BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF STATE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

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Introduction

Since its political independence from Britain on October 1st 1960, the Nigerian state has stumbled from one crisis to another. Six years into independent statehood, the democratic order bequeathed by the colonial system was dismantled by young military officers in a bloody coup on the night of 15th January 1966. Six months later, another bloody counter-coup was staged resulting in the change of guard within the military establishment that oversaw the affairs of the country in the aftermath of the first military coup. The political dynamics of the first and second coups dragged the country into a thirty-month long fratricidal civil war. The civil war gave rise to the first instance of large scale population displacement in the history of modern Nigeria. Millions were displaced while hundreds of thousands of Nigerians became refugees outside of the shores of Nigeria seeking safe haven from the destructive manifestations of the civil war. Since the end of the war and the winding up of the Federal Government's three R program (Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Resettlement), Nigeria has not witnessed any serious internal crisis resulting in large scale forced displacement. While there have been instances of violent

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https://doi.org/10.22456/2448-3923.123449

outburst of conflicts like the Maitatsine uprising in Northern Nigeria in the 1980s, they were contained and did not result in serious forced displacement of the scale witnessed during the civil war.

While many Nigerians had expected that the return to civil rule in May 1999 would bring about peace dividends, such expectations seem to have been misplaced. Nigeria has had to contend with violent expressions of ethno-national, religious and communal conflicts of which the Boko Haram uprising ravaging North-East Nigeria is the most devastating. More than being a national and regional security challenge, the Boko Haram insurgency has given rise to one of the most serious humanitarian crises in Nigeria's history since the civil war. The manifestation of the emergency is better revealed by the extent of people internally displaced within Nigeria's border and those displaced as refugees in neighbouring countries. Other manifestations of the insurgency are the humanitarian crisis, the displaced persons face within and outside Nigeria, and the rights violations arising from the nature and manner of their displacement which is largely informed by the brutality of the insurgents. While significant attention has been directed at understanding the political, security and religious dimensions of the insurgency and how to address them, there has been relatively little academic and policy research on the humanitarian implications, especially as it relates to the crisis of forced displacement.

This paucity of research on internal displacement amongst other humanitarian issues arising from the violence speaks to the lack of coherent national policy and robust engagement by state institutions and agencies in Nigeria on the plight of those internally displaced by conflicts or other factors (Abdulazeez and Oriola 2018; Adewale 2016; Obikaeze and Onuoha 2016; Osagioduwa and Olusegun 2016; OCHA 2013; Ibeanu 1998). Indeed, rather than being an isolated challenge, incidences had shown that the Nigerian state lacks a coordinated policy approach to manage forced displacement, whether induced by violent conflicts or nature. This becomes clear if one examines the nature of state responses to flood induced displacement. The 'omiyale' flood disaster that occurred in Oyo State in 1982 and the more recent incidents of flood disasters along the stretch of the banks of rivers Niger and Benue up to the Atlantic Ocean in Bayelsa state in 2012 and 2018 are points of reference. In these flood crises, the response by the Nigerian state seems to be more of ad-hoc, lacking a nationally coordinated emergency response inclusive of addressing the crisis of displacement arising from such disasters. While it might appear that state agencies are not coordinating their emergency response and disaster management properly, there are spirited efforts being made by national and state agencies, non-governmental organisations, faith based organisations, community based organisations and development/aid agencies towards addressing the humanitarian needs of the displaced people in North-East Nigeria.

To this end, understanding the scale of the displacement crisis, the nature of state management and the resilience of communities impacted by the crisis becomes essential for policy needs. This study explores the nature and dimension of forced displacement that emanate from the Boko Haram insurgency in North-East Nigeria and the nature of state management of the displacement crisis. The study adopts the qualitative research approach in the gathering and analysis of its data. Data for the study was sourced from key national policy documents on displacement in the North-East, media interviews on displacement and its management by state institutions/agencies, news articles, reports, editorials, commentaries and academic publications. Relying on these data sources, the study seeks to highlight the nature of state management of the displacement crisis arising from the Boko Haram campaigns of terror in North-East Nigeria, the successes that have been recorded and the challenges confronting state institutions, and communities impacted by the conflict as it relates to the management of the displacement crisis.

Nature, human and forced displacement: conceptual explanation

A number of factors account for the unravelling displacement crisis facing humanity especially in developing societies. For the sake of categorization, these factors can either be human induced or arise from the force of nature. Most of the human induced factors giving rise to displacement are often associated with incidences of violence. The development process can also generate a displacement crisis. Thus, forced displacement can be categorised and explained along three dimensions: natural disaster induced, development induced, and violence/conflict induced.

In specific terms, forced displacement as a result of the force of nature is largely informed by natural disasters from changing environmental conditions. This cause of displacement includes but is not limited to flooding, drought, desertification/desert encroachment, rising sea level and receding shoreline, tsunami, typhoons and such other natural disasters. For development induced displacement, the provision of social infrastructure, most especially large scale dam projects, has been identified as an important cause of forced displacement (IDMC and NRC 2014a; Twomey 2014; Ferris 2008; Shettima 1997). While not diminishing the factors highlighted above, the general consensus in forced displacement/migration literature is that more than any other factor, violence or war in general generates the most potent threat forcing people to make the decision on whether to flee their homes/communities or stay behind (Adhikari 2013; Melander, Oberg and Hall 2009; Moore and Shellman 2006).

In the discourse of forced displacement, there is the issue of differential definition given to categories of displaced people. The differential definition also gives rise to variances in the way the international community mobilises resources to aid efforts of sovereign states in addressing the humanitarian needs of displaced people across regions of the world. In displacement literature, displaced persons can be categorised either as refugees or Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Speaking on the differential categorization, former US ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke notes that:

> Two-thirds of the refugees of the world do not fall under the official purview of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, UNHCR. We call them IDPs. In our mission, across the street, we have tried to figure out ways to abolish this odious terminology. The very use of initials to refer to people is not, in itself, healthy. These are people, and to a person who has been driven from his or her home by conflict, there is no difference between being a refugee or an IDP. In terms of what has happened to them, they are equally victims but they are treated differently (Robinson 2003, 1; United Nations 2000).

In relation to who a refugee is, the 1951 Refugee Convention provides a clear explanation. According to the Convention, a refugee is a:

> [...] person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, UNHCR 1988; Robinson 2003, 1).

As for the definition of internally displaced persons, IDPs, the UN Guiding Principles, defined internally displaced persons as:

> [...] persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence in particular as a result of, or in order, to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border (Fisher 2006, 8; Robinson 2003, 1; Deng 1999; United Nations 1999).

Protecting the rights and dignity of displaced persons whether refugees or IDPs is a daunting task and has remained a major preoccupation of the international community for decades. The need for protection becomes more critical for those internally displaced as a result of violent conflicts, given the

nature of their displacement and the fact that they often seek refuge close to conflict theatres and that they are usually subjected to continued rights violation by military and security agencies, armed militia groups and state officials charged with running camps sheltering displaced persons. Thus, for IDPs, there is no hiding place when it comes to rights violations and abuse. They are forced out of their homes and communities as a result of acts of violence occasioned by incidences of armed conflicts. In the process, they suffer rights violations and become susceptible to abuse in camps set up to house them and provide protection. The vulnerability of IDPs was amplified by the Brookings Institution (2008, 2) when it noted that:

> The effects of internal displacement on IDPs, local authorities and communities that host them can be devastating. This is because while the act of displacement in itself amounted to violation of the rights of those affected, the subsequent loss of access to shelters, lands, livelihoods, personal documentation, family members, and succour afforded by social networks do affect negatively the ability of IDPs to assert and enjoy range of fundamental rights (Brookings 2008, 2).

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has been in the forefront of facilitating and coordinating international and national governments' domestic responses to internal displacement. These had been done through the humanitarian assistance provided by the United Nations specialised agencies notably, the United Nations Children and Education Fund (UNICEF); United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR); World Health Organisation (WHO); World Food Programme (WFP); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA); among others. Aside from delivering aid and assistance through these specialised agencies, the United Nations has also used the instrumentality of the rules of international law that govern all state responses to displacement as stipulated in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Brookings Institution 2008). Of importance in this regard are principles 1.1, 3.1 and 4 of the 1999 document[3].

3 As it relates to the statutory responsibility of states affected by internal displacement, the Guiding Principles stipulates in Principle 3.1 that, 'Sovereignty entails not only the right of each state to conduct its own affairs but also the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and assistance without discrimination to its population, including the internally displaced, in accordance with international human rights and humanitarian law' and in Principles 1.1. & 4 that, 'While those displaced within their own country remain entitled to the full protection of rights available to the population in general, displacement gives rise to particular vulnerabilities on the part of those affected. Therefore, and in order to ensure that the displaced are not deprived of their human rights, states are obligated to provide special measures of protection and assistance to IDPs that correspond to these vulnerabilities in order to ensure that IDPs are treated equally with respect to non-displaced citizens.

Principle 3.1 clearly tied sovereignty to the responsibility of states to protect their citizens and provide assistance without discriminations while principles 1.1 and 4 speak to human rights of IDPs and provision of special measures of protection and assistance that are commensurate with the level of IDPs vulnerabilities.

Conflicts and the Global Displacement Crisis

Scholars have come to the conclusion that violence and war in general generate threat which force people to make the difficult decision of whether or not to leave their homes and communities and seek safety elsewhere (Adhikari 2013, 82; Edwards 2009; Melander, Oberg and Hall 2009; Oucho 2009, 16; Moore and Shellman 2007; 2006; 2004; Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003). These scholars affirm the existence of certain degrees of disagreement on the scope, nature and dimension of conflict that is required to trigger forced displacement. There are discussions surrounding the extent of displacement generated by international and internal conflicts, on the impact of violence perpetrated by government and irregular forces/militias groups/rebel forces and how they trigger forced displacement, and on how a country's infrastructure and geography might inform the decision to move or not especially across national borders. There is also the position advanced by Adhikari (2013, 83) that when confronted with conflict, people tend to stay in their homes and communities especially when the opportunity cost of fleeing (measured in relations to forgone economic opportunity and attachment to communities) far outweighs a physical threat to life.

Although the position espoused by Adhikari (2013) seems controversial, given that previous studies had established that violent conflicts/wars trigger forced displacement, the position should not be discarded as it contains some elements of truth. Indeed, people that are displaced from their communities but are within the territorial confines of their home countries often decide to stay close to their place of original abode as IDPs even when there are potent threats to their lives and safety. For instance, in the case of the Boko Haram induced displacement in North-East Nigeria, the larger percentage of the displaced are within Nigeria as IDPs and most of the camps are confined within the region, with Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, the epicentre of the conflict hosting the largest IDPs camp. The astronomical rise in the number of people displaced by conflict but who remain within their country as IDPs especially in Sub-Saharan Africa attests to the destructive impacts of civil wars in the region from the 1990s until date.

Arising from the complex conflicts raging in a number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the region has come to be characterised by high numbers of displaced persons (refugees and IDPs). The region has the world highest concentration of IDPs and hosts approximately 20 percent of the world's refugee population. In the region one can find sending and receiving states, states that send and receive at the same time as well as transit states (Croll 2009, 4; Naude 2009, 21). Rather than abate, the conflict situations in Sub-Saharan Africa continue to force people in the region to abandon and flee their homes and communities and seek refuge elsewhere within national boundaries as IDPs or outside as refugees in other countries. For instance, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in the Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) noted that some of the worst ever levels of violence and displacement were recorded in 2017. These new displacements were driven by political instability and conflict, complex humanitarian emergencies, failed peace agreements, and urban warfare and disasters. In specific terms, the report noted that conflict in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen continued to force large numbers of people to flee their homes (IDMC and NRC 2018, 4).

According to IDMC and NRC (2018, 5) a total of 30.6 million new displacements associated with conflict and disasters were recorded in 2017 across 143 countries and territories worldwide. The report noted that thirty-nine percent (39%) of all new displacements in 2017 were triggered by conflict and violence, while sixty-one percent (61%) by disasters. The number associated with conflict almost doubled, from 6.9 million in 2016 to 11.8 million in 2017 (IDMC and NRC 2018, 6). These statistics show that the number of newly displaced persons arising from violent conflicts witnessed geometric increase between 2016 and 2017. The situation was grimmer for Sub-Saharan Africa when compared with other regions. According to the report, the region accounted for 26.3% of displaced persons for 2017, coming behind East Asia and the Pacific that accounted for 30.5%. However, the percentage hides important information. With 5,472,000, Sub-Saharan Africa led the pack when it comes to the number of people newly displaced by conflict in the year 2017. This more than doubled the numbers of newly displaced persons by natural disasters in the region which stands at 2,561,000. The number of people displaced by conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa was rivalled only by the figure reported for the Middle East and North Africa which stands at 4,485,000. Sub-Saharan Africa alone accounted for 46.47% of persons newly displaced as a result of violent conflicts in 2017. When combined, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa accounted for 84.56% of newly displaced persons as a result of conflicts in 2017 (IDMC and NRC 2018, 16).

While Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only 14 percent of global population, it however, generated almost half of new conflict induced displacements for 2017 (46.47%). The countries with the highest numbers of conflict induced newly displaced persons are Congo (DR); Somalia; Ethiopia; South Sudan; and Central Africa Republic (CAR) in descending order (IDMC and NRC 2018, 17). Coming closer home, the Boko Haram insurgency raging in North-East Nigeria with ramifications across the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) countries has brought the area under the spotlight as it relates to conflict induced displacement. For the LCBC countries, 279,000 new displacements were recorded in North-East Nigeria, the epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency. 119,000 were recorded in Cameroon's Far North region, 40,000 in Niger's Diffa region, and 5,800 in Chad's Lac region. As a whole, the Lake Chad Basin countries accounted for 8 percent of conflict induced new displacements in Sub-Saharan Africa for the year 2017. There were more than 2.2 million people living in displacement camps as IDPs and Refugees in the Lake Chad Basin as at the end of 2017 (IDMC and NRC 2018, 17; 21).

Boko Haram insurgency and the displacement crisis in Nigeria's North-East

Nigeria has had its own fair share of internal displacement arising from conflicts, violence and the attendant human rights violations. Underlying the seriousness of the problem of internal displacement in the country was the submission of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC 2014b, 9) that Nigeria was one of the five countries that generated the highest numbers of internally displaced persons as a result of violent conflicts in 2013 and the trend has continued for the country within the context of new displacements in the Lake Chad Basin as highlighted in the Global Report on Internal Displacement for 2017 (IDMC and NRC 2018, 21)[4]. Most of the displaced Nigerians estimated at 1.5 million as at 2013 were forced to flee the violence and terror unleashed by the Boko Haram sect in North-eastern Nigeria, in particular Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states that were the worst affected by the violence in the region at the height of the insurgency (EU 2014;

4 Nigeria was listed along with Syria, Central Africa Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan as the five countries that generated the highest numbers of internally displaced persons in 2013 as a result of armed conflicts. While the numbers of newly displaced generated by Nigeria has steadily declined, the country with others within the Lake Chad Basin area still accounted for 8 percent of newly displaced by conflict, majorly the Boko Haram insurgency in 2017.

IDMC and NRC 2014b, 2; 2014c)[5]. Aside from those registered as IDPs within Nigeria, there are thousands that fled across Nigeria's borders into Cameroon, Niger Republic and Chad as refugees.

The security and humanitarian challenges arising from the Boko Haram campaign of violence has made it to capture and continue to be the focus of attention of academics, policy makers, humanitarian aid agencies and the Nigerian people. Indeed, there exists a sizeable number of academic studies, policy briefings, and other forms of documentation that have explored different dimensions of the challenges that the Boko Haram insurgency in North-East Nigeria has generated for the Nigerian state and its people (Tar and Mustapha 2017; Amnesty International 2014; Marc-Antoine 2014; Onuoha 2014; Human Rights Watch 2014; 2012; Watchlist 2014; Animasawun and Saka 2013; Loimeier 2012)[6]. Many of the issues addressed especially in the reports by Amnesty International (2014); Human Rights Watch (2014; 2012) and Watchlist (2014) highlighted the precarious humanitarian and human rights crisis that the Boko Haram insurgency has generated for the people and communities in North-East Nigeria, the region worst impacted by the conflict. For example, the loss of human life as a result of the insurgency is estimated to be around the range of 30,000 people. The insurgency has also devastated communities in the countryside, towns and cities in the North-East (Council on Foreign Relations 2018; Zenn 2018, III). The situation is particularly grave for people that were forced to flee their homes and com-

5 The Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal Jihad (people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and jihad) also known as Boko Haram was founded in 2002 by Muhammad Yusuf in Maiduguri. In 2009 the Nigeria Army surrounded and attacked the movement's facilities and its leader was later killed in police custody. The death of Yusuf forced the sect to go underground. It resurfaced in 2010 and commenced its series of deadly attacks against state and civilian targets. The group's tactics now include targeted assassinations, suicide bombings, deployment of vehicle-laden improvised explosive devices (IEDs), kidnapping, hostage taking and coordinated armed assaults against communities, schools, and military installations. For details on the origin, transformation and tactics of Boko Haram (Adesoji 2010; Loimeier 2012; Onuoha 2010; 2012; Marc-Antoine 2014).

6 The Boko Haram insurgency has impacted on the six states that make the Northeast geo-political zone of Nigeria. These states are Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe. However, the three states highly impacted by the violence and in which the Federal Government has had to declare a state of emergency in the height of the insurgency were Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. The state of emergency was declared at the time when Boko Haram held territory (11 Local Government Areas at the height of the insurgency) and declared it Caliphate in the areas it was able to hold sway. The state of emergency has since been lifted given the relative success of the military campaign against the group. At present, the group no longer holds any territory (Local Government Areas) in Nigeria and is on the run. However, it still has the potential to stage destructive hit and run attacks, ambush and deploy suicide bombers against security targets, IDPs camps and communities.

munities and seek refuge as IDPs in camps, many of which are located in the six states of North-East Nigeria with majority in Maiduguri, the Borno State capital and the epicentre of the insurgency.

In the period leading to the conduct of the 2015 general elections in Nigeria, the issue of security with particular focus on combating Boko Haram insurgency was an important issue in electoral campaigns of the two leading political parties and their flag bearers. Then General Muhammadu Buhari, the flag bearer of the opposition All Progressive Congress (APC) made the fight against Boko Haram a cardinal campaign issue promising that if elected, his administration would prioritise the defeat of the group and address other security challenges facing the nation. After his electoral victory, and to demonstrate his readiness to take the fight to the insurgents, President Buhari during his inauguration address announced the creation of a new brigade (the 7th Brigade) with headquarters in Maiduguri with the declared mission of routing Boko Haram and retaking territories occupied by the group in the North-East. As part of the battle strategy, the President also directed the relocation of the Nigerian Military Command Centre for the coordination of military efforts against the insurgents from Abuja to Maiduguri, the appointment of Major General Buratai, a native of Borno to lead the Nigerian Army, and Rt. General Munguno also from Borno as National Security Adviser and the creation of the position of Chief of Intelligence for the forces, a move seen as prioritising intelligence gathering in the operational strategy and tactics of the Nigerian Armed Forces and Nigeria's military campaigns against Boko Haram (Blanchard 2016, 9; Leach 2016, 7-8).

By the end of 2015, President Buhari declared that Boko Haram had been "technically" defeated, as the group no longer had the capacity to hold territories and could no longer conduct conventional military attacks against military and civilian targets (Felter 2018; Torbjornsson and Jonsson 2017, 4; Alfred 2016; Zenn 2016). While the military basked in the euphoria of its campaign success, the relative reprieve had come with a cost measured in loss of lives and increased forced displacement. The renewed offensive by Boko Haram since late 2017 resulting in spike in suicide attacks and successfully mounted ambushes against military and civilian targets had also meant that the people in North-East Nigeria in general and Borno state in particular were still being forced out of their communities (Torbjornsson and Jonsson 2017, 20-21). However, while those previously displaced are beginning to return to their communities and localities, continued military operations by the Nigeria Armed Forces against the Boko Haram terror group continue to generates fresh displacement in Northeast Nigeria and across the Lake Chad Basin Commission countries.

In the most recent Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) for the Lake Chad Basin countries released by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in December 2021, it was reported that Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria were hosting an estimated 5,462,244 affected individuals made up of IDPs, Refugees (both in-and-out of camps), Returnees (former IDPs and Returnees from abroad) and Third Country Nationals (TNCs). Of these, 3,032,378 were IDPs, 1,937,769 were Returnees that were former IDPs, 227,753 were Returnees from abroad and 263,344 were refugees. The IOM record also indicated that 4,143,802, representing 76 percent of the total number of the affected individuals, were located in Nigeria. In specific term, the IOM data indicated that 2,200,357 were internally displaced persons registered in IDPs camps in Nigeria, and 264,344 were refugees that crossed the Nigeria borders into Niger Republic (129,835), Chad Republic (19,321) and Cameroon (115,188). By the data, Nigerians forcefully displaced from their communities and localities as a result of Boko Haram campaign of terror and general insecurity as at the end of 2021 stood at 2,464,701. (IOM, 2021). By the IOM data, not only has the Boko Haram insurgency continued to generate forced displacement, it has also made Nigeria to remain atop the ladder of the displacement crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa.

While the conflict in the North-East has impacted the population of the region adversely, women and children as population segments are more severely impacted. For instance, the IOM in the round 23 assessment report on IDPs situation in the region reported that 27 percent of IDP population are children under 5 years, while 46 percent of IDP population are male and 54 percent are female. When combined, the children under 5 years and women IDPs population approximate 79 percent of total IPDs population as of June, 2018 (IOM 2018b, 4). However, while the displaced have numerous needs, reports of survey on unmet needs highlighted that food remains the predominant need in the majority of IDPs sites (IOM 2018b, 4). Whether in the course of displacement or in campsites, reports also showed that IDPs fell victim to extreme violence perpetrated by Boko Haram and the Nigerian military. While Boko Haram continued its campaigns of suicide bombings of population targets, the military in attempts at curtailing these egregious attacks had mistakenly hit communities and IDPs campsites. The erroneous bombing of Rann by the Nigerian military in January 2017 showed how friendly fire from the Armed Forces had resulted in loss of life and destruction of communities in the North-East (Human Rights Watch 2017; Norwegian Refugee Council NRC 2017). While there had been consistent international outcry and call that the military should do more to protect IDPs, Boko Haram bombing and shootings inside IDPs and densely populated areas continue

in the North-East. This clearly shows that while the capacity of the group might have been seriously degraded, it still retains the potential to mount deadly attacks against civilian targets across North-East Nigeria. This has been clearly demonstrated by the resurgence of the group's attacks against communities, IDP's camps and military targets especially in Borno state, the epicentre of the insurgency.

The Nigerian state and the management of internal displacement in the North-East

As stipulated in Principle 3(1) of the United Nations Guiding Principle on Internal Displacement, "national governments have the core primary responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to IDPs within their territorial jurisdictions". To this end, the UN championed the development of a national legal framework geared towards upholding the rights of IDPs. The UN also took the adoption of a national policy or plan of action on internal displacement by national governments as priority. This is largely because the UN considered these steps as cardinal parts of national responsibility of all states as far as responding to the needs of IDPs is concerned (Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement 2005, 16-17; Kälin 2006). Thus, in times of crisis that generates large scale internal displacement, the responsibility to provide protection, facilitate the establishment of places of refuge, and provision of humanitarian assistance and support for those internally displaced falls squarely on national authorities.

In the case of Nigeria, the framework for the provision of protection and humanitarian assistance to people internally displaced as a result of violent conflicts and natural disaster is believed to be informed by legal and institutional parameters. However, it is significant to underscore the position that the legal framework upon which the management of the displacement crisis and provision of protection and assistance to IDPs in the country is expected to be anchored has largely remained an unfinished project. This is because the national policy on IDPs is yet to be ratified. The non-ratification and adoption as part of the national body of law has made state response to, and management of, IDPs arising from the Boko Haram insurgency to lack proper coordination and greater inter-agency synergy that would ensure a robust management of the displacement crisis in the North-East.

Nigeria had sought to develop a legal framework and national policy on IDPs. In 2006, the Nigerian Government put together a National Policy on IDPs, the draft of which was tabled for consideration in 2007. However,

the Obasanjo administration could not adopt it. The draft was revised three times in 2009, 2010-11 and December 2011. Despite the plethora of revisions, it remains a draft yet to be adopted. This draft was further revised by a team of consultants and the Multi-Stakeholders Forum between May 30 and August 2012. However, the revised draft continues to await Presidential assent and subsequent adoption by the Federal Government (Ladan 2013). The failure on the part of the Nigerian state as it relates to the ratification and implementation of a national framework on IDPs is particular appalling given that Nigeria was one of the original seventeen (17) member states of the African Union that signed the AU Convention on IDPs in Kampala in 2009. The country ratified the same in 2012 and was grappling with the most complicated displacement crisis in its national history since the end of the civil war in 1970.

In Nigeria, the national responsibility to respond to displacement lies first with the local government. However, given the glaring lack of capacity at this level of governance, emergency response and humanitarian assistance for displaced persons has become the responsibility of respective state governments and the Federal Government. The institutional framework for humanitarian emergency in time of disaster (nature or conflict induced) at the national level is anchored by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) established in 1999. There is an equivalent agency established by some state governments known as the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) which works with the federal agency and serves as the mechanism for delivering state governments' assistance in emergency and crisis situations (Adewale 2016, 179-180). In the case of human displacement, the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI) established in 1989 works in complementary manner with NEMA and other stakeholders in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection of IDPs especially in conflicts areas (Abdulazeez and Oriola 2018). The multi-sectoral approach has been deployed in humanitarian aid delivery to those internally displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency and Nigerian Armed Forces military counter-insurgency campaigns in North-East Nigeria.

In the context of the multi-sectoral/decentralised approach to humanitarian aid delivery adopted by NEMA, the organisation in conjunction with NCFRMI coordinates national efforts in the management of the delivery of relief materials to IDPs across camps in North-East Nigeria. Relief materials received by NEMA from the Nigerian government, international aid agencies, and from foreign and local donors are channelled to the agency's zonal offices from where they are delivered to authorities of State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs) in a particular geo-political zone. The responsibility of SEMA is to coordinate the delivery of

these materials to IDPs through traditional institutions, local government authorities, local non-governmental organisations and others involved in the process of humanitarian aid delivery.

The international community has aided the Nigerian government's efforts by providing support and assistance to victims of Boko Haram insurgency in North-East Nigeria. The international community through foreign government development/aid agencies, United Nations agencies and international non-government organisations has provided assistance and support to national agencies/institutions and sub-national governments' agencies in the affected region. The assistance and support has been highly instrumental in aiding the efforts of the Nigerian state to meet its national obligation as it relates to the delivery of relief materials to displaced persons in the North-East. The United Nations, through the platform of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) has been particularly essential in the provision of support and technical expertise on management of IDPs camps and coordination of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to IDPs in the region. The Norwegian Refugee Council and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre are crucial in the coordination of information on displacement and the displaced in the North-East. The expertise of the International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC) and other humanitarian organisations have enhanced the coordination and delivery of aid and assistance. International aid agencies such as USAID (United States Agency for International Development), UKAID, JIDA (Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization) and Nigerian nationals have been instrumental in raising funds for humanitarian efforts in the region.

Without doubt, assistance and support for national efforts (Federal and State governments) in the management of the displacement crisis in North-East Nigeria has been forthcoming. However, the assistance has fallen short of needs and there is no denying that assistance from outside of the coffers of the Nigerian state has been highly instrumental to the relief work in the North-East. Within the context of constraint on national capacity imposed by resource availability, logistics and expertise, it should be noted that while the Nigerian state has made progress in the management of the displacement crisis in the North-East, there is still an avenue for greater improvement on disaster response and management. More than this, there have been lapses in the Nigerian state's management of the displacement problem in the region. The lapses make the national efforts in the management of the displacement crisis in the North-East to be haphazard and fragmented in terms of coordination (IDMC and NRC 2013, 12).

The Nigerian state and the challenges of IDPs management in the North-East

An important starting point in grappling with the task of addressing humanitarian needs of internally displaced persons in Nigeria rests on putting in place appropriate legal and institutional frameworks to address the displacement crisis in the country. For this to be accomplished there would be the need to revisit the draft of the National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons. The revisit would be to ensure that the policy document contains appropriate legal provisions on the status of IDPs, security provisioning for IDPs, and identifying a national agency that would be designated as lead agency for the provision of humanitarian assistance to IDPs. Accomplishing this would address one of the core challenges that has been identified as undermining: the Nigerian state's response to the plight of internally displaced persons notably in North-East Nigeria and other parts of the country (Ekpa and Dahlan 2016; Ladan 2015; 2013; Magaji, Zaki bin Ahmad and Suriya Binti Ahmad Apandi 2018; Shedrack and Nuarrual 2016). Addressing the legal and institutional constraint is important given that its lack has meant that the state is unable to plan and implement short, medium and long term measures directed at addressing the plights of the displaced persons in Nigeria (Itumo and Nwefuru 2016; Obikaze and Onuoha 2016; Onanuga 2013). The absence of a legal and institutional framework has also meant that the tasks of rehabilitation, resettlement and reintegration of IDPs are mostly undertaken by agencies of government (NEMA, SEMA, NRC) on an ad-hoc and reactive basis (Abada and Okafor 2017).

Another problem that undermines aid delivery efforts to displaced populations in the North-East is the logistics of relief materials distribution. This challenge is directly linked to the lack of a clear cut national, legal and institutional framework on IDPs and humanitarian aid delivery. The challenges associated with the logistics of aid delivery and distribution to targeted populations is such that facilitated the diversion of relief materials by those that work in the humanitarian sector in the region. For instance, NEMA, the Federal Government's vehicle for aid delivery to IDPs do not reach IDPs directly. Rather, it delivers materials meant for IDPs in a state to SEMA. The State Emergency Management Agency in turn distributes materials through traditional institutions, local government council officials, local NGOs and other civil society organisations in the business of humanitarian assistance in their localities. This layered delivery process means that it is difficult to follow aid until it reaches intended beneficiaries. This makes it difficult to exercise oversight, ensure transparency and accountability in the delivery and distri-

bution of materials to IDPs. Because of the layers of organisations involved in the distribution process, it is difficult for NEMA, International agencies and humanitarian organisations to track materials they supplied for delivery and distribution to IDPs in the region (Alqali 2016). Indeed, civil society groups have been reported to complain that poor coordination among agencies and groups and lack of clear oversight of the delivery and distribution process have aided the diversion of relief materials by traditional leaders, local politicians and officials from the relief agencies themselves (Alqali 2016).

For example, in Geidam local government area of Yobe state, NEMA officials have been accused of allowing aid to go astray. Recounting an experience of aid diversion in the council, a United Nations High Commission for Refugees official was reported to have stated that when shipment of relief material was delivered and received by authorities of the local council, very few of the IDPs benefitted from the materials. The NEMA official was reported to have bribed the local officials by giving them a portion of the items while they carted away the bulk of the relief materials (Alqali 2016). There have been reports of grains and other essential items meant for IDPs sighted in major markets on sale to the larger population across the North-East. Similar allegations of diversion of relief materials, their re-packaging and sale to the public have been levelled against senior officials of the Borno State Emergency Management Agency prompting the then Governor, Shettima, to order police investigation on the matter (Haruna 2016; Kazeem 2016). Aside relief materials, there have been reports that cash transfer meant for IDPs through a scheme run by International Committee of the Red Cross administered by the Nigerian Red Cross Society and delivered through United Bank for Africa has ended up in the pockets of unintended beneficiaries (Alqali 2016).

Another issue undermining state effort in the management of IDPs is the systemic resource mismanagement and endemic institutional corruption that plague governance in Nigeria. While one would expect prudency, frugality, accountability and transparency in the management of humanitarian funds and relief materials as well as empathy in the distribution of the materials to displaced people, the contrary is the case in the governance of humanitarian and relief resources in North-East Nigeria. According to Page (2018, 17) graft, fraud, extortion and other forms of financial criminality abound within Nigeria's humanitarian sector. This has helped to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis arising from the displacement of more than two million people in communities affected by the Boko Haram insurgency. The graft, fraud, extortion and criminal diversions of fund and relief material meant for IDPs in the North-East has worsened the plight of the displaced and compounded the humanitarian disaster arising from the conflict in the region. By assuming the

role of middlemen in the relief effort, Page (2018, 17) notes that officials from the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and its counterpart agencies at the state level, State Emergency Management Agency (SEMAs) on a regular basis obstruct international aid delivery efforts, embezzle relief funds, and divert supplies meant for IDPs in the North-East. These agencies that are led by political appointees have turned these institutional instruments for delivering assistance to IDPs into conduits for diverting millions of dollars in emergency humanitarian spending into private pockets.

Instances of fraud, graft, extortion and criminal diversion associated with humanitarian and relief efforts in North-East Nigeria abound. For instance, in 2016, the Nigerian Senate expressed its concerns that the Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE), which was inaugurated by President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015 to manage the humanitarian crisis in the region, was yet to show tangible results despite the fact that more than half of the money appropriated for it for the fiscal year 2016 had been released. The Senate expressed concern that rather than use the fund to ameliorate the humanitarian crisis faced by the displaced, the focus of disbursement made in the fiscal year had been used for other interests. The Senate in its official record of proceedings listed a summary of transactions that it deemed not of importance to the humanitarian cause of the displaced population in North-East Nigeria (FRN 2016, 471-473).

Making its case for the occurrence of fraud and graft in the disbursement and use of humanitarian intervention fund, the Senate noted that the incoherent and largely fragmented state of the procurement process points to a vague and corrupt scheme that is not in tune with helping the people of the North-East in general and the internally displaced people in the region in particular. The Senate reached the conclusion that the pattern of disbursement, the projects for which the disbursement was made, and the management of intervention fund by state agencies was such that undermined efforts of the Nigerian government. It noted that the management of the fund and governance of humanitarian aid delivery failed to ameliorate the harrowing experiences and misery of the displaced people in North-East Nigeria (FRN 2016, 473; Kazeem 2016). To worsen the case was the allegation of graft levelled against the then Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF) Mr. Babachir Lawal (Punch Editorial 2016). Some of the companies that were awarded spurious contracts with no bearing on ameliorating the plights of IDPs had direct link to the then SGF. As a result of public anger, the President was forced to relieve the SGF of his position. However, it is instructive to note that the prosecution of the former SGF has not progressed as expected.

In a highly publicised case, the National Assembly indicted Vice President Yemi Osinbajo over the alleged illegal approval of a mismanaged N5.8 billion intervention fund for IDPs in North-East, Nigeria. The House of Representatives Committee on Emergency and Disaster Preparedness in its report noted that the approval of the fund by the Vice-President was in contravention of constitutional provision. It also noted that the fund, as released for NEMA to address food security in the North-East, was largely mismanaged. The committee in its recommendations called for the removal from office and prosecution of the then Director-General of NEMA, Mr. Mustapha Maihaja, over allegations of fraud, corruption and embezzlement of N33 billion Emergency Intervention Fund. The committee arrived at its recommendations on the basis of its evidence that the National Emergency Management Agency's Director-General was deeply involved in the approval, processing, release and diversion of the emergency intervention fund to private pockets (Oyeyipo 2018).

Highlighting the fraud that characterised the disbursement and use of the fund, the House committee noted that of the total sum of N5.8 billion disbursed, NEMA got N829 million to take care of logistics alone. Out of this total, NEMA claimed it spent N369.5 million on general logistics, N189 million on branding and packaging, another N248.6 million on branding and packaging and N21.9 million on contingency (Oyeyipo 2018). Expending nearly N1 Billion meant for meeting food security and general humanitarian needs of IDPs on logistics and contingency showed the recklessness that characterised fund management and governance of humanitarian aid delivery by agencies of the Nigerian state in the North-East. This instance alone is a clear validation of Page's (2018) position that the humanitarian sector in Nigeria, like other sectors, is plagued by graft, corruption and criminal diversion of funds, aid and other humanitarian/emergency relief materials.

In 2017, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nigeria's foremost anti-graft agency, arrested the head of Gombe State SEMA, Mr Danlami Rukuje for allegedly redirecting and selling relief materials meant for IDPs in his state (Page 2018, 17). Similarly, the acting Chairman of the EFCC, Mr Ibrahim Magu was reported to have lamented that his commission has received complaints of corruption in IDPs camp. The complaints were made by international humanitarian and other civil society organisations that were donating relief materials to IDPs scattered across camps in the region (Obia 2016). The reports noted that the main culprits are civil society groups, non-governmental organisations and government officials that work in the humanitarian sector in the region (Obia 2016). It was also reported that officials of NEMA were caught changing the bags with rice procured

by government, benevolent Nigerians, and foreign donors for IDPs for the purpose of reselling such re-bagged grains (Obia 2016). Instances like this highlight the corruption, fraud and diversion that characterised the process of humanitarian aid delivery in the North-East and the undermining of government efforts at meeting the needs of displaced people in the region.

From the issues raised above, it seems that the efforts made by the Nigerian government at improving its response to, and management of, the displacement crisis in North-East Nigeria have clearly lagged. The Victims Support Fund (VSF), an important vehicle for fund humanitarian aid delivery in the North-East, is constrained by the lack of clarity in Nigeria's overall framework for humanitarian response and the same can be said of the Presidential Initiative on the North-East (PINE)/Presidential Committee on Northeast Intervention (PCNI). In the same vein, neither the National Emergency Management Agency nor its state-level counterparts (SEMAs) have the funds, logistic capacity and technical experience to manage a prolonged and large-scale humanitarian operation. These legal, institutional and technical constraints are compounded by inadequate resources, the poor governance of the humanitarian aid delivery process and other pressing security problems confronting the Nigerian state.

Conclusion

Nigeria, like other countries of the world combating terrorist inspired insurgency, has had to contend with large scale displacement crisis. Although it is monumental, the incidence of population displacement that emanated from the acts of terror of Boko Haram is not new to Nigeria given that the country had witnessed such large scale displacement during its thirty months long civil war (1967-1970). Therefore, it would be expected that the country should have evolved a legal framework and coordinated institutional mechanism solely devoted to address displacement crises wherever and whenever they arise. Although, Nigeria had signed up to the AU Convention on Internally Displaced Persons and drafted a national policy on IDPs, the failure of successive regimes to ratify and give effect to the implementation of the policy has meant that the country still lacks a national action policy and plan of action on the management of internal displacement. This failure has meant that national response to, and management of, displacement in Nigeria lack a well-defined direction and a designated national institution to coordinate and direct national response to displacement. The state of unpreparedness emanating from an absence

of national policy means that, when tasked, the national agencies that have mandate on disaster response and management are unable to rise to the occasion of effective and energised delivery of humanitarian assistance to ensure the protection of displaced persons and advance the protection of the rights and dignity of displaced persons in Nigeria.

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ABSTRACT

Nigeria has contended with violent expressions of conflicts since the return to civil rule in 1999. The Boko Haram uprising is the most devastating of these crises and it has given rise to serious humanitarian challenges. The manifestation of the emergency is revealed in the extent of internal displacement it has generated. Thus, this study assessed the depth of the humanitarian needs of those internally displaced by the insurgency and the nature of state management of the displacement crisis. Data for the study was sourced from national policy documents, media documents, reports and other publications on the displacement crisis. Relying on these sources, the study highlighted the nature of state management of the displacement crisis, assessed recorded successes and noted challenges.

KEYWORDS:

Boko Haram. Human Rights Violation. Forced Displacement. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). North-East Nigeria.

Received on April 2, 2022
Accepted on June 7, 2022