectare of land per family for agricultural cultivation, construction of classrooms and health facilities, in addition to other infrastructure.

Comparison of living conditions before and after resettlement

The appearance of the universe was accompanied by the existence of living beings and the human is no exception. In this process, changes in several aspects were observed in accordance with countless adversities which comprise structural and conjunctural aspects. Therefore, during specific periods of the history of mankind, and in consonance with the concrete goals and interests of men, changes are inevitable.

The resettlement process in Cateme brought with it some mutations in the daily lives of those affected, which in turn opened the way for an adaptive and integrative process which, of course, was not voluntary. Therefore, this reality arises as a result of the imposition of the agents that guided the resettlement process in the mentioned site. This reflection comes from the fact that most of the resettled informants in Cateme state that their daily lives are not the same, and several evidences illustrate this feeling, taking into account the answers that arose during the conversations. The first aspect is related to the quality of the land allocated for agricultural production, which they consider to be unsuitable for this activity, as they are arid compared to the fields they previously had, in addition to their size being of only one hectare for each family, regardless of the household size.

Aspects inherent in the distance between the Cateme Community and Moatize Village also deserve highlighting in this study. The resettled people stated that it is a long one and creates constraints. However, although the distance is considered long for the resettled, the investigator found that

the road separating the two sites is in good transitability and is tarred to the "community gate".

However, in the process of carrying out any action of the magnitude of involuntary resettlement, there is a need for administrative actions, beginning with the preparatory phase, in which feasible strategies for the efficient pursuit of activities and subsequent compliance with what is previously planned are outlined. Dahl (2001, 28) argues that in these actions democratic rules should be privileged, focusing on the effective participation of the actors involved in the process. Therefore, before a policy is adopted by the association, all members must have equal and effective opportunities to let other members know their views on what the policy should be.

It is in this context that before the resettlement began, there was room for negotiations between the mining company Vale Moçambique and the Government. Subsequently, the period for identifying the places for the transfer of affected citizens followed, and there is evidence that there were contacts between the actors already referenced and the populations affected by the process that led to the resettlement in Cateme.

Among several issues that were part of the negotiations, we should highlight some promises that were made to the resettled by Vale Moçambique, whose character needs analysis, especially by the resistance that the people showed in not wanting to leave the places where today coal is extracted and that were once spaces where they lived and owned their fields. This trend is illustrated in the following statement:

> We at first had refused. Then they promised that we would have all the conditions including employment and support. They also promised that they would organize resettlement projects. But what is happening now is that each one fights in his own way and if anyone succeeds, one works five or six months and the contracts come to an end. They promised to give us good houses, but these have cracks. The problem with these houses is that they have no consistent foundation (Resettled Citizen, 42 years old. Own translation)[2].

Resettled citizens confirm that they were also promised that in the first five years they would be entitled to food, furniture, good houses, cattle, goats, and breeding pigeons, but most of what was said was nothing more than mere promises.

For cases of those that already have cattle and goats, they claim that they face grazing problems due to the aridity of the soil, which causes them to travel long distances to feed these animals. Therefore, it is a challenging reality and something that was not a routine in the places they were forced to abandon.

According to a representative of the resettled people, there is also a sensitive reality that has not been fulfilled and is related to the exhumation and transfer of the remains of loved ones buried in cemeteries from the places where they lived before to bring them closer to the resettled in order to appease the spirits. The most aggravating factor is that in these places there are currently intense coal mining activities which, in turn, make it difficult, and in some cases impossible, to locate the graves as they have been vandalized.

However, among the many pieces of information that show disappointment at the way they were and are being treated during the eight years of their stay in the Cateme resettlement center, there are some cases of people that are adapting better to this new reality, which is demonstrated in the content of this interview:

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2 "Nós, no princípio, tínhamos recusado. Depois prometeram que teríamos todas as condições incluindo emprego e apoio. Prometeram também que iriam organizar projetos para os reassentados. Mas o que está a acontecer agora é que cada um batalha a sua maneira e se alguém conseguir, trabalha-se cinco ou seis meses e os contratos chegam ao fim... Prometeram também atribuir-nos boas casas, porém estas casas continuam a apresentar rachas apesar de terem vindo reparar. O problema destas casas é que não tem fundação consistente (Cidadão reassentado, 42 anos de idade)."

> For me life has improved a little compared to where I came from. They gave me a project and I am involved in chicken farming and I can have some satisfactory results. I am enjoying living here in Cateme because it was an imperative. But I liked Mithethe better than here because it was close to Moatize Village and there I had a profitable coal business (Resettled Citizen, 42 years old. Own translation)[3].

In addition to the testimony presented, there are cases of resettled people who do not consider if life has improved or is on the same level or if it has worsened in relation to places of origin. They simply assume that it is a different context and what they have to do is conform to the new reality. However, given these speeches, it is noticeable that in practice something innovative has occurred, such as the existence of 24-hour electricity and sheet-covered houses, unlike where they left, where houses were made of grass and had no power.

Another aspect that appeals to communities affected by the resettlement process has to do with their neighborhoods. Incidentally, the existing neighborhoods in the Cateme Resettlement Center strictly follow the social fabric that existed in Mithethe, Malabwe, Yagombe, Chipanga, and Bagamoio. Therefore, for most of these citizens, those who were neighbors in the places of provenance, are also neighbors in Cateme. However, there are some specific cases where this reality does not coincide, but these facts occur for purely optional reasons.

Integration of resettled considering political, cultural and sustainable aspects

After a thorough analysis of the conflicting aspects, taking into account the reality on the ground, for an efficient understanding of the phenomenon under study, it becomes peculiar to interpret the integration of the citizens affected by the resettlement, focusing on the policies adopted for the implementation of the process, socio-cultural and symbolic issues, beyond the sustainability of the resettled.

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3 "Para mim a vida melhorou um pouco em relação ao local donde vim. Deram-me um projeto e estou envolvido na criação de frango e consigo ter alguns resultados satisfatórios. Estou a gostar de viver cá em Cateme porque foi um imperativo. Porém gostava mais de Mithethe do que cá por ser perto da Vila de Moatize e lá fazia negócio de carvão que também era rentável (Cidadão reassentado, 42 anos de idade)."

In agreement with Aristotle *apud* Amorim (2011, 17), man is by nature a political animal and his nature is governed by the precepts of justice and law, and only then can he fully realize his essence and excellence. In addition to being political, man is simultaneously a cultural being, as he is imbued with a set of ethical-moral values that make sense in a specific social context and are passed on from generation to generation and through contact with other social patterns which, in turn, define everyday behavioral attitudes. However, Kluckhohn (1949) *apud* Geertz (1989, 4) argues that, in addition to culture being a mechanism for the normative regulation of behavior, it also emerges as a set of standardized guidelines for recurrent problems. The symbolic order arises to clarify the meanings that actors give to their own feelings and actions in light of what is socially standardized. Therefore, the confluence of political, cultural, and symbolic aspects are the pillars for understanding the essence of the resettlement integration in the Cateme community whose cause was the extraction, disposal, and commercialization of coal.

As far as political aspects are concerned, it should be noted that it is a reality that any human society in a specific space-time context feels confronted by problems and their resolutions. This factual dichotomy induces the researcher to the thought of Trotsky (1929), according to whom the essence of dialectic is linked to contradiction, and this leads us to conflict that, violently or not, leads us to solve problems. Also, to understand the problems it is peculiar to assume that human beings have convergent and conflicting interests that affect their daily lives and, consequently, decision-making tends to take the form of seeking cooperation with some generally adjusted solution and implicitly on the conflicting aspects (Sem 2010, 250).

In approaching the comparison of living conditions, the resistance shown by the affected citizens was evident, especially in not wanting to leave the places where they lived and practiced their daily activities. However, due to several persuasive meetings that were accompanied by promises and given the possible comparative advantages, they chose to give in. In this line, the political dictates, especially for their persuasive aspect, played a decisive role in this compromise. In fact, according to Couto (1996, 1), politics is the mediator of social relations and is the means by which the organization and maintenance of social order occurs. Therefore, it is through politics that the peaceful correlation between natural and legal persons, duly guided by laws and other normative codes, is ensured. In addition, it enables the human being – naturally a political and social being – to contribute to the improvement of the living conditions of the entire group in which they are inserted.

However, the lack of political rigor, especially in the dichotomy of efficient political-legal guidelines, has become a fertile space for conflicts. In the specific case of the resettlement process in Cateme Community, the theory was imbued with various expectations and, in practice, not all expectations created in light of the promises were fulfilled, creating a feeling of discontent. In the face of these realities, it is necessary to recognize that any individual and/or community behavior that culminates in strike is because the individual or the community feels excluded or manipulated by the opposing party in view of the apprehension and reciprocity of interests.

In the resettlement process in Cateme, the mismatch between the promises that came with persuasive policies and the practice on the ground was decisive for the creation of a collective feeling of distrust. Similarly, in a context of deep distrust of citizens affected by resettlement *vis-à-vis* the agents who organized the process, with a focus on the non-fulfillment of promises, emotional saturation precipitated the occurrence of peaceful demonstrations and that, in some cases culminated in violence, such as the blockade of the railway line used for the flow of coal, forcing the temporary stoppage of Vale Moçambique's activities. In response, Vale Mozambique requested security from government bodies that, in response, sent the Rapid Intervention Force, which violently dispersed the protesters.

The other focus of analysis on the resettlement issue in Cateme relates to integration, taking into account cultural specificities. In fact, all animate living beings have specific characteristics that emerge as a *sine qua non* condition for defining their behavioral actions. In the specific case of the human being, besides acting on instinct, their conduct is fundamentally determined by a rationality imbued with culturally standardized ethical-moral values. Indeed, there are cultural aspects that have been taken into account, such as the farewell ceremonies of the ancestors where they were forced to leave and the purification ceremony for a good stay in Cateme.

However, despite the observance of the above-mentioned rituals, there are important issues that citizens directly affected by the resettlement have been promised but were not taken into account, such as the exhumation and transfer of the remains of their deceased ancestors and relatives to the Cateme Cemetery. Nowadays, these remains are in the places they were forced to leave, where there currently are intense activities of coal extraction.

Citizens directly affected by the resettlement assume that both the cemetery, as well as the ancestral spirits, are and should be treated as sacred. And, according to Geertz (1989, 92), everywhere the sacred contains in itself a sense of intrinsic obligation, it not only encourages devotion but demands

it, and not only induces intellectual acceptance but reinforces emotional commitment. Sem (2010, 48) adds that an economic intervention without respect for cultural specificities can be harmful to a country, as it may lead to the elimination of its traditions and cultural heritage, and Silva (1963, 540) adds that this procedure weighs unfavorably on development. Concomitantly, given the data hitherto listed and taking into account the assumptions of Social Management theory from the perspective of Cansado *et al.* (2011), presented in detail in the introductory space, there are inconsistencies, especially in aspects related to transparency in dialogicity and lack of efficient inclusion in the decision-making process.

It is a fact that the resettlement of citizens in Cateme was motivated by economic issues by Vale Moçambique, as well as by the Mozambican government, hence the need to illustrate some data inherent to these aspects. In the macroeconomic context, Mozambique is one of the few African countries with prosperous tendencies and that contributes the most to development in the world (Instituto Humanitas Unisinos 2011, 4). After a decade with an average GDP growth of 7.5% in 2016, it slowed to 4.3% due to greater fiscal constraints, falling foreign direct investment and the Hidden Debt crisis[4]. However, there was an increase of around 5.5% in 2017, driven by exports from the extractive sector (Santos *et al.* 2017, 2). Yet, Castelo-Branco *apud* Courrier International (2015, 4) states that only 5% of profits generated by foreign direct investments are reinvested in Mozambique, while 95% of profits generated by mega projects, including Moatize coal, leave the country. However, the macroeconomic GDP indicators illustrated in numerical data are part of economic growth, which is not always synonymous with economic development, despite being one of the assumptions that can lead to sustainability. Given the percentage data illustrated, coal mining in the Moatize Coal Basin greatly benefits mega projects, in this case Vale Mozambique. In fact, it is the enormous benefits that make this company maximize its means of production and the routes to the alluded ore flow.

However, there is a disrespect for citizens forced to leave the places where they previously lived and where intense mining activities are currently taking place. For example, resettled people are unanimous in stating that where they formerly resided the lands were larger and arable for agriculture,

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4 US$ 2 billion debt contracted by the Mozambican government without Parliament's approval on the pretext of ensuring the country's coastal surveillance and ship building and repair, with the creation of three public-private companies, namely: Proindicus, which would have as a function to ensure the coastal surveillance of the country; EMATUM would be a tuna fishing company; MAM (Mozambique Asset Management) (Business & Human Rights Resource Center, 2019).

however, in Cateme only one hectare of land was provided for each family and, as if it was not enough, most of them non-arable and stony. Also, the resettled citizens in Cateme had houses built according to their will in the places they were forced to leave, where the persuasion was that improved and concrete-based residences would be built. However, the reality on the ground proves that the houses were made without consistent foundations and, as a result, they have several cracks, which is a danger to the lives of these citizens. Thus, there is a clear violation of human rights, which in turn undermines emotional stability and its sustainability. When talking about sustainability, we refer to the added value of the production processes, both at national level and, especially, in the context where production occurs directly. Nonetheless, there is clear evidence of the contribution that mining has to GDP. But there is no clarity on the added value of the production process to communities that have been resettled as a result of the start of coal production by mega projects.

The discovery of natural resources focusing on coal has been interpreted as a promise of development. However, the expectations created by the discovery and subsequent exploitation of coal, the way interventions are made, rather than stabilizing the lives of those directly affected, have turned them into a nightmare, and most of the population in the context in which the ore exploitation occurs continues to live below the poverty line. These data are also confirmed by FAO *apud* Human Rights Watch (2013). In addition to the impoverishment of the population directly affected by the resettlement, Mosca and Selemane (2013, 26) add that the neighboring populations of the large projects suffer from environmental effects, especially black dust, due to the intense activity of coal mining, sharpening welfare losses.

Development is the ultimate goal that citizens aim for, and the sustainability of the intervention must be highlighted. When speaking of sustainability, one refers to the added value in terms of production processes, both nationally and above all in the context where production occurs directly. For the first case, there is clear evidence of the contribution that mining has to GDP and world development. However, there is no clarity on the added value of the production process for communities that have been resettled as a result of the start of coal production by mega projects and, in this particular case, the added value from Vale Moçambique.

The present study highlights an unsustainable development as it primarily benefits the shareholders of transnational corporations, who appropriate land, natural resources, nature, and destroy the lives of people, animals, and ecosystems in the name of "development" and profit, forcing the unfairly

resettlement of many communities without guaranteeing the channeling of compensatory benefits and reparations. Therefore, it is the savage capitalism in which, regardless of the means, what matters is the operationalization of what is planned, where the ultimate objectives are privileged, without looking at the means that lead to their achievement.

Conclusions

After identifying the problem that guided the present analysis and before a work whose prologue was to assess the literature related to the theme, going through a field research that privileged a direct contact with the citizens affected by the resettlement and a subsequent thorough analysis of the the data collected, it was found that several factors, fundamentally exogenous, were the cause of the conflicts.

As for socio-cultural integration, it was found that some aspects were respected, which appeals to the resettled citizens in Cateme. However, there are other sensitive socio-cultural realities that have not been respected, such as the exhumation of the remains of their loved ones in places of provenance to close to the community where they currently live, in addition to the former cemeteries being where today there is intense activity of mineral extraction.

There was also a mismatch between the promises made by both Vale Moçambique and the government to resettled citizens, whose speeches tended towards the improvement of living conditions after resettlement and the consequent apparent and effective non-fulfillment of promises. The apparent non-compliance is because some information obtained by the resettled is not confirmed by Vale Moçambique, such as the amount and period of donation of food baskets. Also, issues inherent to the adaptation at the place of arrival weighed heavily on making some conflicting decisions.

In short, at the present time, mining, rather than leading to a sustainable and socio-cultural integration of resettled citizens who suffered directly in the process, was actually unfavorable for these communities. Therefore, the discovery of mineral resources, focusing on coal, although considered as a promise for development, has not yet seen the profits from the sale of this ore reflected in the improvement of the living conditions of the citizens directly affected and, more seriously, the lack of respect for some socio-cultural specificities that was found, which, in turn, contributes to a clear reality of unsustainable integration and development.

Recommendations

Among several aspects that need improvement, there is the need for active involvement of subjects who can later be resettled. This practice needs frank dialogue and presentation of concrete aspects whose conclusions must be agreed. Therefore, contracts concluded between multinational companies with the government of Mozambique must, ultimately, correspond to the wishes and needs of the government and, especially, to the spatial and socio-cultural context of the directly affected population.

In order to avoid non-compliance with contractual clauses, it is up to the government to closely supervise and inspect what has been agreed, not only in matters relating to tax payments, but also in fulfilling its obligations towards resettled citizens. Coherent government intervention is unavoidable and can play a pivotal role in establishing an environment of trust within the community and it will gradually become the main protagonist of its own development. To this end, it is necessary to have a methodology based on a dynamic and creative combination of action and reflection, practice and theory.

It is known what the exploitation of mineral coal was the cause that pushed for the resettlement of the populations to Cateme, and this ore is a finite resource in the medium term.. Facing this situation, it is the duty of the actors directly involved in the processes of resettlement and mineral extraction to research and present alternative and sustainable actions in the present, with medium and long term results.

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ABSTRACT

This article discusses the process of resettlement integration in Cateme, Moatize District, Tete-Mozambique Province, as a result of the start of coal mining, which focuses on the dichotomy socio-cultural integration and sustainable development. For this purpose, the qualitative method was applied in its ethnographic aspect. After fieldwork where participatory observation was privileged, it was found that mining rather than leading to socio-cultural and sustainable integration of resettled citizens in Cateme is characterized by an unfavorable reality for these communities. Therefore, there is evidence of non-respect for some socio-cultural specificities which, in turn, clearly contributes to a deficient integration and unsustainable development. Another factor that contributes to these realities is the factual mismatch between the promises made by both Vale Moçambique and the government to the resettled citizens, in which an apparent and effective breach of the promises was found, creating an environment of discontent and consequent opening of a space. for conflicts between the resettled citizens and the agents who caused the resettlement.

USES, REUSES AND ABUSES: CROSSING "BORDERS" AND "LUSO-AFRICANITIES" IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHIES OF ANGOLA, CAPE VERDE AND GUINEA-BISSAU FOR THE 15TH, 16TH AND 17TH CENTURIES

Alec Ichiro Ito[1]

Introduction[2]

Portuguese navigations and discoveries raise questions among academics. Many of them try to explain the reasons why the Portuguese explored the Atlantic: poverty as a motivator of the search for wealth and commercial profits (Birmingham 2000, 2-3; 1999, 1, 33); Portugal's privileged geographical position on the Atlantic (Santos, C. 1997, 15); peninsular warfare as a driving valve for overseas expansion (Santos, J. 1998, 147-148); the game between empires and the subjugation of other peoples (Godinho 1998, 55; Alencastro 1998, 193); the development of the mercantilist trade (Novais 1995), among others. As much as the discussion raises divergent points, there is common ground on one of the developments: navigations led Europeans to find a "new other", resulting in issues such as the definition of "our world", their "world" (Borhein 1998, 17-18, 32-33) and the establishment of relationships between "different worlds" (Godinho 1998, 71-72; Birmingham 1999, 12-13).

Following the initial meeting, contact between different societies would bring new challenges. In the words of Vitorino Magalhães Godinho,

to study the contact would be to invent "the unity of mankind in plurality" (Godinho 1998, 77, 80, 82). From an analogous perspective, since the 1960s, Africanists have emphasized the importance of local contexts in the process of creating "bridges of connection between worlds". From this interest two points are raised: the first is linked to the notion of "frontier"; the second are some of the notions of "Luso-Africanities".

Contrary to a historiographical study, this article is an essayistic reflection on some notions and understandings that run through African studies about the Portuguese expansion in West and Central West Africa. Therefore, we will not dwell on the conditions of production, ideological affiliations or trends that competed for the elaboration of historical narratives, but on the "itinerant sharing" of ideas, the circularity of conceptual uses and reuses and the "general solutions" provided for some canonical problems. In this sense, we are influenced by a reflection proposal presented by Leila M. G. Leite Hernandez (2014). Our objects of analysis are the most influential works that address the stories of Angola, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau for the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries.

What are the shares and circularities that mesh the notions of border and Luso-Africanity? How are these ideas associated with meetings and contact studies? Is the notion of boundary necessary for the contemporary epistemic paradigm? Are there risks in neglecting it? These are some of the problems that will be analysed through the text.

From the Africanist frontier to the global connection

Our starting point are the interdisciplinary proposals of Philip D. Curtin and Jan Vansina, founders of the Madison-Wisconsin African Studies Program[3]. Since the founding of this research nucleus in 1961, these scholars have proposed writing a history of Africa capable of inserting African particularities, such as those of some historical events and other specificities, into the universality of mankind through the so-called "general standards of change" (Curtin *et al.* 1995, xiii). The fundamental question that perpetrated Madison-Wisconsin was: "How do human societies change over time?" (Curtin *et al.* 1995, xiv).

Even though they used exclusively European criterias of analysis, being sometimes accused of ethnocentrism, Curtin and Vansina were impor-

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3 Information taken from the institutional electronic address of the African Studies Program: http://africa.wisc.edu/.

tant defenders of African history as an independent discipline. The separation between Europe and Africa will be highlighted in this sense as a split between "worlds". By world is meant a macroregion whose traditional or historical framework is confused with the existence of broad linguistic-cultural groups. A world follows a linguistic and socio-historical pattern, such as the association between the Bantu macro group with a common matrilineal structure, recurring from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. Coupled with the understanding of the world follows the "frontier" which, in turn, establishes the boundaries between cultural, linguistic, historical and traditional structures. To make it clear how these terms are associated, we have outlined a brief reconstruction of how the historical anthropology of Madison-Wisconsin worked them.

Particularly interested in understanding how states arose and functioned in Africa and, to a lesser extent, how contacts with Europeans influenced the course of the continent, ethno-historians[4] defended the 'regressive history method'[5]. This mode of writing history assumes that the historical process, or "evolutionary line", would be a chronologically narrated explanation of local communities' development in political societies (Vansina 1990, 31). Such an explanation would be encapsulated in the "original tradition" that founds societies, stimulating the creation of legitimating devices of the sociopolitical order that embody political and social institutions. In Africa, this would be visible in the different ways of telling an oral tradition, modifiable according to the stimuli of the environment. For example, an oral tradition may be altered to meet the claims of members seeking to gain a leadership position in the community. Added to the ancestral prominence – closely linked with political leadership – the original tradition is also a hereditary and perpetual cultural aspect, structuring worldviews and ideologies that provide cohesion to the social body. Thus, it is a "structural", "natural" or "biological" trait of African and non-African societies (Vansina, 2004, 2; 1990, 5-6, 8-9, 31 and 33).[6]

There is a third element necessary to the historical process, in charge of change over time. They are the processes of convergence and divergence, a kind of "engine" that would drive human development through the adop-

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4 The word "ethno-historian" will be applied here in the narrow sense to researchers identified in historical anthropology.

5 What has been called regressive history here is called by Jan Vansina *upstreaming* (Vansina 2004, 12-13; 1990, 32-33). Importantly, the same notion of regressive history was already present in Marc Bloch (2001, 66).

6 For example, Curtin uses the "rule of least moves," a natural science paradigm that argues that the tendency for an action to continue to be directly proportional to lower energy expenditure to explain how group migration populations have resulted in the settlement of increasingly distant regions (Curtin 1995, 6-7).

tion of new techniques or technologies, thereby generating sociopolitical innovations (Curtin 1995, 6-8; Vansina 2004, 14). Successive innovations, in turn, would cause population clusters to "jump" from one "simple" stage of development to a "more complex" one, so that sociopolitical evolution would be a ladder, composed of several steps or stages, surpassable in favor of raising to a "higher level" of development in the form of a political society or governance (Vansina 2004, 2).[7] In other words, the evolution of African communities would involve the union of various groups under the umbrella of governance, around which political societies organize institutions responsible for maintaining internal order and defending against external threats (Vansina 2004, 2-3 and 261).

For the founders of Madison-Wisconsin African Studies, the notion of "frontier" can be interpreted as a dividing line between worlds and distinct histories, coupled according to sociocultural, linguistic communities, and thought traditions capable of relating memories and processes of change which vary diachronically and synchronously. The idea of the Africanist frontier is perceived in the light of the notions of world and history.

Such conceptions of temporalities and spatialities were rethought by some transnationalist historians from the 1970s to the 1990s.[8] Joseph C. Miller (1995), John K. Thornton (1998) and Linda M. Heywood (2002) do not make a deep differentiations between what would be properly African and what would be properly European. Drawing on universal categories of analysis, what sets societies apart is not necessarily the social institutions that shape them — family, kinship, transversal affiliation, and other "specific contexts" — but historical experiences. The historicity of African societies operates in the same way as other human societies, although it gives rise to particular manifestations and variations.

In addition, some economic, religious, or political denominators could be called upon to explain the connection between distinct worlds. Here an important consideration about contacts is highlighted. The groups identified as "Africans" were not merely plundered or supporters of European expansion in the Atlantic, but actors of the continent's relationship with Atlantic trade; On the other hand, foreign influence could generate decisive innovations when absorbed. In this sense, Miller wrote in "Kings and Kins-

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7 American ethno-historians use quite different political terms to describe equally diverse political realities in the words governance, government and polity.

8 The term, transnationalist history, was used by Tobias Green to characterize this current (2012, 1). The transnational perspective in African studies was strongly influenced by the works of Fernand Braudel, Frédéric Mauro and Pierre and Huguette Chaunu (Green 2012, 1 and 6; Thornton 1998, 13-14 and 17).

men: Early Mbundu States in Angola" that the establishment of the political alliance between Portuguese and Africans would have facilitated the full development of the imbangala[9] state of kulaxingo[10] (Miller 1995, 174-175, 177, 182, 189 and 195-196). Thornton, in "Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World" (1998), proposed the existence of the so-called "Atlantic world" as a result of the cultural and commercial exchange between Europe, Africa and America, and this perspective is reinforced in A Cultural History of the Atlantic World (2012).

Underlining the Atlantic power play, Tobias Green recalls that the transnationalist perspective integrated economies and cultures into the global system (Green 2012, 1). By "global" it is meant European, mercantilist, expansionist and overseas. John K. Thornton, for his part, considers that the slave trade operated through the legal system and social relations that were part of African societies (Thornton 1998, 97), leading to the widening of Atlantic contacts and the interconnection between histories – local, regional and global – in the long-term process (Thornton 2012, 5; Green 2012, 1 and 24-26).[11] More than comparing different worlds, it is necessary to connect them in view of the categories that structure the human universe.

Because they are closely associated with the problem of discoveries and contacts between different societies, the determination of boundaries and the possibility of connecting them enables analyses based on "scale games", associating the global – long-term trade and long distance affiliation networks – with the regional – the political decision of the sovereigns and their local reflexes – and the local facts. The analytical lens can also be adjusted to varying temporalities, such as the long-term – the structures – the medium duration – the business cycles – and the short duration – the fact. On a small scale, it would be possible to search the different agents that cohabitated shared spaces – disposition of people in groups, subgroups, communities and villages – as well as to scan the written sources, detailing the relationships maintained between terms, names and words in the language in textual composition.[12]

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9 Joseph C. Miller proposes that the warring groups called "jagas" in Portuguese documentation would be the "imbangalas" (Miller 1995, 149).

10 According to Miller, "kulaxingo" was a title of lunda power used by imbangalas (Miller 1995, 189).

11 Here we keep the term "transnationalism" as used by Tobias Green.

12 In this sense we are influenced by Zeron *et al.*, 2015.

Luso-Africanity as a connecting bridge

In African studies, the proposition of specific histories – the history of the mbundu, imbangala, Kongo – is usually inserted in the precondition of general histories, such as the history of Africa or the history of Portuguese expansion. Whether through general or specific focus, these stories are not closed in themselves. Thus, since the 1960s Africanist historians have proposed means of communication and intersection between the various histories. The idea of global connection provided effective means for the study of mediation and forms of negotiation, urging the need to overcome the ideas of African "isolation" and "exoticity". One of the consequences of this approach was the unveiling of the notion of Luso-Africanity, or of people identified as "Luso-African",[13] understood as mixed blood, cultural and political agents.

The conformation of Luso-African identities is supported by the crossing of borders. Moreover, it is pointed out that these relationships are related to the cultural and economic aspects that act as bridges of connection between the Atlantic trade careers and the Sahara merchant caravans, as we will explain below.

Supported by the analytical model of the "commercial diaspora",[14] Philip D. Curtin stated that merchants, by crossing the traditional cultural boundary, played the role of "transverse intermediaries between cultures"[15], becoming the embryo of "diasporic trade". Over time, these individuals constituted itinerant communities within the foreign enclaves that welcomed them, facilitating trade and the maintenance of merchant networks (Curtin 1975, 59). The success of the commercial diaspora was directly linked to the ability of the "transverse intermediaries" to perpetuate ties with those who gave residence or residence permits, which involved two types of mediation. On the one hand, in order to secure business, cross-cutting intermediaries should behave in accordance with local habits and customs, for example by respecting the kinship network and rituals of welcoming communities. The establishment of bonds of solidarity made commercial exchanges possible, and could generate cultural and blood mixture in different ways. On the other hand, in the economic and legal fields, mediation should assist in dealing

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13 There are several terms used to refer to these individuals: "Euro-African", "Afro-European", "Afro-Portuguese" and the most common of them, "Luso-African". We will call this more or less cohesive and closely related set of labels "Luso-Africanity".

14 Or *trade diaspora*, term coined by Abner Cohen, according to Curtin.

15 The word originally used by Curtin is *cross-cultural broker*.

with different local authorities, so that foreigners are able to use regional jurisdictions for their own benefit (Curtin 1975, 60).

Transverse intermediaries exercised multiple trades and could assist in the structuring of "commercial enclaves" capable of monopolizing the link between distinct economic systems. In this regard, Curtin provided the example of the juulas, as opposed to the European case. Centered on small, self-functioning firms, the "juula trading diaspora"[16] did not monopolize trade because it had simple financing and value-determination techniques, unable to control "market forces." The same was not true of the European, multifunctional enclaves and aggregators of a large number of specialists. The very social composition of these enclaves was more diverse, with miscegenated people and different cultural backgrounds, unlike the young, unmixed, and usually reproductive communities of social hierarchies similar to those of neighboring communities. It was through multifunctionality and cultural or even bloody hybridism that the intermediaries operating in the European enclaves managed to monopolize the connection between the Atlantic and the Trans-Saharan trade (Curtin 1975, 60, 63-66).

Walter Rodney was another researcher who highlighted the importance of intermediaries, viewing them as individuals who were neither "Portuguese" nor "African".[17] For him, the contact between distinct societies and cultures was the side effect of the "expansion of the European trading system to embrace specific roles in global production" (Rodney 1989, 199), thereby ensuring the influx of goods between societies at "fundamentally different stages of development". "Euro-African trade" fitted two asymmetrical socioeconomic traditions, one from a more developed European matrix and another from a less developed African matrix. Out of economic imbalance emerged the "Afro-Europeans" (Rodney 1989, vxiii, 191-192). Sometimes identified as

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16 The juulas (dioula or dyula) are mercantile peoples scattered throughout various regions of West Africa. The American historian identifies three commercial Judas diasporas in Senegambia: i) The first of the Gajaaga group, culturally and linguistically belonging to the Soninkes (also known as sarakole, saraculeh or sarahuli) (Curtin 1975, 69-72); (ii) the second of the Jahaanke group, consisting of "melinkezado soninkes" located in Jahaba (Curtin 1975, 69-72 and 76); iii) the third of the Mori group, composed of Muslim Malinkes who traded from the mouth of the Gambia River to Bamako on the Niger River (Curtin 1975, 69-72 and 81). Although the word "juula" has a Portuguese translation, "diula", we will choose the spelling in malinke, as proposed by Philip D. Curtin.

17 Usually Rodney uses the terms "Afro-Europeans" and "Afro-Portuguese".

successors of the "launched", "tangomaos"[18] and "cabin boys"[19], sometimes as members of mixed families such as Caulkers, Clevelands and Rogers of Sierra Leone, for Walter Rodney African-Americans are characterized as mulattos who "served the interests of mercantilism" (Rodney 1989, 200). Its more specific variety, the Luso-African, was described by the researcher as being "closely associated with the Portuguese", in the form of an identity linked to Christianity and Lusitanism, despite the blackness of the skin (Rodney 1989, 202-203). The Luso-African communities were culturally hybrid, as their members had tattoos, wore Western robes, carried swords, muskets and spoke "Portuguese Creole". Adhering to a syncretic religion, in which the cross was as important as the "gris-gris"[20], the Luso-Africans celebrated the Catholic saints, while paying homage to their ancestors. Finally, they performed professional mediation activities, such as interpreters, diplomats, pilots, and advisers, and engaged in private commercial activities (Rodney 1989, 202-204, 207-208, 212, 216-219, 221).

In Rodney's thinking, Luso-Africanity appears as a junction between a "developed", precapitalist African economy, and other "underdeveloped" one (Thornton 1998, 74, 77-79 and 85-86). Understood as a mixed religious and cultural category, the mulatto had the ease of transiting between worlds, thereby exercising the function of crossing borders.

Deepening the considerations about the "context of economic dependence," Paul E. Lovejoy argues that the "African state economy" sought to monopolize the slave trade, thus participating in the development of commercial capitalism (Lovejoy 2002, 15, 20-22, 180). In the process, African cooperation with the Atlantic trade has gradually transformed endogenous

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18 There are several understandings about what were the "launched" and "tangomões" (tangomaus or tangomões). First, they are described as Portuguese who lived on the coast of Guinea, "outside the law" of Portugal (Torrão 1995, 24-26). They were individuals who lived on the Atlantic coast, were active in the Atlantic trade and who went through a process of "miscegenation", thus being called "Luso-Africans" (Horta 2010, 56-57; Curtin 1975, 75-76). For Walter Rodney, both "launched" and "tangomao" were generic terms used to denote private traders, the former being whites residing on the continent and acting as Angola's "doves", while the latter were whites who adopted their local religion and customs (Rodney 1989, 74-75, 81). The "launched" were often identified as New Christians (Green 2007, 28-29, 101-102).

19 "Cabin boy" was a term used to refer to any African who was a helper for European merchants and lived in the "launched" communities (Rodney 1989, 77). They could be "sailors recruited [,] especially from African maritime groups [,] by Portuguese and Portuguese-descendant traders", providing services such as guides, boat repairers and merchants. The cabin crews could present themselves both as African and as Portuguese, indicating a "multiple identity fluidity" (Horta 2010, 62-63 and note 65).

20 According to Rodney, "gris-gris" were charms worn by the people of Upper Guinea, consisting of a piece of paper housed in a leather bag (Rodney 1989, 230-231).

societies into class-based "slave societies" (Lovejoy 2002, 177-9, 210-211). The ruling elite of these societies, the "warlords", eager for goods obtained through the slave trade, began to foment the reasons for hunting men, generating a "general state of insecurity". At the heart of these slave autocracies was a ruling class of Luso-Africans, ensured by the privilege of transit between distinct worlds (Lovejoy 2002, 178-179).

Another consideration of Luso-Africanism derives from John K. Thornton's criticism of Walter Rodney's "African underdevelopment" and Paul E. Lovejoy's "general state of insecurity" (Rodney 1989 and 2012; Lovejoy 2002). Disagreeing with both, Thornton denies the hypothesis of economic and political disparity, claiming that African inferiority and chaos are unlikely (Thornton 1998, 54-55, 74, 77-79, 85-86, 89-90 and 93-94). Moreover, Thornton maintains that European interference on the continent between the 15th and 18th centuries was small, making the "thesis of transformation" and subsequent "state of general war" in Africa unsustainable (Thornton 1998, 54-55; 2003, 150-151). Highlighting the leading role of the African people[21], Linda Marinda Heywood and John K. Thornton consider that the European presence was not imposed by foreigners, but consented when possible and absorbed by locals when necessary. In addition, by minimizing the negative impact of trafficking on the continent, Heywood and Thornton point out that foreign influence has led to the emergence of an "Atlantic Creole culture" characterized by the use of local surnames mixed with Portuguese names, the use of European clothing and singing of foreign songs (Seibert 2012, 33-35). Understood as a synonym for "Creolization", this hybridism would characterize another type of Luso-Africanity, also marked by the "racial mix" that made it possible to experience "both Central African worlds" (Thornton 2012, 253-254; Heywood and Thornton 2007; Heywood 2002).

Creolization recurs in the historiographies of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. For Tobias Green and Iva Cabral, this phenomenon is mainly insular, as opposed to the coast of Guinea and other continental portions, where Luso-Africanity prevailed (Cabral 1995, 272; Green 2007, 27; Seibert 2012, 50-51). More circumscribedly, creolization would be a reflection of the economic crisis, marked by the "inward turning" process of the Cape Verde archipelago (Teixeira 2005, 13, 19, 184-186 and 192). This explanation also runs through the General History of Cape Verde, organized by Maria Emília Madeira Santos (1995), whose cornerstone lies in Maria Manuel Ferraz Torrão's model of analysis, related to the "economic cycles". The explanation proposed by Torrão is as follows: a first cycle of economic development took

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21The term "protagonism" or "African protagonism" was suggested by Alexandre A. Marcussi.

place between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, prosperous thanks to the function of "complementarity", or "bridge of connection," which the island settlement played as a mediator between the Atlantic trade and the periphery of the trans-Saharan routes (Clod 1995, 17-19, 24-26). From the sixteenth to the seventeenth century, such route would decline, giving way to a systemic rearrangement in which the archipelago would be exempt from transatlantic trade (Torrão 1995, 34-35 and 94, 116, 123). The isolation of Cape Verde would trigger creolization, while on the continent the descendants of miscegenates would be at the mercy of Luso-Africanity. While this would be marked by a strong "mulatization"[22], that would be marked by a strong "Africanization" (Green 2007, 29 and footnote 19; Cabral 1995, 232, 236 and 245; Silva 1995, 352-353).

Luso-Africanity had the uniqueness of reproducing some multiple identity practices, according to Tobias Green and José da Silva Horta, capable of recreating a universe in which endogenous and exogenous aspects converged in favor of a "Luso-African world", or in a "Crypto-Jewish affiliation network". Returning to the discussions of Peter Mark (2008), Georg E. Brooks (2003) and Philip J. Havik (2004), Green points out that such practices determine the fusion of cultural aspects of different matrices – Jewish, African, Portuguese, among others –, creating porous communities receptive to the presence of outsiders. This would be the "modern synthesis" of European overseas experience (Green 2007, 28-29, 337-338). Similar argument leads to José da Silva Horta, for whom textual production is reflected in the consolidation of a "Cape Verdean-Guinean world", represented by a chain of intermediaries, or "co-authoring informants" Luso-Africans, responsible for the transmission of information that would end up fixed in text format. To be operable, this chain of brokering triggered multifaceted identity practices and elicited fluid belongings whereby a physically African individual could claim to be Portuguese, or a Jew could claim to be Catholic (Horta 2010, 2-3, 5, 9, 377- 379).

For Green and Horta, the dual communities, or Luso-Africans, are the key point for the proposition of a "connected history" writing,[23] model that seeks to "reconstitute the historical ties" of different peoples through "common denominators". The so-called "Luso-African History" would embrace

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22 It is a phenomenon of blood mixture and skin coloration (Teixeira 2005, 13 and 19; Silva 1995, 352-353). "Creolization", on the other hand, is a concept originally derived from linguistics (Seibert 2012, 30-31).

23 José da Silva Horta refers to the so-called *connected historie*, recalling the works of Roger Chartier, Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Serge Gruzinski, John K. Thornton and Patrick Manning (Horta 2010, 10 and note 28).

"two sides of the same coin", merging the history of European expansion with the history of Africa, as it should be the case with "all other extra-European stories involved with the former". (Horta 2010, 10). Contrary to what Philip D. Curtin and Walter Rodney propose, the rise of Luso-Africanity as a common denominator seems to obliterate the difference, asymmetry and dissonance between societies immersed in Atlantic contact. The investigative focus on multiple or multifaceted identities takes effective experiences of social reproduction and political and military shocks to the background, addressing colonial violence and eliciting an almost "amnesia" about what dominated Atlantic relations were.

Conclusions

The varied understandings about worlds, borders, hybridity and creolization intersect the notions of border and Luso-Africanity. Recently, debates on these themes have rekindled academic spirits, raising criticism and various solutions. Just check the articles by Roquinaldo Ferreira (2006; 2012), Flavio dos Santos Gomes (Gomes and Ferreira, 2008), Rafael de Bivar Marquese (2006), Maria da Conceição Neto (1997) and Francisco Bethencourt (2011). In light of the considerations made by these researchers and the insights developed in this article, we will give some considerations.

A methodology that minimizes the difference between societies and thus abdicates boundaries demarcation is controversial. First, when the boundaries between the self and the other are versatile, one has the impression that equality between peoples results in horizontal political and social relations. The danger lies in the substitution of scrutiny by simplistic generalizations, backed by the denominators of cultural hybridism, blood miscegenation, multiple identities, religious syncretism, and peaceful social fusion between the societies in contact. Ultimately, the softening of the conflicting environment and the focus on conciliation between peoples diminishes the importance of disagreement between them, as if agreement supersedes divergence. This is what happens when Luso-Africans and the "integrated" ones figure as the central theme of the investigations: the struggle between men loses relevance and inequality is mitigated.

Secondly, the notions of hybridity, syncretism, mulatization, and creolization lack circumscribed definitions. What would cultural exchanges and mixtures be? In which environment is a religiously or culturally "pure", "original" and "isolated" matrix preserved? Are the contexts analyzed really

relevant in relation to the whole?[24] The lack of epistemological and analytical clarity generates an exacerbated fluidity between what is "western" and what is "African", having as a side effect the degeneration of the limits and dissimilarities between self and other. Reinforcing our previous considerations, this accentuates the relegation, or obliteration, of the cruelty of the slave trade, the violence generated by the experience of colonial domination, the sexual exploitation suffered by African women, and the suffering inflicted on "Europeanized" blacks. Thus, although the proposal of "Luso-African history" is tempting, it commonly presents features of European superiority, being indifferent to the asymmetrical processes that sometimes mark the clash between different societies (Sanches 2011, 33).

In the end, revitalizing the notion of frontier not only allows the disclosure of contact as a traumatic experience of negotiation and conflict, but also sharpens the critical reflection on the academic-scientific production on Africa, encouraging the questioning of the notions of "societies with state", "without state", "hamita thinking" and "the sudanese state hypothesis"[25] In addition, the reinvigoration of the notion of frontier can be associated with the exploration of connecting bridges between different worlds, as well as with research on ways of crossing frontiers and the detailed analysis of the agents involved in them, as proposed by Carlos Alberto de Moura Ribeiro Zeron. (1999, 30-31, 37-38). However, such approaches have some risks and disadvantages.

On the one hand, the notion of boundary and correlatives encapsulates ideas linked to evolutionism and the difference between the "more complex" and the less "complex" (Macgaffey 2008, 224, 239). On the other hand, the association of the Africanist frontier with the idea of original tradition is currently criticized by African thinkers. For Achille Mbembe, the idea of African tradition was created during the colonial period as a way of inserting local peoples into the orbit of the "civilized". Thus, "exotic Africa" came to be framed in "human universality", while safeguarding its own specificities or identities (Mbembe 2001, 178-179 and 188). Valentin-Yves Mudimbe also distrusts the tradition's alleged historical validity, arguing that it would often be an "idea of Africa" related to the tradition of Western thought, not necessarily anchored in some endogenous materiality (Mudimbe 1994, xv).

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24 Take for example the work of Souza, 2006.

25 According to Miller, the "Sudanese state hypothesis" encapsulates some of the premises of "Hamita thinking", which the most important are the associations between the "civilizing conquest" and the emergence of states (Miller 1995, 2-4, 7). Jan Vansina was one of the leading researchers to refute this approach, although it is still discussed. See Barry 2000, 24; Miller 1995, 8-10, Santos 2008, 173.

For Paulin J. Hountondji, however, traditions, when interpreted through European ethnological optics, would be linked to ideological discourses about Africa (Hountondji 2008, 150-151 and footnote 4).

Even so, border issues and Luso-Africanities remain debated. The clearest sign of this derives from two works. The first of these is "The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies", edited by Igor Kopytoff in 1987. In it we observe the characterization of the "African frontier" as being regional and open, "internal" and "interstitial", thus being marked by ambivalence and overlapping traditions and cultures. As Catarina Madeira Santos (2005, 14-16) observes, such a notion of frontier is susceptible to the "advances"[26], "retreats", "receptions" and "recreations" of the peoples and cultures in contact, making it "flexible" and "dynamic". The other is Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730-1830, published by Joseph C. Miller in 1988. In it, the expansion of the "slave frontier" inland confirmed the great importance that Atlantic traffic held for the royal treasury and for agents involved in the commerce of persons, such as governors and captains. In this sense, both Joseph C. Miller and Paul E. Lovejoy agree that there was a kind of geographically indeterminate line, perhaps even "imaginary", from which most "exportable" slaves to the Atlantic trade could be drained (Lovejoy 2002; Miller 1988, 666 and 676). The fact is that the crossing of any of these boundaries implies the effective participation of agents who, in holding dubious or ambiguous identities, did not necessarily mediate the encounter between distinct cultures or produced a hybrid culture.[27]

New empirical research, focused on the material reality of African groups and individualities, as well as the scrutiny of written sources, can make valuable contributions to the dynamics and complexities of the encounters, contacts, and relations of domination that intertwined societies, temporalities, and spatialities immersed in slave trade and the capitalist advance. The focus of the question is not so much on generalizing, but on interconnecting and comparing specific knowledge, in order to achieve an imaginable universalization that enables the writing of the stories of Angola, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau at Atlantic or at global level. Rather than postulate the existence of common denominators referring to the writing of a Luso-African history, we expect that it is necessary to undertake descriptions, analyses and evaluations capable of unveiling and verifying the whole by the parties,

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26 The terms used are *internal* e *interstitial* (Kopytoff 1987, 9).

27 More considerations about the relationships between borders and identities can be found in Ito 2015, 1-10; 2016, 297-298, 310-311.

thereby harmonizing the methodological lenses of the microscale with that of macroscale.

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ABSTRACT

This article develops the notions of "frontier" and "Luso-Africanity", addressing some cases anchored in the writing of the history of Angola, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau for the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries. The guiding thread of this narrative is the sharing and circularity of these notions, split into two moments. In the first, we will understand the notion of the Africanist frontier, as it affects the studies developed by North-American historiography since the postwar period. In a second moment, we will introduce some notions of "Luso-Africanity", drawing attention to the focus given to multiple identity practices. At the end of this article, we will point out some of the risks and obstacles that permeate the notion of Luso-Africanity, the main one being the dissolution of the differences, asymmetries and inequalities that have crossed the Euro-African contacts. As a working hypothesis, we assume that future researches will carry out more empirical investigations, as well as support a more critical stance on cultural hybridism, blood miscegenation, multiple identities, religious syncretism and peaceful social fusion.

THE AMBIGUITY TOWARDS PORTUGAL'S AFRICAN COLONIES (1953–1985): DEFINING ASPECTS OF BRAZIL'S AFRICAN POLICY

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Introduction

The Portuguese colonization, throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, was the first bond established between Brazil and the African continent, and it was especially deepened by the slave trade. With the Brazilian independence in 1822, as well as with the end of the slave trade across the Atlantic, between 1845 and 1850, there was a gradual movement away from said continent, once the imperial foreign policy axis was now directed towards the River Plate, to the South, as well as to England, Western Europe and the North of the global system. In the 20th century, along with the two World Wars, the creation of the United Nations, and the Cold War, Brazil's international projection was drawn according to the opportunities presented in this new world system.

The aim of the present paper is thus to analyze the ambiguity between Brazilian political discourse and foreign practice with regard to the Portuguese colonies. The research problem consists in identifying which aspects have exerted an influence on the definition of Brazil's African policy. As a research question, it is assumed that Brazil, since the Independent Foreign Policy (IFP), with its discourse of non-alignment with the powers of the world system, the identification with the Third Worldist theses, and based on the politics of the "3Ds" (development, decolonization and disarmament), supported the anti-colonial principle and was an advocate for the self-determination

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of peoples. However, an ambiguity was evident by the official political alignment with Portugal, due to the 1953 Treaty of Friendship and Consultation.

In 1974, this ambiguity officially came to an end, with the independence of the Portuguese colonies in Africa and their recognition by Brazil, within a pragmatic and universalist framework of foreign policy. Methodologically, the research is classified as descriptive-explanatory in relation to its objectives. It applied the quanti-qualitative approach with the hypothetical-deductive method, since, according to Popper (1975), science is hypothetical and provisional, not a definitive knowledge. Based on the identified research problem, the research-generating question (hypothesis) was formulated, which in turn was tested through the procedures of bibliographic and documentary analysis of primary, secondary and press sources. After analyzing the results, the previously elaborated generating question was evaluated and eventually corroborated.

From 1951 to 1964: from the nationalist bargain to the IFP, nuances of African policy

Brazilian history is also based upon aspects from African cultures and societies, as slavery and the slave trade are two of the bonds responsible for building this relationship, which lasted from the 16th until the end of the 19th century, within the logic of the capitalist system and the international division of labor, which framed the Brazilian colony in a matrix of European liberalism, based on the monoculture of large areas of land. Brazil's withdrawal from the African continent, from its independence until the first half of the 1940s, reflects the sum of two aspects of the historical process of foreign policy, according to Saraiva (2012): the ideological, marked by the role of the Brazilian elite of the time, which sought to build a nation according to "modern and Western nations"; on the other hand, the material aspect, which stood out for the irrelevance of economic and commercial relations with Africa. In addition, it is important to emphasize that the policy of domination of the colonial powers had made international relations of the African continent impossible up to that point.

Domestic and structural changes in the world system since the inter-war period and in the post-World War II led Brazil to revise the axis of its foreign policy, as a result of changes in the country's options for international projection. The Cold War shaped the world system and Brazilian foreign policy was again linked to Washington during Dutra's administration. The

role played by Raul Fernandes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) was conservative in essence and deeply linked to US interests, which were often contradictory to those ones of Brazil. In turn, Osvaldo Aranha, then president of the United Nations General Assembly and head of the Brazilian delegation to the United Nations, perceived that the foreign policy of Brazil being the United States' preferred ally did not exist, since Washington's interests were directed to other regions of the globe.

According to Vizentini (2008), Vargas' second government represented a rupture with the diplomatic aspects of Dutra's government, marking the beginning of a new conduct for Brazilian foreign policy, which would reach its peak in 1961, with the Independent Foreign Policy (IFP). The idea of Vizentini (2004b) is used when analyzing the IFP since 1951, because "[...] it is closely linked to an industrial development model by import substitution, which, both in its economic and political-diplomatic aspects, presents a certain unity between 1951 and 1964" (Vizentini 2004b, 31).

However, the first contacts with Africa in this new phase of rapprochement took place in the commercial-political sphere, with the aim of strengthening the competitiveness of African and Brazilian primary products in the international market, especially the commercial partnership with South Africa. According to Penha (2011), Brazil's first concerns with Africa were grouped into three orders: economic (by the aspects already mentioned), political (in the dialogue with Portugal and in the creation of the Luso-Brazilian community), and strategic (with the process of decolonization of Africa, a space of interest for Brazilian action in the South Atlantic region).

The 1950s brought the agenda of national struggles for independence in the African continent to the world system. In Brazil, industrial modernization and urban growth led up to the emergence of new political actors and new demands in the consolidation of the so-called Developmental State. The presence of an emerging middle class and business interests brought new aspects to foreign policy. Development became more acute as a vector in this period, with diplomacy being used as a useful tool to ensure new spaces that would favor foreign investment for the national project. On the other side of the South Atlantic, African nationalism would flourish, being strengthened by its identification with the Third World. The Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955, according to Venâncio (2009), represented a boost to the struggle for independence of African countries, as well as an encouragement to the leaders of the movements against both European colonialism and the inferiorization of the black man. Later, in 1958, the 1st Conference of Independent States of Africa was held in Accra (Ghana's capital), which

took up Bandung's principles, strengthening support to African peoples still under colonial rule, and also encouraging African union (Venâncio 2009). In 1963, the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) crowned this movement.

In the second Vargas government (1951-1954), foreign policy was evidently noted as an instrument of national defense to achieve the developmental project. The international context put Vargas in a limited position to manoeuvre. Through the nationalist bargaining, the President sought to diversify his partners, and Africa's place in his policy belonged to the set of less developed areas of the world system. However, the Brazilian abstention in the face of the decolonization of Africa stands out. According to Vargas, the development of the colonies would occur with the continuing of the colonization, and the rule of João Neves da Fontoura in the MRE judged the conditions of economic development in the relation between colony and colonizer.

However, with the ministerial reform of 1953, the idea of preserving metropolitan interests in the African colonies became more acute with the appointment of the UDN-linked conservative Vicente Ráo to the MRE. It was at this time that the initiatives on Brazil's side were presented, as well as the last observations that were necessary to give birth to the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation with Portugal in 1953. Such a treaty would deeply establish bilateral connections through mutual consultation on international policy issues, with the exception of issues affecting American and Iberian territories. According to Pinheiro (1989), there were two explanatory reasons for this support: on the one hand, the existence of a Portuguese *lobby* in Brazilian society, representing the most traditional Portuguese interests; and, on the other hand, the strategic interests of both countries over the South Atlantic (Pinheiro 1989 *apud* Rizzi 2014). In addition, according to Cervo (2011):

> [...] His main intention was to resolve the antagonism between the two countries because of the incompatibility between Brazilian foreign policy, guided by national development and the logical support for decolonization, on the one hand, and the Portuguese foreign option of maintaining its late colonialism, on the other hand. The treatment will fundamentally exercise the function of perpetuating sentimentality in bilateral relations (Cervo 2011, p. 48).

For Portugal, the Treaty represented a political need to sustain the regime of António de Oliveira Salazar, as well as reaffirming the Portuguese status in the world system: since democracies emerged victorious from the

Second World War, it was appropriate for non-democratic countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Brazil to adapt to the new world order in accordance with the West. To this end, Vargas convened elections and established democracy in 1945. In turn, Salazar continued to maintain his regime. However, the hardships that Portugal encountered in maintaining its image in the West, as well as in integrating with the United Nations, led its diplomacy to seek mechanisms in favor of maintaining its status. It then sought to integrate with multilateral institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to strengthen relations with Atlantic countries, such as the United States and Brazil (Cervo 2011)

Portugal felt threatened by the commitment assumed by the United Nations to give political autonomy to the peoples submitted to colonial rule (and by the process initiated by the British independence to the Indians), factors that led it to be concerned with the maintenance of its colonies in Asia and Africa. For this reason, Brazil started to be seen as a strategic ally of Lisbon in terms of defending its colonial empire. From this context, the political need to re-establish the historical and cultural ties between Brazil and Portugal, and the creation of the Luso-Brazilian community generated the 1953 Treaty.

In the government of Café Filho (1954-1956), Raul Fernandes' conservative stance in Itamaraty reoriented the axis of foreign policy towards the North, re-approaching the USA. In the ensuing government, of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1960), foreign policy was characterized by the association of nationalism with foreign capital. Africa received the Brazilian discretion and disinterest for its national struggles under the effervescence of great changes in the African continent. Brazil's silent stance towards the first independent nation of sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana, in 1957), along with the independence movements that flourished, represented an awakening of Africa after the Bandung Conference, in 1955, which would be the first steps that would converge, only in 1963, in the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OUA).

Kubitschek's central concern was the developing economic relations between Europe and Africa, without taking into account the status of overcoming or not the colonial situation. With the creation of the European Common Market (ECM) in 1957, a clause certifying the integration of African countries into the European market through the protection of their products was incorporated. For Brazil, Africa's indirect participation in the ECM became a commercial threat (Cervo 2011). The concern of Brazilian foreign policy makers was based on the suspicion that international financing for the development of countries such as Brazil would be directed to

Africa, in addition to being based on the restriction of Brazilian products to the MCE, because the fear was that African products could be favored (due to exemptions from trade tariffs for African products and the low price of the African labor force). Furthermore, Cervo (2011) mentions that, for Brazil, the association of African and European economies, for preferential trade reasons, could affect the Brazilian development project by limiting the entry of Brazilian products to the European market. In addition to the creation of the ECM with the African association, the possibility of US and European investments in Brazil being threatened was also considered. For this reason, the possibility of the Pan American Operation (OPA) was, to a certain extent, a response to this situation.

In 1957, in the IV Commission of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Brazil supported project A/C.4/L.404, whose content mentioned that the Portuguese overseas provinces would be called non-autonomous territories, still belonging to Portugal. However, this stance did not receive unanimous support of Brazilian society and of Itamaraty itself. Political and intellectual leaderships advocated for the rapprochement with Africa, as they understood that the changes in the world system required a reform in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy (Rizzi 2014).

The foreign policy under the government of Jânio Quadros (1961), in accordance with the guidelines of the IFP, had a discourse of non-alignment with the powers of the world system, was identified with the Third Worldist theses, and supported the anti-colonial principle, being Brazil an advocate of the self-determination of peoples. However, that ambiguity was still evident in the official Portugal-Brazil political alignment. It is noticeable that the IFP is the phase of Africa's reintroduction into the external agenda and the gestation of Brazil's African policy, as well as being an outcome of the independence processes of most African countries between 1957 and 1960.

Brazil's rapprochement with Africa was based on "... the idea that both economic development and the ability to exert a certain regional influence should evolve in the same direction" (Penha 2011, 151). The first nuances of Brazil's African policy were based on the search for new political and commercial partners, and it provided new opportunities for Brazil's international insertion. The strategy used to reshape the country's role in the world system represented the establishment of relations with socialist countries in Europe and Asia, likewise with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Cuba, and the revision of relations with the USA. Thus, "Africa began to be seen as a new space for Brazil to exercise influence in the South Atlantic region" (Penha 2011, 151).

The IFP's guidelines represented a milestone in Brazilian foreign policy, as they were universal and non-exclusive, since the new possibilities allowed Brazil to assert itself as an influential actor in the world system. In this sense, it was sought to use foreign policy as an instrument for the international projection of the country, and the principles that guided the IFP were defined at the economic-political level. The search for new international markets and the intensification of trade relations with other partners turned foreign policy into a mechanism to achieve the economic development of the country. On the other hand, in the political sphere, the promotion of dialogue for conflict resolution, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, self-determination of peoples, and emphasis on international law was identified. What was noted was the attempt to take Brazil up to a level of autonomy in a pragmatic strategy.

In line with what Jaguaribe (1979) states, it is understood that the post-World War II world system was marked by relations of two orders: the one between the superpowers (US and USSR), characterized as complex relations of cooperation and conflict, and the ones between the center and the periphery, within each imperial system. The level of autonomy[3] of the system is based on "a complex network of interrelated interests within a profoundly asymmetrical framework, which privileges the center over the periphery" (Jaguaribe 1979, 95)[4]. Such asymmetry was based on the economic-technological and political-military superiority of the United States, which ensured its interests in the world system.

As for states, they need national viability and international permissibility to hold a greater degree of autonomy in the global system. The national viability is subordinated to the historical-geographical and socio-cultural circumstances and to the availability of human and natural resources (Jaguaribe 1979). In this sense, it can be seen that the period studied presents an interesting margin of national viability, with different degrees in each government. In the Jânio government (and later in the Geisel government), there was a high degree of national viability, because Brazil had an expanding economy.

The international permissibility, besides being of more abstract specification, approaches the internal and external capacity to neutralize the risks arising from third parties in the world system (Jaguaribe 1979). It should be noted that the Cold War conjuncture offered Brazil a considerable level of international permissibility (between 1961-63 and between 1974-85, espe-

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3 According to the author, the level of autonomy can only be clearly perceived within the scope of the North American empire, in whose orbit Brazil was located.

4 Our translation.

cially), allowing it to act in the world system questioning, to a certain extent, the current order and the inequalities between the central and peripheral states.

Autonomy, national viability and international permissibility are key concepts in understanding the characteristics of Brazil's African policy, which emerged in 1961 and was consolidated in the 1970s. It was the combination of the analysis between the possibilities and internal demands with the external possibilities identified, within a pattern of conduct based on the "3Ds" of Araújo Castro, that overcame the obstacles of the forming aspects of African politics in this period of the Cold War, within the consolidation of the Brazilian Developmental State.

Brazil's support for the principle of self-determination of the peoples in Africa, as well as the use of foreign policy as a means of fighting against racism and colonialism, did not mean Brazil's adherence to the Third World bloc. Quadros argued that Brazil's African policy would be a "modest reward" for Brazil's immense debt to African peoples. However, the power vacuum left by the colonial powers was seen as an opportunity for Brazil's projection towards the African continent.

In terms of foreign trade, the Quadros and Goulart governments opted to approach African governments directly. The main concern was to undo the image created in previous decades of unfair competition between African and Brazilian products in the ECM[5]. The new Africanist inclinations of Brazilian diplomacy received strong opposition. At the international level, the African policy of Quadros received the disapproval of Portugal, which considered it contradictory to Portuguese interests in Africa. Luso-Brazilian relations represented the first obstacle to his anti-colonialist policy. However, in the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations the ambiguity in the Brazilian discourse was strengthened. At first, the Brazilian delegation voted in favor of the project "Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Peoples and Countries" presented by Asian and African countries. On the other hand, Brazil voted against the resolution that requested Portugal to present social, economic, and political information about its colonies. Moreover, it

5 According to Penha (2011), Brazil sought to regulate its relations with Africa with the following initiatives: 1) the Brazilian request at the United Nations Assembly in 1961 and 1962 for a review of the institutional structure of international trade because it was unfair to developing countries. The discussions resulted in the First International Conference on Trade and Development (INCTAD) in Geneva (1964). 2) the signing of the International Coffee Agreement, implemented in 1963, to constitute a policy of controlling production and promoting exports at profitable prices.

was pointed out that Brazil has always argued that such Portuguese territories were not dependent, but provinces of a unitary state (Brasil 1960, 14-15).

Internally, the National Democratic Union (UDN) and the military did not support the IFP as they believed that African policy and dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe and Cuba meant an alignment with communist regimes. It is important to mention the role of the Portuguese *lobby* that questioned the Brazilian government when its attitudes were contradictory to Lisbon's interests, emphasizing the principles of the Luso-Brazilian community.

It is important to highlight the bilateral relations with South Africa during this period, since this country was a Brazilian trade partner. Pretoria, in turn, guided its relations with Brasília under a more political-strategic bias, since it sought support for its incorporation into the world system. According to Penna Filho (2010), Brasília-Pretoria relations had some practical implications for the Brazilian government. In the first place, it meant the expansion of Brazil's foreign trade at the time when the industrialization process began. Secondly, the relation with South Africa represented an opportunity for Brazil to project into a region of strategic importance. In the third place, this relation evidenced the filling of a void in the field of Brazil's foreign relations after its departure from Africa. However, the author highlights two events that were responsible for the cooling of relations between Brazil and South Africa: the illegal South African occupation of Southwest Africa (currently Namibia) and the regime of racial segregation. Brazil's was against the annexation of the territory of Southwest Africa, as it supported the independence of this colony alongside the United Nations.

The opportunity for Brazil to show the principles of the IFP at the United Nations occurred when the topic at hand was the Angolan issue. However, Brazil's ambiguity and difficulties in breaking with its commitments to Portugal were noticeable. The war for liberation in Angola worsened in the 1960s, gaining space in international discussions. In 1961, the conflict was brought to the United Nations by independent African countries. In July, Ghana announced the closure of ports and airports to Portuguese vessels and aircrafts. Senegal then announced the breaking of diplomatic relations with Portugal. In addition to the African countries, England and the USA also positioned themselves against Portugal. On the Brazilian side, when the issue was the Angolan problem, the country presented itself as a silent spectator, abstaining from voting in the United Nations. The ambiguous discourse of Afonso Arinos, who reproduced his support for Portugal to lead Angola's independence, stands out here. However, the vote in favor

of the Resolution 1.742 presented in the United Nations by initiative of 44 Afro-Asiatic countries, had the goal of creating institutions under the power of the Angolan people. This episode demonstrated the non-compliance with Portugal, as well as the vote for the gradual independence of Angola. Such actions by Arinos reflected the anti-colonialist values that guided the IFP but were questioned by the Senate.

The Government of João Goulart (1961-1964) sought to deepen the IFP through the multipolar route, trying to diplomatically articulate relations with small and medium powers. The stance in favor of African decolonization was understood, internally, as a means of expanding communism in the Brazilian territory, because the African independence movements were seen as products of this ideology. The IFP began to be questioned by the conservative and military sectors of Brazilian society, as well as receiving coercion from Portuguese diplomacy, and Brazil was going through a time of crisis, with the IFP gradually losing its effectiveness. Subsequently, the military coup in 1964 caused African politics and Third World discourse to be replaced by an ideological conception of combating the advance of communism.

From 1964 to 1985: from the "automatic alignment" to the "responsible pragmatism" that consolidated African policy

According to Rizzi (2014), African policy, in the first two military governments, took a more conservative pro-Portugal bias under a geopolitical view of relations with the continent; the following governments, especially from 1970 onwards, positioned Africa in Brazilian foreign policy, somewhat systematizing the future Brazilian presence in newly independent states. During this period, Brazil's African policy did not advance compared to the IFP period, but it did not mean an abandonment. Instead, political-economic cooperation was replaced by a geopolitical aspect followed by the associated liberalism of the Castello Branco government in the face of the struggle against the communist threat, which defined the new guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy from 1964 to 1969.

The Castello Branco government's Diplomacy of National Interest (1964-1967) was aimed at a rapprochement with the United States, invoking a discourse more linked to Portugal. According to Penha:

> The government [...] insisted on the idea that Brazilian policy towards Africa should take into account Brazil's traditional affection for Portugal and advocated the formation of an Afro-Brazilian community as a

"first window" to affirm Brazil's leadership in the South Atlantic (Penha 2011, 162).

The new conduct deepened the internal atmosphere in which African liberation movements seemed to be linked to communism, identifying South Africa as the only reliable partner. Thus, a triangular space was created in the Atlantic, where the three "free" and Western capitals (Brasília-Lisbon-Pretoria) built an alliance against the threat of communism in other African nations (Saraiva 1996).

According to Vizentini (2004a), African politics in the Castello Branco government was characterized by two impulses: first, a cordial greeting to Third World delegations in world forums; and the search for new markets. However, such impulses were annulled by Westernism and by commitments with the ex-metropolis, as Brazilian strategists feared the installation of communist regimes on the Atlantic coast of Africa. The solution adopted was to break the diplomatic discourse of the previous government, as well as to strengthen the link with Portugal, supporting Portuguese colonialism as the best way to prevent the establishment of communist regimes.

In this sense, the Castello Branco government's ambiguity towards Africa was in its condemnation of colonial rule, while unconditionally supporting the positions of the Salazar government and, on the other hand, in its condemnation of the *Apartheid* regime, while considering South Africa as the main economic partner in sub-Saharan Africa. However, according to Penha (2011), the explanation could be in the Brazilian posture of maintaining the ideological alignment with the USA. This ambiguity will gradually diminish as Brazil's influence in the South Atlantic increases[6].

The "Diplomacy of Prosperity" of the government of General Arthur da Costa e Silva (1967-1969) meant the gradual resumption of the subject of development and the adoption of a multipolar bias for diplomacy, in a perspective of South-South relations, previously evidenced in the IFP. African policy followed the economic and commercial interests of conquering new markets and supplying the national demand for oil. The consolidation of geopolitical perceptions is noticeable, since "[...] it was a matter of maintaining the Brazilian influence in the Atlantic by economic means and by a peaceful policy, without the direct interference of external powers and without the collective security pacts" (Saraiva 1996, 128-129).

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6 The 1st Brazilian trade mission to West Africa (1965) visited Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Côte D'Ivoire. In 1966, the 2nd mission covered South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Ghana, and Côte D'Ivoire.

The projection of Brazil was marked, in the government of General Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969-1974), by the new commercial partners, as a result of the consolidation of a new look towards Africa. Foreign policy was oriented towards the objectives of a new regional power, in which the South Atlantic was incorporated as a facilitating space for navigation, as well as a geostrategic environment for national development, because "[...] security issues were subordinated to those of development" (Saraiva 1996, 130).

It is worth noting that the Natal-Dakar distance was mentioned during the government as an aspect of easy communication with the African continent – the distance of 1,600 miles made it possible to build commercial maritime corridors, enabling exchange actions at lower costs. In addition, another strategic measure was the extension of the Brazilian territorial sea to the 200 nautical mile range in 1970. According to Saraiva (1996), the involvement of the African countries of the Atlantic coast in consenting to the decision of the Médici government was another purpose of this measure. In 1968, MRE Minister Magalhães Pinto announced that Brazilian society, as well as his government, repudiated the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa and around the world, and stressed that the government supported all efforts to combat racial discrimination in Africa. There is an important change of attitude, since the Castello Branco government had not spoken out on African issues.

In the world system, anti-colonialism was perceived in two ways: "[...] the metropolises preached that colonial countries should first develop to achieve independence, while the colonies argued that before development came independence" (Vizentini 2004a, 178). For Dávila (2010, 4), decolonization changed this scenario shaped by the African diaspora, besides having a significant impact on Brazilian thinking and its connections with the national development project. In its broadest sense, this transformed the Brazilian state's responses to the Cold War, creating a space for Brazilian diplomats to propose alternatives to the logic of an "iron curtain" dividing East and West. On the Brazilian side, there were frictions with Portugal, the USA, European colonial powers, and South Africa, which exercised a blockade on the development of Brazilian diplomacy for Africa. At the United Nations, Brasília voted with Lisbon on the question of overseas provinces, along with Washington, London, Madrid, and Pretoria.

However, Brazil preferred to adopt a silent stance. Nonetheless, Geisel and Delfim Neto, president of Petrobras and Finance Minister respectively, suggested Brazil's entry into the African continent through the Portuguese Overseas Provinces, taking a different path:

> To separate *metropolitan Portugal*, with whom the development of bilateral relations, cultural, and commercial exchanges, convention on rights and duties was sought, from *colonialist Portugal*, with whom Brazil should avoid political, military or commercial involvement, and who should be denied support for the theory of legal fiction of overseas provinces (Visentini 2004a, 179).

With the effects of the Brazil-Portugal relation, the Brazilian discourse was marked by the absence of the term "overseas provinces", with the use of such an expression being avoided in official documents and business plans. In addition, Brazil shied away from consulting Portugal on Angolan oil exploration, as well as opening up commercial networks between Angola and Mozambique. The trip (1972) under the leadership of Chancellor Mario Gibson Barboza was the target of Portuguese opposition and suffered internally from the divergence between the Ministry of Finance, whose desire was the approximation with the Portuguese colonies, and the Itamaraty, whose preference was directed to the independent countries[7].

Hence, the 1970s represented a deep projection of Brazil towards Africa, differing from previous years, in which the discourse was based on solidarity between peoples. At this moment, the continent started to represent the strategic-commercial space for the expansion of Brazilian products, as well as for the exchange of oil. With the two oil crises, in 1973 and 1979, according to Rizzi (2014, 83), this product was "the first responsible for the attraction that Africa exerted on Brazil, due to the Brazilian energy needs". That is why Brazil's maneuver was to get closer to new partners: Angola, Nigeria, Gabon, Congo, and Zaire. This is the key point of Brazil's African policy, national viability and international permissibility.

Trade with South Africa continued, but Brazil gradually positioned itself against *Apartheid*. Brazil-Portugal relations continued to be privileged when, in May 1973, Médici visited Portugal. However, the contradiction in Brazil's stance in international forums remained, while the country gradually systematized its position against colonialism and racism. This stance was perceived at the XXVI General Assembly of the United Nations, in 1972, where Brazil was in favor of the adoption of Resolution 2.278, whose purpose was to legitimately consider the liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde/Guiné-Bissau (Rizzi 2014).

President Ernesto Beckmann Geisel's "Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism" (1974-1979) launched the II National Development Plan,

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7 It covered Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Ghana, Togo, Daomé (Benin), Nigeria, Cameroon, Zaire, and Gabon.

deepening the process of industrialization through import substitution. The diversification of Brazil's international relations was solidified; with Chancellor Antônio Azeredo da Silveira, the subject of African decolonization was put on the agenda, as his management sought to "harmonize national interests" (Azeredo Da Silveira 1974a *apud* Rizzi 2014) with African countries. In 1974, Azeredo da Silveira exposed Brazil's new policy for Africa, based on three aspects:

> a) increased cooperation, in the South-South modality, for the benefit of mutual development; b) respect for the principles of sovereignty and self-determination of States and the economic independence of societies; c) rejection of colonialism and racial discrimination, with support for the independence of Namibia and the black majority government of Zimbabwe [...] and to the newly independent Portuguese States (Cervo and Bueno 2008, 422).

It is important to highlight, as a segment in the Brazil-Africa trade during the 1970s and 1980s, that the sale of Brazilian arms made Brazil the largest supplier of arms to the African continent, because both of the military production capacity that the country began to develop and of the denunciation of the 1977 Treaty of Friendship and Consultation with the USA (according to Penha, 2011). From 1974 on, when the Brazilian war industry advanced, it recognized spaces to export, whose main destinations were Nigeria (mainly), followed by Gabon, Morocco, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Zimbabwe. However, the problem generated was the supposed inconvenience for some sectors regarding the export of other industrial goods, but "[...] the truth is that the politicization of arms sales in the period was never proven, except later (1988), in the case of US pressure against the sale of one billion dollars in arms from Brazil to Libya" (Penha 2011, 173).

The desire to change the country's position in the hierarchy of the world system led to replacing the ideology of "communist danger" and "Western security" with a strategy of rapprochement with Africa, since the continent was incorporated in the "renegotiation of Brazil's dependence" on the world economy, especially with regard to the USA. Thus, it can be seen that Brazil's projection onto the South Atlantic, through African politics, did not foster the ideological struggle against communism, but rather fed the conquest of future markets (Saraiva 1996).

The Portuguese ideological discourse of "civilizing mission" and "lusotropicalism" continued with the replacement of Salazar by Marcelo Caetano in 1968. However, the Carnation Revolution in April 1974 represented

the end of that "mission" and its greatest result was the independence of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. Furthermore, "the ambiguous position that for more than 20 years brought Brazil closer and further removed it from Africa, in an oscillating policy, was closed" (Rizzi 2014, 84).

Although in November 1973 Brazil was the only Third World country that did not vote for Bissau-Guinean independence at the UN, on July 16, 1974 Brazil finally recognized the independence of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, unilaterally declared in September 1973. The year 1975 was marked by great changes: Brazil installed a Special Representation in Luanda in March and officialized another one in Maputo – which ended up not opening; on June 25, Mozambique proclaimed its independence[8]; Cape Verde, on July 5; São Tomé e Princípe, on July 12. Subsequently, the country was the first to recognize the independence of the People's Republic of Angola under the government of the Movement for the Liberation of Angola on November 11, 1975. According to Rizzi (2014, 85), "... this prestige towards the independence of all the PALOP (Portuguese-speaking African countries) countries must be interpreted as part of the Brazilian strategy to place itself as a bridge country between the interests of the First and Third World". For Penha (2011), the recognition of the Marxist governments of Angola and Mozambique meant a rupture of the ideological conception that led foreign policy to the South Atlantic and Africa, and in so being, the beginning of a new stage of African politics. After these recognitions, President Geisel and Itamaraty were criticized by the press, civil society, public opinion, and the military. This posture not only influenced Brazil's African politics, but also had positive consequences on the relations with the Third World, in addition to the country's disengagement from the image of support for Portuguese colonialism and consolidating its African policy.

The African policy of the João Baptista Figueiredo Government (1979-1985) continued the bases of the Geisel administration. According to Cervo and Bueno (2008), on the one hand, Africa represented an alternative to protectionism and customs barriers by rich countries and their exports, and, on the other hand, Brazil meant for Africa a new source for the supply of goods and services, replacing its independence from former metropolises. Figueiredo was the first Brazilian president to visit Africa between November 14 and 21, 1983 (Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Algeria).

In this context, African policy was consolidated during the government of Figueiredo, systematizing a "pioneerism-reciprocity-respect" (Saraiva Guerreiro *apud* Rizzi 2014), with a preferential look at the Portuguese-spe-

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8 Brazil was not invited to participate in the Mozambican independence party.

aking countries, without neglecting the other African regions. It should be noted that during this period, economic and cooperation relations intensified. The 1980s were characterized by changes in the world system and in the internal sphere; in fact, Chancellor Ramiro Saraiva endeavored to maintain Brazil's autonomy through a universalist foreign policy, upholding the principles of Responsible Pragmatism.

Despite the effects of the "lost decade" and of the war in Southern Africa, Brazil's African policies followed a line of action in the political, economic, and cultural fields, with emphasis on the rapprochement with Angola and on criticism of *Apartheid*. It is interesting to clarify that economic cooperation with African oil-exporting partners has taken place through the expedient of countertrade, since this method is preferred when there is a shortage of foreign exchange and surpluses in goods and services between trading partners.

The relationship between Brasília and Pretoria, in the 1970s, was characterized by distance and, in the 1980s, by a near freeze. According to Penna Filho (2011), some factors explain it: the first is due to the end of the contradiction of the African policy of Brazil after the Portuguese decolonization that leveraged decision making; the second, the criticism of the international community against the *Apartheid* regime, especially the Afro-Asian countries; the third, the diversification of trade partners in the 1970s. It is agreed that the proximity with Pretoria was "based on a strategic calculation of commercial and economic relations", becoming a "conscious pragmatism" (Penna Filho 2001, 81).

The impulse of the relations with Africa, legitimized by cultural ties, allowed the conquest of new markets, since the continent was primordial for the national development project, given the category of lesser relative development of the African countries. In addition, it led to the emergence of technical partnerships[9] that engaged in technology transfer, human resources training and the possibility of providing Brazil with primary products. It is worth mentioning the opening of African countries to the entry of Brazilian companies providing services, especially those focused on the construction of public works and infrastructure, as well as oil exploration (Santana 2003).

As it has been shown, since 1974, there had no longer been any way to sustain an ambiguous policy that tried to sustain sentimental ties with Portugal and the attempt to further approach African peoples. The oil crises, the Carnation Revolution in Portugal and its consequences on Brasília-Lis-

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9 Brazil started to sign general cooperation agreements with all the PALOP countries and most of the African countries from then on.

bon relations, the changes that occurred in the world system, as well as the effectiveness of Geisel's method of "ecumenical and responsible pragmatism" provided Brazil with a more active and autonomous change of position on the African continent.

Conclusions

It was sought to verify that the ambiguity between the Brazilian political discourse and foreign practice towards the Portuguese colonies between 1961 and 1985 was evident in the official political alignment between Portugal and Brazil, due to the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation, of 1953. After the application of the hypothetical-deductive method and the analyses, the research question was corroborated and it was concluded that the aspects that exerted influence on the definition of African policy in Brazil were the 1953 Treaty and the relations with South Africa. In this point there is agreement with Saraiva, when he points out that Brazil initially had two African policies: on the one hand, there was the "general policy of rapprochement" to the continent, whose strand was based on political solidarity to decolonization, and, on the other hand, there was the "policy of admissibility of the continuation of colonialism in the case of the Portuguese colonies in Africa" (Saraiva 1996, 88). Brazilian support for Portuguese colonialism has established an initial blockade since the 1950s to consolidate its African policy, which is forming as the African agenda progressively increases Brazil's foreign agenda (politics and trade).

In addition, we agree with Penna Filho (2010), who identifies that the two obstacles to the development of African policy were Brazil's support for Portuguese colonialism, already commented, and relations with South Africa, due to its policy of racial segregation: both Portugal and South Africa were not accepted by most African states, resulting, thus, in a difficulty in bringing Brazil closer to African governments. As it turned out, only with the end of the Portuguese decolonization process in the 1970s, Brazil was projected to Africa under a pragmatic and autonomous bias. The permissible international conjuncture of the first half of the 1970s and the national viability allowed the country to finish the ambiguity at the time when the independence of the Portuguese colonies in Africa officially occurred. In addition, it is also understood that African policy is consolidated precisely at a time when the political-strategic aspects of Africa and the South Atlantic are fully incorporated into Brazilian foreign policy, in a two-way, complex process.

The consolidation of Africa in the Brazilian foreign policy agenda in the 1970s and 1980s was the result of the ideological rupture, which began to have less and less weight in Brazil's international projection, and of the internal and international possibilities, caused by the oil crisis of 1973. This period represented a deep projection of Brazil towards Africa, differing from previous years, in which the discourse was based on solidarity between peoples. Until the end of the Military Regime, the African continent began to represent a strategic-commercial space for the expansion of Brazilian products, shaping the African policy of Brazil.

Therefore, it is understood that this ambiguity between the discourse and practice of Brazilian foreign policy resulted in the formation of a specific profile of African policy, in which Portugal and the PALOP countries and South Africa continue to play a leading role, for the reasons previously identified. Then, as a result of African policy, in the 1980s, Brazil assertively projected itself into the South Atlantic, aiming to make this area a zone free of bipolar tensions, by the autonomous mechanism without the interference of the great powers, with the creation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) in conjunction with neighboring countries. This Brazilian proposal at the United Nations General Assembly revealed the importance that Brazil attached to newly independent African countries and South American neighbors. It is also observed that Brazilian foreign policy for the South Atlantic was mapped by geostrategic tones, since it ensured a multilateral cooperation space where the flow of energy products became vital to Brazilian interests. Thus, Brazil's African policy is the result of internal possibilities combined with the challenges of the world system, leading to a permanent agenda for Brazilian foreign policy and more consistent and pragmatic decision-making, which has been maintained with moments of progress and setbacks since then.

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ABSTRACT

The objective of the article is to analyze the ambiguity between the political discou-
rse and the Brazilian external practice in relation to the Portuguese colonies in the
period between the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation with Portugal, through the
Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) and the Military Regime (total period 1953 to 1985).
Methodologically, the research uses the quantitative-qualitative approach applying
the hypothetical-deductive method, while it is classified as descriptive-explanatory
regarding the objectives. In relation to the procedures, the bibliographic revision,
the documentary analysis of primary, secondary and press sources was used. It is a
generative question that Brazilian support for Portuguese colonialism established
an initial blockade to consolidate its African policy, which will gradually form as
the African agenda increases in the political and commercial agenda of Brazil in
the 1970s. It is preliminarily identified that the Brazilian support to the Portuguese
colonialism established an initial blockade to consolidate its African policy, that is
being formed as the African agenda progressively increases in the external agenda
of Brazil (political and commercial) in the decade 1970.

ECONOMY OF THE THIRD WORLD AND SEARCH FOR GREENER PASTURES IN THE DESERT: FOCUS ON NIGERIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS

Emmanuel Osewe Akubor[1]

The Desert before the "Desert": A Historical Definition

Available historical accounts as documented by scholars, opines that this area presently described as Desert has not always been so, as before now it was an area with beehive of economic activities (KENNY J., 2000). As such, there was a great influx of both human and economics goods in and around the area (KWANASHIE *et al.*, 1987). The resultant effect was that by about 700 CE the Kanem Empire began to form in what is now Chad and Libya. This empire was to later absorb other tribes and peoples of northern Nigeria and trade and diplomatic exchange took place in the area.

The majority of the early Hausa states held a strategic geographic location at the southern end of the trans-Saharan route between Tripoli and Lake Chad. This trade route, which originated in prehistoric times and was flourishing in the 8th century, linked the Mediterranean countries to the resources of Sub-Saharan Africa. Trade goods included ivory and slaves (KENNY J., 2000), for example while Ayandele argued that the Yoruba area got good supplies of horses used by the royalties for both warfare and prestige before the 19th century (AYANDELE, E., 1979). Usman opined that Kano (nowadays, a Nigerian city) was particularly noted to supply what is today known as Moroccan leather to larger part of North Africa (Morocco and Tripoli), a trade, which only declined after the railway reached Kano in 1912 (USMAN MOHAMMED, 2013). The North African traders, primarily Berbers and Arabs, not only brought trade goods, but also the Islamic religion. In 1085, Hummay, a Muslim noble, removed King Selma, the last Duguwa king, from power and established the Sefuwa (also called Sayfawa) dynasty.

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The Sefuwa dynasty brought great changes to the Kanem Empire, especially in the area of Islamic culture and civilization.

The import of the above is that this introduction of Islamic culture and civilization led to migration from both sides creating a sort of smooth relationship between the new migrants and their Hausa host (this does not in any way point to the complete absence of conflict, as there were cases of warfare and hostility, but Islam as a religion became a unifying factor) and the fate of the people that were pushed further southwards into the central Nigeria area like the Gwari and others that may have followed them. For those that accepted the dominance of the Sayfawa groups, historians have argued that they were drawn into a network of diplomatic exchanges and relationships, which were made with sultan in North Africa, moreover, during the reign of Mai Dunama Dabbalemi (1221-1259) especially in the area of pilgrimage and spread of Islam.

Thus from the reign of Mai Dunama Dabbalemi (1221-1259) down to the present day Nigeria, the area has remained a bee hive of activities especially as it relates to movement of economic goods and services which has continually benefitted the people of both countries. For example, Ayandele (1979) opined that few people realize that in the 18th Century the natron used by the Efik came largely from the Chad Basin; that the Yoruba obtained their horses from Tripoli through Kanuri intermediaries long before the 19th century; that, as slaves, a large number of Hausa were an economic asset to the Yoruba.   In line with Ayandele's view, Gavin, R and Oyemakinde W, (1989) wrote, that Nigeria acquire rare commodity such as natron or potash cut in slab on the northern edge of Lake Chad. The scholars posited that strings of natron bearing donkeys from the Lake Chad area dotted all the major routes in the north especially from Kano southward to the Niger at Bussa where it met another major rote from Brno along the Benue and thence to Yoruba land or west to Gonja in Ghana. In a more detailed and analytical manner, Watts (1983 cited in Mohammed-Baba, T.A, 1989), graphical described the relationship thus:

> The northern savanna and the Sahelian biome constituted a human ecological unity in which the affairs of Hausa agriculturalists and semi sedentary Fulani pastoralists were closely integrated with pastoral Wodaabe, Tuareg and other nomadic groups to the north. These partial linkages were embodied in the strong currents of exchange bridging the two regions – the desert culture providing salt, natrons, date and livestock' and the savanna providing the cloth, foodstuff and

crafts products which conferred a measure of security in the face of climate variation.

The import of the above is that there has been a sort of symbiotic relationship and exchange of goods, services and idea over time across the region, a mark of traditional diplomatic relations and good neighborliness. This is particularly noticeable in the Northern part of Nigeria, where governments of most of the countries around and along the desert areas have continually maintained diplomatic contact. A good example is the case of Libya government uptill the last 2010's which apart from educational exchange had massively funded the construction of Mosques and other Islamic Centers of worship in Kano and other cities of the North. The government particularly under Gaddafi had embarked on several humanitarian donations and visits to Kano and these other Northern states, most times unannounced, after which he would journey back to his country (KINGSLEY, 2011).

The Desert and the Young Nigerians: Establishing the Cause

Scholars have argued that for better understanding of the new relationship existing between the desert and the young Nigerian in post-colonial Africa, we must be able to view it from two angles; viz the romance with the desert caused as a result on lack of better opportunities and the second as caused by wars and conflict (AKUBOR, 2017). Yaro J. (2008) presented the two situations thus; for the period between the early sixties and early seventies, he wrote:

> The deteriorating socio-economic conditions and deepening poverty in the late sixties and early seventies propelled a wide variety of migration configurations. Macro-economic adjustment measures and a huge increase in the number of entrants into the labour market have fuelled a job crisis, creating a sustained pressure for emigration. A significant amount of brain circulation takes place between Ghana, Gambia and Nigeria; Togo and Cote d'lvoire; Burkina Faso, Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire. Since the l970's, highly skilled migrants, including doctors, paramedical personnel, nurses, teachers, lecturers, engineers, scientists and technologists moved from Ghana first to Nigeria and later to other African countries, Europe and North America, attracted by relatively higher salaries and better prospects of living conditions. Many students also remained behind at the end

of their training as political, economic and social conditions at home deteriorated.

The second stage from the 1980s, according to the scholar witnessed mass movement of human out of Africa, as conditions within the continent became even more unbearable to a larger percentage of the continent's population especially as it relates to war, arms conflict, refugee problems and lack of better opportunity. This in the scholar's opinion adversely affected the development of the continent. The scholar presented his argument thus:

> Since the late eighties, traditional labour importing, richer countries in the sub-region (Cote d'Ivoire) and hitherto attractive destinations for migrants (Nigeria) have experienced political and economic crises, which also spur out-migration of their nationals. Until the early 1980's, few Nigerian professionals emigrated because domestic working conditions were attractive and internationally competitive. The collapse of oil price, a sharp decline in oil revenue, rapid deterioration in living and working conditions, wage freeze, devalued national currency, declining real incomes, authoritarian military rule and the vacillating economic situation fuelled large-scale emigration of skilled and unskilled workers abroad. Post-apartheid South Africa also attracted highly skilled professionals from Nigeria and Ghana to staff the universities and other sectors and tradesmen from Senegal and Mali including street vendors and small traders from Sierra Leone.

Apart from the above, the economy back home has continued to deteriorate, while the purchasing power of the naira continuously depreciate. Analysts have argued that this is part of the impact of neoliberal policies, which have reduced the value of the national currency of the third world counties (Nigeria inclusive). Some of these includes Nigeria's over dependence on importation without proportional export and industrialization, politics of price of crude oil in the international market and smuggling across the nation's borders (MATHEW, 2006). The result is that pressure is now mounted on the young Nigerians by most parents to travel oversea, where they believe there is dollar rain. This can be better understood when seen in the light of the table below.

Table 1: Naira to Dollar Exchange Rate History

s/no	Period	US Dollar	Naira equivalent	Black Market Rate	s/no	Period	US Dollar	Naira equivalent	Black Market Rate
1	1972	$1	N0.658	-	24	1995	$1	N21.89	N71.70
2	1973	$1	N0.658	-	25	1996	$1	N21.89	N84.58
3	1974	$1	N0.63	-	26	1997	$1	N21.89	N84.58
4	1975	$1	N0.616	-	27	1998	$1	N21.89	N84.70
5	1976	$1	N0.62	-	28	1999	$1	N21.89	N88-N90
6	1977	$1	N0.647	-	29	2000	$1	N85.98	N105.00
7	1978	$1	N0.606	-	30	2001	$1	N99-N106	N104-N122
8	1979	$1	N0.596	-	31	2002	$1	N109-N113	N122-N140
9	1980	$1	N0.550	N0.900	32	2003	$1	N114-N127	N135-N137
10	1981	$1	N0.61	-	33	2004	$1	N127-N130	N137-N144
11	1982	$1	N0.673	-	34	2005	$1	N132-N136	-
12	1983	$1	N0.724	-	35	2006	$1	N128.50-N131.80	-
13	1984	$1	N0.765	-	36	2007	$1	N120-N125	-
14	1985	$1	N0.894	N1.70	37	2008	$1	N115.50-N120	-
15	1986	$1	N2.02	N3.90	38	2009	$1	N145-N171	-
16	1987	$1	N4.02	N5.90	39	2010	$1	N148.21-N154.8	-
17	1988	$1	N4.54	N6.70	40	2011	$1	N151.05-N165.1	-
18	1989	$1	N7.39	N10.70	41	2012	$1	N155.09-N161.5	-
19	1990	$1	N7.39	N10.70	42	2013	$1	N153.21-N162.9	-
20	1991	$1	N8.04	N9.30	43	2014	$1	N170-N199	-
21	1992	$1	N9.91	-	44	2015	$1	N199-N300	-
22	1993	$1	N17.30	N21.90	45	2016	$1	N300-N320	N310-N370
23	1994	$1	N22.33	N56.80	46	2017	$1	N360	-

Source: MATHEW, Womack Ryan "The Emergence of Neoliberalism and Free Trade in the Developing World" (2006), University of Tennessee Honors Thesis Projects. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonopio/1030

Unemployment, Frustration and the Young Nigerians

In his analysis of the unemployment situation in Nigeria, Nasir El Rufai (2010), posited that at present, Nigeria has about 90 million people who are willing and able to work, but about 70 million of them have no gainful

employment. But when the 4.7million people captured in the formal sector in the latest statistics from the Pensions Commission is increased by the 3 to 4 times standard multiplier to capture those in the informal sector, it means that only about 20 million Nigerians have jobs, out of a population of 162 million. This simple fact causes the country a loss of about N2 trillion annually from the absence of commercial activities that ordinarily should have taken place but did not. He argued further thus:

> The most despairing aspect is the fact that the worst affected are Nigerians between the ages of 21 and 40 years – the future leaders of our country. In 1963, our population was about 56 million, a large percentage of which was employed. The employment to population ratio grew until the early 1980s when it started to decline. Officially, the unemployment rate is 19.7 percent. This means that at least 18 million Nigerians have no jobs and cannot meet their responsibilities. The effects of unemployment on the person and the country can be catastrophic. At current rates, even if government policies, enabling environment and direct efforts manage to create 1 million new jobs a year, it would take 18 years to close the existing job gap. Except that by that time, at least 54 million more Nigerians would have joined the workforce....As at 1996, 2.8 million job seekers entered the Nigerian labour market annually, but only about 10 percent of them found employment. Perhaps, today's figures are too scary for government to release, but unemployment is too critical for government to play political ostrich with. The average years of studies and Return on Investment (ROI) for a university degree in Nigeria are both 5 years, yet it takes an average Nigerian graduate an average of another five years to find what can be considered a stable job. Many others, especially those without 'godfathers' remain for longer periods without jobs no matter how qualified they may be. Not only are large numbers of Nigerian graduates unemployed or underemployed; many are unable to apply the skills learnt in school. There are also large segments of the employed population who are simply wasting away, doing things they really have no business doing – just to remain alive.

The above position is made clearer by the statistics released by Akinyosoye, Vincent (2011) and National Bureau of Statistics, in which it argued that unemployment rates in 16 states, including the Federal Capital Territory, are higher than the 19.7% national average. The analysis indicated that Bayelsa State has the highest composite unemployment rate of 38.4%, followed by Katsina State, whose rate stands at 37.3%. Other states with higher-than-average unemployment rates, according to the survey, are Bauchi State (37.2%), Akwa Ibom State (34.1%), Gombe State (32.1%), Adamawa State (29.4%), Rivers State (27.9%), Borno State (27.7%) and Kano State (27.6%). Yobe, Taraba, Jigawa,

Sokoto, Imo and Ekiti states' unemployment rates stood at 27.3%, 26.8%, 26.5%, 24.4%, 20.8% and 20.6%, respectively.

At the end of 2016, it was reported that the young Nigerians are fast becoming frustrated. Specifically, Peter Osalor (2016) noted thus:

> On Employment, 4.58 million Nigerians have become jobless since last year (2015), adding 2.6 million to unemployment figures of 1.46 million recorded in the third quarter of 2015 and 518.102 in the fourth quarter of 2015. According to reports during the reference period, the unemployed in the labour force increased by 1,158,700 persons, resulting in an increase in the national unemployment rate to 13.3% in Q2 2016 from 12.1 in 2016, 10.4% in 2015 from 9.9% in Q3 2015 and from 8.2% in Q2 2015.

On labour productivity, it continued thus:

> ...Q2 showed that investment in the economy was low in terms of volume of private investment and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), compared to the previous year. The unemployment rate rose by 12.2% over the previous quarter and slowed productivity as recorded by GDP, NBS reported. As should be expected with the development, job creation both private and public sector recorded negative figure of -4,288 for the fourth quarter of 2015 and has continued up till the Q2 of 2016. Nigeria Gross Domestic Product (GDP) report of Q2 2016 showed decline by -2.06% (year-on-year) in real terms. This was lower by 1.70% point from growth rate of -0.36% recorded in the preceding quarter.

The NBS report also showed that Nigeria Capital Importation for Q2 2016 has a total volume of capital imported into the country to be $647.1 million, which represented a fall of 8.98% relative to the Q1 and a fall of 75.73% relative to Q2, 2015. The report also revealed that unemployment in Q2 stood at 13.3%, underemployment 19.3% and youth unemployment 49.5%. This means that a country of about 170 million with youth population put at half of this number, unemployment is really a time bomb.

The situation did not in any way show sign of improvement as at the end of 2017, remaining gloomy and the people getting even more frustrated. This is clear from the statistics as reeled out by the National Bureau of Statistics which pointed out that between January and September 2017, a total number of 4.07 million Nigerians became unemployed. According to the bureau, the number of Nigerians that became unemployed rose from 11.92 million in the first quarter of 2017 to 13.58 million and 15.99 million

in the second and third quarters respectively. It also reported that between the second quarter and third quarter, the number of economically active or working age population (15-64 years of age) increased from 110.3 million to 111.1 million. The NBS report said the increasing unemployment and underemployment rates imply that although Nigeria's economy is officially out of recession, domestic labor market is still fragile and economic growths in the past two quarters in 2017 have not been strong enough to provide employment in Nigeria's domestic labor market.

It reads in part,

> The labor force population increased from 83.9 million in Q2 2017 to 85.1 million in Q3 2017. The total number of people in full-time employment (at least 40 hours a week) declined from 52.7 million in Q2 2017 to 51.1 million in Q3 2017. The unemployment rate increased from 14.2 percent in Q4 2016 to 16.2 percent in Q2 2017 and 18.8 percent in Q3 2017. The number of people within the labor force who are unemployed or underemployed increased from 13.6 million and 17.7 million respectively in Q2 2017, to 15.9 million and 18.0 million in Q3 2017. Total unemployment and underemployment combined increased from 37.2 per cent in the previous quarter to 40 per cent in Q3 2017.[...] During the third quarter of this year, 21.2 percent of women within the labor force that were between the ages of 15 years and 64 years and willing, able, and actively seeking work were unemployed, compared with 16.5 percent of men within the same period.

Furthermore, the NBS noted in the report that in the third quarter of 2018, 16.4 percent of rural and 23.4 percent of urban dwellers within the labor force were unemployed. It added that the rate of unemployment is increasing at a slightly faster rate for dwellers than it was for their rural counterparts.

The tables below gives a graphics picture of the sordid situation.

Table II: National Unemployment Rates (2000-2009)

Year	Rates	Year	Rates
2000	13.1	2005	11.9
2001	13.6	2006	12.3
2002	12.6	2007	12.7
2003	14.8	2008	14.9
2004	13.4	2009	19.7

Source: http://punchng.com/four-million-nigerians-became-jobless-this-year-nbs/

Table III: Unemployment Rates in Nigeria by State, March 2009

S/N	State	% Unemploy-ment (in declining order)	S/N	State	% Unemploy-ment (in declining order)	S/N	State	% Unemploy-ment (in declining order)
1	Bayelsa	38.4	13	Sokoto	22.4	26	Zamfara	13.3
2	Katsina State,	37.3	14	FCT	21.5	27	Osun	12.6
3	Bauchi	37.2	15	Imo	20.8	28	Edo	12.2
4	Akwa Ibom State	34.1	16	Ekiti	20.6	29	Ebonyi	12.0
5	Gombe State	32.1	17	Lagos	19.5	30	Kebbi	12.0
6	Adamawa State	29.4	18	Kogi	19.0	31	Niger	11.93
7	Rivers	27.9	19	Delta	18.4	32	Kaduna	11.6
8	Borno	27.7	20	Anambra	16.8	33	Kwara	11.0
9	Kano	27.6	21	Enugu	14.9	34	Nassa-rawa	10.1
10	Yobe	27.3	22	Ondo	14.9	35	Benue	8.5
11	Taraba	26.8	23	Oyo	14.9	36	Ogun	8.5
12	Jigawa	26.5	24	Abia	14.5	37	Plateau	7.1
			25	Cross--River	14.3			

Source: Akubor, E. Osewe (2017), Attaining Millennium Development Goals in the Midst of Corruption in Nigeria: Reality or Fiction? Ibadan Dominican Studies, Vol. 3, Dominican Institute Ibadan, January 2017, Pp. 175-200

From the above statistics, it should be clear that it will take patriotism on the part of those affected to remain in the country. Thus, it was therefore not surprising to observers that Nigerian women and girls were from the later

1990's taken to Europe, especially to Italy and Russia, and to the Middle East and North Africa, for forced prostitution. Due to desperation on the part of the victims and the quest to make money by the Traffickers, the victims were moved to Europe by caravan, forcing them to cross the desert on foot, and subjecting them to forced prostitution to repay heavy debts for travel expenses. During the reporting period, Nigerian girls were repatriated from Libya and Morocco, where they were reportedly held captive in the commercial sex trade. In 2010, Hon. Mathew Egbadon, then speaker of the Edo state House of Assembly made it public that he got a letter from the Nigerian ambassador to Italy stating that out of about 10,000 prostitutes in that country, 80 percent of them were from Edo State (NIGERIA, 2010).

The Desert Economy and Encouraging Factor: The Libyan Example

Apart from the fact that historically a sort of traditional trade route had existed from the northern part of the country through Agadez to Libya, the young frustrated Nigerians are often encouraged by the fact that the situation in Libya as well as Libyan economy offers far encouraging situation than what is obtainable in Nigeria, and is such that they could cope with while waiting to cross to Europe. As such, the first camp while on transit is Libya. To some others, of all routes, it is the cheapest[2]. While the Nigerian economy seems to be experiencing downwards trend, the desert as exemplified by Libya from 1977 onward, per capita income in the country rose to more than US$ 11,000, the fifth-highest in Africa[3]. The Human Development Index became the highest in Africa and greater than that of Saudi Arabia. This was achieved without borrowing any foreign loans, keeping Libya debt-free (AZAD, 2011). In addition, the country's literacy rate rose from 10% to 90%, life expectancy rose from 57 to 77 years, employment opportunities were established for migrant workers, and welfare systems were introduced that allowed access to free education, free healthcare, and financial assistance for housing. The Great Manmade River was also built to allow free access to fresh water across large parts of the country (ZIMBABWE, 2011). In addition,

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2 This information was obtained from one of my informant who made the journey through the desert on three occasions. He is Moses Iyoha, a Nigerian, from Edo state. Interview was conducted at Igueben village, Edo state, Nigeria, 22/6/2014.

3 African Countries by GDP Per Capita > GDP Per Capita (most recent) by Country". NationMaster. Retrieved 24 July 2011

financial support was provided for university scholarships and employment programs (SHIMATSU, 2011).

The country under the leadership of Gaddafi doubled the minimum wage, introduced statutory price controls, and implemented compulsory rent reductions of between 30 and 40%. Gaddafi also wanted to combat the strict social restrictions that had been imposed on women by the previous regime, establishing the Revolutionary Women's Formation to encourage reform. In 1970, a law was introduced affirming equality of the sexes and insisting on wage parity. In 1971, Gaddafi sponsored the creation of a Libyan General Women's Federation. In 1972, a law was passed criminalizing the marriage of any females under the age of sixteen and ensuring that a woman's consent was a necessary prerequisite for a marriage (BEARMAN, 1986).

Generally, a summary survey of the government of government welfare program shows that uptill the late 2000's, it was channeled for the welfare of the people. This is how some analysts have accessed the case of Libya *vis a vis* Nigeria:

- A portion of Libyan oil sale is, credited directly to the bank accounts of all Libyan citizens
- There was no interest on loans, banks in Libya are state-owned and loans given to all its citizens at 0% interest by law
- There was no electricity bill in Libya; electricity was free for all its citizens
- Education and medical treatments are free in Libya. Before Gaddafi, only 25% of Libyans were literate. Today the figure is 83%
- Should Libyans want to take up farming career, they would receive farm land, a farm house, equipments, seeds and livestock to kick-start their farms – all for free
- If Libyans cannot find the education or medical facilities they need in Libya, the government fund them to go abroad for it – not only free but they get US$2,300/MTh accommodation and car allowance
- In Libyan, if a Libyan buys a car, the government subsidizes 50% of the price
- The price of petrol in Libya is $0.14 (N22) per litre
- Libya has no external debt and its reserves amount to $150 billion – now frozen globally

- If a Libyan were unable to get employment after graduation, the state would pay the average salary of the profession as if he or she is employed until employment is found.
- Late Gaddafi carried out the world's largest irrigation project, known as the Great Man-Made River project, to make water readily available throughout the desert country (OSEWE, 2012).

Adventure or the Route of the Valley of the Shadow of Death: Interrogating the Course

Generally it has been established unemployment and poverty in Nigeria has led to a situation in which young Nigerians and their counterparts from other African countries see Europe as heaven, and the desert through Libya as the Gateway and as such those in this categories who are mostly youth are ready to do anything to get to get out of Africa. For example, in the third quarter of 2014 there was an estimated 128,725 illegal immigrants on its territory. Most of these end up as asylum seekers. According to available statistics, the number of asylum seekers could surge to 700,000 (+28%); this is just as the number of illegal entries into Europe could rise beyond the 276,113 in 2014 (60,000 of whom via the sea)[4]. The detected flow of illegal immigrants has never been as high as in 2014, up by 170% in comparison with 2013. It is due to surge again in 2015 in which the first two months recorded an increase of over 200% in comparison with 2014. According to statistics, since 1988 nearly 20,000 people have died on the external borders of the European Union. In 2014, the number of victims rose beyond 3,500. Statistics also shows that 90% of illegal migrants have taken the maritime route across the Mediterranean. Identified illegal immigration has grown eight-fold in Italy, it has doubled in Greece and has upped by 50% on the Spanish borders. In 2011, which was already an exceptional year, the migratory phenomenon found its explanation mainly in the economic situation in certain countries bordering the Southern Europe shores[5].

Scholars have identified three major route through which Nigerians and other young Africans in general leave the continent through the desert.

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4 This is contained in the document of Pan Africa Initiative Against Irregular And Dangerous Migration (PAIIDAM), an Initiative of Senator Shehu Sani presented to the Nigerian Immigration Service. Abuja, Nigeria, 2016

5 Ibid

The first notable and notorious route is the central Mediterranean link associated with Libya, Italy, Malta and Tunisia. These according to research have since 2013 become the main path by which illegal immigrants set off towards Europe. The notoriety of this route is seen in the figures mainly from Italy, which are spiraling. According to this, the number of castaways rescued in 2014 rose to over 170,000, 30,000 of whom were aided by coast guards as well as merchant ships and 70,000 by the Mare Nostrum operation, launched by the Italian government on 18th October 2013 after the drama of Lampedusa. The number of illegal border crossings observed totaled 134, 272 between January and September 2014, in other words six times the 2013 figure and twice that during the Arab Spring. Migrants still come from Sahel, mainly from Libya (90%), now a transit country, and also from Syria via Egypt (5%) where the refugee situation is precarious.

The second and well-known route is the Morocco, Senegal, and Sahara. From this point, most migrants target Portugal and Spain. It remains however that there has been a further rise in immigration bids via the sea (6,131 interceptions between January and September 2014), since the narrow Gibraltar Strait makes it easy to use boats of any size. "Group" crossing on borders of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco are increasingly spectacular.

It is on record that the number of wreckages leading to losses of life is on the increase, for example it is on record that in 2014 alone there were number of shipwrecks carrying illegal immigrants and the actives of patrol team led to the rescue of over 40,000 during this period. In 2014 in the Mediterranean, there were over 15,000 rescue operations at sea[6].

Specifically during this period, The Nigerian area in particular and the West African territory in general fast became notorious from irregular and dangerous migration especially among her youths. Available data on the volume of migrants making use of the western and central routes are derived from Agadez trail running from the Nigerien city to Algeria. Statistics shows that more than 5,000 West Africans left Agadez to travel to North Africa each month between March and August 2013. In addition, it is estimated that half of all West African migrants who arrived in Lampedusa in 2013 passed through Agadez. It has also been established that the cost of migration along this routes vary depending on the point of departure and destination. The journey from Agadez to the Libyan Coastline cost between USD 2000-3000. The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime states that the "full packet solution" through this route cost USD 10,000

6 Ibid

or more and is often payable in various installments by the families of the migrants when they have proof that their loved ones have reached a specific destination. Also study found that the route from Agadez to Sabha in Libya cost approximately USD 100-300 and the more dangerous desert crossing from Agadez to Tamanrasset in Algeria cost between USD 50-300. Within Libya in 2011, it was reported that migrants paid around USD 800 to be taken from southern town of Sabha to northern Tripoli.

The third is associated with Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania, which presently serves as the most important routes (this is not directly relevant to our discourse, but it is worth mentioning as it has also become route through which frustrated young Nigerians and their colleagues from other neighbouring African states , escape harsh economic conditions). It is on record that until 2012, this constituted the main illegal immigration route counting for nearly half of migrants. It is estimated that since 2000 nearly 3 million immigrants have entered Europe illegally via Greece.

From Freedom to Slavery: Examining the Cartel and the Cost

From the point of history, it is important to note that the sale and use of Black Africans as slaves in the desert is not new as has been pointed out at the opening part of the paper. Even though the slave trade was officially abolished in Tripoli in 1853, in practice it continued until the 1890s and even beyond (MCLACHLAN, 1978). The Tuareg and others who are indigenous to Libya facilitated, taxed and partly organized the trade from the south along the trans-Saharan trade routes. In the 1830's – a period of time when slave trade flourished – Ghadames was handling 2500 slaves a year. Black slaves have also been part of the trade article from time and, therefore, part of the reason Abdullahi Danfodio, the brother of the 19th Century Fulani Jihadist had to abandon the course. Hodgkin particularly noted that Abdullahi was disappointed in his brothers constant capture of black slave which he traded to North Africans even though he claimed his course was for the liberation of the people (HODGKINS, 1960). Then, while the people travelled with the intention of seeking greener pastures, a large chunk of their hosts were already waiting to take them how slaves for domestic works (house chores) farm work and digger[7]. It has been established that apart from the direct sale

7 CNN Exclusive Report: People for Sale: Where lives are auctioned for $400. Cnn. com/2017/11/14/Africa/Libya-migrants-auctions/index.html

of Nigerians by Libyans, a cartel of Nigerians are also involved in the sale of Nigerians (DAYO *et al.*, 2017). The cabal includes family members, friends and contacts who most often are well known to the victims and promise to facilitate their movement from Nigeria to Europe through the Desert. Apart from the direct sale of Nigerians, some militants are involved. Ofehe S. (2017) put it thus:

> It is important to note the presently there is no government in Libya, you only have ISIS, Al Qaeda and militias using Nigerians and other people to raise money to fund their terrorist activities; as such, they sell these Nigerians as slaves to raise money or use them as direct labour and collect the money that is supposed to be paid to them. This forms the proceeds to purchase arms, feed themselves and army as well as move around.

From the above, it can be argued that apart from the money they bring in to their captures, they were also used for purposes of the larger Jihadist movement in the area as well as instrument for the destabilization of the area in particular and the entire region in general. This has been well attested to by some of the returnees who said that apart from using them to carry dead bodies, they also carried bombs and guns for militant groups in the area[8].

Oketola Dayo, *et al.*, argued that some of these Nigerians were sold for 3000 dinars (about N794, 000) at Agadez in Niger and Sabha in Libya. In other instance the Nigerians slave dealers sold women for 5,000 Dinar and Men for 4,000 Dinars. The situation becomes even more pathetic when it is clear that these people paid to be enslaved. For instance, available record shows that some of them paid between N600,000 and N800,000 to cross over to Italy but were left stranded in Libya.

Generally, in term of the physical human loss, it is estimated that between 65,000 and 120,000 sub-Saharan Africans enter the Maghreb (Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya) yearly, of which 70 to 80 percent are believed to migrate through Libya and 20 to 30 percent through Algeria and Morocco. Several tens of thousands of sub-Saharan Africans try to cross the Mediterranean each year (ADEPOJU, 2005). Since the journey is not made in the day or two, these human beings are cramped together in conditions ordinarily not fit for human existence. According to various estimates, at least 100,000 sub-Saharan migrants now live in both Mauritania and Algeria, 1 to 1.5 million in Libya, and anywhere between 2.2 and 4 million mainly Sudanese in Egypt. Tunisia and Morocco house smaller but

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8 Connectwarri.com.ng/2017/12/they-used-us-to-carry-bombs-libya-is.html?m

growing sub-Saharan immigrant communities of several tens of thousands (ADEPOJU, 2005). This is considered great social and particularly economic loss to the home country, because although many of these migrants are commonly portrayed as "destitute" or "desperate", it has however been established that majority of the migrants are often relatively well educated and from moderate socio-economic backgrounds. They move because of a general lack of opportunities, fear of persecution and violence, or a combination of both (ADEPOJU, 2005).

In term of the direct economic cost and loss to Nigeria, scholars have argued that since the trade is illegally conducted it is difficult to get the actual figure involved. Jorgen Carling (cited in Asenime, 2012), reported that as early there were about 10,000 Nigerian women in prostitution in Italy and they were illegally taken out through the desert with the promise of better employment by family and friends on arrival (JOGAN, 2005). Asenime J. (2012), opined that by the second quarter of 2008, there were about 20,000 Nigerian girls engaged in commercial sex in Italy, including 3000 in Turin alone. It has also been established that earlier in 1999 about 500 had been deported back to Nigeria from Italy. Most of these Nigerians made it to Italy via Libya through the Desert (UNESCO, 2006).

Available records shows that Nigerians top the charts of arrivals in Italy by sea in 2017. This is explained in the table below (ELBAGIR *et al.*, 2018).

s/no	Country	Figure	Position
1	Nigeria	37,551	First
2	Eritrea	20,718	Second
3	Guinea	13,342	Third
4	Cote d'Ivoire	12,396	Fourth
5	Gambia	11,929	Fifth

Source: CNN Exclusive Report: Don't Struggle if you're Raped; http:www.cnn.com/2018/02/27/Africa/Nigeria-migrant-smugglers.intl/index.html

Similarly, it has been established that a large number of these were female Nigerians and the since 2012 that figure has continued to rise. The table below gives a clearer picture of this trend and the figures involve (ELBAGIR *et al.*, 2018).

s/no	Year	Figure	Means of arrivals
1	2012	87	Sea
2	2013	433	Sea
3	2014	1,454	Sea
4	2015	5,633	Sea
5	2016	11, 009	Sea

Source: CNN Exclusive Report: Don't Struggle if you're Raped; http:www.cnn.com/2018/02/27/Africa/Nigeria-migrant-smugglers.intl/index.html

Adepagba *et al.* pointed out that in 2017 no fewer than 10,000 Nigerians died between January and May died while trying to illegally migrate through the Mediterranean Sea and the Desert. The document also reported that Deputy Head of EU Delegation to Nigeria, Mr. Richard Young opined that in 2014 the number of people travelling illegally through the desert was 280,000; in 2015, it rose to 1.8 million while in 2016 between January and September it was 420,000 that were involved in this act (ADELANI, 2017). On the other hand, it was widely reported that twenty seven thousand Nigerians seeking pastures abroad died in their in their quest to reach Europe through the desert and sea in 2016 according to non-government organization RARDUJA International (ADEBUMITI, 2017). Similarly, the President of Pan African Institute for Global Affairs and Strategy reported that 7000 Nigerians vanished in desert in 2016. According to this report, 68% of the figure were graduates who were looking for greener pasture in the foreign land, yet they ended up as sex slaves and ready tools for all forms of social vices (ABUBAKAR, 2017).

From the above it is clear that while it is difficult to arrive at specific figure of what has been lost in economic term in the desert as result of frustration among young Nigerians, we cannot however deny the fact that it is alarming.

Yaro J. (2008) gave a general picture of the economic loss of migration to the country in particular and the region in general thus:

Since the late eighties, traditional labour importing, richer countries in the sub-region (*Côted'Ivoire*) and hitherto attractive destinations for migrants (Nigeria) have experienced political and economic crises, which also spur out-migration of their nationals. Until the early 1980's, few Nigerian professionals emigrated because domestic working conditions were attractive and internationally competitive. The collapse of oil price, a sharp decline in oil revenue, rapid deterioration in living and

working conditions, wage freeze, devalued national currency, declining real incomes, authoritarian military rule and the vacillating economic situation fuelled large-scale emigration of skilled and unskilled workers abroad. Post-apartheid South Africa also attracted highly skilled professionals from Nigeria and Ghana to staff the universities and other sectors and tradesmen from Senegal and Mali including street vendors and small traders from Sierra Leone.

On the rural economy, the Scholar opined:

The process of rural-urban or rural-rural migration has created "Empty Spaces" in the rural economy. By empty spaces is meant the labour vacuum created by the absence of the many rural out migrants. The impact of these spaces in the rural economy cannot be overstated, especially with regards to disruption of rural livelihoods. Out migration leads to drastically reduced labour size and quality, which in turn reduces farm size and quality of work resulting in reduced food production and reduced household wealth with consequences of increased vulnerability in many rural areas leading to food insecurity.

On its part The Pan Africa Initiative against Irregular and Dangerous Migration (PAIIDAM, 2016) noted thus:

...Presently, the supply of skilled people in our area can be said to be inadequate due to a number of constraints that hinder human resources development and capacity building. In the case of Nigeria, the primary cause of external brain drain is the unreasonably low wages paid to professionals. The contradiction is that we spend four billion dollars annually to recruit and pay 100,000 expatriates to work in different parts of the country but fail to spend a proportional amount to recruit the 250,000 Nigerian and other African professionals now working outside the continent. ...On a daily basis desperate applicants besiege the embassies of economically prosperous countries where they believe they could get better economic deals. For instance, between January 2015 and March 2016, the UK mission in Nigeria recorded that it issued visas to 14,231 Nigerians, making them one of the top 10 nationalities granted visas in the world.

Statistics shows that the numbers of Nigerians leaving the country has been steadily increasing year by year. In 2010, 64,279 Nigerians were issued visas by the US mission in Nigeria, but the number dropped to 63,503 in 2011. In 2012, the figure increased to 83,944 and to 113,503 in 2013 and to 141,527 in 2014. It was gathered that 42 Nigerians were granted special immigrant visas out of the 116 issued to Africans last year.

The import of this is that the country is generally been deserted by skilled manpower from needed for the development of the country. These were trained with scarce resources and desperately needed for the management of the development process.

Returning to the Land: Any Hope?

Since the beginning of 2017, the International Organisation for Migration facilitated repatriation brought back 5,578 Nigerian migrants who were trapped in and outside prisons across Libya – mostly of Edo-Delta origin. In November alone, the International Organisation for Migration with the backing of the European Union retrieved 1,295 stranded Nigerians from Libya (DAYO *et al.*, 2017).

According to African Union Commission, as at the end of 2017 over 400,000 Nigerians were stranded in Libya. Specifically it was noted that the figure was between 400,000 and 700,000, while about 3,800 migrants languish in camp near Tripoli (DAYO *et al.*, 2017). Although the Nigeria government have made several attempt to lure back these brains to the country, there is however no indication that there is any hope in term of economic engagement and upliftment for them in the country. Unfortunately, since independence successive governments in Nigeria have continued to encourage this mass migration, through policies and acts that does not provide the conducive environment for the best brains to remain and develop the country.

As it is today, in many developed economies, highly qualified labour — for knowledge-intensive activities — is being recruited from poor and emerging market economy countries with specific focus on Nigeria. Presently, Nigerians and Zambians, highly skilled professionals constitute about a half or more of expatriates living in OECD countries. This is indeed a danger sign for the African continent especially in this age of globalization (ADEPOJU, 2005) [9].

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9 Adepoju Aderanti, 2007, Highly Skill Migration: ... Op.cit: p.33

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Conclusions

From the above it is clear that Nigeria is far from any form of technological advancement and development. This as have been explained is tied to mass migration in search for greener pasture in the desert, which denied the country of her best, while helping to develop the European world.

From the discourse so far, it is clear that the only way to stop this brain drain and mass migration is Entrepreneurial revolution that will keep the youths purposefully engaged and economically uplifted. With about 70% youth population (Approximately 80 million), there is an abundance of human resources, which can transform any economy positively. There is the need for the state and individuals create jobs for the growing population of youths. The state must also put in place incentives well as create the right environment for skill and entrepreneurial development. However, there are numerous challenges hindering the growth of entrepreneurship in Nigeria, they are: lack of access to fund; over taxation of small and medium scale

Enterprises; insufficient power to maintain the industries; lack of critical infrastructures; insecurity. All these must be put in place to be able to check this menace.

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ABSTRACT

The Economic situation in most Third World countries since independence have not shown signs of improvement. The result is that those at the prime of their lives which would have stirred the economy to greater height are moving en masse out of the area in search of greener pastures elsewhere especially across the desert into Europe, a situation that has negatively affected her development over the years in these Third World Countries using Nigeria as example. The impact-effect as well as the how, why and when of this is what this paper intends to interrogate as it relates to the Nigerian situation as well as those of her neighbours especially in the last two centuries using the facts and lessons of history. Data obtained from primary and secondary sources (literature review and content analysis) were deployed to carry out the study with an analytical and narrative historical method.

VIGILANTE GROUPS AND POLICING IN A DEMOCRATIZING NIGERIA: NAVIGATING THE CONTEXT AND ISSUES

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Introduction

Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. But, with the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had for centuries served the people, were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became *the primus inter pares*, in the internal security architecture of the colony (Ahire, 1991, 18). With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had for centuries been part of people's social existence now constituted the informal models of policing rendering subsidiary roles.

For decades, this was the arrangement for policing the vast Nigerian territory. Although, there were documented cases of police re-organizations, by the colonial authorities, in Lagos, in 1930 and 1954 (Akuul, 2011, 18), these, however, neither reversed the western-dominated order of policing nor re-organized the indigenous informal models of policing. Put differently, the indigenous police institutions, in differently parts of the country, continued to play subsidiary roles in public order management. Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement rather than being transformed to reflect

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the country's new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites (Chukwuma, 1998, 26).

However, as the country evolves politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it has also been confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which have posed serious threats to its survival (Otto; Ukpere, 2012, 52). Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, would appear to have been less than optimal. Perhaps, this circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country (Wisler; Onwu-diwe, 2005, 13).

Yet, the environment of public policing in the country, in the last few years, despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government, seems not to have fared better, as incidences of crimes, including those of lethal proportions, increased at all corners of the nation (Alemika;Chukwuma, 2004, 14). More worrisomely is the seeming lethargic attitude shown over the years, by the Federal Government, towards salvaging public policing in the country (Jemibewon, 2003, 13).At a point, state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force[3]. Even in spite of these, crisis of public policing in the country continue to fester (Adebakin and Raimi, 2012, 8). Remarkably, the seeming ineptitude of the Federal Government to effectively deal with the crisis of public order management would appear to have compelled the citizens to resort to self-help measures and whereupon, vigilante groups of various genres, once vilified, proliferated throughout the country (see Baker, 2002; Higazi, 2008; Adamu, 2008). In contemporary Nigeria, the issue seems no longer to be whether these groups should exist or not, but what would become of security at the national level if they are put out of existence (Kwaja, 2014, 5). Indeed, in the last few years, it is an incontrovertible fact that many state governments have not legalized vigilante groups to bolster the security of lives and properties in the states[4].

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3 For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government.

4 For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups.

However, in spite of their growing numbers and seeming popularity, especially since the return of democracy in 1999, issues are constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of democratic policing, against the background of their penchants for wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings (see Amnesty International, 2002; HRW/CLEEN, 2002). To this end, there have been increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. In addition, in contemporary times the country is battling its worst level of insecurity since the civil war, which ended in 1970. It is against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Nigeria's policing environment since the return of democracy in 1999. What have been their roles in post-authoritarian Nigeria? In discharging these roles, have they really constituted themselves as security threats to the country fledgling democracy? Specifically, this article engages these questions within the framework of the objective of the study.

In terms of organization, the article is partitioned into six sections, starting with an introduction pointing to the study's purpose, significance and rationale. Section two presents the conceptual framework that guides the discourse in the article. The third section, in a retrospective fashion, looks at the evolution of vigilante groups in Nigeria. The aim here is to lay bare the dynamism of vigilante groups in modern Nigeria. Section four critically examines the roles of vigilantes and other informal policing groups in public order management in the post-1999 era, with illustration of two cases. In section this follows, the performance of vigilante groups in contemporary era are assessed in the context of the country's security environment. Section six rounds up with a few submissions.

Policing, Police, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse

Frankly speaking, the four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie's (1962) elegant phrase, essentially contested concepts. To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. Firstly, the concept of policing,

here defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed, is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.

However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which has now acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by specialized body of men established by law (Loader, 2000, 325). In the words of Alemika and Chuckuma (2004, 2), 'the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police'. In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, edited by Catherine Soanes (2001, 692), police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order. In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chuckuma (2002, 3) sees police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order. The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the Customs and Immigration.

The point being made here is that the concept of policing differs conceptually and analytically from that of police, even though, the duos are part of the social control processes. The former broadly depicts control mechanisms deployed by societal institutions, state and non-states, to regulate the conduct of individuals and groups in order to bring them in conformity with acceptable norms and values. In other words, policing does not only entail law and order maintenance through the instrumentality of the state (public policing) but also through other non-state actors. Framed in this context, therefore, the police, the institutional edifice for operationalizing public policing, is one of the several strategies deployed by modern societies to maintain law and order (see Johnston 1992). Indeed, it is this wise that Baker (2008) and Lar (2015) in their notions of plural policing and multi-choice policing contend that in modern societies, diverse networks of groups-commercial bodies, voluntary and community groups, individual citizens, national and local governmental

regulatory agencies, as well as the public police deliver policing services to the citizen. Specifically, it is in lieu of this broad conceptualization of policing that the concept of vigilantism and by extension, vigilante groups seem to derive their conceptual significance.

However, it is to be stressed that the concept of vigilantism, in modern policing literature, though in the last few decades has assumed wider popularity, conjures up divergent interpretations. As Lar (2015, 54) rightly affirms, 'there is as yet no scholarly consensus on what vigilantism is – especially as regards the nature of its relationship with the state'. But for the purpose of this article, Fourchard's perspective is apt. In relation to policing, he opines that, vigilantism is "an organized attempt by a group of ordinary citizens to enforce norms and maintain law and order on behalf of their communities, often by resorting to violence, in the perceived absence of effective official state action through the police and courts' (Fourchard, 2001, 609). Viewed this way, vigilantism would depict organized efforts on the parts of citizens (individual and corporate) towards fighting criminal activities that threaten social order at the sub-state level. Flowing from the foregoing, vigilante groups would, thus, appear to suggest a voluntary group of individuals organized, usually at the communal/provincial level, for the purpose of policing. In the context of the above, therefore, it may be posited that not all groups that parade themselves, especially in contemporary Nigeria, as vigilantes are, conceptually, so. Reinforcing this contention, Shaw (2000, 48) posits that,

> care must be taken not to generalize on the subject of vigilante groups. Some seek to provide due process for arrested criminals in the absence of any viable state institutions in many areas. Some of the groups that have been labeled as vigilante groups range from neighborhood watches, communal guards, age grades, masquerade cults to hunters' guilds.

In the context of the foregoing and for the purpose of this article, therefore, vigilante groups are conceptualized loosely, following Alemika and Chukwuma (2004, 14), as a generic term in describing the different types of sub-state policing system of a country. In the Nigeria's informal policing system, Chukwuma (2002, 11,12), identifies four typologies of vigilantism and vigilante groups, vis: religious, ethnic, state-sponsored and neighborhood/ community.

Vigilante Groups and Vigilantism in Nigeria: Origin and Evolution

It has to be stressed that the idea of vigilantism and by extension, existence of vigilante groups, predated the Nigerian state (Pratten, 2008, 1). Indeed, the conclusion in most studies on the evolution of policing in Nigeria is that vigilantes of all shades, performing a myriad of policing functions in their communities, preceded the establishment of the colonial police (see Tamuno, 1970; Tamuno *et al.*, 1993; Nwanze, 1999; Rotimi, 2001). For instance, in the eastern part of the country, before the advent of modern police establishment, there existed groups known as 'Ndinche' (community guards). They were put in place by villagers to arrest and bring suspected criminals before the 'Amala' (village council) for trials. As a matter of fact, Ndinche like the 'Olodes' (Hunter Guild) and the 'Yan Banga' in the western and northern parts respectively, for centuries, superintended public order management in the various jurisdictions (Ogbozor, 2016, 3).

However, it has pointed out that irrespective of the *modus operandi* of these indigenous pre-colonial vigilantes, they were structured within each community's existing political structures and values. Fourchard (2011), in an insightful study of vigilante structure in pre-colonial Yorubaland, with reference to Ibadan, recounts an interview with a respondent thus:

> there was a chain of transmission of orders coming from the Oluba-dan[5] and from heads of powerful lineages associated to the Olubadan (the Mogaji[6]) who transmitted information to heads of compound (Baale). The Mogaji were in charge of sode; they will call the head of each household, then they will tell them about the need to keep watch on the surroundings. In each household, the Baale will volunteer at least one or two people.

The point here is that the indigenous vigilante groups, before the foray of colonialism into the various communities that were later amalgamated to become Nigeria, did not operate in a vacuum but interfaced with the various communities to provide policing to their people. In other words, they functioned as self-help entities at the peripheral level of the communities (towns/kingdoms), assisting 'stately' institutions in discharging policing duties. For example, in pre-colonial Hausa Emirate state system, the vigilantes at the local level complemented the Dogaris-palace police-in maintaining law

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5 Olubadan refers to the title of the paramount head of Ibadan.

6 Mogaji is the head of an extended family comprising many households in Ibadan.

and order within the Emirate. Similar patterns operated among the Ijebus, a Yoruba sub-ethnic group, in which the various vigilantes complemented the Odis-palace police in policing the centre and the peripheries of the Ijebu state system under the Awujale[7]. It is worthy to note that this dual system of policing involving the vigilantes and the Kings' police was, however transformed by colonial rule, which added another framework of policing leading to a tripartite system involving the vigilantes, the palace police and the colonial police.

It must be stressed, however, that in spite of their relegation to the background in the colonial tripartite policing architecture, vigilante groups continued to attract the patronages of the people in various communities, as a result of growing crime rates brought about by rapid urbanization (Watson, 2003, 76). For example, in Ibadan and other Yoruba communities, in the second half of the 20th century, the night guard system (vigilantes), that had been suppressed, for decades, by colonial officials for being 'dangerous', was re-invigorated, under strict supervision. Fourchard (2011, 11) adumbrates the five guidelines that a Colonial Resident in 1948, in Oyo, gave for the operation of the night guards within his domain as follow:

- That a roster of Night Guards is kept.
- That a head hunter is appointed whose duties are to supervise the arrangements made and be responsible to the local Baale (Chief) for the conduct of the guards.
- That each hunter guard is clearly informed that firearms must only be used in self-defense.
- If a hunter guard catches a thief or suspect, he should take him to the nearest Police station at once and hand him over to the police.
- That no form of uniform is used by hunter.

Instructively, this was the model of vigilantism in most communities before the country's independence in 1960. Put differently, vigilante groups like the Night Guard system in the Oyo Province, mentioned above, while being allowed to operate because of the limited coverage of the colonial policing apparatus, were strictly under the supervision of the colonial authorities. However, with the attainment of independence in 1960, the character of vigilante groups changed from those established to promote community interests to those that now served the interests of the dominant party in the three regions of the country. For example, in the Western Region, the night

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7 Till date, this is the title of the paramount ruler of the Ijebu Kingdom.

guards and other informal policing groups, especially in Ibadan, the seat of the regional government, became instruments of political intimidation and harassment of perceived political opponents by the Akintola-led government, until the fall of the Republic on January 15th, 1966 (Rotimi, 2001, 140; Fourchard, 2011, 17).

Indeed, for the complementary roles that these vigilante groups played, especially in the Western Region, in instigating the collapse of the first republic, the new military regime, upon assuming power, did not only suppress the politicized vigilante groups but also guillotined their authority to vigilantism. Although, in the 1970s, due to the oil boom which led to rising incidence of armed robbery and other allied crimes, there were increasing proliferation of neighbourhood watches and guard companies, the dispositions of the military regimes that superintended the country during the period, towards vigilante groups appeared not have changed. But, by mid the 1980s, the *volte face* attitude of the military juntas towards vigilantes and other informal policing groups in the country changed. On why this changed attitude should not detain us here as there are abundant of studies (see Fabiyi, 2004; Fourchard, 2011).

Specifically, in 1986, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, through its representatives at the state levels, in order to improve the battered image of the Nigerian Police Force, formally embraced vigilante groups as part of the country's policing structure. In April 1987, in Oyo State, the Military Governor, Col. Adetunji Olurin, by virtue of the Mobilization Community Development Committee Edict (1987), gave legal backing to vigilantism in the state when he officially launched vigilante groups (OYSG, 1987). Legitimizing vigilantism, the Governor had said, 'unlike the previous vigilante groups, the activities of the groups being inaugurated were protected by the law' (see Tribune, 07/04/87). With such terse statement coming from a key member of a military junta, the environment of vigilantism in the country would appear to have changed, whereupon, the number of groups engaged in vigilantism, across the country increased. Interestingly, it was, perhaps, this legacy of government's tacit support for vigilante groups that snowballed into the fourth republic that commenced on May 29th, 1999.

Vigilante Groups and Democracy in Post-Authoritarian Nigeria

On the 29th May, 1999, Nigeria joined the league of electoral democracies. Prior to this date, the country had suffocated under various autocratic regimes that repressed, suppressed and denied the people of their democratic rights (Ojo 2004, 154). As the newly elected President, Olusegun Obasanjo (1999), in his inaugural speech, put it:

> Today, we are taking a decisive step on the path of democracy. We will leave no stone unturned to ensure sustenance of democracy because it is good for us. It is good for Africa, and it is good for the world. We call on the world, particularly the Western World to help us sustain democracy by sharing with us the burden or debt which may be crushing and destructive to democracy in our land.

With such terse remark coming from the first President of a re-democratized Nigeria, the citizens seemed to have been greeted with great hopes and expectations that an atmosphere of peace and stability, built on the foundation of democracy and good governance has come to stay in their country (Basiru, 2016, 4). Put differently, an atmosphere in which the central state and its institutions, most especially those responsible for criminal justice, are alive to their historic mandates of dealing with crimes that could jeopardize peaceful co-existence. Specifically, the Nigerian Police, in line with Section 4 of the Police Act CAP 359 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1990), were expected to be a key player in the criminal justice system. The organization is charged with the responsibilities for detecting and preventing crime in the society.

However, within the shortest possible time, people's expectations of democratic dividends in terms of improved security environment would appear to have been dashed as some of the divisive and violent tendencies that had long been suppressed by the military juntas, while they reigned, resurfaced and became the defining characteristics of the new democracy (Jemibewon, 2001, 30). Indeed, during the first decade of the country's democratization, democracy, by some commentators, was almost assumed to be coeval with violence and insecurity. To be sure, violent crimes such as serial bombings, hostage taking, kidnapping, armed robbery, and ethno-religious violence of various genres, became regular features of the country's security landscape (see Umede, 2011, 18). As stated earlier, the Nigerian Police Force were overwhelmed and overburdened, leading to increasing roles for vigilante

groups (Ikoh, 2013, 48). As Jones (2008, 4) notes, 'vigilante groups in Nigeria were created in response to the security vacuum left by the impotent state and its security forces'. What is being pointed out here is that, democracy, aside offering avenues for wider citizens' participation in public affairs, has also created opportunities, due to the declining capacities of the police to manage growing insecurity, for increasing participation of the vigilante groups in policing democracy.

It has to be stressed, however, that in vigilanting democracy and the *demos* since the beginning of the fourth republic in Nigeria, some vigilante groups, especially, those governed by formal rules, in major cities, would appear to have performed well in the complementing the formal policing structures. On the other hand, some would seem not to have fared better in vigilanting democracy as in the cases of those with conflicting agenda (Akubor 2014). The cases of the Bakassi Boys and O'odua People's Congress (OPC) that are presented in the proceeding paragraphs typify such vigilante group.

The Bakassi Boys

The Bakassi Boys serves as an empirical illustration of the perversion of what vigilantism is by a vigilante group, in a country that transited from authoritarianism into electoral democracy. There are two reasons why the case of the Bakassi Boys is apposite and lends itself to inquiry on the activities of vigilante groups in a democratizing society. First, the groups is, perhaps, the first vigilante group in post-Authoritarian Nigeria that was formed by artisans and later to be hijacked by state governments. Second, it was the first vigilante group in post-Authoritarian Nigeria that drew the attention of the Federal Government and the international community to the danger that vigilante groups could pose to the security of the country. That stressed, Bakassi Boys, like other dreaded vigilante groups that emerged after the departure of the military from the political scene in 1999, came on board as the direct consequences of armed robbery in the major markets in the South-east, especially, in Aba, Abia State (see Baker 2002; Harnischfeger 2003; Smith 2004).

Prior to its formation, Aba, the commercial nerve centre of Abia State, were under the 'government' of a notorious armed robbery gang, nicknamed 'Mafia' which terrorized traders in the major markets in the town. Instructively, while the gang reigned, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) seemed impotent in curtailing and arresting this situation. The seemingly impotence of the

Police forced the traders and the artisans in the markets to resort to self-help in order to confront the dreaded gang which they eventually defeated. Specifically, the group arose, in 1998, following a gruesome murder of a prominent trader in Aba market which forced the traders to, spontaneously, embarked on an operation of seizing and executing suspected armed robbers, until nearly all suspected criminals had been executed or had fled the state (Jones, 2008, 2).

Perhaps, this feat of eliminating the dreaded Mafia convinced the major stakeholders in the markets around Aba that the messiah had finally arrived. At this stage, they realized the imperative of transforming the loosely organized entity into a permanent organization and by so doing, earning stipends from their patronizers. Thereafter, their services began to be sought not only by traders in Ariaria and other major markets in the Southeast but by residents and other major stakeholders in the region (Jones, 2008, 2).

Given the context through which the group emerged, the original aim was to fight armed robbery and other violent crimes but with its hijack by the Governors and other powerful individuals in the Southeast, the original goal of the outfit became diluted, resulting in its politicization (Tertsakian, 2002). At this stage, the group now christened 'political' Bakassi Boys became the tool in the hands of the State Governors. In Anambra State, for example, prior to the formal endorsement of the Bakassi Boys', by the administration of Dr. Chinwoke Mbadiniju, in 2002, the vigilante sector in the state, for years, had been dominated by the Onitsha Traders Association (OTA) which was formed by traders in Onitsha, in the early 1990s. However, by the advent of democracy in Anambra State, in 1999, OTA became less popular with the people as a result of its methods and thus paving way for the emergence of the Bakassi Boys, to take the center stage.

In August 2002, Governor Mbadiniju formally endorsed the group, by sending a bill to the State House of Assembly for consideration. In December the same year, the bill, having been passed by the legislature and signed by the governor, became the Anambra State Vigilante Service Law, No. 9 of year 2000 (HRW/CLEEN, 2002, 10). With the coming into force of this law, the Bakassi Boys of Anambra State, officially, became the Anambra Vigilante Service (AVS) to be maintained and supervised by the Government of Anambra State. As reported by the Amnesty International (2002, 8), 'the Anambra State Vigilante Service is the first – and to date only – armed vigilante group officially recognized by a state government in Nigeria through a bill enacted by the State Governor'. Interestingly, similar experiments were undertaken in other Southeastern states of Abia, Imo and Ebonyi States. The only except

was Enugu state where the Governor insisted that the existing system of public policing was adequate to guarantee security (Akubor, 2014,31). It must be emphasized here that the Bakassi Boys, irrespective of the names that were called in these states, before being proscribed with other similar armed groups in different parts of the country, operated with reckless abandon, killing and maiming of people in the name of crime fighting. Perhaps, it was the totality of these inhuman activities and other malfeasance coupled with the negative press that they were giving the country in the comity of nations that the group, despite the protestations of the Southeast Governors, was proscribed by the Federal Authorities in 2001.

The O'odua People's Congress (OPC)

The O'odua People's Congress (OPC), a group dominant in the Southwestern part of Nigeria, the geographical base of the Yoruba ethnic group, was initially formed on August 24th, 1994, at Mushin, Lagos, by seven individuals, all Yoruba origin, led Dr. Fredrick Fasehun. It did not start as a vigilante group but as a self-determination-oriented group to protect and defend the interests of the Yorubas in the Nigerian project (Fasehun, 2002, 159). Specifically, it arose against the background of the injustice meted out to a prominent Yoruba son, Chief Moshood Abiola and by extension, the Yoruba race, following the annulment of the 1993 presidential election, won by Abiola, by the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. However, it must be stressed that it emerged, albeit, not to restore Abiola's stolen mandate in pristine form, but rather, to prevent the recurrence of another June 12th episode (Fasehun, 2002, 159, 160).

However, by 1999, the group, due to rising crime rates in the major cities of the Southwest and the seeming impotence of the Nigerian police to arrest them, added crime fighting to its foundational objective of being an ethnic champion. In the words of Fasehun (2002, 12) 'fighting crime is not one of the objectives of OPC but when the crime became so high that people were living virtually in fears, OPC took a diversion, mark my word, took a diversion, from its primary aims and objectives to assist the police to fight crimes, secure life and property'. Instructively, crime fighting soon overshadowed the other objectives of the group. Avers Fasehun (2001, 5):

> As a matter of fact, OPC fights crime. Various times, they have arrested criminals and hands them over to the law enforcement agents. And

if you are planning to join OPC, one of the things you are made to swear to is that you will assist in the prevention of crime.

Operationally, like most indigenous-oriented groups, steeped in spiritualism and fetishism, OPC deploys traditional occultism to fighting crime. For instance, members of the group often consult oracle to determine the future on any particular course of action (see Adebanwi, 2005). Also, members of the group wear black clothing and often speak in coded languages which cannot be deciphered by those outside the group (Owumi, 2013,78). According to Human Rights Watch (2003), 'members of OPC were often kitted with occult, 'insurance cover' by incisions, *gbere,* on their bodies with charms. This emboldened them in the discharge of their vigilante duties'.

Notwithstanding these, the group, especially, in the first few years of the country's return to democracy, gained so much popularity and acceptability among the people of the southwest. Indeed, in major cities in the region, the group, because of its audacity to venture into the dens of criminals which the police for years dared not to venture into, became the courted bride of the people (Ajayi; Aderinto, 2008, 2012). As Babawale (2003, 62) notes, 'the OPC in the southwest literally became a parallel security outfit with its involvement in vigilante services and its running battle with criminal gangs'. However, like the Bakassi Boys, examined earlier, OPC, in discharging vigilante services, engaged in activities, that most times, threatened public order.

It clear from the foregoing discussions that the activities of vigilante groups in democratizing societies could be anti-social and as such could have implications on the country's security environment.

Vigilante Groups and National (In)security in Post-Authoritarian Nigeria

In the contemporary mass society, no country, due to a combination of factors, is able to fight crime effectively only through public policing without the supports of sub-state actors. But, in liberal jurisdictions, while vigilante groups often operate within the perimeter of rule of law and constitutionalism, their counterparts in illiberal democracies, as the case of the post-Authoritarian Nigeria being examined in this study will soon show, tend to operate in manner that do not only put question mark on the entire concept of vigilantism but also constitutive threats to social stability and by extension, the security of the society (see Oronsaye; Igbafe, 2012).

Although, it has to be stressed that while some vigilante groups, especially, those organized as neighborhood watches, in major cities, across the country, have to a reasonable degree, tended to mimic vigilantism in liberal jurisdictions, most vigilante groups, in Nigeria, especially those that arose in the atmosphere of what Lumumba-Kasongo (1995, 409) referred to as 'anger', 'conflict' and 'irrationality', in the last few years, have been anti-thetical to established norms of vigilantism and by implications, constitute threats to social stability. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, most vigilante groups in contemporary Nigeria hardly operate in conjunction with the police as is the situation in matured democracies. Even where the vigilante groups are mandated by law to work with the police, in dealing with suspects, most of them rather than working with the police, would still resort to self-help measures. In Anambra State, for example, the law that gave legality to the activities of the Bakassi Boys, states that the vigilante group shall augment the maintenance of security in their various community and shall in particular render all lawful help and assistance to the police in the sphere of crime prevention and detection (ANSG, 2000).

These clear mandates, notwithstanding, the Bakassi Boys, before they were proscribed by the Federal Government, in practice, rarely if ever render all lawful help and assistance to the police in the state (HRW/CLEEN, 2002, 13). The same remark could be made of OPC and other vigilante groups that operate at the communal levels. In bringing crime suspects to justice, these groups created detention and torture camps that look like Kangaroo police stations, courts and prisons where suspects are arbitrarily interrogated, detained, tried, tortured and summarily executed or fined (Owumi, 2013, 79).

All these extra-judicial measures by vigilante groups in the last few years, whether reported or not, aside impinging on the human right sector, have led to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the country as these groups, including those that have recently sprung up, have been the greatest patronizers of illicit arms. With regard to the human rights sector, vigilante violence often leads to the violation of the individual and group rights of the people (Anyanwu, 2007). Indeed, this often assume graver dimension when group rights are violated by a vigilante group as this often lead to reprisal attacks. For example, in 1999, barely a year to the return to democracy, the reprisal killing of the Yorubas in Kano, was generally perceived to be a reaction to the violation of the rights to life and property of the Hausas by the OPC in Sagamu. Indeed, the reprisal attack in Kano did not result in the killing of only the Yorubas but also the killings of Ibo, which in turn led to reprisal attacks on the Hausa/Fulani group resident in Aba and some eastern states, which all resulted in loss of lives and property (Akinyele, 2001).

Directly related to the foregoing is the legacy of violence that the formation of OPC, Bakassi Boys and other militant vigilante groups have brought upon the country. To be sure, they have either triggered a number of violent ethnic movements and by implications, ethnic conflicts across the country or it has had militarizing effects on some existing movements. Specifically, Ikelegbe (2005, 496) contends that the emergence of the Arewa People Congress (APC) was a reaction to the activities of the OPC, particularly attacks on Hausa in the southwest. Even within the Yorubas' geo-political space, Ajala (2006, 131,141) posits that groups, such as the Oodua Liberation Movement (OLM), Oodua Youth Movement (OYM) and Oodua Republic Front (ORF) that share similar ideology with OPC were triggered into existence as a result of the activities of the OPC.

The point being made is here is that the repugnant and uncivil activities of vigilante groups like the OPC attracted other groups to join the vigilante sector, with the result that vigilante violence percolated virtually everywhere. For example, in 2005, vigilante violence perpetuated by a local vigilante group in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Southwest Nigeria, against the students of the Olabisi Onabanjo University, in which many students lost their lives, led to counter-attacks from the students. Indeed, the crisis did not only lead to the closure of the university but also a dusk to dawn curfew was imposed on the whole town by the Government of Ogun State, in order to reduce further human carnage. Another worrisome aspect of the activities of vigilante groups in the last few years is their politicization by the dominant political actors, especially, during elections. For instance, the Bakassi Boys, as reported by major international human rights advocacy groups, was used by the Southeastern Governors to harass and intimidate their perceived political opponents in the run to the 2003 governorship election in the region (HRW/CLEEN, 2002,12).

Linked to the above is the increasing outsourcing of policing to some militant vigilante groups in the country by the Federal and State Governments, a development which reached its zenith under the presidency of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, when militant groups like the Niger Delta Volunteer Force and the OPC were given contracts and licenses to police the country's strategic assets in the Niger Delta. Indeed, this state of affairs to some concerned citizens was not only seen as constituting a threat to the security of the country and the concerned communities but also seemed to have downed the morale of the officers and men of the military and paramilitary forces. The issue here is that by investing in informal groups, with little or no training in arms handlings, with the roles that ought to be performed by the military and paramilitary forces, an atmosphere of insecurity and rights violation is

created by the government. For example, in an operation carried out by OPC to flush out pipeline vandals, around Arepo area, in Ogun State, Southwest Nigeria in early 2015, aside from not achieving the intended objectives, led to loss of innocent lives and destruction of properties.

Conclusions

This article set out to examine the character of vigilante groups in a democratizing Nigeria against the backdrop of the contradictory views about their roles. In furtherance of this objective, it clarified key concepts relevant to the discourse, examined extant literature on vigilantism and vigilante groups in Nigeria and assesses the balance sheet of vigilante groups in a democratizing Nigeria. From these reviews and analyses, it found that the character of vigilantism and vigilante groups in Nigeria is markedly different from those in liberal jurisdictions. It also notes that unlike the practice in liberal democracies where vigilante groups, in conduct and practice, conform to principles of rule of law and constitutionalism; the opposite, going by the activities of some militant vigilantes since the return of democracy, is the case. This state of affair has impacted negatively on the country's security environment. In the light of these, it argues and concludes that as long as the vigilante groups, like the formal policing establishments, remain the instruments of political intimidation of political opponents by the politicians that control them, the terrain of vigilantism would continue to be in the realm of 'anocracy'.

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ABSTRACT

In the last few years, vigilante groups and other informal policing structures have assumed a greater role in the security architecture of many countries, especially those that exited from authoritarian order. In spite of this development, however, issues and concerns are constantly being raised about them regarding whether they could really be agents of democratic policing against the backdrop of their penchant for human rights violations and extra-judicial killings. It is against this background that this article examines the balance sheet of vigilante groups in a democratizing Nigeria. Following an extensive review of extant literature on police, policing, vigilantism and vigilante groups, as well as relevant studies on vigilante groups in Nigeria, it observes and notes that unlike the practice in liberal democracies, where vigilante groups – in conduct and practice – conform to principles of rule of law and constitutionalism, the opposite is the case in a democratizing Nigeria. It argues and concludes that as long as the vigilante groups, like the formal policing establishments, remain the instruments of intimidation of political opponents by the politicians that control them; the terrain of vigilantism would continue to be in the realm of 'anocracy'.

OF MARAUDERS AND BRIGANDS: SCOPING THE THREAT OF RURAL BANDITRY IN NIGERIA'S NORTH WEST

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Introduction

Nigeria is, arguably, a country under distress. The country's woes are most evident in the torrential spate of armed violence and criminality in various parts of the country. Nothing explains this awry situation better than the apocalyptically volatile security ambience in the wider northern Nigeria. The northeastern Nigeria is still patently under the Boko Haram scourge, amidst the precarious counter-insurgency endeavors of the government (Okoli 2017a; Zenn 2018). The north-central area has been afflicted by herdsmen militancy, which has plunged the region into dire humanitarian crisis (Okoli and Ogayi 2018). The northwestern region has recently been enmeshed in the rapid upsurge of rural banditry along its international frontiers as well as the forested interior.

Research on the prevailing precarious security situation of northern Nigeria has been perennial, albeit with disproportionate emphasis on the phenomena of Boko Haram insurgency and herdsmen-farmers disturbances (Olayoku 2014; Okoli and Iortyer 2014; Otewu 2015; Bagu and Smith 2017). Incidentally, while scholarship on Boko Haram and farmers-herder crises has come a full cycle, organized research on rural banditry is still at an inchoate stage of nascence. Although there exist some important scholarly works on aspects of the subject matter (Ladan 2014; Kuna and Jibrin 2016; Okoli and Ochim 2016; Olaniyan and Yahaya 2016; Olaniyan 2018), none of these extant

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works could systematically and aptly account for the northwestern scenario where rural banditry has assumed the scale of a complex emergency.

This study is an attempt to explain the phenomenon of rural banditry in the northwestern Nigeria against the backdrop of the rapid upsurge of the incidence over the recent years. The northwestern Nigeria encompasses seven states namely Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kaduna, Zamfara, Jigawa and Sokoto. Five of these states, which are Katsina, Kaduna, Zamfara, Kebbi and Sokoto, have been mostly affected by the scourge of rural banditry. Of these five states, Katsina, Kaduna and Zamfara have been the most critical hotspots. Suffice it to note that the incidence of rural banditry is not by any means limited to northwestern Nigeria. In fact, it is also reasonably prevalent in parts of north-central region, with states like Niger, Nasarawa, Plateau and Benue as veritable hotbeds (Kuna and Jibrin 2016; CDD 2015a & b).

What then is the nature of the rural banditry incidence in the northwestern Nigeria? What are its critical drivers? Moreover, how could the incidence be mitigated? These analytical posers constitute the thrust of the study. Given the scant scholarship on the subject matter, the principal purpose of the study is to undertake a sort of desk-based prima facie investigation into the phenomenon of rural banditry in the focal area with a view to stimulating further organized field-based studies on relevant aspects thereof subsequently. The remainder of the paper is thematically structured as follows: conceptualizing banditry/rural banditry; theoretical framework; perspectives on rural banditry in Nigeria; critical drivers of rural banditry in northwestern Nigeria; patterns of rural banditry in northwestern Nigeria; mitigating the rural banditry scourge; and conclusion.

Conceptualizing Banditry/Rural Banditry

Banditry refers to the incidences of armed robbery or allied violent crimes, such as kidnapping, cattle rustling, and village or market raids. It involves the use of force, or threat to that effect, to intimidate a person or a group of persons in order to rob, rape or kill (Okoli and Okpaleke 2014). Economic or political interests motivate banditry. The former refers to banditries motivated by the imperative of material accumulation while the latter has to do with those driven by the quest to rob, to assault or to liquidate a person or a group of persons based on political or ideological considerations. Various forms of banditry have been identified in literature. Table 1 highlights these categories of banditry in an attempt to propose a typology of the phenomenon.

Table 1: A Typology of Banditry

Type	Typological index
Social vs. political vs. economic	Intent or motive
Rural vs. urban	Location
Mercenary vs. autonomous	Agency and autonomy
Organized vs. petty	Form and formation
Roving vs. stationary	Operational mode
Frontier vs. countryside	Location
Maritime vs. coastal vs. mainland	Location

Source: Authors' original illustration.

As Table 1 indicates, banditry can be classified based on the underlying 'intent' or 'motive'. In this regard, one can talk of 'social banditry' that is generally motivated by the intent to protest social inequality and to redistribute wealth within a locality. Likewise, one could talk of other forms of banditry that are principally motivated by 'political' or 'economic' reasons. When 'location' of occurrence is the underlying index, one can speak in terms of 'rural vs. urban banditry' or 'frontier vs. countryside banditry', as the case may be. Similarly, banditry can be 'mercenary' or 'autonomous' depending on how the actor of 'agency' is played out. Mercenary banditry is perpetuated by auxiliaries or mercenaries working for a principal in a sort of principal-agent relationship, while autonomous bandits are self-motivated and personally commissioned. 'Organized banditry' thrives on a network of actors that are syndicated and coordinated while petty banditry is perpetrated by individual or group actors that are not so organized. 'Roving bandits' are more or less mobile or itinerant while stationary bandits are settled or sedentary. Lastly, 'maritime banditry' refers to offshore robbery (piracy) as compared to those that occur on the coast or mainland. Rural banditry simply means the prevalence of banditry in the rural sector. It can assume any of the characteristics highlighted above. More importantly, it thrives within the 'social ecology' of the rural sector characterized by gross governance deficits (Olaniyan and Yahaya 2016). Prominent instances of rural banditry in Nigeria include kidnapping, armed robbery, cattle rustling and village raids.

Theoretical Framework: Routine Activity Theory

The Routine Activities Theory (RAT) was pioneered by Cohen and Felson (1979) in an attempt "to understand patterns and upward trends of predatory criminal events in the historical context of changing economy" (Hsieh and Wang 2018, 335). The theory holds that crime is likely to occur when there is a spatial-temporal convergence of three essential elements of crime, namely a motivated offender, an attractive target, and the absence of capable guardianship (see Figure 1).

According to exponents of the theory (Cohen and Felson 1979; Maxfield 1987; Samonas 2013), motivated offenders are individuals who are capable and willing to commit a crime while suitable targets can be a person or object that are considered by offenders as vulnerable or attractive. On the other hand, guardianship can be a person or an object that is effective in deterring offense to occur. Mere physical presence of guardianship in space and time can deter crime committal.

The Routine Activity Theory is based on some basic assumptions (Cohen and Felson 1979; Garofalo 1987; Maxfield 1987; Felson and Cohen 1980):

- Crime is likely to occur when there is a spatial-temporal convergence of three essential elements of crime, namely a motivated offender, an attractive target, and the absence of capable guardianship;
- The factors that render a particular target attractive are situational and crime-specific;
- Crime can be perpetrated by anyone who has the opportunity in terms of capability and availability of vulnerable target;
- Victims have choices on whether to be victims mainly by possibly avoiding situations where a crime can be committed against them.

Fig. 1: An illustration of Routine Activity Theory of crime

Presence of opportunities/ targets to commit crime

Motivation to commit crime

CRIME

Absence of capable guardianship to prevent crime

Source: Adapted from Samonas (2013). Note: *The three interrelated variables depicted in Fig. 1 require physical convergence in time and space.*

Applied to the purpose of the present discourse, it is to be observed that rural banditry is a crime that has been precipitated and sustained by the prevailing socio-existential environment in the rural sector characterized by a high proclivity to criminal indulgence. In the case of the focal area, northwestern Nigeria, the presence and prevalence of under-policed and unregulated hinterlands, forestlands and borderlands have provided an enormous opportunity for rural criminality. In addition, the presence of viable but vulnerable rural economy based largely on animal husbandry, crop production and informal mining, equally provides an avalanche of handy crime objects/ targets: cattle, cash, treasure, etc. In this context, the virtual absence of governmental security apparatus in most rural communities gives incentive for criminal opportunism and impunity as well (*The Humanitarian* 2018). In all, the aforementioned ecology of crime brings about, not only motivation but also temptation, for criminal indulgence. Under this circumstance, criminal deterrence takes flight all forms of predatory crime prevail. This is typically

the situation in northwestern Nigeria, where rural marauders and brigands are having a sustained field day in a criminal escapade that is threatening to overrun the entire region.

Perspectives on Rural Banditry in Nigeria and Beyond: A Literature Review

Rural banditry has to do with armed violence perpetrated by criminal opportunists and syndicates in the countryside and frontiers of countries (Okoli & Okpaleke 2014a). It comprises acts of armed criminality targeting at human life or property: armed robbery, kidnapping, cattle rustling and allied armed violence (Okoli & Okpaleke 2014b). Extant literature on the nature and incidence of rural banditry mostly perpetrated by nomads has yielded a number of thematic perspectives. Foremost among these perspectives is the narrative that situates the phenomenon as a necessary complication of farmer-herder crisis in a volatile security context characterized by the declining state's capacity to govern (Shettima & Tar 2008; Olaniyan & Yahaya 2016). The second perspective characterizes the occurrence as a disguised terrorism that bears the trappings of neo-jihadism (IEP 2015; SBMI 2015; CWI 2016; Omilusi 2016).

This perspective resonates with the popular local cynical anecdotes to the effect that such violence represents the calculated effort to further the islamization of the wider northern Nigeria with the Middle Belt region as the focal target. The third perspective is a narrative, which accounts for the problem from the standpoint of ethno-communal violence complicated by the faultlines of identity conflict (Blench & Dendo 2005; Okoli & Atelhe 2014). There is also an emerging perspective that emphasizes the criminological undercurrents of the threat. This perspective sees the marauding nomads as aggressors who are motivated by wholly criminal intents (McGregor 2014; Olayoku 2014). Nascent thinking on the subject matter is tending towards a cross-cutting perspective that highlights the socio-ecological dynamics of the occurrence. This forms a part of the point of departure in this study.

Beyond the conflicting and contending perspectives above, it is pertinent to note that rural banditry is not a novelty in Nigeria. Anecdotal and scholarly accounts have it that the phenomenon predated Nigeria's emergence as a political entity. In this regard, Jaafar (2018, 2) opines that there were recorded instances of rural banditry in the colonial Nigeria "as far back as the 1930s". Putting this claim in a sort of historical perspective, Jaafar accounts:

> In those days, wayfarers and merchants travelling along our local economic roads usually faced the threats and dangers of ambush from nondescript bandits. Armed bandits and criminals were known to be targeting goods ferried on the back of donkeys, camels and ox carts. Those bandits on our trade routes would forcefully take those goods and disappear into the bush. That is just one dimension of the problem then. In other instances, the bandits would sometimes raid farming communities and villages with the intent of willful killing and wanton destruction of property. During such raids, the bandits would destroy virtually everything in their path, including valuables, farm produce, etc. This subculture has been in existence even before the coming of colonialists to the territories of northern Nigeria (2018, 2).

With reference to the northwestern Nigeria, *The Humanitarian* (Formerly *IRIN News* 2018, 8-9) avers that the region "has a long history of banditry. The first recorded case occurred somewhere between "western Hausaland" and the Niger border in 1901, when a 12,000-strong camel train "laden with assorted grains" was attacked and 210 merchants killed". Although rural banditry is as old as Nigeria, it has nonetheless incrementally transformed overtime from its rudimentary phase, as adverted to in Jaafar's citation above, to a complex and complicated pattern of criminality (CDD 2015a; Egwu 2016). The modern transformation of rural banditry must be understood against the backdrop of the prevailing national security dialectics in Nigeria. According to Bagu and Smith (2017, 5):

> Gangs of criminal, often youth from farming and herding communities and/or local bandits, take advantage of growing insecurity, fear and cyclical attacks to loot villages, engage in highway robbery, and rustle cattle for personal gain. Both farming and herding communities suffer from this criminality.

Contemporary narrative on rural banditry in Nigeria presents a pathetic humanitarian scenario. In effect, the bandits "have been robbing people on highway, rustling cattle, looting, laying siege on rural markets and killing innocent people" (CDD 2015a, 2). Significantly, this pattern of criminality has become a leading cause of violence in Nigeria over the recent years (Azad, Crawford and Kaila 2018). Most existing works on aspects of rural banditry in Nigeria have tended to be situating their account on the farmer-herder problematic (Shalangwa 2013; Gambari 2018; Bashir, Azlizan and BtYusof 2018; Ahmadu 2019). Although the phenomenon bears substantively on the dialectics of farmer-herder crisis, such a perspective must be contextually

problematized in any meaningful attempt to understand properly how the criminality obtains and prevails.

The occurrence of rural banditry is not peculiar to Nigeria. In effect, the phenomenon has been an important facet of the national security debacle in the conflict-ridden countries of Africa's Sahel and Sahara (Fatf-giaba-ga 2016; Gaye 2018a & b). Even beyond the shores of Africa, organized rural banditry has prevailed in places like Latin America where it is often implicated in the morass of drug war. Also in the Far East, rural banditry has been a veritable form of the so-called 'frontier criminality' (Callen, Gulzar, Rezaee and Shapiro 2018, 1). It has also been prevalent in the agrarian sector of Sweden within the continental belt of Europe (FAO 2009). The common identifier of rural banditry across these climes is its apparent opportunistic and predatory tendencies, which has made its occurrence intractable in some cases.

Critical Drivers of Rural Banditry in Northwestern Nigeria

Drivers of rural banditry in northwestern Nigeria consist in some socio-existential conditions that characterize the interior as well as the frontiers of the region. Prominent among these conditions are the scarcely governed hinterlands, forestlands and borderlines of the region. The northwestern hinterlands are marked by extremely dispersed rural settlements, separated by rangelands and farmlands that are susceptible to violent contestations (cf. Gaye 2018a). They are also interspersed by diverse forested landscapes, some of which are dotted by wetlands, rocks and caves. Apart from being separated from each other, they are equally far separated from the centers of governance at the local and state levels.

The forestlands of the region are vast, rugged and hazardous. Most importantly, they are grossly under-policed to the point that makes them conducive to all forms of jungle criminality. In view of this, violent crimes, such as cattle rustling, have festered in such forested areas. Hence,

> Nigerian authorities have recorded an increase in cattle/livestock rustling activities mainly in the north and north-west regions of Nigeria that is directly connected to BH (Boko Haram). Most attacks occur in remote villages, close to forested regions in the north-west where there is little security presence. These activities are profitable for BH

but also terrorise the local population and deprive them of their food and livelihoods (FATF-GIABA-GABAC 2016, 12).

At some points, the forests are coterminous with the multiple porous borderlines in the frontiers of the region. The porosity of the borderlines is nearly total. They are ill delineated, under-policed and thus, grossly under-governed. The consequence of this is the free-flow of illicit activities, often facilitated by criminal state and non-state actors. These activities include smuggling, human and substance (including drugs) trafficking and a host of transnational organized crimes (cf. Gaye 2018b).

The point being emphasized in the foregoing is that the peculiarity of the northwestern countryside and frontiers has made them liable to opportunistic exploitation by criminal gangs. The challenge has been complicated by the enormous landmasses of the region. Table 2 gives an insight in that regard.

Table 2: Landmasses of selected States in Northwestern Nigeria

State	Landmass
Kaduna State	46,053 square kilometers
Zamfara State	39,762 square kilometers
Kebbi State	36,800 square kilometers
Kano State	20,131 square kilometers

Source: Adeniyi (2018, 13).

The above landmass distribution is significant when compared against the sizes of some states in southern Nigeria. For instance, the super-populous Lagos State has less than 4,000 square kilometers (Adeniyi 2018). In addition to the under-governed territorial spheres highlighted above, rural banditry in northwestern Nigeria also derives impetus from the poorly regulated mining, transhumance and arms sectors. Small scale, illicit and artisanal mining in states like Zamfara have provided an enduring material incentive for bandits who occasionally plunder mining sites in order to steal gold and cash (*The Humanitarian* 2018). More recently, some bandits in that context have engaged in the kidnapping of foreign miners in prospect for ransomed (Personal communication, April 2019). Financial proceeds of illicit gold mining have also been fingered in the incidence of arms proliferation in the state (Adeniyi 2018). In recognition of the untoward nexus between rural

banditry and illicit mining, the Federal Government of Nigeria in early April, 2019, suspended all forms of mining in Zamfara State amidst the escalating complexion of bandits' brigandage in the state and the environs.

Regarding the question of transhumance, the poorly regulated livestock enterprise in northwestern Nigeria has led to its infiltration by criminals (Olaniyan and Yahaya 2016; Okoli and Lenshie 2018). This has found expression in the intensification of cattle rustling in the region. In states such as Kaduna, Katsina, Zamfara, and Kebbi, there exists a tribe of livestock bandits who specialize in large-scale raiding of cows. While some of these cattle rustling gangs are affiliated with local and transnational syndicates, a number of them act as mercenaries to Boko Haram (Okoli 2017b). To be sure, cattle rustling constitute a veritable source of Boko Haram's funding. The destruction of the rural economy in northeastern Nigeria by insurgency and counter-insurgency operations has limited the prospect of cattle rustling in the area. Consequently, the insurgents have taken to north-central and northwestern regions as alternative fields for cattle rustling. This partly but vitally explains the spate of cattle rustling in the regions over the years.

Our discourse on the drivers of rural banditry in northwestern Nigeria will not be complete without a mention of the issue of arms proliferation. There has been an incremental influx of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) into Nigeria from the Sahel since the fall of Ghadaffi's regime in Libya (cf. Gaye, 2018). These arms and weapons end up in the hands of terrorists, militants and bandits, who use them to terrorize individuals and communities. In September 2018, military troops in joint operations with personnel of the Department of State Service (DSS) arrested two suspected illicit arms dealers along Funtua-Gusau road with 1,479 rounds of 7.62mm (special) ammunition, on their way to deliver the weapons to armed bandits (Adeniyi 2018, 6). Incidents such as this have been sporadic in the various states of northwestern Nigeria where rural banditry has become the order of the day.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the incidence of rural banditry in northwestern Nigeria is symptomatic of a combination of factors. As indicted previously, there is an avalanche of 'ungoverned', 'under-governed' and 'ungovernable' spheres within the territorial domain of the focal area. However, beyond this narrative is the salient question of state's functionality in relation to security and territorial governance (Okoli and Ochim 2016; Azad, Crawford, and Kaila 2018). The Nigerian State has increasingly grossly demonstrated a pathological incapacity to govern. The government at all levels has exhibited a woeful lethargy in dealing with national security emergencies.

Essentially, therefore, while the menace of rural banditry subsists, the government has persistently failed to muster requisite political will and commitment to tackle the situation. As Jaafar (2019, 3) would like to put it "What we are seeing today is not something that is historically unprecedented. What is new, however, is the incapacity, indifference or unwillingness of the Nigerian state to put the insurgence of rural banditry under its effective control". And *The Humanitarian* (9-10) succinctly adds from the case of Zamfara:

> The tragedy for modern-day Zamfara is that more than a century on, there are still ungoverned spaces where the state is incapable of stamping its authority. Control is so weak in some regions that bandits can come into rural towns, typically three-up on a motorbike, unchecked. In some areas they lay down the law and become the local authority.

The Zamfara case is uniquely perplexing in that bandits in some areas of the State have gone not only sedentary but also territorial. They have founded underworld fiefdoms in the jungles where criminal impunity prevails amidst the ruthless 'authority' of the kingpin-bandits. The story of Buharin Daji – and his cohorts of criminal overlords – speaks volume of this arcane deterioration of the rural banditry infamy in the state (*The Humanitarian* 2018). Of all the states in the Federation of Nigeria, Zamfara has become most notorious for cattle rustling and allied jungle criminalities. Table 3 sheds light on this fact from the standpoint of cattle rustling incidence.

Table 3: Estimated number of livestock rustled in the Zamfara State in 2016

Area	Number of Animals
Badarawa	Over 200
Bagega	Over 4.500
Dorayi	Over 2.500
Filinga	Over 5.000
Gidan Kaso	1455
Guru	270
Jangeme	Over 600
Kizara	Over 4000
Lilo	90
Lingyado	Over 2100
Madaba	106
Nasarawa Godal	Over 1000
Nasarawa Mai Layi	500
Rukudawa	250
Shigama and Kwokeya	1020
Tsabre	Over 3500
Tungar Baushe	1110
Unguwar Galadima	850
Yar gada	230

Fonte: MACBAN (2016), citado em RUFAI (2016).

Patterns of Rural Banditry in North West Nigeria

Four patterns of rural banditry are discussed in this study, namely village raids, highway robbery, kidnapping and cattle rustling. Village raids are the invasion and plundering of rural communities, especially at nights. These often take the form of scorch-earth attacks that leave affected commu-

nities in utter desolation in the aftermath of an incident. Village raids can be uni-episodic or coordinated. The former occurs when a single community is attacked while the latter happens when the attack occurs simultaneously on a number of adjacent communities within a locality. The principal purpose of village raids is material plundering. In effect, in most instances, household, farmlands, shops and markets are targets of looting. It is pertinent to note, however, that some of the attacks have been merely reprisals, designed to show down on communities, which have hitherto challenged or resisted the bandits' onslaught through organized vigilantism (Okoli 2017a).

Village raids have been a common feature of the rural banditry escapade in northwestern Nigeria. Their occurrence has been perennial in the hinterlands of Zamfara and Kaduna States (see Table 3). According to Amnesty International (2018: 22):

> Several villages in Birnin-Gwari LGA of Kaduna State continue to face security challenges similar to those in Zamfara State. Their situation is even more volatile, due to the proximity of the LGA to Zamfara State. The forests that cut across the two states (Kaduna and Zamfara states), made the residents vulnerable to repeated abductions.

In view of the lethality of such attacks, many lives and property have been lost in every incident. This is in addition to massive population displacements and allied humanitarian complications that are also engendered (Bagu and Smith 2017).

Highway robbery is another critical dimension to the rural banditry phenomenon in the North East. This obtains mainly in the fashion of waylaying of commuters on the various expressways in the region (see Table 3). Abuja-Kaduna-Zaria highway has been particularly notorious for highway robberies. The incidence has also been alarming on the Kaduna-Birnin-Gwari-Zamfara-Funtua and Zaria-Funtua-Katsina highways. The highway robbers operate with wartime arms and commando-like brutality. In most incidents, they kill and maim people in their scores. The rampant cases of armed robbery on the Abuja-Kaduna expressway have forced some regular travelers on that route to defect to the use of rail services to commute to and from their destinations in order to safeguard themselves.

Closely associated with highway robbery is the menace of kidnapping. This has been incessant in states like Kaduna, Katsina and Zamfara (See Table 3). Kidnapping is a predatory criminality driven by quest for ransom. Victims of the crime are often those perceived by the perpetrators as possessing some Kidnap Ransom Value (KRV) based on their socio-economic

background (Okoli and Agada 2014). Patterns of kidnapping in northwestern Nigeria include highway-armed abduction whereby travelers are ambushed and abducted by bandits and then taken to a hideout in the forest where their relatives or associates are contacted for ransom payment. This form of kidnapping is common on the Abuja-Kaduna highway. Another important game of kidnapping prevalent in northwestern Nigeria is mass abduction. This is an instance where a group of persons is taken hostage by bandits who are prospecting for ransom. A case in point is the abduction of twenty caregivers in Jibya Local Government Area of Katsina State on December 23, 2018 (see Table 3).

The incidence of kidnapping for ransom in northwestern Nigeria has been disturbing. Between December, 2018, and March, 2019, Zamfara State alone recorded many incidents of kidnapping involving 227 victims (Gusua 2019, 1). The crime is also prevalent in Kaduna and Katsina States where scores of persons have been kidnapped over the recent years. In Katsina State, kidnapping is most rampant in the rural communities surrounding the notorious Rugu forest, which has been a veritable hideout for bandits (cf. Ladan 2014).

The most patent dimension of rural banditry in northwestern Nigeria is cattle rustling. This is a form of organized cattle theft driven by allied accumulative or profiteering tendencies. Of this, Bagu and Smith (2017,5) aptly opine that "in North West Nigeria, criminal gangs are reportedly engaging in organized rural banditry to profit off livestock theft and trade... ". Cattle rustling is intractable in northwest Nigeria because it fits organically into the peculiar political economy of the region wherein mobile pastoralism is an abiding practice (CDD 2015b). This political economy is situated within the rural agrarian sector that is hardly regulated. However, mobile pastoralism in the area has been associated with systemic contradictions, one of which is the emergence of a tribe of criminal nomads who indulge in all forms of opportunistic rural criminality (Okoli and Lenshie 2018). This explains, to a reasonable extent, the prevalence and apparent intractability of cattle rustling in parts of northwestern Nigeria. Table 3 also highlights select instances of cattle rustling in the region over the recent years in serial roll four.

Table 4: Patterns of Rural Banditry in Northwestern Nigeria

Form of Banditry	Selected Instances/Indicators
Kidnapping	A catholic priest was kidnapped in Ankuwa, Kachia Local Government of Kaduna State on March 25, 2019.
	Twin sisters were kidnapped in Daura village, Zurmi Local Government Area of Zamfara State on October 21, 2018.
	A North Korean Medical Doctor was kidnapped Tsafe Local Government Area in Zamfara State on March 25, 2019.
	20 caregivers were kidnapped in Jibya Local Government Area of Katsina State on December 23, 2018.
Village Raids	Motorcycle–riding gunmen attacked Kwara Village in Shinkafi District of Zamfara State Killing about 30 persons on March 5, 2019.
	Gunmen on motorcycles stormed Magami village in Maradun District of Zamfara State, killing and maiming several persons on December 23, 2018.
	Scores of suspected bandits raided Gwaska village in Birnin–Gwari Local Government Area of Kaduna State, killing 45 persons on May 6, 2018.
	On April 28, 2018, 40 miners were killed at Janruwa Village and a week later (May 5th), 71 people were killed in Gwaska (these are villages in Birnin-Gwari Local Government Area of Kaduna State).
Highway Robbery	Travelers were attacked by suspected bandits near Gidam Busa along Kaduna-Abuja expressway on July 22, 2018.
	Gunmen attacked travelers at Mashaya Mariki, along Sokoto –Tureta road on October 9, 2018.
	Thers have been perennial incidents on Kadun–Zaria–Funtua-Katsina highway until date.
Cattle Rustling	In 2013, over 1,000 cows were stolen by armed-to-the-teeth rustlers from a farm belonging to the former Vice President, Namadi Sambo, in the Birin-Gwari area of Kaduna State.
	Zamfara State accounted for 446 of the 470 incidents of cattle rustling fatalities recorded in four affected states of northern Nigeria: Kano, Katsina, Niger and Zamfara in 2015/2016.
	There is a thriving international cattle market in Jigawa State patronized by Boko Haram insurgents.

Source: Author's compilation.

Mitigating the Scourge of Rural Banditry

The menace of rural banditry in northwestern Nigeria is a phenomenal threat with asymmetric proportions. In its current manifestation, it has rivaled Boko Haram insurgency in terms of lethality and humanitarian consequences. Yet, its trajectory adumbrates a scenario that is ominously snowballing into a complex emergency surpassing the Boko Haram onslaught. The tragedy of the situation is that the criminality obtains an organic socio-existential context that makes it not only burgeoning but also pervasive. Already, the occurrence has pervaded most states of the northwestern region, with huge collateral ripples in the north-central axis.

Apart from the attendant deaths and material destruction, the crisis has engendered frosty inter-group relations in the affected areas. A case in point is the Habe-Fulde (Hausa-Fulani) tension in Zamfara and environs (Bagu and Smith 2017; Amnesty International 2018). The crisis has also led to declining rural productivity in many parts of the focal region, leading to aggravated rural poverty and destitution. So far, the response of the government towards addressing the crisis has been overly situational and combatant. The military-style response has consisted of strategic patrol and surveillance, armed reconnaissance, as well as coordinated air raids at the various flashpoints. Rather than mitigating the situation, the military operations have significantly led to the dispersal of the criminal gangs in multiple locations within the North West. Consequently, states such as Sokoto and Kebbi, which were hitherto scantly affected by the scourge, have overtime been inundated by incidents.

While it is advisable to continue with the military campaign against the bandits, the most imperative for the government at all levels is to devise an effective means of subverting the prevailing social ecology of rural banditry in the focal region. This would include, among other things, a conscientious effort at policing the gamut of forested landscapes of the region, regulation of trans-border activities at the frontiers, harnessing the transhumance and mining sectors of the region and controlling the spate of arms proliferation in the area. In other words, there is a need to undo the extant drivers and contours of rural banditry in the North West through an adroit security strategy that prioritizes proper territorial governance. In addition, this strategy must recognize and prioritize the need to systematically unravel and negate the entirety of socio-structural and existential factors that drive and sustain the occurrence.

Conclusions

Nigeria national security ambience has been quite tense and volatile over the years. While the North East is still under the siege of Boko Haram, the North West is steadily sliding into the morass of rural banditry. Just like Boko Haram insurgency, rural banditry in northwestern Nigeria has metamorphosed from a sporadic onset to a rapid upsurge in the recent years. Again, quite like the insurgents, the bandits have become not only stationary but also sedentary in the frontiers and hinterlands of the North West. The consequence has been massive plundering and carnage, which has plunged the region into a sort of humanitarian eschatology.

This study sought to explore the threat of rural banditry in northwestern Nigeria against the rising incidence of the menace in that context. The study observed that rural banditry in the area has festered under a socio-existential condition characterized by spatio-temporal governance deficits. The existence of scarcely governed hinterlands, borderlines and forestlands, as well as poorly regulated mining and transhumance sectors, has created an enduring atmosphere of criminal opportunism in the focal area. The situation has been complicated by the incidence of arms proliferation arising from the under-controlled local and transnational arms markets. Consequently, there has been a high incidence of village raids, highway robberies, kidnapping and cattle rustling in the area with attendant human security implications. Mitigating this challenge has been quite herculean. Nonetheless, the way forward lays in a systematic approach capable of devitalizing the gamut of socio-existential factors that underlie it. This would entail a conscious and conscientious effort at undoing the totality of the socio-existential conditions that tend to precipitate it.

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ABSTRACT

This study explores the phenomenon of rural banditry in Nigeria's northwestern region against the backdrop of its rising incidence over the recent years. By means of a qualitative analysis of secondary data, aided by the Routine Activity Theory (RAT), the study posits that rural banditry in the North West Nigeria thrives within a socio-existential context characterized by governance deficits, which has created an abiding pretext for criminal opportunism and impunity. The study identifies the scarcely governed borderlines, hinterlands and forestlands as well as the poorly regulated mining, transhumance and arms sectors in the region, as the critical drivers of the rural banditry scourge. With reference to the incidences of village raids, highway robberies, kidnapping and cattle rustling, the study situates the palpable threat of rural banditry in the focal area, noting that mitigating the scourge requires a systematic approach capable of devitalizing the gamut of socio-existential factors that underlie and precipitate it.

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