GOVERNMENT, STATE, AND NATIONAL WARS IN AFRICA

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Introduction

To what extent were internal wars in African countries after World War II conditioned by their limited levels of governmental entrenchment and statehood? This is the central issue guiding the following research, which focuses on African countries in the post-World War II period, a period in which the system of sovereign States — with its origins in modernity and formally in Europe with the Peace of Westphalia treaties of 1648 — reached the vast majority of the international system. To achieve this objective, the following article is structured as follows.

The first section aims to present, in the first instance, empirical information about the relative weight that internal national wars had on the international system in general and in Africa in particular, followed by a presentation of the different propositions about the conditioning factors of this type of war in the international system and African States, and, finally, establish guiding hypotheses for the empirical research of the study. The second section describes the methodological project followed to test the hypotheses defined in the first section. The third section presents the empirical results of the research and the data analysis. Finally, the article develops a conclusion that systematizes the main aspects of the study.

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Conditions for National Wars in the International System

Regarding internal national wars, it is possible to argue that they are a type of armed conflict[3] that meets two requirements: they occur exclusively within the national borders of a State; do not involve the participation of other external States supporting either side of the conflict. In simplified terms, these wars can be called national wars. As shown in Table 1 below, national wars have been predominant in the international system since the end of World War II, accounting for 52% of the total wars in the system compared to other types of wars. If we reduce the global data and restrict it exclusively to the African continent during the same period, as shown in Table 2, national wars have also been predominant, with the same relative weight of 52% as they have in the international system.

Table 1: Frequencies and percentages of war onset by type in the international system 1946-2015

			Intrastate			
Years	Interstate	Extrastate	Internationalized	National	Non-State	Totals
1946-1955	4	7	0	12	4	27
1956-1965	7	3	8	14	1	33
1966-1975	9	3	7	20	3	42
1976-1985	7	2	13	18		40
1986-1995	6	1	7	32		46
1996-2005	5	4	7	27	1	44
2006-2015	1	1	9	9		20
Total	39	21	51	132	9	252
%	15	8	20	52	4	100

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3 According to the Correlates of War, a war is a militarized conflict between groups with the power of force that results in at least 1,000 combatant deaths in a one-year period among all involved parties in the conflict (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010: 39-75). Based on this definition, it is possible to identify three broad categories of war - international, national, and non-State - and within them, different and more specific subtypes. Within the structure of international wars, we can find interstate wars, exclusively fought between States on both sides of the conflict; intrastate wars, fought within a State system, with one side directly supported by another State in the international system; and finally, extrastate wars, fought by a State or a coalition of States against an armed group that is not a member of the interstate system. National wars are wars fought exclusively within one state, and the conflicting parties do not receive support from any State in the international system. Non-State wars are wars fought between groups that are not members of the interstate system.

Source: By the authors. Based on data from Sarkees and Wayman (2010), Dixon and Sarkees (2016).

Tabela 2: Frequencies and percentages of war onset by type in Africa:

| Years | Interstate | Intrastate | | | | Totals |
		Extrastate	Internationalized	National	Non-State	
1946-1955		2		0		2
1956-1965		3	2	5	1	11
1966-1975	1	1	2	5	1	10
1976-1985	2	0	7	3		12
1986-1995		0	3	10		13
1996-2005	1	0	6	14	1	22
2006-2015		0	3	2		5
Total	4	6	23	39	3	75
%	5	8	31	52	4	100

Source: By the authors. Based on data from Sarkees and Wayman (2010), Dixon and Sarkees (2016).

Based on these data, national wars, both in the International System and in Africa in particular, constitute a type of social conflict that deserves to be investigated in terms of possible causal factors. It is worth noting that, although this type of war has been the most frequent in the International System, scientific development on the pathology of war and its causal factors has shown more progress in favor of the study of wars between States. However, this does not mean that theoretical and empirical scientific study of this type of war has been neglected, as it is possible to identify a series of theories and studies on this type of war that, with emphasis on political, economic, and social aspects, have sought to explain the fundamental causes of the pathology of national war in the State system. In general terms, theoretical approaches that addressed the study of conditioning factors of what we call, in this study, national wars can be organized into five perspectives: modernization; grievances; greed; State capacity; global power distribution.

One of the theoretical references for the *modernization* approach was Samuel Huntington ([1968] 1997). According to this author, the combination of poverty and social mobility can be a factor of instability, especially in developing countries. As a central proposition, he argued that if the level of participation is higher than the level of institutionalization, conditions for

instability and the emergence of internal conflicts are created. In this sense, he argued that the most important political difference between countries is not their form of government, but the degree of governance they have. The differences between democracies and dictatorships are not as great as those between countries whose political systems are based on a general consensus that gives them legitimacy and those that do not have these qualities. Totalitarian, communist or liberal countries belong to a category of states that are efficient in how they exercise governance and authority, as opposed to weak states that have major problems in exercising authority.

The theoretical perspective known in the field as the grievance perspective focuses on explaining these types of wars in terms of socio-economic, ethnic, or even religious and racial conditions. These approaches conjecture that states with high levels of underdevelopment, inequality, low levels of economic growth, and low levels of education face the greatest risks of internal conflict (Collier et al. 2003; Ballentine and Sherman 2003). To a large extent, this explanation contrasts with the classical explanation of relative deprivation developed by Gurr (2011 [1970]), who argues that the most unstable states are not those with large disadvantaged sectors but those where a privileged part of the population experiences frustrated improvements according to their redistributive references. Within the scope of these approaches, there is also the proposal of Mary Kaldor (2001), who asserts that the new wars, many of them of a national nature, are characterized by being associated with the emergence of groups that, through conflicts, express interests of a religious, ethnic or racial nature.

A third general approach to the conditioning factors of national wars has been termed the greed-centered approach. These approaches assert, as a proposition, that internal armed conflicts within countries are conditioned by the low cost of rebellion for certain resource-predatory groups with high market value natural resources. Through the control and trade of these resources, which can take different forms such as diamonds, oil, illicit drugs, etc., rebel groups finance their attempts to become monopolizers of violence in a given territory and, in this sense, constitute groups that challenge the internal sovereignty capacity of States. Much of the conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and some countries in Latin America can be explained by this dynamic (Keen 1998; Grossman 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Ross 2006).

A fourth theoretical approach focuses on State capacities. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argued that politically weak states, those that have recently gained independence, have limited levels of political entrenchment, and are often under the tutelage of foreign governments, are the most prone to insta-

bility and internal war. From the same perspective, Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch (2001) provide empirical evidence that clearly identifies that anocratic political regimes, that is, less consolidated political regimes, are more likely to experience internal wars than democratic or autocratic regimes. DeRouen and Sobeck (2004) focused on the effects of bureaucratic quality and army size on the duration of internal war, identifying that effective bureaucracies, rather than government army size, reduce the probability of rebel group victory in a conflict. Peksen, Taydas, and Drury (2008) identified that weak states are more prone to internal wars, while those with high taxation rates and redistribution capacity are less likely to suffer internal conflicts.

A fifth approach, with less relative weight than the previous ones, on the phenomenon of internal wars focused on the distribution of global power. From this perspective, it is argued that states in the international system with lower levels of relative distribution of international power are more likely to initiate internal wars. Under this perspective, power inequality makes it very difficult for weak states to ensure internal security and well-being. In this sense, what happens at the local level is the result of the distribution of capacities at the international level; these factors prevent weak states from strengthening themselves to ensure greater stability (Hironaka 2005). After analyzing the main approaches and empirical findings on the conditioning factors of intrastate wars, we present, below, an analysis of the main contributions on the conditioning factors of this type of conflict in Africa.

The conditioning factors of national wars in Africa

The issue of security in Africa is closely tied to the question of the State itself. The concept of the State is, in many cases, strongly related to the region's major security problems. Indeed, in some ways, the failure of the Westphalian-based system of government is one of the factors fueling the region's security problems. According to McLean (2001), there is a clash between the pressures of the traditional Westphalian model and the regional needs of current models that would work in Africa. One of the central issues is the concept of borders and its perception as a guide for decision-making. In the African case, however, borders do not necessarily correspond to the traditional patterns of population behavior or the security realities of citizens.

Security problems in Africa, as Buzan and Waever (2003) refer, exist at both the internal and interstate levels. However, the source of these problems are, above all, internal issues, such as refugee flows and civil wars.

Söderbaum (1998) shares the view of the authors that the main source of insecurity in Southern Africa is internal conflict. As Herbst (2000) notes, the formation of the State in Africa follows a different path than that in Europe theorized in Tilly's work (1996). Unlike the context of conflict and war as a mechanism for state-building, cooperation characterizes the state-building process on the African continent. The occurrence of wars between states is, therefore, much rarer.

However, as Kelly (2007) points out, care must be taken when using security and integration theories in developing countries, especially in Africa. The main concern lies in the different problems and concerns faced by African countries. In this regard, the concept of a common enemy, as we saw above, is not always what will guide African countries' approach to security. Therefore, it is useful to refer to Job's (1997) concept of an 'internal security dilemma.' According to the author, some states face internal problems that threaten the stability and ongoing power of the government in question; these would be states classified by classical security theories as weak or failed. In Job's words:

> The fundamental interest of those in power in these states is the survival of the regime and the maintenance or restoration of the status quo. Thus, in the international context, their main concern is to ensure the principles of non-interference in domestic affairs, maintenance of territorial integrity, and strengthening of sovereignty. International institutions will be attractive to them as long as these institutions adopt these norms and are capable and willing to mobilize on their behalf (Job 1997, 181).

Thus, the focus is on intrastate conflicts to the detriment of interstate conflicts. In this regard, Ayoob (2002, 35) argues that the decolonization process and the consequent need for state-building, in an environment much more vulnerable to external interferences than the one in which European states were built, is the explanatory factor for most of the conflicts in these countries. The new states "redefined the very notion of the security dilemma, making it essentially an internal phenomenon and not interstate." Many African countries continue to face problems in asserting their sovereignty, especially at the internal level. This fact, as Kelly (2007) reminds us, makes issues of internal security much more important than external ones, causing interstate wars to be very rare in these countries; these countries do not intend to conquer the territory of their neighbors, on the contrary, they want to cooperate to contain internal threats, which are very similar.

The concept of security, according to Francis (2006), is highly con-tested, but can generally be understood as the condition of feeling safe from dangers; it is, therefore, related to survival. However, the idea of security that should be adopted, according to the author, is its non-traditional conception, which includes not only military threats but also new security issues such as economic, health, and environmental concerns. Security, in this sense, would imply peace, development, and justice, as the absence of these would create conditions for conflict and armed violence.

The African context, according to Francis (2006), where states are still in the process of strengthening and building, and economies are deve-loping, is a clear demonstration that there is a strong relationship between peace, development, and security. The historical development of the conti-nent, especially in the post-colonial era, according to the author, would show why it is imperative to address these three aspects together when it comes to Africa; armed conflicts, both intrastate and interstate, and the instability they generate, worsen the socio-economic situation of countries, making security and development inseparable issues.

According to Ibekwe and Adebayo (2012), the democratization pro-cess in Africa began in the 1990s, influenced by the end of the Cold War – from a systemic perspective – and by the dissatisfaction of political elites with internal and external military interference – from an internal perspective – and at the regional level, the transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in the early 2000s also contributed to this process, through the possibility of suspending non-democratic leaders, something that was not possible before.

Regarding the relationship between democracy and conflict, traditio-nal liberal theories, such as Doyle's Democratic Peace Theory (1983), mention the positive connection between democratic regimes and peaceful relations. The absence of democracy could, therefore, be seen as a contributing factor to conflict. For Nkiwane (2001, 286), however, "the spread of liberal democracy and consumer capitalism has not resolved many of Africa's contradictions; on the contrary, in many cases, it has exacerbated internal sociopolitical dis-putes". Thus, African conflicts would have much more to do with socio-eco-nomic problems than the absence of liberal democracy.

Nkiwane (2001, 287) further asserts that "democracy, therefore, is not necessarily the main factor that prevents war in African international relations; in fact, it may promote war." Undoubtedly, there can be a multi-tude of factors conditioning the existence of intrastate wars, both globally and, particularly, in Africa. In this sense, based on existing theoretical and

empirical scientific knowledge, this study aims to investigate the effect of political, economic, and social factors on the existence of national wars in African states. For this purpose, this research is oriented towards testing two main hypotheses, formulated as follows:

1. Since the end of World War II, the probability of African states experiencing national wars has been inversely and significantly associated with the levels of governmental entrenchment.

2. Since the end of World War II, the probability of African states experiencing national wars has been inversely and significantly associated with the levels of sovereignty.

Research Structure

To empirically test the stated hypotheses, a quantitative study was conducted based on the creation of a panel-format database that includes African countries as units of analysis from 1946 to 2015. This approach allows capturing not only the years when national wars of African states began but also the years when these wars were active. This enables a quantitative study that not only combines spatial and temporal dimensions but also involves a large number of observations on variables related to the units of analysis, providing empirical consistency to the data analysis. Regarding the units of analysis for the study, the following criteria were applied for their selection.

The first point to emphasize is that the units of analysis for the study were chosen based on the following three criteria. The first criterion was to consider African states that meet the five requirements defined by the Correlates of War for a political unit to be considered a sovereign state[4]. The second criterion is the inclusion of a temporal dimension, considering the post-World War II period until 2015. The third criterion is associated with the empirical information collected for each variable considered in the study; specifically, the units of analysis included in the study were those that had empirical information on all variables considered, both independent and dependent, as well as control variables. Thus, the units of analysis for the study are African states-year pairs for which, from 1946 to 2015, in corresponding periods, it

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4 The five requirements applied by the Correlates of War to consider a political unit as a State in the interstate system are as follows: 1. Territory, the existence of a geographical space on which the political unit is based; 2. Diplomatic recognition, since 1919, belonging to the League of Nations or, later, the United Nations, or the political unit receiving diplomatic accreditation from the two great powers of the interstate system; 4. Sovereignty, implying control of its political institutions through the monopoly of force; 5. See: Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 19).

was possible to obtain quantitative empirical information on all considered variables. In total, the study was based on 2190 units of analysis.

To test the first hypothesis, four multivariate logistic regression statistical models were applied, all considering government entrenchment as the independent variable and national wars as the dependent variable. In the four models applied, a series of control variables were included to reflect political, economic, and social aspects of African countries. These variables include the level of relative material capabilities of each African State in each specific year considered, economic potential measured by economic growth rates, prosperity level measured by the GDP *per capita* of each country, and the development level measured by life expectancy. To test the second hypothesis, a bivariate logistic regression model was applied, where the independent variable was the level of sovereignty and the dependent variable was national wars. It's important to note that the sovereignty level is an indicator derived from the combination of government entrenchment, material capabilities, economic capacity, prosperity level and development level.

The dependent variable for both hypotheses, national wars, was measured based on the presence or absence of an active national war in the African state-year under consideration. Operationally, when an active national war was observed in the analyzed unit, the value 1 was assigned; if no active national war was observed in the unit of analysis, the value 0 was assigned. It is important to note that national wars are understood as those occurring within a State without involving the participation of any foreign State. According to the Correlates of War definition of war types, national wars are considered those that are intrastate in their various specific subtypes but do not involve foreign states; hence, interstate, extrastate, or non-State wars are not considered for hypothesis testing. The sources of information used to systematize this information are those developed by Sarkees and Wayman (2010) and Sarkees and Dixon (2016).

Regarding the independent variable corresponding to the first hypothesis, government entrenchment, the first thing to note is that, in this article, government entrenchment is understood as a quality analogous to the institutionalization of the political regime. This implies that the higher the levels of government entrenchment or institutionalization of the political regime, the higher the levels of state authority. This perspective coincides with the approach of the Center for Systemic Peace, as in its qualitative classification, both democratic and autocratic regimes register higher levels of institutionalization compared to anocratic regimes. In other words, democratic and autocratic regimes exhibit higher levels of government entrenchment com-

pared to anocratic regimes. In this sense, according to Huntington ([1968] 1997), there are no significant differences in the governing capacity of democracies and autocracies; the fundamental difference lies in how they exercise authority. Democracies exercise their authority through the rule of law, while autocracies exercise their authority through the use of force. However, both types of political regimes exhibit higher levels of government entrenchment or institutionalization of the political regime than anocratic countries, which are characterized by significant weaknesses in the exercise of authority.

To measure this variable, the Center for Systemic Peace conducted a reclassification of the index of institutionalization of political regimes in its 5.0. version[5] . Since, for this database, the values of institutionalization of political regimes range on an axis from -10 to 10, a new scale was devised to measure this variable, comprising eleven values from 1 to 11. The value 1 is assigned to countries whose regimes have the lowest level of entrenchment, or 0 on the Center for Systemic Peace scale, and 11 is assigned to those with the highest level of entrenchment. For example, if one country has a value of 8 in a given year and another country has a value of -8, they are assigned the same government entrenchment value, even if their political regimes are different in nature. Note that in years when the political regime of a State experienced an interruption, interim period or transition according to the measurements of this database, the value acquired by the country in the last year before the interruption, interim period or transition was applied

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5 The Center for Systemic Peace 5.0 provides quantitative information about the level of institutionalization of political regimes. For this purpose, it designed a continuous scale of 21 points ranging from -10 to 10. Political regimes between -10 and -6 are considered autocratic, and the closer to the extreme -10, the more institutionalized this type of regime is. Regimes between -5 and 5 are categorized as anocratic, exhibiting low levels of autocratic or democratic institutionalization. It should be noted that regimes between -5 and 0 contain more autocratic attributes, while regimes between 0-5 are more democratic. Similarly, regimes between 6 and 10 on the scale are those where higher levels of institutionalization of democratic institutions can be observed. To access the Center for Systemic Peace information on the institutionalization of political regimes, see: https://www.systemicpeace.org/csprandd.html.

as a measure of institutionalization in the measurement of this variable[6]. The matrix below shows the scores assigned to this variable based on the information provided by the Center for Systemic Peace regarding the institutionalization of political regimes.

Table 3: Center for Systemic Peace values to measure government entrenchment:

Values of the Center for Systemic Peace	Values of government entrenchment
0	1
1/-1	2
2/-2	3
3/-3	4
4/-4	5
5/-5	6
6/-6	7
7/-7	8
8/-8	9
9/-9	10
10/-10	11

Fonte: by the authors.

In regards to the independent variable of the second hypothesis, the level of sovereignty, the first thing to mention is that sovereignty is understood as the material capabilities of states in the international system to exercise authority and promote the well-being of the population. This notion, in some dimensions, aligns with the proposal of the Center for Systemic Peace, which

6 Note that, in the Center for Systemic Peace database on the institutionalization of political regimes, interruptions are recorded as -66, interregnums as -77 and transitions as -88. Interruptions occur when a country is occupied by foreign powers during a war, leading to the collapse of the old system of government and the formation of a new system of government after foreign occupation. Interregnums occur when there is a complete collapse of central authority, mainly as a result of internal conflicts. Transition periods occur when new government institutions and policies are created. For more information, see Marshall, Monty, and Gurr, Ted (2017) "Polity 5. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018. Data Users' Manual". Center for Systemic Peace. Available at: https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p5manualv2018.pdf.

posits that State fragility or strength is related to the states ability to manage conflicts, develop and implement public policies, provide essential services, maintain internal cohesion, promote quality of life and the progressive development of the population (Marshall and Elzinga Marshall 2017). However, the concept of the State proposed here differs in some aspects from the proposal of the Center for Systemic Peace. The first difference lies in the fact that the ability to manage conflicts is seen, in this article, as a consequence of the state's condition and not as an inherent property. From the perspective developed in this article, it is possible to propose that the higher the levels of sovereignty of states, the less likely they are to suffer conflicts.

A second difference is that the concept of the State developed here takes into account the relative material capabilities that states have in the international system, thus incorporating an international relational dimension into the notion of the State. A third difference is that, concerning the political dimension, the concept of the State developed here is restricted exclusively to governmental integration or the levels of institutionalization of the political regimes of states. A fourth difference is that, regarding the economic dimension, the concept of the State proposed in this investigation empirically addresses its study through the economic growth and per capita GDP of states. Regarding the social dimension associated with the quality of life, the notion of the State is measured exclusively through life expectancy. That said, it is evident that the concept of the State proposed here is a multidimensional one, however, the variables inherent in each dimension are fewer than those proposed by the Center for Systemic Peace.

That said, the measurement of the level of the State results from the combination of government entrenchment with the control variables used to test the first hypothesis. As each variable provides quantitative information with different units of measurement, to normalize the variables and aggregate them into a single unit of measurement, each variable was normalized through the z-score process. Subsequently, the data for each variable for each unit of analysis were grouped and divided by the number of variables. The index records values between -3 and 3, with values below -3 or above 3 are considered outliers. Analytically, the units recorded higher levels of the State as the index increased, and vice versa. The formula applied for calculating the index was as follows:

Statehood = zenraigub+zcmateriales +zcrececon+zpibpercap+zesperanza-vida / 5

estatalidad = statehood
zenraigub = governmental entrenchment
zcmateriales = material capabilities
zcrececon = economic growth
zpibpercap = GDP per capita
zesperanzavida = life expectancy
5 = number of variables

With regard to the control variable material capabilities, this variable shows the relative percentage of power registered by each African state, year by year, throughout the considered period. The indicator used to collect this information was the Composite Indicator of National Capabilities in its 6.0 version, developed under the Correlates of War framework. This indicator is constructed by combining six variables into an arithmetic mean, each of the six variables showing the relative percentage of each country in the system of states in interannual periods. The six considered variables are: 1. the % of each State in global military expenditures; 2. the % of each State in global military personnel; 3. the % of each State in global energy consumption; 4. the % of each State in global steel and iron production; 5. the % of each State in global urban population; 6. the % of each State in the global total population. Once the percentages for each State are obtained for each variable year by year of the period considered, version 6.0 covers the 200 years 1816-2016, they are additively summed and divided by the number of variables.

Regarding the control variable indicating the economic potential of each state year by year, we took into account the levels of economic growth at current prices based on data provided by the World Bank. Concerning the control variable representing the prosperity levels of states from year to year, the data series of GDP per capita provided by the World Bank was considered. Finally, regarding the level of development, the control variable considered to measure this dimension was the data series provided by Our World in Data in terms of life expectancy measured in years.

Analysis results

After a preliminary descriptive statistical analysis of the empirical systematized information in this investigation, the inferential statistical analysis of both hypothesis testing models through the application of logistic regression models will be based on four aspects, namely: 1. the type of relationship between variables evidenced by both models; 2. the presence or absence of statistical significance between the independent and control variables with the dependent variable of the models; 3. the interpretation of the coefficients of the models, also referred to as odds ratios; 4. the goodness of fit of the models. Regarding the descriptive information, in Table 2, about the seven variables of the model applied to 2190 units of analysis, it illustrates the following aspects.

In Table 4, it is identified that, concerning material capabilities, the average of these, considering all observations, was 0.128%, with a minimum extreme value of 0.002% and a maximum of 1.05%. In terms of government integration, the average value was 6.786, with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum of 11. Economic growth shows an average of 8.665%, with a minimum value of -83.974% and a maximum of 305%. GDP per capita has an average of 1106.974 US dollars, with a minimum value of 36,157 and a maximum of 19849 US dollars. In terms of life expectancy, the average value is 53.4 years, with a minimum value of 14.1 and a maximum of 75.7 years. Regarding the statehood variable, the average value was -0.000, the minimum value was -1.859, and the maximum value was 3.51. Finally, concerning the dependent variable, 144 units of analysis, out of a total of 2190, recorded wars, meaning that 6.57% of the units of analysis registered wars and 93.4% did not.

Table 4: Description of variables

Values	cmateriales	Enraigub	crececon	pibpercap	esperanza-vida	estatali-dad	Wars	
Mininum value	0,002	1,000	-83,974	36,157	14,100	-1,859	0,000	No war: 2046
Median	0,052	7,000	7,098	448,667	53,000	-0,084	0,000	With war: 144
Average	0,128	6,786	8,665	1106,974	53,401	0,000	0,066	
Maximum value	1,050	11,000	305,158	19849,718	75,700	3,516	1,000	

Fonte: by the authors.

Regarding the analysis of the models presented in Table 5, four of them are multivariate, and the fifth is bivariate. The first one includes all the variables considered in the study, and it can be observed that the only variable showing a positive relationship with war is the material capabilities variable, which means that the greater the material capabilities, the greater the wars; the remaining variables exhibit a negative relationship, indicating that higher levels of government entrenchment, economic growth, GDP per capita and life expectancy, the fewer the wars. However, it's noteworthy that, at a 99% confidence level, the variables showing a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable are material capabilities, government rooting and life expectancy. The variables economic growth and GDP per capita do not show a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. Focusing the analysis on the coefficients of the variables with a statistically significant relationship in the model, Table 5 shows that for each additional percentage point of material capabilities, the probability of an African State being at war is multiplied by 22 times. Regarding government entrenchment, since the coefficient is less than 1 (0.82), the probability of a war year for an African State is reduced by 18% for each increase in this variable. Concerning life expectancy, given that the coefficient is less than 1 (0.86), the probability of an African State being at war decreases by 14% for each increase in this variable. Regarding the adequacy of the model in Table 6, the chi-square test indicates that, at a 99% confidence level, the model is significant.

Model 2 considers only the variables that presented a statistically significant relationship by applying Model 1. As seen in Table 4, Model 2 confirms the positive association between material capabilities and the pre-

sence of war in African states, as well as the negative relationship between government entrenchment and life expectancy with war in African states, all at a 99% confidence level. If we look at the coefficients of these variables in Model 2, with slight nuances, Table 5 again confirms what was reflected in Model 1: for each increase in material capabilities, the probability of a national war in an African State is multiplied by almost 22 times. Regarding government entrenchment, the coefficient again has a value of 0.82, implying that the probability of war in an African state-year decreases by 18% for each increase in government entrenchment. Concerning life expectancy, Model 2 also registers the same values as Model 1 in its coefficients. Regarding the adequacy of the model in Table 6, the chi-square test indicates that, at a 99% confidence level, Model 2 is significant.

Model 3 is a model that analyzes only the political nature variables explaining both government entrenchment and material capabilities of African states, year by year, during the considered period. Table 4 confirms once again the statistically significant and directional relationship between, on one hand, material capabilities, and on the other hand, government entrenchment, and the occurrence of wars in African states. Analyzing the coefficients, Table 5 shows that, for Model 3, for each increase in material capabilities, the probability of an African state-year having a national war increases by 5.27 times, while for each increase in government entrenchment, the probability of an African State having a national war decreases by about 10%. Regarding the adequacy of Model 3 in Table 6, the chi-square test indicates that Model 3 is significant at a 99% confidence level.

Given the influence that material capabilities have on whether an annual African State registers a national war or not, the fourth model omits this variable and only includes the remaining variables from the model. In this regard, as shown in Table 4, the variables government entrenchment and life expectancy exhibit a statistically significant negative relationship with the presence of a national war in an African state-year. The variables economic growth and GDP per capita, although showing a negative relationship with the dependent variable, are not statistically significant. If we examine the coefficients of Model 4 for these two variables, we find that for each increase in government entrenchment, the probability of an African State in a war year is reduced by 16%, while for each increase in life expectancy, the probability of a national war in an African State in a given year is reduced by 12%. Once again, as for the goodness of fit of Model 4 in Table 6, the chi-square test indicates that this model is significant.

Finally, a fifth model was constructed and tested, which, despite having the particularity of being bivariate, the independent variable emerges from the combination of the remaining variables, accounting for the levels of statehood. Model 5 shows a statistically significant negative relationship between the levels of statehood and the presence of wars in an annual African state. Analyzing the coefficient of the variable, given that it is less than 1 (0.4), the probability of war reduces by 60% for each increase in the sovereignty level variable. As for the goodness of fit of Model 5 in Table 6, the chi-square test indicates that, at a 99% confidence level, this model is also statistically significant.

Table 5: Model comparison

	Dependent variable:				
	--				
	guerra				
	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
--					
cmateriales	3.10***	3.07***	1.66***		
	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.32)		
enraigub	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.10***	-0.17***	
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	
crececon	-0.01		-0.005		
	(0.01)		(0.01)		
pibpercap	-0.0000		0.0001		
	(0.0001)		(0.0001)		
esperanzavida	-0.15***	-0.15***		-0.13***	
	(0.02)	(0.01)		(0.01)	
estatalidad				-0.91***	
				(0.20)	

Constant	5.49***	5.47***	-2.30***	4.78***	-2.74***
	(0.81)	(0.76)	(0.25)	(0.77)	(0.09)

Observations	2,190	2,190	2,190	2,190	2,190
Akaike Inf. Crit.	900.26	897.81	1,037.34	955.93	1,043.51

==

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Odds ratios by models

Model 1	**(Intercept)**	**cmateria-les**	**enraigub**	**crececon**	**pibpercap**	**esperanza-vida**
	241,88	22,21	0,82	0,99	0,99	0,86
Model 2	**(Intercept)**	**cmateria-les**	**enraigub**	**esperanza-vida**		
	237,41	21,59	0,82	0,86		
Model 3	**(Intercept)**	**cmateria-les**	**enraigub**			
	0,1	5,27	0,91			
Model 4	**(Intercept)**	**enraigub**	**crececon**	**pibpercap**	**esperanza-vida**	
	119,02	0,84	0,99	1	0,88	
Model 5	**(Intercept)**	**estatalidad**				
	0,06	0,4				

Table 7: Chi-square tests by model

Model 1: guerra ~ cmateriales + enraigub + crececon + pibpercap + esperanzavida
Model 2: guerra ~ 1
#Df LogLik Df Chisq Pr(>Chisq)
1 6 -444.13
2 1 -531.10 -5 173.94 < 2.2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Likelihood ratio test

Model 2: guerra ~ cmateriales + enraigub + esperanzavida
Model 2: guerra ~ 1
#Df LogLik Df Chisq Pr(>Chisq)
1 4 -444.9
2 1 -531.1 -3 172.4 < 2.2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Likelihood ratio test

Model 3: guerra ~ cmateriales + enraigub
Model 2: guerra ~ 1
#Df LogLik Df Chisq Pr(>Chisq)
1 3 -515.67
2 1 -531.10 -2 30.869 1.98e-07 ***
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Likelihood ratio test

Model 4: guerra ~ enraigub + crececon + pibpercap + esperanzavida
Model 2: guerra ~ 1
#Df LogLik Df Chisq Pr(>Chisq)
1 5 -472.96
2 1 -531.10 -4 116.28 < 2.2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Likelihood ratio test

Model 5: guerra ~ estatalidad
Model 2: guerra ~ 1
#Df LogLik Df Chisq Pr(>Chisq)
1 2 -519.75
2 1 -531.10 -1 22.701 1.893e-06 ***
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Based on the results obtained from constructing the models and their respective tests, it can be concluded that both hypotheses are confirmed. It is evident that government entrenchment is a variable that has a statistically significant inverse relationship with the existence of wars in African states, while material capabilities, understood as a political variable, and life expectancy, the latter understood as a variable that reflects social aspects, also have a statistically significant relationship with our variable to be explained, the first a positive relationship, the second a negative or inverse relationship.

Similarly, the State variable, resulting from the combination of political variables (material capabilities, government embedding), economic variables (economic growth, GDP per capita) and social variables (life expectancy), also has a statistically significant and inverse relationship with the variable of the existence of wars in African states. In this sense, it can be stated that the existence of wars in African states since the end of World War II is largely explained by the influence of political factors and, to a lesser extent, social factors, although economic factors had an inverse influence that was not statistically significant.

Conclusion

The objective of this research was to investigate the influence that government entrenchment and levels of statehood had on the existence of national wars in African countries after the end of World War II. To this end, two hypotheses were formulated to guide empirical research, and their contrasts were tested through the design of logistic regression models. Based on the conception of four multivariate logistic regression models, it was found that since the end of World War II, the probability of African states experiencing national wars is inversely and significantly associated with levels of government entrenchment. In other words, based on the results of this study, it can be stated that higher levels of government rooting, the lower the probability of national wars in Africa.

In turn, based on the design of a bivariate logistic regression model, where the independent variable, governance levels, is derived from the combination of the remaining political, economic, and social variables considered in this study, it was also found that since the end of World War II, the probability of African states experiencing national wars is inversely and significantly associated with governance levels. In other words, based on the results of

this study, it can be stated that the higher the level of statehood, the lower the probability of the occurrence of national wars in the African continent.

Although the research does not propose to analyze specific cases but rather seeks a general relationship between State constitution and institutionalization with the occurrence of war, some specific observations deserve to be made. The statistical test aligns with the theoretical discussions presented at the beginning of this article: State institutionalization (or lack thereof) is directly related to instabilities in the security sphere, especially when it comes to conflicts that are not interstate.

It is relevant that the hypothesis test found a positive relationship between material capabilities and the occurrence of wars, which translates into the issue of maintaining political groups in power and the existence of conflicts. As highlighted by Job (1997) and Ayoob (2002), the issues of state-building – stemming from the decolonization process – and institutional structuring lead to the 'dilemma of internal security.' The political forces in power, once they have the material capabilities to do so, will potentially use violent means to maintain the *status quo*. This was the case, for example, in Angola during the almost 30 years of civil war.

Similarly, it is worth highlighting the statistical conclusion that economic variables, although influential, are secondary. This inference corroborates the relationship between development and peace. There is no way to expect that in a conflict environment, socioeconomic development will advance. Nor is it possible to aspire that specific improvements in economic aspects can have significant impacts in a context of insecurity.

Finally, it is pertinent to revisit the basic premise that guided this research from the beginning: there is a relationship between the existence of wars and the level of statehood. African states, in many cases, are still undergoing the process of building and strengthening their internal sovereignty. It is expected, therefore, that as these states progress in the construction of their institutions and sovereignty, the frequency and intensity of conflicts will decrease.

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ABSTRACT

The following article aims to investigate to what extent the existence of national wars in African states, from the end of World War II until 2015, was conditioned by levels of government entrenchment and levels of statehood. Based on the design and application of five logistic regression models, the study essentially shows that higher levels of government entrenchment are associated with a lower probability of internal wars in African states, and higher levels of statehood are associated with a lower probability of national wars in African states.