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ABOUT THE JOURNAL

The Brazilian Journal of African Studies is a biannual publication, in digital and printed format, dedicated to the research, reflection and propagation of original scientific articles with emphasis on the analysis of International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations and Schools of Thought. RBEA is essentially academic, linked to the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

The RBEA has as target audience researches, professors and students interested in the specificities of the African continent and its international insertion. Alongside such perspective, the Journal intends to expand the debate about the Brazilian projection world widely, the Brazilian cooperation efforts (including in the Defense field) with the African countries in the South Atlantic perimeter and the construction of a regional identity in face of a scenario of geopolitical transformations.

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BOOK REVIEW

EDITOR'S NOTE

Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira

December/2017

The international system is characterized by unequal power relations. The power of a state is, therefore, measured by its capacity to define and execute decisive politics in both the economic and military fields. The shift in strategic rivalries that characterized the post-Cold War has been altering the global outlook in successive stages that clearly demonstrate the displacement/emergence of power poles. From the "structural programs" offered by the western financial organisms in the 90s to the restructuring of the African Union, in the 2000s, the African continent moved from a "lost" decade to a new phase in which the idea of development became, once again, the most fundamental demand. Certainly, the overcoming of neocolonialism and the search for autonomy and new partners will not spare Africa from a Euro-American reaction, and neither from the power struggles of the local elites.

However, even though destabilizing actions challenge the capabilities of African states, the political maturing is a reality. In this number of the Brazilian Journal of African Studies, the focus of the discussion proposed by the researchers are exactly the political challenges faced by the African states, elites and societies. In the fourth number of the BJAS, we present ten papers and two book reviews from international researchers.

Sharkdam Wapmuk and Oluwatooni Akinkwotu examine, from a historical perspective, Africa in the world relations, from slavery to colonialism. The authors also discuss the condition of the African states in the global politics and political economy, in the international organizations – mainly the UN – and the African relations with the traditional and emerging economic powers in the paper *The dynamics of Africa in world affairs: from Afro-pessimism to Afro-optimism?. The CPLP as a Brazil's mechanism of acting in the South Atlantic: the increase of cooperation, the challenges and the possibilities of leadership* is discussed by Kamilla Raquel Rizzi, Isabella Cruzichi da Silva. The authors evaluate that the Community of Portuguese Language

Countries (CPLP), in its 21 years of existence, evolved, progressively, from a multilateral forum of socio-political-diplomatic concertation to a geostrategic mechanism focused on the South Atlantic, extending its operations to other fields, such as regional security and defense.

The researcher Hetalben Haribhai Patel, in *Opportunities and challenges for Mozambique from the Indian expansion in Africa*, analyses the Indian interests in its expansion towards the African countries, especially Mozambique. The rapprochement between India and Mozambique, according to the author, resulted in the increase of economic relations, more concretely in the increase of the volume of commerce and foreign direct investment, including the transferring of technology and know-how to Mozambique, elements that present both opportunities and challenges to the young African state. In *Comparative analysis of political competition effectiveness in Brazil and in Mozambique (1990-2014)*, Fidel Terenciano examines the structure of the party system and the effectiveness of the political competition in Brazil and in Mozambique, evidencing the profiles and operation of the political parties in both countries.

Alexandre António Timbane and João Gil Vicente, in the paper *Public and Language Policies: strategies and challenges in combating social inequalities in Mozambique* discusses the influence of the public and language policies in the life of the Mozambicans and analyses the possible paths to a politics that answers to the interests of the population. To the author, there is a need to involve the society in the decision making process and in the resolution of the social issues, because even though Portuguese is the official language, it at the same time segregates the non-alphabetized majority of the population. In the sequence, Henry Kam Kah analyses, in R*itual use of currency in Laimbwe history, Cameroon*, the way in which the arrival of Europeans to Cameroon, in the 14th century, and the introduction of western currency as an exchange standard and measure of value, went on to replace other native currencies. This new relationship, to the author, produced a deep impact in the initiation rituals of the Cameroonian societies, including the Laimbwe, of the northwest region.

The four last papers discuss themes relative to Nigeria. Mike Omilusi, in the paper *From Convenient Hibernation to Circumstantial Desperation: Hate Speech, Party Political Communication and the Nigeria's 2015 General Elections* evaluates that up until the eve of the general elections of 2015, many political parties that conveniently "hibernated" for the greatest part of its existence, either for a lack of adequate organizational structure of support base, or for their uncoordinated programs, or, still, for being registered because of pecuniary gains, suddenly began to show in the political space. According to the analyst, the general elections of 2015 offered, therefore, a unique

context to question the place of the party's political communication in an emerging democracy and, specifically, how the hate campaigns between the competing political candidates/parties could generate violence, and, unless tamed, derail the democratic consolidation. Jolaade Omede and Arinze Ngwube, on their turn, discuss the effect of corruption rooted in the political and economic spheres. To the authors, in *Mainstreaming Corruption Poverty and Development in Nigeria*, corruption suffocates the economic growths, reduces the economic efficiency and the development, despite the big aggregate of resources in the country.

Finally, Dauda Ishaya Suntai and Tordue Simon Targema, anchored by the Social Responsibility Theory, question until which point do the new media platforms liberalize the country's political communication process, beyond the opportunities and threats they hold to the democratic consolidation. The discussion is present in the paper *New Media and Democracy in Nigeria: an Appraisal of the Opportunities and Threats in the Terrain*. Also in this theme, Aondover Eric Msughter, in P*eace Journalism Practice and Development in the Northeast of Nigeria: Focus Group Discussion with Some Members of NTA Correspondents' Damaturu, Yobe State*, analyzes, based on discussions, the role of media organizations and how these should seek the most appropriate way to report the news, contributing to the promotion of peace in the country, especially in northwest Nigeria, where the cases of ethnic, religious and political conflicts destabilize the region.

This issue also includes two book reviews. Vladimir Shubin presents to the readers of the BJAS the works of Andrew Urnov, U*SA – Africa: the Policy of President B. Obama Administration. 2009 – 2014* and *USA – Africa: the Policy of President B. Obama Administration. 2015 – 2016. Chronicle of Events*. A great Russian diplomat and scholar, Urnov, graduated by the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, researches the foreign policy of the United States since his days as a student. From 1966, he became secretary, head of division and finally deputy head of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, being the one responsible for Moscow's political link to the African countries – particularly with the national liberation movements – for almost a quarter of a century. Later, he was the first Soviet/Russian ambassador sent to Namibia. When he retired from the diplomatic services, he became a Leading, then Chief Researcher, in the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Hélder Pires Amâncio, on his turn, collaborates with a review of the work of the Mozambican Alcinda Honwana, titled *O tempo da juventude: emprego, política e mudanças sociais em África*. The book is the result of researches carried out in four African countries, namely Mozambique, South Africa, Tunisia and Senegal, from 2008 to 2011. Its analysis object are the diverse

experiences of the youth (particularly Africans) in the way they deal with issues (such as unemployment, marginalization, lack of civil rights and stable means of subsistence, as well as social inequalities) generated by the flaws of neoliberal policies, bad governance and political crisis in Africa.

The BJAS publishes a bilingual electronic and printed version (Portuguese and English). We hope thus for the contribution of colleagues in Brazil and abroad, with whom we intend to establish bonds to deepen our mutual knowledge and build a Southern vision regarding the African continent and the relations with it.

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THE DYNAMICS OF AFRICA IN WORLD AFFAIRS: FROM AFRO-PESSIMISM TO AFRO-OPTIMISM?

Sharkdam Wapmuk[1]
Oluwatooni Akinkwotu[2]

Introduction

The article argues that Africa has never existed apart from world politics, but has been inevitably entangled in the dynamics and flow of events and changing configurations of global power. Historical records have clearly confirmed that there have been contacts, interactions and a flow of both ideas and goods between Africa, Europe, Asia and Americas. Whether the continent's historical contacts and interactions with the rest of the world have been a 'curse or blessing' has been a subject of serious debate (Adekaye 2010). African affairs have contributed in shaping the world and Africa in turn, has been, and is still being shaped by international processes and structures. The study of Africa in world affairs has no doubt attracted scholarly interest. However, most studies on the continent, especially in the past two decades tend to focused on the negative narrative - crisis, war, poverty, natural disasters, corruption, diseases and famine, criminality, environmental degradation, mismanagement of natural resources and crisis of governance (Zartman 1995). Some even completely wrote-off the continent as a 'hopeless case', 'dark continent', and 'the world's burden' (The Economist 2000). Africans have strongly resisted such narrative that tends to dismiss historical realities of Africa's rape through slavery, colonialism, economic dependency and continued dominance by the international institutions of global governance (World Bank, IMF and WTO) and external involvement and influence of the great powers on the continent.

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Thus, interpretations of Africa's place and role in world affairs lie between those who have completely lost hope in the continent- *Afro-pessimists* and those who hope for a better future for Africa —*Afro-optimists* (Clark 2013). Both viewpoints must take into account historical realities of Africa's emergence, existence and elements of continuity and change in the relations between African states and with the rest of the world. Owing to the lack of faith in Africa by the old powers, the emergence of the new economic powers, such as China, India, and Brazil, who sought to engage Africa on terms of 'partnership', 'mutually benefits', 'common history' and 'win-win' relationship, were embraced with a sense of optimism. Engagement between Africa and the new emerging economic powers have been variously interpreted, with some defining same as a 'new scramble for Africa'- suggesting that it is not different from the old scramble by European powers.

Over the past few years, the narrative has shifted to 'Africa Rising', signifying that Africa is no longer a hopeless continent, but a vast continent endowed with rich human and natural resources and whose prospects are not only rising, but increasingly being recognized by the world. Even so, it must be stated from the onset that studies on Africa in world affairs have tended to focus upon the foreign policies that African states have employed in their dealings with the outside world. While recognizing the centrality of this approach in examining Africa in world affairs, it must be underscored that the wider international system has to a very large extent 'shaped Africa-particularly the forms of state power on the continent' (Taylor and Williams 2004). At the same time, Africa's place in world affairs is being shaped by non state actors, especially international finance institutions (IFI), development and humanitarian NGOs, and transnational corporations. In addition to the forces of globalization, Africa's place in world affairs is further being shaped by international organizations. In particular, these include international organizations which African states established such as the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) /African Union (AU), African Development Bank, and regional organizations as building blocks for regional integration and development.

Our task in this article is to examine and to discuss how African affairs contribute in shaping the world and how Africa in turn is being shaped by international processes and structures. Accordingly, the article will attempt an examination of Africa in world affairs from slavery to colonialism; sovereignty, African states and world politics; Africa and the global political economy; Africa and international organizations, particularly the UN; Africa relations with the traditional and emerging economic powers, and the future of Africa in world politics.

Africa in World Affairs – From Slavery to Colonialism

It has been argued that Africa did not evolve in isolation prior to European colonisation. The continent, like some parts of the world, had to adapt to invasions and imperial rule. Africa was also subject to religious influences, namely Islam and Christianity. Africans participated in the international economy prior to colonialism. By the fifteenth century, the continent had built strong land and maritime trading links with Arabs, Asians and Europeans. Trading activities with European merchants opened the gateway for the entry of the European colonial powers who desired control of activities in the continent of Africa. The Portuguese, Dutch, French and British established trading post in various parts of Africa. By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, numerous trading posts could be found along Africa's coastline, with Europeans engaged in buying gold, ivory and later the transatlantic slave trade. The transatlantic slave trade took place across the Atlantic Ocean from the 15th to the 19th centuries. The Atlantic slave trade was significant in transforming Africans from a small percentage of the global population of slaves in 1600 into the overwhelming majority by 1800. The Portuguese who were among the early arrivals in Africa turned to enslaved Africans to cultivate the sugar and other crops on their plantations. Slavery to a very large extend affected negatively the demography and economy of Africa and for the European economy, it 'signaled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production' (Marx 1867). Even after its abolition, the effects of the Trans Atlantic slave trade in Africa cannot be wished away as it constituted the destruction of culture, language, religion and sustained a legacy of racism. This situation was to change dramatically, however, in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The scramble for Africa brought into sharper focus imperial competition for access to control of African lands (Thompson 2010). For economic, strategic and cultural reasons, agreements were ratified at the 1884–85 Berlin Conference hosted by Germany's Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, and this meeting saw Africa carved up between the European powers (Adekaye 2010). Only the empire of Ethiopia and the territory of Liberia escaped this partition. France was to take possession of North, West and Central Africa; Britain claimed West, East, Central and Southern Africa; Portugal laid claim to the territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau; King Léopold of Belgium was awarded the Congo; Italy sought to control in Libya, Eritrea and part of Somalia; Spain did likewise in north Morocco, the Spanish Sahara and Spanish Guinea; while Germany gained areas in the south-west and the east of the continent, as well as the Cameroons and Togoland. Germany, however, was to lose these possessions

as a consequence of its defeat in the First World War.

The impact of colonialism on the subsequent political, economic and socio-cultural environment was extensive. Elements within this colonial inheritance of particular importance are: the incorporation of Africa into the international political economy as a weak participant, the imposition of arbitrary boundaries; the reinforcement of the non-hegemonic state; the weak link between state and civil society; the promotion of an African state elite ill schooled for developmental pursuit; the building of specialist export economies; and the absence of strong political governance institutions.

Sovereignty, African States and World Politics

Pan-Africanists such as the late Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, Jomo Kenyatta and many others provided leadership in the nationalist movements in their respective countries in the struggle that eventually forced the European powers to grant independence to African countries. Even after independence, African states and the artificial boundaries created remained direct products of the European colonization. Decolonisation, therefore marked a revolutionary change in the basis of statehood in Africa. African leaders acquired rights of sovereignty regardless of the political or socio-economic conditions or prospects of the colonies they inherited. As newly independent states, they sought to defend their sovereign status in world politics. The international system, and particularly the United Nations (UN), collaborated to establish and preserve a large number of new independent states from Africa. Changes occurred in the years following World War II, during which colonialism became an aberration. Beginning in the late 1940s, with the independence of the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and a few other Asian states, a world-wide movement for the independence of all colonies gathered momentum. .

Once colonialism lost its legitimacy, the movement for independence could not stop until all colonies became self-governing. The international community centred in the UN came to replace colonialism as the moral, legal, and material aid structure that maintained Africa. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was formed in 1963 primarily to promote unity and preserve the territorial jurisdictions inherited from the colonial era, reinforced the external supporting structure of international legitimacy by forbidding the use of force and subversion to undermine the independence of member states. After independence, the artificial and poorly demarcated borders of many countries were considered the most potent source of conflict and political instability (Ikome 2012). This resulted in heated

debates on whether to revise or maintain the colonial borders. However, the OAU/AU elected for maintain the status of sanctity of colonially created borders to avert the likelihood of chaos and anarchy resulting from boundary contestations. In spite of this decision, border conflicts became a source of instability and conflict.

Significantly, although intra-state conflicts seem to have replaced inter-state conflicts as the principal source of instability on the continent since the late 1980s, the prospect of destabilising border conflicts is still very real, particularly against the background of Africa's ever-expanding population, which is accompanied by shrinking economic resources and opportunities, and high levels of migration and climate change. There have been recurring invasions, occupations, problems with refugees, border incidents, and other international clashes since independence. Examples are: Tanzania's invasion of Uganda to overthrow the regime of Idi Amin during 1978-9; Morocco's forcible occupation of large areas of Western Sahara since 1976; a prolonged war between Somalia and Ethiopia over a disputed region; invasions of southern Zaire in 1977 and again in 1978 by separatists in an apparent attempt to seize political control of the copper-rich Shaba Province, the Nigerian Civil war of 1967-1970, and contestations between the Sudan and South Sudan, are some examples. Some governments have serious difficulty exercising control over their territorial jurisdictions in the face of external and internal adversaries. These include Angola, Chad, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, and other countries with rebels or local warlords, and insurgents

Africa in International Organizations: The UN as the World's Most Universal Organization

International organisations, irrespective of their objectives, locations, size of membership and geographical spread, are created first and foremost, as a result of what can be described as broad complementarity of interests among the members. International organisations which African states belong to at least one or the other like OAU/AU, UN, and Commonwealth are essentially designed to complement the efforts of states in promoting and consolidating their perceived national interests. In the absence of a 'world government' to regulate the behaviour of states as they engage in the struggle for power, states use diplomacy as a key instrument for ensuring order in the international system that would enable them promote their national interests. Thus, international organizations provide African states with the opportunity to conduct multilateral diplomacy and in turn promote inter-state cooperation, shared values and interests.

The UN, created in 1945, embodies ideals of justice and inequality on the one hand. On the other hand, the power politics embodied in its structures, particularly the powerful five members Security Council, often mean that the Great Powers can manipulate the system to their advantage. The discussion on Africa and the UN is thus an analysis of how Africa has sought to transform itself on the platform of the UN and negotiate its way against the background of great power politics and Africa's search for recognition as an influential player in world politics. According to McKay (1963, 1) the rise of Africa was dramatized to the entire world by the turmoil at the 15th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. That signaled the first appearance of a number of African leaders who were welcomed by world leaders and who later took up the issues of decolonisaiton and anti-apartheid struggle to the front burner of the UN debates. Africa played an important role along with supportive countries from Asia, Latin America and the Soviet bloc, in the Group of 77 (G77) and China, on issues of decolonization, sanctioning apartheid, and promoting socioeconomic development.

African states engaged in a struggle against colonialism, apartheid, and racial rule under the platform of the OAU, UN and other platforms until the vestiges of these evils were crushed following the granting of independence to South Africa and the enthronement of democracy in the country. Even so, the issue of Western Sahara under Morocco remains a vexed issue necessary in closing the chapter on decolonization in the continent. Presently, Africa provides the UN with 55 out of its 194 members. That is not to say that African countries are always united. One of the most thorny issues in the relations between Africa in the UN in recent times has been the failed reform of the UN Security Council, from 2004-2005. The failure to reform the UN in 2005 has several implications. A reconstituted UNSC would almost certainly give Africa an enhanced presence at the top of the table of global diplomacy, helping to ensure that with consistent strong representation, the continent could seek to check the excesses of the great powers (P5) and ensure that Africa's security concerns are taken more seriously. This is particularly important given that about 60 percent of the Council's deliberations focus on the continent and that in 2009 about 70 percent of UN Peacekeepers were deployed to Africa.

Africa and the Global Political Economy

Africa's position and role in the global economy has to be understood in a context. Since the 19th century, Africa's political economy has left it marginalized and highly dependent on outside actors and forces. It has

been established that Africa is well endowed in terms of raw materials and natural resources, yet Africa still occupies a weak place in the global economy. From the 16th to early 19th centuries, Africa played an important part in the growth and development of the world economy, albeit only as a source of slave labor for the white settler plantations and mines in the New World. During the 19th century, the continent was progressively transformed as an additional source of industrial raw materials for European factories and also as market for goods from the factories. By the mid 1980s to the late 1990s, the marginalization of Africa had increased. The decline of Africa was two-fold. The first, primarily economic, aspect was that Africa was no longer regarded as important to the major actors in the world economy. As such Africa was not attractive to investors, multinational corporations and international banks.

The second aspect of Africa's marginalization was that with the end of the Cold War, African countries became less of political and strategic importance for the world major powers. Africa generated a declining share of world trade, and the main commodities it produced were becoming less important or were being produced by other developing countries. Africa's per capita income levels and growth rates declined after the first oil crisis in 1973, while its percentage of worldwide official development assistance rose from 17 percent to about 38 percent in 1991 (Callaghy 2016, 40). Africa's marginalization became more obvious when Africa's performance in the areas of agricultural production, level and quantity of investment was compared with that of other low-income countries. This was particularly true in regard to South Asia, which had performed better than Africa within the same period. Given the ensuing scenario, by 1980-1990s, Africa became more dependent on intrusive external actors. In the 1980s, Africa became more linked to the world economy as an extreme dependence on external actors, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These public financial institutions played key roles in determining and influencing Africa's economic policy. In 1974, total African debt was about US$14.8 billion, by 1992, it had risen to US$150 billion amounting to more than 100 percent of the total GNP (Callaghy 2009, 51). By 1996, the IMF and the World Bank had designated forty one African countries as 'Heavily Indebted Poor Countries' (HIPC). Much of Africa's debt was owed to international financial institutions (IFI), especially the World Bank and IMF, and resulted largely from the borrowing associated with stringent conditionalities.

The difficult external debt burden and the resulting desperate need for foreign exchange made African states very dependent on a variety of external actors, all of whom used their leverage to encourage further economic

liberalization and to convert same into economic policy conditionality. The bottom line is that after more than two decades of implementing the western driven SAP, African economies were worst off. Not only did Africa critique and sought for alternatives to SAP (AAF-SAP 1989), it questioned the entire western model of development or so called Washington Consensus. Part of the modification of SAP based on poor record was the introduction of the notion of good governance and democracy. Due to dramatic political changes in the world in 1989-1990, and the search for new foreign policy thrust to replace containment, the USA transformed governance into a political conditionality focusing on democracy and civil society. The new conditionality which intertwined with the economic conditionality created a dilemma for African countries that were required to reform and adopt democratic systems of government.

By the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, it became clear that if Africa was to address the problems of poverty, diseases including HIV/AIDs, collapse infrastructure, educational backwardness and other negative indices, and to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) - now Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), there had to be a dramatic change in the strategic relationship between Africa and the powerful external actors. This entailed a serious campaign for debt relief, supported by advocacy groups and international NGOs and which partly account for the creation of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) by the USA. By mid-2007, the debt stock of about 30 African countries that had completed the combined HIPC and MDRI process had been reduced by 85 percent.

Nigeria was one of the countries that benefited from the debt relief campaign. Nigeria's external and internal debts which stood at about US $25 billion in 1999 when the government of Obasanjo government assumed office rose to US$34 billion as at the end of 2004. Debt had constituted a heavy burden on Nigeria and stood as major obstacle to sustainable development. Nigeria was spending about US$1 billion annually to service the debt, leaving the country with less than US$2 billion to meet her developmental commitments, especially in the area of provision of amenities and infrastructure for human development and socio-economic growth (Ogwu and Alli 2006: 11). The biggest achievement of Obasanjo debt relief diplomacy was the October 2005 debt deal which led to exit of Nigeria from the Paris Club. This debt relief offered to Nigeria amounted to an US$18 billion debt write off, to pay off the balance of approximately US$12.4 billion to the creditors over a period of six months. When we compare where Africa stood at independence and more than half a century after independence, we can argue that lots of changes have taken place in the continent.

The continent is no longer described as the Dark Continent, a lost

cause or a continent without hope. The World Bank described 2005, and declared by the British as the Head of the G8 to be the 'Year of Africa', as part of the move towards a Decade of Africa. This was in acknowledgement of improvements in Africa's standing in world politics. Compared to the 1980s, growth rate of 1.8 percent, with a per capita growth of -1.1, the 1990s brought 2.4 percent and 0.2 respectively. By contrast, 2000-2004 brought growth rates of 4.8 and 1.6 percent. Exports also grew from 0.0 percent, 5.0 percent and 3.7 percent for the three periods respectively. The growth rate for 2005 was 5.3 percent, marking a sharp departure from the weak and volatile growth of the 1980s and 1990s. Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows also improved after 1999 (Callaghy 2009, 59). Two thirds of the net 2006 increase of US$2 billion in foreign direct investment was concentrated in five countries- Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and South Africa. The attraction of cause is oil, gas and mineral resources. To a very large extent, the extra flow of investment stem from the increased presence of emerging economic powers such as China and India in Africa. From a hopeless case, the discourse on Africa in the global economy has since shifted to that of African rising.

Great Powers Interest in African Affairs and Africa's Relations with Emerging Powers

The major powers in Africa before World War I including the British, the French, the Portuguese, Belgians, Germans, and Italians were attracted to the continent's endowments including vast raw materials, natural resources and land for territorial expansion. The scramble for Africa, colonialism and imperialism, which became features of narratives of Africa in world politics were largely products of vested interests of the great powers. Broadly speaking three major reasons account for the interest of the great powers in Africa and these can be categorized as political/ strategic, cultural, and economic. While the economic motivation has been stated above, the political motivations began with the political rivalry among European states for dominance in the international system of the eighteenth century. The great powers believed that colonial possessions conferred prestige and status. Even today, one can argue that possessions and wealth still bestow a great deal of status on those who have them. Large countries still compete for influence among small states. The competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union in the Cold War era rested in part on the drive for leadership and dominance in world affairs. Beyond the psychological satisfaction of being a great power, acquisition of a colony also provided a large reservoir of manpower to be drawn upon in

time of war. According to President Woodrow Wilson, 'During World War I, the war, to make the world safe for democracy'- nearly 1 million soldiers of African descent fought on the side of the Allied powers. In World War II, about 2 million Africans - and 1 million African Americans - served, again, on the side of those who were fighting against tyranny and oppression.

The great powers including USA, Britain, France, Russia, and Germany have continued to articulate their role in Africa in terms of their strategic interests which includes desire for access to resources, markets, and routes for navigation, and military strategic calculations. International organizations including the UN and its agencies, as well as international financial institutions and governance institution have served to promote the interests of these great powers who have continued to exert influence on African states. Given the dynamics of world politics and against the backdrop of globalization, the world has witnessed the rise of new economic powers that have sought to engage Africa for strategic reasons. With the entry of these powers, Africa has become a ground for competition between the great powers and the emerging powers from the south, particularly with China and India. The increase competition for access to Africa's resources and markets has been described as the new scramble for Africa.

China and India's increased involvement in Africa in recent years is one of the most significant developments in the region. It appears to contradict the idea of Africa's marginalization in world affairs and brings significant economic and political consequences. The period since the end of the cold war, when observers would point to the US, France and the UK as the only foreign powers to have substantial interest in Africa has changed. China and India as well as other emerging economic powers, have established themselves as increasingly influential players across the continent. China and India are often described as the next engines of world economic growth.

The amplified presence of the two countries on the African continent is now widely noticed. Although India's presence received less attention compared to China's, it is nonetheless of substantial and increasing importance. While some have referred to re-entry of the emerging powers as a new scramble for Africa, they fail to underscore what the implications might be for Africa and for the international political economy. It is important to state that the attraction for China and India in Africa is trade and investment, interest in strategic resources such as oil and gas, solid minerals (Obi 2010). The two emerging powers have turned to engage with Africa, and the volume of trade between the two countries and Africa has witnessed a considerable increase over the last decade, with the value of trade between China and Africa increasing by an average 24 per

cent between 1995 and 2007. Total trade now stands at approximately US$ 74 billion in 2007 (Naidu 2010). Bilateral trade between India and Africa rose from US$967 million to US$9.14 billion between 1991 and 2005 and over the period 1997-2017, exports from Africa to India doubled. Indian and Chinese activities on the continent have three primary channels; trade, aid and FDI. These are interrelated- trade is closely linked to the integration of African, Chinese and Indian investments into global value chains, and often Chinese and Indian aid offers are underpinned by market-seeking purposes.

Several aspects in the architecture of the global political economy have acted as midwives for China and India's engagement with Africa. Most importantly, the economic transformations in both China and India have raised strong demand for energy resources and to find new markets for their products. Improvement of transport and financial systems, and supply chains as well as in information and communication technology (ICT) are other important vectors allowing for the scale of current engagement and for an increase in FDI from both countries with India investing around US$1.8 billion by 2004 and China US$1.3 billion by 2005 (Naidu 2010). Perhaps a significant factor for the increasing footprint of Indian and Chinese investments in Africa is that most states had adopted Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) under World Bank and IMF austerity measures, which have created the correct market conditions for their entry and market traction. It is also worth mentioning that both recognize that Africa is undergoing increased political stability and widespread growth, an ideal trend for motivating their expansion.

To strengthen and deepen their relations with Africa, the emerging powers have used diplomatic platforms at bilateral, regional and global levels. The Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meetings held in *Beijing from 10-12 October 2000; Addis Ababa from 15-16 December 2003; Beijing from 3-5 November 2006; Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt from 8-9 November 2009; Beijing from 19-20 July 2012; Johannesburg, South Africa from 4-5 December 2015, were* China's strategies towards engaging Africa. Others strategies include at include bilateral and regional platforms. The 2015 FOCAC elevated China-Africa relations from a 'strategic partnership' to a 'comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership'. At the summit, the Chinese President Xi Jinping went beyond its tradition of doubling its financial commitment to Africa at each FOCAC meeting. This time around it was tripled with a pledge of investment totaling US$60 billion. The difference between the commitment this time around is that it was broadly defined as 'investment', including US$5 billion for grants and zero-interest loans, US$35 billion for concessional loans and buyer's credit, and the rest as commercial financing.

The diversified portfolio sends several messages that China is more than confident in the economic future of Africa; that China is becoming more aggressive in its financial input in Africa; and that the assets owned by China on the ground in Africa are likely to grow. At the Johannesburg FOCAC meeting, President Xi of China proposed 10 overarching plans for Sino-African cooperation, covering almost all aspects of their economic ties. These include: industry, agriculture, infrastructure, environment, trade facilitation, poverty alleviation, and public health. The plan fits into the readjusted China-Africa policy since the inauguration of President Xi. Notably, industrial capacity cooperation and strategic complementarity have become two key words for China's economic aspiration in Africa. There is no doubt that China is keen on shifting its labour intensive industries to Africa. Accordingly, such industrial capacity cooperation is to be complemented by the exports of China's excess capacity to support African infrastructure projects and capacity building through technical assistance, vocational training and fellowship programs. This of course is no free lunch, neither does it rule out the possibility of inflow of more Chinese population into the African continent. FOCAC represents an important platform for China in its interactions with African leaders.

Indian has also used the diplomatic platform in an effort to deepen its relations with Africa. In recent years India has strengthened its involvement in the African Indian Ocean Rim considerably (Ganapathi 2014). This shift in policy comes in part is because of India's desire to compete with China's growing influence in Africa. In 2004, India launched the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement (Team-9) with eight energy- and resource-rich collaborative partners, including Senegal, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana to whom it extended lines of credit totaling US$500 million (Singh 2007). This engagement is indeed strategically aligned to India's resource security and to develop closer ties with energy rich countries in West Africa where its presence has been negligible (Biswas 2016). Its biggest trading partner in the region is the Ivory Coast. In a similar fashion, the first India-Africa Summit held in New Delhi in April 2008, the second India-Africa Forum held in Addis Ababa in 2011, and the third India-Africa Forum Summit held in New Delhi, where "a model of friendship of equals" was presented, sought to be markedly different than "the Chinese template of 'money for minerals" (Singh 2007, 6). Then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated at the conclusion of the 2008 meeting that "India is not aiming to compete with China vis-à-vis its influence on Africa", and that "India is not in any race with China". In 2013, 16 percent of India's total foreign direct investment stocks were in Africa, while Brazil and China had 9 percent and 0.8 percent of their FDI stocks in

continent, respectively (UNECA and CII 2015). In the current conditions of the global political economy, interdependence has emerged as a central phenomenon that brings about a diffusion of power in international relations. In this view, the global political economy might create a more suitable environment for multilateralism, the emergence of international institutions and cooperation by means of a socialization process of states through evolving norms, rules and communication.

Relating this to China and India's engagement with Africa, and given the recent nature and pace of this wave of engagement, both countries are just now starting to define what these norms, rules and forms of communication are. The unprecedented rise of China and India as emerging market forces presents a large set of simultaneously delicate, complex and comprehensive, challenges and opportunities, for the African continent. An effective divide in the developing world becomes obvious when the characteristics of these two massive economies are viewed in relation to some African countries. China and India first and foremost advance their particular interests and play the game of constituency-economics at the international negotiation table. This means that because some African economies are particularly sensitive to tremendous competition from these giants they will now tend to try and find a more concerted bargaining position in trade negotiations vis-à-vis the developed world. The shift in the global political architecture of power, in great part pushed by India and China, has allowed for this situation and provided developing countries with greater autonomy when designing their particular economic policies. Simultaneously it has brought about challenges demanding greater agency from African economic stakeholders and concerted clarity in the strategies that will design Africa's response.

Africa and the Challenges of Globalization

Africa is facing a lot of challenges on account of the phenomenon of globalization. The concept and process of globalization is multi-faced and subject to various perceptions. Essentially, the concept has come to refer to a gamut of interlocking variables. Whereas the dominant perception of globalization in Western Europe and North America is the existence of vast opportunities for world economic development and significant contributions to improving people's condition of existence, in the Third World, especially African countries, the perception of globalization is that of a dangerous process that increases inequality within and among states; a process which increases poverty and sustains disempowerment of the weak. Mazrui (2001) sees globalization as both historical and socio-cultural process. As a historical and socio-cultural concept, globalization

is thus perceived as the movement of people, language, ideas, culture and products around the world. That the concept of globalization poses a lot of challenges to Africa is not in doubt. Mazrui also noted that globalization can be seen as an advanced capitalist mode of production. His argument is that globalization represents the new material and ideological mechanisms by which the capitalist classes control the economies and societies of the world. If globalization relates to global technological determinism, then it means that Africa is operating at an unequal ground with the developed economies of the world.

The major challenge of globalization to Africa is economic. It is common knowledge that today the thematic and dialectics of capitalism has not changed at all. In this sense, globalization basically means increasing vertical and horizontal integration of world economic and social formations into the world capitalist economy. This drive towards increasing global economic integration is driven by the dominant economic powers of the west for their ultimate benefit. It is in this wise that we can understand the argument that globalization strengthens the strong and weakens the weak. In this globalized economic order, Africa is seriously disadvantaged. The economies of the continent are individually and collectively weak in comparison with economies of the USA, European Union or even the emerging economies of Asia. This economic domination by the super-economic powers is sustained by proclaiming and promoting free trade enterprise which works to the benefit of the strongest economies to the detriment of Third World economies especially Africa. This is the neoliberal economic order which has driven the process of globalization from the earliest times and which is being promoted by international multi-lateral institutions such as the World Bank, WTO and the IMF (Asogwa 2011).

Africa is seriously marginalized and disadvantaged in a globalized world. A related challenge to the foregoing is that of technology and information dissemination. Technology drives globalization. The African economy is grossly import-substituted and it is a consumer economy that produces primary products and consumes finished products from Europe, America and Asia. Africa is technologically very dependent on forces outside the continent. This dependence is not for lack of skill, personnel or resources to develop Africa's inmate abilities but primarily due to prevailing socio-political situations that are not enabling. The implication of this is that African energy, intelligence and creativity have been employed in the development of societies other than Africa. Because of the advancement in information, and communication technology, Africa has been subjected to consuming foreign information and culture at the expense of her own. In reality, the effect of globalization on Africa is enormous.

Future of Africa in World Affairs

There continues to be a growing interest in Africa's development challenges and the continent's future prospects. The Economist magazine which in 2000 wrote-off the continent as a 'hopeless' case, in 2011 published an edition of an *African Rising- The hopeful continent* (The Economist December 3, 2011). The narrative of Africa in world politics, today, is not just of the commodity boom that took place from 1997 to 2007, which accounts for much of this positive commentary, but also of Africa's engagement of new emerging partners. Africa's international relations have expanded beyond engagement with the great powers such as USA, Britain, France, to include emerging powers such as China and India that have also helped to spur Africa's economic growth. The discourse over Africa's rising is also spurred by the vast amount of vital resources found within the continent. Such critical resources are seen by the emerging powers as strategic necessities to power their own industrial growth and modernization. Beyond natural resources, the involvement of these new economic powers in Africa spans diverse sectors, such as infrastructure, ICT, agriculture, and finance, with state-driven capital fueling acquisitions in the case of China, and intensifying private sector engagement in the case of India.

In the last decade or so, Africa has turned a corner, both politically and economically. Conflicts have subsided in some countries, such as Mozambique, Angola, and Rwanda and opened up in others. There is a renewed wave of democracy, with 30 countries thus far putting in place democratic processes in the period between mid-1990 to 2008 whereas in the 1980s, there were not more than four democratically elected governments. Coups are not as frequent as in the post-independence period because as the AU strongly condemns unconstitutional changes of government. Overall, Africa's future looks better than the past (Perry 2012). On the economic front for example, Africa's collective GDP in 2008 is said to have been roughly equal to Brazil's or Russia's at US$1.6 trillion, nearly doubling the figures of a decade early. With a combined consumer spending of around US$860 billion during the same period, and projected to rise to US$2.6 trillion by 2020, there is no doubt that Africa is on an upward trajectory. The fast rate of urbanization, although likely to generate more infrastructure-related challenges and increase the burden on inadequate health facilities, water supplies, and road infrastructure, is a sign of future dynamism on the continent, especially if the growth rates keep up and more investment flows into the continent. Despite these improvements in Africa's economic structures, the fundamental conditions that assure long-

term growth, including a proper infrastructure of governance and well-functioning legal, bureaucratic, and market institutions, are still lacking or are weak in a number of countries. Newer challenges have also emerged such as terrorism, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, drug trafficking, kidnappings and a host of other challenges.

Just few years back, the outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease, in some parts of Africa, particularly Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria, revealed the weak health systems in those countries. There are still a number of other constraints to Africa's development: corruption, issues related to weak governance, limited space for civil society, a weak business climate, infrastructural bottlenecks, dependence on a narrow range of products, reliance on traditional markets, underdeveloped human capital, and weak social infrastructure. No doubt, Africa's resource wealth can be a boon for the continent. Political and economic relations involving resources and development continue to develop between many African countries and emerging powers, such as Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey, and South Korea. However, the African leadership needs to manage these partnerships responsibly and with the objective of developing Africa's people. If Africa were to realize its bargaining capacity, it could better leverage relations with the old powers and emerging powers, such as China and India, to achieve much more for its growth and development.

With respect to Africa's role in the UN, it is evident that the number of African countries in the UN has not only expanded its size, but issues that help to make the world more united. In the past six decades, through the platform of the UN, Africa waged war against colonialism, underdevelopment, human rights abuses, and insecurity and helped in the words of Nkrumah, to bring the 'African personality in world affairs'. In essence it helped to humanize the world body, transforming world politics from purely power politics of the great powers to one that has been forced to address and promote the socioeconomic needs of the world's poor. There is no doubt that addressing the issue of poverty is at the heart of the sustainable development goals (SDGs). Even so, African countries must take into cognizance the fact that there would neither be a world of moral opinion nor the means of expressing under the UN does not exist. The UN is a battle ground of ideas, a platform for promoting political, social and economic interests of nations of the world where the strong continue to have their way and the weak nations also have their say.

Concluding Remarks

In this article, we discussed Africa in world politics and argued that

Africa has never existed apart from world politics, but has been inevitably entangled in the dynamics and flow of events and changing configurations of global power. The article also noted that the issue of Africa's position and role in world politics has been a subject of various interpretations – between *Afro-pessimists* and *Afro-optimists.* Notwithstanding the diverse interpretations of Africa in world politics, the reality remains that African affairs contribute in shaping the world and Africa in turn is being shaped by global developments. Africa holds a strategic place in the world (Clark 2013). It contains huge natural resources, including oil and gas, solid minerals and rich arable land for agricultural production and markets that attracted the great powers that partitioned, colonized and shaped the history of the continent. New economic powers are equally attracted to the vast resource and markets of the continent. Just as the world shape African affairs, its affairs also affect the world. Africa is also an important factor in world politics. It is also strategic in the world – Africa sits squarely in the middle of three of the world's most important trade routes: the Atlantic and Indian oceans and the Mediterranean Sea. Its 55 states represent over one-fourth of all votes within the UN system. Still, most African countries exert little influence in world affairs because of their weak political and economic systems and limited military capabilities. In the search for Pan-Africa solutions to problems of leadership and governance, development challenges, poverty, conflicts, terrorism and many others, Africa must act in unity and sought to engage the international community on its own terms as an equal player in world politics. The relationship between Africa and the international community must equally undergo a transformative change. Relations between Africa and the world must be rooted in the principles of equality of nations and peoples; mutual collaboration for mutual interest and respect for the ability and right of Africans to lead their own change.

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ABSTRACT

African affairs contribute in shaping the world and Africa in turn is being shaped by by dynamics in international processes and structures. Africa's position and role in world politics has been a subject of various interpretations between *Afro-pessimists* and *Afro-optimists.* The objective of this article is to examine, through a historical perspective, Africa in world affairs from slavery to colonialism; sovereignty, African states and world politics; Africa and the global political economy; Africa and international organizations, particularly the UN; African relations with the traditional and emerging economic powers, and the future of Africa in world politics. It made a strong case that studies on Africa affairs must take into full account historical realities of Africa's emergence in the world system, its existence and elements of continuity and change in the relations between African states and with the rest of the world. Africa's international relations have expanded beyond engagement with the great powers such as USA, Britain, France, to include emerging powers such as China and India. Accordingly, the narrative on Africa is gradually changing from a hopeless continent to an African rising. Given these developments, Africa must act in unity in addressing its many challenges, and seek to engage the international community as an equal player in world politics. The article recommends that the relationship between Africa and the international community must equally undergo a transformative change. It must be rooted in the principles of equality of nations and peoples; mutual collaboration for mutual interest and respect for the ability and right of Africans to lead their own change.

THE CPLP AS A MECHANISM OF ACTING FOR BRAZIL IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: THE INCREASE OF COOPERATION, THE CHALLENGES AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF LEADERSHIP

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In fact we're a nation that should think intercontinentally and the South Atlantic leads us to Africa, where everything connects us, from the geographical similarities (climate, soil, vegetation), all the way to the ethnical forces, the historical precedents and economic interests. The South Atlantic unites us to almost all of Western Africa and suggests a policy of intercontinental esplanade, that would improve not only our conditions of protection and security, but our economic alliances and our friendship (Rodrigues 1961, 345-346).

Introduction

Although the historical and cultural approach still serves as justifying reference for the majority of academic and technical production regarding the South Atlantic, a more profound analysis of the sociohistorical, geopolitical and economic realities of the countries which Brazil maintains specific relations with is proposed here, by the nature of Portugal's colonization in both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

The world system, anarchic in its origin, configures itself on actions and decisions made by States, influenced by objective forces that act in this system – the structure, the capacities and the power relations of a specific period – motivating the characteristics and the objectives of the relations

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between States, consequently, the very nature of that system (Brucan 1977, 12). When analyzing the historical continuities and ruptures as a whole, one can obtain a definition of the world system, which aspires to overcome the dichotomy between the internal and external factors in the explanation of its dynamics. The core (hegemonic) and its periphery (subordinated) are concepts of the same world system. In this systemic analysis, the elements are in constant interdependence, and there is no sense in considering independent elements, on one side, and subordinated elements, on another. It is, therefore, in agreement with Wallerstein (1979) and Krippendorff (1979), who identify the focus of analysis in the historical formation of the capitalist world system, where:

> [...] **the scientific analysis of international relations must be anchored in an economic-political analysis of society**, that has its starting point and reference point found in the laws that determine the production and reproduction processes of our time, the historical time of the Capitalist Revolution (Krippendorff 1979, 30, **bolded emphasis added)**.

The expansion of the capitalist system, since European mercantilism (XVI century), inserted new poles in its structure. Wallerstein (1979) arguments that the core – which allowed for unity in these processes – refers to the division of labor, which, in the capitalist system, exceeds the borders conditioned by the cultural and political structures[3]. What is interesting to the current research is that the world-system encompasses a capitalist world-economy and a group of Nation-States in a multicultural interstate system. Thus,

> [...] t**he appropriate unit of analysis for the comprehension of the transformations of the modern world is the world-system** [...], that is, a complex system, with multiple structures, but with an organic unit determined by the division of labor organized by capitalist interests, as well as historical, which originated from the modernity of the long sixteenth century and that passed by various cycles and qualitative changes. (Arienti & Filomeno 2007, 104, **bolded emphasis added**).

A world-economy, in this regard, is composed by a division of labor integrated through the market and not by that of a central political entity, where two or more culturally and politically diverse regions are

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3 The same author (1991) exposes that the social systems can be mini-systems or world-systems; the firsts refer to the tribe-like economies, connected by relations of reciprocity, involving an effective division of labor, a sole political entity and culture; the second ones however, are defined as a territorial unit, whose the dynamics of internal forces embrace external areas and integrate them to the expanding system – in other words, its spatial occupancy, determined by the economic base, encompasses political entities, allowing for multiple cultural systems.

economically interdependent. The modern world-system is a capitalist world-economy combined with multiple States that, together, form the world system. According to Vizentini, the world-scale systems, provided of historical continuity and progressive character were only structured after the Commercial Revolution, because

> [...] before the fifteenth century, the asymmetries did not possess a systemic character, due to the lack of a world system. It was the construction of capitalism that created the imbalance between nations, in a dialectic perspective (Vizentini 2004, 13).

The international division of labor, result of the establishment of the capitalist world system, converges with the analysis of the world-economy, limiting itself not only to the functional aspect, but also to its spatial dimension. Wallerstein's interpretation is based on the unequal distribution of the product of labor between classes, extending such inequality to the regions that participate in worldwide production; thus creating, in the production and distribution of the surplus of the capitalist world-system, social and regional inequalities that cross themselves[4].

Therefore, these world systems configure themselves by actions and decisions of the States, influenced by the objective forces that act in these systems (structure, capacities, and relations of power of a determined period), motivating the character and objectives of the relations between States and, consequently, the very nature of the international system (Brucan 1977, 12). Political power, pressure from and for technological interdependence, social change and the self-determination of peoples are the base of inequality between these Nation-States; and inequality (political and economic) is the root of international politics (Brucan 1972, 1978). The disparity between States shapes the world system of a determined period, through power politics[5], in three possible forms of interactions between States: intimidation/coercion; cooperation/exchange; or integration.

This diversity permeates the configuration of the world system through its dual base of actors (or group of actors): in the core, the central States and, in the periphery, peripheral States (classified as Large, Medium and Small Peripheral States). International and national are two sides integrating the matter of power relations of the State, in the field

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4 The Core-Periphery relation is based on a division of labor between the many regions of the capitalist world-economy, where the steps of the commercial chains are developed.

5 These power politics are oriented by its correspondents, according to Brucan (1972, 14): balance of power, spheres of influence; and his method, the rule of force, the dominance of the weak by the strong, the exploitation of the poor and underdeveloped by the rich and developed

of International Relations and of Political Sciences, respectively. Always connected to each other, national and international will have varying degrees of interaction, in accordance to the historical situation and the States involved in the specific matter. Having identified the need to comprehend such connection, the next step is the analysis of how such interaction is given, from its correspondents, between domestic and foreign policy. It can be noted that there is a preponderance of foreign policy over domestic policy, although it's important to stress that "... there is no act of foreign policy that does not have an aspect of domestic policy" (Duroselle 2000: 56). This is relevant not only to the more important actions of the States, but also to the day-to-day manifestations of international life.

A more precise notion of domestic policy is related to the actions of the State regarding its population, its territory, its government, aspiring to reassure its sovereignty and its recognition by the other actors. Foreign policy, in turn, is understood as the effective action of the national interest translated in state politics (a set of political decisions and practices of the government) directed to other States, deeply dependent on the profound forces (geographical factors, demographic conditions, social and economic forces, nationalism and politics) in the domestic sphere, searching for the insertion of this State in the world system. For Brucan:

> [...] the real border between domestic and foreign policies is reflected on both sets of variables [...]: government apparatus and leadership. It's here that real national sovereignty resides, where the truth of autonomy is put to the test. A Nation-State is a sovereign in the world [...] if its decisions are made internally, if they're not imposed or changed by a core of external decisions (Brucan 1972, 28, translated by the authors).

With this reference point, the internal political situation evokes the formulation and execution of a specific foreign policy. Thus, the concept employed by Araújo Castro (1982, 206) is adopted, according to whom foreign policy is the set of guidelines that the country has historically taken to effect in its relations with other States. Every possible connection between the domestic and foreign policies can be made explicit, exclusively, by way of an appreciation of the conditioners that affect each one of the dimensions of state power, in a determined period. It is understood that the formulation of foreign policy is a complex process that involves the relation between actors and structures. In this regard, some conditioners and constraints of the establishment of foreign policy can be identified. One of the factors that effectively exert influence, according to Hill (2003), are the historical events that, in larger or smaller scale, influence the decisions taken in the present. There would be, therefore, three types of historical constraints: a) the matters inserted in the institutions and in the culture of the country,

which, therefore, are almost impossible to be contested; b) the perceptions rooted in society, but that can be altered by one or another generation; e c) more recent conceptions, which can be easily changed without too much resistance.

In such way, in regard to the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), it is considered that the historical aspect is an essential factor in the proposal and maintenance of Brazil as an important actor. Brazilian foreign policy has in its agenda, the projection to the South Atlantic as given historically and geographically, naturally getting closer to the ocean bordering countries, both on the South American and African sides. In terms of the historical aspect, understanding the triangular relation, Portugal-Brazil-Africa based on the South Atlantic is fundamental, because, as Costa e Silva puts it, one cannot "[...] write Brazilian History without an outside perspective, a Portuguese perspective and an African perspective" (Costa e Silva 2005, 54). Understanding how the profound forces (geographical factors, demographic conditions, economic forces and nationalism, according to Renouvin & Duroselle 1967) manifest themselves in the countries focused in this analysis, through the historical, political, economic and social transformations, has also shown to be fundamental in analyzing the interests in play in the respective bilateral and multilateral relations. On the two borders of the South Atlantic are established (and mixed together) collective historical and cultural patterns that originated converging societies in terms of ideas and interests, which reflect, necessarily, in the relations established by these pairs.

The contemporary world system has been characterized by a profound reconfiguration, going from an inter-systemic conflict (the Cold War) to the reorganization of the capitalist system (post-Cold War), a historical moment which has been showing intense complexifications in the internal and external spheres of the States. Even when faced with these different conjunctures between 1974 and 2016, the nationalist character of Brazilian foreign activity has been maintained, punctuated on multilateralism (possibility of horizontality and diagonality, without negating the verticality) and in the clash (specific to some internal and external contexts) between situations: accepting the primacy of verticality (North-South relations), privileging horizontality as an autonomous form of insertion in the system (South-South Relations), or, even, adopting a mixture of both positions.

Complementing, in this article, we parted from the premise of analyzing the Brazilian foreign policy in its fragilities (dependency) and its potentialities (autonomy) in relation to the world system. It is also agreed with Lima when claiming that the orientations of Brazilian foreign policy results, simultaneously, from the necessity to stand up when facing the

constraints and vulnerabilities created by the participation of the country in the world economy on one hand, and, on another, by "attempting to seize occasional spaces of maneuvering in this system, with the goal of redefining its insertion" (Soares de Lima 1990, 10).

Complementing Brazilian foreign policy, it is worthwhile to stress that the international bodies represent a voluntary association between countries, constituted by way of a treaty, with the vision of an establishment of a permanent institutional apparatus, with legal personality distinct from that of the constituent States and that aspires to reach mutual interests, by way of cooperation between its members (Seitenfus 2012). According to Dervort (1998) "...the emergence of a global community of nations with a functional group of differentiated institutions for the taking of political decisions and a set of legal principles that define its functions is the most important development of the twentieth century" (Dervort 1998, 9). Thus, the post-Cold War world system has been characterized, among others thing, by an increase in these integration processes and in the search for larger and more qualified bi, tri and multilateral cooperation as an objective of the many nations' foreign policies, being the CPLP the result of such period.

Cooperation complements the external activity of the States, for it is presented as a form of creation and straightening of the political, economic and cultural ties, as well as offering more international relevance (instrument of influence and credibility). In a special way, cooperation for development, the most characteristic aspect of the CPLP, assumes a more diversified world system in terms of principles, programs and practices, resulting from the different historical experiences.

Therefore, the current matter of research consists in identifying how the CPLP, created in 1996, inserts itself in these natural agenda of the Brazilian foreign policy and that across its 21 years of existence embraced more functions and possibilities of interaction between its member-States. It is questioned, as well, if and how Brazil has been being established as leadership since its creation. As a research generating question, it's understood that this leadership, although competed with Portugal, has solidified the South Atlantic as an area of Brazilian priority activity in the twenty first century, with moments of higher or lower intensity. In terms of method, the article is classified, because of the objective, as descriptive and explicative research, by way of the hypothetic-deductive method and a qualitative approach. Documental material and specialized, theoretical and historical bibliography were used as sources for analysis.

Dispute for influence in the constitution of the CPLP

The idea of creating a community of countries and peoples that share the Portuguese Language – nations linked by a historical heritage, by the language and by a shared vision on development and democracy – was envisioned by many throughout the years. Concretely, the initial step for the creation of the CPLP took place in November of 1989, in São Luís, the capital of Maranhão, when the Brazilian President José Sarney gathered the heads of state and government of Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal and São Tomé and Príncipe, as well as the Special Representative of the President of Angola. The International Portuguese Language Institute (IILP) was thus created in this event, whose goals would be to defend and promote the language; enriching it as a vehicle of culture, education, information and of access to scientific and technological knowledge; to develop the cultural relations between the lusophones; to give incentive to cooperation, research and exchange in the domains of language and culture; and to spread the Orthographic Agreement.

In the 1990's, the CPLP, the re-engagement with Portugal and the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZoPACAS) were fundamental to Brazilian foreign policy in the South Atlantic. Briefly stated, the words of Chancellor Lafer point out this multilateral path:

> The Brazilian Government has intensified the ties with African countries, especially in the areas of technical, educational and health cooperation. The programs for reduction or forgiving of African debt, not only in the Paris Group but also in a bilateral level, equally reflect the government's effort in corresponding to the expectations of the Brazilian society, solidary to the difficulties faced by the fraternal nations. The valuing of inter-regional dialogue, by way of the Brazilian presence in the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, demonstrates the existence of a wide universe of collective interests (Lafer 2001, 192).

In this regard, the constitution of a lusophone community was the main base of this multilateral Brazilian activity towards Africa in the immediate post-Cold War system. Such community was established as a counterpoint to the anglophone and francophone ones, competitive and aggressive to each other (Sobral 1998, 380). Brazil and Portugal have been in a dispute for areas of influence in the South Atlantic since the 1970's, when the language speaking African colonies orchestrated their independencies. The character of the Brazil-Portugal relations, historically consisting of distancing and getting closer, also contribute to the shape and to the phases of implementation of the CPLP. The Brazilian re-engagement with Portugal, started with the quick visit of President-elect Tancredo Neves

to Lisbon, in 1985, furthering with President Sarney, who, in May of 1986, had been to the Portuguese capital, as well as the reception, in 1987, of the Portuguese President, Mario Soares, in Brazil (end of March, beginning of April), broadening during the 1990's. President Fernando Collor de Melo visisted Lisboa in February 1990, and President Fernando Henrique Cardoso had been to Portugal in July of 1995, when Chancellor Lampreia stated that

> [...] reassuring the modern path of the connection between Portugal and Brazil is the point to take from the creation of the CPLP, as well as with our African friends. It is necessary to show the Brazil-Portugal relations in the scope of the modernity of both countries, of their active participation in the respective regions, the MERCOSUL and the EU, and in the release of the CPLP, an enterprise focused on the political and diplomatic projection of the historical and cultural links between the seven Portuguese-speaking countries (Lampreia 1996b, 214).

An important aspect in the creation of the CPLP is in reference to the Brazil-Portugal relation, which is the foundation of the relations inside the CPLP. The character of the Brazil-Portugal relations, historically consisting of distancing and getting closer, also contribute to the shape and the implementing phases of the CPLP. In this regard, the two largest countries of the CPLP, for the same reasons, but in their respective contexts and local-regional-international interests (such as the political influence and economic connections based on their shared history and culture) joined efforts for the establishment of the Community. Although there had been a point of divergence between Brasilia and Lisbon in relation to the format of creation and logistics of the CPLP in the beginning of the 1990's (Rizzi 2014), the lusophone Community was formed based on the cultural aspect, but with clear tones of economy and politics.

The point of divergence between Brazil and Portugal regarding the CPLP was related to the shape that this resulting cooperation would take: Portugal identified the Portugal-Brazil relation in the Portuguese Language African Countries (PALOP), in the "2 + 5=7 equation", considered "ideal". The Brazilian diplomatic documentation is rich in this regard, for it clarifies the understanding that Brazil had of the multilateral partnership (with the creation of the IILP and then the CPLP), as a "7=7 equation", more "dynamic and positive". What prevailed, in the understanding of this research, was the Brazilian positioning, which solidified the lusophone Community from a cultural aspect, but with clear tones of economy and politics (Rizzi 2014).

Created in July 17th, 1996, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries emerged as a multilateral organization whose duty is to privilege cooperation between its members, all chosen by the shared language, which

are: Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe and, later, East Timor[6]. The idea of carrying out an engagement between countries that had historical and cultural affinities comes from the 1960's (and from the very character of the Friendship and Consultation Treaty of 1953). In the 1960's, the Portuguese government proposed the constitution of a "Luso-Brazilian Community", with the intent to make the Brazilian government review some of its attitudes, that had been taken in the United Nations, against Portugal's colonialism. At the same time, there was an intention to strengthen the bilateral relations, but not even the military government was favorable to this idea, even less the Itamaraty.

Although the essential argument of the CPLP was the valuing of the cultural phenomenon, its real (and dynamic) dimension was politics. In addition to the foundation of the Brasilia-Luanda relation, Brazil had a relative apprehension towards the real character of the PALOP-Portugal relations in the post-Cold War scenario. The Brazilian chancellery identified the diminishing contact with the other side of the Atlantic and was skeptical of the Portuguese actions in the vacuum of power and influence left in the five PALOP (but especially in the smaller ones), as was evident:

> The Portuguese Government – which is effectively interested in retaking its presence in the PALOP – recognizes in Brazil a protagonist role in the lusophone community by its pioneering initiatives of political recognition, by its involvement in technical cooperation and formation of human resources and by its significant economic investments, in specific countries of the community.
>
> On the other hand, the political credibility and trustworthiness achieved by the Brazilian government with the PALOP does not translate in an increasing and sustained economic capacity, that would allow and create a foundation for the Brazilian presence in these countries [...]. Thus, as it is of Portugal's national interest to associate with Brazil to, through our political influence, return to having a presence in Africa, it's also of Brazil's national interest to utilize the profound knowledge that Portugal can offer on the region and on the resources [...] that it's capable of moving (BRASEMB Praia, of C nffl 00122 1990 apud Rizzi 2014, 147).

In the beginning of the 1990's, after the changing political-economic situations of the PALOP, Portugal once again took the lead, opening the way to a differentiated relationship between "Lisbon on one side, and Praia and São Tomé on another, hoping that Bissau, Maputo and Luanda, after trailing the democratic path, would follow this new tendency started by Cabo Verde" (Alvaro 1993 apud Rizzi 2014, 148).

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6 In May 20th, 2002, with the achieving of its independence, Timor-Leste became the eighth member-State of the community.

In this regard, this Portuguese return to the PALOP propelled the creation of the CPLP, just as the Brazilian interest in maintaining the presence achieved in the PALOP, previously, had done. Since the creation of the International Portuguese Language Institute (IILP), in 1989, the Portuguese support for this establishment was without restraints, because the government of Lisbon identified the possibilities that the CPLP would allow in its relation with the old colonies, in Africa and in South America. This objective is seen more clearly in the words of the Brazilian ambassador in Praia, who saw the Portuguese vision of the CPLP as a "fusion of the current 5 plus 1 (Portugal plus PALOP) and its adaptation for Brazil's entry, in the larger context of the community which would encompass the seven" (Alvaro 1993 apud Rizzi 2014, 148). In other words, forming the CPLP would be relevant and inevitable. The paths that the institution could take were under Brazilian direction, for

> [The] institution of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, as it is conceived, can come to be a valuable instrument of political action, but we should advance with a realist perception that in the core of the Community might grow the same rivalry that we observe today in the "Francophonie", where France and Canada bicker among themselves for the leadership of the movement, although for distinct reasons [...] France (analogue to Portugal in the current matter) for being the birthplace of the French language and culture, Canada (analogue to Brazil), the rich and industrialized country. Mutatis mutandis, Brazil fosters attraction from the PALOP, for being a country of similar origin to theirs, but overall for having been able to develop and boast an industrial complex that Portugal cannot even dream of equaling (Alvaro 1993 apud Rizzi 2014, 148).

Aside from the objectives relative to the promotion for the defense of the Portuguese language and of the cultural relations between member-States, the process of creation of the CPLP ended up, during the Government of President Itamar Franco, encompassing clear political objectives. According to Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the CPLP would naturally have a vocation

> [...] for becoming a mechanism of political concentration and consultation, destined to give our countries an additional instrument for the coordination of their positions around themes of the international agenda, to promote together their mutual interests and to evaluate, from their own point of view and with a permanent foundation, the evolution of the international political and economic scenery (Cardoso 1993b, 221).

Therefore, if the starting point of the CPLP happened in 1989, the step towards solidification took place in 1994, when the Ministers of Foreign Relations and of Foreign Affairs of the seven founding countries

of the CPLP gathered in Brasilia as an initiative of President Itamar. It was there that the recommendation for the Heads of State to meet with the intent of elaborating a constitutive act of the community, as well as establishing a Permanent Steering Committee (located in Lisbon) to be integrated by the Director General of Foreign Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, and by the Ambassadors of the other six countries, credited in the Portuguese capital. The activities of this Committee related to the preparation of the constitutive meeting of the Community. As a result of the 22 meetings done by the Committee, the Constitutive Declaration of the CPLP and the Statute of the Community have been established. Chancellor Amorim summed up the essence of the CPLP, effectively:

> There has always been, between us (the official Portuguese language countries), a mutual and natural attraction, originated in the spontaneity of our people. But now we are facing a new happening, that compromises our Governments to undertake concrete actions envisioning the expansion of new horizons of political cooperation and coordination (Amorim 1994, 27).

In June 1995, in Lisbon, Portugal, the political and institutional apparatus of the CPLP was defined. The group of Ministers of Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs was now called Permanent Steering Committee and the prevision of April 1996 for the constitutive Summit of the Community was also recommended. On July 17th of the same year, also in Lisbon, the Heads of State and Government of the seven member-countries signed the Constitutive declaration of the CPLP[7]. The then Chancellor Fernando Henrique Cardoso declared in 1993, that the CPLP would not be

> [...] moved by sentimentalists. Its creation corresponds to a tendency of the current international scenery with the end of bipolarity, which opened the way to new initiatives of engagement between countries with affinity, sometimes derived from economic interests, other times based on cultural and political values. (Cardoso 1993b, 220).

It can be evidenced that the political-economic and even diplomatic

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7 The following were established as organs of the Community: the Conference of Heads of State and Government (with the prevision of meeting once every two years); the Council of Foreign Ministers (once a year); the Permanent Steering Committee (ordinary meetings, in Lisbon, once a month); and the Executive Secretariat (the main executive organ of the community, responsible for the implementation of the deliberations emanated from the other organs). In 2002, in the 4th Conference of Heads of State and Government of the CPLP, in Brasilia, the Meeting on Focal Points of Cooperation and the Ministerial Meetings was also conceived. As headquarters of the CPLP, the city of Lisbon, Portugal, was chosen in accordance to the Agreement between the Portuguese Government and the CPLP, signed in July 1998, and ratified in March 1999.

goals have been side by side to those of the cultural sphere in the process of creation of the CPLP. Such statement can be verified by enumerating the main objectives of Community, in Article 3 of its Statutes (revised in São Tomé/2001, and Brasilia/2002). Where the pillars of the Community can be found:

> Art. 3 [...] a) The **political-diplomatic coordination** between its members in terms of international relations, namely for the affirmation of its presence in international forums;
>
> b) Cooperation in all domains, including education, health, science and technology, defense, agriculture, public administration, communications, justice, public safety, culture, sports and social communication;
>
> c) The materialization of projects that promote and diffuse the Portuguese Language, specifically, through the International Portuguese Language Institute (CPLP 2002, n/p, **bolded emphasis added**).

Objective a) denotes that the Community was built in an attempt for its member-States to reach a collective international insertion, notedly in regard to other international bodies, where there is a tendency to treat large scale themes (such as the environment, organized crime, human rights, United Nations reform and economic integration).

Facing the reduced degree of contact between Brazil and Africa in the 1990-2002 period, Brazilian diplomacy identified in the CPLP a possibility to keep part of these relations, stemming from the argument of technical cooperation. This perception of distancing was visible to the Chancellery, although the possibilities of relaunching were, at that point, few[8]. More than a simple initiative of cooperation from Brazil with the PALOP and Portugal, the CPLP must be understood in the political context it was conceived, in the end of the 1980's, in the end of the Cold War and amidst its consequent conjunctural changes to the world system.

The challenges of the CPLP in the twenty-first century: The Brazil-Portugal relations, new members and expanded cooperation

Brazilian foreign policy, as of 2003, entered a new movement of pro-active politics, revisiting concepts and conceptions of the Independent Foreign Policy (applied to the new international scenery of the twenty-first century), utilizing south-south cooperation as a political and economic

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8 The Brazilian initiative and proactivity were evident even to the other members of the future Community, as is noted in the Portuguese press of the time, for example (Portugal 1994: 191).

mechanism, allied to the national defense policy. The South Atlantic, as an area of the country's natural interest came back strongly to the Brazilian agenda, be it for the diplomatic-political side, be it for the economic-commercial one or even the security and defense aspect. If the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, launched in 1986, was weakened in the 90's, at the start of the twenty-first century it began to be retaken in its initial conception of keeping the region free of nuclear armaments, and bringing closer together the ocean side countries around themes of geopolitics, security and economy.

In the same environment of bringing back the relevancy of Africa and the South Atlantic to Brazil, the CPLP also further became a priority in Brasilia's agenda, serving as a mechanism of complementation to the bilateral relations. It is agreed, thus, with Miyamoto (2009), for the presence of Brazil in the Community can be understood in two visions:

> [...] on one hand, its use to project Brazilian interests abroad, that is, an use of the instrumentation made by Brazilian foreign policy, envisioning to maximize the application of all possible resources, including to occupy larger spaces than the other countries of the community together; on the other hand, it can be, equally inferred that, besides the "pragmatism" in its foreign policy, Brazil also thinks in terms of a joint activity of the CPLP to attend to global interests that wouldn't be achievable individually (Miyamoto 2009, 33).

Therefore, among the main challenges of the Community in the twenty-first century are the pursuit of balance between the influences of Brazil and Portugal in the paths of the organization, the entry of new member-States and the extension of the themes of cooperation, notedly in the regional defense and security agenda.

The Brazil-Portugal relations fluctuate for almost two hundred years between continuous engagement and friendship based on the socio-historical aspects and punctual distancing, based on the political-economic competition in the South Atlantic. If the 1970's marked the beginning of the effective approximation of Brazil with the PALOP with its independencies, these also signaled the Portuguese distancing from these countries – by the character of their independence. The three main bilateral treaties (1825, 1953 e 2000) clearly show the primacy of these historical relations, with punctual adaptations to contemporary demands: a) the privileged treatment of traveling or migrating citizens in the other country; b) the fostering of friendship; and c) the autonomy of foreign actions (Cervo 2012).

The bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Assistance, signed April 22nd, 2000 (known as the Treaty of the Millennium) envisages the gathering at annual Summits, meetings of the Ministers of Foreign

Relations and Foreign Affairs and establishes – in place of the Ministerial Commission – the Permanent Luso-Brazilian Commission, with the functioning of the sub-commissions a) about the recognition of academic titles and degrees and for matters relative to the access to professions and their exercise, b) of economic, financial and commercial affairs, c) of education, culture, social communication, science and technology and youth and sports; and d) of consular affairs.

According to Cervo (2012), the contemporary Brazil-Portugal relations are based on two triangles: the first Portugal-European Union-Brazil, based on Portuguese activity integrated in Europe, intending to approximate Brazil with South America (prevalence of the Brazil-Argentina axis and of regional integration); the second triangle is regarded as Portugal-Brazil-CPLP, whose area of activity refers to the South Atlantic. As seen above, the creation of the CPLP in 1996 was a result of the two bigger States' efforts, because without their "solid and collective involvement, Lusophony wouldn't have any reach to the other members of the Community beyond a sparse cultural sense" (Cervo 2012, 91-92).

However, having passed 21 years since its creation, a paradox has been broadly registered in the bilateral political-diplomatic sphere relative to the Community[9], which extends to the economic sphere. The dispute for leadership in the CPLP and for regional influence (Portugal, in Europe, Brazil, in the South Atlantic), has, on one hand, exposed fragilities of the Community, and on another, made punctual advances possible, advances created by the demands of the other smaller States. It is agreed with Cervo, for

> The problem consists, however, in accommodating the collective and bilateral cooperation in favor of the remainder of the members of the community without an eventual conflict for leadership corrupting the purpose and compromising the way of acting of the two more advanced countries in the group (Cervo 2012, 92).

In 2005, the Council of Ministers of the CPLP gathered at Luanda, establishing the categories of Associated Observer and of Consultative Observers. The creation of the statute of the Associated Observer began to

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9 A punctual example of this intra-organization dispute refers to the recent indication of executive secretary by the member-States, in rotating form, by ascending alphabetical order, with mandates of two years, renewable for two more. In 2016, Portugal considered that, by the Statute, it had fallen upon it to indicate a name for the executive secretary, but some countries, such as Angola, Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe and Brazil invoked the existence of a verbal agreement which stated that Lisbon could not be a candidate for the post considering it hosts the headquarters of the organization (São Tomé and Príncipe indicated the new secretary of the CPLP, Maria do Carmo Silveira).

offer opportunities of adhesion for States (or regions) in the Community, by way of agreement with the member-States[10]. In July, 2006, Equatorial Guinea achieved status of Associated Observer State of the Community. Its interest in integrating itself as a member-State of the CPLP converged with its current policy of tightening relations with the Portuguese Language African Countries, especially the neighbors São Tomé and Príncipe and Angola.

However, such process of adhesion had a difficult path, criticized by Portugal and supported by Angola and Brazil, taking in consideration that the country had to deepen its knowledge of the Portuguese language (adopted in 2007 as the third official language, along with Spanish and French, introduced in 1998), starting to spread it among its population through programs of teaching and internalization and even cultural actions, because the *fá d'ambô* language, of creole origin (with a similar Portuguese lexical base to that of the São-Toméan creole) is considered the only legacy of the Portuguese language in Equatorial Guinea. The Brazilian support of the Equatorial Guinean adhesion reflects the return of the African policy of the Itamaraty as of 2003, with pragmatic and political actions toward the African continent. As a practical example, the expansion of the Brazilian diplomatic scope to Africa also targeted Equatorial Guinea: in 2005, the Equatorial Guinean Embassy residing in Brazil was opened and in 2006, Brazil established an Embassy residing in Malabo.

The process was not linear and, in 2010, in the Luanda Summit, Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde and São Tomé, all of which had publicly committed with Teodoro Obiang to the accession of Equatorial Guinea, had a clash with the Portuguese diplomacy, which was against the adhesion. In March 2011, the conditions for such adhesion were defined, and among them, the abolition of the death penalty, the democratization of the regime and the teaching of the Portuguese language[11]. During Equatorial Guinea's

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10 In such manner, the candidate-States must share the respective leading principles of the CPLP, mainly in regard to the promotion of democracy, good governance and respect of human rights, as well as pursuing, through their government programs, goals identical to those of the organization. The status of Consultative Observer however, refers to the partnership with some of the institutions of the Civil Society of the member-States, in the sense of facilitating the actions of technical cooperation between these (health, education, culture, sectorial entities and other areas).

11 Another matter refers to the questioning of the international community regarding the motivations of the government of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema (in charge since 1979), in adhering as a full member in the Community and in the questionable socio-cultural identification of the Guinean society compared with the remainder of the lusophone societies, as well as the matters referring to the promotion of democracy in the country, guiding foundation of the Community. Questions regarding economy, such as the fact that the country is an oil producer (highest GDP per capita of the African continent) and other

accession process, the clash between the Brazilian positioning (favorable) and the Portuguese one (contrary) was evident, as well as the manner with which each diplomacy used their influence over the other member-States. The biggest rejection considering Malabo's adhesion was always Portuguese, demanding that the Portuguese language be of general use – beyond the Equatorial Guinean decree of 2007 – and that the death penalty be eliminated. In 2012, in a meeting in Maputo, Portugal maintained the veto, but Brazil, Timor-Leste and São Tomé and Príncipe voted alongside Angola. Finally, in July 23rd, 2014, in the Dili Summit, Equatorial Guinea was admitted as a CPLP member-State, after, in February of the same year, in Maputo, the ministers of Foreign Affairs having recommended this step to the heads of State. Concluding, thus, a process initiated one decade earlier.

Other adhesions have regarded the CPLP since 2005. In the 11th Council of Ministers, in Bissau, in July 2006, the recommendation was made for the attribution of the Statute of Associated Observer to the Republic of the Mauritius (and the Republic of Equatorial Guinea). In 2008, in the 13th Council of Ministers, in Lisbon, Senegal was admitted in these terms. In 2010, in Luanda, the 15th Council of Ministers determined the "Regulation of Associated Observers", deciding that the category of Associated Observers is made by the Conference of Heads of State and Government. In the 10th Conference of Heads of State and Government, in July 2014, in Dili, the category of Associated Observer was attributed to Georgia, to the Republic of Namibia, Republic of Turkey and Japan. In the 11th Conference of Heads of State and government, which took place October 31st and November 1st, 2016, in Brasilia, the category of Associated Observer was attributed to Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Uruguay.

An important additional aspect is that of the expansion of the themes and conceptions of cooperation in the CPLP. Aside from stating in its Statute as one of the three objectives, this could be considered the main guideline that orients not only the internal relations – between the nine member-States – but also the external ones – between the CPLP and other international actors. According to Bernardino (2008), the organization takes an ever more assertive and global posture, with a much more encompassing field of intervention. In this way, cooperation represents a fundamental instrument of the Community for the development of the States, for its

economic opportunities must also be taken in consideration, because if the Community's main point of action still refers to technical cooperation, this also is shown as an appeal to Equatorial Guinea, be it in the educational or social area, as the interests the country has towards the lusophone countries' experiences are clear: "the Fome Zero program, the Portuguese diplomatic formation and the commercial relations with Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe, according to Anatolio Ndong Mba, representative of the country in the UN".

consolidation and projection as an international organization (Murargy and Ilharco 2006).

Across its 21 years of existence, the CPLP expanded and strengthened the domain of cooperation under the logic of network. In this regard, a series of efforts can be seen by the organization with the intent of forming an institutional body capable of identifying demands, financing and managing multilateral projects of cooperation. These, even though technic in their majority, are not restricted to such area, encompassing, as well, aspects that require a significant degree of trust and consolidation of the relations between member-States, such as security and defense.

The first document in the field of cooperation, beside the founding texts, was the General Agreement of Cooperation of the Portuguese Language Countries signed in the 3rd Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the CPLP, in Praia (Cabo Verde), in 1998, which conducted the implementation of programs and projects of cooperation and, according to Bernardino (2008), served as base for the unraveling of the actions amidst an institutional growth, leading to the origination of the other pillars of the organization.

The member-States had, as a principle, to establish in the scope of the CPLP, guidelines that would regulate the relations of cooperation, in a way that would strengthen the existing interchange and the developing of the members through mutually advantageous cooperation. (CPLP 1998). In this regard, important structures of operationalization of multilateral cooperation were created. In article 4 of the General Agreement a Special Fund is established, destined exclusively for the financing of cooperation and development projects. In 1999, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Foreign Relations signed the Regiment of the CPLP Special Fund, concluding the creation of a Public Fund endowed with legal personality and capacity, with financial and administrative autonomy, managed by the Executive Secretary of the CPLP. The capital of the Special Fund[12] consists of voluntary contributions by the members and other sources (international bodies, private sector entities and civil society in general), being able to finance up to 80% of the necessary resources for the implementation of the projects.

In 2002, in the 4th Conference of Heads of State and Government of the CPLP, in Brasilia, a revision of the Statute of CPLP (article 4, item "b") was approved, expanding from five (economic, social, cultural, legal and technical-scientific) to twelve thematic areas of cooperation (education, health, science and technology, defense, agriculture, public

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12 The resources destined to the Special Fund are different from those of the mandatory contributions fixated in quotas per country for the functionality of the Executive Secretariat.

administration, communications, justice, public safety, culture, sport and social communication). This increase of the cooperation range previsioned in the Statute granted an institutional apparatus for the initiatives that had already been in development, but were not contemplated by the official documentation. Besides, the expansion of the cooperation sectors indicate the consolidation and furthering of the interchange within the member-States of the CPLP.

In 1998, in the Praia Summit, due to the internal instability of Guinea-Bissau, support for the country was officialized by the organization, initiating diplomatic actions with the intent of contributing to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, thus the Contact Group was created, gathering the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Foreign Relations to, through way of diplomacy, end the war. The CPLP adopted a preventive diplomacy to manage the internal crises in Africa, thus, the organization pursued important allies in the continent, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), envisioning more integration and dialogue with the African organizations (Bernardino and Leal 2011). In the following year, the Community formed the first Observer Mission to keep up with the referendum on Timor-Leste's self-determination. The credibility obtained in this participation leveraged the international visibility of CPLP's action in terms of the "diplomacy for peace", representing an important milestone regarding security and defense (Bernardino and Leal 2011). The Community has demonstrated growing vocation for Observer Missions; in 2004, during the meeting of the UN Security Council the CPLP was called to speak about the Special Report of the Secretary-General about The UN Mission of Support to East Timor. According to Bernardino (2008), besides representing an important mark for the Community (a baptism of fire in the areas of regional defense and security), this event made the opening of multilateral dialogues in a global level possible for the organization.

Having in mind the positive results of the Contact Group in Guinea-Bissau, as well as the Observer Mission in Timor-Leste, during the 3rd Conference of Heads of State and Government, in Maputo (Mozambique), in the year 2000, the Joint Declaration on Cooperation, Development and Democracy in the Age of Globalization was signed, being the first document to reference cooperation in the area of security and defense, tracing the mechanisms of cooperation, some of which were to:

> Further the political-diplomatic coordination on the domains of peace, human rights, assistance to development, international trade and social justice; taking joint responsibility in the defense of the collective values and objectives which concern the security between the nations (CPLP

2000, n/p).

It can be noted that cooperation in the sphere of security, although not being part of the main motivations during the genesis of the community, in virtue of the situations of instability and conflict in some of its member-States, became an area of emerging concern coming to gradually occupy the CPLP's agenda. Across the years, in face of the advances and stagnations, organs, meetings, agreements and projects were created specifically dedicated to cooperation in security and defense.

The Center for Strategic Analysis for security and defense of the CPLP (CAE/CPLP) was created in 1998 in the first Meeting of the Ministers of National Defense of the Countries of the CPLP[13], however, only in 2002 and 2003, respectively that its Statute and Regulation of Functioning were approved during the 5th and 6th Meeting of the Ministers of National Defense of the CPLP. The CAE/CPLP consists of a headquarters in Maputo, Mozambique, and by the National Nuclei located in each member-State, in their respective Ministries of Defense[14].

The strengthening of the dialogue on the dynamics of security and defense is notorious in the Community, the more expressive example being the "FELINO" Exercises, which consist in a Combined Joint Task Force (FTCC) between the Armed Forces (FFAA) of the nine CPLP States conducted in their territories, concerned with Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance. The FELINO 2017 exercises, in their 17th edition, took place in the Agulhas Negras Military Academy (AMAN), in Resende/RJ, gathering military personnel of the nine member-States of the CPLP. The Combined Joint Task Force is made up of representatives from the Brazilian Armed Forces (Navy, Army and Airforce), as well as military personnel coming from Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe and Timor-Leste.

The Exercises started in the year 2000, having the first two been

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13 The first Meeting of the Ministers of Nation Defense of the Countries of the CPLP was a Portuguese initiative which took place outside of the institutional frames of the Community, noting that Brazil attended only as an observer, and only after 2002, in the 4th Conference of Heads of State and Government, in Brasilia, that cooperation in the area of Defense was included in the Statute of the CPLP and the meetings of the Ministers of Defense, began to take place in the same rank as the other ministerial meetings (Figueiredo 2013).

14 The Analysis Center is the organ responsible for promoting research in the areas of strategy considering the needs of the Community's countries, it acts developing studies that make viable the upgrade and application of doctrines and procedures, in the field of defense, of mutual interest to the members. The Center also created an archive, consisting of works relating to its activities, another important goal of the CAE/CPLP is to make possible, by way of the acquired content from its researches, between the member-States, the taking of concerted positions in the many international forums (Estatuto CAE/CPLP 2015).

executed in Portugal (the first being organized by the Portuguese), in the Field Training Exercise format (FTX) having as the main objective to practice the joint action of the forces of the constituent countries of the Community. As of 2004, rotation started and, currently, the Exercises are executed annually alternating between the Command Post Exercise (CPE) and the Field Training Exercise (FTX) formats[15] – in the year of the CPE modality, the scenery used is applied in the FTX of the following year. According to the norms of the CPLP, Brazil, Angola and Portugal would host the FTX type exercises and the remaining nations, the CPE type ones.

The FELINO series was created to normatize the execution of combined joint military exercises, fomenting the interoperability of the Armed Forces of the CPLP's member-States, as well as their training and use in Peace Operations and in humanitarian aid, in the scope of the CPLP or the regional organizations, being, under all circumstances, always under the aegis of the United Nations. Bernardino e Leal (2011) state that the FELINO Exercises are

> [...] a reference in the defense component of the Community, being pointed as a good example of institutional growth that has been seen this decade in the CPLP. These were born practically with the defense component, mainly when it was intended to strategically make use of one of the best mechanisms of effective cooperation between the lusophone countries, which constitutes the Technical-Military Cooperation (Bernardino; Leal 2011, 49).

The Exercises have been consolidated as a mechanism of interoperability and operational strengthening of the Armed Forces of the member-States (Bernardino and Leal 2011). Brazil has consolidated the role of the CPLP in its foreign and defense policies, especially as of 2003. Brazil's participation and leadership in the planning and execution of the FELINO Exercises has become a significant mark of this military activity, which happened for the third time in Brazilian territory in 2017.

Hoping to establish the general guidelines and formalize cooperation in the area of security, in 2006, during the "Summit of the Decade", in Bissau, the Community's countries signed the Protocol of Communication of the CPLP in the Defense Domain. Envisioning the promotion of cooperation in this sphere, by way of the systematization and clarification

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15 FELINO 2000 and 2001 - Portugal (FTX); FELINO 2002 - Brazil (FTX); FELINO 2003 - Mozambique (CPE); FELINO 2004 - Angola (FTX); FELINO 2005 - Cabo Verde (CPE); FELINO 2006 – Brazil (FTX); FELINO 2007 - São Tomé e Príncipe (CPE); FELINO 2008 – Portugal (FTX); FELINO 2009 – Mozambique (CPE); FELINO 2010 - Angola (FTX). FELINO 2011 – Timor-Leste (CPE); FELINO 2012 – Mozambique (CPE); FELINO 2013 – Brazil (FTX); FELINO 2014 – Timor-Leste (CPE); FELINO 2015 – Portugal (FTX); FELINO 2016 – Cabo Verde (CPE); FELINO 2017 – Brazil (FTX).

of future activities, creating a collective platform of knowledge regarding Military Defense, contributing thus to the development of the internal capabilities with the objective of strengthening the Armed Forces of the Community's States. In the document, the six organs[16] regarding defense of the CPLP were determined and had their functionality defined. Besides, it can be identified, in article 4 of the Protocol, "the fundamental vectors, that work as mechanisms for the affirmation of the defense component of the CPLP as an instrument for the maintenance of peace and security" (CPLP 2006, 4), bringing together the guiding lines of the Community's activity, such as:

> [...] solidarity between the member-States, awareness of the national communities in regard to the importance and the role of the Armed Forces and each of the countries in the defense of their nation, exchange of strategic information, to put it more daringly, sharing of information in hopes of strengthening our countries' defense faced with threats and challenges from the global surroundings, formation of the military, continuity of the FELINO Military Exercises, development of synergies for the reinforcement of the control and supervision of the maritime spaces of each one of our countries and others such as the military health forum, the naval conference and other actions that can reinforce the affirmation of the Defense component of the Community (Azevedo; Bernardino 2016, 31).

The 2006 Protocol, understood as a symbolic mark to the organization indicated that the CPLP, after 10 years of its creation, was already in a consolidated process and that it walked toward the expansion of its purposes (Bernardino and Leal 2011). However, even after more than a decade of signing, the document hadn't come into force, considering it wasn't ratified by all member-States[17], this served to foment reflections that would lead to the Ministers of Defense of the Community's Member-States recommending that the defense domain adopted a "mechanism with a guiding and conceptual character, capable of validating the new initiatives and the multilateral cooperation in this sector. It would be the elaboration of a new structuring instrument also capable of optimizing the synergies of cooperation" (Azevedo and Bernardino 2016). This came to be designated as the identity of the CPLP's Defense Domain, it was approved in 2015 by the Ministers of Defense and ratified in the same year by the Council of

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16 Meeting of the Ministers of National Defense or equivalent of the Member-States; Meeting of the Chiefs of General Staff of the Armed Forces or equivalent of the Member-States; Meeting of the Directors of National Defense Policy or equivalent of the Member-States; Meeting of the Directors of Military Intelligence or equivalent of the Member-States; Center of Strategic Analysis; Permanent Secretariat for Defense Affairs.

17 Timor-Leste ratified in 2010, Portugal in 2013 and Brazil in 2015.

Ministers of the CPLP.

On the document, Azevedo and Bernardino (2016) highlight that its innovative character, seeing as it gathers the fundamental concepts that encompass the geopolitics and the global surroundings of the member-States, it also proposes to be, in the conceptual aspect, the fundamental matrix of the Defense Domain of the Community:

> In the lack of existence of a strategic concept of the CPLP, that document calls attention to the importance of the collective entities, what unites them, what gathers, clarifies and guides them, being that it in the case of Defense, the mutual interests in this sector are what potentializes cooperation in different domains, maximizing collective responses. And this principle obviously applies to the universe of cooperation that is intended for the security segment of the member-States in the South Atlantic. Besides this, the identity matrix of the CPLP can be identified, based on the Constitutive Declaration and in the current Statute of the Community pointing to its fundamental point, strategic cooperation (Azevedo and Bernardino 2016, 30).

The Identity of the CPLP in the Defense Domain, elaborated by the CAE/CPLP, has a fundamental role for the advancing of cooperation in the defense and security sectors of the Community, once it fills a conceptual vacuum of the remaining treaties and protocols that deal with these themes in the organization. The document gives sense to what the member-States identify as dynamics of insecurity and security, and the mutual values that they are willing to protect.

Another point refers to the specificities of the CPLP in the defense domain, in particular the regional insertion of the member-States, as this insertion stimulates the perfecting of intra-CPLP cooperation and projects the Community in the regional contexts, aspect that values it as an organization of global and globalizing dimension:

> The surplus value that comes from the participation of the many member-States of the CPLP in regional international organizations of distinct natures, the ocean side condition, a shared cultural matrix and the harmony and success of the military cooperation actions, allows a delineation of a particular identity in this domain, with unique characteristics (CPLP 2015, 8).

As it concludes, the document incites that it is indispensable that this identity, detailed there, materializes in concrete actions, framed by a protocol of adjusted cooperation, which should encompass the already created structures, the dynamics in course and the previous ones (Identidade 2015). These actions were already verified in the following year (2016) in the initiative to revise the Protocol of Cooperation of the CPLP in the Defense

Domain of 2006. This, whose revision was being discussed since 2013 and was approved in 2016 during the Meeting of the Ministers of Defense, in Dili (East-Timor), suffered strong influences from the text on Identity of the CPLP in the Defense Domain, particularly in regard to the punctual characterization of threats, as is evident in the following excerpt:

> Conscious that our countries face growing challenges and threats directly affecting the safety of our populations, such as terrorism, transnational organized crime, especially associated with human, arms, and drug trafficking, piracy, cyberattacks, climate change, marine pollution, illegal fishing, among others, which harm the development of each one of our countries and reinforce the need to strengthen and implement efficient mechanisms of cooperation in the scope of the CPLP (Protocolo 2006, 2).

The alterations were made in hope of attending the demand for the creation of new forums and initiatives, in general the addition of article 4 of the Protocol is highlighted, which regards assistance to the population in situations of calamity, natural or technological disasters, as well as, secondarily, combating other non-military threats and risks, defined as a mechanism of joint response to situations of catastrophe in the member countries. The modifications also incorporate the Military Health Forum of the CPLP (FSM) and the Naval Conference of the CPLP (CMCPLP)

Having in mind the cumulated initiatives of the CPLP in the domain of security and defense cooperation, it can be stated that the greatest merit of this work is in regard to conflict prevention. The community has been punctually acting at the level of preventive diplomacy by way of the Contact Groups and Observer Missions, not only with the intent to accompany the internal conflicts in its member-States, as is the case in Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe and in East Timor, but also to actively intervene, in accordance with its capabilities, in their resolution (Figueiredo 2013)[18].

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18 In this regard, the example of joint activity in the process of repeated attempts to stabilize Guinea-Bissau, as of 2011, between the CPLP and the ECOWAS is interesting. Both organizations orchestrated a reform in the Bissau-Guinean Armed Forces (assistance in reforming the physical structures and personnel training). In the 92nd Extraordinary Meeting of the Permanent Steering Committee of the CPLP in 2014, Carlos Moura was nominated as the Special Representative of the CPLP in Guinea-Bissau, to locally accompany the evolution of the situation until the completion of the electoral process. The P5 group (UN, African Union, ECOWAS, CPLP, European Union) have attentively observed the Bissau-Guinean situation, which is not heading toward a solution since 2015. ECOWAS has been the main mediating organization of the situation, becoming a protagonist in the conduction of the negotiations, in detriment of an observer action by the CPLP, which bases its initiatives in meetings with the parties involved in the conflict. In the 14th Extraordinary Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the CPLP the Special Representative of the CPLP in Bissau was extended to July 31st, 2016.

Conflict prevention is vital for stability and sustained development, but also is a fundamental conditioner for the consolidation of the Community, and the CPLP has shown to be capable of fully performing this type of mission, not only in the central core of its member-States, but also in other regions (Figueiredo 2013). When taking on such a significant role the organization is willing to "contribute to the sustained development and security of Africans in Africa, which implies assuming a geopolitical and geostrategic vocation that had always been unconsciously present" (Bernardino and Leal 2011, 31).

Regarding the expansion of cooperation to the field of regional security and defense, correlating the initiatives of the CPLP and the intentions of the ZoPACAS in maintaining the South Atlantic as an area free of nuclear arms:

> Situated in four continents and members of different political groups and defense organizations, **our countries find their collective vocation in cooperation and in concertation.** As it generates consensus around programs and perspectives in common, the CPLP will be increasingly more needed in a multipolar world that has as its basic characteristics the coexistence of different political perspectives. And, in **advancing its message of solidarity in the field of defense,** the CPLP will give its contribution so that this coexistence is guided by the best values of humanity (Amorim 2016, 32, **bold emphasis added**).

The South Atlantic has retaken its role of appeal in the configuration of forces of the world system in the twenty-first century, especially by the leaderships on its borders, in the western side, Brazil and in the eastern side, Angola. It is agreed with Pimentel (2000) when stating that:

> The CPLP is not the remedy of all evils. It is a political-diplomatic instrument, aimed at promoting the approximation of its members and forging partnerships. It does not replace, but actually complements and strengthens bilateral activity. Its objectives are of long prize, its rules are democratic, its space is open to collaborations with other partners, public and private, intra and extra-zone (Pimentel 2000, 19).

There is, in the twenty first century, a revised notion of the Community's and the ZoPACAS' potential to Brazilian diplomacy in the construction of agreements on the multilateral sphere, mechanisms capable of gathering groups of nations around specific or general themes, looking to favor collective objectives in the global forums. Besides, the CPLP as well as the Zone have the ability to potentially serve as a locus of intersection between the many processes of economic integration happening in the region of the South Atlantic, capable of implementing the interchange between MERCOSUL, SADC and ECOWAS.

Final Considerations

Across its 21 years of existence, the CPLP has been gradually growing (and maturing), in accordance with its initially intended objectives, attracting attention and interest from the international community, with special notoriety in the African continent. With precise actions (and without ostentation), of a more technical-social, cultural and even observer character, the Community has furthered the "collective presence" of its members in the world system, where cooperation is key to the relations between member-States, and between them and the world. It would not be odd if the other States started to show interest toward participating of the CPLP as Associated Observer States, such as Argentina, which solicited the status in June 2017

Great ambitions can be seen in expanding and deepening the domain of cooperation between its member-States, but also between the organization and the other international actors. The creation of a platform of mutual interests by way of the business community and private sector investment can become an active principle bringing to the Community the expansion of its markets and the protection of mutual interests in international negotiations. Under this perspective, the relations between the CPLP and the People's Republic of China are also inserted, for example. The Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation Between China and the CPLP, also called the "Macau Forum", created in 2003 by initiative of the Chinese government, with the intent of being a multilateral mechanism of intergovernmental cooperation with the goal of consolidating the commercial and economic interchange between China and the member-States[19]: Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, Timor-Leste and São Tomé[20]. Across the five Ministerial Conferences (2003, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2016) the Plans of Action for Economic and Commercial Cooperation were approved, which defined the purposes and the content for the cooperation in the following areas: intergovernmental, commerce, investment and business cooperation, productive capacity,

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19 São Tomé e Príncipe was only inserted in 2017 after resuming their diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, previously, it participated in meetings as an observer. Equatorial Guinea has yet to be integrated to the Forum.

20 The Macau Forum received this denomination in virtue of its permanent secretariat being located in the Macau Administrative Region, acting as an instrument of persuasion to Chinese foreign policy, as it brought benefits to the region, such as the promotion of its intercontinental image, the expansion of tourism and the diversification of the economy, including new services related to Lusophony, conserving its autonomy and the region's prosperity (Veloso 2015).

agriculture, forest, fishing and cattle, infrastructure, energy and natural resources, education and human resources, financial area, cooperation for development, tourism, transportation and communication, culture, radio, movies and television, sports, health, maritime domain, cooperation between provinces and counties (Fórum Macau 2017). Being a new form of transregional cooperation, the Macau Forum acts by establishing regular contacts between the participants as well as making use of the Chinese economic appeal to expand its space of activity in the international scenery and actively contribute to the increase of commercial cooperation between its members. (Veloso 2015).

The CPLP, has not yet been configured as an arrangement exclusively between Chancelleries, it proposes to make viable the interaction between the civil societies of its member-States and other countries/organizations, in the sense of furthering technical cooperation, with goals of socio-economic development of its activities. The deepening of the member-States' interest in the CPLP is evident in Xanana Gusmão's speech in 2014:

> Our Community's heterogeneity is part of its primary essence, as it always has. A diversity that resides not only in the very different locations that compose it – from Brazil's immensity to São Tomé's special smallness – and also not in the distinct neighboring surroundings where our nations formed, spread out as we are in four continents. **From this diversity come the greatest challenges and the greatest opportunities for our sense of community.** It's this difference that multiplies our richness and which should be capitalized for benefit of our citizens. In this cultural, economic and geographic mosaic we can find, equally, collective or complementary foundations that could in turn sustain new bridges for cooperation inside our Community and with the different regional poles that we have entered (Gusmão 2014, 11, **bold emphasis added)**

Regarding Brazil, it is clear that the CPLP is a vital political mechanism of activity in the South Atlantic, conceived as an area of attention, action and natural interest of the country. Brazilian foreign policy towards the CPLP was analyzed in the aspect of its potentialities (autonomy) in relation to the world system, in the sense of furthering its insertion in this geographical area of influence and natural Brazilian projection. Cooperation has been a mark of the Brazilian foreign policy, especially with the developing nations and the PALOP, specifically. Thus, expanding cooperation in the scope of the CPLP is naturally in accordance with the scope of Brasilia's activity, well solidified since 1986, with the creation of the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC), which acts in this field, integrating the Itamaraty's actions with the other Brazilian ministries and public organs.

Brazil's priority in the CPLP is identified in the spectrum of the south-south cooperation, in the position of regional leadership and in the

defense of the multipolar world system, based on coalitions made in the South. The sharing between the member-States of the CPLP of the values such as sovereignty, resistance to pressure from economic and political hegemonic forces, as well as projection of a more symmetrical order in the international relations that unite and strengthen the organization (Pereira 2010). Besides this, the South Atlantic has been converting to be a Brazilian priority of interest and activity, as is clear in the evolution of the country's defense documents, since 1996. These potentialities start to become more evident after 2003, with the merging of the actions of foreign policy and national defense. Thus, for example, the National Policy of Defense, of 1996, foresaw cooperation in the "Brazilian regional space" extrapolating the continental mass to the South-American mass, including as well, the South Atlantic (PND 1996, 5). In the updating of the National Policy of Defense (2005, 2012 and 2016) the maintenance of the South Atlantic as a strategic area for Brazil is evident, furthering the specificities of attention and activity as well. In the National Defense Strategy (2012) the relevance of the Minister of Defense's action is clearly stressed when regarding the interaction with the CPLP to "increase inter-regional interaction" (END 2012: 37). In the National Defense Plan, this conception is furthered, when establishing "the Brazilian strategic surrounding as an area of priority interest, which includes South America, the South Atlantic, the West African coastal countries and Antarctica" (PND 2016, 6).

The CPLP and the ZoPACAS tend to consolidate themselves in decisive mechanisms of Brazilian activity of foreign and defense policies. As Brazilian efforts in making the region strategically vital (in geopolitical and economic terms), through south-south cooperation, with domestic actions clearly favorable to such, the remainder of the region's countries also understand the relevancy of more concrete and permanent actions, confronting some analysts' views on the notion of "strategic vacuum". In this regard, if the ZoPACAS tends to be configured as an indispensable secondary instrument for the region, the expansion of cooperation in the areas of defense and security of the CPLP puts it as another mechanism that reaffirms the South Atlantic as a vital geostrategic area in the current world system, attracting the attention of extra-regional powers. In the case of the CPLP, it is worthwhile to highlight the Portuguese interest in being close to their former African colonies, be it by the cultural path, or the political-military one.

Brazil and Portugal, as the two largest member-States and with the most influence and interest in the Community, although with moments of competition in leadership and punctual disagreements, understand the relevance of the organization for the cooperation between its member-States

and for the region of the South Atlantic, for,

> [...] this geopolitical and geostrategic instrumentation of historical, cultural and linguistic singularity that characterizes the Luso-Brazilian relationship has two consequences: (i) the end of the so-called "door theory", according to which, the importance of Portugal in regard to the Luso-Brazilian relationship is connected to its role of link between the other political-economic centers that surround it. (Lopes 2000; Leal 2000); and (ii) the reinforcing of Portugal's maritime dimension as a counterpoint to its peripheral localization in the European continent (Bessa 2000; Bessa 2004; Carvalho 2004; Moreira 2004) (Barbosa 2008, 13).

This expansion of cooperation is evident, as well, when in the 12th Ordinary Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the CPLP, taken place in July 2017, in Brasilia, the discussion of the Agenda 2030 for the Sustained Development of its countries was finished. In the 11th Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Community, in Brasilia, on October 31st and November 1st 2016, the Declaration on the New Strategic Vision of the CPLP (2016-2026) was approved, a document that systemizes the action guiding priorities of the Community in the next decade, demonstrating the vigor of the organization and its development, especially in expanded cooperation and in incentivizing greater proximity between the civil societies of its member-States and of its Associated Observer States

The CPLP, whose creating dates back to the Brazilian initiative, depends in Brasilia's leadership to overcome the challenges of the twenty-first century and consolidate itself as an essential mechanism of political-diplomatic cooperation and coordination as well as regional defense. Transforming the historical ties based on the South Atlantic in a leverage for the development of the member-States is the challenge of the Community, going from political-diplomatic coordination to expanded cooperation, notoriously in the area of regional security and defense.

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ABSTRACT

In its 21 years of existence, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) has progressively evolved from a multilateral forum of socio-political-diplomatic focus to a geostrategic mechanism focused on the South Atlantic, expanding its activity to other areas, such as security and regional defense. In this regard, the article analyses how this evolution of the status of the CPLP, enveloping more functions and possibilities of interaction between its members and other States and organizations, discussing how Brazil has been established as leadership in the institution since its creation. The current challenges of the Community are brought up, such as the dispute for leadership between Brazil and Portugal, the expansion of cooperation and the entry of new member-States. As a research generating question, it's understood that this leadership, although competed with Portugal, has solidified the South Atlantic as an area of Brazilian priority activity in the twenty first century. In terms of method, the research is classified, because of the objective, as descriptive and explicative, through the hypothetical-deductive method and a qualitative approach, analyzing primary and secondary sources.

KEYWORDS

CPLP; Brazilian foreign policy; South Atlantic.

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR MOZAMBIQUE FROM THE INDIAN EXPANSION IN AFRICA

Hetalben Haribhai Patel[1]

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the international relations have been marked by the arising of new actors called as emergent countries, which have challenged the power and the traditional relationships of Western nations in Africa. One of these countries is India that, since the end of the 90s, has had high and continuous growth rates, what makes it narrow its ties and establish new partnerships in order to satisfy internal and international necessities.

The ties with African countries, more specifically with Mozambique, have taken place since before the arrival of Europeans through maritime trade. The relationships deepened during the Cold War with the Indian support to the national freedom movement and the creation of a diplomatic mission in the capital. With India's economic growth, bilateral agreements took shape through the increase of commercial relationships as well of investments. Contemporarily, India is one of Mozambique's five main partners.

This paper is organized in four main sections. The first one describes the economic relationships between India and Mozambique in the last five years taking into account the bilateral commercial and investment relationships in private and energy sectors. Apart from trade and investments, the first section of this work also presents data on the credit lines opened by India and their allocation in different projects in Mozambique and the donations made by the Indian government.

The second section of the paper analyses the opportunities that India's approximation represents for Mozambique in different areas, since

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India's economic growth and its interest in Mozambican resources and location enable cooperation to flourish and the development of strategic areas in Mozambique such as education, health and infrastructure. Even though, the opportunities can only be fully reached when the states become sufficiently prepared with strategic policies and specialized institutions on India. That way, the third section of the paper presents the main challenges that this opportunity represents for the Mozambican State.

With the completion of this article, we hope to answer the following question: what are the opportunities and challenges for Mozambique from the Indian Expansion to Africa?

Economic Relationships between India and Mozambique

India arose, in the 21st century, as an important economic and political actor considered as a strategic partner for many African countries. The relationship between India and Africa is considered as centuries old and is based on trade. The political relationships were strengthened in the 20th century as we can observe through India's leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement and its support to national freedom movements in Africa. Mozambique has also received India's support in its liberation struggle and after its independence; India was one of the first countries to open an official representation in Mozambique[2].

Graphic 1: GDP Growth of India

Source:http://statisticstimes.com/economy/gdp-growth-of-india.php

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
2 http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Mozambique_Relations.pdf

Since the end of World War II, global economy has grown while accompanying changes in trade patterns, what is reflected by changes in the structure of the global economy. These changes include the arise of regional trade blocs, the "deindustrialization" of many advanced economies, the growing role of nations of Eastern Europe and the emergence of India and China (Bussière 2008). Recently industrialized countries, such as India, have increased substantially their share in global trade and in the exports of manufacturing goods. It should be noted that investments have also increased in the last years. Mozambique, in turn, since the signature of the general peace agreement of 1992 between the government and RENAMO (National Resistance of Mozambique), presents a political and economic stability that allows the economic growth in different areas and the economic cooperation with other partners, such as India.

The cooperative relationships between Mozambique and India have been rising in the last years, since a merely diplomatic cooperation turned into economic cooperation, notably through energetic investments (MINEC[3] 2007, 3-4). The South-South cooperation, highly fostered by India, can also be mentioned through economic and social projects which are funded by this nation in many developing countries such as Mozambique. We can also remark the active role India has played in the promotion of South-South cooperation and in the technology transfer to Mozambique - for instance, we can mention the formations of Mozambicans[4] by ITEC/SCAAP (*Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Program*) and the construction of Maluana's technology park in Marracuene demonstrate the outcomes of this partnership for development[5].

Even though, nowadays the synergies between India and Mozambique are fostered by the internal change of political and economic factors of both countries, what led to the deepening of their relationship in the last two decades. Besides political cooperation, which entails official visits and the signature of agreements in many key areas for both countries, the economic partnership with India has proved increasingly important for Mozambique. For instance, in the area of trade and investments, Mozambique remains in the leadership in Africa (alongside with Mauricio) as the country which receives more Indian investment amounts (CPI 2015). Indian investment through credit lines has helped to foster small and medium-sized enterprises, the creation of new jobs and job-learning for the inhabitants of the districts.

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3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (2007).

4 Currently, India is the country with the larger number of scholarships for Mozambicans.

5 http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Mozambique_Relations.pdf

According to IndiaTimes[6], in 2025 India is going to host the 5th largest consumer market of the world. That way, we can conclude that, besides being a strategic investment partner, India can be an opportunity to foster Mozambican exports to the Asian market. Mozambique is also a strategic partner for India in many features: as a source of energetic resources such as coal and natural gas, access to the Indian Ocean with ports and corridors to SADC's market and partner in multilateral issues.

The trend to expand Indian interests to Africa through India Africa Forum Summit[7] may represent for Mozambique an opportunity to have a new strategic partnership for investment and the conquest of a new trade area (Asia) to export its goods as well as to counterbalance the presence of other partners such as Western countries and China. In this case, being prepared to cooperate strategically with India with aims of development is going to be a great challenge for Mozambique.

In order to diversify its sources of energetic resources, India signed last year (2016) a memorandum of understanding for the cooperation in gas and oil sectors and the production and marketing of boer-bean. The memorandum envisages a narrower cooperation between the investigation centers of both countries, the strengthening of capacity building and creation and intensification of technology[8].

Besides the economy, the security area has also been privileged in the bilateral cooperation. Indian maritime navy has been supporting Mozambique in monitoring and protecting its coast since 2003 through the delivery of military ships during many conferences[9]. India's interests concerning the Indic Ocean on maritime piracy and reducing the Chinese "advance" provide a larger background for the cooperation between these two nations.

According to *World Economic Forum* (2017), India is currently one of the ten largest economies in the world despite being a developing economy[10]. Indian economic growth requires new markets for exports as well as new zones of investment, since its market already presents some signs of saturation, and raw materials to sustain its industries. Besides the necessity of raw materials, India has currently a very high internal demand

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6   http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2007-05-04/news/28422084_1_power-parity-middle- consumption

7 The first Forum occurred in 2008, and others in 2011 and 2015.

8 https://portugaldigital.com.br/mocambique-assina-acordo-de-cooperacao-com-a-india-na-area-de-petroleos-e- gas/

9 Ibid.

10 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/worlds-biggest-economies-in-2017/

for lentil (*pulses*) - around 7 million tons[11].

The consumption of energetic resources in India has grown exponentially, as graphic 1 shows, since coal is at the top of necessities, followed by oil and natural gas. Despite having reserves of coal and natural gas in its territory, India remains importing these resources and launching many strategies in order to cooperate with other countries besides the developed ones, such as African nations. Even though, international competition is increasingly rigorous concerning the search for markets and sources of raw materials due to the presence of other BRICS' countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), that also look for African markets and resources.

Graphic 2: Consumption of Energy in India

Source: World Energy Outlook (2015, 23).

In turn, Mozambique's economy is one of the poorest of the world, although having registered a remarkable growth in the last ten years (with a decrease in the last two years, since 2016)[12]. Its economy is not diversified, and there are two main sectors: services and subsistence agriculture, and its exports are concentrated in primary goods. The lack of infrastructure in many key areas such as health, education and transformation industry does not allow improving living conditions of its citizens. The lack of jobs

11 http://clubofmozambique.com/news/india-mozambique-relations/

12 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/overview

and social inequalities are realities of the country, where the illiteracy (56% of the population) and malnutrition still have high indices, (*Ibid*). Despite the unfavorable socioeconomic conditions, Mozambique has geostrategic conditions, which stimulate India's interests, remarkably its geographic location, which allows land connection to many countries of Southern Africa, direct access to Indian ocean and the existence of large reserves of gas and coal.

The historic ties that these actors share has left the legacy of the sixth greatest Indian diaspora in Mozambique, with around 25 thousand citizens with Indian origin[13]. This diaspora has contributed to the deepening of political, economic and even security relationships between these two actors, even though, since the forum India Africa took place in 2008 and with the discovery of gas reserves, trade and investment relationships have been deepening significantly. Commercial relationships reached last year (2016) a peak of around two billion dollars, making India the third main export partner and the seventh greatest import partner[14]. Concerning the sector of public and private investments on gas, India has already invested around 6 billion dollars until 2016, and the predictions estimate that the same value is going to be invested until 2019[15]. The investments are also directed to the sectors of agro-processing, industry, health and technology transfer through credit lines of more than 500 million dollars granted by Indian government.

The above-mentioned partnership between India and Mozambique presents a scenario of exponent and long-lasting growth. Even though, socioeconomic realities between the two nations are quite different considering India's vigorous growth. The cooperation has created several opportunities such as investments and increased domestic production for export as well as the existence of non-traditional partners vis-a-vis the Western countries but also counter balance the presence of China in Mozambique. However, the opportunities also lead to some challenges, such as the necessity of having specific strategies/foreign policies for countries like India and strong economic policies to ensure the benefits for all Mozambicans and to keep strong the cultural system of the country.

Commercial relationships

Commercial relationships between Mozambique and India has

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13 http://clubofmozambique.com/news/india-mozambique-relations/

14 https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/mozambique/tradestats

15 http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-s-21st-century-african-partner-why-mozambique-was- modi-s-first-stop/story-jPw0z4yQQbnWdddIOkvRAM.html

faced a remarkable growth in the last years, as the table and graphic below demonstrate. Trade agreements between both countries and the meetings *Business to Business* (B2B) favor this area allowing for flourishing trade on both sides. Currently, there is a regular exchange between the Association of India Industries and the Conference of Economic Associations of Mozambique; furthermore, many companies participate of fairs and other trade events in their countries[16]. In 2008, India has launched the *Duty Free tariff Preference* (DFTP) scheme for African countries regarding many goods that India needed, inaugurating a new stage in its commercial relationships with Mozambique. The following table presents the outcomes of commercial relationships between both countries:

Table 1: Bilateral Trade India-Mozambique

YEAR	Exports to India	Imports from India	TOTAL ($)
2011	87,226,000	570,581,986	657,807,986
2012	155,071,477	888,370,298	1,043,441,775
2013	679,568,019	1,615,537,505	2,295,105,524
2014	387,581,666	1,957,866,296	2,345,447,962
2015	339,036,471	1,476,709,553	1,815,746,024
2016	408,410,289	874,082,277	1,282,492,566

Source: See footnote[17]

It was possible, through the examination of the table, to draw the corresponding graphic, which eases the observation of the growth of the bilateral trade. Although trade with India is still deficient on the Mozambican side, the data show the growth of Mozambican exports indicating an increase in domestic production and, consequently, an increase in its income.

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16 https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Mozambique_July_2016.pdf

17 Source: http://comtrade.un.org/db/dqBasicQueryResults.a-px?px=HS&cc=TOTAL&r=50 8&p=699&rg=2&y=2016,2015,2014,2013,2012,2011&so=8

Graphic 3: Bilateral Commercial Relationships

Source: Elaborated by the author based on data from INE.

So, we present the table regarding the main exported goods by India to Mozambique. With the accomplishment of *India Africa Forum Summit* since 2008, India was able to open the preferential access of African states such as Mozambique to its market. This access includes the exemption of tax rates for some goods as well as the end of double taxation of Mozambican exporters. The business forums which are promoted by the trade leaders (both public and private sector) in both countries have also allowed the knowledge of markets and the flow of bilateral trade.

Table 2: Main Goods Exported to India

No.	DESCRIPTION OF THE GOODS	1000 (USD)
1.	2704 - Coke and semi-coke of coal, of lignite or of peat	274,671
2.	2614 - Titanium ores and concentrates	20,074
3.	7103 - Precious and semi-precious stones	18,361
4.	0713 - Dried or shelled leguminous vegetables	15,766
5.	2615 - Metals of niobium, tantalum, canadium or zirconium	4,929
6.	7204 - Waste and scrap of cast iron	1,562
7.	2824 - Lead oxides; red lead and orange lead	967

8.	0801 - Cashew nut and coconut	713
9.	7404 - Copper waste and scrap	537
10.	2005 - - Not frozen horticultural products in acid	478

Source: INE[18] (2015)

Concerning India's most imported goods, we can mention medicines, cars, motorcycles and rice. At a global scale, India is in the leadership of countries exporters of generic medicines[19], and accessible medical tourism has attracted many Mozambicans who choose to carry their treatments in India rather than in South Africa.

Table 3: Main goods imported by India

	DESCRIPTION OF THE GOODS	1000 (USD)
2.	3004 - Medicins in doses for retail sales	132,725
3.	8704 - Motor vehicles for the transport of goods	13,114
4.	8712 - Bycicles and other cycles with no motor	11,009
5.	1006 - Rice	7,196
6.	8544 - Insulated conductors for electric use	6,461
7.	3002 - Animal blood, serums for therapeutic uses	6,064
8.	7010 - Big bottles, bottles, covers and similar products	4,568
9.	5407 - Woven fabrics of synthetic filament	4,349
10	6309 - Worn clothing and other worn textile articles	4,293
11	4901 - Printed books, brochures, leaflets and similar printed matter	3,909

Source: INE (2015).

Mozambique's main trade partners

With the growth of bilateral trade, India is already one of Mozambique's ten most important partners in imports and exports, as the following graphics demonstrate.

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18 National Institute of Statistics of Mozambique

19https://www.ibef.org/IndiaNowMagazine_e-Versions/Vol-3-Issue-6/files/assets/downloads/page0018.pdf

Graphic 4: Mozambique's Main Exporting Partners (2015)

Top 10 Export Partners	Export Volume ($)	Percentage Distribution
Netherlands	$952,365,046	
South Africa	$585,118,818	
India	$339,036,471	
Singapore	$145,498,035	
Italy	$100,086,302	
Belgium	$88,811,563	
China	$87,874,965	
United Kingdom	$80,874,016	
Zimbabwe	$79,271,757	
Namibia	$69,477,489	

Source: https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/mozambique/tradestats

India is already in the third position of Mozambique's biggest importers, what highlights the eminence of its partnership with the African country. In terms of Mozambique's importing partners, South Africa and China lead the ranking, and India occupies the 7th position.

Graphic 5: Mozambique's Main Importing Partners (2015)

Top 10 Import Partners	Import Volume ($)	Percentage Distribution
South Africa	$2,380,229,257	
China	$986,859,118	
Netherlands	$574,706,480	
Portugal	$456,521,533	
Bahrain	$411,060,595	
United Arab Emirates	$341,647,564	
India	$316,479,419	
France	$270,166,893	
Japan	$243,140,839	
United States	$195,018,352	

Source: https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/mozambique/tradestats

Although Mozambique still faces a deficit in the trade balance with India, acknowledging that there is a wide disparity in terms of the size of the economy, the outcomes are positive for Mozambique, since they allow the increase of national production, job creation, chain development, access to the international market and its rules and in turn improving competitiveness at national and regional level.

Investment Relationships

Indian investment in Mozambique is eminently made in the area of energetic resources. According to CIP (2016), India is one of the ten countries with larger investments in Mozambique, while China occupies the leadership. India's DFI can be subdivided in two categories; namely, private enterprises and enterprises with state participation. Apart from the energetic resources, other areas which receive investments are agroprocessing, mine industry, infrastructure, transports, science, technology and public works. Investments are made by Exim Bank of India through credit lines, underlining that around 75% of the credit value must be allocated in the purchase of Indian goods. Indian commercial banks such as Punjab National Bank (PNB) and Central Bank of India (CBI) are currently interested in establishing partnerships in order to open a bank in Mozambique with the aim of supporting   Indian investments and the bilateral trade (MINEC 2014).

Investment in the energy sector

The main investments are directed to the gas sector, which has already received more than 7 billion dollars from Indian companies in the Rovuma Basin, that is to say 30% of the Rovuma Basin Bloc 1, competing with the American enterprise *Anadarko*. It is expected that more than 6 billion dollars be invested until 2019[20], when the first liquefied gas exports to India are expected. The following table makes a distinction regarding investments made in the sectors of coal, gas and other minerals such as gemstones and metals. The following chart presents the main Indian investments in the energy sector.

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[20] http://www.jornaleconomico.sapo.pt/noticias/mocambique-empresas-indianas-investem-16-mil-milhoes-ate-2019-17449

Table 4: Indian Companies in the Energy Sector

Coal	Gas	Other Minerals
International Coal Ventures Private Limited (ICVL), investment projection of 500$ Million[21] (Benga (65%) coal mine right of prospection bought from Rio Tinto). Other 35% belong to Tata Steel.	ONGC, (Rovuma, Niassa) with 7.12$ billion investment[22]	Osho Cimentos Limitada, limestone, Nacala, Nampula;
JSPL Mozambique, Natural Resources Mozambique, Coal, Iron and associated minerals. Mutarara, Tete;	BPRL, (Rovuma, Niassa) $500 million investment[24].	Osho Minerals Limitada, Base Metals and Precious Metals Zumbo, Tete;
US$180 million[23]		
Osho Gremach Mining Lda, Moatize, Província de Tete	Videocon (Rovuma, Niassa) ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) and Oil India Ltd (OIL) have completed the acquisition of Videocon Group's 10 per cent stake [25].	Osho Diamantes Limitada, Base Metals and Precious Metals, Tsangano, Tete;

Source: Elaborated by the author based on data from MIREM[2122232425]

Indian Investment in the Private Sector

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21 http://www.mining-technology.com/news/newsicvl-to-invest-500m-in-mozambique-coal-mine-projects-4417591

22 http://zeenews.india.com/business/news/companies/ongc-to-invest-3-bn-more-in-mozambique-gas-field_95436.html

23 http://www.mozahub.com/en/mozambique-news/1775-mozambican-mining-companies-forecast-combined- production-of-75-million-tons-of-coal

24 http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/mozambique-gas-to-fuel-bpcls-next-growth-phase/article6228790.ece

25 http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/ovl-oil-complete-videocon-stake-acquisition-mozambique-gas- field/1/202137.html

Indian investment in the private sector has occurred in several sectors of the Mozambican economy, enabling the growth of small and medium-sized companies in the district areas[26]. The main areas of Indian investment are industry, agrobusiness, construction industry and agriculture. The following table presents some data concerning the Indian investments from 2010 until 2015 and indicates how many jobs have been created.

Table: 5 Indian Investments /Number of Jobs

Year	Investments (US$)	Number of Jobs
2010	10,689,369	3,048
2011	8,582,595	3,581
2012	10,937,250	1,202
2013	7,173,593	1,128
2014	8,462,907	1,639
2015	45,845,714	4,096

Source: Centro de Promoção de Investimentos, Mozambique (2015).

The investments in sectors such as industry and agrobusiness enable the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises in Mozambique as well as human capital formation and the creation of jobs at the level of cities and communities.

In order to comprehend the table above, we present the following graphic:

Graphic 6: Number of Jobs/Indian Investments

Source: CPI (2015)

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26 For more details, see the table referred to Indian investments in the private sector.

The number of jobs created corresponds to the level of investments made by India, what demonstrates the positive data for the Mozambican market. Apart from the technology and know-how transfers, the installation of different infrastructures allows the boosting of rural zones.

Special Economic Zones (SEZ)

In Mozambique, the investments in Special Economic Zones (SEZ) are led by Brazil, and India occupies the 6th position. The production allowed by the investments in the SEZ are important for both national and international markets, yet it is still impossible to present outcomes on Indian reinvestments, since they are still benefited of tax exemptions. Furthermore, conclaves between India and Mozambique are important for the attraction of Indian investments in Mozambique and create opportunities for Mozambican private sector.

One of the factors which most benefit Mozambique in investments in SEZs are the energetic resources needed by India and the geographic location with direct access to the ocean. These investments promote Mozambique's image in the international field and the possibility to attract investments from other countries.

Table 6: Indian Investments in Special Economic Zones

Year	Projects	Province	Regime	People employed	FDI (US$)
2009	2 (Simba Steel,S.A e Damodar Ferro, Limitada)	Nampula (Nacala)	ZEE	562	2.804.597,00
2010	2 (Sesame Cleaning Machine E Agroprocessors & Exporters, Limitada	Nampula (Nacala)	ZEE	88	2.856.753,00
2011	0				0,00
2012	1 (Gravita, Ltd)	Maputo (Cidade da Matola)	ZFI	85	1.621.060,00
2013	1 (MMI Integrated Steel Mills)	Nampula (Nacala)	ZEE	225	30.680.000,00
Total	6			960	37.962.410,00

Source: GAZEDA (2013, 1-4).

Lines of Credits

India has extended two lines of credits (LOCs) worth 140 million dollars for many infrastructure projects, agriculture as well as energy before 2010, and another 500 million dollars for Mozambique[27]. Bellow we present two tables referring to the projects finanded by India on the basis of the two lines of credits. The tables present the data about the projects and the recipient zones.

Table 7: First line of credit (139.5 million dollars)

Sector	Project	Location		Value[28]	End Date	Status
		Province	District			
Agriculture	Production and integral exploitation of coconut	Zambézia	Quelimane	2.00		
Public Works and Habitation	Development of rural water (STEP 1)	Zambézia e Nampula		8.00		
	Development of rural water (STEP 2)	Zambézia e Nampula	(Zambézia[29]) e Moma, Mogovolas, Memba, Monapo, Eráti, Meconta (Nampula).	20.00	March 2012	Projects concluded until May 2013
Energy	Electrification of High Zambézia	Zambézia		10.00		
	Rural electrification	Gaza	Massingir, Mabalane	19.50	October 2012	
		Inhambane, Nampula e Zambézia	Mabote, Funhaloro, Mongicual e lalaua, Chinde e Lugela.	30.00	May 2013	

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27 http://www.hicomind-maputo.org/maputo.php?id=Development%20Assistance

Science and Technology	Creation of a Science and Technology Park in Maluana	Maputo	Manhiça	25.00	November 2014	
Energy	Electrification of the provinces of Niassa and Manica	Manica	Machaze	25.00	December 2013	In course
		Niassa	Muembe, Mavago, Ngauma, Majune, Manimba, Lichinga			
Total				139.5		

Source: Mozambican Government (2014).[28][29]

Projects benefiting from the credit lines reflect important sectors such as rural electrification and irrigation water drilling in different districts of the country allowing for inclusive growth. Most of the population has no access to potable water and electricity, what creates many constraints to rural development, such as agricultural mechanization and the installation of agroprocessing industries.

Tabela 8: Second Line of Credit (500 Million Dollars)

Sector	Project	Location		Value[30]	Request Date	Status
		Province	District			
Energy/ FUNAE	Construction of a factory for Solar Photovoltaic Modules[31]	Maputo	Boane	13.00	during the joint committee of 2009	**Concluded (November 2013)**
Science and Technology	Increase of productivity of rice, wheat and corn in Mozambique	Gaza	Manjacaze	20.00	05/13/2011	**In course**
		Tete	Tsangano Angonia			
		Manica	Messica-Nhacondja, Bárue-Catandica			
		Sofala	Caia			
		Nampula	Moma, Angoche			

28 Millions of US Dollars.

29 Morrumbala, Maganja da Costa, Ile, Alto Molócue, Gurue, Gilé, Lugela, Milange, Mocuba, Mopeia, Nmacurra, Namarroi, Nicoadala e Pebane.

Energy/ EDM	Quality improvement of water supply	Maputo	Boane, Moamba, Matutuine, Manhiça e Namaacha	250.00	02/25/11	**In the launch phase / conclusion of competitions**
			Cidade de Maputo			
Public Words and Habitation	Development of rura water (step III)	Zambézia	All Districts	19.72	03/09/11	
		Nampula				
		Manica				
		Sofala				
	Construction of the road Tica-Buzi (New Sofala)	Sofala	Tica-Buzi	149.72	03/22/11	
	Construction of 1200 houses	Zambézia (400 houses)	Nicoadala			
		Tete (400 houses)	Municipality of Tete	47.00	02/25 /11	
		Cabo Delegado (400 houses)	Municipality of Pemba			
Total				**499.44**		

Source: Mozambican Government (2014)[30][31].

The second line of credit has already demonstrated the progress in other areas of the Indian investment application, such as the construction of the technology park, factories of solar panels, roads and rural electricity. At the level of public works and habitation, India is the second biggest Mozambican partner (China is the biggest). Mozambique presents remarkable outcomes of its cooperation with India, differently from its cooperation with western nations. The lines of credits allow the supply and transference of drilling machines, equipment, accessories, water and oil tanks, electric equipment for many strategic areas of development such as agriculture and industry and for rural zones, which are the most deprived in infrastructural terms.

Donations

Over the last few years, Mozambique has been benefited from donations from the Republic of India, such as:

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30 Millions of US Dollars

31 Photovoltaic technology is a technology that converts solar radiation into electricity (http://www.sapa-solar.com/portugal/fotovoltaicas/).

Table 9: Donations to Mozambique from the Indian Government

2006	Offering of a cashew nut processing factory (145.000 dollars) for the District of Nangade in the province of Cabo Delegado[32].
2007	Installation of computers in public schools at the Districts of Mocuma and Chibuto in the provinces of Zambézia and Gaza respectively
2008	Concession of a donation for the installment of a Project designated as *"Hole in the Wall"*[33] and financing of a project called *"pan-African Network*[34]*"*
2009	Offering of 1 million dollars for projects in the area of agriculture, namely agro processing and commercial agriculture
2009	Offering of 700.000 dollars for the Centro de Transferência de Chókwe
2009	Offering of 300.000 dollars for the promoting of small-scale cotton processing
2010	Donation of 4.500.000 dollars for the Polícia da República de Moçambique
2010	Offering of 2 institutes; i) Formation of coal sector workers; ii) planning of the coal industry in Mozambique
2012	Financing of the Project of Reabilitação da Barragem of Chipembe and of Regadio de Nguri at the province of Cabo Delgado at the cost of 10.000.000 dollars

Source: MINEC (2014).[323334]

The relationship between India and Mozambique has always been friendly and we can state that in some moments it may be characterized as "altruistic" because of the support that India has offered in the fight for liberation, even in the context of the cold war through the Non-Aligned Movement. Nowadays, in the context of the South-South cooperation, India continues to lead the support towards Mozambique in the matters of technological transference and know-how, as we can see in the previously

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32 The factory was inaugurated on April 24th, 2013. http://www.rm.co.mz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8923:nangade-guebuza-inaugura-fabrica-de-processamento-da-castanha-de-caju&catid=1:ultimas&Itemid=50

33 Establishment of computers for children in the Districts of Chibuto and Mocuba.

34 In Mozambique the VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) are located in the Maputo Central Hospital (Tele-Medicine site), in the UEM (tele-education site) and in the Presidency of the Republic (between India and the 12 African Chiefs of State).

shown table.

Opportunities for Mozambique

The historical partnership between Mozambique and India demonstrates the existence of a trust and growing relationship between both states taking into account the existing cooperation in miscellaneous sectors over time. Both countries have accompanied the progress of each other and have maintained permanent diplomatic relations. Despite being economically quite distant, both countries have similarities in tropical climate, developing countries, a large part of their territories is bathed by the Indian Ocean. The similarities allow not only the approach but also the exchange of information, experience and formation of strategic alliances when necessary. India's economic growth and it's approach towards Mozambique presents opportunities in a plethora of fields for Mozambique – in particular, the attraction of Indian IDE for strategic sectors, the growth in Mozambique's exports to India, modernization of agriculture also provides cooperation in the areas of information technology, maritime security, development in infrastructure, natural gas industry, transfer of technology and know-how.

The Indian diaspora also weights in the maintenance of political economic and cultural relationships between both countries. The majority of the diaspora can be found in the commerce and service sector and, with the political stability enjoyed by Mozambique since the signature of the General Peace Agreement in 1992, there has been a growth in the diaspora – which could create the basis for an even deeper cooperation.

India's position as one of the 10 biggest economies in the world is strategic, such is its presence in International Organizations such as the UN, IORA, WTO, the World Bank, IMF and the Commonwealth that Mozambique also enjoys membership. This position can serve as a mechanism to create synergy for deepening relations and to take advantage of other Mozambican projects through the exploration of new bilateral and multilateral cooperation platforms. With the discovery of energetic resources in Mozambique, the economic partnership may also help the Mozambican state in the improvement of its negotiation when we take into account the change in the *balance of power* in the international system with the emergence of developing countries such as India. It is also worth mentioning that the western powers are increasingly challenged by the BRICS' presence in Africa and the internal competition inside the BRICS is increasingly harder. In this context, the partnerships must be thoroughly enjoyed with the due zeal. The growth of commercial relations taking into account *Duty Free*

Tariff Preference and the agreements over the elimination of the double fee for national producers creates not only opportunities for access in the Asian market, improvements in the competitiveness of the national enterprises at the national and regional level but also the opportunity of modernizing the agriculture with the goal of maximizing the productivity.

The Indian growth has its positives outcomes, not only because of the investment in the energetic sector of coal and natural gas, but also in the expansion of private enterprises in various sectors that acknowledge Mozambique through the investment of the Indian government and transforming Mozambique in a new investment route in Africa. 14.000 jobs were created between 2010 and 2015 through small and medium sized enterprises' investment all around Mozambique, making possible the development of rural zones by the means of investment in agriculture and agro-processing, construction and industry.

Nowadays, India occupies the top of the list of countries that export IT services in the world[35]. The technological cooperation with Mozambique already shows tangible results and represents a platform for a strategic partnership that can open opportunities for the Mozambican state regarding the transfer of technology and know-how accessible and that adapts the climatic and geographical conditions of the rural population well such as strengthening government institutions. Also in the reinforcement of the governmental institutions. As an example, we have the funding of the technological complex's project in Maluana and Chokwe in the province of Maputo that comprehended the construction of buildings, the installation of an incubator, the center of research and learning, and the administrative simplicity may contribute to the technological advances. In this context, the technical-professional formation of the public and private sector workers may be useful in the cooperation with India when contributing to the construction of important infrastructure with the means of legitimizing the presence of the Mozambican state.

The formation of human capital can be created by transferring low cost technology mostly for the rural population. The congruency in climates may make adaption easier and the population may handle and repair it without big problems.

The theme of *Blue Economy* has been thoroughly debated in India not only because of its interest in protecting the Indic Ocean in the objectives of controlling the commercial routes and the access to the African market, but also with the objectives of using the economic resources existing in the

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35http://www.financialexpress.com/economy/global-innovation-index-2017-india-continues-success-streak-ranked-world-no-1-in-export-of-ict-services-no-2-in-innovation-quality/722178/

sea. The cooperation with India has already show some advances in the area of maritime security but the opportunities in the economic maritime cooperation may also be another way. The use of sustainable resources are extremely important because it may sustain the food and nutritional security in Mozambique, creating jobs in the coastal population. In the context of the Indian investments in the natural gas sector, India has already forwarded the idea of helping Mozambique in the upstream and downstream development of gas exploration. The IORA may also serve as a platform of important cooperation in the Blue Economy quest for both countries to enhance its knowledge and experiences.

The lines of credits allow the development of relevant infrastructure for Mozambique. In the level of public works and habitation, India is sought as the second biggest Mozambican partner after China. Mozambique may also enjoy concrete results in the cooperation with India in contrast with its western partners that focus its financing to conditions of good governance and democracy. The lines of credits allow for the access and transference of technology of water drilling machinery, equipment, accessories, water and fuel tanks and electric equipment for the most diverse strategic areas of development such as agriculture and industry.

It is also noticeable the importance of the Electric Project, as well the technology transference and the deep water drilling equipment that can contribute with the growth in productivity in the agriculture sector and in the growth in manufacturing industry. With the new factory of solar panels, the cost of solar panels[36] used by the National Fund for Energy (FUNAE) for the electrification of villages, localities, schools and health centers in the rural area may meaningfully drop down, generating a big impact in the use of electrical energy in the rural areas. With the installation of the factory, the prices of the solar panels tend to reduce allowing their acquisition more and more by the population of the rural areas[37].

The imports in medicine finds itself in the top of the list of imports from India, creating a new market of cheaper medicines, not only supplying the economy with quantity, but also with variety. Mozambique does not yet possess quality treatment for some chronical diseases and the health services do not have the necessary capacity being it one of the poorest countries in the world, fact that make many Mozambicans look for those services in the neighboring South Africa. Having in account this need, India is already issuing one-day health visas that allow the population to enjoy accessible

36http://www.jornaldomingo.co.mz/index.php/nacional/2373-mocambique-inaugura-fabrica-de-paineis-solares

37http://greensavers.sapo.mz/2013/11/26/primeira-fabrica-de-paineis-solares-de-mocambique-foi-financiada- pela-india/

health tourism.

The funding of scholarships for Mozambicans has also been growing, making India the country that provides the most scholarships for Mozambican students. Also in the context of south-south cooperation, the Indian Government has been offering training in India for Mozambican Government Officials year after year proposing an ample plethora of courses under the tutelage of the Assistência indiana de Cooperação Técnica e Económica (ITEC[38]) and special assistance from the Commonwealth for the Programa de África (SCAAP[39]). Nowadays the number of vacancies in the formation for Mozambique in the program ITEC / SCAAP is 41 each year[40].

The cut in funding for the budget by the Western partners in the aftermath of the discovery of the "*dívidas ocultas*" has not interfered in the bilateral relationship with India nor in its financial support towards Mozambique. This moment evidences even more the compromise of the historical and continuous relationships between India and Mozambique.

Challenges for Mozambique

India is an emerging country considered an economic giant with strong political and economic capacities and leverage. Mozambique has energetic resources, national market with a geo-strategic localization in Southern Africa and direct access to the Indic Ocean – a very important space for India, which also gives advantage for Mozambique to negotiate. In this sense, it is up to Mozambique to create strategies/policies to have a cooperation that seeks determinating goals and paths to follow in order to best use its assets so that it can generate a *Win-Win* relationship and ensure its national interests.

Mozambique needs to pay attention to the interests of the emerging powers, in this case of India so that this partnership does not become a neo-colonization and that the commercial relations not only be based in the exports of energetic resources and imports of manufactured goods in Mozambique's side. Politic and economic strategy must be created to guarantee the best use of the technological advances reached in India and benefit from this partner to create new spaces in the Asian market as well.

The graphics focused in bilateral commerce demonstrate that the commercial relations are still in deficit for the Mozambican side and

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38 *Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation.*

39 *Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Program.*

40 http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Mozambique_Relations.pdf

that exports are mostly raw goods such as coal and, in some year liquid gas. It is perceived the needs to create mechanisms/policies that diversify Mozambican exports towards India to avoid the risk of becoming a partnership that mirrors the western one. The model of *Duty Free Tarriff Preference* launched by India in 2008 must be widely advertised in the context of the national producers, the original rules that the model purposes to allow the access to the Indian Market and full benefits from the model, not only through the growth of already exported products as well. Also in this context it will be needed the effort from the competitive capacity of the Mozambican enterprises because the small and medium enterprises are finding a hard time to compete in the international level.

The Indic Ocean shore is extremely important for both India and Mozambique in energetic resources, maritime safety and sustainable growth of the maritime resources. Mozambique shall know how to use this opportunity to create synergy towards the best advantage of this relationship and ensure its national interests. The Indic Ocean constitutes a huge space of opportunity but also a huge space of challenges, mostly in the areas of defense and security so that it may be used to its advantage. The cooperation with India in the maritime security level may be crucial but also a challenge so the latter does not become the dictator of the cooperation politics.

The growth in maritime piracy at the horn of Africa and the instability in the Middle East makes the commercial routes turn themselves to the southern region of Africa and with this, the maritime Piracy shows signs of projecting itself towards the south of the African Horn, therefore becoming a growing threat to the coast of Mozambique. In this case, the fall in the traffic of ships may negatively affect the revenue of the ports and the use of the latter by the conveyors. This question flashes the need of cooperation in the protection and maritime safety level with India.

India's presence in Africa is centuries old, just like Chinas, however in the last few decades China was able to surpass the western countries in volume of commerce and investments in Africa by means of infrastructure building, investments in natural and energetic resources and the growth in commercial relations. India is currently in an effort to "stanch" the advance of Chinese influence in Africa (*String of Pearls*[41]) through the "*Varuna Tringle*" that encompasses the African states located in the shore of the Indic Ocean, the Horn of Africa reaching also the Cape of Good Hope (including islands located in the Indic, namely Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar. The strategy covers naval diplomacy and the placement of listening posts

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41 The strategy of the String of Pearls includes the establishment of a series of outposts with military and economic powers in various regions. Each outpost is considered as a pearl incrementing the power of the nation that sets the outpost. Such as in Annex 3.

(*Postos de Escuta Militar*), with the goal of detecting and listen to enemy movements and keep the safety of the Indian external commerce. This conflict of interests between India and China must be a point of attention by Mozambique with the objective of avoiding possible conflicts in its relationships with both emerging powers - and to take advantage of the competition.

Mozambique must be ready to enjoy the interests/competition of the great powers, mostly India, to guarantee its integration in the world economy and to develop its economy by exchanging experience and building infrastructure. However, it must be cautious with the massive opening of lines of credits made available by India because, even if the lines of credits have a low and attractive interest rate, it might take Mozambique to its old position of owing without being able to pay its debts.

Even though the lines of credits are focused in infrastructure, the latter are not totally advantageous once they possess conditions. One of those refers to the fact that 75% of the lines of credits must be used to the acquisition of India-produced materials and the rest of the value used in the implementation of the project. This pre-condition limits Mozambique in the option to acquire material prevenient from other competitive partner in the international market and creates space for India to export its manufactured goods and keep the *status quo* of the commercial relationship.

The discovery of energetic resources, such as gas, its geographic position at the southern Africa and the direct access to the sea through the corridor and ports makes Mozambique a strategic partner in Southern Africa and brings the challenge to Mozambique in reference of its institutional, policy and personnel readiness to deal with India. The engaging of India must show concrete positive results in terms of sharing of knowledge and the fall of costs to capacitate the youth from different parts of the country with the goal to contribute to the Mozambican national production.

India's interest are clear in Mozambique and it will be needed to *know how* to negotiate to get the most of the latter, such as the exploration of natural resources for the national economy, development of infrastructure, development of small and medium business, investment in public companies. If these goals are not accomplished, there may be a risk of the relationship between Mozambique and India to become a replica of the dependence relationship with the Western countries.

The imports of manufactured products from India although being cheaper may become a hindrance for the national competition (mostly in small and medium companies) because the competition's level of Indian enterprises is really strong and aggressive, not to mention the subsides

that those receive from the national government for its national and international expansion. It will be needed to protect the national industry of Mozambique, particularly the incipient one. An option would be the creation of manufacture in Mozambique through deals with India to enjoy their know-how and technology, creation of jobs for the Mozambicans and growth of exports. The exchange and the stage may be yet another challenge to move forward with sights of reaping benefits of the knowledge, already advanced in India, of agro processing and manufacture industries.

The exclusive economic zones (EEZ) attract multinational enterprises but do not contribute immediately to the countries revenue because of its period of exemption of taxes. Therefore, it will be needed to create mechanisms to guarantee the permanence of those enterprises that invest in the EEZ with the goal to contribute with the national wealth and in the attraction of other investments from India. Still in this context, it would be important to establish entrepreneurial relations from Mozambique in India, with the goal of attracting more investments, gain knowledge of the Indian and Asian market, conquer strategically the Indian business and expand the Mozambican investment in India.

The Indian pharmaceutical industry has become a worldwide leader in production and exports of generics and in the imports of accessible products from India brings its advantages for Mozambique, but there is the risk of the entry of fake generics and in this case, there must be tighter institutional control by Mozambique from imports.

The imported products from India may contribute to a new lifestyle in the core of the Mozambicans in terms of food, clothing, music and Indian culture through movies and Indian clothing. The globalization brings the advantages of being able to meet and have access to different cultures but the negative implications must be taken into account, especially in the protection of the identity and culture from Mozambique – even more in the youth, which may be easily influenced.

Conclusion

With the present article, it was possible to create a meticulous pondering of the economic relationship between India and Mozambique in the areas of commercial data and investment. It was possible to verify the result of cooperation and its impact in job creation, the growth in Mozambican exports and the development of key sectors such as infrastructure, health and education with the investments made through lines of credits and the investment projects in the private sector.

The cooperation allows the transference of technology and know-how for Mozambique and even more: the beneficiaries of the investments are also the inhabitants of rural zones contributing to the formation of human capital. It is also noticeable that the opportunities for Mozambique are countless and prosperous regarding India, but it will be needed an institutional and political preparation in Mozambique to defend its interests and negotiate in the best possible way facing the economic possibility that is India.

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Annex

Table 1: Indian Investment in the Private Sector (2013-2015)

Project Name	Sector	2013 Province	District	Jobs	India
DASH ENERGY MOZAMBIQUE	Services	Cidade de Maputo	Cidade de Maputo	27	1,000,000
MOZAMBIQUE OASIS	Industry	Cidade de Maputo	Cidade de Maputo	9	100,000
ARCILLA	Services	Cidade de Maputo	Cidade de Maputo	5	100,000
WOOD ALUMINIUM & BOARDS	Industry	Maputo	Matola	17	2,950,222
NIRMAL SEEDS (MOZAMBIQUE)	Agriculture and Agro-industry	Maputo	Marracuene	165	5,871
INNOVATIVE	Services	Maputo	Machava	150	1,000,000
GOLDLINE 2	Industry	Maputo	Matola	100	500,000
TURBO INDUSTRIES	Industry	Maputo	Boane	52	200,000
RIZ INDÚSTRIA -MAIZE MILL	Industry	Maputo	Machava	60	17,500
MOZA-IND AGRICULTURA	Agriculture and Agro-industry	Nampula	Murrupula	21	250,000
AMARULA FARMS	Agriculture and Agro-industry	Nampula	Monapo	10	100,000
DELICIA	Industry	Sofala	Beira	50	300,000
TETE CIMENTOS-PEDRA	Industry	Tete	Tete	22	890,000
OJES AGRÍCOLA	Agriculture and Agro-industry	Zambézia	Morrumbala	490	60,000
Total				1,128	7,173,593

2014

Project Name	Sector	Province	District	Jobs (Nat)	Jobs (State)	India	Total
ADVENT CONSTRUCOES	Construction	C.Maputo	C.Maputo	100	8	3750	375,000.00
REAL BOTTLE STORE	Services	Maputo	Boane	20	1	144000	160,000.00
THRIVENI MINERALS MOCAMBIQUE	Industry	Tete	Cidade de Tete	100	8	1455000	1,500,000.00
AKASHGANGA MOZAMBIQUE	Agriculture	Maputo	Namaacha	40	3	135000	150,000.00
MOZ INDIA AGRO PESQUISA E DESENVOLMENTO	Agriculture	Gaza	Xai – Xai	105	2	150000	180,000.00
PHOENIX- COMPANHIA DE SEGUROS DE MOCAMBIQUE	Services	C.Maputo	C.Maputo	50	4	1033333.33	3,099,999.99
CURECHEM MOCAMBIQUE	Industry	Manica	Manica	31	2	2500000	2,500,000.00
ATLANTICA STELL	Industry	Maputo	Matola	30	2	1400000	2,000,000.00
RAJAN EXPORT (MOZAMBIQUE)	Agriculture	Nampula	C.Nampula	50	0	1250000	2,500,000.00
ARCO IRIS INDUSTRIA	Industry	Sofala	C.Beira	40	3	120000	540,000.00
MOZ BEVERAGES	Industry	Maputo	Matola	78	6	50000	2,050,000.00
AARTI GLOBAL STELL & RESOURCES (MOZAMBIQUE)	Industry	Sofala	Dondo	600	30	20000	10,000,000.00
BONITO TEXTEIS	Industry	Manica	C.Chimoio	341	15	20000	3,500,000.00
STARKIDS	Services	C.Maputo	C.Maputo	35	3	100,000	100,000.00
KTB MOCAMBIQUE	Industry	Tete	C.Tete	19	-	81,824	163,647.00
Total				**1,639.00**	**87.00**	**8,462,906.83**	**28,818,646.99**

2015 (I Semester)

Project Name	Sector	Province	District	Jobs (Nat)	Jobs (State)	India	Total
OLAM MOCAMBIQUE-ARROY	Agriculture	Zambezia	Mopeia	3227	60	31,969,183	63,938,366.00
ANGELIQUE INTERNATIONAL	Services	Maputo	Maracuene	260	13	1,000,000	1,000,000.00
Total				3,487.00	73.00	32,969,183.00	64,938,366.00

Table 2: Indian Enterprises in the Energy Sector

Coal	Other Minerals
Midwest Africa, Lda, Maotize, Changara e Mutarra, Tete, exploring coal, Base Metals and Minerals Associates.	Pranay Osho Cimentos Lda, Limestone and Granite Matutuine, Maputo;
Eta Star Mozambique Lda, in association with SOGIR Coal, Moatize,	Vajra Drill, Lda, Base Metals, Silver and Gold Mutarara, Tete.
Essar Recursos Minerais de Moçambique Lda, Coal, Tete	Damodar Ferro Lda, Iron Lalaua, Nampula;
Essar Minas de Moçambique Lda, Coal and associated mineral, Lago Majune e Mandimba, Niassa.	Indo África, Gold, iron, Bauxite, Manica
Tata Holding Moçambique Lda, Coal, Mutarara, Tete.	Osho Cimentos Limitada, limestone, Nacala, Nampula;
Osho Gremach Mining Lda, Moatize, Província de Tete	Osho Minerals Limitada, Base Metals and Precious Metals Zumbo, Tete;

Source: Created by the author using data from MIREM.

ABSTRACT

This article aims to analyse the Indian interests in its expansion to the African countries, more specifically Mozambique. This approach has resulted in an increase in economic relations, more specifically in the growth in the volume of trade and foreign direct investment, including the transfer of technology and know-how to Mozambique, which represent opportunities and challenges for the later.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL COMPETITION EFFECTIVENESS IN BRAZIL AND IN MOZAMBIQUE (1990-2014)

Fidel Terenciano[1]

Introduction

Studies regarding party systems and political parties are complex. Although a wide literature concerning this topic has already been developed, it is necessary to recapitulate some empirical and theoretical features. In this context, it is imperative to study the party systems of the aforementioned countries, discussing the functioning of political parties and the structure of political competition in these nations. Authors such as Manwaring and Torcal (1995; 2006) sustained that voters, political parties and party systems vary according to the context and are built in concert with social and political scenarios of each collectivity. Therefore, thinking about political parties in "Third Wave" democracies, in accordance with Huntington's typification in his work (Third Wave Democracy, 1990-), and in secular democracies, as is the case of many Western countries (England, Italy, United States of America), requires raising a range of arguments for or against, which will sustain or demonstrate the *sui generis* features to explain the party systems and the functioning of the institutions called Political Parties.

In this sense, the research goal is to verify party competition, profiles and functioning of political parties in Mozambique and in Brazil, describing the dynamics of the party system as a whole and the structure of competition in each country. The proposed analysis would be limited without the inclusion of theoretical and empirical studies developed by Duverger (1961), Huntington (1991), Griffin (2010), Inglehart (1971), Sartori (1982), Aldrich (1995), Webb (2000), Dalton and Wattenberg (2000), Elderveld

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(1964).

In methodological terms, this is an exploratory and descriptive work. A database of political processes in a comparative perspective was considered, combining quantitative and qualitative productivity measures, in order to comprehend the evolution and the setbacks of party systems and political competition, as well as the functioning of political parties in both countries. The process of the structure of the party system and the electoral competition were also analyzed in both countries, based on data from official electoral results, which is available in the websites of the electoral management bodies from both countries. In temporal terms, our analysis begins with the democratization processes of the aforementioned countries, and we resort to the comparative approach in order to identity similarities or differences between the political fields.

Thus, this paper is structured as follows: the second part, after this introduction, presents a set of theoretical arguments about the party system and the political parties as fundamental entities in the functioning of the modern political system; the third part presents a contextual characterization of both countries; the last part is reserved to the empirical elements, such as the number of political parties as a whole (particularly the effective ones) and the structure of competition; and finally, some final considerations, since this is an exploratory research.

Structure of the party political system: theoretical considerations

The debate on the party system has always been associated with two elements: on the one hand, the institutional structure, that is to say the electoral system, as its determinant and, on the other hand, the functioning of political parties, the structuring of the vote and the political behavior as determinant of the party system. Two elements must be taken into account to resume the debate on the party systems. First, one must think about the party system considering social nuances, such as the socioeconomic dimension, left vs right, religious issues, ethnicity vs culture, urban vs rural, support to the regime, foreign policy or post-materialism (Mair 1996; Dalton & Wattenberg 2000; Sartori 1982), and, later, one must think about the political institutions as rules of coexistence; as a *modus vivendi* and *modus operandi* of political actors that can determine the structure of the party system (Rothestein 2001; Steinmo & Thelen 1992).

Thereby, the debate on the party system, as emphasized by Tavares (1994), is a compelling and complex dimension of the political system, and

its profile is an outcome of the unique association of four sets of phenomena, indicated as follows, for each contextual case.

> [...] 1- the internal organization of the parties, including the relationships among ruling elites, cadres, adherent members, voters and masses; 2- the relationships among the different forces and trends or projects, as well as among remarkable sociopolitical cleavages that divide the society, and the parties; 3- the nature of electoral and parliamentary competition among parties; and finally 4- the relationships among parties in regard to the relative participation of each one of them in the electoral market and in the exercise of the political representation and of the government [...] (Tavares 1994, 287).

The three last phenomena are affected, on the one hand, by the differentiation of the society to a greater or lesser degree, and, on the other hand, by the political culture, that includes perceptions, values and attitudes which are linked to the pragmatism and to the ideologically polarized politics (by the number of parties and the electoral system). Our argument is based upon the idea that the party system is anchored in the categories and effects of the electoral system.

Political Parties and Their Functioning Within the Party System

Some aforementioned authors (Paiva; Braga; & Pimentel 2007; Webb 2000; Dalton & Wattenberg 2000), explain that the structure of the political field and of the electoral competition is one of the key indicators of political parties in democracies considered representative. That is because this is the activity which provides the greater visualization and embodies the essential role in the relationship between the voters and the political system as a whole, having in mind its dimension and the possibility to recruit for different functions and to offer the citizens a practical or symbolic integration in the different governability channels.

The political parties, conventionally, perform functions (Strom, Dalton & Wattenberg 2000; Katz & Mair 1994; Webb 1994; Scarrow 2000; Farrell & Webb 2000; Diamond & Gunther 2001) which can be categorized as follows: political parties in the electorate (considering parties as a set of voters, members and activists); parties as party organizations (parties as projected extra-parliamentary organizations with the aim of contesting elections or participating on them); parties in the government (parties as

organizations of civil servants).

In order to substantiate these three topics that allow the existence of political parties in modern times, it is necessary to associate them with four main topics that a few authors have listed (Dalton & Wattenberg 2000; Webb 1995; 2002; Held 1996; Scarrow 1996):

Table 1: Topics about existence of political parties in modern times

Governance and Political Recruitment	It must be thought within the dimension between indication for the government and recruitment. In the same line of thought, the cynicism of electors in regard to the impacts of parties in the government; rethinking the dimension: government personal and the process of recruitment (Dalton & Wattenberg 2000; Webb 1995).
Articulation of Interests and Aggregation	This requires that parties function as a mechanism of connection among representatives, society and State; in the same way, the articulation suggests the idea of the role played by parties and other institutions in expressing and seeking political demands; aggregation, a process related to the moment parties aggregate the requirements of many social groups (Dalton & Wattenberg 2000; Held 1996; Scarrow 1996; Cockett 1994).
Political Communication or Political Education	The idea of dependence of the non-party modes on means of information and political communication (Dunleavy 1985), and helping to inform and educate citizens about public and political matters, that is to say the exercise of the dimension of political education by parties (Scarrow 1996; Dalton & Wattenberg 2000; Cockett 1994; Miller 1989).

Source: Adapted by the author (2017).

Recent studies indicate that political parties, as key elements of the functioning of the party system, have been facing a set of transformations

since the decade of 1960. There are many reasons for that, such as the ideologic pendulum, electoral recruitment, political participation, popular support and ideologic strengthening; however, they have not been reshaped in terms of political coherence (Green 2003). Thus, two perspectives can be identified to analyze the functionality of political parties nowadays. On the one hand, there are the declinastes, authors, such as (Wattenberg 1991; Ware 1985; Crotly & Jacobson 1980), that sustain the idea that the political party as an organization has disappeared and lost its utility. On the other hand, there is the thesis of the revitalists, whose exponents are (Fisher 1978; Frantzich 1989; Petterson 1996), which support the idea that the main party organizations were developed after the World War II and, in the 1980s, obtained resources for their self-support and functioning was sustained[2]. The parties started to adapt themselves to the challenges of the centralization of candidates, the major trend of ideologic coherence according to Aldrich (1995), what proves that some parties are functioning well.

Contemporary Context of Political Parties in Brazil

In 2014, the sixth electoral cycle was conducted in Brazil, in terms of national general elections for President, senators and congressmen. On the one hand, it meant the increasingly institutionalization of the political and electoral competition. On the other hand, at the same a cycle considered by theorists as sufficient to speak of structuring of political wills was beginning.

Since the redemocratization, in 1988, with the promulgation of Brazil's Constitution of 1988, the free competition among nationwide parties, which were able to run in executive or legislative (Senate or Chamber) elections on equal terms, among other elements, gained relevance. From the viewpoint of the origin of Brazil's party system, the main parties have been organizing the electoral and political competition for more than 29 years, which means that the country has already had some experience and that this is the most long-lasting experience with parties in the country's political history.

Historically, between 1979 and 1980, PT, PDT and PTB were created. Meanwhile, PMDB and PDS/PP went through a reorganization process with the aim of satisfying the new requirements of the party reform of 1979 (Braga 2006; Nicolau 1994). Moreover, PFL, which corresponds to DEM nowadays, was founded in the period of the indirect elections

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2 This is not the specific case of Mozambique or of Brazil, but it was necessary to expose this point in order to demonstrate the functional and organizational dimension of the parties.

for President of 1985; in 1987, still during the constitutional debates, a dissidence of PMDB led to the creation of PSDB (Braga 2010). The author continues to explain that some parties with some relevance arose in the mid-80s, highlighting PSB, PL, PR, PCB/PPS, PC do B and PV. Since the end of 1989, the institutional structure has established itself, allowing the legal actuation of political parties, which are components of the main democratic institutions, such as the electoral system, the government system and the format and functioning of the State.

It is necessary to contextualize the issue of the coalition presidentialism. Sadek (1993), Avritzer (2016), Sathler e Braga (2015) aim to clarify that the multiparty system, that was ratified by the Constitution promulgated in 1988, has allowed to redraw a multiparty scenario with a wide range of parties or coalitions, and that was confirmed by the presidential election – which had 22 candidates, most of them from parties with no representation in Congress –, that, on the one hand, confirmed the trend towards party proliferation and, on the other hand, demonstrated the weakness of the parties with congressional strength (Sadek 1993; Avritzer 2016).

In this way, the combination between the proportional principle and the open list that determines the occupancy of the seats in Parliament is a key issue in Brazil's electoral organization, since this format allows a great proliferation of parties, which, consequently, leads to party fragmentation; hence, later, Abranches (1998) analyzed the consequences of these electoral rules and identified that these rules, such as the electoral system and electoral laws, which are the guiding principles of the rules of the game, among others, produce the coalition presidentialism in the Brazilian context. Hence, it is imperative to acknowledge that Abranches labeled the political system that way because of the fact that the President is elected with more votes than his party in the parliamentary elections, what makes political alliances necessary (Avritzer 2016; Abranches 1998; Sathler & Braga 2015).

In theory, Abranche's (1988) idea was to recognize that presidentialism could function as parliamentarianism. This idea counters Linz's (1999) arguments that 1- the executive power cannot be shared in a presidential system, 2- the idea that interparty coalitions are rare in presidentialism. These theses have been rapidly outdated, since they have not encompassed a set of comparative analyses about the same topic in Latin America. Amorim Neto's (1998) and Altman's (2001) researches were important steps in political science literature, since they demonstrated that Latin American presidents employ a multiparty ministerial composition in order to ensure governability (Sathler & Braga 2015).

This model has some consequences, since the elections for Brazil's

Parliament (in national or state level), excluding the elections for the Senate, are based upon the rules of proportionality and follow the open list system – in the case of Brazil, the electoral districts are the states, endowed with a large number of voters. Thus, the seats are distributed proportionally to the votes of each party or (in some cases) of the coalitions, what leads to the division of the votes and, consequently, to the proportionality, with no winners – in contrast to majority elections (Nicolau 2004; Leite & Santos 2010; Lamounier 1994; Kinzo 1993; Reis 1995). That is what determines the natural emergence of the coalition presidentialism (Abranches 1998).

Parties and Mozambique's Political Context

Mozambique, as a nation, is an outcome of the war against the colonizer (Portugal) faced by FRELIMO between 1964 and 1974. This process was supported by the bases held back in the newly independent Tanzania (whose government was then socialist); hence, FRELIMO had established itself in the North of Mozambique very early (De Brito 1995; Terenciano and Souza 2015; Terenciano, Carlos and Braga 2016). With military support from China, the USSR and other socialist countries, the Front expelled the Portuguese in eminent areas of the northern provinces of Tete, Niassa and Cabo Delgado. The military coup of 1974, in Lisbon, ousted Marcelo Caetano from the government, paving the way for Mozambique's Independence, which happened in 1975 under FRELIMO's power (Pitcher 2002; Manning 2002; Pitcher 2004; Terenciano and Souza 2015; Terenciano 2016). The socialist orientation of FRELIMO was consolidated in 1977 with the official adoption of Marxism-Leninism by the party. Under the leadership of the liberation movement (FRELIMO), the independent Mozambique became in 1977 a one-party socialist and Marxist state based upon the principles of democratic centralism with a highly hierarchical political-administrative system.

Mozambique's political and electoral history was instituted by elections in a one-party context. That is the reason why the first and second elections in this context took place in 1977 and 1986 with the aim of choosing the representatives of the people (Nuvunga 2007; Terenciano et al. 2015; 2016). According to Pitcher (2002) and Terenciano (2016), in the period in which an ideologically Marxist Party-State prevailed, the country faced a period of crisis, a subsequent transition and casual changes in the socialist model of government at the same time that the government was involved in the seventeen years conflict against RENAMO. This latter organization was created in 1976/7 against FRELIMO's centralized power, and its leaders, such as André Mantsangaisa and Afonso Dhlakama, organized the

resistance against FRELIMO's authoritarian power.

FRELIMO's government started a process of economic reforms which was accompanied by political liberalization. This was evidenced in in the 5th Congress of the Party, in 1989, when FRELIMO abandoned its Marxist-Leninist ideology, turning into a party with a broader ideological field. RENAMO, FRELIMO's opponent during the Civil War, signed a General Peace Agreement in 1992 and started to build a political party; later, it began its election campaign. In the elections of 1994, FRELIMO won with 44% of the votes for the Assembly of the Republic, but RENAMO became the major opposition force with 38% of the votes (Manning 2002; Terenciano and Souza 2015; Visentini 2016).

Effectiveness of political parties and of electoral competition in Brazil and Mozambique

The issue of political parties and of the effectiveness of the competition has always been under discussion. It is necessary to primarily comprehend the way in which political competition is structured in order to understand the structure of the political field. In the case of Brazil, it is important to note that, since the elections of 1989, there has always been a trend to a centripetal competition, since the main parties, such as PMDB, PSDB, PT and DEM, are capable of structuring the competition around them, forming what Ribeiro (2013) labels as first line parties. It is becoming increasingly evident that there is a kind of standardization of electoral competition in Brazil as long as the disputes are divided between two parties, PSDB and PT, which, in the viewpoint of the author, are the only ones able to head national electoral coalitions strong enough to win the elections and to at least structure the competition[3].

Other important feature of this debate is the regionalization of the votes, which was visible at least until the elections of 2010. The dimension we present regards the standardization of the distribution of votes in each region of the country. It can be seen that the Northeast region was overwhelmingly favorable to PT and its candidate, and the South and Southeast regions were favorable to PSDB and PMDB. Carreirão (2014) sustained that there is a set of arguments raised to comprehend the idea that the indexes of party consolidation or institutionalization have been significant and tend to become effective, in line with the models of secular

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3 Discussing the elections of 2016 is not our aim; however, our analysis involves the elections of 2014, in which, in the presidential or congressional disputes, the two parties were the most capable of structuring coalitions and of becoming winner coalitions again.

democracies. Secondly, the structure of the presidential dispute is not based upon ideology, but upon pragmatism.

In Mozambique's case, the structure of political competition is dual in the sense that it is dependent on the two dominant political forces (FRELIMO and RENAMO). This happens because of two reasons: on the one hand, these two forces are the most deeply-rooted in society, their social bases are strong and their electoral support is notably regional. That way, the multiparty or biparty democracy in Mozambique began in effect since 1990, when the Popular Assembly approved a new constitution, changing the political-electoral system, since then one-party, to a multiparty system, creating the conditions to the end of the civil war (1976-1992), which had its apogee in the General Peace Agreement of Rome in 1992, that led to the formation of new political groups and to the holding of the first multiparty elections of the country in 1994. In this standard, nine elections under a multiparty system have already been hold (four of them executive and legislative elections– 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 e 2014).

Since 1994, the party known as Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) has been winning successively the elections and conquering most seats of Mozambique's Parliament; it is the winning party of all executive elections up to the present. In spite of FRELIMO's successive victories, Mozambique's political field is distributed in areas dominated by the two main parties; in this regard, it is possible to identify the electoral and political geography of the country as follows: FRELIMO dominates all Southern provinces and the far North; conversely, RENAMO dominates Center and North Center regions. This scenario has been increasingly consolidating itself since the first elections of 1994, however, most notably in 1999, when a balance between the two parties was reached (De Brito 2014, 31).

Hypothetically, in Brazil's context, as in Mozambique's, what is visualized is that the process of party system is institutionalized in and of another incipient, respectively. Some authors such as Rose and Mackie (1988) clarify that the main arguments that must be raised in order to comprehend the institutionalization of the party system or of the political parties may include three elements: 1- refer to the existence of competitive organizations at the level of national elections which can be identified in Mozambique as well as in Brazil. Electoral and political competition is nationwide, and the parties run all over the country; 2- institutionalized parties present presidential candidates for national disputes in Mozambique as well in Brazil – in this context, both countries have parties running for president.

In 2014, Mozambique had three presidential candidates – who

also preside the parties in the legislature between 2015 and 2019. In the Brazilian case, there were three presidential candidates, whose parties obtained representation in Parliament; PMDB, even without a candidate for the presidency, had a good electoral performance in the legislative elections. 3- The fact that the parties remain in competition for successive elections. In this regard, only two parties in Mozambique have this feature. The others remain in the game, but with no parliamentary representation, such as PIMO. In the same way, in Brazil, there are many parties that have remained strong since the legislature of 1989, notably PMDB, PSDB and PT (Braga 2010, 49).

About the structure of the electoral competition in both countries

To evaluate the dynamics and the structure of the electoral competition and assess whether it can be considered as closed or open, it is necessary to resort to a branch of literature which sustains our arguments. Sartori (1982), Lipset & Rokkan (1967) propose that social conditions explain the electoral competition in a significant manner. According to the authors, the function of parties is what determines if the party system is closed or open. In this case, the parties become centers of attraction and production of the electoral alignment, which is not dependent of the social, geographic and cultural element underlying the movement. The same way, for Lipset & Rokkan (1967), it is important to think about the structure of the cleavage that determines if the party system is open or closed. In this case, elements such as political support, loyalty, solidarity and commitment must be included, and internal and external agents must also be considered.

Mair (1996) explains that it is necessary to think about the possibility of a freeze in party systems, not allowing the entry or the increase of importance of new actors. For Mair (1996), the real competition is verified not among parties with different ideologies, but rather among invisible parties and the ones willing to keep the main dimensions of competition. Conversely, the thawed party system is the one whose electoral market is only closed for the parties that arose from deep and strong social cleavages, that is to say the major organized parties, and there is a continuous volatility and instability of electoral preferences (Poguntke 1995; Schattschneider 1960; Blondel 1968).

In the Brazilian case, the structure of the competition is unfrozen, since it allows accessibility of (n) actors which were not integrated within the party system yet. Our approach assumes that the high fragmentation is

not accompanied by the premise of the unfrozen party system. Conversely, Mozambique's party system is frozen, since it does not allow the entry of new political actors with reliability, that is to say that only two parties (FRELIMO and RENAMO) control the party system. We are not saying it is a biparty system, but it has some features that allow this label instead of calling it multiparty or one-party. In this case, the structure of electoral and political competition in Mozambique would be closed to the entry of new political actors and to the possibility of evaluating them in regard to the structure and the formation process of the government.

Mair (1996) explains that the structure of the competition can be considered closed when there is no alteration in offices or cabinets; there are few formulations that rule the access to the government; new parties are precluded from breaking the structure of the government; the absence of innovative formulations and the presence of only two parties in the government or with capacity to blackmail. The predictable or open system is the one endowed with practical alternation in cabinets, innovative regimental formulations and free access to the government by (almost) all parties.

Political parties in Mozambique and Brazil

Since the approval of the multiparty constitution of 1990 in Mozambique, electoral and political competition was allowed, ruled by laws and regulations, as well as principles arisen from the Constitutional Charter and other laws - electoral law, law on political parties, etc. Many political parties have arisen, firstly as an ethnic and tribal expression and later with the aim of having national amplitude. As Lundin (1995) demonstrates, political parties and congressmen in Mozambique- FRELIMO, RENAMO and the Democratic Union Coalition (with some exceptions) - have had an almost ethnical and tribal support basis in Mozambique. This data can be measured by their main party leaders, their zones of electoral dominance, as well as the electoral districts with a performance above average. It was precisely the regions that the same parties occupied, dominated and controlled during the civil war, that adopted a multiparty democracy.

According to official information of the National Commission of Elections and to the official data available on the website of the government, there are in Mozambique around 50 political parties[4]. Among the 47 existent

4 1 – Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) 2 – Mozambican National Resistance (REMANO) 3 – United Democratic Front (FDU) 4 –Democratic Movement of Mozambique Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (MDM) 5 – Mozambican People's Progress Party (PPPM) 6- Party of National Unity (PUN) 7- United Front of Mozambique/ Party of National

parties, only three have parliamentary representation. That is to say, in the words of Nicolau (2004), that there is a low fragmentation of the party system, since only two have a representation over 10%. In the Brazilian context, only five political parties exist since before the democratization, but they consolidated themselves as important institutions only after the Constitution of 1988. Hence, there is a set of studies that conclude that the fragmentation of the party system is the key feature of Brazilian party system, since Brazil has more than 35 parties, and 28 of them have representation in the lower house, as the following picture indicates:

Convergence (FUMO/PCD) 8- Mozambican Nationalist Movement/ Social Democratic Party (MONAMO/PSD) 9- National Convention Party (PCN) 10- Independent Alliance of Mozambique (ALIMO) 11- Ecologist Party of Mozambique (PEMO) 12- Democratic Reconciliation Party (PAREDE) 13- Independent Party of Mozambique (PIMO) 14- Liberal and Democratic Party of Mozambique (PALMO) 15- Democratic Party for the Reconciliation in Mozambique (PAMOMO) 16- Party of the National Congress (PACODE) 17- Workers' Party (PT) 18- Popular Party of Mozambique (PPM) 19- Democratic Party of Mozambique (PADEMO) 20- Party for Peace, Democracy and Development (PDD) 21- Social Liberal and Democratic Party (SOL) 22- Democratic Party for the Liberation of Mozambique (PADELIMO) 23- National Democratic Party (PANADE) 24- Social Amplification Party of Mozambique (PASOMO) 25- National Party of Mozambique (PANAMO) 26- National Party of Workers and Campesinos (PANAOC) 27- Ecologist Party – Earth Movement (PEC e MT) 28- Renovator Democratic Party (PRD) 29- Congress of the United Democrats (CDU) 30- Mozambican National Union (UNAMO) 31- African Conservative Party (PAC) 32- Liberal Front (FL) 33- Union for Change Party (UM) 34- Free Democratic Party of Mozambique (PLDM) 35- Party for Freedom and Solidarity (PAZS) 36- National Reconciliation Party (PARENA) 37- Greens Party of Mozambique (PVM) 38- Party for all Nationalists of Mozambicans (PARTONAMO) 39- Social Democratic Party of Mozambique (PSDM) 40- Party of the Democratic Alliance and Social Renovation (PADRES) 41- Socialist Party of Mozambique (PSM) 42- Social Democrat Independent Party (PASDI) 43- Democratic Popular Party of Mozambique (PPD) 44- Party for the Liberal Progress of Mozambique (PPLM) 45- Mozambican Opposition Union (UMO) 46- Youth Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MJRD) 47- Front of Patriotic Action (FAP) Democratic Liberty United Party of Mozambique (PUMILD).

Image 1: Brazilian political parties

BRASIL
28 partidos
513 cadeiras

All parties, regardless of having representation in the Parliament, were created between 1981 and 2014. In the Brazilian context, the age of the party does not matter much in determining its effectiveness or in attracting votes in order to reach parliamentary representation. Sinuously, in the Mozambican context, the main parties remain dominant in Congress because, on the one hand, of its strength and social deepening and, on the other, of the fact that the opposition doesn't function effectively as an alternative.

Final Considerations

This paper had as its research goal analyzing the party systems of both countries considering elements such as the structure of the competition, political parties and the context and functionality of the key elements which characterize the political field in both countries. Considering these aspects, it is clear that Mozambique has a party system of two parties, in which FRELIMO, the ruling party, and RENAMO, are the most dominant.

Obviously, considering the typology which can be thought about a dominant party that allows the existence of other parties giving it keeps winning the elections. Conversely, the Brazilian party system is multiparty and highly fragmented, which often hinders governability and the execution of governance.

In terms of the structure of the party system, Mozambique presents an almost closed party system, since not all elements that characterize closed systems can be identified in the Mozambican context. In Brazil, the structure of the party system is open, since it allows the entry of new parties from outside the government.

Lastly, we can verify the dominance of two parties in the Mozambican case, structuring the elements of political competition and of party organization of the government, the parliament or the electorate. In the Brazilian case, there are many aspects that must be outlined: an incipient system with a structure of open competition, characterized by a high fragmentation explained by the coalition presidentialism. Political institutions are functional, but they are sustained by the strength of more than eight effective parties.

Also governability has been an element to be measured, since eight effective parties can make governability unfeasible in a democracy that is representative of many sectors of the society. And becoming continuously a "reasonably stabilized" party system, with some regularity in the relationship among parties, voters and the State.

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to understand the structure of the party system and the effectiveness of political competition in Brazil and Mozambique, highlighting the outlines and functioning of political parties in Mozambique and Brazil. Theoretically, there are studies (Duverger, 1961; Inglehart, 1971; Sartori, 1982; Webb, 2000; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000) that illustrate some of the approaches we have developed in this study. Methodologically, this is an exploratory and descriptive work. The database on political processes was considered in a comparative perspective, and measures of qualitative and quantitative productivity were combined. The results indicate that Mozambique has a two party system and Brazil presents a multiparty system, highly fragmented. In terms of the structure of the party system, Mozambique has an almost closed party system and in the case of Brazil, the structure of the party system is open.

KEYWORDS

Parties; Political Competition; Brazil; Mozambique.

PUBLIC AND LANGUAGE POLICIES: STRATEGIES AND CHALLENGES IN COMBATING SOCIAL INEQUALITIES IN MOZAMBIQUE

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Introduction

The freedom to express thoughts, to live a life with rights and duties are important aspects that motivate the development of public and social policies. It is the responsibility of governments to develop innovative public and linguistic policies that meet the needs of the population. Bringing the debate in light of the policies in force in Mozambique pointing out ways that can help focus the country's development is the objective of this article.

In order to think about sociolinguistics and social inequalities, this work belongs to a broad paradigm of the need to contribute to dynamize and innovate policies and research in the various forms of governance, citizenship and power. It is the central objective of this research to find consensus in the definition of strategies and challenges in a multilingual and multicultural context as is the case in Mozambique. Parallel to this aspect, the specific objectives are outlined: a) to discuss the relevance of public and linguistic policies in contexts of social inequalities; b) to reflect on the importance of linguistic policies in the elaboration of strategies and challenges in the fight against social inequalities; and c) to contribute to the improvement of public and social policies to mitigate the impacts of social inequalities.

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In order to achieve these objectives, the following research questions are raised: how are public and linguistic policies developed, taking into account the challenges of social inequalities in Mozambique? What factors impede the efficient implementation of communication strategies for the development of sociolinguistic research? How do language policies contribute to the mitigation of social inequalities? It is considered that the public policy area had four founding "fathers": H. Laswell, H. Simon, C. Lindblom and D. Easton Laswell (in 1936) who introduced the expression "policy analysis" as a way of reconciling scientific/academic knowledge with the empirical production of governments and also as a way of establishing a dialogue between social scientists, interest groups and government (Souza 2003).

Souza (2003) summarizes the public policy as the field of knowledge that seeks at the same time to "put the government into action" and/or to analyze this action (independent variable) and, when necessary, to propose changes in the course or course of these actions (dependent variable) (Souza 2003, 23). The formulation of public policies is the stage at which democratic governments translate their purposes and electoral platforms into programs and actions that will produce results or changes in the real world.

Public policies in Mozambique serve a minority coming from upper classes or affiliated to the political regime of the day. The majority of the population is deprived of public policies because most decisions do not meet the interests of the population. The population is rarely heard and answered. Another problem that sickens the Mozambican society, especially of low economic classes, is the lack of knowledge of their rights. Many pamphlets and manifestoes are written in Portuguese and not in Bantu languages , which are most commonly spoken by Mozambicans. There is a greater diffusion of the duties than the rights, which means that the population does not know how to act in the face of adverse situations. Since 44.9% of Mozambicans are illiterate (Vicente 2015), they often do not know how to charge or insist that the problems of their community, neighborhood, block and city be solved. The rise of the Portuguese language (LP) to the detriment of Bantu languages (LB) in Mozambique reveals the postcolonial linguistic policy adopted by the then one-party government. It is essential to formulate linguistic policies that reflect the Mozambican reality and serve as a vehicle for Mozambicanity in the context of national unity. Unfortunately, although the country adopts the democratic system, its language policies continue to fail to mirror the daily life of what is, in fact, a democratic country.

For a better understanding, it is necessary to return to the Portuguese colony's matrix to establish a bridge between the post-independence and

democratic periods regarding the issue of public and linguistic politics. Linguistic policy is understood as the "determination of major decisions concerning relations between languages and society" and linguistic planning as "its implementation" (Calvet 2007, 11). In the accomplishment of the present study, we gave priority to the bibliographical research of diverse documentation (articles, speeches, communications, official reports, dissertations and theses) that discuss on the subject. The study may contribute to a reflection on the public and linguistic policies in force in Mozambique, but also to elucidate some strategies and challenges to face the **Social Question** in Mozambique. We understand by **Social Question** "the set of expressions of social inequalities of modern capitalist society (such as: social exclusion, structural unemployment, extreme poverty, among others) [...] and as a rebellion for involving individuals who experience these inequalities and for them resist and oppose" (Iamamoto 1998, 28).

The challenges posed in everyday life point to a profound reflection on public and linguistic policies, especially for the education of young people and adults in their relations with languages as a starting point for the construction of social changes, in order to make language policies a guide for the present that allows to see the future of the local languages in Mozambique. Linguistic policies are necessary to make the revolution. They will be located in the center of scientific's systematization, sociolinguistic and sociocultural management of the existence of peoples.

The importance of establishing public and linguistic policies favorable to the people explains the apprehension raised by the African Declaration on the Power of Public and Social Policies in Education and Training of Young People and Adults, by the Charter of Development for Africa and by the Declaration of Language Rights ratified in 2006. In this context, Morakinyo (2011) warns of the importance of adequate education and quality so that they can be fully literate. According to Morakinyo (2011), if young people today are not well equipped with exposure of skills, education and guidance needed to meet the challenges of tomorrow, a better tomorrow dies prematurely in our inexperienced hands. In this way tomorrow dies prematurely when public and linguistic policies are poorly designed for an adequate education, of excellence and for all.

The political, economic and social reforms characterized by economic and political liberalization, aimed at modernizing the Mozambican state to make it more efficient and closer to the citizens, led to the decentralization of public and administrative policies in Mozambique since 1988. It was in this context that the opening up of citizen participation in the governance process in Mozambique has emerged. Linguistic policies and the reform of local governance, on the other hand, assume as a fundamental premise the

recognition and institutionalization of traditional power in its various forms of organization and functioning.

Local development is usually associated with the innovative and mobilizing initiatives of the community, articulating local potential in the conditions given by the context. Communities seek to use their specific characteristics and superior qualities in order to specialize in fields where they have a comparative advantage over other regions. It represents, in this sense, the result of a joint will of the society that gives sustentation and political viability to initiatives and actions capable of organizing energies and promoting the dynamization and transformation of reality (Castells and Borja 1996). In these aspects, there is a lack of political will on the part of the Government in power to promote the dynamization and transformation of the Mozambican reality. For political or economic decisions have not played a decisive role in the restructuring and elaboration of social policies. The elaboration and development of linguistic policies always require some form of participation in the mobilization and initiatives of local actors around collective projects.

Due to several factors, there are still more problems that we can mention: the disarticulation of existing interests between local communities and State structures in the definition of public and linguistic policies; lack of effective communication strategies for the promotion of social equality; problems of social organization and financial, human and social capital of local communities impeding the promotion of social and multicultural justice; in other words, several factors acting in combination or in isolation impede the efficient promotion of language policies within the Mozambican justice system. In this context, it is necessary to elaborate the public and linguistic policies to establish the forms of articulation of the local languages in order to find possible solutions or consensus in the solution of the problems of inequalities and social justice. The challenges in mitigating social inequalities are many and we will list them throughout this article.

Focusing on language policies

Mozambique is a Lusophone country characterized by linguistic diversity. It is a country with little more than 24 million inhabitants and with seventeen Bantu Languages with standardized spelling according to Ngunga and Bavo (2011). According to Ngunga and Bavo (2011, 14-5), the four most dominant languages in the country are emakhuwa (26.1%), portuguese (10.8%), xichangana (10.5%) and cisena (7.8%). Although the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique (2004) assumes the

Bantu Language as a national and cultural patrimony, and the Portuguese Language only aims to be the official language, it is prestigious not only for being official, but for being supported by the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique (2004). It has become an instrument that gives little relevance to Mozambican Bantu Languages spoken by the majority of the population. Although the majority of the population lives in rural areas, with low educational level, they preserve their cultural mosaic and speak their various Bantu Languages. In addition to these African languages, Mozambique has five Asian languages (Gujarat, Memane, Hindu, Urdu and Arabic) spoken by Asian communities living in the country and by the Islamic community rooted mainly in northern Mozambique (Timbane 2013, 2).

However, literacy has often been presented as a "magic" solution to the expansion of opportunities and the creation of a more egalitarian society, reifying the notion of a job market with equal opportunities, whose determinant is the meritocratic value. Unfortunately, this is a difficult condition to achieve in a context of extreme inequality, where the elite tends to trigger mechanisms of distinction that invariably pass through education and culture (Scalon 2011, 63). And here we can think of the theoretical argument developed, so properly, by Bourdieu (1984; 1989).

Education is an investment of great importance that has a fundamental impact on public and linguistic policies for the young generations. However, investment in education is indispensable for the promotion of equity and social well-being, even though it has no direct and immediate impact on the poverty and vulnerability of underprivileged groups. The Mozambican school does not debate the variations of Portuguese in society, not even the textbooks allude to this. Therefore, we are living in an atypical and confused moment with regard to educational policies. This attitude causes the reduction of the greatest cultural patrimony that the human being has – the language. Data from the last population census of 2007 clearly showed how the number of Bantu Language speakers reduced to the detriment of the Portuguese Language.

There is still prejudice with regard to Mozambican Bantu Languages and for this reason they are still banned in school campuses. The context is to enable and situate the insertion of Bantu Language speakers and beginners in the past of the community where they lived or live, since when they interrogate the linguistics or the local language and local sources they will find answers and references in older people, known places, identification of the vestiges of the past in their community, allowing an empathic understanding of the sociolinguistic and sociocultural groups that have made and still are part of different moments of history, developing linguistics in children, students and researchers habits and speech

skills, understanding and research skills. Contributing in this way to the development of the capacities of the same ones and to the others interested in the development of the public policies and linguistics like identity or matter of each region or nation.

Public and linguistic policies, when implemented from the bottom up, will prove the authenticity of the sources and enable a solid introduction to the teaching of linguistics, since in situations where the young student is confronted with events in regions very distant, it leads him to consider this science as a mere invention. According to Lopes (2004), language policy consists of a body of ideas, laws, regulations, rules and practices that aim to materialize the intended linguistic change in that community. It is worth mentioning that linguistic planning is subordinated to linguistic policy, giving account of the materialization of the guidelines that the policy describes.

Currently, linguistic policies are disjointed in the sociolinguistic context of the country. However, there is a need that they be revised to cover linguistic-cultural diversity and to fit into the political-administrative system of the State many ethno-linguistic groups or even people who feel excluded from the homogenized society, taking into account that the culture that unites us is also the culture that separates us. According to Lopes (2004, 91), linguistic planning "consists of a set of activities that aim at linguistic changes in a given community of speakers, and whose intention, at the level of the competent authorities, is based on the maintenance of civil order, cultural identity and the improvement of communication".

Citing Firmino (1998, 252), "Portuguese arrived in Mozambique as a colonial language and has been used for many years as an official means of communication in colonial and institutional contexts". In Mozambique, language policies are carried out by advances, but also express forms of resistance. These policies emerged as a response to the various forms of social inequality suffered in the colonial period. With the independence of Mozambique in 1975, waves of social mobilization began to emerge in the design of Public Policies, which called for the need to create a new linguistic political culture in the country that would safeguard, among other premises, the defense of human rights, social commitment and the construction of citizenship.

Speaking of the exercise of citizenship goes beyond the discussion about the concepts that distinguish them, going through a 'kind of' controversial particularity, which deals with citizenship in relation to inequalities, often confused with totalitarianism, generating prejudices and discriminations in the face of differences. The right to equality before the law can be distorted by the particular interests of dominant groups. For

this and other reasons, citizenship and the rights of citizenship are not defined as universal rights, since they are inserted in the Constitution of each nation. They are variable according to the determinations of each country, recommended in its Constitution. Benevides (2009) explains that citizenship and citizenship rights are related to a certain legal-political order in a state that also defines and guarantees who is a citizen.

Mozambique is a nation of many traditions characterized by multilingualism. These changes are considered as attempts to find the solutions needed to meet the various challenges. However, many of the failures of these changes stem from the lack of operational strategies for the definition of public policies consistent with the documents that incite the Mother Law that governs a country to, from them, draw language policies to combat the social inequalities that accompany episodes of everyday life in the country. The first section discusses the issue of public and linguistic policies, questioning their elaboration taking into account the challenges of social inequalities.

Discussing the socio-historical contextualization of Mozambique

Mozambique is considered one of the poorest countries in the world. The Human Development Index (HDI) in its 2009 edition ranks the country in the 172nd position among 182 countries considered, with an HDI of 0.402. The average life expectancy of the population is only 52 years. The number of people living below the poverty line, 45% of the Mozambican population, continues to live on less than a dollar a day and does not have access to basic services, such as drinking water, schools and medical facilities (Suárez and Borras Jr. 2010). Considering the current situation in Mozambique, marked by the lowest Human Development Index within SADC, PALOP and CPLP, the way to reverse the present stage is long and hard, dominated by the worsening of deprived and limited choices of access to decent life. Mozambique is a developing country, affected by the impact of the deliberations of the main world financial organizations. Poor competitiveness, coupled with the scarcity of adequate human resources, has made the path to marginalization inevitable, despite recordings in recent years of encouraging signs of remarkable economic growth.

Although the Mozambican Government and donors invest considerable effort and resources in the development of socio-economic policies and poverty reduction, the key socio-economic indicators are still very serious: GDP per capita is $ 1,100 and adult literacy rate is 48.1%.

Despite some progress, the country's illiteracy rate remains among the highest in the world, especially among women, whose illiteracy rate is higher (64.2%) than men (34.6%), and more in rural areas (81.2%) than in urban areas (46.1%). After the proclamation of national independence on June 25, 1975, the illiteracy rate stood at 93%. This meant that in every 100 Mozambicans only seven could read and write. This has led the Government to place literacy as one of its priorities on its agenda. According to the National Statistical Institute (INE) projections, only in thirty years will the life expectancy of Mozambicans reach the average level currently registered in the world, but according to the UN it will be even later (INE 2010).

Inequality has never ceased to appear with some emphasis on the history of mankind. It is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that has diverse impacts, especially on the conditions of poverty and precariousness. Reflecting and discussing strategies and challenges in the fight against social inequalities in Mozambique is to rethink important aspects of building a basis for overcoming social inequalities that need to involve a significant part of the population, both in the elaboration and implementation of policies that meet interests and needs of local actors. Phillips (1997) emphasizes the importance of clarity between three stages of action planning: the formulation of policy; the actual planning of the action; and the organization for the implementation that requires the detail of the administrative action. However, little or nothing is known about the perceptions and evaluations that the population makes, in the planning of the policies, both of the situation of inequality and lack in which it is embedded and of the initiatives taken to overcome this situation.

Scalon (2011, 55) demonstrates the importance of a deeper discussion of values, perceptions, attitudes and opinions regarding social inequalities, since it is they that "conform socially valid definitions of what is acceptable or not in terms of the distribution of goods, resources and services". However, the structure of inequality is reproduced and transformed into interaction with the cultural code of each social group or society. For each society has its own language and language to legitimize or delegitimize equality and social inequality. For Tvedten et al (2009) language is cultural practice, so "it is important not only to be able to communicate and have access to information, but also to have a deeper understanding of the changing world where people live" (Tvedten et al. 2009, 25).

National unity presupposes a common language, and the urgency to promote and solidify this unity has led the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), since the time of the national liberation struggle, to opt for Portuguese as the national language. According to Grusky (2008, 13), "the task of identifying the main dynamics behind social change has been central

to Sociology, but nowhere is this interest more developed or more essential than in the field of analyzes of inequalities". To do so, we experience the episodes of the neoliberal ideology. It stimulates individualism, where each one has to find the means to provide the basic necessities and indispensable conditions for the reproduction of life, it is valid and fundamental the responsibility of other sectors of society for the execution of social policies in the fight against exclusion and inequality, clarifying the distinction between exclusion and inequality.

> [...] inequality implies a hierarchical system of social integration. Who is below is inside and its presence is indispensable. On the contrary, exclusion is based on a system of hierarchical equality more dominated by the principle of segregation: it belongs to the way in which it is excluded. Who's down is out. These two systems of social hierarchy thus formulated are ideal types, since in practice social groups are inserted simultaneously into the two systems, in complex combinations. If inequality is a socioeconomic phenomenon, exclusion is, above all, a cultural and social phenomenon, a phenomenon of civilization. In other words, in the hierarchical system of social integration the presence of social inequality is evident. While exclusion is in the same system more commanded by the principle of segregation in complex combinations (Santos 2006, 280-1).

We must consider that when the costs and chances of participation are so uneven, we are often faced with a situation in which those included increase their relative advantages over the excluded by appropriating more effectively the benefits generated by society or the state. The phenomena of social exclusion have deserved much attention from researchers. Some researchers, such as Kowarick (2003), Lesbaupin (2000), Proença (2005) and Sen (2000) consider social exclusion a recent concept introduced by René Lenoir in 1974, covering a variety of socioeconomic problems in the states. Therefore, the dynamics of the relationship between State and society, in which the practice of public policies is inscribed, is crossed by inequalities in the distribution of power: be it political, economic, social, intellectual or symbolic. From this relationship, it is important that inequality be seen as a political problem. As a starting point, it is necessary to recognize the close relationship between democracy, social justice and equal opportunities.

Mozambique is no exception. There are local inequalities based on opportunities, education, employment and income, geographic location, political affiliation, gender, age and social isolation resulting from various factors such as HIV-AIDS and physical disabilities. We understand, as a social perception, that the existence of inequalities is a characteristic intrinsic to any society. In this context, the idea of social justice, understood as the access to job acquisition opportunities and status, is defended as a

way to create conditions for egalitarian competition and, consequently, to reinforce a meritocratic system in the allocation of individuals.

According to Isaacman and Stefhan (1984, 240), lately Mozambique has made curricular reforms aimed at accommodating citizens of both sexes, reinforcing the cultural valorization between school and community traditions. In an effort to build a society where access to education should contribute to development and challenges to combat social inequalities. Castiano (2005, 42), "understands the value of culture as a by-product of a capacity inherent to any human and by all of us performed". Mozambique has its beliefs and great riches. A mosaic of racial, ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity in which national identity is built based on plurality and intercultural dialogue. For Castiano (2009), this dialogue between cultures is the basic condition for the formation of a 'national identity'.

According to Geertz (1989), culture can be considered from its various symbolic manifestations. Obviously, talking about the fight against social inequalities means dealing with challenges, norms, experiences and traditional education. Aspects that should be carefully discussed and studied at various levels in a cross-cutting, inclusive and participatory fashion: from traditional and religious leaders to traders, academics, culture makers, politicians, teachers, nurses, parents, students and other mindmakers, to the development of an education that strengthens public policies that consider the factors that perpetuate social inequalities. For Dias (2002, 56), education is an instrument for maintaining social inequalities when public education policies do not consider the factors that perpetuate inequalities over generations. In this context, we are of the opinion that the teaching and the union of all the living forces will be able to undertake a collaboration that is certain in order to sow ideas and practical political questions that will bear fruit future trajectories in the "Indian pearl" that is Mozambique.

We try to reinforce the idea that if we do not look at the disadvantages faced by women in rural areas, varying from lack of infrastructure, education, employment and income, aggravated by social isolation resulting from several factors such as physical disabilities, cultural taboos and others; political discourse on gender equity and education for all will be a utopia, as inequalities will persist. A number of efforts have been made to combat social inequalities and poverty, both through government social programs and initiatives of non-governmental organizations and the private sector. There are major and important changes in gender relations. In most developed countries, and in some developing countries. Mozambique is no exception. Around the world there were important transformations in gender relations.

According to the Annual Report of the Inter-Parliamentary Union

(IPU 2015), Mozambique is a Lusophone country with the largest number of women in parliament. Globally, Mozambique ranks 13th, with 39.6% of seats in parliament filled by women. There was an increase in opportunities for access to education, in the number of jobs and employment for women, as well as in the qualification, in the educational level and in their presence in parliaments. But did all this lead to citizenship and social equality for women? There are still huge differences in women's access to resources, such as the difference in wages paid to women and men, entrepreneurs, businessmen, and the number of traditional leaders, religious and male and female politicians.

For women who can increasingly have access to education, good jobs, leadership, a place in parliament and other political positions, there has been an increase in opportunities to achieve full citizenship. For those who cannot access education and good jobs, especially older women or minority ethnics, rather than opportunities, the problems are getting bigger and bigger for full citizenship. The Mozambican woman fought and continues to struggle to occupy her space in society. After independence in 1975, the gains made by women in schooling are encouraging, countering the colonial period that severely excluded access to education for all Mozambicans.

For Bordieu and Passeron (1975) this did not mean that access to education was democratized, because the chances of majority access depended on areas with favorable objective opportunities and the strengthening of state-provided access mechanisms in various regions. By this we mean that between the rural areas of Mozambique and the cities where there are supposed to be access facilities, different factors have conditioned access to education for all.

In this perspective, Nyerere (apud Castiano 2005), although in his view does not focus on the discrimination of women in access to education in colonial times, in the Mozambican case we can note that, of Mozambicans who could not read or write, 60% were women, as a result not only from colonial practices, but also as a result from traditional education that kept women in a state of ignorance, "the woman's place was to be a good mother, domestic and servile, limiting the social role of women" (Isaacman 1984, 222). Despite the position that Mozambique occupies and the percentage of places filled by women in parliament, the country faces major challenges in the production, appropriation and use of knowledge on public policies that can contribute to greater effectiveness in combating social inequalities.

It is necessary to emphasize the construction of the public and linguistic policy instruments in the Executive, for the development of policies aimed at women, in order to deal with more structural aspects that base the search for a perspective of equality. This is why the search

for alternatives to reduce inequalities goes through two simultaneous paths: the formulation of new development models and the definition and implementation of public policies that allow a more equitable distribution of social assets and resources.

Challenges in combating social inequalities

In Mozambique the challenges in combating social inequalities are and will be permanent. However, several initiatives still have a limited scope and can be more easily identified in the documents and recommendations than through practical action. As a challenge, the projects and programs of community-based organizations, civil society organizations, governmental and non-governmental organizations linked to the promotion of Human Rights, for example, should dedicate themselves to the presentation of proposals related to the issue of social inequalities, resulting to a large extent from the work of the Inter-Sectoral and Interministerial Working Groups to valorize the fight against inequalities and the elaboration of social policies.

We can also highlight as challenges: community activities aimed at the social promotion of children and young people through school reinforcement, professional activities and education aimed at the exercise of citizenship; activities to support and stimulate microentrepreneurs – this activity involves training in knowledge related to business administration and professional qualification –; stimulation and expansion of access to higher education. Press the government to promote and organize conferences that relate to building a state of social, multicultural and democratic justice; strengthen the Role of Affirmative Action in public and linguistic policies in a democratic and contemporary way. The action plans must be developed in terms of public policies. This document, together with the National Human Rights Plan, should express governmental guidelines for combating social inequalities in Mozambique. These are, among others, some of the initiatives that illustrate the existence of a mobilization of different sectors of society towards the adoption of policies to promote equality. These are, among others, some of the initiatives that illustrate the challenges for the mobilization of different sectors of society towards the adoption of policies to promote equality.

According to Souza (2006), we must seek solutions that are not simply the repetition or copy of other imagined solutions to situations in which there is also discrimination and prejudice, but in a different context from ours. It is better, therefore, to seek a more imaginative solution. From the construction of a democratic relationship and instruments for the elaboration and control of public and social policies. It is important to find

support mechanisms in various spheres of government to boost the reach of actions, in addition to redressing the most blatant discrimination, which requires reinstating universal-based social protection, while recognizing the right of the unequal to reach universality through affirmative policies, allied to general redistributive policies (Phillips 1997). The social and cultural diversity in Mozambique produces several dichotomies (Loiane 2013) that in Psychology can be summarized in the concept of 'double bind'. A similar view is found in Castiano (2005), who explores the aporias in education in Mozambique between national identity and particular cultures, between 'education for all' and 'quality for the few', between autonomy and dependency and general education and training for work.

Hirata (2002), in her studies on the current configurations of the sexual division of labor, insists on the persistence of a strong and fundamental contradiction between the entry of women into the labor market and the permanence of a traditional division of labor among women and men, in particular, but not only, in the domestic sphere. The construction of social policies that focus on this logic is therefore central to changing the dependency relationships of women.

The sexual division of labor is understood here not as a descriptive but as a structuring concept in the social relations of sex (Kergoat 1996). The construction of a platform of public policies to combat social inequalities includes, in our perspective, the existence of a body responsible for its articulation and implementation within the Executive, whose objective is to translate a programmatic vision into action and actions that, in its varied scope, reflect the struggle for egalitarian social relations. And respond to the pressures from here and now with the prism of a future project. To that end, each country, each society has different realities and values and, therefore, Ngoenha (2000) enlightened that cultural relativism imposes as standards the respect for differences, tolerance, belief in the plurality of values and acceptance of diversity.

In order to do so, we believe that the Mozambican State, in its various instances, has not yet shown the necessary commitment to the elaboration and implementation of public and linguistic policies to minimize the impact of social inequalities. Even in the projects and programs that have already been implemented, it is possible to identify the insufficiency of material and human resources that guarantee their good progress. It is also noted the discontinuity of the same and the lack of sensitivity of many technicians and employees to incorporate the fight against social inequalities in their daily work.

Social inequalities caused by linguistic constraints

Mozambique's public institutions serve citizens in the official language. In a country where it is known that Portuguese is spoken by the minority, how can one admit that Portuguese is the only language of use in public institutions? It means that those who do not speak Portuguese lose their rights. If this were not the case, the State would provide interpreters to resolve the situation. The question that does not want to remain silent is: how do deaf-mute people make requests to solve their problems? How many sign language schools exist to serve these citizens? The answer we have at the moment is that they are on the sidelines. It is a population that is ignored by the State as if it did not exist.

Let's look at another example that manifests itself in justice: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that "every human being has the right, in full equality, to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal to decide on his rights and duties or the ground of any criminal charge against him" (UNESCO 1998, article 10). The lack of mastery of the language in its various faces limits the application of the expected justice. The mere knowledge of the oral expression of a language cannot be synonymous with the domain of its interpretation or translation. Included here are interpreters in various Mozambican Bantu Languages, Mozambican sign language and foreign languages in general. The presence of these professionals would bring more security and fidelity to the evidence and the statements made by the citizens in the interrogation, denunciation and in other legal documents that are drafted at the police level.

Mozambican cultural tradition has played a leading role in social justice within communities. Rural society respects the power of the rulers as authority and as an area of social justice. Beyond the figure of the ruler, the rural society respects the power of the "elder people" (elders) of the village or of the community as advisers and guides of life in society. These are the judges whose resolve in the first instance all the disputes of the community. What is the language used by community leaders? Obviously, it is a local Bantu Language. This example clearly shows that the functioning of a society revolves around its language. We believe that many campaigns of mobilization, sensitization, electoral and others, if done in local languages, would have more impact than when done in Portuguese, especially in the rural areas where the majority of the Mozambican population is concentrated.

The next example will illustrate how politicians understand very well the importance of language policy, but unfortunately do not wish to

do so because of their own will: we have observed in almost every rally that presidents (of the Republic and municipalities), deputies (Republic, Provincial and Municipal) and the candidates for the elections have always provided an interpreter or translator in their meetings of propaganda and rallies. Why do they take this attitude? They are aware of the fact that Portuguese does not fully respond to the communicative needs of Mozambicans. They know very well that their messages can only reach their fullness using the language of the population. It is this language that is rejected by the Language Policy; it is this language that is rejected in public institutions; it is this language that is worthy of belonging to the political and intellectual elite. Our position is clear and compelling with regard to linguistic diversity. Multilingualism should not be a problem for Mozambicans, but a solution. But this solution will only come when there is the appreciation of the various African languages that are instruments of expression of the culture and the ways of being of the Mozambican people.

Thus, among others, they emerge as social inequalities resulting from linguistic limitations, such as special education. It implies to consider the linguistic policies, especially the presence in the schools of diverse Bantu Languages speaking populations that constitute the country in historical ways. From the cultural and sociolinguistic diversity, we can analyze the social inequalities caused by the limitations, especially of people with disabilities and illiterate, including the complex relationships that involve the places of difference in legal propositions and in school practices.

Combating social inequalities

The fight against social inequalities is directly linked to the identification of what are the 'tolerable limits of inequalities'. But these limits are always flexible and vary according to how inclusive a society looks or expects to be. Here, social perceptions about who have the right to benefit from the resources of society and also about who defines political and symbolic boundaries are crucial. In this context, it is important to discuss deeply about values, perceptions, attitudes and opinions regarding social inequalities. According to Reis (2004), values, perceptions, attitudes and opinions conform the socially valid definitions of what is acceptable or not in terms of the distribution of goods, resources and services. According to the author, it is impossible to understand the distribution patterns of a society without comparing them with the notions of justice and equity that prevail in it; because it is through the cultural code that each society legitimizes or delegitimizes the notions of equality and inequality. "This is because the structure of inequality is reproduced and transformed into

interaction with the cultural code of society. The latter, in turn, provides the language to legitimize or delegitimize equality and inequality" (Munch apud Reis 2004, 55).

If we recognize that the sense of equality is socially constructed and therefore there is a socially shared code that justifies or condemns inequality, we must also recognize that public policies that do not take into account the values and behavior patterns of society are policies destined to failure. We call attention to the incompleteness of the Human Capital Theory that, for decades, has concentrated all our hopes of eliminating poverty and promoting equality in raising the educational levels of the population. The importance of education is undeniable, including as a factor of socialization and transmission of the sense of belonging to a given culture. As it is undeniable that the increase in schooling also affects the capacity for participation, social organization and willingness to claim rights.

The participation of all individuals in social, cultural and leisure activities plays a crucial role in social cohesion, as emphasized by Wixey et al (2005, 18), and contributes to improving health, employment, education and reducing crime by improving the quality of life of the general population. According to Putnam's (2000) thought, increased education, participation, social organization and willingness to claim rights are indispensable components for generating solidarity in the sense of "generalized reciprocity". Although schooling continues to be often presented as a "magic" solution for expanding opportunities and creating a more egalitarian society, reifying the notion of a job market with equal opportunities, whose determinant is the meritocratic value. Unfortunately, this is a difficult condition to achieve in a context of extreme inequality. Bourdieu, in his developed theoretical argument, so properly warns us that the elite tends to trigger mechanisms of distinction that invariably pass through education and culture (Bourdieu 1984; 1975).

It is also difficult to suppose that education alone is capable of reversing a scenario of inequalities that are expressed in several dimensions of capacities and produces situations of extreme deficiency in health, nutrition, stimulation and disposition, among other factors, which creates differences in the appropriation of educational opportunities. Not to mention that there is in the quality of Mozambican education a huge gap between the schools designed to accommodate the children of the elite and the schools that receive the children from the popular classes. Moreover, even grassroots education often incorporates logics and values far removed from the social reality in which its target audience is inserted, which helps to explain the high rates of disapproval, repetition, and dropout. It should also be remembered that education is a long-term investment that has an impact

mainly on the young generations, but also excludes the adult population.

In this context, investment in education, which is indispensable for the promotion of equity and social welfare, does not always have a direct and immediate impact on the poverty, inequality and vulnerability of underprivileged groups. Indeed, the reduction of absolute poverty is strongly conditioned by the reduction of inequalities, not only when it comes to income disparities, but also when we consider other dimensions such as health, education and politics. Looking at this thinking, the search for alternatives to reduce social inequalities goes through two ways simultaneously. One is the formulation of new development models. The other is the definition and implementation of public and social policies that enable a more equitable distribution of social assets and resources, which can expand the opportunities for a greater number of individuals. Distributive policies are indispensable for improving the living conditions and well-being of the vulnerable population; even small changes in income distribution have a significant impact on relative or absolute poverty reduction.

Adopting the Rawlsian concept of justice, Rawls (1993), equality of opportunity, ultimately, is the key element for a just society. It can only be achieved through public action that aggregates and combines different strategies. Thus, both the state and the private sector and civil society organizations can play a relevant role in promoting equality through social policies, which continue to be the fundamental mechanisms for expanding access to rights and generating opportunities.

The intervention of linguistic policies in the reduction of social inequalities

Portuguese, being the only official language most used in Mozambican courts of justice, inhibits and blocks the expressiveness of the defendant or suspect, being limited in his arguments in defense or prosecution. Although police stations and call centers respect these linguistic differences and look for ways to fill up by calling an interpreter or translator, as the case may be. This work could have a participation and multisectoral representation to be coordinated with the Ministry of Justice. The judiciary should have within the framework of the effective official interpreters and specialized translators that could eventually serve the country's police stations. It does not seem fair to a citizen to be questioned or heard in a foreign language. Mozambican linguistic wealth is not a problem for our society, but what concerns it is the way citizens face forensic language. There

is not one language better than the other. Portuguese, although spoken in almost all provinces, cannot be considered the best.

Linguistic policies for social development have to devise a strategy that allows all efforts and activities to be directed towards the aspects and objectives that are decisive for its success. Simply put, it is a question of whether we do the right things. In fact, policy success depends not only on a skilful strategic orientation, but also on the degree of coherence and inter-adjustment between all activities. This requires a large number of communication mechanisms articulated among themselves. It is asking if we do things correctly. This coordination function based on a viable strategy is assumed by the agreements and rules on structures and processes. Those involved also spontaneously assume this function when they understand the strategy and its role is clearly defined.

In addition to strategic orientation and coordination, public and linguistic policies must have a shared meaning horizon and a culture of cooperation so that those involved can, in each case, act and react to the whole. This horizon of meaning answers the question why and for what we do something. It can be created, for example, through a joint vision elaborated in a participatory way and the reinforcement of the common identity. A shared horizon of meaning plays a number of important roles in the coexistence, cooperation and success of social policies.

It is not possible, in public and social policies to combat social inequalities, to regulate all details in a definitive and unambiguous way through strategic guidelines and implementing norms. This would also not be desirable, since in a dynamic and volatile environment this would lead to the immediate blocking and failure of social development projects and programs. People have the ability to organize themselves, articulate and use the margins of action created by the strategic orientation to solve problems in a creative way and take advantage of the opportunities of interpretation to act in function of the whole. Thus, strategic orientation promotes the self-responsibility of the actors involved.

The horizon of meaning also has a promoting effect insofar as it inspires security and allows those involved to properly interpret dubious or even contradictory events and to understand and tolerate dissonances. Finally, a shared meaning horizon helps to enthuse those involved to the common task. Thus, strategic orientation is the foundation that creates margins of action, reinforces self-responsibility and stimulates the creativity of those involved in the design and implementation of public policies. Public policies that provide for equality or equity have been part of the international agenda since the Beijing Conference in 1995. Poverty reduction and social inequalities have been part of the Government's central objectives since the

early days of the National Independence Day for Mozambique.

Among several initiatives, in 1999 the Mozambican government outlined the Lines of Action for the Eradication of Absolute Poverty, one year later the lines were transformed into the Plan of Action for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (2000-2004), aiming to reduce poverty and promote equal opportunities for women and men. As strategies to combat social inequalities, it is essential to articulate between universal policies and focused policies. Although these policies have a distinct character and apply to different situations, they are not practically mutually exclusive or necessarily conflicting. We can understand them as complementary strategies. We must recognize and understand that universal policies have their limits at their cost, while focused policies have limits to their scope.

The multidimensional nature of social inequality requires the combination and articulation between universalization and focus. How to combat social, racial or gender inequality if we do not focus? On the other hand, some rights, such as health and social security, are universal. Some of the important steps for the public and linguistic policy agenda are improving the quality of advocacy, communication strategies and information on the social mechanisms and processes involved in the production and reproduction of inequalities. Notably, it has an immediate impact on the elaboration or design of policies and, therefore, on their chances of success. In this sense, it is fundamental to evaluate the public and linguistic policies effectively implemented. There is a shortfall in the evaluation and monitoring system and so we know little about the history of failures and successes of these measures.

Strategies for developing public and linguistic policies

Here we face two very interesting questions. In addressing the relevant concept of strategy, the most appropriate will be the one that best serve the objectives to be achieved, and on these also depends the most appropriate way of operationalization and measurement. The concept of development is a "living" and complex concept – which has undergone many dramatic changes, especially in the last 50 years and in particular in the last 200 years. Over the past few centuries we have witnessed an extraordinary change in the quality of life, economic growth and population, with the advancement of urbanization processes, industrialization and the technological innovations involved. In public policies and development cooperation projects, 'capacity and strategies building' means the process that puts people, organizations and society in a position to shape its own development of strategies and methodologies in a sustainable way to adapt

to the changes in framework conditions.

According to Sten (2002), two pillars form the basis for development strategy: building an investment environment that facilitates investment and growth, and enabling poor people to participate in this growth. This affirmation confirms that investment in public and social policies duly elaborated, planned and implemented according to the needs and realities of local beneficiaries, public or private sectors, is crucial for the attraction of individual and collective initiatives that, with the production of goods and services, contribute to the improvement of the well-being of individuals and society. Public and linguistic policies to mitigate social inequalities must/can be designed based on projects and programs to support capacity development and strategies precisely in the three-level concept: individuals, organizations and societies. In this context, the level of society can be differentiated and subdivided into its component elements, the "systems of cooperation" and the "field of political action". From the point of view of the formulation and implementation of strategies, a definition of the concept that encompasses the entire process is particularly useful in the management of projects and organizations.

There are not always easy solutions, perfect organizations and methodologies, but we can always work to improve them, especially if we can identify and address the root causes of problems by maintaining a positive, conscious and apprentice attitude. For post-war Mozambique and in the process of reconciliation, the education sector is a first-line challenge, not only in its economic but also social and political valence (Ngoenha 2000, 216). Indeed, if ideology is the link between education and linguistic politics, it is necessary to be attentive to the effects of political power in education. Add to this diversity another one existing between rural and urban schools, public and private and/or mixed, and consequently a whole set of ideas and conceptions that express the vital interests of classes and social groups. In view of this diversity, the importance of language policies for the identification of values common to all Mozambicans becomes a giant undertaking.

Final Considerations

We can consider that in Mozambique, although there are still problems related to the elaboration of public policies, linguistic and social inequalities due to several factors, the current educational system theoretically establishes equal opportunities for both sexes, although not all Mozambicans access teaching the same way. Although women's continued struggle has not yet conquered her space in society in an objective way,

the advances made by women in schooling are encouraging, contrary to the colonial period that has severely excluded access to education for all Mozambicans.

There is no justice in a space where there are no rights and duties. The Mozambican State could play its part, because resources exist as long as there is such political will. As we could see in the debates, the lexical, grammatical and other tone have great importance in the Mozambican Bantu Languages when confronted with forensic interpretation. Without the mastery of these competencies, it is difficult to achieve the desired objectives in articles 250, 252, 253, 254 and 255 dealing with "the questions" in the Mozambique Code of Criminal Procedure (2014).

Therefore, discussing issues of public and linguistic policies: strategies and challenges in combating social inequalities, runs through different thematic fields. For their origins are as manifold and varied as their unfoldings and consequences. It is also important to focus on the analysis of the link between constraint and freedom, between structural constraints and voluntarism. Studies by Tvedten et al (2009, 4) have identified external conditions that also have direct consequences on poverty, and social inequalities. It is important to highlight the gender issue, since the "highly patriarchal system of Mozambique" has implications for women's poverty and well-being.

According to Léon (2011), the concept of empowerment guides us to recognize social constraints that the category is subjected to and the need to think about collective and individual social practices to reverse this situation. Therefore, looking at this line of thought, public policies, and even sociolinguistic studies are important and necessary both for understanding and interpreting the mechanisms and factors involved in the production and reproduction of inequalities, as they are essential for the definition of solutions in the field of public and linguistic policies.

Lowi (1964) developed the perhaps more well-known typology on public policy, elaborated through a maxim: public policy makes politics. With this maxim, Lowi meant that each type of public policy will find different forms of support and rejection and that disputes around its decision go through different arenas. For Lowi, public policy can take four forms. The first is that of distributive policies, decisions taken by the government, which disregard the issue of limited resources, generating more individual rather than universal impacts, by privileging certain social groups or regions, to the detriment of the whole. The second is regulatory policies, which are more visible to the public, involving bureaucracy, politicians and interest groups. The third is that of redistributive policies, which reaches more people and imposes concrete and short-term losses for certain social

groups, and uncertain and future gains for others; they are, in general, the universal social policies, the tax system, the social security system and are the most difficult to address. The fourth is constitutional policies, which deal with procedures. Each of these public policies will generate points or groups of vetoes and of different supports, thus being processed within the political system in a different way (Souza 2006, 28).

In Mozambique, competing with the influence of "new public management" on public policies, there is an attempt, in development, to implement public or linguistic policies of a participatory nature. Driven, on the one hand, by the proposals of the multilateral organizations, and on the other hand, by constitutional mandates and the commitments made by some political parties represented in the parliament, several experiments were carried out aiming at the insertion of social groups and/or interests in the formulation and monitoring of public policies, especially in social policies. Examples of this attempt are the various advisory councils; community councils, etc. Aimed at social policies, as well as the General State Budget.

Decisive forums such as community councils and approval of the State Budget would be the political equivalents of efficiency. Despite the acceptance of several theses of 'new public management' and experimentation of delegation of power to community social groups and/or interest groups, the Mozambican government continues to make decisions about problem situations and design policies to address them, even if it delegates some of its responsibility, especially implementation, to other bodies, including non-governmental bodies.

Language policies do not value Bantu Languages. Only Portuguese is recognized by the Constitution and those who speak Portuguese are assured of their rights. Many Mozambicans are judged in an unknown language. In the police, citizens are interrogated in Portuguese, which is an unknown language. In hospitals, patients report what they feel in the unknown language. In public institutions, those who do not speak Portuguese cannot be cared for. In schools, many children from regions where Portuguese is a second or third language repeatedly fail in the same class. These examples show that an ill-considered policy creates a direct impact on people's lives. We must overcome these impasses.

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ABSTRACT

The democratic world in which most African countries are inserted has created problems, rather than solving problems that affect the population directly. Mozambique has a new state because it reached independence in 1975 and went through five electoral processes. Most of these electoral suffrages are not recognized by the opposition. This research aims to discuss the influence of public and linguistic policies on the life of Mozambicans and show possible ways for a policy that serves the interests of the population. By using a bibliographic method and searching for researchers who discuss public policies and linguistic policies, it has come to the conclusion that there is a need to involve society (in the true sense of the word) in making decisions and solving social problems. It was concluded that Portuguese is an official language, but at the same time, it segregates a majority that is not literate. We need to discuss ways of overcoming the linguistic and social differences, thus creating an environment sane and harmonic.

KEYWORDS

Public policy; Language policies; Mozambique; Democracy.

RITUAL USE OF CURRENCY IN LAIMBWE HISTORY, CAMEROON

Henry Kam Kah[1]

Introduction: Methodology, Objectives and Relevance of Study

Initiation ceremonies, the display of material wealth and money often give people a new grade, an alliance or an office in traditional African community. Ceremonies also mark social maturity and the graduation from childhood to adulthood for males and females. The social alteration, which is accomplished through initiation ceremonies also assist in constructing and legitimating differences in eminence and authority that permeate daily community life. The initiation of a person into a social position goes with doorway money or fees and the payment of a penalty if a member breaks a law. In Africa south of the Sahara, several male and female institutions define status within their spheres of influence. Such institutions exist among the Kaguru, Lovedu, Ndembu, Wagenia Kuranko, Nuer, Bemba of Tanzania, Southern Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zambia respectively. Initiation ceremonies into adulthood, healing associations or political office generally speaking, give African people a new status, an association or an office (Kratz 1997, 378). Some educated elite who aspire to political positions at the national level rely on membership of these traditional institutions to fight their way through. Others have become prominent personalities of their communities because they command respect in ritual and traditional institutions. Membership into these institutions involves the accumulation of material things and money.

In many African communities in general and Cameroon in particular, different items were demanded and provided for ritual and other initiation ceremonies in the distant past. These are still in use today but on a declining scale. Marriage in Cameroon and elsewhere in Africa before

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and during the early years of colonial rule involved field services, giving of slave-attendants, provision of oil, soap, dresses, blankets, umbrella, gifts exchange, mortuary responsibilities, transfer of livestock like among the Turkana of North western Kenya, beads, gold, copper, brass, iron rods and cowries (Nkwi 1987, 48; Fanso 1989, 65; Moore and Vaughan 1994, 157; Yiridoe 1995, 17-32; Peters-Golden 1997, 7; Hamisu 2000/1, 66; Ikpe 2004, 6; Ohta 2007, 3). Some items like cowries, iron rods, beads, gold, copper and brass served a dual purpose namely as money and as commodities (Vansina 1990, 155 and 206).

While material contributions still play an important role in initiation rituals, the introduction of "king" money during contacts with Europeans had an impact on the material and monetary contribution use in marriage. Among the Akan of Ghana marriage from the colonial period involved the provision of two bottles of palm wine or 1:30 cedis and 32 cedis or 200 cedis depending on the social status of the girl to be married. In some cases, men provided presents which included a trunk, a Bible (in the case of a Christian), bottles of rum, beer, and soft drinks to the girls they wanted to marry. While they used palm wine for libations in honour of the ancestors, rum was used to propitiate family divinities and the ancestors (Quarcoopome 1987, 122). In different areas the monetisation of bride-wealth undermined the stability of marriage, threatened social relations, corrupted social values, and inaugurated new identities, status, labour and obligation (Moore and Vaughan 1994, 157-8; Peters-Golden 1997, 7). Elsewhere, in South Western Nigeria, the British introduction of a currency and the monetisation of the economy led to problems of transition and adjustments during the colonial period (Falola 1997, 122). This scenario has survived to this century. The set of social relations, earlier strengthened by a regular exchange of services was replaced by 'king' money. The result threatened the stability of the social system in several ways.

All over Africa, initiation into other institutions relied heavily on material contributions which involved European made goods and the currencies they introduced. In the spider divination of the Yamba of North East Cameroon's Grasslands, pupils of divination made payments of money, fowls, small pots of cooked game and much palm wine to their master. When the master was satisfied with the pupils' ability to manipulate the cards, a final payment was demanded. This payment by the turn of the last century was something to the neighbourhood of £3 (Gufler 1995, 53). Meanwhile initiation of novices of the Dugi or medicine men among the Pere in Cameroon now involves money unlike before. These novices pay a symbolic 25 francs CFA and after their training, they pay another 25 francs to the officiating Dugi. To secure membership in the last stage of the ritual,

each of the initiate gathers three pieces of wood (Pradelles de Latour 1995, 84-5).

Similarly, the initiation of boys into the *Poro* society or girls into the *Sande*, the women equivalent among the Mende of Sierra Leone goes with an initiation fee. The fee for the *Sande* is money, cloth or some other commodities (Quarcoopome 1987, 119). Among the Yoruba, initiation into the *Ogboni* society in the past included human sacrifices but from the colonial era, fowls replaced these human sacrifices (Quarcoopome 1987, 182). These examples are indications of the increasing importance of money in initiation and other ritual activities from the colonial period onwards. Today, many of the societies in need of members have relaxed their material demands in favour of money, some of which is used in socio-economic development of the community.

Study Area

The Laimbwe people are located in the North West Region of Cameroon (See Map). Laimbwe polities straddle Menchum and Boyo Divisions and are principally three in number. Bu is the largest and Baisso the smallest and a reference point for Laimbwe traditions and custom. The census statistics for Bu, Mbengkas and Baisso at independence were 1,118, 530 and 185 respectively. In 1979 the population of Bu was 6,944 with a work force of 2,701 while that of Mbengkas was 1,978 and a working population of about 900. The estimate for the population of Baisso by 1993 was 500 people (Shultz 1993, 10). The population of Bu is projected to reach 17,000 inhabitants by the year 2025 (Strategic Plan of the Wum Council 2009-2014). Mbengkas is a sandwiched settlement between Bu and Baisso and second to Bu in population[2].

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2 NW/Ac. 1960/1/Bk, Historical Notes Bamenda Grassfields, Regional Archives Bamenda (RAB); NW/Qc/b. 1979/4/Bk, Annual Report 1979/1980 of the Divisional Delegation of Agriculture Menchum Division North West Province, RAB.

Image 1: A Cross Section of Menchum/Boyo Divisions Showing the Laimbwe Polities

SOURCE: Adapted from the Map of Nkambe, NB-32-XVII, N.G.I., Paris, 1979.

     Mbengkas is neither accessible by a motorable road network from Baisso nor Bu because of a difficult and undulating topography. Since the late 1970s, the people have made several attempts to dis-enclave the area but without much progress due to financial difficulties and the deceitful attitude of some of their elite. Although they have been engaged in digging or maintaining the road themselves almost every year, this has not produced the required results[3]. There is however hope because since December 2015, a fresh attempt to dis-enclave the area was initiated by the Mbengkas Development and Cultural Organisation (MBEDECO).

3 File No. NW/Qc/b. 1979/4/Bk, Annual Report 1979/1980 of the Divisional Delegation of Agriculture Menchum Division North West Province, RAB; File No. NW/Qb/a. 1985/6/Bk, Diagnostic Account of the Economic, Social and Cultural Situation of the Menchum Division since the Inception of the 5th Five Year National Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan, RAB. Frantic efforts are presently made by the Boyo administration to link Mbengkas to Fundong through Baisso and Mentang.

The Laimbwe polities are bordered to the North and North East by Mentang, Teitengem, Ehwi-njong, Endeng and Mughom. The village of Mentang speaks Kom and shares boundary with Baisso while Mughom, formerly under Mbengkas suzerainty now seeks the protection of Kom (Lah 1989, 2)[4]. The Aghem ethnic group borders the territory to the South and to the East and South East are Mbakong (Mile 28), Obang (Mile 30), Ndung (Mile 34), Aguli (Kekuli) and Befang, an economically viable road junction village and the gate way into the Menchum Valley subdivision from Bamenda, capital of the North West Region of Cameroon. The first three settlements are southern border villages of Bafut sub division of Mezam. To the West of Laimbwe are Kuk, Bafmeng and Mbongkesso villages.

Baisso is located near the western boundary of Kom and near the Kom/Wum Forest Reserve. Bu is separated from the other two Laimbwe polities by the River Meteh and the Kom/Wum Forest Reserve. Shultz (1993) erroneously asserts that Bu was once a Kom village which is now under Wum but is right when he argues that few of the Bu people speak and understand Kom. Mbengkas on the other hand is located to the South West of the Kom border and within the Kom/Wum Forest Reserve. On the whole, Laimbwe territory falls within latitudes 60 degrees 50 minutes north of the equator and longitudes 10 degrees 10 minutes east of the Prime Meridian. They are a people with their own peculiarities.

The Laimbwe like other ethnic groups of the West and North West Regions were considered as a semi-Bantu speaking people. They belong to the Tikars who trace their origin to Ndobo and Bankim in the Adamawa Region of Cameroon; their ancestral home (Amaazee 1964, 54; Muam 1999, 2; Cheng 1996; Ngwoh 2006, 14-15; Asang 2008). Studies about the Tikar, a contested terminology today (Jeffreys 1940, 32; Jeffreys 1952, 141-53; Chilver and Kaberry 1996, 249-57; Fowler and Zeitlyn 1996, 1-16), excludes the Laimbwe whenever mentioned is made of the Tikar groups of the North West Region of Cameroon (Mafiamba 1969; Nkwi 1987, 15 and 23; Fanso 1989, 35).

The Laimbwe cultivate food and cash crops like maize, cocoyams, rice and coffee. They also engage in other related activities like hunting, lumbering and fishing. Their socio-political structure is centralised and similar to that of the matrilineal Kom, Kuk, and Bafmeng people but

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4 Misunderstanding and Disagreement between H.R.H. Fon Yibain James of Kom and Chief Kpwai II Clement Toh of Mbengkas Chiefdom over the Mughom Chieftaincy/Kwifondom Issue since 18 May 1990-29 May 1994; Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Divisional Office Fundong on the 31/01/91 Concerning the Dispute between the Chief of Mbengkas and the Quarter head of Mughom in Mbengkas Village. Other settlements under the influence of Mbengkas include Teitengem and Endeng but these settlements also have close cultural affinities with the valley settlements of Tingoh and Obang.

not matrilineal Aghem; a confederacy of semi-autonomous polities. The *laimbwe* language is spoken in three of its principal polities of Bu, Mbengkas and Baisso. It is also spoken in neighbouring Mughom, Endeng, Teitengem, Aguli and Mbongkesso polities and hamlets. While Mughom, Endeng, Teitengem and Aguli speak a variant of the Widikum language, Mbongkesso blends Laimbwe and Itanghi-Kom, a result of the mixing of cultures at the edge of the Kom/Wum Forest Reserve. These villages value culture, which explains the popularity of initiation into cultural institutions.

Initiation into Institutions

There are several ritual and/or traditional institutions among the Laimbwe and include masquerade societies, marriages and other associations but our study will be based on the most important of these male and female institutions.

Tschong

Tschong, a friction drum institution is prestigious among elderly men in Laimbwe country. In the past, that is, before colonisation family members assisted men of age and status with material gifts like beans to facilitate initiation into *tschong* but this has evolved with growing individualism and personal advancement. Some of the people see in the initiation of lineage elders into *tschong* as a burden. Those who sought initiation into *tschong* fulfilled a number of conditions before they could be considered. They would begin by going to their fathers or their heirs with five goats. This was to clear the way for consideration into membership (Buhghebei 2007; Wakem 2007; Kom 2008; Kendang 2008; Chief Kpwai II 2008; Kpwa 2008; Ngeh 2009; Sei 2009; Zoh 2009). In the colonial era, the people decided to reduce the number of goats usually demanded for initiation of members. They made this up by introducing the use of the British pound sterling in replacement of some goats. Today, a man who seeks admission into *tschong* may give his father the sum of five thousand francs CFA or five bags of salt each of which represents a goat among the Laimbwe people (Kom 2008; Ngoh 2009).

Following the meeting and presentation of goats or bags of salt to one's father, senior members of the *tschong* society were given two goats for entertainment. This was the commencement of the initiation ritual. When money was introduced as a medium of exchange in the colonial period, new members gave two pounds as replacement for some goats. The amount is not known during the era of German administration of the

area. People had also started to rear goats not only for initiation rituals but for sale as well. After the independence of British Southern Cameroons through reunification with the Cameroun Republic on October 1 1961, further innovations were introduced in the payment for initiation rites. New members were now expected to give two thousand francs CFA or two bags of salt. These members were then led into the *mbai-azung* or fence of *tschong* for the ritual proper (Kahghesah 1997; Ngong Mathias 1997; Ndong Teacup 2008). At the fence, they presented two pigs and sticks of fish or *kembou* (sing.), *eh'mbou* (pl.) and (tadpole(s)), a preferred delicacy for the *Isile*. The priest of the *mbai-azung* often request today the sum of five thousand or more and cocks from the new members. This is for the ritual they perform during the *mbai-azung* ritual ceremony.

In the pre-colonial and early colonial epochs, after the *mbai-azung* ritual ceremony, each new members who were rubbed with camwood by elderly women started what was called "searching your father's *tschong* bag" (Kom 2008). This literally meant going back to their fathers to give them more gifts such as blankets, salt and bush meat in appreciation of their having permitted them to join the *tschong* institution of status, adulthood and nobility. Some fathers however spared their children this burden to bringing them more gifts after the *mbai-azung* ritual activity. Others, especially non-members of the *tschong* welcomed these additional gifts and blessed these children who had now become adults. The searching of the bag of one's father was however one of the important aspects of initiation into the *tschong* society in Laimbwe land.

The mother or sister of the father (aunt) of the new member of *tschong* was and is still given a new piece of cloth during the initiation ceremony. This is in honour of fatherhood among a matrilineal speaking people. She wears beads on the neck of the son's or brother's son. This is usually after the rubbing of camwood following the *mbai-azung* ritual. It is the mother or sister of the father of the new member that initiates the rubbing exercise with camwood and other family members and people follow her example (Buh 2008; Ekai 2008; Ewi 2008; Izhoi 2008; Kule 2008; Ngoisey 2008). Her recognition and pre-eminent role in ritual matters was and remains the respect accorded fatherhood among the Laimbwe matriliny of Cameroon. Members of *isaa'enduoh* (lineage) made gifts of money and materials to the newly initiated member of *tschong*. This was to appreciate them for becoming men of status, dignity and influence in the community (Tsche 2007; Tschi 2008; Wei 2009). Generally speaking, during the pre-colonial era most of these gifts were in kind. People attached a lot of importance to material things then. Such material gifts like goats, fowls and pigs were either consumed at the ritual ceremony or kept by *tschong* members to

multiply.

The ownership of the *tschong* entails undergoing a process. Any adult willing to own one for his *isaa'endouh* or lineage could do so. The one who desired ownership of *tschong* needed the support of his *isaa'endouh* to entertain the villagers with food and corn beer. Many of the smaller *ehsaate'nduoh* or *eh'nduoh* (lineages) found it difficult to own a *tschong* of their own because of the cost involved. Others since the 1980s are vehemently opposed to owning or soliciting initiation into *tschong*. Their argument is that this society serves only the purpose of eating, drinking and contributing to famine in the land (Ngai 2007; Muhnjang 2008; Kpwai 2008). This is however contested by owners and senior members of *tschong* who argue that *tschong* comes with influence, status, blessings and opportunities for its members. It is also a way of valorising a people's culture, which if well-handled can promote cultural or heritage tourism in Laimbweland.

The initiation into *tschong* takes place in three main stages, which include the *quekezung, ikoi-azung* and *tschuka-azung*. To *quekezung* involves preparing food for members of *tschong*. For the *ikoi-azung* a new member prepares beans for the others and owners of the *tschong* and for the *tschuka-azung* the new *tschong* member prepares pounded beans in red oil. It is only consumed by members of *tschong* because it is mixed with some medicines. If a member cannot eat all the beans, the left over is thrown into the toilet because it contains a poisonous substance. Apart from the *tschong* prestigious club, there is the *kuiifuai* regulatory society that is involved in initiation, the use of material and money.

Kuiifuai/Andzjom

The *kuiifuai* regulatory society is an important society for men in the Laimbwe villages but that of Bu village is the most revered compared to the *kuiifuai* of the kin village of Mbengkas. The *mu'ukuum* of Baisso is also highly respected as *kuiifuai* (Afuah 2008; Ache 2008; Bong 2008; Zoh 2009). Although in some quarters *kuiifuai* is referred to as the *andzjom*, it is a misnomer because *andzjom* is one of the grades within the *kuiifuai* regulatory society which consist essentially of three grades. The other grades after *andzjom* in ascending order are *ehteighetschuuh* and *ikuum*. The *kuiifuai* is not the property of any single person but its leadership is from the Eselemei matrilineage in Bu and Mbengkas villages.

In Bu village, the Ehzem matrilineage plays a key role in initiation and other pertinent activities of *kuiifuai* as founders of the fondom and the Eselemei, one of the royal families of the village (Ngai 2007; Wakem 2007, Kpwa 2008; Akou 2008; Ngong 2008). This society operates the consensus

will of the population and maintains justice, peace, progress and stability in the Laimbwe polities. This takes place through family heads, notables and other members of the society. Members for initiation into *kuiifuai* are materially and financially supported by their *isaa'endouh* and friends. In the pre-colonial era, their *zheh'abei* (family head) or any senior family member were supported materially and financially in their bid for membership of *kuiifuai* than it is the case now because of growing individualism and the decline in regular family meetings.

Several considerations determine the initiation of a man into the *kuiifuai*. A prospective candidate into the lowest level or first rung of the *kuiifuai* simply known as *ekehghekuiifuai* (to become a member of *kuiifuai*) began when a would-be member of *kuiifuai* lobbied senior members with corn beer or beer. When his candidacy found favour with the elders, they openly discussed his membership into the society during their secluded meetings. He was then asked to pay to the leader of the *kuiifuai*, some shillings in the colonial period and 1000 francs during the post-independence period (Kom 2008). In the pre-colonial and early colonial eras, the payment was evaluated largely in the form of goods.

Upon the payment of dues on an agreed date, the candidate for *kuiifuai* presented three goats, a bag of rice or 5000 francs. The rice became an important ritual commodity during the colonial period when this commodity was first introduced into Laimbwe territory in 1953 from Abakaliki in Nigeria by the British (Ambei 2008; Ndong 2008; Kom 2008; Ngai 2008). Members of the *isaa'enduoh* supported him especially during the pre-colonial and colonial periods because of the need to preserve the unity and pride of the family. This is only partially the case today because some family members have broken with tradition. They no longer support elders during initiation into *kuiifuai* because they consider this to be paganism. In the pre-colonial era and a greater part of the colonial period, the payment was a basin of beans to complement the goats (Ambei 2008; Kom 2008). This was/still considered the first step into the three grades of *kuiifuai* for a member. All new members are initiated on the occasion of the death ceremony of a member. No initiation takes place ordinarily.

The next grade is the *kooh* lodge, *andzjom* or *ehteighetschuuh* (*tschu-ibhuh*). It is a senior rank for position, fame and influence among the Laimbwe. The candidate who asked to be initiated into the *andzjom* made a contribution of a sizeable pig, four healthy fowls and 2000 francs depending on the case. Today 20,000 francs is demanded in place of a pig. Prior to independence, the currency for initiation was the pound sterling and today, it is the franc CFA. Many of the elders of the *andzjom* today prefer the sum of 20,000 francs for several reasons. First, they share part of the

amount, the money is used to purchase basic household needs, and part of it is invested in education, water and the construction of bridges in the community (Kahghesah 1997; Kom 2008).

Membership into the *ikuum* (*tschu-ituoh*), the third and highest grade of *kuiifuai* was and remains highly selective. Some elders of the Laimbwe villages are members of *ikuum*. Initiation of its members in the pre-colonial and colonial eras took place at night. Prior to this, women cleaned up places in anticipation of the initiation ritual of new members. Initiation was organised when only a few members of the *ikuum* were still alive. They were/are expected to teach the new members the ways, secrets and mysteries of the society before God calls them to eternity (Ngai 2007; Wakem 2007). This practice has survived the Laimbwe people to the 21st century.

For a hitch free initiation into the *ikuum*, a candidate made available two pigs, a crate or two crates of beer, 2000 francs and five logs of firewood for their entertainment. In the pre-colonial era pots of locally distilled corn beer did the trick in place of beer which was introduced in the colonial era by Laimbwe who worked in the commercial plantations along the coast of Cameroon or who were engaged in long distance trade in other towns of Cameroon like Bafut, Bamenda, Guzang, Mamfe and Nkongsamba (Afuah 2008; Sei 2009). Those who did not reconcile differences within their lineages were rejected by the *ikuum* during the ritual ceremony. The purity of heart and peace in the lineage were and remain prerequisites for a successful initiation of new members into the *ikuum*. The material things and money demanded of members did/do not automatically guarantee the admission of a person into the *tschu-ituoh* until confirmation or rejection for reasons outlined above during the ritual.

Besides, at the death of *kuiifuai* members the lineages provide what is expected and demanded of them in food and money. In announcing the death of a member of the ordinary rank, that is to *tschai-epheh*, the family gives 5000 francs today through the father of *kuiifuai* to Teacup Ndong of the Ehzem lineage or his assistant John Wakem still of the Ehzem in Bu village. In the years before and some two decades after independence, the amount was smaller. The amount is 7000 francs for a member of the *kooh* or *tschu-ibhuh* lodge and 15000 francs when an *ikuum* member passes on. Before the introduction of money and even when it was introduced during the colonial period, it was not emphasised in ritual and other ceremonies but this is the case today since some of the goods which were demanded for initiation like goats, pigs, beans and rice are sold for money to build houses, pay medical bills of family members or pay for the school fees of children.

During the celebration of a 'fresh death' for an ordinary member

of *kuiifuai*, the family provides four goats and two bags of salt which traditionally are also considered to represent goats for each bag. In the past, what mattered was the goats and corn fufu with which the meat was consumed. This was/is done to *epheh ipheh*, which is to postpone the death celebration awaiting the final death celebration a year or more thereafter. In addition, when a member of *kooh* lodge and *ikuum* passes away, a pig is given to members of these lodges for their entertainment (Kahghesah 2007). In most cases, they divide it raw and take it home for their wives, sisters, nephews and mothers. If the meat is prepared in the *kuiifuai* grove women cannot eat it because it is believed that they will not procreate.

When the *isaa'enduoh* agreed on the date for a final death celebration of an ordinary member of *kuiifuai*, preparation was/is made to entertain *kuiifuai* with five to eight goats usually a mixture of goats and bags of salt and forty-seven loaves of corn fufu. For the member of the *kooh* lodge, the *isaa'enduoh* presented five goats and two bags of salt. If their relative was an *ikuum* member, the *isaa'enduoh* was asked eight healthy looking goats, which were both goats and bags of salt since a bag of salt is taken for a goat (Ngai 2007; Kom 2008). Many more loaves of fufu were prepared by women of the *isaa'endouh* and presented to members of *kuiifuai* who ate it with the goats or pigs (Ngei 2008; Ndum 2008; Ndong 2008; Ngoi 2008; Ngowei2008; Nyooh 2008). While women made contributions of corn flour and prepared fufu corn collegially, the men provided fowls, goats, pigs, dry meat, oil and salt for the celebration. These things are provided today but much emphasis is on converting most of them into money to ease initiation for those who do not have these things. Some of the material things are however still given for the purpose of keeping faith with traditions and custom. The *kuiifuai* is one of the many other male institutions in Laimbwe country like the *mekuum*.

On a general note, although there is variation in initiation cost into *kuiifuai* from the past to the present, initiation today in Bu village has taken on the following characteristics. The person for initiation pays in one bag of harvested rice, which co-incidentally is in abundance in the village, three goats, one of which is supplied by the father, three to five bottles of beer to the *tsite'nduoh* (errand boys) club. For burial, 10,000 francs is given for the death announcement, two fowls to the *mebuuh* masquerade, two fowls to *kembaikoh*, three to four goats, 60 or more loaves of fufu corn. During the final death ceremony, a tin of honey is given and this is mixed with several pots of corn beer, three to four goats and 60 loaves of fufu corn. Initiation into the *andzjom* involves five fowls and during burial, one fowl is given and another one the final death ceremony or memorial. Groundnuts are also an accompaniment. For the *ikuum* lodge, initiation involves one goat,

2000 francs, five logs of wood, two cocks, one crate of beer and during burial the family is demanded one cock and 2000 francs. In the memorial celebration, a goat, 2000 francs and *kemuh*, that is fried maize in powder form (Muam 2001, 151).

This culture of contributing money during funerals is not limited to the Laimbwe because around the Roi-et-Province in Thailand, during traditional funeral rites currency is inserted in the oral cavity of the deceased. Usually 5 or 10 Baht coins are preferred. In some funerals, the people insert personal items like watches, rings, necklaces, and additional money in the coffin. In doing this, they are convinced that this is their own way of providing the deceased with money to pay for the fare to Hell or Heaven (Senaraj, Yodmalee, Potisam and Sohpohn 2008: 208). This aside, the different masquerade societies in Laimbwe country have used money in varying degrees to fulfil membership obligations.

The Mekuum (Masquerade Societies)

Membership of the *kekuum* (sing.) in Laimbwe country entails performing a *rite de passage* into adulthood. While a few of the *mekuum* (pl.) are controlled by the general public most of them are the property of *saa'tenduoh* and directed by the *zheh'nduoh* or *zheh'abei*. As young men grow to maturity and marry, they are admitted into *kekuum* of the *isaa'enduoh* or community through an entrance fees and material. In the pre-colonial past of Laimbwe, initiation of males into the *mekuum* began at infancy through material contributions. After the colonial era, this form of initiation has weakened partly because of Christianity and education of children out of Laimbwe country (Afuh 2007; Buhghebei 2007; Ebuh 2007; Chief Kpwai II 2008; Ngeh 2008). Mostly grown up children and those who have rejected Christianity go for initiation once they have built a compound of their own. They make several monetary contributions and other materials to change from one grade to another within the *mekuum* societies. Many Christian boys have refused membership of these societies describing them as satanic but some of them who have left the church have joined the *mekuum* like the *libah* of the Ehzem and Eselemei lineages in Bu and Mbengkas respectively. A few others belong to the church and these *mekuum*.

During the pre-colonial era to the early decades of independence, children of five to ten years, their peers and age mates met in a meeting of the *mezhuuh* masquerade. This was because for one to be admitted into the senior masquerade societies he obligatorily went through the *rite de passage* in *mezhuuh* with material assistance from his parents. This involved a loaf of fufu corn with a bowl or some quantity of *eh'feghe* (okro-like watery soup)

or boiled cocoyam leaves, roasted or boiled crab/tadpoles or pepper soup and fish (Muam 2001, 150). During the period of mourning the same levy was demanded especially so because there is no memorial ceremony for a child who dies. With the monetisation of the economy from the colonial period onwards, this has come to involve some coins usually less than a dollar. This amount is demanded by the elderly members for their own personal entertainment after the *mezhuuh* gathering is over.

In actual fact, initiation into the *mezhuuh* was and has remained relatively simple in terms of material contributions and money. The boy who asked for membership was given corn fufu and vegetables or meat to members for entertainment. It was and still is not an exclusive club because all young boys, Christians and non-Christians alike joined/join it. Although a simple masquerade society, *mezhuuh* cannot be ridiculed or attacked by any one small or big. If this happens, a fine in goats, fowls and money is demanded as a corrective measure. In the pre-monetary period, *mezhuuh* fines never included money but today money is required.

After the initiation into *mezhuuh* one qualified for membership of *fehndzjeh*, a masquerade society for young boys. Initiation during the non-monetisation period was in material like the other *mekuum* and *mezhia*. The use of money for initiation became common after independence when young boys paid an initiation fee of 100 francs and between one and ten fowls per masquerade society of their choice (Muam 2001, 150). Today the material things that use to sanction full membership of any masquerade or any other society have declined in importance and money has replaced them. The more money someone has and his belonging to a higher social status has often attracted a higher initiation fee than the one presented by the ordinary village folk because he is relatively poor. The cost of burial of members of the lineage in the *nduoh'ehveh* (death celebration house) was some 30 or more fowls or five fowls and 1250 francs including another fowl for the masquerade society (Muam 2001, 150). However, for a few modifications, during the final death ceremony, the charge in monetary terms and material contributions is the same. The availability of money has made some lineages to buy more wines, palm wine, corn beer and beer to entertain the community.

The general entertainment of the community varies from person to person and status. This may involve as small as 10 fowls (50 francs representing a fowl) to as many as over 200 fowls (Ambei 2007; Ngai 2007). The one that involves many fowls is determined by one's social status and promotion to different grades of the village institutions. The two things given include the *baike'ibeh* and the *teh'ndom*. The first is given immediately after the burial of a person and the second follows. It is composed of money

and food but given as part of the *baike'ibeh*. The goat that use to be given may now be given in the form of a bag of salt which is equal to a goat in the traditional milieu and it is divided only to the people present. During the final death ceremony the *zeike'duoh* and *teh'ndom* are presented. While a few are in the form of fowls, the majority is in money which is used for different purposes to develop people and the community.

Initiation of people into the *mekuum* from the pre-colonial era to the first decade of independence began from the quarter to the village level. The grown up was encouraged and supported by his kith and kin with material and money during the colonial period in the initiation ceremonies into *mekuum* at the quarter and village levels. After this, initiation into other *mekuum* from other quarters or lineages and into *ehzhia*, (sing.) *mezhia* (pl.) was pursued. It was always an honour for one to be presented by his father to the *mekuum* and *mezhia* and with material and financial support. At the same time, fish or meat was made available to women and corn fufu prepared to entertain the men and women at the compound of *kieteh* (quarter head's compound) or the palace of *fuai*. In the absence of goats five fowls were accepted in replacement (Afuh 2007; Ebuh 2007; Ibo-oh 2008; Ikai R 2008; Ikai Z 2008; Kendang V 2008; Mukoi 2008; Ndang 2008; Ngwa 2008). It was however honourable to present a goat during this ceremony of the coming of age. After independence, a few fowls were asked and the remainder was converted into money and given to the quarter elders depending on the level attained by the member being initiated.

In fact, men performed the ritual of *kezewai* when their wives gave birth to their first child. The *kezewai* ceremony involved the contribution of a goat and later on after independence, five hundred francs (slightly more than a dollar) was given to represent a goat. After the *kezewai*, fifteen fowls or the equivalence in money during the colonial and post independence periods was made available by the grown up individual. Since independence the sum of fifty francs CFA has been accepted for a fowl. These fifteen fowls were presented as the *nduoh* or house (Afuh 2007; Ambei 2008). This was to tell the elders that this man had come of age and could now move and discuss with them.

The building of a house for which an open ritual was organised in commemoration was a mark of maturity for any Laimbwe male child. For the *itschuoh* ritual, five fowls were given making a total of twenty fowls. During the first two decades of independence ending in the 1980s, these things were done mostly in money. This money was shared among those who had attained senior grades in village societies (Kom 2008). Amounts or material things asked for during these rituals varied from quarter to quarter, *isaa'enduoh* to *isaa'enduoh* and from one Laimbwe village to the

other. Initiation into *mekuum* of the *isaa'enduoh* often took precedence over those of the quarter, other *saa'tenduoh*, the village and ethnic group as a whole. Among the Laimbwe, it is generally believed and rightly too that initiation into societies today is more costly in monetary terms in Bu than in Mbengkas and Baisso because of its accessibility and greater external influence than the other two Laimbwe villages.

The general qualification for the *mezhia* stemmed from fulfilling certain obligations prominent among which were presenting the *mendeng* to one's father. This was when one had built his own house, had domestic animals and other sylvan wealth around his compound. This included bananas, pears, oranges, mangoes, guavas and other fruit trees (Kahghesah 1997; Ambei 2008). When a father felt satisfied with his son's achievements and maturity he urged him to present the *mendeng* to him as tradition demanded. Today, emphasis is not necessarily on the sylvan wealth found around the compound but the ability of a child to do any kind of business, become rich and responsible. Many of them now offer *mendeng* in the form of money to their fathers. Money has thus simplified the process of providing things to one's father.

In contemporary times, the *mendeng* which hitherto was in the form of material contribution has generally been transformed into money which is equal to five thousand francs CFA or less (about 11 dollars) still in attempt to fulfil tradition. According to the Laimbwe people, this ritual of *mendeng* provided enormous blessings from the father to the young adult. Meat was also presented to members of the *ehzhia* for entertainment. This ritual exercise opened the floodgate for the child to scurry for initiation into *mezhia* such as the *kekikuum, ndonyi, mekwasuuh, kuumkengang, phesooh, libah kekuleh, leh'atang* and *tschong*. The process of initiation differs from one *ehzhia* to another today where money is involved as it was before. It has also changed over time because certain things that use to be given in material form are now being given partially in material and in money. Such things include castor oil, fowls and goats.

Initiation into different *mezhia* entails expenditure at different stages. The most basic things like paying an entrance fee are done. In the *libah* for instance, a new member presents money for the *tehmbang*, which are two well decorated sticks, one representing male and the other female used to signal the arrival of the masquerade and its group of flute blowing dancers. The coins for these *tehmbang* are usually given through an old member to the senior members of the society who divide it among themselves (Ebuh 2007; Bong 2008).

After the declaration of intent, the one seeking for membership is told what it takes in monetary terms, fish, fowls, salt, goats and other

items to be fully incorporated into the *libah*. This entails moving from one stage to the other as one grows older and matured. Rank in the society is a measurement of status and influence. Members aspiring to a higher rank to command the respect of others toil day and night and also solicit the material and financial assistance of their sisters, brothers, mothers and uncles. Such support nowadays is based on one's contribution to the unity and growth of the lineage. If one fails to contribute to the progress of the lineage, he is not supported financially and materially when he is seeking for admission into *mezhia*.

Many of these *mezhia* have declined in importance because of a combination of factors. Some of the former members in Bu for example argue that it is a subtle way by the dominant matrilineal groups to perpetually subjugate the smaller and less influential *saa'tenduoh* and dictate the pace of events in the village through the extortion of money (Afuh 2007). In addition, some owners of these masquerades are disenchanted with the young because of their selfish handling of material gifts and money that come in after a funeral or death celebration in the village.

Many of them roast fowls presented during celebrations and share the money among selves leaving nothing for the owner and the older members of the *ehzhia*. In anger therefore, the owners and other older members have resolved to keep the masquerades in the ceilings and in some cases they have been abandoned. The dressing of some of the *mekuum* have deteriorated beyond repair with the result being the inability for these masquerades to animate during death celebrations even of family members as was the case prior to independence of Cameroon in 1960/61.

In other cases, *zhehtebei* are inexperienced and unwilling to learn. Soon after they assume the position of manager of lineage property as *zhehtebei*, instead of improving on what they met; they have taken to naive and irresponsible behaviour and refused to associate and learn from the elders. They have also used their religious inclinations to abandon the once revered masquerades of their lineages. Other successors are absentee landlords who talk more and act less. Proposals for them to make some improvements in the *kekuum* of the lineage are not heeded to. Money raised for this purpose by members of the lineage is very carefully diverted into other personal gains. 'King' money so they say has come to create problems for some of these societies than solve them. Apart from male institutions, there are female institutions of status and nobility.

The Kefa'a

The *kefa'a* is an elderly women society in the Laimbwe villages. It is

under the titular leadership of the *zhehfuai* or queen mother. Lineages are owners of the kefa'a. In the Laimbwe villages, the principal *ehfa'a* (pl.) owning lineages are the Ehzem, Eselemei, Ukwosuuh and Nduokang (Ngoisey 2008; Izhoi 2008; Kule 2008; Mbei Ikai 2008). The other lineages are simply participants as members of the society. Membership into the *kefa'a* is by an initiation ceremony. Today, many women of the younger generation are disinterested because to them membership into the *kefa'a* insubordinate them to the lineages owning or persons controlling the society and also entails a lot of expenditure.

When members of the *kefa'a* of the lineages are performing in public, the distinguishing mark is the rings of different colours they wear round their heads. These instruments were either bought with the pound during the colonial period, the franc CFA during the post-independence era or succeeded to from mother or grandmother. Some of the women bought the material from Bamessing in Ndop and the beads from the market or in the past from Nigeria through traders or smugglers. Most recently, the beads were brought to the women by Hausa traders. The cylinders are today purchased from neighbouring Fundong in Boyo Division of the North West Region of Cameroon (Ngoisey 2008; Mbei Ikai 2008; Ekai 2008; Nyooh 2008). The camwood, a very highly prized condiment for long was imported from the South West Region of Cameroon because of the abundance of the trees in this part of the country.

For anyone to be admitted into the kefa'a, the assistance of the father's mother or sister (paternal aunt) was solicited. If her aunt rejected her admission she was sure not to be initiated. Initiation was in two stages in the pre-colonial to the early independence period. The first stage was the presentation of a tin of oil and three or four dry bush meat. Today, a sizeable quantity of dry cow meat is provided because of the scarcity of bush meat. In the second phase, the member brought to the *kefa'a* members gathered *keh'tia* or pepper soup which was a combination of one tin of oil, one bag of salt, three pieces of dry meat and a good quantity of camwood for their entertainment and distribution (Ngoisey 2008; Mbei Ikai 2008; Ekai 2008). These things today are bought with money since very few people are engaged in palm oil production in the Laimbwe villages.

At the death of a member of kefa'a, her matrilineage did some of the following things. In the first place, the leader of the *kefa'a* who was usually the oldest surviving member was informed. The official announcement was much smaller in shillings in the colonial period but today it is one thousand francs in replacement of material gifts and shillings given in the past. During the death celebration of a member, *kefa'a* women are presented with two basins of corn fufu and a bundle of tadpoles or dried tilapia fish

in the morning and evening respectively (Izhoi 2008; Ngoisey 2008; Mbei Ikai 2008). They are further entertained with five basins of corn fufu and five bundles of tadpoles representing the *koh-afa* (the taking away of *kefa'a* instruments from the fire place), *zhe-eh-afa* (the waking up of the *kefa'a* in the morning), *mbwe-keh-afa* (sending the *kefa'a* to sleep). These are the three levels of entertainment known to members of the *kefa'a* today. Some of the things like tadpoles are today in short supply and so are expensive.

Other things presented to *kefa'a* members include a tin of oil and a bag of salt for distribution. Some lineages give more during death ceremonies out of their own free will. There are however slight differences in what is given in the three villages of Laimbwe of Bu, Baisso and Mbengkas but what is usually given come from the lineage of the late member of the kefa'a. Some people are criticising the society on the basis that initiation is very costly because even the many material things given are bought with money. There are however many other women associations and clubs to which they enlist their membership if they cannot make it to the prestigious *kefa'a*.

Zhiamehzele (Women Associations and Clubs)

The *kefa'a* women regulatory society notwithstanding, there are other zhiamehzele in Laimbwe country serving different purposes. Among these are the *ketaah*, *keseem ndzjang* and *fembweih*. Some of the clubs are directed by particular lineages. The *fembweih* is under the control of the Ehzem, Eselemei and Nduokang in the Laimbwe villages. Its membership is open and performs mostly when an adult male or female dies. The *ndzjang* on the other hand is very well established within its ranks are interested men. The strength of this club lies in its ability to draw together children of the palace to providing its leadership in Mbengkas (Ngei 2008; Ngoi 2008; Ngwa 2008; Ewi 2008). In Bu village, *ndzjang* does not necessarily has palace connections and remain popular among its members. The other *zhiamehzele* like the *ketaah* and *keseem* have remained clubs for women expression of their ability to entertain and provide comic relief to grieving members of the community. They bring together women of age from different lineages who get together to maintain the values of their village and their lineages through performance. Membership into these clubs is simply by monetary or other contributions when the need arises. Expenditure is therefore not as much and those who cannot secure membership into the *kefa'a* join any of these.

Conclusion

In conclusion, in both female and male societies in the Laimbwe ethnic group of the North West Region of Cameroon, initiation was a mark of the coming of age, a marker of status and influence in the community. Evidence from this study shows that during the pre-colonial period, the rite de passage was determined by material accumulation and provision. Many people were assisted by members of their lineages and by friends to provide the huge quantities of material that was requested for initiation into the *kuiifuai, kefa'a, zhiamehzele, mezhuuh, libah* and other societies. Identity and status markers were all determined by the wealth one possessed and the willingness to give it during initiation.

The colonial administration beginning with the Germans in 1884 introduced money as a medium of exchange and as a measurement of value. Material contributions were still overwhelmingly made available but some of the demands were given in money. It is worth noting that some of the materials like rice were introduced from abroad as commercial crops and it came to play a significant role in the political economy of the Laimbwe people. After independence, money has increasingly played a pivotal role in ritual ceremonies. Even some of the material things presented like pigs and honey are bought with money from other neighbouring villages. Many of the elders also need money and not material contributions because of development projects in the community like the construction of health centres, schools, culverts and bridges. Money has therefore fundamentally impacted on the process of initiation and entertainment of people in Laimbweland like elsewhere in Cameroon.

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ABSTRACT

The advent of Europeans in Cameroon in the 15th century and the introduction of a western currency as a standard of exchange and a measurement of value to replace other indigenous currencies had an impact on initiation into regulatory and entertainment societies in Cameroonian communities including the Laimbwe of the North West Region. Male and female institutions eventually began using these currencies during initiation rites. These included *nwerong, ngiri, ngumb*a, *takembeng, ndofoumgbu*i, *kwifoyn* (also *kwifo'o, kwifeu, kuiifuai*) *kefa'a, tschong, libah* and *ikuum* in the grasslands and *Liengu, male, ahon, muankum, nganya, monekim, ekpe* and *obasinjom* in the forest region of Cameroon. Prior to the introduction of standard money, some local currencies like cowrie shells were used together with the provision of material things like goats, pigs, fowls and bush meat. Money is effectively a measure of value, status and a store of wealth within the Laimbwe traditional milieu. This paper examines how and why the introduction of money in initiation and other ritual activities led to the emergence of new social classes and the re-enforcement of the socio-political order of the Laimbwe people. The study essentially relies on discussions with members of societies, observation and written material.

FROM CONVENIENT HIBERNATION TO CIRCUMSTANTIAL DESPERATION: HATE SPEECH, PARTY POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND THE NIGERIA'S 2015 GENERAL ELECTIONS

Mike Omilusi[1]

Introduction

Parties are competing amongst each other for the best ways of resolving political problems. They are in competition for influence and power. Parties not only strive to participate in the formation of political opinion. They also aspire to participate in the representation of the people in parliament. This presumes that parties take part in elections. Besides its candidates, the political programme is the "merchandise" of a party, which it offers to the voters (Hofmeister and Grabow 2011, 9). Thus, the political parties reach out to the voters through organised communication strategies particularly during elections even though electoral campaigns can be very different in different countries and between elections.

As observed by Kavanagh (2000, 29) many factors influence the nature of the campaign, including the type of office the election is for; the legislative framework for electoral campaigning (such as electoral laws), cultural habits, and media outreach; the electoral and party systems, etc. Campaign strategies are on the one hand influenced by the political context in which they occur, and on the other hand affected by the political parties who conduct the electoral campaign. However, looking at a political campaign as a discourse, it goes beyond the mere use of words to gain votes. In their bid to persuade, writers of political campaigns dwell on policy utterances which address past deeds, future plans, or general goals as well as character

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comments, which address personality qualities, leadership ability or ideal (Ademilokun and Taiwo 2013, 437).

Political analysts are of the view that hate speech remains one of the features of political campaigns, not only in Nigeria but also in other parts of the world, particularly in Africa. Nigeria's political history, particularly since the first elections held in the country under the 1922 Clifford Constitution, has been experiencing pockets of crisis that could be traced to hate speech, among other anti-social behaviours.For instance, prior to the 2015 General Elections in Nigeria, as observed by Aghadiegwu and Ogbonna (2015, 2), many political watchers, local and international observers and of course the entire citizenry were concerned about the spate of hate speeches that characterized the political campaign messages and adverts of the two main political parties. As a result of this, there was palpable fear that the Nigeria state was on the edge of a precipice.

This may have necessitated the "Abuja Accord," in January 2015, when all the fourteen presidential candidates signed an agreement, pledging to conduct issue-based campaigns, peacefully accept the electoral results, refrain from using inflammatory language and denounce acts of violence or incitement to violence during the election campaigns. On March 26, the two leading presidential candidates – President Jonathan and General Buhari – renewed their commitments to the Abuja Accord by co-signing a joint pledge for peaceful elections and calling on all Nigerian citizens and party supporters to refrain from violence (NDI 2015). In spite of the accord, however, political campaigns were characterised with hate speeches, mudslinging and violence in many parts of the country (Hassan 2014). The political climate in the run-up to the elections was tense and acrimonious, as both the incumbent Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the lead opposition party All Progressives Congress (APC), backed by competing opinion polls, predicted victory. The Nigerian rumor and conspiracy mill was in full swing, fuelled by social media and an often politicized news media (Cooke 2015).

If we look at the research on campaigns at large, one major imbalance has to do with the emphasis on candidates rather than on parties. The typical campaign study, irrespective of whether it is cast in mainly descriptive or theoretical terms, sees the individual candidate as the main vehicle behind any election campaign (Wemaere 1973; Ferejohn and Noll 1978 cited in Karvonen 1991). Indeed, in many countries, both in established and newer democracies, the focus- during election campaigns- has always been on the candidates rather than the political parties. However, Karvonen (1991) argues that "to the extent that there are systematic studies of election campaigns from the point of view of political parties, the campaign as such often receives but secondary attention on the part of the researcher".

Some pertinent questions have been raised in respect of African parties: What do political parties do between elections? Are African political parties sleeping ghosts that wake up to haunt the goodwill and political resources of the electorates only during election year (if not month) or during election campaigns? Or are they maintaining vigilance and playing their role in democratic governance as the link between citizens, parliament and government? (IDEA 2007, 79). Instead of providing opportunity for public deliberation, African election campaigns are mainly moments for politicians to engage in mass mobilization and manipulation of electoral rules. All too often, campaign strategies feature material inducement and political intimidation (Bratton 2008, 1).

As a matter of insight, in Nigeria, when political parties inescapably choose to communicate during electioneering, election promises have always remained the same in content and context since independence. For instance, the rhetorical promises of education, employment, health services, housing, electricity, potable water, rails, roads and other means of transportation are indicators of the state of the country's development in the twenty-first century. The 2015 general elections therefore, offer a unique context to interrogate the place of party political communication in an emerging democracy and specifically how hate campaigns among political gladiators/contending parties could generate violence, and if not tamed, derail the democratic consolidation.

This essay is structured as follows: Following this introduction is the theoretical background to hate speech and party political communication. The third section dwells on a brief reflection of political campaign and politics of hate in Nigeria within the context of past political dispensations. Section four examines the 2015 general elections and the hate speeches it generated essentially among the two major political parties as an institution on the one hand, and among the political gladiators as individuals fronting for their parties, on the other hand. The political and legal preventive measures to stem this ugly trend in future elections are discussed in section five. The last section concludes the essay.

Theorising Party Political Communication and Hate Speech

Party Political Communication

Political parties, in spite of their shortcomings, still remain the primary institutional vehicles for political representation, interest aggregation and articulation, and as a constituent mechanism for the formation and organization of government, as well channels for

maintaining oversight and demanding accountability from governments (Shale 2010). The communication of political intentions and the search for public consent has always been a part of the main requirements for political leadership in democracy. Since the beginnings of modern party democracy, the conditions and manifestation of communication, however, have changed considerably (Hofmeister and Grabow 2011, 41). In other words, in modern mass democracies, it is political parties that connect government and the governed with one another: 'Citizens in modern democracies are represented through and by parties' (Sartori 1976, 24), which means that communication occurs through political parties and comes from them.

While emphasising the rationale for a communication strategy, the Centre for Multiparty Democracy - KENYA (2012, 1) posits that the importance of communication as a management tool cannot be gainsaid. Indeed, success of any political party can be highly enhanced through a clear communication structure that is well known and understood. On their own, brilliant policies and visions cannot guarantee success for a party. They must be supported by purposeful, structured and targeted communication. In essence, communication between leaders and the led never just happens; it must be deliberately organized, developed and built. Voters need to be informed about political programs, policy issues and political alternatives presented by the candidates and political parties (Muturi 2012, i). All forms of political campaign seek to persuade target audiences by managing the message communicated to them through the media (Stockwell 2004).

Political parties have invested heavily in election campaigning, making full use of new technologies, adapting their organizations and employing specialist agencies and consultants. As a result, the party of today, and the way it operates in the context of electioneering, is a significantly different creature to that of twenty years ago (Farrell and Webb 1998, 21). Parties' communication environments are however, determined by a number of factors: the structure of the mass media, including the composition of the newspaper market and readership; the range of private sector and public service audiovisual channels; the size of the audience reached by newspapers, television, and radio; and the diffusion of new information and communication technologies, such as the Internet and even mobile telephones. The context is also determined by communication policies-which set out the legal regulation of political communications, especially during election campaigns- exemplified by the rules concerning party fundraising and expenditure, campaign advertising, political broadcasts, and freedom of the media (Norris 2005, 4).

Political parties and leaders are moving towards the new media communication tools for spreading their policies, communicating with

the people and election campaigning. These newer forms of technology are actively being embraced by the political parties to gain more mileage. The new media technologies have given a new dimension to the political campaign. Many political parties have created their own websites, blogs and Facebook/twitter accounts. They are regularly watching and reading their new media content. (Arulchelvan 2014, 125). The modern information and communication technologies are now a core element of modern political campaigns. The effective implementation of these sorts of tools is under debate. Politicians in many states have started websites and blogs with a variety of degrees of success. Social software has been used to benefit politicians. Communication of information is usually in paid form and usually persuasive in nature about products, services or ideas by identified sponsors through the various media (Arulchelvan 2014, 127).

Party campaigns are carried out through a multitude of channels at all societal levels. Nationwide television, regional newspapers and local billboards are used side by side; national party leaders, professional media consultants and local party activists all play significant roles. Just to tell 'the whole story of a campaign' in purely descriptive terms requires so much time and effort that comparisons over time or across systems are normally not attempted. In fact, perhaps the most typical comprehensive account is the journalistic one (e.g. Tyler 1987 cited in Karvonen 1991) written shortly after an election to meet a current demand in the market. But even when written by scholars, detailed analyses of election campaigns are frequently presented in the form of descriptive accounts rather than case studies cast in comparative or theoretical terms (Knox 1990).

It is however, emphasised that an effective communications program begins at "home," that is, within the party itself. It is an unfortunate truth that too often political parties have poor internal communications. Sometimes, a party does not even have an up-to-date list of leaders and members with their addresses, telephone numbers and other basic information. If a party cannot communicate effectively among its own leaders and members, it is unlikely that a party will be able to realize its potential in the public arena. Both require similar planning, coordination and the capacity to provide accurate, persuasive and timely information (NDI 2001, 19). Generally, campaigners can reach out to the public either via the media or via their own organization. In either case, there is a direct and an indirect channel. With respect to their own organizational channels (or the channels of their allies, which may also be open to them), political actors are likely to increasingly rely on direct communications with the members of their constituencies.

Hate Speech Campaign

Hate speech is often difficult to identify and prosecute for a number of reasons. For one, free speech is a highly valued right in many countries and is often protected by law. The line separating an inalienable right from a crime can therefore be unclear. Different countries also have different criteria for what constitutes hate speech and for what is legal (The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 2009, 7). By examining the inter-relations between political actors, media institutions and new practices of participatory communication, we can start to examine how extreme speech is (a) in part a product of accelerated competition for public attention, and as such, is shaped by identifiable practices and rituals of communication (b) that "hate speech" has an economic value in a media environment shaped by intensive competition for clicks, hits and "interaction" and that (c) the public contest over what can and cannot be said, a contest often organised around instances of extreme speech, has become a central tactic in and dimension of political positioning in contemporary societies (Tulkens 2013, 9).

Generally, hate speech refers to words of incitement and hatred against individuals based upon their identification with a certain social or demographic group. It may include, but is not limited to, speech that advocates, threatens, or encourages violent acts against a particular group, or expressions that foster a climate of prejudice and intolerance, which can lead to targeted attacks or persecution of that group through 'othering processes' (Gagliardone, Patel and Pohjonen 2014, 9).In general, definitions of hate speech make reference to a number of the following components: the content of speech; the (written or oral) tone of speech;an evaluation of the nature of that speech; the (individual and collective) targets of that speech; and the potential consequences or implications of the speech act (Titley 2014, 9). Cohen-Amalgor (2011), for example, offers an extensive definition in the following terms:

> Hate speech is defined as bias-motivated, hostile, malicious speech aimed at a person or a group of people because of some of their actual or perceived innate characteristics. It expresses discriminatory, intimidating, disapproving, antagonistic, and/or prejudicial attitudes towards those characteristics, which include gender, race, religion, ethnicity, color, national origin, disability or sexual orientation. Hate speech is intended to injure, dehumanize, harass, intimidate, debase, degrade and victimize the targeted groups, and to foment insensitivity and brutality against them

Hate speech is particularly pernicious and effective because of the way it constructs and politicises in-groups and out-groups. In this context, in-groups refer to the perpetrators of hate speech and the wider

community that share their views and/or also partake in hate speech; out-groups refer to those groups that are the victims of the hate speech. In-groups are able to politicise particular social differences (e.g. race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender) characterising an out-group in negative and dehumanized terms (Titley 2014, 9). J.-L. Nancy (2013, 5) argues that hatred can go as far as seeking to destroy the other by engaging in acts of elimination. Hatred is, intrinsically, turned more towards action. It is more committed to, or bent on, achieving a result. So, according to Nancy, hatred has an active and 'executive' nature. A hate utterance is itself an act; the thought it expresses is in itself an act of negation.

Political Transition and Politics of Hate in Nigeria: a Reflection

The history of Nigeria's democratic experiments demonstrates that elections and electoral politics have generated so much animosity which has, in some cases, threatened the corporate existence of the country (such as happened after the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election) and in other cases instigated military incursion in to political governance, most notably in 1966 and 1983s. While assessing the Nigerian electoral process, Richard Joseph (1987, 157) describes party politics in the country as a relentless struggle to procure individual and group benefits via the temporary appropriation of public offices eventually reduces the electoral process to a Hobbesian state-of-war.

Although Nigeria has managed to transit from one administration to another, hardly any election conducted in the country has been completely freed of charges of irregularities, electoral malpractices and various degrees of disruptions (Jega 2010, 3). As emphasised in the report of the Electoral Reform Committee (2008, 148), five key causes can be identified as responsible. Among these are historical context of state creation in Nigeria; the structural imbalance of the Nigerian federation; the nature and character of the Nigerian state and its ruling elites; inter-ethnic competition; and the role of the military and militarization of the polity.

Some scholars attribute the collapse of the first republic to the inappropriateness of the political institutions and processes and to their not being adequately entrenched under colonial rule, whereas others hold the elite responsible. Lacking a political culture to sustain democracy, politicians failed to play the political game according to established rules (see http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/68.htm). The management and outcome of the 1964 federal elections and the 1965 Western Regional Election put the

country on the brink of disintegration and bloodshed with the manifestation of all the centrifugal forces inherent in the body polity. Oyeleye Oyediran (cited in Okereke 2012) described it as the "*signpost to disaster*" for the new nation.

During the 1983 elections, political parties and politicians colluded with electoral officials to subvert popular mandate. Political leaders maximally applied the power of incumbency to ensure that they retained power in states where they held sway (Okereke 2012). The eventual demise of the Second Republic was accelerated by the tension generated by the general elections, which were similar to those of 1964-65. In several places, violence erupted, and every election was contested in court. A number of the electoral verdicts were rescinded in view of evidence that results were falsified (see http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/68.htm). In a nutshell, empirical data in the First, Second and aborted Third Republic suggest that the attitude of members of the political class left much to be desired in the manner in which they conducted themselves politically (Udogu 1995, 216). In his analysis of the country's politics of zero-sum game, Omoh (2013) observes that:

> Nigerian politicians are deadly. They employ every means available to cling to power, not for service, but to dispense favour, enrich themselves and secure the future of their unborn babies. It is only in Nigeria that politics is big business. The more you sow either in resources or violence to diminish your opponent, the more the benefit... They act like moving train, whose path no human must cross when it is approaching. They have rendered institutions of state unworkable.

Nigerian democracy has confronted series of challenges with the return to civil rule in 1999 among which include the imposition of candidates, godfatherism, money politics, injustice, lack of party manifestoes and ideology, party indiscipline and so on. The absence of internal democracy among the Nigerian political parties constitutes a major threat to democratic consolidation in the country. This problem, which has led to party defection, otherwise known as cross- carpeting, party witching, floor-crossing, party-hopping, canoe-jumping, decamping and party jumping has remained a permanent feature in the Nigerian democracy (Abimbola and Adesote 2012: 46).Most platforms for debates and other political communication are turned into platforms for verbal threats, insults, intimidation, coercion, blackmail and hate speech. Political campaigns in Nigeria, either verbal or written, are typically characterized by these uninhibited discursive behaviours (Ademilokun and Taiwo 2013, 438).

Election activities come with different expectations from the politicians, electorate and the government among other stakeholders (Olurode

2014, 72). Over the years, the politicians have become more desperate and daring in taking and retaining political power; more reckless and greedy in their use and abuse of power; and more intolerant of opposition, criticism and efforts at replacing them (Electoral Reform Committee 2008, 19). General elections have always been accompanied by violence (International Crisis Group 2014). The logic of Nigeria's party politics is that powerful and rich political entrepreneurs seek to exclude popular candidates from their parties so that they could get an undeserved nomination for an election that would be won on the basis of rigging (Ibrahim and Aturu 2009, 35).

Frau (2008) argues that for free, fair and equitable elections to be achieved, certain acceptable elements must be put in place and these include: an equitable and fair electoral framework; a professional neutral and transparent election administration; a generally accepted code of ethical behaviour in political and press freedom; accountability of all participants; integrity safeguard mechanism and the enforcement of the election laws and other relevant laws. But as could be deduced from the foregoing, these attributes are alien to electoral politics in Nigeria as the "practitioners of perversion of the popular will through competitive election rigging have shown considerable skills in out manoeuvring themselves or in circumventing the law and in creating new or newer forms of electoral fraud" (Ibrahim and Aturu 2009, 43).

Conceptualising Hate Speech Campaigns within the Context of the 2015 General Elections

During electioneering, parties and campaign organisations do employ different strategies to woo voters and discredit their opponents, including attack advertisements as witnessed in the 2015 general elections. According to Ogwezzy-Idisika (quoted in Premium Times, May 8, 2015), the 2015 presidential campaigns were much about hate speeches and devoid of concrete agenda beyond the promises of water, roads, free education and security.Apparently disturbed by the development ahead of Nigeria's 2015 election, Fatou Bensouda, prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, ICC, for the second time, reminded Nigerian politicians that they risked being taken to The Hague, Netherlands, for trial if they continued with the level of violence already witnessed in the country (See RealNews, March 30, 2015).

For instance, the PDP campaign was characterized by hate campaigns against Mr. Buhari with little emphasis on the achievement of Mr. Jonathan. As shall be explained in the next section, some of the most

horrific attacks against Mr. Buhari "came from the president's wife, Patience Jonathan, the governor of Ekiti State, Ayo Fayose, and the spokesperson for Mr. Jonathan's campaign team, Femi Fani-Kayode" (Premium Times, May 4, 2015). Indeed, as attested to by the party spokesperson, Olisa Metuh, after the election, the party headquarters was sidelined during the campaigns, and that "overzealous" persons were allowed to run a hate campaign against Mr. Buhari, thereby making the former military ruler more popular (ThisDay, May 5, 2015). Kukah (2015) captures the pre-election campaigns more succinctly:

> The 2015 General elections have been turned into a theatre of hate speeches and campaigns coloured in a form that defies logic and common sense. Various politically motivated hate speeches about various candidates and especially the two leading Presidential candidates of All Progressives Congress and People's Democratic Party have been bandied. I am sure if experts should collate analyses of contents of the social media this year, Nigeria will rank top because arguably more than 40 million young Nigerians who have since graduated and have no means of livelihood have found solace in the various social media platforms and are busy churning out divergent messages.

Reports from the WANEP-Nigeria early warning analysis of risk factors across flashpoint states between July and December 2014, showed increasing levels of direct attacks by parties on opposition's existing structures in the form of destruction of party property, the defacing of billboards and campaign structures, destruction of vehicles, bomb explosions at rallies and burning of party secretariats e.t.c. (ThisDay, February 12, 2015).In addition to physical attacks, hate speeches, negative advertorials and propaganda ominously became dominant in the actions of politicians and political parties throughout the electioneering. Some of the outstanding cases are discussed here.

Political Parties (PDP versus APC)

Obviously, prior to the general elections, there was palpable tension in the country. The media was awash with campaigns by the different political parties especially the ruling party- PDP and the major opposition party- APC. Some of the campaigns were seen as campaign of calumny (Aghadiegwu and Ogbonna 2015, 3). There were allegations and counter-allegations from different quarters, many of them unsubstantiated. For instance, there were accusations by the Northern leaders and even the opposition party that Jonathan-led Federal Government was fueling the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East. Reminiscent of the Rwanda genocide, the state governor of Katsina was caught on tape referring to

opponents as "cockroaches" and encouraging his supporters to crush them while they chanted "kill them"(Hassan 2014).

The PDP maintained that the ideology of the APC was the same as *Janjaweed* as well as the *anti-Balaka* and the *Seleka* of the Central African Republic whose ideology are completely anarchists (This Day, March 10, 2014)and that the APC was out to cause confusion and ultimately truncate the nation's democracy: "in continuously hauling insults against a democratically elected President upon whose shoulders lies the sacred mandate freely given by the Nigerian people, the APC is directly insulting Nigerians and showing their disdain for the institution of democracy. This further confirms the APC's *Janjaweed* ideology against the nation...In constantly criticizing every strategy adopted by the President in the war against terrorism, the APC has not only confirmed its preference for insurgency but also exposed its underlining design to distract the government and frustrate the over-all anti-terrorism efforts"(Vanguard, May 27, 2014). Janjaweed, as Lai Mohammed remarked, has a disturbing religious connotation; not to talk of its settled place in infamy, given its murderous havoc on co-Sudanese, who just disagree with the extant government (The Nation, March 14, 2015).

When the APC presidential candidate saw it expedient to travel to the UK in the wake of the postponement of the general elections, the PDP, through its campaign organization spokesperson, Femi Fani-Kayode, accused the All Progressives Congress (APC) of trying to force a dying man into office to achieve ulterior motives. He said the leaders of the APC knew that its presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari had "prostate cancer, acute asthma and that he suffers from dementia" and as such wouldn't last long in office if elected (Peoples Daily, March 9, 2015).However, no proof was shared to support these claims (Omotola and Nyuykonge 2015, 7).

Many inciting comments came from the opposition party (APC) too. For instance, the party once called on the then ruling People's Democratic Party, PDP, and the federal government to jettison its plan to assassinate General Muhammadu Buhari, its presidential candidate. Lai Mohammed, national publicity secretary of the APC, who made the allegation in a newspaper interview, claimed the PDP-led government had security men specially trained as snipers to eliminate those opposed to President Goodluck Jonathan's re-election bid. Mohammed said: "I have never seen a government so terrified of elections as this present administration...coming to issue of security, they have made an attempt on his (Buhari) life once before; it can be done again. But, let us warn them that any attempt on the life of Buhari or Bola Tinubu will lead to a consequence that will be very dear for this country. They should not even contemplate it" (RealNews, March 30, 2015).

While the APC allegation was still simmering, Ejike Mbaka, a Catholic reverend father based in Enugu, during a church service on March 15, alleged that President Goodluck Jonathan and his wife were planning to kill him over his criticism of the federal government and for his opposition to the president's re-election.Before the 2015 elections, Mbaka had "instructed his teeming congregation to vote out Goodluck Jonathan from office because the incumbent president has failed Nigerians on all scores: security, alleviation of poverty, and fight against corruption" (Ukah 2015).There were allegations that Mbaka was pressured by the opposition All Progressives Congress (APC) and the Roman Catholic Church into turning his back on Jonathan. A month before his scathing criticism of the President, Mbaka had predicted Jonathan would be re-elected (The City Reporters, Jan 5, 2015).

Political Gladiators and Candidates

A number of the advertisements published by some political parties and politicians were reckless and inciting while others were scandalous in every material particular (Falana 2015). For instance, Ayodele Fayose, the Ekiti State governor, who literally assumed the position of his party spokesperson, embarked on what many political observers described as crude and barbaric antagonistic campaign of calumny against the opposition party. Fayose once bought the front pages of The Punch and The Sun Newspapers not only to pass a death sentence on Buhari because the man was 72.He used the same medium to mock dead leaders from a section of the country. His invective and acid sarcasms targeted at the presidential candidate of the All Progressives Congress (APC), General Muhammadu Buhari, may have left some Nigerians in consternation nay, bewilderment, but to many others, the Ekiti State Governor was merely treading his familiar terrain of controversy (Omilusi 2015).

The advert, which had the pictures of Murtala Mohammed, Sani Abacha, and Umaru Yar'Adua – past Nigerian presidents who died in office – was accompanied by excerpts from the Bible book of Deuteronomy 30 verse 19. "Nigerians be warned! Nigeria...I have set before thee Life and death. Therefore, choose life that both thee and thy seed may live," it said, suggesting that Buhari represents death while his rival, President Goodluck Jonathan represents life. The advert went ahead to put a huge question mark over the picture of Mr. Buhari, which was placed beside the pictures of the late leaders. The advert asked its readers: "Will you allow history to repeat itself? Enough of State burials". The chairman of the National Human Rights Commission, NHRC, Chidi Odinkalu, decried the death wish publication by the advertiser. He said it offended public decency and

violated all known norms of decorum (Vanguard, January 22, 2015).

Similarly, former militant and leader of the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Mujahid Asari-Dokubo, once declared that President Goodluck Jonathan's presidential ambition in 2015 was already settled, as his Niger Delta compatriots would not succumb to any force opposed to its full actualization. He threatened: "There would be blood in the streets if Mr. Jonathan is not reelected president in the 2015 election" (Premium Times, Sep 9, 2013). Many ex-militant leaders in the region, sharing Asari-Dokubo's stand, threatened to violently cripple the petroleum industry, and a group of former militants threatened to cut off the supply of petroleum products to the north, if Jonathan was not re-elected (ICG 2014, 5).On another occasion, Asari-Dokubo declared that: "For every Goliath, God created a David. For every Pharaoh, there is a Moses. We are going to war. Every one of you should go and fortify yourself" (Osun Defender, Jan 29, 2015).

On his part, in a congratulatory message to Nigerians towards the end of 2014, the APC chairman, John Odigie-Oyegun, noted that: "As a party, we assure you that we will congratulate president Goodluck Jonathan and his party, PDP if our presidential candidate and party are defeated in free and fair elections, and we will not go to court...However, as a party, we wish to reiterate, that we will not hesitate forming a parallel government, if the 2015 elections are rigged either by the use of security agencies (police or military) to harass, intimidate and cajole voters or through the use of a compromised Independent National Electoral Commission, (INEC)" (Osun Defender, Jan 29, 2015). In April 2014, Bola Tinubu, another APC leader, warned: "It is going to be rig and roast. We are prepared, not to go to court but to drive you out .... For every action, there will be a reaction" (Tell, July 7, 2014 cited in ICG 2014, 7). In July, Akwa Ibom state Governor Godswill Akpabio threatened opposition politicians (and dissident members of his party): "those who want to take power through the back door will die. They will die! And the PDP will continue" (ThisDay, July 25, 2014).

Doyin Okupe, Senior Special Assistant to President Goodluck Jonathan on Public Affairs also described the All Progressives Congress presidential candidate as a religious bigot. Okupe then wrote on his Twitter page that: "Buhari is a religious bigot and there is nothing he can do about that. He is not even a nationalist" (NigerianEye, December 17, 2014). Similarly, a Blackberry Messenger (BBM) statement by Deji Adeyanju, an official in the Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on Public Affairs, Doyin Okupe, said: "Buhari can never be President of Nigeria. Quote me any day any time. Instead of Buhari to become President of Nigeria, Nigeria would rather break. A military coup will even be allowed than for Buhari to

become the president of a democratic Nigeria, quote me any day, any time" (Premium Times, January 17, 2015).In a petition dated January 30, 2015, the APC drew the attention of the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) to what it described as "the ongoing mischievous, fabricated, defamatory and hate documentary broadcasts by African Independent Television and Nigerian Television Authority against All Progressives Congress and its presidential candidate, General Muhammadu Buhari" (The Sun, February 2, 2015). The PDP had sponsored a documentary in the two media houses prior to the election.

For Patience Jonathan, her speeches during the campaign were described as "outrageous, mindboggling and unbecoming of a woman of such exalted position" (See Daily Times, March 18, 2015). Mrs. Jonathan, whose husband was the presidential candidate of the People's Democratic Party, PDP asked supporters of her husband to "stone" anyone who chanted the APC's change mantra. The call by Mrs. Jonathan was made at a rally in Calabar, Cross River State during a PDP political rally (Vanguard, March 9).The First Lady was inciting people to be violent during the campaigns. She also brazenly insulted the people of the North and a former Head of State without due regard to the party chairman, who is from the North (Abubakar Tsav, Daily Post, March 6, 2015).

At a PDP women presidential campaign rally in Kogi State, Mrs. Jonathan, appealed to Nigerian women to vote *en masse* for the People's Democratic Party (PDP) during the presidential election because the brain of the All Progressives Congress (APC) presidential candidate, General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd), is dead: "Wetin him dey find again? Him dey drag with him pikin mate.

Old man wey no get brain, him brain don die *pata pata*," she said in Pidgin English (This Day, March 4, 2015). This was later rationalized by the Director of Media and Publicity of the PDPPCO, Femi Fani-Kayode who noted that: "To say that General Buhari is ''brain dead'' is an understatement and to suggest that he is suffering from dementia is nothing new. The First Lady has spoken in a courageous and forthright manner and, most important of all, she has spoken the bitter truth. Instead of crying like spoilt little brats and complaining, the APC and the Buhari Campaign Organisation should live with that bitter truth and leave her alone" (Premium Times, March 5, 2015).

Political and Legal Preventive Measures

Despite the ambiguous status of hate speech in the academic

world, its negative implications for society are clear to everyone. According to Leets (2002), hate speech violates the individual's dignity, resulting to humiliation, distress and psychological or emotional pain. Likewise, Downs and Cowan (2012) mentioned in their study that hate speech has been a strong weapon that could harm individuals by degrading, terrorizing, wounding and humiliating them.

From 'comments' on social media platforms to one on one discussions on ethnic, political and religious issues and also provocative statements in the media by political, community, ethnic and religious leaders, it has become clear that hate speech is gradually becoming a menace in the society (Sekyen Dadik 2015). Hate speech is not simply a concern for media professionals; it affects entire communities and therefore response mechanisms need to engage many people. Leaders play a crucial role when they deploy hate speech, but they can also condemn it when it occurs, even from nonofficial sources. Silence in the face of hate speech can indicate that it- and any violence it promotes- is acceptable (The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 2009, 9).

Thus, politicians and other public figures have a greater responsibility because they have broader possibilities for spreading prejudice against certain groups. Moreover, the impact of political speech is also greater because politicians are in a position of authority: so hate speech has an impact on potential offenders who feel encouraged in their intolerance and bias. In some countries, it has been said that criminal legislation has an added responsibility if the author of hate speech holds public office (Tulkens 2013, 9).

In any democratic nation, the right to freedom of speech and expression should necessarily accompany restrictions against the incitement of masses towards violent conclusions. It is the responsibility of the State to ensure safety and welfare of the masses over the right to expression of a single person, or groups of persons, for that matter (Dhakal 2011).Also, the danger of misuse of government power for campaigning purposes can be limited if laws and regulations are in place to regulate the role of the media in the election campaigns. Thus, legal framework reforms have been advocated as a panacea to election-related violence as may be instigated by the activities of the stakeholders including those who get involved in hate campaigns.

This involves providing assistance in the design and implementation of legal frameworks so as to reduce underlying drivers of violence. It is crucial to develop a legal framework that has broad support among competing parties and candidates. Rao, drawing from the submissions of the USAID (2013) argues that the legal frameworks most relevant for electoral security are

those from: constitutions; peace agreements; electoral legislation; women's protection and equality legislation; and, land ownership legislation. Each of these legal instruments can intersect with electoral security.

Notable attempt to ensure sanity in the electoral process in Nigeria was initiated after the 2007 election by late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua who set up an Electoral Reform Panel, headed by the former Chief Justice of the Federation Mohammed Uwais. The panel later reviewed the country's electoral machinery and recommended ways through which electoral irregularities could be rectified in Nigeria. The final report was received by the government, even though some parts of the report were not implemented by the government (Hassan and Musa 2014, 339).

The fundamental right to freedom of expression including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference has been guaranteed by the Constitution. (Section 39 of the Constitution). Apart from professional ethics the law of defamation protects the reputation of individuals and corporate bodies including politicians and political parties. Since freedom of expression is not absolute any media house or reporter who engages in libelous publications during electioneering campaigns may be sued and if found liable, ordered by the courts to pay damages running to millions of naira (Falana 2015).

In addition to the penal codes, the Electoral Act 2010, as amended, has prohibited political campaigns, which are based on hate or incitement. According to the Nigerian Electoral Act 2010, Section 95 (1), 'A political campaign or slogan shall not be tainted with abusive language directly or indirectly likely to injure religious, ethnic, tribal or sectional feelings.' Section 95 (2) states that 'Abusive, intemperate, slanderous or base language or insinuations or innuendoes designed or likely to provoke violent reaction or emotions shall not be employed or used in political campaigns.' In order to ensure equal coverage of the activities of political parties and candidates, the Act has criminalised certain publications with respect to political reporting.

Conclusion

In view of the foregoing analysis, this essay suggests that the citizens and other stakeholders should imbibe the culture of democratic values. However, for democratic values to be passed on to the members of a given society, "formally or informally, the political culture within a given country should be conducive to democratic ideals" (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2011, 11).There is the need to effectively regulate behaviour and actions of contestants, voters, officials, etc in the entire electoral process and

to carefully frame rules and regulations covering all aspects of the electoral process (Electoral Reform Committee 2008, 61). Politicians should conduct their campaign on the basis of issues rather than attack on personalities or mobilisation of religious, ethnic and regional sentiments (Alemika 2011) as witnessed during the 2015 general elections.

Contemporary discourse of liberal democracy recognises the place of a free and fair electoral process as a critical component of any effort to enthrone a democratically responsive and development-focused government. As Ronald Dworkin (1990) posited: "True democracy is not just statistical democracy, in which anything a majority or plurality wants is legitimate for that reason, but communal democracy, in which majority decision is legitimate only if is a majority of equals. That means…that each individual person must be guaranteed fundamental civil and political rights no combination of other citizens can take away, no matter how numerous they are or how much they despise his or her race or morals or way of life. That view of what democracy means is at the heart of all the charters of human rights".

The spirit of tolerance is particularly important during a period of transition to democracy, in order to entrench the values and practices of democracy at a time when a new political order is being established. This spirit is enhanced if: the opposition recognizes the right and responsibility of the Government to undertake the administration; and the Government recognizes the right of the opposition to criticise government policy and administration, to offer alternative ideas and policies, and to lobby for them (IDEA 2001, 46).In the final analysis, however, it is also pertinent that various stakeholders must play by the rules of the game because due adherence to constitutional and electoral stipulations is fundamental to the credibility of elections and, in the long run, democratic consolidation.

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ABSTRACT

Until a few months to the 2015 general elections, many political parties that have conveniently hibernated for a better part of their existence, perhaps owing to lack of proper organizational structure or support base, uncoordinated programmes or were registered because of pecuniary gains or admittance of anticipated poor electoral outing, suddenly began to jostle for political space. The main opposition party and the ruling party were either perfecting a merger processes or engulfed in internal wrangling such that communication with the electorate on fundamental issues became inconsequential. In fact, the two dominant parties, the Peoples Democratic Party and All Progressive Congress only produced their presidential candidates less than five months to the election; and the electoral campaign assumed desperate contestation in a climate of prejudice and intolerance. Hate speeches and violence were the hallmarks of their electoral campaigns. The 2015 general elections therefore, offer a unique context to interrogate the place of party political communication in an emerging democracy and specifically how hate campaigns among political gladiators/contending parties could generate violence, and if not tamed, derail democratic consolidation. This essay affirms that hate speech is not only inspired by some social circumstances but also part of a general democratic process. It attests to the fact that Nigerian politicians have become more desperate and daring in taking and retaining political power; and more intolerant of opposition, criticism and efforts at replacing them. Relying extensively on secondary sources with the aid of descriptive and narrative tools, this essay concludes that the political culture of a country determines the behavior and attitude of the population towards the political system and that democratic transition from one administration to another, particularly in emerging democracies, has often been accompanied by violence promoted by desires of the political party in power to consolidate their grips on power and by opposition parties interest to capture same.

MAINSTREAMING CORRUPTION POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

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Introduction

The culture of corruption has continued to plague the Nigeria society in all sectors at an alarming rate creating culture of acceptability of such a way of life. That corruption is endemic and has assumed a national way of life is a disturbing reality in Nigeria. It is this light that Achebe (1983, 38) avers that anyone who can say that corruption in Nigeria has not yet reached an alarming proportion is either a fool, crook or else does not live in Nigeria. He further posits that the situation has become so worse to the extent that keeping a Nigeria from being corrupt is like preventing a goat from eating yam. Corroborating this view, Anazodo, Okoye and Ezenwile (2012, 124) submit that corruption in Nigeria has affected all the political, economic and social facets of Nigeria and these are responsible for decayed infrastructure,downturn of the economy, fragile political institutions and steady decline in all institutions of national development.

However corruption is a universal phenomenon, the rate and toleration of corruption acts vary from place to place, basically determined by the socio-cultural environment in a particular place. In Nigeria, corruption has become strange than a fairy tale increasing and manifesting in unimaginable magnitude is raging between and within communities, gradually assuming the character of the society. It has to be tolerated and encourage by the agents of socialisation (the family, the school, the church/ mosque, peer groups, media, occupational groups, etc) which ordinarily should have been responsible for disapproving acts that are anti-social, anti-

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people and anti-development. The continuing manifestation of corruption and the seeming helplessness of the state to curb the menace clearly indicate that the Nigerian state has not just failed to uphold its traditional moral values, its religious norms and tenets but has rather encouraged raw, distorted, unbridled and unregulated capitalist tendencies. This can be seen in the habits of excessive materialism and the inordinate and excessive accumulation of national wealth by individuals without regard to the collective interest and welfare of the larger society (Irikana, Epelle and Awortu 2013, 30).

In other words, obsession with materialism, compulsion for a shortcut to affluence, glorification and approbation of ill-gotten wealth by the general public are among the reasons for the persistent corruption and indiscipline in Nigeria. It is important to reiterate that corruption is a universal phenomenon and its roots are to be traced within the society and not in human psychology (Irakana, Epelle and Awortu 2013, 34). What is the impact of the emerging socio-economic and political culture on the development agenda of the Nigerian state? This paper is divided into six sections Theoretical framework, Conceptional clarification, the interface between corruption, poverty and development in Nigeria, conclusion.

Theoretical Framework

Anomie Theory

The relationship between social class and crime in Nigeria is an issue that continues to attract attention from the media, policy makers and law enforcement agencies. The perpetrators of crime are economically disadvantaged and poor. Merton (1957) applied the concept of anomie to explain the causes of crime in a society. The word anomie, according Durkheim is used to describe a social context in which the moral order has broken down for an individual or group, a situation in which social structural constraints of behaviour become inoperative. According to Durkheim (1938) an anomie society is one in which rules of behaviour (norms) have broken down or become inoperative during the period of rapid social change or social crisis such as war or famine. An anomic society is not able to control human aspirations and demands. Anomie is most likely to occur in societies that are moving from mechanical to organic solidarity. Merton (1957) applied the ideas of Durkheim to criminology in his theory of anomie. Merton used a modified version of the concept of anomie to fit social, economic and cultural conditions found in modern U.S. society. He found that the two elements of culture interact to produce potentially

anomic conditions, culturally defined goals and socially approved means for obtaining them. For example, the United States society-stress the goals of acquiring wealth, success and power. Socially permissible means include hard work, education and thrift. The illegitimate means are force and fraud because the social structure effectively limits the availability of legitimate institutionalized means; a strain is placed on people. Merton believed that strain could affect people in social classes but he acknowledged that it would most likely affect members of the lower class. Merton (1957) argued that this feeling of norm-less arises when an individual is expected to achieve certain universal goals but does not have access to the appropriate means for achieving them. He considered materials wealth a universal goal to which all aspire and the appropriate means of achieving wealth include securing a good education and securing a good job. When individuals do not have access to good education and jobs, Merton predicted that they might be tempted to obtain material wealth through inappropriate means such as criminal activity. Such individuals, not surprisingly, would more likely come from the lower classes (Giddies & Duncier 2000).

The anomie theory see corruption (deviant behaviour) as emanating from the social structure of the society which exerts a definite pressure upon certain individuals in the society to engage in non –conforming conduct. Merton (1960) has succinctly put this in another way when he asserts that a society in which there is an exceptionally strong emphasis upon specific goals without a corresponding institutional means will lead to anomie. Metiboba (2012, 159) notes each culture establishes goals and interests which people are encouraged and expected to pursue and prescribes the method to be followed in seeking these approved objectives. It is when these means fail to match the goal of the individual in question that the individual becomes socially disorganized. The theory is useful because it has explained the cause of different forms of deviant behaviour.

However the Nigerian society tends to over emphasize the individual goal of attainment at the expense of the legitimate means of achieving these set goals. In Nigeria material acquisition has virtually become the ultimate set goals and the society does not appear to be concerned with how one "makes it" or has come to "belong". All that is important is that one has "arrived". The marked discrepancy between the goals and means in the society invariably leading to various forms of corruption such as embezzlement and diversion of public funds; offering and acceptance of bribe, electoral fraud, recklessness and impunity, examination malpractice, which in all mar development efforts in Nigeria.

Conceptualising Poverty, Corruption and Development

Poverty according to Aliyu (2003, 2) is a situation where an individual or group people can be said to have access to his/their basic needs, but is comparatively poor among persons or the generality of the community .It means that the standard of living as obtained within an individual's environment determines if that individual is considered poor or not. It is a basic fact that what is considered a poverty level in on e country or community may well be the height of well being in another (European Commission 2004). Despite these various definitions of poverty that makes it difficult to arrive at clear consensus on what the concept means, there are 'compromise' definition of poverty generally recognized and used by different people. One of such is that of the Central Bank of Nigeria (1999, 1) which views poverty as a state where an individual is not able to cater adequately for his or her basic needs of food, clothing and shelter; is unable to meet social and economic obligations; lacks gainful employment, skills, assets and self –esteem; and has limited access to social and economic infrastructure such as education, health, portable water and sanitation. In other words, poverty is the lack of multiple resources that leads to hunger and physical deprivation.

Any endeavour to conceptualize corruption may seem almost a mere rehash of existing conceptions of the phenomenon. Rehashing old definitions would seem easy. Conceptualizing corruption is not an easy task. Indeed, it is a daunting and challenging venture. (Olugbenga 2007; Odofin and Omojuwa 2007; Ajibewa 2006; Faloore 2010; Igbuzor 2008). According to Andrig and Fjeldstad (2001, 4) "corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon with multiple causes and effects, as it takes on various forms and functions in different contexts". In fact, one of the major crises in conceptualizing corruption is that while it is difficult for it to disappear it has a capacity to take on new forms (Andrig and Fjelstad 2001; Girling 1997). The difficulty of defining corruption is first a function of its being a secret and clandestine activity and secondly because it has many manifestations, dimensions and forms. That is why Johnston argues that studying corruption is a tricky business. According to him:

Definitions are controversial, and solid evidence is often elusive. Descriptive accounts may be clouded by self serving equivocations. Equally subtle is the question of the significance of a corrupt act – not only its consequences, but also its meaning as perceived by citizens and officials alike (in Ogundiya 2009: 282).Be that as it may Tanzi has argued that while it may not be easy to define corruption, the crisis associated with corruption is not difficult to recognize (Tanzi 1998).The word corruption is originally from the Latin verb *rumpere* which means to break (Abdul-Ismail n.d.). Following from the above, corruption means the breaking of a certain code

of conduct for the personal benefit of the perpetrator.

Many definitions of corruption have been put forward. For example, Sen defines it as the violation of established rules for personal gain and profit (in Aluko 2009, 2). Osoba defines it as "an anti-social behaviour conferring improper benefits contrary to legal and moral norms, and which undermines the capacity of authorities to improve the living conditions of the people" (in Aluko 2009, 3) The World Bank defines corruption as: The abuse of public office for private gains. Public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantages or profit. Public office can also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets, or the diversion of state resources (in Agbu 2003, 3). In J.S. Nye's classical definition, corruption is "behaviour that deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains" (Nye 1967, 416). What we can deduce from the definitions above is that corruption entails any behaviour that deviates from accepted norm especially in the public space. It is any behaviour that goes against established rules, regulations, and established procedure. In short, corruption is behaviour that breaks the law or aid and abets breaking the law. Such behaviour usually confers undue and/or unmerited advantages on the perpetrator. Such behaviour also expresses the notion of a betrayal of trust especially in a democracy where public office is held in trust for the people.

Corruption has various forms and dimensions. Aluko has identified nine forms namely:

- Political corruption (grand)
- Bureaucratic corruption (petty)
- Electoral corruption
- Bribery
- Fraud
- Embezzlement
- Favouritism
- Nepotism (Aluko 2009, 5)

Other categorizations which do not differ from that of Aluko exist (see Yaru 2010; Adenugba 2009; Omotola 2006; Orngu 2006; Aghemelo and Oarhe 2003). What is important, however, is that in whatever form

it manifests, corruption perverts public interest and unlawfully elevates private gain and advantage.

Development

The Indian economist and philosopher, Professor Amartya Sen makes the important point that democratic value, as much as economic values are critical in an accurate conception of development. These keys in with the vision of the American Nobel Prize winner, Joseph Stieglitz who definitively affirms that words like openness, partnership, and participation, women empowerment, and environmental health carry in their innards, a theory of development, as well as evidence that can lead to more successful development efforts. Development has been viewed variously to mean economic growth; a reduction in poverty, unemployment, inequality and dependency; provision of basic needs; and as democracy and good governance (Umo 2007, 600). It is important to see development as a process that involves the progress of people in the society. In as much as people, live within some form of social framework consisting of social, economic and political structures, development involves progressive changes or transformations of these structures (Okpaga 1999, 35).

Development includes the eradication of absolute poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy, disease and unemployment. It has moved from specific economic goals like employment, status gain, and housing, water supply to non-economic goals as adequate health, education, environmental sanitation facilities and granting of personal and individual freedoms. These are indicators of real development. In a nutshell, the current idea of development places emphasis on people as the objects of attention and has gone beyond normal growth in the volume of goods and commodities. This shows that development is a process of societal advancement where improvement in the well being of people are generated through strong partnerships between all sectors, corporate bodies and groups in societies.

Effect of Corruption on Poverty and Development in Nigeria

Various authors have written the innumerable negative impacts of corruption on the socio-political and economic development of societies (Enojo 2012; Agaba 2012; Sen 1999). It has been noted that corruption causes a reduction in quality and quantity of goods and services available to the public, as companies would cut corners to increase profit margins. Corruption is a disease spreading itself throughout our polity and we need

to inoculate our country against this infection. Corruption diverts resources from the poor to the rich; increases the cost of running businesses, distorts public expenditures, and deters foreign investment (Mauro 1997; Wei 1997 and Alesina 1999). Corruption saps a country's economy by hampering tax collection and undermining the enforcement of important regulation. Corruption also creates loss of tax revenues and monetary problems leading to adverse budgetary consequences (Murphy 1993), and is likely to produce certain composition of capital flows that makes a country more vulnerable to shifts in international investors' sentiments and expectations (Lambsdorff 2000 and 2005). In addition corruption has an adverse effect on human development, and increases the cost of basic social services (Kaufman 1998).Corruption has had severe negative consequences on economic growth and development of Nigeria. It packs our unemployed youths into stadia without proper consideration. It humiliates and kills our youths. Nigeria's Human Development index at 0.459 lags behind the sub Saharan Africa average of 0.463 and the world average of 0.682.The inequity adjusted HDI is even further disappointing at 0.278. The low point in the global scale is 0.456. The Multi –Dimensional poverty index (MPI) shows that 54.1% of the population live in poverty, with 57.3% in intense deprivation (HDI 2011). Over 70% of Nigeria citizens live below the poverty line (International benchmark is $1.5 per day),and Nigeria is ranked 156th out of 187 countries in the world ranking of nations using the Human Development index (UNDP 2011). Meanwhile Nigeria has earned close to $450 billion since 1970 on oil receipts alone .Between May 1999 and June 2008 alone, the country earned over $205 billion (cited by Wokoma 2008). In Switzerland 7.4% of the population is below the poverty line.

Even where improper conduct, such as fraud and bribery, does not directly involve government, the public effects are severe. Corruption has adversely affected governance and the larger social structure. It has crippled the state's ability to deliver for its citizen's enjoyment of even the minimum social and economic rights, including health and education. This generally leads to a retardation of economic development and to the deterioration of whatever public infrastructure has been put in place. It has been observed that in Nigeria, unbridled corruption has led to bad governance. Corruption and mismanagement swallow about 40 percent of Nigeria's $20 billion annual oil income (Ribadu 2004).Corruption disrupts the capital flow throughout entire developing nations. Tax income is generally far below what the government requires in order carrying out basic services in corrupt nations. When money is stolen, the police are not paid, salaries not commensurate with their task. Police are not paid regularly and are underpaid .The police spend their time hustling for tips instead of training

and pursuit of criminals. The police never investigate cases, they never track criminals; and when they do arrest suspects they release them for some money. The Consequence of the money that could improve the security services being stolen is poverty of the police force and deaths of the people from cheap criminals who would not last a day on America streets. We lose people as a consequence of our tolerating a corrupt society.

Most Nigerians are treated with suspicion in most business dealings thereby making some honest Nigerians to suffer the stigma of corruption due to stereotyping. Ribadu (2006) opined corruption is worse than terrorism because it is responsible for perpetual collapse of Infrastructure and institutions in Nigeria. It is the cause of the endemic poverty and Underdevelopment. When people in government embezzle funds, They have to bribe many unworthy people in the process, it has to placate and please many co-conspirators .The consequence of this is that the society feels the presence of money in the hands of the unworthy. Money flows from one thieve to another crooked friend and then to terrorist's hands, guns are bought. Thugs are hired by the politicians and their friend's .Sometimes; terrorists are paid with these stolen funds. The Poverty is found to persist in Nigeria because of the mismanagement of resources and corruption, found particularly not only in the public sector (Ayua 2001). Corruption stifles businesses that are unwilling to engage in this nefarious activity; ironically, it also eventually destroys the companies that yield to this practice, thus halting or at least delaying considerably, the march toward economic progress and ultimately sustained development (Gire 1999). Nigeria remains one of the most corrupt nations in the world, according to the latest report by Transparency International. In the group's Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, Nigeria ranked 144th, out of 177 nations in the world, scoring 25 points out of a possible 100 points. Nigeria's corruption performance this year was worse than last year's, when it scored 27 points. This year, Nigeria shared the podium of infamy with crisis-torn Central African Republic and neighbour, Cameroon.

In a similar damning reported 2013 the then US Ambassador to Nigeria, Terence McCauley, reportedly told the Nigerian government to demonstrate more courage and conviction in its crusade against graft, insisting that it was the only way to "send a clear signal that the country is indeed committed to good governance, to the security of its citizens, and to its rightful place as a significant actor on the global stage." Unfortunately, corruption has been identified as the major reason for the arrested development in the country. It is responsible for reduced public spending, which results in huge infrastructure deficits, especially poor roads, lack of electricity, inadequately-equipped hospitals and low quality of education. It

is also fingered in the pervasive insecurity in the country, low quality of governance and general poor standard of living. The US report alleges that, in Nigeria, "Massive, widespread and pervasive corruption affected all levels of government and the security forces." While alleging that judges were not left out of the massive corruption ring, the report accused the government of not implementing the law on corruption effectively, thus deliberately allowing "officials (to) frequently engage in corrupt practices with impunity.

As concisely captured by Nebo (2010, 29) contends that:

> Poverty in this land is artcifical; unemployment too is a self-inflicted scourge...The level of widespread poverty, unemployment, high incidence of corruption and insecurity of life and property in Nigeria exist only because our leaders both at the Federal, State and Local Government levels either do not know what to do or are profiting and deriving some form of psychological pleasure watching Nigerians suffer or therefore are reluctant to do something.

It is striking that corruption breeds poverty, sickness, low life expectancy and unequal distribution of income and wealth. Corruption and underdevelopment go hand in hand. One is the cause and the reason for the existence of the other.

Conclusion

Corruption is an impediment to nationhood. The question one would ask is, must it continue forever? It is time for total moral cleansing. The challenge lies with both leadership and followership to address this dread monster. Can the present crop of leaders muster the political will in fighting the cankerworm called corruption? Can the president and his team, with a singular resolve, create the needed irreversible process aimed at correcting the rot afflicting our political and public life? Nigeria begs for solution. One expects that Nigerians return to the original noble values of integrity, love and honesty, this is the only the country can move beyond its present status in terms of growth and development.

Hope is very vital in life; we will surely continue to live in hope, even when we die in despair. Barrack Obama talks of the audacity of hope so it will not be out of place to say that there is hope of finding a way out of corruption for Nigeria. Here one must accept that corruption is a vice and to purge a vice, virtue is needed. Since moral depravity is what engenders corrupt practices, it follows therefore, that an elevated moral life will quell participation in corruption. A morally sanitized individual will be less vulnerable to the courtship of corrupt companies.   One can borrow a word

from Mohandas K. Ghandi, father of the Indian nation: "The things that will destroy us are: politics without principle; pleasure without conscience; wealth without work; knowledge without character; business without morality; science without humanity and worship without sacrifice.

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ABSTRACT

The paper gives an outline of Nigeria's experience on corruption in the context of poverty and Development. It discusses the effects of corruption which are rooted in the political and economic situation of the polity. The challenge of corruption is at the root of our underdevelopment .It has become so pervasive that many essential public projects for which vast sums of money have been paid to concerned contractors have been abandoned. And when such public projects have been completed, their costs are always higher in comparison with the costs of similar projects in other countries. In Nigeria corruption stifle economic growth, reduce economic efficiency and development despite the enormous resources in the country. It depends essentially on data from secondary sources such as books, journal articles, government publications, among other relevant documents. The data were analyzed qualitatively using the descriptive analytical method in order to achieve the primary objective of the paper.

NEW MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA: AN APPRAISAL OF THE OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS IN THE TERRAIN

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Introduction

The advent of the new media has, no doubt, revolutionized the process of political communication and expanded the frontiers of political participation. This is not far from the fact that the internet provides a forum for continuous interaction between the masses and the government. McQuail (2005) articulates this point when he notes that: the new media has been widely hailed as a potential way of escape from the top-down politics of mass democracies in which tightly organized political parties make policies unilaterally and mobilize support behind them with minimal negotiation and grassroots input. They provide the means for highly differentiated political information and ideas almost unlimited access in theory to all voices, and much feedback and negotiation between leaders and followers.

One vital potential of the new media, with its divergent means of information dissemination is that it has increased the volume of information at the disposal of the masses, with unlimited freedom such that the audience equally create and share content to other subscribers with ease. The fact that information is power has, thus, enabled the new media to empower the masses to participate actively in the process of governance. Democracy, which entails public participation in the process of governance, benefits immensely from this new revolution in the process of communication

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(Suntai and Targema 2015).

Nigeria, which has been exposed to authoritarian military rules shortly after the colonial era receives this revolution with a big sigh of relief, as the authoritarian regimes left no stone unturned in the bid to muzzle the press and firmly spread the tentacles of their dictatorship and tyranny devoid of public criticisms and antagonism. With the return to democratic rule, and recent adaptation of the new media platforms, which are trending, the scope of political participation and criticisms has been widened.

Elsewhere, the Arab Spring is a testimony to the power of the new media in extending the frontiers of democracy, as social networking sites dominated the communication activities that trailed the revolution and resistance of oppressive rule in the region. The wave of revolutions that were social media driven saw oppressive leaders, such as Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Ben Ali of Tunisia among others, having social media to blame for their public rejection and subsequent dethronement, after securely monitoring the mainstream media. Hanan (2013, 2), thus, describes the role of the new media in the revolutions as follows:

> much have already been said about the Arab spring but what is already clear, from the current body of work being produced, is that it was the use of social media that acted as a catalyst for change in an already unpredictable environment. The use and availability of social media easily created connections between prominent thought leaders/activists and ordinary citizens, rapidly expanding the network of people willing to take action.

Elegbede (2015) asserts that nothing big and relevant happens in Africa today without the influence of the social media. While the assertion may not be absolutely correct, we are reminded of a series of events that have unfolded, mainly through social media platforms across political, health and commercial development landscape of the continent. The bathing with and drinking salt episode as an immunity against Ebola disseminated on social media, which received massive compliance among Nigerians, is still fresh in our memory.

The 2015 general elections in Nigeria present another scenario where the entire gamut of social media was deployed to entrench the principles of democracy through what appeared to be relatively free and fair elections. According to Oseni (2015), starting from the period of the campaign, through voting to the collation of results and subsequent declaration of winners by INEC, social media were formidable forces in keeping the masses informed. Two years into the administration of President Mohammadu Buhari, who emerged victorious during the polls, we can attest to the formidable role the new media plays in the process of governance.

This study derives its justification from this scenario. Anchored on the Social Responsibility Theory, it explores the contribution of the new media in the entrenchment of democracy in the country, and critically assesses issues and matters arising with the adaptation of the platform by both the government and the masses.

New Media and Democracy: A Conceptual Discussion

The proliferation of new media platforms in Nigeria recently has attracted the attention of researchers to investigate the rippling effects in several fields such as the economy, education, politics and health among others. In all of these fields, research evidence has demonstrated that the platforms have proved effective in increasing access to vital information that helps people to make informed decisions (Alexander, Ifeanyi and Martin 2016). Basically, the scope of new media (as used in this study) is broad, and encapsulates platforms such as online newspapers, social media and blogs, all of which are domiciled on the internet. Of all these, social media play leading role in filling the hitherto existing information gap, as it comfortably houses the other new media platforms on its various channels.

Social media are online communication media that use web based technologies which enable users to download, upload, interact and collaborate with one another regardless of distance and time. Social media as a concept is the use of technology combined with social interaction to create and co-create value (Olise 2014). It is thus a shift in how people discover, read and share news, information and content which may be text, audio, video or graphics.

Media scholars argue that social media involve a fusion of sociology and technology to transform the process of communication from monologue to dialogue or better still, to an interactive process. Some of the common social media sites include Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Flicker, 2go, YouTube, Instagram, and Google+ among others. These relatively new media gain popularity in Nigeria, in spite of her technological backwardness, helping to accomplish complex political tasks across the country.

According to Nwabueze (2014), Nigeria has registered some level of presence in the internet-based community. There are numerous weblogs run by Nigerians, many of which create the forum for the masses to air their views and make meaningful contribution to topics being discussed by a chain of users. Klinreports.com, Chidiopara reports, Nairaland, Naijapost, Naija.com, Pulse Nigeria, Topic.net and Amana online among a host of others are some of the popular blogs in Nigeria. In fact, as at July

2009, there were about 475 Nigerian blogs, with Nigeria having an online population of 42 million people (Nwabueze 2014). This trend must have improved significantly over the years.

As one could rightly expect, the heavy online presence has widened the scope of citizen journalism practice in the country, a form of journalism where members of the public play an active role in the process of collecting, reporting, analyzing and disseminating news and information. With citizens becoming reporters of issues and events happening around them, freedom of information is enhanced, empowering them to be actively involved in the democratic process (Suntai and Targema 2015).

Democracy as a concept originates about 2400 years ago in ancient Greece. It simply means "rule by the people (Galadima and Goshit 2013). Democracy requires that each individual be free to participate in the political community's self-government. To this end, political freedom lies at the heart of the concept of democracy. Basically, democracy connotes rule by the people through free and fair elections and other forms of participation.

According to Galadima and Goshit (2013), the Athenians of ancient Greece, progenitors of democracy, did not leave us in dearth of definition for the concept, conceiving it in their days as "government of the people, by the people and for the people". To this end, democracy entails popular sovereignty, political equality, recognition of the consent of the governed as well as free and fair elections among other forms of participation.

Democracy puts accent on people's participation. Everyone involved should be carried along, and this is where the role of the media becomes necessary. Thus, an environment of dialogue is sine qua non for the sustenance of democracy, but this cannot be achieved unless the media and other essential fabrics that hold democratic institutions are in place. The trending social media and citizen journalism that allow for participation and unlimited access to all, among other virtues, are thus central to the sustenance of modern democracies.

However, central to the exercise of this civic responsibility is the volume of information at the disposal of the masses to take informed decisions all through the electoral process, and that is why Gambo (2013) stresses that liberal democracies rests purely on the capacity of the mass media to gather and disseminate information that can guide citizens in making rational choices. Citing Ibrahim, he notes that:

> For the people to be able to determine who wants to rule them based on an understanding of his policies as well as what structures etc. are preferable in the society presupposes a certain amount of knowledge and information which must be supplied ...the availability of neutral information about the functioning of the political system makes it

possible for the electorate of a democracy to perform its recruitment function intelligibly and effectively and at the same time tends to create an informed stratum of citizens who are public policy-oriented rather than interest oriented in a narrow sense (Gambo 2013, 109).

This is where the nexus between new media and democracy lies. While democracy needs adequate information to filter through its various levels, the new media provide the best platform for the circulation of such information. Through its various platforms, the masses get exposed to information about the activities of the principal actors in the process of governance. Thus, new media has become a formidable force that drives contemporary Nigerian democracy.

Social Responsibility: the Theoretical Bedrock

Social responsibility theory draws the attention of journalists to the fact that they have freedom attach with responsibility to the society. According to Bitner (1989), by the turn of the twentieth century, the printed press had been through the era of yellow journalism (a kind of journalism characterized by reckless reporting and unethical practice). Prior to this era, the press, through the efforts of freedom fighters such as John Milton, John Erskine, Thomas Jefferson and John Stuart Mill attained some considerable degree of freedom to operate without restrictions (formal/informal, constitutional or otherwise) in place (Sambe 2008).

There was thus a great need for self-moderation by journalists who were already abusing the excessive freedom. The social responsibility theory, thus, came on board. Central to the core assumptions of the theory is the fact that the press has the right to criticize government and institutions, but also has certain basic responsibilities to maintain the stability of society. Nurturing this theory is the rise of professional associations associated with Journalism globally; such as the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the Nigerian Union of Journalists, Nigerian Guild of Editors etc., and the evolution of codes of conduct/ethics that encourages responsible action by their members.

With the advent of the new media that has conferred unto every citizen the status of a journalist; the scope of freedom of expression has been extended. No doubt, the various platforms have liberalized the market place of ideas, and have removed the least official barriers to freedom of expression in countries like Nigeria, where the state allows for free interaction on the various platforms.

However, with the public assuming the role of reporters and

professional journalists as citizen journalists via the various new media platforms, there is a great need to re-interrogate the social responsibility question. These issues quickly surge forward: can citizen journalists and members of the general public abide by the ethics standards of the profession in their reportage of activities around them? Can one rely on information by citizen journalists and social media accounts as substitutes for news in the mainstream media? Is there any need to enact rules and regulations so as to checkmate reckless spread of information on the social media platforms? After all, how does the spread of incredible information on social media platforms effect the entrenchment of democracy and national unity/cohesion in Nigeria? Answers to these questions have become pressing, given the current level of abuse which the platforms have been subjected to, as will be discussed in the subsequent sections of the study.

New Media and Democracy in Nigeria: Some Basic observations

Democracy benefits a lot from the opportunities offered by the new media which attracts active youths that interact constantly on the various platforms. In contemporary Nigeria, new media platforms, such as social media, are agog with youths and members of the general public to the extent that the political class is compelled to key into this new technology to sustain their relevance. In the words of Adeyanju (2013, 201):

> The expanded information in public sphere and the quantum of information at the disposal of the citizens are making it imperative for those interested in public opinion to change their strategies at influencing it. Many politicians and governments are now moving fast to imbibe the new media and even the social media to get their messages across to the people. The traditional media are no longer enough to do this. It is becoming very common to see politicians have their own blogs and chat constantly with their audience on Facebook while at the same time monitoring their activities on Twitter.

Elsewhere, we could use the United States President, Donald Trump's constant use of Twitter for the purpose of communication as an instance to justify the claim in the assertion above. But even in Nigeria, an avalanche of evidence abounds as well. Most of the political actors have their official twitter handles which they use to constantly update their fans with information. Also, spin doctors for the various politicians and political groups in the country have created Facebook profiles, pages and groups to supply the masses with information about such personnel or sects. This serves to demonstrate the centrality of the new media to the current

democratic experiment in the country. Below are few case studies where the new media serve as facilitators of democracy in Nigeria's recent history.

The 2015 General Elections

The civil society deployed the arsenal of social media effectively to disseminate information during the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. According to Elegbede (2015), during the period of campaign, Tweetmeets and Hangouts were the in-thing within Nigerian online socio-political networks. Hashtags such as #MeetGej, #Febuhari, #Marchoutjonathan, #WhyiwillvoteGEJ, #MarchforBuhari, #GMB15, #LagosForYou and #iHavedecided were promoted by politicians and their supporters; while #NigeriaDecides, #Nigeria2015, #iPledgeToVote, #MyPVCnow, #GoVote, #VoteNoFight, etc. were promoted by civil society groups to increase citizens' awareness and participation (see also Suntai and Targema 2015).

During the voting process, pictures and videos floated on Facebook and Watsapp accounts of party agents who were caught in the act buying voters with money and some other grants as well as the issue of underage voting in some states prompting immediate action by INEC. Similarly, during the collation of results, citizen journalists and the civil society never spared any effort to update the public on the nature of results in the various states across the federation (Oseni 2015).

Initially, the results were viewed skeptically as mere facades by the "zealous" APC, the opposition party that was bent to grab the mantle of leadership come what may. The masses were however, surprised to observe that when such results were eventually announced at the collation center, they used to tally with the citizen journalists' account on social media. In no time at all, the social media sites were saturated with subscribers who logged in to be updated on the elections. To quote Oseni (2015, 3):

> the trending results on social media made it clear to Nigerians that the APC had won in the north-east, north-west, south-west and was competing with PDP in the north central, while PDP led at the south-south and south-east. Been agitated by the results trending on social media, PDP accused APC of posting fake election results on social media and further charged Nigerians to totally disregard results on social media and wait for official announcement by INEC... However, there was no significant difference between results announced by INEC and those trending on social media.

Analysts contend that the utilization of social media in the elections obviously frustrated Nigerian politicians and stopped the popular strategy of changing election results by returning officers in collaboration with political parties. All through the process of the elections, every citizen equipped with

a mobile cell phone was an observer/reporter, ready to raise alarm to the virtual world/online community on any traces of malpractice or suspicion at any point in the election. This, alongside other forces, culminated into an election that was near free, fair and credible. Oseni (2015, 4) sums up his argument thus:

> Social media age is a revolution to Nigerian democracy; those who must win election must win the will of the people. The days of changing election results by returning officers have gone. By the power of social media, citizens know who win elections before results are officially announced by the Independent National Electoral Commission INEC... social media has become a force and we must live up to this reality.

Emetumah (2016) stresses the role played by social media in the 2015 polls when he notes that the various platforms helped shape the opinion of a lot of youths in the election and increased the political awareness and consciousness of the youths in the country, the outcome of which was the emergence of an unbelievable win of opposition party (APC) over the ruling party (PDP) in the presidential election.

Aftermath of the 2015 General Elections

Two years into the government of President Mohammadu Buhari, the new media have continued to facilitate participatory democracy in the country by linking the government and the governed through the various discursive platforms it harbors. The key agenda of the government - anti-graft war, economic recovery and security among others - have continued to stimulate engaging debates on the new media platforms. These debates helps to express the sentiments of the masses towards key policy decisions of the government to enable for adjustments where need be. In democratic rule, feedback from the masses is crucial to carry everybody along. This is where the new media come in, thus, they fill the information gap that hitherto existed, and facilitate free flow of information in the process of governance, both vertically and horizontally.

Basic Threats Associated with the Practice

While the new media appears to provide vibrant discursive channels that will facilitate democracy in the country, a careful observation of the trend reveal quite a number of threats that are not only worrisome, but have the capacity to diminish the opportunities which they offer to countries with budding democracies like Nigeria. First on the trail of such threats is the issue of hate and dangerous speech. This practice was really endemic in the

build-up to the 2015 general elections, where the platforms were deployed to perpetuate campaigns of calumny against candidates with opposing views. So serious was the practice that it almost divided the country into the extremes of the Muslim-North and Christian-South.

Ibrahim, Pate, Pereira, Ya'u, Agbanyin and Bagu (2017, 6) investigate the escalation of hate and dangerous speech in the build up to the 2015 election in the country and discover that: "there is extensive evidence of an explosion of hate and dangerous speech in Nigeria over the past decade, especially through the broadcast and social media as their major transmitters". The issue here is that, although the divide between North and South has existed in the country for long, new media platforms accentuated the division, and created an atmosphere full of enmity for one another during the 2015 elections. Sentiments that lie latent in the minds of people were given a voice, and widely expressed. This development poses a great threat to the fragile democracy which the country is striving to consolidate.

Similarly, Emetumah (2016, 1) reveals in his study that: "though social media helped in creating political awareness among Nigeria's electorates; they also served as negative propaganda platform for dissemination of hate speeches". The study which surveys opinions of 200 social media subscribers in Nigeria arrives at a conclusion, that:

> Social media users grossly abused freedom of information offered through the medium in Nigeria's 2015 presidential election period... the two leading political parties (APC and PDP) accused themselves of spreading false information on social media using their followers. However, due to unavailability of regulatory outfit, politicians succeeded in using the platforms to disseminate unofficial and inaccurate results that created controversies among stakeholders and political parties in violation to electoral acts guiding elections in Nigeria. Thus, the platforms became a new ground for propagating unreliable election messages (Emetumah 2016, 8).

Today, new media platforms have amplified the voices of secessionist groups in the country such as the Independent People of Biafra (IPOB), who are agitating for an independent state; the struggle which courts the various online media platforms gains momentum by the day, and is threatening the very foundation of Nigeria as a country. What this suggests is that in a diverse entity such as Nigeria, which is grappling with the herculean challenge of unity in diversity, new media platforms which present an unregulated free-for-all terrain can play a counter-progressive role, and pose serious challenges to the task of democratic consolidation.

Concluding Remarks

Conclusively, new media platforms are formidable forces in the consolidation of democracy. The information gap, which they help to bridge, benefits democracy in no small measure, and serves to strengthen the cherished principles of transparency and accountability in the process of governance. Nigerian democracy is speedily heading towards this enviable destination courtesy of the new media. Similarly, the new media platforms have extended the frontiers of political participation and interaction between the rulers and the ruled. This is a positive development that needs to be acknowledge, as it makes democracy in the country to live up to the expectations of its generic definition, as g*overnment of the people, for the people, and for the people.*

However, the abuses that characterize the platforms are equally worrisome, given the threats they harbor, and the damage they portend for Nigeria's fragile democracy. In a country that is grappling with the challenge of unity in diversity, the various platforms if utilized otherwise can deepen the divides that already exist, and plunge the country into a deep dark ditch. Practices such as dissemination of outright lies and deliberate falsehood, dangerous, injurious and vituperative speech capable of spreading hatred among others can overheat the polity, and make nonsense of the budding democracy which the country strives to consolidate. On this note, the study recommends by borrowing the words of Suntai and Targema (2015, 16), that:

> The civil society is hereby cautioned to exhibit a sense of responsibility in the process of online interaction through the process of self-regulation and rational judgment. In this way, the vices of social media will be minimized and its virtues maximized to enable it serve as an effective facilitator of democracy.

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ABSTRACT

Democracy in Nigeria, no doubt, gains momentum recently. This development coincides with an era of increased access to information by the masses courtesy of the new media and its numerous platforms and communication opportunities. Today, each member of the audience who is connected to the new media can not only access information, but can also create and share same on the various platforms for mass consumption. Democracy, which entails popular participation in the process of governance benefits immensely from this trend. This study explores the role new media plays in the consolidation of democracy in the country, with keen attention on the communication channels of the 2015 general elections, where new media championed the spread of information about the election, and the aftermath of the election period, that paved the way for the present administration. Anchored on the Social Responsibility Theory, the study interrogates the extent to which new media platforms liberalize the process of political communication in the country, and the opportunities and threats, which they harbor for democratic consolidation. The central argument in the study is that the new media presents a useful tool in the hands of activists and concerned citizens to participate in the government of the day and effectively play the watchdog role, a privilege which, hitherto, was far from reality. Sadly, however, several abuses exist that are threatening to rubbish the opportunities of the platform such as the prevalence of hate and dangerous speech, increased intensity of lies, mischiefs, falsehood and negative propaganda, and the use of comment sections to attack, verbally assault, bully and demonize co-discussants of political matters raised in the news via the numerous online platforms. To this end, the paper recommends a 'cautious' incorporation of the new media in the democratic process to pave the way for more participation.

KEYWORDS

New media; democracy; Nigeria; opportunities; threats.

PEACE JOURNALISM PRACTICE AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTHEAST OF NIGERIA: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION WITH SOME MEMBERS OF NTA[1] CORRESPONDENTS' DAMATURU, YOBE STATE

Aondover Eric Msughter[2]

Introduction

In the present times, people have witnessed a lot of conflict and crises all over the world. These include the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, between Lebanon and Israel and Pakistan its neighbours. And here in Nigeria is the lingering Boko Haram insurgency and the Niger Delta Avengers. These wars and conflicts have left millions of people killed and many wounded, towns, settlements and infrastructures have been destroyed.

Conflict is said to be inevitable in every society (Adedogun 2006, 90) but all segments of society are expected to find ways of resolving them. The mass media are expected to contribute immensely to the resolution of conflicts in our society "because of the central place of media in disseminating information to the people ... they have power to aggravate and minimize issues depending on the way they report" (Sandra, 2008, 42). Mass media play a vital role in conflict prevention, resolution and transformation. They are thus essential not only for systems growth but also for peace building and stability.

Evidence suggests that media are not a mere conduit for information dissemination; they also frame and interpret events, which in turn shape

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individual and collective perceptions of conflict events. This presumption therefore confers on the media the ability to either escalate or deescalate conflict situations Umar (op cit Gani and Mu'azu 2009).

Thus, in order to achieve the objective of this study, the paper adopts Social Responsibility Theory as a theoretical discourse. Likewise, Focus Group Discussions (FGD) is applied as a methodological approach in data gathering among some selected members of NTA correspondents' Damaturu, Yobe State.

Development News Reporting and Professionalism in the Media

The mass media in Nigeria are filled with stories on development at various levels in the country-federal, state, and local government areas. Nwabueze (2009) states that development journalism was popularised as a result of the guest by developing nations of the world to change western media perception of news, especially about developing nations as the negative and odd-wars, famines, natural disaster, fraud etc. these nations chose to define and stress news from the perspective of the coverage of development issues in the society – road construction, building bridges, health development campaigns, provision of social amenities, and progress made in the various sectors of the society. Nigeria was among the nations that spearheaded this course in the 1960s and 1970s during the agitation for the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO).

Since that time, the Nigeria media have made palpable efforts to bring development news to the people. Nwabueze (2009) notes that the government owned media organizations seem to be at the forefront of development journalism in a bid to amplify the efforts of their employer (state or federal government) to the people. But the problem here is that the government owned media tend to concentrate on the commissioning of projects, flagging-off of development campaigns-immunization, family planning, agricultural programmes use of press releases on development policies and programmes. Most of these media hardly focus searchlight on stories about embezzlement of funds for development projects, supply of inferior materials for projects, substandard development projects done by contractors etc. This is more so if government officials are involved in the scam. This type of reporting apparently led critics of development reporting to describe this branch of journalism as "hand out" journalism which replicates "half-truths put out by official information agencies" and reports only "positive news, to the exclusion of the negative or unflattering news"

(Shrivastava 2003, 175).

However, the privately owned media houses in the country do a great job in amplifying the good and exposing the bad stories of development related issues in the societies. Both privately owned print and electronic media are involved in this objective reporting of development news in the country. However, the competition posed by the privately owned electronic media since their emergence in 1992, has made some government owned broadcast media especially some Nigeria Television Authority (NTA) and Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) stations to also wake up to the challenges of reporting the two side of the issue in development journalism. The numerous probe panels set up by the federal government to investigate allegations of frauds in certain sectors of the nation are products of development journalism-oriented investigative reports. For instance, the probe panel set up to look into allegations of fraud in the oil sector specifically the fuel subsidy scandal that involved some of the staff of Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and other officials, largely came about due to the development news reports which made the public aware of the measure put in place to ensure the judicious utilisation of the revenue that will accrue from fuel subsidy.

Development news reporting is thriving in Nigeria. Some newspapers, for instance have spaces where they publish rural development news stories tagged "news from the local government areas". The media do not only give priority to development journalism but to development communication generally (Nwabueze 2005).

One of the core-value of reporting peace journalism is the ability for one to uphold to the profession. There is an on-going debate on the status of journalism as a profession. Scholars are variously divided on the issue. While some argue that like medicine, law and teaching, journalism can also be regarded as a profession; many others would prefer to classify it as a craft (McQuail 2000; Woo 2003).

Like most social science concepts, professionalism has been variously defined. One of the proponents of professionalism described a profession as full time occupation, which assumes a centrality in the life of the professional, often abolishing boundaries between work and leisure. He said that professionals come to derive satisfaction from the work itself, not simply from the conditions of work or the rewards it offers (Moore 1972). According to Nwosu (1987, 32), professionalism is "a set of principles, ideas, attitudes and activities that characterize and guide the behaviours of members of any occupational group anxious to gain and maintain both in-group and out-group acceptance of its professional standing".

Explaining further, Nwosu argued that professionalism entails high education, specialized training, and self-organisation into an association of practitioners. Other elements include occupational commitment, professional ideology and code of conduct. A further excursion into the literature would reveal that certain criteria have been identified as necessary in a profession. These include the systematic acquisition of specialized skills based on theoretically grounded knowledge, exclusive right to exercise those skills, a public service (as opposed to commercial interest) orientation, a high level of related ethical standards, and autonomy in setting those standards and regulating practice (Ibelema 1993; McQuail 2000).

Looking at the above criteria, one wonders if journalism can rightly and automatically qualify as a profession. However, the study safely argues that journalism exhibits some of the attributes associated with professionalisation. For example, one could find in journalism the existence of a code of ethics, desire for autonomy, independence, high level of education among practitioners, and very importantly, public service. Though the aspect of public service is often disregarded, Journalists, however consider it important to the extent of regarding themselves as the Fourth Estate of the Realm, "independent of public or private power centres. Their mission was disclosure; their canon, objectivity; their discipline, reification; their credo, the people's right to know" (Woo 2003).

The position of the study is that no matter what one feels about the professional status of journalism, let it be appreciated that "the purpose of journalism is more than reporting and writing of stories... skills and competence are essential. Its purpose has to do with something more fundamental...serving the public trust... providing the news and information that free people need to make political, economic, social, and personal decisions" (Woo 2003). The point, however, is that one should be able to understand the contextual or operational environment in which the journalist practices. For example, comparative studies have found out that news media in developing countries enjoy much less autonomy, suffer from shallow reporting, and are more likely to breach standards of neutrality and objectivity, accuracy and facticity, and ethics than in developed countries (Ekwelie 1986; Rugh 1987; Boafo 1992). Thus, one cannot excel in this field of reporting without imbibing a professional skill.

Upholding Professionalism in the Reporting of Peace Journalism and Development

For the media to be eminently respected and trusted, its personnel

must demonstrate professional competence in dealing with issues of peace journalism and development. Of course, the starting point is for the media environment to be diverse by reflecting in their structure and content the various social, economic and cultural realities of the society in which they operate, in a more or less proportional way. For instance, a diverse newsroom would be expected to reflect staff and content to reflect its area of coverage. (Pate 2002).

Secondly, it is important to note that there is a growing interest in what is referred to as "peace journalism". Scholars like Galtung (1998), Albert (2000), and Akinfeleye (2003) advocate for peace journalism by insisting that peace and development issues should be professionally reported with peace building objectives being the guiding principle. Major requirement of peace journalism include "balance news coverage, positive education of people about what is going on in the society, controlling dangerous rumours and providing a trusted source of information for all parties in the society". In the words of Albert (2000), peace journalism is:

> ...a "journalism of attachment" to all actual and potential victims. It stands for the truth as opposed to incitements, lies and propaganda that often dominate war journalism. The peace journalist thus has eyes for the essential; the devotion both to fact and hope... it takes right training, determination, environment and exposure... (Albert 2000, 32).

It is established in the literature that the reportage of peace journalism and development in Nigeria requires professionalism, there seems to be an interlock between journalists - who play a crucial role in shaping public understanding by providing information about conflict - bear a heavy responsibility for what they write and broadcast as well as emphasising a balanced reporting to increase awareness of the contending issues illuminates structural and cultural violence as it bears upon the lives of people (Pate 2002).

Therefore, this study goes further in ascertaining the extent to which peace journalism can pave way to development. Thus, paraphrasing the words of Pate, peace journalism connotes peace initiatives and potential solutions more visible equips people to distinguish between stated positions, and real goals, when judging whether particular forms of intervention are necessary or desirable, multiplies and divides the parties, creating space for initiatives to be taken, and progress measured, as a positive gain all round. Peace journalism is a kind of journalism and media ethics that attempt... to transform conflicts from their violent channels into constructive forms by conceptualizing news, empowering the voiceless, and seeking common grounds that unify rather than divide human societies. Therefore, going by the above arguments, it is clear that development can only be factored in a

country where peace journalism has taken the lead.

Therefore, in a democratic society, the mass media convey information and opinion that must be free from government control in order to present all significant ideas and opinions. On the other hand, they also have a responsibility to present minority as well as majority of views (Orhewere 2012). Thus, the utilization of the mass media specifically, the broadcast media become a channel not only for cultural transmission but also for developmental change. With each new medium has come a new opportunity for social learning, a new way to achieve common understanding is usually designed to reach a large, heterogeneous and widely dispersed people.

The basic functions of mass media are not to inform, educate, and entertain only but they are also veritable channel for wide range of development campaign. To Okunna (1999), the mass media, specifically the broadcast media encourage and ginger people to achieve developmental goals of the society by promoting peace and demonstrating professionalism in their reportage in the media and stimulating the aspirations and activities of people towards achieving development goals. The broadcast media NTA Damaturu for example, which has the power to reach a vast number of people almost at the same time can help tremendously in promoting development plans of the government which seems to be the focal point of this study in reporting peace journalism and development in the Northeast of Nigeria.

Development is a change process that seeks to improve the life and environment of man largely through his own effort and at his own pace. Sears op cit Nwabueze (2005, 2) sees development as "the creation of opportunities for realisation of human potentials" Beltran op cit Nwabueze (2007) summarised what development connotes in the following words:

> Development is a directed and widely participatory process of deep and accelerated socio-political change geared towards producing substantial changes in the economy, the technology, the ecology and the overall culture of the country so that the moral and material advancement of majority of its population can be obtained within conditions of generalised equity, dignity, justice and liberty (Beltran op cit Nwabueze 2007, 191).

Ten Commandments for Peace Journalism

According to Majid (n.d, 46) established a list of Ten Commandments for peace journalism as follows:

1. Never reduce the parties in human conflicts to two. Remember that when two elephants fight, the grass gets hurt. Pay attention to the poor grass.

2. Identify the views and interests of all parties to human conflicts. There is no single Truth; there are many truths.

3. Do not be hostage to one source, particularly those of governments that control sources of information.

4. Develop a good sense of scepticism. Remember that reporting is representation. Bias is endemic to human conditions. You, your media organization, and your sources are not exceptions.

5. Give voice to the oppressed and peacemakers to represent and empower them.

6. Seek peaceful solutions to conflict problems, but never fall prey to panaceas.

7. Your representation of conflict problems can become part of the problem if it exacerbates dualisms and hatreds.

8. Your representation of conflict problems can become part of the solution if it employs the creative tensions in any human conflict to seek common ground and nonviolent solutions.

9. Always exercise the professional media ethics of accuracy, veracity, fairness, and respect for human rights and dignity.

10. Transcend your own ethnic, national, or ideological biases to see and represent the parties to human conflicts fairly and accurately.

In Nigeria, since 1980s, conflicts have become the order of the day, more frequent, more widespread, more violent destructive of life and property has really taken the lead. Between 1980 and 2016 alone, some many conflicts have occurred. Eliagwu op cit Gofwen (2004) established them as follows:

Table 1: Conflict Cases in Northeast of Nigeria (May 1980 – October, 2016)

Date	Location	Principal Actors
October 29-30, 1982	Bullumkutu, Maiduguri (Borno State)	Kala-Kala and Maitatsine sect... 118 people died, extensive damage to property.

Date	Location	Description
April 26-28, 1985	Pantami Ward, Gombe. (Bauchi State)	Maitatsine sect, 105 died, extensive destruction of property.
April 1991	Tafawa Balewa (Bauchi State)	Started as a quarrel between a Fulani man and a Sayawa meat seller in Tafawa Balewa. Escalated into a full blown violence and later took the colouring of a religious war in Bauchi Several lives were lost and property valued over hundreds of millions of Naira was destroyed.
September 8 2000	Gombe	The Kaltungo religious crisis. The crisis erupted over the implementation of Sharia in the State.
June 8 2008	Adamawa	Conflict between Christians and Muslims in Numan town. Caused by the location of the town's Central Mosque close to Bachama paramount ruler's palace; over 17 persons killed.
February 18 2006	Borno	Conflict between Christians and Muslims in Maiduguri. The riot was caused by the Danish cartoon on prophet Mohammed, in Jyllands-Posten newsstudy; over 50 persons killed and 30 churches destroyed; over 200 shops, 50 houses and 100 vehicles vandalized.
March 22 2007	Gombe	Muslim pupils killed their Christian teacher, Mrs. Oluwatoyin Olusesan. The pupils claimed that their teacher had "desecrated" the Quran in the process of stopping a student from cheating in an examination hall.
February 21 2009	Bauchi	Ethno-religious conflict at the Makama New Extension. Over 11 people were killed, more than 400 houses burnt, and over 1,600 families displaced
June 11 2009	Bauchi	Clash between members of the Boko Haram and the police. 17 members of the sect were killed.

July 26-30 2009	Bauchi and Borno	Religious violence unleashed by the radical Boko Haram sect. Over 700 persons killed; 3,500 persons internally displaced; 1,264 children orphaned; over 392 women widowed; and several properties destroyed.
December 29 2009	Bauchi	Religious violence unleashed by the Kala-kato sect. Over 38 persons killed; about 20 suspected members of the sect arrested; and over 1000 people internally displaced.
December 12 2013	Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe and Taraba.	Boko Haram killed over 202 persons.
March 31 2014	Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno and Gombe	More than 1,500 killed in armed conflict across the four states
July 31, 2015	Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe and Taraba.	Violence in the northeast destroyed lives and communities and displaced 1.4 million people.
July, 2016	Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe and Taraba.	Over 14 million people are affected by conflict in northeast Nigeria and more than 10 million people are in need.

Source: J.I. Eliagwu, op cit Gofwen 2004, 65-67

Theoretical framework

This chapter uses cultural theory of conflict and diversity as its theoretical justification with a view to explain vividly the supposed role of journalists in an ideal situation. This theory identifies social difference, particularly cultural, as the main factor that creates a social identity and social exclusion thereby creating "we" against "them" feeling which nurtures animosity, hatred and contemptuous relationship among people of divergent cultures leading to conflict, how the competing interest of groups tie conflict directly into the social, economic and political organizations of society as well as the nature and strength of social networks within and between community groups (Ademola 2005).

The culturally induced conflict that this relationship cultivates is as a result of creation of the enemy image which is learned from early stage of growth to adulthood and is passed on from generation to generation. An example is seen in the case of Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. The theory

believes that different forms of identities in various societies exist; however, the one that has ethnic origin is the most dangerous identity and the one that most explains violent conflicts. Psycho-cultural theory of conflict argues that conflict is avoidable when tolerance and understanding among people of different races, culture, languages and historic are established. The theory however becomes relevant as it address the feeling which nurtures animosity, hatred and contemptuous relationship among people of divergent cultures leading to conflict.

Pate (2009), opines that "diversity is a fact of life. Without it life would be boring, flat and hardly interesting. By simple understanding, diversity is heterogeneity, differences or dissimilarity in several respects". In the words of Albert in Pate (2009), diversity "connotes heterogeneity or dissimilarity on the grounds of sex, cultural practice, ethnic origin, religious affiliation, ideological stance, political leaning, level of social development, place of habitation and so on." In a relative term, Diversity connotes multiculturalism, pluralism and variety. For example, Nigeria is appropriately described as a diverse country comprising of over four hundred ethnic groups, more than 140 million people, pursuing different engagements, speaking different languages, adhering to different religious leanings and different political orientations, and so on. Of course, it would be unrealistic for anyone to expect that all of us would think and behave in the same manner. Or, to assume that because we are all Nigerians, the various cultural groups and religions can fuse into one group for all our problems to "die away". No wonder, therefore that the issue of diversity has remained very important in several countries like the United States and Nigeria (Duncan in Pate 2009).

Furnham and Bochner cit Pate (2009), this importance possibly is borne out of the realization that in a mix where "diverse people" meet, most especially as a result of social and geographical contacts, a culture shock is produced. Thus, the politicization or poor mediation of diversity could produce shocks that can explode into social conflict with devastating consequences.

Research Procedure

Focus Group Discussions (FGD) was used as a method of data collection. The method was interested in understanding the perception, experiences, attitudes and behaviour of the discussants under the study. A sample of 10 discussants was drawn from the identified population. Nine questions were asked with a moderator who led the discussions. Tape recorder and writing materials were used as instruments of data collection

for recording the responses of the respondents.

The choice of focus group discussions as a method of gathering and analysing data for this study is justifiable because of the usefulness of FGD in investigating issues in an appropriate way so as to discover how the individuals (who are the stakeholders of the issue) think and feel about reporting peace journalism and development within Nigerian Television Authority, Damaturu.

The general conclusion that was drawn from the work of Boodhoo and Purmessur (2009) is that a qualitative study is very important to organisations with relatively small or manageable population. These scholars quoted Dr. Prudence L. Carter as saying "The beauty of qualitative study is unpacking the black box and getting at the Why?"

The limitation of this methodology came from the instruments of gathering data for the study. As noted above, some of the respondents declined the request to audio-record the discussion; thus, leaving the researcher with the herculean task of trying to cover the key information given through note-taking while also saddled with the responsibility of observing and listening to the respondents.

Findings and Discussions

As it is noted in the methodology, Focus Group Discussions (FGD) method was used in data collection, nine questions were asked among the ten randomly selected members of correspondences in NTA, Damaturu, Yobe State. The following are the findings and discussions from the members of the panel.

Question one address the general introduction of all the members. While question two asked: *As practicing journalists, are you aware of peace journalism and development? If yes, what is your understanding about the concepts?* In answering this question, members of the panel collectively admitted that they are aware of peace journalism and development. For instance, Yunusa Suleiman says:

> We are actually aware of peace journalism and development. Peace journalism is the practice of using peace mechanisms for the promotion of peaceful co-existence in heterogeneous or homogeneous societies in media reportage. The adoption of peace building mechanisms in reportage becomes imperative considering the growing humanitarian crises plaguing many parts of the world particularly in the developing countries where insurgency, political instability, ethnic/religious conflicts among others have become the order of the day. On the other hand, development reporting is an aspect of reporting that is meant to draw the

attention of the government and other citizenry to development needs of the society; and it also aim at mobilizing the citizenry to support or participate in development process.

Based on the discussion, it can be deduced that journalists are much aware and familiar with the existence of peace journalism and development in the Northeast of Nigeria. However, they admitted that it is an aspect of reporting that demands high level of professionalism and skills.

Question three asked: *Is peace journalism relevant to you as a journalist? If yes how?* They succinctly admitted that peace journalism is very relevant in journalism practice base on the fact that it acquaints the reporter with the professional skills. Contributing to the question, Mustapha Yusuf Musa says:

> Peace journalism gives better sense of editorial judgment during crisis. It is also relevant to journalists in the sense that NTA Damaturu, Yobe State is built on promoting peaceful coexistence and unity among the various divides in the country. Peace journalism also facilitates and encourages media to report positive things happening in the society which have been the core value of NTA Damaturu. Yobe is one of the States in the Northeast affected by the insurgency; thus, the need to concentrate on peaceful reportage has become a priority in our daily bulletin.

According to the discussants, peace journalism is very relevant and significant in the journalism profession. The reason is simple: it serves as a means of unionism and thus, cements the society together.

Question four asked: *Do you consider peace journalism and development reporting very important in your daily routine? If yes, how?* All the discussants agreed that peace journalism and development reporting offer them with the platform of bringing out the plights of people and present them to the public domain for possible interventions for NGOs, government and other critical stakeholders. In the words of Husaini Mohammed:

> Peace journalism is just gaining ground as years of Boko Haram insurgency which has given a bad publicity to the region. Despite that, we can say that peace journalism is very important to us as journalist because it encourage reporting things that have direct bearing on the society and thus, encourage them to see the need to embrace development initiatives.

The above discussion shows that peace journalism practice is just gaining due cognizance as compared to what was obtained in the past. This is because with the emergence of Boko Haram in the Northeast of Nigeria, it has become something journalists cannot do without in their daily routine.

Question five asked: *To what extent can you say peace journalism has contributed to the development of Northeast of Nigeria?* This particular

question tried to ascertain the extent to which peace journalism has contributed to the development of Northeast of Nigeria. The respondents agreed that the contributions of peace journalism to the development of the Northeast are numerous: (a). It has succeeded in presenting to the people of the area the ideals of peace making processes, peace building as well as reconciliation. (b). It has successfully enlightened the people on how to be security conscious by reporting suspicious persons or objects to the security agencies, hence boosting community security awareness. (c). Peace journalism has contributed to the resent peace being enjoyed in the geo-political zone through objective fairness, balanced and impartial reporting of happenings etc.

Question six raised the issues of: *In what way do you think peace journalism enhances effective development in Nigerian media organization like NTA Damaturu for example?* In an attempt to answer this question, Mustapha Yusuf Musa says:

> Nigerian media landscape is dotted with reportage of violence and for the last seven years due to Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast however, peace journalism has helped in promoting the course of peace across the board through effective news coverage that conforms to journalism code of ethics. We at NTA Damaturu, just like any other serious media organisations are out there to promote things that help in societal development.

From the above discussion, it can be said that NTA Damaturu is charge with the responsibility of projecting peace journalism at the forefront in order to ensure meaningful societal development. As the discussants contended that peace journalism has helped in promoting tranquility across the region.

Question seven asked: *There is this belief that journalism is not a profession as compared to other discipline? How true is this?* While contributing in this regard, Abubakar Hashim is of the view that it depend on how one look at it; to him, it is not a profession as anybody can decide to be a journalist overnight with or without the requisite qualifications. However, Yunusa Suleima argued that journalism is indeed a profession like Medicine, Law, Engineering, etc. journalism like any other profession has a union for its members (NUJ). It has also clearly defined code of ethics regulating the activities of members. Journalism as a profession has a specialized training for members just like in any other profession. This coincided with what Aisha Mohammed said that "journalism is a profession hence it has been the watch dog of the society holding government accountable and Fourth Estate of the Realm."

Question eight asked: *What are the challenges you are facing as*

journalists working in NTA Damaturu? The discussants mentioned that the challenges are many, but few among them are: poor state of equipment, lack of adequate funding for the running of the station, lack of commitment on the part of some subordinate staff, poor remuneration and motivation, harassments while on the field and security threats which all constitute the major challenges confronting journalists working in NTA Damaturu.

Question nine asked: *What solutions can you suggest to address some of the challenges you have mentioned?* Members of the panel established some of the possible ways that can be used in addressing the problems which includes adequate funding for operation, provision of state of the art facilities to meet contemporary challenges, good take home package for staff in forms of salaries and allowances, regular training and re-training of personnel, commitment and dedication to work by all media workers and adequate security. The discussants concluded that, we have been complaining to our superiors and extension national headquarters but nothing was done about it.

Conclusion

This study discussed the practice of peace journalism and development in the Northeast of Nigeria. Some members of NTA Correspondents' Damaturu, Yobe State were selected for Focus Group Discussions who responded to some questions raised. Arising from the discussions, the study concludes that all media organisation should imbibe the appropriate way of reporting peace journalism and development in the country, especially in the Northeast of Nigeria where cases of ethnic, religious, political and other types of conflicts have taken the lead. As observed elsewhere, "while the news media need close examination and warrant the same type of scrutiny and analysis they impose on other institutions, there is no strong tradition of media criticism in this country, nor are the news media themselves properly self critical" (Kerr 1992). Therefore, it is a challenge for all the stakeholders, to insist on the observance of professionalism, in the conduct and performance of our journalism and media organizations. It is imperative for the media to be responsible in discharging their social responsibility in reporting conflicts in the Northeast region of Nigeria in other to restore peace and tranquility in the area.

This call has become more compelling given the wave of ethno religious conflicts that have engulfed the region recently, and indeed, the entire federation, most of which are threatening the corporate existence of the country. Against this backdrop, there is a serious need for peace journalism in the embattled region, and the country generally to pave the

way for more responsible, and perhaps, progressive reportage of the conflicts towards attaining amicable resolutions in the interest of development.

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ABSTRACT

Peace journalism is fundamental like in any type of reporting. Thus, it facilitates reporters to disseminate information that would help attune to the development of a nation. Base on the available literature, the study discovered that the media have been variously blamed for their role in the exacerbation of different conflicts in complex and heterogeneous countries like Nigeria. The study uses social responsibility theory as a guiding principle. Likewise, Focus Group Discussions (FGD) is applied as a methodological approach in data gathering among some selected members of NTA correspondents' Damaturu, Yobe State. A total number of 10 practicing journalists were randomly selected in NTA, Damaturu. They discussed peace journalism practice and development in the Northeast of Nigeria. Arising from the discussions, the study concludes that all media organisations should imbibe the appropriate way of reporting peace journalism and development in the country, especially in the Northeast of Nigeria where cases of ethnic, religious, political and other types of conflicts have taken the lead.

BOOK REVIEW

"USA – AFRICA: THE POLICY OF PRESIDENT B. OBAMA ADMINISTRATION. 2009 – 2014", AND "USA – AFRICA: THE POLICY OF PRESIDENT B. OBAMA ADMINISTRATION. 2015 – 2016. CHRONICLE OF EVENTS"

by Andrey Urnov[1]

Vladimir Shubin[2]

The 14th International Conference of Africanists that took place last October in Moscow convincingly demonstrated a high level of African Studies in Russia. After all the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences with over a hundred staff members that hosted the conference is the biggest institution in the world in this field. However, most of the works by these scholars are published in Russian and as a rule are poorly known beyond the borders of their country.

This review is an attempt to make readers of the REBREA acquainted with the writings of Dr Andrey Urnov, a prominent Russian diplomat and academic. Dr Urnov, a graduate of the Moscow Institute of International Relations has been doing research of the US policy since his student years. Then, from 1966, as a desk officer, head of section and finally deputy head of the CPSU International Department for almost a quarter of the

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century he had been responsible for Moscow's political ties with African countries especially with the liberation movements. Later he was the first Soviet/Russian ambassador to Namibia. For his "excellent contribution to the fight for the liberation of the people of South Africa" he was awarded South African national order "Companions of O.R. Tambo" (silver). After retiring from diplomatic service he joined the Institute for African Studies as Principal Research Fellow.

Dr Urnov's research in President Obama's policy towards Africa is issued in two volumes, the first covers 2009-2014 and second – the last two years of his administration. However, it is preceded by a short expose of the policy of previous administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. He writes that initial decline of Washington's interest to Africa after the end of the "Cold War" did not last, and singles out the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act of 2001 as "one of the main instruments of the USA's policy in the region". The following year Camp Lemonnier, the first official USA military base on the African continent was founded in Djibouti and then in 2006 Washington created AFRICOM, a new regional United States Africa Command.

"President Obama continues the course of his predecessors on strengthening political, economic, military and other ties with African states", Urnov writes (2015, 13). At the same time, the fact that the new President was an African American "opened a credit of trust to his administration" (2015, 13). Indeed, the African Union Assembly in February 2009 in a special Message of Congratulations welcomed the administration of President Obama "which opens a new chapter for America, Africa and indeed the entire world" (2015, 13). To confirm Obama's initial popularity, especially in East Africa, here is my own story. Soon after Obama's first inauguration, I noticed a vehicle in a street of Dar es Salaam with the inscription "Barac Obama" on it. However, symbolically, that vehicle was just a tuk-tuk, a three wheel auto rickshaw.

In Chapter 1 the author indicates the main "pillars" of Obama's policy towards Africa and meticulously analyses its political, economic, humanitarian and military aspects. In particular, Urnov writes about "certain positive results" of AGOA, in particular, the rise of bilateral trade, including non-energy export from Sub-Saharan Africa to USA (2015, 18). However in his opinion this region remained for the United States primarily a supplier of raw materials that constitute 80 to 90 per cent of American imports from there (2015, 18) while only 300 items of 1 600 allowed by AGOA were exported to USA.

More positive is the author's assessment of Washington's health

and humanitarian assistance, especially of the President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) advanced by Obama's predecessor but enlarged by him.

The next initiative, launched personally by Obama in 2010 is "Young African leaders Initiative" (YALI) that includes the Mandela Washington Fellowship, Regional Leadership Centers and YALI Network. In Urnov's opinon its aim is formation "of an 'American column' which was to become a US-oriented ruling class" in Africa (2015, 25).

Both volumes contain a detailed expose of the USA's military activities in Africa. A relevant part of the first volume is entitled "Counterterrorism. 'Small footprint' or creeping militarization?" (2015, 25) It analyses various forms of American military "activities" on the continent: Cooperative Security Locations (CSL), Forward Operating Sites (FOS), Counter-Terrorism Partnerships, etc. that were carried out in 47 African countries by the end of Obama's first term (2015, 33).

While discussing Washington's attitude to conflicts in African countries Urnov pays a special attention to NATO's aggression in Libya (2015, 52-64). He recalls a notorious phrase of Hillary Clinton, then the Secretary of State on the CBC News about Muammar Qaddafi's murder: "We came, we saw, he died", though in a joint article for the leading Western newspapers Obama together with Nicola Sarcozy and David Cameron insisted that their aim is not "to remove Qaddafi by force" (2015, 56).

In Chapter 3 Urnov analyses the USA's relations with several African countries, from South Africa to Ethiopia as well as Washington's attitude to Beijing's activities in Africa. A special attention in the first book is paid to two events: the 2012 Presidential campaign debates (Chapter 4) and the first ever US-Africa Leaders summit in 2014 that Urnov calls "America's Year of Africa" (two chapters in Part 2 of the first volume).

The next two chapters are devoted again to relations with separate African countries and Washington's attitude to "zones of conflicts" in Africa in 2013-2014. In the final chapter, entitled "The Year of Africa is over. What's next?" the author gives an interesting forecast: "The growth of US activity will entail an aggravation of the competition for Africa .... And this can help Africa, promoting its policy of balancing and playing on the contradictions of the competitors." (2015, 201).

Urnov's second volume, even more detailed (it includes 1793 references and its sub-title "Cronicle of Events" is fully justified) serves as a proof of this forecast. As in the first volume the author analyses the development of US ties with Africa in various fields. A special attention is paid to a milestone event, Obama's visit to the AU Headquarters in Addis

Ababa and his Remarks to the People of Africa, pronounced there on July 28, 2015 in the Mandela Hall (2017, 34-37).

In the economic field the author concentrates on the prolongation of AGOA in July 2015, elaborating the changes that expanded the powers of President in reviewing the status of its beneficiaries (2017, 52-53). Urnov studies in detail the materials of the AGOA Forums in Libreville a month later and in Washington in September 2016. In particular, analyzing the statement by Michael Froman, the US Trade Representative, he comes to the conclusion that Washington was seeking "to involve Africa in the implementation of US plans aimed at breaking up the global economic space with the goal of creating a vast exclusive zone in which the United States will preserve its dominant economic positions" (2017, 61)

Discussing the issues of the US military presence and counterterrorism in Africa in the next Chapter 3, Urnov profoundly explains the contradictory nature of this involvement. On one hand, "the US hegemonic course and its anti-Muslim component contributed to the rise and spread of international terrorism. In a certain period, the activity of terrorist organizations was useful for Washington. The United States used these groupings to create chaos and instability in countries that they disliked...The assistance [to African states] led to increased dependence on the United States, not only military, but also political".

On the other hand, Washington was not always successful in keeping terrorists under control. "Unchecked chaos prevented the achievement of political and economic goals of the United States, creating a threat to their security. So, where terrorism acted as a hostile to US force, the struggle against it remained a completely natural component of US policy, including in Africa."(2017, 84).

The second part of volume 2 covers Washington relations in the last two years of Obama's presidency with individual African countries. The whole Chapter 1 analyses (perhaps, in too much detail) the situation in Libya (2017, 147-199), and contains its pessimistic assessment by US officials. The great attention is paid, in particular, to the assessment of US relations with South Africa that Urnov characterises as "almost equal partnership" (2017, 342).

Through all the text Urnov draws readers' attention to discrepancies in the US administration policy and statements. For example, at a round table with representative of the Ethiopian civil society during the visit to Addis Ababa Obama underlined that the US resolutely opposed the groupings who were seeking the violent overthrow of power. "So it would be in Syria!" Urnov sarcastically comments (2017, 34). A number of other

countries, Libya in particular, can be mentioned in this respect as well.

In the Conclusion the author gives a summary assessment of President Obama policy towards Africa. In his opinion in the last two years "B. Obama's administration managed to gain a foothold in the positions occupied and move forward somewhat. In Africa, as in other regions of the world Washington pursued hegemonic goals, however, it must be admitted that it acted rather flexibly and skillfully (Libya's exclusion)" (2017, 360).

Urnov writes that in 2016 US Government general expenses on rendering assistance and realisation of global, continental and regional programmes in 51 African countries were 9.645 billion USD, but "the quantity did not translate into quality" and China "was winning 'the battle for Africa'", while in a number of African countries (Libya, South Sudan, DRC) "events did not follow the American scenario" and "it was not always possible to keep terrorists under the control". In Nigeria, Somalia and many states of Sahel and Maghreb they acted as hostile to US force" (2017, 360).

One of the chapters of this volume is devoted to Africa's place in the 2016 presidential election campaign. In Urnov's opinion, Donald Trump had no thoughtful and integral policy on Africa. Moreover, he made some overtly racist remarks. However, as elections approached, he changed his tone in an attempt to win over at least some African American voters and even promised that after four years of his presidency 95% of them would vote for him. (2017, 134-135)

Trump's victory was not expected in Africa ("as essentially everywhere", Urnov adds), but the attitude to this event varied on the continent. "Close partners and allies, representatives of civil society were frustrated and worried". Nevertheless, in the same time it was met "with a sigh of relief by those who were tired of Washington's mentoring teachings and interference and were criticized for failing to comply with democratic norms" (2017, 139).

In Urnov's opinion "the first steps of Donald Trump's administration did not clarify the situation" on his policy towards Africa (the book was sent to press on August 31), but the readers have all reason to hope that he will continue his deep and thorough research.

BOOK REVIEW

"O TEMPO DA JUVENTUDE: EMPREGO, POLÍTICA E MUDANÇAS SOCIAIS EM ÁFRICA"
by Alcinda Honwana[1]

Hélder Pires Amâncio[2]

The Time of Youth is a book published in August 2012 in the United States by the Mozambican anthropologist Alcinda Honwana with the title – *The Time of Youth: Work, Social Change and Politics in Africa*. In May 2013, its Portuguese version was published in Maputo. In this book, the author discusses the experiences of young Africans in *waithood*[3] and analyzes the socioeconomic challenges that most of these young people (also at the global level) face in the contemporary world.

The book is a result of researches made in four African countries, namely: Mozambique, South Africa, Tunisia and Senegal, between 2008 and 2011. The book's object of analysis are the many experiences lived by the young (particularly Africans) about how they deal with problems (such as unemployment, marginalization, the lack of civil liberties and sustainable means of survival, as well as, social inequalities) generated by failures of neoliberal politics, bad governance and political crises in Africa (Honwana 2013, 3 and 218). According to Honwana (2013), most part of the research was made with young people in urban contexts and only occasionally in rural contexts.

Young people, the focus of the study, are from diverse social and economic origins. To make the research, Honwana (2013, 11-14) used

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1 Honwana, Alcinda. 2013. O tempo da juventude: emprego, política e mudanças sociais em África. Maputo: Kapicua Livros e Multimídia Lda.

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3 This concept is defined and developed later.

different research instruments, such as interviews, focal groups, histories of lives focused on juvenile experiences. The author visited places frequented by the young, as juvenile centers, parks, clubs and coffee shops. To access the sociability networks of these young people and to facilitate her relationship with them, she had the support of her research assistants, who were also young. This, according to the author, took to a "more refined understanding of the 'young culture', especially in the approach of sensible themes" (Honwama 2013: 12) – such as intimacy and sexuality, for example.

Beyond the interviews made with young people, the research's main subject, Honwana (2013) interviewed governmental employees, religious leaders, journalists and intellectuals interested in the theme of youth, because in her understanding "studying youth implies not only to look at the younger's lives, in all its diversity, but also to comprehend the social, political, economic and cultural concerns of the adults" (Honwana 2013, 4). This theoretical-methodological option allowed her to "better understand the way how these societies see the youth and the place that it occupies in the economy, in the culture and in the society in general" (Honwana 2013, 12i).

The argument used by the author to justify this choice of looking to the young, without, however, losing sight of the adults is that both generations "are involved in complex processes of building and rebuilding, in making and remaking society" (Honwana 2013, 4). This perspective is clearly critical to the classical sociological approach of education defended by Émile Durkheim according to whom "to have education, it's needed an adult generation in front of a younger generation and an action made by the first over the latter" (Durkheim 2010, 32).

The thesis defended by Alcinda Honwana (2013) in this book is that the notion of *waithood* is more adequate to describe and to comprehend the waiting condition or the interregnum between childhood and adulthood in which most young people live worldwide, and the Africans in particular. To the author "the young are forced to grow quickly, but at the same time, it is much more difficult for them to reach the social and economic autonomy" (Honwana 2013, 12). For this reason, the book centers in the social experiences of young Africans in *waithood* and explores the daily activities and survival strategies that they use to face the socioeconomic and political challenges in their countries.

Honwana (2013, 9) develops in her book five main arguments: 1) most young people, particularly Africans, live in *waithood*; 2) *waithood* is a social and economic inequality issue; 3) the experiences of the young from the global South are neuralgic to understand the youth in the contemporary world; 4) the *waithood* condition is creative and active, and young people in

this condition are not passive; 5) the condition of *waithood* is transformed as long as it provokes radical socioeconomic and political changes.

This is, therefore, a book that analyzes the youth in *waithood* and according to the author "it represents a prolonged adolescence or an involuntary delay in reaching the adulthood status, a period when young people can't find employment, take care of themselves and of their families" (Honwana 2013, 5). *Waithood* is to the author a kind of 'suspended age', a waiting age, a liminal space in which the research subjects (young people) "are not dependent children anymore, but also are not autonomous adults" Honwana 2013: 31). It is a "penumbra zone in which young people might have reached the chronological age of adulthood, but still they are not socially recognized as such" (Honwana 2013, 21).

This condition of *waithood*, that tends to become the rule worldwide, especially in the African societies, derives from "the infrastructural and economic decline, the fragile health and educational systems, the high unemployment rates and the socioeconomic vulnerability that seriously weakens the social tissue" (Honwana 2013, 31).

Alcinda Honwana's interest for this particular condition of *waithood* in which most young Africans live, but also at a global level, comes up "when during researches, many young people expressed repeatedly this feeling of 'hanging' or 'cornered' (Sommers 2012) in a situation with few exits and no perspectives of future" (Honwana 2013, 5).

To Honwana (2013), *waithood* suggests the multifaceted character of young people's transition to adulthood and goes beyond employment, including other aspects of social life such as, for example, "the access to formation and learning opportunities, to marriage and to building a family, to the civic participation". However, the author adverts that the notion of *waithood* may allude to the idea of passive waiting from young people, but her researchers point to the contrary. This condition that most young Africans face does not only enclosure or immobilizes them leaving them without action, but allow them creativity to invent and to negotiate new forms of being and interacting with society (Honwana 2013, 6).

Alcinda Honwana show us in this book an innovative approach, against normative, interdisciplinary and intersectional. It is against normative in a way that, for the author, the theoretical model by life cycles studies and the classical studies of transition are not capable of "capturing the multiplicity of situations that the young people live and simplify excessively the diverse processes that affect their lives" (Honwana 2013, 35). It is interdisciplinary by crossing theoretical boundaries of different disciplines, as Social Psychology, Sociology, and Anthropology. Lastly, it

is intersectional[4] for taking into consideration and putting into relation gender, class, race, generation and nation variables."

One of the main contributions that this book offers by taking as object of analysis young Africans in *waithood* is the possibility of understanding the answers that these young people give to concrete problems faced in their daily lives and, furthermore, realize what it means to be young, but also an adult in the contemporary world (Honwana 2013, 37-39 and 221). By looking to young people in *waithood* as active social subjects, the book contributes equally to change the way they are seen in the world – as being passive.

The book is divided into eight chapters and an introduction. In the introduction, the author provides a general presentation of the book: the context that motivated its production, the contextualization of the research theme, the countries and the period of research making, the methods and the used techniques, the participants in the research, the aims of the study. In Chapter I, she approaches the concept of youth problematizing what she calls youth in *waithood* or in the prolonged waiting age, contextualizes the countries where the research was made, discusses and defines the concept of youth and presents a state of art about the studies of youth in Africa.

In Chapter II, the author debates around the key concept of her argumentation – *waithood* – reflects critically about the theories of transition and life cycle, defines the concept of *waithood*, problematizes the traditional concept of adulthood and the unimaginable future by part of the young people in *waithood*, as well as, the transitions to adulthood in the context of so called 'developed societies'.

The aspirations of young people (education and stable employments) are debated in Chapter III. Subsequently, in Chapter IV, it is approached the subsistence strategies adopted by the young in their daily lives as an answer to the socioeconomic and political scenario in the countries of study. In Chapter V, Honwana approaches the intimacy and sexuality of young people in *waithood*, evidencing the social transformations in the (re)building of masculinity and femininity, as well as in the intimate relationships and marriage.

In Chapter VI, Alcinda Honwana approaches the theme of Participative Citizenship – analyzing the way as young people "understand the political and socioeconomic situation in which they live and their engagement in social, political and cultural processes that may create positive changes" (Honwana 2013, 141). In Chapter VII, the author discusses the social and political transformations resulted from the youth's protagonist in

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4 In the sense defined by Crenshaw (1994 apud Hirata 2014: 62), as a propose that takes into consideration the "multiple forms of identity".

Africa, focusing on the central role that they performed in the first revolution of the XXI century that brought down the Tunisian dictatorship. Finally, in Chapter VIII she systematizes as closure the main ideas developed in the book arguing, therefore, that the condition of *waithood* is not only lived by young africans, but it is a worldwide phenomenon.

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PARTNERS

NERINT

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) was the first center dedicated to the study and research in International Relations in Southern Brazil. It was established in August 1999 at the ILEA/UFRGS aiming the argumentative and innovative study of the main transformations within the post-Cold War international system. Since 2014, it is located at the Faculty of Economics of UFRGS (FCE-UFRGS). In parallel, NERINT has sought ways to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options to consolidate an autonomous international presence for the country, from the perspective of the developing world. Brazil's choice of an "active, affirmative, and proactive diplomacy" at the beginning of the 21st century has converged with projections and studies put forward over numerous seminars and publications organized by NERINT.

An outcome of its activity was the creation of an undergraduate degree on International Relations (2004), ranked the best in Brazil according to the Ministry of Education (2012), and a graduate level program, the International Strategic Studies Doctoral Program (2010). Two journals were also created: the bimonthly *Conjuntura Austral* and the biannual and bilingual *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*. Thus, besides ongoing research on developing countries, NERINT is also the birthplace of undergraduate and graduate programs, not to mention its intense editorial activities.

CEBRAFRICA

The Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) has its origins in Brazil-South Africa Studies Centre (CESUL), a program established in 2005 through an association between the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG), of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its research activities are developed in cooperation with the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT).

In March 2012, CESUL was expanded into CEBRAFRICA in order to cover the whole of Africa. At the same time, the South Africa series, which published five books, was transformed into the African Series, with new titles. The centre's main objectives remain the same as before:

to conduct research, to support the development of memoires, thesis and undergraduate works, to congregate research groups on Africa, to organize seminars, to promote student and professor exchanges with other institutions, to establish research networks and joint projects with African and Africanist institutions, to publish national and translated works on the field, and to expand the specialized library made available by FUNAG.

The numerous research themes seek to increase knowledge of the African continent and its relations to Brazil on the following topics: International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations, and Schools of Thought. CEBRAFRICA counts among its partners renowned institutions from Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Senegal, Cape Verde, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Portugal, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, India, and China. Current researches focus on "Brazilian, Chinese, and Indian Presence in Africa", "Africa in South-South Cooperation", "African Conflicts", "Integration and Development in Africa", "African Relations with Great Powers", and "Inter-African Relations".

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