DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESSES AND POLITICAL COMPETITION IN 1990’s AFRICA: THE CASES OF MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA¹

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Introduction

[...] Democracy and democratization must be taken into their context and in the dynamics of each collectivity. What happened in Europe was something typically european; what happened in Latin America is typical of Latin America and the same must be understood and valid for Africa [...].
(The authors 2015)

Democracy and democratization must be understood within its scope, considering the singularities and the contextual aspects of each society. And the democracies of the third wave also contemplate singularities that cannot be measured by the rubble of other contexts. The pretension of the present research is to study democracy and democratization in Mozambique and Zambia considering two elements: the electoral system, its singularities and then the formation and the shape of the party system with its correspondent nuances. Because it is important to analyze the effect

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of one in relation with the other, we focus our analysis in two aspects: first, the political and electoral competition in both countries, emphasizing to the party fluctuations in the Parliament, and secondly we analyze the electoral competition in the perspective of power alternance, which constitutes one of the dimensions to measure the level of stability of democracies.

According to our view, the analysis on democracy and democratization could be very limited if we did not include the empirical and theoretical studies developed by Dahl (1996), O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Santos (1987), Di Palma (1990), Huntington (1991), Przeworski (2000), Whitehead (2001), Carothers (2002) and Nahlon (2011). On the analysis on the electoral and party systems, our construction and theoretical model were inspired by the approaches of Sartori (1982), Pippa (1997), Ware (1996) and Cintra (2007).

The definitions on democracy and the classic dispositions on its concept are determined by Antique Greek authors, such as Socrates and Plato, and the contractualists, like Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, etc, that determined the theoretical basis to conceive democracy’s concept, considered in this study. Commonly, the idea of democracy is comprehended by the notion that people must control govern decisions upon them (Morlino 1986; Zovatto 2007). However, contemporary democracies have always been followed by the idea that it is important to allow other segments of society to participate of the choices upon politics, in a way that the majority determine people’s intentions (Lavalle and Araujo 2008; Pitkin 1967; Gaxie 1996). On the other hand, democracy can be defined as the regime where society members can really choose its governors and participate directly or indirectly of the determinations upon questions that concern everyone (Held 1991).

In the same way, democracy is a concept and a social-historical process. From the conceptual view, democracy is the people’s government, as showed above, and the historical ways that it is exercised on most countries are based on the principle of delegation (Feres and Pogrebinsc 2010; Hawkins 2016). On the social-historical process, it is possible to verify, according to Majefe (1995), three models of democracy: the liberal, the social and the socialist. They usually result in three forms of government: liberalism, social democracy and socialism, respectively. Dahl (1996) explains that a process of democracy definition must include necessarily two aspects: a maximalist understanding of what would be a democracy and, on the other hand, an understanding from a descriptive definition, that henceforth worries about describing the general elements of democratic societies. Considering the minimum guarantees for democracy, as explained by polyarchy, Schmitter and Karl (1991) add some categories: which elected bodies have to be able
to exercise its constitutional powers without being submitted to a greater power of non elected bodies. The political system must be independent.

Methodologically, it is an exploratory work. We have considered data in a comparative way, realizing a mix with qualitative productivity measures and quantitative measures in order to evaluate the political and electoral processes and the parliamentary fluctuations in both countries. We have analyzed democratization specifically from the dynamics of the political and electoral system of the countries, having aggregated the official electoral results as a data basis, which are available on the websites of the electoral management bodies of both countries. The analysis interval comprehends the years of 1990 and 2011, the period of transition and democratization of both countries. The comparative approach seeks to understand both cases of study (small $n = 2$), as suggested by Landman (2008) and Franzese (2007), that tried to include endogeneity and contextual conditionalisms, such as: social structure of politics, social and political gaps, political institutions and the type of electoral and party systems of Mozambique and Zambia. Therefore, the article is structured like this: on the second section we realize a discussion on the dynamics of the processes of transition and democratization in Africa; on the third section we present the historical trajectory and social structure of democratization; on the fourth section we discuss the political and electoral competition of both countries according to a compared perspective; and, finally, on the last section, we present the final considerations.

**Political dynamics and the transition for democracy in Africa**

According to Jibrin Ibrahim (1997, 124):

[...] between the essential characteristics of the democratic transition figure the constitutional authority, the multiparty, but equally a much deeper sociocultural transformation, allowing the free elected dirigent team and the majority of civil population to make prevail its primacy in relation with military oligarchies, ethnic and regionalist groups and/or the nomenclature [...].

On the perspective of Furtado (1997: 1998), the democratization of societies and states is today on the agenda and, by the end of the 80s, there was a robust movement of democratization that, somehow, moved African countries. Besides external or international factors being important, the historical and structural conditioners endogenous to African countries during the democratization process can not be denied. This discussion is developed by Wiseman (1997) and Visentini (2006), that explain that the
collapse of communism in USSR and the end of Cold War created new opportunities for the political transition to democracy due to the end of competition between East and West, which either supported or protected authoritarian regimes in Africa.

Sahr (1992) explains that General Obasanjo, reformed chief of State in Nigeria, spoke on the Forum of African Leaders of 1990 that:

[...] the changes that are happening on East Europe have enormous implications to the Third World in general and to Africa in particular. The winds that overthrew dictatorships, autocratic regimes, outdated economic systems, and promoted democratic transition and the respect for human rights, are not unknown in Africa. The winds of change on East Europe are bringing numerous opportunities to african people, so that they intensify their fight for democracy [...] (Sahr 1992; Pavia s.d., 5).

Two historical moments had consequences over all Africa. On the endogenous level, first, there was the situation of Benin (1990), on the National Conference of the Active Forces of the Nation, summoned by the one-party system to start developing constitutional reforms which aimed to restore of some sort of legitimacy to the regime, opposing the takeover of power by force. A second event was the situation in South Africa, when the president Frederik de Klerk legalized the African National Congress (ANC) and freed Nelson Mandela from prison (1990), beginning the democratic transition on the country (Pavia s.d.; Southall 2003; Wantchekon and Jensen 2004).

On the exogenous level, Phiri and Macheve (2015) illustrate that the negotiations that led to the end of the conflict on the post-Cold War era coincided with the Third Democratic Wave (Huntington 1991; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). In empirical terms, after six years (from 1989 to 1994), a wave of democratic transitions crossed the whole of Africa (Southall 2003, 9). In this period, about 40 african countries went through multiparty elections, and in many of these there were effective changes of political regime. Between them there were, for example, South Africa, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, San-Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Tanzania and Zambia.
Whitehead (2001, 4), on his analysis on democratization and the transition process, associate such processes to the international dimension, and proposes to study them from three categories: the Contagion, the Control and the Consent. The first category, *Contagion*, that the author calls domino effect, is the propagation of the experience of one country to others by a non coercive and non intentional way. Whitehead shows then two ways that this process occurred during the second half of the 20th Century (from 1950). There was the so called contagion by proximity, experienced in Europe during the end of World War 2: France, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Germany, Austria and Italy. All of these countries experienced contagion in an interval of five years. Secondly, there was the 1989 series, containing countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, each one in an interval of one year. Various african countries participated of this cycle as well: Namibia, Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, also in an interval of five years (1990-94).

Mozambique and Zambia were influenced by the contagion effect of South Africa, that is, it can be assured that the political developments on
South Africa, a regional power, and the liberation of Nelson Mandela, as well as the legalization of the African National Congress (ANC) party, and, finally, the acceptance of the principle of universal suffragium, that lead to the realization of the first multiracial elections in South Africa, in April 1994, and to the constitution of a government led by Nelson Mandela, had a contagion effect in Mozambique and Zambia (Pavia s.d., 7).

The second dimension is control. For Whitehead (2001), this category is related to the promotion of the idea of democracy on an intentional way, using explicit measures that can, on one hand, encourage and, on the other, penalize. The example of this second dimension occurred in Southern Africa, that since 1989 experienced pressure for global powers such as USA, Great Britain, France and other, through its political and economic programs: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). When they achieved their expected results, many countries were led to a national reconciliation and to the democratization (Darrnholf 1997; Olk 2003; Southall 2003). Finally, the third category, consent, the most recent one, is adapted to a situation of consolidation of democracy that involves a set of interactions between international processes and national groups, resulting on the production of new democratic norms and expectations in a vertical way (from the bottom to the top), that Whitehead (2001) considers according to four aspects:

1st. The territorial limits of the successive democratizations and its consequences to the alliance systems established; 2nd. The main international structures that tend to generate consent concerning the change of regime; 3rd. The ways how authentic democratic and national actors can be constituted from transnational groups relatively diffuse; 4th. The role of international demonstration effects [...] (Whitehead 2001, 12)

O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) propose that democratic transition occurs in three phases: liberation, democratization and consolidation. These stages must be understood according to this: liberations means the moment of fall of the authoritarian regime; democratization happens during the process of construction of the political system and of democratic guarantees; and consolidation concerns democratic plenitude. On this study, we consider that transition to democracy is comprehended in the interval between a non democratic and a democratic regime (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Horowitz 1991; Olk 2003), because the first assumption of the transition theories is that democratization is not a situation, but a
process that can be temporarily long.

Historical Trajectory and Social Structure of Democratization in Mozambique and Zambia

Transition to multiparty democracy in Mozambique

Mozambique, as a country, resulted from the war against its colonizer (Portugal), carried out by FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) between 1964 and 1974. This process was helped by the socialist oriented basis left on the newly independent Tanzania, and soon FRELIMO established its central basis on Mueda between the sympathizers of the makonde populations (De Brito 1995; Terenciano and Souza 2015; Terenciano 2016). With military support from China, USSR and other countries of the East Block, the Front had expelled the portuguese from substantial zones of the setentrional provinces of Tete, Niassa and Cabo Delgado. The military coup of 1974 in Lisbon overthrew Marcelo Caetano and gave space to Mozambique’s independence, in 1975, under FRELIMO’s power (Pitcher 2002; Manning 2002; Pitcher 2004; Terenciano and Souxa 2015; Terenciano 2016). The socialist orientation of FRELIMO was consolidated in 1977, with the official adoption of marxism-leninism by the party. Under the leadership of the liberation movement (FRELIMO), independent Mozambique became a one-party socialist state based on the principles of democratic centralism and on a political-administrative system highly hierarchized.

The political and electoral history of Mozambique was instituted by elections in a context of a one-party system (Lavroff 1975; Hayward 1987; Southall 2003). In 1977 the first elections were realized, in the context of a one-party system, to choose members from the Popular Congress. They should be elected by popular choice through a plebiscite, however the chosen ones should be accepted by the ruling party, in that case FRELIMO. Somehow, the choices or simply the indications came from FRELIMO, that considered itself a state-party. A similar situation occurred in 1986, once more through elections and also in the context of one party, with the election of members for the Popular Congress, which process was similar to the one in 1977, except for some singularities (José 2005; Nuvunga 2007; Terenciano et al 2015)5.

5 In 1986, despite having held elections in 1977, especially in the election of the members of the People’s Assembly, there was some slight change. For example, the very choice of members to make up the seats in the People’s Assembly was based on indirect elections based on rallies across the country.
During the period of governance of the state-party with a marxist view, Pitcher (2004), Manning (2002) and Terenciano (2016) explain that there was a period of crisis and transition, as well as occasional changes of the socialist model of governance, at the same time that the socialist government fought for its survival on the conflict against the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO)\(^6\). The RENAMO movement emerged in 1976, against the centralised power of FRELIMO, which leaders like André Mantsangaisa, Urias Simango and others organized since then an intense resistance against FRELIMO authoritarian power. RENAMO emerged:

[...]

Trying to solve these problems, the government led by FRELIMO began a process of economic reform, that was followed by political liberalization. This passage is illustrated by the 5th Congress Party, in 1989, when FRELIMO abandoned its marxist-leninist ideology and became a party with a wider front. The explanation was that, from that moment on, there was the possibility of an opening so the structural conditions could finally follow the capitalist system. And the enduring opponent of FRELIMO during civil war, RENAMO, signed a General Peace Agreement (GPA) with FRELIMO in 1992 and started to consolidate itself as a political party to run the first elections of 1994, which FRELIMO won with 44% of the votes for Republic’s Assembly, however RENAMO became the greater opposition force, achieving 38% of the votes on the legislative elections (Manning 2002; Phiri and Macheve 2015; Terenciano 2016; Visentini 2016).

However, after the first elections of 1994, RENAMO violated GPA terms. On the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1999, two candidates ran the elections. from FRELIMO party and RENAMO-UE\(^7\). The

\(^6\) For Dias (2012), Mozambique’s democratization process culminated in the peace-building process that ended with nearly two decades of war. Following independence, the FRELIMO party-state failed to coalesce the different yearnings and groups, culminating in the civil war between RENAMO and FRELIMO.

\(^7\) RENAMO-UE was a coalition of several opposition parties, with a double perception: for the small parties, it meant the opportunity to get parliamentary seats or to influence the
party on power, FRELIMO, was accused of manipulation of votes and lack of transparency, leading RENAMO to complain about the voting count rules (Pitcher 2004; Manning 2002; Macuane 2010; Phiri and Macheve 2004; Visentini 2016).

Transition and multiparty in 2D (two dimensions) in Zambia

An explanation of Ali Mazrui, on the history of Africa (2010), points out that Zambia, then North Rhodesia, was administered by the British South Africa Company, at the time it became United Kingdom’s domain. In 1953, the two Rhodesias (North and South) merged with the british colony of Nyasaland (current Malawi) and created the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa, under british custody. In 1963 the federation dissolved and, in the next year, the old North Rhodesia becomes independent under the name of Zambia, turning itself into a Republic, a unit state governed by a president and a unicameral National Assembly, within the molds of multiparty democracy. However, the first president was Kenneth Kaunda, from the United National Independence Party (UNIP) (Kabemba 2004).

The post-independence history of Zambia has some singularities that make it different from the other countries of Southern Africa. First, because there was no armed conflict before and after the colonial era. Second, a great part of the protest against the direct administration of the british government used no violence, despite some recurrent episodes of social agitation. Historically, it has been proved that there was a tendency of resistance of some residents to the colonial administration on the Gwembe Valley in 1958, as well as the severe outbreaks of indiscipline between students in 1960 and rural inhabitants between july and august of 1961.

Again, Zambia differs from many countries of South Africa, since there were two principal liberation movements, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the Zambian African National Congress (ZANC), that, in the years near independence, united and organized popular protests against the british domination. After independence, both parties were part of the multiparty election to the Legislative Assembly and the presidential post (Rasmussen 1974; Sanches 2014). UNIP was founded in 1959 by the nationalists Mainza Chona and Kenneth Kaunda, with this one later being president of the country. Kabemba and Eiseman (2004) illustrate that the history of Zambia and other african countries, after independence,
experimented multiparty (Hyden and Leys 1972; Lavroff 1975; Darnholf 1997), where opposition parties were authorised to participate of the political and electoral competition (Olk 2003; Southall 2003).

During the elections of independent Zambia, in 1964, UNIP of Kenneth Kaunda won, having 55 of the 65 parliamentary seats. The configuration of parliament included two minor parties, namely ZANC and Federal Party Unit (FPU). Besides the UNIP domination on the county’s political field, Zambia had a vibrant democracy until 1972, when UNIP’s political leadership chose a one-party State, following the socialist model of governance. The same way, there was the conviction that, with the one-party model, it would be possible to deal with the raising division of the society based on the ethnical divisions of the country (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004). With the adoption of the one-party system, the country’s president was the head of state and government, like most countries of this region of Africa8. The one-party system, legally instituted from 1973’s Constitution, gave wide powers to the president. For example, he was above any other political authority, and in certain circumstances the tribunals had the power to question his actions and declare them licit or illicit. The parliament had only the duty to legislate.

Both parties (UNIP and ZANC), especially the second one, which members were known for their party discipline on parliament, provided a multiparty democracy in Zambia, and increased the prestige and reputation of the zambian parliament. On the parliament, where govern party members approved everything and never questioned the government, the members of the opposition party, ZANC, played an important role by making effective bargains and parliamentary negotiations under the one-party multiparty system. What happened in Zambia was that the opposition kept itself continually into parliament, as well as occupying some ministries, similarly to what happens in presidentialism or parliamentary coalition systems (Mainwaring 1993; Ames 2003; Elgie 2005; Power 2015).

Return of the single party: was it a break from multiparty?

Considering the political and historical trajectory of the country, Kabemba and Eiseman (2004) explain that the introduction of a one-party state, in 1972, killed the young and vibrant zambian democracy, initiated right after the independence in 1964. There were several factors, during the 60s and the beginning of the 70s, that weakened the ideal and

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8 For more details, and in a comparative way, see Sartori, G. 290-291. The author compares political and party systems in Africa after independence, including Zambia.
democratic principles of a liberal democracy consecrated on the state and the 1964 Constitution. However, for these authors, the main reason for the introduction of democracy in one party was the ability to deal with the rising division of society, based on ethnical and tribal divisions in the country.

In early 1970, the government and the inability of UNIP to deal with political divisions on the country, especially on UNIP, convinced president Kaunda that the moment to introduce the one-party state had arrived. The new constitution of 1973 turned UNIP into the only legal party of Zambia, governing the country for 17 years (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004). In these terms, UNIP claimed that it was a one-party state, but still a democracy where people could participate. The biggest challenge for this affirmation came when people had to elect their representatives.

Even though the country was no longer a multiparty democracy in 1972, it was still a one-party participative democracy, which meant that people could participate of elections to choose their leaders. The electoral competition, especially for legislative and local elections, remained elevated, but the same did not apply to the presidential election, where there was no effective competition. It is important to emphasize that, after two decades of one-party regime (1972-1991), Zambia went back to multiparty democracy, with the 1991 elections.

Political-democratic transition and the return to multiparty in Zambia after 1991

The third wave democratization, that is, the democratic transition of the second half of 20th century, was studied many times, highlighting the ones made by O’donnell and Schmitter (1986), Huntington (1991) and Carothes (2002). However, the events on Eastern Europe agitated and influenced the latent movements for democracy in Africa, that somehow created general demands for what is now called political pluralism (Darnholf 1997; Olk 2003; Sothall 2003).

In the end of 1989 and beginning of 1990, new movements were started by men and women in many countries of the continent (Olk, op. cit.; Wantchekon and Jensen 2004), and it was in this period that a new party emerged in Zambia, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Besides having started as a broad based pro-democracy movement, integrating trade unions and students and being supported by Church, MMD became a political party and won on the multiparty elections of

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9 Kabemba and Eiseman (2004) criticise the belief that this system allowed the choice between representatives. In a real democracy, people should be able to choose their governors without fear or interference, and that did not happen in Zambia.
1991. These elections were won by MMD, that substituted UNIP, and MMD leader, Frederik Chiluba, former union leader, was elected president. MMD got 131 of the 150 seats in parliament, reducing UNIP to dozens of parliamentarians on the country, and its presidential candidate won presidency with a majoritary victory. It is important to emphasize that MMD had more than two thirds of the National Assembly’s seats, therefore, the first government had the power to change the Constitution in a unilateral way. Taking advantage of this situation, MMD introduced in 1995 some cosmetic alterations on the Constitution, which marked the 3rd Republic in Zambia since independence\textsuperscript{10}.

Political-electoral competition in comparison: the cases of Mozambique and Zambia

The path followed by both countries had differences and similarities. Considering the historical trajectory, the colonial heritage and the social structure of democratization itself, it can be affirmed that post-independence Mozambique implemented the one-party regime – with FRELIMO –, that followed governance with a socialist view, centralizing politics and economy on the hands of state and having control over all segments of society. Differently, post-independence Zambia had a multiparty democracy system with competitive elections, and, later, introduced the one-party regime with UNIP. Just like we showed the differences between the countries, it was essential to search for colonial heritage in both countries, which was fundamental to structure african countries as a whole. Table 1 describes in a comparative perspective the political system and the electoral and political competition shape on both countries (Zambia and Mozambique) since independence. In practical terms, we can see that both countries have initial party systems, one-party and multiparty, and, after redemocratization, a multiparty system that started to emerge from endogenous groups from governing parties. This path coincided with the social and economic crisis that both countries went through, added to the external requirements deriving from the end of Cold War and the predominance of United Nations with its adjustment programs (WB and IMF), as well as the end of apartheid

\textsuperscript{10} As Kabemba and Eiseman (2004) explain, the intention of changing the Constitution was clear. It was verified that one of the changes explained that anyone who desires to be a candidate for presidency should prove that his parents were zambian. That rule was certainly perceived by many as an attempt to prevent the candidature of Kaunda, whose father was born in Malawi. Besides that, no one should be a candidate if his parents had not lived in Zambia for at least twenty years. This second rule aimed the Zambian Democratic Congress and its leader, Mungomba.
in South Africa (Olk 2003; Southall 2003; Nuvunga 2007; Pavia s.d). Thus, both Mozambique and Zambia had the urge to create new Constitutions and institutional arrangements, that redesigned the political and institutional framework to a electoral and political system that enabled democratic and multiparty participation of all society segments.

Both countries had different trajectories and their electoral and political system follow this structure because of two reasons. First, the fact that Mozambique had its first experience in multiparty electoral processes in the 90s, specifically in 1994. Second, Zambia, differently, already had a multiparty experience in 1964 and 1968, that returned in 1991. We emphasize that both countries had experienced one-party systems, with differences during the adoption moments. In the case of Mozambique, the one-party system follow the logic of many countries of Lusophone Africa, highlighting Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau and Saint Thomas and Prince, where the guerrilla movements that fought for independence named themselves responsible for the people. In the case of Zambia, the one-party system was introduced from the influence of the radical wing of UNIP (Scarritt 2007 and 2012). That is, inside the party, some segments

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<th>Table 1 - Party and electoral system of Mozambique and Zambia (1991-2014)</th>
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<td><strong>Mozambique</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Electoral System</strong></td>
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<td>- Proportional representation for parliament; closed list with districts that vary its magnitude: there are 250 parliamentary seats. On the districts with bigger electoral magnitude, the seat distribution varies from 49 to 52. The ones with smaller magnitude vary from 10 to 14 seats;</td>
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<td>- Majority of two turns for president (there is no second round in case a candidate gets 50% + 1 vote);</td>
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<td><strong>Shape of the party competition</strong></td>
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<td>- Tendency of almost two parties and a half (1994; 2009 and 2014).</td>
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convinced Kenneth Kaunda that the moment to introduce and build a one-party state had arrived. As Kabemba and Eiseman (2004) note, the legal adoption of the one-party system aimed to control the rising fragmentation of the country because of its tribal and ethnic divisions.

In terms of political participation, both cases show that there was popular participation on the choice for members of the parliament, even during one-party periods. This is illustrated by the realisation of elections, where people participated of the choice of its representatives, but according to the state-party logic, that is, even though people participated, the final choice still remained to the state-party. In Mozambique, the political and electoral history shows that, even in the situations where the population chose a certain representative, if FRELIMO believed that he did not shared the same ideals with the revolution, he was not chosen. This occurred, for example, in the elections of 1977 and 1986, in the province of Nampula, district of Érati, according to depositions available on the book “The origins of war in Mozambique”, from Geffray (1992).

Mozambique and Zambia, despite their differences on electoral and political processes, have shown that, since the realization of multiparty elections on early 90s, they are considerably evolving when it comes to electoral democracy parameters. Besides the difficulties and problems inherent to mistrust between opposition and the party on power (Donge 2006; Pithcer 2004), there is no interdiction and not much violence during the electoral processes. Until now, Mozambique realized five general elections for president and deputies and four local plebs, to municipal representatives. Zambia had seven electoral experiences of multiparty democracy, for presidential and legislative elections, including in this list the elections of 1964 and 1968, considered multiparty.

Dynamics of the political-electoral competition on both countries

In this study, for theoretical and methodological purposes, electoral competition is evaluated from election to election, as a way to avoid generalizations that can skew our general analysis of the competition format. From a contextual analysis and considering the contextual conditionalisms, our goal is to evaluate political competition from the electoral results of each election, considering the number of parties on parliament and the alternance of power. However, we verified the most general tendencies postulated by Duverger (1954) and Sartori (1982) about parties and electoral competition, in their relation with the party systems (pre)dominant – bipartisan and
multiparty – verified in each electoral process in both cases.

In Mozambique, since the first elections of 1994, there was a tendency to bipartisan. The studies from the decade of 1990 (De Brito 1995; Pereira 1996) illustrated that Mozambique was a bipartisan system. However, in our analysis, this assumption does not affirm itself, since the typical characteristics of a bipartisan system, from a theoretical point of view, do not fit in Mozambique. Why? In principle, the bipartisan system has undeniably two parties that are in competition for an absolute majority, that is within reach of both (Rae 1967; Sartori 1982; Tavares 1994). And the bipartisan system presents various parties, but only two where the electoral force distributes itself with stable balance, and with probabilities of winning the government through elections. Until then, these theoretical elements would describe Mozambique during its first two elections (1994 and 1999) as bipartisan, however not institutionalized\[11\].

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<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>144</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>89</td>
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<td>UD</td>
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<td>MDM</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Total of seats:</td>
<td>250</td>
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Source: Elaborated by the authors, based on data from CNE 2016.

The ambiguous indication of bipartisan found its limitation because there was neither effective nor partial alternance on power. From the theoretical and empirical point of view, bipartisan tends to party duopoly, that is, two parties dominate the political field and there is effectively alternance on power. However, Sartori (1982) shows that the most important is not effectively power alternance, nut the fact that the opposition party can reasonably expect such alternance. In that case, Mozambique should not have its bipartisan typification denied, because the electoral results of 1994 and 1999 show a equilibration of the electoral force between two of the biggest parties – FRELIMO and RENAMO.

Another author, Rae (1967) shows that bipartisan can be measured from the results of an election, where the first party should necessarily receive almost 70% of the legislative seats and, if conjugated with the second

\[11\] Mozambique has not yet consolidated its party system. Until now, it had five electoral experiences, what shows that it is a short period of time to consolidate the shape of the party system. What can be seen are general tendencies of political and electoral competition.
party, both should have achieved at least 90% of the seats. In a certain way, Mozambique, at least in the elections of 1994, 2009 and 2014, can be considered a bipartisan system, because FRELIMO got more than 70% of the parliamentary seats and, added with RENAMO, it got 90% of the seats. Some survey researches showed that Mozambique was going through the process of changing from a bipartisan system to a two parties and a half system, as indicated by Sartori (1982) and Rae (1967). Thus, it was predicted that RENAMO would lose its space to the new party (Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM). However, the electoral results of 2009 and 2014 showed that the structure of the mozambican political field is loyal and far from redefinition.

Many reasons illustrate the tendency to bipartisan, but it is not less truthful to say that the shape of competition in Mozambique went from an almost bipartisan system to a hegemonic one in 2004. We underline the fact that FRELIMO is the only party in various spheres more important than others, what explains our typification of hegemony. At the same time that FRELIMO always allowed the existence of other satellite parties, the govern monopoly, that is, the central govern, has always been under its wing.

12 It is important to remember that the typification is being made with the idea of FRELIMO’s hegemony. We should be careful to put it into a continuous imaginary line because, effectively in 2004, the FRELIMO party almost constituted a hegemonic party (Forquilha and Orre 2011)
In relation to Zambia, we reiterate the argument that the properties of electoral and political competition, *a priori*, present two dichotomies: it is a system of (pre)dominant party (1991 to 2001) and a competitive and multiparty system (from 2001 elections). It is based on these analytical assumptions (Sartori 1982; Tavares 1994) that we show in this study that, from 2001, there was a tendency to a multiparty system on the typology of Sartori. In this period, what was verified in Zambia was that no party got absolute majority, and the government of the MDM party needed coalitions. In the same way, the electoral results show the tendency to alternance of power, which itself constitute an element for analysis of electoral competitiveness (Scarritt 2012). Since 1991, MMD party wins elections, and it has continuously spreading its influence on the political scene, which culminated on its predominance (1991 to 2011), even with the losses when it comes to parliamentary seats, because of its presidential candidate, who kept winning until 2011 (Donge 2006; Scarritt 2007). UNIP, after losing the elections of 1991, almost disappears from the political scene, returning only in 2011 but with a insignificant political strength\textsuperscript{13}.

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<td>131</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>72</td>
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\textsuperscript{13} In 2011 UNIP started to run for legislative elections again, and the results show that it got 0.69% from the total of the votation, and the presidential candidate from the same party (Tiyenji Kaunda) got 0.36%. Our description here about UNIP is because it was the predominant party from 1964 to 1991, and the only party from 1972 to 1991. After losing the multiparty elections of 1991, the party disappeared from the political map.
UDA   | -   | -   | -   | 27  | -   
NDF   | -   | -   | -   | 1   | -   
ULP   | -   | -   | -   | 2   | -   
ADD   | -   | -   | -   | -   | 1   
Total of seats | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 

Source: Elaborated by the authors, based on data from African Elections Data Base (2016)

The zambian electoral system allows the representativity of almost all parties, what gives them the title of a multiparty system, but, in fact, what happens is the predominance of one, two or three parties, like what happened in 2001 and 2011. In this context, except for MMD, in Zambia, there is a tendency that some parties, relevant or not, disappear from one legislature to other\textsuperscript{14}. With that being said, one of the evident reflexes of the electoral and political competition in Zambia is alternance on power. We should remember that between 1991 and 2011, there was alternance on power (exit of MMD and entrance of the Patriotic Front party). During that period, the electoral competition through representation of different parties on the legislative cycles has increased. This increase is explained by the loss of electoral support from MMD, and propitiated a tight electoral and political competition, typical of almost fragmented multiparty systems.

Conclusions

In this study, we aimed to show that the processes of transition and democratization in Africa present some similarities and singularities. From the point of view of similarities, we point out the historical trajectory of the colonial heritage itself and the social structure of democratization; the singularities were the way that parties went from a one-party non-democratic state to democracies of the end of the 80s. Thus, the political opening of the african countries meant the beginning of the process of transition and implementation of multiparty elections, however, the same cannot be said about Zambia, because, after the country’s independence in 1964, it will experience a multiparty democracy.

From the historical-comparative analysis, it is understood that the institutional choice (government model, electoral system) after the independence of both countries was one of the explanatory factors of the

\textsuperscript{14} This scenario was followed by UNIP (Zambia-AZ), Zambia-AZ (Zambia-Zambia Democratic Congress-Zambia-Zambia Democratic Congress (existed in 1996, disappearing on the scene Policy with greater visibility).
trajectory traveled by political parties. For example, in both countries, even if in different ways, there were experiences of one-party systems (Mozambique: 1975 to 1994 and Zambia: 1972 to 1991), but is effectiveness had a different trajectory. Subsequently, we gave evidence of the internal factors, such as social and economical crisis, that also influenced the process of change of regime and redemocratization on both countries.

There were many reasons for the process of democratization. In the case of Mozambique, the process of political opening and then multiparty elections laureated the state-party FRELIMO, and, in the case of Zambia, the recently formed MMD defeated the then state-party UNIP with great advantage (MMD obtained 76% of the votes against 24% from UNIP). Because of this, Mozambique was able to consolidate its bipartisan system, with tendencies of two parties and a half, while in Zambia its properties emphasized a tendency of domain of MMD, having more than 80% of the seats between 1991 and 1996.

The power alternance was used in this study as one of the indicators to analyse the electoral and political competition. In the case of Mozambique, even with five elections (1994 to 2014), there is still no alternance on power, weakening, that way, one of the dimensions of the bipartisan system. However, in Zambia, 20 years after the realization of (new) multiparty elections, there was alternance. Yet, the electoral competition in Zambia, especially the parliament composition, constitutes itself an indicator of multiparty system. That is the reason why, in this study, we show that, if it is true that Mozambique has a bipartisan system indeed, then it is not less true that, in 2004, Mozambique went through a hegemonic party system. Otherwise, throughout time, Zambia has been a multiparty system, almost fragmented and with constant fluctuations on the parliamentary composition.

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ABSTRACT
This article aims to analyze the processes of democratization and political competition in Africa in two case studies: Mozambique and Zambia. The work of the evidence that democracy is a system that should allow the confrontation of various social and political forces and its legitimacy arises from the recognition of the actors involved in their political processes and election as a whole. Methodologically, the work was developed in a comparative perspective, following the analysis of secondary data available concerning the election results in southern Africa, helped with the theoretical discussion about political history of Africa and of electoral systems and supporters. In the same way, reinterpret data aggregated election, demonstrating the variations along the political competition and partisan in the two cases. Thus, the study concludes that there is a relationship between the historical trajectory and politics and the patterns of electoral competition in both countries, and which have been decisive in the process of transition to democracy. Differently, the two countries have had experiences of single party (Mozambique: 1975 to 1994 and South Africa 1972 to 1991) notwithstanding the process of realization and political openness was differential.

KEYWORDS
Democratization; Elections; Political Competition; Africa.