SITUATION ANALYSIS OF THE CHISSANO GOVERNMENT: DOMESTIC TRANSITIONS AND ECONOMIC PRAGMATISM IN MOZAMBIQUE (1986-2004)

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Introduction

This article analyzes the political situation of Mozambique during Chissano's Government between 1986 and 2005, as well as the internal and external factors that contributed to the fulfillment or unfulfillment of the government's objectives. Political, economic, and historical events are observed in order to evaluate the Chissano Government. Situation analysis is a plural methodology that allows interpreting events, facts, and causes, as well as describing the behavior of the actors involved, the correlations of force, and the internal and external interests that influence the course of politics. Another aspect that justifies using this tool is the historical time involved – 18 years between the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century – characterized by transformations, transitions, and distinct domestic, regional, and international political-economic changes. The situation analysis proved to be an effective tool to reach a broader and deeper perspective of the Chissano Government and the national and international context in which it developed. This methodology requires historical knowledge of the object of study, its context and political dynamics, the organization of local society, its behavior patterns and social values, as well as its political groups, their objectives, and interests. The text constitutes a subjective perspective, a point of view on the "Chissano era", a political, economic, and social period in the history of Mozambique. It is an *ex-post-facto* analysis, as it is written decades after the events have occurred, and although it limits its scope to a short period of time, it nonetheless covers long and complex socio-economic transformations. Despite systemic changes in Mozambican

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society, the structure of the country's politics has remained almost the same, led by the party-state.

Mozambique entered international society in 1975 as an independent state called the People's Republic of Mozambique, governed by FRELIMO in a one-party regime marked by authoritarianism. Two years later, in 1977, the state adhered to Marxism-Leninism, starting to cooperate with the European socialist bloc, China, and Cuba. The Mozambican state was the target of external pressure by the Western world in the form of international blockades and aggression from Ian Smith's Rhodesia and *Apartheid* South Africa. Fifteen years later, in 1990, already under the Chissano Government, the state reinserted itself with another perspective, calling itself the Republic of Mozambique (RM) and adopting the liberal-capitalist model and a multi-party system.

The phenomenon under study is the Chissano Government and its domestic and international actions. In order to elucidate it, a bibliographical survey was carried out, along with document research and the situation analysis as a central tool of the article. As theoretical contributions, the logic of the two-level game and the intermestic perspective that combines the interactions between the domestic and the international environment were discussed. The article is organized into six parts. First, the methodological and theoretical contributions are discussed. The second topic describes the rise of the Chissano Government in relation to national, regional, and international contexts. The third part outlines the first Chissano Government and the fourth part approaches the general peace agreement of 1992. In the fifth topic, the second Chissano Government is evaluated. In the sixth and last segment, its foreign policy is analyzed.

Methodology

The article adopts the method of political situation analysis based on the proposals of Souza (1984), Vieira (2015), Ayerbe (2016), and Pereira (2020) – authors who have developed different perspectives of this tool – in order to assess the Chissano Government. In his pioneering work, Souza (1984) argues that situation analysis mixes knowledge and discovery, constituting a special reading of reality that is carried out due to either necessity or interest. According to the author, there is no neutral or disinterested situation analysis. There is always a certain point of view regarding the meaning and course of events. In his view, there are two ways of reading the situation:

starting from the position or point of view of the dominant power or starting from the position or point of view of popular movements, the subordinated classes, and the opposition to the dominant power. The sociologist points out the following categories of situation analysis: events, scenarios, actors, power relations, and the articulation between structure and conjuncture. Events, scenarios, and actors are part of the conjuncture, which is related to the structure. These categories generate a situation and define the conjuncture, and they do not occur in a vacuum. They are related to history, to the past, to social, economic, and political relations established over the course of a long process (Souza 1984).

Starting from a historical perspective, Vieira (2015) points out that the study of social phenomena – whether from the present or from the past – is broadened, amplified, and deepened if it starts from a situation analysis. In this view, the situation is characterized by chained events that explain the historical process directly related to the historical fact. According to the author, the continuity or change of conjuncture results from the historical process. Its time scope is given by the studied phenomenon, for it is what determines the necessary timeframe. The ideal scope is a few decades.

From another perspective, Ayerbe (2016) analyzes the situation with a focus on factors of stability and disorganization in the structure of international relations. He argues that events, actors, and interests are useful tools for developing a political situation analysis in international relations. In parallel to the representative case studies of situations of order and disorder in global governance, this International Relations scholar analyzes the historical dimension with comparative approaches to the orderings of past periods and their repercussions as a reference for the present debate. His analysis seeks to unravel how events and actors are articulated in order to attribute meaning to a specific scenario within a given historical context (Ayerbe 2016).

Lastly, Pereira (2020) analyzes the situation from an economic perspective, which facilitates the reading of indicators and the interpretation of statistical data aimed at the market. His work constitutes a manual aimed at those interested in economic sciences, teaching the principles of situation analysis, the construction of scenarios, and the analysis of economic and political risks. He emphasizes the role of economics in situation analysis. In this perspective, the conjuncture constitutes a way for companies and investors to analyze the economy, to evaluate it in order to make decisions. The author states that it is a mistake to call situation analysis a method, instrument, or theory. He considers it a mix of those, since the analysis of the situation encompasses different scientific tools aimed at the analysis of events, faci-

litating the understanding of the interactions between actors, which can be families, government, companies, and the external sector. Situation analysis would be the set of scientific knowledge used in the interpretation of a certain situation or event. According to the author, methodologically, the analysis of the situation needs to go through three phases: the description of the actors and variables, the interpretation and analysis of the situation, and the synthesis of the inferences found (Pereira 2020).

As a rule, the economic situation analysis is carried out or commissioned by large companies and foreign investors, who intend to enter and invest in a new market. This type of analysis demands the existence of knowledge and the construction of economic scenarios, as well as the interpretation of economic and market indicators. It is usually done by economists and related professionals. The financial situation analysis encompasses short and long terms between six and twelve months, which implies an analysis almost at the time of events. Thus, the present article is not interested in analyzing the economic conjuncture, as 18 years have passed since the Chissano Government. At most, it includes a description of the economic agenda. Thus, a political, historical, and social situation analysis is more adequate. To understand the conjuncture of Chissano's Government, the perspectives of the aforementioned scholars were followed, which proved to be complementary and fruitful when combined, allowing for a reading of the main events, actors, and correlation of forces, taking into account the international relations, the historical period observed and even the economic reality.

I consider the tragic death of President Samora Machel the event that gave rise to the Chissano Government[2]. The death of the first president of Mozambique constitutes a landmark used in the popular periodization of the country's history, marked by a distinction between the time of Samora and the time of Chissano. In this context, we have as internal actors in correlation of forces, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO, in Portuguese), the party-state that governs the country since its independence in 1975, and

2 Samora Machel, the first president of Mozambique, died on October 19, 1986, in a tragic airplane accident in the town of Mbuzini, South African territory, which killed 34 people, all high-ranking members of the Mozambican state, including ministers, diplomats, advisors, interpreters, translators, journalists, photographers, the Russian airplane crew, etc. The death of Samora and part of his government left Mozambique orphaned by cadres of its political-administrative and ideological machine. The official causes of the accident have never been explained, and there are several interpretations of it, which include: an attack by the *Apartheid* regime that lured the plane out of its route; a human error by the pilots, involving alcohol consumption, insufficient fuel on the plane and outdated flight plans; suicide mission of Soviet pilots in the service of Moscow in the face of the possibility of Mozambique abandoning socialism, etc.).

the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO, in Portuguese), opposition movement that engaged in a civil war against the Mozambican state and constitutes the largest opposition party, as well as the Christian churches that constituted an important sector of civil society. Besides these, there were external actors, such as the Soviet Union and the USA, the two great world powers in the bipolar world scenario of the Cold War, the friendly neighboring states, such as Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and the opponents, such as the *Apartheid* regime of South Africa, Malawi, and Kenya, which exerted pressure on the Chissano Government in the regional scenario. The Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), and the Western European States, which became the largest donors of foreign development assistance, were also important actors at the political and economic levels. These states and international organizations had distinct interests, ending up influencing the destinies of the Mozambican conflict and the Chissano Government.

Theoretical movements

In order to understand the domestic and international political-economic situation during the Chissano Government, Putnam's (2010) two-level game logic was used. This author has shown that domestic politics and international politics are inextricably linked and that the theories that existed until then did not take this link into consideration, particularly those that placed the state at the center and as the main actor of foreign policy. In his view, in order to obtain an international agreement, the heads of state and government reconcile the interests of domestic politics with those of international politics, which the author calls a "two-level game", a metaphor to explain the interactions between the domestic and international dimensions. Putnam (2010) emphasized the role of preferences, alliances, institutions, domestic practices, negotiators' strategies and tactics, uncertainties, domestic repercussions of external pressures, as well as the chief negotiator's particular interests.

As a rule, each negotiator believes that his interests are the interests of the state and that everything he or she does is for the good of the nation. Good agreements are those that successfully combine domestic and international pressures. Partial analyses, purely domestic or purely international, do not account for the reality of states. Only general equilibrium and medium-range theories that combine the interaction of domestic and international factors – the two-level game – are capable of understanding the reality experienced by States (Putnam 2010).

The political struggle in international negotiations can be understood as a two-level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their goals by pressuring the government to adopt policies favorable to their interests – inputs. At the same time, at the international level, governments seek to maximize their own abilities to satisfy domestic pressures – outputs and minimize the adverse consequences of external constraints. Neither of the two levels can be ignored by decision-makers because their countries remain simultaneously interdependent and sovereign. Each national political leader plays on both boards: the international (level 1) and the domestic (level 2). On the domestic board and behind the leader are political parties, parliamentarians, representatives of national interest and pressure groups, and political advisors of the leader himself. On the external board, meanwhile, are foreign counterparts, diplomats, and other international advisors (Putnam 2010).

From this perspective, one should not separate domestic affairs from international affairs. More important than thinking about the dichotomy or knowing whether it is the domestic level that influences the international level or vice versa, is to understand when one sphere influences the other and what are the impacts. It is necessary to analyze the process and the specific case. Even so, Putnam (2010) underscores the domestic level, which is formed by pressure groups with different interests and perceptions, which tend to pressure the government through various actions. Sometimes the demands and interests of pressure groups – inputs – may coincide with those of the government/chief negotiator at the international level and at other times they may have opinions contrary to those defended by the chief negotiator. Hence the importance of understanding which actors are involved and their interests.

Thus, it can be stated that the domestic level has its importance since the signed international agreements need to be accepted and ratified in the domestic sphere by interest or pressure groups. For, it is the domestic level that provides support and employment to the rulers and negotiators. The more successful it is at the domestic level, the more chances the negotiator/government will have of reaching a good deal at the international level and a set of wins – winsets (Putnam 2010). The agreements and decisions signed at the international level reverberate at the domestic level and vice versa. Hence, each negotiator must seek a balance between the two levels, as well as understand which are the actors involved and their interests.

The proposal of the two-level game by Putnam (2010) is supported by Figueira (2011) in her intermestic perspective. The author argues that decision-making processes in foreign policy take into account actors,

institutions, preferences, leadership characteristics, and decisions on international matters. As a public policy, foreign policy is characterized by an interactive dynamic between the domestic and international environments of a given country. It would be the result of the interactive dynamics between the domestic and international environments – intermestic level – and seeks to understand the decision-making processes and the way through which those decisions are made (Figueira 2011).

Adopting the two above-mentioned perspectives, the present situation analysis understood the political-economic performance of the Chissano Government from the interaction between the domestic and international levels. External factors such as regional security, strategic alliances with allied states such as Tanzania, Zambia, and the USSR, economic interdependence with South Africa, and the influence of international financial organizations were fundamental to understanding the international performance of the Chissano Government. On the other hand, the political and government system, the civil war, individual and collective freedoms, national, state and regime security, structural adjustment policies, the personality of the leaders, the decision-making processes, general elections, political-party disputes, and pressure from civil society circumscribe internal factors that influenced government action.

Chissano and the national, regional, and international conjuncture

Less than a month after Samora's death in 1986, Chissano was appointed president of Mozambique by FRELIMO in a direct succession within the party-state. Until then, Chissano held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Samora's government and was not one of the most prominent figures in the state, being one of the most discreet. The Mbuzini airplane crash that killed Samora's presidential delegation was an unforeseen event that changed Mozambique's destiny. After independence in 1975, Mozambique was the target of aerial bombings by Ian Smith's Rhodesia and, later on, of land and air attacks by *Apartheid* South Africa, as well as the civil-military war developed by RENAMO. These conflicts developed in the context of proxy wars between capitalist and socialist regimes in Southern Africa and reflected the international and regional geopolitics of the Cold War between the USA and the USSR. Southern Africa was the last region to be conquered and susceptible to the influence of the two world powers.

Apartheid South Africa had an interest in Samora's physical disappearance or in the elimination of his regime. Likewise, Western governments such as the Carter and Reagan administrations in the USA and Great Britain under Margareth Thatcher had interests in a structural change in Mozambique, whether in the removal of the Samora Government, in the weakening of his regime, or even in the abandonment of the socialist model. These governments economically supported the South African *Apartheid* regime, the regional hegemon, which in its turn supported RENAMO. The USSR was also interested in maintaining a socialist regime in Mozambique, as long as it was faithful to the Soviet model. From 1983 onwards, Samora began to distance himself from Soviet socialism and suggested a profound reform by starting negotiations for Mozambique's accession to the BWIs, and in 1984 he visited the Western European States, such as Mário Soares' Portugal, Thatcher's Great Britain, the headquarters of the European Community in Brussels, as well as Reagan's USA. Machel's approach to the West made the Soviets furious, and they were certainly interested in placing in Mozambique a leader loyal to their development model.

Chissano's appointment to the Presidency of Mozambique was unforeseen, as were the drastic political-economic reforms he implemented. Chissano's continuation in power and the political-economic reforms promoted by his government can be considered a black swan, according to the perspective of Ayerbe (2016), due to the improbability and the fact that this event is beyond the calculation of possibilities and impacts of his nomination for the future of Mozambique. Despite the constant threats from *Apartheid* South Africa and RENAMO to the security of the Mozambican state and the FRELIMO regime, through aerial bombing, land attacks, and civil war, no one anticipated or considered the possibility of Samora's death and a successor. Mozambique was a popular socialist republic, governed by a one-party regime, with a presidential system and without a prime minister. Samora was charismatic and the Constitution of Mozambique said nothing about the succession of the president.

Machel's death generated the phenomenon that Ayerbe (2016) calls a critical conjuncture, which provided a relaxation in the structure, operated as a gap that facilitated other positions with clear interests, whether of crisis, disorder, or opportunity, as well as a transition to a new order or stability. Forcing regime change in socialist countries was a part of the US foreign policy strategy to combat communism in Latin America, Asia, and Africa between the 1960s and 1990s. The US achieved success in this strategy from the 1980s onwards, with the ebb of armed struggles, the beginning of demo-

cratization processes, and the gradual replacement of nationalist economic policies by economic liberalization agendas (Ayerbe 2016).

Machel's death and Chissano's nomination to the position of president provided an opportunity to change the political-economic paradigm in Mozambique and the opening for talks with RENAMO to end the civil war. The accession of the Mozambican state to the BWIs in 1984, the adoption of IMF/WB structural reforms in 1987, the abandonment of the socialist model of development in 1990 in the country and in other states in the region, and the Rome Peace Agreement with RENAMO in 1992, which put an end to the civil war in Mozambique, pointed to a victory for the Western capitalist model against communism in Southern Africa. Even so, the Western capitalist bloc had lost its main ally, the South African *Apartheid* regime.

It is worth highlighting an important event in the national conjuncture during the Chissano Government: the trial of the coup attempt, in June 1991. In the previous year, around 24 Mozambican citizens had been accused of attempting a *coup d'état* against President Joaquim Chissano. Out of the 24 citizens, 21 were arrested and 15 went on trial in the Supreme Court, accused of attempted *coup d'état* against President Joaquim Chissano. Among the accused were military personnel, historical veterans of the liberation struggle against Portuguese colonization, and high-ranking figures in the Samora Government, such as the former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, generals, lieutenants, brigadiers, and family members of Samora Machel himself, tried for crimes against state security (A Semana 1991; Moçambique 1992).

The plot had been discovered by the National People's Security Service (SNASP), the secret services, and among those accused were the former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Colonel General Sebastião Mabote, the Minister of the Interior, Colonel Manuel António, General José Moiane, and about 8 other army officers, including Major Belo Amaral Felipe, head of anti-aircraft defense; Major Fernando Manhiça, military commander of the Moamba district; Major Alberto Mucavel, commander of the 6th tank brigade; Major José Mutame, commander of the Manhiça Military Training Center; Captain Albano Bila, political commissioner of the Moamba district; Sergeant Malaque Machel, an instructor at the Manhiça Center; Major Osório Pelembe, an official at the Ministry of Defence; and Afonso Nuvunga, head of the artillery battalion. There were also 4 civilians: the businessman Boaventura Machel; the electrician Orlando Machel; Estevão Manhiça, a server at the Presidential Palace; and the telephone operator Beatriz Manuel. Among the civilians, 3 were brothers of the late President Samora Machel, and 5 people had been released for lack of evidence: 4 military personnel

and 1 cook (A Semana 1991; Moçambique 1992). This remarkable event of the internal situation of the Chissano Government has not been addressed or has been ignored in studies about the contemporary history of Mozambique. The alleged coup attempt can be included in the scenario of systemic political-economic changes that occurred in Mozambique, in which part of the political-economic and military elite lost its power and prestige. The coup could be an attempt to regain their place in society.

In 1990, the US had managed to impose in Southern Africa a political order favorable to its ideology and interests, as all states in the region had become free market economies and had operated changes in their Constitutions to adhere to liberal democratic systems, as was the case in Mozambique. The transformations in Southern Africa were directly related to the crisis of the socialist bloc and the fall of the Berlin Wall, which left the governments of Mozambique and Angola orphaned. At the same time, the existence of the *Apartheid* regime and its bellicose discourse as a buffer state against the advance of communism in the region ceased to make sense. This situation contributed to the ceasefire agreements in the civil wars in Mozambique and Angola.

In the same period, there were profound political-economic changes in the international and regional scenarios with the collapse of the Soviet socialist bloc, the Washington Consensus, the end of the Cold War, and the dismantling of the *Apartheid* system in neighboring South Africa. Then, gradually, Mozambique normalized diplomatic relations with South Africa, Malawi, Kenya, Indonesia, Morocco, and Israel. With Chissano, Mozambique became one of the largest recipients of international development aid in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to those mentioned above, other internal and external factors have also influenced the posture of the Chissano Government and its foreign policy.

The 1st Chissano Government (1986-1994)

Chissano became President of the People's Republic of Mozambique on November 6th, 1986, succeeding Samora Machel, in a direct transition within FRELIMO. Chissano became president in the midst of the worst crisis in Mozambique's history: the death of Machel. The country was torn apart by the fratricidal war with RENAMO, its social and economic infrastructure was completely destroyed and there wasn't any support from the socialist world,

which was experiencing an unprecedented crisis. Upon coming to power, Chissano appointed new ministers, either comrades from the independence struggle or young technocrats who identified with FRELIMO. Important ministries were occupied by comrades of the armed struggle and FRELIMO members with whom he maintained friendly and close relationships (Chissano 2011).

According to Tollenaere (2006), Machel's sudden death brought Chissano to power, and even though he was less charismatic, he was more diplomatic and pragmatic. Upon succeeding Samora, Chissano led the transition from war to peace, the country's opening to foreign investment, and the incorporation of RENAMO into national political life. In Brito's (2016) perspective, the Chissano Government gave in to pressures within FRELIMO itself to abandon the socialist programs of "creating the new man" and "killing the tribe to give birth to the nation", in order to adopt another conception based on the recognition of diversity – particularly the cultural and linguistic diversity – of the Mozambican people. However, in the political sphere, the recognition of this diversity never took effect. Under pressure, Chissano developed a policy of co-opting and promoting cadres from the Center and North provinces, as demanded by the combatants (Brito 2016). In terms of diplomacy, there was a gradual replacement of Marxist thinkers by new capitalist cadres. Gradually, the ambassadors and representatives of Mozambique abroad who had been appointed during the Samora Government were recalled to Maputo and replaced by others trusted by Chissano (Ferrão 2007; Ndelana 2016).

Over time, FRELIMO's historical-ideological wing was confined to the party's Central Committee (CC), being gradually removed from the political life of the country and the government. In this scenario, some historical FRELIMO members were still handed positions in development programs and projects in provinces far from the capital, while others took control of privatized state companies, transforming themselves into "successful entrepreneurs". The change of the political-economic system from socialism to capitalism, as well as from one-party to multi-party, represented an important leap towards the inclusion and participation of social segments previously excluded from economic and political life, such as businessmen, opposition political parties, and civil society. However, at the same time, it was a traumatic process for part of FRELIMO's political elite, which had been in power since the country's independence and lost its political leading role and social prestige. Some survived by reinventing themselves economically as "successful entrepreneurs", as well as in the banking sector, while others opened law firms, or simply disappeared from the political scene.

The Chissano Government was characterized by the political-economic opening of Mozambique. There was greater participation of civil society organizations in the political and social life of the country, with emphasis on the Catholic and Protestant churches, which exerted pressure for the end of the armed conflict and were directly involved in the negotiations for peace agreements. At the same time, there was an expansion of individual and collective rights, and relaxation of external tensions with the Western world through the approval of the new Constitution in 1991, which provided for freedom of individual and collective association, creation of associations, political parties, non-governmental organizations of different kinds, etc.

From the second half of the 1980s, the Washington Consensus became hegemonic. In Africa, the lost decade was characterized by negative growth, aggravation of conflicts, and the crisis of socialist regimes. The structural adjustment policies of the BWIs were implemented, and access to credit and international aid was decided according to the willingness and capacity of African countries to implement the IMF/WB reforms. The broadening of the notion of human rights, the demand for democracy, and the protection of private property were sine qua non conditions for the efficiency of Western economic reform programs. Mozambique did not escape these demands and accepted them in exchange for economic and financial help. In this way, it was one of the most praised African States by BWI donors and officials for its determination to implement political-economic reforms (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996).

The period from 1987 to 2000 was marked by structural adjustment and the implementation of BWI policies in Mozambique. While the nationalization of enterprises and of important sectors of the economy had been a priority of the Samora Government for the transformation of Mozambique into a socialist economy, during the Chissano Government the opposite happened. The privatization of almost all economic sectors and of small and large enterprises became a priority for the transformation into a competitive capitalist economy. The small and medium companies were transferred to national entrepreneurs while the large companies went into the hands of foreigners.

In 1988, Pope John Paul II, an anti-communist, visited Mozambique and held a mass open to the public in the country's largest stadium, which was understood as a sign of openness by the Maputo regime, given that after independence the state had declared itself as a Marxist-Leninist. In addition to opening new diplomatic missions in the United Kingdom, Sweden, West Germany, and Kenya, the Mozambican state established new alliances and

signed a series of regional agreements and international treaties, such as joining the Commonwealth, the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP), etc. The new diplomatic strategy brought credibility to Mozambique in international society, which led to it being removed from the USA's "black list" (Sitoe, Kassotche, and Pereira 2005). Chissano sought new economic partners and new political alliances and took pragmatic political-economic decisions. He established diplomatic relations with previously unlikely states.

The 1992 General Peace Agreement

The General Peace Accords (GPA) between the Mozambican State and RENAMO was signed in Rome on October 4th, 1992, putting an end to almost 17 years of civil war in the country. The GPA was mediated by the Community of Sant'Egidio, a religious organization of the Catholic Church with extensive experience in conflict mediation around the world. Early mediation efforts began in 1984 with the first dialogues between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO, through the Catholic and Anglican Churches that constituted the Christian Council of Mozambique. However, it was only in 1988 that there was a favorable signal from the Government of Mozambique for the negotiations to advance. The Italians were considered the most impartial mediators since the delegations from various countries involved, such as Portugal, the USA, Germany, Kenya, Malawi, Botswana, and Zimbabwe were considered either pro-RENAMO or pro-FRELIMO (Lalá 2002). The Community of Sant'Egidio developed a parallel diplomacy to that led by the USA and Western European States, as a religious non-governmental organization specializing in conflict resolution (Soriano 2015).

The Mozambican state was represented by President Joaquim Chissano and RENAMO was represented by Afonso Dhlakama, both leaders of the belligerent parties. The GPA was attended by representatives of neighboring states that had interests and direct or indirect participation in the Mozambican conflict, who served as witnesses. It was presided over by the Italian Government and its Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by high-ranking figures from Mozambique's neighboring states: the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, Roelof Botha; the presidents of Zimbabwe and Botswana, Robert Mugabe and Ketumile "Keith" Masire; the Vice-President of Kenya, George Saitoti; the Minister of the Presidency of Malawi, John Tembo; the Deputy Secretary General of the OAU, Ahmed Haggag. The mediators were: Mario Raffaelli, representative of the Italian Government and coordinator of the mediators; Dom Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of the Catholic Church

in Beira, the second largest city in Mozambique and RENAMO's zone of influence; Professor Andrea Riccardi and Bishop Matteo Zuppi, both from the Community of Sant'Egidio. Also, there were representatives of international observers: James Conah, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Ambassador Herman Cohen, Under-Secretary of State for the US Government; Ambassador Philippe Cuvillier, representative of the Government of France; José Manuel Durão Barroso, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Portugal; and Patrick Fairweather, representing the United Kingdom Government (Awepaa 1992). The GPA consisted of seven protocols dealing with the fundamental principles of the Agreement: the formation and recognition of political parties; electoral law; military issues; guarantees; ceasefire; and donor conference.

In this geopolitical frame, the communities of Sant'Egidio and Italy were accepted by both FRELIMO and RENAMO due to their neutrality and history of interventions for peace in the world order since the 1970s. Created in 1968, the Community of Sant'Egidio, an association of lay religious members, has become an international mediator and expert in conflict resolution (Soriano 2015). Before the Rome talks, there were different secret negotiations about the Mozambican conflict that took place in Portugal, Germany, France, and the USA, all without success. RENAMO had advisors and think tanks from the USA and Great Britain on its side, who often made more credible peace proposals than those of the FRELIMO party-state[3]. For both FRELIMO and RENAMO, the priests of the Community of Sant'Egidio were the perfect mediators because of their track record in conflict mediation and impartiality, since they did not represent either side.

The two-level game at the GPA

A The two-level game described by Putnam (2010) was eventful in the GPA negotiations between the Mozambican state and RENAMO. At the domestic level, President Chissano had to negotiate with the ideological and historical wing of FRELIMO, which refused to recognize RENAMO as an opposition movement, while at the same time balancing himself in the face of demands from RENAMO itself and pressures from Mozambican society

3 Between 1976 and 1988, Renamo received economic support from North American and British conservative groups and lobbyists, linked to the US Republican Party in the Carter and Reagan administrations, as well as to Margareth Thatcher's Conservative Party. In addition to these, there were the think tanks that produced research, analysis, and reports such as Chatham House, and Human Rights Watch. Some of the think tanks helped the belligerent parties – Frelimo and Renamo – with their expertise and produced partial analyses, pending on one side or the other.

to put an end to the war. At the international level, Chissano had to deal with pressures from external mediators: from neighboring Southern African states such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, from Western European States and the USA, the main donors of international aid, and from the priests of the Community of Sant'Egidio.

In the GPA both belligerents, FRELIMO and RENAMO, had to adjust their political positions and advantages. At the domestic level, Chissano managed to "pacify" RENAMO and to maintain a political and government system favorable to FRELIMO, which made it possible to win the first multi-party elections as well as the subsequent ones, in a zero-sum game in which whoever wins the presidential and legislative elections gets everything and governs alone, without any kind of opposition. At the international level, the Chissano Government was able to bargain for international aid and for the total waiving of Mozambique's foreign debt with its main Western donors during the Paris Club negotiations between 1997 and 2000. RENAMO also benefited from the Accords: its guerrillas were pardoned for crimes committed during the armed conflict, it achieved national and international recognition as an opposition movement to the Mozambican state, it forced FRELIMO to abandon socialism and the one-party regime, to sit at the negotiating table to discuss peace, to adhere to the democratic system and to the liberal economy, as well as to hold multi-party elections. For having forced FRELIMO to open up to a multi-party system and a democratic regime, RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama called himself the "father of democracy" in Mozambique. In light of the GPA, RENAMO's ruling elite moved to the capital city, having received houses and a permanent party fund from the Mozambican state.

However, even with the GPA and the multi-party elections, the wounds of the war never healed, and the political mistrust between FRELIMO and RENAMO persisted. Contrary to the successful experiences in post-*Apartheid* South Africa, Mozambique did not create a national truth and reconciliation commission as an alternative for reflection on the civil war, acknowledgment of committed atrocities or requests for pardon, nor conciliation among Mozambicans.

Internally, the GPA was seen as a diplomatic victory for Chissano, who knew how to balance between the radical wing of FRELIMO, the demands of the RENAMO guerrillas and pressure from the international community. During the Chissano Government, Mozambique achieved high rates of economic growth, around 7% per year, something that was used by the ruling elite as a flag to obtain external support from the international community,

arguing that the positive performance in international cooperation contributed to peace (Lalá 2002).

The GPA allowed for the emergence of new political-economic agendas in Mozambique, such as democratization, demilitarization of the country, and the concentration of efforts on poverty reduction, and economic and social development. After the GPA and the first multi-party elections, there was disinvestment in the armed forces and in the defense of the Mozambican territory. The liberal peace model was better matched to economic growth and democratization. The external agendas imposed on the Government had as priorities the reconstruction of the country, the fight against poverty, investment in infrastructure, agriculture, education, healthcare, the strengthening of democratic institutions, etc. The Chissano Government was pressured by the international community with the idea that peace was only possible if the country had weak armed forces. There was pressure to dismantle the armed forces and the government was unable to counteract the pressures from international development aid donors. Thus, there was a reduction in the military capabilities of the Mozambican state that, three decades later, the country would resent in the face of new threats: control of land and maritime borders, international trafficking, smuggling, and terrorism.

The GPA was a victory for the "Sant'Egidio method" and the "Italian formula" and its peacemaking, a way of peace negotiations based on goodwill and mutual trust, instituted by the priests and teachers of the Community of Sant'Egidio. After years of failed negotiations that involved European and North American diplomats in secret meetings inside and outside the country – in African and European capitals such as Nairobi, Blantyre, Harare, Lisbon, Berlin, and London – the diplomacy of the Italian priests proved to be effective in order to reach a peace agreement in Mozambique.

The 2nd Chissano Government (1994-2004)

In his second presidential term, following the first multi-party general elections in Mozambique in 1994, Chissano surrounded himself with young technocrats from the state, who had university degrees and had assimilated the IMF/WB booklet. The criterion for choosing ministers and high-ranking authorities continued to be that of trust, either at a personal or party-political level, as his autobiography points out (Chissano 2011). The technocrats in the Chissano Government were members of the FRELIMO party, but not necessarily ideological militants. Some were sympathizers who identified with the revolutionary era, but who did not make a living from politics; they were civil servants, university professors, NGO collaborators, and private-sector

businessmen who were invited to take part in the government. Part of the technocrats were chosen because they stood out in some way, had innovative ideas, or were liberal and pragmatic.

According to Plank (1993), FRELIMO's abandonment of its socialist principles and adherence to the IMF/WB developmental approach was accompanied by a dramatic erosion of domestic authority, as donors, foreign consultants, and NGOs took responsibilities previously reserved for the state. In the author's view, Mozambican leaders were forced to withdraw in the face of external agencies' ever-increasing influence in domestic policy choices, in order to maintain the flow of aid and avoid economic collapse.

The deterioration of the state was not in question. Mozambique's extreme dependence on foreign aid posed a dilemma not only for those in power but also for donors. The Mozambican state's partial relinquishment of control over its economic and social policies implied potentially uncomfortable new responsibilities for the major aid agencies (Plank 1993).

At some moments there were clear ideological clashes between the historically convinced Marxists of FRELIMO and the young neoliberal technocrats. Examples of these clashes occurred in the discussion of the Land Law, in which the young technocrats argued for the flexibility of access or even the sale of land, particularly to large foreign investors and multinational companies, while the ideological radical wing defended that the land should remain the inalienable property of the state, which should only grant the right to use and benefit from the land (DUAT) to citizens, companies, and investors, as it had been doing since independence.

There were other clashes of ideas between the two wings regarding the liberalization of economic sectors not yet privatized, such as civil aviation, ports and railways, telecommunications, and postal services, which continued to be monopolized by the state. The collision course between the "liberators of the homeland" and the "technocrats" became clear. In the view of the liberators, the youngest was not to be trusted, as they could sell the country to foreigners in a short time. Such criticism catapulted the candidacy of Armando Guebuza, a historic, hard-liner and liberator of the homeland. With the ascension of Guebuza to the post of FRELIMO's Secretary General in 2003, and until the end of the Chissano Government's term in 2005, a catharsis within the political party began, with strong criticism and pressure on the Chissano administration, accused of "corruption", "bureaucratism" and "letting go".

Mozambique changed its economic system and the Constitution by adhering to multipartyism, but there were no significant political changes.

The political elite remained in power, transforming itself into a political-economic elite. The former socialist "comrades" became the "new bosses" in capitalism by taking over the former public companies through privatization. The wave of privatizations without entrepreneurs transformed former leader-comrades of FRELIMO into new bosses. A Mozambican middle class was born, resulting from the privatization of state-owned companies and banks, whose economic capital came from economic-financial scandals and the appropriation of goods and services from the former socialist state. The attempt to create a Mozambican business class failed. In its place emerged a bourgeoisie that had no savings, whose capital came from the looting and plundering of now privatized public companies. Mozambique became a "country that produces rich people instead of producing wealth", to cite a famous phrase by writer Mia Couto.

In addition to corruption in every sector, there was excessive inflation and wages remained low. As a result of the situation, civil servants stole their own work materials and inputs in order to resell them in the parallel market. Others used state resources – such as machines, automobiles, tractors, tools, etc. – in personal businesses. The structural adjustment policies and the peace agreement brought prosperity to a minority – the leaders, politicians, and deputies – who paraded around the city in sumptuous houses, cars, and restaurants. Thus, a small class of nouveau riches was created (Hanlon 1997).

The Chissano Government was also marked by countless strikes in the productive sector, by private semi-collective transporters known as "chapa-100" and by bakers, due to high fuel prices. Workers from various sectors and companies organized themselves into unions to defend their rights, disassociating themselves from the FRELIMO party. In this way, divorce was sealed between, on one side, the party of the comrades, and on the other side the workers and mass organizations, with emphasis on the mutation of the Mozambican Workers Organization (OTM), formerly a political mobilization arm of FRELIMO, which became a trade union central, renamed OTM-CS. It was in the Chissano Government that the "bread revolts", which take place annually, began, in which the population, workers, chapa-100, bakers, etc., went on strike due to the high cost of living experienced in Mozambique.

These pressure groups, and even the Catholic Church, had interests distinct from those negotiated by the Chissano Government with the BWIs which resulted in fiscal austerity policies. The international agreements signed with the IMF/WB and the structural adjustment policies that seemed to be beneficial for the Mozambican economy reverberated negatively in the

domestic sphere, being the target of fierce opposition from national interest groups.

The bankruptcy of banks – Commercial Bank of Mozambique, *Banco Austral* – and of small and large privatized companies managed by party members, as well as assassinations of journalists and tax auditors who were investigating financial leaks, were another hallmark of Chissano's time[4]. Even so, after the end of his second term and having "voluntarily" relinquished power, Chissano was awarded the Mo Ibrahim Good Governance Award in 2007, which recognizes African leaders for excellence in political leadership and good governance. Chissano received the award in its first edition from the hands of former UN Secretary Kofi Annan, who recognized his contribution to creating a stable democracy and economic progress in Mozambique.

Little noticed when compared to regime changes in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa, Mozambique's transition from socialism to Western democracy was turbulent, but without having experienced government collapse. Meanwhile, the privatization program of the Mozambican state led by Chissano was considered the most successful in Africa. The peaceful conclusion of the first two general elections suggested that the chances of democratic consolidation were as good as privatization and better than in the rest of the African countries (Pitcher 2002). The author considers that although privatizations had altered state institutions, the process and result of these did not eliminate state power, only redirected it. The government abandoned the direct state management of companies and factories, opting instead for dependence on the private sector, foreign investment, and bank loans. Mozambique has served as a model idealized by neoliberal prescriptions, to be followed by others.

The state puritanism of the Samora Government was not continued in the Chissano Government, it was replaced by state neopatrimonialism. The Chissano Government was associated with the apex of corruption in Mozambique and the illicit enrichment of the business elite. Corruption was endemic in all sectors and recognized by international organizations in various reports. The economic-financial aid injected by the IMF/WB for privatized small and medium Mozambican companies was never reimbursed. The financing ended up in the hands of companies managed by individuals from the ruling party. The national businessmen went to the banks and

4 I am referring to the murder of Carlos Cardoso, investigative journalist and editor of Jornal por fax Metical, and of António Siba-Siba Macuácua, an economist and tax auditor of the Bank of Mozambique, the Central Bank, who was investigating financial fraud in the management of *Banco Austral*; both assassinations occurred in the year 2001.

asked for loans and, as a guarantee, presented the membership card of the party in power.

At the end of his mandate, the Chissano Government became famous for unpopular decisions by strictly following the economic and financial recipes of Bretton Woods, whose consequences were successful for the economy, but terrible for the Mozambican social fabric. The structural adjustment and privatizations were considered successful by the international community, but internally they resulted in the bankruptcy of industries, commerce, and national companies, in mass layoffs due to the resizing of companies, low salaries, increases in the cost of living, and fiscal austerity.

Foreign policy

Mozambique's foreign policy – considered radical during the Samora Government – turned softer under Chissano. The country began to play a key role in important issues and as a mediator between Western countries and Southern African states. Relations with the USA improved significantly and the state adapted to the demands of the BWIs. During the VI Congress in 1991, FRELIMO abandoned its role as a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, and a proposal for a new Constitution was voted on. The Government initiated a transition from a centrally-planned economy to a more liberal market economy (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994).

With a more decentralized state and diffused power among ministers and ministries, the Chissano Government experienced the last years of the Cold War, characterized by the forced distancing of the USSR due to the situation of crisis in Soviet socialism and by the easing of tensions with the Western world, which came to be seen as a partner for Mozambique's development. After a decade of cooperation with the USSR, it became clear that Moscow had not sent enough economic and financial aid, heavy weaponry, military officers, and technicians, nor had trained enough troops to guarantee the defense of Mozambican territory in the face of attacks by the *Apartheid* regime, when compared with Soviet support given to the Angolan State. Allied to this fact, in the early 1980s, Moscow had vetoed Mozambique's entry into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), something that made it impossible for the Mozambican state to access financial resources from this socialist organization[5].

5 COMECON was an organization created in 1949 that integrated states of Eastern Europe. Later it was enlarged, allowing the adhesion of Socialist Bloc countries from other continents, such as Latin America, Asia, and Africa. It was a Soviet response to the creation of the Marshall Plan, aimed at economically supporting the countries of the Socialist Bloc.

Cabrita (2013) argued that although the Mozambican state had defined itself as a Marxist-Leninist country in 1977, expecting in return the attribution of the same status that Cuba enjoyed at the level of COMECON, the USSR rejected this claim with the argument that Mozambique was not a socialist country, but only a socialist-oriented country. Long before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the economic reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev, the USSR leader had recommended that countries like Mozambique should diversify their international economic relations since the Soviet economy had reached the point of exhaustion and could no longer support the kind of relations that it had been maintaining with Third World countries, nor serve as a model for them. Even before Gorbachev came to power in April 1985, the USSR was already showing signs of economic fragility by vetoing the accession of Mozambique and other countries to the financial and economic institutions of the Soviet Bloc (Veloso 2007; Cabrita 2013).

From Gorbachev's (1988) point of view, African nations had the legal right to freely choose their development paths. Thus, the Soviet leader condemned attempts to intervene in internal African affairs and stated that the USSR no longer had interests in Southern Africa. In his opinion, all nations had the right to choose their own path to development, to dispose of their own destiny, their territory, and their human and natural resources (Gorbachev 1988).

In this context, Chissano's foreign policy was characterized by Mozambique's economic opening to international trade and the implementation of IMF/WB policies. With Chissano, cooperation with Western world institutions became effective. The foreign policy agenda became driven from the outside in, dictated by international aid donors, and based on liberal economic development. Mozambique projected itself internationally as an example of pacification and alignment with the Western world, being considered the "pretty IMF boy" in Southern Africa, for having strictly adopted the guidelines of the BWIs and of its main international donors.

With regard to Mozambique's external engagement, Sitoe, Kassotche, and Pereira (2005) point out that the country has become largely dependent on external resources for its development and that much of the aid and external debt relief provided were linked to particular conditions. On the other hand, Mozambicans felt concerned about the government's sovereignty and capacity to define its own priorities and design its own development programs. In the perspective of these authors, Mozambique adjusted its internal and external policy according to the objective circumstances of the world and taking into account the pressures imposed by international actors. In this

way, Mozambican diplomacy successfully adjusted to the new circumstances. This redefinition of policy and strategy led FRELIMO to identify a new vision of its relationship with citizens, committing itself to the principles of human rights and democratization.

Macamo (2003) states that the country was the target of external intervention, economic-financial disciplining, and of the totalitarian violence of structural adjustment. Thus, Mozambique ceased to be a subject, an actor, a society, a political system, and an economy with its own agendas to become an object of IMF/WB intervention. It was through the structural adjustment programs that Mozambique normalized itself, that is, it voluntarily submitted to the powers of the BWIs without being aware of this process (Macamo 2003).

In his analysis of the post-war reconstruction process, Hanlon (1997) pointed out that IMF/WB blocked all reconstruction efforts in the country and Mozambicans did not benefit from peace. The IMF/WB formula determined that investing too many resources in post-war reconstruction would generate inflation. Thus, it was first necessary to contain inflation and impose limits on state spending, causing reconstruction projects – such as the reopening of roads, bridges, stores, schools, and health posts – to be delayed or postponed. Banks had strict orders from the IMF to restrict access to credit and only lend money to large companies and established merchants. Agriculture was considered a high-risk activity, without agricultural credit.

Several scholars have pointed out that the collapse of the socialist project and its replacement by a free market economy was the predictable result of the West's persistent and conscious efforts to undermine Frelimo's revolutionary agenda and subject the country once again to the demands of global capitalism (Pitcher 2002). Thus, issues such as fiscal conservatism, economic development, combating poverty, and regional integration in Southern Africa became the main items on the political-economic agenda of the Chissano Government. The Government was more concerned with its international image, as well as with pleasing the IMF/WB and Western partners in exchange for external economic aid than with responding to the inputs, the domestic demands, and the demands of Mozambican civil society. The privatization of important industrial sectors, the faithful adoption of the neoliberal booklet, and the economic and cooperation relations with unlikely partners, such as Indonesia, Israel, and Morocco, made clear that there was a change in Mozambican foreign policy from the ideological field to economic pragmatism, with emphasis on the developmental and poverty reduction discourse.

Conclusion

The article analyzed the political-economic situation in Mozambique during the Chissano Government, highlighting events, the national and international actors involved, as well as their interests. Joaquim Chissano was the longest-serving president in the history of Mozambique, totaling 18 years in power. He succeeded Samora Machel after his death, in a direct election within the FRELIMO party without the participation of the population or civil society. Chissano had political experience. He was president of Mozambique between 1986 and 1994, during the one-party period, and from 1995 to 2005, in the multi-party period. The political conjuncture of his government was marked by political-economic transitions and profound changes, the end of socialism, structural adjustment policies, adherence to a market economy, and a multi-party model imposed by the BWIs and the Western world in exchange for economic aid. There was a political opening, expansion of individual and collective rights, as well acceleration of negotiations with RENAMO. The end of the armed conflict and the peace agreement between the Mozambican state and Renamo was the defining event of the Chissano Government. The transformations in the international and regional system influenced Chissano's domestic and foreign policy, which distanced itself from the USSR, the only actor to leave the scene and not participate in the negotiations for the resolution of the Mozambican conflict.

The transition to capitalism, the 1990 Constitution, and the multi-party system represented a greater participation of businessmen, political parties, and civil society in Mozambican society, at the same time that part of the political elite that came from one-party socialism lost power and political prestige, hence the supposed *coup d'état* attempt in 1991. With Chissano, the Mozambican state presented more flexible ideological positions, relaxed tensions and began to dialogue with the Western world, and established diplomatic and cooperation relations that were previously unthinkable. There were paradigm shifts in Mozambique with the liberalization of the economy and the adoption of a multi-party regime. With the end of the civil war, the domestic and foreign policy agendas changed. Mozambique focused on reconstruction, development, fiscal conservatism, fighting poverty, investing significantly in agriculture, healthcare, and education, as well as regional integration. Mozambique's strong political positions in the region were weakened, while regional economic integration gained prominence, with Mozambique becoming South Africa's main partner in an asymmetrical interdependence relationship. The state took economic advantages from submission to the IMF/WB, while at the same time, it became more

dependent on international aid. Western states have become Mozambique's main trading partners and donors of development aid.

At the domestic level, the Chissano Government became associated with multipartyism and the introduction of economic liberalism, the expansion of individual and collective freedoms, but also the privatization of the main sectors of the economy, the capitalist and political rationality of *laissez-faire* and millions of unemployed citizens resulting from the structural adjustment programs. Chissano stood out for his diplomacy, and negotiation skills for peacekeeping. In international relations, he achieved prominence for convincing donors to support the state and for his political-economic pragmatism. However, the attempt to create a Mozambican middle class through the privatization of state companies, as well as the transformation of the governmental political elite into a national business class failed due to a lack of management experience and ended in economic-financial scandals and widespread corruption due to promiscuous relations between the party and the State.

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ABSTRACT

The article analyzes the political situation of Mozambique during the Chissano Government. It uses a two-level logic and the intermestic perspective as theoretical contributions and the methodology of situation analysis. Chissano governed Mozambique in the midst of domestic and foreign transitions: the passage from socialism to capitalism, changes in the Constitution, the peace agreement with RENAMO and the first multi-party elections. The international and regional conjuncture was marked by the Washington Consensus, the end of the Cold War and South African *Apartheid*. The distancing from the Soviet Bloc, the break with socialism, the introduction of economic liberalism, individual and collective freedoms, the easing of regional and Western tensions were hallmarks of Chissano's domestic and foreign policies. The *laissez-faire* policy and the attempt to create a Mozambican middle class led to financial scandals and widespread corruption. Chissano sought other ideologies, negotiated with unlikely partners, and adopted economic pragmatism. Surrounded by technocrats, he strictly followed the IMF/WB recipes, with unpopular decisions that led to social upheavals: structural adjustment, privatizations and millions of unemployed. The peace agreement and the total waiving of foreign debt were his great diplomatic achievements. At the end of his government, Mozambique had lost its regional political leading role, had subordinated to external agendas and was increasingly dependent on international aid.

KEYWORDS
Mozambique. Chissano Government. Situation Analysis. Internal and external politics.

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