


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- Centro de Estudos Internacionais sobre Governo (CEGOV)



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About the Journal

AUSTRAL: Revista Brasileira de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais was the first Brazilian journal in the field of International Relations to be fully published in English (2012). It is an essentially academic vehicle, linked to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Its pluralist focus aims to contribute to the debate on the international political and economic order from the perspective of the developing world. The journal publishes original articles in the area of Strategy Studies and International Relations, with special interest in issues related to developing countries and South-South Cooperation – its security problems; the political, economic and diplomatic developments of emerging countries; and their relations with the traditional powers. AUSTRAL is published semi-annually in English and Portuguese. The journal's target audience consists of researchers, experts, diplomats, military personnel and graduate students of International Relations. The content of the journal consists ensure the publication of authors from each of the great continents of the South: Asia, Latin America and Africa. Thus, the debate and diffusion of knowledge produced in these regions is stimulated. All contributions submitted to AUSTRAL are subject to rigorous scientific evaluation.

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*A responsabilidade do conteúdo dos artigos é de seus respectivos autores.
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EDITOR'S NOTE

The world system is rapidly transitioning into an *unstable multipolarity*, gradually replacing the so-called *American unipolarity* and the virtual *US-China bipolarity*. There is also speculation about *tripolarity*, with India and the Geopolitical South forming an alternative pole, discreetly supported by Russia. Various arrangements are continually being tested and altered, and the prolonged Russian-Ukrainian conflict is now paralleled by the ongoing war in the Middle East between Israel and Hamas, which is nearing a year without resolution and increasing regional complexity.

Analysts' focus is primarily on relations between great powers, their summits, and elections in key countries, particularly the unpredictable American presidential race, which never fails to surprise. However, there are *emerging middle powers* that do not receive due attention and, unexpectedly, become protagonists, influencing international events.

In this context, we present a collection of articles examining the cases of Turkey, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and China, providing a platform for scholars from the Geopolitical South (Third World). Also relevant to the current "New Cold War" is an article by an American scholar, offering a critical reinterpretation of the Grand Strategy of the United States at the start of the "old Cold War". Additionally, there is an original article on the impact of the Russo-Ukrainian War on geopolitics, featuring scholars from India, Indonesia, Brazil, and the United States.

This issue is rounded off with a review of three thought-provoking books offering truly realist perspectives on the Russo-Ukrainian War, reinforcing our commitment to publishing comments on works of analytical originality. Moreover, we also introduce a renewed Editorial Board. The Council for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES), part of the Ministry of Education responsible for the Brazilian Postgraduate System and its editorial production, has corrected technical aspects of journal evaluation, elevating AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations to category A-4, with retroactive effect.

The worldview of authors from the Geopolitical South enriches scholarly and strategic perspectives on the analysed themes, fulfilling the enduring objectives of AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations. This is crucial at a time when the global scenario is evolving into a

series of conflicts and tensions, which have already led to military escalation in a highly unpredictable environment. More than ever, there is a need for the academic sphere to conduct urgent critical-realist analysis, setting aside post-modern approaches.

We thank the Dean of Research at UFRGS (Pró-reitoria de Pesquisa) for their long-lasting support through the Periodical Publishing Support Programme (PAEP), as well as the entire team involved in editing and translation, particularly Editorial Assistants Igor Estima Sardo and João Pedro Lopes Gonçalves, with the collaboration of Felipe Werner Samuel. We also thank our qualified reviewers and Professor Cristina Soreanu Pecequillo for reviewing the translations. The teamwork of NERINT/UFRGS researchers has enabled us to maintain the regularity and quality of AUSTRAL.

TURKEY'S DILEMMA AND STRATEGIC STABILITY¹

Jean-Pier de Vasconcellos Esquia²
José Miguel Quedi Martins³

Introduction

This article deals with Turkey's International Relations and the impact of its choices in the International System (IS) in this new era, marked by the return of competition between land powers (Visentini 2021). It is important to set forth, for the purposes of this analysis, that the Turkish quandary is intentionally reduced to two possible lines of conduct — viewed here as pure ideal types (Mills and Geertz 1982, 78). They are defined as being between adherence to revolutionary behavior, and association with the institutions of the Emerging Industrial Axis (Visentini 2019, 14; Vizentini 1995, 261)⁴. In

¹ This research is based on the post-doctoral project entitled “The Brazil-Turkey Cooperation Agreement: Modernization and Transformation of Armored Vehicles” developed by Jean-Pier Esquia under the supervision of Prof. Dr. José Miguel Martins, at the UFRGS PPGEI and the Dean's Office for Research (PROPESQ). The authors would like to thank João Gabriel Burmann da Costa, Lucas Lixinski Arnhold and Felipe Werner Samuel, for their collaboration..

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⁴ Emerging Industrial Axis and Agrarian, Mineral and Peripheral Demographic Axis — The first refers to the semi-periphery and China; includes Russia, Turkey, Iran, India, Brazil, and eventually South Africa. The second, as the name suggests, peripheral countries (VISENTINI, 2019, p. 11). Originally these two axes were called the South-South and South-East Axis. It was a construct designed to describe Brazil's international insertion around three vectors: the South-South, South-North and South-East Axes. And, in this way, describe the diplomatic bargaining of the Vargas (1951-54), Kubitschek (1956-61), Quadros (1961) and Goulart (1961-64) governments with the aim of promoting development. Industrialization “could only be implemented

relation to strategic stability, it should be noted that this is understood as the set of elements that conform the 'rules' of the game within the scope of a multipolar world⁵.

This dilemma is faced by Turkey's trajectory since the end of the Ottoman Empire, in an effort that is characterized as historical explanation, in the terms proposed by Van Evera (2002, 106). The underlying question is: how will Turkey's international inclusion take place? The hypothesis in the present text is that, unlike other times, when Turkey found itself subjugated by international constraints, this time it can choose its form of inclusion in the IS.

This choice will arise through the Foreign Policy that Turkey will adopt in the following years — as Erdogan has already announced his retirement from public life in 2028 (Reuters 2024). Naturally, this study cannot answer what Turkey will choose. Nevertheless, it was possible to determine that Turkey's oscillation can be measured empirically based on three conditions: (01) predominance of balance, engagement or bargain; (02) coercion or adherence to institutions; (03) a logic guided by strict or institutional territorialism.

The social relevance of this analytical effort is justified by the growing global protagonism shown by Turkey. Furthermore, it is a country that maintains defense cooperation agreements with Brazil for twenty years. In 2003, the Agreement on Cooperation in Defense Related Matter (Brazil 2003) was signed, which addresses the exchange of experiences and knowledge, in the civil and military sphere, for topics related to National Defense. In 2010, the cooperation between Brazil and Turkey increased with a Strategic

by obtaining relative autonomy from the USA. To this end, it was necessary to introduce into Brazilian foreign policy the horizontal South-South multilaterality, increasing relations with Latin America and the Afro-Asian world. At the same time, the possible benefits were taken from a 'diagonal' South-East multilaterality, through cooperation with socialist countries" (VIZENTINI, 1995, p. 261). Despite being about Brazil's Foreign Policy, it was considered convenient to mention the original axes given that in the past as now, in the case of Brazil or Turkey, industrial development is central to their international insertion.

5 Strategic Stability — This is a topic extensively explored within the scope of bipolarity. It concerned the correlation of nuclear and conventional forces and wars on the periphery (WALTZ 1964, p. 882-887). But which, within the scope of a multipolar world, have not yet been adequately explored in literature. Immediately, it can be seen that, given the asymmetry of capabilities between the Great Powers, it is counterproductive to consider it in exclusively military terms. In this way, a holistic approach is proposed that, in addition to military themes, also includes Political Economy — insertion in the Fourth Industrial Revolution and infrastructure; and multilateral Political Institutions — integration processes and consultation forums (LOPES, 2024, p. 13).

Partnership Action Plan (Brazil 2010). Also, recently, in March 2022, an Agreement on Defense Industry Cooperation was signed (Brazil 2022). Therefore, the relationship is based on strategic themes and, thus, can affect the national insertion of both countries.

This bias expresses itself also in the methodological choices. As Robert Cox highlighted, every “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective” (Cox 1981, 128). In short, theories are made according to the object and purpose of each research - they must adjust to reality, and not the other way around. Due to this understanding, we sought to operationalize and to make compatible different, and even competing, approaches to International Relations (IR) theories.

The starting point was finding the ‘place’ of Turkey’s ‘choice’ and its impact on the IS. Pursuant to this, we resorted to the “dialectical synthesis” proposed by Wendt, which seeks to correlate Agent (Units) and Structure (SI). In this manner, we “overcome the subordination of one to another” (Wendt 1987, 356), based either on the freedom of the agent, or on the inexorability of the conditioning, which is established by the structure. It is about recognizing that under certain circumstances, agents can modify structures. Additionally, the author highlights that the actor’s course of action will be informed by the perception of their trajectory, identity or interests, as well as that of their counterparts, partners and competitors (Wendt 2014, 227). This last understanding justifies the approach of historical explanation adopted herein.

From the theory of realism (structural and offensive) we take these ideas: (a) the IS is anarchic (Mearsheimer 2007, 35); (b) relationships are regulated through capabilities (Waltz 1979, 99, 181); and (c) balancing is the privileged way in which interactions occur. In this regard, it should be pointed that Turkey is NATO’s largest Land Force in Europe, the third largest in the Middle East and the seventh largest globally (excluding the USA) (IISS 2024)⁶. Shortly, realism serves to justify why Turkey has a prominent role in the IS and, at the same time, why it can allow itself the revolutionary option. However, the analysis is forced to distance itself from realism, as its principles present themselves as absolute notions.

⁶ Effective Eurasian and Middle Eastern Land Forces — India: 1,237,000 (IISS, 2024, p. 265); North Korea: 1,100,000 (IISS, 2024, p. 282); China: 965,000 (IISS, 2024, p. 254); Russia: 500,000 (IISS, 2024, p. 191); Will: 350,000 (IISS, 2024, p. 352); Egypt 310,000 (IISS, 2024, p. 347); Türkiye 260,000 (IISS, 2024, p. 147). Although Turkey’s position may seem unfavorable, it must be considered that from a qualitative point of view, it is at a level that, in some aspects, can be compared to that of China and Russia. For example, Turkey is the sixth largest attack helicopter force in the world, while Egypt, India, North Korea and Iran are in seventh, seventeenth, thirty-fourth and forty-fourth position respectively (GFP, 2024, online).

Such contingency is carried out from five additional analytical perspectives: (i) the role of institutions; (ii) the engagement; (iii) the bargain; (iv) the territorial logic; and (v) from the Economic Decision Center.

Firstly, what justifies the option of adhering to South-South Axis's institutions is the neo-institutionalist approach. This perspective proposes that countries' behavior, under certain conditions, can be shaped or conditioned by multilateral institutions and international regimes (Krasner 1982, 185-186; Keohane and Nye 1977, 19).

Secondly, the concept of engagement in the terms proposed by Resnick (2001)⁷. It is a multidimensional relationship - which includes military interactions - aimed at subduing an adversary using the intensification of interdependence - and not just economic.

For the author, there are three conditions for engagement: (a) the original level of interaction between countries must be low; (b) the 'engaged' country must possess significant ambitions; (c) the 'engager' must have sufficient capacity to create the expectation of effectively contributing to these objectives. Therefore, Resnick's theory serves to justify the importance of Turkey - but it could also be Brazil's - of joining the institutions of the South-South Axis. Except for Russia and China - countries with which a long history of interactions is maintained - the other BRICS members, especially the new ones, meet all of Resnick's requirements. But there is a catch: engagement does not work under any circumstances, with countries that adopt revolutionary behavior - of challenging institutions or international order (Resnick 2011, 560-561).

⁷ Engagement — the term in English has at least three distinct meanings: engagement; other types of commitments, but with some degree of solemnity; in military jargon, in the sphere of tactics, it indicates the act of entering into combat. In its categorical meaning, as explained by Resnick (2001), it was originally a category of Foreign Policy Analysis. However, the criticism made by the author, both regarding the lack of a reductionist approach and on the other, allows its operationalization for the study of IR. Since, according to the author: engagement is "the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the establishment, comprehensive and enhanced, of contacts with that state in various thematic areas, i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural" (RESNICK, 2001, p. 559). As it can be seen, the proposed definition, when covering military interactions, acquires citizenship in international relations, since these are based on the correlation of forces. Furthermore, engagement for the author can be used for purposes of subduing a recalcitrant competitor who is reluctant to adhere to the status quo. This is clearly deduced from the passage in which the author describes that the sending state can achieve its objectives "by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions advocating divergent policies; or changing preferences at the local level, in the hope that this will precipitate bottom-up political change within the target state" (RESNICK, 2001, p. 560). Therefore, something that goes far beyond diplomacy, or even foreign policy.

Nonetheless, it is not possible to fully subscribe to the author's point of view, for whom conduct is typified in three forms: containment, appeasement and engagement - being the first two antipodes, and the third, the superior synthesis of both. In fact, here it is necessary to agree with realism, which argues that containment is a form of strict balancing carried out only by Great Powers. Thereby, balancing is more universal, as it presupposes milder levels of coercion and the possibility of being practiced by virtually any State. Moreover, Resnick emphasizes - rightly - that engagement with Great Powers is not possible. This does not happen due to the asymmetry of capabilities, but because of long-standing relationships. Yet, in this case, the author does not offer any alternative other than the obvious one: appeasement.

Hence, thirdly, understanding the role of bargaining becomes necessary. It would be the preferred way for semi-peripheral countries (Brazil and Turkey) to relate to the Great Powers, since appeasement involves giving up their own interests, and containment is clearly counterproductive. Although balancing in some cases is not possible, it certainly is for Turkey.

Thus, once again, Brazilian foreign policy is used in relation to bargain. Paulo Visentini points out two types of bargaining: pragmatic and diplomatic. In the case of pragmatic, the aim is to explore gains in a competition context between emerging powers. Such was the case of the maneuver carried out by Brazil between Germany and the United States (in a time when England was a hegemonic power in the IS). This bargain culminated in the achievement of the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional⁸, in Volta Redonda, and in Brazil's entry into World War II alongside the allies. The diplomatic bargain, however, consists of aligning oneself in a negotiated way with the hegemonic power - as the USA after World War II - which allows a lesser latitude of maneuver, due to the unfavorable correlation of forces to the other Great Powers (Vizentini 1995, 33, 63).

In Turkey's case, despite its long-term relationship with the USA, engagement appeared viable because of an exceptional circumstance: the overstretch of American forces (Cordesman 2007) and the need for delegation - *buck-passing* and *burden-sharing* (Mearsheimer 2007, 160-161). Afterward, in the fifth section of this paper, which deals with the role of the Middle East (ME) for Turkey, we try to explain why this did not happen. By virtue of this, the Turkish option revolves around balancing the USA in the Middle East or bargaining with them - approaching Russia and China. However, what can compel Turkey to bargain or balance? Its territorial logic.

⁸ Translator's note: The company's name can be literally translated as 'National Steel Industry Company'.

So, fourthly, it is essential to recognize that the conduct of countries waver between the predominance of territorialism or capitalism. These notions are due to Giovanni Arrighi, according to whom, it can be said that the capitalist logic concerns the cross-border network, and the territorial logic pertains to the control of the territory. Such logics do not operate in isolation from each other, but rather in close correlation with each other (Arrighi 2013, 34). Therefore, Arrighi uses this characterization more as pure types - to indicate predominance - than as empirically descriptive categories.

In Michael Mann's approach, they take on an explanatory historical contour. Also, they appear in succession: the capitalist networks, dating back to medieval times, structure capitalism, which ultimately assume the appearance of industrial capitalism (Mann 2020, 450-452). This, in turn, is protected by customs barriers, therefore territorial. Mann recognizes that, in the end, the logic of capital subsumes under the control of territory (Mann 2022, 356). Finally, David Harvey, in a position closer to Mann than to Arrighi, relates territorial expansion to the demands for enlarged reproduction of capital (Harvey 2014, 32-34, 88-91, 117).

Although all of these approaches are useful to describe Turkey's wavering condition, none of them is fully helpful to clarify the Turkish dilemma. After all, in Arrighi's work (2013), the two logics coexist, and the "capitalist" preponderance, at last, is a prerogative of the hegemon. In the approaches made by Harvey (2014) and Mann (2022), capital ends up subsumed in the territory and the tension is not maintained. Capital accumulation becomes an end in itself. Once again, the agent is included into the structure. Accordingly, as seen below, it is necessary to create a particular shade to describe Turkey's swing in relation to the territory. Anyhow, first, it is important to address the role of the Economic Decision Center.

Thereby, fifth and lastly, it is worth highlighting the concept of the Economic Decision Center, formulated by Celso Furtado (1962, 109-112; 2013 [1961], 137-139). In fact, even if he did not intend to, through this concept, Furtado created a new definition of sovereignty: a society is only capable of self-determination if it can endogenize its center of economic decisions. The criterion for this is to "have in our hands the instruments of self-determination that until recently were the prerogative of a few privileged peoples"⁹ (Furtado 1962, 115). Obviously, Furtado (1962) refers to the industry, or what can be added nowadays, to the capacity of a country to produce endogenously, an element that defines the ultimate innovation that allows capital accumulation.

⁹ Translator 's note - In the original: "te[nha-se] em nossas mãos os instrumentos de autodeterminação que até há pouco eram apanágio de uns quantos povos privilegiados" (Furtado 1962, 115).

There is a need to recognize that the dyad proposed by Arrighi (2013) - territorialism or capitalism - serves more to explain the dynamics of the hegemon in high finance than the behavior of countries that do not find themselves in, or even aspire to, this position. Mann (2022) and Harvey (2014) associate territory with the demand for capital accumulation, which explains, at least in part, the imperative of scale for industrialization. Yet, only with Furtado, the subject's intentionality and the mediation of politics are inserted, which may tinge the degree of control of the territory. Thus, a distinction is made with the sole purpose of 'measuring' Turkey's conduct: strict and institutional territorialism. In the first case, control of territory would have priority over other relations, so much so that it would be necessary to make use of internal and external coercion, and consequently, accept confrontation - the antithesis of strategic stability.

In accordance with this approach, this article is divided into five parts. The first concerns the predominance of need in the trajectory of IR in Turkey. The second part deals with the legacy of extra-economic coercion, utilized by the USA during unipolarity, and the challenges this poses for strategic stability - which must be focused on a multidimensional perspective (Lopes 2024, 13). The third part is about Turkey's insertion into the South-South Axis - it remains open to know whether there will also be an adhesion to its institutions. Part four handles revolutionary conduct. Lastly, the fifth and final part presents the role of the Middle East in the outcome of the Turkish dilemma.

1 Turkey: a prisoner of need

Taking Turkey's trajectory - and, even before the Ottoman Empire - one can aspire to synthesize its objectives into three elements: (a) the search for economic development with stability; (b) the endogenization of technologies, mainly those related to military employment, but not only these; (c) the maintenance of territorial integrity and control.

In pursuit of these goals, Turkey has rarely been free to make choices. Certainly, individuals, classes or countries are not free - at least not completely - to write their own history. They do so, as already observed by Marx (2007, 19), under historically determined circumstances¹⁰. That is, the choices always take place under the mantle of necessity. An equivalent reasoning

¹⁰ In the original — “Men make their own history, but they don't make it as they want; They do not do so under circumstances of their own choosing, but rather under those they directly encounter, bequeathed and transmitted by the past” (MARX, 2007, p. 19).

can be made using the concept of the third image - international system and war - by Waltz (1979). Likewise, for the American theorist, the third image determines, ultimately, the behavior of countries (Waltz 1979, 92; Cepik and Schneider 2010, 95).

Nonetheless, in Turkey's case, the necessity or the constraints. However, in the case of Turkey, the need or the conditions of the third image took on a more pressing aspect: a more acute forcefulness. The country has always found itself pressured by its powerful neighbors: Europe, Russia and Iran. Opposing what one might think, Europe has early unified against Turkey - such as the Holy League case, between 1684 and 1699 (Palmer 2013, 17). Russia, for its part, has always been a formidable adversary. Russia, in turn, has always been a formidable adversary. Furthermore, the Shiites of Iran prevented the Ottoman Caliphate (1517 - 1924) from achieving the greatness of its predecessors, the Umayyads (661-750) and the Abbasids (750-1258).

Afterwards, France, England and the United States of America (USA) entered the picture. France's emergence happened during the Napoleonic Wars that followed the French Revolution and dragged behind them the Industrial Revolution - discussed later on. Its symbolic moment is Napoleon's victory (and the Ottoman defeat) in the Battle of the Pyramids¹¹ in 1798. Hereafter, the Middle East would be forever inscribed within the framework of the International System and would suffer the jolts resulting from changes in the power balance in Europe.

Still, even the European presence did not prevent Turkey, Russia and Iran (Persia) from continuing their confrontation. It was the jadedness of these, during the Russo-Turkish¹² (1828 - 1829) and Russo-Persian (1826 - 1828) Wars, that strengthened the Europeans and contributed to the gradual opening of the Greater Middle East to them. However, it was the confrontation between Persians and the Durrani Empire (Pashto) in Herat (1837 - 1838), the last straw that allowed England to penetrate Central Asia. Until then, the region remained undebauched, despite the Western presence in Egypt and, for a long period, in India. Regardless of their initial defeat in the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838 - 1842), from then on, the British established themselves firmly in Central Asia - what is described as the "Great Game", as being fought only between Russia and England.

The USA presence in the region initially occurred in a mild and indirect way. The region became aware of its existence due to Theodore Roosevelt's Great White Fleet (1907-1909), which circumnavigated the globe covering the Mediterranean Sea, the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden. Later

¹¹ Translator's note: Also known as the 'Battle of Embabeh'.

¹² Translator's note: Also known as the 'Russo-Ottoman Wars'.

on, Wilson's "Fourteen Points" (1918) had a dramatic impact on the history of the region, since they proposed the defense of political independence and territorial integrity of "large" and "small" states (point fourteen). This was cunningly used at the Paris Conference (1919) by Clemenceau and Lloyd George, both respectively Prime Ministers of France and England, to consummate the partition of Turkish Anatolia. Foreseen since 1916, in the Sykes-Picot Agreement (Macmillan 2004, 418), the Paris partition was in flagrant opposition to what Wilson had expressed in his twelfth point. Turkey's invasion by the allies was followed by the fierce War of Independence (1919 - 1923). The outcome of the internal conflagration was to overthrow the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) and to assert the Turkish right of sovereignty over Anatolia, enshrined in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). These themes will be discussed later, in more detail.

Despite their bravery and intrepidity, which allowed the Turkish people to defeat the European powers, this tenacious struggle is an expression of necessity, not choice. As with other countries in the region, forging one's destiny was not a viable option.

This scenery changed after the First World War ("I WW" as referred herein), which promoted the decline of Europe (Visentini 2014). As Alexis de Tocqueville (2001, 476-477) had already anticipated, the USA and Russia were destined to "one day hold the fate of half the world in their hands"¹³. In fact, the Fordist industrialism and the Soviet Revolution presented themselves as civilizing alternatives to Europe, opposing not only colonialism, but reactionarism, conservatism and European anachronisms. Indeed, "the emergence of the USSR altered, although not immediately, the very essence of international relations"¹⁴ (Vizentini 1985, 86). Nevertheless, the emergence of these two titans brought the possibility of freedom (sovereignty) in an epochal and virtual sense. This materialized, on the one hand, in the Baku Conference of 1920, in which the soviets, by approaching the Muslims, laid the foundations that would later become Arab nationalism. For its part, the USA in the years 1932 and 1933, with the creation of Saudi Arabia and the "Arabian-American Oil Company" (ARAMCO) (Vizentini 1998, 56-57) embodied a model of dependent development that would lead other countries from the region to the condition of semi-periphery. The entire second half of the 20th century, from the creation of Israel (1948) to the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), will be marked by the confrontation between these two projects.

Turkey, for its turn, knew how to take advantage of this. Nonetheless,

¹³ In the original: "a ter um dia em suas mãos o destino de metade do mundo" (de Tocqueville 2001, 476-477).

¹⁴ In the original: "o surgimento da URSS alterou, ainda que não imediatamente, a própria essência das relações internacionais" (Vizentini 1985, 86).

using others' strength to increase your position is not the same as being free - historical freedom depends on capabilities. And, today, the Turkish people have them - or are in the process of acquiring them. This condition, precisely, puts them on the threshold of a difficult decision for. On the one hand, adopting the behavior of a revolutionary power, defying rules of the system - a feasible option taking into account the void left by USA wars in the Middle East (1991 - 2021). On the other hand, there is a possibility of joining the effort to rebuild the multilateral system - which, in the authors' opinion, is the net result of the action of the BRICS¹⁵.

2 Turkey, Extra-Economic Coercion and Strategic Stability

When the Cold War started, one of the main concerns of International Relations literature was classifying powers accordingly with their behavior in the IS. In 1948, Hans Morgenthau classified them as: (a) of status quo; (b) revolutionary; (c) of prestige policies (Morgenthau 2003, 89, 98, 148). Afterwards, in 1958, when he established his theory of the Transition of Power, Abramo Organski subdivided them into satisfied and dissatisfied, with a few Great Powers belonging to the latter type. The author defined these as challenging (Kugler and Organski 2011, 174-175). Both authors shared the understanding that International Politics was just an extension of domestic politics. The visible difference was that Organski focused his analysis on governance, that is, on the distribution of benefits (Kugler and Organski 2011, 172-173). In turn, Morgenthau focused on the dispute for power (Morgenthau 2003, 49).

Later, in 1962, Raymond Aron — for whom IR was born only after the end of the Second World War with a different logic regarding domestic politics — also classified the Great Powers as or supporters of the status quo or revolutionary (Aron 2022, 141- 143). Yet, in establishing the latter, he proposed a definition that unites the internal situation and the international politics: revolutions are the phenomena that establish revolutionary powers. Posterior literature followed these canonical definitions, with slight modifications, depending on the taste or model adopted by the author. There was a reason for this: in the Cold War it was obvious that the challengers were the USSR and China, with additional abstraction efforts supervening.

¹⁵ BRICS — The concept was originally created by Jeffrey O'Neill, Goldman Sachs chief-economist in 2001, to designate the group of countries that was most inclined to economic growth due to the age group of their population. Soon after it had become a real G4 State movement and gained its identity as a forum for South-South relations, institutionalized as an economic group that has, in the center of its agenda, multilateralism and development (VISENTINI, 2015a, p. 149-151).

Today, however, with the emergence of the multipolar world, this debate is once again relevant. Even though there are minor differences between the authors' understandings regarding the definition of the behavior of the Great Powers, there is a common understanding that they are those encountered at the top of the hierarchy of wealth, power and prestige. And that, precisely for this reason, they are interested in stability and order - in the maintenance of the status quo. It would be obvious if the proposition were true. But it is not. Still in 1979, the USA - even in bipolarity was clearly the power that exercised greater dominance - violated the status quo of détente (1972) to trigger the Second Cold War (1979 - 1991). The initial milestone of this movement was the announcement of the Carter Doctrine, which stated that the USA would protect the Arabian Peninsula with all the means at its disposal - including obviously its nuclear weapons.

Hereof, Mike Davis called this behavior extensive deterrence (Davis 1985, 84-87). It was about the USA ending its nuclear umbrella to others. Nevertheless, after this, Davis drew consequences that went beyond the strategic plan, unfolding within the scope of the international division of labor. According to this conception, the New Cold War, regardless of being fought between the Great Powers, was directed against the Third World (Davis 1985, 68, 77).

Davis's understanding was considerably expanded by Paulo Visentini (1992), when he identified the New Cold War with the spread of counterrevolutionary movements - Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, etc. Furthermore, in the economic scope, this new phase was represented by the establishment of neoliberalism (deregulation and privatization) and leverage (search for liquidity) to enable the Third Industrial Revolution — microelectronics, computers and networks (Visentini 1992, 20- 21). Davis and Visentini were prescient: after September 11, 2001, particularly after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, force went from being a governing element to the exclusive foundation of interactional relations — as can be seen in the Bush Doctrine and the unilateral unipolarity of the USA.

Once the War on Terror began, disorder spread, materialized in Springs, Color Revolutions and the continuous occurrence of civil wars that resulted in NATO interventions. From 2003 to 2013, wars took place in Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Syria — all championed by the USA or its European and regional allies. The American conduct shocked analysts, because for the first time the leading power of the IS assumed a revolutionary conduct, subverting the rules written by itself at the end of the Second World War (Arrighi 2008, 174, 264).

David Harvey (2014) expressed the understanding that “accumulation

by spoliation” and “consensual coercion” were part of the particular dynamics of capital accumulation, in a situation where force makes up for the lack of investments caused by overaccumulation (Harvey 2014, 116). This perception had already been stated in works that sought to unite different designations to describe the role of the use of force in the accumulation of capital, as “extra-economic coercion” (Martins 2004, 31; Hahn 2006, 165-166).

In 2021, in a short period of time, the world witnessed the completion of the many times promised (and many times postponed) USA withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq. Even though the USA had, obliquely, recognized the predominance of the multipolar balance since 2018 (USA 2017; 2018), it was only three years later that they managed to disengage from the “overstretch” (Cordesman 2007, 32-33) — the presence of contingents on multiple fronts around the globe. This withdrawal was a condition *sine qua non* so that the country could face competition from the Great Powers - or the peer competitors, as stated in American strategic documents.

Despite that, the end of unilateral unipolarity, which represented the pinnacle of the use of extra-economic coercion, and the advent of multipolarity, did not lead to Strategic Stability. This is due to, as previously argued, politics and war had entered the terrain of society's infrastructure. In other words, the means by which the accumulation of capital and the reproduction of social life take place. This conclusion has notable implications for the reconstruction of the concept of Strategic Stability, adapting it to the conditions of the multipolar world. As well as, in particular, to elucidate the Turkish dilemma. Next, the alternatives are examined in the proposed terms: (a) the insertion into the South-South Axis; and (b) the revolutionary conduct.

3 Insertion in the South-South Axis

From the outset, it is worth highlighting that the South-South Axis is understood as what other authors designate as the Global South — the mention is necessary, given that the term ended up becoming widespread in the literature on Foreign Policy and International Relations. This last classification is not without difficulties; it suggests a counter position to the ‘North’ and dissociates itself from development and neutralism (Visentini 2015b, 07). Anyhow, the name South-South Axis establishes a substantive meaning, as it associates its genesis with the formation of the Third World, whose movement has as its pinnacle the prominence now enjoyed by the BRICS.

The expression “Third World” was coined by Alfred Sauvy, in 1952, to designate the countries, which, like the “Third State” in France, brought together those without privileges (Visentini 2015b, 07). The precursor to the

Non-Aligned Movement was the Bandung Conference (1955). In the Conference, the Asian governments defeated in the Second World War (Japan and Thailand) met with those from the first generation of national liberation (China and India). The meeting in the Indonesian city also brought together leaders of Pan-Arabism, such as the Egyptian Nasser, and of Pan-Africanism, such as the Ghanaian Kwame Nkrumah. The goal was a common development agenda, which would allow for the establishment of a dialogue that went beyond the automatic alignment of the Cold War period. Six years later, the rapprochement that began in Bandung culminated in the formalization of the Non-Aligned Movement, at the Belgrade Conference of 1961 (Bissio 2015, 62-63).

The venture was successful. After all, China and Japan — although the latter did not join the Non-Aligned — dominate the economic decision-making center; the central production processes (Wallerstein 2005, 46). And, in this path, they can be considered an integral part of the organic core of capitalism (Arrighi 2013, 344). India seems to be on the way to doing so and a considerable part of the others have entered the semi-periphery — have begun industrialization.

However, added to the economic successes, institutional gains matter. Third World countries created, or shaped, the multilateral institutions to the development agenda. From this perspective, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (1960)¹⁶, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (1969)¹⁷, and even the ASEAN Regional Forum (1994)¹⁸, and more recently, the IBSA Dialogue Forum (2003) and the BRICS (2009), can be considered repositories of Bandung's ideals — committed to multilateralism and the development agenda (Bissio 2015, 75-76).

¹⁶ Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) — International organization, founded in 1960, with the aim of coordinating and promoting the policies of the main oil exporting countries. Acting as a cartel, the organization is responsible for articulating production quotas, increasing or decreasing reserves, as well as other measures that influence the determination of the price of oil. It is made up of 13 member countries, which together represent 44% of world oil production, and around 80% of the proven reserves of this energy source. In 2016, OPEC+ was created, an informal group that brings together OPEC members as well as eleven other countries prominent in oil production.

¹⁷ Organization for Islamic Cooperation- Founded in 1969, it is an intergovernmental organization, composed of 57 countries, in which most of the population is of the Islamic religion.

¹⁸ ASEAN Regional Forum — The forum was created in 1994, within the framework of the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) with the purpose of bringing together other countries in the region, in particular, China, Japan, South Korea and the United States. Nowadays, it has a total of 27 members, that gather every year to deal with security and stability related issues in the Asia-Pacific Region.

Certainly, the BRICS — and other forums of the South-South Axis — inherited the heterogeneity inherent to this type of movement, which seeks to compose varied and possibly contradictory interests. Nevertheless, such bodies cease to play a systemic role in global governance. This happens to the extent that they strain the diplomacy of the G7¹⁹ countries, towards the refoundation of the multilateral system — compromised by unilateralism and the de facto US exit from the WTO (2018). Therefore, despite housing US competitors, these spaces do not constitute anti-US fronts. On the contrary, it is precisely the presence of US competitors, which enhances the role of the neutral nations in coordinating positions, in the pursuit of retaking the development²⁰ agenda and in the affirmation of multilateralism. In this sense, Duggan and Azalia (2020, 13), Duggan et al (2022, 507-508) and Ungaretti (2023, 02) appear to be right in their views of the BRICS as a body whose agenda is identified with the refoundation of Bretton Woods, in a context of multipolarity.

The commitment of BRICS member countries to a new multilateral agenda, based on the role of economic development, can be observed, for example, in different regional infrastructure integration initiatives. This is the case of projects launched in the 2000s and 2010s, such as the North-South Corridor²¹ — Russia, Iran and India (2002); the Initiative for the Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA) — Brazil (2000) — and the Belt and Road Initiative — China (2013). Furthermore, the USA and Europe response regarding infrastructure projects came late, only after the COVID-19 pandemic, with the Build Back Better (USA 2021) and the Next Generation EU (Buti and Messori 2020), launched in 2020 by then-candidate

19 G7 — An intergovernmental group composed by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. It emerged unofficially in the 1970s decade, as the member os the group gathered through shared values, such as liberal representative democracy, and as the most developed economies in the IMF agenda.

20 Wolfowitz Doctrine- the dismissal of the USA development agenda was due to the Wolfowitz Doctrine, published in 1992. It was an informal doctrine, as its contents were a byproduct of the leak of the Defense Planning Guidance 1994-1999 document that was being elaborated by Paul Wolfowitz, then Under Secretary of Defense Politics, and future President of the World Bank (2005-2007). In this document, Wolfowitz subverts the security logic in place since Bretton Woods, based on the economic development as a basis for peace. From then on, the USA would be conducting its leadership sustained in the defense of moral values, human rights promotion and liberal democracy.

21 North-South Corridor- Officially called the International North—South Transport Corridor (INSTC), is a multimodal infrastructure project, composed of highways, railways, and ports, with almost 7.2000 km, interconnecting Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Central Asia and India, to the countries of Central Europe. The project was proposed in 2002 and enlarged after 2011, with the signature of the Ashgabat Agreement, that brought together Central Asian countries.

Joe Biden and the European Commission, respectively.

As far as Turkey is concerned, it is also virtuously inserted into this competition around infrastructure projects. The Middle Corridor²² project, originally proposed as a way to integrate Turkey with Turkic-speaking countries (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan), currently has double potential. On the one hand, it has gained prominence among Europeans, as it overtakes Russia (IISS 2023; World Bank 2023). On the other hand, it can bring together the initiatives of Russia (North-South Corridor) and China (BRI), through their intersections along the Caspian Sea (Duffy 2023).

More recently (April 22, 2024), Turkey in a partnership with Iraq – and support from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – launched its own global interconnectivity project. It is the Iraq Development Road²³, an initiative that competes with the Suez Canal, the North-South Corridor and the Belt and Road Initiative, in the interconnection between Europe and Asia. Due to the War in Ukraine, other interconnection projects are compromised – with the exception of the Suez Canal. Thus, the two remaining options for connecting Europe and Asia are the Middle Corridor and the Iraqi Development Road. It is important to note that both depend directly on Turkey.

In fact, the institutional arrangement has already been designed in the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (2002), a forum created with the purpose of promoting cooperation between different regional organizations and integration projects across the Asian continent. This time, geography has undoubtedly benefited Turkey, as it could become the hub that connects these different infrastructure and interconnectivity projects. As a result, it gives Turkish diplomacy its own weight, projecting it beyond the country's capabilities, since it allows benefits in the dispute between Europe and Russia, besides reducing its exclusive dependence on the Chinese (Bahçecik 2017, 54).

Hence, the most general bases for freedom of action in the region are given. Recently (December 07, 2023), Erdogan concluded an agreement with the Greeks — who have always been the thermometer of the relationship with the European front. The Turks have also become essential for the Russians

22 The Middle Corridor- Name given to the new route of the Silk Road that passes through Türkiye. The name is borrowed from the oldest Turkish regional infrastructure project (BAHÇECİK, 2017, p. 55-56).

23 Iraq Development Road – Proposed in May 2023 by the Iraqi government, the project envisions a modernized network of ports, highways and railways. Its estimated cost amounts 17 billion dollars (AZHARI, 2023, online). The corridor will connect the port of Al Faw in Southern Iraq to the Turkish port of Mersin on the northwest Mediterranean coast, across Iraq and along Turkey's Southern border. The agreement was signed in April 2024, between Iraq, Turkey, Qatar and the UAE, and will make investments for the project viable, which should be completed by 2029 (ALACA; KARALP, 2023, online).

regarding the export of hydrocarbons to Europe, a role that is not expected to slow down even with the end of the Ukrainian War — which is not considered as imminent.

Finally, they also became essential to the Iranians — their toughest historical rivals and most resistant to their expansion in Asia — due to their governance of the wars in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Yemen and Gaza. Given the American unwillingness to maintain greater involvement in the Middle East, and the Chinese interest in the Middle Corridor, it is possible that the Turks — possibly in a hasty manner — believe that they can represent the interest of these Great Powers in the region, even if it goes against their declaratory external policy and its immediate interests. Preferring action to concertation would be a huge mistake. At any rate, as we tried to demonstrate, this time Turkey has a choice.

As will be seen, because of the Iraqi Civil War, the Arab Spring and the emergence of the Islamic State, Turkey needed to develop a series of defense mechanisms, which today play an important role in its international relations. However, these circumstances, if associated with certain systemic conditions, can push Erdogan's country towards the revolutionary alternative. From what can be anticipated, these conditions are: (i) the void left by the “war on terror”; (ii) the pressure of Silk Road interconnectivity; (iii) the legacy of extra-economic coercion; and (iv) Turkish territorial tradition.

To understand the process that made this path possible, we will try to identify some patterns that guided the International Relations of republican Turkey — although today's Turkey is more similar to the Ottoman Empire than the country founded by Atatürk (1923).

4 Revolutionary Conduct

It was the revolution that knocked on Turkey's door. At any point, the people and the State have never revealed any type of inclination or proclivity in this direction. However, after repeatedly being attacked by it, Turkey enthroned defense mechanisms whose palette it became part of. In this matter, too, Turkey appears to have had little or no choice.

The Ottoman Empire had its foundations deeply shaken by the double revolution: the French and the Industrial (Mondaini 2015, 190). As it turned out, anachronistically, it tried to obtain political centralization (Cleveland and Bunton 2009, 59) and promote manufacturing at a time when even Egypt was already more advanced in textiles and shipbuilding (Parker 2021, 242). Due to the Egyptian-Ottoman Wars (1828 - 1829) and the pressure from Rus-

sia (1853 - 1856), Turkey ended up strengthening its ties with England. In 1878, it surrendered control of Cyprus to the British. In 1911, Italy invaded Libya, which was part of the Ottoman Empire. Even the signing of the first Treaty of Lausanne²⁴ (1912) did not prevent contagion of the Balkans. In the same year, the First Balkan War broke out. Therefore, within months, Ottoman rule in Europe, which extended to the Adriatic Sea, eroded. The Balkan League, composed of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, divided the spoils, leaving Turkey with only eastern Thrace.

The following year, in 1913, the Second Balkan War ensued, this time fought between the newly independent countries and Turkey, against Bulgaria. The result was the defeat of the Bulgarians, supported by Germany. The British's attitude, at least ambiguous, caused its considerable erosion among the Turkish people and its elites. After all, in 1911 they ostensibly supported the Italians; in 1912 they secretly provided a powerful impulse to the Balkan independence by supporting Greece and Bulgaria. Only in 1913, to counter the Russians and hinder the German project for a railway connection between Berlin and Baghdad, did England support Turkey.

Thus, on the eve of the First War, the country found itself divided between modernizing pro-Germany Young Turks, and the other forces divided between a return to the past and pro-British sentiment (Visentini 2014, 20). The epic of the cruiser Goeben²⁵ and the dramatic gesture of raising the Turkish pavilion upon entering the Black Sea, ended up kidnapping minds and hearts, leading Turkey to ally itself on the side of the Central Powers. Accordingly, in the First World War, the country faced, at the same time, its greatest ally, Great Britain, and its greatest enemy, the Tsarist Empire (Visentini 2014, 59).

Still in 1914, England formalized its domain over Cyprus. In 1915, the British made two decisive moves, failing ignominiously in both. The first was

24 Translator's note: Also called "Treaty of Ouchy".

25 Epic of the Goeben Cruiser — Close to the outbreak of the war, Turkey had acquired two Dreadnought-class battleships from England. Due to British's concern about the proximity of the conflagration, despite payments, the ships were never delivered. When hostilities broke out, the German cruiser Goeben and her pair Moltke, which were in the Mediterranean, were targets of intense attacks. Already seriously damaged and without their escorts, they were forced to enter the Black Sea. At that time, Turkey remained neutral and, as the legislation stipulated, the ships would have to be interned until the end of the armed conflict. So, the unexpected gesture of raising the Turkish flag and saying that from now on, the cruiser would become part of the Ottoman fleet had a devastating political impact (VISENTINI, 2014, p. 59). The Young Turks, due to British fluctuations in the two Balkan wars (1912-1913; 1913) (VISENTINI, 2014, 40), already defended alignment with Germany. Later, the Sultan gave in to the public outcry and Turkey declared war on the Entente.

the attempt to capture the Turkish Straits using the landing at Gallipoli, aiming to supply the main ally at that time, Imperial Russia. The second consisted of the attack on Iraq, intending to prevent Germany from benefiting from the vast resources of the Ottoman Empire, and access to the Indies (Visentini 2014, 60). Defeated in both theaters (Mediterranean and Middle East), the British launched the Arab Revolt in 1916. The creation of this "Arab nation", engineered by T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell, set the region on fire as the French Revolution had done in the Balkans (1811) and Europe (1848). Along this path, the British anticipated the Bolsheviks and Mao Zedong in mastering the art of the Revolutionary War. In the Middle East, the action of insurgents eroded communication and transport routes in the region (Visentini 2014, 60-61; Volkman 2013, 197-199). The extent of the success of Lawrence and Bell's revolt prefigured, a century in advance, what would later become the Islamic State.

Therefore, notwithstanding the Ottoman failures in the war against the Russians — in 1915 alone, the Turkish Third Army had suffered around 77 thousand losses (Keegan 2004, 251) — the British situation did not improve. It was only in 1917, benefiting from the effects of the Arab revolt, that they resumed the offensive in Iraq, capturing Baghdad in March. But for the Ottomans, the loss of Baghdad and Jerusalem (December 1917) was just the beginning. Nationalism, initially mobilized towards the Arabs, was later extended to the Georgians, Armenians, Kurds and other peoples in Anatolia.

As a result, the Arab Revolt, which began in 1916, only ended for the Turks in 1923. At that time, they finally expelled the foreign troops and defeated the separatists, ensuring control of Anatolia. To a considerable extent, this occurred because Turkey allied itself with the declared Great Revolutionary Power of the time: the Soviet Union (Visentini 2022, 15). Briefly, despite centuries of conflagrations, it was the revolutionary war that came close to ending not only to the Ottoman Empire, but also to Turkey itself.

In 1945, by virtue of Soviet intentions to internationalize the straits, Turkey was forced to move closer to the USA (Friedrich 2011, 30; Cleveland and Bunton 2008, 276; Seydi 2006, 126-127). With the creation of NATO in 1949, Turkey claimed membership in the organization. Approval only came after a Turkish contingent was sent to the Korean War (1951) (Aydin 2000, 107, 112), which took place in 1952, also coinciding with its entry into Operation Gladio²⁶ — organization of joint covert operations by NATO countries

²⁶ Operation Gladio — Joint Intelligence Organization created by the CIA and MI6, as part of a secret and clandestine NATO army. Its existence became public in the 1990s when the Italian Prime Minister, Giulio Andreotti, revealed the existence of a secret anti-communist army that operated within NATO countries during the Cold War (GANSER, 2005, p. 01). The name

(Ganser 2005, 01). Since 1948, Turkey had already provided assistance to the CIA in assembling a secret army to intervene in the Greek Civil War (Ganser 2005, 226).

Turkey's entry into NATO (and its secret army) coincided with the beginning of the endogenization of the Second Industrial Revolution in the country. Urbanization and massification had their costs: rural exodus and pauperization. Both were accompanied by the emergence of middle classes and urban wage workers. All of this impacted national political life. A strong Communist Party emerged in Turkey. As a reaction, the "Grey Wolves" emerged, seeking to signal the union between the cities (white wolves) and the countryside (black wolves). Domestically, they began to fight against the advance of communism, based on a far-right nationalist discourse, which served as the basis for carrying out clandestine political repression (Ganser 2005, 228; Shimatsu 2009). Externally, it expressed itself through Pan-Turkism, which ended up constituting itself as the remote foreshadowing of neo-Ottomanism.

Turkey's participation in Operation Gladio was only possible through the establishment of the Special Warfare Department, financed and organized by the CIA (Ganser 2005, 226, 230). Thereafter, the Turks inserted themselves in the joint efforts to keep communist parties out of power on the European continent. In practical terms, the Turkish Gladio operated by hiring its staff within the Gray Wolves organization to carry out secret operations (Söyler 2015, 136; Ganser 2005, 229).

Although a Gladio was never installed in the Middle East, from the 1960s onwards, Turkey began to carry out covert operations jointly with the Mossad in the region (Ganser 2005, 232; Lefebvre 2005, 118). Also in this case, it was a reaction to the alliance between the USSR and Arab nationalists from Egypt, Syria, Iraq and, finally, Libya.

Even so, in the 1970s the Turks registered a rapprochement with the Arabs. Due to the Cyprus Crisis (1963-1974) they withdrew with NATO, and even with the USA. They went so far as to prevent the use of facilities in the country to aid Israel in 1973, yet they facilitated the Soviet airlift to Syria and Iraq (Bishku 2012, 42).

of this ad hoc clandestine arrangement varied from country to country, in Italy it was Gladio, but its range of operations covered a considerable part of the Mediterranean. In any case, the clandestine structure maintained a unified command, control and supervision relationship, carried out by NATO intelligence, CIA and MI6. Always concerned with its sovereignty and specific interests, Turkey has developed its own secret army. This was Kontrguerrilla, linked to the Armed Forces Tactical Mobilization Group — which maintained bilateral relations with the CIA and joint relations with NATO. From 1965 onwards, it began to operate under the aegis of the Department of Special Warfare (GANSER, 2005, p. 226).

Hence, the Turks were left in the sidelines of the two major events in their strategic surroundings, the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and the Syrian Civil War (1976-1982). Concerning the second, it should be noted that it was intense, although still little-known today. The estimate is that, only in the Hamah massacre (1982), there were between 25 and 40 thousand deaths (Lefèvre 2013). It was the first time that the Assads faced the Muslim Brotherhood — supported by Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon, countries that converted their territories into sanctuaries to support the insurgents (Conduit 2019, 134; Seale 1990, 334- 335). The absence of effective protagonism from Turkey may, eventually, have been decisive for the rebellion's failure. Hafez al-Assad's son, Bashar, did not have the same luck – since the Spring in 2011, Syria has remained divided.

It is important to address the Cyprus Crisis (1963-1974), given its subsequent role in shaping the revolutionary alternative — after all, the northern portion of the island claims integration with Turkey to this day. In 1960, Cyprus was granted independence. It enshrined the maintenance of British bases but made little or no provision for the claims of Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Keefe and Solsten 1993, 33; Dodd 2010, 41). As a result, in 1963, the Cypriot Crisis began. The case became more complicated when in 1971, when the Cypriot national guard carried out a coup d'état, installing a pro-Enosis government (Mallinson 2005, 80). In 1974, all US and NATO mediations failed, therefore Turkey found itself compelled to intervene militarily. Initially, the Turks demanded a federated State, in which Turkish Cypriots would own 34% of the island. The proposal was refused, and the Turks resumed the offensive (Dodd 2010, 114-119). When a ceasefire occurred, they controlled 36% of the island. The division between communities was accomplished with the creation of the “Green Line” (Tartter 1993, 219-221). After several attempts at federalization, the Turkish Cypriots declared their independence without, however, achieving recognition from States other than Turkey. The Greek Cypriot position holds the country's seat at the United Nations.

In this instance, Turkey's actions cost the support of Europe, which, resentful, would never allow them to join the future EU. At the time, the crisis only did not escalate to a direct confrontation between Turkey and NATO, as a result of Henry Kissinger's efforts. US Secretary of State at the time, Kissinger was perfectly aware of Turkey's importance for the southern flank of the alliance and the Middle East (Mallinson 2005, 81). To appease the Europeans, the US imposed an arms embargo on the Turks – which would later increase the indigenous development of the Turkish arms industry. But, on the other hand, this mediation made the Turkish action not appear as an overt challenge to the international order. And, therefore, it was not recognized in systemic

terms as revolutionary behavior.

However, in retrospect, it seems the action was exactly that. It was an attempt to expand the spirit of Lausanne (1923) and bury the remains of the humiliation of Sèvres (1920). Cyprus and the Greek Islands situated in the Western coast of Turkey remain a perennial point of tension between the two states. Thus, in the eventual absence of the American presence in Europe, it tends to assume unusual proportions: more than beautiful landscapes, it is about obtaining the rights to explore gas and oil deposits on the island's continental shelf.

Still in the 1970s, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) took place. As a result, it was responsible for revealing to the Turks the full potential of revolutionary war — in this case counterrevolutionary. Once again, its ability to erode a Great Power was revealed. It did not go unnoticed by the Turks that the Pakistanis intended to acquire, through Afghanistan, strategic depth in their confrontation with India. For this objective, they used proxy groups (mainly Pashto) to call into question the Soviet presence in the country (Tanner 2009, 244).

During this same period, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) led to the deepening of Turkey's ties with the Middle East and gave life to the import substitution model. Turkish neutrality in the face of the conflagration allowed the general increase in Turkish exports to the region, as well as the growth of exchanges between Turkey and the two belligerents (Künü and Hopoglu 2016, 112). Therefore, it favored the maintenance of national industry. Whereas, in the case of Brazil, and other similar countries (Argentina and Mexico), the Gulf War (1980-1988) brought inflation, high interest rates and recession that penalized industry and began the reprimarization of the economy.

In 1991, because of the importance that Iraq had assumed for Turkey's foreign trade, it was not without some reluctance that the Turks joined the coalition against Saddam Hussein. Even so, they restricted their participation to logistical support, allowing the use of the Incirlik (Gulbay 2022, 1050-1052). Anyhow, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait served as an example that Turkey — whether because of its capabilities or its geographic position — continued to be important for the USA and NATO — which would only increase with the 'War on Terror' (2001-2021).

Nonetheless, problems soon arose. Also in 1991, the US established no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq. At the same time, they encouraged Kurdish rebellions in the North — in the region adjacent to Turkey — and in the South, among Shiites, along the border with Iran. The idea was that the rebellions, associated with sanctions, would lead to the downfall of the regime.

In fact, a similar phenomenon would also occur in Afghanistan. In 1993, after the extinction of the USSR (1991), the Pakistanis decided to directly control Afghanistan, invading it under the guise of a new group called “Theology Students” — Taliban. At that time, the Taliban were a little more than an extension of the Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), often commanded by uncharacterized Pakistani troops (Visentini 2022, 66).

Such occurrences appeared to be register as a warning. Turkey was afraid that the American plan in Iraq would work, and that an autonomous Kurdistan in the north would encourage Kurdish separatism in Turkey through elements such as the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). After all, they had already experienced the Arab Revolt (1916).

In both cases (Iraq and Afghanistan), the proxy war served as a prelude to the invasion. That is why Turkey acted again — the first was in Cyprus in 1974 — contrary to the interests of other NATO member states: between 1992 and 1997, the country undertook at least four incursions against the Kurds in Northern Iraq (Marcou 2022). In fact, this type of fighting was not completely foreign to the Turks. With the dissolution of the USSR, the Turkish organization “Grey Wolves” built a training center in Central Asia and provided material support to the East Turkestan Independence Movement in Xinjiang (Shimatsu 2009). Even in the ex-Soviet space and within Russia, according to Russian allegations, the Gray Wolves supplied weapons and technological assistance to the Chechens during the Chechen War (1994-1996) (Cornell 1999, 92).

However, despite all previous experiences, the Revolutionary War would hardly have been included in Turkey’s palette of instruments for projecting strength and power if not for the Second Iraq War. In 2003, the US invasion of Iraq took place, alleging that it possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD/WMD) and that it had been an accomplice of Al-Qaeda in the attacks carried out in 2001 — which turned out to be incorrect (Powell 2005). Initially, Turkey agreed that the invasion would also take place in its territory — to also take place in Northern Iraq —, but the executive’s decisions were blocked by parliament. Indeed, the legislature proved prescient.

5 The Middle East in the Turkish Dilemma

Once occupied, Iraq was divided into four zones, whose autonomy bordered, in fact, on independence. The Turks were shocked to realize that, as a result, Iraqi Kurdistan would become a sanctuary for the separatist forces, which they had been fighting intermittently since the War of Independence.

But even worse was the realization that the US took advantage of sectarian violence (2006-2008). Besides, allegedly, they had connived at the creation of the Islamic State (Hersh 2016). Thus, the model used by Pakistan to control Afghanistan was used to solve the problem of Iraq: keeping the country divided, powerless – but under control (Nasser 2015, 24). The initial purpose was to prepare for an eventual invasion of Iran.

In parallel to the invasion of Iraq, the US Military Transformation process took place (Wolfowitz 1992; Rumsfeld 2002). For the Americans, they had to adjust the Forces to the reality of network warfare. And, equally, in the immediate post-Cold War world, in which it was believed that the USA's main adversaries would be non-state groups (Lind 2005, 14). Thus, Military Transformation, in its original restrictive version²⁷, had the consequence of adjusting the Preparation and Profile of Forces for Irregular War²⁸. Nonetheless, its excessive emphasis on strategic mobility led to the disregard of the principle of mass warfare and presence and control of the territory.

A serious problem proven since the disorder that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein was the lack of personnel (Cordesman and Davies 2008, 25-26, 39-40). In 2004, regardless of the USA having 135 thousand troops stationed in the country (CBS 2004), which added to 20 thousand private contractors (Singer 2004, 2), the lack of troops became evident once again in the Battle of Fallujah (2004) — highlighting the problem of border control.

27 Restrictive and Holistic Military Transformation — Restrictive Military Transformation (WOLFOWITZ, 1992; RUMSFELD, 2002; LIND, 2005) presents Transformation as a purely military process, without implications within the scope of the State and society — hence classifying it as 'restrictive' , as it is restricted to the military sphere. Holistic Military Transformation considers that there are Pillars, Expressions and Dimensions of transformation, which must be considered. Originally described by Covarrubias, the pillars can be identified with the Forces ("Capabilities"); State ("Legal Structure"); and Society ("Nature"). Derived expressions are: (i) adaptation, (ii) modernization and (iii) transformation itself. For its turn, Rodrigues focus in the theme of 'expressions', seeking to unveil the broader implications of the transformation related to civil-military integration. As this last approach assumes changes that affect broader spheres than the military, it is called 'holistic' (COVARRUBIAS, 2007; RODRIGUES, 2022). As will be further argued, Turkey followed the holistic model of transformation (YESILTAS, 2016, Online).

28 Preparation and Profile of US Forces — This perception would be modified later on. However, too late, to influence the direction of the intervention in Iraq. The turning point was the publication of the National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2017, which diagnosed the return of the competition between Great Powers (USA, 2017, p. 27). This doctrinal change only occurred with the publication of the FM 3-0 (Operations) manual, which established the Multidomain Battle (US Army 2022) — which indicates a type of preparation in which the use of force involves forms of irregular warfare and not conventional, including nuclear, combined with conventional operations — in any case, implicitly recovers the principle of mass. Back in 2018, the then Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, had already removed the mechanized assets (Bradley and Abrams) from storage.

Initially, the Command considered two thousand soldiers sufficient. James Mattis — later Secretary of Defense (2017-2019) — won it using almost thirteen thousand combatants (Ricks 2007, 399).

In an article written in 2002, Eliot Cohen had already drawn attention to the limitations of Rumsfeld's transformational model. According to the author, it raised difficulties regarding "mobilization and professional education" and the "production of crucial ammunition and platforms" for combat (Cohen 2002, 32). Cohen's words show that what happened in Iraq was predictable. And it is frightening that even today — the Ukrainian War — they are absolutely current.

In 2005, the Battle of Tal Afar took place, a city populated by Turkmen and close to Iraqi Kurdistan. It was won by the then Colonel MacMaster — later, National Security advisor (2017-2018) — employing the strategies of presence and control (Packer 2006). The success was such that the experience was recognized as an example for the reformulation of American strategy in Iraq. An attempt was made to incorporate the experience of real war into the Doctrine, in the revision of the Army Operations Manual (FM 3-0 Operations). Carried out in 2008, this review established the concept of Full Spectrum Operations Operations), precursor of the Multidomain Battle (Baker 2009, 68). But, even so, Donald Rumsfeld found himself deterred from his transformative impetus. Between January and October 2005 — while the Battle of Tal Afar (September) was still raging — there was another drastic reduction in personnel: from 640,000 (Harvey and Schoomaker 2005, 4) to 492,728; around 148 thousand people (USA 2006, 01).

Ironically, in Iraq, in light of the experiences of Fallujah and Tal Afar, it was once again considered that the appropriate contingent for the occupation of the country would be around 450 thousand men (Gordon and Trainor 2010, 629). The situation became critical again due to the multiplication of attacks in Baghdad and the Battle of Anbar — both in 2007. It was then that then President George W. Bush decided to strengthen the contingent — especially in Baghdad —, sending five additional brigades (20,000 soldiers). It was the 'Surge', a term used by the press to avoid the word 'escalation' and the evocation of the memory of Vietnam. Even with the reinforcement, the contingent proved to be insufficient to apply the successful model in Tal Afar. Rumsfeld's Force Profile made the application of the US Army's new doctrine unfeasible, even though it was designed to combat irregular warfare.

In parallel, the Subprime real estate crisis unfolded (2007), which affected banks and reached Europe the following year — once again, the specter of Vietnam returned: the Tet offensive (1968) preceded the gold-dollar decoupling, overthrowing Bretton Woods (1944-1971). In 2008, Israel asked the US

for authorization to attack Iran — which was denied and leaked to the press (Sanger 2009). Considering the situation in the American economy and in Iraq, one could infer the reason.

However, the following year, the reason for the US denial of Israel was ostensibly publicized through the prestigious Brookings Institution²⁹. A study was published that predicted that 1.5 million soldiers would be needed to occupy Iran — for which it would be necessary to resort to conscription (Pollack et al 2009, 69). Between the return to the Welfare State — a necessary counterpart to mandatory military service (Giddens 2001, 249; Tilly 1996, 144-145) — and accommodation with Iran and its nuclear program, the USA preferred the second alternative. They then resorted to mediation from Brazil and Turkey to reach an understanding with the Persians on the last topic (Amorim 2018, 28, 38; Barrionuevo 2009).

To the perplexity of Brazilians, after the agreement was concluded, the USA dispensed with the good offices of Brazil and Turkey (Amorim 2018, 63-64). Previously, in 2008, the USA had been saved in Baghdad by the outbreak of a sectarian clash — promoted by the Islamic State — which led to the outbreak of a civil war in the country. Faced with the savagery of the new conflagration, the American presence became a lesser evil. In the coming years something similar would happen, this time within the entire OM — the rise of the Islamic State.

In 2011, the Arab Spring broke out in Tunisia. Soon, it would spread to Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria. They were the result of a youth that had its basic needs met but was unhappy with its consumption patterns and political rights. Foreign to the discipline of the world of work, the sociability of these groups took place, predominantly, through social networks. In response, some governments began processes of political opening. In Egypt, in 2011, he brought the Muslim Brotherhood — allies of Turkey and Qatar — to power. In Libya (2011) and Syria (2012), it resulted in civil wars. From now on, the dynamics of the springs would establish a system of communicating vessels between the security dynamics of the OM, Europe and Asia — given by the springs of China (2011)³⁰ and Ukraine (2014), which is discussed below.

29 Brookings Institution — A bipartisan Think-Tank, created still in 1916, and that was recognized by The Economist as USA's most prestigious one (The Economist, 2017, Online)

30 China Spring (Jasmin) — It took place from February to March 2011. The overlapping of the agenda, and not repression (which certainly took place), was the main reason for its suppression. The prospect of Democracy was eclipsed by the nationalism raised by the episode of the sale of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands (04/16/2012), claimed by China but controlled by Japan. Anti-Japanese demonstrations took over the mass movement in China. Even so, through this indirect route, the Chinese spring contributed to the fall of the Harmony Faction in China (Hu Jintao) and the DPJ in Japan. Both leaders had the commitment to build an East Asian

In 2013 (11/09), the Russians prevented a US attack on Syria (Putin 2013). It was the beginning of the 21st century, as for the first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), the USA saw its freedom of action being restricted by another Great Power. In the same month, the Russians announced the creation of a permanent Naval Task Force in the Mediterranean, based in the Port of Tartus — in 2017, they obtained a fifty-year lease of the facility. In November 2013, protests began against Yanukovich's pro-Russian government in Ukraine — in which the presence of Vitoria Nuland, at the time US Secretary of State for European Affairs, stood out — which culminated in the overthrow of the government (February 24, 2014). In response, just under a month later, the Russians annexed Crimea. In August of the same year, the US intervention in Syria began, through the use of missiles Tomahawk and Special Forces.

But, at this point (2015), it had become clear to the Americans that Rumsfeld's "Creative Chaos" (Whitney 2005) was not a viable alternative for the governance of the region. After all, the vacuum caused by the erosion of governments brought the Russian presence to the OM — under conditions that they had never before managed to obtain, neither in the Tsarist Empire nor in the Soviet Era. Thus, in 2015 the US signed a nuclear agreement with Iran, which Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA — Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). It also had the signatures of the United Kingdom, France, England, China and the European Union, but contained much more unfavorable aspects than those negotiated between Brazil, Turkey and Iran in 2010.³¹

However, the success of negotiated counter-proliferation did not mitigate the US difficulties with financing interventions and overstretching. An alternative to delegation was needed. The US needed to pass the buck (buckpassing) for someone who was capable of undertaking at least three

Community, which did not prosper to their demise (SILVA, 2023, p. 201).

31 Iran Nuclear Agreement- Brazil and Turkey had negotiated an agreement, through which Iran would benefit from nuclear fuel and energy, but the production of the former would take place outside Iranian territory (BBC, 2010, Online). The agreement signed by Obama, in 2015, was based on uranium enrichment quotas, and the processing would be made by Iran itself. This gave rise to the distance between the USA and Israel, as the latter rarely endorsed the reports that demonstrated that the Persians were acting in accordance with the agreement. The enrichment carried out in the country also opened up space for the existence of clandestine nuclear installations to be considered which, supposedly, had military application. On May 8, 2018, Trump's break with the Nuclear Agreement did not serve to mitigate the situation. Freed from the agreement, the Iranians raised the coefficient — even openly — for uranium enrichment. Nor was any type of military action taken against the country. Economic sanctions, reintroduced unilaterally by the US, did not have a binding effect on Europeans, Russians or Chinese.

tasks: (a) to stabilize the region, (b) contain the Russians and (c) balance Iran — if it violated the terms of the Agreement.

This alternative ended up being envisioned in November 2016, by General Michael Flynn (2016): it was Turkey. Previously, on the occasion of the Syrian Spring, the Turks were already paying attention to developments in the situation in the neighboring country which, like Iraq, also had a significant Kurdish population. Thus, despite having robust capabilities and forces, the Turks did not hesitate to organize their own proxies. In addition to supporting the Free Syrian Army, Turkey offered support to other opposition movements to Bashar al Assad, sheltering and mobilizing dissidents, arming rebels and allowing free passage along the Syrian-Turkish border. In this context, authors such as Tahiroglu and Schanzer (2017, 12) went so far as to state that the Turks were, at the very least, complicit in the activities of groups jihadists and insurgents like the Jabhat al Nusra — Al-Qaeda in Syria — and even the Islamic State (IS). The explanation for this was simple: shortly before, the extension of Kurdish rule in Syria and Iraq had reached its zenith and it had become viable to advocate an independent Kurdistan — Westerners even had a name for it: Rojava. And, for the Turks, the priority has always been to combat separatism in Turkey itself — and the Islamic State was expanding in Syria and Iraq at the expense of the Kurds.

But whatever Turkish relations with armed opposition groups in Syria may have been, they have never represented more than an ancillary resource. Turkey relied on its own forces, to a considerable extent, because they had War Mass, capable of withstanding friction, maintaining a presence in conquered territories, and thus effectively establishing control over the terrain. For comparison purposes, Assad's Army, which had undertaken a Restrictive Military Transformation, could never take advantage of this — having to resort to foreign fighters — compromising the country's unity and sovereignty. In turn, Turkey carried out a Holistic Military Transformation, with an emphasis on the role of society (industry) and the State (consortia). Furthermore, Turkish regular forces, even across the border, could count on police and constable forces from subnational entities.

In fact, the Turks adjusted the imperative of Transformation³², both

32 Turkish Military Transformation- Turkey appropriated the assets of the Third Industrial Revolution- computers and networks- as a result. For example, since 2005, the country has developed its own tactical datalink, not depending on the NATO network (AKALIN, 2014, p. 54). In 2019 it would be declared fully operational (NATIONAL, 2019 Online). And, as their advances in the development of sixth-generation aircraft are proof (ÖZER, 2024, online), they are positioned to do the same with the Fourth Industrial Revolution — endogenizing quantum computing and artificial intelligence.

to its condition as a semi-peripheral country and to the objectives of its foreign policy. Thus, they did not fail to make a nuclear agreement with Russia (Erdogan 2023; Difiglio, Güray and Merdan 2020, 394; Russian 2010), they began to incorporate their own command, control, communication and network warfare computers (C4) and developed indigenous surveillance and reconnaissance systems. And, apparently, they also increased their already vast intelligence network.

The Obama administration clearly leaned towards the Kurds. At the time, Turkish support for IS was also commonplace in the government. In fact, initially, in January 2016, Michael Flynn himself had already accused the Turks of leniency towards the Islamic State (Hersh 2016). Thus, in the perception of the Turks, it was the divergences surrounding the future of Syria – and indeed, the Middle East – that supposedly made the Americans promote an attempted coup against Erdogan on July 15, 2016. The attempt was thwarted, as we know, due to a warning given by the Russians.

The Turkish reaction was quick: they turned against the Islamic State. This happened just a month after the coup attempt. Which suggests that it was already in preparation previously. In this assumption, the Turks would emulate the model of extra-economic coercion, developed by Pakistan and the USA, promoting insurgency and then carrying out intervention. Whatever the case, the fact is that Operation Euphrates Shield (August 24, 2016) was a success. The contingent was made up of regular troops from the Turkish army and proxies from the Free Syrian Army. The Operation aimed to eliminate the Islamic State and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — the latter composed of Kurds and proxy clients from NATO Member States. Turkey managed to occupy the regions of Aleppo and Afrin (Bechev 2022, 163).

The Turkish offensive had a double meaning: in addition to being the first official conventional operation conducted autonomously by Turkey in the context of the Syrian Civil War, it also marked a diplomatic bargain, suggesting a rapprochement with Russia³³. This interpretation by analysts at the time — that Syria was becoming an element of concertation between the two historical enemies — Turkey and Russia (Bechev 2022, 168) — also did not go unnoticed by Flynn.

33 Indicators of the Turkish-Russian rapprochement — After the coup attempt in Turkey, Erdogan made several signs of rapprochement with Russia. On August 9, 2016, Putin and Erdogan met in Saint Petersburg, defining Syria as the new axis of their bilateral relationship (DW, 2016). A few months later, in October, an agreement was signed to create Turkstream, a network of gas pipelines that would transport gas from Russia without the need to pass through Ukraine (REUTERS, 2016). Finally, on July 25, 2017, Erdogan announced that Turkey would acquire S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia (KEŞVELİOĞLU et al, 2019, p. 7).

Concerned about the possibility of Turkey becoming a Russian asset, or a new opponent as formidable as Iran, as mentioned, Michael Flynn began to defend — based on the facts on the ground established by Operation Euphrates Shield — that Turkey it was the USA's main ally in the fight against the Islamic State (Flynn 2016). This was evident in the January 2017 altercation between Flynn and Obama over US involvement in the Battle of Raqqa³⁴ (Afkhani 2017).

So, Flynn embarked on a titanic effort to repair US relations with Turkey. Previously, just one day after the start of the Turkish operation in Syria, then Vice President Biden visited Turkey, without success. In an attempt to establish an agreement that would dispel Turkish fears, Flynn considered handing over the cleric Fethullah Güllen — who lived in the US and was seen by the Turks as the main mastermind of the coup. And, naturally, move the US away from the agenda of an independent Kurdistan, whether in Iraq or Syria.

The reaction of the establishment didn't take long. The director of the CIA during the Obama administration, John Brennan, accused Trump of collusion with the Russians (Brennan 2019). This led to the opening of an impeachment process, with an investigation led by special prosecutor Robert Mueller, former director of the FBI (2001-2013). At the same time, Flynn was accused by another former CIA director, James Woolsey (1993-1995), of receiving bribes from the Turks (Munsil 2017). Faced with this situation, Trump preferred to get rid of the rings (Flynn), to keep his fingers (his own mandate): the National Security Advisor was fired just 23 days into his term (January 22 - February 13, 2017). More than that, later, on June 6, 2017, Trump accused Qatar — Turkey's main ally in the Persian Gulf — of promoting terrorism in the Middle East (Smith, Siddiqui and Beaumont 2017).

The result of this enclosure was the end of US policy towards the Middle East at a critical moment. Subsequently, the two initiatives undertaken by Trump were cosmetic or failed. The first was the rupture of the JCPOA with Iran, in May 2018. Freed from the agreement, the Iranians reportedly began to increase their uranium enrichment coefficients — thus getting closer to the capacity to manufacture a nuclear device than before. Nor did the US carry out, or allow, military action against the country. The economic sanc-

34 Flynn and the Battle of Raqqa – Already appointed as National Security Advisor, Flynn, on January 17th, did not approve an Obama administration plan to arm Kurds for a mission against the Islamic State in Raqqa (Syria) (AFKHAMI, 2017, online). The city of Raqqa had been taken by Islamists on March 6th, 2013, even before the founding of the Islamic State – at the time, the group was an aggregate of Syrian Sunni jihadist forces, including the ISI (Islamic State of Iraq), the Al-Nusra and the Free Syrian Army. From that date until October 2017, Raqqa was the capital of IS in Syria. It was retaken on October 17th, 2017, by the Syrian Democratic Forces, whose main groups are Kurds, with support from the US coalition.

tions, reintroduced unilaterally by the USA, had no binding legal effect on Europeans, Russians or Chinese — it was up to their convenience whether to respect them or not.

The second initiative was led by his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and consisted of an attempt at peace with the Palestinians (Spetalnick and Holland 2019). Once again, due to the action of establishment, the plan failed. This time, thanks to the action of his vice president, Mike Pence, and the US ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley. They proposed to Netanyahu the resumption of the project — which was never abandoned, even if left aside — of transforming Jerusalem into the one and indivisible capital of Israel (Ahren 2018). Netanyahu embraced the proposal, seeing it as the key to remaining in office upon his return to power. In addition to Trump's defeat, this act gave rise to the crisis surrounding the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which culminated in the Eleven Day War, in May 2021 (Cordesman 2021).

In the midst of these events, in 2021, under Biden's administration, the ignominious withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan (August 2021) and Iraq (December 2021) took place. The region was left without leadership — in a multipolar world, the Middle East is non-polar (Carlstrom 2024). According to David Petraeus, the way the US withdrew from the region in 2021 may have encouraged the Russians to invade Ukraine in February 2022 (IAI 2024, IIMINIOS). To which we can add, this same route encouraged the Hamas terrorist attack against Israel on October 7, 2023.

In this way, Turkey proposes to fill this void and impose order on the chaos — otherwise, the vacuum will be occupied by extra-regional powers. Furthermore, the Middle East has become the vertex that unites the impasses of US foreign (and internal) policy and the balance in the scales of Europe and Asia.

6 Final Thoughts

An attempt was made to develop a possibilist approach. This understanding was affirmed from the formulation of the problem, through the theoretical framework, until arriving at the explanatory historical content. Intentionally, a question was formulated that, beforehand, it was known that the research could not answer: what will be the path adopted by Turkey? However, it is hoped that, to some extent, it has been possible to list the components that allow policy makers and decision makers to provide minimal guidance. It is believed that, eventually, other researchers will be able to group these components in the form of variables, creating a model for analyzing Turkey's For-

eign Policy. Are they: (01) balancing, engagement or bargaining; (02) coercion and adherence to institutions; (03) strict territorial or institutional logic. They constitute the main result of the effort undertaken. Therefore, it is important to revisit them soon.

Turkey engaged, bargained and balanced appropriately. Engaged the Turkic States of Central Asia Organization³⁵, creating an organization that could become a Customs Union. And therefore, institutionally provide scale, financial and energy resources for Turkey to face the challenges of Industrial Revolutions. In the case of the bargain, the Turks executed it with professionalism between the USA, Russia and China. Finally, Turkey balanced England and France when there was no alternative: it prevented the creation of the Kurdish State in Syria, east of the Euphrates — “Rojava”.

The country positioned itself well. I was ready to “get the bucket” (buckpassing) of the USA, in order to enable their planned and gradual withdrawal from the Middle East. As seen in the immediately previous session, this did not happen, due to palace intrigues in Washington — and not due to indisposition on the Turkish side. Now, Turkey appears to be grappling with one of the boldest initiatives in its history: engaging Egypt and Pakistan. Although the procedure goes against Resnick’s rule — according to which the original level of interaction between countries must be low — in this case, engagement appears possible thanks to the confrontation between Israel and Palestine. This seems to be the main meaning of Erdogan’s support for Hamas: to consolidate a prominent and undisputed leadership position in the Islamic world.

Egypt has always been the key, not just to North Africa, but to the entire Sahel. Turkey has opened diplomatic legations across the continent. And, it has been accused, by its detractors, of supporting Islamic groups from Somalia to Mali, passing through Niger, Chad and Sudan. The fact is that Somalia is today, for all intents and purposes, a Turkish protectorate — a robust base in proximity to Mogadishu proves this beyond any reasonable doubt.

In turn, Pakistan is the strategic key to accessing the Indian Ocean, which borders some of the most densely populated Muslim countries in the world (Bangladesh) and the one with the largest Muslim population in the world (Indonesia). Although Turkish success may be modest, it will be enough to extend Republican Turkey’s influence beyond any other era of Ottoman rule.

35 Turkic States of Central Asia Organization — Created in 2009, its founding members were Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey. Uzbekistan joined the organization in 2019, while Hungary was accepted as an observer state in 2018.

So far, the Turks seem to have been happy to combine balancing, bargaining and engagement. It is now necessary to know how the combination between the exercise of coercion and adherence to institutions will occur. So far, the artificial confrontation with Israel has not compromised Turkey's position, since it is the Hebrew state — and not the Turkish one — that has challenged the multilateral institutions of the international order. However, given the possibility of the war expanding into Lebanon, the apparent Turkish willingness to prevent the island of Cyprus from being used for operations against the Middle East could force the Turks to balance the US — which is not the same as to do it with the Europeans.

In the assumption of a new Turkish intervention in Cyprus, it must be recognized that it would constitute revolutionary conduct. And, in this case, given Turkey's capabilities and the extent of its influence, it is reasonable to assume that this behavior would undermine the stability of the IS itself. In any case, the Turks seem, beforehand, to seek to mitigate the effects of a more assertive action, expressing adherence to the institutions. Recently (April 06, 2024), the Turkish Foreign Minister declared the country's intention to join the BRICS, receiving enthusiastic support from Russia and China. Therefore, also in this regard, the tension between the use of coercion and adherence to institutions, Turkey strives to strike a delicate balance.

It remains to be seen whether it will be successful. Success in this endeavor conditions to a considerable extent the last aspect: the predominance of institutional or strict territorial logic. This is because, if subjected to sanctions — that is, under the aegis of extra-economic coercion —, Turkey would find itself impelled to a strict territorial logic. On the other hand, to date, the main form of 'acquisition' of territory by the country — at least in Asia — has been the institutional route, it remains to be seen how it will behave in Africa.

The institutional territorial logic is expressed above all in the already mentioned Organization of Turkic States (OET). But, to a considerable extent, this conduct is due to the correlation of forces, as Iran, Russia and China can be formidable adversaries if their vital interests are contradicted. Furthermore, to establish the OET, civilizational reasons — linguistic, cultural, and religious — were invoked to proceed with integration, so that it can present itself as something that is not aimed against any country in the region.

Still, there are at least three bottlenecks that could antagonize Turkey with Russia, China or Iran. The first is Kazakhstan, which is a founding member of the OET, but is seen by Russia as being historically attached to its zone of influence. exclusive. Xinjiang is called East Turkestan by the Gray Wolves but, admittedly, it belongs to China. Finally, Iran could go to war in defense of Armenia if Azerbaijan, which has Turkish support, seizes the Zangezur

corridor³⁶. These bottlenecks can, even in Asia, force Turkey to adopt a strict territorial logic. Also in this case, with serious implications for the International Order.

It is important to know how Turkey will behave in Africa. Despite its historical ties to the Maghreb and the Horn of Africa, Turkey has extended its influence on the Sahel. Between 2002 and 2022, Turkey expanded the number of embassies in Africa from 12 to 44 — an increase of 267%. Although the gateway is usually technical cooperation of a military nature — training, war material and even bases — institutional territorialism also appears in Africa. In the Sahel, it is expressed by Turkey's support for the projected regional Confederation, whose proponents are Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso (November 12, 2023). As well as Turkey's willingness to join the BRICS, after the group gave membership to Egypt and Ethiopia.

In Africa, the main chokepoints are France, Egypt and Ethiopia. With France, by virtue of the CFA Franc and its West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). It was the expression of French dominance in the region, and through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), it managed to obtain the support of Nigeria — which, in turn, is investigating Turkey's alleged ties with Boko Haram³⁷. In the case of Egypt, there is the dispute over Libya. And, eventually, with Ethiopia — with whom Turkey currently has good relations — due to its dispute with Somalia (a Turkish protectorate). The Ethiopians obtained the concession of a port on the Red Sea, in Somaliland, a region that the Somalis claim as an integral part of their territory. Therefore, in Africa too, it remains an open question which Turkish logic of territorialization will be dominant — whether institutional or strict.

After all, Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria are countries endowed with resources that have not yet been fully used for the benefit of their people. And which are eagerly disputed, not only by the USA, Russia, China, Turkey and Europe, but even by Brazil. The decision to place Egypt and Ethiopia in the BRICS — which have serious controversies between them —, and the visit of the Brazilian President to these two countries, clearly indicates Brazil's willingness to engage with the region. It remains to be seen whether, beyond

³⁶ Zangezur Corridor - Located in Southern extreme of Armenia, through which the Yeraskh-Ordubad-Meghri-Horadiz-Baku railway passes, built in Soviet times, which importance increased as it allowed Turkey access to the Caspian Sea.

³⁷ Boko Haram — Islamic fundamentalist group, with a Sunni branch, which operates in Northern Nigeria, Chad and Niger. Since 2015, affiliated itself with the Islamic State. In 2017, the Nigerian government reportedly seized a shipment of weapons coming from Turkey, for Boko Haram. Two years later, again, the African country's armed forces claimed to be investigating the terrorist group's connection with the Turks (BAGUDU, 2019, online).

Africa, Brazil will use the opportunity of the void in the Middle East for its own international insertion purposes.

Finally, the question remains: is Turkey's apparently erratic behavior not establishing a standard of conduct for emerging countries in a multipolar world? After all, Turkey cooperates directly and indirectly with the US. In the case of the first, offering security for American companies and investments (e.g. Somalia). In the second, exacerbating competition between land powers. As a member of NATO, Turkey competes with France and England (Rojava). And, as a candidate for BRICS membership, it competes with China (Xinjiang) and India (Pakistan).

Perhaps what seems obscure about Turkish behavior is precisely the fact that it anticipates the flexibility of alliances and independent conduct in foreign policy, required by multipolarity. As always, the purpose is to bring together the conditions to endogenize the Economic Decision Center, promote development and, in this way, pave the way for Turkey's entry into the organic core of capitalism.

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ABSTRACT

This article deals with Turkey's international relations and the impact of its choices in the International System (IS) in this new era marked by the return of competition between the world powers. Specifically, it discusses the Turkish dilemma, reduced to two possible courses of action: between adherence to revolutionary behavior, or association with the institutions of the Emerging Industrial Axis. This dilemma is confronted with Turkey's trajectory since the end of the Ottoman Empire, in an explanatory historical effort. As for strategic stability, it should be clarified that it is understood as the set of elements that shape the 'rules' of the game in a multipolar world. The question that guides the research is how will Turkey's international insertion take place? The hypothesis that runs through the text is that, unlike other times when Turkey has been subjugated by international constraints, this time it will be able to choose its form of insertion into the IS. The article is divided into five parts. The first concerns the predominance of necessity in Turkey's IR trajectory. The second deals with the legacy of extra-economic coercion, which the US used during unipolarity, and the challenges this poses for strategic stability - which must be approached from a multidimensional perspective. The third part deals with Turkey's insertion into the South-South Axis - it remains to be seen whether it will also join its institutions. The fourth part deals with revolutionary behavior. Finally, the fifth and last part deals with the role of the Middle East in the outcome of the Turkish dilemma.

KEYWORDS

Turkey's Foreign Policy; Strategic Stability; International Insertion; Revolutionary Behavior; South-South Axis.

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INDIA'S STRATEGIC CHOICES IN THE MULTIPOLAR WORLD

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1 Introduction

The era spanning from the global financial crisis of 2008 to the ongoing challenges of COVID-19 has ushered in a transformative shift in the global order. This era of uncertainty holds unique implications and expectations for middle powers such as India, Brazil, Germany, and South Africa as they ascend towards greater global responsibilities. Amidst this transformation, India needs to redefine its relationships with diverse powers while safeguarding its national interests and adopting strategic alliances in dealings with neighbouring countries and major powers. The preceding decades were characterized by distinct phases—initially, a bipolar world during the Cold War, followed by a brief unipolar phase after the collapse of the USSR. However, the contemporary landscape is marked by the emergence of multipolarity, which is reshaping international dynamics. Sahakyan (2023) argues that the world order is no longer unipolar, and the war in Ukraine proves this fact.

India's unity amid diversity and its accomplishments in the face of challenges provide a compelling rationale for its greater role in the United Nations Security Council (Guha, 2012). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts India to be the fastest-growing global economy in 2023, developing by 6.1 per cent, well surpassing the 4 per cent emerging market average and remarkably exceeding the world's 1.2 per cent average growth. India's youthful consumer base holds a pivotal position in the growth strategies of numerous Fortune 500 corporations. This year, India's concurrent presidencies at the G-20 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) underscore its aspirations to be a leading, rather than merely a balancing, global force (Vaishnav, 2023, April 14). Furthermore, India is projected to sustain its status as the fastest-growing major economy with a 5.9 per cent growth rate this year. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently proclaimed,

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“India’s time has arrived” (Zakaria, 2023, April 28).

Beyond its economic prowess, India possesses the potential to earn admiration not solely for its economic growth but also for the values it upholds. This vision positions India as an incredible force, epitomising both growth and ethical principles (Zakaria, 2023, April 28). In the context of this evolving century, a transformative shift from unipolarity to multipolarity has significantly reconfigured the global geopolitical landscape, Mukherjee (2020) says that “the world is in flux, both in terms of the changing global distribution of power and the declining commitment of the United States to the international order”. The waxing influence of regional powers and the waning dominance of traditional global giants have precipitated a new era in international diplomacy. In this fluid landscape, India has emerged as a pivotal player, poised to shape global affairs amidst changing power dynamics. Sullivan de Estrada (2023) argues that India is actively contesting and, in some ways reconfiguring, the legitimating narratives.

Concurrently, the ascent of China and other major powers has reshaped the global power balance, while the once-Western-dominated international order faces mounting pressure (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022). This transformative international framework has empowered regional actors like India to actively engage on the global stage. As India navigates this multipolar reality, it faces an intricate tapestry of prospects and challenges in its pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Within this intricate fabric, India’s task encompasses managing competing interests, mitigating geopolitical rivalries, and addressing regional and global security concerns. Amidst these complex dynamics, this paper seeks to spotlight the multifaceted challenges that India must adroitly confront in its pursuit of foreign policy goals within a multipolar world. By delving into the subtleties of this evolving global scenario, the paper strives to illuminate strategic options and diplomatic methodologies that India can strategically adopt to optimise its influence and secure its national interests.

1.1 Research Objective

This study aims to analyze the challenges and opportunities faced by India in navigating the multipolar world order, with a focus on its foreign policy objectives. It seeks to explore how India can effectively balance diverse interests, manage geopolitical rivalries, and address security concerns in order to enhance its global influence.

1.2 Research Questions

1. What key factors influence India's approach and policy initiatives to navigate multipolarity and how do India's geopolitical positioning and regional dynamics impact its strategy to deal with regional powers?
2. How does India's economic growth and development agenda align with its approach to multipolarity, and what role does it play in shaping its strategic decisions?
3. What are the implications of India's relations with major global powers, such as the United States, China, and Russia?
4. How does India's engagement with multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations and regional organizations, contribute to its strategy for navigating multipolarity?

1.3 Research Methodology

This study employs a comprehensive qualitative research approach to analyse India's foreign policy challenges and strategies in the context of shifting multipolar world order. It involves a thorough review of academic literature, policy documents, and expert opinions to identify key trends and challenges. The analysis focuses on balancing interests, managing rivalries, and addressing security concerns, providing insights into effective diplomatic approaches for India.

2 Discussion

2. India's foreign policy and its traditional approach to non-alignment during the Cold War era were shaped by various historical factors. These factors include India's colonial past, its quest for strategic autonomy, and its commitment to global peace and stability. "Instead of joining any of the two blocs, India, along with many of the then-newly independent colonies, established the Non-Aligned Movement" (Ranjan, 2022). India's long history of colonisation by the British Empire greatly influenced its foreign policy outlook. The experience of being ruled by a foreign power for nearly 200 years fostered a strong sense of nationalism and self-determination among Indian leaders. The struggle for independence and the subsequent process of decolonization shaped India's approach to international relations. India's colonial past instilled a deep aversion to external interference and a commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity. This historical context played a significant role in shaping India's foreign policy decision-making, fostering a desire for autonomy and independence in its international engagements. The BJP's (Bharatiya Janata Party) core ideology and promise

of radically overturning this Nehruvian consensus are then taken up and empirically tested against three significant theatres of Indian foreign policy since 1998: nuclear proliferation, relations with Pakistan, and ties with the USA. (Chaulia, 2002).

3. India's quest for strategic autonomy was another important factor in shaping its foreign policy during the Cold War era. India, under the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, sought to establish itself as a leader of the newly independent countries of the Global South. Nehru envisioned a world order where countries could maintain their independence and pursue their own development paths free from alignment with the superpowers. India's desire for strategic autonomy led to the formulation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. The NAM aimed to provide a platform for developing countries to promote their collective interests and resist the pressures of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. India, along with other like-minded nations, advocated for a policy of non-alignment, which meant avoiding formal alliances and maintaining equidistance from both superpowers.

India's commitment to global peace and stability also played a crucial role in shaping its foreign policy during the Cold War era. India's leaders believed in the principles of peaceful coexistence, disarmament, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. As a country that had undergone a long and arduous struggle for independence, India empathized with the aspirations of other nations seeking freedom from colonial rule. India actively supported the decolonization process and advocated for the rights of self-determination for all nations. India also played a prominent role in peacekeeping operations under the United Nations, demonstrating its commitment to maintaining global peace and stability. The deployment of Indian troops in various conflict zones around the world highlighted India's dedication to international peacekeeping efforts. In summary, India's foreign policy and its traditional approach to non-alignment during the Cold War era were shaped by historical factors such as its colonial past, a quest for strategic autonomy, and commitment to global peace and stability. These factors influenced India's decision-making and positioned it as a champion of independence, non-alignment, and peaceful coexistence on the global stage.

4. The balance of economic power among nations has been shifting over the years. Emerging economies, like China, Brazil, South Africa, and India, have been gaining influence and challenging the dominance of traditional economic powers, such as the United States and the European Union. These changes can lead to new alliances, trade patterns, and geopolitical strategies. Rapid technological advancements continue to

revolutionise various industries and societies worldwide. Developments in artificial intelligence, automation, renewable energy, and biotechnology can alter labour markets, economic structures, and military capabilities. Climate change poses significant challenges and affects global dynamics. Rising sea levels, extreme weather events, and resource scarcity can exacerbate existing tensions, force migration, and impact economies. International cooperation and competition over resources and environmental issues will likely increase. Power struggles between nations may intensify due to the changing global landscape. Existing rivalries, like the one between the United States and China, and new geopolitical tensions may shape alliances and conflicts. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the interconnectedness of global health systems and economies. The emergence of new infectious diseases and health crises can reshape international cooperation and health policies. Examine the emerging multipolar world order characterised by the rise of multiple power centres, including the United States, China, Russia, and regional players (Turner, 2009). Analyse the challenges and opportunities posed by this multipolar environment for India's foreign policy objectives, national security concerns, and economic interests.

5. On many fronts including demography, technology, economy, geopolitics, and others, the world is passing through a period of profound upheaval. The paradigms of global politics are changing, with new standards clearly emerging in geopolitics--financially and strategically (Wiseman, 2023, April 27). Over the past decade, several emerging economies have grown more quickly than developed ones, changing the distribution of income globally in their favour. China has the second-largest economy in the world, behind the United States and ahead of Japan (Morrison, 2019). The global economic landscape is changing, and the economic centre of gravity is shifting from the West to the East. Mike Pence, an American politician said on February 16, 2019 "We cannot ensure the defense of the West if our allies grow dependent on the East." Emmanuel Macron argued "Take India, Russia, and China for example. They have a lot more political inspiration than Europeans today. They take a logical approach to the world, they have a genuine philosophy, a resourcefulness that we have to a certain extent lost. And so, all of that has a major impact on us and reshuffles the cards" (The Munich Report, 2020). In April 2022, Christine Lagarde, president of the European Central Bank, gave a speech titled "A new global map: European resilience in a changing world", she acknowledged that the West did not have a monopoly on power. Despite that the West is losing power relatively, she observed, many Western policymakers are against proposals for wider power redistribution in global governance (Hashem, 2022). On April 5, 2023, Macron urged China's

President Xi Jinping to help negotiate an end to the War in Ukraine (The Wall Street Journal, 2023).

Moreover, in the contemporary multipolar world not a single nation or group of nations is leading the way to address global issues. In other words, new emerging powers have replaced the status quo. New paradigms are emerging, and old paradigms are disappearing. The efforts by Russia and China so that the yuan overtake the US dollar as the most traded currency in Russia are in progress. Russian President Vladimir Putin has hinted that his country wants to use the yuan in trade with other countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Importantly, India is actively promoting its currency in trade; 18 countries have agreed to use the rupee in bilateral trade, with more countries expected to join the group (Bhattacharjee, 2023, March 14). China and Brazil have decided to phase out the dollar in their trade and use their own currencies. Saudi Arabia has publicly stated that it is ready to conduct its trade, including energy, in currencies other than the dollar. On June 5, 2019, Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with Putin at the Kremlin, China and Russia have agreed to use the dollar in their bilateral trade.

6. The global financial crisis, COVID-19, and the Ukraine war are catalysts of trends that have been in motion since World War II. Surprisingly, those who have dominated the world order since World War II seem unable to think pragmatically about a new world order. They think in terms of a zero-sum game that cannot move in the right direction. Multipolarity is revealing new power realities in various places. Significantly, geoeconomic and geopolitical realignments are taking place in various parts of the world due to the emerging power of nations like China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil. The Middle East and North Africa are undoubtedly where this is the case. Arab countries are diversifying their strategic alliances in light of changing interests and the reality of power relations.

The Arabs are finding that their interests and strategic objectives increasingly align with multiple nations not limited to the West and the US. To gauge the decline of US influence in the Arab region, one needs to understand China's active role in resolving regional conflicts in Yemen and Syria. The Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement under China is certainly a clear signal that the US is not the single dominant player in a region of now-fluid alliances and partnerships. However, this is not generating a vacuum. American influence is being replaced by the collective efforts of nations in the region to restructure the regional order and deepen strategic partnerships with countries such as China, Russia, and India. The age of Western hegemony is over. Whether or not America itself declines, the post-war liberal international order underpinned by US military, economic and ideological primacy and

supported by global institutions serving its power and purpose, is coming to an end (Acharya, 2018).

No longer a single power can dominate the Arabs, some US and West policymakers are still focusing on the region as subject to unipolarity, Arab leaders do not want any single power or group of nations to have a monopoly on regional affairs. Not limiting our partnerships to the US or the West, but expanding them to emerging powers such as China, Russia, and India. "The 21st century is touted to be the Asian age, belonging to China and India. Cold War and growing impacts of globalization are making India redefine its position and role at the regional and the global level" (Bava, 2007).

This is the reason for seeking membership in organizations such as China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, etc.). The BRI also includes the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and, the BRICS, its New Development Bank (NDB), headquartered in Shanghai. Strategically, it is not true that the Arabs do not want to continue their relationship with the US and the Western powers. However, Arab nations want to build up relations with countries based on mutual interests and benefits.

The Arab world's future strategic direction will help determine how the game of great power competition plays out and how it contributes to shaping international and regional dynamics. The Arabs are strategically, demographically, and geographically well-positioned to emerge as a pole of global influence. The Arab world is a decisive player in the balance of power. The changing nature of the present is no less than the change in global governance. The change accelerated only after the global financial crisis (2008). The major shift got a further boost after the COVID-19 and the Ukraine crises. The war in Ukraine demonstrates a battle between those who support privileges and the status quo and others who call for equality and fairness in the distribution of power. The process of global multipolarity is seen as Russia striving for its global role and relevance, India's carefully crafted strategic autonomy, the resurgence of the Arabs, and political awakening in other areas.

7. Germany and France are increasingly taking decisions independently to protect their national interests. Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholtz made a one-day visit to China, the first European leader to visit since the COVID pandemic, drawing criticism from the US and his own party. The consequences of the Asian tilt of world capitalism and the eventual overcoming of the legacy of the colonial world order are especially evident in the growing solidarity and expansion of BRIC. Asia's shift from the rich trans-Atlantic democracies to the centre of economic gravity has helped define China's rise within the network of bilateral trading relations, with ASEAN. Asian countries in terms

of population such as China, India and Indonesia support large domestic markets. The Ukraine war and Russia's annexation of the eastern states of Crimea and Donbas have reduced Russia's chances of occupying a powerful pole in the multipolar order. The liberal world order did expand and strengthen with the economic liberalisation in China and India, and with the end of the cold war. And while the champions of that order celebrated its expansion, they still assumed that its main challenge would come from the rising powers (Acharya, 2017).

8. China must be a competitor as well as an inspiration in shaping India to be a global player. The international and regional scenarios are very volatile. India should not allow events to come upon us; it is better to anticipate and analyse them in advance. Since the 1949 revolution, communist nationalism, and economic rise, our understanding of China has been inadequate. India missed the importance of the UN Security Council seat. China's arrival on the global stage as a superpower has repercussions in terms of several strategic challenges. The US-China dynamic as an emerging new world order is a major challenge for India's policymakers. The era of globalisation that facilitated the dramatic rise of China has probably come to an end, when anyone learns the complex dynamics of the world economic order, only then can India execute strategic policies in a new order. The world started to take notice of India's rise when New Delhi signed a nuclear pact with the US in July 2005, but that breakthrough is only one dimension of the transformation of Indian foreign policy that has taken place since the end of the Cold War (Mohan, 2006).

9. Today the West acknowledges India's potential to match China, with depth and skills, over the long term. Saran (2022) cautions that India must be careful of the economic chasm which makes China less sensitive to India's interests and exhibits a lower threshold of tolerance towards India. But an aspirational India should pursue a similar economic course, creating a knowledge and technological ecosystem that promotes quick innovation and assimilation. India must painstakingly pursue this rationale, which has been adopted by the majority of developed nations. India is the only country which has the civilizational depth, population, significant managerial, technical, and entrepreneurial skills to compete with China – and more, sustainably and over the long term. China is one of India's toughest strategic challenges. Consequently, the bilateral push-and-move over the border has years of twists and turns. Following the liberal perspective, Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao decided to target administrative management of the border over a political solution. India's strategy against a much stronger opponent, as diplomatic efforts focused on convincing China that any misadventure would result in full-scale war will affect long-term relations (Menon, 2018).

10. In the geopolitical competition with India in South Asia, China has scored more success in creating an opportunity between India and the smaller states that were traditionally close to New Delhi due to geography and cultural factors (Mosca, 2020). However, even here the relationships in South Asian states have benefitted from the India–China-managed rivalry. “The political psychology of Sino-Indian relations and of the roles of those two countries in the world understanding of contemporary world politics and to the approach of two of Asia’s rising powers to one another and to the global order” (Miller, 2020). The main reason for smaller nations’ strategic manoeuvring is the absence of a balance of power between China and India, which has enabled the smaller states to play off each other. India has been pursuing a mix of diplomatic engagement, limited hard balancing, and soft balancing policies towards China. India’s policy suggests a wait-and-watch approach, sending a message to the other powers that benign actions will create responses while aggressive measures may result in hard balances (Paul, 2019).

The past international opportunities and forthcoming strategies require historical shifts. Indian geopolitical position has made it strategically important to hold a key position. The growing recourse of unilateral measures by the major powers poses one of the gravest challenges to contemporary multilateralism which is a core principle of international cooperation and is essential to create a supportive external environment. India has been proactive in using multilateralism to meet its objectives. Menon (2021) finds India as central to Asia’s geopolitics and yet also set apart from it is a major contribution to our understanding of this great, rising power in this Asian century. In the process, India has contributed significantly to the rapid transformation of world order, driven by its ambitious socio-economic development programmes, which are steered by its international trade demands. The fact that this trade accounts for as much as 40 per cent of India’s gross domestic product (GDP) underscores the critical importance of the interlinkage between India’s aspirations need for international cooperation through multilateralism.

A nation’s hard power is defined by the ability to alter the behaviour of others to get what you want. Soft power is the ability to achieve this through ‘attraction’ rather than ‘coercion’ (hard power). Without, in any way, impeding or limiting the development of a nation’s hard power, it is very much visible that strategizing soft power projection by India should be prioritized as the pathway of primary foreign policy.

11. International politics may face difficulties in today’s multipolar world with its rivals, power imbalances, and value collisions. India’s participation in any alliance for power tussling along with the traditional non-alignment

position. However, once the rivalry between its two main poles could no longer be restrained, others were forced to choose one side. New Delhi cannot allow prejudices and assumptions to get in the way. Delhi's dogmas now stand in the way of India's progress. Our national policy cannot be static in a complex, evolving environment if we are to achieve even more constant goals. Some examples include the 1971 Bangladesh War, the 1991 Economic and Political Repositioning, the 1998 Nuclear Tests, and the 2005 India-US Nuclear Deal. In fact, India was only able to effect significant adjustments in its favour through a series of upheavals.

From 1946 to 1962, the first phase could be characterised as an era of non-alignment. In a bipolar world, India's objective was to resist the constraining choices while protecting its sovereignty, rebuilding its economy, and consolidating its integrity. India's goal was to lead Asia and Africa in a quest for a more equitable and just world order. "This was the heyday of Bandung and Belgrade, the peak of Third World solidarity. It also saw energetic Indian diplomacy everywhere, from Korea and Vietnam to Suez and Hungary. For a few years, our position on the world stage seemed assured. The 1962 conflict with China not only brought this period to an end but did so in a manner that significantly damaged India's standing." (Jaishankar, 2020).

From 1962 to 1971, the second phase is a decade of realism and recovery. India adopted more pragmatic choices on security and political challenges. From 1971 to 1991, the third phase was one of the greater regional assertions. It began with the creation of Bangladesh and the paradigm shift towards India-Pakistan relations, but it came to an end with the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) misadventure in Sri Lanka. The fourth phase was marked by the fall of the USSR and the establishment of a unipolar world. It encouraged India to shift towards safeguarding strategic autonomy. The Look East Policy has changed the Indian approach to world affairs, like engagement with Israel. This fifth phase took a balancing act, resulting in the India-US nuclear deal, a better understanding of the West, and a common cause with China.

One has to acknowledge the ethos of India, that being a democratic polity, a pluralistic society, and a market economy, India can grow along with others, not separately. India must overcome three burdens of the past: first, the partition of 1947 reduced India's geo-political strength against China and created an enemy like Pakistan, second, a protracted economic reform delayed India's growth story; and third, a prolonged wait in the exercise of the nuclear option generated a loss of strategic strength.

12. COVID-19 has allowed India to project innovation in pharmacy and engage in vaccine diplomacy. The Declaration of International Yoga Day is an achievement to demonstrate India's traditional healthy lifestyle. India's

humanitarian intervention, especially in the form of UN peacekeeping missions in the Congo and Korea, served to cement its image as a helping hand and timely help to Turkey after a devastating earthquake earned praise altogether, and New Delhi's "disaster diplomacy" served as potent tools for outreach to countries in need. We must remember that China has been winning without fighting, while the US is fighting without winning. It is even more about economic growth, political influence, and quality of life. As a result, America lost its famous optimism.

In a globalised world, strategic autonomy is secured through creating mutually beneficial relationships of interdependence. In an interdependent world, the fruit of economic growth and development is pursued when a nation is able to utilise the benefits of interdependence. Hence, the concepts of "autonomy" and "self-reliance" should be defined in the context of the economic interdependence of nations. India has the military capability to defend its territorial integrity and security; however, it will have to sustain higher rates of economic growth to be able to alter the strategic balance in Asia, and across the globe. It is not economic growth that holds the key to India's global profile and power, but the nature of that growth process and the manner in which the economic challenges it faces decide the real power of the nation. Social and economic backwardness, inequalities and political uncertainty show the quality of economic development (Baru, 2016).

13. Today, non-state security or non-traditional security as it is commonly referred is not entirely new thinking. It was given as much importance to India's neighbourhood policy as more than a mere subset of its foreign policy. Ever since Indian Independence, the neighbourhood has always received prime attention from the leadership. In spite of challenges posed by legacy issues and concerns about its stance as the dominant country in the region, this has been quite evident in the choice of seasoned diplomats to represent India in the neighbouring countries and the economic and political capital that India spends to maintain friendly relations with each of the countries. The 'Neighbourhood First' strategy is a logical extension of the approach to India's neighbours. Foreign policy initiatives, defence preparedness, along with accurate and timely intelligence about external threats and challenges, technological prowess, and economic growth that invites foreign investment and promotes trade would be some of the main means for the preservation and enhancement of India's national interests.

Indian foreign policy has remained reactive to the strategic environment rather than to strategic realities. Such a casual response to the structural imperatives gives little outcome when India is on the periphery of geopolitics. Sundaram (2022) says, "India's quest for power must be viewed

in geopolitical terms not as hubris, but as a long-term driver of its foreign and security policies. He reminds us that Asian geopolitical structures from Iran to Indonesia are interdependent and that India's agency in the past worked within this coexisting multiverse in the pursuit of its interests. Such an inheritance must lead to prioritizing connections rather than exclusion, prudential agency rather than geopolitical determinism, and an outcome orientation that brings prosperity to the masses rather than flaunting India's ambitions for international prestige." Michael (2013) argues why and how India has until now preferred bilateral negotiation processes and has used a multitude of multilateral organizations in order to push through its own self-interests. India must come to grips with its discomfort with the very notion of power, particularly its wariness of using hard power. India's reluctance to accept a more sophisticated understanding of power, in general, and military power, in particular, will continue to undermine Indian foreign and security policy. By its very nature, India's South Asia policy needs to be extremely dynamic and nimble. Over the last few years, the 'Neighbourhood First' policy has invested significant diplomatic capital in it. But the underlying factors that have traditionally framed India's difficulties in getting its neighbourhood policy right remain as potent as ever (Pant, 2019).

3 Conclusion

The emerging world order is likely to go on the path of the balance of power as its operating principle, rather than collective security. China has never missed the role of the great disrupter, unlike Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN, its emergence cannot be accommodated in the liberal order. The ability of India and China to work together could determine a balance between many fronts. As S. Jaishankar says, "Asia is being shaped largely by the outlook of the UN, the power of China, the weight of Russia, the collectivism of ASEAN, the volatility of the Middle East, and the rise of India. In India's engagement with the West, the shared values and the changes are underway." (Jaishankar, 2020)

The West and the US should accept that India's growth is a strategic development for its larger interests of liberal world order. When it comes to China, the mantra of strategic maturity is at work between the two countries. India refers to its strategy as multi-aligned, but its systemic interactions stand in stark contrast to its scant involvement at the regional level. A strong multilateral framework has not yet been developed in Asia as well as the global level. India needs to adopt multi-polarity in place of neutrality with the changing world without compromising on its strategic autonomy.

India's foreign policy has witnessed a dramatic transformation since the end of the Cold War (Pant, 2019). India is an emerging player in the multipolar world. It has a robust economy, a large population, and a growing military. The strategic decisions made by India in this new world order will have a significant effect both locally and internationally. India has traditionally pursued a policy of non-alignment, but this is becoming increasingly irrelevant in the current environment. China is a rising power and a major challenger to the United States. India has to decide whether to align itself with the United States or China or to pursue a more independent policy. India is also facing challenges from its neighbours like Pakistan and China. China is expanding its influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, which is a major concern for India.

India's strategic choices will be shaped by a number of factors, including its economic development, its military strength, regional cooperation, and its relations with other countries. India will need to balance its desire to maintain its independence with the need to cooperate with other countries to address common challenges. India's strategic choices in the multipolar world will be complex and difficult. India will need to be careful to avoid making any decisions that could jeopardise its security or its economic development. However, India also has the opportunity to play a major role in shaping the new world order. The choices that India makes will have a major impact on the future of the multipolar world. India has the potential to be a major force for good in the world, but it will need to make wise decisions and build strong partnerships with other countries.

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ABSTRACT

The post-World War II landscape underwent a seismic shift, crystallising into a bipolar structure with the US-led West facing off against the Soviet Union, instigating the Cold War. However, the USSR's collapse in 1991 shattered this bipolarity, ushering in an era of American dominance (unipolarity). Yet, this once unassailable US-led global order is undergoing rapid contraction. In its wake, a fresh paradigm is unfolding as novel power centres coalesce to address shared dissatisfactions. Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran forge convergences, beckoning others to unite against US-led supremacy. Astonishingly, Saudi Arabia aligns with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a dialogue partner, relegating its erstwhile oil-for-security doctrine to antiquity. Simultaneously, the Brazilian President advocates terminating dollar supremacy. In a bold affront, Russia challenges the US world order through its Ukrainian incursion. Notably, Emmanuel Macron declares Taiwan beyond the West's scope, potentially puncturing American hegemony. This paper fervently explores how the burgeoning multipolar world order engenders arenas for regional powers, scrutinising the prospects and hurdles that confront New Delhi as it navigates India's foreign policy.

KEYWORDS

Bipolarity, Multipolarity, Middle Power, Regional Power, Unipolarity, World Order.

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INDONESIA'S G20 PRESIDENCY AND MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY: BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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1 Introduction

Unlike the domestic level, the international political structure lacks a specific hierarchy and division of duties. In this regard, the domestic political structure is based on the division of powers, such as executive, legislative, and judicial. In contrast, the international one depends on the distribution of capabilities (power) among system units. Consequently, as entities in the international system, countries are frequently categorized or assigned a status based on their respective powers (Waltz, 1979). In addition, the international political structure contains three spectrums of groups: great power, small power, and middle power (Waltz, 1979).

The term 'great power' refers to nations with advantages over others. As a result, those within this spectrum can influence the international political constellation. Changes in power distribution within this spectrum could impact the international system (Waltz, 1979), such as the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two nations were

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classified as great powers with rival and antagonistic allies. As a consequence of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact alliance, commanded by the Soviet Union, the United States and NATO became a single global power. It is an example of how the dissolution of the Soviet Union altered the distribution of power, resulting in a unipolar international political structure dominated by the United States.

A small power is a nation commonly regarded as lacking the necessary resources (e.g., population, economy, military, and politics) to play an integral part in an anarchic international system. In other words, these small powers have no impact on the international system. However, some countries are included in both the great power and small power categories, as they are perceived to fit between the two opposite ends of the spectrum. Therefore, these nations are called middle power (Gilley & O'Neil, 2014).

After World War II ended in 1946, the phrase middle power first appeared in a speech by Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, in a discussion of world order (Mackay, 1969). On another occasion, he mentioned that it was necessary to include middle-power nations in international organizations in order to create a better international life order: "At least as one of the middle powers, medium powers that should be brought into the world organization in some way that would recognize that power and responsibility go together." As a result, the concept of middle power continues to evolve, resulting in the emergence of various definitions, indicators, and characteristics of middle-power countries (Robertson, 2017).

Middle-power countries are conceptualized using at least three distinct approaches. First, the hierarchical approach emphasizes quantitative or material indicators such as population, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and military expenditures in determining the status of a country as a middle power (Holbraad, 1984; Karim, 2018; Wood, 1987). The second is the behavioral approach. Unlike the hierarchical approach, which emphasizes only material factors, it also considers and prioritizes normative factors, such as the behavior and style of state diplomacy. Thus, middle-power countries prioritize multilateralism, compromise in international disputes, and employ good international citizenship in their diplomatic endeavors (Cooper et al., 1993; Emmers, 2018; Holbraad, 1984; Karim, 2018; Neack, 2013). Third, the identity approach is significantly influenced by constructivism and asserts that a country's status as a middle power result from intersubjective construction by the country and its surrounding nations (Hurrell et al., 2000).

Indonesia can be placed in this spectrum based on three approaches to identify countries of a middle power. In addition, Indonesia is widely recognized as a country that promotes diplomatically acceptable normative

and compromising behavior. Indonesia's familiarity with multilateralism in various international agendas reflects its status as a middle power. It is likely due to the lack of influence in the international political structure. Hence, as a reflection of its power in international politics, Indonesia requires the accumulation of strength from other nations, which can be accommodated in practice by utilizing international forums.

Multilateral interactions are typically facilitated by international organizations, also known as diplomatic instruments, created by states to address global issues (Leguey-Feilleux, 2017). As chairman of the G20 Presidency in 2022, Indonesia was required to take advantage of this forum to resolve international issues. In this context, Indonesia was obligated to accommodate diverse interests and provide strategic solutions to many international issues.

The Covid-19 pandemic, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and the issue of global warming caused multifaceted problems or crises. Therefore, Indonesia proposed the theme "Recover Together, Recover Stronger" with three issues as its top priorities: Digital Transformation, Global Health Architecture, and Energy Transition (Sekretariat Presiden, 2021). Through the theme and focal points mentioned above, Indonesia urged all nations to collaborate, assist each other in their recovery, and grow stronger and more sustainable.

It was believed that Indonesia's primary concerns were related to one another. The topic of energy transition was discussed to solve the problems of global warming caused by environmental degradation due to industrialization and environmental damage leading to health issues triggered by pollution involving carbon emissions. Despite these circumstances, it was perceived that some developed countries with sufficient technology in the health sector, new and renewable energy, and digital technology were not committed to providing developing countries with equal access to knowledge and technology despite being the most significant contributors to carbon emissions. According to Payne, all countries must work together to tackle global health issues, such as the spread of disease and the emergence of new health hazards, by exchanging information and taking practical measures (Payne, 2008).

As a country of a middle power, Indonesia must serve as a bridge between small- and great-power countries. Middle-power nations utilize multilateralism to encourage the maintenance or creation of global norms and order and to position themselves as advocates for good international citizenship. Therefore, they possess the characteristics of brokerage diplomacy or bridge builders, namely positioning themselves as a bridge or interconnecting issues between small-power and great-power countries

(Cooper et al., 1993; Efstathopoulos, 2018; Neack, 2013; Rozman, 2007; Spero, 2009a; Thies & Sari, 2018).

The presence of international organizations is one of the most crucial variables to consider when discussing the current international political situation. As was previously stated, multilateral interactions are becoming more prevalent in modern society, particularly in international forums and organizations. There are numerous well-known multilateral forums, such as the G20, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and ASEAN. In this regard, they have fundamental differences, one of which is membership, as in the case of the G20 forum, whose membership consists of twenty entities with the world's largest economies. However, even though the G20 comprises the twenty states with the largest economies in the world, it does not imply that only great powers are involved. In this regard, most G20 members, precisely eleven members, are classified as middle-power countries (Cooper, 2013; Gilley & O'Neil, 2014). Regardless, there are no small powers in the G20.

Furthermore, APEC differs from the G20, which does not include members classified as small-power countries. In this context, APEC members comprise great powers like the United States and China, middle powers like Indonesia and South Korea, and small powers like Brunei Darussalam and Papua New Guinea. APEC seeks to promote economic growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, facilitate trade and investment, and strengthen economic development cooperation among its members.

The following organization is ASEAN, a multilateral forum formed to develop economic, social, cultural, defense and security, and numerous other sectors in the Southeast Asian region. In terms of membership, it contains countries of middle power and several small powers, such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. As the host of the G20 and a country of middle power, Indonesia was expected to bridge several strategic issues between small power countries in APEC and ASEAN and great power countries in the G20. Indonesia's representation of the aspirations of APEC and ASEAN nations at the G20 summit reflected a form of brokerage diplomacy. Therefore, it is essential to assess whether Indonesia has effectively performed its role as a bridge in the G20.

Evaluation of Indonesia's G20 Presidency in 2022 was deemed essential due to a lack of research on the subject in general. Previous studies investigating Indonesia's G20 Presidency highlighted how the Indonesian government utilized its status to advance economic and tourism sectors (Astuti & Fathun, 2020; Marwan & Isnaeni, 2022). In addition, according to other scholars, the Indonesian government engaged soft power instruments by employing cultural values and digital diplomacy (Agung & Intenilia,

2022).

In addition to the three previous studies that focused on evaluating Indonesia's G20 Presidency, researchers discovered more investigations that attempted to provide strategies for enhancing Indonesia's status. Psychoanalytic and political psychology approaches were discussed to assist Indonesia in carrying out its G20 Presidency responsibilities amidst the geopolitical crisis. It was believed that using these approaches could guarantee the success of the G20 Presidency and boost Indonesia's status and prestige as a nation capable of serving as a peacemaker (Nugraha et al., 2022).

This study investigated whether Indonesia could implement its brokerage diplomacy on behalf of APEC and ASEAN within the G20. In this research, it was assumed that if Indonesia positioned itself as a link or connector, its three prioritized agendas in the G20 would have similar narratives to those of APEC and ASEAN. In this context, APEC and ASEAN had several aspirations pertaining to global health architecture, digital transformation, and energy transition. Therefore, as would be expected of middle-power nations, Indonesia should have raised these issues at the G20.

Based on the preceding explanation, this study was conducted to answer the following research question: How do Indonesia's G20-related agendas compare to the aspirations of APEC and ASEAN countries? In order to evaluate the relationship between the G20 agendas and the aspirations of APEC and ASEAN nations, researchers selected a timeframe lasting from the beginning of the Presidency on December 1, 2021, to mid-June 2022.

2 Research Methods

This research employed Web Scraping, also known as Data Mining, as the data collection technique. It was incorporated to retrieve data from a predetermined website (Zhao, 2017). Accordingly, the information gathered for this research consisted of secondary data obtained from the Google directory. In this regard, the G20-related data was garnered from news portals that published Indonesia's three agendas at the G20. Regarding APEC and ASEAN, the data was obtained from the official websites of APEC (www.apec.org) and ASEAN (asean.org). All information was collected from December 2021 to June 2022. The narratives within the research data were subsequently mapped using content analysis.

Figure 1 - Data Collection Process



Figure 1 illustrates that the data collection process began with determining the context following the three agendas of the G20. This context was subsequently utilized as the premise for scraping the necessary data from Google, followed by content analysis.

Table 1 - Global Health Architecture's variables, indicators, and keywords used to collect data

Variable	Indicators	Keywords
Global Health Architecture	Global Health System Resilience	Health Resources, inclusive health access, health financing mechanism, global health threat, health emergency fund, global vaccination inequality, equitable distribution of vaccines, inequality in access to healthcare, strengthening human resources for health workers, global health fund, sufficient access to finance
	Harmonization of Global Health Protocol Standards	Health information system connectivity, global health guidelines, vaccine validation
	Redistribution of Manufacture Centers and Global Research Centers	Health research collaboration, health technology transfer, production center diversification, global network of genomic surveillance, research collaboration, pathogen information and data sharing, virus data sharing, genome sequence data sharing, vaccine technology transfer

The table above describes the variables, indicators and keywords used

to collect data on the Global Health Architecture.

Table 2 - Digital Transformation variables, indicators and keywords used to collect data

Variable	Indicators	Keywords
Digital Transformation	Connectivity and Post-Pandemic Recovery	Digital access equalization, internet access fulfillment, digital connectivity, digital finance sector innovation, digital finance sector inclusion, economic recovery, corporate participation, digital economy development, inclusive digital ecosystem, digitalization of the economy, digital economy, digital technology utilization
	Digital Literacy and Skill	Digital finance literacy, equalization of digital skills, digital literacy improvement, digital human resource development, digital divide
	Cross-Border Data Flow	Personal data protection, data validity, data transparency, digital data security, cross-border data utilization

The table above maps out the variables, indicators, and keywords used to collect data on Digital Transformation.

Table 3 - Energy Transition's variables, indicators, and keywords used to collect data

Variable	Indicators	Keywords
Energy Transition	Access	Clean energy access, energy affordability, Equitable access to energy, affordable energy services, energy access inequality, energy access improvement
	Technology	Renewable energy development, technology transfer, clean energy technology innovation, eco-friendly technology, low-carbon technology, carbon capture technology
	Funding	New and renewable energy investment, new and renewable energy funding, energy transition investment, energy transition funding, energy transition financing, green energy investment, green energy financing

The table above describes the variables, indicators, and keywords necessary to compile data on Energy Transition.

The present investigation employed the CADS (Corpus-Assisted Discourse Study) method for data analysis. It was incorporated to analyze patterns in a discourse by scrutinizing the frequency of frequently occurring words, executing quantitative calculations, and analyzing data (Kusumasari, et al., 2021). In addition, researchers utilized the MAXQDA 2020 software to quantify textual data and analyze the patterns of the selected texts.

3 Findings

Researchers discovered several informational patterns that could be generalized further based on the processed data. In this regard, the relevant patterns were analyzed based on how Indonesia's G20 Presidency, APEC, and ASEAN articulated the three agendas at the G20 summit.

Tabela 4


Agenda	G20 (Indonesia’s Presidency)	APEC	ASEAN
Health	Health Fund Resources and Access Improvement	Health Fund Resources and Access Improvement	Manufacture Redistribution
Digital Transformation	Economic Recovery through Digital Economy Connectivity	Economic Recovery through Digital Economy Connectivity	Economic Recovery through Digital Economy Connectivity
Energy Transition	Technology Funding and Investment for Renewable Energy	Technology Funding and Investment for Renewable Energy	Technology Transfer and Technology Availability

Indonesia’s G20 and APEC narratives have always emphasized access to funding and economic recovery. In the Digital Transformation agenda, the Indonesia’s presidency in the G20 and ASEAN countries had a similar format and narrative structure. Meanwhile, the agenda regarding the access to the means of production and decentralization of global supply chains is mainly dominated by ASEAN’s narrative patterns on Health and Energy issues.

3.1 Arquitetura Global de Saúde


There were three sub-agendas on the agenda for strengthening the Global Health Architecture: 1) Global Health System Resilience, or Health System Resilience; 2) Harmonization of Global Health Protocol Standards, or Protocol Standardization; 3) Manufacture Center Redistribution and Knowledge Hub, or Manufacture Redistribution. Following is a content analysis of Indonesia’s agenda for the G20 summit.

Figure 2 - Global Health Architecture Agenda Content Analysis




According to the preceding figure, Health System Resilience was the most frequently mentioned narrative, with 49% of mentions, followed by Protocol Standardization & Manufacture Redistribution, with 26%. The patterns of narratives on the APEC website resembled those of the G20. In this regard, APEC prioritized Health System Resilience, followed by Global Harmonization & Protocol and Health Innovation Center Redistribution.

Figure 3 - APEC's Global Health Architecture Agenda Content Analysis



Com base na figura acima, a Resiliência do Sistema de Saúde passou a ser a narrativa mais citada, com 48,3%. A Padronização de Protocolos ficou em segundo lugar com 34,5%, seguida pela Redistribuição de Fabricação com 17,5%. Assim, o G20 e a APEC tinham padrões de dados idênticos, distinguindo-os da ASEAN, que preferiu concentrar-se na Redistribuição do Centro de Inovação em Saúde, com base na análise de conteúdo.

Figura 4 - Análise de conteúdo da agenda da Arquitetura Global da Saúde da ASEAN




The figure above reveals that Health Innovation Center Redistribution was the most frequently mentioned narrative, with 44.4%, followed by Protocol Standardization with 37.8% and Global Health System Resilience with 17.8%.

3.2 Digital Transformation


There were three sub-agendas within the Digital Transformation agenda, namely Connectivity & Post-Pandemic Recovery, Digital Literacy & Skill, and Global Data Flow.

Figure 5 - Digital Transformation Agenda Content Analysis




According to the preceding figure, Connectivity and Post-Pandemic Recovery was the most frequently mentioned narrative, representing 44.4% of all occurrences. It was followed by Digital Literacy and Skill (37%) and Global Data Flow (14.6%), respectively. In addition to the three sub-agendas for strengthening digital transformation, this research uncovered other emerging narratives, such as Financial Technology and the Draft of a Law on Personal Data Protection.

Figure 6 - APEC's Digital Transformation Agenda Content Analysis



Despite the difference in percentages, APEC shared the same data pattern as the G20: Connectivity and Recovery at 51.4%, Digital Literacy and Skill at 37.8%, and Cross-Border Data Flow at 10.8%.

Figure 7 - ASEAN's Digital Transformation Agenda Content Analysis




Regardless of the percentage disparities, ASEAN maintained the same data pattern as the G20 and APEC: Connectivity and Recovery was 56.6%, Digital Literacy and Skill was 25.5%, and Cross-Border Data Flow was 17.9%.

3.3 Energy Transition


There were three sub-agendas within the Sustainable Energy Transition agenda: Funding, Technology, and Access.

Figure 8 - Energy Transition Agenda Content Analysis




Referring to the prior figure, Funding was the most frequently mentioned narrative, appearing 40.2% of the time. It was followed by Technology and Access with percentages of 31.7% and 28%, respectively. In addition to the three sub-agendas for the Sustainable Energy Transition agenda, this study identified other emerging narratives, such as Multilateralism and Climate Change.

Figure 9 - APEC’s Energy Transition Agenda Content Analysis



APEC had a comparable data pattern to the G20, with Funding by 43.5%, Technology by 30.4%, and Accessibility by 26.1%.

Figure 10 - ASEAN’s Energy Transition Agenda Content Analysis



ASEAN data patterns were distinct from those of the G20 and APEC. ASEAN was slightly more focused on narratives regarding Technology (such as the adoption of clean energy technology and the transfer of technology)

than on narratives concerning Funding. For more details, the percentages of narratives of Technology was 41.4%, Funding was 37.9%, and Accessibility was 20.7%.

4 Discussion: Is it true that Indonesia does not carry out the typical role of a middle power country?

As indicated previously, this study aimed to determine whether or not Indonesia played the role or manifested the characteristics of a middle-power nation, as predicted by experts. Theoretically, as the framework for this study's analysis was the concept of middle power, Indonesia's status as a middle-power country holding the G20 Presidency would likely suggest efforts to encourage cooperation and good global citizenship as well as to build bridges between small-power and middle-power countries that are members of the ASEAN and APEC (Cooper et al., 1993; Neack, 2013; Rozman, 2007; Spero, 2009b; Thies & Sari, 2018).

Based on the findings, only one of the three primary agendas raised when Indonesia hosted the G20 indicated that it had discussed the same narratives with APEC and ASEAN. Similar narratives were revealed in the Digital Transformation agenda, which in practice, related to using digital technology to facilitate connectivity and the recovery process following the Covid-19 pandemic. The digital transformation issues highlighted by APEC and ASEAN were concurrently associated with the same topic: Connectivity, particularly the economy, to accelerate the recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic.

The ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework document published in 2021 exemplified ASEAN's emphasis on the need to enhance connectivity for post-pandemic recovery. In this context, ASEAN included both Digital Transformation and Connectivity as critical variables on the recovery pillars (ASEAN, 2021a, 2021c). In addition, the document titled "Bandar Seri Begawan Roadmap on ASEAN's Digital Transformation Agenda" also addressed very similar topics (ASEAN, 2021b).

As a forum for multilateral economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, APEC reinforced the same narratives regarding the Digital Transformation agenda as ASEAN and G20. According to APEC, the Covid-19 pandemic heightened global awareness of the necessity of digital transformation. According to a Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA) publication, APEC argued that the Covid-19 pandemic encouraged industry and economic actors to accelerate the adaptation and adoption of the digitalization era for the next 5 to 10 years. In addition, the document

"Enhancing Implementation of APEC Connectivity Blueprint in the Digital Era: Digital Connectivity for Stronger Recovery," published in March 2022 during Indonesia's G20 Presidency, also contained narratives promoting the essence of digital transformation to improve connectivity (Bayhaqi et al., 2022).

At least two points were depicted by the similarity between the narratives presented by Indonesia in hosting the G20 and those emphasized by APEC and ASEAN. First, due to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the economic sectors of numerous nations, particularly those classified as having small and middle powers, there was widespread agreement that multilateral efforts were required to expedite the recovery process. Second, because G20 is comprised of countries with varying economic power, Indonesia, as a middle-power nation hosting the G20, made an effort to play its role as a bridge between small and middle-power nations and those with great powers. Indonesia endeavored to emphasize the concerns and interests of small- and medium-power states in enhancing connectivity and digital transformation to facilitate recovery from the pandemic.

The Digital Transformation agenda confirmed the identical narratives and demonstrated that Indonesia fulfilled its role as a middle-power country and G20 host. Nonetheless, there were no narrative similarities between the remaining two agendas. In addition, the shared characteristics between the Global Health Architecture and Energy Transition agendas were only revealed during the Indonesia's presidency of APEC and G20. On their respective Global Health Architecture agendas, G20 and APEC were subsequently centered on narratives about efforts to increase resources and access to health funds. Meanwhile, ASEAN established that the Manufacture Redistribution was associated with its dominant narratives. On the Energy Transition agenda, G20 and APEC focused primarily on narratives concerning renewable energy funding and technology investment. On the other hand, the dominant narrative in ASEAN concentrated on the availability and transfer of technology for the use of renewable energy.

The disparities that dominated the narratives raised by ASEAN, APEC, and G20 might lead societies to conclude that Indonesia failed to carry out its role as a bridge-builder. The present study, however, offered a different perspective. Researchers argued that Indonesia's G20 Presidency indicated its efforts to bridge the interests and concerns of ASEAN's middle- and small-power nations. As shown previously, the dominant narratives arising in ASEAN during discussions on the Global Health Architecture were the demands or interests of ASEAN countries for the Manufacture Redistribution. The inability to produce the necessary vaccines, medicines, and medical devices

constituted one of the most significant obstacles and challenges encountered by ASEAN in its struggle against the Covid-19 pandemic. This circumstance resulted from inadequate or insufficient knowledge, technology, and financial resources (Ahmad et al., 2022; ASEAN, 2021c, 2021d; Pananond & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2022). Hence, it has been acknowledged by ASEAN itself, which was further supported by the viewpoints of numerous experts.

To establish a domestic and regional health architecture resistant to future pandemics, most ASEAN nations must enhance their capacity to produce vaccines, medicines, and medical devices. Consequently, without the necessary manufacture redistribution, the Southeast Asia region's health architecture will be incapable of responding to the next pandemic, resulting in the fragility of the global health architecture. Through the Indonesia's G20 Presidency agenda, the dominant narratives to increase resources and access to funding related to ASEAN's requirements and interests were later emphasized. Thus, ASEAN's demands might not be met without a development in resource capacity via knowledge and technology transfers and adequate funding.

The Energy Transition agenda additionally demonstrated a similar pattern. There were connections between the most significant issues arising in G20 and APEC, specifically funding and investment in technology. On the contrary, the emerging narratives in ASEAN were dominated by access to technology. In response, researchers asserted that the distinct narratives between ASEAN, G20, and APEC did not reflect Indonesia's failure to perform its role as a bridge-builder. The current circumstances revealed that Indonesia struggled for and communicated the interests and issues affecting ASEAN to larger forums, namely G20 and APEC.

Limited access to technology significantly correlated with the obstacles encountered by ASEAN countries in their energy transition efforts, which was the most prominent focus of the Energy Transition agenda in ASEAN. According to scientific articles and official reports published by international institutions, Southeast Asia's Energy Transition has been relatively sluggish. This rate was inextricable from the low technological readiness and energy transition budgets. To address these problems, Southeast Asian countries require the transfer of knowledge and technology, which should be supported by funding and investment (Suwanto et al., 2021; Vakulchuk et al., 2022). Given that the Energy Transition agenda in ASEAN was hindered by technological and funding preparedness, Indonesia accomplished its role as a bridge-builder by promoting multilateral cooperation schemes in the funding aspect, enabling ASEAN to accelerate its Energy Transition agenda.

5 Conclusion

The Covid-19 pandemic has caused tremendous disruptions in all aspects worldwide. All nations were compelled to adjust their policy priorities to address the health crisis. Furthermore, the Covid-19 pandemic has affected politics domestically and internationally. In this case, we could observe how countries prioritized their national interests. Moreover, the existing distribution of power had a significant impact on the emerging pattern of interaction and behavior. It was subsequently identified as a challenge that Indonesia, as the G20's host, must confront.

This study concluded that Indonesia served as a "bridge builder" between developed and developing countries. This argument was reinforced by analyzing the three agendas prioritized by Indonesia's G20 Presidency: Digital Transformation, Energy Transition, and Global Health Architecture. First, there were similarities in the Digital Transformation agenda between Indonesia's G20 Presidency, APEC, and ASEAN. Indonesia's decision to highlight the topic of Digital Transformation during its G20 Presidency was substantially correlated with the perspectives of middle- or small-power countries in APEC and ASEAN regarding the value of unity to accelerate post-pandemic digital transformation. Second, despite the distinctions demonstrated by two other agendas, Indonesia was still recognized as an effective bridge-builder between developing and developed countries. Moreover, the existing occurrences suggested that Indonesia was striving for and conveying the interests and issues of developing nations to a significant forum such as the G20.

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ABSTRACT

International Politics has not been immune to the disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, revealing that a country's behavior patterns and policies are inextricably linked to its national interests and power distribution in the international system. In this context, developed countries have a relatively higher level of preparedness than developing nations, whether middle or small powers. It includes the ability of developed countries to produce vaccines, whereas developing states rely on imported vaccines. However, the presence of international organizations such as the G20, APEC, and ASEAN has not thoroughly resolved this issue. Consequently, efforts are required to resolve problems. These efforts exemplify the characteristics of diplomacy carried out by middle-powers like Indonesia. Through an analysis of the prioritized agendas of Indonesia's G20 Presidency, the present study discovered that preparing the agendas in question was intrinsically linked to Indonesia's efforts to build bridges between developed and developing countries. Thus, Indonesia expected G20 could provide advantages to both developed and developing countries. In addition to employing the concept of middle power as an analytical framework, this research was conducted by scraping the web for relevant information, which was then analyzed using the Corpus-Assisted Discourse Study method.

KEYWORDS

Developing Countries; Diplomacy; G20 Presidency; Indonesia; Middle Power.

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THE GREAT RESET AND THE NEAR-TERM IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CHINESE ECONOMY: A POST PANDEMIC OUTLOOK

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1 Introduction

During the recent 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasised the direction of the Chinese economy towards achieving “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era” amidst the aftermath of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic³. Accordingly, the Party Congress also elucidated the challenges that arose with the COVID-19 pandemic since 2020, which presented huge challenges before the Chinese economy. COVID-19 has emerged, arguably, as the deadliest pandemic that has spread worldwide in the 21st century. The pandemic has exposed the economic and healthcare systems in many countries in the Global North and South (Freed et al., 2020). Its spread has been disrupting economic linkages across the globe, regardless of political boundaries, ideological barriers, and economic differences (WHO, 2020a; 2020b) and had caused the largest number of virus-infected deaths ever seen in this century.

On 11 March 2020, the situation was declared a global pandemic, contributing to a global economic contraction of almost all the economies

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³ Accordingly, to “fully build a modern socialist China” a “two-stage development plan from 2020” was envisioned. The first stage (2020-35): PRC “will build on the foundation created by the moderately prosperous society” with this period “to see that socialist modernization is basically realized”. In the second stage (2035-50): On “having basically achieved modernization”, PRC will develop “itself into a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful” (Xi, 2019: 4).

during the first half of 2020 itself. In turn, this has produced symptoms of an already emerging extreme form of a global recession, known as the ‘Great Reset’⁴ (McKee and Stuckler, 2020; Ayittey et al., 2020; Nicola et al., 2020; Açıkgoz and Günay, 2020; Gans, 2020; McKibbin and Fernando, 2020). The recent spur in infections in Global South and North, developed, developing, and least-developing countries (LDCs) are signs in that direction (The Lancet Editor, 2020; Peeri et al. 2020). The Great Reset has already led to a new form of recession, surpassing the 2008 crisis’ impact (and similar to the 1929 Great Depression) (Schwab, 2020).

The Chinese economy has, in recent years, slowed down, both due to internal and external factors (CGTN, 2020b). In the current context, shrinking international demand will have its impact on China’s exports, and this, in turn, will test China’s foreign trade resilience and competitive edge, as well as the capacity of Chinese companies to explore new markets due to the disruptions to the global supply chain (WTO, 2020). The impact of COVID-19 exacerbated these risks that include, but are not limited to, politico-economic fragmentation of the markets of Chinese goods, namely, the European Union (EU) in the post-Brexit era, economic instability in other regions like West Asia and North African (WANA) region (China being the most significant investor), the South American countries and other regions connected under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), climate change-related issues, (and resulting politico-economic pressure from the US). The resulting fragmentation, and shock to the global supply chains, relatively large State-debt among institutions and enterprises, unsustainable corporate debts and related non-performing assets (NPAs) in public banks has only delayed recovery (IMF Blog, 2020; China Daily, 2020). These will have severe implications for China in terms of international trade, with implications on the global supply chain, much worse than the 2008 Financial Crisis and reminiscent of the Great Depression in the late 1920s.

In China, the global economy’s impact would be more inimical for it than in most other countries - not just because of the interdependent nature of China in the global supply chain, but because of the ramifications this has on the political and economic stability for the rule of the Communist

4 According to Gopinath (2020): “[the current COVID-19 crisis is a] rare disaster, [and] has resulted in a tragically large number of human lives being lost... The magnitude and speed of collapse in the activity that has followed is unlike anything experienced in our lifetimes... [M]any countries now face multiple crises—a health crisis, a financial crisis, and a collapse in commodity prices, which interact in complex ways. Policymakers are providing unprecedented support to households, firms, and financial markets, and, while this is crucial for a strong recovery, there is considerable uncertainty about... the economic landscape. [This is] the worst recession since the Great Depression, and far worse than the Global Financial Crisis”.

Party of China (CPC) in China (Sarkis et al., 2020; NPC, 2020). According to estimates, the recent pandemic crisis leading to the “Great Reset” has thirty times more impact than the 2008 Financial Crisis (Schwab, 2020; Gopinath, 2020). In relation to international trade and the global supply chain, there are strong downward pressures on the global engine, with rising uncertainties and destabilizing factors, within and outside China (Ibid.). What makes this worrying is that we are still some ways from deciphering when the negative economic effects might fully peak.

2 Research Methodology

This study attempts to analyze the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on China, with implications for the global supply chain. Exploratory and descriptive research utilizing a mixed-methods approach has been undertaken for the study. The paper will explicate the technological innovation and adoption in China amidst the crisis through an analysis of a survey conducted as part of the research. Snowball sampling has been undertaken in selecting the sample population of interviewees and respondents. A special emphasis on preventing sample bias (through ensuring anonymity in academic and professional networking) has been undertaken. The study utilizes a mixed method approach using both qualitative and quantitative tools. The qualitative facets focus on cases studies and textual analysis, while quantitative facets focus on empirical data collection through disbursement of an online/digital survey questionnaire among a sample population in the PRC identified through snowball sampling between January and May 2021.

The surveys include interviews with experts and other stakeholders in policy institutions and industry across China. This study offers insights on the disruptions caused by COVID-19 in China. It also highlights the ripple effect and disruptions in the global supply chain which resulted from these impacts in China. The paper reviews the impact of the Great Reset on China during the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically during 2020-2021, explicating the overall trend of market demand, deteriorating condition of corporate debts, and economic constraints on the population, i.e., savings rate, consumption, and social security. The survey focuses on the impact, adoption and implications of emergent technologies across 63 businesses, companies, start-ups, institutions, organisations and enterprises involved in 56 types of industries, categories, services and/or related operations in China. The responses bring to the fore valuable insights on the impact and implications of emergent technologies across companies, enterprises, institutions, organisations and start-ups in China, particularly focusing on innovation and adoption of technologies. Further, steps have been taken to

prevent or reduce, the instances of, investigator bias⁵ and, to a large extent, problems related to social desirability bias⁶.

3 China's response to the 'Great Reset'

Due to the impact of the Great Reset, China's primary response focus has been on production and healthcare, which has included stimulus packages, tax holidays, incentives, and other related institutional efforts (IMF, 2020). The institutional efforts have focused on encouraging the corporate sector, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and individuals to ease "the tax and fee burden on industries" that were heavily hit (Mingfang, 2020). A special fund of 110.48 billion RMB (15.48 billion USD) was designated for combating the negative economic impacts (Cruz-Cárdenas et al., 2021; Aljazeera, 2020). By early March 2020, about 65 per cent of funds were allocated towards efforts to directly dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, China declared exemptions from VAT and administrative fees, as well as kept fiscal and monetary policy responsive to entail cash flow for "key companies" to fight the COVID-19 pandemic. The civilians (including donors) and health professionals involved in fighting COVID-19 were exempt from income tax (Mingfang, 2020).

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) continued to encourage economic activities by foreign-based companies in PRC while emphasizing increasing the activities related to monitoring and assessment by the local authorities. The NDRC allotted 300 million Yuan (42.03 million USD) in the budget as an emergency investment for medical equipment and facilities for "centralized patients, centralized experts, centralized resources, and centralized treatment" (KPMG International, 2020a). This was mainly centered around the Wuhan Huoshen Mountain Hospital and Wuhan Leishen Mountain Hospital. In February 2020, the State Administration of Taxation released the "Guidelines for Preferential Tax Policies for the Prevention and Control of the Epidemic Pneumonia Caused by Novel Coronavirus Infection", which essentially emphasized tax reliefs related to COVID-19-related contributions. The Ministry of Finance of the PRC provided subsidies amounting to 99.5 billion Yuan (13.94 billion USD), of which 25.56 per cent was provided by the Centre (Ibid.).

⁵ It is a term used to refer to situations in which researchers convey to research participants in subtle or unconscious ways the results or patterns the researcher would prefer to see (Sage Research Methods, 2020).

⁶ The tendency to respond to questions in a socially acceptable manner (Sage Research Methods, 2020).

In the early months of Q1 (2020), the People's Bank of China (PBOC) took measures to enable and potentially "guarantee sufficient liquidity and offer financial support" to provide stability as well as fight the COVID-19 pandemic. These measures were taken in the direction of enabling a "bounce-back" in the face of a sharp decline in growth and development. Besides enabling the PBOC to have "regulatory forbearance," as a supplement the Central Bank could also increase the lending by domestic banks, reduce the pressure on external borrowing and thus keep the debt levels at manageable levels (CGTN, 2020b; 2020c). Further, based on 2020 Announcement No. 5, PRC announced relaxation and clearance for the export of medical supplies based on declarations and compliance of companies to standards approved by the National Medical Products Administration (NMPA) in China. In addition, green channels were set up for donated goods, tax reductions facilitated, and exemptions from procedures (like simplification of the inspection process) were also made available. There were further relief and exemptions on import duties, VAT, and the consumption tax. It also deferred (any) additional tariffs on US-origin goods for COVID-19 prevention (KPMG International, 2020a).

Besides "tax policies and financial relief measures" to reduce the economic impact of COVID-19, the Ministry of Finance in China also supported companies-based in China by focusing on increasing consumption rather than investment with the expectation that this could initiate revival and stabilization of the Chinese economy (CGTN, 2020a; 2020b). The PBOC lowered the RMB loan prime rate (LPR), the preferential lending rate provided by commercial banks. This mostly supports countries to move towards pre-crisis levels. According to Jacqueline Rong, a senior economist at BNP Paribas, the cuts to five-year LPR "could be interpreted as 'counter-cyclical relaxation' in the housing sector" (Zhou and Galbraith, 2020; ICBC, 2020). Commercial interest rates were lowered while increasing fiscal subsidies were expected to reduce real interest rates (Mingfang, 2020).

In the realm of labour policy, the Ministry of Finance "cut social insurance payments by RMB 1 trillion" for companies. As of late January 2020, workers' compensation and subsidies were announced as well. In terms of trade restrictions, "refund of unemployment insurance premiums" were provided to companies (with temporary difficulties) in major cities, namely Shanghai, Beijing and Guangdong (KPMG International, 2020a). More than six million migrant workers have reportedly returned to Guangdong province, which accounted for one-third of all migrant workers (Ibid.). According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, the agricultural sector saw a 3.5 percent year-on-year (YoY) record growth in terms of value addition (Xinhua, 2020b). This provides a considerable spur to the availability of raw materials

to industries, food security, poverty alleviation, and employment generation in the country. Agriculture thus seems to have emerged as an area where surplus labour could be diverted to be absorbed, thus provide viable financial stability to the population. Besides its goal of “self-reliance” (zi li geng sheng) and “indigenous innovation” (zizhu chuangxin) (Appelbaum et al., 2018: 45-71), PRC could focus on cooperation with countries of the Global North and enhancing South-South cooperation, could increase the inflow of capital and reduce the stress on household savings as well as consumption within PRC.

In order to increase banking liquidity, in February, the PBOC launched a “public market reverse repurchase operation” worth 1.2 trillion Yuan (170 billion USD). It also issued special re-loans and interest discount support to enterprises, as well as a medium-term lending facility (MLF) worth 200 billion Yuan. A seven-days reverse repo of 100 billion Yuan (14.01 billion USD) was provided to increase activities towards prevention and control of the COVID-19 pandemic at the grassroot-level. In March 2020, the PBOC announced a reduction in the mandatory reserve ratio of banks. This increased the liquidity to about 550 billion Yuan (77.6 billion USD). Additionally, an announcement for the opening of more than three-fourths of significant construction sites was undertaken. This could be a more reliable form of spurring growth, with the potential to rejuvenate and provide spillover effects on to other sectors as well. There was an announcement of the package supporting the digitalization of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Further, the State Council Executive meeting decided to reduce and exempt corporate social insurance fees (especially for SME's) in a phased manner, except for Hubei province. This was emphasized, especially in regard to “endowment insurance, unemployment insurance and industrial injury insurance” until April, and a housing fund payment until June 2020 was provided (KPMG International, 2020a).

In April, through the Budget 2020-21, China adopted measures like tax reliefs and exemption from value added tax (VAT). It is also provided incentives for corporation income tax (CIT) as well as VAT and provided “[l]onger tax loss carry-forward period (from five to eight years)” for companies affected by (as well as working directly to tackle) COVID-19. This also provided for imports and donations for the “prevention and control of the epidemic” (Announcement No. 6), besides the extension of the “statutory tax filing deadline (Circular 19). The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security in PRC issued Announcement No. 7, which provided guidelines and policies for local social security bureaus and enterprises to deal with COVID-19. Furthermore, Announcement No. 9 and Announcement No. 10 provided tax relief and exemptions to individual taxpayers and donations. In terms of

fiscal policy, the Ministry of Finance retained five percent more tax revenue for local governments from March-June 2020. This is estimated to provide additional revenue of 110 billion RMB (16 billion USD). Moreover, additional quota bonds amounting to 1.2 trillion RMB (170 billion USD) was allotted, which saw a jump by two-thirds of the original quota (KPMG International, 2020b; Global Times, 2020).

By the end of the Third Session of 13th National People's Congress (NPC) in May 2020, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang emphasized that MSMEs "now provide over 90 percent of all jobs in China today." The Chinese State, it was posited, will look towards providing "vital relief to businesses and revitalize the markets," which according to Premier Li, the "money invested in the people will be able to generate new wealth, help protect and preserve tax sources, and make public finance more sustainable" (Xinhua, 2020c; 2020d; Han, 2020). The strategy ensured that the PRC would be focusing more on "targeted measures instead of massive stimulus to boost economic growth," as China would be focusing on viable responses to any new emergencies and critical conditions that may arise. According to Premier Li:

Just as water is important to fish farming, sufficient liquidity is important to economic development... But excessive liquidity will induce froth in the marketplace where some people may attempt to muddy the waters and fish for arbitrage. [PRC will also] implement the foreign investment law, shorten the negative list for foreign investment, further open up the service sector, and improve the business environment (Ibid.).

In the "two sessions" (lianghui) of May 2020, the central bank representatives, as well as the report of the Standing Committee of the NPC, entailed a revision to the Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banking Law. The current proposals pertain to the implementation of classification supervision, expansion of business scope, strengthening of corporate governance, risk disposal and market exit mechanisms, protection of consumer rights and interests, internal management, and enhancement of regulatory effectiveness. There have been suggestions to let go of restrictions as well as operational limitations of commercial banks under Article 3, and on comprehensive banking (li quanmian yinhang lei) and mixed banking operations (yinhang hun ye jingying) under Article 43 of the law. Meanwhile, the Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission's recommended upgrading standards and procedures in the banking sector (Li, 2020).

Besides the thrust on monetary and fiscal responsiveness, the PRC has specifically entailed on enabling (pro)active global cooperation through

multilateral platforms (Xi, 2020). Moreover, the Chinese President Xi Jinping has asserted the need for “innovation of institutional integration” to enable “bold innovations and [to] ensure enduring progress” (Xinhua, 2020a). This will be a significant primer in providing PRC’s advancements in the high-technology sector, directly linked with achieving ‘Great Power Status’ on the economic front. PRC’s focus has always pertained to the emphasis on policies and strategies that adhere to “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics... Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era... and realizing the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation” (Wang, 2019: 19). These include the five-sphere integrated plan, namely “to promote coordinated economic, political, cultural, social and ecological advancement,” as well as the four-pronged comprehensive strategy: “to finish building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, deepen reform, advance law-based governance, and strengthen Party self-governance” (Ibid.: 1)⁷. Besides the measures in industrial, trade, fiscal, and monetary policy outlined earlier, there have been continuing steps towards further fostering multilateral institutional cooperation.

Globally, there has been an increasing call from multilateral and international agencies for support, cooperation and “collective action in global health governance” (Jin and Karackattu, 2011). These also include the effective use of United Nations (UN) and related institutions, the WTO to stabilize, liberalize and facilitate the multilateral trading system as well as other regional groupings of which China is part of. The UN released 15 million USD from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) to support the global campaign to contain the COVID-19 pandemic. This is expected to be channeled through the WHO and UNICEF to undertake “essential activities” in affected countries. The WHO has called for the constitution of a 675 million USD fund to fight COVID-19 (WHO, 2020c). This is besides undertaking activities “to contain the spread of the virus.” Moreover, the focus is currently on “strengthening surveillance, conducting thorough outbreak investigations to identify contacts and applying appropriate measures to prevent [the] further spread” (Youde, 2018; WHO, 2020c).

4 Survey findings

Technology innovation and adoption in China during COVID-19 pandemic

The unprecedented manifestation of COVID-19 during the course

⁷ Delivered at the Second Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference on 3 March 2019.

of research has revealed how unforeseen transformations are occurring in countries where COVID-19 has exposed economies (and healthcare systems therein) across the globe (Freed et al., 2020; Gülseven, 2021; Ullah et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2020; 2021; Cruz-Cárdenas et al., 2021) to an entirely unforeseen situation⁸ (McKee and Stuckler, 2020; Ayittey et al., 2020; Nicola et al., 2020). The pandemic tested the competitive edge and the capacity of Chinese companies to explore new markets “due to the disruptions to the global supply chain” (WTO, 2020; Albertoni and Wise, 2021; Umair et al., 2021).

Numerous scholarly literature and work have focused on the impacts of COVID-19 pandemic for mobile payments, digital healthcare, location services, education, electric cars, digital nativity amongst university faculties, and consumer behaviour and so on (Zhao and Bacao, 2021; Wang et al., 2021; Guo et al., 2021; Zhang and Bray, 2021; Hu et al., 2021; Zhao and Zhao, 2021; Cruz- Cárdenas et al., 2021). This paper incorporates a unique survey in that an effort has been made to gauge the implementation of emergent (digital) technologies in China – specifically, technology innovation and adoption. To do this, a bilingual questionnaire in simplified Chinese and English was circulated among 130 respondents from 63 companies, start-ups, businesses, institutions, organisations and enterprises involved in 56 types/categories of industries, services and/or related operations in China.

The industries and/or related operations included: Artificial Intelligence, Automobile, Autonomous Vehicles, Banking, Bicycles, Branding, Business, Business Intelligence, Consultancy, Cryptocurrency, Data Analytics, Design, Digital assets, Digital Marketing, Digital Services, Digital Technology, Economy, Education, Electrical, Electronics, Energy, Equity Market, Export-Import, Finance, Fintech, Fitness, Healthcare, Human Resources, Internet technology, Investment, Information Technology (IT), Law, Logistics, Merger and Acquisitions (M&A), Machine Learning (ML), Manufacturing, Media, Media Intelligence, Medicine, Multimedia, Music, Naming, Recruitment, Renewables, Research, Robotics, Smart Homes, Social Networking Service, Sourcing, Sporting Goods, Telecom, Tourism, Trade, Travel, Video-on-demand, and Website Designing (Table 1). The survey was administered online owing to COVID-19 travel restrictions globally, between January 2021 and May 2021.

⁸ The “Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a new strain of [the] CoV family of viruses” (WHO, 2020a; 2020b) that is currently causing the largest number of virus-infected deaths ever seen in the 21st century. COVID-19 was declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) by the “Emergency Committee” convened by the World Health Organisation (WHO) (Ibid.; Guo et al., 2021).

Table 1: Respondent affiliations (based in China)

Businesses/ Companies/ Organizations/ Start-ups/ Institutions/ Council	Category/ Industry/ Service
AGS Group	Healthcare
ANewR Consulting Ltd	Consultancy/Digital Services
Ant Group	Fintech/Banking/Finance
Baidu	Internet technology/AI/ML/AV
Bank of China (HK)	Banking
Becoming 99	Website Designing/Multimedia
BIPO Service	Human Resources
Brainsway	Healthcare
Bytedance	Internet Technology/AI/ML
Caixin Global	Media
China Anglo Education Consultancy	Education/Consultancy
China Britain Business Council	Trade/Investment
China Central Television (CCTV)	Media
China Central Television Plus (CCTV+)	Media/Video-on-demand
Chinatimes	Media
Chiyu Banking Corporation Limited	Banking/Finance
Cosgrove Nigeria	Smart Homes/Digital technology/AI/ML
Deepwisdom	AI/ML
Dun & Bradstreet	Data Analytics/ Business Intelligence
EDC Global (Business Group)	Export-Import/Research/Logistics
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China	Business/Economy
Fahrrad-XXL Group GmbH	Bicycles/Fitness/Sporting Goods
FBA Sourcing China	Sourcing/Logistics
FinTeX Holding Group Inc	Telecom/Finance/Energy/Healthcare
FluentSoon	Education
Foo Bar	IT
GOIP Aula Ltd	Telecom
Guangzhou Puppy Robot Technology Co., Ltd. (Beijing Branch)	Robotics/AI/ML
Headhunter China	Recruitment/Human Resources
Homesun Technology Ltd	Export/Manufacturing
Huobi Global	Cryptocurrency/Digital assets

IAUSS	Education
IM2CHINA	Digital Marketing/Branding
International Carbide Technology Co. Ltd.	Manufacturing
JiZhuangke Inc	Website Designing/Multimedia
Labbrand Group	Branding/Naming
LMU-China Academic Network (LMU-ChAN)	Education/Research
Ministry of Energy/ National Energy Commission	Energy
Netease Inc	Internet technology
Novartis	Medicine
Parsons Music Corporation	Music/Manufacturing
PCE Power China Ltd.	Renewables/Energy
Performars Inc.	Business/Digital Marketing/Branding
Psonerh Creative Investment Management Beijing Co. Ltd.	Investment/Banking
Seltech International	Electronics/Electrical/Manufacturing
Shanghai Osens Creative Co., Ltd	Education/Design
Sino Health International Business Co., Ltd	Healthcare
sMedia	Automobile/Digital Technology
South China Morning Pos	Media
Storymaker China	Design
Suning Holdings Group Co. Ltd	Investment/Equity Market
Telum Media	Media Intelligence/Research
The Globe and Mail	Media
The Mandarin Lab	Education
The Paper (newspaper)	Media
The Teh Group	Media
TikTok	Social Networking Service
Universal Beijing Resort	Tourism
University of Hong Kong	Education
Valuetang	Investment/Law/Media/M&A
WildChina	Travel/Tourism
Xinhua News agency	Media
Zh travel	Travel/Tourism

Source: Compiled by the Author

To the question: “Since the Coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak began, how have the business activities been affected?”

- about 55 per cent of the respondents felt that there had been a negative impact of COVID-19 on the operations of businesses and companies in China.

- about 10 per cent of the respondents felt that the situation had worsened while 18 per cent of the respondents felt that business activities have been positive since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In response to the question: “In the last five years, how was your company/organisation/enterprises’ adoption of technologies?”

- an overwhelming 85 per cent of respondents perceived that the innovation and adoption of existing and emergent technologies in companies, organisations, institutions, start-ups and enterprises in China have been on the rise.

To the question: “What is the trend of your organisation’s total, enterprise-wide revenue spent on digital technologies?”

- 61% of the respondents reported that the organisation’s total, enterprise-wide revenue that has been spent on digital technologies has increased, while a minuscule number of respondents (less than two per cent) reported a decrease in spending.

For the macro-picture, in response to the question: “What share of your organisation’s total, enterprise-wide revenue is spent on digital technologies?”

- 19 per cent of respondents reported up to 10 per cent of the share of the organisation’s total revenue is spent on digital technologies,

- 11 per cent of the respondents reported it to be between 21 per cent to 30 per cent,

- 6 per cent of the respondents reported it to be between 11 per cent to 20 per cent,

- close to five per cent of the respondents reported it to be more than 30 per cent.

Interestingly, to the question: “Which of the following types of risks does your organization consider relevant to its adoption of technology?”

- 62 % of respondents answered that cybersecurity is the biggest risk to innovation and the adoption of technologies, followed by issues relating to regulatory compliance and personal/individual privacy with 41% each.

- Around 31% felt that the organizational reputation would be affected, while almost a quarter of respondents felt that the displacement of the strength

(25.78%) and explainability⁹ (25%) would be the main risks for innovation and technology adoption during this period.

- Nearly 17 per cent of the respondents felt that national security and equity and fairness¹⁰ would be the most affected aspect in relation to the impact on technological innovation and adoption.

- An equally insightful response was that of roughly 13 per cent of the respondents, who felt physical safety requirements¹¹ (of new technology and its adoption) would be a huge risk with the innovation and adoption of technologies.

- Interestingly, less than 9% of respondents considered that political stability has become a prominent issue and/or is relevant to the adoption of technology in a company and/or organization.

To the question: “To date, how successful has your organization been at meeting its targets for technology initiatives?”

- 76 per cent felt that Chinese companies, institutions, start-ups and enterprises have been successful in meeting targets for technology initiatives, while less than per cent of the respondents reported being unsuccessful in meeting their targets for technology initiatives.

To the question: “How do you expect the size of your organization’s enterprise-wide investment in technology to change, if not all, over the next three years?”

- Nearly 76.74 per cent of the respondents felt that there would be an increase in investment for technological innovation, adoption and adaptation over the next three years, while around three per cent of the respondents expected a decrease in investment for the next three years.

5 Going Forward

In the era of social distancing and loss of human-manual labour, industrial robotics will revolutionize export-dependent countries like China. An important reason for this was the decline in exports even during the pre-COVID period. The ‘robotic revolution’ gained momentum in PRC, particularly

⁹ Risk of inability to explain why a certain decision was made. It is mostly important in the adoption of AI/ML technologies, algorithms and processes. This is important in decision-making for companies, enterprises and startups that utilise technology-related processes to determine their actions and activities in the market.

¹⁰ Risks associated with the issues of in economic gains.

¹¹ Risk of physical injury to people or damage to equipment from the adoption of new technologies. This is very important for automation-related technologies and the risk for workers and their safety requirements.

in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (Yu and Sharif, 2017). Xu Zhigang, a researcher at the Shenyang Institute of Automation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), opined how about one-fourth of ammunition factories in China saw “smart machines” replace manual labour. This reduced the number of accident-related hazards and exposures to human workers. It improved the safety of workers and increased the profits of companies in the sector. With the integration of artificial intelligence (AI), the production tripled, the productivity increased up to five times, and a peak level of performance for efficiency. Interestingly, this scenario has led to the creation of new type of jobs like “control optimization, hardware maintenance and technical upgrades” (Leary, 2018).

China is one of the world leaders to embrace the industrialization wave that is linked to robotics. A decline in exports was evident in many countries, mainly due to the burgeoning increase in labour costs as well as growing concerns over workers’ safety among companies and other institutional actors. Countries such as China, that were more reliant on exports, were more concerned about this, while USA and other West European countries were increasingly concerned about bringing back investment and manufacturing-based capital back into the countries (Yu and Sharif, 2017). According to estimates, vast imports of industrial robots have been shipped to PRC, which accounts for nearly one-third of the total worldwide (IFR, 2017; Sun and Zhang, 2018). The recent strides and developments show signs of China’s progress to becoming a global leader in industrial robotics in the upcoming decades. China has also begun exporting industrial robots for countries focusing on the transition from labour-intensive to capital-intensive manufacturing. Being one of the top exporters of industrial robots will unequivocally strengthen PRC’s role in its aspirations towards ‘multilateral economic governance’ and its reforms.

6 Conclusion

There has been a decline in overall market demand in the PRC, causing a dip in the global FDI growth rate and exports for the during the COVID pandemic. The impact on Chinese banks have created a fiscal imbalance and have a significant negative impact on infrastructure development and the labour industry, along with the deteriorating condition of corporate debts poses further challenge to the Chinese economy. In addition to these, job-losses related to COVID-19, coupled with the decline in the global demand, has imposed economic constraints on the population, increased precautionary savings rate, muted consumption, and weakened the sense of social security. All of these can create long term conditions for recession within China, with

implications for the world, exacerbating the effects of the 'Great Reset'.

For the first time in decades, China is facing issues related to negative growth in many of its sectors. The allegations of 'biological warfare' or 'quasi-economic warfare' due to the current COVID-19 pandemic crisis still creates hindrances for China's foreign relations. This is not a situation in which the CPC or its leadership wants to have the Chinese economy lingering amidst the effects of the 'Great Reset'. The PRC has engaged in furthering fiscal stimulus packages domestically, incentivizing production, and undertaking reforms of the economy in challenging circumstances since 2020. Moreover, China has (and should) focus on increasing (technological) innovation and related research to assert itself in the high-technology sector.

The survey undertaken during the study analysed the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on innovation, adoption and integration of digital technologies in China. As per the survey, COVID-19 hugely impacted businesses, enterprises, companies, and organisations in China, negatively even as digitalisation activities and the innovation and adoption of existing and emergent technologies have concurrently been on the rise. More importantly, there have been various risks and challenges in regard to the innovation and adoption of technology, which include cybersecurity, regulatory compliance, privacy, organisational reputation (branding), workforce/labour displacement, and challenges to decision-making through technology, national security, equity and fairness, physical safety and political stability. Interestingly, projected investment in technological innovation, adoption and adaptation over the coming years shows an increasing trend.

Overall, the Great Reset has a severe impact on the Chinese economy, creating serious implications domestically, and on the global supply chain; overall exports have dropped to the US, the European Union, East Asia, and some countries within South Asia and to some extent in Southeast Asia. Domestic demand and consumption played an essential role in maintaining as well as promoting growth and development in China. So far, the internal domestic factors that could create hindering blocks in dealing with the COVID-19 crisis. This includes issues related to ineffective fiscal policy (at the provincial-level) as well as lack of transparent financial institutions (at the national-level). The external factors seem to exacerbate the current situation, both internally as well as in the supply chain. These include the slowdown of export-oriented manufacturing in China due to issues related to domestic constraints and a decline in global demand, which can exacerbate due to increasing tensions with the US.

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ABSTRACT

The Great Reset has had a severe impact on the Chinese economy, with implications domestically, and on the global supply chain. One consequence has been the decline in the overall market demand in China, with a significant negative impact on infrastructure development and the labour industry. A unique aspect is a survey is to analyze the impact of COVID-19 on innovation and integration of digital technologies in China. The authors analyse the impact of the Great Reset on the Chinese economy, the implications on the supply chains that China is a crucial part of, and the global implications thereof.

KEYWORDS

Great Reset; China; COVID-19.

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U.S. GRAND STRATEGY IN THE EARLY COLD WAR: PRIORITIES, CONCERNS AND POLICY ACTIONS

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1 Introduction

During the last years of the Second World War, the allied cooperation could not continue with the rise of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union over the postwar vision of international order. The global U.S. strategy in the early Cold War was formulated with Washington having an unmatched power to shape postwar security and economic architecture on the international stage. The gross national product of the United States increased by 60 percent during the war as American war production enabled Washington to come out of the depression and build the greatest military and economic power in the world. In this context, U.S. policymakers embarked upon a global endeavor to shape postwar economic and security architecture. However, U.S. and Soviet policymakers confronted serious frictions over their opposing postwar visions where U.S.-Soviet security competition accelerated during the early Cold War.

The question remains whether U.S. priorities for the postwar international system were to shape the postwar order in America's image and avoid the grounds that made way for economic nationalism and global depression in the 1930s. Or were U.S. policymakers in the early Cold War years preoccupied with Soviet capability and intent to shape postwar security order against American interests on the global stage? The research aims to identify U.S. concerns and priorities in the immediate post-WWII era. The study is focused on exploring the primary American considerations while formulating a grand strategy during the early Cold War. The paper addresses the question that were Washington's policy choices during the last stages of the Second World War and early Cold War primarily being driven by Soviet

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expansion in Eastern Europe.

The study is qualitative in nature and uses exploratory research because the existing literature on the early Cold War does not sufficiently explain the rationale for American policymakers to adopt a global role. The research also incorporates content analysis by reading official documents, government sources and transcripts of speeches by American officials to make sense of how the U.S. Cold War policy was framed and justified. The sources for the work include: academic books on U.S.-Soviet relations and the history of U.S. foreign policy toward Moscow, peer-reviewed research articles and book chapters published by scholars of U.S. foreign policy toward Soviet Union; reports published by various non-partisan thinktanks, trusted news publications and international institutions; and legislative activity and foreign policy debates noted by the Congressional Research Service and different government sources.

The study argues that the economic horrors of the 1930s and the intense security competition in Europe and Asia that threatened American security in the Second World War made U.S. policymakers in the postwar world to play a central role in the reshaping of the international order conducive to the American principles and values. Washington's active diplomatic role in the making of international institutions – Bretton Woods System (1944), United Nations (1945), European Recovery Program (1947) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947) – to preserve peace and economic security was facilitated by the unmatched extent of U.S. power and influence on the international stage, where other centers of power were tremendously devastated due to a prolonged global war.

The ambition of the Soviet Union to maximize security gains in Europe and ensure a favorable geopolitical landscape for Moscow's security and influence after 1945 also provoked Washington's active postwar economic and security initiatives for the European continent and the rest of the world. However, the formulation of the U.S. grand strategy was driven by factors not entirely shaped by Soviet expansion. Therefore, the U.S. role in reshaping the postwar environment started before the start of the Cold War – when WWII had not ended and when Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe was not entirely visible during the diplomacy of war.

2 American Diplomacy during the War: U.S. Planning for the Postwar Vision

The U.S. diplomatic efforts during WWII indicated the intent to shape the postwar order in America's image. Iriye (2013, 200-6) has shown

how President Franklin Roosevelt's diplomacy of war laid the grounds for Washington's active participation in postwar international affairs through serious planning with the allies in the making of institutional architecture for the postwar peace. Even in the first phase of the war, American policymakers – through the signing of the Atlantic Charter (1941) – started imagining a vision of peace that would follow the victory of the Allied powers. As early as May 1942, Roosevelt suggested the notion of “four policemen” (the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain and China) to carry out ‘big-power’ cooperation for global security after victory (Iriye 1981, 53-4). Serious planning for addressing postwar issues was seen among the ‘big three’ allied powers headed by Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill. The three leaders actively engaged in the postwar planning at the conferences held in Tehran (December 1943) – where the Allied leaders discussed matters of German territory and its potential occupation zones to be administered by the Allies – and Yalta (February 1945) – where the future of Germany, Eastern Europe and United Nations came under consideration. Other than the great power diplomacy in the second phase of the war, American wartime institutional initiatives also played a significant role in shaping the economic and political pillars of the postwar order.

Washington's ambitious endeavor to reestablish an international economic order – after it had been ruined by the economic nationalism following the Great Depression of the 1930s – was directed to carry out economic cooperation through intergovernmental consensus. At the Bretton Woods Conference (July 1944), the American initiative in cooperation with other nations actualized the making of an integrated, interdependent and open world economic order characterized by two institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, later named as World Bank). The former was aimed at assisting countries facing trade and exchange crises so that they would not revert to the economic nationalism of prewar years of economic depression and protectionism; the World Bank was also a step toward economic internationalism through the reconstruction and development of countries undertaking economic transformation after the destruction of war. These economic initiatives were made to avert the conditions and consequences of the economic collapse witnessed in the 1930s. When economic nationalism, regional autarkies, and trade protectionism made fertile grounds for extremist ideologies to thrive and threaten the stability of international order in the 1930s, the U.S. did not play a role in mitigating, let alone addressing, the global economic and financial meltdown of the prewar years. But, in the postwar world, the U.S. was willing to develop an institutional mechanism for

economic exchange and international trade under Washington's patronage. As Iriye (2013, 211) describes the American initiative for the postwar economic order: "Here clearly was a lesson of the Depression well learned. The [American] nation would not again revert to economic nationalism but would, on the contrary, take the lead in the spirit of economic internationalism".

The Soviet participation and constructive engagement during the Tehran, Yalta and Bretton Woods conferences showed Moscow's interest in remaining part of the cooperative postwar international arrangement. However, two major changes considerably impacted the allied cooperation enhanced by the common war aims shared by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. First, in 1945, with Roosevelt's demise in April and the German surrender in May, the Allies questioned that how they could sustain their cooperation for the postwar international order when the expected victors were tempted to go their separate ways (even opposing ways on defeating Japan) when the common German threat was gone. In July 1945, when the 'big three' allies met in Potsdam (with Harry Truman replacing Roosevelt in April and Churchill getting replaced by Clement Attlee during the conference), Stalin reaffirmed his Yalta pledge to join the war against Japan after three months of German defeat – though potential Soviet participation was not seen desirable by the new Truman administration and became a source of straining the wartime coalition (Iriye 2013, 213). The U.S. had already terminated lend-lease shipments to Moscow before the Potsdam Conference, where the Allies rebuffed Soviet trusteeship in the Mediterranean as well as Moscow's demands for war reparations and bases in the Turkish straits (Pechatnov 2010, 95-6).

Second, after the Potsdam Conference, Truman decided to use atomic bombs on Japan in early August 1945 to bring a speedy end to the conflict and seek leverage to shape the postwar peace according to American desires. The American president believed that the atomic bomb – the presence and efficacy of which he had conveyed to Stalin during the Potsdam Conference – would enhance the U.S. ability to seek concessions from the Soviets in the diplomacy of the postwar world (Leffler 2010, 70). David Halloway has argued that Truman's use of the atomic bomb was rightly perceived by Stalin as an "anti-Soviet move" designed to deprive the Soviet Union of strategic gains in the Far East and, more generally, to give the United States the upper hand in defining the postwar settlement. Halloway notes that "His [Truman's] primary purpose was surely to force Japan to surrender, but he also believed that the bomb would help him in his dealings with Iosif V. Stalin. That latter consideration was secondary, but it confirmed his decision" (Halloway 2010, 377). With the disappearance of the common German enemy, conflicting versions about postwar settlement in Japan and considerably opposing views

on Germany produced Soviet-American tensions well before Stalin's postwar expansion in Eastern Europe.

3 The Soviet Challenge and America's Global Strategy of Containment

Washington's active diplomatic role in shaping the postwar political and economic order was facilitated by the unmatched extent of U.S. power and influence on the international stage, where other centers of power were tremendously devastated due to a prolonged global war. U.S. had 50 percent of the world's GDP in 1945 after winning a war that was not fought on its territory. In 1945, the United States had two-thirds of the world's gold reserves, three-fourths of its invested capital, half of its shipping vessels, and half of its manufacturing capacity (Leffler 2010, 67). Despite the unmatched extent of U.S. power, Leffler has argued that American leadership did not feel secure and feared that the U.S. would again sink into depression. The interwar era, as argued above, preoccupied Truman and his advisors, who were committed to not allowing potential adversaries to gain control of the "resources of Europe and Asia through economic practices, political subversion, or military aggression," as witnessed in the 1930s and early 1940s (Leffler 2010, 68).

On the other hand, as Pechatnov (2010, 90) has argued, the Soviet Union gained new heights of strategic and political influence with the defeat of Japan and Germany. Although USSR was devastated more than any other country due to the Second World War, the Soviet model gained greater prestige by effectively resisting the Nazi war juggernaut. In addition, Soviet troops' presence on European soil, the growth of Communist and left-wing political parties in Eastern Europe, and the strengthening of new liberation movements in Asia opened new avenues for expanding Soviet influence (Pechatnov 2010, 90). Meanwhile, the question of a divided Germany had preoccupied Stalin even during the last stages of the war due to Germany's strategic location, historical role and economic importance for reviving the European economy and seeking war reparations. However, security concerns remained paramount in the Kremlin's thinking, for which Stalin envisioned a glacis of "friendly states" along the USSR's western border through the "popular front" strategy (Pechatnov 2010, 92-3). Seeking lessons from the European war effort in WWI and WWII – when Russia's fragile defense was breached due to easily penetrable borders – Moscow pushed for the depth of its defense through the consolidation of the security sphere constituted by satellite states in Eastern Europe.

At the end of 1945, the Truman administration got embittered by

Soviet action in Eastern Europe, where, according to Leffler, Truman wanted a tougher policy as he “ridiculed the “police states” that the Kremlin was forming in Bulgaria and Romania and condemned the Soviets’ refusal to withdraw their troops from Iran” – as they were obligated to do. Truman noted: “There isn’t any doubt in my mind that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean ... I do not think we should play compromise any longer ... I’m tired of babying the Soviets” (Ferrell 1980, 54). In mid-1946, Stalin delayed troop withdrawal from Iran and mobilized Soviet troops on the Turkish border to build pressure and seek control of the Black Sea straits – only to compromise on both occasions after the Allies remained firm against the Soviet stance. Noting Stalin’s lack of long-term strategic planning, Pechatnov notes: “He [Stalin] provoked the consolidation of a British–American bloc against the USSR and pushed Iran and Turkey toward the West”.

The future of a divided Germany, Moscow’s growing political influence in Eastern Europe through the establishment of pro-Soviet states, and economic desperation that raised the fears of socialist discontent and greater Soviet influence in the war-torn Europe occupied Truman’s urgent and consistent attention. As early as May 1945, Washington’s heightened threat perception regarding Communist influence in Europe was elevated further due to dismal economic conditions in Europe. U.S. assistant secretary of war, John J. McCloy, had expected the resultant chaos while writing to President Truman that there would be “pestilence and famine in Central Europe next winter. This is likely to be followed by political revolution and Communist infiltration” (McCloy 1945). Assistant secretary of state, Dean Acheson, soon to become Truman’s most trusted advisor, had also warned that the industrial and social life of Europe “had come to a complete and total standstill” (Acheson 1945, 19-21). As the Communist influence was growing on the war-ravaged continent facing economic turmoil, Britain had to curtail its presence where Communist spread was felt the most – in Greece, where Communist rebels were fighting a civil war; and in Turkey, where Communist guerrillas were waging an insurgency.

As Walter LaFeber (1994, 469) argues, the Truman administration, in its intent to reshape the international order according to Washington’s postwar vision, responded to these issues by using “counterforce” to Soviet assertiveness on the European continent while integrating important strategic centers of power (Western Europe and Japan) within the American economic and security umbrella. Such a policy, crafted by the State Department’s best-known expert on Russian affairs, George Kennan, called for the long-term containment of the Soviet Union when, in Winston Churchill’s words, “an

iron curtain” descended upon Europe. Kennan’s view of the Soviet Union was based on his perception of Stalin as a “neurotic” preoccupied with the “traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.” However, Kremlin leaders, according to Kennan, were “highly sensitive to logic of force” even if they were “impervious to the logic of reason” (Kennan 1946). Therefore, Soviet expansion, in Kennan’s view, could be contained by the long-term application of a containment struggle with Moscow that Truman and his advisors were willing to undertake. Kennan’s words were widely circulated in foreign policy circles as his analysis was very much in line with the instincts of Truman, who, in March 1947, asked Congress for \$400 million in military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey to curtail Communist influence.

In what became known as the Truman Doctrine (March 1947), he divided the world between “free peoples” and governments that “relied upon terror and oppression” (McCullough 1992, 547–49). Truman stated in stark language that:

If we were to turn our back on the world, areas such as Greece, weakened and divided as a result of the war, would fall into the Soviet orbit without much effort on the part of the Russians. The success of Russia in such areas and our avowed lack of interest would lead to the growth of domestic Communist parties in such European countries as France and Italy, where there were already significant threats (Truman 1947).

Dean Acheson echoed this thinking with his “rotten apple theory” (later to be called the “domino theory” also stated by President Dwight Eisenhower) warned that if the United States backed away, “like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all of the East.” The “infection” could communize Africa, then Europe, until the United States virtually stood alone (Rotter 2000).

To revive the European (and particularly German) economy for postwar economic recovery, limiting Soviet strategic influence in Europe and mitigating the prospects of right-wing ideologies that capitalized on economic turmoil in the 1930s, the Truman administration announced the European Recovery Program (1947). This economic and strategic program for reviving European economies and constraining Communist parties from capitalizing on the continent’s economic disarray sought economic integration and greater strategic convergence between Washington and European capitals. The plan was part of the larger containment goal of keeping the European and Asian power centers outside the Soviet orbit and linking them to the United States. Another lesson from the 1930s that U.S. policymakers applied to the

postwar recovery was the making of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947) to boost international trade by keeping it open and free (LaFeber 1994, 458). Simultaneously, Washington used the rationale of ‘economic recovery against potential Communist infiltration’ to take initiatives aimed at resuscitating Japan economically in 1948-50. American policymakers feared that poor economic conditions might play into the hands of Japan’s leftists, with Communists making rapid advances in neighboring China. In this light, the Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote that “Japs will either move toward sound friendly relations with non-commie countries or into association with commie system in Asia” (Acheson 1949).

However, within the core centers of power, Germany remained a crucial point of contention in the early Cold War when the Allies divided it into four zones of occupation, and later U.S., Britain and France merged their zones into what became known as West Germany. “No task,” as Leffler (2010, 79) argues, “was more important than reviving western Germany, establishing self-governing institutions there, and preserving its alignment with the United States.” “Without a revival of German production,” U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall (who orchestrated the European Recovery Program, also known as the Marshal Plan) emphasized, “there can be no revival of Europe’s economy” (Marshall 1947). When the Western Allies (U.S., Britain and France) introduced a single currency in their own zones of occupation to boost economic recovery after starting to gradually merge their zones of occupation, the Soviets blocked their access to the sector of Berlin under Western control. Against the Soviet blockade of West Berlin, the U.S. responded with an airlift for more than a year, providing essential supplies through aerial operations. Berlin continued to remain a focal point of Soviet-U.S. contention, and the test of resolve showed to great heights by Washington and Moscow during the entire Cold War. Other than ambitious economic initiatives – with the Marshal Plan totaling \$13 billion – the U.S. put forward a comprehensive security framework, the North Atlantic Treaty (1948), to integrate Western Europe into America’s security umbrella based on the idea of collective security: attack on one state considered as an attack on all. With the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, the U.S. formed its first military alliance with Europe in 171 years (LaFeber 1994, 466).

4 Reexamining the Threat Perception: Waging and Winning a Global Cold War

Containing Soviet influence by binding economically and strategically

the industrial core regions of Western Europe and Northeast Asia seemed enough until two major changes greatly impacted American threat perception toward Moscow in 1949. First, U.S. policymakers saw the potential enhancement of Soviet ideological and geopolitical influence due to the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. The threat appeared especially alarming as Truman's advisors continued to see the Communist threat as monolithic that was exclusively directed from Moscow under Stalin's patronage. Second, the Soviet detonation of the atomic bomb in the same year challenged America's technological edge in a potential total war with the USSR. Both of these events forced U.S. policymakers to comprehensively reexamine American strategy and not let Washington's influence be limited to only the core industrial regions of the world. With Chinese Communists successfully consolidating their grip on mainland China, American policymakers started to realize that the success of containment in core areas depended on the global reach to integrate peripheral regions into America's grand strategy. As the development of industrial core regions of Western Europe depended on access to petroleum and raw materials in the Middle East and Africa, the revival of the Japanese economy depended on raw materials and markets of peripheral regions in Asia – Korea, Manchuria and Southeast Asia (Leffler 2010, 82).

The reexamination of U.S. grand strategy to expand the scope of America's global footprint was done by Paul Nitze – the new head of the Policy Planning Staff who replaced George Kennan and wrote the most renowned strategic paper of the Cold War: NSC 68, National Security Council paper 68. Nitze had become the head of Policy Planning Staff under Dean Acheson, who had asked him to paint NSC 68 “clearer than the truth” for employing excessively simplistic language helpful in driving popular support (Casey 2005, 655). Nitze did not disappoint as the paper was distinguished from other such policy documents for its stark delineation of the threat posed by the USSR, which, according to the paper, was guided by a “new fanatical faith, antithetical to our own” and wanted to impose its “absolute authority over the rest of the world” through growing military prowess and atomic capabilities (Wells 1979, 131). However, the Soviet threat could be contained and neutralized, as per NSC 68, through “superior aggregate military strength.” Therefore, other than the stark description of the threat, the document called for massive rearmament.

Nitze asserted that once the U.S. showed the Soviet Union that it could contain and drive back Communist power, “it would foster seeds of destruction within the Soviet system” (Nitze 1994). The aim of the new strategy was to contain and roll back Soviet power. Therefore, in Leffler's words: “The

strategy of the Truman administration was never limited to deterrence and containment. The strategy was to wage a Cold War and win it" (Leffler 2010, 88). NSC-68 was based on very stark assumptions about the urgent nature of the threat Moscow posed. NSC-68 assumed the threat to be "civilizational," with the Soviets having the willingness to gain absolute power. As LaFeber (1994, 480) writes, "If you accept these assumptions, you had little choice but to accept the policy recommendations," which Truman did, but hesitatingly. NSC-68 called for building large alliance systems, along with the making of thermonuclear bombs, to bring increased pressure on the USSR. Such a huge military buildup (four times that of the present defense budget), and that too in peacetime, made Truman wanting to first know the exact cost of NSC-68 before he could give final approval to Dean Acheson.

Seeking support from top officials and the public on such an expansive military budget would have been very difficult without the dramatic threat of Communist aggression that was witnessed in June 1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea. With the crisis taking place in one of the many flashpoints of the Cold War and outside the strategic perimeters delineated earlier, the Korean War gave Acheson and other top U.S. officials an opportunity to reaffirm and reinstate their rationales for following NSC-68's recommendations – 1) a monolithic Communist threat undertaking aggression in the peripheral regions vital to the recovery of core regions; 2) the fear of Communist aggression in one region threatening U.S. influence in other adjacent regions (the rotten-apple analogy); 3) and, the global Communist expansion justifying large-scale military buildup and intensive alliance making. Therefore, the start of the Korean War in June 1950, according to Casey (2005, 656), was "a godsend" for selling NSC-68.

5 Conclusion

The study of the American diplomacy during the last stages of WWII helps us conclude that America's strategic vision for the postwar world started to take shape during the war as Washington was determined to take active responsibility in shaping postwar peace. U.S. policymakers in both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations were committed to avoiding the conditions that produced economic turmoil and political instability that partly led to the collapse of the prewar international order. The unmatched extent of U.S. power and influence, along with an ambitious vision to reshape the postwar institutional and security architecture, allowed Washington to formulate a grand strategy for its economic and political footprint in Asia and Europe, where the Soviet Union remained the only standing – yet immensely devastated – victorious power. Moscow's own traditional insecurities on its

western frontier and its considerable strategic influence and vision to shape the political and security landscape in Europe produced U.S.-Soviet tensions as their cooperation due to a common German threat had vanished. All these factors played a crucial part in the formulation of America's grand strategy in the early Cold War when American leadership was focused on taking global responsibility, shaping postwar international economic and political order in light of the prewar lessons, and containing Soviet power and influence from challenging America's dominant position in the international system.

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ABSTRACT

The study aims to identify the concerns and priorities of the United States (US) in the immediate post-World War II era, while exploring key American thinking in formulating grand strategy during the early Cold War. The article raises the following question: whether Washington's policy choices during the latter stages of World War II and at the beginning of the Cold War were primarily driven by Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe. The study is qualitative in nature and uses exploratory research because the existing literature on the early Cold War does not sufficiently explain why American policymakers adopted a global role. This research argues that the unparalleled extent of US power and influence, coupled with an ambitious vision to reshape the post-war institutional and security architecture, allowed Washington to formulate a grand strategy for its economic and political presence in Asia and Europe, where the Soviet Union had remained the only victorious - but immensely devastated - power. Moscow's own traditional insecurities on its western border and its considerable strategic influence and vision for shaping the political and security landscape in Europe produced tensions between the US and the Soviet Union once their cooperation, due to a common German threat, had disappeared. American leadership therefore focused on assuming global responsibility at the start of the Cold War for shaping the post-war international economic and political order in the light of pre-war lessons and preventing Soviet power and influence from jeopardizing US pre-eminence on the global stage.

KEYWORDS

US-USSR competition; Cold War; American grand strategy; Post-war international order.

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THE IMPACT OF THE UKRAINE WAR ON ANTARCTIC GEOPOLITICS THROUGH FUZZY COGNITIVE MAPS

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1 Introduction

The Antarctic continent holds the equivalent of 70% of the world's freshwater, over 170 types of minerals, and large deposits of natural gas (Andrade et al. 2018). Its surrounding area is an alternative navigation route due to its proximity to the southern hemisphere continents. Due to these characteristics, Antarctica, South America, the South Atlantic, and the countries of the western African coast have been included in Brazil's Strategic Environment, being areas of priority interest in the National Defense White Paper (Brazil 2016) and the National Defense Policy (Brazil 2020).

The Treaty of Antarctica was signed in 1959 by countries that claimed possession of parts of the Antarctic continent but agreed to suspend their claims indefinitely, allowing the freedom of scientific exploration of the continent under an international cooperation regime. The treaty came into effect in 1961, and Brazil joined in 1975. Subsequently, with the creation of the Brazilian Antarctic Program (PROANTAR)³, Brazilian scientific research

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3 Established on January 12, 1982, the Brazilian Antarctic Program (PROANTAR) aims to promote diverse and high-quality scientific research in the Antarctic region with the purpose of: understanding the phenomena occurring there that have global repercussions, particularly on Brazilian territory; and ensuring the country's status as a Consultative Member of the Antarctic Treaty, achieved in 1983, which guarantees Brazil's full participation in the respective decision-making processes. PROANTAR uses the Antarctic Operation (OPERANTAR) as an operational arm for implementing the National Policy for Antarctic Affairs (POLANTAR), whi-

in the region was intensified, supporting the country's full participation in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM), the treaty's main decision-making forum (Andrade et al. 2018).

The Antarctic Treaty sought to curb territorial interests that could drive military activities in the region. Thus, in 1987, Brazil conceived the National Policy for Antarctic Affairs (POLANTAR) "with a goal to achieve the country's objectives in Antarctica, considering the commitments assumed within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty System (STA)⁴" (Brazil 2022b). The National Defense Policy also emphasizes the exploration of Antarctica exclusively for scientific research purposes, with the preservation of the environment and its maintenance as a heritage of humanity (Brazil 2020).

Although geographically isolated, the Antarctic Continent is not exempt from the consequences that involve the countries that are signatories to the Treaty, which carry out research and have explicit interests in that region. The still ongoing Ukrainian War is part of this context, as it reignites animosity between the USA, Russia and China. This presents the potential for instability in the international system, capable of impacting other important strategic regions, which include Antarctica (Press 2022; McGee, Edmiston, and Haward 2022b).

This research evaluates possible geopolitical impacts resulting from the Ukrainian War on the STA. Although these events are apparently isolated from each other, the study shows that there are common aspects that influence each other in a complex network of interactions. As it involves events that are still ongoing, the research is relevant for bringing to light a series of driving forces (FM) with high potential for influence in the medium and long term, capable of promoting militarization initiatives on the continent. This assessment is also important for Brazil, as the scenarios raised have impacts on a region in Brazil's strategic surroundings. Additionally, the results of the study may lead to the ratification of objectives or provoke an eventual

ch establishes the country's principles and objectives in the region. PROANTAR is coordinated by the Interministerial Commission for Marine Resources (CIRM) and has four branches: scientific, environmental, logistical, and foreign policy, coordinated respectively by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovations (MCTI) and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq); the Ministry of the Environment (MMA); the Ministry of Defense (MD); and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). It is the responsibility of these ministries to work together to implement POLANTAR (Brazil 2022b).

⁴ The Antarctic Treaty was the embryo of a more comprehensive system, which evolved from its fundamental points – exclusively peaceful use of the continent, freedom of scientific research, freezing of territorial issues – into a complex set of rules and instruments dealing with a wide range of topics, giving rise to what is now known as the Antarctic Treaty System (STA) (Aguilar and Mattos 2018).

reorientation of the Brazilian Antarctic Program. This research contribution aligns with Strategic Defense Action n. 83, which establishes the need to “increase Brazilian participation in decisions about the fate of the Antarctic region” (Brazil 2020).

Initially, the study approached the Treaty of Antarctica and its importance for the country, investigated international interests in Antarctica and expressed possible impacts of the Russo-Ukrainian War, composing a complex system with FM derived from these issues. The cause-and-effect relations between these FMs were evaluated by 28 geopolitical experts, with experience in PROANTAR activities. This later system was modeled by an artificial intelligence algorithm called Fuzzy Cognitive Maps. The results showed the evolution or regression of these forces in the face of favorable and critical scenarios on the maintenance of the Antarctic continent under the current condition of the Treaty.

2 The Antarctic Treaty and its importance for Brazil

The Antarctic continent has extreme characteristics. With 13,661,000 km² (equivalent to 1.6 times the area of Brazil), it has an average temperature between -30 °C in the summer and -60 °C in the winter. High pressure centers and cold fronts influence the climate of several continents, especially South America. The accumulation of ice means that Antarctica has the equivalent of 70% of the planet's freshwater. Câmara and Melo (2018) describe the possible existence of oil, natural gas, rare and precious metals. Colacrai (1998) mentions reserves of gold, silver, cobalt, nickel, tin and uranium. Thorp (2012) estimates reserves of 50 billion barrels of oil in the Ross and Weddell Seas. The region also has a large quantity of krill, which is part of the Antarctic zooplankton, and is the basis of the ocean food chain (Mattos 2014). The location of Antarctica is also strategic, as it passes international maritime routes in the Drake Passage and the Cape of Good Hope, which connect the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian oceans (Câmara e Melo 2018). This set of strategic characteristics aroused the interest of several countries.


Due to its distance, characteristics and climate, the Antarctic continent began exploration late. Andrade et al. (2018) describes that the first reports of activity in the region date from the end of the 18th century to the mid-19th century, with the exploration of Antarctica and its surroundings by commercial interests that aimed to obtain seal skins and whale oil. At the beginning of the 20th century, commercial polar exploration began to be replaced by exploratory and scientific bias (Andrade et al. 2018).

With an increase in expeditions to the region, territorial claims began. Several theories used to justify ownership rights were developed:

the Discovery Theory, according to which the countries that initially found and explored Antarctic lands would have the right; the Theory of Contiguity and Continuity, which would give rights to the closest States; the Theory of Sectors, which implies the division of Antarctica into sectors defined based on the interface of States with the continent; the Defrontation Theory, supported by Brazilian geopoliticians Teresinha de Castro and Meira Mattos, according to which the facing countries in the Southern Hemisphere would have the right to sectors of the continent according to the southern projection of their respective coastal landmarks to the East and West over the region. There is also Effective Occupation, which attributed the right to portions of Antarctica to countries that effectively occupied the continent with scientific activities such as research, expeditions and permanent or temporary bases (Vieira 2006).

Based on these theories, several countries presented their territorial claims, as shown in Fig. 1. The United Kingdom, in 1908, was the first to claim territory, followed by New Zealand (1923), France (1924), Australia (1933) and Norway (1939) (Mattos 2014).

Figure 1 – Territorial Claims in Antarctica



Source: Andrade et al. (2018).

In 1940, Argentina and Chile formalized their territorial claims. There were coincidences between their areas and those of interest to the

United Kingdom. In 1949, the countries signed a joint declaration, according to which they committed not to send warships to the region. There was, however, a dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1952, which was resolved by diplomatic means, demonstrating the risk, however, that new incidents would occur (Mattos 2014).

The issue of the occupation of Antarctica gained momentum with the end of World War II, when disputes between Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom intensified. In parallel, the Cold War motivated the USA and the former USSR by increasing their zones of influence and, consequently, the fear of conflict in the region. Furthermore, there was a fear, on the part of countries with territorial claims, that a proposal for the internationalization of Antarctica, led by India, would prosper (Castro 1976). As a result, Chile presented the Declaration of Escudero, which was the basis of the Treaty of Antarctica and which suggested “a moratorium on territorial claims; an agreement for the exchange of scientific data; and a declaration that stations and expeditions to the region would not constitute grounds for future claims” (Mattos 2014, 171).

In 1959, at the invitation of the USA, 12 countries met in Washington to study and propose a single legal regime for the sixth continent. Thus, the Treaty of Antarctica was signed on December 1, 1959, by the original signatories: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, United States, France, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, United Kingdom, South African Republic and the former USSR. These countries were those that, at the time, had the greatest representation in research, expeditions and the establishment of scientific stations in the region. The Antarctic Treaty came into force on June 23, 1961, following ratification by the original 12 signatories. It should be noted that Brazil was not part of the signing, as it was not carrying out relevant scientific activities at the time (Mattos 2014). Despite the formal complaint sent by the country, the lack of strategic vision and interest demonstrated at the time prevented Brazil from obtaining the status of original member and signatory of the Antarctic Treaty (Medeiros and Mattos 2019; Mattos and Câmara 2020).

In the Treaty of Antarctica, some articles mark the peaceful character of the continent: Art. I determined that the continent has a favorable and specific use for research and prohibits the establishment of bases or the carrying out of military exercises, except those that are to support research; Art. II specifies freedom of scientific research in the region and promotes international cooperation; Art. IV establishes the freezing of territorial claims; and Art. V prohibits weapons testing, including nuclear weapons (Hanessian 1960).

Despite being explicit in its text, territorial demands were not closed

when the Treaty of Antarctica was signed. There is also concern about possible dual⁵ use of scientific support stations, according to Art. I, Item 2: “This Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose”, with the potential for a veiled militarization of the continent (Hanessian 1960).

In the functioning of the STA, it is important to understand the role of the ATCM⁶ which meets annually to decide on the main issues involving the continent (Wanlu 2021). Two groups are part of it: the consultative members who have voting and veto rights, which are made up of the 12 original signatory countries and another 17 countries that maintain relevant scientific activities in the region, such as expeditions and maintenance of research bases. In addition to these countries, there is a group of 24 non-consultative members, who appear on the ATCM councils as listeners and without voting rights (Molenaar 2021). Brazil is part of the consultative members of ATCM, due to its activities on the continent, which corroborate the existence of PROANTAR (Brasil 2016).

Another aspect to highlight in the STA is the Madrid Protocol, which establishes guidelines for the continent’s environmental use and ultimately prevents the exploitation of natural resources. It was signed on October 4, 1991, and came into force on January 14, 1998 (Bastmeijer 2018). The “Madrid Protocol granted Antarctica the status of ‘International Natural Reserve dedicated to Science and Peace’ and can only be modified in 2048, as long as there is unanimous agreement from the consultative members of the Antarctic Treaty” (Brasil 2016). After this period, at the request of one or more advisory members, it may be revised, becoming more flexible and permissive to issues involving authorization for the exploitation of natural resources.

Table 1 illustrates the investment and engagement of consultative member countries in the region. The USA has the largest program and the largest scientific research base, the McMurdo station, built in 1956, which embarks up to 1300 people in the summer. In addition, they built the permanent Amundsen-Scott scientific station, strategically located at the Geographic South Pole (Mattos 2014). Although their Gross Domestic Products (GDP) are significantly lower than those of Brazil, Chile and Argentina carry out a greater volume of research activities. Russia has a structure inherited from

5 A dual-use activity is intended for two different purposes. In the case of Antarctica, these would be activities related to scientific research and military activities

6 The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting - ATCM is held annually on a rotating basis among its members. This is a forum composed of representatives of the Antarctic Treaty, who deliberate on the establishment of standards for activities in Antarctica, in line with the principles and objectives of the Treaty (Brasil 2016).

the former USSR, going through a period of stagnation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but with a recent recovery.

China has a rapidly developing program, which began in 1964 and has seen a strong increase since 2008, with the establishment of specific policies for the region through the Polar Research Institute, subordinate to the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources. The country has a great interest in issues involving krill fishing and has recently opposed the establishment of environmental protection areas in the region. India's research program has accompanied the country's economic growth, which characterizes a stance of non-alignment with the international use of the continent and has revisionist actions for the region (Aguilar and Mattos 2018).

Table 1 – Comparison between Antarctic programs

Countries	Consultative Member	Permanent Stations	Seasonal Stations	Other Facilities ⁷	Total
USA	Yes	3	0	4	7
Russia	Yes	7	5	0	12
China	Yes	2	1	1	4
India	Yes	2	0	0	2
Chile	Yes	3	7	2	12
Argentina	Yes	6	7	0	13
Brazil	Yes	1	0	1	2

Source: Adapted from Andrade et al. (2018).

In relation to the Brazilian program for Antarctica, Mattos (2014) highlights that, in 1975, Brazil signed the Term of Adhesion to the Antarctic Treaty but could only have its membership as a consultative member with the right to vote ratified by the other consultative members, after scientific research was carried out in the region. Based on this, Brazil approved the Brazilian Antarctic Program and carried out, in 1982, the first scientific expedition in Antarctica. In 1983, Brazil was accepted as a consultative member, gaining voting rights. In 1984, the Comandante Ferraz Antarctic Station (EACF) was inaugurated.

Operation Antarctica (OPERANTAR) is made possible through the Navy and is carried out annually between the months of October and April, comprising the Antarctic summer. In this Operation, ships and aircraft from the Brazilian Navy and Air Force (FAB) logistically support research projects in the various areas of interest. The Armed Forces (AF) carry out flights to

⁷ Includes small stations, called refuges; airfields; laboratories; camps; and deposits.

transfer equipment and research personnel to collection sites, which can be located in the vicinity of the EACF itself, in refuges or in pre-established areas. The program is supported by the airstrip at the Chilean station Base Frei Eduardo Montalva (Andrade et al. 2018).

Antarctica was included in the National Defense Policy (PND) as part of the Brazilian strategic environment along with South America and the west coast of Africa (Brazil 2020). The PND highlights the existence of resources in the region that can be a reason for greed and international instability. Despite the fact that Brazil has not formulated territorial sovereignty claims in Antarctica, POLANTAR highlights the country's right to protect its direct and substantial interests, if the functioning of the Treaty is revised (Brasil 2022b). To this end, the country has invested in research and infrastructure, aiming to maintain the status of consultative member of the STA, with emphasis on the acquisition of NPo Alte Maximiano and the reconstruction of the EACF (Agostinho 2019; Andrade et al. 2018). Recently, the Navy announced the project to build a new Antarctic Support Ship, replacing the Oceanographic Support Ship Ary Rongel (Brazil 2022a).

Antarctica has a high potential for natural resources and a possible change in the exploration regime established in the Madrid Protocol will impact national interests in the region. Antarctica exerts a significant influence on the climate of the Southern Cone, affecting food security and Brazilian agricultural capacity. Furthermore, Antarctica is a critical point for international maritime trade, due to the various shipping routes that surround it. A possible imbalance in the equilibrium of power and the high demand for natural resources due to the growth and development of world society could encourage Russia, China and even India to promote actions and alliances in exchange for revisionist agendas in 2048, the revision year of the Madrid Protocol (Hashimoto 2018; Dodds 2019; McGee, Edmiston, and Haward 2022a).

3 International interests in Antarctica

The STA was able to maintain balance on the continent by avoiding conflicts and freezing territorial claims. This stability may “mask the climate of previous periods in which Antarctica and the Southern Ocean were sites of significant international discord” (McGee, Edmiston, and Haward 2022b). The Antarctic Treaty was created in a context of increasing incidents between territorial states, during global polarization between the USA and the former USSR, during the Cold War. The treaty emerged as a response to these circumstances and has been effective in achieving the objectives of keeping the continent free from conflicts and territorial disputes, non-militarized and

focused on scientific research.

Its structure finds a diplomatic solution that establishes a balance between persistent claims and the possibility of new requests. However, some devices that were sufficient at the time may not be as effective in the current context. Art. IV, for example, establishes the “freezing” of past claims and the non-extinction of rights to future claims. This device may be activated by one of the Contracting Parties and territorial claims may return to the agenda in 2048 (Hanessian 1960).

On the other hand, there are loopholes for the use of military capabilities on the Antarctic continent. Art. I allows the logistical use of equipment, bases, material and military personnel in support of research. This device may suffer distortions due to the interests of States, providing dual use of these capabilities and initiating a slow and veiled militarization of the continent. This could compromise the STA and fuel an arms race (Hanessian 1960; McGee, Edmiston, and Haward 2022b).

The global context is different from that in force during the signing of the Treaty. Climate change has reduced the thickness of the ice sheet, making navigation to the continent easier. New resource extraction technologies have made the exploration of Antarctica possible, economically viable and advantageous. The advancement of communications and technology for logistical support has made the Antarctic continent “closer” and “more accessible”, increasing its geopolitical importance. Linked to these factors, the post-Cold War globalization process brought the development and growth of societies with a proportional increase in demand for resources and energy. Furthermore, new actors have emerged, generating another balance of power, which exert pressure for changes to the STA status quo (Hanessian 1960; McGee, Edmiston, and Haward 2022b).

Four main factors with the potential to foment disputes were highlighted by (Hanessian 1960; McGee, Edmiston, and Haward 2022b): mineral resources, fishing, maritime routes, and the ability to use Antarctic space for communications and satellite monitoring. The geological structure of Antarctica allows for the existence of minerals of important economic and strategic value, including rare earth minerals, oil and gas. New prospecting technologies may bring pressure on the Madrid Protocol, which in its Article 7 establishes that “any activity related to mineral resources is prohibited, except scientific research” (Hanessian 1960).

Fishing can become another source of conflict. Krill in particular, in addition to species such as Patagonian toothfish, have been sought after by China and Russia. Activities are regulated by the Commission for the

Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources⁸. The CCAMLR establishes a total catch quota by area, species and locations for fishing fish and krill. However, China and Russia have exploited their veto power in ATCM to block the creation of an environmental protection area and increase restrictions that could impact their activities in the region (Aguilar and Mattos 2018).

The Antarctic Ocean can be used as a maritime route between the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian oceans. New navigation technologies, with ships with greater autonomy and capacity, together with the increase in global trade, generate increased demand and consequently congestion on maritime routes. The experience of sailing in the Antarctic seas makes passage through the oceans of the Antarctic Treaty Area an important alternative (Pereira 2013; Visentini 2022).

Several research stations in Antarctica are operated by the military and may contain dual-use equipment, civil and/or military. (McGee, Edmiston, and Haward 2022b) cites the use of modern drones for surveillance, with high autonomy and great range, as another challenge to STA. These systems would initially be used for maritime surveillance, supporting search and rescue operations, monitoring fishing in the Southern Ocean and monitoring compliance with the Antarctic Treaty. There is, however, the possibility of using drones with military capabilities (i.e. transporting weapons) and monitoring facilities, which would constitute a violation of the terms of the Antarctic Treaty. In the past, Germany, Norway, the United States, Russia, India and Japan have operated satellite ground receiving stations on the continent. Currently, China and Russia are interested in expanding the coverage and accuracy of their global positioning systems, the BeiDou and Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) networks, respectively. These networks are alternatives to the global positioning system (GPS) and can similarly support military firing guidance systems, for example (McGee, Edmiston, and Haward 2022b).

The strategic interests of some countries are also aligned with this context of militarization of the Antarctic continent. The USA has been part of the Antarctic Treaty since the beginning, positioning itself as the leader of the system. They invest huge resources in research in the region and have primacy in the number of stations, bases and human resources. Russia has a long history on the continent, having inherited the legacy of the USSR's Antarctic program, which has always presented a consistent policy for the region, with investments on different bases. From the 2000s onwards,

⁸ The 1980 CCAMLR Convention, which established CCAMLR, includes major distant-water fishing states and supranational organizations such as China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, the United States and the EU, as well as emerging states in developing Brazil, India and South Africa (McGee, Edmiston, and Haward 2022b).

Russia sought to reoccupy its prominent position on the international scene, prioritizing resources for the Antarctic project (Witker 2015; Makuc 2018).

Russia has shown special interest in krill fishing and activities aimed at expanding the region's use, revitalizing its fishing fleet in distant waters to increase revenue from seafood exports (Boulègue 2022). Russia considers Antarctica to be a space of geopolitical, geoeconomic and geoscientific competition, in which its interests need to be safeguarded and protected – just as in the Arctic – including by military means. In this context, Boulègue (2022) highlights that Russian scientific research can mask resource prospecting activities and intelligence and surveillance activities.

China has a high potential for imbalance in the STA, due to its growing protagonism and its initiatives in shaping treaties to its interests (Young 2021). In its five-year plan (2016-20), China declared its intention to review the governance of new fields of activity, which include the polar regions, with the aim of becoming a “polar power” (Aguiar and Mattos 2018). China has been exploring fishing and tourism in the region, in addition to showing the potential to lead a coalition of states in search of mineral wealth. Its interests on the continent include new shipping routes, mineral extraction and the use of the Antarctic aerospace environment for positioning satellites. China has sought to consolidate these interests through huge investments in the logistics of its program, with an increase in the number of bases, ships and research (Young 2021).

When the Treaty was created, India adopted a stance of non-alignment with other countries, opting not to join the TA and focus on the internationalization of the Antarctic continent. At that time, the Indian program made little progress, due to low economic development and low priority for research, as the country was involved in internal disputes in the post-colonial period. Subsequently, with the country's economic growth, associated with the demand for resources, the country changed its political stance towards the region. More recently, the Indian Antarctic program has made significant progress, currently having three permanent stations. Despite advances, dependence on external logistical support still represents a weakness in its program, as the Indian Navy does not have polar ships and research depends on outsourcing air support (airstrips and aircraft). As part of its foreign policy, the country has sought to increase its influence related to the governance of Antarctica, through alliances, including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)⁹ and the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of

⁹ The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) was created in 2007, forming an informal strategic group with the USA, Japan, Australia and India, representing a diplomatic reaction to contain China's growing economic and military influence in the Indo-Pacific region. The group

Agreement (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement - LEMOA)¹⁰ (Aguilar and Mattos 2018; Rai 2018).

The distribution of research stations in the USA, Russia and China, presented in Fig. 2, shows the extent and geographic breadth that these countries occupy on the Antarctic continent. This allows us to infer the difficulty of converging claims related to any theory of claim in the region. The growing installation of research stations may signal an embryo for future territorial occupation initiatives, something in the form of the legal principle “uti possidetis”, according to which those who actually occupy a territory have rights over it. The current impossibility of territorial division of the continent can encourage alliances capable of putting pressure on the STA to make exploratory rules more flexible, which favor countries with a greater presence on the continent (Boulègue 2022).

Figure 2 – Main Russian, Chinese and North American installations in the Antarctic region



meets to exchange information and carry out military exercises.

¹⁰ The US defense cooperation agreement with India (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement - LEMOA) (Aguilar and Mattos 2018).

Source: (Boulègue 2022).

In South America, Argentina and Chile have robust Antarctic programs, consolidated territorial claims and great interest in the region, therefore being relevant on the continent's geopolitical board. These countries have the political and scientific capital to influence decisions that could impact eventual pressure for militarization of the region, as well as the possibility of extracting natural resources (Colacrai 2016).

The Brazilian program is consolidated, in line with the requirements established for ATCM consultative members. The Brazilian Navy has made recent efforts to improve logistical support for PROANTAR, through the acquisition of the Polar Ship Almirante Maximiano, the reconstruction of the EACF in 2019 and the construction project of the new polar ship, which will replace the NApAnt Ary Rongel. The average investment in scientific research in the Antarctic region has not been maintained over the years. In comparative terms, other countries have invested more in their programs, installing new research stations and equipping their Navies with ships with icebreaking capacity to operate in the region in any season of the year (Agostinho 2019; Andrade et al. 2018).

Article 25 of the Madrid Protocol establishes rules for modifications to the document, establishing a series of provisions that condition any change to consensus among members. Two situations for changes are described: until 2048, the Protocol can be modified at any time, as long as there is unanimity of the Consultative Parties; After 2048, any change requires approval and ratification by 75% of the States that were Consultative Parties to the TA in 1991. The Protocol further establishes that prohibitions relating to mineral resource extraction activities will remain in force unless a new regime is approved that regulates the subject (Hanessian 1960). Therefore, it is fair to infer that any changes to the exploration of mineral resources are more likely to occur through alliances than through imposition. The USA, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, Japan and India would probably not accept impositions or changes that were not consensual.

4 Impacts of the Russo-Ukrainian War

The most immediate and noticeable impact of a conflict of this nature is evident in the economic environment. In a recent panel, the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP) analyzed the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian War on some commodities, comparing variations in the prices of

the main raw materials, in the period from February 24 to March 18, 2022. Substantial increases were evident in the prices of Brent Oil (11.4%), Naphtha (11.4%), Iron Ore (a ton reached US\$ 150.59), Coal (a ton reached US\$334.50), Aluminum (highest price since 1995), Copper (highest price since October 2021) and Neon (main input for semiconductor production). The commercial isolation of Russia and Ukraine, large suppliers of commodities, burdened the supply chain of several other products, directly or indirectly affected (FIESP 2022).

Treaties and cooperation agreements tend to expand relations between countries. However, this logic is reversed during conflicts (Mbah and Wasum 2022; Khudaykulova, Yuanqiong, and Khudaykulov 2022; Orhan 2022). The Ukrainian War brought shocks to the economies of Russia and Ukraine, in addition to the economic blockade imposed by the West (Bergeijk 2022). The flight of investors, the increase in country risk, inflation and high interest rates have been other consequences. In addition to the direct impact on the economies of Russia and Ukraine, the risk of extension and expansion of the conflict brings a dampener to global trade, implying the regionalization of production chains and reduced efficiency. The restrictions with the closure of Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea compromise not only the local economy, but also global trade in wheat, sunflower oil, inputs for computer microchips and even for the production of vaccines. Russia also suffered strong commercial impacts with the departure of multinational companies and the interruption of services by several shipping companies. The economic sanctions imposed on Russia are unprecedented in scope and strength. Among them are: the closure of airspace for Russian companies, the ban on investments in the Russian economy, the freezing of foreign assets at the Central Bank of Russia and the exclusion of Russian banks from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication – SWIFT)¹¹ (Liadze et al. 2022; Irtyshcheva, Kramarenko, and Sirenko 2022; Orhan 2022).

The long-term impacts for Ukraine and Russia are incalculable. In addition to economic, commercial and productive capacity losses, the evasion of young people takes technological knowledge abroad. Russia may suffer tendencies towards isolation from Europe and closer ties with China. Europe will need to redirect its energy demand to other sources. China, which initially opted for a “veiled” alignment with Russia, may feel the impact of the withdrawal from European markets with possible consequences for its New

¹¹ SWIFT is a network formed by banks from different countries aimed at carrying out international financial transactions. Created in 1973, it is headquartered in Brussels and is where most international interbank transactions are carried out.

Silk Road project (Ciuriak 2022).

Ciuriak (2022) interprets that there was an error in the West's assessment regarding the strength of the alliance between China and Russia. The agreement signed between China and Russia, in the six months before the invasion, recognized the countries' interests in Taiwan and Ukraine, respectively. This reinforces the strategic alignment of both, in which Russia seeks to regain territories belonging to its former area of influence and China seeks a geopolitical position favorable to its economic project. Putin defended the invasion of Ukraine on historical, religious and psychosocial grounds, claiming there was a Western war against Russia and the need to preserve the unity of the Slavic peoples. Although calculated, the war highlights undesirable consequences, related to the extended duration of the conflict, Ukraine's resilience and the economic impacts of Western sanctions, with a direct impact on the world economy.

Papanikos (2022) argues that there is more behind the conflict than Ukraine's rapprochement with NATO. In his argument, the Russian advance was intentionally leveraged by the US, by highlighting a supposed imminent invasion of Ukraine, reinforcing that it would not become militarily involved in the conflict. The North American intention would be to promote a resurgence of NATO, through cohesion against the Russian enemy and the consequent rearmament of its components and the disruption of Russian energy supplies to Western Europe. These objectives would aim to regain North American protagonism and increase its arms and energy industries (Papanikos 2022).

However, Ciuriak (2022) argues in the opposite direction to the US' supposed intention, highlighting that an immediate consequence of the war was criticism of the NATO system. For that author, the War in Ukraine brought new light to the debate about its impotence in the face of Russia's recent initiatives in Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2014). (Ciuriak 2022) considers that the rearmament of Germany and Japan, with the increase in military spending on acquiring new resources and equipment, is evidence of the low credibility of an alliance that would precisely have the objective of avoiding conflicts.

Even though the Ukrainian War did not reach the scale of a global conflict, its impacts transcend both countries. Commercial, economic, political and military blocs and alliances form the embryo of a reordering of the international system. This instability of the international system affects countries with territorial claims and non-scientific interests over the Antarctic continent, being analyzed by (McGee, Edmiston, and Haward 2022b), in *The Future of Antarctica: scenarios from classical geopolitics*. (Press 2022) also establishes a connection between Antarctic security and the invasion of

Ukraine, describing that polar governance suffers a growing double threat, arising from global warming and global geopolitical instabilities, in particular driven by the recent war. It is these cause-and-effect relations that this research intends to survey and analyze, using a methodological tool from Operational Research, aimed at this type of complex system.

5 Problem modeling

The research continued the work of McGee, Edmiston, and Haward (2022b). Those researchers initially raised 49 FMs that could undesirably impact militarization in Antarctica, being categorized into nine groups: Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, Legal, Geographic, Strategic and Historical. This set was later reduced to the 11 most relevant FMs, based on risk analysis criteria (degree of uncertainty and degree of importance), evaluated by experts. Each criterion was scored on a scale of 1 to 4, and the multiplication of evaluations determined the score for each Driving Force. Based on this final list, a new Driving Force was added to the Strategic group, the War in Ukraine, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2 – Driving Forces considered

Area/Field	Driving Force	Description
Political	P1 - Instability of the international system (relevant to the STA)	The instability of the international system, from the point of view of the Antarctic Treaty System (STA), can reduce the balance in international relations, given possible changes to multipolarity and power competition, particularly between China, Russia and the United States, with potential spillover effect to Antarctica.
Strategic	E1 - Strategic advantage of the militarization of Antarctica	The strategic advantage resulting from the military occupation of Antarctica and the Antarctic Ocean can encourage and expand non-peaceful activities in the region, damaging research and scientific activities.
	E2 - Ukrainian War	The War in Ukraine has caused political, economic and military changes in Eastern European countries, in Military Alliances and has influenced diplomatic and commercial relations in the international community, with a possible impact on the STA.
Technological	T1 - Use of receiving stations in Antarctica for military purposes	Development of global positioning systems leads to the use of receiving stations in Antarctica and the Antarctic Ocean to support military command and control activities and platforms.
	T2 - Link between receiving stations in Antarctica and military satellites	Development of military satellites that use receiving stations in Antarctica to link military communications.
	T3 - Use of infrared telescopes for military purposes	Development of infrared telescopes for target tracking and military surveillance.
	T4 - Use of UAVs for surveillance and aerial attack	Development of UAVs for deep aerial surveillance in Antarctica and with the ability to carry out air strikes.

Area/Field	Driving Force	Description
Environmental	A1 - Severity of the impact of climate change	The magnitude and speed of the increase in global average temperatures resulting from human activity (primarily greenhouse gas emissions) remains uncertain. Projections for the coming decades remain within a wide range, due to the considerable number of variables.
Legal	J1 - Degree of divergence from STA obligations	STA obligations restrict parties from militarizing Antarctica. Furthermore, some provisions of the treaty diffuse key issues with the potential to trigger militarization. In particular: Art. I prohibit military activity for non-peaceful purposes; Art. IV provides a mechanism to respect various positions on territorial sovereignty; and Art. 7 of the Madrid Protocol imposes a ban on mining in the region.
	J2 - Use of civil servants for military purposes	Some civilian research and the operation of ground-based receiving stations may represent non-peaceful use of civilian personnel and therefore constitute measures of a military nature. The lack of clarity in this area makes it difficult to detect violations.
	J3 - Countries' resistance to the inspection regime for detecting dual-use equipment	Inspection and monitoring practices under the Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid Protocol are infrequent and limited in scope. Inspection teams lack access and sufficient technical knowledge to identify whether certain types of scientific equipment are being operated for military purposes.
Geographic	G1 - Extension of ice sheets and restriction of access to land and sea areas	The presence of thick ice sheets, glaciers and gullies across 98% of the continent's surface, along with sea ice and icebergs around the continent's coasts, are challenging to maritime access to the continent and logistics, requiring high-value specialized equipment such as icebreaker ships.


The interactions between these 12 FM were modeled using the Fuzzy Cognitive Maps method. The method provides for the generation of a visualization (map) for analyzing mental projections (cognitive) through criteria valuation (fuzzy).

A cognitive map is a structure used to graphically present the cause-and-effect relations between several important concepts in a problem (Kosko 1986). The map traces a “mental perspective” of an individual, allowing the “impact power” of these relations to be calculated through numbers in the range $[0,1]$ or $[-1,1]$ (Yousefi, Jahangoshai Rezaee, and Moradi 2020). These mental representations change continuously and any attempt to capture them will modify them; they are, therefore, inaccessible to the researcher. In this way, the map does not accurately model cognitive representations, but rather perceived relations and serves as a tool to support analysis and the decision-making process.

Although FCM are a derivation of cognitive maps (CM), there are differences. Both are graphical tools that model an individual's cognitive (or mental) representations, seeking to explicitly represent influence or causality between variables in order to assist the decision-making process. FCMs differ from CMs in that they evaluate concepts and their causal relations through mathematical modeling, which includes fuzzy logic and neural networks.

FCMs have applications in several fields, such as: analyzing and predicting decisions; identify variables in a system for control and monitoring and support the decision support process. The first step in creating a cognitive map is the survey of variables derived from the experience and knowledge of experts in the field under study, from which concepts and causal relations can be traced. Obtaining this information can be done through statements, interviews and questionnaires. The main components of the FCM are the nodes and arcs that represent, respectively, concepts and interconnection relations. These arcs symbolize relations of influence/causality. A positive sign associated with the arc indicates that the increase in one concept will imply an increase in the other related concept. The negative sign indicates that the increase in one concept will influence the decrease in the other related concept (Sperry and Jetter 2019; Shahbazi 2022; Yousefi, Jahangoshai Rezaee, and Moradi 2020).

When modeling an FCM, the problem concepts are called C_i , where i varies from 1 to N , with “ N ” being the total number of concepts. The arcs are assigned weights that show the intensity of the impact. These arc weights, called w_{ij} , vary in the range $[0, 1]$ or $[-1, +1]$ and are arranged in an $N \times N$ matrix, called Adjacency Matrix. The cause-and-effect relations of the Adjacency Matrix are directed from row i to column j . For example, the C_1 - C_6 relations are represented by a weight $w_{61} = +0.6$, thus being indicated in the matrix, while the C_1 - C_6 relations, represented by w_{61} , have a value of $+0.2$. Fig. 3 shows an example of an FCM with its adjacency matrix, representing the causal relations between the concepts of a problem (Papageorgiou et al. 2020).



Source: Adapted from (Papageorgiou et al. 2020).

According to (Papageorgiou et al. 2020), the following steps are necessary to create an FCM:

- selection and numbering of concepts (C_i) that will be objects of analysis;
- definition of the causal relation between concepts; and
- determination of the strength of the impact between concepts;

The intensities of the impacts (w) of the causal relation between the concepts and the type of impact (positive or negative) are essential for assembling an FCM:

- $w_{ij} = 0$, there is no causal relation between concepts;
- $w_{ij} > 0$, causal increase (C_j increases as C_i increases and C_j decreases as C_i decreases);
- $w_{ij} < 0$, causal decrease (C_j decreases as C_i increases, and C_j increases as C_i decreases).

Table 3 presents reference values for the intensity of the impact of cause and effect relations between concepts.

Table 3 – Measures of fuzzy causal relations

Cause-effect relations between variables	Numeric values
Very strong increase (attenuation)	0,9; 1 (-0,9; -1)
Strong increase (attenuation)	0,7; 0,8 (-0,7; -0,8)
Moderate increase (attenuation)	0,5; 0,6 (-0,5; -0,6)
Weak increase (attenuation)	0,3; 0,4 (-0,3; -0,4)
Very weak increase (attenuation)	0,1; 0,2 (-0,1; -0,2)
Null (absence of relation)	0

Source: Adapted from (Papageorgiou et al. 2020).

The problems that are submitted to decision makers are not composed of variables that remain static, therefore generating a changeable environment where FM interact dynamically (Papageorgiou et al. 2020). Under the scope of artificial intelligence, a series of inferences generate continuous changes in variables, based on values initially assumed for concepts and the arcs of interconnection between them. Initially, concepts receive values $A_i(k)$, which vary in the range from 0 to 1, being “0” when the concept does not exist at the

initial moment and “1” when it is complete. The calculation of the following values $A_i(k+1)$ is done using inference rules, the most common of which are: (1) Kosko inference, (2) modified Kosko inference and (3) rescaling inference, according to Equations (1) to (3).

$$A_i(k+1) = f\left(\sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^N w_{ij} \cdot A_j(k)\right) \quad (1)$$

$$A_i(k+1) = f\left(A_i(k) + \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^N w_{ij} \cdot A_j(k)\right) \quad (2)$$

$$A_i(k+1) = f\left((2 \cdot A_i(k) - 1) + \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^N w_{ij} \cdot (2 \cdot A_j(k) - 1)\right) \quad (3)$$

Value variations are calculated by the function $f(\cdot)$ and can be: (4) bivalent (takes only two values), (5) trivalent (takes only three values), (6) sigmoid or (7) hyperbolic tangent, as per shown in Equations (4) to (7), respectively.

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & x > 0 \\ 0, & x \leq 0 \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & x > 0 \\ 0, & x = 0 \\ -1, & x < 0 \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

$$f(x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\lambda x}} \quad (6)$$

$$f(x) = \tanh(\lambda \cdot x) \quad (7)$$

The slope of the continuous function f is established by a positive real number ($\lambda > 0$) and the value of the concept in the initial state $A_i(k)$ is represented by x . It is important to highlight that the sigmoid function guarantees that the calculated value of each concept will belong to the interval $[0, 1]$. The hyperbolic tangent function can replace the sigmoid when the values of concepts can be negative, receiving values in the interval $[-1, 1]$.

6 Expert reviews

From the set of 144 cause and effect relations of the 12 FM, fifteen FM were considered evident, regarding the direct or indirectly proportional relations and the directionality of the relations. These fifteen relations were hidden from experts, so that they could be used as a factor to validate judgments. Thus, if an expert coincided his assessments with the factor, the quality of his judgments would be 1 (equivalent to 15/15), another who agreed

on 12 out of 15 relations, the quality would be 80% (equivalent to 12/15), following the other calculations. From an initial list of 28 Experts, 11 obtained accuracies equal to or greater than 80%, and the matrix in Table 4 was then created, using the weighted average of their evaluations.


Tabela 4 – Matriz Resultante

Forças	P1	E1	E2	T1	T2	T3	T4	A1	J1	J2	J3	G1
P1	0,045 8	0,463 3	0,462 9	0,307 9	0,338 3	0,295 8	0,279 2	0,166 3	0,456 3	0,305 0	0,441 3	-0,0004
E1	0,516 3	0,045 8	0,118 3	0,569 2	0,620 4	0,523 3	0,510 8	0,083 3	0,564 2	0,433 3	0,511 3	-0,1246
E2	0,647 1	0,328 8	0,101 3	0,248 3	0,234 6	0,305 0	0,321 3	0,032 1	0,121 7	0,292 5	0,355 0	-0,0825
T1	0,444 2	0,494 6	0,173 3	0,045 8	0,695 8	0,478 3	0,458 3	0,044 2	0,425 0	0,475 4	0,559 6	-0,0758
T2	0,440 0	0,500 0	0,159 6	0,635 0	0,045 8	0,454 6	0,416 7	0,030 0	0,322 5	0,470 4	0,477 1	-0,0079
T3	0,362 5	0,457 5	0,254 6	0,395 0	0,363 8	0,045 8	0,356 3	0,017 5	0,297 1	0,364 2	0,428 3	-0,0858
T4	0,392 1	0,471 3	0,124 6	0,442 1	0,447 5	0,423 8	0,045 8	0,007 9	0,306 3	0,382 5	0,466 7	-0,0446
A1	0,360 8	0,154 6	0,000 0	0,029 6	0,011 3	0,005 8	-0,007 9	0,108 3	-0,107 5	0,097 9	-0,064 6	-0,0496
J1	0,424 2	0,385 0	0,072 1	0,242 9	0,310 0	0,280 8	0,287 9	0,215 8	0,045 8	0,328 3	0,551 3	-0,0575
J2	0,335 8	0,370 4	0,086 3	0,291 7	0,296 7	0,275 8	0,280 8	0,009 2	0,299 2	0,045 8	0,385 0	-0,0567
J3	0,470 4	0,412 5	0,187 9	0,409 2	0,446 3	0,454 6	0,504 6	0,109 2	0,501 3	0,337 9	0,045 8	-0,0104
G1	-0,152 5	-0,182 1	-0,020 0	-0,112 5	-0,089 2	-0,098 8	-0,039 2	-0,209 2	-0,284 2	-0,173 8	-0,180 4	0,0458

7 Initial scenarios for modeling the algorithm

The initial states of the FM were adjusted in two scenarios: one favorable and one critical. The initial values for each FM are “1”, when the FM is considered “full” in the scenario, and “0”, when the FM is considered absent or “null”. The favorable scenario considers that the FM harmful to the STA and driving trends towards the militarization of the Antarctic continent are initially null, receiving a value of “0”. The critical scenario reverses this logic. FM G1, which concerns the increase in the extent of ice sheets with the consequent restriction of access to land and sea areas, assumes inverted values, being “1” in the favorable scenario and “0” in the critical one. FM E2 referring to the Ukrainian War starts with a value of “1” in both scenarios, for consistency with the research objective. Fig. 4 illustrates the arrangement of values according to the scenarios.

Figure 4 – Initial state of interactions between Driving Forces



* Respectively: 0- initial absence of FM 1- intense presence of FM; Favorable Scenario Critical Scenario; G1- Glaciers in full and melting; E2- The Ukraine War needs to be present in both scenarios for coherence to your research program; Subtitle.

To carry out the inferences of the fuzzy cognitive map, the “FCM” application of the R software was used, considering the initial values of the two scenarios and the dynamics of interactions by rescaling equation, which recorded the final FM equilibria with the greatest number of stages, with six steps for each scenario (Dikopoulou and Papageorgiou 2017).

The results of the interactions indicate values assumed by the FM, between 0 and 1, indicating an increase or decrease in strength or performance in the system, in relation to the initial values established in each scenario. To make the interpretation coherent and facilitate the analysis of the results, the 12 FM were separated into four groups: political-strategic (P1 and E1); scientific-technological (T1, T2, T3 and T4); legal (J1, J2 and J3) and environmental (A1 and G1).


When evaluating the interactions of the Resultant Matrix, the ability of one FM to influence the other (from row to column) and the extent to which each FM is influenceable was considered. In the calculation, absolute values were considered since there will be a positive or negative influence. The FMs with the greatest capacity to influence are E1, T1, T2 and J3. And the most influenced are E1, J3 and T3.

8 Results

The results were analyzed by sets of political-strategic FM (P1 and E1), scientific-technological FM (T1, T2, T3 and T4), judicial-legal FM (J1, J2 and J3) and environmental FM (A1 and G1). The graphs in Figs 5, 6, 7 and 8 show the dynamic behavior of the interactions, which reached equilibrium in the

sixth stage. In the favorable scenario, these undesirable FMs start in a null state (“zero” value), indicating their absence at the beginning of interactions. In the critical scenario, these forces start with a maximum value of “1”, indicating their full presence at the beginning of interactions. The values on the vertical axis show the intensity of the driving force in each stage until its stabilization. The equidistance between the six stages are just to simplify the graphical visualization, as it is not possible to infer how long each stage can last, depending on the complexity of the system, its multiple interactions and the freedom of action of the actors involved.

Figure 5 – Political-Strategic Driving Forces (P1, E1)¹²




Analyzing the political-strategic FM, it is noted that in a favorable scenario both FM would have a small initial variation that would later stabilize at low values. The instability of the international system in this case would have a greater initial variation indicating the pressures on the adjustment of the international system. However, in this case the impact of the Ukrainian War would not cause major disruptions. In the critical scenario where FM would begin at its maximum level, the advantage of the militarization of Antarctica (E1) would barely suffer a reduction, indicating a constant increase in the deployment of resources and personnel for dual use. The instability of the international system (P1) also remains at high levels, indicating that the War in Ukraine can generate impacts that go beyond the regional level. It therefore seems sensible to observe the development of the War in Ukraine and its consequences, being aware that even if FM P1 and E2 are not at full strength in the real situation, they are at high levels, closer to the critical scenario, so they do not tend to have great attenuation. Analyzing the current

¹² Translation: Favourable Scenario; Critical Scenario; Results; Interactions


moment of instability in the international system, the FM's behavior would be closer to the critical scenario than the favorable one.

Figure 6 – Scientific – Technological Driving Forces (T₁, T₂, T₃ and T₄)¹³




Considering scientific-technological FM, it can be seen that in the favorable scenario all FM would present a relatively small initial boost (1.5 to 2.5%) with subsequent reduction and stabilization at low levels indicating the permanence of existing technologies, therefore they would not be null, but without dual use. The sequence of values T₁, T₄, T₃ and T₂ would indicate the greater development and dissemination of the technology, which is coherent when analyzing T₁, which represents the use of receiving stations whose value is preponderant as it is the basis for the other technologies. When checking the unfavorable scenario for these same FMs, a small initial attenuation (between 1 and 2%) is noted, followed by stability at high values close to full use of technologies. This would mean that current capabilities already used in a dual manner would have their military bias expanded. The sequence of values T₂, T₃, T₄ and T₁ indicates which technologies would be most used. In this case, the evolution and impacts of War in Ukraine may establish the levels of use of these technologies as well as the maintenance of their use exclusively in scientific activities or their use for military use.

¹³ Translation: Favourable Scenario; Critical Scenario; Results; Interactions.

Figure 7 – Judicial-legal Driving Forces (J1, J2 and J3)¹⁴

Judicial-legal FMs show similar evolution to other FMs in the favorable scenario: small initial increase and subsequent stabilization at low levels. It is worth highlighting the prominence of J1, which deals with the degree of divergence between countries regarding compliance with STA obligations, as even in a favorable scenario it stands out in values indicating initial divergences between interested states. In a critical scenario, attenuation is small and levels remain high. In this scenario, FM J3 draws attention as it would represent the first indication of irregular activities due to the increased resistance of countries to inspections. If a tendency for the War in Ukraine to continue, although it is relevant not to reach catastrophic levels with the involvement of several countries, there is a tendency for J1, J2 and J3 to remain at at least intermediate levels, not favoring the balance of the STA but not necessarily being disruptive.

¹⁴ Translation: Favourable Scenario; Critical Scenario; Results; Interactions.

Figure 8 – Environmental Driving Forces (A1 and G1)¹⁵

Environmental FM, in turn, presents different behaviors from the others. In the favorable scenario where G1 is set to value “1”, that is, “full”, as a large extension of the ice layer is desirable, the FM suffers great attenuation (more than 60%) which is understandable given that the time for this type of climate change is relatively long. On the other hand, A1, which represents the severity of the impact of climate change, has a small increase, indicating the little relevance of these changes in a favorable scenario. For the critical scenario, the opposite occurs, climate change is of great importance in the militarization of the continent as well as the reduction of ice sheets.

From the analysis of the data resulting from the application of the FCM to the values originating from the weighted average of the experts’ adjacency matrices, it can be noted that the Ukrainian War will be a catalyst for the FM, influencing the possible militarization of Antarctica, since its existence, considered for both scenarios, changes the FM values. The intensity of the changes will depend on the evolution of the conflict and whether it will be restricted to the regional level or will spread not only in space, but in other areas.

9 Conclusion

The research aimed to analyze the possible impacts of the Ukrainian War on the balance of power between nations and how it could be a motivator for revisionist actions by the great powers, based on militarized dual-use structures, on the occasion of the STA analysis, scheduled for 2048.

Initially, the topic was contextualized, showing the characteristics of Antarctica that made it relevant to the point of being included in the Brazilian

¹⁵ Translation: Favourable Scenario; Critical Scenario; Results; Interactions.

Strategic Environment according to the LBDN and PND. POLANTAR was also presented as a guiding standard for Brazilian objectives in the region, its guideline that points to the defense of the exploration of Antarctica exclusively for scientific research purposes, implementing the provisions of AED 83 of the END. This initial part is important for offering an understanding of the country's objectives for the sixth continent, serving as a guide for research on the topic.

Then, for a better understanding of the work by the reader, the research problem, the final objective and the intermediate objectives whose achievement leads to the solution of the first presented. Additionally, justifications for establishing the scope that delimited the research were presented, as well as the information that makes it relevant for study. Still in the initial chapter, the organization of the research was explained, facilitating the understanding of the sequence of the work.

The literature review, presented below, presented the two main study themes: the geopolitical balance of the STA and the War in Ukraine. The work used the theoretical basis of the research by McGee et al. together with the fuzzy cognitive maps method to analyze possible interactions. Aiming to meet this objective, a summary of the work by McGee et al. and the point at which our research settled was indicated.

Next, the research dealt with the history of the continent, citing the evolution of the level of interest in the region. From the period of relative abandonment, lack of knowledge and lack of interest motivated by technological difficulties in access, permanence and navigation, going through a period of still incipient interest where only a few nations sought to establish objectives on the continent through territorial claims when the first disputes arose. This initial analysis was fundamental to better understand the power disputes that made necessary the construction of the STA.

Elsewhere, the process of evolution of the international system since the end of the Cold War, when the USA emerged as the only power and leader of the neoliberal globalization process, establishing the period of Pax Americana, is explained. The factors that led to the end of North American unipolarity were then presented. They contain the origins of multipolarity, the process of deglobalization and the reorganization of production chains. The origins of the Ukrainian War and how it brought about a worsening of the relationship between the USA and Russia were also presented. It also showed that China's non-alignment with other Western powers in favor of sanctions on Russia was another stress factor for the international system. These factors help explain the current instability in the international system and how it could spread to other important strategic regions such as Antarctica.

This set of circumstances generates the need to investigate how this

intensification of tensions can influence Brazil, especially on the Antarctic continent. The investigation was carried out using the Fuzzy Cognitive Maps methodology. It was described how the concepts and relationships of cause and effect were submitted to the experts. It was also explained how the input values for the R interaction software were generated from the Adjacency Matrix resulting from the weighted average of the Questionnaires. The resulting graphs were then presented, the analysis of which allowed the assessment of the impact of the War in Ukraine on militarization and consequently on the balance of the STA.

From the analysis of the graphics, it can be seen that regardless of the chosen scenario, whether the “critical” one when the FM favorable to militarization are at full strength or the “favorable” one when the FM favorable to militarization are null, the War in Ukraine brings about a change in the initial values, that is, it influences the system. The difficulty in developing the prospective scenario is due to the fact that the conflict is ongoing and could still be expanded or distended. The intensity of changes in FM and consequently in the International System depends on the evolution of the conflict and whether it will remain restricted to the regional level or will spread.

Another relevant aspect is that the War in Ukraine exposed weaknesses, dissolved treaties and generated new alliances. Furthermore, it showed the fragility of the world production system and its need for reorganization. By reorienting alliances and exposing divergences, the main global actors turned their attention to issues of national sovereignty, militarization, regional production and the search for new trade opportunities and sources of resources. At this point, within some market possibilities, Africa emerged and among some possibilities for resource sources, the Arctic and Antarctica gained relevance.

Leaders and strategic thinkers have the responsibility to reflect and prepare for the future before it arrives, this is called strategic planning. The revision of the Madrid Protocol in 2048 may arise from an alignment of interests of new and old actors. It is a plausible scenario and should be considered especially by Brazil, which has Antarctica as part of its strategic environment. However, it is noted that the conflict already influences the balance of the global balance of power and is a candidate to be a catalyst for change with the potential to influence changes in the Madrid Protocol. Some of these new positions are ongoing and the extent to which they will reach will depend on the future of the conflict. Among them we mention: resumption of the US and NATO's leading role, rearmament of EU countries, regionalization of the production chain, reduction in the pace of global growth and isolation of Russia from the West with consequent rapprochement with China, among

others.

The evolution of the conflict in Ukraine and its impacts require constant analysis of the international context to identify the position that the country should and can adopt in view of its interests and mainly its National Power to, subsequently, establish the directions for national strategy in a world moving towards multilateralism. In this sense, it is more interesting and more effective for the country to maintain its historical stance of conciliation and establishment of transnational alliances.

In this way, the work in question achieved the purpose of analyzing possible geopolitical impacts resulting from the Ukrainian War on the stability of the STA that could encourage the militarization of the continent. The limitations of the research imposed the need to establish a cut in the analysis of the aspects considered most relevant. In this way, the following improvements are visualized:

- the extension of this work by using the other FM listed in McGee's original research;
- expansion of the specialist group, diversifying into other areas of activity;
- assessment of the applicability of the study in the analysis of conflicts similar to the one considered here; and
- the study of expanding the Brazilian Antarctic Program, defining priority areas and projects for investment as well as evaluating the possibility of expanding the program's logistical capacity by building new stations and increasing the number of research projects

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to evaluate the impact of the Ukrainian War on the geopolitics of Antarctica. Beyond the borders of the countries involved, the most immediate and noticeable impact of a conflict of this nature is evident in the economic environment. However, international relations are tested or shaken, exerting pressure on treaties and cooperation agreements between countries, through the reappearance of past political issues. In 1959, the Antarctic Treaty sought to protect the continent from territorial pressures capable of affecting its natural balance, but this type of conflict compromises international cooperation and brings to light old interests in resource exploration in that region. This complex system, composed of cause and effect forces that involve the interests of the different countries involved in Antarctic geopolitics, was quantitatively modeled by cognitive maps, which explore artificial intelligence concepts to evaluate the behavior of these forces. The results indicated trends in relation to 12 driving forces selected from the literature and evaluated by experts from the Brazilian Antarctic Program, allowing the evaluation of the dynamics of the system over time.

KEYWORDS

Ukraine war; Geopolitics of Antarctica; Fuzzy Cognitive Maps.

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DEVELOPMENT AND METRIC VALIDITY OF “LOGISTIC FRICTION SCALE (LFS)” FOR ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY BORDER ORGANIZATIONS’ SUPPLY

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1 Introduction

The present communication of results is a product of interdisciplinary research, a consequence of both the individual trajectory of the researchers and the complex nature of the object of investigation, that is, the dynamics arising from the supply of military organizations located in the Brazil – Colombia – Peru Triple Border region. It was considered that the Amazon is a region of the national territory characterized by the most varied difficulties, especially regarding distance and the lack of minimum support infrastructure (Becker, 2010). The dense rainforest, the tropical climate, the geographical characteristics, the distances, the low population density, the non-existent or limited supply of energy, the lack of land routes, among other factors, amplify the difficulties in supplying the military units present there (Ferreira, 2020). We are interested here in the Special Border Platoons (PEF, in portuguese), which are small military organizations, generally with 40 to 60 soldiers, deployed close to the country’s border limits, marking the national presence

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in the territory and performing several other tasks (Moraes, 2021). Because they are generally isolated, logistics for supplying these small military units is essential. Because the men and women stationed there on the border do not have access to several basic items if not through the supply chain.

Therefore, studying the friction involved in supplying these PEFs is important to understand their action, and from there, mitigate their effects and reflexes, resulting in an increase in the efficiency of protecting Brazilian territory against potential threats. It focused on the logistical flow associated with the Special Border Platoons (PEF) deployed in the regions of Palmeiras do Javari, Estirão do Equador, Vila Bittencourt and Ipiranga, all in the Brazilian state of Amazonas (Franchi 2013). Logo, estudar a fricção atuante no abastecimento desses PEF é importante para entender a sua ação, e a partir disso, atenuar os seus efeitos e reflexos, resultando no incremento da eficiência da proteção do território brasileiro contra as ameaças potenciais. Focou-se no fluxo logístico associado aos Pelotões Especiais de Fronteira (PEF) desdobrados nas regiões de Palmeiras do Javari, Estirão do Equador, Vila Bittencourt e Ipiranga, todas no estado do Amazonas (Franchi 2013).

The main research question was to generate a valid and reliable measuring instrument – the “Escala de Fricção Logística” (Logistics Friction Scale, or EFL) – to evaluate the model for meeting the logistical needs of the Special Border Platoons that the Brazilian Army maintains in the Triple Border region (Brazil – Colombia – Peru). The choice of this theme was motivated by the following reasons: (i) the relevance of the concept of friction in this region; (ii) due to the importance of guaranteeing supply to the country’s borders and its northern interior and (iii) due to the absence of an instrument that systematically evaluated the construct under study here.

It is assumed, from the outset, that the research object – logistical friction – is an abstract construct. Construct is “an abstraction that the researcher can define in conceptual terms, but which cannot be measured directly...or be measured without error...are the basis for forming the causal relationship...the purest representation of the concept” (Hair, Anderson, Tathan, and Black 2009, 579, own translation)⁵. It cannot, therefore, be evaluated directly, by an objective and direct measure.

This must be done through observable indicators (items) that allow the inference of the latent variable (construct), defined by a theoretical framework (Hair, et al. 2009). A measure by theory must be created based on a defined

⁵ In the original: “uma abstração que o pesquisador pode definir em termos conceituais, mas que não pode ser medida diretamente...ou ser medido sem erros....são a base para formar o relacionamento causal...a mais pura representação do conceito” (Hair, Anderson, Tathan, y Black, 2009, p.579).

theoretical assumption, through which previous evidence from the literature is identified, which is then operationalized by researchers to generate observable indicators (scale items), creating the assessment instrument itself. Next, must be generated evidence of construct validity and internal reliability (McDowell and Nevel 1996). Reliability is the ability of an instrument to faithfully measure a phenomenon, without systematic errors and biases (Kerlinger 1986). Construct validity is concerned with proving the theory that underlies the measure, or in other words, with establishing evidence that the instrument really assesses what it intends to measure (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994; Hoskins 1996).

In order to clarify the taxonomic insertion, and, consequently, the perspective adopted in the reflection, adherence to Applied Social Sciences is recorded, more specifically at the intersection between the areas of Administration and Military Sciences. The approach developed intends to contribute, in theoretical terms and, mainly, in methodological terms, to the common subarea of Defense Logistics (Brick, 2016). Furthermore, it is estimated, as a natural consequence of the object of study, that the research contributes to Defense Studies (Domingos Neto 2014; Diniz 2015), a study field emerging in Brazil, supporting reflection on the topic of strategic interest for the country (CAPES 2010, 287).

This article, which aims to develop and metrically validate a Logistics Friction Scale (EFL) for the Amazon border region, is structured in five sections, which follow the introduction. The first section deals with the presentation of the research design; the second section with the theoretical review of the construct. Next, the third section is presented, which is the research stage focused on the development of EFL, with its methodological procedures and results. The fourth section presents a description of the methodological procedures and results of the EFL metric study. The fifth section discusses the results obtained, as well as presenting the conclusions and suggesting future research opportunities.

2 The Research Design

In methodological terms, the research is divided into two distinct stages: the item generation stage and the instrument metric study stage. To generate the items, the procedures described by DeVellis (2003) were adopted, starting from the theoretical definition to operationalize the construct under study, a literature review and the generation of items by experts in the area based on reading this evidence. For the metric study of the instrument, the multivariate method of factor analysis was used, which is a set of advanced statistical

techniques, which treats the variables together, creating the possibilities of interpretations and factor analysis that allows showing whether the scale can infer or measure what is proposed (Silva and Simon 2005). Among the two multivariate factor analysis methods – exploratory and confirmatory – confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was chosen for this research, as it allows us to evaluate the measurement model and the causal relationships between the constructs, being much more consistent and robust in relation to the exploratory model (Marcoulides and Hershberger 2005; Brown 2006). Another step in the metric analysis was checking that the data was not biased. For this, construct reliability was used to verify internal consistency (Hair et al. 2009).

It is important to record the time frame of the research. In theoretical terms, and with particular regard to the bibliographical research that gave rise to the items in the instrument now created, works published from 1832 to 2018 were reviewed. However, it is necessary to better delimit the period to which the experiences refer, which arises from the composition of the sample available for research. In this sense, most respondents experienced the research problem from the beginning of the 1990s to the middle of the second decade of the year 2000. This is a consequence associated with the number of professionals annually employed in the logistics activity under examination and the sample sizing needs, a privileged option with the intention of obtaining quantitative validation of the proposed scale.

It is noteworthy that the research involved analysis of specific regional dynamics of the border strip of the so-called Triple Border (Brazil – Colombia – Peru). The applicability of this research to other Amazonian spaces, especially regarding the use of EFL in other border areas, is possible and viable, as long as it is subject to greater attention and judgment on the part of the analyst or researcher.

3 Theoretical Review

The limits defined for approaching the problem of this research are based on the concept of friction first synthesized by Clausewitz (2010) in the context of war. For him, the field of action of friction would be on human beings, the environment and the material used in war and military activities. After Clausewitz, other authors and works returned and expanded his concept of friction - Moltke (1993); Keegan (1996); Watts (1996); Elward (2010); Malkki and Malkki (2011) and Gray (2005) – and were also considered.

In the field of physics, the concept of friction is understood as “the phenomenon that produces resistance in the contact between two bodies”

(Ramalho Jr, Nicolau y Toledo 2007, 224). Clausewitz (2010) theorized friction in the 19th century, as a result of his concern with incidents that hindered the execution of military planning, leading to the rectification of these plans, compromising decisive actions in war. Friction is the interaction of chance and action and can be caused by many factors, including enemy forces, friendly actions, or the environment (Clausewitz, 2010). It is important to highlight that friction – or attrition – can only be perceived in war as it is present in everyday human activities, which are also marked by interaction between two – or more – bodies, in which resistance is a fundamental element (Clausewitz, 2010).

Eliminating friction is not achievable, regardless of the technological advances that the devices involved in the action may achieve. Because friction is about chaos and the unexpected (Clausewitz, 2010). However, bringing to knowledge and promoting the systematization of misfortunes already experienced is a way of achieving better planning, more credible, more adjusted to real action. Knowing the elements of chaos in a situation is then a way of anticipating the occurrence of friction in similar situations (Mallki and Mallki 2011).

To minimize friction and its effects, it is important to know friction. Knowing will allow you to anticipate its effects, make plans more adjusted to reality and no longer be surprised by the identified risk (Mallki and Mallki 2011). Therefore, the systematic assessment of friction is something that must be done in human actions, including and especially those that occur in particularly challenging regions and situations.

4 Development of the Logistics Friction Scale in the Amazon (Stage 1)

Methodological procedures

The proposition of the initial pool of EFL items and its factorial structure (determination of latent variables), as already pointed out, followed the methodological procedures described by DeVellis (2003), using a deductive approach, namely: theoretical literature review; writing of items supported by the adopted theoretical definition and literature review, conducted by experienced researchers; checking the content validity of items.

It is noteworthy that in this process some care is essential for the researcher. Specifically for this research, these deserve to be highlighted and were adopted: (1) the items must clearly refer to the manifestations of the eval-

uated construct; (2) items should be as simple as possible; (3) each item must express a single idea; (4) they must be composed of words common to the vocabulary of the target population, avoiding slang and colloquialisms; (5) items must not induce desired responses; (5) they must not present generalizations or estimates and must not be inductive to guarantee the variability of responses; (6) they must be ordered on a scale from the simplest to the most complex and, (7) if possible with a balance between positive and negative statements (Clark and Watson, 1995; Malhotra, 2004; Pasquali, 2010).

The items must also be subject to a content validity assessment at this stage of creating the instrument. This last procedure is carried out by judging the items by people from the target population of interest (professionals who work in logistics in the Amazon region) in relation to the clarity of the wording and the relevance of the items to the construct under study (logistical friction). They also gave their opinion on the pertinence of each observable variable (item) in the latent variables (factors). Based on the responses, the content validation index was calculated for each item (in relation to the judgment of the clarity and relevance of the items), according to the formula: $I-CVI = \text{number of judges who awarded the maximum score} / \text{total number of judges}$. Values equal to or greater than 0.80 indicate adequate items, values between 0.70 and 0.79 items that need revision and below 0.70 items that should be eliminated (Zamanzadeh, Rassouli, Abbaszadeh, Majd, Nikanfar & Ghahramanian 2014)

Seven military professionals, who had already worked in the Amazon region for at least two years in logistics-related roles, were invited to participate as content judges. This should judge the adequacy of the content of the items to the underlying theory, using a 3-point interval scale (1 = irrelevant, 2 = useful, but not essential and 3 = essential).

Results

Literature review

In relation to theory, for Clausewitz (2010), the individual and the environment were central categories of friction. Regarding the individual, danger, fear, and physical effort due to their destabilizing effects, are elements that alter the execution of initial planning. Stress, due to chemical changes in soldiers resulting from cold, heat, thirst, sleep deprivation, physical and mental fatigue, was also an element of friction in the individual category recognized by Clausewitz (2010). Kellet (1987) ratifies these elements and also includes disease, hunger, thirst, uncertainty and more recently, Mallki and Mallki (2011) gave great importance to the effects of friction on individuals, highlighting understanding, judgment, cultural, common sense and even

culture in planning execution.

Regarding the action of friction in the environment, Clausewitz (2010) considered climatic conditions § bad weather, fog, floods, extreme cold or heat, the seasons, the uncertainties of bad weather, topography (mountainous terrain, marshy) and the roads used as elements of this category. These pioneering considerations about the environment as a category of friction and its constituent elements were later ratified (Moltke, 1983; Keegan, 1996).

The equipment category is the most recent and brings together the various means used to carry out planning. They are means of transport, machines, storage units, shelter, parts, roads, runways, navigable rivers, guidance equipment and many others (Moltke 1983; Watts 1996).

Another way of conceiving these friction categories can be considered. From this alternative view, friction “comprises two elements that are of different natures and, consequently, of investigation: 1) the factors: danger, effort, intelligence, bad weather, for example; and 2) the effect: restriction of our judgment” (Malkki y Malkki 2011, 45). From this perspective, the second element is parallel to the category and elements of friction theorized for individuals. The first element, in turn, brings together elements of the environment, the individual and equipment, a category not initially thought of by Clausewitz (2010) in the development of his friction theory. The elements and categories described here can be identified in table 1.

Quadro 1 – Categorias de fricção e seus elementos

Authors	Friction categories	Observable elements
		<i>Description; Expression, Materialization; or essence of what makes up the category</i>
Clausewitz Kellet	Individual	Danger/fear Physical Effort Stress Illnesses Misinterpretation of orders
Clausewitz; Malkki e Malkki; Keegan; Moltke	Ambiente (clima e terreno)*	Bad weather; rain, fog, floods; extreme cold or heat, seasons, uncertainties (bad weather) Type of terrain (Mountainous, swampy, etc.) Roads (roads, rivers, airfields) in poor condition**
Watts; Moltke; Watts	Equipment	Inadequate/inefficient/breakages and defects Railway Accidents (Road/River/Aeronautical) ***

Source: Prepared by the authors based on: Clausewitz (2010); Moltke (1993); Keegan (1996); Watts (1996); Elward (2010); Malkki and Malkki (2011) and Gray (2005).

* Climate is understood as the daily or associated meteorological conditions of regions of the globe and seasons of the year.

** For the Amazon we consider rivers and airfields as circulation routes.

*** As the railway network does not reach the PEF, we consider accidents involving vehicles, boats and aircraft.

Item generation

Based on the evidence collected, two experts deductively operationalized the items. One expert had 15 years of experience in creating/validating measurement scales and the second expert had two decades of study in Amazon and border issues. They met in a room and brainstormed, listing manifestations of friction that could be observed in the region in each of the friction categories. These manifestations were written into sentences, in accordance with the specific precautions outlined above.

At the end of this work, the initial “pool” of items from the Logistic Friction Scale (EFL) was composed of 39 observable variables. The EFL was proposed as a three-dimensional scale, with three first-order factors: (1) Environmental, which addressed elements of friction related to climate, natural accidents and transportation routes; (2) Equipment, which addressed observable facts linked to the breakdown of resources, inefficient/inadequate equipment and accidents; and (3) Individual, which addressed aspects associated with hierarchy and discipline, dedication, personal care, commitment, illnesses and stress.

The items were arranged on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = never; 2 = rarely; 3 = sometimes; 4 = often and 5 = always) with the addition of the response option “not applicable”, with a score of zero, in items 5, 6, 7, 13, 24, 25, 26 and 35. Items 5, 6, 7, 13, 17, 24, 25, 26, and 29 were written in negative statements, and therefore have a reverse score, that is, their response values must be inverted before analysis. A summary of this activity can be seen in table 2.

Charter 2 – EFL factors, their defining elements and examples of observable variables

Authors	EFL Factors	Observable elements Description; Expression, Materialization; or essence of what makes up the category	Examples of Observable Variables To operationalize the construct under study
Clausewitz Kellet	Individual	Danger/fear Physical Effort Stress Illnesses Misinterpretation of orders	<u>Fights</u> among troops embarked on a supply mission cause problems. <u>Disease-related</u> casualties in troops that hamper supply missions
Clausewitz; Malkki e Malkki; Keegan; Moltke	Environment (climate and terrain) *	Bad weather; rain, fog, floods; extreme cold or heat, seasons, uncertainties (bad weather) Type of terrain (Mountainous, swampy, etc.) Roads (roads, rivers, airfields) in poor condition**	The <u>extreme heat</u> during logistical trips to the PEF's hinders the arrival of supplies on the scheduled date. <u>Sudden weather changes</u> make the mission difficult.
Watts; Moltke	Equipment	Inadequate/inefficient/breakages and defects Railway Accidents (Road/River/Aeronautical) ***	Equipment for transporting/storing/unloading cargo causes <u>delays</u> in the arrival of supply trips The unavailability of resources is a reason for <u>delays</u> in supply

Source: Prepared by the authors based on: Clausewitz (2010); Moltke (1993); Keegan (1996); Watts (1996); Elward (2010); Malkki and Malkki (2011) and Gray (2005).

* Climate is understood as the daily or associated meteorological conditions of regions of the globe and seasons of the year.

** For the Amazon we consider rivers and airfields as circulation routes.

*** As the railway network does not reach all locations, we consider accidents involving vehicles, boats and aircraft

Content validation

When judging content validity, of the total of 39 items, 11 items obtained $I-CVI < 0.70$ and were eliminated. Items with $.70 \leq I-CVI < .79$ were rediscussed by the researchers (table 1).

Table 1 – Assessment of the Content Validity Coefficient of EFL items

Items	I-CVI	Items	CRV	Items	CRV	Items	CRV
1	.71	11	.71	21*	.42	31	.71
2	1	12	.71	22*	.14	32*	.14
3*	.14	13	.85	23*	.14	33	.71
4*	.42	14	.71	24	1	34	.71
5	.86	15	.71	25	1	35*	.42
6	.86	16*	.42	26	.71	36	.71
7	.86	17	.71	27*	.14	37	.71
8	.71	18*	.14	28*	.14	38	.71
9	.71	19	.71	29	.71	39	.71
10	.71	20	.71	30	0,71		

Note: * Items with $I-CVI < .70$

At the end of this stage, the EFL version was generated to be taken to the metric study, with 28 items distributed into 3 factors: (1) Environmental, with items 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 19, 22 and 26; (2) Equipment, with items 1, 3, 6, 15, 16, 18, 23, 27, 25; and (3) Individual, in items 7, 10, 11, 17, 20, 21, 24 and 28. In this version refined by the judges, the items with reverse scores in the new reordering became 3, 4, 7, 11, 17, 18, 19 and 20.

The following step is essential for determining the suitability of the scale proposed here to be used in the assessment of friction in logistics activities in the Amazon region, as it is through this step that it will be determined whether the instrument now created does so without inducing errors and generates really relevant data to explain logistical friction.

5 EFL Metric Study (Step 2)

Considering the statistical analysis used (multiple regression in covariance matrix), the sample number for this research was determined, with the Gpower software. Size .15 was adopted for effect size, with a confidence level of 95%, power of 90%, with two predictors involved in the structural model tested. The minimum sample size calculated was 99 people, so that the effect of the statistical test could be adequately detected.

The total sample of this study consisted of 110 participants, of which 98.18% (n=108) were men. The sample age ranged between 22 and 68 years ($M = 37.92 \pm 7.01$). The time that the military personnel served in the Military Organizations (OM) of the Amazon region varied between 1 and 22 years ($M = 4.91 \pm 3.33$). Finally, 29.6% of respondents did not serve in a Special Border Platoon (PEF), but served in other Military Organizations that provided logistical support to the PEF, such as: the Vessel Center of the Amazon Military Command (CECMA) and the 16th Jungle Logistics Base (16th BaLog). Regarding the participation of PEF members in the research, the 5 PEF that had the most participants in this research were from CFSOL/8th BIS: 4th PEF (Estimão do Ecuador) with 10.2% ; 3rd PEF (Vila Bittencourt) with 8.5%; 1st PEF (Palmeiras do Javari) with 6.5%; 2nd PEF (Ipiranga) with 6.5%; and from the 2nd BIS: 1st PEF (Tiriós) with 6.5%.

All EFL data collection was carried out using an electronic form. The list of recipients was constructed based on information provided by the Army Personnel Registration System (SiCaPEX). Participants were invited via email and instant messaging applications (Whatsapp and Telegram) to fill out the scale with an explanation of the research purposes. If the recipient agreed to participate in the research, they should click on the links and answer the EFL and a demographic questionnaire (to characterize the sample, as presented above) anonymously. Participation was voluntary and no participant received

any remuneration or reward for their participation.

Confirmatory factor analysis was the multivariate technique chosen for the psychometric approach to the data in this research. There is a theoretical “background” on friction already established in the literature analyzed. Despite this, the specific study on friction in supply practiced in the Amazon region still requires investigation and theoretical maturity. For these reasons, an approach that can contribute to the prediction and theoretical development of logistical friction was chosen, the Partial Least Square (PLS) method (Hair, Hult, Ringle, y Sarstedt 2014).

The evaluation of the measurement model was carried out through the analysis of factor loadings ($\lambda = .50$ – acceptable and $\lambda = .70$ - ideal) and the average variance extracted ($AVE \geq .50$) – to generate evidence of convergent validity (Hair et al., 2014). The Fornell and Larcker criterion (Fornell and Larcker, 1981) was adopted to assess discriminant validity. According to the aforementioned criterion, there is evidence of discriminant validity when the square root of the AVE of a factor is higher than the correlation between that factor and the other factors in the model ($r \leq \sqrt{AVE}$). Additionally, McDonald’s omega test and composite reliability (ω and $CC \geq .70$) were used to assess internal reliability (Hair et al., 2014).

SPSS software, version 21, and Smart PLS 2.0 were used to conduct the analyzes, with a 95% confidence interval being adopted for all tests. The more stringent “listwise” deletion was used for missing data.

Results

Before the confirmatory factor analysis, a descriptive analysis of the items was carried out, to assist in the decision to maintain/eliminate the items, given their high and low response variability, respectively (Table 2).

Table 2 – Description of EFL items

Items	M	SD	Frequency of responses (%)					
			N	R	AV	F	S	N/S
EFL1	2.31	.80	12	53.7	26.9	6.5	.9	-
EFL 2	3.42	.91	1.9	1.2	44.4	3.6	13	-
EFL 3	2.28	.75	13.9	48.1	34.3	3.7	-	-
EFL 4	2.85	.82	1.9	31.5	5.9	11.1	4.6	-
EFL 5	2.37	.77	14	44.4	38	5.6	-	-
EFL 6	3.03	1.14	1.2	21.3	35.2	22.2	11.1	-
EFL 7	1.78	.87	43.5	4.7	12	1.9	1.9	-
EFL 8	3.48	.81	-	1.2	41.7	38	1.2	-
EFL 9	3.32	.81	.9	13.9	42.6	37	5.6	-
EFL 10	1.59	.68	5.9	39.8	8.3	.9	-	-
EFL 11	2.11	.80	22.2	48.1	26.9	1.9	.9	-
EFL 12	2.67	.97	9.3	35.2	4.7	9.3	5.6	-
EFL 13	1.87	1.06	24.1	4.7	2.4	2.8	1.9	1.2
EFL 14	3.20	1.40	3.7	4.6	31.5	37	13	1.2
EFL 15	2.32	1.46	11.1	13.9	36.1	16.7	3.7	18.5
EFL 16	2.20	.65	11.1	59.3	27.8	1.9	-	-
EFL 17	2.01	.81	27.8	48.1	19.4	4.6	-	-
EFL 18	2.43	1.04	17.6	42.6	21.3	15.7	2.8	-
EFL 19	2.56	.81	7.4	4.7	42.6	7.4	1.9	-
EFL 20	2.43	.86	14.8	35.2	42.6	6.5	.9	-
EFL 21	2.14	.86	23.1	47.2	22.2	7.4	-	-
EFL 22	3.50	.72	-	4.6	49.1	38	8.3	-
EFL 23	2.42	.92	14.8	41.7	32.4	9.3	1.9	-
EFL 24	2.66	1.39	1.9	1.2	5.9	14.8	6.5	16.7
EFL 25	2.42	.79	11.1	42.6	4.7	4.6	.9	-
EFL 26	2.73	.92	4.6	39.8	38.9	11.1	5.6	-
EFL 27	2.20	.72	13	58.3	24.1	4.6	-	-
EFL 28	3.20	.93	4.6	1.9	45.4	28.7	7.4	-

Note: M = average; SD = standard deviation; N = never; R = rarely; AV = sometimes; F = frequently; S = always; N/S = not applicable.

The three-dimensional theoretical model was subjected to factor analysis. In the first rotation, it was identified that items 6, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 26, 27 and 28 had factor loadings varying between $\lambda = .16 - .49$ and were therefore eliminated from the model, one by one, with each new estimation. Therefore, all remaining items achieved adequate factor loadings, as can be seen in Table 2. The final model is shown in Figure 1.

Table 3 – Factor loadings of indicators in each factor

Factor	Items	M	DP	λ
Environment	2	3.42	.90	.67
	8	3.48	.81	.78
	9	3.32	.81	.70
	12	2.66	.96	.58
	22	3.50	.71	.82
Equipment	1	2.32	.81	.57
	3	2.29	.76	.74
	4	2.85	.81	.70
	5	2.37	.76	.79
	25	2.41	.78	.75
Individual	7	1.77	.86	.65
	10	1.59	.68	.74
	11	2.11	.80	.68
	17	2.00	.81	.73
	20	2.43	.85	.69
	21	2.13	.85	.76

Satisfactory evidence of convergent validity was generated for the three factors ($AVE \geq .50$; $\lambda \geq .50$). The factorial loadings of the Environment factor varied between $\lambda = .58 - .82$, and $AVE = .51$. The Equipment factor had factor loadings varying between $\lambda = .57 - .79$ in its items and $AVE = .51$. Finally, the Individual factor had $AVE = .51$ and factor loadings varied between $\lambda = .65 - .76$. Regarding discriminant validity ($r \leq \sqrt{AVE}$), evidence measures were established for all factors, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4 – Discriminant validity of the EFL

	1	2	3
1 – Environment	.71		
2 – Equipment	.21	.71	
3 – Individual	.27	.68	.70

Note: values for the square root of AVE are in bold. Below the diagonal are the correlations (r_2) between the respective pairs of factors.

Discussion

The present study aimed to develop a valid and reliable measure to measure the friction elements that can be identified during supply trips in the Amazon region. The final version of the Logistic Friction Scale (EFL) is composed of 16 items, which assess three factors of friction – Environment, Equipment and Individual – in accordance with the friction theory of Clausewitz (2010) and other theorists who continued to develop its theory considered here.

The first part of the study developed the instrument, generating the pool of original items and defining the response scale. The EFL presented satisfactory content validity values for the reference sample studied – military personnel who served in military organizations in the Amazon region – in 28 of the 39 items initially proposed. Despite the elimination of 11 items, the scale continued to the next stage with items exceeding the minimum quantity usually recommended, which is 20 items, ensuring possibilities for metric adjustments (DeVellis 2003).

In relation to the metric study, the theoretically proposed three-factor structure was confirmed, also generating satisfactory evidence of construct validity and internal reliability with data from the reference sample. This indicates confirmation that the phenomenon of friction analyzed by classical theorists such as Clausewitz (2010), Moltke (2011) and ratified by modern scholars such as Kellet (1987), Keegan (1996), Watts (1996); Elward (2010); Malkki and Malkki (2011) and Gray (2005) are a relevant reality for the planning and execution of logistical operations launched to logistically supply the PEF. The fit of the tested model to real data met all quality criteria required for evidence generated after using multivariate statistical techniques.

However, it is worth commenting on the elimination of eight items at this stage. This fact could be explained by an elaboration far from the theoretical framework that supports the instrument. But considering the rigorous process of judging and refining EFL items carried out in the first phase of the study, a careless elaboration does not seem to be a plausible explanation. Therefore, it is worth resorting to the assumptions of measurement by theory, which states that absolute truths are not measured (Malhotra, 2004) – what always occurs and what never occurs. The concentration of responses for some eliminated items in one of the Likert scale options may explain their elimination. Observing the elements of friction in the light of theory - the basis for the creation of EFL - allows it to be evaluated in a pertinent way. In the case of EFL, the validity evidence generated confirms that the observable variables and predicted factors really are relevant and evaluate the friction in supplying the Amazon region.

The internal reliability of the measure was also adequate, meeting all pre-established criteria. This psychometric evidence is important, as it states that the measurement is error-free. Considering that data collection was carried out non-face-to-face, using internet resources, this metric evidence is even more relevant, as it allows the instrument to continue to be used in the same way by researchers, facilitating reach to military personnel who serve or have served in some Military Organization in the Amazon region.

Despite the satisfactory psychometric qualities of EFL, one should not lose sight of the essential condition of friction itself: essentially dependent on

chance (Malkki and Malkki, 2011). Evaluating it then becomes a challenging task and its constant mapping is the way to achieve better planning, more credible, more adjusted to real action (Malkki and Malkki, 2011). Knowing the elements of chaos in a situation is then a way of anticipating the occurrence of friction in similar situations. Thus, the EFL is one of those instruments that must be reviewed and revalidated from time to time, in order to add new elements of friction that may have started to occur on supply trips to the Amazon region. The recognition of this temporality of the instrument is rather the understanding of the dynamics of friction occurrence – chance – and not a fragility of the instrument.

The research has some limitations, despite having produced a valid and reliable instrument. The sample used was non-probabilistic, being recruited by judgment, essentially made up of military personnel (due to their great experience) preventing the generalization of the results of the scores found. In this study, it was not possible to evaluate other similar parameters (for example, efficiency) which are constructs parallel to friction, concomitantly influencing the fulfillment of supply trips in the region analyzed.

Future studies should expand the analyzes carried out in this research, maintaining the study of the action of friction. Although they cannot be controlled and anticipated, friction factors can and should be understood in greater depth, in order to facilitate the creation and adoption of efficient logistical measures, aiming to increase the supply process practiced in a region that presents numerous difficulties, as is the case of the Amazon.

6 Conclusion

This work sought to develop and validate a measure to analyze the action of friction in the supply of PEF in the Amazon region. The valid and reliable measure consists of 16 items, organized into three factors – environment, equipment and individual. It provides an instrument that can be useful for generating data to improve public policies in the areas of Defense and Transport.

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ABSTRACT

This article aimed to create and conduct a metric evaluation - with the establishment of evidence of construct validity and internal reliability – the Escala da Fricção Logística (EFL), adjusted for the Amazonian environment. Methodologically, the research is divided into two studies; the first, focused on the creation of the instrument, which followed already consolidated recommendations for measurement scales by theory. A second, in which the metric evaluation of the theoretical structure foreseen for the EFL is carried out. The items were evaluated through confirmatory factor analysis, with extraction by partial least squares, in order to generate evidence of construct validity and internal reliability. For this analysis, the EFL was answered by 110 military personnel who served in border organizations. The results indicated that the scale with 16 items divided into three factors - individual, environment and equipment - is valid and reliable to assess the logistical friction in the Amazon frontier region. It is provided an instrument that can be useful for generating data to improve public policies in the areas of Defense and Transport.

KEYWORDS

Amazon; Triple Border; Logistics; Logistic friction; Clausewitz.

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8 Appendix: Final Version of the Logistics Friction Scale

This is a scale designed to evaluate elements that could hinder or even cancel logistical trips to Special Border Platoons (PEFs). Please, considering your last experience in Military Organizations (OMs) in the Amazon region, indicate the frequency with which each of the situations can occur: always, frequently, sometimes, rarely, never. There are some items that do not apply to all OMs (e.g. assess the frequency of road difficulties in OMs that use rivers as transport routes). When you come across this situation, please select the “not applicable” option. There are no right or wrong answers. Your answers will help improve the Brazilian Army’s logistics.

- 1) There is loss of cargo during unloading operations.

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

- 2) Storms during logistical trips to the PEF's hinder the arrival of supplies on the scheduled date.

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

- 3) Foodstuffs spoil during the supply trip.

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

- 4) Equipment for transporting/storing/unloading cargo causes delays in the arrival of PEF supply trips.

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

- 5) Accidents occur with means of transport that delay the supply of PEFs

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

- 7)* Fights among troops embarked on a supply mission cause problems.

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

- 8)* PEF supply trips have been canceled due to inclement weather.

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

- 9)* Travel cancellations occur due to transport conditions (river, land or air).

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

10)* There is a **breakdown of hierarchy and discipline** on supply trips to PEFs.

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

11)* **Fear** of the risks along the way hinders the execution of the activities of troops embarked on supply missions.

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

12)* Fogs **hamper** the route on supply trips.

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

17)* **Disagreements with the orders** given to the troops make the mission of supplying the PEF's difficult.

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

20)* The troop reports **danger** in carrying out supply missions for the PEF's.

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

21)* **Resistance (soft body, attempt to evade the mission)** in the troops hinders logistical supply trips to the PEF's.

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

22)* There are **delays** in arrivals of trips to PEF's, due to bad weather (rain, drought, flood, etc.).

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

25)* Accidents occur with transportation that **cancel** missions.

5	4	3	2	1
ALWAYS	USUALLY	SOMETIMES	RARELY	NEVER

* The original numbering of the items was maintained, so that the indicators for each factor can be identified. For the Environment factor score, calculate the mean of the items based on the marked answers; A = (item 2+ item 8 + item 9 + item 12 + item 22)/5. For the Equipment factor score, calculate the mean of the items based on the marked answers; E = (item 1+ item 3 + item 4 + item 5 + item 25)/5. For the Individual factor score, calculate the mean of the items based on the marked responses; I = (item 7 + item 10 + item 11 + item 17 + item 20 + item 21)/6.

CHINESE MIGRANT WORKERS IN INDONESIA: A CONTESTED SECURITY ISSUE

Ali Maksum¹

1 Introduction

Migration is currently one of the most sensitive topics on a global scale. Fear of a tidal deluge of transnational migration, with all its potential dangers, has compelled nations to increase border security (Ullah, Hasan, Mohamad, & Chatteraj, 2020). In previous decades, particularly during the Cold War, migration was absent from the state security discourse. On the other hand, the security threat to the state is founded on the Cold War constellation within the context of superpower rivalry (Ewing & Caballero-Anthony, 2020; Faist, 2006).

However, the Cold War's end has had a significant impact on international security discourse, especially on migration (Bello, 2020). This shift triggered an intense debate among international relations scholars concerning the post-Cold War international security landscape (Newman, 2010). Realism as a dominant theory was regarded as obsolete at the time, and it was superseded by post-Cold War theorists who focused on non-traditional security (Singh & Nunes, 2016). Nonetheless, the growth of non-traditional theorists began in the West, converging key ideas that dominated non-traditional security studies, namely the Copenhagen School and the Aberystwyth School, and later Critical Security Studies (CSS).

The marginalization of the role of non-state actors, as well as ideas from the Global South, was among the catalysts for the creation of this concept. Since then, international relations researchers all over the world have been interested in studying international migration and security as a non-traditional subject (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2020; Rolf, 2022). Indeed, non-state actors are becoming increasingly prominent in post-Cold

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War security discourse. The State is not the only referent object under threat; other non-state objects such as humanity, culture, and even the individual self are also under threat (J Huysmans, 2006).

The primary goal of the new post-Cold War non-traditional security paradigm is to safeguard societal security against various threats (Waever, 2008). Among these threats are those related to social issues such as culture, identity, and religion, which can be caused by migrants in particular. In fact, the existence of these risks in its different forms, including the threat posed by migration, made it possible for the government to reengage in security-related matters. The state contends it is obligated to implement a securitization policy against the threat posed by migrants, as proposed by the Copenhagen School. Under the guise of maintaining public peace and national stability, the European Union and North American countries were among the first to implement securitization policies, particularly against immigrants (Ghughunishvili, 2010; Jef Huysmans, 2000; Sitompul & Cipto, 2022). This indicates that, particularly in the context of securitization, the role of the state is once more dominating in post-Cold War non-traditional security theory.

Based on earlier studies, governments in Southeast Asia have successfully used securitization to deter immigration. Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are the three countries in the area that have actively rolled out securitization policies that target migrant labor in particular. The purpose behind each government's securitization strategy is different in the three distinct nations. For instance, the government of Malaysia is greatly concerned about unauthorized or illegal migrant laborers who may cause instability in the country's internal security. The government of Malaysia continues to enforce its securitization policy against migrant workers despite receiving worldwide criticism for issues with human rights violations (Arifianto, 2009; Dollah & Abdullah, 2018; Kudo, 2013; Mahalingam, 2022; Ullah, 2013).

Along the same line, Singapore is acutely conscious of the threat posed by migrant workers, particularly those operating illegally in the country. It was previously noted in the literature how migrant workers in Singapore were under tremendous pressure to work in that country because of the securitization policy and a legal system that was deemed very rigorous. The government consistently claims that the securitization policy was implemented to enforce the law, despite the fact that migrant workers are Singapore's economic backbone (Loong, 2018, 2022).

In the meantime, Thailand's government also implemented a policy of securitization for migrant laborers traditionally recruited from Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. The security concerns posed by migrant laborers formed

the basis of Thailand's securitization strategy. Thailand's securitization strategy was established in response to security concerns brought on by foreign employees. A survey showed that the general public has highly unfavorable opinions against migrant labor and that this coincided with a stricter securitization policy (ILO & UN Women, 2021; Jirattikorn, 2015; McDuff, 2017).

Indeed, the securitization of migration by governments is widespread among academics, whereas the de-securitization of migration by governments is rare and relatively recent. In the Indonesian context, the government's paradoxical idea of securitization of migration may contribute to the body of knowledge on securitization theory and practices. Therefore, this article contends that the public's securitization of Chinese migrant workers has failed due to the government's massive counter-securitization campaign conducted through political apparatus, mainstream media, and social media influencers. The government conducted de-securitization to secure foreign direct investment from China and strengthen its economic ties. Thus, the following section will provide a brief of China's investments and the dynamics of Chinese migrant workers in Indonesia.

2 China's investments vis-à-vis Chinese migrant workers flow to Indonesia


Indonesia has become increasingly focused on the issue of foreign workers, especially since President Joko Widodo took office in 2014 and initiated the Sea Toll project. Under the Sea Toll project, Jokowi – as he prefers to be known –, has made the most significant contribution to the country's infrastructure development ever in history. However, the electorate were not properly informed, particularly during the early part of the presidential campaign, that the investment that comes mainly from China's government also brings with it Chinese migrant workers. The presence of these Chinese workers has been increasingly publicly debated as the rate of Indonesian unemployment is high.

The speech of Chinese President Xi Jinping in front of the Indonesian parliament was seen as the beginning of the Indonesian government's engagement with the China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia (Wu & Zhang, 2013). Jokowi's candidacy greatly utilized the BRI project and took it as a primary campaign theme, renaming it the Sea Toll project during the 2014 presidential election campaign. This program is considered fundamental amidst the lack of elite political narratives around the importance of marine development that had led to its abandonment. What was later

known as the 'global maritime fulcrum' is considered a major breakthrough for Jokowi for fostering national economic growth (Anwar, 2018). Jokowi's vision became more articulated during his presentation in Beijing at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit on 10 November 2014, a few weeks after his inauguration. In his speech, Jokowi stressed that Indonesia needed a lot of investment, especially in the infrastructure sector. Therefore, Jokowi openly invited investors to come to Indonesia. In his closing statement, Jokowi stated "We are waiting for you to invest in Indonesia" which became the focus of significant levels of discourse in Indonesia (Madkur, 2018).

After Jokowi's speech in Beijing, the concept of the Sea Toll project became ever clearer. To achieve his vision, President Jokowi introduced a national development road map that would be delivered throughout his tenure called the National Medium Development Plan (2015-2019). Unfortunately, the government's financial ability can only cover one-third of the total budget required. The government sought contributions from the private sector as stated by Jokowi in his speech at the Beijing APEC Summit. As a response, from time to time, the Chinese government offers the fantastic investment that President Jokowi wants (Figure 1), especially in the infrastructure sector (Badaruddin & Octavia, 2018). At the point of this initial investment, BRI's ideas were in line with President Jokowi's priority on infrastructure development (Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board, 2018).

Figure 1. Trend of Chinese Investment in Indonesia between 2013-2019 in Million USD.



Source: adopted from Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board (2020).

The influx of migrant workers is a direct outcome of Chinese

investment, according to Indonesian Minister of Manpower Hanif Dhakiri (Rachman, 2019). To support China's investment in Indonesia, the government issued a visa-free policy for Chinese people coming to Indonesia (Rahayu, 2017). The implementation of a visa-free policy also increases the number of tourist arrivals as well as migrant workers (Rosyidi, 2018). However, the Indonesian public voice is still suspicious towards Chinese migrant workers. They also believe that through tourist visas, Chinese migrant workers are, in fact, working in Indonesia (Negara & Suryadinata, 2018).

This article first outlines a review of the securitization concept as an analytical tool. Second, it will lay out the increase in numbers of migrant workers in Indonesia. Third, it will explore the public views in securitizing Chinese migrant workers. Fourth, it will examine the government's counter-securitization of the issues surrounding Chinese migrant workers. Five, it will focus on the determining factors behind the failure of securitization. It argues that there has been a failure of securitization of Chinese migrant workers by the public due to staunch counter-securitization carried out on a massive scale by the government through political apparatus, mainstream media, and social media influencers.

5 Theoretical framework

This article loosely adopts the securitization theory from the Copenhagen School (CS) which is directly linked to the research of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and other scholars in the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), Copenhagen, Denmark (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998). Buzan's concept of securitization departed from constructivism in International Relations (Balzacq, 2011). Buzan's argument believes that security issues generated from human construction are related to the use of language known as 'speech acts' (Buzan et al., 1998; Waever, 1995).

In general, securitization is the mechanism through which actors create security issues using 'speech acts' to persuade the audience that a specific topic is a threat. In essence, the key point of securitization is whether something in question is a security issue not because the issue objectively affects the state or other referent object. Instead, it becomes a security problem, as it is described as threatening the continuity of the referent object by securitizing actors. Obviously, the CS is not interested in whether a statement is factual or false; the most important facet is the 'truth effect' of the language when the audience can be convinced that there is a real threat to be dealt with.

As a result, according to this framework, all issues can be turned into

security problems through a speech act. However, understanding security as a speech act is problematic because one could then suggest that everything can be turned into and constructed as a security issue. However, to prevent everything from becoming a security issue, the CS argues that securitization is a specific form of 'social praxis' and an inter-subjective practice in which what counts as a security issue depends upon how securitizing actors frame the issue. A successful securitization is not decided by the actors alone, because it involves the crucial role of the audience. Only if the speakers and the audience reach a collective agreement that the issue is an existential threat, can it then be considered as a successful securitization, otherwise it is a failed securitization.

Securitization consist of key elements including a securitizing actor (who securitizes), speech acts (the methods of securitizing), existential threat (what the issues are), and referent object (for whom must the securitizing happen) (Buzan et al., 1998). Effective and successful securitization greatly relies on how the audiences accept and perceive the issues as a security threat (Roe, 2006). At the same time, securitizing actors were also challenged by de-securitization actors to a counter securitization process (Salter, 2008).

However, existing securitization theory is only complete when it includes the idea of desecuritization. For Waever "security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues of normal politics" (Buzan et al., 1998; Waever, 1995). He proposes ideas that refute this securitization through what is known as desecuritization. The logic behind desecuritization is to take an issue out of "emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere" (Buzan et al., 1998). Despite the fact that the CS has not elaborated and defined clearly how the idea of desecuritization works (Collective, 2006), for several scholars, desecuritization refers to the process as "unmaking rather than the making of security problems" (J Huysmans, 2006).

Meanwhile, Roe argues that, to desecuritize an issue is not to return to normal politics, but simply to "undo the emergency politics" (Roe, 2006). Desecuritization typically takes place when the threat that led to securitization is perceived to have disappeared or become 'non-existential'. The actor may also deliberately choose to refrain from describing certain issues in term of security, and instead try to handle them outside the sphere of 'panic politics'. In this context, what has actually been done by the Indonesian government during the issue of the Chinese migrant workers is known as 'counter-securitization' (Stritzel & Chang, 2015). Counter securitization is also important in understanding this issue where other studies have shown that the framing effect will disappear when target audiences are exposed to

competing frames from equally credible sources (Krebs & Jackson, 2007). In addition, the securitization process is articulated as the following framework.

Figure 2. The successful securitization process of Copenhagen School



With this, the subsequent paragraphs discuss how the process of securitization and counter securitization of Chinese migrant workers has taken place. However, prior to examining this issue, the authors attempt to highlight the methodological aspect especially related to data collection.

6 Method

The authors conducted data mining mainly through online media to understand securitization and counter securitization of Chinese migrant workers in Indonesia. Utilizing NVivo software, the authors surveyed online media to map the issues surrounding Chinese migrant workers. Statistical data were mainly obtained from official agencies, whether government or private organizations. This study was also enriched through interviews with some informants of various backgrounds such as academics, public servants, Indonesian migrant workers abroad, as well as testimony from an Indonesian figure and local workers witnessing Chinese migrant workers in Indonesia.

7 Jokowi's championing of his policy of importing migrant workers


Indonesia's economic history since the independence era, until Jokowi led the country, is full of twists and turns. During the Sukarno era, political instability caused the economy to slump and fall apart. Severe inflation made commodities pricey, and living conditions worsened (Boediono, 2005). In fact, Indonesia's inflation rate approached 100 percent annually (Thee, 2012). Relations with the West, particularly the United States, are deteriorating, while relations with the Eastern bloc, principally China, have grown closer.

Simultaneously, US aid to Sukarno's government ceased, but aid for the army group in Indonesia surged (Maksum & Bustami, 2014). After the bloody coup in 1965, Sukarno stepped down and was replaced by Suhar-

to, who promised improved growth and welfare for the people (Paundralinga, 2023). Surprisingly, the 1965 coup drew China, which was accused of involvement in the tragedy, forcing Suharto to freeze relations between Jakarta and Beijing until the Cold War ended. In fact, the anti-Chinese attitude persists in Indonesia today as a result of the unpleasant memories of the past that are kept alive in society (Cribb & Coppel, 2009; Fitriani, 2021).

In general, the Indonesian economy under Suharto experienced a period of rapid development that led to the nation's emergence as a new industrial economy (NIE) in Asia (Thee, 2007). Nonetheless, numerous criticisms were leveled at the economic system of the Suharto era, which was deemed excessively liberal (Woo & Hong, 2010), as poverty persisted and social inequality widened (Booth, 2000; McCawley, 2013). However, at least the New Order government was successful in achieving high economic growth among developing nations. As shown in Figure 3 demonstrates that during the presidency of Suharto (1966-1998), economic development in Indonesia was relatively robust. Since 1966, Indonesia's economic growth has increased rapidly, only to decline drastically when the New Order fell in 1998 followed by a radical political transformation known as *reformasi* or reformation. Indeed, during the two extremely long regimes that ruled Indonesia, Sukarno, and Suharto, there was virtually no discussion of the influx of migrant workers in the country.

Figure 3. The trend of Indonesia's annual GDP growth (1961-2021)




Source: The World Bank (2021)

Indonesia's economy has become more liberal in the post-Suharto era (Woo & Hong, 2010). However, the debate over foreign employees in Indonesia began during the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Previous presidents who governed after Suharto, such as BJ Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati, had no issues with foreign workers. Nevertheless, guidelines for managing migrant workers have been developed since the Megawati government passed Law No. 13/2003 on Employment. Meanwhile, the Indonesian government under President Yudhoyono issued two important regulations namely Law No. 97/2012 Concerning Traffic Control Retribution and Permit Extension Fees for Employing Foreign Workers and in 2014, Presidential Regulation No. 72/2014 Concerning Employment of Foreign Workers and Implementation of Education and Training for Associate Workers (Adha, Husni, & Suryani, 2017). Indeed, prior to Jokowi's government, discussions regarding foreign workers, including those from China, were scarce in the public and academic realm, even in mainstream media. In fact, the debate over the influx of foreign workers began during the Jokowi administration (Badaruddin & Octavia, 2017; Martias, 2021; Yitawati, 2018). Data from 2014 (Figure 4) when Jokowi started his term, indicate that Indonesia had shown a modest increase, but the number is still a significant challenge for Jokowi's administration.

Figure 4. Numbers of Foreign Workers in Indonesia



Source: Indonesian Ministry of Man Power as published by Lokadata (2021).

Figure 4 above shows that the number of foreign workers had reached 73,624 people by the end of 2014 when Jokowi officially became President of Indonesia. Throughout the following year, the number of foreign workers increased dramatically to 77,149 people, which was an increase of 59.00 percent, amidst growing criticism. In 2016, when the public positively assessed Jokowi's performance as Indonesia's leader, the number of foreign

employees increased by about 3,000 to 80,375. The arrival pattern of foreign workers continued to rise over the next two years, 2017 and 2018, but the numbers were modest compared to 2014 and 2015. For instance, in 2017, the number of foreign workers was 85,974, just over 5,000 more than 2016. Yet in 2018, in the middle of the presidential election campaign, the increase in the number of foreign workers nearly doubled to 95,335, a jump of 9,000 foreign workers. This trend shows a gradual acceleration towards the end of Joko Widodo's first-period term in 2018.

At the same time, the problem of foreign workers in Indonesia is becoming highly complex, since China's workers dominate the local-based job sectors. However, foreign workers in Indonesia do not come solely from China although China's laborers dominate much more of Indonesia's international labor market. In 2019 alone, the upward trend in Chinese migrant workers is 38%, higher than the two neighboring countries of Japan (25%) and Korea (17%) which are also both major investors in Indonesia. In addition, there were also Indian (12 %) and Malaysian (17%) employees present in Indonesia as a part of their respective investments. Data on the distribution of migrant workers in Indonesia by 2019 is presented below.

Table 1. The Country Origin of Foreign Workers in Indonesia

No.	Country	Number of migrant workers
1	China	42,822
2	Japan	10,610
3	South Korea	9,264
4	India	6,201
5	Philippines	4,672
6	Malaysia	3,801
7	US	2,118
8	Taiwan	2,025
9	UK	1,854
10	Australia	1,707
11	Others	11,500

Source: Indonesian Ministry of Manpower as published by Kusnandar (2022).

The information above shows that the numbers of foreign workers has grown during Jokowi's administration. The number of Chinese employees in Indonesia continues to be a controversial topic and a national issue that will be discussed in the next section.

8 Attempts to securitize Chinese migrants: the view from the public

The unemployment rate was high when Jokowi took office in 2014 as the new Indonesian president (Statistics of Indonesia, 2014) which caused public anger about the policy around Chinese migrant workers. In addition, the issues freely reported by national media online involving Chinese migrant workers clearly led to an increase in public awareness. The public discourse on Chinese migrant workers, fueled by media coverage, stated that many of them have been detained by immigration for various legal offences including being fake professional workers. Instead, the Chinese workers were employed in unskilled jobs. In October 2017, for example, the Indonesian coast guard detained as many as 46 people from Mainland China. They were all illegal and were working at a nearby construction company (Endi, 2017).

In the meantime, in Mojokerto, East Java, an issue arose when Chinese migrant workers reported receiving around IDR 6 million per month (USD 420) or nearly double that of local workers. The pay for local workers is around IDR 3 million per month according to the local minimum wage regulation (Government of East Java, 2016). Another issue is they could not even speak Bahasa Indonesia. This is a serious offense in law. This is because migrant workers must be able to communicate in Bahasa Indonesia according to East Java local regulation No. 8/2016 (Jajeli, 2016). An expert from Bandung, West Java, has observed and confirmed that all of these Chinese migrant workers cannot understand the Indonesian language. He revealed:

“I purposely hold and stop my trip during my travel to study and ask the Chinese workers at a factory in Serang, Banten Province. And it’s true that they can’t speak Indonesian. The company’s owners also tend to employ foreign workers, especially China, because of their success and they can work without interruption, and he said this is more productive compared to local workers” (Interview A, 2018).

This statement shows that Chinese migrant workers have obviously become a public concern. Employers’ preferences for Chinese migrant workers indicate that local workers were neglected compared to Chinese workers due to performance issues. At the same time, the problem also gained attention from Indonesian migrants abroad who felt humiliated since they needed jobs in their home country. Instead, an unofficial job exchange has taken place with jobs being given to Chinese migrant workers causing the Indonesian workers to leave to find work in other countries. An Indonesian worker abroad has expressed disapproval. He commented that: “At the time when Indonesians need more jobs, and choose to go abroad, Chinese migrant workers came in. I totally disagree. But, we cannot do anything” (Interview

B, 2018).

At the same time, his colleague, also an Indonesian worker gave an account of Chinese migrant workers' presence being a necessity. This is because, based on his observations, especially in Malaysia, Chinese investment often includes unskilled workers to speed up an infrastructure project. He argues that:

"I think this a common issue wherever Chinese investment areas were located; they usually brought the money as well as workers originally from there like in the Second Penang Bridge Project. But, after that they disappeared and returned to China. This needs strong supervision and control from the government. If, once the project is finished they still stay in Indonesia, it is a problem" (Interview C, 2018).

The issue of Chinese migrant workers has received mixed responses, including from the government officials themselves. In an interview a member of staff from a government office stated:


"In my view, this kind of government policy related to Chinese migrant workers is obviously not wise. Actually, our local laborers have the same skills as migrant workers. I have observed especially in the rural area in Eastern Indonesia, for instance, in East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, Merauke (Papua) there have been Chinese migrant workers. I saw at the airport, I knew them. I guessed, they will be employed in plantation and mining industries owned by big corporation" (Interview D, 2018).

This means that there are many who, despite being part of the government, openly disagree with the presence of Chinese migrant workers based on their experiences in the field. Furthermore, public views tend to be more negative since issues involving Chinese migrant workers are becoming increasingly significant. Through an online media survey, we found there were at least six major issues to explain why the public are seriously concerned about the threat posed by Chinese migrant workers. These issues involving Chinese migrant workers fall into six categories as follows: 1) political issues, 2) legal issues, 3) informal workers' issues, 4) issues of competition with local employees, 5) issues of market rivalry, and 6) criminal matters.

The data reveals that most of the threats that were posed by Chinese workers are related to political issues (43.75%), followed by two issues pertaining to legality and rivalry with local workers (17.19%). However, the percentage of Chinese migrant workers which is frequently affiliated with the

informal domestic sector, such as cleaning services, drivers, etc., is just 14.06 %. The last two issues that get a minor percentage are that Chinese workers are associated with business competition issues (4.69%) and are involved in criminal acts (4.69%) as presented in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5. Issues involving Chinese migrant workers



Source: online media survey

The above trend indicates that the public worries greatly about this situation. Since political issues received the highest percentage in the number of issues, this demonstrates that Chinese migrant workers are politically controversial, and the public wants the government to use their political will to change the policy surrounding them. For example, Ifan Seventeen an Indonesian artist who made a video that went viral after he witnessed a plane full of Chinese migrant workers during his trip to Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi stated:


“At a time when Indonesia was still overloaded with human resources, there were still many unemployed, even we still sent many of our brothers to work betting lives in other countries, why do we have to enter labor from other countries ?!” (RMOL.ID, 2017).

This public concern was recognized by opposition groups since the issues became a provocative argument with which is possible to attack government and to attract potential voters. For instance, the opposition party insisted that:

“Chinese migrant workers receive special treatment while our workers are abandoned and even many are laid off. If so, we as people’s representatives will defend our people until we die. We will not let Indonesians be colonized in their own country” (Nainggolan, 2015).

Meanwhile, the issues surrounding Chinese migrant workers became profoundly influenced by public concern following news reports and investigations by national television. In a post on a well-established forum called “Indonesia lawyers club” in TVONE, the issues around Chinese migrant workers were deliberately channeled into the security issues. Former Minister of Justice and Human Rights as well as the State Secretary of Indonesia warned about the worst-case scenario surrounding the arrival of Chinese migrant workers. He has a suspicion that the Chinese workers’ migration to Indonesia allegedly involved a Beijing intelligence mission in relation to China’s conscription laws (TVonenews, 2018). The suspicion of Chinese interest in Indonesia, encouraged the public to recall what had occurred in the 1960s concerning the alleged involvement of the Chinese in national politics and the close relations with the Indonesian Communist Party (Zhou, 2014). As a result, the domination of Chinese migrant workers is narrated as a ‘threat’ not only to the local workers but also to the country’s sovereignty. These phenomena are in line with the survey that placed China as the most threatening country to Indonesia as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Indonesian perception of foreign threats



Source: Desnikia (2017)

Lastly, amid the Coronavirus outbreak, people in Southeast Sulawesi took part in a street protest to oppose the arrival of Chinese migrant workers. The protesters held a mass protest in front of the local House of Representatives (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat). They also blockaded the street which the workers would pass through. Due to the protesters ransacking the main building of the DPR, police violence and brutality erupted. Although, the protest gained public attention and became a trending topic on Twitter under the hashtag #TKAChina which refers to the Chinese workers, the government has stuck to its stance of allowing Chinese workers entry to Indonesia notably Southeast Sulawesi (Azanella, 2020).

Concerning the role of the public in raising awareness about the threat posed by Chinese migrant workers, this appears to contradict the basic assumptions of securitization theory. According to this approach, the public is positioned as an audience rather than a securitization actor (Buzan et al., 1998). The reality in Indonesian public discourse provides significant signs that the public is actively participating in the securitization of Chinese migrant workers despite the government's strong desire to counter this issue. In terms of the "referent object" aspect, the public perceives Chinese migrant laborers as a social, economic, and security threat. Nevertheless, opposition groups' involvement in the issue of Chinese migrant workers, which obviously has political motivations, cannot be avoided. In general, this section reveals that the public perceived Chinese migrant workers as a threat to the nation based on the following indicators. First, high unemployment in Indonesia. Second, a high number of issues involving Chinese migrant workers. And the third, negative perception of China is that they are a threat to national sovereignty. Henceforth, the following paragraphs evaluate the government of Indonesia's efforts to combat the securitization of Chinese migrant laborers.

9 Attempts to counter the issues around Chinese migrant workers: government views

Amid their ambition to bring more Chinese investment to Indonesia, the government has also attempted to counter the issues around Chinese migrant workers. The government is strongly convinced that the arrival of foreign workers especially from China is not a threat to Indonesian society. At the top level, President Jokowi for instance made the effort to convince voters of that:

"How could they want to come here with a smaller salary? I emphasize here so that rumors do not spread everywhere" (Ihsanuddin, 2016).

Jokowi's explanation seeks to emphasize to the public that Chinese migrant workers are not a problem and claims that they are just political rumors. Jokowi believes their arrival to Indonesia is not as big an issue as the media or public reports state. This is because the salary rate in Indonesia is not as high as they receive in their home country, China. Accordingly, it is impossible they would work in Indonesia which has a qualitatively low wage standard. He argues that the transfer of technology is the main reason behind the arrival of Chinese migrant workers. Jokowi's argument is backed by the Minister of Manpower and has totally refuted the issues related to the unskilled labor of Chinese migrant workers. He asserted that the problems arose during the placement process. According to Jokowi, there needs to be facilitators to communicate with local political structures and people during labor deployment. He states that:

"Well, unfortunately the facilitator is unable to provide an explanation to the local people so that it raises suspicion and impression as if the foreign workers are rough and illegal workers" (Fauzia, 2018).

In the inner circle of Jokowi's administration this policy to invite more Chinese migrant workers as part of an investment is fully supported. Indeed, the emotional statement from Jokowi's circle made public views became more resistant to, and upset with, government policy. The public tended to be disappointed and angry with the government's arrogant statement regarding the issue of Chinese workers. For instance, Jokowi's Coordinator Minister for Maritime Affairs Luhut Panjaitan was really emotional and refused any notion related to Chinese migrant workers. He stated that:

"There was a person I saw earlier in social media, he proudly accused there were 10 million Chinese working here, are we really crazy?" (Sukmana, 2018).


Further, Luhut also warned the public not to trust the transmitted video. He expected people to filter the news and to verify the facts for themselves. Concerning the public uproar around the video filming Chinese migrant workers, he defended them by stating that "Not all Chinese people are bastards, there were our people also are bastards too" (Tolok, 2020).

This statement indicated that the government has become frustrated and is not thinking about how to convince the public and to show understanding about the issues surrounding Chinese migrant workers. Instead, the government is using an authoritarian style of policy to handle uncontrolled

social media discourse, despite Indonesia being a democracy. For instance, Indonesian police arrested a street trader for hoax news dissemination in a case related to Chinese migrant workers (Sohuturon, 2019). In addition, Indonesian police headquarters in Southeast Sulawesi detained local people for spreading a viral video of Chinese migrant workers in Kendari airport (Budi, 2020). Government efforts to counter public discourse have shown that Chinese migrant workers are a problem and that this is an undeniable issue. Almost all government ministers, except the Ministry of Defense, strongly believe that Chinese migrant workers are not a threat to national sovereignty. Ministry of Law and Human Rights of Indonesia, for instance, argue that this is consequence of globalization. Yet, tight and preventive policies should be provided to ensure migrant workers remain under government surveillance (Ministry of Law and Human Rights, 2020). Mr Sofyan Djalil, another of Jokowi's ministers also commented that Indonesian people should not be so suspicious of Chinese migrant workers as they are actually an asset to the transfer of technology and they teach local workers to be more skillful (Kusumadewi & Armenia, 2015).

In further countering these issues reported by Indonesian workers, the government's position was bolstered by a polling result concerning the public perception of Chinese workers. A private survey company named Indo Barometer released a survey that showed only 27,8% of the respondents perceived Chinese workers as a threat. Conversely, 41% still believed that Chinese workers were not a threat, while the remaining (31.3%) chose a neutral answer.

Figura 7. Percepção dos indonésios sobre trabalhadores migrantes chineses



Source: Iqbal (2018)

Using social media influencers is common in Indonesia to build support for political agendas. This strategy has been used since early in Jokowi's presidential campaign (Irsyad, 2019). Specifically, Jokowi's social media teams were built as early as his contest for the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election against a Chinese-descendent, Basuki Purnama. Jokowi and his political teams are still using social media influencers to this date (Leiliyanti & Diyantari, 2016). Lastly, early in his second term of presidency, Jokowi called for all government civil servants to become influencers in order to disseminate the government's programs and achievements (Pratomo, 2019).

Partisan media companies also fully support Jokowi's program (Tapsell, 2019). For instance, The Jakarta Post, a well-known English newspaper in Indonesia and Jokowi's supporter, published an editorial column entitled "Editorial: We welcome foreign workers," which opined that Chinese migrant workers were employed due to their professionalism amid the local unskilled and low educated workforce (The Jakarta Post, 2018). Therefore, this paper arrives at the conclusion that the central government consistently refuses to acknowledge the issues and continues to convince the public that Chinese migrant workers are not a threat as it was publicly debated and apparently resolved. Moreover, the government, supported by mainstream media, forcefully persuaded Indonesians that the number of Chinese migrant workers was relatively small and not a threat. To achieve this result, they used private surveys and social media influencers as part of their strategy to counter the sentiment against Chinese migrant workers.

This section demonstrates that the Indonesian government is perceived as an anti-securitization actor. This also contradicts the fundamental assumptions of securitization theory, particularly with regard to the issue of immigration, which holds that the government tends to act as a securitization actor (Buzan et al., 1998) and not as an anti-securitization actor. The government seeks to mitigate the threat posed by Chinese foreign laborers, which has become a hot topic of discussion in Indonesian society, through his speech act. The government is attempting to refute that Chinese migrant laborers do not pose a threat to Indonesian society as part of its de-securitization strategy (Roe, 2006).

10 Failed securitization of Chinese migrant workers

Based on the discussion in the two previous sections there are two indicators of the failure of securitization of Chinese migrant workers. First, there has been no pause in the influx of Chinese migrant workers coming to

Indonesia. Even amid the Coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak which was firstly found in Wuhan, China, migrant workers from China were consistently allowed to enter Indonesia particularly Southeast Sulawesi (Indonesian House of Representative, 2020). This policy, of course, became publicly controversial especially considering that the Indonesian government has firmly banned all flights to and from China (Costa & Suroyo, 2020).

Second, the Indonesian government strongly pushes the policy of importing Chinese migrant workers. The Indonesian government seems to be unable to search for an alternative solution and policy regarding Chinese migrant workers. The Indonesia-China joint venture infrastructure projects such as ports, airports, highways, power plants, etc., became the main reference for government decision making related to Chinese migrant workers. Local government is powerless to stop the policy of encouraging Chinese migrant workers. In the latest case, for instance, the Governor of Southeast Sulawesi, the epicenter of Chinese workers, was concerned that it was basically the prejudices of the people in the area that meant they did not want to accept the arrival of foreign workers (CNN Indonesia, 2020).

The above two indicators are arguably the result of the government's robust strategy to counter securitization of Chinese migrant workers. This strategy includes firstly, using government apparatus. From the highest level, namely president and ministers, all are given the consistent rhetoric that Chinese migrant workers are not a threat. Further, local authorities seem powerless over central government in this issue.

Secondly, the government is fully supported by mainstream media in countering the discourse surrounding Chinese migrant workers. This strategy includes the use of private surveys to convince the public about the lack of threat posed by Chinese workers. The results showed that the majority of respondents did not perceive Chinese workers as a threat (see Figure 7), but the details of the survey result uncovered a new fact: most of the respondents were Jokowi's supporters, approximately 53% (Iqbal, 2018). The survey also contradicted the other polls that confirmed that China is the most threatening country to Indonesia (see Figure 6).

Thirdly, the government is using social media influencers. As discussed in the previous section, Jokowi has been using social media influencers since the start of his campaign. In addition, Jokowi also strongly encourages civil servants to become influencers to disseminate government programs and success stories. In this context, they will influence social media discourse that shore up Jokowi's policy on Chinese migrant workers.

Finally, the securitization carried out by the public failed. Instead, the government is winning the battle to counter public discourse on Chinese

migrant workers. It means the public has to accept the reality that has been decided by the government, that Chinese migrant workers are not a threat.

The failure of securitization of Chinese migrant labor in Indonesia generates an intriguing theoretical examination. First, if a threat is politically damaging to the government, the government can implement a counter-securitization policy (Waeber, 1995). Second, while experts claim that there are no specific parts of a desecuritization approach (Collective, 2006), the occurrence in Indonesia appears to demonstrate that in the digital world, deploying paid influencers on social media is capable of reducing security issues posed by the public. Third, there has been a shift in securitization actors, with the public emerging as a new securitization actor in Indonesia. This is consistent with Bigo (2006) criticism of the Copenhagen School, which holds that in the contemporary era, non-state actors must also be considered in securitization analyses as important actors (see Salter, 2008). In the Indonesian context, in addition to official desecuritization actors, there are non-state actors namely influencers and social media, to minimize the issues of Chinese migrant workers' threats.

11 Conclusion

In summary, this article has shown that Chinese migrant workers have become a huge national issue following investment from China that was welcomed by Jokowi. Unfortunately, this policy is at odds with the fact that unemployment has become a serious problem in Indonesia. Public discourse believes that Chinese migrant workers have entered Indonesia on a massive scale amid high unemployment rates among the locals. Migrant workers from China are employed in unskilled jobs. Their arrival, along with various cases, has apparently become a national threat. However, the government argued that foreign workers were only a small number, were professional workers only, and were not a threat to sovereignty.

Using the theory of securitization, this article found two contested security actors. First, the public as a negative securitizing actor which strongly attempts to define Chinese migrant workers as a threat. Second, the government as a counter-securitizing actor which sees Chinese migrant workers in a more positive light and defines them not as a threat.

In fact, securitization has failed as indicated by two parameters. First, the continuity of the inflow of Chinese migrant workers. Second, the government maintains its policy of allowing Chinese migrant workers to enter Indonesia amid mass protests and became a trending topic. Overall, this paper argues that the failure of securitization of Chinese migration

workers by the public was due to staunch counter-securitization carried out on a massive scale by government through political apparatus, mainstream media and social media influencers.

In light of the fact that this is preliminary research on Chinese migrant workers in Indonesia, this article acknowledges some limitations and offers suggestions. The data used is still arguably limited, although it is bolstered by primary data in the form of field interviews. This area of study will advance in the future if researchers concentrate on a variety of issues, such as conducting interviews with parties directly involved in the policy of importing Chinese migrant laborers and social media/network analysis. Interviews with local communities and employees who interact directly with Chinese migrant workers are necessary to gain a clear understanding of this issue. It is also feasible to analyze the issue of Chinese migrant workers through other lenses, such as the military, regional security, and international political competition, particularly between the United States and China. Other than that, research on the analysis of Chinese migrant laborers and social media remains essential. However, its reach must be broadened, for instance by analyzing Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and other social media platforms that are highly influential in public discourse regarding Chinese migrant laborers.

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ABSTRACT

The influx of Chinese migrant workers in Indonesia has become a contentious issue and is perceived publicly as a threat. Chinese migrant workers are accused of seizing local occupational employment amidst high local unemployment. The government has repeatedly told people that Chinese workers are not a threat. In fact, several issues involving Chinese workers have arisen, for example, related to residence permits, involvement in smuggling, involvement in crime, even suspicion that Chinese workers were members of security forces. This article examines two competing representations of Chinese migrant workers in Indonesia. First, a public representation which is negative and strongly attempts to securitize Chinese migrant workers. Second, the government representation that views Chinese migrant workers in a more positive light and that acts as a form of counter-securitization. The paper argues that the failure of securitization of Chinese migrant workers by the public is due to staunch counter-securitization carried out on a massive scale by the government through political apparatus, mainstream media, and social media influencers.

KEYWORDS

securitization, Chinese migrant workers, Indonesian, election.

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Three Truly Realist Perspectives on the Russo-Ukrainian War

Reviewed by Paulo Fagundes Visentini¹

The Russo-Ukrainian War has triggered an avalanche of academic publications, journalistic reports, and, above all, fake news and highly ideological and prescriptive analyses, replete with victimisation and demonisation. It has been difficult to find objective works written by qualified experts, rather than by “self-declared realists,” often writing on commission or to capitalise on the media moment. In this context, three exceptions are presented, with the understanding that realism does not represent a theory but rather a philosophical concept.

Francisco Veiga is an acclaimed historian, a professor at the University of Barcelona, a specialist in Eastern Europe, and fluent in local languages. Among his renowned works, I highlight what I consider the best on the Yugoslav dissolution wars, *La fábrica de fronteras*. He has spent considerable time not only in the academic and political offices of the Balkans and the former Soviet Union but also in the streets and trenches, observing and conversing with the population. Veiga has the ability to seek the historical roots of contemporary conflicts in their political-economic and anthropological dimensions. He adeptly transitions from the personal dramas of the common man and the plots of the ruling elite to the geopolitical aspects, with immense analytical acumen. Moreover, he writes exceptionally well: his books are academically dense yet accessible and enjoyable to read.

In *Ucrania 22*, he demonstrates how an independent Ukraine emerged from the complex web of the end of the Cold War. This is a state with a severe identity crisis, situated at a geopolitical crossroads, between a history intertwined with Russia and a faction’s desire to “be European.” It is one of the best analyses of post-Soviet Ukraine. The enormous political instability, economic setbacks, and internal divisions create a political landscape that, framed by the actions of great powers, reveals the roots of a *planned war*.

His argumentation, grounded in solid empirical evidence,

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dismantles the dominant Western narratives while also highlighting Russian inconsistencies. For example, he describes the 2014 struggles in Donbass as a civil war between neo-Nazi and neo-fascist militias, touching on the wounds of both sides. He explores the enormous accumulated tensions and the international plots that led to the war, as described below. He concludes with a macro-historical analysis of a recurring phenomenon in the region of late nation-state construction, the Balkan trap, which involves the repetition of fragmenting conflicts exploited by great powers.

Jacques Baud, on the other hand, has a different background. He is a retired Swiss Intelligence Colonel, highly erudite, with a degree in sociology and unmatched technical expertise in military and intelligence fields. He has participated in missions for the UN, NATO, and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, in several of the world's most turbulent regions. These missions have involved counter-terrorism, civilian protection, monitoring Warsaw Pact forces in the 1980s, and the conflict in Ukraine, among others. His extensive body of work covers topics such as the manipulation of fake news, terrorism, Middle Eastern wars, intelligence services, and, of course, Putin's Russia, the USSR, and Ukraine. He is a critic of the dominant Western journalistic narrative and does not shy away from sensitive issues.

In his work *Ukraine Between War and Peace*, available in both English and French from the same publisher, he provides a military and strategic analysis of the conflict. The armaments, tactics, and military doctrines of each side are explored in depth, with extremely precise illustrations and maps. His solid historical knowledge allows him to understand the motivations of each protagonist and their worldviews, offering an original approach to the real evolution on the battlefield and in decision-making commands. Episodes such as the Bucha massacre, the Nord Stream pipeline explosion, and many others are analysed in detail, with solid and challenging sources.

As a former "insider," he speaks with assertiveness, unraveling the hidden knots of dominant political and media narratives. By detailing certain Ukrainian deficiencies, often ignored, and some Russian capabilities, also concealed, he is regarded by the mainstream as a proponent of conspiracy theories. However, his work is so rich

in detail, with verified sources and interpretative skill, that it is indispensable for any serious study on the subject. His area of expertise complements others, being one of the few military history studies with a multidimensional approach. After all, his work has a solid technical dimension. And when he gives interviews, many of which are available on YouTube, in French, German, and English, he demonstrates himself to be a calm, cultured, and explanatory gentleman, updating the audiences on the complex themes of his books.

One aspect thoroughly explored is the negative effect that NATO's training of Ukrainian forces had on operations in that terrain and against that adversary. Similarly, he showcases Russia's rapid tactical, operational, and technological adaptability in neutralising the military equipment supplied by the West. But, above all, he demonstrates that this is not a high-intensity war but rather a limited one. It is not aimed at territorial conquest by the Russians, with objectives that change over time.

Finally, Emmanuel Todd is better known to the Brazilian public, with several books published in the country. A historian, demographer, and anthropologist, he is an academic who works as a Research Engineer at the National Institute of Demographic Studies in France. His education also took place in the United States and England, and he gained recognition for predicting the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1976, not based on political or ideological assumptions, but through a detailed demographic analysis. His specialty is the study of the anthropological foundations of societies.

Despite being an academic, he is a biting critic of the European Union and has presented in his studies a Spenglerian version of the *Decline of the West*, focusing more on anthropological aspects related to the evolution of family structures. In 2022, he published a book of interviews titled *The Third World War Has Already Begun*, where he highlights the surprising Russian performance against Western powers. An important detail: the book was published only in Japanese, where it sold 100,000 copies in a few months, due to the hostility his approach received in Europe. In the midst of impactful events, he typically writes in an assertive, essayistic style, characteristic of the French tradition. In an era of conformism, it is reassuring to see a scholar become a political critic, only to later return to the academic sphere. The professor is, after

all, a citizen with the right to express his views.

The work showcased here, *La défaite de l'Occident* (The Defeat of the West, in the sense of disintegration), presents a well-developed scholarly version of the aforementioned work. It identifies three factors he considers fundamental to the West's demise: 1) the industrial deficiency of the United States, with its fictitious GDP that has outsourced production to Asia; 2) the shockwaves caused by the disappearance of American Protestantism, such as educational decline and the emergence of a "zombie society," governed by an elite that has been losing its *ethos*; and 3) the rest of the world's preference for Russia, which he labels as an "authoritarian democracy," in contrast to Western "oligarchic liberalism." These concepts are, in turn, supported both theoretically and empirically.

The chapter on Ukraine is extremely rich, demonstrating the difficulties and misfortunes experienced by the country, but also its capacity for resistance and the significant reaffirmation of Russia. He identifies ten "surprises" that the war has brought out, with the first being its very outbreak and the Russian invasion. The second one is that the real adversaries are Washington and Moscow, as the American objective is to drive Europe away from Russia. The third surprise was the Ukrainian capacity for resistance, even with Western support, and the fourth was Russia's economic resilience under sanctions. The fifth surprise was the sympathy of the Global South towards Russia, as Muslims, Africans, Asians, and even Latin Americans found a courageous reference that also aligned politically, economically, and ideologically with their needs.

The sixth surprise consists of the collapse of European interests and their subordination to the United States, which has made the continent responsible for containing Russia. The seventh surprise is the emergence of a bloc separate from the Franco-German condominium, driven by England and including Poland, the Baltic states, and Scandinavia. The eighth surprise was the insufficiency of arms and ammunition production by the United States, contrasting with the dynamism of the Russian defence industry. Ninth, there is a gradual American withdrawal from Europe and the Middle East to focus on containing China in Asia. And finally, he argues that the real surprise is not the destabilising effect of Russian or Chinese forces,

but the disintegration of America and the Anglosphere itself. The analysis of American internal transformation since the 1970s is highly provocative, complex, and detailed. Regardless of one's opinion, it is impossible to maintain old views after reading his work, even if only to refute it.

Taken together, these three very different works allow us to unravel the immense complexity behind the Russo-Ukrainian War. Furthermore, the superficiality of most analyses, constrained by political correctness and often official in tone, makes scholars long for someone to assert that the Earth is round. With different perspectives, the three authors prove to be truly realistic, examining contemporary processes as they really are, rather than how we might wish them to be. The purpose of this review is not, as is often the case, to relieve the public of the "obligation" of reading the books, but rather to encourage the audience to delve into them.

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PARTNERS

NERINT

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) was the first Centre in Southern Brazil to focus its study and research exclusively on the field of International Relations. It was established in 1999 at the Latin American Advanced Studies Institute (ILEA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) in Porto Alegre, Brazil, and is currently part of the university's Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV). Its objective has always been the critical and innovative study of the international system's transformations after the end of the Cold War, from the perspective of the developing world. In parallel, NERINT has also sought to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options for the autonomous international insertion of the country.

The exploratory studies developed by NERINT on the new emerging countries since the threshold of the 21st century experienced remarkable expansion. Cooperation with state, business, academic and social institutions was intensified, as well as the direct contact with centres in Latin America, Africa and Asia, in addition to the existing ones in Europe and North America. An outcome of the Centre's activity was the creation of an undergraduate course in International Relations (2004) and a Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI, 2010). Two journals were also created: the bilingual and biannual *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* and the bimonthly journal *Conjuntura Austral*. In addition, since 2016, NERINT offers a bilingual Research Bulletin, published by graduate and undergraduate students and researchers of the Centre. NERINT is also partnered with UFRGS's Doctoral Program in Political Science (PPGPOL), established in 1973. Thus, besides the advanced research and intense editorial activities, NERINT is also the birthplace of innovative undergraduate and graduate programs.

PPGEEI

The Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) started in 2010, offering Master's and Doctorate degrees, both supported by qualified professors and researchers with international experience. It is the result of several developments on research and education at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Its roots can be traced to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT), established in 1999, established in 1999 and now affiliated with the Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV) at UFRGS.

The research tradition that gave rise to the PPGEEI was based on a prospective analysis of world trends in the 1990s. The remarkable expansion of Brazilian diplomacy and the economy from the start of the 21st century confirmed the perspective adopted, which has allowed for intense cooperation with Brazil's international diplomatic and economic organisations. The course is already a reference in the strategic analysis of the insertion of emerging powers and South-South international relations.

The PPGEEI's distinctive vision emphasises strategic, theoretical and applied methods, always based on strict academic and scientific principles. For this reason, it has been sought out by students from all over Brazil and various countries, and has established partnerships on all continents. For these reasons, it is a programme focused on understanding the rapid transformations that the international system is undergoing. In partnership with NERINT, it publishes the journals *Conjuntura Austral* (bimonthly) and *Austral: Revista Brasileira de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais* (bimonthly and bilingual). The PPGEEI has three lines of research:

International Political Economy

It focuses on the international insertion of the Brazilian economy and other major developing countries in South America, Asia and Africa; it addresses the characteristics and effects of globalisation; and it develops comparative and sectoral studies concerned with the effects of the internationalisation of companies and productive segments. Special attention is paid to international financial crises and their impact on Brazil and other countries in the South.

International Politics

It emphasizes the analysis of the process of formation, implementation and evaluation of foreign policy. It seeks to compare the international insertion patterns of strategic countries in South America, Africa and Asia, considering institutional patterns, trade policy, interest intermediation structures and the role of civil society actors in the South-South axis of contemporary international relations.

International Security

It approaches the main security problems in the international system from a perspective that takes into account the most powerful states at a global

level, but systematically introduces the problem of regional balances of power, the South-South axis, the existence of regional security complexes and the impact of information technologies in the Digital Age.

CEGOV

The Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV) located at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) develops studies and research projects on governmental affairs from a comparative perspective. The Centre gathers researchers from several departments of the University, such as Political Science, International Relations, Law, Economics, Administration, Education, Urbanism and Computer Science. It encompasses scholars from the most traditional research groups at UFRGS, such as NERINT and CEBRAFRICA, specialised in a broad range of public policy areas.

CEGOV is chaired by a Director, and its policies and priorities are determined by an Advisory Board and a Scientific Board. The activities of the Centre are undertaken by working groups, which take the responsibility for specific projects. Currently, CEGOV has eight fully established and operating working groups. The Centre's researchers work on multidisciplinary projects covering the fields of international politics and governance, monitoring and evaluation of public policies, institutional development, Brazilian and South-American economy, comparative institutional design and decision-making processes, as well as public management, democratic controls and decentralisation of public services.

The Centre is a place for interaction among scholars from UFRGS and other academic institutions, highlighting its multidisciplinary and open nature, as well as its vocation to collaborative applied research. Being a reference for research on comparative governmental studies, CEGOV offers a wide range of extracurricular activities such as extension and specialisation courses, and advisory activities.

CEBRAFRICA

The Brazilian Center for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) has its origins in the Center for Brazil-South Africa Studies (CESUL), a program established in 2005 through an agreement between the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG) of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its research activities are carried out at the Brazilian Center for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT).

In March 2012, CESUL was expanded to cover the whole of the African continent, becoming CEBRAFRICA, while the South African Series, which had published five books, was transformed into the African Series, with new works in the pipeline. The objective remains the same: to carry out research, support the preparation of theses, dissertations and final papers, bring together research groups on African themes, hold seminars, promote the exchange of professors and students and establish research networks and joint projects with African and Africanist institutions, publish works produced in Brazil or translated and expand the specialized library provided by FUNAG.

The aim of the research is to gain knowledge of the African continent and its relations with Brazil, in the following areas: International Relations, Integration Organizations, Security and Defence, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformation and Currents of Thought. CEBRAFRICA's partners are renowned institutions from Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Senegal, Cape Verde, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, India and China. Ongoing research focuses on "The presence of Brazil, China and India in Africa", "Africa in South-South Cooperation", "African conflicts", "Integration and development in Africa", "Africa's relations with the Great Powers" and "Inter-African relations".

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5. Contributions must be original and unpublished, and can be submitted in Portuguese, English or Spanish;
6. Contributions must contain the full name of the author, their titles, institutional affiliation (the full name of the institution) and an e-mail address for contact;
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11. Contributions must be accompanied of: three keywords in Portuguese or Spanish and three keywords in English; title in English and in Portuguese or Spanish; abstract in English and in Portuguese or Spanish, both with up to 100 words.
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