ABOUT THE JOURNAL

The Brazilian Journal of African Studies is a biannual publication, in digital and printed format, dedicated to the research, reflection and propagation of original scientific articles with emphasis on the analysis of International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations and Schools of Thought. RBEA is essentially academic, linked to the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

The RBEA has as target audience researches, professors and students interested in the specificities of the African continent and its international insertion. Alongside such perspective, the Journal intends to expand the debate about the Brazilian projection world widely, the Brazilian cooperation efforts (including in the Defense field) with the African countries in the South Atlantic perimeter and the construction of a regional identity in face of a scenario of geopolitical transformations.

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Cooperation efforts amongst several Africanist and African institutions have progressively, and in a large extent, helped to increase African studies in Brazil. The specificities and, above all, the continent’s new strategic role need to be understood through the lenses of a new geopolitical reality in a transitional world. If, on one hand, African countries’ weaknesses are part of the nation-State building process, in which political and economic survivals are basic elements, on the other hand, despite internal rivalries and divergent external alliances, a common agenda among African countries already exists. Therefore, when analyzing the relations with the greatest international powers, the African continent does not constitute a passive pole.

After a brief period in which occurred the loss of its strategic importance due to the end of the Cold War and to the weakening of the Non-Alignment, Africa started to occupy once again an important role through the presence of new actors, what enables the continent to achieve greater autonomy and development. New correlations of forces are defined and regional African powers emerge. In the next few years, there will be a rising global dispute towards continent, surrounding both the security and the natural resources agendas. Alongside this perspective, it is crucial to analyze the Brazilian projection and its cooperation efforts (including in the field of Defense) with African countries within the perimeter of the South Atlantic in a scenario in which the Ocean is given new geopolitical importance. Through the cooperation used by Brazil in order to promote the construction of a regional identity in the South Atlantic, it has been possible to reshape power relations in the area and to generate new, more complex presence of the traditional powers. This recent central role, marked by interventions or by the promotion of internal (and regional) instability, represents a challenge not only to African countries, but also to the entire developing world.
In this sense, the second edition of the Brazilian Journal of African Studies aims at analyzing these new challenges. Vladimir Shubin’s paper establishes a debate concerning the dilemmas faced by the last South African electoral process, observed in loco, whilst John Akokpari analyzes the establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture to prevent and to solve conflicts that have endemically remained in the continent. By discussing the African studies in China, Li Anshan considers that the academic production is a reflex of the fast development of China-Africa relations: Africanists outside of China have been expressing great interest in the Sino-African academic engagement. Sylvio de Souza Ferreira and Eduardo Migon bring a debate on the Brazilian technical cooperation in Security and Defense with Africa. The authors affirm that, as part of the Brazilian strategic surroundings, the African continent attracts Brazilian attention, since the continent is obtaining greater insertion in the national research agenda, especially in the fields of Security and Defense. Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira analyzes the Cuba-Africa relations and their traces of exceptionality. Since the first years of the Revolution, Cuba has defined its line of action in the African continent, marked by multiple forms of cooperation.

Diego Pautasso analyzes the role of Africa in the construction of the new Maritime Silk Road. This is one of the facets of the ambitious Chinese integration process in Asia, Europe and Africa, released in 2013 under the title OBOR Initiative (One Belt, One Road). The security dynamics in the Horn of Africa in the post-independences period is discussed by Nilton Cardoso, who identifies the actors, the agendas and the challenges, as well as the “new” threats and regional, international responses. The author also analyzes the region’s strategic importance to the traditional superpowers after the post-9/11 2001, matured in the process of securitization. Fidel Terenciano, Maria do Socorro Souza Braga e Carlos Augusto da Silva Souza analyze the democratization processes and political competition in Africa through two studies of case: Mozambique and Zambia. The paper is written upon the evidence that democracy is a system which must allow the confrontation of several social and political forces, and its legitimacy is acquired from the recognition of the actors involved in its political and electoral processes as a whole. Simone Gibran Nogueira e Raquel Souza Lobo Guzzo aim at locating and establishing a dialogue on the production of the African Psychology itself within the context of scientific-cultural productions of the Global South. At last, but not least, the Cameroonian Kingsly Awang Ollong proposes a study of case on one of the main products cultivated in the developing countries, the banana, whose profits from its crops are an important source of wealth via exports. However, for decades,
the banana’s economy has been a clear example of trade injustice.

The BJAS publishes an electronic bilingual version (Portuguese and English), as well as a printed one in English. In this sense, we expect the contribution of colleagues from Brazil and from abroad, with whom we aim at establishing ties in order to further deepen the knowledge and the construction of a South vision regarding the African continent and the relations with it.

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We thank the Editing-Assistants Rafaela Serpa and Rodrigo Cassel, as well as the CEBRAFRICA’s staff, which has worked on the translation of the articles. In addition, we thank Guilherme Thudium, Francine Juchem Salerno, Camila Kowalski, Marcelo Kanter, Maximilian Barone Bullerjahn and Joana Búrigo Vaccarezza for revising and translation the texts in English.
SOUTH AFRICA:
POLITICAL LIFE TODAY

Vladimir Shubin

Among the events that took place in South Africa in recent years, three can be named as most important: BRICS summit in Durban (eThekwini), the death of Nelson Mandela and the general election.

The Fifth BRICS Summit was held on 26-27 March 2013 in Durban under the motto - “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialization”, proposed by the leadership of South Africa. Apart from eThekwini Declaration and Plan of Action, it resulted in signing a number of agreements in the presence of the BRICS leaders. The BRICS Business Council was set up within the framework of multilateral co-operation and a declaration on the establishment of the BRICS Think Tank Council was adopted. On South Africa’s initiative the Retreat, a dialogue forum on the theme “Unlocking Africa’s potential: BRICS and Africa. Cooperation on Infrastructure”, was attended by heads of state and government, heads of African continental and regional organizations and their seniors, including the chairperson of the African Union Commission Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

At a time when the BRICS countries are experiencing considerable economic difficulties, there are voices that this association has not lived up to expectations. However, speaking in Ufa at the Seventh BRICS Summit in July 2015 South African President Jacob Zuma was more optimistic. He noted that “Both South Africa and the African continent have benefitted from our economic cooperation with our BRICS partners. South Africa’s total trade with BRICS in 2011 was R268 billion and has since grown to R382 billion in 2014, an increase of 70%. BRICS total trade with Africa

1 The article has been written with financial support of the Russian Foundation for Humanities, project 16-07-0038, “South Africa, a strategic partner of Russia”.
2 Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia. E-mail: vlgs@yandex.ru
3 eThekwini is the name of the metropolitan municipality that now includes the city of Durban.
doubled since 2007 to US dollar 340 billion in 2012 and is projected to reach US dollar 500 billion by 2015”4.

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Like the holding of the BRICS summit in Durban, the world reaction to Nelson Mandela’ death and the farewell to him with the participation of leaders of dozens of countries in December 2013 reaffirmed that South Africa holds a special place not only on the continent but also in the on the international arena. It was in Johannesburg at the farewell ceremony when Barak Obama approached Cuban leader Raul Castro and shook his hand, symbolizing the beginning of the normalisation of the bilateral relations.

The third important event, general election took place in May 2014. The African National Congress won a landslide victory, gaining 62.15% of the vote5, only 3.5% lower than five years earlier. However, it should be borne in mind that less than only 60% of South African citizens, eligible to vote, used their right, and so the total number of votes received by the ANC was even less than in the first general election 20 years earlier.

The fact that the ANC has the support of a large majority and the opposition had not been able to present a real challenge on the national scale was confirmed, although this general election was the most difficult for it. The ANC, a governing party for over 20 years, acts in an alliance with two other organizations - the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) that themselves do not participate in elections, but their members join parliament and cabinet as the ANC members. However a new striking feature of the political life in South Africa at present is the fact that each of the members of the “tripartite alliance” experiences problems.

Jacob Zuma became the ANC President, when at the party conference in Polokwane in December 2007 he defeated then President Thabo Mbeki, receiving the support of 60% of the delegates. In May 2009, Zuma confidently took over as President of the Republic of South Africa, and then in December 2012 at the next ANC conference in Mangaung received even greater support than five years earlier - more than 70% of the delegates. Yet the second candidate - the then deputy president of the ANC (and of South Africa) Khalema Motlanthe virtually led no campaign either for his election or reelection for his previous post. So, Cyril Ramaphosa occupied

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4 Remarks by President Zuma at the 7th BRICS Summit during the Plenary session, Ufa, Russia. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=20075
5 http://www.elections.org.za/resultsnpe2014/
the second highest post in the ruling party. As Motlanthe, he previously served as secretary general of the National Union of Miners, then secretary general of the ANC, and even was second after Mandela in the list of the party in the elections of 1994, although the post of Deputy President of South Africa at the last moment was proposed not to him, but to Thabo Mbeki. After the completion of the work of the Constitutional Assembly, which he chaired, in 1997 he went into business and has achieved, although not immediately, a great success, becoming a billionaire, at least, in South African rands. It should be noted that the two other candidates for the post of ANC Deputy President (and potentially after the next general election due to in 2019 of the country president) - Mosima “Tokyo” Sexwale and Matthews Phosa are also successful businessmen.

The ANC conference delegates clearly manifested concern of a slow pace of social and economic transformation and this has found expression in the adoption of provisions on the “second phase of the transition from apartheid colonialism to a national democratic society”, which “will be characterised by decisive action to effect economic transformation and democratic consolidation, critical both to improve the quality of life of all South Africans and to promote nation-building and social cohesion”\(^6\). According to Zuma, during that stage, a “radical shift” should have occurred toward greater state involvement “needed to play an active role in helping to democratise and deracialise the ownership and control of an economy”\(^7\). The arrival of Jacob Zuma to the highest post in the ruling party, and then in a country considered by many in South Africa as a “Left Turn” or at least “a potential for a Left Turn”. But so far there is hardly any basis for such judgments, moreover, during Zuma’s second term in office the political situation in the country deteriorated. In its election campaign, the ANC has used two anniversaries - its centenary, celebrated during the whole 2012, and the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of a democratic system in South Africa in April 1994. But in the political lexicon, especially of opponents of the government, two other terms prevailed - Nkandla and Marikana.

In the first case, it was about the erection of several facilities at public expense in Jacob Zuma’s private estate in his birthplace, in Nkandla in KwaZulu-Natal. The investigation of this issue took several months, but for some reason, its results were published in a nearly 450-page report of the Public Protector Thuli Madonsela on 19 March 2014 at the height of


\(^7\) http://www.miningweekly.com/print-version/go-deeper-than-call-for-nationalisation-zuma-urges-anc-delegates-2012-07-06
the election campaign. It argued that some of them - Visitors’ Centre, the cattle kraal, the swimming pool – cannot be justified in terms of the South African National Key Points Act (that covers President’s residences). The report suggested that Zuma should “pay a reasonable percentage of the cost of the measures as determined with the assistance of National Treasury”8. Naturally, such a report was a “gift” for the opposition on the eve of the election. However, later the minister of police Nathi Nhleko claimed that the report exaggerated costs several times, and that in any case the President was not liable to pay back for “necessary security features”9. His position was supported by the ANC majority of members of Parliament, but that was not the end of the story.

The second case was a real tragedy. On August 16, 2012 34 miners were killed and 78 injured by police bullets near the Marikana platinum mine in South Africa’s North Western Province. They participated in a “wildcat” strike demanding a salary increase of three times (!). Under the conditions of tough confrontation in the area ten persons had been killed earlier, including two police officers and two employees of the Lonmin company.

This tragedy has caused a major stir in the country, it was compared with the shooting Africans in Sharpeville on 21 March 1960, and police actions were subjected to stiff criticism. However, in this situation, the government did not “sweep the rubbish under the carpet”, it established a commission of inquiry, headed by a prominent lawyer, a retired judge of the Supreme Court of Appeal (by the way, white) Ian Farlam, which had the right to question policemen, miners, government officials and employees of the company. Its meetings were public, they were shown on television. Originally, the commission was supposed to work for four months, but its term was extended for more than two years; the final 660-page report10 was handed over to the country’s president in April 2015 to be published for some reason much later - in June. The report contains a detailed critical assessment of the actions of Lonmin11, the police, AMCWU, trade-union

11 Cyril Ramaphosa was a board member and owner of the shares of that company. In the run up to the massacre, he emailed politicians and police urging them to take tougher action against the striking miners, because events around the strike were “plainly dastardly criminal acts and must be characterised as such”. Ramaphosa wanted the police “to act in a more pointed way” (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/44d49cd4-2164-11e4-a958-00144feabdco.
that organized the strike and suggested measures to prevent such tragedies. Not all were pleased with the results of the report, but the investigation of the tragedy demonstrated a democratic nature of the South African state.

The tragedy in Marikana eclipsed a very important event in the economic and political life of South Africa, the publication on the previous day, August 15, 2012 of the National Development Plan, prepared after two years of work by the National Planning Commission (NDP) – “Our Future. Make it work. 2030”\(^{12}\). This extensive document, which consists of almost 500 pages, proclaims its main goal the elimination of poverty and reduction of inequality and identifies ways to achieve their goals. In particular, the NDP envisaged increase in the number of employees from 13 million in 2010 to 24 million in 2030, and the growth of annual average per capita income from 50 thousand rand to 120 thousand rand\(^{13}\).

The drafting of the project by the NDP Commission was followed by six months of “public consultation to build consensus and refine the plan”\(^{14}\). However, talking about the real consensus would be wrong. In particular, COSATU, the largest trade union federation and private sector unions belonging to it were especially critical. The discussion paper prepared by the leadership of COSATU said: “The NDP proposes cosmetic reforms to the economic structure, aimed at best deracialise ownership, rather than transforming the structure of the economy”\(^{15}\). Moreover, the implementation of the plan has been slower than expected, for example, only 1.3% economic growth was achieved in 2015\(^{16}\), although the 5.4% was envisaged in the Plan.

Earlier, the differences in the vision of the future of the country and ways to it appeared on the June 2012 ANC Policy Conference. Although the demands for nationalization of mines were not supported in fear that such steps without compensation would push away investors while spending huge sums of money for compensation would be unrealistic, the proposal for “state intervention” was approved\(^{17}\). In particular, a single mining company was to control the state-owned shares in the mining industry, while it was

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\(^{13}\) [http://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030], p. 34.

\(^{14}\) Ibid. p. 483.


suggested that they should be up to 30% of the industry. Such a company - African Exploration Mining and Finance Corporation had already been established earlier, but initially had a modest goal - to supply coal to power plants belonging to the public sector. And by 2016 the state owned only two mines in coal and diamond mining.

Let us look now at the political spectrum of the South African society. The major opposition party is Democratic Alliance (DA). In general election the party, headed then by Helen Zille, the premier of the Western Cape significantly strengthened its position, not only in that province, but also in the economic center of South Africa - Gauteng. Across the country, the DA received 22.23%, 5.5% more than in 2009 primarily at the expense of smaller parties.

However, immediately after the elections the DA faced an unpleasant situation, its “rising star” Lindiwe Mazibuko, who led its faction in the National Assembly, preferred a master student fellowship in one of the American universities to the parliamentary seat.

Third, to the surprise of many, was the party formed only a few months before the elections, in October 2013 –“Economic Freedom Fighters” (EFF) with 6.35% of votes. Its “Commander-in- Chief” is Julius Malema, the former head of the ANC Youth League. Initially an ardent supporter of the ANC incumbent President in his conflict with Thabo Mbeki (Malema became famous, or, rather, notorious for his phrase “I will kill for Zuma”), he began criticizing Zuma from the “left”, or, more exactly, populist position, advocating the “economic freedom” (hence and the unusual name of the party), and requiring, in particular, the nationalization of the mining industry. ANC leadership resorted to administrative measures; Malema was expelled from the organization and began to create his own one. It should be noted that his way of life is far from “proletarian”, the South African Revenue Service wanted him to pay dues totaling the amount of over 18 million rand including interest while the prosecutor’s office accused him on 54 counts of money laundering, corruption, racketeering and fraud.

Another new party participated in the elections, “Agang” (“Let us build” in Sesotho and Setswana languages) founded by Mamphela Ramphele, known, above all, as a “partner” of Steve Biko, a prominent opponent of the apartheid regime, who died in 1977 in police custody shortly after his arrest. Surprisingly, just prior to the election it was announced that Ramphele would be a DA candidate for the presidency. A photo of kissing two women

leaders - her and Helen Zille went around the Internet and mass media, but this “same-sex marriage” (in South Africa, they are, by the way, legal) lasted only three days, and “Agang” stood in the election independently. It got two seats in the National Assembly, but, oddly enough, Ramphele refused to take one of them and soon withdrew from politics.

Meanwhile in May 2015 Helen Zille herself gave way to the new leader of her party, a young African Mmusi Maimane, retaining however the post of premier of the Western Cape. The move was seen not only as an attempt of the DA to get rid of the image as primarily white party, it aimed at winning the majority at the local elections in August 2016 in “Big Five” - five major cities, including Johannesburg and Tshwane (Pretoria). Much less were expectations of the Congress of the People, the party that earlier broke away from the ANC; and it received in 2014 less than ten percent of 2009 votes. Another looser was the Inkatha Freedom Party, led by former “Chief Minister” of KwaZulu bantustan Gatsha Buthelezi, who three decades earlier claimed to be the national leader of Africans.

So, ANC still holds a solid majority in parliament, but there is a growing disappointment with the results of its rule, both in the ranks of the party itself, and especially among its allies. The “radical” leadership of the National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA), numbering about 350 thousand, not only criticized the ANC government for adopting “a neo-liberal document like the National Development Plan”, but also initiated the adoption by the union conference a decision to refuse the support of the ANC at the elections. Following this, the NUMSA has announced plans to create a broad opposition movement and “a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary working class political party”.

The organizing committee of a new movement, named the United Front was formed in December 2014. It seems that its founders hoped to repeat the success of the United Democratic Front (UDF), which brought together widespread opposition to the apartheid regime three decades ago. However, the difference between the fronts immediately became obvious: in contrast to the UDF, a new front is being created from the top and so far with little success: its founding conference was postponed several times and its dates are not yet fixed. As to the creation a new party, practically a rival the SACP, the process did not go before the declarations of intent.

It should be noted, however, that the plans of the formation of the

20 Maimane has Master degrees in public administration from University of the Witwatersrand and in theology from Bangor University, Wales, he is also a pastor and elder of the conservative Liberty Church.


new structures deepened divergence within the left in South Africa. Some former prominent members of the SACP were involved, in particular Ronnie Kasrils, a former member of the Politburo, who held a number of positions in governments of Mandela and Mbeki, became a member of the UF National Working Committee, and Mazibuko Jara, a former spokesman of the Communist Party, became its National Secretary.

It would be wrong however to speak of a “split” in the SACP, or of a “departure” of a significant number of its members. On the contrary, its numerical strength in recent years rose “in leaps and bounds” to 230 thousand, and majority of them are young. Several dozen members of the SACP are members of parliament, five, including Party General Secretary Blade Nzimande and its Chairperson Senzeni Zokwana, are Ministers and three Deputy Ministers. However, all of them occupy these posts as ANC members, but proposals to participate in the elections independently, and not only in the framework of the Congress, are advanced increasingly often in recent years, particularly in the Young Communist League.

The SACP leadership is facing a dilemma: many communists are critical of the NDP, but as members of the government and officials they had to implement it. For example, the First Deputy General Secretary Jeremy Cronin wrote that “But the NDP is not a ready-made implementation plan, it is more a vision. It consists of some useful insights and recommendations, intriguing but untested proposals, summaries of programmes long under way, and much else. These are sandwiched between an opening section of cringe worthy poetry (“Our leaders’ wisdom is ours, because we sense our wisdom in theirs...”) and a clumsy attempt to present a social contract theory... From the outset, the SACP has warned against “monumentalising” the NDP – either idolising it or seeking to tear it down like Saddam Hussein’s statue in Baghdad. All serious plans need to be relatively open-ended and subject to learning from experience”24. However at the same time, according to Cyril Ramaphosa, Cronin, a deputy minister, is alongside him “leading the charge in implementing the programmes that are set out in the National Development Plan”25.

More difficult situation is evolving in the trade union movement. After NUMSA’s expulsion from COSATU in November 2015 its leaders seek to attract other unions for the creation of “a new, worker-controlled, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist, independent, financially self-sufficient, internationalist, socialist-orientated and militant union federation”. The

“Workers summit” was held on 30 April 2016 and expressed hope that “the founding congress [of such federation] can be convened by the latest in 2017, possibly earlier”\textsuperscript{26}. Thus, the ambitious plans of NUMSA leadership included the establishment of an alternative to all three components of the ANC-led alliance, but up to now they failed.

Such actions were taking place against the background of the worsening economic and political situation in South Africa. One of the most dramatic events was a wave of xenophobia that swept a number of cities in the country in April 2015 when several people (both foreigners and South Africans) were killed and thousands of citizens of other African countries fled or were deported as illegal migrants.

The reasons for this crisis was the dissatisfaction of many local people, especially Africans, by a low rate of socio-economic transformation, and it was “fuelled” by the speech of so called “king of the Zulus nation” Goodwill Zwelithini, who said that “foreigners must pack their bags and go home”. However his defenders claimed that the remarks, made in the Zulu language, “have been misconstrued and only referred to the deportation of illegal immigrants”\textsuperscript{27}. ANC and its allies have done much to counter this wave - from demonstrations in defense of migrants to the involvement of the army to help the police. The “Operation Fiela”, a campaign to restore order followed in the course of which over 9 000 arrests have been made and over 15 000 undocumented immigrants repatriated\textsuperscript{28}.

Then, in the second half of October 2015 South Africa faced a student unrest caused by the increase of by more than 12% of tuition fees in a number of universities. Mass demonstrations, accompanied in some cases by the clashes with the police took place near the parliament in Cape Town, near the headquarters of the ANC in Johannesburg and, finally, on 23 October near the Union Buildings, the offices of the President of South Africa in Tshwane. The decision to raise the fees was taken over by the university rectors, who are sometimes paid higher than ministers and even the President, but the blame was deflected onto to the government, and Jacob Zuma was forced to personally declare a zero increase in student fees in the next school year\textsuperscript{29}. However the disturbances from time to time still happen, and in a very ugly forms such as setting fire on the of university premises.

\textsuperscript{26} http://www.numsa.org.za/article/declaration-workers-summit-may-day-rally/
\textsuperscript{27} http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/south-africa-xenophobic-violence-zulu-king-goodwill-zwelithini
\textsuperscript{28} http://mg.co.za/article/2015-09-07-the-numbers-behind-operation-fiela
\textsuperscript{29} http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Zero-increase-in-fees-Zuma-20151023]
Such was the situation when Jacob Zuma became a target not only for criticism, but for direct calls for his resignation. To a large extent this new wave of vilification is connected with the appearance of one more term in the South African political vocabulary, that is “state capture”\(^3\), attributed first and foremost to the Gupta family. Three Gupta brothers, Ajay, Atul and Rajesh came to South Africa from India beginning from 1993 and established a versatile business, allegedly using their connections with President and his family. Zuma’s fourth wife, Bongi Ngema Zuma, worked for the Guptas, one of his sons, Duduzane, was a director in some of the Gupta family companies and President’s daughter Duduzile was appointed as a director of Gupta-owned Sahara Computers in 2008, soon after her father was elected as ANC leader, although she has since resigned\(^3\).

The first major scandal involving them happened in 2013 when a chartered plane from India with the guests for Gupta family wedding was allowed to land at the Waterkloof Air Base near Pretoria, normally reserved for visiting heads of state and diplomatic delegations\(^3\). More serious developments took place late last year. On December 9 President Zuma suddenly dismissed Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene, replacing him with well-educated but “unknown backbencher” Des van Rooyen\(^3\). The next day new minister arrived at National Treasury with his two “advisers” who were identified as “Gupta allies”. “Their arrival so shook the Treasury that its Director General threatened to resign and his staff immediately dubbed the event “9/12” – a reference to the US’s disastrous “9/11” of 2001”\(^3\).

President’s decision was detrimental to the country’s financial system: rand weakened by two for a USD and R500bn were wiped off the value of South African assets. The outcry in the country was so great that the members of the tripartite alliance distanced themselves from Zuma’s decision and in four days President had to reverse his appointment, replacing van Rooyen with Pravin Gordhan, who previously held this post in 2009-2014.\(^3\)

\(^3\) The efforts of a small number of firms (or such groups as the military, ethnic groups and kleptocratic politicians) to shape the rules of the game to their advantage through illicit, non-transparent provision of private gains to public officials, he noted that examples of such behaviour include the private purchase of legislative votes, executive decrees, court decisions and illicit political party funding.


\(^3\) Ibid.


\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Ibid.
There were indications that, just ahead of these developments “somebody (presumably with foresight into the events about to unfold) took a multi-billion rand bet against the currency (technically known as “shorting”). They borrowed rands to purchase dollars and when the rand crashed they sold the dollars back for rands, walking away with several billions in profit”36.

Furthermore, Msebizi Jonas, Deputy Finance Minister publicly stated that on the eve of Nene’s dismissal the Guptas offered him Minister position37. Similar accusations were made by some other officials. Under these circumstances President and his family hurried to distance themselves from the Guptas, in particular his son Dudusane immediately resigned from his post38, though Zuma insisted in parliament that none of his cabinet ministers had been appointed by “the Guptas or anybody else”39 and two months later reiterated that he knew “nothing about the dealings of the Gupta family and whoever”40. The scandal was so serious that Gupta brothers preferred to urgently leave South Africa and the ANC National Executive Committee decided to investigate whether President’s relationship with the Gupta family has started a process of “capture of the state”41. Finally, on 27 August Guptas announced that they would sell all their shares in South Africa by the end of 201642.

Soon time more bad news came for president. The Constitutional Court unanimously decided that the power of the Public Protector to take appropriate remedial action has legal effect and was binding and therefore Zuma had to pay back the money used on his private home in Nkandla, the final figure to be determined by the National Treasury. In rather strong words the Court also held that, by failing to comply with the Public Protector’s order, the President failed to “uphold, defend and respect” the Constitution. Besides, it held that the National Assembly’s resolution, based on the Minister of Police’s findings exonerating the President from liability, was inconsistent with the Constitution and unlawful43.

37 http://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-16-guptas-offered-me-finance-minister-position-mcebisi-jonas
39 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d1d15888-ec4d-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8.html#axzz4AiSzXlLC
40 http://ewn.co.za/2016/05/17/Zuma-reiterates-he-never-lied-about-Nkandla
41 http://ewn.co.za/2016/03/21/ANC-to-investigate-Zuma-relationship-with-the-Gupta-family
42 AAN7 TV, 27 August 2017.
43 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/full-text-constitutional-court-rules-on-
Then the Gauteng High Court renounced the decision taken by National Prosecution Authority before the 2009 election to drop the criminal case against Zuma and declared that he “should face the charges as outlined in the indictment” that is 783 counts of alleged corruption, fraud and racketeering. Moreover, it ruled that this decision to abandon the charges had been misguided and that Mokotedi Mpshe, then chief prosecutor, had acted under pressure. To avoid reopening of the case the NPA decided to appeal against the Court’s decision and so to “send a clear message that political interference in the work of the NPA would not be tolerated”. Zuma has joined the NPA to appeal the decision; however they were dismissed.

Under these circumstances the demands for Zuma’s resignation could be heard from various political corners. The most “radical”, as usually, is EEF that called also for dissolution of parliament and new general election. The direct calls to Zuma to resign (or “to take a proper step”) were made by Ahmed Kathrada, a Rivonia trialist, by other ANC veterans, by a group of religious leaders. Others, like a group of senior commanders and commissars of the Umkhonto we Sizwe (ANC People’s Army) called on the leadership of the ANC “to urgently convene a special National Conference to assess these challenges and chart a way forward to restore the prestige of our glorious movement and the State”.

However, there were other moods as well. The ANC Youth League even proposed to nominate Zuma as president of the Congress for a third term and his supporters raised their hands with three fingers curved, signaling support for this initiative. As distinct from the South Africa’s constitution, the charter of the ANC do not prescribe limitations on the

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45 http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2016/05/24/appeal-looks-beyond-zuma-case-says-npa
46 http://allafrica.com/stories/201606250014.html
47 http://www.southcoastnews.co.za/eff-calls-for-dissolution-of-parliament/.
49 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cd6274a8-fcob-11e5-b5f3-070dca6da0d.html#axzz4AmtYiek3
50 http://ewn.co.za/2016/04/08/Religious-leaders-tell-the-ANC-Zuma-must-go
term of office of its supreme leader, but it is worth recalling that similar actions by Thabo Mbeki ended in his resignation. In the October 2015 Zuma at ANC General Council clearly stated that he would never participate in elections for a third term as leader of the party, even if the ANC “begged him”53, however earlier he pledged not to stand for the second term as country’s president but then changed his mind.

Holding his position, Zuma also expressed the opinion that it is not the time to address the issue of succession in the ANC. Nevertheless, this topic is being hotly debated in South Africa. New South African President to be elected by parliament after the next elections, which will take place in 2019, but since it is expected that the ANC will keep a majority in parliament, the name of the future head of state will be practically determined two years earlier, at the next ANC conference that will elect new president of the party.

So far, there are two most likely candidates for that post (and therefore later for the highest public office): Cyril Ramaphosa and Zuma’s former wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. There are conflicting opinions about Ramaphosa’s political views. When he was secretary general of the National Union of Miners, he openly advocated socialism, but later, after leaving public office, has become a very successful businessman. His answer to the question whether he is still a socialist was rather peculiar: “Yes, I am. But I have coined my own phrase, which in many ways describes what I am. I am a socialist but I operate in a capitalistic world. I am therefore a capitalist with a socialist instinct.”54

Ramaphosa’s chances, as of Zuma’s deputy on both his posts looks high, however strong sentiments are expressed in South Africa in favor of the election a women as the supreme leader. This was recently openly declared by the president of the ANC Women’s League, Minister of Social Development Bathabile Dlamini55, and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is the most frequently mentioned name in this respect. A strong and influential person, she previously held several ministerial posts and in 2012 was elected the Chairperson of the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa. Her term in the office finally ends in January 2017 and her decision not to seek the second term was considered by many as a sign of her preference for an important post at home.

All in all the ANC leadership are aware of the problems arising in the ranks of the organization in a difficult socio-economic situation. “Corruption, [perceived or real], factionalism, political ill-discipline and the

use of money to subvert internal democratic processes were identified as posing a very serious and real danger to the unity and cohesion of the ANC,” said Gwede Mantashe, Secretary General of the Congress (and member of the SACP CC)\textsuperscript{56}. Not surprising, therefore, that its membership has fallen from one million in 2012, when the party turned 100, to 769,000 by October 2015\textsuperscript{57}.

The seriousness of problems was underlined by SACP second deputy general Solly Mapaila, in whose words members of the ANC and its alliance partners who speak out against state capture may be risking their lives, and various party officials - himself included - had recently received death threats\textsuperscript{58}.

Growing tensions in the South African political life raise questions about the possibility of influence of external forces on the evolving situation. This is not limited by idle “conspiracy theories”; it looks like more serious information appeared on this subject, for example, Baleka Mbete, ANC National Chairperson and Speaker of the National Assembly, said: “Those people (EFF) are not working with people of this country alone; they are pawns in a bigger scheme of things where some western governments are involved”\textsuperscript{59}.

Moreover, South Africa’s State Security Agency (SSA) in March 2015 confirmed that it was investigating allegations of collaboration with the CIA of a number of prominent persons, aforementioned Thuli Madonsela, Julius Malema, Lindiwe Mazibuko and Joseph Matundzhvi, the head of the AMCU trade union that organized a strike in Marikana\textsuperscript{60}. In October 2015 the SSA said the investigation was at an “advanced stage”\textsuperscript{61}, but its results have never been reported.

In any case, there is no doubt that the position of the South African ruling party on international issues (it is expressed in ANC documents more “openly” than in the official government statements) cannot but be a concern of certain forces in the West. For example, the Discussion Document prepared for the October 2015 meeting of the ANC National General Council said: “Russia has not been spared the wrath of US-led Western imperialism

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{57} http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/pics-anc-4th-national-general-council-1.1927774#
VizUWCSpqzk

\textsuperscript{58} http://www.polity.org.za/article/you-risk-your-life-if-you-speak-out-against-state-capture-sacps-mapaila-2016-06-03

\textsuperscript{59} http://mg.co.za/article/2015-02-14-mbete-eff-are-pawns-of-the-west-who-want-to-control-sa

\textsuperscript{60} http://mg.co.za/article/2015-03-05-ssa-investigating-political-leaders

\textsuperscript{61} http://sa-monitor.com/top-10-bogus-anc-conspiracy-theories-bdlive-25-may-2016/
... The war taking place in Ukraine is not about Ukraine. It intended target is Russia. ... Russia’s neighbors are being mobilized to adopt a hostile posture against Moscow, and enticed to join the European Union and NATO”62.

The recent confirmation of the CIA involvement into arrest of Nelson Mandela in 1962 was widely commented in South Africa and the statement made on this occasion by Zizi Kodwa, ANC spokesperson, speaks volumes. “We always knew there was always collaboration between some western countries and the apartheid regime... We have recently observed that there are efforts to undermine the democratically elected ANC government,” he said. “They never stopped operating here. It is still happening now – the CIA is still collaborating with those who want regime change”63.

Nevertheless Pravin Gordhan was right to underline the primarily domestic origin of the problems the ANC is facing: “We need to revolutionise our own politics. If we ourselves don’t change the way we do things, no one will. I don’t think we are under attack by outside people. We give them the fuel to attack us”64.

Indeed, whatever is the interference from outside, so called “coloured revolutions”, be it in North Africa, Central Asia or South America can succeed only when the local conditions are conducive to them.

In this respect the position expressed by Dr Bonginkosi “Blade” Nzimande, the SACP General Secretary (and member of the ANC National Executive Committee), Minister of Higher and Professional Education deserves attention: “The fact of the matter is that the relationship between the Guptas and our movement and the government it leads is TOXIC! But at the same time we need to point out that blaming the Guptas alone is not enough. The question that has to be answered is who is this family working with on the side of our movement and government?”65

The SACP Political Bureau called the ANC leadership “to reflect critically on the capacities and motives of a circle of informal presidential courtiers, flatterers, patrons, factionalists and hangers-on. It is a circle that, in our view, continuously and prejudicially exposes the presidency”66

Under these circumstances the election held on 3 August, though

64 http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/politics/2016/05/22/pravin-gordhan-urges-unity-and-return-to-old-values-in-anc
local, acquired national importance. The discussions the author had in South Africa prior to it showed that there were two “schools of thought” in the ANC: some believed that Zuma became an “albatross around the neck” of the party, while others thought that his resignation on the eve of the election would cause chaos and damage the party’s position.

The latter point of view prevailed, but the election results inevitably brought back the controversial issue. Initially the ANC leadership put a “brave face”, emphasizing in their statement the fact that the party received more votes “than ever before”\(^\text{67}\). However in reality those millions constitute just 54.5% of votes cast, that is almost 8% less than in 2011. “On the surface” it was still not bad; twice more than the DA which result was better by 3%, while the results of the EEF was much lower than their ambitions, instead of doubling or even tripling the number of words, the rise was just about 2%. However the ruling party suffered a serious setback in all major municipalities except eThekwini (Durban). The DA strengthened its grip on Cape Town, won a relative majority in municipalities of Tshwane, the administrative capital, and of Nelson Mandela Bay (Port-Elizabeth) and reduced ANC majority to relative in Johannesburg and Erkhuhuleni. So, as South African press put it, “the era of coalitions” has come\(^\text{68}\), and in spite of its third place, the EFF received a chance to become a “kingmaker”\(^\text{69}\) in several cases.

Its “radical” leadership used a rather canny tactics. “To safe a face” it held talks with the ANC, but put eight unacceptable conditions, including the “removal” of Zuma, and after the talks failed made a deal with the “right-wing” DA. However Malema emphasized that his party would not form coalition but would support DA “in hung metros”\(^\text{70}\). So with assistance of the EEF and some small parties the DA managed to get control not only of Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay, but of Johannesburg as well, though the ANC received there more votes than its main opponent.

Many prominent members and rank and file put the blame for the ANC letdown on its leader whose image has been marred by the scandals. However according to ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe, though the members of the party’s National Executive Committee spent several days discussing the debacle “There was no proposal [at the NEC] meeting that

\(^\text{67}\) http://www.anc.org.za/content/many-more-vote-anc-2016-ever

\(^\text{68}\) http://www.citizen.co.za/1237810/welcome-to-the-era-of-coalition-politics-2/

\(^\text{69}\) Term used to illustrate a situation where a player through his actions in the game determines the winner of the game (other than himself).

\(^\text{70}\) mg.co.za/article/2016/08-17-malema-says-the eff-wont-form-coalition-but-will-support-da-in-hung-metros
the president step down”71. But more and more voices are calling for earlier holding of the ANC national “elective” conference.

ANC chief whip Jackson Mthembu appropriately stated in parliament that the losses suffered by the ANC “were self-imposed” and “not because any other party is better”. All in all the ANC had won over 78% of the wards in the country, but lost “key metros” that are “critical to the economy of the country as they control serious budgets”.

Besides, the moral blow to the ANC is hard to overestimate. Zuma used to say that people needed to accept that the ANC would rule “until Jesus Christ comes back”72 and this phrase boomeranged. After the election a bad joke became popular: “Zuma might have gone to OR Tambo International airport to welcome Jesus.73

However, the responsibility for election debacle should not lie on one man. COSATU President Sidumo Dlamini stated, “We must demonstrate that we have listened to that final warning shot which seems to be saying stop factionalism in the movement while the working class is under siege. They [voters] expected that the ANC could do good to the promise of a socio-economic and radical phase in our democracy to transform lives”74. Indeed, the main issue in South Africa is deeper than actions (or lack of them) of one politician, as important as he happens to be, or of his “circle”. It may be rather reduced to a question: can the plight of the majority be greatly improved without undertaking radical social and economic actions?

Nevertheless, though South Africa is facing nowadays all sorts of problems caused by both internal and external reasons, yet each time you visit it75 you cannot but see a contrast between the actual situation (as difficult as it may be) and the picture being drawn in the so-called international media, where, according to Nzimande, “South Africa has consistently portrayed always five minutes to midnight, always on the verge of collapse and transformation into a “failed state”76. In refutation of this just one argument. Often, in the media and in futile conversations one can see and hear complains about the “expulsion” of whites from South Africa. In reality, the situation there is, rather the opposite: in five years, 359,000

71 http://www.polity.org.za/article/coalition-talks-enter-critical-stage-2016-08-15
73 http://www.citizen.co.za/1240868/where-is-zuma-maybe-hes-with-jesus/
74 http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/voters-have-fired-their-final-warning-shot-cosatu-2056476
75 Author’s latest visits were in April and August 2016.
immigrants, that is about 40% returned home. And this fact alone allows South Africans and their friends, despite all the difficulties, to look with optimism to the future.

ABSTRACT
South Africa is currently facing several political dilemmas that influence the entire social organization of the country. Thus, the historicity of the political processes that permeate South African society today, the power plays of the country’s elites, as well as the external influences that act internally through the political parties of South Africa, and the presence of important African nation within the scope of the BRICS, are essential elements for understanding the South African policy context. Through of experiences in loco, this article establishes a comprehensive analysis of the situation, not only pointing out the political agents which actively intervene in this game, but also constructing possible scenarios for the unfolding of the events.

KEYWORDS
South Africa; political process; ANC; Jacob Zuma.
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AFRICAN UNION’S PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: OLD RESPONSIBILITIES AND NEW CHALLENGES

John Akokpari¹

Introduction

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was officially replaced by the African Union (AU) in July 2002. As the largest regional body, the AU was tasked with uniting the continent and promoting Africa’s development. One of the reasons for the demise of the OAU was its demonstrated inability to adapt to the global changes taking place after the Cold War and in particular to respond to the new set of challenges and opportunities facing the continent. These challenges include Africa’s marginalisation in the global economy, its growing international indebtedness, as well as domestic constraints such as HIV/AIDS, governance and, more crucially, internal conflicts. The OAU remained largely invisible on these issues, and as Packer and Rukare noted, the organisation was only “discussed for many years within and outside its headquarters in Addis Ababa” (Packer and Rukare 2002, 365). The failures of the OAU in a new global context rendered it obsolete. There was thus popular expectation within the continent for the AU to become more assertive and to succeed where the OAU failed. To distinguish itself from the failings of its predecessor, the AU put a peace and security architecture (PSA) in place aimed at preventing, but also managing conflicts, which became a defining feature of Africa’s political economy. While the AU’s PSA has been hailed for providing a new approach to peace, security and governance, it was criticised for its incapacity to surmount the many challenges facing it, including the failure of some member states to fully support AU resolutions. In some instances, some countries openly

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contradicted the stance of the AU.

This paper highlights the challenges facing the AU’s PSA. It notes that one of these challenges is the contradictory position of South Africa on some of the peace and security decisions of the AU, including the disputed election results of the Ivory Coast presidential election of November 2010, and the Libyan crisis in March 2011. The paper argues that the AU also faces challenges relating to inadequate funds and the reluctance of member states to readily contribute troops for peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Together, these challenges vitiated the efforts of the AU to speedily resolve conflicts and other threats to regional peace and security. In addressing this and related issues, the paper underscores Africa as a theatre of conflicts. Next, it outlines the key features of the AU’s peace and security architecture, and then highlights the challenges facing the peace and security project. The conclusion summarises the main points in the paper.

Africa: the continent of conflicts

The scale and frequency of Africa’s conflicts are too familiar to be recounted. However, suffice it to say that no fewer than 80 conflicts were recorded in Africa between 1960 and the early 1990s (Adedeji 1999, 3), many of which occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War. Moreover, a majority of the conflicts were intra-state. In spite of the global decrease in the number of inter-state wars after the Cold War, Africa has seen an increase in the number of intra-state conflicts (Goodhand 2006, 79). For example, Laremont observed that only two – the Chad/Libya and the Rwanda/Uganda – wars were interstate among the total of 16 wars that occurred on the continent between 1990 and 1997 (Laremont 2002, 3). While intra-state conflicts continue to proliferate, the only full-scale inter-state conflicts since the dawn of the new millennium were the Ethiopian-Eritrean border war, which continues to re-erupt intermittently and, until 2011, the North and South Sudan conflict. The ubiquity of conflicts in Africa was further revealed in the fact that while 13 percent of the world’s conflicts were fought in Africa in the 1960s, this figure escalated to 35 percent by the beginning of the 21st century.

Africa’s notoriety as a leading theatre of conflicts is revealed, moreover, in the fact that it currently hosts the largest UN peacekeeping contingent of about 22,492 (made up of troops, police, military observers and UN volunteers) in the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC – MONUSCO (United Nations 2016). The mutiny of soldiers loyal to Bosco Ntaganda, a former general of the Congolese military in April 2012, and
the continuing instability in Eastern DRC where rebel Ntaganda is based, does not suggest the withdrawal of MONUSCO anytime soon. The UN also maintains a hybrid AU-UN force (UNAMID) in Darfur, Sudan, which by January 2016 numbered 21,022 (ibid); and a stabilisation force of 7,120 in the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire - UNOCI (ibid). As well, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had a paltry force of 5,000 by August 2011, before the figure was augmented by Kenyan troops, who entered Somalia in September 2011 in pursuit of Al-Shabab militants suspected of being behind the spate of kidnappings and bombings in Kenya and parts of East Africa.

Equally remarkable, about Africa’s intra-state conflicts, is the upsurge in the use of child soldiers on battle fronts. The conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC and the rebel war in northern Uganda involving the Joseph Kony-led Lord Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan national army, have all involved the use of child soldiers. At the height of the Sierra Leonean conflict between 1992 and 1996, for example, an estimated 4,500 children, many of whom were 14 years or younger, were forcefully recruited by the Revolutionary United Front – RUF (Skinner 1999, 10). Similarly, in Northern Uganda children between the ages of 10 and 18 were routinely abducted by the LRA and used as soldiers, while girls were used as “comfort women” (MacMullin and Loughry 2004). Other features of Africa’s conflicts have been the systematic rape, which rebels often visit on women; the inhumane maiming and amputation of civilian limbs (Laremont 2002, 14) as well as the growing incidences of HIV/AIDS infections among soldiers and rebels (Ndinga-Muvumba 2008). The increasing use of terrorist tactics, such as scotched earth methods, the use of explosives against soft targets especially civilians, has become new defining features of conflicts in Africa. Militant fundamentalist groups, including Al Shaabab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria have in the last few years resorted to the systematic use of terror against the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Nigerian population respectively. These conflicts have led to deaths, destruction of property, the weakening of the already fragile institutions of governance, and a massive threat to peace and security.

While the reality and wider implications of conflicts for Africa’s peace and security are beyond dispute, the causes have elicited a wide range of explanations. A popular explanation of Africa’s conflicts has been linked to the struggle over the state and resources. Goran Hyden notes that, Africa’s conflicts are increasingly over natural resources (Hyden 1992, 2). Accordingly, Africa’s conflicts are now increasingly referred to as “resource conflicts.” Other observers attribute the causes to political and governance-related factors such as neopatrimonialism, corruption, poor leadership, disrespect for human rights and democracy (Guest 2004), while others
trace the causes to economic adversities and poverty (Adekanye 1995; Brown 1995). Other analysts, too, link it to the partisan posture of the state and its tendency to marginalise certain communities, which leads to irredentism and secessionist sentiments (Adam 1995; Adejumobi 2001; Akokpari 2008) while yet others view African conflicts as reflecting contestation over farming and grazing lands and other diminishing environmental resources. These analysts refer to Africa’s conflicts as essentially “eco-wars” (Suliman and Omer 1994). Further, others see conflicts as a reflection of the fragility of the African state and the pervasiveness of ethnic politics (Copson 1994). The rise of religious fundamentalism has also become a new cause of conflicts in Africa. These various perspectives underscore the complexity of the causes of Africa’s conflicts and the illusiveness of a single causal explanation.

A visible failing of the OAU has been its inability to address issues around governance whose effects often resulted in conflicts. Poor governance was reflected in the emergence of authoritarian and largely unaccountable leaders, who were not only corrupt but who also systematically abused human rights with impunity. Those who did not blatantly abuse human rights became sit-in or life presidents. These leaders flourished under the glaring eyes of the OAU. Many of these leaders fell from power either through popular revolts as was the case of Mengistu Harmiriam (Ethiopia) and Siad Bare (Somalia); military coup in the case of Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana); armed rebellion as in the cases of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo-DRC) and Samuel Doe (Liberia); democratic elections as in the case of Kenneth Kauda (Zambia); or through natural death while in power such as were the cases of Gnassengbe Eyadema (Togo) and Sani Abacha (Nigeria). Typically, these leaders received no condemnation from the OAU. To be sure, the logic of the cold war was largely responsible for the persistence, even survival, of many of these leaders. As strategic allies of the chief cold war protagonists, these leaders were protected against popular revolts. For example, when in 1978 Mobutu’s regime was threatened by rebellion in the Katanga province, French and Belgium troops, supported by US, expeditiously came to his aid (Schatzberg 1997, 80). Largely as a result of this strategic importance, the west turned a blind eye to corruption and human right atrocities committed by these leaders against their citizens. The abatement of the Cold war, however, attenuated the strategic salience of African regimes and some like Samuel Doe and Mobutu readily fell to rebels in 1991 and 1997 respectively. Not only did the OAU remain silent on governance issues, but it was also constrained by the old and discredited principle of “non-interference” in the OAU charter from intervening in conflicts. This posture was, however, to change under
Recognising the central responsibility of conflicts and poor governance in the threat to peace and security, the Constitutive Act of the AU laid the foundations for a new security architecture on the continent. Article 3(f) of the Constitutive Act lists the promotion of “peace, security, and stability on the continent” as one of the key objectives of the AU, while Articles 3(g) and 3(h) seek to promote democratic governance and human rights respectively. Thus, the Constitutive Act set the AU apart from its predecessor. Two provisions of the Constitutive Act particularly relevant to the PSA are Article 4(h) which, consistent with the UN’s doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), authorises the intervention of the Union in member states “pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”; and Art 4(j) which grants “the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.” These provisions, in contrast to the posture of the OAU, marked a fundamental positional shift of the AU from “non-interference to non-indifference” (Mwanasali 2008). Moreover, the provisions underscored the AU’s determination to directly confront acts of impunity and incidences where the state becomes a source of threat to the security of its citizens (Akokpari 2011). Importantly, the interference clauses redefined sovereignty, stripping it of its previously absolute status and prioritising the security and safety of people over the territorial integrity of states. It was under the powers of Art 4(h) that the AU intervened in the conflicts in Somalia (2007), Darfur (2007) and Ivory Coast (2011), among other countries.

A notable institution of the PSA is the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which was officially launched in May 2004. A key organ of the AU, membership in the PSC was a form of reward to countries which have been active in previous peace and security systems of the OAU. At the same time, membership also served as an incentive for countries to become more involved in the peace and security operations on the continent. Thus, as Adebajo Adekeye notes, membership is “based on four basic criteria: peacekeeping experience; capacity to pay; financial contribution to the AU’s Peace Fund; and constitutional governance commitment” (Adekeye 2008, 133). The 15 members of the PSC were drawn from countries in each of the five sub-regions of the continent – North, South, East, West and Central Africa –pursuant to equitable regional representation. Ten of the 15 members are elected for a two-year term, while the remaining 5 serve a term

the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture (PSA).
of three years. While this arrangement ensured continuity, it was also a compromise between dominant states like South Africa and Nigeria, which wanted veto powers on account of their disproportionately bigger financial and material contribution to the AU on the one hand, and the broad range of countries who were opposed to the idea of veto. Thus, unlike the UN Security Council, no members of the AU PSC wield veto powers. Decisions on substantive issues are carried by a two-thirds majority vote. Generally, the PSC is to function like the UN Security Council in matters relating to peace and security. Article 7 of the Protocol on PSC mandates it to assume full responsibilities over issues relating to peace and security. This includes the prevention, resolution and management of conflicts and attendance to any issues that threaten regional peace and security (AU Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council, Art 2).

The Protocol establishing the PSC provided for an African Standby force (ASF) to be composed of the Standby Brigades of the five sub-regional blocks. Each sub-regional brigade was envisioned to number between 3,500-5,000 troops (Kent and Malan 2003: 76). In addition to military personnel, the ASF was also to have police and civilian segments and together number 40,000 (Dersso 2009; Potgieter 2009). The PSC originally envisioned the ASF to be ready for rapid deployment to conflict spots by 2010. However, the ASF is yet to be assembled and the AU, meantime, has to call on states to contribute troops when needed. The deployment of the ASF is to be the responsibility of the PSC (Sarkin 2008, 59). In the exercise of its functions, the PSC is advised by the Council of the Wise, a five-member panel of eminent persons, who serve for a three year-term and are eligible for reappointment for a second term. Article 20 of the PSC protocol mandates it to involve civil society “actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.” Other key institutions of the PSA include a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) under the PSC. The CEWS office is to use appropriate “early warning indicators” such as economic, political, humanitarian and military from countries, analyse these and carefully track situations and take appropriate measures to forestall the outbreak of conflicts (Cilliers and Sturman 2004). A Military Staff Committee (MSC) composed of the representatives of military top brass of countries constituting the PSC is established under the PSC. The key function of the MSC is to advise the PSC on issues of peace and security. A final institution under the PSA is the Special Fund to which member countries make mandatory and voluntary financial contributions. In 2011, the AU increased the mandatory contribution of member states to the fund from six to seven percent (Report of the Executive Council 2011).

Equally worthy of note is the greater responsibility devolved to sub-
regional organisations as part of the AU’s PSA. In retrospect, the idea of formalising the role of regional organisations in conflict resolution and peace building developed from former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 *Agenda for Peace*. The *Agenda* called for burden sharing between the UN and regional organisations, especially in areas where the former was limited in its ability to maintain peace and security (United Nations 1992). In the *Agenda*, Boutros-Ghali underscored the importance of regional organisations as first responders to conflict as a way of reducing the peacekeeping burden of the UN. A subsequent UN Report expanded on the merits of using regional organisations in peacekeeping noting their “comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and [in assisting] the UN in containing them” (United Nations 1995, 4). Boutros-Ghali’s proposal was bolstered by the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) successful intervention in the conflicts in Liberia in 1990 and Sierra Leone in 1997 (Levitt 1998). The abatement of the cold war and Africa's loss of strategic importance to the west was attended by a corresponding decline in the willingness of western governments to either lead or be involved in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in Africa (Adekeye and Landsberg 2000). Thus, a new urgency was created for the AU to assume greater, if not full, conflict management responsibilities on the continent. Western governments are, however, willing as the cases of Ivory Coast and Libya showed, to instigate “regime change” in countries where incumbent leaders are perceived as acting contrary to international norms or as a hindrance to the foreign policy agenda of the west. In such situations, western governments are prepared to side-line the AU.

Ideally, while the use of regional organisations in peace keeping carry the danger of promoting the parochial interest of intervening countries, it is nonetheless seen as more advantageous than the use of an international force. Among other things, regional peacekeepers have better familiarity with the region, including its cultural, social and historical terrain, which make them more effective on the ground. This factor partly explains why, with its superior weaponry and military technology, the US failed to outgun Somali militias during the former’s intervention in 1993-4. Further, geographical proximity lessens the financial cost of intervention and peacekeeping by regional actors. Moreover, regional forces can be assembled much faster than a multinational force. Above all, the sheer desire to mitigate the associated effects of conflicts on the region in the form of refugee flows, gunrunning and weapon proliferation, as well as general insecurity make regional actors more committed to peacekeeping than extra-regional actors (Adekeye 2002, 16). While the advantages of
regional peacekeepers over extra-regional multinational forces is yet to be empirically demonstrated, it is fair to argue that ECOWAS’ successes in the interventions in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts were largely due to the unique advantage enjoyed by the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as a regional peacekeeping force. Yet, while the AU and its sub-regional organisations have shown a strong inclination towards regional peacekeeping, they face numerous challenges, which undermine the long-term effectiveness of the AU’s peace and security initiative.

Challenges facing the Peace and Security Architecture of the AU

The old and perennial problem of inadequate finance and logistics, which afflicted the OAU, continues to undermine the AU and its PSA. In 2011, the AUs budget stood at $260 million, which was grossly inadequate to cover its administrative costs, peacekeeping operations and the salaries of its 400-member staff. The entire AU budget of 2011 was smaller than the $645 million and $1.8 billion which the UN spent on UNOCI and UNAMID respectively between July 2011 and June 2012 (United Nations 2012). Even so, AU members contributed only 40 percent of the budget, the larger percentage coming from the EU, the US and China (The Economist 27 January 2011). The biggest source of the financial challenge is the inability of member states to pay up their yearly contributions. Five members – Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa – make the largest financial contributions. In 2011, these countries each contributed $15 million while the majority of member states paid much lesser amounts ranging from $160,000 to as little as $20,000 by Malawi (The Economist 27 January 2011). This truncated ability of the majority of member to make significant contributions has been coupled with the increasing demand of the AU to assume greater peacekeeping duties on the continent.

Related to financial constraints is the inadequate logistics at the AU’s disposal. AU peacekeepers are often poorly equipped and overstretched. Largely as a result of these constraints the AU has had to rely on external partners for finance and logistical support in its PKOs (Saxena 2004, 186). The US and the European Union (EU) have been regular financial and logistical contributors to AU’s PKOs. The AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was financed almost entirely by South Africa in 2003 until financial contributions from the EU and the US came in 2004. For that operation, the EU contributed about €25 million while contributions from individual
EU countries brought in an additional €30 million towards AMIB. In addition to logistical support, the US and EU have contributed $220 million and €162 million respectively towards AMIS since the mission’s inception (African Union 2006, Frazer 2006). China has since 2000 been making contributions towards the AU’s conflict management efforts. In 2008, it donated $11 million and $1.8 million towards humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping efforts respectively in Darfur (World Savvy Monitor 2008). By the close of 2011, Beijing became the largest contributor to AU’s PKOs among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, although its personnel are principally deployed in non-combat roles, mostly as engineers and transport experts (Ayenagbo et al 2012). While helpful, regular reliance on extra-African financiers delays intervention and undermines the AU’s ability to resolve conflicts on its own terms (Akokpari 2011: 161). A further challenge is the hesitance, sometimes failure, of member states to pledge troops and where pledges have been made, fulfilment has been appalling. The AU has traditionally struggled to assemble peacekeepers for quick deployment to conflict zones.

South Africa’s controversial stances: a new challenge to the AU’s PSA?

A new and creeping challenge to Africa’s PSA is the contradictory position of South Africa, a leading member of the AU, on crucial peace and security issues. In perspective, the crucial role of South Africa in Africa’s peace and security initiatives cannot be overemphasised. As noted already AMIB was initially funded mainly by South Africa. Although Ethiopia and Mozambique provided troops, the bulk of the AMIB forces were drawn from South Africa. Along with ECOWAS, South Africa also played a central role in the attempts to resolve the previous conflicts in the Ivory Coast. It hosted peace talks between the warring factions in both the Ivorian and DRC conflicts between 2003 and 2005 and helped broker ceasefire agreements. South Africa’s most recent conflict resolution/mediation efforts under the PSA of the AU were in Zimbabwe, Mauritania and Madagascar. In these countries the conflicts were successfully resolved although the peace remained tenuous. Pretoria’s contribution to the PSA of the AU is cannot be underestimated.

Many of South Africa’s recent peace efforts were initiated by Thabo Mbeki, whose involvement in continental peace negotiations cannot be seriously disputed. Mbeki has been key in the conflict resolution initiatives in the Ivory Coast conflict between 2003 and 2005, the DRC, Zimbabwe and has served as the chief negotiator in the Darfur and in the Sudan-South Sudan conflicts although as an envoy of the AU. As well, Mbeki has been
pivotal in repositioning Africa in the new global political and economic order under the auspices of the AU. Moreover, Mbeki was part of the brains that restructured the OAU into the AU (Tieku 2004), while his role in reordering governance on the continent has equally been remarkable. He was influential in the promotion of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), which among other things, is helping to improve upon human rights protection and good governance in Africa in return for western aid and investments; and the African Peer Review mechanism (APRM), which assesses a country’s progress towards democracy, human rights and good governance (Hope 2005). Mbeki has used diplomacy and tact in dealing with the AU and individual states. He mastered the art of dealing with African leaders, including such errant presidents like Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe) and Omar Al-Bashir (Sudan) to get them at least to the negotiating table with their opponents.

However, Mbeki’s soft and overly diplomatic approach has been criticised for failing to resolve conflicts. His quiet diplomacy approach in the Zimbabwean conflict failed to yield dividends (Akokpari and Nyoni 2009). In spite of successfully brokering a peace deal between ZANU-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the form of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in 2008, the resultant unity government between the two contending political parties remained fragile, and characterised by mutual suspicion. Moreover, human right abuses and unilateral appointments to key positions were made by ZANU-PF without consultation with the MDC as stipulated in the GPA. To add, Mbeki controversially tried to get the International Criminal Court (ICC) to revoke the indictment of Al-Bashir on war crime and crime against humanity charges on grounds that the arrest and prosecution of the Sudanese leader would complicate the resolution of the Darfur and the Khartoum-Juba conflicts (Akokpari 2011). Mbeki’s soft and non-blame-apportioning posture was also evident in his failed mediation efforts in the Ivorian post-election conflict in 2010 as an AU envoy. Typical of his style, Mbeki wanted a compromise position, possibly the formation of a Zimbabwe-styled power-sharing government to include Alassane Ouattara and incumbent Laurent Gbagbo. The formation of a unity government was, however, contrary to the position of ECOWAS and the AU, which both called on Gbagbo to cede power after losing the polls. In spite of this, Mbeki never really led South Africa to openly contradict the collective position of the AU on critical peace and security matters. This was, however, not to be the position under his successor, Jacob Zuma on the Zimbabwean, Ivory Coast, and Libyan conflicts.
South Africa and the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture: old responsibilities and new challenges

South Africa- a torn in AU diplomacy?

South Africa’s position on the Zimbabwean, Ivory Coast and Libyan crises raised questions around Pretoria’s neutrality as a mediator and about whether it truly represents Africa. It was widely thought that as a designated mediator by SADC in the Zimbabwean conflict, South Africa under Jacob Zuma would adopt a tougher and an uncompromising stance on Zimbabwe, in contrast to Mbeki’s largely ineffective quiet diplomacy. During his campaign for the presidency, Zuma became openly critical of Robert Mugabe, demanding that the people of Zimbabwe be allowed to freely elect their leader. However, on assuming office, the South African leader surprisingly retracted from his tough posture. Like his predecessor, Mr Zuma rather “broke bread” with Mr Mugabe much to the chagrin of the opposition MDC. In 2010, the president of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL), Julius Malema, then a close ally of Zuma, paid an official visit to Zimbabwe during which the ANCYL leader openly endorsed Mugabe as a legitimate leader while denouncing the MDC as a puppet of the West. Although the ANC eventually chastised Malema for his utterances, this did not convince the MDC that South Africa was an impartial mediator in the conflict. Meantime, the situation in Zimbabwe hardly improved as human rights violations were perpetrated by ZANU-PF against supporters of MDC, even with the establishment of the unity government in 2008 (Shaw 2011). Frustration with progress in Zimbabwe led MDC supporters and South Africans, who had hoped for the application of intense pressure on Mugabe, to question South Africa under Zuma as a neutral mediator.

Although not directly involved as a mediator, South Africa’s position in the Ivorian conflict was equally controversial, if not oppositional to the stance of ECOWAS and the AU. The Ivory Coast conflict erupted when President Laurent Gbagbo who was widely believed to have lost the 28 November 2010 presidential polls, refused to cede power to his rival Alassane Ouattara. While both ECOWAS and the AU were unanimous that Laurent Gbagbo had lost the election and were contemplating the use of force to enforce the will of Ivorians if he continued to cling on to power, South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, maintained that the outcome of the election was inconclusive (DIRCO 2011). This position emboldened the beleaguered Ivorian president to ignore calls to step down. ECOWAS and AU suspicion of South Africa’s support for Gbagbo was heightened when in January 2011, a South African naval frigate, the SAS Drakensberg, docked off the Coast of Ivory Coast. The position of South Africa and the presence of its war ship off the Ivorian coast were seen by ECOWAS as not only undermining
its authority but also countering the efforts of the AU at getting Gbagbo to cede power (Lynch 2011). Amidst mounting regional and international calls for him to quit, Laurent Gbagbo was emboldened to claim that he could still rely on seven of the 53 members of the AU including Angola, Uganda, South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, and Ghana (ISS 2011). It was widely suspected that South Africa’s position was partly responsible for the refusal of Gbagbo to cede power, hoping that divisions within the ranks of the AU members would weaken its resolve. The resulting impasse prolonged the violence in the country, which claimed over 3,000 lives and spawned thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons (Mail and Guardian 15 March 2012). The post-election conflicts was, moreover, characterised by massive human rights abuses believed to be perpetrated by forces loyal to both Gbagbo and Ouattara (Human Rights Watch 2011). Laurent Gbagbo was eventually arrested on 11 April 2011 by a combined force of opposition and French forces.

If South Africa undermined regional efforts in the resolution of the Ivory Coast post-election conflict, it betrayed the AU on the Libyan crisis. As rebellion against Muammar Qaddafi gathered momentum in late 2011, the AU proposed a roadmap to resolve the conflict. At the core of the roadmap were proposed talks between the beleaguered Libyan leader and rebels that would lead to democratic reforms. The roadmap was, however, rejected by rebels who maintained that Qaddafi should play no role in the future of the country. Meantime, civilian casualties were mounting while refugee flows from Libya were escalating. Led by France and Britain, Western governments proposed a no-fly zone to protect civilians in an apparent attempt to weaken Qaddafi’s ability to quell the rebellion. In the light of possible marginalisation in the resolution of the conflict, the AU resolved not to support any UN Security Council resolution that sought to use force or external military intervention of any sort in Libya. However, less than a week after the passing of the AU resolution, on 17 March South Africa, one of the 10 non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, surprisingly voted in favour of Resolution 1973. The resolution established a no-fly zone over Libya and also authorised NATO to use “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. South Africa’s support for the Resolution was disturbing for not only contradicting the collective position of the continent, but also seriously undermining the AU’s peace proposals for Libya. South Africa justified its support for Resolution 1973 on grounds of its concerns for protecting civilians (United Nations 2011). However, Pretoria ought to have foreseen that a resolution authorising the use of “all necessary means” was open to various interpretations and given the West’s obsession with “regime changes” in the South in the post-Cold War era, Resolution 1973
South Africa and the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture: old responsibilities and new challenges

would provide both the context and pretext for the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi. South Africa made frantic efforts to stop the NATO bombing once it began, by declaring that NATO’s bombing of Libya was an abuse of Resolution 1973 (*Mail and Guardian* 14 June 2011). However, it was too late - the irreparable damage had been done; the West had fully grabbed the opportunity it had been looking for to effect regime change in Libya.

**Implications of South Africa’s controversial stance**

South Africa’s action had critical implication for the unity of the AU, but also for the organisation’s PSA. It might be plausibly argued that the inability of the AU to elect the Chair of its Commission – the topmost job in the continental body – on 30th January 2012 during its eighteenth Summit in Addis Ababa, might be linked to Pretoria’s controversial stance on the AU’s peace initiatives. The contest for the Chair of the AU Commission became a straight two-way race between Jean Ping, the Gabonese, who was elected in 2008 and who was seeking a second term and Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, the South African Home Affairs Minister, who was challenging for the job. After three rounds of voting none of the candidates secured a two-thirds majority vote needed for election. During the fourth round of voting Jean Ping still failed to secure two-thirds of the total votes after Dlamini-Zuma withdrew. The impasse was unprecedented; the election of previous Chairpersons of the Commission – Amary Essy (Ivory Coast) 2002-2003; Alpha Oumar Konare (Mali) 2003-2008; and Jean Ping 2008-2012 - had never required second rounds of voting. In fact, there has never been two candidates contesting at a time. Consensus was always the norm with official voting legitimising the choice. Following the failure to obtain a winner, a new round of voting was scheduled for the next AU summit in mid-July 2012. The weeks preceding the July summit saw increased lobbying of African states by the contending candidates. When votes were eventually cast on 14th July, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma won, polling 60 percent of the 54 votes during the third round of voting (BBC 2012).

Some observers argued that the voting in January and July was done along linguistic lines with Anglophone Africa supporting Dlamini Zuma and Francophone countries voting for Jean Ping (Cilliers and Okeke 2012, 1). It was also apparent that the linguistic divide was overlaid by regional divisions with SADC countries lining up behind Dlamini Zuma and ECOWAS members behind Jean Ping. Whatever the truth might be Jean Ping’s challenger ought to have won the contest during the January vote since no former Chair of the Commission has ever contested for a second term. The failure of the South African candidate to beat Jean Ping perhaps
highlighted Africa’s suspicion of South Africa, a suspicion heightened by Pretoria’s controversial stance on the crises in Ivory Coast and Libya. Without doubt Pretoria’s contradictory position on the Ivory Coast and Libyan crises raised uncomfortable questions about the direction it was likely to lead the continent. Some countries might have calculated that it would be too dangerous to entrust the top-most job of the continent into the hands of a country which did not seem to speak the same language as the rest of the continent. The failure of Dlamini-Zuma to win the contest in January 2012 was therefore a rejection of South Africa’s leadership in the Commission. Given its tendency to follow a unilateral foreign policy different from the collective position of the continent, along with its affability with the West, the inevitable question that beamed in the minds of African leaders was whether Pretoria could be a trusted spokesperson of Africa on critical regional and international issues.

The eventual election of Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma may have delivered the AU Commission chair, but may not have restored unity to the AU, nor could it be said to have forestalled potential problems for the organisation. On the contrary, the election of the South African candidate could be the beginning of more schisms and suspicions in the AU for a number of reasons. First, there is an unwritten agreement among AU members that the chairship of the AU Commission should not be contested by any of the leading member states – Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa. This practice was similar to what obtained in the UN where the Secretary-General has never been elected from any of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The election of a candidate from South African thus breached this long-standing gentleman agreement. Trouble and dissension could emerge if Nigeria which, like South Africa, makes huge contributions to the AU budget decides to contest for the office next time around. Second, South Africa’s cross-continent lobbying and the eventual election of Dlamini Zuma’s may suggest that the chairship of the AU Commission is guaranteed only for those countries with bigger financial muscles. This could potentially create a “coalition of the weak” who will constantly oppose the economically powerful member states, thus creating a new and disconcerting fault line in the AU. Importantly, the long-standing election of AU Commission chair by consensus may have ended, paving the way for potentially divisive politics and damaging implications for AU’s PSA.
Conclusion

The African Union’s PSA was an innovation aimed at proactively tackling Africa’s seemingly intractable security challenges. The PSA was also to distinguish the AU from the OAU, which lacked any structured conflict management programme. In addition to the AU’s recognition of sub-regional organisations as key partners in regional conflict management, the PSA was also characterised by such novel and security-enforcing institutions as the Peace and Security Council, the African Standby force, the Panel of the Wise, the CEWS, the Military Staff Committee and the Special Fund. In establishing the PSA, Africa showed a commitment and initiative, at least in theory, to confront the perennial conflicts on the continent. The PSA was thus ideally set to be an effective tool. However, it faced a number of challenges, not least of which included inadequate funding and logistics as well as the lack of sufficient troops for expeditious deployment to security-threatened spots. Recently, however, the contradictory position of South Africa on the AU’s stance on the Ivory Coast and Libyan crises has added a new challenge to the list of the continent constraints. Not only did South Africa’s action deprive the AU of a united voice on serious security issues, but it also divided the organisation. This was partly seen in the widely publicised AU’s failure to elect the Commission’s chair in January 2012. Although the chair was eventually elected in July 2012, the combined effect of these challenges may vitiate the already tenuous position of the AU in conflict management.

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John Akokpari


ABSTRACT
The African Union established a Peace and Security architecture to prevent and resolve conflicts, which have remained endemic on the continent. The initiative was also to distinguish the AU from its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, which had an appalling record in conflict resolution. However, in addition to the familiar challenges of financial constraints and perennial conflicts, the PSA faces a new challenge in the form of contradictory postures by South Africa on critical security issues. Together, these challenges vitiate the ability of the AU to swiftly end conflicts. As well, South Africa’s contradictory positions on certain security issues undermined unity among AU members. The latter was demonstrated in the initial lack of consensus in the election of the Chairperson of the AU Commission.

KEYWORDS
OAU; AU; Peace and security; conflicts; governance; South Africa.

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AFRICAN STUDIES IN CHINA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY¹

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Academic studies are always the reflection of reality. With fast development of China-Africa relations, Africanists outside China have showed great interest in China-Africa academic engagement. One of the important aspects is what has been done in China regarding African studies. I once published an article on African study in China and divided it into four phases, i.e., Contacting Africa (before 1900), Sensing Africa (1900-1949), Supporting Africa (1949-1965), Understanding Africa (1966-1976) and Studying Africa (1977-2000) (Li 2005). Although China’s trade with Africa increased from $10.5 billion in 2000 to 220 billion in 2014, African studies in China did not have the fortune as the trade. However, the dramatic development of the relation has provided Chinese Africanists with new opportunities and challenges. This paper will elaborate what Chinese Africanists have studied in the period of 2000-2015. What subjects are they interested in? What are the achievements and weaknesses? It is divided into four parts, focus and new interests, achievements, young scholars, references and afterthoughts.

Focus and New Interests

During the past fifteen years, the focus has been mainly on China-

¹ This is a revised and supplemented version of three articles (Li Anshan, 2008-2009a-2012c). I tried to cover various works of Chinese Africanists in different fields. As Chair of Chinese Society of African Historical Studies, I would like to thank the members who responded my email accordingly with the information of their own publications. Owing to the shortage of space, non-Chinese works with a Chinese translation have the publication year in a bracket and articles in Chinese are not included with few exceptions.

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Africa relations and contemporary African nations. FOCAC has greatly promoted bilateral economic relations. With more Chinese companies in Africa, they need to know more about Africa and its people. Quite a number of studies have been done on China-Africa relations and current situation of African countries. According to statistics, in the period of 2000-2005, 232 books on or about Africa were published (Chen Hong & Zhao Ping 2006). If we add books published in 2006-2015, the total number should be much more covering a wide range of fields, such as history, politics, foreign affairs, law, economy, culture, geography, ethnology, religion, etc.

**China-Africa Relation**

China-Africa relation is a hot topic both at home and abroad. A few books were published either on general study, cooperation plus international development cooperation, or bilateral migration. As early as 2000, “Series of Investment Guide for Development of African Agriculture” comprised of four volumes to celebrate the opening of FOCAC (Lu Ting-en 2000; Wen Yunchao 2000; He Xiurong, Wang Xiuqing and Li Ping 2000; Chen Zhongde, Yao Guimei and Fan Yushu 2000). Li studied the linkage between African Economic Zone and Chinese Enterprises (Li Zhibiao 2000). A few investment guides were also published in various fields such as mining, oil and gas, emerging markets, etc. A journalist in Africa for 8 years, Li Xinfeng traveled a lot, experienced great occasions and wrote many reports. Exploring Zheng He’s voyage to Africa, he published a work with data in Africa and stirred up an excitement both in East Africa and China. In another work, he gives us a fresh image of Africa, reports on important events (Li Xinfeng 2005 2006). In 2012, another book tried to link Zheng He and Africa through the data, maritime silk-road and various records (Li Xinfeng et al. 2012). The cooperation of China-Kenya archaeologists headed by Qin Dashu in Peking University in the exploration of Kenyan coast brought about some discoveries (Qin Dashu & Yuan Jian 2013).

Bilateral migration between China and Africa is another focus. In 2000, the first history of overseas Chinese in Africa was published covering three sections, early history of China-Africa relation and the origin of Chinese communities in Africa, the survival and adaptation of Chinese in Africa, their transformation and integration. It is stated that there would be a boom of Chinese going to Africa in the 21st century. The book was reviewed in *African Studies Review* (James Gao 2001) and *Canadian Journal of African Studies* (Brose 2002). The first part of this book was translated into English

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3 Professor Qi Shirong, the Vice Chairman of the Association of Chinese Historians praised
in 2012 (Li Anshan 2000, 2012). A sister volume of data was published with records, reminiscences, articles in early journals and newspapers of Chinese in Africa (Li Anshan 2006). Now more and more works are written on this subject, some are by young scholars. Chinese scholars are also involved in the study of African communities in China (Li Zhigang 2009, 2012; Bodomo & Ma 2010, 2012; Ma Enyu 2012; Xu Tao 2013; Li Anshan 2015a).


What is the implication of China-Africa economic diplomacy to the global value chain? Tang’s work probed the issue from angles of trade, infrastructure, mining, agriculture, economic zone, manufacturing, social transformation, etc. (Tang Xiaoyang 2014). The development of China-African economic and trade relation is dealt with (Zhang Zhe 2014). China-Africa cooperation in low-carbon development strategy is studied in terms of the international rule, international cooperation, African low-carbon development strategy, etc. (Zhang Yonghong, Liang Yijian, Wang Tao & Yang Guangsheng 2014). Another important work deals with the strategy of China-Africa economic and trade cooperation in the new situation (Shi Yongjie 2015). However, a different view argues that China lacked African strategy and “there is everything Chinese in Africa except a strategy” (Li Anshan 2011). In addition, China’s Achilles’ heel lies in the shortage of strategic means and specific measures to realize its aim (He Liehui 2012).

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*it highly in his keynote speech at the conference “World History Study in China in the 20th Century” held at Peking University in April 2000 and the French international broadcast reported the publication of the book in its Chinese program.*
Several important works have covered various aspects of China-Africa relations. Zhang’s work deals with the economic cooperation between Africa and big economies including developed economies and new economies such as India, Russia, Brazil, China. It also made a comparison of economic cooperation between Africa and different powers (Zhang Hongming 2012). Covering a wide range of fields, Yang’s work studied the comprehensive strategy of China-Africa economic cooperation in terms of historical heritage, trade, investment, project contract, assistance, science, technology (Yang Lihua 2013). There are studies of comparison of poverty and poverty reduction between China and Africa (Li Xiaoyun 2010a, 2010b).

As for the international development aid, several works were published including study on Chinese and Western aid to Africa from different aspects (Zhang Yongpeng 2012) and Chinese medical cooperation with Africa focusing on Chinese medical teams and a campaign against Malaria (Li Anshan 2011). A work on China’s aid to Africa used the concept of “development-guided assistance” to describe China’s model (Zhang Haibin 2013). Other studies partly deal with China-Africa development cooperation (Zhou Hong 2013; Liu Hongwu & Huang Meibo 2013). China-Africa relation is studied from various perspectives such as African integration (Luo Jianbo 2006), African NGOs (Liu Hongwu & Shen Peili 2009), African infrastructure (Hu Yongju & Qiu Xin 2014), etc. “Entering into Africa to Seek for Development” becomes a theme of conferences held by Chinese Association of African Studies (CAAS) and it published the collection of papers continuously.

Country Study

To understand all countries in the world is difficult and a special committee was set up by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 2002, in charge of the series of Guide to the World States. The outline of the content is uniform, focusing on seven aspects, i.e., land and people, history, politics, economy, military, education (with cultural aspects), foreign relations. After several years, the study of all African states is almost finished for the first edition in 2010 with exception of Nigeria, Serra Leone and Namibia. Many senior scholars are involved in the work, such as Peng Kunyuan, Zhang Xiang, Gu Zhangyi, Pan Peiyong, Li Guangyi, Yang Lihua, etc. Now the new edition has started.

In 2006, Institute of West Asia and Africa (IWAA) of CASS, Chinese Society of African Historical Studies (CSAHS) and Center for African Studies of Peking University decided to carry out a project on bibliography
of African studies in China during the period of 1997-2005. Regarding the graduate theses on individual countries, there are 152 titles on 29 countries. South Africa is on the top, with 36 theses (Chen Hong & Zhao Ping 2006).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Theses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cogo (B)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (K)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the statistics indicate, the study on African countries is concentrated on big countries, with South Africa and Egypt as major focus. Among more than 4000 articles published in more than 800 journals, five countries attract more attention and articles on those countries count more than one quarter of the total. South Africa is on the top with about one half of the total articles, i.e. 620 on South Africa out of 1256 (Chen Hong & Zhao Ping 2006).

The study on Portuguese speaking African countries has been neglected for a long time owing to the language barrier. This situation is changing. The fourth volume of the series published by the Center for African Studies at Peking University is a collection of articles on the development of these countries (Li Baoping, Lu Ting-en & Wang Cheng-an 2006). There are specific study of individual countries as well, such as the history of Ghana (Chen Zhongdan 2000), Nigeria (Liu Hongwu et al. 2008, 2014) and Egypt (Wang Haili 2014), development of Tanzania (Li Xiangyun 2014), South Africa’s politics and urbanization (Qing Hui 2013), etc.

Current Situation

It is necessary to provide a survey of current situation in different fields. Recently, there are quite a few studies of this type, such as African transportation (Luo Fujian, Huang Xinmin et al. 2010), African tourism (Luo Gaoyuna 2010), African agriculture (Jiang Zhongjin 2013), industry and mining in Africa (Zhu Huayou et al. 2014), African education (Liu Yan 2014; Lou Shizhou 2014; Wan Xiulan & Li Wei 2014), law system (Hong
Yonghong 2014), international organizations (Li Bojun 2014), security regime in Africa (Mo Xiang 2014), resources and environment, AIDS (Cai Gaoqiang 2014), etc.

The most important work is *Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics*, edited by two prominent economists Célestin Monga and Justin Yifu Lin. The book includes two volumes, the first sub-entitled “Context and Concept” and the second “Policies and Practices”. Raising the issue of linkage between economics and Africa, the work comes out of several firm convictions, i.e., Africa as a region still under-researched, neglected African contribution to economic knowledge. Realizing Africa on the verge of take-off, the book attempts to serve as useful knowledge in guiding African’s new phase of development and provide clear guidance to policymakers in Africa (Monga & Lin 2015). The introduction for both volumes lays the rationale and general arguments of the author (Monga & Lin 2015a,b) and Lin’s chapter indicates the linkage between China’s rise and African economic structural transformation (Lin J.Y. 2015).

According to the above-mentioned 2006 statistics, most of the articles are on current issues. Among 1256 articles, those of economy are 424, about one third of the total, while 208 articles are on politics and law and 127 on foreign affairs.

**Classification of Articles on Specific African Countries (1997-2005)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject/Country</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics &amp; Law</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 The classification is not very strict since ethnicity and religion or politics may be intertwined, so are culture and society. Geography is classified in either society or culture since it is usually linked to tourism, heritage or environment.
It is noticeable that articles of economy stand out as No.1 in the list for all 5 countries, reflecting China’s focus today. There are more works on politics/law or foreign affairs for Ethiopia and Nigeria. History occupies the second place in Egypt since Egyptology is included in the subject. More works on culture and society of South Africa indicate that more Chinese are familiar with the country. It is interesting the writing of South Africa is on the top, with 620 items. The graduate theses (1981-2005) have some implications. Among 238 M.A. and PhD. Theses, 73 titles about Africa in general, 17 on politics, economy 13, foreign affairs 26, history 12 and culture 5. There are four on East Africa, seven on West Africa and two on Southern Africa. Now more studies are focused on security, environment and climate change.

African integration is another focus. Several works studies the issue (Luo Jianbo 2010). CSAHS held its annual conference on “China-Africa Cooperation and African Integration” in 2013. The collection of papers is divided into Pan-Africanism and African Unity, African integration and China-Africa Cooperation (Zhai, Wang & Pan 2013). There are studies on regional integration as well. Xiao Hongyu emphasized the linkage between African regional integration and economic development. Taking West Africa as a case, she studied the interaction between integration and modernization (Xiao Hongyu 2014). African economic integration is an important phenomenon and Zhang Jing took a case study of 30 years’ development of SADC (Zhang Jing 2014).

Monographs and Achievements

African History

Although contemporary Africa now attracts more attention from
Chinese scholars, historical study of Africa is still important in China. Several scholars of the old generation published their works. Ai Zhouchang finished a book on modernization in South Africa (Ai Zhouchang et al. 2000). Lu Ting-en compiled his articles into a volume of four sections, i.e., African history in colonial period, history of African parties and politics, African economic history and history of China-Africa relations (Lu Ting-en 2005). Zheng Jiaxing taught South African history at Peking University from the beginning of the 1980s. As a summary of his teaching, his book studies the history from the establishment of Cape Town till the formation of the New South Africa government, with a chapter on literature in South Africa (Zheng Jiaxing 2010). His volume of colonialism in Africa forms part of the “Series of History of Colonialism” (Zheng Jiaxing 2000). Gao Jinyuan, a senior researcher in CAAS, published two works, one a collection of his study of Africa, comprised of three sections, i.e., colonialism and liberation movement, area/country study, contemporary politics, the other Britain-Africa relations from slave trade to the present (Gao Jinyuan 2007, 2008). Xu Yongzhang compiled his early articles on the history of China-African relations as part of his collection and also published a comprehensive history on African countries (Xu Y. 2004, 2014).

Shu’s work deals with the structural adjustment in Africa, an important chapter in African development. After an analysis of the interference of the international financial system and the response of African countries, he concluded that the World Bank’s structural adjustment is a failure (Shu Yunguo 2004). The history of African economy gives a survey from the 19th century to the 1990s with additional chapters on South Africa, African economic relations with China and other countries (Shu Yunguo & Liu Weicai 2013). Another work is an introduction to African studies which deals with data, historiography, topics and sources. A history of Pan-Africanism is an important work, which divided the movement into two parts. The first deals with its origin, ideology in early period, the first phase (1900-1945) and the second phase (1945-1963). The second part (1963-2001) studies the movement during the period of Organization of African Unity until the founding of African Union. (Shu Yunguo 2012, 2014).

Li’s book on rural protest in Ghana during the colonial period is the first monograph in English by a Chinese Africanist. Based on government documents and field work, he explores protest of the Ghanaian people through case studies, i.e., people against colonial government, commoners against chiefs, religious leaders against secular authority and lesser local leaders against paramount Chiefs (Li Anshan 2002), which invited a review in Journal of African History (Gocking 2003).5 Another work introduced

5 Both English and Chinese version of the monograph was sent to Mr. Kofi Annan as a gift.

An excellent study on African intellectuals of modern time with a focus on the 18th-19th century, Zhang’s book first deals with the ideological background of the slave trade through important figures such as Antoin-Guillaune Amo, Olaudah Equiano and Ottobah Cugoano of the 18th century, then on the three cultural trends of Westernization, Africanization and Integration of the 19th century with case study of Samuel Ajayi Crowther, Alexander Crummell, Samuel Lewis, and finally with a focus on Africanus Horton and Edward Blyden (Zhang Hongming 2008). A study on De Gaulle and African decolonization analyzed the major factors, i.e., change of international situation, struggle of the colonies, demand of French monopolized capitalism and the change of social configuration (Chen Xiaohong 2003). Sun Hongqi’s study tried to analyze the role of colonialism in Africa (Sun Hongqi 2008).

Politics, International Relations and Law

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Chinese government called for a grand diplomacy, that needs efforts, experiences and ideas from all walks of life. “It is recognizable that there should be more cooperation between practical work and academic research. The government needs information, analysis and assessment, while the academia needs funding, stimulus and feedback” (Li Anshan 2005). The situation is developing dramatically. Scholars were asked to give lectures to top leaders or for opinions on the draft of state leaders’ speeches in FOCAC. Africanists took up projects from various ministries in order to provide their thinking and ideas as to how to carry out development cooperation with Africa. Ministry of Education promoted the formation of think-tanks in universities. All shows

by Peking University during his visit in 2015 and Mr. Kofi Annan was quite surprised to know that a book on his country was written by a Chinese scholar.

6 World Modernization Process: Volume of Africa was published in early March 2013 by Jiangsu People’s Press. After President Xi Jinping raised the concept of “African dream” during his visit to Africa, March 24-30, 2013, Jiangsu People’s Press decided to republish it under the different title The African Dream: In Search of the Road to Modernization and held a book launch in Nanjing.

7 In May, 2004, Li Anshan was invited to give two lectures about African history to former President Jiang Zemin.
the adjustment of the government to a changing situation and increasing interaction with academia.

Zhang Hongming’s work discussed the internal and external factors of African politics. As for the internal, he illustrated the relation between politics and the state, tribalism, traditional culture and religion. The external factors covered Western political culture, Eastern political culture and Islamic political culture and their linkage with political development (Zhong Hongming 1999). Xia Jisheng of Peking University explored the structure and function of the parliament system of South Africa and Egypt (Xia Jisheng 2005). Li Baoping’s book is on African culture and politics. It deals with traditional culture, political transformation and the case study of Tanzania and South Africa. He discussed President Nyerere’s personality and contribution, democratization and its diplomatic philosophy, and dealt with South Africa about the breakdown of apartheid, the game of different ethnic groups during the transition and its political transformation (Li Baoping 2011).

Studying the origin and evolution of nationalism in Africa, Li approached the subject from its various expressions, i.e., national intellectual, religion, peasantry, nation-building, democratization, international politics, and its different forms such as Pan-Africanism, African nationalism, state-nationalism and local nationalism. Using “local nationalism” to replace “tribalism”, he argues that local nationalism has its origin in pre-colonial social base and was strengthened by indirect rule. After independence, ill-distribution of power, economic difficulties and external interference have strengthened ethnic conflicts (Li Anshan 2004). With an increasing interest on democratization in Africa, He Wenping’s work on the subject enriches our understanding of the process. The author argues that different countries take different forms and ways in pursuing democracy, using case studies of South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda. As author says, “There is the common desire for democracy, but there is not the common way for realizing it. The democracy that people has been empowered must be built by people themselves. The way of ‘transplanting’ democracy forcibly by the ‘outside’ is due to short-lived and hardly realized.” (He Wenping 2005).

To understand early communist leaders’ view on Africa, a book was compiled of the sayings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin on Middle East and Africa (Cui Jianmin 2010). There are studies of early generation of African leaders (Lu Ting-en et al. 2005) and contemporary leader such as President Museveni (Mu Tao & Yu Bin 2013). Nyerere’s important works were translated (Nyerere 2015). Another focus is on African diplomacy and foreign relations. The first diplomatic history of South Africa deals with the foreign policy during the apartheid and international reaction, South

African’s neighboring policy, adjustment of De Clerk’s “new diplomacy” and foreign policy of new South Africa (Mu Tao 2003). The relation between Modern Egypt and U.S., Russia, Israel, Saudi Arabia and China was studied (Chen Tiandu et al. 2010). There are studies on foreign relations of Nigeria (Yang Guangsheng 2014) and New South Africa (Fang Wei 2014). Political economy of South Africa’s land issue is studied (Sun Hongqi 2011). Darfur issue is probed in terms of its origin, its relation with north and south Sudan, and with oil, geopolitics, UN, West, Darfur with China and Beijing Olympics, its process and impact (Liu Hongwu & Li Xinfeng 2008; Jiang Hengkun 2014). Political systems is dealt with, such as Ethiopia’s federalism and political transformation (Zhang Xiangdong 2012; Xiao Yuhua 2014), democratization and politics of Egypt (Wang Tai 2014), Islamic socialism in Libya (Han Zhibing et al. 2014). AU’s role is also studied in terms of African economy, conflict management, common foreign policy, collective development and its contribution to the world politics (Luo Jianbo 2010).

Despite the view questioning the existence of African law system, Hong has devoted his time to the study of African law for more than ten years. After the first primary research, he published other books on the subject (Hong Yonghong 2005, 2014). In another work, the authors try to cover various law systems practiced in the continent, such as the ancient Egyptian law, Islamization of African law, African customary law, common law, civil law, mixed jurisdiction, etc. (He Qinhua & Hong Yonghong 2006). An important work is on International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). He studied ICTR from various aspects, i.e., its origin, institutional framework, jurisdiction, crime elements under ICTR’s jurisdiction, adjudication rule, ICTR’s contribution to ICT (Hong Yongong 2009), which helps the Chinese understand the organ and the case. Hong carried out the study on African law with his colleagues and continuously published works including translations (Hong Yonghong & Xia Xinhua, 2010; Mancuso & Hong Yonghong 2009; Dickerson 2014; Zhu Weidong 2011, 2013). West Asia and Africa ran a special column for the study of African law for more than ten years (Institute of West Asian and Africa 2011).

In the field of African geography, Chinese scholars also made their contribution. Jiang’s work offers a comprehensive survey of the position of agriculture in Africa, assessment of agricultural natural resources, analysis of social economic conditions in agriculture, the history of agricultural development, regional distribution and economic type of agriculture, etc., deals with various topics of agricultural natural resources, food crop, husbandry, forestry, fishery, agricultural food processing, consumption of agricultural products and nutrition security. This work probes the relations between people, culture of agricultural economy and environment (Jiang
Zhongjin 2012). As a focus of research of Center for African Studies of Nanjing University, “Series of Security Study on China-Africa Resource Development and Energy Cooperation” covers various subjects, such as China-Africa energy cooperation and security (Jiang Zhongjin & Liu Litao 2014), African agriculture and development (Jiang Zhongjin 2014), port economy and urban development (Zhen Feng 2014), land resource and food security (Huang Xianjin 2014), fishery and development strategy (Zhang Zhenke 2014), and modern African human geography (Jiang Zhongjing 2014), etc. Cultural geography also became a subject of research (Chong Xiuquan 2014)

African art is a rich source and various translations were published yet few serious studies have been done. Seven volumes of African arts were published in 2000 yet they are more for eyes than for thoughts. Quite a few African art works especially Egyptian art and architecture are edited or translated. There are several cultural studies, either in general (Ai & Mu 2001; Ai & Shu 2008; Zheng Jiaxing 2011) or specific countries (Yang & Zheng 2001; Jiang Dong 2005), related subjects (Liu Hong Wu & Li Shudi 2010). The most important work is a history of South African literature by Li Yongcai, a scholar long time involved in the study of African literature (Li Yongcai 2009). And there are articles of study in African art, sculpture, film, literature, dance, drum, etc.

English Publications and Young Scholars

An increasing number of Chinese scholars take an active part in international academia. Some of them become the editor of the books related to China-Africa relations, some published articles in journals, as chapters, or in networks.

English Publications


After an international conference on “China-Africa Relations: Past, Present and Future” held at South Africa in November 2005, a collection of papers was edited by the prominent Ghanaian Africanist Kwesi Prah, several Chinese scholars contributed their ideas (Kwesi Prah 2007). “The China-African Civil Society Dialogue” conference was held in Nairobi in April 2008 by Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBF) and 10 Chinese scholars were invited. The collection was published and 6 articles by Chinese participants were included (Harneit-Sievers et al. 2010). A seminar was held in Nairobi by Inter Region Economic Network (IREN) as a concrete result of China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Program. The meeting was attended by a delegation from China whose speeches were included in a volume edited by James Shikwati (Shikwati 2012). In October 2012, the China-Africa Think Tanks Forum (CATTF) held its meeting in Ethiopia, co-hosted by Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University and the Institute of African Studies (IAS) of Zhejiang Normal University and a collection was published including that of Chinese scholars (Berhe and Liu 2013). Some of them are actively involved in English networks, such as He Wenping, Liu Haifang, Luo Jianbo & Zhang Xiaomin, etc. Some Chinese students are studying or collecting data in Africa and start to show their academic capability (Cheng Ying 2014, 2016; Zhang Qiaowen 2014, 2015; Xu Liang 2015, 2015a).

More young students are engaged in African studies and they have better opportunity to go to Africa. Luo Jianbo has done works on African integration and China-Africa relations. A few PhD students of different disciplines finished their dissertation or based on field work, such as those of Chen Fenglan (2011) and Chen Xiaoying (2012) of sociology, Ding Yu of archeology (2012, 2014) and Yang Tingzhi (2015) and Shen Xiaolei of

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8 For example, Li Anshan was invited by the Director-General of UNESCO, Ms. Irina Bokova on 8 November 2013 and became member of International Scientific Committee of UNESCO General History of Africa (Vol.9). He was elected as Vice Chair of the Committee at its 1st session, held at Salvador, Brazil, 20-24 November 2013.
Chinese anthropologists or social scientists went to Africa through different channels or did field work there, such as Si Lin and Xu Wei (Shi Lin 2012; Xu Wei 2012, 2014).

Academic Monographs by Young Scholars

A new generation of Africanists have more opportunities of international contact, favorable academic environment and better time for African study. Most of their works are revised PhD dissertations. Bi studied the linkage between Egyptian modernization and political stability, covering the period of 1805 to the 1990s, analyzed different political regimes, i.e., military regime and president regime, and related issues such as political participation, political parties, Islam, political violence, urbanization, Asyut. He also analyzed the impact of economy, unemployment and external factor on political stability (Bi Jiankang 2005). The first Chinese MA graduate on Hausa language awarded in Ahmadu Bello University of Nigeria, Sun published her PhD dissertation on British educational policy in north Nigeria during the colonial period. Based on her research on original data in both Hausa and English, she studied the interaction between power and language. Analyzing the language policy, examination system, development of Hausa and educational policy, the author explained how the British colonial government used Hausa language as a tool in its colonial administration (Sun Xiaomeng 2004, 2014). Luo published two related books and a new one on China’s responsibility. One analyzed the achievement, problem and perspective of African integration and also tried to explore the linkage between China-African relations and African integration process, and the other African Union’s relation with its member states in terms of development, economic cooperation, conflict management, foreign policy and its significance to the world (Luo Jianbo 2006, 2010, 2016).

Indigenous knowledge of Africa is a new subject and Zhang made a detail study of its role in various fields and its relation with development (Zhang Yonghong 2010). Li probed the history of the spread of Islam in West Africa and traced the historical origin of Islam in West Africa in ancient times, Jihad movement in the 19th century, Sufism, Islam during the colonial period and the contemporary time (Li Weijian 2011). Zhu excelled himself in the study of African law. Besides translation of related works, he also published two books on legal system (Zhu Weidong 2011, 2013). Jiang has studied the Sudan for a long time and his work on Darfur issue probed the causes, process, condition for peaceful solution and impact of the crisis (Jiang Hengkun 2014). Wang Tao studied the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda in terms of its origin, development, influence and its linkage with
international affairs (Wang Tao 2014). Based on knowledge of Arab and English languages, Huang Hui has studied Berberism in Algeria from different perspective (Huang Hui 2015).

Several important works in the study of African economy are written by young scholars. An studied poverty and anti-poverty in Africa focusing on theories, characteristics and origin of poverty, anti-poverty policies and measures, dynamics, international aid, etc. and concluded that pro-poor growth is the solution of poverty reduction (An Chunying 2010). Yang researched the linkage between liabilities and development in Africa from a perspective of international relations and he studied the theory, origin and development of debt in Africa, debt issue in international affairs and the effect and impact of debt-relief program, as well as adjustment of policy and development with debt (Yang Baorong 2011). Comparative advantage is a different perspective regarding African economic development. Liang analyzed its theory, different elements and change, the path of its upgrade, etc. and argued that Africa can develop only through its own path, not copying others (Liang Yijian 2014). Huang Meibo, an economist, has started research on African economy.

Annual Report, Memoirs and References

In China, associations and institutions of African studies have their academic activities annually and usually publish their works in a form of collection of papers.

Annual Report and Review

Chinese Association of African Studies (CAAS) published collection of papers almost annually, mostly focused on China-Africa relations (Chen Gongyuan 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010; Feng Zuoku & Chen Gongyuan 2008). CSAHS holds a conference annually and usually publishes a collection of papers. Different institutions of African studies publish annual reports or reviews regularly. The most important is Yellow Book of Middle East and Africa by IWWA of CASS, which has a focus each year. For example, the 2001-2002 yellow book is focused on “United and Self-strengthening Africa” (Yang Guang & Wen Boyou 2002), while 2004-2005 one is “Special Report on International Experiences for Prevention of Oil Crisis” (Yang Guang & Chen Mo 2005), 2006-2007 on the “History and Reality of China-African Relations” (Yang Guang & He Wenping 2007). Now the yellow book of the two regions is separated and one is entitled Yellow Book of Africa,


Memoirs and References

With the opening-up of China, this discipline gradually loosened up and officials started to write reminiscences or life memoires, especially after their retirement. Some diplomats with the experience of work in Africa contributed articles to a volume with a subtitle “A Glorious Passage of China-African Friendly Relations” (Lu Miaogeng, Huang Shejiao & Lin Ye 2006). Several series of diplomats serve as supplementary data. “Witness the History: Republican Ambassadors’ Narrations” is a series of ambassadors’ life experiences. Wang Shu told us his life as reporter in Africa during the late 1950s and the early 1960s, including his personal experience during the Congo incident (Wang Shu 2007). Guo Jing-an and Wu Jun’s work is included in “Diplomats Look at the World” series. As former Ambassador in Ghana, Guo described experience in African countries, e.g., the sever-up of diplomatic relations with Liberia because of Taiwan issue, his mission as special envoy in Somalia, and as an ambassador in Ghana (Guo Jing-an &
"Chinese Diplomats Series" attracts students of international relations. *Chinese Diplomats in Africa* includes 19 articles by diplomats who worked in African countries. The collection covers different topics, sacred "mission impossible" (Botswana), their suffering (Zambia), witnesses of important events in Ghana, Tanzania-Zambia railway, Cameroon and South Africa, reminiscences of their life, etc. (Li Tongcheng & Jin Buoxiong 2005). Former vice-premier and foreign minister Huang Hua, one of the early diplomats and Chinese Ambassador to Ghana and Egypt, also published his memoir (Huang Hua 2008). Several Ambassadors described their life in African countries vividly (Zhou Boping 2004; Jiang Xiang 2007; Yuan Nansheng 2011). A few Chinese ambassadors and diplomats in Africa also told their stories and reminiscences (Cheng Tao & Lu Miaogen 2013; Chinese Embassy in Rwanda 2013).

Former vice-premier Qian Qichen’s memoir is by no means less important, since he started his diplomatic career in Africa. Through Qian’s memoir, we know something which does not appear in other writings, such as President Jiang Zemin once wrote four letters to President Mandela, in order to promote friendship and establish diplomatic relations between China and South Africa (Qian Qichen 2003, 245-87). A report of the former-President Jiang Zeming’s visits abroad gives a vivid description of the President’s visits to African countries, especially his two important visits and talks with several African leaders in 1996 and 2002 (Zhong Zichen 2006). Former vice-minister of Commerce Wei Jianguo devoted most of his career to Africa and his book recorded different events and life experience (Wei Jianguo 2011).

Different dictionaries and encyclopedia have been published during this period of time. Two important dictionaries of diplomacy were most useful for their Africa related items. *Dictionary on China’s Diplomacy* contains various diplomatic contacts between China and Africa in history (Tang Jiaxuan 2000). *Dictionary on World’s Diplomacy* published in 2005 comprises important events, treaties and figures in African diplomacy (Qian Qichen 2005). The compilation of the *Encyclopedia of Overseas Chinese* with more than 15 million Chinese words was finished in 2002. The monumental work includes 12 volumes of different subjects and each volume contains some items in Chinese overseas in Africa (Zhou Nanjing 1999-2002). *Dictionary of World’s Educational Events* covers schools and educational events in Africa (Gu Mingyuan 2000).

Some writings by news reporters or travelers also provide valuable materials for African study. Their personal experiences in various events as witness resulted in some unique understanding of Africa (Wang Dongmei & Wang Guotai 2000; Zhang Yun 2000; Liang Yu 2000; Guo Chaoren
Chinese Africanists have always tried to introduce the best work of African studies to Chinese students. During the period, the translation of volume 5 (B.A. Ogot 2001) and volume 8 (A.A. Mazrui 2003) of the UNESCO *General History of Africa* marks the completion of the translation of the monumental work. For recent years, different presses are involved in the translation of books related to Africa issues. Commercial Press, as an oldest press with a long tradition of translation, started a project of World History Library by organizing an Editorial Committee. Now it has carefully selected more than seventy histories of countries, regions and continents, eleven being African history, i.e., history of Africa, North Africa, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, Zimbabwe and Somali, including a few African scholars such as Toyin Falola, Brian Raftopoulos & Alois Mlambo, Saheed A. Adejumobi, etc. Democracy and Construction Press published 20 books as a “Series of Translation of Africa” in 2015, covering economy, law, history, China-Africa relations, politics, society, ethnicity/ religion, culture/arts, etc. It tries to introduce African scholarship such as Nzongola-Ntalaja, Terreblanche, Opoku, etc. There are quite a few important books translated and the most impressive is *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History* by Ibn Khaldun.

### Conclusion and Afterthoughts

There are several new features regarding African studies during the past fifteen years. First, with the increase of monographs, more academics now concentrate on current situation such as politics, economy, culture and society, with economy at the top, and South Africa is the most studied state. Yet the proliferation of publication emphasized the importance of research quality which Chinese scholars have a long way to go. Secondly, various studies on African countries or related topics expand the interdisciplinary study which implies the significance of methodology, and long-time and solid field work with local language capability is very much needed. Thirdly, more Chinese scholars are engaged in international academic exchanges and their views are gradually catching attention from outside, yet this is
merely concentrated on China-African relations. Young scholars are growing up with better opportunity to study Africa and some have displayed their academic capability. Finally, many books by reporters and overseas Chinese about Africa came out with their adventures and personal experiences in Africa which enrich the understanding of Africa in China.

African study in China is promising, but needs more effort and hardworking.

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ABSTRACT
With fast development of China-Africa relations, Africanists outside China have showed great interest in China-Africa academic engagement. One of the important aspects is what has been done in China regarding African studies. Although China’s trade with Africa increased from $10.5 billion in 2000 to 220 billion in 2014, African studies in China did not have the fortune as the trade. However, the dramatic development of the relation has provided Chinese Africanists with new opportunities and challenges. This paper will elaborate what Chinese Africanists have studied in the period of 2000-2015. What subjects are they interested in? What are the achievements and weaknesses? It is divided into four parts, focus and new interests, achievements, young scholars, references and afterthoughts.

KEYWORDS
China-Africa; African studies; Chinese Africanists.

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TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN SECURITY & DEFENSE: BRAZIL’S PRESENCE IN AFRICA

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Introduction³

This article aims at reviewing the dynamics of foreign relations between Brazil and Africa, especially in terms of technical cooperation in Security & Defense⁴.

_Pari passu_ with the increase of foreign action, in a multipolar and asymmetric international environment, Brazil has been taking the role of prominent emerging country and has been seeking to participate in a more active way in the global security agenda. In this sense, its strategic surroundings constitute a priority area, where the country takes technical-military cooperation initiatives, such as military exchanges, Defense agreements and actions for peace enforcement and maintenance under the aegis of the United Nations⁵. Such actions can be conformed as tools

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³ According to a recent orientation by _The Scientific Electronic Library Online_ (SCIELO/FAPESP), the kind of participation of each author is specified as follows: author 1 took part in the conception of the research, in data collection, analysis and interpretation, as well as in the preliminary and final version of the text. Author 2 participated in the conception of the research, critical review and final version of the text.
⁴ For a better understanding of the term Defense, we suggest the conceptual analysis of Rudzit et Nogami (Rudzit and Nogami 2010). As for the term Security and its wider definition, we suggest works such as that of (Buzan and Hansen 2012).
⁵ Authors understand the actions taken in the scope of the United Nations as technical cooperation, as pointed out by (Valler Filho 2007) and ambassador (Soares 2015), in lectures
of Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP) to achieve the country’s insertion in the international scenario, as seen in the political (MD (Ministério da Defesa) 2012c) and strategic (MD (Ministério da Defesa) 2012a) planning as well as in public communication of the state to Brazilian society (MD (Ministério da Defesa) 2012b).

Africa is part of the Brazilian strategic surroundings, which is why it receives so much attention from state planning (Kenkel 2013; Gabrielli 2010; Acioly and Moraes 2011; Teixeira da Silva, Oliva Neto, and Torre 2014; Coutinho 2014), and why it has been increasingly considered as part of the national research agenda, especially in the area of Security & Defense (S&D) (Migon et al. 2014; Visentini, Pereira, and Migon 2014; Aguilar 2013; Pereira and Migon 2014; Martins, n.d.; Kenkel 2013). It is a strategic space with future perspectives (Ahlers, Kohli, and Sood 2013; Cilliers, Hughes, and Moyer 2011) and potential consequences for Brazil (Abdenur and Neto 2014). In terms of the S&D dynamics, it is important to consider that the region was hit as no other by the transformations of the world economy and politics, reason why the issue of security has become of primary importance for the continent (Penna Filho 2004b; Freitas and Araújo 2014) and even for the southern Atlantic space as a whole (Vaz and Migon 2013; Coutinho 2014).

In this sense, the worsening of the economic crisis and the withdrawal of international support to some regimes have resulted in a boost in African conflicts and the deepening of its economic crisis. With the escalation of these crises and with the almost live television broadcasts, the international community was forced to respond. The African situation was particularly affected by the deliberate retreat both by the United States and by former colonial Metropolitan states. Therefore, some of these responses are closely related to S&D, to the point that many of them have been taken as actions of Military Diplomacy.

This work intends to approach the actions of the Brazilian state in terms of technical cooperation for Security & Defense included in its agenda for the African continent. We will initially make a brief explanation of our scientific-methodological perspective, after which we will present aspects of the Brazil-Africa relations and of the African continent security agenda. In the end, the technical cooperation actions for Security & Defense will be analyzed in light of the agenda of the researched geographic space.

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6 Particularly in the post-Cold War period, as acknowledged by (Penna Filho 2004a; Visentini 2013a)

about the integration of Brazilian Defense and Foreign Policies.
Epistemological and methodological considerations

The scientific perspective taken transversally in this research was Complexity theory (Waldrop 1992; Mitchell 2009). It means that it is understood, on the first place, that the object of analysis displays the characteristics of a “complex system” (Newman 2009), that is, a reality with multiple actors, who interact and improve their behavior and decisions throughout time, making it difficult to establish direct and deterministic relationships of cause and effect. In other words, we suggest that the analysis of a complex reality should take into account not only the actors themselves, but also their relationships, including in terms of its dynamics throughout time.

In epistemological terms, it is about an effort to find a more encompassing view of social phenomena, going beyond the study of parts and seeking a better overall understanding. It seems to be the most adequate perspective when we (re)remember that social phenomena have a vast diversity of structures, interactions and agents and that from their inter-relationship emerge structures, learning, actions and reaction dynamics, changing processes etc. As a consequence, we verify that the reality of the complex systems cannot be described by a single rule, nor reduced to a single level of explanation.

More than a theory of the natural sciences, the possibilities of interpretation and the philosophic-scientific consequences of the paradigm that establishes that the whole is more than a sum of the parts offers the opportunity of a new world-view to a vast array of scientific areas, especially in the case of this article, to the Humanities and Applied Social Sciences (Byrne 1998; Bousquet 2009; Richardson, Mathieson, and Cilliers 2000; Richardson and Cilliers 2001).

In methodological terms, this is a qualitative research, supported by a systematic review of bibliographic and documentary references, which have been objects of qualitative content analysis (Bardin 1977). The time frame has not been rigid, but most attention was dedicated to the 20th and 21st centuries. The place of analysis was fixed as Brazil and its strategic places of interest in Africa, which is in a way a very wide a concept but allows for connecting different perspectives such as that of South Atlantic and that of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), for example.
Brazil-Africa relations

Brazil's relations with the African continent are relevant in terms of Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP) and Brazilian Defense Policy (Corrêa 2014), although, when a larger time frame is observed, it becomes imperative to emphasize that Brazil-Africa rapprochement shows more contours of discontinuity and alternation than continuity and progression, as one can conclude from the retrospective made available by Amorim Neto (2011). Such relations benefit from shared aspects, such as a colonial past, and from different points of arrival, such as Brazil's rise as a major economy with a medium power status and a different situation in the case of African countries.

Between the 16th and 19th centuries, there were strong links connecting Brazil and Africa, such as slave trade, which made Brazil the “second African nation”. After some time, and with the end of the slave trade, these ties would cease to exist. From the independence of African states, which happened especially throughout the 20th century, Brazil resumed this rapprochement, reaching its peak many years later (VISENTINI, 2013b).

Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy made an effort to internationalize Brazil and take it closer to new actors, having been planned during the Vargas and Kubitschek governments. From 1967, Brazil's African policy gained consistency. So, the Costa e Silva and Médici governments formulated a strategy for a Brazilian insertion in Africa in a politically independent way, which is exemplified by Brazilian recognition of Angola's independence (O. D. A. Melo, n.d.). Especially through economic and commercial partnerships (Santana 2003; V. D. S. de Melo 2011), Brazil-Africa relations acquire relevance as national foreign action.

During the 1970s, there was a certain degree of universality which allowed for Sub-Saharan Africa to be integrated to national strategic interests, a period that became known as Brazil's “Responsible Pragmatism”. During the 1980s, the constant economic crises that struck Brazil discouraged the momentum of the rapprochement with Africa, which was left with no more than the remaining spaces of the national agenda, a situation reversed on the following decades (Migon and Santos 2013). On the beginning of the 1990s, the rise of neoliberalism inaugurated a new phase of distance in the relations with Africa. On that time, the strategic view of the Washington Consensus followed by Brazilian elite attributed more importance to North-South relations than to South-South relations, keeping Africa in a secondary place (Santana 2003)(Visentini 2013b, 92).

During Itamar Franco's government (1992-1994), there was
again a sort of articulation with the African continent, an action of chancellors Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Celso Amorim. At that time, some countries were prioritized in terms of diplomatic efforts, such as South Africa, Angola and Nigeria. In 1993, the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) was reactivated and there was support for the reconstruction of some African countries through the participation in Peacekeeping Operations, especially in Angola (Coutinho 2014; Vaz and Migon 2013; C. O. Ribeiro 2008). More concrete cooperation initiatives with a security agenda appeared from then.

Still modest in the following government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), Africa’s place in Brazilian Ministry of External Relations counted with relevant initiatives and a relative change on FHC’s second mandate. From 1995, Brazilian Armed Forces participated in a more robust way on peacekeeping missions in Angola (UNAVEM III) and Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (Nasser 2012; Oliveira Junior and Góes 2010; Lannes 1998; Freitas and Araújo 2014).

It could be observed that the Brazil-Africa relationship has gone through moments of varying intensity. It could also be considered that Africa’s emergence in Brazil’s Ministry of External Relations happened when Brazil was focusing on its own internal problems and its development limitations, especially until the end of the last century. Until then, there was a prevalence of a rapprochement with South America and the appreciation of the terrestrial stand. As a consequence of political and economic stability, allied to Lula’s government’s vision, a resuming of African ties took place under the axis of the “South-South dialogue”. Such rapprochement was established under the incentive of a political stand and economic component, having been initially more focused on commercial trade itself than on the economic development of African partners (Migon and Santos 2013; Rizzi et al. 2011).

With its initial success and the increase of reciprocated awareness, the rapprochement dynamics was spilt to other sectors, such as partnerships in the area of healthcare, education, agriculture and security and defense. Territorial proximity, language convergence and a greater cultural similarity facilitated the option for Africa in Brazilian foreign relations. Many characteristics of Africa drove the attention of the Brazilian government, particularly from the time of Lula as president, who expanded the country’s relations with Africa as part of his logic of a Logistic State (Cervo and Lessa 2010). The existence of a promising consumer market, the lack of services, the need for infrastructure and the availability of workers constitute some of the examples of aspects that motivated growing interest from the Brazilian government.
There was a considerable increase on the amount of government action, which included presidential diplomacy, without, however, effectively integrating such reality to the formal national policies and strategies, especially in the area of security and defense. However, there were some initiatives in this sector, which will be approached in the current paper.

The African Security Agenda

As we have seen, Africa was one of the most affected regions of the world by the recent shifts in world economy and politics. Until the end of the Cold War, there was still a political and strategic interest in the continent, which raised hopes of resolution for the region’s problems. Subsequently, such interest decayed and the continent was left to its own devices, entangled in an almost generalized insolvency situation. The security issue then became of utmost importance. Given the state of deep political and economic uncertainty, African states could not solve its issues through institutional negotiation. Thus, a political crisis composed of destabilizing elements led to the employment of violent means of resolution, often bringing instability to a whole region (Penna Filho 2004b).

This context’s immediate consequences were disastrous for the African security agenda. It was characterized by the interference of neighbor countries on internal conflicts, the destruction of the continent’s already weakened economic structure, environmental devastation, death, huge population displacements, poverty perpetuation, low level of development of productive forces and an increase in the large gap between Africa and the developed world. One could state, thus, that the rise in African conflicts in the 1990 decade was clearly associated to the end of the Cold War.

At the same period, the international security studies’ concepts expanded in scope. Such concepts had emerged from post-World War II studies that discussed ways of protecting states against internal and external threats. Although difficult to define concisely, these studies focused on four structuring axes: a state-centered approach, the analysis of both external and internal threats, the expansion of security beyond the use of strength and the military dimension and the linkage between threats, dangers and urgency (Buzan and Hansen 2012).

After the collapse of the “real socialism” and the fall of the Berlin wall, along with the advance in the globalization process, the interest for anything related to Africa sunk. Naturally, the superpower involvement in African affairs typical of the world power balance fell brusquely. Africa’s situation only deteriorated with the worsening economic crisis and the withdrawal
of international support to some regimes. Such a complex scenario, that transcended the military field, validated the expanded concept of security brought up after the end of the Cold War.

The escalation of civil wars, the widespread ethnic killings, and the live transmissions made by CNN made urgent a response by the international community. It was carried through within the United Nations system, with the creation of numerous peace missions and a rise in humanitarian aid, developed by UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In fact, the UN’s participation in peacekeeping missions (with the employment of troops) in Africa rose from five cases in 1988 to its triple in 1994. The missions’ economic expenditure is also revealing: the values went from US$ 230 million in 1988 to US$ 3,6 billion in 1994 (Penna Filho 2004b). However, despite the role enacted by the United Nations in the continent, the results were not very encouraging. In fact, better results were not possible due to the way the UN executed the missions and the complexity of the conflicts, which generally had multiple and associated causes.

Africa shows a complex security structure (E. de B. Ribeiro 2010; Escorrega 2010; Santos 2011). Besides UN intervention, some African leaders tried another practice of conflict resolution. In this sense, regional African organizations, like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), implemented collective security measures. Since the end of the 1980s, Western Africa was strongly affected by internal conflicts with third party countries interference, which conferred them a much more complex scenario. The civil war in Liberia7 launched yet another model for conflict resolution which up to then had only been used in the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, executed under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS) and sponsored by the United States, in a very different context.

Therefore, considering the developed countries’ lack of interest for African affairs, regional leaders were impelled to seek solutions to the local challenges. Regionalism, in its security dimension, emerged as a viable solution for the entire African continent and for most peripheral regions of the world experiencing conflict. Such facts have arisen as the constitution of regional forces could become an extremely useful element for political stability and regional peace (Buzan and Wæver 2003).

Once created, regional security schemes relieved the economic burden related to military expenditures that relied upon a few states, decreased the possibilities of coups d’état, and rapidly became inhibitors to violent

7 Liberia is a small-proportioned state - 111,369 km2 and 2.7 millions inhabitants – and singular in African history for having been a pole of attraction to North American former slaves.
seizure of power by rebel political or ethnic groups. Furthermore, for the coming into effect of an international force which would have, for example, a greater knowledge of the local reality and a greater speed to take action, one of the requirements was a relatively long time for operationalization, which was often mentioned as one of the biggest obstacles of United Nations peace missions.

However, extremely sensitive issues arose when considering the creation of regional forces for interventions of any kind. Such a measure might have an opposite effect to the desired one, since it could raise suspicions against the action of regional powers, fueling differences and creating a climate conducive to regional instability. In addition, there were a number of other aspects pertinent to the theme, that generally were not considered when intervention actions took place. One was the question of the legitimacy of intervention: under what conditions can a regional organization intervene in a given country? Furthermore, what makes this intervention legitimate? The first intervention sponsored by an African regional grouping occurred on 24 August 1990 with the deployment of troops from the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in order to try to contain the crisis in Liberia. ECOMOG\(^8\) was employed on two more occasions: in an attempt to resolve conflicts in Sierra Leone (1997) and in Guinea-Bissau (1998).

In consideration of all these obstacles, bilateral and/or multilateral initiatives have been seen as good solutions to optimize the complex security agenda of the African continent. Brazil, for reasons already explained, was able to take advantage, in both the bilateral and multilateral plans, and intervene in the security agenda of the African continent, which was part of its strategic environment. These initiatives will be dealt with in the next section.

Technical Cooperation in Security & Defense: Brazil’s presence in Africa

With the rise of decolonization in the 1960s, armed conflicts broke out in search for the political independence of the colonized societies of the African continent. Such disputes have provoked destabilization in the region, as seen previously. As a result of this process, a greater number of national states emerged, increasing the participation of Africa in the international system.

Brazilian participation in Africa’s agenda has occurred for about five
decades based on a national strategy approach, rather than on intermittent or opportunistic initiatives. This relates to the fact that Brazilian participation in the continent has remained regardless of which political groups took power. However, it is necessary to emphasize that although constituting strategic long-term actions, the initiatives had some particularities depending on the situational political project. Following this approach, it might be important to highlight the paradigm of the Logistic State, in which the economic aspects of the process have been privileged over safety issues (Cervo 2003), a policy that seems to be reversed within the scope of the CPLP, especially in light of the existing proposals in the National Defense Strategy of Brazil (Miyamoto 2009).

However, Security and Defense cooperation initiatives have emerged. In this context, the Brazilian initiative for the establishment of a Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic, ZOPACAS, proposed in the United Nations General Assembly in 1986, deserves to be mentioned. ZOPACAS is composed of 24 countries on both sides of the Atlantic. This initiative sought to expand cooperation in various fields, including defense (Miyamoto 1987). The UN General Assembly formalized the practice through Resolution 41/11, even with the abstention of the United States of America. This mechanism has gained momentum since 2007 with a meeting in Luanda. The process of revitalizing the organization continued during the VII Ministerial Meeting held in Montevideo on January 15, 2013, which approved a statement on international policy issues and a plan of action.

In considering that ZOPACAS should dispense with extra-regional actors to guarantee an environment of peace and cooperation, it became necessary for the region’s states to hold the means needed to guarantee those objectives, precisely in order to minimize the possibility of interference. Under these circumstances, the existence of naval powers adequate for regional actions against neo-traditional threats, as well as the good relationship of Brazilian and Argentine navies, was fundamental. Issues regarding the use of space and the use of the sea were also effectively discussed with the African states. The use of the sea, being of more pragmatic relevance, was debated not only within the context of ZOPACAS, but also, in a broad way, in the sphere of the CPLP, within which the “strategy for the oceans” was launched.

One of the great contributions to the optimization of the African security agenda took place in the scope of the United Nations. In the 1960s, Brazilian contribution was limited to the assignment of military personnel

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9 According to Soares (2015), the Ministry of Defense understands Brazil's participation in Peace Operations as one of the country's most important vectors of cooperation and projection in the international scenario, in particular regarding the Brazilian Defense and Foreign Policies.
- notably the deployment of troops to operate in Egypt (UNEF I) and the provision of air support services in the Congo (ONUC). Since the 1990s, Brazilian contribution has gained new impetus, since it has made available to the organization military, civil, and police personnel, in addition to the regular assignment of military personnel - mainly through the deployment of troops to Angola (UNAVEM III) and Mozambique (ONUMOZ). According to Kenkel (2013), in order to signal interest in UN issues and demonstrate democracy and status credentials, Brazil has gradually increased its deployment of troops to United Nations Operations in the 1980s and 1990s, including large contingents in Mozambique and Angola. It is noticeable that the Brazilian state considers Peace Operations as an element of the country’s international projection, conferring to Africa a certain priority, due to regional fragilities that demand such operations as well as to the intentionality and synergy of foreign and defense policies regarding a national strategic area of interest (Campos 2015; Rito 2013).

According to Rocha and Góes (2010), when analyzing the profile of Brazil’s actions in the most recent peace operations, three aspects stand out: special attention to development cooperation, especially in missions governed by Chapter VII of the UN Charter, i.e. when the use of force is authorized to restore order; consideration of regional issues, cultural ties and the possibility of involving group diplomacy; and once the decision to participate is taking, privileging the means based on personnel, supply and transportation, in spite of financial contributions. Such facts were notorious in the Brazilian participation in Peace Operations in Africa. This is also in line with the long-term objectives of Brazilian foreign policy, which seeks to strengthen Brazil’s leadership status in the world, particularly among developing countries.

There are currently nine UN interventions underway in the African continent: UNMISS (in South Sudan), UNISFA (in Abyei), UNAMID (in Darfur), MINUSCA (in the Central African Republic), MONUSCO (Congo), UNOCI (in Côte d’Ivoire), UNMIL (in Liberia), MINURSO (in Western Sahara) and MINURCAT (in the Central African Republic). Noteworthy is the fact that there are only sixteen missions of this nature in the world, that is, more than half of these operations take place on African soil. Brazil participates in six of such missions: those in South Sudan, Abyei, Liberia, Western Sahara, Côte d’Ivoire and Central African Republic. Additionally, it partook in the now extinct missions in Uganda, Rwanda, Mozambique, Angola, among others. There is therefore a greater presence in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as a preferential deployment of Military Observers, under Chapter VI of the UN Charter10.

10 For more detailed information on the Brazilian participation in peacekeeping missions in Africa, like personnel figures and time periods, we suggest consulting Ferreira (2016).
In terms of technical-military cooperation, it is worth highlighting a significant increase in formal instruments between Brazil and the countries of the region in the period between 2003 and 2013. A total of nine defense cooperation agreements in general were signed with partners such as Angola (2010), Guinea-Bissau (2006), Mozambique (2009), Namibia (2009), Nigeria (2010), Sao Tome and Principe (2010), Senegal (2010) and South Africa (2003) (Seabra and Seabra 2014). The naval partnership with Namibia and South Africa is particularly remarkable, as well as some academic exchanges with Mozambique, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe and Cape Verde. In addition, there are specific defense agreements signed with these countries and also with Equatorial Guinea, Senegal, Cape Verde and, jointly with the CPLP organization, Guinea-Bissau (Abdenur and de Souza Neto 2013; Barroso 2010). Brazilian trainers and specialized troops cooperate with several African countries in the area of humanitarian demining (Borlina 2015) and in the fight against maritime pollution, while multilateral exercises have been conducted within the framework of the CPLP, namely the FELINO Exercise. In Cape Verde, the Air Force takes part in the assistance of air and sea surveillance (Migon and Santos 2013).

As to the defense industrial sector, Brazil’s presence took place through companies, such as Embraer and Engepron, with a predominantly commercial approach, although there are joint projects, such as the hydrographic survey of the Namibian continental shelf. This is yet another way through which Brazil has developed initiatives aimed at reducing the problems of the complex security agenda of the African continent.

**Final considerations**

Africa’s security agenda is widely complex and was strongly influenced by the end of the Cold War, the same period of reemergence of International Security studies on the academy (Buzan and Hansen 2012). The wider scope adopted in these studies fit perfectly the African continent, since it presented many of the components of a new security framework.

The relationship between Brazil and Africa is quite old and has gone through times of greater and lesser exchange. From slavery, through the rapprochement conducted by the military governments, the typical stagnation of the 1980s, the ascension of the 1990s, and the peak during President Lula’s administration, Brazil has made itself present in a continent that not only shares a common colonial history, but is also part of its strategic environment.

The variety of colonizers, the hasty and ill-conducted process of decolonization and typical Cold War circumstances all led to the emergence
and deepening of conflicts throughout Africa and its consequences. All parts of the African society consequently suffered with decades of isolation and institutional failure. Naturally, all these happenings had a brutal effect on the continent’s security agenda.

This article has brought up both bilateral and multilateral Brazilian initiatives in the security and defense sector taken in order to cooperate with the African security agenda. It can be concluded, however, that these initiatives were hardly expressive. Should there be a political interest in it, more concrete and systematic actions would be necessary, like signing new multilateral agreements, strengthening already existing ones and developing new cooperation initiatives. Brazilian foreign policy has generally demonstrated caution regarding the expansion of its military diplomacy and its participation in conflict mediation in Africa.

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Technical cooperation in security & defense: Brazil’s presence in Africa

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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to review the dynamics of the Brazil-Africa relations, specifically regarding technical cooperation in Defense, emphasizing the 20th and 21st centuries. As part of Brazil’s strategic surroundings, Africa attracts the attention of Brazil and has been increasingly considered as part of the national research agenda, especially in the Security & Defense area. In this sense, it should be noted that the region has been struck like no other by the changes in world economy and politics; for that reason, such issues have become central to the continent and South Atlantic area as a whole.

KEYWORDS
Security & Defense; Brazilian Foreign Policy; National Defense Policy; Brazil-Africa Relations.

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CUBA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA: IDEALISM OR PRAGMATISM?

Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira

There is a complexity in the difficulty of revolutionary development. Socialism needs productive forces and social and cultural awareness. In order to do so, it is up to the socialist state to assist and sympathize with development, giving the “aspiring” socialist state political, cultural and military support. But the progress of one state should be the result of its own people’s work.

(Yuri Andropov, 1983)

The connection between Cubans and Africans can be defined as a successful South-South Cooperation experience, which has assured political and military advantages in the short term, both for Cubans and for Africans, at a relatively reduced cost, making it a topic for further study. The small Cuban state, individually or through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Soviet Union (USSR), was able to develop a middle power policy, with high military impact. There is a wide variety of studies about the relations of great powers and former Metropolitan states with Africa and, more recently, about the relations of China, India, Brazil and some Arab countries within the continent, but few of them are about Cuba. Apart from this, regimes like the one in Angola, as a way of fostering greater internal and international legitimacy, nowadays produce a historiography which reduces Cuban participation in African political processes to the minimum.

In this sense, it is important to observe an exceptionality of African foreign relations – cooperation with Cuba. Cuba was the only economically underdeveloped state which carried out, effectively, an African policy comparable to that of great powers. Either on its own account or as part of an alliance with the USSR, the Cuban role in Africa was unprecedented.

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Never another Third World country projected its power so far beyond its neighborhood. Intercontinental intervention referred to an attitude of superpowers, of few European countries and of China (whose role was smaller than Cuba’s until recently). It is important to observe as well that Cuban-African cooperation has been maintained (although it has suffered a reduction) during the critical period of the 1990s, acquiring renewed strength on the 2000s.

The conditioning factors of Cuban African policy

Cuban revolutionary movement, while fighting for power in a “neocolonial” state, reinforced itself with the advancement of African national liberation movements. Cubans and Africans were in touch before the development of revolutionary processes (in Cuba and in Africa), having the taking of Havana been simultaneous to the African independences, happening just a year before the “Year of Africa”. As a result of the radicalization of the revolutionary process, Cuba was soon isolated in Latin America (to the point of reducing its relations only to Mexico), and, upon defining itself as a socialist state, approached the USSR. In this context took place the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, which had the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, defined in Bandung, as its bedrock, with an anti-hegemonic profile and based in a non-socialist internationalism which supported emerging nationalism. However, the Cuban Revolution’s poorly calculated radicalism ended up distancing it from the USSR, without achieving a closer relationship with China (Kapcia 2008). Havana, thus, would eventually emphasize its revolutionary third-world profile in spite of its socialist profile.

Cuban involvement in the Third World was characterized by idealism and pragmatism, despite the fact that, in many moments, the Realpolitik expressed itself in a more powerful way than the idealist aspect. Anyways, Cuban presence in the African continent has combined these two factors. Although the links between Cubans and Africans date back to the second half of the 1970 decade, Cuban policy towards Africa was only asserted from the so-called Operation Carlota, in Angola. From 1975 onwards, Cuba’s relations with the African continent were resized, having reaffirmed themselves in Ethiopia, in 1977, and having impacted anti-apartheid movements in South Africa (especially the South African Communist Party), just to cite two of the main Cuban lines of action.

Until 1945, Africa was almost completely divided in European possessions. Approximately 15 years later, most of the territories were...
already independent. For Europeans, the maintenance of the colonial rule collided with the discontent caused by two World Wars, although new forms of domination (neocolonial) were created to assure profitable relationships. European policy in Africa was maintained, in many cases, through a multilateral approach, despite the presence of new and important actors in the continent – USA and USSR. North Americans, as a result of the détente’s erosion, came to see the African continent as an unstable and explosive area. They thought that political immaturity and resentment against the West could turn the new African countries towards the USSR or China. The African space, from then, became a stage for the Cold War.

The founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 gave power and relevance to the continent and produced impacts on the international setting. The United States had to cover up protests in its territory for African-American Civil Rights and closely watch the African continent. However, the United States also had two advantages – they were better prepared than the USSR and its European allies to help the new states economically, and they counted on the former metropolises, France and the United Kingdom, to take “new responsibilities” in Africa. Nonetheless, USA’s European allies often made American policy harder to be put to practice, as in the case of Portugal, who denied any possibility of abandoning its colonies without fighting.

The West’s concern with African political evolution or with the ability of the other side of the balance of power to influence African politics was related to the role that the USSR or China could play in that continent, but was not related to the role of Cuba, whose only link to the continent was represented by slaves who once arrived from African to work on the other side of the Atlantic. And yet the Cuban government was thinking of it. Two years after its revolution, Cuba was already sending medical and military support to rebels in Algeria in 1962. It was the beginning of Cuba’s important role in Africa.

Despite its dependency in certain areas – the soviet help prevented Cuban economy from collapsing and its supply of weapons guaranteed the island’s integrity –, Cuba did not want to submit itself to the USSR. According to the view of Cuban policymakers, the USSR was looking for a “settlement” with the USA, which affected its support to revolutionary movements in the Third World. Actually, Cubans felt free to criticize the United States and pursue their own policies. Their dependence from a foreign power’s economic and military help, in this sense, deepened the Revolution’s permanent need to reaffirm itself.

In 1964, Che Guevara went to Africa with a project which showed Cuban interest in the region more clearly. The idea that a revolution
in Africa was imminent due to the instability in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Congo and Zaire, made Cubans believe in the importance of establishing a policy towards Africa. Che’s journey was monitored by the United States through the CIA which, in order to contain revolutionary movement, supported and sent white mercenaries to Africa. In 1965, there were 400 Cuban soldiers in central Africa, especially in Zaire and Congo, but also in Angola (Gleijeses 2003). Cubans aimed at rising to prominence within the Non-Aligned Movement and making socialist countries support their foreign policy.

Cuban Revolution’s Internationalism, or rather Third-Worldism, acquired an institutionalized profile after the Tricontinental Conference was held in Havana in 1966, gathering national liberation movements and progressive governments. It originated the Organization of Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) was also created in order to coordinate the support from the continent’s Left to Cuba and to guerrilla actions. At the first summit meeting, Guevara urged the creation of “two, three, many Vietnams”. Soon after that, he left Cuba, and it was said that he had been killed by Fidel. But he had decided to engage in the revolution in other countries, traveling throughout Africa and then Bolivia, where he was captured and killed in 1967. He became an iconic public figure, revered worldwide for a certain revolutionary romanticism, but which contained the basic values of socialism.

For Western scholars, Cuban-African relations are focused in terms of their military aspect. However, this focus neglects other important aspects, especially the political and civil cooperation ones, which are rooted in the relationship. In comparative terms, Cuba’s policy towards Africa was sustained and coherent, a commitment previous to Cuba’s alliance with the USSR and transcending it in a way. Thus, it becomes important to observe the motivations for Cuban action and for the establishment of its diplomacy. If, on the one hand, world powers tried to create areas of influence or even to promote a distribution of power, on the other, African political elites, often pressured by domestic problems and conflicts, frequently searched for external support. Actually, it is about the dialectic between African autonomy and foreign intervention. Africans tried to increase their freedom of action while great powers tried to intervene according to their own agendas. Thus, African interests for autonomy and development have been conditioned by the global logics of rivalry among the main powers.
Cuba’s “great diplomacy”

With the expansion of decolonizing processes in the African continent, West-East rivalry represented a considerable change in the external environment for new African states. The Cold War thus conducted the USA and the USSR to the condition of main actors in African international relations. While Europe preserved its essentially commercial relationship, rival superpowers entered the continent through the political sphere. For the USSR, decolonization of African countries meant an opportunity of forging links with new states, especially those where strong anti-imperialist movements arose. As for the USA, African independencies offered an opportunity for maintaining European ex-colonies in the Western area of influence. However, their reduced experience and little knowledge of Africa made superpowers stumble upon their African policy, while their military and economic abilities were important to establish their roles in the continent.

Cuba’s identification as a Third World country and its isolation in Latin America increased, in terms of external relations, its empathy for the region and the idea that it had a special role to develop in that space. Soviets and Eastern Europeans, richer and whiter, or Chinese, who didn’t understand a culture so different from their own, distinguished themselves from Cubans, who had the ability to project themselves in the Black continent. With a population of Latin-Americans descended from Africans, being poorer and threatened by a powerful enemy, as well as being a socialist state sensitive to Third World problems, Cuba tried to take a stand in a world in conflict between developed and non-developed and in the anti-imperialist struggle.

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2 It is important to emphasize that, from 1960 to 1990, French policy remained strong in Africa. The African Empire was one of the greatest historical French conquests, especially from 1830 onwards, when they arrived at Algeria. By the end of the XIX century, France took control of a vast part of the Sahara, the Sahel and the Atlantic Coast, extending its presence all the way until Congo, to the South. In the following 20 years, France conquered protectorates in Morocco, Togo and Cameroon. This extensive rule through the seas was crucial for the wealth of “Free France”, under the leadership of General Charles De Gaulle, during the Second World War. When President De Gaulle later managed the decolonization of this empire, he was very careful to preserve a close relationship with “Francophone Africa”. De Gaulle and his successors had created a “club” environment, which offered prestige to the elites of francophone states. The French kept their military bases in former colonies and kept supplying them with weapons and police and military training. However, France was not the only neither the main supplier of weapons to countries in the “francophone club”. The USSR took the position of main weapon supplier for the region. It is important to highlight that francophone elites got used to the special treatment they received from the French government at the highest level. The maintenance of this relationship was actually the French alternative to superpowers’ hegemony. See Chazan et al. (1992) and Visentini (2010).
For this reason, Cuba’s policy towards Africa can be described with the following dominant characteristics: a) coherence – correspondence between political discourse and concrete action; b) immutability – permanence of basic principles throughout the years despite of the need for certain adjustments and changes; c) adaptability – the capacity to operate in changing contexts and conditions which affected Africa and Cuba in general. Cuba had as its main purpose the promotion of revolutionary processes and the survival of the Cuban Revolution. So, it was important to make Cuba viable and to preserve its independent status and prestige. Being a small country and suffering from the imposition of a policy of undeclared war, Cuban political leaders believed that if revolution happened in the African continent, the United States would be obliged to accept and negotiate with new revolutionary countries. These two dynamos – self-preservation and revolutionary zeal – were the bases of Cuban foreign policy.

On the other hand, African states rapidly reached 27% of United Nations’ seats and represented a third of Non-Aligned countries. Africa, in this sense, became a viable area for the projection of the Cuban Revolution. The cultural revolution in Cuba allowed the offer of help for Africans and for the involvement in revolutionary processes, as well as in wars, in a way that didn’t disturb internal cohesion or revolutionary ideology. On the contrary, it was a permanent tool for reaffirming the Revolution’s purposes.

The greatest proof of Cuban internationalism took place in Angola. In 1975, the MPLA, threatened by two rival groups, FNLA and UNITA – the former supported by China and the latter by the United States and South Africa – turned to Cuba for support. Due to the connection of their leaderships, MPLA, in the person of president Agostinho Neto, required Cuban military assistance when UNITA rebels advanced to the capital with South African military support. Before sending troops to Angola, Fidel asked for Brezhnev’s support. On the one hand, this was a new situation for Cuba, because the country had never asked for support to accomplish a military operation before, but on the other, Havana also had never accomplished such a large operation in another continent. Asking for the USSR’s help was reasonable at that moment. However, the USSR denied support and Cuba found itself in a position of either intervening or sealing the fate of the MPLA. In that way, and at a crucial time, the Cuban government sent troops without Soviet support, at the risk of not receiving any endorsement. Havana launched, then, the so-called Carlota Operation.

In November 1975, 4,000 Cubans disembarked at the Luanda coast. Within weeks, the troops grew to 7,000 with logistic support from

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3 These ideas are based on López (2002).
Cuba’s foreign policy towards Africa: idealism or pragmatism?

the Soviets, who were convinced to get involved in the conflict. The military power eventually grew to 20,000 men. In 1976, the Soviets signed many economic agreements with Cuba, which included the shipping of more sophisticated weaponry to Havana. Cuban action in Angola was successful, resulting in a popularity and legitimacy increase for the Cuban Revolution and government, both inside and outside of the country. Cubans admired the role that their country, however small and suffocated by superpowers rivalry, was playing, sacrificing itself in order to help liberate a former colony and, on top of that, being able to resist the powerful aggressions and military might of South Africa and the United States of America. Resisting the United States’ siege at home was one thing. But resisting this siege in another front was something greater, especially when the hateful South African racist regime was being defeated as well.

Another great intervention occurred in Ethiopia in 1977-1978. Cubans were called to support Mengistu Haile Mariam’s revolutionary government alongside Soviet experts. From December 1977 to April 1978, Cuban troops went from 400 to 16,000 combatants (Azicri 1988). The conflict had started in Somalia, which had obtained North American assistance. Initially, Cubans were reluctant to get involved, for Somalia was an old ally and a Third World country. A great effort was made to avoid conflict; Fidel met with Ethiopians, Eritreans and Somalis, trying to create a Socialist Federation between them, but it wasn’t possible. Cuban forces fought well – they reversed the war in Ethiopia in seven weeks and in Angola in ten weeks. However, due to the fact that the conflict in Ethiopia occurred between two Third World nations and that the USSR got involved, Cuba’s role in Angola received greater attention.

There were more Cuban military actions in Africa, such as the support of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) and the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), in Namibia. So, by the end of the 1970s, Cuba maintained personnel in various American, African and Asian countries. However, disappointment and the new world conjuncture of the end of the 1970s led Cubans to a less active state and a position closer to the USSR. Rushed observers affirmed that Cuba had lost its enthusiasm for Revolution, and so had lost its heterodox commitment to it. What was happening, though, was that it took a more consistent and pragmatic attitude, in face of the world’s transformation. Previously, Cuba, isolated, had nothing to lose. Now, in a new context, and after many victories by the Revolution, it was necessary to preserve itself in order to survive. However, these aspects did not mean the end of Cuba’s policy towards Africa, nor of Cuba’s third-world profile, for example. It was precisely in this framework that Africa became a fruitful place to
demonstrate its commitment to the Revolution.

Crisis and resizing of Cuban-African cooperation

The ideals defended by Cuba – the principle of sovereign equality among nations; multiple solidarity towards underdeveloped countries; and support to national liberation movements all over the world – drafted the dominant traits of its policy towards Africa. Nevertheless, if revolutionary internationalism is a result of revolutions, this is also valid for its opposite – counterrevolutionary internationalism.

It is important to remember that in the passage of the 1980s decade to the 1990s, with socialist countries in a defensive position, Washington developed the strategy of low-intensity conflict, initiating a vigorous counterrevolution in the Third World. The end of the bipolarity made the African continent lose its strategic importance and its capacity of bargaining. In this context, African states suffered greatly from the effects of the crisis and restructuring of capitalist world-economy, which started in the 1970s. Due to African countries’ fragility and vulnerability, as well as their inability to react in an articulated manner, it was inevitable to resort to world financial organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Africa was entering the so-called “lost decade”, shrinking economically, resulting in profound social crisis. Obviously, the end of the bipolarity also affected the Cuban state in an essential point – the revolutionary force that was obtained, in a way, through Cuban presence in the Third World. However, Cuban presence in Africa from the 1960s and the maintenance of the cooperation scheme after the Cold War revealed the conditions of adaptability to the local reality, expressed by the modest conditions which Cuban technicians and specialists lived in and the high level of integration and acceptance which they achieved (López 2002).

Another important aspect to consider is the Cuban respect for organizations which acted in favor of international solidarity. When the Organization of African Unity was founded and the groups that preceded it were dissolved, Cuban policy always took into account the positions of this Organization and extended its support to the unity of the continent in the landmarks of the Third World, the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and anti-apartheid struggles. Cuban official discourse highlighted as main virtue of the OAU the absence of neocolonial powers in it. Another reason for Cuban respect for the Organization was in terms of its defense of sovereignty, non-interference of external actors in internal issues, as well as the general principles of International Law. It is important to emphasize that when Cuba
took troops to Africa, the role of its contingent was limited to defend the country. There was a clear orientation of no involvement in internal fights or in counterinsurgency missions. When external aggression or threat ceased, Cuban troops promptly abandoned the territory. Thus, for instance, Cubans played a key role in negotiating Namibia’s independence and, consequently, the end of apartheid in South Africa. The clear counterpart was revealed in the form of diplomatic support of African countries to Cuba, voting against the embargo and against the accusation (condemning) of human rights violation at the UN.

The post-Cold War era presented a new moment of difficulties for Cuba and for African countries, but, at the same time, it created new conditions for its international integration. In comparative terms, if 2001 produced some sort of international collapse due to the so-called War on Terror sponsored by the USA, in Africa the creation of the African Union (AU) and, the following year, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), projected the continent positively. If we take into account the transformation of the international system, we will notice that some African states consolidated as medium powers and, among these, some acquired the status of regional powers. At the same time, to the extent that wars in Africa ended, Cuban cooperation expanded to other beneficiaries. In 2000, at the G-77 South Summit, in Havana, many African countries of relative economic power committed themselves to contributing to a fund which would allow 3,000 Cuban doctors to act in Africa. So, until 2000, out of 138,805 Cuban civil technicians working abroad, 76,771 (55%) were operating in Africa. In August 2008 there were 1,886 Cuban cooperation workers in 30 African countries (López 2002).

In this perspective, taking a more far-reaching and collective posture has converted into an important objective for the African regional group, as well as for Cubans. African leaders were obliged to make an effort in this sense. They understood too well the consequences of unequal power relations, so as not to work for a movement towards equal relations. This perspective explains, in part, the reason why, even in times of galloping neoliberalism, it was important to maintain the cooperation with Cuba. Despite the prognosis of the collapse of Cuban-African cooperation because of the serious economic crisis of the 1990s, relations were maintained even in an unfavorable setting. Between 1990 and 1999, Cuban-African cooperation suffered a resizing and readjustment according to new circumstances. However, the impact of the formation of generations of technicians, specialists and even politicians in current African context guarantees a new phase for Cuban-African relations.

Gradually, democratization processes, alongside attempts of
conflict resolution and civil wars, meant an important step towards the construction of a new political and economic setting which can be translated into development opportunities. In this context, Cubans are important actors, although their presence in the continent has been relegated to the background by most of the specialized literature. Nevertheless, it remains to be comprehended how a small country, with no material resources and with the task of constructing its own state foundations, was able to develop a permanent and decisive role in contemporary international relations. Today, Cuba has diplomatic relations with 51 out of the 54 African countries; it hosts diplomatic missions in 23 African countries; it counts with embassies in 30 of the continent’s countries; and not to speak of its cooperation in educational development (Isle of Youth). Between 1961 and 2007, 30,719 students from 42 Sub-Saharan African countries graduated in Cuba – 17,906 from high school; 12,813 from a bachelor degree; 5,850 were educated by Cuban specialists. The Cuban literacy program, which is carried out in five Sub-Saharan African countries and has reached 73,000 people so far, has more than 7,000 currently enrolled.

In terms of healthcare, between 1960 and 2000, 138,805 Cuban civil technicians had worked abroad, out of which 76,771 (55%) in Africa; 2,809 Cuban specialists had worked in 84 different countries, out of which 1,157 in Africa up to 1998. The Universal Healthcare Program gave coverage to more than 48 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa (almost 20% of the population); 5,463 Cuban cooperation workers fulfilled 42 million health appointments, 6 million home assistances, 600,000 birth assistances, 1.7 million surgical activities and applied over 5 million vaccines. Operation Miracle recovered the eyesight of 6,247 patients in an ophthalmological center in Mali and of 1,065 Angolans. Entrepreneurial Group Biological and Pharmaceutical Laboratories (Labiofam) works on transferring technologies for the development of nations in the continent (the Group also works for the elimination of malaria). There are still possibilities of cooperation in sectors such as biotechnology, commerce and investments.

It remains necessary, however, to establish the essential elements of the formation of the revolutionary state, of its foreign policy guidelines for these states, and, fundamentally, of social conflict as an international issue. According to Fred Halliday, “there is an assumption that the objectives of revolutionary states are similar to those of other states (...)”. However, according to the scholar, “all revolutionary states, with almost no exception, have tried to promote revolution in other states. The challenge they have posed for the international system doesn’t reside in a new form of diplomacy or interstate relations, but in the very content of their foreign policy which prioritizes and sees almost as a right or obligation the transformation of
social and political relations of other states” (1999). It is upon this reality that lies the historic Cuban-African relations.

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ABSTRACT
Cuban-African relations are marked by traits of exceptionality. The Cuban Revolution coincides, in terms of time, with the intensification of the decolonization process in Africa. From the first years of the Revolution, Cuba has defined its line of action in the African continent, marked by civil and military cooperation. Cuban African policy was, in this way, defined by self-preservation and revolutionary zeal.

KEYWORDS
Cuban foreign policy; Africa; South-South Cooperation.

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THE ROLE OF AFRICA IN THE NEW MARITIME SILK ROAD

Diego Pautasso

Introduction

The OBOR (One Belt, One Road) Initiative, also known as the “New Silk Road”, was revealed in the second semester of 2013 by the Chinese President Xi Jinping. It is the most ambitious Chinese project towards the country’s international insertion. As highlighted by Yiwei (2016), this project presents itself as an alternative to the American way of conducting the process of globalization, which he sees as unsustainable.

Regardless of the official rhetoric, it is a fact that such initiative has the potential to establish a new order not only in Eurasia, but also in the entire international system. Despite the contradictions which divide the rhetoric from the practices, the intentions from the reality, it seems plausible to suggest that the Chinese insertion strategy differs from the strategy adopted by the United States. Beyond its willingness to shed light on such background issues, the present academic paper aims at understanding how the Chinese diplomacy has been trying to adjust its OBOR Initiative to its policy towards Africa. All in all, it intends to perceive how the re-emergence of Asia, with China in its center core, is shaping the systemic transition (Arrighi 2008, 17).

For this purpose, in the first section of the paper, the main elements of the Chinese international insertion, which is progressively getting more assertive, are presented. In the second one, there is an explanation on the features of the New Silk Road, as well as on the capabilities and objectives of its implementation. In the third part of the text, we revisit a few core aspects of the Chinese policy towards Africa, looking forward to understanding eventually which is the role of the continent within the new maritime Silk

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When the New China emerged, after the Revolution of 1949, it paved the way to a multifaceted and sinuous process of national reconstruction. The first generation of leaders, led by Mao Zedong, turned the country into an independent nation, resumed territorial integration and established the landmarks to base industries and infrastructure (transportation, communications and energy). The second generation, whose leader was Deng Xiaoping, shaped the Chinese economic reform in the mid-1970s, which opened the country to the world, resumed the process of accelerated growth, internalized technology, reduced the gap in terms of the developed countries and created a new institutional framework to the country. The third generation, under Jiang Zemin’s administration (1993-2003), had to face two challenges: (i) resist the situation resulting from the collapse of the Soviet sphere of influence; (ii) and not only maintain the measures proposed by Deng, but also strengthen them.

From the twenty-first century onwards, along with Hu Jintao’s fourth generation (2003-2013) and with Xi Jinping’s fifth’s (2013-present), the Chinese international projection acquired new shapes. As stated by Visentini (2011, 131), if the consolidation of the New China represented the recovery of the country’s sovereignty and the establishment of the landmarks for the further national development, a “Brand New” China, after the Reforms, begins to transform the international order itself. The challenges faced by China are complicated, since the country has to deal not only with the contradictions of the Post-Cold War world, but also with the aging of the contemporary capitalism and its historical cores.

Alongside the process of national solidification, China started to exert a more important role within international organizations, as it is the example of the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 and the more significant role it started to play within the IMF. Besides, Chinese leadership towards regional integration is also worth pointing out. According to Zhao (2013), Chinese diplomacy became more assertive over time, giving up on Deng’s traditional low-profile foreign policy, especially when it comes to crucial matters of national interest, such as the country’s presence in Africa and security issues involving the South China Sea. China has been building objective and subjective conditions in order to develop an active multilateral diplomacy, giving up on its supporting player condition to exert a leading figure and to take on great responsibilities (Tianquan 2012, 182).
Towards this direction, regional assertiveness and activism are preconditions to consolidate the Chinese role as a superpower. That is why conducting and leading the processes of regional integration is so important, be it towards the Pacific (ASEAN Plus Three and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, also called ASEAN+6) or towards Eurasia (Shanghai Cooperation Organization). The New Mainland and Maritime Silk Road (One Belt, One Road), let on by the Chinese government, intends to set the infrastructure and the political plea to integrate the entire region of Eurasia. In other words, the argument that China is rebuilding a “sinocentric” system is getting stronger (Pautasso 2011).

Hence, it is clear that China has been proclaiming a rhetoric that aims at legitimizing its rise. Firstly, the concept of Peaceful Rise, forged by Zheng Bijian, a prominent member of the Communist Party of China, in 2002. This concept was also created as a response to the frequent assertions of “Chinese threat” or “Chinese breakdown”. However, the concept was rejected, among other reasons, because it would arouse mistrust among neighboring countries due to the notion of “rise”. According to (Tianquan 2012, 188), in 2007, a Report by the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of China adopted the idea of Peaceful Development and Harmonious World.

In 2004, the British writer Joshua Ramo introduced the notion of the Beijing Consensus. According to it, China has been performing an alternative path based not only on the recognition local development needs of each country, but also on the recognition of multilateralism and cooperation as a way to build a new world order (Arrighi 2008, 383). In spite of the fact that this concept was not forged by the Chinese elite, the Chinese model – characterized by intense State presence in development matters and based upon the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (1955) – is perceived as different and even divergent from the neoliberal supremacy enshrined in the Washington Consensus and from the widespread interventionism of the US.

Recently, the Chinese elite has been highlighting the idea of the “Chinese Dream”. This concept is conceived as the country’s rejuvenation, as well as the revitalization and renewal of its civilization, in order to promote transformation and to materialize development. The Chinese dream is intertwined with the “bicentenary agenda” (the creation of the CPC in 1921 and the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949), which establishes the baselines for the construction of a country and of a society modestly comfortable.

It is evident, therefore, that China is searching for concepts and frameworks capable of providing identity to the country’s foreign insertion. It does so as a reaction to concepts such as the “Chinese Threat”, arranging
alternative paths to the global governance patterns of the United States and its European allies. However, it not about a conceptual ‘dispute’; the Chinese journey itself has always been contrasted by the Western. As highlighted by Losurdo (2016), in China, the Welfare State is being built facing the challenges that only a continental-size country with more than 1.3 billion inhabitants, wide social mobility and enlargement of the middle class – not to mention the setback in regional inequalities – could face. On the other hand, in the West, while social and regional polarization arise, social rights are going through a process of dismantling. In this sense, development is imperative to the legitimacy of the regime, to national sovereignty and to the autonomous international insertion of this Asian country (Losurdo 2016, 343).

**China’s New Silk Road policy and strategy**

After being announced by Xi Jinping in 2013, the New Silk Road was given a document issued by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), whose title was *Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road*. The document emphasizes that, more than two millennia ago, peoples of Asia, Europe and Africa were integrated by the Silk Road. According to the Chinese government, the New Silk Road seeks for the following elements of cooperation: political coordination, facilities connectivity, unobstructed trade, financial integration and people exchange. In order to make it happen, the main objectives are to align and coordinate this countries’ development strategies; to create demand and job opportunities; and to promote trust, peace and prosperity. The plan explicits the availability of the Chinese government in handling higher responsibilities and obligations – according to its possibilities – and in promoting the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. As reported by the document, the New Route subdivides itself into the Economic Belt, linking China–Central Asia–Russia– Europe (Baltic states); and the Maritime Route, developed to sail from the Chinese coast to Europe, going across the South China Sea and across the Indian Ocean, by one route, and from the Chinese coast, across the South China Sea and towards the South Pacific by the other one (Figure 1).

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The project of the New Silk Road is structured upon 6 corridors: (i) Economic Corridor China–Mongolia–Russia; (ii) New Eurasian Land Bridge; (iii) Economic Corridor China–Central Asia; (iv) Economic Corridor China–Indochinese Peninsula; and (v) Maritime Economic Corridor. Such integration process would involve around 65 countries and 63% percent of the global population of three continents (Asia, Europe and Africa). The main idea behind this endeavor is the rejuvenation and integration of Eurasia, a region once referred to as the World Island by Mackinder, involving several civilizations (Chinese, Arabic, Persian, Indian) and several religions (from Islam to Christianity), always avoiding the expansionist model and the colonialism adopted by the Western powers (Yiwei 2016, 187-188).

The Chinese strategy of the New Silk Road seems a fair project, since it is based upon the exploitation of the main capacities available to the Asian country. The first one is the Chinese productive capacity, which includes an enormous base industry: steel production is a clear example, as China completed 2014 with a production of almost 823 million tons, against 110.7 from Japan and 88.3 from the United States. The second one

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3 See Valor’s news “Produção global de aço cresce 1,2% no mundo e cai 0,7% no Brasil” on:
is the country’s giant port infrastructure, owing 7 out of 10 of the world’s biggest ports and 21 out of the 100 world’s biggest construction companies (only 8 of them are Japanese and 7 American). Last but not least, China has been mobilizing its financial capacities to boost the integration conceived by the New Silk Road. It is worth mentioning the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the BRICS’ New Development Bank, the establishment of a financial institution owned by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Silk Road Fund, and the Chinese banks themselves. In other words, such financial capacity works not only as a way to leverage the country’s international insertion, but also as a tool to pressure the emergence of a new financial and geo-economic architecture in a global scale.

In this sense, the New Silk Road enunciates three fundamental goals of the Chinese government, namely its economic capacity, its foreign policy strategies and its financial reserves. These three goals may intertwine with the shaping of a new financial and geo-economic architecture. Firstly, the Chinese government has been pointing out, since the 2008 financial crisis, the necessity to overcome its vulnerabilities of an economy anchored upon the dollar and pressured to make its own currency part of IMF’s currency basket – as it started to happen in 2016, when the yuan began to represent 10,92% of such basket, behind the dollar (41.7%) and the euro (30.9%), and ahead of the pound (8,1%) and the yen (8,3%). Secondly, there is the BRICS’ initiative that created the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserves Agreement in the 6th Summit of the group, in July 2014. Thirdly, China widened its role as global infrastructure financier through China Development Bank (CDB) and Exim Bank, both established in 1994 as State development banks. Fourthly, there is the growth in foreign direct investments and contracts in China – what explains the fast-track enlargement of the number of Chinese companies in the Fortune’s list of the


5 See the ranking of the world’s biggest construction companies: http://www.enr.com/toplists/2015_Top_250_International_Contractors1.


7 See note published by the Chinese Embassy in Brazil “Chinese Premier asks the U.S. to approve reform of IMF’s quotas”, March the 31st 2015, available on: http://br.china-embassy.org/por/szxw/t1250761.htm

500 greatest companies in the world to 106 in 20159. Fifthly, the government created an international payment system (China International Payment System – CIPS) in October 201510, an alternative to the Western dominant SWIFT (Society for the Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication). Hence, the Chinese government works towards the global de-dollarization and the internationalization of its own currency, the yuan, looking forward to enlarge its autonomy towards the financial market centered in the U.S. and in the European Union. All in all, the dialectic between power and capital has been shaping the contemporary international system and, therefore, it is worth understanding how the American hegemony has been built from Bretton Woods onwards and considering the signs which point towards the fact that significant changes are occurring in the international sphere (Pautasso 2015).

And what could turn the OBOR initiative into a feasible project? In the first place, it must be kept in mind that the answer does not involve complex institutional arrangements of integration, which premises huge concessions and consensus. Secondly, its feasibility is being driven by a single, almost irrefutable objective: the interest of the countries in infrastructure. Thirdly, once confirmed the feasibility of the project – coming from the capacities available to China (base industry, engineering, financing, etc.) –, trade flows get consolidated, allowing the exercise of its economic gravitational power. At last, the economic power generates the legitimacy needed to explore the political power, which may progressively displace the American hegemony by integrating Eurasia.

Africa in the context of the Chinese foreign policy

The collapse of the soviet socialism has had a much more significant impact to international relations and to the international society than it is usually credited. The neoliberal offensive and the American expansionism, shown by a unilateral and interventionist foreign policy, may be its most apparent facets. However, its developments are perceived in the contemporary scenario still. When it comes to China and the African continent, the situation is not much different.

In Africa, even though the cessation of the conventional conflicts led by the superpowers (USA and USSR) have had a positive outcome, the end of the Cold War has at the very least changed the political orientation of

progressive governments which emerged from national liberation struggles. The neoliberal adjustments have disarticulated the recent-born African states, leading, eventually, to economic and institutional setbacks. The outcome was a marginalization of the continent in the field of international relations whilst identity conflicts, misery and epidemics took over (Visentini 2010, 155).

To China, the repression faced at Tiananmen Square has granted the maintenance of the regime and of Deng’s reforms, whilst the rest of the socialist countries were in the process of disintegration, diving into a decade of regression due to neoliberal shock therapies. Still, the approach with Africa was a crucial part of the Chinese strategy, not only as a way to break the siege, but also as a path to universalize its foreign policy and widen the economic synergy which had been feeding its economic dynamism.

From the mid-nineties onwards, the mutual efforts between China and African nations has increased. Chinese trade with the African continent surpassed US$174 billion in 2014. Around 4.2% of Chinese exports have Africa as destiny and around 4.8% of the country’s imports come from this very same continent11. In 2009, Chinese-African trade – which, in 1992, comprehended only 1.3 billion – had already overcame the transacted amount between the U.S. and the African continent. The growth in trade flow taxes, however, is a result of a multi-approach interaction which has been institutionalized behind the creation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).

FOCAC was formally established in 2000 and comprehends China and 50 other African nations. The Ministerial Conference occurs every three years and aims at intensifying China-Africa cooperation, using several other forums which deal with agriculture, science and technology, law, finance, culture, reflection groups, youth, NGOs, women debate, media and local governance, etc. Throughout this period, a great amount of documents have been signed, with a special note to Addis Ababa Action Agenda (2004-2006), whose goals were to increase assistance to African countries and to provide them tax-free exports to China when coming from least developed African nations. Every new summit, the Forum develops a new Action Plan – to be implemented in the subsequent period (Action Plan towards Cooperation-Beijing China-Africa 2007-2009; Sharm el-Sheikh Action Plan 2010-2012; Beijing Cooperation Action Plan 2013-2015). Moreover, the Chinese government has been extending billionaire credit lines to several sectors of the African economy12. In other words, FOCAC strengthens the bilateral relations of China with African countries, achieving natural resources, new markets and investment opportunities, while cultivating African states’ commitment to China within International Organizations (Lopes, Daniele and Javier 2013).

Such institutionalization of Chinese-African relations boosts several

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other initiatives. Firstly, it has increased Chinese international aid in Africa, providing professional training, technical cooperation, humanitarian aid, etc. Secondly, the continent’s infrastructural development has shown substantial progress behind the construction of public buildings, power generation plants, highways, schools, agriculture development sites, hospitals, etc. Thirdly, Chinese foreign direct investment has stimulated Special Economic Zones and Free Trade Zones in several African countries, compensating for the unemployment generated by Chinese exports. As highlighted by Visentini (2014), such features are the very expression of South-South Cooperation and are contributing to the creation of a meridional geopolitical scenario based upon the spirit of the Bandung Conference. In other words, Bandung, the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77 have established the foundation basis of South-South relations, as well as its organization around common principles, values and ideas (Pereira and Medeiros 2015).

It is evident, therefore, that China’s African policy is driven by its self-interest and its own political and strategic considerations. However, it is extremely different from the Western rhetoric which constantly characterizes it as “Chinese imperialism”. Although the earnings, the benefits and the capacities are indeed asymmetric, Chinese relations with African countries do not involve territorial control, military interventionism, interference on economic management, ethnocentrism on political organizations, imposition of cultural patterns, etc. – which are clear facets of nineteenth and twentieth century imperialism.

Africa and the New Maritime Silk Road

Persuasively, China is combining its rhetoric and capabilities to put forth the OBOR Initiative. According to Yiwei (2016, 15-60), the New Maritime Silk Road throws out the path previously adopted by Western powers – which promoted expansion, conflict and colonization –, choosing in favor of a new maritime civilization, in which there is the integration of men and seas, harmonious coexistence and sustainable development.

For this purpose, China aims at establishing ties between the main markets of the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. The New Maritime Silk Road is dedicated to consolidate port infrastructure in order to strengthen commercial and energetic corridors that go through the South China Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, encompassing Peninsulas such as Indochina, Hindustan, Arabia and the Horn of Africa. It is a way of increasing Chinese presence in the face of the existing chokepoints of the region, such as the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Ormuz, between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and the Strait of Malacca, between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.
Regarding the African continent, Northeast Africa and the Horn of Africa are the other pole of the maritime connection provided by the OBOR Initiative. The position of countries such as Egypt, Djibouti and Kenya reveals the role of the Horn of Africa as the other pole of the New Maritime Silk Road. This region may potentialize Chinese policies towards Africa (Figure 2). Furthermore, much of the Chinese experience behind the New Silk Road, based upon infrastructure buildup as a way to boost new fluxes and partnerships, has been shaped through Sino-African relations.

Figure 2: Africa and the New Maritime Silk Road

Therefore, Egypt is particularly crucial for the New Maritime Silk Road, since the Suez Canal is the main transit spot between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. When visiting this African country in January 2016, Xi Jinping encouraged Chinese companies to take part in big projects in the country, such as the development of the New Suez Canal and the construction of a new administrative capital outside Cairo.\(^\text{13}\)

Djibouti’s case is no different, strategically located between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In spite of its small size, the country is very important in the framework of the New Maritime Silk Road, sheltering the first Chinese ultramarine naval base – where the United States already

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\(^{13}\) See Shannon Tiezzi’s article on The Diplomat “Xi’s Visit Cements Egypt’s Place on the ‘Belt and Road’ on: http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/xis-visit-cements-egypts-place-on-the-belt-and-road/.
have the Pentagon’s African Command (AFRICOM), used for CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) drone operations. The alleged goal of the Chinese government is to deploy facilities able to provide logistic support to efforts against piracy, humanitarian assistance and peace maintenance. Although China insists on denying the term “military base”, it is clear the willingness of the country in building a Marine capable of operating in worldwide global waters – supported by its first air carrier, the so-called “Liaoning”\textsuperscript{14}.

In the same way, in Kenya, the Chinese government has settled a deal in order to build the Port of Lamu. The objective is to integrate South Sudan and Ethiopia through other infrastructure operations, including roadways, railways, airports, oil refineries and fiber optic cables. Hence, the emerging oil and gas industries from East Africa shall be integrated with Asian markets dynamics\textsuperscript{15}. This region is also connected to Chinese interests in Sudan.

In this sense, it is possible to observe that the OBOR Initiative will knot together a set of great goals of the Chinese government – which have been already described in previous studies (Pautasso 2012). Firstly, it will, in the domestic arena, deepen national territorial integration with the establishment of a continental economy, since Eastern China develops the maritime “wing” of the Route; Western China, the mainland “wing”, connecting more than 10 Chinese provinces. Secondly, it will also deepen regional integration, further strengthening the conditions towards the creation of a Sinocentric system. Thirdly, the universalization of Chinese foreign policy, marked by a significant presence in Africa, will become a field test for Sino-American disputes, which reveals conflicting development models in the current era.

All in all, the New Silk Road is clearly a Chinese strategy towards (i) Eurasian integration, (ii) the consolidation of a new Sinocentric system, and (iii) the establishment of foundation basis for China to consolidate itself as a global superpower. It is, at the same time, both a strategy and a rhetoric to legitimate China’s emergence in different patterns from those announced by the U.S. in the post-Cold War period.

**Final Considerations**

History itself (and history of international relations, for obvious

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\textsuperscript{14} See Sputnik Brazil “China construirá sua 1\textsuperscript{a} base naval ultramarina perto de base dos EUA no Djibouti” on: http://br.sputniknews.com/mundo/20151127/2900669/china-base-baval-ultramarina-eua-djibouti.html.

reasons) is a contradictory process. The understanding and the reading of such contradictions, the forces in dispute, is obfuscated by its involvement with the contemporary era. During the beginning of the twenty-first century, the world witnessed the rebirth of Africa, the strengthening of popular governments in Latin America and the international projection of emerging countries – later reunited under the BRICS acronym. There was the rehearsal of South-South cooperation movements and the recapture of the processes initiated with the decolonization of global periphery and with the emergence of the Third World and its movements under the sign of the Conference of Bandung. The 2008 crisis, by its turn, has reinstated neoconservative forces, which were already strengthened by the collapse of the USSR and by the advent of neoliberalism, led by the United States of America.

In this sense, Chinese modernization experience and the construction of integration and development processes, articulated under the New Silk Road, represent, without a doubt, not just a project, but also one of the forces in an international relations field marked by crossroads. If the ambitious project of integrating Asia, Europe and Africa manages to afford an alternative to capitalism’s central poles and to the Consensus of Washington, China will be able to exert a fundamental leading role in the twenty-first century. Africa, paradoxically, takes on a decisive role: from marginalized continent, it may turn itself into the new frontier of the experiences of development and South-South cooperation. The inclusion of the African continent within the New Silk Road also represents the opportunity to globally shape the initiative and, at the same time, China’s role itself in the new global power setting.

REFERENCES

The role of Africa in the New Maritime Silk Road

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to analyze Africa’s role in the construction of the New Maritime Silk Road. This is just one of the vectors of the ambitious Chinese integration project in Asia, Europe and Africa, launched in 2013 under the title OBOR Initiative (One Belt, One Road). By overcoming the challenges of national reconstruction, China is becoming more assertive and shaping its global integration strategy. In this sense, the New Silk Road aggregates the main objectives of China’s diplomacy in the twenty-first century, elevating Africa to a springboard condition in order for the project to become global.

KEYWORDS

China; New Maritime Silk Road; Africa.

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REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: CONFLICTS, AGENDAS AND THREATS

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Introduction

The beginning of the decade of 2000 was marked by relevant economic and political transformations in the African continent. After facing two decades of political instability, socioeconomic problems and marginalization, Africa emerged as a new commercial, investment frontier, as well as a new object of geopolitical, economic and strategical interests of the traditional and emerging powers, what has significantly increased its importance in the international scenario (Oliveira & Cardoso, 2015). In a large extent, this new moment experienced by Africa is directly linked to (i) the exponential growth which most of the continent’s economies presented in the last decade; to (ii) the renewal of regional integration processes – with a special note to the substitution, in 2002, of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU), which aims at providing more efficient solutions to African problems; and (iii) to several complementary initiatives in the field of development, governance and mainly security (Adebajo 2013; Castellano 2013).

In this sense, recently, it is emerging a new literature which addresses the African regional security dynamics in the beginning of the twenty-first century, almost always focusing on UN and AU’s capacities and initiatives on the stabilization of the continent. However, sub-regional dynamics, perhaps apart from Southern and Western Africa, are rarely addressed and analyzed. Within this context, this paper looks forward to contributing for this debate thorough a study which analyzes the regional security dynamics of the Horn of Africa, a complex and important region to

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international security, however barely not studied, especially here in Brazil.

The Horn of Africa\(^2\) is marked by intense occurrence of interstate wars, high level of extraregional actors’ penetration within regional security agenda, intense polarization, small capacity of interaction between the countries of the region itself (communication, transport and infrastructure deficits) and unities’ (States) vulnerabilities – internal political instability, low ability to provide security and social development deficits (Buzan & Wæver 2003; Cardoso 2015).

On the other hand, it is in this region that took place the one and only social revolution modern Africa has witnessed (Clapham 1996). It is the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974, which provoked deep transformations in the countries’ internal social, economic and political structures, as well as a significant regional and systemic impact. Besides, the regional security dynamic verified throughout the Cold War period and after the end of bipolarity has reset the map of the African continent with the creation of two new States in the region, Eritrea (1993) and South Sudan (2011).

The strategic geographic position of the Horn of Africa, close to oil producer countries of the Middle East and to the important international maritime route which connects the West to the East through the Suez Canal, has given the region great relevance during the context of the Cold War, attracting superpowers’ attention since the decade of 1970 (Chazan 1999; Westad 2005). The presence of superpowers has polarized the political forces of the region. On one side, there were the nations in favor of the United States; on the other side, there were the pro-USSR. It has increased the existing rivalries among the States of the region.

With the end of the Cold War and, consequently, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the region lost a great deal of its strategic importance. After the failed humanitarian intervention in Somalia (1992-1994), there was a strategic withdrawal of the United States from the Horn of Africa. They only returned after 9/11 in 2001, in the U.S., especially after the war on terror was declared, going through a process of securitization\(^3\)

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2 For the purpose of this paper, the region of the Horn of Africa refers to the member countries of Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda.

3 The studies on the process of securitization have a reference point the School of Copenhagen, whose main authors are Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. The theme was introduced by Ole Wæver in 1995 as a significant effort towards the tentative of dismantling the concept of security which prevailed during the Cold War – and widely supported by Realist authors of International Relations – and that was associated exclusively to State survival. For other authors, the process of securitization does not deal with the discussion of what is, or is not, a threat, but, instead, with under which conditions something may become a threat. Therefore, it is a process socially constructed, in which actors seek
marked not only by a rhetoric, but also by concrete projects, such as the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EACTI) and the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), among others (Cardoso 2015; Schmidt 2013).

At the regional level, when new leaderships rose to power – such as Meles Zenawi, in Ethiopia, and Isais Afewerki, in Eritrea, who both joined Yoweri Musevini, in Uganda –, there was a period of detenté (1991-1994), characterized by the densification of political interactions and by several regional initiatives on conflict resolution in Somalia, Sudan and Djibouti, as well as by the processes of economic integration involving the countries of the region. However, situations such as the civil war in Sudan and Somalia, Djibouti’s political instability, insurgent groups operating in several territories, added up to the installation of a Islamic government in Sudan with a strong tendency towards fundamentalism, were relevant factors that contributed to the deterioration of regional relations after 1994 (Cardoso 2015; Cliffe 1999).

In this sense, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the security dynamic in the Horn of Africa in the post-independence period, identifying the actors, agendas and threats. For this purpose, it is subdivided into three parts beyond the present introduction and the further conclusion. The first one analyzes the security dynamics taking place in the Horn of Africa during the Cold War period, focusing on the regional rivalries and on the penetration of extraregional actors. In the second part, there is a discussion regarding the transformations which occurred in the region in the immediate post-Cold War period, focusing both on the unities’ (states) internal security dynamics and on the regional ones. The third and last section aims at identifying “new” threats and regional and international responses, as well as the emerging strategic importance of the region to traditional superpowers in the post-9/11 period, marked by the process of securitization.

to bring up topics of the political agenda – or politicized – to the security agenda, that is, to the core of the security decision (Cepik 2011). When affirming that threats are socially constructed, the authors do not deny that a de facto threat exists, but, instead, they attest that, along the process of securitization, certain affairs might represent effectively real threats. All in all, the securitizing movement begins through a rhetoric representation (speech act), signalizing the existence of a threat which, due to its urgent nature, cannot and must not be treated as normal political decisions, therefore demanding emergency and extraordinary measures (Buzan, WaEver and Wilde 1998).
The Horn of Africa: regional and extra-regional rivalries (1960-1991)

The Horn of Africa is traditionally known as one of the most unstable regions of the international system, due to the rising number of armed conflicts and to the political instability verified since the mid-1950s (see table 1). Furthermore, the region is assessed as one of the poorest in the world, due to its socioeconomic issues, the fragility of its States and social indicatives, such as per capita income and Human Development Index (Mengisteab 2011; Woodward 2013). The illustration of that may be found in the Fragile States Index, which is annually published by Fund for Peace (FFP) since 2005 and based upon twelve wide indicatives. There, countries such as Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan are found in the worst positions, currently occupying the 1st, 2nd and 4th positions, respectively (FFP 2016).

Table 1 - Main conflicts which took place in the Horn of Africa (1950-2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Theater of Operations</th>
<th>Nature of the Conflict</th>
<th>Number of Casualties (around)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Sudanese Civil War</td>
<td>1956-1972</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>500k</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 In this work the Horn of Africa region refers to the member countries of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). They are: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda.

5 Namely: demographic pressures, massive movement of refugees and internally displaced people, group grievances, human flight, uneven economic development, high economic decline, State legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, factionalized elites and external intervention (FFP 2016).

6 By Failed State we refer to “that State which cannot manage to maintain its internal political order, nor the public order, unable to provide safety to its people, control its borders and the entire national territory, keep independently functioning both the legislative and judiciary systems, provide education, health care, economic opportunities, infrastructure and environmental surveillance” (Rotberg 2013, 5-6). The merit of such concept is not discussed in the present paper, and it is here used exclusively to refer to a initial characterization of the region of the Horn of Africa.

7 Regarding the nature of the conflicts, we used the taxonomy developed by Meredith Sarkees (2011) to the project called Correlates of War (COW). Therefore, by Interstate War we mean war between two or more states; Intrastate War refers to wars which are fought between the government of a State and opposition groups (insurgents), with no external intervention; by Internationalized War we mean internal conflicts with external intervention (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Sarkees 2011).
Eritrean War of Independence 1961-1991 Eritrea Intrastate 220k
Ogaden War (Somalia-Ethiopia) 1977-1978 Ethiopia (East) Interstate 30k
Uganda-Tanzania War 1978-1979 Uganda Interstate 100k
Ugandan Civil War 1981-1986 Uganda Intrastate 300-500k
Second Sudanese Civil War 1983-2005 Sudan (South) Intrastate 1,9 mi.
Insurgency of the Lord’s Resistance Army 1987-... Uganda, DRC, Sudan, CAR Intrastate 12k
Somali Civil War 1987-... Somalia Internationalized 300-400k
Ethiopia-Eritrea War 1998-2000 Border Ethiopia-Eritrea Interstate 100-300k
War in Darfur 2003-... Sudan (West) Intrastate 180-300k
II Ogaden War 2007-2008 Ethiopia (East) Intrastate 1k
South Sudan Civil War 2013 - South Sudan Intrastate No data

Source: Adapted from Castellano (2012, p. 34-35) and complemented with information provided by Clayton (2001), Mesfin (2011), Reno (2011) and Williams (2014).

Analyzing table 1, we noticed that intrastate wars have prevailed in the region in the post-independence period. Historically, African states have face more internal threats than external ones, especially due to an insufficient encouragement of national territory occupation and domination. Hence, due to the absence of the necessity of strengthening State capacities to a possible need to defend the territory, colonial and post-colonial African states have been marked by a territory ruled by a strong Capital city, which is assured by distant borders and internationally legitimate; however, there is also a widespread power vacuum in peripheral regions (Castellano 2012; Clapham 1996; Herbst 2000)\(^8\). In this sense, the Organisation of African Unity

\(^8\) In his book “States and Power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority and control” (2000), Jeffrey Herbst widely analyzes the main challenges involved in State-building processes in Africa. In his opinion, the vast territorial extension and the demographic
supported the idea that if an African government controlled the Capital, it also had the sovereign right to control the State and, therefore, could not be contested by other national, subnational or foreign groups (Herbst 2000).

Evidently, African states have also faced external threats. However, such threats were relatively less harmful, because, in general, they did not use to put territoriality in risk and, when getting into national territory, they used to become internal threats – or they were already connected to intrastate conflicts (Castellano 2012). Thus, the wars between Somalia and Ethiopia (1977-1978), Uganda-Tanzania (1978-1979) and Eritrea-Ethiopia (1998-2000) have been the few conventional interstate conflicts that took place in the African continent in the post-colonial period.

The number of casualties also matters to our analysis since it allows us to perceive the real scale and intensity of the conflicts which occurred in the region. Such data acquires even higher importance if we compare it to the total number of casualties provoked by the wars in Africa since the 1950s (around 13,16 million deaths). Within this context, the Second Sudanese War, for instance, have been the second armed conflict which killed more human beings in Sub-Saharan Africa in the post-colonial period, second only to the Second War of Congo (1998-2003) – which killed almost 3,8 million people (Castellano 2012; Reno 2011).

Since 1970, with the penetration of extra-regional superpowers, the regional security scenario has become more complex. From the second half of the twenty-first century onwards, at a moment when other regions of the globe (Europe, Asia and the Middle East) had been divided into zones of influence of the two socioeconomic systems led by the United States (capitalist) and the Soviet Union (socialist), the African continent had become a critical region to the defense of the superpowers (Visentini 2010; Westad 2005).

To the USSR, decolonization of African countries would mean the opportunity to acquire bonds with the new States, especially with those where strong anti-imperialistic movements were emerging. To the United States, on the other hand, political immaturity and resentments with the West could lead to an approach of African countries with the USSR or People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Pereira 2013; Schmidt 2013). Within this context, the African space became a stage of the Cold War and, there, the confrontation between the two superpowers managed to establish a governance system over the States which, with no regard to their merits, took away their sovereignty (Adebajo 2013; Cepik and Martins 2012).

shortage have been two of the main issues surrounding the State building in the African continent.
One of the main features of the Cold War in Africa has been the so-called Proxy War, even though this kind of war has not been limited to such period (Schmidt 2013; Westad 2005). In some conflicts, foreign presence has had the primary role and has been decisive to define the conflicts. It was due, on one hand, to the structure and fragility of the newly independent African States and, on the other hand, to the decisions of the policy-makers (Castellano 2012).

In the case of the Horn of Africa, the conflicts have been marked by support from neighboring countries and external superpowers to insurgents groups. On the regional scale, the countries of the region have used proxy elements to destabilize neighboring governments. Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, for instance, Ethiopia has supported the insurgency of Sudan’s People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM/A), in Sudan, of Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and of the Somali National Movement (SNM), while Sudan and Somalia have helped rebel groups inside Ethiopia, such as Eritrea’s Liberation Front (ELF), Eritrea’s People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigrinya’s People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Oromo’s Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden’s National Liberation Front (ONLF). Besides, when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) rose to power in 1986, in Kampala, Cartum started to support the insurgency of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the North of Uganda, as a retaliation to the support given by the new Ugandan government to SPLM/A (see table 2) (Berhe 2014; Cliffe 1999; Doop 2013).

Proxy War is an armed conflict in which two countries use a third one – the proxies – in order to avoid a direct conflict. According to Castellano (2012, p. 36), “[...] its main features are intersubjectivity, the level of autonomy among the forces involved in the combat and its encouraging actors (or financers) [...] proxy war is not merely an insurgency; foreign support allows it to defy national guards with relative easiness. It is possible to characterize a proxy war through the presence of two or more indicators, namely: (i) political-ideological alignment (especially valid to the Cold War era); (b) financing through counterpart or usufruct of enclave – diamond, gold, cupper, etc; (iii) presence of advisors; and (iv) supply of military equipment and ammunition”.

As an example, we can mention the support of then-Liberia President Charles Taylor to the rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone in 1991, the support of Ugandan presidents Yoweri Museveni and Rwanda, Paul Kagame, to the group Insurgent Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaïre (AFDL), led by Laurent-Desiré Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 and the support of Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire to the United Liberian insurgent groups for Reconstruction and Democracy And the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) in Liberia in 1999 (Castellano 2012; Francis 2006; Reno 2011).

On the other hand, SPLM/A have actively supported government forces in Southwest Ethiopia’s civil war (Johnson 2003).
Table 2 - Main insurgent groups in the Horn of Africa in the post-independence period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Select group of insurgents</th>
<th>Year of creation</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Regional Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Regime change</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Eritrean Islamic Jihad</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Regime change, Autonomy</td>
<td>Sudan, Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eritrean Democratic Alliance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rea Afar Democratic Front</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Regime change, Autonomy</td>
<td>Sudan, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan e Araba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Eritrean People’s Liberation Front</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tigrinyan People’s Liberation Front</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Autonomy and Regime change</td>
<td>Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western Somalia Liberation Front</td>
<td>1961/1976</td>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Regime change, Secession</td>
<td>Somalia, Ethiopia, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shiffa War</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Regime change, Secession</td>
<td>Somalia, Ethiopia, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Regime change, Secession</td>
<td>Somalia, Ethiopia, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Regime change, Secession</td>
<td>Somalia, Ethiopia, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al Itihad Al Islamiya</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Islamization, Regime change</td>
<td>Somalia, Ethiopia, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Regime change, Secession</td>
<td>Somalia, Ethiopia, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Somali United Congress</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Somalia, Ethiopia, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harakat Al Shabab Al Mujahedeen</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Somalia, Somalia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

138
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Movement</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Beja Congress</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anyanya</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan’s People Liberation Army</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Libya, Uganda,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Democratic Alliance</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Regime change</td>
<td>Eritrea e Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equality and Justice Movement</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>Eritrea e Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan’s Liberation Movement</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>Eritrea e Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>National Resistance Army</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Regime change</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Designed by the author. Inspired by Berhe (2014); Cliffe (1999); ICG (2008); Mengisteab (2011); Reno (2011); Williams (2014).
On the systemic level, the geopolitical position of the Horn of Africa (strategic to American and Soviet interests due to its neighboring position to Middle Eastern oil producer countries, as well as to important international naval routes), has turned the region into stage of a systemic dispute. Indeed, countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan took on a highlighted position within this bipolar confrontation in the African continent (Patman 1990; Westad 2005). The United States had established a strategic partnership with the Ethiopian imperial regime in the 1950s, whilst Somalia, afterwards the military coup which brought General Mohamed Siad Barre to power in 1969, has declared itself as a socialist country, establishing closer ties with the USSR. Nevertheless, it was only in the 1970s, with the Sino-American alliance and the Nixon Doctrine, that it was defined the insertion of the Horn of Africa in the Cold War system. Wishing to contain the other side’s influence and expansion, both superpowers have had to play the game according to the existing polarization in the region. As expected, the presence of both superpowers has polarized the political forces into the pro-United States nations and the pro-Soviet Union nations, fact that has boosted existing rivalries among the States of the region (Clapham 1996; Westad 2005).

Between 1971 and 1974, the Somali military regime has received a great deal of economic and military support from the USSR. On the other hand, in 1972, the USSR established a military base in Berbera, whose objective was to increase its presence and contain the American military presence in the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf (Schmidt 2013). On July 1974, during the visit of the Soviet president Nikolai Podgorny to Somalia, Mogadishu and Moscow consolidated relations by signing a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (TFC)12. After they signed this TFC, Somalia received from the USSR modern and sophisticated weaponry systems, such as MiG-21 combat aircrafts, Ilyushin-28 bombers, T-54 tanks, torpedoes and SAM-2 missile systems (Ofcansky 1992; Patman 1990).

On September of that same year, however, the regional scene suffered great transformations. A military coup dragged the Ethiopian emperor, Haile Selassie – allied of the U.S. – out of power, establishing a military government (DERG) with popular backing in the country. The Ethiopian Revolution has had a fundamental impact towards regional polarization, due to the fact that the new regime declared itself socialist and got closer to the USSR (David 1979; Visentini 2012).

12 In the terms of the agreement, both sides have committed cooperating in each and every sector, in order to preserve and deepen socioeconomic ties between both peoples; expand economic, technical-scientific and military cooperation; oppose all shapes and forms of imperialism and colonialism; at last, they have declared not to take part in any military alliance or actions against the other part (Patnam 1990).
On July 1977, believing that Ethiopia would not be able to defend itself due to political instability generated by internal insurgent groups – Afar, Oromo, Tigers and Eritreans –, Somalia decided to invade Ogaden desert in support of the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) – formed by native Somalis which had been fighting for the autonomy of the region since 1963 –, as an attempt to annex the desert and hammer out a “greater Somalia”\(^\text{13}\). Somali aerial and terrestrial tactic and technical superiority has been decisive in the first months of conflict, contributing for the occupation of almost 90% of the desert by Somali forces. However, the Ethiopian revolutionary government reacted by sending its army to the region and, backed by 16,000 Cuban troops supported by Soviet advisors\(^\text{14}\), the Somali army was quickly defeated and expelled from Ogaden on March 1978\(^\text{15}\) (Cliffe 1999; David 1979). By the end of the conflict, Ethiopia emerged as one of the most militarized and powerful States in the Horn of Africa.

According to Weis (1980),

“The Soviets have not only established an impressive aerial and maritime bridge which sent weaponry to Ethiopia, but they have also increased its naval forces in the waters adjacent to the war zone, helped on the deployment of Cuban forces in Ethiopia and planned, managed Cuban/Ethiopian\(^\text{16}\) military maneuvers which led to the withdrawal of the Somali army from Ogaden in 1978” (Weiss 1980, 12).

Counting on such support, “[…] the Ethiopian Army was able to carry out the vertical envelopments tactic by transporting 70 tanks by helicopter to the Somali rear; Ethiopian troops were able to encircle the forces of the enemy army, making it impossible to retreat” (Kruys 2004, 21). It is

\(^{13}\) “Great Somalia” is a pan-Somali nationalist ideology (to certain extent encouraged by the British at the moment of the independence) which aims at reuniting all the territories inhabited by Somalis in the Horn of Africa (namely, Ogaden, Djibouti and Northern Kenya) under the same government. In this context, the annexation of the Ogaden desert would be the first step towards this pan-Somali project (Cliffe 1999; Tareke 2009).

\(^{14}\) On December 1977, Soviet guns, tanks and fighter aircrafts arrived, followed by 200 Cuban “coaches” which would train Ethiopian military personnel on how to use such kind of weaponry (Schmidt 2013).

\(^{15}\) There has been an enormous effort coming from the Soviets and Cubans to avoid confrontation and to settle the situation in Ogaden via peaceful means. The Cuban president, Fidel Castro, for instance, has been sent to the region in order to establish dialogue with Ethiopians, Somalis and Eritreans, looking forward to creating a socialist federation among them. However, it has not been possible, because the proposal has been turned down by all the parts involved (Chazan et al. 1999; Pereira 2013; Visentini 2012).

\(^{16}\) The warfare has been planned and managed by the Soviet generals Vasilii Ivanovich Petrov and Barisov and by the Ethiopian coronel Mesfin Gabreqal (Tareke 2009).
estimated, that during the war, the Ethiopian regime received US$1 billion in Soviet armaments (four times more than the amount the Emperor Haile Selassie received in twenty-five years of partnership with the US), including hundreds of T-34, T-54, T-55 and T-62 tanks, about seventy MiGs-17, 21 and 23, thirty Mi-6 and Mi-8 helicopters, hundreds of SAM-7 missiles, artillery, mobile radar unit and thousands of light weapons (Patnam 1990; Tareke 2009; Westad 2005).

Although proclaimed socialist since 1975, the alliance between Ethiopia and the USSR was only consolidated in 1977, mainly due to the Somali invasion. Until then, the USSR was reluctant on increasing its ties with Addis Ababa for both strategic reasons and distrust towards DERG. Strategically, the Soviet Union was allied with Somalia, which did not have good relations with its neighbors. In addition, issues such as the absence of a political party, the persistence of the conflict with the civilian opposition, and the ambiguity with respect to Eritrea’s independence bothered Soviet leaders (Patnam 1990; Tareke 2009; Visentini 2012).

In November 1978, the Ethiopian government signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR17 and approached other socialist countries, such as the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Vietnam, Bulgaria, Libya, South Yemen and Cuba. At the regional level. In this context, after the alignment of Ethiopia with the Soviet Union, countries such as Cuba, Libya and South Yemen suspended their support for the EPLF - although this movement remained faithful to the Marxist-Leninist ideology until 1987 - when it abandoned socialism. In the case of Cuba, it refused to support Ethiopia in the war against the Eritrean insurgent groups, in view of the ideology of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries of which the country is a member (Clapham 1996; Schmidt 2013; Westad 2005).

Somalia, on the one hand, renounced the Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship with the USSR, expelled the Soviet advisers of the country and broke diplomatic relations with Cuba. On the other hand, it established a strategic partnership with the United States and, throughout the 1980s, received substantial economic and military aid. In contrast, the United States received the strategic naval and air bases at Berbera in the Gulf of Aden, Kismayo and Mogadishu in the Indian Ocean18 (Tareke 2000, Schmidt 2013; Woodward 2013). In addition, Somalia has established close relations with US allies in the Middle East such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran

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17 The USSR established a naval base in the strategic archipelago of Dahlak in the Red Sea (Chazan et al, 1999).

18 In the context of the Iranian Revolution (1979), the hostage crisis in the US embassy in Tehran, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979), the United States began to seek bases to strengthen its presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.
(before the 1979 revolution), receiving military aid from them (Ofcansky 1992; Samatar 1992; Schraeder 1996).

Domestically, the defeat of Ethiopia, which also symbolized the collapse of the pan-Somali project, coupled with the deepening internal economic crisis and the authoritarianism of Siad Barre, led to a growing increase in the Somali population’s dissatisfaction with the government and proliferation of insurgent movements. In addition, the increase in internal dissidence resulted in a coup attempt in 1978 led by a group of military personnel. As a result, nineteen coup mentors were publicly executed and those who escaped to neighboring Ethiopia, under the leadership of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, created the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) in 1979 in the Majerteen clan (Clapham 1993; Harper 2012; Hooglund 1992).

On October 1981, the SSF joined the radical wing of the Somali Workers Party (SWP) and the Democratic Front for Somali Liberation (DFLS) and formed the Democratic Front for Somali Salvation (SSDF), promising to intensify the political and military struggle Against the Barre regime. The SSDF received economic and military support from Ethiopia and Libya and maintained a performance throughout the 1980s based on guerrilla tactics aimed at destabilizing the Somali government. In the same year, a new insurgent group, the Somali National Movement (SNM), was founded in the north of the country, with a support base in the Isaq clan, which sought to depose the government (Lewis 2008; Ofcansky 1992; Woodward 2002).

Former British colonies in the region (Kenya, Uganda and Sudan) and the former French colony (Djibouti) have been incorporated into the western zone of influence. Between 1976 and 1989, Sudan became a major partner of the United States on the African continent, which gave it the status of largest recipient of US economic and military aid during Jimmy Carter administration (1977-1981) (Schmidt 2013). During the Ronald Reagan administration (1981-1989), Khartoum received massive military aid to stem the advance of Libya in East Africa and Soviet influence in Ethiopia. Even with the outbreak of the Second Civil War in 1983, the US supported Khartoum against the SPLM / A, supported in turn by the USSR, Cuba, and Ethiopia. With the arrival of Islamists in power in 1989 by a military coup perpetrated by General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, backed by Hassan al-Turabi of the National Islamic Front (NIF) and the northern elites, relations between the two countries deteriorate (Adar 2000; Cohen 2000; Woodward 2013).

The intensification of a radical Islamist discourse, the close relations

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19 In the early 1970s Sudan was a major buyer of Soviet arms, mainly through Egypt. Changes in the internal and external environment after 1974 pushed the country out of the Soviet bloc and moved closer to the United States (Schmidt 2013).
of the Omar al-Bashir government with the groups considered by the United States as terrorists (especially Hamas, Hezbollah, Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda) and support for Iraq during Gulf (1990-1991) led the United States to sever diplomatic relations with Sudan in 1991, and included it on the list of states sponsoring terrorism in 199320 (Cohen 2000; Johnson 2003; Woodward 2006). In response, through the neighboring states (Frontline States Initiatives - Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda), the United States began to support the rebels in the south, especially the SPLM / A led by John Garang de Mabior21, who had lost the support of his main Allies (USSR and the Ethiopian military regime) in the early 1990s (Berhe 2014; Cohen 2000; Kagwanja 2006; Woodward 2006).

In Somalia, in 1989, under pressure from the Congress, the US government suspended all military aid to the country except for the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program because of the growing allegations of human rights violations (Hooglund 1992; Schraeder 1996; Woodward 2002). Aware of the deterioration of the combatant capabilities of the regime brought about by the economic collapse and the end of US support, and with the objective of strengthening its positions, three belligerent groups (Somali National Movement - SNM, Somali Patriotic Movement - Formalized an alliance in 1989 to overthrow President Siad Barre. In this context, a pact was signed that provided for the formation of a coalition government to be integrated by the three groups after the fall of the regime (Harper 2012; Reno 2011).

In late 1990, under the command of USC leader Mohamed Farah Aideed, insurgent groups launched an offensive toward the capital. Finding little resistance along the way the group arrived in the capital Mogadishu in early 1991. After intense clashes with government forces, Siad Barre was overthrown and fled the capital in January 1991. However, belligerent groups did not reach agreement to establish a An alternative government in Somalia, leading to the division of the country between warlords who began to fight for political supremacy, contributing to the collapse of the state.22

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20 In 1996, the UN Security Council approved sanctions against Sudan that remained until 2001, and the following year the US imposed a financial and trade embargo on Sudan that hampered the interests of large US oil corporations that had business with Khartoum as Chevron, which had spent decades exploring oil and had finally begun prospecting for it (Johnson 2003; Oliveira 2007).

21 Military defeats against government forces and, consequently, loss of territory in the early 1990s, impacted the SPLM / A structure / leadership, favoring the split of the group into two factions: SPLA / Mainstream (Torit group led by John Carang) and SPLA / United (Nasir group led by Riek Machar). In order to weaken the southern opposition, Khartoum began to finance the faction led by Riek Machar (Cohen 2000, Johnson 2003, Doop 2013).

22 With the removal of Siad Barre from power, one of the leaders of the USC, Ali Mahdi
With the internal division of the USC, the capital Mogadishu began to be disputed by the militias linked to Aideed and Ali Mahdi (former allies). In the south, Muhammad Said Hershi Morgan, SPM leader vied for power with the local warlords. In the north, SNM proclaimed the independence of the northern region of the country in March 1991, which was renamed the Republic of Somaliland, establishing the capital at Hargeisa. However - no state has recognized the region's independence (Harper 2012; Hooglund 1992; Lewis 2008; Woodward 20013).

In Ethiopia, internal instability, economic crisis and loss of support from the regime’s main external ally (USSR) in the late 1980s had a profound impact on the government. In addition, the joint offensive of the Eritrean Popular Front for Liberation (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) were fundamental to the defeat of the Ethiopian army in various regions. In this context, realizing the fragility of the regime, in 1989, the TPLF brought together the smaller groups that were fighting the DERG and formed a coalition, the Ethiopian Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPRDF). After intense clashes between EPRDF and government forces in Addis Ababa in 1991, Mengistu Haile Mariam fled the country and settled in Zimbabwe. The EPRDF, under the leadership of Meles Zenawi, formed a new government in Addis Ababa. Regarding Eritrea, following a referendum, the new Ethiopian government accepted the independence proclaimed in 1993 by EPLF (Tareke 2004; Schmidt 2013; Vestal 1999; Westad 2005).

Post-Cold War (1991-2001): new and “renewed” security challenges

Mohammed, proclaimed himself acting president of Somalia, breaking with the pact signed in 1989, however, the other leaders refused to accept the legitimacy of the interim government and began to fight (Hooglund 1992).

23 The Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Oromo Democratic People's Organization (OPDO) and the Ethiopian Democratic People's Movement (SEPDM) (Tareke 2004).

24 Eritrea was conquered by Italy in 1890 and had been occupied by British forces between 1941 and 1952 when, on the recommendation of the UN General Assembly, it was formally handed over to Ethiopia as a federative unit which was to be subject to Ethiopian sovereignty, even though it maintained Autonomy in domestic matters. In 1962, however, such autonomy was repealed and Eritrea was formally incorporated into Ethiopia as one of its fourteen regions, triggering a thirty-year EPLF-led national liberation war. In 1991 with the seizure of power in Addis Ababa by TPLF / EPRDF under the leadership of Meles Zenawi, the new Ethiopian government accepted Eritrean independence and after a popular referendum in May 1993, the Republic of Eritrea became independent (establishing Capital in Asmara); Thus, EPLF Secretary-General Isaias Afewerki was elected President of the country (Clapham 1996, Cohen 2000, Reno 2011 and Schmidt 2013).
With the end of the Cold War, in 1989, and the USSR collapse, in 1991, the region’s security dynamics was substantially altered, because of Somalia’s disintegration, the self-proclamation of the independence of Somaliland, the Ethiopian’s Marxist-Leninist government’s collapse, in 1991, and Eritrea’s independence, in 1993. Such events, for a moment, reduced the tensions between countries in the region. However, even with the end of Ethiopian’s official support to insurgent groups in Sudan and Somalia, and of these countries’ support to Ethiopian insurgent groups, the prevalence of tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan, Sudan and Eritrea, added to the civil wars in Sudan and Somalia, remained relevant factors in the regional security agenda in the immediate post-Cold War (Berhe 2014; Sharamo and Mesfin 2011).

Indeed, in the beginning of the 1990s there was hope for pacification in the Horn of Africa with the coming to power of the insurgent groups in Ethiopia and Eritrea, supported by Sudan and Somalia. According to Cliffe (1999), there was a brief period of détente between 1991 and 1994, characterized by various regional initiatives for the resolution of conflicts in Somalia, Sudan and Djibouti, as well as by the economic integration processes involving countries in the region.

As an example, we can mention the role taken on by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the management of the region’s conflicts and political crisis from 1990s on. In 1993, after three failed attempts to solve the conflict between Khartoum and the SPLM/A, president al-Bashir formally asked IGAD to mediate the civil war in the country, allowing for a series of conversations between the belligerent parties, culminating in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, ending the Second Sudanese Civil War. In Somalia, despite IGAD’s many conflict resolution attempts since the beginning of the crisis, it was not possible to stabilize the country and to establish an authority able to maintain order and peace. In 2002, however, and agreement was reached that established, in 2004, a Transitional Federal Parliament and, in 2005, a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (Cardoso 2015; Healy 2014).

However, the historical rivalries and the still pending disputes, generating mutual distrust between the countries, remained as relevant factors in the region’s security agenda in this period. The first rivalry axis verified in the post-Cold War was between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

25 The institutionalization of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), in 1994, and the transformation of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) into the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 1996, which included a security agenda, can be mentioned as examples.
The tensions between the two States have their origins in the disagreements between the TPLF and the EPLF, leading to the outbreak of a large scale conventional war between the countries in May, 1998. It is important to emphasize that these were the main reasons to the collapse of the Ethiopian military regime, in May, 1991 (Cliffe 1999; Marcus 2002). In the first years following Eritrea’s independence, the relation between the countries were positive and cooperative. Results of this the many agreements signed on the first half of the 1990s between Asmara and Addis Ababa, aiming to achieve economic integration and political cooperation. The Agreement on free trade and economic cooperation, facilitating the use of Eritrea’s Assab and Massawa harbours by Ethiopia, the use of the Ethiopian Birr as the common currency and the mutual defence agreement are worthy of mention (Abbink 2003; Berhe 2014). Besides, a collaboration to the rebuilding of the countries infrastructures, destroyed during the war, was agreed (Clapham 1996; Mulugeta 2011).

In 1997, however, when Addis Ababa adopted an orthodox economic policy (in line with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), the capital flux from Ethiopia to Eritrea was reduced and the relations between them began to deteriorate. Besides, Ethiopia faced economic issues because of the low coffee price (its main commodity) in the international market. Because of the profound interdependence of their economies, specially Eritrea’s dependence to Ethiopia’s market, the economic issues reflected on the country. In an attempt to revert the situation and pressure Ethiopia, in November, 1997, the Eritrean government abandoned the use of Birr and created its own currency - Nafka, and increased tariffs on the use of harbours (Mulugeta 2011; Schneider 2010).

The borders disputes worsened the already shaken relations between the States. The almost 1,000 kilometres shared by the countries had not been clearly defined when Eritrea became independent, and some disputed areas remained. Eritrea based their claims in the Italian colony maps, while Ethiopia based theirs in the treaties between Italy and Ethiopian empire in

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26 In February, 1994, EPLF was renamed as People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ).

27 In view of the commercial complementarity between Asmara and Addis Ababa, in which Eritrea exported manufactured goods to Ethiopia and imported from it coffee and most of the internally consumed food goods, an inflation control and commercial policies synchronization mechanism was agreed (Tareke 2009).

28 According to Schneider (2010), this wasn’t well received by Ethiopian authorities that, in retaliation, declared the commerce between the countries would be, from then on, commonly conducted – through the use of foreign currency. Besides, in the end of 1997, Ethiopia printed new Birr bills, making unfeasible a possible Eritrean’s withdrawal of their new currency plans.
the beginning of the 20th century (ICG 2003; Marcus 2002).

War began in May 1998, when Eritrea invaded and occupied the Ethiopian city of Badme. In the beginning of June, the conflict intensified with terrestrial and aerial campaigns from both sides. The causes to the conflicted remain unclear; some authors classify it as a mere territorial dispute, while others, such as Peter Woodward (2006), Gebru Tareke (2009) e Kidist Mulugeta (2011), argue that the territory was the catalyst, not the cause, of the war (Mulugeta 2011; Tareke 2009; Woodward 2006). Despite the conflict resolution attempts, mediated by the USA, Rwanda and, posteriorly, by OAU, it was not possible to re-establish peace.

Eritrea was, in conventional terms, defeated by Ethiopia in June 2000, and, in July of the same year, through the 1298 resolution, the UNSC established the United Missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), with the mandate of monitoring the cease-fire and watching the buffer/demilitarized 25-kilometre zone between the borders. In December, under the auspices of the OAU, UN, European Union and the USA, the Algiers Agreement was signed, determining, among other terms, the submitting of the border disputes to two independent and impartial organs to be designated by the Secretary-Generals of OAU and UN, as well as by both countries. The first one was the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, responsible for analysing the claims regarding losses in the war and the second, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), composed by five members – responsible for demarcating the limits according to the colonial treaties of 1900, 1902 and 1908 (ICG 2003; Mulugeta 2011).

In April 2002, EEBC decided on the demarcation of the border: the city of Badme would be on Eritrean territory; Ethiopia refused to accept it, leading to a dead-locked situation (ICG 2010b; Tareke 2009). In 2004, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, proposed an internationally well-received tension reduction plan, that was, however, not accepted by the Erithrean government, because of the Ethiopian repudiation of the EEBC resolution. In 2008, the UNSC decided on the non-renewal of the UNMEE and the dead-lock remains (Schneider 2010).

Regarding the Addis Ababa and Khartoum rivalries, the coming to power of Sudan backed insurgent groups in Ethiopia pointed to an improvement in relations. However, Khartoum’s support to Islamic insurgent groups in Ethiopia pushed the countries apart. The bilateral relations deteriorated even further when members of the Islamic Brotherhood groups, responsible for the murder attempt on Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, in June 1995, in Addis Ababa, during the OAU Summit, fled to Sudan – supposedly confirming the country’s participation in the attempt. In response, the Ethiopian government started to significantly support
SPLA financially and militarily, allowing to the reversion of the situation against the Sudanese government (Adar 2000; Doop 2013).

With the outbreak of the war against Eritrea, Addis Ababa attempted to improve the relation with Khartoum, in order to reduce the fronts it was engaged on and redirect attention and efforts to the country’s northern border. Combined to the tuning down of the Sudanese government’s Islamic rhetoric, this allowed the relation between the countries to improve towards the end of the 1990s, allowing for greater cooperation regarding regional security. In 2004, for instance, Sudan, Ethiopia and Yemen signed an informal alliance to counter Eritrea, opposed to both governments (ICG 2010a; Schmidt 2013).

In turn, tensions between Sudan and Eritrea go back to the beginning of the 1990s, when Khartoum began to support Eritrean Islamic fundamentalist groups, such as the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) (Cliffe 1999; ICG 2010b). In response, Asmara began to support, militarily and financially, groups opposed to Omar Hassan al-Bashir – especially SPLA and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Eritrean support was paramount to SPLA’s forces victory against the government’s forces in the Blue Nile State in 1997. Eritrea severed diplomatic relations with Sudan in December, 1994, and, in June of the following year, hosted a conference with all groups opposed to the regime of al-Bashir (SPLA, civilians and exiles), occasion when the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was created. The NDA headquarters were in Sudan’s embassy in Asmara, closed from 1994 up until 2000, when diplomatic relations between the two countries was re-established. In 2003, however, the Eritrean government was accused of supporting insurgent groups in Darfur – especially the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Cliffe 1999; ICG 2010a).

Relations between Sudan and Uganda became tense since the end of the 1980s, after president Yoweri Museveni offered financial and military support to the SPLA. In response, Khartoum began to provide weapons, military intelligence and training to Ugandan insurgent groups, such as the LRA, the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (Cliffe 1999; Reno 2011). In the 1990s, diplomatic relations between the countries were severed, When the peace agreement was signed in Sudan, in 2005, the relations between the States improved substantially (ICG 2010a).

Towards the end of the 1990s, the security dynamics in the region took a small turn because of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and, specially, the terrorist attack in August 1998 against the USA’s embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. The attack killed at least 220 people, including 12 North-Americans, and injured about 5 thousand, with a second terrorist attack,
minutes later, against the USA’s embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing dozens. Both attacks were attributed to the al-Qaeda terrorist network, led by Osama bin Laden. In response, the USA bombed a pharmaceutical factory in northern Khartoum, in retaliation to the support granted by president Omar al-Bashir to al-Qaeda, and also because of the suspicion that the country was developing a clandestine chemical weapons program (Adebajo 2003; Kagwanja 2006; MØller 2009). Mainly because of USA’s pressure, Bin Laden was expelled from Sudan in 1996 and returned to Afghanistan, where he would be under the Taliban’s regime protection until its overthrowing, in 2001.

Post-September 11 (2001-2015): agendas, actors and “new” threats

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, on the United States29 changed the security dynamics in the region again, placing terrorism30 at the center of the agenda. The Horn of Africa was the first target for the North American securitization in the African continent post-September 11; besides being close to the Middle East, it was the region where al-Qaeda began its large-scale operations (Kenya and Tanzania, 1998). This new threat perception is based on the confluence of factors characteristic of the region, such as the activity of radical Islamic groups, the disintegrator potential of weak/failed states, the plots of non-governed territories and the idea that such features are attractive for refuge and recruitment of terrorist organizations, especially for the al-Qaeda’s network.

With the National Security Strategy (NSS) publishing, also known as the Bush Doctrine, on September 2002, the North American macro-securitization began in many parts of the world, through the so-called Global War on Terrorism (GWoT). In this document, the United States recognized

29 “On September 11, 2001, four passenger airplanes kidnapped inside the United States, from local companies, American Airlines and United Airlines, and piloted by terrorists, hit traditional symbols of the North American economic and military power, causing thousands of deaths. In New York, two Boeing attacks caused the explosion and collapse of the twin towers of the World Trade Center and, in the capital Washington DC, the Pentagon was attacked (...). The fourth plane fell in a forest in Pittsburgh, apparently failing to achieve its goal, which would be Camp David.” (Pecequilo 2011, 374).

30 There is no clear and consensual definition for terrorism. For this paper’s purpose, we will use the concept developed by Eugenio Diniz, who defines terrorism as “[...] a kind of use of force or threat of use of force characterized by the indiscrimination of the targets, by the centrality of the desired psychological effect and by the virtual irrelevance, given the force correlation of the antagonistic wills involved in the conflict, of the material and human destruction by the terrorist action.” (Diniz 2010, 165-166).
non-state actors as important enemies and weak states as dangerous. Moreover, the NSS argued it was necessary to answer to threats before they were fully formed and justified preemption as early self-defense (Crenshaw 2010; Pecequilo 2011).

The securitization process of the Horn of Africa started in October 2002, when the George W. Bush administration began construction of an antiterrorist military defense network in the region, establishing a military base in Djibouti – *Camp Lemonnier* – which became the base for the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), under the responsibility of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)31. Its objective is to locate and destroy international terrorist networks in the Horn and East of Africa, Yemen and nearby Indian Ocean islands32 (Adebajo 2003; Fischer and Anderson 2015). The following year, the United States started the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI), a US$ 100 million program to fight terrorism in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti (Fisher 2013; Møller 2009). This dynamics in the Horn of Africa ended linked to the Middle East GWoT itself, given the geographical proximity of the regions and the terrorist attack against the North American destroyer *USS Cole* in October 2000, at the Aden port in Yemen – attributed to Yemeni terrorists linked to al-Qaeda (Buzan and Wæver 2003; Rotberg 2005; Schmidt 2013).

In 2002, the USA also launched the Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), focusing on the fight against terrorism in the Horn of Africa, especially in Somalia, and the fight against piracy in the eastern coast of Africa (Fisher 2013). In February 2007, the Pentagon announced the creation of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), responsible for operations, exercises, soldiers training and security cooperation with the African countries – except Egypt, part of CENTCOM (Adebajo 2013; Oliveira and Cardoso 2015). Operating since October 2007, the AFRICOM is one of the six North American military commands around the world33. Perceived as an instrument focused on guaranteeing the North

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31 Following the creation of a separate African command, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in October 2007, the responsibility of the CJTF-HOA was over its responsibility.

32 At the same time as the Horn of Africa securitization, the USA launched in November 2002 the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), a US$ 7.75 million program aiming to offer logistical support and counterinsurgency military training in the Sahel region, which includes the governments of Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. In 2005, the PSI was expanded and turned into the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) which also included the countries of the Maghreb, Morocco and Tunisia, Nigeria, Senegal and Burkina Faso. Moreover, the budget was increased to annual US$ 100 million (Adebajo 2013; Schmidt 2013).

33 U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S.
American strategic interests on the continent and maintenance of power by key regimes (main oil exporters), through arm sales and training of their armed forces, the AFRICOM was widely rejected by most African countries (Keenan 2009; Volman and Keenan 2009). This rejection can be seen in the refusal of all African states, except Liberia and Morocco, to receive the AFRICOM headquarters – which remain in Stuttgart, Germany, with support bases in Djibouti, in the Red Sea, and in the Ascension Island, in the South Atlantic (Keenan 2009). The former presidents of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, and Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, for instance, believed the construction of North American bases would make the continent more susceptible to terrorist actions.

In 2009, already under the Obama administration, the Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT) was established, focused on the fight against terrorism in Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Since its creation, the United States Department of State made about US$ 104 million available to PREACT (Fisher 2013).

Some important contradictions arise through the analysis of the GWoT in the Horn of Africa. One of the first factors to be identified is related to the bilateral relations between the United States and the countries in the region. To the previously allied states – Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda – the GWoT represented the consolidation of relations with the United States. Regarding the countries the United States had kept a relative distance from, as Sudan and Eritrea, these had their relationships with Washington suddenly transformed. Sudan, turned into an international pariah in the 1990s, ended up benefiting with the GWoT, being reintegrated to the international community after the lifting of sanctions34 (Fisher and Anderson 2015). Indeed, after the launching of the GWoT, fearing a US military intervention, as in Afghanistan, president Omar al-Bashir tuned down the Islamic rhetoric in his international politics and expelled from his government Hassan al-Turabi, one of the main Islamic ideologues of the country (Schneider 2010; Woodward 2013). Khartoum became an important regional ally of the United States in the fight against terrorism, since it began to use its connections and provide intelligence to the North American government (Johnson 2007 Schmidt 2013).

With the narrowing of the relationships with Washington and the

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34 Between 2001 and 2004, Sudan became the main recipient for North American economic aid in Sub-Saharan Africa.
building of a transnational antiterrorist network in the Horn of Africa, all countries in the region, in varying degrees, used the situation to securitize their internal issues (Fisher and Anderson 2015; Oliveira and Cardoso 2015). Ethiopia was the main beneficiary of this process. For instance, internal groups opposed to the government, such as the Oromo Liberation Front, the Ogaden National Liberation Front, Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia and the Ginbot 735, responsible for a number of attacks in the country, were categorized as terrorist organizations (Kagwanja 2006; Mulugeta 2014; Rotberg 2005).

Similarly, Uganda framed LRA and ADF as terrorist groups. With financial and logistical support from the United States, the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) started in March 2009 a large operation (Operation Lightning Thunder) against the fighting forces of LRA and their leader Joseph Kony, dismantling their bases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – forcing the group to flee to the Central African Republic (CAR). In October 2010, in Bangui, an agreement was reached between the DRC, CAR, Uganda and Sudan for the creation of a permanent regional force to act, especially, against the LRA fighting forces (Fisher and Anderson 2015; Giacopelli 2010). However, the proposal was never implemented. In 2011, the United States sent 100 military advisors to Central Africa, aiming to help the Ugandan government fight LRA.

Thus, is posed the question: whence does terrorism arise as a regional security problem? The absence of such a critical perspective forces the fight against terrorism to take on a “a prior” way to identify a threat, in detriment of others, perhaps more important ones. The historical roots of terrorism in the region must be sought. In many countries of the Horn, the moderate opposition groups were historically co-opted by the regime, while more radical ones were relegated to the complete exclusion from the political system.

On the other hand, the proliferation of terrorist attacks in Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda gave the subject importance in the regional security agenda. Many continental, regional and national initiatives focused on the fight against terrorism and protection of civilians reflect this. In the continental scope, during the OAU Summit in Algiers, July 1999, the member states adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and, in 2002, the African Centre for the Study & Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established (Kagwanja 2006).

In the regional scope, in 2005, during the IGAD Summit, in

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35 Ginbot 7 is an Ethiopian political party founded by Berhanu Nega and was one of the main opposition parties in the 2005 elections (Mulugeta 2011).
Khartoum, an action plan was developed to the fight against terrorism in the region. It is the IGAD’s Peace and Security Strategy. The following year, the IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT) was launched, built on four main elements: reinforcement of the judicial capabilities, interdepartmental cooperation, borders control, training and strategic cooperation. In 2011, the IGAD Security Sector Program was created, focusing on maritime security and the fight against organized crime and terrorism, as well as the Security Sector Reform (SSR) (Kagwanja 2006; Woodward 2013).

In the national scope, countries of the region adopted policies to the prevention and combat against terrorism – Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, for instance, ratified all twenty-one international conventions and protocols on fighting terrorism and passed laws to prevent terrorist attacks (Rotberg 2005).

In Kenya, country suffering in the last years with the spillover of terrorism from Somalia to its territory, the fight against terrorism was adopted as a priority defense policy. Since the Nairobi terrorist attacks of 1998, and the Mombasa ones, in 2002, began the development, even if incipient, of the counter terrorist capabilities of the Kenyan authorities. Already in 1999, the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) was created, and in 2003 the Suppression of Terrorism Bill was published, and created the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit. The following year, a bill protecting witnesses in terrorism cases was sanctioned, established the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), as well as published the National Counter Terrorism Strategy. In 2006, a supplemental Anti-Terrorism Bill was published (Kagwanja 2006; Rotberg 2005). Moreover, the country promotes and extensive cooperation program with the United States and United Kingdom to fight terrorism.

Known since the beginnings of the 1990s by the epitome of failed state, because of the internal political instability, Somalia turned into an important battlefield in the War on Terror. Although Somali fundamentalist

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36 In October 2011, in response to the kidnapping of tourists in the border with Somalia, attributed to the Somali fundamentalist group al Shabaab, in a counter terrorist operation named operation Linda Nchi, the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) military intervened in the neighbouring Somalia in order to locate and destroy al Shabaab cells. In February 2012, Kenyan soldiers officially joined the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON) – the country currently has 4,664 contingents in the mission (AMISOM, 2014). Answering this role played by Kenya in Somalian conflict, al Shabaab linked militias began to perform low intensity terrorist attacks in Kenya. In September 2013, however, al Shabaab planned and carried out their largest attack outside Somali territory, against a luxurious Israeli-owned commercial center (Westgate Shopping) in Nairobi, Kenyan capital. The attack caused 67 deaths of various nationalities and injured hundreds.
Islamic groups – such as Al-Itihaad-al-Islami (AIAI) – figure since 2002 in the United States Department of State terrorist organizations list, it was only from 2004, with the rise and advance of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) – coalition of Sharia (Islamic law) defending Islamic militias – through the southern and central regions of the country that Somalia became the epicenter of the war on terror in Africa (Rotberg 2005; Samatar 2013). An indicator of the insecurity in the Somali territory is represented by the Global Terrorism Index, pointing Somalia as the country with highest risk of occurrence of terrorist attacks.

In this context, through the warlords and neighbouring states, the United States created a front to fight terrorism in Somalia. The CIA played an important role in this respect, arming a group of warlords and, under the leadership of Bashir Ragha and Musa Sude, creating the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), in February 2006, aiming to counter the UIC rise. However, it was quickly defeated by the Islamic militias and expelled from the main cities. In June 2006, UIC already controlled the main cities in the South and Central regions, including Mogadishu, the capital. In December 2006, however, with tactical and military support from the United States, Ethiopia intervened in Somalia supporting the newly formed Transitional Federal Government (TFG), in order to stop UIC’s territorial expansion and weaken its political and fighting capabilities, as well as to legitimize the new government (Adebajo 2013; Woodward 2013).

UIC was military defeated in January 2007 and fragmented between two distinct factions, a moderate and a radical one. The first one, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), led by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, was incorporated to the transitional government through the Djibouti peace deal (Power-Sharing), signed in 2008. However, the second one, Harakat al-Shabaab Mujihadeen (al Shabaab), led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, became the main challenge to the consolidation of peace in Somalia. The al Shabaab appears in the North American Department of State list of terrorist organizations for the first time in March 2008, because of the supposed link to the al-Qaeda network (Woodward 2013). In summary, the outbreak of the Global War on Terror, made official by the 2002 Bush Doctrine, whatever their merits, changed the regional security agenda and the strategic priorities for the countries in the region.

The maritime piracy\textsuperscript{37} consists in another important current

\textsuperscript{37} For the purposes of this paper we will use the definition of piracy from the United Nations Montego Bay Convention, defining it as any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: i) on the high seas, against another ship or
regional challenge. Although the number of raids in the coast of Somalia have decreased in the last years, from to 237, in 2011; to 75, in 2012; reaching 15, in 2013 (see figure 1), this problem still represents an enormous, not only regional, but, especially, international, challenge, given the strategic location of the country and the importance of this maritime route for the international trade, as well as the proximity to the Persian Gulf (Fantaye 2014).

For this reason, since 2008, by decision of the UNSC (resolution 1851) and by request of the TFG, the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) of Somalia has been patrolled by the international community, aiming to guarantee the security of the intense maritime traffic between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea daily. Currently, three major operations combating piracy in the region are underway: Operation Atlanta – European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAFVOR), Operation Ocean Shield, of OTAN, and a multinational naval force, Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) (see figure 1), comprising a 29-country coalition under the command of the United States Navy, based in Bahrein. The last one includes individual contributions from countries that detached their own naval assets under the national command, as China, Japan. India, Iran, Russia and Saudi Arabia (Fantaye 2014; Mckay 2011).

It is also important to take into account the privatization of maritime security in the fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa. A number of companies hired armed protection services for merchant ships transiting in the region. As a result, there was a proliferation of private military companies acting in the region: as examples, we can mention Eos Risk Management, Hollowpoint Protection, Anti-Piracy Maritime Security Solutions, Secopex, Gulf of Aden Group Transits (GoAGT), the Hart Group, the Olive Group, ISSG Holdings Ltd., Muse Professional Group Inc and Xe Services (Fantaye 2014).

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38 Maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia has captured increasing attention from the international media and economic operators concerned about the negative effects of this phenomenon on the international economy and security. As of 2009, there has been an increase in maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. In most cases pirates are former fishermen who hijack cargo ships and oil tankers and demand millionaire bailouts for the release of ships and their crews.

39 The costs fighting maritime piracy are estimated at around US$ 7 billion yearly, with the expenses with ransom of ships and its crews accounting for just 2% of the amount (International Maritime Bureau 2014).
Even though there is no consensus regarding the causes of piracy in the Horn of Africa, some authors, such as Peter Woodward, Demessie Fantaye, among others, directly link it to the collapse of the Somali state. Indeed, the severe internal crisis experienced in the country since the beginning of the 1990s, as well as the weakness of its surveillance and control capabilities, ended up allowing the operation of foreign crafts which, in addition to engaging in predatory fishing in the Somali EEZ, also contributed to environmental damages through the disposal of toxic waste in the territorial waters of Somalia (Fantaye 2014; Woodward 2013).

Currently, the main threats to security involving countries of the region are attributed to insurgent groups operating in different territories, as al Shabaab, in Somalia, LRA\(^40\), in Uganda, the Oromo Liberation Front, in Ethiopia, as well as maritime piracy in the coast of Somalia, the internal conflict in Sudan (Darfur, Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains), the civil wars in Somalia and South Sudan\(^41\) (Doop 2013). On an interstate level, the dispute

\(^{40}\) In October 2010, an agreement was signed between DRC, CAR, Uganda and Sudan to create a permanent regional force acting, especially, against the fighting forces of LRA.

\(^{41}\) The South Sudan crisis originated in July 2013, when vice-president Riek Machar was expelled from office by president Salva Kiir, accused of an attempted coup. In response,
between Sudan and South Sudan for the oil region of Abyei, the territorial dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti, the rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the dispute for the Migingo Island between Kenya and Uganda (Mesfin 2011) can all be cited. However, these disputes remain on the diplomatic level.

Added to this are the challenges for human security, as the poor social indicators in most states of the region and the large number of internally displaced persons and refugees. In Kenya alone there are currently 442,170 Somali refugees. The situation is even more complex if the Somali refugees in the other countries of the region are taken into account, as well as the Sudanese and South Sudanese refugees.

Conclusion

This study aimed to analyze the Horn of Africa’s security dynamics in the post-colonial period, as a way to understand the security perspectives and challenges in the region. Therefore, an analysis of the actors, conflicts, agendas and threats from the period of the Cold War to the present day was carried out.

Altogether, the security dynamic of the Horn of Africa in the post-independence period had, thus, impact on the whole continent. The result of two long civil wars in the region (the cases of Ethiopia and Sudan) reshaped the African map in the post-Cold War period. Indeed, the creation of two new states in the region, Eritrea (1993) and South Sudan (2011), besides transforming the regional security dynamic, reconfigured the map of Africa. The importance of these events is reflected in the fact that the conservation of the borders inherited from colonialism was one of the main provisions argued by the African leaders in the post-colonial period, within the OAU and reaffirmed within the current African Union (AU). The Biafra (1967-1970), Katanga (1967-), Cabinda (1963-), Somaliland (1991) and Puntland (1998) cases are clear examples of the traditional African stance of not recognizing separatist movements (Castellano and Oliveira 2011; Williams 2014; Woodward 2013).

Largely, the security dynamics found in the Horn of Africa in this period are domestic dynamics regionalized through various spill over

Machar organized militias and created the SPLM-IO (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition) in December, initiating attacks against the Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile provinces’ oil fields, leading to the outbreak of the country’s civil war. At president’s Salva Kiir request, Uganda sent a military contingent to South Sudan, supporting the government troops in their attempt to regain control of cities taken by SPLM-IO militias. Machar, in turn, received support from Khartoum (Rolandsen et al. 2015).
mechanisms, as the flows of refugees, insurgencies, small arms trafficking, intensified by the borders’ porosity. It is a result, on the one hand, of the existence of poorly consolidated states, with weak state capabilities and fragility in the social indicators; on the other, of the concentration of internal political disputes, border issues and problems related to terrorism and small arms trafficking, among other transnational challenges. Such limitations can be verified in the low level of cooperation regarding security and defence among the countries in the region, fundamental to the handling of the mutual security issues.

In these sense, is of important prominence the recent rapprochement of Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya, seeking an institutionally stable and economically developed environment. This is due, partly, to the exponential growth of their economies during the last decade, contributing to the regional economic interdependence. The exchange of Ethiopian services and electricity for Sudanese oil\textsuperscript{42} can be mentioned as an example, resulting in a significant increase in the supply of oil from Sudan to Ethiopia, which in 2009 exceeded 80\% of the Ethiopian imports of the product (Castellano and Oliveira 2011; Woodward 2013).

Furthermore, the projects underway in the infrastructure integrating sphere can be mentioned, such as the building of a pipeline, connecting the South Sudan oil fields to the Djibouti and Mombasa, Kenya, ports, and the Lamu Port and Lamu-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET), financed by China. When completed, South Sudan will not only reduce its dependency on Sudan’s infrastructure to export oil, but will also reduce the cost to do so, as the distance will be significantly reduced. The definitive rapprochement between the three largest countries in the region, with an increasing economic interconnection, seems to be, at the same time, pre-requisite and contributing element to the stabilization of the Horn of Africa through political cooperation and mutual confidence building.

However, until there are heavy investments in the construction of a modern infrastructure common to the Horn of Africa countries – plus intergovernmental organizations capable of solving the mutual security problems (armed insurgencies, separatism, political and religious extremists, small arms trafficking and piracy) – everything indicates that there will be no real progress to stabilize the region, strengthen regional

\textsuperscript{42} It is in underway the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, on the Blue Nile in Benishangul-Gumuz, in Ethiopia, capable of generating 6,000 MW, supplying cheap electricity beyond Ethiopia, to Sudan, South Sudan and Egypt. The country still has, according to estimates from the Ethiopian Electric Power Authority (EEPA), the possibility of producing more than 45,000 MW of hydroelectric energy.
integration and development. In this regard, IGAD emerges as a necessary and extremely important mechanism, nevertheless insufficient to stabilize the region.

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ABSTRACT
This paper aims at analyzing security dynamics in the Horn of Africa in the post-independence period, identifying the actors, agendas and threats. For this purpose, it is subdivided into three parts. The first one analyzes the security dynamics taking place in the Horn of Africa during the Cold War period, focusing on the regional rivalries and on the penetration of extraregional actors. In the second part, there is a discussion regarding the transformations which occurred in region in the immediate post-Cold War period, focusing both on the unities’ (states) internal security dynamics and on the regional ones. The third and last section aims at identifying “new” threats and regional and international responses, as well as the emerging strategic importance of the region to traditional superpowers in the post-9/11 period, marked by the process of securitization.

KEYWORDS
Security; Conflicts; Horn of Africa.

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Democratization Processes and Political Competition in 1990’s Africa: The Cases of Mozambique and Zambia\(^1\)

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Introduction

[...] Democracy and democratization must be taken into their context and in the dynamics of each collectivity. What happened in Europe was something typically european; what happened in Latin America is typical of Latin America and the same must be understood and valid for Africa [...].
(The authors 2015)

Democracy and democratization must be understood within its scope, considering the singularities and the contextual aspects of each society. And the democracies of the third wave also contemplate singularities that cannot be measured by the rubble of other contexts. The pretension of the present research is to study democracy and democratization in Mozambique and Zambia considering two elements: the electoral system, its singularities and then the formation and the shape of the party system with its correspondent nuances. Because it is important to analyze the effect

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of one in relation with the other, we focus our analysis in two aspects: first, the political and electoral competition in both countries, emphasizing to the party fluctuations in the Parliament, and secondly we analyze the electoral competition in the perspective of power alternance, which constitutes one of the dimensions to measure the level of stability of democracies.

According to our view, the analysis on democracy and democratization could be very limited if we did not include the empirical and theoretical studies developed by Dahl (1996), O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Santos (1987), Di Palma (1990), Huntington (1991), Przeworski (2000), Whitehead (2001), Carothers (2002) and Nahlon (2011). On the analysis on the electoral and party systems, our construction and theoretical model were inspired by the approaches of Sartori (1982), Pippa (1997), Ware (1996) and Cintra (2007).

The definitions on democracy and the classic dispositions on its concept are determined by Antique Greek authors, such as Socrates and Plato, and the contractualists, like Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, etc., that determined the theoretical basis to conceive democracy’s concept, considered in this study. Commonly, the idea of democracy is comprehended by the notion that people must control govern decisions upon them (Morlino 1986; Zovatto 2007). However, contemporary democracies have always been followed by the idea that it is important to allow other segments of society to participate of the choices upon politics, in a way that the majority determine people’s intentions (Lavalle and Araujo 2008; Pitkin 1967; Gaxie 1996). On the other hand, democracy can be defined as the regime where society members can really choose its governors and participate directly or indirectly of the determinations upon questions that concern everyone (Held 1991).

In the same way, democracy is a concept and a social-historical process. From the conceptual view, democracy is the people’s government, as showed above, and the historical ways that it is exercised on most countries are based on the principle of delegation (Feres and Pogrebinsc 2010; Hawkins 2016). On the social-historical process, it is possible to verify, according to Majefe (1995), three models of democracy: the liberal, the social and the socialist. They usually result in three forms of government: liberalism, social democracy and socialism, respectively. Dahl (1996) explains that a process of democracy definition must include necessarily two aspects: a maximalist understanding of what would be a democracy and, on the other hand, an understanding from a descriptive definition, that henceforth worries about describing the general elements of democratic societies. Considering the minimum guarantees for democracy, as explained by polyarchy, Schmitter and Karl (1991) add some categories: which elected bodies have to be able
to exercise its constitutional powers without being submitted to a greater power of non elected bodies. The political system must be independent.

Methodologically, it is an exploratory work. We have considered data in a comparative way, realizing a mix with qualitative productivity measures and quantitative measures in order to evaluate the political and electoral processes and the parliamentary fluctuations in both countries. We have analyzed democratization specifically from the dynamics of the political and electoral system of the countries, having aggregated the official electoral results as a data basis, which are available on the websites of the electoral management bodies of both countries. The analysis interval comprehends the years of 1990 and 2011, the period of transition and democratization of both countries. The comparative approach seeks to understand both cases of study (small $n = 2$), as suggested by Landman (2008) and Franzese (2007), that tried to include endogeneity and contextual conditionalisms, such as: social structure of politics, social and political gaps, political institutions and the type of electoral and party systems of Mozambique and Zambia. Therefore, the article is structured like this: on the second section we realize a discussion on the dynamics of the processes of transition and democratization in Africa; on the third section we present the historical trajectory and social structure of democratization; on the fourth section we discuss the political and electoral competition of both countries according to a compared perspective; and, finally, on the last section, we present the final considerations.

Political dynamics and the transition for democracy in Africa

According to Jibrin Ibrahim (1997, 124):

[...] between the essential characteristics of the democratic transition figure the constitutional authority, the multiparty, but equally a much deeper sociocultural transformation, allowing the free elected dirigent team and the majority of civil population to make prevail its primacy in relation with military oligarchies, ethnic and regionalist groups and/or the nomenclature [...].

On the perspective of Furtado (1997: 1998), the democratization of societies and states is today on the agenda and, by the end of the 80s, there was a robust movement of democratization that, somehow, moved african countries. Besides external or international factors being important, the historical and structural conditioners endogenous to african countries during the democratization process can not be denied. This discussion is developed by Wiseman (1997) and Visentini (2006), that explain that the
collapse of communism in USSR and the end of Cold War created new opportunities for the political transition to democracy due to the end of competition between East and West, which either supported or protected authoritarian regimes in Africa.

Sahr (1992) explains that General Obasanjo, reformed chief of State in Nigeria, spoke on the Forum of African Leaders of 1990 that:

[...] the changes that are happening on East Europe have enormous implications to the Third World in general and to Africa in particular. The winds that overthrew dictatorships, autocratic regimes, outdated economic systems, and promoted democratic transition and the respect for human rights, are not unknown in Africa. The winds of change on East Europe are bringing numerous opportunities to african people, so that they intensify their fight for democracy [...] (Sahr 1992; Pavia s.d., 5).

Two historical moments had consequences over all Africa. On the endogenous level, first, there was the situation of Benin (1990), on the National Conference of the Active Forces of the Nation, summoned by the one-party system to start developing constitutional reforms which aimed to restore of some sort of legitimacy to the regime, opposing the takeover of power by force. A second event was the situation in South Africa, when the president Frederik de Klerk legalized the African National Congress (ANC) and freed Nelson Mandela from prison (1990), beginning the democratic transition on the country (Pavia s.d.; Southall 2003; Wantchekon and Jensen 2004).

On the exogenous level, Phiri and Macheve (2015) illustrate that the negotiations that led to the end of the conflict on the post-Cold War era coincided with the Third Democratic Wave (Huntington 1991; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). In empirical terms, after six years (from 1989 to 1994), a wave of democratic transitions crossed the whole of Africa (Southall 2003, 9). In this period, about 40 african countries went through multiparty elections, and in many of these there were effective changes of political regime. Between them there were, for example, South Africa, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, San-Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Tanzania and Zambia.
Whitehead (2001, 4), on his analysis on democratization and the transition process, associate such processes to the international dimension, and proposes to study them from three categories: the Contagion, the Control and the Consent. The first category, Contagion, that the author calls domino effect, is the propagation of the experience of one country to others by a non coercive and non intentional way. Whitehead shows then two ways that this process occurred during the second half of the 20th Century (from 1950). There was the so called contagion by proximity, experienced in Europe during the end of World War 2: France, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Germany, Austria and Italy. All of these countries experienced contagion in an interval of five years. Secondly, there was the 1989 series, containing countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, each one in an interval of one year. Various african countries participated of this cycle as well: Namibia, Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, also in an interval of five years (1990-94).

Mozambique and Zambia were influenced by the contagion effect of South Africa, that is, it can be assured that the political developments on
South Africa, a regional power, and the liberation of Nelson Mandela, as well as the legalization of the African National Congress (ANC) party, and, finally, the acceptance of the principle of universal suffragium, that lead to the realization of the first multiracial elections in South Africa, in April 1994, and to the constitution of a government led by Nelson Mandela, had a contagion effect in Mozambique and Zambia (Pavia s.d., 7).

The second dimension is control. For Whitehead (2001), this category is related to the promotion of the idea of democracy on a intentional way, using explicit measures that can, on one hand, encourage and, on the other, penalize. The example of this second dimension occurred in Southern Africa, that since 1989 experienced pressure for global powers such as USA, Great Britain, France and other, through its political and economic programs: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). When they achieved their expected results, many countries were led to a national reconciliation and to the democratization (Darrnholf 1997; Olk 2003; Southall 2003). Finally, the third category, consent, the most recent one, is adapted to a situation of consolidation of democracy that involves a set of interactions between international processes and national groups, resulting on the production of new democratic norms and expectations in a vertical way (from the bottom to the top), that Whitehead (2001) considers according to four aspects:

[...] 1st. The territorial limits of the successive democratizations and its consequences to the alliance systems established; 2nd. The main international structures that tend to generate consent concerning the change of regime; 3rd. The ways how authentic democratic and national actors can be constituted from transnational groups relatively diffuse; 4th. The role of international demonstration effects [...] (Whitehead 2001, 12)

O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) propose that democratic transition occurs in three phases: liberation, democratization and consolidation. These stages must be understood according to this: liberations means the moment of fall of the authoritarian regime; democratization happens during the process of construction of the political system and of democratic guarantees; and consolidation concerns democratic plenitude. On this study, we consider that transition to democracy is comprehended in the interval between a non democratic and a democratic regime (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Horowitz 1991; Olk 2003), because the first assumption of the transition theories is that democratization is not a situation, but a
process that can be temporarily long.

Historical Trajectory and Social Structure of Democratization in Mozambique and Zambia

Transition to multiparty democracy in Mozambique

Mozambique, as a country, resulted from the war against its colonizer (Portugal), carried out by FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) between 1964 and 1974. This process was helped by the socialist oriented basis left on the newly independent Tanzania, and soon FRELIMO established its central basis on Mueda between the sympathizers of the makonde populations (De Brito 1995; Terenciano and Souza 2015; Terenciano 2016). With military support from China, USSR and other countries of the East Block, the Front had expelled the portuguese from substantial zones of the setentrional provinces of Tete, Niassa and Cabo Delgado. The military coup of 1974 in Lisbon overthrew Marcelo Caetano and gave space to Mozambique’s independence, in 1975, under FRELIMO’s power (Pitcher 2002; Manning 2002; Pitcher 2004; Terenciano and Souxa 2015; Terenciano 2016). The socialist orientation of FRELIMO was consolidated in 1977, with the official adoption of marxism-leninism by the party. Under the leadership of the liberation movement (FRELIMO), independent Mozambique became a one-party socialist state based on the principles of democratic centralism and on a political-administrative system highly hierarchized.

The political and electoral history of Mozambique was instituted by elections in a context of a one-party system (Lavroff 1975; Hayward 1987; Southall 2003). In 1977 the first elections were realized, in the context of a one-party system, to choose members from the Popular Congress. They should be elected by popular choice through a plebiscite, however the chosen ones should be accepted by the ruling party, in that case FRELIMO. Somehow, the choices or simply the indications came from FRELIMO, that considered itself a state-party. A similar situation occurred in 1986, once more through elections and also in the context of one party, with the election of members for the Popular Congress, which process was similar to the one in 1977, except for some singularities (José 2005; Nuvunga 2007; Terenciano et al 2015).

5 In 1986, despite having held elections in 1977, especially in the election of the members of the People’s Assembly, there was some slight change. For example, the very choice of members to make up the seats in the People’s Assembly was based on indirect elections based on rallies across the country.
During the period of governance of the state-party with a marxist view, Pitcher (2004), Manning (2002) and Terenciano (2016) explain that there was a period of crisis and transition, as well as occasional changes of the socialist model of governance, at the same time that the socialist government fought for its survival on the conflict against the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). The RENAMO movement emerged in 1976, against the centralised power of FRELIMO, which leaders like André Mantsangaisa, Urias Simango and others organized since then an intense resistance against FRELIMO authoritarian power. RENAMO emerged:

[...] aiming to destitute the power of the country, in the hands of the state-party FRELIMO. In the same social-political context of the global polarization, because of the Cold War, RENAMO was created by the regime of Ian Smith in the old Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) as an answer to the help given by FRELIMO to Zimbabwe during the fight for independence, and its majority was composed by portuguese settlers who moved to Rhodesia after Mozambique's independence, but still had financial interests on the country. On the other hand, RENAMO was constituted by mozambican citizens who were part of the old portuguese army [...] (Geffray 1991; Jardim s.d.; Hermele 1990 apud Terenciano 2016, 47).

Trying to solve these problems, the government led by FRELIMO began a process of economic reform, that was followed by political liberalization. This passage is illustrated by the 5th Congress Party, in 1989, when FRELIMO abandoned its marxist-leninist ideology and became a party with a wider front. The explanation was that, from that moment on, there was the possibility of an opening so the structural conditions could finally follow the capitalist system. And the enduring opponent of FRELIMO during civil war, RENAMO, signed a General Peace Agreement (GPA) with FRELIMO in 1992 and started to consolidate itself as a political party to run the first elections of 1994, which FRELIMO won with 44% of the votes for Republic's Assembly, however RENAMO became the greater opposition force, achieving 38% of the votes on the legislative elections (Manning 2002; Phiri and Macheve 2015; Terenciano 2016; Visentini 2016).

However, after the first elections of 1994, RENAMO violated GPA terms. On the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1999, two candidates ran the elections. from FRELIMO party and RENAMO-UE. The

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6 For Dias (2012), Mozambique’s democratization process culminated in the peace-building process that ended with nearly two decades of war. Following independence, the FRELIMO party-state failed to coalesce the different yearnings and groups, culminating in the civil war between RENAMO and FRELIMO.

7 RENAMO-UE was a coalition of several opposition parties, with a double perception: for the small parties, it meant the opportunity to get parliamentary seats or to influence the
party on power, FRELIMO, was accused of manipulation of votes and lack of transparency, leading RENAMO to complain about the voting count rules (Pitcher 2004; Manning 2002; Macuane 2010; Phiri and Macheve 2004; Visentini 2016).

**Transition and multiparty in 2D (two dimensions) in Zambia**

An explanation of Ali Mazrui, on the history of Africa (2010), points out that Zambia, then North Rhodesia, was administered by the British South Africa Company, at the time it became United Kingdom’s domain. In 1953, the two Rhodesias (North and South) merged with the British colony of Nyasaland (current Malawi) and created the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa, under British custody. In 1963 the federation dissolved and, in the next year, the old North Rhodesia becomes independent under the name of Zambia, turning itself into a Republic, a unit state governed by a president and a unicameral National Assembly, within the molds of multiparty democracy. However, the first president was Kenneth Kaunda, from the United National Independence Party (UNIP) (Kabemba 2004).

The post-independence history of Zambia has some singularities that make it different from the other countries of Southern Africa. First, because there was no armed conflict before and after the colonial era. Second, a great part of the protest against the direct administration of the British government used no violence, despite some recurrent episodes of social agitation. Historically, it has been proved that there was a tendency of resistance of some residents to the colonial administration on the Gwembe Valley in 1958, as well as the severe outbreaks of indiscipline between students in 1960 and rural inhabitants between July and August of 1961.

Again, Zambia differs from many countries of South Africa, since there were two principal liberation movements, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the Zambian African National Congress (ZANC), that, in the years near independence, united and organized popular protests against the British domination. After independence, both parties were part of the multiparty election to the Legislative Assembly and the presidential post (Rasmussen 1974; Sanches 2014). UNIP was founded in 1959 by the nationalists Mainza Chona and Kenneth Kaunda, with this one later being president of the country. Kabemba and Eiseman (2004) illustrate that the history of Zambia and other African countries, after independence, political game. On the opposite, RENAMO had the objective to clear the ground for the presidential election of small party candidates whose leaders got in exchange eligible places on the lists to parliament coalition.
experimented multiparty (Hyden and Leys 1972; Lavroff 1975; Darnholf 1997), where opposition parties were authorised to participate of the political and electoral competition (Olk 2003; Southall 2003).

During the elections of independent Zambia, in 1964, UNIP of Kenneth Kaunda won, having 55 of the 65 parliamentary seats. The configuration of parliament included two minor parties, namely ZANC and Federal Party Unit (FPU). Besides the UNIP domination on the county’s political field, Zambia had a vibrant democracy until 1972, when UNIP’s political leadership chose a one-party State, following the socialist model of governance. The same way, there was the conviction that, with the one-party model, it would be possible to deal with the raising division of the society based on the ethnical divisions of the country (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004). With the adoption of the one-party system, the country’s president was the head of state and government, like most countries of this region of Africa. The one-party system, legally instituted from 1973’s Constitution, gave wide powers to the president. For example, he was above any other political authority, and in certain circumstances the tribunals had the power to question his actions and declare them licit or illicit. The parliament had only the duty to legislate.

Both parties (UNIP and ZANC), especially the second one, which members were known for their party discipline on parliament, provided a multiparty democracy in Zambia, and increased the prestige and reputation of the zambian parliament. On the parliament, where govern party members approved everything and never questioned the government, the members of the opposition party, ZANC, played an important role by making effective bargains and parliamentary negotiations under the one-party multiparty system. What happened in Zambia was that the opposition kept itself continually into parliament, as well as occupying some ministries, similarly to what happens in presidentialism or parliamentary coalition systems (Mainwaring 1993; Ames 2003; Elgie 2005; Power 2015).

Return of the single party: was it a break from multiparty?

Considering the political and historical trajectory of the country, Kabemba and Eiseman (2004) explain that the introduction of a one-party state, in 1972, killed the young and vibrant zambian democracy, initiated right after the independence in 1964. There were several factors, during the 60s and the beginning of the 70s, that weakened the ideal and

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8 For more details, and in a comparative way, see Sartori, G. 290-291. The author compares political and party systems in Africa after independence, including Zambia.
democratic principles of a liberal democracy consecrated on the state and the 1964 Constitution. However, for these authors, the main reason for the introduction of democracy in one party was the ability to deal with the rising division of society, based on ethnic and tribal divisions in the country.

In early 1970, the government and the inability of UNIP to deal with political divisions on the country, especially on UNIP, convinced President Kaunda that the moment to introduce the one-party state had arrived. The new constitution of 1973 turned UNIP into the only legal party of Zambia, governing the country for 17 years (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004). In these terms, UNIP claimed that it was a one-party state, but still a democracy where people could participate. The biggest challenge for this affirmation came when people had to elect their representatives.

Even though the country was no longer a multiparty democracy in 1972, it was still a one-party participative democracy, which meant that people could participate in elections to choose their leaders. The electoral competition, especially for legislative and local elections, remained elevated, but the same did not apply to the presidential election, where there was no effective competition. It is important to emphasize that, after two decades of one-party regime (1972-1991), Zambia went back to multiparty democracy, with the 1991 elections.

Political-democratic transition and the return to multiparty in Zambia after 1991

The third wave democratization, that is, the democratic transition of the second half of the 20th century, was studied many times, highlighting the ones made by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Huntington (1991) and Carothes (2002). However, the events on Eastern Europe agitated and influenced the latent movements for democracy in Africa, that somehow created general demands for what is now called political pluralism (Darnholf 1997; Olk 2003; Sothall 2003).

In the end of 1989 and beginning of 1990, new movements were started by men and women in many countries of the continent (Olk, op. cit.; Wantchekon and Jensen 2004), and it was in this period that a new party emerged in Zambia, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Besides having started as a broad based pro-democracy movement, integrating trade unions and students and being supported by Church, MMD became a political party and won on the multiparty elections of

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9 Kabemba and Eiseman (2004) criticize the belief that this system allowed the choice between representatives. In a real democracy, people should be able to choose their governors without fear or interference, and that did not happen in Zambia.
1991. These elections were won by MMD, that substituted UNIP, and MMD leader, Frederik Chiluba, former union leader, was elected president. MMD got 131 of the 150 seats in parliament, reducing UNIP to dozens of parliamentarians on the country, and its presidential candidate won presidency with a majoritary victory. It is important to emphasize that MMD had more than two thirds of the National Assembly’s seats, therefore, the first government had the power to change the Constitution in a unilateral way. Taking advantage of this situation, MMD introduced in 1995 some cosmetic alterations on the Constitution, which marked the 3rd Republic in Zambia since independence

Political-electoral competition in comparison: the cases of Mozambique and Zambia

The path followed by both countries had differences and similarities. Considering the historical trajectory, the colonial heritage and the social structure of democratization itself, it can be affirmed that post-independence Mozambique implemented the one-party regime – with FRELIMO –, that followed governance with a socialist view, centralizing politics and economy on the hands of state and having control over all segments of society. Differently, post-independence Zambia had a multiparty democracy system with competitive elections, and, later, introduced the one-party regime with UNIP. Just like we showed the differences between the countries, it was essential to search for colonial heritage in both countries, which was fundamental to structure african countries as a whole. Table 1 describes in a comparative perspective the political system and the electoral and political competition shape on both countries (Zambia and Mozambique) since independence. In practical terms, we can see that both countries have initial party systems, one-party and multiparty, and, after redemocratization, a multiparty system that started to emerge from endogenous groups from governing parties. This path coincided with the social and economic crisis that both countries went through, added to the external requirements deriving from the end of Cold War and the predominance of United Nations with its adjustment programs (WB and IMF), as well as the end of apartheid

10 As Kabemba and Eiseman (2004) explain, the intention of changing the Constitution was clear. It was verified that one of the changes explained that anyone who desires to be a candidate for presidency should prove that his parents were zambian. That rule was certainly perceived by many as an attempt to prevent the candidature of Kaunda, whose father was born in Malawi. Besides that, no one should be a candidate if his parents had not lived in Zambia for at least twenty years. This second rule aimed the Zambian Democratic Congress and its leader, Mungomba.
in South Africa (Olk 2003; Southall 2003; Nuvunga 2007; Pavia s.d). Thus, both Mozambique and Zambia had the urge to create new Constitutions and institutional arrangements, that redesigned the political and institutional framework to a electoral and political system that enabled democratic and multiparty participation of all society segments.

Table 1 - Party and electoral system of Mozambique and Zambia (1991-2014)

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<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
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<td><strong>Electoral System</strong></td>
<td><strong>Party and electoral system</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Proportional representation for parliament; closed list with districts that vary its magnitude: there are 250 parliamentary seats. On the districts with bigger electoral magnitude, the seat distribution varies from 49 to 52. The ones with smaller magnitude vary from 10 to 14 seats;</td>
<td>- First past the post FPTP for parliament; - Parliament with 158, from which 150 are elected by popular vote and 8 are chosen by the president;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Majority of two turns for president (there is no second round in case a candidate gets 50% + 1 vote);</td>
<td>- Simple majority for presidential elections;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shape of the party competition</strong></td>
<td><strong>Party and electoral system</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tendency of almost two parties and a half (1994; 2009 and 2014).</td>
<td>- Fragmented multiparty: from 2001 until today, with some variations: PF, MMD, UNPD, UDA, FDD, UNIP, ZRP, HP, ZDC, ADD.</td>
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Source: Compiled by the authors. With base on the data from African Elections DataBase (http://africanelections.tripod.com) 2016.

Both countries had different trajectories and their electoral and political system follow this structure because of two reasons. First, the fact that Mozambique had its first experience in multiparty electoral processes in the 90s, specifically in 1994. Second, Zambia, differently, already had a multiparty experience in 1964 and 1968, that returned in 1991. We emphasize that both countries had experienced one-party systems, with differences during the adoption moments. In the case of Mozambique, the one-party system follow the logic of many countries of Lusophone Africa, highlighting Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau and Saint Thomas and Prince, where the guerrilla movements that fought for independence named themselves responsible for the people. In the case of Zambia, the one-party system was introduced from the influence of the radical wing of UNIP (Scarritt 2007 and 2012). That is, inside the party, some segments
convinced Kenneth Kaunda that the moment to introduce and build a one-party state had arrived. As Kabemba and Eiseman (2004) note, the legal adoption of the one-party system aimed to control the rising fragmentation of the country because of its tribal and ethnic divisions.

In terms of political participation, both cases show that there was popular participation on the choice for members of the parliament, even during one-party periods. This is illustrated by the realisation of elections, where people participated of the choice of its representatives, but according to the state-party logic, that is, even though people participated, the final choice still remained to the state-party. In Mozambique, the political and electoral history shows that, even in the situations where the population chose a certain representative, if FRELIMO believed that he did not shared the same ideals with the revolution, he was not chosen. This occurred, for example, in the elections of 1977 and 1986, in the province of Nampula, district of Érati, according to depositions available on the book “The origins of war in Mozambique”, from Geffray (1992).

Mozambique and Zambia, despite their differences on electoral and political processes, have shown that, since the realization of multiparty elections on early 90s, they are considerably evolving when it comes to electoral democracy parameters. Besides the difficulties and problems inherent to mistrust between opposition and the party on power (Donge 2006; Pithcer 2004), there is no interdiction and not much violence during the electoral processes. Until now, Mozambique realized five general elections for president and deputies and four local pleas, to municipal representatives. Zambia had seven electoral experiences of multiparty democracy, for presidential and legislative elections, including in this list the elections of 1964 and 1968, considered multiparty.

Dynamics of the political-electoral competition on both countries

In this study, for theoretical and methodological purposes, electoral competition is evaluated from election to election, as a way to avoid generalizations that can skew our general analysis of the competition format. From a contextual analysis and considering the contextual conditionalisms, our goal is to evaluate political competition from the electoral results of each election, considering the number of parties on parliament and the alternance of power. However, we verified the most general tendencies postulated by Duverger (1954) and Sartori (1982) about parties and electoral competition, in their relation with the party systems (pre)dominant – bipartisan and
Democratization processes and political competition in 1990’s Africa: the case of Mozambique and Zambia

multiparty – verified in each electoral process in both cases.

In Mozambique, since the first elections of 1994, there was a tendency to bipartisan. The studies from the decade of 1990 (De Brito 1995; Pereira 1996) illustrated that Mozambique was a bipartisan system. However, in our analysis, this assumption does not affirm itself, since the typical characteristics of a bipartisan system, from a theoretical point of view, do not fit in Mozambique. Why? In principle, the bipartisan system has undeniably two parties that are in competition for an absolute majority, that is within reach of both (Rae 1967; Sartori 1982; Tavares 1994). And the bipartisan system presents various parties, but only two where the electoral force distributes itself with stable balance, and with probabilities of winning the government through elections. Until then, these theoretical elements would describe Mozambique during its first two elections (1994 and 1999) as bipartisan, however not institutionalized.

Table 2 - Distribution of parliamentary seats on Mozambique: 1994-2014

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>144</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>89</td>
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<td>UD</td>
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<td>MDM</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total of seats:</td>
<td>250</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: Elaborated by the authors, based on data from CNE 2016.

The ambiguous indication of bipartisan found its limitation because there was neither effective nor partial alternance on power. From the theoretical and empirical point of view, bipartisan tends to party duopoly, that is, two parties dominate the political field and there is effectively alternance on power. However, Sartori (1982) shows that the most important is not effectively power alternance, nut the fact that the opposition party can reasonably expect such alternance. In that case, Mozambique should not have its bipartisan typification denied, because the electoral results of 1994 and 1999 show a equilibration of the electoral force between two of the biggest parties – FRELIMO and RENAMO.

Another author, Rae (1967) shows that bipartisan can be measured from the results of an election, where the first party should necessarily receive almost 70% of the legislative seats and, if conjugated with the second

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11 Mozambique has not yet consolidated its party system. Until now, it had five electoral experiences, what shows that it is a short period of time to consolidate the shape of the party system. What can be seen are general tendencies of political and electoral competition.
party, both should have achieved at least 90% of the seats. In a certain way, Mozambique, at least in the elections of 1994, 2009 and 2014, can be considered a bipartisan system, because FRELIMO got more than 70% of the parliamentary seats and, added with RENAMO, it got 90% of the seats. Some survey researches showed that Mozambique was going through the process of changing from a bipartisan system to a two parties and a half system, as indicated by Sartori (1982) and Rae (1967). Thus, it was predicted that RENAMO would lose its space to the new party (Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM). However, the electoral results of 2009 and 2014 showed that the structure of the mozambican political field is loyal and far from redefinition.

**Graphic 2 - Electoral competition for parliament in Mozambique: 1994-2014**

![Graph showing electoral competition for parliament in Mozambique from 1994 to 2014.]

Source: Compilated by the authors, based on the official data by CNE-STAE 2016.

Many reasons illustrate the tendency to bipartisan, but it is not less truthful to say that the shape of competition in Mozambique went from an almost bipartisan system to a hegemonic one in 2004. We underline the fact that FRELIMO is the only party in various spheres more important than others, what explains our typification of hegemony. At the same time that FRELIMO always allowed the existence of other satellite parties, the govern monopoly, that is, the central govern, has always been under its wing.

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12 It is important to remember that the typification is being made with the idea of FRELIMO’s hegemony. We should be careful to put it into a continuous imaginary line because, effectively in 2004, the FRELIMO party almost constituted a hegemonic party (Forquilha and Orre 2011)
In relation to Zambia, we reiterate the argument that the properties of electoral and political competition, \textit{a priori}, present two dichotomies: it is a system of (pre)dominant party (1991 to 2001) and a competitive and multiparty system (from 2001 elections). It is based on these analytical assumptions (Sartori 1982; Tavares 1994) that we show in this study that, from 2001, there was a tendency to a multiparty system on the typology of Sartori. In this period, what was verified in Zambia was that no party got absolute majority, and the government of the MDM party needed coalitions. In the same way, the electoral results show the tendency to alternance of power, which itself constitute an element for analysis of electoral competitiveness (Scarritt 2012). Since 1991, MMD party wins elections, and it has continuously spreading its influence on the political scene, which culminated on its predominance (1991 to 2011), even with the losses when it comes to parliamentary seats, because of its presidential candidate, who kept winning until 2011 (Donge 2006; Scarritt 2007). UNIP, after losing the elections of 1991, almost disappears from the political scene, returning only in 2011 but with a insignificant political strength\textsuperscript{13}.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
MDD & 125 & 131 & 69 & 72 & 55 \\
UNIP & 25 & - & 13 & - & - \\
ZDC & - & 2 & - & - & - \\
NC & - & - & - & - & - \\
AZ & - & 2 & - & - & - \\
MDP & - & - & - & - & - \\
NP & - & 5 & - & - & - \\
NLD & - & - & - & - & - \\
SDP & - & - & - & - & - \\
NCC & - & - & - & - & - \\
PF & - & - & 1 & 44 & 60 \\
HP & - & - & 4 & - & - \\
FDD & - & - & 12 & - & 1 \\
UPND & - & - & 49 & - & 28 \\
ZRP & - & - & 1 & - & - \\
Independent & - & 10 & - & 2 & - \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Parliamentary seats on the legislative disputes in Zambia: 1991-2011}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{13} In 2011 UNIP started to run for legislative elections again, and the results show that it got 0.69\% from the total of the votation, and the presidential candidate from the same party (Tiyenji Kaunda) got 0.36\%. Our description here about UNIP is because it was the predominant party from 1964 to 1991, and the only party from 1972 to 1991. After losing the multiparty elections of 1991, the party disappeared from the political map.
The Zambian electoral system allows the representativity of almost all parties, which gives them the title of a multiparty system, but, in fact, what happens is the predominance of one, two or three parties, like what happened in 2001 and 2011. In this context, except for MMD, in Zambia, there is a tendency that some parties, relevant or not, disappear from one legislature to another. With that being said, one of the evident reflexes of the electoral and political competition in Zambia is alternance on power. We should remember that between 1991 and 2011, there was alternance on power (exit of MMD and entrance of the Patriotic Front party). During that period, the electoral competition through representation of different parties on the legislative cycles has increased. This increase is explained by the loss of electoral support from MMD, and propitiated a tight electoral and political competition, typical of almost fragmented multiparty systems.

Conclusions

In this study, we aimed to show that the processes of transition and democratization in Africa present some similarities and singularities. From the point of view of similarities, we point out the historical trajectory of the colonial heritage itself and the social structure of democratization; the singularities were the way that parties went from a one-party non-democratic state to democracies of the end of the 80s. Thus, the political opening of the African countries meant the beginning of the process of transition and implementation of multiparty elections, however, the same cannot be said about Zambia, because, after the country’s independence in 1964, it will experience a multiparty democracy.

From the historical-comparative analysis, it is understood that the institutional choice (government model, electoral system) after the independence of both countries was one of the explanatory factors of the

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14 This scenario was followed by UNIP (Zambia-AZ), Zambia-AZ (Zambia-Zambia Democratic Congress-Zambia-Zambia Democratic Congress (existed in 1996, disappearing on the scene Policy with greater visibility)).
trajectory traveled by political parties. For example, in both countries, even if in different ways, there were experiences of one-party systems (Mozambique: 1975 to 1994 and Zambia: 1972 to 1991), but is effectiveness had a different trajectory. Subsequently, we gave evidence of the internal factors, such as social and economical crisis, that also influenced the process of change of regime and redemocratization on both countries.

There were many reasons for the process of democratization. In the case of Mozambique, the process of political opening and then multiparty elections laureated the state-party FRELIMO, and, in the case of Zambia, the recently formed MMD defeated the then state-party UNIP with great advantage (MMD obtained 76% of the votes against 24% from UNIP). Because of this, Mozambique was able to consolidate its bipartisan system, with tendencies of two parties and a half, while in Zambia its properties emphasized a tendency of domain of MMD, having more than 80% of the seats between 1991 and 1996.

The power alternance was used in this study as one of the indicators to analyse the electoral and political competition. In the case of Mozambique, even with five elections (1994 to 2014), there is still no alternance on power, weakening, that way, one of the dimensions of the bipartisan system. However, in Zambia, 20 years after the realization of (new) multiparty elections, there was alternance. Yet, the electoral competition in Zambia, especially the parliament composition, constitutes itself an indicator of multiparty system. That is the reason why, in this study, we show that, if it is true that Mozambique has a bipartisan system indeed, then it is not less true that, in 2004, Mozambique went through a hegemonic party system. Otherwise, throughout time, Zambia has been a multiparty system, almost fragmented and with constant fluctuations on the parliamentary composition.

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ABSTRACT
This article aims to analyze the processes of democratization and political competition in Africa in two case studies: Mozambique and Zambia. The work of the evidence that democracy is a system that should allow the confrontation of various social and political forces and its legitimacy arises from the recognition of the actors involved in their political processes and election as a whole. Methodologically, the work was developed in a comparative perspective, following the analysis of secondary data available concerning the election results in southern Africa, helped with the theoretical discussion about political history of Africa and of electoral systems and supporters. In the same way, reinterpret data aggregated election, demonstrating the variations along the political competition and partisan in the two cases. Thus, the study concludes that there is a relationship between the historical trajectory and politics and the patterns of electoral competition in both countries, and which have been decisive in the process of transition to democracy. Differently, the two countries have had experiences of single party (Mozambique: 1975 to 1994 and South Africa 1972 to 1991) notwithstanding the process of realization and political openness was differential.

KEYWORDS
Democratization; Elections; Political Competition; Africa.

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AFRICAN PSYCHOLOGY: DIALOGUES WITH THE GLOBAL SOUTH

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This work aims to find out the production on African Psychology³ in a context of cultural scientific productions of the Global South. Hence, we will urge dialogues that are due to be articulated among the referred area of investigation and other southern⁴ perspectives of Human Sciences and Psychology, such as Critical Psychology, Latin American Liberation Psychology, Decolonization of Psychology, Indigenous Psychology and African Studies.

It is interesting to observe that each of these references have been produced in different social spaces and times, in the five continents. It exposes a diversity of proposals and contexts which, however, can be interlinked by guiding lines of reflection. One of these guiding lines, which permits the dialogues between these different perspectives of science, is the critical posture related to Eurocentric, racist and white-centric hegemony of/in colonial/modern western science (Cunha Jr. 2013; Ferreira & Hamlin 2010; Quijano 2005; Santos 2002). Another guiding lines are the ethic-political postures grounded in the pursuit of liberation, decolonization and

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³ This article is an outspread of doctor’s thesis entitled “African Critical Psychology and Decolonization of Life in Angolan Capoeira Practice”, advocated in the Program of Post-Graduate Studies in Psychology of Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo in 2013. (Nogueira 2013)
⁴ The term ‘southern’, adopted by Paulo Freire (1987), denotes that the orientation this thought assumes comes from a southern hemisphere deriving perspective, historically marginalized and oppressed. It is an attitude of resisting to the application of terms such as northern, which contains in its origin a meaning that can be related to domination processes, once it makes references to geographical or symbolic North.
knowledge production that attends to urgent local demands, despite the colonial/modern western capitalist domination (Adams et al. 2015; Parker 2015, 2009; Paredes-Canilao et al. 2015; Dargenos et al. 2013; Santos & Menses 2010; Darfenos et al. 2006; Lander 2005; Martín-Baró 2009a, 2009b, 1996, 1998).

In this sense, this work is condensed in the *Epistemologies of the South movement*, formulated by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2006) and shared by/with other Global South thinkers (Santos & Menses 2010; Gonzáles-Rey 2009). This movement critically denounces the Eurocentric, racist and white-centric epistemological paradigm crisis, formulated since the 16th century and consolidated in the 19th century (Lander 2005). According to this analysis, the referred paradigm produced, and still produces, an epistemicide, that is, the destructing suppression of some local wisdoms by a logic of exclusion, which depreciates and hierarchizes wisdoms, “what led to the waste – in the name of colonialist desires – of the rich variety of present perspectives in cultural diversity and in many ways shaped cosmovisions produced by them (Gomes 2012, 45)”.

This positioning can be related to the philosopher Charles Mills (2007) when he refers to *epistemologies of ignorance*. According to him, despite the fact that we think about ignorance as a lack of knowledge (and we imagine that the work of the educators is conceived to fulfill this gap), it can be more productive thinking about ignorance as a type of knowledge (alienating one), that is, ideas that promote the incapacity of recognizing things – as the diversity of local wisdoms – which could be obvious, yet they are silenced and/or deleted from the social imaginary by institutionalized sovereignty and epistemic monopoly of science (Adams 2014; Gomes 2012). In the same orientation, Parker (2014) exposes the knowledge that alienates as an ideological tool.

Notwithstanding the denounce of the Eurocentric, racist and white-centric epistemological paradigm crisis, the Epistemologies of the South movement announces as well the emergence of a new paradigm of science, which recognizes a “plurality of new forms of knowledge beyond the scientific knowledge” (Santos 2010, 54). According to Gomes:

> What one does proposes, starting from world’s diversity, is the dealing of an epistemological pluralism that recognizes the existence of multiple visions which contributes to the enlargement of horizons of human experience in the world, of alternative social experiences and practices. (Gomes 2012, 49)

This epistemological pluralism can be described by four orientating principles, which contain an ethic-political posture that corresponds to
an including logic, which are: 1) all the scientific-natural knowledge is scientific-social; 2) all the knowledge is local and total 3) all knowledge is self-knowledge; 4) all the scientific knowledge aims to constitute itself into common sense (Santos 2010). Such principles lead to a new understanding mode of the historic dimension of knowledge production. They counteract the idea of a linear history and base themselves in the proposal in which contemporaneity is simultaneity. In other words, colonial/modern scientific knowledge is not, necessarily, the best nor the most advanced, yet it is contemporary, simultaneous and as much important as the other knowledge/wisdoms that have been historically disqualified, devalued, silenced, wiped out from global social imaginary (Adams et al. 2015; Parker 2015; Paredes-Canilao et al. 2015; Santos & Menses 2010; Lander 2005).

This logic, inclusive and plural, is associated to an ethic-political posture of inseparability between knowledge production and a world transforming action. Insomuch, it would be set as praxis. According to Gomes, “knowledge has as one of its most important validity criteria no longer the paradigms of modern science but its effectiveness capacity in a given local reality (2012, 52)”. The author says more:

One of the biggest challenges will be, then, on thinking the South beyond a product of empire. “ So, one only learns from the South in so far as one does conceive it as resistance to North domination and search in it what hasn’t been entirely disfigured” (Santos 2004, 18). (...) Learning from the South will only achieve success to the extent that one contributes in order to stop it being a mere imperial product of the North. (Gomes 2012,52)

It is important to highlight that more than a critical attitude and posture of denouncing racist and white-centric Eurocentrism, the perspective of appreciation of the epistemological pluralities across the world, that is, the recognition of resistances to domination of the colonizing North and the pursuit of wisdoms and practices that haven’t been totally disfigured by coloniality, do configure themselves as an announce of renewed possibilities of liberation of/in/to the Global South. The paradigm of inclusive plurality opens a path to the development of African Studies in Psychology, as well as to the other references with which will be object of dialogue in this work, as to be considered: Critical Psychology, Latin American Liberation Psychology, Decolonization of Psychology and Indigenous Psychology. This work will be presented from the critical, liberating, decolonization and indigenization perspectives; and finalizing with a short presentation on African Studies in the world and the appearance of African Psychology.
Insurgent Psychologies in the scope of Epistemologies of the South

In a very short and illustrative manner, some perspectives of Psychology will be presented here that can be confined to the range of Epistemologies of the South and that corroborate to localize and support the development of African Psychology in the context of Global South.

Critical Psychology

The term “Critical Psychology” was first used in Berlin during the 70’s, associated to Critical Theory. Other terms are also related to this, such as: Radical Psychology, Anti-Psychiatry, Critical Psychiatry. During the 90’s, this perspective gains more consistence with a wave of publications regarding Critical Psychology, bounded by the publication of the book *Critical Psychology* by Dennis Fox and Isaac Prilleltensky and researches in the United Kingdom. From 2000, Ian Park boosts even more this movement by means of the Journal of Radical Psychology and the organization of the Annual Review of Critical Psychology. According to Parker (2009), Critical Psychology is not a theoretical dimension nor a branch of psychological science, yet, an ethic-political attitude upon the task modern western psychology has been providing to the maintenance of the power of minorities to the detriment of social inequalities lived by majorities in the world. For the purposes of this work, it is important to outline dimensions of Critical Psychology that can be correlated to or be sustainers of African Psychology as an Epistemology of the South.

Parker (2009, 3-4) points out that Critical Psychology “is the systematic exam on how some varieties of psychological action and experience are privileged in contrast to others, and on how dominant speeches of psychology operate in an ideological mode to benefit power”. This field investigates “the manners in which all the varieties of psychology are historically built and how alternative varieties of psychology can confirm or resist” to the dominant models. As so, this perspective can be related to the first guiding line of the Epistemologies of the South.

However, Parker (2009, 5) indicates that Critical Psychology goes beyond, and studies “modalities of vigilance and self-regulation of everyday life and the manners in which psychological culture operates beyond the limits of professional and academic practice”. In this sense, Critical Psychology is concerned with everyday life, with people and groups’ day-to-day and the way they resist to domination. According to the author, “it
structures professional and academic work of Psychology and on how daily activities can provide the basis to resist against contemporary disciplinary practices”. In other words, this psychological perspective is concerned with the oppressive processes of domination and colonial/modern exploitation, and so, we can say, characterizes itself by an archeology of local knowledge that aims being consistent and coherent towards cultural diversity of groups and folks in the world. It is as from these dimensions that the dialogue between Critical Psychology and African Psychology can be developed.

**Liberation Psychology and Decolonization of Psychology**

The term “Liberation Psychology” was used for the first time by Ignácio Martín-Baró in 1976 in El Salvador City. This theoretical perspective has been developed in the Latin American context of the 70’s, by social psychologists preoccupied with the oppression of majorities of the populations. They criticized, and still criticize: 1) the conception of science as neutral, 2) the affirmation of universality, and 3) the social irrelevance of psychology to attend the necessities of oppressed majorities. Among his main contributors are Maritza Montero (Venezuela), Ignacio Dobles (Costa Rica), Bernardo Jiménez Domínguez (Colombia/Mexico), Jorge Mario Flores (Mexico), Edgar Barrero (Colombia) and Raquel Guzzo (Brazil) (Guzzo & Lacerda 2009).

Prior to Liberation Psychology there was Franz Omar Fanon’s work. As a matter of fact, he inspired liberation movements in Latin America, in the African continent and around the world, affecting Paulo Freire’s work in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Orlando Fals-Borda’s methodologies on participative research-action and, consequently, Martín-Baró’s Liberation Psychology.

Nonetheless, for a long time his work has been disqualified as political activism abroad the limits of activities of the very science. Fanon was concerned about issues such as how colonialism engendered psychopathology and the human, social and cultural consequences of decolonization. Nowadays, critical psychologists are resuming Fanon’s work in order to develop the perspective of Decolonization of Psychology. One important publication that brands this recovery of Fanosian work is the Special Thematic Section on “Decolonization of Psychological Science” in the Journal of Social and Political Psychology from 2015. In Brazil, the research group “Psychosocial Evaluation and Intervention: Prevention, Community and Liberation” is also committed in this perspective by developing the mother-research project 2015-2020 “Decolonizing Psychology: processes of
participation at school and community (Guzzo 2015)."

Back to the referred special thematic section, it points out important conceptual resources for the work of Decolonization of Psychological Science: the perspective of Liberation Psychology and the Studies of Cultural Psychology. According to Adams, Dobles, Gomez, Kurtis & Molina, liberation psychology contains a central feature which is a manner that privileges the epistemological position of people in conditions of oppression or marginalization. “Another central feature is a participative process in ethics in research that emphasizes praxis over sterilized theory” (2015, 216, t.a.).

In this sense, one is concerned about the de-ideologization of everyday realities, about the historical memory, privileging a perspective of marginalized majorities. The de-ideologization of everyday realities “implies the utilization of empirical investigation to collaborate so that people can reveal the everyday truth of their experience (Adams et al. 217)”. According to authors:

The recuperation of historical memory neutralizes institutional negation or the collective forgetfulness of historical violence; augments the conscience of viable alternatives to colonial violence in modern world order; and promotes the construction of an identity that provides a sense of unity and a purpose around these alternative ideas of history and progress. (Adams et al. 217)

So that this work can be developed, Adams et. al. (2015, 218) suggests we should give “emphasis to local knowledge as an epistemological tool to contradict universalizing speeches of hegemonic science”. It is in this point that the perspective of Liberation Psychology shares efforts towards perspectives of Cultural Psychology. The authors draw the attention to different visions and theoretical positions inside this last one, and point out the most consistent one for the purpose of the decolonization of psychology.

In contrast, the version of analysis of Cultural Psychology that informs our approach to the theme of decolonization of psychological science reflects a compromise towards the configurations of the majorities of the world and the perspectives of conscious knowledge of identity such as those of African Studies (for instance, Bates, Mudimbe, & O’Barr 1993; see as well Adams 2014), Critical Racial Theory (Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, & Thomas, 1995; see as well Adams & Salter 2011) and Decolonial Feminisms (for example, Mohanty, 1988; see as well Kurtis & Adams 2015, this section). (Adams et al. 2015, 219) [italics by the authors]

What these slopes of knowledge have in common are the same guiding lines of the Epistemologies of the South, to be considered: 1) a concern
towards the forms of epistemic violence that feed the sovereignty of global institutions, strengthening the powerful geopolitical centers in contrast to the relatively powerless peripheries, maintaining the systems of exploitation and domination; 2) attention backed to the problems of local social groups, with emphasis on local knowledge as an epistemological tool to generate innovative manners on problems resolution aiming the transformation and the overcoming of colonial/modern oppressive processes. In this proposal of Decolonization of Psychology, it is highlighted that the references to African Studies, to Critical Racial Theory and to Decolonial Feminisms can introduce substantial contributions in fruitful dialogue with psychologists that have this intentionality. In other words, working under dialogue with African Psychology can be very fruitful to the whole critical psychology attending decolonization claims. According to Adams et. al.: 

The intersection of perspectives of Cultural Psychology containing the epistemological point of view regarding the communities in the Global South offers a platform in which scholars and critically conscious scientists can submit/adhere to reveal and resist to those forms of epistemic violence. (Adams et al. 2015, 219)

In other words, in the paradigm of epistemic plurality in the world, ruled by the logic of inclusion, as proposed by the movement of Epistemologies of the South, we can figure out fecund partnerships and approximate critical postures towards the coloniality of power and wisdom (Quijano, 2005); as well as join forces to yield more freed and liberating knowledge, guided by necessities of everyday life of oppressed majorities in the world and informed by social, cultural, political and geographical experiences of each place.

**Indigenous Psychologies**

The *Handbook of Critical Psychology* edited by Parker (2015) is a fertile reference to the development of Psychologies within a critical, plural and inclusive paradigm, as proposed by Epistemologies of the South. We consider that this collective work represents a tendency of Global South production in the referred area of knowledge. Many investigative works arising from the five continents characterize what is being called as *Indigenous Psychologies*.

The movement of the Indigenous Psychologies begins as resistance spots in old colonies from the western empires since the 60’s. They have been and still are developed by indigenous people of relatively free and
economically stable nations. As Paredes-Canilao, Babaran-Diaz, Florendo, Salinas-Ramos & Mendoza describe, despite being sub-represented in literature when compared to mainstream western Psychology, even so, they are legitimate, plural, contemporary, simultaneous:

> Indigenous Psychologies have “roots” in Africa (Cameroon, Zambia); the Americas (EUA, Canada, Latin America, Mexico, Venezuela); Asia (Hong Kong, India, China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan); Europe (France, Germany, Scandinavia); Middle East: (Iran, Turkey), e Oceania (Fiji, Papua New Guinea). (Paredes-Canilao et al. 2015, 356)

As it has been described about the Epistemologies of the South, the term Indigenous Psychologies embraces a plurality of world visions from an inclusive logic. It is operationalized from guiding lines similar to the ones previously described, in this case Decolonization and Indigenization. In the dimension of decolonization, indigenous psychologists censor the irrelevance of western academic-scientific Psychologies, which have been colonially implemented, in order to attend the necessities of colonized/local groups and peoples. Paredes-Canilao et. al. summarize this critique as following, highlighting they might be taking the chance of simplification:

> Western psychology detains questionable assumptions regarding premises or orientations towards world and human being’s nature (ontology), towards regarding what is accounted as true knowledge and on how acquire it (epistemology), and regarding what does have value or what is devalued (ethics). Western Psychology is incorporated in: (1) an alienating world vision (mechanistic atomistic), that mows the world in distinct parts, and sees totalities as reducible to the parts (methodological individualism) or the parts as nothing beyond the totalities (methodological holism, functionalism); (2) an epistemology not integrated to the context (objectivist, rationalist empiricist) that denounces only two sources of valid knowledge – algorithmic reason and/or sensorial experience; and (3) a calculative system of values (economistic materialistic), which is hidden in appeals of the value of neutrality. (Paredes-Canilao et al 2015, 358) [italics from the original]

As a result of this process of knowledge production, Western Psychology is characterized as a colonialist, racist and cultural imperialism project. It fit, and still fits, as an apparatus of Neocolonial Social Sciences to promote the mental captivity, the academic dependence or the blind imitation. These characteristics have been analyzed by Alatas (2006) in *Alternative Discourses in Asian Social Science: Responses to Eurocentrism*. According to Paredes-Canilao et. al. (2015, 358), “many times these are worst ways of
power loss than those that have been experienced during the colonization itself, which occur in the context of formal education, considered the biggest legacy of colonial regimes, what makes them more insidious/treacherous/disloyal”. This positioning is close to what Quijano (2005) denominates in Latin America as Coloniality of Wisdom.

Another critique of Indigenous Psychologies regards the value of neutrality in Western Sciences, in the sense that this value permitted Western Psychology to become an academic-scientific apparatus of the empire to classify natives as genetically, behaviorally and mentally poorer, through the practices that automatically pathologize non-white people. Among these practices are: the counseling (Naidoo 1996), and the instruments as IQ tests. African Psychology researchers also share these and other critiques about colonial/modern western professional practice (Durojaiye 1993; Akbar, 2005; Nobles 2006; Nsamenang 2007).

In contraposition, the second guiding line that unifies the plurality of world visions in the paradigmatic proposal of Indigenous Psychologies is the movement of Indigenization. In the context of the Philippines, Mendonça (2002, 2006) used the native concept of Pantayong Pananaw, for a reconstruction of psychological science informed by the local world vision. This means, ‘we talking-between-us, using our own categories and for our own purpose’. She argues that the pluralities (of subjectivities, the cultural and ethnical differences, as well as political interests) start to appear and need an involvement and contestation (Paredes-Canilao et al. 2015).

Corroborating with this proposal of knowledge production, from the Sub-Saharan African context, Nsamenang aims a manner of empowerment by the overcoming of psychology colonially received by them. As mechanisms of empowering people and groups, indigenization perspectives develop psychologies that “make sense in their own cultures and through which they can acquire understanding of their socio-emotional subjectivities, experiences and social emotional functioning” (2007, 19). These perspectives are in sharp contrast to Eurocentric racist and white-centric Western Psychology ruled by the logic of exclusion and difference. Those affirm that the objects of programmatic recovery in Indigenous Psychology are: the indigenous dynamic, its complexity and its relating forms of life, knowledge and appreciation that were marginalized or eliminated under the judgment of colonization (Paredes-Canilao et al. 2015).

In accordance to the logic of inclusion in the paradigm that recognizes the epistemological plurality in the world, from a critical perspective, Paredes-Canilao et. al. (2015) outlines the emerging friendly attitude or posture of equality relations that are pursuit to be established between the target and the origin of Western Psychology, that is, the pursuit
for recognizing the European Indigenous Psychology, if it’s even possible. This implies the very European indigenous psychologists to recognize themselves as producers of more than one Indigenous Psychology in the world, giving up the universalizing imperialism and the fallacy of scientific neutrality so to adopt a horizontal dialogic attitude, inclusive, plural and of social justice. This way, as other Indigenous Psychologies, the European one would have adopted the auto-critical processes of decolonization and indigenization regarding its knowledge production, research modalities and professional practices.

Eventually, indigenous psychologists highlight that “by emphasizing the ‘intellectual diversity’, and alternatives to linear models, the focus shifts into a more appropriate way for what is “relative”, but relevant, useful, applicable and adequate in understanding the behavior and mental processes of determinate subjected populations (Paredes-Canilao et al. 2015, 361)”. Being so, there is a clear preoccupation to maintain a unity inside Psychology, no longer on imperialist, dominating, racist, but on renewed shapes basis. There exists a paradigm model that is being built in Asia and is being called methodological relationism, which considers relations, instead of individuals, as a primary datum (Ho et al. 2001). According to Paredes-Canilao:

Methodological relationism is not only a new approach of social personality and psychology; it is defying psychology as a whole, which has been traditionally supported on methodological and ontological individualism. To demonstrate how powerful the methodological relationism is as a paradigm, it makes intelligible a class of indigenous concepts in eastern Asia that emphasizes the human relation, utilizing the Chinese, Japanese and Korean word for “human being”, literally translated as “human among” (Kim e Park em Allwood e Berry 2006: 250). (Paredes-Canilao 2015, 361)

The indigenous psychologists have already incorporated and developed theories with countless native concepts that collaborate to an understanding and resolution of problems faced by local people in a more consistent manner and coherent to their cultural experiences and world readings. It is in this same perspective of methodological relationism that African Psychology can and is being developed, as for instance, in the use of the concept “Ubuntu”, that means “I am because we are, and because we are, so am I” (Bono 2015; Nogueira 2013; Ramose 2010; Nobles 2006; Akbar 2004). Following the proposal of this work, now come some historical dimensions and characteristic postures of African Studies and of African Psychology that male dialogue possibilities with all the references
Historical Context of Appearance of African Studies in the World

“Now we give back the stubborn ‘white’ segment of the Brazilian society its lies, its ideology of European supremacy, the brainwash that intended to take our freedom. Proclaiming the collapse of Eurocentrist mental colonization, celebrating the advent of quilombist liberation”. (Abdias do Nascimento 2009, 206)

The quilombist liberation celebrated by Abdias do Nascimento represents the African resistance against colonization of power and of wisdom enforced by Europeans during the slavery colonialism. This political resistance has been changing itself and strengthening itself as academic and political knowledge in the entire world. This work describes part of this process from a Global South Perspective and some of these impacts on Psychology.

Since the 60’s and 70’s African researchers from the continent and from the diaspora have been systematically producing a culturally consistent multi-inter-transdisciplinary science with an African world vision, that is, the way of very feeling, thinking and acting of a people. This science has been collecting some names that identify better the schools of thought than properly significant differences of content, among them: African, Afrocentric, Afrocentered or africana5 studies. According to Karanja Keita Carroll (2010), these studies are organized in an area of interdisciplinary knowledge concerned about developing a precise description of life conditions of African peoples in the continent and the diaspora, while prescriptive solutions for changing African reality are sought. In other words, African Studies can be considered as part of Epistemologies of the South for possessing an interdisciplinary academic dimension that considers the inseparability between theory and practice; as well, a social dimension, working themes such as access to power, wealth distribution, identity and alienation, self-image, mental health, educational opportunities, family and gender relations (Silva & Silva 2006).

Despite the fact this scientific movement has taken shape and

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5 The term “African” always refers itself to the set composed by Africa and its diaspora. The word Africana, underlined in italics, is linked to everything that regards to that set, sawn from the inner. The sentence “africana studies” indicates the field of knowledge that studies what relates itself to the set composed by Africa and its diaspora in a multidisciplinary way and from an African point of view (Nascimento E.L., 2009).
consistency since the 60’s, its beginning is far prior to this date and happened in diverse parts of the African continent and the diaspora. Elisa L. Nascimento & Charles S. Finch III (2009, 38) outline that “the tradition of Afrocentered thought developed in western intellectual context, consists, with effect, as an act of resistance.” For the authors, the starting point of this intellectual movement dates in the Afrodescendant uprising in Haiti, in the entire Caribbean and in the Americas. They are repeated in the quilombos, in the cumbes, in the palenques and in the maroons of all the region and are characterized by the “presence of African pattern of religious philosophy inspired by the struggle against Eurocentric colonial domination.”

Nascimento & Finch III (2009) indicate historical documents and actions that trace and represent these processes prior to the 20th century, some of them are: the resistance of the quilombo of Palmares in Brazil around 1624; the poetry of Phillis Wheatley, enslaved Senegalese in the USA around 1761; Afro-American poet Jupiter Hammon born a slave in the USA in 1711; the letter of enslaved Esperança Garcia of Piauí; the writer, educator and composer’s voice of Maria Firmina dos Reis, born in Maranhão in 1825; the Haitian revolution in the 19th century; the struggle for liberation of Afrodescendants in Cuba in the 19th century; the appearance of Pan-Africanist thought, notably in the Caribbean and the United States in the 19th century. The latter with an important historical role that reconnected Africa to the diaspora, strengthening the struggle for colonialist liberation in the world.

The 20th century definitely branded the development of African Studies with Afrodescendant intellectuals and Africans from diverse parts of the world. Among the most remarkable and influential intellectuals of African perspective appointed science one finds out: W. E. B. Du Bois, Booker T. Washington, Richard Wright, Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, from the USA; Kwame Nkruma from Ghana; Amilcar Cabral from Guinea-Bissau; Abídas do Nascimento from Brazil; Marcus Garvey from Jamaica; Jean Price-Mars from Haiti; Aimé Césaire and Albert Memmi from France; Lamine Senghor and Cheikh Anta Diop from Senegal; Frantz Fanon from Martinica; Carlos Moore and Gustavo Urrutia from Cuba; Nnamdi Azikiwe from Nigeria; Théophile Obenga from Congo; among others (Nascimento & Finch III 2009).

The Senegalese physicist, historian and anthropologist Cheikh Anta Diop (1991), for instance, contributed in a consistent and definitive way to the reconstruction of African and world history from an Afrocentered

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6 The 60’s were stamped by African insurgency movements in the mother-continent with struggle for liberation and independence, in Europe with Blackness movements, in the USA with struggle for civil rights, among others.
perspective. His last work Civilization or Barbarism – an authentic anthropology, published in 1981, outcome of 30 years of research, offers a critical challenge to the orthodox academic interpretation of Egypt as a white civilization. An interpretation emerged in the 19th century to reinforce European racism and imperialism. Diop gathered linguistic, archeological, historical, mathematical, and philosophical, among others, evidences that testify that Egypt was a black civilization and that the blacks are the legitimate heirs of Egypt’s pride legacy. Moreover the true name of this civilization was KMT or Kemet, which signifies “Black Earth”. Egypt was a name imputed to Kemet by Greeks centuries later.

Furthermore, Diop shows through a superbly detailed documentation that Greek civilization, much reverenced as the “cradle of western thought”, has a substantial depth regarding Egyptian ideas, thought and achievements. He reports detailed historical marks and knowledge that date from 2,600 BC and proves that Greek thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Herodotus, Pythagoras, among others, were initiated in Kemet (ancient Egyptian) and employed the knowledge they acquired there to make their famous theories, without making references to the original source or in many cases this reference has been cleared from the 19th century. This researcher confirms what South American Guyanese mathematician, linguist and historian George G. M. James wrote in 1954 in the polemic book Stolen Legacy. In this work, James (2010) also demonstrates that important doctrines of Greek philosophy have been based on kemetical antique theology.

This is only an example that represents the power and the impact that African Studies centered on historical and cultural processes since kemetical antique can achieve on production of world scientific knowledge, in any area of knowledge. By refuting the very spread idea that Greece has been the “cradle of western thought”, and by unveiling that this history begun as a matter of fact in kemetical civilization that dates over two thousand years before Greek civilization, provokes at least a review and probably a reformulation on what is believed to be humanity and modern science’s history nowadays. This is an example of disruption towards linear history, which appreciates contemporaneity and simultaneity of other knowledge and wisdoms in the last five centuries, according to the proposal of Epistemologies of the South.

In this sense, it is indispensable to highlight that African studies, in all areas of knowledge, have a particular historical dimension and a universal dimension in its propositions. The particular historical dimension relates itself to the successive processes of Arab and European colonization that inflicted genocide strikes towards African peoples and their knowledge. In that, one includes the intellectual thievery denounced by James and Diop.
besides disqualification and dehumanization of everything that is native from Africa. Due to this particular dimension, there is the necessity to delimitate the original and historical place of African Studies, as a process of resistance and political affirmation against ethnic-racial oppression in the pursuit of liberation. In other words, African Studies are knowledge that has been historically particularized by ethnic-racial attacks and disqualification, hence the necessity of claiming them as so.

Despite the particular historical dimension, originally the African philosophical, cultural, political, sociological principles and propositions are universal. In other words, African Studies can fit any human being or society, if it makes sense in their respective contexts. It is worth mentioning that the meaning of the word universal in this case is in terms of human potential and not an obligatory determination, it doesn't mean it does necessarily fit in any context. Thus, it differs, fundamentally, from the used sense in the word universal by colonial/modern racist Eurocentric ideology, in which universal propositions must be effectual apart from cultural and historical context it may be applied.

James and mainly Diop were researchers compromised with the development of a scientific operational concept that evidenced the truth about Africa and world’s history. Besides that, their works point out the profound interrelations between the varied African nations from north to south, and from east to west of the continent, which form, according to him, Black Africa. For Diop, history of African thought becomes an indispensable scientific discipline to the study of societies’ evolution in the world and the means to transition between the ethnological level and the sociological level.

It is not an objective of this work to deepen overmuch, the pointed problem, only to highlight the matter and relevance these studies have for Africans and descendants, as well as for humanity in general. These and other intellectuals constituted and still constitute foundation and philosophical, cultural and political basis to the development of the Africa centered or Afrocentered paradigm and its following science. This paradigm puts African ideas and values in the middle of scientific investigation and the researcher founds himself socio-historically situated, occupying a place as historical subject (Silva & Silva 2006).

Appearance of African Psychology as a Contemporary Study Field

African Psychology starts being thought and structured as contemporary study field since the foundation of the Association of Black
Psychology (ABPsi) in the United States during the 60’s, in the context of movements for Civil Rights and of Black Power. According to Nobles (2015), one of the founders of ABPsi and of the very African Psychology as a studying field, this association was composed by black psychologists and had as main objectives: 1) organize its responsibilities and skills to influence necessary changes and 2) approach the significant social problems that affect black society and other segments of population whose necessities society did not suppress. According to the author, the ABPsi was formed as an independent institution apart from the American Psychological Association (APA):

These men and women accused the American Psychological Association of making vindication to the white racist character of North American society and for failing in the offering of models and programs leading to resolution of Afro-American problems due to the oppressive effects of American racism. It is extremely important to point out and highlight that we declare the primacy and the importance of our blackness above our status as psychologists. (Nobles 2015, 400, t.a.)

At that moment, despite having founded ABPsi, these black psychologists still needed to create the discipline of Black Psychology. According to Nobles (2015), during the next two decades many researchers added to the “digging” of African ideas as foundation for emergence and advent of the discipline Black Psychology, among them: King, Dixon, and Nobles (1976); Akbar (1984, 1990); Azibo, (1989); Hilliard (1986); Nobles (1972, 1986a, 1986b, 1997); Myers (1988); Kambon (1992); Wilson (1993); Grills and Rowe (1996).

In the American context of antiracist conflict and struggle for Civil Rights, the African centered paradigm reached fertile ground and constituted itself as a discipline from the 60’s. The studies in Psychology done by Afrodescendants, about Afrodescendants and in the perspective of Afrodescendant community, were the ones that mostly generated Afrocentered guidance and researches on systematic mode, contributing to found and cement the “new discipline” on African Studies (Nobles 2006; Karenga 1986).

In the context of the USA both dimensions quoted in the previous topic are still present, as far as the particular historical dimension that determines the origin place and affirms the political resistance of Black/African Studies, as well as the universal dimensions of its prepositions. But in this historical context, due to severe racial segregation, the particular dimension of African Studies as resistance to racial oppression is highlighted.

It is worth noting that “in the same way that one tries to reach the origins of European thought in Greece and in Rome, the thought, the
history and the experiences of the Black ought to be ransomed in Egypt and in the various cultures of the African continent”, as point out Silva & Silva (2006, 46). In the late 80’s and beginning of the 90’s, Afro-American psychologists such as Na’im Akbar were producing knowledge that, among other concerns, presented two basic components: one deconstructive component, that criticized the dimensions of western paradigm for social sciences and scientific research, that we can correlate to the proposal of decolonization of Psychology; and the reconstructive one, an approach that started to identify the dimensions of the Afrocentered paradigm, which could be associated to the proposal of indigenization of Psychology (Adams et al. 2015).

These studies in Psychology were denominated as Black Psychology. Maulana Karenga defines this area of science in the following way:

The interests of Black Psychology spin around the development of a discipline that not only studies the behavior of black people, but seeks as well to transform it in conscious agents about themselves and its very mental and political liberation. This is acquired by the means of 1) a critical and severe rejection to white psychology, in the terms of its methodology, conclusions and ideological premises in which it rests; 2) provisions of Afrocentered models of study and therapy; 3) self-conscious interventions in social efforts to promote a more black and human environment. (Karenga 1986, 322)

The perspective of the production of Black Psychology pointed out by Karenga (1986) gets close to the epistemological propositions suggested by social scientists of Latin America, from the movement of Epistemologies of the South, of Critical Psychology, of Liberation Psychology and of Indigenous Psychology. It is possible to detect the first guiding line, which corresponds to the posture of decolonization of Eurocentric thought and logic, by assuming a critical reading and severe rejection towards white Psychology informed by the ideology of racial white supremacy.

Besides that, it becomes evident the intention of producing new milestones and marks from the recuperation of historical memory of African peoples since Ancient Egypt (Santos & Meneses 2010; Martín-Baró 2009a, 2009b), which relates itself to the second guiding line. This implies complex analysis and evaluations from different forms of interpretation and intervention in the world produced by an African world vision and by the experiences of Afrodescendants prior and later to the colonial period in the continent and in the diaspora. Period that labeled the history of modern western societies by the means of a process of globalization and that had different consequences to the diverse involved peoples (Lander 2005).
The posture of developing self-conscious social interventions to promote a “black and human environment” is more related to the concern of repairing consciousness about African history and culture which has been purposely disqualified, silenced and cleared in the last four hundred years, than to a segregationist posture, as we can observe in the description of the second objective of the ABPsi (Nobles 2015). It denotes, in fact, an ethical commitment with the appreciation of the African ethnic dimension that has historically suffered from genocide attacks from anti-African colonial movements. As well, demonstrates the involvement with processes of construction of humanizing and intercultural experiences, through the appreciation of wisdoms that have successfully resisted to the genocide and racist attacks (Santos and Meneses 2010). We emphasize the intercultural posture of these thinkers and researchers of Black Psychology and African Studies in general, because differently from Eurocentric ideology that arrogates itself as the only valid model of humanity, the in Africa centered perspective recognizes and assumes the epistemological plurality in the world. Moreover, it affirms the importance and the necessity of the African world vision to research and work with Afrodescendant peoples in the continent as much as in the diaspora looking forward the promotion of physic, mental and spiritual liberation (Nobles 2006; Akbar 2004; Karenga 1986).

In this way, despite Black Psychology being systematized, more consistently, in the United States, that is, in the northern hemisphere, it still constitutes itself as an Epistemology of the South. Such statement is possible because it is not its geographical location in the imperialistic North that determines its philosophic cultural paradigm, yet African history and world vision since Kemet. This is a southern perspective of this science (Santos & Meneses 2010; Freire 1987, 1992).

Lastly, it is possible to conclude that Black/African Psychology contributes to the promotion of liberation of Psychology as a whole, in the sense enclosed by Martín-Baró (2009a, 2009b). This happens because it assumes to itself the tasks of recuperation of historical and cultural memory of African and Afrodescendant peoples. In this case it contributes to de-ideologization of common sense and of everyday experience that lowers this population in the world; as well, appreciates and potentiates traditional virtues found in African world vision since Kemet that resisted to colonial/modern genocide attacks. Nonetheless, it also characterizes itself as a overcoming from dominant pragmatism, once it does not detains itself only in appointing physical, mental and spiritual losses caused by Eurocentrism in the life of Africans abroad. On the contrary, Black/African Psychology aims to illuminate the negativities in this context, that is, what is not given,
humanity and the humanization of Afrodescendant population from its own history, culture and experience. In Martín-Baró’s (2009a, 2009b) words, it compromises itself with “what is to be done” to free the Afrodescendant peoples from physical, mental and spiritual slavery.

In the form of conclusion

It seems to us very valuable to note, highlight and set by way of horizontal dialogue the insurgence of various academic-scientific-cultural movements that appeared during the 60’s and 70’s in the entire Global South in Human Sciences and the area of Psychology, specifically. Besides, it becomes evident the tension between the dominating North and the insurgent South in the global sphere of academic-scientific production, as to know that these always resisted and still resist in varied contexts, countries and in the five continents of the planet. All of them, Epistemologies of the South, Critical Theory, Liberation, Decolonization and Indigenization can be correlated and set into dialogue by the guiding lines detached along the entire work, the one denouncing western colonial/modern imperialism and the other announcing the renewed possibilities inside a plural, inclusive and social justice contained paradigm. Considering these movements in present, we conclude this work appointing that the 21st century might be the historical milestone of the overthrow of white-centric racist Eurocentrism in Psychology and Social and Human Sciences, and the advent of the construction of an academic-scientific-cultural paradigm ruled by a more inclusive, dialogic and social justice engendered logic.

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ABSTRACT
This work seeks to locate and put into dialogue the production of African Psychology within the context of scientific and cultural productions of the Global South. In this case, the dialogue is established between prospects of Human Sciences and Psychology, they are: Critical Psychology, Latin American Liberation Psychology, Psycholinguistics, Indigenous Psychology and African Studies.

KEYWORDS
African Thinking; Psychology; Global South.

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SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES IN THE CAMEROON BANANA SUPPLY CHAIN

Kingsly Awang Ollong

Introduction

Cameroon is a country endowed by nature. It has a large natural resource potential such as soil, hydrology and minerals that predisposes it to be a true Garden of Eden in the agro-pastoral domain. As a result, the bulk of its economic strength was built on this agropastoral potential. The political and institutional authorities who controlled the commands of state power since independence in 1960 and 1961 have indeed made agriculture a major axis of Cameroon’s economic development (Bella 2009).

The option of organizing the economic development of Cameroon around agriculture as a preferred mode of development enabled both the private and public authorities to have a valuable source of financial income, while making sure the rural populations, whose key pursuit is agriculture, equally benefit from this activity as a source of income. Improving living conditions of rural populations was a key element in the establishment of a planning policy that targeted a substantial increase in agriculture, food and agro-industrial productivity. Since then, this sector has employed between 50 and 60% of the working population in Cameroon (Atanga, 2006). In 2003 agriculture generated close to 1,300 billion CFA francs of gross domestic product (GDP) or about 20% of global GDP and more than one-third of foreign exchange earnings for the country (Bella 2009).

Banana cultivation has long been a key aspect of agricultural development in Cameroon, actually taking advantage of this incentive impetus created for agricultural development. In the late 1970s, the Office Camerounaise de Banane (OCB), a state parastatal was put in place to regulate the banana industry in Cameroon. It received the mandate to

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organize the marketing chain of Cameroonian bananas (UNECA 1981). To better realize this mission assigned to her by the State, OCB was endowed with financial autonomy guaranteed through the allocation of public subsidies, ensuring the channeling of production, supervision of producers and access to credit and agricultural inputs to operators in the banana sector in Cameroon. The attractive and enticing prospects of a booming banana market and opportunities for land acquisition in a banana field that was seen as terra nullius aroused the interest of many international operators for the Cameroon banana sector. Until 1988 the banana sector in Cameroon was organized around coexistence between food crops and industrial cultivation. Since 1988, the organization of the productive system changed with the dissolution of the OCB in 1993—effectively signaling the end of small banana farms (Anania 2014, 173). Consequently, the field was left free to banana agribusiness consisting of giant multinational corporations. Under the impetus of these large industrial groups, Cameroon’s banana industry experienced tremendous growth. Thus, the industry pointed to the first largest export crops in Cameroon, imposing itself as a crucial economic activity (Atanga 2006).

The Cameroonian banana industry was among the world top producers. It had ambitions of posing as a major banana exporter in the Africa - Caribbean - Pacific (ACP) region. This sector was one of the main providers of employment in Cameroon. In 2011, close to 297,210 tons of bananas were exported while the business generated about 170 billion CFA francs per year for an average production of 300,000 tons. At the heart of the activity of the banana sector in Cameroon are land concessions exploited by major agro-industrial groups operating in the Mungo Division in the Littoral region and Tiko in the Fako Division of the South West Region of Cameroon (Anania 2014, 179).

The implication of these regions in the banana industry was motivated by their fertile volcanic basements, mild climate, availability of plantation labor, as well as a long entrenchment of culture of plantation economy that was installed since the colonial era. These areas were the chosen lands of the banana agro-industries in Cameroon: both have a long and rich economic history for banana cultivation with major plantation activities (Anania 2014, 182). For several decades, Njombe-Penja and Tiko have served as host to many operators engaged in the cultivation and exportation of bananas. The main actors in this sector were the Cameroon Development Corporation, with plantations in Tiko and Plantation de Haut Penja (PHP), which is an affiliate of the french fruits giant, Compagnie Fruitiere with plantations in Njombe-Penja. While this activity has generated a lot of benefits to the multinational corporations that operate the plantations, the labourers
and the communities in which these plantations are found have suffered injustices in the hands of the companies. It is against this backdrop that this paper sets out to make an appraisal of some sustainability issues that have gone a long way to affect the lives of both the workers and the communities.

To understand some of the sustainability issues in the Cameroon banana industry, this study will rely on oral interviews documentaries like, *The Big Banana* that critiques the human and environmental impact of banana plantations in Cameroon. The documentary begins by presenting an aerial view of the Njombe-Penja community where the banana wealth goes to the multinational company, Plantation du Haut Penja (PHP), while most members of the community remain poor. PHP workers are shown as they labor to cut down the bananas and transport them to the processing station. The profit generated by company came at the expense of the workers, who were paid paltry wages in contrast to the high salaries and benefits of the expatriates. It is therefore not surprising, that European consumers of the bananas are appalled upon hearing the actual wages of the laborers who produce the commodity. A consumer in the UK aptly calls the situation “slave labor,” while another expresses her “disgust” at the laborers’ working conditions (*The Big Banana* 2009). These workers are not only underpaid; their health is at risk from exposure to toxic chemicals (pesticides, fungicides, fertilizers, and other agro-chemicals). The film indicates that four out of five farmers suffer from eye problems due to PHP’s toxic materials and features a former worker who has become blind. He was fired by PHP because of his disability and without adequate compensation.

The health of members of the larger community was also endangered by PHP’s operations, specifically, the aerial spray of chemicals, which is detrimental to humans, plants, animals, and bodies of water. One community member recalls having been sprayed and admitted to the hospital for some days; unsurprisingly, PHP refused either to pay the hospital bill or compensate the victim. Another lamented how the aerial spray contaminated their food. The banana processing system washes off the chemicals, but the soiled water was not disposed of properly and as such, contaminated the sources of potable water supply in the locality.

Displacement of the people was another trepidation of the plantation’s procedures. As a multinational corporation, PHP succeeded in stifling competition from smaller companies. The company’s low-cost production and export-friendly incentives enabled it to crush the local farmers. While some of them were pressured to sell or lease their lands to PHP, the more resilient ones witnessed their lands being forcefully expropriated by government officials who conspired with PHP. Chief Daniel Nsuga epitomized the corrupt elite evoked here. Throughout the film, he
downplayed the adverse consequences of the plantation, while indicating that the community is happy with PHP. In addition to the issues raised in the film, this section will provide an overview and appraisal of some recurring sustainability problems that affect the banana sector in Cameroon. These issues were identified through a review of existing literature, documentaries and oral interviews with labourers and corporate experts who are directly or indirectly involved in the cultivation and exportation of bananas in Cameroon.

**Theory of plantation agriculture as applied to Cameroon**

In-depth analyses of the existing literature reveals that the major theories on plantation production, such as modernisation, dependency and the articulation of modes of production schools, have tried to evaluate the role of plantation production in processes of capital accumulation as well as its relationship with peasant production and societies (Konnings 1993). A short discussion of these theories might contribute to our understanding of the dominant role of the agro-industrial sector in general and the banana industry in particular in Cameroon’s political economy.

The modernisation school of thought has always advocated the diffusion of western capital, know-how, technology and values as a necessary prerequisite for development and capital accumulation in developing countries (Long 1977; Varma 1980). It claims that plantations are economically efficient units of production that benefit from considerable economies of scale and technical progress, and should be seen as significant agents of development and capital accumulation (Graham & Floering 1984; Goldthorpe 1985). However, it should be noted that these claims have often been disputed. For example, de Silva (1982) and Rote (1986) have convincingly demonstrated that most plantations have barely undergone any technological innovations and have largely preserved their labour-intensive production techniques. Of considerable importance to the study of plantations was the dual society and dual economy theory, a well-known variant of the modernisation theory (Boeke 1953; Lewis 1954). It argues that there is the near absence of any linkages between a dynamic capitalist sector and an enclaved pre-capitalist sector. Some of these theorists (Lewis 1954) did not, however, exclude the possibility of an adverse effect of the modern plantation sector on the traditional peasant sector (Konnings 1994). This theory has been severely attacked by the dependency and articulation of modes of production schools.

Most studies on plantation agriculture in Cameroon have been either implicitly or explicitly written from a modernisation point of view (Epale
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1985). Epale’s book on the history of plantation production and the CDC in Anglophone Cameroon was clearly inspired by the dual economy theory. The special circumstances of Western Cameroon, and the introduction of a modern plantation enclave in the relatively backward and inarticulate economy of the region at the turn of the 19th century and the development of that enclave to its present-day state, had, in balance, a salutary effect on the economy (Epale 1985, 7).

Unlike the modernisation theory, the dependency theory argues that the promotion of capitalist plantation production in the ‘periphery’ inevitably led to growing underdevelopment and dependency on capitalist countries of the North (Frank 1967, 1969; Leys 1975). This dependency perspective of plantations as agents of underdevelopment and exploitation has been elaborated on in specialist studies of plantation production in Latin America (Oxaal 1975; Benn 1974), Asia (de Silva 1982; Bagchi 1982) and Africa (Brett 1973; Leys 1975). The most influential work in this school of thought has undoubtedly been Beckford’s: Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World (1972). He characterises plantations as enclaves due to their domination by western multinational corporations that are interested in the drain of capital from the periphery to the industrialised countries. Their exclusive specialisation in export commodities has resulting in monocultural cropping patterns, neglected food production and a dangerous dependence on world market prices.

According to Beckford (1972, 215), this enclaved nature of plantations caused a number of underdevelopment biases in the domestic economy and society and also created a chronic dependency syndrome that manifested itself as a value system characterised by dependency and low motivation as well as by strong authoritarian traditions. Strikingly, several studies (Epale 1985; Molua 1985; Jua 1990) of plantation production in Cameroon have tended to support his negative assessment of the consequences of plantation systems for local societies, economies and the development of a chronic dependency syndrome among the local population.

The dependency school’s perspective on plantations seems to be able to overcome some of the shortcomings of the modernization theory. It helps us to situate the study of plantation production in a historical and international context, with its introduction during the colonial period as an important locus of metropolitan capital accumulation, its (former) domination by foreign capital and management, and its vulnerable dependence on world market commodity prices. However, the dependency theory has not paid sufficient attention to the changes that have occurred in plantation production in the wake of transformations in the world
capitalist system and the independence of colonial states. On the one hand, multinational corporations now control the capitalist world market and trade in plantation products. They also control much of the necessary processing, though they have tended to disinvest in the (risky) production of plantation crops per se (Barker 1984).

On the other hand, post-colonial states have attempted to establish a larger measure of control over their national economies. They increasingly intervened in the control, regulation and stimulation of plantations and tried to integrate smallholders further into the plantation system, thus challenging the dependency school’s thesis of the existence of a comprador political class in newly independent states and the impossibility of a more autonomous capitalist development on the periphery (von Muralt & Sajhau 1987; Sajhau & von Muralt 1987). In some cases, post-colonial states have taken measures that have led to either complete or partial nationalization (Bolton 1985), while in other cases, they have acted as partners in joint ventures with foreign or local private capital. However, following the liberalisation of the economy of Cameroon in the 1990s, plantation activities have been dominated by MNCs both at the level of cultivation and exports. Given that the main quest of these enterprises is profit maximisation, exploitation has become the order of the day as we shall see subsequently (Awang 2011, 203).

A third school of thought that has made a significant contribution to the study of the role of plantation production in capital accumulation and its relationship to peasant production and societies has been the so-called theory of the articulation of modes of production as propagated by scholars such as Laclau (1971), Meillassoux (1972, 1975, 1977), Rey (1971, 1973, 1976, 1979), Terray (1969, 1975, 1979), Wolpe (1972, 1980) and van Binsbergen & Geschiere (1985). They do not accept the dependency view that pre-capitalist societies have been destroyed or fully transformed following incorporation into the world capitalist system. Instead they argue that pre-capitalist modes of production have at least been partially preserved since colonial rule, albeit in subordination to the dominant capitalist mode of production. Some of them, particularly Meillassoux (1975) and Wolpe (1972, 1980), have emphasised that this (partial) preservation of pre-capitalist modes of production might be beneficial to dominant capitalist sectors such as mining and plantations. Capital accumulation by plantations is dependent on, and safeguarded by, the domestic community’s supply of cheap land, labour and commodities. Plantation owners can shift the costs of reproducing their labour force onto domestic communities and in this way lower their costs of production.

Most of these scholars claim that the establishment of capitalist
domination and the subordination of pre-capitalist modes of production have not always been easy or automatic processes in African social formations. Rey (1971) in particular asserts that the 'lineage mode of production' offered (initial) resistance to capitalist domination in defence of its own autonomy and that capitalism faced considerable obstacles in its attempt to take root in pre-capitalist modes of production. He tries to demonstrate the existence of a variety of mechanisms for integrating pre-capitalist modes of production into the capitalist system, mechanisms that occurred in different forms and combinations and account for the huge variations in the processes of articulation in Africa: (initial) state violence, class contradictions within pre-capitalist mode(s) of production, the establishment of alliances between the dominant classes within the capitalist and pre-capitalist sectors, and the (gradual) operation of market forces (Geschiere 1978, 1985).

Contrary to the modernisation and dependency schools, the modes of production school has been able to demonstrate the problems that accompanied the subordination of autonomous pre-capitalist societies to the imperatives of capital accumulation and to provide a more detailed picture of the varied impact of capitalist plantation production on the surrounding domestic communities. By moving from the level of exchange to that of production, it has been able to explain the continuing existence of pre-capitalist modes of production which, rather than being destroyed, are reshaped and subordinated to capitalist modes of production.

These three schools of thought provide a useful starting point for examining the continuing interest of some post-colonial states in plantation production. The agro-industrial sector in Cameroon has become one of the main pillars of the post-colonial state’s agricultural policies. Courade (1984) and Konings (1993a) have convincingly demonstrated that the Cameroonian post-colonial state has continued to allocate a substantial proportion of its agricultural budget to the expansion of the agro-industrial sector, in particular to the creation and expansion of agro-industrial parastatals, which accounted for nearly 60% of its agricultural budget during the country’s third and fourth five-year plans (1971-1981).

Modernisation theorists would see the Cameroonian post-colonial state’s support of agro-industrial expansion as a clear expression of the political elite’s selfless and detached commitment to the modernisation of agricultural production. The latter’s promotion of plantation production was more likely to contribute to increased output and capital accumulation than ‘archaic’ peasant production. However, with the drastic fall in prices of agricultural commodities in the early 1980s, the state of Cameroon was rendered powerless and was forced to undergo a structural adjustment that further eclipsed the state from major decisions concerning the
commercialisation of agricultural produce (Ngoh 1998).

The dependency theorists (Molua 1985), on the contrary, argue that the Cameroonian post-colonial state’s encouragement of agro-industrial expansion reflects the political elite’s class interests. They allege that the ruling class is collaborating closely with foreign capital in stimulating agro-industrial expansion as it has its own stake in a project that will inevitably lead to deepening dependency and underdevelopment.

The theory of the articulation of modes of production is also potentially able to help explain the Cameroonian post-colonial state’s interest in agro-industrial expansion. This school assumed that state intervention was only required in the initial process of the articulation of modes of production (Rey 1971, 1973; Meillassoux 1972, 1975). Initial state intervention helped to establish the supremacy of the capitalist mode of production and the ultimate subordination of pre-capitalist modes to the imperatives of colonial capital accumulation: the supply of land, labour and agricultural commodities to the capitalist sectors, especially the plantation sector. It seems to have overlooked the possibility that the post-colonial state’s interest in expanded production and capital accumulation led to renewed state intervention so as to incorporate the relatively autonomous domestic communities further into the capitalist mode of production (Hyden 1980; Konings 1986a).

These three major theories help to explain the role of plantation production in processes of capital accumulation, its relationship with pre-capitalist societies and the continuing interest of some post-colonial states, like Cameroon, in its expansion. The sustainability issues raised by this study are a continuation of the exploitative motives that led to the emergence of capitalism and the eventual colonization of the African continent. These exploitative tendencies, as expressed by the dependency school, were very visible in the Cameroon banana industry supply chain.

The political economy of the banana industry in Cameroon

The banana sector is a key cubicle and major agro-exporter in the political economy of Cameroon. It is a circuit of both profits and power. This section will lay emphases on the place of banana in the global economy through an examination of is often referred to as the banana wars, analyse the colonial origins of banana industry in Cameroon and finally, it will make an appraisal of the key actors which are the Cameroon Development Corporation, Del Monte and Plantation du Haut Penja which is a subsidiary of La Compagnie Fruitiere in France.
Production and international banana trade

Banana, as an agricultural commodity, is one of the flagship products of world trade. It occupies an important place in the agricultural trade after cereals, sugar, coffee and cocoa. This is one of the main sources of food for people in developing countries. Banana has a growing importance on the geopolitical chessboard, as shown in the paragraph below, at national and international levels to which countries that are producers, are being inserted. Banana is based on an economy whose structure symbolizes the persistence of neo-imperialist or neo-colonial dynamics in the globalization of the agricultural economy.

Six countries (India, Brazil, Ecuador, the Philippines, Indonesia and China) dominate the economic map of the world banana output (55%). However, the international banana trade is a globalized trade dominated by three large multinationals corporations (Chiquita Brands, ex - United Fruit, Del Monte and Dole Food Inc.). This trio has control of 65% of world banana exports, while featuring as a global oligopolistic power. The global banana industry is marked by some countries, like India and Brazil, which are among the main banana producers, but are hardly involved in international trade. The argument for local consumption is regularly invoked to justify this fact, confirming the predominance of yellow fruit in the diet of populations. The banana sector is a very dynamic industry. World production has more than doubled since 1990, from around 47 million tons to 107 million tons in 2013; bananas traded internationally show a similar growth, increasing from 9 million tons in 1990 to 20 million tons in 2013 (Anania 2014, 183).

In 2013 the six main producers of bananas accounted for almost two thirds (62.4%) of global production; they were, in order of importance: India (27.6 million tons), China (12.1), the Philippines (8.6), Brazil (6.9), Ecuador (6), and Indonesia (5.4). The largest net exporters of bananas and their ranking do not coincide with those based on production, as India and China, the two largest producers, are a marginal international trader and a net importer (504 000 tons in 2013) respectively. The largest net exporter in 2013 was Ecuador (5.5 million tons, 27.7% of total world exports), followed by the Philippines (3.2, 17.2%), Guatemala (2.0, 16.3%), Costa Rica (1.9, 9.8%) and Colombia (1.6, 8.2%). In 2013, the top five exporting countries alone accounted for 79% of the world market (Anania 2014, 185).

Market concentration for imports is even higher than for exports. The European Union, with 4.9 million tons of bananas imported in 2013 (25% of the world market), is the largest importer, followed by the US with 4.3 million tons (22% of the market). Other important net importers were
the Russian Federation (1.3 million tons), Japan (1 million tons), Canada (557,000 tons) and China (Anania 2014, 187). Banana trade flows show a clear pattern of regionalisation. At least in part, this is the result of past and current EU import regimes for bananas. Virtually all exports from the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries are directed towards the EU, while Latin American countries export bananas to Europe, Russia and North and South America. Virtually all US and Canada imports of bananas come from Central and South America, and over 95% of the bananas imported by the Russian Federation in 2013 come from Ecuador alone. The Asian market is largely characterised as a regional market separated from the rest of the world with a very large share of imports satisfied by exporters from within the region itself. For example, in 2013, Japan, the largest importer in the region, imported 93% of its bananas from the Philippines (FAO 2014).

Countries in the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific region (ACP) in 2010, accounted for about 23% of the total exports of the international banana trade. ACP bananas are exported, primarily for the countries of the European Union, mainly because the products from this area were given preferential access since 1993 (FAO 2014). This privilege, which operates against the current of competitive rules organizing international trade in the neoliberal framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), is due to the bonds of colonial origins.

The Colonial Origins of the Cameroon Banana Industry

Three arguments have been advanced to indicate with authenticity the origin of banana cultivation in Africa. The first argument holds that banana was introduced in Africa by Portuguese sailors in the 16th century. The second considers that it was the Arabs and Persians who are responsible for the introduction of banana in Africa around the 8th century AD. The third view, according to Norman Simmons, banana was introduced around the 10th century. Archaeological discoveries have hinted traces of banana cultivation to some 2,500 years ago.

It is with the establishment of the Cameroon plantation economy by the Germans (1889-1916) that we can date the organization of industrial cultivation of banana in Cameroon. The development of the Cameroonian territory under German protectorate (Schutzgebiet), based on agricultural and infrastructural plans came to materialize the German settlement enterprise. In this context of domination and colonial exploitation, large plantations of export products such as coffee, rubber, palm oil, cocoa and banana were set up in order to supply the metropolis. This agricultural
economy that was based on concessions encouraged land appropriation and dehumanizing working conditions. These phenomena led to revolts in the plantations around the Douala region and equally triggered a tax strike. However, the German colonial rule was not challenged. Even with the advent of the mandate system that emerged following the defeat of the Germans during World War One, agricultural concessions were still maintained, despite the move to mandate plans (1914-1946) and trusteeship (1946-1960), by corporate interests located in the lap of the new colonial powers that were France and Britain (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) 1984).

With the advent of French Cameroon’s independence in 1960 and the subsequent reunification with British Southern Cameroons a year later, there emerged a dynamic economic and political transformation of agro-industrial landscape. Against this backdrop the new post-colonial authorities instructed public authorities to make agriculture a lever for growth and development of Cameroon. In so doing, it limited the colonial regimes of exploitation and management of the banana industry (Kaptue 1986). This was followed by cohabitation between industrial private operators in the banana sector and local producers (small holders) coordinated by a state body known as *Organisation Camerounaise de Banane* (OCB). This coexistence was challenged with the dissolution of the OCB in 1988, thus leading to the extinction of peasant production.

The disappearance of the OCB marked a radical change in the banana sector in Cameroon towards a liberalized regime of production and trade. This is because, the Cameroon Banana Association (ASSOBACAM), created in 1988 to substitute OCB, could not take over the coaching duties of peasants production (ASSOBACAM 2015). Against this backdrop, the peasant operators were doomed to disappear since they were unable to meet the challenges of liberal competition that brought giant multinational corporations involved in the banana industry to the lime light. The disappearance of the OCB left the door open to private operators, who in most cases were large foreign industrial groups. Large foreign companies, specialized in the production of bananas, benefitted from the situation to strengthen their hold on the existing banana plantations in Cameroons. This move promoted the fact that certain areas of production, like that of Njombe-Penja became the exclusive preserve of the PHP group. This large group increased its concession over vast hectares of land in and around Njombe-Penja, producing mainly bananas and pineapples to the EU market, and pepper sold in local markets. The Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) came with a project that allowed Del Monte to manage the Likomba banana plantations in Tiko.
Actors in the Cameroon Banana economy

The production of dessert bananas in Cameroon is extremely concentrated; in the recent past, four firms produced virtually all bananas exported from the country: the Société des Plantations du Haut Penja (PHP), Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC), BOH Plantations Limited (BPL) and the Société des Plantations de Mbanga (SPM).

The Plantation du Haut Penja group is the largest operator, with 57% of total Cameroon banana exports in 2010, and a share that remained above 40% between 1994 and 2003. The group is a combination of two companies, PHP itself and SBM. PHP is entirely owned by the Compagnie Fruitière, a French-American company owned by the French Fabre family (60%) and by Dole (40%). PHP controlled 51% the SBM Company, with Cameroon investors and the Italian firm Simba owning the remaining 13% and 36% respectively (ASSOBACAM 2015). Compagnie Fruitière has been present in Cameroon since the early 1980s. It is a major player in the banana sector in other countries in the region, mainly Ivory Coast and Ghana (www.compagniefruitiere.com). Though the main activity of PHP remains the cultivation and exportation of bananas, it was also involved in the exportation of flowers and pepper from Cameroon. According to the Corporate Social Responsibility Report of La Compagnie Fruitière, all PHP bananas are GlobalGAP and ISO14001 certified while 800 out of the 3 300 hectares it farms and four of its packing facilities are Fair Trade certified; PHP bananas also meet Tesco’s ‘Nature’s Choice’ quality standards, a private standard that is more strict than GlobalGAP in terms of the chemicals that can be used. PHP is strongly pushing for the introduction of an ‘African’ label for high-quality bananas from the West African region (Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Ghana), an umbrella quality assurance certification to be used in conjunction with private firm labels. PHP pays its employees a salary that is significantly above the minimum wage. Compagnie Fruitière owns ripening facilities in several European countries and in African Express Line (AEL), a sea shipping company operating a reefer fleet. PHP is in the process of expanding banana production by increasing its farmed land by almost 25%. PHP is currently providing, on a contractual basis, CDC and BPL, the only two other firms producing bananas in the country, with technical assistance in the field. In addition, Compagnie Fruitière handles, on a commission base, all BPL exports and part of those by CDC (Ouma & Jagwe 2010).

On her part, the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) accounts for around 40% of Cameroon banana production and exportation. Low productivity and the liberalization of the agricultural sector in Cameroon
prompted the takeover of the banana project of the CDC by Delmonte in 1992. CDC is one of the largest firms in the country in the agro-industrial sector with the largest number of employees after the state. Its operations are concentrated in agriculture, mostly in producing and exporting bananas, palm oil and rubber. CDC banana plantations cover close to 3 900 ha (16 000 ha are devoted to palm oil production, 24 000 to rubber). The government made efforts to privatise CDC since 1998, without success and this left CDC management with a very uncertain medium-term scenario that had negative effects on investment decisions, including those related to banana rotation plans and drainage management, thus leading to low productivity. A large portion of CDC plantations were characterised by relatively poor soil quality and high rainfall, which created conditions favourable to the spread of black sigatoka. Between 1988 and 2011, thanks to the partnership with Del Monte, CDC employed 6 500 labourers in its banana operations. Workers receive a salary 36,700 that was slightly above the minimum wage 28,000 they were entitled to by law (Ntube, 2013). From 1988 until 2011, CDC was active in close partnership with Del Monte Fresh Fruit, which provided technical assistance in the area of production and was exporting most of the CDC bananas at a fixed, pre-determined free on board (FOB) price out of the Douala port. Following the expiration of the agreement, and De Monte’s unwillingness to renew the agreement, CDC was obliged to seek technical assistance first from SPM and later PHP. Bananas sold through Del Monte were labelled ‘Del Monte Cameroun’. Some CDC exports were also taking place under the label ‘CDC banana’ (Azengela 2013). CDC launched its own brand of high-quality bananas in 2010 labeled ‘Makossa’. Since 2011, CDC has been able to market 3 000 000 boxes of bananas (the equivalent of 54, 400 tons) per year via Del Monte at a pre-fixed FOB price that is set on an annual base while the rest of the production, including the Makossa-labelled high-quality bananas, are exported through Compagnie Fruitière on a commission basis (Azengela 2013).

The Makossa bananas are sold mostly in Southern France, where consumer recognition of the label is highest. All CDC bananas are certified GlobalGAP. In the past, CDC has used refrigerated containers to ship its bananas, when it was offered a good deal by Maersk, who needed return cargo in lieu of empty containers back to Europe. While CDC did not consider obtaining the Fair Trade certification for its bananas in the past – Del Monte never saw this as a strategy worth pursuing (Anania 2014, 189).
Sustainability issues within the Cameroon banana supply chain

The sustainability issues within the Cameroon banana supply chain are roughly divided into labour rights issues, fiscal delinquency, land rights issues, health/safety issues and environmental degradation. This, however, should not be seen as an exhaustive list of sustainability issues affecting the cultivation, production and commercialisation of bananas in Cameroon. For a better understanding of some sustainability issues witnessed in the Cameroon banana supply chain, we have opted to treat a particular case study of the principal banana producer in Cameroon. To this effect, the Plantation du Haut Penja (PHP), an affiliate of Compagnie Fruitière, will be analysed. The research conducted for this case study focuses on working conditions at PHP without bothering to examine what happens within the last knot of the supply chain that deals essentially with commercialisation. In addition, it brings to the fore information from communities around Njombe Penja plantations who accuse the company of grabbing their ancestral land which they had been using for subsistence agriculture. This case study presents findings from interviews conducted in 2014 and 2015, and assesses all changes and developments that occurred during the research period.

The Place of Labour in the Cameroon Banana Supply Chain

Analyses under this heading are going to focus more on the category of labourers, working hours/overtime and remuneration. PHP outsourced most of its plantation work to contractors who engage in a bidding process, and then recruited their own workers who, did not get to sign any written contracts. This category of workers was referred to as agency workers. The actual number of agency workers is unknown, but there are more than ten contracting companies that supply workers to PHP. Agency workers do not belong to the workers’ union and do not enjoy any benefits. They are not entitled to free medical services, food allowances, free housing or bonuses. Whenever they get sick or injured, even at PHP plantations, these workers have access to PHPs clinics but are required to pay the medical bills themselves, which many workers cannot afford (Nzimbi 2014).

According to some anonymous agency workers interviewed, the contracting companies only write down the names of the people who offer themselves for employment, give them necessary equipment and deploy them where they are needed. These workers are the most vulnerable group.
They are not unionised and have no job security. In the absence of a contract, these workers are at increased risk of unfair dismissals and hindered from obtaining any redress as they have no proof of employment (Chief Nsonga 2014).

**Working hours and overtime**

In Cameroon, according to the labour code (*Code de Travail* 1992), a normal working week consists of 40 hours and five working days. Any hours worked in excess of 40 hours are treated as overtime and should be paid at the rate of at least 150% of normal hourly wages. During the interviews conducted in 2013, workers reported that they were expected to work on Sundays. Although overtime was paid, providing a much needed supplement to workers’ income, those who refused to work on Sundays could expect disciplinary actions or even dismissal. PHP claimed that workers accepted Sunday shifts voluntarily, and that the Industrial Relations Court even turned down a worker request for an order to be allowed to continue working seven days a week (Pigeaud 2009).

Recent interviews (August – September 2015) revealed some major changes regarding working hours and overtime work. The most significant one is the removal of overtime work and payments in almost all departments. In addition, information provided by the workers surveyed suggests that PHP has made this possible by shifting some of the work previously done by its permanent and seasonal workers to its agency workers (Oxfam 2009).

For all permanent and seasonal workers compulsory overtime on Sundays is no longer required; workers now enjoy a day off on Sundays. In addition, the working week has been reduced to five days. However, working weeks for permanent and seasonal workers still add up to 48 hours. Three days a week; they work 8 hours a day, while two days a week they work for 12 hours a day. The Cameroonian Labour Code (1992) is silent on this practice of subjecting workers to 16 hour shifts. The emphasis is on 48 hours per week; hence employers may take advantage of this loophole (*La Nouvelle Expression* Fevrier 2012).

According to the permanent and agency workers interviewed, this removal of overtime has significantly reduced their monthly income. The company notes that it has introduced a ‘shift allowance’ to compensate for loss of overtime payments. Still, the fact that there was no reference to this measure in the interviews suggests that this measure is not fully making up for the income loss derived from less overtime work. Workers complained that the removal of overtime work and payments has forced them to find
alternative additional sources of income. According to them, they are now depending on informal money lenders who may charge 100% interest for any amount of money borrowed just for a month (Ewane 2015).

Working hours among agency workers often exceed eight hours a day, and they are required to complete daily targets. For instance, banana harvesters have to complete a daily target of 100 to 150 bunches before they receive the daily wage of 400 Francs CFA (€ 0.88). If the target is not met, the worker can choose to continue working or the task will be added to their target for the following day. Those who fail to meet the target are eventually penalised by having part of their wages deducted (Manu, 2015). Since plantation work is very tough, most workers, especially women, fail to reach the targets and hence they suffer from wage cuts or even loss of jobs.

**Remuneration**

Through field trips to the plantation, we found out that wages at PHP were below the legal minimum wage of 28,700 Francs CFA (€ 36) per month at that time. In 2013, average monthly basic wages of PHP workers were around 24,000 francs CFA (€ 29, based on 48-hour working weeks). In addition, agency workers received 4,000 francs CFA (€ 7) in overtime payments a month (overtime hours were remunerated at 150 francs CFA (€ 0.30) per hour while permanent workers received 5,200 francs CFA (€ 11) as food allowance. The average monthly net pay between 2009 and 2012 including overtime wages and food allowance was about 36,000 francs CFA (€ 50) (Ekane 2014).

In January 2012, the legal minimum wage in Cameroon was adjusted from 300 francs CFA (€ 0.50) to 520 Francs CFA (€ 0.88) per day. The minimum monthly wage was thus increased to 33,326 (€ 57) per month. In response PHP increased wages (up to 28%) for all workers hired directly by the company (both permanent and seasonal workers). Average daily wages for PHP workers stood at 900 Francs CFA (€ 1.43) a day and the monthly basic wage was around 31,000 (€ 47). The average monthly net pay in 2015 for a permanent worker was about 33,000 francs CFA (€ 55). This is slightly above the legal minimum wage (Simeu 2015).

Workers acknowledged that there has been some improvement when they compare their pay package in 2013 to what they earned in 2015, a number of developments have been observed. For instance, the food allowance was adjusted from 5,200 francs CFA in 2013 study to about 6,000 (€ 13) in 2015. In addition, the house allowance of 4,353 francs CFA (€ 7) was introduced into the earnings of those workers who did not live in
free company houses. However the most significant change is that there are no longer overtime payments or attendance bonuses for PHP workers. Indeed, while basic wages increased, net total monthly payments decreased by about 10%, as permanent and seasonal workers no longer earn overtime wages or an attendance bonus (Njume 2015).

All the permanent and seasonal workers interviewed complained about the removal of overtime work and overtime payments. According to them, the removal has significantly reduced their monthly income. It is not clear why PHP removed overtime payments and even introduced an extra day off in addition to Sunday, but it is likely this was done to save costs (Ndifor 2015). According to some company officials who were interviewed, there are no overtime payments because PHP has transferred some of the tasks previously carried out by permanent and seasonal workers to agency workers.

Further, it was observed that despite the fact that permanent and seasonal workers receive equal allowances (house allowance, food allowance, etc.), differences in monthly incomes exist within the two categories. According to the seasonal workers, they all belong to the same grade and receive equal payments. In contrast, permanent workers are graded, and they therefore receive higher remuneration.

Another observation is that although PHP payments were slightly above the government minimum wage, and also above average wages in other sectors, they were not enough to sustain a worker and his/her family for the whole month. The daily living wage for a rural Cameroonian as of January 2014 was calculated at 1,531 francs CFA (€ 2.63) for workers without in kind benefits, 1,408 francs CFA (€ 2.42) for workers with some in kind benefits and 1,193 (€ 2.05) for workers receiving most in kind benefits. Workers on PHP’s pay roll receive a number of benefits and their average daily take home pay stood at 1,192 francs CFA (€ 1.90) in 2015. Hence wages at PHP are somewhat below the living wage. According to the company, entry level wages are well above the living wage level. It is, however, unclear exactly how the company comes to this conclusion.

A field trip at PHP for interviews with agency workers established that the 2015 wage increments only affected workers directly hired by PHP. Agency workers who constitute the majority of the workforce at PHP were not covered by this wage increment.

The agency workers interviewed indicated that they receive a daily wage of 851 francs CFA (€ 1.15) for an eight-hour working day, which is equal to the legal minimum wage and far below calculated daily living wage levels. As noted before, their eight hour working day only exists on paper, as in
practice they may work much longer to reach their target. Agency workers receive their wages once a month but do not receive pay slips. Unlike other categories of PHP workers, agency workers do not enjoy benefits such as free housing, medical services and food allowances. They rent houses in the surrounding villages which are about 3-5 kilometres from the plantations. Most of them commute from their homes to the agency’s offices, and are transported from there to their designated work stations (Big Banana 2012).

Clearly, agency workers earn much less than workers hired directly by PHP, and they also lack job security altogether. In its reaction to some accusation leveled on its activities, the management of PHP stated that ‘independent contractor’ employees were required to be paid the equivalent of PHP’s ‘negotiated wage rates’, and that where contractors pay their workers based on completion of tasks, ‘this requires monitoring from a human rights perspective’. However, from the worker interviews it becomes clear that, taking into account the number of hours worked, agency workers are often paid below the legal minimum wage and clearly earn less than those workers hired directly by PHP. There seems to be a clear gap between company policy and practice in this regard. Cameroonian workers earn little but they work, however, a lot to supply French and British markets, which represent the main consumers for Cameroon’s banana exports. Work starts at six in the morning and finishes around 5 or 6pm. But for a Cameroonian banana worker it is not uncommon to stay until 10pm in periods of high demand. Salaries are not based on an hourly rate but rather on the task assigned by managers each day. If the set quota is not achieved, pay is withheld. The gap between official salaries (starting at 31,777CFA for an unqualified worker) and the actual wages received can be significant. Therefore many, like Caroline, end up earning less than the legal minimum of 28,000 francs. On top of this, health problems often restrict actual working hours. At the same time, the workers’ protection in the workplace is highly insufficient. Even though the European label GlobalGap, ensuring social and environmental standards of Cameroon’s banana production, forbids aerial fungicide spraying – this practice is still used whilst workers are in the fields. Obligatory protective equipment is not always used. Most banana pickers explain that they have to buy new boots regularly themselves, necessary for protection from deadly snakes in the plantations. In the conditioning unit, where bananas are treated before being packed, women spend their working hours with their hands soaked in chlorine, often without gloves... except during inspection visits which are, of course, announced in advance. Medical provision is supposed to be completely covered by the banana company, yet in practice, workers must regularly purchase their own medicine (Rigobert, 2015).
But at least, banana workers in Cameroon have union freedom. The Fako Workers Union (Fawu) (Fako is the division in the South Western region where the CDC mostly operates) has 4,000 members, of which 2,000 work in the banana industry. This independent union, formed in 1947 at the same time as the CDC, is purely financed by contributions from its members (1% of their salary). Its small team of seven employees deals with many legislative infractions regarding work in the banana production: from abusive dismissals to age discrimination cases (FAWU 2011).

Their relationship with the company board remains proper however, says Charles Mbide Kude, in charge of legal affairs at Fawu: “Six cases out of ten are amicably settled. When a complaint goes to court, we win 90% of the cases because they are often due to people ignoring the work code” (FAWU 2011).

Cameroon’s Social legislation provides for equal work for equal pay with no gender discrimination but the SMIG and SMAG salary structure is still applicable. The legislated minimum wage as at 2008 is set at 28.216FCFA. The various economic sectors employer’s Associations and the Trade Union Confederations improve on the legislated minimum wage through Collective bargaining. The Collective Bargaining for the Agricultural sector to which banana plantations fall, set the Agricultural minimum wage at 30.777FCFA. The provisions of the Collective Agreement in the Agricultural Sector regarding the minimum wage and the legislated minimum wage are not respected, and by way of ambush the workers are paid less than both minimum wages. The ambush is carried out through payment by results, which entails pro-rate payments. This system disadvantages banana workers in general and female workers in particular whose take home pay due to pro-rata is usually 40% - 50% lower than the legislated minimum wage (Gibbon 2011).

Because they are not paid a living wage they suffer consequences such as: Inability to educate their children up to high school; Inability to provide for themselves and family at least two balanced meals a day; Inability to hire proper accommodation resulting to overcrowding in single room accommodations, due to the fact that 25% of their basic salary paid to them as Housing Allowance is grossly inadequate; and lastly, 25% of 30.777FCFA gives 7.675FCFA and a single room of cardboard cost 12.000FCFA.

This is stack contradiction with the National Collective Agreement of Agricultural Undertakings which provides for the advancement of workers from one category echelon to the other bi-annually on merit basis. The appraisals of female workers performances for purposes of merit increments by their Sectional Heads is a tool for sexual harassment while Line Headmen use pro-rata payments as a tool for sexual harassment as well (Emilia 2015).
**Poor Working Conditions**

Apart of the wage levels that are low, other key concerns for workers are their working conditions. Issues included the lack of proper breaks; the absence of transparency concerning the recording of the number of hours worked on payslips; a lack of sanitation, such as toilet facilities (the use of which is only with the permission of a senior manager who holds the key) without toilet paper or soap, and the culture of reckless irresponsibility in the storage and application of agrochemicals. The theme throughout was one of worker reports conflicting with management claims, this disparity often backed up by what the delegation witnessed during plantation visits.

**Health and safety**

According to PHP officials, daily safety briefings were undertaken to enforce and bolster safety measures; constant efforts are applied to inculcate an awareness of safety issues throughout all areas of the business. In addition, in-company theatre plays are used to highlight safe behaviour. Visible signage has been introduced in strategic locations as a constant reminder of a safety-first culture. However, our visit to the plantation in 2013 revealed that despite all these efforts to ensure safety, safety malpractices are still common. We witnessed a nine month pregnant woman, only a few days from starting maternity leave, using a plastic lid to apply fertiliser by hand, and plastic gloves were her only protective equipment. She told us she had been working for 4/5 hours in the tropical heat without a break. She was working alongside a male colleague who was mixing large amounts of the fertiliser for application, again without proper protective equipment. It was this casual handling of agrochemicals, apparently endemic throughout PHP operations, which was so shocking. The level of awareness of the dangers of handling and applying a range of fungicides, fertilisers, nematicides and pesticides appears woeful at management level, with a sense that these chemicals are a symbol of progress and development (Bonte 2011).

Although we appreciated seeing workers in the Garage wearing improved Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), most workers in other areas reported either having no PPE or having new equipment only once a year when the plantation receives visitors. Many field workers reported having to buy their PPE, with boots, for example, costing 5000 CFA francs. Deleafers in particular reported not being given gloves, resulting in repeated wounds on their hands. Workers stated that although designed for one use only, their protective clothing is worn many times before being disposed of.
and is rewashed for use. Although denied permission to visit the laundry facilities, we deduced the workers washing protective clothing for reuse are doing so without gloves or other protective clothing themselves. We witnessed workers unloading and opening packages of blue bags lined with Chlorpyrifos, an organophosphate, without any protective equipment. This included pregnant women opening the packs of bags by hand despite the prenatal risk of impaired neurobehavioral development. There also appears to be a lack of consultation with workers about the appropriateness of the PPE provided given the tropical conditions in which people are working. Quality was also questioned with the boots that some had, lasting only 3-4 months before needing replacement. We witnessed women working in only flip flops slipping over on the rough ground of the plantation (Yamileth, 1998).

As far as aerial spraying of bananas to protect against Black Sogatoka, we were told by PHP management that spraying only takes place in the mornings (because of wind patterns) and that farms are informed well in advance to ensure that workers are removed from the field for the 2/3 hours that spraying can take. One management claim was even that spraying only took place on Sundays. However, we filmed the cycle of a spraying application, from the plane being refueled and reloaded with pesticide at the PHP-owned airbase, to the application of this pesticide on the field. Signs may clearly warn that aerial spraying takes place, but our experience showed that when it does, no effort whatsoever is made to stop people entering the plantation. For example, workers finishing for the day passed through as the plane sprayed overhead, as did other people, carrying food, possibly intended for sale. We witnessed workers working in the field whilst spraying took place, these workers telling us, as many others did in interviews off site, that they simply sheltered under banana leaves (Dole 2012).

One of the most shocking aspects of the visit was the denial by senior medical staff employed by PHP of any negative health impacts from the handling of agrochemicals. Given the extensive research in this area and that many chemicals used in the banana industry are classified as ‘hazardous’ by WHO, this was quite astonishing. It is therefore difficult to understand how effective treatment can be if there is not transparency about the possible causes of health problems for the plantation workers.

All workers are supposed to receive quarterly training, including advice on how to handle chemicals. However there seems to be a cultural ignorance and inertia throughout the management structure about the dangers posed by the handling, storage and application of toxic agrochemicals to workers or the environment. There, for example, appeared to be an absence of buffer zones around water courses on several PHP
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Plantations. At every turn the blatant lack of safety in the handling and application of agrochemicals was denied at management level, as were any negative health impacts by medical staff.

PHP provided health care as specified in Section 98 of the Labour Code with a hospital that serves workers their families and the community, offering a range of services including ante and post natal care and a vaccination programme. Workers expressed a wide range of concerns about the healthcare provided. There were many complaints of insufficient supplies of drugs and workers taking incomplete doses or combinations of drugs due to irregular supplies. This pushed workers to buy their own drugs and are not subsequently being reimbursed. There was a first aid post on each plantation but these are only staffed for a few of the hours when workers are on site. There are no drugs available when the posts are not staffed.

Workers reported 1-2 workers collapsing a month and being taken to the clinic. Many workers worried that there were insufficient ambulances available to transport ill or injured workers to the clinics. Healthcare contributions of 800 CFA francs were deducted from low wages but workers also had to pay a consultation fee of 300 CFA francs and have other associated costs, such as paying for food for hospital patients. Workers expressed fears that they were being given insufficient sick leave to recover from illness which would also contribute to poor productivity if workers in poor health have to return to work. Nursing staff also shared a number of concerns, notably the delay in laboratory investigations, non-functioning sterilizing units (autoclaves) (leaving one clinic to use a two ring gas stove) and the lack of drying room which is a particular problem in rainy season. They also emphasised their belief that there was a need for 24 hour clinic provision.

**Gender Issues**

At PHP, 23% of workers are women with a ratio of 60:40 women to men in the pack house. This is a far higher rate of women being employed on plantations than in Latin America. Women begin their four month maternity leave three weeks before the delivery date. Social insurance covers maternity pay. Nursing mothers are given a 1 hour break per day for breastfeeding which can be taken at the beginning or end of the day. They are also entitled to start work at 8am, but these rights are not respected. Nursing mothers are given field tasks when they return to work so that they finish earlier. However, undertaking the demands of, for example, deleafing soon after childbirth had severe health impacts for women, including
abdominal pains. Management described removing women from certain tasks in response to their being hospitalized with lower abdominal pains. Pregnant women could work six hours without a break, applying fertiliser, deleafing or even cleaning drainage canals. Women felt strongly that - if consulted - they could propose better jobs for pregnant women and nursing mothers during their first 6 months back at work that would allow women to work seated, such as material preparation and the washing of plastics and foam. Women employed in the pack house also suffer a range of health complaints including back pains and irregular menstruation (Nsoh 2011).

Unfortunately, the long hours that women spend working in the pack house, especially in the evenings, means they are often absent from the home and the incidence of domestic violence appears to be increasing as a result. In addition, if women refuse sexual favours to their supervisor, they fear that their hours of pay may be cut or continual employment threatened.

**Implication of PHP in Fiscal Delinquency**

Companies operating in the banana sector in Cameroon had real power of influence, corrupt and manipulate government officials for purposes of collusion to free themselves from their tax obligations. Njombe-Penja hosts the activities of two of the three major private operators in the Cameroon banana industry: they are the PHP and SPM groups with annual turnovers of more than a billion CFA francs. Yet, despite the presence of these giant banana corporations, the local communities in which they operate retained an amazingly low budget, while they have on their territory such productive structures able to significantly develop their potential for tax revenues that could be used to develop the communities.

Given the paradox of a low budget plan provided to the municipality, despite the presence in the spring of old structures that are PHP / SPM groups Kingué Eric Paul (then mayor of the said town) decided to employ the services of a tax firm, based in Yaoundé, in order to obtain a reliable assessment of fiscal possibilities of his municipality. The study of the issue by the consulting firm revealed that the municipality of Penja lost nearly two billion seven hundred and fifty million (2,750,000,000) CFA francs of communal taxes and other taxes due to the fiscal delinquency practiced by PHP, PMS and CAPLAIN Group, that failed to fulfill any of their tax obligations for close to 30 years. The efforts made by Mayor Kingué to redress the situation created by this tax delinquency, only led to a slight increase in the budget of the municipality, which increased from 150 million CFA francs to 256 million francs CFA in 2008 (Oxfam 2009).
From a personal point of view, the exemption that was granted to agro-industrial companies operating in the Mounigo area was based on complacent, revealing the existence of collusive maneuvers that had an adverse effect on tax resources. Exemptions unduly granted to agro-based industries in Penja violated the legal provisions laid down in Article 160 of the General Tax Code, which subjects the above companies to license. However, the non-payment of this patent, that is wholly owned by the municipality of Penja, in accordance with Article 156 of the Tax Code, prevented the eligibility of the municipality to the deferred deduction of 3% of the balance of municipal surcharges provided for in Order No. 0013 / MINAT of January 13, 1999.

Apart from the obvious, 13 other direct municipal taxes and two communal deliberations were not paid by the operating companies. At this juncture, it can be deduced that these companies have a long history of tax delinquency, which drastically reduced the tax potential which the town of Njombe-Penja could use to ensure a stabilized budget that could be exploited to jump-start development projects in the community. The recurrence of these tax delinquency practices reveals serious shortcomings of the companies who have exercised their obligations in terms of governance, the fight against corruption and corporate social responsibility, and the likelihood of harmful collusive and corrupt links for the municipality of Penja (Afite 2008).

To see more clearly in this case, Paul Eric Kingue decided to seek the consent of the General Manager of PHP through a written correspondence. This request for information made by the mayor of Njombe-Penja sparked a response in the form of corrupt deals initiated by the banana companies. Notified of that they should clarify their tax position vis-à-vis the council of Penja, PHP and SPM, instead chose to protect their tax evasion strategy, seeking to conclude a pact of corruption with former mayor of the municipality of Penja, then in office.

**Land Use in Njombe-Penja**

Three categories of actors were identified by respondents as the originators of land-related conflicts in the Njombé-Penja community. They include: elites, plantation owners and small-holder farmers. Elites who desire land for commercial agriculture (as a source of revenue during their retirement period) use their wealth and power to forcefully acquire vast expanses of land, including the farms of some small-scale producers for the cultivation of predominantly oil palm. Small-scale farmers, who are poor and politically powerless, are usually left landless, especially if they are not
compensated or given alternative farmland. This situation accounted for 16.9% of land-related conflicts in Njombé. The presence of agro-industrial plantations such as PHP with a surface area of approximately 1250 hectares of land in Njombé (Boa 2007, 29) is another cause of land disputes in the area. While PHP uses large expanses of land for the production of bananas (pineapples), and ornamental flowers for export, their desire to expand their production area directly or indirectly leads to land conflicts. About 11.3% of all land disputes in Njombé directly result from the appropriation of small-holders’ land, especially lands which border the big plantations such as PHP, without fair compensation. This leads to disputes between small-holder farmers and plantation owners as each actor is trying to protect his/her land interest. The expansion of PHP indirectly results in land scarcity and increased population pressure on land, due to the influx of migrants to work as plantation labourers. This aggravates the conflict situation of the area. These conflicts, according to the farmers, will continue as long as the plantation is expanding and appropriating their land.

Land use pattern in the area is a direct effect of the past and therefore how land is used today is determined by how it was used in the past (colonial period). Land in Njombé is used for various purposes including subsistence agriculture, commercial agriculture, experimental trials, plantation agriculture, real estate and other developmental projects. The presence of the agro-industrial plantations in the centre of the town makes access to farmland difficult as small-scale producers are forced to go far into the forest in search of farmland.

Although small-scale producers account for over 80% of domestic food production (IFAD 2008, 4), the presence of agro-industrial plantations in the centre of Njombé has some negative consequences on the livelihoods of small-scale producers. For instance, farmers were of the view that the presence of plantations undermines access to and control of resources of the local population now and/or in future, as it takes up the best lands pushing the rural people to cultivate on marginal lands that are hardly productive enough to feed them and secure surplus for market. This therefore affects their rights to adequate living standards and increases their vulnerability to hunger and poverty as they rely heavily on land for their livelihood (Pemunta 2014).

Secondly, farmers were of the view that plantation estates displace local producers (small-holder farmers) who often have the knowledge of producing sustainably, and would be in a position to do so with even higher yields if they were provided with an enabling agricultural policy environment. Furthermore, respondents remarked that their health is threatened as aerial spraying of banana crops leads to air pollution. River
water, formerly used by the inhabitants, is now confiscated and used for irrigating plantations. Irrigation channels of these plantations are being emptied into the residential areas leading to water-borne diseases especially during the rainy season. This reduces the farmer’s capacity to invest in other productive activities as they say “health is wealth”.

Conclusion

The consumption banana is increasing worldwide. However there is much less attention in the media for the often problematic environmental and socio-economic conditions associated with sugar cane production. This paper aimed to raise awareness among sourcing companies, such as supermarkets, of these sustainability concerns and outline suggestions for better company policies. Recent reports on different important banana producing countries indicate that working conditions in the industry are often problematic: forced labour, child labour, lack of job security, low wages, and health and safety problems. The banana industry, as indicated in the paper, is also linked to a range of harmful environmental impacts, including loss of animal habitats and biodiversity and pollution of land and water. Land conflict is one of the biggest problems associated with the production of banana. In Cameroon cases of land grabbing were reported. The inventory of reports this paper has consulted shows that such sustainability issues were widespread. A case study of banana cultivation and exportation at Njombe Penja by the Haut Plantation du Njombe-Penja unearths many of the same problems and also brings new issues to the table.

This paper concludes that among banana-consuming countries in Europe and North America, there is little awareness of, or interest in, the origin of the banana they buy. This raises doubts about the willingness and ability of banana-selling companies to verify that the sustainability policies they may impose on their suppliers are effectively implemented. Leading European and North American supermarkets generally have policies to mitigate the risk of unsustainable practices in their supply chains. However, addressing the range and complexity of the sustainability issues affecting the production of bananas requires more ambitious policies.

For banana producing and exporting countries like Cameroon to benefit from this activity, the paper has come with various recommendations. Given the companies involved in the production of banana have made exploitation of workers and local communities a principle within their supply chain, this paper proposes the following recommendations to supermarkets involved in the commercialization of bananas to final consumer:
• Supermarkets are advised to commit to sourcing sustainably certified bananas, as a first step in properly implementing human rights due diligence;
• Investigate human rights and negative environmental impacts in their banana supply chains; Identify banana plantations at the origin of their supply chain; Verify compliance with their policies at the origin of their banana supply chain;
• Mitigate negative human rights and environmental impacts in their supply chain through a targeted and coordinated engagement with different stakeholders including local communities, NGOs, trade unions and governments in producing and importing countries;
• Support banana producing companies that have been identified by the company as having specific negative human right and environmental impacts in their remediation efforts that engage affected communities and workers and finally;
• Publish the names of the companies that produce the bananas they sell, so that their responsibility can be publicly examined, and their progress can be independently evaluated.

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APPENDIX INTERVIEWS

Bernado, Ekane, Njombe-Penja, 18 October 2014.
Chief Nsonga, Njombe Penja, 21 October 2014.
Emilia Lima, Tiko, 20 April 2015.
Ewane Robert, Tombel, 26 February 2015.
Ndifor Ransome, Njombe-Penja, 10 April 2015.
Njume Epie, 16 March 2015.
Nzimbi Moses, Loum, 11 October 2014.
Rigobert Ndjimma, Melong, 12 March 2015.
Simeu Alexandre, Loum, 11 March 2015.
ABSTRACT
Bananas are a major staple as well as an important cash crop in developing countries and the most eaten fruit in Europe and Northern America. For decades, the banana economy has been a key example of trade injustice. The concentration of power in the hands of a few multinational companies has negatively affected the lives of thousands of banana workers and small farmers. While this activity has generated considerable profit for the multinational corporations that operate the plantations, the labourers and the communities in which these plantations are found have suffered injustices in the hands of the companies. It is against this backdrop that this paper sets out to make an appraisal of some sustainability issues that have gone a long way to affect the lives of both the workers and the communities in the Njombe-Penja area which is one the key banana producing area in Cameroon.

KEYWORDS
Multinational corporations; sustainability; supply chain agriculture; development.

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PARTNERS

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The Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) was the first center dedicated to the study and research in International Relations in Southern Brazil. It was established in August 1999 at the ILEA/UFRGS aiming the argumentative and innovative study of the main transformations within the post-Cold War international system. Since 2014, it is located at the Faculty of Economics of UFRGS (FCE-UFRGS). In parallel, NERINT has sought ways to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options to consolidate an autonomous international presence for the country, from the perspective of the developing world. Brazil’s choice of an “active, affirmative, and proactive diplomacy” at the beginning of the 21st century has converged with projections and studies put forward over numerous seminars and publications organized by NERINT.

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7. Contributions must contain the full name of the author, their titles, institutional affiliation (the full name of the institution) and an email address for contact;
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2. Submitted files must be in Microsoft Word, OpenOffice or RTF (as long as their size is up to 2MB) format.
3. URLs must be informed in the references when necessary.
4. The text must be single-spaced; Times New Roman typeface 12 pt must be used for the body of the text; italic is to be used instead of underline (except in URL addresses); Figures and Tables must be embedded in the text.
5. The text must follow patterns of style and bibliographical requirements described in Author Guidelines, in the section “About the Journal”.
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