

ARTIGOS LIVRES

NEO-REACTIONARY FUTURISM: TECHNO- UTOPIANISM AND THE FAR RIGHT'S PAST- FUTURE NEXUS

*FUTURISMO NEORREACIONÁRIO:
TECNOUTOPIANISMO E O NEXO PASSADO-
FUTURO DA ULTRADIREITA*

Lucas Sudbrack* 

* Bank of Northeast Brazil, Sectoral Intelligence Observatory,
Fortaleza, CE, Brazil.

lucas.sudbrack@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The far right has achieved electoral success as a reactionary movement that rejects the path society has taken and promises to restore an idealized past. Recently, however, far-right leaders have aligned with futuristic views that advocate accelerating technological development towards a techno-utopian society. This article seeks to understand how the past and future are connected within far-right ideology. It argues that, while the radicalization and overlap of techno-utopian ideologies see liberal values as obstacles, the far right sees techno-utopianism as a means to achieve an illiberal technological future that can govern a high-tech globalized economy. This convergence is termed “neo-reactionary futurism” and advocates authoritarianism and producerism as means to rebuild society. The study sheds light on an emerging branch of the far right and the significant challenges posed by the growing influence of the tech industry and its ideologies.

Keywords: Big Tech; Silicon Valley; Populism; Elitism; Anti-establishment.

RESUMO

A ultradireita tem alcançado sucesso eleitoral como um movimento reacionário que rejeita o rumo tomado pela sociedade e promete restaurar um passado idealizado. Recentemente, contudo, líderes de ultradireita têm se alinhado a visões futuristas que defendem a aceleração do desenvolvimento tecnológico em direção a uma sociedade tecno-utópica. Este artigo busca compreender como o passado e o futuro se conectam na ideologia de ultradireita. Argumenta-se que, enquanto a radicalização e a sobreposição de ideologias tecno-utópicas encaram os valores liberais como obstáculos, a ultradireita vê o tecno-utopismo como um meio de alcançar um futuro tecnológico iliberal capaz de governar uma economia globalizada de alta tecnologia. Essa convergência é denominada “futurismo neorreacionário” e defende o autoritarismo e o produtivismo como formas de reconstruir a sociedade. O estudo chama atenção para uma vertente emergente da ultradireita e os desafios significativos impostos pela crescente influência da indústria tecnológica e de suas ideologias.

Palavras-chave: Big Tech; Vale do Silício; Populismo; Elitismo; Antissistema.

INTRODUCTION

Reactionary politics is conceptually understood as strong rejection of the path society is taking to the point that is necessary to return to a mythologized past to restore traditional values. In the 20th century, Nazi-fascism emerged as reactionary movements that mobilized traditional values in response to many anxieties originating from uncertainty (Fromm, 1941; Fukuyama, 2018). However, in both Italy and Germany, far-right movements incorporated futuristic ideas into their ideologies (Bowler, 1991; Herf, 1981). Similarly, over the past decade, contemporary far-right movements have achieved great success by opposing progressive ideals, mobilizing feelings of nostalgia, and promising to take back power or to make their country great again. More recently, however, while anti-establishment narratives have remained prevalent, some far-right leaders have increasingly aligned themselves with tech industry actors and their futuristic views.

What started with the far right becoming more active on digital platforms has evolved into support for the deregulation of AI industries and the adoption of cryptocurrencies, as well as promises to send people to Mars. Meanwhile, some tech industry figures who previously presented their digital platforms as liberating, democratizing tools against traditional power have increasingly shifted towards the far right, joining political rallies and even governments.

In the United States, figures such as Donald Trump have deregulated the sector while receiving overt support from industry leaders. Mark Zuckerberg has aligned himself with Republican interests by dismantling fact-checking and influencing interventionist economic policies. Peter Thiel's views are even more radical: he promotes "neo-reactionary" theories, arguing that technology should provide an "escape from politics" and viewing democracy as incompatible with

libertarian freedom. Meanwhile, Elon Musk has used his platform globally to champion far-right parties such as Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD), attacking 'woke' culture and dismantling content moderation under the guise of free speech. This 'techno-utopian' discourse is also evident in developing nations such as El Salvador, where authoritarian governance is paired with the adoption of cryptocurrency. Moreover, such leaders have not only promoted tech industry deregulation but increasingly questioned liberal values such as democracy and egalitarianism, while some have also financed neo-reactionary literature and far-right electoral campaigns.

The literature has given some attention to the conservative aspects behind the cool image of the Big Tech companies (Brockmann; Drews; Torpey, 2021; Levina; Hasinoff, 2017; Noble; Roberts, 2019; Schradie, 2015) and most recent has called attention to the growing influence of both techno-utopian and neo-reactionary ideologies (Geburu; Torres, 2024; Hughes, 2024; Okolo, 2025; Ranger; Ranger, 2025; Taşkale, 2025). However, a gap remains in the ideological convergence between the far right and techno-utopian imaginaries on historical and conceptual approaches. This study first argues that the convergence of the far right with techno-utopian views is a far-right impulse to present technological future projects while maintaining its reactionary ideology of rejecting the politics of the present. Additionally, by analyzing the emergence of techno-utopian ideologies and their convergence with the far right, it is argued that their grouped and radicalized forms share with the far right a rejection of democracy and egalitarianism, proposing to (re)build society around authoritarianism and producerism. These concepts offer individuals a sense of purpose and hope, promising to address their anxieties by establishing order and excluding those who do not contribute to society.

Given the global success of the contemporary far right, the complexity arising from its different manifestations is likely to create a new

ideological branch within the far-right ideology, much less populist and protective and much more elitist and libertarian. Additionally, given the greater power of tech companies and the mainstreaming of far-right parties, this alliance is likely to have important impacts not only for the future of the far right as an ideology but for Western democracies and the whole world.

Beyond this introduction, the article begins by exploring the theoretical and historical concepts of reactionary politics and its futuristic impulses. Next, it provides a brief literature review of the contemporary affinity between techno-utopianism and reactionary politics, as well as research design. Then, a conceptual framework is developed on the rebirth, radicalization, and convergence of techno-utopianism with the far right by analyzing the work of right-wing techno-ideologues Guillaume Faye, Nick Land, and Curtis Yarvin. The article concludes with a discussion section.

THE REACTIONARY POLITICS OF THE FAR RIGHT

THE REJECTION OF PRESENT POLITICS

Ideologies have been defined as a set of beliefs that intend to describe and interpret the world by making assertions or assumptions about human nature, historical events, present realities, and future possibilities (Jost; Federico; Napier, 2009). In perhaps the most common and simplest understanding, ideologies have been divided into left- and right-wing, according to how inequality is seen. While for the left inequality is unfair and so must be fought, for the right inequality is said to be a natural outcome from human interactions and so must be ignored or even incentivized (Bobbio, 1997).

Another term associated with right-wing politics and the defense of inequalities is 'reactionary politics.' Although it is commonly

understood as radical conservatism, the term originally referred to the reversal of existing trends. Unlike conservatism, which seeks to discourage change and protect current institutions and values, reactionary politics imply a rejection of contemporary society and a desire to return to an idealized past. This is driven by restorative nostalgia, involving attempts to reinstate a particular vision of neglected, forgotten or defeated cultural or social arrangements (Kenny, 2017). As these are projects that seek to restore mythologized former glories through radical measures, reactionaries tend to be more radical than conservatives, frequently appealing to ‘indignation’, ‘decadence’ and ‘conspiracy’ (Shorten, 2015).

According to Furedi (2018), from the Enlightenment, scientific and technological progress has become a way to manage fears about the future. However, rapid scientific and technological advances have led to widespread perceptions that change has escaped human control. Thus, even though knowledge growth and development have brought us closer to reducing uncertainty, they have also paradoxically led to more uncertainty. Rather than offering a solution to the problem of uncertainty, the source merely intensifies it (Furedi, 2018; Newell, 2025). Consequently, right-wing radicalism can be understood to be a common phenomenon in rapidly modernizing societies. In such societies, people who cannot cope with economic and cultural developments respond to the pressures of readjustment by advocating a backlash in favor of traditional values (Norris; Inglehart, 2018). Right-wing movements then mobilize these people by offering political philosophies that promise to eliminate these pressures and create a simpler, better society — a romanticized version of what the nation was like before such changes (Minkenberg, 2000; Taggart, 2004). Consequently, far-right movements are often ideologically linked to the agrarian myth, which posits that rural, agrarian societies are morally superior to urban, industrialized centers (Brass, 2013).

Recent research has emphasized the impact of cultural and economic factors on the current rejection of societal progress (Eatwell; Goodwin, 2018; Norris; Inglehart, 2018; Rodrik, 2021). Regardless of which factor is more important, the primary appeal of far-right movements lies in their promise to restore the status quo, mobilizing those who have been left behind. Accordingly, research has identified links between support for radical right parties and societal pessimism (Steenvoorden; Hartevelt, 2018), a greater sense of national nostalgia associated with ethnic nationhood (Smeekes; Wildschut; Sedikides, 2021) and welfare chauvinism (Schreurs, 2020). Similarly, there is a growing consensus in contemporary literature that the defining features of far-right ideology are authoritarianism — the belief that society should be strictly organized with severe punishments for those who disrespect it — and nativism — the idea that those who are culturally different should either be absorbed or expelled (Mudde, 2019). Thus, from a reactionary perspective, social order facilitates the radical backward movement, while cultural unity represents a stable, safe and better society.

Populism, which often overlaps with these concepts, has also received significant attention in literature as a strategy, performance, or ideology that divides society into ‘the pure people’ and a ‘morally corrupt elite’ (Moffitt, 2020). It has been argued that, to avoid becoming the very political elite they criticize, populists must redefine the concept of ‘the elite’, thereby risking falling into ‘the paranoid style of politics’ (Mudde; Kaltwasser, 2017). Surprisingly, however, little attention has been given to the efforts of anti-establishment politicians to legitimize their presence in mainstream politics. In this sense, a key issue in reactionary politics that often goes unnoticed is the intrinsic metapolitical struggle involved in offering views on the future and the path that society must follow. While liberals tend to propose new egalitarian ideas and absorb them into society, conservatives tend to slow them down or adapt them in ways that do not challenge established hierarchies. Reactionaries, however,

do not actively engage with the future. Nostalgia and romantic sentiments can certainly form the basis for a utopian reimagining of a better future (Thompson, 2011), but the nature of this future usually remains unclear. After all, reactionaries reject not only new egalitarian ideas but also values recently absorbed by society.

EARLIER FUTURISTIC IMPULSES

Since the rise of Nazi-fascism, psychoanalysts have argued that the embrace of individual freedom by humanity can cause fear, anxiety, and alienation. These can be minimized through the unconscious adoption of conformism, destructive impulses, and authoritarian tendencies, which provide a sense of order and control (Fromm, 1941). Similarly, it has been argued that the decline of a shared moral framework defined by religion has left a void, which traditional culture can help to fill by giving individuals a sense of purpose, connecting them to others and teaching them their place in the universe (Rieff, 1966). However, while technological development and rising uncertainties contributed to the anxieties that led to the rise of Nazism and fascism, technological development itself emerged as a process that could offer many people a sense of purpose and hope. Consequently, it was incorporated into far-right politics as a way of presenting a vision for the future while continuing to reject the present.

In early 20th-century Italy, Italian Futurism emerged as an artistic movement that rejected the past and celebrated technology, industry and speed. Led by Filippo Marinetti, the movement's radical agenda quickly took on a political dimension, advocating the destruction of traditional institutions and their replacement with a decentralized technocratic state run by twenty administrative 'technicians', and

proposing that children should be raised by the state. Marinetti believed that war was not a catastrophe, but rather a necessary and purifying remedy for problems such as egoism and economic opportunism (Bowler, 1991; Joll, 1960). Initially, this vision aligned with Fascism's anti-democratic and nationalist ambitions, providing Mussolini with a powerful modernist aesthetic. However, the alliance fractured when Mussolini, seeking to consolidate his power, compromised with the very institutions — the monarchy and the Church — that the futurists had sought to overthrow. This led many of the movement's intellectuals to abandon the fascist cause in disillusionment (Oestereicher, 1974).

Similarly, in Nazi Germany, a unique ideological synthesis known as 'reactionary modernism' reconciled a romantic, anti-capitalist worldview with the necessity of technological progress. German conservative thinkers and engineers separated technology from its liberal, capitalist and Jewish associations, which they blamed for abstract, profit-driven materialism, and instead framed it as a spiritual tool rooted in German culture (Herf, 1981, 1984). This enabled them to embrace modern engineering while rejecting Enlightenment values, on the basis that a strong, authoritarian state was the only entity capable of realizing technology's true potential to unify the nation and overcome chaos. This paradoxical adoption of radical change for anti-liberal purposes made modern technology a key part of the Nazi totalitarian project, presented as the ultimate solution to modern anxieties (Fritzsche, 1996).

Much more recent, the rise of the far right has led scholars to draw parallels between the anxieties that led to the rise of Nazism and fascism, and those that are boosting the contemporary far right. According to Fukuyama (2018), anxieties surrounding the transition from agrarian village society to modern, urban industrial life brought the question of identity to the forefront. Similarly, the recent rise in

inequality and economic distress is often perceived by individuals not as a lack of resources, but as a loss of dignity and sense of belonging. In both contexts, traditional identities emerged as a stable and solid answer that could provide dignity and pride, sustaining their vision of the world in a fast and confusing era.

However, as far-right parties have become more established in mainstream politics, they have also adopted futuristic views in an attempt to consolidate their political project. This offers people a sense of purpose while rejecting the current political landscape. Despite the historical recurrence of the past-future nexus in far-right politics, the current convergence of reactionary and futuristic views between far-right and Big Tech leaders has received little attention from scholars.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Research on this increasing affinity has been divided into two groups. The first group of scholars has focused on the tech industry and have paid increasing attention to the emergence of a Silicon Valley ideology and its promotion of class inequality (Schradié, 2015), gender and racial exclusions (Noble; Roberts, 2019), tech-bro masculinity and exploitative work ethic (Crandall; Brown; McMahon, 2021), and a reactionary tech oligarchy (Farkas; Mondon, 2025). Similarly, research has demonstrated how the Silicon Valley has promoted the far right (Massanari, 2024) and that algorithms of platforms such as YouTube and Twitter (now X) systematically amplify right-leaning content, effectively serving as powerful recruitment tools for the alt-right (Bryant, 2020; Huszár *et al.*, 2022).

Additionally, a second group of studies have recently emerged focusing on the new techno-utopian ideologies that have influenced

the tech industry and far-right movements. Although scholars have recognized the influence of new thinkers of the radical right and their theories (Sedgwick, 2019), greater attention has been formed around their growing prominence in recent years. Gebru and Torres (2024) call attention to ideologies such as transhumanism (the use of science and technology to transcend human biological limitations), extropianism (the use of technology and rational thinking to maximize human potential and freedom), singularitarianism (the creation of a technological superintelligence that surpasses human intellect), modern cosmism (the control of nature to achieve radical life extension, resurrection, and space colonization), rationalism (aiming to improve decision-making by eliminating emotional and cognitive biases), effective altruism (the use of strict data, metrics, and reasoning to maximize global charitable impact), and longtermism (the favoring of far-future human potential over contemporary moral debates). The authors argue that these overlapping ideologies, grouped as TESCREAL, have influenced policymakers and researchers who may not share the utopian eugenic ideals associated with such views. Similarly, Hughes (2024) analyzed techno-colonial doctrines of individuals such as Nick Land, Curtis Yarvin and Peter Thiel to call attention for the contemporary attempts to selectively reproduce settler colonial practices under the approach of technological development. Ranger and Ranger (2025) investigate what they call Muskian futurism, a dangerous technocratic accelerationism (which promotes unrestricted tech progress to force systemic transformation and untimely solve human problems) composed by various overlapping futurist reactionary ideologies that influence Trump's second administration and aims at undermining democratic institutions. Okolo (2025) notes the role of effective accelerationism and its promotion of unrestricted progress in AI as a solution to humanity's problems, which has made into Trump's administration. Finally, Taşkale (2025) uses the term

reactionary futurism to address the ideology that rejects both the state and democracy while entrenching class stratification, where the market reigns supreme and the corporation sets the rules.

However, a gap remains in historical and ideological analyses approaching the convergence of the far right and techno-utopianism. To investigate this convergence, this study develops a conceptual framework of the contemporary synthesis of techno-utopianism and the far right, with the intention of identifying the core ideological mechanisms of their alignment. Although techno-utopianism is not necessarily linked to the right-wing, it is argued that the radicalization of such ideologies leads such ideas to the right, as will be discussed. Thus, to develop this theoretical discussion, the article focuses on the ideas of three techno-ideologues that embrace right-wing ideologies – Guillaume Faye, Nick Land, and Curtis Yarvin – mapping their relationship with contemporary far-right radicalism.

THE PAST-FUTURE NEXUS OF THE TWENTIETH-FIRST CENTURY FAR RIGHT

THE RE-BIRTH AND RADICALIZATION OF TECHNO-UTOPIANISM

The post-Second World War period was marked not only by the crisis and widespread condemnation of far-right ideology, but also by an ideological debate around redistributive policies. This was characterized by a high interventionism in socialist countries and the embedded capitalist Keynesian model in the West. However, in the post-Cold War context, where liberal values triumphed, the ideological convergence of new left- and right-wing movements disenchanted with authoritarianism and war allow for a new focus

on pro-market policies and renewed enthusiasm for the infinite possibilities of technological development. This was particularly evident in California, where counterculture ideals merged with economic libertarian ideologies to embrace an optimistic and emancipatory form of technological determinism, called Californian Ideology. According to Barbrook and Cameron (1996), that was formed through the emerging techno-intelligentsia who have enjoyed and mutated the cultural freedoms won by the hippies into the belief that individual freedom can only be achieved by prioritizing technological progress.

These optimistic views are based on the belief that technology plays a key role in ensuring that the good prevail over the bad. Although techno-optimism can manifest in different degrees, there is a growing understanding that evolves the idea that technology makes society not only better, but essentially good (Danaher, 2022; Königs, 2022), what has caused the emergence of the term techno-solutionism, and the idea the technology can be the answer to society's problems (Morozov, 2013).

Although many transhumanist views advocating the enhancement of the human condition originated decades earlier, it was during this period that they gained notoriety. While different ideologies have become associated with transhumanism, such as longtermism and accelerationism (the promotion of unrestricted technological progress as a solution to human problems), these concepts are not necessarily ideologically oriented. Such views can be promoted by leftists who believe that a high-tech future will bring an end to capitalism and create a more equal society, and by right-wingers who believe that technological development can enhance freedom and opportunities regardless of inequality.

However, it has been highlighted since then that although this imaginary was guided by optimism, this was an inherently

contradictory mindset, promoting free-market principles while ignoring the fact that hypermedia could only have been developed with substantial state funding (Barbrook; Cameron, 1996). Thus, while this libertarianism has been shaped around the image of the self-sufficient, lone hacker, it has always carried an inherently elitist behavior. As such views evolved, concerns around the use of unrestricted technologies for authoritarian and elitist purposes eventually clashed with the inherent concerns with inequality within the left.

While leftist technosolutionists believe that technology can solve social problems, they are also concerned that, without proper planning, technological development could perpetuate existing inequalities. Meanwhile, those on the right of the ideological spectrum ignore or even incentivize inequalities and advocate technological development without any restrictions, neglecting the social issues of the present, placing all bets on a utopian future. Although an effort for the promotion of a post-capitalist world remains within techno-utopian views (Srnicek; Williams, 2015), it has been argued that capital itself is the accelerative factor, and prioritizing anything else goes against what sustains accelerationist views (Land, 2017). In other words, while the intrinsic focus on technological development without restrictions raises specific concerns among leftist thinkers, the inherent producerist aspects within such views reject the leftist egalitarianism. A practical example of this process is the second wave of eugenics and their desire for radical human enhancement. Although proponents of this movement claim that it has moved beyond the racist, xenophobic and elitist attitudes of the past, researchers have highlighted that the same discriminatory attitudes that characterized the first wave of eugenics are often present in many of the ideologies within the TESCREAL bundle (Geburu; Torres, 2024).

Consequently, while social scientists have increasingly challenged the idea that society is moving towards a desirable direction,

highlighting that people have lost trust in the future, techno-utopian views increasingly aligned with the tech industry, making Silicon Valley actors hopeful and confident that their technological innovations are making and will continue to make a positive social change. Facing the risks and dangers of the current capitalist system, this techno-solutionism binds together technological development with the libertarians desires of human freedom to present a future led by entrepreneurial, charismatic and powerful individuals inspiring people with their visions of a good extraplanetary imaginary in opposition to the bad public institutions and their egalitarian efforts (Tutton, 2021).

Additionally, as techno-utopian views became increasingly linked to the right-wing, the evolution of this ideology carried on by tech leaders has been the intensification of their opportunistic relationship with the state. The Silicon Valley narrative promotes disruption, framing it as a driver of technological progress and a liberator from outdated regulations and monopolies, ostensibly empowering individuals while increasing their ties with the government (Levina; Hasinoff, 2017). The tech elite not only relied on state subsidies and public funding to develop the internet, microchips, and artificial intelligence, but they are also products of elite institutions, beneficiaries of publicly funded regimes, and architects of monopolistic platforms (Brockmann; Drews; Torpey, 2021). Even so, they constantly promote the idea of self-made success, portraying their dominance as the just reward for taking private risks. This not only legitimizes their wealth, but also their growing political influence, as they portray any pushback against regulation as an attack on progress itself.

In similar vein, by promoting an image of themselves as cool — a blend of narcissistic self-mythmaking (the entrepreneur as humanity's redeemer) and ironic detachment (Pountain; Robins, 2008) —, the tech leaders present themselves as visionary saviors offering creative solutions to the disenchantments of modernity (Crandall; Brown;

Mcmahon, 2021). Nevertheless, despite their rebellious image, Silicon Valley's labor practices mirror the hierarchical exploitation observed elsewhere. The negative consequences, such as worker exploitation, market consolidation, and social fragmentation, are dismissed as unavoidable externalities and the necessary cost of saving humanity (Quandt; Klapproth, 2024). Table 1 clarifies different techno-utopian ideologies, how their radical forms tilt to the right-wing, and how they link to the far right.

Table 1 – Techno-utopian Ideologies and Their Link to the Far Right

Techno-utopian ideology	Core idea	Radical forms' connection to the right-wing	Far-right link
Accelerationism	Promote unrestricted tech progress to force systemic transformation and untimely solve human problems	Prioritizes technological acceleration over human-centric or egalitarian needs	Democracy and human rights may be seen as obsolete constraints on a post-human future
Transhumanism	Use science and technology to transcend human biological limitations	Dismisses social egalitarianism as a biological delusion	Can lead to the creation of a genetically engineered, superior tech-elite
Extropianism	Use technology and rational thinking to maximize human potential and freedom	Rejects state regulation in favor of absolute free-market forces	Can be aligned with anarcho-capitalism, viewing democratic oversight as societal decay
Singularitarianism	Create a technological superintelligence that surpasses human intellect	Focus on capturing the ultimate intelligence revolution rather than public safety	Technological superintelligence can become a tool for political dominance to replace the democratic global order

Continuação Table 1 – Techno-utopian Ideologies and Their Link to the Far Right

Modern Cosmism	Master nature to achieve radical life extension, resurrection, and space colonization	Rejects space exploration as a universal, egalitarian human triumph	Often frames cosmic expansion as the destiny of a spiritually superior civilization
Rationalism	Improve decision-making by eliminating emotional and cognitive biases	Misuses “unbiased truth” to legitimize eugenics and innate biological hierarchies	Often treats controversial far-right stances on race and gender as “suppressed forbidden knowledge”
Effective Altruism	Use strict data, metrics, and reasoning to maximize global charitable impact	Employs a top-down, utilitarian math that rationalizes massive wealth accumulation	Prioritizes elite-driven, technocratic interventions over grassroots social justice
Longtermism	Prioritizes far-future human potential over contemporary moral debates	De-prioritizes current humanitarian crises for far-future tech potential	Merges with eugenicist, natalist, and race-preservationist anxieties
TESCREAL	The overarching bundle of these interlocking techno-futurist ideologies	Views modern democracy and egalitarian movements as obstacles to human evolution	It ends up supporting a system in which an elite rules with centralized power that harms marginalized groups

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Despite all the talk of empowerment and disruption, this contemporary futurism binding philosophical branches and the tech industry actively cultivates a technocratic elite whose authority is

legitimized by their perceived mastery of the digital future. This imaginary normalizes radical social stratification, presenting vast wealth disparities as the inevitable and fair result of meritocratic competition. It creates a political framework that is inherently hostile to redistributive mechanisms and collective social welfare, viewing them as obsolete impediments to innovation. Thus, the techno-optimistic narrative not only ignores inequality, but also structurally justifies it. This provides a ready-made philosophical basis for a new, digitally enabled social order that is profoundly hierarchical, creating a fertile intellectual ground where the goals of the tech elite can unexpectedly converge with the anti-democratic and inegalitarian impulses of the contemporary far right.

THE CONVERGENCE WITH THE FAR RIGHT

While the techno-optimism of past decades has evolved into an inherently socially conservative and economically libertarian mindset, it has also influenced and evolved alongside much more explicitly reactionary ideologies. These ideologies form a constellation of ideas that, although different, often overlap. Due to the complexity of the subject matter and the limitations of this study's scope, special attention will be given to archeofuturism and the Dark Enlightenment as examples of the connection between techno-utopianism and reactionary far-right politics.

Guillaume Faye's archeofuturism is perhaps the most notable attempt to develop a vision for the future of the contemporary far right. Faye (2010) views his archeofuturism as distinct from a mere attachment to the past, as it does not represent a historical counter-revolutionary regression, but rather promotes archaic values as a means of enabling a positive technological future.

Although he does not reject technology and science, he believes that ‘scientific progress’ has missed its mark and needs to be redefined along inegalitarian lines. Rejecting the path that society has taken, he believes that technological progress can save humanity if it preserves ethnic identity and is carried out around traditional values, paying attention to the importance of ancestor worship, rites of passage, and the re-establishment of organic communities (François, 2019).

Scholars such as François (2019) have identified this combination of archaic and futuristic elements as a recurring theme in science fiction, as seen in Frank Herbert’s *Dune*. This narrative often extends to a shared belief in a destined group of pioneers who fight for a grand, transcendent cause, manifesting in two distinct yet parallel forms. The first is the individualistic, asocial hacker of the ‘Californian Ideology’, who acts alone to engineer salvation through ‘magical’ technology, and the second is the ethnically homogeneous societies found in fantasy epics such as J. R. R. Tolkien’s *The Lord of the Rings*. The latter’s vision of ordered, traditional societies has proven particularly resonant, attracting admiration from far-right political figures such as Giorgia Meloni, as well as tech industry leaders like Elon Musk, who see this as a model for a unified, purpose-driven future.

Additionally, the influence of the past-future nexus of historical fascism is evident in Faye’s writings. Like Marinetti in his futurist manifesto, he views marriage as a matter of state, advocating the de-individualization of marriage and asserting that unions should be a matter for the entire community, not just the married couple. However, like German reactionary modernism, Faye detaches technological progress from the harms of modern capitalism, criticizing a system that prioritizes speculative profits over production. Along these lines, he expresses great concern about the current global technological competition and economic warfare over

control of markets and scarce resources, arguing that it will be won by people with the strongest and best-selected 'elite blocs' and the most organically integrated masses (Faye, 2010).

Attempting to bind reactionary politics with techno-solutionist views, he recognizes the current social problems and lack of trust. However, he argues that anxieties and dissatisfactions surrounding social competition and the desire for high social status should not be addressed through egalitarianism and equal opportunities. Instead, he suggests embracing inequality and accepting that many individuals lack the skills required for the positions they are expected to aspire to.

While archeofuturism is an attempt to develop a vision for the future of the contemporary far right, other movements have emerged from techno-utopian circles and have become increasingly political. Receiving much more attention and directly influencing both the tech industry and far-right politics is what has been termed the Dark Enlightenment (also called the Neo-Reactionary Movement or simply NRx). This movement is mainly based on the radical longtermist and accelerationist views of Nick Land. According to Land, by removing the saviorist ideas that something big and benevolent is looking after us, we are left with Darwinian survival of the fittest. He then rejects the existence of dynamism without competition and of science without an effective social mechanism for eliminating failure. Consequently, he views all egalitarian and democratic mechanisms as acting not only against technological development, but also against the probability of saving the human race (Land, 2017).

By viewing democracy as merely a system in which politicians buy votes to gain the right to exercise political power in their own favor for a limited time, Land dismisses democracy as an inherently

corrupt mechanism. He believes that the only solution is a pro-market authoritarian system that can provide the autonomy and dynamism necessary to boost technological development.

Although the far right has traditionally promoted welfare chauvinism, the importance of this producerist aspect in mobilizing voters against redistributive values has increased. According to Ivaldi and Mazzoleni (2019), the producerist ideology promotes the idea that producers contribute not only to economic prosperity, but also embody virtue and morality, in contrast to ‘parasites’, who may refer not only to aristocrats and bankers, but also to the poor and migrants. Producers are then seen as the backbone of economic prosperity and defenders of moral values such as work ethics and honesty, being a coalition of productive and deserving people. Thus, reactionary politics is the answer to restoring justice in society by rejecting egalitarian principles that redistribute wealth to those who do not contribute. This meritocracy is closely linked to the competition that radical techno-utopians identify as necessary for accelerating technological development. From this perspective, democracy is a problematic consequence of the egalitarian values that undermine the fairness desired by people who work hard and contribute to creating a better society.

Curtis Yarvin took these ideas even further, arguing that monarchy, dictatorship and elite rule are superior governance models to democracy. However, he does not view these as ideological. On the contrary, he draws attention to what he calls the ‘cathedral’: a bureaucratic and intellectual class that holds power in modern society, constantly shaping and controlling public opinion. This class includes universities and journalists who punish those who dissent from their authoritarian liberal beliefs. Consequently, Yarvin argues that democracy itself is ideological and must be replaced, as it is simply a defective operating system. In order to escape the

‘cathedral’ during the replacement process, Yarvin has promoted not only free speech, but also anonymity, as he believes this facilitates the expression of new ideas (Rowley, 2025). Unsurprisingly, such views provide ideological support for tech industry leaders such as Elon Musk, as well as for far-right leaders and parties such as Trump and the AfD in their promotion of free speech on digital platforms.

Finally, their proposed alternative to governance is what Yarvin terms ‘neocameralism’: a system in which the state is run like a corporation, headed by a sovereign CEO. As the state’s interests would be defined as maximizing long-term shareholder value, individuals would have no reason to engage in politics (Land, 2017). In this way, they intend to replace existing social relations with a posthuman neo-feudalism (Ranger; Ranger, 2025), in which individuals are excluded from politics and a small elite runs a highly authoritarian, producerist government.

DISCUSSION


From a historical perspective, although reactionary movements reject the path that society has taken and mobilize feelings of nostalgia around an idealized past, when they achieve political success by assuming government, they face the necessity to present their own vision for a technologically advanced future. Through the lens of populism, presenting a vision for the future can help the far right avoid falling into the paranoid style of politics, in which anti-establishment stances are persistently promoted even after consolidation in government. While not entering the debate as to whether fascism can be considered populist, this past-future nexus within far-right ideology is not only associated with contemporary anti-establishment movements, but can also be traced back to historical fascism.

In Italy, the alliance of fascism and futurism brought together traditional landowners and modern industrialists. In Germany, reactionary modernism reconciled the traditional ‘organic German soul’ with the technological advances necessary to demonstrate the superiority of the German race. Following this pattern, we see today the emergence of neo-reactionary futurism, which combines traditional values, often associated with whiteness and Christianity, with techno-utopian views. On the one hand, in all cases, this past-future nexus provides a vision for the future of reactionary politics, denouncing liberal democracy and egalitarian ideologies in the process. On the other hand, this reactionary futuristic impulse has evolved from artistic movements in 1910s Italy and idealistic and spiritualized engineering views in 1930s Germany to an active industrial role in politics in the 2020s.

While there are democratic and egalitarian techno-utopian views built on values of equality and welfare, in radical forms techno-enthusiasm has tilted this utopianism towards authoritarianism and the free market as requirements for the order and competition that could accelerate technological development. This radicalization of futuristic ideals has given rise to movements such as the Dark Enlightenment, whose core values align with those of the contemporary far right. Simultaneously, the far right is highly interested in these movements because they propose a future that challenges the perceived weakness and flexibility of the current liberal era, offering instead a radical, ordered and hierarchical alternative. In other words, since restoring the past in a high-tech, global economy creates an operational vacuum, radicalized techno-utopianism supplies a non-liberal democratic vision of the future to fill this void. Techno-utopianism then acts as a pragmatic driver for far-right agendas. It provides the far right with a modernization project that circumvents Western liberal institutions, such as human rights, environmental regulations, and egalitarian democracy, by replacing them with algorithmic governance.

This past-future nexus is therefore essential to the far right, as it finds in radical techno-utopian views a powerful existing methodology for its own reactionary project. Considering that the past-future nexus in Nazi Germany was termed 'reactionary modernism', and that the Dark Enlightenment movement has been termed also the 'neo-reactionary' movement, linked to both philosophy and politics, it is proposed that 'neo-reactionary futurism' be used to describe the past-future nexus of the contemporary far right. In practical terms, archeofuturism and Dark Enlightenment represent the ideological convergence of far-right and techno-utopian views that forms neo-reactionary futurism. The former began with political identity and embraced techno-utopianism, while the latter began with a technological identity and moved towards reactionary politics. Figure 1 shows a framework mapping the convergence of far-right politics and techno-utopian views.

Figure 1 – Framework of the convergence of far-right politics and techno-utopian views



Source: Elaborated by the author.

By focusing on the ideological features of this neo-reactionary futurism, which combines techno-utopianism with reactionary politics, it becomes clear that authoritarianism is the main point of convergence, as both sides completely reject liberal democracy.

Authoritarianism here is then understood as the strict organization of society in a certain way, leaving little space for questioning. While many far-right movements have been linked to populism and majoritarian democracy in the sense that minorities should not be considered or heard, these same movements have shown that they are willing to reject democracy altogether when the majority shifts towards the opposition, exemplified by the attacks to the Congress in the US and Brazil. In this sense, many populist movements have been criticized for displaying elitist tendencies by offering a ‘good’ elite to combat a ‘bad’ elite rather than empowering the people (Mangset *et al.*, 2019; Schoor, 2019). Similarly, although techno-utopian views are not inherently authoritarian, the radicalization and convergence of such ideas end up requiring a great deal of social order and little space for criticism of those not contributing to the realization of this techno-utopia.

Beyond ideological affinity, the development of a techno-authoritarian society is likely to benefit both the far right and the utopian views of the tech industry. While authoritarian politics see technologies as a means of deterring activities or beliefs that challenge the state (Feldstein, 2021), tech companies want to provide governments with the means to expand surveillance and control in society. As these contracts include a great deal of information about the population and they are likely to be renewed, they contribute to the formation of a monopoly. Accordingly, it has been argued that autocrats benefit from AI as a technology of political control, and that tech companies benefit from investments and contracts with governments, creating a dangerous cycle (Beraja *et al.*, 2023). Thus, the symbiotic relationship between the far right, which is in need of advanced control systems, and the tech industry, which is eager to profit from supplying them, creates a powerful, self-financing pathway for digital authoritarianism.

Another important aspect of this neo-reactionary futurism is producerism. By presenting an unequal future as a meritocratic and inevitable result of 'natural' competition, neo-reactionary futurism offers a moral and intellectual justification for a new form of techno-feudalism. This narrative has the power to reshape public opinion, convincing parts of the population that the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a tech elite is not a failure of democracy, but a deserved and efficient outcome, eroding support for redistributive policies and social welfare. The producerist aspect of this contemporary convergence is particularly concerning because, unlike historical fascism, where futuristic views were closely linked to the state, the core ideologies of neo-reactionary futurism are embedded within powerful, transnational corporations. This means that even if their political allies suffer electoral defeats, the techno-authoritarian vision underlying the ideology and its capacity for development persists and continues to evolve within the unaccountable architecture of the tech industry. This decentralization of the authoritarian threat makes it more diffuse, durable and difficult to counter through traditional political means.

While modern capitalism has allowed the tech industry to increase its power, it has also brought the far right closer to pro-market libertarianism. Scholars have identified the seemingly contradictory alliance between neoliberalism and the far right (Davidson; Saull, 2017), with specific studies highlighting the emergence of nationalist neoliberalism in the US (Cozzolino, 2018) and the transformation of welfare into workfare in Hungary (Busemeyer; Rathgeb; Sahm, 2022), to name a few. The discrepancy between far-right leaders who argue for the protection of people by increasing welfare and regulating business, and those who have moved towards deregulation and meritocracy, could be exacerbated by an alignment with the tech industry. By openly promoting a highly unequal and authoritarian future, this latter group is likely to adopt a much more elitist position

than a populist one. Its alignment with the tech industry and neo-reactionary futurism helps to consolidate a techno-libertarian far right. Given the exponential development of technology and the increasing power of the tech industry, the convergence of radical techno-utopianism and reactionary politics with liberal economics and digital authoritarianism poses an increasing threat to liberal values and democracy worldwide.

The increasing convergence between tech industry leaders such as Peter Thiel, Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg, and the far right is a consequence of this ideological alignment. While Thiel and Musk's actions are arguably more political than Zuckerberg's, which can be seen as more opportunistic, this is no less alarming. Tech leaders who have not directly engaged with neo-reactionary theories have also been drawn into similar actions in order to remain competitive in the industry. This contributes to the practical convergence of far-right and techno-utopian views through actions such as digital colonialism, which are moving the world towards the neo-feudalism proposed by neo-reactionary futurism. When such actions become normalized and the most powerful visions of the future are explicitly anti-democratic, anti-egalitarian and authoritarian, alternative, more humane trajectories for technological progress are pushed aside. The growing resources and cultural influence of this neo-reactionary futurism are threatening to restrict what is deemed possible by defining 'progress' purely in terms of acceleration, control and market dominance, thereby marginalizing the pursuit of equity, solidarity and democratic governance.

CONCLUSION

This study investigates the ideological convergence between reactionary politics — specifically, the far right — and techno-utopianism, ranging from techno-optimistic views and the tech industry to neo-reactionary movements. Adopting a historical perspective, the study identifies significant parallels between the emergence and consolidation of Nazi-fascism and contemporary far-right movements as reactionary forces. Both require futuristic views to present their technological political projects, which are linked to an idealized past, while rejecting the present. By analyzing historical and contemporary ideological developments, the past-future nexus is seen as an important and natural impulse of reactionary politics. Currently, the increasing radicalism of techno-utopian views has enabled the development of neo-reactionary futuristic views, in which techno-utopianism provides the means and the far right provides the end goal of forming a highly authoritarian and producerist future that challenges liberal values such as democracy and egalitarianism.

Although the length restrictions limit the depth of the analysis, it is expected that this study will contribute to the literature by highlighting the far right's intrinsic futuristic tendency, the ongoing evolution of ideologies and the serious threat that neo-reactionary futurism poses to global democracy and egalitarianism. Similarly, it is hoped that this study will encourage further research into this topic, which could be approached using both qualitative and quantitative methods.

The implications of neo-reactionary futurism extend beyond the realm of political theory. They signal a shift towards a future where technology is designed for control rather than liberation, where citizenship is undermined by surveillance and producerist

hierarchies, and where the democratic project is challenged not by external enemies, but by an ideology forged within modern capitalism. Recognizing these implications is a necessary precondition for mobilizing the political, cultural and regulatory defenses required to contest this future.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lucas Sudbrack: Innovation Fellow at Bank of Northeast Brazil's Sectoral Intelligence Observatory. Holds a Master's degree in International Relations from Xiamen University and a Ph.D. in Government and Public Administration from The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

His research focuses on global trends such as populism, the rise of the far right, and the effects of China's rise on public opinion and electoral discourse in other countries. His work has been published in academic journals including *Mass Communication and Society*, *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, and *Latin American Policy*.

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