# AUSTRAL

Revista Brasileira de Estratégia e Relações Interacionais
Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations

Porto Alegre, v.12 n.24 | Jul./Dez. 2023

NERINT
Núcleo Brasileiro de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais
- Centro de Estudos Internacionais sobre Governo (CEGOV)

UFRGS
UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL
DO RIO GRANDE DO SUL

PPGEEI-UFRGS
Programa de Pós-Graduação em
Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais
Faculdade de Ciências
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About the Journal

AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations was the first Brazilian journal in the field of International Relations to be fully published in English (2012). It is an essentially academic vehicle, linked to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Its pluralist focus aims to contribute to the debate on the international political and economic order from the perspective of the developing world. The journal publishes original articles in the area of Strategy Studies and International Relations, with special interest in issues related to developing countries and South-South Cooperation – its security problems; the political, economic and diplomatic developments of emerging countries; and their relations with the traditional powers. AUSTRAL is published semi-annually in English and Portuguese. The journal's target audience consists of researchers, experts, diplomats, military personnel and graduate students of International Relations. The content of the journal consists ensure the publication of authors from each of the great continents of the South: Asia, Latin America and Africa. Thus, the debate and diffusion of knowledge produced in these regions is stimulated. All contributions submitted to AUSTRAL are subject to rigorous scientific evaluation.

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Volume 12, Number 24 (Jul./Dec. 2023)

Summary

EDITOR'S NOTE

In the second half of 2023, global tensions escalated rapidly, shaking certainties, undermining many of the narratives established throughout neoliberal globalization, and generating a new wave of instability in the Middle East. Hamas's attack on Israeli territory in the peripheral region of Gaza sparked a high-intensity military reaction against the urban enclave. The result was a serious humanitarian crisis and a radical alteration of the region's geopolitical landscape, with the eruption of new conflicts, tensions, and realignments. The deepening competition between old and new powers on a global scale demonstrates a pattern of unstable multi-vector politics. The prolonged crisis may be reaching the limits of a systemic rupture if some sort of agreement is not achieved in the short term.

All of this unfolds within the context of absolute uncertainty surrounding the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and the escalating tensions between China and the United States in East Asia. The Ukrainian counteroffensive did not yield military results – it only caused wear and tear on the Zelensky government, whose political and material external supports are in decline. This is especially the case in the United States, where Joe Biden seeks re-election in 2024 amid growing difficulties. Internal fractures and sporadic reactions against Russia have not altered the military status-quo. Strangely, the European Union is making a financial effort to assist Ukraine, while social protests and farmer protests exacerbate the internal political balance and the decline of the Welfare State.

Add to this the surprising geopolitical shift in the Francophone Sahel region and the Horn of Africa. There is the protagonism of nationalist governments distancing themselves from France and approaching Russia. Moreover, the African system of states is undergoing rapid change, with an evolution that many deemed impossible just a few years ago. The cleavage that marks American and European societies also occurs in Brazil and in Spanish-speaking countries. Fluid alliances and shifting rivalries have as their backdrop economic stagnation and technological transition, with profound social impacts. The instability that existed before the covid-19 pandemic has taken on the characteristics of chaotic geopolitics, with absolute unpredictability.

This issue of AUSTRAL: *Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International*

Relations features articles from scholars from Brazil, the United States, Indonesia, and Russia. The first article offers an interesting critique of the concept of the Global South, forged in the Northern Hemisphere to eliminate that of the Third World, proposing instead the concept of Geopolitical South. The second analyses the decline of dollar hegemony and the advent of a multipolar world, while the third article addresses contemporary African policy of the United Kingdom. The fourth article in this issue explores the role of Turkey in Sweden's accession to NATO, followed by a fifth paper analysing the foreign policy of the Barack Obama administration. Finally, the seventh article of this issue explores the international role of the Confucius Institute, while the last one provides a comparison between the foreign policies of Argentine President Mauricio Macri and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro.

This number also features a special note on the legacy of Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (1939-2024) and his interaction with the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) for the establishment of the area of International Relations. His passing represents a great loss, both for diplomacy and academia. The issue concludes with a book review written by Professor José Miguel Quedi Martins.

The perspective of authors from the Geopolitical South enriches academic and strategic perception regarding the topics analysed, materializing AUSTRAL's foundational and ongoing objectives. This is crucial at a time when the global scenario is evolving into a sum of conflicts and tensions, which have already led to military escalation and strong unpredictability. More than ever, it is necessary for academia to proceed with an urgent critical-realistic analysis, setting aside post-modern approaches. As the Brazilian essayist Millôr Fernandes once said, "today, an optimist is someone who is not sure of the future".

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Disclaimer: AUSTRAL prioritises British English as the standard form of written English. However, some translations may be presented in American English.

TRIBUTE TO SAMUEL PINHEIRO GUIMARÃES

Paulo Fagundes Visentini

Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (1939-2024) was an extremely courageous diplomat and an important advocate for Brazil's national interests during the enthusiastic wave of neoliberal globalization. In doing so, he dared to cross institutional and corporate boundaries. His involvement with UFRGS began in 1995 when he assumed the presidency of the Institute of International Relations Research (IPRI), an entity linked to the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In collaboration with academia, he organised seminars, conducted research, and published seminal works, inspiring scholars who were bewildered by the prevailing narrative at the time. In 1999, he collaborated on our initiative to establish the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) within the Latin American Institute of Advanced Studies (ILEA) at UFRGS. That same year, the International Relations and Integration Collection, published by the university press, released the first edition of his emblematic work *Five Hundred Years of Periphery (Quinhentos Anos de Periferia*, available only in Portuguese), co-edited by Contraponto, which left a mark on Brazilian political-diplomatic thought.

Due to his activism in warning about the risks posed by the implementation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) to the Brazilian economy and sovereignty, he was removed from his position in 2001. However, in 2003, he assumed the position of Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), serving as the right-hand man of Ambassador Celso Amorim in the first Lula administration. While the Chancellor travelled the world, Guimarães coordinated and organised, motivating many and challenging others, both in Brazil and abroad. His activities during this period deepened relations with academia and society. As he stated, "we need to train Brazilian specialists in the knowledge of other regions of the world." And indeed, the seed was planted, as our university has produced numerous specialists in the field of International Relations since then.

In positions of power and outside of them, he consistently maintained his attitude, friendship, and support for academic initiatives, whether institutional or personal. Unfortunately, despite our efforts, he did not write his memoirs. Always engaged in current agendas, he considered this less relevant. This was a mistake because the foreign policy, in which he played

a leading role, had a systemic impact, and provoked reactions far beyond our borders. He was a man of the backstage and could have clarified many controversial issues, which are now analysed based on ideological narratives. This is particularly pertinent at a time when the Brazilian national question appears confusing to both Greeks and Trojans.

Translated by Guilherme Thudium.

AUSTRAL: BRAZILIAN JOURNAL OF STRATEGY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

GLOBAL SOUTH VERSUS GEOPOLITICAL SOUTH: A DEBATE ON THE ANALYTICAL RELEVANCE OF THE CONCEPTS

Hugo Bras Martins da Costa[1]
Rubens de Siqueira Duarte[2]

Introduction

On April 13, 2023, Dilma Rousseff, former president of Brazil, was sworn in as president of the New Development Bank (NDB), also known as the BRICS Bank. During the swearing-in ceremony, when talking about the benefits of the bank for developing countries, she referred to two concepts that have gained enormous traction among experts and decision-makers in international relations in the post-Cold War era: South and the Global South. More precisely, the current president of the NDB said that the founding of the institution:

> Besides being a historic event, it was a demonstration of the importance of establishing a strategy and a partnership, sharing the needs of the countries of the South, of the Global South. In other words, the South, which is the South that wants to emerge, and which also includes countries from the North, and with multilateralism (ROUSSEFF, 2023 apud PODER 360, 2023, our translation).

Despite some of the press and social media profiles highlighting this speech, claiming that there was some kind of geographical gaffe, the speech reveals Dilma Rousseff's conscious use of a term with a strong connotative meaning which, in turn, refers to a rich debate among analysts of contemporary international relations.

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More than just a stylistic variation of the word South, the use of the adjective "Global" seeks to qualify the noun South and refer to a specific portion of this broader group. Politically, the use of this concept by decision-makers usually reflects the positions and preferences of countries or groups of states, expressed in their bilateral relations and in multilateral organizations, which are backed not only by academics but also by criticisms of its use and suggestions for alternatives.

Among the alternatives presented, this article focuses on the concept of the Geopolitical South, developed from discussions and research carried out within the framework of the Laboratory of World Political Analysis (LABMUNDO), a research group linked to the Institute of Social and Political Studies of the State University of Rio de Janeiro (IESP-UERJ), on the shortcomings and gaps left by the concept of the Global South. More specifically, this work aims to debate the limitations and analytical possibilities offered by the concept of the Global South, compared to the concept of the Geopolitical South, for a more accurate understanding of the geopolitical dynamics of international relations in the first decades of the 21st century.

In structural terms, the article is divided into four parts, in addition to this introduction and a conclusion. The first section presents the origin of the concept of the Global South, as well as its definitions in the literature. The second section analyzes the main analytical limitations of the concept of the Global South. The third section presents the concept of the Geopolitical South and highlights its analytical advantages over the concept of the Global South. The final section aims to highlight the main shortcomings of the Geopolitical South concept and offer suggestions for its improvement.

Building the concept of Global South

Unequivocally pinpointing the origin of the term Global South is an inglorious task. There is no classic work that marks its emergence, as is the case, for example, with the concept of soft power, coined by Joseph Nye. Nor is there a definition in International Relations academia that has become predominant over time, as has happened with the concept of international regimes and the circulation of norms. However, it is possible to search for its most famous first appearances. The term Global South has its founding myth in the article "Vietnamism has failed... The revolution can only be mauled, not defeated", by American writer and activist Carl Oglesby, published in 1969 in the liberal and Catholic periodical Commonweal, in a special issue on the Vietnam War. However, it is worth noting that Heike Pagel, Karen Ranke,

Fabian Hempel, and Jonas Köhler demonstrated in their 2014 article *The Use of the Concept Global South in Social Science & Humanities*, that the use of the expression Global South has become common sense in literature and has experienced significant growth in English-language academic publications only since 2004 (PAGEL; RANKE & HEMPEL, 2014).

This article argues that the Global South is a derivation of the concept of the South. The latter, in turn, gained prominence in the literature at the end of the 1980s, based on reformulations of two other concepts that had been more prominent in previous decades: the Third World and developing countries. The Third World (*Tiers Monde*, in French) aimed to highlight that, at a time when the world was divided on international security issues by the ideological dispute between the capitalist bloc, led by the United States, and the socialist bloc, led by the Soviet Union, there were countries whose main concern was development issues. In other words, in addition to the "two worlds" of the East-West ideological dispute, there was a "third world", which had other priorities given the social and economic situation they faced. The concept of the Third World, coined by Alfred Sauvy in his 1952 article *Trois mondes, une planète* (SAUVY, 1952), has lost its prominence due to its anachronism for analyzing international relations in the post-Cold War period, although it is still used with a derogatory and segregationist content (ALBARET & DEVIN, 2016; DUFOUR, 2007). The term developing countries, in turn, preceded other concepts, which generally had origins more linked to economic criteria and a liberal reading of development. Developing countries thus came to represent a reformulation of other expressions, such as underdeveloped countries, less advanced countries, and non-industrialized countries. In common, these expressions carry the unmistakable evolutionist character of the developmentalist theses of the 1970s and modernization theory. Although they are still very common in newspaper articles, academic papers, and even in reports by international organizations, the use of these concepts has decreased due to the perception that they carried with them - and therefore spread - content with a hierarchical, ethnocentric, and Western connotation, which led to the frequent use of quotation marks, and their limitation to the economic dimension of development, without alluding to other dimensions, such as the social, human and environmental (ALBARET & DEVIN, 2016; DUFOUR, 2007).

Thus, in comparison with the concepts available in International Relations, the South was presented, at least at that time, as a less committed option (politically and ethically), but one that served the purpose of indicating the shift from the East-West divide in international relations at the end of the Cold War to the North-South axis, without being limited to econometric

criteria (ALBARET & DEVIN, 2016). Consequently, the South emerged as the preferred term in the literature from the 1980s onwards, especially for those who sought to affirm that geopolitical disputes continued to be an important element of interstate relations after the end of the Cold War.

More precisely, the diffusion of the concept of the South and the notion of a North-South divide in the literature to refer to the stratification of states in the international system was marked by the publication of the report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, known as the Brandt Report, by the World Bank in 1980, the aim of which was to present recommendations on ways to break the political deadlock that existed in multilateral negotiations on the development agenda in the 1970s and 1980s (BRUN, 2022). The definition of the South presented in the document was, on the one hand, borrowed from civil society organizations, which defined it as not belonging to the Western world and, on the other hand, based on differences in terms of development or socio-economic indicators between national states, i.e. socio-economic performance. In turn, their argument was that the deepening inequalities between states along the North-South axis was the main social challenge of that period. It is also worth noting that, based on the Brandt Line presented in this report for a cartographic representation of the world based on the North-South division, the South would include countries in the northern hemisphere, including countries whose geographical location goes beyond the Tropic of Cancer, while excluding Australia and New Zealand, which are geographically south of the Equator.

Figure 1 - Brandt's line
Source: Banco Mundial 1980

The geographical imprecision of the South presented in Brandt's Line, however, generated important questions and improvements in the definition of this concept in academic literature. Firstly, several authors began to debate which indicators would be most accurate to contemplate the socio-economic criteria that would define the South from a particular position on the issue of economic development (SANTANDER CAMPOS, 2016). The second type of questioning and improvement came from the inclusion of a shared political condition at the international level as an essential dimension for defining the South (ALBARET & DEVIN, 2016; BRUN, 2018; DADOS & CONNEL, 2012). Finally, some authors have come to include immaterial elements, such as the multi-ethnic character of the societies of the South (BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, 1986; 2016), the national construction dilemmas faced by their states (ALDEN, MORPHET & VIEIRA, 2010), and a positive identification based on sharing common challenges and solutions (SANTANDER CAMPOS, 2016). In the absence of a general agreement on the indicators that would be essential for a state to be included in the concept of the South, these authors did, however, share a reference to "developing" status in their different definitions of the South (BRUN, 2022).

If the South, as we have seen, was presented as a reformulation of the concepts of the Third World and developing countries, the term Global South, in turn, became widespread from the beginning of the new millennium, as a reformulation of the concept of the South, although it brings little new in its content. We now turn to an analysis of the ontological debate about the Global South in the literature, with the aim of presenting a systematization of the main definitions found. However, as mentioned, it is difficult to pinpoint its origin, as there is no classic work that inaugurated the term or a definition that has become widely accepted. On the contrary, academic references or greater conceptual detail rarely accompany the use of the term Global South. This weakness can also be seen in academic works, which are more often applied to case studies.

For this reason, for the purposes of this article, it is understood that the best way to understand the way in which the literature conceives the concept of the Global South is by questioning the reasons that led to the reformulation of the concept of the South, which from the beginning of the 21st century gained the adjective Global, which should qualify the existing noun. In other words, we will try to understand the different definitions of the Global South through an analysis of the reasons why international organizations, national governments, academics and experts, the media and civil society organizations

have come to prefer the Global South to the South.

The concept of the Global South has gained traction in the specialist literature, to the detriment of the South, primarily due to the valorization of an approach centered on the deterritorialization of the negative effects of capitalist accumulation on spaces and peoples on a global scale within the framework of globalization theory. In other words, it was disseminated by authors who aimed to demonstrate how contemporary global capitalism produced new socio-spatial configurations that could not be effectively described based on purely territorial models of the division between the Northern and Southern hemispheres, but which were still fundamentally socio-spatial in nature because they generated a division between a developed North and a developing South within the same state, as in the Italian case, or between states in the same region, without taking into account circles of latitude, such as the Equator. (BRENNER, 2011)

Secondly, the adjective Global began to be affixed to the South due to dissatisfaction with the preservation of a Third-Worldist and non-aligned character in the concept of the South by a portion of the literature, to think about the dynamics of international cooperation in the era of globalization. While the South necessarily referred to the opposite of the North, highlighting asymmetries and hierarchies implicit in the international order, as well as an interrelationship between the development of the North and the underdevelopment of the South, the Global South was not used as an opposite to the Global North, which, in turn, was and continues to be mentioned infrequently. This part of the literature sought to emphasize in the concept of the Global South the building of strong, interactive networks of cooperation as a fundamental element of government policy and practice to contribute to the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals established by the UN in 2000 so that the vulnerabilities and challenges common to these countries could be tackled jointly by the countries of the South, and so that the gross imbalance between developed and developing countries could be remedied by absorbing the positive dividends of economic globalization (DIRLIK, 2007). The main expression of this approach was the publication of the United Nations Development Program's Forging a Global South report in 2003. This is a perspective inspired by liberal thinking, which defends the positive impacts of globalization in these countries' quest to overcome their social and economic challenges. Therefore, the adjective "global" indicates states that have embraced the globalization project as an appropriate means of development. The expression indirectly diminishes the visibility of the asymmetries caused or deepened by globalization itself.

Finally, the Global South was preferred by the literature, as it does

not necessarily reflect the state-centric character that the notion of the South carried with it. The Global South has been recurrently mobilized in reference to civil society organizations that have gained more and more space in multilateral international organizations (DEVIN, 2011) and that build their identities and networks of political activism from the mutual recognition of their conditions on the margins of the neoliberal world of globalization and the shared experience of the negative effects of neoliberal globalization (LÓPEZ 2007; POLET 2007; PRASHAD, 2012). With this, the Global South would also encompass movements, networks and actors that do not have territory as one of their constitutive elements - as is the case with the state in the Weberian conception. Although territory is still a fundamental element for understanding the dynamics of international relations - after all, non-state actors have headquarters, activities, flows and individuals that are inevitably located in territories - the concept of the Global South, from this perspective, gives the impression that more types of actors are covered by the definition.

In summary, we can conclude that the concept of the Global South does not have an objective, agreed definition, either in the scientific literature or in reports by states and other international actors. Its emergence is justified based on the need for a new, more de-territorialized, less state-centric approach, which does not place so much emphasis on the inherent contradictions of international relations, to the terminologies previously mobilized by academic literature and political documents from states and international organizations: South, third world, underdeveloped countries, developing countries, emerging countries, backward countries, non-industrialized countries, poor countries. Therefore, the origins and trajectory explored in this first section reveal a history of searching for a denser, more precise, and less ethnocentric concept. However, there are other versions of this history, which will be explored in the next section.

The insufficiency of the concept of the Global South

The previous section showed the trajectory of the term Global South and other related concepts since practically the beginning of the scientific field of International Relations. Despite its widespread use, the definition of the Global South has flaws that result in analytical shortcomings. This section aims to analyze these shortcomings, such as semantic imprecision, conceptual vagueness, the absence of a counter-concept and ethnocentrism. Based on this critique of the concept of the Global South, the third section will be dedicated to the conceptual construction of an alternative.

Throughout this section, as the fragility of the explanatory power of the term Global South becomes clear, it is worth reflecting on why it has become so popular, despite its shortcomings. As mentioned, there is no academic work that defends the reform of this concept and that has become such a classic in the literature as to be a turning point and explain such a change. However, one should not make the mistake of inferring that the absence of "founding parents" of a concept can represent a natural or disinterested process. Change in this regard is part of political, economic, social, and cultural movements, which reflect hierarchical power relations and at the same time feed them. Although many who use the term Global South don't do so consciously, there are messages inherent in this concept that are disseminated and crystallized, which is not a disinterested movement. And these motivations are rarely included in the explanations developed in the last section of this article. Furthermore, it is not possible to argue that the adjective "global" only has the purpose of indicating that the countries that belong to this group are located on the globe since at the time of writing there is no nation outside the Earth.

The semantic imprecision of the word "global" is one of the possible criticisms of the concept. The semantic function of adjectives is to qualify nouns, either by attributing characteristics, restricting, or clarifying their nature. Therefore, in the expression Global South, the adjective "global" is intended to modify the meaning of the noun "south". However, it is worth asking what informative value the word "global" adds. As has already been argued, it does not refer to the fact that everyone in this group is located on the globe, because this characteristic does not differentiate the new concept of the Global South from its predecessors: Third World, developing countries, South, etc. This case differs, for example, from the term "human security". The adjective "human", when qualifying the noun "security", has the function of making a distinction from the security that is traditionally analyzed in International Relations: that relating to States. Therefore, in addition to its semantic function, the word "human" has a relevant explanatory function for the field of International Relations, highlighting a fundamental difference in the type of security that is dealt with, as well as the main victims of this insecurity: individuals. It could be argued that the adjective "global" seeks to indicate inclusion in the process of globalization, which accelerated and deepened throughout the 20th century. On the other hand, all actors in international relations, albeit asymmetrically and with different results, have been affected by the globalization process. As a result, the choice of adjective remains, at best, questionable as to its relevance.

Semantic imprecision can be considered a cause or symptom of another criticism of the Global South: its vagueness. When using the concept,

it is not clear what the main nature of the group is that is being defined. The origin can be political, economic, social, cultural, behavioral, material, geographical or even a mixture of all the factors mentioned above. There are no clearly defined criteria as to the main characteristics and their weight, for inclusion or exclusion of members who can be classified in this concept. Although in the social sciences, it is not uncommon for concepts to have elastic boundaries in their definitions, in the case of the Global South, these boundaries are practically unknown. While some states are often classified as part of the Global South (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, India, and Nigeria), other countries are not automatically associated with the definition (e.g. North Korea, Iran, South Sudan, China, Cyprus, Panama and the Maldives). If these countries are not considered members of the Global South, it is also unclear what classification would apply to them, as there is no understanding of what a non-Global South would be.

As the definition of the Global South is vague, as are its criteria, various explanatory hypotheses can be put forward to understand the differentiated treatment: position in international politics, economic relevance, human development index, domestic political regime and even subjective reasons stemming from worldviews. This vagueness may reflect the real objective of the concept of the Global South, which remains hidden between the lines of its use: to name everything that is considered to be "the rest", just as the title of Alice Amsden's work (2003) denounces.

This perception that the Global South seeks to include within a single concept a myriad of actors that are part of the "rest" generates two main difficulties. Firstly, any concept that seeks to place very heterogeneous units under the same umbrella ends up losing its explanatory capacity. Excessive generalization creates platitudes, making the concept not very useful for analyzing the complexity of the group's members, as well as intra- and inter-group relations. The Global South aims to embrace countries with a large territorial extension, such as Brazil, and others that are at risk of disappearing due to the effects of climate change, such as Tuvalu; nuclear powers, such as India, to countries such as Costa Rica, which has decided not to have armed forces; economically robust states, such as China, to fragile countries, such as Yemen; liberal democracies, such as Taiwan, to authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia; as well as countries aligned in international politics with the traditional powers of the North, such as Mexico, to revisionists, such as Iran. While the inclusion and exclusion criteria are unclear, the attempt to cover so many units under the same concept gives the impression of a profound lack of knowledge about the characteristics of this group. As well as highlighting the weakness of the concept's explanatory power, this finding reinforces the

hypothesis that the Global South's main objective is to give a name to the "rest". In other words, regardless of the characteristics of the cases, everything that doesn't belong to an idea of the North is defined as the Global South.

Curiously, although the Global South is coined from an idea of opposition to an established group (i.e. "the other"), there is no inherent counter-concept in scientific literature. In geographical terms, the South is the opposition to the North, which also includes explanations in physics, given the planet's magnetic field. The same is not true of the Global South, since the South is treated as Global, but the North is not always. Academic concepts require clear scientific criteria that are applied impartially to all cases (GOERTZ, 2006). In this case, one wonders whether the reasons that led to the need to insert the adjective "global", even though the choice of the word can be semantically criticized, to describe the South were also observed for the North. Furthermore, even if the expression "Global North" were more common, this concept would inherit the same difficulties and inaccuracies that weaken the definition of the Global South.

The concept of the Global South was born in academic circles, but has had a degree of acceptance, albeit timid, in speeches, reports and other documents from states and international organizations. Despite this, few actors, state or otherwise, bother to define themselves as Global South in their official documents, speeches, and reports. This is not the case with other concepts, as occurred, for example, in the Non-Aligned Movement, in which states sought to mark a political position, emphasizing the North-South divide beyond the East-West divide of the Cold War (MILANI et al., 2014). Today, we can cite the cases of China and Brazil in the political field of International Development Cooperation, which reinforce their characteristics as developing countries to legitimize their international actions vis-à-vis their partners and in opposition to the Official Development Assistance of traditional donors (DUARTE, 2019b). Due to the rules agreed in the World Trade Organization and other international institutions, which provide for differentiated treatment for countries at different levels of industrialization, several states are concerned with reinforcing their characteristics as countries with lower relative development (MILANI et al., 2014). However, the Global South does not reflect any identity that the actors recognize, nor does it have a political impact or produce legal or commercial consequences. The fact that it is primarily an academic concept is not a problem in itself, as analytical frameworks are created to facilitate the process of analyzing and interpreting the phenomena studied, although decision-makers rarely make decisions based on scientific concepts. However, the virtual non-existence of a Global South in the empirics is noteworthy and, added to the weaknesses already

explored, reinforces the criticism that the Global South has little explanatory power.

It is possible to infer that one of the main motivations behind the concept of the Global South, even if it is hidden, is the Northern powers' view of everything they consider exogenous. It is therefore a concept based on an ethnocentric, paternalistic, and inevitably superficial reading of the international system and the actors within it. In this sense, the Global South also carries with it a need for validation and recognition by the powers, which would explain the need for the adjective "global" to qualify the South. Actors who are not part of the North (i.e. belong to "the rest"), but are considered close by the powers, are considered global. Countries in the South that are seen as pariahs generally do not appear as part of the Global South (i.e. the unspoken definition of the non-Global South). As Milani and Kraychete (2022, p.10) argue, "(...) the term 'Global South' would imply that analysts accept a concept of the social (the international) that removes even more agency from the countries of the geopolitical South." For its part, the North does not need to be classified as global, because the analysis of the aspects necessary to be considered as such takes as its starting point this group, which, according to this perspective, are naturally already worthy of being considered global. The asymmetry of power crystallized in the power structure of knowledge (DUARTE, 2019a) has made it possible for this fragile and ethnocentric concept to gain ground and consolidate itself in the academic sphere, including in countries that are considered the "rest". For these reasons, this article argues that the idea of the Global South, as well as being analytically unhelpful, should not be used by academics from the South. In the next section, a conceptual alternative will be presented.

Geopolitical South: a contribution to the debate

As announced in the introduction, this section presents the concept of the Geopolitical South as an alternative to the use of the term Global South. It is not argued, however, that this new concept ends the debate in the literature on how to classify the South, given its plural characteristics, or that it is exempt from criticism. On the contrary, it is recognized that, despite the advantages that will be developed in the following paragraphs, there are still shortcomings and points that need further reflection, which will be analyzed in the next section. It is understood, however, that the establishment and use of the concept of the Geopolitical South encourages and rescues an important debate in the academic sphere, denaturalizing and tensioning concepts loaded with biases from the North in order to analyze other actors in the world.

Therefore, despite being subject to criticism, it is hoped that theorizing about the Geopolitical South will make a contribution to academia by encouraging reflection and debate.

In pointing out the shortcomings of the Global South, the previous section listed some weaknesses, such as semantic imprecision, conceptual vagueness, the absence of a counter-concept and ethnocentrism. These points will also be important for analyzing the concept that will be presented in this section, but first it is necessary to define it. The definition of the Geopolitical South is based on actors who construct their political and identity positions on a systemic level, politicizing their (unfavorable) positions in the international hierarchy, based on a historical reading of asymmetries, which are perpetuated and crystallized in power structures. It is not, therefore, a concept created from the world powers' vision of other actors. The concept of the Geopolitical South seeks to reinforce the agency of actors from the South, insofar as it brings a self-constructed image, based on their readings of international relations and their insertions.

In contrast to the concept of the Global South, the definition described above already has an immediate advantage in terms of substance and meaning. The adjective "geopolitical" has informative value, since it brings meaning and qualifies the noun "South". While the Global South, both because of its semantic choice and because it is a vague concept, obfuscates and softens the existence of power relations, the concept presented seeks to place these disputes and tensions at the center of the analysis, inviting a historical reading of asymmetries, relations of domination, exploitation, and humiliation as constitutive factors of international relations (BADIE, 2014). What most characterizes the dynamics between actors (state and non-state) is not the fact that they take place on the globe (and are therefore global), but their strongly hierarchical dimension that shapes the anarchic system.

The concept of the Geopolitical South seeks to reduce the problem of semantic imprecision, since its construction makes it clear what is the main nature of the group it seeks to define. Consequently, the criteria for inclusion and exclusion of the states that are part of this concept become clearer. Like other concepts in the social sciences, these criteria have a subjective content, which requires interpretative work when applying their definition to empirical cases. Some constitutive elements of the Geopolitical South (such as identity, social, political and cultural issues) cannot be precisely determined by means of mathematical formulas or purely technical factors. As argued in the previous section, the elasticity of concepts in the Social Sciences, due to different interpretations of the phenomenon being analyzed, represents a weakness, but does not invalidate their explanatory power. In this sense,

it is worth pointing out that the boundaries drawn by the definition of the Geopolitical South are clear, although there is still a degree of subjectivity.

Defining these boundaries also helps to reduce (although it does not eliminate) a negative effect that is inherent in processes that establish analytical classes: the creation of platitudes within a class, forging a false homogeneity. It is still possible to classify actors with very diverse characteristics under the definition of the Geopolitical South (for example: military capacity, economic weight, political representativeness, social challenges they face, geographical position, domestic political regime, culture, etc.). The factor that unites this myriad of actors in the light of the concept of the Geopolitical South is their political positioning in the international power game (MILANI & KRAYCHETE, 2022). The Geopolitical South was not constructed on the basis of a stereotyped and superficial view that actors have of everything they consider exogenous. On the contrary, it is a concept developed by actors from the South, to highlight the reading they have of themselves, although they may have different motivations for having developed this self-perception. The Geopolitical South, therefore, is a definition that covers fewer cases than the Global South, as not all actors from the South will be part of it. Despite the problem of creating unwanted generalizations within the analytical class, the concept is designed to highlight the identity of these actors, which is reflected in their behaviour, their worldviews, the construction of their international norms and their readings of national interest, despite being heterogeneous in material and ideational terms.

There are no cases of actors officially declaring themselves to be part of the Geopolitical South, unlike the term Global South. This is a concept that was born in academia and is intended to have an analytical function. The existence of groups, networks and political movements provides empirical evidence of the Geopolitical South. This is the case, for example, with variable geometry groups that aim to challenge the concentration of global decision-making power. Perhaps the most eloquent example is the BRICS (VIEIRA, 2016), but we can also mention the G-20 trade group within the World Trade Organization, the New International Economic Order, the World Social Forum, Via Campesina, as well as the narratives that accompany South-South cooperation policies (BRAGA & DUARTE, 2022).

It is important to note that belonging to the geopolitical South is not linear. As mentioned, the concept is based on historical, identity, cultural and material peculiarities, which are reflected in the reading and behavior of actors in international politics. Since these factors can vary over time, the relevance of being classified as part of the Geopolitical South also fluctuates, although the material criteria of the actors that place them in a low or intermediate

position in the hierarchy of world power remains stable. In other words, there are actors who can be considered part of the South (according to economic, social and military criteria), but decide not to engage in political behavior that would allow them to be classified as part of the Geopolitical South. This is the case, for example, with Mexico, especially after signing the North American Free Trade Agreement, or Brazil, which under Jair Bolsonaro has adopted a stance of automatic alignment with Donald Trump's government (ALVES & FARIAS, 2020). Dissatisfaction with the status quo, which is manifested mainly in the defense of greater participation in the decision-making mechanisms of international regimes, is a requirement of the Geopolitical South (BRAGA & DUARTE, 2022).

It can therefore be seen that the concept of the Global South and that of the Geopolitical South do not cancel each other out, as they do not have exactly the same purpose. The alternative presented in this section, however, has clear comparative advantages, especially for research on states and other actors in the South. A reading based on self-perception removes the ethnocentrism rooted in the concept of the Global South, interrupting the spread of stereotyped readings that relegate entire societies to the definition of the "rest". There are weaknesses, however, that should be noted, as will be further explored in the next section.

The insufficiency of the Geopolitical South

The concept of the Geopolitical South, which was presented in the last section, makes a significant contribution to overcoming some of the limitations of using the term Global South. In particular, it creates a definition that takes greater account of the agency of the countries of the South, as well as highlighting the existence of asymmetries and inequalities in the North-South divide, rather than hiding them. To this end, the new concept breaks with the exogenous character that serves as the basis for the construction of its analytical criteria, while seeking to increase precision and transparency. However, the concept of the Geopolitical South and its empirical application open up new analytical possibilities that still need to be worked on. As argued by Goertz (2006), clearly defining the inclusion and exclusion criteria inherent in scientific concepts also defines the universe of possibilities that concept can be applied to. The Geopolitical South brings with it two basic categories of analysis.

The first is the "South", which refers to the material dimension and the reflection of this asymmetry in the trajectory of international actors. The formation of the South is therefore a historical process marked by a common

unfavorable condition in the stratification of the international system. In their diversity, the actors of the South find their unity factor in their history of domination or subjugation, whether through the system of colonialism, protectorate or unequal treaties, in their relative position in the international division of labour, in their socio-economic conditions and in their conditions as countries excluded or underrepresented in their ability to participate in the decision-making processes of international organizations (DEVIN & ALBARET, 2016).

The second is "Geopolitics", which, as Milton Santos (2021) disciplines, deals with the relations of power and space that occur simultaneously on various global, regional, and local boards. The word "Geopolitical" should be seen as a new analytical category. Therefore, the concept of the Geopolitical South combines criteria from two dimensions which, although related, are distinct. This makes it difficult to clearly identify a single counter-concept for the Geopolitical South. The definition presented makes room for at least three other categories that derive from the combination of criteria that make up the concept. This is different, for example, from what has been argued for the Global South, where there is no clear counter-concept.

The Geopolitical South is materially, historically, and politically opposed to the actors who come from the traditional zones of power (which, with rare exceptions, are the same as those of colonialism and imperialism) and who defend the status quo because they benefit directly from it. The discourses present in international development cooperation make this counterpoint even clearer. In order to legitimize and strengthen their international cooperation policies, countries like China, Brazil, India and South Africa strive to create a symbolic regime in opposition to the Official Development Assistance provided by traditional donors from the North (MILANI, 2018). Often, the official discourse of these countries highlights the common past of colonialism and exploitation in order to present themselves as a partner more concerned about the other (DUARTE, 2019b). These countries use their pasts of exploitation, domination, and humiliation, as well as their socio-economic contradictions, to reaffirm their identities and legitimize their international insertion (CONDE, 2022). This example richly illustrates a political instrument used by the countries of the Geopolitical South for their international insertion, while denouncing the perversity of historical power relations in the world.

However, there are other possibilities beyond these opposing poles. The first point to note is the existence of actors who are in the South by historical and material criteria, but decide not to use these factors to denounce the negative impacts of international asymmetries. This is the case of actors who

believe that they can be rewarded by more powerful others by not denouncing the status quo (and therefore distance themselves from the worldview and political behaviour that characterize belonging to the Geopolitical South). This behavior on the part of states in the international system receives different classifications, such as "alignment" or "bandwagon", depending on the theoretical lens used. Although considerably known empirically and theoretically, the literature that has created or adopted the concept of the Geopolitical South (including this article) has not looked into how to classify this group in terms of the analytical criteria suggested.

Just as there are actors from the South who are not part of the geopolitical South, there is also the analytical possibility of countries from the North that are not part of the geopolitical North. The theoretical existence of this group of actors as ideal types, however, does not imply their empirical existence. There are few actors who are in a privileged position in the hierarchy of world power and who altruistically renounce part of their privileges in solidarity with actors from the South. It should be recognized that an analytical category that is empty indicates a clear weakness in the explanatory potential of this concept, as it is not capable of distinguishing between empirical cases, which calls for its revision. On the other hand, it would be an interesting intellectual exercise to discuss Russia's international position in the light of this conceptual debate. Classifying this country as a Global South would be difficult, as although its stance of challenging the status quo gives it credentials for the Geopolitical South, historical and material criteria lead us to believe that it would be an actor from the North.

Figure 2 - Ideal types of states: a proposal to deepen the concept of the Geopolitical South

Classification Diagram– Presentation of Cases Accordingly to the Players Material–Historical Dimensions and Behaviour

Horizontal Axis-Players Behaviour in the International Scenario

Historically with greater capacities (materials, ideational and political)

Geopolitical North	Compassionate North
Aligned South	Geopolitical South

Less Use of its position to question the status quo — More use of its position to question the status quo

Historically with lower capacities (materials, ideational and political)

Source: Made by the authors.

The division into the historical-material and geopolitical axis, which generates the analytical classification of cases, as shown in figure 2, reflects the time of the analysis. However, the world is constantly changing, as is the behavior and characteristics of the agents analyzed. The concept of the Geopolitical South still lacks work that incorporates ways of contemplating the transition of cases between categories. As mentioned above, this article assumes that international insertion is the result of a domestic power play, which takes into account systemic factors, but is not determined by them. Therefore, changes in the agency axis are easily explained by changes in the agents' behavior and worldviews.

Based on this typology, it would be possible to understand different degrees of (geo)politicization of a state's status as South or North at the systemic level over time, as a result of government changes at the level of its domestic policy, as well as cases of occasional politicization for convenience and pragmatism by the same government to ensure greater efficiency, legitimacy and representativeness for its international actions in different thematic agendas and political arenas of international relations. Similarly, it would help us to understand the processes of upward and even downward mobility of states in the hierarchy of the international system over time, due to structural transformations in their material capacities and the achievement of greater representation in power structures.

However, changes on the vertical axis, which relate to historical-material factors, require greater care, as they reflect limitations inherent in the classification of South and North. Even if an actor gains power and moves

up the global hierarchy, the historical trajectory of oppression, humiliation and domination remains. This would be the case, for example, with China. Similarly, a decaying imperialist power may experience a new situation of marginalization in world politics, but its historical position is reversed.

Another factor that limits the concept of the Geopolitical South compared to other concepts such as the Third World, Developing Countries, the South, and the Global South, is its exclusively academic nature to date. As has been shown, it is a concept that was born in academia and proposes to have an exclusively analytical function, like several others with which it dialogues, but which, unlike these, has not yet gained traction with state actors from the South and North, international organizations, and civil society organizations, to become a native concept in international relations.

Final thoughts

When we investigated the origin of the concept of the Global South and its main definitions, we concluded that it gained traction in the 2000s as a reformulation of the concept of the South, due to the appreciation, by analysts and decision-makers, of an approach centered on the deterritorialization of the negative effects of capitalist accumulation on spaces and peoples on a global scale within the framework of globalization theory, dissatisfaction with the preservation of a third-world and non-aligned character in the concept of the South and the lack of a state-centric character that the notion of the South carried with it. However, we also came to the conclusion that this concept does not find an objective and consensual definition in academic literature or political documents.

The analysis of the concept of the Geopolitical South, developed by researchers from the World Political Analysis Laboratory, linked to IESP-UERJ, allowed us to conclude that it reinforces the agency of actors from the South. Likewise, the concept places these disputes and tensions at the center of the analysis, inviting a historical reading of asymmetries, relations of domination, exploitation, and humiliation as constitutive factors of international relations. However, we found that this concept is still limited in terms of addressing other limitations present in the concept of the Global South, in particular its inability to simultaneously account for the unity of the South, as a counterpoint to the North, and its diversity, as an ontological phenomenon, and to contemplate the possibilities of changes in terms of a state's affiliation to the Geopolitical South over time.

Therefore, by comparatively analyzing the analytical performance

of the concepts of the Global South and the Geopolitical South for a more accurate understanding of the geopolitical dynamics of international relations in the first decades of the 21st century, we conclude that the concept of the Geopolitical South has advantages over the Global South. However, we also conclude that the Geopolitical South needs improvement and, for this reason, should not be used uncritically by scholars of Southern states. As possibilities for future research, the fourth section of this article points out weaknesses and opportunities for deepening the concept. The conceptual proposal of the Geopolitical South aims to contribute to the theoretical discussion that overcomes concepts that seem to be of little use analytically, such as the Global South. It is recognized, however, that the proposal presented here requires further reflection.

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to analyze the limitations and analytical possibilities offered by the concepts of the Global South and the Geopolitical South, for a more accurate understanding of the geopolitical dynamics of international relations in the first decades of the 21st century. In methodological terms, the article is based on an analysis of the history of the concept of the Global South, a critical reflection on the main shortcomings of its definition, a presentation of the concept of the Geopolitical South, and, finally, a recognition of its main limitations, to indicate suggestions for improvement. In its conclusion, the article argues that the concept of the Geopolitical South generates greater analytical yield compared to the Global South due to its valorization of the agency of the countries of the South, the greater precision of its inclusion and exclusion criteria, and its denunciation of the asymmetries and inequalities present in the North-South divide in international relations. However, we also argue that the Geopolitical South needs to be improved so that it is capable of simultaneously contemplating the dimension of the unity of the South, as a counterpoint to the North, the dimension of the diversity of the South, as an ontological phenomenon, and the dimension of change in terms of a state's affiliation to the Geopolitical South over time.

THE TWILIGHT OF THE US DOLLAR HEGEMONY AND THE COMING MULTIPOLAR WORLD

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Introduction

The US has emerged as the world's only superpower in the aftermath of the Cold War, effectively establishing itself as the global hegemon. The secret to United States' success in the Cold War and the post-Cold War era was its tremendous economic strength that enabled it to easily outspend every potential rival power in terms of military capabilities (Berkowitz 2003, 5). As pointed out by Michael Beckley, the US government has been spending in average half a trillion dollars per year on weapons, amassing "an arsenal of thousands of ships, aircraft, vehicles, satellites, R&D labs, radar installations, ammunition stockpiles, testing and training facilities, and bases" (Beckley 2018, 53). US defense spending amounts to only 3.74 percent of the US GDP, which means that US military superiority does not impose an extraordinary economic burden on American society. However, US hegemony may be also much more fragile than what conventional wisdom suggests: not only are military capabilities far less useful as political tools in a world characterized by complex interdependence and frighteningly large nuclear weapons stockpiles, the very foundation of US geoeconomic dominance has now become shaky, namely the USD. The USD has been described as the "soft underbelly of the American empire" and this underbelly has come under attack (Hensman and Correggia 2005, 1091-1095).

The article argues that the US rise to global dominance would not have been possible without making the USD the most important world

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reserve currency. The USD almost failed as a dominant reserve currency in the 1970s but was eventually propped up by the energy-backing of the USD. In the early 2000s the US government realized that it could use the USD as a most powerful weapon against adversaries, which ultimately encouraged the development of parallel global financial institutions by the BRICS nations. The unprecedented financial sanctions by the US and the EU against Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 may have further eroded the global attractiveness of the USD as a world reserve currency. If, or when, there would be a viable USD alternative, the USD would decline in value, making it far less affordable for the US to military maintain a global presence and to function as the global policeman. The consequence will be the emergence of a new multipolar order.

The Bretton Woods System

Britain created a global financial system by establishing the first international gold standard, also known as the classical gold standard, which was operational from 1880 to 1914 through the Bank of England. The standard was during that time jointly maintained through the four core nations Britain, Germany, France, and the US (Gallarotti 1995, 11). The classical gold standard has been widely praised as having been effective in terms of maintaining monetary stability, strengthening the growth of international trade, and enabling economic expansion and high employment rates (Gallarotti 1995, 18-19). The gold standard came to a sudden end with the beginning of the First World War. The new gold exchange standard that replaced the classical gold standard during the interwar period, was ineffective due to the lack of a strong hegemonic power that could guarantee it.

In order to lay the foundations for a new global financial system, delegates from 44 countries met at a hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 1944. It was decided to create two key institutions, the Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund. The function of the World Bank is to provide loans to countries for economic reconstruction and development, while the function of the IMF is to provide funding in order to solve temporary payment problems (Eichengreen 2021, 555). The Bretton Woods System was based on a gold standard that was to be maintained by the US government, which promised to keep USDs convertible to gold at a rate of $35 per ounce (Cesarano 2006). All other currencies were to be pegged against the USD with the expectation that all central banks would maintain the value of their currency within an agreed range.

The Bretton Woods System became brittle as more countries were forced to devalue their currency relative to the USD. For example, the Bank of England had to devalue the Pound two times in 1949 and 1967 (Eichengreen 2021, 555). In the 1960s the US government moved to an arrangement known as the Gold Pool, where several major countries cooperated in maintaining an international distribution of gold reserves. The arrangement was, according to Barry Eichengreen, enabled by the US "applying economic, financial and geopolitical leverage" (Eichengreen 2021, 555). Due to high government expenditures in relation to the Vietnam War and resulting inflationary pressures, the Bretton Woods System ended in 1971.

Many of the current challenges to the global financial system originate from Nixon's decision to close the gold window in August 1971. This effectively devalued the USD and created an entirely new global financial system (Dalio 2021, 347-348). Currencies began to fluctuate in a much greater range against each other than under the Bretton Woods system. Not surprisingly, the end of the gold standard caused severe inflation in the US throughout the 1970s. By the late 1970s, the USD was already failing as a world reserve currency. In order to stabilize the USD at the beginning of increasing inflation after closing the gold window, the Nixon administration began high-level negotiations with Saudi Arabia that they would sell their oil only against the USD (Clark 2005, 20). Out of a secret agreement with Saudi Arabia grew two pillars of the new global financial system: petrodollar recycling and the development of IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). Petrodollar recycling refers to the practice that oil exporters in the Middle East would reinvest a portion of their oil profits in the financial markets of Europe and the US. The SDRs, on the other hand, represent a basket of currencies in accounts held by IMF member states that they can use for settling international debt. The SDRs were first introduced in 1970. Petrodollar recycling began in 1974 when Saudi Arabia secretly bought $2.5 billion in US Treasury bonds (Clark 2005, 20).

Since most countries in the world need to import energy and since some of the biggest exporters of energy now demanded USD in exchange, more international demand for the dollar was created, which stabilized the value of the USD. Petrodollar recycling further ensured that substantial amounts of USD and USD-denominated financial instruments would be held by foreign powers long-term, which thereby further artificially tightened the USD supply. About 80 percent of all international oil sales are currently conducted against USD (Budryk 2022). What is now called the petrodollar is the idea that the USD is backed by oil by virtue of countries having to hold USD in order to purchase energy on the global market.

The advantages for the United States of USD hegemony are substantial,

as argued by Zarate: "The standing of the dollar allows the United States to shape the global economic and political system and offers greater influence abroad, greater flexibility at home, and greater insulation from international crises" (Zarate 2013, 399). USD hegemony also allows the US government to borrow money for financing a substantial trade deficit and to sustain levels of national debt without a severe devaluation of the currency.

The Weaponization of the USD

The dominance of the USD in the global financial system provided the US government occasionally with opportunities for coercing allies such as Britain during the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Katz 2014, 79). However, it was not before the era of globalization during the 1990s that the USD became useful as a weapon that could be wielded with great effectiveness against enemies. Paul Bracken argued that it was the tremendous growth of the international financial system and the dominance of the USD in international currency transfers that has enabled targeted financial warfare analogue to precision strikes in modern warfare (Bracken 2007, 685). Juan Zarate was among the first to explain how the US Treasury has used financial warfare, which he defines as the "use of financial tools, pressure, and market forces to leverage the banking sector, private sector interests, and foreign partners to isolate rogue actors from the international financial and commercial systems and eliminate their funding sources" (Zarate 2014, 88). As Blackwill and Harris have argued, "[t]hanks to the dollar's continued universality and America's central role in financial markets, the U.S. Treasury is able to deliver a credible ultimatum to international banks: either do business in the U.S. dollar or do business with the target country or bank" (Blackwill 2016, 58-59). In other words, the US Treasury can cut off banks from the international banking system if they do not play ball and comply with US demands.

The US Treasury has waged financial war against a wide range of adversaries. Al Qaeda was targeted with financial sanctions under UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001), which meant that all suspected terrorist assets could be frozen in the international banking system (Zarate 2013, 33). After al Qaeda Iran became a major target of US financial warfare for the country's violations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The country is particularly vulnerable to financial sanctions targeting the energy sector as 80 percent of its foreign currency reserves and 50 percent of its budget are derived from oil exports (Katz 2014, 83). On 15 March 2012 Iran was cut off from the SWIFT international payments system, which

directly impacted its ability to export oil due to the difficulty of buyers making payments (Zarate 2014, 88). Overnight, Iran lost between $45 billion and $50 billion in oil sales, which crashed its currency, the Rial, and caused massive inflation at 25 percent per year (Torbati 2012).

The rise of BRICS

The Chinese and Russian governments have been outspoken against the weaponization of the USD and have worked towards reducing their USD holdings and their dependence on the USD as a means for international payments. Furthermore, they have been creating financial institutions in parallel to the World Bank and IMF, which is already threatening USD hegemony. Of particular concern is China's new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which US officials have called out as an attempt to undermine the financial institutions created after the Second World War (Blackwill and Harris 2016, 115). Russia has established the BRICS group of nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in 2009 as an annual summit to bring together the leaders of emerging economies to discuss avenues for cooperation. Out of this annual summit came the commitment to a BRICS bank modeled after the World Bank and capitalized with $100 billion, which is called New Development Bank (NDB) (Blackwill and Harris 2016, 74). Unlike the AIIB, which has attracted many states beyond BRICS and Asia as members, including some Western states, the NDB is primarily composed of BRICS countries (Cooper 2017, 275). It is the BRICS bank and it has built up its capital base through the innovative way of issuing bonds in BRICS national currencies, thus bypassing the USD (Cooper 2017, 276).

China and Russia have already agreements in place to conduct trade with their respective currencies, circumventing the USD. China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and a growing number of other nations are in process of developing digital currencies (CBDCs) that could be used for international payments. China already conducted a test launch of its own digital yuan in Shenzhen in September 2020 in view of rolling out the currency nationwide within a few years. Most recently, Iran announced its new CBDC called Ramzrial in September 2022, which is a digital version of its regular currency, the Rial (Dudley 2022). It is not hard to guess why nations that are US competitors and adversaries would want to switch to CBDCs: they can more easily circumvent sanctions, they can exercise far more control over their currency, and they are no longer vulnerable to financial warfare in the form of asset freezes.

The next step would be to develop a basket of BRICS currencies that not only enable the international transfer of funds via alternative payment

systems but also function as a new global reserve currency, which means that it must be a stable store of value (Molodiko 2020, 73). The first step towards this goal has been taken by the development of BRICS Pay, an intra-BRICS payment mechanism, which functions as an alternative to the American Visa and Mastercard payment systems Losev 2019). In June 2022 President Putin announced a BRICS basket-based reserve currency modeled after the IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which could compete with the USD as a stable world reserve currency (Birch 2022).

Blowback from the Ukraine War sanctions

On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, taking large swaths of eastern, southern, and northern Ukraine. In response, NATO has implemented a hybrid warfare strategy that consists of arming and training Ukrainian forces and of waging economic warfare to ultimately turn Russia "into North Korea, completely isolated economically and diplomatically" (Myre 2022). The US and the EU targeted Russia's economy by attacking Russia's finances and ability to profit from energy exports. The idea is that by strangling the Russian economy Russia would be forced to end the war in Ukraine and withdraw from all the territories that it currently occupies.

The US government and the EU have frozen $300 billion of Russia's foreign reserves (Tan 2022). This act temporarily weakened the ruble overnight and caused domestic price levels to increase. Freezing Russia's foreign reserves has the aim of hindering Russia's ability to pay off its international debts and imports in foreign currency, forcing countries to use the ruble. Like Iran, Russia has been disconnected from SWIFT (Norrlöf 2022). This means, Russia can no longer do cross-border financial transactions effectively delaying any payment for Russia's exports, which substantially reduced the ability of Russia to export oil to the EU since Russia no longer can receive payments in Western currencies.

In order to make exports more difficult, Western insurance companies have withdrawn coverage from Russian vessels that need the coverage for accessing ports and generally conducting business (Saul 2022). Other sanctions imposed on Russia include travel bans for the Russian elite, closing off the European and American airspace to Russian flights, restricting oil/gas equipment, banning all imports from Russia, asset freezes on President Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov as well over 350 politicians and oligarchs, restrictions on USD through sanctioned state-owned banks and other financial institutions, and the removal of Russia from

"most-favored nation" status bringing significant increases in tariffs (Lin and O'Donnell 2022).

The Western financial, trade, and other sanctions have clearly fallen short of limiting Russia's ability to continue its military operations in Ukraine, as the war has dragged on for almost a year. The value of the ruble, which is highly dependent on energy prices and Russia ability to export energy, has not collapsed. Europe continues to buy natural gas from Russia but is now forced to use rubles as a means of payment (Jewkes and Wacket 2022). In fact, the exchange rate for rubles to USD has remained remarkably stable (after a temporary spike in March 2022) at around 70-75 rubles per USD. The impact on the Russian economy was moderate with a likely drop in GDP of only 3.3 to 3.4 percent for 2022 (NPR 2022). The Russian economy has proven to be more resilient than expected.

Given that it was the first time that a major economy was subjected to freezes of central bank assets, as well as assets of certain private individuals, and a removal from SWIFT, other US competitors and potential adversaries must be concerned about the possibility that they could be next if they ran afoul the rules imposed by the US government. In particular, China must be greatly concerned about how any move they make against Taiwan could result in financial warfare by the West, which is likely to force them into a decision of either abandoning a reunification with Taiwan or reduce the impact of likely future US financial sanctions by dumping USD holdings and aggressively promoting the yuan as an alternative payment option for international trade.

The end of the "petrodollar"

The idea that financial warfare could undermine USD hegemony is not a new one and it has been considered repeatedly by several experts over the last two decades. For example, Zarate has warned that "the US dollar – and its predominance – is a target for competitors and those who bemoan the world's reliance on the dollar as the accepted reserve and trading currency as the central element of US financial power" (Zarate 2013, 394-395). Since the USD is implicitly backed by energy due to the promise of Saudi Arabia to only export their energy against USD, thereby forcing other nations to maintain large USD reserves to buy energy, an attack on the USD might target the US special relationship with Saudi Arabia.

It has been noted that US ties with Saudi Arabia have been weakening over the last decade. In April 2016 the Saudi government threatened that it would sell off $750 billion worth of US Treasury bonds in the event of them

getting held liable in US courts for 9/11 after the release of the 28 missing pages of the 9/11 Commission report (Wong 2016). The relationship was further harmed by the scandal surrounding the murder of Jamal Kashoggi in the Saudi embassy in Turkey in 2018. There have been concerns for years that Saudi Arabia could renege on the deal made in the 1970s and sell oil in a currency other than USD. China, which imports 25 percent of all the oil exported by Saudi Arabia, has been negotiating for several years with Saudi Arabia to buy oil in yuan (Said 2022).

Saudi Arabia initially stated they would not accept yuan but might in the future sell oil against a reference basket of currencies (Economist 2022). They reversed course in January 2023 to announce their willingness to trade oil against other currencies, presumably also the yuan (Omar and Cranny 2023). If that were to happen, it could over time result in more energy being traded against other currencies, thus undermining the need for other countries to hold the USD as a reserve. This may negatively affect the willingness of countries to accept USD as a means of payment for exports to the United States.

What may be indicative for a Saudi Arabia defection from its partnership with the US is that it is not condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine and is actually seeking closer ties with Russia through OPEC+ (Economist 2022). The Saudis also plan the purchase of a number of advanced Russian weapons systems, including the S-400 air defense system, the Su-35 fighter jet, and the Kornet anti-tank missiles (Episkopos 2021). The US has been Saudi Arabia's primary protector and supplier of arms for 50 years. It is therefore a worrying sign that the Saudis want to buy weapons from a US adversary, which may indicate that the country could change its strategic allegiance from the West to the East (Russia and China).

A BRICS currency

Up to now, the USD has not faced any serious challenge until the introduction of the Euro in 1999. The Euro was only initially seen as a viable competition to the USD as the leading world reserve currency (Bergsten 1997, 83-95). The financial crisis of 2008 almost led to a crash of the global financial system, and it revealed the weakness of the EU and its ability to cope with the high indebtedness of some of its major members. Due to the need to bail out banks that had toxic assets on their balance sheets and in order to save the global financial system, US national debt increased sharply from 2008 to 2009. US national debt measured in percentage of the US GDP

increased from 68 percent GDP in 2008 to 86 percent in the first quarter of 2010, eventually peaking at 135 percent in the second quarter of 2020 (Federal Reserve 2022). The increased borrowing of the US government in the years following the 2008 financial crisis was heavily criticized by some of the larger foreign holders of US debt, most notably China. In 2013 during the partial US government shutdown and with the possibility of US debt default the Chinese government issued a statement that they wanted to "de-Americanize" the world (Sherwell and Moore 2013). This was a thinly-veiled threat to dump US debt and thereby weaken the stability of the USD.

The Chinese yuan is now more widely held as a reserve currency but only takes three percent of the share of foreign reserves held by other states (as compared to 60 percent for the USD). The Chinese economy is not strong enough and the People's Bank of China is not trusted enough to make the yuan a viable competitor to the USD. However, the greatest threat to the USD hegemony is not the yuan: it is the prospect of the development of a new BRICS currency, which could be gold-backed or commodity-backed.

The BRICS group has been openly discussing a new BRICS currency that could replace the USD as a medium of exchange for intra-BRICS trade since at least 2011 (Sule 2011, A14). China and Russia have already agreements in place to conduct trade with their respective currencies, circumventing the USD. The next step would be to develop a basket of BRICS currencies that not only enable the international transfer of funds via alternative payment systems but also function as a new global reserve currency, which means that it must be a stable store of value (Molodiko 2020, 73). The first step towards this goal has been taken by the development of BRICS Pay, an intra-BRICS payment mechanism, which functions as an alternative to the American Visa and Mastercard payment systems (Losev 2019). In June 2022 President Putin announced a BRICS basket-based reserve currency modeled after the IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which could compete with the USD as a stable world reserve currency (Birch 2022).

Western analysts generally dismiss the possibility of the USD getting dethroned as the dominant world reserve currency as very unlikely, mainly due to the lack of a viable USD alternative in the global financial system. For example, Elliot Hentov, Ramu Thiagarajan, and Aaron Hurd have argued in relation to the unprecedentedly extreme Russia financial sanctions:

> Do these historic sanctions signal the end of the dollar's dominance? We believe that any imminent change is highly unlikely. Paradoxically, the recent events may have even buttressed reliance on the dollar and highlighted its appeals: deep and liquid capital markets; traceability and convertibil-

ity; and network effects. In the long run, any alternative needs to be able to compete on those metrics (Hentov, Thiagarajan, and Hurd 2022).

It is true that the USD is unbeatable in terms of liquidity, it may also a factor in the USD's downfall. Here it is important to consider that there is a difference between the relative strength of the USD in relation to other currencies and the absolute strength of the US in terms of purchasing power. Reckless spending is destroying the value of the USD and its capability to function as a store of value, which will affect other powers to look for a better alternative if or when such an alternative would arrive.

Conclusion

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis in early 2020 the world has arguably entered an era of de-globalization. Global supply chains have experienced some disruption during the period of the US-China trade war and have been breaking down due to government responses to COVID-19, as well as due to disruptions caused by the war in Ukraine (Rickards 2022, 42). This has already resulted in shortages across different types of goods such as certain food items, car parts, computer chips, and other consumer goods. Once broken, supply chains are very difficult to reestablish since they are so incredibly complex. As James Rickards has argued, "[t]he system is extremely frail. One missed delivery can result in an entire assembly line shutting down. One delayed vessel can result in empty shelves. One power outage can result in a transportation breakdown" (Rickards 2022, 60). The growing military tensions between the US and China will likely lead to further disruptions and subsequent shortages. The other factor that these problems cannot be easily fixed or fixed any time soon is that they are also caused by major political shifts and geostrategic realignments that will shape the future of the world.

US elites increasingly understand that globalization or the "liberal world order" is being challenged by BRICS and may fail altogether. The World Economic Forum has published a series of articles that discuss the question whether the liberal world order will succeed or whether it will collapse and be "replaced by something fundamentally different" (WEF 2023). National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently stated that the world was at an "inflection point" with the post-Cold War era being over, and that the 2020s would be a decisive decade that would decide "what comes next" in terms of world order (Sullivan 2022).

For now, the US economy remains stronger than others, but it is also

facing serious headwinds. Although not yet officially acknowledged, the US has or will very soon enter a recession that is accompanied by high inflation. US inflation may have slowed since summer 2022 but it remains at a 40-year high with no end in sight. Most governments of the world, including the US, have massively increased their debts in response to COVID-19, which has resulted in unsustainable levels of national debt. The US national debt now exceeds $31 trillion dollars. The US General Accounting Office has pointed out that the "federal government faces an unsustainable fiscal future" (US GAO 2022). US national debt is projected to reach 200 percent GDP by 2050 (US GAO 2022). Due to escalating national debt levels the USD has subsequently suffered significant devaluation in absolute (but not relative) terms against hard assets such as gold or other commodities. Ray Dalio has argued that "[t]he loss of reserve currency status is a product of chronic large devaluations" (Dalio 2021, 145). He also pointed out that "[o]f the roughly 750 currencies that have existed since 1700, only about 20 percent remain, and all of them have been devalued" (Dalio 2021, 132).

Should existing trends continue, it seems likely that the days of the USD as the world's number one reserve currency are numbered. Hentov, Thiagarajan, and Hurd may be right that USD hegemony may persist for longer but that the consequences of it ending would change the existing world order profoundly:

> One clear conclusion from the extraordinary weaponization of the dollar in the Ukraine war is that it serves to increase incentives toward financial fragmentation. Although the ability to move away from the current dollar-centric system is structurally limited for now, that structure can change over time. The economic costs of such change, particularly when considered alongside the broader effects of global fragmentation, may be very high indeed (Hentov, Thiagarajan, and Hurd 2022).

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ABSTRACT

USD hegemony is central to the primacy of the United States in the international system, perhaps even more so than US military superiority. The US government can afford to spend several times more on its military than its military competitors because it has the ability to sustain seemingly unlimited levels of debt thanks to the relative strength of the USD. Other nations have been willing to buy US debt and maintain large USD reserves, which has kept the value of the USD fairly stable in comparison to other currencies. The authors argue that there are clear signs that USD hegemony is declining and that this could lead to a multipolar world in which the United States is just one great power among others. The article will discuss the reasons why the USD is so central to US power, why the USD's attractiveness has been declining, and how the unprecedented Russia sanctions in response to the Russian incursion into Ukraine may have inadvertently accelerated the emergence of a multipolar world.

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH POLICY IN AFRICA[1]

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Introduction

Great Britain, along with France, is a post-colonial power that has retained some of its influence on the African continent. However, comparing the positions of these two countries, it should be noted that the current position of Great Britain in Africa is weaker and not as complex as that of France. So, for example, Great Britain does not have such a financial instrument as the CFA franc, which circulates in 15 African states and is tied to the financial system of France. Also, in recent decades, Great Britain has not changed the governments of African states to please its economic interests and practically did not participate in military interventions.

At the same time, one cannot identify a certain risk associated with the international status of the English language. This leads to the fact that the English-speaking states of Africa in the late 20th - early 21st centuries turned out to be much more open to external influence than, for example, the countries of Francafrique. In many respects, this cultural and linguistic factor determines the deep penetration of the influence of the United States and India on the continent, which also represents the English-speaking cultural tradition, but has completely alternative geoeconomic and geopolitical goals.

Thus, the relevance of the issue under analysis is associated with the

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processes of a wide geopolitical confrontation on the African continent, and the opponents in this confrontation are not always the objective geopolitical counterparties of Great Britain - China and Russia. In many cases, the interests of Great Britain clash with the policies of the United Kingdom's allies and partners, both within NATO and in general within the framework of the global political game.

In such conditions, Great Britain is forced to constantly maneuver in the system of global goals and interests in order to maintain and strengthen its position on the African continent, which is reflected in the political rhetoric of the leaders of this country.

A wide range of research material determines a high degree of scientific elaboration of the topic from various angles, including British, Russian, and global [Miller 2011; Cook 2003; Gallagher 2009; Taylor 2010, etc.]. In this regard, Kulkova'a approach seems relevant [Kulkova 2014]. It aims to map the problems of the UK's implementation of the policy of "soft power" and cultural diplomacy. Kulkova states that although Great Britain sees itself as a "cultural superpower" and seeks to expand its cultural presence in the world despite financial constraints, it faces the difficult task of building a consistent image of a country that is at the same time the core of the Euro-Atlantic world, a center of gravity and a melting pot for non-Western cultures, including in their own territory, subject to British cultural influences from a long period of colonialism.

Another approach is presented by Taylor (Taylor 2010) who criticizes the classic neo-colonial approach, according to which Africa appears as a "passive" continent and object of international relations, without its own identity. In contrast to this concept, Taylor states that Africa has always been an active participant in the international process and its activity only intensifies as the intensity of globalization processes increases. In many ways, Taylor's approach explains why British leaders over the short period from 1997 to 2020 so dramatically transformed their approaches to interaction with African countries and, in fact, moved away from the model of continental dominance in favor of bilateral equal dialogue with individual, at least "key" countries. Taylor believes that only the study of the internal mechanisms of power in African states can help to understand how foreign policy decisions are actually made and to see the real image of the country and the whole continent, viewed through the prism of British national interests.

Exploring this issue in our paper, we proceed from the continuity of British policy towards Africa and its determination not only by the political ambitions of individual national leaders but also by the long-term structure of dialogue, which is rooted in the concept of neo-colonialism.

Our research methodology is based on the principles of the theory

of "path dependence". This social phenomenon was described by Pearson (2000) and then received many interpretations, for example, in the works of Mahoney (Mahoney 2000) and Boas (Boas 2007). It refers to either the results at a given point in time or the long-term equilibrium of the process, and two theses are indicative here: first, "history matters." Second, the predictable increase in small differences is a disproportionate cause of later circumstances.

Within the framework of the study, a problem-historical research method was also used to analyze the evolution of African politics under different cabinets of ministers in the period from 1997 to 2021 in a single complex of historical, political, and economic conditions and in the context of general changes in the international situation.

Britain's turn towards Africa

Of course, language is a platform for the use of London's soft power towards African states. Nevertheless, the determining factor of influence during the entire post-colonial period was the political will of the British establishment, aimed at keeping the former African colonies in the orbit of their political and economic influence. During the entire period of its implementation, this policy changed, which was due to the transformation of Britain's foreign policy goals in the context of a government in power.

From the late 1940s, a practice began to take shape in which territories gaining independence joined the Commonwealth. Since 1960, the political issues that have engaged the attention of Commonwealth leaders have been mostly African ones (Akinrinade 1989). As Power (2009) states, the Commonwealth's focus on democratic process, state capacity and 'good governance' is shallow, derivative and in many ways undistinguishable from the agendas of countless other international development organizations and the international financial institutions in particular. For most of the participants in the association, the Commonwealth was seen mainly as a tool to stimulate their bilateral relations with the UK.

To date, the population of the Commonwealth countries is more than two billion people, and the African states are the largest contingent of countries in the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth for the UK primarily plays the role of "soft power", and it has also become a potential new partner that can replace the European Union. At the same time, the Commonwealth plays a quite significant role in the UK's adaptation to the new international environment, reinforcing its position in the main international organizations. Despite the fact that the economic benefits from membership in the Commonwealth are

small, it is worth noting that the Commonwealth is a fairly well-functioning economic space in which a number of countries benefit from membership. In fact, the UK has managed to create a mechanism that does not require huge financial investments from it, but brings certain benefits to almost all of its participants - first of all, of course, to Britain.

With the end of the Soviet era, an intensive revision of priorities begins in the world. The countries of the "Third World", including those on the African continent, found themselves in a situation of instability due to the partial loss of geopolitical priorities and influence from the countries of Europe and the United States. In some cases, this led to civilian wars, such as the 1994 conflict in Rwanda.

As a result, Western countries, including the former colonial powers, including Great Britain, found themselves forced to re-actualize the African vector of foreign policy towards the end of the 1990s. For Great Britain, the actualization of the African political vector turned out to be associated with the policy of the Labor government headed by A. Blair, who was in power from 1997 to 2007 (Kulkova 2013).

During this period, British policy turned out to be focused on numerous external challenges, including integration into the EU and NATO military companies in Afghanistan and Iraq and strengthening ties with the former colonies. This was largely due to the personality of A. Blair, as he considered the use of military force as one of the determining factors in the restoration of the country's power.

In this regard, Kulkova identifies four factors that influenced the intensification of cooperation between Britain and African countries, including those outside the boundaries of traditional colonial influence [Kulkova 2014]. Among them is the struggle for African mineral resources, practical interests, ideological motives, and personal characteristics of A. Blair.

In our opinion, the fifth factor that was actualized closer to the mid-2000s is the arrival of new external political players on the African continent, who gradually began to transform the system of geopolitical influence that has developed on the continent. Among them, China should be noted first, followed by India and Brazil.

Interestingly, Britain's turn to Africa turned out to be connected with the thesis that Britain needs to atone for the sins of colonialism and start relations from a "clean slate," but at the same time, in 1997 A. Blair already declared: "I value and honour our history enormously, but Britain's empire should be the cause of "neither apology nor hand-wringing"; it should be used to further the country's global influence".

Blair's government steps in relations with African countries

It is relevant to recall the international project "Make Poverty History", which the UK led in 2005. The G8 meeting was held the same year, which was chaired by Great Britain with its agenda. Undoubtedly, such great attention to Africa under the leadership of Great Britain should have brought this country big political points as a country-leader and a country-peacemaker. It is characteristic that after the G8 summit, the activities of the "Make Poverty History" project weakened greatly. It was completely discontinued in 2006 (January 31), although the organizations participating in the project clearly did not achieve their formal goals.

Despite the fact that the "Make Poverty History" movement was compromised and actually ceased to exist in 2006, in 2013, it was resurrected under the new name "Enough Food for Everyone". In the context of this movement, Great Britain again assumed the chairmanship of the G8. The fight against hunger was also a central theme of the campaign.

In 2002, A. Blair visited Nigeria, where he participated in the discussion of issues of environmental restoration, economic management, agricultural development, etc. This has become part of the Prime Minister's policy of supporting large British businesses operating in African countries.

However, going back to the period 1997-2005, it should be noted that the Blair's government implemented a number of profound administrative reforms, including, for example, the creation of the Commission for Africa, which indicates its political engagement, despite the transnational nature.

The Commission published a report in 2005 that generated a broad public debate, which was interpreted within the G8 in 2005. The G8 countries stated they were taking on obligations to fulfill the requirements of the report. As such, this was the failure of their political position since the G8 countries were able to meet the requirements of the Trade Commission, including ending subsidies for agricultural exports by rich countries and ending "reciprocity" in world trade negotiations.

Great Britain's policy towards the continent from 1997 to 2005 was implemented very actively in the context of political populism. An example of this is the speech from Prime Minister Blair at a party conference in October 2001, in which he directly says that the situation in Africa is problematic, the UK and Western countries are ready to help solve this problem, but in return, they want to see political changes in Africa, aimed at adapting specifically to European values.

Based on the statements of A. Blair in 2001, it becomes obvious that a new complex political concept was developed during this period, the essence of which was reduced to the hegemonic position of Britain, including in relation to African states, which, first of all, was shared with the partner

- the United States - and boiled down to the thesis that Britain needs loyal "democratic" partners who will nominally be considered equal.

The factor that made such a statement on the part of Great Britain possible, without a doubt, is the actualized terrorist threat, which has become a shadow over the entire system of international law and the principles of the UN (Kulkova 2013).

In this regard, we can say that Africa has become a very convenient object for extrapolating British interests. Since the 1960s, former colonial countries only moved away from the metropolis, losing ties with it and establishing ties with other agents, such as the USSR and then with China or India in 2000. In such conditions, the need for revenge on the part of Great Britain became obvious, which, being primarily economic, had to be supported by various kinds of sanctions, including the possibility of military operations.

To implement Blair's concept, a number of administrative decisions have been introduced in the UK since 1997. So, for example, the first among the innovations was the creation of the Department for International Development (now FCDO) in 1997. This Department, included in the government, had the goal of implementing a targeted policy of assistance to developing countries and systematic cooperation with charitable societies and international organizations to eradicate poverty. A convenient context for the development of the ministry's activities was the adoption at the UN level in 2000 of the Concept of the Millennium Development Goals, which coincided with the goals set by the ministry.

Nevertheless, at the Department for International Development level, practically no attention was paid to the deep processes of the evolution of developing societies related to culture, historical memory, and politics (Vines and Cargill 2006, 53-56). However, since its inception, the Department has become a leader in analyzing African issues, and to a large extent, this has been facilitated by dialogue and agreements with external counterparties (Porteous 2005, 281-297).

Thus, the UK at that time was just acquiring a new African strategy, including through dialogue with other stakeholders. Along with the Ushtein Group created in 1999, the 1997 P3 initiative became an important milestone in UK international cooperation on African issues. France, the UK, and the USA joined it at the first stage.

The intensification of cooperation with France became possible as a result of the French-British summit in Saint-Malo, where the discussion was about the organizational foundations and goals of a common European policy in the field of security and defence. Despite the nominal complexity of the approach to the problem on the part of the three states, each of them

extrapolated its influence on African countries in accordance with its own interests (Walpole 1998). Later, the project was also expanded to include Germany, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and some other countries, cooperation with which was implemented, including through the Africa Conflict Prevention Fund created in 2001 in Great Britain.

In fact, Britain has increasingly militarized its humanitarian work, integrating it with the creation of sub-regional training teams and supporting the national military forces of countries such as Ghana, Mozambique, and Nigeria. In parallel, other British initiatives were being implemented, including, for example, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which primarily affected Ghana and Nigeria.

Brown's, Cameron's and May's cabinets

After 2007, in connection with the coming to power of the new government headed by Gordon Brown (2007–2010), Great Britain's policy towards the African continent is somewhat transformed. We can talk, for example, about the continuation of interaction with Nigeria, which began under A. Blair. So, in 2007, U. Yar'Adua came to power in this country. In 2008, he visited London, and during this visit, the parties agreed to form a group to train security forces to eliminate lawlessness in the oil-producing region of the Niger Delta.

It is impossible to speak unequivocally about a change in foreign policy priorities since African countries had remained the focus of attention. However, the toolkit of influence is being adjusted, in which financial mechanisms begin to prevail.

This is largely due to two factors. The first is the global financial crisis of 2008-2012, which hit both Britain and Africa at the same time. And the second is the personality of Gordon Brown himself, who previously, as the Minister of Finance, placed more emphasis on the effectiveness of financial rather than military mechanisms of influence.

In 2008, the British Minister for International Development declared that Britain would not abandon its financial obligations on Africa. Until 2011 it would provide developing countries (not only African ones) with assistance worth more than two billion pounds.

It should be noted that this investment seems to be extremely successful since construction prices during this period were declining while the potential of integration projects on the continent, on the contrary, increased. At the same time, the military aspect of interaction with Africa

during Brown's term noticeably sagged, as indicated by the rejection of the Defense Strategy until 2010, which was expected back in 2007.

During the term of Brown, there was also an administrative transformation associated with the merger of the Africa Conflict Prevention Fund and the World Conflict Prevention Fund in 2008. In 2009, another consolidation took place in connection with the merger with the Fund for Stabilization Assistance. The new structure was named the Conflict Fund. In our opinion, this demonstrates a tendency to create a more comprehensive approach to regional conflicts.

With the departure of Brown and the arrival of Prime Minister David Cameron, the attitude towards African countries was once again somewhat transformed. The first factor has to do with the structure of the government, which became a coalition and was represented by an alliance of conservatives and liberal democrats, i.e., more gravitated towards the need for internal political compromises. The second factor that became actual in 2015 was the Brexit referendum, which forced Cameron to pay much more attention to British-European relations.

In this context, the African vector of British politics, in a sense, became hostage to allied relations between Britain, the United States, and the EU. However, during 2010-2016, there were several events that characterized British policy in Africa. First of all, it should be noted that in 2010 the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Review "Securing the UK in an Age of Uncertainty" were finally adopted. Both of these documents can be considered significant, as they transformed the general approach of the British government to foreign policy for years to come.

Another landmark document of this period was the "Strategy for Strengthening Stability Abroad", adopted in 2011, which determined the updated structure of the UK's actions in other countries. The strategy has been supported in practice by the increased funding of the Conflict Fund, which has maintained an African dimension.

Compared to Blair and Brown's policies, Cameron's Africa policy seems more contextual. So, with the arrival of Cameron, the stake in Africa, as in the period before Blair, was shifted to the Foreign Office, and much less attention was paid to the activities of the Department for International Development and the wishes of the Ministry of Defence. In part, this can be attributed to the prime minister's desire to stake on long-term projects, including in the field of trade (Kulkova 2013).

At the same time, if we look at the trade statistics of this period, we would have found that the position of Great Britain in Africa was gradually

weakening. For example, statistics show an increase in the trade deficit. If from 2009 to 2011 the trade balance was a surplus due to the increase in UK exports and the fall in imports, then in 2014, the deficit was 4.3%, which was associated with an increase in imports.

The structure of trade with African countries is also uneven, which to a certain extent contradicts the ideas of Brown, who relied on the development of trade relations and the search for new partners.

There is a pronounced asymmetry in favor of the UK on foreign direct investment between the two sides. In 2014, UK foreign direct investment in Africa totaled £42.5 billion. African countries in the same period invested only 3.0 billion pounds sterling.

In terms of industry, mining, and quarrying, as well as financial services, were the main industrial groups receiving UK FDI, accounting for 54.4% and 34.3% of the total in 2014. To a certain extent, this suggests that African countries have acted and are the bearer of a raw material resource for Britain, which, to a large extent, contradicts the idea of the development of the African continent, which was expressed at the UN level in 2000 and was actively supported by all British prime ministers before 2016.

A larger increase in UK investment in Africa compared to African investment in the UK resulted in the UK's net FDI position in the continent growing from £ 19.2 billion to £ 39.5 billion between 2005 and 2014.

UK investors' earnings from their FDI in Africa (outward FDI) fell from £ 5.8bn in 2005 to £ 3.8bn in 2014. Despite the fact that more than half of British investments in Africa are in mining, the largest income (£ 1.7 billion) comes from financial services. In contrast, the UK's FDI revenues from mining and quarrying were £ 1.3 billion. In many respects, it was the success of the economic policy of Great Britain in South Africa and Nigeria that dictated Cameron's visit to these countries in 2011. When visiting these two countries, Cameron represented a new model of regional centers of economic power, capable of enclosing surrounding countries, including those not belonging to the British zone of influence, and forming a system of transit of goods and services through logistics centers that would be beneficial to Great Britain.

As a result, by 2016, the end of Cameron's term and the time of Brexit, the position of Great Britain in Africa turned out to be extremely ambiguous. On the one hand, since 1997, the country has achieved great success in trade and investment, has clearly identified two main economic partners, South Africa, and Nigeria, and has also strengthened its position among a number of former colonies, including Kenya, Tanzania, Gabon, DRC, etc. In addition, Britain actively participated in the fight against the outbreak of the Ebola virus

in 2014 and developed its relations with countries of the continent that do not fall directly under the zone of its neo-colonial influence, such as Rwanda or Mali.

On the other hand, the results of Britain's activities in Africa turned out to be rather dubious in terms of global achievements. Most of the conflicts in which Britain participated in different years have been frozen or not resolved, and the results of its activities are only temporary. This is largely why, in Prime Minister Cameron's speech on the strength and security of Great Britain in the EU on May 9, 2016, i.e., on the eve of the Brexit referendum, Africa as a complex area of cooperation between Britain and the EU, was practically absent.

Otherwise, the British-African dialogue remained virtually beyond the political battle of 2016 and passed in transit to the next government under the leadership of the already new politician Theresa May.

Theresa May was given a great responsibility to lead British society through the crisis period associated with the country's exit from the EU. In any case, this exit was fraught with high costs for the national economy due to the rupture of established economic ties, the emergence of new customs barriers, and the withdrawal of a part of European business. Alternative non-European areas of economic cooperation were receiving additional actualization. In this regard, the African direction of British policy becomes particularly attractive, especially in the context of the development of new economic ties and attracting new investments.

The very same premiership of T. May in the aspect of British-African relations was primarily characterized by a tour of three African countries - South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya. This tour is significant in many ways. First of all, it is symbolic for the partners of Great Britain since major British politicians have not visited the continent for five years. The second point is related to Britain's exit from the EU and the need to update alternative economic ties. The third is the intensification of China's policy in Africa. May's arrival on the continent actually coincided with another event, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, which took over from Xi Jinping's tour, who also visited South Africa and Mauritius, Rwanda, and Senegal.

In this regard, South Africa has become a country for which a geopolitical struggle unfolded, which brought quite unexpected results. For example, May supported the land reform carried out in South Africa and associated with the seizure of land from the white population, including the heirs of the British colonists.

During May's visits to Nigeria and Kenya not only trade but also

military and social issues were raised. In our opinion, the issue of countering terrorism that can threaten oil production, should be considered as a priority.

During May's term, several other significant events characterized the general approach of Great Britain to African problems in addition to the African tour. For example, the diplomatic presence in Mali was expanded, and embassies were opened in Niger and Chad.

Despite the growth of cooperation between Britain and African countries during the rule of Theresa May, it is impossible to unequivocally declare the formation of a certain turn in relations during this period. The policy of Britain of this period was in the outline of the principles set forth by Gordon Brown, the essence of which was to minimize military participation and maximize positive, primarily mutually beneficial trade interaction. Nevertheless, with a high degree of certainty, this path can be called extensive since it did not imply the solution of issues important for the continent, a profound change in the structure of trade, or the initiation of any innovative and unique projects.

At the same time, the need for these changes was felt both in business and in political spheres. In many ways, their initiation required a certain solution to the Brexit issue, which could stabilize British policy both concerning the EU and in relation to others, in that number of African counterparties.

It is now clear that such changes have come to British politics with the new Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who has been actively playing the African card in 2020.

Here, first of all, we are talking about the first UK-Africa Investment Summit 2020, which was opened by Johnson on January 20, 2020, in London. The summit was supposed to mark a change in the mechanism of relations with African countries and establish a new model of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Nonetheless, despite controversy in some of the claims, the summit was a big economic success, with a total of more than £ 6.5 billion in commercial transactions, accounting for 43% of the UK's total trade with Africa. In addition, trade agreements were signed with 11 countries, and trade preferences were declared for 35 countries.

The background idea of the forum was the prospective creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area, within which an agreement is planned to reduce tariffs by 90% for all types of goods (each country is allowed to exclude 3% of goods from this agreement). To date, only 22 out of 49 African countries have ratified the treaty. In this issue, the partnership between Great

Britain and Africa is being actualized, since some African countries are key partners of Britain in Africa, and at the same time some of them, for example Nigeria, are not interested in launching a free trade zone, as this will affect the price of exported oil and, accordingly, the state's profits.

When describing the achieved results in general, it should be noted that they are very contradictory. On the one hand, deals were concluded, the equality of positions of the parties was demonstrated, plans for the development of cooperation were outlined. But on the other hand, despite the results achieved, the scale of the agreements reached, and the volume of contracts concluded make up only a few percent of the total revenue of Britain and its trade agreements with global partners.

It is worth noting here that, back to history, with the entry of the UK into the EU in 1973, the British benefited from the trade agreements implemented by the Europeans. In this way, the former British colonial territories in Africa were incorporated into these agreements. At the present time, the break with the EU gives the country the opportunity to renew trade agreements with African countries, expanding them and increasing opportunities for African exporters. Thus, one of the key strategies in this case is the signing of new bilateral trade agreements, replacing the previous ones signed by the EU. For 46 countries in Africa, Britain guarantees the preservation of preferential customs and tariff regimes after Brexit. Bilateral trade agreements have been signed with eleven African countries, and a law on a system of trade preferences has been adopted with another 35 states of the continent.

It can be said that Britain is going through a period of transformation in the system of its international relations. New approaches and measures are being developed in the field of interaction with foreign partners, and, to a greater extent, with African countries. The formation of a new agenda - "Global Britain" - was declared. In a narrow sense, the goals of the "Global Britain" doctrine, voiced back in the premiership of T. May and subsequently developed under B. Johnson, are to maintain key global positions, primarily economic ones, after the loss of advantages and opportunities associated with membership in the EU. The existence of diverse historical and human ties between Britain and Africa, as well as the powerful influence of British "soft power" on the continent, was stated (Fituni and Abramova 2020).

In addition, an approach was proclaimed to deepen cooperation with individual countries and regional organizations in the field of economic development, peace and security, human rights, democracy, and public administration. To achieve these goals on the continent, which has become a direction of increased importance, it was decided to use the Fusion doctrine (synthesis, fusion of resources). The implementation of the objectives of

the strategy is supervised by two special structures: The *Sub-Saharan Africa National Security Strategy Implementation Group* (NSIG) which oversees the development of strategic government policy priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa, and *The Whitehall Africa Group* (WAG) which is responsible for the implementation of the developed strategic approach, in particular, for a specific strategy in certain regions and individual countries of the continent. (Ibid.).

Conclusions

Despite the ambiguity of the event held in 2020, the summit became an occasion or symbol for the British government's political turn in matters of political and economic cooperation with African countries, to which Britain has been moving towards since 1997. The main essence of this turn was concentrated in a special government statement and boiled down to 4 theses, including "increasing trade, supporting African countries in transforming their economies, mobilizing sustainable financing for Africa and building clean energy capacity".

Nevertheless, Britain's turn towards Africa cannot be regarded as unambiguous and complete, as indicated by the content of the report of the Committee of the House of Lords on Foreign Relations and Defence of Great Britain. Following the Summit, it states the strategic nature of cooperation with African countries and notes the need to lay the foundations for a new medium-term economic partnership after Brexit, to diversify UK investments in Africa and increase trade, leveraging the promising benefits of African integration. These processes indicate that in the context of reformatting the system of world politics and the challenges associated with leaving the EU, the United Kingdom is striving for new political and economic alliances. Expanding ties with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the Persian Gulf and evaluating the prospects for markets in Latin America, Britain has significantly stepped up the African direction (Godovanyuk 2018).

Thus, despite some positive moments, including creating a trademark for East Africa and assisting in supporting industrialization in Ethiopia, the change in strategy becomes fundamental and expected. In this regard, the Committee of the House of Lords ascertained the need for a "second throw", apparently considering the policy of Blair in the early 2000s as a "first throw". The new throw should be comprehensive and include trade, investment, migration, and humanitarian components at the same time.

The investment aspect of British policy is criticized, which, back in the period of Brown, declared its intention to become the main investor of the G7

(G8 at that time) in Africa. Now Britain has changed its approach (apparently trying to reduce the feeling of neo-colonial influence) and, in the words of Johnson at the summit, seeks to become a "partner of choice". Critics point out that this goal is difficult to measure. In addition, following this strategy may not be effective if other external counterparties in Africa begin to impose their influence.

On one more issue, namely the assistance to African countries, which comes from Great Britain, the authors of the report entered a confrontation with the position of Johnson. As we wrote earlier, Britain has spent up to 0.7% of its GDP on this type of aid in recent years, but at the 2020 summit, the Prime Minister declared that this kind of interaction is not very effective and should be abandoned in favor of trade. His words have a strong enough reasoning. Indeed, British aid, as well as aid from other states and organizations, in most cases acts as an inappropriate transfer, which is often directed simply to finance a particular regime and has no visible social or economic effect.

Despite these arguments, the committee insists on preserving and considering the strategic planning system as its main goal. The caveat, in this case, is the thesis of additional reporting, which can increase transparency.

As a result, summarizing all of the above and relying on the support of James Duddridge, Minister for African Affairs at the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO), the commission stated the need to intensify work on creating a strategy for cooperation between Great Britain and African countries, which, in its turn, could become the first of its kind comprehensive document capable of streamlining intercountry interaction for a long period, especially in the context of the weakening of British-European trade and economic relations.

Nevertheless, despite the exponential increase in UK political institutions towards African issues and following the 2020 Summit, it should be noted that the UK has not yet achieved a clear approach to interaction with the continent's countries. As a result, the unstable course of cooperation laid down by Blair continues to maintain its relevance and determines bilateral policy in a rapidly changing global space.

After Brexit, London seems to keep Africa in the field of its attention, but its actions in the framework of global international politics clearly do not benefit the strengthening of interaction between the parties. To equalize the shaken positions of the United Kingdom in Africa, long-term purposeful work is clearly required without breakthroughs and distractions to other regions.

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RESUMO

O objeto de estudo neste artigo é a política do Reino Unido na África no último período histórico. O ponto de partida do estudo é 1997, quando Anthony Blair se torna o novo primeiro-ministro do Reino Unido, que, após um longo intervalo, propõe uma nova abordagem para a interação política com os Estados africanos. Foi a partir deste momento que as questões africanas se transformaram em um dos vetores estáveis da política de Estado e surgiram como uma esfera complexa das atividades da Grã-Bretanha na arena internacional. No âmbito do estudo, foi também utilizado um método de investigação problema-histórico para analisar a evolução da política africana sob diferentes gabinetes de ministros no período de 1997 a 2021 em um único complexo de condições históricas, políticas e econômicas e no contexto de mudanças gerais na situação internacional. Os principais eventos pelos quais se pode acompanhar a dinâmica das mudanças na política do Reino Unido em relação aos países africanos foram considerados neste artigo. Os autores chegaram à conclusão de que o Reino Unido ainda não conseguiu uma abordagem clara para a interação com os países africanos. Como resultado, o curso instável de cooperação estabelecido por Blair continua a manter a sua relevância e determina a política bilateral em um espaço global em rápida mudança.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE

Grã-Bretanha, África, interação política, cooperação, colonização.

ANALYSIS OF SWEDEN'S BID TO JOIN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AFTER THE TURKISH EARTHQUAKE: A DISASTER DIPLOMACY PERSPECTIVE

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Introduction

Turkey and Sweden are at odds linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkêren Kurdistan, PKK). The PKK has committed several terrorist assaults for over 40 years to mobilize Kurds to establish an independent state. Although the PKK has not yet successfully created an independent state, the party has actively employed mass media, like Roj TV, to spread its messages throughout various European nations. The book by Samih Teymur and Cindy J. Smith titled "The PKK: A Decades-old Brutal Kurdish-Terrorist Organization" has about 1,500 PKK members in Turkey and close to 4,500 in Northern Iraq. In fact, George W. Bush is quoted in the book as saying, "PKK is a terrorist organization and enemy of Turkey, enemy of the United States, and enemy of free-democratic Iraq" (Teymur and Smith 2008).

The military coups of 1971 and 1980 resulted in many Turks and Kurds moving to rural areas and migrating out of Turkey to escape military violence. As a haven for multiculturalism, it is not surprising that in the 1980s, Sweden became a destination for several refugee flows from Chile,

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Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. A thesis from the European University Institute stated that the majority of the refugee population in Sweden consists of Iranians, Iraqis, Chileans, Argentina, Peruvians, Kurds, Turks, and Eritreans. Even though Kurds from Turkey are the largest group in the country, most migrant groups are descendants of native Kurds who came to Sweden in search of asylum (Baser 2012).

One of the scientific research articles published by the Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security said that Kurdish groups in Sweden are considered extremist groups and supporters of terrorism, where they have been providing support to PKK activists (Baser 2013). Because of this, it is not surprising that Turkey then accused Sweden of being a country that provides protection for terrorist groups that are included in the European Union (EU) blacklist. Turkey has also urged Sweden to hand over PKK activists who fled to the country as a condition if Sweden wants to get Turkey's approval to become a member of the North African Treaty Organization (NATO). But unfortunately, the insistence received a negative response from demonstrators who recognized themselves as PKK.

The demonstration, which took place on Saturday, January 21, 2023, was marked by the burning of copies of the Qur'an by a leader of Denmark's hardline right-wing party, Rasmus Paludan. The demonstration, which received permission from the Swedish government, then received strong criticism from several parties such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and also Turkey. The arson was carried out outside the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan gave his first response on Monday, saying: "Those who allow such blasphemy in front of our embassy (in Stockholm) can no longer expect our support for their NATO membership". President Erdogan also added that the Quran burning carried out outside the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm was an attack on the 85 million Muslim population in Turkey. "If you do not show respect to the religious beliefs of the Republic of Turkiye or Muslims, you will not receive any support for NATO (membership) from us" (Aljazeera 2023a).

Anger was also shown by the Turkish Foreign Minister by issuing a statement "We condemn in the strongest possible terms the vile attack on our holy book... Permitting this anti-Islam act, which targets Muslims and insults our sacred values, under the guise of freedom of expression is completely unacceptable,". Mevlut Cavusoglu even expressed anger at the Swedish government for failing to stop the demonstrations, saying: "It's a racist action, it's not about freedom of expression," (Aljazeera 2023c). Although 28 other NATO countries have ratified Sweden, Turkey and Hungary remain

steadfast on their choice. As a result of this event, the conflict between Turkey and Sweden became increasingly heated and Turkey became increasingly resistant to Sweden's application for NATO membership. This further reduces Sweden's chances, so it takes even more effort for the country to get full support from Turkey.

Two weeks after the demonstration and arson took place, suddenly an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.8 occurred on February 6, 2023 in the Southern Turkey region with a depth of 11 km and has triggered a tsunami as high as 30 cm in the city of Erdemli, Mersin. The magnitude of the earthquake that occurred at that time did not necessarily end the earthquake event that occurred in the country. After that day, hundreds of aftershocks were reported and have resulted in dozens of buildings, schools and hospitals collapsing. According to United Nations Humanitarian Chief Martin Griffiths, three weeks after a magnitude 7.8 earthquake struck Southern Turkey and Northern Syria, there have been at least 44,000 deaths in Turkey and about 6,000 in Syria. Griffiths also said there were many injured, tens of thousands of people missing and hundreds of thousands of residents left homeless (Lederer 2023).

Seeing the condition of his country devastated in an earthquake that occurred, the Turkish government swiftly coordinated with Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) and also the Turkish Red Crescent. Turkish authorities then declared a level 4 state of emergency in ten provinces of the country for the next three months. Turkey has also not hesitated to ask for international help to restore conditions in its country. Governments from all over the world quickly responded to requests for international assistance by offering a wide range of humanitarian assistance and sending rescue teams to Turkey (CDP 2023).

Based on the report from Aljazeera, countries that participated directly in Turkey include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Austria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, European Union, Germany, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Palestine, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Ukraine, UAE, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). While the international organizations involved include: World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations (UN), Red Crescent, Norwegian Refugee Council, NATO and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Aljazeera 2023b).

By reviewing several studies using the keyword "Turkey, Sweden and NATO" obtained data from the Scopus and Publish or Perish databases, where Abdullah Murat Tuncer wrote his articles about "Turkey's options for Finland and Sweden's NATO membership applications", and he analyzed Turkey or

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan who are taking advantage of the heated situation between Russia and Ukraine to create favorable conditions for him in the 2023 elections (Tuncer 2022). In the writings of O. D. Çakir and M. E. Chasnouski entitled "Turkey in NATO: An extraordinary position", he explained Turkey's interest in NATO membership to maintain the stability of his country's security, although sometimes Turkey does not always agree with the strategies pursued by the US regarding its interests in the Middle East region (Çakir and Chasnouski 2020).

In addition, an article written by Selin M. Bölme, "NATO-Türkiye relations: From irreplaceable partner to questionable ally", described NATO's relationship with Turkey and the country's role in the alliance through a historical perspective (Bölme 2022). Based on Tarık Oguzlu's article, "Making sense of Turkey's rising power status: What does Turkey's approach within NATO tell us?", he focused on observations to find out how Turkey's rise as a developing country capable of establishing close ties with NATO as one of the most respected organizations in the world (Oguzlu 2013). Finally, Müge Kinacioglu and Aylin G. Gürzel in their research entitled, "Turkey's contribution to NATO's role in post-cold war security governance: The use of force and security identity formation", he investigated Turkey's involvement as the only Muslim country capable of joining the world security organization in operations outside NATO territory using a constructivist perspective (Kinacioglu and Gürzel 2019).

The five authors focused on research related to President Erdogan's strategy in creating favorable conditions for himself in the 2023 elections amid the heat of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, differences in strategy between Turkey and the US regarding interests in the Middle East, relations between NATO and Turkey reviewed from a historical perspective, Turkey's rise in establishing close ties with NATO, as well as the importance of Turkey's involvement in conducting operations outside NATO territory are viewed through a constructivist perspective. Based on a comparison of several literature reviews, the authors make a research question of how Sweden used the earthquake that occurred in Turkey to get full support for its application for NATO membership.

Concept of Disaster Diplomacy

Diplomacy is a peaceful negotiation between a sovereign state and official representatives of other countries. But in practice, there are many actors involved in it. Regarding its relationship with disasters, diplomacy can

be an analytical framework to investigate more deeply the relationship between disasters, humanitarian assistance, and diplomatic activities through the process of disaster risk reduction and disaster response. Disaster diplomacy is used to understand how and why activities related to disasters, pre-disaster, post-disaster, or even during disasters can affect diplomacy efforts. It also emphasizes a reality in which disaster and its management activities become a political effort that can give rise to short-term diplomatic relations based on previous relationships, but not applicable in long-term diplomatic efforts (Whittaker et al. 2018).

Through a collection of research articles "Disaster Diplomacy: Discord Disintegrated?", shows that disasters can encourage diplomatic efforts even though it does not allow the creation of new diplomacy between countries in conflict (Ganapati, Kelman, and Koukis 2015). An article titled "Governmental duty of care for disaster-related science diplomacy" specifically explained that disaster diplomacy is a disaster-related activity that is able to affect the diplomatic process, where the application of disaster diplomacy includes things needed to reduce disaster risk and diplomacy involved can affect peace and conflict (Kelman 2017). Furthermore, it was also conveyed that disaster diplomacy is impossible without a rapprochement between the two countries. Even conflict, peace and disaster also have interactions to support each other explaining the meaning of this disaster diplomacy (Duda and Kelman 2023).

Various kinds of disasters can have an impact on several important sectors of a country. In some countries, disasters such as Cyclone Nargis devastated Myanmar in 2008 and left more than 130,000 people dead. In Southeast Asia, the December 26, 2004, tsunami left more than 220,000 people dead (Oh and Oetzel 2011). Therefore, disaster management is needed as an effort to prevent, manage, and reduce the impact of disasters caused. Conceptually, disaster management is divided into four elements, namely: preparedness (facilitating response to hazards), response (actions taken before, during and after a hazard occurs to protect people and property, as well as improve recovery), recovery (actions taken after a hazard occurs to restore the state to its pre-disaster condition) and mitigation (actions taken before or after the hazard occurs to reduce the impact caused) (Henstra and McBean 2005).

The same thing is also conveyed in a book entitled "Struktur dan Kebijakan Diplomasi Bencana Malaysia", where the disaster management cycle which refers to the regulations of the National Disaster Management Agency (NADMA) consists of the emergence of disasters, response to disasters, recovery, mitigation and then forming a culture of preparedness in facing disasters.

Figure 1. Disaster Management Cycle

Source: Surwandono 2020.

All forms of activities that have a connection with this disaster can affect diplomatic relations by spurring or providing space for reconciliation efforts. For example, the earthquake and tsunami on December 26, 2004, shook Aceh, Indonesia and has caused countries around Asia and Africa to be affected. The regions of Aceh, Indonesia and Eastern Sri Lanka are known to be the centers of violence worst affected by the tsunami and require great efforts in the post-conflict and post-tsunami reconstruction process. Many international actors came massively to Aceh to clean up and rebuild the region from violence and tsunami. In the midst of this massive humanitarian response from the international community, the Indonesian government and Acehnese separatist groups negotiated and finally signed a peace agreement on August 15, 2005. The Aceh tsunami event shows that peace could succeed if the parties involved really strive for a reconciliation process. Although it is not known for certain whether the ongoing negotiations will succeed or not, the earthquake and tsunami could be the reason for making peace between the Indonesian government and separatists (Kelman 2016).

Other case studies are also illustrated by the emergence of epidemic and pandemic diseases that can be disastrous for people around the world. Some efforts to eradicate smallpox, rinderpest, polio, dracunculiasis (guinea worm disease), measles, and rubella are all underway and involve health interventions in conflict areas. Many measures taken to reduce disaster risk

and disaster response, ceasefires began to be negotiated amid the war to prioritize health for children and spurred vaccination campaigns in places like Afghanistan, Cambodia, Lebanon, Liberia, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. Some advocates use vaccine diplomacy to build peace by separating any health intervention from conflict. Under these conditions, vaccines have successfully contributed to health-related success because neither side feels threatened from the spread of the disease outbreak. All disaster-related activities have proven to have the potential to catalyze pre-existing diplomacy, but there is no guarantee that they will have a long-term impact or that disaster-related activities will shape diplomacy going forward (Kelman 2018b).

For some practitioners, disaster diplomacy is related to disaster prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery activities in cooperation with opposing parties nationally and globally. But behind its role as a facilitator of cooperation and negotiation, disaster diplomacy has encountered opposition among politicians. As it develops broadly, disaster diplomacy will produce political consequences from previous humanitarian actions. For them, disaster diplomacy has been considered a violation of the principle of neutrality, where the attitude of quick disaster response is considered to have been politicized (Yim et al. 2009). Even by definition of literature, disaster diplomacy is understood as the study of how and why natural disasters are able to contribute to the establishment of peace or trigger conflict (Kelman 2018a).

Methodology

This article research uses qualitative descriptive methods in collecting several sources of information. The data obtained is also secondary data from several document sources such as: journal articles, official websites and some reports from official online media which are then analyzed and described descriptively to explain the essence of this writing. This data analysis method aims to find out how Sweden took advantage of the earthquake and established systematic disaster diplomacy with Turkey to get ratification of its NATO membership application.

Results and Discussion
Relations Between Kurds, Turks, and Swedes

The Kurdish diaspora is described as a form of stateless diaspora

(Alinia and Eliass 2014) and is the product of the political repression and economic dispossession taking place in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. This has resulted in hundreds of thousands of ethnic Kurds fleeing their homes and migrating to Europe in search of security, political and cultural, as well as economic rights (Eliassi 2016). As a result, the first Kurdish refugees arrived in Sweden in the early 1970s. Over the next few decades, Kurds from all over Kurdistan and countries around the world flocked to Sweden to escape the oppressive regime.

In some European countries such as Sweden, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, there is a strong and active ethnic Kurdish diaspora. Each diaspora differs from each other in terms of composition, profile of migrants and asylum seekers, dimensions of time and generation, and degree of integration. For example, the Kurds in Germany are mostly of Turkish origin and their emergence as a result of political instability in Turkey and the PKK's efforts to raise awareness among ethnic Kurds about their identity and rights. In the United Kingdom, the majority of ethnic Kurds are Iraqi, and they have been well integrated into British society. In Sweden, more Kurds are intellectually mobilized to develop Kurdish culture and literature (Baser, Emanuelsson, and Toivanen 2015).

Sweden also has many ethnic Kurds who have shown their commitment to previous homeland politics. Generally, the Kurdish diaspora often celebrates various festivals and honors a number of anniversaries, such as the respect for Anfal and Halabja, and the Newroz festival celebration carried out annually by thousands of ethnic Kurds in Sweden and other countries (Khayati and Dahlstedt 2014). Through the article titled "Music, memory, and affect attunement: Connecting Kurdish diaspora in Stockholm", it is said that there are 60,000 to 70,000 ethnic Kurds from various parts of Kurdistan living in Sweden. As a result, since the 1980s Sweden has been a major destination and important place for cultural and political activity within the Kurdish diaspora community (Volgsten and Pripp 2016).

The 1960s saw the beginning of large-scale labour migration in Europe by ethnic Kurds, one of which was Turkey. These migratory flows were dominated by the arrival of Kurdish intellectuals which led to the formation of associations and networks throughout Europe, especially Western Europe (Germany, Britain, Sweden, and France). This large-scale migration flow began with the arrival of ethnic Turkish Kurds which was then followed by political migration flows due to the conflict between the Turkish military and the PKK in the late 1980s to mid-1990s. Although not the largest overall, the Turkish diaspora in Sweden is quite large. Family reunification and asylum seekers are the main motivations of Turkish immigrants.

The initial migrant workforce was mostly Sunni Muslim Turks from areas such as Konya, most of the subsequent arrivals were Armenian, Assyrian, or Kurdish (Wackenhut 2022). Political upheaval in Turkey has created discrimination, persecution, mass killings and widespread war, resulting in a significant increase in the wave of ethnic Turkish Kurdish migration to Europe in search of asylum in the span of ten years (Syrett and Keles 2019). In addition, political oppression and economic deprivation are other reasons for migrant workers as well as asylum seekers to enter Europe (Wahlbeck 2019).

For the republican regime in Turkey, cultural differences are a national threat, so both language and expressions of cultural identity related to Kurds are banned in the country. Kurds in Turkey have had to face decades of forced assimilation and attempts to destroy their cultural identity. Harsh repression and cultural genocide led to the formation of the PKK, which began in 1973 and was inaugurated by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978. The party advocated for the right to self-determination by forming an independent and united Kurdistan and transforming into a socialist society (Jongerden and Akkaya 2016).

Before the 1980 military coup, the PKK had attracted much attention because it was considered the most radical Kurdish organization and prone to violence. By calling it a revolution "anti-colonial liberation struggle", the PKK carried out various acts of resistance against the class and opponents of its group. After the 1980 coup, a number of PKK activists went to Sweden and Germany, where they managed to build networks and organizations by establishing publishing businesses that produced journals, books and newsletters in Turkish, Kurdish, and European. In the late summer of 1984, the PKK resumed its offensive activities by carrying out hit-and-run attacks against military personnel and Kurdish civilians. By mid-1985, the PKK had strong members and supporters in Europe, where its participants consisted of young militant radicals, middle-aged, not highly politicized and their own families (Bruinessen 1988).

In Sweden, there are many ethnic Kurds who have gradually adopted the identity of Kurdistan, they no longer use the national identity of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Thanks to Sweden's multiculturalism policies, ethnic Kurds can mobilize themselves and engage in politics without being separated from Swedish society. The Kurdish diaspora does not want a choice between Kurdish and Swedish identities, but they do want to harmonize a symbiotic relationship. Kurds in Sweden have not come to fully assimilate or give up their Kurdish identity but continue to be ethnic Kurds without having to feel alienated from their daily activities in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres of Sweden (Eliassi 2015).

As a country with a political culture that emphasizes elements of human rights and dignity, as well as an open policy that supports refugees from conflict zones, Sweden is considered the country most conducive to claims of recognition (Koinova 2019). For Kurdish intellectuals, Sweden was a safe haven to develop their culture. There are many influential figures, such as writers, singers, and public intellectuals among Kurdish migrants in Sweden. The ability of Kurdish culture to adapt has helped the ethnic group assimilate into Sweden's dominant culture. Although labor migration from Turkey is an important historical event in Europe, the presence of large numbers of political refugees has had a major social, cultural, and political impact on Sweden given that relations between Turkey and the Kurds have always been in a cycle of conflict. Through its politics and policies, the conflict between Turkey and ethnic Kurds was actually "imported" to Sweden directly or indirectly (Akçalı 2017).

One such conflict has been virtual fights and provocations in website chat rooms between politically active Turkish and Kurdish youths. Many Turkish members blog and react to Kurdish activism in Sweden. They even condemned the country for allowing the ethnic Kurdish diaspora to show their support for the PKK, which has been considered a "terrorist group" in Turkey. One of the most famous blogs at the time was "The Anatolian Voice" (Baser 2014). Another conflict is also taking place in Sweden, where several sources from a youth organization say Turkey has been portrayed negatively in the Swedish media. But luckily, since AK PARTi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) came along, positive changes have changed the portrayal of Turkey in the media (Mencutek and Baser 2018).

Recently, the conflict came to the fore again after Turkey accused Sweden and Finland of aiding the PKK and armed groups in Syria which it considers an extension of the PKK. As a result, on October 6 last year President Erdogan suddenly suggested that Finland and Sweden join the NATO alliance separately despite Turkey previously agreeing to a trilateral memorandum with Finland and Sweden under NATO auspices. Turkey's stance is one attempt to block Sweden's accession despite the country's firm support to Turkey to counter threats to its national security (Arms Control Association 2023).

Swedish Humanitarian Aid to Turkey

The epicenter of the February earthquake was 26 km East of Nurdagi, Gaziantep and in the West of Southeastern Anatolia close to Aleppo. The

location of the epicenter is 18 km with the ground surface and occurred in an environment with a bad building structure, so the earthquake that occurred in Turkey-Syria became one of the largest earthquakes that occurred in the country. Several aftershocks also occurred 11 minutes later with a magnitude of 6.7 and 9 hours later followed by an earthquake of magnitude 7.5. This is the reason why seismologists say that earthquakes in Turkey are the most feared earthquake phenomenon (Sisfofitb 2023).

Many buildings were destroyed and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that around 210 million tonnes of debris had to be cleared in Turkey. This is equivalent to 14,000 football areas with a size of 10x10 km and a height of one meter. The devastation has displaced 1.5 million people and requires about 500,000 new housing units to compensate earthquake victims. This situation is further exacerbated by the cold weather conditions that are currently sweeping the country. This is why UNDP then urged the government to immediately clear the rubble so that road access is immediately open and the distribution of humanitarian aid in the form of food, water, health, and other essential supplies is not hampered (UN 2023).

Based on AFAD's report during its stay in the Pazarcik and Elbistan regions of Kahramanmaras, a total of 360,167 tents have been installed in 332 cities and 189 container cities have been formed providing for the installation of 90,914 containers in earthquake-affected areas. A total of 1,440,668 residents were in shelter tents and 34,120 residents were provided shelter inside container houses. The total number of displaced people in the earthquake-affected areas reached 1,593,808 people, while in other provinces as many as 329,960 residents affected by the earthquake reportedly received accommodation services. In the shelter area itself, 2,284 mobile shower facilities and 5,058 toilet containers are also provided to be used for earthquake victims (AFAD 2023).

Sweden is one of the world's largest humanitarian donors and says it stands ready to lend its support to the United Nations and the International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent. These grants are essential to ensure that humanitarian organizations have the capacity and readiness to provide immediate assistance without having to wait for emergency assistance requests or additional donor contributions. The government is closely monitoring developments to provide support for earthquake victims in need, both in Turkey and Syria (Government Offices of Sweden 2023d)

As a form of Sweden's quick response in providing humanitarian assistance to earthquake victims, on February 6, 2023, the Swedish Presidency immediately took the initiative to hold an Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) meeting regarding the initial situation in Turkey and Syria. As a first

step, the government immediately allocated around SEK 7 million to the IFRC to provide initial assistance for the two countries. The government will decide on additional aid funds once humanitarian needs become clearer and there is further coordination with Turkey, the EU, the UN and the IFRC. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency has also received requests for assistance from Turkey and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). At that time, the agency immediately prepared tents, temporary emergency shelters and expert assistance in the fields of water, sanitation, energy, logistics and construction. Sweden also closely monitored developments and maintained contact with Turkey at various levels, including politics (Government Offices of Sweden 2023g).

The day after the earthquake occurred, on February 7, 2023, the Swedish government decided to provide additional assistance of SEK 30 million and send some experts to Turkey and Syria. Around SEK 20 million will be channelled to the IFRC and SEK 10 million to the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Sweden also provided aid funds of around SEK 55 million to the IFRC and SEK 663 million to UN CERF. Through UCPM, Sweden even sent experts in construction, IT and logistics experts to Turkey. The Swedish government also offered to send more than 300 family tents that can accommodate four to five people (Government Offices of Sweden 2023a).

Two days later, on February 9, 2023, Sweden sent 45 additional personnel, sniffer dogs and rescue teams using aircraft provided by the Swedish Armed Forces to Turkey. Of the 45 personnel, 5 are team leaders employed by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and 40 are employed by the Swedish Armed Forces. Three search teams totaled 24 people, four sniffer dog teams totalled 8 people and two medical teams totalled 8 people. In addition to this support, Sweden also sent 7 experts and provided humanitarian assistance amounting to SEK 37 million to alleviate the situation on the ground (Government Offices of Sweden 2023i).

Six days after the earthquake, a transport plane organized by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency landed in Turkey with 300 family tents. As of that day, February 12, 2023, it is reported that Sweden has contributed around €10.1 million to help Turkey and Syria. Sweden will continue to be committed to providing a rapid response to catastrophic events occurring in Turkey and Syria. The Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission have even taken the initiative to organize an International Donor Conference in coordination with the Turkish Government (Government Offices of Sweden 2023b).

Through a report from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency on February 17, 2023, it was reported that some essential equipment such as 300

larger tents, beds, mattresses, food, and electricity had been delivered to Turkey on that day. Donations were made through the NATO-Euro Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), which was then transported using the Türkiye Lions Club (MSB 2023c). On the same day, Sweden also sent 500 emergency homes to earthquake victims through a joint project between Sweden and the EU, rescEU. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency also dispatched emergency housing resources, beds, heaters, and other essential equipment to help people who lost their homes as well as emergency response teams to ensure that the resources sent arrived on time and on target. The main focus of vital aid to provide for the earthquake victims is food, water, shelter, medicine and accommodation, where all humanitarian assistance can be used for a longer period of time during the reconstruction process (MSB 2023b).

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) provided emergency funding of €3 million to victims affected by earthquakes in Turkey and Syria. The emergency funding was provided through four humanitarian partners, namely the Norwegian Refugee Council, Action Against Hunger, Save the Children and Oxfam. Assistance is used to meet basic needs such as winter clothing, water, and psychosocial support for children. In total, Sweden has provided around €13.6 million in aid to both countries. The assistance includes cash support to buy food needs and arrange shelter. These organizations also provide hygiene items, health services and medicines, portable toilets, cholera prevention assistance and repair of damaged water systems (Government Offices of Sweden 2023h).

The Swedish plane also transported about 500 tents weighing nearly 40 tons from Pakistan to Incirlik, Turkey. In addition, the aircraft also carries a logistics center for humanitarian and emergency assistance (Swedish Armed Forces 2023). Sweden has again provided an additional €7.63 million in aid for people affected by the earthquake in Turkey and Syria. Of this, about €6.28 million is humanitarian aid from SIDA through UNICEF and UNHCR for Turkey and through UNICEF and OCHA for Syria. In addition, SIDA is also providing about €1.35 million through the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency to set up 1,000 tents and accommodate their transportation to Turkey and Syria (Government Offices of Sweden 2023c).

Based on a report from the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union released on March 10, 2023, it is reported that Sweden-EU is rapidly allocating humanitarian assistance to earthquake-affected people in Turkey and Syria, as well as mobilizing EU emergency reserves through the European Humanitarian Response Capacity and RescEU. A total of nearly €12 million in EU humanitarian assistance has been allocated to residents

in Turkey and around €10 million has been mobilized for disaster response in Syria. UCPM has also deployed 1,750 rescue teams and 111 sniffer dogs to assist in the search and rescue process in Turkey. As a result, several lives have been saved by search and rescue teams deployed through UCPM. In addition, 20 EU member states, including Sweden and Montenegro also offer various equipment as shelters, heaters, generators, furniture, medical equipment, hygiene kits, food, and warm clothing for Turkish residents. Sweden even set up 500 relief housing units equipped with 2,500 beds (Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2023).

On Monday 20 March 2023, the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission will host an International Donor Conference with the theme "Together for the people of Türkiye and Syria". The conference was hosted by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, the Prime Minister of Sweden, Ulf Kristersson who represented the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, with Minister for International Development Cooperation and Foreign Trade, Johan Forssell and Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Olivér Várhely moderating. The conference, which took place in Brussels and has been coordinated with the Turkish Government, was attended by more than 60 representatives of EU member states, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, neighboring countries and partner countries, G20 countries (except Russia), Gulf cooperation council member states, the UN, international organizations, humanitarian actors, and international and European financial institutions, such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), as well as other relevant stakeholders (Government Offices of Sweden 2023f).

During the conference, a total of €7 billion in humanitarian aid was raised by the international community to help earthquake victims in Turkey and Syria. As of €6.05 billion in aid and loans were provided to Turkey and €950 million in aid to Syria. Turkish aid funds are used to meet humanitarian needs and assist in the reconstruction of affected areas, while aid funds for Syria are used to help meet humanitarian needs and support recovery, as well as resilience in the country (Government Offices of Sweden 2023e). Through a report from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency published on March 22, 2023, it is reported that more than 350 medical bed supplies were shipped from Sweden to Syria and Turkey. The shipment of medical supplies was donated by a medical company called OneMed and was shared equally between the two countries. The request for assistance received by UCPM is then coordinated with actors in Sweden, where UCPM works with transportation companies, the National Health and Welfare Agency and OneMed. The request for

assistance includes medical equipment, several types of machinery, personnel and other materials used to respond to disasters. UCPM is also responsible for the distribution of logistical assistance, the transportation of donations and cooperation with other international actors (MSB 2023a)

Comparative Analysis of Disaster Management Elements

The four elements of disaster management consist of response, recovery, mitigation, and preparedness. Table 1 will show a comparison of the four elements of disaster management that Sweden implemented after the earthquakes in Turkey and Syria.

Table 1. Analysis of Turkish Disaster Management by Sweden

Type of Assistance/ Elements	Response	Recovery	Mitigation	Preparation
The Swedish government continues to monitor developments in Turkey and Syria.	Yes			
Sweden held an Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) meeting.	Yes			
The Swedish government allocates humanitarian aid funds for Turkey and Syria.	Yes			
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency prepared tents and temporary emergency shelters.	Yes			
Sweden sent some experts in the fields of water, sanitation, energy, logistics, construction and IT.	Yes			

Sweden sent 45 additional personnel, sniffer dogs and rescue teams.	Yes			
Sweden hosted International Donor Conference.	Yes			
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency distributed emergency housing resources, beds, heating and electricity.	Sim			
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency provided food, water, medicine and accommodation.	Sim			
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency provides transportation accommodation to deliver humanitarian aid.	Sim			
Sweden offered a variety of equipment, such as generators, furniture, cleaning supplies, and warm clothes to Turkish residents.	Sim			

Table 1 shows how Sweden responds to the impact of the earthquake that occurred in Turkey several months ago. As shown in the Disaster Management Cycle, mitigation and preparation is an action that must be taken before a hazard occurs, while response and recovery are carried out when a hazard has occurred. If we look at the Disaster Management table carried out by Sweden in dealing with the impact of the earthquake in Turkey, then Sweden looks very aggressive in providing humanitarian assistance, in terms of financial, medical, accommodation, experts and logistics. All aid was immediately sent and handed over one day after the earthquake and Sweden is also monitoring developments in Turkey and Syria for any developments in both countries. Sweden also seemed to take advantage of this moment very

well to attract Turkish sympathy so that the country concerned would give its approval to Sweden's application for NATO membership.

This is even more interesting because with the aggressiveness shown in providing various kinds of humanitarian assistance to Turkey, Sweden until now has not received Turkey's approval to join NATO. This contrasts with Finland which apparently first received Turkey's approval, where the country officially became a member of NATO on March 30, 2023. As we know, Sweden is the largest donor of humanitarian aid in the world, but Sweden's involvement with ethnic Kurds in the country is an obstacle for Sweden to be able to attract sympathetic of Turkey. So, it is not surprising that until now Turkey is still resistant to Sweden considering that the country allegedly protects groups considered terrorist for Turkey, the US and also the EU.

Conclusion

The Islamic world has been shocked by the burning of copies of the Qur'an in front of the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm as a form of freedom of expression after Turkey expressed its rejection of Sweden's application for NATO membership. A few weeks after the anarchy drew various reactions and condemnations from the top brass, suddenly Turkey and Syria were rocked by an earthquake and caused both countries to be destroyed instantly. Turkey immediately declared a state of emergency and asked for help from the international community to restore conditions in the country. Despite the prolonged conflict between Turkey and Sweden and events that had heated up some time ago, Sweden emerged as the largest donor country in the world by providing various kinds of humanitarian assistance in the form of financial, medical, accommodation, experts, and logistics. Sweden is seen to be very aggressive in allocating aid funds, ready to monitor any developments and responsive in providing and sending various humanitarian assistance to earthquake victims. This study proposes to be carried out further research on Turkey's reasons for giving approval for Finland to join NATO after all the efforts made by Sweden to help restore the condition of the country, considering that Sweden and Finland are both countries that have links to the ethnic Kurdish diaspora from Turkey. That way, better analysis results can be found, especially to answer more complex problems in the future.

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ABSTRACT

After Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan requested Sweden to turn over the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkêren Kurdistan*, PKK) activists to secure Turkey's approval for its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), tensions between the two countries erupted again. Several weeks after the tension heated up, Turkey was abruptly hit by a catastrophic earthquake on February 6, 2023, abandoning the country instantly, just a few weeks after the arson incident. Then, Turkey's government proclaimed a level 4 emergency and promptly requested assistance from other countries. The paper aims to clarify how Sweden used the Turkish earthquake to ratify its membership in NATO. To respond to the problems raised by this scientific literature, this research employs qualitative descriptive methodologies while keeping the idea of disaster diplomacy in mind. This study includes information from various literary sources, including journal publications, government websites, and news items from various online media. The findings revealed that Sweden used systematic disaster diplomacy to its advantage by offering various aid to earthquake victims hoping that Turkey would postpone ratifying its NATO membership.

NEW ENEMIES, OLD STRATEGIES: BARACK OBAMA'S FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON THE TWO PRESIDENCIES THESIS

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Introduction

In 2008, Barack Obama was elected president of the United States of America (USA) with ambitious and revolutionary promises, such as ending the Invasion of Iraq and closing the Guantanamo Bay Prison. Contrary to expectations, the logic of "fighting terrorism" remained, which encouraged drastic foreign policy decisions while at the same time looming like a ghost in the American political imagination, just as the fight against communism had for decades. Obama's mission was difficult: to reinvent the USA in the international system while dealing with the biggest economic crisis since 1929. However, to execute this foreign policy agenda that focused on defense and security, cooperation between the President and Congress was necessary, as the branches constitutionally share the responsibilities in the decision-making process. To do so, Republicans and Democrats need to vote together (known as bipartisanship), especially in the Senate, which historically is more related to international relations.

How has the relationship between the President and the Congress impacted the foreign policy of the Barack Obama administration (2009-2017)? The main objective of this research is to analyze the foreign policy of the Barack Obama administration based on the relationship between the President and the Congress. Two events have been used to analyze the period: the Afghanistan War (2001-2014) and the Invasion of Iraq (2003-2011). Legacy of the Republican George W. Bush, these were the biggest challenges for the

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Obama administration in foreign policy and certainly the most politicized and conflictive issues.

As from the Two Presidencies Thesis by Aaron Wildavsky (1966), the central argument is that the United States has one President, but two distinct presidencies, one linked to foreign policy, in which the President would find it easier to enforce his preferences, and the other concerning domestic policy, in which Congress would have more impact on the decision-making process. Thus, what influences cooperation between President and Congress is the type of policy in question. A descriptive analysis of all votes taken in the US Senate during the eight years of the Obama administration was performed in order to observe whether there is more cooperation between the parties on foreign policy issues as compared to the domestic policy. From the analysis of the votes, it can be observed that the Democratic President was able to materialize his preferences in foreign policy during his administration, counting on the support of the Republicans, while on domestic policy issues there was less cooperation between the parties. In this sense, the type of policy can explain how US Senators vote.

The relationship between the president and the Congress: a brief historical background

What is the role of Congress in the formulation and execution of US foreign policy? In constitutional terms, the power to decide on US foreign policy is divided between the President and the Congress, mainly in three key areas. Firstly, in matters of defense and national security, the President is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but only Congress can declare war. Secondly, the President has the institutional capacity to make international treaties, but they need to be approved internally by Congress by qualified majority voting. Finally, in diplomacy, the President has the power to appoint ambassadors to represent US interests around the world, but Congress must approve all appointments. In short, even though the President is seen internationally as a national leader, much of his power is shared with Congress (Wildavsky 1966).

The literature understands that there is a cyclical pattern of leadership alternation in foreign policy between the President and the Congress throughout US history. Depending on the period analyzed, it is possible to understand changes in the power relations between the Executive and the Legislative government branches. (McCormick 2009). After World War II, Presidents began to exert greater influence in the decision-making process.

Congress itself understood, at that moment, that it was fundamental for national interests to show greater internal cohesion in the post-War international system. The scenario would only begin to change after the failure of the Vietnam War (1955-1975). The human and economic costs were high regarding public opinion. Part of the responsibility was attributed to the excessive freedom that presidents had to decide the course of the war, with the support or omission of the Legislative branch (Mccormick and Wittkopf 1990).

Congress has the institutional means to limit the President's freedom in foreign policy, such as the "two-thirds rule". In basic terms, any international treaty signed by the President can only be ratified with the approval of at least 2/3 of Congress (Waltz 1967). In this context, the most effective way to ensure the President's will in foreign policy is through bipartisanship. This action mechanism allows the Legislative branch to act cooperatively with the President in foreign policy, participating in the decision-making process regardless of which party has control of the White House (McCormick and Wittkopf 1990). Bipartisanship is necessary to pass themes for which a qualified majority is required.

Two distinct historical periods can be defined in the relationship between the President and the Congress. The first one was between 1945 and 1975, when the President had primacy in foreign policy, counting on the support of Congress, materialized in the practice of bipartisanship. The second period, beginning in 1975, saw an ideological rupture between the parties, specifically in foreign policy.

It is in the first period that Wildavsky (1966) proposes the Two Presidencies Thesis, a moment in which the USA consolidates itself as a world power. The author explains the case of the USA due to two fundamental factors. The first one was that foreign policy was a priority issue and the responsibility of the President in case there was an eventual catastrophe in the national territory (for example, a nuclear attack). Secondly, institutionally, the President has greater freedom of decision in international relations because there are prerogatives that facilitate the Executive's action, such as executive agreements which do not necessarily need to go through validation by Congress, as in case of an international treaty (Canes-Wrone; Howell and Lewis 2008). Moreover, in this period, Congress, interest groups, and the military were divided and did not represent much of an opposition force to the President, reflecting the public's lack of knowledge or interest in foreign policy (Wildavsky 1966).

Thus, by analyzing all the votes cast in the US Congress between 1946 and 1964, Wildavsky (1966) concludes that in domestic policy the

President would struggle with Congress for power, especially if his party did not control the House of Representatives or the Senate. Furthermore, for any key government strategy, an opposition scenario would be present. By comparison, in foreign policy the scenario would be more favorable to the President and, regardless of whether or not he had a majority in Congress, the Executive's international strategies would be accepted with less resistance through the practice of bipartisanship.

Foreign policy cooperation between President and Congress began to encounter obstacles in the mid-1960s, after the bipolarity of the international system weakened. From that moment on, presidents found it difficult to maintain bipartisanship as the increasing ideological differences between Republicans and Democrats did irreparable damage to the consensus that existed previously. The shared values that supported bipartisanship gradually deteriorated during the 1970s, mainly because of three historical events: 1) the failure of the Vietnam War, 2) the outbreak of the Watergate Scandal, and 3) the passage of "The War Powers Act" (Leloup and Shull 1979; Sigleman 1979).

The growing ideological polarization caused by these factors fueled the emergence of two political groups that divided Congress in a decisive way: the Liberal Internationalists, essentially from the Democratic Party, who supported cooperative initiatives - arms control, economic aid, strengthening the United Nations system of organizations - but placed less emphasis on the armed struggle against communism or other nations. On the other side were the Conservative Internationalists, mostly members of the Republican Party, who support the defense of American interests and values through, above all, military action. Despite the ideological cleavage on matters of defense and security, cooperation was still widely used between Democrats and Republicans (Oldfield and Wildavsky 1989).

In the face of changes in US foreign policy with the end of the Cold War, how would the Thesis hold up? The communist threat, which explained the delegation of foreign policy to the President, no longer existed. Studies then began to argue for the resurgence of the US Congress as a central foreign policy actor and a direct competitor in the decision-making process. However, the terrorist attacks of 2001 changed the relationship between the President and the Congress in foreign policy again and would usher in a long period of US war strategy: the War on Terror.

The War on Terror united the USA around a common enemy. In this context, bipartisanship returned to Congress and the President found support from opposition congressmen and senators to approve his strategy to combat the new threat. This conjuncture reinforces Wildavsky's (1966) thesis, in

which the relationship between the President and the Congress is influenced by systemic factors, moments of crisis, and clear threats to the American way of life.

The Afghanistan War (2001 - 2014) found broad support from public opinion and from both parties. The Invasion of Iraq (2003-2011), initially, also found broad population support, while securing the reelection of George W. Bush. At that point, the explanatory capacity of the Two Presidencies Thesis seemed to have regained strength within the political and academic debate.

Canes-Wrone, Howell and Lewis (2008) have conducted a systematic literature review on the topic and come to some important conclusions about the debate surrounding the Thesis in the 21st century. The authors reinforce the idea that Congress has material incentives to delegate foreign policy to the President, especially in defense and security matters. The incentives would be: 1) the status of the President as a diplomatic representative and commander-in-chief of the armed forces; 2) the greater access to information that the Executive branch has in comparison to the other branches of the republic; and 3) in electoral grounds, the actor who gains (or loses) the most votes with foreign policy is the President. Therefore, it would be costly in electoral terms for congressmen to oppose the War on Terror, for example, since any dissent or apathy at that time on the part of Congress could be interpreted as an omission in the face of a threat to the country.

On the whole, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 served as a pressure force to unite the parties again, Republican and Democrat, on ideological grounds, especially regarding foreign policy. At that time, there was a national consensus around the need to fight terrorism at any cost in the international system. Internally, this scenario produces a new moment in the historical relationship between President and Congress. Bipartisanship will again be the rule, especially in all votes on defense and security (Lindsay 2003). However, the next parts of the paper will show that the excess of power in the hands of the President does not always produce good results for the Executive leader's own party.

Case study as a data analysis strategy

The case study provides the researcher with the possibility of drawing from an emblematic case to elaborate on other cases through the proposed theory. It provides a valid alternative to test a theory or explanatory thesis (Gerring 2017). The main goal of our research is to test the explanatory capacity of the Two Presidencies Thesis for the Obama administration's

foreign policy. Still, why does this case matter? Firstly, Barack Obama was the first and only African American President in US history. In a country where racial prejudice is one of the main national political problems, Obama took office with serious internal and external problems. In domestic policy, the USA was facing the worst economic crisis in its history since 1929. In foreign policy, besides the international consequences of the economic crisis, the USA had to solve two major wars in the Middle East: Afghanistan and Iraq. At that historical moment, there was great antipathy toward the country, which was increasingly challenged by the rise of China in the international system.

Obama's presidency began with an expectation of change. Many believed that the Democrat would be able to change this negative perception towards the USA and restore the US image in international relations. Moreover, in theoretical terms, the Presidencies Thesis has always stressed that Democratic politicians were more likely to cooperate with Republican presidents than the other way around. In this case, the Obama administration would also serve to test this supposed specificity, as, during his second term, the Democrat had to negotiate with a Republican-majority Senate.

Gerring (2017) points out that the case study does not imply a loss of transparency, rigor, or replicability for the research; neither is it exclusively quantitative or qualitative. In our framework, thousands of observations were made, providing robustness to our findings. Our proposal is to present an observational framework that descriptively analyzes all 2341 votes cast in the US Senate over Obama's two terms in office. Each phase of the research is explained below.

We first collected all votes through the GovTrack platform, one of the most important US agencies on legislative transparency, which produces different types of databases. In our research, only the replication of the official data is used. The votes are presented didactically, without modifying the information or prior treatment. The qualitative data analysis was performed by us manually and individually.

Our independent variable is the voting policy type, i.e., whether the vote can be classified as domestic policy or foreign policy, following the classic pattern of Wildavsky (1966). However, after the end of the Cold War, the literature came to the consensus that the US foreign policy had shifted to a diverse agenda of issues, such as the environment and drug trafficking, among other new issues. Therefore, it would be necessary to divide foreign policy into two major categories, the first one with all votes on themes related to defense and national security, and the second category with all votes on the other international policy issues. As a result, in our research framework, each vote was analyzed by using several criteria for classification into the

three possible categories: a) domestic policy; b) foreign policy on defense and security; c) foreign policy on other themes. The classification was made by reading the voting proposal, analyzing its content and the committees related to the project. The committee type usually served as a strong indicator, enabling the classification between domestic or foreign policy.

Our dependent variable was whether or not bipartisanship, cooperation between the parties, occurred. Each vote cast was then analyzed, ranking the patterns of vote distribution between Republicans and Democrats to determine whether bipartisanship did, or did not, occur on that vote. Our dependent variable is dichotomous, taking on only two categories. On the basis of our methodological choices, we managed to test whether bipartisanship occurs more in foreign policy than in domestic policy. Thus, following the Two Presidencies Thesis proposed by Wildavsky (1966), we can contribute to the debate by testing his explanatory hypothesis in the Obama case.

The challenges of the Barack Obama administration (2009-2017) in foreign policy and the role of the relationship between the president and the congress in the decision-making process

When Barack Obama was elected President, the USA was at a time when domestic and foreign policies needed to be reinvented. The Democrat represented the union of youth and wisdom, especially in foreign policy, as he had been one of the biggest opponents of the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. However, the Afghanistan War (2001 - 2014) and the Iraq Invasion (2003 - 2011) presented different challenges for President Obama. Nevertheless, there was one clear objective: to end both conflicts. The US image was negative for both domestic and international public opinion (Krieg 2016), and it was necessary to balance expenditure between domestic and foreign policy, given the economic crisis scenario since 2008.

In the case of Afghanistan, the primary objective was to modify the strategy; instead of focusing on Afghan territory, it would be necessary to delineate a new strategic combat region comprising the territory of Afghanistan and Pakistan (AfPak). The battle against terrorism could not be limited to national borders. In the case of Iraq, the challenge was to withdraw troops as quickly as possible, in a planned manner, to avoid unnecessary human and economic costs (Krieg 2016).

The weaknesses of the government that the USA helped put in power in Iraq showed that the initial objectives of the invasion had not been achieved,

as no chemical weapons had been found and the removal of Saddam Hussein did not guarantee an improvement in the lives of the Iraqi population. President Obama, with support from Congress, began the withdrawal of troops from Iraq as early as mid-2009. By August 31, 2011, the White House was already celebrating the end of the operation in Iraq.

The rapid US exit from Iraq has led the literature to believe that this may have favored the rise of the Islamic State terrorist group in the country. The Islamic State's expansion into Syrian territories has reignited the strategic importance of the region to the Obama administration's foreign policy. In 2014 President Obama resumed bombing in the region without UN consultation or authorization. In domestic policy, the White House sought support from Congress to declare war on the extremist group and for the systemic use of military force against the new enemy. Yet, the discussion was stuck in Congress, with many blaming Obama's strategy as the cause of the rise of the Islamic State (Pecequilo e Forner 2017).

Conflicts were the main challenges faced by President Obama. It is within this context that the cooperation between the Executive and Legislative branches will be analyzed. Bipartisanship throughout Obama's term in the White House between 2009 and 2017 will be analyzed as of the voting in the Senate. The choice for this house is justified by the Senate's historical proximity to foreign policy. The framework used has a descriptive nature, in line with the analysis models used by other similar studies such as Prins and Marshall (2001) and CanesWrone, Howell and Lewis (2008). The voting was divided into three categories: a) domestic policy; b) defense and security; and c) general foreign policy.

From the database construction, the level of cooperation between the parties in the three types of voting was compared. The goal was to measure whether the type of policy influences the level of bipartisanship in the US Senate. The occurrence of bipartisanship means that regardless of the President's party, Senators cooperate to approve or reject voting, acting as a single party. The following criteria were used to classify an outcome with the occurrence of bipartisanship: 1) voting with approval or rejection by 75% of the votes; 2) occurrence of critical votes, for example when a party does not have a simple majority to approve a proposal but gets support from enough opposition senators to approve a measure.

Before looking at the votes, it is necessary to introduce how the US Senate is composed. In the USA, Congress changes its composition every two years. During the Obama administration, there were four elections, which consequently formed four different compositions of the Senate: 1) 110th (2009 – 2011); 2) 111th (2011 – 2013); 3) 112th (2013 – 2015); 4) 113th (2015 –

2017). In the first three compositions, the majority belonged to the Democrats; it was only in the 113th Senate that the majority went to the Republicans. The number of independents remained the same throughout the period (2). Historically, those who are independent usually vote with the Democrats.

In Graph 1, the composition is shown in the course of time. President Obama can be seen to have never had 75% control of the Senate seats. Thus, any voting that required a qualified majority would only pass with bipartisanship. Foreign policy depends mostly on qualified majority voting, so much of President Obama's action depended on the support of Republican Senators, especially in voting that was classified as security and defense. In the USA's internal political system, the President cannot directly put any matter to a vote, but he can indirectly express his preferences through the Vice President, who by law is the President of the Senate, or through his other party colleagues.

Graph 1. Composition of the Senate by party during the Obama administration


Source: Elaborated by the authors.

Graph 2 presents the occurrence of bipartisanship by type of policy in the 110th Senate. The levels of cooperation are noted to be similar to the data found by Wildavsky (1966). Between 2009 and 2011, President Obama encountered little resistance from Congress to carry out his foreign policy as a whole. Some factors help us understand the context. Firstly, at that time there was an internal unity over the need to restore the international image of the

USA, mainly through the reformulation of the strategy in the War on Terror. The economic crisis itself encouraged the need for unity in foreign policy. The data corroborate Hybel's (2014) and Krieg's (2016) perception that Obama's biggest rival in defense and security foreign policy was the Pentagon during his first term.

Graph 2. Level of bipartisanship by policy type in the 110th Senate

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

In turn, the low level of cooperation in domestic policy (36%) can be justified by two factors. Firstly, if the 2008 financial crisis helped internal cohesion in foreign policy, this unity is not seen in domestic policy. One of the biggest differences between Republicans and Democrats lies in how they see the economic development alternatives for the State, especially what role the State should play in this process. In other words, President Obama did not have the Republican support to implement his economic policies domestically. Secondly, most domestic policy voting required a simple majority (51); since the Democratic Party had 57 senators and the support of the Independents (2), bipartisanship was not necessary. However, analysis of the votes shows that the Republicans blocked decisions with other institutional mechanisms, such as inserting amendments and revising proposals. The proposed amendments were rejected by the Democrats, which contributed to the fall of bipartisanship. The combination of these two factors contributed to the scenario depicted in the graphs.

EIn 2010, the composition of the Senate underwent changes in the proportion between the parties. The 111th US Congress remained with the Senate under Democratic control; however, the Republican share increased, with the difference between the parties being then by 4 senators (51 to 47). Graph 3 shows the level of bipartisanship in those two years.

Graph 3. Level of bipartisanship by policy type in the 111th Senate

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

It can be seen from the graphs that the domestic policy situation underwent a reversal from bipartisanship. Cooperation between Republicans and Democrats occurred in 61% of domestic policy voting, representing a significant 25% increase over the 110th Senate. Once again, two factors can be presented to explain this change of scenery. Firstly, the most radical economic reform strategies were proposed at the beginning of the Obama administration, with a balance concerning which proposals would be accepted or not by the opposition in the second biennium. At that point, it was necessary to invest in cooperation. Along with this, there is a second factor with the increase in Republican seats showing a slight but important change in the electorate, who had been dissatisfied with the first two years of the Obama administration. This thermometer made the Democrats adjust and move closer to the Republicans.

The bipartisan stance of the Senate was felt in domestic policy and especially in the foreign policy of defense and security, which reached the level of 82%. However, in the other foreign policy themes there was a 9% decrease in the level of cooperation. The period from 2011 to 2013 was crucial for the consolidation of the Obama administration's foreign policy strategy. During that period, President Obama withdrew American troops from Iraq and managed to execute Osama Bin Laden in 2011. These two actions favored Obama's approval with senators regardless of party, consolidating bipartisanship in the 111th Senate.

The success in foreign policy, with emphasis on the War on Terror, coupled with improvements in economic figures, favored the re-election of President Obama to his second term in 2012. The Democratic Party is also strengthened and remains in control of the Senate. The 112th US Congress (2013-2015), shows a Democratic majority of 53 senators against 45 Republicans. During that period, President Obama ended the Afghanistan War in 2014. However, it was also the time of the rise of the Islamic State, which put the Iraq region back as a priority within Obama's foreign policy. Graph 4 presents the levels of bipartisanship in the 112th Senate.

Graph 4 shows a significant decrease in bipartisanship in domestic policy as well as in foreign defense and security policy. The only type of policy that maintains the same level of bipartisanship is foreign policy focused on other themes. The decrease in cooperation between the parties can be understood according to some factors.

The use of drones in the fight against terrorism as an action strategy in the War on Terror initially represented an important reduction in human and financial costs for the USA, yet it started to be questioned internally by civil society as time went by, with organized groups questioning the many deaths of innocent civilians in those attacks (DOYLE, 2013). In addition, the expansion of the Islamic State in Iraqi territory is pointed as a result of the power vacuum left by the USA after the end of the Invasion of Iraq in 2011. According to Pecequilo and Forner (2017), the Iraqi government left in charge of the country by the USA did not have enough power or organization to fight the extremist rebels. President Obama's desire to end the occupation of Iraq as soon as possible may have been costly to the American strategy in the Middle East. Many analysts believe that the removal of Saddam Hussein and his execution along with the strategy of executing rebel leaders through drone attacks were determining factors for the rise of the Islamic State precisely on Iraqi territory.

Graph 4. Level of bipartisanship by policy type in the 112nd Senate

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

President Obama's strategic error was serious and had negative repercussions within the USA and the international system. The history of American foreign policy shows that in the Gulf War (1991), Republican President George H.W. Bush had chosen not to remove Hussein from power precisely because he feared the rise of extremist groups within the fragmented Iraqi State. Thus, the narrative that the Iraq Invasion would be "Obama's Vietnam" has emerged in the literature, thus drawing parallels with the situation of President Nixon, who, like Obama, did not start the Vietnam War but was responsible for ending it and for choosing the wrong strategy (Pecequilo e Forner 2017).

This political conjuncture generated important changes in the elections and consequently in the formation of the 113th Senate, sworn in in 2015. For the first time in six years in office, President Obama would have a Senate controlled by the opposition. The Republican Party had 10 more senators than the Democratic Party. From that moment on, all voting of interest to the White House in the Senate depended on bipartisanship, no matter whether it was by a simple or a qualified majority. Bipartisanship would have to be lifted or President Obama's strategy for domestic or foreign policy would fail to materialize. Graph 5 shows the levels of cooperation between Republicans and Democrats.

Graph 5. Level of bipartisanship by policy type in the 113th Senate

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

As can be seen, the control of the Senate by the Republicans caused changes in bipartisanship in that period. After four years, cooperation between the parties did not exceed 50% in voting on domestic policy. The strategy of economic recovery adopted by President Obama began to be blocked. To some extent, the Republican's lack of cooperation can be understood as a reflection of important changes in public opinion, with the growing dissatisfaction culminating in the election of Republican President Donald Trump.

However, the Two Presidencies Thesis appears to have been resilient in that period. Even with a Republican Senate, bipartisanship in foreign policy is not affected as it is in domestic policy; on the contrary, there is a positive effect - especially on defense and security issues (79%). The Senate chose to use its strength more in domestic than in foreign policy. Hence, it can be understood that most Republican senators approved of President Obama's leadership role in foreign policy. In other words, the senators delegated foreign policy to Obama and exercised their opposition in terms of domestic policy, as predicted by Wildavsky (1966).

All in all, the graphs reinforce the argument of the Two Presidencies Thesis. The comparative approach between the three types of policy adopted here follows the classical model of Wildavsky (1966), relying on the separation of foreign policy proposed by authors such as Lindsay (2003). In the post-Cold War period, American foreign policy became more complex and diffuse.

There is no single enemy and therefore it is necessary to separate defense and security, which were the basis of foreign policy during the Cold War, from the other themes to maintain the logic of the Thesis. The majority in the Senate impacted bipartisanship in domestic policy, but not in both types of foreign policy. The classic 70% to 30% ratio for foreign policy happened in almost every year of the Obama administration, showing the resilience of the explanatory power of Wildavsky's thinking (1966).

Conclusion

Throughout the article, we understand the importance of cooperation between the President and the Congress in foreign policy through the concept of bipartisanship, which is key to Wildavsky's (1966) argument. The cooperation between Democrats and Republicans during the Cold War and later during the War on Terror shows how foreign and domestic settings engage in dialogue. The international context influences cooperation between political actors due to the existence of a threat to national survival. At the same time, in times of peace, foreign policy becomes more diversified, and interests become more diffuse, resulting in increased competition between the parties. The President's alternative in these moments is to use all the power of his institution to enforce his international preferences, thus showing yet another element that ends up diminishing the incentives of Congress to compete in this arena.

In summary, this paper aims to analyze Obama's foreign policy by using an American classic policy thesis. While using the Senate voting data, we tested Wildavsky's (1966) thesis and discussed the relationship between the President and the Congress on the basis of domestic and international factors. The major finding of this research is that in fact there were two presidencies during the Obama administration; following Wildavsky's (1966) logic, the terrorist threat is understood as a key factor in explaining the success of Obama's agenda supported by bipartisanship.

Analyzing the Obama administration's foreign policy presented us with some lessons. Firstly, as Wildavsky (1966) argues, the Presidency as an institution has more legitimacy, resources, and electoral incentives to prioritize foreign policy over Congress. Secondly, the War on Terror, as well as Communism, eased this process by providing a common enemy, one that was easily recognized by public opinion. The voting analyzed in this article shows levels of bipartisanship that are similar to those found by Wildavsky (1966) at the peak of the Cold War. Even when the President had the minority in the Senate, his proposals on foreign policy were approved more than on domestic

policy. Thirdly, excessive power generates electoral costs for the party in the medium or long term. The Presidency is perceived as responsible for foreign policy, so any mistakes are pinned on the President's account. The rise of the Islamic State, combined with other strategic errors and broken promises, left a bitter taste in the electorate, playing a major role in the election of Republican Trump.

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ABSTRACT

How has the relationship between President and Congress impacted the foreign policy of the Barack Obama administration (2009-2017)? The main objectives of this research are to analyze the foreign policy of the Barack Obama administration based on the relationship between President and Congress, testing whether the type of policy, either domestic or foreign, can explain the occurrence of bipartisanship in voting within Congress. The research framework combines the analysis and classification of all 2341 votes cast in the US Senate during the eight years of the Obama administration with a thorough theoretical and historical case study analysis. The findings confirm our expectations. In brief, during the Obama administration, bipartisanship between Republicans and Democrats was greater in foreign policy than in domestic policy.

KEYWORDS

President. Congress. Two Presidencies Thesis.

DIFFERENT GLOBAL CONTEXTS OF THE CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE: A SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW

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Introduction

The Confucius Institute is a non-profit organization that aims to promote the teaching of the Chinese language abroad, provide knowledge of Chinese language and culture to different peoples, stimulate humanistic and cultural exchanges, and foster mutual understanding between countries and China (CIEF 2020). By the end of 2021, despite the adverse conditions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the global development of this language and culture institution demonstrated resilience and reached a milestone of 489 Confucius Institutes and 817 Confucius Classrooms spread across 158 countries and regions worldwide. These institutions offer a diverse range of courses and classes, with over 105 million students enrolled in 78,000 different courses and classes (CIEF 2023).

With globalization, China's economic rise, and its integration with the world in recent decades, there has been a growing demand for learning the Chinese language. Inspired by the practices of Western countries such as the British Council of the United Kingdom, the Alliance Française of France, the Goethe-Institut of Germany, and the Instituto Cervantes of Spain, among others, the Confucius Institute was established as a joint venture, which marks its major difference and uniqueness in terms of its operating model compared to the aforementioned institutes (Cai 2019; Li 2022b; Liu 2019a). Most Confucius Institutes are established within the campuses of

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host educational institutions in partnership with the Chinese International Education Foundation (CIEF) and Chinese universities. The parties involved, particularly the partner educational institutions, form a council consisting of members such as university presidents and directors of various administrative divisions. This council serves as the decision-making and administrative body of the Confucius Institute.

For China, the Confucius Institute has been one of its successful initiatives to develop friendly relations with the world. Chinese President Xi Jinping has stated that language is a golden key to understanding a country, and the Confucius Institute serves as an important platform for the world to get to know China. It acts as a window and a bridge for linguistic and cultural exchanges, playing a positive role in teaching the Chinese language and culture. Furthermore, it contributes to diversity, multiculturalism, and dialogue among civilizations (XINHUA 2015). Former Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong described the Confucius Institute as a "high-speed spiritual railway" to connect peoples (CHINA 2016). Considering its rapid expansion in less than two decades, the global presence of the Confucius Institute is indeed remarkable. Other language and cultural institutions took more than a century to achieve a similar level of reach and impact.

Although many countries have embraced the initiative, the Confucius Institute has also been subject to accusations and has become a tool for politicization in some Western countries. In the case of the United States, there has been a significant increase in negative attitudes towards the Confucius Institute, with it being portrayed as an educational institution with a political agenda. The U.S. government has taken a series of measures, including influencing public opinion, conducting inquiries and investigations, political interference, budget cuts, and legal restrictions, to hinder the activities of the Confucius Institute. As a result, many American institutions had to terminate previously formed agreements with China, leading to the closure of Confucius Institute activities under the effect of sanctions (Lien e Tang 2022). Today, it is not difficult to find metaphors, assumptions, and associations of the Confucius Institute as a "Trojan Horse," "undermining academic integrity and importing censorship," "political and ideological propaganda machines," "national security," etc. in Western media (Homeland Newswire, 2023).

Why has the Confucius Institute been well-received in some countries while experiencing a less amicable relationship in others? Why does the Confucius Institute, despite having the same nature as a language and cultural institution, seemingly receive different perceptions in Western contexts? What activities does the Confucius Institute engage in, and what role does it play? What are the major challenges faced by the Confucius Institute? This debate

about the Confucius Institute provides an observation panorama that can help enrich the understanding of China's role in the international arena, as well as the attitudes and involvement of other countries towards China's integration in the world. It is common to see many authors addressing the Confucius Institute within the dimension of international relations and politics (Lien and Tang 2022; Li 2022a; Wang, Uzodinma, and Niu 2021; Tien and Bing 2021; Nur Mutia and de Archellie 2023; Repnikova 2022; Zhou 2021; Luqiu and McCarthy 2019; Yellinek, Mann, and Lebel 2020; Becard e Filho 2019; Hruby and Petru 2019; Liu 2019b; Popovic, Jenne, and Medzihorsky 2020). At the same time, being installed in numerous educational institutions, the Confucius Institute is also studied for its academic functions and its role in the field of international education (Nitza-Makowska 2022; Rwantabagu 2020; Caruso 2020; Selezneva 2021; Paliszewska-Mojsiuk 2019; Haughton and Han 2020; Stambach 2022; Jain 2020; Li 2021). There are many comparative studies between the Confucius Institute and its Western counterparts or different Confucius Institutes in a particular country, region, or continent (Lien and Tang 2022; Cai 2019; Liu 2019a; 2019b; Li 2022b; Popovic, Jenne, and Medzihorsky 2020).

In this regard, given the importance and multidisciplinarity of this topic, an update of knowledge is necessary. The present study aims to gather scientific literature on the Confucius Institute, investigating the most frequent questions and current research trends in this field, both nationally and internationally. Using a descriptive and comparative analysis as a basis, the study aims to construct reflections that significantly contribute to the study of this area.

Methodology

A systematic review aims to gather, critically evaluate, and conduct a synthesis of multiple primary studies (Magno Cordeiro et al. 2007). In the case of this study, the aim is to review articles related to the Confucius Institute published in the last 5 years (2019 to May 2023), focusing on the academic and diplomatic role of the institution. Therefore, a systematic literature review was conducted following the typical process of the method, which consists of: i) Defining the research question; ii) Searching for evidence; iii) Reviewing and selecting studies; iv) Analyzing the methodological quality of the studies; v) Presenting the results (Rf e Mancini Mc 2007).

The question that motivated this study was: What is the role of the Confucius Institute in the fields of education, academia, and diplomacy between countries and China? Guided by this question, the initial search aimed to find all articles that included the term "Confucius Institute" in the title, abstract, or keywords published in the last 5 years (2019 to May 2023). As a result, 402 articles were identified from two main databases (291 results from Web of Science and 111 results from Scopus). After reviewing the titles and abstracts, articles from the fields of philosophy, sociology, linguistics, and communication that did not address the research question were excluded. After removing duplicates, a total of 98 articles were selected for the next stage of analysis.

Next, an initial assessment was conducted based on the reading of abstracts, introductions, and conclusions, guided by inclusion and exclusion criteria. After this stage, 46 articles were excluded due to lack of relevance to the central theme, inappropriate format (work reports or event reports, comments, case reports instead of articles), restricted access to the full text, and difficulties in understanding foreign languages (Russian, Korean, etc.).

The remaining 52 articles were classified and analyzed in Microsoft Office Excel as potential references to be included in the review. By reading the full text of these articles, they could be broadly categorized into three groups: (a) studies that address the economic role of the Confucius Institute, focusing on how it can stimulate trade, exports and imports, investments, or tourism between countries and China; (b) studies that investigate the diplomatic and political role of the Confucius Institute and its reception in different countries; (c) studies that analyze the educational and academic role of the Confucius Institute.

The present study aims to analyze the Confucius Institute as a relevant institution for cooperation and exchanges in the fields of education and research. In this process, the institution plays an important role in strengthening diplomatic relations between various countries and China. For this reason, only articles that exclusively focus on the economic role of the Confucius Institute in group (a) were excluded, as well as a portion of the articles in group (b) that only address political perspectives. After the filtering process, it was concluded that 25 articles met the established criteria and parameters and were included as references.

Table 1- Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

Criteria	ID	Description
Inclusion	I1	Central theme approach that meets the research objective
	I2	Full-text access
	I3	Articles written in English, Portuguese, and Chinese
	I4	Academic articles with theoretical framework, methodology, and consistent presentation of the findings.
Exclusion	E1	Irrelevant articles for the research (excluded based on titles, abstracts, and keywords that do not relate to the objective, as well as articles from the fields of philosophy, sociology, linguistics, and communication).
	E2	Articles in languages other than English, Portuguese, and Chinese.
	E3	Articles with restricted access (paid articles or unavailable for download).
	E4	Work reports or event reports, comments, and case studies that are not actual research articles.
	E5	Articles solely focused on the economic role of the Confucius Institute.
	E6	Articles solely with political perspectives.

Source: Compiled by the author (2023)

Figure 1 - Selected Articles Flowchart

Source: Compiled by the author (2023)

Results and Discussion

Quantitative Analysis

The final analysis is based on a sample of 25 articles from the fields of political science, international relations, international education, and university internationalization management.

A total of 36 authors were identified, of which 8 (22%) have Chinese names and 28 (78%) have non-Chinese names. Regarding authorship, Li Siyuan (University of Leeds, UK) is responsible for 3 articles, while Liu Xin (University of Central Lancashire, UK) is the author of 2 articles.

Regarding the locations where the studies were conducted, a wide diversity is observed, including the African continent (6 articles), Asian continent (7 articles), North America (3 articles), Europe (1 article), and Arab countries (1 article). Additionally, there are studies that compare the Confucius Institute in China with other European, American, British, and Russian language and cultural institutions (6 articles), and one general study article that does not specify a location.

Table 2: Authors, Articles, and Study Locations

Authors	Articles	Study Location
Siyuan Li	China's Confucius Institute in Africa: a different story?	Africa
Siyuan Li	A Foucauldian Power Analysis of China's Confucius Institute in Africa: Power, Knowledge and the Institutionalisation of China's Foreign Policy	Africa
Repnikova M.	Rethinking China's Soft Power: Pragmatic Enticement of Confucius Institutes in Ethiopia	Ethiopia, Africa
Stambach A.E	Chinese-Tanzanian Friendship and Friendship Treaties	Tanzania, Africa
Hermenegilde Rwantabagu	Building Dialogue Among Nations Through Educational and Cultural Cooperation: The Case of Burundi and the P.R. China	Burundi, Africa
Nur Mutia R.T., de Archellie R	China soft power and cultural diplomacy. The educational engagement in Africa	Africa
Ngu Ik Tien, Ngeow Chow Bing	SOFTPOWER, CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE AND CHINA'S CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN MALAYSIA	Malaysia, Asia
Hruby, J. Petru, T.	China's cultural diplomacy in Malaysia during Najib Razak's premiership	Malaysia, Asia
Selezneva, NV	LEARNING CHINESE IN VIETNAM: THE ROLE OF THE CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE	Vietnam, Asia
Zhou, Y	Confucius Institute in the Sino-Thai relations: A display of China's soft power	Thailand, Asia

Nitza-Makowska, A	Can the China-Pakistan economic corridor help Beijing Win Pakistanis' hearts and minds? Reviewing higher education as an instrument of Chinese soft power in Pakistan	Pakistan, Asia
Nur Mutia R.T. de Archellie R.	Reassessing China's Soft Power in Indonesia: A Critical Overview on China's Cultural Soft Power	Indonesia, Asia
Jain, R	China's Strategic Foray into Higher Education: Goals and Motivations vis-a-vis Nepal	Nepal, Asia
Yellinek,R. Mann, Y. Lebel, U	Chinese Soft-Power in the Arab world–China's Confucius Institutes as a central tool of influence	Arab countries, Africa and Asia
Haughton, NA Han, DW	Internationalisation through a Confucius sister city partnership: examining a 10-year sister city and university bi-lateral partnership	US
Luqiu,LR McCarthy, JD	Confucius Institutes: The Successful Stealth Soft Power Penetration of American Universities	US
Danielly Silva Ramos Becard Paulo Menechelli Filho	Chinese Cultural Diplomacy: instruments in China's strategy for international insertion in the 21st Century	US
Monika Paliszewska-Mojsiuk	Education along the Belt and Road	Poland, Europe
Donald Lien Peilan Tang	Let's play tic-tac-toe: Confucius Institutes versus American Cultural Centres	Comparative, US and China
Siyuan Li	China's Confucius institute and its European counterparts in Africa: A six-dimensional comparative study	Comparative, Europe and China

Liu Xin	So Similar, So Different, So Chinese: Analytical Comparisons of the Confucius Institute with its Western Counterparts	Comparative, Europe and China
Popovic, M; Jenne, EK; Medzihorsky, J	Charm Offensive or Offensive Charm? An Analysis of Russian and Chinese Cultural Institutes Abroad	Comparative, Russia and China
Cai, L.	A comparative study of the Confucius Institute in the United Kingdom and the British Council in China	Comparative, United Kingdom and China
Liu Xin	China's Cultural Diplomacy: A Great Leap Outward with Chinese Characteristics? Multiple Comparative Case Studies of the Confucius Institutes	Comparative
Wang, YW; Uzodinma, CG; Niu, CY	The path, value and limits of the Confucius Institute in carrying out public diplomacy	General study

Source: Research data (2023)

As the title, abstract, and keywords were analyzed, a WordCloud tool was used, and the most frequent words were: Confucius Institute, Soft Power, China, Relations, Cultural Diplomacy, education, and Public Diplomacy. Regarding the theories discussed, the most cited one was Joseph Nye's theory of Soft Power, which gained prominence from the 1990s to the present day. Following that, theories of Public Diplomacy and Cultural Diplomacy are also frequently mentioned. The majority of the articles made reference to or mentioned at least one of these theories.

Figure 2- Keywords Cloud

Source: Research data (2023)

In terms of methodology, the selected studies encompass various case studies and comparative applied studies conducted in different contexts around the world. Qualitative methods prevail in these studies, with data collection primarily conducted through interviews, field research, observation, as well as documentary, bibliographic, and journalistic content analysis. However, two studies combined qualitative and quantitative methods. The article titled "Confucius Institute: The Successful Stealth Soft Power Penetration of American Universities" used chi-square tests to investigate the characteristics of host institutions of the Confucius Institute in the United States. On the other hand, the article "Charm Offensive or Offensive Charm? An Analysis of Russian and Chinese Cultural Institutes Abroad" adopted a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model with a logarithmic link function to clarify the factors and variables influencing the strategic geography of China's Confucius Institute and Russia's Russkiy Mir Institute.

Qualitative Analysis: the theoretical framework

The concept of Soft Power was developed by American political scientist Joseph Nye in his book, suggesting a more attractive approach to the exercise of power, without relying on traditional means. It refers to the

ability of a country to influence others through non-coercive means such as culture, values, policies, and institutions, rather than through military or economic means (Joseph Nye 1990). The author identifies three main sources of resources for a country's Soft Power: culture, political values, and foreign policies. In the context of globalization, education promoted by educational institutions plays a relevant role in the construction of Soft Power (Joseph Nye 2005).

Public diplomacy is a new diplomatic strategy adopted by various countries, which involves direct engagement with foreign audiences to improve the country's image and implement national policies (SHARP, 2005). Public diplomacy primarily targets the public of foreign societies, specifically non-official groups, organizations, and individuals. The central actor in public diplomacy is the government, and its objective is to explain the country's policies to foreigners, present its values and culture, and shape the national image of the country (Melissen 2005).

Cultural diplomacy is a diplomatic approach that involves specific fields, and in most cases, the actors involved are non-governmental, unlike public diplomacy (Wang, Uzodinma, e Niu 2021).The dynamics of Cultural Diplomacy are not limited to a dichotomy between state and non-state actors or between center and periphery, but are characterized by a network of transactional relationships involving various actors, including the state. This network is polycentric in nature and not hierarchical (Hrub e Petru 2019).

Analyzing the theoretical framework present in the reviewed studies, it is possible to observe that the trends are strongly linked to international relations and policies. At the same time, a portion of the studies seeks to evaluate the Confucius Institute from an educational and academic perspective, in light of theories of international cooperation or educational internationalization.

Case studies and comparative studies: Africa and arab countries

Comparing with the debates surrounding the Confucius Institute (CI) in the West, the development of the CI in Africa and Arab countries appears to be consistent and robust. According to the reviewed studies, this positive development is mainly attributed to the convergence between the CI and local Chinese presence. The CI is part of a broad network involving public and private institutions, businesses, labor agencies, and other forms of Chinese presence (Li 2021). Together with Chinese presence, the CI establishes a

collaborative power dynamic that contributes to the institutionalization of China's foreign policies in Africa (Li 2022a). The CI provides opportunities to experience China, enhance employability for its student body, and establish channels of contact for the host institution to integrate into the contemporary global education community (Repnikova 2022). Arab countries accept the CI as a contribution that can improve the quality and diversity of their educational system (Yellinek, Mann, e Lebel 2020). Chinese educational engagement in Africa has been seen as a cooperation based on shared benefits and interests, which helps nations overcome marginalization (Caruso 2020). The academic contribution of Chinese universities is of utmost importance, especially as educational institutions in Burundi face the challenge of understanding the needs of a developing society (Rwantabagu 2020).

However, challenges have also been observed. In terms of internal factors, there is a need for better coordination and transcultural understanding in the management of the Confucius Institute by both parties, as well as ensuring long-term sustainability (Li 2021; 2022a; Stambach 2022). In relation to external factors, the discourse of neocolonialism still causes repercussions (Repnikova 2022).

Asia

In the reviewed studies on Asian countries, all of them dedicated considerable paragraphs to explore the historical and cultural connections with China, as well as the evolution of bilateral relations as a contextualization. In the case of Thailand, it is argued that the success of the Confucius Institute is due to the economic, political, and social context of Sino-Thai relations within a specific period, rather than the attractiveness of Chinese culture (Zhou 2021). Similar conclusions can be observed in the cases of Malaysia and Indonesia, where the Confucius Institute was evaluated from the perspective of Cultural Diplomacy, actively involving the construction of a positive image in conjunction with other state, semi-state, and non-state actors, both Chinese and local (Hruby e Petru 2019; Tien e Bing 2021; Nur Mutia e de Archellie 2023). The authors consider it difficult to individually assess the effective impact of the Confucius Institute on the local public, but rather the cumulative effect of the relationship between various actors and factors (Tien e Bing 2021), especially China's economic agenda (Nur Mutia e de Archellie 2023).

In the case of Vietnam, the role of the Confucius Institute in teaching Chinese language and culture was deemed insignificant due to the fact that

the country had a long history of language teaching and learning even before the Chinese initiative (Selezneva 2021). In the cases of Pakistan and Nepal, the Confucius Institute was studied alongside other educational cooperation initiatives launched by China. Education in this sense is seen as a national brand, a conduct of values, and a tool for foreign policies, manifesting in various forms of technical assistance, scholarship grants, the introduction of the Confucius Institute, elite training, and influence of alumni, among others (Jain 2020). Due to the precarious conditions of Pakistani universities, assistance in this sector is urgently needed, and China's effectiveness and attractiveness have been demonstrated, as fragile states are unable to introduce these improvements on their own (Nitza-Makowska 2022).

The United States of America

In the United States, the situation of the Confucius Institute has gone through phases of reception, reflection, and criticism. Discussions about the Confucius Institute began within the academic sphere, transformed into a political arena, and have currently escalated to the level of national security (Lien and Tang 2022).

In the initial phase of reception, until the end of 2015, over 100 Confucius Institutes were present in educational institutions, primarily in highly ranked public universities, spread across almost all U.S. states. The external funding that the Confucius Institute could bring amidst budget cuts by the U.S. government was advantageous for these institutions, and there was generally a more positive and neutral perception of the Confucius Institute by the American media and public (Luqiu and McCarthy 2019).

Between 2014 and 2017, a shift in attitude and perception towards Confucius Institute programs in the U.S. began, as five Confucius Institutes were closed by their host universities following a petition signed by over 100 professors at the University of Chicago against the renewal of the Confucius Institute agreement (Becard and Filho 2019). Starting from 2018, due to pressures from sanction measures, more Confucius Institutes had to close their operations. Relevant U.S. agencies and departments were engaged in investigations and research to justify the restrictions. The National Defense Authorization Act prohibits any academic institution from concurrently operating a Confucius Institute and the Chinese National Security Education Flagship Programs, funded by the Department of Defense, which aim to enhance U.S. security by increasing the national capacity to understand and effectively engage with foreign cultures and languages (Lien and Tang 2022).

The accusations against the Confucius Institute are related to academic freedom, institutional autonomy and transparency, political influence, and propaganda, among others.

On the other hand, according to the study by Becard & Filho (2019), many academics opposed these criticisms. Edward A. McCord, then director of the Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University, argued that the biggest problem regarding the Confucius Institute was the readiness to be suspicious and jump to conclusions, while over 100 host institutions have sufficient competence to evaluate how the Confucius Institute interacts with the American academia. Michael Hill, then director of the Center for Asian Studies at the University of South Carolina, emphasized that the Confucius Institute was indispensable in creating courses and never witnessed any attempt of interference from the Confucius Institute in his institution. Stephen E. Hanson, a professor at the College of William & Mary who worked in the administration of two Confucius Institutes, stated that he had never witnessed any form of censorship or self-censorship in the Confucius Institute. There are case studies that examined the events and activities carried out by American and Chinese partner universities of the Confucius Institute over a decade (2009-2019), demonstrating the resilience of the Confucius Institute and a rare case of success in the macro environment. Despite the controversies, the premise of the Confucius Institute is based on reciprocity for the promotion of educational, cultural, and academic actions in favor of the internationalization of the institutions involved (Haughton and Han 2020).

Comparative studies

It is true that the Confucius Institute (CI) seeks to learn from Western language and culture institutions, as they are pioneers, have a longer history, and have a highly visible impact. For example, the Alliance Française has a history of over 120 years, and the International English Language Testing System (IELTS) administered by the British Council conducts three million tests per year (Liu 2019a). This learning is seen by Popovic et al. (2020) as emulation within the Policy Diffusion Theory (PDT), which refers to the adoption of policies based on the experiences and models of others.

Motivated by these similarities and differences between the Confucius Institute (CI) and its Western counterparts, many authors have dedicated themselves to comparative studies. Li (2022b) compared the CI with other European language and culture institutions in Africa and highlighted the following advantages of the CI: generous material support from China, joint-

venture operational model, financial accessibility for the local audience, diversity of activities and benefits offered, and responsiveness to local needs. The European language and culture institutions in Africa operate with greater independence, which is reflected in their higher financial self-sufficiency compared to the CI (Li 2022b).

Similar points can also be found in the comparative study between the Confucius Institute in the UK and the British Council in China. The Confucius Institute adopts a unique joint-venture model that encourages deep cooperation and enables greater promotion of educational internationalization. However, the British Council, being structured and organized relatively more independently, has more autonomy in decision-making, project management, and the pursuit of broader and more lucrative partnerships (Cai 2019).

Lien & Tang (2022) compared the evolution of the Confucius Institute in the US and the American Culture Center (ACC) in China. From the initial peaceful acceptance to the sanctions faced by the Confucius Institute in the US and the stagnation of the ACC in China, it reflects the transition of Sino-American relations from an era of collaboration to an era of competition. In this regard, public diplomacy implementation agencies are also indicators of international political relations. Liu's study (2019b) analyzed the purpose, operational model, and scope of activities of the Confucius Institute and its Western counterparts in light of the "terrain of struggle," proposing a new perspective that, even though they share the purpose of promoting language and culture and have similar ties with their host governments, the Confucius Institute can still be interpreted differently within the struggle on the ground, which the author describes as Orientalism, cultural and ideological hegemony.

When comparing the Confucius Institute with the Russkiy Mir institutes in Russia, quantitative research reveals a geographical strategy: while China is more willing and proactive in cooperating with countries that have different political and cultural systems, Russia is more conservative. The study considers both the Confucius Institute and the Russkiy Mir institutes as results of emulation and attributes their failure in some countries simply to copying Western Cultural Diplomacy without adaptation to the Western context (Popovic, Jenne, e Medzihorsky 2020).

The other study by Liu attempted to create a diagrammatic model to analyze the variables that determine the operation of the Confucius Institute. After comparing five Confucius Institutes in four different continents, the study highlighted the importance of the Institute's ability to customize its products according to the audience and the interaction between external variables, which encompass ideology, nationalism, media environment, and the moderating effect of direct people-to-people exchange (Liu 2019b).

Conclusion

This article proposes a systematic review of the literature on the Confucius Institute. The number of articles found in the initial search indicates the popularity and relevance of the topic. The review revealed some trends in this research:

In terms of topics covered, the most frequent are: 1) The Confucius Institute as an actor in Public Diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power, as well as its reception and effectiveness; 2) The Confucius Institute's organizational structure, operational model, management mechanisms, scope of activities and its relationship with the various entities involved; 3) The Confucius Institute's roles and impacts, identifying problems and challenges encountered, among others. Most of these studies reviewed are related to the areas of international relations and politics, while another part focuses on educational and academic areas, with a focus on cooperation between Chinese and foreign institutions and contributions through programs, products and services offered.

Regarding the geographical dimension, they are categorized into: 1) General studies focusing on the origin, history and global evolution of the Confucius Institute; 2) Case studies in specific countries or regions; 3) Comparative studies between the Confucius Institute and other similar language and culture institutions. Africa, Asia and the USA are the regions that have registered the most case studies, and European language and culture institutions have also been widely studied as a parameter for comparison. After the review, it can be said that there are significant particularities when considering location and geopolitics, which seem to be determining factors for the development of the Confucius Institute. In this sense, the inclusion of studies on Latin America and Oceania is lacking for a more complete overview of the literature, since these continents are also home to a significant number of Confucius Institutes and play an important role in geopolitics, especially Latin America in the context of the Global South.

In terms of theoretical framework and methodology adopted by the studies, there is a predominance of Western theories and perspectives that have political connotations such as power relations and influence through non-coercive means. Therefore, the Confucius Institute is primarily seen as a public and cultural diplomatic tool of China. Despite some challenges in specific countries where the Confucius Institute has been politicized, it is still received and perceived positively in the global context, according

to recent statistics. Several reviewed case studies support the role of the Confucius Institute in fostering pragmatic cooperation based on reciprocity. The methodological approach adopted in these studies is predominantly qualitative. Most of the research collected primary data through interviews, questionnaires, field observations, etc., to obtain empirical results. Other research relied on secondary data through literature review, document analysis, etc. However, it should be noted that the quality inference of the cases and the results are restricted and should not be generalized when the context changes.

In conclusion, studies related to the Confucius Institute cover a wide range of topics, including general research, comparative studies, and case studies in different contexts around the world. While there is evidence of success in the global development of the Confucius Institute, it is important to acknowledge the existence of controversial repercussions that have also received attention. In this regard, addressing this topic through scientific research has great potential for innovation both in theoretical and methodological terms, especially in less explored contexts.

Based on these considerations, the following future studies are suggested:

Investigating the presence of the Confucius Institute in Oceania and Latin America and the resulting impact of this presence. This analysis can address subtopics such as evaluating the quality of products and programs offered, diagnosing operation and management, assessing the ability to meet local needs, examining the relationship and engagement with the host institution and other local entities, as well as the perception of the surrounding society, the challenges and problems encountered, among others.

Based on the empirical results obtained in a specific context, the development of manuals, guidelines, evaluation and analysis models, management consulting, and practical applications are also expected. These initiatives can guide and assist in achieving the objectives of all involved parties, contributing to the sustainable development of the Confucius Institute.

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ABSTRACT

The discussion about the Confucius Institute provides a broad observation that can help enrich understanding about China in the international scenario, as well as the attitude and involvement of countries towards China's integration into the world. In order to investigate the current state on this subject, systematic review methods and procedures were adopted. 25 articles that cover the practice of the Confucius Institute in the main continents and countries were analyzed: Africa, Asia, and USA, as well as comparisons between it and similar European language and culture institutions, were included in the reference for this study. As a result, it was possible to identify and summarize some trends such as research scopes, frequent themes, theories and methodologies used, regional characteristics, success and controversy among others.

KEYWORDS

Confucius Institute. International Cooperation. Diplomacy. Education.

THE GOVERNMENTS OF MAURICIO MACRI AND JAIR BOLSONARO: IDEOLOGY, PRAGMATISM AND FOREIGN POLICY[1]

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Introduction

In recent years, Brazil and Argentina have experienced significant transformations in their domestic and foreign policies. In 2015, the center-right candidate and representative of the *Cambiemos* political coalition[5], Mauricio Macri, won the presidential elections in Argentina, ending twelve years of Kirchnerist governments in the country. In Brazil, a troubled (and questioned) impeachment process ousted then-president Dilma Rousseff from the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) and put vice-president Michel Temer of the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB) in her place. Temer remained in office until 2018 when Jair Bolsonaro, a former military man and far-right deputy affiliated at that time to the Partido Social Liberal (PSL), won the presidential elections.

The trio formed by Mauricio Macri, Temer and Bolsonaro is part of

a turning point in the political and economic situation in South America. If in the 2000s we observed the rise of left and center-left governments in the region, a phenomenon widely and consensually known as the Pink Tide, in the last decade we have witnessed the decline of the progressive cycle and its replacement by liberal and conservative governments[6]. These transformations occurred not only in the domestic environment, with the revision of redistributive social policies and the resumption of the neoliberal economic agenda, but also in the scope of the foreign relations.

In their first speeches, Mauricio Macri, Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro showed a favorable inclination towards the North-South axis instead of the South-South axis and showed some changes in their countries´s regional integration framework: approach to the Alliance of the Pacific (AP); abandonment of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR); emphasis on a "commercial" Mercosur based on free trade. More specifically, the Bolsonaro and Macri governments also criticized previous governments´ foreign policy. For both of them, the "vices" committed by their predecessors needed to be overcome, reviewing the bilateral ties with China and Venezuela, considered essentially "ideological" countries with a negative bias. In this scenario, the United States (USA) and Europe once again occupied a privileged position in their international strategy.

The case of Brazil is even more emblematic, as Jair Bolsonaro's second year at the helm of the presidency coincided with the outbreak of the pandemic caused by the COVID-19 virus. Between 2020 and 2022, both Bolsonaro and members of his government promoted a discursive radicalization, adopting climate change and vaccine denialism and anti-globalism as part of their ideological premises. In the short term, such positions diminished Brazil's international prestige and its influence in multilateral, international and regional forums. As we will see, the speeches of the Brazilian representative and his ministerial team contributed to the intensification of ideological disputes inside and outside the government, affecting Brazil's relations with some of its traditional partners, such as China and Argentina. These noises contributed to a significant change of direction within the scope of the implemented foreign policy.

In this work, we define foreign policy as "a set of actions and decisions of a given actor, generally, but not necessarily the State, in relation to other States or external actors" (Pinheiro 2004, 7). External actors can be represented

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6 This situation has recently started to be reversed with the return of left-wing governments in the region, such as Mexico, with Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Bolivia, with Luis Arce, Argentina with Alberto Fernández, Chile with Gabriel Boric, Colombia with Gustavo Petro and finally Brazil with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

by international organizations, multilateral corporations or transnational actors. The constraints of foreign policy can be of domestic origin, such as the political system, economic policies, cultural and historical factors, state and non-state actors, or of international origin, such as the distribution of resources, conflicts, and the country's position in the world-system (Pinheiro 2004).

We consider that in presidential systems the head of state acts as a central actor leading a country's foreign relations. For Milani (2015), presidents have the responsibility of "representing the country in the world and its national ideas". Therefore, the profile of presidential leadership can be a determining factor in achieving bilateral, regional and multilateral diplomatic successes, with official pronouncements and personal involvement of leaders in negotiations being good indicators of presidential interest in foreign policy matters (Milani 2015).

Another aspect that underpins this work is the debate about ideology and pragmatism in foreign relations. According to Gardini and Lambert (2011), although the combination between ideology and pragmatism is not exclusive to Latin America nor is it new in foreign policy studies, the discussion on the applicability of these concepts was useful to explain, to a large extent, the ideas and the actions of governments that ascended during the 2000s. Here, we test whether the different combinations between pragmatism and ideology extend to the post-Pink Tide period. But to what extent can a foreign policy be classified as ideological or pragmatic?

Bobbio, Matteucci and Pasquino (1998) point out that there are two general meanings attributed to the term "ideology": the first, considered "weak", designates "the genus, or the species, diversely defined, of political belief systems – a set of ideas and values concerning the public order whose function is to guide collective political behavior" (Bobbio, Matteucci and Pasquino 1998, 595). In its "strong" meaning, usually associated with Marxist thought, ideology is "a negative concept that precisely denotes the mystifying false-consciousness character of a political belief" (Bobbio, Matteucci, and Pasquino 1998, 595). In many cases, something that is "ideological" is usually opposed, implicitly or explicitly, to what is "pragmatic" (Bobbio, Matteucci and Pasquino 1998, 595).

In foreign policy studies, the opposition between ideology and pragmatism reflects a dynamic tension between the desirable and the achievable and, far from representing an inconsistency, it is a component that permanently integrates the international strategies of States (Gardini and Lambert 2011). According to Gardini and Lambert's (2011) definition, ideological foreign policy starts from a cognitive map and emphasizes

"principles and doctrinal solutions about adaptability and the practical consequences of statements and actions". In this case, it reinforces preconceived positions, usually associated with short-term planning and represents a personalized view of international relations defended by a certain leader or government (Gardini and Lambert 2011, 17; Saraiva and Silva 2019). A pragmatic foreign policy, in turn, is based on policies and proposals and not on the viability and practicality of ideas; it emphasizes the priority of action over doctrine, experience over fixed principles and is generally associated with medium- or long-term state planning and not with a determination limited to a specific government (Gardini and Lambert 2011, 17).

The main objective of this article is to analyze the objectives, foreign policy strategies and world views of presidents Mauricio Macri, in Argentina, and Jair Bolsonaro, in Brazil, with an emphasis on three agenda topics: relationship with the United States, with China and regional integration within the scope of Mercosur. The choice of themes reflects, firstly, the historic geopolitical influence of the United States over South America. Secondly, the growth of Chinese protagonism at a global level and, in the region, the fact that Beijing is currently one of the main partners in economic, structural and trade terms. Finally, the centrality of Mercosur for the integration of the Southern Cone. With this comparison, we will analyze the differences between the speech and practice of both presidents and identify whether their foreign policies were guided by ideological or pragmatic principles. As a hypothesis, we suggest that Mauricio Macri and Jair Bolsonaro adopted, at the discursive level, an essentially ideological position, but their actions sought a certain pragmatism due to the occurrence of restrictions and incentives in the international, regional, and domestic contexts.

In summary, we consider the intermestic nature of foreign policy, its identification as public policy and therefore "its subjection to the influence of specific interests of domestic actors and their perceptions of the country's place in the world" (Milani 2015, 60). We adopted the State as a unit of analysis, specifically the Executive Branch, and focused on ideational aspects and preferences of presidents and their representatives, materialized through speeches and actions taken, such as the signing of bilateral and multilateral agreements and meetings.

The identification of the positions signed by Mauricio Macri and Jair Bolsonaro, and occasionally by their Ministers, will be done by triangulating bibliographic sources, documents and official pronouncements, obtained from the pages of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult and Casa Rosada in Argentina; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE-Itamaraty) and the Planalto Palace, in Brazil. In this work, we gathered

pronouncements that dialogue with the three proposed themes (USA, China and regional integration) as well as presidential inaugural speeches and those made within the scope of the United Nations (UN). The following sections deal, respectively, with the governments of Mauricio Macri, in Argentina, and Jair Bolsonaro, in Brazil.

Macri and the "Opening to the World" proposal

Mauricio Macri won the presidential elections in Argentina in 2015 supported by a broad center-right alliance and proposed, in foreign policy, the objective of promoting a "policy of openness to the world with an integrative vision" that would increase "the country's role in regional and global level, protecting national interests based on mutual respect" (Macri 2016a). In the words of the former president, the strategy could be summarized in the phrase "we want to be part of the world again and cut isolationism" pronounced in 2016 during the annual meeting of the Clinton Global Initiative (Macri 2016b).

Since the presidential campaign, Mauricio Macri insisted on the idea of an Argentina that would be "isolated in the world", from investment flows and from its "historical partners". The Memorandum with Iran/AMIA Case (2013)[7], the links with China, Cuba and Venezuela and the Mercosur protectionism associated with the governments of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner were used to make sense of this narrative. According to Macri, the "ideological" positioning - with a negative bias - of Kirchner's foreign policy had led the country to a series of failures that left Argentina broken, without growth and isolated from the world on the verge of "Venezuelization", a metaphor that represents, for this political sector of Argentina, the concentration of all the evils of the Republic.

The main points of Macri´s foreign policy, at least in terms of discourse, are summarized in the document "Reflections on the external challenges of Argentina: we will be beyond what we are inside" (CARI 2015) published in April 2015 by Grupo Consenso[8]. The document points out the need to "properly insert" Argentina into the world based on a "Western identity" built on the "strengthening of traditional relations with Europe and the United

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7 Agreement signed in 2013 between Argentina and Iran by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs Héctor Timerman and Ali Akbar Salehi to address issues related to the terrorist attack on the headquarters of AMIA (Asociación Mutual Israelita de Argentina) in July 1994.

8 This document was signed, among others, by Jorge Faurie, future Minister of Foreign Relations, Fulvio Pompeo (future Secretary of Strategic Affairs) and Diego Guelar (future Ambassador of Argentina to the People's Republic of China).

States". Generally speaking, Cambiemos' international strategy can be summarized in five points: 1) hierarchy of links with the United States and Western European countries such as Germany, Spain, Italy, Great Britain, and the Netherlands; 2) search for the improvement of relations with multilateral credit organizations (IMF, World Bank) and other multilateral spaces (WTO, G-20); 3) improving relations with the international financial sector and transnational corporations; 4) isolation of Venezuela and reorientation of regional integration mechanisms towards Asia-Pacific and; 5) "cooling" of relations with China and Russia (Busso 2019).

Upon assuming the presidency, Macri spoke about the need for Argentina to "go back to the world" and build "mature relationships" with all countries and especially with the United States and Europe. Therefore, he adopted an international insertion strategy prioritizing a rapprochement with the hegemonic powers and their free trade agendas and initiatives (Frenkel and Azzi 2018). In the first year of his administration, Mauricio Macri was assertive in his speeches regarding his proposal to redirect economic and foreign policies. As soon as he took office, he deregulated exchange controls, in addition to paying the debt with investment funds that restricted the country's access to markets, the so-called "vulture funds". In addition, Macri acted in the organization of national statistics, in the revision of Article IV with the IMF, established the end of exchange controls, trade liberalization and inflation targets. These actions, added to Argentina's engagement with the United States' perspective on international issues, sought to encourage the inflow of foreign capital and investment.

Following the proposed alignments, the Argentine government sought to position Argentina as the leader of a "post-progressive" transition in the region, taking advantage of the strong internal crisis experienced by Brazil with the dismissal of Dilma Rousseff and the instability and unpopularity of Michel Temer's interim government. The idea of "returning to the world" and "de-ideologizing" foreign relations, in the words of Minister Susana Malcorra (2016)[9], consisted of positioning Argentina as a regional leader and promoter of free trade. In concrete terms, this meant a commitment to realign foreign policy based on Mercosur's "flexibilization", the search for trade diversification, Venezuela's suspension from the bloc and rapprochement with Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico.

Macri's vision of foreign policy was situated in a place close to the paradigm of "globalist liberalism" that sought to revitalize the relationship

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9 A little over a year before Malcorra's statements, the foreign policy adviser to presidential candidate Aécio Neves (PSDB) had stated exactly the same to the Brazilian press. "It is necessary to de-ideologize foreign policy".

with the United States, based on a benevolent diagnosis of the international conditions to receive investments and increase exports flow (Russell and Tokatlian 2017). The success or failure of its foreign policy resided, from this conception, in obtaining better political ties and greater economic integration with the United States and the countries of Western Europe (Simonoff 2022). For this reason, Macri´s foreign policy strategy focused on seeking investment and access to the US market, giving much importance to the Agreement between Mercosur and the European Union and to the alignment with the hemispheric interests of the United States, seeking convergence with the countries of the Pacific Alliance in the Trans-Pacific Treaty.

However, after a series of changes in the international scenario and internal pressures, the Macri government had to redefine its strategy in order to return to a more pragmatic foreign policy stance, while still prioritizing ties with the West and in particular with Washington. The advance of protectionist trade policies, the election of Republican Donald Trump and the "trade war" between China and the US were some of the factors that contributed to this turnaround. According to Listrani Blanco and Zaccato (2018), after a first moment of coupling, the Macri government began to outline a strategy of concessive peripheral unilateralism, continuing the rapprochement with the United States, but without neglecting multilateral forums or the regional space. The pragmatism of this second phase of the foreign policy of the Cambiemos administration had, in any case, an orientation towards the North and the West and an opening bias.

Relations with the United States

Cambiemos government rescued the logic of acquiescence and alignment for its foreign policy towards Washington (Busso 2019). Alignment with US interests can be interpreted as a new cycle of ideological Americanism (Guimarães 2019), acquiescence[10] (Russell and Tokatlián 2013) or accommodation, which is characterized by an active role in shaping international regimes in harmony with Washington, maintaining a relative indifference position towards the region (Russell and Tokatlian 2009). Far from "de-ideologizing" Argentina´s foreign policy, Macri´s proposal of "returning to the world" and its government's alignment with the United

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10 In these frameworks, foreign policy is associated with the strategic interests of the United States with the objective of obtaining material or symbolic gains, building a stable coexistence relationship and counting on its protection to sustain the coalition of power in the international system. Therefore, the North-South relations with traditional Western partners is given priority and the adherence to deep integration schemes is avoided.

States aimed to re-ideologize foreign policy prioritizing the North-South axis.

The accommodation profile is verified in the official discourses on the "commitment to the defense of human rights and the fight against organized crime, drug trafficking, mafias and corruption" (Macri 2019a). This alignment culminated in the establishment of a High-Level Strategic Dialogue with periodic meetings to review the bilateral relationship and address issues of common interest. On the Argentine side, the main concerns were the strengthening of the bilateral economic relationship, the increase and diversification of commercial exchange and the promotion of investments in infrastructure and energy. On the US side, the main concerns involved the fight against terrorism and the condemnation of the government of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019c). At this point, both Macri´s and Bolsonaro´s governments repudiated, whenever they had the opportunity, the violation of human rights in Venezuela and tried to isolate the country from the regional forums and the MERCOSUR[11].

At the beginning of his term, Mauricio Macri received Barack Obama[12] and later expressed strong support for the candidacy of Democrat Hillary Clinton for the US elections. Donald Trump's unexpected victory made the government rethink its alliance scheme and adopt a pragmatic stance that included a rapprochement with US hemispheric interests in its implementation of an updated version of the "Monroe Doctrine". In the meantime, relations between Buenos Aires and Washington were permeated by commitments at the regional and international levels, but the unrestricted defense of free trade and multilateralism made by Macri collided with the protectionist actions of Donald Trump.

The withdrawal of the US from regional "mega-agreements" (such as the Trans-Pacific Economic Cooperation Agreement - TTP and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement - TTIP) and other global pacts (such as the Paris Agreement) and the preference for Negotiations at the bilateral level of the agreements in force interrupted the impulses of macro-economic opening. This change in US foreign policy consolidated the trends observed since 2008 in questioning multilateralism and the globalist

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11 US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo would say, after a bilateral meeting with President Macri in Olivos, that "Argentina stands out as a reliable partner in our shared efforts to restore democracy in Venezuela" (Pompeo 2019).

12 At the G-20 Summit in China in June 2016 Obama stated that "Economies grow better when everyone participates in that growth. We have to take measures to ensure that we do not adopt new protectionist or populist recipes (...) there are several presidents who they are taking the right measures, as in India, Indonesia or Italy (...) and the new president of Argentina who has taken measures to redesign and give new strength to its economy" (Obama 2016).

project and inaugurated a new phase of slowbalization and interruption of global value chains.

On the other hand, Argentina's relationship with the International Monetary Fund has become one of the most important issues on the bilateral agenda with the United States. The loan requested from the International Monetary Fund in 2018 can also be read from the logic of acquiescence. In November 2018, within the framework of Donald Trump's visit to Argentina for the G-20 summit, Mauricio Macri especially thanked the support given to obtain financial assistance from the IMF (Macri 2018).

The Macri government sought to please the United States, realigning its foreign policy to US hemispheric interests and, in exchange, managed to get the IMF to grant the largest loan in its history. Many analysts interpreted this as direct political support by Donald Trump for Argentina's economic stability to give the government the necessary ceiling to obtain its re-election[13] (Cantamutto and Feliz 2021). The agreement with the IMF and the external indebtedness once again indicates Argentina's return to the paths of external dependence with the consequent increase in its international vulnerability. In terms of results, Argentina's return to international debt markets is clearly linked to the articulation between foreign and domestic economic policy. In addition, Argentina achieved improvements in access to the US market in pork, lemon and yarn exports incorporated into the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) (Listrani Blanco and Zaccato 2018).

Despite the priority given to rapprochement with the United States, as we will see in the next section, the Macri government also approached China in a clear demonstration of pragmatism and the search for equidistance.

Relations with China

The foreign position of Macri´s government clearly prioritized relations with the traditional countries of the West, underestimating the relevance of the emerging powers of the East. As we discussed earlier, Macri actively approached the United States, showing a clear tendency to move away from China (Hua 2017). As Castaño points out, "in the initially prioritized trips around the world, the place attributed to China was practically nil" (Castaño

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13 Chancellor Faurie recognized, in other words, the cruciality of the United States' support for the internal reforms that were being implemented after a bilateral meeting with Undersecretary Breier: "Argentina is grateful for the support given by the United States government to President Macri and to the objective to achieve growth through the economic reforms that are underway" (Faurie 2019).

2017, 11). During the first year of the Macri government, international relations were re-hierarchized and China and Russia were placed in the background (Simonoff 2017). However, throughout the government, the relationship with the People's Republic of China went through several stages, from diplomatic tension to a strong rapprochement and pragmatism (Pascual and Ghiotto 2019), often interpreted as a "realistic turn" (Morasso 2018).

According to the periodization carried out by Lin (2017), at first there was a kind of "strangeness", which later became a "filming period" where the relevance of bilateral cooperation was valued and understood. Finally, since the end of 2016, a moment of "non-stop dialogue" has opened, which has passed into a phase of "deepening strategic cooperation" (Lin 2017). The idea that a rapprochement with the United States required a more marked commitment to distancing from China in strategic matters initially prevailed. Therefore, the relationship with China was built, under this logic, in opposition to the relationships that the previous government had developed and that came to be characterized as a negatively "ideological" approach in the Macri administration (Paikin 2018).

As Oviedo (2018, 98) points out, during the first months of his government, Macri "put bilateral relations in a tense situation" and made Beijing consider that "Argentina was moving away from comprehensive strategic relations towards the European-American axis". In these first months, the "Integral Strategic Association" was questioned and the agreements previously signed were reviewed, such as those for the construction of two dams and two nuclear power plants and the possible dual use of the Deep Space Station of Neuquén. The commercial dimension has also become a tension factor in Sino-Argentine relations. After Macri declared that his government would review the contracts signed during the Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández administration, China stopped buying soybean oil from Argentina. After that, the Macri government backed down, revoked the action and reassessed the cooperation projects signed by both parties (Pascual and Ghiotto 2019).

After the initial estrangement, the approach to diplomatic relations with China became more pragmatic (Corigliano 2018). The Chinese influence in Argentine foreign trade[14], the electoral triumph of Donald Trump (which

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14 China is Argentina's second most important trading partner and occupies a central role in terms of investments (mainly in energy and infrastructure) and in financial matters due to the agreements signed between the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic (BCRA) and the People's Bank of China (PBC). China has been one of the main consumers of Argentine soybeans for years, concentrating more than 80% of the country´s foreign sales of this product and more than 60% total exports to China.

modified the global and continental strategy of the United States) and the pressure from a significant portion of the political base of Cambiemos (the agribusiness-export sector) made the government change its initial position of suspicion and openly sought the normalization of relations with the Asian country.

Once the moment of distrust was over, the main leaders established several meetings in which they ratified bilateral relations, emphasizing cooperation. At a bilateral meeting in Hangzhou (2016), they signed an agreement to develop a "China-Argentina Integrated Five-Year Plan for Infrastructure Cooperation (2017-2021)"[15] and a series of cooperation agreements[16]. One month after the meeting, in line with the Five-Year Plan, Argentina joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) aiming to finance investments in the energy, transport and telecommunications sectors. In addition, a new currency swap for US$9,000 million was signed in 2018 and Macri participated in the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, promoting articulation with the Initiative for the Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA) (Oviedo 2018).

By redefining its position in relation to China, the Argentine government also rethought its objectives, seeking to explore the complementarity between the economies. In bilateral relations, Argentina's priorities were aimed at expanding and diversifying bilateral trade (although not necessarily adding value to exports), conquering greater spaces in the Chinese market for Argentine products and promoting direct investment in strategic sectors such as infrastructure, agribusiness, energy, mining, finance, telecommunications, knowledge-based services and logistics (MREC 2018a). On the Chinese side, the priorities were the attachment of Argentina's foreign policy to the "One China" policy and progress in strategic sectors such as nuclear energy, space and astrophysics, hydroelectric power, mining (lithium), renewable, conventional and non-renewable energies. conventional, railway and road infrastructure, among others (MREC 2019a).

In a speech at the China-Argentina Business and Investment Forum,

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15 This agreement consolidates the participation of Chinese capital in railway, nuclear, hydro-electric, wind and photovoltaic infrastructure and ratifies projects that, having been signed by the previous government, were revised at the beginning of the Cambiemos administration (Castaño 2017).

16 In all, 19 agreements were signed during the May 2017 trip. Among them is a Memorandum of Understanding for the training of diplomatic officials, another for the installation of a Chinese Cultural Center in Argentina, an Action Plan for Agricultural Cooperation, another on Food Safety Cooperation, a protocol on Phytosanitary Requirements for exporting grapes, one on cooperation in railway matters, an agreement to facilitate tourist and business visas, and a Memorandum between the Ministry of Finance and the Development Bank of China.

Macri highlighted the importance of the Asian country as a trade partner and the potential for developing complementarities between the two countries, mainly in the supply of food, technological development and infrastructure construction. In that speech, the Argentine president mentioned the invitation to participate in the so-called "New Silk Road" or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), one of the biggest contemporary geopolitical projects sponsored by the Chinese government. After these initial negotiations, Argentina finally joined the initiative in February 2022 during Alberto Fernández's administration (MREC 2022).

In addition to the successive bilateral meetings, which led to the ratification of the Global Strategic Partnership, the signing of a Joint Action Plan between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Argentine Republic (2019-2023) and the preparation of the way for entry of Argentina in the BRI, in terms of results, it was possible to expand access to the Chinese market for Argentine products such as peas, grapes and alfalfa, and protocols were signed for the opening of the market to beef and lamb (MREC 2018a) and for the entry of soybean meal (MREC 2019b).

On the other hand, China has strongly supported economic and financial stability through fiscal and financial cooperation through currency exchange, loans and direct investment, and has remained committed to continuing to implement cooperation projects in hydroelectricity, railway works and roads, infrastructure, nuclear energy, oil, gas, clean energy, agriculture, mining, tourism and manufacturing, among other cooperation agreements (Treacy 2023; MREC 2018b).

As in China, something similar happened with regard to orientation towards the Mercosur regional bloc. If at the beginning there was a clear directive to open it up and make it converge towards the Pacific Alliance and the Mega regional Free Trade Agreements, then there was a realistic turn that ended up giving a more pragmatic character to its orientation.

Regional integration

The gravitation that Mercosur had since the end of the 2001 crisis as a representation of the regional priority in the integration process was lost with the Macri administration, which saw the regional bloc as a platform for "strengthening economic and trade relations between us and with the world" (Macri 2016). In other words, the regional bloc also became part of the foreign policy strategy of "going back to the world" and came to be thought of as a gateway to globalization. The relationship with Mercosur was established

as a way to achieve, through free trade agreements with the Pacific Alliance and the European Union, the mega regional free trade agreements (TPP and TTIP), which had been promoted by the United States before Trump's triumph (Simonoff 2020). The bet was made outside the multilateral scope and expressed the clear intention of approaching the United States, even if that meant cooling relations with China and moving towards a more flexible Mercosur.

In the first two years of the Cambiemos government, autonomy lost relevance and the understanding of the importance of Mercosur for Argentina was linked to the reorientation of its ties with the European Union, the United States, and the Pacific Alliance (Míguez 2017). Although Mercosur has not ceased to be a priority of Argentine foreign policy, the absence of mentions to the bloc in Macri's inaugural speech (Dec/2015) and at the United Nations General Assembly (Sep/2016) draws attention. The inaugural sign of the government's political and ideological turn coincided with the strong change in the orientation of the regional space. The quest for flexibility in Clause 32/00 of the CMC[17], the suspension of Venezuela, the participation as an observer in the Pacific Alliance summits and the dismantling of most of the political and social actions characterized this shift.

The signing of the free trade agreement with the European Union in 2019 crystallized the vision of the regional bloc as a bridge to hyperglobalization, even if this meant renouncing sovereign spaces and harming the region's industrial sector. This idea, shared by Macri and Bolsonaro, is at the heart of the logic of acquiescence and is summarized in the category "Mercosur for the 21st century" that the former president used in several of his speeches (Macri 2017). The Agreement with the European Union was used as a milestone in the integration of Argentina with the "Western world" and also as a guide to future actions: "Mercosur must continue to deepen the negotiation of agreements, we have many in our portfolio, which allow a better insertion in the global economy, improving the competitiveness of our economies and our participation in trade and investment flows" (Macri 2019c).

The idea of a "modern bloc" and an "intelligent integration" was created through a symbolic construction that aimed to associate openness with progress, dynamism and competitiveness in a clear ideological contrast with the construction of a supposedly old, protectionist and retrograde Mercosur, associated with previous actions. In this symbolic construction of the regional project, priority was given to an open vision of regionalism, which postulated the abandonment of protectionist guidelines as a path of development. In

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17 Clause 32/00 of the Common Market Council (CMC) prevents individual countries from signing free trade agreements, establishing that agreements must be signed in bloc.

Macri's words, the objective of modernizing Mercosur was linked to "moving towards an integration space that adapts to the challenges of the 21st century and that takes advantage of the opportunities that the world offers" (Macri 2019a).

For the Macri government, Mercosur would be in line with a regionalism proposal "aimed at attracting investments and participation in global value chains" (Michetti 2017). This position was echoed in the manifestations of Minister Susana Malcorra, who had already stated that "FTAA is not a bad word"[18], opening the doors to a favorable position to the signing of similar agreements. In this context, the Mercosur-European Union Association Agreement was seen as a reference for the integration project sought by the Argentine government and its signature in June 2019 was presented as one of the greatest achievements of the administration and as "the most important agreement that we signed in our history" (Macri 2019e)[19].

In addition to the reconnection with strategic partners in the West and the signing of free trade agreements, in the rhetoric of the president and his ministers was also a dimension linked to the reinforcement of productive integration, the participation of small and medium-sized companies (PyMes) in the global values chains (Macri 2019c), energy and logistics integration, physical and virtual interconnection, simplification of borders to streamline trade, tourism and sociocultural exchange (Macri 2019d). These objectives are associated, as we saw in the previous section, with China's role in the region and the bilateral agreements signed with Argentina.

Just as Macri represented an attempt to change the orientation of Argentine foreign policy and had to move from an ideological position to a pragmatic one, Bolsonaro's Foreign Policy, as we assess in the next section, represented a rupture with the guidelines that Itamaraty had been adopting, but at some point they had to face concrete conditions that would make them move from a more ideological position to a more pragmatic one too.

Jair Bolsonaro's "New Foreign Policy"

In his inauguration as President of the Republic, Jair Bolsonaro declared that Brazil was being freed from "socialism, the inversion of values, state gigantism and political correctness" (Bolsonaro 2019a). The recurrent

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18 Ambito. "FTAA is not a dirty word", 8 December 2015.

19 Maintaining the objective of "returning to the world", the Macri government presented the signing of the agreement as "a clear signal to the world that we want Mercosur to be an open, competitive and dynamic bloc, committed to integration, trade and clear rules of game to invest and do business" (Macri, 2019b).

use of terms such as "change", "renewal" and "transformation" signaled the desire for differentiation to previous governments. Emulating the style of Mauricio Macri, criticism of a supposed "ideologization" of foreign policy was recurrent in Bolsonarist discourses, with this practice being associated with the Workers' Party (PT), former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and former president Dilma Rousseff, blamed for "decades of economic stagnation, backwardness, corruption, inefficiency, crime" (Araújo 2019a).

To compose the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bolsonaro chose Ernesto Araújo, a career diplomat at Itamaraty who gained notoriety for his pro-Western and pro-Donald Trump positions and for being one of the followers of the self-proclaimed philosopher Olavo de Carvalho. Following Carvalho's philosophy and aligned with the principles of the global extreme right[20] Araújo redesigned Brazilian foreign policy adopting negationism, the fight against "cultural Marxism" and anti-globalism as premises. In practical terms, this meant a rupture with Itamaraty's traditional paradigms, such as multilateralism, the search for autonomy and development and the diversification of partnerships, which culminated in the abandonment of an active posture by Brazil both in regional and international forums and a direct alignment with the interests of the United States of Donald Trump.

In the economic area, Bolsonaro proposed a prioritization of "trust, the national interest, the free market and efficiency", in addition to the "opening of markets to international trade (…) without ideological bias" (Bolsonaro 2019a, emphasis added). With the motto "Brazil above all and God above all", the Brazilian president assigned to his foreign policy the task of "defending sovereignty" and "building greatness and fostering the development of Brazil" (Bolsonaro 2019a), giving the Armed Forces the role of "guarding sovereignty" and "protecting borders" (idem). To achieve this goal, the president chose economist Paulo Guedes as the head of the Ministry of Economy and continued to deepen the liberalizing agenda that was already being implemented by Temer´s administration.

At first, the Brazilian representative signaled for the maintenance and deepening of the pro-Western position and, mainly, pro-US agenda through a political, military and economic alignment with the Trump administration. Although a large part of the actions carried out by Bolsonaro continued the decisions taken by the interim Michel Temer[21], the Bolsonarist strategy was guided by an "asymmetrical and non-reciprocal" relationship with the

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20 Some of the countries that make up this group are Israel, Italy, Hungary and Poland.

21 Such as, for example, the use of the Alcântara Base and the search for support from the United States for Brazil's entry into the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). It is worth noting that the claim related to the OECD began to be aired during Dilma Rousseff's second term.

northern neighbor, by the removal of the so-called "Bolivarian" axis in the region and by the resumption of a pro-free trade agenda very similar to that of its Argentine counterpart (Santos 2019; Guimarães 2019).

Throughout 2019, Brazil's relations with the rest of the world were guided by positive movements towards the United States and Israel, rapprochement with right-wing and center-right governments in South America and the intensification of tensions with Venezuela. Later that year, the government faced some internal crises, such as, for example, the noise caused by President Bolsonaro's attempt to nominate his son, Eduardo, to the Brazilian Embassy in Washington. As of 2020, the health crisis caused by COVID-19 hit the world and in Brazil provoked ideological divergences, tensions in Sino-Brazilian relations, and, after Bolsonaro´s positioning against multilateralism, the isolation of the country on the international scene.

Relations with the United States

The appointment of Ernesto Araújo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a significant indication of the directions that Bolsonaro intended to set for his foreign policy. The choice of Araújo accentuated the already notorious preference of the Brazilian president for an alignment with the United States, since the Minister presented himself as a great admirer of Donald Trump (Albuquerque and Ives 2019). In this sense, Jair Bolsonaro's foreign policy pursued "the explicit objective of promoting economic rapprochement and political alignment" with the US (Santos 2019), as did Macri at the beginning of his government.

This alignment manifested itself at several instances: in the search for US support for Brazil's entry into the Organization for Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a priority extra-NATO ally, with the guarantee of the refusal of special treatment and differentiated (TED) of developing country in the World Trade Organization (WTO); in the unilateral granting of exemption from Brazilian visas for the entry of US tourists; in the Brazilian vote at the UN in favor of maintaining the economic embargo on Cuba - which changed the position adopted by the country since 1992 - and in the waiver of the UN Global Migration Pact (Santos 2019, 18-19; Santos and Leão 2021). Brazilian behavior towards the US was strongly influenced by the government's "ideological wing" composed of the self-styled philosopher Olavo de Carvalho, Chancellor Ernesto Araújo, deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro and the advisor for International Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic, Filipe Martins (Saraiva et al. Silva 2019; Santos and Leão 2021).

On his first bilateral trip to the United States, Bolsonaro celebrated

the "new partnership" between Brasilia and Washington based on "increasing prosperity, improving security, promoting democracy, defending freedom and national sovereignty" (Bolsonaro 2019b). The Brazilian representative was committed to reversing the supposed "anti-Americanism" of the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff (Bolsonaro 2019b). On the occasion, Trump and Bolsonaro also recognized Juan Guaidó as "president in charge of Venezuela", which was a great point of convergence between the two governments. In a speech at the United States Chamber of Commerce, on the occasion of "Brazil Day", in March 2019, Minister Ernesto Araújo pointed out that Brazil's relations with Washington - until that moment - would have been guided by "a relationship of indifference or hostility" and that recovering the relationship with a "dynamic and open nation that produces freedom, reinforces the rule of law and promotes human values" was a task of his management (Araújo 2019a).

In July 2019, President Jair Bolsonaro revealed his intention to appoint his son, deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro, to the embassy in Washington. However, after negative repercussions, accusations of nepotism and pressure from the Legislative Power, the president backed down. Visits to the northern neighbor, however, remained constant: Ernesto Araújo met with the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, and participated in an event organized by the conservative think tank Heritage Foundation. On this occasion, he pointed out similarities between presidents Jair Bolsonaro and Donald Trump, classifying them as "outsiders" and members of a "universal insurgency" against the political establishment (Araújo 2019c). This speech, in particular, summarizes the convergence between the Brazilian and US governments in relation to climate change denialism, criticism of international organizations and the defense of liberal-conservative values.

In the following year, Bolsonaro met again with Donald Trump and discussed the political situation in Venezuela, bilateral trade and economic cooperation, signed technological agreements and followed up the advances in the negotiation for Brazil's participation in the "America Cresce" initiative, which aimed to face the Chinese New Silk Road initiative (Santos e Leão 2021). At the meeting, Brazil and the United States signed, in the Southern Command, a military agreement regarding Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Projects (RDT&E Agreement) (Gonçalves and Teixeira 2020; Santos and Leão 2021). Another point of convergence between the agendas of Brazil and the United States was the Christian and conservative religion that justified Brazilian support for the creation of the International Alliance for Religious Freedom, an action sponsored by the US Department of State. They also shared the position against "gender ideology" and the sexual and reproductive rights of women, in a position similar to that of countries such as

Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and the denunciation of an alleged "Christophobia" in the framework of the United Nations (Bandeira de Mello 2022).

The scenario changed after the outbreak of the pandemic caused by COVID-19, but relations between Brazil and the United States remained ideologically aligned. Regarding the pandemic, both Jair Bolsonaro and representatives of his government, like Chancellor Ernesto Araújo and former Minister of Education Abraham Weintraub, emulated positions adopted by Donald Trump, such as criticism of the World Health Organization (WHO), xenophobic speeches directed at China and a denialist and anti-scientific point of view (Santos e Leão 2021). Ernesto Araújo used the term "comunavirus" to refer to COVID-19, criticized sanitary measures implemented by China and suggested that the spread of the pandemic would be part of a "globalist" strategy led by the Asian country[22][23]. In addition, Bolsonaro, like Trump, also spread numerous fake news and propagated the use of hydroxychloroquine and azithromycin, without scientific proof, for the treatment of COVID-19. By choosing to mimic Trump's style, Bolsonaro isolated Brazil, making the country an international pariah.

Another factor that crossed the bilateral relationship was the beginning of the presidential race in the United States. Reinforcing his alignment with the republican government, Bolsonaro has openly and several times supported the re-election of Donald Trump to the White House, causing discomfort in internal sectors. The tension worsened after the Democratic candidate, Joe Biden, positioned himself in favor of an international campaign to protect the Amazon, suggesting that, if elected, he would mobilize resources to protect the Brazilian biome. In the last act of support for Trump, Bolsonaro validated the invasion of the Capitol and suggested the possibility of "electoral fraud"[24] after Joe Biden's victory. Brazil was one of the last countries to recognize the democrat's victory in the US elections (Santos e Leão 2021). The option to maintain alignment with the United States, especially during the pandemic, caused noise in Brazil's relations with the world and, mainly, with China.

Relations with China

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22 "The comunavirus has arrived", article published in the book Foreign Policy: sovereignty, democracy and freedom, April 8, 2020.

23 According to Santos and Leão (2021) "globalism", in the view of Ernesto Araújo, would be "a global trend resulting from the amalgamation between nihilism and cultural Marxism, embedded in the main multilateral organizations, starting with the United Nations."

24 "Bolsonaro repeats Trump's speech and talks about "fraud in the US election". Valor (Online), January 6, 2021.

Throughout 2019, there has been a progressive shift in the tone adopted by the president and senior members of the government towards China. Before assuming the presidency, Bolsonaro declared that the Asian country "would not buy Brazil", in allusion to the large Chinese bilaterally[25] and multilaterally[26] participation in the Brazilian economy. During the presidential campaign, Bolsonaro visited Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, and declared that this trip, in addition to visits to Israel, the United States and Japan, aimed to show with whom Brazil would like to maintain "friendly" relations (Saraiva e Silva 2019, 122). It is known that the One China issue is a sensitive topic in Chinese geopolitics, being a reason for controversy on the international scene.

The presidential role in the Sino-Brazilian agenda was less intense when compared to other diplomatic partners such as the United States or even South American countries such as Chile and Paraguay. At the beginning of his administration, Minister Ernesto Araújo claimed that the Brazilian commitment to the "post-American" world, especially relations with China and the BRICS, were "wrong choices" made by previous diplomacy. The option of the Brazilian Executive, then, was to maintain dialogue with China on commercial and economic matters and delegate part of the bilateral diplomatic relations to other actors. As a result, the Vice President of the Republic, General Hamilton Mourão, made the first official visit of the Brazilian government to China in May 2019.

At the discursive level, mentions of China were restricted to the economic-commercial axis, with emphasis on investments and market opening. In the first year of the Bolsonaro government, the Sino-Brazilian agenda was limited to business and high-level meetings between representatives of the Chinese and Brazilian governments, such as, for example, the meeting of the Sino-Brazilian Commission of High Level of Concertation and Cooperation

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25 China has been, since 2009, Brazil's main trading partner and one of the main sources of external financing (MRE 2019b). In 2018, according to the Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services, 28% of Brazilian exports were destined for the Asian country, with soy being the main exported product. Between January and July 2020, exports to China reached 34.1% of the total.

26 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the four other members of the BRICS were the destination, in 2018, of 30% of Brazilian exports. The value of goods purchased by Russia, China, India and South Africa reached US$73.8 billion (against US$56.4 billion in 2017). 23.8% of national imports came from these countries, corresponding to US$ 43.1 billion. Brazil's trade balance with the BRICS was, in 2018, positive at US$ 30.7 billion (it was US$ 23 billion in 2017), equivalent to 52% of the Brazilian trade surplus in the year (MRE 2019a). Data from the Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services.

(COSBAN)[27]. At the meeting, Brazilian Vice President Hamilton Mourão and his Chinese counterpart Wang Qishan committed themselves to advance in the "Global Strategic Partnership" established between the two countries in 2012 (MRE 2019a).

Minister Ernesto Araújo participated in the Brazil-China II Meeting of the Global Strategic Dialogue (DEG) in July 2019, together with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi. On the occasion, the chancellors highlighted the "solidity of the bilateral agenda" restricted to trade and economic exchange. At the opening of the Brazil-China Business Seminar, Bolsonaro declared visa exemption for tourism and business travel for Chinese citizens and committed to strengthening the agricultural sector, indicating the primacy of trade relations on his agenda (Bolsonaro 2019c). The Brazilian president also thanked China for its position in relation to the Amazon and concluded by indicating that "China, increasingly, is part of the future of Brazil" and that the government would treat the Asian country with "affection, respect and attention" (Bolsonaro 2019c). Chinese participation in infrastructure and energy projects, including oil and natural gas exploration, was also recovered (Araújo 2019b).

On a bilateral basis, Bolsonaro and Xi Jinping highlighted the need to "deepen and strengthen the Brazil-China Global Strategic Partnership, based on equality, respect and mutual benefits", highlighting the update of the Joint Action Plan (2012-2021) and the Ten-Year Plan of Cooperation (2012-2021) between countries. There was reciprocal support for actions coordinated by Brazil, such as the Partnership and Investment Program (PPI) and by China, such as the "Belt and Road Initiative". On the Chinese side, there were declarations of support for the reform of the UN Security Council and the Brazilian intention to "play an even more prominent role in the United Nations" (MRE 2019b).

Multilaterally, the "Brazilian participation in the BRICS had its profile lowered" (Saraiva e Silva 2019). As Saraiva and Silva (2019, 123) point out, during the G20 Summit, for example, the leaders of Russia, China and India even held a trilateral meeting, without the leaders of Brazil and South

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27 Established in May 2004, COSBAN has an institutional structure at various levels, at the top of which is the Plenary Session, chaired, on the Brazilian side, by the Vice-President of the Republic and, on the Chinese side, since 2018, by the Vice-President Wang Qishan. The Executive Secretariat is in charge of the Secretary General of Foreign Affairs of Brazil and the Deputy Minister of Commerce of China. COSBAN is divided into twelve thematic Subcommittees – Politics; Economic-Commercial; Economic-Financial; Inspection and Quarantine; of Agriculture; of Science, Technology and Innovation; of Industry and Information Technology; of Space Cooperation; Energy and Mining; Educational; Cultural; and Health – which have among their objectives the promotion of the implementation of the commitments signed by the countries and the identification of new fields and cooperation modalities.

Africa. Rhetorically, during the BRICS Summit in November 2019, Bolsonaro reinforced the "importance of emerging economies for the vitality and stability of the world economy"; in addition to defending a "more inclusive global governance" and the reform of the "multilateral system" (Bolsonaro 2019d). On the other hand, the Brasilia Declaration[28] incorporated "references to the sovereignty and independence of nations in relation to transnational organizations", at the request of Brazil, as a sign of alignment with the United States (Ibañez 2020). At the end of 2019, Sino-Brazilian cooperation ensured the launch of the CBERS 04A space satellite[29], the sixth developed by Brazil in partnership with China.

The health crisis caused by COVID-19 in early 2020 provoked a profound inflection in Brazil-China relations, intensifying the ideological dispute and the radicalization of the Sinophobic discourse in the Brazilian government (Sousa et al. 2020). Being the main producer of hospital supplies (masks and respirators, for example) and promoting cooperation with several countries and multilateral organizations, including in Latin America, the Asian country was the target of numerous pejorative statements by the Brazilian government. On the social network Twitter, deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro asserted that China had direct responsibility for the spread of the coronavirus, comparing the pandemic with the episode of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (Ibañez 2020). The deputy's comment led the Chinese ambassador to Brazil, Yang Wanming, to release a note on the same social network, "vehemently repudiating the deputy's words" and demanding immediate retraction (Ibañez 2020). Itamaraty's response consisted of an official note criticizing China (Sousa et al. 2020).

At the multilateral level, the Brazilian government acted to prevent China from assuming the leadership position in the World Health Organization and during the XII BRICS Summit, held in virtual mode, Bolsonaro criticized the WTO, the handling of the pandemic carried out by the WHO, in addition to highlighting the importance of national sovereignty and unilateralism (Sousa et al. 2020, 35). As a result, the Brazilian position was directly

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28 The document established a series of commitments such as "defending the principle of sovereignty and mutual respect and equality with the common objective of building a peaceful, stable and prosperous world" based on four pillars: (a) strengthening and reforming the multilateral; (b) economic and financial cooperation; (c) performance in regional conjunctures and; (d) intra-BRICS cooperation.

29 "The satellite is the result of a technological cooperation agreement signed between the two countries in 1988. Brazil and China share 50% of the investments and participation in the development of the satellites of the Sino Brasileiro de Recursos Terrestres Program (CBERS), under the responsibility of the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), for Brazil, and the Chinese Academy of Space Technology (CAST), for China".

contrary to that adopted by China and very close to that adopted by the United States of Donald Trump (Sousa et al. 2020, 35).

The anti-China impulses, mainly in the circle close to the president, however, were curbed by actors linked to the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Infrastructure and Ministry of Agriculture, with emphasis on Vice President Hamilton Mourão (Saraiva e Silva 2019; Sousa et al 2020). In addition to these, subnational governments – through the Nordeste Consortium[30] and in the partnership signed between the Chinese laboratory Sinovac, the Butantan Institute and the government of the State of São Paulo (SP), for example – played a strong role during the pandemic, articulating cooperation strategies with China for the purchase of vaccines and hospital supplies (Sousa et al. 2020). These movements contributed to the adoption of a more pragmatic stance by the Brazilian government, which culminated in the departure of Ernesto Araújo from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and his replacement by the moderate Carlos França, in March 2021. Since then, the government has opted in maintaining relations with China in the commercial and economic areas, without big discursive and policy switches and controversial declarations. There was, however, no Brazilian manifestation regarding the incorporation of the country to the New Silk Road. In Latin America, the Brazilian position was weakened, above all, by the adoption of a denialist discourse and by conjunctural changes, as we will see below.

Regional integration

In South America, the Brazilian government intensified its participation in the Lima Group - being vehemently opposed to Venezuela, including inclinations in favor of military intervention in the country[31] - going against the Brazilian tradition of non-intervention in foreign affairs. In addition, it prioritized relations with Chile, Perú, Colombia and Paraguay, within the framework of the newly formed PROSUL (Foro for the Progress of South America) and the Pacific Alliance, to the detriment of the relations established within the framework of UNASUR and CELAC, formerly central in

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30 "The Consortium was created in 2019 to be the legal, political and economic instrument for the integration of the nine states in the Northeast region of Brazil. It is an initiative that intends to attract investments and leverage projects in an integrated way, constituting itself, at the same time, as a management tool created and available to its consortium entities, and as an articulator of governance pacts. Among the possibilities opened up with the creation of the Consortium are the carrying out of joint purchases, the integrated implementation of public policies and the search for cooperation, also at an international level".

31 "Bolsonaro does not rule out military intervention by Brazil in Venezuela, but says the possibility is 'close to zero'". Jornal O Globo (online), April 30, 2019.

progressive governments of the Pink Tide. In the integration agenda, Bolsonaro adopted a discourse in favor of "de-ideologizing", "flexibilizing" and "liberalizing" Mercosur, with the aim of facilitating bilateral and interregional free trade agreements, such as the case of the European Union. This position was reinforced by statements by the Minister of Economy, Paulo Guedes, who said that Mercosur would not be among the priorities of the Bolsonaro government[32].

Thus, Brazil's regional action had as its central axes the Lima Group, PROSUL (Foro for the Progress of South America) and, to a lesser extent, Mercosur. Mentions of other blocs, such as CELAC and UNASUR, did not appear in the government's speeches or actions. The consolidation of PROSUL, composed of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay and Perú, emerged with the purpose of "renewing and strengthening the process of integration of the nations of South America" and as a "new space for more efficient, pragmatic and simple structure integration" (MRE 2019c). The subsequent departure from UNASUR, in April 2019, reinforced this position, further contributing to promoting Venezuela's isolation in the region and demarcating the ideological preference of PROSUL member countries.

As for Mercosur, the main event on the Bolsonarist agenda was the conclusion of the Mercosur-EU Association Agreement signed based on the blocs' commitment to economic openness and the strengthening of competitiveness conditions. At the 54th Summit, which marked the beginning of Brazil's pro-tempore presidency, the "convergence between the four founding members" was mentioned, which would have the objective of transforming Mercosur into an "instrument to reinforce competitiveness and increase the integration of economies in regional and global markets" from an original vocation for "open regionalism" and pragmatism (MRE 2019d). The signing of the Cooperation and Facilitation of Intra-Mercosur Investments Protocol, between Brazil and Uruguay, and the free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) reinforce this vision (MRE 2019e).

Brazil's relations with Latin America and, in particular, with South America, were also affected by conjunctural changes. The change of government in Argentina, with the electoral victory of Alberto Fernández of the Frente de Todos, the triumph of Movimiento al Socialismo Luis Arce, in Bolivia, and the approval of the Constituent Assembly in Chile, signaled a timid recovery of center-left alliances in the region (Almeida et al. 2020) Regarding Argentina, after declaring his support for the re-election of Mauricio Macri and not attending the inauguration of Alberto Fernández, Bolsonaro partici-

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32 "Paulo Guedes: MERCOSUR will not be a priority in the Bolsonaro government". Época Negócios, October 28, 2018.

pated in the first bilateral meeting, in November 2020, by videoconference, in allusion to the 35th anniversary of the Day of Friendship – date that marks the meeting between Presidents Raúl Alfonsín and José Sarney, in Foz do Iguaçu, within the framework of the negotiations that gave rise to Mercosur.

From 2020, during the pandemic, the denialist discourse sponsored by the Brazilian government and the lack of articulation in multilateral instances prevented greater coordination of health control policies by South American countries. At the end of March, for example, the Argentine government "criticized the Brazilian government's stance in opposing social isolation", while Mario Abdo Benítez, president of Paraguay, declared that Brazil "was a great threat in the fight against the pandemic" (Almeida et al. 2020, 26). For this reason, South American countries acted, in many cases, in isolation, closing borders, preventing the movement of people and adopting health protection measures within their territories.

Final considerations

The governments of Mauricio Macri, in Argentina, and Jair Bolsonaro, in Brazil, have similarities and differences in their international activities. In both governments, we observed a discursive practice, especially in the electoral period and in the first year of government, which was quite incisive and based on ideological principles associated with a neoliberal and conservative agenda. The two presidents sought to demarcate their differences in relation to previous governments – linked to Kirchnerism and PT – breaking with the strategies consolidated by these administrations.

However, the drastic ruptures advocated by Macri and Bolsonaro had to deal with some restrictions in practice. The Cambiemos government had to adapt its discursive positions and its foreign policy actions to a more pragmatic posture due to the results of the elections in the United States, which consecrated Trump and not Hillary Clinton (the candidate supported by Macri), the growth of China in international forums, the pressures of internal sectors linked to agribusiness and the transformations that occurred in Latin America. Macri's initial commitment to multilateralism and openness failed both in its objective of attracting investment and in strengthening international trade relations. The idea of projecting integration in the world through IIRSA collided with the departure of UNASUR and the construction of PROSUL, an initiative that has not yet delivered the promised results and which is already heading towards obsolescence.

The choice of Susana Malcorra and Jorge Faurie for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Argentina, the organization of the Mini-Davos Forum

(2017), the WTO Ministerial Conference (2017)[33], the G20 Summit (2018) and the signing of the Agreement between Mercosur and the European Union (2019) tried to project the image of a government that actively sought to return to a supposed "normality" of its foreign relations through alignment with central countries.

However, the expected "investment rain" projected for the second half of 2016 never arrived; there was no growth of exports, of the economy, or reduction of poverty. Far from it, Argentina once again suffered an acute capital flight, and its initiatives to contain the crisis were unsuccessful, especially when we consider the adoption of an irresponsible monetary policy. The result of this process was the acceleration of inflation and a strong devaluation of the currency, which culminated in the Minister of Economy, Nicolás Dujovne, knocking once again on the door of the IMF in 2018 - the amount obtained reached US$ 56.3 billion dollars, making it the organization's largest loan.

The Western and benevolent view defended by the Macri government on the conditions of integration in the world led the government to take a position that Russell and Tokatlian (2017, 221) describe as "innocent", since it overestimated the role of political and market signals in the real economy in a world with "major global economic uncertainties". The world after the 2008 crisis has not been the same as the world before it, as strong trends seemed to slow down international trade, accompanied by the rise of "*globalphobic*" governments, the weakening of multilateral forums and China's growth in trade, finance, investment and spaces of decision making. In other words, "the idea of financial and commercial openness as a synonym for re-entering the world appeared to be dissociated from global dynamics" (Rochi 2021). The new cycle of external indebtedness with the loan requested from the IMF conditioned the internal economic policy and would leave Argentina on the verge of a new *default*.

In Brazil, during the first two years of Jair Bolsonaro's government, the president was forced to reassess statements attributed to China and Mercosur due to pressure from internal sectors, especially the military and agribusiness, in search of reasonableness in diplomatic relations with the Asian country and the regional bloc. However, anti-China positions and xenophobic speeches by government representatives during the COVID-19 pandemic crystallized the influence of the "ideological wing" on foreign policy. Within the scope

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33 The Ministerial Summit of the World Trade Organization in Buenos Aires (Dec/17), unfortunately, will go down in history for several reasons. First, local and international academics and activists were denied entry, in violation of protocol. This case is currently classified as Illegal Espionage by Argentina's Agencia Federal de Inteligencia (AFI). Furthermore, it was not possible to finalize a final declaration and the US delegation withdrew before the end of the Summit, in a clear demonstration of contempt for the multilateral space and for the host country.

of Mercosur, the more pragmatic attitude benefited from the ideological convergence of interests between Mercosur presidents - especially Argentina and Paraguay - aligned with the political right. However, this alleged alignment did not show significant results, nor was it sufficient to coordinate regional responses to the pandemic, as an effect of the abandonment of multilateral instances such as UNASUR.

The most constant element in Bolsonarist discourse and practice was the relationship with the United States and its President Donald Trump, a great reference for Bolsonaro and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ernesto Araújo. During much of the Bolsonaro government, both the president and his ministerial team opted for the uncritical adoption of positions declared by Donald Trump, assuming a predominantly ideological foreign policy. The discourse was accompanied, in practice, by the lack of reciprocity and asymmetry in the Brazil-USA relationship. The fact is that, although the Brazilian agenda has been full of trips to the United States, Donald Trump was the first US president, since 1978, who did not visit Brazil. Even with evidence of an asymmetrical relationship between the two countries and the return to ideological Americanism, the Bolsonaro government continued to maintain the privileged position of the US in Brazilian foreign policy – this being its most ideological dimension.

In summary, the ideological discourse of Macri and Bolsonaro did not translate into political, commercial and economic gains for either country. On the contrary, this discourse unfolded into practices that culminated in Argentina's re-indebtedness and Brazil's international isolation. For this reason, part of its choices at the international level, mostly wrong, had to be revised due to restrictions and incentives coming from the international, regional and domestic contexts. Finally, this study points to the growing and important role of China and the decrease, even if subtle, of the influence of the United States on the foreign and commercial-economic policy of both countries, factors that contribute to the interpretation that assumes a position of balance, not acquiescence, may offer better results.

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ABSTRACT

This article compares the foreign policy of the governments of Mauricio Macri in Argentina and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, based on the positions of the presidents and their representatives on three topics: 1) relations with the United States, 2) with China and 3) regional integration. We suggest that the Macri government has had to adapt its positions and discursive practices throughout its administration to national and international pressures. We understand that Jair Bolsonaro has adopted a similar stance in his foreign agenda and that his discourses, although strongly ideological, oppose more pragmatic actions, especially in the Brazilian economic and trade agendas, as in Argentina. The methodology used in this study is content analysis of speeches and reports from the Brazilian and Argentine Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and the theoretical contributions of foreign policy analysis.

VISENTINI, Paulo Fagundes. Brazilian Authoritarian Thought and the World Crisis: Reflections of Francisco Campos in the Interwar Period.

Reviewed by José Miguel Quedi Martins[1]

Paulo Visentini's[2] latest book focuses on an unusual theme for an already established author with several works published on Contemporary World History and International Relations. It is a study that finds in Francisco Campos the vertex that links the global crisis in the interwar period with Brazilian authoritarian thought and the genesis of Estado Novo. While the author himself is quick to downplay the importance of the book as a product of his academic youth, it nevertheless stands as a seminal work. Publishing the study 40 years later is justified by the similarity between the period analysed and current events, in which a global transitional crisis enhanced authoritarian political manifestations, both on a national and global levels.

The topics of interest range from the History of Brazil through the History of Ideas – the genesis of authoritarian thought in Brazil and worldwide in the interwar period –, Brazilian Foreign Policy, the Vargas Era, urbanisation, industrialisation, and the emergence of mass society. The

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2 Paulo Visentini was a professor at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) for 40 years, retiring as a Full Professor – the highest rank in the academic track. He remains an active member of the Postgraduate Programs in Political Science at UFRGS and in Military Sciences at the Army Command and General Staff School (ECEME), in Rio de Janeiro. As Director of the Latin American Institute of Advanced Studies at UFRGS, he founded in 1999 and still directs the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT). In 2004, he played a prominent role in the founding of the International Relations course at UFRGS, within its Faculty of Economics (FCE). At FCE, in 2010, he was a co-founder and coordinator of the Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI). In addition to advanced publications and research, he sought to bring internationalist knowledge to society through extension projects, such as UFRGSMUN and International Relations for Educators (RIPE).

guiding thread is the life and work of Francisco Campos. He was Secretary of State in Minas Gerais and in the Federal District, federal deputy, minister, and representative of Brazil in the Inter-American Commission. He drafted the Brazilian Constitution of 1937 and the Institutional Act n.1 (1964), having passed away in 1968 (Visentini 2023, 80).

The book does not express a formal commitment to carry out a biography, although it masterfully fulfils this task. However, it is presided over by the tacit commitment to find the place of human consciousness in the face of an inexorable need – prompted by the Second Industrial Revolution (Visentini 2023, 35) – which, in its frenzy, threatened to destroy the social fabric, the foundations of public life, and lead Brazil to be deprived of its essence and emerge into chaos.

It is remarkable that the author, in 1983, defending a dissertation in Political Science, intuitively already perceived that the determinants move from structures (the third image) to units (countries) – exactly as proposed by Waltz (2002, 155; Visentini 2023, 28). So that the "cause" of Francisco Campos' thought is the global crisis prompted by the industrial revolution and mass society (Visentini 2003, 35-89). The publication of this "youth work" is consistent with this perception.

Moreover, the book infers a warning to the present about the risks involving the Fourth Industrial Revolution, while at the same time demonstrating. by rescuing Campos' thought, that Brazil has already faced this challenge before successfully. And thus, it can do so again.

The book projects the future through the past and the challenges of the present through historical narrative, rigorously and richly documented. Therefore, even though the book is based on abundant documentary sources and frequently gives voice to the biographer himself in the form of direct quotations, it is about a Campos who is reorganised as a demiurge of consciousness. In this condition, he is stripped of his idiosyncrasies and assumes the role of a subject who imposes himself, facing adverse fortune, to develop *virtù* – preparing society and the state to control change. Through this path, biographer and biographed are associated with the foundational thinker of modern Political Philosophy: Niccolò Machiavelli, for whom dams and canals (*virtù*) should be built in order to, during floods, be able to contain the waters of the mighty river (*fortuna*) (Machiavelli 2017, 102).

Despite the numerous positions he held, Francisco Campos had difficulties dealing with the practical aspects of politics (Visentini 2023, 75). However, it was precisely this relative isolation from his contemporaries, his intelligence, and powerful imagination that allowed him to perceive the threshold and dimensions of the impending change. Francisco Campos

moved against four major threats: (1) mass society; (2) urbanisation; (3) industrialisation; and (4) mass media. In Campos' perception, these were formidable challenges, especially the first. They could not be conjured away, as they were imposed on Brazil from the outside. Given their totalising nature, they required a comprehensive reformulation of the state and society.

Even before the 1930 evolution, as Secretary of the Interior of the State of Minas Gerais (1926-1930), Francisco Campos promoted education reform (Visentini 2023, 76). It was the weapon the intellectual relied on to oppose fascism, which was based on mobilisation and political violence (Visentini 2023, 127). As mentioned above, with Vargas Campos wrote the Constitution of 1937. The intention was that, through it, a reformulation of the state would occur, so that it could be robust enough to effectively carry out the task of social control (Visentini 2023, 130).

The starting point in this process was political centralisation, indispensable for the state to be able to achieve the concentration of means of payment in the hands of the federal government, allowing for investment and promotion (Visentini 2023, 90). In short, using the terminology of Celso Furtado here, it was about ensuring the Brazilian economic decision-making axis – defined by the possession of the elements that substantiate the ability of a community to self-determine and distribute its social products (Furtado 1962, 115-116). Thanks to this, the state was able to control change as the formation of the national industry allowed it to scale and smooth the contours of its impact.

Moreover, signs of a World War were already visible (Visentini 2023, 132). Due to the competition for markets and raw materials prompted by the Second Industrial Revolution, a series of conflicts erupted, in the face of which the League of Nations proved powerless. Confrontations in Asia, Africa, Europe, and even in South America – the Chaco War (1932-1935) – brought to the fore military preparation in Brazil.

Due to the centralisation prompted by the *Estado Novo*, the rupture with the Old Republic, and with it its reactionary liberalism and oligarchic democracy, was made possible. Francisco Campos was right: the alternatives then lay between exclusionary liberal oligarchic democracy ("formal") or inclusive hegemony ("substantive democracy") (Visentini 2023, 130). The phenomenon was not exclusively Brazilian: the experiences of Cárdenas (1934-1940) in Mexico and Perón (1946-1955) in Argentina also illustrated that the "Latin American political tradition has always been more linked to the valorisation of social or substantive democracy, relegating the pursuit of political democracy as a mere formal democracy" (Trindade 1990, 155). Furthermore, for Campos, liberal democracy was "improvident" (Visentini

2023, 154), and therefore powerless in the face of the impending challenges, such as the "socialist threat."

Thanks to the *Estado Novo*, Brazil managed to effectively initiate the endogenization of the Second Industrial Revolution (electricity and steel). This was due to the pragmatic bargain (Visentini 1995, 33) made between the US and Germany, which ensured the construction of the Volta Redonda Steelworks. Additionally, it succeeded in military preparation to join World War II alongside the winning bloc. This occurred through the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB), to which the characteristics of the National Army are owed to this day.

Virtuous industrialisation in the Vargas Era and during the Military Regime followed the crisis of the import substitution model – it was the embodiment of the legacy of the Second Industrial Revolution. This process coincided with the end of the Cold War (1985-1989) and the establishment of unipolarity (1991-2017). In this scenario, it was unfeasible to carry out any kind of diplomatic bargain (Visentini 1995, 63) to internalise the Third Industrial Revolution (microchip and fibre optics). Additionally, internal management problems played a role, which will be discussed later.

It is important to highlight that the Third Industrial Revolution altered the balance of power established by its earlier phases. In 1820, when the Industrial Revolution was still in its infancy, the West possessed 14% of the world population and 25% of income. By 1950, after a century and a half of industrialism, the West increased its share of income to 56%, while maintaining its population at 17% (Radelet; Sachs 1997, 44). Indeed, it was the Industrial Revolution – accompanied by scientific and political revolution – that led to the West's supremacy over the East (Parker 2021, 273; McNeill 1972, 418). Unbridled privatisations in China, Russia, and India brought 3 billion human beings into the market, including 1.5 billion skilled professionals (Friedman 2014, 248). Due to digitalisation, which enabled flexible production, segment production and the denationalisation of the industrial base soon followed. As a result of this process, industries shifted from the West to the East (Visentini 2004, 24-27; Miller 2023, 87). And now, Asia threatens to dethrone the West in the primacy of the current Industrial Revolution.

With the return of great power competition (EUA 2017; 2018) and the possibility of a new world war, once again diplomatic bargaining comes to the forefront (Visentini 1995, 63). Despite occasional discontinuities, Brazil has sought to carry this policy, notably through its participation in the G20 and BRICS groupings. Once again, it becomes possible to place foreign policy at the forefront of development policies, leveraging the relative decline of the US to obtain, whether from the Americans or the Chinese, the inputs of the

Third Industrial Revolution, and what constitutes the decision-making axis of the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Artificial Intelligence (AI) and quantum computing.

If the Second Industrial Revolution altered the geographical space by moving people from the countryside to the city, the Fourth Industrial Revolution will be accompanied by an equally drastic shift: the impact of climate change destroying the public goods of civilization. In contrast, telecommunications technology will allow for the redistribution of populations into smaller cities or even uninhabited areas. As a result, mass society, whose crowd behaviour (rightly so) frightened Francisco Campos (Visentini 2023, 89), may give way to something even more complex: an atomised, hedonistic, narcissistic society, with individuals indifferent to everything beyond their immediate physical surroundings.

The Second Industrial Revolution also brought about intensive capital concentration and the advent of State Monopoly Capitalism. As for the Fourth Revolution, in its second phase, with AI and quantisation[3] (chips, computers, and quantum communication), it will instead empower large companies. Consequently, these may seek to abolish state mediation and take over the administration of public services – including security and defence – as ordinary parts of their assets. If with electricity came mass communication media (broadcasting), with the Fourth Revolution will come neural networks, which, when combined with satellites, will allow the formation of transcontinental societies, indifferent to borders or any territorial or jurisdictional reference.

In short, all the reasons that compelled Campos to pursue the restructuring of society and the state to address the deleterious effects of change are now present with equal, if not greater, intensity. But unlike what happened in the context of the Third Industrial Revolution, in which Brazil's part was precarious, the inability to insert itself into the Fourth Revolution entails the risk of a catastrophic collapse.

It is worth remembering that, at the time of the Third Industrial Revolution, privatisations worldwide aimed to generate liquidity to leverage the development of new technologies (Vizentini 1992, 21). However, in Brazil, they ended up serving only to sustain the parity of the Real with the dollar, seen as indispensable for the re-election of then-president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1998). Mindful of the risk of social fabric collapse resulting from

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3 Quantisation – "In quantum physics, the phenomenon where observable quantities take on discrete values; the transition from a system described classically to one described by quantum mechanics" (Houaiss; Villar 2001, 2345). This definition applies to chip architectures that do not adhere to a binary process, to computers with expanded processing capacity, as well as to photon-based communication.

privatisations (Visentini 2004, 30), which removed the indirect subsidy of the state sector from the economy, Bresser-Pereira conceived the "Non-State Public Sphere" (Bresser-Pereira; Grau 1999, 16-17). This was an incipient, still timid, version of projecting the creation of an "Extended State" (Buci-Glucksmann 1980, 358)[4]. Both Bresser-Pereira's (1999) "Public Sphere" and Buci-Glucksmann's "Extended State" (1980) address Francisco Campos's concern: to maintain a robust public sector capable of mass control – albeit, in this case, not only at the expense of the treasury. Similarly, hybrid forms of associated management, uniting different federated entities, or public-private partnerships, should take the place of state-owned enterprises in leveraging the national economy – the public consortium (Salles 2021, 87). Thus, these would serve to ensure the dynamism of a competitive private sector and the efficiency of an austere state.

This pathway remains open. However, to glimpse the solution, it's necessary first to discern the problem. Here, it's important to recognise the short-sightedness of the political forces, which maintain their ordinary disputes at the expense of trivialising the debate. Campos' legacy leaves conservatives with the lesson that they were the architects of the National State, both in the Vargas Era and during the Military Regime. Therefore, they cannot pretend to maintain their identity as such and at the same time dispense with the state. This was, is, and, in a foreseeable horizon of events, will continue to be the main mechanism of social control – even in its extended form, funded also by off-budget resources.

Thanks to conservative thought, the Estado Novo was able to pre-emptively take from the left the protection of workers; from liberals, the defence of democracy beyond formalism; and confront the reactionary tendencies of conservatives themselves, controlling change through anticipation. Thus, Francisco Campos leaves a challenge to liberals: to what extent is liberalism compatible with democracy? After all, the trivialisation of the use of totalitarian techniques by liberalism implies getting rid of democracy and thus of its own political ideal (Visentini 2023, 129). Lastly, to the left, he presents the challenge of overcoming the atomisation of identity politics and joining the ranks of the struggle for reindustrialisation and the debate around a national project.

This is precisely what Visentini's thesis does. It establishes recognition standards so that, in light of Brazil's experience facing the Second Industrial

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4 Extended State – This refers to an Integral State where the political society and civil society integrate and interpenetrate. In Gramsci's words, "hegemony armoured by coercion." Interestingly, the goal of the Marxist theorist was to replace the state stricto sensu with a regulated society, which has become the dream of modern liberals (Buci-Glucksmann 1980, 358).

Revolution, there are references for the sharpness of the challenges and opportunities posed by the Fourth Industrial Revolution. After all, mechanical solutions (legal and administrative instruments) may be available, but they will not be properly identified or used without the recognition of the problems they intend to solve.

Thus, the man and the book use education to create, based on the perception of the importance of International Relations, a strategic culture that allows us to become contemporaries of our time – as Francisco Campos was in his. The education path, as a way to disseminate Strategic Culture, has as its synthesis the understanding of foreign policy as the centre of national development. In descriptive terms, this translates into the resumption of diplomatic bargaining, exploiting the rivalries between great powers. In particular, leveraging the imperial confrontations that often take place during world wars – which would allow Brazil to acquire economic decision-making power –, holding and expanding its sovereignty, enhancing the country's international insertion and the well-being of its people.

Translated by Guilherme Thudium

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PARTNERS

NERINT

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) was the first Centre in Southern Brazil to focus its study and research exclusively on the field of International Relations. It was established in 1999 at the Latin American Advanced Studies Institute (ILEA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) in Porto Alegre, Brazil, and is currently part of the university's Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV). Its objective has always been the critical and innovative study of the international system's transformations after the end of the Cold War, from the perspective of the developing world. In parallel, NERINT has also sought to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options for the autonomous international insertion of the country.

The exploratory studies developed by NERINT on the new emerging countries since the threshold of the 21st century experienced remarkable expansion. Cooperation with state, business, academic and social institutions was intensified, as well as the direct contact with centres in Latin America, Africa and Asia, in addition to the existing ones in Europe and North America. An outcome of the Centre's activity was the creation of an undergraduate course in International Relations (2004) and a Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI, 2010). Two journals were also created: the bilingual and biannual Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations and the bimonthly journal Conjuntura Austral. In addition, since 2016, NERINT offers a bilingual Research Bulletin, published by graduate and undergraduate students and researchers of the Centre. NERINT is also partnered with UFRGS's Doctoral Program in Political Science (PPGPOL), established in 1973. Thus, besides the advanced research and intense editorial activities, NERINT is also the birthplace of innovative undergraduate and graduate programs.

PPGEEI

The Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) started in 2010, offering Master's and Doctorate degrees, both supported by qualified professors and researchers with international experience. It is the result of several developments on research and education at the Univer-

sidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Its roots can be traced to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT), established in 1999, established in 1999 and now affiliated with the Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV) at UFRGS.

The research tradition that gave rise to PPGEEI was based on a prospective analysis of the trends of the 1990s. The remarkable expansion of Brazilian diplomacy and economics from the beginning of the century confirmed the perspective adopted, which allowed the intense cooperation with the diplomatic and international economic organizations in Brazil. The Program is already a reference in the strategic analysis of the integration of emerging powers in international and South-South relations.

The Program's vision emphasizes strategic, theoretical and applied methods, always relying on rigorous scientific and academic principles to do so. For this reason, it has been approached by students from all over Brazil and several other countries, and it has established partnerships in all continents. Thus, PPGEEI is a program focused on understanding the rapid changes within the international system. Alongside NERINT, it publishes two journals: Conjuntura Austral (bimonthly) and Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations (biannual and bilingual). PPGEEI has three research lines:

International Political Economy

It focuses on the international insertion of the Brazilian economy and other major developing countries in South America, Asia and Africa; discusses the characteristics and effects of globalization; and develops comparative and sectoral studies concerned with the effects of the internationalization of companies and productive sectors. Special attention is paid to international financial crises and its effects on Brazil and other countries of the South.

International Politics

It emphasizes the analysis of the process of formation, implementation and evaluation of foreign policy. It seeks to confront patterns of international integration of strategic countries in South America, Africa and Asia, considering institutional patterns, trade policy, structures of intermediation of interest, governance, International Law and the role of actors of civil society in the South-South axis of contemporary International Relations.

International Security

It approaches the defense, strategy and security issues in the international system from a perspective that takes into account the most powerful states at the global level, but systematically introduces the question of the regional balances of power, the South-South axis, the existence of regional security complexes, military issues and the impact of information technology in the Digital Age.

CEGOV

The Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV) located at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) develops studies and research projects on governmental affairs from a comparative perspective. The Centre gathers researchers from several departments of the University, such as Political Science, International Relations, Law, Economics, Administration, Education, Urbanism and Computer Science. It encompasses scholars from the most traditional research groups at UFRGS, such as NERINT and CEBRAFRICA, specialised in a broad range of public policy areas.

CEGOV is chaired by a Director, and its policies and priorities are determined by an Advisory Board and a Scientific Board. The activities of the Centre are undertaken by working groups, which take the responsibility for specific projects. Currently, CEGOV has eight fully established and operating working groups. The Centre's researchers work on multidisciplinary projects covering the fields of international politics and governance, monitoring and evaluation of public policies, institutional development, Brazilian and South-American economy, comparative institutional design and decision-making processes, as well as public management, democratic controls and decentralisation of public services.

The Centre is a place for interaction among scholars from UFRGS and other academic institutions, highlighting its multidisciplinary and open nature, as well as its vocation to collaborative applied research. Being a reference for research on comparative governmental studies, CEGOV offers a wide range of extracurricular activities such as extension and specialisation courses, and advisory activities.

CEBRAFRICA

The Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) has its origins in in the Center of Studies Brazil-South Africa (CESUL), a program established in 2005 through an association between the Universidade Federal

do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG) of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its research activities are developed in cooperation with the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT).

In March 2012, CESUL was expanded into CEBRAFRICA. At the same time, the South African series, which published five books, was transformed into the African Series, with new titles. The Centre's main objectives remain the same as before: to conduct research, support the development of memoires, thesis and undergraduate works, congregate research groups on Africa, organize seminars, promote student and professor exchanges with other institutions, establish research networks and joint projects with African and Africanist institutions, publish national and translated works on the field, and expand the specialized library made available by FUNAG.

The numerous research themes seek to increase knowledge of the Af-rican continent and its relations with Brazil on the following topics: Interna-tional Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations, and Schools of Thought. CEBRAFRI-CA counts among its partners renowned institutions from Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Can-ada, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Senegal, Cape Verde, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Portugal, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, India, and China. Current researches focuses on "Brazilian, Chinese, and Indian Presence in Africa", "Africa in South-South Cooperation", "African Conflicts", "Integra-tion and Development in Africa", "African Relations with Great Powers", and "Inter-African Relations".

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5. Contributions must be original and unpublished, and can be submitted in Portuguese, English or Spanish;

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8. Contributions from undergraduate or graduate students are allowed, as long as in partnership with a Professor or PhD, which will appear as the main author of the paper;

9. Manuscripts from only one author must be written by a Professor or PhD;

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