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ABOUT THE JOURNAL

The Brazilian Journal of African Studies is a biannual publication, in digital and printed format, dedicated to the research, reflection and propagation of original scientific articles and book reviews by PhD researchers and professors, with emphasis on the analysis of International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations and Schools of Thought. RBEA is essentially academic, linked to the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

The BJAS has as target audience researches, professors and students interested in the specificities of the African continent and its international insertion. Alongside such perspective, the Journal intends to expand the debate about the Brazilian projection world widely, the Brazilian cooperation efforts (including in the Defense field) with the African countries in the South Atlantic perimeter and the construction of a regional identity in face of a scenario of geopolitical transformations.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira

June/2021

In the second half of 2020, the social and economic challenges arising from the pandemic of COVID-19 became more evident in Africa. In South Africa, it is estimated that the economy will have its worst contraction since 1930, with a result of -7.1% and an unemployment rate of 30%. The GDP of many African countries is expected to contract by 2020 or, at best, to have little growth. To circumvent this scenario, most governments have launched plans to stimulate economic activity, including rolling over debts and taxes for companies, opening up easier credit lines and financing energy and water bills.

In most African countries, the main form of tax collection is still the taxation of exports. Thus, a break in international trade chains has a strong impact on the state budget, just at the time when the pandemic of COVID-19 requires greater state investments in health, sanitation, and infrastructure. On the other hand, drops in sales and prices of a certain product — in the case of countries that are very dependent on a single type of exported product — mean greater difficulty in obtaining strong currencies like the dollar and the euro, which are crucial for the importation of medicines, vaccines and food.

As they seek to combat the spread of COVID-19 on their territories, many African countries have to deal with serious security crises. In the Sahel, attacks by extremists continued to occur throughout the year in Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, and Niger, affecting the civilian populations. In northern Nigeria, Boko Haram's actions intensified, including, in October, the kidnapping of hundreds of students from a school in the city of Katsina. In the east of the continent, a separatist uprising in Ethiopia led to several deaths and thousands of refugees, who took shelter in Sudan. In Mozambique, rebels occupied important parts of the province of Cabo Delgado, causing a large

displacement of people towards Nampula, and in Angola there were armed conflicts in the province of Lunda Norte.

Security issues impact resource mobilization (financial and human), the disruption of school and production cycles, as well as migration flows and the spread of contagious diseases. The withdrawal of the UN missions in Sudan (Darfur) and Guinea-Bissau also represents an impact on the budgets of these countries, since it will depend on national agencies to maintain stability in these regions. Another phenomenon that required attention and investment from the public authorities, and also generated many internally displaced people, were the heavy rains and floods that hit Niger, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Sudan, and South Sudan.

However, both the African Union and the African Regional Organizations have played an important role in the formulation of far-reaching public policies. Foreign and domestic policy initiatives aimed at overcoming the health crisis (and other resulting crises) and, fundamentally, regional and international concertation have been important responses to the problems that have arisen. Finally, the South-South axis clearly shows itself to be vigorous in establishing the possibilities for cooperation, even in a scenario of many overlapping crises.

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In its sixth year, the BJAS discusses, in this issue, historical and contemporary themes, focusing on issues of foreign and domestic policy, development and education, as well as security issues. In the article "Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in Mozambique: the first post-independence government - Samora Machel (1975-1986)", Ercilio Neves Brandão Langa analyzes diplomacy and foreign policy in the first government of independent Mozambique. Gilberto Libânio and José Castigo in "Regional inequality and the persistence of poverty in Mozambique, explained from the perspective of the vicious circle of poverty" analyze how regional inequalities negatively influenced the effectiveness of policies for poverty reduction in Mozambique in the period 2001-2014, through the principle of the Vicious Circle of Poverty advocated by Myrdal.

In the work of João Paulo Davi Constantino, Robson Dias da Silva, Georges Flexor, entitled, "The development of post-*apartheid* South Africa in the light of the institutionalist perspective: a critical review", it is evaluated to what extent the adaptation to market-oriented institutional models

has contributed to the South African development, from a set of institutions. Following, Anselmo Otávio discusses the permanences and ruptures of Ramaphosa's foreign policy in relation to his predecessors in the article "The Ramaphosa administration and the return to South Africa's protagonism: trends and challenges to foreign policy".

In "Democracy in Africa: the outstanding case of Somaliland", Pio Penna Filho and Henrique Oliveira da Motta analyze the political success of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. According to the authors, since its independence from Somalia in 1991, the country has gone through four electoral processes, considered fair and reliable, and has achieved significant stability in its territory, even without any international recognition and under adverse conditions. Nilton César Fernandes Cardoso, Guilherme Geremias da Conceição and Igor Estima Sardo discuss Ethiopia's foreign policy from the 1974 Revolution to the first year of Abiy Ahmed Ali's administration, investigating in the process the country's greater political and economic openness.

Terence M. Mashingaidze, in the article "Zimbabwe's paradoxical 'new dispensation': political harm, endemic impunity and unending silences, 2017-2020" analyzes the capacity and commitment of the post-Mugabe government in Zimbabwe to the task of reconciling Zimbabweans and healing the country's historical wounds. Next, Nigeria's position in the *Next Eleven vis-à-vis* the BRICS is analyzed, with particular reference to the prospects for its emergence as an economic power before and after the COVID-19 pandemic. "Nigeria-BRICS relations and the Next-11: the dynamics of economic power before and beyond COVID-19 disruptions" is authored by Sharkdam Wapmuk, Oluwatooni Akinkuotu, and Vincent Ibonye.

Still on Nigeria, Emmanuel Olugbade Ojo, in "Dimensions of electoral reforms in Nigeria", presents a prognosis of the dimensions of electoral reforms and the likely challenges for the nascent democracy to withstand the possibility of reversion to autocracy. "Party politics, passive stakeholders and vengeful governorship election campaign in Ekiti state, Nigeria" by Mike Opeyemi Omilusi studies the 2018 governorship election in Ekiti State as a window to peek into the ruling party/opposition in a tough political contest and the behind the scenes of some passive stakeholders in Nigeria's electoral politics. And, Aondover Eric Msughter and Hamza A. Pate, in their article "National interest, freedom of expression and the nigerian press in contemporary democratic context" discuss the media as the Fourth Estate of the Nation.

Finally, Cesário José Sanajmbo Barbante analyzes the inclusion of technology, information, and communication in education in Angola, which marks another moment of transition in the Education and Teaching System,

with the integration of new digital tools that have provided a new teaching, a new learning, and new ways to manage administrative processes in the article "Digital inclusion in education in Angola: advances and retreats".

BJAS publishes a bilingual electronic and printed version (Portuguese and English). Thus, we expect the contribution of colleagues from Brazil and abroad, with whom we intend to establish links for the deepening of knowledge and the construction of a Southern vision on the African continent and its relations with them.

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DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN MOZAMBIQUE: THE FIRST POST-INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENT – SAMORA MACHEL (1975-1986)

Ercilio Neves Brandão Langa[1]

Introduction

Mozambique is a country located in southern Africa, it borders to the north to Tanzania, to the northwest to Malawi, to the west to Zambia and Zimbabwe, to the southwest to South Africa and Swaziland, being bathed by the Indian Ocean to the east and south. It was colonized by Portugal, whose presence began in the 15th century. It was only at the end of the 19th century that the effective occupation of the territory occurred. The independence of Mozambique happened in 1975, under the leadership of FRELIMO (Liberation Front of Mozambique) and Samora Machel, independent Mozambique's first president. FRELIMO resulted from the union of three nationalist movements founded abroad: the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO) created in 1960 in Salisbury, Rhodesia; the Union of the African Nation of Mozambique (MANU) formed in 1961 by Mozambican workers in Tanzania and Kenya, the majority of the *Maconde* ethnicity; and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI), created in Malawi by Mozambicans exiled there from the province of Tete (Mondlane 1995).

In order to comprehend the international performance of the first independent Mozambican Government (1976-1986), the following questions were established: (i) what were the guidelines for diplomacy and foreign policy of Mozambique during the Samora Machel government? (ii) What was

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the performance of the Samora Machel Government in the face of national circumstance, dominated by the RENAMO[2] destabilization war, and regional circumstance, characterized by aggressions from the Rhodesian regime and South Africa's *apartheid*?

As for the methodological aspects, the qualitative method was used, allied with the bibliographic review of works, articles, reports, dissertations and theses on the historical and international relations of Mozambique. Another technique used was documentary research on the internet on official government websites, virtual libraries, public websites and private archives and the author's personal collection on the subject. Such collection consists of television reports, magazine and newspaper materials, reports from educational institutions on the subject.

In foreign policy, Figueira (2011) argues that the international structure determines diplomatic performance and that a country's foreign policy would be the result of the interactive dynamics between the domestic and international environments. Lopes and Nascimento (2011) argue that the factors that condition the formulation of a country's foreign policy can be analyzed according to the logic of concentric circles: internal, regional and international that mutually interconnect and influence. In the internal circle, economic and political stability stand out as factors supporting a vigorous and committed foreign policy. At the regional level, relationships distinguish themselves within the scope of closer neighbors and a wider neighborhood. The international circle includes the dynamics of participation in international organizations, of a multilateral nature, as well as relations with other countries, namely with international and regional powers (Lopes and Nascimento 2011).

Following the aforementioned theoretical and methodological assumptions, the article adopted the perspective of concentric circles, understanding that in the diplomacy and foreign policy of the countries, the internal, regional and international levels are interconnected and mutually dependent. The politics, the domestic economy and the well-being of Mozambicans depended on the environment in the region of Southern Africa and on the relations with neighboring countries. The relations of Mozambique with its neighbors were directly linked to the international arena, to the context of

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2 RENAMO is the acronym for Mozambican National Resistance, a nationalist movement founded in Rhodesia in 1976, which developed a war against the Government of Frelimo and Mozambique after the independence. The movement said it was fighting communism and the lack of freedom in Mozambique.

the Cold War between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR), to the blocs, rivalries and disputes.

The bibliographic review emphasized the interveners of Mozambique's foreign policy such as Mondlane (1995), Mozambican nationalist, founder and first president of FRELIMO and, Jardim (1976), Portuguese soldier, businessman, diplomat and state advisor who worked in Mozambique for twenty-two years, a tenacious defender of Portuguese colonization. Both influenced foreign policy in the colonial and post-independence period. On the other hand, Christie (1996), a foreign journalist, covered the struggle of African nationalist movements, having lived with FRELIMO, in addition to becoming the author of the first biography on Samora Machel.

In International Relations, Abrahamsson and Nilsson (1994) analyzed the political transition in Mozambique of 1974 — independence, socialist period and civil war — assessing the international and regional context of Mozambican strategy and the interaction between internal and external factors. The approaches of Zeca (2015), Castellano da Silva (2017) and Massangaie (2018) were verified.

Zeca (2015) addressed the genesis of Mozambique's foreign policy and diplomacy with FRELIMO, whose objectives were to raise support for the liberation struggle, the denunciation and isolation of the Portuguese colonial regime at the international level in UN forums and in the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Mozambique had two opponents: the western capitalist system and the region's white minority governments. The regional cooperation and the liberation of neighboring states were prerequisites for Mozambique's economic and future development (Zeca 2015).

Massangaie (2018) verified the insertion of Mozambique in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In the colonial war, FRELIMO established relations of friendship with nationalist movements of neighboring countries — the movement considered that the Mozambique's independence would only be effective when other countries in the region were free from colonial domination and racist regimes —, underlining the importance of organizations such as the Frontline States (FLS) and SADC.

Mozambique's international insertion was progressive, beginning in the 1960s with the efforts of FRELIMO's first president, Eduardo Mondlane. Mozambique's foreign policy had the objective to "create more friends and fewer enemies" in the context of Cold War ideological bipolarity. Portugal's refusal to comply with the UN resolution on the self-determination of peoples, the support that the Portuguese received from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the ideological conflict of the Cold War

influenced the foreign policy decisions made by FRELIMO. On the other hand, the threats posed by the South African and Rhodesian regimes and the political-economic orientation adopted by FRELIMO after independence, also had influences on the foreign policy of the independent Mozambican government (Massangaie 2018).

Castellano da Silva (2017) analyzed the state, the elites and the regional foreign policy in Mozambique between 1975 and 2015, verifying the context, the continuations and changes, as well as the state capacity and the relations between the state and society. He distinguishes the elites, their role in foreign policy and the government's regional foreign policy. He divides the Samora Machel Government into two periods: 1975 to 1983 and 1983 to 1986. The moment from 1975 to 1988 corresponds to the construction of the state and the foreign policy of the Machel Government, in which it was necessary a complete reformulation of the state, the economy and relations with society, in search of autonomy and development. The adoption of social-ism and the state structure based on Marxism-Leninism were seen as more suitable alternatives by FRELIMO. The construction initiatives in the state of Mozambique by FRELIMO since 1975 are evaluated in the ambit of coercion, capital and legitimacy. The Machel Government, composed of the most radical wing of FRELIMO, sought to reform the state and strengthen itself through revolutionary measures. Mozambique's regional policy was derived from the complex state-building process, in which political elites sought to concretize their own political projects and respond to domestic and external pressures, according to available state capacities (Castellano da Silva 2017).

Colonial war and diplomacy

With the diplomatic channels exhausted, in 1964 FRELIMO resorted to armed struggle as a way to liberate the Mozambican territory from Portuguese colonization. In the following ten years, the Portuguese regime developed a colonial war against FRELIMO and the Mozambican people, with the logistical and military support of NATO and its natural allies: England, France and the US. Portugal also had the support of its African allies: *apartheid* South Africa, Ian Smith's Rhodesia and Kamuzu Banda's Malawi. FRELIMO's diplomacy has garnered African support among the already independent neighboring nations: Zambia, Tanzania and Algeria. It also obtained support from the USSR, East Germany and China.

In 1973, the crisis of the Portuguese colonial regime worsened as it became evident its inability to win wars overseas. On April 25, 1974, the dictatorial government in Portugal was overthrown by the Carnation Revolution. There was no alternative to the New Portuguese Government but to negotiate the end of the war with FRELIMO. Months after the April 25, the Portuguese government sent a diplomatic delegation to Lusaka, capital of Zambia, to meet Samora Machel's FRELIMO, proposing a ceasefire, followed by a referendum for the people of Mozambique to decide whether they wanted independence or the continuation of Portuguese tutelage. Samora vehemently refused the proposal, intensifying the war.

With the war's continuation, there were changes in Portuguese diplomacy with respect to Africa. The Portuguese Government and FRELIMO delegations met again in Zambia and, on September 7, 1974, the Lusaka Agreements between Samora Machel and Mário Soares were signed, ending the ten-year-old colonial war between Portugal and FRELIMO. The Lusaka Agreements established the transfer of powers, a transitional government and set the date for Mozambique's independence as June 25, 1975. This was the first major victory for FRELIMO's diplomacy and foreign policy, as will be seen in the following sections.

The diplomacy of FRELIMO

During the colonial war, the diplomacy of FRELIMO was well articulated. To inform Mozambicans about their work and objectives, as well as the situation experienced in the country and its position on the world scenery, FRELIMO had the Department of Information, Publicity and Propaganda (DIPP) that cooperated with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DRE) — in charge of relations with foreign governments and organizations, keeping the rest of the world informed about Mozambique and the struggle, organizing the dislocation of its representatives abroad, as well as participating in conferences and visits to other countries explaining what the movement was and its problems (Mondlane 1995).

FRELIMO maintained diplomatic relations with African, European and Asian countries; with the great polarized world powers, the USA, the USSR and China, with capitalist and socialist countries, such as Norway, Holland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, Vietnam, North Korea etc. It had offices or delegations in the capitals of different countries, the main ones being in Cairo, Algiers, Lusaka and Dar-Es-Salaam. Its first militants received

political and military training in Algeria, Zambia and Tanzania, as well as in China and the USSR, which disputed the hegemony of the socialist world.

It was in Tanzania that FRELIMO established its main base from 1963, in which its political and military elite was formed and drank from the socialist experience from an African perspective. In addition to the military base, still in 1963, the Front built its Secondary School in Dar-Es-Salaam, the capital of the country, where its cadres were formed. In the province of Mtwara, FRELIMO built a hospital as a fundamental support for the armed struggle, in which militants wounded and mutilated in the war and other victims of Portuguese colonization were treated. In the same location, it was created an Educational Center where the children of the combatants studied. In Dar-Es-Salaam, it was also built the Mozambican Institute, a link of friendship with other peoples, receiving foreign delegations and where the information and propaganda department operated. The political-military formation, the social and economic experience, the African socialism and the *Ujamaa* villages experienced in Tanzania, would serve as inspiration years later and would be tested in the areas liberated by FRELIMO and in its foreign policy (Wache 2017).

After Algeria's independence in 1962, FRELIMO contacted the leaders of that country, who offered military training to two hundred and fifty young Mozambicans. Later, his cadres were formed in the Soviet Union, China, East Germany and Cuba. FRELIMO obtained support and solidarity from different countries; Zambia and Tanzania were its main military partners during the armed struggle, providing logistical, political-military support, hosting bases and welcoming their guerrillas.

In 1970, Marcelino dos Santos traveled to the Vatican with the FRELIMO delegation, where they were received by Pope Paul VI, sympathetic to the cause of the independence movements[3]. However, since 1940, the Catholic Church had an agreement with the Portuguese regime and had collaborated with it in the colonization of Mozambique. Such a meeting revealed FRELIMO's intelligent foreign policy of "making more friends and fewer enemies", seeking international support, even among unlikely partners and friends of its enemies such as the Vatican and the USA. The visit to the Vatican represented a diplomatic victory for FRELIMO and generated discontent among the Portuguese government and society, leading to a cooling

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3 The delegation was also composed of Agostinho Neto, representing the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and, Amílcar Cabral representing the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde.

of traditional relations between the Portuguese Colonial Regime and the Catholic Church (Christie 1996).

Despite the socialist inclination, Samora Machel and FRELIMO opted for non-alignment in the bipolar conflict, neither with the USA, nor with the USSR and China — which disputed hegemony and influences of the Socialist Bloc. Even so, it was obtained financial support from the capitalist world and training and weapons from the socialist world for its guerrillas. FRELIMO obtained economic and financial support from European countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, which revealed a clear anti-colonial position and withdrew their investments in Portuguese enterprises in Africa.

The Lusaka Agreement

FRELIMO's diplomacy demonstrated positive results in the negotiations of the Lusaka Agreement with the Portuguese state, which led Mozambique to independence. The Agreement was signed in the capital of Zambia, on September 7, 1974, mediated by President Kenneth Kaunda. In the Agreement, the Portuguese state recognized the right of the people of Mozambique to independence, provided a transfer of powers until the date of independence, scheduled for June 25, 1975, the anniversary of the founding of FRELIMO. The Agreement created a Transitional Government and its governance structures — prime minister, ministers, secretaries and undersecretaries, police corps — led by FRELIMO (Portugal 1974).

The Transitional Government of Mozambique was led by Joaquim Chissano and comprised of Mozambicans and white Portuguese. It was marked by the departure of about two hundred thousand Portuguese settlers in 1974, following two episodes of violence after the Lusaka Agreements. The first, an uprising of Portuguese settlers that occupied some public institutions and the second resulting from clashes between Portuguese commands and FRELIMO guerrillas that caused bloody riots in black neighborhoods, with the murder of whites and blacks. Even though Samora had ensured that FRELIMO never fought against the Portuguese people, the Transitional Government did little to stop the Portuguese exodus. On the contrary, it saw the presence of a large Portuguese community as a risk to stability and a possible threat to FRELIMO's power (Christie 1996).

In FRELIMO's understanding, its struggle was against the colonial system of oppression and exploitation of man by man. Those who lived by

their honest work would have a positive contribution to make to the reconstruction of the country, including the white population. Despite the effort for the Portuguese community to stay to build an egalitarian and fair country, the exodus of Portuguese technicians and cadres continued because the colonial system had reserved for them the public administration and management and other services with numerous privileges for them (FRELIMO 1977; Machel 1979).

The departure of the Portuguese led to the shutdown of factories in the textile, metallurgical and chemical industries, and sectors such as education, leading to the collapse of important sectors. The Transitional Government revealed a lack of skill in conducting domestic diplomacy, using more of its police and military forces, hard power, than its power of persuasion, soft power[4]. In the international arena, FRELIMO proved to be competent and victorious in its foreign policy.

Independence and the first Government of Mozambique: internal challenges

On June 25, 1975, Mozambique's independence was proclaimed by Samora Machel and FRELIMO, who were aligned with most of the nationalist and socialist movements of Southern Africa. Mozambique changed its name, renamed for People's Republic of Mozambique (RPM), having its Constitution approved five days before Independence, on 20 June. The Constitution affirmed the popular character of the country, "a state of popular democracy and whose power belonged to workers and peasants", the Republic "being guided by the political line defined by Frelimo, the leading force of the State and society" (Mozambique 1975, 2nd and 3rd articles). FRELIMO's leaders become the leaders of Mozambique, in a single party system, in which the state confused itself with the Party.

On June 29, 1975, four days after independence, it was announced the first RPM Government, with Samora Machel as President of the Republic (PR) and a Council of Ministers constituted of fifteen ministries under the direction of the PR. All ministers were senior members of FRELIMO and

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4 In this article, it is understood as hard power the utilization of aggressive force, armed forces, military power, intelligence services and even economic sanctions by states to assert their interests in foreign policy or in the international arena. *Soft power* refers to the use of convincing power using ideological, social, political, cultural and economic values and issues, as soft forms of power in foreign policy and the international arena.

simultaneously held portfolios in the Government and the Party, constituted of blacks, whites and mestizos.

After the independence, FRELIMO and Mozambique had as main challenges: (i) the exodus of Portuguese technicians and the lack of national cadres for technical, economic and social areas; (ii) external threats to the country's security due to attacks by minority South African and Rhodesian *apartheid* regimes and hostilities of Malawi; (iii) the RENAMO destabilization war. On July 24, 1975, Samora Machel nationalized the sectors of education, health, land, funeral companies and law services, prohibiting any type of private activity in these areas. By nationalizing education and health, Samora Machel reached the heart of the Catholic Church by statistizing schools, student homes and hospitals created by the Church.

On February 3, 1976, eight months later, the cycle was completed with the nationalization of income buildings; private housing leasing was prohibited, large companies in the air, land and rail transport sector, banking and insurance sector, industrial sector and factories were nationalized. The nationalization of the last three sectors ended the expectations of small and medium-sized Portuguese investors who had left the country, but maintained hopes for a possible return as soon as the situation calmed down. The nationalizations were a package of nationalization measures towards socialist organization and a response to popular concerns, constituting the most acclaimed measures in the eyes of the people.

FRELIMO saw in the nationalizations another blow to the structure of bourgeois colonial power, affecting the Mozambican petty bourgeoisie that owned thousands of small houses in the suburbs of cities (Cardoso 1978). During the Portuguese colonial administration, the traditional authorities were used as an intermediate administrative structure between the state and the native communities. At the internal level, the Party-State tried to end certain groups and social practices such as prostitution and idleness, considered as behaviors inherent to capitalism and colonialism (Bissio 1978). Traditional cultural practices, initiation rituals, traditional ceremonies for evoking ancestral spirits, *lobolo* etc. were forbidden, seen as retrograde and contrary to the "construction of the new man", free from traditional prejudices and inspired by scientific knowledge, through literacy campaigns and sending young people to attend high school and undergraduate education in socialist countries (FRELIMO 1977). It acted in the same way against religious groups such as Jehovah's Witnesses, traditional authorities, kinglets, sepoys, healers and "reactionaries", accusing them of having collaborated with the colonial

administration and representing remnants of colonization. These actors were sent to "production" and "re-education" camps, spread across the country.

The regional geopolitics

Led by Samora Machel, FRELIMO and Mozambique projected themselves into the world because of their internationalism, with a proactive and challenging foreign policy in their speeches at the UN, denouncing aggressions of Ian Smith's Rhodesian and South Africa's *apartheid* regimes against their people, affirming its anti-imperialist and anti-colonial self-determination. Mozambique announced its solidarity with the struggles of the peoples of South Africa, Rhodesia, Southwest Africa[5], East Timor, the Republic of Western Sahara and Palestine.

Mozambique's foreign policy was anti-imperialist and anti-racist. With its internationalism, Mozambique granted political asylum to ANC (African National Congress) militants, to militants from the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) and other Timorese citizens, offering scholarships to its students, political-ideological formation to its leaders and facilitating the opening of the country's Embassy in Maputo. It was one of the first countries to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), facilitating the opening of the embassy of the Arab Republic of Palestine in Maputo.

In early March 1976, the Government of Samora Machel was the first in the world to enforce UN sanctions applied to Rhodesia, closing the border with the country, in compliance with UN Resolution No. 216 of 12 November 1965. With the attitude, Mozambique challenged the regime of Ian Smith and at the same time sacrificed millions of dollars a year from trade and transit of goods through the port of Beira and railroad towards Rhodesia. Despite knowing the negative socio-economic impacts on the population and the retaliation of Ian Smith, Samora Machel did not hesitate to close the border by imposing such a sacrifice on the Mozambican people.

The relations with the governments of South Africa and Rhodesia were strained because they were racist white minority regimes that defended the *apartheid*, and were opposed to black majority governments in the region. Since 1965, the South African regime has opposed FRELIMO's liberation struggle against the Portuguese colonization, having collaborated with the

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5 Territory corresponding to the current Republic of Namibia.

Portuguese regime, including the sending of military troops to act in Mozambican territory against FRELIMO guerrillas (Christie 1996; 1976).

South Africa waged war against FRELIMO for classic reasons: there were political convictions in the context of the Cold War and in its struggle against the advance of communism in Southern Africa; in addition, South Africa viewed the independence of Mozambique and Angola as a threat to their regional hegemony and political, economic and military power. Moreover, the role of South African political-economic elites and of an unbridled domestic policy of strengthening security, with the existence of a heavily armed and sophisticated army and the development of a military nuclear program were condemned by the Mozambican regime (Van Wyk 2014). To FRELIMO, the Portuguese, South African *apartheid* and the Southern Rhodesia colonial regimes represented the continuation of white colonization and oppression to be fought in Southern Africa.

On the other hand, Malawi, a country with which Mozambique shares the northwest border, Lake Niassa and the Chire and Zambezi rivers, was governed by Hastings Kamuzu Banda, who collaborated with the Portuguese colonial regime, maintaining close relations with the *apartheid* and Rhodesia regimes. Banda had strained relations with the Mozambican Government, particularly in the border region. Malawi does not have direct access to the sea, being its only possibility through the Chire and Zambezi rivers, which flow into the Indian Ocean, within the Mozambican border[6]. Malawi depended on the Mozambican port of Nacala to supply its territory. The opening to navigation of the rivers Chire and Zambeze in the Mozambican part has always been a dream of Banda, which would allow the construction of the port of Nsanje, in Malawi. Because of his pro-Western foreign policy, Banda's hostility towards FRELIMO and later towards the Government of Mozambique has been public knowledge since colonial times. In the colonial struggle, FRELIMO tried to use Malawian territory as a rearguard. However, Banda arrested FRELIMO militants and guerrillas who entered its territory and sent them to the Portuguese colonial authorities, under the agreement that Banda had signed with Portugal, in which he would help maintain the colonial situation in Mozambique in exchange for territorial annexation — on the *Marave Map*, as long as he did not support FRELIMO nationalists. On the other hand, Banda welcomed defectors from FRELIMO and the organizations created by

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6 Former Niassaland, Malawi is a territory in the Southern African *hinterland*, nestled between Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania, with rugged terrain and numerous lakes, not having access to the Indian Ocean maritime coast. It shares with Mozambique a land border and a maritime border with two rivers, Chire and Zambeze and Lake Niassa. The Chire and Zambezi rivers flow into the Indian Ocean, in Mozambican territory .

them — the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) created in 1965 and the African National Union of Rombezia (UNAR), created in 1968 in Malawian territory — which had offices in Malawi and whose actions of military provocation caused the closure of FRELIMO's military front in the province of Tete (Chambote 2015).

The "Malawian factor" represented, since the beginning of the armed struggle, an obstacle to the Mozambican foreign policy and FRELIMO. Several times, they tried negotiations with the neighboring country, without success. It was the return of one of these negotiations that resulted in the death of Samora Machel in 1986. Even so, Malawi's participation in the destabilization of Mozambique was smaller, if compared to the actions of South Africa, of Rhodesia and of Portuguese colonialism, because it never launched an open confrontation against Mozambique.

Flaws in internal diplomacy: the birth of RENAMO

In 1976, armed attacks against populations and socioeconomic infra-structures, classified by FRELIMO as actions of "armed bandits", began. Initiated in the rural areas in the center of the country, the attacks multiplied and spread to different regions, as well as the cruelty of their perpetrators, led by André Matsangaíssa, a former FRELIMO member. Matsangaíssa joined FRELIMO in 1972, being a former member of the Mozambican armed forces punished for infractions and sent to a re-education camp in Gorongosa, his homeland. Released during an attack by Rhodesian forces, he is taken to that country and is later appointed by the Rhodesian forces as leader of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Only years later MNR will adopt the Portuguese language nomenclature of *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO).

The MNR was created in 1975 in Rhodesia, by the Rhodesian army in response to the support given by FRELIMO to the Rhodesian nationalists of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), who were fighting for their country's independence from the center of Mozambique, region in which they maintained some bases and made incursions into Rhodesian territory for the liberation of Ian Smith's colonial yoke. In response, the Rhodesian army along with dissidents from FRELIMO and other disgruntled Mozambicans created the MNR, which received military training and began conducting guerrilla attacks in Mozambique from Rhodesia and under its sponsorship. The initial objective

of the Rhodesian forces was to create small groups on the border that would impede the actions of Zimbabwean nationalists from Mozambique.

In the beginning, Matsangaíssa specialized in attacking re-education camps, freeing the prisoners and recruiting them for his group. Gradually, the group of Matsangaíssa executed many riots in rural areas and made itself known through its English acronym, MNR. When negotiations began for the Lancaster House Agreements that resulted in the Independence of Rhodesia, the MNR transferred its base in Phalaborwa in Rhodesia to the forests and mountains of the provinces of central Mozambique, establishing it in Gorongosa, intensifying the attacks. In 1979, Matsangaíssa died in combat during an attack on Frelimo, being succeeded by Afonso Dhlakama.

In 1980, after Rhodesia's independence, commanded by nationalist and leader Robert Mugabe of the ZANU-Patriotic Front, the country was renamed Zimbabwe, and Mugabe became its first president. Thus Rhodesia's support for the MNR ceased, which began to be carried out by the South African *apartheid* regime. With Dhlakama as president and leader of RENAMO, such guerrilla gained momentum. Thanks to South African logistical support in weapons, fuel, food, uniforms and money, the MNR's guerrilla spread throughout Mozambique, increasing its military numbers, which, in addition to men, included children and women who were abducted during their attacks.

Samora Machel and FRELIMO censored and silenced news of the armed attacks, banning any mention of the rebel movement, even arresting journalists who reported attacks and news about the MNR. Samora refused any contact and negotiations with RENAMO, calling them "armed bandits", "matsangaíssas" or "matsangas", expressions with which the RENAMO guerrillas were designated during the civil war's period. Only after a decade of civil-military warfare, the MNR came to be known as RENAMO.

In the first Government of Mozambique, FRELIMO inherited a failed colonial capitalist system, but which, through a combination of populism and luck, soon managed to recover. On the other hand, due to FRELIMO's form of occupation of the political space, other nationalist projects were excluded and forced to make common cause with interests that were opposed to Mozambique's own independence. It was from this explosive mix of marginalized opportunism and conservative nationalism that Rhodesia, at first, and South Africa, subsequently, created and unleashed RENAMO (Darch 1992).

Samora and FRELIMO failed to recognize the state of war and negotiate with RENAMO, because the latter had its genesis outside the country, created by the Rhodesian intelligence services, a strategy formerly used by

the British army against the *Mau Mau* in Kenya to confuse the populations and make it difficult to support the liberation movement. In this way, the MNR started to carry out destabilization missions in Mozambique, with the command and support of Rhodesian intelligence. Later, with its consolidation as an insurgent movement, the MNR, renamed RENAMO, with the support of the South African armed forces, gained increasing autonomy. In the beginning, it was not foreseeable that RENAMO would carry out a civil-military war as destructive as that which developed in the first half of the 1980s, which led the Government of Samora to sign the Nkomati Agreement (Acordo Incomáti, in potuguese) with South Africa and not with RENAMO.

The foreign policy

In 1970, FRELIMO supported ZANU guerrillas in their incursions into Rhodesia from Mozambican territory, as well as helping their recognition in countries like Tanzania and Zambia. At that time, FRELIMO was already collaborating with the *African National Congress* (ANC) with which it shared military training in Tanzania. Samora arrives in Tanzania for the first time on a flight chartered by the ANC in the company of Joe Slovo, a member of the *South African Communist Party* (SACP) (Christie 1996).

After the independence, in 1976, Mozambique and FRELIMO received visits from various representatives of African Portuguese-speaking countries, as well as visits by the heads of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere (1964-1985) and Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda (1964-1991) for the establishment and strengthening of friendship, mutual aid and cooperation relations. In February 1977, during the III FRELIMO Congress, held in Maputo — in which, for the first time, Party members and representatives of society were in liberated territory — FRELIMO radicalized, becoming a political party unique in Mozambique, with a Marxist-Leninist orientation, proposing to organize a modern state and a new society (FRELIMO 1977).

In this event, for the first time the Foreign Policy of Mozambique was defined, which denounced the racist imperialism in Southern Africa, the policy of Bantustans, the aggressions against the peoples of Western Sahara, East Timor, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, with which the FRELIMO sympathized. FRELIMO acknowledged that the independence of Mozambique and Angola accentuated the change in the correlation of forces in Southern Africa with the end of Portuguese colonization, and, for the first time in the region where imperialism and racism dominated in Africa, states emerged

that engaged through the socialist revolution way. The Party defines the principles and guidelines of the foreign policy of the Republic of Mozambique, giving priority to the establishment of diplomatic relations with friendly and allied countries, establishing diplomatic relations with the African socialist, Asian and European countries that supported them.

> In its Foreign Policy, the People's Republic of Mozambique strictly applies the principles of Frelimo's political line. In this context, the People's Republic of Mozambique gives priority to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the countries that have always engaged by our side. During the Transition, Frelimo agreed to establish diplomatic relations since the proclamation of Independence with African, socialist, Asian and European countries that have always supported us. The People's Republic of Mozambique has established and develops friendly and cooperative relations in all countries based on the principles of mutual respect for territorial sovereignty and integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and reciprocity of benefits (FRELIMO 1977, 81).

After the Congress, Mozambique's foreign policy started to emphasize non-alignment, with a clear inclination towards anti-imperialism and the need to reduce dependence on South Africa (Zeca 2015). In 1976, Mozambique founded, along with Angola, Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia, the Frontline States (FLS), a regional organization encouraged by the OAU, with the objective of supporting African resistances in the face of the continuation of colonization, combating aggression of racist and segregationist white minority regimes in the region, politically isolate the South African regime, coordinating efforts for the liberation of Rhodesia and Southwest Africa.

Because of the option for one-party socialism and adherence to Marxism-Leninism, Mozambique was the target of an international embargo by Western capitalist countries, a reality that affected the country's society, economy and industries, leading to extreme poverty. On the other hand, the internal context marked by the exodus of Portuguese technicians, lack of national cadres, destabilization of RENAMO, military attacks and bombings by South African and Rhodesian forces, forced the Mozambicans to sacrifices.

On March 8, 1977, Samora Machel summoned the young people from across the country and made an appeal to them to contribute their knowledge and experiences in the reconstruction and development of Mozambique. Those who had the 9th, 10th and 11th grades, the last years of high school, should sacrifice themselves for the challenges that the country faced, being sent to the Training Center 8 of March, to study different areas defined by

the Party-State and "formation of the new man", giving up their dreams and vocations. From there, nurses, doctors, teachers, soldiers and varied technicians came out. Others went to take courses abroad in socialist countries, particularly in the military field to strengthen the country's army and defense. These young people became known as the "Generation 8 of March". The appeal was effective and demonstrated FRELIMO's ability to mobilize in the domestic scenery, amid difficulties and a hostile environment.

With the independence of Rhodesia and its transformation into Zimbabwe in 1980, renewing the objectives of the FLS and with the economic liberation mission of Southern Africa, in 1980, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe created the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), predecessor of SADC, whose goals were the reduction of the economic dependence of the countries in the region in relation to South Africa and a bigger cooperation between members for the economic balance (Massangaie 2018; Langa and Sacavinda 2019).

Due to the economic crisis in the early 1980s, Mozambique tried to join the Council For Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), a mutual aid organization between socialist countries. However, their adhesion to the Bloc was vetoed by the Soviets because of the non-alignment policy practiced by Mozambique, preventing the country from accessing the Organization's economic loans (Maloa 2016).

Approximation to the capitalist world

With the veto in the COMECON, there was a reorientation of Mozambique's foreign policy, aiming at "making more friends and fewer enemies", a principle that has guided FRELIMO since the liberation struggle. Mozambique developed efforts to improve the diplomatic relations with Western countries that had economic interests in South Africa. In this context, in 1983, Samora made an official visit to the most important countries in the European Economic Community (EEC), including Portugal.

Two years later, in 1985, Samora visited the Western world and the heart of the capitalist world, with two important meetings. On September 19, he met President Ronald Reagan at the White House in an attempt to align Mozambique's economy with the capitalist market. The meeting was important, because in the following months the United States reduced its support for the South African regime. The meeting between Reagan and Machel would have been facilitated by Margareth Thatcher, in return for

Samora Machel's mediation in the Lancaster House Agreements that led to Zimbabwe's independence.

Days later, on September 27, Samora Machel met with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in London. Such an unusual encounter between a convict communist and a conservative capitalist revealed the existence of past contacts. On the other side of Europe, the Soviets became furious with Samora Machel's approach to the Western world. Soon after, an "accident" occurred in the natural gas extraction mines of Pande, in southern Mozambique, which burned for more than a week, causing incalculable economic losses to the country. The exploitation of natural gas in the Pande mines was under the responsibility of Soviet engineers and technicians; therefore, the Mozambican authorities saw such an "accident" as Moscow's retaliation for Samora's visit to the heart of the Western world and its attempt to keep Mozambique independent from the Soviets.

Mozambique's economy has never had an abundance of easy resources available; its strategic importance for the socialist bloc was smaller, which left few alternatives for financial and military support to FRELIMO's action to impose itself strategically in the region and in its own territory. The geographical proximity to South Africa left the country vulnerable to attacks. On the other hand, the Party's institutional strength, including the political direction, was overshadowed by that of the PR. The formulation of foreign policy depended on the elites at the highest levels around the PR. Foreign policy in Mozambique was characterized by the reduced quantity of official and unofficial inputs, in a context in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs carried out more than formulated policies (Castellano da Silva 2017).

The Nkomati Accord

With a gross domestic product twenty-five times higher than that of Mozambique, South Africa was the hegemonic power in southern Africa, in addition to being considered an obstacle to political and economic liberation in the region. Land attacks and bombings in Mozambique and economic and military support to RENAMO destabilized the country, impeding economic and agricultural development, in addition to sabotaging the electrical system with constant cuts. "Mozambique did not have a modern, well-equipped regular army. The guerrilla structure inherited from the days of the war for independence appeared to be inadequate in the face of the great infantry and artillery and strong air support" (Christie 1996, 157).

This scenary forced the Samora Machel Government to recognize South Africa's economic and military superiority and sign a non-aggression agreement with the *apartheid* regime. In March 1984, Samora Machel and P. W. Botha, Prime Minister of South Africa, signed in Maputo, on the banks of the Nkomati River (Incomáti), the "non-aggression and good neighborhood pact" known as the Nkomati Agreement (Acordo Incomáti, in portuguse). In the Agreement, Mozambique pledged to deactivate ANC bases and offices in its territory and South Africa to end its logistical and military support to RENAMO.

The Nkomati Agreement was a humiliation to Samora Machel and FRELIMO, being interpreted as a surrender by the nationalist movements allied to neighboring countries. In particular, the black South African majority was disappointed with Frelimo, feeling betrayed. Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, heads of state of Tanzania and Zambia respectively, refused to participate in the ceremony because they did not agree to such an agreement, even though they respected the decision of Samora Machel and FRELIMO.

A few months later, it was realized that South Africa never stopped to provide support to RENAMO. Mozambique, in turn, deactivated the ANC bases and the logistical support it provided. It was clear that Samora Machel was deceived by the *apartheid* regime in the Nkomati Agreement. On October 19, 1986, Samora Machel and thirty-three other occupants of his presidential flight died in an air crash when their plane crashed in the South African town of Mbuzine. The Mozambican delegation was returning from a SADC meeting in Zambia, whose agenda was Malawi's strong relations with the *apartheid* regime. Samora and other leaders in the region were trying to convince Malawi to abandon such a stance, since it had joined SADC in 1980[7]. The fall of the presidential plane was considered an attack attributed to the *apartheid* secret services, which would have installed a false Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range (VOR). Instead of sending signals that indicated the Maputo International Airport, it would have induced the pilot to the mountains of Mbuzine in South Africa.

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7 A month earlier, on September 11, 1986, Samora Machel, Head of State of Mozambique, Kenneth Kaunda, Head of State of Zambia, and Robert Mugabe, Head of State of Zimbabwe, had traveled to Blantyre, in Malawi, to convince Kamuzu Banda that the interests of the Malawian people were no different from other SADC member states, as well as that Malawi's irresponsible attitudes could have unpredictable consequences (Chambote 2015).

Conclusion

In the liberation war, FRELIMO obtained support from different capitalist and socialist countries; it opted for a diplomacy whose objective was "to make more friends and fewer enemies". After the independence, Mozambique took a proactive stance, convincing other countries in the region to found two regional organizations: the FLS and the SADCC, in an attempt to end colonization and reduce South Africa's economic dependence. Such actions demonstrated the capacity for cooperation and regional and international convincing, as well as a *soft power* performance of the foreign policy of the first Government of Mozambique. In southern Africa, Mozambique was a small power, unable to maintain its own security. Still, it stood out for its regional leadership against colonization and *apartheid*. It tried to influence the regional scenery with notorious engagement, supporting the struggles of nationalist movements of neighboring countries. In the international arena, it opted for non-alignment, standing out for internationalism, activism and solidarity.

It had to face alone and simultaneously the RENAMO's destabilization war and the South African, Rhodesian and Malawian aggressions. Mozambique found itself weakened, having no technical, human, economic, material or military resources to protect its borders and air space, without the capacity for *hard power*, thus adopting a defensive posture. The unsustainable situation led Mozambique to recognize the enemy's superiority and sign the Nkomati Agreement. The genesis and external support for RENAMO prevented Samora Machel from recognizing the existence of internal support for the rebels and their nationalist character, underestimating it and rejecting any type of negotiation to end the war. At first, RENAMO was an instrument of the Rhodesian regime; in the second, it became part of the South African strategy. Any negotiations with RENAMO had to be assured by South Africa.

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ABSTRACT

The article analyzes diplomacy and foreign policy in the first independent Government of Mozambique. In the theoretical analysis, the perspective of concentric circles moved, seeing the internal, regional and international dimensions as interconnected and mutually influenced. As a methodology, bibliographic surveys and documentary research were used. Internally, the performance of the Samora Machel Government in the construction of the nation-state and responses to domestic conflicts were

evaluated. At the regional level, Mozambique's relations with border countries were verified. Finally, the state's foreign policy on the continent and its international performance were observed. The Samora government adopted a Marxist-Leninist nationalist policy defined by the party-state and the country was experiencing armed RENAMO attacks that turned into civil-military war. In Southern Africa, Mozambique was a Frontline State (FLS) and founder of SADC, showing solidarity with neighboring peoples, supporting politically and militarily its African nationalist movements in the fight against white domination. In the international arena, the state opted for non-alignment and developed international activism against colonization and *apartheid*. Mozambican foreign policy and diplomacy have been proactive in the region and internationally, managing to move their soft power. However, the Executive Government faced internal difficulties, with political and economic failures due to the systematic destabilization promoted by neighboring South Africa and South Rhodesia, as well as refusing to recognize the state of war and to negotiate with RENAMO, seen as an extension of the regime's minority interests in the region.

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REGIONAL INEQUALITY AND THE PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY IN MOZAMBIQUE, EXPLAINED FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF POVERTY

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Introduction

After its independence in 1975, Mozambique adopted the centrally planned economy for managing the country, following the example of many African countries that have achieved independence since the 1960s. From 1984, the country began the process of exit from this system after not finding, in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (former USSR), a partnership to support development plans. Thus, in 1987, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was initiated as an important step towards the adoption of the market economy system, with support from the United States and other Western countries, through the *Bretton Woods* institutions.

The SAP process, which was locally called as the Economic Restructuring Programme (ERP), has had social impacts, increasing poverty, which was mainly due to measures of economic liberalization and privatization, which caused widespread unemployment and a reduction in the purchasing

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power of the population. Such adverse results led to the reformulation of the program, so that it included social issues, becoming known as the Economic and Social Restructuring Program (ESRP), from 1990. However, the concrete policies of the Mozambican government for poverty reduction began in 2001, by designing and beginning the implementation of the Action Plan for Absolute Poverty Reduction 2001-2005 (PARPA I). Thus, the year 2001 can be considered as the beginning of concrete policies to combat poverty in Mozambique.

The implementation of PARPA I occurred in a context where about 70% of the population lived below the poverty line[3], with notable inequalities between urban and rural areas, regions (north, center, and south), and provinces. After the implementation of three poverty reduction plans by the Mozambican government, an evaluation was carried out in 2014/15, which found a reduction of poverty to 46.1% at the national level. However, there was still persistent rural and urban inequality and between provinces, with rural poverty standing at 50.1%, while urban poverty stood at 37.4%, in addition to the multidimensional poverty that was even greater (GdM 2001; MEF 2015).

This raises the following question: *to what extent have regional inequalities adversely affected the effectiveness of policies to combat poverty in Mozambique?* To answer this question, the Vicious Circle of Poverty (VCP) perspective is used to explain the persistence of poverty in the context of significant regional inequalities that characterize the economy of Mozambique, in the period 2001-2014.

Therefore, the study aims to analyze how regional inequalities negatively affected policies to combat poverty in Mozambique and dictated their persistence and unequal incidence, using the VCP perspective. More specifically, it is intended to demonstrate the existence of unequal development or opportunities between regions and provinces, and to analyze how this difference in development/opportunities influenced poverty reduction, finding its basis in the VCP.

In methodological terms, the study used a combination of bibliographic and documentary methods and used secondary data to analyze the problem under study. In the bibliographic method, it will support articles, papers, manuals, among other materials, for the construction of the theoretical foundation. In the document, it used reports from official institutions in Mozambique, such as the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), the defunct Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD), and Planning

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3 That includes monetary (income and consumption) and non-monetary (other basic needs) poverty. Such concepts will be better explained below.

and Finance (MPF), where it used socioeconomic values resulting from the assessment of poverty in the country, and reports from the National Institute of Statistics of Mozambique (INE) to obtain secondary data for the analyses, demonstrating existing inequalities and the effectiveness of policies implemented. The discussion of the effectiveness of poverty reduction policies was based on five variables, with the evolution of absolute and multidimensional poverty as a dependent, and access to education, health, and employment opportunities as independent variables. In other words, this work investigates how unequal access to employment opportunities, education and health has negatively impacted poverty reduction. Due to the lack of two variables in a direct way, in place of access to employment opportunities, the activities that the head of household exercises were used as a proxy, and in the access to education, the level of illiteracy was used as a proxy.

In terms of contribution, it is expected to be able to initiate some change in the way poverty is discussed and to propose alternative policies, as many of the work undertaken so far generally identifies policy outcomes, interested only in their evolution or stagnation over time, but do not discuss the reasons behind this behavior. By using the foundations of the VCP to explain the persistence and unequal incidence of poverty in some regions or provinces, it is hoped to awaken the idea that regional or provincial inequalities may hinder, if confirmed, their connection with the foundations of the VCP, reducing poverty, resulting in its persistence unevenly due to the possible inefficiency of policies.

To answer the problem under study, the work consists of six parts, in addition to this introduction. The next section provides the theoretical framework, discussing the concepts of poverty, inequality and poverty, Cumulative Circular Causation (CCC), and VCP. The third section presents a brief historical, political, and socio-economic contextualization of Mozambique. In the following, there are the policies implemented in the period 2001-2014 and the inequalities between regions and provinces in access to employment opportunities, education, and health. The fifth section discusses the effectiveness of policies in the period 2001-2014, in the face of inequalities, trying to find out how the VCP can influence the effectiveness of policies to fight poverty. And the sixth part presents the final considerations.

Theoretical Framework

Conceptualization of Poverty

The conceptualization and measurement of poverty have been changing since the Industrial Revolution when it began to attract the attention of researchers and governments in measuring its size and understanding its causes. Since then, the questions related to the income necessary for the individual's physical subsistence guided its treatment, followed by the concern of the dimension of the satisfaction of basic needs. Currently, several deficiencies to characterize poverty are identified.

This fact makes poverty a complex phenomenon, because, over time, subjective issues were being aggregated beyond income, all to be able to describe and measure poverty (De Codes 2008, 6). This causes poverty to be currently defined and treated under various approaches in different pieces of literature, but most fall on the issues of deprivation or lack of choices that can lead people to a dignified life. For example, Foster *et al.* (2013, 1) consider poverty as the absence of choices that are acceptable, in a wide range of existing decisions, to lead a dignified life, or the lack of freedom to do what one wants. Haughton and Khandker (2009, 1) regard poverty as a pronounced deprivation of well-being, which may be the result of lack of sufficient income for consumption, lack of access to a decent home, health, or education, among other aspects.

We can see that in the definitions raised, among several others possible, poverty is the result of the conjunction of many phenomena that condition and deprive people to live a dignified life. It is therefore in the interests of many governments and international organizations to reduce them through policies and programs. Thus, to discuss the success of different public policies implemented or programs, it is important to know about the approaches to their measurement, as it will be from them that concrete and appropriate policies will be designed for their reduction, assessment, and monitoring of their effectiveness.

Poverty Measurement

As a complex phenomenon, poverty has several approaches to measuring it, which results in a multiplicity of indicators, but which will not be subject to exhaustion in this work. However, developing countries, of which Mozambique is a part, focus on poverty in terms of spending on consumption

or income and the approach to multidimensionality. Thus, the measurement, for this work, will focus on two indicators: (i) absolute poverty line, which is based on income or consumption deprivations; and (ii) multidimensional poverty, which includes other variables.

i) Absolute Poverty Line

This approach has three methods to enumerate: the cost of basic needs, the consumption of food energy, and subjective evaluations. In these three methods, the cost of basic needs is the most used, in which the cost of acquiring sufficient food for adequate nutrition is estimated (usually 2,100 calories per person/day). In this way, everyone below this line is considered poor. This has been the most widely used measure to identify the poor over time and space, with widespread use in low and middle-income countries. The absolute poverty line remains fixed over time, adjusted only to inflation, as in the United States, where it has been in force (in real terms) since 1965. It allows monitoring the evolution of poverty over time and is also useful in evaluating policies and programs to combat poverty (Foster *et al.* 2013, 27; Haughton and Khandker 2009, 40).

ii) Multidimensional Poverty

The multidimensionality of poverty was brought about by the World Bank's 2000/2001 World Development Report 2000 and made concrete by the Human Development Report (HDR) 2010, which joined the deprivation approach also initiated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1997. This approach includes elements such as access to health, education and housing, possession of durable goods, freedom of expression, self-confidence, security, among others, elements that also determine poverty if there is a need or deprivation. Thus, the indicator that includes these elements measures multidimensional poverty.

Ferreira (2011, 495) points out the lack of consensus in multidimensional poverty since there are many subjective elements to translate deprivations to well-being, which gives space to the use of various multidimensional poverty indices. Nevertheless, this measure has been widely used, mainly

since 2010 in the HDR as a result of cooperation between Oxford Poverty and the Human Development Initiative (OPHI)[4].

In the specific case of Mozambique, starting with the absolute poverty line, this is obtained, on the one hand, through the selection of a basic food basket, which: (i) reflects the patterns of consumption of poor families within the geographic space and provides approximately 2,150 calories per person/day, and (ii) respect a range of spatial and temporal conditions of preference that ensure comparability between the quality of baskets in geographical spaces and over time. And on the other hand, the non-food poverty line, focusing on access to public goods and services. Thus, the computation of the poverty line in Mozambique, in the fourth evaluation 2014/2015, was estimated at USD 1.54 PPP per person/day at 2011 prices (MPD 2010, 3-5; MEF 2016, 11).

In turn, the official multidimensional poverty index in that country captures deprivation in six indicators: completion of primary education by someone in the family, safe water source, safe sanitation, house coverage in a conventional material, access to electricity, and the possession of durable goods[5] (MEF 2016, 10-11).

Therefore, for this work, we will use the data compiled in the different IOFs, for showing consistency and comprehensiveness in the period under study, although the multidimensional poverty index on the country is published in parallel in different documents of an international character, as is the case with the HDR of the different years since 2010.

Inequality and Poverty

Inequality refers to non-equity or non-proportional distribution among members of a region, country, or society of opportunities, resources, income, consumption, wages, access to public services such as health, education, and other basic services to enjoy a dignified life, and to the political space and social identity for a good coexistence in society. This is often considered an injustice that can be resolved through public policies, because it

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4 The Multidimensional Poverty Index compiled in this Convention and reported in human development reports since 2010 takes into account deprivation in ten indicators, namely: nutrition, infant mortality, years of schooling, school attendance, cooking fuel, sanitation, drinking water, electricity, housing, and durable goods.

5 The index calculation uses the Alkire-Foster methodology (A-F), one of the methodologies used internationally to aggregate and determine this Multidimensional Poverty Index (H).

is not something divine or natural, and can be changed to improve the living conditions of those affected (Rohwerder 2016; Ali 2010).

Inequality is, therefore, a concern of many countries, especially emerging and developing countries, which have major inequalities among members of society, such as Mozambique. Although there are several approaches to treat and measure inequality, some authors choose the Gini Index[6], which measures the concentration of income or consumption in a certain group. However, for this work, due to the need to confront the VCP and include multidimensional poverty in its analyses, it is necessary to treat inequality equally in a multidimensional way, in order to be compatible with the concepts of poverty adopted.

UNICEF *et al.* (2014) considers inequality as a problem in itself, and also a challenge to the eradication of extreme poverty, due to its impact on the efficiency of policies to fight poverty and economic growth, because high levels of inequality undermine the sustainability of economic growth due to its negative impacts on human capital, institutional legitimacy, and social cohesion, among other things. It also states that inequality may be the result of a lack of investment or political negligence in certain geographical areas, sectors, or population groups. However, this work is not intended to explore the origins of inequalities, but how their existence impacts on poverty reduction, the difference in access to education, health, and employment opportunities as upstream factors in the fight against poverty, as discussed by CCC and VCP, that will be addressed in the following section.

Cumulative Circular Causation and Vicious Circle of Poverty

The concept of Cumulative Circular Causation (CCC) was approached and developed by Myrdal in his works on the study of development. Myrdal understands the idea of Cumulative Circular Causation as the appropriate method for the study of the processes of underdevelopment and development and contributed decisively to the enumeration of the abstract principles of the CCC model (Toner 1999). Particularly, it should be noted: (i) the notion that economic and social changes tend to generate elements that reinforce themselves — which brings the implication that the "free" market perpetuates the tendency to underdevelopment and inequality between regions or between countries; (ii) the proposition that circular and cumulative forces

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6 It is derived from the Lorenz curve, and varies from 0 to 1, where 0 means perfect equality and 1 means perfect inequality or few individuals have it all.

can be counterbalanced by economic policy actions. It is also pertinent to note that Myrdal attributed equal importance to economic and non-economic factors (cultural, political, and social) for the understanding of development processes.

In his work *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions* (Myrdal 1960 [1957]), in which he refers to the works of Winslow and Nurkse, who in their studies on development and underdevelopment made mention of the VCP to discuss the cause and effect of poverty. In this sequence, Winslow relates disease and poverty, stating that the disease affects the poor more intensely. Therefore, they become poorer due to the disease, by affecting their disposition and vigor at work, which makes the circular process cumulative, in which a negative factor is simultaneously the cause and effect of other negative factors.

Following the same line, Nurkse relates hunger and poverty, arguing that it is more likely that the poor man does not have enough to eat, weakening his health, making his productivity lower, which would imply more poverty. This reduces their ability to provide food, so successively. Thus, this cumulative circular process, left to be solved by market forces, will promote increasing inequalities (Myrdal 1960, 26-27).

Therefore, Myrdal (1960, 28), by the presence of the process of cumulative circular causation, denies the existence of stable equilibrium for social realities, because the autonomous transformations in the system would not provoke compensatory changes, being able to generate worse situations, if left to the internal forces to resolve themselves. To stabilize the system, external interference through planned policies is necessary to stop the movement, break the VCP.

By studying the African American population in the first half of the 20th century, who lived in poverty, discrimination, precariousness, and social fragility, Myrdal argued that their ability to get out of poverty was inhibited by prejudice and precarious living conditions, because the prejudice of whites and the low standard of living of blacks are, conversely, cause and effect. Because of this, poverty was fed by living conditions and the lack of guarantee of civil rights, which was reinforced by the discrimination they lived, being born the thesis that "poverty creates poverty" or "vicious circle of poverty" or even that "a country is poor because it is poor".

So, Myrdal argues that modifying any of the forces, or the prejudice of whites or the low standard of living of blacks, would bring changes in the other, triggering a cumulative process of mutual interaction, where an improvement of one element of the forces would lead to the improvement

of the other, so successively (Myrdal 1960, 29-32). Considering that the persistence of both forces is equivalent to a system in which the forces are in opposite directions, in this case there would be hardly a balance, proposing an external shock (public policies) for them to walk in the same direction, causing a CCC with primary, secondary, tertiary effects, so successively, between the variables, because they intertwine.

In this case, among the factors that influence the standard of living of blacks who deserve this external shock, Myrdal considers that each has its quantitative weight, but chooses the time factor to analyze its effects. For example, it considers that providing employment opportunities can have more immediate effects than promoting access to health and education (Myrdal 1960, 33-35).

Therefore, even if Myrdal advocated that the promotion of access to education and health have a slow effect, it is a consensus today and is advocated by several international organizations supporting poverty programmes, which are structuring elements, by creating conditions for increasing labor productivity in the case of health and providing skills for access to different employment opportunities in the case of education. For this reason, we will adopt as variables employment opportunities and access to education and health, to study the influence that public policies have had in the fight against poverty in Mozambique.

Thus, using the Myrdal CCC principle, we started from the assumption that unequal access to these variables would influence the effectiveness of the policies adopted, being less effective in the regions with low access and more effective in the regions with greater access. However, before starting this discussion, a brief historical, political, and socioeconomic context of Mozambique is presented in the next chapter, in order to perceive the dynamics behind the current condition of inequalities.

Historical, political, and socioeconomic context of Mozambique

Mozambique is a country located in the eastern part of sub-Saharan Africa, in the southeastern portion of the African continent, with a territorial extent of approximately 799,379 Km². Its territory is bordered to the east by the Indian Ocean, to the north by Tanzania, to the northwest by Malawi and Zambia, to the west by Zimbabwe and to the southwest by South Africa and

Swaziland (Figure 1). The country has 11 provinces[7], 23 cities and 62 villages, Maputo being the capital of the country (Maloa 2018, 160-165).

Figure 1: Map of Mozambique

Source: PPG Consulting (2012).

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7 Divided into three regions: North (Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula); Center (Zambezia, Tete, Manica and Sofala); and South (Inhambane, Gaza, Maputo Province and Maputo City).

Brief Historical and Political Context

For the historical and political contextualization of Mozambique, we can divide into four periods: colonial period; post-independence period and experience of centrally planned economy; transition to liberalism and structural adjustment programs; and the present period and challenges of the 21st century.

The colonial period lasted almost 500 years, between the arrival of the Portuguese in Mozambique in 1498 and the national independence in 1975. But effective occupation began from the end of the 19th century, after the Berlin Conference (1884-1885). In this period, the economy was based on the accumulation and export of surpluses to the metropolis, in which agriculture and industry were based on forced labor to meet the existing white minority, and on the export of raw material. The technological development of the industry was a result of the modernization of the Portuguese industry in the 1930s, because, at this time, it required a replacement, as it was obsolete, and its relocation would be in the colonies to, thereby reducing the opportunity cost of modernizing it, since it was technologically backward, which has resulted in the transfer of a backward industry which has been involved in modernizing it to this day. Because, for the settlers, Mozambique had to be: (i) a source of raw material for Portuguese industries, (ii) a supplier of cheap labor, (iii) a market for Portuguese manufacturing goods, and (iv) a labor market for the Portuguese unemployed. These practices were accompanied by class segregation, as the domestic population did not have equal access to education and health, let alone paid work for a dignified life, and led to a very deep social crisis, the effects of which accompany the country to this day (Castel-Branco 1994, 90-95; Bellucci 2007, 60-71).

The post-independence period (1975-1984) began with the national independence gained by a nationalist movement, as was the case in other African countries, led by FRELIMO[8] since 1964. This period was characterized by a massive exodus of Portuguese who guaranteed the functioning of the colonial economy, which was a challenge to the new government to establish policies to compensate for this lack of cadres. In 1977, the country adopted the management model of the centrally planned economy, with a single party, and the economic policies characterized by the nationalization and nationalization of the means of production, with the state as the main economic agent. While trying to rebuild the country, it plunged into a civil war even in 1977, in addition to the sabotage of neighboring countries dominated by the white minority.

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8 The Mozambique Liberation Front was a nationalist movement founded in 1962.

This period was marked by the collapse of the national infrastructure, the lack of investments in productive assets and the various generalized hunger crises. Thus, in order to overcome the underdevelopment inherited from colonialism, in this post-independence period, a socialist plan was adopted which was designated the Prospective and Indicative Plan (PIP), the aim of which was to eliminate underdevelopment in just 10 years (1980-1990), but this plan did not have the necessary support of the former USSR, and Mozambique was refused its accession to CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), an economic aid bloc among socialist countries. At this time, the state had to cover about 50% of public investments through external debt to maintain the economy, having led to the country's insolvency in 1983 with a debt of 1.4 billion dollars. Thus, the deepening of the social crisis and the advancing war of internal destabilization led to a transition to neoliberal policies on IMF standards, which began their negotiation in 1984, with an implementation started in 1987 (Castel-Branco 1994, 101-102; Bellucci 2007, 135-175).

In the transition to liberalism (1987-1997), Mozambique introduced the Bretton Woods Institutions' Structural Adjustment (SA) Economic Restructuring Programme (ERP) in 1987 and approved a more market-friendly constitution in 1990, where agriculture continued as the basis of development and industry as the driving factor of the economy. The peace agreement was signed, marking the end of the 16-year civil war in 1992. These factors removed the barriers that prevented development, and the country began to access the funds of international partners and began to privilege the private sector and market forces for economic development and not the state, as before. The ERP left marks of social scope (poverty), which led to the reformulation of a program that included social issues, which became known as ESRP, from 1990. Thus, after the period of SA, a survey was carried out to assess the level of poverty in 1996/1997, which found that this affected 70% of the population. This result inspired the design of policies to combat poverty, whose implementation began in 2001, still with great technical and financial support from abroad (Bellucci 2007, 183-204; Cruz *et al.* 2014, 12-13).

The current period and the challenges of the 21st century was characterized, at the beginning of the new millennium, by a period of high economic growth (average annual rate of 7%) between 1998 and 2018, which made the country one of the economies of sub-Saharan Africa with a consistently high growth rate in this period and macroeconomic stability as a result of the SA and the continuation of external assistance, but nothing that would eliminate extreme poverty. Public debts in this period were controlled at levels of sustainability, until the discovery of hidden debts, endorsed by the government

without the parliament's authorization, between 2013 and 2014, which led to the departure of all cooperation partners in 2016. The inclusion of hidden debts in public accounts led to an increase in the stock of debt and exceeded the country's GDP from 2016. The new discovery of resources (coal, gas and probably oil) since the beginning of the 21st century would be a hope for the country, but its exploration and the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) linked to this discovery, are carried out by megaprojects with little connection with the economy, and capital-intensive technology in a country with surplus labor and low technical qualification. In other words, the employment generated by these megaprojects is insignificant. These aspects reveal the continuous marginalization of a large part of the population, so that agriculture remains the activity that supports most of the population, because labor-intensive industries (textiles, footwear, among others) do not find a financial structure and technological capacity that is competitive in the foreign market (Bellucci 2007, 245-255; IMF 2014, 32-38).

Finally, in addition to these challenges to development, the current political instability, due to attacks by armed groups, has created many refugees in the central and northern regions since 2013 and 2017, increasing the vulnerability of populations and social inequality.

Policies for reducing regional poverty and inequality in Mozambique

Poverty Reduction Plans

The first diagnosis of poverty in Mozambique was carried out in 1997 by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) and showed that absolute poverty affected on average about 70% of the population[9]. In this incidence of poverty, imbalances (regional inequalities) between urban and rural areas, regions (north, center, and south) and provinces (GdM 2001, 23-24) were notable. After one year of implementation of PARPA I, the second IOF was carried out, which found a reduction of absolute poverty by approximately 10 percentage points to 60.30% at the national level.

Multidimensional poverty, which demonstrates the families' lack of access to basic services and durable goods, presented a high level (76%), and also showed a persistence of inequality in its incidence between rural and

9 This result showed, to some extent, the negative impacts of the implementation of shock policies to access the support of the Bretton Woods institutions.

urban areas. Thus, multidimensional poverty presented about 92% of private people in rural areas against 40% of urban ones, and absolute poverty had 69% and 41.70%, respectively, according to graphic 1 below.

Graphic 1: Poverty Profile in Mozambique (%) (2002-2003)

Source: Prepared by the author, based on MEF data (2016).

This persistence has led the Mozambican government to implement two more poverty reduction action plans: (i) Action Plan for Absolute Poverty Reduction, 2006-2009 (PARPA II); and (ii) Action Plan for Poverty Reduction (PARP III), 2011-2014. It follows that in PARP III, the word "Absolute" was removed, because, from the perspective of the Mozambican government, poverty was no longer absolute[10]. In these three plans, despite the bad experiences experienced in the implementation of SAP programs, the fight against poverty continued to be at the forefront of the international agenda, due to the chronic dependence on the country's external aid.

Thus, the main lines defined by the international donors were essentially good governance (decentralization and the fight against corruption), increased productivity in the various sectors and agrarian production through

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10 A concept that may be out of the question because poverty is not only absolute by reducing people below the poverty line, but by improving conditions and not having more people below the poverty line. However, it is not intended to discuss this issue in the relevant work.

the green revolution, among other measures. In this perspective, according to Brito (2012, 29-31), the lines and priorities of the plans drawn up by the government were:

Table 1: The Lines and Priorities of PARPAs (2001-2014)

Plan Designation	Period	Plan Priorities
PARPA I	2001-2005	It focused on key areas such as education, health, infrastructure (roads, energy, and water), agriculture and rural development, good governance, legality and justice, and macroeconomic and financial policies, complemented by areas such as business development, job creation, social action, housing, mining, fisheries, tourism, manufacturing industry, transport and communications, technology, environmental preservation, and reducing vulnerability to natural disasters.
PARPA II	2006-2009	It was based on cross-cutting issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS, environmental preservation, food and nutrition security, science and technology, rural development, calamities, demining, based on governance pillars, human capital, and economic development.
PARP	2011-2014	It prioritized the increase of agricultural and fisheries production and productivity, the promotion of employment, and human development, and the promotion of the private sector through the pillars of good governance, management of macroeconomic policy and public finances.

Source: Brito (2012, 29-31).

Thus, in the three plans, despite several lines of priorities that the government has launched as policies and have permanently prioritized the generation of employment, agriculture was only given greater prominence at the last level and there was a discontinuity in education as a key policy for poverty reduction. Furthermore, it can be noted that good governance has been prioritized in all plans, as a policy line, as it is considered a way to bring the state and public services closer to citizens, making management more able to respond to needs in rural areas, which would enable local governments to formulate and implement policies for the poor.

However, the allocation of the State Budget (SB) in the period under study did not show this willingness or pretension of the government to

decentralize resources for the resolution of citizens' problems in rural areas, because the SB flowed less to the districts. Therefore, the annual budgets did not demonstrate this intention of budgetary decentralization, leading to inequality in access to public services between the central level and the districts (rural regions).

Regional Inequalities: Employment, Education and Health

In the assessment of poverty that has been made by the Mozambican authorities, specifically by the INE and MEF, since 2001, several indicators have been used to measure inequalities. However, in this work, as a result of the use of the foundations of the VCP, the activities practiced by heads of families (to represent job opportunities), illiteracy (to represent access to education) and access to health will be considered. With regard to employment opportunities between urban and rural regions, the distribution was uneven between 2014/15. According to graphic 02 below, in the rural region almost 83.7% of heads of households were occupied in agrarian activities; only 15.1% (5.5% of non-agricultural workers and 9.6% of trade and services) had non-agricultural employment. However, in urban areas, about 26.7% of these bosses were engaged in agricultural activities and 64.4% (20.7% of non-agricultural workers and 43.7% of trade and services) in other activities outside agriculture.

These regional differences in employment opportunities, where a large part of the rural population was engaged in agriculture, considered to be of lower productivity than other sectors, have a major impact on household income and poverty reduction, because employment in agriculture can create more poverty due to one of its classic problems, particularly in Mozambique, which is characterized by monoculture and seasonal work. Thus, even if the salary were high, considering the months in which one does not work, it would be insufficient for subsistence. This labor regime does not create a productive workforce and, on the other hand, makes it exceedingly difficult to organize it in the face of employment conditions, compromising the improvement of the living conditions of workers in agriculture (Castel-Branco 2019).

On the other hand, part of the population that is linked to non-agricultural activities (industry, trade, and services) has the potential to earn a better income for a decent lifestyle, due to productivity and job stability in these sectors.

This difference of opportunity is also present between provinces. According to Graphic 02, the provinces of the northern region, such as Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula have an average of about 80% of the population linked to agriculture. In the central region, the province with most of the population engaged in agrarian activities is the province of Tete, with about 82.4%. The southern provinces of Mozambique, mainly those of Maputo and Maputo City, showed a low rate of population to devote themselves to agricultural activity, with 28.7% and 6.4%, respectively.

Graphic 2: Heads of Family by Main Occupation, 2014-2015

Source: Prepared by the author, using IOF data 2014/2015.

With regard to illiteracy, we have the rural region showing more people who could not read or write, with 56.6% against 23.1% of the urban region. In terms of provinces, those in the northern region had a high illiteracy rate, in which Cabo Delgado had 60.7%, Niassa 58.0% and Nampula 56.0%. Among the provinces of the central region, Tete presented a higher illiteracy rate with 55.2% and Zambezia with 53.9%. The provinces of the southern region have the lowest rate, with the most emphasis on Maputo City and Province, with 9.5% and 19.3% illiteracy, respectively, according to graphic 3 below.

Graphic 3: Illiteracy rates in Mozambique (%) (2014-2015)

Source: Prepared by the author, using IOF data 2014/15.

Regarding access to health, graphic 4 shows that the rural region had less access to services, which reach 64.4% of the population, compared to 76.7% of the urban region. The province of Cabo Delgado had a lower rate of access to health services by the population and the three provinces of the southern region (Gaza, Maputo City and Province) had a higher rate, with Maputo City approaching 100%.

Therefore, in the indicators analyzed, the urban region is more favored than the rural one and, among the provinces, the northern region, namely Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula, had less access to employment opportunities, with a large part of its population devoting themselves to agricultural activities that are themselves the promoters of poverty. They also had less access to education, with higher illiteracy rates, and to health services.

Graphic 4: Access to Health in Mozambique, 2014-2015

Source: Prepared by the author, using IOF data 2014/15.

Therefore, the southern provinces presented better remunerable employment opportunities and better access to education and health care. In accordance with the VCP, poverty reduction policies are expected to be less effective in the northern region than in the southern region and even less so in rural areas than in urban ones, which will be analyzed below.

Effectiveness of public policies in poverty reduction

Direct poverty reduction policies in Mozambique were in place in the period 2001-2014. However, the 2014/15 evaluation showed that such policies had different and unequal effects for the different regions and provinces of the country. Thus, considering the measure of the poverty line, there were provinces where policies increased the levels of initial poverty, regions, or provinces that this reduction was insignificant and others with a significant reduction (graphic 5).

Graphic 5: Impact of Policies on the Poverty Line (2002–2015)

Source: Prepared by the author, data from IOF 2002/2003, 2008/2009 and 2014/2015.

In the provinces of Niassa and Sofala there was an increase in poverty by two percentage points, with the province of Niassa increasing from 65% in 2002 to 67% in 2015 and the province of Sofala from 48% to 50%. The provinces of Nampula had a tiny reduction, of four percentage points (69% to 65% in the reference period), and of Zambezia of two percentage points (63% to 61% in the same period).

The province of Cabo Delgado saw the incidence of poverty remain at the same level of 50% in this period, and for Maputo City, although the reduction was nine percentage points, it represented a reduction of 69.2% compared to initial poverty, the initial poverty levels were extremely low compared to the national average, which had an incidence of 13% and decreased to 4% during the period of the policies.

The other two provinces in the south of the country, Maputo Province and Inhambane, had a reduction above 50% of the initial poverty. Finally, other provinces have had a reduction in the incidence of poverty above double digits, even if they have not achieved a 50% reduction in initial poverty. These are the provinces of Tete, with a 37 percentage point reduction, of Manica with 28 percentage points and Gaza with 26 percentage points of reduction.

Among these, Tete Province performed better, with a 46% reduction from initial poverty.

Regarding multidimensional poverty, three situations can be highlighted, according to graphic 06, below. First, a significant reduction in deprivation in urban areas compared to rural areas, with a reduction of approximately 56% in initial poverty in urban areas compared to 22% in rural areas (from 41% to 18% in urban areas compared to 92% to 72% in rural areas). Second, a reduction close to 100% for the City and Province of Maputo (from 13% to 1% in the Maputo City and from 38% to 7% for the Maputo Province) and a reduction close to 50% for the provinces of Inhambane and Gaza (presented, respectively, a reduction from 81% to 43% and from 52% to 23%). Third, a reduction of about 20% compared to the initial deprivation for the provinces of Niassa, Nampula and Zambezia, in which all together have approximately 44% of the Mozambican population, and an increase in deprivation by approximately 30% in the province of Sofala in the period under study.

Therefore, the provinces that showed greater inequality in access to education, health, and employment opportunities had a lower response to poverty reduction policies, including those in the northern region (Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula) and two in the central region (Zambezia and Sofala). This fact can be explained by the VCP principle, which argues that conditions of inequality lead to the reproduction of poverty or "poverty creates poverty" by cumulative circular effect of negative factors, the less effective policies and their persistence in these regions and provinces are justified. However, the only one that did not corroborate with the foundations of the VCP was the province of Tete, which should merit future studies to find the reasons for having responded positively to poverty reduction policies even with high inequality.

Graphic 6: Impact of Policies on Multidimensional Poverty (2002-2015)

Source: Prepared by the author, based on MEF data (2016).

Conclusion

The focus of this work was to answer the problem of how regional inequalities negatively influenced policies to combat poverty between regions/provinces in Mozambique. For this, the work was based on the principle of Cumulative Circular Causation and Vicious Circle of Poverty, defended by Myrdal. It is argued that in regions or countries with less access to education, health, and employment opportunities, or with a lack of social inclusion, poverty feeds back, because the negative factors that foster poverty are in themselves cause and effect, i.e., "poverty creates poverty" or "Vicious Circle of Poverty". Therefore, it was assumed that less access to education, health and employment opportunities leads to less effective policies to reduce poverty, while greater access to these variables would be associated with greater effectiveness of policies.

Thus, it was noted that, during the implementation of poverty reduction policies in the period 2001-2014, the provinces with the greatest inequalities in access to education, health and employment opportunities

were less responsive to poverty reduction policies, between the provinces of the northern region (Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula) and two of the central region (Zambezia and Sofala).

In this sequence, all the provinces of the southern region (Inhambane, Gaza, Maputo Province and City) had relatively a greater response to policies for poverty reduction, as they present less inequalities. However, the only province that did not find an explanation in the VCP was Tete, future studies are being proposed to find the reasons for having responded positively to policies for poverty reduction, despite the great inequalities in this province.

In this context, in terms of alternative policies for the effective reduction of poverty in Mozambique, policies giving equal weight to regions or provinces should be abdicated and inequalities should be considered, promoting access to education and health in the least-favored provinces, and increasing agricultural productivity (by public investment in agricultural infrastructure and technology transfers, as agriculture absorbs a large part of the population) in rural areas.

In this process, the decentralization of public services should become more effective for the districts through budgetary decentralization. These alternatives are based on the fact that the level of education influences the type of employment and, consequently, the level of income, the understanding and interpretation of the policies implemented by the government. Access to health has an influence on the quality of life of the population and increases the possibility of a better dedication to the work of the workforce. And increased agricultural productivity, by public investment in agricultural infrastructure and technology transfer, has the potential to improve the living conditions of rural populations beyond subsistence, by increasing the agricultural surplus, and the possibility of increased income.

Finally, as regards employment opportunities, despite the fact that companies gravitate more towards the southern region of the country due to the possibility of higher profitability, existence of skilled labor, level of income, support infrastructures and market for their products, what justifies the great concentration in this region, the Mozambican Government can induce the implantation of investments through concrete signs of monetary incentives (tax exemptions) and non-monetary (infrastructure and workforce qualification) with a greater focus on the poorest provinces with great inequalities and, combined with the increase of agrarian productivity, would increase the possibility of increasing income, resulting in the breaking of the "Vicious Circle of Poverty". Therefore, the continued implementation of policies with equal weight between provinces and regions, makes it impossible to see, in

the short and medium term, the significant reduction of poverty and reduction of inequalities between provinces and regions.

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to analyze how regional inequalities negatively influenced the effectiveness of poverty reduction policies in Mozambique in the period 2001-2014, using the Vicious Circle of Poverty principle advocated by Myrdal. Thus, access to employment, education and health opportunities in different regions and provinces were adopted as central variables to measure these inequalities. To this end, it was assumed that inequalities in access impact the effectiveness of the policies adopted to reduce poverty, being less effective where there are more inequalities in access and more effective where there are fewer inequalities. It was found that the provinces

with the greatest inequalities had a lower response to poverty reduction policies, among them those of the northern region (Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula) and two of the central region (Zambezia and Sofala). In this sequence, all those in the southern region (Inhambane, Gaza, Maputo Province and City) had relatively a greater response to policies. However, the only province that found no explanation in the Vicious Circle of Poverty was Tete. Finally, in terms of policy alternatives, it was suggested to focus on promoting education and health and increasing agricultural productivity by public investment in agricultural infrastructure and technology transfers to the most unequal provinces, in place of policies that give equal weight to regions or provinces.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POST-*APARTHEID* SOUTH AFRICA IN LIGHT OF THE INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE: A CRITICAL REVIEW

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Introduction

In September 2015, the British magazine *The Economist* released an article that questioned differences in development patterns, even internal ones, among emerging economies such as Mexico, Brazil, Russia and South Africa. It recommended that, besides making the right choice for macroeconomic policies, they should take into consideration factors such as security of contracts, high-quality public services and transparent budgets to be trustworthy to economic agents[4]; in other words, it was necessary building institutions the population could trust in.

Although advocating for the institutionalist perspective of economic development is nothing new[5], the idea that "good institutions" and "good governance" were necessary to promote development has gained prominence

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4 See https://www.economist.com/leaders/2015/09/19/the-two-mexicos.

5 Cf. (Gerschenkron 1962).

in the political and economic debate in the late 20th century, in convergence with neoclassical propositions and with the discourse of multilateral organizations. Based on the agenda for developing countries, "good institutions" and "good governance" are synonymous with greater protection of property rights, independent central banks focused on stabilization policies, transparent corporate governance, among others prescriptions crystallized in the Washington Consensus, which are translated into greater economic liberalization and market deregulation. The acceptance of these recommendations did not happen in a historical vacuum.

For some countries, this change went against social formations that had already presented structural cracks. It was the case of South Africa, which not only spent much of the 20th century dealing with a primary-export economy that depended on foreign capital from multinational corporations (Marais 2011), but was also ruled by an authoritarian and segregationist political regime. After years of political struggle by liberation movements, led by the African National Congress (ANC), the democratic transition started in mid-1990s and met the diffusion of new development conventions: multilateral institutions and developed countries started recommending a series of institutional and governance reforms combined to policies focused on eradicating poverty mainly for African countries. Therefore, since the 1990s, South Africa has been a special example of drastic institutional transition, economic and political change occurring at the same time.

This work aims to present a critical analysis of the impacts on the diffusion of new international institutional and governance standards in the economic development of South Africa (in its broad sense). The study was divided into four sections, besides the introduction and the final considerations. The second section addresses the association between institutions and economic development in recent academic literature. The third section presents the methodology applied to assess the development of democracy, private and intellectual property rights, financial institutions, tariffs and commercial protection in the country, as well as of welfare and labor protection institutions. The fourth section briefly addresses the South African democratic transition period back in the 1990s, highlighting its institutional and political shift towards a neoliberal model capable of favoring monetary stability and "big business", despite the chronic inequalities yet observed in the country nowadays. The fifth section makes an in-depth analysis of each of these institutions in the South African context and investigates the extent to which they have resulted in economic growth, reduced inequalities and have enabled better quality of life for the South African population. It was possible concluding that the association between institutions and economic

development is more complex than the one presumed by many economists and international organisms, since it does not present a simple and linear correlation. Moreover, it was observed that developing countries need to implement structural transformations that are beyond the sole power of market mechanisms.

Institutions and economic development: from the New Institutional Economics to the critical view of Ha-Joon Chang

The interest in bringing institutions to the core of the debate about economic development has gotten significant contribution from the New Institutional Economics (NIE) in recent decades, mainly since the 1990s. According to authors who follow the "new institutionalism orthodoxy" (Castellano 2012), there would be a series of historical evidence capable of proving the association between institutions and economic development. These researchers interpret the progress of nations as a process deriving from basic economic development forces observed in decentralized relations of market institutions. Thus, NIE discourse is crystallized by the logo "institutions matter" (Tylecote 2016) for development purposes, which highlights the direct relationship established between the institutional framework of a given country and its economic growth variables (Acemoglu and Robinson, in "*Por que as nações fracassam: as origens do poder, da prosperidade e da pobreza*" [2012]; North, Wallis and Weingast, "Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History" [2009]; Tylecote 2016; Zanden 2009).

The term New Institutional Economics was introduced by American economist Oliver Williamson (1975). According to Richter (2005), two branches of the New Institutional Economics have developed from the pioneering works conducted by Ronald Coase (1937; 1960) namely: Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson 1985); and New Institutional Economics of History (North 1986). According to North (1990), who won the Nobel Prize in Economics, institutions arise from uncertainty and from the need of overcoming transaction costs, for instance, the costs of establishing, monitoring and controlling agents' relations in market-failure environments[6].

Most studies based on this tradition (North 1971; 1981; 1990; Landes 1998; Zanden 2009; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005, 2012;

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6 Cf. (Coase 1937); (Williamson 1979); (North 1986; 1990); (Gala 2003).

Bates 1981, 1997; Bates, Coatsworth and Willianson 2007) have inferred that, nowadays' developing countries are those that somehow still have undermined institutions that favored free competition and smooth Market functioning. This interpretation features developing countries as the ones that have adopted institutional arrangements that reduce productivity, destabilize contracts and create a property right-insecurity environment. This "vicious path" (North 1990; Medeiros 2001) would have been the one followed by the Spanish colonies in Latin America, and its solidification would be the reason why their economic development is permanently blocked. On the other hand, the "virtuous" path taken by the current developed economies is featured by the Anglo-Saxon model of market economy.

Following North's tradition, economist Daron Acemoglu and political scientist James A. Robinson, both in *Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth* (2005) and in *Why Nations Fail* (2012), have defined institutions as rules for human game-shaping interactions. According to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005), economic institutions are important because they influence the structure of incentives available in a given society, as well as help allocating resources in order to be more efficiently used. In addition, these authors have shown how institutional differences are determining aspects for divergences observed in prosperity levels between countries colonized by Spain and England. If on the one hand, theories by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001; 2002; 2005) rejected geographic and cultural explanations for the success, or failure, of nations, on the other hand, they have put their hopes for development in institutions that encouraged free markets, as well as in the private sector.

Since the late 20th century, the aforementioned concept has been adopted as mainstream discourse, which echoes on the agendas of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Governance reforms and market-oriented institutional changes are seen as essential to promote economic development. Institutionally strong states — i.e., who are capable of guaranteeing security and the rule of law for the largest number of individuals possible, but, above all, who are capable of guaranteeing property rights — are also essential (Bates, Coatsworth e Willianson 2007; Buchanan 2008; Boettke and Fink 2011; Dhonte and Kapur 1996; Glaeser *et al.* 2004; La Porta *et al.* 1999; Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999).

It is possible to find an alternative approach to the theoretical association established between institutions and economic development, as well as in the greater framework of trust in the markets as economic growth

and development drivers. According to Chang (2011), NIE has two main theoretical issues, the first one lies on causality, according to which, NIE sees association between institutions and economic development as a linear process that goes from institutions to economic development. The second issue refers to the linear, static and simplistic ways often substantiating the understanding about this association (Chang 2007; 2011). Such an understanding ends up leading to the assumption of the existence of a universal model of "good economic and political institutions", as well as to the belief that such models could be extrapolated to other countries, based on the experience of powerful Western countries (Castellano 2012; Evans 2004; 2010; Portes 2007; Przeworski 2004).

Chang's (2011) main criticism to the mainstream discourse about institutions lies in the fact that it describes the association between institutions and economic development in a simplistic, linear and static manner. Institutional changing processes that advocate for the market are often recommended to developing countries without taking into account several aspects ("one-size-fits-all" model) likely involved in these processes that do not follow closed models (Chang 2004). Moreover, Chang (2004) criticizes the excessive focus on private property rights. Although economies without any property rights protection, where uncertainty almost permanently prevails, are clearly not the best environment for development, there is a belief in property rights as a "good-in-itself" institution (Chang 2004, 144).

Some methodological aspects:
Institutionalist analysis of a developing economy

The idea that a "package of good institutions" (Chang 2004) would be essential to enable economic growth (Aron 2001; Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999); as well as that the development history of advanced countries would be marked by the application and evolution of this group of institutions (Bates, Coatsworth e Williamson 2007; North 1990; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), has gained room in the economic discourse since the late 20th century.

However, applying this institutionalist approach to better understand the economic development of a country facing severe economic and social issues is a great challenge, since many institutional changes undergone by this country are so recent that most statistical data or censuses about specific institutions, or specific analyses, may not yet be available. Therefore,

analyzing institutional changes in South Africa, as evident as some of them may be, leads to some challenges.

The first challenge refers to the application of a traditional institutionalist perspective to favor historical treatment and its effects on the economic development of a given society — path dependence —, within the South African context. Although the analysis to be conducted aims at covering the democratic years of the new South Africa after the end of *apartheid*, one cannot deny the effects of this regime on, and the roots it left in, the development of South African capitalism. The short time series covering this analysis will be compensated by the comprehensive analysis of the institutions.

Thus, the hypothesis raised in this work is that adapting to the "good institution" models did not necessarily result in economic development, or even in greater economic growth, in the post-*apartheid* South Africa. This study has also presented how, in some aspects, the country has shown better performance in institutional indicators than some developed countries, although it did not improve the quality of life of its population or reduced its deep inequalities.

The institutions analyzed in the next section were the ones mostly defended by the mainstream institutionalist discourse and by NIE as essential to enable economic development — the so-called "good global standard institutions"[7]. The herein analyzed institutions were democracy (universal suffrage and worldwide governance indicators such as voice and accountability, rule of law, political stability), property rights (mainly intellectual property rights), financial institutions (banking system, central bank), commercial tariffs (trade opening level) and social and labor protection institutions. Furthermore, the timeline of analysis has privileged the decades following the South African democratic transition, when several institutional changes and reforms took place based on the neoliberal approach (1994-2014). However, it has also outlined the history of these institutions in case their origin dated back to times prior to the assessed one.

Democratic transition and neoliberalism in South Africa: (mis)guided paths of post-*apartheid*

Although the South African *apartheid* regime was only institutionally formalized in 1948 by the Afrikaans National Party, the roots of segregation observed in it date back to the 19th century. The social panorama by 1910

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7   *"Global Standard Institutions (GSI)"*, Chang (2011).

encompassed a great majority of black individuals (who were the labor force to be exploited and did not have political rights) and the white minority who had voting rights (Fonseca-Satter 2011). In the meantime, several laws and acts have been enacted and evidenced the segregationist nature of the country's economic and political elites and a state capitalism type emerged in South Africa that allowed the country to grow fast (Fonseca-Satter 2011; Pereira 2010).

The transition to a democratic regime in South Africa started in 1994; this time meets the period marked by the international neoliberal agenda driven by the end of the Cold War and by globalization. Indeed, despite the legacy of *apartheid*, mainly the profound social and racial inequality in the country, the South African economic policy has embraced a conservative marked-oriented program instead of making deep structural repairs. The abandonment of a more critical stance by the ANC represented, in its turn, a true "elite pact", since the ANC elite organized the elections, whereas the white elite managed to maintain their interests and economic privileges (Bond 2000; Taylor 2016).

This "transition of elites" (Bond 2000, 16), which has validated an economic policy that prioritized private initiative and property rights, was added to the GEAR (*Growth, Employment and Redistribution*) governmental plan from 1997. However, it did not happen overnight, but resulted from a process whose origins date back to the 1980s. Part of this process is linked to the involvement of Thabo Mbeki (who would become the country's future president) with the South African business elite and with international financial institutions such as Goldman Sachs (Segatti and Pons-Vignon 2013).

The economic policy adopted by the South African post-*apartheid* government was summarized in three main dimensions: European approach to social policy, along with the fear of risks of personal dependence on the state, in association with the East Asian approach to economic growth — based on conservative macroeconomic parameters (Hirsch 2005). However, these changes in South Africa's institutional settings during the post-*apartheid* years did not necessarily result in better economic performance. The average GDP *per capita* annual growth rate in South Africa declined from approximately 1,9% per year, in 1960-1980, to approximately 1,5% per year, in 1994-2014, or even 0,3% per year, if we consider the period 1980-2014 (Graph 1). "Good institutions" alone do not deliver economic development, as the study will show in the next sections.

Graph 1: South Africa GDP *per capita* growth (annual %)

Source: World Bank Data.

Institutions and economic development in post-*apartheid* South Africa

The South African democratization process took place at a time when the role played by institutions gained importance in political and economic debates. Several analysts, mostly the ones from multilateral organizations such as World Bank and IMF, have started interpreting the crises and structural issues of developing economies as institutional and governance issues (Aron 2001; Fallon and Pereira de Silva 1994; Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999; Riley 1995; IMF 2000). International recommendations, mainly the ones regarding African countries, have headed towards the implementation of a package of good institutions and focused on reducing poverty, as well as on improving education and health (Blackden 1999; Christiaensen, Demery and Paternostro 2002; Coudouel, Dani and Paternostro 2006; Marc, Graham and Schacter 1994; World Bank 1996). The next subsections analyze South African institutional development in light of this debate, as well as to what extent compliance with NIE discourse models has contributed to the economic development of the country.

Democracy

Although successful, the South African transition into an institutionally democratic regime only took place after a long process marked by violence and repression. However, it did not change the significant socioeconomic

inequality between the white minority and the black majority in the country (Bond 2000; 2004; Holdt 2013). Universal suffrage was established in the country in 1994, after the country's first multiracial election, which brought Nelson Mandela to power. The democratic constitution approved in December 1996 was considered one of the most progressive constitutions in the world, since it set clear parameters for human rights, freedom of expression, religion and equal rights.

According to defenders of "good governance", South Africa has accomplished significant advancements in some of the indicators necessary to build democracy since the promulgation of its first democratic constitution. Such indicators, such as "voice and accountability", "rule of law", "political stability", among others, are components of the World Bank Group's Worldwide Governance Indicators proposed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). These indicators reflect to which extent citizens of a given country are able to pick their government and collect their rights. They also measure the perception of trust in the law and in rules of society, as well as the likelihood of having their government destabilized by unconstitutional trends.

Graph 2 shows the position of South Africa (based on percentile) in these indicators: 0 is the lowest position and, therefore, reflects the worst performance in this indicator, whereas 100 is the best performance. Overall, South Africa presents a relatively good position in these aspects, mainly in relation to the "rule of law" — which rose from the 55th percentile to approximately 59th in 2010, as well as to the 64th percentile, in 2014. Although "Voice and Accountability" presented a downward trend since 2004, as well as worse position in 2010 than in 1996 (approximately 67th and 73rd percentile, respectively), its rank remained above the average of upper-middle income countries, and higher than that of other African countries — it ranked the 68th percentile in 2014.

With respect to "political stability and violence", the South African rank is below the average of upper-middle income countries, although it showed progress and approached this average from 2006 on. Similarly, Looney (2014) has compared these very same South African indicators to those of "emerging economies" such as Mexico, Malaysia, Turkey and Indonesia. South Africa presented better performance than each of these countries, on average. This outcome highlights the political gains acquired by the country, as well as its relative high governance levels over the years.

Graph 2: Governance Indicators, South Africa and mean of upper-middle income countries, 1996-2014

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank.

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)[8] was another indicator capable of evidencing South Africa's progress on democracy. This index measures the performance of institutions in African countries in comparison to governance, which, in its turn, is defined as "the provision of political, economic and social assets citizens have the right to expect from their respective states"[9]. It comprises categories such as "Security and the Rule of Law", "Participation and Human Rights", "Sustainable Economic Opportunities and Human Development", which, in their turn, comprise other subcategories. Nowadays, South Africa ranks the seventh position in the ranking of 54 African countries; its governance performance is well above the African average (Graph 2), mainly in subcategories such as "legitimacy of electoral processes" and "holding free and fair elections".

However, the outcome of these indicators presents some paradoxes that make the analysis of the association between democracy and economic development even more complex. This association in the South African case elicits some contradictions that test the supposedly linear and inseparable view between democracy and economic development.

8 The time series updated for this index starts in 2008.

9 See http://iiag.online/

Per capita income in South Africa when the universal suffrage was instituted for the 1994 elections (consolidated by the 1996 Constitution) was $3,445.23[10]. It was well above that of other African countries that had enacted universal suffrage decades earlier. On the other hand, South Africa *per capita* income faced a downward trend from its democratic transition until 2002 — it reached US$ 2,502.277. Thus, although one cannot deny the advancements achieved by South Africa through democracy introduction in the country, mainly in the form of universal suffrage and political rights of citizens, it is not possible to establish a simplistic and linear association between variables featuring liberal democracy and economic growth. Democracy is more than a "requirement" for growth; it is part of a larger historical process of social transformation (Alence 2009).

Graph 3: Ibrahim Index of African Governance in South Africa and the average for the African continent, 2008-2014

Source: IIAG Data Portal

Property rights

The protection of property rights occupies central place among institutions addressed in the neoliberal institutionalist discourse as essential for economic development. Property right regimes are seen as essential tools

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10 World Bank data, in current dollars.

to encourage investment, work and, therefore, economic growth (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; 2012; Aron 2001; Clague *et al.* 1996; Soto 2000; Knack and Keefer 1995; Gala 2003; North 1990; Tylecote 2016).

The 1978 Patent Act was the first patent law enacted in South Africa; it addressed the registration and granting of patents associated with commercial, industrial or agricultural activities. The Copyright Act (1978) was also drafted in that very same year. Most of the content in these laws, as well as that of previous laws associated with the protection of intellectual property rights — such as the 1967 Performer's Protection Act —, was revised in the 1997 Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act. The introduction and revision of these laws have been increasingly influenced in order to comply with the standard of an international regime for intellectual property rights. South Africa became a member of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in 1999; this treaty aims at protecting patent rights for inventions simultaneously developed in different countries, based on the application of an international patent. It is important emphasizing that even before the official patent law was enacted in South Africa, the country was already a member of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property since 1947. In addition, the country has joined the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Convention in 1975.

According to WIPO, South Africa has granted the total number of 5,748 patents through its official office, between residents and non-residents, in the year it drafted its first Patent Law, whereas 6,817 patents were granted in the following year (1979). The number of patents granted to South African residents has decreased since its transition to democracy in 1994 — from 942 (in 1994) to 140 (in 1999). The number of granted patents has increased and stabilized since the 2000s; 822 patents were granted to South African residents in 2010, although this number was still smaller than the one recorded in 1994. This number has decreased again by 2015, when 453 patents were granted to South African residents[11].

Patent granting to non-residents has shown an upward trend in 1994 (n = 3,889) and 1998 (n = 6,663); then, there was a sharp decrease to 1,858 patents granted in 2001. After 2004, the number of patents granted to non-residents was smaller than that granted to residents; this trend remained until 2009. It is possible seeing a paradox between the level of *per capita* income and the analyzed institution — in this case, intellectual property rights measured through patent granting. *Per capita* income in the year South Africa has instituted its Patent Law was US$ 1,722.227 and, despite small

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11 Direct patents and those held by PCT.

advancements, this level remained almost unchanged until the mid-1980s, when it recorded US$ 1,807.977 in 1985.

Graph 4: Total number of patents granted in South Africa, 1994-2014

Source: WIPO and World Bank.

Although the country recorded peaks in patent granting at several points in the series, mainly in the mid-1990s (6,783 patents in 1996), the *per capita* income level has kept the decline rate at least until 2002, when it reached US$ 2,540.00 (current dollars). On the other hand, the level of *per capita* income increased from US$ 2,502.277 in 2002 to US$ 5,760.805 in 2008, as the total number of granted patents tended to fall; it ranged from 5,759 patents in 2003 to 1,742, in 2008.

South Africa has presented excellent performance in recent decades in the protection of intellectual property rights, which is measured based on the International Property Rights Index (Table 1)[12]. This index measures three basic dimensions, namely: "legal and political environment", "protection of physical rights" and "protection of intellectual property rights". The last dimension is further divided into subcategories such as "protection of intellectual property rights", "protection of patent rights" and "copyright protection".

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12 See https://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/

Table 1: Patent Right Protection Index (1960-2005) in developing countries

Countries	1960-1990 (average)	1995	2000	2005
South Africa	2.94	3.39	4.25	4.25
Brazil	1.22	1.48	3.59	3.59
China	1.33	2.12	3.09	4.08
India	1.03	1.23	2.27	3.76
Mexico	1.19	3.14	3.68	3.88
Nigeria	2.50	2.86	2.86	3.18
Russia	-	3.48	3.68	3.68

Source: Park (2008).

Protection of property rights remains the main recommendation of the institutionalist discourse for the progress of developing economies. However, it is fallacious to think that this is a good thing in itself. It is not uncommon for the protection of intellectual property rights to oppose social justice promotion; thus, it is necessary taking into account the significant social effects resulting from restrictions imposed to technological progress in developing countries. The economic performance of developing countries that did not do so well in protecting patent rights was better than that of South Africa. The growth rate of South African annual *per capita* income, for example, was one of the lowest between 1994 and 2010 in comparison to other BRICS countries[13].

Financial Institutions

The Central Bank of South Africa (South Africa Reserve Bank, SARB) was launched in 1921 based on the 1920 Currency and Banking Act. When it was created in 1921, the country became the fourth nation to establish a central bank outside Europe and the United Kingdom; the remaining three were the United States States, Japan and Java.

When it comes to political independence and autonomy, which are considered essential elements by the World Bank and the IMF, the South

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13 See Bond (2013) for the analysis of South African performance in the context of BRICS.

African central bank has a considerable level of autonomy to carry out its duties. According to the 1996 Constitution, "in pursuit of its primary object, [it] must perform its functions independently and without fear, favor or prejudice" (Republic of South Africa 1996). With respect to its ownership, at the time it was created, SARB followed most central banks around the world, which had most of their shareholders of private origin.

The regulation of the South African banking system is performed by SARB, based on the 1990 Banks Act and on the 1993 Mutual Banks Act. Nevertheless, there was gradual institutional development regarding the regulation of financial institutions. Since the late 20th century and early 21st century, South Africa has been implementing several institutional changes to meet the international standard. These market-oriented changes were implemented in the early 20th century, when the country already had a Central Bank established, even before other developed nations had it. However, it was unable to reach the level of economic growth it achieved in the 1960s-1980s. When it comes to the group of institutions in the financial sector, the cause and effect relations between institutions and South African economic development become more paradoxical and often hard to identify[14].

Tariffs and commercial opening level

South Africa was one of the founding countries of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) in 1948, when there was no differentiation between developed and developing countries within it. From 1960 on, when GATT allowed this differentiation to enable developing countries to get some type of specific treatment, the South African government opted to maintain the status of developed country within the agreement; in practical terms, it meant further and faster cuts to protectionist measures (Hirsch 2005). The period of the South African democratic transition was marked by the re-entry of its economy in the world stage, based on a fast trade liberalization process (Bhorat *et al.* 2013).

The fall of trade barriers was quite abrupt after democratization (Barbosa and Tepassê 2009). The Minister of Commerce and Industry from 1994 to 1996, Trevor Manuel, who were also Minister of Finance in 1999, considered that inserting the South African economy into the world would be a challenging task, mainly due to the legacy of an economy that he considered non-competitive and protectionist (Hirsch 2005). South Africa

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14 When it established its legislation for the regulation of the banking sector, for example, the Banks Acts of 1990, South Africa already had a *per capita* income of approximately US $ 3,182.

quickly became one of the developing countries with the highest degree of trade openness; it has even exceeded the tariff liberalization requirements demanded by the World Trade Organization since it became a member-country (Pons-Vignon and Segatti 2013) (Table 2).

Table 2: Mean tariffs on imports of manufactured products (%), developing countries, 1996–2010*

Countries	1996	2000	2006	2008	2010
South Africa**	19.8	9.0	8.3	7.4	6.9
Argentina	11.9	12.8	8.6	8.6	9.0
Brazil	13.4	14.7	9.8	10.5	10.7
China	21.7	16.2	8.6	8.2	7.6
Egypt	-	23.8	14.1	10.0	9.4
Ethiopia	-	-	18.6	17.8	17.8
India	37.6	30.4	13.1	8.4	7.2
Russia	11.9	-	-	9.4	6.5

Source: *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development* (UNCTAD)
* Applied consolidated rates.
** Data from 1996 to 1999 refer to the *South Africa Customs Union* (SACU).

Economic integration took place, mainly in South Africa, after the years of isolation brought about by the *apartheid* regime, which turned foreign policies into a strategic element for the new government (Barbosa and Tepassê 2009). Cooperation in Southern Africa Customs Unions (SACU), which was increasingly supported in versions presented by the European Union and multilateral institutions, represents the market modality established in the early 20th century; this modality aims at reducing customs tariffs and barriers to economic activities (Visentini 2010). Another initiative towards a free trade zone lies on the integration to the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in 1994, which signed an agreement in 1998 to decrease tariff barriers for a 12-year period, in compliance with WTO standards — this process started in South Africa (Hirsch 2005). However, the drop in tariffs was not enough to provide a level of growth in *per capita* income comparable to that of previous decades, when mean tariff levels were much higher. The

mean growth rate of *per capita* income recorded for the 1960-1980 period was 2.3%, whereas the rate recorded for the 1994-2010 period was 1.4%[15].

Social welfare and work protection institutions

The last point to be analyzed lies on the development of social welfare institutions and of those that regulate work in South Africa, with emphasis on the 1996 Constitution, which is considered one of the most progressive constitutions in the world. Institutions that "support the weaker segments of society have always been necessary to guarantee social stability" (Chang 2004, 176; Polanyi 2000 [1944]). These mechanisms and institutions in South Africa were delayed for even longer by a regime that marched against History for decades. The institutional framework of *apartheid* has contributed to stifle levels of poverty, as well as to social and economic inequality. These two factors have turned, and still turn, the broad and democratic establishment of adequate social welfare institutions into a challenge. The provision of these institutions in rural South Africa is an even more complex topic, since *apartheid*-control measures aimed at removing the black population from urban centers have favored the formation of isolated rural areas with high unemployment rates and precarious housing and education conditions (Hirsch 2005).

In order to deal with this legacy of racial discrimination and with social imbalances generated by it, the 1996 Constitution committed itself to improve the quality of citizens' life, by designating the South Africa Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) as the official monitor of public departments and state agencies accounting for the application of institutions that asserted the socio-economic rights of South African citizens. In 1994, the new government had already committed to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which was one of the biggest treaties focused on protecting economic and social rights at that time (Seleoane 2001).

The commitment to the ICESCR has established clauses regarding working conditions — sanitary, working environment, equal opportunities, fair wages and salaries, limitations on working hours, right to strike, among others —, as well as social security, adequate housing and health standards, proper education, among others (Seleoane 2001). The South African Constitution aimed at meeting these conditions by including specific sections for such institutions, in an attempt to loosen *apartheid* ties and to enable political initiatives to combat poverty and inequality.

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15 World Bank data.

Work-regulating institutions have been gradually introduced since then, and such an introduction has broken patterns that have segregated workers from different races and sexes for years. By 1999, most of the main institutions responsible for regulating the South African labor market had already been established, a fact that strengthened the struggle for labor and union rights with a historic record in South Africa (Table 3).

Table 3: Important new labor laws since 1994

Law	Main goal	Year
Labor Relations Act	Provides the framework for collective bargaining, union right, right to strike, dispute resolution, among others.	1995-1996
Basic Conditions of Employment Act	Provides the framework for the application of minimum standards to workers who are not covered by the LRA and of overall minimum standards regarding working hours, dismissal procedures, overtime and restrictions on child labor.	1997
Employment Equity Act	Eliminating race or sex discrimination in large firms.	1998
Skills Development Act and Skills Development Levies Act	Establishment of spending levels on the training and qualification of workers by firms.	1998-1999

Source: Elaborated by the author based on data available in Hirsch (2005).

However, the regulation of the South African labor market took place in parallel with the economic restructuring and with unemployment increasing from 19.3% to 25.8% (1996-2000) (Barbosa and Tepassê 2009; Paola and Pons-Vignon 2013). The hope that a democratic regime with labor protection institutions would reduce unemployment did not meet reality, which led neoclassical interpretations to point out a supposed "rigidity" in the labor market. These institutions, in their turn, demanded greater "flexibility" and ignored the structural roots of unemployment in South Africa, the low economic growth of the period and the dominance of sectors linked to the mineral-energy complex, which are basically capital-intensive (Paola and Pons-Vignon 2013). In addition, labor institutions were inserted in the context of a "dualistic economy", where thousands of workers were on the margins of the modern and industrial economy, a fact that highlighted the

need of implementing state assistance for poverty and inequality matters (Hirsch 2005).

Such assistance came in the form of a substantial social security system, which transferred income to individuals with disability, provided support for children, pensions, among others. In 1997, when the White Paper for Social Welfare was launched, the South African government has expanded its spending on several social assistance programs, which jumped from R$10 billion[16] in 1994 to R$38.4 billion, in 2003 (Hirsch 2005). The income transfer provided by these institutions was particularly important for the black population, which participated with 60% of the income distributed in the form of retirements, pensions and social programs in 2005 (Barbosa and Tepassê 2009). The total number of social assistance beneficiaries more than doubled between 1996 and 2008 and the share of public spending on health and education as part of total public spending between 2000 and 2011 ranged from 10.9% to 12.7%, and from 18.1% to 19.2%, respectively (Barbosa and Tepassê 2009; Good Governance Africa 2013).

Conclusion

Based on the debate about the association between institutions and economic development, the main aim of this study was to present a critical view of the mainstream economic discourse propagated by multilateral organizations and developed countries. This view credits the successful path travelled by advanced economies to a set of "good policies" and "good institutions", which are mostly market friendly and based on the Anglo-Saxon models. The seminal study by South Korean economist Ha-Joon Chang has shown, on a historical perspective, that today's developed countries did not exactly follow the path they now advocate for the periphery of capitalism. On the contrary, they resorted to active policies of state intervention and protection of national industry, whereas their institutional development was slow and often had setbacks (Chang 2004).

The pro-market institutionalist discourse gained strength in the developing countries of capitalism in the late 20th century. Thus, it was possible to see transformations brought about in South Africa since the 1990s as the example of a country that was experiencing new institutional change processes. The South African democratic transition took place when the discussion about the role played by institutions gained importance in the

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16 In *rands,* the South African official currency.

political and economic debate. Multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, started interpreting the crises and structural issues of developing economies as institutional and governance issues and, in the case of African countries, they started equalizing development policies to poverty-eradication measures.

Nevertheless, the current study has also addressed how the development of a set of institutions — such as democracy, protection of intellectual property rights, financial institutions and an independent central bank, tariffs and trade liberalization, and the labor market-regulating institutions — since the end of the *apartheid* regime did not necessarily result in better economic and social performance. If, on the one hand, it is quite true that "institutions matter", on the other hand, it is necessary taking into account that the association between institutions and economic development is more complex than what is predicted in the linear "one-size-fits-all" models defended by orthodoxy. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown was right when he told *The Economist* that it can take generations to develop reliable institutions. The same happened with developed nations, but it is always possible learning from history, as well as thinking about institutional programs capable of reflecting the structural, political, economic, social and cultural conditions of developing countries, without falling into sterile neoliberal models.

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ABSTRACT

The transition to a democratic regime in South Africa in the 1990s met the rise of neoliberal policies and the discourse addressing "good institutions" and "good governance" as economic growth drivers. In the case of African countries, the discourse preached by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF included the idea that policies focused on eradicating poverty and on encouraging education would also mean development. The aim of the current study is to assess to what extent the adequacy to market-oriented institutional models has contributed to South African development, based on a set of institutions. In order to do so, the current study conducted a literature review about the New Institutional Economics (NIE), which is the main proponent of market-oriented institutions as key to development; it also analyzed the critical view of these linear models. It concludes that the association between institutions and economic development is more complex than that estimated in market-oriented models applied to mainstream institutionalism, mainly for developing countries.

THE RAMAPHOSA ADMINISTRATION AND THE RETURN TO SOUTH AFRICA'S PROTAGONISM: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES TO FOREIGN POLICY

Anselmo Otavio[1]

Introduction

In the State of the Nation 2018, Cyril Ramaphosa explained that South Africa is facing challenges such as rising unemployment, growing social inequality, low growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and limited government capacity to expand investments in social areas. Although not citing — at least directly — any specific name, it is a fact that the newly appointed president related these challenges to previous administrations. He even said that, unlike the early years after the end of the racist regime (*apartheid*), when there was a decline in poverty, in recent years what was seen was an increase in poverty[2].

Criticism of previous administrations was not restricted to internal challenges only, but also to South Africa's role in the international system. Roughly speaking, the new administration understood that Pretoria was losing its prominence, so there was a need for changes in foreign policy as a means of recovering this condition. A reflection of this discontent can be found in the initial months of the former Minister in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Lindiwi Sisulu, when speaking in Parliament in 2018, she exposed the need for South Africa to recover its leading role, which, in her perception, had been conquered during

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2 State of the Nation is the speech given annually by the President to the Congress. Its main objective is to explain the measures and plans that the government has been adopting.

the Mandela administration, when the country was seen as "a moral compass and a voice of reason in a world increasingly overcome with selfish and narrow interests" (Sisulu 2018, n.p)[3].

Sisulu's speech indicated that the decrease in this role was the result, even if indirectly, of the choices made during previous administrations. It is based on these critics that this article has as its main objective to compare the foreign policy that has been developed by Ramaphosa administration with those adopted over the governments of Mandela (1994-1998), Mbeki (1999-2008) and Zuma (2009-2018). Taking into account that the current administration is in progress, and based on the analysis of primary and secondary sources, it seeks to demonstrate that the processes of international and regional insertion that are being carried out, bring as main characteristic the search to strengthen the interaction between foreign policy and economic development, in the same way that the Mbeki and Zuma governments, to a greater and lesser intensity, did.

For this purpose, and along with this introduction, the article is structured in three other sections. The first concerns the understanding of the main characteristics found in the foreign policy developed over the administrations Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma. The second, on the other hand, refers to the Ramaphosa administration, whose objective will be to demonstrate the existence of points that symbolize convergence or divergence in its foreign policy when compared to previous governments. Finally, the third section corresponds to the final considerations, when it is expected to conclude that the current foreign policy maintains universality in foreign policy, multilateralism and economic diplomacy, initiatives that were already constant in previous administrations.

Between successes and challenges in foreign policy: the administrations Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma

The pursuit of expanding South African international relations, as well as making the country increasingly active on the continent, can be considered as two of South Africa's main objectives in post-*apartheid*. Initially, such objectives can be found in the Mandela administration, which in 1993, that is, even before assuming the presidency of the country, had published in the *Foreign Affairs* journal the article *South Africa's Future Foreign Policy*, which

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3 It is worth mentioning that in 2019, Sisulu was replaced by Naledi Pandur as minister of DIRCO.

indicated the ways in which the foreign policy should be guided. At that time, points that were valued by the traditional powers were highlighted, which also gained prominence in the post-Cold War period, that is, human rights, multilateralism, the promotion of democracy, respect for the sovereignty of States and the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means. In addition to these, another feature that gained relevance was the universality of foreign policy through the strengthening of strategic partnerships and the admission or readmission to international organizations and multilateral articulations[4].

An example of this expansion can be seen in the interactions between South Africa and the United States, and between Pretoria and Iran, Cuba and Libya, countries that assisted the African National Congress (ANC) in its fight against *apartheid*, and that were widely criticized by Washington (Hamill and Lee 2001). With regard to admission and/or readmission to international organizations and multilateral articulations, it is worth mentioning the Commonwealth, the United Nations (UN), the Non-Aligned Movement, the G77, among others that were transformed into spaces of greater South African performance (DIRCO, 1996). The valorization of multilateralism, the strengthening of strategic partnerships and the defense of points estimated by the traditional powers, not only guaranteed South Africa's role in the international scenario, but also raised "the country to the status of strong moral dimension" (Van Wyk 2002, 182).

In the regional scenario, the search for a new insertion started to be considered as one of the main objectives of the Mandela administration. In a way, this new insertion in the African continent symbolized the break with one of the main legacies of the racist regime, namely, the image of South Africa as the very incarnation of the European colonizer on the continent, as well as demonstrating that the country is an integral part from Africa. Even, as Mandela indicated, "first and foremost we are part of the African continent, and Africa's problems are ours too'' (Mandela 1999, n.p).

For this purpose, the strategy was also characterized by universality in foreign policy and the higher value of multilateralism, which reflected in the admission to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, unlike the success achieved in international insertion, such a choice did not guarantee that the protagonism expected by Pretoria would be achieved, since the country's performance in certain episodes was widely criticized. A first example can

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4 "the principle of universality underscores the willingness of South Africa to establish diplomatic relations with all countries of the world regardless of the domestic or the foreign policies of those countries" (Schraeder 2001, 234).

be found in Nigeria, a country that entered the 1990s marked by political instability, characterized by the cancellation of the presidential election — disputed between the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDC) of Moshood K.O. Abiola (victorious party) —, and the military coup carried out by Sani Abacha in 1993.

Initially, Pretoria sought to mediate such groups via agreements and meetings, which included the presence of Thabo Mbeki — Mandela's future successor in the presidency of South Africa — and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. However, the ineffectiveness of these initiatives was seen in the so-called "Ogoni 9", a case marked by a flawed trial and without judicial review that culminated in the hanging of the journalist and political activist in the Ogoni cause, Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight more activists who were against the regime imposed by Abacha (Lewis 1999; Barber 2005)[5].

In this case, Ogoni 9 was essential in changing South African performance in this episode. In fact, from then on, Pretoria was guided by the search for external support to the continent for the creation of means to generate the isolation of Nigeria. Examples of this were the incentive to create sanctions by the UN, the insistence on the suspension of this country from the Commonwealth, and the incentive for countries to stop buying Nigerian oil. However, even though there was a suspension in the Commonwealth, Nigeria did not become isolated, as countries like the United States, France and Germany remained interested in guaranteeing access to Nigerian natural resources, especially oil (Jordam *apud* Adelmann 2004). In addition, the political cost of the South African strategy occurred mainly on the African continent, as in addition to not securing Nigeria's isolation, the search for sanctions against Abuja was interpreted as unilateral and authoritarian, characteristics that referred to the current foreign policy during the *apartheid* regime (Van Wyk 2002; Hamill and Lee 2001).

In addition to the case of Nigeria, another example to be highlighted refers to the two wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the first conflict, which was marked by the actions of the *Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo* (AFDL, in french) against the Mobutu Sese Seko regime (1965-1996), Pretoria sought to act via a peaceful solution between government and opposition, the result of which it was Mobutu's exile in Morocco. In the second war, as a result of the AFDL's growing unpopularity

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5 The Ogoni community is a minority group that inhabits southeastern Nigeria, a region rich in oil and marked by the extensive exploitation of this resource by oil multinationals. Throughout the 1990s, this community became known for fighting the degradation of the environment and economic neglect by the Nigerian government, in its area (Lewis 1999).

and the intervention of countries like Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, what was seen was the South African interest in peaceful means being undermined by the military intervention desired by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola (Adelmann 2004).

In addition to symbolizing the mismatch between success on the international stage and the difficulty in reaching another regional insertion, the suspicions regarding South Africa's performance in episodes involving Nigeria and the DRC were factors that demonstrated the existence of the gap between Pretoria's interest in being more present in Africa and, in fact, the achievement of this objective, since the distrust in relation to the country remained present. It is in view of this mismatch that the Mbeki administration developed its foreign policy, and, in particular, sought to spread a new economic and political ideology to the continent, also known as the *African Renaissance*.

Although discussed in previous moments in African history, as carried out by Cheikh Anta Diop, who linked the rebirth to the rescue of African native languages, the *African Renaissance* spread by Mbeki can be understood from two dimensions. The first is related to the transformations seen in both the international and regional scene, both favorable to the continent[6]. At the international level, such favoring is related to the greater presence of traditional and emerging powers in the African continent, motivated mainly by the search for natural resources (Visentini 2013). At the regional level, the increase in democratic elections, the decline or end of authoritarian regimes, economic growth and the decrease in the number of wars, are some of the examples that symbolized a continent in transformation. The second dimension concerns South Africa's role in this renaissance process, in which Pretoria would act to defend African interests on the international stage, as well as convince African countries to adopt political, economic and security changes.

In view of the proposal indicated by the *African Renaissance*, South Africa's foreign policy has gone through changes. Although marked by continuity, since the defense of human rights, democracy, and the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means were maintained, in reality what was seen was the major role of multilateralism and universality in foreign policy. In the international scenario, the favoring of both led to an intensification in relations

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6 Discussing the concept of African Renaissance by Anta Diop, Phemelo and Mompati (2018, 174) highlight that "The language was one of the things that change a worldview". Thence he resonated that; "the development of our indigenous languages is the prerequisite for a real African renaissance, and in justifying his claim, he was quick to remind Africans of the detrimental effects of using foreign languages as a media of instruction in African schools".

with emerging powers. Although maintaining strong economic ties with the United States and the European Union, the South-South relations began to gain more and more space during the Mbeki administration (DTIC 2020). In bilateral relations, the main example can be found in the strengthening of relations with partnerships considered strategic, notably, Brazil, India and China. At the multilateral level, the appreciation of groupings in which the country had been integrated during the previous administration, such as the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement, added to the insertion in several other groups, notably the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC), the New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership, and the IBSA Forum.

Similar to the international scenario, the strategy adopted for insertion in Africa was guided by multilateralism and universality in foreign policy. While the first would serve to demonstrate the non-imposing character of the points adopted and defended by South Africa, the second would guarantee the strengthening of ties with countries that, due to their historical importance or political relevance, were better accepted by the vast majority of African countries (Landsberg 2000). Initially, the effectiveness of this strategy can be found in the New Partnership for Economic Development in Africa (NEPAD), an initiative created in 2001 that links development to respect for human security, good governance, and investment in the industrial, agricultural, environment, science and technology, infrastructural sectors, among other characteristic features of the post-Cold War scenario (NEPAD 2001).

Another example concerns the transformation of the OAU into the African Union, the process of which was marked by the predominance of two strands. The first was symbolized by Libya's desire to create the United States of Africa, that is, to move the continent towards the formation of a Federalist State. The second included the interests of Nigeria, a country that advocated greater participation by the organization in issues related to security, and South Africa, whose perception was that the new organization should be marked by the creation of rules, norms, and, fundamentally, for the commitment of member countries to respect these standards (Otavio and Cardoso 2014; Landsberg 2012a). In general, the second aspect was predominant, since points such as human security, the valorization and construction of principles, institutions, political structures and mechanisms that could regulate the behavior of States became part of the AU.

The successes achieved previously helped to formulate a third example symbolic of South African interest in being more active on the continent, the African Agenda, which can be understood as the continuation and intensification of the *African Renaissance* (Otavio 2017). Continuity, since it remains

faithful to the encouragement of the creation and adoption of democratic systems by African countries, to the search for peace and security on the continent, to the creation of means that lead to the economic growth of African countries, among other objectives defended by this doctrine of African renewal. Intensification, as it enhanced the interaction between South Africa and other African countries. In addition to maintaining or expanding strategic partnerships between Pretoria and countries such as Algeria, Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique and Botswana, this agenda has ensured that the country is increasingly inserted economically on the continent, becoming one of the main trading partners of countries such as Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, Namibia and Zimbabwe (Mbekeani 2013).

To a certain extent, the strategies of international and regional insertion based on the role of multilateralism and the universality of foreign policy, generated two consequences for the Mbeki administration that differed from those found during the Mandela administration. The first is related to the discontent on the part of Western powers, because the choice to approach countries widely criticized by the West led South Africa to lose its image as a country with a strong moral dimension (Titus 2009). In contrast to this first consequence, the second was the intensification in the regional integration process, symbolized by the partnership with several African countries and the activism in the creation of initiatives considered important for the *African Renaissance*.

The consequences previously indicated influenced the foreign policy adopted during the Zuma administration. In fact, the valorization of democracy, economic development and conflict resolution continued to be linked to the role of multilateralism and universality in foreign policy, which is symbolized by the greater interest in strengthening ties with emerging powers. In this case, the strengthening of ties with southern powers brought the invitation in 2011 to join the BRICS Group as an initial success. Although economically the country was distant from other members of the Group, it is a fact that the invitation to enter reflected the main characteristics of South Africa, that is, of being a regional power, characterized by the sophisticated infrastructure network, and by the commercial, technological and financial dynamism. In addition, it is worth mentioning that entry into this group guaranteed Pretoria to expand its economic relations with other member countries, notably China, a country that between 2005 and 2015 increased its exports and imports (DTIC 2020).

In the regional scenario, the economic relations resulting from the African Agenda were not only maintained, but also intensified during the

Zuma administration. A first example of this can be found in the formulation of the so-called Business Forums, which were created with countries like Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Namibia, Zambia and Angola. In the Angolan case, the Zuma administration sought to strengthen the South Africa-Angola Chamber of Commerce, as well as to ensure that South African companies operate more and more in this country (Zuma 2009). A second example of this economic diplomacy can be found in the prominence given to NEPAD, the consolidation of the SADC Free Trade Area, launched during the Mbeki administration, and in the Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), an initiative created in 2010 and aimed at creating means to guarantee the improvement of the continent's infrastructure (PIDA 2012).

The desire for greater intensification in economic relations with several African countries can be framed as one of the two characteristics of the Zuma administration that demonstrated the continuity in the South African strategy of regional insertion, since the other refers to the resolution of conflicts through dialogue, which, however, proved challenging. A reflection of this can be found in Côte d'Ivoire, a country that since 2002 has been polarized between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara. In this case, if Pretoria initially supported Gbagbo, throughout this conflicting process it started to support Ouattara. In addition to Côte d'Ivoire, another example can be found in post-Gaddafi Libya, when the country diverged from its main strategic partner, Nigeria. While South Africa chose not to recognize the National Transitional Council (CTN) as a legitimate representative of the Libyan people, Abuja not only legitimized CTN, but also sought to encourage other African countries to follow suit (Landsberg 2012b; 2012c).

In general, when compared to the Mbeki administration, the strategy based on multilateralism and universality in foreign policy, brought divergent consequences for the Zuma administration. Although on the international stage, the protagonism guaranteed South Africa to strengthen ties with the emerging powers and, consequently, become part of the BRICS, in fact, the frustrated performance in Côte d'Ivoire and the performance in the Libyan case were episodes that symbolized limits such strategy, especially with regard to insertion on the African continent.

Towards a new foreign policy? Trends and challenges in the Ramaphosa administration

In parallel with Zuma's resignation in early 2018, one of the demands that has gained preponderance in the country and, broadly speaking, can be understood as one of the main objectives of the Ramaphosa administration, concerns the search for solving socio-economic challenges — especially poverty and unemployment. To a certain extent, it is a fact that previous governments sought to create initiatives aimed at the same purpose, and even managed to improve some indexes. Examples of this can be found in access to drinking water, which went from 58% in 1994 to 91% in 2009, and in the scope of public policies, since in 2015 around 17 million South Africans were supported, while in 1994, there were 4 million (Cilliers and Aucoin 2016). However, some challenges remained, such as the high unemployment rate, is reflected in the relationship between young people entering the labor market (annually, around 1.2 million) and those who, in fact, manage to be employed (about a third of the total) (Ramaphosa 2020).

In seeking to break with socioeconomic challenges in general, and unemployment in particular, the Ramaphosa administration has been demonstrating that multilateralism and universality in foreign policy will continue to be fundamental to the country, as both favor the expansion of economic diplomacy. At the multilateral level, the importance of economic diplomacy is found in the greatest interest in the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), an initiative created in the 1990s, which, among its various objectives, seeks to strengthen economic ties between member countries (IOR-ARC 2014).

Along with this appreciation, another example can be found in the BRICS, a group that in 2018 was marked by the South African presidency. In this case, the interaction between Pretoria and other member countries can be seen in economic relations, since between 2018 and 2019 South African exports to the bloc grew by more than 110%, and in the same period, imports increased by around 106% (DTIC 2020). In addition, it is worth highlighting the access to loans from the Bank of the BRICS, an institution that in 2019 lent US $ 790 million for South African projects, especially those related to Eskom, a company in the energy area that, in addition to having more than half of this amount, it also gained access to an additional $ 180 million to implement renewable energy projects (Pandor 2019).

In bilateral relations, the economic diplomacy highlighted in South-South relations is seen in the interest for greater interaction with China. A

reflection of this can be found in trade, whose figures show that of the values found in the relationship with the BRICS, a large part is the result of trade with Beijing. In fact, between 2018 and 2019, trade was marked by an increase in both South African exports (122%) and South African imports (103%) to China (DTIC 2020). In addition to the economic, it is worth mentioning the cooperation in the medical field, since the Chinese government donated various materials aimed at combating Covid-19 (Pandor 2020).

Parallel to South-South relations, Pretoria also seeks greater interaction with traditional powers. In the economic relationship with Washington, for example, the figures for South African exports and imports were increased by 106% and 113%, respectively. Regarding the European Union, it is worth mentioning Germany, a country to which South Africa increased its exports and imports between 2018 and 2019, an average of 115% and 103%, respectively (DICT 2020). In a speech addressed to the German President, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who was on an official visit to South Africa in 2018, Ramaphosa spoke about the strategic importance of Berlin at the international level, as both defend multilateralism and the promotion of peace, as well as domestically, as Germany is the country's third largest trading partner, and one of the main investors, with more than 600 companies operating in South African territory.

To a certain extent, the reflection of this greater interest in strengthening ties with traditional and emerging powers can be found in the percentage invested by South Africa in diplomatic missions. In figures, of the total resources directed to DIRCO for the years 2019 and 2020, around 68% are destined to the maintenance of 125 missions distributed in 108 countries (Pandor 2019). In this case, such investment corresponds to the interest in making these missions assist in the export of South African goods and services, in the field of tourism and, in particular, in the fulfillment of the goal related to the entry of FDI in the country, around US $ 100 billion, a figure stipulated by Ramaphosa when he came to the presidency of South Africa.

At the interstate level, it is worth mentioning that investments were already announced in 2018 by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (US $ 10 billion), and by China (US $ 14.7 billion) (Shubin 2019). State and companies, the fulfillment of this goal converges with the so-called South African Investment Conferences, events that seek to expand the investment of large companies in the country, in which case the 2019 conference stands out, when more than 70 companies committed themselves to invest in the most diverse areas of the South African economy (Ramaphosa 2020).

Alongside economic diplomacy, universality in foreign policy and the appreciation of multilateralism can be expressed in the political-diplomatic sphere. However, unlike the Mbeki and Zuma governments, what is perceived is the Ramaphosa administration's quest to use such tools as a way to rescue the status of a country with a strong moral dimension, and, in this sense, to approach the foreign policy adopted by the Mandela administration. In other words, the interest in strengthening strategic partnerships and increasing the value of multilateral spaces is maintained. However, it again highlights the need for Pretoria to act in favor of characteristic features of post-*apartheid* South Africa, notably, democracy, human rights and conflict resolution.

On the one hand, it is expected that the characteristic of a country with a strong moral dimension will guarantee Pretoria the protagonism that, in the perspective of current management, the country had. On the other hand, however, it must be stressed that such a choice does not necessarily mean a certain alignment with the traditional powers. Firstly, because the country understands the characteristic trend of the current international scenario, that is, multipolarity. Second, and as relevant as the previous one, because the Ramaphosa administration maintains an interest in strengthening ties with the most diverse types of countries. In other words, the search for status with a strong moral dimension corresponds to South Africa's desire to be active in themes or events that are seen as challenging in the international system.

Such a finding can be found in the Israeli-Palestinian cause, in which the Ramaphosa administration reaffirms that the maintenance of the downgrade in the status of the Embassy in Israel to office, which occurred during the Zuma administration, reflects the unfavorable South African positioning of Israeli activities in Palestine. Along with this cause, another example refers to Cuba, a country that has been gaining prominence since the Mandela administration. In addition to cooperation in combating Covid-19, since Cuba has sent more than 200 health professionals to work in South Africa (DW 2020), it is worth highlighting the solidarity with the Cuban people and the defense for the removal of the imposed economic embargo by the USA to Havana (Ramaphosa 2018c).

In addition to the previous cases, another example that expresses the search for protagonism on the international stage is related to the 2019/2020 biennium, a period in which the country occupies a non-permanent seat of the UN Security Council (UNSC). On this occasion, the current administration has shown an interest in acting on various topics, with emphasis on conflict resolution, such as those in Syria, Somalia and Yemen; and in the defense of the independence of Western Sahara (Ramaphosa 2018d). Activism about

Western Sahara and the resolution of the conflict in Somalia are examples that symbolize the continent's continued importance to South Africa. Even, as quoted by the current DIRCO Minister, Naledi Pandor, "Our foreign policy as South Africa is, and has always been based on our vision of championing an African continent which is prosperous, peaceful and democratic" (Pandor 2019, n.p).

As highlighted in this article, Africa's centrality in South African foreign policy is not merely rhetorical, and since the beginning of his administration, Ramaphosa has been demonstrating continuity in this objective. A first example that demonstrates interest in continental integration can be found in the AU, with South Africa not only assuming its presidency in the 2020 and 2021 biennium, but also demonstrating that in this period it will act in favor of one of the main initiatives linked to the Organization, Agenda 2063, created in 2015 and marked by several aspirations that symbolize the continent's quest to solve challenges in the fields of economics, politics and security (AU 2015). It is worth mentioning that among the objectives of Pretoria at the UNSC, the search for partnerships aimed at achieving one of the objectives of Agenda 2063 stands out, namely, to silence weapons on the continent by the end of 2020 (Pandor 2019).

In addition to symbolizing one of the main objectives of Agenda 2063, this element is in line with one of the characteristics of South African foreign policy, namely participation in the pacification processes. In this case, such an objective can be exemplified by Pretoria's interest in directing the AU presidency to resolve crises in Libya and South Sudan (Africa News 2020). In the Libyan case, it is worth mentioning that the instability generated after Gaddafi's death was not ended with the CTN, and, in this sense, South African support is found in the baking given to the AU High Level Committee on Libya (South Africa 2020a). With regard to South Sudan, the aid given by the African Union and the intermediation carried out by Ramaphosa, were important for the signing of the agreement between the opponents, the current president, Salva Kiir Mayardit, and the opponent, Riek Machar, of the South Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM-IO) (South Africa 2020b).

Alongside conflict resolution, the silencing of weapons is also related to another characteristic that remains present in the Ramaphosa administration, in this case, multilateralism. In general, since the criticisms made to the Mandela administration regarding the performance of conflicting episodes, Pretoria has guided itself in articulation with other African countries as a means to become increasingly present and active on the continent. In the

current administration, in addition to being an instrument for stabilizing and pacifying Africa, multilateralism also continues to be important in the economic dimension. Similarly to the Zuma administration, this finding can be found in the objective of making the Free Trade Area resulting from the Tripartite Agreement (TFTA) between the Common Market of East Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and SADC come into force. To this end, Pretoria is looking for other countries to sign and ratify the agreement, since it takes 14 ratifications for the TFTA to enter into force (Pandor 2019).

In addition to the TFTA, another economic initiative that remains important is the African Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), created in 2018 by most African countries and expected to come into force in 2020. The expectation about AfCFTA is related to increased continental integration, as it will seek to expand intra-African trade, which currently stands at around 16% (Fabricius 2020)[7]. As expressed by Pandor (2019, n.p) "The coming into operation of the AfCFTA is a clear demonstration that there is political will amongst Africa's leaders to integrate the economy of our continent, thereby creating new opportunities for greater volumes of trade among African countries".

In general, the multilateral choice in resolving conflicts and intensifying economic integration is related to the continuity of the African Agenda, an initiative developed during the Mbeki administration and maintained throughout the Zuma administration. In this case, in addition to acting on the main multilateral initiatives developed on the continent, the Ramaphosa administration has sought to maintain South Africa as a defender of African interests on the international stage. This is confirmed in his 2019 speech in Biarritz, France, when he highlighted the importance of G7 member countries investing in the African continent (Ramaphosa 2019). This highlight reflects one of the main objectives set by the country in the post-*apartheid* period, the search not only to strengthen its regional insertion, but also to remain as a relevant actor in solving existing challenges in Africa.

Another feature found in the African Agenda that is also present in the current administration concerns the intensification of interaction between South Africa and other African countries. An example refers to the relationship with Angola, a country that since the Zuma administration has remained strategic for Pretoria. In this case, it is worth highlighting the intention and interest of Ramaphosa and João Lourenço, current Angolan president, in cooperating in the areas of extractivism, trade, infrastructure, agriculture,

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7 For comparison, intra-European trade amounts to 68% and intra-Asian trade, 60% (Fabricius 2020).

tourism, among others considered relevant for both (Africa News 2018). In parallel with the interaction with Angola, another example of a bilateral relationship involves Ghana, a country with which South Africa already had more than twenty cooperation or intention agreements. In 2018, Accra and Pretoria created the Binational Commission (BNC), which proposes to meet every two years (Ramaphosa 2018e).

Although there is an interest in prioritizing the African continent, both the advancement in multilateral and bilateral relations can be impacted by a challenge that since the Mandela administration has been growing in South Africa, in this case, xenophobic violence. An example of this can be found in 2008, when a wave of violence against immigrants, mainly Zimbabweans, Mozambicans and Malawians, resulted in about 62 people killed, 670 injured, and thousands of establishments looted or destroyed. In addition to 2008, it is worth mentioning 2009, when around 3 thousand foreigners who lived near Cape Town were expelled from their homes, and 2015, when the death of 15 was accompanied by the expulsion of 2,000 immigrants who lived in KawaZulu Natal (Misago, Landau and Monson 2009; Mililo and Misago 2019). In response to the treatment of African immigrants, Pretoria came under criticism, as seen by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, Olugbenga Ashiru (2011-2013), who in 2012 accused the deportation of 125 Nigerians who were in Africa as xenophobia of the South (Landsberg 2012c).

Of course, blaming the African immigrant for internal challenges to South Africa is a prejudiced view that South African administrations are constantly trying to combat. It is also worth mentioning the ratification in the 1990s of the Geneva Conventions and African Unity on refugee law. In the current administration, the fight against xenophobia converges with the development of the National Action Plan to combat Racism, Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerances (NAP). Created in 2019, the NAP has as its goals the protection of human rights, the adoption of anti-racist and anti-discrimination initiatives, especially in the field of education. However, in the same year that the Plan was created, several Nigerians were killed or expelled from areas close to Johannesburg and, in response, what was seen were some Nigerians attacking South African traders residing in Abuja. To a certain extent, this type of violence ends up exposing one of the challenges that the Ramaphosa administration will face, since the defense of regional integration and xenophobia tend not to go in the same direction.

Conclusion

The quest to be a protagonist on the international stage and an important player in the African continent can be considered two of the main objectives of South Africa in the post-*apartheid* era. In general terms, when the Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma administrations are compared, the successes, as well as the challenges in achieving these objectives, went hand in hand with the adoption of strategies based on the valorization of multilateralism and universality in foreign policy. As analyzed in this article, this finding could be noticed, initially, in the Mandela administration, since the success in the international scenario contrasted with the challenges in the regional insertion, this characterized by the distrust about the interests of Pretoria for the continent.

Although losing the status of a country with a strong moral dimension, the Mbeki and Zuma administrations, to a greater or lesser extent, have also been successful in the international stage, given that universality in foreign policy has led such governments to strengthen ties with emerging powers, which gained increasing prominence in the international system. However, in the continental scenario, what was seen was the disparity between the success achieved by the first, when South Africa was successful in initiatives such as the transformation of the OAU into the AU, and in the creation of NEPAD and the African Agenda; and the failure of the second, since both in the Côte d'Ivoire and in the Libyan case, Pretoria did not achieve the expected results.

Although multilateralism and universality in foreign policy are perennial to successes and challenges for the realization of South African goals, it is a fact that both have become increasingly strategic means for the country, since they have expanded South Africa's international relations. This importance could even be found in the Ramaphosa administration, whose government has been directing the country's international and continental insertion to the adoption of such means. In this sense, taking into account the initial years of his administration, it is possible to highlight three characteristics that, roughly, will tend to gain more and more prominence.

The first refers to one of the main characteristics of the Mandela administration, that is, South Africa as a country with a strong moral dimension. In this case, even aiming at such status and considering it as important for the return of South African protagonism, it is possible to indicate the tendency of Pretoria not to distance itself from universality in foreign policy. Foremost, because the country understands the trend towards multipolarity

that is characteristic of the current international scenario. Secondly, because universality symbolizes the rupture with *apartheid*, since during the lifetime of the racist regime the focus was exclusion, in post-*apartheid* South Africa what predominates is the maintenance of ties with the most diverse types of countries. In this sense, it is possible to find the tendency to balance between points characteristic of previous administrations, since the search for a status with a strong moral dimension will go hand in hand with the construction or strengthening of ties with countries that are constantly criticized by Western powers, as seen in the Cuban case. In addition, the moral dimension is seen as fundamental to legitimize South African action on issues seen as challenging in the international system, this symbolized by criticism of Israel regarding the invasion in Palestinian territories.

The second characteristic, on the other hand, refers to economic diplomacy, which is gaining more and more prominence in the South African agenda. In fact, along with the continued interest in initiatives such as NEPAD, PIDA, TFTA and AfCFTA, the tendency to value economic relations with the African continent converges with the creation of South African Investment Conferences and the strengthening or development of strategic partnerships, as found in the cases of Angola and Ghana. On the one hand, the strategic character of this diplomacy is related to the quest to improve the performance of the South African economy, since it may increase trade with the African continent and, consequently, raise the rates related to South Africa's economic growth. On the other hand, such diplomacy is seen as important in the fight against unemployment, since the expectation is the largest inflow of foreign direct investment in the country.

Converging with previous compliance relationships, a third characteristic concerns the continual appreciation of the African continent. In addition to economic and political ties, this reflected by the defense of Western Sahara's self-determination and the appreciation of SADC and the African Union, it is worth highlighting the scope of security, whose peace process continues to be relevant for Pretoria. Even if this dimension presents itself as challenging, the emphasis given to the quest to silence weapons on the continent, a factor that demonstrates the relevance of Agenda 2063 for the Ramaphosa administration, as well as the performance in the Libyan, Somali cases and in the conflict in South Sudan, are examples that demonstrate how relevant Africa's pacification continues to be for the country. However, the greater interest in being active on the continent, as well as maintaining itself as the African voice on the international stage, contrasts with one of the challenges that the Ramaphosa administration will have to overcome, such

as xenophobia, since the attacks against African immigrants contrast with the desire for an increasingly integrated Africa.

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ABSTRACT

This paper compares the Ramaphosa's foreign policy with that adopted by the Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma governments. Based on primary and secondary sources and taking into account that the Ramaphosa administration is in progress, it seeks to demonstrate that the international and regional insertion processes that are being carried out bring as a main characteristic the attempt to strengthen the interaction between foreign policy and development economic, in the same way as the Mbeki and Zuma governments. Having done so, it seeks to demonstrate that the current

foreign policy maintains universality in foreign policy, multilateralism and economic diplomacy as characteristics, which were already present in previous administrations.

DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: THE OUTSTANDING CASE OF SOMALILAND

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Introduction

With the fall of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia was consumed by a civil war which extends to present day. Tens of thousands have died or were exiled and many others are homeless in cities such as Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo. The country hasn't had a functional government for practically three weeks, and large portions of its territory are under the control of paramilitary or terrorist groups, such as *al-Shabaab*[3], and warlords. For six years (2008-2013), Somalia has led the Fragile States Index elaborated by US journal Foreign Policy and by the group Fund for Peace. Two UN missions have been dispatched to the region in the 1990s (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II) and two transitional governments have been formed. Moreover, the *African Union Mission to Somalia* (AMISOM) has been active since 2007 supporting government transitions, training the country's armed forces and helping with the logistics of humanitarian aid. However, despite all the efforts directed at solving the conflict and constructing a functional state, political stability seems like a distant dream, and the survival of Somalia's central government is highly dependent on the African Union and AMISOM (Forti 2011, 5).

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3 Terrorist islamic group linked to Al-Qaeda.

Nevertheless, there is a remarkable case of stability and peace in a territorial area internationally-recognised as Somali. In Northern Somalia, a region called Somaliland has claimed independence in 1991, after the fall of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre. Since then, the self-declared nation has undergone six national elections, has created functional institutions, such as a central bank and a judiciary system, has improved educational indexes and has maintained a minimum level of stability. Yet, even as it is a *de facto state*[4] under the logics of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States[5], no other country recognizes it as a sovereign nation.

This case study's objective is to structure a chronological explanation about how, even in a completely adverse situation, without international recognition and surrounded by conflicts, Somaliland was able to build a minimally functional and stable state. Using the existing literature about the issue, as well as analyses of international organization's reports and of some of the country's most important legal documents, such as its newest Constitution, we will try to reconstruct the events that led Somaliland to its current state of relative stability. Elements such as civil society's participation and traditional Somali governance mechanisms were used in a successful way in this process, mitigating the inevitable flaws of an emerging democracy. Consequently, as Kaplan (2008) writes, the case of Somaliland can bring important lessons not only to its neighbors, but also to other post-colonial nations in Africa and the Middle East.

Somali Traditional Society

In order to better understand events in Somalia and Somaliland, it is important to present Somali people's forms of organization. They profoundly influenced post-independence episodes in the Horn of Africa, especially the construction of the Somaliland state.

The Somali descend from a lineage of peoples who, for thousands of years, have lived in the coastal area of the Horn of Africa. Their culture is a mixture of traditions developed from the contact with nearby civilizations, such as those from the Arabian Peninsula, Northeastern Africa, as well as from more distant communities, such as peoples from the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia (Abdullahi 2001, 155). Their society is defined by aggre-

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4 The term designates a territory with the characteristics of a state.

5 The Convention determines the necessary criteria to incorporate a state under international law.

gate kinship relationships and ruled by customary Somali law (*Xeer*), Islamic practices and commune-driven conflict mediation (Forti 2011, 8). Although Islam is predominant and fervently adored, Samatar (1989) describes the existence of a mix of pragmatism and flexibility in its devotion, largely due to the demands and inconsistencies of the Somali pastoral lifestyle.

Clan system

Ethnically, Somalia is one of the most uniform countries in Africa. It is currently estimated that 85% of its inhabitants, including Somalilanders, are ethnically Somali (WPR, n.d.). However, this doesn't mean that there are no internal cleavages. Somalis organize in a complex clan system which defines the communities' political and social identities (Kaplan 2008, 144). In order to be defined to which clan someone belongs, this individual's paternal family tree must be analysed until a connection to the main Somali families or clans is found (*Darod*, *Dir*, *Hawie*, *Issaq* and *Rahanweyn*), the *Darods* and the *Issaqs* being the largest clans in the region. Clans are the primary identity of a large part of Somalis (Walls 2009, 377). Therefore, elders, responsible for leading their clans, are important characters in the country's political scene. Somalis frequently use their relationships, in any of these layers, to stimulate cooperation, support and motivation in their communities.

Because they are connected through distant common ancestors, going as far as 15 generations in the past (Lewis 1959, 276), clans are extensive units. Naturally, they have dozens of subdivisions. More defined lineages inside a clan culminate in forming sub-clans, which often possess a sense of identity. When an individual is part of a sub-clan, this group will be the one that he or she mentions as being a part of (Lewis 1959, 276). The most basic unit of this system, other than nuclear families, are the *dia*-settlement groups. These are groups with a common ancestor from four to eight generations past, constituted by a few hundred to a few thousand men (Lewis 1959, 276) and formed via verbal or written contract. In case of homicide, for example, these are the groups which will either pay or receive compensation, which is also called *dia*. Based on Lewis (1959) and Forti (2011), we can delineate the following order of importance for affiliations related to the Somali clan system: 1) the family nucleus is the basic unit, led by an elder; 2) next are *dia*-payer groups, which constitute a combination of families with a closest common ancestor; 3) sub-clans, when existing inside a larger clan; 4) clans are the most comprehensive identity in this system, comprising thousands, sometimes millions of people, and having multiple internal divisions.

Traditional Political-Normative Instruments

This traditional Somali organization system is ruled by consensual decision-making mechanisms which develop under a net of agreements and unwritten rules. In order to understand the regional context and the formation process of contemporary Somaliland, it is fundamental to understand such instruments.

The *Xeer* is one of the main institutions of Somali society, a type of customary Somali law (Kaplan 2011, 145). It represents unwritten agreements between any unit of the clan system, from family nuclei to the main groups. It rules various aspects of life, determining, for example, the due compensation in case of injury, territorial division or even the use of natural resources. When an incident occurs, a delegation of elders, known as *ergo*, is sent to the place where the trial will happen (Wojkowska 2006, 54). Its members will be the judges of the case, and must be from a neutral clan or from extended families of the parties in dispute, which usually are equally represented. Normally, 10 elders take place, five from the victim's ethnic group and five from the aggressor's ethnic group (Lombard 2005). Such individuals are generally chosen because of their knowledge, but there are no specific trainings in law and they can elaborate their own doctrines. Trials are commonly open to the public and take place under a tree. Oral presentations of the case, witnesses and evidences are used in the same way as any other legal system (Wojkowska 2006, 54).

This customary law system has many problems. A militarily stronger clan, for instance, can refuse to follow the determinations of the *ergo* (Wojkowska 2006, 20), which means that many minority groups are discriminated upon. Moreover, in such a system there are problematic issues involving the rights of women. A woman victim of rape, for example, is frequently forced to marry her aggressor. This is done to supposedly protect the woman's honor and to assure that her family gets paid an endowment by the aggressor's family (Wojkowska 2006, 21). Despite these negative aspects, the *Xeer* is of fundamental importance to maintain peace in the region, for it minimizes conflict and creates a culture of negotiation among Somalis. Its flexibility and adaptability also adapt to the nomadic lifestyle (Forti 2011, 9).

The *Shir*, another important traditional Somali mechanism, has on its essence the combination of the structure of clans and the *Xeer*. Such mechanism constitutes of meetings in which decisions are made in a consensual and democratic way (Lewis 1999, 198). Meetings are summoned on an *ad hoc* basis and can last for hours, days, or even months. They are used to deliberate on any issue that could affect the community, such as lawmaking,

distribution of resources or conflict resolution. As described by I.M. Lewis (1999), it is the fundamental governance institution in the Somali culture. In it, each married man can speak for any of his four divisions in the clan system. This institution is the primary representation of some kind of Somali 'pastoral democracy'. However, this system, as well as all the Somali clan structure, has a highly patriarchal organization, giving women a secondary role. Women's political functions are reduced to serving as a bridge between groups through marriage.

Colonization

The geopolitical situation of the African continent is largely a direct and indirect result of its colonization. It formed new boundaries and altered the power dynamics among ethnic groups on the whole continent. It is fundamental to understand the colonization of the Horn of Africa in order to understand the region's current situation. The events that have led Somaliland to declare its independence are linked to this process.

French, British and Italians established settlements in the region from the end of the 19th century. Previously, Somalis were organized in several city-states relatively independent from one another, with the Adal Sultanate and the state of Ajuuraan among the most famous (Forti 2011, 10). As described by Samatar (1989), these centralized governmental structures were important for the Somali pastoral society to expand its network of trade and to create an effective tax-collecting system. From the beginning of the direct European occupation, the territories that would later become Somalia were divided in two. They were called British Somaliland (current Somaliland) to the North, and Italian Somaliland (current Somalia) to the South.

Between 1884 and 1960, Somaliland was an important, although small, British possession. From it, the British obtained the necessary cattle to supply their other colonies with, such as Yemen (Forti 2011, 11). Their approach in the protectorate of the Horn of Africa was different from the one used by the French and Italian in the region. The British were not interested in creating a country-colony in Somaliland (Ahmed and Green 1999, 115). Due to the difficulty in centralizing power, characteristic of the nomadic lifestyle of the Somalis, they adopted a policy of alliance with chiefs of local clans (*Akils*), who would serve as a link between imperial administration and locals. In Somaliland, therefore, the clans maintained their lifestyle and continued to use their laws and decision-making mechanisms.

In Italian Somaliland, changes imposed by colonizers were more drastic. According to Samatar (1989), their policies, driven by a sense of civilizing mission, Roman nostalgia and the pursuit of prestige, undermined traditional Somali structures, diminishing the elder's power and, often, expropriating their lands. With the beginning of Mussolini's leadership, in 1923, Italians imposed an even stricter colonial system, aiming to export agricultural goods. The most fertile lands were confiscated without compensation, rural workers were subjected to forced labor in the fields. The quick transition from a subsistence to an export system resulted in the shortage of food and generalized hunger (Walls 2011, 98).

The organization imposed by Italians in the area controlled by them followed Western examples, disregarding local customs and forms of governance. Consequently, great unbalance was created. A small educated Somali elite in the West was formed and took control of the public administration (Forti 2011, 12). Moreover, due to the changes in agriculture, many people moved to the cities, where large peripheral neighborhoods, previously nonexistent, were formed (Kaplan 2008, 146).

Colonization created a series of socioeconomic distortions in Somali society and aggravated possible political differences between the Southern clans (mainly *Darods* and *Hawies*) and Northern clans (mainly *Issaqs*). This would be a crucial legacy for political events in the post-independence years.

Independence and the Siad Barre Era

In 1960, British Somaliland declared its independence on June 26th. Soon after, on July 1st, Italian Somaliland followed suit. On the same day, both nations, now independent, held a joint session which resulted in the union of both countries in a single large republic. Thus emerged the Republic of Somalia. Political issues were soon centralized in Mogadishu, which became the capital of the new country. A new constitution was created, in which freedom of expression, democracy and a multi-party system were granted (Ahmed and Green 1999, 116).

Although the union was widely supported and quickly accepted by the Northern states, which had belonged to the British Somaliland, it wasn't long until dissatisfaction with the new structure emerged in the region. Southerners occupied most jobs in the government and held the majority of seats in Parliament (Ahmed and Green 1999, 116). Public administration

was concentrated among Southern groups, which marginalized sectors of the former British Somaliland.

The new government's policies were also fount of dissatisfaction. Not much effort was made to alleviate underdevelopment and the exaggerated stratification of the colonial period. Another negative factor was the latent corruption in the public sector. Indicated by many as an inheritance of the Italian colonial administration (Italian factor), it rapidly mined the regime's legitimacy (Ahmed and Green 1999, 116). The newly created Somali democracy, previously presented as a mechanism to create union and prosperity, became a catalyst of tension and inequality.

In 1969, the country was completely divided. In that year's elections, fragmentation was at such a level that around 60 political parties ran for a seat in Parliament (Walls 2011, 116). In October that year, president Abd ar-Rashid Ali Shirmake was assassinated by his bodyguard, which led the country to chaos. The incident evoked discussions regarding succession, and the whole electoral process was seen with distrust due to suspected corruption (Forti 2011, 15). In this context, Mohamed Siad Barre, a general in the Somali Army, gathered his troops and took Mogadishu in a bloodless military coup.

Barre was a member of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), a Marxist-Leninist wing of the Somali Army. Now in power, he took the initial measures to revoke the constitution, to dissolve Parliament and to prohibit any form of political association. Barre defended the application of "scientific socialism", seeking to substitute, through the state, the clan's functions of promoting security, leadership and welfare (Barre 1970). In short, the former general claimed that he would try to transform Somalia into a modern nation state. His initial promises also mentioned the eradication of tribalism and the future decentralization of power.

Barre was supported by a large part of the population, which saw in his figure an escape from the divisions hindering the young nation's development. However, his promises of union soon deteriorated. The SRC regime counted with the massive support of the *Darod* clan and manipulated clan rivalry in order to neutralize any form of political opposition (Haldén 2008, 24). Besides, due to Barre's alignment with the Soviet Union, the country received large aid packages, which were used by the government to strengthen the Army and maintain itself in power (Walls 2011, 119).

The socialist experiment made successful reforms in the health and education sectors. However, it nationalized important enterprises and administered them in an inefficient way. Bad management and the favoring of specific groups had terrible results. Between 1974 and 1975, the lack of

supply, combined with a drought, resulted in 20,000 people dead in the North (Ahmed and Green 1999, 117). Paradoxically, the Somali Army was then one of the largest and better equipped in Africa, due to Soviet support (Drysdale 2000, 17). Relying on this and seeking to reinforce Somali nationalism, Siad Barre decided, instead of solving the problem of hunger, to invade the Ethiopian region of the Ogaden, with a great Somali population.

The invasion of Ogaden in 1977 rapidly evolved to a large-scale conflict. The Ethiopian government, previously a monarchy led by Haile Selassie, the "Rastafari", was now controlled by a Marxist-Leninist military junta. In this framework, Cuba and the Soviet Union saw the opportunity to change the region's dynamics (Walls 2011, 121). Both countries cut their support to Somalia and began supporting the Ethiopian forces. Ethiopia was traditionally a regional hegemon and, in the socialist powers' point of view, it would be a more important ally than Somalia.

The Somali defeat, in 1978, was humiliating. Hunger, devastation and economic crisis fell upon the country, especially in the North, where many refugees settled (Ahmed and Green 1999, 118). Northerners' dissatisfaction with the regime was growing and many *Issaqs*, a major clan in the North, were marginalized in their own territory.

Naturally, opposition movements began organizing. In former British Somaliland, the Somali National Movement (SNM) emerged in 1981, an organization formed by businessmen, clerics, academics and former military belonging to the *Issaq* clan. The group was trying to overthrow Barre, forming bases in Northern cities such as Hargeisa and Burao.

Like the SNM, other opposition groups emerged throughout the country. The former general's government, which had previously relied on domestic support, now depended on repression and foreign aid to hold on to power (Kaplan 2008, 146). Formerly an ally of the Soviet Union, Barre's regime now was aligned to the United States, which began to send financial support to the country in the first half of the 1980s decade. However, towards the final phases of the Cold War, the amount of aid sent by Americans was drastically reduced. With many organized opposition groups and with no external financial support, Barre's fall became inevitable.

In 1991, after a series of battles and protests around the country, Mohamed Siad Barre fled Mogadishu. Immediately, the country and its political structures collapsed. This marked the beginning of the Somali Civil War. There is no exact date to the outset of the conflict, but generalized confrontation between rebel groups and the Somali government's Armed Forces started in 1988 (Menkhaus 2007, 73).

From the construction of the Somaliland
state to current days

Dissatisfaction in the North due to the union of the two Somalias dated back to the 1960s, when Southern clans took key positions in the administration, marginalizing local clans, especially the *Issaqs* and their sub-clans. In Barre's regime, differences were aggravated. After his fall, in 1991, the SNM gathered elders from Northern clans and sub-clans in a national conference in the city of Burao, known as *shir beeleddka*, or clan meeting (Ali 2013, 394). An important part of this process was the conciliatory behavior of the *Issaqs*. As a Northern majority clan, they could try to retaliate the violence that they suffered, but, under the leadership of their elders, they decided to end conflict in their lands and sought to use traditional Somali governance mechanisms in order to build bridges between clans. From the beginning, this search for consensus based on the clan system and its informal mechanisms, as well as the balance in each clan's representation were marks of the construction of the region's hybrid political order. In the end, the greatest result of the Burao Conference was Somaliland's proclamation of independence, which happened on May 18th, 1991.

The trauma of recent events helped create a kind of national identity among Northerners. Moreover, despite the future challenges that the newly-created nation would face, this spirit of reconciliation built in Burao helped generate a sense of differentiation among the inhabitants of Somaliland towards Somalia (Renders and Terlinden 2010, 730).

Upon separation, Somaliland hoped to obtain vast international recognition. The region had been independent for five days in 1960, before its union with Italian Somalia was put into effect. In this brief period, 34 countries, including the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, recognized its independence (Ali 2013, 338). In 1991, the SNM argued that the country was just returning to its original boundaries and, therefore, hoped not to find major difficulties in establishing diplomatic relations with other nations. However, nations from Africa and other parts of the world preferred not to grant such recognition, fearing that the dissolution of the Somalian union would bring more instability.

Without recognition and facing serious problems in its territory due to conflict with the central government, Somaliland had a big challenge ahead of it. The whole process of independence was constructed from a series of negotiations between the clans that previously formed the British protectorate, which made the country's environment less divisive. The *Gadabursi*, the

Dhulbahante, sub-clans Dir and Harti respectively, were politically distinct from the *Issaqs*, who controlled the SNM. From the actions of elders from these clans and their sub-clans, a series of *shirs* were held in Somaliland region. These negotiations formed the basis for the construction of the state.

During the Burao Conference, when independence was declared, there were enormous variations in public opinion (Walls 2009, 380). Because of this, worried with misinterpretations of the reunion's results, the meeting's Central Committee rewrote the elder's final declaration, making it more clear and incisive. It was decided that the SNM leader, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali 'Tuur' would be in Somaliland's presidency for two years. This pattern of *shirs* to solve specific issues, later evolving to national conferences, is something that would be repeated many times during the peacebuilding process in the region.

Now under SNM leadership, more specifically under Ali Tuur's leadership, the newly emancipated, but not yet recognized nation enjoyed a brief period of stability, optimism and economic growth. Reunions and large meetings continued to happen, now aiming at constructing an agreement about what form of government and political representation Somaliland should follow (Kaplan 2008, 148). However, in 1992 the SNM government started to face some problems. There were disputes among militias of *Issaq* sub-clans in Burao, which evolved to more violent fights inside the city. Moreover, the President, while trying to ensure control of taxes in the port of Berbera[6], ended up initiating a dispute between two *Issaq* sub-clans. The *Habar Yoonis*, to which he belonged, and the *Lise Musa*, who had lived in the port region for years, were both *Issaq* sub-clans. After weeks of negotiation, an elder delegation of the *Gadabursi* clan mediated an agreement between the government and both groups.

This conflict, although brief, is a very important event to understand the formation of Somaliland. The elders consolidated themselves as relevant and formal agents of the country's political structure. Besides, the fact that the mediation of a conflict between *Issaq* sub-clans was conducted by a neutral clan showed that the *Issaqs* wouldn't dominate the state's political structure, as was feared by members of minority clans in the region (Walls 2011, 137). The commitment with the end of retaliation was also noteworthy. The term *xalaydhalay*, which means something like erasing resentment from the past, was very noticeable in the process of forming the country. In normative terms, a fundamental definition that emerged from this conflict was the establishment that the main components of infrastructure, such as

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6 Important Somaliland port city.

the Berbera and the Zelia ports, as well as the main cities' airports, would be under the responsibility of the central government in Hargeisa.

The next step would be to continue building the country's institutions. It had been defined that president Tuur would govern for two years, but the following stages were still undefined. It was also important to determine how possible future conflicts among clans would be resolved. With such objectives, the Borama Conference was held in 1993. With the government and the SNM awakened by the Berbera conflict, the president decided to assign to the *Guurti*, a formal council of elders, the responsibility to organize the next steps. At that point, the executive transferred the responsibility of mediating the construction of institutions and resolving the transition, from a civilian government to a Somali traditional institution. Although this didn't strengthen the government's power, this was an important measure to unite the country around a national project (Walls 2009, 383).

As a result of the Borama Conference, the "Somaliland Communities Security and Peace Charter" (*Axdiga Nabadgaladyada ee Beelaha Somaliland*) was created. Based on the principles of *shir*, it molded the solution of possible future conflicts. A National Charter (*Axdi Qarameed*), which served as an interim constitution, was also instituted.

The conference lasted for almost four months and its discussions were directed by elders and based on consensus (Forti 2011, 19). Themes such as the government system were widely discussed. Certain clans were favorable to a strong executive, pending presidentialism. Others defended parlamentarism. This issue would also be defined in a consensual manner. The Conference was of extreme importance, and many argue that it was there that an embryo of national identity was formed (Renders and Terlinden 2010, 731).

In the end, the institutions formed in the Borama Conference were a mix of traditional Somali elements with democratic governance mechanisms. This government system was known as *Beel*. In it, there would be a bicameral legislature in which the *Guurti* would be institutionalized, as a type of Senate, sharing responsibilities with the House of Representatives. The *Guurti* would designate the President and determine measures to maintain the region's fragile peace. Haji Ibrahim Egal, a member of the *Issaq* clan and experienced politician who had been the Prime-Minister of unified Somalia in the 1960s, was chosen for a three-year mandate with the possibility of renewal.

Between 1994 and 1997, new conflicts occurred in the country. *Issaq* sub-clans, disputing natural resources in the Hargeisa and Burao regions, initiated armed confrontations. Despite interventions of the *Guurti*, a consensus

was not reached. However, civil society organizations, including expatriate groups, urged the government to take more incisive actions (Forti 2011, 20). Thus, the Hargeisa Conference was established in 1997. After a ceasefire was defined, the participants of the meeting, under Egal government's tutelage, successfully redefined Somaliland's constitution (Forti 2011, 21). This meeting, unlike the previous ones, was financed by the Hargeisa central government and didn't count on foreign financial aid. Besides, the number of delegates was twice the number of participants of the Borama Conference and a reasonable number of women could observe the discussions, although they were not allowed to vote (Abokor, Bradbury and Yusuf 2015, 461).

The country's political system was of organized electoral bases centered in clans for a multi-party democracy (Constitution of Somaliland 2001, 18-41). Under the leadership of Egal and the *Guurti*, each clan was consulted, which gave strong support and legitimacy to the new Constitution (Abokor, Bradbury and Yusuf 2015, 463). In May 2001, a new referendum took place, in which 97% of voters approved that the document produced by the Hargeisa Conference, which formerly only had an interim status, would serve as Somaliland's definitive Constitution.

Traditional governance systems had been very effective when the state had failed. However, Egal and a great part of the Western-educated elite saw a stable future which depended on the adequate establishment of a balance between traditional sociocultural inheritances and the country's political aspirations. Therefore, presenting the country as a modern nation state with a democratic system was important for its political success and for obtaining international recognition (Renders and Terlinden 2010, 735). This mindset was spread throughout the country and was fundamental for the approval of the new Constitution.

In 2002, when he was 74 years old, Egal died. His death generated a stronger nationalist connection among the inhabitants of Somaliland. During his mandate, Egal had often been criticized for adopting clientelist policies and for trying to influence the outcome of important conferences (Renders and Terlinden 2010, 731). However, his figure was very respected because of the fact that he was an elder statesman, active since the 1960s, and for leading the country in the difficult decade of the 1990s (Abokor, Bradbury and Yusuf 2015, 463-464). Both influential supporters and passionate opponents attended his funeral. Thereafter, Vice-President Dahir Riyale Kahin, from the *Gadabursi* clan, fulfilling his constitutional function, took power. This transition was memorable, because it was the first time that the president wasn't *Issaq*. Riyale would be elected in 2003 for another mandate and

would govern until 2010. The 2003 elections had been controversial, but after deliberation by the *Guurti* and the Supreme Court, they were considered fair (Forti 2011, 22). Neutral observers concluded that all parties had benefited from loopholes in the legislation, but, even so, considered that the elections were fair and definitive. In 2005, parliamentary elections were also considered trustworthy, marking the first time that Somalilanders could choose members of the House of Representatives, which shares the legislative body with the *Guurti* (Kaplan 2009, 150).

In 2010, presidential elections were also considered free and fair by international observers, and happened without greater problems (Ali 2015, 58). Mohamed Silanyo, an *Issaq*, was the winner. Voting should have taken place in 2008, due to the five-year presidential mandate, but the lack of experience in organizing elections led to its two-year delay (ICG 2010). Silanyo government would be very criticized. During his mandate, inflation soared and the country's economy became more fragile. Charges for corruption, data fraud and press freedom violations also emerged (Ali 2015, 62).

New general elections were planned for 2015. However, due to a severe drought and lack of preparedness by the organizing committee, they were postponed to 2017. Similar episodes of election postponement represent a recurring problem in Somaliland's young democracy. Pegg and Walls (2018) argue that this is the result of two factors: the lack of resources to hold them and the absence of political will from incumbents. The *Guurti*, which acts as a Senate, should have its members elected every six years. However, since this rule was instituted, in 1997, there was never a poll to choose them. The House of Representatives, which functions as a Parliament, hasn't undergone elections since 2005. This contributes to the fragility of the country's democracy and to an overly presidential dominance. Moreover, during the most recent elections, a frequent complaint among voters was that it was difficult to identify the differences among the country's main parties. Disputes for positions inside the parties, as well as alliances of convenience showed a growing opportunistic feature in the nation's politics and created a certain cynicism among voters (Abokor, Bradbury and Yusuf 2015, 463-464).

In 2017, elections successfully happened. Musa Bihi Abdi, a former Air Force *Issaq* pilot, indicated by Silanyo, who did not run for reelection, was the winner. Parliamentary elections, on its turn, are still pending, and have been postponed since 2005. Abdi's government inherited important challenges from Silanyo. The former leader had created policies favorable to his clan, the *Issaqs*, and imbalance in the distribution of public positions for each group (Ali 2015, 65). A possible resurgence of clan rivalry is one of the

greatest threats to Somaliland's democracy, with the potential to seriously affect its ambition for international recognition. Therefore, it is crucial for the government to take conciliatory actions in this matter.

Adbi, however, has been seeking to improve his country's position in the international arena in other ways. His government has developed closer ties to the United Arab Emirates, a nation that could, possibly, be the first to recognize the country as a sovereign state. In 2018, both governments closed a deal for the construction of a military base in the region, but due to tensions in Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni War, the final project has been transformed into a civilian airport (Reuters 2019). Abdi has also met with representatives of Mogadishu's federal Somali government on two occasions. The first meeting happened in February 2020, and the second one in June, when the Horn of Africa had already been hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. In those meetings, Abdi showed reasons for Somaliland secession, citing the 1933 Montevideo Convention and the country's brief independence period in 1960 (Muse Bihi Abdi Speech [...], 2020). However, little progress was made. Both governments sought advances in other areas, such as the division of foreign aid. This is a crucial issue for Somaliland, because currently any attempt to support the country must pass through Somalia first. In the end, little was decided, but Abdi obtained a small political victory by receiving head of state treatment during the meetings, which were held in Ethiopia and Djibouti.

Although the country has plenty of specific issues, its last challenge was shared with the whole world: the COVID-19 pandemic. Its response received compliments from international organizations such as the WHO, while neighboring nations, such as Somalia itself, couldn't manage to minimally control the spread of the virus (Mukami 2020). Without foreign aid, the country raised US$15 million internally to face the disease, created informative campaigns and efficient restrictions to the movement of people in cities (Rubin 2020). Somaliland's appropriate response can bring good political outcomes for the country. The European Union and the USA, looking for stability in the region, have sent large sums to the government of Somalia, which administers the resources inefficiently (Rubin 2020). At the same time, Somaliland has done a good job with a small amount of money, which can make foreign donors give the country more attention and treat it separately from Somalia when donating.

During the pandemic, Somaliland also evoked comparisons with Taiwan, an Asian nation which also seeks for international recognition as an independent territory. The similarities in both countries' situations made them establish diplomatic relations at the beginning of July, foreseeing pos-

sible agreements in the fields of fishing, agriculture, mining and education (Aspinwall 2020). This could mean a turning point in the country's history, as it can now count on a valuable partner.

Conclusion

Challenges ahead of the Somaliland state are huge. The country has to deal with frequent deadly droughts and with the persistence of deep socio-economic problems. The nation still has a huge task in obtaining international recognition. However, since its independence, Somaliland was able to maintain stability in its territory and to organize transitions of power between different groups, such as the one after president Egal's death. The country's balance contrasts with the generalized chaos in Somalia, to the South.

The reasons for Somaliland's success in comparison with Somalia date back to the country's colonization. In British Somaliland, the region's peoples, although subject to cruel domination, could maintain their customs and forms of governance. While to the South, Italians imposed their form of administration and created considerable imbalance in social structure. Thus, when confronted with Mohamed Siad Barre's tyranny, Northern clans managed to organize more easily.

The elder's pragmatism after the declaration of independence, in 1991, is another important factor for the region's success. The many conferences held to solve controversies and build institutions happened in a methodical way, approaching a new issue only when the previous one had been resolved (Kaplan 2008, 148). The use of traditional Somali customs was also key to achievement. Meetings shaped from the *Shir* and agreements based on the *Xeer* facilitated understanding among different clans and their union around the ideal of a nation.

In the political sphere, the idea that in order to obtain international recognition it would be necessary to establish a strong democracy helped maintain stability. Moreover, continuous conflict in the South served as a reminder of the importance of solving controversies peacefully. It is argued that this could have had the role of an external enemy as an element for a country's internal union (Walls 2009, 389).

Still in terms of political structure, there is much discussion about whether the country should move away its clan system and traditional decision-making mechanisms from its institutions, as it is argued that they generate rivalries in the public sphere. However, as imperfect as the peace and

institution-building process has been in Somaliland, its achievements are meaningful and demonstrate the importance of handling these processes in a local and bottom-up way. Thus, there are less disputes over the institutional progresses under construction.

In short, while other attempts of peacebuilding in Africa made by international organizations have failed, notably in Somalia, in Somaliland there is an example of the creation of stability driven solely by native leaders. In the region, a unique model of democracy was created, mixing Somali elements to Western prerogatives. In Africa, abrupt transitions to democratic regimes have caused instability in many countries. Somaliland is an example of how customs and traditional structures must be considered when establishing democratic regimes in countries as diverse and complex as the ones in Africa. This way, the country emerges as an interesting example of the construction of state structure not only for post-colonial nations around the world.

In terms of its search for recognition, it is undeniable that the country already fulfills the legal requirements in order to be considered a *de facto* state. The international community tends to follow the African Union's positions regarding boundaries in the continent, and it has been firm in defending that a possible recognition of Somaliland could lead to more instability. For the moment, the best strategies for the country are to maintain itself firm in its road to build a consolidated democracy. Achievements such as its response to the 2020 pandemic can accelerate this process, and it is interesting for the country to keep trying to influence decision makers in nations such as the US, the UK and Scandinavian countries, where there are many Somali expatriates. South Sudan, which obtained international recognition in 2011, is an example of successful international lobby. The government in Mogadishu, in its turn, continues to pose a difficult barrier for the country's recognition, by using its presence in international fora to advocate for Somalian union.

It is not possible to predict if Somaliland's dream is distant or close. It could happen in years, decades, or maybe never. Challenges, internal and external, are plentiful. However, the country has accomplished a lot with limited resources, and recognition would certainly help its development and, possibly, the establishment of peace in the Horn of Africa.

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to understand the processes that culminated in the political success of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland through a case study. Since its independence from Somalia in 1991, the country has gone through four electoral processes, considered fair and reliable, in addition to achieving significant stability in its territory, even without any international recognition and in adverse conditions.

It was concluded that the mixture of traditional elements with western democratic prerogatives was fundamental for the construction of stability in Somaliland. Governments and governance structures that have long been present in Somali culture were used to resolve disputes when the state failed, and were later incorporated into formality in the form of *Guurti*, a council of elders that went on to function as a senate. Several negotiations and conferences, based on the customs of the region, took place during the 90s, uniting the different rival clans that inhabited Somaliland around an ideal of nation. Furthermore, the idea that in order to obtain recognition it would be necessary to establish a solid democracy also contributed to the country's political balance. In short, even though the nation has profound problems, such as misery, corruption and lack of recognition, it is possible to say that in Somaliland a new model of hybrid democracy has emerged so far successfully. And while attempts at peacebuilding in Africa by outside agents have failed, Somaliland is a successful example led by local actors using endogenous governance elements, which can bring lessons and teachings applicable to other cases on the continent.

ETHIOPIAN REGIONAL ASCENSION: ETHIOPIA'S FOREIGN POLICY FROM MENGISTU HAILÉ MARIAM TO ABIY AHMED ALI

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Introduction

The African Horn is located at the eastern end of the African continent, in a peninsular formation that politically covers eight countries today: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. Historically, the region has always been targeted by foreign powers, due to its strategic geopolitical position, in this case, the connection of the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. However, the history of East Africa included the formation of rudimentary political units that managed to develop the productive forces: among them, the Axum and Abyssinian Empires, which developed on the Ethiopian plateau and along the Somali coast, stand out (Pereira 2007).

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It can be seen from the above that the current borders of the African Horn, as in much of Africa, are the result of political and diplomatic treaties between European powers. However, in the center of the African Horn, the secular empire of Abyssinia survived the Turkish-Ottoman and European attacks, configuring itself as a political bastion of sovereignty, stability, resistance and strength. Thus arose the myth of the Ethiopian force on the African continent, a people who managed to repel the Italian attacks in 1896, at the Battle of Adowa, and guarantee their independence. In this sense that — as will be seen later — Ethiopia constitutes a pillar of stability and development to the politically unstable Horn of Africa, since its presence in the region and its state and military apparatus date back to immemorial times (Visentini 2012).

With a long diplomatic tradition, Ethiopia has also established itself as a bastion of the decolonization of the African continent after World War II, welcoming the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in its capital and advocating for the emancipation of the remaining colonies on the continent. Still, despite diplomatic haughtiness, the Ethiopian state exposed contradictions: governed by a practically absolutist emperor, the majority of the population was still under the control of feudal lords and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. This situation changed dramatically in the first half of the 1970s with the beginning of the revolutionary process in the country. After 1974, the monarchy was overthrown and an Armed Forces Committee — the Derg — would lead the Revolution, national development and foreign policy (Halliday and Molineux 1981).

The events from 1974 to the present day built the Republic of Ethiopia, that is, the modern Ethiopian state. Before the 1974 revolution, Ethiopian foreign policy was still tied to the interests of an archaic landed elite and automatic alignment with the West. After the revolution, Ethiopia sought alignment with the East and greater national development, seeking to destroy the archaic structures of the countryside and the clergy. With the end of the Cold War and, consequently, the economic and military support of the Soviet Union, Ethiopia succumbed to its own internal struggles in 1991 and a new period of redemocratization began gradually. To succeed the Derg, the 1991 revolutionaries commanded the country still with the Derg's authoritarian inheritances, with examples of external belligerence, lack of transparency in the conduct of internal politics, repression of popular movements, among others (Visentini 2018).

Since the rise of Abiy Ahmed Ali to the post of prime minister in 2018, there has been an acceleration of reforms and political and economic

opening since the Revolution. It is a fact that such reforms have been underway since 1991, but the speed that such a remodeling took with Prime Minister Ali is remarkable. In this sense, this article seeks to analyze the conduct of foreign policy in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from the 1974 Revolution to the first year of Abiy Ahmed Ali's administration, investigating in the process to which Ethiopia's regional rise in the African Horn is due. Through a bibliographic review, it appears that this process of political reopening occurs due to the needs of national development and the rise of a new party to the post of prime minister.

The variables of analysis to verify this hypothesis would be (i) the pace of economic growth in the country in recent decades, (ii) the approach to China, (iii) foreign investments in the country, (iv) privatization packages, (v) diplomatic rapprochement with neighbors and (vi) diplomatic offensives. It is concluded in an assertive way that since the end of the Meles Zenawi administration, in 2012, Ethiopia has gone through a phase of greater openness in the conduct of its foreign policy precisely because of the need for subsidies to national development. Finally, this work is justified in view of its effort to understand a recent political phenomenon in the interstate dynamics of East Africa.

Ethiopian Revolutions and Derg's legacy

From 1941 to 1974, Ethiopia was governed, uninterruptedly, by Hailé Selassié, successor to the Ethiopian Empire. Selassié, after the withdrawal of Italian troops in World War II, sought to restore the status quo ante, trying to preserve the archaic structures of the Ethiopian monarchy, relying on local land leaders, the clergy and the international support of the capitalist bloc, in the context of the Cold War. However, from 1973, the archaic foundations of the monarchy collapsed with the beginning of the 1974 international recession (Tareke 2009; Visentini 2012).

If the year 1973 represented the rise of the Third World with the international inflationary process of commodities, it was not so for the specific case of Ethiopia. In fact, Ethiopian foreign trade has always been based on primary products — such as coffee, cowhide, khat[4] and gold — but in 1973 a long period of drought affected the entire pastoral belt of the African

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4 Narcotic stimulant similar to amphetamine. The World Health Organization (WHO) considers it a drug that causes chemical dependence, which has led many countries to control its trade.

Sahel — especially Ethiopia —, and when the financial instability of the Nixon Shock summoned the periphery to claim the deterioration of terms of trade, Ethiopia had lost much of its annual crop. At first, the Ethiopian emperor, Hailé Selassié, did not seek international help, fearing that a weakened image of Ethiopia would be an opportunity for regional neighbors to project themselves over the country. The emperor's disregard for the critical situation — which claimed the lives of 300,000 Ethiopians — would not go unpunished (Droz and Rowley 1993).

In this context of political apathy, a revolutionary committee (Derg), which emerged from the top of the Armed Forces, which faced the archaic structures, articulated a coup against the Selassié monarchy in September 1974. Selassié tried to negotiate power and delay the end of the monarchy, but on September 12, the parliament was dissolved, and Emperor Hailé Selassié himself deposed and exiled. Apparently confused and apathetic, the political movements of 1974 represented the complete erosion of the Ethiopian monarchy, based on the archaic structures of a feudal aristocracy and a modern political structure. In this context, popular pressures lacked the direction and leadership to call for a unified movement against the status quo — however, the Armed Forces did. The Armed Forces have always been at the forefront of questioning the political and economic contradictions of the monarchy, and since the mid-1960s, they have opposed the emperor (Schwab 1985; Visentini 2012).

In December 1974, the Derg presented the Political Guidelines on Ethiopian Socialism (Ethiopian Tikdem), which include the collectivization of the countryside, the nationalization of all banks, 13 insurance companies and about 70 industries, as well as the creation of an avant-garde party. The measure of greatest impact, without a doubt, was the deep agrarian reform that the committee undertook. In fact, the entire Ethiopian economy and society was based on the primary sector, and thus the Derg needed support from the peasant communities, in addition to undermining the feudal aristocracy (Tareke 2009; Visentini 2012).

It is notable that, from 1974 to 1977, a vacuum of power was established in Ethiopian politics, which reverberated throughout the East African region. In 1974, the insufficiencies of the revolutionary government led to an internal dispute for political preponderance within the vanguard committee itself. In the interim of three years, the rise of Amhara Mengistu Hailé Mariam was sponsored by the most radical wing of the Derg. This three-year political stalemate was due precisely to the committee's indecision between which policy to adopt to the regime. Although it was a declared socialist

regime since 1974, there was still no consensus within the committee whether the Marxist-Leninist line would be taken, a fact that would change the country's entire foreign policy (Schwab 1985; Visentini 2012).

Since 1953, Ethiopia has maintained military ties with the United States and Israel, both desirous of a stable and conservative Ethiopian state that would eliminate the communist threat, by the desire of the USA, and the Arab nationalism, by the desire of Israel. In addition to the common adversaries, the USA saw Ethiopia as a state capable of maintaining order in the African Horn, since it was suspicious of Somalia's political instability. The year of 1977, however, marks the tipping point of Ethiopian foreign policy — at least momentarily. In early 1977, Ethiopia, by adhering to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, broke off with the USA (Visentini 2012).

In July of the same year, the revolution began to reverberate throughout the region: Siad Barre's Somalia invaded the southern portion of Ethiopia, in order to form a large Somalia, bringing together ethnic minorities in the Ogaden desert. Such ethnic minorities, however, have long been areas of resistance to Addis Ababa a long time ago, and therefore the 1977 Somali invasion was an opportunistic attempt by Siad Barre to support these areas of resistance and expand Somalia's borders (Schwab 1985).

Apparently defenseless, due to the instability caused by internal groups, the Derg managed to defend itself from foreign hostilities, relying on a new ally: the Soviet Union (USSR). The adoption of Marxism-Leninism as a doctrine of Ethiopian socialism and revolution had a foreign policy projection character. The USSR, desirous of a more stable political ally in the African Horn region, supported the Mengistu regime to build the new Ethiopian state. At first, Soviet and Cuban advisers tried to reconcile the two belligerents — given that Siad Barre had been a socialist and Soviet ally since 1969. However, feeling betrayed by conflicting interests, in November 1977, Barre expelled Soviet advisers and Cubans and broke off with the socialist bloc. At the same time, the diplomatic and military relationship between Ethiopia and the USSR grew. In March 1978, thanks to Soviet logistical and material support and 16,000 Cuban soldiers, Ethiopian forces expelled the invading Somali forces (Schwab 1985; Visentini 2012).

In the midst of southern problems, Ethiopia also faced areas of internal resistance. The province of Eritrea, a former Italian colony annexed by Ethiopia after World War II, took advantage of the political vacuum to rise against the Ethiopian occupation. Eritrea, in a way, has always been a disparate state in Ethiopia. Although the coastline in the Red Sea has been under Ethiopian rule for a few centuries, ethnic differences have aggravated the

differences between Ethiopians — mostly Amhara and Christian Tigrayan — and Eritreans — mostly Christian and Muslim Tigrayan, influenced by the Ottoman yoke. Thus, the Eritrean political structure eager to emancipate was formed by two pillars of identification: the Ottoman and Italian colonial heritage, and the ethnic-religious differences. Furthermore, the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, beginning in the 1980s, took on the shape of yet another proxy war in the context of the Cold War on the African continent. On the one hand, the Eritrean insurgents were supported by the USA, China, Somalia, Sudan and Syria, and on the other hand, Ethiopia was supported only by the USSR, North Korea and, to a lesser extent, Israel (Pool 1998; Visentini 2018).

In this context, in 1977, the EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front) controlled much of the interior of the Eritrean province, while Mengistu, uncompromising about the political fragmentation of his country, controlled only the capital Asmara and the ports of Massawa and Assab (Schwab 1985). This scenario, however, would change with Soviet support. The USSR would not let the Ethiopian central power lose its way out to the sea, precisely because this would mean the loss of a strategic point in the Red Sea. Supported by Soviet logistics, Ethiopian forces, from 1978 to 1982, contained the Eritrean insurrections (Pool 1998).

The situation of the Ethiopian socialist regime began to erode in 1984. This year, another drought devastated the countryside, demonstrating the fragility of the Derg's agrarian reform policies. From 1985 to 1991, the situation became untenable, as Soviet aid dissipated because of the ruin of the socialist bloc and the military escalation that internal conflicts in Ethiopia were taking. From 1985 to 1989, the EPLF took over much of the Eritrean territory and, in addition to military victories, it joined the TPLF guerrilla militia (Tigray People's Liberation Front), which was internal to the Ethiopian territory and representative of the minority ethnic group, in order to both overthrow Mengistu's authoritarianism. In May 1991, Mengistu Hailé Mariam fled Addis Ababa, while the EPLF-TPLF union was victorious over the Ethiopian capital. From this union of guerrilla groups came the EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, in its acronym in English), which, since then, has been hegemonic in parliament and in the structures of the Ethiopian state (Visentini 2012).

With regard to discontinuities, the 1974 Revolution succeeded in destroying many of the archaic structures of the monarchy, such as the power of the feudal nobility and the complacency of Ethiopian foreign policy with the capitalist powers. Certainly, the revolution strengthened Ethiopian foreign policy, which, after 1974, sought to be more incisive on regional and

diplomatic issues with foreign powers, giving it a more independent content — unlike Selassié's complacency. In the economic sphere, the Derg was successful in urban organization by managing associations of proletarians — *kebelles* — that would correspond to the rise of state industrialism (Schwab 1985), and in public education, an area in which a deep student reform was applied in 1980, with a view to literacy — a reform that was even recognized by UNESCO with the International Literary Association for Literacy Award (Halliday and Molineux 1981). Although the collectivization of the countryside was disastrous in 1984 with the beginning of the Great Famine, such agrarian reform served to start the end of aristocratic feudalism and the beginning of urbanization. Since the beginning of the revolution, therefore, three variables can be noted: (i) national development and socioeconomic transformation; (ii) change of orientation in foreign policy and (iii) high diplomatic offensive.

From Meles Zenawi to Hailemariam Desalegn: national reconstruction

Indeed, one of the Derg's legacies has endured time: authoritarianism. The authority figure, however, is already an intrinsic feature to the structures of Ethiopian politics since the Axumite emperors. But, particularly this legacy, the Derg not only did not know how to dissolve, but, in a way, used it to balance its power. The figure that marks this continuity of the 1974 legacy is, without a doubt, Meles Zenawi. Zenawi was one of the most prominent leaders of the TPLF, a tenacious and resolute guerrilla for the Tigrayan cause, and responsible for leading the Derg to its ruin in May 1991. Since then, Zenawi, and the bulk of the EPRDF's political elites, have led Ethiopia to internal and external processes to national policy (Dias 2013). Within the variables of analysis, the pace of growth of the country during the 1990s was low and, equally, with low participation of the national and foreign private sectors; due to the end of the Cold War tensions, Africa as a whole was put on the margins of high international politics; Ethiopia faced problems with its neighbors in the African Horn, tarnishing the country's diplomatic image (Visentini 2018).

Internally, the political elites of the EPRDF sought, by increasing state capacities, to implement a project to strengthen the state, by promoting reforms aimed at the integration of the country, in order to avoid the destruction of the nation, as it seemed, to the time, that the entire African Horn was doomed. According to the 1995 Constitution, a regime of ethnic

federalism would prevail in the country, in which both freedom of worship and the right to self-determination would give a greater voice to the amalgamation of peoples that Ethiopia had always been. The regions would be dominated according to the predominant local ethnicity, and their official language would follow according to the majority. Although Article 39 of the Constitution protected this implicit right to secession, Zenawi sought to form a cohesive state, using as a pretext the representation of minorities — given that he himself was a representative of the Tigrayan minority (Dias 2013; Hagmann and Abbink 2011).

In the economic sphere, the Zenawi government sought to accommodate itself to the global order in search of favorable investments and trade agreements that would guarantee the recovery and development of the domestic economy. In this sense, in 1991, the centrally planned economy was abandoned and the process of economic liberalization began. In 1994, the EPRDF announced a Five-Year Development Program with the objective of improving the infrastructure and conditions for making investments and which was assisted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The program focused specifically on health, education, agriculture, road construction and mining projects (Clapham 2006; Vestal 1999).

In the security sphere, the country significantly increased its state capacities, which had a positive impact on its foreign and security policy, starting in the 2000s. In addition, the primacy of national security was maintained, with special attention to security challenges produced by internal insurgent groups and neighboring countries sponsoring the proxies. In this context, a strong internal coercive and repressive apparatus was built to contain the internal threats from the remaining insurgent groups, capable of guaranteeing the country's territorial integrity and external defense. Thus, despite the extensive Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programs put in place, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) was formed by the integration of the armed wing of the EPRDF and elements of the Derg forces, based on equitable representation of nations, nationalities and Ethiopian peoples (Cardoso 2020; Vestal 1999).

Externally, the fall of the Derg in 1991 caused yet another rapid power vacuum that shook the entire African Horn, proving, again, that Ethiopia is the pillar of the entire region. As early as January 1991, the Siad Barre regime in Somalia, without any external assistance, could not stand the pressure of internal disputes and collapsed, fragmenting into warlords' struggles. The entire southern part of Somalia — the former Italian administration — was seized by a social upheaval, while the northern part — the former British protectorate (Somaliland) — declared itself independent and maintained relative

political stability, but with little international recognition (Visentini 2012). Since 1991, attempts have been made to re-stabilize the southern portion of the country, carried out by different actors. For example, the UN, in response to the intensification of the conflict and the worsening of the humanitarian crisis, established the United Nations Operation for Somalia (UNOSOM I) in 1991, with the mandate to guarantee the distribution of food to the population and monitor the ceasefire agreement between the fighting factions. However, UNOSOM I failed to restore order in the country (Schmidt 2018).

In this unstable scenario in the Horn of Africa, a regional political project stands out that, although at first glance not apparent, at the limit aims to develop economically the entire region of the African Horn: the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Visentini 2018). The IGAD was another legacy of the Derg, founded in 1986 to combat the endemic drought in the Sahel region. This is, in fact, one of the most endemic factors for the socioeconomic destabilization of the African Horn (Pereira 2007). Within the analysis of the variables in this article, it is interesting to point out that IGAD was a step towards rapprochement with Ethiopian neighbors, a strong component of diplomatic offensive and an attempt at joint regional development.

In this sense, the Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Development (IGADD) was first founded in 1986 by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. A first move towards integration is signaled by the nationalist government of Mengistu and by the other states in the region concerned with the primary economy. Regional integration, in its embryonic stage, seemed to demonstrate a palliative concern, but it had objectives of stabilization and economic development, given the social and economic revolutions that states like Ethiopia were going through. However, the destabilization of the region went beyond the endemic drought of the Sahel, considering that from 1991 onwards the region started to count on the political and military destabilization of the states of Somalia and Sudan, and later, of Eritrea, in 1998, when it entered a collision course with Ethiopia (Visentini 2012; 2018).

In 1994, IGADD was renamed Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), increasing its scope of action, including security and defense issues in the region, in addition to economic development, communications and transport. As such, a regional integration of the Horn of Africa has the impetus to develop economically, bringing together poles of dynamic economy — such as Ethiopia and Kenya —, but rather needs to unite for peace and security. An eclectic analysis makes it possible to verify that such

security integration has, in fact, a view to the union of national markets, given that the region's economic hubs, in addition to having Chinese and American aid, grant the flow of production to the neighboring states. Stabilization is the logical means to achieve the practical economic end (Cardoso 2016; Visentini 2018).

Therefore, since 2002, IGAD, which integrates the African Horn states[5], has tried to install a transitional government in Somalia to stabilize the region. The Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) was created in 2005 to have such an assignment, that, however, in 2006 it faced resistance from warlords. Ethiopia has sought since 1977 to contain Somali expansionism and, above all, to keep the entire African Horn in a stable manner under its umbrella. In the Zenawi administration, with the Eritrean emancipation in 1993, the subsequent loss of sea access and the beginning of conflicts with Eritrea in 1998, dependence on Djibouti as an Ethiopian foreign trade partner increased — both countries are connected by a railway line since the time of the French administration of Djibouti. To this end, in December 2006, Ethiopia intervened in the neighboring country to support the TFP, seeking to stabilize the entire region. However, even with US diplomatic, logistical and military support, Ethiopia was unable to assert peace in the neighboring country, being forced to withdraw in early 2009[6], in compliance with the Djibouti Peace Agreement signed in 2008 (Cepik and Schneider 2010).

Again, the 1991 Derg's power vacuum reverberated in another direction: Eritrea. Zenawi — a former member of the TPLF — came to power with the help of the EPLF and, therefore, gave a positive nod to Eritrea, which in 1993, after a popular referendum, opted for political emancipation. On May 24, 1993, the Secretary General of the EPLF, Isaias Afewerki, was elected Eritrean president, which continues to this day as an unchallenged leader. From independence until 1998, Zenawi and Afewerki maintained friendly relations, until political impasses over border disputes and the shared use, between the two countries, of the ports of Massawa and Assab led the nations to the armed conflict in 1998. Both worn out by the conflict, negotiated peace in 2000 and submitted the border dispute to arbitration by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In 2002, the Ethiopian and Eritrean Border Commission gave a favorable case to Eritrea and ruled that the Ethiopian occupation of the city of Badme was illegal. Meles Zenawi did not comply with the ICJ's

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5 Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda were members in 2002.

6 The Ethiopian government sent troops back to Somalia in 2014 under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Currently the country has about 4,395 contingents in AMISOM (Cardoso 2020).

decision, and both states remained without a formal peace treaty until 2018 (Maru 2017; Visentini 2012). Derg's legacy of animosity towards neighboring states is still evident, making the diplomatic projection of the Ethiopian state difficult.

After the formal end of the war against Eritrea, the Ethiopian government put in place a program to reform its foreign and security policy, aiming to provide more assertive responses to the new regional and international context. In 2002, the government drew up a White Paper (the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy of Ethiopia — FANSPS), which restructured the concepts and approach of the country's foreign and security policy. The document defined that Ethiopian foreign and security policy should follow the principle of Concentric Circles, which established the country's priorities and positions in the different spheres of regional policy. According to the document, we can see three concentric circles: the first, broader, would be the antagonism with Egypt[7] and concerns about a militant Islamic state in the region. The second would be composed of the other neighboring countries, which could threaten the country immediately, through invasions or destabilization, through sponsorship of insurgent groups (proxy). Finally, the third, the innermost circle, refers to the countries with which Ethiopia has unresolved border disputes (Ethiopia 2002; Mohammed 2007).

In line with the principles contained in FANSPS, Ethiopia has projected forces on the civil conflict that had been taking place in Sudan in the regions of Darfur — since 2007 — and Abyei — since 2011. In this context, the country participates in UNISFA (United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei) with 3,900 staff, 1,900 contingents at UNAMID (United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur) and 2,158 staff at UNMISS (United Nations Mission in South Sudan)[8]. It is demonstrated once again that the stabilization of their contiguous territories and the diplomatic offensive have always been a policy shared by Ethiopian leaders. In general terms, the Ethiopian foreign security and defense policy during the Meles Zenawi government was guided by a set of "national defense" principles contained in the 1995 Constitution, which were reinforced in the White Paper published in 2002 (Dias 2013; Woodward 2013).

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7 Egypt plays a central role in Ethiopia's foreign and security policy strategies. A reflection of this can be found in FANSPS, which dedicates eleven pages to the country (Maru 2017).

8 Since January 2016, Ethiopia has been at the top of the ranking of troop contributing countries (TCCs) for UN Peace Operations, worldwide. Currently, Addis Ababa has about 7,554 contingents in three United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNISFA, UNMISS and UNAMID), in addition to about 4,385 staff in the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Cardoso 2020).

On 20 August 2012, Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, died of infectious complications. Immediately, Hailemariam Desalegn, Deputy Secretary-General of the EPDRF, succeeds him to the head of the government. Zenawi represented one of the continuities of Derg's break. With his death, a process of institutional reforms in the Ethiopian state begins to take shape. At first, however, Desalegn's choice as Zenawi's successor was the result of a little ruminated political calculation: first of all, it was necessary to maintain the balance of the ethnic federalism of the 1995 Constitution — Desalegn was a Tigrayan, a northern minority; second, Desalegn was the obvious choice to succeed Meles Zenawi — given that Desalegn was deputy secretary-general of the dominant party in the Ethiopian parliament (Dias 2013).

From 2012 to 2018, however, Desalegn proved to be more skilled in the field of foreign policy than his predecessor. With support from China — which offered low interest loans —, Desalegn undertook the modernization of the country's energy complex, in addition to seeking alternatives to foreign trade logistics by promoting bilateral agreements with Kenya, Djibouti and Somaliland. To this end, Desalegn undertook, through IGAD, the construction of railways, highways and an oil pipeline through a Juba-Lamu corridor — known as Corridor of Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia, or LAPSSET, in the acronym in English — , which will link the South Sudanese oil wells and the Kenyan port of Lamu, passing through Ethiopian territory (Cardoso 2020; Visentini 2018). In addition to infrastructure work, Desalegn is also credited for maintaining the Ethiopian economy at growth above double digits in 2013 (10.5%), 2014 (10.2%) and 2015 (10.3%) (World Bank 2020).

In the scope of the variables of this work, Desalegn conducted an administration that accelerated the pace of economic growth in the country, approaching China, attracting foreign capital, partial rapprochement with the neighbors of the African Horn and also a timid diplomatic offensive. At the regional level, one can mention, for example, the creation of various forums and partnerships to assist in building the security capacity of South Sudan, discussing and resolving common security threats. Ethiopia has also trained officers from the South Sudanese Army (SSA), pilots, technical experts and engineers in Addis Ababa and has sent security officers and experts to Juba to support the SSA transformation process. In turn, South Sudan bought light weapons and ammunition, as well as refurbished tanks and other military equipment from Ethiopia (Cardoso 2020; Makonnen and Lulie 2014).

The rapid growth of the Ethiopian economy in the last decade, with the expansion of the services and agriculture sectors, contributed to the increase of public investments in infrastructure and to the increase of inter-

dependence between Addis Ababa and its neighbors. As an example, we can mention the increase in the volume of Ethiopian private investments in neighboring states, particularly in Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti and Kenya, in the energy and transport sectors. This also contributed to the increase in Ethiopian demands regarding the use of ports in the region, especially in Djibouti, for their foreign trade. In this context, the Ethiopian government recently modernized the railway that links Addis Ababa to Djibouti, and has been expanding the network of capillary roads to access the interior of the country, with plans to expand the internal rail network as well (Cardoso 2020).

In short, this demonstrates that Hailemariam may have started the process of institutional reforms, based on a diplomacy more conciliatory with his neighbors and with a project of a broader and more modern industrial park. However, his performance as Ethiopian Prime Minister proved to be an obstacle to the political process that was taking place, a factor that led him to resign his condition on February 15, 2018[9] (Dias 2013).

Abiy Ahmed Ali: the regional rise

Indeed, the rise of Abiy Ahmed Ali to the post of Ethiopian prime minister on April 2, 2018, marks the triumph of political and economic reforms. Abiy, of Oromo descent[10], pursues an even more conciliatory and proactive foreign policy than his predecessors. A fact that confirms the above is the Peace Agreement of July 9, 2018, between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which ended 16 years of a poorly negotiated peace between the two countries and earned Ali the honors of the 100th Nobel Peace Prize in 2019. This attitude, in line with other bilateral agreements with states with coastline in the Indian Ocean, is a reflection of Ethiopia's need to participate in international trade and to project itself into the African Horn region as a key component of peace and stability (Reuters 2018).

In keeping with and continuing with its predecessor, Ali (i) strengthened ties with China to (ii) attract foreign capital in order to continue with infrastructure and modernization projects, such as the Great Dam of the

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9 One of the reasons that led to Hailemariam Desalegn's resignation was the popular protests against the government that began in 2015, resulting in a serious political crisis with profound implications for the country's internal and foreign policy. In general, the leaders of the movements called for political and social reforms, greater political participation and criticized the supposed privileges of the tigrayan elite (Cardoso 2020).

10 Oromo is the ethnic majority in the south of the country, which for centuries has been subjugated to the interests of the north of the country.

Ethiopian Renaissance (GDER), (iii) carried out privatization packages in telecommunications, transport, energy and logistics, thus, (iv) maintaining a good economic performance in 2018 (6.8%) and 2019 (8.2%) (World Bank 2020). Furthermore, as a cause and reflection of subsidies to the national economy, it also engendered a reorientation in the stance of internal and external policies.

Ali, since taking office, has taken internal reform measures — such as the appointment of the diplomat Sahle-Work Zewde to the country's honorary presidency in October 2018 — and regional integration — such as the normalization of relations with Eritrea in July, and the multilateral approach with South Sudan and Kenya for the construction of a trade corridor, and with Somaliland for the use of the port of Berbera (Visentini 2012; 2018).

In the economic sphere, Ali implemented a reform of state sectors and opened companies in the areas of telecommunications, transport, energy and logistics. On the one hand, strategic sectors will still be kept with 51% of the shares under state control — such as Ethiopian Airlines, Internet and energy services — meanwhile, less strategic sectors may be completely privatized — such as railroads, industrial parks, hotels etc. (Maasho 2018; Saigal 2018). Ali carries out this movement to maintain the country's external solvency and boost growth, including opening the country's first capital market from 2020 (Zekele 2019).

In the field of regional cooperation, what was observed was a significant deepening of economic projects in the commercial, telecommunications, transport, housing and energy sectors. It should be noted that even before Ali's political rise, the country's economic growth was reaping the rewards of previous administrations, whether in expanding agriculture or with a significant increase in public investments, which led Ethiopia to increase the volume of its private investments in Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti and Kenya. In addition to agreements between Addis Ababa and Juba, in the areas mentioned above, and the establishment of regular flights between Ethiopia and South Sudan by Ethiopian Airlines, financial corporations such as the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) and United Bank (UB) began to operate in the neighboring country. The Ethiopian state, which has already supplied electricity (since 2011) and drinking water (since 2014) to Djibouti, has strengthened this supply transmission, which transports about 100,000 cubic meters of water daily (Cardoso 2020).

In this sense, because of the need for national development, that, since 2003, the growth rates of the Ethiopian economy are the second highest in the entire African continent. In addition, the country's population is

one of the largest on the continent and one of the fastest growing annually (Visentini 2007). Adding these two facts to the climate changes that have been occurring in the world since the 1950s, water control by the Ethiopian government has become one of its five-year plan priorities. It is in this respect that the Ali administration, since 2018, has carried out a diplomatic offensive, together with a rapprochement with its neighbors, to guarantee national interests, such as the construction of the largest hydroelectric dam on the African continent, the Great Dam of the Ethiopian Renaissance (GDER), with a production capacity of 6,000 MW, which will supply cheap electricity not only to Ethiopia, but also to Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya and Egypt. However, the construction of such a dam breeds an international dispute to the present day with the other riverside countries downstream (Cardoso 2020; Rahman 2012).

As early as 2010, the Zenawi government announced that the construction of a dam on the Blue Nile — a tributary river of the Nile that has its source on the Ethiopian plateau — would be planned — a fact that caused controversy to the governments of countries bathed by the Nile downstream — especially the Egyptian government. In 2014, GDER's works, despite the Egyptian lobby, were started with the help of Chinese capital. After three years of work, with 60% of its installations completed, the Egyptian government still disputes the arbitrariness of the Ethiopian government (Rahman 2012).

The energy dispute over the waters of the Nile Basin dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, when agreements between riparian countries and the United Kingdom were discussed in 1902, but little was formally signed. In 1922, Egypt managed to emancipate itself from England, taking advantage of the fragility of the metropolis after World War I. To this end, in 1929, Egypt signed a treaty with England, which grants unrestricted freedom and monopoly to deliberate on the economic and energy issues of the Nile River. In 1956, Sudan also managed to emancipate itself from the old metropolis, and the Nasser government expertly negotiated the issues of sharing the economic and energy exploitation of the Nile in a 1959 treaty, which divided the possibility of using water advantages between the two states. It has been observed, so far, that the use of the Nile basin as a source of energy resources has been an almost monopoly of the former British colonies that were directly bathed in the main river, while the other states upstream were excluded from diplomatic negotiations, either because they were still colonies — and, therefore, non-sovereign nations —, either because they were states without economic conditions to explore the use of hydropower (Maupin 2016; Rahman 2012).

Therefore, since February 1999, the states upstream of the River Nile have come together to claim their right to use the river and challenge the supposed arbitrary veto right of the Egyptian state. Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda face the hegemonic position that Egypt takes at the mouth of the Nile and together form the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), a regional mechanism for dialogue and river water management. It is notable that the Egyptian state enjoys a comfortable situation, inherited from the English colonial period, which has perpetuated for almost a century. Only recently, with the organization of African states bathed by the Nile River, is the status quo questioned. Ethiopian measures, however, cannot be premeditated and inconsequential, given that GDER, when completed, will take 10 years to fill its reservoir, a period which the countries downstream will lose in water flow. In addition to filling the dam, the formation of the Ethiopian dam lake will cause permanent losses to the downstream countries, due to the increase in the natural evaporation of water through the contact surface (Rahman 2012).

Ali has moved steadily to ensure national interests in the face of Egyptian hegemony. However, to date, the diplomatic dispute over the use of the Nile River's water potential has not yet been resolved between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. From a regional point of view, Ali won other victories, such as peace with Eritrea, modernization of the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway and bilateral agreements for the use of ports in Sudan, Somaliland and Kenya. It is notable that the lack of access to the sea hampers Ethiopian development and, in this regard, Ali seeks to reconnect with neighbors to ensure alternatives to drain subsidies for national development (Visentini 2018).

Still from a regional point of view, Ethiopia makes great use of IGAD to maintain regional peace and thus achieve development and cooperation goals. Regarding the security aspect of the IGAD, it cannot simply be characterized as a regional balance of power, given that there are no external enemies, but internal ones. In a defensive security approach, regional actors would come together to defend a greater threat that seeks to increase power. However, the perceived threat in the African Horn comes from localized conflicts — bankruptcy of the Somali state, South Sudanese civil war, terrorism, etc. — and contesting states — Afewerki's Eritrea and al-Bashir's Sudan. Collective security can, to some extent, be configured as a balance of power in relation to Eritrea and Sudan, since integration guarantees the cohesion of the region, preventing members from seeking the use of force to resolve disputes, instead of peaceful solutions (Visentini 2018).

The IGAD, after the destabilization of the region in 1991, focused its efforts on a security agenda. Four regional factors that threaten the economic development of the African Horn must be highlighted here: (i) the bankruptcy of the Somali state and its internal political fragmentation; (ii) the Eritrean state's belligerence, commanded by Isaias Afewerki since the country's independence; (iii) the Sudanese civil war that led, in 2011, to the independence of the southern portion of the country and (iv) the presence of terrorist groups, which formed armed militias opposed to the governments of the region — among them, al-Shabaab stands out. In this sense, the IGAD, which at first had an environmental and socio-economic agenda, found itself insufficient to alleviate the region's problems, having to move to a scope not only broader, but also more focused on the collective security of the African Horn (Visentini 2018).

However, IGAD does not yet undertake many projects in the economic sense, since economic integration between regional actors is only possible with the harmonization of trade and macroeconomic policies. In fact, IGAD has economic purposes, but such an end is only possible with the political stabilization of regional conflicts. Thus, IGAD has socio-economic purposes to develop the region, but it is still in a stage of regional stabilization, through a security agenda (Visentini 2018).

Finally, another factor of the Ali administration was the recent resumption of diplomatic relations with Eritrea. In the first few months of his government, the Ethiopian Prime Minister formally acknowledged the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Borders Commission (EEBC) of 2002, on the demarcation of territorial boundaries between the two states, in addition to concluding a new peace agreement with the Eritrean President, Isaias Afewerki, aimed at restoring diplomatic relations between the two nations and reopening their borders. After recognizing the definitions of the EEBC, on 5 June 2018, Eritrean authorities, such as the delegation headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Osman Saleh, and Ethiopians, exchanged official visits and a series of commitments were signed, within the framework of the Peace and Friendship, such as ending the state of war; political, economic, cultural and security cooperation, as well as the reopening of its embassies in the respective capitals; the reestablishment of the lines of commerce, transport and communication; and cooperation to promote peace and security in the region (Cardoso 2020).

Whereas, for Ethiopia, the rapprochement symbolizes the end of the financing of insurgent groups and the proxy war in its territory (threats to the national integrity of the country); and the use of Eritrean ports as alternatives

to the port of Djibouti, for Eritrea, the normalization of diplomatic relations with the neighbor has as a backdrop the end of the country's regional and international isolation and a greater participation in the integration processes underway in the region, with its readmission to IGAD; in addition to attracting foreign direct investments to modernize its infrastructure in strategic sectors, such as the port sector, for example (Cardoso 2020).

By the end of 2018, Ethiopian Airlines flights to Asmara were resumed, granted the use of the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa by Ethiopia, the telephone lines between the two states were re-established and troops were withdrawn from their borders. Developments related to Ali's diplomatic role and peace between the two countries were also visible at the regional level, and in September of the same year, a tripartite agreement was signed between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia within the framework of the region's economic, political and security stability, through the establishment of a Joint High-Level Committee, integrated by the ministers of foreign affairs of the three states. An agreement was also mediated by Ethiopia, aiming at the normalization of relations between the governments of Eritrea and Djibouti, broken in 2008, after disputes over the island Doumeira; and a meeting between South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and the leader of the Sudan Opposition People's Liberation Movement (SPLM-IO), Riek Machar, in Addis Ababa (Cardoso 2020).

Conclusion

As seen, Ethiopia, due to its strategic geographic position and capabilities, remained a relevant player in regional politics after 1991, playing a central role for polarization in the Horn of Africa. After the wear and tear of decades of wars, the EPRDF's political elite sought to rebuild the state's capabilities to respond more assertively to internal and external challenges. Thus, since the early 2000s, the country has significantly increased its state capacities, which has had a positive impact on its foreign policy and, consequently, on the political, economic and security dynamics in the African Horn.

Therefore, Ethiopian foreign policy in the post-2000 period has focused on situations that are directly linked to the country's internal problems and stability. Participation in UN and AU Peacekeeping Operations in neighboring countries (Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan) and unilateral military intervention in Somalia are indicators that seem to support this perception. In addition, cooperation with central powers, especially with the

United States, in combating terrorism in the region has reflected this attitude of using diplomacy in a pragmatic way for national interests.

Abiy Ahmed Ali has been in office as Ethiopian Prime Minister since April 2, 2018 and has already implemented reforms in domestic, economic and foreign policy. Since 1974, with Mengistu Hailé Mariam, Ethiopia has built the foundations of a modern state and, slowly, from Meles Zenawi to Abiy Ahmed Ali, the Derg's legacy is transformed, dialectically, into the foundations of national development in 21st century Ethiopia, characterized as a reformist for uniting and transforming the socialist heritage of the revolutionary period internally and externally.

Abiy Ahmed Ali (i) strengthened ties with China to (ii) attract foreign capital in order to continue with modernization projects (iii) carried out privatization packages in telecommunications, transport, energy and logistics, in this way, (iv) maintaining a good economic performance in 2018 (6.8%) and 2019 (8.2%) (World Bank 2020). In addition, as a cause and reflection of subsidies to the national economy, in foreign policy, Ali (v) re-approached its neighboring states, establishing peace and bilateral trade, logistical and defense cooperation agreements in a (vi) diplomatic offensive aimed at guaranteeing national interests. These variables reinforce and corroborate the hypothesis of this work, and it can be concluded that the reforms of Desalegn and Abiy occur due to the need for modernization and national development, changing the country's foreign policy orientation. Through a bibliographic review, this article, therefore, achieves its objectives in elucidating the conduct of Ethiopian foreign policy from Mengistu Hailé Mariam to Abiy Ahmed Ali, in order to verify the causes and processes of the modernization of the Ethiopian state as a phenomenon of the reforms undertaken by Ali. Notwithstanding, this work was justified by the need to understand recent phenomena in the African continent.

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to analyze the conduct of the foreign policy of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from the 1974 Revolution to the first year of Abiy Ahmed Ali's administration, investigating in the process to which the country's greatest political and economic openness is due. Through a bibliographic review, it appears that this process of political reopening occurs due to the needs of national development and the rise of a new head of state. The variables of analysis to verify this hypothesis would be the country's growth rate in recent decades, the approach to China, foreign investments in the country, privatization packages, diplomatic rapprochement with neighbors and diplomatic offensives. It is concluded in an assertive way that since the end of the Meles Zenawi's administration, Ethiopia has gone through a phase of greater openness in the conduct of its foreign policy precisely because of the need for subsidies to national development. Finally, this work is justified in view of its effort to understand a recent political phenomenon in the interstate dynamics of East Africa.

ZIMBABWE'S PARADOXICAL "NEW DISPENSATION": POLITICAL HARM, ENDEMIC IMPUNITY AND UNENDING SILENCES, 2017-2020

Terence M. Mashingaidze[1]

Introduction

When President Emmerson Mnangagwa took power after the November 2017 military-assisted transition which displaced the long serving President Robert Mugabe, his newfound rhetoric signaled an uplifting rejection of the divisive language and combative politics of his predecessor. President Mugabe's 37-year reign had been premised on the contentious notion of the inevitability of violence in maintaining political power at nation-state level (Blair 2002; Meredith 2002; Chan 2003; Holland 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015). In spite of being a somewhat popular post-liberation struggle leader with strong Pan-Africanist credentials, for much of his tenure at the helm of postcolonial Zimbabwe Mugabe apparently blocked and disabled alternative political organisation by openly deploying physical and discursive violence against perceived opponents. Such politically-motivated violence coupled with economic mismanagement, hyperinflation and the flight of capital correspond to what became known as the Zimbabwean crisis in the post-2000 era (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003; Raftopoulos 2006).

As a matter of political habit, just before the 1998 labour strikes, Mugabe warned trade unionists by boasting that his governing Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party "had [academic] degrees in violence" (Blair 2002; Fleming 2014). Emblematical of this political high-handedness were the state-instigated *Gukurahundi* Massacres of the

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1980s in the Matabeleland and Midlands Provinces, which resulted in the death of nearly 20,000 Ndebele people and the 2008 nationwide election-related reprisals against the resurgent opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and its supporters (CCJP 1997; Sachikonye 2011).

In spite of having been an ever-present enabler to the foregoing exclusionary politics from the liberation struggle, when he served as Mugabe's special assistant and subsequently a long-serving government minister and Vice President in the post-colonial era, upon assumption of the presidency Mnangagwa carefully re-presented himself as a transformative politician to his fellow citizens. On numerous occasions soon after assuming power, Mnangagwa claimed to be "as soft as wool" (Mubangizi 2018). He tapped into the cross-party and near euphoric public appeal of the palace coup that ended Mugabe's rule by somehow self-consecrating his mandate to govern. Thus in the immediate aftermath of the military-assisted transition, he often quipped that "the people's voice is the voice of God" (Ndawana, 2018).

Most importantly, President Mnangagwa attempted to de-escalate long simmering domestic political tensions by calling for peace and inclusivity in national affairs while simultaneously promising free and fair elections. As a way of reversing Mugabe's two decade-long isolationism, he tried to court the international community back into the country through his trademark "Zimbabwe is Open for Business" mantra. In his inaugural address as President on the 24th of November 2017, Mnangagwa declared that:

> While *we cannot change the past*, there is a lot we can do in the present and future to give our nation a different positive direction. As we do so, *we should never remain hostages to our past. I thus humbly appeal to all of us that we let bygones be bygones*, readily embracing each other in defining a new destiny. The task at hand is that of rebuilding our great country. It principally lies with none but ourselves. I implore you all to declare that NEVER AGAIN should the circumstances that have put Zimbabwe in an unfavorable position be allowed to recur or overshadow its prospects. *We must work together, you, me, all of us who make this Nation*...The values of Unity and Peace cherished by all Zimbabweans are the enduring foundations for the desired goal of development, itself the third pillar of the trinity of Unity, Peace and Development espoused by my Party, ZANU-PF [All statements in italics are my own emphasis]. (Mnangagwa 25 November 2017).

The attempt to entice and unify diverse and contradicting publics embedded in the foregoing speech largely encapsulated the essence of what came to be optimistically defined as the *New Dispensation* in the post-Mugabe era public discourse. However, the forgive and forget ethic embedded

in the same speech, which became a signature talking point in President Mnangagwa's public rhetoric, compromised, it is argued, the newness of his dispensation as far as the healing of the nation's historical wounds and haunting legacies of politically motivated and state-inflicted violence against the citizens is concerned.

It seems that the President did not want Zimbabweans to have forthright conversations about their impunity-riven past and yet it is essential and cathartic for both victims and perpetrators to have open conversations about politically-motivated harms. While commenting on post-*apartheid* South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Antijie Krog (1998, 24) observed that "a community should not wipe out a part of its past because it leaves a vacuum that will be filled by lies and contradictory, confusing accounts of what happened." Societies cannot simply whitewash the pains of the past, perpetrators should testify and own up to their wrongs because "to make a clean break from the past, a moral beacon needs to be established between the past and the future" (1998, 24).

Although the South African TRC is generally celebrated for attempting to address the traumatic legacies of *apartheid*, especially by affirming the importance of truth-telling in post-conflict societies, its limits have become apparent over the years (Swart and van Marle 2017). The TRC fell far short in bringing justice to the victims of *apartheid* and white supremacist politics because of its 'amnesty for truth' principle which allowed most perpetrators of violence against the black African majority to simply go unpunished (Bowsher 2020). Again, the South African TRC had a limited mandate which foreclosed the availing of reparative care to victims of violence in the form of compensation, restitution, post-traumatic treatments, and justice. Such institutionalized sensitivity is crucial because "...violence and violation are not only contained in time, but have effects that far exceed the original moment of violence" (Srinivasan 1990, 305).

The following sections of the article attempt to show that President Mnangagwa's notion of a new dispensation was an indistinct rebranding of the *status quo* because his government did not significantly resolve the country's checkered human rights record. State-instigated violence, torture and enforced disappearances of human rights activists and other oppositional elements persisted. The new government did not open up civic space by guaranteeing basic freedoms of peaceful assembly and association. Procedures on police notification and authorisation of demonstrations and concomitant access to public spaces remained deliberately inchoate while processes for

holding peaceful demonstrations were at times arbitrarily enforced by the police.

Endemic Impunity and Silences as Spillovers from the Mugabe Era

President Mnangagwa's quest for Zimbabweans to disregard their painful past(s) and collectively move on under the all-inclusive national banner of "unity, peace and development" was a well-established practice in the country's defective peacebuilding architecture, largely characterised by state-decreed reconciliation pronouncements, clemency orders and amnesties for perpetrators of politically motivated harms (Mashingaidze 2017). Upon assumption of power in 1980 after a protracted, violent and life-destroying liberation struggle, then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe declared the once much-vaunted policy of national reconciliation in which he called his fellow countrymen to forget their traumatic past and forgive each other by collectively rebuilding their nation (Fisher 2010; Mashingaidze 2010). Members of the colonial Rhodesian security sector establishment who had tortured, harassed and punished black Africans *en mass* in their counter-insurgency measures were the major beneficiaries of this policy.

In the subsequent years, the Mugabe government regularly resorted to blanket amnesties and clemency orders to protect state and ruling-party-aligned perpetrators of politically motivated violence. This happened in the aftermath of all of the postcolonial era's episodic cycles of violence, such as the *Gukurahundi* Massacres of the 1980s, the 2000/2001 election-related violence, and the nationwide but state-orchestrated June 2008 violence against MDC members and supporters (Makumbe and Compagnon 2000). These state-imposed amnesties and clemency orders inevitably fomented a culture of impunity among ruling-party-aligned perpetrators of human rights violations. Ruling party supporters such as war veterans implicated and pardoned in the 2000 election-related brutalities against MDC supporters went on to repeat such violence in the 2001 by-elections and the 2002 Presidential elections (Reeler 2004; Feltoe 2004).

To a large extent, the forgoing elite-bargained measures for healing and reconciling post-conflict societies are a travesty to victims of politically-motivated violence because they compel victims to sublimate their pains and 'move on with life' unhealed and unreconciled. These measures disregard individual pains and overlook perpetrator culpability by focusing on the

community as a self-immolating abstraction of unknowable protagonists. This approach subverts one of the key principles set at the Nuremberg Tribunal soon after the Second World War: "justice has an individual focus, and does not countenance group harms" (Aoláin and Turner 2007, 31). Jürgen Habermas also averred that collective guilt does not exist. Whoever is guilty has to answer individually (Krog 1998, 24). These perspectives discount the import and moral high ground of state-defined and communal reconciliation pronouncements in favor of relocating, where possible, both the individual culprit and victim back to the center of any post-conflict measures. The South African TRC, in spite of its limitations noted above, exemplified this approach to post-conflict praxis by treating all victims of *apartheid* identically:

> There were no first and second class victims. The mother whose child died opposing *apartheid* testified next to the mother whose child died defending it. White and black, 'colored' and Indian, literate and illiterate, rural and urban-the testimony of each was respected in the same way. The TRC thus taught the country that grief, loneliness, bewilderment and pain knows no color or creed, that the cut of hurt is the same for all. This is a major break with established international thinking around 'victimhood' and it remains the TRC achievement that is the least acknowledgement (Krog 1998, 290).

Besides foreclosing opportunities for truth telling and reconciliation, the Mugabe government prevented harmed communities from interring their dead and establishing memorials for victims of the *Gukurahundi* mass murders. Such denial to memorialize the communal harm were a potent weapon against survivors, because memorials are symbolic reparations (Hopwood 2011, 6).

The Mnangagwa-led government's perpetuation of the foregoing amnesia in the aftermath of gross politically-motivated violence did not connote strong ethical grounding. Rather, it affirmed incapacity to account for potentially embarrassing political excesses and, possibly, lack of moral courage to confront egregious political behavior perpetrated by allies, surrogates, and supporters. The Zimbabwean leadership's constant demand to disregard acts of politically motivated harm compelled harmed citizens to subdue their pains. This approach is insensitive because the past is never past for victims of politically-motivated violence, especially in circumstances where they confront memories of the loss of loved ones, impaired livelihoods and the debilitating effects of bodily injuries in their everyday engagements. Most victims endure post-conflict lives in the same spatial locations where they experienced harm, what Pierre Nora (1996, 1) calls *"milieu de mémoire,*

settings in which memory is a real part of everyday experience." Mashingaidze (2017) argues that disregarding survivors' injuries and senses of loss forces them into ever diminishing cycles of existence and being.

Essentially, to expect victims to forgive their violators and forget their pains is an act of denialism because it silences victims' voices from exposing oppression and abuse (Tarusarira 2019). Where possible, states and governments should avail victims of gross politically-motivated harm empathetic spaces for narrating their losses, injuries and pains. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the Chair of South Africa's TRC, once presciently identified the intricate connections between truth, healing and reconciliation by saying:

> I hope that the work of the Commission, by opening wounds to cleanse them, will thereby stop them from festering. We cannot be facile and say bygones will be bygones, because they will not be bygones and will return to haunt us. True reconciliation is never cheap, for it is based on forgiveness, which is costly. Forgiveness in turn depends on repentance, which has to be based on an acknowledgement of what was done wrong, and therefore on disclosure of the truth. You cannot forgive what you do not know (Tutu 1995).

Zimbabwe's silencing of open and public discussions about the pains of the past was a time-buying strategy that ultimately neutered perpetrator culpability. It also compromised the affirmative potency of survivor's testimonies and victims' renditions of their abuse, and in the long run blurred the victim-perpetrator binary.

Unending Violence in the New Dispensation

State-sanctioned violence, torture, rape, and killings of opponents persisted under the new dispensation and this confirmed a "dangerously low tolerance for dissent" (Kingsley and Moyo 2019). On August 1st 2018 soldiers using live ammunition killed six MDC supporters demonstrating against the presumed vote rigging and delays in releasing the results of the recently held Presidential elections. These soldiers indiscriminately shot at the demonstrators, most of them from the back. Some bystanders were also killed (Rogers 2019, 118). In response, President Mnangagwa quickly set up a controversial six member international commission of enquiry led by the former South African President, Kgalema Mothlante. Three of the local commissioners seemed partisan because one was a well-known and active ruling party supporter, another one was opposed to the MDC (whose supporters had

been killed), while the third was well ensconced in the country's governance structures. Among the three foreign commissioners was a retired Tanzanian military general with strong ties to the Zimbabwean military.

The commission's terms of reference were also somewhat inappropriate: it focused on what "necessitated" the deployment rather than who "authorised" the deployment of the soldiers. Presidential authority was necessary in the deployment of the army, especially, in the domestic policing sphere. It is presumed that the Vice President, who was also the Minister of Defence, deployed the army without the President's knowledge. The President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. Therefore, it seems in crafting the commission's terms of reference the President and his advisors were trying to deflect culpability and also avoid exposing the Vice President's possible unprocedural actions (Matyszak 2019). Nearly two years after the commission's submission of its final report on the killings, none of the soldiers who killed the people have been prosecuted.

The country witnessed additional bouts of violence from the security forces in mid-January 2019 when the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) organized worker stay-aways against price hikes, dwindling salaries and the ever-escalating cost of living in the country. In response, the government imposed a three-day internet blackout to disable potential mobilisation among citizens. The government further deployed state security agents to maintain a curfew. However, these security forces quickly went on a pre-emptive rampage of abductions and enforced disappearances of oppositional activists and trade unionists spearheading demonstrations. By the time of their withdrawal from the communities, they had carried out 17 extrajudicial killings, 17 rapes and 26 abductions. More than one thousand people were also arrested in dragnet arrests (Nichols 2019). The President, who was outside the country courting investors, failed to condemn the security forces' high-handedness. He "tweeted a statement denouncing the 'wanton violence and vandalism' – not of the soldiers, but of the demonstrators" (Rogers 2019, 118).

The police unleashed further violence against weaponless MDC-aligned peaceful demonstrators on the 16th of August 2019. These people were demonstrating against the escalating cost of living amidst spiraling inflation, fuel shortages, water scarcity and power outages. Several organisations, including the Law Society of Zimbabwe (LSZ) criticised the police's brutality against the demonstrators and noted that "where the demonstrators are subdued, there is no legal justification for unrelenting and unmitigated assaults to be perpetrated on unarmed citizens" (Nicodamus 2019). The

police's high-handedness against demonstrators signaled a shrinkage of civic space and this was a big dent on the Mnangagwa government's image of a "New Dispensation." These state-instigated assaults on citizens and the concomitant unlawful detentions violated Section 50 (10) of the Zimbabwean Constitution, which provides that a person arrested or detained must be informed at the time of arrest of the charges preferred against them. Such arrested people have to be treated humanely as enshrined in section 53 of the same constitution which stipulates that "No person may be subject to physical or psychological torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" (Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013).

Enforced Disappearances

In addition to the foregoing, from January 2019 to May 2020 the country witnessed a series of abductions, torture and enforced disappearances of government detractors by "unknown assailants." By October 2019, 50 activists, including Dr Peter Magombeyi, who was leading the medical doctors' strike action for better pay and conditions of service, had endured such abductions (Zenda 2019). The medical doctors' strike embarrassed the state by paralysing the health sector. On the 13th of May 2020 the MP for Harare West, Joana Mamombe, and two other female MDC colleagues, Cecilia Chimbiri and Netsai Marova, were "abducted" from police custody at Harare Central Police Station by unknown assailants. They had been arrested at a police roadblock after staging an unsanctioned flash demonstration against worsening hunger and poverty in the country. The police claimed the women had violated the country's COVID-19 lockdown restrictions on demonstrations and gathering. The women were found two days later, distraught and heavily battered at Muchapondwa Business Centre in Bindura, more than 80 kilometres from Harare. They had also been sexually assaulted (Moyo 2020). This abuse drew international condemnation from the European Union, the United States and African civic organisations (European Union Delegation to the Republic of Zimbabwe 2020).

In spite of apparent hallmarks of state security involvement in the abductions and enforced disappearances of the activists, the government customarily offered lame subterfuges by claiming the existence of a Third Hand made up of disgruntled members of the old establishment or Mugabe loyalists known as the G40 faction (Ndlovu 2019, 180 and 196). At times these government officers claimed the activists were self-abducting in order to embarrass the government and to remain in the political limelight. Nick

Mangwana, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services denied government involvement by casting aspersions on the abducted activists:

> Why would a state torture people for participating in a much-flopped demonstration? There is no reason nor rhyme for the government to do that because doing so would be shooting itself in the foot. On the contrary some stand to gain from playing the spoiler through inflicting a reputation damage on the Government of Zimbabwe... There is no doubt... that what faces this Government is a case of serious smear campaign. The perpetrator is either the opposition or some remnants of the previous regime who are still quite bitter and cannot stomach to see the success of President Mnangagwa's policies including that of re-engagement. There is also a possibility that these parties are working together in orchestrating their dark arts (Mangwana 2020).

In spite of the rebuttals embedded in the foregoing statement, the Zimbabwean government has never investigated or prosecuted anyone for the numerous cases of abductions, torture and enforced disappearances that happened under the new dispensation. Like the Mugabe government, the new dispensation continued to renege on its constitutional mandate and international obligations to investigate and prosecute politically motivated crimes committed by its security agents and other political actors, especially those aligned to the ruling party (Gwinyai 2020; Masuku 2020; New-zimbabwe. com. 2020; Taruvinga 2020). This shows that the Mugabe era's machinery of repression remained intact under the new dispensation. The Zimbabwean lawyer, Douglas Coltart aptly argued against the persistent disregard for human rights:

> There is very little respect for the rule of law in Zimbabwe. The institutions that are meant to uphold and protect the rule of law are fundamentally broken and are being used instead to undermine the rule of law. What we have in Zimbabwe is what we call rule by law: where the law is used as a coercive means of meting out oppression and injustice (Newsday 2020).

Conclusion

This article has shown that in spite of the occasional expressions of liberatory rhetoric by President Mnangagwa and his ruling ZANU-PF party,

Zimbabwe persisted as a nation enchained to its mendacious past. The *New Dispensation* government failed to reinvent itself into a transformative agent for steering the country into a free, transparent, and inclusive future. Zimbabwe remained beholden to the Robert Mugabe rule book of maintaining political power: public beatings, torture, abductions, and enforced disappearances of oppositional citizens. Therefore, Zimbabwe's presumed *New Dispensation* ushered through the November 2017 military-assisted transition was not a turning point but a populist cover up for the perpetuation of the high-handed practices inherited from the Mugabe-dominated era.

The transition implied in the notion of a *New Dispensation* was not based on a strong moral rejection of the excesses of the previous regime because the securocratic culture and legal architecture that abets impunity and all its after-effects continued unrestrained. In order to navigate its way into a peaceful future, the Zimbabwean government has to reduce force projection by deescalating military intervention in the civilian policing sphere. The military should be a defense-only-force, well attuned to non-violent means of conflict resolution (Harris 2004). The Mnangagwa government has to resolve the country's human dignity deficit by establishing a culture of peace. This is "a set of values, attitudes, modes of behavior and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations" (United Nations Document A/53/370 apud Harris 2011, 122). Just like in the Mugabe era, the new government has been failing to establish a culture of peace because of endemic impunity in its political practices.

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ABSTRACT

This article attempts to audit the capacity and commitment of Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe government to reconcile Zimbabweans and heal the country's historical wounds and haunting legacies of politically motivated violence. Following the November 2017 military-assisted transition, President Emmerson Mnangagwa's newfound rhetoric signaled a rejection of the violence and combative politics of his predecessor, the long-serving President Robert Mugabe. In spite of having been a key enabler to President Mugabe from the Zimbabwean liberation struggle days in the 1970s to the postcolonial era, President Mnangagwa re-presented himself as a transformative politician who wanted to deescalate domestic political tensions by calling for peace and inclusivity in the management of national affairs. He also urged his fellow citizens to disregard the politically motivated pains of the past and collectively move on under the all-embracing triadic national banner of unity, peace and development.

In spite of this conciliatory, though amnesia-riven rhetoric, that sought to unify the country's competing and antagonistic political constituencies, in reality, the Mnangagwa-led government, popularly defined as the *New Dispensation*, perpetuated the high-handed Mugabe era tactics of violence, abductions, and enforced disappearances against political opponents. It is therefore argued that the changeover implied in the ideal of a *New Dispensation* amounted to sheer populist gesturing because Zimbabwe has largely remained enmeshed in the impunity and appeasement gridlock of state-instigated spasms of violence against political opponents, interspersed with official silences and denialism.

NIGERIA-BRICS RELATIONS AND THE NEXT-11: THE DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC POWER BEFORE AND BEYOND COVID-19 DISRUPTIONS

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Introduction

The 2003 Goldman Sachs paper, *Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050*, spearheaded by Jim O'Neill, proposed that the BRIC countries will constitute the future engine of global economic growth, and predicted their growth thereof in United States dollar terms will surpass that of the G7 countries by 2040 (Qobo 2011, 6). Outperforming Jim O'Neill's team assessment that China was to overtake Germany by 2007, Japan by 2015, and the US by 2039, China overtook Japan in 2009 to become the world's second-largest economy. Implicit in the Goldman Sachs paper was the view that the kind of policies and institutions put in place by the BRIC countries to support growth would sustain their rise. From when O'Neill coined the BRIC acronym, through its change to BRICS to reflect South Africa's enlistment, the BRICS has not only served as a diplomatic platform for bilateral and multilateral engagements of, and negotiations by, member states, but also as a

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vehicle to drive their political, economic and socio-cultural interactions with other countries such as Nigeria.

Despite the likes of China having achieved targets much earlier than the projected timeline, the Goldman Sachs BRIC paper was criticized for not only grouping into a special category, four countries with little in common in terms of growth history, land mass, population size, among other inherent weaknesses, but also combining numerous complex variables into a long-range forecast comprising a string of unscientific and, therefore, questionable political assumptions (Bremmer and Keat 2009, 67). Acknowledging his omission of other emerging economies at that time, O'Neill later denoted these potential economic heavyweights the Next Eleven or N-11 (Wilson and Stupnytska 2007). Four years after *Dreaming with BRICs*, Goldman Sachs' subsequent mapping of this different tier of economies regarded as rising in its 2007 paper, *The N-11: More Than an Acronym*, focused on a group of countries that could become future growth centres owing to their demographic characteristics. According to the paper, "Nigeria and Indonesia have the scale to be important if they can deliver sustained growth" (Wilson and Stupnytska 2007). Other countries in the N-11 designation are Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Turkey and Vietnam, a mixture of democracies and authoritarian regimes. Compared with *Dreaming with BRICs*, the paper takes a broader view in its reflection on trends related to demography, technology, energy, urbanisation, infrastructure and human capital, and what these countries can do to sustain their growth.

Since O'Neill's submission, from Chatham house publication pieces to conferences held by the Woodrow Wilson Center, academic and policy attention is not lacking nor is the focus on which of the five major emerging national economies will follow the trend of BRICS to drive South-South regional relations. While global attention has been geared towards the role of BRICS nations during the Covid-19 outbreak, little attention has been paid to other regions. This in part has been a stark reflection not only of the bias of the global media industry, but also the seriousness of recent global health events and where countries with the potential to make significant economic and political impact on the world economy stand as a result of a shifting global focus toward population health and economic health. As poor quality health services increasingly become a significant feature that holds back progress on improving health and economic activities in countries at all income levels, there is the fear that regions in desperate need are being drowned out of the global picture by discussions and debates largely taking place from Washington to Beijing.

In that light, of importance to this study is analysis on Nigeria's position in the Next-11 vis-à-vis the BRICS. Premised on the supposition that the "Next Eleven" group of countries were on track to catch up with the BRICS subject to sustained growth levels, the release of the Next-11 report by O'Neill brought into sharp focus the prospects of the emergence of another power group or the enlargement of the BRICS in the future. It is against this background that the article examines Nigeria's elements of power that could be harnessed to propel the nation to achieve greatness, and concludes by noting that the prospects of the country's emergence as an economic power and the future of its relations with global emerging power bloc such as the BRICS are hinged on her overcoming critical challenges that have rendered the country prostrate even before the COVID-19 disruptions on her economy.

The BRICS and the Next-11:
Success and Impact of the BRICS

Since 2003 when Brazil, Russia, India, China and (the later included) South Africa (BRICS) were named as the most rapidly developing countries with the greatest economic potential, they continued to develop, albeit at different rates, and have encouraged analysts to look out for the next tier of emerging economies. This situation led Goldman Sachs Chief Economist, Jim O'Neill, coined the now-famous acronym BRIC(S) not only in recognition of these countries individual and collective successes in market activity but also that they were actually developing at rate fast enough to help keep the global economy afloat amid the financial crisis in Europe and the US at that time. On one level, it has been argued that as the old economic powers (G7 — US, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Canada and Italy) encountered economic difficulties, troubled by crises and losing dominance in the world market share, the emerging market economies of Brazil, India, Russia and China — with their special resources, population and market advantages — grabbed the opportunity, and greatly enhanced their respective national powers. On another level, it has also been argued that the rise of BRICS stems from the growing discontentment and resentment among developing economies against the traditional international economic institutions (International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank), especially given the latter's penchant to undermine the economic institutions of the former through strangulating economic policies (Folarin, Ibietan, and Chidozie 2014).

The BRICS concept was somewhat successful as an investment fore-cast during a time when some economies across the globe grappled with towering budget deficits, anaemic economic growth and rising unemploy-ment. This was partly because of the grouping of four (now five) seemingly unrelated nations into an economic category which, economists have pro-jected, in 40 to 50 years, will very well catch up to the OECD countries in their economic prowess. Some financial analysts, particularly from the new Castlestone fund, have argued that BRICS returns have outperformed almost any other equity product since the concept was termed (Johnson 2012). It is now believed that Goldman Sachs' BRICS projections were in fact conserva-tive and warranted a revision. New projections now show BRICS as a group growing more rapidly than before.

> As a result, China surpasses the US earlier (2027 vs 2035) and over-takes more dramatically than before (by 2050 it is projected to be 84% larger rather than 41% before), while India too essentially catches up with the US by 2050, where before it was projected only to reach 72% of the US economy. Both Russia and Brazil's projections are also somewhat higher (Wilson and Stupnytska 2007, 138).

There is no disputing that the BRICS nations have contributed to the growth of the global economy. In 2012, Brazil, China, India, and Russia accounted for a quarter of global output, a figure that is forecast to rise to approximately one third by the end of the decade. Economic analysts had predicted that China would most likely become the world's largest economy before then. Should India continue to rise alongside many of the world's populous emerging markets; projections place it among the world's major economic powers (The Economist 2013). The BRICS were forecast to account for 37 percent of global growth in the period 2011-16, with China alone con-tributing 22 percent (Thornton 2012). In terms of business profitability, China led the way with net 61 percent expecting to see a rise in 2012, slightly ahead of Brazil (60 percent), India (57 percent) and Russia (42 percent) (Thornton 2012). Analysis of China's economic development had put its gross domestic product to nearly 40 trillion RMB (£4tn; $6.3tn), from less than 10 trillion RMB, rising from position 6 to 2 in the world ranking. Its foreign trade had increased from less than US$ 500bn to nearly US$ 3,000bn, again putting China second in the world (Fubin 2011). Despite this growth, China needs its cooperation with the other BRICS and non-BRICS countries, as much as they need China's participation in the world. India's annual GDP growth stood at about 6.5 percent in 2012; Russia had awakened after its initial shock period; Brazil's GDP was leading South America; South Africa had given the

BRICS a wider reach and access to African markets (Fubin 2011). Indeed, at a high-growth markets conference hosted by the *Economist*, O'Neill described BRICS economies as "the driver of everything positive in the world economy" and should be grouped alongside Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey as "growth markets" (Thornton 2012).

The Next 11

In response to analysts' clamour for a repeat of the BRICS-like impact and the search for the next group of countries with similar transformative impact on the world economy, Goldman Sachs published a follow-up paper that identified what O'Neill called the "Next 11" (N-11) growth markets. According to Wilson and Stupnytska (2007) the rationale behind the selection of the N11 countries was simply that they were the next set of large-population countries after the BRICs. Goldman Sachs identified the Next-11 (N-11) to include Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey and Vietnam. As emerging economies, all BRICS nations had more incentive to participate and maintain active trade relations with the US, among one another, and with other countries in the world.

The difference in the case of the N-11 is its diversity, making it difficult for analysts, particularly Goldman Sachs, to generalise. Consequently, Lawson, Heacock and Stupnytska in 2007, made use of certain measures (energy, urbanisation, infrastructure, health and technology) to present interesting growth stories of the N-11 that although may not have the same transformative impact on the world economy like BRICS, but presented answers to questions of globalization and cooperation. In a multipolar world in which monopolies on economic and political power are diffusing, the idea of the N11 nations is yet another approach of non-Atlantic systems hoping to influence and shape the norms of global governance to suit their interests.

Nigeria and the BRICS

Nigeria and Brazil

Beginning from the 2000s, economic ties between Nigeria and Brazil have been predicated on three key factors: Brazil's recognition as an emerging power in the international community; Nigeria's desire to maximize its

ties with Brazil towards national development; and Brazil's need for Nige-ria's resources for its domestic demands of industrialization. A bilateral pact between the two countries in September 2005 saw the value of bilateral trade rise to an excess of $ 2 billion (Lohor 2005). Between 2003 and 2005, the value of Nigeria's commodity exports to Brazil rose from about US$ 1.5 billion to US$ 5 billion, placing Nigeria as the fifth-highest exporter of goods to Bra-zil, after developed nations such as the US, and Germany, among others. On Brazil's part, export value to Nigeria rose at a dissimilar pace, reaching US$ 643,000 in 2005. The field of energy is a mutual trading point for both coun-tries, having considered Nigeria's interest in developing alternative sources of fuel and Brazil's expertise in the development of bio-fossils evidenced in its ethanol use (Press Report from Group of 15, 2006). Trade between the countries was about US$ 8.2 billion in 2008 and this rose to US$ 9.6 billion (N1.5 trillion) by 2012 (Nigeria-Brazil Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2012). While Nigeria's import from Brazil was US$ 1.2 billion, her export to Brazil was US$ 8.4 billion (Vanguard News October 5 2012). According to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade, while Nigeria exports to Brazil was US$ 851.59 Million during 2019, its imports from Brazil was US$ 705.21 Million during 2019 (COMTRADE 2019a; COMTRADE 2019b). Nigeria is the second largest trading partner of Brazil in sub-Saharan Africa and 11th in the world. Brazil emerged the second largest importer of Nigerian crude oil after India.

Oil and Gas traditionally constitute the major commodity of export trade from Nigeria to Brazil. Currently Nigeria is Brazil's largest petroleum supplier. In August 2009, the late President Umaru Musa Yar' Adua paid an official visit to Brazil, during which discussions were held on the possi-bility of using oil trade for infrastructural development approach; Nigeria's interest in Brazil's vast hydro-electric generating capability and the issue of energy sustainability. Brazil later participated in open bids for control over some of Nigeria's oil blocks, establishing an Energy Commission between them to facilitate the transformation of Nigeria's energy sector. In 2012, there was the equally successful business visit of Brazil's President to Nigeria, preceded by a preparatory investment delegation from the country's third largest conglomerate, Queiroz Galvão Group, whose interests in Nigeria cut across several sectors including transport, energy, and real estate, among others (Yemi 2012). Today, President Bolsonaro administration's orientation for agro-business expansion is reflected in the Green Imperative, a US$ 1 billion bilateral agricultural development program between both countries. Designed by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV), the 10 year partnership seeks to expand Nigeria's agro-industrial employing an integrated business

plan comprising workforce training, the introduction of a financial rationale and increased productivity through field modernization (Romildo 2019).

Nigeria and Russia

The relationship between the two countries, which began on a low key in the 1960s, reached a strategic partnership by 2010. During the state visit of former President Obasanjo to Russia, March 5-7, 2001, the legal framework for the eventual establishment of the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation (ICESTC) between the two countries was laid. Of the several high-level exchanges that followed subsequent years, the visit by the then Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, to Moscow in March 2009 on the basis of the ICESTC framework, and discussions with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, culminated in Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Nigeria on 24 June 2009 — the first of such visit from a Russian leader to Africa's most populous nation. Its highpoint was the signing on 29 June, 2009 of six bilateral agreements which included: Investment Promoting and protection Agreement; Memorandum and Articles of Association on Joint Venture between the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and Gazprom etc.

Between 1999 and 2003, trade between the two countries grew from US$ 30.1 million to US$ 80.6 million. But, according to Oleg Vlassov, Counselor at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Nigeria, the rate of growth did not reflect the available opportunities present in both countries (The Guardian Nigeria 2005, 17). The trade between the two countries rose from US$ 300 million in 2010 to about US$ 350 million (about N56 bn) in 2013 (The Nigerian Voice 18 February 2016).

More recently, the Sochi Summit held in October 2019 witnessed both countries enter into 13 Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) across multiple fields. As Nigeria looks toward economic recovery, one agreement that could have the deepest impact is in the petroleum sector, upgrading the relationship between NNPC and Russia's oil giant Lukoil to a government-to-government partnership working in upstream operations; to overhaul Nigeria's non-functioning refineries as well as revive and strengthen a venture (initially costed at US$ 1-2.5 billion) between NNPC and Russia's Gazprom for oil and gas exploration, production, and transportation, processing of gas, and construction of power plants in Nigeria (Ogunmade 2019). In Nigeria's steel industry, the Ajaokuta Steel Rolling Mill project would be revived by Russian construction and engineering group MetProm which has agreed to complete the plant's assembling and bring it online. Another sig-

nificant deal struck covers Russian Railways long-term assistance in restoring Nigeria's railways and rolling stock, and expanding its rail network with new lines (The Guardian News 25 October 2019).

Nigeria and India

Of the number of high-level exchanges recorded between Nigeria and India since 1962, the visit of the External Affairs Minister of India, Shri Jaswant Singh to Nigeria in March 2000 saw the reactivation of the India-Nigeria Joint Commission and the revitalization of Nigeria's Machine Tools Industry in Osogbo. Subsequently, the state visit by the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Manmohan Singh from October 13-17, 2007 resulted in the signing of several agreements which came to be known as the Abuja Declaration on Strategic Partnership between Nigeria and India and other MOUs, which overall enunciate an all-embracing vision of India-Nigeria strategic partnership with emphasis on closer energy partnership. Nigeria and India have maintained close bilateral relations even during the COVID-19 pandemic era. The two countries adopted and adapted to the new normal including virtual platforms for diplomatic and business meetings (High Commission of India 2020).

The COVID period also provided an opportunity for the exploration of direct flights from Nigeria to India by a Nigerian airline. Indeed, even before the emergence of COVID-19, Nigeria has emerged as one of India's primary sources of crude oil, providing about 8-12 percent of its requirements (Indian High Commission, Abuja, Nigeria, March 16 2011). Between 2005 and 2007, Indian companies participated in bid rounds for Nigeria's oil blocks and obtained a number of them. ONGC Mittal Energy Limited (OMEL) won three blocks (OPL279, OPL285 and OPL297); Sterling two (OPL2005 and OPL2006); and Essar one (OPL226). The ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) already has three blocks in Nigeria — OPL279 and OPL285 (won in 2005) and OPL246 (won in November 2006) (Vines *et al.* 2009). The Indian government approved the OVL request to invest US$ 359 million during the first exploration phase in the two deep water blocks, of which the OVL budgets stood at US$ 1,195 million for OPL279 and US$ 164 million for OPL285, including the signature bonus and acquisition cost. The Nigeria-Sao Tome joint development zone has been supported by OVL through a 15 percent stake in one of the oil block's in the zone, thereby marking the OVL's entry into Nigeria.

According to Nigeria's Foreign Ministry, Indo-Nigeria trade peaked at US$ 10.2 billion through 2008 to 2009, and dipped to US$ 8.7 billion during 2009 to 2010 having come under the impact of the global financial crisis.

During 2010 to 2011, bilateral trade increased by 50 percent compared with the exact period the previous year. In 2011 to 2012, trade estimates between both countries were US$ 12 billion. Trade between them increased significantly, reaching US$ 16.36 billion in 2014/2015, while Indian investments in Nigeria amount to US$ 5 billion. Trade between the two countries reached US$ 11.76 billion in 2017-18.

Overall, trade balance has been to Nigeria's advantage, largely because India hugely imports the country's crude oil. Also, India is a major supplier of pharmaceuticals to Nigeria, even as its pharmaceutical companies situated in Nigeria participate in the importation of medication. In June 2011, Indian telecommunication company, Bharti Airtel, entered into a partnership with Ecobank to launch mobile banking as well as a numerous variety of mobile financial services (Chima 2011). With Bharti Airtel US$ 600 million investment in Nigeria's telecommunication industry it purchased Zain Telecom's representation in Africa for $ 10.7 billion, following which it expanded into the broader information technology sector. The National Institute of Information Technology (NIIT) belonging to India carries out the training of about 15,000 Nigerians annually in information and communications technology.

Nigeria and China

Since the historic visit by General Yakubu Gowon to China in 1974 (Bukarambe 2005, 233), relations between the two countries have progressed. Chinese manufacturing and export capacity increased and between 1978 and 1979, under General Olusegun Obasanjo, high-level interactions were conducted between the two countries to address a developing trade imbalance that arose. During the 1980s to early 1990s, trade volume between Nigeria and China continued to advance at a slow pace up till the point of China's transition in 1993 from a net exporter of crude oil to the second-largest importer of crude oil in the world. Under General Sani Abacha, the need for alternative sources of foreign inflows prompted Nigeria to fervently seek cooperation with China such that in 1994, the Nigerian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce was founded (Ogunsanwo 2008, 200); in 1995, the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) secured a contract worth US$ 529 million for the rehabilitation of Nigeria's railway system (Ogunsanwo 2008). In 1997, the two countries entered into agreements on protection and cooperation in electricity generation, steel production and the oil industry (Utomi 2008, 40).

Shortly after top Nigerian officials returned from the October 2000 conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in

Beijing, both countries entered into agreements establishing trade and investment offices in their respective countries. In 2005, Nigeria and China relations reached a "strategic partnership" (Obayuwana 2013, 9) anchored on a mutual relationship on trade, goods and technology transfer, and development cooperation. By late 2008, the total figure of Chinese investment in Nigeria was US$ 6 billion (Mthembu-Salter 2009, 6) — a spike attributable to Obasanjo's 'oil for infrastructure' policy which required the Chinese to incorporate the provision of infrastructural projects to bids for Nigerian crude (Wong 2009, 1). By 2012, Nigeria became China's third largest African trade partner with the trade volume between them standing at US$ 10.57 billion, in addition to US$ 8.7 billion in non-financial direct investment from the Chinese (Obayuwana 2013, 9), although quality control of imports from China continues to pose a problem for trade cooperation. China's commitment to economic ties with Nigeria is evident in significant development partnerships in critical sectors of the nation. In the steel sector, the US$ 1.3 billion cold roll steel mill plant established by China's Western Metal Products Company Limited's (WEMPCO) in Ibafo, Ogun State, is ready for operation (Momoh and Coker 2012, 4).

The year 2016 marked the visit of President Muhammadu Buhari to China during which the Naira and Yuan (Renminbi) swap deal was signed that some have argued its consummation between the apex Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and China's Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd (ICBC) (the world's largest lender by total assets and market capitalization) raises issues of sovereignty (The Guardian News, 18 April, 2016). In the power sector, North South Power Company and Sinohydro Corporation Limited signed an agreement at US$ 478,657,941.28 dollars for the construction of 300 megawatts solar power in Shiroro, Niger State. Potentially unlocking an additional 3,600MW of power to the national grid, China has agreed to revive the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP) project initially struck with Russia but paralyzed by terrorist activity across the Nigeria-Niger border. Regarding this, NNPC closed a US$ 2.8 billion financing agreement with the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Bank of China, and Infrastructure Bank of China for construction of the Ajaokuta-Kaduna-Kano (AKK) gas pipeline project which forms the first section of the broader 4,401km-long TSGP which will export natural gas to customers in Europe (Nyabiage 2020). Then again, a major deal at the Nigeria-China business forum was the US$ 363 million dollars agreement for the establishment of a comprehensive farm and downstream industrial park in Kogi state (Dailypost April 15 2016).

Nigeria and South Africa

The relationship between Nigeria and South Africa entered a new era with the enthronement of democracy in both countries, and the elections of Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999. The teamwork between the two leaders was pivotal in the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in 2002 (Adebajo 2006, 1). The two countries also established a Bi-National Commission to foster deeper relations between them. South Africa is presently Nigeria's seventh largest trade partner with trade volume of € 1.909 million or about 2.1 percent of the global trade (IMF). Statistics show that trade between the two countries has grown from less than US$ 12 million in 1994 to about US$ 100 million before peaking at US$ 400 million in 2001 (Kan-Onwordi 2007, 60).

The South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation also states that trade between the two countries has increased from R181 3578 000 in 1999 to almost R11 billion in 2007. And the balance of trade favours Nigeria, despite its low technological base and poor infrastructure. South African exports to Nigeria stood at R707, 253, 060 and R2, 960113,000 in 2000 and 2004 respectively, while her imports from Nigeria stood at R1, 281, 293,000 and 5,195,147,000 during the same period (Ibeanu, Umezurike and Nwosu 2007, 32). The single largest South African investor in the Nigerian domestic economy is the Mobile Telephone Network (MTN). According to Onuoha (2008), during the 2003/2004 period, MTN recorded an after-tax profit from its Nigerian operation of R2.4 billion, representing 55.8 percent of its total profit from its non-South Africa ventures. As at 2003, Nigeria had become South Africa's third largest trading partner and largest single continental importer in Africa after Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Compared to over a 100 South African companies currently operating in Nigeria, only a handful of Nigerian companies such as Union Bank, First Bank, Philips Consulting, News Media, Financial Standard and *ThisDay* Newspapers managed to set up business in South Africa (Weekly Trust 2003) which has refused reciprocating Nigeria's gesture in opening up its market space to South African companies.

Noting that South Africa's xenophobic tendencies against Nigeria recur in their bilateral relations, the friction between the two countries' economies has somewhat impacted on trade and investment relations between them. In that light, the official visit of South African President, Jacob Zuma from 8th to 10th, March 2016, was seen as necessary in resolving a major

dispute involving Nigeria's decision to impose a fine of US$ 5.2 billion, which was later slashed to US$ 3.9 billion on South Africa's MTN due to its failure to register phone lines as requested by law. The official visit of President Zuma provided an opportunity to strengthen the economic relationship between Nigeria and South Africa. Amongst others, bilateral, continental and multilateral issues of interests such as insecurity, terrorism, trade and investments, climate change and African integration, were discussed between Presidents Zuma and Buhari.

As observed, there are some variations in the nature and character of the relations between Nigeria and individual members of BRICS. Economic interests have been a major driver of relations between individual BRICS states and Nigeria, with a strong emphasis on energy security particularly by countries such as China and India. Nigeria has signed economic agreements with the individual BRICS states and several have evolved into strategic partnerships. Almost all the BRICS states tend to portray their relations with Nigeria as mutually beneficial, devoid of exploitation, and in the spirit of South-South cooperation. For example, Indian officials have emphasised that the orientation of India's foreign policy is designed to promote "enlightened national interest"; while Indian policymakers highlight clearly that energy security is an important element of India's foreign policy, particularly in the context of the developing world. While this suggests the nature of interest pursued by BRICS countries in their engagements, Nigeria's aspires to join the top 20 countries by 2020 i.e. to emerge as an economic power.

Prospects and Challenges as Nigeria Emerges as an Economic Power

Of the tangible and non-tangible power elements Nigeria possesses that it could harness towards emerging as an economic power, the first major element is her population, which translates as a market for large scale manufacturers of goods and services. A major attraction of both developed and emerging countries to Nigeria is the huge market base which has been put at more than 170 million. The second major element in Nigeria's advantage is its geographical location. In terms of geographical size, the country has 923,768 sq km. The country is also endowed with favourable climate that supports rich agricultural production of a variety of cash crops (maize, yams, sorghum, cassava, rice, millet, palm kernels, cotton, cocoa, rubber, and groundnuts) while its access to sea is a plus for economic and military purposes. In addition,

Nigeria is blessed with natural resources such as hydrocarbons including solid minerals such as tin, gas, iron-ore, coal, limestone, zinc, niobium (The World Factbook 2008). Saliu (2010, 152) buttressed this point by arguing that because some countries are positioned as sources of strategic natural resources, they have acquired some measure of power and influence in the international system. Nonetheless, it is not enough for Nigeria to possess huge strategic resources without harnessing the same for overall national development.

As for military strength and size, though Nigeria's capacity is limited at present in terms of arms production, it is not only a highly respected and experienced actor in international peacekeeping operations across the globe, but also its impact especially under the sub-regional mechanism has been substantial. Since joining the United Nations in 1960, Nigeria has participated in about 25 UN peacekeeping operations across the globe and has produced not less than eleven force commanders (Galadima 2011, 302). It occupied the Chair of the UN Special Peacekeeping since 1989, expending enormous human and material resources in support of peacekeeping operations. Nigeria spent more than US$ 10 billion on peacekeeping from 1990-2000 alone and has lost dozens of its personnel.

A case can be made for the Nigerian economy as a determinant of a nation's power and influence. Nigeria's exports were worth US$ 98.364 billion in the fourth quarter of 2013 (Economy Watch 2013), which was far higher than most countries on the continent. The country produces 1.8-2.3 million barrels of crude oil per day (p/d), a major commodity which accounts for 95 percent of Nigerian export earnings (Munyama 2009). Nigeria's nearest African competitor in oil exports, Angola, produced an average of 1.9 million b/d in 2008 (Mthembu-Salter 2009, 4). With oil reserves estimated at 32-36 billion barrels including huge natural gas reserves estimated at 100-188 million cubic feet of reserves, the impression gleaned is that the Nigerian state is rich and its citizens enjoy a good life. Contrarily, even after a rebasing exercise that raised Nigeria's annual GDP in the year ending December 2013 to an estimated N80.3 trillion (US$ 509.9 billion), making it the highest in Africa, and the 26th largest economy in the world, its economic performance falls below expectations.

Recent figures from "Nigeria in Times of COVID-19: Laying Foundations for a Strong Recovery" (2019) show that roughly 83 million people (equivalent to 4 in every 10 Nigerians) were living below the national poverty line as of 2019. The report further states that with over 75 percent of the poor living in the north of the country, their dependence on the informal

economy or on smallholder farming puts them at a risk when considering the deep rooted and complex relationship the region has with politics, unrest and security. Basically, populations living on the cusp of the poverty line can easily join those 83 million if or when a shock occurs. Like many developing countries within BRICS and the N11, Nigeria faces many realities which leave it highly vulnerable to potentially large daily cases and deaths such as a large population size[4], high poverty rates in relation to national income[5] and a weak coordinated national health system.

Before the COVID-19 outbreak, the number of poor Nigerians was expected to rise by 2.3 million (due to population growth) as the poverty rate saw an increase by about 0.1 percent from 40.1 percent in 2019 to 40.2 percent in 2020 (Cortes *et al.* June 2020). However, due to the reported recession, the number of poor Nigerians is set to rise to 7.2 million, implying that the poverty rate will double to 2.4 percentage points in 2020 (Cortes *et al.* June 2020). The global forecast reported by development practitioners and economists is similarly bleak. The World Bank's June 2020 Global Economic Prospects baseline forecast predicts a 5.2 percent contraction in global GDP in 2020, described as the deepest global recession in decades. Apparently, the report seems to imply that the damage has already been done as deep recessions are expected to leave lasting scars through low investment, an erosion of human capital through loss of income and schooling, an erosion on investor wealth, and fragmentation of global trade and supply linkages (World Bank 2020). As the toll on human lives increases, the outbreak continues to impact Nigeria's economy in several different ways whilst disrupting regional activity.

Social distancing measures implemented by the federal government and the presidential order to "lockdown" the country over two-week periods, intended to reduce community level spread of the virus and the pressure on an already weak national health system had more adverse effects relative to other measures, bringing economic and social activities to a near halt. This included the fall in household consumption as restrictions on movement forced consumers to spend less on luxury goods and service (hotels, restaurants) and more on essential goods and services. As expectations of future

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4 India: with the world's second most populous country has the fifth highest death toll, reports the BBC. As of August 12, 2020, India has recorded more than 50,000 new infections every day for the last two weeks, and has pushed past two million cases in total (BBC News 2020).

5 Its BRICS and N11 neighbours cannot escape similar economic considerations as the population of South Africa 55.5 millions, and Mexico living below the national income poverty line rate similarly high to Nigeria.

income fell[6] particularly for workers with short-term contracts and those in the informal economy, the erosion of wealth was expected to lead to a decline in assets such as stocks and home equity. Taking into consideration the large uncertainties that come with uncertainty over the duration of the pandemic, a decline in stock prices is reported to persist as the Nigerian Stock Exchange records its worst performance since the 2008 financial crisis. An unintended consequence of the federal government's containment measures was a steep decline in output. It is propagated that the disruptions of supply chains due to the "lockdown" will begin to have immense effect on the planting season and agricultural yield in the coming year.

Before the pandemic, we are reminded that the federal government had been struggling with a cocktail of macro-economic and micro-economic challenges. These include weak recovery from the 2014 oil price shock, as GDP growth danced around 2.3 percent in 2019. Although the economy was gradually recovering from the 2016 recession, *per capita* incomes were still falling as economic growth lagged population growth (Cortes *et al.* June 2020). Nigeria's GDP growth rate improved slightly in 2019, reflecting rising service output. According to OCHA (2021, 1) report titled "Nigeria in Times of COVID-19: Laying Foundations for a Strong Recovery", 2019 saw some strengthening in economic recovery as annual GDP growth reached 2.2 percent. By February 2020, the IMF revised the 2020 GDP growth rate from 2.5 percent to 2 percent, as a result of relatively low oil prices and limited fiscal space (Onyekwena and Ekeruche 2020).

Onyekwena and Ekeruche's analysis highlight Nigeria's debt service-to-revenue ratio of 60 percent, as at April 2020, as a source of concern for policymakers. Their report states this is likely to worsen amid the steep decline in revenue associated with falling oil prices which in turn is said to aggravate the economic impact of the outbreak and make it more difficult for the government to weather the crisis. In June 2020, Ayoade observed that the oil markets had been on a downward trend due to COVID-driven fallen demand recorded at an eighteen year low in trading at less than 22 dollars per barrel (Ayoade 2020), and the subsequent fall in the volume and value of Nigeria's net exports.

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6 The inevitable impact on the labour market shows the extent to which employment within certain sectors within the economy is as unstable as it is critical to economic sustainability. Reported job losses in private organisations where staff either have their contracts terminated and/or their salaries cut, led to disruptions to markets and supply chains. For example, Punch newspapers reportedly let go about 40 members of staff at the end of May because of a massive fall in revenue generated by adverts which were being used to maintain staff overhead costs.

To ease the burden of the government's preventative measures on business, the government deployed several measures namely the Central Bank of Nigeria's (CBN) fiscal stimulus package. This included a 50 billion naira ($ 138.89 million) credit facility to households and small and medium enterprises most affected by the pandemic, a 100 billion naira ($ 277.78 million) loan to the health sector, and a 1 trillion naira ($ 2.78 billion) to the manufacturing sector (Onyekwena and Ekeruche 2020). Ayoade lists other CBN initiatives such as the additional moratorium of one year on CBN intervention facilities, interest rate reduction on intervention facilities from 9% to 5%; the activation of the N1.5 trillion InfraCo Project for building critical infrastructure; the strengthening of lending to deposit ratio policy, additional N100 Billion naira intervention in healthcare loans to pharmaceutical companies; and the N1 trillion loan to boost local manufacturing and production across critical sectors (Ayoade 2020).

This is where government's economic strength can be measured to assess the extent to which government policies can mitigate the impacts of the pandemic in general and economic contractions, and lay foundations for a strong recovery. Many commentators believe that the extent to which the government can go further in its measure is far beyond the extent to which it has gone so far as recommendations on vital policy reforms to support economic growth and job creation over the medium-term have been called upon by Cortes *et al.* (June 2020). Their report discusses policy options in five critical areas that can help Nigeria recover from the impact COVID-19 pandemic whilst building a stronger economy. These include:

- Containing the outbreak and preparing for a more severe outbreak
- Enhancing macroeconomic management to boost investor confidence
- Safeguarding and mobilizing revenues
- Reprioritizing public spending to protect critical development expenditures and stimulate economic activity
- Protecting poor and vulnerable communities

Although prior to the 2020, Nigeria's Human Development Index ranking played a significant role in quantitative and qualitative development assessment of human capabilities vis-à-vis economic growth, a further look into COVID-driven developmental research and analysis shows a more human side of the impact of economic contractions. 2008's HDI ranking

was a dismal 154th in the world, with life expectancy at just 47 years, and the under-five mortality rate in 2005 was an appalling 194 per 1,000 live births (Mthembu-Salter 2009, 4).

Almost ten years later, the 2019 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) rates that 46.0 percent of Nigeria's population are living below the national income poverty line. No doubt this does not paint the picture of a healthy economy — a major factor for consideration if Nigeria is to become a major economic power — and goes to show that managing and recovering from the impact of the coronavirus pandemic and the associated oil price shock will require both public and private sector intervention. Other intangible elements, though not quantifiable, but very important in power permutations, include the quality of leadership, the level of support which the country enjoys in the international system, the level of participation of the citizen and its deployment of diplomacy prudently to achieve its national goals.

Conclusion

In this article, we examined Nigeria's relationship with the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as an emerging global power bloc. We noted that the economic success recorded by the BRICS led analysts to clamour for a repeat of the BRICS-like impact, leading to the search for the next group of countries, which Goldman Sachs identified as the Next 11 (N-11) growth markets. The paper also notes that scholars have attempted to make use of measures such as energy, urbanisation, infrastructure, health and technology to gauge the performance and prospects of the N-11 serving as a springboard for the emergence of members of this group as economic powers. In essence the expectation is that N-11 countries could replicate the interesting growth stories of the BRICS. The reality however, is that these measures were at best generalized. Of importance in this paper is Nigeria's position vis-à-vis the BRICS and the nature of its relations with the individual BRICS countries.

No doubt, certain elements of power including geography, population size, and the economic resources, military strength and the diplomatic experience, are at the disposal of Nigeria to achieve greatness as an economic power, influence and recognition. The paper underscored the fact that the challenges posed by collapsing oil prices in the international market and its implications for Nigeria's economic growth and development have been

further exacerbated by the COVID-Pandemic. The article concludes by noting that given the dynamics of economic power, countries seeking to enhance their economic power status, went beyond acronym and focused on strategic economic development which in turn was based on their technological capacities and capabilities. Consequently, the prospects of Nigeria's emergence as an economic power and the future of its relations with the global emerging power bloc such as the BRICS, are hinged on her overcoming critical challenges that have rendered the country prostrate even before the emergence of the COVID-19 disruptions.

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ABSTRACT

Since the emergence of the BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — there have been lots of changes in the global environment. The BRICS has not only served as a diplomatic platform for their multilateral engagements and negotiations of its member countries, but also as a vehicle to drive the political, economic and socio-cultural interactions of the members with other countries such as Nigeria. Jim O'Neill's release of the "Next Eleven" report brought into sharp focus the prospects of the emergence of another power group or the future enlargement of the BRICS. Predicated on the earlier proposition that the "Next Eleven" group of 11 countries, were on track to catch up with the BRICS provided they sustained their growth levels, this article examines Nigeria's position in the Next-11 vis-à-vis the BRICS, with particular reference to the prospects of its emergence as an economic power before and after the COVID-19 pandemic. As observed, despite Nigeria's possession of critical elements of power that include geography, population size, and the economic resources, military strength and diplomatic experience, it is yet to harness them to

achieve prosperity and greatness. It therefore concludes that the country's prospects thereof including the future of its relations with global emerging power blocs, such as the BRICS, are hinged on her overcoming critical challenges that have rendered the country prostrate even before COVID-19-driven disruptions of its economy.

DIMENSIONS OF ELECTORAL REFORMS IN NIGERIA

Emmanuel Olugbade Ojo[1]

Introduction

One of the fundamental problems that post-colonial African states, including Nigeria, are faced with is how to best sustain and eventually consolidate democracy — in this case one-man-one-vote — through credible elections (Kolawole 2007, 15). No doubt, this simple task has become a herculean one in the whole continent of Africa, few states could lay claim to having genuinely conducted free and fair elections as universally perceived. The tendency in many instances is to substitute a bastardised variant of it and justify its efficacy on the platform of expediency to merely secure governmental legitimacy (Iwu 2008, 37). One country that perfectly represents such negativity which serves our immediate purpose here is Zimbabwe (Vale 2005, 14). This is a country where a one-time freedom fighter gained power and refused to dispense with it even after years of exercising it and in spite of the natural law of diminishing returns, which daily affected his capability to provide real governance. It was simply a case of a liberator turned oppressor (Femi 2007, 11). The picture did not change until Robert Mugabe, who was winning all elections, was removed in old age by military putsch before his eventual demise.

In Nigeria, which is the focus of this study, it has been pretty difficult for elected presidents to tinker with the constitutionally established tenure of maximum of two terms (of eight years) even when they desire an extension of tenure like former President Olusegun Obasanjo tacitly attempted (1999-2007). However, successive elections are hardly free and fair. The imperatives of electoral reforms in Nigeria can be summed up thus:

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> Nigeria has a history of violent and deeply flawed elections. At least 300 people were killed in violence linked to the last general election in 2007 [...] since November 2010, more than 50 people have been killed in violence linked to political party primaries and election campaigns and the level of violence is expected to increase in the run-up to the April poll (see Joint statement by Global Watchdog and the Nigeria Bar Association NBA in 2011, *The Nation*, 14 March, 2011, 4).

In a perceptive work, Adekanye (1990, 2) summed up the problem thus: "elections in the country have often been characterized with political tension, crisis, assassination and high levels of violence".

The sad reality in Nigeria, Africa's largest democracy, is not unconnected with her capacity and political will to conduct free, fair and peaceful elections. Since independence in 1960, "violence and myriad irregularities have persistently marred the process of electing the country's leaders" (Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart 2010, 2). The snag is that fierce ambition among Nigerian politicians is certainly part of the problem. In addition, "elections have been about power: controlling it, undermining it, and distributing it" (Samuel 2016). In a country that is not only plural but deeply divided yearning for national integration in all ramifications.

In view of the foregoing, the thrust of this paper is basically to justify the imperatives of electoral reforms cum their dimensions in Nigeria. The paper is organized into a number of sections. With the above introductory remarks, the paper proceeds to an exploration of democracy and elections, bringing out the nexus. Part three of the paper is a review of conduct of general elections in Nigeria between 1999 when the nascent democracy was inaugurated till the 2019 recently conducted elections. Part four dwells on the real focus of the paper, which is the various dimensions electoral reforms should take in the interest of the polity so that the system may not suffer another reversal to dictatorship and autocracy.

Democracy and elections: a nexus

In the extant literature on democratic consolidation, generally elections and democracy are interwoven. The psychology of the elective process lies in the fact that it gives the citizenry a sense of relevance. It imbues him with the fulfilling sense of participation and partaking in public policy through his elected representatives. Put differently, the linkage between elections and democracy is clear, so far, no other method for selecting the

leadership of a democratically ruled society, has been proved or shown to be superior (Ogunsanwo 2003, 11). Thus, a great deal of emphasis has been placed on holding regular elections and this has often led to the misconception that they are an end in themselves and not a means to an end. It is generally agreed that elections are a hallmark of democracy and an important instrument through which leaders are elected to public office. Nevertheless, we recognize that the mere existence of political parties and the holding of regular elections, although important ingredients of democracy, do not in themselves amount to democracy. They remain, however, central pillars of its institutionalization and consolidation; without them, democracy cannot exist. In theory, elections are perceived to enhance democratic governance but in practice some elections are merely a charade geared to legitimating authoritarian rule (Molomo 2006, 23-24; Ojo 2006, 105-123).

As it were, elections broadly conceived, refer to the process of elite selection by the mass of the population in any given political system. Beyond the role of elite recruitment, there is a kind of general acceptance that elections are means by which popular commitment to the regime may be mobilized (Anifowose 2003, 21). In a more explicit manner, the core functions of elections can be summarized as follows:

- recruiting politicians and public decision-makers;
- making governments;
- providing representation;
- influencing policy decisions;
- educating voters;
- building legitimacy;
- strengthening elites;
- providing succession in leadership;
- extension of participation to many people (Anifowose 2003, 21).

However, for an election to perform democratic utility function in a polity, such polity must, as a matter of necessity, allow the media to have power to decide how news is to be covered, who is to be invited to comment, and who is not to be invited (Olurode 1990, 3). Put differently, press freedom is a *sine qua non* to a free and fair election and by extension democratic sustenance and consolidation (Ojo 2003; 2007b, 72-86).

In essence, a vote is democratic if its procedure is democratic. The procedure is democratic if all the following conditions or substantial parts of them are met:

(a) Every preference is freely revealed i.e. the process is free.

(b) There is a level (competitive) playing field for all contesting candidates and their parties.

(c) Every valid vote counts.

(d) There is no single vote whose preference automatically determines a majority i.e. there is no autocracy.

(e) No "proxy" votes are allowed.

Fraud in the process of aggregation is often systematically organized and its enormity has clear correlates to wit:

(a) The greater the degree of power centralization, the greater is the possibility of vote rigging that may occur.

(b) The bigger the size of government, the more the variety of vote rigging.

(c) The lower the degree of accountability of governments/representatives, the higher the level of corruption.

(d) In an environment of poverty, votes, which are a democratic resource bound by decision-role, may acquire market value, determined by competition among the rich who wish to acquire power in addition to wealth. So poverty may entrench a (corrupt) plutocracy (Olurode and Anifowose 2004, vii; Ojo 2006, 105-123).

Nonetheless, elections should enable a democratic society to translate the preferences of its citizens into wise policies. In reality, however, elections do not always produce such results. As observed in Magstadt and Schotten (Anifowose 2003, 40), among the inherent limitations of elections as vehicles of public choice are the following:

(a) Candidates may find that they cannot carry out their promises once elected to office — certain pledges may prove impossible to implement either because candidates deliberately overstated what could be accomplished or because they simply underestimated the forces of resistance.

(b)   If public opinion, one the most important issues of the day, is ill-defined; badly divided newly elected officials may receive no clear mandate from the voters. And even if such a mandate is given, an elected official may regard public opinion on a particular issue to be misguided and either ignores it or tries to change it.

(c)   After being elected to office, a candidate may simply have a change of heart about the desirability or feasibility of a particular policy. The influence of new interest groups, exposure to more and better information, and the realization of the intricate relationship between various domestic and foreign policies can all have a profound impact on a newly elected official.

To extend our typology of the nexus between elections and democracy further may not serve any useful purpose, most especially in a situation whereby scholars of "stasiology" have failed to reach a consensus (Ojo 2007, 4-131). We now move to a brief review of elections in the Fourth Republic.

Dimensions of electoral reforms

The 2007 flawed election, which has been attested to by diverse stakeholders both local and international, has really necessitated the intense call for the restructuring of the electoral system (Pham 2007, 53). But it needs to be emphasized that Nigeria has attempted electoral reforms in the past, but usually under the military whose true motive was to claim some dubious reforming mission so as to try to justify its illegal seizure of power. And that is why nothing has really changed. Behind the façade of this reform effort was a calculated desire never to see them succeed so that they could continue to hold on desperately to power. The last of such panels was the Justice Babalakin Commission of Enquiry into the affairs of Federal Electoral Commission, FEDECO in 1986 (Tinubu 2007, 8).

In spite of many useful and informative memorandum submitted to the panel, there had been no government white paper on the recommendations. And because of this bad faith, the so-called reforms of the late eighties and early nineties for instance, crashed and burned, ending with the perverse annulment of the June 12, 1993 election adjudged to be the most free and fair election the nation ever witnessed[2]. And thereafter, things just

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2 See *The Punch*, 12th June, 2008.

got worse and worse culminating in what has been generally believed as the most flawed and compromised national "election" in Nigeria's history, under the self-interested watch of a militocrat — that is, "soldier-turned born-again" politician — Chief Olusegun Obasanjo (Tinubu 2007, 8). With that existential reality of Nigerian polity, the beneficiary of the discredited 2007 polls — President Umaru Musa Yar-Adua — on assumption of office acknowledged the perverted nature of the country's electoral system which has however warranted his inauguration of a 22-member "*maggie*" to recommend far reaching reform agenda[3].

For record purposes, the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the Electoral Reform Committee is as highlighted hereunder:

    i.   undertake a review of Nigeria's history with general elections and identify factors which affect the quality and credibility of the elections and their impact on the democratic process;

    ii.   examine relevant provisions of the 1999 Constitution, the Electoral Act, and other legislation that have bearing on the electoral process and assess their impact on the quality and credibility of general elections;

    iii.   examine the roles of institutions, agencies and stakeholders in shaping and impacting on the quality and credibility of the electoral process. These should include Government, Electoral Commissions, Security Agencies, Political Parties, and Non-Governmental International Community;

    iv.   examine electoral systems relevant to Nigeria's experience and identify best practices that would impact positively on the quality and credibility of the Nation's electoral process;

    v.   make general and specific recommendations (including but not limited to constitutional and legislative provisions and/or amendments), to ensure:

        a.   a truly Independent Electoral Commission imbued with administrative and financial autonomy;

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3 The names of the 22-man Electoral Reform Committee inaugurated on 29 August 2007 are: Mohammadu Lawal Uwais — Chairman and a former Chief Justice; Godwin Ononiba; Olisa Agbakoba; Okon Uya; Ahmadu Kurfi; Musiliu Smith; Bolaji Akinyemi; Gambo Balarade Abdullahi; Grace Alele-Williams; Toyin Olakunmi; Jibril Ibrahim; Oladayo Popoola; Ahmed Lemu; Attahiru Jega; Ndamusa Alao; John E. Odah; Abduraheem Ujo, 'Dije Bala; Aliyu Umar; Steven Dike; Festus Okoye; Hassan Kukar. For information on the background of each member of the Committee, which has a year to complete its assignment, see *The Nation*, (Lagos), 23 August, 2007, pp. 1&2.

b.   an electoral process that would enable the conduct of elections to meet acceptable international standards;

c.   legal processes that would ensure that election disputes are concluded before inauguration of newly elected officials; and

d.   mechanisms to reduce post-election tensions including possibility of introducing the concept of proportional representation in the constitution of governments.

vi.   make any other recommendations deemed necessary by the Committee.

We now proceed to the critical areas where the reform agenda can be carried out in the interest of the polity. We begin with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), constitutionally charged with the responsibility of administration of elections in Nigeria.

Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

In a national wide opinion survey by IFES-Nigeria (2007), most especially in the wake of the elections[4], election observers called into question INEC's independence and impartiality. The survey results show that these doubts are shared by many in the public when asked to choose between two opposing statements — whether INEC is a neutral body guided in its work only by the law or whether INEC makes decision that favour particular people or interest — a slim majority select the statement that INEC is biased (53%), while four in ten (40%) lean more towards the description of INEC as a neutral body. Not surprisingly, nearly all of those who have little or no confidence in INEC incumbida (93%) vs. (31%). However, even many of those who express confidence in INEC, doubt its independence. Nearly a third (31%) of those who say they have at least moderate confidence in INEC also

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4 See An Election Programme to Fail: Preliminary Report on the Presidential and National Assembly Elections held on Saturday, April 21, 2007 (2007 April). Retrieved July 23, 2007 from http://www.american.edu/ia/idem/nigeria/reort_070421.pdf. The results of this survey are based on face-to-face interviews conducted under the direction of IFES in Practical Sampling International. The interviews were with 2,410 Nigerians 18 years of age or older and were conducted between February 13 and 25, 2007. Interviews were conducted in all 36 Nigerian states and the Federal Capital Territory and are representative of the Nigerian adult population. The survey was paid for by the Department for International Development (DFID) under IFES "Nigerian Election Support 2007" Program. See, IFES Monograph "What Nigerians Think: Nigerian Public Opinion in the Pre-Election Environment, April 2007, IFES – Nigeria, Abuja.

say INEC favours particular people or interests. With an empirical finding[5], demonstrating evidence that there is low confidence in INEC, any meaningful electoral restructuring should begin with the election administrator — INEC.

The fundamental problem with INEC, which makes it potential targets of restructuring and reform, is basically constitutional. No doubt, any electoral administrator like INEC that will perform creditably must be independent, impartial, transparent and indeed accountable. But the kind of constitutional hindrances on the way of INEC is daunting. For instance, Section 156(i) (a) of the 1999 constitution (as amended) provides that those to be appointed as Electoral Commissioners must be qualified to be members of the House of Representatives. The interpretation of this which may not actually be in the spirit and letter of the constitution, is that those appointed as members of the electoral commission should be party members, as party membership is a major criteria to be elected into the House of Representatives in Nigeria (Adejumobi 2007). Not only that, section 14(2) 9; in the Third schedule, part one of the Federal Executive bodies in the Nigerian 1999 constitution empowers the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to appoint Resident Electoral Commissioners for all the States (36) of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja without recourse to the National Assembly for approval. No doubt, this provision has given any ruling party and most especially the incumbent President the leverage to appoint anyone who may be willing to do his biddings.

Connected also with the constitutional problem is the structural and institutional dimension to the electoral management. It is well known that INEC is far from being independent of the Executive organ of government. This is not unconnected with the fact that the chairman of INEC, and the 37 Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) were not only appointed by the President, they also report to him. In terms of financial autonomy too, the commission has a long way to go if it will ever be independent. For instance, for smooth operation of the commission, its financial 'fate' is at the mercy of the Federal Minister of Finance who is also appointed by the President. The Executive headed by Mr. President does not only determine the levels of funding and disbursement to the Commission, it also determines when and how the allocation to INEC is to be released. It is for this constitutional lacuna that the body performed woefully in the administration of 2007 general elections (Ijim-Agbor 2007, 79-94).

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5 See An Election Programme to Fail: Preliminary Report on the Presidential and National Assembly Elections held on Saturday, April 21, 2007 (2007 April), page 29.

Therefore, INEC must be independent and be seen to be so legally, structurally, financially and in virtually all ramifications. The personnel who will lead the national electoral body and the national commissioners should be appointed in a manner that truly confers on them the garb of independence and more critically, independence of thought and action. To achieve this, appointments of Electoral Commissioners and their principal officers have to be rooted in a system which does not allow a sitting President or Governor to appoint electoral umpires that will supervise elections into which they are either participants or personally interested in (Tinubu 2007). Only under such a system will the people's confidence in the election process be restored.

In the same vein, the 1999 constitution needs to be amended to grant INEC real autonomy. The legal backing may have to provide for INEC that is autonomous structurally and has financial autonomy not only administrative one. The arrangement should be akin to the judiciary's consolidated fund which cannot be tampered with by the executive arm of government.

Perhaps more critical is the imperative of deepening the deployment of technology in the management of the voters' register, voting and result collation processes. Though this should be done with caution; e-voting in a developing country like Nigeria could face a number of challenges which includes but not limited to hacking of voting machines, hacking of election campaign data, and hacking of online voting itself. Be that as it may, INEC needs to find a way of prosecuting electoral offenders. The electoral body should find a way to deal with a situation in which Returning Officers are compelled to declare winners under duress. Hence, it is a cheering news that INEC is proposing 34 amendments to the Electoral Act 2010 Amendment Bill.

Political parties

No doubt, political parties in all regions and climes of the world are important components of liberal democracy and electoral processes. Political parties produce the candidates, set the parameters of issues and agenda within which elections are to be fought and are further expected to perform these duties from one election to another (International IDEA 2000, 226-227). The growth of modern democratic practice revolves around political parties, which stand out as organized platforms for the articulation of aspirations and canvassing for electoral votes. While the idea of independent candidacy is practiced in some democracies, it remains an exception to the rule of political organization or the machinery through which government is formed and power is acquired.

Under the 1999 Nigerian constitution, only duly registered political parties licensed by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) can take part and present candidates for election into all the offices in the federation. In other words, any Nigerian seeking elective office must be a card-carrying member of such a party; independent candidature is not provided for in the constitution. Put differently, political parties are really imperative in Nigeria's nascent democracy. Expectedly, they tend to play a critical role in promoting democratic thinking and democratizing political systems. They are instruments linking the rulers to the ruled. Parties are thus basic organizational means by which people compete in elections for the rights to formulate and implement their policy objectives through the political system. Indeed, according to leading scholars of party politics, democracy is a function of competing and conflicting parties and that there is a structural link between mass mobilizing parties and political participation as it is the case in Europe (Manafu 1998, 1-26).

The snag however is that there is a missing link in Nigerian politics. What is more, the Nigerian political parties do not perform the aforementioned functions today. Virtually all the existing political parties are not well organized for them to be a catalyst for democratic sustenance and consolidation. They also do not compete over the issues they will pursue if elected into public office. Parties have failed to offer policy alternatives as expected of them. Hence, elections are not fought mostly on issues. Additionally, as reflected in successive general elections, the result of elections does not mostly reflect what people prefer going by the spontaneous reactions to the much-contested results. To be sure, parties fail to have elected officials bound by their campaign pledges. Therefore, there remains a wide gap between what is promised and what actually is delivered (Manafu 1998, 2).

Whereas, according to the majoritarian model of democracy, parties are essential to making the government responsive to public opinion. Thus, four clearly identified principles of responsible party government postulated by Jerry Goldman *et al.* (Janda, Berry and Goldman 1992), defines the ideal roles of parties in a democracy. These include:

- parties should present clear and coherent programmes;
- voters should choose candidates according to the party programmes;
- the winning party should carry out its programmes once in office;
- voters should hold the governing party responsible at the election for executing its programme (Janda, Berry and Goldman 1992, 294).

In line with these principles of responsible party government, political parties are expected to observe the following basic functions:

- Nominate candidates. This is a crucial function, so as to avoid a situation whereby the electorate will be faced with a bewildering array of self-nominated candidates.
- Structure the voters' choice. Political parties held democratic government by allowing the voters to have choices based on candidates' proposals or their party manifestos.
- Coordinate the actions of government officials. The leaders of the legislative and executive arms of government are not expected to be in agreement all the time. Political parties offer a platform for bridging the gaps, ensure functional separation of power and produce coordinated parties that will better the lot of the citizens (Janda, Berry and Goldman 1992, 294).

It is in view of the afore-stated malady of political parties in the current democratic dispensation that now necessitated the need to evaluate their formation, development and prospects in Nigeria's bid to attain sustainable and consolidated democracy. One major observable feature of party politics in Nigeria is the absence of ideological class. Hence, the tendency is for these parties to see themselves as a force competing in a multi-ethnic civil society. Indeed, we equally note that these parties have interpreted political competitions in terms of the survival of the ethnic entities in which case political parties may have institutional ethnic solidarity rather than national outlook. They almost replicate Larry Diamond's description of political parties and party systems up to the Second Republic thus "they tended to reflect ethnic and regional peculiarities too closely to provide a fresh crosscutting basis for political conflict" (Oyediran and Agbaje 1991, 20). Corroborating Larry Diamond, Anthony Akinola notes that the political parties of the First Republic were "severely limited in their capabilities to integrate the components of that great diversity of societies known as Nigeria" (Akinola 1989). Indeed, as claimed by Chudi Nwazurike, they [political parties] "barely passed the critical litmus test for competitive democracy — the willingness to play by the rules — in fairly and squarely seeking power across the nation through an intemperate electoral process" (Oyediran and Agbaje 1991). The report of the Political Bureau in its comment on Nigerian political parties of the time averred that:

> The Nigerian pattern has exhibited virtually the worst forms of an unstable democracy. Most parties were narrow based, tied to some great and unassailable leader who tended to stamp the organization not with any grand ideological vision but his personal biases. Besides, each was ethnically based, mass-mobilizing and confrontational in orientation (FRN 1987, 124-132).

All these problems and fears make Nigerian political parties far from being catalysts to national integration and democratic stability.

Furthermore, of the eight phenomena identified by Celestine Mongu (1999), as fuelling collective skepticism about Africa's (indeed Nigeria's) democratization project, the point on the weakness of the political parties stood in bold relief. A contemporary political party is expected to meet four criteria, which Nigerian parties are lacking:

(a) Continuity that is having a life span that extends beyond those of its founders.

(b) Nationwide organization that is to seek to appeal to a wide range of electorate across the country in order to be able to actualize its primary objective of capturing power through the ballot box or by people's consent.

(c) It must desire to exercise power. A political party should not exist just to play the same role of a pressure group.

(d) Lastly, it must make consistent effort to garner significant popular support (Mongu 1999).

As noted earlier in this piece, one of the major banes of party politics is ideological fluidity by politicians, which makes many politicians behave like political bats changing party affiliations in response to the political fortune of their group. Oyeleye Oyediran (1991), however, identifies two factors as being responsible for this:

(a) the first is the basis for political party formation; and

(b) the second is the caliber and behaviour of political leaders whether or not they hold elective office (Ayandiji 2004, 83-100).

No doubt, Oyediran's observation is valid even in the current dispensation, which has however necessitated reforms (Adejumo and Kehinde 2007). Thus, if Nigeria's nascent democracy will be consolidated eventually, the issue of internal democracy within all registered political parties must

be taken seriously. INEC should ensure that, legally, all parties comply with that requirement before candidates are fielded for elections. Lack of internal democracy has always been subject to litigation after elections when candidates complain that they were marginalized during primaries. Party primaries should be taken seriously (Ojo 2019). A party that lacks democratic credentials internally cannot be expected to run a democratic government if it eventually wins election. For 2019 elections alone, according to INEC, there were as many as 809 pre-election petitions filed before the general elections; the reformed electoral body should provide clear procedures for party primary and consequences of violations (Egburonu 2020, 15).

Influence of money on politics

One other fundamental problem which is in dire need of reform is the twin cankerworm of debilitating influence of money and corruption in the electoral process, which has negatively impacted on the body politik. Presently, political financing is indeed corrupted. The corruption in virtually all political systems vis-à-vis electoral processes manifest in one of the following ways:

(a) Political contributions that contravene existing laws on political financing.

(b) The use for campaign or party objectives of money that a political office holder has received from a corrupt transaction.

(c) Unauthorized use of state resources for partisan political purposes.

(d) Acceptance of money in return for an unauthorized favour or the promise of a favour in the event of election to an office.

(e) Contributions from disreputable sources, and

(f) Spending money on banned purposes such as vote-buying. (Pinto-Duschinsky 2004, 1-23).

Meanwhile, the penchant of politicians to strive to win elections, even at the party primary levels, at all cost for that matter, makes desperate contestations to engage in all sorts of malpractices including offering financial and material inducements to voters. Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria's ex-president confirmed this when he averred that:

With so much resources being deployed to capture elective offices, it is not difficult to see the correlation between politics and the potential for high level corruption. The greatest losers are the ordinary people, those voters whose faith and investment in the system are hijacked and subverted because money, not their will, is made the determining factor in elections. Can we not move from politics of money and materialism to politics of ideas, issues and development? (Obasanjo 1992, 138).

Chief Obasanjo also bemoaned the cost of conducting elections in Nigeria thus:

Even more worrisome, however, is the total absence of any control on spending by candidates and parties towards elections. I have said that we prepare for elections as if we are going to war, and I can state without hesitation, drawing from my previous life, that the parties and candidates together spent during the last elections more than would have been needed to fight a successful war (Obasanjo 1992, 138).

Nonetheless, in a bold attempt to reduce the problem of vote buying by candidates, the 2006 electoral act placed a ceiling on how much a candidate can spend in contesting an election, section 93 sub-sections 92 (7) clearly stipulated that the maximum election expenses to be incurred by a candidate at a presidential election shall be N500,000,000; Governorship election N100,000,000; Senatorial seat N20,000,000; while the seat for House of Representatives shall be N10,000,000 respectively. In the case of State Assembly election, the maximum amount of election expenses to be incurred shall be N5,000,000, same amount for the chairmanship of local governments and N500,000 for council election (Electoral Act 2006, A48).

Cashing-in on the poverty of the people, Nigerian politicians are well known for distributing foodstuffs and other consumable materials to voters shortly before the elections and sometimes on Election Day, contrary to the provisions of the extant electoral law (as amended) that prohibits such practice. Instances abound too, when candidates threw some money into the air during campaign rallies, making people scramble for it and getting injured in the process (Adejumo 1995, 125-145). No doubt one of the critical areas that require reform is the issue of money as regards party financing cum campaign expenses. This can better be enhanced not only by law but institutional mechanisms that can properly monitor compliance strictly with the law. The greatest obstacle here is the inability of INEC to monitor election expenses of

parties and their candidates; more so in a developing system where records are not kept coupled with criminal secrecy by candidates.

Strengthening the weak state

As a corollary to the aforestated, a weak state cannot successfully administer a free and fair credible election. For election administration to attain governmental legitimacy after polls has always been a serious concern to electoral scholars (Elklit and Keynolds 2000, 1-37). It is well known that most new states in Africa, Asia and Latin America are too weak for the assignment. Thus, state capacity is a major prerequisite to successful polls. State power is said to consist of the following five elements:

(i)   monopoly of the coercive power of society, that is, control of instrument of coercion;

(ii) the right to improve tax and collect revenue;

(iii) the power of legal enactment, that is, power to make laws;

(iv) sovereignty over territory and society; and

(v)   control of the institutions of the state or state apparatus, bureaucracy (Onyeoziri 2005, 3).

These five elements taken together constitute the basis of state power and they endow the state with the status of statehood. But nation states which qualify for the status of statehood may differ in their degree of *stateness*, some are strong states, others are weak. No doubt, Nigeria falls into the category of weak states. Like others in her category, Nigeria runs a system, one in which formal rules (laws, officially stated administrative rules and practices etc.) are applied copiously and in a lax manner rather than rigorously and consistently. It is one in which private advantage can be gained and private bargains struck concerning the enforcement or non-enforcement of the rules as when a businessman bribes a tax official, besides money, another inducement is kinship sentiment and another is the favour of superiors.

The consequential effect is that in some cases individuals may be more powerful than the state in which the rule of law is abused with impunity. Cases of such were too numerous to be mentioned during successive elections. Meanwhile, the state requires to be strengthened and justice dispensed on time without fear or favour. This should be done in a way that after any general election, aggrieved parties should be able to have access to the courts/election petition tribunals which should be able to adjudicate such

cases before the inauguration of a new government; and also justice seen to be done vis-à-vis electoral offences.

In the same perspective, all security apparatus of the state must be given sufficient re-orientation in what their constitutional roles should be before, during and after elections. The experience with the last general election was not palatable, security agents were biased doing the biddings of the ruling party. The consequential effect of this was an unprecedented rate of electoral violence all over the country. Indeed, the tempo, and character of electoral violence, resulting from representational campaign, balloting and result conflicts, has been a terminal problem of Nigerian politics since the 1950s (Albert 2007, 132). According to INEC sources, the violence led to 265 cases of electoral violence, recorded all over the country during the governorship and State House of Assembly elections on 14th April 2007 elections alone. During the same period, 1,093 persons were arrested, 11 civilians killed and 39 policemen also lost their lives[6]. Put differently; when one man's corps is another man's thug, the bastardized, ill-trained and poorly paid security agencies can never assist in the maintenance of law and order[7]. The reform agenda should carry the law enforcers along. It is by doing so that Nigerian state will be waxing stronger.

The judiciary and credible elections

The judiciary is a cardinal institution in our established democracy. This is not unconnected with the fact that the constitutional government must in part be a judicial government (Hague *et al.* 1983, 279). As the third organ or branch of government, the constitution vests it *inter alia* with the

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6 For the spate of electoral violence all over the country during the last general elections, see *Sunday Tribune*, Ibadan, 15 April, 2007. The Tribune chronicle recounted below is not cheering:

- 61 killed in Rivers, Lagos, Osun, Oyo, Borno, Abia, Edo
- Ballot boxes snatched, burnt
- PDP leader shot dead in Ekiti.
- 2 Police stations burnt in Port Harcourt
- 17 fake soldiers arrested in Ibadan, 3 in Enugu, 1,500 thugs arrested
- Bisi Akande quizzed over possession of gun
- This election is horrible – Senate President
- We didn't anticipate this – INEC Chairman
- What a state of anomie?

7 For a full detail of electoral violence in 2011 general elections see, Emmanuel O. Ojo 'Bunker' Democracy and the Challenges of Sustaining Democratic Values in Nigeria – An Appraisal of the 2011 General Elections, in Journal African Elections, Vol. 15 No. 1 (June). 2016, pp. 93-112.

powers to interpret and apply all laws in the country in relation to both criminal and civil matters and disputes between individuals and groups, between individuals and political authorities, as well as, between political authorities in a parallel relationship or in a vertical relationship, such as between one state and the federal government in a federal system (Awa 1996, 8). Thus, it is the guardian of the rule of law and the upholder of justice, fair play and equity. This is the reason why in Nigerian constitutions it enjoys the greatest measure of independence from both the executive and legislative arms of government, except during military interregnum (Ojo 2000, 1).

Meanwhile, beyond mere theoretical postulations, the Nigerian judiciary has manifested a number of shortcomings which eminently qualifies it for reform and total overhauling. In a relatively complex society, like Nigeria people are appointed even into the Supreme Court not on merit but on such nebulous grounds of religious and ethnic balance, federal character, seniority, zonal representation and old school ties (Osuntokun 2008). The effect of this is divided loyalty and inability to uphold the solemn principle and ethics of judicial independence. This is one of the constraints of the judiciary in Nigeria.

Secondly, as long as there is no fiscal or financial independence of the judiciary, it will continue to be subject to the control of the purse. This is not ideal for a judiciary that is worth its salt. We have seen in recent times in Nigeria especially after the poorly conducted and violently rigged and manipulated elections of 2007 that the judiciary is perhaps the only institution standing between justifiable resistance to electoral manipulation and anarchy (Osuntokun 2008). The 2006 Electoral Act makes the judiciary the final arbiter of electoral disputes. But, where it is taking the judiciary too long a time to resolve electoral cases before them thereby permitting the wrong people to occupy positions of power for years unduly before respite comes the way of petitioners are uncalled for; compounded with this are several allegations of corruption both against the bar and the bench. Until these issues are addressed, a free and fair election may not be easily attainable in Nigeria.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, there should be a dispute resolution mechanism during and after elections (Mukele 2007, 4). This is what a restructured electoral system should look like. Be that as it may, it needs to be emphasized that, whatever reform or restructuring put in place, Nigerians need to be

re-oriented — both the followers and the led — on what it takes to have a credible election. The snag is that Nigerians are not democrats thereby the possibility of having democracy becomes a mirage. It is only when re-orientation is done, which takes time that a kind of political culture congruent to democratic sustenance can ever evolve. Above all, the present level of excruciating poverty is uncalled for. The poor will be receptive to reform, while the rich find them useful in perpetuating electoral atrocities. The envisaged restructuring must not lose sight of the parlous state of the economy. This is where civil society organizations need to be reanimated and galvanized for it to be able to discharge its duties well. No doubt, the dimensions of electoral reform discussed in this paper are far from being exhaustive, but indeed salient towards the attainment of a better and improved system, more so, to call for a perfect human system is to anticipate Eldorado and utopia which is never the goal of reform, but rather improvement on the existing system.

A holistic electoral reform agenda would no doubt bring about an INEC that would be autonomous and shielded from political manipulation especially from the political party in power. There should usually be a clause in the law stating that in the exercise of its functions, it shall not be subject to the dictate of any other person or authority. The office of the chairman and commissioners shall be so protected that it would not be easy or possible to sack them at the whims and caprices of the executive. Not only that the legal framework shall be sufficiently glaring on the electoral body for it to be able to take quick decisions. Also, such a commission shall have powers to hire and fire personnel, without being restricted to seconded officers and *ad hoc* staffer that cannot be effectively disciplined.

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ABSTRACT

No doubt, successive general elections in Nigeria fall far below internationally acclaimed minimum standard for a free and fair election. Whereas, democracy which is the desire of Nigerians will survive only if its basic and elementary rules — free and fair election for citizens — in terms of one-man-one-vote for the citizenry to exercise their choice are observed — unfortunately, "a number of elections did not meet even the barest minimum requirement in a failed state". It is against this background that this paper now attempts a prognosis of the dimensions of electoral reforms and the likely challenges so that the beleaguered nascent democracy can resist the possibility of reversal to autocracy. To achieve this aim, the paper has been organized into a number of sections. With an introductory overview, which dwells on the imperatives of a free and fair election in Nigeria, the paper proceeds to brief theoretical postulations that bother on the nexus between democracy and credible elections. The paper however proceeds to the dimensions of restructuring the electoral institutions to be able to guarantee free and fair credible elections. Few of the areas of concentration for restructuring includes: a review of the electoral acts, rejig of INEC, political parties and internal democracy, the debilitating influence of money in politics most especially vote-buying, strengthening the weak state and the role of the judiciary in credible elections amongst others. The paper however infers that even if all restructuring dimensions are undertaken, the state must be strengthened from its present extremely weak status cum adoption of IT while Nigerians need to be given re-orientation so that they can imbibe a congruent political culture vis-à-vis democracy.

PARTY POLITICS, PASSIVE STAKEHOLDERS AND VENGEFUL GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN EKITI STATE, NIGERIA

Mike Opeyemi Omilusi[1]

Introduction

Two months before the July 2018 governorship election in Ekiti State, Nigeria, precisely after the emergence of the All Progressives Congress (APC) candidate, the social media, local TV and radio stations and various informal discussions were already awash with an unusual "sloganeering" by APC members and "sympathizers", calling for a rehash of "the 2014 free and fair election" model believed to have been invented and choreographed by the then Federal Government for the victory of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) governorship candidate. This was a thinly-masked euphemism for a seemingly settled intention to assert the "federal might"[2] to deal with the opposition as allegedly done against the then incumbent APC government in the state in 2014. Indeed, the use of security agencies to intimidate and arrest opposition members and so-called photochromic technology[3] — *in printing the ballot paper and the quality of the indelible ink* — to manipulate the outcome of voting — had been alleged in the 2014 election. Four years

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2 Federal Might, in Nigeria's political lexicon, depicts a case of employing apparatus of government at the centre, including financial resources and security, to influence the election outcome against opposition parties.

3 This was comprehensively explored in my previous work and considered alien to the country's electoral democracy while its authenticity has been questioned by curious observers (Omilusi 2016, 124). The allegation has not been proven by any technological or legal mechanism till date.

later, political gladiators were up in arms to slug it out in a contest that appeared to be a litmus test of not merely the popularity and acceptability of local politicians but also the prospects of the Buhari presidency ahead of the 2019 general elections.

It was expected that the APC would want to use Ekiti State to strengthen its chances ahead of the presidential election, but more compelling was the view that the President Muhammadu Buhari was eager to thwart the wish of incumbent Governor Ayodele Fayose of Ekiti State to retain the PDP's control of the affairs of the state (Adeoye 2018). In a consolidating democracy with a powerful executive such as Nigeria's, mid-term governorship elections obviously shed light on the extent to which a sitting president is willing to use 'federal might' or to tip the electoral scale in favour of his party, as was widely reported to have happened in the 2014 Ekiti State election. The governorship poll was, therefore, viewed by some people as the battlefield for a 'proxy war' between the President and the Ekiti State Governor. This means that, like with other mid-term governorship elections, the Ekiti polls provided an early indication of essential factors which could determine the conduct and outcome of the subsequent presidential race.

This study interrogates the 2018 Ekiti governorship election as a window to peep into the ruling party/opposition muscle-flexing in a stiff political contest and into the behind-the-scene engagements of some passive stakeholders[4] in Nigeria's electoral politics. Can the so-called stakeholders be identified as the real drivers of democratic regime change in Ekiti? Are there other external variables impinging on the voters' choice of party or candidate? Are the variables mutually exclusive or complementary? Indeed, what is the underlying power structure that determines electoral outcomes in Ekiti? This study has the ambition to set the stage for the broader inquiry that is needed to find answers to these overarching research questions. Through the use of an analytic narrative and with the understanding of the "electoral model" of democratization as a technique of contemporary regime change, this work reveals that the Ekiti electorate is often influenced by the choices and strategies of different significant political actors and that the vigorous electioneering activities of these actors who seize the electioneering period to exploit voter vulnerability for mobilization and voting constitute a dominant feature of Ekiti political behaviour.

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4 I am being particular about the civil servants, academics, media, security agents and civil society practitioners who, apart from their professed or statutory public engagements, are also partisanly involved in determining the outcome of the election.

Motivation and Concerns

The 2018 governorship election in Ekiti State presented an interesting opportunity for further analysis of electoral democracy. It attracted significant interest because of the anticipated keen contest expected from the major contending political parties and candidates, as well as concern about election-related violence. Even though the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) assured Ekiti people that it would ensure that the July 14 governorship election was conducted in a most transparent and credible manner (see *This Day*, May 19, 2018, 7), many sceptics still entertained fear, notably when the tempo of political activities in the state increased just as cases of assassination, destruction of campaign materials and violent rallies began to erupt. The hate speech campaign and the unfathomable level of propaganda in which party members were at loggerheads on social media were unprecedented in the state. Thus, the deafening shenanigans and boastful rhetoric that attended the election's prospects and outcomes served as a suitable barometer for speculating on the direction of the 2019 election.

Apart from the visible party members and political gladiators, there were other significant actors whose activities shaped the electoral process. This study is, therefore, guided by an overriding question of what impact some passive stakeholders and anticipatory external influence, coded in federal might, generally had on the electoral outcome. In interrogating this, the researcher was interested more in how the interface of peoples' resolute in making political consensus and intervening variables could make or mar an election in a homogeneous community like Ekiti. As a researcher, however, his initial fear was how to maintain neutrality in accordance with research ethics in an election where he was formally and clandestinely multi-tasked. The other concern was for the stakeholders (hereafter referred to as informants) not to portray him as a spy in the eventual publication of this study even though specific names are not mentioned. Overall, one of the main arguments of this study is that irrespective of projected non-partisanship, their (passive stakeholders) impact on politics and society in the current democratic period cannot be underestimated. Also, the process of selection of candidates (and their presentation) by the voters had underpinnings in other factors including economic value, bandwagon effect and personal benefits.

Figure 1: Ekiti Map[5]

Methodology/Study Area

The study adopts the qualitative method of generating data. It employs the participant-observer method of data gathering. In some instances, the evidence for this study drew on *impromptu*, informal focus group discussions (FGDs), one-on-one chats and in-house activities of the *ad hoc* groups to which the researcher belonged. In a separate research with other colleagues, the researcher participated in the party primaries of three political parties while gathering data from party delegates. He also relied essentially, via media tracking, on Facebook, to extract posts by politicians and party sympathizers, particularly between May 8 and July 13, 2018. The evidence on which this study makes its most authoritative submission is primarily sourced from different key informants, including voters, politicians, media correspondents, security agents, academics, members of civil society groups and election observers.

Objectives of the Study

As a researcher with previous experience of working with civil society groups, policymakers and politicians in the state, it is realized that a combination of social, political, economic, and historical factors determine electoral consensus among voters in Ekiti, seemingly reinforcing their homogeneity at that level of collective decision-making. The objectives of the current study,

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5 Ekiti State is in the Southwest geo-political zone of Nigeria, with Ado Ekiti as the state capital. The state was created on October 1, 1996, from the old Ondo State. It comprises 16 local government areas.

therefore, are to (1) examine the nature of electioneering within the context of the ruling party/opposition muscle-flexing in a political contest; (2) interrogate how the electoral power dynamics and relationships between Ekiti voters and political gladiators (elites) played out during the election; (3) explore the underlying power structure and socio-political factors that determine electoral outcomes in Ekiti; (4) examine the potency or otherwise of behind-the-scene engagements of some identified passive stakeholders as drivers of regime change in Ekiti electoral politics; (5) determine how mutually exclusive or complementary the external variables and Ekiti voters' *orchestrated consensus* were in the 2018 election.

The Nature and Nuances of a Vengeful Campaign: The APC Spiteful Comparison

Leaders of the two dominant political parties underscored the strategic importance of the Ekiti election. At a rally in Ado Ekiti, leaders of the PDP boasted that the defeat of the APC in 2019 would begin at the Ekiti polls (Oluwole 2018). Like previous electioneering campaigns devoid of issues and contestation of ideas, the two most visible parties resorted to propaganda and outright falsehood to convince the electorate. It was a vitriolic campaign from the very blast of the whistle. The tempo of campaigns stretched political ties to the limit. Besides the regular campaigns of promises, the gladiators resorted to outright blackmail and character assassination to paint their opponents black. The allegations and counter-allegations were well balanced across the lines. For the All Progressives Congress, (APC), the July 14 gubernatorial election in Ekiti was like the epic battle of two bitter, ancient football rivals (Akinsuyi 2018). As aptly captured by Alamu (2018a, 3):

> Right from the beginning, the Fayemi campaign was projected as a grudge match with the governor-elect himself famously being quoted as saying that Fayose would be caged on Election Day. Looming in the background was an unforgiving presidency very much embarrassed not to say embittered by Fayose's endless taunts and often ill-bred tirades.

Though Fayose was not directly contesting the governorship election, the governor did not cloak his avowed interest in making sure that his deputy, Kolapo Olusola, succeeded him (Lashore 2018). Many political observers believe that the stage was set for an epic battle because of the belief among

the APC members that the 2014 governorship election in which Ayo Fayose defeated incumbent Fayemi was manipulated by then PDP Federal Government in favour of its candidate and that the 2018 exercise was payback time (Bello 2018).

Put differently, it meant: whatever Federal Might the PDP central government deployed to Ekiti to record that unbelievable victory (in all the 16 local government areas) against a sitting APC governor should be returned to that same Ekiti by the current APC central government (Nwosu 2018). For instance, observers alleged that the presence of the Minister of Defence, Mansur Dan-Ali in the National Campaign Council for the Ekiti governorship election was aimed at using the military to coerce, harass and intimidate the electorate and, ultimately, rig the election in favour of the ruling party. The same thing applied to the Minister of Interior who superintends over the Police, Para-military and security agencies.

There were fears that the not-so-cordial relationship between Fayose and President Muhammadu Buhari on the country's political developments may have prepared the ground for the so-called powerful cabal at the presidency to use the election to take their pound of flesh from the Ekiti governor (Bello 2018). Of a fact, some of the politicians in the state described the 2019 contest as "the bigger picture", contending that "the 2018 election in Ekiti would set the tone for what would eventually play out in the state in the 2019 general election" (Egbas 2018, 12). On Saturday, April 14, 2018, Fayemi took over Ado Ekiti and told the surging crowd on the streets that he forgot something in the government house that only he could retrieve. According to the then-candidate, "We will use local, state and federal power to take over Ekiti from a rapacious government being run by brigands in Ekiti" (Egbas 2018, 15).

As a matter of fact, the foot soldiers of various camps engaged in whatever means (right or wrong) to market and promote their principals, including personal attacks. It is important to stress that social media offer massive potential for freedom of expression, and this was maximally explored in the Ekiti election. Traditional posters were complemented by modern websites; potential voters were contacted through Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. Because it is far easier to more precisely target potential voters with information online, either based on demographics, geography or associations or behaviour, party members and sympathizers concentrated more on social media. However, rather than promoting their candidates based on identifiable manifestos, many resorted to hate speech or what I referred to as vengeful campaign (being the focus of this study) to spite or denigrate opponents. Below are the captured campaign messages from *Facebook* between May 8 and July 13, 2018:

Table 1: campaign messages from facebook (May-July, 2018)

Bouuda Ayo Fayose, Olusola Kolapo Eleha, Peoples Destructive Party, Very Close to enter Red Sea of Ekiti Politics, July 14 stands for JKF/OBE

Just like in 2014, tell Fayose that we shall use Police and Soldiers in this election.

(Niyi Adebayo, former governor at APC rally on June 19)

Exactly four years ago today, Politicians sympathetic to APC cause were intimidated, harassed and Detained!

July 14 will be a return Match!!!

#Ekiti2018

Let the coward engage all the civil servants, artisans, okada riders today, he can't on election day. This is the end of a terror reigns in Ekiti. *JKF leekan si*

A governor that brought violence that almost took the life of Prince Adeyeye and Olubo-lade during primary is now placing a curse on who will bring violence to Ekiti during the election, why is he afraid of himself? It's Karma, what you do to people will be done unto you Mr dictator. Run from pillar to pole, cry from morning till the following morning, you're a goner already, your game is over. *JKF legbegbe, JKF leekan si.*

..If you think it was right in 2014, it is hypocritical to condemn it in 2018

Oshoko should know that a new Sheriff is in town, his name is Adam Oshiomhole... A veteran in the act of rough play.

What goes around, comes around. Back in 2014, Fayemi was also teargassed and heaven did not fall.

...In 2014, you were comfortable with soldiers, DSS and Mobile Police, but now, you are not. You can leave Ekiti!

...Just like the Ekiti 2014 governorship election, this one too shall be free, fair and peaceful. Nobody should be afraid of peacekeepers pls!

...Ekiti election practical is next week Saturday, imminent surprise looms. PDP set to meet their waterloo

..It would be an injustice to see Army Personnel at my Polling unit in 2014 and not to see them in 2018..#I need soldiers#

...Revenge is always the sweetest

...2014 was for the thieves, 2018 is for the owners...Oshiomhole

Source: Compiled by the author.

The election was as intensely personal, as it was deeply polarising. Contextually, there was a measure of desperation on the part of the major combatants, partly because the APC required a victorious election to debunk the growing impression that it had failed to grapple with governance problems and that voters are ready to throw it out at the earliest opportunity (Olukotun 2018). Fayose and the PDP also fought what they considered to be the battle of their lives, partly because the party was eager to show that it had morphed into a serious alternative to the ruling APC and to flash the possibility of regaining power at the centre in 2019 (Olukotun 2018). On a general note, however, while the PDP premised its campaign on "Continuity", pleading with people to vote for Olusola in order to continue with the "good works of Fayose", the APC maintained that Ekiti would use the election of July 14 to "reject Continuity of poverty, hunger, maladministration and bad governance" (Adeyemi 2018, 7).

Voting for the Devil you Know? The Cliché of *I-prefer-some-one-who owes-me-to-the-one-who-will-sack-me*

As several people have argued, fake news is not new, but what is new is its scale and participatory nature. It was, therefore, not surprising that politicians deployed propaganda, using persuasive allegations, messages, ideas, opinions, statements, accusations and exaggerations with the primary purpose of influencing, and, if possible, manipulating, the minds and emotions of the public or of those at which they are directed. The PDP counter-messages and propaganda or outright fake news readily encapsulated this assertion. For many of its supporters and members, it was a stratagem calculated to win more sympathy votes particularly among the civil servants and undecided voters — if any — at that material time.

Ayodele Fayose once declared that his performance would make the victory of his Deputy, Kolapo Olusola, an easy accomplishment in the July 14 governorship election (Ojomoyela 2018). He had framed it as a contest between good and evil, as a test of strength and power and will between himself and President Muhammadu Buhari, between the APC and the PDP, and finally between himself and Fayemi (Dare 2018). Weeks before Election Day, Fayose's well-oiled propaganda machinery had asserted over and over that the poll would be rigged by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) for the benefit of the ruling APC and the Federal Government (Dare 2018). Fayose alleged that the APC had plans to engage students of

the Federal University at Ado Ekiti as *ad hoc* staff with the main purpose of using them to rig the election. He called on the international community to intervene to ensure that the election was not rigged (Menas Associates 2018). He even told a visiting official of the United States Consulate, Lagos, Osman Tat, of plans by the All Progressives Congress-led Federal Government to use federal might to rig the election:

> They are planning to do this because they know that in a transparent and credible election, the APC cannot win in Ekiti State. We are popular and our party, the Peoples Democratic Party, is popular because of our performance in government and my brand of politics (Vanguard 2018, 6).

That Dr Fayemi would sack teachers and workers if elected into office or that *okada* would be banned from operating in the state if Fayemi became governor reverberated among supporters of the PDP candidate and sent fear in the minds of the target groups. These alarmist claims by PDP left the APC with the huge task of reassuring workers, teachers and *okada riders* that their jobs were safe with Dr Fayemi in the saddle (Oluwole 2018). Some people thought that Fayemi lost the 2014 election partly because of the controversial competency test his administration intended for civil servants. The leaders of the Nigerian Union of Teachers, National Union of Local Government Employees (NULGE) and the organized labour rose against Fayemi over the policy as they were of the view that the government intended to use the test to prune down the workforce.

The issue became a sing-song among the civil servants, especially teachers and local government workers, in the build-up to the election. The propaganda machinery was substantially oiled by the PDP campaign organization that had capitalized on this segment of the voters to coast home to victory. At a point, the Association of Nigeria Conference of Principals of Secondary Schools in an online message to members directed all teachers to submit their names, voter cards, phone numbers and accounts numbers to their zonal chairmen as conditions for the approval of their running grants (The Eagle Online 2018). In early July, the DSS, acting on a tip-off, swooped on Olaoluwa Grammar School, Ado Ekiti and arrested three teachers who were alleged to be collecting PVCs from teachers (Ojomoyela 2018).

Expectedly, Fayemi lampooned Fayose for owing core civil servants, local government workers and teachers between five and nine months salaries, expressing regret that no worker had collected salaries meant for the year (2018). He said it was an act of irresponsibility and insincerity for the

governor to be calling himself a friend of civil servants and teachers and still owing them arrears of salaries despite getting financial reliefs from the Federal Government (Ani 2018). Fayemi affirmed that he never sacked a single worker but engaged doctors, teachers, civil servants and moved teachers in local government to where they could do better professionally to advance their careers.

The state government had sought to pre-empt the former Minister of Mines and Steel Development's governorship ambition, when it initiated a probe of his tenure as governor of the state, raising some allegations for which a report was issued, indicting and banning him from holding public office for ten years. Although this has become a matter for legal contention, the engagement and efforts by the Fayemi campaign to wipe off the smear from this singular attack from the Fayose continuity group had been enervating (Vista Post Nigeria 2018). Mr. Fayose also tried to sow the seed of discord between the APC and the people of Ekiti, accusing the APC of withholding funds meant to pay the salaries of workers. He had always boasted that he would not leave office owing a single Ekiti worker. When it became evident that paying all outstanding salaries was going to be difficult, he had offered the excuse of the "frustration" caused by the federal government in not releasing the funds to his administration.

The fear that the state's anti-open grazing law could be abolished and Ekiti land awarded as a cattle colony to herdsmen was also smuggled into the narrative against the APC candidate; thus portraying Fayemi as a Buhari loyalist that would most likely convert Ekiti's ancestral lands into cattle colony for herdsmen.

Passive Stakeholders and Behind-the-Scene-Critical Engagements

The quality of participatory politics and democracy might seem to be on the retreat globally, in North and South, in what has been called a "democratic deficit" or a "democratic recession" (Friedman 2008). Usually, election stakeholders include political parties, the elections management body, the civil society, elections observers drawn from various institutions, the media and the government. This study beams its searchlight on some passive election stakeholders. Of particular importance are the civil servants, partisan academics, civil society organizations, electors, the media and the security agencies.

Civil Servants

The 50,000-strong workforce on the payroll of the Ekiti State government became a crucial deciding factor in the election. Consequently, a few weeks to the election, the civil servants became "beautiful brides" sought by all politicians. Promises and assurances of improving on the welfare of workers, prompt payment of salaries and allowances, training and retraining of workers, were made (Adeyemi 2018). Indeed, the expected block vote that could decide the election was attributed to that of the civil servants because they usually decide where the pendulum swings in Ekiti as manifested in the 2014 governorship poll. There was an *Osoko Mass Movement* WhatsApp platform comprising teachers, local government staff and sundry others. Some teachers were arm-twisted into joining the group. Many of my informants did not hide their preference for the PDP candidate, and they might have influenced their dependent relatives to vote for him. "At least, the devil I know is better than the angel I don't know", one of them told this researcher. As previously alluded to, while Fayemi was in office, there was a Needs Assessment Test he wanted teachers of public schools to partake in which did not go down well with them. He also introduced examination as a condition for promoting civil servants. This forms the basis of their rejecting his re-election in 2014 and resentment to his second attempt. One trending phenomenon in Ekiti was that, often, no one could differentiate politicians from civil servants as many of the latter openly canvass and mobilize for parties while a few privileged ones fund local party meetings.

Security Agencies

One area that attracted considerable interest was around the participation of security agencies, particularly the armed forces. Even though the role of armed forces and their influence in democratic settings has continued to raise concern, their involvement during elections is always assessed with mixed-feelings by the general public. The effectiveness of the security forces is significant as it often plays a role in how responses to elections' outcomes are managed. In Nigeria, as observed over the years, security agencies who are supposed to maintain law and order during elections are now ominously partisan. For the 2018 election in Ekiti, police deployed 30,000 operatives, two helicopters and 250 patrol vehicles, including five Armoured Personnel Carriers.

In some polling units visited, security agents colluded with politicians/party agents who openly distributed cash to voters to sway them to

their side. At a particular unit in Ado Ekiti where I interacted with some police officers, their indifference to vote-buying was ominous. One actually told me he was there only to "maintain security of voters and INEC materials and nothing more". Even when the ballot papers were snatched and torn by an overzealous party member during counting, they explained their helplessness with the fact that they were not armed for the exercise. One of my informants (a top security officer) alluded to the fact that the two dominant parties made financial assistance available to security agencies at different levels of authority/outfit considered more patronizing for possible "favour" during an election. A report had it that "in specific locations in the state considered to be PDP strongholds, a generous deployment of soldiers, many of them ditching the army camouflage, took pleasure in intimidating the electorate" (Soyombo 2018, 23).

Media

During the election process, the media remained at the forefront of presenting different opinions — leading newspapers, television and radio stations all presented different views, and carried opinions from political figures across the spectrum. The local radio stations were very often parochial. The state-owned radio and one private radio in the state played extremely partisan politics while hate speech almost became a daily menu with which they fed listeners. Because the residents/voters were addicted to radio programmes, it had always been a source of *authoritative news* outlet to them. My informal interaction with some print media correspondents in the state also unravelled their political leaning; so also, in their reportage, particularly feature stories. A call through to one of my informants (among the correspondents) on his post-election report attested to this observation when he said: "we need to respond to these people's insinuations about the election".

Partisan academics

At the Ekiti State University, a group of faculty members met in early June 2018 to strategize on how to support the APC candidate through the mobilization of University Staff and members of their communities. A WhatsApp group named JKF EKSU FORUM was created to coordinate effective communication. They met with students' organizations and various other unions within and outside the University. Adverts/Jingles were placed on the local radio stations canvassing for their candidate. Souvenirs were also provided and distributed to prospective voters. Few days before the

election, these academic and non-academic staff mobilized many students for an interface with the APC candidate at the centre of the state capital, damning all consequences in a society where witch-hunt is almost a norm.

At the Federal Polytechnic, Ado-Ekiti, a similar group had earlier been formed, and a WhatsApp forum created where information regarding the election was shared. Their activities, and that of other institutions in the state, were strategically complemented by the EKSU chapter. Though self-sponsored, the forum occasionally liaised with notable politicians for support. Because many of the group leaders are influential lecturers in the institutions, the potency of influencing students and co-workers may not be lost on the election process, particularly in the choice of voting for the opposition candidate.

Sympathetic civil society groups

In a chat with a friend in May 2018, he had drawn my attention to an election observers' recruitment advert placed on a Facebook wall by one of the NGOs in the state, pointing out the glaring preference of its Director for a particular candidate in his previous posts. He questioned the possible neutrality of such an exercise, asking me to engage him on the issue. My call to the said Director confirmed his fear: "don't mind them, let them continue to say whatever they like; everybody supports one candidate or the other".

Various civil society organizations, displeased with Fayose's style of governance, engaged in clandestine activities to rally support for the opposition party. A discerning mind may not find it challenging to identify the direction where their partisan pendulum was swinging. Similarly, those whose disenchantment with the central government of APC, arising from its inability to stem the wanton killings across the country, brought the sentiment to bear on Ekiti election with a preference for a man (Fayose) who seemingly represented a fearless voice of the opposition. This became obvious through different opinions expressed and political information shared by members, in a WhatsApp group channel, of the Coalition of Ekiti Civil Society Organisations (COECSO) — an umbrella body of CSOs in the state.

Election observers

In my nearly two decades of recruiting and training election observers in Ekiti State, we have always had difficulty in identifying (either by profiling or direct engagement) absolutely non-partisan individuals — without sympathy for one candidate/party or the other. Maybe it is a universal phenomenon.

In a politically active state like Ekiti, one only needs to opt for those who are not politicians in the real sense of the word. In the 2018 governorship polls, election observers were recruited and trained by prominent NGOs[6] from within and outside the state. In my engagement with some of them during training, while the election was on-going and after the declaration of result, their (Observers) support, just like the practising politicians, were sharply divided among the two dominant parties in the state. This observation was reinforced by the fact that some of the candidates hitherto shortlisted for training as election observers ended up being INEC *ad hoc* staff or political party agents.

Ekiti Political Sociology, Impact of "vengeful campaign" and Emergence of "Orchestrated Consensus"[7]

Ekiti State is one of the most literate communities in Nigeria and adjudged to be a politically sophisticated entity within the federation. Expectedly, its politics becomes a research interest for political observers, policymakers and scholars alike (Omilusi 2016). Judging from the intensity and almost fatalistic mindset that is often brought into discussing the affairs of their state on different fora, most especially the social media platforms, Odere (2018) contends that there is hardly any doubt that Ekiti State indigenes are intricately and unapologetically tied to its apron string.

However, an interesting cliché often quoted is the emergence of "a new sociology" of Ekiti that is worthy of further exploration by academia and other political observers (Sogunle 2014). One observable phenomenon among the populace in Ekiti, however, is that many people depend on the government and political appointees for daily survival. Politics, rather than the much-talked-about education, has become the major industry in Ekiti State, especially for the teeming youths — both the unemployed certificated ones and the unemployable. To many of them, it is more desirable to pursue

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6 They include Africa Centre for Strategy, Alliance for Credible Elections, Leadership and Development, Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) and YIAGA, among others.

7 By this, I mean a consensus not occasioned by logical debates in formal stakeholders' gatherings/town hall meetings as it's the practice in advanced democracies, but rather a product of aggregate well-coordinated imposed narratives, crude propaganda, the commodification of votes and off-the-mill innuendoes projected by the political gladiators and party machinery — and gullibly bought into by the critical mass of the voters. While passive stakeholders do also exercise their franchise, they are categorized differently from the community of voters in this study.

a career in politics — which they pride as their chosen profession — to access free money in place of a career job or skill acquisition in entrepreneurship (Omilusi 2016). Oke (2018) observes that the Ekiti socio-political life is viewed within two prisms: agrarian and backward on the one hand, repository of wisdom and knowledge on the other hand. Each political leader, since the creation of the state in 1996, has chosen where to place the people from the two prisms. For Oke (2018), Fayose constructed and designed the state in the image of the former.

Social welfare consisted of spontaneous handouts to the needy and impoverished residents. For him, demagoguery was democracy by other means since neither he nor Ekiti people had the sophistication to understand or demand anything better. It worked, and Fayose became a local champion in the exalted seat of governor of the Kingdom of Ekiti State, where the policy was made on the hoof, and everything reduced to the lowest common denominator.

Little wonder, Alamu (2018b) contends that Ekiti lives on the old glory of having the highest number of professors *per capita* in Nigeria. "Today, with as many poorly educated young people as other states, the state matches the rest of the country ignorance for ignorance, and in the process manages to make their peculiar brand of ignorance even sexy" (Alamu 2018b, 3). Sogunle (2014, 32) adduces some reasons for this:

> A cursory look will reveal that the current demographic composition of Ekiti state residents does not indicate the often touted [*sic*] typology of Ekiti being a hotbed of people of substantial educational accomplishments, with every household having at least a Professor. The reality of the situation is that these highly educated indigenes would have emigrated, with their 1st and 2nd generation offspring to other climes such as Lagos, Abuja, Port Harcourt, even Ife, Ibadan etc. and abroad in US, UK, Germany, France, Singapore, UAE, Canada etc. in other parts of the world for greener pasture leaving at the base a substantial residual population and the influential electorate of people called NEET ("Not in Education, Employment, or Training") who are easily susceptible to bread and rice issues over rights.

Election studies, as posited by Oculi (2014), have claimed that specific indicators of economic development, notably: industrially-based urbanization; the spread of private wealth in the hands of capitalists and a high income-earning middle class; high rates of literacy, and increased capacity for the organization of campaign and voter mobilization "facilitated political action and increased citizen capacities for sustained political action" (Gins-

berg apud Oculi 2014, 262). As voters and politicians became fractured in pre-election desperate reactions that appeared like the last kicks of a dying horse; they were engulfed in "peddling of cheap lies, counter-accusations, deepening conspiracies, gang-up and the threat of the use of violence" (Opey-eoluwa 2018, 5). The vengeful campaign had prepared voters for any eventuality and authenticated their worry about whose favour the "federal might" might work for[8].

It is in this light that the pre-election campaign in Ekiti is examined. Previous research has shown that voters' perception of electoral fairness has an impact on their attitudes and behaviours. This may also influence the choice they make in subsequent elections. Apart from generating tension before the election, the "vengeful campaign" could be said to have impacted on the electoral process particularly concerning the undecided voters who felt aligning with the power/government at the centre would be a better decision. And for politicians who considered being out of power (seat of government) for four years a suicide mission, defection was an option with a foreseeable commensurate reward after election. It reflects the politics of clientelism that pervades many African countries. The "good" government is one that can reward individuals at the detriment of the public good. In other words, for the defecting politicians, the only form of "accountability" is the level to which those who helped get the leader and his faction "re-elected" can benefit.

For the citizens, their preferences and aggregate demand for public goods are not fixed. They are the strategic outcomes of enterprising politicians who set the terms of public choice employing persuasion and discussion. Such demand may also pave the way for temporary incentives during an election. For the elites too, the incentives that move them to push for regime change are not only shaped by their probability of gaining or losing power, but also by their material well-being under the existing regime. The acquisition of material patronage thus indicates the importance of elite cadres within the ruling coalition. This accounts for, as a temporary measure, the incessant defections from one party to the other — a sort of alignment to guarantee economic benefit until next election. The level of defections prior to the 2018 governorship election appeared unprecedented in the state, particularly from the ruling party. Though defectors were always dismissed as "paper weight" or inconsequential, they brought celebration to the receiving opposition party.

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8 Some voters expressed their worry about the intimidating nature of such posts on social media, lending credence to the allegation of suppressing opposition as it was done in 2014. However, rather than dissuading voters from coming out, the turn-out was higher than the 2014 election. This is indicative of the fact that "federal might" as an instrument of intimidation was a flux during the election.

Capitalizing on the vulnerability of the electorate, who ironically have a much stronger preference for private transfers than for public goods in making an electoral choice, the political gladiators usually find a willing manipulable political community in them. For instance, while Governor Fayose, two weeks to the election, approved the promotion of 46,000 workers and made available employment forms for 2,000 new recruitment, Fayemi promised to pay workers a backlog of salaries within six months if elected. Even when it appeared unrealizable in the face of economic doldrums in the state — where the government owed five to eight months' salary arrears — the workers/electorate found those issues alluring. Curiously, for the promotion interview, while the exercise ought to have been both in form of written and oral interviews, going by the civil service rules, the written aspect was jettisoned, and the only oral question was "who will they vote for during the election?" (Adeyemi 2018, 15). One of the promoted civil servants confirmed that:

> Almost all of us were asked the same question, and once you assured them you would vote for Eleka, you have passed the interview. I just received my letter, but we all know that it's all politics because he cancelled all promotion exercises Fayemi did shortly before his election (The Guardian 2018, 7).

What then guided the electorate's decision in choosing their candidates despite the glaring dishonesty? Was it a collective or individual decision? According to Cohen (1998), a decision is collective when it emerges from arrangements of binding collective choices that establish conditions of free public reasoning among equals who are governed by the decisions. Mouffe (2000) is of the view that provided that the procedures of the deliberations (political discourse) secure impartiality, equality, openness and lack of coercion, they will guide the deliberation towards generalizable interest, which can be agreed upon by all participants — thereby producing legitimate outcomes. Chambers (2012) argues that deliberation must be practical — in the sense of being aimed at a binding decision — in order for citizens to invest cognitively into the process. Even when such a deliberation does not take place between persons authorized to take a binding decision, it must at least be motivated by a concern about *what to do* about a subject that affects them. The Ekiti election, as could be deduced from the initial submissions, provides the basis on which desperation, political clientelism and flexibility of the critical mass of the electorate can be measured.

The Ekiti journey to civic culture, as posited by Alamu (2018b, 56) is undoubtedly "flawed and unprincipled, but they have admirably and co-in-

cidentally manifested the right democratic characteristics of reserving the right and independence to change their governments". However, the intervening variables, essentially vote-buying[9], provided a strategic and influential underpinning on the choice made by the electorate in the 2018 election. Such distortion makes the genuineness of their choice inaccessible particularly when they are too weak, too disparate and dispirited to make deliberative consensus outside the elite overbearing influence. In 2014, in spite of the federal might earlier alluded to, there seemed to be a consensus among the voters to reject the candidature of the then incumbent, making a 16-0 defeat across the local governments a novelty in Nigeria's electoral politics.

Conclusion

An attempt has been made to interrogate some pertinent variables that shaped the 2018 Ekiti election and their impact on the electoral process. The study further provides for elaboration and building on the body of knowledge by mainly focusing on electioneering and covert or overt activities of some passive stakeholders. This is not an exhaustive account of what constitutes passive stakeholders who may have influenced the election outcome. Still, I hope that giving an insight into the inner political workings and antics of this group reveals a significant part of our electoral democracy.

However, the central hypothesis addressed in this study asserts that political actors, such as politicians, political parties and other elites of established political institutions usually find a willing manipulable political community in the Ekiti voters — who ironically have a much stronger preference for private transfers (gains) than for public goods in making an electoral choice. Yet, elections should be part of a broader political framework that promotes good governance, the rule of law, and equal participation in politics. The 2018 election in Ekiti may have undermined this prism given the motivating factors impinging on the voter's choice. It is also established that when the disempowered citizens and groups are confronted with the choice of changing their condition through the ballot, such intervening variables as espoused in this study, inhibit/accentuate the process; with the election outcome suggestive of "orchestrated", rather than deliberate consensus, by

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9 Though no election is possible without the funding of activities around it, unbridled deployment of money can derail its primary purpose, which is to ensure that the electorate cast their votes freely and that candidates who get the majority of votes will be declared winner. All major political parties freely participated in vote-buying, and this ensured that elections went to the highest bidders, which invariably were those with bottomless pockets.

the voters. Going by the bandwagon effect, the Ekiti election did have a significant bearing on the 2019 presidential election when, for the first time since 2003, another party other than the PDP, won in the state. Indeed, a repeat of the 2015 general election took place as APC won all federal and state constituencies, leaving the PDP with nothing.

Overall, it is established that electoral processes are an essential element of democratic change, consolidation and stability. Although the organization and occurrence of elections tend to boost political trust for a short while, the electorate are inclined to register their disenchantment through other means particularly in young democracies because political actors often derail from the path of accountability and service delivery. For the often-incredulous percentage that periodically graces the electoral polls, they do vote against incumbents — for various mundane issues — than a genuine interest in voting for someone else. This, descriptively, epitomizes the Nigerian electoral democracy after almost three decades of authoritarian military rule. A symptom of this observable trend also manifests in the rapid regime turn-over in Ekiti State, having produced fourteen governors/administrators/acting governors in the first eighteen years of its existence unlike other states created at the same time.

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ABSTRACT

The current study interrogates the 2018 governorship election in Ekiti State as a window to peep into the ruling party/opposition muscle-flexing in a stiff political contest and into the behind-the-scenes engagements of some passive stakeholders in Nigeria's electoral politics. It examines how the electoral power dynamics and relationships between Ekiti voters and political gladiators (elites) played out during the election. The study also explores the potency or otherwise of some identified passive stakeholders as drivers of electoral regime change and the underlying power structure and socio-political factors that determine electoral outcomes in Ekiti. Data were primarily sourced from different informants, including voters, politicians, media correspondents, academics, security agents, members of civil society groups and election observers. Through the use of an analytic narrative and with the understanding of the "electoral model" of democratization as a technique of contemporary regime change, this work reveals that the Ekiti electorate is often influenced by the choices and strategies of different significant political actors. Thus, the vigorous electioneering activities of these actors who seize the electioneering period to exploit voter vulnerability for mobilization and voting constitute a dominant feature of Ekiti political behaviour.

KEYWORDS

NATIONAL INTEREST, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE NIGERIAN PRESS IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRATIC CONTEXT

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Introduction

In Nigeria, apart from the executive, the judiciary and the legislature, the media are regarded as the Fourth Estate of the Realm. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Right provides freedom of expression as part of fundamental human rights. At the level of the African Union (AU), the right to freedom of information and freedom of expression is also recognized. The Nigerian Constitution of 1999 (as amended) equally guarantees the freedom of expression, specifically Section 39 of the Constitution which assigns a constitutional right, power, role, obligation and duty to the press. Nigerian Constitutions since then have upheld this role. Section 22 of the same Constitution recognises the media as the "Fourth Estate of the Realm". It therefore means that the media oversees the government and its agencies, thereby keeping them on their toes. The Freedom of Information Act establishes that information should be made available and that citizens should feel free to express their personal views. In order to achieve the objectives of this paper, the major question to consider is: How potent is the Nigerian media as watchdogs of the society as far as freedom of expression is concerned? Data

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analyzed in this paper include pertinent judicial decisions contained in law reports and journals, technical documents, and non-legal sources.

The United Nations has established May 3rd as World Press Freedom Day, in recognition of the contributions of the media to national and global development. In his statement on World Press Freedom Day, President George W. Bush (2008) mentioned that press freedom was enshrined in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. The former American President Thomas Jefferson declared that if he had a choice, he would prefer media without government than government without the media (Akinwale 2010). The press is a vibrant institution which provides platforms for power negotiations in the public space. They set the stage for public discourse on popular issues. Iredia (2015) established that the immense contribution of the media to the success of the struggle for independence in Nigeria, the heroic role it also played in bringing the military dictatorship in the country to an end, and its unending quest since the return to democracy in 1999 to make the country's government accountable to the Nigerian people are issues which underscore the pragmatic posture of the Nigerian media in its nation's development process. By their professional calling, Pate (2017) added that journalists should enjoy autonomy, independence, flexibility and ease for credible operations.

The Context

According to Pate (2017), the challenge of freedom of expression remains daunting for all countries and especially for Nigeria with its large population of 198.8 Million people, 400+ ethnic groups, two major religions, dozens of political parties, 36 federating states and additional complex platforms of diversities. The Nigerian multicultural setting is characterized by diversity, heterogeneity and pluralism in the cultures, orientations and attitudes of the people (Pate 2017).

Nwanne (2014) is of the view that Nigeria is not yet a free and open society, despite the availability of diverse viewpoints flowing from a remarkable abundance of press organisations in the country. However, several press organizations in Nigeria lack complete freedom due to censorship, the multiple existing power centres and volatile political institutions. In spite of the proliferation of press organizations, constitutional provisions for press freedom have not been fully enforced. Empirical evidence presented by Iredia (2015) shows that no other group has played a more crucial role than the

media in the struggle for Nigeria's independence. He argued that the great leaders of the nationalist movements in Africa, and other political activists, recognized the immense power of the media. In Nigeria, the colonial press was spear-headed by leaders of nationalist movements like Herbert Macaulay, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Ernest Ikoli, Obafemi Awolowo, Anthony Enahoro and Ibrahim Imman who, according to Jibo and Simbine (2003), used the press to fight gallantly to challenge the basis of colonial rule so as to liberate Nigerians from that yoke. The attainment of independence was thus largely due to the media.

In the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, Section 39, Sub-section 1, it is stated that "Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinion and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference". However, Oboh (2018) articulated that the claim by the Nigerian journalists of having press freedom is not correct. He argued that the rights that the Nigerian journalists have to report on events and issues in society are the same right other Nigerians have just for being citizens. Pointing that, the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, Section 39, Sub-Section 3, stated that, "Nothing in this section (section 39) shall invalidate any law in the Constitution that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society".

The implication of sub-section 3 in section 39 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution is that journalists have no entitlements to any right in the Constitution that is not available to other citizens. For example, it is unethical for journalists to disclose the sources of their information. But it will amount to Contempt of Court in Nigeria for a journalist to withhold information from a judge that would enable him or her to deliver justice on a case forming the basis of a judicial enquiry. This is because journalists have no legal entitlements protecting them against anti-press provisions in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, unlike the US Constitution where journalists cannot be compelled by the judiciary to disclose the sources of their information. Pate and Idris (2017, 137-138) noted that the "Constitution did not accord journalists specified safety and protection framework, except that of every citizen, all journalists in principle benefit from the right to life and the prohibition against forced disappearance and torture".

The media can rely on the provision of freedom of speech in section 39(1) of the Constitution, which provides that every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference. Proper scrutiny of this provision as presented in this paper, however, shows that it is not about press freedom but freedom of speech. To argue that media professionals are

citizens, and are therefore covered by the general provision on freedom of speech which is available to all is simplistic. In any case, there is evidence that the Constitution itself does not see the media and the public as one; hence, it assigned functions to the general public before isolating the media for its own mandate. Section 13 of the Constitution provides that everyone, including all organs of government and all authorities and persons exercising legislative, executive or judicial powers, shall conform to, observe and apply the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Constitution. To further reiterate, down the line of section 22 the media is presented as a body upon whom the observance of the provisions of the chapter rests to differentiate the media from the general public. Having, thus, effected such differentiation, the media should not be expected to derive its empowerment from that of the public. Instead, there ought to be an exclusive provision on press freedom to enable the media to meet the specific mandate given to it by section 22 (Iredia 2015).

Arguably, Oboh (2018) established that the only additional Freedom of Information Act brought to bear on the existing provisions on press freedom in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution is the right that journalists have to ask a public officer to disclose the information that is at his or her disposal and which is considered to be of public interest. The same public officer relying on the provision in the section 39, sub-section 3, could decline giving the information to journalists on the ground that such disclosure would amount to a breach of other laws that are reasonably justifiable, like the law on State Security, Official Secret Act, Classified Documents, Protected Areas and others. It is also shown in the literature that the laws establishing the media in Nigeria are: News Agencies of Nigeria, NTA Acts, Voice of Nigeria Decree, National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) among others. Also, under these laws, the President is the person to appoint the chief executive in these media. In a few cases, there is a representation of the professional association to appoint members to represent others. Therefore, in a situation whereby the President is to appoint the chief executive, the expectation is likely to be that the media will dance to the tune of the controller. Yes, the media may be able to enjoy some level of freedom but such freedom may not be absolute. Thus, the situation of the media in Nigeria regarding freedom of expression is as if using the left hand to retrieve what has been given by the right hand.

Interrogating Nigerian Media and the Military Administrations

The relationship that existed between the mass media and the military administrations is best described in the words of Okoye (2003) as a "cat and mouse affair." Several reasons accounted to this description, among which are the mutual distrust from both parties, too much government secrecy, corruption of government officials, refusal of government to take the media into confidence on matters of national interest, and undue restrictions imposed by the government through obnoxious legislations and extra-judicial actions to curb what government perceived as the pull-him-down tendency of the press (Suntai, Agbu, and Targema 2018).

The Nigerian media had their worst experiences during this era (Targema and Ayih 2017). It was an era characterized by the presence of several repressive and obnoxious decrees to gag or muzzle the press. Inhuman treatments such as physical assault, harassment and molestation of journalists; arrests, detention and in some cases, killing of journalists; confiscation or proscription of issues of publications as well as a clamp down on media houses became the order of the day. Celebrated cases include: the arrest, flogging and shaving of Minere Amakiri by military personnel in 1974; the arrest and jailing of Tunde Thompson and Nduka Irabor in 1984; and the killing of Dele Giwa through a parcel bomb in 1986. Suntai, Agbu, and Targema (2018) note that there were many editors and news reporters who were in and out of police custody between 1966 and 1984 no matter how brief their stay with the police.

The subsequent military regimes were no exceptions to this. In fact, if anything, they were worst in their relationship with the press. Several media houses were closed down during General Babangida and Abacha regimes. In the words of Abayomi (2003) General Abacha's regime clamped down on newspaper houses at will, proscribed publications, seized magazine copies, jailed many newsmen on allegations of taking part in coup plotting. Some of the repressive decrees enacted to restrict the press by the various military regimes include: Newspaper Prohibition from Circulation Act of 1967, Public Officers Protection against False Publication Decree No 11 of 1976, Public Officers Protection against False Publication Decree No. 4 of 1984, Detention of Persons Decree No. 2 of 1984, Newspaper Registration Decree No. 44 of 1993 among several others (Abayomi 2003).

According to Suntai, Agbu, and Targema (2018), these decrees constituted stumbling blocks to journalists, as they were, on several occasions

invoked to deliver severe penalties to defaulters. Noting this point with great bitterness, Oyebode, as cited in Suntai, Agbu, and Targema (2018), established that, indeed, the Abacha years were a seemingly unending saga of invasions, vandalization, shutdowns, false accusations, arrests, detention without trial, show trails, forced exiles, and countless heinous crimes against people wielding weapons not more lethal than their pens, recorders or laptops. This was the fate of the press during the era of the militarization in Nigeria.

Nigerian Press under Democratic System

Empirical evidence by Suntai, Agbu, and Targema (2018) show that Nigeria had two previous experiences with civilian rule before the present dispensation — i.e. the First Republic, 1960-1966, and the Second Republic, 1979-1983. Bye-and-large, the press-state relationship with civilian rulers has been better off. For example, a study by Okoye (2003) reveals that the Tafawa Balewa administration scored 40% in the index presented by the author, while Shagari and Obasanjo (second era) scored 61% and 62% respectively. When compared with the military regimes, Aguiyi Ironsi scored 43%, Yakubu Gowon 42%, Murtala Mohamed/Olusegun Obasanjo 41%, Muhammadu Buhari 26%, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida 32%, Sani Abacha 11%, and Abdulsalam Abubakar 49%; it becomes obvious that press-state relationship have been more cordial with civilian rulers. However, this discussion is more concerned with the present regime, from 1999-2019. Temegha (2011), commenting on Obasanjo's second era, notes that:

> What is known about Olusegun Obasanjo's stance as a state's man was that during his eight-year Presidency, the Nigerian press and Nigerians in general enjoyed a dint of freedom. The press was free for expression and the people free for association (Temegha 2011, 47).

This may sound like sycophancy but a critical observation and comparative analysis of the media-state relationship under military rule with the present era clears every doubt. Sambe (2008) holds a similar view when he notes that, since the sudden death of the despot (Abacha) and the subsequent takeover of the reign of Government by General Abdusalami Abubakar who eventually handed over to an elected government, there has been some kind of reprieve for the media. Okoye (2003) observed at the early stage of the democratic system that:

> Two years on, the Obasanjo administration has bent backwards to deliver Nigerians the "dividends of democracy". The administration has also considerably rebuilt cordiality with the media which had borne the major brunt of military misrule over the years. Freedom of expression has blossomed once again (Okoye 2003, 7).

There were sighs of relief during the transition to civilian rule as most of the repressive decrees were being repelled, with media-state relationships seemingly more cordial. However, a careful observation of media-state relationship, especially with regard to the treatment of journalists, indicates that freedom of expression was not fully guaranteed during the first and second terms of Chief Obasanjo. Instances abound where journalists clashed with security agents and in some cases they were severely dealt with even in the democratic system. Ekuma (2012) established that, instead of the succeeding democratic regime to depart from humiliating and oppressing men of the press and as well confer freedom of expression and information on the press, without constraints, contrary is the case some journalists' experience in the country in the democratic era is still worrisome.

In the same perspective, Olaide (2011) notes that unlawful attacks on journalists and media organizations are very common in Nigeria despite the advent of civilian rule in 1999. Incidents such as physical assaults on journalists, seizure or destruction of journalistic equipment, raids on or sealing up of media offices and confiscation of publications are still manifest. Idumange (2013) cites the following as a selection from hundreds reported in the media and collected in Media Right Monitor, an organ of the Media Right Agenda: beating up of Suleiman Osasuji, a sport journalist with *All Sports* newspaper on the 14th of October, 2003; assault, arrest, and detention of Savannah Peters, a reporter with *Island News* by soldiers from the 81st Division Garrison, Dodan Barracks, Ikoyi on May 17th, 2014; the arrest of Segun Omolehin, Kogi State chairperson of NUJ by police in Lokoja on 22nd June, 2005; the raiding of DAAR Communication Limited in Abuja on 14th May, 2006 by state security agents to seize a master tape of a documentary, arrest and detention of Fiddis Mbah, of the BBC and Tade Oludayo of *Silver Bird Television* on 10th January, 2008 by security operatives among several other cases (Olaide 2011; Idumange 2013).

Aside from these cases, the reluctance of Obasanjo's administration to sign into law, the Freedom of Information Bill did not go down well with the struggle to expand the frontiers of press freedom, although there was serious improvement on the struggle. The short-lived Yar'Adua/Jonathan administration has no serious record regarding the press and can be scored

positively for facilitating freedom of expression. In May 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan signed into law the Freedom of Information Act. This is adjudged as a positive feat in the struggle to actualize press freedom, as the act gives impetus to journalists and members of the civil society to probe deep into issues that are within the public domain.

President Muhammadu Buhari has continued in this spirit. From his inception in 2015 to 2019, the administration reiterated its commitment to guarantee freedom of expression. However, the menace of hate speech that increases in the country by the day has necessitated several attempts by State forces and concerned agencies to reassess the debates surrounding freedom of expression. Top on the agenda of the government is the need to curb hate speech in the mainstream media and on the various social media platforms. Efforts in this direction include the bill to establish an independent national hate speech commission and the social media bill. Although these bills are still being debated in the National Assembly, the extent to which they will limit freedom of expression is glaring, as they contain grave penalties for defaulters that, if eventually passed into law and fully implemented, can go a long way to limit freedom of expression. The paper points out that these are retrogressive steps towards the actualization of freedom of expression in the country. The demolition of facilities of Breeze FM Lafia in 2017 also counts against the struggle towards a fuller actualization of freedom of expression, although the exercise was trailed by a series of controversies, claims and counterclaims. Below are some of the demolition pictures.

Figure 1: Pictures of Breeze FM Lafia, demolished by the Nasarawa State Urban Development Board

Source: (Suntai, Agbu, and Targema 2018).

Discussion on the Situation of Press Freedom in Nigeria

Oyeleye (2004) explored the turbulent relationship between the press, the political process and political actors in the context of the complex structure of Nigerian society. The popularity of press organizations in Nigeria began in 1859 when Henry Townsend established the first known newspaper (*Iwe Iroyin*) in Abeokuta, Western Nigeria (Akinwale 2010). In 1863, Robert Campbell established another newspaper (*The Anglo-African*) which served as a channel for promoting "the interaction between Britain and Africa". Both newspapers set the stage for the emergence of flourishing indigenous press organizations, with the establishment in 1880 of the *Lagos Times* and the *Gold Coast Colony Advertiser* by Richard Beale Blaize. The success of the *Lagos Times* inspired the emergence of several other newspapers. Chief Remi Aboderin established *The Punch* newspaper in 1973, followed by other publications including *National Concord* (1980), *Business Concord* (1982), *The Guardian* (1983), *African Concord* (1984), *African Economic Digest* (1988), *Hints* (1989), *Weekend Concord* (1989), *Tell* (1991), *Tempo* (1993), *The News* (1993), *P.M News* (1994), *The Week* (1994), *This Day* (1995), among others (Akinwale 2010). The electronic media in Nigeria started up in the 1950s with the establishment of *Western Nigeria Television*, followed by a proliferation of radio and television stations across the country.

Ukaegbu (2007) is of the view that different press organizations have brought the deplorable state of Nigerian society to public knowledge. They have used critical journalism to expose issues ranging from poverty and crime to bad roads and other shortcomings in Nigerian cities. One newspaper vividly captured the plight of commuters on a federal road, stating that the hopeless and helpless countenance of Nigerians detained uncomfortably against their will painted a picture of a flock of sheep without a shepherd (Leba 2006). The relationship between the press and Nigerian governments has often been largely antagonistic. It started from mild restrictions of press freedom during the colonial era and grew into full-blown repression in the post-colonial era. With the establishment of state media and press censorship, the Nigerian press became weak, partisan and ethnocentric. Successive governments employed the press as an instrument of propaganda (Akinwale 2010). The Nigerian Press Organisation attempted to effect changes in the National Mass Media Commission (NMMC) after the 1999 general elections but to no avail. The NMMC defines lawful information and balanced reporting in the light of the interests of the state. Similarly, the Newspaper Registration Decree mandates a non-refundable fee of one hundred and fifty thousand naira (N 150,000 or $2,640) for anyone who wants to start a newspaper. In

1984, the Nigerian government published Decree 2, which empowered the Inspector-General of Police to detain indefinitely and without trial any person considered as a risk to state security (Akinwale 2010).

Ojo (2006) established that the government used Decree 60 to establish the Nigerian Press Council (NPC) in 1999 and charged it with the enforcement of professional ethics. Immediately, the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) and the Newspaper Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN) rejected the creation of the Press Council because the decree contained a number of provisions perceived to be inimical to the operation of a free press. The NPC was empowered to accredit and register journalists. In applying for registration, publishers were expected to submit their mission statements and objectives and could be denied registration if their objectives failed to satisfy the NPC. The penalties for operating without meeting the Council's standard were a fine of N 250,000 ($2,500) or three years' imprisonment. The review made above drives the significance of the Libertarian Theory as anchored in this paper.

Libertarian Theory emerged in Europe in the 17th century, in opposition to the Authoritarian Press Theory. This was the period when Monarchs ruled most of Europe with a series of anti-press laws that were aimed at restricting freedom of expression. Proponents of the theory such as John Milton, John Stuart Mill and John Locke advocated for "a free marketplace of ideas" where both good and bad ideas will float freely, with the conviction that good ideas will naturally "sell" and be preferred by the masses at the expense of the bad ones (McQuail 2005; Sambe 2008; Nwabueze 2014). As a result, any limitation to freedom of expression (formal or informal) violates the tenets of this press theory. The theory is a normative theory; hence, it serves to explain the workings of the media within the operational environment. Though a relatively old press theory, libertarianism is not fully attained in most of the post independence African democracies. This is not far-fetched from reality as a series of military dictatorships thrived in most of the post-independence African States, where authoritarian principles were held with high esteem in a bid to muzzle the press, and by extension the civil society, so as to have a firm grip on power. Libertarianism was, therefore, an unaffordable luxury. However, with militarization now a thing of the past, there is a tendency that the new democracies would allow some space for libertarianism to thrive in the media.

Taking other countries side by side with Nigeria, in the United States of America, for example, the First Amendment to the Constitution specifically provides that Congress shall make no law restricting the press. Although the

courts have long struggled in that country to determine whether the framers of the Constitution intended to differentiate press freedom from speech freedom, some legal scholars, including Justice Potter Stewart, of the U.S. Supreme Court, have persuasively advocated for special press protections distinct from those accorded to speech. In Ghana, Section 162 (4) of the nation's Constitution expressly empowers the media to function. In the words of the section, editors and publishers of newspapers and other institutions of the media shall not be subject to control or interference by government nor shall they be penalized or harassed for their editorial opinions and views or contents of their publication. In Malawi, Section 36 of the Constitution provides that the media shall have the right to report and publish freely, within Malawi and abroad, and to be accorded the fullest possible facilities for access to public information. The situation in Malawi is probably the most apt as the country provided for freedom of expression in section 35 of its Constitution and moved just one step ahead to provide for press freedom in section 36.

Therefore, Malawi and other countries which have specific provisions for media freedom in their constitutions, notwithstanding that there is a general provision for freedom of speech, have established beyond reasonable doubt that press freedom and freedom of speech are not coterminous. If, therefore, the media in the USA, Ghana, Malawi and some other countries are more courageous in their facilitation of social change in their countries, the statutory support they have cannot be wished away. In Nigeria, on the other hand, there is ample evidence that the media is not free. It is in earnest obvious from the Acts, Laws and Regulations which govern media practice in the country that there has always been an overzealous official policy to legally gag the media. The trend in fact dates back to the colonial era when the Newspaper Ordinance of 1903, the Sedition Ordinance of 1909 and the Criminal Code of 1916 came into being. One of the early steps of the colonial governor, Frederick Lugard, after the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria was to consolidate all existing Acts to enact the Newspapers Act of 1917 for the sole purpose of regulating the existence of Newspapers through the process of registration.

The Act was amended in 1964 to accommodate government-owned newspapers, which did not exist before then, and in 1993 it was amended again to increase penalties for breaching any provisions of the Act. Other laws which govern media practice in Nigeria such as those on Sedition, Pornography, Official Secrets, Copyright and Defamation were similarly enacted essentially to repress the press and prevent criticism of the government in power (Iredia 2015). In the case of the law of defamation, some media professionals think that the law can make the nation's media timid because it

provides for a greater penalty for the media used than the person who actually committed the offence. Indeed, as far back as 1961, the Supreme Court of Nigeria had held that the mass media have no special immunity; they must bear full responsibility for their actions (Momoh 2004). The media is also virtually liable for only the more serious dimension of defamation or libel and not slander because every defamatory act in the media being in permanent form requires no special proof and, as the lawyers say, is actionable *per se*.

In Nigeria, journalists are also occasionally confronted with issues like Contempt of Court. In 2012, for instance, a magistrate court judge ordered the police to arrest and detained seven judiciary correspondents in Lagos, South West Nigeria. The judge accused the journalists of allegedly disturbing court sessions with their cameras and phones, as they were said to be busy clicking for exclusive pictures, which eventually angered the judge, who handed down the order. Based on the directive, which was interpreted as Contempt of Court, the journalists were moved from the court premises at Ikeja GRA to Area F police command for eventual detention (Udom 2012).

In addition to the laws, there are also several regulatory bodies, such as the Nigerian Press Council, the National Broadcasting Commission, the Film and Video Censors Board and the Copyright Commission, set up essentially to put the media in check all the time. In the case of the Nigerian Press Council (NPC), which regulates the print media, it is set up supposedly to protect both the public and the press but it is difficult to find an example of the NPC ever standing on the side of media operatives, despite the numerous attacks on them in Nigeria. Interestingly, no media professional expects the council's protection in view of the judicial decision that its enabling law is oppressive, overbearing and grossly not compatible with the standard of a society (Iriekpen 2010). On its part, the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), which regulates broadcasting in the country, penalizes only the opposition media and for frivolous reasons too. In 2009, it took the courts to save Adaba FM 88.5 Radio, an Akure based station, from the claws of the regulatory body. According to Sowole (2009) the decision of the NBC to shut the station was reversed by Justice C. Okeke of the Federal High Court Akure who upheld the plea of the station that the NBC breached its constitutional right to fair hearing, freedom against discrimination, and freedom of expression.

As for the public media, their enabling laws are equally restrictive leaving the operatives with little or no room for personal initiative and discretion. For instance, the Nigerian Television Authority Act, which sets up the main public television broadcaster, says in its section 12 that the Minister may give the Authority directions of a general character or relating generally

to political matters with regard to the exercise by the Authority of its functions under this act, and it shall be the duty of the Authority to comply with such directions (Iredia 2015). The same provision which is reproduced in the laws setting up the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria and the Voice of Nigeria has turned out to be the basis for which the organizations are now and again professionally misdirected especially to manipulate their news bulletins (Iwokwagh 2005). Perhaps some of the media laws and regulations so far identified fall into the category which section 45 of Nigeria's Constitution says may be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health, or for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons but their implementation as shown above are often inimical to media practice in Nigeria.

Apparently, like every other profession, the media certainly has its bad eggs that are engaged in sensationalism, inaccurate reporting, corrupt practices and other vices. It also has a plethora of constraints; among them are ownership control, poor salaries, as well as inadequate human and material resources. These notwithstanding, the media can be exceedingly useful to society because it is the most effective organ of public enlightenment which can empower the people to be rational, wise and useful to themselves and society. Fortunately, since 2011 Nigeria has joined those countries which operate a freedom of information regime which can assist the media to further educate the public. It is however unfortunate that the Freedom of Information Act (2011), which provides for unhindered access to public information, has not substantially changed the situation because the modalities for implementing the law are yet to be institutionalized. Going by the posers of whether Nigerian media have the teeth to bite as far as freedom of expression is concerned or the provisions are just give-and-take documents, the paper submits that, actually, it is a give-and-take document and Nigerian media have no teeth to bite as far as freedom of expression is concerned as it is evidence in the literature. Freedom of expression in Nigeria is a mere myth.

Conclusion

For democracy to be strengthened, the media have a very big role to play. Within this context, the paper submits that, for the media to facilitate the goal of development, national interest must be put first in order to achieve national objectives which will pave the way for political realism. The media must project the interest of the nation while carrying out their social responsibilities. National interest must be highly recognised by the media and must

remain a big priority. As the Fourth Estate of the Realm, the media must strive to play their role in the agenda more effectively by ensuring that they raise the level and quality of public debates on issues of national interest. The paper concludes that the media are the essential ingredients for governance and for democracy to be strengthened; freedom of expression must be guaranteed to the media in reality. No constitution is sacrosanct when there is the need to make useful amendments on the existing laws. In the alternative, the provision in Section 39, Sub-section 3 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution should be expunged to enable the media to enjoy the entitlements provided in Section 39, Sub-Section (1) and (2). Accordingly, the paper renews the appeal of Pate (2015) calling on the media to understand the complexities of the nation in order to develop common national platforms in reporting and the ability to be guided by the national interest or spirit in all cases. Paraphrasing the words of late Professor Weiner, the media must understand that to build a nation, it takes centuries; to destroy it, it takes only a day or two.

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ABSTRACT

In all civilized societies, the media stand as an independent institution that checks the activities of the people and the government. In Nigeria, apart from the executive, the judiciary and the legislature, the media are regarded as the Fourth Estate of the Realm. From the Universal Declaration of Human Right, Article 19 provides freedom of expression as part of fundamental human rights. At the level of AU in Africa, the right to freedom of information and freedom of expression was also given due consideration especially in Article nine. The Nigerian Constitution of 1999 also guarantees the freedom of expression, specifically Section 39 of the Constitution which assigns a constitutional right, power, role, obligation and duty to the press.

Nigerian Constitutions since then have upheld this role. Section 22 of the same Constitution recognises the media as the "Fourth Estate of the Realm". It therefore means the media are seen as an oversight of the government and its agencies. The Freedom of Information Act establishes that information should be made available and that the citizens should feel free to express their personal views. Thus, in order to achieve the objectives of this paper, the following serve as the basic tools of inquiry: do Nigerian media have the teeth to bite as far as freedom of expression is concerned? Or the proceeding provisions are just give-and-take documents? These questions are the main focus of this paper. The paper employs a multidisciplinary research methodology using a combination of socio-legal methods to obtain the contextual data. In addition, selected pertinent judicial decisions in law reports and journals were reviewed to examine the freedom of expression. The paper also critically examined non-legal sources for investigative or supporting information. Among the technical documents reviewed are: The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999; Freedom of Information Act among others.

DIGITAL INCLUSION IN EDUCATION IN ANGOLA: ADVANCES AND RETREATS

Cesário José Sanajmbo Barbante[1]

Introduction

> *"Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted"*
> *Albert Einstein (apud Cameron 1963, 13)*

Since 2002, there has been a significant increase of Information and Communication Technology's users in Angola (ICT) — essentially regarding the access of the internet. In this sense, there has been more investments by the Government in the telecommunication sector and consequently the emergence of more operators and/or services in the area of ICT. It is notorious that, as the XXI century advances, the use of ICT on a daily basis is more required from the citizens; in a period where we are changing to artificial intelligence. This technological penetration has already arrived in schools, in other words, education is immersed in a world where technology is omnipresent and omniscient (Landauer 1988). Despite the advances in this field in the African continent, there are still great challenges for the development; the innovation is visible, as the authors refer:

> The innovation is abundant in Africa and it is reflected in multiple areas — in the next generation of social protection; on the new platforms that attend remote and fragile communities; in the diffusion of digital technology; and in the pro-rights movements, leading to the public acceptance of people that were previously excluded (Das Bordia and Espinoza 2019, 4).

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On this matter, the majority of governments are working to potencialize its citizens, mainly the younger ones, in the field of ICT. The author Henriqueta Costa emphasizes:

> The school becomes, then, the privileged space to promote, among the youth, this technological competencies that will bring them advantages not only on a personal level, on the protection against the misuse of technologies, but especially on a professional level, once the dominion of these technologies is a professional requirement in almost all fields (Costa 2014, 8).

The technology inclusion in education, in Angola, marks another transition moment of the System of Basis of Education and Teaching, with the integration of new digital tools that are providing new ways of teaching, new ways of learning and new ways of managing administrative processes. Thereby, in response to the technological invasion that the contemporary society lives, the Government of Angola created, in 2013, the National Plan of Informational Society (PNSI, in Portuguese) 2013-2017 — as an actualization of the Action Plan of Informational Society 2005-2010 — which established Education as one of the strategic pillars to the development of informational society and having the following lines of action: a) To reinforce the ICT's competencies; b) To reinforce the ICT's use in the Teaching and Educational System; c) To increase the access to education and contents; d) To promote researches and development (PNSI 2013, 3). On the PNSI spectrum, a set of more directed action plans emerged, for example, the National Plan to Massification and Digital Inclusion (PNMID, in Portuguese) — in this moment, the following projects are already implemented: *Rede de Mediatecas*, *Angola Digital* and *Telecentros*.

In this context, there is an advent of different educational projects for digital inclusion, particularly non-university education, such as the *Meu Kamba* project, the *ProFuturo* project and the *E-Net* project, which are the focus of this study. On the other side, the integration of the Basic Information discipline and/or Introduction to Information in the curriculum of various teaching subsystems has been a practice. In private education, this integration happens earlier, from the 7th grade — in Primary Schools and in the first cycle of Secondary Education; meanwhile, in public education, the inclusion of Basic Information discipline only occurs from the 10th grade, in the second cycle of Secondary Education.

Therefore, with a qualitative approach, this work aims to reflect on the initiatives for digital inclusion in Angola, mainly on non-university education. In accordance with this objective, this work also focuses specifically on:

a) To identify the advances and retreats of the communication and information technologies' inclusion in education in Angola, on non-university education;

b) To reflect on the politics and implementation actions of these projects.

From the assumption that the XXI century citizens are technologically active, in this paper, the results of governmental and private initiatives for digital inclusion in education in Angola are presented. On the other side, a contextual, cultural, circumstantial approach in which the projects were conducted is defended.

Digital Inclusion Projects in Education in Angola

As referred in the last section, this study focuses on the digital inclusion on non-university education. With the update of the National Development Plan (PDN, in Portuguese) 2018-2022, it states, among priority actions, "the promotion of remote education and *e-learning*" (PDN 2018, 86). The New System of Basis of Education and Teaching Law n.ffl 17/16 envisages the remote education modality (article 89) and semi-present education (article 92), where the teaching and learning process happens with ICT resources.

For this paper, three digital inclusion projects in education were selected, all of them familiarized with non-university education, which are the *Escola Meu Kamba* project, the *Escola Profuturo* project and the *Escola-Net* project. Subsequently, the description of these projects is presented.

Escola Meu Kamba Project[2]

The *Escola Meu Kamba* project, created in 2014, is a Government of Angola's initiative, integrated in the National Plan of Informational Society 2013-2017, in partnership with a private company for its execution. Aligned with the National Development Plan 2013-2017, currently renewed in 2018-2022, this project pursued the integration of informatic equipments, such

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2 The word *Kamba* has *Kimbundo* origins — one of Angola's national languages —, which literally means "friend, comrade, companion".

as computers, cabinets, routers, servers, interactive boards, projectors, and others, in public schools, in the Primary Education Subsystem, in all provinces and in a staggered manner. This project was created with the objective of facilitating access to education — a more inclusive education — through technology, mainly on distant locations to impoverished people. The computers were portable, with 11 inches, Intel Atom processor, 300 GB hard drive, 2h30 minutes battery approximately, professional operational system Microsoft Windows 7 with 32 bits, one input type RJ45[3], three inputs type USB 2.0 (Universal Serial Bus "*Porta Universal*", in Portuguese), one audio input/output, one microphone and one input type VGA (Video Graphics Array) (cf. Figure 1).

Figure 1: *Meu Kamba* project's computer

The project also envisaged a training plan for teachers and directors of the covered schools, with a formative cycle of seven days; its objectives were the insertion of Communication and Information Technologies in the primary education subsystem and its familiarization among teachers and students. The project also contemplated programmatic contents in the disciplines of Portuguese language, mathematics and natural sciences, on the computer software, with interactive contents, videos, simulations, exercises and other tools.

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3 RJ45 means registered jack; it is a type of connector utilized for the Ethernet network.

Escola ProFuturo Project

The *Escola ProFuturo* project, a private initiative, is an educational program launched by the *Fundación Telefónica*[4] and the *Fundación la Caixa*[5] in 2016, whose mission is to diminish educational inequality by quality digital education for boys and girls in deprived environments in Latin America, Sub Saharan Africa and Asia. The project had an aim to achieve 10 million children by 2010 and 20 million by 2030. For this, the project integrates, in an interrelated way, technologies, educational resources and teaching and learning methods, aiming to capacitate teachers and enable students to acquire abilities and competencies for their personal and professional future (ProFuturo 2017).

At this moment, according to aggregated data from 2018, *ProFuturo* contemplates 8 million children, 300 million professors and 28 countries — in Africa it is present in the following countries: Angola, Nigeria, Madagascar, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe, Liberia and Rwanda (ProFuturo 2017).

ProFuturo is a universal educational program opened to third parties — companies, institutions and international actors who support large scale initiative. In this sense, the Roman Apostolic Catholic Church, by its missionary schools, joined this project and, in Angola, coordinates its implementation.

In Angola, the project intended to include until 2020 a total of 260 thousand students of the Primary Education Subsystem — from the initial years until the sixth grade — beyond the missionary schools, the *ProFuturo* also expects to benefit students of public institutions, all over the country. The project envisages a training plan to teachers, school directors and it has a specialized technical support. In sum, the project works as follows: it distributes a suitcase with technological devices with which an internet network can be created, where the teacher creates its class and the students can access it through a tablet — it operates with the aid of photovoltaic energy. At this moment, the project has already expanded in twelve provinces, which are Malanje, Uíge, Moxico, Lunda-Norte, Lunda-Sul, Luanda, Benguela, Huambo, Bengo, Cuanza Norte, Cuanza Sul and Huíla.

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4 The *Fundación Telefónica* was funded in 1998 and it is based in Madrid, Spain. It develops educational, cultural, employability and voluntary projects that attend the digital world.

5 The *Fundación la Caixa* is a financing institution that is based in Barcelona, Spain.

E-Net Project

Regarding the *Escola E-Net* project, it is an initiative of the telecommunications company Unitel, the largest mobile operator in the country, which is responsible for the management and supervision of the project and it has as direct partners the Chinese telecommunication company Huawei — who provides the computers for the project —, and Angola's Ministry of Education, the project's executing entity. The project aims to provide a free internet signal to the academic community, mainly to students in their learning activities and for the interaction among students.

The project sought to benefit 18 thousand students of the II Cycle of Secondary Education public and private institutions, in all of Angola's provinces. In each school covered by the project, free computers and routers were received with a monthly balance of 625 UTT's (the equivalent of 6250,00 *kwanzas*). The project has been running since June 2012 and it is currently expanding in eleven provinces of the country, namely Luanda, Benguela, Huambo, Bié, Cabinda, Uíge, Cuanza Norte, Huila, Malanje, Cunene and Bengo.

Similar projects

For a better framing of this study, other similar governmental programs in other countries were researched, preferably lusophone countries, with emphasis to Portugal and Brazil, for being considered prominent among this community in almost all sectors, mainly in Education and Communication and Information Technologies' areas.

In this regard, it is highlighted the MINERVA project in Portugal between 1985 and 1994, "having as an objective to promote the introduction of information technologies in non-university education in Portugal" (Ponte 1994, 3 apud Barbante 2018); the Technological Plan in Education (PTE, in Portuguese), in 2007, envisaging the technological modernization of the education in Portugal; the EDUCOM project — *Educação com Computador*, in Brazil, the first information program for education, implemented in 1984 by the Ministry of Education (MEC, in Portuguese) —, which "Promoted the creation of pilot-centers in five Brazilian public universities with the intention to execute a multidisciplinary research and to capacitate human resources to subsidize the decision of informatization of Brazilian public education" (Almeida 2008, 26 apud Barbante, 2018). Still in Brazil, in 2010, it is highlighted the *Um computador por aluno* program (PROUCA, in Portuguese), implemented by the Brazilian Federal Government in multiple public schools

with the purpose of digital inclusion of primary education students, in other words, the use of DCIT (Digital Communication and Information Technologies) in education. The PROUCA:

> aims to promote digital pedagogical inclusion and the development of learning and teaching processes to students and teachers of Brazilian public schools, by the use of portable computers named educational laptops (Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Educação 2010).

Methodology

This paper aims to reflect on the digital inclusion initiatives in education, mainly in Angola, on non-university education. To this purpose, the following specific objectives were traced:

a) To identify the advances and retreats of the technological projects in education being developed;

b) To reflect on the politics and implementation actions of these projects.

Contextualized in the field of communication and information technologies inclusion in Angolan schools and focused, in particular, in existing projects, this work utilizes an empirical qualitative approach, with a descriptive type of research, where it sought to act objectively and in a non interventionist way by the researchers (Creswell 2003). The authors Bogdan and Biklen (1994, 47) emphasize that, in this type of investigation, "the researchers participate and spend great amounts of time in schools, families, neighborhoods and other places trying to clarify educational questions''. Therefore, we had direct contact with some of these digital inclusion projects in education — *Meu Kamba*, *ProFuturo* and *E-Net*, while visiting the schools contemplated by these projects, with proper authorization; we talked with students, teachers, directors and trainers in these schools — they were informed about the study's objectives and freely participated, being guaranteed the results' confidentiality — in order to obtain a more cleared perspective about the object of our study. The participants did not want to be interviewed, but accepted having an informal conversation without commitment and no recording, which was respected. At the occasion, the events were registered in a logbook.

The research centered, essentially, in analysing three digital inclusion projects with the largest impact in the country, familiarized with non-university education, described above, as well as the consultation of the curriculum of diverse education subsystems, to examine if they integrated disciplines related to the ICT. Hence, this research objective aims to reflect on the digital inclusion in education, in Angola. The study also discusses the advances and retreats about the integration politics of the referred projects.

Data was collected between January and May 2019, in a first moment, in a disaggregated manner (Metz 1978), by participant observation in three schools approached by these digital inclusion projects in education, in Huambo province. Documents and scientific notes and official records which were related to this study's thematic were also used. As mentioned before, data was also obtained by informal talks with multiple public involved in these projects. In order to comply with the aims of the investigation, a flexible observational framework was utilized, there were various adjustments in relation to the contents approached. The framework presented the following dimensions: project type, financing, year of implementation, coverage, education subsystem, target population, year of creation, objectives, characteristics of the devices.

In the analysis of qualitative data, a comparative analysis was implemented — cross analysis — (Miles and Huberman 1994). In this phase, the constant comparative method was utilized (Glaser and Strauss 1967) which allowed to search common patterns, as well as differences. A comparison among the three projects approached in this text was conducted, and linked with similar technological inclusion projects in education, namely the MINERVA project in Portugal between 1985 and 1994 and the PROUCA program in Brazil. In general, three schools of non-universitary education participated in the study — referred to as School A, School B and School C —, in Huambo province.

Results

The main focus of digital inclusion in education is, essentially, allowing content diversity and a more open education. On the other side, the ICT contributes to a more inclusive schooling and allows citizens to stay connected with the world, what Castells (1996) designated as network society.

Curricular Integration of the Discipline ICT

The incorporation of the discipline Introduction to Information and/ or Basic Information was verified in the following education subsystems: Technical and Professional Education Subsystem, in 7th and 10th grade; in Teachers Formation Subsystem, in 10th grade, in General Education Subsystem, in 10th grade, and Adult Education Subsystem, in 10th grade.

Digital Inclusion in Education

About the incorporation of communication and information technologies in education, it was observed the existence of digital inclusion projects in non-university education — Primary and Secondary Education — with special attention to the *Escola Meu Kamba* project, the *Escola ProFuturo* project and *Escola E-Net* project. Regarding the *Meu Kamba* project, it is present in twelve provinces, namely Zaire, Bengo, Uíge, Luanda, Cuanza Sul, Huambo, Namibe, Benguela, Bié, Huíla, Lunda Sul and Cuando Cubango. The project has already installed 7056 computers, covering an academic population of 36 354 students and more than 45 trained teachers (Cruz 2019), having, still, a formation plan for the various parties involved.

Concerning the *Escola E-Net* project, created in 2012, it is currently attending eleven provinces of the country, namely Luanda, Benguela, Huambo, Bié, Cabinda, Uíge, Cuanza Norte, Huila, Malanje, Cunene and Bengo. Besides, it seeks to comprise students and teachers of the secondary education of public and private institutions.

As for the *ProFuturo* project, presently, it is distributed in twelve of the eighteen provinces of the country, that are Malanje, Uíge, Moxico, Lunda-Norte, Lunda-Sul, Luanda, Benguela, Huambo, Bengo, Cuanza Norte, Cuanza Sul and Huíla. The three projects, in a connection among them, are geolocated in the eighteen provinces of the country, as illustrated on table 1, where the provinces of Benguela, Huíla, Huambo, Bengo, Uíge and Luanda, were benefited with all of the three projects; followed by the provinces of Cuanza Sul, Bié, Lunda Sul, Cuanza Norte and Malanje, with two projects; and the provinces of Cuando Cubango, Cabinda, Cunene, Moxico, Lunda Norte, Zaire, Namibe, with only one project each, are the less contemplated.

Table 1: Geolocalization of the digital inclusion projects
in education in Angola

Provinces	Escola Meu Kamba Project	Escola ProFuturo Project	Escola E-Net Project
Bengo	Yes	Yes	Yes
Benguela	Yes	Yes	Yes
Luanda	Yes	Yes	Yes
Uíge	Yes	Yes	Yes
Huíla	Yes	Yes	Yes
Huambo	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cuanza Norte		Yes	Yes
Cuanza Sul	Yes		
Bié	Yes		Yes
Malange		Yes	Yes
Lunda Sul	Yes	Yes	
Lunda Norte		Yes	
Cuando Cubango	Yes		
Moxico		Yes	
Cunene			Yes
Namibe	Yes		
Cabinda			Yes
Zaire	Yes		

Analysis and Discussion of the Results

The inclusion of ICT in education marks another moment of transition in the System of Basis of Education and Teaching in Angola. We recognize the investments and initiatives the government has implemented,

in order to modernize education and, therefore, allow more access to information. In this sense, Angola would be aligned with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the United Nations — "objective 4. To assure inclusive and equitable and quality education, and to promote learning opportunities throughout life for all" (Nações Unidas Brasil 2015, 18).

Regarding the digital projects in the schools, the 3 projects — *Meu Kamba*, *ProFuturo* and *E-Net* — are innovators and aim to encourage the use of communication and information technologies in the teaching and learning process. The fact that these projects are inserted, predominantly, on non-university education, provides children and teenagers to begin earlier the use of ICT and, consequently a great opportunity of teaching the children to correctly use them.

Comparison among the three digital inclusion projects

In comparative terms, among the three projects, the *ProFuturo* project presented a personalized pedagogical model; adaptive flexibility; use of *learning analytics devices* based on algorithms and *big data* to evaluate the results and impact generated by the quality and transformation of education. This system of analysis and measurements of results allows decision making about the progress of the solution. For its characteristics, it seemed to us the most promising and, indeed, it adjusted perfectly to the Angolan context. On the other hand, *ProFuturo* is more entertaining for the children's learning, firstly, by its use of tactile technology, where the contact is direct, providing better usability and, secondly, is in conformity with the mobility and autonomy; in other words, the mobile devices have greater autonomy in relation to conventional computers, and facilitate the mobility of teachers and students in the classroom. Lastly, it is the only one, for what was analyzed, in which technical assistance is guaranteed, as well as it counts with an alternative power supply of public network — the use of solar panels.

Considering the *E-Net* project, the main goal is to provide internet access to students, despite the project also contemplating computer access, not individually, but in cybercafes — a desktop computer equipped room with internet access to be shared among all the students each time. Given the difficulties and/or limitations of internet access in Angola, in particular, by students, this project was, in fact, an enhancement compared to the current moment, as Barbante refers (2019, 898), "the access to most of the data basis is free, only being necessary the access to the world's largest network,

the Internet. In other words, the internet has served as a passport to the access of digital libraries". Unfortunately, as it has happened with multiple projects that, on the first hand, looked ambitious, for unknown and unclear reasons, this project was discontinued in 2014. In practice, the project only worked normally for two years, between 2012 and 2013, as seen before, in twelve provinces. In almost six years this project is not mentioned, with only a few equipment left, in this case, computers, which have been used for other purposes — administrative activities in the referred schools. On the other side, the *routers* have never been charged with the monthly balance envisaged in the project.

About the project *Meu Kamba*, which had direct government financing, it is being developed, hesitantly, across the country, already being present in twelve provinces — it seems to have been an obstacle by part of the sponsoring company for unknown reasons. On the other hand, it is limited, in other words, the children (students) of private education have not been covered by the project — this project is limited to public education students. The private education does not individualize its students, on the contrary, it is a partner of the government on this noble mission of teaching and educating its citizens. It is not the child who chooses where he is going to study, but, many times, the circumstances and the opportunities that parents and those responsible for educating find to be able to enroll their children and students. Given the fact that in Angola there are many children out of the Education and Learning System, for the lack of classrooms, private education has been an alternative for many children to have access to education. Therefore, considering public funding, the Government has to look to education in its totality and not to just part of its process. Next, a comparative analysis is made among the three projects and a short description of each dimension (c.f. Table 2).

Table 2: Comparative Analysis among the three projects
(Meu Kamba, E-Net, ProFuturo)

N.º	Dimensions	Meu Kamba	ProFuturo	E-Net
1.	Communication and Information Technologies	Portable Computers of *Magalhães* type	Tablets	Computers and Internet Access
2.	Year of Implementation in Angola	2014	2016	2012
3.	Financing	Public	Private	Public-Private

N.º	Dimensions	*Meu Kamba*	*ProFuturo*	*E-Net*
4.	Coverage	Public Institutions	Public and Private Institutions	Public and Private Institutions
5.	Education Sub-system	Primary Education and I Cycle of Secondary Education	Primary Education and I Cycle of Secondary Education	II Cycle of Secondary Education
6.	Covered Population	Students and teachers	Student and teachers	Students and teachers
7.	Equipments' characteristics	Hybrids	Ubiquity and tactile	Hybrids

However, a lot of these projects are elaborated unilaterally by the political elite, which, in many occasions, does not supply the real necessities of the main actors in the learning and teaching process, students and teachers. A better and more modern education is interesting to all of the society and not only to those who rule, because education is a task of "politicians, families, teachers and students" (Estanqueiro 2010, 9). These digital inclusion plans in education also are, many times, introduced in a "pamphleteer tone (...) and dangerously populist and glorify the common sense — triumph of neoliberal politics, worked skillfully by the hand of social media companies — and what consists in articulating and disarticulating" (Oliveira 2012, 167).

The majority of the government initiative projects have ended often in setback objectives, by being submitted to politics and centralism, what has been in effect for at least four decades in Angola, and appears now renovated as a "conservative modernization" (Apple 2003). The authors Mandela and Langa (2017, 101), refer that "the majority of the political leaders make decisions in order to minimize the threats to their political survival". The government should be the only one who deliberate and/or supervise the projects that are considered essential in education, in such case the technologists, while the specialists in the field — teachers and researchers — would be the executors, with the minimum autonomy necessary to add new ideas and/or inventions. These digital inclusion projects in the country should not be part of propaganda and should be, indeed, a collective mission, having, nevertheless, task distribution and competencies in favor of a common objective, which is a better education, more inclusive, accessible and with equal opportunities to all citizens. In sum, one cannot change from one project to another as if flipping the pages of a book; it is important to register visible

and significant advances that it is something useful that is being made. It is not enough to have good initiatives, it is necessary, effectively, put them into action and in the best way possible.

Conclusion

It is believed, therefore, that the Government of Angola's intentions in wanting, from an early moment, in the basic subsystems of education, to develop digital competencies in children and teenagers is an aspect to be applauded and supported by all of us. These projects are implicitly suitable in the National Development Plan (PDN) 2018-2022, to a better education, more expanded and a more digital Angola. Considering the dynamics of contemporary society, which is considerably dependent on communication and information technologies, these initiatives can and should contribute to the reinforcement of social and economic development of the country, allowing citizens to stay connected to the global network, benefiting from the access to global education. In this paper, the three main plans of digital inclusion in education have been highlighted, namely the *Escola Meu Kamba* project, the *Escola ProFuturo* project and the *Escola E-Net* project. These projects privilege public-private partnerships — Government, Companies and institutions.

Despite the quality of these projects, subsist, however, gaps in relation to infrastructure, qualified human resources, contents and specialized technical assistance. It has also been observed a deviation of the real objectives in which these projects were conceived, for example, some equipment of these projects are used to other means. On the other hand, these projects are found in an accelerated slowdown and/or discontinuity.

Comparatively, the *Escola Meu Kamba* project was the most solid, because it had direct financial coverture by part of the government; the *ProFuturo* project, on the other hand, was the most innovative by using mobile and tactile devices, besides counting on an alternative energy supply source to the public network; and, finally, the *E-Net* project contributes the most to the access to the Internet by the academic community. It was not our intention to classify them as if they are competing with each other, on the contrary, their interdependence is recognized. On the other hand, the *Meu Kamba* project, which counts with public funding, needs to be expanded, in order to benefit the largest number of children that is possible.

Finally, these digital inclusion projects in education, meanwhile, are a mirage and have a long way to go through, mainly in organizational

terms — tasks distribution, competencies, autonomy, training, technical assistance and collaborative work. It is a fact that many good initiatives and/or digital inclusion ideas in education exist, above all political initiatives, but in practice, they have been nothing but "false promises and myths" (Oliveira 2012, 166).

On the other side, the discontinuity of these projects in the majority of the covered schools, contrast with the objectives of the National Development Plan 2018-2022 of Angola and the 2030 Agenda for the Sustainable Development of the United Nations, which aim to secure an inclusive, equitable and quality education, besides promoting learning opportunities throughout life for all.

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ABSTRACT

The inclusion of technology in education in Angola marks yet another moment of transition in the Education and Teaching System, with the integration of new digital tools that have provided a new use, new learning and management standards for administrative processes. The study presented in this document aims to reflect on the digital inclusion initiatives in education in Angola, mainly in basic education. Contextualized in the domain of the inclusion of information and communication technologies in Angolan schools and focused, in particular, on existing projects, this study is part of an empirical approach of a qualitative nature, assuming a descriptive investigation. In comparative terms, the *Escola Meu Kamba* Project was the most solid, due to the fact that it had direct financial coverage from the State; the *ProFuturo* Project was the most innovative when using mobile and tactile devices, in addition to having an alternative power supply to the public network; and, finally, the *E-Net* project was the one that had contributed the most to Internet access by the school community. On the other hand, there are regrets about the discontinuities of both projects.

KEYWORDS

Digital inclusion in education. Technological projects. Basic education.

PARTNERS

NERINT

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