BRAZIL-PALOP¹ RELATIONS: 40 YEARS OF COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC (1974/75-2015)

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Introduction

Beyond a mere geographic feature, the South Atlantic Ocean should be understood, historically, as a link between Africa and Brazil. The importance of Africa to Brazil and of Brazil to Africa is justified by the historic-cultural connections between the two coasts, which was triggered by the establishment of a Portuguese presence on the African coast, starting on the 15th century. As Costa e Silva puts it, one cannot “[…] write Brazilian History without having a Portuguese perspective and an African perspective”³ (Costa and Silva 2005, 54).

Thus, the Portuguese Empire, by the mercantile world system – 14th to 18th centuries – connected Western Europe, West Africa (and also East) and South America (along with Asia), through relations inherent to the colonial pact. Then, in the 19th and 20th centuries, the states that achieved their independence from Portuguese imperialism (Brazil, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe and Angola) kept their common grounds, such as cultural aspects, bonds and interests based in the South Atlantic.

The concept of system is essential to the understanding of international politics; only through a vision of the coherent, complex and

¹ An acronym meaning Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa, or African Countries with Portuguese as an Official Language.
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³ The original text as follows: “[…] escrever História do Brasil sem ter uma perspectiva de fora, uma perspectiva portuguesa e uma perspectiva africana”.
dynamic entirety of International Relations (economic, political, ideological, cultural, legal, diplomatic and military) it is possible to understand the prevalence of politics in the international arena, since states

[...] seek to obtain a more favorable position in the international scenario, with the aim of promoting their own interests, influencing in issues and problems, increasing their power and changing the power correlation in their favor, or even preserving the status quo (Brucan 1974, 63).

The international system, anarchic at its base, is configured by the actions and decisions of nation-states, influenced by objective forces that act in that system – the structure, capacities and the power relations in a given period – motivating the character and the agenda of the relations between states, and therefore, the very nature of that system (Brucan 1977, 12). While analyzing the historic continuities and breaks in their totality, a definition of the world system becomes evident, and it seeks to overcome the dichotomy between internal and external factors in the explanation of its dynamics.

The (hegemonic) core and its (subordinate) periphery are concepts of a selfsame world system, which elements are interdependent, there being no meaning in considering independent data on one hand and subordinate data on the other. These states (Brazil and PALOP) are understood as peripheral states (Guimarães 1999) in the world system, although with marked differences in their participation, resulting from the specific way in which each colony and resulting state became independent, structured their governments and conducted their foreign relations.

Thus, it is fundamental to understand how the deep forces (geographic factors, demographic conditions, economic forces and nationalism, as Renouvin and Duroselle 1967) express themselves in these countries, as a consequence of historic, political, economic and social transformations, in order to analyze the interests at stake in their respective bilateral relations, and therefore, in their participation in the world system. On the two margins of the Atlantic Ocean, common historical and cultural patterns were established (and mixed), originating societies that were convergent in ideas and interests, which reflect, necessarily, the relations that were established between these peer countries.

The PALOP become apparent as a natural area of focus, interest and influence for Portugal and Brazil, due to the historic-social and cultural links. In this present study, the three main characteristics that guide Brazil PALOP relations in the South Atlantic since 1974/75 will be examined: a) the bilateral interaction; b) the multilateral interaction and c) the recurrence of the value of the South Atlantic region in the current world system, with traces of multipolarity, also identifying how Portugal came to return to the
orbit of the PALOP since the decade of 1980.

Due to the disparities between their economic, political, demographic and territorial characteristic, it is convenient to define Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau and Sao Tomé and Principe as the Small PALOP, as opposed to the Large PALOP (Angola and Mozambique). Despite their shared past and the characteristics that make them peripheral states in the world system, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tomé and Principe have important differences, which become significant in examining their degree of development and their participation in the system. The aggregate study of these five countries is incomplete, since the fact that they shared the same colonial history, and later their post-independence orientation towards the adhesion to some form of socialism constitutes an exceedingly frail basis to enact general analyses.

The similarities between the Large PALOP vis-a-vis the Small PALOP are defined by their historic-cultural conditions, guaranteed by the Portuguese presence in their territories, having trade as an axis, adding to that the slavery of Africans, whose main destiny was Brazil. The export-oriented production of agricultural goods through monoculture (sugar, cocoa and coffee, mainly), tied to the consolidation of a bureaucratic class (that went on to become the post-independence elite), along with the development of a mass of unemployed and precariously employed in concerning social conditions, delimited the economic, political and social structures of these post-colonial states. Chabal (2002) discusses that the political africanization that took place in the continent was a consequence of the process related to the political legacy of colonialism – ideas, practices and institutions – which were “assimilated, transformed and reappropriated by Africa”. The privatization of these states, with their foreign investment capitalization strategies, are strongly connected to clientelism and corruption networks, which ultimately provide most of the necessary resources for its maintenance, such as the exchange of goods and services at the personal level (along with political support).

Another fundamental aspect of the formation of these post-colonial states refers to what Chabal calls hegemonic pursuit, which denotes an effort by the state to be absolutely comprehensive in its actions, seeking to add dynamism in all spheres of public life, without, however, having the effective means to do so. As a result, civil society has “undermined and penetrated the state in many ways, contributing to its weakness and failure” (Seibert 2002, 23). Therefore, the actions of high-level public servants with the effect of privatizing the state (accumulating private wealth in detriment of providing a public service) – many times Portuguese that remained in the African territory, or nationals that had their education in Portuguese
territory and then returned to their homelands – is examined by Chabal (1993; 2002) and Seibert (2002) as resulting from the structure of African pre-colonial societies, in which the “[...] accumulation was a means to attain positions and social status, enabling the redistribution as a mechanism to maintain the social statute and the community’s cohesion” (Seibert 2002, 23). As a result of its historical conditioning factors linked to Portuguese colonialism and to the independence processes, these countries present deep structural deficiencies when they develop their participation in the world system. These deficiencies affect the infrastructure of basic services provided to the population (education, health, sanitation) and of the economy (agriculture, cattle raising, public administration, foreign commerce) that require modernizations and adequations to the demands of development, by means of partnerships with other countries.

Regarding the differences between these two groups of Lusophone countries, they are reflected mainly by their geographic dimensions, more favorable to the first group, enabling a more sustained development, in the medium and long terms, with an abundance of vegetable and mineral resources and an agriculture that is not overly dependent on climate and soil, unlike the Small PALOP. The size of their borders and their coast make Angola and Mozambique countries with greater potential for economic development, and therefore, for social development, besides the chance for a more solid regional presence, with the possibility of negotiations and disputes. On the other hand, the Small PALOP, whose insularity (Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe due to being archipelagoes; and Guinea Bissau, located on the mainland, but amid a Francophone enclave) and reduced territorial dimensions hold back their possibilities for development and autonomous action, tending to restrict their foreign agenda to historical-cultural bonds or to issues in their immediate surroundings.

Brazilian foreign policy and its cooperative action towards the PALOP: the bilateral path

There is an inherent relationship between the domestic factors and the formulation and enacting of a State’s foreign policy. The internal and external realms, despite being independent, cannot be researched in a wholly independent manner, since their structures, actions and actors are linked and cause common effects. Putnam (2010) argues that the discussion about which realm has greater influence over the other is irrelevant, since both influence one another in a direct and balanced way. Therefore, it is up to every state to take into account its domestic responsibilities without neglecting its foreign policies. The interconnectedness of the two
dimensions requires them to be in an established coherence regarding the objectives and the strategies to reach them. In these states, foreign actions have been historically connected to the advances and retreats of their domestic politics (national viability), according to the period’s world system – that is, the degree of international permissibility (Jaguaribe 1980). In the case of the PALOP, the degree of complexity between the domestic factors and the world system’s constraints have, since their independences, deeply conditioned their external action, restricting actions to circumscribed actors and demands that remain, inasmuch as the national viability of these countries passed through distinct conditions since 1974: the small PALOP, with a socialist experiment, with single party regimes, attempted to launch the bases for socioeconomic development, however, without success; the large PALOP, also with socialist experiments, were mired in internal conflicts (with regional and international consequences) and also did not manage to advance in the organization of their States and societies until the decade of 1990.

In this study, we took as a starting point the analysis of Brazilian foreign policy from its fragilities (dependence) and its potential (autonomy) regarding the world system. We also agree with Soares de Lima when she asserts that the orientations of Brazilian foreign policy result, simultaneously, from the necessity of facing the constraints and vulnerabilities caused by the participation of the country in the world system, on one hand, and on the other, by the “attempt to harness occasional margins for maneuver in that system with the objective of redefining its participation” (Soares de Lima 1990, 10, emphasis added).

By seeking to redefine its participation in the world system since 1960, Brazilian foreign policy has increasingly taken into account development and South-South relations as possibilities for expanding the country’s international relations, in the sense of overcoming the Brazilian internal constraints and of those peers, and also reducing their degree of dependence regarding the Central States. We add that the Brazilian foreign policy toward the PALOP – given the social and economic constraints of these countries, which had negative effects on those relations – was based, from 1974 to 2015, on a cooperation action caused by the demands, but complemented by a political or technical element (depending on the period under scrutiny). We extend that concept with the notions brought by Lima, arguing with Souza, in which one must also highlight the

[...] ‘active development policy’ and [...] the needs to ‘articulate a national project oriented towards overcoming the internal unbalances in the first place’. The active participation [of Brazil in the world system] must be sought in the ‘harmonization with countries that have interests similar to our own
and are willing to resist the impositions of the dominant powers’ (Lima, 2005, 11, emphasis added)

This external action – whose more precise notion must be understood as an active development policy, aiming to configure an influence area for the PALOP – was operated with minimally diverse focuses in each stage: from 1974 to 1990, the cooperation with a political focus was the emphasis of Brazilian foreign policy for the PALOP, within the framework of the horizontality that marked Third World thought; from 1990 to 2002, the purely technical cooperation was the conduit that maintained Brazilian presence in those countries; from 2003 to 2015, that cooperation took on, once again, the political focus and sought greater depths in terms of the renewed South-South cooperation.

For the PALOP, it is evident that Brazilian foreign policy fits these relations with the purpose of establishing a direct influence sphere in that African lusophone space, whose external actions – once facing the difficulties of Brazilian foreign policy in consolidating economic links – were based on development as a vector, made concrete by means of cooperation actions.

**Horizontal cooperation (1974-1990)**

This first period was marked by the establishment of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the recently independent PALOP. The years of 1974 and 1975 are, thus, fundamental to understand the way in which Brazil approached the African South Atlantic coast once more, identifying the historic factor as the main conditioning agent (and, conversely, how Portugal, as a consequence of the independence process, distanced itself).

Whereas in the decade of 1950, England and France were preparing to transfer their government power to the African colonies, Portugal made the following argument about its ultramarine possessions:

[Portugal] gradually made clear that it did not see self determination, much less independence, as an option for its African possessions, and this understanding consolidated itself over time, apparently determined to maintain itself at all costs [...] The Portuguese, moving in the opposite direction [of France and England] had not prepared anything that could be left to their successors [in Africa] because they had no intention of abandoning the continent (Arnold 2005, 307).

In the decade of 1950, the Organization of the United Nations (UN) had considerable international authority which was used in order to aid African nationalist movements and decolonization. Portugal’s adhesion to
the UN only in 1955 (as it had been previously vetoed by the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in 1946 due to Portugal’s colonialist stance) became a focal point in discussions. The dissolution of the British, French and Belgian empires in the decades of 1950 and 1960 caused Salazar to be skeptical of the transformation of the British Empire into the Commonwealth. In December 1960, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) approved Resolution 1514 (known as the Anticolonial Declaration). The external pressure, combined with the internal tensions (with an opposition led by intellectuals and politicians), in the end of 1960, led Portugal to abandon its isolation and to accept to initiate a dialogue for decolonization.

The war in the Portuguese colonies began in Angola, in February 1961. The examination of that situation by the UN was focused on two aspects: the Angola crisis, and the lack of adherence by the Portuguese government to the recommendations of that organization. In April, the UNGA approved, by 73 votes in favor, two against (Portugal and South Africa) and nine abstentions (among which Brazil, France and the United Kingdom), the Resolution 1603. Finding that the continuity of disorder and conflicts and the lack of measures to diminish inequalities could put the maintenance of peace and international security at risk, the Assembly, calling on Resolutions 1514 and 1542, decided: on the one hand, to urge the Portuguese government to urgently promote reforms that followed the Anticolonial Declaration; and on the other, established a subcommittee integrated by five members, in charge of investigating the situation. In response to international pressure, Portugal created the Free Trade Zone between the colonies and the metropole, in the following November.

Moita (1985, 504) identifies that the involvement of the Portuguese troops in the struggles for liberation in the African colonies is directly connected to the political orientation of the regime. The Carnation Revolution, in April 1974, must be similarly understood as the beginning of the transfer of power over to the Portuguese colonies in Africa.

While discussing the Portuguese presence in the colonial wars of independence, we must follow closely the simultaneous involvement of the troops in three conflicts (Angola, starting in 1961; Guinea Bissau, after 1963; and Mozambique, from 1964), which required a complex military and logistical engagement. Chabal (2002, 4) points to the military question as determinant of the local complex, along with the issues of the resistance and its campaigns/results. The initiative to carry out insurgencies in these three colonies followed from a practical and ideological base, in which the understanding of the colonial war was the evidence of the intransigence of Portugal’s colonialism in refusing the negotiations for the decolonization.

The Treaty of Friendship and Consultations with Portugal (1953)
linked Brazil to that country, in that time’s world system. From that moment until the beginning of the decade of 1970, Brazilian policy developed an official ambiguity towards the colonial question in Africa. If, on one hand, there was a political commitment attached to the defense of colonialism between Brazil and Portugal, on the other hand, there was an increasingly evident interest on the part of Brazil in establishing contact with Portuguese colonies in Africa (soon to be independent countries). Its text established mutual consultation between the two parts, in international issues, and also promoted the Portuguese-Brazilian Community in the world. Brazil subordinated its position regarding Portuguese colonies in Africa to Portuguese interests, since the document legally embodied the Brazilian-Portuguese friendship.

The year of 1974 must be understood as a turning point in Brazilian policy towards Africa, and, as a consequence, the end of ambiguity on the issue of Portuguese decolonization. The fall of Marcello Caetano, in Portugal, in April, favored the definitive resumption of the anti-colonialist and anti-racist thematic in Brazilian foreign policy. In June 8th, the following year, the Itamaraty, by an official notice, defined, finally, the Brazilian stance as irreversibly favorable to the independence of Portuguese former African colonies, as well as anticipating the recognition of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, which had already declared its independence from Portugal.

By basing itself on the “special bonds of friendship” between Portugal and Brazil, and between Brazil and all the African nations, the Brazilian stance defined, furthermore, the need of a peaceful solution to all independences at stake, which “ensures the respect to all the legitimate aspirations of interested peoples”, reiterating the condemnation of “all

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4 Guinea Bissau declared its independence unilaterally in September 23rd 1973, but it was only recognized in September 10th 1974, under the official name of Republic of Guinea-Bissau; Mozambique achieved independence in June 25th 1975, as the People’s Republic of Mozambique; Cape Verde became independent in July 5th 1975, as the Republic of Cape Verde; Sao Tome and Principe, in July 12th 1975, as the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe; Angola, in November 11th 1975, as the People’s Republic of Angola. In the case of Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau, until 1980 Amilcar Cabral’s ideal of Cape Verde-Guinea Bissau Unity was in place, two independent countries governed by a single party (PAIGC). All governments in the PALOP were ruled under single party regimes until the decade of 1990.

5 The emblematic moment in the open defense of decolonization on the part of Brazil – which had already begun in the XXVI General Assembly of the United Nations of 1972 – took place in 1974, when the Itamaraty received an official communiqué from the Organization of African Unity, asking that the country, “as a friend of Portugal, exert its influence with the new Portuguese government in favor of the concession of independence to Mozambique and Angola, along with the recognition of the independence of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau” (OAU 1974, 67).
policies of colonialist or racist character”, and did not take on any mediation role in the resolution of that situation, but stated that it would offer its collaboration if it was requested “by interested parties to which Brazil feels linked by history, race and culture” (Problema Português 1974, 67).

There was a convergence of Brazilian foreign policy for these countries (and from these countries towards Brazil), although with two distinct stages: a) from 1974 to 1985 (during the presidencies of Geisel and Figueiredo), there was an increasing intensity in the political interactions, along with the identification of demands in economic relations and cooperation possibilities; and b) from 1985 to the first trimester of 1990 (the Sarney presidency), which was marked by the retraction of contacts, especially due to the internal and external constraints in these countries.

Until 1985, the very notion that the country had reached a considerable importance, in political and economic terms, in the world system, along with its strategic position in the South Atlantic, justified its close links with the PALOP. Open ended cooperation agreements were signed with all five countries, and these would serve as base documents in future actions, presenting the themes of bilateral cooperation projects: health, culture, public administration, professional qualification, education, environment, sports, human rights, cooperativism and agriculture (signed with Guinea-Bissau in 1978, Cape Verde in 1977, Angola in 1980, Mozambique in 1981 and Sao Tome and Principe in 1984), which were complemented over the years, accordingly with African demands, by means of adjustments.

The alignment with the Third World, evidenced by the stance adopted at the UN of favoring anticolonial movements, was also emblematic, given the accusations of neoprotectionism and external indebtedness. A key moment in that process was the political activism in alliances and coalitions that sought to strengthen the Brazilian participation in multilateral organisms, such as the G-77, the Amazonian Pact and the Cartagena Group. In the diplomatic documentation of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, there are many references to the synonym terms “mutual cooperation”, “conjugated interests”, “political coordination”, “mutually satisfactory advantages” and even “diplomatic earthmoving efforts”.

In the Sarney government, the creation of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC, from the Portuguese Agência Brasileira de Cooperação) and the Institute for Research and International Relations (IPRI, from the Portuguese, Instituto de Pesquisa e Relações Internacionais), in December 1987, under the authority of the Foreign Ministry, demonstrates how the demands in the area of cooperation were an important topic in Brazilian foreign policy, as a mechanism to complement the political and commercial relations. This horizontal cooperation, that would become mostly technical,
especially in the areas of health, education and human resources, should lead the country’s foreign actions, identifying demands and potentialities. In 1989, the President pointed out the relevance of the area in Brazilian foreign actions, in the sense of “from outside to within”, but mainly in the sense of “from within to abroad”:

The ABC was created to play the role of central organism of the international technical cooperation system of the Brazilian government. The measure represented a considerable operational advance in the treatment given to this matter, since Brazil, previously a mere recipient of international cooperation, had developed its own capacity of also cooperate with friendly nations in the Southern hemisphere. This evolution has led quite naturally to the structuring of the Agency according to two basic guidelines: the receiving of technical cooperation, and the technical cooperation between developing countries (Sarney 1989, 37).

The configuration of the Brazilian cooperation policy, starting with the ABC, was based on the promotion of development (“the solid base for overcoming, peacefully, the obstacles to development”, according to Abreu Sodré 1989, 63). This cooperation was focused mainly on those sectors of the economy considered priorities, both by the donor and the receptor: agribusiness, cattle raising, environment, education, transport, mining, irrigation, healthcare, sanitation, social assistance and the qualification of human resources. In 1989, Veiga Cabral analyzed that Brazilian African policy, which was in its consolidation efforts:

[… the common bonds […] tend to grow closer. Brazil seeks Africa and Africa seeks Brazil. Objectives very different from those times [colonialism]. The main interests are alternatives for economic expansion, as well as its repercussions in international politics. On the African side, the interests are the basic development of infrastructure and the support of one of the leaders of the Third World. Both share a common past, colonialism, both seek through South-South dialogue a solution to their problems, in the increasingly competitive and exclusive universe of the developed. Both, ultimately, seek to enable their complementarities, both economic as well as political (Veiga Cabral 1989, 5, emphasis added).

6 Regarding the PALOP, Brazil has always been either a cooperation donor, or an articulator of three way cooperation.

7 The partnership between ABC and internal or (especially) foreign agencies (such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Development Programme, the Organization of American States and the International Labor Organization) was standardized from this moment onwards, made possible also by the concept of triangulation (the possibility of a developing country to receive cooperation resources from a developed country or international organism, to absorb Brazilian technology), whose base was Brazil.
The basis of educational cooperation, the Student Graduation Agreement Program (PEC-G, from its Portuguese form, Programa de Estudantes-Convênio de Graduação), which had its origin in the end of the decade of 1920 (administered exclusively by the Foreign Ministry until the year of 1967), was developed, since then, on the basis of the signature of joint protocols, with indeterminate duration, between Education Ministries (and Superior Education Institutions) and the Foreign Ministry.

From 1985 to 1990, starting with the stagnation of previous actions, due to the internal and international constraints, there was special attention to cooperation. And important aspect was the Summit in São Luís, Maranhão, in 1989, when President Sarney received the Heads of State and Government of Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, Sao Tome and Principe, and a Special Representative from the President of Angola. In this occasion, the International Institute of the Portuguese Language (IILP) was created, which objectives were to defend and promote the language; to enrich the language as a means for culture, education, information and access to scientific and technologic knowledge; develop the cultural relations between lusophones; provide incentives to cooperation, research and exchange in the realms of culture and language; and spread the Orthographic Agreement.

**Technical cooperation (1990-2002)**

The Brazilian governments from 1990 to 2002 placed the country within the post-Cold War world system’s logic, based on neoliberal globalization, adding greater importance to the market and to economic issues. The relative draining of the Foreign Minister of its prerogatives in the decision making process in foreign policy completed that rescaling of the country’s foreign positioning, which became oriented towards the global North and regional integration, focusing on the MERCOSUL. The African continent was confined to the background inasmuch as Brazilian foreign policy formulation and enacting was concerned, a fact that is demonstrated by the scarce political contacts and a low volume of bilateral trade.

At that moment, there was a reduction of bilateral relations as a consequence of the transformations that the post-Cold War world system imposed on states, with complex transformations both within Brazil and especially on the PALOP (the small PALOP underwent economic and political reforms, and the large PALOP, in addition to them, were either going through a process of stabilization – Mozambique – or facing a civil war – Angola).
In Cape Verde, only in the year of 1988, with the 3rd Congress of the PAICV, the process of internal reforms began. The initial momentum was based on the economy, but that soon spilled over into a political restructuring, which culminated on the presidential elections of February 1991, which marked the institutionalization of a multiparty system in the country. In Angola, constitutional revisions were made in 1992, establishing a semipresidential system, abolishing the death penalty and removing the expression “People’s” from the name of the Republic. In the case of Mozambique, the Constitution of 1990 introduced in the national political system the possibility of organizing political parties, and in 1992 the conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO was ended and the first multiparty elections took place in 1994. In Guinea Bissau, in January 1991, during the 2nd Extraordinary Congress of the PAIGC, President Nino Vieira launched the country’s democratization, altering the Constitution to allow political pluralism and the freedoms of speech, association, assembly and press. In Sao Tome and Principe, the political transition evolved in parallel with economic reform: the new Constitution was approved in March 1990, after the neoliberal adjustments of the end of the decade of 1980, defining presidential and legislative elections in the same year of 1990; in the end of May, the parliament approved the law of political parties.

The line that kept Brazil close to the PALOP in this dynamic period of domestic and international change was technical cooperation, which by the maintenance of a few projects, allowed the country to maintain a minimal continuity with the actions pursued in the previous stage. This cooperation, which between 1975 and 1990, was thought of as an horizontal relationship, that is, between equals, became, between 1990 and 2002, more technical and bureaucratic, with the reduction of projects, budgets and human resources.

The only conceptions that were maintained were those of “relative neighborhood”, “African presence in Brazil, as the true ethnic and social subtract of our country [...]”, or still “condition of developing country which, with differentiated shades and degrees, we share with the totality of the African continent [...]”, as per the diplomatic statements. The lack of economic complementarity was an important obstacle in relations that only did not cease because of the understanding of the “great similarity of physical, climactic and social conditions between Brazil and many African countries” (LAMPREIA, 1995, pg. 202). The selective contacts that were maintained at this time between the margins of the South Atlantic were based on the CPLP, ZOPACAS and the new South Africa.

The ABC, since its inception, was integrated to the General Secretariat of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, but then became an organism of Direct
Administration, with the aim of “coordinating, negotiating, approving, following up on and evaluating, on a national scope, the development cooperation in all areas of knowledge” (Agência 2011). Gradually, the ABC expanded the scope of Brazilian cooperation actions with most African countries, within the framework of “technical cooperation between developing countries”. Within the scope of the PEC-G and the PEC-PG, as well as the PEC-TEC, there was the maintenance of the student exchange of about 50 students from the PALOP going to Brazil annually, between 1990 and 2002, as well as the technical cooperation on the subject of public administration, within the “Public Administration Project”, elaborated and executed by the FUNDAP, with financing from the UNDP, within the concept of three way cooperation.

**South-South cooperation (2003-2015)**

In the contemporary period, during the governments of Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2015), there was a renewal of Brazilian foreign policy to Africa, and especially towards the PALOP. The South Atlantic reemerged as a link in these relations, denominated by Chancellor Celso Amorim (who was Foreign Minister during Lula’s two terms) as a “goodwill belt” (Amorim 2011). A clear concept of foreign policy articulated with defense policy was noted, since the South-South cooperation was guided by a diplomatic strategy that originated in an “authentic wish of exercising solidarity with poorer countries”, but also “to help expand Brazilian participation” in the world system, where cooperation is coordinated “[...] between equals in matters of trade, investment, science and technology and other fields, reinforces our stature and strengthens our position in negotiations regarding trade, finances and climate” (Amorim 2011).

The resumed pragmatism was presented by the President in an interview given to the Algerian press, in 2006, about the relations with the PALOP as a “politico-diplomatic and cooperation reality” (Silva 2006). Chancellor Amorim, in a general analysis about the eight years of his management, stated that the PALOP are “understandably, those with whom Brazil has the longest lasting, most solid and diverse relation” (Amorim 2010a, 233). The Itamaraty had its traditional role recovered in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy as a state policy.

Celso Amorim understood this cooperation as a “diplomatic strategy that was originated in an authentic wish of exercising solidarity with poorer countries”, but also “to help expand Brazilian participation” in the world system, where cooperation is coordinated
“ [...] between equals in matters of trade, investment, science and technology and other fields, reinforces our stature and strengthens our position in negotiations regarding trade, finances and climate. Lastly, but not any less importantly, the construction of coalitions with developing countries is also a way of bringing about the reform of global governance, with the aim of making international institutions fairer and more democratic (Amorim 2010, 230)

In the PALOP, the fifteen years that began in 2000 represented decisive moments in their historic evolution, which allowed that greater approximation with Brazil, but also with Portugal (and the European Union), African powers (Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa) and the international institutions: Angola ended their civil war in 2002, and has set in motion a solid development and regional participation project, which turned the country into an African leader, directly competing with Nigeria and South Africa in regional affairs, but also among the PALOP; Cape Verde consolidated its multiparty democracy, and has increasingly approached the European Union, with the argument of being a geographic bridge between Europe, Brazil and the PALOP, especially performing in the services sector; Guinea Bissau, as in the decade of 1990, deepened its political instability, which generated social and economic chaos, becoming one of the main concerns in the fields of defense and human security among the PALOP (especially in the CPLP); Mozambique also consolidated its democracy in the contemporary era, although with political corruption scandals and increasing tension between FRELIMO and RENAMO, lately; Sao Tome and Principe sought to move gradually towards the institutionalization of its democracy, but suffering with political crises and coups in the surrounding area, especially after the Gulf of Guinea became an oil exporting area, along with Nigeria.

Thus South-South cooperation was consolidated as an instrument of the projection of Brazilian foreign policy. From 2003 to today, there has been an evolution of the bilateral agenda: deepening actions related to development, joining articulated foreign and defense policies, but maintaining cooperative action as the main propelling element. Although with foreign policy guidelines that were very complementary among themselves, there is a difference in emphasis and pragmatism between the Lula and the Dilma governments: the first one was more oriented to the intense resumption of the African agenda in Brazilian foreign policy, especially favored by the programs, projects and actions enacted between 2003 and 2010; whereas the succeeding government only conserved the actions of its predecessor, although with less intensity and no proactivity, merely seeking to maintain the extraordinary external and bilateral gains
obtained in the preceding period.

The Lula and Dilma governments were marked by the increase in cooperation agreements and development programs with Africa, increasing the availability of positions in the PEC-G and PEC-PG programs. The PALOP established themselves as the main beneficiaries by the cooperation agreements, both by the federal institutions and by agreements signed directly with private superior education institutions, through religious associations or NGOs. The cooperation actions in the areas of public administration and human resources qualification, education and agribusiness were configured as pillars of Brazilian foreign policy toward the PALOP.

**Main aspects of cooperative action: programs and results**

Since 1974, cooperative action has been identified as a priority in Brazilian foreign policy, due to the demands historically presented by the PALOP, going through the variables previously presented (cooperation in areas that complemented each other, oriented towards development). As articulating agents in the Brazilian state, we can identify the Foreign Ministry and the ABC, with a competent and realist performance, in an institutionalized cooperation policy. The main area of cooperative action in Brazil has become the formation and qualification of African human resources (education, agribusiness and public administration).

In education, the formation of teachers for the primary and secondary levels, along with the creation of libraries and film libraries, and the introduction of education through radio networks were some of the main initiatives in the decades of 1970 and 1980. Starting in the decade of 2000, the introduction of the *Bolsa Escola* (“School Grant”) and *Alfabetização Solidária* (“Solidary Literacy”) increased the advances in those areas. Since 1978, the PEC-G, and since the decade of 1990 the PEC-PG (similar to the PEC-G, but for post graduation students) have brought, in average, 50 students of the PALOP annually for higher education in Brazilian institutions – with significant increase in the 2003-2015 period (in which an average of 300 students from the PALOP entered Brazil annually).

Regarding cooperation in the area of diplomacy, there was the formation of diplomatic cadres since the decade of 1980, at the Rio Branco Institute, in Brasília (in average, 2 students per PALOP, per year, with grants). On the subject of public administration, there have been semiannual courses in the areas of comptrollership and accounting targeting PALOP public servants, with the participation of the São Paulo Administrative Development Foundation (FUNDAP), of the Public Administration
Institute (IBAM) and the School of Finance Administration (ESAF). In the legal sector, there has been support from the Brazilian Electoral Justice to the electoral census, electoral observers, Superior Electoral Courts, Regional Electoral Courts, census and civil registry, especially in the small PALOP.

Cooperation in the agricultural and cattle sectors was developed with the participation of EMBRAPA (with a regional office inaugurated in 2008, in Ghana), justifying its actions by the Brazilian experience in tropical agriculture, in the attempt of changing the low African agricultural productivity. There has also taken place the formation of human resources (in African and Brazilian territory), the exchange of experiences and technologies, exchange of scientific research, support for the production of fruit (especially bananas and pineapple) and cereals (such as rice, corn, beans and soy), in the raising of cattle (mostly bovines, with the aim of extracting milk, and providing techniques for the development of pastures), along with the demand for a laboratory of animal pathology, and in the extension of rural areas.

In healthcare, there has been the progressive qualification of professionals, with specialization programs or internships, by the concession of scholarships. Joint research programs in scientific areas of common interest (especially referring to tropical diseases), donation of vaccines and medication, exchange of specialists and scientists, the organization of seminars and conferences, the sending and exchanging of equipment and necessary material for the execution of specific projects, also with the establishment of a human milk bank, and generally with the strengthening of primary care being the focus. The Oswaldo Cruz Foundation has become the responsible institution for the exchange of experiences and scientific research. Regarding the qualification of commercial and entrepreneurial sectors of the workforce, the SENAI, SENAC, SESI and SENAR have been the main responsible institutions for the installation of Professional Formation Centers in the capitals of the PALOP.

In the area of defense, there have been significant advances in the training of officers of the PALOP Armed Forces in Brazil and Africa, joint exercises, and constant sales and donations of military equipment. However, it is worth noting that there are specific characteristics to Brazilian cooperation with the small and the large PALOP: with the first group, the actions are still budding, with specific demands, the establishment of representations and military attachés, support and training for coast guards (such as in Cape Verde) and training of marines (in Sao Tome and Principe); in the second group, however, the cooperation actions, that began with the same specific actions of the previous groups, advanced and became more complex. For instance, in Angola, there has been the implementation of
the Program of Angolan Naval Power Development, by means of the Naval Projects Managerial Enterprise (EMGEPRON) of the Brazilian Navy. The Angolan Naval Program includes, along with the construction of shipyards in Angola, the acquisition of six 500 ton patrol ships, the formation of human resources for the construction, maintenance and operation of the ships, shipyards and maritime surveillance system (the creation of the Provisional Joint Defense Committee marks that advance). In the case of Mozambique, the sale of materiel has been the emphasis.

The cooperative action through the multilateral path

Brazil recognizes the African continent as an area of privileged action, and the South Atlantic is the way to this increased narrowing of relations between them. The PALOP, in behalf of historical and social matters, became fundamental partners of the Brazilian foreign policy. This “good will belt” is a Brazilian priority due to two aspects: 1) the cooperative action on the Brazilian foreign agenda, via the bilateral relations pointed previously, and via multilateral ones that are consolidated by the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) and the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) and 2) the repositioning of the South Atlantic as a geostrategic region on the contemporary international system. In this sense, the CPLP has been the legitimizing tool and the ZOPACAS emerged, since 1994, as a promising possibility: both have in their agendas the cooperation.

A converging point refers to the Brazil-Portugal relations and their consequences for the PALOP and CPLP. The content of the Brazil-Portugal relations, historically constituted between closeness and distance, also characterized the way and phases of implementation of the CPLP itself. The two countries, for the same reasons, but in their respective contexts and local-regional-international interests (political influence and economic contacts based on common history and culture), joined forces for the consolidation of the Community, since “it was agreed that Brazil and Portugal would seek for joint cooperation actions on PALOP, in order to test the viability of a common work in the whole continent” (BRASEMB PRAIA, OF C nº1 001-00112 1992, 1). After the African independences, Lisbon stood away for more than a decade from the former colonies, especially by the traumatic way that the independences were conquered (most of them in colonial wars) and by the posture of searching for autonomy in the international system something intended by the PALOP until de decade of 1990.

The convergence around the Portuguese language, which began
in 1989 and extended in the 1990s, was the moment of Portuguese rapprochement, now with the Brazilian competition, in PALOP. The divergence between Brasília and Lisbon, in PALOP, was about the way that the resulting cooperation would take: Portugal identified the Portugal-Brazil relation in PALOP, in the “equation 2+5=7”, as the “ideal”. The Brazilian diplomatic documentation is rich in this sense, since it clarifies the understanding that Brazil had of the multilateral partnership (with the creation of IILP and after the CPLP), as in the “equation 7=7”, more “dynamic and positive”. What prevailed, on this understanding, was the Brazilian positioning, which accomplished the Lusophone community from a cultural content, but with clear political and economic overtones.

The CPLP was born from the convergence of historical and social relations around the maintenance of a common language, having the South Atlantic as a facilitator axis. In July 1996, the creation of the CPLP converted these aspects around a political and cultural conciliation among its members, whose basis started to be the cooperation. Along these eighteen years, the action of the CPLP has also expanded to an agreement in other areas, especially in defense (after 2006). The promotion of security and stability in the South Atlantic, based on the affirmation and protection of common values and interests, has been the tonic of this cooperation. As an example, the reunion of defense ministers from 1998 in Portugal (Brazil as an observer), and the assistance of the Brazilian and Portuguese Marines to the Marines of Angola, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau.

In 2010, at the XII Meeting of CPLP Defense Ministers, held in Brasília, the former minister Nelson Jobim expressed concern relating to concrete joint political actions between the two sides of the South Atlantic, referring to a political and defense agreement, indicating the ZOPACAS as a practicable geopolitical alternative. In 2011, at the XIII Meeting, in Brazil, it was settled among the members the “Cooperation Protocol in the Defense Domain”. As fruits of this specific cooperation emerged the CPLP Strategic Analysis Center (2006) and the uninterrupted accomplishment Felino Exercises. The Armed Forces of the CPLP countries have participated in military exercises since 2000: at the first two years the Felino Exercises took place in Portugal; in 2002, it was held in Brazil; in 2003, Mozambique; in 2004, Angola; in 2005, Cape Verde; again in Brazil in 2006 (in Petrolina/PE); in 2007, in Sao Tome and Principe; in 2008, in Portugal; in 2009, Mozambique and in 2010, in Angola. In 2013 and 2014, the Exercises occurred in Brazil.

Another important point related to the multilateral way, the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) must be understood from the context in which it was suggested and created. In July 1988, Brazil
reunited, in Rio de Janeiro, for the first time, the ZOPACAS countries delegates to coordinate actions, considering that the Brazilian proposal was presumed as “an intra regional understanding effort, of egalitarian nature, by the aim of cooperation to peace and security in our region and the development of our peoples” (Abreu Sodré 1988, 21), in a historic moment that was forwarding to the end of the Cold War changes. The ZOPACAS was stated as a concrete effort of regional policy coordination, of multilateral nature, led by Brazil, as an instrument of the “materialization of the Atlantic-African inheritance” according to Penha (2011).

The II Zone Meeting, in June 1990, took place in Abuja and represented new lines of action between the member states. However, the international background took away its main topic from the Zone:

from the geopolitical view, the relatively significant strategic position played by the South Atlantic during the Cold War was gradually losing its importance and, with it, the very ZOPACAS idea, precisely created by this potential conflict context (Penha 2011, 188).

The Brazilian diplomatic initiative, in 1992, of relaunch under new templates, considering the post-Cold War world system, aimed to foster new regional priorities through collective actions. The final version of ZOPACAS was an informal arrangement between the countries of the South Atlantic basin and the resolutions that institutionalized the Zone, incorporated items such as human rights defense, self-determination of peoples, racial equality and cooperation in national and regional levels, besides seeking encouragement to improvements in regional cargo logistics and in applying the international maritime law.

The independence process of Namibia, the democratization of South Africa, the normalization of the Argentina-Great Britain relations and the peacemaking efforts in Angola contributed to this recovery. The III Zone Meeting happened in September 1994, in Brasília, where the States members adopted the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the South Atlantic, Declaration on the Marine Environment, and the Declaration on Business Cooperation in the South Atlantic, along with the establishment of a Permanent Committee of the ZOPACAS, responsible for the permanent operation of the Zone’s actions. The IV Meeting occurred in Cape Town, in 1996. In 1998, in Buenos Aires, the V Meeting took place, emphasizing “the necessity to fortify bonds between the two South Atlantic margins and consolidate the sub Atlantic region as an important economic basin capable of promoting the economic development of the region” (Penha 2011, 190). In 2007, the VI ZOPACAS Meeting happened in Luanda and resulted in the Luanda Plan of Action; the seventh Ministerial Meeting took place in
Montevideo in January, 2013 and culminated in the Montevideo Plan of Action, the most complete action proposal of the Zone\(^8\).

**Final considerations**

From these notes, it is understood that, historically, the South Atlantic has approached its shores. The political situation has been linked to the cooperative action that guided the relationship between Brazil and the PALOP, as, since the 1970s, the consolidation of an area of regional influence is sought, based on the South Atlantic Ocean, and legitimized by the principles of development and universality of the foreign relations of the country.

Thus, the opening of the diplomatic representations in Praia, Bissau, Maputo, Luanda and São Tomé\(^9\) – in the first period of the Brazilian foreign policy to these countries – converged with the posture to be present in those societies, whose argument of cultural justification and political-diplomatic approach generated the demands for bilateral cooperation and glimpsed possibilities of commercial exchange. Even with moments of closeness (1974/75-1990 and 2003-2015) and distance – with even the reduction of the political profile – (1990-2002), the Brazil-PALOP relations remained with a certain high level of relationship degree of technical, ministerial and business missions, but with low volume of bilateral trade. These ups and downs were a direct consequence of the combination of deep forces in those countries, with historical, social-political, and economic transformations in the past 40 years, which resulted in moments of weakness or action potentialities in the world system.

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\(^8\) The Montevideo Plan of Action contains the objectives, actions and more detailed goals of the Zone (counting 124), listing the main issues that are related to the zone performance, as global governance, disarmament, peace and security, defense, development (economic and financial issues), sustainable development and climate change, oceans and marine resources and international crimes (piracy, drug trafficking, weapons and people, money laundering and other related crimes). It is detailed the understanding of the Member States on mapping and exploration of the seabed, cooperation in the areas of environment, maritime transport, air and port security and maritime security, defense, public security and combating organized crime, as well as the development capabilities (including the exchange of information between the Zone and other regional cooperation mechanisms, such as Africa-South America Cooperation Forum and the dialogue between Member States through the permanent missions of the United Nations or other forums that are relevant for peace and security agenda issues) (PLANO 2013).

\(^9\) In 1975, even before the independence, Brazil installed a Special Representation in Luanda, in March, under the Ambassador Ovídio de Melo command, and a Special Representation in Lourenço Marques, (now Maputo), Mozambique, in April.
The South Atlantic has resumed its role of attraction in the international system configuration of forces in the XXI century, especially by the leaders in their margins – on the west side, Brazil, and, on the eastern side, Angola. Brasília increased its influence in all the PALOP, but the investments in the Great PALOP expanded, which also started to have the presence of Brazilian companies (medium and large).

The educational cooperation – deeply facilitated by language – appeared as one of the main instruments of the Brazilian foreign policy for PALOP human resources training on Brazilian soil, bringing positive results for both countries, for

[...]

By collaborating with the creation of an intellectual elite and policy made from PALOP (competing directly with the Portuguese Higher Education Institutions), Brazil emphasizes that these former students return to their countries to assist in the development and institutional strengthening, undertaking new standards of socioeconomic behavior taught by Brazilian professionals, from a Brazilian experience.

Brazil, thereby, has undertaken and depth, from 1974/75, the cooperation agreements with the PALOP, identifying the corresponding demands and providing its expertise and human and financial resources in the formation of programs and projects. These, increasingly specific to certain sectors of the involved societies, have sought to improve the living conditions and the development of these countries, in the sense of South-South cooperation, since this type of relationship

between the Portuguese-speaking countries should be considered beyond the economic aspect, which limits the cooperation to the effort of market integration. In fact, its design must assume the educational and cultural meaning of becoming closer countries and cultures, in a process marked by the permanent dialogue, allowing the awakening of new possibilities in the consolidation of a widest integration [...].

Another feature that complements the cooperative action was the creation (in the 1980s) and the maintenance of the bilateral Mixed
Committees, a field where the African demands and cooperation possibilities became to be identified within the framework of ministerial meetings and gatherings with representatives of their respective civil societies.

Is important to emphasize that, although the cooperative action is the basis of the Brazil-PALOP relations 40 years ago, there is an elementary basic and generalist design of projects and programs applied to the five PALOP, as the basic Projects of Social Security Modernization, Legal Training of Trainers and Magistrates, Implementation of a Human Milk Bank and a Lactation Center, Implementation of Tele-Health Center and Technical Training Center, in partnership with SENAI.

However, there are important differences in perception, scope and number of agents involved in this operation for the Small and the Large PALOP: in the Small PALOP, it is identified the more generalist programs and projects and others more specifics, especially demanded by the local governments with the aim of remedy a particular area for a certain period (as an example, the implementation project of a cashew peduncle processing unit and other tropical fruits in Guinea-Bissau; the Housing Development Support Project in Cape Verde or the Desalination in Ribeira da Barca). Regarding the Great PALOP, although they have the same range of cooperation projects and programs, is denoted a wider scope and with a greater number of local and Brazilian agents involved and, sometimes, a higher volume of resources, complexity and technology degree covered (for example, actions around the EMGEPRON/Angola, the ProSAVANA Projects, and the construction of an antiretroviral drugs/Mozambique). Clearly, these differences are the direct results of their own socio-economic disparities and of dimension between the Small and Large PALOP, discussed above.

Anyway, this “development action among equals”, which may be more egalitarian in theory than in practice, has effectively occurred since the PALOP became independent, whereas the Brazilian presence in these territories has expanded since the 1970s (although with reluctance from 1990 to 2002). The Brazilian diplomacy recognizes the relevance of the PALOP, which have, in Brazil, a partner capable of supplying part of their basic demands and has sought government after government the maintenance of these ties. So, if “…there is no foreign policy act that does not have an internal policy aspect” (Duroselle 2000, 56), it is understood that internal and external conditions have directly influenced the level of these bilateral relations in certain periods, but not their content.
REFERENCES


ABSTRACT
The celebration of 40 years of independence from Portuguese-speaking African Countries (PALOP) is critical to understand the historical and social, economic and integration into the world system of these former Portuguese colonies in Africa. The socialist experiments in the 1970s and 1980s, the external constraints, economic reform and the move towards a multi-party in the 1990s and the attempt to stabilize and develop in the 2000s, show an overview of successes and failures in the construction of five young countries. This article examines historically the political, economic, social and diplomatic path traveled by the five PALOP, based on the argument that these countries (although staying in the orbit of the former metropolis, especially after the 1980s), approached strategically from Brazil as basis of their political and cultural premises for their survival in the world system.

KEYWORDS
Brazil; PALOP; Cooperation.