

REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY OF NAMIBIA: THE AGENCY OF A SECONDARY POWER

Igor Castellano da Silva¹

Introduction

There is a growing concern with the level of regional analysis in International Relations, about the role of regions in the global power distribution and of regional systems as a unity of analysis, which enables theoretical and empirical progresses in the area. Regions of the global South, including Africa, have been one of the most important parts of this process and drive attention from the Brazilian foreign policy and academic communities. However, understanding the evolution of the dynamics of Southern regional systems leaves room to significant advances, including a clearer interpretation about how and why regional systems change and which role foreign policy of systemic units play in this process. Regional studies have focused almost exclusively on the analysis of regional powers and too little on the secondary powers' position of the current orders. Perhaps these analytical difficulties (lack of a *bottom-up* vision of regional relations) influence even in the difficulties of advancing the integration processes in the global South, which recurrently lack representing smaller powers. As has been sustained by recent studies (Castellano da Silva 2015a; 2015b), the Southern Africa's case follows this pattern and the available analyses focus mostly on South Africa, with lack of comprehension about the characteristics and causes of the other systemic units' behavior. Despite the importance to regional and continental relations, little is known about the regional foreign policy of some countries such as Namibia, a secondary power of reduced capabilities, but whose actions significantly affect the dynamics of the region.

In this context, this research attempts to answer how the regional foreign policy of Namibia has evolved in relation to the regional system's

¹ Social and Human Sciences Centre (CCSH), Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM), Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. E-mail: igor.castellano@gmail.com

order since 1990 (year of its independence). More specifically, what explains the Namibian foreign policy facing the regional order established between 1990 and 2010? Evaluating Namibia's role in the Southern Africa's international relations is crucial to understanding the magnitude of the challenges faced by the regional order centralized in South Africa and the areas of action available to secondary powers. Namibia's history marks the transformations of regional dynamics, since the conflicts over its independence were in the core of the dispute in the content of the regional order, centered in South Africa.

This article analyzes the recent foreign policy of independent Namibia, but also seeks to prospect Namibia's regional position as a colony (*South West Africa*) and the formation of the State structures and of its pre-independence foreign policy. Before its independence, Namibia was a colonial State, ruled by Pretoria with a foreign policy contested by South Africa. The later commanded Namibia's security forces and its State structures since 1951; the UN (United Nations), which sought to take over the supervision from the former League of Nations mandate and negotiate the country's independence; and the national liberation movements, as SWAPO (*South- West Africa People's Organization*), which fought to assure that South Africa would give in to the decolonization pressures. The victory of these two later actors, together, contributed to the Namibian policy characteristics in the post- independence. On one hand, the SWAPO's government aligned, in the domestic sphere, to the political principles of the liberal regional order. On the other, it sought a relatively developmentist regional foreign policy, also supportive of the former regional allies of the revolutionary axis (Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique). The impetus of action of these policies varied according to domestic and external pressures that the defining elite of foreign policy experienced in the period, tending, nowadays, to more restrained actions.

The argument here sustained is that we can understand the regional foreign policy of regional powers or of secondary powers by country's position in favor of the continuity or change of the systemic order and its action impetus to achieving this project. The regional foreign policy, however, is a consequence of a complex process of State building, in which defining elites of foreign policy (DEFP) will seek to accomplish their political projects and will respond to domestic and external pressures according to the available capabilities of the state².

2. The analytical model adopted by this study stresses the role of State building as a factor of change in the regional system. One of the ways in which this process influences the regional system is regarding to the foreign policy of the systemic units. States act according to established systemic orders (formal and informal institutions that sustain the behaviors'

The first section of the article approaches Namibia's domestic and foreign policy in the context of the regional order between 1975 and 1990, highlighting the State building process (context, State capacities and State-society relations) and the evaluation of the pre-independence foreign policy over three competing actors (South Africa, the UN and SWAPO). The second section identifies changes in the process of State building in relation to the mentioned variables, for the period from 1990 to 2010. It also evaluates Namibia's foreign policy in face of the new regional order, regarding formation (political project of the DEFP and its security in face of domestic and external pressures) and performance (Namibia's position in relation to the *status quo* and its urge for action in the system). The conclusion brings a synthesis of the results, which compose a broader study involving the foreign policy in Southern Africa's regional system (Castellano da Silva 2015a).

Pre-State, elites and foreign policy in Namibia (1975- 1990)

The Southern Africa's regional system order, while shaping itself since the beginning of the 20th century, has gradually been centered on South Africa and sustained in four basic pillars, maintained until the decline of the *apartheid* in the end of the 1980s³. In the political pillar, the conservative order was based in the colonial system heritage, in the territorial *status quo* and in the principle of sovereignty defense by the State's means, through a governance centralized in the stronger States. In the economic field, conservatism (protectionism and mercantilism) combined with liberalism, since the later favored the centralism of South Africa's position. This centrality was sustained by (infrastructural) logistic and financial

rules and the benefits' distributions in the system) according to the interests of their DEFP and the pressures (threats and power asymmetry) their experience domestically and internationally. Although available natural resources and foreign support help the acting capacities of some States, the effective State's capacities that are available to the ruling elites regarding coercion, capital and legitimacy will define the sustainability of the external action and the conditions of exploitation of resources available in the society (Castellano da Silva 2015a).

3 For analytical purposes, systemic orders may be evaluated on the political, economic, social and security fields. The political order's basis involves values, norms and institutions that rule the territorial distribution of the system, the principles that rule the diplomatic relations and the assurance of the political survive of the States. The economic basis is related to the values, norms and institutions that rule the content of the economic relations (trade and flow of goods and services principle). The social basis indicates values, norms and institutions linked to the content of social relations and to the established priority to different kinds of regional population's rights. The security basis relates to values, norms and institutions that rule the organization and behavior over the security's content.

axis, and trading relations based on Rand's economic polo. In the social pillar, the conservative order was based in the sociocultural domination by elites that were linked to the colonial project and part of discriminatory and segregationist systems. In the security area, the national security rule was maintained, with special attention to security challenges produced by national liberation movements. The independence of regional revisionist countries in the 1960s, 1970s (Angola and Mozambique) and 1980s (Zimbabwe) represented the increasing claim against the order centered in South Africa. Namibia, therefore, was a key element in the South-African policy of conservative regional order defense centered in Pretoria. On one hand, it served as a colonial bastion that protected South Africa of its main regional rival (Angola). On the other, it attracted regional and extra regional pressures to the Southwestern Africa's cruel national liberation fight. These characteristics were fundamental to Namibia's State formation, as well as to its foreign policy before and after the independence.

Construction of Namibia's colonial State (1975-1990)

Namibia's recent history is different from the one followed by its neighbors. Since 1975, the Southern African countries were political independent; they had a central government which claimed control over a population and a territory. The legitimacy of these governments varied from case to case, but all of them had experienced difficulties of establishing the State and the region's domain over the national population, besides facing several international pressures. Ian Smith's Republic of Rhodesia and the South-African *apartheid* were received with great opposition from the international community, which claimed for peaceful domestic transition processes and for the guarantee of liberal rights (civil and political) to the part of the population without access to them. Besides, insurgent groups that, peacefully or violently, sought the State's reconstruction over more democratic and representative structures rivaled them both⁴. In a lower extent, the regimes of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), in Angola, and the FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), in Mozambique, had similar problems of establishing their domain and faced rivalries of domestic groups that were against the central governments and that violently claimed for political change, with foreign support. Namibia, as its neighbors, had groups politically articulated and internationally supported. These groups fought for the State's transformation and, as

⁴ These cases were usually known as domestic colonialism, given the characteristic of the central governments, the dominant elites (originated from the colonial pact) and the violence used in the political, economic and social domination over the local (non-white) population.

Rhodesia and South Africa, sought for a guarantee of rights for a population excluded from the political, economic and social fields. However, on the contrary of all the other cases, Namibia wasn't sovereign. As *South West Africa* (SWA), it was a territory illegally occupied by South Africa without an independent government, nor effective armed forces to assure its existence empirically. It was, therefore, effectively a South-African colony.

For this reason, the analysis of the relation between the State, elites and foreign policy of Namibia before 1990 (year of its independence) will deter only in the relevant points, useful for the comprehension of its foreign policy as an independent nation. On the other hand, the "Namibia's issue", as it was called when referring to the fight for the Southwest Africa's independence, was in the center of the international relations of Southern African between 1975 and 1988, and its main points must be highlighted to understand the social agency of a population, even without supervision by the State's structures. On this aspect, the foreign policy main focus becomes no longer the State, but other social organizations, which challenge the State's power and, eventually, are successful. In this case, it is important to evaluate specifically SWAPO's actions as leadership of the fight for independence and basic institution of the future State structures.

Namibia's occupation by South Africa had begun when the United Kingdom delegated the territory's administration to the South Africa's Union, as a part of the mandate obtained in the League of Nations, after the conquest of the territory by South-African troops in 1915. Before, SWA was part of the German colonial empire, which occupied the territory at first in 1884, as a protectorate. The result of the First World War assured the dissolution of the Turkish-Ottoman and German empires and the establishment of the mandate systems in the League of Nations (LN), which sought to guarantee assistance in the territories' administration. This should be done in favor of the local populations. The establishment of the government by the South Africa's Union in face of the type "C" mandate (to be ruled as an integral part of South Africa) in the SWA was marked by segregationist policies, discriminatory and oppressor legislation, and economic exploitation of the local population (Pisani 1985). The situation, in practice, represented a violation of the terms of the League of Nations' mandate (Mushelenga 2014, 58).

With the end of the Second World War and with the speech of the victory of the free world over imperialist totalitarianism, the colonialism was no longer sustainable, especially in face of the ideals of self-determination. The League of Nations' mandate had expired and should be passed to the UN's tutelage until Namibia's independence. However, the South-African government tried to assure the incorporation of the Namibian territory and

of its population to the Union, as its fifth province. The UN's opposition to the veiled South-African colonialism, materialized in the territorial expansion, led to the international clash that persisted until the end of the 1980s. The domestic and international pressures for independence started to grow as fast as the territory's strategic importance to South Africa and to the Western countries in the context of the Cold War. Besides strategically located in the South Atlantic (emphasis to the important harbor of Walvis Bay⁵) the country served as a strategic source of diamonds and uranium. After 1975 and 1980, it was used as the last protective belt against the presence of revisionist states in the South-African boundaries (in this case, the most threatening of them, Angola, including the Cuban troops that were established there). Finally, due to the regional policy configuration, it was signed, in 1988, the Tripartite Accord of New York, the South-African acceptance of Namibia's independence, prepared in 1989 and accomplished on March, 1990.

State capacity: coercion, capital and legitimacy

The State in SWA was built by South Africa with plans of incorporating the territory as its fifth province. Until the early 1970s, the basic objective was to transfer the social political system of the *apartheid* to the colony, seeking with this to incorporate it easily. Gradually, were adopted segregationist legislations, grounded in the non-white population's control and in the impoverishment of the rural sector, as a means to assure cheap labor to the urban economy in Namibia and in South Africa. In 1949, South Africa withdrew the main legislative powers of the general government chosen by the United Kingdom and transferred them to the South-African Parliament. To the white (at that time 10% of the population) was given the right of electing six representatives in the Parliament. In 1954, the responsibility for the native affairs was removed of the white local administrations and established under the *Minister of Bantu Administration and Development*. Despite increasing international pressure, the South-African government initially kept the annexation policy. In 1962, it established the *Odendaal Commission* that, formally, tried to investigate welfare policies to the SWA's population, but, in practice, recommended greater South African interference. The result was the justification to absorb more of administrative functions that were still over local control

⁵ It is the Namibia's only deep waters harbor and used as a South African base for military training. The territory was already an enclave belonged to the United Kingdom, separated from the German protectorate. In 1922, South Africa integrated the enclave to SWA's territory and in 1978 proclaimed a national law that formally annexed the harbor to South Africa.

(e.g. education) and the implementation of a development policy separated from ethnic groups in the same configuration of the Bantustans.

The tasks of State's coercion were centered in the repression of liberation movements that emerged in the end of the 1950s and which responded increasingly with violence. From May 1980, the counterinsurgency actions, until then ruled by the police forces and SADF (*South African Defense Force*) units that acted in the SWA, were transferred with priority to the new force *South West Defense* of SWA, under the command of the General Administrator⁶. In the capital sphere, the subsistence agriculture and the still incipient industry created a large economic dependency on South-African manufacturing goods, as well as its food. The dependency repeated itself in the ores' exports; the main source of the income was from the diamonds and the uranium in Rössing (Grotperter 1994, 117-118). Finally, the State's legitimacy was guaranteed by the double policy of incorporation of white settlers and coopting of local leaderships. On one hand, the incorporation of white elites had the purpose of weakening the autonomous administrative and political structures of the territory. The white conservative inhabitants of the territory also pressured South Africa for policies that would assure them their protection in face of the black and communist 'threat'. On the other hand, Pretoria tried to control the rising of political aspirations of the local people against the ethnic element and the creation of legislative bodies that would assure the self-determination in a slow, gradual and controlled way (Jaster 1985).

The State-society relations

The State-society relations were marked by the South-African *apartheid* regime's control over the institutions. The elite who defined Namibia's policy was the same conservative elite that had controlled South-African policy since 1948 and that sought to assure privileged political and economic positions to the white community of European origins. The growing opposition to its domain came from movements raised next to African populations that worked out of the country or in the *locations* (peripheral urban zones). The *Ovamboland People's Organization* (OPO) came from the leadership of *ovambo* workers who operated in Cape

⁶ The forces were composed of about 20 thousand troops in the early 1980s (ten thousand men in ethnic and multiethnic units, commanded by 10 thousand Namibian white men). They were responsible for 65% of the counterinsurgency operations including SWA, still coordinated by the SADF. The *South West African Police*, created in 1981, with approximately eight thousand men, assisted the SWATF in the paramilitary operations (Grotperter 1994, 492-494).

Town and organized themselves around the labor agenda and the ideal of independence. After the arrest of its leader, Hermann (Adimba) Toivo ya Toivo, by security forces, Sam Nujoma took over the group's presidency and chose to turn it in SWAPO in 1960, something that would break with the ethnic essentialism and expand the nationalism ideal to the entire population of Namibia (Schoeman and Schoeman 1997, xxviii). Another relevant party was created in 1959 by the encouragement of the *herero* and *nama* chiefs' representatives: the *South West Africa National Union* (SWANU), by the leadership of Jariretundu Kozonguizi, and as an association of OPO's leaderships and the urban movement *South West Africa Progressive Association* (SWAPA) (Pisani 1985, 145-150). Nevertheless, the nationalist and pan-African agenda in the SWAPO and its strategy of articulating international credibility gave political strength to the group, which ended recognized as the only legitimate representative of Namibia's people by the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) and by the UN. However, the insufficiencies in the mediations led by the UN forced the group to adopt the armed struggle and to create the PLAN (*People's Liberation Army of Namibia*) after 1966, due to a polemic decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as shown below. The first shock against the security forces happened in Omugulugwombashe, on August 26, 1968, and tensions multiplied in the following years (Zaire 2014, 43).

After 1971, South Africa realized its administration over the territory could not be maintained indefinitely, due to international pressures for independence. Therefore, B. J. Vorster abandoned the annexation notion, and, from that moment on, sought to guarantee the control over the country's transition (Jaster 1985, 7)⁷. Internally, the government sought to recruit groups supported in the controlled transition process. Turnhalle's solution from 1975 aimed to divide the political representation of the population in ethnic groups and to assure significant representation to the white people⁸.

7 It prioritized (i) a domestic agreement based on the cooptation of native leaderships under the ethnic organization who might guarantee exceptional rights to the white minority; (ii) to assure control of the general elections, under UN pressures, in case the intern agreement wasn't accepted; and (iii) to postpone as much as it was possible the conditions for independence, increasing gains during the diplomatic bargain (between them, the territory control of Walvis Bay, the marginalization and deterioration of SWAPO and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from southern Africa).

8 In September of 1975, Vorster organized a Constitutional Conference in the Turnhalle building, in Windhoek. Moderated leaders of the country's eleven ethnic groups were invited as delegates, including white ones, to discuss the formulation of a Constitution and the establishment of an interim government that would lead Namibia to its independency. No national liberation party was represented, even SWAPO. The intention was to ensure that the political activity of blacks was limited to their political ethnic communities and that the segregated space was maintained and guaranteed to the whites. After 18 months, the

The solution was opposed by the UN and had to be replaced by plans of a large election and of formation of a Constituent Assembly, supervised by the United Nations. Nonetheless, the rise to power of P. W. Botha and the extreme conservative right wing in South Africa; the emergency of revisionist regimes (Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe) in the region; the presence of Cuban troops; and the increase of armed actions by the SWAPO led the *apartheid* regime to suppress the UN's role and to look for intern solutions, in addition to the increase counterinsurgency actions. The rising of Reagan's government in the US contributed to South Africa postponing the country's independence, ignoring what was disposed in the resolution 435 of 1978 (see below). Only with the mitigation of Angola's conflict and the victory of North-American *linkage* policy (exit of Cuban troops in exchange for Namibia's independence), Pretoria enabled Namibia's intern transition, which was supervised by the UN, as determined by the resolution from a decade earlier.

Formation of the Regional Foreign Policy of Namibia

Three fundamental actors contributed to the foreign policy of SWA/Namibia before its independency. South Africa (the official policy's formulator), the UN (which advocated the right of protection of the territory) and the SWAPO (internationally recognized as the Namibian people's representative).

Namibia's official foreign policy in the period under control of South-African was given by the government in Pretoria, in a way of guaranteeing its position in the regional system and the maintenance of a conservative regional order that would assure the privileges for the *apartheid's* elite. Some factors have contributed for the South-African policy: the characteristics of the State building process, the profile of the foreign policy defining elites and the pressures and threats to their security faced internally and internationally, compared to the spaces they had for action. If Vorster (1966-78) was open to progressive negotiations with the UN in order to achieve a political transition in the country, Botha's (1978-89) policies had hardened the approach. These policies sought, mainly, "[...] to avoid actions in Namibia that might contribute to the alarming erosion of the Afrikaner's support to the National Party in power and that might threaten the chances of this program of limited racial reform at home" (Jaster 1985, 2).

group finished a draft of the Constitution that established political distribution by ethnic criteria (eliminating the possible political domain of the *ovambo* majority) and three legislative chambers. The constitutional committee recommended the creation of an interim government and the independency was scheduled to the end of 1978.

The policy adopted by the UN was influenced by the juridical decisions made by the ICJ and by the mediation of the *Western Contact Group* (WCG). Initially, the UN's position in the discussion with South Africa had been weakened because of the ICJ's reluctant behavior in relation to the subject. In 1950, in answer to the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA)'s consult, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion that affirmed South Africa's mandate and obligation should be maintained. This would happen only with the proviso that the supervisory functions of the LN should be passed to the UN, whose consent would be a precondition for the transformation of the territory's administrative status. As a result, the UN's actions in the 1950 and 1960s were guided by the establishment of advisory committees and by the attempt of building a supervision of the South-African administration in the SWA. However, Pretoria rejected the notion of the UN's supervision⁹. In 1966, a second polemic decision by the ICJ led to more emphatic decisions by the UN¹⁰ and, finally, in 1971 a new ICJ advisory opinion was issued, now declaring that South Africa had violated its mandate over the SWA and understanding as illegal the continuity of its presence in the territory¹¹. The UN actions were taken to the Security Council (UNSC), where the Western countries guaranteed the negotiations' mediation and the actions against South Africa's moderation (which may be seen, for example, in the Western veto in 1975 to punitive measures against the country).

The UNSC positions kept moderated. In 1976, the organism issued resolution 385, which affirmed the realization of elections managed by the UN, the contrary of what Voster was arranging in Turnhalle. On April 7th, 1977, the Western countries, now organized in the WCG¹², delivered a letter to Prime Minister Vorster, condemning the South-African activities in Namibia and demanding (i) free elections (out of Tunhalle's scope), (ii)

9 In 1966, the General Assembly declared that South Africa was failing in guaranteeing the material and moral safety of the local population and, therefore, established the UN's Council for Namibia. The mandate's supervision continued to be blocked by South Africa. However, the Council's administrative personnel started to emit visas by Namibia and to organize conferences using its own name.

10 In 1966, the ICJ did not accept an Ethiopian and Liberian's request of investigation over the abuses practiced by South Africa over the local populations. Both countries were ex-members of LN. However, in the same year, the UN adopted resolution 2145, formally putting an end to the South-African mandate over the territory. Besides, it created a subcommittee to the southwest African, in charge of recommending concrete policies to SWA's independency.

11 Besides, it recommended the immediate removal of the South-African administration and that member states of the UN were to avoid acts that could indicate support to South Africa's occupation (Jaster 1985, 4-7).

12 USA, United Kingdom, France, West Germany and Canada.

the exit of South-African forces and (iii) the release of political prisoners¹³. Finally, the rise of hard line politicians in South Africa in 1978, represented in the figure of P. W. Botha, had reduced the perspective of moderation and acceptance of an agreement that the international community might recognize, consolidated in the resolution 435 of the UNSC, approved one day after his rising as Prime Minister. The resolution planned ceasefire in the liberation fight and supervised elections by the UN, and established the *United Nations Transition Assistance Group* (UNTAG). Nonetheless, Botha blocked the adoption of this resolution for one decade, justifying his policy in the Cuban presence in Angola and in the SWAPO's insurgence actions, supported by Cuba and the MPLA.

It is worth mentioning the importance of the counter-diplomacy established by SWAPO. It turned out to be the only recognized diplomacy by international organizations as Namibia's people representative (in 1972 by the OAU and in 1973 by the UN), besides structuring the international credibility of the new independent State. The SWAPO's diplomacy was mainly based in the heritage of the mobilizations existing since the 1940s which sought to petition the UN's General Assembly (namely to the Fourth Committee of UNGA and to the Southeastern Africa Committee) to report the abuses practiced by South Africa in its mandate in the SWA. The SWAPO's diplomacy took place in the 1960s, with missions in Dar es Salaam, Egypt and Zambia. The role occupied by representatives of the Namibian people in the OAU, MNA and UN also provided international credibility to the organization and a notable differentiation in face to the other organizations, as SWANU.

[...] SWAPO treated its international diplomacy in a more serious way than SWANU and gradually won the competition for the recognition of foreign governments. SWAPO was capable of establishing itself as a dominant Namibian's nationalist organization, since SWANU hadn't launched an armed struggle, and begun to collapse in exile, but also because of the support the diplomats from SWAPO received from the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). (Saunders 2014, 29).

Despite its credibility, achieved during the 1960s and 1970s, the mediation established by Reagan and Crocker and the *constructive*

¹³ Negotiations between the WCG and South-African leaders resulted in resolution perspectives, especially when Vorster canceled the movements to establish the interim government and chose a general administrator. More effective mediations were made in 1978 with South Africa and SWAPO, and involved plans of ceasefire and political transition. However, disagreements remained in relation to Walvis Bay's *status* and to SWAPO's bases monitoring. At the same time, both sides sought to advance their positions in the battle field to ensure bargain instruments.

*engagement*¹⁴ marginalized the diplomatic participation of the group in the independence negotiations. SWAPO maintained its actions in the battlefield and diplomacy through the Frontline Countries (Brown 1995; Saul and Leys 1995). These countries had success in the process of negotiation for independency, supervised by the UN. This double debt, to the multilateral institutions, representative of the liberal order, and to the ally neighbors, has influenced the regional foreign policy of Namibia in the post-independence.

State, elites and foreign policy in Namibia (1990-2010)

In Southern Africa, the transition to the global order in the post-Cold War and from the *apartheid* regime in South Africa contributed to the rising of a regional order, based, mainly, in liberal principles, which served to the continuity of the South-African centrality. The human rights defense and the acceptance of external interference have started to coexist in an instable way with the (juridical) State's (negative) sovereignty principle. The economic liberalization represented by the implementation of structural adjustments was adopted, even in the former socialist or Marxist-Leninist regimes and the institutions of regional integration held its fundamentals. The principle of "good" governance and the development programs focused on assistentialism, often detached from employment and income alternatives for the population, started to be treated with priority. Human security was changed from a rhetorical discussion into an excuse for the national security forces reform and into a foundation to regional security management. In Namibia, the dominant elites maintained, with different impetus, a (revisionist) developmentalism project to the region, characterized by the national reconciliation principle and by regional solidarity (political, economic and security), but influenced by the defense of liberal-democratic institutions. Its position over the regional order may be comprehended by the study of the State building process and of the DEPF interests and safety.

State building in Namibia (1990-2010)

After the transition process mediated by the UN during 1989, Namibia's independence on March 21st, 1990 had global significance;

¹⁴ The plan led by Chester Crocker sought the establishment of a positive approximation between Pretoria and Washington with the declared objective of favoring the containing of the Soviet threat and removal of the Cuban troops from Angola, the reconstruction of southern Africa's stability and the using of the central economic role of South Africa to promote the regional development. The centrality of South Africa's participation was reinforced as a necessary element to solve the regional conflicts (Vale 1990, 173; Davies 2007).

it marked the end of the direct colonial experiment in Africa. Equally, it happened during big global and regional orders' transformations. The later was acquiring traces from the former and imputed action spaces and constraints to the State. The fragility of a recent independent State, with limited capacities and a reduced population (two million people) turned action in the regional and international systems difficult. Internationally, the country had submitted itself to the new order and assumed its principal rules of political and economic liberalism. Although Namibia's independence has carried a large content of the revolutionary armed struggle, the victory of the plan projected by the UN and the mediation created by Chester Crocker have put the country in a position of example of the Western order success. As a consequence, the country was included in this order's scope. This happened including in the formulation of the country's national Constitution, which principles were pre-established by the WCG (Erasmus 2000, 81).

Regionally, Namibia was similar, in a certain way, to the position of the BLS (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland), the States directly submitted to the South-African economy, because of the trade and monetary dependency. On the other hand, the geopolitical challenges experimented by Namibia were less blocking. The country has an extensive coastal strip in the South Atlantic, which ensures itself a strategic position; voluptuous reserve of marine products (one of the national economics' basis); besides important reserves of natural resources, as uranium and diamonds. The country also has boundaries with relevant neighbors, such as Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana, which allows prospecting alternatives to the dependency in relation to South Africa. Moreover, its historic trajectory of formal submission and direct conflict with the South-South Africa for independency have positioned Namibia in the center of debates about conflict and regional cooperation and it has assured the country has a prominent role in the regional policy. This is verified in the regional leadership adopted by SWAPO as a movement, and, currently, as a party, and the participation in alternative alliances to the *status quo*. On the other hand, the constraints have remained. Geographically, although it guarantees strategic boundaries with neighbor States and virtual access to the Indian Ocean (by Zambezi), the Caprivi strip complicates territorial control, which is materialized in separatist groups' actions. The lack of agricultural lands (only 2% of Namibian lands receive sufficient rain to the agricultural production) affects between 20% and 40% of the population who depends subsistence agriculture and grazing. There are efforts to compensate the situation by industrialization means, which were initiated in the colonial period.

The structural constraints sought to be overcome by policies to strengthen the State and by the adoption of a liberal political-economic

model that could contribute to the external support and would not exceed the costs of stability from the early independency years. A unitary State was built, with separation of power and a presidential political system¹⁵, with the Legislative divided into two chambers¹⁶. Foreign policy continued as a combination of the revisionist pro-activity from the time of the national liberation, given the political preeminence of SWAPO (now a political party), the acceptance to the international context and the use of globalization and political liberalism forces in its favor.

State capacity: coercion, capital and legitimacy

Independent Namibia's primary objective was to build domestic stability and territorial integrity. The means to achieve this were invariably the construction of state structures and a bureaucracy that would work. SWAPO's workers and diplomats, notable for their formation, were used in different spheres within the State.

The coercive sphere was built by the constitution of armed forces that could ensure the territory's control and that could project capacity to cooperate with regional security (military interventions under the principle of collective security) and of a stable international order (active participation in peace missions). The *Namibian Defense Force* (NDF) was created after the independence by the integration of the *People's Liberation Army of Namibia* (PLAN, SWAPO's military branch) and the *South West Africa Territorial Force*. The new force resulted in a reduced contingent of only 9,2 thousand men. However, it is the highest contingent proportion over the existing population in the region (WB 2013). Furthermore, the *Special Field Force* (SFF), which counts with 2 thousand troops, was created to perform paramilitary tasks, supervised by the *Ministry of Home Affairs* (IISS 2010). The force was composed almost exclusively by former PLAN. The participation in foreign conflicts and intern threats of separatism in Caprivi encouraged the relative strength of coercive capabilities, as, for example, the 40% increase on the budget of the *National State Intelligent Agency* (NSIA) in 1998/1999 (Matanga 2002, 145).

Economically, the State sought to articulate the capital's sphere and to increase its extraction capacity. The strategy tried to join, on one hand,

15 The president acts as Head of State and chief of the government (Executive) and chooses one prime minister.

16 The parliament is composed by two houses. The National Assembly is formed by 72 elected members, by the using of a closed list (proportional system and a five-year-mandate), and six members without power to vote, chosen by the president. The National Council has revision power and is formed by 26 indirect elected members, voted by 12 Regional Councils.

the principles of acceptance to the global order in search of investments and favorable trade agreements and, on the other, a vindictory posture that would try to guarantee the development of the domestic economy. Although it had significant economic challenges, Namibia's economy had the benefit of not having inherited South Africa's debts (later pardoned)¹⁷ and of not being submitted to the IFIs' structural adjustment programs, as Mozambique and Zimbabwe were (Matanga 2002, 137). Namibia has an important infrastructure, as the Walvis Bay harbor and the Trans-Kalahari Highway, which ensure the country to be one of the gates of entrance and exit of Southern Africa. Besides, it is one of the touristic centers in the region. Despite the weather, which hampers agriculture, and occurrence of droughts, approximately 30% of the population is employed in farming, mainly the subsistence one (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 207, 232)¹⁸. As Zimbabwe and, in a certain way, as in South Africa, the white Namibian population (5% of national population¹⁹, compared to 85% of black people²⁰ and 10% of mestizos or *coloured*) kept their economic interests preserved post-independency²¹. Also as a consequence of these assurances, social inequality continued to exist, with 10% of the population keeping 55% of the country's aggregate income (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 299). On the other hand, together with the rapid urbanization, the industry has been advancing to more than fish and meat processing²².

17 The initial negotiations post-independency involved the search for the canceling of the country's foreign debt with South Africa, that argued the debit inherited from the colonial period (R250 thousands) was related to investments in Namibian infrastructure, and for that should be compensated. The rising of Nelson Mandela assured, however, the dispute's settlement and the cancelling of the debt (Matanga 2002, 137-138).

18 However, in terms of the importance to the economy, agriculture occupies a secondary position. Together with fishing, it represents just a tenth of the GDP. Ores occupy more than half of the income with exports and diamonds are the main revenue of the sector (almost 70%), followed by uranium and salt (Matanga 2002, 138).

19 Two thirds of the population is descendant of *Afrikaners*. The others are of Germans or British descent.

20 Members of the ethnic-linguistic group *ovambo* are half of the country's population and inhabit mostly the four North provinces, *ohangwena*, *omusati*, *oshana*, e *oshikoto*. The *nama* and *damara* groups constitute 12% of the population, whereas *herero* and *kavango* constitute 10% of the population each.

21 A law, created right in the beginning of the 1990s, guaranteed generous conditions and safety to foreign investment (NAMIBIA 1990, art.97). In fact, "[...] the new government decided not to antagonize the predominantly white private sector, local or foreign, and that controlled the commercial agriculture and the retail, industry and mineral sectors." (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 229).

22 In 1997, the industrial sector represented only 13% of the GDP (Matanga 2002, 138). However, the situation started to change, the establishment of processing zones for exports in 1995 were created, something that encouraged the settlement of Asian fabric industries in

The State's legitimacy was based in its association with the democratic liberal model and in the construction of political institutions that could legitimate its action. The result was a respected political system, with notable relative stability when compared to other African countries²³. Most important is that the Constitution has been widely heeded since its implementation and the *rule of law* has been respected, including the independent action of the Judiciary and the Supreme Court, despite the lack of qualified magistrates²⁴. The symbolic State's legitimacy, in its turn, is sustained by the heroic national liberation process' legacy (Bösl 2014, 5) and is confused with the identity of a State that claims for the emancipation ideal and pan-African solidarity as its existence fundamentals²⁵. The Namibian State considers itself to be a fruit of the pan-African solidarity, an identity that is capable of integrating different political opinions. However, the expected distribution of welfare to the population, existing because of SWAPO's revolutionary speech while liberation movement, was limited. On one hand, there was a distributive policy that expanded health infrastructure and increased literacy and school enrollments. In 2001, the country achieved a per capita income of US\$ 1960 (US\$6,700 in purchase power parity), a considerable value to the African case and for such a young country. On the other, society suffers with the HIV proliferation, incessant droughts and the permanency of an unequal land distribution structure²⁶. The land reform policies followed Zimbabwe's example, keeping the principles of land buying and redistribution by the State over the *willing buyer-willing seller* regulation,

the country. The process is also encouraged by the possibility of obtaining trade preferences to the entrance of textile products in the North American market over the influence of *Africa Growth and Opportunity Act* (AGOA) from May, 2000. The license was obtained in October, 2000 and amplified in December, 2001, to textile and clothing products (USA 2015).

23 The distributive sphere of liberal rights was the way found to sustain support to the State. When adopted on February 9th, 1990, the Namibian Constitution was considered one of the most liberal and democratic constitutions of the world, including fundamental human rights and civil freedoms (association, expression and meeting freedoms). The Constitution of liberal-democratic character was the ground that guaranteed the bases of the political pact that constituted the State (Erasmus 2000, 81).

24 Locally, the Judiciary also works with the assistance of the common law, by the work of traditional cuts that act in the trial of small crimes and infractions inside smaller communities (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 217-218).

25 It is not by chance that the president Sam Nujoma adopted in 1998 the Pan-Africanism symbols (the flag and the anthem) as fundamentals of its own State (Mushelenga 2014, 70).

26 Currently, four thousand white farmers have 30,5 million hectares, about 37% of Namibia's area. The land obtained during the colonial period was especially from the Herero and Nama-Damaras population, in the center and south of the country. Approximately 120 thousand black families are concentrated in 5% of the arable lands in the north of the country (Matanga 2002, 138).

which assures market prices to the proprietaries²⁷. After, in the beginning of the 2000s, more distributive politics were adopted, creating perspectives of an effective agrarian reform²⁸. The association of a democratic-institutional stability and a renewed national identity has sustained the high legitimacy of the State in the post-independency period.

The State-society relations

The State-society relations in independent Namibia were characterized by the predominance of SWAPO as the government party. Its political strategy and the credibility achieved during the national liberation process assured to the party significant political predominance in the post-independency period and the victory in the presidential elections of 1989 (indirect)²⁹, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 and wide majority in the national legislative election in the same years³⁰. The government is characterized by the predominant position of the president, who nominates the Cabinet's members, besides the parliament and local government's members³¹. The charismatic posture of Sam Nujoma, SWAPO's president since the national liberation fight period, has contributed to this centrality. Posteriorly, however, the *low profile* posture of Hifikepunye Pohamba hasn't

27 It was prioritized the maintenance of farms commercially efficient to the economic growth. The policy was limited to land redistribution due the high prices and the lack of resources given by the government.

28 In April, 2003, a new tax over rural property was established to create funds to the land reform. Furthermore, in June of the same year, a new legislation assured the right of the State to acquire land over the justification of public interest and to pay lower prices than the market ones (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 233).

29 In November, 1989, the first universal national election occurred, in order to compose the Constituent Assembly. The election was organized and supervised by the UN. The Constituent Assembly with 72 members was a consensual process of antagonist forces' trucing, such as SWAPO and the DTA (*Democratic Turnhalle Alliance*), in their search for a constitution that had national character.

30 Local elections also made possible the party's prominence in the political spheres closer to the citizens. National elections happen every five years and local elections every six years. SWAPO leads the local, regional and national legislative bodies, guaranteeing an average of about 60% of the seats in local elections and more than 75% of the parliament seats in national elections since 1989 (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 221).

31 The Executive's dominance has been present in its relations with the Parliament, since almost all ministries and vice-ministries are also representatives in the National Assembly. They end up overcoming other SWAPO's representatives in number and reproducing the government's policy. While the National Council connects directly to the regional counselors' actions, the system of closed list to the National Assembly creates distance between the population and the representatives, since exclusively the parties do the composition.

reduced the presidency centrality in the political paths of the country³².

Since its independency, SWAPO's prior political project was to ensure stability to its government in the State building period and to obtain capacity from political institutions, including the democratic process. The initial way found was to adopt a national reconciliation policy, one of the regular principles in the preamble of the Republic's Constitution (NAMIBIA 1990, preamble). Sam Nujoma tried to ensure, as it had happened in Zimbabwe a decade before (Nhema 2002, 101), a policy to strengthen the government over the national reconciliation idea that could overcome the racial segregation and oppression. Therefore, in the government formed in 1990 there was a careful mixture of party leaders in exile, from inside the country and of white people³³. The political acceptance also happened towards local authorities³⁴ and gender relations³⁵.

The democratic process remained stable³⁶. A presidential transition occurred in a pacific and democratic way in the 2004's elections, where Hifikepunye Pohamba (former minister of *Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation*) was victorious, something repeated in 2014. Although it hasn't occurred a change of the party in power, the government party has accomplished all the constitutional and democratic requirements. Nonetheless, the political predominance of SWAPO doesn't mean lack of opposition, especially of moderated groups associated with conservative elites and with the white population. The main opposition comes from

32 Although president Pohamba has taken over the government, the party's formal leader remained Nujoma until November 2007 and continues influencing the directions of the national policy.

33 More recently, this policy was reduced in terms of intensity, since the whites didn't remain as ministries, just as secretaries and vice-ministries. The policy also has difficult impact over the society, due to traumas of racial segregation from the past that weren't healed by truth commissions and reconciliation that didn't bring the national history back. The option adopted was "[...] to deliberately get away from dislikable memories from the past and focus on what was postulated as the construction of a unified nation." (Erasmus 2000, 81).

34 Chiefs and leaders were integrated in the state bureaucracy as counselors and started to receive payments, from the *Authorities Act* from 1995. In 1996, almost one million people (half of Namibia's population) were evaluated to live under traditional leaders' authority (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 223).

35 SWAPO adopted a gender quotes policy that ensured the presence of 30% of women in the parliament, one of the highest taxes of the world and of Africa. Furthermore, volunteer quotes from parties guarantee high female representation in local and national levels.

36 Although President Sam Nujoma has been a target of a lot of criticism for breaking with the constitutional rule that limits in two consecutive mandates the presidential government, the pessimist expectations that this would be the authoritarianism principle fell apart. The exception was justified by the fact that the first mandate (1990-1994) was guaranteed by indirect elections, since the president was elected by the Constituent Assembly in February, 1990.

the *Democratic Turnhalle Alliance* (DTA), which continues to be associated with the pre-independence administration³⁷. One of the greatest opposition difficulties is to articulate a national platform that breaks with the regionalist bonds and overcome the *ovambo* majority support to SWAPO. Social pressures also arise from old allies, as the *Council of Churches of Namibia* (CCN), which pressures the government to promote social rights and criticizes the option for military intervention in the region; and the *Namibian National Student Organization* (NANSO), which left SWAPO in 1991 to widen its regimentation basis. The most important opposition comes from the Caprivi region, which part of the population states to prefer over the development policies directed to other North provinces, something that results in high levels of unemployment in the region. On the other hand, the government receives its support base from the syndical union *National Union of Namibian Workers* (NUMW), which has gradually become closer to SWAPO in the post-independency, including composing the party's frame. Furthermore, different types of NGOs work together with the government, helping with ministerial policies, as, for example, collaborating in development programs of the *National Planning Commission*, and in legislative commissions (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 226). The legitimacy assured by the State in the post-independency and the wide prominence of SWAPO in power allowed the party to put into practice an impetuous and revisionist regional foreign policy as an instrument of overcoming still existing constraints, both domestic (separatism) and external (territorial integrity, insurgencies at the borders and economic dependency).

Elites and regional foreign policy in Namibia (1990-2010)

The regional foreign policy of Namibia in the first decades after independence was directly affected by the DEPF project to strengthen the State and its international position in face to the domestic and external challenges. Just as in most presidential regimes, the Presidency and the *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (MFA) were the main responsible for the State's foreign project. They created a policy that was far from the characteristic minimalism of small States (Moon 1985; Moon 1983; Braveboy-Wagner and Snarr 2003, 22-25) and that disputed a notable position in the discussions and solutions of regional and global challenges. This posture was, in a great instance, consequence of the diplomatic experience during the national

³⁷ Recently, SWAPO's dissident factions tried to ally with the opposition, which in fact could represent an effective political threat. However, the initiatives were disarticulated by SWAPO. It is the *Congress of Democrats* (COD), formed by ex- SWAPO leadership Ben Ullenga, who acted as high commissary in the United Kingdom and who resigned in August 1998, after Nujoma's decision of sending troops to the DRC (see it below).

liberation, which sought to obtain spaces through work and the priority of international activity as part of strengthening the cause.

The almost assured political predominance almost assured of SWAPO guaranteed to the party a great international action freedom. The reduced State's capacity and the economic difficulties were compensated with policies that ensured wide international support and investments influxes. This relatively stable environment made possible the creation of spaces to attempt solving externally fundamental challenges that still existed, among them territorial integrity, more distributives regional economic alternatives, and regional security.

The great Namibian strategy was guided by the attempt of aligning itself to the existing order, looking for spaces for changes that could ensure the strengthening of its position. Despite its big dependency on South Africa, Namibia sought to align itself to the regional order in its sociopolitical ideals (liberal rights), but transform it in the direction of three mainly points. These were the defense of negative/juridical sovereignty (respect to the rules of international law) and State's positive/empirical sovereignty (including of the weaker ones, as itself)³⁸; relative distribution of development, although integrating itself to the economic system centralized in South Africa; and defense of the regional security under the ideals of political solidarity and collective security.

The action from the regional system was impetuous, mainly in these three central points, which happened especially in Sam Nujoma's government. His drive to act in the system was influenced by the president's role as a political leadership of the elite who defined the foreign policy, and also by the considerable reduction of threats and external challenges during Pohamba's government (when most of the more threatening domestic questions were already solved), except for the permanent challenge of economic dependence to South Africa.

38 Jackson and Rosberg (1982) introduced the dialectic between juridical and empirical statehood, focused on the African countries' case. Juridical statehood indicates the conditions given by the negative sovereignty (merely legal), as territory, boundaries, population and international recognition of its State and govern. This principle of international legality was established as a fundamental regime of the order created in the Charter of the United Nations, which sustains the banishment of the war of aggression (art 1ffl, § 1 e art 2ffl, § 1) and the respect to the principle of non-interference in the States' internal affairs. Empirical statehood, then, refers to the effective sovereignty accomplishment (positive sovereignty), which includes to govern, to control, to defend and to protect the State's territory and people. In this case, it is evident the necessity of means/capabilities to execute these tasks. In 1990, Robert Jackson expanded the study to the other countries of the Third World (Jackson 1990).

Elites and regional foreign policy in Nujoma (1990-2005)

During the government of Sam Nujoma, the president consolidated his figure as the most powerful actor in the process of defining the foreign policy. Nujoma was a central formulator of foreign policy even before Namibia's independence. As SWAPO's president, he represented the Namibian population in a variety of multilateral institutions as the MNA, SADCC, OAU and the UN. After independency, he kept this centrality and his leadership role in decisive actions was seen in all the period (Mushelenga 2014, 69)³⁹. Theo-Ben Gurirab's position as Foreign Affairs' ministry (1990-2002) also has to be highlighted, given the respect and trust he received from Nujoma and his previous international credibility as Chief of Mission of SWAPO in the UN (1972-1986) and Secretary of Foreign Affairs of SWAPO (1986-1990). He was a "[...] respected international relations guru [...]", who contributed to international credibility of independent Namibia's project (Mushelenga, 2014, 71)⁴⁰. The *Ministry of Trade and Industry* and the *Ministry of Defense* also had advisory participation in the negotiations of trade agreements with the SACU, the SADC and the EU and in the participation of peace missions in international conflicts, respectively.

The DEPF's security was stable, given the force of SWAPO's political leadership and to the reduced competition between internal elites. However, the Caprivi separatist threat destabilized this tranquility. The Caprivi's separatists sought the incorporation of a new Barotseland in Zambia and received military support from UNITA. Since 1998, Botswana's government agreed in receiving Caprivi's refugees who left Namibia, even giving asylum to some leaderships from *Caprivi Liberation Army* (CLA) (Matanga 2002, 149). Externally there were threats to the territorial integrity and to the boundaries in Walvis Bay, in the Orange River and in the extreme Eastern boundary with Botswana. The security instabilities of allied neighbors created a regional vulnerability that could turn into even greater challenges to the consolidation of the State's power. Finally, the economic

39 However, there was increased criticism about the autonomy in the decision-making process. In the case of DRC's invasion, critics argued the decision of sending troops was the President's exclusive and personal choice, without consulting other actors and responsible bodies. They affirmed that "[...] information about the involvement of Namibia in the DRC just came out as a result of Zimbabwe's reveal and of the death of some Namibian soldiers in the front in the war in Kinshasa" (Matanga 2002, 145).

40 In August 2002, Gurirab became prime ministry and was replaced by Hidipo Hamtenya, who didn't have similar credentials in the international area. Nevertheless, in his administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established wider principles of external action in 2004 and prioritized economic diplomacy. Besides, during all the period, the ministry had great significance in the selection of diplomatic solutions to external disputes, as it will be seen later.

dependency to South Africa was a challenge to be faced by the DEPF and the whole country.

Regarding the State's position on the *status quo*, there was an acceptance of the political-social regional order and the appreciation of the liberal rights importance, based on the Constitution of the Republic and respected in the government's system⁴¹. The credibility of a stable liberal-democratic regime was used as a political currency and defended in the relations with the neighbors. The ties to the order were reaffirmed in the idea of alignment to the principles of international law, since the republican Constitution sustained the fundamentals of the external relations in the pacifism and in the peaceful solutions of controversies⁴². Moreover, Namibia attributed to itself a moral obligation to promote peace and international security, since "[...] its own independence was a result of international efforts to achieve the peace" (Mushelenga 2014, 65). Besides, the country also attributed to the international law a similar importance as it did to the Namibian legislation, the only country in SADC to dispose of such a constitutional provision (Mushelenga 2014, 64)⁴³.

The acceptance of the liberal order in social terms (rights) wasn't superior, however, to the idea of solidarity. The aid policy to Mugabe shows that the protection to the principle of sovereignty and to the historic solidarity could exist above the political liberalism's speech.⁴⁴ Therefore, the Namibian vision built in Nujoma also was in favor of the protection of the States' empirical capabilities, especially in the direction of governing

41 In fact, the constitutional principles, which guided the 1989 Constitution, had already been formulated in July, 1982, by the UNSC, in the document entitled '*Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia*'. The UN and the WCG performed great Western interference in the process of consolidation of the rule. With the balance of forces established, there was little alternative to divert in relation to the pre-ordained international scheme. Therefore, '[...] Namibians, in fact, didn't enjoy a complete autonomy in the writing of their own constitution.' (Erasmus 2000, 81)

42 "The State should make efforts to guarantee that in its international relations: (a) it adopts and keeps a non-alignment policy; (b) it promotes international cooperation, peace and security; (c) it creates and maintains fair and mutually beneficial relations between nations; (d) it promotes respect to the international law and to the obligations of treaties; (e) it encourages the solution of international controversies by peaceful means" (NAMIBIA 1990, art. 96).

43 "Except for disposition established in this Constitution or in the Law of the Parliament, the general rule of international public law and international agreements that include Namibia in the terms of this Constitution will be part of Namibia's law" (NAMIBIA 1990, art. 144).

44 To Namibia, the negative sovereignty and the juridical statehood should be assured to the States, mainly to the less materially capable ones. To Du Pisani (2003:16), as it was to Mushelenga, "[...] Namibia has a strong conviction that the international system governed by rules guarantees the smaller and weak States' security" (Mushelenga 2008, 10-11).

its own territory and having its sovereignty respected. This posture can relate to a collective vision of regional security. Nujoma also saw in the external alliances' consolidation a way of strengthen Namibia's position in the internal security⁴⁵. In economic terms, Namibia's foreign policy has inserted itself in the current order, but with reformist policies and speeches. On one hand, it has engaged in the regional mechanisms of trade and has adopted liberal policies of opening to the free-market and to foreign investment⁴⁶. On the other, it eventually criticized the current order giving signs of militancy in favor of distributed development⁴⁷.

The acting in the system involved, besides diplomatic means, acting through institutional, economic and military means. In the diplomatic field, the first task of Namibia's foreign policy was to ensure its territorial integrity. The national Constitution had already established the objectives of assuring control over the disputed territories with South Africa, '[...] including the enclave, the bay and Walvis Bay's harbor⁴⁸, as well as the islands in Namibia's high seas, and its southern border should be extended until half of the Orange river'⁴⁹ (NAMIBIA 1990, art. 1(4)). Furthermore, the country claimed territorial sovereignty over the Kasikili-Sedudu and Situngu islands⁵⁰, in dispute with Botswana. In the institutional field, the respect to

45 The insecurity of allied States was seen, inside the solidarity perspective, as a security challenge to Namibia itself. It was notable that "[...] Namibia's security is too much attached to its neighbors' stability [...]" (and beyond its immediate neighbors) (Matanga 2002, 142).

46 The country sought to increase foreign investments, mainly the miner sector, with Russian contributions (RAO Almazy Rosii-Sakha). *Exporting Processing Zone* received German investments, as, for example, U\$ 25 million in Namibia Press and Tools, in the vehicle components area, and Asian textiles (Matanga 2002, 148).

47 Nujoma, in September, 2002, signaled a more scathing revisionist posture, public criticizing European donors and suggesting that Namibia did not need external help. However, the policy hasn't effectively concretized (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 230).

48 Walvis Bay is the only harbor of deep waters of the country and South Africa remained occupying it despite the UN's recognition of the harbor as Namibian. In the first years of the 1990's decade, F. W. De Klerk seemed annoyed by the international pressures and remained indecisive about the issue. Nujoma, on the other hand, recused to establish complete diplomatic relations with the country. Nonetheless, the diplomacy advanced. In November, 1992, the *Walvis Bay Joint Administration Authority* (JAA) was created and included officials of both countries. Finally, after assuring control over this matter, De Klerk's government agreed in transferring the harbor to Namibia. In February, 1994, JAA's work was finished and in March Walvis Bay was given to the country.

49 Another tension issue was given in the establishment of the territorial sovereignty in the southern border, along the Orange River. Before 1990, South Africa demanded sovereignty over the entire river and the ores found in its bay. Posteriorly, the country agreed in moving the border to the center of the river, but claimed the ores of the entire river. The dispute also involved the sovereignty of the riverine islands and the flow of fishing vessels.

50 A third territorial dispute occurred with Botswana, for the sovereignty over the Kasikili-

the political institutions has guaranteed to the country the centrality of its position in the SADC. Windhoek hosts since 1997 the SADC's *Parliament Forum* and is instrumental to maintaining the inter-parliamentary and autonomous character of the forum (Bösl 2014, 18).⁵¹

The acceptance to the economic order is, nonetheless, marked by a partial and reckless alignment characterized by the attempt of overcoming dependency in face of the former settler, which affects, mostly, the industrialization tasks. More than 80% of the imports come from South Africa, also a great portion of the exports is sent to this country (Matanga 2002, 138). Paradoxically, Namibia has in its regional institutions and in its possible democratization a way of breaking with the dependency from South Africa. Initially, the possibility of a free-market area in the SADC was seen as a potential market diversifier to the country. However, the liberal fundamentals of the organization have only increased the predominance of South Africa's exports to its neighbors. SACU equally ended to assure markets to the South-African products and to increase the economic dependency from the BLNS (BLS plus Namibia)⁵². These countries have pressured South Africa to renegotiate SACU's agreement, which was achieved only in 2002 (Gibb and Treasure 2011, 12)⁵³. The attempt to diversify and to overcoming dependency on South Africa is meant to be consolidated by the approximation to Angola and to China⁵⁴.

Sedudu (3,5 km² and Situngu (91 km²) in the Linyati- Chobe River, in the Caprivi's region. The situation got worse when both countries sent troops to the islands. A diplomatic attempt to solve the issue bilaterally started in May, 1998, but didn't bring results to the matter and was sent to the ICJ. After the court's decision in favor of Botswana, Namibia accepted to the international law ruling.

51 Besides, the commitment with the liberal political model made Namibia an important partner for the European Union and '[...] a reference to the good governance in SADC's region' (Bösl 2014, 19). Furthermore, the country integrated SACU in 1991, as a way of concretizing its relative alignment to the regional order, even before the political transition in South Africa. Consecutively, the country '[...] gained benefits of SACU's aggregated common incomes, until that, in 2003, these incomes provided 30 to 40% of its GDP' (Mushelenga 2008, 11).

52 In 1993, South Africa "[...] exported to the rest of SACU about 5.7 times the value of its goods and services that it imported from partners" (Matanga 2002, 139).

53 With the difficulties to renegotiate the agreement, Namibia started to adopt an increasingly confrontational posture, besides searching for its economic relations diversification. This was produced with initiatives of connecting infrastructures to other States of the region (Trans-Kalahari Highway and Trans-Caprivi Highway, connecting Namibia, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and of establishing bilateral agreements, as the ones done with Sweden, Germany and the EPA with the European Union in an independent way from SACU (Matanga 2002, 140).

54 In the first case, only after the Angolan civil war there was possibility of increasing the cooperation started in 1990 with the *Angolan–Namibian Joint Commission of Co-operation*

In the area of military operations, the promotion of the peace principle was already in practice in 1993, with the participation in the UN's peacekeeping mission in Cambodia. In southern Africa, the country had pressured for a peaceful transition in South Africa and negotiated efforts in the UNSC (with Zimbabwe) to raise awareness of the international community to support the peace process in Angola and to establish sanctions against UNITA. At the same time, Nujoma tried to make possible a mediation with Jonas Savimbi (Mushelenga 2014, 64). The country sent military contingent and observers to a total of eight UN's missions. They were Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, DRC, Eritrea, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sudan (two missions)⁵⁵. Besides the actions in peacekeeping missions in the region and out of it, the priority of the regional security and the instabilities in neighbor countries made the country get directly involved in two external armed conflicts, in the DRC and in Angola. In the case of DRC, in August 1998, Nujoma decided to support the SADC's coalition sending from 1,400 to 2,000 troops and weapons. The coalition went to Congo to protect the government of Laurent Kabila against the external invasion of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi (Castellano da Silva 2012). The decision to send troops was based in the regional security solidarity and connected to the strong bonds with the regimes of Angola and Zimbabwe – old supporters of SWAPO against the counterinsurgency employed by South Africa⁵⁶. Concerning the conflict in Angola, in December 1999, Namibia gave permission to the FAA to

(ANJCC). In 2003 the *Agreement on Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investment* was concluded; and so did the *Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation* in 2004. The rapprochement has been focused in the implementation of the Benguela Current Commission and in the establishment of the Trans-Cunene Corridor, which connects by highways and railroads the Wavis Bay harbor to the south of Angola (Lubango), placing Namibia in the center of the commercial connection between South Africa, Namibia and Angola. According to Du Pisani (2014, 116-117), the relations between China and Namibia have developed in the energy, trade, investments, education, cultures, security and multilateral spheres. The bounds were consolidated with five official visits of Nujomba to Beijing, which was maintained in the following period, with the increasing of the bilateral trade in 103% between 2005 and 2006. Between 2001 and 2011 China's imports increased three times more than total imports' additions (WTM 2015).

55 The regional security view advanced to the continental policy. In the OAU and AU, the country has established a pressure policy to achieving a Pan-African force of *peacekeeping* (Matanga 2002).

56 As in the case of Angola and Zimbabwe's participation, Namibia's role in Congo's Second War was relatively compensated (in small amount) with financial negotiations. In Namibia's case, few are the indicators, but it is known that there was a *joint venture* between one Namibian company, *August 26* (with major participation of the Ministry of Defense), COMIEX and a North-American enterprise (UN, 2001). In 2001, Namibia already started to remove its troops. The actions in the DRC were internally criticized, mainly due to lack of any consultation by Nujoma to his Cabinet (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 218).

operate from the north of its territory to promote attacks against UNITA. It also supplied soldiers and weapons to the allied forces⁵⁷. As an answer, this group has promoted retaliatory attacks against Namibia, which led the NDF to get directly involved in the conflict, establishing bases and operations in the Angolan territory and seeking to suppress one of the supporters of its intern separatism in Caprivi.

The external allies' support also sought to ensure guarantees to overcoming internal challenges to the territorial integrity. On August 2nd, 1999, united separatists in *Caprivi Liberation Army* attacked a police station, an army base and the office of *Namibian Broadcasting Corporation* (state TV network) in Katima Mulilo, largest city in Caprivi. The government declared emergency state in the region and captured hundreds of collaboration suspicious. The movement's leader, former leadership of the DTA in Carivi, Mishake Muyongo, ran to Botswana and Denmark. A lot of other inhabitants of the region went to Botswana. The military aid against the internal threat was ensured by regional allies Zimbabwe, and in a lesser extent, Zambia. Finally, in March 1999, Nujoma visited Gaborone and established with President Mogae the warranty of refugee status to the separatist leaders, if transferred to a third country, which was implemented by Botswana.

Both the participation in the DRC's conflict and the political support to Mugabe had as consequence strong intern criticisms relating to the presidential autonomy to decide the foreign policy. The situation created additional pressures to the future new president of the country.

Elites and regional foreign policy in Pohamba (2005-2010)

Hifkepunye Pohamba took on a different approach when deciding foreign policy. With a more discreet profile and with certain hesitation, the new president regularly consulted the MFA for advices and preferred the existence of a consensus in the Cabinet before defining measures to be taken about a subject of more importance in the foreign policy. The command of Marco Hausiku in the Ministry contributed to this type of approach. He and Pohamba preferred to act without great announcements about external issues, which as consequence had criticisms about the lack of publicity and communication. The successor in the Ministry, Utoni Nujoma, sought to restore the institutional image and increase bilateral visits to Asia, Europe

⁵⁷ The alliance has been connected to revolutionary origins of the government parties, to MPLA's support to SWAPO's movement, to the ethnic alignment of the Kwanyama elite in both countries, and to the existence of a consciousness of class between Angolans workers who worked in the Namibian mines during the South African domain period (Matanga 2002).

and the region (Mushelenga 2014, 71). The position adopted in the foreign policy was similar to the one of Sam Nujoma's period, in which policy was both sympathizing and, in some aspects, liberal.

As threatening social groups (separatism) and external pressures were reduced (except by the continuous economic dependency on South Africa), the foreign policy defining elite's safety became more affected by the pressures of opposing elites. The challenges of conservative internal groups and strong criticism to the insulation of Pohamba's presidency pressured for change. There was a need for establishing a new dialogue and more transparency in the foreign policy's composition. Pohamba's profile contributed to the establishment of inclusion and democratic processes in the foreign policy. This process involved, on one hand, the inclusion of the opposition in the foreign policy's definition process, through eventual consultations and participation in significant regional events⁵⁸.

The external posture on the *status quo* remained practically unchanged during Pohamba's presidency. The passive alignment to the social regional order continued to exist. In 2005, SADC's Tribunal became operational in Windhoek and represented the country's credibility and commitment to the *rule of law*, as well as the assurance to rights to the southern Africa society. According to Melber, Pohamba stressed that '[...] the rule of law is one of the pillars of global governance system that seeks to respect and to guarantee human rights, democracy and justice' (Melber 2014, 44). Nonetheless, the political solidarity principle remained a priority in the country's foreign policy. The conflict between Zimbabwe's government and the tribunal's decision in favor of a country's farmer, who appealed to the court against the land grabs done by the government, led to a regional impasse (Murungi and Gallinetti 2004, 130-131). Therefore, the Tribunal had its activities suspended with SADC's leadership meeting in Windhoek on August 16th-17th 2010 and a new protocol started to be negotiated, seeking the transformation of its scope to limit itself to judge disputes between member-States and not individuals anymore (Melber 2014, 444-446). The priority of civil and political rights didn't seem that essential.

Pohamba kept the external posture of African sovereignty's defense, prioritizing it in face of the human rights protection justification. The pan-African solidarity principle and the respect to sovereignty were already present in the AU Summit in Sirte on July 3rd 2009, when Namibia was

⁵⁸ For example, the president included in his delegation to the induction ceremony of President Guebuza of Mozambique, the leader of the opposition in the parliament, Ben Elenga. Besides, the president promoted a new foreign policy thinking in face of regular consults to young analysts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mushelega 2008, 211- 212).

between the countries that would support and repeal the extradition order of the International Criminal Court to Sudan's president Omar Al-Bashir. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Marco Hausiki stated in the occasion that Al- Bashir would be a welcome guest in Namibia (Melber 2014, 443). A stronger position about this matter could be noticed in the condemnation of NATO's attacks in Libya, following resolution 1973 from 2011 of the UNSC. The president maintained support to the African Union Peace and Security Council, which sustained that '[...] any foreign invasion in the domestic affairs of any African state [should be] strongly condemned and rejected.' (Kisting 2011, on-line). The speech given by President Pohamba on the 66th UN General Assembly on September 23 2011 was a milestone of this position:

The Government of Namibia recognizes the legitimacy of the peaceful demands for democratic changes in the sister countries such as Tunisia and Egypt. It is of paramount importance that the demands for democratic changes be locally driven and owned, but not be used as a pretext by foreign powers to undermine the fundamental principle of sovereignty and non-intervention in the international affairs of independent states. This cardinal principle constitutes the core essence of the United Nations. To maintain its unique legitimacy and universal credibility in the eyes of the vast majority of humanity, the United Nations should respect and uphold this principle. The United Nations, which supported the decolonization of Africa, should now not be seen to be reversing or compromising on this principle by opening up the continent to new threats of external forces. Never in the history of United Nations has the sanctity of the principle of non- intervention been so compromised as we have witnessed recently in Libya. The intervention in Libya by powerful members of the United Nations Security Council represents mortal danger for the security of weak countries. The military intervention in Libya by foreign powers must remind Africa of the infamous 1884/1885 Berlin Conference when Africa was carved up by imperial powers (Pohamba 2011, on-line).

The impetus of action in the system, currently, keeps the priority of seeking for diplomatic, economic and institutional alternatives to reform the actual order according to the existing possibilities. The attempt to reinforce the distributive role of SADC remains and Namibia is reticent with South Africa's capability to distribute and not concentrate development in the region (Alfredo Tjiurimo Hengari, 2013, interview). Moreover, the current partnership with China is part of a scope of action in favor of South-South cooperation with Brazil, Cuba and India, as an alternative way of promoting development and technology transference (Mushelenga 2014, 67). Brazil, for example, has been assisting in the process of building the Namibian state capacities, establishing cooperation between the navy forces

and making it possible the organization of the country's Navy (MRE 2011; Abdenur and Neto 2014, 227).

To sum it up, between 1990 and 2005, the high legitimacy of the Namibian state in the post-independency and the initial economic growth were combined with the assured prominence of SWAPO in power, using the symbolic leadership of Sam Nujoma. The UN's legacy to the country's independence led it to a position of respect to the priority of liberal rights. On the other hand, the revolutionary solidarity of the liberation movement encouraged a foreign policy that fought for the guarantee of States' empirical sovereignty and regional security. Although with reduced coercive capabilities, the immediate promotion of regional integrity and of collective security was adopted as an attempt to overcome the challenges that came from separatists and external forces (border disputes and security instability). In the Pohamba's period, there was the continuity of the State's stability, since the territorial and security challenges had been overcome, and the maintenance of the political project in part liberal, in part revisionist, of SWAPO. The external instabilities were now reduced, except by the remaining threat of economic dependency from South Africa, and were combined with the increase of intern pressures on the DEPF. The necessity of external action decreased and the actions were restricted to economic and institutional means.

Conclusion

The analysis was based in the explanatory method, which realizes in the external project and in the security of the defining elites the main encouragements to the position and urge in relation to the regional systemic order. This process, focused in the will and in the ability of the DEPF, must be comprehended together with the process of State building, more specifically the available capacities and the State-society relations that define the interests and the acting capabilities of the DEPF. The text was divided into two big parts. The first one evaluated the origins of the process of State building and of the regional foreign policy in the period before independency. It was noticeable that the internal and external legitimacy of the colonial state happened at the same time as the rising of SWAPO's liberation movement, which linked the regional to international credibility, due to the solidarity by the former and the respect to global institutions by the later. This characteristic was determinant to the post-independence foreign policy, evaluated on the second part of this text. The Namibian foreign policy achieved a new credibility from the state and the government (SWAPO) and, although with constraints over coercive and capital capacities, made possible

a revisionist foreign policy in relation to the established regional order, even using military means to solve its own problems as well as its allies’.

Namibian foreign policy was, therefore, essentially influenced by the historic liberation fight. On one hand, SWAPO’s predominance in the domestic policy after 1990 directed the foreign policy to the acceptance of the regional liberal order’s principles, since Namibia’s independency and its own national Constitution were consequence of the liberal global order. On the other, the regional revolutionary solidarity showed that SWAPO was committed to fighting for a more distributive and aligned to a developmental conception order. The internal (separatism) and external (threat to the territorial integrity and instability in neighbor countries) pressures encouraged the use of the State’s capacities in external action, including the use of military forces. A later decrease of the foreign and domestic pressures assured a limitation of the urge for regional action to the economic and institutional instruments.

Despite theories of international relations stressing the small systemic impact of countries with reduced aggregated capacities, they do not explain why these States regularly adopt revisionist attitudes in relation to the systemic order and use of a great strength in its performance (breaking with the tendency to *bandwagoning*) (Mearsheimer 2001, 209-210). It happens because they ignore significant aspects of their foreign policy. The sustained thesis is that the characteristics and interests of the defining elite of foreign policy will directly affect its position when related to the systemic order and that the security of this elite in power (available capacities in face of domestic and external pressures) will affect its possibilities of performing its interests. Namibia’s case will serve as an example of how small countries, with reduced systemic power can use the transforming and extractive capacities of their (high legitimate) State to act internationally in a revisionist and sustainable way, even with limited impact.

REFERENCES

- Abdenur, Adriana Erthal, and Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto. 2014. “O Atlântico Sul E a Cooperação Em Defesa Entre O Brasil E a África.” In *O Brasil E a Segurança No Seu Entorno Estratégico: América Do Sul E Atlântico Sul* edited by Reginaldo Mattar Nasser and Rodrigo Fracalossi de Moraes, 215–238. Brasília: IPEA.
- Bauer, Gretchen, and Scott D. Taylor. 2005. *Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in Transition*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

- Bösl, Anton. 2014. "Namibia's Foreign Relations in a Changing World – An Appraisal." In *Namibia's Foreign Relations: Historic Contexts, Current Dimensions, and Perspectives for the 21st Century*, edited by Anton Bösl, André du Pisani, and Dennis U Zaire, 3–26. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia.
- Braveboy-Wagner, Jacqueline Anne, and Michael T. Snarr. 2003. "Assessing Current Conceptual and Empirical Approaches." In *The Foreign Policies of the Global South: Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks*, edited by Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, 13–30. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Brown, Susan. 1995. "Diplomacy by Other Means - SWAPO's Liberation War." In *Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword*, edited by Colin Leys and John S. Saul, 19–39. London: James Currey.
- Castellano da Silva, Igor. 2012. *Congo, a Guerra Mundial Africana: Conflitos Armados, Construção Do Estado E Alternativas Para a Paz*. Porto Alegre: Leitura XXI/Cebrafrica /UFRGS.
- . 2015a. "Política Externa Na África Austral: Causas Das Mudanças Nos Padrões de Cooperação-Conflito (1975-2010)." Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.
- . 2015b. "Política Externa Regional de Angola: Mudanças Frente à Ordem Sistêmica (1975-2010)." *Austral: Revista Brasileira de Estratégia E Relações Internacionais* 4 (7): 139–172.
- Davies, J. E. 2007. *Constructive Engagement? Chester Crocker & American Policy in South Africa, Namibia & Angola, 1981–1988*. Ohio: Ohio University Press.
- Erasmus, Gerhard. 2000. "The Constitution: Its Impact on Namibian Statehood and Politics." In *State, Society and Democracy: A Reader in Namibian Politics*, edited by Christiaan Keulder, 77–107. Windhoek.
- Gibb, Richard, and Karen Treasure. 2011. "SACU at Centenary: Theory and Practice of Democratising Regionalism." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 18 (1) (April): 1–21. doi:10.1080/10220461.2011.564805. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2011.564805>.
- Grotper, John J. 1994. *Historical Dictionary of Namibia*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
- IISS. 2010. *The Military Balance 2010*. London: Routledge.
- Jackson, Robert H. 1990. *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in International Relations.

- Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg. 1982. "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood." *World Politics* 35 (01) (June 13): 1–24. doi:10.2307/2010277.
- Jaster, Robert S. 1985. *South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy*. Washington: University Press of America.
- Kisting, Denver. 2011. "Pohamba Slams Libya Strikes." *The Namibian*, March 22. http://www.namibian.com.na/indexx.php?archive_id=77541&page_type=archive_story_detail&page=3129.
- Matanga, Frank Khachina. 2002. "Towards and Understanding of the Foreign Policy of a New State: The Case of Namibia." In *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States' Foreign Policy-Making Process: A Comparative Perspective of Southern Africa*, edited by Korwa Gombe Adar and Rok Ajulu, 135–152. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: WW Norton.
- Melber, Henning. 2014. "Namibia: Global Governance Matters." In *Namibia's Foreign Relations: Historic Contexts, Current Dimensions, and Perspectives for the 21st Century*, edited by Anton Bösl, André du Pisani, and Dennis U Zaire, 435–449. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia.
- Moon, Bruce E. 1985. "Consensus or Compliance? Change and External Dependence." *International Organization* 39 (2): 297–329.
- Moon, Bruce E. 1983. "Foreign Policy of a Dependent State." *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (3) (September): 315–340.
- MRE. 2011. "Balanço de Política Externa (2003-2010)." Brasília: Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil.
- Murungi, Lucyline Nkatha, and Jacqui Gallinetti. 2004. "O Papel Das Cortes Sub-Regionais No Sistema Africano de Direitos Humanos." *SUR. Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos* 1 (1) (January): 121–147.
- Mushelenga, Peya. 2008. *Foreign Policy-Making in Namibia: The Dynamics of the Smallness of a State*. Pretoria: University of South Africa.
- . 2014. "Principles and Principals of Namibia's Foreign Relations." In *Namibia's Foreign Relations: Historic Contexts, Current Dimensions, and Perspectives for the 21st Century*, edited by Anton Bösl, André du Pisani, and Dennis U Zaire, 59–80. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia.
- NAMIBIA. 1990. *The Constitution of The Republic of Namibia*. Namibia.
- Nhema, Alfred. 2002. *Democracy in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Liberalization*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe.

- Pisani, André Du. 1985. *SWA/Namibia: The Politics of Continuity and Change*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.
- Pisani, André du. 2014. "Namibia and China: Profile and Appraisal of a Relationship." In *Namibia's Foreign Relations: Historic Contexts, Current Dimensions, and Perspectives for the 21st Century*, edited by Anton Bösl, André du Pisani, and Dennis U Zaire, 111–34. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia.
- Pohamba, Hifikepunye. 2011. "President Pohamba Addresses the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly." *Namibia High Commission London*. <http://www.namibiahc.org.uk/president-pohamba-addresses-the-66-th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly.php>.
- Saul, John S., and Colin Leys. 1995. "SWAPO: The Politics of Exile." In *Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword*, edited by Colin Leys and John S. Saul, 40–65. London: James Currey.
- Saunders, Chris. 2014. "Namibian Diplomacy before Independence." In *Namibia's Foreign Relations: Historic Contexts, Current Dimensions, and Perspectives for the 21st Century*, edited by Anton Bösl, André du Pisani, and Dennis U Zaire, 27–36. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia.
- Schoeman, Stanley, and Elna Schoeman. 1997. Namibia.
- UN. 2001. "S/2001/1072. Letter Dated 10 November 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council. Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Rep." New York: United Nations, 13 November.
- USA. 2015. "AGOA: General Country Eligibility Provisions." *International Trade Administration*. <http://trade.gov/agoa/eligibility/index.asp>.
- Vale, Peter. 1990. "The Botha Doctrine: Apartheid, Southern Africa and the West." In *Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern Africa, 1978-1988*, edited by Stephen Chan, 170–178. London: Macmillan Publishers.
- WB. 2013. "World Development Indicators." *World Data Bank*. <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>.
- WTM. 2015. "Trade Map: Trade Statistics for International Business Development." *World Trade Map*. <http://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx>.
- Zaire, Dennis U. 2014. "Namibia and the United Nations until 1990." In *Namibia's Foreign Relations: Historic Contexts, Current Dimensions,*

and Perspectives for the 21st Century, edited by Anton Bösl, André du Pisani, and Dennis U Zaire, 37–50. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia.

ABSTRACT

The article addresses Namibia's foreign policy to Southern Africa focusing on the period between 1990 and 2010 and evaluates its position in face of the order of the regional system and the explanations for this behavior, connected to the State building process and to the interests and security of the defining elites of foreign policy.

KEYWORDS

Namibia; Foreign Policy; Southern Africa.

Received on November 23, 2015.

Approved on April 29, 2016.

Translated by Alexandra Oppermann