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ABOUT THE JOURNAL

The Brazilian Journal of African Studies is a biannual publication, in digital and printed format, dedicated to the research, reflection and propagation of original scientific articles with emphasis on the analysis of International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations and Schools of Thought. RBEA is essentially academic, linked to the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

The RBEA has as target audience researchers, professors and students interested in the specificities of the African continent and its international insertion. Alongside such perspective, the Journal intends to expand the debate about the Brazilian projection world widely, the Brazilian cooperation efforts (including in the Defense field) with the African countries in the South Atlantic perimeter and the construction of a regional identity in face of a scenario of geopolitical transformations.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira

June/2020

BJAS, in its ninth issue, is launched in the midst of a global health crisis. Much is being said about its impacts on large developed centers, but little about the African situation in this context. In regional settings, there is little articulation between states within their organizations. In Africa, on the contrary, the African Union's role in the health crisis triggered by COVID-19 is being articulated by the African Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), responsible for preparing technical-scientific reports, providing information and recommendations for countries of the continent, training scientists, communicators and health professionals, as well as the aggregation of new scientific discoveries related to the virus. All of these activities are being recorded in weekly reports, available in full on the CDC website (<https://africacdc.org/>). In addition to the reports, the organization also makes available a series of other documents, the purpose of which is to assist African countries in fighting the pandemic. These documents include strategies for identifying, testing and monitoring the evolution of the virus in the specific case of Africa.

By pointing out the bottlenecks in basic sanitation, urban infrastructure and the capacity of health systems, the CDC draws attention to the fact that African countries will have to develop measures appropriate to their reality to deal with the crisis. While countries like South Africa show rapid action by the government, which has announced intensive isolation measures and a large number of tests implemented with the aid of the army, other African countries do not have the same resources. Even at the domestic level, inequalities continue, with poor regions of high population density being physically unable to implement intensive social isolation. According to a World Bank report, Sub-Saharan Africa will face its first recession in almost two decades, with the expectation of shrinking between -2.1% to -5.1% and a loss that can reach 79 billion dollars. At the continental level, the African Union predicts

a shrinkage of -0.8%, with the sum of losses from all governments reaching 270 billion dollars. By way of comparison, Egypt's 2019 GDP, one of the continent's largest economies, was 250 billion dollars. This decline is the result of a series of factors, including disruption of global value chains, with a severe impact on the export of primary products, reduced capital flows, reduced tourism, reduced foreign direct investment and reduced domestic economic activity because of social isolation measures.

The AU diagnosis emphasizes the central role of the state in combating the pandemic, both in the health and economic spheres. According to the organization, about 130 billion dollars would be needed to apply to emergency public policies aimed at preserving Africans' income and jobs. In countries like Uganda, where more than 50% of the employed population works in the informal sector, taking such measures are imperative. The African Development Bank announced in the first week of April a \$ 10 billion fund for governments and businesses on the continent. The CDC report of February 11, 2020, stated that 16 African countries had suspected cases, but without confirmation. The agency took the following measures at that time: activation of the Emergency Operations Center; training of 16 specialized laboratories for virus testing; recruitment of epidemiology professionals to monitor the progress of the virus; weekly meetings with health ministers from AU member countries; gathering information on the main measures taken by African countries with regard to social distancing and the closing of borders. The measures taken by the AU and the establishment of communication and interaction with African governments were precocious. This fact, largely, explains the relative success of Africans in containing the pandemic.

In the fifth year of BJAS, the discussion on central issues for the analysis of the African reality is evident. In the article "Brazil-Africa relations: from the slavery nexus to the construction of strategic partnerships", Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira resumes the debate on the secular partnership between Brazil and African states, which began in the formation of the modern world system, in the 16th to the 18th centuries, going through the times of imperialism and independence in the 19th to the 20th centuries, reaching more recent years. Precisely from the 2000s, the author demonstrates, Brazil-Africa relations become more intense and bear fruit for both sides of the Atlantic, especially among the member countries of the Portuguese-speaking community (CPLP). Paulo Gilberto Fagundes Visentini, in his article

“African marxist military regimes, rise and fall: internal conditioners and international dimensions”, argues that alongside the Revolutions resulting from long anti-colonial wars such as Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Zimbabwe, it developed an innovative element, the Military Coup of a new type, which introduced revolutionary regimes called Marxist-Leninists.

Terrorism as one of the main security challenges in Africa is discussed by Yoslán Silverio González in the text “Main trends of terrorism in Africa towards 2025”, and by Osiomheyal O. Idaewor in the article entitled “The dominance of terrorism: aspects of socio-political challenges in post independence West Africa: Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mali”. For the authors, the Sahel-Saharan region, corresponding to West and Central Africa, remained at the center of terrorist activism in Sub-Saharan Africa. With an emphasis on political processes, Cícero Ricci Cavini, in “The influence of diplomacy on controversies: a comparative study between diplomatic mediation and armed conflict”, assesses that diplomacy, mediation and armed conflict are choices of the political system in which we are inserted. They are tools to obtain power, influence and money in a geopolitical space where states face or cooperate with each other for a specific purpose. In the article by Kátia Sara Henriques Xavier Zeca, “Trust in political power and government institutions in Mozambique: 2014-2018”, the confidence of voters in the institutions of political power in Mozambique is analyzed. In the text “Elections and democratic deficits in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: a commentary”, Al-Chukwuma Okoli, Chigozie Joseph Nebeife and Markus Arum Izang discuss the phenomenon of democratic deficits in the Fourth Republic of Nigeria.

In a recent historical approach, Luiza Bizzo Affonso and Vitor Ferreira Lengruber discuss how Thabo Mbeki, former president of South Africa popularized the concept of African Renaissance, whose proposal offered solutions, in the political and economic sphere, to face political and socio-economic adversities at that time in “African Union: Mbeki’s South Africa policy for Africa”. In the article “Socio-spatial and ethnic-racial segregation in megacities, large cities and global cities in Africa”, Fabio Macedo Velame and Thiago Augusto Ferreira da Costa analyze the structural phenomena that culminated in socio-spatial and ethnic-racial segregation, which currently occurs in megacities, large cities and global cities in Africa. Finally, Carolina Bezerra Machado, in the article “Representations of power in Mayombe: ‘men will be prisoners of the structures they will have created’, presents an analysis of the novel *Mayombe* (1980), by Angolan writer Pepetela, to analyze the political process in Angola in its contemporaneity. For the author, the power structures that existed in Angola after independence appear already drawn in this novel, still woven in the guerrillas.

In this edition, BJAS publishes two book reviews. The first, by Ermelinda Liberato, presents the work “Out of the Dark Night: Essays on Decolonization”, by Achille Mbembe, and the second, by Carla Pereira Silva, presents the work “Decoloniality and afro-diasporic thinking” by Joaze Bernardino-Costa, Nelson Maldonado-Torres and Ramón Grosfoguel. BJAS publishes electronic and printed bilingual versions (Portuguese and English). Thus, we expect the contribution of colleagues from Brazil and abroad, with whom we intend to establish links for the deepening of knowledge and the construction of a vision of the South on the African continent and of relations with them.

CEBRAFRICA is monitoring the African situation in the face of the health crisis triggered by COVID-19. We thank Rafaela Serpa, doctoral student in Political Science/UFRGS and Eduardo Faustini, master's student in Public Policy/UFRGS, assistant researchers at the Center, for the research related to the actions of the African Union.

We thank the Assistant Editors Camila Ayala, Cecília Pereira, Igor Sardo and Rafaela Serpa and the CEBRAFRICA team that worked on the translation of the articles. We would also like to thank Pietra Ribeiro Studzinski for her collaboration in the translation and proofreading of texts in English.

BRAZIL-AFRICA RELATIONS: FROM THE SLAVE NEXUS TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS¹

Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira²

Introduction

After a long period of estrangement, Brazilian relations with the African continent overcame rhetoric and gained new force with the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva government. The particular attention payed to these relations reflects an old aspiration of Brazil, that until then had not been pursued with determination. The historical bonds, the country's large population of afro-descendants and the internal debate on racial equality, are elements in the Brazilian view regarding the need for rapprochement and cooperation. Even though Africa is a continent with alarming poverty indexes, it is not a stagnant one. The dynamism and development of "African" alternatives for its own problems define the stance of many of its leaderships.

The discourse and diplomatic exercise during the Lula government converged towards the building of preferential alliances with partners in the scope of South-South relations. The Dilma Rousseff government kept the interest in relations with the continent, but redefined the axis in regards to its priority. Nevertheless, the African continent represented one of the areas of greatest diplomatic investment during the 2000s. The President Lula and Foreign Relations Minister Celso Amorim, during their first term, made several visits and established numerous agreements with different African countries. In just over two years in office, there were four trips to the continent, resulting in visits to seventeen countries. The rapprochement with the African continent is not only focused on the accomplishment of short

¹ Work presented at the Congress "India and its Diaspora Engagement: Comparative Global Practices", Bangalore, India, 2017.

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term results, even though, under the economic aspect, Africa presents itself as an important market.

In that sense, despite weakened, Brazil's African policy is diplomatically dynamic, gaining special importance when Brazilian actions in the continent are considered. However, the political, economic and sociocultural dynamics has, in both regions and varied historical moments, made the relations either more difficult or easier. In a number of periods, Brazil's actions resulted from a mistaken understanding of its foreign policy priorities. Such actions, ignoring the country's long term political and strategic interests, and taking into account only the short term economic and financial interests, postponed the implementation and renewal of bilateral projects, as well as the establishing of multilateral cooperation agreements. It is therefore appropriate to analyze the trajectory of the relations between Brazil and Africa.

From the slave nexus to estrangement

Africa's and Brazil's history are closely related, since Portuguese colonists occupied both South Atlantic shores in the 16th century. With the arrival in Brazil of the first African slaves, in 1533, following the construction of the first sugar mill in the São Vicente village, a long period of close links initiated, mostly because of the slave trade, which extended until 1850, when its decline began. Thus:

Table 1: Slave trade – arrival estimates of Africans in Brazil, 1531-1780

<i>Period</i>	Arrival Estimates of Africans		
	<i>In the period</i>	<i>Annual average</i>	<i>% over total slaves taken to America in each century (1)</i>
1531-1575	10,000	222	
1576-1600	40,000	1,600	
1601-1625	100,000	4,000	22
1626-1650	100,000	4,000	
1651-1670	185,000	7,400	
1676-1700	175,000	7,000	
1701-1710	153,700	15,370	
1711-1720	139,000	13,900	
1721-1730	146,300	14,630	43
1731-1740	166,100	16,610	
1741-1750	185,100	18,510	
1751-1760	169,400	16,940	
1761-1770	164,600	16,460	
1771-1780	161,300	16,130	30
Total	1,895,500	-	33

(1) This estimate excludes Africans sent to Europe or the Atlantic islands, a movement that only had importance in the 16th century.

Source: Linhares, 1990

These relations were not of less importance to the global stage, because, if in the 17th century the South Atlantic was the dynamic center of the world economy, with Brazil boosting the Portuguese Atlantic Empire; in the 18th century it was surpassed by the North Atlantic, due to the rising of powers like France and England³. Despite the Eurocentric view of Africa as a sparsely inhabited and cultural and socially primitive continent, based on the contacts established by merchants and colonial employees (often uninterested

3 See Rodrigues, José Honório. 1964. *Brasil e África: outro horizonte*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2a ed.

in deepening their understanding of the lands around them), important civilizations have developed in the region, allowing the creation and mastering of techniques posteriorly exported to the New World.

These cultures already had slavery as a consolidated practice, with records been found from the second millennium B.C. detailing captures in the Nubia region. This institution, however, becomes usual only from the contact with the Islamized people of the north of the continent, who since the 9th century undertook expeditions to the south of the Sahara with that intent. A number of African societies begun, thus, to be strongly based on slavery bonds. The Tuareg had, in the beginning of the 19th century (importantly: before direct European interference), 70% of its population made up of slaves; in the Sahel region, this number was around 50%; and in the great kingdoms of the continent, near the rain forests, the percentage reached 20%.

When the Portuguese arrived, in the 15th century, the practice intensified, given that the breaking of the monopoly of the eastern spices trade forced the creation of colonial enterprises, demanding a large, ever-growing amount of manpower to the maintenance of its plantations. In the Lusitanian case, the main target was Brazil, with which the metropolis was beginning to strengthen the domination ties, vital to the preservation of its Portuguese Empire.

It is worth noting that, with this, the Europeans also significantly altered the profile sought among slaves, abandoning the preference for children and women and favoring young men, able to resist the rigors imposed in the plantations. Regardless, the estimates point that, for every slave landed in America, another died in Africa during the capture process, making the population loss even more dramatic⁴.

As it has been shown, during the Colonial and most of the Imperial periods of Brazilian history, millions of Africans were brought to country, so that the *Europeanization* of the new lands was followed by its *Africanization*. The historiography highlights the African contribution to the makings of the Brazilian society with its culture, art and religion, besides the demographic aspects. But the Africans also brought techniques that boosted agriculture, cattle raising, mining and the fight against diseases, given that the knowledge possessed by the Portuguese was inadequate to the development of the tropical world. The metal casting and utensils production, as well as the introduction of a number of political behaviors and social organization patterns were also important African contributions.

4 See Linhares, Maria Yedda (org.). 1990. *História geral do Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 9^a ed.

The King of Benin was the first sovereign to recognize Brazil's independence, in 1823, and, between 1822 and 1830, there was a strong political movement across the Atlantic aiming to turn Angola into a part of Brazil, given the economic bonds created by the slave trade and the fact that most of the Angolan colonial elite was Brazilian. Only the pressure of the English diplomacy prevented it, remaining the African country a Portuguese colony. At the same time, a colonial era phenomenon ensued: the returning of former slaves to Africa, particularly to the Gulf of Guinea, where they constituted an elite that, in the eyes of the natives, was westernized.

The English pressure for the end of the slavery was ever growing and the promulgation of the Aberdeen Act (1845), allowing the boarding of any ship carrying slaves, resulted in an important increase of the clandestine trade. The Brazilian slave owners, trying to enlarge their stock before the trade was definitely extinct, ended up indebted and decapitalized. The state reacted with the promulgation of the Eusébio de Queiroz Act, that, in 1850, officially prohibited the trade. That was, however, followed by a spirit that aimed the creation of a "white and westernized" society, with the "whitening" ideology and the immigration of European workers. After all, the Brazilian elite considered the country as having a European political regime, monarchy, and a European dynasty, the Bragança, being obliged to differentiate itself from its neighbors.

The end of the trade coincided with the beginning of the European colonial expanse in Africa, resulting in the regression of relations and absence of contacts between Africa and Brazil. In the first half of the 20th century, ninety percent of Brazil's trade with the continent was exclusively with South Africa. After the Second World War, the relations with Portugal were priority for successive Brazilian governments, that bargained the electoral support of the Lusitan immigrants (encouraged by Salazar, through the "Casas de Portugal" – Houses of Portugal), in exchange for Brazilian support to the Portuguese colonialism in UN forums. Furthermore, Brazil avoided supporting decolonization, given that Dakar was a strategic point for the aeronaval communications with Europe and Portugal was a member of NATO.

The contradictory rapprochement with postcolonial Africa

In 1952, Vargas signed the Brazil-Portugal Treaty on Friendship and Consultation, that Kubitschek took even further, with the proposal of the establishment of a Portuguese-Brazilian Community. It was the time of Gil-

berto Freire and his luso-tropicalism, giving Salazar, leader of the Portuguese fascism, a theoretical basis for the maintenance of the colonial empire in Africa and the turning of Brazil into a paradigm for its assimilation policy though the legal fiction of the “Overseas Provinces”. As compensation, a Coffee Agreement was signed (the African production competed with the Brazilian), in a moment in which the European Economic Community was formed (1957) and the Itamaraty (Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations) was restructured, creating a Commercial Department.

In addition to the persistence of what José Honório Rodrigues (1964) called the “old conservative mentality of Mr. Raul Fernandes” (chancellor⁵ from 1946 to 1951 and 1954 to 1955), typical of the Cold War alignment, the introduction of the Pan-American Operation by JK, in 1958, restricted Brazil’s foreign policy to America. The African independences, started exactly during the Kubitschek government, were largely overlooked. In 1960, the *African year*, seventeen countries became independent, and Brazil adopted a merely protocol stance. The triggering of the Independent Foreign Policy, in the Jânio Quadros government, was fundamental to the gaining of importance of Africa to the Brazilian diplomacy.

With the Independent Foreign Policy, from 1961 to 1964, a rapprochement began to take shape, followed by a new estrangement during the two first military governments (1964-1969). From the Médici government to the end of the Sarney government (1969-1990), there was a qualitative leap in the Brazil-Africa relations, involving intense cooperation in a number of areas, but the coming to power of the neoliberal administrations, from Fernando Collor de Mello to Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) (1990-2002), following the globalization tendencies, resulted in renewed distancing. However, with the turn of the century, particularly with the beginning of the Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva government, the African continent would finally become a priority to Brazil.

In 1961, with the announcement of the Independent Foreign Policy by Jânio Quadros and his chancellor Afonso Arinos, Brazil started an African policy and took a stand in favor of the right to self-determination of colonized peoples, especially in the Portuguese colonies, that were beginning their armed fights. Such a stance, that brought tensions with Lisbon, was not exempt from setbacks, given the action of the powerful pro-Portuguese lobby. Anyway, Itamaraty created an African Division, a navigation line was established and five Embassies opened: Senegal (visited by Afonso Arinos), Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Ghana. In relation to the last one, an inter-

⁵ Minister of Foreign Relations.

esting episode took place when Quadros designated as Ambassador the black writer Raimundo de Souza Dantas. Kwame N’Krumah, the combative leader of the country, quipped: “if Brazil meant to show us it is not a racist country, it should have appointed a black [ambassador] to London, Washington or Paris, not Africa”.

The signing of a number of Cultural Agreements allowed the establishment of a scholarship program for African students in Brazil, that eventually became the Exchange Program for Students (PEC, in the Portuguese acronym). The country also denounced the Sharpeville massacre, in South Africa, and criticized the *Apartheid*, seeking to keep relations with the South Africans in a more discreet level, even though there was significant trade. Despite João Goulart, that took on the presidency following Quadros’ renounce, and his chancellor, San Tiago Dantas, keeping and even deepening the Independent Foreign Policy, there were hesitations and setbacks in the relations with Africa, given the weakness of the government and the ideological suspicions against it.

In fact, Quadros and Arinos desired to increase Brazil’s bargaining power against the USA, take advantage of new niche markets to Brazil’s increasing industrial production, projecting the country in the international stage and play the role of a link between the West and Africa, given the recess of colonialism. It is interesting that one of the government’s concerns was the “unfair competition” poised by the African countries because of their privileged access to European markets when it came to tropical products (coffee, sugar and cocoa), both as colonies, or because of the preferential bonds created after the independencies.

From the Cold War geopolitics to economic relations

This first draft of a South-South Cooperation, however, was considerably set back by the 1964 military coup. Castelo Branco desired to end the politicization of the Independent Foreign Policy and set aside the Third-Worldist discourse. Despite sending a commercial mission to West Africa, the new regime focused on improving relations with Portugal and, on behalf of the security of the South Atlantic, condemning the Marxist-influenced national liberation movements in Southern Africa. Once again, because of the geopolitical approach of the Cold War, the collective security theme was rescued, both in regards to America (with the proposal of an Interamerican Defense Force), as to the South Atlantic (with the proposal of a South Atlantic Treaty

Organization – OTAS, in the Portuguese acronym). The last one implicated cooperation with the Portuguese colonialist and South African racist regimes. The Costa e Silva government, despite criticizing the great powers hegemony and moderating the discourse regarding multilateral defense mechanisms, did not promote rapprochement initiatives towards Africa during his short government (1967-1969).

Such initiatives took place during the Médici government, the regime's most repressive one. In 1970, diplomatic relations with three countries were established and, in 1972, the chancellor Mário Gibson Barboza visited nine countries in the West and East Africa, signing many commercial, cultural and technical cooperation agreements. Because of the "Brazilian Miracle", with its concentrated income and rapidly expanding industry, the country needed markets and raw materials, particularly oil. On the other hand, Brazil's intermediate and "tropicalized" technology was useful to the provision of services and served as an inspiring model to the African states. Brazil also needed the African sympathy to legitimate the expansion of its territorial sea to 200 miles, at the same time as the OTAS idea was forgotten. The "National Interest Diplomacy" of the Médici government, however, avoided the Southern African controversial agenda, where the national liberation wars preparing the final assault against the failing Portuguese colonialism.

The 1973 oil crisis, and the beginning of the Geisel government (1974-1979), pointed towards a deepening of the African policy. Diplomatic relations were established with six countries in Africa, and Brazil was the first to recognize the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola's (MPLA, in the Portuguese acronym) government, of Marxist inclinations, in November 1975. The firm condemnation of the Rhodesian and South African racist regimes marked, as well, the "Responsible Pragmatism" diplomacy under Geisel and the chancellor Azeredo da Silveira, characterized by a strong Third-Worldist discourse. While Brazil exported consumer goods, food, cars and the building of infrastructure, it imported growing amounts of oil. Braspetro, a Petrobrás subsidiary, began prospection activities in Africa, the Vale do Rio Doce company developed mining projects and the Mendes Jr. and Odebrecht contractors built highways, bridges, harbors and hydroelectric dams.

The relations with Angola, Gabon, Nigeria and Argelia were the most intense, while Brazil received hundreds of African students into its universities, through the PEC program, and dozens of trainees in its companies, in particular in the state-owned ones. The "Universalism" diplomacy, under president Figueiredo (1979-1985), and chancellor Saraiva Guerreiro, maintained and expanded the Brazil-Africa cooperation. Figueiredo was the first

Brazilian president to officially visit Africa: Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and Argelia. With the end of the Rhodesian racist regime, in 1980, Brazil grew closer to the new Zimbabwe and continued to harshly criticize the South African racism and aggressions against the newly-freed countries. Beyond the ever-growing trade, the cooperation programs were intensified in a number of areas, while more African representations were established in Brasília.

The Sarney government, despite the growing economic difficulties and the problems originated in the international system, kept a high profile in the Brazil-Africa relations. He visited Cape Verde and, after, Angola and Mozambique, that faced difficulties because of the South African aggressions and civil war. In 1986, exactly during the Reagan Era and in a context of militarization of the South Atlantic (post-Malvinas), he managed the approval by the UN of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (Zopacas). In this context, in 1988, he promoted the I South Atlantic Summit, in Rio de Janeiro, with the participation of 19 African countries. The Namibian emancipation, the *Apartheid* criticism and the support to peace in Angola (through the withdrawal of South African and Cuban forces) were important aspects of this policy, paired with the pursuit of development.

However, the obstacles were mounting. The impact of the debt crisis was strong in Brazil and even more so in Africa, devastated by the IMF's adjustment plans and the Cold War conflicts. Thus, the first post-military government sought an inflection towards the Portuguese speaking countries, using the room left by Portugal, that joined the European Community. In 1989, the I Portuguese-Speaking Countries Summit, in São Luís do Maranhão, with the presence of Brazil, Portugal, and the Portuguese-Speaking African Countries (PALOPs, in the Portuguese acronym), resulting in the creation of the International Portuguese Language Institute, to be based in Cape Verde.

The era of transatlantic economic adjustments

The ascension of Fernando Collor de Mello to presidency and the adoption of neoliberalism as the economic policy in Brazil, in 1990, inaugurated a new time of absence towards Africa. The strategic objectives of the Washington Consensus guided Brazil's new elite, stressing the vertical North-South relations, instead of the horizontal South-South ones. In the context of end of the Cold War and the creation of Mercosur, in 1991, Africa

was relegated to a secondary status, following a diplomatic First-Worldly and neoliberal view of globalization. The following decline in trade resulted from adjustment plans in both sides of the Ocean, the withdrawal of the state from the financing of exports and many areas of the economy and the need to buy oil from Argentina, as a way to balance the trade relations within the Mercosur.

In any way, the diplomatic transition in South Africa and the independence of Namibia, that received Brazilian help to structure its war Navy, brought the president to the region in 1991. Meanwhile, the number of Brazilian diplomats in Africa constantly diminished: in 1973, they were 25, reaching 34 in 1989 and falling to 24 in 1996, already under Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Worse than that, the African status within the Itamaraty structure was reduced, together with that of the Middle East, in political-administrative terms. All of these was done based on short-term cost-benefit views, despite the strategical policies undertaken by former administrations.

During the Itamar Franco government (1992-1994), with Fernando Henrique Cardoso and, then, Celso Amorim as chancellors, a certain level of articulated vision returned in regards to an African policy. Some key-countries were selected as priorities and the limited efforts in them centered. The new South Africa, Angola and Nigeria were the main focus of Brazil's foreign policy, seeking to reach their neighbors through them. In 1993, Itamar Franco reactivated the Zopacas and, in the following year, hosted the Portuguese-Speaking Countries' Chancellors Summit, in Brasília. More important, however, were the bilateral and multilateral (through the UN) supports to the peace process and rebuilding of some countries of the continent, particularly Angola.

During the FHC government (1995-2002), Africa's role in Brazil's foreign relations remained modest, though some important initiatives were made and a certain inflection occurred during his second term, posteriorly qualitatively deepened by the Lula government. From 1995, the Brazilian army actively partook in the UN's peace missions in Angola and some other countries. In 1996, FHC visited Angola and South Africa, signing agreements on a number of areas and, in 1998, the president Mandela visited Brazil. In the year 2000, his country signed a Framework Agreement with the Mercosur.

In this sense, the cooperation in the public policies scope grew, especially when Brazil started its campaign to remove the patent rights of AIDS drugs, epidemic in the Southern Africa region. When the president, because of the Real crisis, began its critic against the "asymmetrical globalization",

a greater convergence in the global diplomacy and its multilateral forums started, particularly in the economic area.

It is also important to point out that, since the end of the 1980s, Brazil's influence in Africa increased because of its television companies (especially its soap operas), of the evangelical churches⁶ and even the establishment of smuggling networks, drugs and arms trafficking and money laundering (in a two-way flow). Cultural and security aspects, thus, become common agendas in the relationship between both shores of the South Atlantic. Brazil has also come to receive refugees from the African continent.

The multidimensional cooperation era

The Lula presidency, from 2003, initiated a new chapter in the Brazil-Africa relations, combining a new vision regarding the international order with internal social transformations. Already in his inaugural speech, the president nominated South Africa among the great developing powers (along with China, India and Russia) and stressed that the African continent would be a fundamental vector of his foreign policy, auto-defined by him as affirmative and propositional. At the same time that the fight against poverty adopted effective solutions such as the “Fome Zero” (Zero Hunger), the “affirmative policies” sought to integrate the afro-descendants in the developments of the Brazilian society. In this sense, one of the initiatives, already in March 2003, was the promotion of the admission of the group to the diplomatic staff, through preparatory scholarships for the Rio Branco Institute entrance examination.

Three months later the India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA or G-3) was announced, a South African initiative for South-South cooperation. During his first term, Lula visited Africa on four occasions: in November 2003, he visited São Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa; in July 2004, São Tomé and Príncipe, Gabon and Cape Verde; in April 2005, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea Bissau and Senegal; and, in February 2006, Algeria, Benin, Botswana and South Africa. Ten new embassies were established and the number of diplomats in the African continent greatly increased. Besides maintaining concrete support to the peace and rebuilding processes, the president forgave the debt

⁶ Only in South Africa there are more than 300 temples of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, where Brazilian ministers can even tell jokes in Zulu, but the phenomenon is even more intense in the Portuguese-speaking countries.

a number of countries had with Brazil, granted loans and offered assistance in many areas.

In the educational scope, the Student Agreement Program (PEC, in the Portuguese acronym) was enlarged and extended to the post-graduation level, with Brazilian scholarships and the cooperation regarding scientific research and professors exchange fomented. Courses in Africa and a number of seminars aiming at mutual acknowledgement on both shores of the Atlantic were promoted. Among these, the II Conference of Intellectuals from Africa and the Diaspora, that took place in Salvador, Bahia, in July 2006, is worth highlighting. Thus, Africa became Brazil's most important laboratory on South-South relations, combined with the increasing bilateral trade.

While the opposition accused the government of "wasting money on a futureless continent", Brazilian companies gained prominence in the region, consolidating their presence, above all Petrobras. If the Chinese and, more recently, Indian penetrations, aimed at economic goals, despite their contribution to infrastructure works, and the fresh North-American presence is related to geopolitical and security concerns, the cooperation with Brazil, aside from the undeniable material interests, introduced new elements.

These are the fight against poverty and epidemics (particularly HIV-AIDS), the introduction and creation of technologies adapted to Third World problems and the active alliance in multilateral forums to defend common interests regarding development and the building of a multipolar and pacific global system. Two examples are the G-3 and the G-20, contributing to the strengthening of the African countries position in the WTO negotiations. Crowning this policy, took place, in Abuja, Nigeria, the I Africa - South America Summit (ASA), in November 2006, providing both regions with unprecedented international projection, much contributing to the "African Renaissance". Meanwhile, black movements developed, seminars took place, legislations prohibiting racial discrimination were drafted and research centers specializing in African studies were established in Brazil.

How much of these is political discourse and economic interests, or the association between two peripheral regions seeking socioeconomic development, only time will tell. The African governments, on the one hand, face the need to overcome their assistentialist and victimized mentality, originated during the Cold War and aggravated because of the "lost decade", and intensify their integration processes, against the challenging impact of the globalization. To overcome the colonial legacy of "divide and rule", visible in the configuration of small and unfeasible states, is an urgent need. Mean-

while, they must deepen their bonds related to foreign cooperation with an autonomist perspective, reversing the marginalization of the continent.

The development of capitalism in Africa, however, creates new contradictions, expressed through the emergence of modern ways of social inequality, that will, unavoidably, create new agendas and political actors in the future. Still, such economic development shall build the infrastructure and modernity Africa needs to obtain a more effective liberation than that found in the political discourse of other times. It is interesting to note, as an example, that the South-African urbanization, promoting the coexistence of not only national cultures and ethnicities, but of thousands of workers from other African nations, is generating a new culture. The black urban youngsters are transforming the English language, enriching it with new expressions and grammatical structures, at the same time that they use it as the common language.

Brazil, on the other hand, is a *mixed-race* country, not a “racial democracy” (flawed conservative concept) nor a multicultural nation (European/North-American post-modern concept). Miscegenation does not mean whitening, but *mixture*, something related to a culture that ignores a number of differences and feels great attraction towards others. We are building our own culture, one in which the African element imparts a fundamental contribution that needs recognition, and the social inequalities, through which black people are especially penalized, must be eliminated. Even so, amongst these many injustices, we show enormous tolerance, that could serve as a model for an intolerant world.

Far beyond the commercial aspect, Brazil can be an important partner to the African continent, provided that it can overcome certain internal political, social and economic obstacles. Africa, in turn, is also interesting to Brazil, both in economic and political-cultural terms. Even though it is a developing Third World country, a First-Worldly temptation always presents itself to the Brazilian elites. Besides welcoming African students, Brazil should send its own students and tourists to Africa, which would contribute to the improvement of our identity. Finally, the tension between a transoceanic cooperation facing towards the North Atlantic (resulting from the history of capitalism) and another facing towards the South Atlantic (based on the South-American integration, the association with Africa and the South-South cooperation), represents a fundamental contradiction. In this context, the Brazil-Africa relations are paramount to its overcoming.

After decades of stagnation, the African economy begins to show signs of important improvements. In the last decade, the continent has not

only experienced a constant acceleration of its economic growth, but also accompanied new opportunities for trade and investments. The African states have worked towards the promotion of economic growth based on regional political actions: the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) are clear signs of the will to overcome historic problems. Furthermore, their aims are defined by the Africans themselves, that take on all the difficulties related to projects of this size.

In this perspective, it is important to look into the potential of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP, in the Portuguese acronym). Few countries have received from the Itamaraty a treatment as differentiated as the members of the CPLP, that comprises a 22 million inhabitant population, besides Brazil, in four continents. Portugal, East Timor, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Mozambique and Angola seek through Brazilian cooperation develop the security, business, health and education areas. Already in the first year of the Lula government, São Tomé and Príncipe, Mozambique and Angola received visits of the president⁷.

In this context, Brazil developed with the countries of the Community strong bilateral cooperation programs. Among the most significant ones are the opening of technical education centers in Timor and Angola and the offering of electronic ballot boxes to the election in Guinea Bissau, that ended up postponed because of the military coup in the country. Furthermore, the installation of an antiretroviral drugs factory was agreed, bringing great enthusiasm to the members of the CPLP.

It is important to point out that Brazil, while chair of the organization, played a fundamental role in the diplomatic negotiations that contributed to the reestablishment of democracy in São Tomé and Príncipe. Additionally, a cooperation with the country's National Oil Agency took place to help them develop their regulation and bidding system. The relations with Angola, traditional partner in a number of areas, was extended. Regarding Mozambique, commercial bonds were strengthened and a cooperation in the agricultural sector created. With all the countries of the Community, there were negotiations involving agricultural development, the fight against AIDS and poverty.

7 In the occasion, the possibilities for investments in a number of industry and commerce sectors were discussed. 128 businessmen accompanied Lula, interested in the expansion of exports. Cement and medicine factories were negotiated, as well as the construction of railways, the exploration of coal, exports of cellular phones, mounting of buses and sale of garbage collecting machines, amongst others. The estimates for the value of the negotiations surpassed US\$ 1 billion.

Visiting the headquarters of CPLP, in Lisbon, president Lula highlighted the particular responsibility of the organization to revert the condition of extreme poverty of some peoples and the need to mobilize the international community.

The South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (Zopacas, in the Portuguese acronym) also presents significant potential to the Brazilian diplomacy regarding the building of agreements in a multilateral scope, capable of uniting groups of nations with converging interests that can mutually support each other and favor common objectives in the global forums. Both CPLP and Zopacas provide intersection points for a number of economic integration processes in the South Atlantic region, favoring exchanges between the Mercosur, SADC and ECOWAS. The Brazilian government has been significantly supporting a growing number of Brazilian business, mainly service exporters, that seek the African continent to the implementation of projects. Notably, the Vale do Rio Doce company won the competition to the exploration of the carboniferous complex of Moatize, in northern Mozambique, strengthening the country's relations with Brazil.

The rapprochement with the African continent has shown to be an important development of the Brazilian foreign policy. Through a superficial evaluation, the strategy attracts criticism, so far as it can seem paradoxical to a developing country as Brazil to focus its diplomatic efforts on poor partners, with limited influence in the global geopolitical context and an overall low impact in Brazil's trade balance. However, it is necessary to take into account the internationalization movements and some political and economic tendencies accelerated by the deepening of globalization.

Brazil is beginning to be a capital and technology exporter, besides a traditional (and now competitive) exporter of primary products, services and manufactures. The phenomenon taking place in Brazil is also observed in other developing economies, as India, South Africa and China. Africa is one of the most adequate territories for the Brazilian companies to invest, even though the continent is marked by some unstable regimes, armed conflicts and other forms of violence, significant sanitary issues and immense poverty. Meanwhile, it is one of the few natural frontiers still open to the expansion of business in sectors such as oil, gas and minerals extraction and stage of a global dispute for the access to raw materials, increasingly scarce and demanded.

With the beginning of his second term of office, Lula made his seventh trip to the continent, visiting Burkina Faso, the Republic of the Congo,

South Africa and Angola⁸. The agenda, besides the signature of bilateral and multilateral agreements, included the participation in the 2nd India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum Summit. The travel to Burkina Faso, retributing the visit to Brazil of president Baise Compaoré, in 2003, allowed to agreements of technical cooperation in the educational area and a protocol for cooperation in health sectors such as traditional medicine and milk banks. Retributing the president Denis Sassou Nguesso's visit to Brazil in 2005, in the Republic of the Congo the countries agreed on the fight against malaria and HIV/AIDS. When the travel was done, the Brazilian president had visited 19 of the 52 African countries, some of them more than once⁹.

Nevertheless, the biggest investment was in diplomatic terms. In 2007, by participating, in South Africa of the 2nd IBSA Summit (the first one took place in Brasília, in September 2006), the Brazilian diplomacy intensified trilateral cooperation and political articulation¹⁰. The reform of the United Nations Security Council and the Doha Development Round were some of the discussed matters. The WTO negotiation round is a priority for all three countries, because they integrate the G-20 and, together, fight for the opening of the agricultural market of the developed countries to the production of those in development.

In any way, the formation of the IBSA will already have played an important role by pointing out to the North countries the intention of the South countries of having their voice heard about the big global themes and will have, to some extent, influenced the G-8 to invite them to their internal debates. The IBSA, in this sense, is succeeding in projecting its members in the international stage, alerting the global community that the countries

8 The president was, this time, accompanied by businessmen in the energy, construction, aeronautic industry and finances sectors. An agreement regarding biofuels was also signed, with the Economic Community of West African States, as well as a cooperation regarding the cotton industry, besides a business event, during the visit to Burkina Faso. In the Republic of the Congo, the countries signed agreements about palm growing and modernization of the sugar-alcohol sector.

9 Since the beginning of the Lula administration, Brazilian exports to Africa more than tripled – in 2003, Brazil exported US\$ 3.06 billion, in 2006 they were US\$ 7.86 billion. In 2007, the data up until September showed a growth of 15% in comparison to the former year.

10 The countries also established daring aims to the increase of trilateral trade. In July 2007, during the 4th Trilateral Ministerial Commission Meeting, in New Delhi, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations, Celso Amorim, proposed a goal of US\$ 15 billion until 2010. During that year, Brazil, India and South Africa intended to reach US\$ 10 billion in commercial exchanges. In the occasion, Amorim also defended the creation of a free trade zone between Mercosur, India and the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), group that includes South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland.

are willing and able to break the limitations of their regional contexts and decisively contribute to the advance of a multipolar order. Finally, the Forum opened an important political space to the international action of South Africa and Brazil.

The possibilities for commercial exchange were, as well, one of the main topics of the bilateral meeting of president Lula with the South-African president Thabo Mbeki. In the political sphere the governments agreed on instruments on the social, energetic, educational, cultural, health and tributary administration areas. In South Africa, the president also partook in a Business Council, Academic Seminar, Parliamentary Forum and Women Forum. The end of the trip was in Angola, where Lula, with his Angolan counterpart José Eduardo dos Santos, signed treaties regarding the prevention of malaria, teaching and graduation. In Luanda, the Brazilian president was honored in a solemn session of the National Assembly and opened a business meeting with representatives of more than 30 Brazilian companies installed in the country.

Angola, Africa's second biggest oil producer, was stage for an intense discussion regarding what president Lula called a "biofuel revolution". According to him, both countries – Angola as an oil power and Brazil as self-sustaining in its production – could together be part of the next energy revolution, of the biofuels. The "Brazilian energy revolution", as announced by the president, has in the Brazilian potential to the production of ethanol an exit to the substitution of non-renewable energy to clean energy sources. The importance given to the theme by the Brazilian government is clear, and it has been approaching other countries on the subject, aiming the development and improvement of this energy source.

In November 2007, Brazil and China announced they would release free of charge to all of Africa images of the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS). The announcement, made by the Brazilian delegation during the 4th meeting of the Group on Earth Observations (GEO), in Cape Town, had the objective of increasing the capability of governments and organizations in Africa to the monitoring of natural disasters, deforestation, drought and desertification, threats to agricultural production and food security, and threats to the public health. Beyond providing high quality satellite images, Brazil also committed to the providing of the necessary software for the processing and other tools required to the interpretation of the images, as well as the training of interested African users.

The relations between Brazil and Africa, during the second Lula government, leaned towards an deepening. In December 2007, Brazil was

chosen by the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to coordinate the organ's works in Guinea Bissau. The choice followed requests made by the country itself. In the coordination of the PCB works to the Guinea Bissau, Brazil will increase its contribution to the country, already evident through the bilateral cooperation, as well as through the CPLP and the IBSA Fund. In March 2008, because of severe floods affecting Mozambique and Zambia, Brazil reinforced initiatives of humanitarian help to the African nations, donating 3 tons of basic and emergency drugs to each of the countries, as well as continuing the support to Guinea Bissau and Angola, also affected by the disasters.

Despite being impossible to precisely determine the impacts of the favorable conjuncture to the rapprochement between Brazil and the African continent, it is a fact that Africa is in a privileged position within the international insertion strategy developed by Lula's foreign policy. Brazil seems to wish to be a responsible and active actor in the international system and, historically, Itamaraty has been the institution that, with excellency, plans the long-term national interest. Granting greater importance to regions yet poorly explored and developing countries, without neglecting the well-established relations with more traditional partners, does not only agree with a broader definition of national interests and Brazil's insertion in the global economy, but also contributes to the conferring of legitimacy to the Brazilian diplomacy.

If during the Dilma Rousseff government it is possible to observe a certain "recess" in the intensity of the relations with the continent, it is worth mentioning that Africa's importance to the Brazilian policy can be shown in numbers. According to the World Bank/Ipea Report (2012), in 2009, 50% of Brazil's projects financed by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC, in the Portuguese acronym), were destined to the African continent. In 2011, that value increased to almost 60%, accounting for more than US\$ 22 billion. Even though the validity of becoming involved with poorer countries, with a limited participation in Brazil's trade balance draws criticism, Africa has shown to be a great destination to Brazil's exports and investments, besides being a route to Indian Ocean. Moreover, as the Report stresses, Brazil's knowledge in the fields of tropical agriculture and health constitute a unique opportunity to the African countries to import effective solutions to the development of both areas. Furthermore, the imports of Brazilian social protection services are highlighted. The similar social inequality situation in both shores of the Atlantic, the apparent success of social programs such the Fome Zero, led to the implementation of adaptations of these social support systems in countries like Angola, Kenya and Senegal, from 2003. Despite being still early to make an assessment of the results obtained so far, the initiatives are examples of Brazil's long-term participation in the continent.

The similar interests in both shores of the ocean, the search for joint solutions to common problems, the importance to safeguard the peace in a way that strengthens regional development and integrations, and the growing trade flow with the southern African nations comprise the main points of Brazil's African policy.

Conclusion

It is important to point out that, to Brazil, Africa is not only a link to Asia. The South Atlantic has been serving as stage for the discovery of a wealth of natural resources, such as the Brazilian pre-salt, but also the oil reserves in the Angolan shore, where Brazil is already investing and cooperating regarding the providing of the technical resources needed to the exploration. The affirmation of sovereignty over the territorial waters, the maintenance of safety of navigation in the oceans and the blocking of any attempts by extra regional powers to militarize the region are, thus, urgent. It is worth considering, yet, the North-American need to control safer and less expensive reserves than the Venezuelan and Middle Eastern ones, besides the close military relation of the country with South Africa – a country that could be a gateway to Africa and, ergo, the South Atlantic region.

Despite the criticism, the development of military capabilities by regional powers is indispensable, while the emphasis on the Zopacas must be reinforced, especially given the attempts to militarize the region, as shown by the situation in the Malvinas (Great-Britain), the recreation of the IV Fleet (United States of America) and the AFRICOM (United States Africa Command), besides the North-American insertion in the South American continent, with its bases in Colombian territory.

The great potential to the transformation of the South Atlantic in a security and energy supply community, as an option to the Euro-North-American North Atlantic system, is perceived by the Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil seeks to lead the consolidation of this project, something that seems to be succeeding through the country's assertive international projection policy. In this sense, South Africa, possessing a central position between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and a strong economy, makes it impossible to any country to disregard it when seeking to act in the continent (Kornegay 2011).

It is fundamental to stress that the regional conflicts resolution in Africa (as exemplified by Angola and South Africa) boosted an "African turnaround", allowing Brazil to act in the rapprochement with and between

these countries. The expansion of these relations is important to increase the options within the SADC, which may generate a joint maritime security plan capable of bringing the region closer to Brazil, ergo, strengthening IBAS. While the South Atlantic does not possess an institutionalized organization, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the international relations in the region shall lead to a transatlantic maritime security architecture (Kornegay 2011). In this sense, the creation of the Council of South American Defense, under the leadership of Brazil, must be taken into account.

Diplomatic discourse and practice during the Lula government converged on building preferential alliances with partners within the scope of South-South relations. The Dilma Rousseff government maintained interest in relations with the continent, but redefined this axis in terms of priority. However, the African continent represented one of the areas of greatest investment in diplomatic terms during the 2000s. The approach to the African continent is not aimed at obtaining results in the short term, even though, in economic terms, Africa represents an important market.

In this sense, today, despite being weakened by the events of the political crisis in the country, Brazil's African policy is dynamic in the diplomatic sphere, assuming special relevance when considering Brazilian actions on the African continent. However, the political, economic and socio-cultural dynamics of both regions, at different historical moments, blocked or boosted this relationship. In different periods, Brazilian actions resulted from a misreading of the priorities of Brazilian foreign policy. These actions, which did not take into account long-term political and strategic interests, only immediate economic and financial interests, postponed the implementation and renewal of bilateral projects, as well as the establishment of multilateral cooperation agreements. Thus, it is necessary to monitor the trajectory of relations between Brazil and Africa.

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ABSTRACT

The Brazilian relations with the African continent, after a long period of estrangement, gained a new momentum since the 2000's. The historical links, the consolidation of a Brazilian policy of Africa and the important changes on the African continent are present in the Brazilian perspective about the need of rapprochement and cooperation. The discourse and the diplomatic practice converge to the building of preferential alliances with partners in the context of South-South relations. In this perspective, the African continent represents one of the largest investment areas in diplomatic terms from the recent governments. And still, the building of a strategic space that connects Brazil to the African coast makes the Atlantic Ocean an area to be preserved for cooperation between both sides. In this sense, this study evaluates the interaction between Brazil and the African continent and analyses the Brazil-Africa relations, especially Lusophone Africa, in the framework of South-South Cooperation.

KEYWORDS

South-South Cooperation; Brazil-Africa relations; Foreign Policy.

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AFRICAN MARXIST MILITARY REGIMES, RISE AND FALL: INTERNAL CONDITIONERS AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS

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Introduction

The historical dimension is used in a limited or selective way in the analysis of contemporary international relations, and it needs to be developed. Recovering the theme and the period from 1970-1980 means, therefore, both a historical and a theoretical matter. International Relations, as an area dominated by political science, has been a field of study marked by theorizations with little empirical basis and instrumental character. Without the State building, of ruling elites and social transformations promoted by revolutionary processes, the situation of Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, for example, would not have allowed their current international prominence.

Halliday (1983) remarks that during the 1970s there were fourteen revolutions in the Third World. However, for these revolutions it can be added the negotiated transitions to independence and, paradoxically, *Military Coups* led by low and medium militaries, which have entailed a radical change of political regime, giving rise to the *African Marxist Military Regimes* (Markakis and Waller 1986; The Journal of Communist Studies 1992). In this case, the number exceeds twenty between 1968 and 1983. The Revolutions and Revolutionary Regimes implemented had a significant regional impact, producing trends and countertrends, as well as violent internationalized conflicts and civil wars.

Throughout previous studies, in addition to the Revolutions resulting from long anti-colonial wars such as Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Zimbabwe, an innovative element was identified, the *Military Coups of a*

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new type, which introduced *revolutionary regimes self-declared Marxist-Leninist*. This is the case of Somalia (1969) and Ethiopia (1974), the most emblematic case, but also of four french-speaking countries: Congo-Brazzaville (1968), Daomey/Benin (1972-74), Madagascar (1975) and Alto Volta/Burkina Faso (1983). The original and controversial revolutionary experiences proposed here for reflection, the *Marxist Military Regimes*, are different from the first States governed by the so-called “African Socialism” soon after independence, in the passage from 1950s to 1960s: Ghana (1957), Guinea (1958), Mali (1960), Tanzania (1961), Zambia (1964) and Algeria (1962).

Revolutionary processes and regimes and their international impact

For both theoretical and methodological purposes of this study, revolution means an abrupt political change, generally violent (but not always), with the overthrow of one regime and the strive to build a new one. This rupture with the current order aims to effect structural changes in the legal-political and socioeconomic order. The triggering element of such an event could be a popular uprising, an armed insurrection, a *coup d'état*, or even a relatively peaceful political transition. However, for these conjunctural elements to be effective, there must be favourable domestic and external objective political conditions.

Besides the bourgeois revolutions, the bourgeois-democratic revolutions (with active participation of the population) and the socialist revolutions themselves, during the second half of the 20th century, the popular-democratic revolutions developed, especially in peripheral countries. It concerns the national liberation revolutions, the democratic, anti-imperialist and “anti-feudal” revolutions of the Third World, generally linked to decolonisation and nationalism. In these revolutions, the trigger elements were popular uprisings, reformist mobilizations, *coups d'état* (including military ones) and guerrilla combats like the theorized ones in China, Vietnam, Cuba and Lusophone Africa with Amílcar Cabral (Silva 2004). In them, there was an alliance between segments of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, as well as sectors of the working class.

The theories of revolution and socialism are still heavily focused on European cases, with limited knowledge and reflection on Third World experiences, generally more recent and less documented. It is commonly insisted that peripheral countries “would not be prepared” for the Revolution and for

the socialism, according to a restrictive interpretation. During the phase of European imperialism, the most acute social contradictions moved from the center to the periphery, where the process of proletarianisation became more accentuated, with the rural exodus and the establishment of market-oriented agriculture. It is important to point out that the international dimension, already significant in the classical revolutions, becomes even more decisive in the framework of the growing internationalization deepened by capitalism in the periphery (Davis 1985).

The Revolutions have two meanings: the first, more restricted, refers to the conquest of political power, through the conquest of the State; the second consists in the use of the former to unleash a longer process of transformation of social, political and economic structures. In the Marxist philosophical and strategic conception the two were brought together in a single concept. For theoretical and methodological purposes of this study, Revolution means a sudden political change, generally violent (but not always), with the overthrow of one regime and the struggle to build a new one. This rupture with the current order seeks to effect structural changes in the legal-political and socioeconomic order.

The triggering element of such an event could be a popular uprising, an armed insurrection, a *coup d'état*, or even a relatively peaceful political transition. However, for these conjunctural elements to be effective, there must be favourable objective political conditions. In the case that interests us, the formation of the *African Marxist Military Regimes*, the fact that they have their origin in coups d'état usually set off by soldiers of medium and low rank (from Captain to lower ranks) does not invalidate the concept, therefore. Nor does it make any difference that young and radical military personnel were unaware of Marxism, for just as many leftist groups withdrew from revolutionary transformations after coming to power, several "conservative" or just nationalist groups embarked on Marxism and revolutionary changes after achieving power.

Revolutions are always related to both internal and external factors and, following their materialization, inevitably generate an international impact as far as they affect the internal rules on which the (capitalist) international order is based. "Revolutions are international events in their causes and effects", as Fred Halliday (2007, 148) recalls. In this sense, they inspire political forces in other countries, both sympathizers and opponents. Revolutions usually give rise to external wars, generally associated with or resulting from internal civil wars.

The place of the African Marxist Military Regimes in the Revolutions of the 20th Century

Marxist-oriented socialism has succeeded, throughout the 20th century, in driving a series of victorious revolutions in successive waves. The first of these revolutions took place in the debut of the World War I, with the triumph of the Russian Revolution and the establishment of socialism in the USSR. The second, as an outcome from the anti-fascist movements and the results of World War II, affected Eastern Europe, both through the “revolutions from above” supported by Moscow, which would constitute the Popular Democracies, and through the autonomous revolutions of Yugoslavia and Albania.

The third, which had been developing in parallel with the previous one, had as its epicentre the Chinese Revolution, which had already begun in the 1920s, characterized by the rural issue. After a quarter of a century of guerrillas and wars, the most populous nation on the planet became a socialist regime. The Korean Revolution and the first stage of Indochinese are part of this phase. The Marxist revolutions and regimes engendered in the first half of the 20th century occurred on the “periphery of the center”; the capitalist industrial powers, the center of the system, entered into open conflict in the World Wars. Thus the victory of two revolutions and structuring regimes of a new world reality, the Soviet and the Chinese, which were on the periphery of the geopolitical space affected by the gigantic confrontation and transformation, was possible.

Finally, in the fourth and last, the decolonization movement and Third World nationalism led to the triumph of several revolutions of socialist orientation, such as the Cuban, the Vietnamese, the Afghan, the South-Yemeni and the African revolutions of the 1970s (Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia). They occurred in the second half of the twentieth century “in the center of the periphery,” that is, in the southern region of the planet not yet industrialized, where the expansion of the *asymmetrical and combined development of capitalism* occurred (Westad 2007; Davis 1985).

In contrast to Angola and Mozambique, where the Marxist component was associated with *National Liberation Movements*, those in Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as the four Francophone States, had Marxist Military Revolutions/Regimes after more than a decade of independence. Ethiopia never became a colony and Somalia brought two colonial territories together with no structural element of external dependence. Ethiopia had a previous Imperial State (though archaic), different from the others who had recently

strived to edify one, but none of the six countries had formed the Nation and built stable institutions (Visentini; Ribeiro and Pereira 2012).

The neo-colonial regimes, replicated from the metropolises, proved to be tremendously unstable and were soon succeeded by traditional military coups, which could not maintain internal cohesion and economic development either. The tempered attempt by the populist regimes referred to as “African Socialism” in Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania and Zambia also failed, toppled by coups d’état or drifting towards authoritarian personalist regimes. In their failure, a space was opened for trends of “African Marxism”, driven by intellectuals, students and unionists, in the face of the failure of the two previous paths. However, an important player in this process was a segment of the state, the Armed Forces, which imposed itself through *coups d’état* in Somalia (1969), Ethiopia (1974), Congo-Brazzaville (1968), Daomey/Benin (1972-74), Madagascar (1975) and Alto Volta/Burkina Faso (1983) (Markakis 1986).

The military, who had no Marxist influence, admired the performance of the Soviet Union and Cuba, as well as the socialist tools used in centralizing the State, nation building, sovereignty via military defense and economic and social development. They found in the small civilian Marxist groups (influenced by the PCF and CGT, in the case of the french-speaking) important interlocutors and allies, but also challengers. These groups were gradually absorbed or dispersed for the most part, but their program was incorporated by the military, who had the organization and instruments of power to implement them. Marxism merged with nationalism in these regimes in an attempt to overcome national fragmentation, political apathy, socioeconomic backwardness and international subservience (Hughes 1992).

It is our central hypothesis that such processes had indigenous roots and that the link with the Soviet camp was a later (though indispensable) instrumental element, with Moscow’s interest being limited, except in Ethiopia, for geopolitical reasons. The reasons are listed below, but the military *ethos* found in Marxist-Leninist court socialism elements that were familiar to it (centralization, discipline) and useful for the accomplishment of the program they proposed to do. The army, in turn, was one of the few truly national institutions in terms of regional and social extraction. It is also observed that internal fragmentation did not concern tribal or cultural elements, as some historiography insists, but with the distribution of resources and power of the State to different regions, groups and economic activities.

Many successes have been achieved in the social, political, educational, health, women’s emancipation and, more restrictedly, economic fields. Internal difficulties, external economic pressures, and changes in the degree

of Soviet commitment made it complicated for such regimes to perform. In the mid-1980s they had to adopt liberal economic reforms (appealing to the IMF) and, when Gorbachev came to power in the USSR, also political ones. The end of the Cold War left them orphans in ideological, external support and political terms. Nonetheless, Cuban aid was different from Soviet aid and should be considered separately. According to Margot Light (The Journal 1992), Moscow felt the weight of the involvement in a strategically secondary scenario like Africa and resented the strong limitations of what its scholars called the *Socialist Oriented State* or *Non-Capitalist Way of Development*. About the legacy of such regimes, it is curiously observable that their leaders and parties have remained in power or, later, returned to it by electoral means (See below).

To what extent were revolutions and socialist regimes based on Marxism?

One relevant question is why the African military that came to power through a *coup d'état* in the 1970s adopted Marxist-Leninist references. Marxism, and then the practice of Marxism-Leninism, represented a doctrine that offered a series of attractive solutions to the great challenges to countries that followed the path of revolutionary rupture and the attempt to build a post-capitalist society, according to Clapham (1996). Ethiopia, for example, was an ancient empire, with feudal structures, dominated by the Orthodox Church, which had gone through a period of expansion, which led it to control a very large territory with great ethnic diversity.

In this sense, the first appeal Marxism offered was obviously that of a revolutionary doctrine of conquest and maintenance of power. Unlike most colonial or semi-colonial states – which made revolution primarily through nationalist and anti-colonialist ideologies, seeking liberation in the first place – revolutionaries who embraced Marxism (with greater or lesser sincerity) considered it a radical and progressive alternative to the current status quo. This was true as much for the organization of political and/or armed movements for the conquest of power and the mobilization of popular support, or even after conquering power in a confused framework of balance of forces. In the case of the Marxist Military Regimes, which rise to power through a *coup d'état*, “the usurpation of power requires legitimacy through a credible alternative to the overthrown regime. (...) The radical soldiers shared the illusion that socialism could be achieved quickly and by decree” (Markakis 1986, 4). More than that, it was necessary to occupy the space of the civilian far left, an ally that challenged the new holders of power.

Secondly, Marxism also offered them a *doctrine of development*. This preached the destruction of the oligarchic power that had controlled the country until then, which was seen as an obstruction to the well-being of the people, and its replacement by a more efficient State combined with free peasantry. This development strategy sought alternative paradigms to neo-colonial liberalism and the purely moralistic and voluntaristic experience and was therefore based on Marxist development premises, rooted on a central planning structure, socialist distribution and, when possible, industrialization.

A third and fourth appeal from Marxism-Leninism to the revolutionary government was *Nation building*, whether *unitary or multi-ethnic*, and *State building*. How to deal with the internal divisions arising from the low level of development, the historical legacy, and the manipulations of colonists or external agents? It was necessary to forge a nation on new foundations. Certainly, the USSR, which combined an effective central government with respect for the cultural identities of diverse nationalities and a considerable level of autonomy, was an attractive model. In a dialectic relationship with this factor, the new egresses of colonialism or neocolonialism relied on internally limited administrative apparatuses and addicted to external domination, direct or indirect. It was necessary to organize an apparatus capable of dealing with the enormous transformation and conflicts that were approaching, a new type of State. Thus, Marxism-Leninism was also an *ideology of state control*.

Finally, Marxism-Leninism's fifth appeal for a revolutionary government was its use as a *source of international support* in a Cold War context. The USSR, China and the socialist community in general therefore represented the only consistent source of military supplies, legitimization, political and economic support. The need to gain foreign support was a necessary condition for the survival of many of the Marxist regimes. However, Soviet aid, besides creating certain ties of dependence, was generally restricted to the military field, leaving much to be desired in the economic and financial field. In this regard, Arnold Hughes (1992) adds that it also represents a *guarantee of national sovereignty*.

Hughes adds three additional elements that have a connection with African political culture. Marxism was perceived as a *superior ideology*, as an alternative to Western capitalism and African Socialism, considered in the 1970s as inoperative projects for the continent. Through Marxism the ruling groups felt as part of the world's socialist modernity because it brought a sense of security through an ideological speech that allowed the problems to be identified and policies and strategies to be formulated to solve them.

For the radical African military, Marxism, besides being a rational strategy, would also have the properties of a “*political amulet*”, with “an almost magical charm to prevent political diseases such as neo-colonialism and underdevelopment” (Hughes). According to Zolberg (apud Hughes 1992, p. 13), Planning was not only an objective instrument, “but also *symbols* of rationality, control and order. Political ideology becomes an enchantment that genuinely transforms reality, and even if nothing happens, it changes men’s view of it”. For him, the “amulet” would enable the intelligent elites to control the future.

Finally, especially for the middle classes, the Marxist regime represented a possibility of *social self-promotion*. The State was the main provider of formal jobs and the model of socializing development largely expanded the jobs in this sector. But it was not only about economic profits, for vast segments of the youth and the middle class believed that the Marxist could offer hope for a better future. By removing most of the elites linked to the former colonizer, the regime opened space for the social and political rise of new players.

African Marxist Military Regimes: domestic and international dimensions

The decolonisation of Africa in the early 1960s led to the establishment of neo-colonial regimes that reproduced the institutions of the former metropolises, but left out the so-called *white bastions* from the south of the continent. The result was the radicalization of national liberation movements through guerrillas supported by socialist countries and, after the collapse of the Portuguese Empire, a long regional civil and conventional war in Southern Africa. This war had the active participation of South Africa, Cuba and the USSR, which lasted from 1975 to 1992.

In Somalia and Ethiopia, military coups in 1969 and 1974, respectively, evolved into socialist-oriented Marxist Military Regimes, which did not prevent the outbreak of a war between both states in 1977-78. In Somalia, the conflict complicated the strategy of socialist transformation, but in Ethiopia the opposite happened, with its deepening. In parallel, Congo-Brazzaville, Benin, Madagascar and Alto Volta (Burkina Faso), four former French colonies, suffered military coups that took the same path. And these six countries, with their unusual trajectories, constitute the case studies proposed here.

The Socialist Republic of Ethiopia

Ethiopia is located in the Horn of Africa (northeast) and its geography has always been an important element. Many regions of the country were inaccessible, making central control difficult, allowing provincial or local centers of authority to dominate the local peasantry. The surface of the country was 1.2 million km² and the population 45 million in 1985. With the separation from Eritrea in 1993, the surface area is now 1.1 million km². The history of Ethiopia has a continuity of more than three millennia, passing through great ancient empires and having maintained the Christian Empire of Abyssinia. It has resisted Islam, which controlled the coast, and the European colonizers (the only non-dominated country in Africa) in isolation.

Punished by misery, drought, feudal socio-political archaism and the Muslim and leftist guerrillas in Eritrea, the regime did not resist. The old pro-American emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown in 1974 by a military coup, when there were major urban popular protests and rural uprisings. The military junta (DERG) expressed an ill-defined populism, while opposition, chaos and centrifugal tendencies threatened the existence of the new regime. This, while the faction clash within the ruling group grew, increasingly linked to the program of the civil left schools of thoughts (which critically supported it) and implemented broad agrarian reform, mobilized the population in the *Kebeles* (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution), severed ties with the United States and faced opposition movements (Schwab 1985).

In 1977, Colonel Mengistu Haile Marian ascended to the leadership of the DERG. While defining himself as socialist, the rebellions of the far left (PRPE and Meison), separatists or autonomists and conservative counterrevolutionaries agitated almost all provinces and Somalia attacked Ethiopia in support of the Somali guerrillas in Ogaden. The country was on the brink of disintegration and *White Terror* was countered by *Red Terror*. The army's own upper hierarchy, shaped by the monarchy, was harshly purged. Peasant militias were incorporated into the new "*Red Army*".

The Somali invasion had been encouraged by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United States, while the USSR and Cuba welcomed Mengistu's request for assistance. Fidel Castro visited the two countries in dispute, trying to mediate the conflict by proposing the formation of a confederation, but stumbled upon the Somali negative, which expelled all Soviet advisors from the country (LeoGrande 1980). At that time, Moscow established an air-bridge, sending weapons, Soviet and East German advisers, and ten thousand Cuban soldiers. The 1977-78 war ended with the victory of Ethiopia, which consolidated its ties with the socialist side, while Somalia allied itself with the United States and Arab petro-monarchies.

But the wars against the Eritreans (also Marxists), Somalis and separatists/autonomists (some conservatives and other Marxists) continued to consume the country's scarce resources. Despite the soviet recommendations to establish a mass party (delayed until the consolidation of the regime) and the adoption of a federal structure, Mengistu maintained its refusal and autonomy. They were not "pawns" of the Cold War. In 1984-5 a new drought produced widespread starvation, with refugees that the government was removing from conflict areas in the North and setting up in cooperatives in the South. Still, agrarian reform and urban reform radically changed the nation's socio-economic profile and public health had a significant development. But the most important was the educational campaign, which literate the vast majority of the population, receiving a UNESCO prize (Clapham 1996).

The difficulties increased with Gorbachev's arrival in power and the gradual reduction of Soviet aid. In 1988-89 the weakened Red Army suffered defeats in Eritrea and Tigris province against Marxist insurgents (those of the Tigris declared themselves "Albanian line"). The two groups associated themselves in a front and, with the US's blessing, were authorized to conquer power after a formal transition to political and economic liberalism. In 1991 they advanced to the capital and the regime fell, with Mengistu's escape to Zimbabwe (Hughes 1992). In 1993 Eritrea became independent and, despite a border war between the two former allies, the power structures of both changed little. Ethiopia became a regional power and, with Chinese support, developed its economy from starvation.

Somali Democratic Republic

Somalia is a desert country of 637 thousand km², located in a strategic position in the Horn of Africa, facing the Arabian Peninsula. The eastern part of its territory was an Italian colony, while the northern part was an English possession, but a large part of the Somali people live in Ethiopia (Ogaden region), Kenya and Djibouti, in an extension almost equivalent to the surface of the independent country (which in 1983 had 6.3 million inhabitants). Independent in 1960 with the reunion of the former British and Italian Somalias, the new state had an unstable and incompetent regime.

On October 21, 1969 Major General Mohamed Siad Bare led a military coup almost without bloodshed and established the Supreme Revolutionary Council. The composition of the governmental body was 25 military above the rank of captain and 6 chiefs of police, where clans and regions were represented, and called *Jaalle* (Comrade). The cabinet included several civilians of the *intelligentsia*, graduated in Italy and the USSR. Formally the

regime sought legitimacy in the fight against corruption, nepotism, bribery, theft, and also criticized the clan system. Many officers were trained abroad, especially in Nasser's Egypt, and several were placed in the administration to watch over civilians (Ottaway 1982).

In May 1970 the regime nationalized banks, oil distributors, energy and sugar producers (almost all foreign) and in October proclaimed adherence to "scientific socialism", and "not Arab, African or Islamic ". It needed to produce a credible alternative to the ousted regime and, in fact, most of its members believed that this was the path to development and sovereignty. In 1976 the Revolutionary Socialist Party was created, and in 1979 the country was renamed the Democratic Republic of Somalia. However, in a society characterized by the predominance of illiteracy and nomadism, intellectuals had to seek an equivalent concept, *Handiwadaag* ("sharing the wealth").

In a atmosphere of popular excitement, socialist songs and poems were spread to the illiterate. The Latin alphabet was adopted, a Somali national language (which had no written representation), and alphabetization brigades were sent throughout the country. Local political committees watched over the traditional bureaucracy and comrades were set up against tribalism, corruption, laziness and gossiping and in favour of hygiene, scientific socialism and gender equality (Markakis 1992). The great drought of 1972-74 caused 20,000 deaths, the loss of a third of the herds and 250,000 refugees. Half of them were sedentary or became fishermen through government programmes.

Between 1970 and 1978 Somalia approached the Soviet and Cuban sphere, receiving technical assistance, military aid and diplomatic support. Somalia found support and a model, while the USSR found a geopolitical ally against pro-U.S Ethiopia, when it was losing influence in Egypt. As a consequence, Washington opposed the regime and the Peace Corps was expelled from the country, but Barre never even confronted the petro-monarchies, from which he also received some financial support for his miserable country. The establishment of Marxist-Leninist political and socialist institutions and practices was intense, together with the assembly of a modern army. However, history was preparing another of its ironies (Coker 1985).

In 1974 the Ethiopian monarchy was overthrown by the military, as seen above, followed by a confusing period of internal fights and separatist guerrillas. One of them was the Western Somali Liberation Front of the Ogaden region, which was supported by Somalia, and in April 1976 attacked the Ethiopian army. Both the Soviets and Fidel Castro himself visited Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea seeking to prevent the conflict between three nations of Marxist regime and proposing a socialist federation. But nationalism spoke

louder and everyone rejected the mediation and the proposal. This was followed by the Somali invasion in support of the guerrillas and the 1977-78 war, in which the Ethiopians were saved by the Soviet air-bridge and the dispatch of 10,000 Cuban fighters.

Barre broke off with Cuba and exposed the military agreement with the USSR, which had formed its army, but hardly got any help from the US or Arab petromonarchies as compensation. The effects of the war (more than half a million refugees, with their flocks), of a new drought, growing opposition and coup attempts, as well as an increase in the price of oil and food on the world market, generated a serious crisis. Curiously, despite having to appeal to the IMF in the 1980s and being pressured by the West and the Arabs to give up their “socialist way”, the regime did not give in. But in the face of internal difficulties and world changes at the end of the decade, Barre left power in January 1991. The nationalist temptation to create a “Great Somalia” destroyed the regime and left the country divided among 14 “war-lords,” immersed in terrorism and suffering international intervention for almost three decades. No regime succeeded Somali socialism (Harper 2012).

People's Republic of Congo

The Republic of Congo (Congo Brazzaville) is one of the most urbanised African countries (61%) and it had a population of 1.8 million in 1986. It gained independence in August 1960. Fights between rival groups erupted in the government of the first president, Fulbert Youlou, with neo-colonial characteristics. Popular uprisings justified the military takeover, which established a provisional government led by Alphonse Massamba-Débat. After being elected in 1963, he established a regime called “scientific-socialism” (Marxist-Leninist), with the adoption of five-year plans and the convergence with USSR, China, North Korea and North Vietnam. The Congo became the first popular and socialist republic of Africa. However, with the inability to reconcile different internal political factions, and with growing friction between government and army, in 1968 Major Marien Ngouabi staged a new *coup d'état* and assumed power, without, however, deviating from the socialist path – proclaiming Congo as the first popular republic of Africa, based on the Congolese Labour Party. The country's name was changed to the People's Republic of Congo (Radu 1989).

Congolese politics remained unstable. The assassination of Marien Ngouabi in 1977 led to Denis Sassou Nguesso's ascension to power in 1979 (until 1992). Maintaining the socialist line that had been adopted since independence, Sassou Nguesso aligned himself with the Soviet bloc until the end

of the Cold War. With the fall of the socialist bloc, Nguesso began a process of opening up, with the Congolese Labor Party flexibilizing the socialist profile and adopting the multiparty system in the country in 1990. Nguesso returned to power in a civil war in 1997 and was elected president in 2002.

During the Cold War, Congo adopted a socialist stance, maintaining extensive relations with the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union. The Cuban presence was important in the country and, from it, important support was given to the revolutionaries of the MPLA in Angola. Surrounded by two neo-colonial and pro-French States, Gabon and Zaire, the small country lived under intense pressure.

People's Republic of Benin

The little Benin had a population of 4 million in 1986, 40% urban, and became independent from France in August 1960. The first president of the then Daomé, Hubert Maga, was ousted three years later, beginning an era of instability with the succession of six military coups. In 1972, a new coup brought young soldiers to power and in 1974 the country adopted the Marxist-Leninist ideology under the leadership of Mathieu Kérékou. His government lasted until 1990. During this period, private companies were nationalized and popular programs were implemented. The regime established the Benin People's Revolutionary Party (PRPB) as the only party. In 1975, the country was renamed the People's Republic of Benin and remained so until 1990 (Allen 1989).

The adoption of Marxism-Leninism was accompanied by the construction of the State, the nation and mass organizations, supported by left-wing nationalism of segments of the urban population. Efforts were made in the area of education and health, with some improvements, as well as attempts to introduce new forms of cooperative rural property and modernization for export and food self-sufficiency. But the patronage policy continued and the political and economic management wasn't enough, while the support of socialist countries was not substantial either. Relations with Nigeria were important, but subject to constant exchanges of government in the powerful neighbour.

The establishment of socialism produced several conflicts: an invasion of mercenaries in 1977, financed by France, Morocco and Gabon, which was defeated by the army and the militias of the PRPB, as well as several coup attempts with external support. In 1980, a direct vote for the Popular Assembly was instituted and a more pragmatic diplomacy was adopted, and contacts

with France were re-established. But despite the discovery of oil, generating self-sufficiency, the fall in prices of agricultural products and desertification generated a serious supply crisis and the request for international aid in 1984. To make matters worse, Nigeria expelled thousands of foreign workers because of the fall in the price of oil, which affected remittances, increased unemployment and reduced the activities of the port of Cotonou.

Faced with the economic situation, the regime went into crisis in the 1980s when Benin resorted to foreign loans. In 1989, an uprising forced Kérékou to carry out a political and economic openness. At the National Conference of Cotonou in 1990, the Marxist ideology was abolished, the old flag was used again and the multiparty system returned. With the institution of multipartyism, elections took place in 1991, but former President Kérékou returned to the presidency in the 1996 and 2001 elections.

Malagasy Democratic Republic

Madagascar had a population of 10 million in 1986 during the Marxist phase. The island is ethnically divided, with the West populated by Africans and the East by Malay-indonesians and the urban population was only 21%. In 1883, France invaded Madagascar, converting it into a colony. In 1942, during World War II, the Anglo-Americans occupied it and received the status of self-government in 1946, but France did not recognize the nationalist Malagasy Democratic Renewal Movement (MDRM). There was a general uprising in 1947 and the massive repression of the French caused 80,000 deaths, but in 1960 it became independent under the presidency of Philibert Tsiranana, who maintained a parliamentary and neo-colonial regime.

There were riots in 1972, which led to the removal of the government and the establishment of a military regime (led by Gen. Ramanantsoa) and the withdrawal of French troops the following year. The instability lasted until 1975, when Frigate Captain Didier Ratsiraka took power and established a socialist-oriented regime supported by a coalition of parties, the National Front for the Revolution. Ratsiraka drafted and submitted to plebiscite the *Red Book*, a kind of Charter of the Socialist Revolution, which gave rise to the new Constitution in December and the nation was renamed the Malagasy Democratic Republic. The French bases were closed, as well as a NASA station. The parties that supported the Revolution formed the National Front of the Revolution (with groups ranging from Marxism-Leninism to Christian democracy), where Ratsiraka's Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution was dominant, with 11 of the 19 seats on the Supreme Council of the Revolution (Covell 1987).

In foreign policy, he practiced an active non-alignment, condemning Apartheid and advocating the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. In 1982, he made a major acquisition of Soviet armaments, especially MIG-21 fighters, because he feared for destabilization actions, such as those South Africa unleashed against Comoros and Seychelles. The country is surrounded by islands where French bases are located: Réunion and Mayotte. Cooperation with socialist countries was important, especially in technical, political and military areas, but smaller in economic terms, which forced the nation to maintain contacts with the West.

There have been advances in industry and a broad agrarian reform has been implemented, creating the *focolononas*, similar to the *Ujamaa* villages of Tanzania, and important investments in health and education. But the economic crisis of the 1980s, with falling *commodity* prices, forced the country to turn to the IMF and resume commercial ties with France, as well as the adoption of austerity policies, generating disturbances. Extreme left-wing groups, non-participants of the FNR, as well as the conservative Council of Christian Churches clashed with the police, who decreed a curfew. With the support of the FNR and the military the political crisis was overcome and the president won the 1983 elections with 80% of the votes, in 1989 he was re-elected with 67% of the votes.

But since the mid-1980s, Ratsiraka has had to adopt economic reforms that moved away from the socialist orientation and, by the end of the decade, political liberalization measures. In 1991, faced with protest movements, he resigned. The opposition's election victory in 1992 consolidated the adoption of a market economy in the impoverished and isolated country, but in 1997 Ratsiraka would return to power through elections.

Democratic People's Republic of Burkina Faso

The Alto Volta, a former French colony, was an unstable and unpopular neo-colonial regime since independence in 1960, which had to cope with poverty, aggravated by the great drought in the Sahel in the early 1980s. Its population was 6.7 millions in 1986. A poor country, landlocked and a victim of drought, it has experienced a succession of military coups since the first (neo-colonial) president was overthrown in 1966. The military coup governments were marked by a rift between the high ranks, linked to the economic elites, and the young officers, who criticized corruption and incompetence. In January 1983, Captain Thomas Sankara was appointed prime minister and, based on his experience as a former garrison commander in the hinterland, created brigades in which the military assisted the peasants (Baxter 1989).

This earned him his resignation in May, but in August, at the head of a group of young officers, he obtained power through a military coup. The popular Sankara proclaimed a socialist regime with a Marxist-Leninist profile, which carried out an agrarian reform and established Committees for the Defense of the Revolution throughout the country, following the Cuban model. In 1984 he changed the name of the country to Burkina Faso, a composition of terms which, in the local languages, means “Homeland of worthy men”. What draws attention is the explicit adoption of the Cuban model as an explicit reference (Otayek and Sankara in Markakis 1986).

On the diplomatic level, it approached Libya, the USSR, Cuba, Benin, the P.R. of Congo and Ghana, then governed by left-wing nationalist military man Jerry Rawlings. Popular mobilization and enthusiasm were intense, but in October 1987 Sankara (who was returning from Libya with financial support) was overthrown and shot by Captain Blaise Campaoré, the regime’s number two. Rivalries between the military, radicalism and popular support for the revolution and French politics were certainly behind the coup. Campaoré initially gave some continuity to the policies of his predecessor. Later, in a context of economic difficulties, he sought the help of international financial organizations and drifted into economic liberalism, maintaining an authoritarian regime and a populist discourse. Despite the short duration of the government, social mobilization and achievements were intense.

Conclusion

An analysis of the experiences above leads to brief conclusions. Firstly, the original African Revolutions are post-colonial African events which resulted from the establishment of Marxist Military Regimes can be considered *Revolutions*, even though they were implemented through *coups d’état* by military personnel without an initiation into Marxism. Secondly, the motivation for the adoption of such regimes is based primarily on the domestic and African sphere instead of on Cold War alliances and geopolitical factors. Thirdly, these original and unusual revolutionary processes were not gaps in the history of the respective countries, but an important step in state and nation building, which left an important legacy. Lastly, they represent an attempt to overcome the limitations and failures of the previous phase of so-called (non-Marxist) *African Socialism*.

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ABSTRACT

Alongside the Revolutions resulting from long anti-colonial wars such as Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Zimbabwe, an innovative element has developed, the *Military Coups of a new kind*, which have introduced *revolutionary regimes called Marxist-Leninist*. This is the case of Somalia (1969) and Ethiopia (1974), the most emblematic case, but also of four French-speaking countries: Congo-Brazzaville (1968), Daomey/Benin (1972-74), Madagascar (1975) and Alto Volta/Burkina Faso (1983), which established Regimes throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The original and controversial revolutionary experiences presented here, the *Marxist Military Regimes*, are different from the first states ruled by the so-called “African Socialism” just after independence, in the passage from 1950 to 1960: Ghana (1957), Guinea (1958), Mali (1960), Tanzania (1961), Zambia (1964) and Algeria (1962).

KEYWORDS

African coups d'état; African military regimes; African Marxism.

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MAIN TRENDS OF TERRORISM IN AFRICA TOWARDS 2025

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Introduction

In the last two decades the international relations have been altered by the impacts of terrorism which have affected different areas and captured the attention of politics and scholars all over the world. The regions of Middle East and North Africa, as well as Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are also immersed in these dynamics, nuanced by different interests and geopolitical objectives, which vary from one region to the other. The phenomenon of terrorism has also been subject of political manipulations by different actors – Western and regional powers like United States of America (USA) or European countries – in order to promote their own interests and agendas, for example in Middle East. This idea is based on what they did in Afghanistan supposedly fighting against Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden and after that, promoting the emergence of Islamic States (ISIS) with the aim to overthrow the government of Bashar al-Assad and also in the Sahel region after the war in northern Mali. This problematic, the political Islam, the interest of Western powers in Africa and Middle East have been broaden analyzed by Samir Amin (Amin. Samir., *Mali*. February 4, 2013).

In this sense, there is no consensus among specialists, about the global responsibility in the emergence and manipulation of this problem. The security mechanisms of USA and its allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) “engaged” in the “search” and “capture” of the possible suspects of committing terrorist acts, have fostered on one hand the islamophobia and, on the other, the rise of fanaticism in very small sections of the Islamic population. That is why they directly associate terrorism with Islam, and this is a wrong perception. The development of events of an economic, socio-political and military nature, unveiled the intention of the USA governments to manipulate terrorism in their favor.

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The study of terrorism requires not only a depth analysis of the historical reasons that led to the formation, development and sustainability of it through the exacerbation and exploitation of fundamentalism, but also the projection of political behavior of this phenomenon in the short and medium term. The objective of this paper is to project the main variables that will determine the trends of terrorism in the case of Africa. Based on a primary diagnosis of the history of this groups and its subsequent development, we pursue to construct the possible scenario for terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa, taking into account the year 2025 as our horizon: a short-time analysis. There is a set of internal and external economic, sociopolitical, ideological, psychological, religious, cultural and environmental variables, related to national and international interests that could explain the trends that this problem presents in the Sub-Saharan region.

The article is divided in: a methodological and theoretical framework to explain the prospective method used and some ideas about the discussion of terrorism and how to understand it. The second part of the paper focuses on the scenarios, taking into account the development of organizations such as: Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its related groups, Boko Haram (BH) in the area surrounding the Lake Chad, as well as Al-Shabaab (ALS) in southern Somalia and the border with Kenya. We finalized with a generalization of terrorism in Africa – conclusions – and the possible recommendation to solve this problem.

Methodological framework: the scenario-based analysis

This study was carried out using the prospective method through the methodological tool of the Matrix-based Multiplication Applied to a Classification (MICMAC), created by Michel Godet. This tool allows to determine the direct and indirect influences among the identified variables. It also makes it possible to identify a greater number of relationships between the variables and which of these would be the determinant ones. It's also important to underline that this paper was part of a broaden research that implement a combination of methodologies, not only those coming from the scenarios building process but also from history, international relations and political science.

With this proposal, the definition of the variables, their nomenclature and conceptualization were carried out in a first phase. In a second phase: the quantitative evaluation of the variables was defined through the matrix of direct potential influences. A total of seven variables were determined, which contain other dimensions of each variable. The variable selection does not correspond necessary to a theoretical conceptualization, but to the elements taken

into account for its analysis: what is to be understood by each of them. In this identification-selection-definition process, a prior diagnosis of the situation of terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa was made. These variables are only a proposal for doing the analysis and any of them could be understood in different ways.

List of variables (nomenclature) and description

1) *Dynamics of the international system* (*International System*): These dynamics are understood as the geopolitical and geo-economic environment that impact on the development of terrorism, as well as the regional economic and social situations that influence the evolution of terrorism.

2) *Level of institutionalization* (*Institutionalization*): It is conceived through the functioning of the internal structures, the capacity of spread them to other regions and the organizational stability achieved by terrorist groups and organizations.

3) *Level of financing* (*Financing*): It refers to the self-financing capacity of the group (tax collection, bribes, or ransom payments for kidnappings) and to other income resulting from its connection and/or control of transnational organized crime nets (use of drug trafficking networks, routes of migrants and weapons). It is also referred to the resources coming from political and private actors, as well as for the illegal commercialization of commodities.

4) *Recruitment capacity* (*Recruitment capacity*): Level of manipulation of ideological factors, including religion, to attract adherents to its cause, using the Technologies of Information and Communications (media influence) and/or other means to promote fanaticism. This capacity for recruitment is expressed through the support of certain sectors of the population – exchange of information – that identify with their objectives and see their affiliations to them as a means of subsistence. For these reasons they are integrated into the group.

5) *Leadership* (*Leadership*): Capacity of influence of their individual leaders and/or incidence of the group/organization at local, regional or international level.

6) *Relations between groups/organizations* (*Relations groups*): Dynamics of connection between them or level of autonomy and dependence through the exchange of information, logistical support and ability to train its own members or to train terrorists from other cells.

7) **Violent actions** (*Violent actions*): Availability of armaments, means of combat and military technology for the execution of their terrorist actions and/or the confrontation against regular forces or against civil populations.


During the investigation several methodological difficulties were presented related to the nature of the studied phenomenon, the number of organizations, the geographical variety where they operate and also the possibilities offer by the prospective technique itself. There were several possibilities for addressing the issue: perform the analysis of the variables and the matrix for each terrorist organization, do it at the level of the subregions, or the third variant, related to the general analysis of the phenomenon. Of these three possibilities, the third option was chosen to emphasize the common elements of terrorism in each region and then indicate the general trend in the short term.

In this way, with the results offered by the MICMAC, the analysis of these data was made considering the particularities of each terrorist group/organization in their specific scenarios. It was decided to apply the method from the general to the particular to see how each of the general tendencies offered by the method fitted the specific case or not. This implied that the results obtained after the application of this foresight tool – in relation to a certain variable – were not always in accordance with the specific evolution that the group/organization will present. This is one of the limits that this tool could have. Spite of that, the results offered by the MICMAC allowed a better validation of the main trends of terrorism in Africa.

Table 1: Matrix of direct influences (MDI)

Variables	International System	Institutionalization	Financing	Recruitment capacity	Leadership	Relations groups	Violent actions
1. INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM	0	2	3	2	2	3	3
2. INSTITUTIONALIZATION	1	0	3	3	3	2	3
3. FINANCING	2	3	0	3	3	3	3
4. RECRUITMENT CAPACITY	2	2	3	0	3	2	3
5. LEADERSHIP	2	3	3	3	0	2	3
6. RELATIONS GROUPS	3	1	3	3	3	0	2
7. VIOLENT ACTIONS	3	3	3	3	3	2	0

Image 1: Potential direct influence/dependence map



After selecting the variables, the next step is to complete the Matrix of Direct Influence (MDI). It describes the relations of direct influences between the variables defines in the system. Influences range from 0 to 3, with the possibility to identify potential influences, in this case: 0 means no influence; 1: weak; 2: moderate and 3: strong influence.

These values were adopted after several meetings with a group of experts. For doing this, the scholar have to question him/herself about how does the variable 1 influence the variable 2, and so on for the rest of the variables. Of course, the level of influence of one variable over itself is zero, that's why you can see a diagonal line only with zero numbers. Each specialist are supposed to fill up its own table and after that one have to select the number that is more represented. This process does not allow that one opinion prevail over the others.

The MICMAC program showed the following graph (Image 1) where the variables are located in a plane of influence/dependence, which allow the analysis to be carried out based on the relationships between the variables and their importance within the object of study. According to this graph the variables of violent actions, financing and leadership are the most influence

(that’s why they are located in top of the graph), meanwhile the rest of the variable are located on bottom, it means that this variable has no influence over the system, and, therefore, the other variables are highly dependents.

Taking these results into account, an analysis of each of the interrelationships of these variables is proposed, according to the trends that the three most active terrorist organizations in the region will present by 2025: AQIM, BH and ALS. In this work only one of the multiple variants that the MICMAC can offer is shown. It’s important to notice that this result can’t be literally taken, because each group behave in different ways. This graph is only a general proposal according to the values that the experts adopted and it can be modified depending on the context.

Board 2: Main three African terrorism organizations and the correlation with the variables

Groups variables	Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	Boko Haram (BH)	Al-Shabaab (ALS)
Dynamics of the International System	Do not had a direct impact on the rise of AQIM, except in conjecture contexts, from which it has benefited, as those occurred after the intervention of NATO in Libya in 2011. The political situations of the subregion, have influence a lot on the development of the organization.	The dynamics of the international system do not have also a direct influence on the development of terrorism.	The subregional geopolitics of Horn of Africa has a remarkable influence on the evolution of terrorism, because the actions of the governments of the area.
Level of Institutionalization	It has a low level of institutionalization.	It faces of a greater fragmentation and des-institutionalization but this process can't be associated with its disappearance.	ALS present serious difficulties in the functioning of its structures. It is not in position to externalize these structures outside Somali borders. The group does not have an organizational stability.

Level of financing	Its comes from the control of transnational crime networks, kidnaps from westerns citizens and ransom.	It depends on the control of international trafficking networks – arms, drugs and people and others resources coming from political and private actors.	It self-financing coming from the collection of taxes and bribes and also receive other income from the Somali diaspora and the control of other transnational criminal activities.
Recruitment capacity	Based on economic factors and not so much on ideological conviction of its new members.	Their social support is considerably reduced which translates into the need for this group to perform forced recruitments of the civilian population through kidnapping, compulsory marriage and the use of women and children as “suicide bombers”.	It is characterized by the combination of voluntary and compulsory factors. For many people ALS is an alternative for their economic subsistence: receiving a salary, social status and even a wife.
Leadership	It's exercised fundamentally by its component of Arab origin, although there is an increase in the emergence of Black-African origin leaders, especially in the smaller cells.	The physical elimination of the terrorist leaders does not mean a weakening of the group since the tendency indicates that they are replaced immediately.	The capacity of influence of its new leaders is very weak, as well as the incidence of the group at local and subregional level.
Relations between groups/ organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Al-Qaeda - Islamic States in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) - Ansaroul Islam - Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) - Macina Liberation Front (MLF) - Ansar al Dine - Al-Mourabitum - Support Front to Islam and Muslims (Jama'at Nusrat al Islam Wal Muslimin, JNIM) - Boko Haram 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Islamic States (ISIS) - Islamic States in West Africa (ISWA) - Ansaru – Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa – when it was separated from Boko Haram in 2012. 	<p>There is a reduction in the dependence of ALS on Al Qaeda.</p> <p>Relations with Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are stagnant.</p> <p>The Islamic States (ISIS) has created fissures within the group but ALS execute the accused of being pro-Islamic State.</p>

Violent actions	They operate in the Trans-Saharan region: Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. There has been an increase of the actions of some of its cells in the bordering areas of Mali and Burkina Faso. They use car bombs, improvised explosive devices, ambushes, placement of mines and attacks against checkpoints on roads.	Take places in the area surrounding the Lake Chad: northern Nigeria – Borno state – and bordering countries. There is a reduction of its military operations theater and the loss of effective control of territories and towns.	It acts in southern Somalia and the border with Kenya against AMISOM and Kenyan forces in the Gedo and Upper Jubba regions. They use car bombs, and improvised explosive devices.
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Theoretical framework: understanding terrorism

Through a powerful and well-designed communicational gear, the so-called war on terrorism is presented, by Western countries, as a method of “protection and salvation” against their actions. This propaganda omits the true causes behind the rise of such phenomena as poverty, insecurity and social inequalities caused by the application of structural adjustment programs in African. This phenomenon began to affect African countries in the last two decades. Regions like the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, which includes territories of West and Central Africa, have become areas of attention and central axes of the so-called fight against terrorism on the continent, due to the maintenance of the actions of extremist groups such as ALS (since 2006), AQMI (since 2007) and the Movement for the Uniqueness of Jihad in West Africa (MUYAO since 2012) in Western Sahel and BK in northern Nigeria (since 2009).

The actions of these organizations have been concentrated against the governmental institutions of the countries of the area, against the national populations – civilian victims –, and in the same way, against the foreign interests, mainly European: sabotage activities to the properties of transnational companies and kidnappings of European tourists. Due to the strong manipulation to which they are subjected, every political-military movement that arises in the region is almost automatically classified as a terrorist if they do not respond to the interests of extra-regional or regional powers.

This problem has led to the adoption of institutional initiatives within the framework of the UN, where the Counter-Terrorism Committee was created, based on the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005). Its objective was to strengthen the capacities of member states to combat terrorist activities within their borders and in all regions.

The Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate had the responsibility of monitoring the implementation of Security Council resolutions. Subsequently, the UN Secretary General established in 2005, the Special Team for the Fight against Terrorism and on September 8, 2006, the General Assembly approved the Global Strategy against Terrorism. It was the first time that the states agreed on a global framework to face this scourge.

Under the auspices of the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations, 16 universal legal instruments have been developed and approved, namely 11 conventions, 4 protocols and an amendment. Most of these instruments are in force and constitute the legal framework for the adoption of multilateral counter-terrorism measures, as well as the criminalization of specific acts of terrorism, including the diversion of airplanes, the taking of hostages, the attacks committed. With bombs and their financing².

In this context, Western powers began to categorize certain countries as “sponsors” of terrorism to justify international pressure actions and intervene in the internal affairs of those governments that did not have the capacity to deal with these groups and thus achieve certain objectives, such as changes in government, for example, in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Similarly, they developed lists of organizations classified by them as terrorists, which rise a strong debate between academics and politicians about how to define what terrorism is.

For Cuban professor Elsie Plain Rad Cliff (2011), terrorism is the application of indiscriminate violence that can be extended to the entire population and in most cases takes civilians as the target of their attacks. Their actions are unpredictable due to the surprise with which they always act, which contributes to: instilling terror; produces unnecessary suffering by hitting the most vulnerable areas of society; employs hostages and human shields to achieve what they propose. Among the most commonly used methods are the use of indiscriminate physical violence against: civilians, through torture, kidnapping, extrajudicial execution or disappearance. In the tactical order they can adopt a scheme based on the realization of attacks with explosives or other incendiary means for the destruction of private and public goods (Cliff 2011, 101-115). A terrorist is an individual who acts against civilians using illegal methods to achieve a political goal.

² These instruments are complemented by the following General Assembly resolutions: A / RES / 49/60, A / RES / 51/210 and A / RES / 60/288; and the Security Council: S / RES / 1267 (1999), S / RES / 1373 (2001), S / RES / 1540 (2004), S / RES / 1566 (2004) and S / RES / 1624 (2005). See: United Nations actions against terrorism. Available in: <http://www.un.org/spanish/terrorism/strategy-implementation.shtml>

All this has evidently complicated with the 19 conventions against terrorism and resolutions adopted by the Security Council, with the exception of resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1566 (2004) where it is indicated that, whatever their motivation, no terrorist act is justifiable. From this situation derives the complexity of establishing a definition on terrorism, due to the lack of consensus on the part of the international community and depending on who is assessing it. This problem has also served to increase the level of conflictive in international relations and at the same time, the militarization of them, due to the increase in military budgets to “confront” the actions of groups hostile to the interests of developed capitalist countries and its regional allies.

For its part, the African Union (AU) and its subregional organizations did not lag behind, rather, they were pioneers in the implementation of legal mechanisms to combat terrorism. One year after the attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) in East Africa, in 1998, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) had adopted, at its 35th Summit, held in Algiers (Algeria) in July 1999, the Convention on Prevention and the Fight against Terrorism. This document was a milestone, as it was the first legislative instrument made for its confrontation.

This 1999 convention was followed by the OAU Protocol for the prevention and fight against terrorism (*Protocol of the OAU Convention on the prevention and combating terrorism* 2004, 2). The next steps that evidenced the African commitment in the fight against terrorism were expressed at the Dakar Summit (Senegal) in October 2001, where the Dakar Declaration against terrorism was adopted. Then the Action Plan for the Prevention and Combat of Terrorism was approved, at a high-level Intergovernmental Summit developed in Algeria in September 2002. In 2002, the newly created AU had adopted the Action Plan on Prevention and Fight against Terrorism, and subsequently with the implementation of the Peace and Security Council, as the governing body for conflict issues, the institutional apparatus was strengthened in the fight against terrorism. An important step was the creation of the African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) whose headquarters are in Algiers, Algeria.

For the purpose of this paper, we are going to adopt the concept of terrorism approved by the OAU in 1999 in Algiers, which constitute the first instrument in understanding terrorism in the region. This principle was also embraced by the AU after its creation in 2002. The main contribution of this concept was a broad definition of terrorism without the qualification of Islamic and the differentiation between terrorist acts and the actions developed

by groups in their struggle for self-determination. According to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, a **terrorist act** is

any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to: intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential Service to the public or to create a public emergency; or create general insurrection in a state (OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 1999, 2-3).

An exact definition that characterizes the actions of the groups that operate in Africa is that offered by the Spanish professor Fernando Reinares (2005) in his concept of **transnational terrorism**. Reinares states that transnational terrorism

is one that in one way or another crosses state borders, basically because those who execute it maintain organizational structures or develop violent activities in more than one country, usually including territories over which they have no jurisdiction the authorities. (...) This means that acts of violence involve more than one country and often individuals of two or more nationalities, both in terms of terrorists and their victims (Reinares 2005, 48).

Terrorism in Africa: future trends

Terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa presents different characteristics from those that occur in the Middle East region. In this sense, the most extreme variants, which have later become terrorists, have been perceived as foreign elements, exogenous to African realities, and thus they have had an almost generalized rejection from the population and have not been able to spread to other regions, except by the way of force. For these reasons is not possible that certain cells in Democratic Republic of Congo and in northern Mozambique could intensify its military actions. It should be noted that a distinctive element between the radical groups that act in the Middle East

from those that operate in sub-Saharan Africa is the fact that in their origins, the second one, did not used terrorist methods.

This means that groups like BH and ALS started out, in its early beginnings, as groups that made political and socio-economic demands to the local governments and later became radicalized. In the case of AQIM, its Saharan branches were controlled by Algerian Arabs and Black-Africans were excluded from the leadership roles although years after the situation start changing (Filiu, Jean Pierre 2012; Furuhashi, Yoshie 2012). This is the way this organization was presented as a non-genuine organization of the sub-Saharan region and this caused start contradictions between different factions or *katibas*. Among other differences can be mentioned the fact that they have not been financed by Western powers or regional governments as they have done in Middle East. Its prominent interethnic character has been a factor that limited the greater propagation of its networks towards other areas.

Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb and its transaharian action

The permanence of terrorist activism in 2025 still remains a particularity of the Sahel-Saharan zone. Although the stabilization attempts of governments such as Algeria, Mali and Niger, can gain recognition and effectiveness in the area, the relative autonomy of this organization suggests that insecurity and instability will continue to be a condition desired by groups that maintain their control over the main vulnerable zones.

Although it is not possible to deny the traditional impact of the dynamics of the international system, even in sub-Saharan Africa, these have not had a direct impact on the rise of AQIM, except in conjuncture contexts, from which it has benefited, as those occurred after the intervention of NATO in Libya in 2011 (Amin. Samir., *Mali*. February 4, 2013). In this sense, the political situations of the subregion, have influence a lot on the development of the organization, because the greater or lesser coordination of the governments of the area that will enable their weakening or strengthening. If policies are maintained by the Economic Community of West Africans States (ECOWAS) the possible scenario will led to a reduction of this group. The tendency points to a greater articulation of the antiterrorist policies of the governments of the area to confront this transnational group. On the other hand, the relations between the different terrorist groups that operate under the AQIM's umbrella will remain diffuse. However, the great fragmentation experienced by the organization in recent years corresponds more to a strategy adopted

by them than to a greater weakening, since the constant recomposition of its internal forces hinders its effective eradication.

Therefore, the organization will continue to lead a broad and increasingly volatile group of cells and terrorist groups operating in the wider Trans-Saharan region. In turn, it will maintain the line established by Al-Qaeda, while the splits of leaders linked to the remnants of the Islamic State (ISIS) do not have a positive development in the area. Only in this sense can be understood that the level of institutionalization and leadership of the organization work as very influential variables in the development of terrorism in the Sahel.

The leadership within this group is dispersed, which responds to the levels of fragmentation of the organization. This continues to be exercised fundamentally by its component of Arab origin, although there is an increase in the emergence of Black-African origin leaders, especially in the smaller cells. This fragmentation can't be confused with a low level of institutionalization, since each one of the cells will continue to respond to the central command of AQIM that is still located in the Algerian mountains of the Kabylia region (Oumar, Jemal and Bakari Gueye 2013).

Likewise, the recruitment capacity of the organization is produced as a highly dependent dimension with little influence. The units that make up AQIM seem to subordinate the recruitment to the needs of expanding its membership as a result of the military offensives launched by the governments of the area that have undoubtedly affected their activism. In the recruitment of this group will continue to have a fundamental weight economic factors and not so much the ideological conviction of its new members. It means that Islam, contrary to popular belief, will not be the main factor for the recruitment. The socio-economic crisis in the regions where it operates remains the main reason why potential new recruits are linked to AQIM networks, as a form of "work" and obtain "income" because of its link with other transnational crime networks.

Terrorism around Lake Chad: Boko Haram

The security landscape in the Sahel zone remains very unstable in 2025 due to the maintenance of the actions of the terrorist groups – most of them reconfigured – so this phenomenon will persist within the agendas of the governments direct or indirectly affected by their actions. One of the nerve centers of this terrorism will continue to be located around the area of

Lake Chad with an epicenter located in northern Nigeria and with specific ramifications towards the bordering countries.

In the case of the Sahel region, the dynamics of the international system do not have also a direct influence on the development of terrorism, because its solution is not within the priorities of the Western powers, despite the rhetoric that is used by France and the United States regarding the “fight against terrorism”.

Despite the adverse socio-economic situation in these regions, this variable will not have a direct influence on the development of this issue due to the rejection they generate in local populations as a result of the negative consequences that their actions have generated in recent years. This economic context also does not allow them to extend to other regions to “legitimize” their “antisystemic” political discourse. Their social support is considerably reduced and they can’t “satisfy” the demands of the populations in economic terms. The discourse of the leaders of BH fails to add new followers. They can do that only by the use of coercion.

In this sense, the MICMAC program showed that the recruitment capacity is a strongly dependent variable, which translates into the need for this group to perform forced recruitments of the civilian population through kidnapping³, compulsory marriage and the use of women⁴ and children⁵ as “suicide bombers”. Their inability to recruit is also related to the loss of social support as it was mentioned before. Nevertheless, the group will maintain this

3 According to Human Rights Watch, Boko Haram has kidnapped 2,000 girls and women since 2009, who have been subjected to rape, forced labor and marriage. However, these figures are only approximate because one can’t determine how many have been kidnapped. According to the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), since 2014 there have been at least 123 “suicidal” women linked to BH, most of them forced. See: *The women of Boko Haram: Driven to extremism*. Available in: <http://www.dw.com/en/the-women-of-boko-haram-driven-to-extremism/04>

4 A United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) report indicates that the number of children who are used by Boko Haram as suicide bombers have increased between 2014 and 2015. As of February 2016, one of five bomb attacks have been carried out by a child, for 19%, while 18% has been taken performed by women. The report also gives an account of the problems related to the reception of women who have been raped, abducted or forced to marry a member of the group. These women are rejected in the communities when they try to rejoin their daily activities (Duvillier 2016, 2-4).

5 According to the UNICEF report, BH employs more and more children as suicide bombers. In the first quarter of 2017 the figure has tripled compared to the same period of the previous year, to reach 27, according to Marie-Pierre Poirier, UNICEF regional director for West and Central Africa. During the past three years, 117 children were employed to carry out bomb attacks in the Lake Chad basin. Around 80% of the attacks were perpetrated by girls (Cubadebate 2017, 1).

tactic of forced recruitment, which will have an indirect impact on the future evolution of terrorism. Mercenarism, fueled by other actors, as another way to enter their terrorist cells, is not representative in the case of BH, nor will the use of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) to foment religious fanaticism or strengthen the “support” of other sectors of the population. The broad social bases formed around this group is further dismantled and do not have the same characteristics as it enjoyed in the initial years of its creation.

The MICMAC offered as result that the relations between the groups and the level of institutionalization are autonomous variables that have an indirect influence on the development of terrorism, especially the case of institutionalization. This is explained by the fact that, in most cases, if the group are most fragmented and supposedly “disarticulated”, it will be more difficult to be able to implement accurate policies for their final eradication. This fragmentation within the group – of which BH has also appropriated – responds more to a strategy to operate with a greater capacity than to sign of weakening.

The links between the organizations (Boko Haram-ISIS, Boko Haram-AQIM) in terms of information exchanges, logistical support and ability to train terrorists from their cells have not been effective and therefore were not a guarantee for the success of their actions. This fact reaffirms the tendency that, in the face of a greater fragmentation and des-institutionalization of the group, these links will be increasingly smaller and will be more in the level of discursive rhetoric. The different cells that make up BH reach a greater level of autonomy to the extent that the group tends to its disintegration⁶, but this process can't be associated with its disappearance.

The dispersion of the terrorist cells and the little social link of the “insurgency” with its leaders hinders the control over the group. According to the Nigerian professor Mohammed Kyari, of the state of Adamawa, BH is a group of cells operating under a single banner and that the fractures within the group correspond to the way they operate (Matfess 2016, 1). This trend will probably continue. Therefore, the “factionalization” of the group has a negative impact on the possibility of completely eradicating them. This is due to the fact that the emergence of rival factions also causes confrontations between them and between these and the regular forces. Apart from the challenge of dispersion, factional fighting is an additional problem, especially if

⁶ Boko Haram had called itself Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) in 2015, as a proof of its links with the Islamic State. At the beginning of August 2016, the Islamic State had nominated Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the new “wali” of the group, “replacing” Abubakar Shekau. This provoked a strong polemic inside the group in the matter of leadership and the emergence of two antagonistic factions.

an attempt is made to produce a negotiation process. Hilary Matfess (2016), American researcher on issues of governance and security in sub-Saharan Africa poses three scenarios related to the process of division within Boko Haram:

- 1) Development of violence between factions (Shekau vs Barnawi). Contrary to what is thought, these contradictions will not mean the end of the “insurgency” but will be more deadly clashes for the civilian population.
- 2) Greater division before its complete elimination: This scenario is held in the fate of Ansaru – Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa – when it was separated from Boko Haram in 2012. In April 2016, the Nigerian government announced the capture of Khalid al-Barnawi (Watkinson. W. 2016, 1), after several years without major terrorist operations, so it was assumed the end of their activities.
- 3) Coexistence and duality in the terrorist insurgency: in this scenario the faction linked to the Islamic State consolidates as a group and develops its capacities to carry out military and terrorist actions (Matfess 2016, 1).

In all three scenarios, the idea of fragmentation and reconfiguration of BH itself, as well as the cells or factions linked to the group is present. None of these three scenarios suggests the end of terrorist actions around Lake Chad. Therefore, it will continue to be a security problem for the area. The level of institutionalization – understood as the correct functioning of internal structures and organizational stability – is a variable that has a strong relationship with the financing of the group, because it allows the creation of new structures and the strengthening of existing ones. Although its leaders manage to reverse this process of group regression, in organizational matters, this variable will not have a strong influence on the evolution of terrorism, because institutionalization, *per se*, is not a guarantee of success. Similarly, BH does not have the capacity to export its organizational structures, that is, to expand its network to other regions beyond its traditional areas of operation.

The tendency in terms of financing terrorism in the Sahel zone points to the continuity of its dependence on the control of international trafficking networks – arms, drugs and people. In the case of BH, its resources have been reduced in order to maintain its military and logistical capabilities, but

this does not mean that they do not yet have the capacity to “self-manage”⁷. The resources coming from political and private actors – related to their tactics – do not reach the figures shown in the initial years of the group. This situation must also have repercussions in the decrease of their recruitment capacities or in the increase in desertions, which have already taken place. They have also been promoted by the authorities⁸.

Leadership, understood as the ability from its leaders to influence, is another of the driving variables and depends on the charisma of the people who are in charge of the cells that make up the group. If this component is maintained, BH leaders will continue to have a strong influence on the development of the group, despite the internal interest struggles that point to personal positions. Therefore, leadership is exercised at different levels. For example, at the local level, it is very small, while at the regional and international level it is practically non-existent, even with the “disclosure” of the videos showing their actions and the postulates of their political program. At the same time, there are still strong contradictions between the leaders of the different BH factions. The physical elimination of the terrorist leaders does not mean a weakening of the group since the tendency indicates that they are replaced immediately.

Violent actions have a strong dependence on the military capabilities of the group and have a considerable influence on their positioning – control of villages and areas – through military actions. With respect to Boko Haram, the reduction of its military operations theater and the loss of effective control of territories and towns will continue occurring. The group will maintain its tendency to retreat and dispersion. In the near future they will lose capacity for confrontation against the regular forces from Nigeria⁹ and other local

7 According to a report presented to the United Nations Security Council, the two main BH factions present serious financial difficulties and are not in a position to “pay” their fighters their monthly “salaries”. Most of the recent attacks are motivated by the need to purchase supplies, including food. The report concludes that the group as a whole is facing a severe financial crisis. See: Gaffey, C. (2017). *Boko Haram Factions ‘Cannot Pay Fighters’ Salaries: U.N.*

8 The Nigerian Army launched the Operation Safe Corridor with the aim of allowing repentant BH militants to enter the rehabilitation camps as part of a program to reintegrate them into society. See: Gaffey C. (2016). *Boko Haram: 2,000 Captives Freed by Regional Force as Nigeria Launches Rehabilitation Program.*

9 The Nigerian armed forces have increased their presence in the Sambisa Forest area in the state of Borno and have dominated the area since December 2016.

armies coming from the neighboring countries such as Niger¹⁰ or Cameroon. They also will lose its ability to carry out large-scale operations in the areas recovered by the national armed forces.

This situation has led them to strengthen attacks against easier targets – like civilian population – through the use of suicide attacks, avoiding direct confrontations against regular forces. Therefore, it can be argued that the military offensives of local governments have reduced their capacity to carry out conventional armed actions against the security forces, the transnationalization of their actions is increasingly minor and sporadic, an example of their retreat in the military order. Despite this and the inevitable process of internal fragmentation, they maintain their military power.

The Horn of Africa and the terrorism of Al-Shabaab

The region of the Horn of Africa by 2025 continues under the threat of terrorist actions by the Somali organization Al-Shabaab (ALS). The most affected countries will be Somalia, where the bulk of the organization is concentrated, and Kenya, one of its main objectives. The situation in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea is substantially different, but in the case of Ethiopia, although they have not carried out attacks on their territory, it remains a challenge to their national security. This situation explains that the geopolitical environment of the subregion will continue to be nuanced by the issue of the fight against terrorism and the instability that this causes.

Similarly, the subregional geopolitics will have a remarkable influence on the evolution of terrorism, because the actions of the governments of the area contribute by one hand to their eradication, but on the other, they legitimize the discourse of combating the external interferences in the area, as the group affirm. One of the points within the political program of ALS is the “struggle” against foreign troops, among which are those from Ethiopia and Kenya as part of AMISOM (African Union Mission for Somalia). Therefore, contrary to the result offered by the MICMAC regarding the variable related to the international situation, the subregional political dynamics here do have a paramount importance in the evolution of terrorism.

¹⁰ Military successes by national armies continue to occur. One of the examples was the defeat of BH in April 2017 by the Niger Army in the southern region of Diffa on the border with Nigeria, where as a result of the Army's counter-offensive, 57 BH members were eliminated and a large military park was seized. The Minister of Defense congratulated the Security Forces. See: Sridharan. V (2017). *Niger forces kill dozens of Boko Haram Islamists in counteroffensive*.

An element that has been characteristic of this type of groups has been the fact of “swearing” allegiance to larger organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. In this sense, ALS relations with central Al-Qaeda by 2025 are not strong enough to “boost” the organization and increase its subregional projection. Al-Qaeda itself is going through a period of institutional crisis and loss of leadership within terrorist organizations, so this will have a negative impact on its ability to unite other groups such as ALS. There is a reduction in the dependence of ALS on Al-Qaeda, as well as the ability to carry out information exchanges, logistically support and train members of their cells. Relations with Al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are stagnant, especially in terms of mutual support in training its members, as it existed before.

On the other hand, relations with other groups or organizations are equally weak, precisely because of the process of decline that is taking place within terrorism in the region. ISIS does not manage to incorporate ALS to its axis of influence but it has created fissures within the group¹¹. In this sense, ALS is forced to achieve a greater degree of autonomy in terms of its “strategy” of struggle as the only way to “strengthen” its political program and do not show an image of exclusion or marginalization within the networks of international terrorism.

There is an evidence that there may be more supporters of the ISIS in southern Somalia, but the control exercised by ALS has not allowed them to be articulated. This indicates the inability of ALS to neutralize ISIS supporters within the organization. To this end, the “secret services” of ALS – *Amniyat* – have been making “arrests” of members of the group on suspicion of having an inclination towards ISIS. The *Amniyat* continues with its ability to perform intelligence work, through a wide network of supporters, informants and spies that are scattered throughout the country. They also have the possibility of infiltrating government structures, as well as the Somalia National Army (SNA) (Danish Immigration Service 2017, 10).

11 On October 25, 2015, Abdiqadir Mumin, who was one of the “spiritual leaders” of ALS, left the group to pay homage to the ISIS. This new franchise led by Mumin has its operations center in the Galgala Mountains in the Puntland region in northeastern Somalia, outside of the traditional zone of influence of ALS. In April 2016 they became official as Jahba East Africa and in October of the same year they carried out their first major attack against Qandala, a port city in Puntland. See: Reid, G. (2017). *Militants Rising: Islamic State’s East African Ambitions*.

The contradictions have led to Al-Shabaab to execute the accused of being pro-Islamic State¹². There is no clarity regarding the possibilities that this faction will continue to evolve, nor the number of members that may be available. As is often the case, the links with ISIS in the Middle East are not direct, but are part of the rhetoric to attract international attention. This weakness in its international “projection” is also a reflection of the problems within the group. ALS continues to present serious difficulties in the functioning of its management structures due to the struggles among its leaders regarding strategies, methods and objectives to be followed by the group. Nor is it in a position to externalize these structures outside Somali borders, precisely because of the policies adopted by the main regional actors in their fight against terrorism: Ethiopia and Kenya. In the Kenyan border and due to the strong presence of Somali refugees, they manage to transplant some of their cells and support networks, but they are not significant either. As a consequence, the group does not have an organizational stability, which is evident in the continuous transformation of its commands and leaders, as a result also of the elimination of them, by the selective drone attacks carried out by the United States and by the actions of AMISOM¹³.

One of the problems ALS continues to face is that of desertions. The main ones are taking place among the younger militants as part of a growing discontent in leadership, especially from those non-Somali militants, the so-called foreign fighters. The group needs these members to give greater legitimacy to their “jihadist” struggle (Kriel. R. and Duggan. B. 2017, 1). Those who leave the group also do so for reasons of amnesty policies which have been implementing by the Somali government is implementing as another way to dismantle them¹⁴. This variant will not have a generalizing effect due to the retaliation of ALS against all those who resign from the group¹⁵. The institutionalization process experienced by the country after 2012 and 2016

¹² Sheikh Hussein Abdi Gedi was a veteran ALS commander and “governor” of the Lower Jubba region who was killed after trying to recruit ALS militants and form a pro-IS militia in the Kismayo area. See: Platt. S. (2017). *Al-Shabaab update: February 2017*.

¹³ According to AMISOM reports, several ALS leaders have been eliminated. See: Reuters. (2016). *AU mission says several al-Shabaab commanders killed in Somalia*.

¹⁴ One of the ALS leaders, Hussein Mukhtar surrendered to the Somali National Army in Baidoa in March 2017. See: Agutu. N. (2017). *Al Shabaab top leader Hussein Mukhtar surrenders to Somali army*.

¹⁵ The defectors are one of the main targets of the group because they can have information that affects them. ALS uses all its informant networks to locate and eliminate those who leave the group, even if they relocate to areas controlled by AMISOM and the government.

elections have also facilitated the reduction of ALS¹⁶. This also will contribute with the consolidation of the local and regional authorities.

The relationships of alliances are very diffuse due to the complexity of the clan and sub-clan framework. As part of the support networks of ALS, there are also relations with the heads of minority clans and their respective militias, mainly in the southern part of the country. These links allow the advancement of the group, access to supplies and recruitment. At the same time, there are militias that oppose the military presence of ALS; therefore, this element must be seen region by region and is modified with the passage of time. The foregoing indicates that the contradictions between these actors will not be eliminated in the short term and these also act as an element to stop further progress of ALS in certain regions, although their military strength remains, being superior to these militias that have a local character and smaller “national” scope.

The MICMAC indicated that leadership is a driving variable due to its levels of influence. In the specific case of the situation of ALS, it would be necessary to say that the capacity of influence of its new leaders is very weak, as well as the incidence of the group at local and subregional level. This translates into their inability to serve as a “reference” to other smaller organizations. At the international level they have no impact, since their military potential does not allow them to carry out cross-border actions beyond the subregion in which they traditionally operate. In this way, the reduction of leadership has a positive effect on the decline of the group in the short and medium term, but even so, it receives the support of important sectors of the population.

Their social base is not reduced and a lot of people see ALS as an alternative for their subsistence. A large part of the population in rural areas under their control, “prefer” the “security” that is offered by ALS, since they manage to “organize” social structures according to their conceptions and not the legal vacuum offered by regional and “federal” authorities. The levels of coercion that the group exercises in the areas they control will also continue to play a fundamental role. This situation is related to the recruitment process, which is characterized by the combination of voluntary and compulsory factors. Reducing their leadership does not necessarily imply a decrease in their recruitment capabilities. The adverse internal socioeconomic context

¹⁶ The last presidential elections took place between November 2016 and February 2017, when the 328-member Parliament elected former Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as President of Somalia. Farmajo won the presidency 184 votes against 97 in favor of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, in the presidency since 2012. See: Nor. O., Sevenzo, F., & Masters, J. (2017). *Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo elected Somalia's president*.

in Somalia – 64% of young people between 14 and 29 are unemployed –, also exacerbated by the same actions of ALS, favors the attraction of new adherents to their cause¹⁷.

The manipulation of ideological factors, including religion, through the use of a well-structured network of propaganda and dissemination: radio, social networks, internet and Medias¹⁸, are effective in achieving the incorporation of new combatants. One of the incentives for recruitment remains the possibility of receiving a salary, social status and even a wife in the territories they control. Another way of recruitment also occurs through mosques and inter-clan rivalries. ALS uses these rivalries to integrate members of minority clans with the promise of greater status (South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups. 2017, 20).

Forced recruitment will remain characteristic of areas that are completely under their control. If a person refuses to be recruited, he must pay some compensation. Denial often has negative consequences. The phenomenon of the use of children as combatants is also occurring in ALS. In 2014, 437 child soldiers were reported and 555 in 2015, and in 2016 there were about 1.560 reported cases (South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups. 2017, 21). The average age for recruitments is between 14 and 25 years. ALS also continues to recruit women for logistics work, serve as wives, attract other women, collect information and use them as suicide bombers because of their easiness to move from one place to another (South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups. 2017, 22).

Financing terrorism remains the most influential variable within the system for the continuity of groups and their programs. In this sense, ALS maintains the capacity for self-financing through the collection of taxes and bribes. In the same way, it continues to receive other income because of “donations” from its Somali supporters in the diaspora and those who have become delinquent due to their transnational criminal activities (use of drug trafficking and weapons networks). The group’s sources of self-financing are given by the tax system and the work of the Sharia Courts. The system of collection of taxes is part of the administrative order in the regions that control and is considered as more “fair” than the government. At the same time, they manage a judicial system based on Sharia and due to the malfunc-

¹⁷ 50% of ALS dropouts have declared joining the group for economic reasons. See: *South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups. 2017, 20.*

¹⁸ Shahada News Agency is the name given to the news agency belonging to ALS through which they transmit their statements to the media.

tion of the legal system in the country, many people turn to the Courts of ALS when they are not satisfied with a ruling by a governmental and secular court (South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups. 2017, 11).

Despite the organizational problems, the group still has weapons, means of combat and military technology for the execution of its terrorist actions and the confrontation against the regular force, the AMISOM troops or the local security militias and the SNA. Their military actions will continue to be focused on the attacks on facilities, bases and convoys of AMISOM, of the Kenyan forces in the Gedo and Upper Jubba regions (BBC 2017). Their civilian objectives are concentrated in the assassination of political figures, local leaders and clan leaders (elders or clan elders) who support the federal government. Part of the attacks against the civilian population have been due to reprisals by ALS for “collaboration” with foreign military forces. In this sense, there have also been retaliatory actions by AMISOM troops, the SNA or the ENDF (Ethiopian National Defense Force) when they have resumed a village or area (South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups. 2017, 20). This is a factor that further influences the support that ALS has in certain areas as “guarantors” of “security”.

Its *modus operandi* will be maintained through the use of car bombs, improvised explosive devices, ambushes, placement of mines and attacks against checkpoints on roads¹⁹, hotel facilities and government buildings. In general, they will continue to avoid direct confrontation against military forces and instead privilege asymmetric warfare. In particular, the regions of Kenya, along the border with Somalia, will be the most affected²⁰.

After a period of clear withdrawal from the group, the trend suggests that ALS continues to gain ground in the south-central areas of the country²¹

19 In the course of 2017 – until April – some 337 people have been killed or injured as a result of 87 explosive incidents. The civilian victims of this concept have increased by 50% since 2015. See: *Somalia: 337 civilians killed and injured in Al Shabaab attacks in 2017*. (2017).

20 In April 2017 the Kenyan government was forced to decree the curfew until June 28 in the border region of Mandera and within a radius of up to 20km from the Somali border, this includes the town of Mandera, Omar Jillo, Arabia, Fino, Lafey Kotulo and Elwak. See: *Somalia: Kenya Extends Curfew in Border Over Al Shabaab Attacks* (2017).

21 ALS has been carrying out a strong offensive in the center-south area of the country since mid-2016. One of the factors of this advance was the withdrawal of part of the Ethiopian forces from several towns. There is no clear demarcation of which areas are under the control of ALS and the clan militias, while there are other areas in which there is a duality in the actors that control them. In the regions of this part of the country, ALS controls the main supply routes by road through checkpoints in which taxes are charged to those who are in transit. See: *South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups*. 2017, 6.

in a war of constant positions against the forces of AMISON and the SNA. Therefore, the presence of ALS in south-central Somalia is consolidated, despite the actions of the AU peacekeeping troops, which only control certain areas during the day, while at night, ALS can be easily moved. The military situation is imprecise due to the advances and setbacks that occur: captures of towns and villages on several occasions, clashes between militias and rival clans to ALS for control of the regions, for example in Lower Shabelle and Jubaland.

The security situation in the capital continues to be deteriorated. Although the group can't regain control of Mogadishu and establish military bases, the city remains under constant threat for the actions of ALS. Most of the attacks are still centered in the capital. Despite being "expelled", they still have the ability to continue collecting taxes and participate in legal disputes. For its part, in the Lower Jubba region, ALS is in control of rural areas, while the Jubaland administration is "effective" in urban centers. The port of Kismayo is still controlled by AMISOM and SNA forces. In Middle Jubba, ALS controls the entire territory.

In the Hiraaan region, the group is less active – subclanic confrontations prevail here. In the Bay region, the main urban centers – Baidoa – are under the control of AMISOM/SNA. In the Galguduud region, the situation is more diffuse due to the number of actors involved: Galmudug Regional Forces, Al-Shabaab and the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama militia (ASWJ). In the Mudug area, there are clashes between ALS and local forces (South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups. 2017, 11-16). The security situation in general does not improve, but this insecurity can't be attributed solely to the actions of ALS because other militias fighting for control of the land or for political power are also acting.

Conclusion

Spite of a certain increase of terrorism actions in bordering areas of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the territorial settlement of terrorism tends to weaken in short-term, as well as its dominance and mobility in sub-Saharan Africa. It could be forecast that in 2025 will be a drastic reduction of the operating capacity and the areas of these groups if the current policies adopted by the AU continues to be implemented. Everything seems to indicate that the joint international offensive that takes place within the framework of the fight against terrorism is forcing them to carry out more covert and punctual

actions. Thus, we are going to witness a systematic eviction of the territories that they usually occupied. This forces them to change their strategy and tactics by having to move to different forms of organization through smaller groups, not concentrated in the same territory, which significantly reduces their military strength, making them move into a situation of greater concealment, as well as regroup in lighter cells.

In terms of leadership, the systematic elimination of “emirs” at different levels affects the internal articulation of the groups due to the emergence of new figures of lower level and that would alienate the majority of those recruited from the top leaders, which could cause antagonisms within the cells/groups/organizations. The absence or frequent changes of convincing leaders to higher levels, trained to exercise power, but with little charisma, religious, psychic and political control, also exerts a marked influence on the erosion and loss of legitimacy in front of others.

The group-organization relationship and the levels of institutionalization are not determinant variables in the evolution of terrorism, because in the first case what has happened is more a declaration of principles between both structures than a real collaboration in practical terms. This is influenced by the geographic separation that exists between the areas where they operate. In the second case, the institutional weakening can contribute to a greater dispersion of the group/organization and increase the difficulty for its eradication. International terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda continue to rival in Africa to achieve supremacy within the different groups linked or not to them.

These antagonisms will be expressed in the ideological, propagandistic and territorial domain. This will cause a constant reconfiguration of the alliances between these organizations and the groups, as well as the internal fractioning of the smaller groups. However, the relations between them tend to crack, although they do not go beyond the rhetoric. Geographic distances and anti-terrorist actions prevent greater contacts between these organizations and groups, as well as the preparation of strategies to carry out joint tactical operations of greater impact. Both organizations also face financial problems that make it difficult to extend their logistical “support” to the vast network of cells that are operating in Africa, with some of which have lost contact. In this sense, the influence of the Islamic State in the region has weakened and fails to adequately articulate a strong movement in its favor, but some cells linked to ISIS will go on its actions in the Sahel.

The fact of paying homage to organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, becomes a strategy for those leaders with less influence and who seek

to break relations with their immediate leaders and thus achieve greater international legitimacy using the media and attracting attention to build its own leadership. According to the behavior of the different terrorist groups/organizations, it can be observed that the relations established between them are not in a positive stage, that's why there are lower levels of cooperation among the different groups.

These groups are moving towards a recomposition of alliances and inter-terrorism influences, because of the backward they have suffered in the military and propaganda fields. Despite the few links that exist between them, they maintain an apparent degree of autonomy and military capacity to be able to continue with their political agendas through the use of force and to resist the anti-terrorist actions adopted by the world community. The maintenance of an international policy of double standards by some powers in the treatment of this problem, as well as their antagonistic positions on how to eliminate terrorism, still tend to favor the activity and resistance of these groups.

The most influential variable and, in turn, the most dependent, is the level of financing of terrorism. Its dependence obeys to the ability of each group to attract new financial resources. Once acquired, these are necessary to buy armaments, means of combats and military technology for the execution of their terrorist actions, becoming a determinant for the impulse of the group.

It is concluded that the level of self-financing and resources to be obtained by these organizations will be affected as a consequence of a major coordination process between the countries and the security mechanisms to face terrorism internationally. However, their capacities for obtaining resources through organized crime remain and will continue to be one of the main allied in supplying terrorism. In particular, the groups that operate in the trans-Saharan corridor are among those that most rely on the multiple smuggling networks, overlapping between itself. These connections do not tend to disappear, helping its existence in the near future. For that reason, one of the most important actions must be cutting all sources of financing that could encourage them to go on.

Regarding the progressive failure of Al-Qaeda's performance, the situation has been somewhat different due to its attrition for more than a decade due to the confrontation with Algerian forces, which leads the fight against terrorism in the subregion, and whose special troops and security agencies have been systematically eliminating them. Despite this, AQIM remains the organization with the greatest territorial dispersion due to the persecution of which they are subject by all national, regional and international forces. The organization tends more and more to the decentralization, when integrating

different dispersed groups. They also lack from a fixed headquarters and have to move constantly because of the military response.

In the rest of the area, BH continues to be the main terrorist actor in comparison with other groups that act almost autonomously in northern Mali and Niger, and that do not structurally have the level of institutionalization reached by BH. In East Africa and the Horn area, the Somali organization ALS will represent the most potent threat to security and the leading exponent of terrorism in this part of the continent. In Somalia, ALS has its greatest dominion and control in the south-central territories of the country and will carry on with its actions against regional actors present militarily in the country. In particular, the Kenyan region of Garissa in the northeast and especially the counties of Dabaab, Wajir and Mandera are the most direct targets of their cross-border actions (Cummings R. 2017, 1).

The trends point to a decrease in the violent actions of the terrorist groups in sub-Saharan Africa, which is verified after the reduction in the number of civilian victims²², as well as the low intensity and systematic nature of the terrorist attacks. However, BH and ALS remain the most lethal in their respective subregions. Another feature points to a greater geographical concentration of their actions. The phenomenon of terrorism will remain affecting the African continent, directly or indirectly, through indiscriminate violence, the generation of forced migrations, and the increase and use of transnational organized crime.

Recommendations

- the governments of the region must identify the most conflictive territories to be able to concentrate in these areas all the necessary resources to combat the recruitment process of these groups;
- local development programs must continue to be implemented to counteract the recruitment capacity;

22 The civilian victims caused by BH have been reduced from 11,519 in 2015 to 3,455 in 2016. In the first six months of 2017, these two groups have experienced a 29% reduction in the number of victims. ALS has caused 1,831 victims in the first half of 2017. See: Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2017). Setbacks and Realignments: *The Continuing Evolution of Militant Islamist Groups in Africa*.

- encourage greater integration of youth sectors into licit economic activities to discourage the process of radicalization and recruitment;
- redouble intelligence efforts in order to counteract the possibility of terrorist acts;
- increase levels of coordination among national security agencies, following the experiences of the Joint Multinational Task Force in the areas surrounding Lake Chad to strengthen cross-border military and counter-terrorism actions by mutual agreement;
- incorporate civil society organizations in the fight against terrorism;
- strengthen the financial mechanisms that allow the control of money laundering, illegal transactions and organized crime of which terrorist networks are financed; and
- continue with the study and dissemination of the phenomenon of terrorism to raise public awareness of its negative consequences.

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ABSTRACT

The Sahel-Saharan region, corresponding to West and Central Africa, has remained at the center of terrorist activism in Sub-Saharan Africa. The most affected countries remain Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. However, there have been changes in the actions of several groups. On one hand, Boko Haram has decreased its level of violence, which is manifested in a reduction in the number of civilian victims, while new cells have been reactivated on the Mali border with Burkina Faso. In this particular area there has been a substantial increase of groups such as the Islamic State in the Grand Sahara and the Islamic State of West Africa, among other groups of lesser degree of organization. Because of this, security problems and foreign military presence have been maintained in all these countries. A similar situation is presented in the Horn of Africa, where Al-Shabaab (ALS) is the main group, affecting not only Somalia but also Kenya with its transborder actions. The role of the Federal Government and the AMISON troops have been insufficient to reduce or finally eliminate ALS. For those reasons, terrorism continues to be the major security challenge of the sub saharan region and it will not be mitigate in the long term.

KEYWORDS

Terrorism in Africa; Security in Africa; Foreign military presence; African Union.

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THE DOMINANCE OF TERRORISM: ASPECTS OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CHALLENGES IN POST-INDEPENDENCE WEST AFRICA: NIGERIA, BURKINA FASO AND MALI

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Introduction

The West African countries, namely, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mali, all gained independence in 1960. Since the attainment of independence, these countries have continued to witness peculiar socio-political and economic challenges. These include the contemporary menace of terrorist groups such as the *Boko Haram*, ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province), and their local and international affiliates. These challenges had been precipitated by both local and external socio-political and economic dynamics in the sub-region. Apparently, the challenge of terrorism has intensified in a way that it has overshadowed and compounded existing challenges in West Africa in the contemporary period.

Terrorism is defined in this paper as the deliberate commission of an act of violence by non-state actors, whether individuals or groups, in order to create public fear and psychological disturbance, through the suffering of the victims, in the furtherance of a political, economic, religious or social agenda of a specific geographical region.

These terrorists, who could otherwise be regarded as Islamic fundamentalists, seem determined to establish an Islamic or quasi-Islamic state-style caliphate across the sub-region. Affiliate terrorist groups in the sub-region include the Islamic State (ISIS), *al-Qaeda* in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Tuareg jihadists,

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among other emerging jihadist groups. Apparently, the efforts of interventionist initiatives such as the G5-Sahel, MNJTF, MINUSMA, ECOWAS, and others, have not been able to eradicate the deadly attacks by terrorists in West Africa.

It is imperative to note that there are both national and international concerns as to whether militias, gangs and sects, or those who metamorphosed into having violent orientations, are terrorists. These include among others, the Maitatsine and the Shiite sects in Nigeria, the Tuareg jihadists in Mali, and the violent Fulani herdsmen across the sub-region. Aside the defunct violent Maitatsine sect in Kano, northern Nigeria, which invariably claimed thousands of lives and properties during the 1980s, and which was characterised by mass looting maiming, assaulting women and killing of citizens (Adegun 2017), the other groups are currently believed to have links with *Boko Haram*, ISWAP and ISIS. To this end, this paper is rather focusing on terrorism, as regards the well-known *Boko Haram* and ISWAP, including their affiliates. The choice of the aforementioned countries, which to some extent cut-across the loose Sahel region of West Africa, is reflective of the current terrorist activities there (Chergui 2019; Pujol-Mazzini 2018).

Terrorist activities have been further intensified in the Sahel region after chaos engulfed Libya as a result of the overthrow of long-time dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, in 2011. Terrorist activities include, *inter alia*, suicide bombing, mass killings, raping, maiming, arsons and kidnapping. These deadly activities and the general feeling of psychological, socio-political and economic insecurity of lives and properties are, however, not limited to the Sahel parts alone, but the length and breadth of the concerned countries as a whole. In fact, the heinous crimes committed by *Boko Haram*, ISWAP and their affiliates, transcend the national boundaries of the aforementioned West African states. This has taken centre stage in the current global security and strategic discourse (Chergui 2019; Gberie 2016).

The deadly terrorist activities of *Boko Haram* since 2009 (especially in the northeastern part of Nigeria and the Chad Basin), ISWAP, and their affiliates, has succeeded in intensifying and compounding the hitherto socio-political and economic challenges of contemporary Nigeria, (colonized by Britain), Mali and Burkina Faso, (both colonized by France). Succinctly, these challenges include bad governance, ethnic conflicts, political fragility, kidnapping and poor economy, to mention a few (Blake 2019; Pujol-Mazzini 2018; Arieff 2018).

In qualitative terms, the West African sub-region currently harbours some of the world's poorest countries such as Mali, Guinea Bissau and Burkina Faso, among others. This is in spite of the contemporary phenomenon of globalization, regional integration and the "colonial hegemonic

connections". Imperatively, varying factors have influenced the socio-political and economic performance of respective countries in West Africa over the decades. These included, *inter alia*, human and material resources, development strategies, political conditions and sources of finance. Therefore, it is not an easy venture to make generalizations about the socio-economic development of West Africa during the post-colonial period. It is pertinent, therefore, to emphasize that it is not the intention of this paper to enumerate, in quantitative and statistical terms, the socio-economic indices of the respective West African states.

It is worth noting that some works on the socio-political economy of West Africa had already set a stage for the analysis of the contemporary developments. These works (Ake 1983; Rodney 1972; Lawal 1997; Onyekpe 1997), discuss, *inter alia*, the socio-political and economic dynamics and relations of the Developed and Underdeveloped nations, prior to the twentieth century. They identified some of the root causes of the continued post-colonial underdevelopment of Africa. However, the issue of insurgency or terrorism, and its aggravation of the existing socio-political and economic challenges in West Africa was not emphasized in the aforementioned works.

The work by Kuerschner (2013) provides an analysis of the dynamics of conflicts in West Africa, focusing on the Civil Wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the late twentieth century. He noted that economic and socio-political factors were crucial in the conflicts. However, the restriction of the study to those two countries only captures a minor aspect of the socio-political and economic challenges inherent in West Africa. The present study intends to expand the scope by underscoring how the outbreak and intensification of terrorism in the contemporary period had strong linkages with the socio-political and economic contexts in the sub-region since the late twentieth century.

Equally germane are the separate works by the Africa Development Bank (ADB), titled, *West Africa Economic Outlook* (2018), and that edited by Ogunremi and Faluyi (1996). These works provide a rather comprehensive analysis of the economic dynamics of the sub-region. The works underscore the extent to which the dwindling economy of West Africa influenced the indices for underdevelopment, among others. However, their inability to emphasize some of the crucial socio-political factors which directly impeded the economy of the sub-region, coupled with the dynamics of terrorism, creates a gap in our understanding of the historical development of the sub-region. However, this present study intends to fill this major gap.

Placed in perspectives, this paper gives an overview of the linkage between the post-colonial and post-independence periods, thereby under-

scoring the contemporary intensification of terrorism. It further examines the contributions of the UN, ECOWAS, MINUSMA, G5-Sahel and other interventionists' initiatives towards the development of the sub-region. It concludes by proffering some prospects for development.

Challenges since independence: an overview

The colonial authorities, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, asserted their political and socio-economic hegemony in the sub-region. Some scholars consider that in the process, the colonial masters discovered, expropriated and exploited the potential human, mineral and natural resources of the various territories in Africa. Hence, the underdevelopment of Africa (Onyekpe 1997; Claude Ake; 1983; Rodney 1972). Meanwhile, others scholars have opined that although colonialism had its own demerits, it had more positive than negative impacts on Africa (Gann and Duignan 1967). In the ongoing analysis, it is imperative to note that Fieldhouse (1999) and Ferguson (2003) have expressed their reservations about the direct impact of colonialism on Africa. These authors maintained that although the seeming negative impact of colonialism was underdevelopment, it was however minimal and not deliberate.

Many of the African states continued to maintain links with their former colonial masters, such as the British and French, especially through diplomatic ties and economic interaction. The activities of some foreign multinational companies, such as the United African Company (UAC) and John Holts could be linked in this regards. Apparently, these companies were technically European agents, noted for their massive economic exploitation of African resources. Nevertheless, social amenities, such as schools, road transportation, railways and telegraphs, among other infrastructures, were ostensibly set in place by the Europeans in each colonial territory, albeit in varying degrees. In the area of provision of conventional health care service, the colonial authorities established clinics, hospitals and dispensaries in the sub-region, such as Lagos (Nigeria), Accra (Ghana) and Freetown (Sierra Leone). However, to what extent these services performed since the attainment of independence remains to be determined as the sub-region still lacks significant and efficient basic health care system.

The twentieth century was a landmark in the socio-political, cultural, diplomatic and economic history and historiography of West Africa. Particularly, many countries in the sub-region, except Liberia, got their indepen-

dence from the former colonial (European) masters, such as Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal. Interestingly, some parts of the sub-region, including Nigeria, Mali and Senegal, among others, had already been influenced by the Islamic civilization centuries prior to the advent of the Europeans. However, the latter's hegemony was strong enough to significantly transform the hitherto pre-colonial arrangement to the conventional status. Some scholars such as Rodney (1972) and Onyekpe (1997), among others, have opined that it was because of the contradictions exhibited by the colonial administration towards the Africans that nevertheless paved the way for some of the socio-political and economic challenges witnessed in the contemporary period.

Since the political independence of the countries in focus was collectively achieved, economic and socio-political challenges gradually gained grounds. This situation, among other factors, could partly be attributed to the divisions, which the Western powers, deliberately or otherwise, imposed on the continent, such that artificial demarcations of polities were created without the consent of the local Africans (Watson 1980, 307). In clear terms, the sub-region consequently witnessed series of political upheavals and intrigues during the post-1960s. Obviously, these challenges frustrated genuine regional cooperative linkages (Olagbaju and Falola, 226-227), among other socio-economic and foreign contexts in West Africa.

Furthermore, since the attainment of independence, countries in the sub-region continued to suffer from incessant balance of payments deficit (Lawal 1997, 210). The importation of capital and consumer goods, on a massive basis, to finance internal development projects have been largely responsible for this challenge. Thus, respective countries had to enact monetary, fiscal and exchange policies to maintain external equilibrium and conserve foreign exchange reserves.

The inability or lack of access to external financial markets stands as another problem encountered by developing countries (including those of West Africa). All loans that the developing countries were able to obtain end up accumulating huge debts and interest charges. Hence, external capital have been used to cover interest payment rather than investment over the years. The latest economic estimates show that West Africa battles with a high level of poverty. With the informal workers (estimated to be about 80 percent overall in Africa), receiving wages below the poverty line. The estimates therefore show that about 43 percent of the collective population in the sub-region live below the international \$1.90 per day poverty line (ADB 2018, 4).

Based on the colonial experience, West African countries still maintain trade and monetary ties with their former colonial administrators espe-

cially in Europe, and other industrial countries, such as the USA, Japan and Canada. These foreign powers however have different ideological orientations. Apparently, trade imbalance between West African countries constitutes a major barrier to “real” economic integration and development (Olagbaju and Falola, 234-235; Lawal 1997, 210). This is in spite of the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975. The ECOWAS was aimed at promoting the economic integration, as well as maintaining the collective security of the sub-region. However, with its 16 member countries, ECOWAS is still faced with myriads of socio-political and economic challenges. In essence, the sub-region still lacks “real” economic integration, among other challenges such as high mortality, unemployment, inadequate health care systems, porous borders, environmental degradation, corruption, poor governance, religious and ethnic intolerance, and more recently, terrorism. All these challenges with no doubt encourage socio-political and economic underdevelopment.

More importantly, the aforementioned colonial and foreign powers have since been aware of the dangers that might befall them if ECOWAS were to be united in their quest for socio-political and economic greatness. Aside this, the formation of yet another union within ECOWAS, the CEAO, (the French speaking West African Economic Community) might likely stand as an obstacle to the overall aim and objective of ECOWAS (Olagbaju and Falola, 226-227).

Regrettably, with the high availability of human, mineral and natural resources, such as, crude oil, gas, energy, lead/zinc, ore reserves, wild life, land, waterways, rubber, cocoa, and gold, amongst others, the sub-region, however, remains one of the most underdeveloped in the world. Nigeria for example is the most populous nation in West Africa, with over 200 million people (Aworinde 2019). It is also one of the largest producers of crude oil in the world and a very large economy in Africa. Yet, socio-political and economic challenges have continued to fester. In spite of the Federal Government of Nigeria’s efforts at improving these conditions, there is, for example, marked underfunding of sectors of the economy, including education and health.

Generally, there is a high mortality rate in spite of the availability of hospitals, doctors and equipments in West Africa. In this regard, efforts to remedy the inadequacies in health care especially during the late twentieth century included the Bamako Initiative. Concisely, much was not achieved with this Initiative, as respective countries in the sub-region continued to experience inadequacies in the provision of health care services to their citizens (McPake et al 1993, 1383-95; Odejide and Morakinyo 2003, 164-65). Can one then compare the workability and accessibility of these services in

post-independence West Africa's to what obtains in Developed Societies, such as Europe or the US? Aside these, the perception of the citizens towards their various governments as regards administrative transparency, sincerity of purpose and committed developmental policies pose another major challenge to West Africa's development.

The deliberate neglect or abandonment of public and private duties, illegal acquisition of public resources, nepotism, alongside the insincerity of purpose, among others, all account for the endemic corruption prevalent in contemporary West Africa. Relatedly, the level of financial corruption and administrative recklessness exhibited by many government officials in West Africa, and the inability to strengthen anti-corruption institutions, such as the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), both in Nigeria, contribute to the contemporary challenges. In addition, the inability of the Police to prosecute some of the "alleged" corrupt officials successfully further compounds the inherent challenges in West Africa. It is important to note as well that while some of the looted funds by these purportedly corrupt officials are hidden locally, the majority are deposited in foreign financial institutions.

Ironically, the mere availability of modern socio-economic infrastructures such as internet facilities, airports, electronic media, mechanized agriculture, modernized transport system, schools, among other conventional services, do not in any way translate to real national development. The workability of these services, and their accessibility to majority of lives, as well as serving the essence of purpose, productively, positively and purposeful, remain lacking. These, among other factors, hinder the holistic growth and development of modern West Africa.

Terrorism: the contemporary challenge

An assessment of the socio-political and economic challenges earlier discussed contributed immensely to the fecundity, spread and intensification of terrorist's activities in the areas of study (Pujol-Mazzini 2018; Blake 2019). Without stereotyping, these challenges, which include porous borders along the Sahel region, poor governance, inadequate infrastructure, political instability, ethnic rivalry, lack of political will to combat insurgency, sabotage, inadequate training and funding of security agents (Chergui 2019), ethno-religious suspicion, and youth unemployment, among others, have helped significantly to the rapid spread of terrorism across the sub-region.

A typical example is the postulation by Blake (2019) that the high level of political instability and poverty have been largely responsible for the intensification of terrorism in the sub-region, citing the example of contemporary Guinea Bissau. This is similar to what obtains in other parts of West Africa, such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Nigeria. In some cases, the teeming unemployed or poor youths in these countries are easily enticed with money to be recruited into terrorist organizations such as, *Boko Haram* and its affiliates. Thus, the failure of leadership, weak prosecutor and enforcement institutions, among other socio-political and economic contexts, cannot be exonerated from the current spread of terrorism in the sub-region.

Respective West African countries had experienced a series of socio-political turmoil since gaining independence. These ranged from the various military *coups d'états*, shortly after independence, to Civil Wars, including regional and ethno-religious rivalries, among others. Seemingly, Islamic terrorist groups, such as the *Boko Haram* and ISWAP, both having links with ISIS and *al-Qaeda* and others, have begun to turn their attention to West African countries notably, Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso and even Senegal, one of West Africa's most stable nations, especially after the colonial period (Pujol-Mazzini 2018).

These terrorists are jihadists, with extremist Islamic or quasi-Islamic orientation. At least in Africa, these terrorist groups are determined to establish a massive Islamic state-style caliphate (Gberie 2016), having direct links with the Middle East, the Maghreb, the Horn of Africa, down the sub-Saharan territory, invariably terrorizing inhabitants within the regions. Terrorists could also claim to be dissatisfied with the existing socio-political order. For instance, the designation *Boko Haram* simply means "western or non-Islamic education is a sin" (Kelly 2019). Thus, in pursuance of this anti-Western, unconventional ideology, this group, like others, resort to attacking any conventional entity or arrangement found within their targeted region. The group therefore resort to unconventional warfare, kidnapping, suicide bombing, and the mass killing of unsuspecting citizens in places of worship, markets, military barracks and schools, among other public and private places.

Poverty stands as a crucial factor in the spread of terrorism. Burkina Faso, for instance, is ranked amongst the poorest countries in Africa, with about half of the population living below the internationally approved poverty line of \$1.90 per day (ADB 4, Blake 2019). This is worsened by political instability, kidnapping and killings. These conditions undoubtedly contributed to the infiltration and spread of international terrorist groups, such as ISWAP and their affiliates within and outside the country. Since the regime

of the former President, Blaise Campaore, was toppled in 2014 by a popular revolution, Burkina Faso has experienced over 200 attacks by terrorist groups having international links with *al-Qaeda* and IS. The rise in the number of attacks has been attributed to the declining security apparatus and the general political instability in the country. Invariably, internal political instability served as a catalyst for the rapid influx of insurgents. Thus, the consequence of this has been the perpetration of perhaps some of the most vicious attacks in the history of Burkina Faso. A typical example in this regards is the January 2016 attack on the Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou, which killed about 30 people (Blake 2019; Gberie 2016).

In Mali, ethnic violence and political instability since the 1960s have contributed in no small measure to the rather unhindered activities of the AQIM, *al-Qaeda*, MNLA, ISWAP and *Boko Haram* affiliates up to the contemporary period. Evidently, there is a worsening violence ongoing largely between Muslim jihadists and Malians. This has further led to inter-communal or inter-ethnic violence. Aside the violent attacks by extremists, Mali also currently suffers the challenge of separatists, as the Tuareg ethnic group in the north are attempting to seek political autonomy. Although former President Lt. Moussa Traore's regime repressed the Tuareg rebellion, armed clashes as well as jihadists' attacks continued despite the peace accord in January, 1991 (Nossiter 2012). A notable deadly attack by terrorists in Mali took place in November 2015, when some affiliated terrorists groups, who claimed to be AQIM, attacked the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, killing 22 people, including two attackers (Gberie 2016). These challenges, as well as the poor environmental conditions, such as recurrent drought, high population growth, decrepit infrastructure, among others, have all continued to undermine the development process of contemporary Mali (Arieff 2018).

Furthermore, the *Boko Haram* insurgency in parts of Nigeria and the Chad Basin, is among the challenges facing contemporary West Africa. With the violent attacks meted by terrorists on innocent citizens, public and private properties, among others, the socio-political and economic landscape of the countries affected are thereby seriously distorted without any meaningful socio-economic development. Coupled with this is the psychological trauma experienced by both the young and old who are caught in the web of these violent guerilla or surprise attacks by terrorists. Meanwhile, the unwarranted violence, as evident in north eastern Nigeria and the Chad Basin, have resulted in the killing of over 27,000 people. It has also affected about 2 million others who are currently displaced and in dire need of humanitarian services (WHO 2019; Kelly 2019).

A latest development indicates that ISWAP is strongly entrenching its hold in Nigeria and parts of the Chad Basin. This terrorist group has been able to influence some of the local population who have accepted to abide by their rule and ideology. In this regard, those locals who have abided by the rather favourable governance style of ISWAP could carry out socio-economic activities unhindered. Accordingly, ISWAP has been able to gain the support of the locals such that more terrorists are easily recruited from the teeming youth population there (ISSAT 2019).

Apparently, the *Boko Haram* and ISWAP terrorists groups are sponsored by foreigners and other affiliates. Assertively, there are also other internal “unidentified” collaborators who are determined to sabotage the efforts of government in the war against terrorism (Umeh 2019). There are also indications that there exists some socio-economic motives behind terrorist attacks. In the northern part of Nigeria, Zamfara state to be precise, there are ongoing violent activities of “bandits,” known for terrorizing and killing innocent citizens through the use of weapons, such as AK-47, machetes and dynamites, among others, to loot, expropriate, murder, rape and maim. Apparently, socio-economic and security challenges have considerably increased, leaving thousands of displaced inhabitants in need of humanitarian assistance (Sahara Reporters 2019).

Imperatively these socio-political crises have a direct negative consequence on the lives and properties of the affected territories. This invariably raises the issue of provision and enforcement of adequate health care services for victims of terrorist attacks and other forms of violence. Although the Geneva Convention prohibits attacks on health care facilities during wars, such incidences have continued unabated in West Africa as a consequence of terrorism and ethnic violence. In the northern region of Nigeria and the Chad Basin, Mali and Burkina Faso, the provision of health care service is critically hampered by the insecurity posed by *Boko Haram* and ISWAP terrorists. In 2016, two-thirds of the 743 health care facilities in Nigeria, for instance, were completely damaged or destroyed by terrorist attacks, thereby leaving a large number of people unable to access humanitarian services (WHO 2017).

Interventions and foreign contributions

The international community has contributed immensely to the fight against terrorism and other forms of political violence in the sub-region. The contribution of the UN in this regard cannot be overemphasised.

In September 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. This was meant to enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism through a common strategic and operational approach. By extension, the strategy is aimed at taking practical steps, individually and collectively, to prevent and combat terrorism globally (UN 2006). Prior to 2006, the activities of ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group), and UN peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the Civil Wars in both countries are also worthy of note (Kuerschner 2013). Other efforts at waging war on terrorism and enhancing regional peace and security in West Africa have been carried out by the US and other counterterrorism initiatives.

In efforts at curtailing and countering terrorism in the sub-region, the US recently pledged the sum of \$60 million to build a new African counter-terrorism force. This is in addition to the presence of a regional United Nations Force in West Africa. This Force consists of American and European troops (Pujol-Mazzini 2018). The UN has also continued to raise awareness towards the need to support humanitarian efforts in the sub-region. In a recent development, for instance, the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that about 1.2 million people are currently in need of special humanitarian assistance because of ethno-political conflicts and terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso (Blake 2019).

Other ongoing interventionist effort by the US government in West Africa is the PSI (Pan Sahel Initiative), which operated between 2002 and 2004. It subsequently paved the way for the TSCTI (Trans-Saharan Counter-terrorism Initiative) in 2005. It was incorporated into the United States Africa Command in 2008. Notably, the TSCTI was an expanded version of the PSI with similar aims and objectives. Whereas the PSI was made up of partner countries including Chad, Mali, Niger and Mauritania, TSCTI partner nations currently include Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Chad and Senegal. Primarily, TSCTI is intended to counter terrorism in the sub-region and assist respective governments to control and protect their territories against the incursion of terrorists (Miles 2005).

Relatedly, the US has since 2015, continued to support the issue of food security and agricultural development in the conflict prone northeastern part of Nigeria (FAO 2016). According to recent reports, the US has spent, in the way of intervention, about \$165 million to support farmers and displaced people in the country to restore food security, tackle severe hunger and malnutrition, as well as develop the overall agricultural sector. This intervention, through an initiative known as the Feed the Future Global

Food Security Strategy (Nigeria Country Plan), also focuses on improving conditions in northeastern Nigeria where terrorism has greatly disrupted agriculture, among other socio-economic ramifications (Agric Base 2019).

In Mali, for instance, foreign troops from Europe (particularly the former colonial masters – the French), have contributed towards the attainment of peace by countering terrorism. Similarly, MINUSMA has been charged with the task of protecting civilians and supporting the peace process. Equally important is the European Union's (EU) multi-year program to train and restructure the Malian military. In 2017, a regional force, called the G5-Sahel, which is made up of five neighboring countries including Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad launched a joint force to counter security threats in border regions. The initiative has so far received donor backing, but has conducted few operations to date. However, the G5-Sahel, with their operational headquarters in central Mali, is currently faced with some challenges as terrorist attacks continue to linger (Arieff 2018). Inadequate funding of the G5-Sahel force, as well as others, is largely responsible for some of the challenges in the sub-region.

In the provision of health care and humanitarian services for victims of terrorist attacks including other forms of conflicts in contemporary West Africa, the World Health Organization (WHO) has continued to play a major role. It should be noted that the WHO is responsible for coordinating the overall health care services, alongside interfacing with security mechanisms in conflicts zones globally. It is also responsible for supporting the national health authorities of respective countries in the international system to strengthen their core responsibilities. Thus, in northeastern Nigeria for instance, WHO has been able to support the Borno State government to establish an all-hazard Emergency Operation Centre. However, in 2017, only a third of requested funding was received by WHO and their health partners, thus, making the provision of humanitarian and other health care services inadequate for victims and survivors of terrorist attacks among other forms of conflicts in the sub-region. Generally, since WHO's aim is to address global health threats, it has so far been able to support over six million refugees and internally-displaced persons in contemporary Africa (WHO 2017).

Conclusion

Apparently, terrorism was most prominent among the challenges in the areas of study. From the qualitative historical point of view, the contradictions inherent in the internal and external dynamics of the colonial adminis-

tration were invariably responsible for the post-independence socio-political and economic challenges faced in the sub-region. Aside the challenges since the 1960s, the 2000s were marked with incessant terrorist attacks in the areas of study (Chergui 2019). Certainly, the establishment of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006, played a crucial role in the counter terrorism crusade in the sub-region and other parts of Africa (Miles 2005). However, the extent to which this strategy was adopted and domesticated in the countries under consideration remains debatable, as incessant deadly terrorist acts continued to recur.

Abreast of the global phenomenon of terrorism in scholarly discourse, it is pertinent to note that these challenges are not limited to West Africa alone. In contemporary East, Central and North Africa, countries like Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Tunisia, and others, are faced with serious local, national, regional and socio-political challenges. These challenges, which cut-across the socio-political and economic milieus, are further worsened by the deadly activities of terrorists, such as *al-Shabaab* in the East, *al-Qaeda* and extremists jihadists in the North and the Allied Forces in Central and East Africa.

Acknowledging the roles played by the UN, US, EU, ECOWAS, G5-Sahel, MINUSMA and TSCTI, among others, the aforementioned West African countries however still rank among the poorest in the comity of nations. Little wonder ISWAP is currently gaining support from civilians in parts of their conquered territories in the northeast of Nigeria and the Chad Basin. The seeming favourable governance structure of ISWAP in these territories has further encouraged the easy recruitment of youths into the terrorist group (ISSAT 2019).

It is for that reason, instructive to advocate for the need to address the internal socio-political and economic challenges inherent in these West African states so that terrorism will no longer have “a fertile ground to grow.” Therefore, respective governments in the sub-region should exhibit the necessary sincerity, political will and commitment to, as a matter of urgency, put the socio-political and economic environment on the path of growth and development. In this regard, employment and adequate educational opportunities should be provided for the teeming youth population in the area of study. Good governance and the “real” tenets of democracy should be learnt, encouraged and practiced. Political leaders in these countries should endeavor to eschew corruption, nepotism, religious intolerance, ethnic rivalry and partisanship and so on, and focus on the overall development of their countries without prejudice or ethno-religious bias.

The economy should be managed by seasoned professionals, with clearly defined national ideologies for positive nation building, such that would attract both local and foreign investors. The overall security architecture should be well funded by the relevant authorities. Respective internal borders in the sub-region should be well manned by patriotic security officials. The proliferation of firearms across borders should also be checked. In this connection, the military personnels, and other security agents should be well trained, equipped and well remunerated in the course of their service to protect lives and properties within the respective countries. By so doing, the contemporary terrorist activities and their rampancy in the sub-region would be curtailed.

In the area of sub-regional cooperation, integration and development, this paper recommends that:

1. The resolution of the UN's Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006 should be strictly adhered to and adopted, individually and collectively, by the respective countries in the sub-region. This rather comprehensive resolution generally provides for collaborative, combative, preventive and protective actions against terrorism in the sub-region as well as globally.
2. The mission statement, aims and objectives of ECOWAS must be strictly adhered to and actively enforced without ethnic, socio-political or diplomatic prejudice. ECOWAS member countries and institutions, not minding their former colonial affiliations, should endeavor to encourage mutual inter-state trade and freedom, efficient management of resources, provision of adequate transportation infrastructure, provision of qualitative education and employment opportunities for the numerous youths. They should also enforce the collective security of member states through the necessary organs and institutions of government. By so doing, socio-economic challenges such as poverty, unemployment and trade restrictions etc., would be a thing of the past. Respective governments within ECOWAS should take central and active roles in this regard.
3. Against the background that ECOWAS currently allows citizens of member states to travel around the sub-region without visas, as well as the daunting challenges of poor border control, as human and arms trafficking, the military intelligence should, as a matter of urgency, be employed such that suspected terrorist individuals or groups are monitored and followed as soon as they

enter the respective countries across West Africa. Relatedly, there is need to strengthen cordial diplomatic ties, among the states of the sub-region. By so doing, terrorism could be curtailed from spreading across borders.

4. Perhaps, through the ECOWAS institution or any of the sub-regional counter terrorism Initiatives, government officials and terrorists in Mali, Nigeria and Burkina Faso should engage more on workable dialogue and amnesty programmes. In this connection, local terrorists should also be curtailed by national law enforcement agencies before their escalation across borders. A typical example is the *Boko Haram* insurgency. This group was initially thought to be mere militants in the northeastern part of Nigeria, and therefore not adequately given the necessary military attention before it transformed into a full-blown international terrorist group which spread to other countries in West Africa.
5. The WHO, as well as their partners in the respective countries in West Africa should endeavor to establish a workable system for collecting data on attacks by terrorists on health workers, health facilities and patients, as this will help in the overall assessment, control and prevention of health hazards, and the provision of health and security for all. In this regard, war crimes committed by terrorists as a result should be judiciously and adequately addressed, with a sense of purpose, by the respective national judicial systems across West Africa, the ECOWAS Court and/or, the International Criminal Court.
6. Without prejudice to foreign colonial or diplomatic affiliations, ECOWAS member states should make regional security their watchword. These countries should not fund or conspire with terrorists groups, as the repercussion for this obnoxious act could spell doom for not only the conspirer, but also the sub-region as a whole. This is because terrorist groups, sometimes, act irrationally, and deviate from their specific goals to inflicting untold calamity on any target through suicide bombing, kidnapping and attacking soft targets, such as public and private entities.
7. Counter terrorism Initiatives in the sub-region, such as the G5-Sahel, MNJTF, TSCTI and others, should exercise the necessary sincerity of purpose in their anti-terrorism endeavors. They should equally be well funded by donor countries without any ulterior motives or conspiratorial tendencies with terrorists.

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ABSTRACT

This paper attempts a qualitative historical analysis of the nexus between aspects of socio-political challenges and the intensification of terrorism in post-independence Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Mali. The analysis is especially restricted to terrorist groups such as the *Boko Haram* and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Slight references, however, are, made to other African countries and terrorist groups such as *al-Qaeda*, ISIS, and their affiliates. It underscores the significance of the aforementioned countries, noting why they are currently recognised in contemporary global discourse as refuge of terrorists in West Africa. It examines the interventionist and collaborative roles played by international and regional entities and initiatives such as the United Nations (UN), G5-Sahel, Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), among others. Using the historical method, which involves the evaluation and analysis of secondary sources, alongside other relevant qualitative evidence, the paper argues that the socio-political challenges faced in these countries, during the late twentieth century, not only served as a catalyst for the twenty-first century emanation and spread of terrorism, but it also compounded or worsened them. It concludes by demonstrating the strategies and prospects for the qualitative development of the sub-region, noting that if the socio-political and economic variables are effectively addressed, terrorism, alongside its ravaging consequences, could be curtailed.

KEYWORDS

Terrorism; West Africa; Contemporary; Development; Socio-Political; Africa.

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THE INFLUENCE OF DIPLOMACY ON CONTROVERSIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN DIPLOMATIC MEDIATION AND ARMED CONFLICT

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Introduction

International Security developed after the World War II, under the aspect of state protection. Traditional security currents have developed their theories in a Cold War environment, thus, there are epistemological elements of Rationalism and Positivism (Barrinha 2013; Lasmar 2017). The goal of this study is to observe the influence of diplomacy on international controversies, analyze real situations where diplomacy influenced the mediation choice and the armed conflict choice, and finally, deepen the knowledge of the consequences of war and mediation.

The article has its theoretical framework on Post-Structuralism, characterized by Lasmar (2017) by the conditioning of the human being as meaning and attributor of the facts (social construction). In the International Security sphere, Post-Structuralism must nominate the threat or the protection as also the means for this. Therefore, it can expose the hidden intentions in the act of political construction (including political speech). The authors and researchers Christer Jönsson and Karin Aggestam question the preference of the states for mediation or war, and, given that, we intend to contribute with analysis under the diplomatic prism. Thus, we can align the revisited theory to the diplomatic actions, collaborating with the international security system.

International Security developed other theories, that in this study only have the function of contextualization, first of all, the Realism (Neo-realism), characterized by the understanding that the state is the lead actor

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of International Relations and, also, is unitary, rational and the power holder in an anarchical environment. Due to the absence of regulator power in the international environment, there is excessive distrust, rivalry, hostility and search for power. In this way, Realism understands that one state is the main threat to another state (Santos and Ferreira 2012; Lasmar 2017). Continuing with the vision of Lasmar (2017), Liberalism in international studies has its basis on human reason, that is, there are institutions, dialogues, norms, values, development and, finally, peace (Theory of Democratic Peace). In this environment, characterized by progress, commerce and democracy (the goodness of individuals), there is little space for conflict between the states.

Critical Studies about International Security began in 1960 when there was a search for a bigger understanding of International Security. In this context, three theoretical schools stand out in this studies: the Galesa School, through researchers Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, that criticize security in an anarchical environment, disseminated by the Realist Theory; the Copenhagen School, through the authors Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, that developed the Theory of Securitization; and, lastly, the Paris School, through Didier Bigo and Jef Huysman, that analyzed International Security policies by the domain of the state (Gomes 2017).

Finally, the Constructivists, that interpret the actions, practices and social institutions from the collective and its meanings, i.e, the social practice build norms and institutions. Hence, it is not possible that conflicts have an only material bias, so it is necessary to be aware of the values, norms, alliances, institutions, and perceptions to give meaning to a threat (Lasmar 2017).

In this International Security Environment, diplomacy builds itself under three connected basis: (1) Public Diplomacy, that represents a nation and the image of this country abroad; (2) Information, data grouping for intelligence services; and (3) Negotiation, dialogues that make possible the win-win and secure the defense (Jesus 2014). Diplomatic efforts to solve conflicts constitute integrant parts of state governance; those efforts can be translated by negotiations. The term diplomatic is intrinsically connected to official representatives, professionals that need to trust in their abilities (Jönsson and Aggestam 2009).

The 1961 Vienna Convention about Diplomatic Relations (article 3) describes the functions of diplomacy as (1) Representation, the state is represented abroad by the diplomats; (2) Protection, the state defends its citizens on foreign lands; (3) Information, messages between governments characterized by the most diversified fronts; (4) Promotion, the projection of both the image and the good economical, cultural and scientific relations; (5) Negotiation, the seeking of agreements and common compromises with other states;

(6) Technical Specialization, the ability of the diplomat in a specific matter such as press, trade, and culture; (7) Mediation, when the hostile actions between states need a third impartial part to establish contact (Mendes 2017).

According to Marshall (1990), there are six meanings assigned to diplomacy that influence conflict resolution:

1. Diplomacy became synonymous with Foreign Policy;
2. Diplomacy conducts foreign policy, synonymous with Governance;
3. Diplomacy makes International Relations management through negotiations;
4. Diplomacy is organized, linked with a state or a professional team;
5. Diplomacy conducts relations by intelligence and the perception of the environment; and
6. Diplomacy includes norms, language, and courtesy.

Therefore, diplomacy characterizes itself, firstly, as the activities exercised in the relations between states, whose main goal is peace and conflict prevention; and, after, negotiation and power, that illustrate the oscillation between threat strategies and reward. Those strategies influence the incentive structures to conflict resolutions and, can reach war routes (Jönsson and Aggestam 2009).

Remaining in the authors' vision, in the last years, the great challenge to diplomacy has been the management of those conflict groups and the supervision and the implementation of negotiated agreements. We consider that the changes in regulatory frameworks evolved and facilitated the resolution of the conflicts. In this way, diplomacy is, with a certain frequency, a contrast of war, but the so-called coercive diplomacy makes use of limited force and threats to persuade its opponents.

The Middle East is an example of the extremes of mediation and conflict, at the same time that the region builds peace, it accomplishes war. Diplomats are always in this environment, making negotiations and coercions and when hostilities occur there is a break of diplomacy and war demands new diplomatic efforts (Jönsson and Aggestam 2009).

The researcher Sales (2016) writes that conflict mediation is a mean that seeks for resolution through the consensual dialogue, inclusive and collaborative, between the parts involved and a third impartial participant. According to the United Nations (2012), mediation is considered one of the more effective ways more in prevention, management, and controversial

resolutions. So, to achieve this satisfactory final goals, it is essential that the participants involved know the nobility and the merits of mediation, always with technical and political support.

Mediation with a preponderance to pacific resolution makes the connection between listening and dialogue. If necessary, it accomplishes the introduction of other parts interested in the peace negotiation. A peace agreement that expresses quality and offers justice, security and reconciliation must cover, obligatorily, “the treatment of past mistakes and create a vision of the future for society” (ONU 2012, 25).

Talking about diplomatic mediation assumes conflicts, having wars² as a large part of human history. Zahreddine (2017, 133) tell us that after World War I, Idealism gained force through Woodrow Wilson with his fourteen necessary points to create the closing conditions of the Great War. Continuing with the author’s contributions, in 1929 the crisis on the international system and the change of the states’ vision caused Liberalism to fail to respond to development problems (2017, 134). Consequently, this Theoretical School could not stop World War II, and after this event, Realist Theory understood as the cause of wars the systemic events in the anarchical environment.

To Lara (2011; 2017), diverse factors have become war agents: the means, the goals that will be achieved; the conflict duration and its extension. The conflicts are distinctive in three groups: (1) Total War, when a state desires the total destruction of another state and utilizes all means possible to achieve that; (2) General War, when it seeks the destruction of its opponent, but with no effect to the totality of available resources; (3) Limited War, when the conflict has a restricted purpose, with partial use of available resources. When we revisit historical facts, it is possible to observe approximately 824 mediations carried out by the United Nations between the years 1947 and 2017 (ONU 2019) and, by on another hand, there are approximately 37 armed conflicts from 1932 to 2009, being considered in this number, wars/invasions that involved/involve two or more states (Sohistoria 2019).

Methodological research note

There are two motives that drove to study this content and its observation. The first one refers to the declaration of the General-Secretary of the UN, on 05/23/2019, that made public the information that in the last year

² The terms “wars” and “armed conflicts” have semantic meanings, the only distinction being the emotional charge of the words due to the negative histories of the first term.

there were 22.800 deaths of civilians in six countries where there are conflicts, they are Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen³. The second motive was the release of *UN Peacekeeping*, on 05/21/2019, that informed that, daily, 44.000 people are forced to leave their homes and their means of survival due to conflicts and, consequently, enter to the poverty world⁴. Thereby, under the argument of diplomatic influence, we propose the starting question: how can diplomacy influence the controversies in the international scenario?

Characterization of the research performed

The present research is framed in the qualitative paradigm, where we are going to use study cases to explore and describe the phenomenons and characteristics of a determined region or population. In this way, the scientific investigation is the search for the resolutions of the problems linked to pragmatic knowledge in which we live (Martin 2009).

Sample and collection of research data

In this article, we utilize two study cases to analyze the phenomenon of diplomatic influence in mediations and armed conflicts. The cases were chosen by geographic space, followed by date proximity, with similar controversies and, in the end, by the choices made by its leaders: mediation or war.

The first study case is located on the African continent, and occurred in 1999 to a controversial resolution on the borders of Sudan and Uganda; the countries opted for diplomatic mediation. The second study case, also located in Africa, occurred between 1998 and 2000, to a controversial resolution on the borders of Eritrea and Ethiopia; the countries opted for armed conflict.

The data about the two situations of the study cases of this article were taken from United Nations (UN), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), academic books and scientific articles about the subjects. The countries in those study cases are located in East Africa, a region that has its importance related to the studies of Samuel Cohen as an integral part of *Shatterbelt* of the Middle East. The controversies of those fourth countries were considered one of the main conflicts of the 1990s in the African continent (Batalha 2015).

3 Information extracted from the tweet of the UN Secretary-General, Mr. António Guterres, on May 23, 2019 at 5:09 pm.

4 Information extracted from the UN Peacekeeping tweet on May 21, 2019 at 2:00 pm.

In the year of 1999, those two countries have taken an important step toward maintaining peace among themselves. The agreement, denominated *Nairobi's Agreement*, was signed in December 1999 to guarantee the respect to sovereign and territorial integrity, based on the Letters of United Nations and, also, of the Organization for African Unity. So, both countries renounced the use of force and hostile actions to solve their differences through diplomatic mediation.

For the effective peace of the countries, the UN was responsible for the mediation between the parts and the controversial resolution program was based on ten essential points, according to UN (2019), being:

1. each country Sudan and Uganda must respect the sovereign and territorial integrity of another, according to the United Nations and Organization for African Unity charters;
2. renounce the use of the force to solve the differences and perform actions to avoid any hostile acts between each other;
3. there will be efforts to dismantle and disarm terrorist groups, prevent any acts of terrorism or hostile actions that can originate on the territories generating danger and insecurity for the other nations;
4. there will not be a shelter, sponsorship, military information or support to any of the rebel groups, opposition groups or hostile elements in the territories of the countries;
5. there will be a common effort to promote regional peace, at their initiative, with the total support of IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority for Development), and at no way hurting or interfering in their role, to end with the civil war in Sudan;
6. there will not be hostile and negative propaganda campaigns between both countries;
7. the war prisoners will be restituted to their countries of origin;
8. there will not occur any abuse or injury to innocent citizens, and there will be special effort to locate any missing persons, especially children that were kidnapped, and return them to their families;
9. the international laws that govern refugees, the NGOs' activities and the borders transports will be respected. There will be facilitation to the regress and resettlement of refugees; and
10. there will be amnesty and reintegration to all the ex-combatants.

Those signed terms between the countries allowed in February 2000 the two capitals involved to designate diplomatic teams to continue the services. There was the sending of ambassadors and the diplomatic relations were restored.

Case 2: The armed conflict of Eritrea and Ethiopia

Observing the situation of Eritrea and Ethiopia is too complex with “embarrassing diplomatic contradictions” (Prunier 2015, 233). For the comprehension of the conflict that occurred from 1998 to 2000, we remember that the origin of the Eritrea state is fruit of thirty years of armed conflict in the region. When, finally, Eritrea managed its independence in 1993, the international community thought that the situation was solved. However, new armed conflict reaffirms the geopolitical problem of the region. To Gérard Prunier, the Eritrea-Ethiopia question can be compared to the Israel-Palestine question, characterized by cultural divergences and offensive history.

The solution to this conflict was considered complex because it is based on “feelings” (Prunier 2015, 235). According to the author, the historical background of this region is resumed to occupation and agricultural explorations (or industrial-agricultural on XX century), beginning in 1314, by Emperor Amda Syon, passing by Ottoman Empire, after Egypt (1821), the influence of Great-Britain and, finally, Italy (1907).

What relighted the war between the two regions in 1998, at principle, was an economic factor, but there are other causes in this context. We must pay attention that Eritrea had throughout its history a projection to be an industrial agricultural nation; but, with the little advance and growth of Ethiopia, the region has again had problems.

On one side, Eritrea said that the new production capacity of Ethiopia mined its exports and, on the other side, Ethiopia said that Eritrea explored its underdevelopment. The paths chosen by the nations after the split in 1993 show that Ethiopia’s conquests were based on a federal choice, while Eritrea was taking a path with a centralized choice, based on the authoritarianism of guerrillas (Prunier 2015).

Remaining under Prunier’s look, the economic problems were not the causes of the resumption of war, and, yes, political and cultural disconnections (besides the other facts already exposed on the text, what aggravates the situation is that a part of the population is Christian and the other is Muslim, incurring in an ethnic-political division). Eritrea was proud of being influenced by the Ottoman Empire, while Ethiopia was not; and Eritrea’s big economic disadvantage in comparison with Ethiopia bothered Eritrea’s superiority (a lot).

The guerrilla's authoritarianism that was in power in Eritrea and the lack of diplomacy of the country were the real reasons that re-started the war. This authoritarianism by guerrillas in power can also be seen in countries like Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan. What fostered the new conflict of 1998 to 2000, in Prunier's (2015) opinion, was "the prejudice and the irrational politics justified by border territories without economic value" (Prunier 2015, 251).

This war dragged itself through the trenches, World War I style, with the salty cost of US\$ 4.5 billion and approximately 80 thousand deaths. Diplomacy was as "obscure and confused", as the armed conflict itself, and resulted in a non-peace status, subsequently non-war (Prunier 2015, 252). After the war ended in 2000, Eritrea drowned itself in a dictatorship, with the closing of independent organizations and Christian churches. In the beginning of the 21st century, Eritrea was the second biggest refugee's source of Africa and the fourth of the entire world (Prunier 2015, 253).

Conclusion

The current work addressed the theme of diplomacy and its influence and controversies, specifically about mediations and armed conflicts. The goal of this article is to observe the influence of diplomacy in controversies, analyze real cases and deepen knowledge and theoretical characteristics of the matter.

After the proposed research in the study case methodology, we can perceive that in Horn of Africa region there was the realization of both diplomatic mediation and armed conflict, and such events respected the proposed parameters of (1) geographical space proximity, (2) date proximity, (3) with similar controversies and (4) distinct choices that were accomplished by its leaders: mediation (Sudan and Uganda) and war (Eritrea and Ethiopia). We can answer the starting question reflecting on how diplomacy can influence controversies in the international scenario; this being its main mission or even its key role.

Firstly, we have to consolidate that diplomacy, mediation, and armed conflict are choices of the political system to which we are inserted. They are tools to obtain power, influence, and money in a geopolitical space where the states face or cooperate with themselves to achieve a specific goal.

Diplomacy, as seen at theoretical review, moves between the two extremes (mediation and coercion), being the direct answer of the countries at controversies. By its characteristics, diplomacy influences and is vital for both

paths observed in this article. For example, we remember that the Ambassador can formally request to the UN, through a diplomatic letter, intervention in controversies as a way to seek the pacific solving of the problem. When this does not occur, it shows a horizon that can result in armed conflict.

In the same way, diplomacy, through intelligence, can choose a coercion path and point to a more aggressive level that will not contemplate the diplomatic mediation. Even if the new geopolitics expresses itself by space and power, it is important to be aware of the consequences of armed conflicts (Batalha 2015), such as migration, refugees, authoritarian governments or neoliberal capitalism, sexual violence, degradation of social and familiar structures, unemployment, poverty, inaccessibility of basic services unities, barriers to exports, commodities devaluation, increase in alcohol and drug use, increase in prostitution, falling of basic sanitation and access to clean water (Piepole 2001; Batalha 2015).

To Prunier (2015), even if an armed conflict is good for economy and politics (and, even, geopolitics), due to involved interests, it has a cultural effect that can be characterized in a negative way to society and, even so, to the government itself. Mediation seeks alternatives paths for the controversies that do not achieve the extremity of war. However, we recall that diplomacy has legality to point any one of the analyzed paths in these pages, being that, for mediation, the diplomatic body itself can initiate the request and the process, while for war the diplomatic body break off relations with another country and wait for the Chief of state to authorize the confrontation.

This study has some limitations, such as: (1) there was no deepening of economic bias on the two possibilities (mediation or war); (2) there was no discussion about the war profits, market gain, and geographical space increase; (3) we used only two study cases in just one region; and (4) we did not use a comparison with others regions to measure and discover new interpretations such as mediations as also conflicts.

Following this study, we suggest researches that fill the gaps of the limitations mentioned above, including: (1) the economic gain of war due humans lost; (2) the political influence of the decision of mediate or war face to social consequences; (3) check other controversies solutions that do not configure mediation or war; (4) search for new ways to end a controversy in the XXI century; and (5) measure the political, diplomatic and religious maturity of the regions with historical armed conflicts. This study made it possible to observe diplomacy, provide knowledge and continue studies on mediations and conflicts in order to reflect and understand these two international phenomena.

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ABSTRACT

The article seeks to understand the influences of diplomacy in controversies. We observe cases in the African continent, which are detected in the same geographical space, followed by the proximity of dates and, finally, similar controversies, in which there were distinct diplomatic choices between mediation and confrontation. It is concluded that diplomacy, mediation and armed conflict are choices of the political system in which we are inserted. They are tools to obtain power, influence and money in a geopolitical space where states fight or cooperate with each other for a specific purpose.

KEYWORDS

Diplomacy; Africa; Mediation; Confront.

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TRUST IN POLITICAL POWER AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE: 2014-2018

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Introduction

Thinking about the state in the African context is a challenge, considering that it arises under the influence of conflicts, advances and setbacks, in addition to identity construction. The debate in Africa is heavily influenced by nationalist movements and struggles for self-determination. The colonies imbued and linked to the colonial government were devoid of autonomy and autonomous capacity to build and develop their ideals. The processes of state formation are closely linked to the processes of self-determination. Politics in Africa is usually seen from the top to the bottom. Political scientists focus their analysis on the individual, in this case, on the presidents or members of the government (Ministers and Prime Minister, in the case of Mozambique). Political development can be summed up as the distinction between national institutions and the dominant single party or armed intervention system (Bratton 2013).

Bratton (2013) argues that interest in social issues and political rights arises among scientific analysts almost 30 years after independence, around the first decade of the 21st century. Aspects such as civic associations, the informal economy, street protests, and the emergence of political opposition are beginning to gain some strength and relevance in some societies. In Mozambique, there is much research carried out by the Institute of Economic and Development Studies (IESE, in Portuguese) (Brito 2007, 2011; Forquilha 2017) in which various topics related to political behavior, political participation, abstention, decentralization or institutions of the political power, matters of extreme importance to think the state in Mozambique.

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In Bratton's *Voting and Democratic Citizenship in Africa* (2013), the author brings a debate about what is happening in Africa in terms of voting. What are the motivations that lead voters to the polls? A number of issues are raised and discussed in this work. In order to legitimize their political actions in the eyes of the population, African leaders were forced to implement multiparty rules for the exercise of power. However, the literature points to manipulation of electoral processes, patronage, violence and party domination at the institutional level.

Speaking of state building, in Africa this phenomenon is also associated with elections, which tend to be contested due to corruption and the existence of a clientelistic elite. Political parties are often personalists, dominated by an elite, and internally undemocratic, thus forming national assemblies that are little or nothing representative and far from popular demands (Bratton 2013).

Other authors, such as Shaapera (2012) discuss some conceptions of the state, its emergence, its purpose and functions, using Nigeria as an example. One aspect to reinforce is that the author defends the need to think the state, taking into account the satisfaction of basic needs, as found in Sen (2000) and Inglehart and Welzel (2009). This perspective becomes relevant because, in some of these states, democratization processes emerge at a time when it is at the heart of the debate on the development and capabilities of the individual.

Shaapera (2012) also defends that the state in the Third World must be thought taking into account the basic needs of man. In this case, the main objective is access to infrastructure, drinking water, goods and services, transportation and communications networks, regular energy, safe and quality homes, health and quality education. These are concerns of a specific state, but with some similarity to other African states, such as Mozambique or Angola. There is no consensus in defining the origins of the state, there are several theoretical perspectives, divine theories (São Tomás de Aquino), social, natural state theory or Social Contract Theory (Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau) or the state as the result of a natural evolution.

The post-colonial state emerges from a situation of conflict and operates as a form of instrument of domination, in which political power is maintained, generating a weak and underdeveloped state with a relative degree of development. Looking at the latest data on the Human Development Index (HDI), it can be seen that countries with a low HDI are mostly African, such as Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Mozambique, Angola, São Tomé and Príncipe, among others (UNDP 2015).

Mozambique is a state that resulted from a negotiation and transfer of command from colonial power to the recognized liberating movement, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO, in Portuguese), and which is in consolidation of its democratization processes. It is also important to emphasize that the debates around the state by theorists have some gaps, but this is not to say that they do not exist. Researchers are concerned with analyzing society, institutions, participation processes and electoral behavior that currently govern a society. The dominant elite, at the same time as the state thought, built the Rule of Law and these two processes happen simultaneously.

Thinking about the state in Mozambique is, at the same time, reflecting on its construction process, very marked by external forces and internal turbulences (colonial period and civil war). With just over 40 years old, he still has many challenges to face, in social, economic, political and cultural aspects. However, the experiences lived by other countries are an essential tool to analyze the young state, and from there draw lessons that allow to perceive and analyze the same (Xavier-Zeca 2019).

The purpose of this article is to understand voters' confidence in the institutions of political power in Mozambique. The question that arises is what is the level of voter confidence in the institutions of political power? For the purposes of this research, the following political institutions were considered: Assembly of the Republic, National Election Commission (CNE, in Portuguese), Police, Army and Judicial Courts. Throughout the text, the CNE is emphasized because it is the institution responsible for managing the entire electoral process. And because the article is based around the issues of trust and democratization, some concepts will be discussed here that will support the conclusions presented: institutions, democratization, consolidated democracy.

In methodological terms, the article favored the use of documentary review, complementing it with a descriptive analysis of data from the Afrobarometer² round 6 (R6) 2014-2016 to analyze the electorate's confidence in the institutions of political power. Likewise, this method is used to analyze the

2 Afrobarometer is a project that was founded by three independent survey research researchers, without affiliation or party color, Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, from Michigan State University, South African Institute for Democracy (Idasa) and the Center for the Development of Democracy in Ghana. The first round took place in 2000, with only 12 countries (Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe), currently counting 36 countries (Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Cape Verde, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, Benin, Madagascar, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo and Tunisia).

electorate's confidence in relation to the institutions of political power with a focus on their leaders and on the pillars of understanding about democracy and also the degree of voter satisfaction with democracy.

The article has some limitations regarding the difficulty in accessing information and bibliographic material on the web that focuses on Africa, which to some extent makes research difficult not being in the place of study. It was intended to support the article taking into account the perspective of African theorists who can give their point of view on a reality that is familiar to them.

Theoretical approaches around the concepts of institutions, public opinion, democratization and democratic consolidation

Institutions have an integrating role in society, since they are the ones that enable collective coexistence (North 1991). The role of institutions in society is essential and crucial to protect the citizen. Dissatisfaction with democratic institutions can be a problem for political stability. According to Easton (1965), the perception of the functioning of institutions does not always match the expectations that citizens have about them, which can lead a democratic regime to high levels of discontent with political institutions and even questions about the democracy as a regime. It is in this sense that addressing the role of political institutions becomes relevant in the sense that it is up to them to maintain political stability.

Another of the fundamental concepts of the article is that of *public opinion*. This concept started to be addressed in the studies of Arendt (2007), in her work *The human condition*. Despite not addressing the concept itself, it starts the debate on the public and private spheres, in which they arise in a context of the Greek polis, with no room for public opinion.

The concept of public opinion has evolved in historical terms over time. It is important to mention that this is not something new or a trivialization of the concept, associated only with opinion polls (Ferreira 2015; Figueiredo and Cervellini 1995), but their approaches go back to Locke, Kant, Burke or Bentham, being one of the concepts themselves of Political Science. Ben Hermet, Badie, Bienebaum and Braud (2014), based on Bourdieu's definition, present a concept of public opinion associated with a social construction, which intends to represent what a given population thinks about a given subject. Considering these authors as something manufactured to justify the politician's action, this is just one of the controversies that the authors reinforce. However, they recognize the relevance of this term and the evolution it

has undergone, dropping the discredit associated with the conceptualization of public opinion, recognizing that this evolution has contributed a lot to its scientificity.

Despite the difficulty and debates around the concept, it is present in opinion polls in Political Science, which has its validity for making use of a methodology that allows analyzing and systematizing the results obtained. In this sense, the results of the Afrobarometer survey result from opinion polls and have their scientific and academic relevance for understanding political phenomena.

In the case of Mozambique, a country that is part of the 3rd wave of democratization and that started its process in the 1990s, it becomes pertinent to understand what *democratization* will be then. According to Huntington, democratization involves: “[...] the end of an authoritarian regime; installation of a democratic regime and the consolidation of the democratic regime” (1994, 44). Thus, democracy arises from an evolutionary process that goes through different phases, whose the core is in the transition that will occur and the ultimate goal is its consolidation. Here in this pillar is the great challenge, to consolidate regimes that sometimes become fragile in the process of cohesion of the internal order.

In short, democratization involves moving from one undemocratic regime to another. The author warns that democratization will not always be total, at some point it may be partial. It is not certain that transitions lead to democratic regimes, although it is desirable (Dahl 2001; Huntington 1994; Mainwaring 1989). Often ending an undemocratic regime can lead to another undemocratic regime, as there is no formula to indicate that the transition will lead to democracy.

It can be concluded that the transitions do not always lead to democratic regimes, mainly because each country, at the moment it started this process, was in different stages of evolution and political and economic organization. Huntington, in his definition, mentions the issue of consolidation as one of the aims of the democratization process. Linz and Stepan present the concept of complete democratic transition and consolidated democracy, which is considered to be important for a brief discussion.

According to Linz and Stepan (1996, 3), consolidated democracy can be defined taking into account the following precepts:

A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct results

of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when executive, legislative and judicial generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*.

In this definition, it is necessary to highlight three essential points that characterize a complete democratic transition: governments democratically elected by vote, *de facto* authority of the governors and a legislative, executive and judicial body with *de jure* power. This definition also allows us to understand the distinction that must be made between liberalization and democratization. For even in non-democratic states there can be some liberalization of markets without necessarily being democratic or in some process of democratization. This requires more contestation over the rights of political control and one of the crucial points is the existence of free and competitive elections, the result of which will dictate who governs. It is concluded that there can be liberalization without democratization (Linz and Stepan 1996).

In many cases, after the democratic transition is complete, there are some issues that need to be complemented, conditions that must be established, attitudes and habits that must be cultivated before democracy is considered consolidated (Linz and Stepan 1996). It is not enough to go through a transition process and to implement new rules for the organization of the state. Another aspect to keep in mind is that the fact that a regime is consolidated does not mean that it cannot return to the previous stage. Consolidation is not taken for granted and eternal. These breaks can also be associated with the weaknesses of the transition process itself. There is no single format for democratic consolidation. There are studies that analyze the variation of consolidated democracies.

Consolidated democracy is assumed to have a pre-established state. And if that state works, there are five other necessary and interconnected conditions for democracy to be consolidated: free civil society; autonomous and valued political society; Rule of Law that ensures the legal guarantees of citizens in terms of freedom and independence of association; state apparatus that will be used by the new democratic government and an economic society (Linz and Stepan 1996).

Civil society means self-organized groups, movements and relatively autonomous individuals from the state, who survive in an attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarity in their own interest (civil society encompasses various types of organizations, minorities, women's groups, intellectuals, among others). *Political society* is when politics itself exists to challenge the legitimacy of the exercise and control of public power and the state apparatus. The compositions and consolidations of a democratic policy must imply thinking

and action on the development of a positive normative policy of the fundamental instances of a democratic political society (political parties, elections, electoral system, political leadership, inter-party alliances and the legislature).

Political parties are part of this process of democratic consolidation and there is a need for a healthy dialogue between the state and civil society, and there must be independence between the two. It is in this context that the important role of the *Rule of Law* comes in, in which there must be a commitment to accept the established rules. Linz and Stepan (1996) consider civil society, political society and the Rule of Law to be the prerequisites for democratic consolidation.

State apparatus: modern democracies need a state capable of responding to the demands of individuals and making it functional. In this perspective, the citizen has rights and duties and it is up to the state to guarantee its execution. For this, the state needs the capacity to exercise its activities legitimately within the territory.

Economic society encompasses socioeconomic characteristics and is not a pure market economy. The authors believe in a duality of the concept, hence they use the term “economic society”. Social and political regulation is needed, hence the name economic society.

Democracy is more than a regime, more an interplay of economic, political, social, individual needs and rules that need to be interconnected with each other, and for the system to work it needs support. It is in this sense that the concepts of institutions, public opinion, democratization and democratic consolidation have in common the fact that they allow the democratic state to be thought in the light of its assumptions. The state is composed of institutions. The voter, through various survey mechanisms, expresses his opinions and, finally, the states went through democratization processes that, to some extent, will have led them or not to democratically consolidated societies.

Voters' perception of trust in institutions of political power and the level of political participation of voters

State-building in Africa

Thinking about the state in Africa is always a challenge, always in an attempt to build a thought that distances itself from the ex-governing elites, marked by the thought of the colonial period of retraction and the absence of the state in the modern perspective. After the declaration of Independence, on

June 25, 1975, Frelimo triumphed as a legitimate political force and began to exercise power in the national territory. With Samora Machel as president of the People's Republic of Mozambique, he started to adopt a Marxist-Leninist political line.

According to art. 1st of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique of 1975, the state is then the result of the liberation struggle, and it is "sovereign, independent and democratic" (Mozambique 1975). Until the end of the colonial period, according to the definition of the Modern state, Mozambique did not exist. If we understand that one of the elements of this concept presupposes the establishment of relations with other states or even the ability to enter into international agreements with other states, Mozambique did not have such a prerogative. Any possibility of representing Mozambique, which until then (1975) was an overseas province, belonged to the colonial government.

The new constitution traced the new legal framework for the organization and structuring of the governing machine, an organization of a socialist nature. The post-colonial period was marked by the implementation of a series of programs aimed at stabilizing the country's economy, which was weakened. This paradigm shift was not intended to look at the state itself, but at economic issues. The social issues and implications of this perspective were not taken into account. It was not questioned which state is intended and what would be the best form of organization for Mozambican society. Every thought about the state, which begins to develop in this period, has the characteristics of a socialist State adapted to the prevailing reality and based on Marxist-Leninist thinking. Above all ideology, there was a need to build a unified nation-state.

Machel (1974) argued that power belonged to the popular masses. He had a speech very influenced by Eastern Europe. The new leadership considered that the structures were democratic in that the people could choose their representatives. Socialism in Africa was seen as a form of economic progress, so it became easy to enter the ideology that came from the Soviet Bloc. For this reason, after June 25, 1975, the country embarked on a single party line. This was considered the only possible way to achieve national unity. During this period, the country benefited greatly from aid from Eastern Europe, in the face of insufficient infrastructure and staff, caused by the end of colonialism and the return of skilled labor to Portugal. It was in this context that the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO, in Portuguese), as a way of imposing itself against the direction the country had taken, started an armed conflict against Frelimo. This conflict devastated the country and, as always, was marked by the struggle for power and a strong challenge to the established regime.

Alden and Simpson (1993) argue that one of the reasons that hindered the resolution of the conflict in Mozambique was the position of external

actors, the USA, South Africa and the former USSR. The scope of the conflict began to change as soon as both Frelimo and Renamo were ready to negotiate. In 1984/5 the non-aggression pact was signed between Mozambique and South Africa, the famous Nkomáti pact.

After the death of Samora Machel in 1986, Joaquim Chissano succeeds him, and with him Mozambique gradually moved away from the ideology of the countries of Eastern Europe, in order to obtain economic aid from the West. At the 5th Frelimo Congress in 1989, led by Joaquim Chissano, Marxism-Leninism was abandoned (Hall and Young 1991; Alden and Simpson 1993). The commitment is made to create a new Constitution and to prepare the first multiparty elections. By the end of the 1980s, the conflict with Renamo had already destroyed and weakened the country, creating a context in which talks were essential between Renamo and Frelimo. Talks with this movement gradually began to take another course, as if it were a light at the end of the tunnel. Peace began to be an attainable truth, not a utopia.

In July 1990, the two movements met in Rome, with the community of Santo Egídio and the Archbishop of Beira as observers of the General Peace Agreement process. The meeting assumed the commitment to introduce a multiparty system, with regular elections based on universal suffrage, while also guaranteeing freedom of expression, worship and the press, as well as the independence of the judicial system. The negotiations took place in October 1990 in Rome, and internal factors played a major role (the dimension that the conflict was taking was only leading the country to ruin, not to mention that both Renamo and Frelimo were losing the support that came from the great powers). On the other hand, the economy was in a chaotic situation, which led the country to implement the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), advocated by structural adjustment programs (Alden and Simpson 1993).

The long period of negotiations culminated in the signing of the Peace Accords on October 4, 1992, ending 16 years of civil war. Thus, the path towards democratization began. After the signing of the Peace Accords, a commitment is made to hold multiparty elections, under the supervision of the United Nations (UN). The armed opposition (Renamo) accepted the agreement and consented to organize itself as a political party. After that period, the country moved from a one-party logic to a renewed democratic network. Then new political parties were created and elections were scheduled for 1994, which were held under the control of international UN observers. It is also important to emphasize that many of these new parties were small nationalist movements that had not had much weight or relevance in the liberation struggle against Portugal. From 1994 to 2019, the year of the last general elections, Frelimo

remains in power both within the scope of the Presidency of the Republic, as well as in the majority of the Assembly of the Republic.

The decolonization process in Mozambique allowed the Rule of Law to be created. State building is influenced by endogenous and exogenous factors. On the one hand, a growing nationalism, greatly influenced by Eduardo Mondlane's struggles for self-assertion, which led him to engage with the various existing movements in the fight against colonial rule. On the other hand, the pressures that Portugal suffered from the international community and at the time when the liberation of the oppressed peoples were advocated, were factors that gave rise to the formation of the state in Mozambique, in the post-colonial context.

The democratization process in Mozambique was marked by the intervention of external forces. That is, through the international community, Mozambique benefited from support in order to allow the construction of the democratic process. It was during this period that donors began to provide support for the state budget, whose main objective was to finance projects that would allow better performance by the new democratic institutions. It is important to emphasize that, despite the concern with democratization, other cross-cutting sectors have been included in the external aid package (among them, legal, political support and the media). Mozambique started the democratization process in the 1990s. This democratic transition was greatly influenced by the international situation and international pressures (end of the Cold War, growing hegemony of the USA and the growing need to democratize states) (Lalá and Ostheimer 2003).

The political transition process in Africa and its electoral processes have been characterized by indices of political violence before, during or after electoral campaigns, at the time of the publication of electoral results. The experience of democratic elections in Mozambique has been marked by the double challenge of establishing peace, after a long period of armed conflict, and creating economic development policies that satisfy the minimum needs of the population. Although there are many political parties in the race, in reality there are two groups that face each other in the elections: Frelimo, the party currently dominant in power, and Renamo.

The role of political institutions in electoral processes: the National Election Commission (1994-2015)

Discussions and uncertainties about the National Election Commission (CNE) go back to the first electoral law and Protocol III of the General

Peace Agreement (AGP, in portuguese). After these discussions, the definition of the first composition of the CNE was reached, according to Mazula (1995, 40):

The government was to have 10 members, Renamo seven members, and political parties, excluding Frelimo and Renamo, three members. The President should be a person appointed by the President of the Republic, on the recommendation of members of the CNE [...] and the Vice President should be assisted by two vice-presidents.

According to this first formation of the CNE, the partisanship that was to begin and which is now being taken and fought for a less partisanized CNE has already been demonstrated. In the context of trust and mistrust that was experienced during this period, the need for an increasingly vigilant organ was perceived. Thus, it may have been this spirit that characterized the first formation of this electoral supervisory body.

It was also in the initial formation of the CNE that the Technical Secretariat for State Administration (STAE, in Portuguese) was appointed as the operative body. This would be composed of a general director assisted by two deputy general directors (Mazula 1995). The CNE in this period, in addition to being partisan, had a representation of the United Nations operation that could observe all the processes, without the right to vote in its sessions.

During this period, the electoral court was also created, the entity responsible for settling electoral disputes. This court was made up of foreign judges who should demonstrate suitability and experience in the post (Mazula 1995). Initially, its activities were of a provisional nature, it worked *ad hoc*, only in the moments preceding an electoral moment. After the investiture and presentation of the reports, the body was extinguished (Mozambique 1993; 1997; 1999). Its great role is as an organ that supervises the registration and the electoral acts, in an independent and partial way. Decisions taken by this body are subject to appeal to the Constitutional Council (CC) (Mozambique, Assembly of the Republic 2002). Although the CNE is an autonomous body in its management, it has a clear connection to the CC, and there is no full autonomy as an institution that organizes and directs electoral processes.

According to law 20/2002, the CNE became a permanent body with a five-year term. However, with Law 6/2013 the number of terms changed from five to six years. In terms of composition, the CNE started with 21 members, then suffered a drastic reduction to nine members. Remember

that in these two moments of its creation, they were organs that functioned only in the electoral periods³, being the later extinct. The CNE legislation from 1993 to 2014 has undergone significant changes in terms of content and explanation of the rules. From 1993 to 2002, the legal text referred to the creation of the CNE, leading to the belief that it would always be in creation, however, it resulted from changes that it underwent each legislature. Thus, the legislation from 2007 to 2017 addresses its content and operation in a clear and more descriptive way. It is important to emphasize that from Law 3/97 to 9/2014 there has been a satisfactory jump in terms of drafting the text, taking into account the explanatory form of its contents. The current legislation is more detailed and explanatory about the law and its content and each of the articles. Especially in terms of the composition, organization, competence and functioning of the CNE. These issues may, to some extent, contribute to a negative analysis of the performance of the CNE as an organ that has a determining role when talking about the electoral process and create distrust among voters around it.

In a context in which the institutions responsible for the supervision and coordination of electoral acts are fragile, it becomes a challenge to strengthen these institutions, so that they inspire confidence to resolve electoral conflicts. There is always suspicion about the decisions taken by this body. In the 1999 and 2004 legislative elections, the CNE continued to have an excessive number of members, mainly from political parties. During this period, there was a debate about the reduction of political parties as members of the CNE in order to make it more professional. The CNE has been composed mostly of political parties with parliamentary representation, as set out in article 5 of laws 4/99, 20/2002 and 8/2007 respectively. The excess of political parties in the composition of the CNE has been one of the criticisms made against this body. Another aspect to be taken into account is the fact that the legislation does not clarify the number of members per party representing the Assembly of the Republic (AR). Laws 6/2013 of February 22 and 9/2014 of March 12 are more specific with regard to the composition of the CNE, clearly indicating how many members per party, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and other entities appointed by the government.

The CNE has followed a path that sometimes seems to be on the path to professionalization, less represented by political parties. From an organ with an excessive number of members coming from political parties, one moves towards a CNE with less party representation, where a large part of the mem-

³ 15 days before the electoral registration began and ended 15 days after the electoral results were released.

bers begins to emerge from civil society organizations (CSOs), although this path is marked by advances and setbacks (Table 1). Law 8/2007 “aimed to make the CNE a less partisan body, through the integration of members from civil society, and to strengthen its professionalization in accordance with the principle of impartiality” (Mozambique, Constitutional Council 2009, 4). From this moment on, a new stage in the structuring of the CNE begins.

Table 1: Composition of the CNE from 1994 to 2014

Legal table	Party composition	Other bodies	Civil society organizations (CSOs)
4/99 February 2 nd	15 members appointed by parties with seats in the Assembly of the Republic (AR)	2 members appointed by the government	-
20/2002	18 members appointed by parties with AR seats	-	1 President suggested by CSOs
8/2007 February 26 th	5 members appointed by parties with AR seats	-	8 Members proposed by CSOs
6/2013 February 22 nd	5 Frelimo members 2 Renamo members 1 MDM member ⁴	1 Judge appointed by the CSMJ ⁵ 1 Attorney appointed by the CSMMP ⁶	3 CSO members
9/2014 March 12 th	5 Frelimo members 4 RENAMO members 1 MDM member	-	7 Members from CSOs

Source: Prepared by the author

Thus, one of the challenges that can be posed is a CNE closer to reality and greater attention to the exercise of this body. Because of the importance it has, there is no justification for the lack of clarity about its performance and high level of distrust on the part of the electorate. Despite being an organ foreseen by the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique (CRM) of 1990, since its creation until today it has been shown to be poorly consolidated.

⁴ Democratic Movement of Mozambique, MDM in Portuguese.

⁵ Superior Council of the Judiciary, CSMJ in Portuguese.

⁶ Superior Council for the Public Prosecution Service, CSMMP in Portuguese.

Analysis and interpretation of Afrobarometer data

After more than 25 years of democracy in Mozambique, it is important to understand the relationship of the electorate with the institutions of political power, as well as their understanding of democracy. It is in this context that, based on the opinion polls made by Afrobarometer in Round 6 (R6) 2014-2015, observing some indicators, it was possible to obtain some of the perceptions that respondents have regarding democracy. To this end, voters' perceptions of trust in institutions of political power, the respondents' understanding of democracy, as well as their degree of satisfaction in relation to democracy in Mozambique were analyzed.

The sample consists of 2,400 cases, of which 56.4% are female and 43.6% are male. Of the sample population, 35% live in urban areas and 65% in rural areas (Afrobarometer data 2018). It is important to make this reservation because, according to the National Statistics Institute of Mozambique (INE, in Portuguese), the Mozambican population is mostly rural. To analyze the confidence that the voter has in a given institution of political power, the following variables were selected: Assembly of the Republic, National Election Commission, Police, Army and Judicial Courts. The answers are grouped according to the following scale: do not trust anything; trust just a little; trust reasonably; trust too much; or don't know/haven't researched enough.

When asked about their understanding of democracy, the data show that, although around 55.9% of respondents understand its meaning, there is still a high number of people who do not understand the word or the question (36.4%) (Table 2). However, it should be noted that awareness campaigns are often conducted in local languages, but it may not be enough to create some understanding among voters.

Table 2: Perceptions of the electorate on Democracy

		Frequency	Valid percent
Valid	Missing	19	0,008
	Understood Democracy	1342	55,9
	Needed translation into local language	165	6,9
	Did not understand the word or question	874	36,4
	Total	2.400	100

Source: Prepared by the author

When analyzing the degree of democracy in Mozambique, the majority of respondents (around 55%) agree that there are some problems in relation to it. Only 11.5% are sure that the country is a democracy (Table 3). This perception may be fundamental to understand the results⁷ of Freedom House⁸, when they say that Mozambique is not a democracy and is partially free. Although the fundamentals are based on political rights and the issue of civil liberties, there are aspects that make the country fall into this category. These perspectives serve to make a reflection taking into account the question of the voter's understanding of political processes to the detriment of institutional issues.

Table 3: Degree of Democracy in Mozambique

		Frequency	Valid percent
Valid	It is not a democracy	225	9,4
	Democracy with big problems	621	25,9
	Democracy with small problems	736	30,7
	A complete democracy	277	11,5
	Do not understand democracy/ what is a democracy	150	6,3
	Don't know it	391	16,3
	Total	2.400	100

Source: Prepared by the author

When it comes to perceiving the level of satisfaction in relation to democracy, it appears that about 58% are not satisfied and only about 22% are satisfied (Table 4). This satisfaction can be associated with several factors and one of them associated with the mistrust that exist in relation to the institutions that manage the electoral processes.

⁷ Freedom House is mentioned because it is an institution that has presented data on democracy around the world and in which it mentions the fact that the country is not a democracy. In this way, it serves to substantiate and support the data also presented by Afrobarometer.

⁸ Freedom House is a non-governmental organization, based in the USA, that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom and human rights. This institution works to defend human rights and promote democratic change, with a focus on political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House's catalysts for freedom are a combination of analysis, advocacy and action. Its analyzes are based on 12 central issues: authoritarianism, declining democracy, electoral integrity, equality and human rights, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, responsibility and transparency of government, freedom of the press, promotion of leadership, strengthening of civil society, religious freedom and technology and democracy. Available in: <https://freedomhouse.org/issues>

Table 4: Level of satisfaction in relation to Democracy

		Frequency	Valid percent
Valid	Mozambique is not a democracy	66	2,8
	Not at all satisfied	432	18,0
	Not very satisfied	968	40,3
	Pretty much satisfied	289	12,0
	Very satisfied	249	10,4
	Don't know it	396	16,5
	Total	2400	100,0

Source: Prepared by the author

However, it is noted that, for the same question, “Mozambique is not a democracy” (Tables 3 and 4), respondents present different answers. It is important to keep in mind that the questions are asked independently and at some point, due to the language or exhaustion of the respondents, their answers do not match 100% on similar questions. Another aspect to be taken into account is that in Table 3 it was questioned about the degree of democracy and in Table 4 about the level of satisfaction. In the case of a survey, in many cases the answers will not be exactly the same, but will depend on the context in which it is questioned.

It can also be seen that, in relation to the 2014 general elections, 76.9% of the respondents considered that they were free (Table 5). Electoral processes are often characterized by several incidents, some of which can lead to violence or distrust on the part of voters.

Table 5: How do you think the 2014 elections were

		Frequency	Valid percent
Valid	Neither free nor fair or with any problem	555	23,1
	Completely free and fair	1845	76,9
	Total	2400	100,0

Source: Prepared by the author

In relation to trust in the institutions of political power, opinions are divided between not trusting anything, little, reasonably or trusting a lot. In general terms, it can be concluded that, in relation to the Assembly of the Republic (AR), opinions are divided and, although there is some confidence in this body, there is a not insignificant percentage of mistrust or low confidence, as the respondents affirm who trust little (20%) or trust reasonably (23%), and only 28% trust this organ a lot. In relation to CNE, the confidence scenario does not differ much from what happens in relation to AR. But, in the case of this body, the level of distrust is around 19.5% and those who have a lot of confidence are in the 25.6% (Table 6).

Table 6: Trust in the institutions of political power

	Trust in AR		Trust in CNE	
	Frequency	Valid %	Frequency	Valid %
Trust nothing	354	14,8	469	19,5
Trust just a little	482	20,1	492	20,5
Trust reasonably	541	22,5	518	21,6
Trust a lot	676	28,2	615	25,6
Don't know/Didn't research	347	14,5	306	12,8
Total	2400	100	2400	100

Source: Prepared by the author

When it comes to trust in the Police, Army and Judicial Courts, opinions do not differ much from the bodies previously analyzed (CNE and AR). There is a balance when asked to respondents about their confidence in the various organs of political power. On average, for the three bodies mentioned above, respondents trust a lot (23%), and do not trust anything (22%) (Table 7).

Table 7: Trust in the institutions of political power

	Trust in Police		Trust in Army		Trust in judicial courts	
	Frequency	Valid %	Frequency	Valid %	Frequency	Valid %
Trust nothing	621	25,9	497	20,7	435	18,1
Trust a little	584	24,3	593	24,7	575	24
Trust reasonably	461	19,2	515	21,5	486	20,3
Trust a lot	534	22,3	552	23	579	24,1
Don't know/ Didn't research	200	8,3	243	10,1	325	13,5
Total	2400	100	2400	100	2400	100

Source: Prepared by the author

Taking into account the role of the institutions (AR, judicial bodies, CNE) and, since the holders of power ascend in different ways (in some cases, from the delegation of powers, election or appointment to positions), the lack of trust or the low levels of trust in these bodies can pose a problem for political stability, as well as for the process of democratic consolidation. Recalling that democratization does not necessarily lead to stable democratic states.

Conclusion

It is important to emphasize that the debates around the state and its construction are new in Africa, and are associated with the process of independence and the period of democratization. The modern state in Mozambique itself is just over 40 years old and the creation of democratic institutions that refer to democratization processes dates back to the early 1990s.

Three main concepts were discussed in this article: institutions, democratization, democratic consolidation and public opinion. *Institutions* have a pivotal role in maintaining a state's political stability. *Democratization* presupposes the transition of a regime and the ultimate goal is the consolidation of a new one. Democratization is not always easy or could culminate in a state that is constantly consolidating democratic institutions. The great challenge is to consolidate regimes that are sometimes fragile in the process of cohesion of the internal order. And because part of the article refers to data that result from *public opinion*, it brought this concept to clarify.

It is associated with social construction and intends to express what a certain population thinks through surveys around a given subject. And finally, *consolidated democracy*, which is assumed to have a pre-established state and, if that state works, there are five other necessary and interconnected conditions for democracy to be consolidated: free civil society; autonomous and valued political society; Rule of Law that assures the legal guarantees of citizens in terms of freedom and independence of association and state apparatus. These elements are at some point complemented with each other without the five being achieved simultaneously.

Based on the descriptive analysis of Afrobarometer data in Round 6 (R6) 2014-2015, some conclusions can be drawn: more than 50% understand what democracy is, however there is still a worrying number that does not even know the meaning of that word (36.4%), although at times the surveys are conducted in the local language as well as election campaigns.

Despite some discrepancies in the questioning about democracy, when it comes to the answer option “Mozambique is not a democracy”, in which one of the questions was asked about the degree of democracy and in another about the level of satisfaction, the respondents provide answers many different. In this sense, it is important to keep in mind that the questions are asked independently and at some point, due to the language questions or exhaustion of the respondents, it is possible that their answers do not match. It is unanimous that there are some problems in democracy in Mozambique and there is a high number of respondents who are not satisfied with democracy. Of the respondents, 76.9% believe that the last elections were free.

Regarding the institutions analyzed, the Assembly of the Republic, the CNE, the Police, the Army and the Courts, opinions are divided between not trusting anything, little, reasonably or trusting a lot. The confidence levels for both AR and CNE, in general terms, are between 25% and 28%. When it comes to trust in the Police, Army and Judicial Courts, opinions do not differ much from those of the bodies previously analyzed (CNE and AR). There is a balance when asked to respondents about their confidence in the various organs of political power. On average for the three bodies, respondents trust a lot (23%), and trust nothing (22%). And, if we want to talk about fully consolidated societies, it is important that there is some level of social cohesion as well as confidence in the institutions.

Despite the country having gone through six electoral processes (1994 to 2019), Mozambique still has a long way to go on understanding this process. It denotes an effort made by national and international institutions to make voters understand and participate in the elections. However, there

is still some ignorance and distrust on the part of voters, when it comes to trust in institutions or even in the democratic process itself. The fact that the experience and democratic institutions are recent thus creates a path for constant changes in matters that are not yet consolidated.

Even though elections are considered free and fair, there is a certain understanding on the part of the electorate that those elections are not fair. In general terms, the confidence levels in relation to the institutions of political power are situated on an average of satisfaction not exceeding 50%. In order to achieve a consolidated state, one of the premises is that political institutions function. Thus, it is important to analyze the context of the new societies to understand their dynamics. Several challenges are imposed on the institutions of political power in order to achieve the full democratic transition.

Returning to the question that guides the article: what is the level of voter confidence in the institutions of political power? It can be clearly concluded that the level is quite low, not reaching 50%. Ideally, there would be greater confidence around the organs of political power, as this may compromise the state's democratic consolidation process.

Recommendations

- For future research, it is recommended to emphasize the study of institutions separately;
- it is important to have an analytical look around the parliament; and
- it is important to analyze CNE and STAE independently, which are the institutions for managing the electoral process and technical operation.

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ABSTRACT

Having held six general elections (1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019), challenges are faced in the Mozambican democratic process, including understanding voter confidence in government institutions. The purpose of this article is to understand voters' confidence in the institutions of political power in Mozambique. Using a documentary review, through a theoretical approach that will make it possible to understand the issues of democratization in a broader sense, with a focus on Mozambique in the period from 2014 to 2018. We intend to use data from the Afrobarometer, from round 6 (R6) 2014 -2015 to analyze the electorate's confidence in relation to the institutions of political power as well as their leaders, the understanding of democracy and the degree of satisfaction in relation to democracy. It is noteworthy that more than 50% of respondents agree on how there are some problems in relation to Democracy in Mozambique and there is a need to improve the processes around some electoral management bodies.

KEYWORDS

Confidence; Public opinion; Democratization; Institutions.

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ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC: A COMMENTARY

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Introduction

The modern world's appreciation of peoples' participation in the determination of who governs the affairs of the state in the overall interests is observably the underpinning factor for the global celebration of democracy as a system of government (Igbokwe-Ibeto, Osakede, Nkomah & Kinge 2016). Cardinal to all democracies is public participation, at least at the leadership selection level by the instrumentality of election. This is, essentially, because democracy is a government designed to serve the interests of the public. Political scientists associate elections with democratic governance by arguing that election is the machinery that provides the avenue for the emergence of a constituted government. Also, elections have become an acceptable mode of legitimate political succession.

Separating election from democracy is nearly impossible due to their organic functional relationship. Extant scholarship recognizes this nexus by affirming that it is through elections that formal transfer of power occurs in all democracies. Besides, it is also through the medium of election that legitimacy is conferred on a government. Election depicts the social contract between representatives and the represented. This is to the effect that the electorate reserves the right to vote in or vote out a government at any instance of election (David, Manu & Musa 2014).

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In effect, election has remained indispensable to the practice of democracy. It also constitutes a yardstick for determining and measuring democratic consolidation and progress (Powell 2000; Berouk 2008). Incidentally, while election is universally acclaimed as the quintessence of democracy, Nigeria's experience with election has been rather disheartening. In fact, elections in Nigeria have passed for a veritable de-democratizing factor in her democratic experience. First, rather than providing an avenue for smooth and legitimate transfer of power, elections have been associated with untoward occurrences that have often vitiated the prospect of a seamless transition. Second, instead of bridging the gap between the electorate and their elected representatives, elections in Nigeria have largely lost its essential democratic essence and ingredients: (i) they are often compromised to the extent that the outcome does not reflect the will or wishes of the electorate (ii) even when they are credible, the elected representatives do not feel that they hold their mandate at the instance of the electorate; (iii) there is hardly any meaningful synergy between the electorate and their representatives in the aftermath of the election; (iv) elected representatives conduct themselves in government with little or no regards to the yearnings and aspirations of the electoral populace.

It is in the light of this that this study examines elections and democratic deficit in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. The essence is to interrogate the seemingly ironic reversals of democratic tenets in the processes of politics and governance, even as the country democratizes. The paper contends that Nigeria's experience with democracy has largely amounted to nominal civilizing, in view of the fact that what is on course has not fulfilled minimal requirements of the democratic order.

Conceptualizing democracy, democratic deficit, election

The term democracy is derived from the Greek word "democratia", basically designating "a political arrangement in which political power is vested in the majority of the citizen" (Adejumobi 2004, 5). It is a form of government in which people willingly and freely choose their leaders through free and fair direct or indirect election process (Osabiya 2014). In this system of government, the people enjoy the fundamental freedoms of speech, association, assembly, conscience etc. In it also are such institutions as an independent judiciary, free press, competitive party system and an active civil society.

Democracy could be used to describe a government that is based on the ideas of majoritarian rule and popular representation of the true interests of the public. It has its essence in a free and open society, where individuals are free to develop themselves and where those in power are kept in check by a combination of civil institutions and procedures. Some of the fundamental attributes of democracy include the rule of law, periodic election, and civic political culture. A popular expectation is that democracy is a prerequisite for good governance: it should provide the material conditions for the improvement of society in terms of literacy, security of life and property, better health, employment, food security, potable water and rural development, as well as ensure political stability. The inability of a democratic system to guarantee the above is herewith conceived as democratic deficit.

To be sure, democratic deficit has to do with the inadequacies of the democratic practice comparative to the ideals of democracy. Deficit means a shortage or a lack of/in something. Lack of democratic institutions in terms of existence and poor capacity for the existing ones to optimally discharge legitimate responsibilities translate into failures and hinder democratic efficiency. Democratic deficit implies that the values of democracy are lacking in a democratic society (Dahl 1999). Democratic deficit entails the disparities between the perceived democratic performance and public aspirations (Russell 2004). Roller (2005) states that democratic deficit can be the consequence of a regime whose rules, procedures, and institutions are unable to provide what citizens look for and aspire to.

Also, Norris (2011) notes that democratic deficit depicts a situation where the electoral system fails to satisfactorily channel the preferences of the voters. It has to do with instances where democratic institutions are falling short of the principles of responsiveness and accountability in their operations. It is this lack of responsiveness to the popular preferences and democratic oversight that is known as the democratic deficit (Dahl 1999). Democratic deficit may be linked to democratic illegitimacy or irresponsibility occasioned by distorted flow of influence from citizens to government through popular mandate mediated by periodic elections.

The concept of election refers to the process through which qualified citizens are allowed to participate in determining who pilots the affairs of a particular state or organization either by voting or standing as candidates. It is a process that begins from political campaign and ends at the emergence of an individual or group to represent the public in government. Ibeanu (2007) states that election entails the process by which citizens choose preferred candidates to run their government at all levels in an episodic framework

for a specific tenure of office. It entails the process of selecting the people who would be saddled with the responsibility of determining who gets what, when and how in a polity through balloting, which entails making choice between alternatives (Lasswell 1936). This is to say, therefore, that election is a formal group decision making process by which a population chooses an individual or group to hold public office in their collective interests. Election is a major ingredient of modern democracies in the world.

Theoretical premise: from elite control to elite capture

This study derives its theoretical anchor from the elite capture theory. The earlier versions of the theory emphasized personal attributes of leaders, which aided their hold or dominance in power positions while the new versions dwelt more on the institutional framework of society. The political elites are usually located within the mainstream power structures of any nation-state and are responsible for managing the political and administrative affairs (Platteau 2004). The elite capture theory is anchored on the assumption that most societies are dominated by elites that are free from popular control and pursue their peculiar interest defined in terms of power and self-aggrandizement. It entails a situation where a fraction of the society has the power to take decisions which affect society and these decisions usually reflect the interest of the elites rather than the wishes of the majority. General elite theory argues that the elite possess some qualities necessary for their accession to political power, such as consciousness, coherence, conspiracy and organisation. Members of the elite are thus not only aware of their status, but work determinedly to protect it with the use of exclusionary factors in leadership.

Platteau (2004) notes that elites perpetuate their dominance through land holding practices, family networks, employment status, wealth, political and religious affiliation, as well as personal history and personality. This suggests that what makes elite capture so powerful and dominant is that elites exert their influence less often by coercion, and more by moral claims and symbolic power (Dasgupta and Beard 2007). The dynamics of elite domination and manipulation is sustained and reproduced via the process of elite circulation. This mechanism ensures elite continuity, transformation and replacement through which elites cooperate, compete and reconcile their differences from time to time (Higley & Burton 2006).

The elites in Nigeria's Fourth Republic tend to have kept virtually all the state apparatus at hostage through skewed electoral process and undemocratic governance. Democratic institutions in Nigeria such as the legislature,

executive, judiciary, and regulatory agencies have been captured by the elites thereby weakening the capacity of the state to ensure rule of law. This has resulted to lack of accountability, unprecedented abuse of power for selfish pursuit and personal aggrandizement, as well as crass misrule. The elites focus on control of political and state power for protecting and promoting the interests of members at the expense of the masses. The consequence is antithetical to democracy for it negates the salient attributes thereof, such as accountability, responsiveness and transparency. This is a threat to democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

Election and democratic representation/consolidation in Nigeria: an overview

Election depicts a social contract between representatives and the represented and also provides opportunity for transition from particular sets of representatives and office holders to another (David, Manu & Musa 2014). Ayoade (2006) describes election as the process of actualizing representative democracy. It is a method of selecting a few people from a large group such that the few people become a representative of the large group. Nnadozie (2004) posits that election is a medium through which individuals or groups are chosen in order to represent their constituencies in the context of governance.

Scholars such as Schumpeter (1942), Linz and Stepan (1996), Przeworski (1997) and Omotola (2014) have separately noted that elections are the first and most basic indicator of democracy because of their presumed capacity to guarantee political participation, competition and legitimacy which, in turn, are pivotal to democratic consolidation. This implies that competitive elections provide a framework quintessential to organizing democratic uncertainty in order to produce legitimate change, rebirth, renewal and power alternation (Przeworski 1997).

Since the democratic transition heralding the Fourth Republic in Nigeria in 1999, Elections have been aggressively contested. This is owing to its strategic place a means to gaining access to the control of state power which is considered to be the prime source and/or sustainer of material wealth and livelihood security (Fadakinte 2013). This thinking has, over the years, informed a pattern of politicking that involves desperate competition for power, making pursuit of state power a matter of ‘a do or die affair’ where the winner takes all and the loser loses all.

This situation is complicated by the character of Nigeria's political class which is not in tune with the ideology of liberal democracy. To be sure, the dominant political class does not possess the requisite democratic ethos, such as tolerance, discipline and democratic temper to engage in credible elections (Fadakinke 2013). Due to the desperate desire by politicians to win elections at all costs in order to enjoy the perquisites of power, elections in Nigeria have often been characterised by violent confrontations, bringing about outcomes that negate democratic consolidation and sustainability. In the process, the country at every turn of election becomes crisis ridden and prone to instability.

The crisis of electoral democracy in Nigeria is endemic. Over the years, it has manifested in the forms of excessive manipulation, monetization and structural emasculation of the electoral processes, with widespread irregularities and violence (Ademola & Adenuga 2015). This tendency has persisted across all elections in the Fourth Republic and has taken the form of widespread illegitimate use of state power (abusive incumbency advantage) as well as money (vote-buying/selling) to influence a preferred outcome in an election. This has found expression in heavy monetization and militarization of the electoral process whereby the electioneering experience assumes the complexion of a 'market' as well as a 'war' scenario.

Furthermore, election in Nigeria appears to have been characterised with poor administration, often defined by a seemingly weak and inefficient electoral umpire. The Nigerian 1999 Constitution as amended and the 2010 Electoral Act as amended has empowered Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) as the electoral umpire to organize and conduct elections into various political offices in the country. However, each elections conducted by INEC have always been flawed by INEC's poor organization, lack of accountability and transparency (Edet 2015). The weakness of election-mediating institutions such as Police, INEC, the courts etc. has effectively reduced Nigeria's elections to mere periodic rituals, yielding little or no meaningful democratic outcomes. This affirms the position of Dudley (1982) to the effect that Nigeria parades weakly institutionalized political institutions which are incapable of handling pressures from the political system. Hence, successive elections in Nigeria have been generally poor as the electoral umpire (INEC) seems to have been heavily influenced and manacled by the vested interests of the powers that be (the forces of incumbency). This has vitiated the prospect of delivering on the task of conducting free, fair and credible elections in Nigeria.

By the above indices, election in Nigeria can be said to have amounted to a contradiction of the traditional theoretical postulations that election is the fulcrum of democracy which carries a premium of political representation as well as legitimizing a government through popular mandate. This gross

negation of the cardinal democratic principles in relation to electioneering in Nigeria holds critical implications for the country's democratic representation and consolidation. Thus, achieving the essence of democratic representation and consolidation seem to have remained utopian. As observed by Nwanegbo (2015), that the manipulative nature of electioneering instantiated by massive riggings, diabolic politicking, violent electioneering, vote selling/buying among many irregularities, explain why elections seem not have resulted to true democratic representation and consequent consolidation in Nigeria.

Elections in a democracy are not a simple transfer of decision-making powers onto the political representatives. This is because a mere possession of political autonomy and subjectivity by a voter does not always determine his or her credible participation in the elections. By this token, Democratic representation entails peoples' government or popular rule. Popular rule entails a governmental process of defining, collecting, harmonizing, promoting and protecting the general interests of the people for the betterment of life in the entire society. Here, it is the general concern and responsibility of all to manage the affairs of their society to bring about improvement in the quality of life by increased general access to the basic needs of life. But since people cannot do this all together at once, they do it through a freely 'democratically' elected few called the representatives. Democratic representation can be regarded as a system of government that is underpinned by the perception that people in any society should be free to determine their own political, economic, social, and cultural systems. Therefore, democratic representation simply refers to a political system where governance is rooted in the basic principles of democracy and carried out by individuals who are willingly and freely chosen by the people.

The system of government in a democracy is one under which the people exercise the governing power either directly or through representatives periodically elected by them (Appadorai 2004). Thus, representation is widely seen as the pillar of contemporary democratic leadership. The implication is that the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of collective civic life is one in which majority of the citizens take active part. However, direct inclusive participation is only achievable in a small populated community and not in a highly populated and complex modern society, hence, the necessity for representation in government. Simply put therefore, representation implies the indirect presence of people in the management of their public or state affairs.

The above corroborates the assertion of Fairlie (1940), that democratic representation depicts that system of government where the powers are delegated to elected representatives, who exercise them for the benefit of the whole nation. Suggestively, democratic representation is the activity of making

citizens' voices, opinions and perspectives 'present' in public policy making processes. It occurs when political actors speak, advocate, symbolize and act on behalf of their electorates in the political arena. Laying the philosophical foundation of representative governments, renowned political philosophers and theorists as Hobbes in his *Leviathan*, Plato in *The Republic* and Machiavelli in *The Prince*, observably advanced that public decision making should be left as a responsibility of a few members of the community.

According to Lincoln's famous perspective that democracy is government of the people, by the people and for the people, democratic regime provides a platform for selected individuals to represent their people because it is only by courtesy of such an arrangement that government can hope to attain the status of people's rule. It is to be observed that the essence of democratic representation is to enable the people have not only a say in the management of their society, but that they can also control effectively how the state is run and what policy is implemented for their general good. Incidentally, there are indications that electorates have not been able to determine the quality of their lives as well as the fate of their state through democratic representation in the Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

The idea of democratic consolidation means an identifiable phase in the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic systems that are critical to the establishment of a stable, institutional and lasting democracy. Democratic consolidation entails strengthening, entrenching and institutionalizing democratic ideals, values and virtues in a political system. It has to do with the avoidance of authoritarian regression; particularly, through the institutionalization of a credible electoral administration process. This is in tune with the assertion Linz and Stepan (1996, 10) that "democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions, a democratic system expressed in periodic and regular elections becomes the only game in town; when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic norms and values". Democratic consolidation, therefore, involves strengthening of certain institutions, such as the electoral system, revitalized or newly created parties, judicial independence and respect for human rights, which have been created or recreated during the course of the transition (Carothers 2007). Thus, Democratic consolidation revolves around making new democracies secure and extending their life expectancy beyond the short term by creating immune against the threat of authoritarian regression and building dams against eventual reverse to authoritarianism (Carothers 2007; Fawole 2005; Przeworski 1997; Zakaria 1997). The implication of this is that election serves as a critical framework for democratic consolidation with ultimate regard for the rule of law (Frempog 2006; Sha 2005).

According to Diamond (1999) creating a stable, democratic, effectively governed politics is an enormous challenge for any developing country that has experienced predominantly political instability, democratic failures and institutional decay since independence. It implies series of continuous actions and changes geared toward the replacement of an existing system of authoritarian and undemocratic rule (Yagboyaju 2007). Some other scholars view democratic consolidation as the process by which a new democracy matures in a way that means it is unlikely to revert to authoritarianism without an external shock or a process of democratization that resist the tendencies of reversing or regressing back to the dark days of authoritarian military regime (Linz & Stepan 1996; Asiwaju 2000; Mortiar 2002; Jega 2007; Yagboyaju 2007). More specifically, democratic consolidation, “implies the internalization of democratic culture and the institutionalization of democratic best process” by a polity that has successfully embarked on a democratic transition (Asiwaju 2000, 4). Thus, consolidating democracy means reducing the probability of breaking to a point where they can feel reasonably confident that democracy will persist in the near future (Schedler, in Egbegbulem 2011). Thus, Schedler as cited in Egbegbulem (2011, 67) contends that:

[...] consolidating democracy may involve the positive tasks of deepening a fully liberal democracy or completing a semi democracy or it may respond to the “negative” challenges of impeding the erosion of a liberal democracy or else avoiding the breakdown of whatever minimal kind of democracy we have in place [...] (Egbegbulem, 2011, 67).

Linz and Stepan (1996) posit that the key indicators of democratic consolidation include credible elections, and the rule of law, free and active civil society, relatively autonomous and valued political society, functional bureaucracy as well as institutionalized economy. Democratic consolidation prevails in societies where many of the prominent democratic principles largely constitute positive political culture. According to Przeworski as cited in Mortiar (2002) democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a particular system of institutions become the only game in town. It is when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they lost (Mottier 2002).

In his view, Jega (2007, 297) argues that democratic consolidation is a term which describes “a vital political goal for new democracies”. Diamond cited in Jega (2006, 6) stated that “Democratic consolidation has to with overlapping behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional dimensions, through

which democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even in psychological life, as well as in political calculations for achieving success" (Jega 2007, 6). Linz and Stepan (1996) earlier provided further explanation on behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional aspects of democratic consolidation. They explained that behaviorally, a democracy is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime or by seceding from the state.

Democratic consolidation could also be viewed from the standpoint of stability of the democratic processes with emphasis on regular and credible elections (Igbuzor 2005; Akinsanya 2006). Thus, it is important to state that elections are the foundation for any successful democracy and indeed its consolidation. However, emphasis on elections as a stepping stone towards consolidating democracy seems to be questionable especially when taken into cognizance Nigeria's experience, mainly characterized so far by electoral malfeasance and structural infractions that detract from the merit of electoral democracy. And besides the question of electioneering, the outcome of the electoral processes in Nigeria's Fourth Republic has left much to be desired of the essence of the social contract between the electorate and their elected representatives which is serviced by way of routine elections. The question then is whether successive electoral dispensations in that context have engendered substantive outcomes that leverage democratic dividends. The following subsections attempt to proffer relevant insights in that regard.

Contexts and indicators of democratic deficits in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

Nigerian democracy is running on weak foundations (Adeniyi 2018). This is because the enabling structures and culture required to effectuate and consolidate the practice are either nonexistent or inefficient. In effect, therefore, the practice has been characterized by both structural and functional deficits. For the purpose of our discourse in this paper, democratic deficits could be seen in three different dimensions: *normative*, *empirical* and *functional* perspective (Ogbonna 2012). From the normative perspective, democratic deficit occurs when political arrangements and institutions fail to satisfy public expectation and aspiration; this defies the expectation that popular political participation (mostly through election) makes government responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people. On the other hand, the empirical perspective sees democratic deficit in a government in terms of citizens ability or otherwise to utilise their civic stake in governance to make


their government amenable to their wishes or interests. In the functional perspective, a government is democratically deficient when it is unable to generate appreciable popular legitimacy from the people. These three dimensions of democratic deficit have generally manifested in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

The ruling elites and democratic institutions have failed to provide the enabling civil infrastructure for sustainable and profitable democratization. Instead, cycles of civilian governments have been characterised by false starts, failed transitions, and recurring challenges to stable rule. Elected regimes have faltered over precarious institutions, factionalism among elites and pervasive corruption (Peter, Alemika & Michael 2002; Osaghae & Larry 1995). With reference to Nigeria's Fourth Republic, democratic deficits have been variously made manifest by virtue of the indicators considered here-under.

Alarming poverty rate

The trajectory of Nigeria's poverty level from 1999 has maintained an unfortunate increase. In 2018, the World Poverty Clock ranked Nigeria topmost in terms of countries of the world with the largest concentration of people living under extreme poverty as captured below in Figure 1:

Figure 1: Nigeria's poverty level, 2018



Source: Sahara Reporters, 2019. <https://qz-com.cdn.ampproject.org>

The above indicates that about 46.5 per cent of the country's population reportedly lives below poverty line of a dollar per day (Sahara Reporters 2019). This is unfortunate when considered against the backdrop of the country's huge material and human endowments. It only explains the inability of the various democratic governments in the country over the years to improve the general living conditions by way of proper needs-based authoritative allocation of values/resources.

Security debacle

Burton (2019) having empirically studied incidences of security threats across the globe, placed Nigeria as the fifth most threatened/dangerous country in the world in terms of safety and security indices. Table 1 is instructive in this regard.

Table 1: Most dangerous countries in the world

Rank	Country	Ranking 2018	Rank	Country	Ranking 2018
1	Central African Republic	149	11	Cameroon	139
2	D.R. Congo	148	12	Libya	138
3	Iraq	147	13	Kenya	137
4	Afghanistan	146	14	Burundi	136
5	Nigeria	145	15	India	135
6	Sudan	144	16	Ukraine	134
7	Pakistan	143	17	Mexico	133
8	Colombia	142	18	Uganda	132
9	Philippines	141	19	Chad	133
10	Yemen	140	20	Mali	134

Source: Burton (2019)

This is also a glaring indicator of democratic deficit in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Ensuring the safety and security of the people is the essence of government generally, but more fundamentally in a democracy being

people's government. However, the democratic institutions in control of the state's coercive apparatuses have by-and-large failed to secure maximally, human lives and resources and hence the prevalence of insecurity in the country. This is instantiated by the incidences of Boko Haram insurgency, armed banditry, militancy and a host of other security threats in the country.


Infrastructural and industrial deficits

Infrastructural deficits include collapse of basic amenities and public facilities in the country. This is amply exemplified in the near extinction of railways, as well as the colossal dilapidation of road networks, public schools, health and water facilities. Public power has been at its lowest ebb, with less than 5,000 MW generation capacity alongside intractable distribution and transmission challenges. Allied to the problem of infrastructure is that of poor industrial base.

The Nigerian industrial sector is in virtual comatose. The Nigerian textile industry, steel rolling mill, rubber, woods, cement, fertilizer, ceramics and publishing industries were vibrant and internationally competitive in the 1970s and 1980s. Currently, their operational capacities are being dwarfed by high cost of production caused by epileptic power supply, high interest and exchange rates, influx of inferior and substandard products, multiplicity of taxes and levies, poor sales partly as a result of low purchasing power of the consumers, delay in clearing consignments due to existence of multiple inspection agencies at the ports etc. The national refineries are struggling to maintain nominal serviceability while the mega Ajaokuta iron and steel project has suffered a generational neglect.

Heightened unemployment

Nigeria's unemployment records are colossal (Figure 2). The situation holds critical implications for human security in Nigeria. An integral facet of Nigeria's unemployment palaver is the issue of youth unemployment and unemployability. More than a half of the unemployed population of Nigeria is youth, most of whom are educated at the tertiary level.

Figure 2: Unemployment rate in Nigeria, 2016-2018

Source: Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, 2018


The non-engagement of the magnitude of the country's youth in gainful employment has led to dire collateral consequences, including youth bulge, youth restiveness, and associated vices and crimes. The prevalence of these existential situations in the country speaks ill of success of democratic governance in Nigeria.

Brain-drain/Human capital depreciation

There has been a persistent exodus of Nigerian best brain for better livelihood opportunities (Figure 3) outside the shores of the country. This brain-drain syndrome critically affects the country's human resource development index as Nigerian professionals in diverse fields especially health and education sectors daily exit the country for Europe, America and Canada among other developed countries in search of greener pasture. About 5,405

Nigerian trained doctors and nurses currently work with the British National Health Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom. This has aggravated Nigeria's physician-patient ratio from 1:4000 to 1:5000, negating the W.H.O's recommended 1:600. The irony of the situation is that Nigeria incidentally ranks so highly in terms of patronage of international medical and educational tourism.

Figure 3: Reasons for brain-drain in Nigeria



Source: <https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/Africa/2018-09-05-a-third-of-nigerians-want-to-emigrate-but-not-to-south-africa>

Allied to the issue of brain-drain is the crisis of the education sector. The sector has suffered enormous neglect, yielding therefore dysfunctional outcomes. This has pushed many Nigerians into the option of seeking to study abroad. Hence, the number of Nigerians schooling in universities in the West has been alarming (Table 2).

Table 2: Number of Nigerian students in America, 2005-2016


Year	Undergraduate	Graduate	OPT ⁴	Other	Total
2015/16	5,424	3,803	1,231	216	10,674
2014/15	4,770	3,339	1,198	187	9,494
2013/14	4,030	2,771	997	115	7,921
2012/13	3,707	2,551	953	105	7,316
2011/12	3,577	2,522	819	110	7,028
2010/11	3,772	2,454	799	123	7,148
2009/10	3,490	2,327	646	97	6,566
2008/09	3,513	2,153	516	74	6,256
2007/08	3,745	1,968	438	71	6,222
2006/07	3,569	1,820	483	71	5,943
2005/06	4,102	1,819	N/A	271	6,192

Source: wenr.wes.org.google.com

Corruption incidence and prevalence

Corruption has remained a prominent issue in Nigeria's national question. Several rankings have placed the country among the topmost in terms of global corruption incidence especially within the Fourth Republic. Transparency International (Figure 4) indicates how corruption has persistently threatened to endanger the collective destiny of the nation from 2010 to 2018.

⁴ Optional Practical Training.

Figure 4: Level of corruption in Nigeria, 2010-2018

Source: Transparency International, 2018. tradingeconomics.com

From the foregoing, it is evident that years of democratic practice in Nigeria's Fourth Republic have not really translated into much prospect of good governance. Concrete dividends of democracy appear not to have been sustainably realized. It should be pointed out that the whole essence of democracy is to determine and implement the will of the citizens in governance. The government is contracted through election to carry out the functions of authoritative allocation of resources at the instance of the people. Fulfilling this mandate requires the government to not only harness but generate resources to bringing about the greatest happiness for the greatest number of the citizenry. Where this is not feasible, democracy can be said to be non-existent, or at best, deficient.

Democratic deficits in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: sundry implications

Democracy is a system of popular control over governmental policies and decisions. For this to happen, a government needs to be responsive and accountable to popular control (Dahl 1989). However, there are instances where democratic institutions are falling short of fulfilling the principles of responsiveness and accountability in their practice or operations. This lack of responsiveness to the popular preferences and democratic oversight is known as 'the democratic deficit' (Dahl 1989). Democratic deficit is a great big gap where public engagement with political processes should be. To reiterate, a democratic deficit occurs when ostensibly democratic organizations or institutions (particularly governments) fall short of fulfilling the principles of democracy in their practices or operations (Rohrschneider 2002).

The return to democratic governance on May 29, 1999 to most Nigerians provided the opportunity to overturn the widespread developmental and political problems associated with prolonged military rule and at the same time a hope of great expectations of improved quality of wellbeing and governance. However, many years after the return to democratic rule, the huge expectations of many Nigerians have been largely undermined by poor governance, with its attendant socio-economic and political challenges. For instance, the Nigerian economy is currently characterized by the problems of poverty, widening income inequality between the rich and the poor, disinvestment, inflation, deindustrialization, mass unemployment and debt crisis. The Transparency International in its annual rating made Nigeria third, fourth and fifth most corrupt nation in the world in 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. Thus corruption has eaten deep into the fabric of the nation and has shaken it to its foundation and tends to turn the efforts at democratic consolidation into a mere mirage. There has always been the use of violence or the threat of violence in the context of party politics (Jega 2014). The ultimate prize is the capture and retention of political power at all costs.

More worrisome is the trajectory of party politics which has been associated with syndromes such as the phenomenon of godfatherism. Godfatherism is one of the biggest dangers to democracy today and paradoxically it only survives with government support (Gambo 2006). It has come to assume a dangerous dimension as a consequence of the systematic entrenchment of money politics in the country. It produces an unresponsive leadership and tends to negate all tenets of democratic process by obstructing candidate selection and even executive selection once government is installed. The activities of godfather tend to reduce the legitimacy of government and void the electoral value of the citizens (Edet 2016; Odigbo 2015). In addition, the inordinate culture of profligacy arising from the low level of accountability characterizing governmental processes, leading to abysmal economic performances and culminating in serious developmental misfortunes. The country's road, rail, electricity, water infrastructure, health and education institutions have been in a state of decay and total collapse.

Other signifiers of democratic deficits in Nigeria's Fourth Republic include over politicization of governance and insecurity, securitization and militarization of electioneering, electoral malfeasance, political impunity that smacks of disregard for the constitution and the rule of law, violation of human rights, emasculation of the civil society and the judiciary, to mention but a few. These indicators point to a bleak future for the country especially as it relates to democratic survival and consolidation.

Closing the gaps: mitigating democratic deficits in Nigeria

Contemporary scholarly contestations about democracy and election are perceptibly not more on establishing the superiority of democracy on other forms of government or election as a means to achieving representative democratic leadership but on how best a society would vis-à-vis its peculiarities utilize the merits of election to achieve democratic value. To this end, mitigating democratic deficit in any polity fundamentally requires an all-inclusive approach burgeoning from individual character re-orientation to institutional re-structuring based on the earnest determination to have a functional democracy where the greatest good of the greatest number is sacrosanct.

Going forward, elections should be free and fair in order that the public is enabled to select in or out the candidates of their choice into the country's leadership. People should determine who occupies what position and who does not through the power of the ballot so that through same, they can hold nonperforming leaders accountable. This is because the essence of democracy is the joint participation of the members of society in selecting, usually through free, fair and competitive elections, those whom they wish to have as their representatives in government. In this regard, political accountability and popular participation are promoted to the extent that the public feel a sense of an inclusive polity where their views and opinions are respected and their interests protected.

Furthermore, there should be adherence to democratic principles of rule of law and checks and balances. A state is democratic if there is devolution of governmental powers such that no single individual or institution has the opportunity to abuse power. It is therefore recommended here that rule of law alongside the supremacy of the constitution be upheld at all times in order to avoid abuse of power and all forms of impunity.

Additionally, empowerment of anticorruption agencies such as Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is also recommended. This will curb corrupt anti-democratic practices in the country. Similarly, a public reorientation on the ills of corruption is necessary so as to breed from the Nigerian homes, a people grounded in patriotism. By the same token, the leadership and followership arms of the polity should be given some civic orientation designed to inculcate a progressive political culture capable of breeding up a viable and consolidated democratic entity.

Conclusion

Election remains the cornerstone of democracy due to its strategic importance as a framework for democratic transition as well as a critical indicator of democratic representation and consolidation. However, it appears that Nigeria has been witnessing voting without 'choosing', because the process of electing our political leaders is horrendously flawed. The manifestations of democratic deficits are evident in poor governance, blurred leadership resulting to incongruencies and policy summersault. Political and economic instability, flawed electoral process, rampant disregard to the rule of law and disobedience to court rulings as well as mortgaged judicial system amongst other colossal failures of democratic ideals seem to have made electoral democracy a mere caricature in the Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Democratic deficits are the consequence of structural inefficiencies inherent in the democratic framework due to poor design and the malfunctioning of the institutions resulting to a crisis of democracy.

The scorching persistent poverty, unemployment, poor economic management, widespread corruption, infrastructural deficits, low investor's confidence, debt overhang, inefficient public institutions, and lack of social trust and confidence in government are some of the indicators of democratic deficits in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. In fact, this has led to widespread collapse of social values and infrastructure, as well as the prevalence of illiteracy, insecurity of lives and properties, political corruption, authoritarianism, electoral malpractice, political violence and general governance failures. In order to entrench, sustain and consolidate democracy, there is a need for a strategic reformation of the key institutional frameworks of democracy. In other words, INEC, the legislature, the judiciary, the police, the constitution and the civil society should be reconfigured in line with the global democratic best practices to ensure credible elections as well as effective democratic representation and consolidation.

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ABSTRACT

This paper is a commentary interrogating the phenomenon of democratic deficits in Nigeria's Fourth Republic based on an exploratory analysis of secondary sources. The essence of government is the fulfillment of public good. Democratic government is acclaimed to be most suited to determine and implement such a mandate. Incidentally, this has not been a general experience across the world's democracies. Successive democratic administrations in Nigeria's Fourth Republic have left a lot to be desired in relation to fulfilling their democratic mandate through proper representation and good governance. Series of elections have produced different crops of supposed people's representatives. Yet the existential conditions of the people have not been touched in a manner that justifies that these representatives rule at the instance of the people, let alone represent their interests and aspirations. The gaping deficits of democracy in that regard has warranted the submission of this paper to the effect that electoral democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic has not brought about the needed democratic dividends in terms of efficient governance and effective representation.

KEYWORDS

Democracy; Democratic deficits; Democratic representation; Election; Fourth Republic (Nigeria).

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AFRICAN UNION: MBEKI'S SOUTH AFRICA POLICY FOR AFRICA¹

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Introduction

Marked by tragedies that reinforce stereotypes about itself, especially those that portray it as dependent on developed countries and unable to solve its own dilemmas, the African continent still presents itself in the 21st century with challenges related to hunger and humanitarian calamities, more recurrent in some regions than others. The initiatives to deal with these issues arise right at the beginning of the second millennium primarily from South Africa. In this sense, it is possible to ask the following question: what political and economic measures were adopted by the African continent in order to combat these problems?

Based on the bibliographic review of qualitative secondary sources relevant to the theme and on the analysis of primary sources, such as speeches and official documents of the Organization of African Unity, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate changes in the political and economic dynamics. Those changes were materialized in the different principles incorporated by the Organization of African Unity (1963) and the African Union (2001), the two main organizations for political, economic and social cooperation at the continental level, which took place in Africa at the beginning of the 21st century. The specific objective of this article is to present the change of

¹ This work has contributions made by speakers after the presentation of the research in two events: *África e Educação: avanços, desafios e realidades*, organized by the Universidade Católica de Petrópolis, and *II Encontro Regional Sudeste da Associação Brasileira de Estudos da Defesa*, held at the Universidade Federal Fluminense in October 2019.

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guidelines, politically and economically, adopted by the African Union at the time of the transition to the new millennium and the role of South Africa, during the administration of Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008) during the process. The historical period being analysed, therefore, dates from the mid-1990s to the end of Mbeki's presidential term in September 2008.

Thus, the study assumes the following hypothesis: in addition to the circumstantial issues, which, to a certain extent, demand solutions to the new challenges posed to Africa in the period, the changes in the African political and economic orientation, observed during the transition of the Organization of African Unity for the African Union, in the early 2000s, had a notable influence from South Africa.

For better understanding of the following arguments, the article will be divided into four sections. While the first provides historical contextualization of the African continent on arrival in the 21st century, the second will present the popularization of the term "African Renaissance" by the South African former president, Thabo Mbeki. Finally, concrete examples of institutional changes will be exposed in the last part, followed by final comments.

Africa in the 20th century: from pan-Africanism to Afro-pessimism

European domination in Africa, dating from the Berlin Conference in 1885, until the mid-1960s, lasted over 75 years. For almost this entire period, the continent was under the control of European industrial powers, reaching the end of World War II with only four states – nominally, at least – independent: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and the South African Union (Meredith 2017; Pereira, Ribeiro and Visentini 2014). However, the extensive history of European interference on the continent does not begin in 1885, since it dates back to the enslavement of people and their trafficking in the Atlantic Ocean during the 16th century (Fonseca 2015; Macedo 2018).

The weakening of the old colonial empires, especially the French and English, and their consequent inability to project their power, due to the physical, political and economic destruction caused by the Second World War (1939-1945), had profound impacts on the African continent (Otávio 2013). Thus, much of Africa entered the second half of the 20th century "under the control of four European colonial powers – England, France, Belgium and Portugal –, all assuming that the trajectories they had chosen for their African colonies would last" (Meredith 2017, 543).

According to Martin Meredith (2017), there was also the participation of colonial armies in relevant conflict war theaters and their economic collaboration in the growing colonial urban centers. If World War I and the Russian Revolution, at the beginning of the century, already announced the beginning of the decline of the European colonial enterprise and influenced political movements in defense of the emancipation of the colonized peoples, the impacts and results of the Great Depression and World War II accelerated this process even more (Pereira, Ribeiro and Visentini 2014).

Before exploring the national liberation struggles that broke out in Africa since the 1950s, it is necessary to study pan-Africanism, the main catalyst for the continent's independence processes (Otávio 2013). Although the historical origins of pan-africanism are relatively defined the consensus around a unique understanding of the term is still something that is desired (Iroulo 2017). Arising in the Americas between the 18th and 19th centuries, Pan-Africanism had as its central purpose to fight against slavery and white domination. In Africa, pan-Africanism, already as a strong political-philosophical movement, can be dated from the "invasion of Ethiopia by fascist Italy in 1935, as well as, and above all, the fifth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, in October 1945", where, for the first time, the number of African representatives was higher than representatives from other countries (Chanaiwa and Kodjo 2010, 897; Mazrui 1967 apud Ahluwalia 2002).

Pan-Africanism, as an integration force that seeks cultural, political and economic cooperation on the continent, can be understood through three distinct stages: the colonial stage, between 1935 and 1957; the independence stage, regarding the liberation from colonial rule; and a third stage, initiated in the 1970s, in which pan-Africanism "was greatly reinforced by the spectacular changes that occurred in the world economy and by the heavy repercussions of these changes in African economies", with the main purpose of finding solutions for African development (Chanaiwa and Asante 2010, 873). In this sense, one can understand Pan-Africanism by looking at its common core: the economic, political and social liberation of the continent, just like its union to achieve this goal (Iroulo 2017).

The fifth Pan-African Congress (Manchester 1945), mentioned above, is considered the landmark of the first phase. The event was attended by important figures such as Peter Milliard (Guyana), RT Makonnen (Antilles), Kwame N'Krumah (Ghana), George Padmore (Trinidad and Tobago), Peter Abrahams (South Africa), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya) and the American W. E. B. Du Bois (Chanaiwa and Kodjo 2010). The deliberations and declarations made during the congress, aimed to the colonial administrations, claimed the following points:

the emancipation and total independence of Africans, and other racial groups; the immediate end of discriminatory and racist laws, as well as forced labor; freedom of association and expression; equal pay for equivalent positions; and political and social rights, such as health care and education⁴.

The transition of African societies to the phase of national liberation struggles is based on the independence of Ghana, which, in the past, had become the “ideal colony”, a status sought by other colonies in Africa. Under the guidance of Kwame N’Krumah, and his Convention People’s Party, the population of the Gold Coast gained independence in March 1957, taking the name of an ancient African empire (Meredith 2017).

However, for N’Krumah, the independence of his people from England would not represent its emancipatory potential if it remained an isolated event on the continent. “According to him, as he declared on the night of the conquest of sovereignty by his country, Ghana’s independence was meaningful only in the perspective of a complete liberation of the African continent” (Chanaiwa and Kodjo 2010, 900).

Three years after the achievement of Ghanaian autonomy, in the so-called *African Year*, other countries also had the same experience. In 1960, numerous colonies⁵ promoted their respective processes of independence from European metropolises. Between 1961 and 1966, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Gambia, Botswana and Lesotho also joined the group of newly released colonies (Macedo 2018).

Thus, the next step in the fight against colonial domination was debated: the adoption of an organized emancipation strategy on a continental scale (Iroulo 2017; N’Krumah 1969). Even after the development of national liberation struggles, colonial interference was still evident on the continent. An example of this, as presented by N’Krumah in *Neocolonialism: the last stage of imperialism* (1967), can be seen in the European attempt to fragment Africa after the beginning of decolonization. The objective, according to the author, was to guarantee corporate interests and access to the large African market.

At a global level, such structures can be observed in some international institutions, such as the League of Nations Mandates, that allowed

4 In South Africa, for example, the Native Urban Act and the Native Affairs Act were passed in 1923. The first limited the “possibility for blacks to settle in cities considered to be white strongholds”, while the second “crowned the complex establishment of a segregationist legislation, regulating the system of exploitation of black labor” (Pereira 2012, 57).

5 Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Chad, Central African Republic, Togo, Ivory Coast, Dahome (today’s Benin), Nigeria, Niger, Upper Volta (today’s Burkina Faso), Senegal, Mali, Madagascar, Somalia, Mauritania and Belgian Congo.

the continuation of colonial administration over territories for an indefinite period of time (Pereira, Ribeiro and Visentini 2014), and the United Nations Guardianship Council, whose purpose was to supervise the territories administration under the tutelage of the international community (UN 2019). This demonstrates the continuity of the Orientalist thought, exposed by Edward Said (2007), classically translated by Marx as “they are not able to represent themselves, therefore needing to be represented” (Marx 2011, 143). Furthermore, according to the Brazilian diplomat Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (2001), the expansion of international agencies, such as the UN, IMF and World Bank, is one of the strategies adopted by hegemonic structures of power, a concept proposed by the author to refer to the asymmetric international dynamics in which the States operate, to perpetuate the center-periphery relationship in international politics. According to Guimarães, such organizations, conceived as neutral and universal, would endeavor to standardize and sanction behavior in the international arena according to the interests of the great powers that lead them.

Thus, two groups emerged with the common goal of breaking with the domination structures inherited from imperialism: the Casablanca Group (Guinea, Egypt, Mali, Morocco, Libya, exiled government from Algeria and Ghana) and the Monrovia or Brazzaville Group (Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Liberia). While the former sought the creation of the United States of Africa, with the planning and centralization of economic development, in addition to forming a continental security system, the Monrovia/Brazzaville Group advocated for a more moderate strategy and respect for sovereignty and integrity of independent states (Otávio 2013; Pereira, Ribeiro and Visentini 2014).

The influence of the Monrovia Group can be seen in “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence” (OAU 1963, 4), one of the founding principles of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Created in 1963, in Addis Ababa, capital of Ethiopia, the organization aimed to coordinate efforts to improve the quality of life of African peoples; to eradicate all forms of colonialism from the continent; to defend the right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence and to promote unity and solidarity among African states.

The OAU’s role as a mediator proved to be efficient in matters of establishing borders between its member states, but in other situations, divergences and hesitations ended up revealing its fragility and, consequently, causing its weakening. It is precisely the possibility for states to act within a realist system, where, due to international anarchy, there are no legitimate

mechanisms to constraint the state actions, that contributed to situations of humanitarian calamity in the continent after 1963 (Farmer 2012; Macedo 2018; Paterson 2012 apud Rabelo and Guimarães 2014). In order to combat such occurrences, in 1992, for example, Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the institution in the period, submitted a proposal to the OAU Council of Ministers, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The Mechanism, whose main objective was to anticipate and prevent conflicts by engaging in peace-making and peace-building missions, was one of the points incorporated into the OAU jurisdiction in June 1993, in the Cairo Declaration, which also commemorated the organization's 30th anniversary (OAU 1993).

In addition to the absence of an institutional device to deal with the aforementioned issues, the Cold War, due to the strategic importance of allied states in the bipolar competition for zones of influence, also contributed to the permanence of authoritarian governments on the continent. USA and USSR accepted, when they did not encourage regimes such as those installed in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Chad and Equatorial Guinea (Hobsbawm 1995; Pereira 2012; Pereira, Ribeiro and Visentini 2014). In addition, the American and Soviet dispute over the support of allied African governments offered the continent numerous assistance programs, of different matrices, and contributed to the strengthening of the borders, artificially established by Europe in the 19th century. Under the influence of Washington and Moscow, such demarcations were maintained after the recognition of independence by the international community (Guimarães 2001). As a result, the African scenario since the 1970s, to a large extent, is characterized by the rise and consolidation of authoritarian regimes, such as Togo, Daomé (Benin), Alto Volta (Burkina Faso) and Central African Republic (Meredith 2017).

In the sphere of international economy, the period was also marked by the oil crises, in 1973 and 1979, and the collapse of the Welfare State, events that, given the restricted export agenda of African States and the contraction of European consumption, put the continuity of African economic development at risk (Fonseca 2015). The economic growth rate of sub-Saharan Africa between 1973 and 1983, for example, fell from 4.38% to a negative -2.49%, only returning to stable growth rates in 1996 (World Bank 2019).

Another element that represents the African scenario in the last quarter of the 20th century, as pointed out in the report "Trade liberalization and economic reform in developing countries: structural change or de-industrialization?", published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2005), is the incorporation of economic reform programs developed

by international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, and based on the Washington Consensus neoliberal agenda. In addition to calling attention to the adoption of liberalizing programs in an uncritical way, without taking into account the disparity between the levels of development of the countries, the document highlights deindustrialization trends in these economies.

The Rwandan Genocide (1994), portrayed in *We would like to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families*, by Philip Gourevitch (2006), seems to exemplify the last two decades of the 20th century in Africa. The period, which also witnesses the Second Congo War (1998-2003), known as the African World War, demonstrates the process of converting a remarkable optimism, experienced during decolonization, to a growing pessimism about the future of the region (Castellano da Silva 2012; Döpcke 2002).

The growing wave of optimism and self-confidence noted in the African continent since the 1960s, after the beginning of the process of achieving independence from the former European metropolises, finds a hindrance to its continuation in the rise of authoritarian regimes and the development of an economic crisis. Thus, at that moment, the recurring word in the international community to designate the future of the continent, after a reversal of expectations that has unfolded for little more than three decades, is clear in itself: afro-pessimism.

South African protagonism during the Mbeki administration

An important landmark for the African continent in the 1990s is South Africa's democratic transition. The end of the apartheid regime is symbolized by the historic 1994 election, in which, for the first time in the country's history, blacks were able to vote (Pereira 2012). The choice for Nelson Mandela as the first president of a democratic South Africa became a symbol of the country's integration into the African community and of the black victory over segregationist regimes, in addition to keeping alive vestiges of optimism to combat Afro-pessimism (Vale and Maseko 1998).

As vice president of the Mandela government, Thabo Mbeki, president of South Africa between 1999 and 2008, articulated a strategy to "build a counterweight to the widely publicized image of Africa as a continent incapable of combating its ills and inclined to the emergence of dictatorial governments" (Otávio 2013, 94). His proposal, the so-called "African Renaissance", gains name and form during a speech given at the University of the United

Nations in 1998, entitled *The African Renaissance, South Africa and the World*. Note that the term has antecedents in history, in authors such as Nnamdi Azikiwe, Cheikh Anta Diop and Pixley Seme, but it was popularized by Mbeki in the 1990's (Adebajo 2016).

According to Mbeki (1998), African self-esteem to alter its image before the international community would come from an umbilical relationship between the past and the future. This is observed in Landsberg and Hlophe (1999), who present two dimensions of the project and its historical and multifaceted approach. The first dimension stems from a conservative view that advocates a return to the roots and values of pre-colonial Africa, since there was an understanding that this would reorient the continent to a prosperous future. The second puts democratization and economic development at the heart of the renaissance, which are necessary to create a stable environment for peace and sustainable economic activity. According to Iroulo (2017), the African Renaissance represents not only the desire to modify the portrait of the continent, fighting the democratic and economic stagnation characteristic of afro-pessimism, but also the search for political and economic independence, regional integration and increased quality of life.

The longing for a genuine liberation, an aspiration that guides contemporary Africans, demands two crucial elements for its success. The first is the consolidation and maintenance of good governance systems, based on multiparty democracies and periodic elections, and the adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The intention was simple: to prevent the occurrence of cases such as Rwanda, Liberia and Somalia, which marked the African transition to the 21st century (Mbeki 1998).

The second essential element for the restoration of African dignity is the eradication of hunger, in order to fight the narrative that presents Africa as a place exclusively dependent on external charity. According to Mbeki (1998), this victory would come through economic modernization, with policies that guarantee foreign investments and encourage the private sector, reducing state participation in the economy.

During the speech, Mbeki also conditions the success of the African Renaissance to its elaboration by the Africans themselves, highlighting the failure of the inflexible importation of external models, "like the structural reforms driven by the liberal genius, the restructuring plans carried out by the economists of the West or even the carbon paper copy of real socialism and the Stalinist single-party model" (Saraiva 2008, 92).

In this sense, there is a divergence between Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance, because, although both preach the importance of inte-

grating Africa to face its challenges, especially that of economic development, the African Renaissance “encourages African countries to accept the globalized world and its conditions, to link democracy with economic development and to forge partnerships with industrialized countries” (Otávio 2013, 94).

In this way, it is possible to interpret the African Renaissance in three ways (Evans 1999 apud Ahluwalia 2002). The first version places the African Renaissance as a mere political instrument to consolidate Thabo Mbeki’s position in South Africa. Wishing to demonstrate that the country would not fall into crises after Mandela’s departure from the presidency, Mbeki appeals to romanticized images of an Africa prior to the colonization to leave the shadow of Mandela and endorse his place (Adebajo 2016).

The second interpretation portrays Mbeki as a radical Africanist who aims to reconstruct the continent’s identity, placing Africa in its rightful place in the international arena. This analysis argues that Mbeki would be following the work of Kwame N’Krumah, with the African Renaissance being the conclusion of the pan-Africanist movement. Adekeye Adebajo (2016), for example, lists, among other similarities, the attempt to build modern states, as an instrument for the restoration of African ancestral glory, as a common point between the two leaders.

Finally, the last reading sees Mbeki as the modernizer that would make the African continent internationally competitive and put an end to its marginalization during the deepening of globalization. It is precisely in this context that South Africa, with its capital and infrastructure, would place itself as the natural leader of the continent, a view that is celebrated by the South African business community and received with caution by African neighbors (Vale and Masejo 1998; Murthy, Soares and Vernoeven 2014). The alleged representation of Africa by Pretoria can be exemplified in the country’s association with the BRICS group, which, in 2011, officially adds the letter “S”. Superficially, the main efforts of the group, composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, are aimed at the democratization of the world order consolidated with the end of the Cold War (Stuenkel 2017).

In this sense, Wolfgang Döpcke (2002) emphasizes that the African Renaissance must in no way be understood as a mere humanitarianism of South Africa in appreciating African societies, enjoying the advantages of political and economic modernization. Whether to guarantee this country’s economic interests or to present an Africa “palatable to Western tastes”, the African Renaissance must be understood as part of South Africa’s political strategy for Africa. Still, according to the author, this argument would explain

Pretoria's efforts to be the main protagonist in the creation of a modernizing project, supposedly progressive and neutral, at the continental level.

Combining the scenario of afro-pessimism with the orientation of South African foreign policy, the context described above allowed South Africa to play an influential role as an architect of the African Union and its projects, especially the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Adebajo 2016; Landsberg 2007). Thus, in accordance to the central hypothesis of this paper, the changes observed at the time of transition from the OAU to the AU had great South African influence.

African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development

The OAU's adoption of the principle of inviolability of national sovereignty has enabled humanitarian crises and *coups d'état* to occur throughout the continent (Meredith 2017). The bipolar dynamics of the Cold War also contributed to the rise of these regimes, supported both by the capitalist bloc, led by the USA, and by the communist, under the leadership of the USSR (Macedo 2018).

In line with South Africa's political orientation project in the period, the troubled African scenario in the early 21st century motivates the creation of an institution capable of effectively solve the presented challenges (Adebajo 2016; Landsberg 2007). Thus, in order to combat economic marginalization in the globalized world and problems related to good governance and international indebtedness, in addition to promoting peace through democratic principles, the African Union is created in 2002 (OAU 2000; Akokpari 2016).

Precisely because of its character of humanitarian interventionism, combined with the principle of "non-indifference", the predecessor of Responsibility to Protect⁶, a vast academic literature places the African Union as the materialization of the ideals of the African Renaissance (Adams 2014; Murthy,

6 Coined in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the concept, Responsibility to Protect was unanimously adopted by the heads of state and government at the UN World Summit in 2005. At that time, state leaders have shown a willingness to take swift and collective action to protect a population against war crimes, ethnic cleansing and threats of genocide when peaceful means are ineffective in resolving such problems or the failure of national authorities to safeguard life of the population itself. Thus, it was established that it would be the responsibility of the international community to guarantee human security, even if, for this, it was necessary to break the national sovereignty of states incapable, if not violators, of protecting their population (Stuenkel 2017).

Soares and Vernoeven 2014). While providing for the defense of sovereignty and respect for the territorial integrity of the Member States, the AU sees Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, as an important mechanism for maintaining stability, peace and security on the African continent, the organization's right to "intervene in a Member State in accordance with a Conference decision in serious situations, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity". In addition, the institution also guarantees, in article 30 of the same document, the suspension of "governments that come to power through unconstitutional means" (OAU 2000, 8, 19)⁷.

The dilution and relativization of national sovereignty in favor of individuals and security, simultaneously with the incorporation of democratic principles and respect for human rights, foreseen in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, also finds materialization in the structuring of the African Peace and Security Architecture (Döpcke 2002; Haffner and Viana 2013). Its main body, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), operates similarly to the UN Security Council, authorizing operations necessary to prevent crimes against humanity and human rights violations (Murthy, Soares and Vernoeven 2014). The instrument, created to implement PSC decisions, is called the African Standby Force (ASF), an African multinational force whose headquarters would be located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, made up of five regional brigades. ASF, which also finds a fraction of its scope of activity in peace-keeping and peace-building operations, should go into action by 2010 (Geldenhuis 2010).

Since the creation of the AU, four missions of the organization have been issued and nine mandates for Peace Support Operations (African Union 2019) have been authorized. For example, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), created in 2003 with substantial participation of Ethiopian, Mozambican and South African officials, stands out. In 2004, AMIB is replaced by the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), as stated in UN Security Council Resolution number 1545 (UNSC, 2004). Also worth mentioning are the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), approved, respectively, in 2004 and 2006. After receiving logistical support from the UN for about three years, the AMIS management is transferred to the United Nations and African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), whose mandate, like that of AMISOM, was renewed in 2019 (AMISOM, 2019; ISS, 2019; UNAMID, 2019).

7 Sudan, for example, was suspended from the African Union in June 2019 after escalating tensions between the military and civilians, intensified by the fall of former Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir (Burke 2019).

When analyzing one of the main projects of the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), one can see, more explicitly, the great role of Pretoria in structuring the new political and economic dynamics in Africa. Supported by Nigeria, Algeria and Egypt, Mbeki institutionalised the ideals of the African Renaissance in a continental socio-economic development program, the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Program (MAP), which, for a long time, competed with the Omega Plan, a similar proposal by Abdoulaye Wade, Senegalese President in the period (Döpcke 2002). In 2001, the two proposals are compiled in the New African Initiative (NAI), renamed NEPAD and ratified by member states of the African Union in 2002 as a continental development strategy for the 21st century (African Union 2019).

Combining sustainable development, security and democracy (Pereira, Ribeiro and Visentini 2014), NEPAD's main objective is to provide a common mechanism, led by African leaders, to eradicate poverty; to promote sustainable growth on the continent; to stop Africa's marginalization from globalization; to accelerate women's empowerment and to integrate the continent into the global economy (African Union 2019).

From this, Döpcke (2002) argues that, to understand NEPAD, it is necessary to interpret it in three different contexts. The first context is that of the global insertion of Africa in the 21st century, since its inventors proposed to resume the international negotiations between African heads of government and the leaders of developed states. Therefore, NEPAD's strategy accepts, and internalizes to its proposals the liberal globalization, which is, in fact, a kind of "Africanization" of Western proposals. Such "Africanization" is also noticeable in the inclusion of a "set of political and social values such as democracy, human rights and good governance" (Döpcke 2002, 149).

The second context of interpretation is South African foreign policy after the fall of apartheid. The author observes in the African Renaissance the incorporation of values such as the fight against apartheid and the new South Africa, which turns the African Renaissance into an instrument of South African foreign policy. As already mentioned, this would explain Mbeki's desire to be the actor that will transform and lead Africa in the 21st century, under a project of domestic and continental modernization.

Another interpretation that can be made in this analysis is the economic interests of South African in its interaction with Africa. Since several African countries receive their manufactured goods, the adoption of NEPAD by these states would benefit the South African business community. Thus,

Mbeki's insistence on spreading the African Renaissance, that South Africa's future is inextricably linked to that of the entire continent not only reflects a concern for the West's image of Africa, of a junction between South Africa and the continent, but it reveals first of all the economic interests of this country (Döpcke 2002, 151).

As Joseph Nye (2002) points out, the creation of a system with common values and principles is a remarkable tool for maintaining political stability and economic growth. Therefore, it is believed that the institutionalization of the African Renaissance was part of South Africa's strategic calculations, to guarantee Africa's political and economic security, as well as to change the continent's image before the international system. Thus, there is a South African preponderance in the construction of the new African political and economic dynamics at the beginning of the 21st century, especially in the ordering of the African Union and NEPAD.

Conclusion

The present study sought to answer the following question: was there a participation of Pretoria in the incorporation of new political and economic paradigms, materialized in the change of posture of the African Union in relation to national sovereignty, for example, by the African continent in the 21st century? The affirmative answer to that question is supported by three arguments.

The first is based on the need for the adoption of a new political and economic model by Africa in the late 1990s. The consolidation of a liberal world order and the marginalization of the continent in the process of economic interdependence, in addition to mitigating the strategic importance of the African continent, disputed by the USA and the USSR during the bipolarity of the Cold War, presented African states with new challenges. Such problems found a solution in the African Renaissance, popularized by Mbeki when he was vice president of Nelson Mandela government. As noted, the African Renaissance combined revisiting the pre-colonial past with multiparty democracies and liberalizing economic reforms.

The second, largely due to the scenario of afro-pessimism and the urgency to participate in globalization actively, is based on the institutionalization of the African Renaissance in the African Union. This institutionalization can be seen both in its socioeconomic projects, such as NEPAD, and in its new stance towards potential interventions in the name of human security and peacekeeping on the continent.

Finally, there was also an intense South African commitment to the dissemination of the proposed reforms and the structuring of the African Union. Likewise, in the bilateral field, Mbeki engaged in mediating political crises during the period in which he was the head of the South African presidency, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire.

The arguments presented above, in addition to confirming the hypothesis of notable South African action in structuring African political and economic dynamics in the 21st century, also open the possibility to conclude one more thing: Pretoria's movements were not unnoticed, but carefully absorbed by countless African governments that saw such moves as attempts to consolidate regional hegemony.

One of the obstacles, recognized by Mbeki himself, that hinders the recognition of South Africa as a representative of Africa in international forums, responsibility delegated to a large extent by the international community during the negotiations for the end of apartheid, is economic asymmetry, and its consequences, between the country and the continent. While, since the 1990s, South African society has looked down on immigrants from other African countries⁸, especially from neighbors to the north and east, African governments fear the flooding of their economies by South African manufactures⁹. In this regard, one last point deserves mention.

On January 29, 2018, the African Union adopted its main program, Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want¹⁰, the Protocol Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment, a project started in 1991, with the former OAU. Similar to the Schengen Agreement of the European Union, the protocol signed in Ethiopia establishes, in article 6° (1), the right of citizens of a certain AU member state to enter, stay, move and leave the territory of another member state, where it would be forbidden to the receiving states, in accordance with article 3° (2a) of the treaty, any type of discrimination in relation to these people. In addition, the development of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), a continental free trade bloc that came into force in May 2019, fourteen months after its signature by

8 Suggested reading: Neocosmos, Michael. 2010. From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners': explaining Xenophobia in Post-Apartheid South Africa.

9 Suggested reading: Geldenhuys, Deon. South Africa: the idea-driven foreign policy of a regional power. In: Flandes, Daniel (Coord.). Regional leadership in the global system: ideas, interests and strategies of regional powers. Farnham Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010, p.151-168.

10 Suggested reading: African Union. Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. 2019. <https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview>

54 of the 55 AU members in March 2018, should also be noted. In an article published by the International Monetary Fund in the same month of implementation of the AfCFTA, for example, it is highlighted that, between 2000 and 2017, intra-African trade had as main object of exchange manufactured products, mainly from South Africa followed by Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire. These questions exemplify one of the challenges faced by Pretoria for years: the immigration-economy trade-off.

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ABSTRACT

Marked by calamities that emphasize stereotyped views about itself, Africa presents itself to the 21st century with a growing pessimistic expectation regarding its future and potential in the international arena. In response to this challenge, among others, Thabo Mbeki, president of South Africa in the period, popularizes the concept of African Renaissance, whose proposal offers solutions, in the political and economic sphere, to face adversity. In addition to political and economic guidance, the African Renaissance, understood as part of Pretoria's strategy for Africa, also has a remarkable role in structuring the African Union, created in 2002 as a deepening of the Organization of African Unity. Thus, this paper seeks to analyze the South African role in changing the political and economic dynamics observed in Africa at the beginning of the 21st century.

KEYWORDS

South Africa; Thabo Mbeki; Africa; Political and economic dynamics.

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SOCIO-SPATIAL AND ETHNIC-RACIAL SEGREGATION IN MEGACITIES, LARGE CITIES AND GLOBAL CITIES IN AFRICA

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Introduction

The estimated world population for 2030 is 8.6 billion people, one billion more than the current 7.6 billion (UN 2017). The same study points out that nine countries will account for more than half of this population growth, with five African nations among them (Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Egypt), in addition to three Asian countries (India, Pakistan and Indonesia) and one country in the Americas (The United States). In this work, we present an overview of the megacities, large cities and global cities of seven countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, which, according to the UN, is the continent's fastest growing region in population terms. These countries, with the cities that stand out on the international scene, according to the analyzed authors.

Still in 2030, two thirds of the world population will live in cities, which will produce 80% of the planet's GDP, with megacities appearing again in Asia, Latin America and Africa (UN 2017). The increase in the cost of living in these superclusters is certain, as well as in small and medium-sized cities. However, it is in the global and millionaire cities where cutting-edge urbanization occurs, although they are not the fastest growing cities in population terms, according to the UN (2017). Therefore, we bring here examples of these cities that become increasingly segregated.

The urban centers that will grow the most in Africa will be the now small and medium-sized cities, those with less than one million inhabitants, that is, those that concentrate 62% of the urban population of the African

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continent (UN 2017). Once again, it will be necessary to have urban, green and sustainable planning, so that these cities do not become new superclusters without infrastructure, as we will see throughout our examples.

According to UN (2017), the concept of “megacities” refers to those that are very large in population terms, not considering other aspects of these urban centers. The term “global city” is used when we make a qualitative analysis of the city, referring to its degree of influence over other urban centers, in different parts of the world (Decicino 2014).

Thus, we present a text that begins by explaining the origins of what we conceive today, in general, as African societies, then the text cites the countries analyzed, with their respective historical trajectories and examples of their most important urban agglomerations. Hence, we ask: how do the past and the present-day relate to the urbanization process of African cities (large, mega and global), expanding socio-spatial and ethnic-racial inequalities?

Going back to the origins

African societies from the 16th to the 18th centuries were hierarchical, centralized, based on the collection of taxes from conquered populations and commanded by militarized family elites (Macedo 2008, 95). The continent’s subsequent structural poverty can be explained by the trafficking of enslaved people, beginning in the 16th century, which generated the greatest forced immigration of humanity and the African socio-cultural dispersion throughout the world, known as the Diaspora. The European interference marked the direction of Africa forever, even reaching the stagnation of its population in the 18th century (Macedo 2008, 96).

The abolition of slavery came from a change in English Christian discourse that, combined with the enlightenment ideas, other French revolutionaries and even post-American independence, expanded humanitarianism to African peoples. There was also the advantage of a permanent consumer population in Africa that could benefit from the raw material before selling it to European and North American markets.

According to Macedo (2008, 97), colonialism and imperialism in Africa sustained the second European industrial revolution of the 19th century, dividing the map of Africa among the invading European nations, without taking into account any secularly established ethnic territoriality. Two major world wars (1914-1945) also exploited African forces, who were fighting on the battlefronts for their European metropolises. In the post-war, the

appearance of another dispute, the Cold War, aligned interests of capitalists and socialists over territories still dominated on the continent, from 1945 to 1960, when the independence movements of the colonized countries began.

The ideological-scientific basis of that domination has always occurred from racism, which the African person was dehumanized in the period of slavery and later was made inferior as a human, even after abolition. Centuries of exploitation and racism have resulted in fragile African states, with successive regimes of exception and dependent on international trade with their former metropolises, except in South Africa (Macedo 2008, 173). However, since the 19th century, as an identity construction of the continent, there has been an insurgency of an African philosophy and pan-Africanism – an ideology that sought to unite the peoples of Africa as a way to enhance the continent's narrative in the international context.

Below, we present examples of cities in seven African countries, in order to contextualize them with the history of African societies presented above, going through European colonization and their independence and post-independence movements. This historical process, for us, is essential to understand how the phenomenon of socio-spatial and ethnic-racial segregation has evolved in these cities.

Megacities, large cities and global cities in Africa

Nigeria, the “Giant of Africa”

Lagos, Nigeria, is a megacity of 21 million inhabitants (WPR 2019), surpassing Cairo and Kinshasa as the continent's largest city. Its name is due to the Portuguese colonizers who, in the 15th century, left Lagos (Portugal) and passed through this region when they surrounded Africa during their navigations. Later, in the 19th century, European colonialism placed Nigeria under the rule of England and its indirect government, based on local leaders and with profound ethnic-racial segregation (Khapoya 2008, 143).

The country became independent in 1960, but plunged into civil war. Since then, democratically elected civilian governments and military dictatorships have alternated in command of the nation, with only the 2011 presidential elections being considered free and fair (Nossiter 2011). Currently, the Nigerian government has large international investment to finance large projects, mainly with English and American capital.

Lekki is a city under construction since 2008, located southeast to Lagos on a peninsula of 80 km by 10 km, between the great lagoon and the Atlantic Ocean. By 2015, only the first phase of the project was completed, with the second phase being still unfinished. Lekki is home to several gated residences, agricultural land, a Free Trade Zone, an airport and a sea port, both still under construction. Under the title of “blue and green environmental city”, this global city expects to accommodate more than 3.4 million people, from the middle and upper classes, and a fluctuating population of at least 1.9 million people, that is, of pendular workers living outside Lekki (Baldwin 2019). The first phase of the project was implemented over the region that was previously known as Maroko, a popular neighborhood destroyed in 1990 by the military government of the state of Lagos.

Another global Nigerian city, under construction since 2007, on the edge of the capital city, is the so-called Eko Atlantic, which the name “Èkó”, in Yoruba, refers to the city of Lagos itself. However, like Lekki, Eko Atlantic is not being built for the majority of the Lagos’s population. Tons and tons of sand were used to create a landfill at the mouth of the channel that connects the great lagoon to the ocean, under the discourse of minimizing the effects of the tide on the port of Lagos and of erecting the futuristic “West African Dubai”. Again, another stronghold of the middle and upper classes is being built, with high-tech architecture and the slogan of the most technological city on the continent.

Just 12 minutes-drive away from Eko Atlantic is Makoko (what is left of Maroko), an occupation over the great lagoon, populated by 100 thousand people (Agwu 2015, 12), known as “Venice of Africa”. Remnant part of Maroko, swallowed by Lekki, the resilient Makoko still persists in its forced segregation, even though it is in the financial center of Lagos. It is separated, geographically speaking, for being an enclave with few accesses and, socially speaking, for sheltering people of lower income attracted by the economic opportunity of the great center. However, as in so many other occupations in Lagos, Makoko is also an ethnic-racial stratification, because it served as an alternative to the flight of the Ogun ethnic group from the interior of the country and from neighboring country Benin. The Ogun’s flight was due to the conflicts of the civil war that devastated Nigeria and the poverty resulting from post-colonialism (Macedo 2008).

Abuja has been the capital of Nigeria since 1991, planned to occupy the central Nigerian region. Its cost of living is high and the city currently has 400 thousand inhabitants (Abuja 2019). Compared to other urban centers in the country, Abuja is considered relatively safe, as local security forces are

very careful with warnings coming from the north and south of the country, including the constant threats of terrorist attacks. For this reason, it is in the district of the federal capital that the “Centenary City” is being implemented, an ambitious government project to build a “smart city”, just like Eko Atlantic, however far from the “wretched of the Earth” of Lagos (Fanon 1968, 175).

Map 1: Lagos, where Makoko is located, and the Lekki Peninsula, in whose edge relies Eko Atlantic (in red)



Source: <https://phys.org/news/2019-07-nigeria-lagos-atlantic-erosion.html> (2019)

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Kinshasa is the Congolese megacity, with 12 million inhabitants, of whom 8 million live below the poverty line (United Nations 2018). One of the causes is that the DRC, which before independence (1960) was called Belgian Congo or Congo-Leopoldville, suffered the most violent process of colonization in Africa. In 1878, this region began to be explored with commercial warehouses on the Congo River, under the order of the Belgian King Leopold II. In the Berlin Conference in 1885, known as the “Scramble for Africa”, among European powers, Leopold II received Congolese territory as a personal possession. He governed it to his wishes and with extreme

brutality, including the amputation of enslaved workers in order to force those who watch to work harder (UNESCO 2010, 89-109).

In 1908, the “Free State of the Congo”, so named by Leopold II, ceased to be owned by the Crown. Its unscrupulous colonization, as a business model, was exposed in the Western press and caused astonishment even among other colonizing countries (Khapoya 2008, 144). Thus, the region was transferred to the government of Belgium, changing its name to Belgian Congo.


Even after a colonial overexploitation, mainly mining, and subsequent independence, the DRC suffered from the Mobutu Banga dictatorship for 32 years – a period in which the country was called Zaire. Supported militarily by the USA, this regime sparked a civil war (the largest in the world since World War II) between the country’s various ethnic groups, confined within the same territory once conceived by Belgium. The DRC’s immense mineral wealth is also its curse. Natural resources finance militias, in addition to being smuggled into neighboring countries. Meanwhile, the Congolese people remain one of the poorest in the world, exploited by the rebels in the hard work of mining activity and whose 10% of agricultural production is confiscated (Carranca 2013).

Despite this, a project for the emerging middle class has been under construction since 2008, totally excluded from Kinshasa from the 75% irregular occupation of the land. The project is called *La Cité du Fleuve*, or “City of the River”, because it is confined to an island, surrounded by the rough waters of the immense Congo River. Social and spatial segregation, in this case, bypass the great land conflict that marks the urban expansion of Kinshasa, since expropriations would not be necessary. However, these expropriations took place on the banks of the river, without any compensation to the removed residents, in order to build access to the island of *Cité du Fleuve*.

These new housing standards, according to French-Indian-Chinese capital entrepreneurs, will offer *Cité du Fleuve* residents a global “smart city” with quality water, modern waste management, security and transportation systems, which are rarities for the Congolese society that lives outside this “island of prosperity” (Wahba and Ranarifidy 2018). A new image of the DRC is being built, far from the Congolese ethnic war, hunger and disease, but close to the outflow of mining production that flows down the Congo River, towards the buying countries.

In the eyes of those who see *Cité du Fleuve* from Kinshasa, the inaccessibility or social immobility to that reality is clear. The militaristic and eclectic architecture of the “City of the River” buildings exclude any possibility of the end of colonialism in the DRC.

Map 2: Kinshasa and the island of *Cité du Fleuve*



Source: <https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinshasa> (2019)

Tanzania, in East Africa

Tanganyika, the mainland of present-day Tanzania, was a German colony from 1880 until 1919, when it was handed over to the United Kingdom as a result of Germany's defeat in the World War I. Zanzibar, the island part, was an independent sultanate, which became a British protectorate at the same time. Tanganyika became independent in 1962 and joined Zanzibar in 1964 to create the United Republic of Tanzania. The country has an equivalence between Christians and Muslims, but also with a minority of traditional religions. More than 100 languages are spoken in Tanzania, so there is no official language in the country, despite Swahili being used in parliament and English in international trade and tourism (Faustino 2016).

The country's first president governed until 1985 in a regime of the so-called "African socialism", one of the solutions found at the time for some African countries that were recently created and decapitalized due to many years of European exploitation. The country's first multiparty election was in 1995. Currently, Tanzania has foreign investments for the construction of large enterprises, mainly with Chinese, Australian, North Korean and North American capital (Namkwahe 2019; Hotham 2013).

Dodoma is the current capital of Tanzania, and has just over 2 million inhabitants (Census 2013). Founded by the Germans in 1907, the city should be "the main village of a nation of villages", according to the founders' thinking, "on a human scale and to be experienced on foot" (Friedman 2012).

Despite this, following the colonial model, the city was built segregated from the native village existing in the region, with the reason of being a global Tanzanian city.

Today Dodoma is a city of micropoles (clusters), with several centers of urban attraction, mostly with organic layout, of English inspiration, as are, for example, the current best known London parks. Its basic principles follow the Corbusian garden city model, with green belts separating specialized areas for middle and high income residents, commerce and industry. However, since it became the capital city in 1974, there has been a lot of resistance from the government to transfer the national government entirely. Therefore, only the assembly went to the countryside (Britannica 2019).

According to Beeckmans (2018), this modernist and segregating model of Dodoma was conceived taking inspiration from Brasilia, as a nation building project and to cement the nation identity after independence. The same happened in Nigeria (Abuja), Botswana (Gaborone), Malawi (Lilongwe) and Mauritania (Nouakchott).

The former capital, and still the largest city in Tanzania, is Dar Es Salaam, with 4.3 million inhabitants (Census 2013). This urban center has a development plan that values tourism and sustainability, after Tanzania has experienced a weak integration with global markets, which, in a way, helped to isolate the country from the 2008 recession. The recovery has been happening thanks to the strong tourism, telecommunications and banking sectors (Lago 2013, 44).

Dar Es Salaam has radial urban planning and centralities. According to the United Nations Development Program – UNDP (United Nations 2015), however, the recent growth of the Tanzanian economy has benefited few, leaving behind the majority of the population. The requalification of the city's waterfront, for example, expelled traditional settlements and verticalized the region. The same will happen along the Msimbazi River, under the pretext of containing floods and implementing a linear park.

Kigamboni City is a global Tanzanian city, whose development plan was proposed in 2010, located in a district south of Dar Es Salaam. The activities within the city are well defined spatially, such as industry, sports, tourism, residence and education, following the modernist model linked to the automobile and great distances. In the residential part, the social distinction happens according to the architectural typology of the houses, from medium to high standards. Similar to the Nigerian Eko Atlantic and the Congolese *Cité du Fleuve*, Kigamboni City is segregated spatially and socially from the largest city in the country, even though it is adjacent to it.

The appeal to safari, a very lucrative activity for Tanzania, due to its immense inland national parks in the savanna biome, was brought to the coast through Kigamboni City. Thus, the global project expects investments from the international real estate market, since most of the land consists in residential area, designed to house up to 500 thousand people. As a consequence, more than 90,000 people who lived off their activities on the coast, were resettled away from the sea, a constant practice in Tanzania, which colonial authorities repatriated the unemployed and urban residents to the countryside. Therefore, the division that was ethnic-racial in the colonial period (European, Indian and Asian neighborhoods), it is currently defined by income (Moshi, Msuya, and Todd 2018, 18).

What still occurs as an ethnic-racial division in Dar Es Salaam concerns the places where groups of migrants settle when they enter the city. Most of them tend to live in relatives' homes and this creates a social cohesion that, over time, have an impact on the division of settlements. The neighborhoods start to be based on ethnicity and family ties in the city, as in Kitunda, occupied by populations from the region of Mara (Wakurya), Kimara, by populations of Kilimanjaro (Chagga) and Mbagala, by populations of Lindi and Mtwara (Moshi, Msuya, and Todd 2018, 3).

Arusha is a city in the interior of Tanzania, known as "the green tourist capital", because it is located close to the Tanzanian savannas and Mount Kilimanjaro, the culmination point of Africa. A large investment in the touristic sector in this region of 1.7 million inhabitants is expected (Census 2013), mainly from the World Bank, the USA and China, which causes great real estate speculation, both in the center and in the periphery (Owens 2014, 2-5).

This city is also an important international diplomatic center, since it houses the East African Community and, until 2015, hosted the International Criminal Court for Rwanda. It is also a multicultural center, with indigenous, Arab-Tanzanian and Indian-Tanzanian populations, as well as a small European portion and an American minority. Religions include Christianity, Islamism, Sikhism and Hinduism (Tanzania 2020).

Large tourist enterprises (including huge golf courses) occupy vast portions of land in Arusha, even larger than consolidated settlements. In addition, there is no more space to build in the city, because its rural areas are exploited by commercial networks. As a result, there are several conflicts with the local population, who feel pressured by the real estate advance, expelling it and making land values more expensive (Owens 2014, 2-5). Rather than having participatory planning, according to Owens (2014, 2-5), the government itself competes with the private sector to take advantage of the touristic potential.

It is not by chance that it is in this region that it is planned to build the global city of Safari City, satellite to Arusha, “more modern and less failed” than the regional capital. Intended for medium and high incomes, this enterprise has a social differentiation well defined by zoning, defining where each income should live. The streets converge to the center, where volumetry frames the sunset on the savannah and takes us to a kind of Thebes gate, a clear reference to the Egyptian African empire as a denotation of power. However, with its 13 km distance from Arusha, exclusive car access and basically “summer for foreigners”, Safari City distinguishes itself as a global city that excludes those “without style” and without capital.

Map 3: Tanzania, national parks and studied cities



Source: <https://br.pinterest.com/pin/563090759631498721/?lp=true> (2019)

Kenya, East Africa

Kenya is formed by 47 different peoples, of which Bantus and Masai are predominant. It was a British protectorate since 1895, with numerous disputes between the English and the traditional peoples, until a subsequent declaration of independence in 1963. Despite this, Kenya only became multiparty in 1991.

Nairobi is the capital, with 4.5 million inhabitants (WPR 2019). The city was founded in 1899 by the British, on the path of the railway that links Uganda to the ocean, and today it is a center of business, culture and international organizations, such as the United Nations Environment Program (UN Environment).

Especially after 1948, Nairobi's development plan marginalized the low-income population in favor of a functionalist zoning. Kibera, for example, a neighborhood west of the city center and one of Africa's largest irregular occupations, was left behind. Its formation began when the British authorized soldiers returned from the war to occupy the residual areas of the railway that crosses Nairobi. As in other large African cities, the following development plans were "strategic" and favored neoliberalism to build an "African metropolis", in favor of reinforcing socio-spatial segregation (Njeru 2012).


Konza Technological City is one of the global Kenyan cities, the "Silicon Valley of Africa", created in 2013 to compete with other cities, even the country itself, in the search for foreign capital with a technological bias. This phenomenon is common today, especially in the sub-Saharan part of the continent.

The attraction of American, European and Chinese capitals was quick to buy land 60 km from Nairobi, on the way to the port city of Mombasa. However, investors did not count on the ethnic dispute for land, common in the post-colonial process of African countries, which ended up delaying the beginning of the works.

The project ended up frustrated by the competition with another city, just over 1,000 km away, but with an identical proposal that offered better conditions to investors: Kigali, capital of Rwanda. Concerning the project, Konza City proposed afrofuturism, the "smart city", the sunset in the savannah, sectorization based on an axis, contemporary architecture (high tech and parametric), as well as ecological corridors for biodiversity. This project also includes, in charge of a neoliberal positioning, a green block zone, 10 km wide, in order to curb the formation of new residential settlements attracted by the employment and income opportunities (Datta and Shaban 2017).

Tatu City, another Kenyan global city, is 24 km north of Nairobi. With Kenyan, New Zealand, British and American capital, this city has been developing a decentralized and mixed-use urban project since 2013, however,

Map 4: Kenya, national parks and main cities



Mauritius in the Indian Ocean

Mauritius Islands are located between Africa and India, being an archipelago formed by Mauritius, Rodrigues and other smaller islands, as well as British and French territories claimed in the region. One of these is right in the middle of the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia, and has a strategic American military base. Built with permission from the United Kingdom during the Cold War, this base forced the removal of nearly 1,200 indigenous inhabitants, who were sent to neighboring countries, including Mauritius, where they currently live in irregular occupations (Tkach and Amanpour 2013).

Current tourist and cargo ship route from all over the world, Mauritius was colonized by the French in the 18th century and by the British in the 19th century, who made their languages prevail in the country, in addition to Mauritian Creole, similar to French. Port Louis is the capital, with more than 150 thousand inhabitants (WRP 2019), many of whom are Chinese and Indians who brought with them the Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic religions.

Port Louis seeks real estate speculation on its waterfront through a caricatured European image. An example is *Le Caudan Waterfront*, where even the place that was the landing of enslaved Indians in the 19th century became an amusement park. The increased land prices forced the inhabitants of the city's coast to migrate inland. Many of these, Hindu or Islamic vegans who do not eat pigs, were forced to set up pig and fish breeding farms, which are fed back by pig manure, which therefore also does not serve the consumption of Islamic breeders.

Ebene Cybercity, or Ebene Technological City, is the global Mauritian city 15 km south of the capital. Its construction began in 2001 with the aim of serving as an international link to trade between Africa and Asia, especially with Indian and South African investments in the region. Ebene has a strictly commercial occupation, that is, it does not provide for residences (Schuetze 2016). For this reason, another city is being created right next door, the *Côte d'Or City*, or "City on the Gold Coast", a large gated community, which further contributes to the socio-spatial segregation of the middle and upper classes.

Map 5: Mauritius and its main cities



Source: <https://br.pinterest.com/pin/235102043031727341/?lp=true> (2019)

Ghana, “Black Star” of Africa

Marcus Garvey, a Jamaican political activist, editor, journalist, businessman and orator from the early twentieth century, was the pan-Africanist who idealized the company “Black Star”. Committed to the desire to ensure the financial independence of African Americans, Garvey launched several businesses in the United States. There were factories, supermarkets, restaurants, and publishers with jobs for black people, as well as an Ethiopian grape winery and the passenger transport company Black Star Line (a naval link between North America and Africa). Garvey envisioned the return of Africans from the Diaspora and his effort was honored on the flag of Ghana, with a black star.


Inspired by Garveyism, the son of the land of Ghana, N’Krumah was also a pan-Africanist who spared no effort until he saw the Ghanaian nation independent of the British Empire. In 1956, he established a socialist-inspired government, whose name Ghana was named after the great pre-colonial empire of West Africa. Once N’Krumah was deposed in 1966, Ghana had governments that alternated coups d’état until 1992, when the first free elections took place. In 2011, Ghana was one of the fastest growing economies in the world (14%) (Worldbank 2011).

Accra is the capital, with 2.5 million inhabitants (WPR 2019), congested, flooded and polluted with tons of garbage coming illegally from central countries. However, the city has several projects financed by national and foreign capital, mainly British, which are part of the urban development plan.

Among these, Villaggio View (set of buildings near the airport), Gold Coast City (mixed-use building), Aerotropolis (new multifunctional city-airport in the Accra region), Ningo-Prampram (new city, planned by an office Dutch, in the Accra region) and Marina Drive (requalification of the center of Accra). For this, see map 6. Still on the same map, it can be seen that Accra has 3 settlements of ethnic groups, 3 irregular occupations and 3 other settlements that were acquired for regularization. This is the opposite reality to the city’s large enterprises.

This segregation in Accra revolves around the interest of Ghana’s middle and upper classes (30% of the population) to isolate themselves in new business opportunities. Meanwhile, exclusion and inaccessibility are aimed at the lower-income class, the one most vulnerable to the ethnic conflicts that followed the sharing of communal lands in post-colonialism. With no alternative, this portion of the population (70%) is concentrated in precarious settlements, which are sometimes characterized by ethnic homogeneity, as in Ga Mashie, in the center of Accra (ethnic enclave of the Ga-Adangme people, the first occupants of the capital, as seen on map 6).

Map 6: Urban planning and settlements in the Big Accra



Source: Adapted by the author, from Google Maps (2019), Awal e Paller (2016)

The devaluation of Accra's urban fabric by the “unwanted classes”, informal sellers (although constantly removed from one place to another by the government), landslides, floods and congestion, created in the middle and upper classes the desire to escape the city and its everyday problems (*fugere urbem*). For this reason, still on map 6, one can observe the emergence of two other enterprises around the capital: City of Hope and Appolonia. The first is a technological residential and commercial center which imitates the village formation of traditional West African architecture, and that is based on the myth of the six warriors of the ancient Empire of Ghana, to form six luxurious towers. The second, a global city for the middle class, far from the urban center of Accra, but which invests to some extent in improving the pre-existing population, building, for example, a school and a small hospital. Both cities have great national and European private investment.

South Africa, land of the “Big Five”

Known as the “Big Five” land, due to its rich fauna of large animals such as the lion, buffalo, elephant, leopard and rhino, South Africa is the continent’s second largest economy, behind Nigeria. Moreover, it is the country with the best infrastructure in Africa. In addition, it is one of the few African countries where there have been no coups d’état, and currently constitutes a Parliamentary Presidentialism.

South Africa had one of the worst racial segregation regimes in the world, apartheid, which lasted from 1948 to 1994. Apartheid ended at the moment when the noble of its people, Nelson Mandela, became the country’s first black president, after 27 years in prison, due to his commitment to the defense of human rights.

The country was dominated, during colonialism (19th century), by the British and the Dutch, the latter called Bôeres (Dutch or German Huguenot colonists). Throughout this domain, 30% of the (white) population was left with 83% of South African lands, while 70% (black) of the population was left with only 13% of the lands, the so-called bantustan. In 1948, under a racist narrative, the apartheid law came into force, when public, residential, commercial and industrial spaces were totally segregated according to the color of their skin.

In 1970, in the most radical phase of the regime, South African citizenship was withdrawn from all inhabitants of the bantustans, that is, from the black population, who were subjected to living confined in neighborhoods and legally defined lands, where passports were required to enter to “white areas”. Deprived of seeking opportunities in more industrialized areas, the black population was impoverished.


It has been 25 years since the end of Apartheid, however, segregation is still quite evident. In the east of the country, where Cape Town is located (Legislative capital), the population miscegenated between whites and Asians (colored), and the Afrikaans language (derived from Dutch) predominate. In the East and North of South Africa, where the Bantustans took place and where the cities of Pretoria (Executive capital), Johannesburg and Bloemfontein (Judiciary capital) are located, there is a predominance of traditional African languages and a black population. In the high-income suburbs of large cities and valued rural regions, the white populations are predominant with English and Afrikaans languages.

These luxury suburbs are the place where the South African global cities are being built. Between Pretoria (2.5 million inhabitants) and Johannesburg (5.7 million inhabitants), which form the megacity “Jotoria” (WPR 2019), the City of Waterfall, the City of Stey, Hazeldean, Menlyn Maine and Modderfontein are being built.

All of these are projects that accumulate funds from South African millionaires with capital abroad (as in Steyn City and Menlyn Maine), as well as European, Japanese, North American and Chinese capital. These are projects financed for allocations in large shopping centers, hotels, buildings, advanced technology industries (mainly electronics and automobiles), in addition to vast areas of luxury residential condominiums.

In Pretoria, only one of the major planned urban plans is being implemented in an area of the city with a black majority population. It is the CDB (Central Business District). This intervention, which houses the official buildings of the South African government, historical heritage and museums, aims at a cultural and commercial regeneration of the city downtown, integrating public land (sometimes idle) with the financial center of Pretoria. On maps 7 and 8, you can better see the segregation and urban plans of the city.

Maps 7 and 8: Ethnic-racial segregation (and socio-spatial) in Pretoria (above) and Johannesburg (below)




Source: Adapted by the author, from *Statistics South Africa (Stats SA)* (2011)

In Johannesburg, as you can see on map 8, there is the biggest remnant of the segregation inherited from apartheid, the Soweto neighborhood. With a homogeneously black population, this region concentrates half of the city's residents. However, it is disconnected from the rest of the urban fabric, due to a housing void and the lack of clear integration routes on the map. Currently Soweto is considered a middle class region, although 1% of its population lives in irregular occupations.

Cape Town, in the south of the country, has a Development Plan in order to try to integrate the segregated city through traffic, public transportation and networked communities. It also has a Housing Plan, with the purpose of bringing residents with less income to better infrastructure areas in the city center. However, the apartheid heritage is still quite evident in the city's socio-spatial and ethnic-racial division (map 9).

Map 9: Ethnic-racial segregation (and socio-spatial) in Cape Town



Source: Adapted by the author, from *Statistics South Africa (Stats SA)* (2011)

The neighborhoods along the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, most valued due to tourism, are mostly white, as well as the north of the city. In the “core” of the urban fabric, there is still the predominance of colored neighborhoods, of people mixed between whites and Asians. In the most distant peripheries,

as was stipulated by the law, during apartheid, there are practically exclusive neighborhoods of black population. Among these, Nyanga (in blue, on the map), which has 98% of its population of Bantu origin. The segregation, plus the lack of infrastructure, the high unemployment rate (over 50%) and the great HIV occurrence, as a cause of social disorder, made Nyanga one of the most violent neighborhoods in all of Africa (SA News 2018).

Conclusion

As we saw in the introduction, colonialism left profound changes in African cities. Old commercial routes and urban centers were destroyed by European exploitation. The intensely modified culture of the African peoples, added to the Diaspora that, for centuries, dispersed people of African descent throughout the world. As a result, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the Islamic world was not dominant to make traditional culture and urbanism persist, post-independence cities took the course dictated by their former European metropolises, as in the countries analyzed. Soon overpopulation intensified the urban processes of socio-spatial and ethnic-racial segregation, still implanted in colonialism, in which income and origin dictate where the person was born (or where he migrated) and from where he should not leave. From the 2000s, with the majority of African nations still dependent on the foreign capital of their former colonizers, with the capital invested by the new antagonists China and the USA, cities began to want to emerge on the globalized world scene.

They are “smart”, “sustainable”, hightechs and neofunctional, focused on the emerging middle and upper classes, but following the logic of the dispute for the African market, as competing cities and corporate cities, such as Konza City and Eko Atlantic. Often these city ventures are born with the enhancement of the savannah, the colors of the sunset and the resumption of “traditional forms” and villages, as in Safari City and Modderfontein. This is an attempt to create a new African identity, detached from hunger and poverty, whose images traveled the world in the 1980s and 1990s, to attract eyes to a new Africa, more connected with its origins, at least in appearance. Therefore, the bonds of the new colonialism, that of the capital, involve the current African cities, and show that the emerging urban space does not belong to the “wretched of the Earth”, as Frantz Fanon (1968, 175) wrote, but for those who can pay for it.

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to present an observation on the structural phenomena that culminated in socio-spatial and ethnic-racial segregation, which currently occurs in megacities, large cities and global cities in Africa. To this end, a presentation of futuristic issues that cross contemporary African urbanization discussions will be made. Then, historical issues and discourses present in some African countries, which help to explain ethnic, racial, social and spatial aspects perpetuated in urban space, will be addressed. These aspects will include examples from cities in sub-Saharan African countries, where overpopulation and high foreign investment in the real estate market aggravate the segregationist effects.

KEYWORDS

African Cities; Urbanism; Segregation; Socio-spatial; Ethnic-racial; Africa.

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REPRESENTATIONS OF POWER IN *MAYOMBE*: “MEN WILL BE PRISONERS OF THE STRUCTURES THEY WILL HAVE CREATED”¹

Carolina Bezerra Machado²

I suffered colonialism in the flesh. My father was killed by the tucas. How can I bear to see people who have not suffered now commanding us, how can they know what we need? It is against this injustice that we have to fight: that the real children of the people, the genuine ones, take things in hand (Pepetela 2013, 47).

Introduction

The passage highlighted above, referring to the novel *Mayombe*, in which the character “Milagre” assumes the first person of the narrative, is fundamental to rethink the process of creating the state in Angola, based on the internal political disputes that still occurred during the colonial period and that extended into post-independence. The controversies about Angolan nationalism and identity were woven from different interests among the groups that disputed political power, which in their way, supported on the disqualification of others, proclaimed themselves as genuinely Angolan. The policy of favoritism, based on privileges for the closest ones, cases of corruption, ideological differences, and regional disputes that will characterize post-independence in Angola, were also already present in the anti-colonial struggle, despite of there seeming to be plenty of time available to fix them and maintain the dream of a more egalitarian and democratic society.

¹ This article is part of a larger research that resulted in the author’s PhD thesis.

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Written during the guerrilla war, but published only in 1980, a period in which there was a political discourse of national mobilization, from the defense of the construction of a "New Man", the book also brings an enriching debate about the ethnic and racial fissures that existed within the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA, in portuguese), as well as in Angolan society. As the proposal here is to address the power relations and micro-powers that have been built between the state and the Angolan society in the post-independence through the reading of *Mayombe*, it is valid to return to these issues. It is noted how much ethnic and racial tensions remained in the political arena after the country's independence and contributed, in a significant way, to the political structuring of Angola, guided by the MPLA, which sought to detach itself from these debates, diminishing them and treating them on the margins. After all, the tension surrounding this discourse contributed to the political escalation among nationalist movements and to the mobilization for civil war, which is inseparable from the process of formation of the post-colonial Angolan state.

In understanding that, like the nation, the construction of a state should not be seen as something natural, but as something artificial and susceptible to political disputes, it is fundamental to focus on the formation of the Angolan state after independence, as well as the main actors involved in this process, the limits of this new state, the colonial permanences and the role played by the MPLA in the country's politics. The end of colonialism in Angola did not bring the desired peace, but a new political instability with a scenario of war between the main nationalist movements that disputed power. In this sense, it is important to highlight how much ethnic and racial disputes, as well as the different social and economic components, still created under the colonial yoke, remained and contributed to the state's weaknesses. For Bittencourt, this "inability to unify nationalist forces" is related to the "historical contexts built on colonial experience", fragmented and unequal (Bittencourt 2015, 231).

Taking these issues into consideration, we should note the social tensions that characterized the formation of the state after the independence process, since the complexities stemming from the historical differences of the social groups that composed Angolan society, from their trajectories and experiences in different socio-cultural spaces, contributed to the coexistence of different national projects. In view of this, disputes over politics will also be permeated by conflicts that were part of the formation of the Angolan state. In a recent research, Catarina Antunes (2009) proposes to analyze how the MPLA has consolidated itself in the government, even in the midst of different existing political projects, both internally and by the opposition. To do so, she reflects on the authoritarian

character that the movement has come to represent, as constant threats have come to be present. However, to reflect on the contradictions between Angola's political relations, an analysis of the colonial state is also employed to understand the continuities that existed in the post-colonial period, when differences remained and opened space for new conflicts (Antunes 2009, 67-69).

Pepetela's novels and trajectory, and the politics of Angola

Thus, the choice for the analysis of power relations in Angola after independence based on *Mayombe*, a novel produced during the guerrilla war in Cabinda in 1971, thus still written during the colonial period, is justified by the debate on politics in Angola that already accompanied the work. The reflections, as well as the disputes between the guerrilla-characters in the book, point to the construction of a political reality that will be fundamental to understand the relations that are established in the post-independence. Besides, we should still be attentive to the possible writings and/or rewrites that the book may contain, since its publication took place only in 1980, a period of a great political clash among the groups that rivaled power in the country. As Fábio Baqueiro (Maria 2011) points out, in *Mayombe* several delicate themes, in which the critical tone is high, will be worked on, as much as we cannot point to a rupture, because the defense of a reconstruction project still ruled by the MPLA is evident. In an interview to the historian, Adolfo Maria recalls that he was one of the first readers of the novel:

Mandatorily, I was. I was because we were very good friends, and I even criticized it, I read *Mayombe* typed on the machine, which was writing at that time. [...]

And more than this, *Mayombe*, when he went East, he left it with me in storage. When I arrived in Luanda - [...] we were in opposite camps, but we never stopped having relations - he asked me: "do you still have it? because of mine...I lost mine". And I gave it to him. [...]

And I would like to have that manuscript today - to compare it with what was published. Because I read the *Mayombe*, this printed *Mayombe* has less strength than the manuscript I read. In the conflicts of people etc., in the conflicts of the soul, of spirit, [...] the plot was more complicated and, let's say, the criticism of the environment and the context was more explicit. [...] I got the feeling, and then said: "What a pity if I had the manuscript, I could compare". But that's it, he went to get it, and it was his, and I gave it. "Have you brought it? Did you keep it?" - "I brought it." - "Ah!" Ready (Maria, Adolfo. In.: Figueiredo, F. B. 2012).

From the interview comes a questioning about the possible external interferences that could have led to a rewriting or a readaptation of some key moments of the novel. In any case, as the writer has already pointed out, the political criticisms contained in it started from a militant who saw the internal problems and indicated the existing fails and contradictions that should receive more attention. The choice to address some of the delicate issues of Angolan politics, which preceded some of the political conflicts that took place in the country after independence, generated questions, sometimes answered in interviews, in which the writer takes up the reality of neighboring African countries, whose independence process did not guarantee political stability, but rather gave rise to new disputes for power to justify some of the issues addressed in the work. In 2016, Pepetela was at the *Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro* (UFRJ) at the invitation of the African Literature Sector of the University's Department of Vernacular Letters. At the meeting, after being asked about the criticism that had already appeared in *Mayombe* about the formation of the Angolan state in the post-independence, he replied that it would be easy to predict the bureaucratization of the country when taking into account the experience of the African countries under one-party systems, even more so that this experience was based on the tradition of the socialist countries of Europe. For Pepetela, within that context of independence, a democratic political way out would be unfeasible³.

However, it is not appropriate here to debate whether a subject was written in 1971 or 1980, but rather to understand the impact that such a work has on the disputes over politics, as well as the extent to which it contributes since its publication to an analysis of power relations in Angola after independence. By reading *Mayombe* we are involved in a political reality of denouncing the approximations between "tribalism" and power struggles, as well as between ethnic issues and the politics of favoritism that already existed in the woods, which will be one of the main problems faced later, hence the importance of analysis. These issues appear as obstacles to nation-building, but also to the strengthening of the state. They are criticisms of a political system that was already born distorted, with internal conflicts that will go beyond this moment and will be present in the 1980s, reaching still the disputes between the movements.

On the other hand, we can also recognize the didactic sense of criticism and the defense for the internal renewal of the movement as political opponents of the MPLA are disqualified and the defense of the construction

3 Pepetela in lecture at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) on 06/21/2016.

of a *New Man* is highlighted⁴. But one of the debates that must be deepened here, and for this, it is necessary to go back to the novel, is the already existing concern with the authoritarianism of a political system, that appears in some characters, although the internal reformulations proposed by Pepetela throughout the narrative are also evident, which must be thought of in dialogue with the moment of publication, especially when noticing moments of reflection on the political structure of the movement from passages that seem to be a reference to political decisions of an authoritarian nature in the face of political dissidences that at the time of publication were already a reality, such as the Revolt of the East (1972), the Active Revolt (1974) and the Nitista Movement (1977).

At various times in the novel, politics are widely debated. For a few pages, we are involved in the political relations of the militants through their ambiguities, yearnings, and contradictions. From a disagreement that arose between Commander Sem Medo, the protagonist of the book, and the Political Commissioner, another important character and main interlocutor of Sem Medo, the reflections on the political are high. Everything begins when the Commissioner calls the Commander's attention in front of the other guerrilla fighters, causing a malaise for breaking the hierarchy patterns and turning against the attitude of a superior. The Commissioner's apology leads to a series of debates in which Sem Medo defends the freedom to criticize as well as the democratization of the political environment: "– The guerrillas must get used to hearing those responsible criticize each other and to seeing that this will not cause problems among them" (Pepetela 2013, 113). And the Commissioner responds:

– It was a thoughtless gesture, it's wrong. The criticism should be made in a Command meeting or in private. That's the way it's always been said.

– That's where the evil lies – said Sem Medo. – Things are going on among those responsible. If there's dirty laundry to be washed, the militant must not know, it's taken in the little chapel. (...) How then do you teach the guerrilla fighters to criticize and be sincere, and to control those responsible, if in practice you don't give them examples? (Pepetela 2013, 113).

4 In the early years of independent Angola, the MPLA, a movement that came out ahead in building a national image for the newly created Angolan state, began to defend the emergence of the *new man*, who should not be attached to ethnic, tribal, and/or religious conceptions. The traditional was now seen as negative, the developmentalism of the new nation should be linked to a rupture with ethnicity, regionalism, racism, and religions. Tradition and modernity appeared as extreme poles and a problem to be overcome (Bittencourt 2010).

Pepetela's comparison of a party to a chapel in the course of the debate points to the silences surrounding the MPLA's internal relations. From this passage one may note the restriction of political freedoms, denying the right to difference, pluralism and democracy, without even respecting the individual. These practices contributed to the strengthening of an authoritarian and unequal policy. This reference will appear in other moments of the novel, as well as in the novel *A Geração da Utopia*⁵ (1992). Therefore, the "religiosity" of the political project proposes, in this sense, to make reference to the creation of a Party linked to a truth that is absolute and intolerant of differences (Mata 1993, 267). When asked about the constant association between socialist theory and the Catholic Church in his novels, Pepetela answers:

It is very curious that the structure of the Catholic Church is so similar, although with different names, to the structure of the Communist Parties (the synod of cardinals and the central committee, the infallibility of the leader, the Councils on one side, the congresses on the other, etc.). Of course, about the One Truth, or One True Religion, and the one true theory of society, often falling into totalitarianism and the most fundamentalist intransigence, there are also strange similarities. Marx has a phrase (I don't have it in mind so I can only give the idea and not the quote) in which he declared himself fascinated by the religious that was contained in politics (Pepetela, In: Minuzzi 2017).

These notes reflect the lack of consensus on socialist theory among MPLA members. There has always been a tension, which at times has had repercussions in ruptures and withdrawals among the militants of the Movement. Reading Pepetela's novels we can follow the different relations that have been established between the men of the party, as well as between society and socialism, the representations of these relations go back to accommodations of interests that were ambiguous. As Nuno Vidal (2016) explains, we can identify within the MPLA the existence of a progressive socialist wing, led by public men of great importance to the Movement, such as Lúcio Lara, Carlos Dilowa, Iko Carreira, and Antônio Jacinto, defenders of Marxist socialism that exalted a revolutionary ideological position, and another group, with which they disputed space, who defended a more flexible economic policy and, incredulous of Marxist socialism, defended "a system of nationalist leadership" that was in dialogue with the culture and tradition of the country.

We can highlight in this last wingmen like Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho, Domingos Paiva da Silva and Manuel Pacavira. This institutional bipolarity will be very well articulated by Agostinho Neto who will put into

⁵ *The Generation of Utopia*, in free translation.

operation “a system of management of balances of power based on the rotation of appointments to the top positions in the party and state” (Vidal 2016). The political interests of the system were thus assured and were controlled by Neto in a pragmatic way, forming a “patrimonial carousel of positions”. It is also important to emphasize how much this division carries with it the racial issue. While the first group was formed mainly by whites and half-breeds and had a relatively higher level of educational instruction, the second was made up of a black M'bundu base (Vidal 2016).

Therefore, it is interesting to know this scenario in order to understand the political disputes that were part of the writing of Pepetela (2017). The writer puts himself as an advocate of freedom, equality and the values of individuals, but at the same time, he was in favor of a socialist political structure, which, as he has said a few times, would be close to a utopian socialism, because he was very critical of the way socialism was raised and defended in other already independent African states. At that moment the choices for the political future of the country were at stake, and criticism of the authoritarian construction of a single model party worried the writer, who already seemed non-conformed, even by reserving a final destiny for Sem Medo, the hero of *Mayombe*. On the other hand, we are reminded how much Pepetela (2017), as an agent of the Angolan state after independence, also contributed to the strengthening and legitimization of the political model that was formed. If the interviews, given after his departure from the party, point to discontent with an authoritarian political structure, and his novels published in the 1980s pointed to the inevitability of this reality, it is strange that he remained in the MPLA until 1982, even contributing directly to the fight against the Nitista Movement (1977).

Returning to *Mayombe*, the characterization of a political scenario where there are no political alternatives is reaffirmed. The Movement's internal mistakes are pointed out, but within a reflection that distinguishes the MPLA as the only viable alternative to the other nationalist movements, stuck to tribal and racial issues. For the writer, the process of narrating the humanization of the guerrilla fighter and the leader, as individuals who make wrong and right choices seems fundamental to broaden the debate on the political, although only in the internal aspect of the MPLA. Thus, he advocates the development of a more democratic political and social structure in which differences could open space for the formation of a democratic political environment where criticism would be possible and would help build a more inclusive society. In that same debate, Sem Medo continues: “– You all talk so much about the popular masses and want to hide everything from the people” (Pepetela 2013, 109). By always referring to “you all” at the beginning

of his sentences, Sem Medo is questioned again by the Commissioner, who is annoyed that he is part of this plurality. But the commander fights back:

– Because you are really part of a group: the future Party officials, the senior officials, who are going to release the ex-communication on heretics like me. "You all" represent all those who have no humor, who take themselves seriously and show ominous looks of occasion to give themselves importance (Pepetela 2013, 109).

Sem Medo then refers to the end of the war and begins to narrate what it would be like from the moment the MPLA, as a victorious party, came to power. As long as the opposition was not allowed, for the consolidation of the independence process, Angola would live in a dictatorship, not of the proletariat, but of a "small group of men" who would be on a fine line between a power that represented the people and the human ambitions that could speak louder and destroy the dreamed political project. The disillusionment with this group would happen "when they realized that in practice socialism is not the work of a day or the will of a thousand men," and new challenges would arise for the Party, which would be increasingly forced to close down and persecute those who criticized it:

And how will you react? The people are being agitated by counter-revolutionary elements! This will also be true because any regime creates its opposition elements, we have to arrest the leaders, we have to pay attention to the maneuvers of imperialism, we have to strengthen the secret police, etc., etc. The dramatic thing is that you will be right. Objectively, it will be necessary to tighten the vigilance inside the Party, increase discipline, clean up. Objectively, this is how it is. But these cleanings will serve as a pretext for ambitious men to mix up counterrevolutionaries with those who criticize their ambition and their mistakes. The necessary vigilance within the Party will pass to the police environment within the Party and all criticism will be stifled within it. Centralism is strengthened, democracy disappears. The dramatic thing is that there is no escape from that... (Pepetela 2013, 111).

It is interesting in this passage to note that as the political project consolidates, we witness the departure of Sem Medo from the group that will make up the country's future leaders, as he announces to the Commissioner: "– I see you clearly, as a political cadre. As to me, I do not see myself. Perhaps in another country in the struggle... Who knows if in jail? I don't see myself in independent Angola" (Pepetela 2013, 115). For him, "the political cadres of the Movement" (Pepetela 2013, 110) would be linked to Marxism, which he

also approached, but he also distanced himself by not agreeing with “a series of things that are said or imposed, in the name of Marxism”, so he considers himself an “anarchist, a non-Party, a renegade” (Pepetela 2013, 110), who won’t have space in the political plans of the movement. This “series of things” is soon shown, while the character moves away for a few moments from the authoritarian political structure that is already outlined during the war and that will establish itself in the post-independence. Among the dialogues that appear at this particular moment in the narrative, we note the political uncertainties regarding the socialist position of the MPLA, which for Sem Medo would be forced:

Let us not call that socialism, because it is not necessarily. Let’s not call it a proletarian state, because it’s not. Let’s demystify the names. Let’s put an end to the witchcraft of labels. It is not a democracy, because there will be no democracy, there will necessarily be a dictatorship over the people (Pepetela 2013, 113).

From these passages, we can notice, during the moment of *Mayombe’s* writing, his disillusionment with the authoritarian directions that were taking the MPLA. This made him anticipate the political scenario that was to come. However, it is worth highlighting again Pepetela’s participation in the MPLA’s governmental structure that was established after independence, even being part of one of the most repressive moments of the regime. If the character of Sem Medo would be reserved an end that would keep him forever on the side of revolutionary ideas, keeping him away from the political system that was established, which for the writer would lead to a corrupt and authoritarian system, Pepetela will act in the state until 1982.

As we turn again to the political-ideological debates held at that time, we can notice the uncertainties and ambiguities already present within the Movement, including by its leaders. The MPLA, guided by an integrationist and globalizing discourse, was recognized before independence by the defense of nationalism, in a broad narrative that had in common the struggle for independence and the construction of a pluricultural nation. In this sense, it denied the racial and ethnic differences that could be impediments to its objective. However, as much as the Movement’s program could be seen from the point of view of “revolutionary nationalism”, as Mabeko-Tali points out, in recognizing the desire to “profoundly transform the economic and social structures created by the colonial system”, we must not forget the great diversity of people and ideas that make up the MPLA, each with a different

vision of the future of Angolan society (Mabeko-Tali 2001, 152-160). Therefore, the defense of a Marxist-Leninist political structure was not unanimity.

Many of the MPLA's political cadres have indeed placed themselves on the side of Marxism, but within an international context of Cold War that should not be diminished. At the time of the guerrilla war, this relation was even more modest, built between rapprochements and estrangements according to the political interests at stake. Moreover, the political program of the MPLA was never clear, as we can notice in some interviews and speeches from Agostinho Neto. When asked about the ideological option of the MPLA, Neto answers:

There are schematic descriptions, used to classify the movements as communist, socialist, etc. But we think that, in our movement, such classification is not possible at this stage. For a simple party, it is possible, but when a movement is made up of politically and ideologically different peoples it is not possible, for example, to say that it is communist [...]. Concerning economic organization, we say that the Angolan people should be masters of our country's riches, that fair wages are needed to avoid the exploitation of workers, etc. is what is usually called socialist. It is socialism, because we do not intend to allow anyone, Angolan or foreign, to exploit our people. (Neto, In.: Mabeko-Tali 2001).

Statements like this were successive until the Party's adopted the Marxism-Leninism in 1977. Until then, both Agostinho Neto and other comrades of his sought to dissociate themselves from the labels attributed to him by political opponents. Thus, when Pepetela addresses this debate in his novel, he helps us to reflect on the complexities of the political cultures that were in force at that time. By observing different characters, the contradictions and ambiguities that would form the political structure of the MPLA in the post-independence period appear. Sem Medo wants to avoid labels emphasized by others, even when they do not contribute to the strengthening of the guerrilla movement. From him also comes criticism about the socialist nature of the Movement, which for the writer is fragile and "populist", because social inequalities would remain while the people were still on the fringes of political power, and the experience of other African revolutionary movements led him to believe that the path of politics in Angola was going in the same direction. At this moment, we realize how much *Mayombe's* writing already showed a discredit as to the future of the MPLA, as much as Pepetela did not break with the Movement together with those who participated in the Revolt of the East and the Active Revolt. When asked when he began to

notice that the independence project in which he believed began to become a utopia, he answered:

I never thought nor was it ever a utopia, that is why we gained independence. But the project of many was not only that, but it was also to create a fairer society, and that has not yet been achieved. My book “Mayombe”, written in 1970-71 shows that I was already beginning to moderate that hope (Pepetela. In: Minuzzi 2017).

In one of the dialogues between Sem Medo and the Commissioner, the Commander states that the dictatorship may be necessary, he is not sure, but he cannot think of any other way, even if it is not ideal and then says: “Let us be honest with ourselves. We are not going to get to one hundred percent, we are going to stay at fifty. Why then tell the people we’re going to go to the hundred percent?” This position was taken by Pepetela already demonstrates how much the dream of a totally free society is staying on the path, through the years of guerrilla warfare.

In this sense, the Angolan political system was born without a precise debate on “democracy” and “popular power”, one of the main demands of the political oppositions that arose in 1974, “which accused democratic principles of betrayal” by emphasizing authoritarianism and the concentration of power in Neto’s hands. And as we can see, these debates are already echoed in *Mayombe*, through the lines of Sem Medo. It is certainly a moment of intense reflection on the political directions of the movement and we can notice, in the pages of the novel, how much Pepetela participates and contributes to this debate, already existing in the early 1970s and heated in the 1980s, when socialism is no longer seen as the best solution.

Sem Medo is described as the great hero of *Mayombe*, from a close narrative choice in which he will be used to heroize the character Aníbal in *A Geração da Utopia*, that is, the heroization occurs as they are put aside from the political process that is established during and after the war. When he calls himself a “heretic,” we can notice the difficulties that Sem Medo would have in being part of the political apparatus and the state bureaucracy, which although he thought necessary for the affirmation of the Movement, he could not recognize himself within this gear, which would bring him closer to a utopian character, more developed by Pepetela through Aníbal. As Alexandra Santos states, we have witnessed the “impossibility of the apparatus of power coexisting with the individualism and critical spirit personified in Sem Medo” (Santos 2011, 84). Possibly, if he remained alive until the MPLA took power, he would be

removed and break with the government, from some opposition movement or even having his destiny close to the character Aníbal of *A Geração da Utopia*.

Within this debate, it is interesting to note how Sem Medo refuses to be "dogmatic", in the strict sense of the term, by opening himself up to questions and uncertainties and denying the absolute truth of things. For him, the definition of dogmatism is in being:

Rigid in his conception of the discipline, he does not see the conditions that exist, he wants to apply the scheme as he has learned it. That's what I call dogmatic, I think it is the true meaning of the word. His truth is absolute and all made up, he refuses to put it into doubt, even if it were to be discussed and then reinforced with the data of practice. Like those Catholics who refuse to question God, because that could disturb them (Pepetela 2013, 159).

As we turn to this passage, the distance that Sem Medo will take from the political power that he thinks will be established after independence becomes understandable, since there will be no room for opposition, criticism and doubts. To live in this state would be unfeasible for the character who defines himself as a libertarian, sometimes approaching anarchism and at other times flirting with communism. For this reason, he is creating new political conceptions that guide him, which do not necessarily fit the labels already given. One example is how the writer defines what it means to be communist, within a perspective of freedom. By characterizing a French friend of his, according to Sem Medo, a "true libertine", the term communist was appropriate, but not in the "classical, orthodox, sense of the word, but in my sense" (Pepetela 2013, 192). And Ondina, a key character in the narrative⁶, asks him:

- In which women are collective?
- What are those ideas? That's anti-communist Catholic propaganda. For him, every woman should be free to accept him or refuse him, just as he was free to desire any woman or not. That's all. And if there were consequences, everyone was free to bear them. He was a communist, not in the sense that women are collective, but in that they are as free as free men (Pepetela 2013, 192-193).

⁶ Through this character we are involved in new themes that enable the questioning of the role of women within the process of liberation struggles, as well as the constructions of Pepetela on the role of women and their ideals of freedom that would challenge the taboos of society and individual morality, guided by social morality that differentiates men and women in their pleasures and duties.

We can see that through these debates new perceptions of Angolan society are opening up. Sem Medo, as a character, refuses to be part of the project of a society that is unequal, both between men and women, and among other barriers that would delimit and frame men, as the racial and/or ethnic factor. This position would tend to lead him to the step away from the MPLA after independence, because the loss of some initial values to remain in power would be inevitable and the character from beginning to end is aware of this movement, as clarified in a passage at the end of the book. In a dialogue with Mundo Novo, one of the guerrilla fighters, Sem Medo affirms:

You are the apparatus type of guy, one of the ones who is going to install the sole and omnipotent Party in Angola. I'm the guy whose historical role ends when we win the war. But my goal is the same as yours. And I know that to achieve my goal, an intermediate phase is necessary. Guys like you will fill that intermediate phase. So I think I was right to support your name. One day, in Angola, there will be no need for rigid apparatuses, that's my goal. But I won't get there (Pepetela 2013, 227).

Pepetela's novels are characterized by keeping this thread of hope and optimism at the end, which we can see in *Mayombe*, using the highlighted passage. However much of what the writer points out as the internal problems that already present themselves as a barrier to the ideal of society he defends, especially as he defends men in their individuality by recognizing the guerrilla fighters as "a set of different, individual beings, each with their own subjective reasons for fighting and who, in fact, behave as such". This position emphasizes the contradictions and ambiguities that exist between Sem Medo and the MPLA, because for him a new man is also born when "a young man decides to build himself a personality, even if this politically means individualism" and in practice goes against the project of a socialist society. For this position, Sem Medo says he cannot belong to a state apparatus, because that would limit him.

On the other hand, at the same time, Pepetela, between the narrative voice of his characters, also defends and exalts the emergence of a *New Man* in the principles that the MPLA highlights. When narrating an action that occurred under the support of a great number of men, Commander Sem Medo says:

That's why I trust Angolans. They're Confucians, but everyone forgets the makas and the grudges to save a fellow man in danger. That's the merit of the Movement, having achieved the miracle of beginning

to transform men. One more generation and the Angolan will be a new man. What is needed is action (Pepetela 2013, 203).

This degree of solidarity that for the Commander would be innate to Angolans is what would put an end to the differences that would be an impediment to the construction of a nation and an Angolan state after independence. Therefore, if we understand the importance of ethnic and "tribal" factors for the construction of a nationalist project, it is important to stress here how much the defense of a national project defended in the pages of *Mayombe* was linked to the MPLA's power project. In this sense, as Alexandra Santos points out, the adjective "tribal", used throughout the work, to characterize the existence of various social groups in Angola seeks to disqualify and devalue the existing differences by "suggesting a primitive and rudimentary form of social organization" (Santos 2011, 61). In dialogue with this play Sem Medo, the main character and the great hero of the novel, keeps himself away from these ethnic debates that were frequent among the guerrilla fighters.

As we turn to the narrated history of militant André, we can perceive the degree of distance and closeness to the frequent political debates of the period. André was one of the leaders of the guerrilla military base and of Kikongo origin, unlike Ondina, with whom he had an affair, who was the girlfriend of the political Commissioner, a Kimbundu. These characteristics would not be important for Sem Medo, however, the conflicts that ethnic origin still generated within the movement made him reflect on this case. André was no longer very favored by the great majority of the guerrilla fighters, since he was responsible for the food that was missing, and it is also through him that we know the favors that already existed among the militants, since it was known that he gave money on the sly to men close to him when they arrived in Dolosie. Therefore, it is precisely because he is a character with a dubious character that he approaches and identifies with tribal issues, with class differences and with the permanence of clientelism in current politics:

The plebs are all the same, they do not deserve trust, the one responsible for them is only worthwhile they can bring benefits to them. That's why my father, who was Soba, spent so much money to distribute to his men. He knew that if he didn't, he would lose his strength. My mistake was to forget those elementary teachings.

Deep down, deep down, it's Sem Medo who's going to get screwed. I'll go somewhere else where I'll go up anyway: there's such a lack of cadres that who has one eye is king. He will be here with all the problems, now aggravated. Sem Medo is just a little wolf, I'm an experienced wolf, I know what I mean (Pepetela 2013, 170-171).

The passage above refers to the moment when André is caught by the other militants to be tried for his crime of treason for having gone to bed with the Commissioner's wife. We understand from his speech that regardless of the political model that is established in Angola, men like André will always have space and privileges, remaining in political power. It is these findings that will lead Sem Medo to gradually move away, placing himself as a utopian before the political inevitability, including the fact that corruption is narrated as a problem that affects all men:

The traitors stopped the fight from growing. Traitors on all sides. It is a lie to say it is the Kikongos or the Kimbundus or the Umbundos or the Mulatos who are the traitors. I've seen them of all languages and colors. I saw our own countrymen who had farms want to take advantage to increase the farms. And some collaborated with Pide (Pepetela 2013, 185).

In addition, within this political framework outlined by Pepetela, we also noticed the disfavor of other groups that were involved in the guerilla war for independence, such as the UPA (Union of the Populations of Angola) and the FNLA (National Liberation Front of Angola), linked to ethnic conceptions and therefore diminished in the political dispute. The MPLA appears throughout the book as a movement of all, while the UPA appears only linked to the 1961 massacre, as a disorganized and primitive group. When one of the militants, the head of operations, is called to the narrative, he presents himself as the son of a peasant compared to Sem Medo and the Commissioner, intellectuals who brought him the "meaning of the words" about the attacks on the settlers' fields in which he participated. With distancing and knowledge, now on the MPLA's side, the Chief of Operations states:

I came to the Congo and in the MPLA I learned how to make war, a war with the organization. I also learned to read. Above all, I learned that what we did in 1961, cutting off the heads of the white, half-breed, assimilated and umbundus, was perhaps fair at that moment. But today it can't be a source of pride for anyone. It was a historical necessity, as the Political Commissioner says. I understand the meaning of the words, he is right, in that he is right (Pepetela 2013, 209).

Conclusion

In that sense, we have the legitimization of the MPLA, exalted in the pages of *Mayombe* as a great guide to an independent Angola. As much as the problems existed, such as the favoritism policies, the disputes between the intellectuals, as well as the escalation between the urban man and the peasant, and some of them could still persist in the post-independence, following the MPLA is seen as the only possible path. The struggle against the colonizer must be inseparable from this project. For this reason, Alexandra Santos argues that "all of Sem Medo's discourse is crossed by the inability to imagine alternative futures as if there were no option as to the imposition of an authoritarian regime in Angola" (2011, 101).

It is also interesting to note how this discourse is supported by a broader debate, in which it points to the complex rapprochement between society and the state in the post-colonial era. In affirming that the advance of independence implied the "concentration of authority and not the dissipation of forces", denying a democratic ideology, Augusto Nascimento, in an analysis of political relations in São Tomé and Príncipe after the country's independence, calls attention to the diffusion of excusable ideas to justify the new forms of domination that were imposed by parties within a single-party system. Also, the abstention of some intellectuals in this debate contributed to reducing the political, since the development and modernization of the state would necessarily be linked to authoritarian practices in the face of a delicate historical moment in which the main enemy continued to be the other, sometimes represented by the colonizer, and sometimes represented by the other opposition nationalist fronts, when it was convenient (Nascimento 2010, 160).

Through the discourses in Pepetela's narratives, we can learn a little about the tensions surrounding the political debates of the period in which the novels were written. In *Mayombe*, the intellectual, still very close to the MPLA, legitimizes the political choices of the movement, which would be restricted to him, given the needs imposed by the historical period. However, if in *O Cão e os Caluandas*⁷ we already see a narrative that denounces the cases of corruption and clientelism that have established themselves as a political model in the country, it is after *Geração da Utopia* that it becomes clear how much the political project dreamed of in the guerrilla era is no longer a possible path within a political structure that has already been ruined. However, it is still interesting to note how much Pepetela recreates this political

⁷ *The Dog and the Caluandas*, in free translations.

panorama, showing the greed of predatory men, but also the permanence of utopia in some characters who appear more and more distant from the political regime that was established in the post-independence.

It is still worth underlining how the state in the Mayombe period is the colonial state and how we can already observe that amid the chaos of the guerrilla warfare, micropolitics that are autonomous to the power of this state are already developing. These have to do with an internal logic of their own, based on factors that move the political in Angolan society and will contribute to the complexities that surrounded the formation of the post-colonial state.

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ABSTRACT

After the independence of Angola in 1975, a political structure was consolidated in which the state/MPLA became the main means for the distribution of benefits and privileges, contributing to the strengthening of an authoritarian and patrimonial policy. Therefore, this article aims to start from the novel *Mayombe* (1980), by the Angolan writer Pepetela, to analyze the political process in Angola in its contemporaneity. It is understood that the power structures that existed in Angola after independence, appear already drawn in this novel, still woven in the guerrillas. In the same way, there are debates about the nation and identity propagated in the midst of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). It is assumed that the contradictions, ambivalences, and accommodation of interests present between Angolan society and the state were already being structured internally even before independence.

KEYWORDS

Pepetela; Angola; *Mayombe*.

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BOOK REVIEW

“OUT OF THE DARK NIGHT: ESSAYS ON DECOLONIZATION”By Achille Mbembe¹Ermelinda Liberato²

Extraordinary! This is how we can characterize the present work of Achille Mbembe, a well-known and recognized African philosopher, political scientist, historian, intellectual, professor and researcher, in this work that, although it was originally published in French in 2010, only in 2014 was translated into Portuguese, a boldness by the Mulemba Editions of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the *Universidade Agostinho Neto* (FCS-UAN – Angola), in collaboration with *Edições Pedagogo* (Portugal). Through a fluid, assertive, firm and descriptive narrative, Achille Mbembe proposes, therefore, to make a general check up on the health status of the continent, both in physical, emotional and affective levels, analyzing key issues and at the same time the sensitive, such as colonization, decolonization, miscegenation, among others. The author thus clearly delineates a rigorously well-founded and bibliographically well-documented theoretical framework, equipped with contradictions and ambiguities, which at the bottom constitute the characteristics of the continent itself, which forces us to reflect more deeply and carefully.

The general objective of the work, the “interrogation about the decolonized community” (p. 19), is presented to us right in the introduction (p. 19-30) where the author reinforces the position on the need for debate and criticism around the subject matter. To this end, it begins by characterizing the concept

¹ Mbembe, Achille, 2014. *Out of the Dark Night: Essays on Decolonization*. Luanda/Mangualde: Edições Mulemba/Edições Pedagogo.

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of colonization: "immense abyss" (p. 19), based on a "network of dependence and supremacy" (p. 22), with a "capacity for proliferation and metamorphosis" (p. 19) impressive, fueled by the "force of the false" (p. 19), responsible for the implementation and consolidation of an economic system of extraction and predation (p. 23), a political system based on manipulations, "at the mercy of satraps", shackling Africans in general in a condition of "indignity, contempt and humiliation" (p. 23).

All of these issues are discussed and deepened in the chapters that follow. In chapter I (p. 31-48), *From the Skull of a Dead Man. Trajectories of a Life*, Mbembe uses memory and traces a biography of himself in the first person: "I was born" (p. 32), his childhood in his native country (Cameroon), adolescence and later his departure for the world (France and the United States of America), his experience "was largely the result of the early age of post-colonialism" (p. 35) and subsequent return to the continent where he settled at the University of Wits, South Africa, which is faced with a fragmented country, still shackled to the bonds of *Apartheid*. This circulation across the three continents made it possible to access and contact the "aspects of erudite culture" (p. 41), "the collection of human knowledge and thought" (p. 41), proudly transforming it into a "legitimate successor to this heritage" (p. 41).

Mbembe also dives into the origins of Pan-Africanism and *Négritude*, two political and cultural movements that were able to ideologically train the children of the continent, in order to register an *Opening to the World and ascension in humanity* (p. 49-77), but they also did not achieve their purposes. And to better explain his position, the author uses as examples Haiti, "the first born of decolonization" (p. 53) and Liberia, the prototype of the creation of "a christian, modern and civilized black state" (p. 55), two countries on two different continents but which have gone through the same process and, in both cases, the result is the same: "two failures" (p. 53), which support the idea that "decolonization was a mere political, controversial and cultural category" (p. 49) and not a true liberation of black men in all dimensions.

In chapters III and IV, the author addresses the colonizing role of France on the continent, as well as its position after the independence of its colonies, emphasizing the relationship between colonizer and colonized, dominant and dominated, exploiter and exploited, which allowed the establishment of a system of "proximity without reciprocity" (p. 79-99) that remains in the present. His "inability to think about the post-colony" (p. 86) led to a form of neocolonialism, that is, a renewed colonialism, but based on the

pillars of old colonialism. As France insists on its “cultural narcissism” (p. 87), convinced that it is still the “center of the world” (p. 88), there is thus the “decline of a crystallized nation” (p. 81) sailing in countercurrent, thus plunging into a “long imperial winter” (p. 101-139) characterized by “relative regression of a thought” (p. 103) and desire for provincialization (p. 122-131) that continue to feed a senile state posthumous diseases of memory (p. 131-139).

This continuous state of denial of the Other leads the author to qualify the continent as *the house without keys* (p. 141-163), which is characterized above all by a “new Creole and, in many ways, cosmopolitan urbanity” (p. 145). In this fifth chapter, the author focuses his analysis on the construction of borders on the continent, in its multiple dimensions, having as a starting point for his analysis the Berlin Conference (1884-85), which followed the period of the slave trade, until the submission of the first resistance movements, identifying oil and other natural resources as the new frontier that inaugurated “new cycles of extraction and predation” (p. 149). Events that defined the “colonial structuring of economic spaces” (p. 143) unequal, established according to the interests of exploitation. And the consequences are very visible: informality, structural adjustment, “atomized capitalism” (p. 146), accentuated asymmetries between rural and urban space, militarism and lumpen-radicalism, the institutionalization of violence as a way of life, among others.

As a result, new colonialisms were being built, using a softer vocabulary and under the mask of *Circulation of the worlds* (p. 165-190). In this last chapter, Mbembe analyzes concepts such as development, state and Nation, gender issues, rapid social changes, sexuality, HIV/AIDS, among others, and proposes a new current of thought, which he calls Afropolitanism, which it is characterized by a “political and cultural stance in relation to the nation, race and the issue of difference in general” (p. 187). What the author claims is, above all, the debate and criticism about the post-colonial in Africa, by Africans, in African academies, decentralizing, or decolonizing it in relation to the West, a “thought that thinks it’s possible outside of himself, aware of the limits of his uniqueness” (p. 192).

Out of the Dark Night above all portrays post-colonial Africa, its projects, its perspectives, its betrayed dreams, its disappointments, in short, Africa in its fullness as Africa, free from the bonds of the past, and its need to walk alone looking for its own existence. *Out of the Dark Night* is nothing more than “before life”, the search for “the brightest sun and the purest stars” (p.

20), that is, the construction of a better place to live, where the sun is born, the stars shine and the moon illuminates the most remote corner of the continent. It is urgent for the continent and Africans to face this reality and look "at what is new", because only then will it be possible "to discover new times, for itself and for humanity" (p. 194).

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BOOK REVIEW

“DECOLONIALITY AND AFRO-DIASPORIC THINKING”

By Joaze Bernardino-Costa, Nelson Maldonado-Torres and Ramón Grosfoguel¹

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Criticisms of abstract universalism and of ontological and, consequently, epistemological generalizations are increasingly gaining body and space in the struggles for re-existence and resistance. The body is also understood as the materiality of the geopolitics of knowledge, the geopolitical body, denounces the invisibility and the silencing of peoples, knowledge and histories that were subjugated by the various hierarchies of coloniality. In this context, the following text is a welcome addition: “Decoloniality and afro-diasporic thinking”, organized by Joaze Bernardino-Costa, Nelson Maldonado-Torres and Ramón Grosfoguel.

Released in 2018 by the publishing house Autêntica, within the Black Culture and Identities Collection, the book has the editorial seal of the Department of Sociology (SOL, in Portuguese) of the *Universidade Federal de Brasília* (UnB) and support from the Research Support Foundation of the Federal District and is in its second edition, by *Autêntica*.

The work has three hundred and sixty-six pages, with a dense introduction and fifteen independent chapters that can be read sequentially or not. However, the connection between the texts is impressive, both for the use of concepts and for the ethical and political purposes, clearly exposed throughout the book.

¹ Bernardino-Costa, Joaze; Maldonado-Torres, Nelson; Grosfoguel, Ramón (orgs). 2018. *Decoloniality and afro-diasporic thinking*. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica, First Issue.

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Decoloniality and afro-diasporic thinking contribute to the strengthening of the discussion on the effects of coloniality, bringing in Portuguese texts by renowned female and male authors such as Patrícia Hill Collins', "Black feminist epistemology" and names that cross the Atlantic, like Oyèrónké Oyewùmí, who present an original perspective to study gender from African epistemologies.

Chapters of different authors have an intense intellectual proximity, for example, "Analyzing coloniality and decoloniality: some basic dimensions" and "Convergences between Black Atlantic intellectuals: Guerreiro Ramos, Frantz Fanon and Du Bois", written by Nelson Maldonado-Torres and Joaze Bernardino-Costa, respectively.

There is also a complementarity of ideas between Nilma Lino Gomes, author of "The Black Movement and black intellectuals decolonizing curriculums" and José Jorge Carvalho, in "Meeting of Knowledge and epistemic quotas: a movement for the decolonization of the Brazilian academic world".

By merging conceptual articles and others that share experiences, the book allows the reader to identify key definitions and clear examples for understanding the Decoloniality Project. Concept defined in the first chapter by Nelson Maldonado-Torres, which refers to the struggle against the logic of coloniality and its material, epistemic and symbolic effects. Unlike decolonization, that is, historical moments when colonial subjects rebelled against ex-empires and claimed independence.

As a form of activism, the valorization of the tradition of black thought in opposition to the constitutive, organized and hierarchical racism of peoples, knowledge, cultures, economic, political and social relations, the work recognizes the existence of other epistemologies, which aim to put race, sex and gender at the center of the debate, questioning narratives called "universal", which have long reinforced the existing domination in the modern/colonial World-system.

In this way, the so-called universal, abstract and objective knowledge is questioned, for ideas with defined authorship, location and identity, with high theoretical-conceptual rigor, enabling the formulation of new questions in relation to the validity of knowledge.

Based on an intrinsic dialogue, the book presents the reader with the convergence of afro-diasporic thoughts, thus justifying its title and unity. In this sense, it has as an analytical axis, the displacement of subordinated knowledge, especially from black populations, from a locus of object to a subject of knowledge, in search of the decolonization of knowledge, power and being, belonging to a collective political-academic project.

For those who are interested in themes related to the decolonization of international relations, history, social theory, literature, educational processes and even philosophy, the book presents itself as an invitation, especially, for conceptual deepening, since the work contributes to a rigorous dissemination of the decolonial perspective, favoring that new voices be echo and heard beyond the African diaspora.

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PARTNERS

NERINT

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) was the first center dedicated to the study and research in International Relations in Southern Brazil. It was established in August 1999 at the ILEA/UFRGS aiming the argumentative and innovative study of the main transformations within the post-Cold War international system. Since 2014, it was located at the Faculty of Economics of UFRGS (FCE-UFRGS) and since 2018 is located at Center for International Studies on Government (CEGOV), at Latin American Institute of Advanced Studies (ILEA-UFRGS). In parallel, NERINT has sought ways to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options to consolidate an autonomous international presence for the country, from the perspective of the developing world. Brazil's choice of an "active, affirmative, and proactive diplomacy" at the beginning of the 21st century has converged with projections and studies put forward over numerous seminars and publications organized by NERINT.

An outcome of its activity was the creation of an undergraduate degree on International Relations (2004), ranked the best in Brazil according to the Ministry of Education (2012), and a graduate level program, the International Strategic Studies Doctoral Program (2010). Two journals were also created: the bimonthly *Conjuntura Austral* and the biannual and bilingual *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*. Thus, besides ongoing research on developing countries, NERINT is also the birthplace of undergraduate and graduate programs, not to mention its intense editorial activities.

CEBRAFRICA

The Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) has its origins in Brazil-South Africa Studies Centre (CESUL), a program established in 2005 through an association between the Universidade Federal do Rio

Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG), of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its research activities are developed in cooperation with the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT).

In March 2012, CESUL was expanded into CEBRAFRICA in order to cover the whole of Africa. At the same time, the South Africa series, which published six books, was transformed into the African Series, currently with eleven titles. The centre's main objectives remain the same as before: to conduct research, to support the development of memoirs, thesis and undergraduate works, to congregate research groups on Africa, to organize seminars, to promote student and professor exchanges with other institutions, to establish research networks and joint projects with African and Africanist institutions, to publish national and translated works on the field, and to expand the specialized library made available by FUNAG.

The numerous research themes seek to increase knowledge of the African continent and its relations to Brazil on the following topics: International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations, and Schools of Thought. CEBRAFRICA counts among its partners renowned institutions from Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Canada, United States, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Senegal, Cape Verde, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Portugal, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, India, and China. Current researches focus on "Brazilian, Chinese, and Indian Presence in Africa", "Africa in South-South Cooperation", "African Conflicts", "Integration and Development in Africa", "African Relations with Great Powers", "Inter-African Relations", "Security and defense agenda in Africa".

CEGOV

The Center for International Studies on Government (CEGOV) located at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) develops studies and research projects on governmental affairs from a comparative perspective. The Center gathers researchers from several departments of the University, such as Economics, Political Science, Law, Administration, International Relations, Education, Urbanism and Computer Science. It encompasses scholars from the most traditional research groups at UFRGS, specialized in a range of public policy areas, such as Health, Education, Sports, Public Security, Foreign Affairs and Defense.

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4. The footnotes should be of a substantive and complementary nature;
5. The bibliography must follow the rules of the Chicago system (Author-date or note-bibliography), specifying the used literature at the end of the text;
6. Contributions must be original and unpublished and can be submitted in Portuguese, English or Spanish;
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