LATENT POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE FALL OF *APARTHEID* AND THE PERSONALITY FACTOR

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Introduction

The aim of this paper is to study the phenomenon of latent politics in South Africa's struggle against *apartheid* in the period from the second half of the 1970s to the early 1990s. Its methodological basis includes the theory of latent politics and Hegel's philosophical substantiation of the role of the individual in the historical process. The paradigm that is developed in the article considers real politics as an organic unity of additional parts – hidden (latent) and overt (transparent). The potential theoretical or empirical significance of the work is as follows: at the theoretical level – a more detailed development of the concept of 'latent policy' and its use; and at the empirical level – an applied research of specific archival material, recorded oral history testimonies, political speeches and documents that confirm the correctness of the proposed paradigm which focuses on latent politics. We also argue that latent policy is not only the activity of intelligence and special services, but also includes many other unobserved or concealed actions and phenomena in society.

On the phenomenon of latent politics in political science, the work by Vadim Kurillo (2013), although published in the Russian language, offers a general theoretical approach but does not relate directly to realities in South Africa; it focuses specifically on Eastern Europe. The theme on the fall of

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https://doi.org/10.22456/2448-3923.124485

apartheid has received wide coverage in many publications, including those by Nancy Clark and William Worger (2013), Dedria Bryfonski and Alex Cruden (2010), Lindsay Eades (1999), Adrian Guelke (2005), Robert Harvey (2001), Ken Keable (2012), Robert Price (1991), Paula Pratt (1995), Liz Sonneborn (2010) and many others. These works provide a valuable historical description of events, but do not focus on latent politics and its role in South African politics. Nevertheless, some challenges posed by hidden politics and the personality factor are considered in the works of Niël Barnard (2015), Barry Gilder (2012), Ronnie Kasrils (1998), Ron Nixon (2016), Jacques Pauw (2017) and Allister Sparks (1995) – primarily in the format of historical narratives. Furthermore, Kevin O'Brien (2011) and James Sanders (2006) make an extensive study of the intelligence services of South Africa, but other aspects of the political process, including the personal factor, are not covered. This is understandable because archival documents and primary sources about clandestine and covert actions in South Africa are either kept secret or have been destroyed. Between 1990 and 1994 huge volumes of information were destroyed in an attempt to keep the *apartheid* state secrets hidden. All documentation confiscated by the security police from individuals and organizations opposed to *apartheid* were destroyed before the 1994 general elections (TRC Report 1998). This being so, the speeches of political leaders, publications by the heads of the special services of both the *apartheid* regime and the liberation forces, are of cardinal importance.

On the politics and history of resistance, the South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) multi-volume publications, *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*; the oral history interviews and archival material collected by both SADET Oral History Project (SOHP) and those recorded by Padriag O'Malley, some held at Nelson Mandela Foundation and the Mayibuye Archives at the University of the Western Cape, are used as sources. From an interview with Thabo Mbeki (former president of South Africa) conducted by Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu in Johannesburg on 23 February 2011 on behalf of SOHP, it is clear that Mbeki is of the view that political change in South Africa came about primarily because of internal dynamics which challenged the South African economy; change was not necessarily wrought because of the fall of the Soviet Union or through the supposedly constructive engagement as pursued by certain Western powers during the Cold War. As he puts it:

> I am saying when we (the ANC) looked at things like that, with the chairperson of the Broederbond saying to me they will get rid of *apartheid* legislation, with the Minister of Finance saying *apartheid* is unaffordable, we might still be attached to it but we cannot finance it ... this indicated that political change was coming to South Africa ... and

> indeed adds to what then happened with the pull-out of the SADF from Angola leading to the processes that led to the independence of Namibia in 1990 ... Then the changes in South Africa came about because of internal pressures. It was the question about the financial sustainability of *apartheid* and the war in Angola, add to that the mass struggles that have been taking place internally. It was not the changes in the Soviet Union (Mbeki 2011, n/p).

About his meeting with the chairman of the Broederbond, Pieter de Lange, held in New York, in 1986, Mbeki asserted:

> The chairman of the Broederbond effectively said that *apartheid* must go. He said to me, if we had not arrived at this point by 1990, when South Africa definitely had to change, then it means South Africa will be caught in a terrible civil war which would claim the lives of many people. We must solve this thing by 1990. [He said that we would] have to resolve this conflict by 1990 (Mbeki 2011, n/p).

In the same interview in February 2011, Thabo Mbeki indicated that he informed his principals about his meeting with Pieter de Lange when he returned to the ANC headquarters in Lusaka:

> With regard to the use of oral history testimonies in the study of the struggle against *apartheid* in South Africa, one agrees with Jeremy Seekings (2010, 7-28) who claims that the challenge for scholars is to integrate different voices or testimonies into an overall picture, while recognising that voices are incomplete; that some potential voices are likely to remain silent; and that making sense of oral history testimonies requires going beyond them (Mbeki 2011, n/p).

This article focuses on the following three themes. It begins by discussing latent politics as a social phenomenon and looks at the elements of its theory. It then turns to the practical application of the concept of latent politics to the South African political process prior to the 1994 political dispensation. Finally, it identifies the role of the personality factor in latent politics in South Africa during the *apartheid* era.

Latent politics as a social phenomenon: the basic elements of its theory

The terms 'latent policy', 'latent politics', 'latent directions of political activity' and others, are based on the Latin word 'latens' ('latentis'), meaning hidden or invisible. This denotes something hidden, secret; something that is not manifested outwardly, but is not necessarily negative. A prominent American political scientist of the twentieth century, Gabriel Almond, was among the first to use this concept in October 1959 in a speech at a scientific conference devoted to the study of outer space. He emphasized that popular opinion could also be classified as latent politics. As he put it: 'It is not only significant changes in public politics and the political elite, it is the most significant component of that public policy and must be understood and appreciated if a proper of the meaning of that policy is to be made (Almond 1959, n.p.)'. Strictly speaking, Almond did not propose the definition of 'latent politics' and in the context of his speech he emphasized that public opinion is designated only as a behind-the-scenes element of resource allocation in the political system. At the same time, his views highlight an important development in methodology, one that calls for further theoretical and empirical research work in the field of latent political processes.

However, the very term 'latent' has become widespread in various fields of study and knowledge production, as in Robert Bradley's work, *Latent Impulse in History and Politics* (1911), Robert Merton's (1957) sociological work, and the latent class analysis in the study by Paul Lazarsfeld (1950). See also the publication by Jacques Hagenaars and Alan McCutchen (2002) and the journal article by Richard Breen (2000). In addition, the term 'latent' has its own essence, which distinguishes it from other similar terms, for example, from 'informal politics' discussed in the book by Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky (2006). 'Informal politics' as a rule means a policy that is not legally approved or formally defined. However, one type of latent policy – intelligence – has both a legislative basis and a formal status. The term 'covert', differs from the notion 'clandestine', while latent politics includes both. Peter Scott (1993, 2015) uses the notion of 'deep politics', but this is dominated by a negative meaning – something that also deviates from the normative pattern (drug trafficking, crime, military conspiracies, etc.). The term latent policy includes both positive and negative phenomena. It is a universal term denoting a wide spectrum of phenomena, a theoretical construction with specific categories and regularities and a concrete practice in the field of politics.

In this article, political latency is understood as existing objectively, but not reflected in the public consciousness; it is realized but concealed from extraneous eyes. It is underpinned by reality in the aggregate of its inherent negative and positive qualities. This allows us to perceive political life more truthfully and pressurizes subjects to act more effectively. In the words of German philosopher, Hegel (2001, 44), politics in this case, has a beginning 'from concealed fount ... still hidden beneath the surface, which, impinging on the outer world as on shell, bursts it in pieces, because it is another kernel...'. The concept of latent politics is not identical to conspiracy, since it does not consider politics in the format of conspiracy theory.

By definition, latent policy and latent politics refer to a special, unenlightened sphere of activity, the implementation of hidden interests or the use of secret methods of obtaining, retaining and using power, as well as ensuring the security and self-protection of the political system, that is, society as a whole. It is underpinned by a non-transparent type of relationship between people, society and the state. When considering the latent content of the *apartheid* state, 'latent policy' is implied. As for the latent political activities and actions of some structures and personalities, the term 'latent politics' is used.

Therefore, politics as a holistic phenomenon includes its latent and transparent components in their organic unity and complementarity. According to Vadim Kurillo (2013), safety, rivalry and the struggle for survival by the state, members of ruling government and elites are the main source and core of latent politics. The understanding of safety in his interpretation of latent politics covers:

- the safety of achievement or conquest of power and its retention;
- the safety of the mechanism of functioning and implementation of power, including the safety of decision-making processes;
- the safety of subjects of political life and protection of their interests;
- the safety of the state's position in international relations;
- the safety of the functioning of certain structures that protect the interests of the state and society within and outside the country, including intelligence, counter-intelligence, law enforcement bodies and regime institutions;
- the protection of society from political and economic destabilization, destruction, drug trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, etc.; and
- the safety of some industrial, financial, research and information and communication structures, etc. (Kurillo 2013).

Furthermore, Kurillo (2013) also argues that the social purpose of latent politics is indicated by its functions. They can be divided conditionally into functions reflecting the organic connection of latent politics with politics in general and those in which the specificity of latent politics is manifested. The following belong to the sphere of latent politics:

- the realization of the existential interests of the state and other subjects, including political parties, that is, security, survival, assessment of the prospects for the development of situations and threats, timely adaptation to the new conditions or the implementation of certain preventive measures, etc.;
- the realization of the interests of coexistence and harmonization of value positions, that is, an exact definition of the international positions of the state and other actors of interstate relations an adequate understanding and consideration of the positions of political subjects in the country among themselves, etc.;
- the implementation of functional interests, that is, a realistic assessment of the effectiveness of political activities with the help of various, including confidential, sources, objective information, financial support provision, staffing, etc.; and
- the realization of the interests of strengthening/undermining the internal order; and the protection of the individual and society from the actions of destructive and criminal elements (Kurillo 2013).

In this paper, Kurillo's theory of latent politics in the *apartheid* crisis from 1976 to the early 1990s will be explored – particularly the political process which led to substantive negotiations at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) which convened formally in Johannesburg on 20 December 1991 (Ndlovu 2010; 2013).

Practical application of the latent politics to processes that led to the end of *apartheid* in South Africa, 1970s-1990s

The main content of the political process in South Africa in the given period was the struggle between the supporters and opponents of *apartheid*, and the outcome was the fall of the *apartheid* system. The elements of the political process were underpinned by various types of politics, including latent politics; and some latent components, the results of spontaneous interaction of its participants; and latent changes in public consciousness associated with further radicalization of the mood of the oppressed peoples of South Africa.

A fundamental feature of South African history was the existence for many years of 'colonialism of a special type' (CST), which means that the 'metropolis' and the 'colony' were located on the territory of one country. CST consisted of, firstly, political power that was explicitly monopolized by white South Africans; they had the vote and controlled state institutions. Secondly, whites had exclusive economic power. For example, the 1913 Natives Land Act set aside 13% of the land area of South Africa to indigenous inhabitants and 87% for white inhabitants. Thirdly, the economic system in South Africa was basically one of labor coercion, in which a number of systems and laws were used to compel indigenous peoples, that is, 'natives', to make themselves available as cheap labor power. Fourthly, because the system was so evidently unfair, it had to be authoritarian, so there were a myriad of laws to bolster the CST system which deprived Africans, the oppressed majority, of rights that other people took for granted elsewhere in the world. So when we talk about emancipation in South Africa, it means overthrowing the system of colonialism of a special type (Turok et al. 2010, 38).

In 1962, in the South African Communist Party (SACP)'s chapter on CST characterized the essential feature of South Africa as: a new type of colonialism in which the oppressive white colonisers 'occupied the same territory as the oppressed people themselves and lived side by side with them' (SACP 1962). Similarly, the ANC describes the South African social formation as a system of 'internal colonialism' or 'colonialism of a special type', a latent form of colonialism (ANC 1977). One of the most important elements underpinning latent policy is the development and promotion of a general strategy for 'double entity': the disguise or concealment by politicians of the true content of their ideological platform and its goals. Formally, *apartheid* meant 'separation' and 'division' of the racial groups of the population in South Africa because of allegedly insurmountable contradictions between them, and this was justified by the supposed right of every 'nation' (racial group) to independent development. As L.M. Eades (1999, 33) notes, 'an examination of the nature of separation and the tradition of racial divisions before and during the years of *apartheid* is crucial to understanding the reasons for its collapse'. The hidden goal of *apartheid* was to strengthen the dominant position of the white population by means of total racial segregation, discrimination and exploitation of the African majority, depriving it of political rights and freedoms. For the sake of an even deeper hiding of the true essence of *apartheid*, after 1948 when the National Party (NP) came to power, it replaced the negatively perceived word '*apartheid*' in its doctrine with the more harmonious term 'separate development'. However, for the African people, this 'separate development' meant lack of rights in the country of their birth, police arbitrariness, impoverishment, cultural degradation and the destruction of family foundations (Butler et al. 1978).

The cornerstone of the latent strategy of *apartheid*, which can be traced back to the late 1940s, was the so-called 'Bantustanization' of the African population. This involved the creation of ethnic reserves with limited self-government, outside of which Africans were not recognized as full citizens of South Africa. The leaders of the racist regime declared that in the future, Bantustans would become independent, sovereign states that would provide their inhabitants with a decent life, political rights and freedoms (Ndlovu 2018, 43-69). The prime minister of South Africa, B.J. Vorster (1966-1978) articulated this policy as follows:

> I say to the Coloured people, as well as to the Indians and the Bantu, that the policy of separate development is not a policy which rests upon jealousy, fear or hatred. It is not a denial of the human dignity of anyone, nor is it so intended. On the contrary, it gives the opportunity to every individual, within his own sphere, not only to be a man or woman in every sense, but it also creates the opportunity for them to develop and advance without restriction or frustration as circumstances justify and in accordance with the demands or development achieved (Williams 1989, 23).

But it was a hidden maneuver of the ruling classes in the changing political realities of South Africa and in the rise of the national liberation movement on the world stage. The true goals of Bantustanization were to separate the African population and automatically transform the white minority into the dominant 'nation' in South Africa with a monopoly on power, thereby enabling it to undermine the formation of a democratic, non-racial South Africa; to incite the so-called African 'tribes' into divisive conflict; to undermine the formation of a united front of the African masses to resist racial discrimination and exploitation; and to supress the struggle for a democratic dispensation which prioritized the oppressed people of South Africa.

The struggle for the liberation of South Africa's oppressed majority has a long history which began when the first European settlers set foot in the region. But when scholars and others analyse the beginning of the collapse of *apartheid*, often their timeline begins from the mid-1980s. This in our opinion does not take into account the latent phase of the process, the earlier, hidden stage of conflict between the African people and *apartheid* South Africa. As shown below, the rise of the democratic movement was preceded by a stage of gradual increase of latent radicalization, a simmering moodiness of the oppressed population; the 'hidden' strengthening of the liberation forces and the gradual erosion of *apartheid*'s racist practices. In an imperceptibly evolving process, it is difficult to identify the initial milestone that marks the beginning

of the end of *apartheid*. Most likely, the beginning of the latent stage of deepening the crisis of *apartheid* was the Soweto uprising of African youth in 1976, supported nationally and not only by the youth (Ndlovu 2017). In his book entitled *The Soweto Uprisings: Counter-memories of June 1976,* Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu writes that the Soweto uprisings were a turning point in our history. They exploded into a momentous historical and political event, leading to major repercussions that are still with us today. The uprisings reinvigorated the ailing ANC as well as the PAC, and it also led to the re-examination of the ideology of black consciousness and the formation of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). The uprisings aroused world abhorrence of *apartheid* and its image as child killers; and it gave rise to a dual response from the *apartheid* regime, a stepping up of ruthless repressions, and desperate, yet ineffective reforms (Ndlovu 2017, 64). According to Harvey, '16 June 1976, [defined] the starting point for the events that were to result in a handover to black rule 18 years later and [was] the real turning point in South Africa's post-1948 history'(Harvey 2001, 71). Similarly, J.D. Brewer writes: 'However great the differences may be between the various accounts of the process of change and reform in South Africa, there is much greater agreement in the view that the events of 1976 were crucial in beginning or reinforcing the slow, often hesitant, process of liberalization and reform' (Brewer 1986, 4).

A growing number of young people moved into exile during the late 1970s; most of them joined the ANC, and some pursued their studies outside South Africa. In July 1977, the commissioner of police had every reason to state that the Soweto unrest of African youth had swelled the ranks of the 'terrorist movement', as he put it (*South African Digest*, 29 July 1976). It took the ANC some time to provide these young people with the necessary military and political training and to create additional resources. There was also preparation for their subsequent penetration as Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) cadres into South Africa.

According to the theory of conflict as shown at Ebrary.net[3], open insurgency (for example, pickets and mass mobilization) are preceded as a rule, by the latent stage of articulation of political attitudes, organizational preparation and development, during which discontent, initially psychological, arises in consciousness and grows without external manifestation or action. The BCM, with its strong ideological basis, played a special role in the 'psychological liberation' of Africans – especially in the early and mid-70s among the youth (Mzamane, Maaba and Biko 2006).

3 https://ebrary.net/2866/management/stages_conflict_conflict_process.

The murder in September 1977 of Steve Biko, a prominent BCM figure, in the state torture chambers, was proof that all hope for nonviolent forms of struggle was futile. This prompted BCM supporters to go into exile to join the ANC and the PAC military cadres (Nyameko and Singh 1977, 34-47). Such changes occurred and accumulated gradually but by the mid-1980s they became increasingly apparent. Moreover, incidents of protest by workers became more frequent; mass protests also spread to the Western Cape. At the same time, MK launched resonant sabotage operations. Therefore, it was evident that the crisis experienced by the South African government in the 1980s was kick-started by the Soweto uprisings of 1976.

Furthermore, the turbulent 1980s saw the formation of trade unions, the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) and student organizations such as the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) which brought together a network of student bodies that flourished in the wake of the 1980 school boycotts. New and radical forces such as the United Democratic Front (UDF), formed in 1983, emerged and became more vocal in their protest against *apartheid* rule. And despite divergent viewpoints, there was slow but promising progress in worker unity paving the way for the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU). The fact that the UDF united various organizations was significant for it represented the ANC's call for united action.

The simmering crisis took on a new dimension in 1984 when a countrywide popular insurrection broke out. The situation in the Vaal area was one such example. In a desperate bid to stem the tide, the government declared a national state of emergency and instituted what it termed 'reform', a phony constitutional maneuvering to set up a tricameral parliamentary system involving Indians and coloured people as 'junior partners' – but excluded the African majority. In defiance, the ANC rejected this meaningless constitutional tinkering. In his annual address to the ANC on 8 January 1984, the president of the ANC, O.R. Tambo, made the following salient observations:

- The revolutionary ferment in South Africa had plunged the ruling racist clique into deeper levels of crisis and was evidence of the growing credibility of the ANC as an alternative center of power. Western governments had come to regard the ANC as a government in-waiting. Inside South Africa growing numbers of whites realized that the ANC had to be part of any solution to the country's political predicament. Importantly, most of the capitalist establishment thought so too.

- The recent constitutional maneuvers by the government were an implicit recognition that unless Mandela was released, the crisis could not be resolved.
- The popular anger that was sweeping the country looked to the ANC for inspiration. The ANC encouraged this by calling on the masses to make the country ungovernable.
- The growth of the democratic trade union movement and its power to wrest recognition from both the regime and the employers was a significant advance in the struggle.

Although mass mobilisation and peaceful demonstrations had occurred earlier, the erosion of *apartheid* developed slowly and took place in latent and semi-hidden forms, contrary to the will of the ruling white minority, some of whom believed the situation was under control. This creeping progression has been called the 'silent revolution' and is explored in the works by Allister Sparks (1995) and J. Kane-Berman (1990). Robert Price (1991) describes it as the slow transformation towards transition. But in the late 1970s and 1980s, some were mesmerized by the obduracy and power of the Afrikaner establishment and its willingness to use that power to bludgeon everyone to submission. As Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (1975) show, the regime spread the word that it was 'perfectly secure' and insisted that ... the 'gross national product has continued to soar'. It went on to profess: 'European, American and Japanese corporations have continued to increase their profitable participation in the South African economy by trade and investment through industrial subsidies' (Thompson and Butler 1975; Adam and Giliomee 1979).

But this was mere bravado. Mass popular resistance to *apartheid* had reached unprecedented heights by the mid-1980s. The country was on the verge of being ruled under a permanent state of national emergency. The balance of power had changed and the African townships had become ungovernable – a major political objective of the ANC. The mass popular resistance posed special problems both at the level of practical activity and theoretical understanding – how, to use Lenin's phrase, 'to organize a universal political struggle ... in such a manner as to obtain the support of all opposition strata for the struggle' (Lenin 1975, 153).

It is necessary to emphasize that it would be a mistake to depict all anti-*apartheid* actions and processes as being exclusively latent in character. Such an error may lead one into the sphere of conspiracy theory, which reduces everything in politics to conspiracies and secret actions. In politics, there are both latent and overt activities. Between these poles is a large array

of blurred, intermediate phenomena in which both poles manifest themselves interdependently. Therefore, these cannot be categorized as exclusively latent or overt. There are elements of latency and openness in close interpenetration. Many visible actions (strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, the formation of organizations, etc.) initially involve intentions, plans and predictions, all this is undercover; it is preferable not to reveal such issues prematurely in the public domain because the state will curtail such plans. And it is true that in overt actions there are often hidden, covert performers.

As shown above, one of the manifestations of the growth of the resistance movement against *apartheid* was the creation of the UDF in August 1983. It was the outcome of changes on the social, economic and political level since the Soweto uprisings. By the mid-1980s, UDF was the leading legal anti-*apartheid* opposition, a coalition of hundreds of organizations numbering some 2.5 million members. It was a front for the banned ANC. The growing influence of the UDF led to the ban of its top echelon's activity and hunting down of its leadership. Another factor with growing influence on the *apartheid* regime in the period 1976-1985 was the successful struggle for independence in Angola and that of the Namibian people for liberation. On the other hand, as the head of the *apartheid* regime's National Intelligence Service (NIS) Niël Barnard notes, in the early 1980s some of the white establishment had already, though in embryonic form, come to the realization that the government's policy of defending *apartheid* was unacceptable in the eyes of many white South Africans and that the only way to solve the most urgent problem for the country was a political solution (Barnard 2015, 47, 147). In an interview conducted on 7 September 1998 by Padraig O'Malley, Barnard emphasized:

> Even before I joined the NIS, but from 1980 onwards there was an annual intelligence report ... if you read [those intelligence reports systematically] you will see that from as early as 1981 ...we gave the view [to the government] that there was only one solution ... there would have to be a political solution. There was no way to fight it out ... In this country there are many who don't enjoy fundamental political rights. We shall have to change that and we will have to find a political answer (Barnard 2015).

According to Pallo Jordan (Ndlovu 2010, 63-64; Jordan 1985, 8-10), the introduction of the tricameral constitution was the *apartheid* regime's undercover, latent attempt to paint the ANC into a corner by championing constitutional models that were counter-revolutionary[4]. As ruling elites, they

4 This section of the article is based largely on Pallo Jordan's briefing paper. It was presented by him to the NEC of the ANC and is available in the archival collection held at the University of Fort Hare (UFH), OR Tambo Papers, Folder B4.5.3, Box 34.

wanted to salvage essentials of white domination, consolidate the position of the ruling class and blunt the thrust of the South African revolution by co-opting elements from the oppressed majority as allies. Another strategy was to isolate the black elite who were then expected to pose a challenge to the gains made by the ANC and oppose the liberation movement if substantive negotiations were to be held. Jordan goes on to explain that the most explicit exposition of the government's strategic thinking and that of 'big business', came from Samuel Huntington, a professor of Political Science at Harvard University. In his keynote address to political strategists at a conference in Johannesburg in 1981 (subsequently published as an article in *Politikon*), Huntington asserted that fundamental change in South Africa appeared to be 'waiting for its Lenin' (Huntington 1981, 8-26). He hastened to warn that this should not be read as approbation, but rather as urging that 'intense attention' be paid to the strategy and tactics of reform, just as Lenin had used 'the strategy and tactics of revolution'. The reform process, according to Huntington, would be affected by six factors, which he enumerated as (i) political leadership; (ii) strategy and tactics; (iii) timing; (iv) power and its use; (v) issue selection and sequence; and (vi) divide and reform (rule). Jordan maintains that Huntington's exposition gave the ANC some idea of how long-range strategists and ideologists of the ruling class conceptualized what they were doing as political advisors to governments. He rationalized that the ANC leadership might agree and disagree about the extent to which it conformed to P.W. Botha's strategy *vis-à-vis* the tricameral parliament, the constellation of states in southern Africa, the Nkomati Accord and 'talks about talks'. The ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) agreed that the tactics outlined by Huntington had a familiar ring and Jordan writes: 'On one thing we must absolutely agree, and on this Huntington is quite clear, the purpose of [P.W. Botha's] reform is to pre-empt revolutionary change – its essence is counter-revolution' (Jordan 1985, 10).

Thus, the situation in 1985 when the Pretoria regime began to look for paths to solve the problem of *apartheid* in a satisfactory way, arose over an extended period of time with ongoing discussion and the gradual formation of what it felt were appropriate internal and external measures and prerequisites. Moreover, much of this process unfolded in a latent format. As suggested by Barry Gilder (2012, 316), one of the leaders of the ANC intelligence structure, '... each participant ... interacted and interfaced with that struggle through a complex web of often hidden cause and effect'. In reaction to cumulative pressure from different interest groups and power-brokers, underscored by a complex web of often hidden cause and effect, the ANC took steps to address the question of negotiations during the mid-1980s. In 1985 it appointed a four-member sub-committee whose task was to analyze the question of

negotiations in South Africa systematically and to submit a working paper/report to the NEC immediately after its completion. The members of this sub-committee were Pallo Jordan, Sipho 'Simon' Makana, James Stuart (Hermanus Loots) and Thabo Mbeki. By November 1985 this sub-committee, driven by Jordan, who was presumably the 'principal author', produced two incisive papers[5]. The content of both papers is similar. 'A Submission on the Question of Negotiations' was a summarized version of the full report, and included a 'sunset clause' with preliminary ideas on constitutional guidelines. This was produced in 1986 and later improved upon and officially adopted by the ANC in 1988. The early draft laid the framework for the ANC's first official statement on negotiations and was released into the public domain in October 1987. These policies later informed the substantive negotiations which took place in the early 1990s and subsequently led to the formation of a democratic, non-racial Republic of South Africa in 1994. In hindsight, it can be argued that the 1985 submissions were the basis of the so-called 'sunset clause', a compromise strategy employed during substantive negotiations in the early 1990s. Indeed, the sub-committee proposed various scenarios, including a 'worst case' scenario whereby the ANC might have to 'consider a situation in which it had to make do with a great deal less'. In terms of the politics of knowledge production and history of ideas, it is important to highlight the existence of these very significant primary documents and the archival material because they provide insight into the opinions and ideas put forward by outsiders, various power brokers, personalities/individuals, foreign governments and interest groups, who profess that *they* latently drove and spearheaded the process of negotiation in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). In order to understand such views, read, for example, the publications by Van Zyl Slabbert (2006), Rosenthal (1998), Renwick (1997), Crocker (1993), Sparks (1990) and Waldmeir (1997). These groups and personalities justify such claims by asserting variously that the ANC was a captive of 'intellect' and 'diplomatic' charm offensive of the ruling party, liberal, white South Africans and western governments.

Speaking of the specific manifestations of latent politics, let us dwell on its types such as clandestine/covert forceful actions and political intelligence. The distinctive feature of forceful action (active operations) in latent politics is the hidden use of a resource that makes primary use of a resource of force (armed struggle, physical influence or coercion, poisoning, arson,

5 The ANC's two papers, 'Submission on Negotiations' and a condensed version entitled 'A Submission on the Question of Negotiations' can be viewed at UFH, ANC Archives, OR Tambo Papers, Folder 137.1.7–1.7.2, Box 36. The ANC also published its 'Statement on Negotiations, October 9th, 1987', in *Sechaba*, December 1987.

armed coup d'état, etc.) to solve a particular political problem. Gregory Houston writes that in the 1980s, there were significant changes in the ANC's military structures and the regional situation that affected the conduct of the armed struggle. MK actions until the end of 1982 were focused primarily on armed propaganda, with spectacular armed operations, such as the MK attack at Voortrekkerhoogte and SASOL, which aimed at motivating the population to participate in the struggle. In the second phase, from 1983 until 1985, the focus of military policy shifted to preparing for a people's war, that is, creating an armed presence inside the country, while in the third phase, from mid-1985 to 1989, the ANC military policy shifted from preparing for a protracted struggle to preparing for insurrection – ensuring that MK linked up with the popular struggles inside the country (Houston 2010).

Covert actions differ from clandestine operations by the fact that the result is most often obvious, but the source remains unknown. Clandestine operations usually hide the very fact of their implementation[6]. On the other hand, hidden covert actions, for example the Pretoria-inspired military raid on Lesotho on 20 December 1985, had the aim of killing ANC members. Similar operations were carried out into Swaziland, Angola and Mozambique. Because such actions, also involved the death of civil refugees and residents of neighboring countries, as a rule Pretoria denied its involvement in such events. Thus, political murders became part of the latent policy at governmental level. Ronnie Kasrils (1993, 244) writes that in 1986, South Africa 'instigated a military *coup d'etat* in Lesotho to overthrow the government that provided friendly support to the ANC'. Another type of forceful operation is the killing of those arrested by the *apartheid* regime under the guise of an 'accident' while in police custody. The death of Bantu Steve Biko in 1977 is an example of such political murders. By 1985, about 120 victims died in police custody. According to an exhibition staged in 2007 at the *Apartheid* Museum, Johannesburg, the minister of Justice, Jimmy Kruger, claimed that Biko's death on 14 September 1977 was as a result of a hunger strike and added: 'I am not glad and I am not sorry about Mr Biko. His death leaves me cold. I can say nothing to you...'.

The government also used fake paramilitary structures and semi-criminal groupings to kill fighters and/or supporters of the ANC and other liberation movements, trade unions and above-ground anti-*apartheid* movements. In 1986, for example, the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) – a government-sponsored death

6 According to the 'Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms' a clandestine operation is 'sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment', while a covert operation is 'planned and executed to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor'. UFH, ANC Archives, ORT, Box 34, Folder 85-85.2. O.R. Tambo's note to NEC members, nd.

squad was created for attacks against activists. Jacques Pauw (2017) notes that it carried out brutal acts of intimidation, poisoning, sabotage and killings, such as murdering Ruth First and Janette Schoon by sending them letter bombs.

The ANC also made use of violence of various kinds in the armed struggle. But as it repeatedly stated, this violence was in retaliation to the terror of racist power. Such action involved covert preparation and implementation to make the results widely known – to use the power of 'armed propaganda' (Kasrils 1993). Furthermore, on occasion ANC sabotage had to be covered up as happened in December 1985 when a bomb was placed in a garbage container in a shopping centre in Amanzimtoti. Because civilians were killed, this matter received serious attention behind the scenes (Maharaj 2008, 30-31). Then too, a specific part of the ANC's armed struggle was the provision of military training to MK fighters abroad. Most often this was carried out in a latent format. For example, Thabo Mbeki underwent political and military training in the USSR and at the International Lenin School under the Soviet Union's ruling party. He also attended the military center near Moscow, specializing in guerrilla warfare. This cannot but have impacted on his thinking and development as a leader; he played a prominent role in substantive negotiations for democratic dispensation and majority rule in South Africa.

Political intelligence is the receipt and processing by state and non-state structures of information about its own and other political systems, as well as a secret influence on the processes occurring in them. The qualitative difference between political intelligence and other types of such activity is its focus on the structural elements of political systems and political processes. This information is obtained both legally and illegally by both state and non-state structures. During the period under review, in South Africa at the state level, intelligence was undertaken by the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) (1969-1978); the National Intelligence Service (NIS) (1980-1990) and the Military Intelligence Division of the Ministry of Defense (1976-1990). To discuss political intelligence by state structures, a particular example will be used – the visit of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) sent to South Africa by Commonwealth leaders to investigate the prospects for change and democratization. The group arrived in 1986, and held meetings with Mandela in Pollsmoor Prison, together with senior UDF leaders and P.W. Botha and asked about cross border raids. The government emphatically denied any previous knowledge of the cross-border raids (Papenfus 2010, 426). But Niël Barnard, NIS head at the time, admits that he knew beforehand the SADF was scheduled to attack neighboring countries on the morning of 19 May. He explained in an interview in December 2007, that the government's motivation was about far more than just choosing military might over negotiation:

> The fundamental question was, if we decided on a negotiated settlement, who were the people who should negotiate and settle? I was involved in the negotiations on Namibian independence ... we sat around the table talking, but Russia and America determined the rules, they were pulling our strings. There was a similar situation during the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe negotiations ... We could not allow international consultants to negotiate on our behalf. Why not do it ourselves? We are all South Africans. If we want to make peace, we'll talk to each other around a table. We don't need outside help. Let me say this about the EPG episode. We were not talking as yet, but we were about to do so – the talks with Mr Mandela began soon afterwards and we could not talk about the meetings we had ...they were held in secret (Du Preez 2013, 78).

Like the South African government, the ANC also had a highly developed non-governmental intelligence structure which in 1987 was transformed into the Department of Intelligence and Security (DIS). There was also a unit of military intelligence in MK (O'Brien 2011, 208).

Political intelligence can be divided into various categories such as agent (illegal), legal, technical and analytical types. (i) Agent intelligence is the secret penetration to glean information carried out by specially selected, recruited and as a rule, conspiratorial people. The ANC and MK, were engaged in gathering information that could be used against the *apartheid* regime (Kasrils 1993; Gilder 2012). And similarly, the regime had agents who operated secretly to investigate the ANC and other liberation movements. (ii) Legal intelligence does not require special agent technologies, because it uses open sources to obtain information. Especially valuable channels of legal intelligence are official receptions, meetings, etc.; the use of open and semi-open visual observation and using various non-governmental organizations and foundations. (iii) Analytical intelligence is the intellectually complex processing of information received; new information of a higher level is derived from such processes. For this work in the ANC's intelligence, a special unit was created under the leadership of Bill Anderson (Kasrils 1993). As for the South African government, in the early 1980s, the head of NIS, Niël Barnard, was instrumental in carrying out the transformation of the repressive BOSS into the analytical NIS. He believed that 'the era of "blood and thunder" was over' and that instead of using its fists, we 'had to start using our heads' (Barnard 2015, 33). (iv) Technical intelligence implies the use of optical reconnaissance, electronic computer reconnaissance and other types of information collecting in which the technical factor plays the key role. This type of political intelligence played an important role in the ANC's Operation Vula. There was skilful use of computer networks for communication and obtaining secret information from the data banks of the *apartheid* regime's special services (Braam 2005).

Because of the significant role played by the secret services of both the ANC/MK and the South African government in the latent component of the negotiation process, it is sometimes argued that the end of *apartheid* was championed by the intelligence services of both sides (O'Brien 2011, 172). But it is difficult to attribute the fall of *apartheid* to the work of the special services on either side of the divide. *Apartheid* was not destroyed by secret services. It was brought to its knees by the people. The South African government's relentless oppression and denial of human rights; its aggression against the frontline states; and its destabilization of neighboring governments, failed to bring it the security it sought. Furthermore, the tricameral reforms, the 'hoax' reform, had no takers. From that time onwards the *apartheid* state suffered paralysis of initiative in the face of mounting popular struggles from the masses at home and from the international community (Magubane 2013, 1371). There were other processes which took place before the intelligence services of both sides met in the late 1980s and these define the latent politics of negotiations. A meeting in New York in 1986 with Pieter de Lange, the chairperson of the Broederbond (AB), convinced Mbeki that substantive negotiations would begin soon in South Africa. Some 25 years later, in an interview conducted by Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu in Johannesburg on 23 February 2011.

Outside the military sphere the reformist trend inside Afrikanerdom gained momentum in the mid-1980s. Most significant was the publication by the Afrikaner Broederbond of a document on the basic political conditions for the survival of the Afrikaner. It stated boldly that the status quo had become unsustainable and that all citizens had to have participation in the political and legislative processes. It did qualify this view by saying that power sharing should be such that no group could dominate another; minority rights had to be protected; and power had to be devolved to limit government interference. The way to achieve this was through a negotiated settlement. In an interview cited in Max du Preez (2013, 73-75), Pieter de Lange explained:

> The most dramatic thing in the document was [the realization] that there was going to be a black president in the future, with all the implications that would have. The document was sent to all AB divisions ...The Executive Council was tasked with visiting all the regions and divisions to explain the context of the document ... It was a purely Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) initiative and had nothing to do with the National Party (du Preez 2013, 73-75).

According to De Lange, the ruling NP did not react favorably to the AB's suggestions, although there was some 'support from some senior members', even in the cabinet, such as Barend du Plessis. Apparently F.W. de Klerk was

very worried about the [AB] document. He went on to say that he informed P.W. Botha about his New York meeting, his impressions of Mbeki and the ANC's positions. Botha's reaction was apparently not one of surprise or anger and this made De Lange think that he 'already had something up his sleeve'. De Lange was correct. Botha's minister of justice, Kobie Coetsee had paid Nelson Mandela a secret visit in a hospital in Cape Town in November 1985 (Mandela was treated for an enlarged prostate gland). P.W. Botha encouraged Coetsee to maintain the contact. Shortly after this meeting, Mandela asked his lawyer, George Bizos, to travel to Lusaka to inform the ANC leadership in exile about this meeting. Indeed, Bizos traveled to Lusaka more than once to inform Oliver Tambo on developments. Bizos and Judge Johann Kriegler had a private briefing with Coetsee after the second trip to Lusaka in February 1986.

A decisive step towards formal negotiations to end *apartheid* was the signing of the Peace Accord of September 1991. And it is not by chance that in the section on 'clandestine or covert operations' it read: 'The government shall not allow any operation by the security forces with the intention to undermine, promote or influence any political party or political organization at the expense of another by means of any acts, or by means of disinformation'. But on 17 June 1992 the massacre at Boipatong took place. The Goldstone Commission was appointed to investigate the massacre and its findings were a surprise. As F.W. de Klerk put it:

> Then, out of the blue, on 16 November 1992, the Goldstone Commission issued a dramatic statement in which it revealed it had made a surprise raid on an office building in a Pretoria suburb, which turned out to be the headquarters of a covert, ultra-secret branch of the ... South African Defense force. During the raid the commission seized files that pointed to unacceptable activities in the area of the commission's investigations (De Klerk 1996, 259).

The commission discovered that Ferdi Bernard, who had previously been employed by the now disbanded Civil Cooperation Bureau death squad – had been re-employed secretly, apparently to conduct propaganda activities against the ANC. This was yet another example of latent components in the South African political process at the time (Pauw 2017). And on the other hand, social and political changes that undermined the foundations of *apartheid*, the growth of resistance to the racist regime and the active struggle against it called for a vigorous challenge by the oppressed masses and the strengthening of their organizations. Some of these changes, processes and actions were of an overt nature while others were semi-latent and some were latent. It is posited that the time of its origin was the second half of the 1970s.

Identification of the personality factor role in latent politics in South Africa: late 1970s to the early 1990s

In any analysis of the personality factor in latent politics in South Africa during the period under review, one must at the outset point to the crucial roles played in the political process and the elimination of *apartheid* by individuals such as Nelson Mandela, Frederik de Klerk, Oliver Tambo and Thabo Mbeki. One should also note the roles of Niël Barnard, Aziz Pahad, Willie Esterhuyse, Kobie Coetsee, Michael Young as well as the role of P.W. Botha. The personality factor of some of these personalities will be unraveled below.

A remarkable contribution to the elimination of *apartheid* was made by personalities such as Mandela and South African president, Frederik de Klerk. It is to them, quite deservedly, that much attention is paid in publications on the fall of the *apartheid* system. However, in this regard most authors tend to focus on unofficial contacts and secret negotiations conducted since 1985 by representatives of the regime and its mediations with the imprisoned Mandela, and his firm and incorruptible position as a fighter for democratic South Africa. But many of these studies neglect the crucial role played by Tambo's leadership of the ANC. In October 1987, the ANC's NEC issued the organization's 'Statement on Negotiations' and subsequently published it in *Sechaba*, the official ANC mouthpiece, in its December 1987 issue. The ANC's position was based on the 1985 submissions by the sub-committee discussed earlier in this article. The statement served as a counterpoint to the *apartheid* government's policy on negotiations enunciated by P.W. Botha on a number of occasions, including his so-called 'Rubicon' speech. While addressing parliament on 17 April 1987, Botha proclaimed that negotiations would 'not be conducted with the SACP, international or national terrorist groups [presumably here he referred specifically to MK] or other fanatics [the ANC leadership]' (South African Bureau of Information 1987, 33). Furthermore, on 15 May 1987, Botha elaborated on the South African government's pre-conditions for negotiations:

> As far as the Government is concerned, it remains adamant that it is prepared to negotiate with citizens of South Africa, provided they do not resort to violence as a means of attaining their political and other goals, or call in foreign agencies to support them. Negotiations of necessity imply that participants should accept that not all their requirements are likely to be met; it implies willingness to listen, to discuss, to seek solutions. But these solutions will result from deliberations by South Africans in the interests of South Africans. It is in this spirit that the Government approaches the process of negotiation and I want to appeal to all who have made the change for peaceful and constitutional change, to display similar disposition (South African Bureau of Information 1987).

Responding to P.W. Botha, the ANC's October 1987 official statement on negotiations reiterated the point that the liberation movement had never been opposed to a negotiated settlement geared towards addressing the national question in South Africa. On various occasions the ANC had, in vain, called upon the government to cease the violence perpetuated in *apartheid* policies and for the regime to dismantle *apartheid* and enter into negotiations 'provided they are aimed at the transformation of our country into a united, and non-racial democracy'. One such statement was presented by Tambo in a speech in London on 29 October 1985. This standpoint was sacrosanct for it clarified the main objective of any negotiating process in South Africa. Being fully conscious of the way the *apartheid* government had, in the past, deliberately dragged out the question of exploratory negotiations and 'talks about talks' to buy time for itself, the ANC maintained that any negotiations would have to take place within a definite timeframe. This was considered necessary to meet the urgent necessity to end apartheid 'and lift the yoke of tyranny from the masses of our people who have already suffered for too long' (Sechaba 1987, 5). The 1987 statement also re-emphasised the ANC's rejection of any secret negotiations (and secret deals) behind the backs of the oppressed majority.

The decisive and determining source in history is not the individual but the people and then the individuals. Their influence depends on the people and on the connection individuals have with them and their social activity. To Mandela's honor, he understood and gauged this perfectly. To avoid friction within its ranks, the South African government adopted a divide-and-rule strategy on the question of negotiations by offering to release the incarcerated Nelson Mandela. This offer was made public by the then state president, P.W. Botha, who stipulated the preconditions necessary for Mandela's release during a parliamentary session early in 1985. Mandela's response to Botha was also read in public by his daughter, Zinzi, at a political rally in Soweto on 10 February 1985. In this hard-hitting response, reported at length in *Sechaba* of April 1985 and also discussed in Mandela (1995) he indicated his surprise at the conditions attached to the offer of his release. He maintained that essentially, he was not a violent person. He reminded P.W. Botha that in the 1970s at the time of the ANC's defiance campaign, he and his colleagues had written a letter to the then prime minister, D.F. Malan, asking for a round-table conference to find a solution to the national question in South Africa. This letter had been ignored. Again, 'when Strijdom was in power, we made the same offer. Again it was ignored. When Verwoed was in power, we asked for a national convention for all the people in South Africa to decide on their future. This, too, was in vain'. Driving home the point about freedom and negotiations, Mandela said that only free people could negotiate.

Nelson Mandela reiterated these views four years later in the notes he made in preparation for his meeting with P.W. Botha on 5 July 1989. He wrote: 'I am a loyal and disciplined member of the ANC, my political loyalty is owed primarily, if not exclusively to this organization and especially to our Lusaka Headquarters where the official leadership is stationed and from where affairs are directed'. In practical terms, Mandela meant that he required, indeed had to have, an organic relationship with the ANC and a rigorous orientation towards the political line of the Congress Alliance, especially during secret negotiations with the regime (McCartan 1990). As shown above, preliminary talks took place in November 1985 but were confidential, informal meetings between Mandela and Kobie Coetsee when he visited Mandela in hospital. The next series of secret meetings with Mandela from 25 May 1988 was by a small group of officials under NIS chief, Niël Barnard – with the full knowledge of P.W. Botha. Barnard (2015) says he was not told of Coetsee's meeting with Mandela, but he found out soon enough when Coetsee asked the NI to compile a profile of Mandela for him – a profile that referred to Mandela as charismatic; without question the most prominent black leader in the country; and a man with no bitterness towards whites. In an interview cited in Max du Preez (2013), Barnard claims he had talked to Botha about releasing Mandela even before Coetsee's visit:

> Remember, in 1985 there was an internal uprising and a state of emergency and despite minister Louis le Grange's assurances, parts of the country were literally ungovernable. The idea of a negotiated settlement started gaining traction, even with Botha himself. I told him on several occasions ... that when we think about a negotiated solution, we should also think about who we're going to talk to. It won't help to talk to the stooges, the homeland leaders. We had to negotiate with the nucleus, and that was Mr Mandela. So that seed was planted with him ... (du Preez 2013, n.p.).

Mandela's position in his contact with Pretoria reflected the strategic thinking of the ANC and did not undergo any significant transformations in the years leading up to the destruction of *apartheid*. The struggle was always about attainment of one person one vote, the establishment of a non-racial, democratic South Africa in which the majority would rule. But the position of the *apartheid* regime changed over time, depending on the particular crisis it faced and the increased pressure from the oppressed majority and the international community. And of course the individual who headed the *apartheid* state – his ability to judge the situation objectively, to feel the necessity and inevitability of historical changes and to take appropriate action. As Harvey (2001, 116) writes, 'Mandela was one extremely strong-willed man in prison. The ANC [in exile] consisted of hundreds of hundreds of guerrillas, activists

and supporters'. To secure a peaceful settlement, the *apartheid* regime had to negotiate with the ANC in exile. To hold talks with Mandela, influential as he was, would not provide the settlement it sought.

P.W. Botha's militaristic ideas were first expressed in 1977, while he was minister of defense in Vorster's cabinet. Botha tabled the concepts of 'total onslaught' and 'total strategy'. Total onslaught was a policy formulation to give credibility to what was fundamentally a strategy to ensure the survival of racism and *apartheid*. It posited that the southern tip of Africa was being 'targeted' by the forces of Marxism, orchestrated from Moscow, a move, he declared, that had already made significant gains in the shape of socialist-oriented Mozambique and Angola (Holness 1986). To resist this 'communist' onslaught required that countries in the region join forces and mobilize their human and material resources in a well-coordinated 'total strategy', at whose core would be South Africa – economically the dominant country in the region. Thus, the *apartheid* regime's total strategy had two prongs; one coercive, the other persuasive. In international geopolitics there can, of course, be no sharp demarcation separating these two strategies. Coercion easily spills over into persuasion and vice versa. On 7 March 1979, in an effort to sensitize the international world with a 'diplomatic' version of total onslaught, 'Pik' Botha (the minister of foreign affairs) addressed a reception in Zurich. He announced that henceforth, Pretoria would give priority to 'advancement of our own southern African region', with a view to the 'establishment of a sub-continental solidarity which would form the basis for cooperation in the important spheres of life'.

The historical personality needs to be assessed in terms of how she or he implements the actual tasks facing that society. A progressive personality speeds up the course of events, a conservative one tends to slow it down. From this point of view, Botha can hardly be mentioned among supporters of a democratic South Africa state, fostering a movement forward to the establishment of a non-racial, majority ruled democratic state. Although it could be argued that he initiated reform that led to the dismantling of *apartheid* by releasing political prisoners such as Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and Andrew Mlangeni, the vector of his activity was by no means forward-looking. He acted within his political culture and one might argue that he served as a brake on the course of history rather than its accelerator. But this is not the case in terms of latent politics and policy. During 1984 there were persistent hints from official quarters and in the *Sunday Express* of 13 December – that two senior ANC leaders, Govan Mbeki and Walter Sisulu, might be released. And in November 1984 the posturing 'Pik' Botha announced in an interview in West Germany that the ANC was welcome to take part in South Africa's

constitutional discussions if it dropped its 'violent aims'. All these events culminated in the Afrikaans-language newspaper, *Beeld,* publishing two articles on 11 December 1984, indicating that Piet Muller, its assistant editor, was in Lusaka to interview members of the ANC executive. He could not have done this without the permission of P.W. Botha.

Various political analysts observed that articles published by *Beeld* were part of a strategic move, a sort of 'kite flying' exercise carried out by the South African government which was preparing the white public for dialogue with the ANC. It was believed that Kenneth Kaunda played a central role in arranging for the interviews to take place between the pro-establishment newspaper and the ANC. Significantly, *Beeld* editorials and articles urged P.W. Botha to hold talks with the ANC, the UDF and the Inkatha Freedom Party.

In 1986, after the four person sub-committee had submitted its proposal, Tambo complained to the ANC's national executive committee that its leadership was poorly briefed and lagging behind on ideas being bandied about among the enemy's 'think tanks' on constitutional modeling. The NEC's response was to form a sub-committee on constitutional guidelines, and the paper on 'constitutional models'. It was also led by Jordan. In one of the in-house seminars organized by the constitutional guidelines sub-committee in 1986 to discuss its draft submission, Tambo remarked:

> I am pleased that ... these proposed constitutional guidelines are not a series of prescriptions which we clutch out of the sky as so many so-called experts do and as the wealthy Think Tanks do. The Western world seems to abound with these ... and the governments, including the *apartheid* regime which hides behind them, want adjustment to *apartheid* which ...will firmly preserve if not entrench economic privilege, which in our country is synonymous with racial privilege ... they want to institutionalize racism through their fancy formulas and the desire to protect so-called group rights. We on the other hand, want to assert the sovereignty of the people.

But because part of the South African society was still actively opposed to the abolition of *apartheid*, and was supported by the Western super powers during the age of Cold War politics, the ANC had to adopt perceptive tactical strategies, hence the first steps in the negotiation process had to be done in latent politics format. O.R. Tambo's critique of US policy towards *apartheid* South Africa was articulated in an address in New York on 8 November 1982 and in other interviews. His 1982 lecture was titled 'The African National Congress, the United States and the Future of South Africa'. Tambo asked the question: What qualified P.W. Botha for protection and unflinching support

in the eyes of the US administration? The answer was that P.W. Botha was perceived by the Reagan administration as a reformer. In the eyes of US policy makers on Africa, Botha was the one in power and thus had the means to initiate and control the process of change. Therefore, from the hard nosed point of view of the US government, it could deal with P.W. Botha rather than some perhaps more attractive liberal-reformist elements outside the corridors of power. Some years later, the ANC met the USA government officially for the first time in February 1987, when Tambo met George Schultz, the US secretary of state. Thabo Mbeki, who was among those involved in the planning for this important meeting, recalls that on one occasion they met with Chester Crocker to finalize their preparation. Crocker bluntly told the ANC delegation that the meeting with the US government became possible because the armed struggle had begun to claim the lives of white South Africans. And in an address he gave in Doha on 24 May 2010, Mbeki recounted that an arrogant Crocker said that the situation in South Africa was 'too important' to be left to South Africans (Ndlovu 2010).

Much more interesting is the question of F.W. de Klerk. The fact that he was in the forefront of South African political history on substantive political negotiations, together with Mandela, is a combination of chance and necessity. The need to nominate de Klerk for the presidency was predetermined by South African society's need to replace a 'militaristic' Botha.

Unlike the role of Tambo and Botha, the discussions between Mandela and De Klerk, which began in 1990, are described in detail in the literature. They were underpinned by many elements of latent politics. Kasrils (1998), for example, believes that De Klerk played a double game and, during the negotiations, sanctioned the secret murder of ANC activists and fomented violence in urban areas. The horrific massacre in Boipatong in 1992 provided both the OAU and UN, as members of the international community, an opportunity to act decisively regarding substantive negotiation in South Africa. On 17 June 1992, 48 residents of Boipatong were butchered in their homes when approximately 200 men, alleged to be Inkatha Freedom Party supporters, heavily armed with guns, knives and axes rampaged through the usually peaceful township. The slaying of innocent residents of Boipatong, coming so shortly after violent outbursts on the East Rand, West Rand and Natal made a mockery of the National Peace Accord signed by the various political formations. This accord was no longer worth the paper it was written on; it had been violated and this posed a very real danger to the CODESA negotiations. Until those responsible were arrested, the utterances of the commissioner of police and F.W. de Klerk could not be taken seriously. It was commonly

held that much of the violence was perpetrated by 'third force' elements, shadowy assassins controlled by, or at least connected with, members of the South African security forces. The *Sunday Star* headline of 21 June was 'Codesa could Crumble' and sure enough, on 22 June 1992 the NEC of the ANC formally announced its withdrawal from negotiations with the regime. It was reported in the *Cape Times* the following day that the ANC was holding what it called 'crisis talks'.

The ANC strategy served as a principled guide in the struggle against *apartheid* and negotiations with Pretoria. It was the result of careful strategizing by the collective leadership of the ANC, for thirty years headed by Tambo. He had a profound theoretical grasp of the internal and international situation, hidden and open public practice; the ability to maintain the simplicity and clarity of thought in the most difficult conditions and to fulfill tactical plans and political strategy. A leader with Tambo's tactical acumen was aware of the possibility of political change in the correlation of social forces, could understand what path to choose, how to combine latent and overt politics, and how to turn historical opportunity into reality. Tambo was a great historical personality who led the ANC in exile during Mandela's imprisonment and what was achieved was largely the result of Tambo's strong and stable thirty year leadership. He returned to South Africa in late 1990 to attend the ANC's National Consultative Conference. Speaking after the conference on 16 December 1990, Tambo highlighted:

> It has taken us many long years of grim and bloody struggle to persuade the National Party to open talks with the true leaders of the black majority ... I stand in front of you in the company of that illustrious son of our people, my brother and friend, Comrade Nelson Mandela. What he has said about me so many times, whether it is true or not, I want to repeat to him a thousand times, and this covers all the years of our political life, whether we were in jail or not ... It covers our position to this day when the head of the government feels it necessary to seek out the opinion of an African leader ... We are as capable of running a country as anybody else ... South Africa is at the crossroads ... [We must] ... live up to our responsibilities and engage one another in an honest and serious dialogue.

The years of tense, dangerous work undermined Tambo's health and caused his premature death but his name stands among the greatest sons of South Africa. Considering the role of the individual personality, Mandela was by no means the only channel of the ANC, through which the liberation movement and its allies could pursue the negotiation process with Pretoria.

In another example of latent politics, from August 1984 to May 1987 in Zambia and Senegal, a number of meetings were held between the ANC leadership and representatives of the intelligentsia and business circles of South Africa to develop mutual understanding between the ANC and the white community. Then, in October 1987, a series of secret negotiations between the emissaries of Pretoria and the ANC delegation began in Marlow, England. Of particular importance here was that there were no representatives of the public present. These were indirect and hidden contacts between 'insider' leadership authorities. Although formally the group of negotiators from Pretoria was headed by Willie Esterhuyse, he agreed to cooperate with Barnard (NIS) who took control with the support of Botha (who apparently watched expectantly in the background). The ANC negotiation team was headed initially by Aziz Pahad, but from February 1988 Thabo Mbeki, who was then the head of ANC Information and Publicity, took over. During these meetings, a constructive framework for further agreement on a political settlement was created. The organizer of the external communication channel between the two sides of the negotiation process was Michael Young from the British-based company Consolidated Gold Fields. Young, who was the head of communications and corporate affairs at CGF, was a participant in the negotiation process, not so much for his goodwill as a humane person but because of his understanding that *apartheid* was causing significant economic damage to the mining company for which he worked, and whose major subsidiary was in Johannesburg (Du Preez 2013; Ndlovu 2013).

While on an economic note, besides political insurrection, P.W. Botha's 'Rubicon' speech in August 1985 was disastrous for the South African government. Over the following years the rand collapsed and this triggered a string of other international banks to stop rolling over the country's debt. South Africa's financial reputation worldwide was in tatters and the noose from within and without was tightening. Even De Klerk (1996, 122) was obliged to admit in retrospect that there was a 'serious collapse of international confidence in South African government's capacity to handle the escalating crises' from all sides.

The final phase of the struggle against *apartheid*, especially its negotiating part, was undertaken in public and thus the final victory of the liberation forces is sometimes labelled the 'negotiated revolution', for example by Sparks (1995, 15), and is associated with the role of prominent personalities such Mandela and De Klerk. It seems that in this case there is something of a distortion of the real picture of cause-effect relationships. Vladimir Shubin notes astutely: 'What really mattered was not the goodwill of one or the other political figure, however important, but the development of the struggle, which led to the growing pressure on the regime from inside and outside South Africa' (Shubin 2008, 282).

Conclusion

The discussion above leads us to conclude that for an adequate understanding of the content of South African public policy in this period it is necessary to explore the component which G. Almond designated as 'latent policy' or 'latent politics'. Latent politics is a special sphere of human activity, primarily related to the realization of hidden interests or the use of secret methods of obtaining, retaining and using power. As the grip of *apartheid* tightened and all hope for peaceful change appeared to be fading it became apparent to the ANC that it could not rule out dramatic new seismic shifts and realignments and the sub-committee on negotiations reasoned that if negotiations were viewed as providing another relevant terrain for the struggle, rather than being a means of drawing the struggle to a close, the ANC had no convincing reason to reject negotiations with the enemy camp. However, as demonstrated in Namibia, adversaries could press for talks in South Africa to use the process as a means to buy time and force the ANC to wind down the struggle. Furthermore, proceeding from the ANC's dependence on the frontline states, including the diplomatic and moral support of African countries, the liberation movement had to face the prospect of being forced into negotiations. Therefore, in its 'Submission on the Question of Negotiations' in 1985, the sub-committee advised the ANC to approach proposed substantive talks as a means of winning the battle at the negotiating table, and in the process it would be consolidating what MK had not won on the battlefield. In other words, the ANC would enter into talks with the *apartheid* regime as a means of pursuing its political objectives by supplementing the liberation movement's conventional means.

The ANC's sub-committee on negotiations established by Tambo expressed the view that the ANC had no option but to be both vigilant and well organized if substantive negotiations with the NP government were to commence. Historical antecedents proved that negotiations and the shape they assumed were determined largely by the relative strengths of the contending parties, that is, which party was on the ascendant and which was in decline. Therefore, should the ANC hold talks with the *apartheid* regime, either voluntarily or through force of circumstance, the organisation was expected to extract from the new situation the optimum condition for the continuation of the liberation struggle.

Many options for classifying types of latent politics can be suggested. First, since it is part of politics as a whole, the general classification of politics (as economic, military, international, etc.) is included. Second, it is possible to designate a whole series of classifications that reflect the special nature of latent politics: the development and promotion of the political strategy of the

'double entity'; political intelligence; covert forceful actions (active operations); undisclosed public opinion and its influence; campaigns of disobedience and destabilizing peaceful resistance; covert psychological and information operations; non-public diplomacy and secret activity of illegal structures in the sphere of world politics; hidden and illegal clandestine activities of political parties (this does not apply to military operations, psychological or information operations); creation and legal activity of 'subsidiary' structures of political underground; 'confidential management' of legal and banned political parties; lobbying operations; illegal activities of terrorist, criminal groups and non-state military formations; the secret political activity of private and commercial structures, and so on.

The study of latent politics is possible within the framework of a special branch of political science – the science of latent politics (or, using brief terminology – political latentology). It is a system of knowledge that explains the laws, trends and forms of implementation of latent politics with the help of appropriate paradigms, categories and methods. For example, the law is that the increase of the 'stealthiness' of latent politics leads to the growing trend towards the degradation of its political content, or that the increase in transparency of latent politics reduces the security of its subjects and complicates the fulfillment of their specific functions. An important regularity of latent politics is the narrow circle of its subjects and participants, the strengthening in it of the role of political leaders, narrow groups of professionals and individuals (Kurillo 2013).

The ANC's 1986 draft paper on constitutional guidelines provided the framework for the final document adopted by the ANC in 1988. The draft document qualifies as a primary document that influenced the new South African Constitution after the demise of *apartheid* in 1994. The authors of the 1986 draft paper on constitutional guidelines teased out the five main issues as fundamental to the proposed Bill of Rights which was earlier suggested by Jordan. These were (i) basic principles; (ii) political and exercise of rights; majoritarian state as opposed to protection of group rights; (iii) economic freedom, land and property bill; (iv) the choice between a presidential and prime ministerial system; and (v) the legal system and judiciary. The new South African Constitution of 1996 addressed all these pertinent issues.

In terms of latent politics and policies and the personality factor, it is argued in this article that both O.R. Tambo and P.W. Botha played a crucial role in establishing a strong foundation upon which both Mandela and De Klerk were able to convene CODESA and drive substantive negotiations in South Africa to a successful conclusion (Ndlovu 2010; 2013).

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the phenomenon of latent politics in South Africa during the *apartheid* era. The term 'latent policy/politics' was introduced into scientific use by Gabriel Almond. In the field of political science latent policy/politics refers to a hidden, completely or partially unobserved sphere of politics underpinned by personality factors. The political process in South Africa shows many examples of latent politics. For example, the Soweto uprisings and the wave of unrest in mid-1976 marked the beginning of the final stage of the struggle against *apartheid*. Furthermore, in the fall of *apartheid*, hidden personality factors are also apparent, and here the role of the liberation movements was of decisive importance. Organizations such as the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and other historical movements of the masses like the worker movements and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) are also studied in this context. An exploration of latent politics allows inclusive disclosure of various aspects of the political process.

KEYWORDS:

Latent Politics. *Apartheid*. National Liberation Movement. Secret Negotiations. Coercive Action. Political Intelligence. Personality Factor.

Received on May 10, 2022
Accepted on June 10, 2022