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ABOUT THE JOURNAL

The Brazilian Journal of African Studies is a biannual publication, in digital and printed format, dedicated to the research, reflection and propagation of original scientific articles and book reviews by PhD researchers and professors, with emphasis on the analysis of International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations and Schools of Thought. BJAS is essentially academic, linked to the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

The BJAS has as target audience researchers, professors and students interested in the specificities of the African continent and its international insertion. Alongside such perspective, the Journal intends to expand the debate about the Brazilian projection world widely, the Brazilian cooperation efforts (including in the Defense field) with the African countries in the South Atlantic perimeter and the construction of a regional identity in face of a scenario of geopolitical transformations.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Paulo Fagundes Visentini

December/2021

With this issue, the Brazilian Journal of African Studies completes six successful years of existence, dedicated to academic and intellectual cooperation in the perspective of South-South Cooperation, giving voice to Africa and Africanists from all over the world. To this end, it features articles written by academics from Brazil, Nigeria, Mozambique, Cuba and China. The last two countries are among those with the greatest knowledge about the African continent. In this second year of the Covid-19 pandemic, the journal constituted a link of integration among scholars from various countries, in which the Brazilian Centre of African Studies (CEBRAFRICA, in Portuguese) produced an important study on the effects of the current health crisis in Africa.

The present 12th issue brings an important dossier on Nigeria, with articles by Nigerian and Brazilian academics, which explore the history and politics of this important African nation. Firstly, the intense international activity that the country conducted against *Apartheid* South Africa is addressed, which greatly contributed to the isolation of the racist regime. Next, Nigeria's active Nation Branding diplomacy is analyzed, which is not only an African, but also a global reference. Regarding the historical dimension, there is an article on the complex relationship of the Auchi Kingdom with the British colonialists. The following one deals with the role of the Anioma community with the separatists of Biafra.

Finally, the dossier closes with an interesting article on the autobiography of Olaudah Equiano, a native of the Kingdom of Benin (now part of Nigeria), who lived in the eighteenth century and was sold into slavery. Later, free and residing in London, he became a notable activist in the fight against slavery. What this set of studies shows is the extreme complexity of the country's history and political life, enriching an academic vision free of ethnocentrism.

In the General Articles section, there is an important analysis on African Studies in the People's Republic of China (from 1950 to 2020), which contributes greatly to the knowledge of that country's vision on Africa, something very useful as a counterpoint to contemporary Euro-North American narratives on China-Africa Relations. Next, there is a study on Brazil-Africa Relations, between the diplomatic and commercial dimensions, exploring its dialectical component. Another relevant theme is the reflection on the impact of the so-called Arab Spring on Algeria and Sudan, two important African nations, with effects on the entire continent.

In the field of critical political analysis, there is an important reflection on the management of political impasses as a form of endorsement of clientelistic practices on the African continent, in counterpoint to certain idealistic visions. Another relevant contribution is the analysis of the role of universities in the formation of black consciousness in South Africa, an issue that continues to be the object of narrative disputes, due to the problematic "unfinished transition" and its socio-political situation. Finally, an extremely topical article addresses the challenges of building e-government in Africa under the post-Covid "New Normal". There are few analyses on this situation in developing countries.

This issue is dedicated to the British academic Ian Taylor, one of the most renowned Africanists, who passed away prematurely in March 2021. Since the beginning of the BJAS publication, he was an enthusiast of the project, volunteering to collaborate, and soon afterwards becoming part of the Editorial Board. He was a humanist, with a very focused look at the reality of the countries of the South.

The BJAS publishes a bilingual electronic version (Portuguese and English). Thus, we expect the contribution of colleagues from Brazil and abroad, with whom we intend to establish links for the deepening of knowledge and the construction of a vision of the South about the African continent and its relations with them.

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NIGERIA'S ROLE IN THE EXPULSION/ WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa[1]
James Adewunmi Falode[2]

Introduction

Racial segregation in South Africa began in colonial times. The inhabitants were classified into four racial groups ("native", "white", "coloured" and "Asian") and residential areas were also segregated, sometimes by means of forced removals. From 1970, black people were deprived of their citizenship, legally becoming citizens of one of ten tribally based self-governing homelands, unofficially called *bantustans* or Bantu homelands, established by the Apartheid Government as pseudo-national homelands, and areas where the majority of the Black population was moved to prevent them from living in the urban areas of South Africa, four of which became nominally independent states (Baldwin-Ragaven 1999). The government segregated education, medical care, beaches, and other public services, and provided black people with services inferior to those of white people. Apartheid sparked significant internal resistance and violence led by the African National Congress (ANC), as well as a long trade embargo against South Africa by some of the Commonwealth members. Since the 1950s, a series of popular uprisings and protests were met with the banning of opposition and imprisoning of anti-apartheid leaders who were mostly ANC members.

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1   Department of Research and Studies, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Lagos, Nigeria. E-mail: segunbolarinwa1985@gmail.com. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0082-3632

2   Department of History and International Studies, Lagos State University. Lagos, Nigeria. Email: adewunmi.falode@lasu.edu.ng. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0649-1042

So, for more than four decades, apartheid served as the institutional centerpiece of South Africa's internal and external policies, especially that discrimination and other forms of violation against black South Africans. Nigeria's anti-apartheid policy did not evolve, however, until October 1960, when the country attained political independence. Nigeria then viewed its independent entrance into the world stage as a profoundly significant event, that provided a unique opportunity to craft a coherent foreign policy towards the international community in general and in Africa in particular; Africa therefore became the centerpiece of the country's foreign policy. One of the cardinal objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy as enunciated by Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa was the promotion of African solidarity and working towards the decolonization of all African states (Akinboye 2005). Nigeria's commitment to the anti-apartheid struggle had been made absolutely clear even before it attained its independence on October 1st 1960 and her role in the struggle, particularly in the United Nations' Anti-Apartheid Committee, which Nigeria headed until 1994, is commendable.

Consequently, Nigeria led other African states to many international fora with the call for an end to all forms of racial discrimination, apartheid and colonialism. In the process, Nigeria was subjected to a form of economic blackmail by the West for her role in the decolonization and liberation of the African continent. In spite of this, Nigeria remained undaunted in her commitment to see the apartheid eradicated. It was precisely for this commitment that Nigeria was considered a member of the Frontline States. As a matter of fact, Nigeria's foreign policy has, since independence, been anchored on the anti-apartheid struggle (Ajala 1992), which was consistently maintained by different regimes in the country until apartheid was completely dismantled in South Africa (Akinboye 2005).

The Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 and the Events that Followed

Sharpeville Massacre, incident in 1960, when South African police opened fire on a crowd of black protesters was a turning point in the fight against apartheid. The confrontation occurred in the township of Sharpeville, in what is now Gauteng province, in northeastern South Africa. Just as earlier mentioned, following the election of the National Party to office in South Africa in 1948, a policy of racial segregation known as apartheid was introduced. Apartheid was designed to regulate the lives of the black major-

ity and to maintain white minority rule. Legislation was passed governing where blacks could live and work, and massive restrictions were placed on the exercise of civil liberties.

During the 1950s, black protest against apartheid mounted. This was organized by the African National Congress (ANC, founded in 1912) and by its rival, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC, founded in 1959). The PAC called for a nationwide demonstration on March 21, 1960, against South Africa's *pass laws*, which controlled the movement and employment of blacks and forced them to carry "reference books" of identity papers. As part of this mass demonstration, a large crowd gathered outside a police station in Sharpeville, some people burning their reference books. The police, fearing the crowd was becoming hostile, panicked and opened fire. They continued to shoot as the protesters tried to run away, and about 72 blacks were killed, including women and children. More than 184 people were also injured.

The uproar among South African blacks was immediate, and the following week saw demonstrations, protest marches, strikes, and riots around the country that led to the death of many other blacks. On March 30, 1960, the government declared a state of emergency, detaining more than 18,000 people. The ANC and the PAC were banned and forced to go underground or into exile. Thereafter, both movements abandoned the traditional strategy of nonviolent protest and turned increasingly to armed struggle. A storm of international protest followed the Sharpeville shootings, including condemnation by the United Nations (UN). Sharpeville marked a turning point in South Africa's history; the country found itself increasingly isolated in the international community for the next 30 years (Lemon 2008).

In 1961 South Africa broke her 155-year-old British connection and became a republic outside the Commonwealth of Nations. It was a step whose international and economic results, though not yet fully felt, were foreshadowed during the year. Rapidly mounting criticism of South Africa at the UN, stringent financial measures to save the country's reserves, and the start of an intensified military build-up were the most obvious signs of the country's growing isolation. Although, the non-white political activities were less spectacular than in the previous year, deep racial uneasiness continued to express itself among the Africans and the Colored people (a mixed population), and further legislation to suppress political demonstrations among them was passed. However, elections toward the year's end showed that support for the government was growing among the Afrikaners in spite of moral and political restiveness among the church and university groups, and the appearance of a new liberal trend in the opposition (Lemon 2009).

The Soweto Student Uprising of 1976

Another watershed in the struggle against apartheid was the Soweto Uprising by the students, which Nigeria and many other African countries used in fighting the Apartheid government in South Africa, especially on the platform of the Commonwealth of Nations. This uprising was another major struggle since the Sharpeville Massacre. On the morning of June 16, 1976, thousands of students from the African township of Soweto, outside Johannesburg, gathered at their schools to participate in a student-organized protest demonstration.

Many of them carried signs that read, 'Down with Afrikaans' and 'Bantu Education – to Hell with it;' others sang freedom songs as the unarmed crowd of schoolchildren marched towards Orlando soccer stadium, where a peaceful rally had been planned. The crowd swelled to more than 10,000 students (Bonner 1976). En route to the stadium, approximately fifty policemen stopped the students and tried to turn them back. At first, the security forces tried unsuccessfully to disperse the students with tear gas and warning shots. Then, policemen fired directly into the crowd of demonstrators. Many students responded by running for shelter, while others retaliated by pelting the police with stones.

That day, two students, Hastings Ndlovu and Hector Pieterson, died from police gunfire; hundreds more sustained injuries during the subsequent chaos that engulfed Soweto. The shootings in Soweto sparked a massive uprising that soon spread to more than 100 urban and rural areas throughout South Africa.

The immediate cause for the June 16, 1976 march was student opposition to a decree issued by the Bantu Education Department that imposed Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in half the subjects in higher primary (middle school) and secondary school (high school). Since members of the ruling National Party spoke Afrikaans, black students viewed it as the "language of the oppressor". Moreover, lacking fluency in Afrikaans, African teachers and pupils experienced first-hand the negative impact of the new policy in the classroom.

The Soweto uprising came after a decade of relative calm in the resistance movement in the wake of massive government repression in the 1960s. Yet, during this "silent decade", a new sense of resistance had been brewing. In 1969, black students, led by Steve Biko (among others), formed the South African Student's Organization (SASO). Stressing black pride, self-reliance, and psychological liberation, the Black Consciousness Move-

ment in the 1970s became an influential force in the townships, including Soweto. The political context of the 1976 uprisings must also take into account the effects of workers' strikes in Durban in 1973; the liberation of neighboring Angola and Mozambique in 1975; and increases in student enrollment in black schools, which led to the emergence of a new collective youth identity forged by common experiences and grievances (Bonner 1976).

Though the schoolchildren may have been influenced by the Black Consciousness Movement of the 1970s, many former pupils from Soweto do not remember any involvement of outside organizations or liberation movements in their decision to protest the use of Afrikaans at their schools. In his memoir, Sifiso Ndlovu, a former student at Phefeni Junior Secondary School in Soweto, recalls how in January 1976 he and his classmates had looked forward to performing well in their studies but noted how the use of Afrikaans in the classroom significantly lowered their grades (Hirson 1979); this was buttressed by Brooks *et al.* in their account on the uprising in Soweto (Brooks 1980). Echoing Ndlovu, current Member of Parliament Obed Baphela recalled: "It was quite difficult now to switch from English to Afrikaans at that particular point and time." [Watch Bapela video segment]. The firing of teachers who refused to implement the Afrikaans language policy in Soweto exacerbated the frustration of middle school students, who then organized small demonstrations and class boycotts as early as March, April and May (Ndlovu 1998).

To sustain resistance, leaders of the Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC, founded in August 1976) decided to involve adults in the protests in order to build inter-generational unity and to strike an economic blow against the apartheid regime. From August through December 1976, SSRC leaders organized a number of campaigns, including stay-at-homes (short strikes) for adult workers, marches to Johannesburg, anti-drinking campaigns, mass funerals (which became politically charged and often turned into protest rallies), and a Christmas consumer boycott (SSRC 1976). In preparation for the stay-at-homes, the SSRC printed flyers urging adults to participate. One read "[...] the scrapping of BANTU EDUCATION, the RELEASE of Prisoners detained during the demos [demonstrations], and the overthrow of oppression, we the students call on our parents to stay at home and not go to work from Monday" (Carris 1972). Sporadic clashes between students and police continued into 1977; by the end of the year, the government acknowledged that nearly 600 people had been killed, although recent research showed that at least 3,000 people died. Thousands more were imprisoned and many black South Africans fled into exile or joined the armed struggle.

The politicization and activism of young South Africans in Soweto and beyond galvanized the liberation movements and set in motion a series of transformations that ultimately led to the demise of apartheid (Carris 1972). It is on record that many of the students who fled South Africa were helped by the Federal Government of Nigeria as they were all given scholarships. Many of the African National Congress (ANC) leaders were all issued Nigerian Passports to move around the world among other things.

Expulsion/Withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth

Nigeria's commitment to the anti-apartheid struggle had been made absolutely clear even before it attained its independence on October 1st, 1960 (Ajala 1992). Following the Sharpeville massacres of March 21st, 1960, when South African police shot and killed 72 blacks and wounded 184 (as earlier mentioned), there was a general consensus among all the Nigerian political parties, as well as the regional and federal governments, that decisive actions should be taken against the Pretoria regime in order to force that regime to change its abominable apartheid policy. This event marked the beginning of Nigeria's confrontation against white South Africa. Nigeria banned the importation of South African goods into the country and was instrumental to the political and economic sanctions passed against the racist regime.

In 1961 also, Nigeria demanded and spearheaded the forceful expulsion/withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth at the 11th Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference which was held in March 1961 in London. In fact, Nigeria mobilizing other black African countries succeeded in isolating South Africa in such a way that it would realize the absurdity of its racist policies (Agbu 2010). In continuation of this posture, Nigeria terminated all the privileges of Commonwealth membership that South Africa enjoyed in Nigeria before her forced withdrawal from the Commonwealth. Henceforth, all South African whites were treated as foreigners in Nigeria.

Nigeria, achieved her independence, at a period when the international community was already up in arms against colonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid. Yearnings for independence in the remaining dependent territories of Asia and Africa had gathered such momentum that the General Assembly of the United Nations had no problem in adopting the memorable resolution 1514 (XV) on "The Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" on 14 December 1960 – not long after

Nigeria's independence. Just as Nigeria had taken a stand against the Pretoria regime shortly after the Sharpeville Massacres (already mentioned), it also joined the other freedom-loving nations in adopting this special resolution on decolonization.

In spite of this momentous resolution the international environment was tense. The Cold War was very much evident as both the East and West were engaged in vile and hostile propaganda against each other; both NATO and the Warsaw military blocs had been solidified with bases in their respective spheres of influence; each bloc had imposed restrictions on trade between it and its friends on the one hand and its opponents on the other. Each bloc had embarked on the development of nuclear weapons, as well as indulged extensively in spying against the other. Besides, the ideological warfare between the capitalist liberal democracy of the West and the communist proletarian democracy of the East was at its height as the Cuban crisis ably demonstrated.

The Congo crisis brought the stark realities of the situation much nearer home to all the newly independent African states. The little knowledge of these new nations, which has had long association with the West as against the East, had come through the prejudiced and biased channels of the West. Their perception of the Eastern bloc was, therefore, a distorted one.

In Nigeria's case, it was precisely for this and other reasons that Nigeria banned Soviet and Communist literature and turned down scholarships from the Eastern bloc. Nigerians were discouraged from traveling to the Eastern bloc while Nigerians, who had found their way there, were on their return looked upon in government circles as "communist agents." It was also because of this suspicion that Nigeria delayed the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Eastern bloc countries, and when it finally established these relations, it initially restricted the size of the Soviet Mission in Lagos. The prevailing international environment also made it impossible for Nigeria to practice the policy of non-alignment that professed. Instead, it was, to all intents and purposes, allied to the West.

Another major factor, which forced Nigeria into this position, was the expectation that it was only the West that could provide the necessary financial and material assistance that would be needed for Nigeria's economic development. To make matters worse, the report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development mission, which was in Nigeria in the 1950s, had recommended that "without foreign investment neither public nor private endeavour can achieve the rate of economic growth and development that the Nigerian people desire" (Ajala 1992).

With all these factors at the back of their minds, Nigerian leaders approached foreign affairs with caution. They did not want to take any action that could jeopardize their chances of securing aid and other forms of assistance from the West. Policies adopted by the Balewa government were manifestations of this approach. Nigeria, however, soon found out that it needed to be categorical and not affected by the prevailing international environment on matters of vital interest to the African continent. This realization is born out of the fact that, by virtue of the size of the country and its human and material resources, Nigeria could not sit idly by and allow Ghana to continue to play the leadership role in African affairs. As independence approached, therefore, Nigerian leaders resolved never to continue finding excuses for British duplicity on the South African situation "but took a firmer line not only on the apartheid issue but also on the decolonization of the remaining dependent territories in Africa" (Ajala 1986).

In consonance with this stance, the Prime Minister went to the March 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London "determined to oppose South Africa's apartheid policy" (Ajala 1986). Consequently, "Nigeria spearheaded the move that led to the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth" (Adebisi 1980) at the meeting. In continuation of this changed posture, as mentioned earlier, Nigeria terminated all the privileges of Commonwealth membership that South Africa enjoyed in Nigeria before its forced withdrawal from the Commonwealth. Henceforth, all South Africa whites would be treated as foreigners in Nigeria while a trade ban was also immediately imposed upon South Africa. A few months later Nigeria moved a resolution at the International Labour Organization calling on the organization to expel South Africa on the ground that apartheid was a flagrant violation of both the letter and spirit of the ILO Constitution.

On March 16, 1961 Dr. Verwoerd, the Prime Minister, withdrew South Africa's request to continue as a member of the Commonwealth after it had become a republic. This was done at a meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London which Dr. Verwoerd attended to carry out his promise to retain South Africa's membership if he could. Considerable criticism of South Africa's policy of racial separation or *apartheid* was expressed by other Commonwealth members, particularly Canada and the Afro-Asian dominions led by Nigeria. In the face of this criticism, Dr. Verwoerd withdrew his request 'so as not to place our friends, particularly the United Kingdom, in the invidious position of having to choose between us and the Afro-Asian states of the Commonwealth'. The news of the withdrawal was received with shock by the opposition and with jubilation by the great majority of the larger white group, the Dutch-descended Afrikaners.

Almost immediately South Africa's race policies came under heavy attack in both the UN Political Committee and the General Assembly. Within twenty-four hours of withdrawal from the Commonwealth, South African administration of South-West Africa was condemned by a 74-0 vote in the General Assembly. The heaviest vote ever recorded in the UN General Assembly condemned *apartheid,* and even Portugal voted in the 94-0 division. The South African delegate maintained that this was 'domestic interference.' The Security Council also ordered its Committee on South-West Africa to enter the territory and investigate charges concerning the application of *apartheid* within this area controlled by South Africa under a post-World War I mandate. The South African government refused to grant the committee visas to enter although it offered to allow some person of international standing to enter. In late October, soon after the resumption of UN sittings, there was a call for sanctions against South Africa by Afro-Asian states in a debate lasting over a fortnight. South Africa's foreign minister, E. H. Louw, defended his government's policies as being in the best interests of everybody in the country (Lenon 2008).

On May 31, 1961 South Africa became a republic. In effect this was a restoration of the republican form of government, which had been ended in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, the then two Northern Provinces of South Africa, at the close of the Boer War of 1899-1902. The new State-President, previously the Governor-General, Mr. C. R. Swart, took the oath of office and swore in the cabinet. The constitution remained the same parliamentary one based on a white electorate, with four communal seats for the Colored (mulatto) people, and no representation whatsoever for the 11,000,000 Africans and 500,000 Asians. The event was celebrated by the Afrikaners and largely ignored by the English white minority and the non-whites. A three-day strike planned by the non-whites as a protest to coincide with the establishment of the republic failed to come up to expectations, though it was about 50 per cent effective in some areas. This failure was partly due to the display of force by the government, which included calling up the citizen forces and deploying armored units at key points, as well as heavily policing the non-white townships. The government also passed a law by which any person might be detained for up to fourteen days without a court hearing. This power was used to harass and arrest many of the main strike leaders. Towards the end of May, about 10,000 people were seized in pre-dawn raids.

Immediately after the establishment of the republic, the fall in the South African gold reserves accelerated. It was part of a process which had been going on since the Sharpeville emergency in March 1960 and had caused the reserves to slump from about $450,000,000 to $220,000,000 by mid-

June 1961. This was largely due to a capital outflow of nearly $300,000,000 in what was called a 'crisis of confidence' in the stability of the country. Dr. Donges, minister of finance, immediately ordered all South Africans to recall all funds placed abroad and blocked the further removal of capital from the country. This broke the 70-year-old link between the Johannesburg and London Stock Exchanges. After this development, these government measures appeared to have been effective and the reserves have now risen to $330,000,000, or $105,000,000, above what is considered the danger level. During the year the country switched from sterling (£s.d.) currency to a decimal one. The unit is now a rand (R1.00) which is equal to half of the former pound (£1.00). The rand is equal to 100 South African cents (Lemon et al. 2009).

Conclusion

From the above, it is clear that Nigeria has been declared to be a great promoter of African affairs and has historically been attaching great importance to Africa (Saliu 2005). Nigeria made major contributions to the emancipation of African countries from colonial rules and settler racist domination (Ezc 2011). This is because it has always committed itself to defending the interests of the black race in the world and the largest for that matter and more importantly; ever before her independence in 1960, the country's political leaders had developed an idea on the possibility of Nigeria leading Africa upon the attainment of independence (Saliu 2005). That Nigeria's support and contributions to the anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa were recognized and acknowledged by the international community especially by the Organization of African Unity now the African Union (OAU/AU) and also the United Nations (UN), where Nigeria provided effective leadership in the struggles against colonialism, racism and apartheid rule in South Africa.

Therefore, when some African countries attained independence in 1960, the decolonization of the remaining territories under colonialism became a common project and a rallying point. Nigeria became the undisputed leader (even working with other countries in establishing the ECOWAS in 1975, Nigeria led the prevention and resolution of the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Nigeria was the Chair of the UN Anti-apartheid Committee until 1994 and above all, the thrust of Nigeria's foreign policy is African centered) in the struggle against colonialism and especially apartheid by the OAU. Nigeria expended enormous amounts of resources: political, diplomatic and material in prosecuting this struggle (Zabadi et al. 2012) In doing this,

she has been condemned, at times commended and, in most cases as it were, unsung. Nevertheless, since its independence, Nigeria has remained committed to its afro-centric policy which comes in different forms and magnitude.

Nigeria has made immense contributions to international development, peace and security, especially in Africa. Unfortunately, Nigeria's contributions, including those made towards the decolonization of Southern Africa and anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, were not properly documented and disseminated within and outside Nigeria. Consequently, information about Nigeria's heroic role and contributions is not transmitted accurately to succeeding generations of Nigerians and citizens of countries that benefited from Nigeria's kind gestures. Indeed, there are today evidence to suggest distortion[3] of historical facts about Nigeria's role and contributions by some of the countries that benefited from Nigeria's support and assistance.

It is also surprising and unfortunate that Nigeria's African policy does not send a clear message to these African countries on her mission and this has affected how they should reciprocate Nigeria's gestures and show some gratitude (Saliu 2005) (as in the case of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Angola etc). Therefore, in Nigeria's future engagements there is an uncompromising need for a special review of her foreign policy to reflect the changing times of global politics and events. Nigeria's gestures and hands of fellowship to other nations especially in Africa, should also be tied to or reflect her national interests and in fact, apply the principle of reciprocity in whatever it does in the international arena.

In line with the conclusion, the following recommendations are suggested:

1.   The Federal Government should always support the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs to acquire appropriate technical capacity for effective documentation and dissemination of information about Nigeria's contribution to international peace, security and development. For example, Nigeria's roles and contributions can be memorialized in plays and films by Nollywood art workers for people within and outside Nigeria to know what Nigeria contributed to the liberation and decolonization of Southern Africa;

3   Authors' personal experiences as part of Nigerian delegation to the African Union as observers during the AU Commission election, when the leader of South African delegation to the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa said, Nigeria's support for the ANC and the fight against apartheid regime was for economic gain. This was an attempt to distort historical fact, because Nigeria has been against apartheid even before her independence.

2. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Information and other relevant official agencies such as the National Orientation Agency (NOA) should step up the use of the media and other cultural resources to disseminate information about Nigeria's role and contributions within and outside Nigeria, especially at the African Union, the United Nations and particularly, the Commonwealth of Nations;

3. In fact, the Ministry of Education should ensure that educational and learning processes include information about Nigeria's role and contributions to international development, peace and security. In this regard information about Nigeria's contribution to the liberation and anti-apartheid struggles can be integrated into the curricula for formal and informal education programmes.

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ABSTRACT

Nigeria's commitment to the anti-apartheid struggle had been made absolutely clear even before it attained its independence on October 1st, 1960. Following the Sharpeville massacres of March 21st, 1960, when South African police shot and killed 72 blacks and wounded 184, there was a general consensus among all Nigerian political parties, as well as the regional and federal governments, that decisive actions should be taken against the Pretoria regime in order to force that regime to change its abominable apartheid policy. This event marked the beginning of Nigeria's confrontation against white South Africa. Nigeria demanded and spearheaded the forceful expulsion/withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth by mobilizing other black African countries in isolating South Africa in such a way that it would realize the absurdity of its racist policies. It is against this background that this paper assesses Nigeria's role in the expulsion or forceful withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth of Nations.

KEYWORDS:

NATION BRANDING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE CASE OF NIGERIA

Bruna Coelho Jaeger[1]
Izabela Mota Bastos[2]

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, new forms of public diplomacy have been invented, especially after the advent of mass communication. The use of *Nation Branding* in International Relations has increased, as a supplement to one of the functions of public diplomacy: that of image creation and state propaganda. This method can be considered a way of restructuring a country's business environment and projecting its international image, an image that is true to its national culture and history. Thus, its objective is to stimulate the reconstruction of foreign policy and international trade through the commercial refinement of a country. These are, hence, programs jointly led by state institutions and private enterprises.

There is a constant struggle by countries to expose their identities and images in a positive way (Dinnie 2008), as they can't be perceived by the International State System in accordance to their true cultural and political identity, essentially because these are subjective identities (Wendt 1992). Therefore, in order to understand this identity in an intersubjective way, an efficient system is necessary, such as *Nation Branding*. So, perceptions of identity must be collectively shared, otherwise there won't be an interaction based on common interest in the International State System (Wendt 1999).

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1   Department of International Relations, Centro Universitário LaSalle do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. E-mail: brunacjaeger@gmail.com. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7776-7213.

2   Department of International Relations, Centro Universitário LaSalle do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. E-mail: izamotabastos@gmail.com. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6424-7382.

Nation Branding is thus used as Nigeria's main resource to break the colonial paradigm manipulated by the West.

In light of this, this article's main objective is to analyze the case of Nigeria's *Nation Branding* in order to report on the danger of a single story and its impact on the country's positioning internationally. Nigeria is a land of ancient kingdoms and multiple ethnic groups[3], which until present days suffer the consequences of the scramble for Africa. In this way, the image that the West projects of Nigeria is that of "corruption, abuse, tribalism, religious fanaticism and lack of the most basic aspects of daily life" (Nation Branding 2009).

The question guiding this article is: in which way has the construction of *Nation Branding* in Nigeria, from 2009 to 2019, impacted in the country's international insertion? We present the hypothesis that, from the use of *Nation Branding* for the creation of political, economic, and marketing programs, a national unity has developed in favor of Nigeria's success in the International State System. Thus, such programs have improved the business environment, even with security policies. By doing so, some sectors have become more attractive, especially through the creation of policies to promote technology and the education of Nigerian workers. Consequently, the enhancement of political and social harmony, and of the country's competitiveness, was achieved, generating a new international image. This analysis will be based on quantitative and qualitative data, especially through the *Trading Economics* and *CEIC Global* databases, as well as on Penresa[4] reports. Our objective is to show, in an explanatory way, the relation between Nigeria's development after the 2008 crisis and the applicability of *Nation Branding* programs, such as the YouWin! and the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan. The research's time frame from 2009 to 2019 is justified by the effects of the 2008 crisis on the Nigerian economy, and due to the fact that this was the period when the country's *Nation Branding* initiatives acquired greater political and institutional structure.

The applicability of *Nation Branding* finds correspondence in Wendt, whose theory suggests that the main factor in international politics is the dissemination of ideas in the International State System (Wendt 1999). However, these ideas, which dictate countries' positioning in the International State System, especially for developing countries, are imposed by the West,

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3   Nigeria's main ethnic groups are: the Yoruba, the Igbo, the Tiv, the Ijaw, the Kanuri, the Ibibio, the Ijaw, and the Hausa (Muslims) (CIA 2018).

4   Penresa is a multicultural team of *Nation Branding* in Africa, which aims to nurture a positive image of Africa's emerging countries (Penresa 2020).

which chooses those who have the power to build international norms and those who may or may not act politically. This research's main justification is the goal to combat the single, and discriminatory, narrative over Nigeria. In this sense, the research refers mainly to Nigerian authors. Nonetheless, it aims to contribute to a more complex discussion over the idea of *Nation Branding* in International Relations, which is commonly analyzed simply as a factor of cultural and touristic influence. We also intend to contribute to Constructivism by creating a new debate in International Relations and African Studies.

In the first part of this article, we will establish a dialogue between Wendt's constructivist theory and decolonial theory, in order to approach the danger of a single history and the coloniality of power. We will explain the need to remove the white masks that influence the perceptions of Africans about themselves, for the ideas that are currently narrated are eurocentric, xenophobic and dominated by the Great Powers of the West. This association of ideological factors has directly influenced Nigeria's current positioning, as stereotypes can often dominate the perceptions of nations (Wendt 1999). Consequently, the second part of this article aims to explain the concept of *Nation Branding* and show its main programs carried out by the Nigerian state during the time frame of 2009-2019. By doing so, this analysis seeks to comprehend how such factors relate to policies for an increased stability of the national currency; for the recovery of international credibility and investors' trust; and for the fortification of national feeling (Dinnie 2008).

The third part of the article shows the impacts of these programs for *rebranding* "a product, service or organization considered in association with its name, identity and reputation"[5] (Anholt 2007, 4), in terms of Nigeria's international presence. In this sense, we will report through quantitative data an increase in reliability and foreign direct investment, as well as the outcomes of such investment for Nigerian human capital and for the diversification of exports. This is the case of the technological surge through startups which reposition Nigeria as an innovative and attractive state for investment, especially since the creation of Abuja's scientific villa, which expects to be a new technologic hub. Additionally, the increase in commercial multilateralism is noteworthy, and it is accompanied by a political regionalism, due to African Renaissance and Nigeria's will to restore the Pan-Africanist ideal.

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5   Original version: "produto, serviço ou organização considerada em associação com o seu nome, identidade e reputação".

The power of ideas and the danger of a single story: a debate between Constructivism and Decoloniality

When trying to understand the role of ideas on Nigeria's foreign policy and how the construction of images could influence the way a country is seen in the international arena, it is important to use a theory which escapes rationalist analysis, that is, which doesn't open the state's black box. With this in mind, this section has the main objective of establishing a dialogue between Constructivism and Decoloniality, showing how both complement each other on a critical assessment of the power of creating ideas in the International State System.

According to Wendt's (1992) Constructivism, International Policy is socially constructed, and structures and cultural formation are characterized, mainly, by shared ideas, and not only by gross material forces or the maximization of power. Actors' identities and interests are constructed by such shared ideas, which create norms, as in the case when the author mentions that anarchy is what states make of it (Wendt 1999). Therefore, rules and ideas dictate institutions, agents, and interests in the International State System, which are created through adaptation. So, identity builds interests, promoting its bases. Consequently, the concept of identity works as a link between structures and interests (Jepperson, et al. 1996), especially because there is no way that the state can define its interests before it defines its identity. However, Wendt points out to the power of speech and discourse, and how they can be readapted and built in a way to reflect the interests of the propagators of such narratives. This issue can be observed from the discourse of revisionist states, due to their desire to conquer, whether territories or rules in the International State System (Wendt 1999).

Under this perspective, this article encompasses the need to analyze the use of discourse and myth construction to create a single story, generating a shared idea in the International State System. In this framework, we will establish a parallel between Wendt's Constructivism and Post-Colonial and Decolonial Theory, for according to post-colonial theory it is necessary to observe different forms of oppression and dominance of peoples. In a similar way, decolonial theory corresponds to a continuous struggle to overcome colonial structures, which operate in an economic, military, and political way, but also in a cultural and identitarian way (Colaço 2012).

Such colonial structures reflect the construction of the interests of the Great Powers. As noticed by Wendt, the structure and norms of the International State System are characterized by three main elements, which are

correlated: material conditions, interests, and ideas. Without the creation of ideas, there are no interests and without interests there is no need to possess material conditions, therefore, without these pillars there is no system (Wendt 1999). In light of this, shared knowledge that Nigeria is essentially "poor" creates a myth and a questioning over the country's capacity to participate in international affairs. Thus, a single story is built, in which Great Powers' projections dictate which countries should be a part of politics, and which shouldn't, and this is the danger of the single story (Adichie 2019). Each state has its particular interests and its peculiarities, additionally, anarchy builds its own structures, so these identity constructions cannot cancel the origin of the countries but constitute a set of all these identities and logics (Wendt 1999). Certainly, discourse is a speech act and power. Onuf (1998) argues that we make the world what it is, for speaking is making: to speak is the most important way of making the world what it is, speaking in a way that makes someone else act (Kubálková, et al. 1998). Common knowledge is nothing more than beliefs, treated as shared "mental models" which form the driving forces for a single setting, independently from aspects inherent to this belief (Wendt 1999). In this context, the power of ideas, of discourse and of identity construction are directly correlated to the post-colonial period, for a discourse is constructed from the point of view of the colonizer, so that the colonized constructs him or herself based on the discourse of the colonizer (Rosevics 2017). In order to change the perspective of international norms and inter-pretations constructed by the West, it is necessary to take the responsibility of building a new identity (Reis and Andrade 2018) to Nigeria, seeking to unite Nigerian society through patriotism, despite internal social differences.

There is a tendency in literature to presume that certain states are associated with the role of identity, with the construction of a universal iden-tity (Wendt 1999). In Nigeria, it was unusual to access non-Western literary works; all stories had white characters and realities which were seen as uni-versal (Adichie 2019). That was considered the genuine idea of a civilization. Adichie reports that she only realized the stereotype when she began to read books written by African writers, such as Chinua Achebe and Camara Laye, and began to recognize herself in those stories (Adichie 2019). Amid the combat of the pejorative view propagated by the single story, it is of uttermost importance to highlight African authors in the international arena. There is a search for representativeness, but also to have control over one's own story and to help construct a society which values its own identity, generating acceptance and national pride. When readers find only books which portray a stereotyped view, this reaches Africans by generating a feeling of coloniality.

Such construction of stereotypes generates what Frantz Fanon (1952) called "colonial alienation", which emerges from a hierarchy between white and Black, giving white people assent to subjugate Africans and Afro-Descendants, which resulted in the internalization of this propagated inferiority and of the myth of enchantment towards white people. Therefore, the ideas and identities have much more strength to dictate who can act in the global setting than forces kept through material resources (Wendt 1999). In light of this, Fanon states that colonialism is not only about the use of economic oppression or military force, but about the creation of the idea of racial difference, generating a complex of inferiority in Africans, due to the burial of their cultural originality (Fanon 1952). Quijano (2002) describes the colonial matrix of power[6] also as the control of knowledge and subjectivity. Consequently, this control is legitimated by the monopoly of knowledge shared at the decision-making table in the International State System (Wendt 1992). Thus, Eurocentrism can be seen as a hegemonic form of authority over the way knowledge is produced (Quijano 2002).

It is important to stand against any structures of power and oppression that silence someone (Miglievich-Ribeiro 2014, 66-80), especially because such structures hold the channels for transnational actors to access the political system, making it possible for domestic actors to influence political change. However, the more the area of interest is dominated by international rules, the more difficult it becomes to generate ideological change (Risse-Kappen 1995). Thus, a society whose culture is based on colonial beliefs is doomed to perpetuate the construction of feelings and policies that benefit the Great Powers and not their own national interest. Hence, the broadening of ideas should be encouraged in order to go beyond the stereotype created by the West.

In terms of the control over information channels, identities have a hierarchical structure (Wendt 1999), especially because the global perspective is dominated by the white man, responsible for the construction of racism and xenophobia (Adichie 2014). Adichie (2014, 38) highlights this line: "I am Nigerian because a white man created Nigeria and gave me that identity. I am black because the white man constructed black to be as different as possible from his white. But I was Igbo[7] before the white man came." This myth, propagated about Africa, can be seen in the case shown by Achebe (1977), in which Conrad (2007, 82) inferiorizes Africans, reporting that the

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6   The coloniality of power, that is, the idea of "race" as the basis for the universal pattern of essential social classification and social dominance (Quijano 2002, 1).

7   Nigerian ethnic group which constitutes 15.2% of the population (CIA 2019).

people were nothing but black shadows of disease and hunger, that they were cannibals who inhabited unpleasant environments. This was a story of inferiority manipulated so that the atrocities done by the West in the African continent were justifiable, as Africans needed help to reach civility.

When giving an interview for *The Economist* in 2019, Chimamanda Adichie states that identity is a very fluid factor, prone to adaptation, and has multiple forms. Depending on which place a person is at, some aspect of identity can be highlighted (Wendt 1999), leading to an identity that propagates interests present at the moment, in a particular context. These identities are adaptable to foreign policy interests, as international rules are interpreted through social construction (Wendt 1999). Storytelling is rarely done impartially, and there will always be issues of power and interests in the creation of such narratives, especially due to the lack of access to other important voices in the story. So, discourses are limited to a reductionist and colonialist story. According to Soyinka (2012, 57): "The darkness that was so readily attributed to the 'Dark Continent' may yet prove to be nothing but the willful cataract on the eye of the beholder." This intentional xenophobia legitimates the norms which only reflect exclusion and selective authority in the International State System.

An example of such intentional xenophobia is reported by Adichie (2019, 2) when she moved to the United States to study and, according to the author, her roommate looked at her with a "well-intended arrogance", a feeling of mercy. This woman knew a single story about Africa, a story of catastrophe, to which the only possible reaction was pity; there was no possibility of connection as equal human beings. These people have only absorbed the information that was selected to be propagated, due to control over who tells the story and which parts of the story are told, so that the story of reality becomes a story built in its own reality (Adichie 2019). In that way, interests are constructed in the form of ideas and are easily propagated. During an interview for *Channel 4 news*, in 2016, Soyinka stated that, being Nigerian, he didn't have a positive view of Winston Churchill, neither as a person nor as prime-minister, for he was one of the most incisive and brutal colonizers, costing countless African lives. However, only the narrative that shows Churchill as a hero is told, generating the adoration of many, for they only know his image as was shared by those who dominate the International State System's discussion environment.

When a story is told from different points of view, this leads to an alternative scenario, as many different perceptions of reality are generated. Everyone should have access to these stories and cultures in order to form

their own perception of the world, not simply reproducing an idea shared and dominated by Great Western Powers. In Wendt's (1999) point of view, common and shared knowledge reflects actors' beliefs regarding the construction of some aspects of other states, for example: rationality, strategy, preferences and beliefs and their position in the outside world. However, such beliefs don't necessarily need to be true, they only need to be accepted as true (Wendt 1999). "Sometimes people follow norms not because they think it will serve some exogenously given end but because they think the norms are legitimate and therefore want to follow them" (Wendt 1999, 272).

The practice of Nation Branding in Nigeria (2009-2019)

Guided by Constructivism, the use of *Nation Branding* helps construct a new identity for Nigeria. New ideas, including principles, beliefs, knowledge, and new identities generate narratives able to impact and to be incorporated into norms, consensual knowledge and collective identities (Risse-Kappen 1999). This section aims to explain Nigeria's new way of participating in the global scenario, as the country paid and continues to pay the price for the Western fiction (Soyinka 2012). This change in Nigeria's international position through *Nation Branding* means that a change in beliefs, in members of the International State System or in power, generates new norms and cultural perspectives (Wendt 1999). That is, *Nation Branding* is a political tool which seeks to strengthen a country's economic position, in order to compete commercially, militarily and economically with superpowers (Volcic and Andrejevic 2011).

The concept of Nation Branding

Through *Nation Branding*, the state positions itself as an enterprise in search for clients, so as to influence the market. However, in terms of sovereign states, such clients are the different peoples of different cultures; the products are the *Nation Branding* programs; the market is the international arena; and the goal is to become more attractive and competitive on a global level. Thus, it can be stated that *Nation Branding* is based on three P's: *People*, *Place* and *Product* (Kayode 2018). Besides, in terms of the International State System, these strategies go beyond the creation of design and logos, they constitute government and private programs focused on external relations (Oliveira 2017, 1-15). As argued by Wendt (1999,225), the sum of personal and corporate identities is what generates all other identities, including state

identity. So, *Nation Branding* seeks to share knowledge and a new view of a country's history and culture, dominating the ideas intended to narrate. Once, according to Constructivism, those who dominate ideas and their media, construct the norms of the International State System (Wendt 1999).

In order to improve the domestic environment, it is necessary to improve the foreign environment, and vice versa, so *rebranding* helps enhance the international identity being propagated. According to Dinnie (2008), *Nation Branding* is a component of national politics, and not a campaign of entrepreneurial or electoral nature, as it shouldn't separate the creation of identities from the areas of governmental planning or economic development. In terms of a good identity, the first requirement is to conquer the domestic audience. From this, a narrative which demystifies colonial feeling itself is created, generating national pride.

Figure 1: The main pillars of *Nation Branding*

Pilares do Nation Branding

Source: Authors' from data collected in Dinnie (2008).

It is important to highlight that, according to Gilmore (2002), it is important to propagate a new true image while constructing *Nation Branding*, for a widening of currently existent national cultural values is necessary. Under this point of view, in order for the state to implement *Nation Branding* policies in a critical way, it is necessary to comprehend its wishes and what it is trying to represent for the global arena. Nigeria needed to make an agreement with its past. Only this allowed it to establish a relationship of honesty and mutual respect with the world scene, inaugurating a new era of interaction. There should be conquering through values of the past, demonstrating pride for ancestrality, thus exploring the potential and creativity of African culture. By doing so, praising its riches and particularities, and not through adapting to what is expected by other states in the International State System (Soyinka 2012).

Nation Branding Programs in Nigeria

Political and economic change in Nigeria arose before the institutionalization of *Nation Branding* as a form of strengthening recent Nigerian democracy. A great propagator of this change was President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), who created policies for the retreat of the military from power, when they still had political decision power in Nigeria. Furthermore, especially since the 1990s, Nigeria was seen as a pariah in the International State System, when its government was declared illegal and unconstitutional in the Lagos Supreme Court (1993) due to the abandonment of measures required by the Structural Adjustment Plans (Oliveira 2014).

Obasanjo recovered Nigeria's influence worldwide and regionally as Africa's giant (Penresa 2019), which resulted in the signing of an agreement with the Paris Club in 2006. In October 2005, the financial institution pardoned two thirds of Nigeria's external debt (Millet and Toussaint 2006), which helped recover its position of economic highlight in the continent and the state's relation with the IMF. This debt had been acquired due to unsuccessful nationalist measures in 1994, which generated a sudden fall of non-oil exports, currency devaluation and an interest rate much higher than the value established by the government (Oliveira 2014). Furthermore, in order to build a strategy to recover international credibility and lower poverty and unemployment indexes promoted by Nigerian military dictatorship, Obasanjo and his administration created the *National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy* (NEEDS) (Awojobi 2015).

In that moment, a new image of Nigeria was cultivated, an image which reflected democracy and the aspiration of participating in the interna-

tional community, as the interdependence between the domestic and international fields became clear, due to the international isolation affecting the country's internal crises. The country's participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions is also an element of this international image restructuring. One of the main points for the recovery of Nigeria's image was presidential diplomacy and frequent visits to supportive and non-supportive countries made by both Obasanjo and Yar'Adua (Oliveira 2014), with the objective of recovering relations with the countries that had been most critical towards Nigeria in former years. These trips were effective to recover Nigeria's image, as in Obasanjo's swearing in, in 1999, leaders such as Nelson Mandela, prince Charles, as well as African heads of state and an American delegation were present. Notwithstanding, in 2005 Obasanjo took the presidency of the African Union, of NEPAD's Heads of State Committee, and of the *Commonwealth*. This contributed to the establishment of relations with non-Western countries, fostering partnerships especially with Asian enterprises, which started investing in Nigerian infrastructure.

Currently, as a consequence of this process, it is impossible to ignore Nigerian potential. More than 16% of Africa's population lives in Nigeria, which has a consumer market of approximately 190 million people (Penresa 2019). Nigeria is currently the 10th country with most oil reserves in the world. However, as in most regions rich in resources, there are disputes over the control of such natural riches, for example the Niger Delta, an area in conflict since 2003. Worried about Nigeria's international image, constantly linked to corruption, the Nigerian government started investing, since 2016, in financial technology, trying to prevent illegal transactions (Penresa 2019). An example of this was the incentive to the *Economic and Financial Crimes Commission* (EFCC)[8], in 2017, a government body investigating Nigerian corruption (Senado Federal 2018). EFCC became necessary, as domestic policies such as investment in security and in the economy also constituted a part of *Nation Branding*. Above all, through financial, infrastructure and urbanizing programs (Anholt 2007). Furthermore, in order for a country to become attractive internationally, its domestic environment must be willing to receive this target audience.

Another example is the amnesty plan, created by Yar'Adua in 2009, a project which encompassed a raise in oil profits for the Niger Delta region, combating *Boko Haram*, as well as investment projects to build infrastructure (Ghosh 2013). Therefore, it is the role of *Nation Branding* to take care of all sectors which influence in the state's reputation for international trade, from

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8   Economic and Financial crimes commission.

defense policies to public policies, as the context in which this propaganda is sent is important, that is, the country's political context at a given moment (Anholt 2005, 116-121).

Nigeria has been trying to break free from economic dependency on oil[9] and gas. From 2009, as a form of responding to the 2008 crisis and to a decline in 13% of its GDP, Nigeria started using *Nation Branding* as a way of implementing bolder economic policies, resulting in a dynamic reform of the state's international trade. These policies encompassed areas such as: technology, telecommunication and services, reform policies in agriculture, industrial associations, and national policies (Dinnie 2008, 37). Thus, the campaign "Transformative Agenda for Nigerians" was created afterwards, focused on generating jobs in an organic way, on changing the logic of production and trade, reducing poverty, promoting education, healthcare, energy, and security (Awojobi 2015). Within that framework, a new international image of Nigeria was cultivated, an image which reflected democracy and the aspiration of participating in the international community, while the interdependence between domestic and external fields became clear, as happened during the international isolation of the 1980-1990[10], which affected the country's internal crises (Oliveira 2014).

In 2011, Goodluck Jonathan created programs such as "Graduate Internship Scheme" and "Community Service Scheme", granting young students opportunities to work in big companies and to improve the country's infrastructure. Especially because through investing in education, young entrepreneurs are more effectively reached, and Nigerians' professional abilities are developed (Penresa 2020). Another important program was YouWin! (*Youth Enterprise With Innovation in Nigeria*)[11], which favoured the insertion of new companies in the national and international arenas (Awojobi 2015). Thus, while exploring new technologies, these rebranding programs raised Nigeria's economic complexity and competitive power in the international market, resulting in a more active and innovative image. Similarly, to Goodluck Jonathan's policies, according to Penresa (2019), in 2017, under the administration of current president Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria was able to

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9   Oil responds to 93% of the country's exports (Observatory of Economic Complexity 2018).

10   From the beginning of the 1980s to the end of the 1990s, Nigeria kept away from the international arena, due to the fall in oil prices during the 1980s, an issue that encouraged the finding of new energy sources and consequently lowered the demand and production of Nigerian oil. Hence, it caused discontent among the Nigerian population, due to an increase in inflation of more than 50%, resulting in the military takeover of power (Oliveira 2014).

11   Young Innovative Companies in Nigeria.

position itself more successfully in the international market[12]. The Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (2017-2020) was created with the objective of generating credibility in the external and domestic fields through the dignity of work, social justice, religious tolerance, self-confidence, and patriotism. The main priorities of the plan are: to stabilize the macroeconomic environment, to reduce inflation, to achieve stable currency exchange rates and to harmonize trade and public budget balances. In a similar way, through the improvement in tax and customs administration, there was the goal to promote non-oil sectors, and of taxing luxury products (Penresa 2017), a necessary step since Nigeria charges low taxes and most of its budget comes from oil revenue (Oliveira 2014). As previously stated, one of these programs' greatest promises is the incentive to agriculture, essentially in order to generate more jobs and cut expenses with food imports.

Hence, the Nigerian government has been investing in new information and communication technologies (ICTs), especially by creating technology villages and special economic zones, such as Abuja Technology Village Science and Technology Park (STP), as well as the Yabacon Valley (Penresa 2019). It should also be highlighted that there is a search for greater emphasis on security, defense, and technology. In 2006, in a partnership between the National Space Research and Development Agency and *Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd*, Nigeria promoted its space program. This contributed directly to an increase in national pride among Nigerians, building an interest in studies in this area (Penresa 2020).

Similarly, in 2016 Nigeria's government started to promote a campaign called "*Change begins with me*" and "*Made in Nigeria*", trying to demonstrate its new image of technologic and productive diversity through *Nation Branding*, thus enhancing its position in international trade (Penresa 2017). In order to increase its *world wide*, there was the implementation of the National Industrial Revolution Plan, associated with the Special Economic Zones, fomenting exports and at least 1.5 million jobs up until 2020. An important demonstration of how Nigeria emphasizes "*Made in Nigeria*" can be observed through the creation of OyaNow Logistics in 2017, a Nigerian app which works similarly to the app Rappi (Penresa 2019). Other examples are the company Jumia, also known as "Africa's Amazon" and IRokoTV, also known as "Africa's Netflix". When we hear the phrase "*Made in...*", we automatically think of Western countries or China. With this in mind, Nigeria created this campaign in order to support national brands position themselves in the international arena, linking organic growth to artistic inheritance.

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12   A GDP raise of 5% from 2017 to 2018, according to Data World Bank.

In light of this, Lagos has been the host of countless events, such as *Lagos Fashion Week* (Penresa 2019). These improvement measures are made through the political program called *T.H.EM.E.S*[13], focused on making Lagos a 21st century economy. Still in this context, from 2006 the Nigerian government has adopted tax incentives to cinema in the form of laws. The Nollywood term was soon created as a way of criticizing Western movie industry and the way it exercises its power of creating ideas and interests through films, looking for nothing other than profit. Nollywood is thus a satire, reconstructing a westernized term and enhancing it by taking into consideration Nigerian culture, aiming for a new history and national pride, something that has also been fomented through the musical genre *afrobeat*. Nollywood is one of the greatest movie industries in the world (Uechi 2020).

The impact of *Nation Branding* policies in Nigeria's international participation

Since before the 2008 crisis, Nigeria had a very fragile economy, essentially dependent on *commodity* exports and with low economic complexity, with oil responding for 95% of exports at the time (Oliveira 2014). Thus, it can be said that during the boom of oil exports in the 1980s, Nigeria (as all other states) wasn't prepared to face the free market changes imposed by Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) (Chang 2010), and was going through Dutch disease[14]. So, when the manufacturing sector was depreciated, there was an increase in unemployment and a lowering of the trade growth rate for manufactured goods, reducing even further the country's economic complexity and the industrialization of new sectors, such as that of technology (Gala 2018).

Due to this economic dependency linked to a commercially unstable natural resource, Nigeria's economy, in the 1980s, was surpassed by South Africa's and the country became internationally isolated (Oliveira 2014). The discovery of new oil reserves in the 1980-2003 period culminated in an international dispute for the control over Nigerian oil. Countless international *offshore* companies started exploring Nigerian land in a brutal way, in what

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13 Acronym for Traffic Management and Transportation; Health and Environment; Education and Technology; Making Lagos a 21st Century state; Security and Governance (Penresa 2019).

14 Dutch disease is a market flaw known as the curse of natural resources, in which the gains in currency exchange rate resulting from the discovery of a new natural resource make the economy concentrate in just one sector. This was the case when Nigeria discovered new oil reserves in 1979, and oil responded for 90% of its exports (Gala 2020).

became known as "new imperialism" guided by oil companies (Alvarenga 2020, 1-12). Furthermore, such companies contributed to Nigerian production becoming undifferentiated and uneven, increasing social inequality and internal conflicts. Hence, Nigerian economy and sovereignty were once more weakened by Western actions, at the same time that there was a feeling that without such international companies there would be no economic growth (Quijano 2002). In other words, the emergence of neoliberal capitalism was based on obtaining profits while perpetuating underdevelopment.

With the 2008 crisis[15], there was a stagnation in the diversification of goods and an economic decline due to an oil-focused export agenda, for in the beginning of 2008 the oil barrel was sold for US$140 and in 2009 it cost only US$40 (Fernandes 2012, 20). Soon, in countries like Nigeria, these factors would cause a decline in revenue, in socioeconomic indexes and an increase in public debt. The sudden fall of Nigeria's economy (2008-2009) can be related to the 2008 crisis, especially because, with financial powers in crisis, there was less foreign direct investment, a smaller flow of private capital and a decline in the value of *commodities* (Fernandes 2012, 20). From then on, Nigerian international positioning began to focus on the search to sophisticate Nigerian production, as well as on the use of oil not only as a guarantee of energetic security, but also as raw material for high quality products. In short, there was a strategic assessment of how oil could be used to boost the country's technological capacity (Oliveira 2015), especially through the inflow of foreign reserves which could enable the purchase of more sophisticated equipment (Chang 2010). The need for economic diversification and for enhancing the use of natural resources also became clear after the 2014 crisis, which slowed down the economy and resulted in a recession until 2016 (Senado Federal 2018).

In view of these circumstances, there was an improvement in Nigerian human capital through the *Nation Branding* programs, due to investments in education, proper working environment and professional training on administration and entrepreneurship. Subsequently, there was the promotion of structural change in the assistance policies for the most vulnerable

15 Crisis caused by the lack of regulation in financial speculation attached to *subprime* investments, in which mortgages were offered in an unbalanced way for low purchasing power clients. This economic incentive generated an economic overheating, but the fake success soon collapsed. Buyers couldn't pay the mortgages, especially because due to high demand in the real estate market, houses' values rose more than expected. Thus, there was an economic recession and banks started accumulating debt, which were later sold to international banks in the form of titles as "safe investment". Therefore, when the American financial market collapsed, this collapse was already affecting other countries (Bresser-Pereira 2010).

communities (Penresa 2019). From 2009 to 2014 it is clear that there was an increase of approximately 95% in Nigerian GDP (World Bank 2020). Notwithstanding, according to a report by US News, from 2017 to 2019, Nigeria went from 77th to 74th in the global ranking of commercial dynamism, from 69th to 67th in the global ranking of entrepreneurship, and from 71st to 63rd in the global ranking of cultural influence (Penresa 2019).

The decade of Nigerian production sophistication

As stated by Muhammadu Buhari, companies have invested in Nigeria for more than 40 years, for Nigeria's riches are not only oil, but its people's ability, intelligence, and energy (Penresa 2018). Since 2006, Gates has started expanding his programs in Nigeria, with an investment of over US$1.6 billion in education, healthcare, and digital financial services (Gates Foundation 2018). That said, these investments, along with previously cited *Nation Branding* projects have generated an increase in human capital. Besides, Nigeria has risen from 225th to 157th in the human development index (Country Economy 2017). In other words, it is clear how the discourse of a tribal Nigeria, without urban life, is a single story built by the West, with the objective of subjugating Africans and maintaining the concept of Western primacy.

From the goal of becoming a great market of complex products, Nigeria started investing primarily in technology and communication sectors. In 2018, the number of Nigerian startups grew exponentially, and technological companies collected around U$306 million in investment funds (Penresa 2019). Furthermore, there was an increase in foreign direct investment between 2017 and 2019. In 2017, this type of investment corresponded to US$808,564 million and in 2019 it amounted to US$1,266,824 billion (CEIC 2020). The outcome of the investments by such foreign funds can be observed in data about confidence in Nigeria's private sector, which in 2017 corresponded to -2.6 and in 2018 reached 34.7 (Trading Economics 2020a). Such change in Nigeria's commercial perspective happens mainly due to investment in infrastructure and to safety in the commercial environment.

In view of this, in 2016 Nigeria hosted another 23 new technological centers, which promoted the success and professional growth of Nigerian youth in *startups* (Penresa 2019). As examples of this boost, there are now more young Nigerians in companies such as Google, Microsoft and Booking, due to opportunities created in Lagos (Penresa 2019). Notwithstanding, during the same year the American company General Electric (GE) funded Lagos Garage, aiming at forming a generation of entrepreneurs, through education focused on innovation, advanced manufacturing, and strategic

development (GE 2018), including courses on 3D printing, finance, *branding, marketing* and innovation. Besides, with the same objective the Nigerian cement company Dangote created a teaching institute, in order to enhance its employees' knowledge and abilities (Augusto and Gala 2020).

When talking about Nigeria's national *startups*, Interswitch, OPay, Andela, Palmpay (EMI 2020) and Mobihealth International must be cited. In 2019 such companies collected around US$663.24 million from Africa's investment fund (Wee Tracker 2019). So, currently Nigeria has the largest information technology and communication sector in the African continent, responding to more than 82% of Africa's telecommunications market (ITA 2020). In this sense, it directly influences the country's internal production in relation to its GDP, as in 2019 the IT sector was responsible for 14% of Nigerian GDP (ITA 2020). This promotion of industrialization and of technological sectors is evident in terms of Nigeria's industrial production. In 2010, the percentage of industrialization was stagnant at 0, in terms of growth, but in the period from August 2019 to January 2020, it reached a growth rate of 25.1% of total Nigerian production (Trading Economics 2020b). Furthermore, from 2002 to 2018 domestic production increased from 3 million to 45 million, in which 95% use local raw material. There was a significant decline in imports, which in 2002 represented 76.5% of national consumption and in 2018 amounted to only 3.5% (Augusto and Gala 2020).

In parallel, through global positioning in terms of sustainable development, the country started equally attracting investment for renewable energy. The World Bank approved US$3 billion in loans for the expansion of Nigeria's renewable energy system (Yakubu and Idowu 2019). Microsoft, via its initiative 4Afrika, has also initiated a partnership with *ICE Commercial Power*, a Nigerian company focused in renewable energy, especially solar energy for small and medium enterprises (Laba 2019).

The enlargement of commercial and political multilateralism in Nigeria's agenda

It is noteworthy that through *Nation Branding* incentives Nigeria has managed to overcome last decade's economic crises. The country has regained its aspiration of aligning with Pan-Africanism, with the goal of building a more diplomatic relationship with other African countries. This process started in Olusegun Obasanjo's (1999-2007) government and was enhanced during Goodluck Jonathan's (2010-2015) administration, for during the 1980s and 1990s Nigeria had focused on protectionism and isolationism (Oliveira 2014). Some examples of actions taken to improve Nigeria's

regional relations are: the countless diplomatic trips aimed at demonstrating friendliness (Senado Federal 2018), as well as the admission, in 2019, to the Africa Continental Free Trade Area[16] (Penresa 2019). In this scenario, this rapprochement occurs due to African renaissance[17], which has as its main focus the reduction of economic and political dependency of African countries towards the West. The goal of integration intensifies cultural links through an integration led by African companies. Thus, interdependence increases between African countries, generating greater stability in the balance of trade due to gains in scale (Diallo 2016, 243-263). The agreement guarantees the protection of some national products which are necessary for the country's subsidies, that is, it guarantees a healthy trade aimed at commercial stability. Hence, there is a reduction in dependency to the Great Power's incisive free trade. Furthermore, in the Africa Continental Free Trade Area, Nigeria has the greatest competitive power in terms of its industrialized products. Indeed, it has intensified its exports to South Africa, which increased by 126% from 2017 to 2018 (OEC 2018). This can be observed in the leadership role taken by the country in the Economic Community of West African States (1975), through which Nigeria granted financial support to other African countries, enlarging its consumer market (Diallo 2015). Besides, Nigeria has been a political leader in combatting racist regimes linked to neocolonialism[18] (Oliveira 2014).

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16 One of the greatest regional agreements since the African Union (2002). This agreement's goal is to create a single market of goods and services, as a consequence of the easing of the circulation of people. It seeks to integrate Africa economically and culturally through Pan-Africanism. Its specific objective is to gradually eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers, promote investment, intellectual property, a competition policy, among others (União Africana 2018).

17 The African Renaissance has four main phases, having started after decolonization due to an anti-West feeling. The African continent is united under a single objective: to reduce external dependency and to advocate for African trade and culture. In terms of its phases, we can highlight the following: the first one during independence, in 1960, then during the creation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963, at the end of the apartheid regime in 1990 and the last one during the creation of the African Union in 2002 (Diallo 2011, 93). It is important to point out that even though African independence is something new, African integration is considered one of the oldest projects of this type, as from its origins its objectives were the resistance to slavery, imperialism and Western colonial dominance. In the 1990s, another objective was added, that of economic, political and cultural development in times of globalization (Diallo 2016, 243-263).

18 Neocolonialism occurred in the 19th century after decolonization of former colonies. An imperialist cycle began, with former colonies, along with Europe, occupying mainly African and Asian territories, with the objective of exploring raw materials, looking for new consumer markets, cheap labour and political, economic and cultural dominance. This happened especially due to a moment of industrial revolution (Sauerbronn, et al. 2017).

In an extra-regional setting, due to Nigeria's growth, the country reached the position of 26th largest economy in the world, and Africa's greatest economy. During Goodluck Jonathan's (2010-2015) government, the Nigerian economy grew approximately 7% in terms of GDP (Oliveira 2014). It is important to highlight that in the international arena, then, Nigeria was able to recover its trustworthiness. Previously, from 2009 to 2011, due to a weakening of its ties to the United States because of the financial crisis, there had been a greater relationship with Eastern and Southeast Asian countries, as well as BRIC countries. In particular, with China and India, through imports[19] and exports, as Chinese interaction goes beyond *commodities*, encompassing the communication and infrastructure sectors as well. As with India, the relationship is especially intense due to energetic dependency (Brites, et al. 2012, 95-116). The country has expanded its competitiveness, in 2014, when it made new commercial partners in order to become a *Global Trader*, in contrast to the situation in 2008, when Nigeria depended significantly on a few commercial partners and couldn't expand its economic partners due to low industrialization.

Figure 2: Nigeria's main commercial partners (2008/2014/2018)

Parceiros comerciais: Nigéria

2008	2014	2018
Brasil, Índia, Espanha, EUA e França	Brasil, Índia, Espanha, EUA, França, Camarões, África do Sul, Portugal, Reino Unido, Itália, Alemanha, Turquia, Suécia, Países baixos, Costa do Marfim, China, Japão, Coreia do Norte, Indonésia, Rússia e Austrália	Brasil, Índia, Espanha, EUA, França, Camarões, África do Sul, Reino Unido, Itália, Alemanha, Turquia, Suécia, Países baixos, Costa do Marfim, China, Japão, Coreia do Norte, Indonésia, Rússia e Tailândia

Source: Author's, with data taken from Resource Trade Earth (2018).

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19 Chinese imports in Nigeria correspond to 27.5% of all imports (OEC 2018).

In terms of Nigerian participation in international organizations, it is currently a member of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization, and an observer in the Organization of American States, apart from its participation in the African Union. As seen above, the *Nation Branding* strategy, apart from its cultural feature, also enabled a reduction in Nigerian coloniality and dependence towards the West. Through the use of *Nation Branding* policies, Nigeria affirmed its sovereignty over its own history, and proved its economic and political potential. Subsequently, its commercial trustworthiness, industrial growth and attraction of foreign direct investment were restored, paving the way for tackling Dutch disease. This change in Nigerian politicians' mindset was directed to a rise in the number of technological *startups* headquartered in the country, with the objective of obtaining sophisticated production and taking *Made in Nigeria* to international trade. In short, Nigeria is on the path to strategic and sovereign repositioning in terms of its international decisions, especially through the African Renaissance and actions to combat the coloniality of power and stereotypes created by the West.

Conclusion

In summary, currently a great number of states which invest in *Nation Branding* are the ones that had previously opted for a more restrictive and oppressive policy, and are remembered for it, as are the cases of Nigeria and Germany. However, it is important to understand that such incisive policies were perpetuated by central powers in international relations, who were favoured by other countries' underdevelopment, thus gaining control over them. Therefore, *Nation Branding* is used as a form of *Soft Power*, in order to influence universal perception over Nigeria's image. Furthermore, a reconstruction of the International State System is fundamental, in order to give more space to African countries. In view of this, Nigeria created a propaganda about the country's magnitude, and restructured its business environment so that *rebranding* would be a consequence of its industrialization programs, since the industrial sector is the economy's productive school (Gala 2020). These changes generated results in Nigeria's commercial insertion due to an improvement in its economic competitiveness, its consumer market's purchasing power and its environment for business.

That said, *Nation Branding* helped Nigeria's unification, through a decrease in ethnic-cultural disagreements between North and South[20], which had been active since the Biafra War. Hence, it enabled the Pan-African discourse to resume. Unity is a primordial part of identity reconstruction, as better domestic conditions reflect on international decisions. Furthermore, stakeholders acquire a more active voice after recognizing that they have a common goal, that of repositioning Nigeria in the International State System. Lastly, a more unified domestic structure results in the country's strengthening and in the recovery of its own essence. Besides, it helps modify the construction of ideas in the International State System, due to the fact that ideas construct images projected in the world, which will finally affect decisions and political results (Wendt 1999). As Nigerian representation in the decision-making process is clear now, with the Nigerian Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala running for the position of WTO leader, as she could be the first woman and the first African to preside over the WTO. Ngozi has been breaking epistemological barriers for many years, as she was the first woman to be a Minister of Finance and Foreign Relations in Nigeria, was director of operations for the World Bank for 25 years and a member of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (Migliacci 2020).

Furthermore, Nigeria recognized in *Nation Branding* the opportunity to strengthen its industrial sector, national human capital, and production diversification. In view of this, the country regains power over its own natural riches, as the year 2020 was seen as the year of growth in natural gas production in Nigeria (Penresa 2020). Moreover, it is important to highlight that *Nation Branding* allows for policies that go beyond cultural and mediatic limits. One of the main factors for the failure of the "*The Heart of Africa*" program was its shallow vision in terms of concept, as the *branding* policies were considered only in terms of the country's cultural and geographic appraisal. There is the necessity to understand *Nation Branding* as a set of policies aimed at areas such as: economic and financial programs; technological innovation; cultural appraisal; infrastructure and safety in the commercial environment. So, the result of this set of actions has created a favorable and attractive

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20 This can be observed currently, in October 2020, in the union of all different peoples of Nigeria towards the same goal, the end of political violence by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS). There is a request for a military reform and for the end of SARS, as well as a written law about the political agreement between Northern and Southern regions of the country, in order to obtain an inclusive government for all tribes and with 50% of the government occupied by young people, aiming at structural change (Ogunyinka 2020). Finally, through a unified domestic structure, president Buhari has signed a New Police Act, in September 2020, reviewing laws and police brutality as well as demanding for the immediate dissolution of SARS (Olaniyi 2020).

environment for business, a genuine image of the country and not simply a manipulated propaganda of a product, which doesn't correspond to reality. In each day, Nigeria frees itself further and further from the ties imposed by the Great Powers and proves the country's technological advancement. In economic settings with a high level of violence, investors prefer to keep their investment, or prefer to invest in programs that have a short cycle and can be easily undone (Wafure and Nurudeen 2010). However, with public investment in infrastructure due to *Nation Branding* (ports, energy, roads, and aviation) (Penresa 2020) there is a strengthening of logistics, production and distribution, so as to create an attractive environment for private investment (Wafure and Nurudeen 2010).

Lastly, in 2020, with the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been an increase in the role of technology in the globalized world. Consequently, it is possible to predict the indispensability of productive diversification in any country. Hence, investment in *Nation Branding* has put Nigeria in a good position for a digital revolution, having prepared it to survive and compete in the international market when many countries have lost their competitiveness. Nigeria has the possibility of showing the potential of *Made in Nigeria* and its *startups*. This, along with the programs mentioned in the second section, has helped people obtain the means to safely prevent COVID-19, as Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, has had 60.834 cases and 1.116 deaths, very small numbers if compared to other populous countries (NCDC 2020). In conclusion, it is necessary to cease being based just on Eurocentric authors, who obfuscate Africa's protagonism as a propagator of knowledge on education, culture, and innovation. There are people and authors who live in a kind of Plato's allegory of the cave. Especially because the constructions of norms form the political system and norms are interpreted in an epistemic way (Adler 1999), in an environment where epistemicide[21] of African voices prevails.

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21 Trying to silence non-hegemonic knowledge of subjugated peoples. "Epistemicide wounds to death the subjugated person's rationality, or kidnaps it, maiming its capacity to learn" (Carneiro 2005, 97).

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ABSTRACT

This research aims to analyze how Nigeria has been using *Nation Branding* in order to reconstruct its image and reorient its policies, especially in the aftermath of 2008 and in terms of its participation in the international commercial market. The analysis takes an explanatory focus through a critical historic perspective, using Wendt's Constructivism and the theory about power and the creation of ideas. In a complementary way, we propose a dialog between Constructivism and Decolonial Theory, as norms and ideas constructed by the great powers perpetuate a colonial structure of power. That said, the question that guides the article is: in which way does the use of *Nation Branding* in Nigeria, from 2009 to 2019, impact the country's international position? Our hypothesis is that, through the implementation of *Nation Branding*, with policies beyond tourism, there has been consequently an improvement in human capital and in the country's economic independence, as well as a digital revolution boosted by Nigerian *startups*. Finally, the article uses quantitative and qualitative research made by Nigerian authors in order to show an African perspective of history, as well as to contribute to overcoming stereotypes deeply rooted in our society.

KEYWORDS:

COLONIAL RULE IN NIGERIA: THE AUCHI KINGDOM ENCOUNTER WITH THE BRITISH COLONIALISTS AND THE IMPACTS

Yakubu Suleiman[1]

Introduction

The closing years of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century witnessed the establishment of the British colonial rule in Nigeria. There is no gainsaying that the colonization of Nigeria by the British was not an easy task. The British encountered a lot of opposition or resistance from many ethnic groups or polities, while some willingly welcomed the British. The conquest and subjugation of the major ethnic groups or polities has been a common trend with most African historians. But little attention has been given to the minority or small groups like the Auchi Kingdom, in the present day Edo state, Nigeria. In the southern part of Nigeria, great attention has been given to the Benin Kingdom, while little attention has been given to Etsako land, where the Auchi Kingdom is located (Egbefo 2015, 1).

Attention will be focused on the political, socio-economic consequences of colonial rule in the Auchi Kingdom and the significance of these after Nigeria gained independence in 1960. Colonial rule left behind a trail of development which had serious implications on the evolutionary development of the Auchi Kingdom into a modern Kingdom. This article is, therefore, aimed at explaining the impact of the innovations of the British on the Auchi Kingdom despite their interior motives and how these innovations impacted on the lives of the people even after the independence of Nigeria in 1960.

1   Department of Historical Sciences, University of Pardubice. Pardubice, Czech Republic. E-mail: susukhaldun@yahoo.com. ORCID: 0000-0002-9184-6460

Conceptualizing colonialism and imperialism

Colonialism and imperialism are two concepts that are very similar, but Colonialism is when one country physically exerts complete control over another country and Imperialism is a formal or informal economic and political domination of one country over the other. In a nutshell, colonialism can be thought of as the practice of domination and imperialism as an idea behind the practice. The concept of Colonialism in Africa has a pretty long history; a history that spanned many centuries and phases. In the light of this consideration, the most famous history as far as colonialism is concerned is the European colonization of Africa, which took place between the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Boardman 1973, 114). The African continent was segmented into spheres of influence and colonies of the European powers for the sole purpose of exploitation, subjugation and domination. While the Africans themselves became slaves to the European invaders, the Europeans became masters of the continent and owners of virtually everything in Africa that was of any value (Ozumba and John 2013, 50-51).

Various schools have written on this forceful subjugation, exploitation and domination of Africa. It was during this period that the reins of exalted traditional government and institution were compulsively seized from African bona fide rulers by the European colonialists who became self-appointed masters. Africans who dared to resist the European infiltration and inhumanity were ruthlessly dealt with. That is to say that some rulers and outstanding African personalities were deposed and exiled or in many cases killed (Mbiti 1969, 128). Having overpowered African nations through their sophisticated weapons, the colonialists moved into the second stage of their ambition, namely: humiliation – to divide, rule and exploit the Africans to the maximum. It is on record that this process of humiliation started with the undermining of African cultures and values. And all these set the pace for the underdevelopment of the continent. Rodney (1972, 52-82) indicates that the African civilization, culture, beliefs and values were trodden under the feet. For these European invaders to effectively realize their objectives, they had to establish themselves firmly on the continent of Africa by introducing and imposing on Africans their religious, political, economic, social, linguistic and administrative systems, thereby upstaging the hitherto familiar, noble and enviable African institutions.

The concept of Imperialism, on the other hand according to Merriam-Webster (1828), refers to "the policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and domination of a nation especially by direct territorial acquisitions

or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas" (Merriam-Webster Dictionary 1828). Reill and Wilson (2004) further defined imperialism as "the political, cultural and economic domination of other countries by a nation, achieved through military or other means" (Reill and Wilson 2004, 294). It denotes the domination by one country or people over others (Lenin 1999, 8). Even though it has largely been defined by its political and economic interests, imperialism had a civilizational component, which did not simply focus on the acquisition of territories, but the transformation of cultural and religious norms as well (Corrie 2007, 62; Porter 2004, 316; Gorringe 2004, 188). Scholars like Oduro, Pretorius, Nussbaum and Born (2008, 37) maintain that colonialism was driven by the "three Cs" – Christianity, Commerce and Civilization. The main idea behind these "Cs" was that all three should go together and promote each other: Christianity must prepare the way for commerce so that Western civilization can replace the African culture, that is, the African 'lack of civilization' (Oduro *et al.* 2008, 37).

The important thing to note here, perhaps, is that during this colonial period in Africa, some Africans went abroad and studied political science, history, philosophy, law, etc which were tilted towards one direction, namely: the purported "divine" superiority of the whites over the blacks. But these Africans consciously refused to imbibe this kind of dubious intellectual indoctrination and innuendo that they were exposed to. Hence, they all gave different interpretations and considerations to the things they were taught. The point here is that colonialism and imperialism had great significance on Africa: It left a lasting legacy on the African mode of thought, development and civilization.

Methodology

This article is anchored to the discipline of history. It is worthy to note that oral sources are very important in the reconstruction of African history. Without oral sources, there is no African history. The field work of this article was carried out in various cities in Nigeria. It was really difficult to reach out to the participants to conduct interviews because of the current trend of things and the pandemic situation. The research combines ethnographic and historical designs by using different research techniques such as semi structured, structured and unstructured interviews. Moreover, all the participants participated willingly. Basic demographic information such as age, religion, marital status, occupation, *etc* were collected from the par-

ticipants. During the research, we[2] carried out ten interviews with different respondents. The oral testimonies of these people were very helpful and have gone a long way to prove that the Auchi Kingdom was directly under British colonial rule from 1897 to 1960, a period of sixty-three years, when Nigeria gained independence.

Both primary and secondary sources were consulted for the writing of this article. The books that were consulted were very helpful in this regard. This was done in order to have a balanced view of the history of the Auchi Kingdom which provided credibility in its history. Also, during the course of the interview I decided to analyze not only personal narratives but also the attitude, age, behavior and also mindset of all the people interviewed in order to identify discrepancies in their narratives.

Auchi Kingdom before the arrival of the British Colonial Masters

Auchi is located on latitude 70 north of the Equator and longitude 6.250 east of the Greenwich Meridian. The town is surrounded by a number of Etsako villages and it shares boundary with South Ibie on the East; on the North–East by Jattu; on the North by Ayua, Iyuku and Imehke; on the North-West by Ikpeshi and Ihievbe Ogben; on the South by Era and Ayuele-Ugioli (Sule 2021). The topography of Auchi is hilly with valleys and flat plains (Momodu 1987, 3). Auchi town is made up of five traditional villages named after the five children of Uchi, the founder of Auchi (Aruna 2006, 1). The villages are Utsogu, Akpekpe, Aibotse, Igbhei and Iyekhei. Utsogu is the royal quarter from which the Otaru (King) of Auchi is customarily chosen and enthroned right from the Era of Ikelebe I, in the middle of the nineteenth century (Oseni 1998, 28).

Auchi is one of the fastest developing urban centers in Edo State. It has an estimated population of about 150,000 people (Auchi, wikipedia). The booming commercial activity in the town started long ago. The town was a center for slave trading during the trans-sahara slave trade (Dawood 2020). This equally accounts for the administrative character of the town, as the British colonial government in Nigeria made Auchi the headquarters of local

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2   The interviews in Auchi were carried out with the assistance of a close friend, Edagese Alex. We attended the same University in Nigeria.

administration for the Etsako land after the abolition of slave trade.[3] Since that time, Auchi has continued to be the headquarters of local of Edo North Senatorial District; the Headquarters of Edo North Police Area Command and of Etsako West Local Government Area; the headquarters for Muslims and center of Islamic learning in Edo State, Nigeria (Seghosime 2006, 2).

Several accounts abound as to the founding of the Auchi Kingdom, but one interesting thing about these accounts is that they are all related in the description they gave about the origin of the town. The town was named after a man called Uchi, who migrated from Udo in the Benin Kingdom about the 14th century before the reign of Oba Ewuare of the Benin Kingdom (Oseni 1998, 61). Another source put it that Auchi is a contraction of the name Evbo-Uchi, meaning "the settlement founded by Uchi" which is the Bini name for 'Usi', meaning "fame", which is associated with nobility in the normal course of native life.[4] Accordingly, Uchi and his family migrated from Benin and settled in the Guinea Savannah belt of the Etsako land. Uchi left Benin because of the harsh policies of the ruling Oba, incessant wars, intimidation and dehumanization prevalent in the Benin Kingdom which he could not bear (Aruna 2006, 1).

This emigration from Benin took place in the fifteenth century. After a very long trek and search for a suitable place to settle, Uchi and his followers settled at a place about 130 kilometers away from the Benin Kingdom on the top of a hill, just behind the present-day Guarantee Trust Bank (Garba 2021). A market developed in and around the location that Uchi and his followers settled. The market is known as "Aku-Uchi" (Uchi Market). The market is still in existence and remains the biggest market in Auchi. Over the years

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3   The Auchi Kingdom is known to have experienced growth and development since the 20th century. This is evident in population growth and trading activities. The Auchi Kingdom is also the administrative headquarters of the local council area. It is also the headquarters of all the religious bodies of the area. The Kingdom has five villages which are overseen by chiefs who report to the King of the Kingdom. The villages also are made up of numerous kindreds which are overseen by lesser chiefs who report to the chiefs of the villages. The royal family is from a particular village/quarter known as Utsogu. The king is always chosen from the royal family and the Utsogu quarters. The ascendency to the throne is not hereditary. Any male adult can be chosen from the royal family. See Oseni 1998.

4   There are many versions of the origin of the Auchi Kingdom but the one stated above is the most popular. More information on the origin of the Auchi Kingdom could be sourced from oral sources. The most common source for the reconstruction of African history is oral tradition. The historic incidence of Uchi fleeing from the Benin Kingdom was during a period of chaos, wars and crisis known as "Igodomigodo" in the Bini language. Most kingdoms and settlements in Africa before the 18th century were products of migration as a result of wars, crisis etc. These are major towns and villages that surround the Auchi Kingdom. The Kingdom is known for its central and strategic location. See Aruna 2006.

after the demise of Uchi, he was deified and a shrine was built on his original abode at Uchi Market. Worshipers of the Uchi deity went to the Uchi shrine with native chalk and salt and made requests, believing strongly in the potency (Charity 2021). The shrine was eventually destroyed and uprooted in an upsurge of the spread of the Islamic religion in the early 20th century (Ornoruan 1986, 48).

The arrival of the British Colonial Masters to the Auchi Kingdom

The Europeans encroached into Africa as slave traders from the 15th century until the era of colonialism. After the exploitation of Africa through slavery for roughly four hundred years, it was replaced with exploitation through colonialism. Hence, though Europeans ended slave trade, but their interest in Africa remained intact. The Industrial Revolution which started in Britain in the eighteenth century and subsequently in other parts of the world had played a pivotal role in the termination of slave trade and beginning of colonialism. The industrial revolution in Europe accelerated production and this increased the demand for more raw materials and markets. This, in turn, again turned the face of Europeans to Africa to supply both raw materials and new markets for their surplus products. Therefore, colonialism came out of the need of European countries to have direct political control over their colonies so as to ensure the protection of their economic interests (Endalcachew 2015, 23).

The exploitative nature of the colonial economy ensured that very little sustainable development occurred during the colonial period. Neither the profit-mongering European firms nor the stingy colonial government were willing to invest in the long-term development of Nigeria in the period before the Second World War. European firms took their profits back to Europe, enriching shareholders at the expense of exploited Nigerian labor. Because so much of the wealth of Nigeria was being extracted for European profits, very few Nigerians earned enough to invest in local development projects of their own (Falola and Heaton 2008, 121).

As the main objective of European countries was to satisfy their economic interest, each of them competed to get the biggest and the richest colonies. Consequently, to avoid intra-European war, the colonialists held a conference in Berlin in 1884-1885, aiming for a peaceful partitioning of Africa (Thomson 2010, 25). The scramble for Africa at the aforementioned

conference and other succeeding formations of many small countries in Africa was based on pure imperialist intentions and a voracious quest for wealth (Baah 2003, 1). This resulted in arbitrary division of its people without taking into account social cohesion which had kept Africans together for a long period of time.[5] Africans were not consulted, rather, they were blindly divided to satisfy the selfish interest of the imperialists. Hence, colonialism was primarily intended to exploit the continent and send back profits to the imperialists' home country (Rodney 1973, 231).

It must be said at the Juncture that the Nupe people, who had firm control over the Auchi Kingdom, was a threat to the imperial moves by the British to take over the Auchi Kingdom at the tail end of the eighteenth century (Audu 2020). The British felt that there was a great need to dislodge the Nupe to gain control over the Auchi Kingdom because of its strategic location. The Royal Niger Company was established by the British in 1886 and was instrumental in the formation of Colonial Nigeria, as it enabled the British colonialists to establish control over Nigeria for trading relations and administrative purposes (Shaibu 2021).

Sir George Tubman Goldie, who established the Royal Niger Company, epitomized the spirit of the new era of mercantilism and Social Darwinism that was sweeping across West Africa during the global depression. He amalgamated British firms trading on the Lower Niger in 1879, forming the United African Company (UAC). The monopolistic policies of the UAC, however, impoverished the local palm produce traders, who began to pillage its factories. The UAC then appealed to the Consular Office for military intervention to protect the lives and property of British firms trading on the Niger. Goldie reorganized the UAC and changed its name in 1882 to the National African Company (NAC) due to the intrusions of the French on the Niger and in Dahomey and the Germans in Cameroons. He then used his company to undermine the commercial interests of rival foreign firms, undercutting their sales by 24 percent. Goldie further changed the name of the NAC to the Royal Niger Company (RNC) and applied to the British government for

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5   This is basically a description of the exploitative tendencies and intentions of the Europeans in Africa The European's intentions and actions were basically profit oriented and this further impoverished the Africans, making them unable to invest in their various communities and this clearly shows that the Europeans used Africa as a place to get all the resources and raw materials that they needed. See (Falola and Heaton 2008).

a royal charter that would enable him to administer the Niger region.[6] The charter was granted in 1886, and he used the RNC to establish a paramilitary commercial empire on the Niger and the coastal communities (Oriji 2011, 156).

The Royal Niger Company under the control of Sir George Tubman Goldie ordered his military forces to attack the Nupe Kingdom at Bida, which had emerged as the most powerful Kingdom in the area during that period. It was this military expedition against Bida that led to the withdrawal of all the Nupe soldiers and their war commandants from the Auchi Kingdom and Etsako land as a whole in 1897. These troops, like those that were similarly withdrawn from other parts of Nigeria at that time, were to increase the numerical strength of the army in Bida to enable it to put a strong defense against the army of the Royal Niger Company in 1897. Despite the strong resistance put up against the British, their Kingdom collapsed due to superior weapons. The British then assumed political administration over the Nupe Kingdom in 1897. It is very important to note that the withdrawal of the Nupe troops from the Auchi Kingdom and other communities enabled not just the fall of Bida but also the incursion of the British into the Auchi Kingdom and other communities in 1897.[7]

It must be noted that there are two logical reasons why British occupation of Auchi and other parts of Afenrnai land was conveniently done without resistance from the people. One was the fear envisaged in the consequence of going into military warfare with a more militarily superior power than even their former conqueror, the Nupe. The second, and perhaps much more important reason, was the desire to see to the end of giving out their kinsmen and children as slaves, which had been the main pastime of the Bida government in the area. Thus, in spite of the position which Auchi was already placed during the period of Nupe colonial rule, the coming of the British colonialists was still welcomed as a veritable step to save the people from the yoke of the oppressive Nupe rule.

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6   Europeans have looked for territories to exercise their military might and dominance over and Africa was the most ideal location. This explains how Europe underdeveloped Africa to develop Europe. See Walter Rodney's book for more information. Also see The Royal Niger Company on wikipedia.

7   The British strategy was to attack and conquer the Nupe Kingdom, the homeland of the Nupe people. The British succeeded in doing so in 1897 and this resulted in the establishment of firm imperial rule over the Auchi Kingdom. The year 1897 is very significant in Nigerian history because Britain used their military might to conquer major kingdoms in 1897. Some of these Kingdoms include the Nupe, Benin, Opopo etc.

The result of this therefore was that by the tail end of 1904, the then Otaru of Auchi, Ikharo Ikelebe, in consultation with his Council of Chiefs, signed the British protection treaty in formal recognition of British colonial rule.[8] Although it has not been found easy to interpret the full nature of the treaty signed by Otaru Ikharo with the British colonizers, the fact remains that almost all the treaties signed by the British with African rulers were done within the same understanding of the central framework. That is the fact that the contents were hardly understood by African rulers who never realized that they were only signing away their sovereignty through persuasion. But as earlier opined, Otaru Ikharo and members of his council may have foreseen much satisfaction with British protection than giving out their kinsmen and children for slavery to the Bida authorities. Thus, the signing of the British protection treaty by Otaru Ikharo in 1904 consequently led to the dismissal of Bida representatives, Azenis, from Auchi and the formal establishment of British colonial rule in the Kingdom with Idah as its administrative head-quarters (Omoruan 1986, 1970).

The positive impact of British colonial rule on the Auchi Kingdom

There are many legacies created and left behind by the British colonial masters that are still very much in existence till the present day. Firstly, the creation of the Auchi Kingdom as the administrative headquarters in Etsako land was done by the British in 1920. The collapse of the Nupe Empire in 1897 led to the emergence of British colonial rule and administration in all the areas that the Nupe had a strong hold. In January 1900, the British pro-claimed the Northern and Southern Protectorate. These Protectorates were ruled separately and independently by the British colonial administrators. Under this arrangement the Auchi Kingdom, under Etsako land, was part

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8   Britain was ready to remove all obstacles that were on the way from preventing them from establishing imperial control over the Auchi Kingdom and Nigeria as a whole. This made Tubman Goldie to establish and attach a military outfit attached to the Royal Niger Company. This was to ensure that resistant regions were conquered and to firm imperial control was established in such regions. This implies that the British did not want just trad-ing relations, but also wanted firm imperial control over the Auchi Kingdom and beyond. See The Royal Niger Company on wikipedia.

of the Northern Protectorate and was ruled from Idah, a town located across the River Niger.[9]

The British penetration of Etsako land of which Auchi was to become its headquarters started in 1904, seven years after the defeat of the Emirate of Bida. This date marked the time British imperial patrols moved from their Idah station, then in southern provinces of Nigeria but now part of the present day Kogi state, to Etsako land. When the British arrived at Etsako land, they found the people to be very friendly and accommodating. Etsako land was carved out of Esan District as a separate District.

The British discovered that Ubiaja was too far from Etsako land, so the administrative district was moved to Iddo-Okpella, a town on the far northern part of Etsako land, in that same year, 1904. However, the British did not find the place too suitable for their headquarters. In 1916, the administrative headquarters was relocated to Fugar, a town on the eastern part of Etsako land. The British, still not satisfied after two years in Fugar, began to search for an ideal location for the siting of their administrative district. Two sites were proposed, Auchi and Ayua, the last is a town located a few kilometers away from Auchi. Auchi was eventually chosen as the new headquarters because of its strategic geographical location at the heart of Etsako land. In 1920, the District administrative office was moved to Auchi and Major C. M. Dunn became the first District Officer.[10]

The second important thing to note here is that the establishment of British colonial rule in Auchi brought about the introduction of new administrative policies, which like those of the former Nupe overlord and were totally alien to the people. One of such administrative policies was the Indirect Rule system of government which the British colonialists found suitable in this regard. It should be noted that, contrary to what has been shared by some people, the Indirect Rule system was not evolved by the British in recognition of African values but was intended to prefer a solution to inadequate availability of funds and British officials who had been scared by the West

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9   The proclamation of the Southern and Northern protectorate and later amalgamation was to aid a more effective administrative control over the two regions with a lesser cost of running the government and the people were not even consulted. This was done to make administration less expensive and easier to carry out due to selfish reasons. See (Adewumi and Egwurube 1985).

10 The search for the most ideal location for siting of the headquarters was necessary for them to ensure that an effective administrative system was established. The Auchi Kingdom was chosen because of its central and strategic location. The indirect rule system was intended to cut the cost of administration and save the limited resources. See (Momoh 2016).

African hot weather and mosquitoes. Hence the use of the term "white man's burden" to describe the hot region.

Thirdly, there was the creation of a modern official building complex, official staff quarters and a modern prison by Major C. M. Dunn. This was the first time that such had even happened in the Auchi Kingdom. Prior to that time there were no such buildings in the whole of the Auchi Kingdom. All these were done during the time of Major C. M. Dunn, as District officer between 1920 and 1921. It may be interesting to note that most of these buildings are still standing till today. Some of them that are still in use have been modified to meet up with the recent standards while others are preserved as historical sites for tourist attraction (Momoh 2016, 113).

Fourthly, the British introduced Western Education in the Auchi Kingdom. After the exit of Major C. M. Dunn in 1921 as District officer, his replacement was an Oxford University trained Lawyer called Barrister Archer. It was Archer's challenge to develop his District educationally and otherwise. The District office was in need of clerks, interpreters and tax collectors and there was no one in Auchi to carry out these roles. He ended up looking for people at Agbede, Okpella and other towns for urgent recruitment. He, accordingly, proceeded to the establishment of the popular Government School in the Auchi Kingdom in 1922. This was the first school to be established in the Auchi Kingdom, which marked the beginning of Western Education in the Auchi Kingdom and then other schools both Primary and Secondary were established in later years.

Again, Barrister Archer embarked on the creation of a network of roads to link up other towns and villages with the District headquarters in the Auchi Kingdom. The Auchi-Ikpeshi road that was started by D. H. Momoh, the then Otaru of Auchi, in 1919 was taken over by Barrister Archer and extended to Igarra, a town located towards the boundary of the Afemai land in 1923. Archer also embarked on the construction of a road to Agenebode through South Ibie, Ekperi. Another road was constructed to link Sabongida Ora through Warrake, Ihievbe and Afuze-Emai. It must be said that many of these roads are still used till the present day.[11]

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11 The period when the new official building complex was built, it was regarded as a modern building because there was no building of such at that time. The building is still standing till date. I have visited the building a few times. The establishment of schools in the Auchi Kingdom was a significant event and many people benefited from it. The main reason was to train people that would be used to run the activities and affairs of the District. The establishment of a network of roads within the District was to have easy access to interior villages from the Auchi Kingdom in order to make tax collection easier and to make trading more convenient. See Denton report (1936).

Furthermore, the Trans-Atlantic slave trade was abolished in the early nineteenth century, but domestic slavery continued. Before the arrival of the Europeans, the Nupe that had established a hegemony over the Auchi Kingdom continued with the practice of slavery and slave trade but the British put an end to this practice when they arrived. In 1900, the colonial administration ended the practice of slavery and slave trade within the Auchi Kingdom and beyond, because they believed it was an evil practice and had outlived its essence. This was indeed one of the greatest and most enduring legacies of the British in the Auchi Kingdom and Etsako land (Denton 1936).

Additionally, in 1921 the colonial administration abolished the practice of trial by ordeal. Archer, the then District officer, was faced with the problem of people being accused of witchcraft, because at that time the people of the Auchi Kingdom had a strong belief in witchcraft and sorcery and this blurred their sense of reasoning. It arose from the ignorance and superstition of the people and it thrived on their poverty. People that were accused of witchcraft were forcefully brought before a shrine where the juju priest administers forces the person to drink a concoction known as "Osaki" which was a poisonous mixture extracted from the bark of trees (Binta 2021). This was boiled with other fetish items and herbs for several days in a clay pot. The poisonous concoction is then administered on the helpless victim. A victim who had a strong immune system survived it and was declared not to be a witch but a victim with a weak immune system who died of the poison was declared a witch. The family of the deceased mourned their loss and continued to live in shame because one of their family members was tagged a witch.[12]

Lastly, in order to achieve justice and fairness, native courts were set up all over the District. These native courts were manned by chiefs who were believed to be men of integrity. The native courts were not given the jurisdiction to hear and determine serious and criminal offenses like arson and murder. Essentially, their civil jurisdiction was restricted to cases related to marital issues, inheritance and minor chieftaincy issues. Serious criminal cases like murder, for example, could only be tried by the superior court based at Idah. The administration of justice in colonial days was short and swift. There was little or no room for tedious legal technicalities. As soon as the facts were carefully and honestly ascertained, the law in its raw form was coldly applied (Omo-Ananigie 1936, 98).

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12 See Momoh (2016) for more details.

Conclusion

The situation the British found in the Auchi Kingdom was that of a society still undergoing changes as a result of the Nupe presence. The Nupe, in the wake of their intrusion, introduced novel principles and ideas, to which the people were still getting accustomed to when the British arrived. The origins of some of the characteristic traits of present-day Auchi Kingdom can be traced to this period. In assessing the extent to which the British contact affected the people of the Auchi Kingdom socially, politically, culturally and otherwise, it is important to note that by 1897 when the Nupe no longer had control over the Auchi Kingdom, their administrative innovations persisted. The British colonialists rather built on these administrative innovations to rule over the people successfully. There were some bad practices that were abolished among which includes trial by ordeal and slave trade. There was also the introduction of Western Education and a new means of administering justice. Since colonial rule did not result in the total obliteration of the indigenous practices of the Auchi people, their present-day society still exhibits many of those traits acquired as a result of the Nupe contacts of the late nineteenth century. It must be said at this junction that despite the exploitative tendency of the British they still impacted positively on the Auchi Kingdom.

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ABSTRACT

The British conquest of parts of Africa in the nineteenth century has attracted a lot of studies. Yet, all scholars involved hold different views, especially as to the role of the indigenous African groups in it. There are those who opine that the Africans who resisted the British were patriotic in spite of the futility of their actions, and the Africans who supported the British are portrayed as collaborators or saboteurs that facilitated imperialism. Other scholars are of the opinion that those who took sides with the British were not necessarily collaborators or unpatriotic elements, but that they merely reacted to the circumstances of the time. The incursion of the British to the Auchi Kingdom was part of their general conquest and occupation of Nigeria which was sequel to the collapse of the Nupe imperial control of the Auchi Kingdom in 1897. This was a deliberate act by which the British sought to guarantee their interest in the South West of the Niger. The intention of this paper therefore is to examine the British colonial rule in the Auchi Kingdom. Attention would be paid to the impact of the British colonial rule in the Auchi Kingdom amidst their exploitative intentions. The paper adopts both primary and secondary sources in its analysis. The paper then concludes that despite the exploitative intentions of the British, they still impacted positively on the Auchi Kingdom, unlike the Nupe that enslaved the Auchi people. As the saying goes "Every cloud has a silver lining".

KEYWORDS:

Colonialism. Imperialism. Innovations. Kingdom. British.

EXCHANGE OVER TROUBLED WATERS: THE ANIOMA AND THE WAR-TIME TRADE WITH BIAFRA, 1967–1970

Odigwe A. Nwaokocha[1]

Introduction

The Nigeria-Biafra war was fought between the secessionist state of Biafra and Nigeria between 1967 and 1970. It witnessed intense struggles between the two contending parties to gain victory. Biafra struggled against many odds to survive not just militarily. This included the attempt by the Nigerian Federal Military Government to economically strangulate her, by stiffly enforcing a blockade that denied her of all goods, including food, necessary for her survival. The federal aim was to force her into surrendering and abandoning her proclaimed status as a state. Reacting to the exigency of the time, Biafra looked west and traded with the Anioma people in a way that enabled her to procure needed items. This prolonged the war with her Nigerian foe and elongated her survival. Many works exist on the Nigeria-Biafra war (Achuzia 1986; Akpan 1976; Alabi-Isama 2013; Anwunah 2007; de St. Jorre 1972; Madiebo 1980; Obasanjo 1980; Ogbemudia 1991; Okocha 1994; Okocha 2012; Tamuno and Ukpabi 1989; Uchendu 2007). One was authored by a top civil servant; five by ex-soldiers; two by a journalist and two by professional historians. They said very little on the war-time economy and trade on both sides of the divide. However, a few works focused on the economies of both sides during the war (Aboyade and Ayida 1971, 15-37; Adisa 1984, 93-104; Nafziger 1972, 223-245; Ogbudimkpa 1985; Okigbo 1989, 201-212). None of these works discussed the cross-border trade between the Anioma people and Biafra during the war. Gloria Chuku (2002, 216-228) and Egodi Uchendu (2007, 135-145) have, however, discussed aspects of the

1   Department of History and International Studies, University of Benin. Benin, Nigeria. E-mail: odigwenwaokocha@gmail.com. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3947-070X.

trans-border trade between Biafra and the Anioma. Both were restricted to the role of women in the trade. This work attempts a general examination of the trade, as it concerned the Anioma people.

It is important to point out that the old Eastern Region that seceded to form the Republic of Biafra was dominated by the Igbo ethnic group. However, a subset of the Igbo group – the Anioma – lived in a part of the Midwest Region and were not geographically part of Biafra. Many of them, however, felt culturally and historically affiliated to Biafra and so shared in the dream of Biafra and actively supported the idea. Some Anioma people were killed in the pre-war killings targeted at the Igbo in the Northern and Western regions of Nigeria that led to the separatist thinking that produced the secession and eventually, war (Agunyai 2005, Interview). Some Anioma military men (formerly of the Nigerian armed forces) crossed over to the Biafran side and fought for Biafra against Nigeria during the war (Nwa-okocha 2019, 103-119). Another aspect of their support for Biafra was that Anioma communities on the western bank of the River Niger played a key role in the economic relationship between Aniomaland and Biafra during the Nigeria-Biafra war. Starting from Ebu and Illah in the north down to the Asaba-Ase and Onyaa area to the south of Aboh, the economic survival of Biafra partially rested in the hands of a section of Aniomaland. Some other Anioma people living upland were also involved in the economic sustenance of Biafra. This was done through trade with Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. Essentially, the trade involved the movement of goods in a one-way traffic from Anioma communities on the Nigerian side across the Niger to Biafra in the east. It was a huge trade with very many dimensions. Unfortunately, the general outline of the phenomenon; the nature of the trade; the reason for it as well as its implications and meaning for Biafra, Nigeria and the Anioma people, has escaped the attention of most scholarly discourses. It is almost an uncharted territory. As shown earlier, some works have highlighted aspects of the trade. However, they are too restricted by the choice of women traders alone, and the exclusion of their male counterparts, as a tool of analysis. In delving into this field, this work hopes to add something new to our under-standing of the Nigerian civil war. The trade attempted to undermine the federal blockade against Biafra and so was prohibited on Nigerian soil. It was, however, encouraged in Biafra for whom it was an aspect of continued defiance of federal authority and a vote for national survival. One of the major things about the trade is that, amongst other things, it helped to shore up the Biafran economy and prolonged the survival of Biafra.

Due to the nature of the work, this study employs oral data alongside other sources. This includes interviews focused on various facets of the trade

in question. Oral data was obtained from interviews with nine informants between 2008 and 2012. At the time of interview, they were aged between 56 and 76. One informant lacked primary education. Six of the informants had secondary education, while three had post-secondary education. Three were retired public servants; three were retired head teachers; two were businessmen; one was a community leader and two were traders. Two of them were women. All the informants were resident in Aniomaland during the war. All are of Anioma ancestry. Interviews were conducted in the local Igbo language and English, recorded and later transcribed.

Locating Aniomaland and its People

It is important to note that the Nigerian civil war was essentially between the Igbo ethnic group and the rest of Nigeria. Most of the Igbo in Nigeria live in the former Eastern Region, which seceded to form the Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967. An Igbo sub-group lives outside the former Eastern Region in the previous Mid-West. They are referred to as the Anioma and the area they occupy is called Aniomaland. The two groups are separated from each other by the Niger River. The Anioma tag for the Igbo group on the western bank of the Niger has not always been used for them and the land they occupy. The name has a history of its own. In fact, it is a new term said to have been deployed for the first time to refer to the people and their land around 1976 (Okocha 1994, xv).

The area known as Aniomaland lies in the middle reaches of the lower Niger River's western bank in Nigeria. It stretches from Onyaa axis in the south to Ebu in the north of the Niger Valley. Further upland and away from the Niger Valley but still on the same axis, the Anioma territory goes as far as the village of Anioma in Odiani clan. Here, the territory has a common boundary with Esanland in Edo State just like it does on the Ebu axis in the Niger Valley. In geographical terms, the relative position of the Anioma area is as follows: it is bounded in the east by the Niger River, with Anambra and Imo states located at the eastern bank of the river. The territory has a huge stretch of boundary with Edo state on its western axis. In the south-west, Aniomaland is bound by Bomadi, Isoko-South, Isoko-North and Ughelli North local government areas of Delta State. The area also shares boundaries with Edo State along its northern axis.

Modern Aniomaland has nine local government areas. These are Aniocha North, Aniocha South, Ika North and Ika East, Ndokwa East, Ndokwa

West, Oshimili North, Oshimili South and Ukwuani. At the time of the Nigerian civil war Aniomaland had three political divisions, namely Aboh, Aniocha and Ika. Residing on the western bank of the Niger River has necessitated the Anioma people being referred to as 'West Niger Igbo' in some circles. This descriptive term was employed as a geographical phrase to differentiate them from other Igbo sub-groups, who live on the eastern bank of the Niger. At a time in their history the Anioma people were referred to as 'Western Igbo'. They have also been called 'Ika Igbo', 'Western Igbo', 'Mid-Western Igbo', 'Bendel Igbo' and presently some refer to them as 'Delta Igbo'. The idea behind their being called by these names is to differentiate them from the larger Igbo stock of the former Eastern Nigeria. This can be explained by the fact that Aniomaland was located in the Western Region between 1946 and 1963; in the Midwest from 1963 to 1976. The Midwest was re-christened Bendel State in 1976, a name she bore till 1991, when Delta State was carved out.

For most parts, Aniomaland is marked by thick rainforests laced with elegant tall palm trees. The area is also a natural home to swamps and mangrove growths in some of its dense wetlands around the Niger River. This is towards its southern extreme, particularly following the course of the Niger and its adjourning swamps as the river navigates its way to the sea. These swamps are noticeable and starts from around the Ebu and Illah in the northern tip of the territory through Asaba, the Oko clan, stretches to the Ibusa area, Olodu, Ewulu, Abala-Oshimili, Utchi, Onuaboh, Okpai, Beneku, Aboh down to the Asaba-Ase, Umuolu and Onyaa area to the south. This swampy terrain is criss-crossed by streams, brooks and rivulets, all of which are tributaries of the Niger River, into which they empty themselves. Accessing this part of Aniomaland is challenging because of its difficult terrain. In some areas, the swampy terrain stretches about five kilometers inland from the banks of the Niger. It stretches beyond that distance inland in a western direction as the Niger gets close to the sea. It manifests in such a way that around Utchi, Okapi, Beneku and Aboh, it increases in span to a range of about ten kilometres inland. This swampy terrain was critical in the trade that forms the subject-matter of this work.

Majority of Anioma people speak basically three different dialects of the macro Igbo language and two other dialects of Yoruba and Igala. Broadly these are: Enuani (made up of Oshimili and Aniocha), Ika and Ukwuani or Kwale. The various Igbo dialects of the Anioma are widespread and virtually all the Anioma people, including the Olukwumi and Igala speakers, speak and understand Igbo. So, Igbo is the general language of the Anioma. These three variants of the Anioma dialect are spoken by three broad sub-cultural entities that make up what is now seen as the Anioma group in Nigeria. Their

identity has become the subject of many arguments (Ijomah 2010, 13-18). However, evidence exist that most Anioma people are of ancient Igbo stock and are regarded in very many circles as an Igbo group (Talbot 1969; Isichei 1976, 16; Ekechi 1971, 166-175; Onyekpeze 2003, 14-27; Ben Nwanne 2004, 294-375; Akeh-Osu 1992; Ejiofor 1982; Dike 1956, 25-26; Afigbo 1981, 17-24; Ohadike 1991; Ohadike, 1994; Dieyi 1992; Osia 2012, 1-22; Egwu 2009, 18&21). It is instructive to know that in his classification of Igbo sub-groups and their languages, the ethnographer P. A. Talbot referred to the Anioma group and their dialects collectively as 'Ika-Igbo' (1969, 39). This and other cultural affinities between Aniomaland and the Igbo across the Niger River may well prove the hard facts of a shared and unbroken relationship between the Anioma and the Eastern Niger Igbo. Aniomaland is generally seen as a section of the larger of the Igbo culture area in Southern Nigeria. In fact, there is a strong continuity between the Anioma and the Eastern Igbo. This is only physically but not culturally punctuated by the mighty Niger River. Many Anioma people saw themselves as Igbo and other Nigeria groups saw them as such prior to and during the Nigerian civil war. When, for instance the Military Governor of the Igbo-dominated Eastern Region, Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu proclaimed the region the independent Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967, different sections of the Anioma community both at home and abroad, erupted in joy and supported the move as long overdue (Aniedue 2010, Interview; Otuya 2011, Interview). This explains how Aniomaland and the Anioma people came into the picture in the Nigerian civil war; fought massively on the side of Biafra and promoted a trade that sustained Biafra's yearning for essential commodities. Outside the opportunity for profits provided by the trade, the Anioma were partially involved in the trade for being who they are: an Igbo group involved in socio-cultural relations with their kith and kin across the Niger River in Biafra.

The Origins of the Trade

Prior to the declaration of hostilities on July 6, 1967 that kicked-off the Biafra-Nigeria war, at the declaration of the state of Biafra on May 30, 1967; the federal military government of Nigeria had imposed an economic blockade on Biafra. This measure was stiffly implemented by federal troops during the Nigeria civil war.

It is important to note that as neighbours separated by the Niger River which presented a barrier that was bridged with canoes; the Anioma and the Igbo east of the Niger had traded for a very long time before the

Nigerian civil war. The exigencies of the Nigerian civil war that produced the federal blockade attempted to kill-off this time-tested economic tie. In a way, people on both sides of the Niger resisted that attempt to criminalize an age-long trade that had existed across the Niger River by canoes as the Niger Bridge was only commissioned for use on December 14, 1966. The federal determination to enforce the ban on economic relations between Biafra and Nigeria meant very difficult times for Biafra and her citizens. The burning and looting of the Onitsha Main Market in October 1967 and the final fall of Onitsha into federal hands by March 1968 were very bad news for Biafra from an economic point of view. Onitsha was of strategic economic importance with her huge market and tonnes of goods that would have aided Biafra's war effort and eventual survival. The loss was very disadvantageous. The Midwest had traded freely with Biafra when it was under Biafran occupation starting from August 9, 1967 up to October 4, when the last batch of motorized Biafran forces retreated into Biafra from the Midwest. Even when the Niger Bridge was sealed by Nigerian authorities as part of the blockade against the Eastern Region for seceding from Nigeria, the Anioma and indirectly, the Midwest traded actively with Biafra employing canoes and boats with Asaba and Onitsha as hubs. The fall of most of Aniomaland, including Asaba in September/October 1967 presented new challenges that threatened Biafra's survival. When added to the loss of Bonny at the early stage of the war and Port Harcourt and Calabar subsequently, which cut off Biafra completely from the sea, her envisioned collapse became nearly palpable. As the size of Biafra shrank, her economic fortunes dwindled significantly. Something had to be done. The war-time trade under discussion was an aspect of the Biafran response to a dire situation. The need for Biafra's survival in the face of the rising scarcity of every essential commodity like drugs, soap food and clothing, made Biafrans turn to a new kind of trade with her neighbours. The Anioma people who live just across the Niger from Biafra's western border were one of such neighbours. A market in essential commodities consequently boomed across the Niger between the Anioma and their neighbours in the east. The uniqueness of the trade is underlined by the fact that it was considered illegal on the Nigerian side while it was legal on the Biafran side and so warmly embraced. This warm feeling towards the trade was shared by their Anioma neighbours to the west across the Niger. For the federal government, prohibiting economic relations with Biafra was a vital aspect of the war. For Biafra, bursting the economic blockade ringed around her by the federal government was not just about defiance. It was an intrinsic part of her struggle for statehood and survival. On the Nigerian side, where Aniomaland belonged to in the war, the trade was clandestine and conducted

with stealth. The trade has come to be known by three interrelated names: *ashia ataak* (attack trade); *ashia nmgbo* (attack bullet trade) and *ashia nmgbuka* (auction trade). The word *ashia* in all three denotes trade as *ashia, afia* or *ahia* is the Igbo word for market, depending on the dialect of the Igbo language one chooses to deploy.

The Nature of the Trade

The trade involved ferrying essential commodities of all kinds from riverine and hinterland Anioma communities on the western bank of the Niger to their Igbo counterparts on the eastern bank of the same river. The articles of trade included food items, drugs, petroleum products, motor and machine spare parts, tobacco, cigarettes, clothing, soap, glue, stationery items and Nigerian newspapers (Oyana 2007, Interview). Both Nigerian and Biafran currencies were accepted as legal tenders.

It was a trade that involved the Anioma moving large quantities of goods in little consignments across the Niger River with the use of canoes and boats into Biafra. On the Anioma side, most of the trade was conducted over unmotorable bush tracks employing the use of bicycles and head potterage as well canoes to cross innumerable water bodies on the way even before the huge Niger River that separated Aniomaland from Biafra. Because ties with Biafra were strictly forbidden following the terms of the federal blockade against Biafra, the trade constituted illegal contact and smuggling of goods to Biafra by the Anioma. Participants in the trade conducted business in war zones and war frontlines. Bullets flew around and death was common. Oyana, who participated in the trade, remembered over ten traders who died (Oyana 2007, Interview). Olise, who was himself a trader, still remembered that five of his fellow traders were shot by federal troops (2010, Interview). The fact that the trade went with the possibility of death explains why the trade was tagged *ashia ataak* (attack trade) and *ashia nmgbo* during the war (bullet trade) in some circles as both phrases were employed as descriptive terms to capture the nature of the trade. The risky nature of the trade conducted across enemy lines and its necessity for Biafra has led Gloria Chuku into labeling it '… a life-or-death trade but a child of necessity' (2002, 220).

The communities involved in the trade on the Anioma side were Illah, Asaba, Ibusa, Ogwashi-Uku, Ewulu, Olodu, Akpako, Osisa, Iselegu, Afor, Inyi, Oko-Ogbele and Utchi. Abala-Oshimili, Abala-Unor, Obalagada, Okapi, Beneku and Aboh. In the hinterland, Obiarukwu and Agbor were

also involved as markets for goods at the supply end. On the eastern side receiving the articles of trade were traders in Atani, Idenmili, Umunankwo and Osomala (Dike 2008, Interview).

Some of the known trade routes over which the trade was conducted are as follows: Agbor-Issele Uku-Illah and Otuocha in Biafra (Nwose 2009, Interview); Agbor-Ogwashi Uku-Ewulu, Isheagu Abala Oshimili and Atani in Biafra (Ofili 2009, Interview); Obiarukwu-Iselegu-Inyi-Utchi and Umu-nankwo in Biafra (Olise 2010, Interview); and the Agbor-Issele Uku-Issele Azagba-Ibusa-Olodu-Abala Oshimili and Atani in Biafra routes (Oyana 2007, Interview). Other routes were Agbor-Ogwashi Uku-Ibusa-Oko Ogbele-Oso-mala (in Biafra) (Oyana 2007, Interview); Agbor-Issele Azagba-Ibusa-Oko Anala-Oko Ogbele-Osomala in Biafra (Uchendu 2007, 141); Agbor-Issele Azagba-Okpanam-Anwai near Asaba-Ekempu and Anam (in Biafra) (Uchendu 2007, 141) and the Obiarukwu-Utagba Ogbe-Obikwele-Okpai-Abala and Atani (in Biafra) route (Uchendu 2007, 141). As shown by the trade routes, Agbor on the Anioma side and Atani on the Biafran side were heavily involved in the trade. However that should not be taken to mean that the routes were constant. They actually varied according to the dynamics of the war and the need to avoid federal forces on the Anioma side intent on stopping the trade. This shifting dynamics of the trade according to the intensity of the war can be gleaned from the demise of Asaba as a major emporium of the trade and the emergence of Isheagu away in the hinterland as the new hub.

The federal government's imposition of an economic blockade on Biafra meant an economic break which the federal government ferociously enforced. The Midwest regional government helped in enforcing the eco-nomic blockade (*Daily Times* 1967, 4-5). The eventual sealing of the Niger Bridge after the May 30, 1967 declaration of Biafra could not stop the trade between the Anioma and their kith and kin in the new Biafra. The two groups turned to other means to continue their trading activities. In this wise, the old and earlier abandoned Asaba wharf on the Niger that had acted as a fulcrum for river transportation between the Midwest and the East before the commis-sioning of the Niger Bridge that connected the two regions through Asaba and Onitsha for use, was called back into action as a trading port (Enemoh 1999, 227). This trade continued unimpeded in the early stages of the war both through the wharf and mostly through the Niger Bridge, which was smashed open by Biafran forces on their invasion of the Midwest on August 9, 1967 and remained open to traffic until Asaba fell to the federal forces on October 4, 1967. The next day, two spans of the Niger Bridge at the Onitsha end were blown up, thus rendering the bridge unusable. It remained so until it was reconstructed in 1972, two years after the end of the war.

The federal military conquest of much of Aniomaland by September/ October 1967 and the expulsion of most Biafran forces from Aniomaland and the official severance commercial links between her and Biafra did not kill-off the trade. It merely changed the location of its headquarters. With the fall of Asaba and the huge presence of federal forces in the town, the town ceased to be an emporium for the trans-border trade. Security concerns pushed the trading activities into a more hidden location in the Anioma hinterland. This development created the Isheagu-Abala Oshimili-Oko Ogbele-Osomala route among others as new avenues for transporting goods into Biafra. The importance of the strategically-located Isheagu in the trade was further strengthened by the end of March 1968 with the fall of Onitsha after three failed attempts by the forces of the 2nd Division of the Nigerian Army under the command of Lt-Col Murtala Mohammed to capture Onitsha through the crossing of the Niger River from Asaba.

The trade was of strategic importance to the Biafrans. Their survival and that of their state was somewhat hinged on its fate. The economic blockade had ensured that Biafra lacked everything she needed to survive. Shortages of virtually all that were essential meant Biafra lived on borrowed time. As the territorial size of Biafra shrank, it got worse and the borrowed time was being deeply depleted. Biafra got into dire straits starting from March 1968 as she lost almost all its key towns including Enugu and Onitsha. Due to the fact that she also faced serious military reverses on every conceivable side, the importance of the trade with the Anioma across the Niger grew. For the Biafran military, medical supplies, particularly antibiotic drugs, were of utmost importance. They were critical in the treatment of Biafra's injured soldiers. For Biafra therefore, it was a desperate situation. On the federal side, policing everywhere to ensure the blockade was ultra-effective was a major component of the general war strategy. It was a weapon of war without ammunition. Biafra needed the trade for the survival of the Biafran state and the wellbeing of her people. For her, therefore, the importance of the trade could not be overemphasized. But the trade faced daunting obstacles. The federal side needed to snuff it out in order to maintain the advantages conferred on her by the stranglehold the economic blockade imposed on Biafra.

The nature of the trade was such that people involved in it conducted trade in war zones and went to the war front sometimes to conduct the business of buying and selling. Chief Otuya mentioned that many of the traders were shot in the process (Otuya 2011, Interview). It is important to know that beyond the risk of getting shot at the war front, the terrain in which the business was conducted made it doubly risky for participants. It was a trade conducted across rivers and most times traders had to cross many rivers to

get to desired destinations (Oyana 2007, Interview). The risk factor was quite high and getting drowned was never far-off. In fact, one Oduko of Illah was allegedly pushed off a canoe by his mates over some disagreements in the course of the trade on the Niger River. He drowned and his body was never found (Okoh 2012, Interview). Despite the dangers involved, many Anioma youths of the era got involved in the trade. A lot of such people were shot by federal troops for aiding Biafra (Dike 2008, Interview).

Anioma Motivations for Participating in the Trade

From the point of view of winning the war through an effective economic blockade of Biafra, the federal authorities imposed the instant death penalty on anyone found trading with Biafra. The Anioma traders involved in the trade knew this. One of them recalled that some of his partners were caught in the process of ferrying goods to Biafra and were shot by federal troops (Olise 2010, Interview). Despite this, the trade was popular and attracted huge patronage. The reason for that may not have been unconnected with the lucrative nature of the trade. According to two people who were active participants in the trade in their youth, the profit margin for the least article sold was over two hundred percent (Oyana 2007, Interview).

The attraction of huge profits reaped from the trade was partly responsible for the enthusiasm with which it was embraced by some courageous Anioma young men and women. However, while the lure of profit loomed large as a major motivation for participating in the trade, there were other push factors for the traders. Some Anioma partisans were very active in the trade, which they considered an integral part of the war. For them, the trade presented an opportunity to undermine the federal attempt to crush Biafra. It was their way of assisting fellow Igbo people across the Niger River in Biafra beat hunger, starvation and general lack occasioned by war-time exigencies (Oyana 2007, Interview; Olise 2010, Interview). The ethnic dimension to the trade was fundamental in the fanaticism with which some of the traders pursued the trade. One would have expected that with the brutal treatment meted out to Isheagu and its inhabitants for hosting a major component of the Trans-border trade that it would have fizzled out completely out of fear of reprisal from the federal authorities. That, however, did not happen. The determination of Anioma traders to continue with the trade despite appeals from the federal army authorities was quite frustrating to the federal forces (*Nigerian Observer* June 8 1968, 3; *Nigerian Observer* July 9 1968, 3).

The Organisation of the Trade in Aniomaland

The *ashia ataak* between the Anioma and Biafra was organized in such a long sequence that it took it deep beyond Aniomaland. Short of saying it was well organized, the chain of the trade ran back into the hinterland, to Benin City and Warri in two different directions. In both cases, Agbor and Obiarukwu were fundamental and lay at the middle. The 'real traders' procured most of their products from the massive war-time markets that grew in both towns. These traders who lived close to the riverine area in turn sold to Biafran who came from across the Niger. It is important to point out here that many traders crossed the Niger into the riverine areas of Aniomaland to buy goods and ferry back to Biafra. Not many Anioma traders were known to have crossed the Niger into Biafra to sell goods. It was a very powerful economic relay with articles of trade as batons. With time, particularly with the Onitsha market in ruins and following the capture of Onitsha by federal troops on March 31, 1968 after three earlier disastrous attempts, Isheagu emerged as a huge market in the trade between Aniomaland and Biafra. The fate that befell Isheagu on May 2, 1968 when the town was burnt and many killed was partly due to her alleged role in the trade across the Niger (Okocha 1994, 125-127).

The Trade and the Federal Attack on Isheagu

One of the consequences of the trade and a response by the federal authorities to stop the trade was the sacking of Isheagu by federal forces. The emergence of Isheagu as a major economic hub in war-time Aniomaland is traceable to developments outside Aniomaland but not completely unconnected with her role in the Nigerian civil war. In a twist that is not easily explainable, Isheagu's emergence as a major trading depot among the Anioma people can be traced to what happened across the Niger River in Onitsha. By October 12, 1967 when federal troops made their first attempt to invade Onitsha by boats from Asaba, the Onitsha Main Market became a smouldering ruin. It was looted and set ablaze by federal troops before their forced hurried retreat across the Niger to Asaba due to the stiff opposition of Biafran troops stationed at Onitsha under the command of Col. Conrad Nwawo. The destruction of the Onitsha market and the subsequent loss of Onitsha to the federals in March 1968 was a huge blow to Biafra's mid-section. It is doubtful if she ever recovered from that set-back. With Onitsha gone, a

large reservoir of products that could have served as Biafra's economic shock absorber lay prostrate.

From a purely strategic survival angle, the trade in essential goods from anywhere was crucial for the survival of Biafra. Between the end of March and the beginning of May 1968, Isheagu's reputation as the new market for all essentials grew and exploded to a level where it could no longer continue to be ignored by the federal army. She had emerged as the main trading focus and traders involved in the Biafran provisioning trade from both sides of the Niger flocked to Isheagu to buy and sell. Another challenge for federal troops was that while normal buying and selling of most goods that ended up across the Niger took place in day-time, the difficult canoe and bicycle ferrying away from the area of federal control and into Biafra took place over difficult terrains at night (Unoshai 2009, Interview). It was covert and well organized. The booming market at Isheagu had also, from a Nigerian perspective, become dangerous in military terms as many traders from Biafra flocked there in a way that compromised the security of federal troops stationed around there. Unknown persons suspected to be Biafran partisans had planted a bomb that killed many federal troops close to Nsukwa junction within the precinct of the community (Unoshai 2009, Interview). The Nigerian Army watched in utter consternation as these largely untowards developments unfolded. Unable to have access to the hinterland between Isheagu and the Niger because it was difficult to reach and mostly in Biafran hands, federal troops decided to take matters into their own hands. Isheagu, therefore, along with its market had to go to stop the market with all it meant to Biafra and Biafran surreptitious military presence in the area. The community was consequently attacked on May 2, 1968. From a federal point of view, the attack on Isheagu was, therefore, a clampdown on some clandestine activities going on around the town. The attack on Isheagu succeeded in stopping the booming trade across the Niger with the town as a major base of operations. The market and the town itself were sacked while the town's traditional ruler was reportedly buried alive by rampaging federal forces (Okocha 1994, 104). However, it did little else and failed to stop the trade from continuing. It rolled on up to the very end of the war in 1970 (Olise 2010, Interview).

The sacking of Isheagu had a consequence of shifting the trade centre further inland to a more western direction to Nsukwa. This time around, traders avoided the wrecked Isheagu but still connected to an old route that passed through Abala, Oko-Ogbele to Atani that had been routed through Isheagu. This time around, federal troops could not do much as they had erroneously assumed that Iseagu was the only Anioma town that was an

anchor of trade with Biafra (Uchendu 2007, 141). They failed to grasp that the trade was far more diffused among the Anioma people for many reasons, including fraternal ties with Biafra, which no heavy military presence could uproot and throw into the air.

Beyond stopping the clandestine trade, the federal intention to remove Isheagu and its environs from the Biafran sphere of influence was not achieved. Biafran enclaves lay in a long stretch of land to the east of Isheagu and other neighbouring communities to the north and south. In June 1968, while the Biafrans were on the offensive to regain Onitsha, they launched into that part of Aniomaland with their 11th Division under the command of Col. Ogbugo Kanu from Atani across the Niger in the East. The idea was for the force to move northwestwards to capture places like Oko, Ibusa, Ogwashi-uku and their environs (Madiebo 1980, 256-259). Coming a few weeks after the sack of Isheagu and the physical destruction of a market that had ministered to the best needs of the Biafran economy and national survival, it is difficult not to imagine that those June forays into that marshy part of Aniomaland were not a Biafran attempt to keep the trade routes open and protect Biafra's over-all national interest around Aniomaland. If it was a coincidence, it is too powerful to ignore.

Some Results of the Anioma War-Time Trade with Biafra

Chief Paul Otuya informed us that in some parts of Ukwuani, the trade boomed as the area was under Biafran control for most of the war. This was particularly true of remote communities behind the Ase Creek and the Akpuke Bridge. Many residents of those communities became full-time participants in the trade and grew substantially wealthy before the war ended for their boldness and enterprise (Otuya 2011, Interview). The emergence of young men as big traders and wealthy men at the end of the war in certain Anioma communities is traceable to the inter-war trade between the Anioma people and Biafra. Chief Olise informed us that a well-known Nigerian millionaire whose name he mentioned but pleaded to be kept away from official communications worked under him and cut his teeth in business in the trade. He said his experience and accumulated wealth laid the foundation for his current status (Olise 2010, Interview). In Ibusa, two young men who were active participants in the trade and became big time traders at the end of the war are still called *Nmgbuka* up to this day. This name derived from their involvement in the trade has swallowed their real names (Aniedue 2010, Interview).

The emergence of Boji-Boji Owa (erroneously referred to as Agbor as different from Agbor Obi) as the commercial nerve-centre of Aniomaland until Asaba emerged Delta State capital in 1991 dates from the civil war and Boji-Boji Owa's role in the trade between the Anioma people and Biafra. When the Onitsha market was burnt by federal troops on 12 October, 1967, Agbor was a major beneficiary of a fall-out of that incident. The point needs to be made that the demands of war made economic ties between the Anioma and the former Eastern Region more vital. The economic blockade imposed on Biafra got harsher as the war wore on and got critical with the destruction of the Onitsha market and its tons of goods that would have aided Biafra's survival deep into the war. The fall of Onitsha in March 1968 made matters worse. Basic necessities of life became scarce and Biafran traders besieged the riverine areas of Anioma on the western bank of the Niger in search of goods to aid Biafra's survival. Anioma traders responded to the lure of profit by going behind the frontlines to procure needed items for Biafran traders to ferry home at exorbitant rates.

That was how Agbor came into the picture as a place for the procurement of goods for Biafra and other parts of Aniomaland during the civil war. War-time scarcity of essential items in Anioma communities to the east of Agbor and Biafra promoted trade and Agbor emerged as Anioma's biggest market during and after the war. Given her geographical location of being only a stone throw from Warri and Benin City, no other town in Anioma could compete favourably with her in the struggle for the duties thrust upon her by the war. Obiarukwu was a poor competitor because of her position of only being accessible to the Ndosimili and Ukwuani markets. Agbor enjoyed a position that aided her emergence as the prime war-time market and the post-war nerve centre of Aniomaland. The economic boom witnessed by Agbor had multiplier effects on other facets of the community's life.

Conclusion

Ashia ataak was important for Biafra as it was essential to her survival. For the federal authorities, however, stopping the trade was an integral part of winning the war. The trade, for the Anioma, represented a double-edged sword. On one hand, it puts a lot of wealth in the hands of the participants. It also promoted enterprise and commercial activities that redrew the socio-economic map of Aniomaland. On the other hand, however, it was quite ruinous as it cut short the lives of many young people who attempted to take part in the trade. Many of them died. The exact number remains unknown as no

census of that has been conducted. Trying to stop the trade gave an entirely new complexion to the war as epitomized by the sacking of the Anioma town of Isheagu. It is arguable that the trade was a major contribution of the Anioma people to the prolongation of the life of Biafra. The bravery displayed by the Anioma in the trade was an aspect of fighting for Biafra without bearing arms. For some of them, the feeling of empathy for their Biafran kith and kin entrapped in war was a major factor. For some, the lure of fantastically huge profits was too tempting to resist. For others still, it was a combination of both.

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ABSTRACT

A lot has been written on the Nigeria-Biafra war which lasted from 1967 to 1970. However, little attention has been given to a very important but almost forgotten part of that war. This is the trade that took place between the Anioma people on the Nigeria side and Biafrans across the Niger River. It has been called the '*ashia attack*'. The trade played a very important role in prolonging the survival of Biafra as essential commodities were ferried across the Niger in a trade that proved very lucrative for traders on both sides. The trade was labelled clandestine because it was forbidden by federal authorities while it was encouraged by Biafran authorities hemmed in and challenged by the economic blockade ringed around her by the former. The neglect of this important phenomenon in the Nigeria-Biafra war, particularly from an Anioma perspective, represents a void that needs to be filled if some finer details of the war are to be understood. It is important in helping glue some facts together to make for a deeper explanation of aspects of the war. In undertaking this task and employing mostly oral sources, this paper highlights and discusses the dynamics of the trade; its larger significance in the Nigeria-Biafra war that pitched the Igbo population of Nigeria against the other Nigerian ethnic groups as well as the consequences of the trade for the Anioma.

CONCEPTS AND HISTORIOGRAPHIC DEBATE FROM THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF OLAUDAH EQUIANO (1745-1797)

Artur José Renda Vitorino[1]
Gisele Maria Beloto[2]

Introduction

This text seeks to explain the fundamental concepts for historicizing the topic of Africa, such as the concept of "slavery", contextualizing the origin of its use in the continent ("domestic slavery" or "dependence" situation due to integration with the family group, "slavery" from the influences of Arab expansion in the 7th century and the transatlantic slave trade); and possible conceptual transformations through the connections mentioned, along with the historiographic debate.

The debate on Africanist historiography involved historians with wide international recognition, such as Izabel de Castro Henriques (2003), Paul Lovejoy (2002), Elikia M'Bokolo (2009), Alberto da Costa e Silva (2002), Olaudah Equiano (2012), John Thornton (2003), among others. This conceptual debate was developed in the Master's thesis of Gisele Maria Beloto in the field of study of Public Policies in Education, in the Postgraduate Program in Education at the Pontifical Catholic University of Campinas (PUC-Campinas). In this dissertation, the construction of this debate had the objective of developing a paradidactic material on History, focused on students on the 6th year of schooling, as a means of assisting teachers and students analysing the

1   Postgraduate Program in Education, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Campinas. Campinas, Brazil. E-mail: arturvitorino@uol.com.br. ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8654-3182

2   Postgraduate Program in Education, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Campinas. Campinas, Brazil. E-mail: giselembeloto@hotmail.com. ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2519-7685

historiographical debate about the History of Africa and Africans, as required by the law n.° 10.639/03 (Beloto 2019).

The study, thus, did not seek to construct a historiographic research with the aim of solving or bringing hypotheses about certain historical events, through the use of historical sources and arguments, but rather it was built as a description of historiographical divergences, without necessarily defending one or another idea, but highlighting what we consider fundamental: the historical role of Africans.

Thus, the primary source of the study is the autobiographical narrative by Olaudah Equiano (2005): "The interesting narrative of the life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African written by himself". The selected excerpts, aimed at enriching the historiographic debate, tell us of Equiano's childhood in Igbo, when he witnesses from a tree a conflict involving his family, his experiences after his abduction and his first impressions on the slave ship.

It is essential to highlight the advances and dissemination of research on *the Africas*, with emphasis on the Igbo region, since it was the second largest supplier of enslaved people to the American colonies, thus having a fundamental role in the construction of the cultural identity of the Americas. Finally, Equiano's work also played a key role in the construction and formation of Nigerian identity after its independence in 1960.

The methodological path will be that of Adalberto Marson, in "Reflections on the historical procedure". Marson (1984) criticizes in his text the rules of historical procedure rooted and defended by positivist historians for narrating stories, in the sense of the false idea of achieving an exact historical reconstruction and narrative. In this way, Marson (1984, 46) argues that it is primarily necessary to recognize *the stories* that produced us, a movement which is a "[...] decisive step in the achievement of the freest possible reflection on what we are and what we have done in our work "[3].

Marson (1984) defends the use of the historical source in combination with the sets of elements that made it historical, in such a way that emphasizes those protagonists who were hidden by Eurocentric historiography and breaks with the traditional historical narrative. In this sense, it is a matter of not highlighting the winners' memories, but of carrying out historical reconstruction, with emphasis on the identities that make up the African continent and, consequently, the American continent as well.

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3   Translated by us. Originally: "[...] *passo decisivo na conquista do direito de reflexão mais livre possível a respeito do que somos e do que temos feito no nosso trabalho*"

"The interesting narrative of the life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African": Concepts & Debates

It is essential to explain the debate around the concept of dependency and slavery from the perspective of Africanist historiography before and after the beginning of the Atlantic trade, tied to the primary source of the ex-enslaved Olaudah Equiano in order to broaden the debate and its understanding.

In this way, conceptualizing and contextualizing what would be the forms of "slavery" among Africans, before European colonization, becomes a necessary task. However, it is worth mentioning, at the beginning of this exhibition, the philological problems in the application of several concepts, such as *slave* and *slavery*, as they have a remote periodization. According to Henriques (2003), this is an anachronistic and Eurocentric concept, as can be seen in the excerpt below:

> In fact, both *slave* and *slavery* are recent terms in the cultural history of the world: the term slave, from the medieval Latin *sclavus*, coming from *slavus*, would have appeared in the 13th century, while the word *slavery* would only have integrated the European languages in the 16th century. The use of the two terms is thus due to a trivializing operation that, in a sense, creates a kind of homogeneity of social practices, denying the very meaning of history (Henriques 2003, 62, emphasis added by the author)[4].

Thus, it is noted that they are concepts from a later European context, which started to be integrated in the vocabulary from the beginning of European colonization in the Americas; therefore, insufficient to describe an African context prior to the beginning of the slave trade. In terms of the "slave", defending her statement, Henriques (2003) cites Henrique de Carvalho's source in which he described the *Muatiãnvua*'s trip to Mussumba and noted the different categories of social hierarchies and words present in that society. In this case, the social category "mururos" and "mubicas" were misinterpreted by the Portuguese as a word analogous to the concept of "slave", however, it was a structure equivalent to a certain type of "dependency".

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4   Translated by us. Originally: *"Efectivamente, tanto o escravo como a escravatura são termos recentes na história cultural do mundo: o termo escravo, do latim medieval sclavus, provindo de slavus, terá aparecido no século XIII, enquanto a palavra escravatura só teria integrado as línguas europeias no século XVI. A utilização dos dois termos deve-se assim a uma operação banalizadora que, em certo sentido, cria uma espécie de homogeneidade das práticas sociais, negando o próprio sentido da história".*

It is advisable to bring such warning, as mentioned earlier, however, even though Africanist historiography is advancing rapidly, it is still a recent field of research, especially if we think that this field seeks to distance itself from Eurocentric bonds. At the expense of this, many terms and concepts used can lead, arbitrarily, to a certain anachronism and Eurocentrism. However, no matter how generalizing terms such as "slave" and "slavery" are, they can also help to bring greater understanding and be useful for situating oneself, if it is explained that we are within a pre- or post-start of the Atlantic trade Africanist perspective. In short, it is about, according to the possibilities, bringing together the concepts and notions of the African worldview from the cut of previously delimited space and time.

In order to present the history of Africa and the history of "dependency" or "slavery" relations on the continent, it is extremely important to expose historical sources from the African point of view. According to Thornton (2003), only studies and documents of European origin were the ones that stood out and gained the researchers' attention.

As a large part of African civilizations were formed by oral tradition, with words transmitted from generation to generation as a way of preserving ancestral wisdom, there was a diversion of attention on the part of the academy due to the lack of written documentation. Even in areas such as West Africa, where writing started to be developed in the 15th century, few Westerners wrote. In this way, researchers viewed African civilizations of oral tradition with disinterest, as they demanded the development of complex techniques for the analysis of oral tradition. The interests turned, above all, to European civilizations that developed writing, however, "[...] orality is an attitude towards reality and not the absence of a skill" (Vansina 2011, 140)[5].

Ki-Zerbo (2010, 37) states that written sources should also not be neglected, but rather, "[...] cross a new qualitative and critical threshold on the vision of the African past", in this way, the historical source to be followed is the autobiography of Olaudah Equiano (1745-1797), which constitutes a narrative of emancipation that "[...] reflects the situational, mobile, entrenched and oscillating dynamic that characterizes the Black Atlantic" (Bicalho 2016, 2327).

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5   Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] a oralidade é uma atitude diante da realidade e não a ausência de uma habilidade"*.

Olaudah Equiano was the son of an *embreche6*, born in an Igbo village[7] – although there are controversies[8] – published in 1789 in England, after his freedom, under the title "The interesting narrative of the life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African"[9]. According to Canto (2015), Equiano's full account fluctuates between fiction - there are unselected passages in which his narrative is linked to biblical issues and the reconstitution of a mythical Africa[10] – and veracity – unquestionable episodes for current historiography. Likewise, it is worth mentioning that, "[...] the facts, literature and fiction are part of the narrative and memory" (Canto 2015, 89) and such elements are part of the historian's job. As stated earlier, much of the African continent, in this period, was adept of oral tradition and not writing, and such tradition did not diminish its value as a source, as well as Equiano's childhood memory – more specifically, when he was eleven years old – that is, he became an adult in contact with Western culture; therefore, his view had been influenced by the Western Christian world.

As mentioned earlier, only a few excerpts were selected. In the excerpt below Equiano (2005, n/p) relives his memories when he reports that he witnessed a conflict in his region:

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6   According to Silva (2012, 276) "*embrechê*" was a specific member with the title of Ozo. Its distinction was given by the scarification "*itchi*".

7   "*Ibos*" – or Igbo – is a group of people who inhabited the region of present-day Nigeria. In these groups, there was no figure who exercised a position of total control of the central power; generally, decisions were made on public meetings (Lopes and Macedo 2017, 150). According to Uchendu (1977. apud. Canto 2015, 94), the correct term to use is "Igbo", since "[...] Ibo is its transliteration for Western Languages" and the social structure and politics was based on lineages, among other titles attributed from his courage as a warrior, ability in speech or based on wealth. In addition, according to Alagoa (2010), the Igbo region, from archaeological sources, was populated in the Stone Age period and was based on agriculture, such as yam cultivation.

8   With the publication of his account "The interesting narrative of the life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African" in 1789, the work became a kind of abolitionist campaign. According to Silva (2012, 275), to disqualify him, they questioned his African origin, claiming that he had been born in the Caribbean.

9   According to Canto (2015), as Equiano's autobiography was for abolitionist purposes, his work was financed by 321 people who pledged to buy it.

10   According to Canto (2015, 98), texts of the time are common, mainly those with the abolitionist intention (above all, due to the fact that Equiano is part of the abolitionist groups) to reconstruct a mythical Africa: "[...] there was a need to show Europeans an Africa rich in food, knowledge and quality of life, in particular, with the aim of arguing how pernicious and destructive the slave trade was", since "[...] in the 18th century, news from the African continent through European travelers were about famines, exotic diseases and barbarism among Africans themselves".

> I was once a witness to a battle in our common. We had been all at work in it one day as usual, when our people were suddenly attacked. I climbed a tree at some distance, from which I beheld the fight. There were many women as well as men on both sides; among others my mother was there, and armed with a broad sword. After fighting for a considerable time with great fury, and after many had been killed, our people obtained the victory, and took their enemy's Chief prisoner [...] The spoils were divided according to the merit of the warriors. Those prisoners which were not sold or redeemed we kept as slaves.

From this selected excerpt from Equiano (2005), it is possible to identify that wars were the main source of enslaved people, "[...] the activity that most frequently transformed free men into captives, throughout history" (Silva 2002, 108), with some exceptions[11]. In addition to the war, the endogenous slavery present in Igbo was, in the most common cases, for political reasons (Canto 2015)[12].

Equiano described these conflicts from the top of a tree, but was not so lucky afterwards. His account also discusses the day when he was kidnapped, moved between several families and finally negotiated for crossing the Atlantic on a slave ship. It was common to take the captured away from their place of origin, covering great distances (Silva 2002). In the case of Equiano (2005, n/p), according to the account of his first capture, he was taken to a region far from his birth: "[...] After many days travelling, [...] I got into the hands of a chieftain, in a very pleasant country. [...] they all used me extremely well, and did all they could to comfort me; particularly the first wife, who was something like my mother".

In sub-Saharan Africa, armed conflicts yielded enslaved people from neighboring regions, who were then transported – approximately 500 to 600 kilometers away – and passed on to make it difficult for them to escape or return to their homeland. Those who were not sold over long distances, would remain, for the purpose of replacing casualties and working for the winning group. It was a lucrative option and a synonym for political and military power, since they were extremely necessary for the maintenance of this structure: "[...] to expand the armed groups and the armies with which

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11 According to Thornton (2003), wars for the capture of slaves in Africa were similar to wars over territories in Europe in search of power and political influence.

12 As well as in other regions, due to judicial, religious procedures, punishments for murder, theft, adultery. In addition to cases like orphans, widows without children and in cases of hunger, they sold themselves as enslaved people (Lovejoy 2002; Silva 2002).

more slaves were produced, essential to the process of accumulation of wealth and political domination" (Silva 2002, 89)[13].

Silva (2002) argues that the genesis of the condition of "slave" or "dependent" lies in a specific context – of collector nomadism or later movement – for convenience. That is, at the end of conflicts between different groups, women and children would serve as substitutes for casualties and to add to the workforce of the winning group (Silva 2002). According to Henriques (2003), the act of domination over the other is something that comes from and belongs to *homo sapiens*, which is why there are different power relationships in different social contexts and periods. In this way, it is something that does not depend "[...] only on the cultural and political system, but on the power relationship that allows men and especially women to be classified and hierarchized" (Henriques 2003, 66)[14].

According to Silva (2002), in Sub-Saharan Africa, the enslaved worked alongside the family, but exercised the most arduous functions, allowing for the expansion of wealth and power. In these agricultural regions, conflicts did not yield many slaves, but on the other hand, casualties were significant, especially in small communities. Domestic slavery – integrated into the family group – is likely to have been the first form of slavery that Africa has known.

According to Henriques (2003), African domestic slavery is closer to social structures that integrate the power relations which generate the condition of dependence, precisely due to the non-existence of the concept of "slave" as a commodity, such as that within a colonial logic in the Americas. Therefore, the thesis defended by Henriques (2003, 68) is that domestic slavery is constituted by dependents, not by "slaves". The concept of "domestic slavery" is incompatible with such a structure, approaching a more tenuous and flexible "dependency" condition. In this way, the structure of integration with the family group generated a system that repelled "[...] the most violent forms of domination and exclusion" (Henriques 2003, 68)[15].

On the other hand, Silva (2002, 82) criticizes the thesis that domestic slavery was less violent due to proximity with the slave-master, resulting in a possible and "[...] progressive reduction of his marginality, by the incorporation to the master's family and to the flock" (Silva 2002, 82). Silva (2002) states that it was through violence that the enslaved were subjected to serve others. It was

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13   Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] para engrossar os grupos armados e os exércitos com que se produziam mais escravos, essenciais ao processo de acumulação de riqueza e de domínio político".*

14   Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] só do sistema cultural e político, mas da relação de força que permite classificar e hierarquizar os homens e sobretudo as mulheres".*

15   Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] as formas mais violentas de dominação e de exclusão".*

unlikely that, when captured, he or she could assume a role similar to that of a true member of the family group, given that he or she was left with the heaviest and most ungrateful work. In times of crisis and hunger, they were sold, even though they had already been fully incorporated into the family.

According to Henriques (2003), considering a dependent as a vassal, subject to abuse and indifferent to the family is an ethnocentric view, since it was an interpretation of the European when faced with the relations of power and social hierarchies in Africa. However, it is evident that transformations between African slavery occur, in the conceptual sense of the word slave, due to the influences of the trade carried out by Muslims and Europeans and the way these trades dealt with the captured, constituting a commercial and violent sense.

According to Equiano (2005), the conditions of those who were subject to "domestic slavery" or "dependence" were significantly different on the other side of the Atlantic, making it clear that they are not the same subordinations: "[...] how different was their condition from that of the slaves in the West Indies! With us they do no more work than other members of the community, even their masters" (Equiano 2005, n/p), and, after moving to work for a second family, Equiano tells us:

> I was washed and perfumed, and when meal-time came I was led into the presence of my mistress, and ate and drank before her with her son. This filled me with astonishment; and I could scarce help expressing my surprise that the young gentleman should suffer me, who was bound, to eat with him who was free; and not only so, but that he would not at any time either eat or drink till I had taken first, because I was the eldest, which was agreeable to our custom [...] There were likewise slaves daily to attend us, while my young master and I with other boys sported with our darts and bows and arrows, as I had been used to do at home.

From these excerpts, Equiano seeks to present differentiations in the forms of submission which he experienced. According to Canto (2005), from Victor Uchendu, there were different ways of obtaining enslaved people in Igbo, some of which could be through improved life conditions. In this way, "[...] the distance between the status of *diala*, free, and *ohu*, slave, was very small. However, it is very clear that in Igbo society, slavery was never the basis of the social system" (Canto 2005, 104, emphasis added by the author)[16].

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16 Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] a distância entre o status de diala, livre e ohu, escravo, era muito pequena. Entretanto, é muito claro que na sociedade Igbo, a escravidão nunca foi a base do sistema social"*.

In this sense, according to Henriques (2003), dependents were considered as children for political leaders, and also, when integrated into the family group they caused positive effects – increased the power of lineage and strengthened the demography of the group – as pointed out in Equiano's account previously[17]. From the contact with the European slave trade, wars in search of capturing people were effective due to this demography, generating large numbers of enslaved people to the American colonies (Henriques 2003). Equiano's account (2005, n/p) regarding his contact with the slave trade with white traffickers turns into a painful tone, as explained in the excerpt below:

> I even wished for my former slavery in preference to my present situation, which was filled with horrors of every kind, still heightened by my ignorance of what I was to undergo. I was not long suffered to indulge my grief; I was soon put down under the decks, and there I received such a salutation in my nostrils as I had never experienced in my life: so that, with the loathsomeness of the stench, and crying together, I became so sick and low that I was not able to eat, nor had I the least desire to taste any thing. I now wished for the last friend, death, to relieve me; but soon, to my grief, two of the white men offered me eatables; and, on my refusing to eat, one of them held me fast by the hands, and laid me across I think the windlass, and tied my feet, while the other flogged me severely. I had never experienced any thing of this kind before.

According to the Dictionary of African History, elaborated by Lopes and Macedo (2017, 108-109), the concept of slavery meets the thesis defended by Henriques (2003): "In several parts of West Africa, what the experts called 'slavery of lineage' was in place, a situation expressed in the word *jonya* in Fulani language (bend, lean; seek protection, asylum)"[18]. In this perspective, the concept of "slavery" would not incorporate the European mercantile logic given to the enslaved as a commodity with the use of violence, as Equiano tells us after entering the slave ship.

The authors also emphasize that the concept of slavery, enslavement or bondage does not broadly reflect the different types of power relations and forms of subjection that produced the hierarchies, and so the social relations,

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17 Also, he had some "legal" requirements, in case of conditions of violence, the dependent could change his master. In this way, it was impossible a system in which the master "[...] treat the dependent as a thing, as can be seen in colonial slavery, [...] requires the 'master' to be reasonable and try not to offend the values of the false slave" (Henriques 2003, 68).

18 Translated by us. Originally: *"Em diversas partes da África Ocidental, vigorou o que os especialistas qualificaram de 'escravidão de linhagem', situação expressa no vocábulo jonya, da língua fulâni (curvar, inclinar; buscar proteção, asilo)".*

in this case, "[...] are linked to the great lineages of hegemonic groups, becoming directly dependent on their chiefs, or else on their rulers" (Lopes and Macedo 2017, 108-109)[19], as shown in the story of Equiano. M'Bokolo (2009) also points out that it is a relationship of dependence through unprecedented violence, at least until the 7th century – at the beginning of the Arab-Muslim traffic – which endured until the 19th century, having the slave trade across the Atlantic started in the 16th century.

Trans-Saharan trafficking and slave trade across the Atlantic: transformations in the concept of "slavery" in Africa

According to Nicolau (2013), Arab domination in Africa began in 639 AD and in 711 AD the conquest was complete in the Northern region. Arab-Muslim trafficking, or Trans-Saharan trafficking, began on a small scale after the preaching of the Prophet Mohammed, from the Arab expansion in North Africa, lasting until the beginning of the 20th century.

Arab conquests led to a development of the traffic, legitimizing the practice, since "[...] any idolater captured in a holy war was condemned to slavery. [...] they could not ask for freedom, even if they converted to Islam" (M'Bokolo 2009, 215)[20]. According to Lovejoy (2002), the absence of culture meant the absence of lineage; therefore, a greater possibility of control, since people were not from the same culture. Even when the enslaved converted to their owner's culture, in this case to Islam, he was still considered less devout. It was unlike the slavery developed by Europeans in their colonies, which was justified on a racial basis, as a means of social control (Lovejoy 2002).

The Arab conquest in North Africa – through trade routes with Sub-Saharan Africa – also influenced that region, gaining adherents to Islam among smaller populations. In this way, "[...] the Islamization of the African continent led to the emergence of an elite of Black Muslims capable of adapting the then existing agricultural societies to an effective political and commercial system" (Lopes and Macedo 2017, 159)[21].

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19 Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] se vinculam às grandes linhagens dos grupos hegemônicos, tornando-se dependentes diretos de seus chefes, ou então de seus governantes"*.

20 Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] qualquer idólatra capturado numa guerra santa estava votado à escravatura. [...] não podiam reivindicar a liberdade, mesmo convertendo-se ao Islã"*.

21 Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] a islamização do continente africano proporcionou o surgimento de uma elite de muçulmanos negros capazes de adaptar as sociedades agrícolas então existentes a um sistema político e comercial eficaz"*.

For M'Bokolo (2009), the Arab military and religious expansion, and the subsequent formation of caliphates, generated a sudden transformation in the continent. From that moment on, the forms of dependence or subjection by lineage, which until then had a marginal aspect among African societies, was transformed, and, consequently, incorporated the concept of market-based slavery in the continent, especially after contact with Europeans, which happened through Muslims.

According to M'Bokolo (2009), the slave trade across the Atlantic adopted characteristics of the Trans-Saharan trade carried out by the Arabs. In the first contact established between these two worlds, the beneficiaries were "[...] perhaps the African ruling classes, for whom the Portuguese represented an additional opportunity and who knew, particularly in Senegambia, how to use competition between Christian and Muslim traders in their favour" (M'bokolo 2009, 260)[22].

However, according to Thornton (2003), when Europeans and Africans started the trade of enslaved people, the former did not have sufficient military power to force any disadvantageous participation for African leaders. Africa resisted and repelled the first European attempts of attack in search of irregular trade; such commodity exchanges were only carried out when they met the interests of these African elites. This trade resulted in Europeans accepting and trading in accordance with the numerous state control mechanisms of African elites.

Thornton (2003) states that African elites were able to preserve sovereignty and European merchants were unable to control the trafficking of enslaved people in Africa. The elites insisted on being the first beneficiaries, as well as controlling the beginning and the end of commercial activities. However, M'Bokolo (2009) disagrees that Africans have benefited during all the centuries when the slave trade existed to supply the demands of the American colonies, but only during its first attempts. In this way, European crowns soon recovered their advantages and obtained financial advances for the exploitation of that market: "[...] it was in Central and Southern Africa that Europeans were able to penetrate entirely new spaces and disturbed, in a very short time, the structure and logic of exchanges to benefit them" (M'bokolo 2009, 261)[23].

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22 Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] talvez as classes dirigentes africanas, para as quais os portugueses representavam uma oportunidade suplementar e que souberam, em particular na Senegâmbia, utilizar a concorrência entre comerciantes cristãos e muçulmanos"*.

23 Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] foi na África central e austral que os europeus penetraram em espaços inteiramente novos e perturbaram, num espaço de tempo muito curto, a estrutura e a lógica das trocas em seu proveito"*.

However, if there have been transformations in dependency relations due to external influence, whether by Europe and/or by the Islamic world, it is a controversial topic among historians, since this debate is related to the autonomy of the Africans' history. Lovejoy (2002) argues that contact with the Trans-Saharan, and later transatlantic traffic was the factor responsible for the transformations in Africa, since "[…] Europe and the Islamic central lands saw the areas on their periphery as a source of slaves, and Africa was one of those peripheral regions" (Lovejoy 2002, 55).

It is argued that in Sub-Saharan Africa slavery was not institutionalized, that is, slavery was a "[…] less important aspect of society […] incidental to the structure of society and the functioning of the economy" (Lovejoy 2002, 39)[24], since it focused more on domestic and sexual exploitation. Lovejoy (2002) uses the arguments presented by Moses I. Finley, to affirm that the transformation took place from the moment in which slavery became institutionalized, based on the increased importance of the enslaved, who started to play an essential role in the economy and in the monopoly of political power, due to a higher demand in the colonies. This transformation from non-institutionalized slavery to an institution that started to play a fundamental role in the economy resulted in the development of a slave mode of production as the most important part of this society.

Silva (2002) also argues that, as a result of the contact established with both traffic routes (Trans-Saharan and transatlantic), there was a strong influence and, consequently, people who did not have it before, started to adopt slavery due to this external pressure, as, for example, the Casamansa diolas[25]. It is argued that the intense exploitation (from 1600 to 1800)[26] prevented military and political leaders from consolidating a strong and centralized African state. The continent has remained fragmented, precisely in the areas that provided goods which interested Europeans – such as slave labor, gold, among others – along the Atlantic basin (Lovejoy 2002).

Lovejoy (2002) found that the expansion of slavery to the interior of the African continent resulted in an intensification of rivalry between African traders and rulers, who were fighting for control of markets and trade routes. Faced with this scenario, the economy became dependent on the export of

24 Translated by us. Originally: *"[…] aspecto menos importante da sociedade […] incidental à estrutura da sociedade e ao funcionamento da economia".*

25 The Casamansa diolas are a people that were concentrated in West Africa, in the current Republic of Senegal (Lopes and Macedo 2017).

26 According to the W. E. B. Du Bois Travel Database of Naval Ships, a total volume of 11,313,000 enslaved people were transported to America, having its high peak between 1701-1800, with 53.8% of the total volume (Lovejoy 2002 , 51).

slaves and its intensification generated the need for more captures, the effects of which contributed to the expansion of African political fragmentation.

Canto (2015, 96) also has a perspective similar to the thesis of Love-joy (2002) and Moses I. Finley, since it is stated that Equiano's region, Igbo, suffered an intensification of conflicts aimed at capturing new slaves for the Atlantic trade, to the point that "[...] priests or oracles had the power to incite war between small clans or communities with the aim of acquiring slaves for sale"[27]. Therefore, Igbo suffered external influence on the part of the Europeans and their interests, changing the dependency relations established before the Atlantic traffic. This external influence occurred to the detriment that Igbo was a village and not a consolidated and powerful state as pointed out by Canto (2015, 95):

> The Igbo nation was one of those that suffered most from the birth of the international slave market in the Atlantic world, mainly due to its type of social structure and the ease with which the slaves in these communities could be transported to the large slave distribution ports. [...]. These villages, small political structures, made Igbo communities vulnerable, as there were no powerful states to protect their residents, [...]. Small wars between groups or clans, captures and kidnappings, like the one with Equiano, made Igbo communities the second largest supplier of slaves to the Atlantic world [...].[28]

Silva (2002, 90) does not believe that such a context has contributed to continental political fragmentation, as "[...] the transformations of slavery must have accompanied the political changes that brought together in micro-states villages governed by heads of lineage, and from these micro-states, they made kingdoms, and from kingdoms, empires"[29]. In other words, these transformations that occurred from external influences consolidated

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27 Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] sacerdotes ou oráculos tiveram o poder de incitar a guerra entre pequenos clãs ou comunidades com o objetivo de adquirir escravos para a venda"*.

28 Translated by us. Originally: *"A nação Igbo foi uma das que mais sofreu com o nascimento do mercado internacional de escravos no mundo atlântico, principalmente em virtude de seu tipo de estruturação social e da facilidade com que os escravizados nessas comunidades podiam ser transportados para os grandes portos de distribuição de escravos [...]. Essas aldeotas, pequenas estruturas políticas, tornavam as comunidades Igbo vulneráveis, pois não haviam Estados potentes para protegerem seus residentes, [...]. Pequenas guerras entre os grupos ou clãs, capturas e sequestros, como o ocorrido com Equiano, fizeram das comunidades Igbo a segunda maior fornecedora de escravos ao mundo Atlântico [...]"*.

29 Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] as transformações da escravidão devem ter acompanhado as mudanças políticas que reuniram em micro-Estados, aldeias regidas por cabeças de linhagem, e desses micro-Estados, fizeram reinos, e dos reinos, impérios"*.

slavery, making it important for political figures to increase and centralize their power. As a result of this movement, slavery became more complex – through trafficking across the Red Sea, the Sahara and the Atlantic – in more centralized and hierarchical states.

However, Lovejoy (2002, 121, emphasis added by the author) argues that the situation of political fragmentation on the African continent along with the advances of Islamic, especially European, institutions in the slave trade, resulted in an Africa that "[...] remained the poor cousin of the world community [...] the continent's role seemed to be that of sending its people to the *plantations* and mines of the Americas"[30] and contributed to Africa remaining on the periphery of capitalism, even after the abolition of slavery in the Americas. These findings create an aesthetic of Africa that reduces and simplifies its image, measured from the judgment of values and the idea of progress, from the Eurocentric point of view, disregarding its complexities (Silva 2002). Silva (2003, 55) points out that Africa was "[...] a continent without external masters", as far as the beginning of the 19th century, with the exception of Cabo da Boa Esperança and Portuguese possessions, but without large territorial dimensions, as it was in colonialism[31]. The establishments of European origin fixed in both sides of the coast paid rents, taxes or trade fees to the local chiefs (Silva 2003).

For Thornton (2003), Europeans did not enter Africa for plunder, as they were traders in a more developed and advanced economy - with organizational advantages and more elaborate notions of profit. Trade with Africa had complex dimensions, very well worked out by African governors, who were looking above all for ways to maximize profits and avoid losses. This trade resulted in Europe's acceptance and trade in accordance with the numerous state control mechanisms of African elites.

The hypothesis that Africans were experienced traders is questioned by Lovejoy (2002) because of the demographic consequences, that is, the export of slaves would have been detrimental in relation to the loss of male adults, affecting sexual indexes, dependency rates and sexual divisions of labour (Thornton 2003). In regions where the number of male slaves was

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30 Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] continuou sendo o primo pobre da comunidade mundial [...] a função do continente parecia ser a de enviar o seu povo para as plantations e minas das Américas"*.

31 According to Silva (2003, 63) "[...] history has its ironies": in a British political movement, under the pretext of prohibiting the continuation of the slave trade and establishing control of the Atlantic, Europeans occupied Africa. With the help of gunpowder and new weapon technologies, they deposed African chiefs and elites and, consequently, destroyed monopolies, on which many founded their power. The "generous movement" to end human trafficking resulted in the colonization of Africa and the myth of the "civilizing mission".

higher than that of female, or when the distribution was uneven – due to the high export of slaves to the Americas and slaves to the Islamic world – the birth rate could suffer large declines in proportion to the population, resulting in a demographic imbalance (Lovejoy 2002). Thornton (2003) does not believe that Africans were forced to make irrational decisions, since the slave trade developed rationally by African societies, as the enslaved were the only form of profitable private property, different from the European system that was based on profits from land tenure.

Silva (2002, 98) also points to the enslaved as "[...] the only type of truly private capital asset recognized by the customary laws of most parts of the African continent"[32], different from Europe, in which the production of wealth was in the land. In Africa, on the other hand, the soil was the good that belonged to everyone, thus, those who had more slaves to work on the land would obtain more prestige and influences, and consequently produce wealth on the lands. However, it is worth mentioning that this currency of power was not guaranteed, since there was a cost to maintain and replace them in the event of escapes, illnesses, sacrifices, deaths, among other circumstances. In the case of escapes, the enslaved who were at risk could go against any region that would cause their capture again.

According to Manning (1998, 18), "[...] the main source of socio-demographic change was external influence"; thus, large-scale depopulation reached drastic numbers in the early 18th century, due to the sugar plantations in the colonies (Brazil, Barbados, Jamaica, among others). As a result, the prices of enslaved people (in decline) increased to the detriment of this intense demand (around 100 thousand per year, until the beginning of the 19th century). Thus, social transformation took place in the African continent, since this slave market – with new demands – caused impacts on demography, as mentioned above, and impacts on prices – around four times higher compared to the 17th century (Manning 1998).

As war was one of the main drivers that supported trafficking (transatlantic and trans-Saharan), it also enabled changes in the social organization of war itself and its technologies: that is, "[...] as the war gradually transformed from combat of elites, [...] and in objectives of territorial conquest, a proportionally inexhaustible flow of conflicts was released" (Manning 1998, 17)[33].

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32 Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] o único tipo de bem de capital verdadeiramente privado reconhecido pelas leis costumeiras de grande parte do continente africano".*

33 Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] à medida que a guerra foi-se transformando de combate de elites, [...] e em objetivos de conquista territorial, um fluxo proporcionalmente inesgotável de conflitos foi liberado".*

In summary, Manning (1998) defends the idea that the external influences on the African continent in the slave trade to the New World were intense enough to bring about social changes in African political structures.

Conclusion

From reading and analyzing excerpts from Equiano's autobiography, in light of the divergent debate of Africanist historiography, the work's important abolitionist characteristic is reinforced, as well as its contribution to the understanding of the Igbo-born main character's experiences. In this way, the divergences between the pre-existing power relations in Sub-Saharan Africa were highlighted, from Igbo point of view and the divergences among historians regarding violent forms or their absence in this context. Equiano told us about his experiences from before his kidnapping, such as the conflicts between different groups and their conquests, which included new subjects, as well as his first experiences as a captive living and working as an integrated member of a family distinct and far from his home region. His account incorporates a more melancholic tone from the narrative of his contact with European merchants inside the slave ship, highlighting the various forms of violence never experienced before, as narrated in this excerpt: "[...] the white people looked and acted, as I thought, in so savage a manner; for I had never seen among any people such instances of brutal cruelty"(Equiano 2005, n/p).

This statement by Equiano runs counter to the Eurocentric discourses present among missionaries during the slave trade and, above all, to the discourses that expanded throughout the 19th century regarding the concept of civility and progress defended by racial theories as opposed to "barbaric customs" and "savages" associated with the African continent. In this sense, it raises reflections about the contradictions present in world history, mainly in the construction of philanthropic discourses that remained rooted in literature for much of the 19th and 20th century (Visentini, Ribeiro and Pereira 2012).

His narrative was marked by a more intense suffering from the contact with the slave trade practiced by Europeans, showing the main characteristics of the concept of slavery and its possible transformations along the connections and external influences: "In this manner we continued to undergo more hardships than I can now relate, hardships which are inseparable from this accursed trade" (Equiano 2005, n/p). In Igbo, purchases of new slaves were not common, as well as kidnappings in large quantities,

however, after the external influences started by the slave trade in the Atlantic, kidnappings became more common. In Igbo, the kidnappers were called *Abam* and *Ekumeku* (Canto 2005).

According to Silva (2012), Equiano went first to Virginia and then to England; he acquired freedom in 1776 and died in 1797. After almost two centuries of his death, Equiano became a source of inspiration for the formation of the Igbos' identity during the 20th century, as stated by Canto (2015, 117):

> Equiano's autobiography has been obscured for a long time. Only in the sixties, in the period when Nigeria became independent and when the Biafra war exploded, did it surface again. Equiano's text is again a strong ideological weapon. If, during the period in which it was written, it had the pamphlet nature in relation to abolition, in the 20th century it will have the power to constitute the identity of the Igbos. Gustavus certainly did not imagine that his text would go through the centuries and be reborn again as a political tool.[34]

It was in the period when Nigeria was emancipated, in 1960, that Equiano's work became a key point as a political instrument of identity formation. Thus, the primary source highlighted is of paramount importance for greater understanding, not only for the outline established in this research, but also for understanding contemporary Nigeria and the formation of Brazil, since, "[...] Igbo [was] the second largest supplier of slaves to the Atlantic world" (Canto 2015, 95)[35].

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34 Translated by us. Originally: *"A autobiografia de Equiano ficou obscura durante muito tempo. Somente nos anos sessenta, no período em que a Nigéria se tornou independente e que explodiu a guerra da Biafra, é que ela veio à tona novamente. O texto de Equiano é novamente uma forte arma ideológica. Se, no período em que foi escrita, tinha o cunho panfletário em relação à abolição, no século XX vai ter o poder de constituir a identidade dos Igbos. Certamente Gustavus não imaginava que seu texto iria percorrer os séculos e renascer novamente como ferramenta política".*

35 Translated by us. Originally: *"[...] Igbo [foi] a segunda maior fornecedora de escravos ao mundo Atlântico".*

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ABSTRACT

The text seeks to debate fundamental concepts regarding the History of Africa theme, above all, the debate around the concept of dependency/slavery and its possible transformations in the face of external influences and connections with other cultures, such as Islam and Christianity. This text was developed from the historical autobiographical source of Olaudah Equiano and through the methodology of Adalberto Marson (1984). The objective is focused on advancing the conceptual debate through Africanist historiography and is justified by the importance of advancing research regarding the regional profile of Igbo, since it was one of the regions that most exported slaves to the American continent, having as great contribution to the formation of the American cultural identity.

Translated by Camila Andrade

AFRICAN STUDIES IN CHINA IN GLOBAL CONTEXT (1950-2020)

Li Anshan[1]

Introduction: China-African Relations, History and Present

China-Africa relations began in ancient times. A "Silk Road" already existed in the Han Dynasty (202 B.C.-220 A.D.). In 1993, Austrian archeologists discovered the fiber of worm-silk in the hair of a female corpse of the 21st Dynasty (1070-945.B.C.) in Egypt. Since only China had the technology for silk production at the time, the product was most probably made in China and transferred to Egypt.[2] According to Sun, there is a North Way and a South Way to connect China and the "West".[3] The "North Way", from Chang'an to Sogdiana, through the border between Sabbath and Rome, by water to Syria, Damascus, and Gaza, finally reached Alexandria in Egypt. This is the main trade route from China to Egypt. The "South Way", from Loulan to Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, and then southward to the upper reaches of the Sindhu River, then to the port of Karachi, and finally reached the Western and Indian Ocean countries. There are other connections between China and Africa as well (Xu, Y. 2019; Li, A. 2019).

Besides the land route, there is a Maritime Silk Road. Historically, various ports along the East African coast by the West Indian Ocean were important destinations for maritime traffic between China and Africa, or a middle station for the Chinese travel boats to continue further to Europe. According to historical records, the names of Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Madagascar, and other countries all appeared in various

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1   School of International Studies, Peking University, Beijing, China and University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Sichuan, China. E-mail: anshanli@pku.edu.cn

2   "Egypt used Chinese silk 3000 years ago", April 2, 1993, *People's Daily*.

3   "West" in ancient China indicates the foreign land west of China, including Mid-Asia and West Asia, North Africa and further westwards (Sun 1979).

travel notes and in the official history of ancient China. China's maritime contact with Africa, especially East Africa, took place long before Da Gama's voyage around the Cape of Good Hope to East Africa. Cities in Africa did act as ports, supply depots, settlements, and protection areas in China's maritime endeavors in ancient times.

At the present, the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) tries to link the world with capital, trade, and personnel. Africa can play an even more important role. It is found that the BRI is constantly making African countries gradually involved. At first, the proposed 65 countries in the BRI included Egypt as the only African country. Later, a Chinese official mentioned African countries as the "natural extension" of One Belt One Road (OBOR). During his visit to Madagascar, Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed that "both countries seize the two major opportunities for international cooperation respectively brought about by the implementation of the outcome of the 2015 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Johannesburg and the promotion of international cooperation under Belt and Road Initiative".[4] This invitation was confirmed when President Xi Jinping met Madagascar's President Hery Rajaonarimampianina and both countries signed the "Maritime Road Memorandum of Understanding".[5] Until now, 37 African countries have signed the MOU or other BRI agreements with China in the past two years.[6]

Yet what is the role that Africa can play in the BRI? In general, ports on the East coast of Africa are a key part of the Maritime Silk Road. African islands in the West Indian Ocean constitute an expressive fulcrum of maritime traffic. Maritime safety in the Gulf of Aden is an important guarantee for the international sea route, and Africa is becoming an important investment and trade partner of Asian countries. Africa is an important hub and transshipment point for maritime exchanges between Asia and Europe. The BRI is supposed to bring mutual benefits to both China and its partners. China has gained a great deal from Africa, such as political support and economic benefits, which go both ways. There are examples of bilateral cooperation in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, etc., such as the Chinese Light Rail in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the first batch of Kenyan female drivers in Mombasa-Nairobi Railway, the Chinese-built Dar es Salaam University Library, among others. All symbolize the concrete results of cooperation related to the BRI in Africa.

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4   "Chinese FM meets Madagascar's president on cooperation under Belt-Road Initiative", January 8, 2017, Xinhaunet.

5   "Xi meets Madagascar's president", September 5, 2018, *China Daily*.

6   "China signed BRI Memorandum with 37 African countries and AU", September 7, 2018. Chinese Government Net.

In addition, there is a great deal of similarity between Chinese and African civilizations and many aspects that both can learn from each other (Li, A. 2014). That is why mutual understanding/learning is very important for both sides. Thus, African studies become a vital factor in promoting bilateral relations and facilitating the implementation of the BRI.

African Studies in China: Four Generations

China's African studies have gone through the efforts of four generations. My two articles have explored China's African studies in the 20th and 21st century (Li, A. 2005; 2016a). Here is a brief survey of the achievements of the four generations.[7]

China's African studies began with a focus on Egypt. Duanfang (1861-1911), an epigraphist in the late Qing Dynasty, collected Egyptian antiquities. Huang Junsheng and Li Dongfang studied Egyptian characters in the early 20th century (刘文鹏 2002). Xia Nai, the "father of Chinese Egyptology", mastered hieroglyphs and participated in the archaeological excavation in Egypt while studying in London (颜海英 2008). At the beginning of the 20th Century, Chinese scholars began to study the early Sino-African exchanges. The understanding and systematic study of Africa itself began with the establishment of new China. The first generation (1950s-1970s) includes Zhang Tiesheng, Yang Renpian, Na Zhong, and Zhang Tongzhu. Zhang Tiesheng (1904-1979) was the first leader of the Institute of West Asian and African Studies (hereafter IWAAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (hereafter CASS), formerly under the Section of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and he published a book on China-Africa relations (张铁生 1973). Yang Renpian (1903-1973), of Peking University, graduated from Oxford University majoring in French history, changed his field to African history in 1958 and cultivated younger scholars (俞莉琪 2014). His work was later collated and published by his students (杨人梗 1984). Na Zhong (1909-2008), of Beijing Foreign Studies University, graduated from Azhar University in Egypt in 1940. He studied the Egyptian and Arabic history all his life (纳忠 1963; 1998). He was president of the Chinese Society of African Historical Studies (张惠文 1983; 杨孝柏、马为公 1986; 1987; 朱威烈 2004).[8] Zhang Tongzhu (1915-2008), of Nanjing University, established

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7   For a history of China's African studies, see 李安山 2006; 张宏明 2011;《中国非洲史研究会三十年》编委会 2011; 舒运国 2012.

8   "Professor Na Zhong", September 15, 2011.

the African Geography Research Office in 1965 and coordinated the national project "Strategic Study on African Economic and Social Development" and the research on African economic development (张同铸 1992).[9] Although Professor Zhou Yiliang didn't specialize in African history, he discussed the history of China-Africa relations early on in a Ghanaian journal (Chou 1972).

The second generation was from the 1980s to the end of the 20th century. Since the reform and opening up, scholars have gained unprecedented opportunities. This generation includes university professors and researchers from different institutions. In the CASS for example, scholars of the IWAAS such as Ge Ji, Zhao Guozhong, Tu Erkang, Chen Gongyuan, Wu Bingzhen, Yang Lihua, Xu Jiming, Gao Jinyuan, Wu Qiyang, Tang Dadun, and others., Yang Haocheng and Peng Kunyuan of the Institute of World History, Ge Gongshang of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Xia Jisheng, Zheng Jiaxin, Lu Ting'en, He Fangchuan, and Ning Sao of Peking University, Zhang Wenchun of Beijing Normal University, Zeng Zungu, Su Shirong, and Jiang Zhongjin of Nanjing University, AI Zhouchang of East China Normal University, Gu Zhangyi of Minzu University of China, Li Guangyi of Xiangtan University, Zhao Shuhui of Renmin University, Shen Fuwei of Suzhou University, Xu Yongzhang of Zhengzhou University, Zhang Xiang of Nankai University. Liu Wenpeng of Inner Mongolia University for Nationalities has trained a number of scholars for Chinese Egyptology (王海利 2008；郭子林 2008；李长林 2009；田明、王泰 2010). Gao Jinyuan, He Fangchuan, Ge Ji, Yang Lihua, and other scholars published articles in English (Gao 1984; He, F. 1987; Ge 1997; Yang, L. 2006; 2015). The achievements of this generation include three aspects: Institutional Construction, organizational work, and academic achievements. Institutional Construction: the Chinese Association of African Studies was established in 1979, and the Chinese Society of African Historical Studies in 1980. Organizational work: they organized various meetings of African scholars from different institutions and universities, and coordinated debates and research on various issues. Academic achievements: they published research works, especially the publication of the "African Studies'' series and other reference books,[10] as well as the translation of various African books and the UNESCO General History of Africa (1-8 volumes). Some of them continue to work in the 21st century.

9　Wu Nan, "Academicians memorized the hundred anniversary of Mr. Zhang Tongzhu", December 1, 2015.

10　The most prominent is the publication of three volumes of *General History of Africa* (1996), Ge Jie, ed. *Concise Encyclopaedia of Sub-Saharan Africa* (2000) and Zhao Guozhong, ed., *Concise Encyclopaedia of West Asia and North Africa (Middle East)* (2000). For more details, see Li, A. 2005, 2016.

The establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) ushered in a new era of African studies in China. The cooperation between China and Africa needs the support of academia, which must also meet the requirements of the government, the business community, and the public. The third generation of scholars has received formal training and academic background. They have more opportunities to visit Africa than their predecessors, either receive education or training abroad, and gradually engage with international academia. The national emphasis on academic research has provided various funds and favorable conditions, thus promoting the academic community to pay attention to research topics related to Africa. Shu Yunguo, Yang Guang, Zhang Hongming, Li Xinfeng, Liu Qinjian, Liu Hongwu, Yan Haiying, Jin Shoufu, Mu Tao, Zhang Zhongxiang, and Zhu Zhenwu, among others, have successively undertaken or participated in major national research projects on African history, China's African strategy, EU's aid to Africa, history of China-Africa relations, China-Africa cooperation, and African literature. They are deepening their research on Africa. Take the project "African Economic History" as an example. On the one hand, it is recognized that China's research level on African economic history is not high compared with that of foreign countries, "so it is difficult for China's version of African economic history to catch up with the world's cutting-edge level in the overall research level"; on the other hand, "China's version of African economic history still has its own characteristics, such as making full use of Chinese ancient books and materials, comprehensively and in-depth elaboration of China-Africa economic and trade relations and unique historical stages of African Economic History" (舒运国 2019, 126-133; 2019a, 133-147). African languages are taught in many universities. The publication of various works and translations has opened up readers' horizons, and the construction of African country studies and think-tanks are a good attempt. African research institutions have various publications, thus contributing to the popularization and deepening of African research. They have strengthened closer ties with relevant national ministries and commissions,

The new era brings new requirements. A group of young African researchers constitutes the fourth generation. These scholars have received strict academic training, have good foreign language communication skills with field work experience. At the same time, they are closely connected with the international academic network and highly sensitive to new research trends. Wang Haili (2010; 2013; 2014) of Beijing Normal University and Guo Dantong (2005; 2011; 2015) of Shanghai University have studied the history of ancient Egypt for a long time and published many monographs, in addition to promoting exchanges with the international academic community. Young

scholars of the CASS' IWAAS have achieved fruitful results in the past three years, such as Zhu Weidong, specialized in African Law (2018), Yang Baorong, committed to African economy and China-Africa relations (2018), Wang Jinyan, exploring the tribal issues in Libya (2016), Xu Guoqing, evaluating India's African Policy (2017), Zhi Yuchen, studying the role of China's central enterprises in China-Africa relations and the basic elements in African economic development (2016 and 2018), Zhao Yating, focusing on the EU's assistance to Africa (2019), and others who have their own research focus.

Young scholars either study a particular country or a certain topic, such as Liu Weicai, interested in the history of Southern Africa, African integration and China-Africa relations, with a few publications (2018), Guan Peifeng's analysis of African border disputes and settlement model (2017), Niu Changshong's study on Zimbabwe's Higher Education (2017), Shen Xipeng's probe on China's assistance in the construction of Tanzania Zambia Railway (2018), Zhou Yuyuan's assessment of African autonomy (2017), Song Wei's analysis of the U.S. policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa after the Cold War (2018), Cheng Cheng's focus on China-Africa Financial Cooperation (2018), Li Pengtao's analysis of issues related to colonialism and social change in British Africa (2019), and Wang Congyue's interpretation of the security policies of US and EU in North Africa (2019). The youngsters are either proficient in academic research or extensive in scope. Some are concerned about one certain country, such as Li Wengang (Nigeria), Jiang Hengkun (the Sudan), Xiao Yuhua (Ethiopia), Shen Xiaolei (Zimbabwe), etc. Some are interested in specific theme, such as Li Weijian's research on Islam in Africa, Zhang Yonghong's emphasis on local knowledge, He Jian's study on African ocean issues, Jiang Huajie's focus on China's assistance to Africa, Liang Yijian's probe on Peer Review System, Wang Tao's interest on anti-terrorism, and Zhang Jin's exploration on the water environment in Africa. Zhang Yong is the first scholar to study African film and, with African scholar Dr. Hodan, has made a film that has become well-known in China and Africa. In recent years, the young scholars have obtained funding for research projects either from the National Fund or the Ministry of Education. In 2019, for example, Zhou Yuyuan, Huang Yupei, Jiang Hui, Li Beilei, Zheng Xiaoxia and others won National Social Science Fund support for projects on African countries' relations, debt issues, African literature, Afro-American literature, African women's studies, etc.

In recent years, young scholars who studied abroad have come back and have demonstrated their full strength. For example, Ha Wei, a PhD in public policy from Harvard University, returned to work at the Graduate School of Education in Peking University after working in the World Bank and

in United Nations agencies. Tang Xiaoyang once worked in foreign research institutions and universities after receiving his PhD from the New School for Social Research in New York and now works in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University. After graduating from Georgetown University, Wen Shuang, who once taught at New York University (Abu Dhabi), now teaches history at Beijing Foreign Studies University. Qiu Yu received her PhD from the University of Cambridge and currently teaches in the School of Ethnology and Sociology of Minzu University of China. Yuan Ding of Shanghai Normal University received two PhDs from Yunnan University and Leuven University at the same time. Lu Lingyu of Yunnan University received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Missouri. After graduating from Westminster University, Dr. Xiang Yu teaches in the School of Journalism and Communication of Shanghai University. Dr. Zhou Yang, of Nanjing Agricultural University, graduated from the University of Cologne, Germany. Chen Liang, of the School of Sociology and Anthropology of Sun Yat-sen University, received his PhD from the Australian National University, specializing in urbanization and African studies. Yang Beibei, of the School of Health Care Management of Shandong University, obtained her PhD of medical anthropology from Southern Methodist University. Tsinghua University's Development Program has sent out many students abroad and Dr. Gao Liangmin from the Department of Sociology is among the first to complete the degree. Liu Shaonan of the School of History, Beijing Normal University, received his PhD from Michigan State University, the best in African studies in the United States. Lian Chaoqun and Cheng Ying both obtained MA degrees from Peking University, completed their doctoral studies at University of Cambridge and University of London respectively. With his PhD in law from Peking University, Xu Liang obtained his PhD in history from Harvard University. Currently, the three have become the backbone of the Center for African Studies of Peking University.

Some scholars hold graduate degrees directly in Africa. For example, Dr. Sun Xiaomeng, of Beijing Foreign Studies University, received her MA in Hausa language in Nigeria. Zhang Qiaowen, of China Africa International Business School of Zhejiang Normal University, received her PhD in business management from Stellenbosch University in South Africa. Dr. Ma Xiujie of the School of Asian and African Studies, Beijing Foreign Studies University, studied at Rhodes University for seven years. She is proficient in English, Xhosa and Zulu, and can communicate with Ndebele and Swazi. Ma Jie, of the China Institute of International Studies, received her MA degree from Addis Ababa University. In addition, many students are currently studying

for degrees abroad. What's more, Chinese scholars are increasingly confident in international academia.

Chinese Scholars' Engagement in International Community

There is no doubt that China's African study is not as advanced as expected, yet the situation is changing. Chinese scholars have actively participated in academic exchanges around the world and gradually gained recognition from international academia. In addition to the participation of many Chinese scholars in international seminars and cooperation projects, and African research institutions in China frequently organizing academic seminars with international academic circles, especially African scholars, their engagement is reflected in three aspects: showing their own characteristics in some research fields, getting more attention in the international community, and increasing international publications.

Chinese scholars began to show their own characteristics, which made them outstanding in some international research fields. Justin Yifu Lin and Celestin Monga, a Cameroonian scholar, edited The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics (Monga and Lin, J. Y. 2015). Works on China-Africa cooperation were jointly edited by Chinese and international, especially African, scholars (Li, A. and F.Y. April 2013; Shelton, April, and Li, A. 2015; Berhe and Liu 2013; Monga and Lin, J.Y. 2015; Alden *et al.* 2018). Some scholars have been invited to write relevant chapters in different encyclopedia or handbooks of various disciplines published by internationally renowned publishers, such as Ge Ji, Li Anshan, Xu Liang, Zhang Chun, Sun Xiaomeng, Tang Xiaoyang, and Cheng Ying who have put forward their viewpoints on different subjects such as China's African studies, China's African policy and Chinese immigration in Africa, contemporary China-Africa relations, re-conceptualizing China-Africa engagement, China's African language research, Africa's China economic and trade cooperation zone, Africa-China drama exchange (Ge 1997; Li, A. 2013c; Akyeampong and Xu 2015; Zhang, C. 2017; Sun, X. 2019; Tang, X. 2019; Cheng 2019). Some have become editorial board members or peer reviewers of international journals. Governmental organizations from developed nations such as the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, and Japan have held seminars on China-Africa relations and invited Chinese scholars, or are frequently sending personnel to visit China's African research institutions. The Foreign Ministry of other governments also invited Chinese scholars to

explain the current situation of China-Africa cooperation.[11] All indicates the influence and competitiveness of Chinese scholars in the world.

The international community is increasing its attention to scholars of African studies in China. Professor Na Zhong, Honorary President of the Chinese Society of African Historical Studies, was awarded the first International Prize of the Arabic Language Sharjah by UNESCO in Paris on October 25, 2001. In 2002, Yan Haiying was invited to attend the research database project of ancient Greek Olympic Games hosted by Willy Clarisse, academician of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Belgium and professor of Department of Classics of the KU Leuven. In 1998, Jin Shoufu, a PhD student in Egyptology of Heidelberg University, participated in the excavation of the Tomb of Thebes Amenhotep III by the archaeology team of Waseda University from Japan. In 2000, he also participated in the excavation of the official Tomb of Luxor in Egypt by Heidelberg University. On May 24, 2013, Yang Lihua and Li Anshan, at the invitation of the African Diplomatic Corps in China, gave keynote speeches at the seminar "Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance" held at Kempinski Hotel to celebrate the Golden Jubilee of the OAU/AU on September 9, 2013.[12] Zhu Weidong was appointed to the International Commercial Panel by the Arbitration Foundation of Southern Africa (AFSA).[13] On September 19, 2013, Li Anshan was invited to participate in the "symposium to celebrate the 15th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Africa" and delivered a speech at the launch of the new book edited by himself and by South African scholar F.Y. April in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Africa (Li, A. and April 2013).[14] On November 3, 2013, Li Anshan was invited by the Director General of UNESCO, Irina Bokova, to participate in the International

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11   For example, on June 13, 2014, Li Anshan and two Norwegian scholars in Ch. Michelsen Institute were invited to meet with officials of the Africa Department at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to exchange ideas on China-Africa relations. On November 10, 2016, after meeting with Ms. U. Dwarka-Canabady of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mauritius, Li Anshan gave a lecture on "Development cooperation between China and Africa: Concept and Practice" in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mauritius, and exchanged ideas with more than 50 diplomats, including the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Professor Li Anshan, an expert on African issues, comes to Mauritius for academic exchanges".

12   "African Diplomatic Mission in China held the Golden Jubilee of the OAU/AU Seminar in Beijing".

13   "Zhu Weidong of Center for African Law was appointed to the International Commercial Panel by the Arbitration Foundation of Southern Africa", Xiangtan University Law School, November 4, 2013.

14   "China-South African held seminar to celebrate the 15th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations", Chinanet, September 20, 2013.

Scientific Committee of UNESCO General History of Africa (volume 9, later expanded to 9-11 volumes), and was elected Vice Chairman of the Committee at the first meeting held in Brazil.[15] The McMillan Center of Yale University invited Li Anshan and Ibrahim Gambari, former Foreign Minister of Nigeria and former Under Secretary General of the United Nations, to co-chair the international seminar on "Africa-China Relations: Balance, Growth and Sustainable Future" held in Nigeria from March 15-18, 2016, and the seminar held at Beijing Forum of Peking University in November 2017.[16] In 2018, Liu Haifang was appointed member of the Executive Board of the CA/AC Research Network. It is encouraging that some young scholars' capability has been recognized by international academia. For example, Cheng Ying's doctoral thesis won the Best Doctoral Thesis Award of the Lagos Studies Association, the first among Chinese scholars. Dr. Liu Shaonan was the first Asian scholar to receive the Graduate Student Paper Prize Winner at the 2018 annual meeting of the U.S. African Studies Association.[17] Dr. Zhou Yang's thesis on cross-cultural marriage between China and Africa was awarded the "*sehr gut*: 1.0 (excellent)" level.

The international publication of Chinese scholars is also increasing. In the 1990s, Chinese scholars published few articles in international academia. In 1995, Yan Haiying, of Peking University, presented a paper at the 7th International Egyptologist Conference held in Cambridge, which attracted the attention of the international academic community (Yan, H. 1998). After graduating from the University of Toronto and working at Peking University in 1994, Li Anshan put forward his own views on Ghana's history (Li, A. 1994; 1995). Since the end of the 20th century, the research on Africa or China-Africa relations has been strengthened, and scholars have published more and more in international academia, presenting their opinions in the form of monographs, anthologies or papers. For example, Jin Shoufu, of Fudan University, studies ancient Egyptian papyrus documents and theoc-

15 "Report of the meeting: International Scientific Committee for the drafting of Volume IX of the General History of Africa", Salvador, 20-24 November 2013; Chen Zhenyun, "Let the great African history tell the future – Interview with Li Anshan, Vice Chair of the International Scientific Committee of UNESCO General History of Africa (9-11 Vols.)", *Peking University Gazette*, January 10, 2020. See also the net version in The Paper website.

16 "Professor Li Anshan, Chair of the Chinese Society of African Historical Studies, was invited to co-chair the seminar on China-African Relations", World History Research of China Net. In 2014, Li Anshan gave lectures/speeches as AFRASO Professor at Frankfurt University. In 201, during former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's visit, Peking University sent him as a gift Li Anshan's monographs on Ghanaian history both in Chinese and English.

17 "Graduate Student Paper Prize Winners".

racy (2000; 2001a; 2001b; 2003a; 2003b 2003c; 2004; 2005). Li Anshan's monographs probe the colonial rule and rural protest in Ghana and the history of China in Africa (Li, A. 2002a; 2012a). Yan Haiying states her own view on Ptolemy's Stele (Yan, H. 2007). They have also introduced the research status of China to international circles, such as Yan Haiying's research on ancient Egyptian cultural relics collected in China (Yan, H. 2006a; 2006b), Wang Haili's analysis on Chinese research methods of Egyptian hieroglyphs with the introduction of Professor Liu Wenpeng (Wang, H. 2013; 2015), Wen Shuang's introduction to Chinese Arabic research (Wen, S. 2015), Li Anshan's review of African studies in China in different periods (2005; 2007c; 2008a; 2010b; 2019; 2019a).

International academia pays more attention to Chinese works, and this is greatly increasing. Their papers mainly focus on China-Africa relations. K.K. Prah, a Ghanaian scholar now working in South Africa, the Kenyan scholar J. Shikwati, the German Boer foundation, and African NGO Faham made special collections for seminars on China Africa Cooperation (Prah 2007; Shikwati 2012; Harneit-Sievers *et al.* 2010), that reflect the understanding of China-Africa cooperation between the two sides. Three collections of papers jointly compiled by Chinese scholars alongside South African and Ethiopian scholars express the representative opinions of both sides on China-Africa cooperation. These anthologies include the papers of Zeng Qiang, Yang Lihua, An Chunying, He Wenping, Hong Yonghong, Li Baoping, Li Zhibiao, Zhang Yongpeng, Liu Hongwu, Shi Lin, Zhang Chun, Liang Yijian, Tang Xiaoyang, Xiao Yuhua, Zhi Yingbiao, Luo Jianbo, Li Xinfeng, Wang Nan, Pang Zhongying, Wang Xuejun, Li Anshan, Xiao Hongyu, Xu Liang, Zeng Aiping, Zhang Weijie, etc., which show the Chinese understanding of Sino-African partnership. In general, Chinese scholars either discuss China's African policy and its role and influence (Zeng, Q. 2002; 2010; Li, B. 2007; 2008; Li, A. 2007a; 2008c; Zhang, Y. 2007; He, W. 2008d; 2009a; 2010b; Pan 2011a; 2014; Luo, J. and Zhang, X. 2015; Liu, H. 2017; 2018; Li, X., Li, Y., and Zhang, M. 2019), or macro analysis of BRICs Cooperation (Li, A. 2013a; Li, H. 2017), international cooperation or aid (He, W. 2010c; Zhang, X. 2011; Liu, H. 2015a), industry and mining (An 2002; Wang, X. 2013; Tang, X. 2014a; 2014b; 2019; Xu, L.; 2019; Zhao, S. *et al.* 2019), economic technology (Zeng, Q. 2002; He, W. 2006; 2012a; Tang, X. 2011; 2014c; Liu, H. and Monson 2011; Zhang, J. 2015; Li, A. 2016b), medical and health (Li, A. 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2013d; Lin, S. *et al.* 2016), culture and education (Liu, H. 2008; 2010; Li, B. and Luo, J. 2013; Li, A. 2011d; 2012b; 2018a; Li, X., Wang, N. and F. Y. April 2013; Li, X., Li, Y. and Zhang, M. 2019; Xiang, Y. 2018a; 2018b; Pan 2019; Qiu 2019), law and governance (Hong 2007; 2010;

Zhu, W. 2008; 2009; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2017; Xia, X. and Xiao, Y. 2011; Zeng, A. 2015), Two-way migration (Zhang, L. 2008; Li, Z. *et al.* 2009; 2012; Li, A. 2009a; 2010a; 2012a; 2015b; 2016a; 2016b; 2017a; 2017b; 2018a; 2018b; Yang, Y. 2011; Niu, D. 2018).

Young scholars who come back to China from abroad have published many articles internationally. Wen Shuang focuses on the history of China-Egypt relations and Asia-Africa exchanges (Wen, S. 2014; 2015; 2016; 2016a; 2019). Zhang Qiaowen has noted the role of the China-Africa Development Fund (Zhang, Q. 2015a; 2015b). Cheng Ying specializes in Nigerian drama and the exchange of Chinese and African Drama (Cheng 2014; 2016a; 2016b; 2018a; 2018b; 2019). Xu Liang studies the economic development of South Africa and the role of Chinese (Xu, L. 2015; 2015a; 2017; 2019). Tang Xiaoyang's articles on China-Africa relations are noticed among scholars (Tang, X. 2016; 2016a; 2018; 2019; 2019a; Monson, Tang, X. and Liu, S. 2017; Brautigam, Weis and Tang 2018). Lian Chaoqun produces articles on Arab politics and culture in English and Arabic (Lian 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2018). Qiu Yu discusses social aspects of China-Africa contact, especially corporate ethics (Qiu 2018). Yuan Ding created an English proper noun "Guoke" (过客) on the basis of his own study (Pang, C. and Yuan, D. 2013; Yuan, D. and Pang, D. 2018)[18] and of others' previous research, especially Niu Dong's study on Africans in Guangzhou which took the Chinese concept "过客" (Niu 2015; 2015a; 2016) which translates to "transient" in his English article (Niu 2018). Liu Shaonan examined the contribution of overseas Chinese to Nigerian local society (Liu, S. 2019). The *Journal of Ancient Civilizations*, a journal in English issued by the Institute for the History of Ancient Civilizations in Northeast Normal University, published relevant articles (Guo 1995; 1998; 1999; 2002; 2003; 2004). *World History Studies*, an English journal of the Institute of World History, CASS, also published articles on Africa (Guo 2015; 2017; Li, A. 2015c; 2017c; Wang, H. 2017; Song, H. and Guo, D. 2018; Guo, X. and Guo, D. 2019). Other English journals in China such as *Contemporary International Relations* by China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, *China International Studies* by China Institute of International Studies, *Global Review* by Shanghai Institutes of International Studies and *China International Strategy Review* by Institute of International and Strategic Studies Peking University, publish related articles occasionally (Liu, H. 2012; He, W. 2012b; Liu, Q. and Zhao, Y. 2016; Zeng A. and Shu, Z. 2018; Li, A. 2018c). *Journal of China-Africa Studies* (in Chinese, English,

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18 "Yuan Ding: A 'Guo Ke's self-description", January 18, 2018.

and French), newly published by China-Africa Institute, will provide a new platform for the international exchange of China's African studies.

African Research Institutions in China

There are three pioneers institutions in African research: the West Asia Africa Research Group, of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, set up in 1956 and the Institute of West Asia and African Studies established in 1961; the African History Research Office, of Peking University, set up in 1958 and the Institute of Afro-Asian Studies established in 1965; the African Geography Research Office, of Nanjing University, set up in 1964 and the Institute of African Studies established in 1992. After the reform and opening up, many universities have established teaching and research institutions related to Africa, including Xiangtan University (1978), East China Normal University (1985), Shanghai Normal University (1998), Yunnan University (1998), among others. With the establishment of FOCAC and the rapid development of China-Africa relations, African research institutions have sprung up, such as the Center for African Studies of Peking University (2000), the Center for African Education Studies of Zhejiang Normal University (2003), renamed as the Institute of African Studies in 2007, the Center for African Vocational Education Studies of Tianjin University of Technology and Education (2005), renamed as Center of African Union Studies in 2012, the Center for African Agricultural Studies of Nanjing Agricultural University (2006), the Center for African Studies of Yunnan University (2007), the Center for African Studies of East China Normal University (2010), renamed as Institute of African Studies in 2011, etc. African language teaching started early in China, mainly focusing on Swahili and Hausa. Beijing Foreign Studies University, Tianjin Foreign Studies University, Communication University of China, Peking University, Shanghai International Studies University, and others now begin to attach importance to African languages. Some students are sent to Africa to learn Swahili, Amharic, Hausa, Yoruba, Zulu, Xhosa, and other African languages. In addition to government ministries and subordinate institutions (such as the Development Research Center of the State Council and the Party School of the Central Committee of CP), more than 30 African research institutions have been established, with journals, weekly reports, annual reports, websites, and various publications.

Among the African research institutions, the IWAAS of the CASS has an irreplaceable position. In addition to its outstanding institutions, personnel, conditions, and project funding, it has published the *Annual Report*

on Development in the Middle East and Africa or the *Yellow Book of Middle East and Africa* since 1998, covering the current situation and characteristics of African affairs every year. In 2012, the *Yellow Book of Africa* and the *Annual Report on Development of Africa* were separated into publications of their own, thus becoming important references for African studies and the forecast of African affairs. In recent years, its journal *West Asia and Africa* (created in 1980) has gained great influence under the editorship of An Chunying and Zhan Shiming, greatly promoting the study of African issues and China-Africa relations. In 2019, 10 articles of the journal were reprinted by *Chinese Social Science Abstracts* and *Periodical Materials Photocopied by Renmin University of China*. The China-Africa Institute, founded on the basis of the IWAAS in 2019, has made its African research more focused and interacted frequently with African academic institutions. The Institute has launched two batches of cooperative research projects with the African scholars (4 in the first batch and 14 in the second), covering political, economic, social, cultural, and other aspects. The newly founded flagship *Journal of China-Africa Studies* will adhere to "the principles of academic quality, innovation, and openness, the journal will publish high-quality academic papers on Africa studies, China studies, and China-Africa relations by scholars from all over the world", being "dedicated to promoting outstanding academic works, facilitating academic exchanges, reflecting new academic trends", which is believed to provide a platform for China-Africa cooperation. [19]

The Center for African Studies of Peking University was established in 2000. Prior to the establishment of FOCAC, it was arranged to hold an "International Forum on China Africa Cooperation", and has carried out long-term academic cooperation with key African countries such as Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria. In addition to the *Annual Review of African Studies in China*, PKU African Tele-Info as a weekly journal has operated for nearly 10 years and published more than 400 issues in electronic form with more than 6000 users, having a great impact at home and abroad. The Institute of African Studies of Nanjing University has achieved fruitful works on African economic geography. It began to publish an annual report, the *African Development Studies*, in 2017, and also published the compilation of research materials on African economic geography and regional development in 2019 (6 volumes) including the papers and reports on African issues that were not made public during 1964-1986, which have important academic value and

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19 The institutions involved in the first and second batches of joint-research projects are those of South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Cameroon, Mauritius, Morocco, etc. China-Africa Institute issued the notice of the third batch of joint-research projects in December 2019.

practical significance. In Xiangtan University, after the establishment of the Center for African Legal and Social Studies on the basis of its African studies, the Center has published *African Law Review*, focusing on legal research in Africa, with rich achievements. The Center for African Studies of Shanghai Normal University has achieved great progress in recent years. In addition to holding regular African Economic seminars, it has also published *African Economic Review* (created in 2012) and *African Economic Development Report* (created in 2014). The African Institute of East China Normal University has its focus on East Africa, mainly in Tanzania, Uganda, and other countries. The research team has translated four volumes of Julius Nyerere's works and holds seminars on African art. As a new force, the Institute of African Studies of Zhejiang Normal University has made great achievements. It publishes *African Studies*, *Annual Report on the Development of Africa*, and *African Studies Series*, it has established an African Museum and many research centers for education, film, anthropology, etc. The Center for African Studies of Yunnan University has produced many works. In recent years, it has absorbed talents and has begun to explore its own focus according to its location characteristics and research team. The School of Asian and African Studies of Beijing Foreign Studies University (now the independent School of African Studies) has long had the characteristics of African language teaching and scientific research. It publishes *Asian and African Studies* (created in 2007) and has sent teachers and students to study local languages in Africa. The Center for African Media Studies of Communication University of China was founded in 2012 and has trained a lot of professionals for China-Africa news communication and exchange.

Newly established African research institutions put emphasis on strengthening their own characteristics, some of them make full use of the advantages of setting up Confucius Institutes in African countries. The Center of African Union Studies of Tianjin University of Technology and Education makes full use of the Confucius Institute in Ethiopia. On the one hand, it promotes the development of African educational cooperation. On the other hand, it is committed to carrying out research on African Union organizations in politics, economy, culture, and other aspects to provide intellectual support for national strategy. Yangzhou University established the Center for Sudanese Studies in 2012 and recruited two Sudanese researchers to cooperate with Sudanese universities. Its research focuses on the history of Sudan in the colonial period, Islamic movement, foreign relations, higher education, the dilemma after the political mutation, the production of an annual report and the manual of the religious situation, etc. The *Centre de Recherche Sur Madagascar* of Jiangxi Normal University employs two Malagasy researchers

to conduct a follow-up study on Madagascar based on the ten-year experience and achievements of the Confucius Institute in Madagascar. Its website has its own characteristics, especially the relevant laws and regulations of Madagascar. The School of Sociology and Anthropology of Sun Yat-sen University, making full use of its own advantages, has held two successive seminars on "Ancient and Modern China-Africa Relations" focusing on "field research methodology of African anthropology". It has also conducted anthropological field research in Ethiopia and archaeological excavations with international scholars in Kenya.[20] Founded in 2016, the Institute for African Studies of Guangdong University of Foreign Studies pays great attention to social practice and has carried out a variety of activities at home and abroad in recent years. The Center for African Studies of Jinan University and the Center for African Studies of Wuhan University mainly rely on foreign language research and teaching talents, having their studies focused on African French speaking countries. The Center for African Coastal States Studies of Zhejiang Ocean University focuses on nine coastal States, including Senegal. Research institutions of China Foreign Affairs University, Hunan Normal University, and others are also following suit.[21]

The African study in the School of Social and Anthropology of Xiamen University has been fruitful due to the invitation of Professor Augustin Holl (who uses the Chinese name Gao Chang) to join the team. Professor Gao Chang is a Cameroonian scholar and a famous archaeologist. He once served as Professor/Curator of the Museum of Anthropology of the University of Michigan (2000-2008) and Vice President of Université Paris X (2012-2014). At the invitation of Xiamen University, he resigned from the CNRS (*Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique*) in 2017 and went to teach at the Department of Anthropology and Ethnology of Xiamen University. Later, he donated his archaeological and cultural collections to Xiamen University for teaching and research purposes and established an archaeological anthropology laboratory. He led Chinese students to Senegal for archaeological excavation in the summer of 2018 and published a large number of papers and research reports in international academic journals (Holl 2017; 2018; 2019a; 2019b; 2019c; Holl and Bocoum 2017; Silva Santos, Symanski and Holl 2019).[22] In 2017, the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China established the

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20 Wang Xiaopeng & Lu Duobao, "Remains of Chinese consanguinity during the Zheng He's period are discovered in Kenya", July 29, 2017.

21 For details, please refer to "Notes on the chronicle of African studies in China since 1949: Taking the research institutions and academic journals as the main line".

22 "Featured Interview: Professor Augustin F. C. Holl", Office of International Cooperation and Exchange/Office of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, November 1, 2019.

Center for West African Studies (CWAS) together with five universities in Ghana: University of Ghana (UG), University of Cape Coast (UCC), Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA), University of Education at Winneba (UEW), University for Development Studies (UDS). The two sides have jointly held a seminar to promote cooperation in education and scientific research. Currently, the CWAS regularly issues annual reports in Chinese and English. One of CWAS's innovative ways is for African and Chinese scholars to publish articles together. This joint research has achieved good results (Ameyaw and Li 2018; Asare and Shao 2018; Asare-Kyire *et al.* 2018; Boadi *et al.* 2018; Boadi *et al.* 2018a; Lartey and Li. 2018; Dumor and Li 2019; Zhao, S. *et al.* 2018). In 2020, two works on China-Africa relations were published (Tang, X. 2020; Li, A. 2020).

New trends of African research in China

The most important factor in the study of liberal arts and social sciences is its relevance to human society. In terms of regional and country studies, survival, development, and the environment (including nature, society, and the international community) are important concerns. I have studied the current situation and new interests of China's African Studies, such as China-Africa relations, country studies, African history, political economy, international relations, and legal studies (Li, A. 2016a). This paper will briefly introduce the new trends of fields and topics for research.

The study of Africa in China began with the study of Egyptian history. Egyptology rose with the slave trade and with European colonial expansion. The colonial rule made Egypt seem separate from Africa and an extension of Europe. With the efforts of African scholars, including Egyptian scholars, the UNESCO General History of Africa Collection (Volumes 1-8) has brought Egypt back to Africa from the perspective of academic history. Starting from Xia Nai, the "father of Egyptology in China", being further developed by Na Zhong, Liu Wenpeng, Yang Haocheng, and other older generations, it has been carried forward under the inheritance of Yan Haiying, Jin Shoufu, Bi Jiankang, and others. Lin Zhichun, Professor of Northeast Normal University, has made outstanding contributions to Egyptology in China, and has cultivated a backbone of scholars such as Lingfu Ruoming, Yan Haiying, Jin

Shoufu, Li Dongxiao, Li Mo, etc. (Lingfu 2003; Guo 2016).[23] A new generation is emerging, as shown by Guo Dandong's concerns on economic history, Wang Haili's emphasis on social history, and Guo Zilin's interest on autocratic monarchy. In the modern and contemporary history of Egypt, Bi Jiankang analyzed the political stability of Egyptian society and Wang Tai paid attention to the interaction among the three basic forces on the Egyptian political stage: state, society, and political Islam. The research team in Egyptian studies is relatively neat, and the subjects are diversified.[24]

Anthropological/ethnological and sociological research on Africa is increasingly active. Shi Lin and Zhuang Chenyan, of Minzu University of China, have probed the ethnological methodology and African ethnic/national issues. Li Zhigang and Niu Dong have analyzed the way of existence of Africans in China. Xu Wei has probed African anthropology, the ethnicity issue, and ethnic relations, especially in Botswana through his field work.[25] More importantly, in recent years, a number of anthropology/ethnology doctors have returned to China, such as Qiu Yu, Yuan Ding, Chen Liang, Yang Beibei, Zhou Yang, etc. These young scholars discussed the social interaction of two-way immigrants, the survival track of Africans in Guangzhou, African ethnography and urbanization, the health challenges and medical strategies of new Chinese immigrants in Africa, and the two-way cultural adaptation of Chinese/African families. Dr. Lei Wen transferred from development studies to anthropology research.[26] From 2015 to 2018, Gao Liangmin, of Tsinghua University, conducted ethnographic research in Tanzania, Kenya, and surrounding areas. These scholars have brought a new horizon to the study of Africa and China-Africa relations. Ethnography, ethnic relations, environmental adaptation, conflict mediation, and so on have entered the research field. Zhejiang Normal University has established the Center for African Anthropology Studies and has held various academic activities. Minzu University of China, Sun Yat-sen University, and Xiamen University all have held lectures, forums, and seminars on African anthropology/ethnology/sociology. The cross-border ethnic mobility, conflict, adaptation and mediation, interaction between nomads and settlers, the complementarity

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23 The Institute for the History of Ancient Civilizations of Northeast Normal University set up a special experiment class for young scholars, which became the backbone of the study of ancient world history in China. It also runs an English journal, *Journal of Ancient Civilizations* (JAC) to provide a platform for the study of Egyptology, Assyriology, and Hittist studies, etc., which has greatly promoted the study of Egyptology in China.

24 For Egyptology in China, refer to "Entry into Egyptology in China".

25 "Xu Wei: I and African anthropology——Era, subject, platform and individual".

26 "Lei Wen: My anthropological time", January 15, 2018.

between urbanization and urban and rural areas, the local wisdom to solve the contradictions between man and nature and between man and man, and the role of African immigrant groups should be gradually included in the research scope.

One of the main characteristics of China's African studies is its close connection with African reality. The interaction between politics and economy has always been the research focus, including various topics, such as African leaders and political governance, party politics and development strategies, democracy and corruption, NGOs, power inheritance and political stability, national issues and national construction, non-traditional security and counter-terrorism, etc. With the signing of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, the topic of African integration is becoming increasingly important, which is reflected in the relations between the AU and the UN and other international organizations, the AU and the International Criminal Court, the AU and its member states, and the AU and African regional organizations. African law research is also one of the important areas in recent years. With the strengthening of China-Africa relations, more and more Chinese enterprises and immigrants are entering Africa, hoping to understand the laws of African countries, thus arousing scholars' attention to this issue. The "African Law" series, edited by Hong Yonghong, provides a platform for the dissemination of African legal knowledge and discussion. Zhu Weidong, Xia Xinhua, Li Bojun, and others have not only translated African laws or legal systems, but also published many articles on international arbitration and dispute settlement. Chinese scholars should gradually strengthen the research on the legal settlement of international disputes, such as the issue of the Chagos Islands.

The study of African economy involves such issues as industry, agriculture, marine fishery, water environment, small enterprises, poverty reduction, technology transfer, food security, population dividend, debt sustainability, international cooperation and assistance, etc. Lin Yifu's new structural economics shows Chinese scholars' view on the world economy, especially African economy, from a unique perspective (2012). Li Xiaoyun's team made efforts to explore the issue of aid effectiveness through the practice of increasing food production in Tanzania (2019). We should strengthen the research on the African Continental Free Trade Agreement and its effects. The free trade zone will cover a market with a population of 1.2 billion and a GDP of 2.5 trillion US dollars. The Secretariat of the free trade zone is located in Ghana, and its spillover effect cannot be ignored. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional organization with rather quick integration, and its 2019 Ministerial Conference reaffirmed that it would

speed up the process of monetary integration and launch a single currency in 2020. Its role and trend need to be explored. The study of countries and regions (such as the Horn of Africa, the Mediterranean coast, the Great Lakes region, the Sahel region, the Congo River Basin, the Gulf of Guinea, the West Indian Ocean Islands) is of great importance. With a general understanding of the continent, we should put emphasis on its characteristics, such as the relationship between countries using the African Franc and France, the economic diversification of resources in countries such as Nigeria and Angola and the marine resource development of coastal countries, the intermediary role of Mauritius (development model, capital, goods, finance, etc.), the biodiversity and social development of Madagascar, the governance model of Rwanda, the immigration economy of South Africa, the role of African diaspora, especially those in the US and Europe, etc.

African literature is a new field. Except for the introduction of a few works at the end of the 19th century and the few published in *The Eastern Miscellany* in the early 20th century, the study of African literature in China began in the 1960s, and systematic research only after the 1980s. From 1986 to 2016 important African writers were explored and about 990 papers on African literature covering 16 African countries were published in Chinese journals. The translation and introduction of African works focuses on the works of protest against colonialism or for national independence, African tradition or local culture, and Nobel Prize winners, with the characteristics of having more English works than French works, more male works than female works, more novels than dramas, etc., and there are various projects to translate or study Africa including African-Americans (汪琳 2015; 黄晖 2016; 陈凤姣 2017; 邓耘 2018). For example, 445 articles were published about Nobel Prize Winner J. M. Coetzee from January 1986 to June 2016 (黄晖 2016) and research works are also concentrated on Coetzee (高文惠 2008; 王敬慧 2010; 蔡圣勤 2011; 2011; 2017; 段枫; 2011; 2017; 钟再强 2015; 邵凌 2016; 罗晓燕 2017; 史菊鸿 2017). Very few take notice of African black authors (俞灏东, 杨秀琴, and刘清河 2012). The two works edited by Zhu Zhenwu reflect the general situation of China's research on African English Literature (朱振武 2019a; 2019b). In recent years, African literature research has expanded from Nobel laureates to popular writers, from literature research to critical theory, from general to specific. Yao Feng, Sun Xiaomeng, Wang Lin, etc., translated *African Literature - An Anthology of Criticism and Theory*, edited by Tejumola Olaniyan and Ato Quayson, the first collection to comprehensively introduce African literary theory and criticism, emphasizing the uniqueness of African philology and highlighting the local characteristics of Africa.

There has been a discussion about the possibility of Africa making full use of its advantages to develop. If the answer is yes, what are the advantages? How to use these advantages? Political science should be deeply explored in the aspects of the balance of African political tradition and its rationality, the advantages and disadvantages of the contemporary introduction of Western democratic elections, the enthusiasm of people to participate in politics, and the operation of different power groups. African countries have encountered various problems, but they have resisted external interference and hope to overcome the difficulties with their own efforts. This growing sense of self-consciousness, with Ethiopia and Rwanda as models, reflects Africa's exploration of a development path that suits its national conditions. African localization and autonomy is another important issue, including the African perspective in international development cooperation. Why can all forms of African culture survive in the economic backwardness and spread and flourish all over the world? Cultural studies should not only recognize the diversity and particularity of African cultures, but also evaluate its appeal, adaptability, penetration, and influence, including the boundaries of African philosophy, religion, and tradition. International politics and international relations should strengthen the discussion of Africa's role in the international arena, including the role of Africa in the United Nations and the balanced relationship between Africa and major powers. The Franc area in Africa is extremely dependent on France in all aspects, which is a dependence imposed by the former suzerain. All these should be explored with care.

Conclusion

China's African studies have gained new momentum. It must be acknowledged that African studies are still rather weak in China, and the study of China-Africa relations tends to be too inclined and lacks depth. Policy oriented research must be objective and based on profound academic research. We look forward to conducting comprehensive academic cooperation with African counterparts and international academicians, paying more attention to countries or topics, as well as to solid field work and interdisciplinary research. China's African studies should deal with the following relations: academic discussion and social practice, knowledge popularization and in-depth research, case study and theoretical generalization, microanal-

ysis and macro meaning, country, region and global research, etc. I am full of confidence for China's Africa research[27].

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ABSTRACT

China's systematic understanding and research of Africa began in New China, which can be roughly divided into three stages. Supporting Africa (1950-1965). Political emphasis decided that the contact with and study on Africa should be based on support for national independence movements. Understanding Africa (1966-1976). Some institutions translated a large number of works in the "Cultural Revolution" to

enhance understanding of Africa. Studying Africa (1977-). The reform and opening up prompted the academic community to become familiar with Africa and start preliminary research. The development of China Africa relations has promoted all-round research on Africa (Li, A. 2005). This article attempts to further explore China's African studies, which are divided into five parts, e.g., a historical background of relationship between China and Africa, a brief illustration of the achievements of four generations (especially young people), the participation and contribution of Chinese scholars in the international academia; the development of research institutions, and an analysis of the new trend of African studies in China.

BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN TRADE: AN ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL-AFRICA RELATIONS

Daniela Freddo[1]
Guilherme Gomes de Barros de Souza[2]

Introduction[3]

An interesting way to visualize the changing world perspective about Africa in the 21st century is by analyzing two covers of the British journal The Economist: the cover of May 2000 entitled "The hopeless continent" and the cover of December 2011 under the title of "Africa rising" (Veiga and Rios 2014, 4-5). It is possible to add another cover of this journal to the list, the cover of March 2019 called "The new scramble for Africa". Three covers showing three different views on the African continent: the first presents an Africa with no prospects for the future and plagued by conflicts and hunger; the second considers an Africa with accelerated economic growth; and the last one shows the race of world powers for a part in this region of new human and economic prosperity (Veiga and Rios 2014, 4-5; The Economist 2019b).

The world is increasingly interested in Africa. In addition to the traditional foreign actors in the region – the United States, France, the United Kingdom –, other countries – such as China, India and Turkey – are investing heavily to conquer areas of influence on the continent. Following this interna-

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1   Department of Economics, Universidade de Brasília. Brasilia, Brazil. E-mail: freddo.daniela@gmail.com. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1188-174X

2   Department of Economics, Universidade de Brasília. Brasilia, Brazil. E-mail: guidebarros26@gmail.com. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6257-3555

tional trend, as of 2003, Brazil made a considerable economic and diplomatic effort to also build a prominent role in relations with the 54 African countries (Veiga 2013, 4-8; Veiga and Rios 2014, 2-3, 20-21; The Economist 2019a).

However, as much as there is growing international attention in relation to the economic development of African countries, there is insufficient Brazilian academic interest in an economic perspective of relations between Brazil and Africa. There is a limited number of updated academic productions focusing on trade between Brazil and the African continent that tries to understand deeply how this connection is characterized and that seeks to explain the variations of this trade in recent years.

On the other hand, from a diplomatic perspective, it is generally sought to justify – or not – the costs of maintaining a consular structure based on the possible economic returns that can be brought by that initiative to that country (Gallaga 2013, 1; Charleaux 2018, 1). An illustration of this trend was the preparation of Report No. 16, 2016, by the Brazilian Federal Senate, which analyzes, among other points, a possible correlation between the opening of Brazilian embassies and the performance of Brazilian exports (Brasil 2016, 34-39).

In order to contribute to the academic deepening of these themes, the objective of this paper is to assess, considering the diplomatic and economic dynamics that have marked the new phase of Brazil-Africa relations since 2003, whether there is a significant correlation between the opening of Brazilian embassies in African countries and the increase in Brazilian exports observed for these countries. It is noteworthy that this analysis does not seek to base Brazilian foreign policy on purely commercial objectives, since Brazilian international interests go beyond simple economic logic.

In section 2, the foreign policy for Africa of the three Brazilian presidents active between 1995 and 2016 is analyzed and data are shown on the 19 embassies of Brazil opened in African countries from 2003 to 2013. In section 3, on the other hand, data on exports and imports between Brazil and Africa are considered, which are compared from two perspectives: the value of Brazil-Africa trade and the African percentage share in Brazilian foreign trade. In section 4, data from the previous sections are used to analyze whether there is a correlation between the opening of Brazilian embassies in African countries and the increase in exports to these states after the beginning of the diplomatic mission.

Brazilian foreign policy for Africa between 1995-2016

The period between 1995 and 2016 covered in this section encompasses the government of three presidents: Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) (1995-2002); Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010); and Dilma Vana Rousseff (2011-2016). Costa Filho (2018, 81) defines this period as unique in Brazil's foreign relations "*since the Cardoso administration inaugurated a period of unprecedented presidential involvement in foreign policy and the Lula administration, in turn, elevated the relations with Africa to an unparalleled level*".

The foreign policy of the Cardoso government, while it was considerably active in relation to Europe and South America, was not very expressive in African countries (Vilela and Neiva 2011, 72-76; Costa Filho 2018, 81-84, 89, 92). As Costa Filho (2018, 81-84) explained, the main objective of the Brazilian government in relation to Africa was to update its relations with the continent, taking advantage of the more favorable economic context on both sides of the South Atlantic and the existing relations between the two. However, this did not mean prioritizing foreign policy for African countries (Costa Filho 2018, 81-84).

In fact, President Fernando Henrique visited only 3 countries in Africa between 1995 and 2002 (South Africa, twice, Angola and Mozambique, once each) (Costa Filho 2018, 83). It is noted, therefore, that the focus of the presidential agenda was related to Portuguese-speaking countries (Angola and Mozambique) and to a large African economy (South Africa). In an analysis of the importance and frequency of foreign policy issues during the FHC government, Vilela and Neiva (2011, 76-91) concluded that the African continent was one of the least mentioned regions in official pronouncements made at the time. It is not surprising, therefore, that the data obtained from the Department of Africa (*Departamento de África*, DEAF, in portuguese) (Mello 2019) shows that at least four Brazilian embassies in African countries were closed during this period[4], as highlighted by Souza and Souza (2019, 122-123) in a compilation on the establishment and closure of Brazilian embassies in Africa.

With the inauguration of President Lula in 2003, Brazil-Africa relations took a prominent position in Brazilian foreign policy. "The renewed emphasis on South-South cooperation as a priority vector for international insertion and political affirmation of Brazil in the global scenario and the

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[4]   The closed embassies were: Lusaka, Zambia, in 1996; Kinshasa, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in 1997; Lomé, in Togo, in 1998; and Yaoundé, in Cameroon, in 1999 (Mello 2019). More detailed research is needed to ascertain whether there have been other Brazilian embassies in African countries closed during the FHC government and the reasons for each closure.

promotion of Brazilian economic and business interests" were the guides of foreign and economic policy that characterized this period (Veiga 2013, 1).

As stated by Ambassador Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto (2013, 58), contrary to what had been done until then, Brazil intensified its diplomatic efforts in a generalized way in the African continent, without giving priority only to the big African economies or only to the Portuguese-speaking countries. To this end, measures were taken to increase the number of official visits and meetings with African authorities (Pinto 2013, 58-60). Vilela and Neiva (2011, 76-91), mentioned above, concluded in their research that Africa became the second most cited region in statements by the Lula government, behind only South America. As informed by Melissa Cook (2013, 42), between 2003 and 2010 alone, 12 diplomatic and economic presidential missions were made to African countries[5], a fact that exposes Lula's presidential activism in relation to Africa (Costa Filho 2018, 81-84). In addition, the Department of Africa, formerly part of the Department of Africa and the Near East, was created in 2003 (Costa Filho 2018, 82).

This upward trend in Brazil-Africa relations is contained in a broader context of valuing South-South relations, which was a hallmark of the Lula government (Seabra 2014, 77-79). It is noteworthy that the growth trend of South-South relations, especially with Africa, was not restricted to the Brazilian experience, but was part of an international movement to expand diplomatic and economic relations, as was observed in initiatives conducted by countries like China, India and Turkey (The Economist 2019a).

Foreign policy in this period was raised to the center of governmental priorities in order to contribute to the ultimate goal of establishing Brazil as an emerging world power. For that, building alliances with the 54 African countries would be essential. This process sought to recognize the heterogeneity of the countries of the global south and to establish individual and specific relations between Brazil and these actors (Seabra 2014, 77-79).

On the other hand, Dilma Rousseff's government reduced, in general, Brazil's international performance, impacting the Brazilian engagement in Africa (Costa Filho 2018, 84). This administration retained initiatives implemented during the Lula government, "but with less intensity and without pro-activity, only seeking to maintain the extraordinary external and bilateral gains seen in the previous period" (Rizzi 2016, 156) with the continued appreciation of South-South relations (Seabra 2014, 79; Costa Filho 2018,

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5   Between 2003 and 2014, for African countries, 28 visits were made to 23 countries by ex-president Lula, 67 visits to 31 countries by ex-foreign minister Celso Amorim, 3 visits to 7 countries by ex-president Dilma Rousseff and 20 visits to 13 countries by ex-foreign minister Antonio Patriota (Seabra 2014, 79).

85). Therefore, even though Africa remained an axis of interest for Brazilian foreign policy, there was a redefinition of priorities for international action in the Dilma Rousseff government (Pereira 2020, 20).

Such a change in foreign policy during the Dilma Rousseff government can be seen both by the reduced number of visits to African countries made during her government and by the reduced number of Brazilian embassies opened in that continent between 2011 and 2016 (Costa Filho 2018, 84-86; Mello 2019).

In any case, it can be seen that the efforts made between 2003 and 2016 had concrete diplomatic effects. In 2013, of the 37 Brazilian embassies in African countries, 19 had been opened or reactivated since 2003 (see Table 1 and Figure 1 below) (Pinto 2013, 59; Seabra 2014, 79). As stated by the British journal The Economist, Brazil is one of the non-African countries that has more embassies in Africa and is the Latin American country with the most diplomatic representations on the continent (The Economist 2019a). The data for African countries with Brazilian embassies are consolidated in the figure below.

Figure 1: Countries with Brazilian Embassies in Africa[6]

Note: Green - Brazilian embassies opened until 2002; Orange - Brazilian embassies opened between 2003 and 2013.

Source: Department of Africa (Mello 2019) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasil 2020b). Elaboration by the authors.

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6   African countries with Brazilian embassies opened until 2002 are: South Africa, Angola, Algeria, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal, Tunisia and Zimbabwe (Brasil 2020b).

In Figure 1, we highlight the 18 African countries with Brazilian embassies opened until 2002 and the 19 African countries with Brazilian embassies opened between 2003 and 2013, totaling 37 African countries with Brazilian embassies in 2013. It is noteworthy that Brazilian diplomatic efforts also were, in a way, reciprocated by African countries. In 2013, of the 34 embassies of African countries in Brasilia, 18 had been implemented since 2003, making it the capital with the most African diplomatic representations in Latin America (Pinto 2013, 59). The data of the Brazilian embassies opened between 2003 and 2013 are consolidated in the table below.

Table 1: Opening of Brazilian Embassies in Africa (2003-2013)[7]

Opening Order	Embassy	Country	Creation Decree Date	Opening Date
1	São Tomé	São Tomé and Príncipe	18/03/2003	17/07/2003
2	Yaoundé	Cameroon	10/02/2005	21/04/2005
3	Dar Es Salaam	Tanzania	11/03/2005	16/06/2005
4	Addis Ababa	Ethiopia	30/09/2004	20/06/2005
5	Kinshasa	Democratic Republic of Congo	–	09/10/2005
6	Cotonou	Benin	06/12/2005	26/09/2006
7	Lomé	Togo	22/12/2005	16/11/2006
8	Khartoum	Sudan	21/11/2005	04/12/2006
9	Lusaka	Zambia	08/05/2006	31/01/2007
10	Malabo	Equatorial Guinea	21/11/2005	01/03/2007
11	Conakry	Guinea	08/05/2006	29/03/2007
12	Gaborone	Botswana	19/06/2006	12/06/2007
13	Bamako	Mali	11/10/2007	14/07/2008
14	Brazzaville	Republic of the Congo	11/10/2007	22/08/2008
15	Ouagadougou	Burkina Faso	11/10/2007	22/10/2008
16	Nouakchott	Mauritania	11/10/2007	11/05/2010

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7   The date of the Decree creating the Brazilian embassy in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, has not been found. However, on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it is reported that the Brazilian embassy in Kinshasa was reopened (at least legally) in 2004 (Brasil 2019a).

Opening Order	Embassy	Country	Creation Decree Date	Opening Date
17	Monrovia	Liberia	10/09/2010	25/02/2011
18	Freetown	Sierra Leone	26/01/2010	30/07/2012
19	Lilongwe	Malawi	27/10/2010	06/06/2013

Source: Department of Africa (Mello 2019); Access to Information (Brasil 2015, 1-5). Elaborated by the authors.

Table 1 describes the order in which Brazilian embassies are opened in African countries. The data in relation to the opening dates of the embassies were obtained in consultation with the Department of Africa (DEAF) of the Itamaraty (Mello 2019). The dates of the Decree to create the embassies were obtained from the Federal Government's Access to Information portal (Brasil 2015, 1-5). In Table 1, 'Date of the creation decree' refers to the date of publication of the decree[8] in which the President of the Republic determines the creation of a Brazilian embassy in those specific cities and countries. In turn, 'Opening Date' refers to the date on which the first Brazilian diplomat accredited to the government of that country arrived in that state. As explained by the Department of Africa (Mello 2019), for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a Brazilian embassy will be politically open with the arrival of the first ambassador or commissioner to the country, regardless of the day of the week or the physical installation of the embassy. It is noticed that there is a difference between the date of the creation decree and the date of opening of the Embassy. This can be explained, among other reasons, by the legal and diplomatic procedures necessary for the opening of a Brazilian embassy in another country (Mello 2019).

As explained earlier, the embassies listed in Table 1 were the 19 Brazilian embassies opened in Africa between 2003-2013. It is important to note, as Costa Filho (2018, 85) pointed out, that the three embassies in African countries opened during the Dilma administration (2011-2016) had been created, by decree, during the Lula government (2003-2010), which again underscores the greater shyness of Dilma Rousseff's foreign policy in relation to that of her predecessor.

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8   A complete list of decrees to create Brazilian embassies between 2000 and 2015 can be found in the following reference: (Brasil 2015, 1-5).

Brazil-Africa trade relations between 1997-2019

This section briefly analyzes trade relations between Brazil and Africa from 1997 to 2019, a period in which data from the Ministry of Economy (Brasil 2020a) on international trade are available. In this sense, Souza and Souza (2019, 120-137), in a recent study, presented an in-depth economic analysis of the variations in Brazil-Africa trade from 1997 to 2018 and established a possible correlation between the variation in the price of commodities and the value exported by Brazil to the continent, in addition to analyzing in detail the products traded and the volume of exports in the period.

In turn, Seabra (2014, 79-80) suggested that the strong Brazilian diplomatic movement for African countries, symbolized by the opening of Brazilian embassies in Africa, can be seen from another perspective, that of the economic benefits coming from the rapprochement between Brazil and Africa[9]. In fact, according to data from the Ministry of Economy (Brasil 2020a), it can be noted that there was a positive variation (however inconstant) in Brazil's trade relations with African countries over the past 20 years. The values of Brazil-Africa trade between the years 1997 and 2019 are consolidated in the graph below.

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9   Seabra (2014, 79-80) and Veiga (2013, 5-9) also defined the potential for expansion of Brazilian companies in the region as another reason for Brazil's rapprochement with African countries. However, this perspective will not be analyzed in this article.

Graph 1: Brazil-Africa trade between 1997-2019 (FOB US $ Billion)[10]

Note: Blue line stands for Brazilian exports and orange line stands for Brazilian imports.

Source: Ministry of Economy (Brasil 2020a). Elaborated by the authors.

From the data in Graph 1, it can be seen that there was a significant variation between 1997 and 2019 in trade between Brazil and African countries. Considering Brazilian imports first, it can be seen that they went from a very low level, of 1.8 billion dollars in 1998[11], to their maximum level in 2013, of 17.4 billion dollars, corresponding to an increase of 957% in the period (in nominal values). However, the Brazilian economic recession that started in the second quarter of 2014 significantly reduced the value of Brazilian imports from that continent, which in 2016 reached a level close to that recorded in 2004 (Institute of Applied Economic Research, IPEA, in its acronym in portuguese, 2019; Brasil 2020a).

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10 Current values, that is, not updated by inflation for the period.

11 As an example of the variations that occurred in foreign trade, Ambassador José Vicente de Sá Pimentel (2000, 10) attributed the increase of about 22% of Brazilian imports from 1998 to 1999 to the purchase of oil from Algeria and Nigeria. On the other hand, he related the drop of approximately 19% of Brazilian exports to African countries to the reduction in sugar sales.

A similar logic applies to Brazilian exports, which in 1999 were US$ 1.3 billion and which grew continuously until 2011 – when they reached the maximum value of US$ 12.2 billions – which corresponds to a 917% increase in the period (in nominal values). After that year, there was a significant reduction in exports until 2019, with no recovery of previous levels of exports to African countries (Brasil 2020a).

Even with all the variations in this period, the trade balance between Brazil and Africa was in deficit in most of the years analyzed. Between 1997 and 2015, only for a brief period – in 2009 – Brazil had a slight trade surplus. As of 2016, the country started to have a significant trade surplus, however this is due more to the sharp drop in Brazilian imports from Africa than to the increase in exports from Brazil to the continent (Brasil 2020a).

Graph 2: Africa's participation in Brazilian foreign trade (%)

Source: Ministry of Economy (Brasil 2020a). Elaborated by the authors..

Graph 2 shows, in an analysis similar to that made by Souza and Souza (2019, 127-128), about the importance of trade with Africa for the Brazilian trade balance. Graph 2 considers the percentage participation of

African countries in trade with Brazil from three perspectives: total Brazilian foreign trade (blue); total exports (orange); and total imports (grey).

Regarding total Brazilian exports, it can be seen that African countries registered a relatively timid participation throughout the analyzed period, varying from 2.44% in 2000 to the peak of 5.68% in 2009 and returning in 2019 to percentage export levels close to those observed in the 1990s. In turn, there was a greater variation in African participation in Brazilian imports, which increased from 3.16% in 1998 to 9.85% in 2004, gradually decreasing to 3.15% in 2019. African participation in total Brazilian foreign trade, on the other hand, behaved in an intermediate manner, varying from 3.1% in 1997 to 7.1% in 2007 and decreasing to 3.3% in 2019 (Brasil 2020a).

As weighted by Souza and Souza (2019, 128), the perspectives presented in Graph 1 (value of Brazil-Africa trade) and Graph 2 (African participation percentage in Brazilian foreign trade) allow us to reach alternative conclusions – in value and percentage – of the importance of Brazil-Africa trade over the analyzed period (Souza and Souza 2019, 128). For example, considering the percentage share, Africa's most important year in Brazilian exports was 2011 (according to Graph 1), while when considering the exported value, Africa's most important year in Brazilian exports was 2009 (according to Graph 2). Anyway, it is observed that the importance of Africa for Brazilian exports culminated between 2009 and 2011.

It is noted that trade between Brazil and Africa had considerable variation in the analyzed period. There has been a large increase in trade flows since the late 1990s, but the importance achieved by this trade has been reduced in recent years. That said, it is worth seeking to understand whether the greater Brazilian diplomatic interest in Africa, discussed in section 2, may have had an impact on the increase in Brazil-Africa trade recorded in the 2000s.

Correlation between the opening of Brazilian embassies and exports

In this section, the data presented in section 2, on the creation of Brazilian embassies in African countries, and in section 3, on the variations of Brazil-Africa trade, are combined. The objective is to establish whether there is any correlation between the opening of Brazilian embassies in African countries and the variation of trade of Brazil – with a focus on exports, an element of greatest importance for the country's commercial interests – with these countries.

With a similar objective, Report No. 16/2016 of the Federal Senate tried to establish a correlation between the opening of Brazilian embassies with the performance of Brazilian exports and with the growth of the Brazilian Gross Domestic Product (GDP), focusing on the period between 2003 and 2015. The Report considered all existing Brazilian embassies and highlighted embassies opened worldwide since 2003. However, the results obtained were not conclusive, finding little or no correlation between the variables, and also considered other embassies in addition to those opened in Africa (Brasil 2016, 35-43). An alternative methodology is then proposed to that used in this report, considering only Brazilian embassies opened in Africa between 2003 and 2013 and focusing on Brazilian exports to such countries.

Therefore, all the data presented in the graphs in this section refer to the 19 countries where Brazilian embassies were opened between 2003 and 2013 (as shown in Table 1). In Chart 3, presented below, the data presented previously are associated and the years of opening of Brazilian embassies in African countries are related to the variation in exports from Brazil. Then, the methodology of the analysis is explained and the results obtained are interpreted.

Graph 3: Aggregate Brazilian exports to the 19 countries analyzed (FOB US $ Million)

Note: Red - period in which Brazilian embassies were opened in the countries analyzed.

Source: Department of Africa (Mello 2019); Ministry of Economy (Brasil 2020a). Elaborated by the authors.

In Graph 3, the aggregate value of Brazilian exports to the 19 African countries in which Brazil created embassies between 2003 and 2013 is defined on the vertical axis. On the horizontal axis, the periods analyzed in relation to the year of opening of Brazilian embassies. The 'T' time frame represents the year in which Brazil opened an embassy in an African country and serves as a reference for the other years of analysis, covering four years before and five years after the opening year, thus totaling 10 years of analysis.

Consider, for example, Brazilian exports to São Tomé and Príncipe. 'T', in this case, is the year 2003 (see Table 1). 'T-1' refers to the year 2002, while 'T+1' represents 2004. The same logic is repeated for the previous and subsequent years. The period considered for that country, then, is 1999-2008. For each country analyzed, the periods considered are different, given that it is based on the year of the opening of the Brazilian embassy in that territory. The values of Brazilian exports to the 19 countries analyzed were aggregated in these periods - from 'T-4' to 'T+5' - in order to allow a general analysis of the data.

The objective with this graph is not to assess the absolute value of the exports themselves, but the variation that occurred before and after the opening of Brazilian embassies in the countries analyzed. As the embassies were created in different years, normalizing the opening year – 'T' – was the solution found to allow for a clearer comparison between countries. This analysis also permits to focus only on the variation that occurred and not on the year in which it occurred (only in relation to the year the embassy was opened). In addition, the use of embassies' opening years – unlike the year of the creation decree (see Table 1) – allows us to effectively analyze when the embassy's diplomatic work began and if there is any correlation between this fact and the variation in Brazilian exports. Considering the year of the creation decree (most easily obtained) would create a bias in the analysis, because, as highlighted in section 2, the dates of creation and opening of embassies differ (occurring in different years, in most cases).

It can be seen that there was a tendency of increasing Brazilian exports to the countries analyzed after 'T', compared to the values of previous years. The value exported by Brazil increased from 224.9 million in 'T-4' to 1,248.5 million in 'T+3', followed by a slight reduction to 1,127.8 million in 'T+5'. Therefore, in an aggregate manner, Brazilian exports to the countries analyzed increased after the year of the opening of Brazilian embassies in those states.

However, care must be taken here not to jump to conclusions. There is a correlation between the years following the opening of Brazilian embas-

sies – mainly the first three years – and the increase in exports from Brazil to these countries. However, it is not possible to guarantee, according to the data in Graph 3, whether this increase is due to the opening of the embassy – and the consequent facilitations in communication and commercial promotion – or to other exogenous factors (such as the variation in the price of commodities, the change in the value of the Brazilian Real in relation to the US Dollar etc.). Graph 4, presented below, aims to make this analysis clearer.

Graph 4: Aggregate Brazilian exports to the 19 countries analyzed (1997-2019) (FOB US $ Million)[12]

Note: Red - year in which one or more Brazilian embassies were opened in the 19 countries analyzed.

Source: Department of Africa (Mello 2019); Ministry of Economy (Brasil 2020a). Elaborated by the authors.

Graph 4 shows the aggregated values of Brazilian exports to the 19 countries analyzed. However, differently from what was done in Graph 3, the temporal representation of the data is linear, starting in 1997 and ending in 2019.

This graph allows for a better analysis of whether there is any temporal coincidence that is associated with the frequent correlation between the opening of Brazilian embassies and the increase in exports to those

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12 See Table 1, the Brazilian embassies opened each year were: 2003 - São Tomé; 2005 - Yaoundé, Dar Es Salaam, Addis Ababa, Kinshasa; 2006 - Cotonou, Lomé, Khartoum; 2007 - Lusaka, Malabo, Conakry, Gaborone; 2008 - Bamako, Brazzaville, Ouagadougou; 2010 - Nouakchott; 2011 - Monrovia; 2012 - Freetown; 2013 - Lilongwe.

countries in the following years. It should be noted that there was an increase in aggregate Brazilian exports to these countries from 46.1 million in 2000 to 1,443.2 million in 2011, representing an increase of 2,027.4% over the analyzed period.

As explained by the analysis in Table 1, it is observed that there is a concentration of embassy opening between the years 2005 to 2008, in which 14 of the 19 embassies were opened. As Brazilian exports to these countries increased between 2000 and 2011, it is not surprising that the years after the opening of most Brazilian embassies were marked by an increase in exports from Brazil to these countries, since there was already a general trend in exports in this direction since the year 2000.

It is observed that there are 4 countries – Botswana, Liberia, Malawi and Sierra Leone – in which there is no clear correlation between the years following the opening of Brazilian embassies and the increase in exports from Brazil to these countries. In these cases, the years after the creation of embassies in general did not coincide with the period of increase in exports from Brazil observed between 2000 and 2011[13].

Therefore, there is a frequent correlation between the years after the creation of the embassies and the increase in Brazilian exports, however this upward trend was already observed in years prior to the openings. It is not possible, then, to confidently use this correlation as a causal element that associates the creation of Brazilian embassies in African countries with the increase in exports from Brazil. This increase was possibly caused by other existing exogenous factors (as already explained).

Finally, it is emphasized that the importance of Brazilian embassies abroad cannot be reduced to their contribution – or not – to the increase of Brazilian exports to the countries where they are located. Embassies have strategic importance in international dynamics and their function should not be simplified due to their possible economic role. As defined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, maintaining a vast network of Brazilian embassies and consulates "is essential to allow the proper execution of foreign policy, ensuring Brazilian participation in the main themes of the international agenda" (Brasil 2019b, 1). The promotion of foreign trade is only one of the diverse functions of the consular network (Brasil 2019b).

As Gallaga pointed out, "establishing or maintaining an embassy is a clear sign to the host government of a commitment to deepening bilateral relations" (Gallaga 2013, 1). In addition, embassies allow diplomatic repre-

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13 These embassies were created in 2007 (Botswana), 2011 (Liberia), 2012 (Sierra Leone) and 2013 (Malawi).

sentatives of the state to have personal contact with the socio-cultural and administrative context of the other country, in addition to promoting the political, economic, scientific and cultural interests of the country represented (Gallaga 2013, 1; Charleaux 2018, 1).

In this sense, Report No. 16/2016 of the Federal Senate recommended to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its conclusions, to review the "allocation of diplomatic infrastructure around the world, privileging the location in countries of the south and north that have the greatest chance to generate economic and political dividends for Brazil" (Brasil 2016, 83-84). However, as stated by the report's author, the economist Humberto Laudares, "saying that an embassy is not necessary, based only on assessments of economic criteria, is nonsense" (Charleaux 2018, 1), but that it would certainly be necessary to measure the performance of an embassy in all the functions assigned to it.

It was considered in the Report that an in-depth investigation of political and geopolitical elements was not carried out on the opening of new embassies. Furthermore, it was concluded that "the number of diplomatic posts in a country seems to respond to idiosyncratic criteria – perhaps political or historical – that do not necessarily reflect the dynamics of the global economy" (Brasil 2016, 42). Therefore, an analysis of purely economic factors is not enough to understand all the elements of the importance of embassies for national interests.

Conclusion

The variation on the brazilian foreign policy objectives and the country's diplomatic efforts with no precedent for its relations with African countries – mainly during president Lula's government – were the reason for the opening of 19 brazilian embassies in Africa between 2003 and 2013, more than doubling the number of brazilian embassies in the continent.

This period of diplomatic engagement occurred concomitantly with the increase of Brazilian foreign trade with African countries from the 1990s, which achieved its peak during the following decade. However, the commercial flow between Brazil and Africa in recent years returned to lower levels, both in value and in percentage.

These data were combined to allow the following analysis: is there a correlation between the opening of Brazilian embassies in African countries and the variation in exports from Brazil to those countries? By evaluating

the data obtained, it was possible to verify that there is some correlation, but one cannot confidently attribute a causality between the increase in Brazilian exports and the establishment of Brazilian diplomatic missions in these countries, at the same time, this correlation cannot be denied. It is noteworthy that the analysis of diplomatic and economic relations between Brazil and Africa made in this article does not exhaust the necessary elements to assess the possible political and economic importance of an embassy.

From an alternative point of view, another possible analysis of the data presented is inferred: could the creation of Brazilian embassies in African countries be motivated by an already existing increase in exports from Brazil to those countries? In other words, what would lead to the opening of an embassy in a country could be the already existing increase in trade? Further analysis would be necessary to answer this hypothesis.

Furthermore, as concluded by Souza and Souza (2019, 135-137), the variation in the prices of commodities exported by Brazil to Africa would explain a significant portion of the variation in the value exported by Brazil and its difference in relation to the volume exported. Thus, as highlighted in section 4, there are other elements that may have impacted the increase in exports from Brazil to Africa in addition to the opening of Brazilian embassies in the region.

Finally, the reduced amount of academic production updated on the economic relations between Brazil and Africa is a factor that makes research on the subject difficult. More articles are needed, such as the one written by Ambassador José Vicente de Sá Pimentel (2000, 5-23) and the one published by Souza and Souza (2019, 119-137) that analyze the variations of Brazil-Africa trade from period to period and that establish probable causes for the observed variations. In this way, conclusions about Brazil-Africa trade will have more solid grounds to be based.

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ABSTRACT

This article analyzes whether there is a correlation between the opening of Brazilian embassies in African countries and the increase in exports from Brazil to those countries. The change in the objectives of Brazilian foreign policy and the diplomatic efforts of Brazil to deepen its external relationship with African countries were the reason for the opening of 19 Brazilian embassies in Africa between 2003 and 2013, more than doubling the number of Brazilian embassies in the continent. In the same period, there was a considerable increase in trade flows between Brazil and Africa, both in relation to the value traded and the African percentage share in Brazilian foreign trade. After 2011, however, there was a setback to lower levels of trade. It could be seen that there is some correlation between the opening of embassies and the increase in Brazilian exports, but a causality between the increase in Brazilian exports and the establishment of Brazil's diplomatic missions in these countries cannot be confidently established. The analysis of diplomatic and economic relations between Brazil and Africa made in this article does not exhaust the elements necessary to assess the possible political and economic importance of an embassy.

THE ARAB SPRING'S BERTH IN ALGERIA AND SUDAN: INSIGHTFUL COMPARATIVE PARALLELS

George A. Genyi[1]

Introduction

The Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) was engulfed by a riveting wave of popular revolts and uprisings in 2011 resulting in dramatic reshaping of geo-political dynamics in Tunisia with domino effects in Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria and Yemen (Friedman 2011; Fahim 2011; Mushtaq and Afzal 2017). These movements, expressed through spontaneous but sustained street protests led by youths, reverberated in major cities leading to divergent outcomes.

In Tunisia, the autocratic regime of President Ben Ali was brought down, leading to his flight to exile in Saudi Arabia. In Egypt, the military seized power, while Syria, Libya and Yemen descended into a fratricidal civil war (Joffe 2015). These movements are widely dubbed as the "Arab Spring", the "Arab Revolution", the "Arab Awakening" or "Arab Insurgencies" (Souza and Lipietz 2011). The Arab spring has remained the most popular concept and refers to a widespread, complex and multi-faceted phenomenon epitomizing the fall of entrenched dictatorships to pave way for new democratic systems (Abdulsattar 2015). The movement has also been against widespread unemployment, poverty and inflation, all of which have resulted in declining or stagnating living conditions for the majority of citizens in affected countries.

In terms of spread, the Arab spring has seen a lull since 2013 but finally berthed in Sudan and Algeria in 2019. Street protests in Sudan began

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1   Department of Political Science, Federal University Lafia. Lafia, Nigeria. E-mail: georgegenyi56@gmail.com. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5006-0456.

in September 2013 upon the announcement by President Omar al-Bashir of the end to fuel subsidies and the introduction of other austerity measures that saw the price of bread soar to unprecedented levels (Elmilek 2018). In Algeria, protests began on 1st March, 2019 against President Abdullaziz Bouteflika and were further inflamed by his desire to run for a fifth term in office, having ruled the country for 20 years.

The main comparative cases considered here are Sudan and Algeria. Both countries had experienced uprisings in the mould of the Arab Spring. The two countries express a false homogeneity in its Arab population but show remarkable differences in economic and social dynamics and the structure of society. Algeria is different from Sudan in its dynamics and structure and international economic relations. Historically, both countries experienced colonial rule: Sudan under the British and Algeria under the French. Algeria's bloody war of independence compares with Sudan's bloody decades civil war[2]. This is an overview of the Arab Spring as a revolutionary movement with initial inchoate demands that culminated in the consolidated demand for the departure of the prevailing autocrats and their regimes. The triggers of the uprising are comparatively explored against the backdrop of deep rooted economic and structural dynamics of the countries societies to undergird the differentiation in the outcome of the revolution. In conclusion, the paper illustrates the impact of the popular uprising on democratization in both countries.

Revolutionary underpinnings: Theoretical Notes

In its strict sense, a revolution signifies radical and deeply rooted transformations of society in political, economic and social terms. In this sense are considered revolutions: the French Revolution of 1789, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Chinese Revolution of 1948, the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and also the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Ramaswany 2003). These events had drastically altered the nature of the social and political systems in the societies in which they occurred. Revolutions can take a violent or nonviolent character. Dunn's (1989, 12) violent characterization reflects "a form of massive, violent and rapid social change [...] attempts to embody a set of values in a new or at least a renovated social order". Contrastingly,

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2   Algeria's bloody war of independence against France remains indelible in the minds of citizens as a dark moment Algerians dread to return to. In Sudan, the decades of secessionist war with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army are an enormous moment of instability.

nonviolent revolutions are orchestrated by unarmed civilians relying on tactics like civil resistance and other forms of public protests aimed at forcing a departure of an entrenched authoritarian regime (Summy 2007; Nepstad 2011; Lehoucq 2016;). The People Power Movement of the Philippines in 1986 and the bloodless Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 are credible illustrations (BBC 2019). Aristotle, in the 4th century BC, believed that social change was inevitable and had the potential to lead society towards perfection. In this sense, revolutions are critical corrective tools for restoring a just and properly ordered society that may have been disturbed by tyranny.

The desire to checkmate tyranny of rulers formed the original justification and has remained the fundamental basis of revolutions. John Locke justified revolutions as a legitimate means for governments to be altered whenever a monarch introduces arbitrary will in place of laws; when the monarch constrains the legislature from performing its constitutional functions and arbitrary power of the monarch tampers with elections without the consent of the people. In addition, a deliberate delivery of the people into foreign governments and when the supreme executive power neglects laws popularly enacted but could not enforce would produce a revolution.

The material basis of social revolutions were subsequently laid by Karl Marx in his comprehensive treatise on the course of human history. To Marx, a revolution is a product of irresistible historical forces along class lines expressed in the exploitative nature of relationships that intensifies class conflicts. Thus, Skocpol (1978, 26) defines social revolutions as "rapid, basic transformation of a society's state and class structures, often accompanied by class-based revolts from below". Goldstone (2001, 142) describes a revolution "as an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and non-institutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities". According to Abdulsattar (2015), the key to the success of any revolution is the willingness of the mass of the people to pour out into the streets to demand change and this must be achievable. Arendt (1969) cautions that the focus of a revolution as pursued by its leaders must be less on issues of mass poverty but rather be concentrated on achieving freedom for citizens including democracy and human rights as resonated in Algeria and Sudan.

The causes of a revolution are broadly framed under materialistic and psychological conditions. Tocqueville (1955) and Davies (1962) had a similar emphasis on material conditions, where long term increase in economic development followed by a sharp decline might precipitate a revolution. A revolution is, therefore, a popular movement that seeks a significant change

in the structure of a society resulting in the overthrow of an existing government accompanied by remarkable social and economic changes (Gottschalk 1944; Davies 1962). These changes can be achieved by nonviolent means of public protest and civil resistance.

An Overview of the Arab Spring

The Arab spring is an umbrella term for the social movements and widespread popular uprisings that emerged in December, 2010 in Tunisia (Abdulsattar 2015). From Egypt to Tunisia and Libya, prevailing political leadership was authoritarian even when democratic semblance was perceived in the mould of "illiberal democracies" (Zakaria 1997) or "liberalized autocracies" (Brumberg 2002). These pseudo democracies permitted civil society institutions to exist but civil liberties were largely curtailed, which became the bastion of social movements that were mobilized to demand for radical political changes.

The Arab Spring was sparked by the desperate self-immolation of a 26 year old Tunisian graduate vegetable vendor Mohammed Bouazizi, on 17 December, 2010 in the city of Sidi Bouzid (Souza and Lipietz 2011). Bouazizi, was an unemployed man who began selling vegetables and fruits after a hard struggle for a job. Without a licence to sell, a policewoman confiscated his cart, a repeated experience and his attempt to pay a fine to the police woman elicited a slap and a spat in the face, in addition to insults on Bouazizi's deceased father (Joffe 2015). Infuriated and frustrated, Bouazizi left but returned to the headquarters and doused himself with inflammable substances and set himself ablaze (Mckay 2011).

Bouazizi's self-immolation was transformed into a symbol of generalized discontent with Ben Ali's regime (Joffe 2015). With indeterminable rapidity, widespread spontaneous demonstrations had begun and coalesced around the demand for the removal of Ben Ali's regime. The protests were demonstrations of deeply buried frustrations against high unemployment, corruption, food inflation and lack of political freedoms (Mckay 2011; Mushtaq and Afzal 2017). The protests intensified, and on 14 January, 2011 President Ben Ali stepped down into exile in Saudi Arabia after 23 years in power.

The causes of the uprising vary across the region, but some shared similarities are distinguishable. Following the economic crisis in the early 1990s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank induced liberal reforms in North Africa, leading to wide ranging privatization of state

enterprises that resulted in reduced government interference, but with sustained decline in standards of living that remained for years (Akram 2011). The fall in oil prices and global financial crisis of 2008-2009 meant low revenues for the state, which in turn forced a drastic reduction in public expenditure (Muller and Hubner 2014). The far reaching implication of that was economic austerity that gave rise to higher unemployment rates (Tucker 2012), which average 20 percent across the region. Closely following high unemployment rates was an ensuing food crisis in 2010 (Mushtaq and Afzal 2017). Consequently, public protests against rising inflation and food prices had begun to appear in these countries by 2010 (Ansani and Daniele 2012). Behr and Aaltola (2011, 2) sum the cause of the Arab uprising as deteriorating living standards and growing inequality, lack of political freedoms and public accountability (Shahi 2011; Muller and Hubner 2014).

The practical outcomes of the uprising vary across the region, due essentially to the internal socio-economic and political dynamics and structures of each country. In Tunisia, the state dominated society and held total control over peoples' lives. The Tunisian revolution became an internal revolt against state domination, and the uprising was supported by exiled opposition parties and coordinated by trade unions like the Tunisian General Union of Labour (UGTT) (Shahi 2011). The ousting of Ben Ali was possible only with the support of the military that pledged to protect the revolution (Brooks 2013).

The outcome in Egypt has been radically different from Tunisia. The events in Tunisia triggered protests in Egypt that culminated in Tahrir square demonstrations on January 26, 2011. As the protests increased and expanded with intensification of demands for liberalization, President Hosni Mubarak called on the military to crack down on protesters, which was rejected. On 10th February, 2011, Mubarak resigned and the military took over by changing the head of the regime as President Mohammad Morsi took over while retaining the underlying power structure (Hassan 2011). The military promised reforms and held elections on 3rd July, 2013 when General Sisi took over as President. By this development, Egypt's revolution has stalled with a terrible backslide into a repressive junta rule, due to social division and violent cycles of conflict since the military coup (Abdulsattar 2015). Like Tunisia, the dictator has left but dictatorship stayed. The military supported the revolution, but exploited it to its own advantage to sustain the regime, suppress the people and retain its privileges and protect US interest.

The momentum and staggering transformations in Tunisia and Egypt raised expectations in Libya, whose citizens saw the evolving scenario

as potentials for the future. Tribal schism, military isolation and Gaddafi's son's willing experimentation with openness revealed the weakness of the regime coupled with Libya's acquiescence to the international system in the handover of the Lockerbie bombers. These were to confirm the gradual loss of control by the regime. The failure of the Libyan government to compensate victims of the 1996 prison massacre further deepened resentment against the regime and in this light plan for public protest on February 15, 2011 was ignited in Benghazi (Lehmann 2011).

These developments depleted the regimes morale and tribal support from Cyrenaica, selected urban intellectuals, Islamist guerillas, secular professionals and other tribal leaders that formed an Interim National Transitional Council on 17th February, 2011 to topple the regime (Joffe 2015). Though the regime was toppled with the assassination of Gaddafi, the country descended into a fratricidal civil war with the interim government of national unity recognized by the United Nations, while General Khalifa Khaftar rebels with Saudi Arabia's support remain a deadly challenge in Libya (Yom 2011; Abdulsattar 2015).

Yemen, another literally failed state with endemic tribalism, religious sectarianism with a growing rebellion from Houthi Rebels in the north also drew inspiration from the Arab spring. The country, under President Ali Abdullah Saleh's three decades rule, is in painful misery. With falling oil prices and growing population predominantly youth, unemployment at 50 percent, highest level of malnutrition and acute water shortage, the country's citizens have reeled under widespread grievances. Against economic misery, nepotism and political repression, widespread protests had "united tribal leaders, the opposition and unions" (Jones 2011) into their demand for Saleh to step down. Buoyed by Saudi Arabian support with the blessing of the US, Yemen has fallen without a functional government and is still reeling under a brutal civil war against the Houthi Rebels. So by and large, the heterogeneity of the various Arab countries in their internal dynamics and the technical assistance from external actors have revealed paralleled outcomes of the Arab Spring in different Arab countries (Negri 2015).

Algeria and Sudan Enter the Fray: Political Background and Economic Conditions

Though Algeria shares commonalities with its neighbours, such as a burgeoning young population, a laggard economy and uncertain political lead-

ership transition under the authoritarian 20 years rule of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the country appeared to have weathered the Arab Spring storm in 2011. The Algerian government offered a pragmatic response to the uprisings by upping public spending through excessive subsidies, infrastructure investments and an ambitious housing program to douse local discontent, in addition to clandestine handouts. Large public jobs were also created in the security sector to absorb many young unemployed and a large grant of interest-free public loans for young entrepreneurs was made (ICG 2018).

The Algerian society was reeling under difficulties economically and politically. Politically the country was in the grip of President Bouteflika who was seen as a symbol of reconciliation after the civil war against the Islamist fundamentalists in the late 1990s. Bouteflika came to power in 1999 and was rooting for a fifth five year term in April 2019 despite being paralyzed by a stroke in 2013. Though rarely seen in public due to his health challenge, he was determined to cling onto power, a tendency that was an initial transition concern for the country. Economically, the country depended "on oil and gas up to 97 percent of total exports, two thirds of state revenue and one third of gross domestic product" (ICG 2018, 2). When oil prices dropped in 2014[3], the economy was belly up forcing the regime to turn to its US$200billion foreign exchange reserve to patch things up by maintaining a supportive subsidy regime and state patronage. Even though prices partially recovered in 2017, the state could only respond to the crisis by introducing austerity measures like raising the prices of fuel, introducing import restrictions and permitting cautious devaluation of the local currency. These measures had an enormous painful effect on public welfare.

Contestation for power and influence had also emerged in Algeria between a new private business oligarchy since the collapse of the socialist economy in 1992 and an entrenched political class skimming resources of the state. Since 2017, it appeared that the emerging private sector oligarchy was on the ascendancy, raising the transition tension (Mekouar 2017). It was seen as a parasite benefiting from special state favour yet playing a deadly political role. In all of these dynamics, the state had successfully warded off unrest by a veiled threat of the return of the 1990 styled violence. But this seemed to fail when protests began in 2017 challenging state economic pol-

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3   Algeria is a strategic country in Western Mediterranean; the largest natural gas producer and exporter of crude oil to Mediterranean countries and the second major exporter of LNG to Europe and neighbours. The 2014 oil price collapse threatened the country's economy and security, raising concerns for comparison with the 1986-1988 price collapse that triggered riots leading to a military coup, repression and Islamist electoral victories and the civil war of the 1990s.

icies. These protests were spontaneous, but scattered and uncoordinated. In January 2019, protests grew, spread and intensified but were largely tamed by security forces.

The Algerian state efforts to fully tame the popular uprising failed when on 21 February, 2019, thousands of its citizens staged a peaceful demonstration against corruption and oppression under Bouteflika's regime when the President announced the decision to run again for the fifth time in the April 18 election (Aljishi and Jacobs 2019). Bouteflika came to power in 1999 and through a constitutional coup created amendments against a two term limit in 2008 allowing him the possibility of a life presidency. Incapacitated by a stroke since 2013, the 81 year old president was perceived by citizens as medically unfit to run for another term. When the president confirmed his intention to run, the protests exploded and intensified throughout the country, leading to his resignation after pressure from the military when it called on the Parliament to declare him unfit. The military's resort to constitutional means was a testimony to the level of institutionalization of democracy in Algeria. Besides, the move associated the military with the people and avoided the impression it wanted power for itself. Similarly, Judges across the country also announced their decision to not supervise the elections if President Bouteflika was to run. A combination of these moves with unrelenting protests aptly supported by the military forced the President to resign and handover to an interim candidate who promised elections within 90 days and a subsequent referendum on a new constitution.

In Sudan, President Omar-al Bashir came to power in 1989 through a coup d'état and transformed himself into a civilian elected president and has ruled the country for 30 years. Under the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), South Sudan separated from the rest of the country and the rest of Sudanese society continued to experience excruciating human suffering. The country's deteriorating economic conditions were largely responsible for the South Sudanese secession of 2011[3]. This led to the loss of 75 percent of Sudan's oil reserves (ICG 2019) denying the country billions of dollars in revenue. Oil revenue had constituted more than half of Sudan's resources and 90 percent of its exports (Sudan Tribune 2019). The Sudanese government under Bashir was not prepared for the economic shock of South Sudan's secession. Much of the country's economy was mismanaged through entrenched corruption and high military spending in the fight against insurgency in South Kordofan, Darfur and Blue Nile Regions (Abdulbari 2019). Sudan was rated 175 out of 180 on the corruption perception index in 2017 testifying to the high level of entrenched corruption in the country. The small gold boom of 2011 also did not benefit the economy as miners refused to sell to the Central Bank pre-

ferring to smuggle it to where prices were higher. With low foreign reserves and a $55billion foreign debt, external loan leverage was curtailed and the country was forced to rely on ad-hoc loan arrangements from the Gulf States (ICG 2019). Access to the IMF-World Bank highly indebted poor country initiative was blocked due to US 20 year sanctions. The combined effect of these developments worsened economic conditions in Sudan, leaving the government vulnerable to discontent.

Though the Sudanese government blamed US sanctions imposed for their support of international terrorism and prevalence of human rights violation (Verjee 2018) for economic dysfunction, its management of the economy was poor. With the lifting of sanctions in November, 2017, a meeting with the IMF by Sudanese officials resulted in a recommendation for "streamlined tax exemptions and the phasing out of costly fuel and wheat subsidies'' (Elamin and Mampily 2018, 1). Government accepted these recommendations and cut subsidies to fuel and wheat, but failed to implement the other IMF recommendation on cash transfer to vulnerable families as part of social protection spending (Abdulbari 2019). In addition, the government devalued the Sudanese pound (ICG 2019). These measures raised inflationary pressures that cumulatively hit the poor hardest, many of whom were unemployed that accounted for 20% of the youth population (Altaher and Fox 2018; Abdulbari 2019). The Sudanese people responded to the crushing economic condition and unsatisfied manner the government had handled the situation that resulted in fuel shortages and food price rises especially bread on 19th December, 2018 with public protests that started in the city of Atbara spread across the country to other cities including Khartoum the capital, demanding for the overthrow of NCP and for al Bashir to step down.

Triggers of the uprising in Algeria and Sudan

There are profound parallels that can be drawn in the triggers of the Arab spring's berth in Sudan and Algeria. Broadly conceptualized, Sudanese and Algerians had long suffered economic deprivations. In Sudan, economic fortunes had largely disappeared following decades of mismanagement and the yoke of twenty-year US sanctions over the Sudanese economy. In 2017, sanctions were lifted but its benefits were too slow in spread. Besides the sanctions, the South Sudanese secession occurred in 2013, and the Sudanese economy lost 75 percent of its oil revenue (Abdulbari 2019). Following insurgencies in South Kodorfan, Darfur and the Blue Nile regions, military expenditures remained high while those on health and education continued

to decline. With inflation at 72.94 percent, youth unemployment at 20 percent and austerity measures introduced to shore up public revenue through subsidy withdrawals on fuel and wheat, prices of these essentials dramatically rose and living conditions worsened, pushing the Sudanese to their tether's end and making them rise against the regime.

In Algeria, an oil dependent economy like Sudan, oil revenues plummeted in 2014 following global oil prices slump. The effect of this drop-in revenue was ameliorated by drawing down from the country's $200 billion foreign reserve and $37billion Sovereign Wealth Fund. But this was not enough to push for recovery of the economy shortly. By 2017, reserves were down to $97 billion and the state responded with the introduction of austerity measures by trimming state spending by 9 and 10 percent in 2016 and 2017 respectively (Mekouar 2016). Subsidies on fuel were cut and its price rose. Import restrictions were imposed and the currency devalued. In 2018 more budget cuts followed, leading to rising cost of living. In a rentier economy like Algeria, cutting state spending is an unpopular decision in a country used to subsidizing fuel and other basic goods. In the light of this, unemployment rose to 29 percent among the youth, which constitute 70 percent of the country's population (Aljishi and Jacobs 2019). An economy in such a crisis cannot help citizens to access opportunities for better livelihood and it appeared it was getting worse.

The political conditions that were also at the root of the uprising shared parallels in both Sudan and Algeria. Sudan had been under the authoritarian leadership of Omar al Bashir since 1989. President Bashir's thirty-year rule tolerated no opposition. His brutalityhas a genocide tag on his head from the International Criminal Court (ICC) and an arrest warrant (Abati 2019). Political repression was predominant using security forces. The Sudanese people could no longer contemplate a future with Al Bashir as president and demanded he leave office.

President Abdelaziz Bouteflika had ruled Algeria for 20 years and is perceived as a national reconciliator, having ended the country's bloody civil war of the 1990s. He is perceived as the scion of social and political stability. In 2013 he suffered a stroke and was hardly seen in public since then. Despite this physical weakness for seven years, it appeared that the military, business and political elites had a consensus on keeping him as the country's leader (Boduszynski 2019). While initial protests were against austerity measures, the announcement of the intention of Bouteflika to contest presidential election for another term sparked off outrage and protesters added the demand for him to step down. Sudan and Algeria, two societies accustomed to subsidies,

could not take cuts in public expenditures, especially with no alternatives and with a growing unemployed and dominant youth population. It was time to take their destinies in their hands and demand for the emergence of new political leadership.

Mass protests: States and International Response

Massive protests began in Sudan on 19th December, 2018 against austerity measures in the city of Atbara, 180 miles from Khartoum, but quickly spread to 28 other cities, including the capital by January 2019. Comparatively, these protests had been going on in Sudan much longer with a greater spread than in Algeria. The Arab spring had triggered protests in Sudan in late September 2013, but was stoutly tamed through the deployment of security forces. The wave of protests broke out in three major cities of Wad Madani, Khartoum and Omdurman, as well as other towns over state policies that ended fuel subsidies and other austerity measures. State security forces responded with lethal force leaving over 170 people dead (HRW 2014, 1). Many hundreds more were wounded and detained. Due to the uncoordinated nature of the protests, they lacked direction and, with extreme force applied by security forces, they soon petered out. The onset of peaceful protests in mid-December 2018 differed from the previous ones, because the "drivers, intensity, popularity, duration and death toll" were significantly different (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 2019, 4). The protests which began in Atbara, a semi town, quickly spreaded to other towns and cities by December. It is important to note that Atbara and other towns were deliberately targeted by austerity measures to forestall the effective organization of protest in the capital, but with the protests it was clear this strategy had failed.

Once it had begun, organized Sudanese professionals consisting of doctors, engineers, lawyers and journalists, university teachers and students joined forces with the two largest opposition parties to intensify the protests. Initial protests were against the high cost of bread and fuel due to inflation, but this changed soon into a demand for the President to step down (Altaher and Fox 2019). The intensity of the protest had been reinforced by the huge number of unemployed youths who have been effectively mobilized by intellectuals and professionals with clear objectives: a transition to civilian rule that would prepare the frameworks, including legal and political, for holding free and fair elections.

State response had been brutal, with security forces using live ammunition and tear gas, leading to the death of over 45 people by late January

2019 (Abdulbari 2019). The more force was used, the more energized were the protesters. The uprisings were boosted by the withdrawal of 22 political parties including Islamic ones from the national dialogue and their call for President Bashir to step down and put a sovereign council and a transitional government in its place. The Sudanese government also imposed a state of emergency for a year, but was reduced to six months by the parliament. It was followed by the dissolution of the cabinet and the removal of the Vice President Gen. Bakri Hassan Salih, who was replaced by the Defence Minister Gen. Awah Ibn Auf. All elected regional governors were also dissolved (Hashim 2019). These moves were to distance Bashir from his NCP and assume broad neutrality. The last straw was the army's tactical support for protesters which they described as ambitious.

The persistence of protests led to a military coup that ousted President Bashir on April 10, 2019 with his arrest and detention. A military Council was put in place led by Gen Auf. The Council announced widespread reforms with a promise for elections in four years, promises that were turned down by protesters who insisted on a civilian transitional council without any of the personalities associated with the Bashir regime. Gen. Auf would bow to protesters' demands and step down within twenty four hours for Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah-al-Burham (Tisdall 2019). The Freedom for Change alliance coordinating the protesters was determined to eliminate the entire old system and inaugurate a new dawn in the country's political history. The military determined to hold onto power accepted a compromise of a hybrid military-civilian transitional council for three years.

The resilience of the protests is attributed to a number of salient factors. The protest did not begin in the capital Khartoum where the regime had invested in security forces to checkmate similar activities. Protests may have struggled to gain momentum in 2013, but this time the rural areas were the focus of attention and their mobilization supported national rallies in major urban centres. The coalition of forces in organizations and notable figures gave vent to the protests also. Large opposition political parties (Sudan Call, including Umma Party, Democratic Unionist Party and the National Consensus Forces) coalesced toward the protests. The return of the self-exiled opposition leader Sadiq-al-Mahdi, who declared support for the protesters, remained a major plank that surged with the demonstrations. Then the fragmentation in the ruling party that led to the isolation of the army and its fringe presence outside the capital opened the regime and paved the way for the army to turn against Bashir and favour protesters.

The role of the military in shaping the outcome of the protests in Algeria and Sudan is significant. Trust in the military in Algeria is fairly high due to its role in decolonization and stability in the country. In Sudan trust in the military oscillates between very high and low and remained declined after the Arab Spring from 2011-2018 (Alkurd 2019). It was this positive perception of the military that accounted for its siding with the protesters to remove Bouteflika and Bashir from power (Alaoui 2019; Alkurd 2019).

On a broader regional scale was the contagious effect of the protests in other countries (Mampilly & Elamin 2019). Finally, the demand of the protesters was clear: change that meant a complete break from the past including the military. What the protesters asked for was a new untainted civilian transitional government headed by technocrats capable of transforming Sudanese economy for improved opportunities and political freedoms; a government in which they would have a stake.

Comparatively, protests began in Algiers without clear political demands or objectives and no firm leadership. Protesters' voices were a mere challenge against austerity measures. These voices, however, soon coalesced into a political demand for President Bouteflika to resign upon confirmation of his intention to seek a fifth five-year term. These protests like in Sudan differed from previous ones as they were galvanized by more educated urban unemployed youth.

In the wake of the Arab spring in 2011, sporadic protests appeared in Algiers but were tamed. Two reasons account for this. The country placed a premium on stability and security, which have been buoyed by collective memory of the civil war of the late 1990s. More than 200,000 people lost their lives and Algerians dread going back to that era, hence are cautious on political moves, especially drastic changes. The second reason relates to the use of oil revenue to buy peace through increased public spending by nearly 25 percent (Khan and Mezran 2014). Domestic discontent was diluted by lavish subsidies, infrastructure investments and a huge free housing scheme. In addition, large recruitments were undertaken by security forces (ICG 2018).

Politically, as in Sudan, the country was fed up with the prospects of the same authoritarian regime under Bouteflika and they demanded change. The isolation of the military and its transformation into a professional body left it untainted by the regime and it could not be used to quell the protests. Acting in favor of protesters, they leveraged constitutional arrangements to demand the removal of Bouteflika by Parliament. This sustained pressure led to the resignation of the President, paving way for the appointment of Abdelkader Bensalah, former Speaker of the Parliament with a promise for

election within 90 days (The Economist 2019; Nossiter 2019). Unlike the brutal response from the security forces in Sudan against peaceful protesters, Algerian authorities simply pushed for the resignation of the President through the instrumentality of the military.

Non-violent protests have been largely less costly and reasonably constructive and result oriented in the face of aggression. By remaining peaceful, security forces in the context of wide media international coverage could not retaliate with brute force against unarmed protesters. Over all, the dying regime may have been visibly divided on the option of deploying brute force to demobilize the protesters. Closely related but powerfully reinforcing is the functional effect of the peaceful protests in generating effective mobilization of the people. At the heart of mass participation of the populace in the protests was the palpable inclusiveness as a principle for mobilization. Protesters broke the social, political and economic barriers and were united by the deprivations endured for years to demand for basic freedoms and improved conditions of living as collective entitlements (Bishara 2019).

The United States, Norway, the United Kingdom and Canada issued a joint statement that condemned orchestrated violence by security forces against peaceful protesters and called on the Khartoum government to avoid violence, arbitrary detention and media censorship (Altaher and Fox 2018). In general, the international community has remained cautious about events in Sudan, a move that has been informed by the disastrous outcome of international influence of events in Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Libya. However, in the wake of a military crackdown on protesters in early June killing 113 people, the UN nations urged restraint and called on Sudanese military authorities to respect Sudanese basic rights including freedom of expression and assembly. The United States too condemned the attacks and called for a civilian led transition that would conduct elections that will see the free expression of the will of the Sudanese people (Aljazeera 2019).

The African Union, in its traditional response against military coups, gave the military three months within which to hand over power to a civilian regime in Sudan. This was a strategic move that served the ends of protesters' demand for a clean break from the past, in which the military was a veritable part of. The African Union (AU), though a reincarnation of the old African sentiments of self-preservation, was forced by events to act decisively. First was the Military Council suspension of talks with the opposition on the composition of the Transitional Council, the massacre of 113 people by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) using excessive force to disperse the revolutionary sit-in protesters from the military headquarters (AP 2019a; 2019b). Following this

drastic turn of events, the AU suspended Sudan from the Union until the appointment of a civilian transition in the country (Aljazeera 2019).

International response to the uprising was also muted and appeared neutral, leaving Algerians to decide their future (DW 2019). The French stand on the fence reflects its fear born out of its relationship with Algeria, especially its colonial legacy. France from all indications avoided any interpretation of its action as interference. Algeria is also seen as a strategic partner to France on economic and social issues, such as the curbing of migration from sub-Saharan Africa and Islamist terrorism in the Sahel. In this strategic context, French diplomatic relations with Algeria are a sensitive matter and the latter turning into turmoil is the least desirable option as this may affect relations with the European Union.

The seemingly muted and sideline posture of France was copied by the US, with a tilt in favour of protesters. The US noted that protesters had a right to oppose President Bouteflika in the context of their right to peaceful assembly (Kramdi 2019). European leaders were bothered about events in Algeria, especially Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Italy and France, who have stakes in stability in Algeria as regards immigration and terrorism. As the largest trading partner in oil and gas with Algeria, the country's stability is therefore invaluable to the US and Europe, hence the muted and covert support to the protesters by the US in order not to aggravate the events that may precipitate instability with adverse effects on strategic concerns to both parties.

Conclusion

The Arab spring has remained one of the most relevant events on the international scene since the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Economic crisis with high inflation, unemployment and lack of democracy triggered the nonviolent uprising which achieved significant results, notably the ouster of the authoritarian leaders in both countries. The Arab spring became the vent to outburst decades of suppressed frustrations and fears for the future.

The nonviolent approach to regime change has proved successful with the military as an effective ally. The isolation in Sudan produced a coup which has positioned the military as a formidable institution to guarantee security and the future of their countries by siding with the protesters with a major role in the transitions. In Algeria, the military being more professional relied on constitutionalism to drive the transition. In both countries, however, protesters have evolved a common demand to do away with the past in its

entirety and shape the future of their countries with the military on the side of the civil population, a positive outcome of a nonviolent strategy.

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ABSTRACT

The existential conditions in Middle East and North African countries that gave
rise to the Arab Spring have been comparatively explored against the backdrop of
heterogeneous socio-economic and political dynamics that undergirded its vary-
ing outcomes. These developments were further examined to draw parallels in the
delayed but eventual berth of the Arab spring in Sudan and Algeria. Relying on
documentary evidence, contextual thematic content analysis was employed to explain
the contagion that is the Arab Spring and its inevitable arrival in Sudan and Alge-
ria. Declining economic livelihoods and opportunities, high youth unemployment
and political repression triggered the uprising, but internal political and socio-de-
mographic dynamics and the degree of international influence of events in these
countries generated different outcomes in Sudan and Algeria, as much as in the
other countries touched by the uprisings. The Arab Spring holds all the trappings
of a revolution, but leaned strongly towards a non-violent slant. Broad based political
and economic liberalization are therefore critical to political stability and economic
progress in MENA and sub-Saharan Africa.

KEYWORDS:

Democracy. Economic crisis. Public protests. Political repression.

MANAGING POLITICAL IMPASSE THROUGH DIALOGUE: A VALIDATION OF CLIENTELISM IN AFRICA

Jean-Marie Kasonga Mbombo[1]

Introduction

The experience of national dialogue as a method for peace goes back to the democratization process that witnessed the end of the Cold War, particularly in French-speaking Africa. Popularly known as Sovereign National Conferences (SNC), these broad-based and inclusive fora were designed to manage the political transition in times of crisis and facilitate the organization of multiparty elections in fragile states such as Benin, Gabon, Congo Brazzaville, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and Togo, to name but a few. While some dialogues had a few hundred delegates in attendance and lasted a couple of weeks, others covered many months with thousands of participants (Brandt, Cottrell, et al. 2011). Even though most deliberations reached an agreement, only half of such agreements were implemented (Paffenholz, Zachariassen, and Helfer, 2017). What is more, inconclusive national conferences provided a fertile ground for armed conflicts particularly in Rwanda (1993), Burundi (1993), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1997). To end the 'Africa's World War', warlords and a portion of non-armed opposition entered a 52-day Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun City (South Africa) which provided a legal framework for a transition government headed by Joseph Kabila, assisted by four vice presidents (Prunier 2009; Sagare 2002; Meredith 2006). However, in recent times, young democracies have continued to experience political impasse following the incumbents' attempt to remain in power indefinitely by ways of breaching agreements, amending constitutions, rigging elections among other things. In a fashionable style,

1   Department of History and International Studies, University of Benin. Benin, Nigeria. E-mail: odigwenwaokocha@gmail.com. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3947-070X

the ruling parties have resorted to national dialogues as a political tool to reclaim lost legitimacy while maintaining their power grips.

Using the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a case study (Bayart 2009), this paper analyses the call for national dialogue initiated by the former President of the Democratic Republic to discuss the future of the country at the end of his constitutional term in office in 2015. The study relies on secondary data (review of extant literature) and adopts a theoretical framework of neopatrimonialism in an attempt to address the question as to whether the call for national dialogue was meant to generate innovative solutions to the Congolese perennial problems of governance or to legitimize the continuation of the regime by way of rewarding a few sympathizers to the regime with political appointments. As an alternative to a fruitless dialogue, the paper underscores the political will that is gradually turning things around under the new leadership of President Felix Tshisekedi. The argument is thus articulated in four sections, as follows. First, the paradigm of neopatrimonialism unveils the dominant characteristic of patronage politics in Africa, namely elite clientelism. Second, a call for a national dialogue that came at the end of President Joseph Kabila's last term in office is taken at face value as a nice way of finding an appropriate solution to Congolese current affairs. Third, the dialogue's failure to produce a roadmap for a peaceful transfer of power testifies is critically discussed. Fourth, an alternative to endless dialogue transpires in the political will which the new president has demonstrated in gradually dismantling elite clientelism in the DRC.

Theoretical Framework

Most scholarly studies about post-independent Africa revolve around the concept of neopatrimonialism under different labels: personal rule, big man syndrome, politics of the belly, godfatherism, warlordism, and the like (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; van de Walle 2001; Bayart 2009; Bach and Gazibo 2012). The concept is derived from Max Weber's term of "patrimonialism", suggesting a system of rule in which administrative and military personnel were only answerable to the ruler. The neologism first appeared in the work of Eisenstadt (1973), *Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism*. From Latin America, Middle East, Far East, and Europe, the practice of neopatrimonialism has attracted scholarly works (Erdmann and Engel 2006). It has also provided an important key to understanding why many African countries lag behind the rest of the world in terms of economic development, democratization, transparency,

accountability, and the rule of law. In the literature, it appears that neopatrimonialism, prebendalism, patronage, and clientelism are sometimes used interchangeably to describe a kind of political system that concentrates political power in a single individual with ultimate control of networks. Before proceeding further, it is important to provide a conceptual clarification of the above terms.

Prebendalism takes place when public offices are held by key elites and allies of the ruling party, granting personal access over state resources. However, the difference between prebendalism and patronage can be found in fiscal implications as evidenced in the following illustration: "Hiring a member of one's ethnic group to a senior position in the customs office is an example of patronage but allowing the customs officer to use the position for personal enrichment by manipulating import and export taxes is an example of a prebend" (van de Walle 2007, 4). Accordingly, leaders of low-income countries are attracted to prebendalism when they do not control a high level of resources but are characterized by a lack of professional civil service. In this case, government officials use their positions to embezzle public funds but go unpunished because political stability which is construed as the survival of the ruler compels the latter to recycle criminals at the next cabinet reshuffle instead of sending them to jail. Political stability is such that membership within the elite is relatively stable as removal from one position usually leads to appointment to another (van de Walle 2001, 125). Patronage and clientelism point to a relationship between two unequal parties whereby one gains political power and the other economic benefits, but both are not synonymous. Whereas clientelism stresses the supportive role of the elite, patronage is an institutionalized form of resource distribution: a ruling party leader acting as a patron allows public jobs and services to beneficiaries of the regime at his discretion to gain the needful support. Patronage politics is most practiced in democratic regimes and growing economies, while clientelism is a trademark of poor and autocratic regimes.

As far as Africa is concerned, the origins of a neopatrimonial state can be traced back to the colonial era where indirect rule (by kings, chiefs, and elders) combined with modern bureaucracy to produce hybrid regimes or a mixture of patrimonial and legal-rational domination. According to Chabal and Daloz (1999), such hybrid regimes reflect an institutionalized disorder in which modern and traditional lifestyles are bedfellows. As they put it: "what is distinct in Africa is the creative manner in which this overlap of modernity and tradition combines to create a form of political accountability which is rooted in the instrumentalization of disorder" (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 147). In the same way, van de Walle (2001, 116) contends that "the

style of rule that emerged combined the authoritarian legacy of the colonial administration and village traditions of patrimonialism.". It is little wonder that post-independent leaders were quickly attracted to and inspired by the unquestionable authority of traditional rulers. Being treated as life presidents by their respective populations, many heads of state awarded themselves the prestigious titles of Emperor, Field Marshal, Father of the Nation, Supreme Leader, and the like (Ohene 2015).

Following the democratization drive at the end of the Cold War, the practice of clientelism allows politicians to engage in electoral competition without political ideology. According to van de Walle (2007), three categories of clientelism exist, namely traditional, elite, and mass clientelism. Traditional clientelism was practiced under customary law, in traditional kingdoms, whereby the ruler and the subjects developed a bond of reciprocity through tribute and gift exchange. When independent states grew out of a colonial state in Africa, elite clientelism developed within the executive branch of government with the sole objective of keeping the president and his cronies in power as long as possible. Instead of redistributing the wealth of the nation, clientelism facilitates the growing gap between the elite and the masses through extractive institutions of governance. It also opens political space for mass clientelism to take center stage as the democratization process unfolds. At this third level, power struggle and its attendant access to resources become the norm, especially at the party level where candidates seek tickets in primaries. Victory at the polls depends on the ability of the candidate to dispense cash to the electorate.

Neopatrimonialism can be appreciated as a process of state formation but many years after independence, elite clientelism as practiced in young democracies constitutes a clog in the wheel of economic progress: state resources are distributed within members of an inner circle of government to undermine economic reforms and prevent political change. In a patron-client relationship, the fate of an entire population has to depend on one 'Big Man' who is capable of giving generously and it becomes difficult to draw a line between what is public and private fund. As a result, party members can easily shift ground and identify with the winning camp to remain in the lucrative business of governance. As van de Walle argues:

> In mass clientelist systems, the objective is to win elections, and the key instrument of electoral competition is likely to be the political party. The centrality of competition is the hallmark of electoral politics, and the reliance on patronage to buttress parties is a fairly standard feature of a wide number of democracies (van de Walle 2007, 7).

It is worth stressing that beneficiaries of state patronage are not the bottom millions that lack any political leverage, but the critical power brokers of the inner caucus. The theory of neopatrimonialism has shed some light on the politics of patronage in vogue in many African countries, whereby incumbents tend to hold on to power indefinitely. Using the DRC as a case study of entrenched elite clientelism, the next section examines the rationale behind the call for national dialogue at the end of the second and last constitutional term of office of Mr. Joseph Kabila.

Call for National Dialogue

Article 70 of the 2006 Constitution of the DRC stipulates that the president is elected according to universal suffrage for a five-year term, renewable once. At the beginning of his second term in office, President Joseph Kabila launched a round of consultations in a symbolic gesture of reaching out to the losers of the 2011 general elections. Accordingly, the ruling party and a large number of opposition parties were able to form a coalition government in December 2014 which was expected to end by December 2016 with general elections. However, in a televised broadcast to the nation on 28 November 2015, Mr. Kabila made a call for a national dialogue to discuss the future of the country before the expiration of his last term in office as if the constitution was silent about the organization of elections by the national electoral commission and the possible transfer of power. Inclusion and ownership are the main ingredients for national dialogues as a method for peace (Paffenholz, et al. 2017). But the opposition party was not prepared to negotiate power with the government that was about to change hands. It also cautioned the outgoing regime against a violation of the constitution, while reiterating their demand for a peaceful transfer of power at the end of fair and credible general elections. On its part, the ruling coalition beefed up massive campaigns locally and internationally in an attempt to induce selected audiences that another inter-Congolese dialogue was necessary if the country was to avert cycles of violence similar to what followed the fall of dictator Mobutu in the 1990s (Meredith 2006; Prunier 2009; Stearns 2011).

At the African Union (AU) Commission, the option of the national dialogue for a political solution was eventually adopted with the appointment on 6 April 2016 of former Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Edem Kodjo to facilitate the Congolese national dialogue between the government and opposition groups. Worthy of note however is the fact that many members of the opposition boycotted the proceedings

while the government seized the opportunity to identify a few personalities that were willing to compromise. Together they signed an agreement on October 18, 2016, to share power in a transitional government. In the end, the Constitutional Court legitimized the extension of the Kabila regime by interpreting Article. 70 of the Constitution (as amended in 2011) in favor of the incumbent, stating that "The President remains in power until a newly elected President takes office" (VOA 2016). Security agents were soon mobilized nationwide to preempt any action that might trigger a popular movement similar to the one that ended the regime of Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso in 2014. Despite police brutality, peaceful protesters still occupied the streets of Kinshasa to manifest their popular discontent on 19 December 2016. They called on President Kabila to let the Independent National Electoral Commission organize general elections for a peaceful transfer of power to take place for the first time in the DRC, but to no avail.

It was at this critical juncture that the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (CENCO) came on board to revive the stalled dialogue between government and opposition parties (Gettleman 2017). On 31 December 2016, another compromise agreement known as the St. Sylvester Accord was reached. This was after a series of talks between those who signed the Kodjo deal of 18 October 2016, including the government, and those who held out. According to a clause of this new agreement, the leader of the opposition, late Etienne Tshisekedi was chosen to head the Transition Council and so pave the way for Kabila to leave power in 2017. Another area of agreement was to appoint a Prime Minister from the opposition *Rassemblement* who was to form a transition government. All in all, it appears that the Kabila government was just buying time and more supporters of the regime, including members of the opposition party. In other words, the incumbent made use of both the Kodjo-led national dialogue and the CENCO initiative to identify potential allies and strengthen his grip on power. In the next section, the paper argues that the inconclusive nature of national dialogue to proffer a consensual solution to the Congolese problem of political instability is an indication of elite clientelism that sacrifices the rule of law embodied in the constitution on the altar of continuity of the regime that benefits only a few.

Political Impasse

Why should incumbents resort to national dialogue at the end of their mandate instead of preparing for a peaceful handover of power? Communication theorists contend that conflicts are primarily communication problems.

At the heart of every dialogue is the willingness of the parties involved in a conflict to communicate. Even though a dialogue does not imply a binding agreement between two conflicting parties, it is an integral part of negotiation and mediation processes. A facilitator in a negotiation process meets the parties separately and ensures that they are not only ready for dialogue, but also committed to work together for a mutually satisfactory outcome. He or she makes preliminary contacts with relevant stakeholders to gather their interests and needs before facilitating the dialogue and eventually proposing a compromise agreement to be signed by all participants (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 2007, 167; Harowitz 2007). In a democracy, it is, however, imperative that the government of the day improves not only on service delivery but also on communication about important issues if they want to remain in power.

As far as the government is concerned, the Minister of Information is usually seen as the government's mouthpiece who should regularly communicate with the citizenry, not only by keeping the latter in the know about government action but also gathers feedback on issues of national interest. Even when one government goes out and another takes power, the political dialogue continues, given that the incoming administration is keen on fulfilling its electoral promises. It is also believed that issues of national interests ought to be discussed in parliament. Individual members of parliament (MPs) have the opportunity to organize interactive sessions with their respective constituencies in a bid to explain the rationale behind new bills proposed in the National Assembly and gather the views of the grassroots that will help in the decision-making processes. To the opposition parties is assigned the role of watchdogs that scrutinize the agenda of the ruling party and exploit the gap between what citizens expect and what they receive from the government, in a sustained effort to win the hearts of the electorate at the next polls.

Lack of communication that guarantees the freedom of information is alien to a democratic dispensation and likely to generate rejection, frustration, and aggression from the electorate. Arguably, searching for solutions to political impasse through government-initiated dialogue is a mechanism that points in the direction of elite clientelism, whereby state resources are mobilized to buy the support of loyalists to maintain the status quo (Bayart 2009). A close look at the Kodjo-led dialogue reveals that opposition parties were not committed to negotiating unconstitutional solutions with the government at the end of President Kabila's last term in office. They equally rejected the services of the AU-appointed facilitator, who could not pass the test of impartiality. As Jackson (2009, 243) contends, a third party can

enhance the chance of success, but the latter depends on the willingness of the conflicting parties to settle their differences. The AU Peace and Security Report links the failure of the Congolese dialogue with the appointment of Mr. Kodjo when it said that "he has stepped into a process initiated by the Congolese government that does not have the buy-in of the opposition, which views it as a waste of time with the ultimate objective to extend Kabila's stay in power" (Report 2016). Among the elite that participated in it, not everybody signed the final document (agreement). There is, therefore, a need to interrogate the role of the political elite in maintaining the status quo in the DRC.

It is worth recalling that at the beginning of his second term in office, the then DRC president Joseph Kabila launched national consultations. As a result, the ruling party and a large number of opposition parties were able to form a coalition government in December 2014 in exchange for ministerial portfolios. It was in the context of patronage that the Independent National Electoral Commission lost its independence to organize general elections in 2016 while the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the incumbent to remain in power. Following the death of Etienne Tshisekedi as renowned leader of the opposition on 1 February 2017, the St. Sylvester Accord became another false start. Even though the country was able to avert bloodshed through the good office of the Congolese Bishops' Conference (CENCO), the latter lacked political muscles to oversee the implementation of the St. Sylvester Accord. Out of frustration, the Congolese prelates decided to discontinue their services on 28 March 2017 and let Joseph Kabila decide the fate of the country alone. The divided opposition was unable to propose not only a credible figure to lead the Transition Council, but also a Prime Minister with the power to head a unity government under the authority of the Head of state.

Capitalizing on a divided opposition, the Head of State met with a few malleable dissidents of the opposition parties and on April 7, 2017, appointed Bruno Tshibala as the new Prime Minister who would then form a government of national unity. By picking someone who had been recently expelled from the *Rassemblement*, the incumbent disregarded the St. Sylvester Accord (Aljazeera 2017). As the European Union analysts in Kinshasa put it, Kabila's move was "contrary to the letter and spirit of the compromise agreement" (Wembi 2017). How can a co-opted minister challenge his boss without being fired and replaced the next day by a more loyal servant of the regime and agent of the status quo? Going against the interests of a large portion of the opposition demonstrated simply that the national dialogue was synonymous with a divide-and-rule mechanism at the service of the ruling party. Eventually, the whole exercise plunged the country into a political impasse that only hurts the masses. To propose an alternative to an endless

dialogue, the last section takes note of a series of victories stemming from the political will under the new leadership in DRC.

Change through Political Will

At a book launch in Addis Ababa in 2008, renowned economist George Ayittey urged African leaders to apply "African solutions to African problems'' instead of recycling colonial clichés that no longer work for the people of the continent in the 21st century (Fiquremariam 2008). However, one thing is for African politicians to claim ownership of the solutions they adopt in their respective constituencies, and another thing is for them to agree on what African problems are. Former president Yayha Jammeh ruled the Gambia for 22 years but refused to step down after losing the December 2016 elections. Thus, he created an African problem that, if left to him alone, would have led the country into a civil war. An African solution came from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that threatened to use force against Jammeh before the latter accepted to leave the country. In the DRC, Joseph Kabila who succeeded his slain father (Laurent Desire Kabila) in 2001 stepped down after 18 years in power when the call for national dialogue failed to extend the constitutional term limit imposed on him. Accordingly, DRC experienced in January 2019 for the first time since independence in 1960, a peaceful transfer of power between Kabila and the flag bearer of the main opposition party, Felix Antoine Tshisekedi, thanks to mounting pressure nationally and internationally over many years. It is important to note however that Mr. Kabila created a political impasse by attempting to prolong his regime by proxy after the failed dialogue.

Through an electoral commission that was bought to the cause of the regime, a political alliance, 'Common Front for the Congo' (FCC) was formed to safeguard the interests of the patron. Endorsed by the Constitutional Court, the December 2018 general elections' results produced pro-Kabila officials to lead provincial governments, National Assembly, and the Senate. It begs the question as to how a defeated party at the general election could still retain the majority of seats in parliament. The answer to this critical question is not far-fetching because as Stearns puts it:

> A key word in the Congolese lexicon of corruption is *the envelope*. If you want to buy votes in Parliament to squelch the audit of your state--run company, you pass around envelopes. When you want to obtain a lucrative contract to supply the police with beans and rice, you make sure the officials on the procurement boards all get envelopes delivered to their homes (Stearns 2011, 321).

On his part, the newly elected president had to form a coalition with pro-Kabila loyalists. It was a disguised form of an endless dialogue between two parties that stood for change on one hand and continuity of the old regime on the other hand. Accordingly, the head of a new government (Prime Minister) would come from the majority in parliament, according to Article 78 of the Constitution. Equally important to mention is the fact that to ensure Kabila's grips on power by remote control, two-thirds of ministries out of 65 had to go to FCC, including defense, justice, finance, and budget among others. In the same way, the outgoing president ensured that the army, the police, and the intelligence services were headed by staunch clients of his predatory regime.

After two years of paralysis at the heart of the coalition government, the new leader decided to terminate what many analysts have described as a 'marriage against nature' with Kabila. In his address to the nation on December 7, 2020, President Tshisekedi admitted publicly the coalition government's failure to move the country forward and challenged honorable members of parliament to have a rethink as representatives of the people rather than servants of one patron. As he puts it:

> The reasons for dissolution were met, given there has been a persistent crisis, crystallized in particular by the parliament's refusal to support certain government initiatives; as was the case during the swearing-in of the members of the Constitutional Court, I will use the constitutional prerogatives granted to me to come back to you, sovereign people and ask you for this majority (Gras and Tshiamala 2020).

Starting from 3 November 2020, President Tshisekedi has demonstrated his political will to make the expected change happen. Without distributing envelopes to a few, he has opted for intense consultations with different stakeholders including the political elite, opinion leaders, and representatives of civil society. Rather than calling for another national dialogue involving the opposition only, he has the opportunity of not only listening to the aspirations of the great majority of people, but also selling his vision of a new Congo in which officeholders would be servants of the people.

To materialize such a vision at the end of the consultations, he has launched a new platform, the Sacred Union for the Nation (SUN) in which willing political actors across the board would freely join hands in putting an end to the system of impunity. As attested by presidential informant Senator Modeste Bahati Lukwebo in his report of 29 January 2021, the wind of change has quickly turned the tables upside down when 381 out of 500 Members of Parliament have taken a U-Turn and reconfigured the new pro-Tshisekedi majority under the umbrella of SUN. This reversal of loyalty has enabled lawmakers to vote the speaker of the lower house, Madam Jeanine Mabunda out with her entire team before filing a similar no-confidence vote against the Prime Minister and his cabinet (Asala 2021). As if that was not enough, the upper house followed suit and removed Senate President Alexis Thambwe Mwamba and his team from office through ballot papers, all within a matter of weeks.

Conclusion

The concept of national dialogue subscribes to the mantra of African solutions for African problems and its application as the preferred option of managing political impasse, especially in the aftermath of contested election results, is gaining currency. Although a dialogue brings antagonists closer and makes communication possible, it can become ineffective when parties to the conflict hold asymmetric powers. What's more, it can be used as a tool in the hands of an autocrat that clings to power. This paper has adopted the case study of DRC to underscore the impact of patron-client politics on regime change in Africa. The study has argued that President Joseph Kabila opted for national dialogue to enlarge his political base and ensure the continuity of his regime at all costs. Even though delayed elections were conducted in December 2018, the transfer of power was only ceremonial because real power was held by the majority of the pro-Kabila coalition (FCC) which controlled all institutions of government, including the National Assembly and Senate, the central and provincial governments, the army, the police as well as state security service. In a typical patron-client regime, local actors are not willing to sacrifice their benefits on the altar of power alternation, and whatever initiative taken by the Big Man is designed to perpetuate elite clientelism. The ensuing coalition government between Kabila and Tshisekedi was nothing more than a continuous tension between continuity and rupture. Having summoned his political will after two years of political stalemate, Felix Tshisekedi launched large consultations with various segments

of the population to share his vision for a new DRC. Using constitutional prerogatives, he moved on to terminate the fruitless coalition and evoked the possibility of dissolving the parliament if lawmakers failed to live up to their constitutional mandate as representatives of the people. Consequently, a new majority that allied with the pro-Tshisekedi Sacred Union of the Nation was identified, and it precipitated the downfall of key figures of the ancient regime without the use of force. This is a demonstration of political will that produces tangible results, as opposed to inconclusive national dialogue at the service of the elite in power.

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ABSTRACT

Political impasse occurs each time an African leader breaches peace accords, rigs elections, or amends the country's constitution to remain in power indefinitely. In a fashionable style, the ruling party would resort to a political tool of national dialogue to reclaim lost legitimacy while maintaining their power grips. Using the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a typical case study of elite clientelism, this paper analyses the call for national dialogue initiated by the former President of the Democratic Republic to discuss the future of the country at the end of his constitutional term in office in 2015. It relies on secondary data (review of extant literature) and adopts a theoretical framework of neopatrimonialism to address the question as to whether the call for national dialogue was meant to generate innovative solutions to the Congolese perennial problems of governance or to legitimize the continuation of the regime by way of rewarding a few sympathizers to the regime with political appointments. As an alternative to a fruitless dialogue, the study underscores the political will under the new leadership of President Felix Tshisekedi, that is gradually dismantling the ancient régime in the DRC.

THE UNIVERSITY IN THE GENESIS OF BLACK CONSCIENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

Luis Edel Abreu Veranes[1]

Introduction

The Black Conscience Movement in South Africa is inscribed with a special stamp in the long itinerary of the South African people's struggle against the *apartheid* regime, as one of the great unifying processes of the forces that opposed the philosophy and practice of separate development in the Austral country during the seventies, and the main one emerging within the university campus. This movement is generated from the intellectual experience of black university students who, anchored in the philosophy of a pan-black thought influenced by various exponents of pan-African thought, undertook the task of recreating these ideological springs in the *apartheid* scene with the aim of contributing to the total liberation of blacks in South Africa, in a context in which the main currents of the anti-*apartheid* movement had been inhibited as a result of government repression.

The present work is aimed at answering some questions that arise in the way of research on the causes of the origin of Black Consciousness within the university campus. In historical and social processes we are used to pointing out the multi-causality of the events of history and in the case that concerns us we cannot speak of an exception. The emergence of Black Consciousness in South Africa is marked by a multiplicity of variables in which the structural phenomena of Mandela's country are intertwined with certain circumstantial processes associated with the lives of black university students in South Africa, which sowed the germ of political unrest, with the aim of changing their society, starting from the internal life of the Universities. These young people were sensitized by the intellectual development

1   Department of History, Universidad de La Habana. Havana, Cuba.
E-mail: luisedel@ffh.uh.cu. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3460-7727

of blacks on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean with all its charge of liberation and opposition to white hegemony, which marked the evolution of black ideologies throughout the 20th century. At the same time, they found themselves in a context of oppression and segregation that cloistered the desire for fulfillment of those young people moved by that counter-hegemonic and rebellious thinking.

The ideological resonances of the American black movement and the decolonization processes in the African continent are frequently referred to as a fundamental reference in the emergence of Black Consciousness in South Africa. The movement's founding leader himself occasionally draws on the black thinking of some of these figures who impacted black philosophy and thought on three continents. In this author's consideration, these two fundamental aspects of black thought and movements in the American continent must be evaluated, but without detaching it from the process of decolonization in Africa. Steve Biko himself stated:

> The development of consciousness among South African blacks has often been attributed to the influence of the American 'black' movement. But it seems to me that this is a consequence of the conquest of independence that many African states have achieved in a short time (Biko 1989, 54, own translation)[2].

However, the development of Steve Biko himself is a result of the evolution of that black thought that has been influenced by many personalities from the Afro-Caribbean and Afro-American world. The existence of certain parallels in the history of black people in America and in Africa cannot be denied, as in the case of the North American movement to fight for civil rights and the concomitant processes of blacks in Africa. Biko cites in his article "White racism and black conscience" a fragment of Aimé Césaire when he resigned from the French Communist Party and reflected the problems of the peculiarity of the history and culture of a people, then the South African leader argued: "Almost at the same time that Césaire said this, a group of angry young black men was emerging in South Africa who were beginning to

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2   "El desarrollo de la conciencia entre los negros sudafricanos ha sido a menudo atribuido a la influencia del movimiento 'negro' americano. Pero a mí me parece que esta es una consecuencia de la conquista de la independencia que muchos Estados africanos han logrado en corto tiempo".

'grasp the notion of their peculiar uniqueness' and who were eager to define what and who they were" (Biko 1989, 51-52, own translation)[3].

Those tools were the ones that that generation of South African black students projected within the scenario of the southern country, where, in addition, black people made up most of the population, in a difficult context of repression in which the maturation of that black consciousness occurred, within that black university vanguard that gave a very broad dimension to their movement, paradoxically from that pan-black conception. In this direction, Biko resorted to the thought of another great Afro-Antillean who permeated the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa, in this case Frantz Fanon, when he expressed:

As stated by Fanon *apud* Biko:

> The consciousness of being is not closing a door to communication ... the national consciousness, which is not nationalism, is the only thing that will give us an international dimension. This is a sign of encouragement, because there is no doubt that the black-white power struggle in South Africa is but a microcosm of the global confrontation between the Third World and the wealthy white nations of the world that manifests itself in a more real way as the years go by (Biko 1989, 57, own translation)[4].

There is a direct or indirect intertwining between those two processes in the contemporary history of the black, the Africa that decolonizes and the black America that fights for its rights, in which personalities from the Afro-Caribbean and Afro-American world stood out, based on the libertarian goals of African nations. In the particular case of South Africa, due to the delicate situation between black and white, and *apartheid* that was manifesting itself against the current in the midst of the African decolonization process, these ideas had fertile ground for their development, which would materialize in a movement born within the university walls.

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3   "Casi al mismo tiempo que Césaire dijera esto, emergía en Sudáfrica un grupo de jóvenes negros coléricos que empezaban a 'captar la noción de su unicidad peculiar' y quienes estaban ansiosos de definir qué y quiénes eran".

4   "La conciencia del ser no es cerrar una puerta a la comunicación...la conciencia nacional, que no es nacionalismo, es la única cosa que nos dará una dimensión internacional. Este es un signo de aliento, porque no hay duda que la lucha de poder blanco-negro en Sudáfrica no es sino un microcosmos del enfrentamiento global entre el Tercer Mundo y las naciones blancas ricas del mundo que se manifiesta de una manera más real a medida que transcurren los años".

The historical context

Since 1948, South Africa was governed by the Nationalist Party that brought the *apartheid* ideology to fruition, once a previous stage of strengthening the identity contours of conservative white ideologies had been established, mainly that coming from the Afrikaner colonato. *Apartheid* began to develop a government program based on the separation of the entire South African social fabric based on an ethno-racial criterion. This is reflected in a powerful legal and institutional body designed to materialize the government's proposal, whose laws were aimed at segregating all settings of social and private life, including privacy, but in the most advantageous way for the white community.

In the sixties of the last century the different movements of the interracial struggle had been inhibited in their fight against the *apartheid*, as a result of the hardening of the repressive policies of the South African government. The previous decade had represented a historical turning point in relation to the organization of the different tendencies and parties that gathered around the common objective of achieving the dismantling of the perfidious regime. The Alliance of Congresses had been one of the most transcendent results with a cluster of organizations that were radicalized in the heat of their confrontation with the *apartheid*, highlighting the leadership of Nelson Mandela and shaping the prominence of the African National Congress (ANC) in the course of events[5].

In the 1950s there was a trend towards the unification of all the organizations opposed to *apartheid*, based on a model of peaceful struggle, but with a trend towards violence, directly related to the repressive response of the government. This process of unity crystallized in the summer of 1955 in the famous People's Congress, as expressed by Professor Reinaldo Sánchez Porro: "The important gathering was the culmination of a year-long campaign in which the members of the Congress Alliance went house to house throughout South Africa, collecting the demands of the people for a free South Africa" (Sánchez Porro 2016, 274, own translation)[6]. In this conclave the historic Freedom Charter was proclaimed, which proposed the solution of the national and class problem in South Africa based on the equality of

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5   This Alliance was made up, in addition to the ANC, by the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the Congress of Democrats (COD) of the whites who opposed *apartheid* and the Coloured People's Organisation, later (CPO).

6   "La importante reunión fue la culminación de una campaña de un año en la que los miembros de la Alianza de los Congresos fueron casa por casa por toda Sudáfrica, recogiendo las peticiones del pueblo en función de lograr una Sudáfrica libre"

all its children, and after proclaiming all the rights seized from the South African people, it culminated by stating that: "For these freedoms we will fight, shoulder to shoulder, throughout our lives, until we have conquered our freedom" (Entralgo 1979, 476, own translation)[7].

The racist regime did not take long to project its plans to stop the rise of the anti-*apartheid* movement trying to divide the people through the Bantustans, which began to be applied in the following decade, articulating this policy with the strengthening of repressive mechanisms and the consolidation of the *apartheid* institutions[8]. By the 1960s, *apartheid* had touched very sensitive fibers in society such as the educational sector. We must take a parenthesis here because it directly interconnects with the emergence in the late 1960s of the Black Consciousness Movement. The first five years of this decade had not been very happy for the organizations that opposed apartheid, after the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, due to the demonstration promoted by the Pan-African Congress to oppose the law that restricted the movement of South Africans within their own land[9]. The ANC opted, after a long debate, for armed struggle and the training of many of its leaders abroad. But between 1963 and 1964 the ANC leadership faced the Rivonia trial as a result of the regime's persecution and eventually sentenced to life imprisonment, others captured were sentenced to long sentences and others had to leave South Africa to avoid capture. Therefore, the second half of the

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7   "Por estas libertades lucharemos, hombro a hombro, durante nuestras vidas, hasta que hayamos conquistado nuestra libertad"

8   The Bantustans were a project of the South African regime, which took shape since the 1950s to fragment the majority black population on the basis of a criterion of tribal division. These tribal "ghettos" were projected by the Tomlinson Report of 1955 whose objective was the promotion of these homelands with a retribalizing purpose. In the end, that majority of the population was cloistered in 13% of the country's land, by the way, in the least useful lands. Over time some of those Bantustans formed autonomous governments, governmental entelechies that depended on the entire South African structure and infrastructure, such as the Transkei corresponding to the Xhosa ethnic group, Ciskei also Xhosa, Kwazulu, Lebowa of the North Sothos, Gazankulu of the Tsonga, Vhavenda , and Bophuthatswana of the Tswana. Later, these Bantustans had to face an important group of labor problems and problems related to overcrowding, as a result of the government's act of dispossession of that population expelled from their places of origin to those reserves.

9   The Sharpeville Massacre was a sad event in South African and *apartheid* history that filled the hands of the South African regime with blood. These events took place in March 1960 as a result of a demonstration organized by the Pan-African Congress to publicly burn their passes, opposing the pass laws enacted by *apartheid* to control the movement of the majority of the South African population. The event raised a great wave of rejection around the world against *apartheid*. These events led to a revision of the ANC's philosophy of struggle to oppose *apartheid*, hitherto anchored within the limits of a peaceful struggle. But after Sharpeville there was a process of radicalization of the ANC that was reflected in the creation of its armed wing, the *Umkhonto we Sizwe* or Spear of the Nation.

sixties passed as a period of transition and rethinking of the social movements that faced the South African regime.

The problem of Bantu education

The Black Conscience, which emerged between university walls, was a new platform for the relaunch of the project of liberation of the South African people, but taking as a reference other ideological sources that disconnected with the philosophy and practice of interracial struggle. The government had tried to exorcise the dangerous potential of the education and training of these people, through Hendrik Verwoerd and his model of Bantu education. Even before *apartheid*, black people did not have a training that matched that of white, due to the structural reasons of South African society, conceived so that non-whites were immediately integrated into the labor world of the worker in the mines and the farms and the domestic service of the whites. In this sense, it is not idle to refer to certain parallels and resonances with North American society since the last decades of the 19th century after the Civil War, when the South began to guide the education of the black according to their industrial interests, a process that acquired certain relevance in the voice of a black man like Booker T. Washington, who gained some support from his region and also important detractors like William Du Bois, who opposed the instrumental education based on the industrial world promoted by Booker T. Washington, and Tuskegee[10] Institute-style educational segregation. Washington opposed the maximum elevation of the cultural level of blacks, as reflected by Du Bois most explicitly:

> Mr. Washington clearly calls for Black people to relinquish, at least for the moment, first, political power; second, to the insistence on civil rights; and third to higher education for black youth, in order to concentrate all their energies on industrial education, the accumulation of wealth and the reconciliation of the South (Du Bois 2001, 56, own translation)[11].

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10 The Tuskegee Institute is an educational institution that emerged in the United States in the late nineteenth century, in Alabama, which represented the principles of educational segregation in relation to the black who later recreated *apartheid* in South African educational institutions.

11 "El señor Washington pide claramente que el pueblo negro renuncie, al menos por el momento, primero, al poder político; segundo, a la insistencia en los derechos civiles; y tercero a la educación superior para la juventud negra, con el fin de concentrar todas sus energías en la educación industrial, la acumulación de riquezas y la conciliación del Sur".

Like southern interests in the United States, the *apartheid* regime sought to control black education in a more efficient way, this did not exclude plans oriented towards higher education. The architect of that policy was the Minister of Native Affairs Hendrik Verwoerd, who would later become President of the Republic. The centralizing policy of the regime was essentially aimed at creating an institutional framework that would support the legal tools approved by the government and that would control education, curricula, teachers and everything related to the formation of black people and non-whites in a more general sense. There is a staggering and hardening of this policy, first projected towards general education, which of course has a noticeable impact on higher education. In *Educación bantú: Política para el futuro inmediato* the projection of the government is reflected, in the words of Verwoerd himself:

> The policy of the Department is that Bantu education must be based on the Reserves and have its own objectives according to the spirit and what Bantu society represents... There is no place for it in the European community outside of certain limits and some forms work... For this reason you are not allowed to receive any training that results in your absorption by the European community (Tabata 1980, 38, own translation)[12].

By the 1950s, education already had the mark of segregation, but the new centralizing effort of the government was articulated with the projects of Bantustanization of social life, whose paroxysm was the creation of the Bantustans, to which we referred above. The policy of strengthening educational segregation was intended to prevent a dangerous social mobility of blacks, and the circulation of progressive and advanced ideas in function of their liberation, as expressed in all contemporary black thought. The new institutional framework was accompanied by the respective reduction of funds for education in black schools, beyond being a public education supported by the South African State, there was a tendency and decision of the government to gradually eliminate financial support from the State for Bantu education, which should be sustained from now on, according to the government projection, with the resources from taxes on that population.

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12 "La política del Departamento es que la educación bantú debe de estar en función de las Reservas y tener sus propios objetivos de acuerdo al espíritu y lo que representa la sociedad Bantú...No existe lugar para esta en la comunidad europea fuera de ciertos límites y algunas formas de trabajo...Por esta razón no se le permite recibir ningún entrenamiento cuyo resultado sea su absorción por la comunidad europea".

The birth of the Black Consciousness, therefore, is founded on the demolition and the fracture of the barriers interposed by the government for the education of the South African black people, a policy that was based on two essential principles, the structural phenomena that contradicted the legitimate formation from black to university level and the institutional tools developed by *apartheid*, mainly from the 1950s, with the aim of achieving social, educational segregation and the total inferiority of black, mixed and native peoples in the South African social fabric.

This progression towards segregated education was concretely reflected in the passage in 1953 of the Bantu Education Law, which created a department oriented to these objectives[13]. This legislative process would be completed in the 1960s with the laws that regulated the formation of mixed and natives in 1963 and 1965, respectively. Of course, these institutions marked the line of a censored educational policy towards teachers and publications for the training of students, conditioning the new texts that should be placed in the hands of the students.

As early as 1948, when *apartheid* was recently created, President Daniel François Malan expressed himself in favor of a segregated higher education as he posed in the following terms:

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13 This law placed under the direct administration of the state, through the Ministry of Bantu Affairs, the educational institutions of the country, and therefore under the principles of segregation promoted by the government. Previously, it was very complex for the government to have control over all these institutions because they were under the control of the provincial governments and their laws, as well as ecclesiastical and private institutions. With the Bantu education law, control of the schools was transferred to the Department of Native Affairs, removing them from the administration of the provincial authorities, while private institutions could choose between transferring their institutions to the department or keeping them private, but abiding by all instructions of the department related to the admission of students, teachers, the means of instruction etc. The main decisions regarding school subjects began to be taken from government agencies where the presence of blacks, mixed and Asians was practically nil.

>An intolerable situation has developed here in recent years in our university institutions, a situation that has led to certain frictions, due to the annoying relationship between Europeans and non-Europeans... We do not want to stop higher education for non-Europeans and we will take all necessary measures to guarantee to the native and mixed peoples the university improvement as much as we can, but in their own sphere; in other words, in separate institutions (UNESCO 1967, 83-84, own translation)[14].

Segregation and South African Universities

In the 1950s, the government had already created a commission to study the possibility of implementing segregationist measures in university education. The Holloway Commission had not issued a favorable report towards *apartheid* in Universities, among other reasons, for logistical reasons and the existing infrastructure. Despite this report, the South African regime forced towards a university bantustanization, which affected the few universities that did not use an ethno-racial criterion for the enrollment of their students. A member of the Commission synthesized in 1957 the centralizing effort of the regime:

>[...] The purpose of such legislation is to deviate from the old university tradition that had been maintained throughout the history of the Universities in South Africa, the tradition by which they themselves, and not an external authority, determined the conditions of admission in their classrooms (UNESCO 1967, 83, own translation)[15].

Professor Malherbe interpreted these events, no longer from a perspective of the social consequences of said process, but from the evident reduction of the institutional autonomy of the high houses of studies in

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14 "Una situación intolerable se ha desarrollado aquí durante los últimos años en nuestras instituciones universitarias, una situación que ha conducido a determinadas fricciones, debido a la molesta relación entre los europeos y no europeos... Nosotros no queremos detener la educación superior para los no europeos y tomaremos todas las medidas necesarias para garantizarles a los pueblos nativos y mestizos la superación universitaria tanto como podamos, pero en su propia esfera; en otras palabras, en instituciones separadas".

15 "[...] el propósito de dicha legislación es la desviación de la vieja tradición universitaria que se había mantenido a lo largo de la historia de las Universidades en Sudáfrica, la tradición mediante la cual, ellas mismas, y no una autoridad externa, determinaba las condiciones de admisión en sus aulas".

the Austral country. Since before the approval of the University Education Extension Law, certain extracurricular activities such as residence, sports or recreational activities had been segregated in the so-called open universities, even in the University of Natal they accepted non-whites, but in classrooms different from those of whites, with some exception when it came to post-graduate courses. When the Extension Act was passed in 1959, the South African government's intentions were toward university Bantustanization. The result of this policy was that universities began to accept students of an ethnic group or race, for example, the University of Durban was destined for the population of native origin, the University of the Western Cape for mixed, the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Natal for Africans, mixed and natives. On the other hand, the University College of Fort Hare was reserved for the Africans of the Xhosa ethnic group, the University of Ngoye for the Zulu and the Swazi, the University College of the North was oriented for the formation of the Sotho, the Bendoa and the Sanga.

This had a noticeable impact on the higher education of the majority of the South African people, the non-whites:

> In 1983 the four English-speaking Universities (Cape Town, Witwatersrand, Natal and Rhodes) had 14% black students. But both the five Afrikaans universities – Rand Afrikaans University (RAU), Potchefstroom, Stellenbosch, Pretoria and Bloemfontein (University of Orange Free State) – and Port Elizabeth's bilingual (English/Afrikaans) had just 1% black students. (Tazón (s/a), 79, own translation)[16].

Here it can be perfectly visualized that the regime's legislation had a deeper impact on Afrikaans universities than on English-speaking ones, a situation that is perfectly understood knowing that the Afrikaans people and nationalism were the hard core in the creation and development of the spawn of *apartheid* through its Nationalist Party. Some English-speaking universities, especially those in Cape Town and the Witwatersrand, and even Natal's were called open universities, which resulted in the acceptance of students of different ethnic origins. But this onerous consequence, as referred to above, is not the exclusive result of the regime's legislation but of the structural and social conditions of the heterogeneous South African people, whose majority was anchored in a condition of inferiority imposed by the

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16 "En 1983 las cuatro Universidades angloparlantes (Ciudad del Cabo, Witwatersrand, Natal y Rhodes) tenían un 14% de alumnos negros. Pero tanto las cinco universidades en afrikaans – Rand Afrikaans University (RAU), Potchefstroom, Stellenbosch, Pretoria y Bloemfontein (University of Orange Free State) – como la bilingüe (inglés/afrikaans) de Port Elizabeth tenían apenas un 1% de alumnos negros".

ruling white minority. This subaltern situation inhibited the opportunities for improvement of the black, but also of the mixed and natives from elementary education, an educational balance that is projected towards higher education in the percentages set out above. English-speaking universities, although with a less fundamentalist stance, were also hit with a significant reduction in their non-white student body.

Therefore, we can say that there were conditions that favored the gestation of the Black Consciousness Movement, within the university campuses. The new movement that emerged at the end of the sixties would become the great ideological boomerang of the educational policy of the *apartheid* regime, articulated with the other variables related to the national problem in South Africa, the intense repression of the anti-*apartheid* movement, as well as the international context of the decolonizations and the struggles for the civil rights of the forgotten peoples in the world, at the end of the decade of the sixties. But as can be seen, there were spaces for interracial communication mainly in the so-called open universities and through student organizations and it will precisely be in those interstices of interracial student convergence, where the germ of Black Consciousness was born, since the black student body could experience more easily double discrimination, inside and outside university spaces. In spite of everything, there was a group of young people who broke down the obstacles of Bantu education and were trained in universities, even if they were segregated university institutions.

The sixties, the black student movement and the birth of Black Consciousness

In the 1960s the main student organization was the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), and there had long been an ideological debate among black students about black membership in that organization. Some were in favor of joining the student body, while another group of detractors saw this institution as part of the South African regime. The truth was that it represented the so-called "open" organizations but with a predominantly white criteria and analysis of events, taking into account the composition and the debates that took place there. As Barush Hirson puts it:

During the 1960s, black students campaigned for the right to join the National Union of South African Students (...) NUSAS was also excited to welcome their colleagues into their ranks (...) there were always voices that opposed it, expressing that NUSAS was part of White Imperialism. The United Movement of Non-Europeans always took that point of view, between 1954 and 1957 it was oriented towards the support of the students in Fort Hare for their disaffiliation from NUSAS (Hirson 1979, 65, own translation)[17].

NUSAS had been criticized from both extreme positions, also many members of the government questioned it for its open nature and its liberal stance. However, in the sixties it had not lost its leading role within the student body, including the black students who made it up, but with the aforementioned characteristics of the predominance of white discourse in the organization. White students did not experience double segregation, in and out of school, as was part of the daily life of non-white students. On the other hand, since the 1960s, students had seen their inter-student contacts reduced by the government's policy of centralization and segregation. We are talking about young people who were born or raised under the conceptions of *apartheid*, and in full development and hardening of their segregationist positions. The black students, therefore, had a group of concerns, in light of the repression deployed by *apartheid*, which went beyond the liberal demands of their white colleagues, who did not suffer this situation in their own flesh. In that direction, it was a matter of time before black students created an alternative organization that was capable of recreating all those claims and concerns of the black student body.

In 1967, the University Christian Movement (UCM) was formed, an organization that contributed to increasing synergy and communication among black university students, unlike NUSAS, which was a predominantly white organization. As Steve Biko himself put it shortly after:

17   "Durante los años sesenta los estudiantes negros hacían campaña por el derecho de afiliarse a la Unión Nacional de Estudiantes de Sudáfrica (...) NUSAS también estaba entusiasmado por darle la bienvenida a sus colegas en sus filas (...) siempre había voces que se oponían expresando que NUSAS era parte del Imperialismo blanco. El Movimiento Unido de los no europeos siempre adoptó ese punto de vista, entre 1954 y 1957 se orientó hacia el apoyo de los estudiantes en Fort Hare para su desafiliación de NUSAS".

> The fact that within a year and a half of its existence the UCM had a black majority in its sessions is significant. Hence, with the constant practice of bringing the students of the universities together, the dialogue between the black students began again (Biko 1989, 131, own translation)[18].

The University Christian Movement would be a laboratory for debates on the problems of black students, which would later be transferred to the future South African Students' Organization (SASO), made up exclusively of black students, which became the launching pad for South African society of the Black Consciousness Movement, under the leadership of Steve Biko and other university students. NUSAS had been inhibited from its previous activism as a result of the repression of the regime and had become an essentially passive organization complicit in the dictates of the segregation promoted by *apartheid*. The point of no return that motivated a group of black students to create SASO was the well-known NUSAS congress at Rhodes University where black participants were, once again, segregated: "[...] the university authorities prohibited African student delegates from staying in the residences (...) The African delegates had to sleep in a nearby church in an African neighborhood and eat separately from their white companions" (Vizikhungo, Maaba y Biko 2006, 111, own translation)[19].

But in addition to these symbolic gestures, a group of black student delegates from the conference realized the predominance of a hegemonically white discourse within this organization, which made them understand that to change the situation it would have to be through other means. This had its greatest crisis peak at the 1968 University Christian Movement Conference, which was interrupted because it took place in the white city of Stutterheim, where blacks could not stay longer than 72 hours. Steve Biko wanted to use the University Christian Movement conference to channel his idea around an exclusively black organization, using a scenario where the majority of the delegates were black, the Christian Movement had mainly taken hold in black universities and had contributed to the reconstruction of the interuniversity dialogue between these students. After the event of breaking the course of the conference by the 72-hour law in a white city, the irreconcilable divide between black and white students and their determination became much

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18 "El hecho de que dentro de un año y medio de su existencia el MCU tuviera una mayoría negra en sus sesiones es significativo. De ahí que con la constante práctica de reunir a los estudiantes de las universidades empezara el diálogo entre los estudiantes negros otra vez".

19 "[...] las autoridades universitarias prohibieron a los estudiantes africanos delegados permanecer en las residencias (...) Los delegados africanos tuvieron que dormir en un local de una iglesia cercana en un barrio africano y comer separados de sus compañeros blancos".

clearer to Biko, along with other colleagues such as Barney Pityana and Moloto to develop the idea of a new organization, this was the turning point. As Xolela Mangcu says: "For Steve that outrage confirmed the absurdity of interracial organizations between black and white students, and reaffirmed his call for a new exclusively black organization" (Mangcu 2014, 158, own translation)[20].

The founding or launching moment of the new student organization occurred at Steve Biko's old school in Mariannhill, near Durban, in December 1968. The meeting in Mariannhill, with a few dozen colleagues present, decided the creation of the new organization under the name of South African Students' Organization (SASO). An inaugural conference was organized and held in Turfloop in July 1969. With all those preceding events there was evidence of a fracture in the discourse and practice of organizations like NUSAS with the more legitimate interests of black students on and off the university campus: "It was now evident to Biko that black interests would never be adequately defended or promoted by white-led organizations such as NUSAS where most were satisfied with simple moral statements" (Karis, Gerhart 1997, 95, own translation)[21].

Black students thought that activism within university organizations would be an adequate mechanism to respond to their concerns as a segregated South African people, but there were already many signs that this was not going to take place within the framework of a traditional liberal entity like NUSAS, which also was not in its moments of greatest activism due to the repression of the South African regime and the suspicion that the government felt towards that student body. It is in this scenario that the vanguard of the black student body decided to pursue its own path outside the white student hegemony. In this way Steve Biko, without intending to, became the most visible figure of the emerging movement, as Donald Woods put it: "[...] the main founder and inspiration of the Black Consciousness, which was directed in itself to prepare the young black man for a new phase of his liberation" (Woods 2017, 43, own translation)[22].

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20 "Para Steve esa indignación le confirmaba el absurdo de las organizaciones interraciales entre estudiantes blancos y negros, y reafirmó su llamado por una nueva organización exclusivamente negra".

21 "Ahora era evidente para Biko que los intereses negros nunca serían adecuadamente defendidos o promovidos por organizaciones dirigidas por blancos como era el caso de NUSAS donde la mayoría estaban satisfechos con simples declaraciones morales".

22 "[...] el principal fundador e inspiración de la Conciencia Negra, que estaba dirigida en sí misma a preparar al joven negro para una nueva fase de su liberación".

Conclusion

For all the above, it can be seen that at the birth of the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa, variables associated with the social structures created and consolidated by *apartheid* in the Austral country are intertwined with circumstantial phenomena of a generation of young university students trained within the separate development context, reaching a university education that allowed them to be in contact with black thought, and at the same time put that liberating philosophy in function of the national problem in South Africa.

Throughout the process, problems related to student life were articulated that put the mirror of segregation in front of the eyes of black students, mainly that university vanguard, which, anchored in a solid pan-black ideological platform, decided to embark on the exercise of making the way with the creation of SASO, the main launching scheme for Black Consciousness in South Africa.

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ABSTRACT

The origin of the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa is related to the events that occurred within South African universities, especially the situation of black students. Situation that is perfectly articulated with the segregationist structures deepened by the *apartheid* regime in South Africa since 1948. In this sense, certain questions are formulated that come to light in the investigative process, mainly about that relationship that favored the origin of the notorious movement. To try to respond to this phenomenon, proposed variables and an analytical and historical-logical methodology were handled, the intention of which is to demonstrate the impact of the evolution of Bantu education and the importation into the educational sector of the segregationist proposals that created very unequal conditions for the advancement of students, based on their ethno-racial origin, as part of the Bantustanization strategy of *apartheid*. In this direction, a group of students was formed, who by the sixties had been born or raised with *apartheid* and who were doubly segregated inside and outside the University, but also influenced by the African decolonization process, the repression of the regime in the sixties and the social movements that took place internationally. To conclude that all those external and internal, structural and circumstantial conditions led to the birth of the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa, with a relatively new ideological platform in the South African scene of struggle.

NEW NORMAL AND THE CHALLENGES OF ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT ARCHITECTURE IN AFRICA: EXPLORING POST-COVID-19 SOCIOTECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES IN COMPARATIVES PERSPECTIVE

Fidel Terenciano[1]
Tania Muriezai[2]

Introduction

According to network society theorists (Castells 1996; Van Dijk 1999; Wall Smith 2003), social structures and activities in all areas of society are increasingly organized around network forms, and largely based on information and communication technologies (ICT) on the electronic basis. In this context, governments are apparently lagging behind in adopting this new logic. For example, contemporary public administrations have become increasingly complex, having to coordinate actions with emerging actors in the public sphere, and to manage processes with increasing amounts of information.

This article approaches the future-oriented culture, whose slow decision-making processes and the diffusion of knowledge from the old bureaucratic model do not seem to be adequate to improve the flows of information

1   Department of Ethics, Citizenship and Development, Universidade Católica de Moçambique. Pemba, Mozambique. E-mail: fideldeanarosa@gmail.com. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6608-4671

2   Law School, Universidade Católica de Moçambique. Pemba, Mozambique. E-mail: weta.muriezai@gmail.com. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1890-216

and cooperation, the levels of legitimacy and trust as are perceived by citizens and, ultimately, efficiency and effectiveness. Since they began, in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, Modern ICT and "Electronic Government" have been seen as an ideal platform for solving some of the problems of contemporary public administrations. The main argument is that the intensive use of technology could transform operating rules for public administration to increase efficiency, to simplify administrative procedures, to expand citizen participation processes (Hague and Loader 1999) and to make government activity more transparent and accountable.

Another equivalent approach to the study and development of e-government architecture is the "Digital Government", which was and continues to be popular in North America, for example. Since then, both terms have been used interchangeably. Researchers and academies have begun to use the terms "electronic government" and "digital government" only later, by providing definitions that tried to capture government modernization ideas, promoting participation and improving services via new ICT.

A new definition was adopted in 2006. It shows that electronic government is the use of information technologies to support government operations, to involve citizens, and to provide government services. Over the years and since its recognizable beginning in the late 1990s, a multidisciplinary field of e-government study has been formed around these themes and has produced a considerable and well-respected body of knowledge at the intersection of the public sphere, including public administration, information and information technology, as well as the individual, group and institutional needs and desires of the stakeholders in this particular context (Bozeman and Bretschneider 1986; Chisenga 2004; Heeks 2002).

Around the world, there has been a paradigm shift in which governments and other decision makers have realized the importance of e-government as a strong tool for responsive governance. But traditionally, many governments have used paper and file approaches in the management of their businesses, which has proved to be disadvantageous when it comes to accountability. With the scenario in which the majority of government transactions with citizens, companies and private partners take place at the local level, it is imperative that a lot of effort is devoted to the creation of mechanisms that allow maximum collaboration and participatory governance.

The change in paradigms in the form of governance was also caused in part by the rapid growth of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), which have the potential to transform the generation and provision of public services by public institutions. It is in this context that this study seeks

to study the architecture of e-government in Africa, highlighting the main expectations and the clear need to explore how public administrations are undergoing a transformation process linked to the systematic incorporation of ICT in their basic activities.

A brief structure of the article: the introduction is presented, with emphasis on the objective of the study and on the main arguments. Second, there is a theoretical discussion on the architecture of electronic government and some contextual discussions. The methodology that was applied once observed, the article then analyzes and discusses the aggregated and empirical data on e-government in Africa, the levels of development and the main challenges.

Brief Theoretical Background

In the light of existing studies, we observe that the path for the boom of e-government in most developing countries follows the development of electronic services that customers can access via the Internet. However, most African countries have not yet reached this stage, given that it constitutes, in itself, a long way to go before reaching the development of integrated government portals and the reengineering of back-office processes (Tassabehji and Elliman 2006; Torres, Pina and Acerete 2006; Zwahr and Finger 2007).

We also observe that developed countries are increasingly adapting their e-government strategies in the direction of customer orientation and, instead of persisting with rigid organizational structures, they are increasingly working on integrating services and processes into bodies and individual administrative institutions, and even including private companies. In this context, the development of e-government requires a holistic strategic approach that encompasses the entire public administration and that is not limited to individual bodies and institutions, nor to individual sectors and levels of administration (Smith 2003; Moon 2002; Carvin, Hill and Smothers 2004; Seifert 2004).

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E-Government is an important innovation to improve good governance and strengthen the democratic process; it can also facilitate access to information, freedom of expression, greater equity, efficiency, productivity,

growth, and social inclusion (Zwahr and Finger 2007; Oracle 2006; Heeks 2002; Backus 2006). Following closely the definition of the United Nations (2002), the following elements are central: Electronic government is the use of ICT to: promote a more efficient and effective government; facilitate the accessibility of government services; allow greater public access to information; make governments more accountable to citizens.

Many studies have defined e-government in different ways. Coleman (2006) defined e-government as the combination of information-based electronic services (e-administration) with the reinforcement of participatory elements (e-democracy) to achieve the goal of "balanced electronic government". Muir and Oppenheim (2002) defined e-government as the provision of information and government services online through the Internet or other digital media. Electronic government has also been defined as the provision of better services to citizens, businesses and other members of society through drastic changes in the way governments manage information (Kumar et al. 2007).

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

A set of successful e-government initiatives can have a demonstrable and tangible impact on improving citizen participation and quality of life, as a result of effective partnerships between the parties (Steward and Walsh 1992; Backus 2006). For example, African governments need to develop policy frameworks, supported by legislation for e-government, that are linked to strategic development goals.

First of all, the use of ICT in government structures is not new, but the concept of electronic government became widely used in the 1990s, when it began to be seen as a political strategy to improve service delivery and cut costs, also aiming at the simplification of administrative procedures (Fountain 2007; Backus 2006), at the increase in citizen participation (Hague and Loader 1999; Zwahr and Finger 2005; Mambrey 2004) and at the transparency and accountability of government activities (Bhatnagar 2003; Shinkai 2003). The following synthesis of the different visions and definitions of e-government is based on the work of Mayer-Schönberger and Lazer (2007).

It is necessary to contextualize that the literature on e-government has traditionally focused on the transactional aspect of e-government, analyzing how the provision of online services could develop from information to transactional. From this, studies were also carried out on the implications

of electronic government in the back office of public administrations, based on costs and efficiency gains. More recently, the topic of citizen centrality in e-government has gained prominence, particularly with the emergence of the concept of Web 2.0 (Coleman 2006; Fountain 2007).

The three main objectives of the technological element in e-Government are interconnected and interdependent. They need to be seen holistically as an integrated platform for a management system: to improve information management; to improve service delivery; to improve accessibility and participation of different stakeholders (Blackmore 2006; Misuraca 2007; Coleman 2006). As far as we know, despite the enormous determination of many governments around the world to implement e-government and the acclaim that e-government finally won, previous studies present mixed cases (failure or success) of implementation and adoption of e-government in the socioeconomic configuration.

The growth of the Internet has greatly changed the way all organizations deal with their respective stakeholders. The electronic provision of government services (E-Electronic delivery of Government services/E-Government) was being considered before the WWW, but in the last 15 years the migration of governments at a global level to the electronic provision of services has been substantial.

Design and Methodology

This investigation is of a more qualitative than quantitative nature, although it is based on an extensive analysis of case studies related to e-government strategies and architectures in Africa, through a literature review. The analysis involved mapping the various e-government strategies in Africa and ranking countries in the global e-government index of the United Nations survey that has been developed from time to time.

This perspective provided some thoughts related to which strategies could be produced and used by governments to be successful in the process of implementing and building e-government. At the same time, this study balances the intensity of data collection from case studies and specialized theoretical discussion. Most of the time, the construction of the research sought to avoid an excessive amount of data in order not to create a more complex picture. On the other hand, a volume of data or a variation might not have been able to capture the framework of the e-government architecture in its entirety.

A relevant fact is that the research adopts a continuous and interactive approach, as a way of confronting the data vis-à-vis the construction of an evolutionary framework of e-government in Africa. The analysis focuses on current research on e-government in Africa, at its general level, and we use data and studies for analyzes explicitly related to e-Government and concepts closely related to the area.

In terms of ways of selecting texts and articles, the present paper carried out an investigation into current research, including magazines and conferences. To identify relevant articles on e-Government, a search for keywords was carried out in databases of libraries and search engines on the World Wide Web. The keywords included "e-Government", "government systems", "public systems", "e-Democracy", "e-Services", and "e-Security". Second, articles from conferences and magazines were identified and analyzed where the sources were widely accessible and whose emphasis was on research. Third, the reference lists of the researched communications were investigated to relate researchers to each other and to find more relevant research in the field.

Henceforth, the articles excluded from the analysis included those whose focus was exclusively on technical aspects of electronic government. The intention was to use the scientific citation index to create and establish a core of well-cited researchers in the field, but the effort failed due to the immaturity and youth of the field.

This paper focuses on examining and outlining the various challenges that African governments face in planning and implementing e-government, as well as reviewing and comparing the availability and use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and associated tools in selected African countries. The study also examines the visibility and performance of African governments on the Web, identifying the number of governments in the region that have their own websites; number of pages and links; the most targeted websites; interconnections of pages, directories, domains, and sites; and interrelationships between government websites.

This study used both content and link analysis methods to identify the challenges that governments face in implementing e-government and the presence and performance of African governments on the Web, respectively. The existing statistics were used to support the arguments presented in the results section, especially with regard to the challenges of e-government. Specifically, two Internet sources were used to provide statistics on the availability of information and communication technologies (ICT) in Africa.

Presentation and Discussion of Results

Prerequisites for e-government in Africa in the "New Normal"

Under various perspectives and forms, the e-government models that this study showed were those proposed by Backus (2001), Gartner and Backus (2001) and Zwahr and Finger (2005). While a line of authors understand that e-government directly linked to electronic commerce (that is, using concepts of electronic commerce), Zwahr and Finger (2005) built their model using three main concepts, namely (a) information and technology as the main drivers of the transformation of the state, (b) the emerging pressures on government and public administration and (c) the magnitude of e-governance. Finally, the Zwahr and Finger model still takes into account four main dimensions of e-government, namely the level at which the transformation is occurring or has occurred; actors in e-governance and e-government (i.e., the public and private sectors); the functions performed in e-governance (that is, service provision, policy making and regulation); and the technology that is used to enable e-governance.

It is easy to see that African governments understood and appreciated the above-mentioned e-government contribution to the governmental agenda. However, at this time, strategic plans have only been initiated for example in Egypt, Senegal, Mozambique, South Africa and Kenya; these plans aim to include a set of challenges and points mentioned above by Zwahr and Finger. Although it cannot be said that all African leaders understood the importance of e-government, some of them accepted the new dynamics of the notion of e-government and recognized that this concept is here to stay in Africa.

We are now in a position to say that the African continent as a whole cannot be excluded from this paradigm shift in e-government, and this was brought about by the communiqué released by the 4th African Development Forum (ADF IV 2004). Our understanding is that the consensus statement further proves that policy makers in Africa understand the need for massive ICT involvement in their governance paradigms in order to be sufficiently competitive with regard to accountability for nations' resources.

Henceforth, it is correct to state that e-government has the potential to improve the provision of public services by public institutions in the sense of transparency, accountability and responsiveness, to promote collaboration and the union of administrations that others interested in government companies can access services through portals or 'one-stop-shops'. Likewise, e-government also has the potential to improve decentralization reforms, bringing decision-making closer to ordinary citizens through collaborative

reasoning made possible with the use of ICT (Tassabehji and Elliman 2006; Backus 2001).

Functionalities of ICTs post COVID-19 and E-Government in Africa

E-government projects in Africa cover a wide variety of approaches, from technological and internal guidance (introducing ICT in all aspects of government activity) to the most external or value-neutral approach to provision of government services on the Internet, through the customer-centered and development-oriented approach advocated by UNPAN, which seek to see in e-government the ability to transform public administration through the use of ICTs. In light of this, all of these approaches, the convenient caveat is that the use of ICT's is not technology per se, but rather because of its ability to improve communication between people and as tools for development.

Given a set of elements and contextual reports on e-government in Africa, our analysis of the statistical content and other documents shows that African countries face several barriers and challenges in their full functioning and implementation of e-government, since, as Oracle (2006) outlines, there are several weaknesses that are associated with the conceptualization, operation and maintenance of e-government systems. These challenges include *social aspects* (for example, poor basic education, low literacy, low computer literacy, different languages, lack of public acceptance of self-service models, and skills shortages); *political aspects* (for example low budget allocation, lack of cyber laws, slow decision-making processes, deficient hierarchical structures, short-term approaches due to the model of governments and elections, and a poor reform and integration agenda); *economic aspects* (for example, lack of investors and poor budgetary control); and *technological aspects* (lack of IT skills, high cost of the Internet, heterogeneous data, lack of IT standards, and software licenses).

We also quote Tankoano (n.d.) who observes obstacles to e-government in the African context, which are largely associated with customers whose sensitivity to e-government may be insufficient; a low level of adaptation to these technologies by individuals, management and companies; resistance to change; and existing infrastructure. Additionally, the United Nations Online Network in Public Administration and Finance (UNPAN) (2007) considers the following to be the main challenges for e-government in Africa:

I.   The leadership of a country that may lack a clear electronic vision, capacity and willingness to lead change, and management and

accountability structures; the people who can, they lack adequate competence, training, culture of greater access to information and commitment to high level team work;

II.   Lack of policies on the liberalized telecommunications sector and effective regulation, adoption and use of ICT;

III. Freedom of information, privacy, security, intellectual property and copyrights and policies on stopping the "brain drain";

IV.   Deficient monitoring and evaluation processes, etc.;

V.   Challenges related to technology, such as privacy and data sharing, authentication and building user confidence; and access (e.g. making information widely available to citizens, etc.).

The way in which e-government has been developing in Africa can be deciphered as follows:

I.   Government-to-Citizen (G2C) - Speak to citizens by providing them with details of public sector activities, increasing the contribution of citizens to public sector decisions and improving public services provided to the public, in terms of quality, transparency, accessibility and cost. Thus, the G2C includes apps such as e-Banking, e-Procurement, e-Education and e-Health. Among the services of the G2C there are the dissemination of information, provision of licenses, birth/death/marriage certificates, tax information and files, educational results and online libraries. Examples of the G2C in Africa are **Rwanda's** Online Government Services and the Government of **Mauritius's** Online Center.

II.   Government-to-Business (G2B) - Includes services exchanged between the government and the business community, such as disclosure of policies, rules and regulations, downloading license application forms, renewals, tax payments and e-procurement. An excellent African example is the **Mauritius** Contribution Network Project.

III. Government-to-Government (G2G) - Also known as e-Administration. G2G involves leveraging technology to improve public administration processes for better service delivery. It is especially used to decentralize the government and to link the local government to the central government. The **Ethiopian** government's Woreda Net project is a G2G project.

IV.   In addition, there are also Government-to-Employees (G2E) projects, which are less common than the other (3) three in Africa and involve specialized services for civil servants, and Government-to-Any (G2X), through which the government provides ICT-based services to non-citizens, such as issuing visas online and to foreign investors, as is done by **Rwanda**.

Other challenges include the lack of electronic preparation in terms of data systems infrastructure, legal infrastructure, institutional infrastructure, human and technological infrastructure and the precariousness of leadership and strategic thinking (Heeks 2002). In this work, when analyzing the problem of e-government architecture in Africa, a set of elements that are connected to one another must be considered, which constitute points of integrated evaluation per se:

Image 1: Model and Preparation of Electronic Architecture to follow in Africa


Figure 4.2
A multi-level integrated information system (MIIS).

Source: Fountain 2007

On one hand, social networks affect the flow and quality of information t

Source: Fountain (2007)

Although it is difficult to accurately identify the origins of e-government in Africa, we can note that as early as 1996 the African Information Society Initiative (AISI) adopted by African ministers of economic planning and development at ECA recommended activities related to e-government for the entire region. AISI called for the development and implementation of national policies and plans to promote the adoption of ICTs in all key economic sectors and in the national administration (strategies and plans for National Information and Communication Infrastructures – NICI) and

especially for the use of ICT to improve the effectiveness of government service delivery (ECA 1996).

Development of e-Government in Africa in the New Normal

With regard to this, there have been a number of qualitative and quantitative measures that can be mobilized to understand progress, either individually or on the continent as a whole, on the implementation of e-government in Africa. Over the past two years (2017-2019), a number of benchmarks that African countries have achieved have been noted, notably:

I.   Mozambique, the only country in Africa, which joined the first 30 countries that allowed e-participation (citizen participation in policy making), as well as the first 20 (No. 19) in e-information (citizens receive basic information as a basis for citizen participation);

II. Botswana was at the top of the 25% of all countries in the world in terms of electronic consultation (governments that ask the opinion of citizens);

III. Five African countries now have open web forums to discuss topics;

IV. Eight African countries now have 10% of their population online.

The South African government, which is in an advanced phase of e-government, provides three types of services, namely (a) services for the people, (b) services for organizations and (c) services for foreign citizens. Services for people (ie citizens) include, but are not limited to, information on birth, parenting, education and training, youth, relationships, living with a disability, the labour market, social benefits, a place to live, transportation, travel outside South Africa, moving to South Africa or visiting South Africa, sports and recreation, citizenship, dealing with the law, retirement and old age, and death.

Specific information for the business community (or organizations) includes starting an organization or business; taxes; intellectual property; import and export; authorizations and licenses; transport; labor issues; health and safety in the workplace; and discontinuing a business while the site provides foreign citizens with information about moving to, working and entering South Africa.

In turn, **Kenya** provides the following information on its e-government website: e-citizenship, e-taxes and e-revenue, e-civil service, e-education and e-business in Kenya. The government of Kenya identifies communication within the government and communication with companies and citizens as its main e-government activities. Similar results to those found on the Kenya government website have been seen on other government websites. It is worth mentioning that several other good e-government practices in Africa have been identified, namely:

I.   The development of electronic voting in Cape Verde, allowing almost instantaneous vote counting, avoiding conflicts over the results, and advancing towards integrated information systems in two countries;

II.   Databases of the Environmental Information Network and connected Forest Research Institute in Ghana;

III. Mauritius Contribution Network project that links companies to pay taxes to various government departments (United Nations 2008).

Criticisms over the implementation of African e-Government in Times of the New Normal

There has been little academic analysis and evaluation of African e-government efforts. Given the rapid growth in Africa of information technologies in general and e-government in particular during the last decade, a holistic and more Afrocentric analysis, based on the realities of the region, is necessary.

The most general criticism known of e-government practices in Africa is that of Richard Heeks (2002) and Heeks (2002), who estimate that 85% of e-government projects in developing countries end in partial or total failure (Heeks 2002). In Africa, this is largely due to "*the great gaps that often exist between the design of projects and the reality of the African public sector*", resulting from a western animus driven by supply that does not take into account African realities (Heeks 2002). Heeks attributes the western focus of African e-government efforts to international donor agencies, (presumably international) consultants, information technology vendors who often carry the "*If it works for us, it will work for you*" mentality (Odedra-Straub 1995) and African civil servants trained by the West.

Another African author attempting a critical analysis of African e-government efforts is Ngulube (2007). He points out that ICT infrastructures are not widely available to rural populations and, in most cases, government officials and potential users do not have the basic skills to use ICT-based systems. Other shortcomings he points out are the lack of properly organized government information in records management systems, as well as the lack of digitization of existing records, what he calls "the Achilles heel of e-government in Sub-Saharan Africa". He also underlines the lack of legal frameworks on cybersecurity, digital signatures and protection and confidentiality of personal data, privacy laws and access to information legislation in most African countries.

Agenda and future research

First of all, Zhu and He (2002), Heeks (2003) divide the success of e-government into three different categories: Total failure; Partial failure; and Success. These levels and successes can be seen in the African context. For example,

I.   Total failure is a situation in which the initiative has never been implemented, or has been implemented but immediately abandoned, or has been implemented but has not achieved any of its objectives.

II. Likewise, a largely unsuccessful case is one in which some objectives have been achieved but most stakeholder groups have not achieved their main objectives and/or have had significant undesirable results.

III. Another understanding, a case of partial success/partial failure is a case in which some of the main objectives of the initiative have been achieved, but some have not been achieved and/or there have been some significant undesirable results.

IV. The other measures of e-government success are: a) Very successful: most stakeholder groups have achieved their main objectives and have not had significant undesirable results, b) Total success: all stakeholder groups have achieved their main objectives and have not had significant undesirable results, c) Too early to assess: it is too early after implementation and / or there is very little evidence yet to assess the outcome.

Unless otherwise indicated, the full use of e-government will bring many benefits to the management philosophy of many governments and will close the interaction gap between ordinary citizens and the government. This implies that citizens can participate collaboratively in decision-making / policies. This is the case because governments have been seen as complex bureaucratic establishments with a set of information secrets that erect barriers to accessing information and make service provision uncomfortable and frustrating (Coleman 2006; Kumar et al. 2007). Having realized the benefits that e-government brings, many governments around the world have adopted e-government as an effective tool to reach their citizens and other different stakeholders.

For a New E-Government discussion agenda in Africa, it is necessary to rethink the following lines of research:

I.   Focus on citizens' needs – Government 2.0?

II.   Integrate E-government in the public sector?

III.   Or a new agenda?

Conclusion

As indicated earlier, the error of "African exceptionalism" that sees failure as inevitable because things, especially those based on new technologies, simply do not work in Africa because African bureaucratic institutions "differ fundamentally from those of Western states within which computing and IT has been developed "(Berman and Tettey 2001).

Examining the first three factors that hinder the effective implementation of the E-government architecture in Africa, we can see that many African countries are far from fulfilling the basic prerequisites for the development of effective e-government and a concrete and viable architecture for a E-government along the western lines. However, what can happen is its effectiveness in varying degrees. With regard to technological infrastructure, it is generally agreed that widespread access to broadband is required for Internet-based e-government systems. To that extent, 4/1000 Africans have access to broadband, while the comparative number in Sweden is 81 out of 100.

Another interesting fact is that only five African countries have a broadband density that can be measured in whole numbers (from 1 to 6) in 100: they are i. South Africa, ii. Cape Verde, iii. Morocco, iv. Seychelles

and v. Mauritius. Thirty-three countries (% of the total) do not have broadband, while a few others have a broadband density of 1/1000. About Internet connectivity, African leaders are i. Seychelles, ii. Mauritius, iii. Morocco, iv. Sao Tome, v. Tunisia, vi. South Africa, vii. Sudan, with an Internet density ranging from 10 to 40/100, while those at the bottom of the scale (Liberia, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo and Niger) register 1 to 3 users per thousand.

The implementation of ICT in governments does not necessarily represent a vast immediate reduction in government operating costs, as this requires investment in large projects, which often experience substantial cost overruns (Borins 2007); also, studies in the private sector show that ICT does not necessarily increase the productivity of office work (O'Callagham 2004). But at the organizational level, the picture may look different, as research shows that the intensive use of ICT is positively linked to performance and steady results.

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ABSTRACT

The process of building the architecture of electronic governments in the world begins as management tools that focus primarily on the technical (ICTs) and social side (structural possibilities of ICT use). As the most recent literature shows, there is a set of tools that map side by side the four levels of E-Government (G2C, G2G, G2B, G2E) and the benefits/challenges. It is in this context that the study aims to analyse and problematise in a comparative perspective, the set of architectures that have been carried out in various quadrants of the world, with regard to the development of E-Government in its 4 dimensions (4D), in the time of normal news past COVID-19. Methodologically and from a socio-technical and empirical perspective, it is a comparative and longitudinal study, and works with similar and different aggregated data in African countries. In addition, government documents and online material have been analysed. From the results in a comparative perspective, it can be seen that there is a set of tools and possibilities that help the implementation of an e-government architecture in all countries, but that its density and effectiveness depends very much on the investments and socio-economic conditions of each country that considers the technological aspects, processes and people. In concluding notes, it is noted that there are constant flaws in African countries that jeopardize concrete E-Government projects, especially the fact that it does not give special and balanced attention between demographic/social aspects and the technical dimension.

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