THE SECURITY INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: SADC AND OPDS

Nathaly Xavier Schutz

Initial Considerations

The integration processes on the African Continent follows a quite particular logic, as a consequence of the historical and socio-political context in which they were conceived. Security and state-building issues are present in most of these processes, especially in the case of Southern Africa. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is one of the most emblematic examples when it comes to security-integration in Africa, as a result of its origin, established on the necessity these countries had to withstand the apartheid regime in South Africa.

As it occurs with other issues, traditional security theories are not always suitable to understand African affairs. In any case, the approach of Buzan and Weaver’s regional security complexes provides some useful elements for the analysis of the case of Southern Africa, and SADC, in particular.

Regional security complex is defined by Buzan and Weaver (2003, 44) as:

[…] a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.

Within this broader concept, Buzan and Weaver (2003) make a distinction between two major types of regional security complexes: the standard, defined as closer to the Westphalian model, where there are one or more regional powers and a predominant and common security agenda;

---

1 This article is an adaptation of some chapters of the Doctoral Thesis of the author.
2 Universidade Federal do Pampa, Santana do Livramento, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. Email: nathalyschutz@unipampa.edu.br
and the centered, which a regional or global power dominates the security agenda. In this study, our focus, in particular, is the standard regional security complex, as it is the one that better applies to Southern Africa.

In terms of amity/enmity, the standard regional security complexes may be conflict formations, security regimes or security communities. The most important aspect of security in such cases is the relationship between the regional powers inside the region. The conflict formations are a pattern of security interdependence determined by the threat of war and expectation of the use of violence. As for the security regimes, they are a pattern of security interdependence still determined by the threat and expectation of the use of violence, but constrained by a set of rules of conduct.

On the other hand, the security community is defined by Buzan and Waever (2003) as a pattern of security interdependence, in which the units do not plan to use force in their relations. Laakso (2005) describes the security community as a group of states among which war becomes inconceivable and where the states share the perception that force must not be used to resolve disputes between them. Thus, there is the possibility of disputes, although the capacity to resolve them in a peaceful manner is essential.

The objective of this article, hence, is to verify the existence or the possibility of establishment of a security community in Southern Africa, centered in SADC. This study starts from the assumption that there is a historical connection between the countries of the region, which mobilized the beginning of the integration process, that is, the restraining of the apartheid regime in South Africa. It is presumed, thus, that not only there is a sharing of values but also that the end of apartheid leads, as well, to a redefinition of the relationship patterns in the region, expressing a positive evolution in the security scope, demonstrating the transition from a conflict formation to a security regime. Regarding this, the SADC and the OPDS are featured as the main forums for managing security issues in Southern Africa.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), that a few years later would become the SADC, had a very significant historical origin and was preceded by a number of organizations that culminated in the creation of the Frontline States. The context of the apartheid in South Africa determined, to a great extent, the foreign actions of other countries in the region, and not only it motivated the alliance of
these countries around organizations that aimed coordinating policies against the regime of racial segregation, but also supported the movements of national liberation.

In 1975, the Heads of State from Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique created the Frontline States (FLS). The FLS was born as a forum of cooperation between states, without being a formal institution, with the purpose of coordinating policies supporting national liberation movements, and reducing the dependence of the region’s countries in relation to South Africa.

After the independence of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, the Frontline States realized the necessity of addressing economic issues in the region as well. In 1979, the President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, called for a consultative meeting in the city of Arusha, Tanzania. At the time, members of the FLS met to discuss the possibility of an economic alliance between them.

In April 1980, SADCC was formally established by the Lusaka Protocol. While the Frontline States coordinated efforts to support the national liberation movements and to resist the aggressions of South Africa, SADDC tried to reduce the economic dependence of these countries in relation to Pretoria (Murapa 2002). It is important to elucidate, on this matter, that the organization of the Frontline States was not transformed into SADCC: the two organizations coexisted.

The historical moment in which SADCC was created, as well as the background of the organizations that preceded it, make it quite clear that there is a prior history of political and security cooperation over the economic cooperation. In the words of Murapa (2002, 158):

Thus, SADCC was born from the positive experiences of cooperation between governments and societies of Southern Africa in their struggle against colonial resistance and the apartheid policies in the region. Strong bonds of solidarity emerged from a sense of common purpose and collective action against colonialism and racism.

According to Swart and Plessis (2004), the decade of 1990 was a period of change in the process of integration in the Southern Africa. As it is acknowledged, the beginning of the 1990s presented a changing scenario in the entire international system, with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the African continent, especially, it materialized the end of the anti-colonial battles and the abolition of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Consequently, the political and security problems changed, and the opportunity for a greater regional cooperation in these areas arose.
It is in this context of change and new possibilities that, in 1992, the Heads of State from SADCC’s members signed the Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, SADC, known as the Declaration of Windhoek, name of the Namibian city where the meeting was held. At that time, became part of SADC the following countries: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

In August 1994, after the end of the apartheid and the victory in the elections of the African National Congress, South Africa joined SADC. Four years later, during the meeting in Blantyre, other members were admitted to the forum: Democratic Republic of Congo and Seychelles. In 1995, the Republic of Mauritius also became a member. The last member to join the SADC was Madagascar, in the SADC Silver Jubilee Summit, in 2005.

Map 1: SADC

The Organ for Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS)

As examined earlier, SADC is not restricted to an essentially
economic integration process. The tendency to discuss political and security issues is in the origin of the rapprochement between the countries of Southern Africa, translated into the various organizations created in order to support the national liberation movements in the colonies and to fight the apartheid regime in South Africa.

As the proximity between the countries evolved and there was an increase of institutionalization in this integration process - that occurred with the transformation of SADCC to SADC -, the necessity to create a specific body to deal with political and security issues became evident. It is in this context that it was created the Organ for Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS).

According to Williams (2004), until the creation of the OPDS, the security issues in SADC states could be described as operationalized in three levels. The first level corresponds to the meetings of the Frontline States: the region’s leaders met to resolve crises and find the best way to manage security problems collectively. That was the pattern adopted, especially before the creation of SADCC, still in the 1970s.

The second level of operationalization was the Interstate Security and Defense Committee (ISDSC), created under the Frontline States and later incorporated into the SADCC. During the 80s and early 90s, according to the author, the ISDSC coordinated the defense activities of the region’s countries. The Committee was formed by three primary subcommittees - defense, policing and public security - which were divided into specialized analysis sectors. The third level arose with the formalization of the OPDS in 1996.

The imperative to create an organ of defense and security in SADC, according to Malan (1998), became more evident in 1994, when the Frontline States decided independently to close the organization’s activities and become the political and security-arm of SADC. Furthermore, the SADC Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security, held in July 1994, recommended that the Organization got involved, formally, in cooperating on matters of security-coordination, conflict mediation and military cooperation.

On the following meeting of SADC’s Foreign Ministers, in 1995, it was determined the creation of the Association of the Southern African States (ASAS). The ASAS, according to Cilliers (1999), should act with an independent structure from SADC’s Secretariat and would report directly to the Summit of Heads of State or Government of SADC.

The creation of the ASAS, however, was postponed and ended up not occurring. To Cilliers (1999), this delay in the creation of the ASAS
is a consequence of Zimbabwe’s President position, Robert Mugabe, that believed he was the one who should play, in this new organization, the same leadership role he had among the Frontline States, which contradicted the increasingly important role of South Africa. Therefore, the establishment of the ASAS, in particular, was not mentioned in the final report of the 1995 Summit, which mentioned only the necessity to establish the Politics, Defense and Security sector and the granting of more time for the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense to discuss the issue.

Once acknowledged the perception that there was an imperative to institutionalize the treatment of political and security issues within the SADC, in January 1996, a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security of SADC was held. As a result, it was recommended to the Heads of State and/or government the creation of an organ that would serve for this purpose. Accordingly, at the meeting of the SADC Summit of 1996, the Organ for Politics, Defense and Security was created.

The OPDS was created with an independent structure from SADC, without the obligation to report to the Summit or any other organ of the organization. This dual structure with two Summits significantly undermined the functioning of the OPDS, creating a situation in which decisions were made in two instances, however, with no hierarchy between them.

This problem was aggravated by the polarization between the SADC member states, represented by South Africa and Zimbabwe. While South Africa, governed by President Nelson Mandela, argued that, based on the SADC Treaty, there wasn’t any assumption for the creation of a body that could act separately from the organization; Zimbabwe, represented by Robert Mugabe, as highlighted by Malan (1998), argued that there was no legal restriction to the functioning of the organ independently, and that it would follow the model of the extinct FLS, which was of a more flexible and informal administration.

It must be highlighted that, in addition to a different point of view in relation to technical and legal issues, this two perspectives involved a personal dispute between Mandela and Mugabe, who were, at the time, respectively the Presidents of the SADC Summit and the OPDS Summit. The problem of the independent structure of the Board, as well as the confrontation between the two Presidents, was treated at a Summit of SADC held in the following year, with no practical result. This event, as noted by Malan (1998), was repeated in subsequent meetings. The issue would only be resolved with the restructuring of SADC and the Protocol on Defense, Politics and Security.
In Blantyre Summit, held in 2001, the Cooperation Protocol on Defense, Politics and Security was adopted, and the formulation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO\(^3\)), which was signed in 2003, was decided. The Protocol modifies the organ’s structure and incorporates SADC’s structure itself, ending a long disagreement represented by the positions of South Africa and Zimbabwe. The OPDS operates on a troika\(^4\) basis and now the President refers to the SADC Summit. Immediately below the troika, there is a Ministerial Committee, comprised by the ministers of SADC who are responsible for Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security.

The Ministerial Committee is divided into two subcommittees: the Inter-state Politics and the Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), where the Ministers of Foreign Affairs act; and the existing Inter-state Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) comprising the Defense and Security Ministers. The ISPDC is responsible for pursuing the objectives of the Organ relating to politics and diplomacy, while the ISDSC performs functions of defense and security policies, which were already performed since the existence of the Frontline States\(^5\).

The objectives presented by the Protocol, according to Hammerstad (2004), include both traditional security issues and aspects of human security. Therefore, the concern for the sovereignty and territorial integrity - represented in military relations between states and in the signing of a mutual defense pact –coexists with the protection of the population and with the assurance of a stable environment for the promotion of socioeconomic development, which reinforces the recognition of the necessity to address the countries’ internal security problems.

It is present in the Protocol (SADC 2001c) the jurisdiction of the Organ, specifically, the issues in which it has competence to act. Concerning the interstate conflicts, the OPDS should intervene when the contest includes: a conflict over territorial boundaries or natural resources; a conflict in which aggression or other form of military force occurred or is about to occur; a conflict that threatens the peace and the region’s security or the territory of a member state that is not a participant on the conflict.

In relation to intrastate conflicts, the OPDS should try to resolve

---

\(^3\) Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ.

\(^4\) Commite composed by three members.

\(^5\) Both ISPLC as ISDSC could create substructures to act on specific issues within their areas. The ISDSC at the time of the reform already counted, according to Isaksen and Tjønneland (2001), with a set of subcommittees in its structure, with a very significant presence of the defense subcommittee. Furthermore, it was also submitted to its structure, in the area of public security, the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operationOrganisation (SARPCCO).
conflicts involving: large-scale violence between sections of the population or between the government and sections of the population, including genocide\(^6\), ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights; military coups or other threats to the legitimate authority of a state; civil war or insurgency; a conflict that threatens peace and security in the region or territory of another member state.

The action of the OPDS, therefore, is restricted to some conflict situations; therefore, not all conflicts, even the ones involving member states, are subjected to the organ’s intervention. In addition, it was not established the methods and criteria to identify and classify conflicts, or threatens of conflict, in those cases. The idea of “threat to peace and security in the region”, for example, is very broad. Besides, it allows more restricted interpretations, which would result in a reduced number of possibilities of intervention; or it allows a wider interpretation, which could include, ultimately, any type of conflict.

Cooperation in the field of defense and security in SADC is going through a transitional phase. A significant portion of the problems faced after the end of apartheid and independence, represented by internal conflicts, has been resolved. An example of this achievement is the end of the civil war in Angola. Notwithstanding, new issues emerge, such as the political stability of these countries, and coexist with the permanence of some classic security issues, which have not been solved yet. This combination of contemporary problems that require new strategies of cooperation, with the existence of traditional security issues, obstructs progress in the region’s security integration, and brings difficulty even for the choice of which strategy to follow.

One of the aspects addressed by the SIPO is the state security. In this context, it is highlighted the concern shown in relation to threats, both internal and external, to sovereignty and the economic interests of the countries. It is also important to point out the progress in cooperation between the intelligence sectors, including at the bilateral level. Among the most prevalent problems listed, it is evident, once again, the interrelationship between issues of socioeconomic development, political stability and security: negative effects of globalization, such as increased vulnerability of

\(^6\) Under Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide Crime (1948), genocide is understood as any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious injury to the physical or mental integrity of members of the group; c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life that would lead to physical destruction in whole or in part; d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Similar definition is described in the Statute of the International Criminal Court.
national borders and the rise in drug and human trafficking; effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic; scarce resources; and food safety.

It is important to observe that the question regarding the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity is always guiding principles and objectives of SADC, even in documents that do not relate to security aspects. This concern is more than natural, since those are countries that have been invaded and colonized and which independences are still very recent. It should remain clear, however, that such posture is not an obstacle for cooperation in political and security issues; the concession of part of the sovereignty should not necessarily be part of the integration process, nor should be seen as an indication for its success.

Advances in security integration in Southern Africa

Security problems in Africa, as highlighted Buzan and Waever (2003), are both at the domestic level and in the relations between states. The origin of these problems, nonetheless, are, mostly, domestic issues such as refugee flows and civil wars; for that reason, the authors declare that the interaction in terms of security in the region is given, much more, by the weakness of the states than by their strength. Söderbaum (1998) share the opinion of the authors, stating that the main sources of insecurity in Southern Africa are domestic conflicts.

Southern Africa can be classified as a standard regional security complex, with a key regional power, South Africa, and a defined regional organization7. To Hammerstad (2004), from a historical perspective, the hostilities between the apartheid regime in South Africa and its neighbors were the main reason for the region to have become a regional security complex. Initially, as stated Buzan and Weaver (2003), the tension between the segregationist regime of South Africa and the recently independent countries of the region created a regional security complex of conflict formation. In this sense, the central feature was the mutual interference in domestic affairs divided between South Africa and its allies on the one hand, and the Frontline States, on the other.

Since the end of the apartheid in South Africa, the region has evolved from a conflict formation into a security regime, supported by the creation of the SADC and the incorporation of South Africa. The progress achieved, however, as emphasized by Buzan and Waever (2003), was

7 According to Buzan and Waever (2003), the correlation between the regional organizations with regional security complex must be made with caution, because not always these organizations correspond to a regional complex.
compromised by disputes, especially between Zimbabwe and South Africa, and the stagnation of the OPDS.

According to Hammerstad (2005), SADC can be understood as an emerging security community, a stage in which they begin to coordinate their actions and raise their interaction in order to increase security and mutual trust. In some sectors, the Community already has characteristics of a rising security community, identified by the construction of regional institutions and by the reduction of the feeling of threat from one country to the other.

As highlighted by Kelly (2007), however, one should be careful when using the security theories and integration in developing countries, especially in Africa. The main complications reside in the different problems and concerns that African countries face. In this sense, not always the concept of common enemy is the one that will guide the rapprochement of African countries in terms of security.

It is useful, therefore, to refer to the concept of Job (1997) of ‘internal security dilemma’. According to the author, some states are facing internal problems that threaten the stability and the maintenance of the government in matters of power; these would be the states qualified by classical theories of security as weak or failed. In Job’s words (1997, 181):

> The fundamental interests of those in power in these states are regime survival and maintenance of the status quo or restoration of the status quo ante. Thus, within their international context, their concern will be to shore up the principles of noninterference in domestic affairs, the preservation of territorial integrity, and the entrenchment of sovereignty. International institutions will be attractive to them to the extent that these institutions foster such norms and are capable and are willing to mobilize on their behalf.

The attention, consequently, turns to the intrastate over the interstate conflicts. In this sense, Ayoob (2002, 35) states that the process of decolonization and the subsequent necessity for state-building, in a much more vulnerable environment to external interference than that in which the construction of European states occurred, is the explanatory factor for a large part of the conflicts in these countries. The new states thus “redefined the very notion of security dilemma by making it primarily a domestic rather than an interstate phenomenon.”

Many African countries still face problems related to sovereign consolidation, especially from the domestic point of view. This, as noted
by Kelly (2007), turns the subjects of internal security into a much more important issue than those of external security, making interstate wars very rare in those countries. Such countries would not have the intention to conquer the territory of its neighbors; on the contrary, they would desire to cooperate to oppose the internal threats, which are very similar.

The Southern Africa region, despite having passed through a period of stabilization and conflict solving during the 1990s, with the end of the civil war in Mozambique, and the abolishment of the apartheid regime in South Africa, still presents instability outbreaks and some relevant conflicts. Table 1 shows the conflicts in SADC countries that currently involves seven of them: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

According to Ngubane (2004), the sources of military insecurity in Southern Africa, most of the time, do not correspond to the traditional threat, that is to say, a military conflict between two or more countries. On the contrary, the insecurity emanates from the conflicts that have ended and the challenges of (re)build the stability and security of the State and its population. The author’s statement is confirmed with the data in Table 1, since most conflicts are now internal and, in many cases, derive from the confrontations originated during the process of decolonization and independence, as is the case of Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

From the political perspective, the major challenge is state stability and political control of its territory. As noted by Ngubane (2004), in many cases, the source of insecurity comes from the perception of the state as the exclusive center of power, and the dispute for the state control by different actors, viewed as the only way to ensure their interests. This situation is aggravated, and often made possible, by the illegal arms trade, which was originated from past conflicts, especially during the Cold War, when the different sides of the conflict were supported and armed by the US and USSR.

In general, with the exception of the Democratic Republic of Congo9,  

9 The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo is an exception in many ways. First, because it is not an exclusively intrastate conflict, since it clearly involves Rwanda and Uganda. Second, the conflict relations also involve Central Africa. Third, the conflict is of greater intensity than other conflicts of the region: while others are categorized as violent crisis (intensity 3), the Democratic Republic of Congo has war (intensities 4 and 5). The peculiar situation of the DRC, thus, creates difficulty in its analysis, especially in comparison to other crises in Southern Africa, since the Congolese question involves countries outside the region and, to some extent, compromises the stability of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Thus, it is understood that considering the advancement or retreat of the conflict only from the point of view of Southern Africa would be an excessive reduction of the analysis; similarly, consider
Table 1: Conflicts in SADC (Source: Elaborated by the author, utilizing data from Conflict Barometer (2012)).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Conflict Parties</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Intensity*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>FLEC; Government</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Separatism; resources</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNITA; Government</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Central power</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Angola; RDC</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Territory; resources</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Basarwa; Government</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Congolese Rally for Democracy – Goma [ex-CD-G]; Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR); Interahamwe militia; Government</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Regional control; resources</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enyele; Government</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Regional control</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC); Rally for Congolese Democracy (RDC); Government</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Regional control; resources</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RDC; Rwanda</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FDLR; Nyatura; Mayi-MayiCheka; RaiaMutomboki; FDC; APCLS; Mayi-MayiShetani; M23</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Regional control; resources</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hemamilitia; Lendumilitia; Mayi-Mayi; Government</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Regional control; resources</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uganda; RDC (Lake Albert)</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Territory; resources</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Swaziland; South Africa</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IFP; ANC (KwaZulu-Natal) (1990)</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Regional control</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Movement (PUDEMO);</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Central power</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (STFU);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Swaziland; South Africa</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Uamsho; Government</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Separatism</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CUF/Zanzibar; Government</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change (MDC);</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Central power</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1: Dispute; 2: Non-violent Crisis; 3: Violent Crisis; 4: Limited War; 5: War*
it is possible to separate conflicts into two major groups. The first group includes the conflicts caused by some sort of regional demand for greater participation and/or political representation, which is the case in Tanzania with the region of Zanzibar, and South Africa with the Kwa Zulu region. The second group involves countries in which the conflict takes place due to some sort of restriction on political participation and/or the persecution of the opposition, which includes the cases of Angola, with the long-running dispute between UNITA and MPLA, Swaziland, with restrictive legislation for political parties, and Zimbabwe, with the violent acts against the MDC.

Some characteristics are common to most of the conflicts mentioned, and once respected the peculiarities of each case, this fact allows us to draw a pattern of security issues and democratic institutionalization faced by the Southern African region. The first aspect of these crises and/or conflicts is the source: except for Angola10, all the others have roots in the 1990s, during the reconfiguration of the international system in the post-Cold War. During the Cold War, many conflicts and governments were promoted and sustained by the economic and military resources provided by the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War alters, significantly, this pattern of relationship. The decline and consecutive disintegration of the USSR drastically reduced the support sent to African countries; the US, however, no longer had much interest in Africa, since its main purpose - to contain the spread of communism - supposedly had been reached. In this new context, many governments failed to receive assistance, whether from the US, or from the USSR. This fact allowed, in some cases, an advance of the opposition forces.

In addition to the beginning of the post-Cold War period, the 1990s were also a time marked by two other aspects of great importance: the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the adoption of economic and political liberalizing reforms in the African continent. The transformations in South Africa had not only a domestic impact, but in the entire region of Southern Africa, as discussed throughout the study. The reintegration of the post-apartheid South Africa, which was represented by the country’s admission into SADC, reconditioned relations in Southern Africa. As noted by Clapham (1996), the 1990s featured a context of reforms in most African countries, which, being economically fragile and suffering not only the impact of the end of the Cold War and the supposed victory of liberal
regimes but also the rising of a more expressive public opinion in Africa, are externally pressured to implement multiparty governments.

Another characteristic to be highlighted in these crises is the subject of political representation and elections. The problem of political representation and restriction of parties, both in its functioning and in its participation in the elections must not be minimized. It is evident, however, that this is a step forward in the pacification process of the region. In most cases, the greatest violent crisis, civil war itself, has come to an end, thus opening space to a later stage in development, the rearrangement of forces and political representations. It can be said, therefore, that these political crises are part of the process of state building in Africa, after decolonization. Undoubtedly, African countries are also in the process of structuring its institutions; a period, in particular, suitable to disputes and conflicts. That is why regional organizations can play a key role in helping these processes and support the implementation and maintenance of democratic institutions, especially in missions of election observation.

Although not among the countries in conflict, Madagascar is an important example of the role of regional organizations in domestic crises. The role of SADC in Madagascar has been significant since the beginning of the crisis: in 2009, a series of protests and manifestations took place, carried out by supporters of Rajoelina, the primary opponent of President Ravalomanana, when the television channel owned by Rajoelina was closed by Government. This event was followed by acts of repression, deaths and an army’s rebellion. Ravalomanana then delivered the power to a military joint, which by its turn, passed the power to Rajoelina, obligating Ravalomanana to leave the country.

The new government was not recognized internationally and Madagascar was suspended from both SADC and the African Union. Initially, SADC defended the restoration of the Ravalomanana government, including through OPDS statements. As the situation unfolded, SADC changed its position and indicated the former Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano to mediate negotiations between the different political forces. The negotiation concluded, according Cawthra (2010), with an agreement that established a fifteen months transition with a coalition government. The elections of 2013, supervised by SADC, marked the resumption of the democratic path for the country, which went through four years of political and economic destabilization.

Unlike the other operations implemented by SADC before the 2001

---

11 According Cawthra, it was considered including an intervention by SADCBRIG, position taken by Swaziland.
reforms, the missions in Madagascar occurred with prior authorization of the Community, in consonance to the provisions of the Treaty and the Protocols. A consequence of this is the absence of significant questioning about the legitimacy of the operation.

Moreover, it can be recognized a greater unity between SADC members. Even though there was the selection of a head of Mission, from a determined country, there was not, at least not in an intensified and declared mode how it had been in previous operations reform, a position of division between countries in relation to the Mission. Of course, in part this is related to the very planning of the operation and legitimacy already mentioned. On the other hand, it is also indicative of the existence of a shared vision of SADC States in relation to security and political and institutional stability, demonstrating a significant improvement compared to the 90’s.

It is noticeable that there have been significant progresses in the political and security issues in the Southern African region. The improvements in the regional context, although some conflicts still exist and there are questions to be resolved, elucidate the importance of the main regional organization in this process. The strengthening of SADC and, in particular, the institutionalization of OPDS were indispensable facts to the evolution of security cooperation between countries, in the same way that represents the major forum for addressing these issues.

**Final considerations**

Southern Africa has undergone major changes, from the decolonization process until the last decade. It is clear that the initial problems, originated from the states’ independence and from the construction of its political and bureaucratic structures, have now been largely solved. Other subjects, however, arise from the very development of those states.

One of the aspects addressed in the SIPO relates to these latest issues: the concern for common values and state-building in the region. SIPO (SADC, 2003: 16) states that:

The strengthening of existing common values and culture is at the center stage of cooperation among Member States. Whereas conventional borders confer nationality to citizens, cultural values transcend boundaries. The process of building the nation-state is taking place in tandem with the process of building the SADC Community.

There is, therefore, the recognition of the process of state building as being concomitant to regional integration. It is of great value, thus,
resuming the assertion that in the case of Southern Africa, participation in an integration process is not seen as a loss of sovereignty, but rather as an affirmation of its mechanism. Likewise, it doesn’t seem appropriate that, for every integration process, transferring part of sovereign, namely, the degree of supra nationality should be used as an indicator for the integration success.

It must be mentioned the position of part of the literature, which argues that the lack of construction of common values between the states of the region likely leads to a failure of the integration process. For Nathan (2004), for example, one of the major problems that prevent the creation of effective security cooperation between the countries of Southern Africa is the lack of common values among the member states. Distinctively, Hammerstad (2003), defends that despite the countries of the region diverge between the traditional view of security and human security perspective, this does not indicate the absence of common values among the leaders of Southern Africa. The history of struggle for independence and against colonialism and the mobilization against apartheid, with the exception of South Africa, assure the sharing of common values.

The historical factor, therefore, once again is relevant to the construction of the integration process in Southern Africa. The idea of sharing common values to the formation of effective security cooperation does not necessarily require the identification of a common external enemy. Shared values, in the case of Southern Africa, are present in the history and construction of these states, which, in turn, also define security relations of the South African sub-regional system.

It seems plausible, therefore, to conclude that Southern Africa - and SADC, in particular - is in a process of construction of a security community, even though it is at its embryonic phase. The consolidation of the organization, as well as the strengthening and expansion of the OPDS performance, indicate a maintenance road to build these ties among states in the region. In addition, they strengthen the conception of a collective vision on security issues that must be addressed in consonance, since they relate to the region, and not only to certain states, establishing thus the SADC as the principal forum not only for the resolution of disputes, but also to formulate joint policies.
REFERENCES


ABSTRACT
The African continent’s security problems are, for the most part, originating in the processes of colonization and decolonization occurred during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In Southern Africa, particularly the apartheid regime from South Africa marked, in a very significant way, the construction of a common identity and the rapprochement among other countries in the region around security issues. The objective of this study is to evaluate the evolution of SADC over the 1990s and 2000s, with regard to International Security aspects in order to analyze to what extent the organization has contributed or not to the resolution of the political and security problems in the region, especially in periods of crisis. The analysis will focus on the creation and the modifications of the Organ for Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The central hypothesis of the study is that the SADC, and the OPDS in particular, are the main spheres of treatment of securitarian issues in Southern Africa and, over the years, contributed to the evolution of solving these problems. The study will use bibliographic and documentary review, adopting a historical approach, aiming a temporal comparison of the case.

KEYWORDS
Africa; Southern Africa; Integration; OPDS; SADC.