


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About the Journal

AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations was the first Brazilian journal in the field of International Relations to be fully published in English (2012). It is an essentially academic vehicle, linked to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Its pluralist focus aims to contribute to the debate on the international political and economic order from the perspective of the developing world.

The journal publishes original articles in the area of Strategy Studies and International Relations, with special interest in issues related to developing countries and South-South Cooperation – its security problems; the political, economic and diplomatic developments of emerging countries; and their relations with the traditional powers. *AUSTRAL* is published semi-annually in English and Portuguese. The journal's target audience consists of researchers, experts, diplomats, military personnel and graduate students of International Relations. The content of the journal consists ensure the publication of authors from each of the great continents of the South: Asia, Latin America and Africa. Thus, the debate and diffusion of knowledge produced in these regions is stimulated. All contributions submitted to *AUSTRAL* are subject to rigorous scientific evaluation.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The 2022 year was marked by the protracted Russo-Ukrainian military conflict, which had enormous and multiple impacts worldwide. Few analysts expected a prolonged war, with such oscillating objectives, intensity, and unpredictable outcomes. The outbreak of a conventional confrontation between industrial countries in the heart of Europe represents a turning point for international security in the post-Cold War era. Interestingly, Europe appears to be the most affected and damaged region. The rupture of economic ties between the European Union, and especially Germany, with Moscow, had the economic and strategic effect desired by Washington. Now, Brussels complains about Biden's policy of economic incentives to US companies as "unfair competition".

In Brazil, we had a tumultuous post-election environment that resembled the US after the defeat of Donald Trump. And the return of Luís Inácio "Lula" da Silva to a third term has been signalled as the possible revival of the "active and affirmative" diplomacy of former chancellor Celso Amorim – now a presidential advisor for international policy, like Marco Aurélio Garcia in the past. However, what few analysts and activists took into account is the dimension of the general economic crisis and the dangerous cleavage and deepening of diplomatic-military tensions. Moreover, with the defeat of Trump, the Bolsonaro government modified its diplomatic priorities in April 2021, resuming cooperating with BRICS countries while relations with the newly elected Biden administration had become a problem. In this 2022 previous context, a pragmatic move of survival, most likely, which included a presidential visit to Moscow a few days before the invasion of Ukraine and the signing of several agreements of which mass media gave little information.

For obvious reasons, Washington, and the capitals of Western Europe, as well as some of the major Brazilian and international media, showed concern about the 2022 elections in Brazil. The defence of the electoral system and the preference for the oppositionist platform were assertive. Thus, the broad coalition needed to govern and such international support, which calls for Brazil to align within a framework of criticism against the BRICS and its members, makes the ability to reissue the Brazilian diplomacy of the first decade of the 21st century unlikely. 2023 will be a very difficult year, as divisions in the country and in the world are deepening.

This issue features articles by academics from Brazil, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Turkey, and Jordan. The themes are relevant and unpublished in Brazil. The first paper addresses the so-called “Putin Doctrine” in a very objective way, as a broad national security strategy, and the second addresses the economic and technological dimensions of the acquisition of Gripen fighter jets by the Brazilian Air Force. A second block of articles tackles Middle Eastern issues: the security dimension of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, US policy towards underestimated Jordan and an accurate analysis of post-revolutionary Iran’s foreign policy at the crossroads of supranationalism and of sovereignty. Finally, the last three articles address themes that refer to Asia: the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and the Caribbean, the role of Indian Ocean maritime diplomacy for Pakistan, and ASEAN legal mechanisms in tackling non-traditional security challenges in the region.

The perspective of authors from the Geopolitical South enriches the academic and strategic perception regarding these analysed issues, thus materialising the founding objectives of *AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations*. This is particularly important at a time when Cold War-era narratives are resurfacing, which identify current tensions as a confrontation between the politically correct “International Community” of Western Liberal Democracies and populist-authoritarian “deviant” nations. A reissue of the “Free World” against the “Totalitarianism” of the 1950s, which absolutely cannot explain the origin of the current fractures, caused by the shock waves of the 2008 financial crisis and Covid-19. In such a context, the role of the academy becomes ever more fundamental for the analysis of what Emmanuel Todd considers as the first movements of a Third World War.

Finally, as of this issue, NERINT Strategic Analysis will only be available in Portuguese at ufrgs.br/nerint.

This publication was possible thanks to the Research Office at UFRGS through the Support Program for Journal Editing (PAEP), as well as the entire team of editors and translators, in particular Assistant Editor Guilherme Thudium, Editorial Assistants Igor Estima Sardo and Felipe Samuel Werner, with the collaboration of Marina Felisberti, Gabriela Ruchel, Magnus Kenji Hiraiwa and João Pedro Lopes Gonçalves. As usual, we would like to thank Professor Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo for reviewing the translations, as well as our qualified reviewers. The teamwork of NERINT/UFRGS researchers has

allowed us to maintain the regularity and quality of AUSTRAL.

Disclaimer: *AUSTRAL prioritises British English as the standard variety of the English written language. Some English translations, however, may be written under the American English dialect.*

THE PUTIN DOCTRINE: WHAT IS IT? THE RUSSIAN STRATEGIC ISSUE AND THE ENLARGED NATIONAL SECURITY

José Alexandre Altahyde Hage¹

Introduction

There are several ways that help us to understand Russia's political option in Ukraine's War in the 2022 year². Considering this conflict, one can mention Russian expansionist drive, represented by its governing elite and Vladimir Putin's government. This drive, as well as the international system revisionism, is a product of the Soviet Union's demise in 1991, a tragic moment for the Kremlin. At that time, as Tim Marshall (2018) points out, the fear was the State's political dismantling due to regional clashes, first at Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Geopolitical, sociological, historical perceptions, linked to a social psychology view, may be tools for investigating the reasons why Russia intends to rebuild its imperial policy stance, as a second nature of its Slavic soul. It may be considered an ethos that in some historic moments emerges and has the impact of changing great powers actions that are competing against each other for areas that are relevant for Russian political interest. In the 19th century, the dispute was against the British Empire. Nowadays, the struggle is focused on the United States and its armed, and European body, the Atlantic Alliance (BRZEZINSKI, 1987).

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² The analysis of this war is circumstantial, it is not our goal to explain its developments. Even though there is no way to set apart the ongoing war from the Putin Doctrine, it was not conceived to justify or explain this conflict.

Contemporary social sciences usually do not present reductionist analysis of their object or search for broader investigations that adopt several conceptual tools. Methodological moderation is a convenient starting point for studying Russian present or past issues. Research that combines geopolitical, historical, and economic factors may be convenient.

Therefore, one issue that deserves to be researched in our point of view, can be found in the matter of the Putin Doctrine by Sergei Karaganov (2022), head of the Moscow Council of Foreign Policy and Defense, that is not well-known for several reasons, one of them the current European war. In this sense, the goal of this article is to analyse the Putin Doctrine, its birth and evolution in Russian politics, its link to the past and its agenda.

Although a political conservative, Karaganov also presents the relevance of making use of Social Sciences to understand Russia, including the rescue of Marxism-Leninism and its contributions for the country. Learning from these disciplines is essential for the development and understanding of national matters. The author stresses the inconvenience of the “national question”, of Western critical assumptions and the new Academic US left, whose focus is attached to Identity politics and the appraisal of anti-traditional social movements (KARAGANOV, 2022).

So, we can put forward some characteristics of the Putin Doctrine: 1- Admit Russian’s frustration for believing in the West’s good will in the worst political and economic moment faced by the country; 2- A concentrated effort to rebuild political power in the face of the United States and European Union opportunism, as exemplified by 2014 Euromaidan in Ukraine and Washington’s attempt to lure some former ex-Russian satellites for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), such as Georgia; 3- The Atlantic Alliance own enlargement, without security guarantees for a weak Russia due to its institutional crisis; and 4- To evaluate the best way on how to frame democracy, social order and university education (KARAGANOV, 2022).

For its turn, doctrine is a concept present in Diplomacy, Canonical and International Law, as a coherent set of basic ideas, supported by philosophy and “universal” values³. This concept gained ground in interstate politics, mostly during the Cold War with the launch of the 1947 Truman Doctrine, and other agendas in the 20th century such as the 1980s Carter Doctrine (BENETTI, 1986).

³ Regarding this issue, we focus on the analysis of Christian Caubet, that is closely linked to our arguments in this article, as it focuses on fundamental geopolitical matters, as the occupation of space and international rivers (CAUBET, 1991). For this author, the relation between power politics and the international law doctrine is not mutually exclusive in principle.

One can mention that this essay is only a contribution for an urgent issue in International Relations that is igniting debates in part of the academic community and the press in general, Russian expansionism and its conception of international security that, in our view, can be defined as enlarged national security. For Moscow, the dividing line between the international and the domestic whereas considering this issue is very thin⁴. This is why it is not a part of our objective to exhaust such a broad and complex topic, but to present some of its features.

The period analysed in this article begins in 1991, with the demise of the Soviet Union, till January 2022, that marks the beginning of military exercises in some parts of Ukraine, namely the Donbass region, promoted by Putin's government. Our theoretical and methodological framework is based on classical and contemporary geopolitical literature, Halford Mackinder and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and International Relations realist thinkers such as Henry Kissinger and John Mearsheimer. Nevertheless, that does not mean that we will not be able to reference some liberal authors, such as Francis Fukuyama and Joseph Stiglitz.

Apart from this Introduction, our essay is divided as such: a first part in which we propose a brief review of the concept of doctrine, as used by interstate politics and the State's national power principle. Following, we present an analysis of the Putin Doctrine, seen as both a result and as a drive for Moscow's revisionism in the face of the current geopolitical balance. In the third part, we examine some passages of the 1990s and of this emerging system, as an era of globalization, liberalization and "shock therapy" that disturbed the Russian **quantum**. Last, but not least, in our Final Thoughts some reflections will be brought.

Doctrine Characteristics

In the frame of this article, it is convenient to explain the concept of Doctrine and, later, of Power Doctrine. This will help us to better understand what is represented by the Putin Doctrine and its call to dispute the current State system at play, that is under the challenge of other powers beyond Russia, such as China, Iran and possibly India.

⁴ We consider that the "enlarged national security" concept is convenient due to Russia's historic stance on this issue. For Moscow politics, security matters do not have a clear-cut frontier. For Russia, the perception of frontier is not exclusively linked to the physical aspect or demarcation of territory, but it also implies cultural issues. The notion of "near abroad", frontier States with Russian-Slavic tradition is an example of this view.

In a more specific definition, added to the above statement, Doctrine is a concept that can be seen as a moral and programmatic framework of certain social and political institutions that keep the compromise of change or positioning. In the catholic movement, one can define the Papal Bull *Rerum Novarum* proclaimed by Leo XIII as a Doctrine. In this document, the Pope criticized the effects of the urban and industrial capitalism in the first decade of the 20th century: poverty increase, the loss of moral values and financial greed. The cure for these maladies was in a culture of Christian charity, tradition, and solidarity. This was the Church's social Doctrine (BENETTI, 1986).

Going even further, Doctrine was also a concept linked to the documented condemnation of the abusive relationship of great powers with poor countries in the Southern hemisphere. As an example, the 1902 Drago Doctrine criticized the use of US military in Venezuela and other nations to collect their debts. The statement by Argentinian diplomat Luís Maria Drago tried to be recognized as a rule by International Law, against the violation of sovereignty in exchange for external and other debts (CORREA, 1967).

For those well versed in these matters, although it may sound as common sense, one should not forget the 1947 Truman Doctrine, which role was to contain Soviet expansion in Western Europe and to offer military cooperation to concerned third nations. This concept was a call to end US policy behaviors seen as inconvenient such as the withdrawal from the European war stage after the conflict (as in the 1919 Versailles Treaty) or the adoption of isolationism since US power was the holder of the world's balance.

The 1980s Carter Doctrine could also be mentioned as it proclaimed US right to military intervene to uphold the freedom of sea routes, mostly in the Middle East and its surroundings since they affected its energy security: the control of international waters for the navigation of oil-tankers (MELLO, 1997). Also, this document was used to justify US position against the Soviet Union in its war with Afghanistan and to stop the export of Iran's fundamentalist revolution both in 1979.

In our point of view, not all interstate political reactive policies should be seen as Doctrine, as considered in its full meaning. Nevertheless, we cannot argue against the fact the Truman's mission was doctrinaire if one considers the well-known document written by George Kennan, the Long Telegram (and the article *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*) in which the American diplomat proposed an effective way of facing Soviet Union power. Mostly, a Soviet power that should be accounted for and contained for the defense of the Western European territory (KENNAN, 1947).

Kennan's report gained ground in US strategic community as it

proclaimed that the tools for dealing with the Soviet Union could not be conventional, as if the country was like others. An understanding of the Russian soul was needed, such as its undying compromise to the goals that should be reached. As an example of this attitude, the Soviet Union actions in Greece could be mentioned, despite the higher costs it was generating for Moscow in its quest to be at the core of Europe's politics. So, the Truman Doctrine was created.

Similarly, Carter's stance can be seen as a Doctrine as the government envisioned US power projection overseas, in Nicholas Spykman geopolitical theory of Rimland, in which Brzezinski interpretations were based. Brzezinski agenda was to promote US penetration in Eurasia's periphery, to counterbalance the intended Soviet Union's expansions into the Indian Ocean, disturbing US influence. This view of the "Struggle for Eurasia" was an updated version of the old power clash amongst land and sea powers (BRZEZINSKI, 1987).

In line with our analysis, we state that a Doctrine needs to be conceived in a document (or moment) that considers its psyche. Carlos de Meira Mattos believes that the Power Doctrine cannot be created without considering the reality of governing elites as well as the investigative and selective work to define the real goals that one given State should follow, to reach the condition of a great power in a context of power politics. We are making use of the concept of Power Doctrine because we believe it will be a useful contextualization for the analysis of the Putin Doctrine, as both are linked to similar issues, being one of them the idea of the territorial State.

Mattos, sharing Arnold Toynbee analysis that was very popular in Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s, argues that the Power Doctrine needs to offer *National or Critical Goals*. In the Brazilian case, the rise to the status of great power was expected in the long run, because of urgent State reforms such national integration. Even though the document mentions Brazil, its analysis can be applied to other States and parts of the world, as many players intended to build their power in face of global conflicts (MATTOS, 1970).

Therefore, the Brazilian military, as inspired by the British intellectual, sees that some goals in the Power Doctrine are of geopolitical nature. Some issues that are common for great powers could be found in the following lines, even somewhat dated, and limited, as some are present in Russia and its efforts to regain its decision-making role:

- 1- Its sovereignty must be projected over a significant territory; 2- nowadays, a great power can be defined as the one that projects its management influence in world dimensions; 3- A modern power should be characterized

by its capacity to manage a larger area than its own territory. This directive power does not need to be political and military. It could be, mostly, economical, or ideological (MATTOS, 1970: 44).

So, we can put forward, as an operational concept, that the Putin Doctrine bears a set of specific contents that compose a program destined to contribute for the elevation of Russian power, in the areas that seem most urgent in its geopolitical condition and enlarged international and national security. We consider that an analysis of such a document is relevant and would help us to understand two connected actions, free of any moral value that one may have towards the Putin government.

First, the existence of the Putin Doctrine is linked to the coming of age of Kremlin's criticism of Russia's secondary (or subordinate) condition during the 1990s. In particular, the relative dismantling of State power inherited from the Soviet Union, such as its international clout, including the chance of a larger territorial crumbling due to the 1994 Chechen War. For its turn, the liberal government of Boris Yeltsin that came into power into 1991 till 1999 brings back bad memories for the ones who imagined a better place for "Mother Russia" in a challenging world, as he was the architect of many of these deconstructing measures.

Second, the document is useful as Russia is taking part into a war which is not limited to the clash with Ukraine but extends to the combination of US and NATO power that is trying to strategically encircle Russia. Indeed, a measure linked to a protracted Washington goal to project its hegemony in the post-Soviet Caucasus and to contain the rise of the other competing powers. Reagan's government in the 1980s was based on Brzezinski analysis of choosing strategic linchpins to counter the Soviet Union such as Western Germany and Poland and instigate a psychological war with the support of Pope John Paul II to undermine communist ideology. Brzezinski was a thinker that was very useful in the Cold War and, in the 1990s, had suggested ways to stop Russian power.

This task still goes on in *El Gran Tablero Mundial*, a book in which the former National Security Advisor of Jimmy Carter's government suggests that the US should be at Eurasia's Heartland (BRZEZINSKI, 1997). It is not by chance that we mention Brzezinski's name in our article, as he is extremely relevant in the current Russian geopolitical debate and is mentioned in Putin Doctrine as an engaged intellectual that had represented Western's efforts against Moscow (KARAGANOV, 2022).

The Putin Doctrine Framework

Sergei Karaganov believes that his manifest has two features: first, as mentioned, it is a reaction to Russia's fate in the 1990s, a decade of limited strategic and economic capacities. It can be called reactive to the balance of the recent past, seen as detrimental, since Russia had not opposed the Atlantic Alliance enlargement and NATO's interference in areas that were not under its umbrella, as in Libya and Syria cases in 2011. In Libya, Russia was not able to act, but in its Middle Eastern ally Moscow was able to relatively counter US military presence.

The negative condition in which Russia was living was not only limited to structural issues, economics, and geopolitics. Some matters, such as university education in the country had their standards lowered. The abandonment of relevant issues for Russia and the adoption of Western "acritical" views of the free market, deregulation, and some academic trends that would prove harmful to the national spirit would affect foreign policy and security. For some, these views were helping to build an opinion that it would be better for Russia to accept its historical defeat and fatalism.

Second, the Putin Doctrine can also be defined as forthcoming, as it prescribes the methods to reduce Russia's vulnerabilities, inherited from the Draconian treaties, that could reestablish the country as a viable power and help build some qualified regional relations in areas of Moscow's significant interest and historical projection, namely the Central Asia and the Caucasus. These were regions in which the attempt to create sovereign States, with all the weight that this concept brings, was a broken failed promise as there were no communities of stable and economically modern people (KARAGANOV, 2022).

There were no cultural and historical tradition amongst the population that could cement the centralization of the State. How is it possible to promote national values and democracy in a region that first was under the czarist rule and later under Soviet control till its end in 1991? There was only an attachment to natural resources, hydrocarbons, which promoted Western interest in the global energy economy (SÉBILLE-LOPEZ, 2007).

During the period in which the United States and the European Union searched to promote the existence of these sovereign States, the reality found was the one of several political units and collectivities that had not planned to live as a State, as it is conceived in the West: a minimally coherent entity, with a national cultural, territorial and political identity. In this sense, this is like a traditional European reality, of national values, that is slowly disappearing (FERNANDES, 2017).

Agreeing with Fernandes, the Putin Doctrine thinker see two divergent political realities: on one side the European Union argues in favor of a post-national reality, with the decentralization of political power, in favor of Brussels and international institutions such as NATO that, truly, is led by Washington; on the other side, Russia values national, popular, and religious unity. Specifically, a sovereignty that is seen as sacred for its country and the near abroad, that includes Ukraine, which sovereignty is linked to Russia's (PUTIN 2021).

Regarding democracy, national will and political organization, Karaganov evaluates that this form of government should project Russia social values, and not only reflect a culturally different stance. In other words, one should not expect that the concept of democracy is limited to the Western liberal view.

But, this time, what the Putin government must do is establish a project of regional cooperation and not hierarchical reproduction of political units, in the same way that happened with czarist Russia or the Soviet Union itself – basically, multinational experiences more of domination and less of complementarity and cooperation in the broadest sense of the term (KARAGANOV, 2022). The Putin government took into account the economic slowdown the West is going through, its acknowledged decline and, paradoxically, the hostility that international security institutions have started to show not only against Russia, but also against other countries, including China. It was as if the frustration of losing power was compensated with more aggressiveness:

There is no need to interfere or to try to influence the internal dynamics of the West, whose elites are desperate enough to start a new cold war against Russia. What we should do instead is use various foreign policy instruments – including military ones – to establish certain red lines. Meanwhile, as the Western system continues to steer toward moral, political, and economic degradation, non-Western powers (with Russia as mayor players) will inevitably see their geo-economic and geo-ideological position strengthen (KARAGANOV, 2022: 11).

Nowadays, Russia would be in a peculiar and favorable situation. As a great power, domestically satisfied, the country has access to all its needs regarding economy and raw materials. Considering diplomatic relations, the author believes that the rapprochement with China is useful. Nonetheless, Beijing has expansionist plans, in areas that interest Russia. Even though, this relevant neighbor is the best partner to establish a block to counter the West. One cannot disagree that the dynamic core of the international economy is in

Asia.

There is no doubt that if there is Russian resentment against the West, it is found in the expansion of NATO to the East, without reflecting on whether there was such a need, and whether it was worth ignoring a country that, despite everything, kept geopolitical relevance and importance. The integration of Poland into that organization, in 1999, already pronounced the maxim that the future would hold conflicting situations, of high intensity, as Russia sought to gain self-respect.

Warsaw's entry into the Atlantic Alliance gave clear signs that Moscow would not be able to oppose it; the country did not have enough power resources to assert its position against the West, in the same way that the Soviet Union would in preserving its area of interest. The author writes that after Poland, all that remained was to wait for the expansion of the Atlantic Alliance with the participation of the Baltic countries, which were not embarrassed to exchange their sovereignties for the "supposed Western protection". Now, if Western strategic expansion wants to rely on Ukraine, it must stop, or there can be no mutual respect and peaceful coexistence in Europe (KARAGANOV, 2022).

In an analysis, which may be critical of the Putin Doctrine, there is no doubt that there were efforts to make the US the holder of the balance in the international system, in which Russia would be subordinated with the end of the Cold War; not just her, but the entire European continent, deprived of the Warsaw Pact. However, for Angela Stent, the observation made is that Putin overplayed his hand to defend his objectives, even implying that he wants to recreate the Soviet Union.

The evolution of this behavior would come to the point of "underestimating" US power, considered weak to face major challenges. Likewise, this would extend to Germany, whose concern is "putting the house in order" and the European Union in general. In this respect, the invasion of Ukraine would only be a first step towards giving Russia what it thinks is politically just, even if this claim throws the world into chaos (STENT, 2022).

In the Putin Doctrine, according to Karaganov, there would be no Russian commitment to violence. However, war would not be ruled out if the US and the European Union put Russian security at risk, that is, if they call on Ukraine to become a "testing ground" for hypothetical NATO geopolitical exercises to intimidate Russia through the stationing of long-range tactical weapons, in the same way as in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Furthermore, the use of Kiev to wage irregular, propaganda, ideological warfare through Western-funded organizations against the Russian worldview must also be resisted. In defense of the spiritual and historical unity between Ukraine and Russia (daughters of the Principality of Kiev), Putin explains his criticism in line with Karaganov's article, since the work to disrupt the

Ukrainian national culture is essential for anti-Russia policies:

Along with that we are witnessing not just complete dependence but direct external control, including the supervision of the Ukrainian authorities, security services and armed forces by foreign advisers, military “development” of the territory of Ukraine and deployment of NATO infrastructure. It is no coincidence that the aforementioned flagrant law on “indigenous peoples” was adopted under the cover of large-scale NATO exercises in Ukraine (PUTIN 2021: 13).

Within this vision, if there is an area that is really affected, for some purposes, it is Western Europe. The Old World, ancient arena of civilization and vigor, became a military appendage of the United States, without its own will, to design its destiny and interests to pursue. Collective security, coordinated in Washington, undermined continental autonomy, and did not improve it. The withdrawal of command over strategic matters, from London, Berlin, or Paris, did not help to improve European security, it only demonstrated the apathy of those centers, as follows:

As for NATO, it is very clear what we should do. We need to undermine the bloc’s moral and political legitimacy and refuse any institutional partnership, since its counterproductivity is obvious. Only the military should continue to communicate, but as an auxiliary channel that would supplement dialogue with the DOD and defense ministries of leading European Nations. After all, it’s not Brussels that makes strategically important decisions” (KARAGANOV, 2022: 9).

To think that the existence of NATO would be a sign of guarantee for Europe would be misleading. Those powers that now live under Washington’s guidance would have to know that Russia’s role is not to create animosity, but to be able to cooperate with the continent. To help with issues that truly contribute to obtaining advantages for all sides, and not to feed principles, whose aim is the immobilization of power and political hierarchy, according to what is found under cosmopolitan, technocratic, and anti-popular elite governments (KARAGANOV, 2022).

Even if Russia is close to territorial satisfaction, or essential raw materials for its economy, there are a good number of issues to be overcome by a national program consistent with what is thought to be the spirit and needs of the country. University reform, in social sciences, international relations and economics, has already been mentioned. But Russia still suffers from having lost technological dynamism and more advanced science, compared to the West.

Another worrying item for the Kremlin is the demographic weight loss that has occurred since the end of the Soviet Union. Regarding this, there is the view that population is power; that is to say, high demography is important to occupy empty spaces in a wide territory. With a population of around 140 million inhabitants, Russia would not be able to spread across Siberia and, from there, avoid demographic imbalance, a matter of national security. Indeed, there are estimates that even point to a loss of population mass below 140 million, if the country does not reverse the low birth rate and prevent deaths through new health policies (KAPLAN, 2013).

A less known fact is that Russia's standard of living, after the end of the Soviet Union until the 2000s, was closer to the group of countries of the former Third World, far from the European industrialized powers. In fact, the life expectancy of the population in general dropped to unknown levels for that type of society, with modern and cultured traits. The resurgence of malnutrition and the increase in alcoholism can be cited as an explanation for the country's demographic issue (GOWAN, 2003). Perhaps Russia was the only case of a great power that sees its quality-of-life plummet without suffering military defeat in the strict sense.

With the elements exposed above, we can say that the Putin Doctrine is a reflection on events and political distress that Russia went through shortly after its resurgence as a territorial State in 1991. The 1990s are considered the lowest moments of self-esteem in that country in recent times. We will try to demonstrate this reasoning in the next part of this essay.

The Roaring 1990s

First, we would like to inform you that we would like to use a stylistic-methodological resource found in famous human sciences books: increasing or decreasing certain periods of analysis according to the circumstances. Our 1990s, for long term purposes, does not end in 1999 or 2000. It ends in 2010 for two reasons: 1 – It defines the power ceiling of the US and Western Europe because of the financial issue, brought about by the breakdown of 2008 and the rise of China; 2 – by Vladimir Putin's quest to restructure Russia's power.

The Russian restructuring, even if it took time, because of the country's economic limits, had managed to maintain the power of President Bashar Al Assad, of Syria (Russian ally), in the face of American harassment from 2011 onwards, a variant of the Arab Spring, whose objective was to remove rulers considered anti-democratic and anti-Western. Russia was not able to take the same action in 2003, in the deposition of the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein, which until the 1980s received Soviet support.

The title of this part of the essay, reproduces how the economist Joseph Stiglitz named his book about the success that was the economy of the United States in the 1990s which promoted a prolonged period of economic growth, and full employment, through free trade, financial deregulation, services, and greater freedom for the banking system (STIGLITZ, 2003).

The author does not fail to show some perplexity about certain policies signed by the Bill Clinton administration (from 1993 to 2000) that contributed, albeit involuntarily, to the financial crisis of 2008, which dragged almost the entire international economic system into instability. A problem that affected the United States itself in its scale of power. The preservation of the same economic policy of the Reagan government in the Federal Reserve, already with Alan Greenspan (1987), can serve as an example of the “contradictions” of that democratic government.

Also in military matters, there was the impression that the United States, in the 1990s, lived in “clear skies”, since its budget for the area was greater than that of all the great powers combined. There was no parallel in the history of the international system for such a phenomenon – not even the British Empire enjoyed such distance in its time of hegemony. In the view of Henry Kissinger, US dominance was atypical in all terms (KISSINGER, 1994).

It is not feasible to observe a great power keeping so much advantage over its competitors due to hegemony or the assembly of a competing block. In the current century, the pro-United States war condition had already begun to change due to the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009, diluting itself a little. However, we can see that the budgets still indicated a good lead for Washington. Let’s look at the data for 2010 and 2011, in billions of dollars:

Country	2010	2011
United States	698,3	689,6
China	121,1	129,3
Russia	58,6	64,1
France	59,1	58,2
United Kingdom	58,1	57,9

(Source: SILVA FIHO; MORAES, 2013)

The economic and military situation of the United States was unique in the international system, and this allowed them to formulate plans for expansion in other areas of the globe, as well as preserving those that were created during the Cold War. Because of the events of September 11, 2001, the Carter Doctrine, even without being mentioned, was reinforced with the military takeover of Iraq and the engagement of US naval forces in the

waters of the United Arab Emirates. There was an effort to enforce the “Bush Doctrine” that, in part, survived in the government of Barak Obama, rethought so that the United States closely followed Russia and China in Eurasia.

All this allowed Washington to choose Central Asia and the Caucasus as new testing grounds of American power, as it sought to bring former protectorates of the Soviet Union under its influence. Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan could be new “strategic linchpins” that the US would use to build a safety net against a renewed Russia. Otherwise, they encouraged the war of secession that Chechnya had waged against the Russian central power in 1994.

On the European side, the operation was also carried out, even starting with the debacle of the Soviet Union in 1991. Therefore, a task that could not be delayed was to know what to do with NATO, since its counterpart, the Pact of Warsaw, had disappeared. The initial debate on the Atlantic Alliance considered that it should not end, but rather become a guarantee of European balance, since German unification, hailed as political and moral progress, aroused fear in its former enemies, such as Great Britain. (GOWAN, 2003). Berlin’s admission to the Organization would be instrumental in easing some parts of the continent. Nevertheless, the core of the issue had changed as the organization was spreading eastwards, in countries that were once part of the Soviet regional security bloc: Poland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania and Hungary migrated to NATO under the feeling that they could make a stand against Russia and, from that, receive Western economic help.

After the first expansion stage, the Atlantic Alliance reached the Baltic countries, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia with the aim of setting up a type of anti-Russian “cordon sanitaire”. And the plan would be even more complete if it included Ukraine, whose location and importance, as a territorial entity, would give the West greater projection. The Ukrainian State is the best served in natural resources and with the best strategic position, including its exit to the Black Sea. But Ukraine was not yet on the agenda.

The situation was tense even if the US did not have a large projection of power and if Russia could offer a minimum of resistance. In 1999, even though Moscow had shown opposition to NATO in the former Yugoslav war, in support of Serbia, it could not show more than protests and discontent. Even so, within the scope of the debates, a Russian deputy appeared, an ultranationalist, who made a mark by invoking a new role for Russia in the conformation of a new Europe, which no longer ignored the weight of Moscow in the international order.

Vladimir Jirinovski presented a very sensitive point of view for that situation. In an interview provided in 1994 he preaches that the Eastern part of Europe must be geographically reshaped between the two major

continental powers: unified Germany and Russia, which should be militarily rebuilt. Some countries, for that matter, would have to be incorporated into these two political units that, effectively, matter in the balance of continental power.

In the spatial conception of the Russian member of parliament, it is convenient to let the nature of politics take its course: the three Baltic countries and Ukraine must be reincorporated into Russia, in the same way they were in the imperial and Soviet period. Poland is expected to concede territory to “Greater Germany” in the center of Europe; it should also integrate with Berlin, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and perhaps Kaliningrad. The result of this expansionist manifestation would be cooperative activity between Germany and Russia, rather than a ludic and falsely virtuous vision of European integration (FSP, 1994).

Leonel Mello understands that Jirinovski’s vision is a small manifestation of Russian geopolitical culture, of Mackinder, in search of pre-eminence and solidification of power in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. The new arrangement sought by the Kremlin resembles a map prior to the First World War, in which European policy was clearer: a military power in the center, Germany, and another in the East, Russia:

Broadly speaking, the current context presents the following configuration: a reunified Germany emerging as a great power in the center of Europe; a Russia amputated in its peripheral territories but retaining control of most of the Eurasian Heartland; a mosaic of buffer States from the Baltic Sea to the Black and Adriatic Seas oscillating pendularly between the two powers (MELLO, 1994: 64).

When former President George H. Bush announced the New World Order in 1990, he followed the path opened by theorists who had gained publicity for having tried to predict a better, more democratic, and fair international system, compared to the one that ended with the Cold War. Francis Fukuyama was one of these minor prophets. His text, *The End of History?* states that there would be no more high-intensity conflicts, the fall of the Berlin Wall ended the ideological conflicts.

Taking advantage of the philosophy of the German George F. Hegel Fukuyama believes that if there are wars, they will be fought for minor reasons, they will not carry the germ of contesting the international values that would subdue democracy and liberalism. Democracy and liberalism would be the Cold War winners, thus becoming references for the New Order (FUKUYAMA, 1989). The problem is that the Stanford professor limited himself to citing communism as a practical ideology in international relations,

other ideologies were not on his radar, not least because they did not exist or were not mature enough to become contestation tools (FERNANDES, 2017).

Even Kissinger was touched by the good news for America. Of course, more mischievous, and knowledgeable about world affairs, in his deepest state, the former adviser to the Nixon government knew that that international order would be permeated with contradictions, which would lead to challenges from all sides. The idea that the United States would be the leader of the interstate world based on moral and idealistic examples, typical of a frugal and self-contained power, would not take shape for a long time. Washington's message, with this content, would be seen as cynical by enemies and counterproductive by allies (KISSINGER, 1994).

However, the student of international politics had a feeling that the Russian bear, injured by the bites of the American whale, would recover enough to be a nuisance to the American ideals of balance of power, in which only the United States would profit without having to do much work. The world was supposed to be multipolar, despite the pain this could cause. In terms of Russia nowadays, this is what the Putin government seeks to demonstrate by claiming that the rise of the Global South, also incorporated by the BRICS, is the opposite of the traditional Western weight that even seeks to secure itself through neocolonial measures (PUTIN in RT, 10.13.2022).

It is evident that a great power, practically uncontested militarily, that expresses moral values of great scope, for having defeated the grouping of totalitarianisms, will not admit losses without at least fighting to conserve some specific advantage, however: "The relative military power of the United States will gradually go into decay. The absence of a well-defined adversary will produce internal pressure for resources to be directed to other priorities, a process that has already begun" (KISSINGER, 1994: 16).

Perhaps the principle that the world was fomenting a second (or third) Cold War would be a sample of the anguish that the United States, in the first place, would demonstrate by seeing the rapid changes that occur in the international system, allowing greater space to players who, not so long ago, were just supporting actors in the great game of international politics. It may be that all this appears as a symptom of the changes that Kissinger predicted.

Final Thoughts

In 2014, during the hot events at Maidan Square, called Euromaidan, in the Ukrainian capital, there was an alert that caught the attention of Putin government in Russia. The reason for this was not unimportant, but of a geopolitical nature, especially for a power that for centuries has seen its

foreign policy from the perspective of Eastern Europe, not separating what is its national interest from other countries in the region (MARSHALL, 2018).

Soon after the defection of the Ukrainian government allied to Moscow of Viktor Ianukovytych due to the protests of the Euromaidan, Russia, quickly entered the Crimea, until then an Ukrainian territory. In Putin's political calculations, the replacement of a former representative to install a representative politically, closer to the European Union, should not go unnoticed.

After all, Crimea was not just any region in the Russian mind. In addition to the cultural and historical imagery of being part of "Mother Russia", there is the strategic port city of Sevastopol, where the Russian navy stations a substantial part of its fleet for its access to the Mediterranean Sea. The warning appeared to Russian policy makers due to the fact that opening Ukraine to suggestions from the European Union could possibly promote the country's entry into NATO and, consequently, make Russia lose the right to use Sevastopol. In 1991, with the independence of Ukraine, Moscow began to use that port through a bilateral treaty.

One of the effects of Western, pro-NATO operations could be the launching of a new "naval doctrine" in which the Putin government calls for the weight of the Russian navy to be realized, initially, in the areas of the Baltic and Black Seas and parts of the Pacific. In fact, the rise of the Russian fleet would be an essential component to integrate the configuration of a larger doctrine and indicate changes that may occur in the present global geopolitics (PUTIN in RT: 05.08.2022).

In a practically zero-sum political climate, Kiev's possible relationship with the Atlantic Alliance could mean a loss of prestige for the Kremlin, which would raise doubts as to whether Russia would even have the strength to bankroll its projection of force as a relevant power. We know that in "great politics" discredit usually exacts a high price from the inattentive ruler.

Perhaps countries not used to, or not participating in, the heightened tensions of international politics, can afford the luxury of indifference. But this logic cannot be valid for Russia, China, the USs, Israel (plus a few) because they cannot show any signs of vacillation or stalemate, without this being interpreted as weakness by their opponent. Namely, an opponent who can later get excited, and grow politically, on the indecisions of his opponents.

There are practically no disputes about the maxim that the international system is changing. Whether the change will be for a better, fairer, or democratic one is not on the agenda. It would not be expected, within the systematic use of power, for the US to descend in the management of global affairs without, at least, showing some resistance or leaving obstacles in the way of those who intend to rise to the top. Therefore, trying to leave

some mines in the Russian path, in its traditional area of operation, should not show signs of novelty.

Fostering policies to attract former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO; infiltrations of all sorts in the Caucasus, and even in Russia itself (Chechnya), were tools for the diversification and disruption of Russian power as far as possible. A power that enjoys having the largest economy in the world, and having the largest military budget, does not let itself fall without at least disturbing the lives of those who want to share the world command.

It is certain that, even in a country resistant to losing space, with an open deadline, considering that there is democracy and freedom of opinion, voices can arise asking for moderation in the descent or care in confronting those who compete for hegemony. John Mearsheimer stresses his opinion on the erratic trajectory of the US vis-à-vis Russia (MEARSHEIMER, 2015.02.08). The more cautious professor at the University of Chicago suggests that Western powers, especially the United States, admit that certain issues are beyond Washington's will. The realistic nature of international politics makes it clear that Ukraine is an area of Russian geopolitical interest. Ignoring this premise would be cheap provocation, without achieving anything useful.

The well-known proverb "do not do to others what you would not want them to do to you" seems to be accepted by Mearsheimer when he says that the US would also show opposition if Russia or China tried to establish a foothold in Canada or Mexico. What was the Monroe Doctrine made for anyway? In this regard, it seems that his moderation is not necessarily opposed to the designs of the Putin Doctrine and the attempt to divide world politics from agencies, one of which is dedicated to Russia. After all, it would be the most convenient.

In this arrangement, Ukraine's role should be to be a buffer state, a transition area between Western Europe and Russia, militarized only for its own defense, but without formal commitment to any power bloc, in the same way that there was with Finland or Austria after 1945. Even so, nothing would prevent Ukraine from being integrated into the European Union economy.

The Putin Doctrine was not written for the clash between Russia and Ukraine or any other country. The document stresses that Moscow would not accept seeing its immediate neighbor become a testing ground for Western forces, without at least reacting. Whether the reaction employs military forces (now employed) will depend on the will of whoever is on Kiev's side (KARAGANOV, 2022). In 2022, the military clash in Eastern Europe is a proxy war.

Whatever happens in Ukraine, whether in 2014 or 2022, reminds us of Raymond Aron, when he understands that the loss of the Suez Canal, former Franco-British heritage in the capital of Egypt, to the nationalism

of Colonel Nasser, shook the world. What happened in 1956 may have been contrary to international law, but a gain for the balance of power, as it preserved the system and avoided a war that could involve nuclear powers. (ARON, 1986). By different means, it seems that Aron, Mearsheimer and Karaganov converge in their appraisal for prudence.

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ABSTRACT

The goal of this essay is to analyse the paper called the *Putin Doctrine*, published by Sergei Karaganov, in January 2022, its relation to Russian expansionism found in the annexation of the Ukrainian region of Crimea, in 2014, and its criticism on the emerging international system with the end of Cold War. This is a period considered quite harmful for the Russians and this country's power restoration and its rise as a great power. The research covers the period from 1991, the end of the Soviet Union, till January 2022, the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian hostilities over Donbass. The main argument and theoretical-methodological framework of this paper is based on geopolitics literature and on thinkers that belong to the Realist school of International Relations.

KEYWORDS

Russian Power; Putin's Government; European Geopolitics; Political Doctrine.

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POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PURCHASE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROCESS FOR GRIPEN FIGHTERS

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Introduction

This article aims to present a descriptive study from a qualitative perspective through a bibliographical analysis, according to Coutinho (2014), which aims to discuss the political process of purchase and Technology Transfer (TT) of GRIPEN NG fighters. For this, we resort to the study of the decision-making process involving interrelationships between the main actors, consensus, interests and values. The goal is to present some reflections about the results of the political game that had taken place during the FHC, Lula and Dilma governments, to verify their relationship with the neoliberal political-social project and its actors in the international sphere. As a guide for this study, questions are presented, which must be answered throughout the text referring to political actors: Who were these actors? How did political actors act? What are the reasons for their actions?

In Political Analysis (PA), beliefs, values, ideas and political objectives are variables that must be taken into account, in order to explain, among other aspects, the reasons why they undergo changes over time (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Thus, it is considered that belief systems determine the direction of public policies (PP). Political groups, here called *advocacy coalitions*, eventually use political strategies, technical and scientific information to change the views of other political groups (coalitions), according to a certain system of beliefs, interests, and values.

This work rescues aspects pointed out by Ham and Hill (1993), regarding the way of carrying out the Political Analysis, as it discusses how

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the process of purchasing GRIPEN NG fighters emerged historically, how this PP was implemented and what results or consequences were reached because of this process. As for the concept of ideology used in this research, the view of István Mészáros is considered, a theme extensively analyzed in his work “The power of ideology”, being understood by him as a form of social consciousness specific to a social class or political group (Mészáros 2012).

In Brazil since the beginning of the 21st century, S,T&I (Science, Technology and Innovation) policies, despite showing a certain appreciation of public policies (PP), maintain a preponderance guided by the emphasis on market mechanisms (Viotti 2008). According to Dagnino (2010), the BDI, due to its particularities, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has a low adherence to the logic of innovation centered on the private company, despite defending it in its political-ideological discourse.

For Dardot and Laval (2016), neoliberalism cannot be explained only as a type of economic policy, but also as a normative system, which has expanded its influence in a systemic way, in all social relationships and spheres of life. This system governs behavior, and relationships with others and with oneself, which orders all relationships (including between institutional actors) to follow the market model. For more than 30 years, this rule of life has also governed public policies.

The criticisms of most heterodox economists regarding the efficiency of neoliberal policies for the social and economic development of a country are widely known. In particular in Brazil, an ideological legacy of military governments, especially since the 1964 military coup, materializes in pressures characterized by this belief system mixed with authoritarianism. In this way, it is observed in the political-ideological discourse of increment of the national defense industry, through the purchase of imported weapons, the fragile democratic character that this would represent. However, it is necessary to understand the complexity of the political game involved in public policies, because according to Serafim and Dias (2012) the State is not completely dependent on society, but there is also no complete autonomy, which is considered normal in modern democracies. So, the question would be: what kind of democratic participation would we be talking about? Certainly, it does not refer to a conception of direct democracy, but a type of democracy that would depend on a kind of “proxy” given to a group that defends an ideology to achieve social and economic development, which would be in favor of a majority. It would remain for society to verify the effectiveness of this policy in the long run.

According to Dagnino (2010) the Defense Industry Revitalization Network (DIRN) was the main political-ideological element that acted in

the form of a *lobby*, and that gained ample space in the media during the Lula government. His belief system was mostly published in major national newspapers.

As a deepening in the understanding of these specificities, other studies such as Dagnino (2009); Dagnino and Dias (2007); Dias (2005) highlight the problem of accepting a triumphalist view of Science and Technology (S&T), as well as the need to reorient S,T&I policies towards a democratizing bias, considering the social and economic development of peripheral countries, especially Brazil. According to this view, the mere investment of huge resources in science and technology would already be capable of generating social and economic development, disregarding the existence of economic growth without employment or with the generation of unemployment. This is a very controversial and complex topic that has always required attention, especially in the field of Science, Technology and Society studies, since its origins in the 1960s and 1970s. In this sense, this article goal is to present some reflections for the case study of the purchase process and TT of the GRIPEN NG fighter jets, which aims to contribute to the strategic intelligence of the Armed Forces and to the interests of the Brazilian sovereignty.

In addition to other relevant aspects, according to Dias (2014), this controversial view that was raised by PLACTS (Latin American Thought in Science, Technology and Society) in the 1970s, with Renato Peixoto Dagnino as one of its main representatives, provides an important counterpoint to microeconomic studies focused on experiences. of private companies that characterize the conventional approach of the countries of Europe and North America. In fact, this vision constitutes an inconsistent basis for the formulation of public policies, considering the peripheral condition of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), which results in a different behavior of private companies in relation to innovation. As a result, Brazilian private companies do not see innovation as something important and profitable for their businesses, as they prefer to import foreign technology. This different behavior of Brazilian industry is called peripheral condition, which is historically unfavorable in relation to central countries (Dagnino 2020).

Table 1 presents the two conceptions dealt with in this study: the predominant and hegemonic conception that governs S,T&I policies for the IDB (Industrial Defense Base) and the vision close to PLACTS, associated with the belief system with a democratizing and social bias, which this work shares.

Table 1: Comparison between the concepts discussed in the present study

Belief Elements	Hegemonic conception	PLACTS
Overview	Conception based on the Theory of Innovation, entrepreneurship, and meritocracy.	Society is determinant in science and technology and not the other way around.
Design of technology	Emulation of S,T&I in relation to the so-called advanced countries.	Emphasis on technology developed with democratic participation and social inclusion. Technologies focused on problem solving.
Who should produce S,T&I	Scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs and businessmen	Scientists, social groups, public companies, or individuals.
Protagonists of policy	Scientists, government and business	Scientists, government, companies, NGOs, organized civil society.
Strategy of Implementation	Entrepreneurial vision of the free market (neoliberal), with the support of the “strong” non-interventionist State.	Emphasis on cooperativism or associativism
Technological Diffusion	Technology transfer	Sociotechnical adequacy

Source: Rodrigues et al. (2020) with adaptations.

From the perspective of PLACTS, according to Galante and Mari (2020), especially the one from the intellectual Jorge Sábato, who despite valuing the participation of the State and state-owned companies in the economy, was a critic of what he called the “military party”, when referring to the US military-industrial complex. This was due to Sábato’s democratic convictions and his belief that science and technology should address the social and economic needs of the population through a national developmental path. According to Dias (2014), the members of PLACTS have the understanding that the scientific and technological backwardness of Latin America would be a consequence of its economic and social problems, as opposed to the linear offerist vision that understands science (and technology) as being deterministic of economic and social development. This vision takes into account the need for a national development project that opposes the S,T&I

policy oriented exclusively to private interests, as is the case of the Innovation Law (Law n. 10.973/2004) . As an example, this law emulates US policies and favors private companies, to the detriment of the particularities of Latin America in its peripheral condition. Another point is the lack of distinction between national and foreign companies, both having the same prerogatives and rights (Dias 2014).

According to Dagnino (2016), the following excerpt explains how the relationship between “quality” and “relevance” works in technoscientific production in advanced countries, while in peripheral countries, the scarcity of signs of relevance from civil society results in a fragile and almost non-existent National Innovation System. The dysfunctionality of the Brazilian university is a reflection of the emulation of “quality” and “relevance” that is given to scientific and technological research in so-called advanced countries.

The United States, in the 1980s, spent 70% of public resources on research in the military area. Added to the expenditure that went to nuclear and aerospace energy, it reached 85%. The remaining 15% was for agriculture, health, etc. But there was no doubt that the American public (or the *establishment* that represented it) at that time believed this to be important. There was a sign of relevance and scientists did with quality what was considered important. That is, in developed countries, relevance is essential, necessary and *ex ante*. Quality is supplementary, not necessary and *ex post*. Quality, therefore, is not universal: it is socially constructed. In our case, we have a situation and a peripheral condition, where companies do not carry out research and the State and social movements do not demand new knowledge, strong signals of relevance are not emitted. Currently, the public university orients its teaching and research in an exogenous way. The research agendas and criteria are attempts to emulate what is done in the most prestigious universities in developed countries. This takes place as an imitation of what is called “dynamics of exploration of the world frontier”, but which in reality is a process that produces an increasingly monopolized knowledge, which is seen as universal and neutral (Dagnino 2016, 40).

In the US, for example, the military-industrial complex was constituted in the period of the Second World War, as it showed its relevance for society. Society and the government understood that there was a need to stop the advance of fascism and Nazism that was awakening in Europe, in addition to which this could harm the expansion of international trade in this country. In LAC, these signs of relevance would not be effective enough to be identified by universities and public teaching and research institutes, given their peripheral condition.

Technology Transfer, Actors and Political Forces

A “state-of-the-art” TT process can be highly complex and demands several negotiations in which a multitude of variables are at stake. If these variables are not properly equalized, these can lead to negative results for both parties in play, or one of them simply can achieve no advantage in that matter. The licensed technology must be transferred without limitations, and still maintain other advantages for the company that owns the patents. It is essential that the technological parts can be transformed into other products capable of generating innovations in the civil area (Barbosa 2010).

Some important authors such as De Souza et al. (2019) state that technological projects of a military nature, such as the acquisition of Swedish fighter jets (GRIPEN NG), can generate technological autonomy (contributing to the export of Defense Material -DM), inserting Brazilian companies in the development processes and production and would be able to generate thousands of jobs. It is enough to know if in fact these results will be consolidated in the coming years, since data on this issue have not yet been found.

On the other hand, a more detailed analysis, based on Dagnino's (2010) view, the IDB has been moved much more in terms of a theoretical discourse based on a belief system. This condition should be rethought because the insertion of Brazilian private companies in the manufacture of defense technologies is very small when considering the Brazilian Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Thus, this situation has resulted in great technological dependence on the so-called advanced countries and the jobs generated by the IDB have been small or, in some cases, non-existent (Dagnino 2010). In this sense, it is reasonable to say that the TT can only fully occur, on the supplier's side, if the technological race is won.

It would be naive to think that this would be easily sold at the cost of just a pecuniary sum, but it actually comes at the expense of military and strategic advantages, as a function of the principles of national sovereignty of foreign powers. Typically, TT occurs when the supplier country already has more advanced technology than the one being sold. The technological gap, even if small, is an inexorable reality to the TT process, this is easily verified, in the case of the purchase of GRIPEN fighters by Brazil, in the delay of the purchase process, starting in 2010 and only completed in 2020 with the signature of the contract. Table 2 below presents the chronology of the planning and negotiation, culminating with the purchase of the Swedish fighters, until the present TT process (in progress) with a current delivery

deadline until 2024.

Table 2: Comparison between the concepts discussed in the present study

Government	Date	Main Events
FHC	1995	Policy arena/ Problem identification / PP Planning Phase. Conformation of the agenda in the FHC government. The FHC government creates the FX project with the aim of replacing the outdated FAB F 2000 mirage fighters.
LULA	2003	Policy arena/ PP Planning Phase/ Agenda setting in Lula's government. Cancellation of the FX project by the Lula government
	2006	Policy arena/ Formulation of the PP/ Planning Phase of the PP/ Conformation of the agenda in the Lula government. Lula government announces FX2 project
	2008	Policy arena/ PP Planning Phase/ Agenda setting in Lula's government. Title of article: Instead of buying, FAB will build hunting. Source: O Estado de São Paulo, 05/18/2008, Nacional, p. A8
	July 2009	Policy arena/ PP Planning Phase/ Agenda setting in Lula's government. Brazilian parliamentarians travel to France to get to know the Rafale fighter up close. President Lula publicly declares that this is the only company interested in talking about a possible TT.
	September 2009	Policy arena/ PP Planning Phase/ Agenda setting in Lula's government. A series of negotiations take place between Brazil as an interested party in the purchase and the other countries as bidders: Sweden, US and France.
	October 2009	Policy arena/ PP Planning Phase/ Agenda setting in Lula's government. With the statement by Minister Nelson Jobim, at a political level, Brazil's perception of the importance of Technology Transfer increases after Sweden's offer at a lower price and with the fact that 40% of the planes can be manufactured in Brazil.
	November 2009	Policy arena/ Setting the agenda in Lula's government. New expanded offers from France postpone the decision and intensify competition between the countries offering the technology.
	January 2010	Policy arena/ Setting the agenda in Lula's government. A technical report is issued by the FAB declaring the Swedish fighter Gripen NG as the best purchase option.

DILMA	November 2013	Policy arena/ Setting the agenda Budget proposal worth 8.4 billion dollars is sent with the National Congress
	December 2013	Policy arena / Setting the agenda The budget reporter informs that there is no forecast for the purchase since it is not considered a priority as a political project for that moment.
	December 18th, 2013	Phase of the formal process of the PP/Conformation of the agenda “The Gripen was selected after analysis of operational, technical, logistical, cost and technology transfer aspects. The report prepared by the Brazilian Air Force had 33,000 pages and included analyzes of industries, projects and a team made up of pilots, engineers, logistics officers and other specialties.” (Revista Asas, 2020)
	October 27th, 2014	PP Formal Process Phase/PP Execution. Signing of the contract, published in the Official Gazette of October 24, 2014. (Revista Asas, 2020) and (Defesanet, 2015)
	September 20th, 2020	Phase of the formal process and PP Execution. Arrival of the first fighter jet in Brazil (Revista Asas, 2020)
	Term of the TT contract	PP execution 2024

Source: Own elaboration based on data from Jornal Estadão (2013); Vasconcelos (2019, 282); Wings Magazine (2020); Aero Magazine (2014); Defensenet (2015), Monteiro and Nogueira (2008).

According to Serafim and Dias (2012), the policy cycle is supported by many authors as consisting of five phases, the first three being the most important because they characterize the rationality of a PP and involve disputes (policy policy). arena): 1. problem identification; 2. setting the agenda; 3. formulation; 4. implementation and; 5. Policy evaluation. Therefore, in the PA of the purchase process of GRIPEN NG fighters, according to Table 2, the identification of the problem in mid-1995 in the FHC government and the conformation of the agenda in the sense of postponing the expenditure, due to the strong posture of “reduction” of the State in that government.

The conformation of the agenda is identified in Lula’s government from the year 2003 onwards, when it cancels the old FX Project, started in the FHC government. It is believed that this decision already provided for a modification in this PP, pointing to a possible increase in spending in this sector, certainly due to pressure from the DIRN. However, the change in the name of the project (from Project FX to Project FX2) would have occurred

as a form of explicit policy, since in essence the genesis of the previous government remained the same, which was the modernization of the old FAB Mirage F2000 fighters by more modern jets. However, it was, to a certain extent, with a bias contrary to the idea of the Minimum State, which advocates the reduction of public spending. Before 2013, the competition would have occurred between the Rafale F3 fighter of the French company Dassault, the Super Hornet F-18 of the American Boeing and the GRIPEN NG of the Swedish Saab.

According to Ferreira and Medeiros (2016a), it is not possible to think about the implementation of PP independently of the policy formulation, and in different circumstances such processes may be intertwined. This results in the fact that, regarding the period of formulation of the PP, it can be said that it started in the Lula government in 2003, but in the previous government (FHC) there was already some incipient planning, but the pressures for the acquisition of the fighters may not have been sufficient to face the strong neoliberal discourse prevailing at that historical moment, this is confirmed by the low value initially proposed in the FX Project, (US\$ 700 million), when compared to the expenditures foreseen in the Lula and Dilma administrations (Jornal Estadão 2013).

It is noteworthy that the Swedish company Saab has offered a compensation agreement worth US\$9 billion in company investments in Brazilian factory facilities for the production of fighter jets (Vasconcelos 2019, 282). It remains to be seen what the posture of future governments in relation to these investments will be, more precisely in terms of the increase in new technologies, policies to protect the national defense industry and the DM export policy, in the sense of compensating for the high expenses in the purchase of GRIPEN NG fighters. These results would need to be closely monitored by civil society, since it pays the taxes that allow these PPs to exist.

In the opinion of Unicamp researcher Dr. Marcos José Barbieri Ferreira, the possibility of completing the technological development in the construction of the fighters in Brazil, with the engineers of the FAB, would make the TT even more promising for Brazil. According to Table 3 below, Embraer's participation in the partial assembly of 23 fighters in São Paulo countryside is highlighted, with 13 units being assembled with the participation of 46 engineers from FAB, trained to work in partnership with Saab in Sweden. As of 2021, 15 units will be assembled entirely at Embraer (Vasconcelos 2019, 282). The efficiency and effectiveness of the TT process in the purchase process of GRIPEN NG fighter jets was closely linked to the existence of EMBRAER as a public and national company, and less of the private capital IDB, since according to Ferreira (2016b) this company alone is

responsible for more than 80% of the revenues of the group of companies in the sector, making the production chain of the Brazilian aeronautical industry highly dependent on EMBRAER.

Table 3: Final results of the purchase of Gripen fighters.

Total units	Models	Offset program	Amount
Pack of 36 jets Gripen NG (Delivery of the last jet in 2024)	28 Gripen E single- seaters 8 Gripen F two-seaters	Saab's investment in manufacturing companies in Brazil; Training of engineers and pilots in Sweden.	US\$ 4.1 billion (BRL 15.5 billion)

Source: Vasconcelos (2019, 282).

Table 3 shows the results of the purchase of Gripen fighter jets, representing an investment far beyond what was initially budgeted in the FHC administrations (R\$ 700 million) and in Lula's government (R\$ 2 to 3 billion). This would perhaps have caught the attention of newspapers and representatives of the judiciary and would have led to contestable versions of possible embezzlement of resources in the Workers' Party governments. This fact illustrates the importance of the PA and of considering the aspects linked to the peripheral condition of Latin American countries pointed out by PLACTS, since a review of these data explains that the greatest damage would not be in the possible damages to the treasury due to corruption, but to the serious political actors associated with the game of global power, in a context of growing neoliberalism, with the expansion of hunger and social inequality.

The DIRN (lobby), which according to Dagnino (2010), is a network formed by public (mainly military) and private actors (businessmen, journalists, and researchers) who participated of the DIRN 's political game since the beginning of the Lula government. Borelli and Dos Reis Peron (2017) discuss the reasons for the return of this discourse from the year 2000.

One piece of evidence that characterized this political game of the GRIPEN NG fighter purchase process as being almost exclusively of a political-ideological nature, according to Magalhães (2016), was that the two actors that established contradictory relationships were the Itamaraty and the Ministry of Defense, which would point to a political fragility of that period:

He called "Imperfect Synthesis" the relations between the Itamaraty and the Ministry of Defense during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso

administration. That is, the interaction between defense and diplomacy was mainly characterized by the absence of an integrating element that manifested itself through a comprehensive political consensus and capable of producing long-term guidelines on the role to be played by Brazil in the world. The National Defense Policy (PDN) of 1996, according to Alsina, constituted a document that cannot even be classified as a Policy, since, in the absence of clear guidelines emanating from the political power, the PDN only reflected traditional positions of the Chancellery and the Armed Forces: “The PDN did not represent, therefore, any significant constraint to the continuity of poorly articulated sectoral policies pursued by diplomats and military personnel. In the end, an imperfect synthesis was produced between foreign policy and defense policy”. (Magalhães 2016, 84).

The fragility of the articulation between foreign policy and defense policy seems to be very clear at that historical moment, which would lead to a difficulty for the State to benefit from the process of purchasing GRIPEN NG fighter jets, either for the defense of its national sovereignty, or for the defense of your military industry.

In the process of purchasing GRIPEN NG fighter jets, a more formal and technical part of the policy (planning) was assigned to the Brazilian Air Force (FAB), while the politics was influenced by several different bodies, such as EMBRAER, the National Congress, the mainstream media, the Public Ministry, the Presidency of the Republic, internal actors of the Judiciary and especially the DIRN.

According to Dagnino (2010), the IDB consisted of a group of 100 to 150 companies in the 1980s. According to the Ministry of Defense (2014a) this is defined as “the set of state or private companies that participate in one or more stages of research, development, production, distribution and maintenance of strategic defense products - goods and services that, due to their peculiarities, which can contribute to the achievement of objectives related to the security or defense of the country.” To date, it is still unknown how these companies will be stimulated, benefited or involved in any process of generating innovation and economic and social development. With the research carried out by this article, it was possible to verify that no objective data was clearly exposed on this point until the year 2022, the researched journalistic sites do not make more in-depth comments on this point.

Means of Communication

For some reason, when the FX project was created by the FHC government in 1995, there was some pressure from the media and FAB. However, nothing compares to the pressure exerted during the following Lula and Dilma administrations, since there are no studies with the objective of to clarify the political game that involved the IDB and the FHC government. Perhaps the defense coalition mentioned by Dagnino (2010) was not yet formed, but it is necessary to consider that the party in power was aligned with the thinking of those who formed the coalition in the Lula government, with a view to acquiring weapons (DIRN).

According to Barbosa (2010), FAB already had the intention of continuing the FX2 project from 1998 onwards. However, in early 2010, already under Lula's government, the newspaper *Folha de São Paulo* had access to a report by a FAB technician, which indicated the preference of this military institution for Swedish fighters. The purely journalistic controversy arose from the fact that a few months earlier the president had made a statement to the media of his political preference for the French Rafale fighter jet (Barbosa 2010). This would have triggered a series of newspaper articles that culminated in the accusation that PT governments had the intention of diverting financial resources from the process of buying the fighter jets. This process culminated with the judicialization of the acquisition process against President Lula and that also involved President Dilma.

In 2013, some controversy persisted in the newspapers (Table 2). In an article published by *Jornal Estadão* (2013) there is an attempt to explain to the reader what actually happened and what are the possibilities of Lula's government involvement in corruption in this case. In view of the critical position of the aforementioned Journal, it becomes evident that the controversy still persisted until the year of the aforementioned article and that it was possibly the result of a system of neoliberal beliefs, which contested the high expenses with the purchase of fighters, something atypical in federal government policy up to that time.

According to Berdu (2016), in June 2013, the British newspaper *The Guardian* released information leaked by Edward Snowden. Such information mentioned the existence of espionage in the form of recordings that took place at meetings of President Dilma Rousseff. Certainly, this influenced decision-making in some public policies in Brazil, and one of them was the choice to purchase Sweden's Gripen NG fighter jets, which came about at the expense of purchasing North American fighter jets from Boeing, at the conclusion of

the FX Project. -two.

According to Berdu (2016) the decision to buy Gripen fighters followed several technical, operational, logistical parameters, final and maintenance costs, TT and job creation, with reports of about 33 thousand pages with opinions from pilots, engineers, and other experts. However, according to the theoretical framework adopted in this article, it is undeniable that there was also a decision of an eminently political nature by President Dilma at that time. Here, we emphasize the importance of the format of this decision, which took place before the report was prepared. Despite also being based on a more “progressive” system of beliefs, it seems obvious to see that political-ideological interests permeated them, even if not identifiable under a given study perspective.

Furthermore, as stated by Mészáros (2012) and Alborno (1997), in addition to numerous other authors, there is no neutrality in the institutions that represent the State, much less on the part of the newspapers that, mostly, represent the interests of the oligarchies and the capital. The approach defended by Alborno (1997) has as one of its assumptions the defense of the concept of “social innovation”, since it understands that innovation is the result of a much more complex process than that defended by a hegemonic and exclusively economic vision, or innovationist. This process depends not only on purely economic actors such as companies and States, but also on a vast social fabric capable of sustaining innovation, for which greater democratic participation in the elaboration of public policies in S,T&I would be essential. S,T&I policies in Latin America have been created according to an uncritical transport of models that correspond to the reality of the so-called advanced countries, which are part of different realities in relation to Latin American countries.

International Defense Material Trade

For Dunne and Uye (2014) the influence of the arms trade and military spending on the economic growth of countries is very complex and depends on several channels, such as training of human resources, factors related to capital investments, type of technology, relationships external. In line with Ambros (2017), studies in general do not present a clear consensus regarding the real economic advantages for countries, and some authors consider that defense activities are capable of even inhibiting economic growth. Even so, these channels can have positive or negative effects, depending on a variety of factors, often uncontrollable by governments and their policies, which make

investments in the defense industry something uncertain and risky.

In this sense, Dagnino (2010) argues that the IDB has an eminently deficit character, so that it is always linked to a political decision and never an economic one. Spending on Defense Material (DM), in most countries, causes them to be moved to export in order to amortize military spending.

Interestingly, and in order to confirm the view presented here, a study by Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003) points out that there was little change in military spending in developing countries during and after the Cold War, even those countries that had non-hostile neighbors. This can be considered an indication of the merely political-ideological character (which could be linked to the legacy of the Cold War) regarding the State's actions with regard to policies related to the IDB. On the other hand, this could lead to some reflections about the real interests under the cloak of the Cold War concept, which can be much more linked to the economic interests of certain military groups, whether private or political.

This data can also point out that, as in Brazil, the political and ideological motivations for the growing global ID have not regressed and that they can move through mechanisms of compensation of expenses through exports and imports. Therefore, these compensation mechanisms can be very profitable for countries. However, as Dagnino (2010) points out, they have been much more interesting for the US and less interesting for Latin American countries. Brazil buys more than it sells and has no major reasons for this, as is the case with Venezuela, which has reason to buy, as it is a country that needs to invest in military defense due to its enormous geopolitical and strategic potential in oil, and the international political disputes arising from its characteristics.

Dunne and Perlo-Freeman's (2003) reflections on keeping military spending at similar levels before and after the Cold War, analyzed together with Dagnino's (2010) studies, lead us to think about how much the countries of the South (mainly Latin Americans) are guided by the foreign arms export policy adopted by the US. In a way, this shows another side of the cultural and technological dependence experienced by peripheral countries. For Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003), there were no significant changes in this regard after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which shows the prevalence of US economic interests due to its military-industrial complex.

Following the study carried out by Dagnino (2010), from 1989 to 1999, the participation of the United States of America (USA) as an exporter of Defense Material (DM) has always been the highest in the Americas. According to Herrera-Lasso (1987, 129) between 1977 and 1980, Brazil imported US\$ 641 million compared to exports of US\$ 421 million in armaments. According to data from USACDA (2000) cited by Dagnino (2010), from 1997 to 1999

Brazil was the largest importer of DM in Latin America, ranking first with US\$ 980 million. Curiously, the second place went to Venezuela, which always had as a political motivation the fact that it is one of the countries with one of the largest oil deposits in the world. In view of its greater economic strength in relation to other Latin American countries, due to its size and natural resources, Brazil's higher expenditures are justifiable. However, there was not necessarily a greater development of the IDB and the development of autonomous military technology in this period.

According to Mészáros (2012), the US military-industrial complex caused an international historical influence to the point of being an important supplier of weapons to many countries with which it had closer relations, and this fact would still persist to the present day. As a result, there was an important economic compensation for this country when a part of the countries became important importers of DM. On the other hand, cases in Latin America, such as Brazil, export less than they should in terms of DM, in order to compensate for the exorbitant expenditures of ID, which have not generated spin-off spillovers.

FHC, Lula and Dilma Governments

According to Dias (2012), the FHC government was marked by a S, T&I policy of emulating practices used in developed countries, dismantling a large part of the state structures implemented in previous periods, aligning the legal framework with that practiced at the international level, in particular in countries of the global North. The discourse of technological innovation (innovationism) gained strength with the expressions “entrepreneurship”, “business incubators” and “technology parks”. Concomitantly with these approaches, the emphasis on the idea of “increased spending on R&D activities” and “university-company partnership” especially defended by the research community (Dias 2012) was strengthened at an explicit policy level. In that historic moment there was a significant rise of the neoliberal project.

In Lula's government, regarding the IDB, the Theory of Innovation was also a predominant discourse, despite criticisms of neoliberalism made by the PT, mainly to embody arguments in favor of an increase in military spending (Dagnino 2010).

Following the approach of Bachrach and Baratz ([1962]2011), in view of the approach of these authors on the pluralist face of power and considering the political procedures and established rules of the game according to Dagnino's (2010) view, it can be inferred that, during the FHC administration, a kind of

non-decision-making was possibly configured .

The pluralist theory, according to Dahl (1961), cited by Ham and Hill (1993, 47), points out that “the sources of power are unevenly but widely distributed among individuals and groups”. In the case of the PA in the process of purchasing the GRIPEN NG fighter jets, this can be seen from the fact that, from 1995 until the end of its government, there was not enough pressure to carry out the purchase of the jets (“invisible face of the power”). It should be noted that the DIRN already existed in that period, as noted in Dagnino (2010). The DIRN would have acted as a pressure group, which promoted cooperation with the FHC government in order not to generate conflicts with this government, since it can be assumed that both political forces were on the same ideological side (conservative right).

In the view of Bachrach and Baratz ([1962]2011) the fact that a government does nothing about a problem is also a way of doing public policy. For Ham and Hill (1993) the absences of decision also need to be studied in the AP. Based on these assumptions, it is clear that the FHC government was characterized by a typically neoliberal policy of the Minimum State, including omission on the part of the Executive Branch in some fundamental areas such as health and education (Dias 2012). Therefore, the failure to make a decision regarding the abandonment of the FX Project by the FHC government is a political fact to be considered in the present study.

Conclusions

The arguments presented in this study reinforce the approach presented in Dagnino (2010) and show the relevance of this author to the PA of the IDB. With regard mainly to the political-ideological bias of the decision-making process of the PPs, which received support from the Defense Industry in the Lula Government. This same tendency overflows to the Dilma government regarding the purchase of the GRIPEN NG fighter jets, as well as the continued existence of the DIRN in the Lula and Dilma governments. The importance of the purchase process and TT of the GRIPEN NG fighters and its contribution to the National Defense is undeniable.

However, as a main result, this work brings to light another perspective on what were the real motivations that culminated in the execution of the purchase contract and TT of the GRIPEN NG fighters, which helps to enrich the debate. For hegemonic thinking, it was the most successful DM purchase in the history of Brazilian aeronautics, and for a counter-hegemonic thinking, one of the examples in which ideological aspects were predominant, to the

detriment of values linked to social and economic development.

Through this study, it is possible to perceive, according to Dye's (1992) view, that public policies tend to shape public opinion, being much more common the fact that public opinion contributes little in the construction of public policies. In this sense, the existence of a political game that is inherently little participatory, in a democratizing sense, is preponderant, and this was observed in the analysis of the performance of the media.

The process of purchasing of the Swedish fighter jets followed an internationalized conception of DM, even if these interests were not North American, as President Dilma tried to avoid, due to leaks disclosed by Edward Snowden (Harding 2014). To a certain extent this shows a certain fragility of the unipolarity represented by the US.

Our dependence is closely linked to historical processes that were directly linked to international interests and to the rise of neoliberalism in the world (Ocampo and Flores 2016). It is a problem of chronic dependence, which cannot be overcome exclusively from a vision of neutrality and determinism of capitalist technoscience (S,T&I triumphalism). More than that, it is necessary for the State to be the great direct promoter of the economy, whether in the improvement of health infrastructure, transport, communication, etc., even in strong interventions to overcome poverty, illiteracy, social exclusion, and degradation of nature, themes that could even be considered more important in the current historical moment. This alone would justify the debate exposed in this article in the field of studies of the CTS.

In general, the position of the media, represented by the main newspapers such as *Jornal Estadão*, *O Globo* and *Folha de São Paulo*, played a political-ideological role, with the purpose of only drawing the reader's attention to possible corruption in the Lula and Dilma governments. In comparison, there was little technical analysis and virtually no deeper economic analysis with national interests in mind. On the other hand, the newspapers *Defesanet*, *Revista Asas* and *Revista Aero* magazine presented a more technical and bureaucratic vision, hiding a supposedly militaristic and neoliberal approach, which could easily go unnoticed by unobservant eyes of some readers. If the major newspapers with national circulation claim a certain non-existent neutrality, those with lesser circulation bring a certain appearance of "technical neutrality". This framework promotes the reproduction of a triumphalist vision of science and technology in the case of the purchase process and TT of the GRIPEN NG fighter jets, a vision that needs to be the object of greater discussions in academic research in order to guarantee greater strategic intelligence for the Armed Forces when it comes to the purchase of DM and the guarantee of national sovereignty.

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to present a descriptive investigation from a qualitative perspective through a bibliographical analysis to discuss the political process of purchase and Technology Transfer (TT) of GRIPEN NG fighters. The research is presented in the form of a Political Analysis (PA) of the political game involving the main actors linked to the Brazilian Defense Industry (BDI) during the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995 - 2002), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003 – 2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011 – 2016). We resorted to the study of the decision-making process involving interrelationships between the main actors, consensus, interests and values. The study made it possible to identify and analyze the main political actors, how did they act in the political game? For what motivations did they act? The process of purchase and Technology Transfer (TT) was discussed, its advantages and difficulties and how some of the means of communication proceeded, highlighting some characteristics of the international Defense Material (DM) trade that are relevant for a better understanding of the approach raised and some similarities and differences between the FHC, Lula and Dilma governments, given this type of public policy formed during their governments. This work raises another issue, little remembered behind the scenes of the purchase process and TT of the GRIPEN NG fighters, due to the partial view of the media, not pertaining to the economic interests of the US military-industrial complex and often hidden by interests and values of the political environment given the intrinsic characteristics of these actors. This is another aspect that justifies the need to plan and evaluate public policies for the acquisition and TT of DM, primarily aiming at the interests of defense, national sovereignty, and socio-economic development.

KEYWORDS

Purchase process; Technology transfer; Gripen NG; Policy.

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THE EAST MEDITERRANEAN GAS FORUM: CONVERGENCE OF REGIONAL AND ENERGY SECURITY CONCERNS

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Introduction:

Thomas Malthus, a 19th century British thinker had aptly stressed on the power of mankind in creating conditions for their subsistence on earth (Belyi 2015). This can be contextualised in the aspirations of the Eastern Mediterranean states in fuelling their economies owing to natural gas discoveries in the region. The natural gas bonanza had hit the Eastern Mediterranean region in the 2000's beginning with the offshore Gaza Marine field (Palestine) Leviathan and Tamar fields (Israel), Aphrodite field (Cyprus) and Zohr gas field (Egypt).

This became a watershed moment for the regional economies who were seeking to improve their economic prospects. Given the increasing demand for natural gas and renewable energy coupled with the intense competition from established players in the international energy markets, the regional economies felt it prudent to pool their resources and establish a regional organization to cater to their common interests. As a result, the energy ministers from Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian National Authority decided to conceive the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) in January 2019 (Winter and Gallia 2020).

These convergences have a bearing on Egypt's rising energy fundamentals in the region given its strategic location in connecting Europe, West Asia and North Africa to a regional sub-system of energy security

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(Tziampiris 2019). Thus, the regional forum has enhanced the geopolitical standing of the Eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea as a 'region' (Stivachtis 2019).

However, such developments have threatened Turkey's interests in the region especially on energy security. Hence, Turkey has sought the need to assert itself in the regional disputes which have been perceived as regional security challenge by specific members of the EMGF. The energy-related interactions inevitably deepen their securitization or desecuritization relations in the political and potentially the military sectors (Adamides and Odysseas 2015). In the light of Turkey's recent manoeuvres, it therefore becomes imperative to understand the convergences that have taken place in the context of both energy and regional security within the fold of the EMGF.

As energy insecurity remains an imminent characteristic of energy security, it can simultaneously influence the securitization of non-energy referent objects in other sectors (Adamides and Odysseas 2015). This leads one to examine the geopolitical underpinnings behind the formation of the EMGF which by and large has affected the region as a whole. Egypt, the region's star player has always played a fundamental role in harbouring relations based on energy and regional security and hence its relations with Greece, Cyprus, Israel, France, Italy and the EU needs examination in the wake of the establishment of the EMGF. The EMGF has been kept as the central pillar in understanding the international political economy behind the energy and regional security convergences by the above-mentioned member states. The objective behind undertaking this study has been to point out the inadequacies in establishing the EMGF which has inevitably shaped the geopolitics of the region.

Evolution of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum

The leaders from Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian National Authority came together in 'signing a charter establishing the intergovernmental' East Mediterranean Gas Forum in September 2020 (Reuters, September 22, 2020). Headquartered in Cairo, the forum became an arena to extend energy cooperation between the member states to establish a regional gas market. With French and Italian companies' interests invested in the offshore fields of the Eastern Mediterranean region (Leigh and Charlotte 2012; Lerman 2019), their inclusion into the forum's (Aydintasbas et al. 2020) membership was imperative. It is also important to note that the forum was cemented against the backdrop of energy cooperation

between Egypt and Israel as well as Egypt and Israel's trilateral summits with the European Union (EU) members (Greece, Cyprus) respectively (Al Jazeera, January 15, 2020; Embassy of Greece in Israel, December 21, 2018; Press and Information Service, Cyprus, October 09, 2019).

The Madrid conference (1991) and Barcelona process (1995) were some EU-led efforts which remained unsuccessful in culminating economic cooperation between the Mediterranean economies (Soliman 2011). The discoveries of natural gas in the offshore fields of Gaza (Palestine) (OQ, n.d.), Leviathan and Tamar (Israel) Aphrodite (Cyprus) and Zohr (Egypt) were game changers (Ellinas 2019) that signalled economic cooperation in the region. In the light of such developments, Israel and Egypt sought to extend their existing security cooperation in the Northern Sinai region and Gaza strip to the arena of energy as well by settling an international arbitration dispute (2012) between them (The Jerusalem Post, June 28, 2019; The Times of Israel, June 17, 2019).

As a result, Israel started exporting natural gas to Egypt with a two-fold strategy: a) to secure a regional market by utilizing the existing pipeline infrastructure between them b) to utilize Egypt's two LNG processing facilities for re-export to Europe until the construction of the East Med Gas (EMG) pipeline (Reuters, January 15, 2020). The EMG pipeline worth 6 billion Euros is expected to be completed by 2025 (Greek City Times, July 18, 2020). Destined to reach Europe from the Israeli coast, the decision to construct the pipeline was green lit by Cyprus, Greece, and Israel at their sixth trilateral summit (March 2019) alongside the decision to construct the Euro-Asia Interconnector, an undersea electricity grid for European markets (EuroAsia Interconnector, March 27, 2020).

Around the same time, Greece, and Cyprus' yearning to engage with Egypt also surged due to Egypt's biggest gas discoveries in 2015 and its overall regional standing as a 'natural gas exporter' (State Information Service, May 19, 2020). The resulting trilateral summits between Cyprus, Egypt and Greece extended over cooperation in the exploration of their offshore gas fields (Press and Information Service, Cyprus, October 09, 2019) to building the Euro-Africa Interconnector, another undersea electricity cable to Europe to boost energy exports (EuroAfrica interconnector, October 11, 2019).

Also, Jordan's membership into the forum stems from its energy relations with Egypt via the Arab gas pipeline (AFESD, n.d.). Notably, the inclusion of the Palestinian National Authority as a member of the EMGF is pivotal as it is the first regional organization whereby Israel and the Palestinian National Authority will be sharing screen space together despite the ban imposed by Israel on the exploration rights granted by the Palestinian

National Authority in 1999 on Gaza's offshore fields (Henderson 2014).

Nevertheless, the exclusion of Libya, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey from the forum's membership throws light on the perspective of the forum's existing members to exclude unfriendly or politically unstable countries. Thus, the pretext of organizing a budding natural gas industry in the name of energy security has cast a shadow on the prospects of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean region known for its historically infamous conflicts (Litsas 2018). This has warranted the need to examine the dimensions of energy security which became instrumental behind rallying the formation of such a regional organisation.

Dimensions of energy security underpinning the EMGF

Energy security refers to the ability of states to maintain uninterrupted energy supply that is relative to demand at affordable and relatively stable prices without sudden and significant price increases (Adamides and Odysseas 2015). As energy security can be examined in multiple dimensions namely political, military, economic, technical, and academic theories, the study has chosen to focus on the below-mentioned dimensions whereby the above-mentioned dimensions can be seen to be developing a convergence at various points in time.

Egypt's vibrant energy apparatuses

In command economies like Egypt for instance, institutions have played a crucial role in shaping energy resources and markets (Belyi 2015). The Egyptian government's modernization strategy (International Trade Administration 2020) in terms of production performance, refining, distribution, enterprise resource planning, and skilling of human resources (Cingoli 2016) have outlined its role in promoting its energy resources and markets. International Relations and security studies have contributed to the development of energy security theories whereby energy dependence remains a major security concern especially from a classical realist perspective due to the absence of an overarching authority in terms of global energy governance (Belyi 2015). Hence, Susan Strange, a prominent scholar in International Political Economy (IPE) has outlined four primary structures in IPE viz knowledge, production, finance, and security structures (Belyi 2015). Of the four primary structures, the security structure caters mostly to the energy

security dimension which includes self-sufficiency policies, interaction with other states, cooperation, and conflicts (Belyi 2015).

The elasticity in energy markets is due to the inter-fuel competition which has increased in relation to power generation (Belyi 2015). This puts Egypt's natural gas discoveries in Zohr (30 trillion cubic feet), Nooros (32 million cubic meters per day) and East Delta (350 million cubic meters per day) along with a mix of renewables, coal-fired plants and natural gas imports from Israel (International Trade Administration 2020) in the spotlight of the changing dynamics of the international energy markets. Besides, Egypt's administration over the Suez Canal, Suez-Mediterranean (SUMED) pipeline and LNG infrastructures at Idku and Damietta (Alterman, Conley, and Malka 2018) have proved complementary in harnessing Egypt's domestic energy production. Given the diverse range of energy production and distribution and based on the data provided by the Fitch Solutions Egypt Power Report, 2020 (Enterprise, March 11, 2020) attempts at achieving self-sufficiency in the generation of cleaner sources of electricity have become the chief goal of the Egyptian government. This had led the Standard Chartered Bank to predict in 2019 that 'Egypt would occupy the seventh position amongst the top ten economies in the next ten years' (Enterprise, March 11, 2020).

As the concept of sovereignty is pivotal to the dimension of energy security under IPE's security structure, Egypt's credibility in electricity exports to Jordan and Libya (Galal 2019) shored up Arab and European investments into Egypt's electricity generation. Noteworthy among them include the interconnection project (2013) with Saudi Arabia (Mahmoud 2020), 2000-megawatt Euro Africa Interconnector project to Europe (EuroAfrica Interconnector, April 28, 2020), wind farms such as West Bakr, Ras Ghareb, Gabal al-Zeit (boasting of 300 wind turbines), solar projects in West Nile Delta, Zafarana, Benban (Enterprise, 11 March, 2020) and the Siemens power plants construction (2018) that had produced a surplus of 20,000 megawatts (Galal 2019). Such developments have inevitably fuelled Egypt's desire in becoming a regional energy hub (State Information Service, May 19, 2020) by engaging in energy diplomacy with its regions nearby viz. Europe, West Asia, and Africa (Pedersen 2014).

As bidding for potential buyers in Africa continues, Egypt has decisively aimed at increasing its 'share of renewable energy to 20% in 2022' (Egypt Today, May 11, 2020) which attunes with Egypt's 'Vision 2030' that envisages sustainable development policies as regards energy security is concerned (Arab Republic of Egypt, June 19, 2020). Such positive developments for Egypt have led to improved relations with the EU evident during the 'first EU-League of Arab States Summit' (Egypt Today, February 24, 2019), trilateral

summits as well as multilateral engagements in establishing the EMGF enhancing Egypt's regional power apparatus. In particular, this has posed challenges for Turkey for whom energy security is both an economic as well as a security issue (Sotiriou 2020). Hence, it is pivotal to understand Turkey's role in the region of North Africa because of its involvement in the conflict of Libya which has coincided with the formation of the EMGF.

Turkey's role in the conflict in Libya

Libya which had been a bountiful Petro-state under the benevolent dictatorship of Muammar Qadhafi descended into chaos due to the intervention of NATO post the Arab Spring (2011). The divergences in power-sharing arrangements consequently led to the formation of two divisional governments. The Western division based in Tripoli is globally recognized as the Government of National Accord (GNA) while the Eastern division based in Tobruk is led by the Libyan National Army (LNA) under General Khalifa Haftar (Eljarh 2020). The Eastern division largely supported by Egypt, France, Russia and the UAE had launched an offensive against the Western division in April 2019 (ABC NEWS, June 07, 2020). The strategic gains made by the Eastern division came under threat when Turkey decided to join forces with the Western division in late 2019 (Lindenstrauss 2019). Turkey's trajectory towards aligning with troubled territories and supporting their national interests has been evident through its interventions in establishing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC; 1974) recognised only by Turkey and in Syria (2016) to block the Kurd ethnic groups from whisking away power from the Assad government. However, Turkey's entry into the region of North Africa were largely due to fears at having to miss an opportunity in exploring the prospects of energy resources given the recent discoveries of natural gas in the region (Sotiriou 2020).

Turkey's patience started to wear with increasing importance being given to maritime delimitation agreements by its adversaries which restricted its ability to explore for energy resources that were closer to its territorial waters. Examples include the 'maritime delimitation agreements between Greece and Egypt' (2020) (The New York Times, August 27, 2020), Cyprus and Egypt (2003), Cyprus and Israel (2010) and between Cyprus and Lebanon (2007) all of which remain unrecognised by Turkey (Stocker 2012). These agreements while triggering the race to establish their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) also have their bearings on the contentious issues that some of Turkey's neighbours have against it. Significant among them include the political legitimacy regarding TRNC with Cyprus and Greece,

Mavi Marmara incident with Israel and the non-recognition to Egypt's coup by the Abdel Fatah El-Sisi government post the Arab spring (Prontera and Mariusz 2017; Greek City Times, August 13, 2020). Such ruptured ties with Turkey resulted in the thawing of relations between the Eastern Mediterranean neighbours namely Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Egypt and later on France and Italy owing to their oil companies. The trilateral, bilateral and multilateral (through the establishment of EMGF) mechanisms in energy cooperation thereby attempted to create conditions that would scar Turkey's credentials both as an energy gateway as well as a regional power. Hence, it became imperative for Turkey to stall the progress of the cooperative summits by nipping its problems in the bud.

In a bid to legitimize Turkey's claims to the EEZs, Turkey's maritime delimitation agreements with Libya's GNA (2019) and the TRNC (2011) (Pinko 2020; Forbes, February 07, 2020) resulted in the overlapping of its EEZs with that of Greece and Cyprus. Also, Turkey's military support to the Western division in Libya must be understood in the light of its need to securitize its claim in the regional competition pertaining to EEZs as well as to explore options in diversifying its energy security from Libya's share of reserves (Fouad 2019). By killing two birds with one stone, Turkey was thus able to sting the prospects of construction of the EMG pipeline from the Israeli coast while altering the power dynamics of the Western division through its military support in the Libyan conflict, a theatre predominantly controlled by the traditional players viz. Egypt, France and the UAE (Aydintasbas et al. 2020).

Turkey's strategies have its bearings on its major energy dependence from Russia which Turkey had attempted to diversify as per the strategic plan (2015-19) (Bechev 2020) by looking for prospective hydrocarbons in the Black as well as the Mediterranean Sea. With major 'discoveries of natural gas in the Black Sea' (Al Jazeera, August 27, 2020), 'Turkey's Annual Presidential Programme (2020)' had vouched to look for hydrocarbons in the contested EEZs of Greece and Cyprus (Daily Sabah, May 29, 2020). This has sparked alarm among Turkey's adversaries fuelling the formation of a 'five-nation alliance consisting of Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, UAE, and France' (The Associated Press, May 13, 2020). Hence, in the wake of Turkey's increasing assertiveness, convergences along regional and energy security lines became the final push towards the formation of the EMGF (S&P Global Platts, January 17, 2020).

Convergence of regional and energy security concerns

The securitization of a conflict helps partially in understanding the different perspectives on interdependence in international energy relations (Belyi 2015). Hence, by dissecting the term ‘securitization’ as per Robert Keohane’s positive and negative interdependence it can help one to discern the reasoning behind the formation of the EMGF. To garner a better understanding of the problem, the paper intends to focus upon Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Israel, France, Italy, and the EU to study the dynamics behind the unfolding of positive and negative interdependencies in the context of energy security goals amid regional security concerns. Beginning with ‘positive interdependence’ it represents a situation whereby states are willing to depend on each other to create a situation of deeper governance (Belyi 2015) which has been noticed in the widespread cooperation between Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and Israel in forming the EMGF to counter the regional security challenges posed by Turkey (Wolfrum 2020).

Egypt who had pioneered the entire process of forming an energy-based regional forum has a history of harbouring energy relations with its neighbours especially Libya. This can be traced back to Egypt’s energy sector that had grown immensely during the reign of Muammar Qadhafi in Libya whose ardent investments (Arafa and Mieczyslaw 2017) led Egypt to enjoy plentiful energy exports until the Arab Spring (Piera 2020). However, with the ongoing civil war in Libya, Egypt’s porous border with the country remains a perennial security threat owing to Egypt’s fears that it might have a potential spill-over of terrorist activity into Western Egypt (Arafa and Mieczyslaw 2017). With Egypt battling terrorist activities in the Northern Sinai region (Arafa and Mieczyslaw 2017) while experiencing an outpour of investments into its energy sector, managing Libya’s conflict remains one of Egypt’s primary foreign policy goals (State Information Service, Egypt May 19, 2020).

This explains Egypt’s diplomatic support to the LNA which is pivotal as the Eastern division in Libya controls most of the energy reserves which if disrupted can create further chaos (Fouad 2019). Thus, Egypt’s call for ceasefire (ABC NEWS, June 07, 2020) and active participation in the Berlin process (Xinhua, January 10, 2020), and Cairo Declaration (State Information Service, May 19, 2020) enunciates Egypt’s foreign policy to engage in Libya’s state-building exercises to ensure peace and stability (Mühlberger 2016) in the region of North Africa. Egypt’s actions in the wake of Turkey’s entry into the conflict by calling for a ‘military intervention in Libya’ (Egypt Today, January 12, 2020) and drum rolling support for the five-nation alliance showcases attempts in cementing Egypt’s role in the conflict (Xinhua, January 10, 2020)

as a mediator and a prudent regional actor vis-à-vis Turkey in the region of North Africa.

Egypt's actions stem from its display of indispensability rendered during the UN held peace processes at Morocco (Arafa and Mieczyslaw 2017) due to its vibrant ties with the Eastern division of Libya. Thus, Egypt's susceptibility in being both a regional ally as well as a significant counterweight to balance Turkey has resulted in Egypt being chosen as the headquarters for the EMGF. This has been reflected in the enlargement of the stakes in the positive interdependencies by Israel, Greece and Cyprus with Egypt given the latter's amicability with the regional as well as non-regional powers viz. USA, EU, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (Eljarh 2020). This renders flocking around Egypt as a potential insurance cover against the regional security challenges posed by Turkey in their respective EEZs as well as in receiving the necessary impetus towards sustaining their energy security agendas through the medium of the EMGF.

Hence, for transit points Greece and Cyprus, the EMG pipeline remains a key in delivering their economic dispositions while seeking disengagement from Turkey. This is in fact due to their shared animosity for Turkey given the latter's military intervention into Cyprus (1974) resulting in the creation of contentious maritime borders with Turkey. Adding fuel to the animosity has been Turkey's desire for exploration operations in the EEZs of Greece and Cyprus (Aydintasbas et al. 2020) creating regional security challenges for both Greece and Cyprus. As Turkey remains a non-signatory to the UNCLOS, it does not recognize the right of islands in enjoying EEZs (Sotiriou 2020) which is the case with Greece and Cyprus possessing islands as part of their political boundaries. As Cyprus is an island country with an ethnic Greek population and the epicentre of the EMG pipeline, Nicosia's selection as the permanent Secretariat for the trilateral summits between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus and between Egypt, Greece and Cyprus throws light on its geostrategic importance (Pedi 2019) in terms of both energy as well as regional security in relation with Turkey. Hence, Greece and Cyprus have chosen to rally behind Egypt by extending cooperation through trilateral summits, maritime delimitation agreements (Lindenstrauss 2019) and the EMGF membership. The decision to join the five-nation alliance further cements their positive interdependencies with Egypt so as to insure their economic and national interests, case in point being the contested EEZs with Turkey.

Israel's choice in staying neutral by being absent from the five-nation alliance that includes Greece, Egypt and Cyprus in Libya's conflict explains Israel's geostrategy in appreciating Egypt's regional prowess in the region of North Africa (Lerman 2019) while ensuring its market for natural gas exports

to Egypt. Also, Israel's decision to cooperate on the EMG pipeline was purely economic in nature given its rapprochement with Greece and Cyprus that took place against the backdrop of degraded ties with Turkey due to the Mavi Marmara incident (Prontera and Mariusz 2017). This was due to Israel's newly found fundamentals in natural gas and electricity exports. But with Turkey's drilling operations in the disputed EEZ of Cyprus that is close to the Israeli gas fields, its perception of security threat from Turkey inevitably matched with that of Cyprus and Greece's perceptions. Thus, the trilateral summits between them signalled the need to create positive interdependencies in regional security as far as energy security was concerned (Embassy of Greece in Israel, December 21, 2018; Press and Information Service, Cyprus, October 09, 2019). As a result, Israel's membership to the EMGF and its engagement with Turkey's fraught neighbours points to the rising tide of negative interdependencies as far as energy relations with Turkey are concerned.

This correlation between the positive and the negative interdependencies in the region points to the fact that the stakeholders can be biased, manipulative or poorly informed, prompting one to reflect on the element of irrationality in their policy choices (Belyi 2015). On that note, the scholars have been right in noting the tensions between dependent states' need for security of supply and producing states' need for security of demand (Belyi 2015). In this regard, France and Italy's push towards steering the EU into the EMGF remains instrumental given their oil companies' presence in the region (Aydintasbas et al. 2020; Alterman, Conley, and Malka 2018).

The build-up to France and Italy's interest in the EMGF membership remains energy infrastructure investments in the EMGF's member states. Significant among them are Italy's involvement in the construction of the EMG pipeline (Energy Egypt, April 30, 2020), Eni (Piera 2020), Electricite de France, Engie (Energy Egypt, November 25, 2019; Energy Egypt, December 8, 2019) and Agence Française de Développement's investments (AFD, June 16, 2020) into Egypt's renewable energy infrastructure projects. Interestingly, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever have characterized Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) as having a flexible interstate relationship, whereby states can be a part of two or more RSCs, which may also overlap with each other geographically (Belyi 2015).

Thus, the driving force of RSCs is the enmity and amity relationships among the states within the complex rather than the balance of power resulting into regional security integration (Adamides and Odysseas 2015). Such flexibility of interstate relationships within two RSCs led to the development of positive interdependencies by France and Italy with fellow EU members Cyprus and Greece enabling them to jointly request the 'February

2020 sanctions against Turkey' due to the latter's pervasive activities in the Eastern Mediterranean waters and Libya (Council of the EU, February 27, 2020). Thus, given the widespread discontent harboured by the EMGF states against Turkey, it becomes pivotal to understand the trigger points behind the formulation of negative interdependencies in the region.

'Negative interdependence' represents a situation whereby states show unwillingness in being dependent on the other resulting in the emergence of energy security problems (Belyi 2015). This has been particularly witnessed in the case of harbouring energy-based ties with Turkey who seems isolated from the deepening positive interdependencies in the region. Be it Turkey's actions in negotiating a 'maritime boundary agreement with GNA' or its activities in the 'contested waters of Greece and Cyprus', they have been both 'denounced as invalid' under the international law by the Eastern division in Libya as well as the five-nation alliance (Eljarh 2020; Aydintasbas et al. 2020).

In the light of such developments, the EU's position as an observer in the EMGF (S&P Global Platts, January 17, 2020; Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, May 18, 2020) cannot escape due consideration. The EU had been sending representatives to the high-level working group meetings held under the EMGF (Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, May 20, 2020) which indicates the EU's primary energy security concerns emanating from its dependence on Russian energy supplies (Belyi 2015). With hydrocarbon discoveries so close to Europe viz. in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean region, the EU has sought to create positive interdependencies in the region by seeking an alternative to Russian supplies that are currently being transported via Turkey (Turk Stream pipeline; Alterman, Conley, and Malka 2018).

Thus, the EU by rendering a negative interdependence with Russia and Turkey has sought to balance it through positive interdependencies through the medium of investments into Egypt's renewable energy segment and funding for the EMG pipeline. With Turkey's growing assertiveness in Libya and the contentious EEZs of EU members Greece and Cyprus, the EU has been forced to take a stand alongside the EMGF member states given their geo-strategic interests in the region. Barry Buzan in his book 'Peoples, States and Fear' had called for re-assessing the term 'securitization' which is a non-linear reaction to a threat (Belyi 2015). Building on Buzan's argument, the EU's actions have indeed taken a non-linear reaction by engaging in 'Medusa 9 joint military exercises' (November 2019; Greek City Times, November 5, 2019) and 'Operation Irini' to enforce an 'arms embargo on Libya' (April 2020; EEAS, April 1, 2020) to ensure both regional peace as well as energy diversification.

Hence, two results can be inferred from the above-mentioned dimensions of energy security underpinning the EMGF:

a) Energy cooperation has been needed with state actors that are willing to develop friendly relations both bilaterally as well as multilaterally. The maritime delimitation agreements, energy exploration and infrastructure arrangements have been clear pointers in this regard. Thus, the establishment of the EMGF remains pivotal in consolidating the member-states roles as energy players in the burgeoning energy fundamentals of the region.

b) The absence of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Libya from the EMGF membership indicates the wariness of the member states in taking risks with unfriendly or politically unstable countries. The non-members absence during inter-governmental negotiations was in fact due to the EMGF member states reluctance in including them during the trilateral and bilateral mechanisms. These mechanisms have in turn augmented the developing of negative interdependencies in the region thereby exacerbating the region's security challenges.

Thus, a close reading of the above-mentioned dimensions indicates that the EMGF state actors have by and large embraced the development of certain transnational norms that have been adapted within the EMGF's framework. However, they have necessarily become impediments in realizing the region's energy interests as a whole calling into question the long-term viability of the EMGF.

Issues and Concerns in the EMGF initiative

As 'multi-scale governance' gains traction in the field of energy markets and infrastructures, the adaptability of the various state and non-state actors to the various norms, rules and values of an economic activity plays a key role in defining the new role of sovereignty in IPE (Belyi 2015). As per the new institutional economics, a boundedly rational choice approach is applied in defining institutions which can be derived either from a social or an economic context (Raudla 2014). Thus, the major theme that spells from the objectives of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum has been energy security mired with the need to ensure regional security in the region (State Information Service, May 19, 2020). As transnational norms, rules and values can find acceptance in certain parts of the world or in certain expert communities and businesses (Belyi 2015), the development of the same when it comes to the EMGF appears skewed given the member states interests looming large over the non-member's interests. This has been explained in the below-mentioned

arenas.

Membership criteria

Ties related to energy infrastructure has played out significantly into establishing the membership criteria in the EMGF. Beginning with Egypt, the star player in the region, its possession of the Arab Gas Pipeline, SUMED pipeline as well as the two LNG infrastructures at Idku and Damietta (Stonaker 2010) have benefitted customers such as France and Jordan. This paved the candidature for all the three to become members of the EMGF. Palestine's 2016 Electricity agreement with Israel, its electricity imports from Egypt and prospects attached to the Gaza Marine gas field have found clearance as to Palestine's application for EMGF membership (OQ, n.d.). Greece's fundamentals in energy infrastructure had been recognised through the presence of Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), an extension of TANAP (Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline) passing through Turkey (Tagliapietra 2020). With EU looking at energy diversification from Turkey and given Israel and Cyprus' inability in possessing energy infrastructure, the EU by commissioning the EMG pipeline has sought to transport similar volumes as TAP (Eran 2019).

The decision to construct the EMG pipeline from the Israeli coast to Greece and onwards from Italy into Europe during the trilateral summits between Greece, Cyprus and Israel was the final straw in placing the state parties within the spectrum of the EMGF membership. These developments however come with a caveat when it comes to developing a regional gas market with Turkey, Libya, Syria and Lebanon. By ignoring Turkey's wealth of energy infrastructure projects such as TANAP, Turk stream, Blue stream including renewable energy (Bechev 2020; Livingston, 2018) or Libya's capacity in generating oil and gas that is sixty percent of its total GDP (The Economist, June 11, 2020) or the prospects of hydrocarbons in the waters of Syria and Lebanon (Reuters, December 17, 2019; Aydintasbas et al. 2020), their absence from the EMGF membership indicates the development of a politically-induced norm. The norm to disengage with political systems that are unfriendly or volatile in nature from an institutional economist point of view appears to be structuring the incentives of the member state in deciding the costs and benefits attached to the subscription of such a norm (Raudla 2014).

However, in terms of the IPE such a norm definitely draws down on the energy fundamentals of Turkey, Libya, Syria and Lebanon stopping short of conceiving the notion of a 'regional' gas market as underlined under the

objectives of the EMGF. In the light of such institutional weaknesses, the EMGF can take a leaf off the OPEC's mindfulness (OPEC, n.d.) when it comes to admission of members. The OPEC's playbook has been instrumental in housing key rivals such as Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as the other big and small Petro-states despite their differing national interests (OPEC, n.d.). Thus, it will be a step in the right direction if the EMGF member states take heed to correct one of the institution's paramount deficiency.

Energy resource development

The politically-induced norm while admitting members to the forum has also been effectively applied when considering awardees for exploration contracts in the region's offshore fields. With Italy's 'Eni enjoying a 50% stake in the Bouri field of Libya' (S&P Global Platts, January 29, 2020, in 'Map: Libya's oil and gas infrastructure'), energy supplies to Italy have continued despite the challenges posed by the conflict in Libya (Villa 2016). As best-practice transfers remain a standard practice in the field of energy policy (Belyi 2015), Eni's prowess has led it to receive contracts in the offshore fields of Cyprus and Egypt. This has not deterred the other international companies such as Rosneft and Novatek (Russia), Total (France) and Delek (Israel) from participating and winning exploration contracts in the offshore fields of Egypt, Cyprus and Israel respectively. Such instances indicate the stark realities behind the formation of a value system based on energy and security partnerships.

France, Italy, Russia are active players in the conflict in Libya as well as in the offshore oil fields of the EMGF member states. Israel on the other hand due to its superior military systems has enlarged its support base with Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt (Lerman, 2019) in exchange for cooperation in exporting natural gas through a shared pipeline. As deterring Turkey remains core to the EMGF's interests French air and naval support to monitor Turkey's activities (Kohler 2020) and Israel's testing of sea-to-sea missiles (The Times of Israel, September 25, 2020) to warn Turkey bears witness to the allegiance by the EMGF members to safeguard the value-system of energy and security partnerships. Meanwhile, the adoption of this value-system remains absent from the exploration and production agreements of the non-member states viz. Libya's GNA to Italy (Eni) and Turkey, Lebanon to France (Total) (Middle East Eye, February 13, 2021) and Russia (Novatek) (NOVATEK, February 09, 2018), Syria to Russian oil companies (Mercury LLC and Velada LLC) (Reuters, December 17, 2019) and Turkey to its state-owned firms (Al Jazeera, August 27, 2020). Libya, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey's trust deficit in engaging with

other oil companies in the region stems from the relative absence of energy partnerships with EMGF member-states propelling them to favour the oil companies of their respective regional security providers in the development of their energy resources. Hence, the above-mentioned value-system is not conducive to all the members of the Eastern Mediterranean region thereby questioning the fundamentality of the EMGF as being a representative of the region as a whole.

UNCLOS norms

The norms laid down by the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea) has been sparking conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean region (Stocker 2012). The recent maritime delimitation agreements signed between Italy and Greece and between Cyprus, Egypt and Israel have been in accordance with the norms and principles laid down by the UNCLOS (Sotiriou 2020).

Although Israel is the only non-signatory to the UNCLOS, it has consistently vowed to respect the regional aspirations during the trilateral summits (Sotiriou 2020) as well as during the EMGF negotiations (Macaron 2019) which has been key towards including Israel within the fold of the EMGF. Moreover, with Greece's overtures to Libya to set up a commission on finalizing the maritime zones (Greek City Times, July 04, 2020), the development of a transnational rule as stated by Belyi is reflected in the maritime delimitation of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea in terms of development of energy resources.

However, there's a substantive deficiency in the creation of this norm due to the digression from the principle emancipated under Part XV of the UNCLOS. Part XV calls for resorting to alternative dispute resolution in order to resolve problems pertaining to the delimitation of maritime zones (Sotiriou 2020) which has not been the case with Greece, Cyprus or Egypt evident in their failure to defuse tensions with Turkey. As Turkey lost the opportunity in negotiating maritime delimitation agreements with Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt (Tsukerman, 2020), it chose to negotiate a maritime delimitation agreement with a fellow non-signatory state to the UNCLOS viz. Libya's GNA (Sotiriou 2020).

On the other hand, while Israel claims to respect the international law during maritime delineation of borders it dispute with Lebanon, an UNCLOS signatory remains unresolved (Prontera and Mariusz 2017). This highlights the limited bargaining power of countries like Lebanon or Libya vis-à-vis

Turkey indicative in their silence as regards the maritime delimitation efforts in the region are concerned throwing light on the lack of consensus to the UNCLOS norms in the region. Thus, the closing of doors for participation in the evolving regional gas market based on UNCLOS norms remains skewed. Consequently, the visible disruption to the EMGF member's plans in carving out a bargaining chip in geoeconomics of the region based on their energy fundamentals showcases an early warning. Hence, efforts should be made to build a consensus as to the delineation of maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea by drawing inspiration from customs, precedents, and other sources of international law (Hasan et al. 2019) other than the UNCLOS alone.

Thus, suitable sector-specific mechanisms should be employed by the forum's member states in initiating a dialogue with the other distressed economies in the region in order to enhance the effectiveness of the EMGF as a symbol of energy cooperation both in letter and spirit.

Conclusion

The establishment of the EMGF has been a step in the right direction especially in a region that remains known for its volatile conflicts. The EMGF while having moorings based on energy cooperation and regional security concerns also suffers from institutional weaknesses. This is in fact due to its infancy as an organization vis-à-vis the other regional organizations. As the EMGF's resilience remains to be tested, restructuring of the EMGF is warranted in order to put up a united front against stiff competition from the other major energy players. This can only be realized through mechanisms aimed at dimming the tensions in the region which in turn affects both the EMGF as well as the region's existing and upcoming investments. Regarding the conflict in Libya, a tug-of-war situation has been witnessed between the two fundamental powers in the region - Egypt and Turkey.

However, as possibilities of rapprochement remain open in the wake of withdrawal of the GCC blockade (Egypt was one of the supporters) against Qatar who has been Turkey's ardent supporter (Kabbani 2021), it is prudent enough to opine that Egypt and Turkey's geo-strategic importance as energy gateways should be utilized in harbouring bilateral as well as multilateral energy partnerships with the other regional states. For instance, the extension of the Arab Gas pipeline through Syria, Lebanon and onto Turkey (AFESD, n.d.) can unleash the energy fundamentals of these countries who are primarily not members of the EMGF.

Such scenarios can help build better relations among territories where the pipelines will be built as the incentives associated with pipeline politics remains a potential area of research in this region. Hence, tendencies at harbouring positive interdependencies coupled with the resolve of the member states to rectify the above-mentioned deficiencies can prove fundamental in letting the EMGF grow as a ray of hope for the region.

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ABSTRACT

The East Mediterranean Gas Forum, a nascent regional organisation stands at the crossroads of regional cooperation today. Formed in the wake of natural gas discoveries and the resultant bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, the organisation has been beset with positive and negative interdependencies in the region. These interdependencies highlight the energy and regional security concerns of the region's members. As convergences along energy and regional security lines unfold, the foundational structures of the forum have showcased cracks raising questions regarding its relevance. The study thus seeks to examine the dynamics of the international political economy behind the formation of the EMGF by analysing the convergence of energy and regional security concerns of the specific state actors in the region.

KEYWORDS

The East Mediterranean Gas Forum, Energy security, Regional security, Pipeline, EEZ.

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS JORDAN FROM THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY DIMENSIONS FROM 1990 TO 2017

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Introduction

Foreign policy cannot be dissociated from what we call the theory of international relations (Holsti, 2015). Relations between Jordan and the United States go back to 1949 when diplomatic relations were first established. The United States contributed to providing economic and military assistance to Jordan for the first time since 1951 and 1957, respectively, and has continued until now. The United States and Jordan share the common goals of a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East and to end violent extremism that threatens the security of Jordan, the region, and the world at large. The peace process and counterterrorism between the two countries aid American interests. The United States has helped Jordan maintain its stability and prosperity through military assistance and close political cooperation (Bush, 2009).

This study examines the United States foreign policy towards Jordan from 1990 to 2017. This period witnessed important regional and international political events that significantly impacted American foreign policy in the Arab region and the United States - Jordan in particular. The political events covered in the study have the greatest impact on the development or decline of relations between the two countries in terms of politically and security aspects.

Therefore, the study looks at four political events (Jordanian-American

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Relations during the Iraq War on Kuwait in 1990, Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty (Wadi Araba) on 26 October 1994, the events of September 11, 2001, and Trump's decision to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem in 2017).and explains them in great depth to clarify the relationship between the political event and its impact on Jordanian-American relations from the political and security aspects because every political event has its political and security implications (Sharp, 2019; Vatikiotis, 2017; Schuetze, 2017; Harders, 2016; Sharp, 2015; Sharp & Blanchard, 2012).

In addition to the political aspects, the United States also supported Jordan from the security side in the years 1990-2017 (Congressional Research Service, 2018). Security assistance includes Foreign Military Financing (FMF), provision of Military Equipment, International Military Education and Training (IMET), and De-Mining Operations (Vatikiotis, 2017).

This study will explore the US foreign policy towards Jordan from the political and security aspects and clarify the relationship between the political event and its impact on Jordanian-American relations politically and militarily.

Research Questions

1. What is U.S. foreign policy towards Jordan from the political aspect?
2. What is U.S. foreign policy towards Jordan from the security aspect?

Significance of the Study

This study is expected to be significant in three broad dimensions. First, it will provide some literature that contributes to the body of knowledge by looking at United States' foreign policy towards Jordan. The research will also shed light on the state of the relationship between the United States and Jordan from aspects (political and security) and knowing the role and importance of the distinguished geographical location of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the Middle East for the benefit of the United States. Second, it will benefit policymakers in both the U.S. and Jordan in making appropriate and strategic foreign policy decisions of mutual gain for the two countries. Third, this research is expected to guide future studies in the area.

Scope of the study

This study explores United States foreign policy towards Jordan from 1990 to 2017. The year 1990 was pivotal because it represented a radical change in the world order, as it shifted from bipolar to unipolar. The United States became the sole global power in the aftermath of the Cold War. The year 2017 marks the end of this study because it constituted an important event, the transfer of the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Therefore, the embassy move event is significant for Jordan because Jordan is the guardian of the holy places in Jerusalem according to the Wadi Araba agreement. The data covers the study period to analyze the impact of US foreign policy toward Jordan and identifies the determinants of international relations in line with the country's policy due to the importance of foreign policy as proven in the empirical literature.

Literature Review

Saleh and Yassin (2020) explain in a study entitled *Jordanian-American Political Relations 1990-1993*, Jordan's regional and international role in its attempts to settle Arab issues in Palestine and Iraq. Since the United States viewed Jordan as a major party in its political vision, it strived to ensure its security and stability, which is directly reflected in ensuring the security of (Israel). From this standpoint, Jordan took advantage of its position with the United States to highlight its role towards peace and this approach made it within the circle of American interest and support on an ongoing basis. The study adopted a qualitative approach as a case study.

Furthermore, the study entitled *Political and Economic Relations between the United States and Jordan 1990-2019* explains that The Kingdom of Jordan is a major partner of the United States in the Middle East. The research is based on a main hypothesis that local, regional and international factors affected the Jordanian-American relations to shape the nature of cooperation between them. The main objective is to reveal the main aspects underpinning Jordanian-American relations. The study followed a qualitative approach to study the relationship between the two sides (Sheikh, 2020).

In addition, (Sheikh, 2020), in another study entitled (*Relationship between Jordan and United States in the context of Military Aid and Alliance*), explains that Jordan has attracted the attention of international powers for decades because of its unique characteristics as a country, furthermore Jordan's unique location in the heart of the Middle East.

Accordingly, in his work entitled *A History of the Modern Middle East*, William L. Cleveland examines the emergence of American relations in the Middle East and discusses the factors that led the United States to direct its political interests toward the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as one of the Middle East countries. The study focused on the specificity of the Jordanian-American relationship, monitoring the repercussions of this relationship, its material feasibility, and its political consequences. (Cleveland, 2018).

Accordingly, in his study *A Comparative Analysis of Jordanian and United States Counterterrorism*, Cash explores that the study will provide a comprehensive examination of counterterrorism in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the United States. A multifaceted analysis of counterterrorism in Jordan (the social, economic, and political drivers of terrorism, historical counterterrorism efforts, and its contemporary successes and failures) will be supplemented by an overall report on US counterterrorism. Jordan's counterterrorism successes were analyzed to reveal whether certain practices could be applied in America (Cash, 2018).

According to (Kinne, 2018) in a study entitled *The Confluence of American and Jordanian Exceptionalism: An Enduring or Transactional Relationship*, explains that the confluence of shared security interests, King Abdullah II's leadership in the region, and the country's geographically strategic position make Jordan a vital US partner in the pursuit and protection of national security interests in the Middle East region. US legislators and military leaders must understand the dynamics of the security, economic, and social threats that endanger Jordan's stability and work to achieve balance in the region. US. policy toward the Hashemite Kingdom must recognize and promote "Jordanian exceptionalism."

According to his study entitled *(Simulating, marketing, and playing war: US-Jordanian military collaboration and the politics of commercial security)*, Schuetze reported the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Centre (KASOTC) was financed and established by the US Department of Defence. The study adopted a qualitative approach through important empirical security studies based on interviews and observations made during a visit to KASOTC in early 2013 (Schuetze, 2017).

Furthermore, in *The Future of U.S.-Jordanian Counterterrorism Cooperation*, Hardin Lang, William Wechsler, and Alia Awadallah explored the political and economic relations between Jordan and the United States. These relations were influenced by the repercussions of the events of September 11, 2001 (Lang, Wechsler, & Awadallah, 2017). It adopted a qualitative, historical, and descriptive approach.

Al Sarhan (2017) examined the signing of The Jordan-Israel Peace

Treaty of October 26, 1994, which markedly enhanced US-Jordan bilateral relations to unprecedented levels. The United States' foreign aid from political, economic, and military aspects, Qualifying Industrial Zones, and the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement have dramatically boosted the Jordanian economy and modernized its military weapon systems. The study adopted a qualitative approach to historical – descriptive.

Looking at Gutkowski's study, we are the very model of a moderate Muslim state: The Amman Messages and Jordan's foreign policy discussing moderation as its importance as one of the most problematic rhetorical dualities in the "War on Terror," moderation is largely a theoretical and empirical category in the field of international relations. This study examines "Islamic moderation" as part of the branding of Middle Eastern countries in the decade and a half since 9/11 and adopted a qualitative approach using Jordan as a case study (Gutkowski, 2016).

Al-Rousan (2013) study adopted the historical analytical descriptive approach. This method was followed in order to deduce the consistent and persistent American bias towards Israel and build concepts and generalizations that explain it. The study considered the approach of the international system, which included external variables that enabled the formation of the external political decision biased towards Israel.

Theoretical Framework

This study adopted the Realist theory (classical and neo). Classical realism is based on the following assumptions: power is the basis in international relations, the state is the basic unit of analysis, ethics is a secondary factor, and alliances are what determine the balance of power. In view of the neo- realism, it has modified its principles to conform to the new reality from the security, economic and political side (Milani, 2018, Cox, 2016).

The relations between the US and Jordan that are expressed in political and military initiatives ultimately serve the American interests in the Middle East. The anarchic nature of the world in general and the Middle East, in particular, made the United States maintain and appease strategic allies in the region to maximise power and enhance its security. The geographical position of Jordan in the Middle East made it very important to the interest of the United States. For instance, the border between Jordan and Israel made Jordan crucial for protecting American interests in Israel. Also, Jordan, as an ally of the US in the region, sharing the border with Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the West Bank, placed the US in a position of power, security and

hegemony dominance.

After analyzing the interviews and the results of the study, the closest theory adopted by the study is neo-realism.

Research Methodology

Qualitative research may be considered as a more appropriate approach than quantitative research for studying and gaining an understanding of behaviour and a deeper understanding of the participants' personal experiences (Bryman, 2017; Yilmaz, 2013).

The researcher is the primary research tool in qualitative research. Since qualitative research is interpretive research, the researcher's biases, beliefs, and assumptions can interfere with data analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Social researchers should attempt to neutralize or bracket their biases through full disclosure (Noble & Smith, 2015; Chenail, 2011). Accordingly, no direct relationship of any participant with the researcher represented a conflict of interest, such as a reporting relationship, contract, or any relationship with the researcher that might have conveyed a bias in the research study. The researcher conducted interviews with many people to obtain saturated information to answer the research questions.

Samples in qualitative approaches are usually small and targeted. The goal of qualitative researchers is to achieve saturation (Boddy, 2016). The sample was taken from political, economic and security experts in Jordan and the United States as follows (people in decision-making in Jordan such as former Prime Ministers and former Foreign Ministers, officials of government and private study centres in Jordan, university lecturers at Jordanian public universities in international relations, Senior military retirees in the Jordanian army, American lecturers). English was not the mother tongue of the Jordanian participants.

The participants were recruited by accessing the phone numbers of the decision-making personnel from the relevant ministries, and they were contacted by phone to determine the appropriate date for the face-to-face interview. Coordination was made with university lecturers by going to universities and coordinating with them to set the interview date in the place that suits them and the exact date. As for the study centres and military experts, it was coordinated by phone to schedule the interviews.

In this regard, Creswell (1998) suggested five to 25 sample size as suitable for qualitative research to reach the saturation point. However, Morse (1994) proposed at least six. Thus, going by Creswell (1998), in this study, 16

people will be selected to conduct the semi-structured interviews.

The study adopted interviews as a data collection tool for the primary data. While the secondary data were obtained from books, journals, theses, newspapers, seminar papers, articles and other documents.

Hill et al. (2005) recommend an interview protocol of 8-10 questions with discussion to fit within one hour. It also recommends conducting at least two trial interviews to test the questions. Accordingly, two experimental interviews were conducted to test the questions. The first interview was on campus with a university lecturer with a specialization in international relations. The second interview was also with a university specialist in political affairs. The questions were developed after the experimental interviews to suit the desired goal: to obtain saturated information for the main study questions. The number of interview questions was eight.

Table 1: Participant List

Participant	Gender	State	Major
1	M	Jordan	Head of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies
2	M	Jordan	Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs 2016
3	M	Jordan	University lecturer (international relations)
4	M	Jordan	University lecturer (international relations)
5	M	Jordan	University lecturer (international relations)
6	M	Jordan	Head of the University of Jordan Studies Centre
7	M	Jordan	University lecturer (international political economy)
8	M	Jordan	Prime Minister (June 1991 - November 1991)
9	M	Jordan	University lecturer (political science)
10	M	Jordan	Foreign Minister 2011
11	M	Jordan	Retired Major General (modern)
12	M	Jordan	Retired Major General (modern)
13	M	Jordan	Minister of Foreign Affairs (1991-1993)
14	M	USA	University lecturer (international relations)
15	M	USA	University lecturer (international relations)
16	M	USA	University lecturer (international relations)

Source: Own elaboration.

Participants were recruited by accessing the phone numbers of

decision-makers from the relevant ministries, and they were contacted by phone to determine the appropriate date for the face-to-face interview, and coordination was made with the university lecturers by going to universities and coordinating with them to set the interview date in the place that suits them and the exact date. As for the study centres and security experts, coordination was coordinated by phone to schedule the interviews due to the strict measures of the Corona epidemic.

All participants made an audio recording of their data after obtaining their consent and taking pictures with some of them, except for one person from Jordan who refused the audio recording and all communication with him was written.

Data saturation is reached when sufficient information is obtained for the study and when adding new information is obtained (Fusch and Ness, 2015). Saturation was reached in this study after the 16 interviews.

The trustworthiness and validity of qualitative research depend on what the researcher sees and hears (Noble and Smith, 2015). In addition, one way to ensure credibility and portability is to ensure that interviewees have the expertise to discuss the phenomenon that the researcher seeks to explore, and the researcher is not biased (Noble & Smith, 2015). Full and manually transcribed interviews in this section address credibility, portability, reliability, and compatibility. Their coding helped ensure a deep understanding of the interview content and the participant's intent.

According to Chenail (2011), clear rules be established and followed to help reduce bias in research. This researcher had a set of clear rules and many controls to help ensure that the rules were followed. Audio recordings of all interviews prevented the researcher from adding or excluding any data from participant interviews.


Data Analysis

In this study, thematic analysis (TA) was used to analyze interview data. Thematic analysis is a popular method for analysing qualitative data in many disciplines and fields and can be applied in different ways, different datasets to answers research questions. The thematic analysis focuses on identifying patterns of meaning (themes) in qualitative data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The analysis of interview data was conducted using Atlas.ti software for qualitative data analysis. The purpose of using Atlas.ti software was to help the researcher uncover and systematically analyze the interview data. The program provides tools that help researchers to locate, code, and annotate

findings.


The data were collected using semi-structured interviews and analyzed using inductive thematic analysis. As stated earlier in the methodology part, Atlas.ti software for qualitative analysis was used to code and present the relevant information from the interview data. The interview questions were piloted to determine if there is a need to restructure the questions before the actual interview. Subsequently, the questions were refined and used for the actual study. The results of the analysis of the interviews related to the first question in the following figures:

Figure 1: US foreign policy recognizes Jordan as a close ally and considers its stability very important




Source: Own elaboration.

Figure 2: US foreign policy was slightly negative toward Jordan during The Iraqi War on Kuwait in 1990




Source: Own elaboration.

Figure 3: The Wadi Araba peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994 plays a significant role in promoting positive US foreign policy toward Jordan



Source: Own elaboration.

Figure 4: US foreign policy towards Jordan slightly weakened in 2017 because Jordan was against the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem



Source: Own elaboration.

The second research question explores US foreign policy towards Jordan from a security aspect. The findings related to the second research question are presented in the following table.

Table 2: US foreign policy towards Jordan from the security aspect

SN	Themes	Exemplary quotes	Source
1	US foreign policy supports Jordanian military in terms of security intelligence, army presence, and military equipment	The US seeks to preserve Jordan... militarily	P1
		The US support addresses Jordan's weaknesses militarily	P12
		The US views Jordan as a major ally in the fight against terrorism	P9
		[Wadi Araba] has decreased the likelihood of hostility between Jordan and Israel	P14
		Jordan receives aid on military equipment	P3
		[The US] is the main supporter of Jordan through its military	P3
		...the US aid is used to cover part of the armament side of equipment	P11
		The US has a military presence in Jordan	P7
		There is an exchange of confidential information between the two countries	P8

2	US foreign policy supports Jordan to fight terrorism	[There are US military bases] in Jordan in the areas of Safawi, Azraq, and Al-Jafr	P3
		[The US bases], in cooperation with Jordan, are tasked with combating terrorism	P3
		Jordan is a strong ally of the US in the fight against terrorism	P4
		Jordan also participates in terrorism and military operations against terrorism	P4
3	Certain political events play an important role in American foreign policy in terms of military aid towards Jordan	The military cooperation has been strong since the events of [9/11]	P16
		Jordan [supported] the US in its new war against terrorism [during 9/11]	P12
		[The 9/11] event contributed to Jordan's involvement in the war on terror	P11
		[After 9/11], the US launched the coalition against terrorism, and Jordan was an essential part of this alliance	P9
		The war on terror is the most influential component for Jordan to obtain aid from the US	P9
		The negative impact [of 9/11] was [negative because of] the emergence of other terrorist groups in the region towards Jordan	P6

4	US military support for Jordan decreased slightly during the Iraq war on Kuwait in 1990, and military support was maintained during the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem in 2017.	[During Iraqi War on Kuwait], the US considered Jordan's position against its foreign policies	P11
		Jordan took a different position at [Iraqi War on Kuwait] and did not agree with the American proposal to invade Iraq	P12
		[The Iraqi war] was negative for Jordan... greatly affected the Jordanian economy	P1
		[The Iraqi war on Kuwait in 1990] was negative because Jordan stood by Iraq and... this position affected the Jordan-US relations	P3
		[The Iraqi war on Kuwait] was negative on American foreign policy was negative towards Jordan	P4
		...the US foreign policy towards Jordan [during the Iraqi War on Kuwait] was negative	P9
		[During Iraqi War on Kuwait], relations between the US and Jordan were at their lowest levels	P8
		...closing the seaports between Jordan and Iraq [during the Iraqi War on Kuwait]	P9

5	US foreign policy provides military supports to Jordan to protect Israel	Maintaining Israel	P12
		...the Jordanian policy is in line with the American policy to preserve the security and existence of Israel	P13
		The stability of Jordan is important to protecting Israel	P2
		...aimed at protecting and preserving Israel	P13
		[For] the survival and protection of Israel's security in the Arab region	P3
		...protecting the stability of Jordan and Israel	P5
		...it has a relationship with the Palestinian issue. Any change in Jordan will affect Israel	P7
		The US is interested in the issue of stability in Jordan to help the stability of Israel	P8
		[to] preserve longer stability for Israel	P8
		...in support and protection of Israel	P8
		...for maintaining Israel's security and stability	P13
		... and on top of these interests is the protection of Israel	P8
		The US maintains Jordan's stability to preserve the stability of Israel	P13
		...the US support [Wadi Araba] agreement to ensure the stability and security of Israel	P10
		[The US tried] to use Jordan...to solve the Palestinian issue	P15

6	US foreign policy provides military supports to Jordan to spread American ideology and fight against its enemy	Providing a strategic ally in the region to confront any dangers threatening the United States	P1
		To benefit from the military improvement	P12
		The US fears that Jordan will cooperate with Russia	P4
		Jordan can be used to pressure the failure of the Russian-Chinese project	P7
		...to benefit from the expertise of the Jordanian army	P8
		...to Americanize the world...militarily	P9
		Had America not benefited from Jordan, it would not have supported Jordan	P11

Source: Own elaboration.

Discussion of the results

This section presents a discussion of the analysis results related to the political and security aspects. Results are related to the first question which are four results. According to figures I-4, four different themes emerged from the interview data regarding the US foreign policy toward Jordan from the political aspect. First, the US foreign policy recognizes Jordan as a close ally and considers its stability very important. Second, the US foreign policy was slightly negative toward Jordan during The Iraqi War on Kuwait in 1990. Third, the Wadi Araba peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994 plays a significant role in promoting positive US foreign policy toward Jordan. Fourth, the US foreign policy toward Jordan weakened slightly in 2017 because Jordan was against the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem.

As result 1 in figure 1. The US foreign policy recognizes Jordan as a close ally and considers its stability very important. For example, according to a participant, Jordanian-American relations have remained stable during the past twenty years and gradually increased (P12). Another participant added, "Jordanian-American cooperation is an important factor in Jordan's stability and assistance, given that Jordan is closest to the West, especially the United States" (B6).

This result is consistent with the study of Saleh (2020) that Jordanian policy tends to the West, as it is linked to historical relations with the United States. In the assessment of another participant, "The United States, in its relations with Jordan, makes the security of the regime higher than the

security of the society and the state, while the United States tries to influence the security of society and the security of the state together to achieve the security of the regime, and therefore the United States influences Jordan through financial aid and facilitates access to Jordan” referring to loans from the International Monetary Fund to achieve sufficient political stability in Jordan” (B9). The results showed that Jordan is an important ally of the United States. One of the participants said, “The stability that exists in Jordan in light of sectarian and ideological conflicts makes Jordan a magnet for the United States to maintain its stability, and therefore the United States can only deal with Jordan as an ally and friend” (B13). Explains (Sheikha, 2020), the United States helps to improve the design of Jordanian foreign policy to move and play a more significant role on the international arena, and is more effective, and works to change the means and tools that serve this policy and respond to the new international order.

These results are consistent with studies of Cleveland, (2018); Lang, Wechsler & Awadallah (2017); Al Sarhan, (2017). In terms of the following result, Jordan is a major partner and ally of the United States, and that its stability is important to the region. A difference lies in terms of the methodology used. This study used interviews, but previous studies did not use interviews but used the historical and descriptive method to collect data.

In addition, this result is consistent with the Neorealist theory that alliances are important in achieving political stability for countries and thus, Jordan is trying to achieve a coherent alliance with a superpower such as the United States to maintain its stability and security. Through neorealism, the theory attempts to reduce the chaotic nature of the international arena, and neo realists argue that states merely seek to maintain their existence. At the same time, the major powers provide guarantees to shape their security by forming balanced alliances. Also, by keeping pace with the new reality, neo-realism considers that the interdependence on the economic side will have a significant impact on countries by controlling their political decisions through economic support, which will discourage countries from using force against each other and increase their stability.

Accordingly, the study believes that Jordanian-American relations have historically crystallized and have grown stronger with the passage of time due to the importance of Jordan to the United States of America, as Jordan is the closest to the West, and that its stabilizing factor is important in the region to play an important role in peace. A better role on the outside arena.

As a result, in figure 2, US foreign policy was slightly negative toward Jordan during The Iraqi War on Kuwait in 1990. According to the participants, “This event was negative for Jordan because Jordan decided to

stand with the Jordanian people aligned with Iraq in that war and not to stand with the coalition led by the United States and the Gulf states against Iraq to preserve the regime in the Iraqi state. As a result of this decision, Jordan was subjected to many pressures, including the blockade of the port of Aqaba, the prevention of American aid, the return of thousands of expatriates from the Gulf countries and abroad to Jordan, and the cessation of pumping oil from Iraq, which Jordan was getting at symbolic prices.

These results greatly affected the Jordanian economy and lasted almost until mid-1995 when King Hussein bin Talal visited the United States. But the Jordanian position did not turn into political instability because of the harmony between the people and the regime but rather turned into economic instability” (p1, p12, p11, p10, p9, p6, p4, p3, p2). Another participant added, “The American intervention towards Iraq feared the Iranian Shiite extension to the Middle East (p8, 13)”. In a personal interview with CNN (26-7-2021), King Abdullah II of Jordan explained that Iran’s progress through its nuclear program affects Israel and the Persian Gulf and will impact Jordan. This danger has become apparent in Jordan through Iranian drones heading towards Jordan, so the United States fears Iran’s advances in the region. Another participant explains, “The interests of the United States are superior to the interests of its allies, and therefore it sacrificed the interests of Jordan to achieve its interests in that war” (p7).

According to Participant (p7) linking economic aid to political positions harms the Jordanian economy, such as the Iraq war. The United States also asked Jordan to stand with the Syrian opposition during the Syrian crisis, and this led to closing the borders with Jordan, which was considered an important economic resource.

Table 3: US Economic Aid to Jordan (\$ in millions)

FY	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
M\$	35	50	35	28	28.9	30.1	120.4	151.2	251.4	251.7
FY	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	*****
M\$	151.7	251.6	951	352.3	351.6	298.6	255.3	561.4	363.5	*****
FY	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	****	*****
M\$	413.5	463	362	460	564.4	700	615	812.3	****	*****

Source: Sharp, J. M. (2016). Jordan: Background and US relations. Congressional Research Service. Sharp, J. M. (2009). Jordan: Background and US relations. Diane Publishing. Sharp, J. M. (2006). Jordan: Background and US relations. Diane Publishing.

The previous table shows that US economic aid to Jordan is closely linked to Jordan's political position. This is evident in the low volume of aid in the years 1991-1994 during the Iraq war on Kuwait.

Based on the foregoing, this result is consistent with studies of Saleh (2020); Alsarhan (2017); (Kinne, 2018) In terms of the following result, that war was negative for Jordan politically and economically and differs in terms of the methodology used. In addition, this result is consistent with neorealist theory. As a result of the disparity in the balance of power, the United States used economic pressure on Jordan to achieve its political interests. The neorealist view is that the influence of politics is one of how the policies of the status quo and imperialist policies are used to achieve its goals. The aim of this policy is the influence by one country on other countries through the power that it already possesses, believes it possesses or wants others to believe. Also, this result is consistent with this theory that the interdependence between states should be based on relative and not absolute gains, meaning that the gains between the two parties depend on the balance of power and not the amount of interdependence.

Accordingly, the study believes that the political events and the interests of the United States that it wants to achieve with Jordan have a significant role in reducing and raising the relations between the two sides. The previous result shows that the relations have deteriorated due to the Jordanian support for Iraq against the American alliance, which led to the deterioration of the Jordanian economic situation as a result of linking the Iraqi event to cutting aid to Jordan. This indicates that the United States considers its interests to a greater degree than the interests of its allies.

The Wadi Araba peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994 plays a significant role in promoting positive US foreign policy towards Jordan. According to the participant's responses, American foreign policy towards Jordan through this event was positive. For example, one of the participants believes that the United States supports any country that tries to get closer to Israel and Jordan. By signing the Wadi Araba Agreement, relations with the United States returned to their course. Jordan does not have the ability to confront Israel because it is not facing Israel alone, but rather the United States with Israel. The United States also knew that the Arab countries could not confront Israel because of internal disintegration. The United States policy was based on dismantling the Arab camp for ease of confrontation. Thus, it constitutes the third stage of peace and preserves many of Jordan's rights to peace with Israel (p4, p5, p6).

Another participant believes that since the Madrid International Peace

Conference will be led by the United States, there will be no peace conference without the presence of Jordan, and thus this conference is considered incomplete. From here, the United States began to restore its relations with Jordan on this basis. And Jordan could not refuse because of the bad economic situation. In the end, the effect was positive because it broke the barrier of mistrust in Jordan in the second Gulf War and showed Jordan's size in the political efforts seeking peace with Palestine. Therefore, Jordan had an added value to pressure the Palestinians as the strongest party to negotiate. The United States also sees its interest in Jordan, and Jordan sees its interest with the United States as "mutual interest" (p12). Other participants explained that the United States succeeded, through the peace agreement, in turning the Palestinian cause from an Arab-Israeli conflict to a Palestinian-Israeli conflict through peace agreements signed with Arab countries (p3, p10).

Table 4: US Economic Aid to Jordan (\$ in millions)

FY	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
M\$	35	50	35	28	28.9	30.1	120.4	151.2	251.4	251.7
FY	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	*****
M\$	151.7	251.6	951	352.3	351.6	298.6	255.3	561.4	363.5	*****
FY	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	****	*****
M\$	413.5	463	362	460	564.4	700	615	812.3	****	*****

Source: Sharp, J. M. (2016). *Jordan: Background and US relations*. Congressional Research Service. Sharp, J. M. (2009). *Jordan: Background and US relations*. Diane Publishing. Sharp, J. M. (2006). *Jordan: Background and US relations*. Diane Publishing.

The previous table 4 shows that US economic aid to Jordan is closely related to the Jordanian political position. After signing the peace agreement with Israel in 1994, economic relations and American economic support for Jordan increased.

This result is consistent with studies of Sheikha (2020); Lang Wechsler (2017); Alsarhan (2017). In terms of the following result, that agreement was positive and improved the Jordanian-American relations politically and economically, which had declined in the Iraq war on Kuwait. There is also a difference in terms of the approach used in data collection. Also, this result differs with the study of Al-Rousan (2013) in that Al-Rousan believes that the biggest winner from this agreement is Israel, not Jordan.

In addition, this result is consistent with the Neorealist theory

considering the interdependence and rationality of the State, where America used economic pressure on Jordan to achieve its political interests. This is because the effect of politics is one of how the politics of the status quo and imperialist policies are used to achieve their goals. The goal of this policy is the influence of one country on other countries through the power that it already possesses, believes it possesses or wants others to believe in. Also, the new realism that believes that the rationality of the state will push it to solve its problems in international cooperation with its partners, because it will maximize the relative gains over the absolute gains for all, which means excluding the idea of war for a certain period and maximizing power, the possibility of international cooperation and integration.

According to the previous result 3 in figure 3, the study believes that this political event was positive for strengthening relations with the United States because it corresponds to its interests and protects Israel and that the United States supports a positive stance with Israel.

As Jordan is an internally cohesive country with a good influence in the region, the United States sees it as the strongest party to achieve peace in the area. The United States succeeded, through the peace agreement, in transforming the Palestinian issue from an Arab-Israeli conflict into a Palestinian-Israeli conflict through peace agreements signed with Arab countries.

According to the previous result 4 in figure 4, The US foreign policy toward Jordan weakened slightly in 2017 because Jordan was against the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem. For example, the participants see (p7, p1) that the Jordanian position rejects the transfer of the American embassy to Jerusalem, and this contradicts what came in the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement under American auspices regarding the Hashemite guardianship of the holy sites and Al-Aqsa Mosque. This decision is part of the American century deal. During the Trump era, moving the embassy is even greater than that, as it will lead to the liquidation of the Palestinian cause at Jordan's expense because Jordan has begun to feel threats such as the alternative homeland and the geographical and demographic threat. Considering that the Palestinian cause is the first issue for Jordan and thus will affect politically, economically and socially and this creates tension between the two parties and with the United States.

Another participant adds that Jordan is protesting, but in the end, the United States takes the appropriate decision in its interest and the interest of Israel. No matter how strong the partnership between Jordan and the United States is, the United States will not decide against Israel (p13).

Participant (p8) explains that the United States and Israel want to turn

Palestine into a Jewish state, and therefore this decision will make the city completely Jewish and this will be at the expense of Jordan. The solution to the Palestinian issue is through Jordan building itself from the inside politically, economically, and militarily to confront advanced Israel in these areas because the Zionist project is a comprehensive project for all Arab countries, not just Palestine.

Participant (p12) pointed out that the apathy in the relations was on the leadership side but remained in the political and economic aspects due to the value of Jordan in relation to American interests.

Another believes that the United States does not look at the region except the perspective of the Israeli interest, and thus the conditions came to realize the Israeli dream of Israel being the dominant politically, economically, and militarily. Also, the role of the Jewish lobby (AIPAC) was an important factor in the process of American foreign policy towards the Middle East and thus all decisions issued by the United States do not take into account international law, the Security Council, or political legitimacy (p3).

Based on the foregoing, the United States wants to realize the Israeli dream through the Jewish state in Palestine, and this will have catastrophic consequences for Jordan as an alternative homeland for the Palestinians and a solution to the Palestinian issue at Jordan's expense. Also, based on the political event, the United States did not attempt to bring relations with Jordan to an ambiguous aspect. In 2017, the United States provided at least \$1.279 billion in bilateral aid to Jordan from state accounts and foreign operations to aid the Jordanian economy (Sharp, 2019).

This result is consistent with the theory of classical realism in that the stronger party imposes its conditions. It is also in line with neorealism for countries to consider relative gains rather than absolute gains. Also, from the point of view of neorealism, international cooperation is not related to a period because friends may turn into enemies at any time, so countries should use collaboration as much as possible to enhance their strength in all aspects. This applies to some previous events between Jordan and America; for example, relations were strained during the first event, then returned to increase relations through the second and third event of the study.

The study believes that this political event was negative for Jordan because it would lead to the liquidation of the Palestinian cause at the expense of Jordan because Jordan began to feel threats such as the alternative homeland and the geographical and demographic threat, considering that the Palestinian cause is the first issue for Jordan. Therefore, will affect politically, economically and socially, creating tensions between the two parties and the United States.

In addition, America and Israel are attempting to transform Palestine into a Jewish state, and this decision will make the city completely Jewish, and this will be at Jordan's expense.

A discussion of the analysis results related to US foreign policy toward Jordan from the security perspective of the second question. As shown in Table 2, six different themes emerged from the interview data regarding to the US foreign policy toward Jordan from the security perspective. First, US foreign policy supports the Jordanian military in terms of security intelligence, army presence, and military equipment. Second, US foreign policy supports Jordan to fight terrorism. Third, US military support toward Jordan in the fight against terrorism increased after the 9/11 attacks. Fourth, US military support toward Jordan decreased slightly during The Iraqi War on Kuwait in 1990 and the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem in 2016. Fifth, US foreign policy provides military supports to Jordan to protect Israel. Sixth, US foreign policy provides military support to Jordan to spread American ideology and fight against its enemy.

As result 1 in table 3 shows, US foreign policy supports the Jordanian military in terms of security intelligence, army presence, and military equipment. According to the participants' responses, participants (p10, p12) believe that the United States supports Jordan with military equipment for the Jordanian armed forces to develop its defence system to obtain advanced technology and defend Jordan and Israel's security.

Concerning American military support, the participant (p7, p5) believes that the United States has a military presence in Jordan through military advisors and American military bases in Jordan. Therefore, any instability in Jordan will threaten the United States. It will try to find a solution to the instability due to Jordan's link with Israel and the Gulf States Allies with America located on the Jordanian border.

The United States also fears that Jordan will become a centre for terrorist organizations. The same participant (p7) adds that US military support to Jordan does not constitute 25 per cent of the US budget, as the total US military spending is about one billion eight hundred million dollars. Participant (p1) believes that the support is disproportionate compared to the size of the alliance. The US military assistance to Jordan is limited to not affect Israel in terms of the balance of power. Participant (p3) confirms what Participant (p1) addressed that the weapons provided to Jordan are not from the new and advanced generations but the old generations. These weapons are of a defensive type, not offensive so that there is a difference in the balance of power with Israel, which possesses advanced defensive and offensive weapons.

Participant (p4) indicated that the United States is aware of any mistake with Jordan that will reflect the cause of its reality, its political presence and America's fears after the emergence of the new Russian role from Jordan's tendency to cooperate with Russia instead of the United States.

This result is consistent with studies of Saleh (2020); Sheikha (2020); Cash (2018); Schuetze (2017); Alsarhan(2017); Sharp (2015) in terms of the result and differs in terms of the approach used in data collection.

This result is consistent with neorealist theory through alliances and common interests. The new reality of states is a fundamental interest in power and knowledge of military and economic capabilities - not as an end but as an important tool for achieving security in this cause. It attaches importance to the intentions of its peaceful neighbours or international norms (institutions that renounce violence and encourage international cooperation), but always realize that it cannot rely on the sustainability and effectiveness of such favourable conditions. Security is not the only goal of states, but it is the primary goal, as it seeks to achieve other goals related to their ability to achieve adequate levels of security.

According to the result, the study believes that the United States supports Jordan in security to develop its defence system to obtain advanced technology, defend the security of Jordan and Israel, and achieve a military presence in Jordan through military advisors and American military bases in Jordan. Therefore, any instability in Jordan would threaten the United States. And it will try to find a solution to the instability due to Jordan's association with Israel and the Gulf States allied with America on the Jordanian border.

Also, the American fear that Jordan will become a centre for terrorist organizations, and this, in turn, threatens Israel. In addition, the study believes that the American security support for Jordan is low compared to the size of the alliance and gives that the volume of spending is limited so as not to become a disparity in the balance of power between Jordan and Israel.

The participants believe that in result 2 in table 3, US foreign policy provides military support towards Jordan to fight terrorism. Participant (p3) indicated that Jordan has suffered from terrorism. The Amman Message is a great international bell to talk about extremism and terrorism and the events of the Arab Spring and the fall of the Syrian state captive to terrorism in 2011. Also, the presence of ISIS in 2014 is a danger reflected in local, regional, and international security. Hence, the United States formed the Thirty Coalition led by the United States and Jordan to combat terrorism after the September events. Jordan has a powerful intelligence apparatus that makes the United States turn its attention to Jordan to combat terrorism. Given the limited capabilities of Jordan, it cannot achieve this without the help of the United

States.

Participants (p3, p1, p6) explain US military bases in Jordan in the areas of Safawi, Azraq and Jafr. Their main mission is to combat terrorist organizations such as ISIS to maintain Jordan's stability. Jordan is also more interested in stopping extremist groups than in Western countries from removing Islam from suspicion.

Participant (p8) stated that the United States supports its allies to fight terrorism on its behalf by proxy instead of going to their regions. Participant (p2) supports that Jordan's position is in line with the United States in combating extremist Islam and America's fear of an increase in the number of Arab youth and that young people have emotional and romantic tendencies. Bypassing the stage of the Arab Spring, the United States supported Jordan in its war against terrorism.

The United States is the cause of terrorism in the Middle East due to its blockade of Iraq in 1991, the war in Afghanistan, and then the Iraq war in 2003, which made those countries vulnerable to extremist ideology as a result of poverty and unemployment in those countries. Since the nineties, Western countries have linked the idea of terrorism to Islam, and this link is rejected by King Abdullah II, to prove to the world and the United States that Jordan represents moderate Islam far from extremism, so it fights terrorism (p9, p3, p10, p7).

Participant (p9) explains that Jordan's access to US aid is linked to its war on terrorism through the Americans' recognition that Jordan is a major ally in the fight against terrorism.

These results are consistent with studies by Sheikh (2020); Cash (2018); Gutkowski (2016) in terms of the result regarding the issue of combating terrorism between Jordan and the United States, considering terrorism as a global phenomenon and differs with it in terms of the methodology used. This study used interviews, but previous studies did not use interviews but used the historical and descriptive method to collect data. It is also consistent with the theories related to the study. This result also is consistent with neo-realism theory through alliances and common interests. The new reality of states is a fundamental interest in power and knowledge of military and economic capabilities - not as an end in itself but as an important tool for achieving security in this cause. It attaches importance to the intentions of its peaceful neighbours or international norms (institutions that renounce violence and encourage international cooperation), but always realize that it cannot rely on the sustainability and effectiveness of such favourable conditions. Security is not the only goal of states, but it is the primary goal, as it seeks to achieve other goals related to their ability to achieve adequate levels of security.

As mentioned, the US is seen as a root cause for terrorism in the region. Since the 1990s, Western countries have linked the idea of terrorism to Islam. King Abdullah II rejects this link to prove to the world and the United States that Jordan represents moderate Islam far from extremism, so it is fighting terrorism.

According to result 3 in table 3, certain political events play an important role in American foreign policy in terms of military aid towards Jordan. According to the participants' responses, the September event had a positive impact by strengthening their relations in the face of terrorism. Participant (p3) indicated that Jordan has suffered from terrorism. The Amman Message is a great international bell to talk about extremism and terrorism and the events of the Arab Spring and the fall of the Syrian state captive to terrorism in 2011. Also, the presence of ISIS in 2014 is a danger reflected on local, regional, and international security. Hence, the United States formed the Thirty Coalition led by the United States and Jordan to combat terrorism after the September events. Jordan has a powerful intelligence apparatus that makes the United States turn its attention to Jordan to combat terrorism. Given the limited capabilities of Jordan, it cannot achieve this without the help of the United States.

Participant (p9) stated the impact of US foreign policy on Jordan and expressed that Jordanians began to witness something of the new security doctrine adopted by Jordan, which was previously before the signing of the Wadi Araba agreement characterized between defence and attack. Still, after the signing of the Wadi Araba agreement, some of the military power has been restructuring. Israel is no longer in the direction of this strategy. Jordan's security and military strategy is also linked to the American strategy, which is clearly and explicitly studied through support, aid, arming, and joint manoeuvres among them. This happens despite the positive state of adaptation between Jordan and America, but there is a kind of negative aspect at the intellectual, ideological and security level in Jordan. For example, the war against terrorism, the coalition against terrorism, and the establishment of US military bases in the region, consequently has internal security implications through the people's dissatisfaction with the existence of such military bases.

Participant (p7) also explains that with the signing of the Wadi Araba agreement and peace with Israel, the volume of Jordanian military spending increased, which is the opposite of what was expected from the peace agreement with Israel that Jordan would not remain threatened by Israel. The following table shows the volume of US military aid to Jordan.

Table 5: US Military Aid to Jordan (\$ in millions)

FY	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
M\$	35	50	35	28	28.9	30.1	120.4	151.2	251.4	251.7
FY	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	*****
M\$	151.7	251.6	951	352.3	351.6	298.6	255.3	561.4	363.5	*****
FY	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	****	*****
M\$	413.5	463	362	460	564.4	700	615	812.3	****	*****

Source: Sharp, J. M. (2016). *Jordan: Background and US relations*. Congressional Research Service. Sharp, J. M. (2009). *Jordan: Background and US relations*. Diane Publishing. Sharp, J. M. (2006). *Jordan: Background and US relations*. Diane Publishing.

It is clear from the previous table that the amount of US aid to Jordan increased during the Wadi Araba agreement and the September events because these events are consistent with US interests in the region and the protection of Israel.

These results are consistent with studies of Sheikh (2020); Cash, (2018); Yom & Samour (2017) in terms of the result and differ from it in terms of the methodology used. This study used interviews, but previous studies did not use interviews but used the historical and descriptive method and comparative study.

This result is consistent with Neorealist theory due to the gains obtained and the belief that alliances are important in the state's political stability. Also, the vital factor of the Neorealist interpretation of foreign policy focuses on the societal interests prevailing in the country. These interests are always determined according to the issue or issues facing the country.

The study believes that some political events play an important role in US foreign policy regarding military aid to Jordan. The September 11 event was positive regarding relations and the increase in US military aid to Jordan. But it poses a threat through the presence of new US military bases in Jordan, and the volume of Jordanian military spending increased after the signing of the peace treaty; thus, Jordan, with the signing of the agreement with Israel, is still greatly concerned about the Israeli threat to Jordan.

As presented in table 3 in result 4, the participants considered that US military support towards Jordan decreased slightly during The Iraqi War on Kuwait in 1990 and the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem in 2017. According to the participants' responses, most of the participants emphasized that the Iraq event was negative for Jordan, as it was previously explained,

due to not joining the allied coalition led by the United States. The embassy move was also negative for Jordan from a political point of view (P9, P12), as previous results showed that the United States links political events with the size of aid, be it economic or military. The following table shows the volume of US military aid to Jordan.

Table 6: US Military Aid to Jordan (\$ in millions)

FY	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
M\$	35	50	35	28	28.9	30.1	120.4	151.2	251.4	251.7
FY	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	*****
M\$	151.7	251.6	951	352.3	351.6	298.6	255.3	561.4	363.5	*****
FY	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	****	*****
M\$	413.5	463	362	460	564.4	700	615	812.3	****	*****

Source: Sharp, J. M. (2016). *Jordan: Background and US relations*. Congressional Research Service. Sharp, J. M. (2009). *Jordan: Background and US relations*. Diane Publishing. Sharp, J. M. (2006). *Jordan: Background and US relations*. Diane Publishing.

It is clear from the previous table 6 that the volume of US aid to Jordan decreased during the Iraq war due to political incompatibility because this event is not in line with US interests in the region and the protection of Israel. Trump advised Congress that the administration is seeking \$1 billion in total U.S. assistance to Jordan, which “consists with the previous 2015-2017 fiscal year memorandum of understanding amounting to \$1 billion annually.” It will also continue to request the FY18 budget to fund foreign military financing grants to Jordan, instead of converting the first microfinance grants into loans (Sharp, 2017).

This result is consistent with Neorealism as cooperation between states is linked to the strength of the state and the nature of alliances, and that economic support is linked to the nature of the state’s political position, and that cooperation is determined through negotiations and their gains from those agreements.

As depicted in table 3 in result 5, US foreign policy provides military support to Jordan for the protection of Israel. According to the participants’ responses, most agreed that part of the US interests in the Middle East and support for Jordan is linked to the protection of Israel.

Participant (p9) stated that the United States links security, political and economic issues with each other to form a pressure card on Jordan by not

interfering directly with Israel's existential and expansionist side in Palestine.

Participant (p11, p9) explained that the United States sponsored the peace agreement between Jordan and Israel to reduce the state of hostility and direct military participation between the two parties and to reach peace with the exchange of bilateral agreements. After the peace agreement, the American intervention in the Jordanian affairs became more intense after the expansion of the influence of the Zionist lobby in many of the components and borders of the Jordanian state, such as many waterways and their borders (the Yarmouk River, Lake Tiberias, and the diversion of the Jordan River). Also, the American military and economic aid to Jordan is linked to peace and security with Israel.

Participant (p1) adds that Jordan and Israel are bound by mutual agreements, such as the qualified industrial zones resulting from the peace agreement between the two parties so that the two parties maintain common interests to reduce the state of hostility.

The same participant adds that the US military support for Jordan is limited compared to the US support for Israel so that the balance of power remains in favour of Israel over Jordan. Participant (p5) clarifies that the joint cooperation between Jordan and the United States towards terrorism in the region is to combat terrorism and to prevent the infiltration of terrorists into Israel, and to keep it safe.

This study demonstrates that the United States has long cared about the security of the State of Israel because it is the only country that practices Western democracy and is biased towards strange interests in the Middle East. This is why the United States is working to stabilize this state and create conditions with Arabs and Muslims to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and establish lasting peace.

The United States considered Israel the first strategic means that it depended on in the Middle East, and Israel obtained American support because it is the only democratic country in the region and that the evangelical creed of the Americans made them stick to the support of Israel because God's chosen people must prevail in the Holy Land. In their opinion, even Christ descends, and from another angle, Israeli installations and airports gave the United States a safe starting point for its forces when conditions required military attacks to the east, and Israel is an effective military restraint that prevented the expansion of the former Soviet Union in the Middle East. Also, billions of dollars were marked annually for a country that only gained from it, getting involved in crises and undermining the American reputation and its place in the world (al-Akhdari, 2016).

This result is consistent with Sheikha's study (2020) and differs with Kinne's study (2018) in that the United States does not support Jordan for the sake of Israel, nor will it because it is a democratic state that sponsors peace in the Middle East and religious tolerance.

This result is consistent with Neorealist theory as the interdependence of countries to achieve relative gains and the use of the economic card to achieve the desired interests. The new reality of states is a fundamental interest in the authority and knowledge of military and economic capabilities is not an end in itself, but an important tool to achieve security in this issue. When discussing Israel, the United States tries to keep Jordan militarily in an excellent defensive and not offensive state to accomplish the waning of power in favour of Israel. This theory attaches the importance of on the intentions of its peaceful neighbours or international norms (institutions that renounce violence and encourage international cooperation), but always realize that it cannot rely on the sustainability and effectiveness of such favourable conditions. Security is not the only goal of states, but it is the primary goal, as it seeks to achieve other purposes related to their ability to achieve adequate levels of security.

According to the result 6 in table 3, the study believes that the United States links security, political, and economic issues to form a pressure card on Jordan by not interfering directly in the existential and expansionist side of Israel in Palestine.

US foreign policy provides military support to Jordan in order to spread American ideology and fight against its enemy. For example, the participant (9) believes that the Jordanian military strategy is linked to the American strategy and the American military thought. This is clearly and explicitly studied through joint military aid and exercises that gain the two parties the necessary skill. Despite the positive tone between them on the intellectual level, there is a kind of negativity by entering Jordan with jobs such as the war on terrorism and the establishment of US military bases. Consequently, this has internal security implications through the people's dissatisfaction with the existence of such bases. Also, all purchases are consistent with Israeli approval.

Participant (8) believes that Jordan will turn Western in everything in the strategic concept of NATO, and there will be cooperation, export and import between Jordan and the United States through the Mediterranean with Israel.

According to the neorealist theory, this result is consistent through self-help is not incompatible with cooperation. Still, states are reluctant to engage in relationships that undermine its strength or its capacity for self-help, for the

new reality of States is a fundamental interest in force the first knowledge of military and economic capabilities - not as an end in itself but as an important tool to achieve security in this case. It attaches importance to the intentions of its peaceful neighbours or international standards (Institutions that renounce violence and encourage international cooperation), but are always aware that they cannot rely on the sustainability and effectiveness of such favourable conditions. Security is not the sole goal of States, but the essential one, as it pursues other goals linked to their ability to achieve adequate levels of security. From a new realistic point of view, States cannot enjoy full security under an essentially chaotic international system of assistance. States are always struggling to maintain or enhance their security, and even in periods when friends can surround states, it does not include a warranty for them. In other words, friends can turn into rivals and even enemies. Realism, the new view, states that States should consider this possibility even under the most harmonious periods and consensus.

The study believes that the US foreign policy provides military support to Jordan in order to spread the American Western thought because of the convergence in the strategy and the Jordanian-American military thought and that over time Jordan will turn to the American Western in everything in the strategic concept of NATO, and there will be cooperation, export and import between Jordan and the United States across the Mediterranean with Israel.

Recommendation and Limitations

Based on the results, the Jordanian state needs to increase international and regional cooperation concerning influential economic alliances at the international level, such as approaching the European Common Market like the most important economic and political grouping, and the clear and effective force in directing European policy in particular and global politics in general.

In addition, the Jordanian policy must be redrawn in line with the international reality to put pressure on the U.S. of America to have Jordan play an active role in the region and the international arena by responding to the new international structures, systems and situations.

In addition, through the embassy move, it is clear that the United States prioritises its interests in the region and its first partner, Israel. Therefore, in light of the political, economic and military progress of the neighbouring country, Israel, Jordan must rely on building itself politically, economically and militarily to defend itself and to be able to compete with the

Israeli progress.

According to the results, US security aid and equipment are provided to Jordan to the extent that it does not affect the balance of power with Israel. Therefore, the security orientation with America should be redrawn in proportion to the Jordanian-American strategic alliance and security cooperation among them through the war on terrorism and others, and not linking it to Israel.

Continuing the policy of moderation, centrism, non-extremism, and cooperation with everyone, to serve Jordan's national and national interests will bring more cooperation in view of Jordan as a stable and moderate country.

By studying the results drawn from the developments accompanying the so-called Arab Spring by reconsidering internal and external policies and re-evaluating them at intervals in proportion to the changes.

Adhering to the characteristics of flexible dynamics far from stagnation, and based on fixed foundations, namely non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, belief in the policy of dialogue to solve problems, continuous cooperation with Arab brothers and brothers in Islamic countries and friends, respect for international laws and norms, and rejection of foreign interference and the seizure of the lands of others by force.

Adherence to Jordan's first issue, which is the Palestinian issue, and that the Jordanian-American partnership does not lead to pressure on Jordan through aid and the International Monetary Fund to solve the Palestinian issue at Jordan's expense, and that Jordan becomes an alternative homeland.

The study was influenced by some limitations that other researchers should consider and improve upon in their research. One of the main shortcomings of this study is the Corona pandemic and the restrictions imposed by countries within them due to the pandemic to protect their citizens. Jordan imposed the same restrictions at home.

Since the data collection tool in this study was based on interviews, it faced difficulty in scheduling interviews and accepting the parties to conduct interviews due to their fear of the spread of the epidemic, so the interview dates were repeatedly postponed in proportion to the epidemiological situation.

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ABSTRACT

Foreign policy is an integral part of international relations. This study examines United States (US) foreign policy towards Jordan from 1990 to 2017 since the period witnessed important regional and international political events that significantly impacted US foreign policy. These events have the greatest impact on the development of relations between the two countries in terms of political and security aspects. The study looks at four political events and their impacts on Jordanian-American relations from the political and security aspects. Therefore, the objectives of this study are to examine US foreign policy towards Jordan from the political and security aspects. This study adopted the qualitative approach. The primary data were collected from interviews while the secondary data were obtained from books, journals, theses, newspapers, seminar papers, articles, and other documents. In this study, 16 respondents from political, economic and security experts in Jordan and the US were selected for semi-structured interviews. The study employed Thematic Analysis in analysing the data obtained. This study adopted the neo-realism theory as a theoretical framework. This study found that US foreign policy recognizes Jordan as a close ally and considers its stability very important. The US foreign policy was seen as slightly negative towards Jordan during the Iraqi War on Kuwait in 1990. However, the Wadi Araba peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994 had promoted positive US foreign policy towards Jordan. This policy was slightly weakened in 2017 due to the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem. Certain political events had played an important role in US foreign policy regarding security aid towards Jordan. The study found that US foreign policy provides security support to Jordan to protect Israel, spread American ideology and fight against its enemy. This research also found that Jordan has a suitable location to defend Israel because the country is surrounded by important Arab countries. The US links its aids to Jordan due to political events. Accordingly, the study recommends the necessity for the Jordanian state to increase its influential economic alliances at the international level. In addition, Jordanian policy must be redrawn in line with international realities to pressure the US to make Jordan play an active role in the region and international arena. Jordan should better use its geographical location to achieve international cooperation and enhance Arab security as a barrier against Israel.

KEYWORDS

Foreign Policy; Jordan; Security.

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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF POST- REVOLUTIONARY IRAN: EXPEDIENCY AT THE CROSSROAD OF SUPRA-NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY

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Introduction

The direction of the Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy has been a source of argument among scholars since the establishment of the revolutionary regime in 1979. Iran's foreign policy just like its revolution is still a mystery to many researchers as it is difficult to find an appropriate theoretical framework for it. Revolution and how revolutionary states such as China and Cuba view the world and build their foreign relations with other nations have been long discussed in the works of prominent scholars including Leng (1972), Armstrong (1993), Walt (1996), Halliday (2002), and Doma-NGuez & Domínguez (2009). However, what makes the foreign policy of revolutionary Iran different from other revolutionary states (mostly Marxist revolutions) and, therefore, more confusing to study, is the Shi'a Islamic nature of it.

The Shi'a Islamic ideology is a central constraining factor, which "limits the choice of an appropriate conceptual framework to analyze the country's foreign policy" (Nia 2011). The unpredictable and to an extent confusing foreign policy of Iran has been the source of this division among scholars to theorize Iran's foreign policy. This paper, therefore, aims on providing answers to two important questions on how to explain the pendulum-like foreign policy of post-revolutionary Iran, between supra-nationalism and national interest, and how the decision-makers in Tehran choose which path to take in different contexts. By reviewing the current literature and analyzing

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several cases in Iran's foreign policy, this paper argues that the conflict between the Islamic supra-nationalist nature of Tehran's foreign policy and the current Westphalian system of international relations is the main source of confusion and disintegration in Iran's foreign policy. By emphasizing the concept of *maslahat* (expediency), the paper also provides explanations on how the foreign policy of Iran decides which path to take at the crossroad of supra-nationalism and sovereignty.

Background

Placing Iran's foreign policy within the existing frameworks and theories of international relations has long been debated among scholars since the establishment of the Islamic republic in 1979. The inconsistent behaviour of Tehran in facing events at the international level has been the source of this confusion. Reviewing the current literature demonstrates two main arguments addressing Iran's foreign policy behaviour: the rational actor model and the supra-nationalist approach.

Rational Actor Model (RAM)

One of the most used frameworks to analyze a country's foreign policy is the Rational Actor Model (RAM). This simple yet effective framework is based on the rational choice theory which "consists simply of selecting that alternative whose consequences ranks highest in the decision maker's payoff function; value maximizing choice within special constraints" (Zelikow 1999). The rationality element in this framework, therefore, makes us predict and explain a consistent trend of policy and action by the state. This means states choose the action that will maximize strategic goals and objectives (Zelikow 1999). Concepts such as objectives, calculations, choices, threats, and opportunities are central, weighing all advantages and disadvantages and taking up a value maximizing option regarding the major formula in RAM Allison employs (Kafle 2004).

The rational actor approach shares similarities with neo-realist theory, in which the impact of domestic politics on foreign policies is marginalized. Neo-realism argues that it is the structure of the international system that has the most impact on the design and implementation of foreign policy for any given country (Toni 1998). Based on the neo-realist approach, the major objective of the Iranian state can be viewed within the framework of

prioritizing its survival in the anarchic nature of the international system. Within the same neo-realist structure, it can be argued that Iran is maximizing its power by strategically calculating the opportunities and restraints of each issue towards its interests in the international system (El Berni 2018). For this reason, and contrary to the ideologically-bounded representation of Iran's foreign policy, a number of scholars such as Tarock (1999), Ramazani (2004), and Salehzadeh (2013) trace more pragmatic and realist approaches. Ramazani argues that some pragmatic national interest existed even in the earliest, most volatile and ideological phase of Iranian foreign policy in 1980's (Ramazani 2004).

Scholars in favour of explaining Iran's foreign policy through the RAM approach indicate several historical incidents to strengthen their argument against the claims calling Iran's foreign and ideological policies ideological. The Iran-Contra affair is known as one of the main cases to debunk the ideologically led direction of Iran and portrays a more rational actor image. In 1985 and at the height of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran got involved in a direct arms deal with both the United States and Israel. Based on the Iran-Contra agreement, American and Israeli arms were decided to be transferred to Iran in exchange for Iran's assistance in the release of Western hostages in Lebanon (Ramazani 2004).

The impact of war as an international pressure factor to shape Iran's choice of foreign and security policy was evident in the Iran-Contra affair. In several other periods such as during the rule of reformist President Khatami (1997-2005), Iranian foreign policy was not consistent with its ideological patterns. During this period, Iran was more cooperative and improved relations with western countries especially the EU member states and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Iran's cooperation with the world community and the U.S. in its nuclear talks was further a sign of Iran's rational behaviours in foreign affairs.

Supra-nationalist Approach

On the other hand, and contrary to the above narrative, several scholars such as Nia (2011) and Beeman (2008) reject the application of the Rational Actor Model for Iran's foreign policy and, instead, emphasize the Islamic supra-nationalist ideology as the main explanatory driver of Iran's policies. They criticize the Rational Actor Model for overlooking the importance of domestic politics in shaping Iran's foreign policy and emphasize the impact of domestic variables in shaping the structure of the foreign policy decision-

making of Iran since the 1979 Islamic revolution more than any other international variable (Ramazani 2004). The insignificant impact of two major paradigm shifts in international relations, namely, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the September 11 attacks in 2011, on Iran's foreign policy, is the backbone of this argument. In fact, strategies such as counter-hegemonism, resistance, justice-seeking, anti-arrogance campaign, anti-American, and anti-Israel as the fundamental principles of Iranian foreign policy have remained intact since 1979 (Nia 2011).

Unlike RAM, an Islamic supra-nationalist-based foreign policy does not view policies merely based on materialistic cost-benefit relations or their outcomes. Supra-nationalism on its own is an understudied field within different branches of political science. Much of the research conducted on the concept of supra-nationalism is focused on the European Union (EU). Following this regional focus, supra-nationalism is majorly viewed as the merging of several states into a new entity (Agnes 2017). At the same time, the current definitions of supra-nationalism mostly argue about entities above domestic sovereign politics of recognized territories such as in the EU (Sweet, Sandholtz & Fligstein, 2001).

Supra-nationalism in the Middle East, however, is of another type. Unlike the territorial definition of supra-nationalism in the EU context, there is a strong ideological dimension to it in the Middle East. The pan-Arabism movement of the mid-twentieth century is a testimony to this ideological approach, by trying to unify the Arab nations of the Middle East and North Africa around the Arabic language and/or their common struggles against external aggressors (Dawn 1988). In the case of Iran's foreign policy, however, the binding element is Iran's Shi'a state ideology.

Contrary to most countries in the world, Iran is a Shi'a messianic state with the mission of passing the state to Imam Mahdi whom Shi'as believe went into occultation in 874 AD. Supra-nationalist principles such as 'the defense of the rights of all Muslims' and 'non-alignment with respect to the hegemonic superpowers' are the basis of Iran's foreign policy and, according to the Islamic Republic's Constitution, the country "supports the just struggles of the oppressed against the oppressors in every corner of the globe" (Papan-Matin 2014). Although these statements are general in nature, the main focus of Iran's foreign policy has been the Islamic *Ummah* (Islamic community), especially the Shi'as. For this reason, one of the first attempts by the newly founded Islamic Republic in 1980 was to establish the Office of Liberation Movements in Tehran aiming on bringing together different Islamic militant organizations to facilitate the export of the revolution and to further pave the path for Iran to intervene domestic affairs of other mostly Muslim countries

(Alfoneh 2013, Ostovar 2016).

In theory, the supra-nationalist and ideologically driven direction of Iran is in favour of *Ummah* (Islamic community) and Islamic unity against nationalist ideologies. Yet in practice, the same foreign policy favours the Shi'a minorities over the majority Sunnis. Such an approach seems incompatible with RAM or neorealist principles. The strong support of Iran for Islamic militant groups which are mostly identified as terrorist groups by the world community and Iran's opposition to Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations are mostly viewed as evidence that Iran's foreign policy should be viewed from their ideological perspective.

The Foreign Policy Doctrine of Iran

Iranian foreign policy is the sum of a dual identity: "a quasi-imperial nation pursuing political hegemony and an anti-status quo Islamic revolutionary power." (Hokayem 2012). The policy was substantially influenced by the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, when Iran transformed from a pillar of US security in the Persian Gulf into a challenger of the Western-dominated regional order (Hinnebusch 2011). In line with Gasiorowski's argument, which introduces the U.S.-Iran clientelist relationship as a predominant factor that facilitated the road to the Revolution (Farhang 1991), the concepts of the 'rejection of all forms of domination' and 'defending the rights of Muslims around the globe' (explicitly mentioned in Article 152 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran) have become the key principles of post-revolutionary Iran's foreign policy. The roots of this drastic shift of policy can be also addressed from the structuralist point of view, which argues that the historical presence of imperialism in the Middle East relegated countries such as Iran to the bottom of the global hierarchy. This in turn imposed an order against indigenous resistance, through coercion and co-optation and in violation of regional identity, which lacks hegemony in the region, hence, is subject to regular challenge by counter-hegemonic movements that ultimately leads to regional instability (Hinnebusch 2011).

To this end, the new revolutionary state identified the U.S. (and later all Western countries including Israel) as its main rivals in both the regional and international arenas. Shortly after the formation of the Islamic Republic, on November 4, 1979, the Iranian revolutionary students invaded the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took hostage of its 52 staff. The invasion of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the ensuing hostage crisis became "an ordeal for revolutionary idealist foreign policy which pitted Iran against virtually every

country in the world” (Ramazani 2004). The hostage crisis lasted 444 days, and among its more lasting repercussions, is the suspension of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States to date.

Abandoning ties with the U.S. was not the only move made by the newly established revolutionary state concerning its foreign policy. Against the cold war division of states, Iran subsequently adopted the slogan of *Na Sharqi, Na Gharbi, Jomhoori-e Eslami* (Neither East nor West but the Islamic Republic) as the foundation of its foreign policy. Armed with this vision, Iran joined the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) in 1979 hoping to discover new partners among developing nations which would meet its foreign policy objectives as a developing state, “whereas an alliance with either the East or the West would not fit the Iranian religious, cultural, or historical context” (Sadri 1998). At the same time, Islamic Republic also condemned all regional governments with pro-Western tendencies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as corrupt and un-Islamic, directly questioning their legitimacy (Byman 2001).

Given the Islamic nature of the Revolution of 1979, Iran’s foreign policy is fundamentally rooted in Shi’a principles in which religious values and ideologies have a norm-defining function (Dehshiri & Majidi 2008). Ideology, in this context, is defined as a system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a “particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote, realize, pursue or maintain” (Hamilton 1987). The following sections will explain the main areas of conflict between Iran’s Islamic supra-nationalist foreign policy and the Westphalian system of international relations. The sections will also explain Iran’s pendulum-like swinging between the two by using the concept of *maslahat* (expediency).

Ummah vs. Nation-State

The Islamic ideology emphasizes unity among Muslims regardless of their race, ethnicity, nationality, or social status. For this reason, it is Muslims’ belief in Islam which makes them different from other citizens of the world. Therefore, a strong narrative in Islam does not recognize the current political borders among countries as legitimate means of separating people. Within this strong narrative, the world’s population is divided into two sections, *Ummah* (the global Muslim community) and the non-believers. In this system, the political loyalty of citizens is not to the nation-states, but to the Islamic community as a whole. This supra-nationalist view finds its

origin in several Quranic verses including: “And surely this your nation is one nation, and I am your Lord, therefore be careful (of your duty) to Me” (The Holy Quran). According to interpretations of such verses, the only path to redemption for human beings is to surrender to the will of Allah. For this reason, differences such as nationality, language or ethnicity must be ignored.

However, the main challenge for this approach in the current setting of the world is its contradiction with the existing international rules and regulations. The approach of this narrative towards international relations is in direct contrast with Article 2 (7) of the United Nations which clearly declares that “nothing should authorize intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (United States 1945). This specific Islamic approach is also in conflict with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which supports a society of states based on the principle of territorial sovereignty (Newnham 1992). The abovementioned narrative shapes the principles of Iran’s post-revolutionary foreign policy.

Because of the same narrative, the Islamic Republic’s constitution is confused between holding to the ideological principles of the 1979 Shi’a Islamic revolution or adhering to the necessities of the current international order. It can be argued that this confusion is a common issue in the foreign policy of most Islamic countries, where lip service is paid to a universal *ummah* against their realpolitik practice. However, what makes Iran’s foreign policy different from these Islamic countries is that, firstly, the Islamic supra-nationalism makes the backbone of the country’s constitution and secondly, in the past four decades, Tehran has repeatedly executed these supra-nationalist principles in practice (mostly in favour of Shi’a populations) around the world.

Article 16 of Iran’s Constitution clearly frames the foreign policy doctrine of the country on “the basis of Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and unsparing support to the *mustad’afin* (the oppressed) of the world” (Algar 1980). Such criteria cover a wide range of foreign policy components that encompasses international relations, citizenship and Islamic *Ummah* (global Muslim community), sovereignty, protection and security of the citizens, and foreign military relations. Among the fundamental principles of the Iranian foreign policy which has played a critical role in shaping Iran’s international behaviour is the concept of utilizing Islamic supra-nationalism and the *Ummah* (global Muslim community) to reject domination by “oppressors”.

In accordance with Shi’a Islamic thoughts on international relations and as it was argued earlier, Iran’s foreign policy is constructed on the ideology of Islamic supra-nationalism - which places its emphasis on the unity of the global Muslim community (*Ummah*). Arguably, this ideologically-based supra-

nationalist doctrine is in many ways incompatible with the current political world order which is based on the concept of the Westphalian nation-state. It is argued that in the Islamic traditions, “the tribe and the *Ummah*, have been the principal foci of loyalty and commitment, and the nation-state has been less significant” (Huntington 2000). The importance of Islamic supra-nationalism was also emphasized greatly by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Iranian revolution: “Islam is not peculiar to a country, to several countries, a group, or even the Muslims. Islam has come for humanity. Islam wishes to bring all of humanity under the umbrella of its justice” (Owen 2010). Contrary to the above principles, there are several other articles in the Islamic Republic’s Constitution that recognize the Westphalian nation-state approach including, “In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the freedom, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the country are inseparable from one another, and their preservation is the duty of the government and all individual citizens,” “All changes in the boundaries of the country are forbidden” and “the hierarchy of the executive authority, will be determined by law, in such a way as to preserve national unity, territorial integrity, the system of the Islamic Republic, and the sovereignty of the central government” (Algar 1980).

The conflict between the Shi’a Islamic interpretation of international relations and the Westphalian nation-state concept has created an inconsistent trend in Iran’s international behaviour. While justifying its support of radical Muslim groups around the world based on its Islamic ideological values, Iran is absolutely careful not to be identified as a country with a desire to expand its territorial borders based on its Islamic supra-nationalist ideologies. This can be observed in Iran’s insistence on recognizing Iraq as the aggressor in the eight-year war by the world community through the UN Resolution 598.

Supporting the Global Oppressed

As it was mentioned earlier, Iran utilizes Shi’a Islamic principles as its point of reference concerning foreign policy, therefore, it does not recognize nationality based on political borders or nation-states. This is because, in Islam, nationality is a faith-based concept. Non-Muslims are considered aliens and Muslims all around the globe are citizens of the universal *Ummah* (Nakhaee 1997). Therefore, the Islamic Republic of Iran is responsible for the affairs of Muslims anywhere in the world irrespective of political borders. This phenomenon is well framed in the Article 154 of the Iranian constitution as “it supports the just struggles of the *mustad’afun* (the oppressed) against the *mustakbirun* (the oppressor) in every corner of the globe” (Algar 1980).

Clearly, this approach conflicts with the current world order that is based on the sovereignty of nation-states. Shortly after its establishment, the Islamic Republic went on to export revolution as its way of assisting and supporting oppressed Muslims around the world. In general, the policy aimed to spread Shi'a revolutionary ideas against the so-called Arab apostate states in the region, force a clash of civilizations with the "infidel" West, and proclaim leadership over the Arab Middle East - particularly in the oil-rich Persian Gulf (Shapira & Diker 2007). Implementing such a policy created a tense and distrustful relationship between Iran and its neighboring Arab nations, particularly those with large Shi'a populations - including Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, and even Saudi Arabia. The eight-year Iran-Iraq war in the early 1980s could be viewed as Iran's first attempt in putting its new foreign policy ideology into practice. The war could be defined as a clash between Khomeini's pan-Islamism and Saddam Hussein's pan-Arabism (Toni 1998).

As a result, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf were terrified as they unexpectedly found themselves 'in the much broader context of the Islamic world in which Islamic groups and segments of the population were responding to the Iranian revolution' (Marschall 2003). The result of this approach was the regional isolation of Iran, which in turn did little in convincing the revolutionary state to change its ideologically based foreign policy. Such policy turned out to be the backbone of the ideologically-based foreign policy doctrine of Iran since 1979, irrespective of the political differences among the political figures raised into power in Iran (Cakmak 2015).

Due to its ideologically-based foreign policy, Iran pays particular attention to Muslim countries with large Shi'a populations, such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Afghanistan. Syria, together with Iraq and Lebanon, form the Shi'a Crescent in the Middle East. The Shi'a Crescent is viewed by the Arab Sunni states as an endeavor by the Islamic Republic to mobilize the Shi'a population of the region and to establish an ideological belt of sympathetic Shi'a states and political parties in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Persian Gulf region (Barzegar 2008). The Shi'a Crescent provides Iran with invaluable strategic and ideological depth in the region against Israel and other Sunni Arab states. The importance of the Shi'a Crescent in Iran's foreign policy is easily traced in Tehran's response to the Arab Spring. In line with the Islamic concept of "rejection of all forms of domination", Iran warmly welcomed the Arab Spring by calling it the "Islamic awakening" against the U.S. and its regional Sunni Arab allies.

Choosing between Ideology vs. Maslahat

Another important conflict between the Islamic system of international relations and the Westphalian nation-state order is their views on the source of laws and regulations. Based on the Islamic ideology, Allah's will is the sole source of all human laws and regulations regardless of race and ethnicity. Therefore, establishing institutions to ordain laws and regulations based on national interests conflicts with Islamic values and principles. In the Westphalian system, however, states are the only subject of international law, having the last and absolute power within their sovereign territory (Engle 2004). This very core principle of the Westphalian system is challenged by Islamic principles.

Within the context of Shi'a Islamic thoughts and *Fiqh* (jurisprudence), supra-nationalism is based on the two key binary concepts of *Darul-Islam* (territory of Islam)/*Darul-Kufr* (territory of disbelief) and *Darul-Islam* (territory of Islam)/*Darul-Harb* (territory of war). *Darul Islam* is referred to "region of Muslim sovereignty where Islamic law prevails" (Esposito 2003). In this concept, the existence of an Islamic state (not a nation-state) is the necessary condition for regarding a territory *Darul-Islam*, and Islamic laws must be enforced by the state in that territory. Consequently, *Darul-Kufr* refers to regions of non-Muslim sovereignty where Islamic law does not prevail.

To overcome the clashes between this ideological system and the reality of today's relations between the states, the concept of *maslahat* was introduced to the Islamic jurisprudence. Based on this concept, Muslim states are conditionally permitted to deal and interact with non-Muslim territories that are not at war with them. A majority of Islamic countries have accepted using *maslahat* in foreign relations. In the immediate years after the Islamic revolution of 1979, the Iranian regime has adopted the more radical binary approach of *Darul-Islam* (territory of Islam)/*Darul-Harb* (territory of war). *Darul-Harb* refers to the terrains in which Islam does not prevail. Symbolically, "the *Darul-Harb* is the domain, even in an individual's life, where there is a struggle against or opposition to, the Will of God" (Paterson 2009). Based on this approach, Jihad as a divine institution of warfare should be declared on such territories to defend and restore the rules and regulations of Islam. This principle was both a fundamental component of Iran's foreign policy and of its security in its first decade after the Islamic revolution of 1979.

The impracticality of following Islamic principles in the current world order and the constant clash between the supra-nationalist approach and sovereignty has forced Tehran to seek religious justifications for shifting its ideologically based foreign policies towards more practical ones. *Maslahat*

seemed to fulfil this goal properly. To rescue the state from the consequences of ideologically driven decisions in both national and foreign policies, Iran established the Council for the Discernment of the Expediency of the State (*majma-e tashkhis-e maslahat-e nezam*, henceforth Expediency Council) in 1988. The duty of the Expediency Council is simply formulated in the words of Ayatollah Khomeini as an institute to intervene in situations that could not be solved through normal means (Sarrami 2001). In the context of Iran's pendulum-like foreign policy, the Expediency Council is among the main entities in the Islamic Republic to decide which path to take at the crossroad of supra-nationalism and national interests. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the Iranian state resorted, time and again, to the loophole (escamotage) of *maslahat* to bring forth crucial political projects whenever its survival was in immediate danger (Ghiabi 2019). The following section demonstrates the importance of expediency in the foreign policy of Iran in practice.

Discussion

A closer look at the history of Iran's foreign policy since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979 indicates a pendulum-like trend of behaviour. This spectrum of behaviour varies from the total rejection of the current Westphalian system of international relations based on Islamic supra-nationalist ideologies to desperate attempts to be accepted as a part of this system. The source of such a paradox is rooted in the disintegrated approach of Iran toward the world. As it was discussed earlier, on one hand, Iran is trying its best to remain loyal to its ideological revolutionary principles while on the other hand, as a member of the international community, it needs to adhere to the current world order. This paradox can be best understood through the concept of *maslahat* (expediency) with the survival of the state at the heart of it.

The cause of such drastic convergence and divergence in Iran's foreign policy is rooted in its paradoxical ideological approach. Iran's foreign policy tends to accommodate both Islamic supra-nationalism and the Westphalian system at the same time within its structure. To achieve this goal, an ideological interpretation of *maslahat* is manipulated by Iran to ensure the survival of the Islamic state. In the complicated structure of the Iranian foreign policy, *maslahat* can be precisely viewed as 'nothing less than a cost-benefit approach to decision making' (Tarzi 2009) This approach posits that until the survival of the state is under immediate threat, Iran bases its initial

foreign policy on Islamic supra-nationalist objectives instead of rational ones within the Westphalian system. However, when such a threat materialises, Iran retreats from its initial ideological objectives in favour of adopting pragmatic approaches (recognising the Westphalian system), at which point it is prepared to either covertly or overtly negotiate its idealist objectives – sometimes abandoning them altogether.

On several occasions, Iran has retreated from its ideologically driven foreign policy when confronted with threats to the survival of the state. In the 1980s, Ayatollah Khomeini initially welcomed the Iran-Iraq war, calling it the beginning of a solution to the Middle East problems, and repeatedly stressed that Iran will fight till the last breath even if it takes 20 years. In 1982 and upon the liberation of all the Iranian territories, Tehran rejected the Iraqi offer of a ceasefire and declared that only “the overthrow of the Baath regime and its replacement with a Shia Islamic republic were the only peace terms Iran would accept” (Karsh 2014). Insisting on this ideological foreign policy however came to an end in 1988. After eight years of an inconclusive war and when Iranian forces were exhausted and were putting up very little resistance to the Iraqi offensives which were threatening the survival of the state, Iran’s foreign policy once again shifted towards pragmatism. Ayatollah Khomeini accepted the UN Security Council resolution 598 and agreed to a ceasefire in 1988. He called his acceptance of the resolution an act of *maslahat* and described it as drinking the bitter chalice of poison (Taremi 2014).

Shortly after the ceasefire and removal of the survival threat, Iran again shifted the direction of its foreign policy towards supra-nationalism in February 1989. In a historic *fatwa*, Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the execution of Salman Rushdie the author of *The Satanic Verses* and all involved in the publication of the book. In his *fatwa*, he called the book blasphemous against Islam. In his *fatwa*, Ayatollah Khomeini declared “I call on all zealous Muslims to execute them quickly, wherever they may be found so that no one else will dare to insult the sacred beliefs of Muslims. Whoever is killed on this path is a martyr” (Chase 1996). A national mourning day was declared in Iran and the Iranian Prime Minister Hussain Mousavi authorized radical Islamist groups to take the necessary action against Rushdie (BBC 1989).

By issuing this *fatwa*, Ayatollah Khomeini played the role of a supra-nationalist Muslim hero by defending Islam against the proclaimed insult of Rushdie’s book. Although his supra-nationalist *fatwa* resulted in the mobilization of many Muslims around the world, it once again put Iran’s foreign policy at crossroads. In response to this *fatwa*, 12 European countries recalled their ambassadors from Iran and froze all economic ties with Tehran. Britain also broke diplomatic relations with Iran. Once again, Iran

found itself under mounting economic pressure and diplomatic isolation. Shortly after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989 and in a clear change of direction towards expediency, both President Rafsanjani and President Khatami rescinded the Ayatollah's call for the death of Salman Rushdie (Eggerking 1991). During the United Nations General Assembly in 1998, President Khatami once again emphasized that we should consider the Salman Rushdie issue as completely finished. At the same time, Robin Cook, the British Foreign Secretary, and Kamal Kharrazi, the Iranian foreign minister, announced that the affair was over. Kharrazi also expressed his hope for a new chapter in the relationship with the UK to be opened through this act (Black 1998).

In another incident and in the aftermath of 9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran found itself under threat of becoming the next U.S. target in the region. American troops were by then deployed to their north in Central Asia, to their east in Afghanistan, to their south in the Persian Gulf and to their west in Iraq. Iran was virtually surrounded (Dobbins 2012). In this situation and against its ideological values, in June 2003, Iran covertly contacted the United States to open a channel for a broad dialogue over all disputing issues including full cooperation on nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian support for Palestinian militant groups (Kessler 2016). Fearful for its survival and facing increasing international pressure, Iran halted its nuclear program in the same year (Mazzetti 2003).

The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, which resulted in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015, is another example of Iran giving up its ideological objectives in favour of pragmatic approaches. Similar to his predecessor, Ayatollah Khamenei, has long described the negotiations with the United States as a red line of the state. However, only under the U.S.-led global crippling economic and financial sanctions (threatening the state's survival) did Iran decide to engage in meaningful negotiations over its nuclear program with the Obama administration in 2013.

To justify this drastic change in foreign policy, in 2014, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei announced a new phenomenon named *Narmesh-e Ghahramananeh* (Heroic Leniency). The idea of heroic leniency is based on the Shi'a interpretation of Imam Hassan's (the second Imam of Shi'as) peace agreement with Muawiyah bin Abu Sufyan, the Caliph of the time, in the seventh century. Based on this interpretation, Imam Hassan chose not to fight the stronger Muawiyah and become a martyr and instead made peace with him despite Muawiyah's illegitimacy. This peace treaty is justified by Shi'a clergies as safeguarding the blood of the Muslims, strengthening Islam and

preventing the external and internal enemies from taking undue advantage of the situation (Ayati 1984). The justification was used by Ayatollah Khamenei to justify Iran's change of foreign policy and starting negotiations at the highest level with U.S. officials since the 1979 revolution. It is apparent that in that period of time, the Islamic supra-nationalist principles were once again halted in favour of Westphalian values.

The JCPOA has permitted Iran to regain access to the global market after a decade of economic sanctions. Tehran was allowed access to more than USD 100 billion of oil revenue frozen in foreign countries in a special form of escrow. Iran also regained access to the international banking system as a part of the JCPOA (Samore *et al* 2015). However, the benefits provided by the JCPOA is argued to once again encourage Iran to leave expediency and resume its regional malign behaviours including its periodic testing of the limits of the nuclear deal, continued progress on ballistic missiles, regional expansion, support for Islamist extremist organizations and propagation of virulent anti-American ideology (Edelman & Wald 2018).

The "maximum pressure" policy of President Trump's administration on Iran can be viewed through the main argument of this article as well. Believing in facing survival threat as the main ground for the Islamic Republic to change its policy direction, the United States announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018. Upon the U.S. withdrawal, Iran once again faced crippling economic sanctions. The country's GDP contracted an estimated 4.8% in 2018 and shrank another 9.5% in 2019. The unemployment rate meanwhile rose from 14.5% in 2018 to 16.8% in 2019 (International Monetary Fund 2019). Meanwhile, by October 2019, Iran's crude oil production had fallen to 2.1 million barrels per day (bpd) on average only 260,000 bpd on average was being exported as compared to about 2.3 million bpd in early 2018. Iranian Rial has also lost 50% of its value against the U.S. dollar since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA (BBC 2019).

Building upon the main argument of this article, the U.S. administration aims, by imposing harsher sanctions on Iran, to change its foreign policy direction towards political expediency. The U.S. hopes these sanctions lead to a significant reduction in Iran's revenues and therefore disrupt its interference in or influence states such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, or the Persian Gulf Arab countries (Luers 2012). Pushing Iran into an economic crisis which threatens the survival of the state, the U.S. administration believes it will force Iran to reach out to the White House cap-in-hand to negotiate for a more holistic deal including issues such as the recognition of Israel, ballistic missiles program, and regional security. President Trump has repeatedly called the JCPOA a disaster agreement, and

his goal is set to reach a better agreement than he sees fit.

The mild reaction of Tehran to the killing of General Qassem Soleimani, Iran's most powerful figure after its supreme leader can be also analyzed through the main argument of this paper. Immediately after the news of General Soleimani's death was published, a shout of severe revenge was raised from all sides in Iran, including the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Some Iranian military officials have also warned the United States to consider a coffin for its troops in the region. However, despite all these shouts, Iran chose *maslahat* to respond. On January 8, 2020, Iran fired 10 ballistic missiles on Iraq's Ain al-Assad American military base and targeted Erbil facility. By informing the United States prior to the attack (through Iraqi officials) and despite its epic slogans, Iran once again showed that it has no intention to confront the United States militarily, even though its most prominent military man has been killed. The attack was only a symbolic act to protect the reputation of Iran's leaders in the eyes of their domestic followers. The country's chaotic socioeconomic condition has left no room for Tehran to seek for a full-fledged confrontation with the U.S. as this can severely question the survival of the Islamic Republic.

Conclusion

Studying the post-revolutionary foreign policy of Iran clearly shows a clash between its Shi'a supra-nationalist tendencies and acting as a committed member to Westphalian principles. As discussed through several cases in this article, as long as the state does not confront survival threats at the international level, it continues to pursue its respective ideologically bound foreign policy. In this phase, the ruling elites – consisting of the ruling political administration as well as the military and security apparatus, are primarily responsible for achieving the state's ideological foreign policy. However, upon facing conditions that threaten the survival of the state, the state adopts a more flexible attitude whereby its foreign policy decisions become more rational in nature within the Westphalian system. The degree of the State's flexibility is in direct relation to the severity and proximity of the threat to the state's survival.

The paper also suggests that the same argument can be utilized to study and analyze the foreign policy of other ideologically driven authoritarian states including North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela. In these countries, the state will base its initial foreign policy on idealist objectives instead of pragmatic ones. Upon facing a threat to their survival, however, these states

choose expediency over ideological preferences.

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ABSTRACT

Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the subsequent formation of the Islamic Republic, the Islamization of Iran's foreign policy has arguably become the newly established state's primary agenda in the international arena. In accordance with Islamic thoughts on international relations, the Islamic Republic's foreign policy was constructed on the concept of Islamic supra-nationalism - which places its emphasis on the unity of the global Muslim community (Ummah). Arguably, this supra-nationalist doctrine is incompatible with the current political world order which is based on the concept of the Westphalian nation-state. This incompatibility exists on three levels; first, Islam places its emphasis on ideological boundaries rather than political borders and therefore rejects the idea of nationalist states. Secondly, Islam denies current sources of legitimacy concerning international laws and regulations, and finally, Islam calls for the elimination of cultural, ethnic, and geographical boundaries among Muslims to unite Muslim communities in a new power bloc within the current political world order. This paper first identifies the differences between Islamic supra-nationalism and the doctrine of Westphalian sovereignty. Secondly, emphasizing the concept of *maslahat* (expediency) and using several examples, this paper also provides explanations on how the foreign policy of Iran decides which path to take at the crossroad of supra-nationalism and sovereignty.

KEYWORDS

Islamic Supra-Nationalism, Westphalian Sovereignty, Foreign Policy, Iran, Expediency.

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THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: DYNAMICS FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGION

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Introduction:

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is considered the cornerstone of President Xi Jinping's foreign policy. The concept of the BRI is inspired by the ancient Silk Route. It was referred to as 'One Belt One Road' in the past. The rise of China as an economic superpower has led to its own set of challenges such as securing access to new markets and ensuring energy resources to sustain economic growth. The BRI is seen as a mechanism through which China intends to increase its connectivity and its global influence. It aims to build such linkages which are required for the sustained growth of China through investing in infrastructure, opening transport and economic corridors, and connecting China to other nation-states "physically, financially, digitally, and socially" (Mobley, 2019).

When the BRI was first proposed, it was limited to two specific geographical routes—an overland Silk Road Economic Belt and a sea-based Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road ("Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)", 2019). Nevertheless, the BRI has increasingly turned out to be a global endeavor. Though excluded in its earliest phases, the Latin American and the

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Caribbean region was stated to be a ‘natural extension’ of the Maritime Silk Road by President Xi Jinping during his meeting with Argentine President Mauricio Macri at the Belt and Road Forum (Babineau & Farah, 2019). Since the conclusion of the first BRI forum, the LAC region has slowly begun to come under the ambit of the BRI.

Despite Latin America and the Caribbean states relative distance, geographically, the leaders and diplomats of LAC nation-states have been advocating for the inclusion of the region under the BRI. For example, in 2015, Bolivia’s ambassador to China stated that the BRI is “extremely important to Bolivia’s future development” (Myers, 2018). Several other Latin American officials such as the former Foreign Minister and Ambassador of Peru to China, Gonzalo Gutiérrez Reinell (published an article regarding Peru’s hope that the Belt and Road would be extended to Latin America), Ecuador’s Ambassador to China José Borja, Chile’s Ambassador to China Jorge Heine etc., have sought for the BRI to be extended to Latin America (ibid). Panama became the first nation-state in the region to sign a cooperation agreement under the BRI in 2017. Following this several other nation-states such as Chile, Ecuador, Antigua and Barbuda, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica have signed the BRI agreements (Koop, 2019). Peru is the latest in the region to join the BRI, which happened during the Second Belt and Road Forum.

However, not all nation-states in the region, have been enthusiastic in joining the BRI. The largest economies in the region – Brazil and Mexico have not yet signed any BRI agreements so far (ibid.). Chile is the only big economy of the region that has signed up for the BRI. However, recently the new president of Argentina, President Alberto Fernandez has reportedly expressed his eagerness to join the BRI (“Argentina wants to join China’s Belt & Road Initiative - Belt & Road News”, 2019). Sustaining eagerness, Argentina joined BRI recently in February 2022 (Lanteigne, 2022). With increasing interest and participation from the LAC nation-states, it becomes important to understand as to why China is gradually trying to bring the LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean) states under the ambit of the BRI and what the Latin American and the Caribbean states would gain from being a part of the BRI. While infrastructure development is stated to be the critical element of the BRI, scholars such as Matt Ferchen have expressed concerns regarding the link between infrastructure development and what it means for China in terms of security and access to resources. For instance, Venezuela has borrowed heavily from China while being mired in economic troubles. The Venezuelan example serves as a caution to others as well as China on the intricacies of debt management and lending. The situation in Venezuela raises questions as to what China’s deeper strategic motives are and provides

a case for analyzing the BRI in this context.

To examine the challenges and risks arising from the Belt and Road Initiative, this article, in its initial section undertakes a case study of Venezuela in explaining the probable debt-trap situation arising in the Latin American region. Following it, the next section examines the risks arising from BRI from the perspective of dependency theory. It is observed that the US has taken the Latin American region for granted. However, China appears to encroach into what the US considers as its backyard. With this hindsight, China's increasing involvement in the region is dichotomously analyzed to ponder whether it is a strategy to gain influence or an extension of peaceful rise in the third section. China's post-pandemic investments in LAC have been analyzed to enhance the argument of a tussle between the US and China. This provides a clear picture of how the two global economic giants are scrambling their money to sustain their influence over LAC. Finally, digital geopolitics has also been considered in explaining the risks and challenges of BRI. It is observed that without any data regulation regime currently across the world, would end up LAC states into what we call *data-trap*. As all the above is considered, it cannot be ignored that the future of geopolitics is no more validly explained through hegemonic stability theory or hierarchical structures. It is either going to be a horizontally varied power poles anchored to the regional institutions or going back to the idea of sovereignty as the main concept.

The Belt and Road Initiative in Venezuela: Debt-Trap as a tool for gaining strategic leverage?

President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela died in 2013. Ever since his death, Venezuela has been experiencing a period of great political instability. The current President of Venezuela Nicolás Maduro was re-elected in May 2018 for a second term, but the results were criticized as being fraudulent by most neighboring nation-states and the United States of America (Kaburi, 2019). China, however, recognized the election of President Maduro. The situation though deteriorated in January 2019, as the opposition-controlled National Assembly declared that President Maduro's re-election was invalid. Juan Guaidó was declared as the acting president of Venezuela. The United States of America, Canada, Brazil, and several other Latin American states recognized Juan Guaidó as the interim president, however, China expressed its support for President Maduro (ibid.). The Chinese support to President Maduro became evident in February 2019, when China along with Russia vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution calling for new presidential

elections in Venezuela (“What’s behind Venezuela’s political crisis?”, 2019). China has continued to extend its support to President Maduro in the hope that its interests were not adversely affected. This is because Venezuela has a lot of debt with China. With the United States backing a new president, China could have a lot of issues in Venezuela.

This begs the question as to why China is still interested in the affairs of Venezuela despite being well aware of the grave issues that Venezuela faces. China has not only continued to back Venezuela financially till date but has also signed agreements under the banner of the BRI. To gain an insight into the matter as to why China continues to be involved deeply with Venezuela, a historical perspective needs to be looked at. Until 2003 the economic relations between China and Venezuela were very insignificant. However, under the rule of President Hugo Chávez, the Sino-Venezuelan economic ties grew exponentially. From the year 2003 to 2012 the bilateral trade between China and Venezuela increased to about 24-times from \$742,417,000 in 2003 to \$20,000,000,000 in 2012 (Ríos, 2013).

During this period Venezuela also became China’s fourth-largest oil supplier. However, recently it has come to light that from approximately 2007 to 2014, China had lent Venezuela a staggering sum of nearly \$63 billion (Balding, 2019). This amounts to about 53 per cent of all the Chinese lending to Latin America during this period (ibid.). Beijing though had sensibly insisted on the loans being repaid in the form of oil. Oil was arranged as the guarantee for the repayment of loans as it was widely known by this time that Venezuela had the largest proven oil reserves in the world. The problematic concern here is that most of this deal was agreed to when oil prices hovered at more than \$100 a barrel. The oil prices in the world market floated at this rate during the period from roughly 2007 to 2014. However, oil prices have experienced a severe downfall since January 2016. The price drop has been so severe that the oil prices now range close to about \$30 a barrel (ibid.). This becomes a major issue for Venezuela as its price tag for completing its debt payments has now exploded. In order to repay Beijing now, Venezuela must ship two barrels of oil for every one barrel it had originally agreed to.

Chinese investment and lending arrangements are generally intended to open up new export markets and secure access to natural resources (Chellaney, 2017). The reason why China had originally grown closer to Venezuela was that China at that point in time was interested in gaining friends in the Western Hemisphere. This along with the need for securing access to oil overlapped with Venezuela’s interest as well. Venezuela was interested in diversifying its customer base away from the United States (Ríos, 2013). However, this overlap of interest did not mean that China had ever

offered any sort of discount on its loans. China has lent at exorbitant rates to Venezuela. Now, China refuses to renegotiate those debts, even as Venezuela's economy and oil industry are struggling. Strategically, Venezuela has changed from being the closest ally China had in Latin America and the Caribbean to a clear liability. A Venezuelan default could have grave consequences for China.

Through the BRI China sees an opportunity to push its influence farther, winning friends and securing assets at the same time. Today China is at an even better position to strike such deals to gain friends in the Western Hemisphere while securing resources. China has constantly leveraged its financial strength and expertise in infrastructure. Based on the Venezuelan model, China is planning to go ahead with the same kind of deals as a part of the BRI (Balding, 2019). This is a cause for concern as Chinese investments and lending under the BRI does come with conditions such as the projects undertaken must be granted to Chinese companies and at least 50% of the material, equipment, technology, or services must be sourced from China (Mobley, 2019).

China's unsustainable debt relationship with Venezuela is a clear example of how the Chinese BRI could lead to a debt-trap scenario. This along with the clauses such as having to grant the projects under the BRI to Chinese companies and 50% of the material, equipment, technology, or services having to be sourced from China is a matter of great concern. This leads to the economically weaker states becoming dependent on China in the long run as they are unable to sustain paying loans just like in the case of Venezuela. This phenomenon is defined as a debt trap. A debt trap is ordinarily defined as "A situation in which a debt is difficult or impossible to repay, because of the high-interest payments preventing repayment of the principal" ("Debt Trap | Meaning of Debt Trap by Lexico", n.d.). A debt-trap helps the creditor nation to leverage influence or arm-twist nation-states into following the policies which benefit the creditor. This is a situation in which smaller nation-states could end up if they are unable to repay loans in the long run.

The Venezuelan example possibly could be the most extreme case of a debt relationship gone wrong. However, this is not an isolated occurrence with China's investment. Recently a lot of other examples are emerging. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has increasingly been scrutinized for the ways in which China's economic and security interests may be undermined by deals gone wrong (Ferchen, 2018). In Sri Lanka, the case of the Hambantota port in which Sri Lanka had to handover the port for lease to China for 99 years is yet another example of a nation-state being subject to a debt trap (Chellaney, 2017).

China is yet to use coercive means (such as a military option) in the

case of Venezuela. If China does use more coercive methods in order to retrieve the money, oil, or ports it has financed, it risks adding to the growing impression that all of its rhetoric of a “win-win” situation under the BRI and contributions to developmental cooperation is really just a cover for a more traditional zero-sum realpolitik game (Ferchen, 2018). It thus becomes interesting to witness as to how China intends to recover its dues from Venezuela and as to why China is continuing to lend huge sums of money to economically weaker states. China under the BRI is continuing to invest huge sums of money which is like the Venezuelan model. This begs the question as to whether the BRI in Latin America and the Caribbean is just a tool for replicating the means to create a dependency model.

The Belt and Road Initiative: Creating a system of Dependency?

Every nation-state faces the difficulty of having limited resources to fulfil its needs. For a rising power like China, it becomes essential to secure access to resources and new markets. The age of using brute force and colonizing other states to achieve the above-stated aim has passed. In the study of International Relations, Dependency theory tries to map out as to how powerful states try to secure their national interests by other means which are not essentially linked with the use of military force as the primary method of securing their interests. The Chinese practices of investment as seen in the case of Venezuela draws the question as to whether they are following a similar model based on Dependency theory (Abdenur, 2017). Dependency theory emphasized the constraints imposed by the global political and economic order which prevented lesser developed nation-states from achieving its full potential and being dependent on the developed economies. Dependency theory was first proposed during the late 1950s. The credit of proposing this theory goes to the Argentine economist and statesman Raúl Prebisch. The theory though gained prominence only during the 1960s and the 1970s.

The crux of the theory is that nation-states are divided into three categories which are the core, periphery, and the semi-peripheral states. It emphasizes the unequal relations between the states worldwide (Zimmerman, 1978). These unequal relations are exacerbated in Latin America when the European and the US industries established their economic control over the resources (Kaufman et al., 1975). This explanation stands on the proposition that the core states are economically well developed, the semi-peripheral states are developing states who are in the process of becoming a developed state and the peripheral states are the states in which there is a very weak economic structure usually caused due to the lack of modernization (these peripheral

states are usually the formerly colonized states who have been exploited). Underdevelopment in the peripheral states according to the theory is mainly caused by the International system (Munro, n.d.). The affected nation-states in the world economy (the semi-peripheral and peripheral states) are typically underdeveloped states who offer cheap labour and raw materials in the world market. The core states (developed states) possess the means to transform the resources into finished products. The very resources sold by the peripheral states as raw materials are sold back to them as finished commodities at very high prices, depleting their capital resources. This capital could have otherwise been devoted to upgrading their own productive capacity by the peripheral states. This results in a vicious cycle that leads to the division of the world economy between a rich core and a poor periphery.

In the context of the BRI, the Chinese are at a position to strike deals in which the lesser developed states of Latin America and the Caribbean region are vulnerable to becoming victims like the dependency theory states. It is essential to understand the relationship between China and the region to evaluate as to whether a dependency model is being created by using the BRI as the means. The trade relations between China and the LAC were not significant. This was because Latin America and the Caribbean region was considered to be in the zone of influence of the United States of America. However, China is slowly starting to make considerable inroads into the region. The total annual trade between China and Latin America rose to more than \$200 billion by 2014 (Schechter, 2019). This is a significant rise and according to the Inter- American Development Bank (IDB), Latin America's exports to China increased by around 30 per cent in 2017 (ibid.). This exponential growth in economic relations could be attributed to a rise in the prices of the South American oil, minerals, and other commodities. China has become the largest trading partner of Brazil, Chile, and Peru in such a short span of time. Along with an increase in trade, the investments by China have also shot up. The concern here is regarding the type of investments. A report by the Boston University's Global Development Policy Center points out to the sort of investments undertaken by China (ibid.). Chinese companies have majorly used the method of "greenfield" foreign direct investment in the region. The commonly accepted definition of a greenfield investment is "A type of foreign direct investment (FDI) in which a parent company creates a subsidiary in a different state, building its operations from the ground up" (Abdenur, 2019). Greenfield investments authorize the construction of new production facilities. Such ventures additionally include the construction of new distribution hubs, offices, and living quarters. This characteristic of the greenfield investment type of foreign direct investment is that it provides the

highest degree of control for the sponsoring company (*ibid.*). This could lead to unfair terms of trade contracts as Latin American states will find it difficult to regulate the Chinese investments. China in recent years has increased such investments in Latin America through its enterprises. The Chinese enterprises have increased their investment based on the “greenfield” foreign direct investment pattern in Latin America to approximately a total of \$29.5 billion from 2013 to 2017 (*ibid.*). Since 2008, Latin America has turned out to become the second-largest destination for Chinese finance. The recent trend in Chinese investments is that Chinese investors are diversifying their investments away from extractive industries. Their geographic focus which was mainly on Venezuela is also shifting into a more comprehensive outlook. Investments in Brazil and Argentina have progressed to such a great degree that the Chinese are concentrating on banking and infrastructure projects now such as rail- roads, power plants, and ports (Schechter, 2019). This greatly resembles the way in the BRI agreements have been carried out in other countries like Pakistan for instance, under the China-Pakistan economic corridor (Chellaney, 2017). These investments are a cause of concern primarily due to the Chinese policies which have been criticized for employing methods such as ‘debt trap, to secure its interest (*ibid.*).

Scholars such as Matt Ferchen, however, have claimed that China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a little more than just a ‘debt trap’ (Ferchen, 2018). The numbers though speak for themselves. According to a report of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) from January 2018 on “Exploring New Forms of Cooperation between China and Latin America and the Caribbean,” it has been reported that 80 per cent of the international loans granted to the Latin American states from the year 2005–2016 have originated from the China Development Bank (Schechter, 2019). It amounts to a staggering total of \$141 billion. This is highly significant because the Chinese lending to the region’s governments exceeds that of the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the CAF Development Bank of Latin America put together (*ibid.*). The issue here is that the loans provided by the multilateral financial institutions usually insist on accountability and reforms as conditions for providing these loans. In contrast, though the loans granted by China lack measures which insist on structural reforms or accountability. They instead have stipulations which mandate that the projects tied up under the loans must be granted to Chinese companies and at least 50% of the material, equipment, technology, or services used must be sourced from China. Early BRI infrastructure investments have already been subject to scrutiny due to these kinds of practices which is followed by China. China is known to use the debt trap strategy to “reshape

international relations in its favor” (Mobley, 2019). This is usually done by creating a model of dependency with its BRI partner country. This can be seen as Chinese lending to “more than half the nations listed under BRI are rated as ‘junk’ or not graded, due to internal political and economic weaknesses. (ibid).” The Latin American states have limited options and are very vulnerable to dependency and economic coercion as piling up loans without reforms could create a severe crisis as seen in the case of Venezuela.

However, the BRI cannot be refused by the region as China has offered to provide loans to states where other lenders are very reluctant to engage. This has led to concerns that it is a strategic ploy by China to gain assets and build influence through diplomatic and economic coercion. From the regions viewpoint though these investments and loans offer infrastructure investment opportunities which may have otherwise not been available. The question as to whether the region will be able to avoid becoming victims of economic coercion will depend on the ability of the region’s states to strike an equitable balance between China’s interests and those of the partner nations. For striking an equitable balance the states need to be aware of their political and economic health, as well as their ability to hedge against excessive dependence on China. But the question remains as to whether Latin America and the Caribbean states can come out of being mere peripheral nations supplying raw materials to China which is on its way to becoming a developed state (China still has a long way to go before being classified as a developed nation) or can become a partner with equal stakes in the BRI. This depends on whether China’s rise on the world stage will be peaceful.

The Belt and Road Initiative: The means for China’s peaceful rise or a dominance agenda in Latin America?

The BRI deserves both praise and criticism. China has taken interest and invested in nation-states where other lenders are reluctant to engage. For example, Chinese manufacturers BYD and Yutong sold 200 electric buses in Chile in 2019 (“The Chile Embrace: Beijing Charts path into Latin America - Belt & Road News”, 2019). Such initiatives by China demonstrate a dramatic shift in China’s relationship with the region. Chile’s capital (Santiago) will now have the second-largest fleet of electric buses in the entire world (ibid.). While Latin America’s largest economies namely Brazil and Mexico remain skeptical of the BRI, China is increasingly focused on making inroads in the region through states such as Chile. Chile has a fast-growing economy, stable government and natural resources which makes it an important target for China’s efforts to expand its global reach. This development also

shows the progress of China's technology which can make affordable and environmentally conscious products. This can immensely help the busy cities of Latin America to reduce pollution. However, many scholars have argued that China's real intention is to use the BRI to improve its economic, political, and security situation. China on its part though has stated that the BRI is an economic boon for partner countries and has highlighted the BRI as China's means of rising peacefully. This is a positive development.

However, it is essential to look at the other side of these developments as well. Dr John J. Mearsheimer in his work "The Tragedy of the Great Power Politics" used his framework of Offensive realism to offer important insights into the rise of China. One of his main arguments was that if China continued to grow economically, it will eventually attempt to dominate Asia. This will result in the United States of America (considered as the hegemon and the leader of the free world) going to enormous lengths to prevent China from achieving such regional hegemony. The result of this clash of national interests according to Dr Mearsheimer will be an intense security competition with significant potential for war (Mearsheimer, 2014). According to him, China's rise is unlikely to be a tranquil one. This view has been criticized but according to Jennifer Lind, China is already following the strategies of previous regional hegemonies. She states that China is using economic coercion to bend other countries to its will (Lind, 2018). China according to Jennifer Lind is intervening in other states domestic politics to get more favorable policies. This can be backed up by evidence also. One can see that China has been successful to implement this with smaller states like Cambodia which is willing to serve as China's proxy within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Some scholars associate China's engagement using the BRI in Latin America as a means to secure its ever-growing energy needs which is termed as a sort of "energy mercantilism" (Mobley, 2019). This comes in the backdrop of China's insecurity with the ability of the United States to use access to oil as a weapon. China fears the possibility of being coerced and appears to face the Malacca dilemma (China depends heavily on import of oil which must pass through the Malacca straits which is considered as a choke point which could be used by China's enemies for gaining leverage). The expansion of the BRI to Latin America and the Caribbean is seen as a means to secure multiple energy supply sources and routes. China is also building such relationships globally to ensure favorable votes in the United Nations General Assembly and other multilateral bodies (Babineau & Farah, 2019). Another critical priority for China is to strengthen its position as the legitimate Chinese government in the Western Hemisphere (ibid.). Beijing considers Taiwan to be a breakaway

Chinese province. China attempts to avert countries from establishing ties with the island. In 2017, Panama established diplomatic ties with Beijing after breaking ties with self-ruled Taiwan. This is a major victory for China which has now become the second most important customer of Panama's key shipping canal ("Group including Chinese firm begins Panama port project", 2017). Following Panama, El Salvador cut ties with Taiwan in August 2018. The Dominican Republic cut ties with Taiwan in May 2018 (Babineau & Farah, 2019). This left Taiwan with just 17 formal diplomatic allies. This is a cause of concern for the United States of America. This development shows the increasing willingness of the Latin American and the Caribbean states to accept the BRI and China. This does not go well with the present-day superpower the United States of America. This is because the United States and China have differences of opinion due to their view of world politics.

In his article "The Strategic Price of Neglect", Peter Schechter warns the United States of the price it will pay if it does not actively involve itself in the Latin American region. The United States has considered Latin America to be in its sphere of influence. The United States has taken it for granted that it would continue to enjoy a predominant influence in the region. This attitude can be seen with the lack of attention from the U.S. policymakers. It is well known that Latin America has not enjoyed commercial favoritism from America's businesses despite Latin America being geographically close. Peter Schechter and other scholars have called for more assistance, more presidential visits and more creative policy frameworks with Latin America and the Caribbean region. The inroads made by China are a threat to the traditional area of influence of the United States (Roa, 2019). China's increased interest in the region has not come without controversy though. This interest has prompted the officials from the United States to warn Latin America about China's "predatory" nature, and the "debt traps" it has created for developing countries (Churchill, 2018). The practices followed by China in granting loans or while investing often requires that the projects be granted to Chinese companies and at least 50% of the material, equipment, technology, or services be sourced from China. Such clauses as explained earlier could be used by a stronger nation to arm-twist weaker states. This creates a sort of dependency as the Latin American and the Caribbean states often do not possess the strength to counter China. China has also been very secretive as the deals signed under the BRI in the region have been very obscure. The projects which have the involvement of Chinese enterprises could establish a monopoly over raw materials and scarce resources and use its power to enforce its control over the smaller Latin American states.

In addition to all the skeptical observations, LAC's growing renewable

energy capacities can be attributed to Chinese investments. This is done under China-Latin American and Caribbean Countries Cooperation Plan (Lu, 2017). Even when European firms undertake the projects, some of their equipment are sourced from China (Albe & Sarah, 2021). From 2011- 2018, most of the Chinese investments are in the energy sector (Ding et al., 2021). Not only in the energy sector, but Chinese investments are also significant even in agriculture, and infrastructure (Neves & Tulio, 2022). This shows that Latin America benefits economically from Chinese investments. However, as discussed earlier, LAC countries should be wary of the debt traps.

It is very early to judge whether China is pursuing the BRI in Latin America and the Caribbean as a strategic ploy to gain influence or as to whether China indeed seeks a peaceful rise. This along with the fact that the entire picture of the BRI in the region is unclear due to the lack of transparency and the scarce availability of the Memorandum of Understanding signed under the BRI initiative in Latin America raises suspicion of the Chinese intentions. Peter Schechter points out that there will inevitably be a debate about the role of China in Latin America sooner or later. This is because, despite the lack of clarity with regards to the BRI's motives in Latin America and the Caribbean region, the BRI's success or failure in the region will determine or shape the world's view of the BRI in general. Margaret Meyers goes on to ask as to whether China has understood the appeal to Latin American governments of inclusive rhetoric and development-oriented policies, may be better than the United States. If this is the case, then China will be able to prove that it is a leader of the developing states of the world and that by joining the BRI the world stands to benefit. The United States, on the other hand, must be able to prove that its claims of the BRI being a strategic tool of the Chinese to bring smaller nation-states under its influence is not just mere rhetoric to prevent the rise of China. For this, the United States must provide the region with economic support. However, as Peter Schechter has rightly pointed out that the United States must move beyond the narrow narrative of looking at the Latin American states through the lens of drugs, crime, and immigration for providing such support. He further states that the United States is at a historic juncture where the price for neglecting the region is simply the abdication of influence to the United States' most important strategic rival- China. He calls for the U.S and its allies to build an "arc of confidence" of western-oriented, democratic nations that have faith in the rules-based order and have chosen openness and inclusion for all.

However, building such a rules-based international order is going to be challenging. Dr. Evan Ellis who is a research professor of Latin American Studies at the U.S. Army War College points out as to how China does not

adhere to the key tenants of the liberal world order (Ellis, 2019). The way in which China operates is a challenge to the United States as in a world with the rise of Chinese influence the goals that the United States has actively promoted through its foreign policy is under threat. China has also been accused of the desire to gain hemispheric leverage. China has displayed an attitude that is largely devoid of considerations for issues such as environmental degradation, rule of law, functioning democratic institutions, and internal repression. For example, in the capital of Ecuador (Ecuador has signed the BRI agreement), Quito, Chinese made video surveillance devices are installed on street corners and inside buildings (Carvalho, 2019). In 2011, Ecuador introduced a monitoring system in public spaces which also comprises of facial recognition technology. The adoption of such Chinese technology has given rise to human rights concerns as images captured using these kinds of CCTV cameras have also been used for surveillance and intelligence gathering. The usage of such technology aids in internal repression (ibid). The lack of privacy and concern for human rights helps to explain China's willingness to lend massive amounts of money to the Maduro regime in Venezuela. China has displayed that it is not concerned with values such as human rights, rule of law etc. As long as China sees an opportunity to secure its needs it continues to aid the governments of its allies. The outcome of such disregard for the established norms could lead to a confrontation. The largely dominant American view is that the Chinese companies are harming Latin America by investing mostly in the fields of extraction and transportation of its precious raw materials.

Apart from the natural resource exploitation and economic risks of BRI, the new left also appears to support the Chinese rather than the European and the US. China's increased investments in natural resources and infrastructure are partly attributed to the approach of the new left in LAC (Pickup, 2018). The leaders - Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa are considered proponents of the 'new left' in LAC. Hugo Chavez openly advocated a multi-polar world subtly showing his resentment towards the growing US hegemony (Ellner, 2012, P. 104). The newly elected leader Xiomara Castro of Honduras (Arsenault, 2021), Gustavo Petro of Columbia (Vishwanathan, 2022), leaders of Chile and Brazil (Londono et al., 2022), and Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru (The Economist, 2022) are categorized as new left. From this development, it is not a stretch to infer that they would allow the increase in Chinese influence.

For Latin America and the Caribbean region, a confrontation between the United States of America and the Chinese could lead to disastrous consequences and further push them back from achieving their developmental aims. Hence the Latin American states must be careful while signing the BRI

agreements as there is a possibility that nation-states will increasingly be forced, as they were during the Cold War, to choose sides. The challenge for the Latin American and the Caribbean states will be to tap into the possibilities that the US-China competition offers without becoming its victims.

Post pandemic BRI Investments

UNCTAD's director of investment and enterprise, James Zhan said that the LAC region's economies would be pushed into deep recession because of the COVID – 19 pandemics (UNCTAD, 2020). The major factor for the latter is opined to be the reduction in the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) into the region. Before this COVID – 19 struck the world, FDI inflows into this region was mired with strategic implications. A snap into the pre-pandemic world shows a booming Chinese capital inflow into the region. In 2018, China accounted for more than 20% of the regions FDI inflow (Chen, 2018). They have invested in high technology companies making global assets (Rolando Avendano, 2017, p. 4). China's trend of increasing outward capital flows is definitely helping the LAC region though it is a strategic move. Will China's role in the LAC in the post – pandemic world will be same as it was during the times of 2008 financial crisis?

It can be argued to go both ways, but mostly the investments would increase. It cannot be ignored that the China has potential to lend financial and technical assistance to the LAC and is an equal competitor to the US. Before the pandemic, the decline of the US investments in the Latin America were attributed to the US exit from Trans Pacific Partnership [TPP] (Rolando Avendano, 2017, p. 5). The increasing domestic political disturbances in the US open up a channel for China to extend a strategic helping hand to LAC countries. China's increased focus on the service sector further encourages it to provide surveillance systems and health care services. Already Chinese companies like Huawei, ZTE, and Bank of Communications have made their inroads into the domestic market (Robert Greene, 2020, p. 7). Tencent is seen as an emerging investor for the region's startups (Asia Unbound, 2021).

An article published in *The Diplomat* fancily argues that if LAC realizes that China is engaged in the neo-colonial pathway to overthrow the US hegemony globally, LAC states would have less incentive to co-operate (Bernhard, 2021). But a Baker McKenzie report says that the Covid – 19 pandemic has given rise to the investments on the digital infrastructure development (GRI News Reports, 2020, p. 5). Another major opening for China is its investments in the health care sector (Koop, 2020). These

two areas would be enough to conquer the whole of the influence, if done effectively. Digital technologies like AI, and surveillance systems would provide China access to the citizen's data. Such access if unregulated would give away perception control of LAC to China. However, the argument of hegemony and social control cannot be solely applied for China. It equally implies for the US. Thus, it is up to the LAC states on which terms they would allow the investments.

The strategic importance of LAC region can be understood by looking at the customs records of China during the pandemic. Its import of food supplies has increased during the first quarter of 2020 (Yunxia, 2020). This trade ensured the unhindered food supplies for China during the pandemic. Scholars opine that the future wars would be fought over food and water. In such scenario, extending ties across the world and securing the national interest become inevitable. China appears to be the right path to tackle its growing demands.

The conflict between the dominant power i.e. the US and the emerging great power which is the China is better explained by Organski's Power Transition Theory. This neo-realist sub theory strongly proposes that the national power includes socioeconomic and political resources. Such development in understanding the concept of *power* is derived from the economic fruits provided by the industrialization, demographical change and the ability of elite to make use of such skilled industrial demography (Kugler & Organski, 1989, p. 181).

The power of a state is calculated by $\text{Power} = (\text{Economic Production per Capita} \times \text{Population}) \times \text{Relative Political Capacity}$ Where the Relative Power Capacity (RPC) is the ratio of the revenue expected to the revenue generated. When such calculated power of great power exceeds dominant powers, conflict arises. In the case of China's BRI and its tussle with the US, China's PRC might have been increased when compared to that of US in this region. The US looks at China as a belligerent state. Gilpin argues that a dominant state would try to protect its status if a hegemon when a rival arises. He also proposes that a counter Hegemon might successfully emerge if it has a superior technology and organizational capacity (Gilpin, 1988, p. 8).

China's Digital Silk Road

The Digital Silk Road, which was announced in 2015 Chinese government white paper aims to provide assistance in improving the digital communications, network capacities, and almost all the other critical internet infrastructures. Not only financing, China also helps its domestic countries like Huawei to export its innovative technologies like 5G. Given the political

volatility in the LAC, it shouldn't surprise the world if they ask for high tech surveillance technology from China. Such technologies, without any data regulation regime currently across the world, would end up LAC states into what we call *data-trap*.

Not only China but the fear of going into *data trap* would be true even if states take assistance from the US. The leaks by Edward Snowden indicate that the US government is not different from the China when it comes to surveillance behavior. At least, XI Jinping's government emphasizes on the cyber sovereignty. China even declared that all its digital infrastructure projects along the BRI would adhere to the sovereign laws of the region (Robert Greene, 2020). Another interesting development of the DSR is that it is not carried with top-down approach. Rather, Chinese companies are encouraged to provide international services (Robert Greene, 2020). This makes the *data trap* invisible. In order to stay away from the *data trap*, client countries to DSR should know Chinese domestic laws and also should be concerned about the social and political fabric of the nation. However, immediate health care infrastructure support, cheap and reliable critical digital infrastructure are only provided by China. Further, people of the client countries are trained and educated apart from just providing the technology. This is a honey coated *data trap* deal, if China goes for data espionage.

The disadvantage that LAC states will encounter is the geographical distance of China. The alternative digital infrastructures can be availed from the US at some cost. If China has to establish its influence, it must engage completely in the LAC. The entire regions digital infrastructure, especially hardware manufacturing must be done in LAC.

Till now, the DSR has made visible inroads into African nations. The US with its ego and cultural façade of superiority, cannot establish another home in Africa and adopt some of the African cultures. The second Belt and Road Forum, for the first time held a separate session on the DSR. It brought more than 30 states including Cuba. In the area of digital infrastructure, Brazil is the most invested region by Chinese company Huawei. It is involved in building network infrastructure, research institution and training (Malena, 2021, p. 8). The US government announced in mid-2018 a multi-year Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership (DCCP), focused on the Indo-Pacific. Such partnerships are to be initiated in the LAC region to sustain its influence.

Conclusion

The BRI has evolved significantly from the initial concept of the

One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013. The Latin American and the Caribbean leaders and diplomats are indicating a greater willingness to be a part of the BRI. Despite the larger economies such as Brazil and Mexico not signing the BRI agreements yet, Chinese engagement with these states is along the lines of BRI projects. China has made inroads with states like Chile which has enabled it to become an important player in the region's politics. China has also diversified its engagements and has moved from a narrow focus based only on Venezuela to include more states as partner states in the region. The major concern regarding the BRI in this region has been as to what China seeks to gain out of including the region under the banner of the BRI. Despite the growing Chinese interest in extending the BRI to Latin America and the Caribbean region and the sustained enthusiasm in the region itself about this possibility, it remains unclear as to what exactly the BRI will do for the region ("China's Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and the Caribbean", 2018). One possibility is that Latin America and the Caribbean states could attract more state-backed finance from China as a result of joining the BRI (Myers, 2018). Chinese investments in infrastructure can turn out to be a boon for this region especially as the region seeks to address its critical deficit (*ibid.*).

The other challenge for the region is that many Chinese projects have been increasingly questioned for violating human rights by Non-governmental organizations (Carvalho, 2019). For instance, Bolivia adopted an "emergency response system" developed by a Chinese company. The particular company in question was financed with a loan from Beijing (*ibid.*). The emergency response system is utilized for surveillance on its citizens itself. This is disturbing as surveillance is used by authoritative regimes to quell any kind of opposition and to repress the people from voicing out their opinion. Venezuela has begun issuing fatherland cards since 2016 using Chinese technology (*ibid.*). The fatherland card is an identity certificate which the human rights activists fear will be used for surveillance or to infringe on privacy. Another emerging roadblock has been the Chinese non-compliance with environmental standards. Argentinian scholar Ariel Armony and Mexico-based researcher Enrique Dussel Peters state that most projects in the region have been met with a local backlash because of environmental concerns (*ibid.*). The indigenous people are worried about pollution and the harm caused to its residents and their livelihoods. In Argentina, the construction for the Condor Cliff and La Barrancosa hydroelectric dams ended up in controversy. Construction work on the dams planned to be constructed in Santa Cruz, Argentina was begun without an environmental impact assessment. This led the Argentine Supreme Court to order a suspension of the projects. Such disregard for environmental standards has led to severe backlash but

according to the Chinese firms the community is not a valid interlocutor, only the government is (ibid.).

This sort of cultural difference and the difference in terms of political setup could lead to a severe clash of interests. According to Po Chun Lee, a Taiwanese-Ecuadorean economist the other significant problem is that “Wherever China invests, they make it very Chinese”. They don’t give importance to the native culture. The Chinese separate or segregate the workers in terms of dividing them into a Chinese camp and a local camp. The predicament here is that China does not take it seriously to abide by International standards. This is the very reason as to why there is a skeptical view regarding whatever China does.

This is also the reason as to why the offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer argue that China cannot rise tranquilly as despite having economic interdependence with other states, Chinese practices are a challenge to the rules-based established order which the United States the sole superpower has promoted. The Chinese stand on the South China Sea where they have rejected a Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling, the 99-Year Lease of the Hambantota Port to Chinese Firms due to Sri-Lanka being caught in a dept-trap etc., have clearly shown the coercive policies of China with weaker states (Chellaney, 2017). This is the reason why Chinese investments are subject to severe scrutiny.

This is also why global politics may turn out to be the deciding factor in the context of the BRI’s success in the region. Peter Schechter predicts that Latin America is where the fight to expand the arc of confidence must succeed. The clash between the current superpower the United States of America and its allies versus the rising power China is going to manifest in this region. The region’s growth potential makes it a possible ground for a clash between the United States and China. If the United States can extend support to the region’s economies, then Chinese opportunities to extend its influence may decrease. The challenge for the Latin American and the Caribbean states will be to tap into the possibilities that the United States of America and the Chinese competition offers without becoming its victims. This does not mean that the Chinese investment must be shunned, or the BRI must be viewed from a negative perspective only.

As stated, earlier China is willing to lend to states where others are unwilling to lend. The Chinese investment though should be more transparent, and it is up to the ability of the Latin American countries to ensure that they get fair and transparent deals. For the region to benefit from the BRI it must think strategically and collaboratively about regional infrastructure development. Together the Latin American states could be at a better position to gain rather than making state to state deals with China.

Chinese companies on their part have also expressed the difficult investment environment as a major challenge for proceeding with the BRI agreements. The vast distance between China and Latin America along with complex regulatory environments and bidding processes acts as a deterrent from further cooperation (Zhimin, 2018).

Hence for the Latin American and the Caribbean states to benefit they must concentrate on having well-developed plans for domestic infrastructure projects, regional and even sub-regional strategies while also easing the regulatory environments and bidding processes (Myers, 2018). The Latin American and the Caribbean states must also create the fundamental conditions required to attract Chinese investors.

As Margaret Myers points out the Latin American states must ensure that the projects are demand-driven and promote long-term, responsible, and sustainable economic growth. The major challenge hence lies in the ability of the Latin American and the Caribbean nation-states to build a relationship based on equality and avoid becoming a victim of the superpower rivalry or being reduced to becoming mere peripheral states completely dependent on China for its needs.

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ABSTRACT

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is increasingly turning out to become a global endeavor and has recently been extended to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region. The diversity in the makeup of the nation-states in the region poses several challenges concerning the region's association with the BRI. For instance, Venezuela has borrowed heavily from China while being mired in economic troubles. The Venezuelan example serves as a caution to others as well as China on the intricacies of debt management and lending. This paper aims to study the challenges and risks arising from the Belt and Road Initiative extending to Latin America and the Caribbean region. This paper also tries to analyze as to whether a win-win outcome can be achieved for both China and the LAC nation-states and as to what China seeks from the region. An attempt has been made to evaluate the role that the global environment might play in this evolving relationship between China and the LAC nation-states. The paper also analyzes the post pandemic BRI investment in the LAC region.

KEYWORDS

Debt-trap, Strategic leverage, Dependency theory, China, LAC, BRI, Venezuela.

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MARITIME DIPLOMACY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: A WAY FORWARD FOR PAKISTAN

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Introduction

“Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas. In the twenty-first century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters” (Holmes 2004).

The Indian Ocean (IO), although the smallest of three large oceans, on the geopolitical landscape commands a prominent region. It covers an area of 73,600,000 sq km that equals almost one-seventh of the entire global surface. Representing 20 percent of the total oceanographic area being 9500km wide is located between the Southern tip of Africa and Antarctica (Goel, 2005). It steadily narrows towards the North where it is intersected by the Arabia Sea and the Bengal Bay. The Strait of Bab el Mandeb connects the Arabian and Red Sea to the Persian Gulf. The Oceanic region is bounded on the North by Iran, Pakistan, India, Burma and Bangladesh whereas on the West by the Arabian Peninsula and Africa; on the East side by the Malayan peninsula and the continent of Australia; and on the South by the icy continent of Antarctica.

Therefore, the Indian Ocean is considered as a tropical Ocean that extends from 700° S to 300° N. It has an average depth of 12,700 ft (3890m) with a volume of 70,086,000 cubic miles and a maximum depth of 24,442 ft (7450m) located at the Java Trench (Rao & Griffiths 1998). It is the only major ocean that does not extend from pole to pole, at the same time it is large enough to extend from the Indian peninsula to Antarctica. The world's oldest and most densely populated countries are located on the Northern part of the Indian Ocean rim. Unlike the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the Indian Ocean

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is unique as it is closed from the North by the Asia continents but open in the South. Vulnerable, this is the place from which invasions have occurred. The European colonizer came from the sea to reach its shores. The Indian Ocean is symmetrical in the sense of a 'North-South axis,' running down the length of the archipelago of Maldives (Bowmann 1988).

In the contemporary times, the sea has transformed to be the critical lifeline for safety, security, economics, environment, and maritime geopolitics. There are contested and often intersecting interests that characterizes the complex environment represented by competition, interdependence, rivalry, susceptibility in the strategic maritime picture (Holmes & Yoshihara 2008). Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in this regard, is essential for cooperative governance at the sea (Boraz 2009). It is defined as the understanding of the nature and characteristics of the maritime domain that have an overlying impact over security, economics, and the environment. Effective MDA can be possible only via a partnership of inter-state government agencies, coast guards and the navy (Campion 2008).

Pakistan is blessed to be located in a geostrategic location in close vicinity to the oil rich Gulf States, providing an opportunity to share its expertise and experience in the maritime realm as part of MDA. By leading the MDA initiative, it can play a pivotal role in providing maritime cooperation in the IO. The past developments in the region including China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship initiative of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), adds to the geo-economic dimension which Pakistan can capitalize on to further its national interests (Bueger & Stockbreugger, 2016). The Western Indian Ocean (WIO) therefore requires handy scrutiny by stakeholders at the highest levels of policy procedures. Pakistan needs to consider the WIO as an arena for regional cooperation. It has the potential to offer multilateral platforms such as AMAN and Regional Maritime Security Patrol (RMSP). A key priority area would be to further collaborate on maritime issues with states of Africa and the Middle East.

Research Methods

The study is carried out using qualitative examination of primary and secondary sources of data relating to maritime strategy and diplomacy. Primary data comprises of government documents, strategy papers and discussions held informally with dignitaries, academics, and speakers of International Maritime Conference. Secondary data including dissertations, research articles served as important source of information. They were

examined along with the thought-process of prominent regional states of the Indian Ocean. The latter was studied using techniques of discourse analysis to avoid policy bias and address the literature gap.

Diplomacy in International Relations

Diplomacy remains to have a significant position in the art and practice of International Relations, where states continue to use it as a tool to further their national security objectives in a changing geopolitical world characterized by complex interdependence. The transition in international power corridors have had profound effects in shaping the diplomatic mechanisms that include the wide range of non-state entities such as global financial conglomerates and institutions. Traditionally diplomacy was thought to be the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of state-to-state relations by peaceful means. Harold Nicolson has called it “the process and machinery by which negotiations are carried out” (Nicholson 1961).

For Peter Barber, a renowned European historian it is the “peaceful management of international relations” (Barbet 1979). James Der Derian called it the very process of mediation that facilitates estranged individuals and entities. The role of diplomacy in this context would be to facilitate in opening spaces for cultural exchange (Sharp 1999). However, concurring to the changing character of the 21st Century which has seen the ‘Rise of Asia,’ diplomacy consists more of being a general system that provides for information gathering in a world challenged and flashed by media manipulation and disinformation operations that have the potential to trigger hostilities between adversaries (Black 1990).

The paper studies how maritime segment of an overarching diplomacy continues to play a major role in providing for a collaborative and peaceful mechanism in order to address the issues for potential conflict at the sea. It should be noted that the region has attained a prominent stature at the global chessboard where interests of regional and extra-regional actors converge on major sea lines of communications. The maritime realm of security in the Indian Ocean is on the surge whereas regional cooperative security arrangements are still at an embryonic stage.

Conceptual Framework: The Essentials of Maritime Power

“The navy has always been an instrument of the policy of states, an important aid to diplomacy in peacetime” (Admiral Gorshkov 1979, 248).

In the subject-matter of international relations there are varying accounts pertaining to the absolute definition of power. James Cable has defined it as the capability to use a force of fitting response in a given situation. Over the years, theorists have devoted considerable efforts to the refining and elaboration as to what benchmarks power. These definitions extend to characteristics pertaining to the realms of technology, economy, military and geography. Nowadays, the extension has been to the factors less noticeable previously such as the organization and way of politics formation, the morale, motivation, and foundations of the state. These studies were undertaken for the purpose of providing a “comprehensive definition of power,” that would be reliable enough for inter-state comparison of power factors. In the context of maritime power, the studies undertaken recognize around forty of such elements that substantialized the naval aptitude.

There are two features that may elucidate Maritime power today. The most relevant is related to the aspects of technology, which despite the unprecedented firepower and sophistication provides the limitation which is reflected by the fact that ships of even the most advanced nations are prone to be vulnerable at sea. They are not immune to probable opponents and to the weapons that are cheap, readily available, and widely diffused. Only considering the issue of equipment, the gap between a Super Power and a middle power nation has relatively narrowed down more than it had ever been. However, at all levels excluding the highest one, the combat openings have contracted.

Sea-power can economically be employed by a ‘single-minded’ state with some sophisticated weapons to deny the use of adjacent waters a distant adversary within the easy range of shore-based aircraft and artillery (Voyer et al. 2018). The Ottoman Empire resistance of the Dardanelles in 1915 is a peculiar example, dependent on few fortress guns and mines against the formidable British and French naval flotilla (Cable 1985, 52). Another prominent example would be that of UK which has the strongest naval fleet in the years prior to World War I. However, the U-boat capabilities of Germany during the course of war to some extent left no escape from the prospects of decisive defeat in the naval operations. The US, the sole superpower was demeaned in 1968 by the North Koreans in *USS Pueblo affair* and by the Iranians in the 1980 hostage crisis (Murray 2010).

There is no single answer to the question, “Power to do what?”. It was believed that the command of the sea provides the flowing of other rewards that would sustain naval susceptibility. Since then, the concept evolved from Mahan’s views to the times of Colbert and Holmes, with aggregate credentials and certain omissions. The use of fitting power was traditionally recognized to

permit the extension of national interests and power projection. This was the reason why Bismarck afforded to proclaim his intent of sending counterforce if the British fleet blockaded the coast of Pomerania in the “Schleswig-Holstein affair”. The “appropriate force” mechanism in such instances provided an edge against those who were exposed at the sea (Pflanze 1955).

Since then, the range of these weaknesses has been overcome by the advancing political organizations systems and the global communication infrastructures of coastal nations. The changes in what command of the sea can do are nevertheless less fundamental than the new obstacles to its creation. Previously the case was that sea fleets were considered benign from everything but a sturdier flotilla. The sea command, therefore allowed for an appropriate-sized force to achieve an aim, as an uninterrupted occupation of naval strength. Added to that, the sea strong capabilities were thought to bring in all the benefits affiliated with the command as the predestined reward of a sufficiently superior fleet. Mines, torpedoes, aircraft, submarines, and missiles have all changed the equation. Admiral Turner: “it is no longer conceivable, except in the most limited sense, to totally control the seas for one’s own use or to totally deny the enemy.” He added that US Navy at best could hope for a “realistic control in limited areas and for limited periods of time” (Nathan & Oliver 1979, 48).

From the present onwards, force is in use, over and under the sea to protect or deny a particular use of the sea. The best the US can do “in a limited area and for limited period of time” (Cable 1985, 156). It is imperative to postulate the use of sea power as a tool for containing dispute. For this purpose, there is need to measure the power in the maritime realm. There are several yardsticks for this purpose conforming to various preceding disputes. An interesting example is that of the British Royal Navy which despite superior capabilities had been overwhelmed to a significant extent by two rather subsidiary power countries. The first one is Albania, which in the year 1946 caused austere casualty damage to British destroyers (Thompson 2004). The following one is Iceland which efficaciously affirmed her prerogative of exclusive fishing rights with the help of gunboat. The two conflicts ended without the occurrence of war or continuing conflict. It is the fact that neither possessed naval power analogous to UK, yet each prevailed and able to make use of “appropriate force”. The conservative estimate of contemplating sea power relates to the counting of ships whereby via comparing and analyzing the scale and grandeur of mission’s operational capacities the capabilities are derived. A former US Secretary of Defense categorized this as the knack to fight “2 ½ or 1 ½ wars” (Cable 1994, 146).

Defining Maritime Diplomacy (MD)

MD can facilitate behaviors ranging from cooperative ones such as port visits, philanthropic aid to coercive and persuasive placement of naval destroyers to extract political incentives. In the contemporary era, the activity is no longer confined only to the naval force where civilian vessels and non-state groups such as multi-nationals have a growingly important role to play. The section describes the evolution of maritime diplomacy and how it could prove to be a mechanism for bringing stability in the Indian Ocean Region.

The age of the ‘gunboat diplomacy’ which brings up images of European warships bombing and coercing states via act of naval intimidation is generally thought to be long gone in the age of unipolarity that is relinquishing towards more of multipolarity. Added to that, MD based on gunboats, may not be a historical undertaking of the imperial past, as the former Asian victims of colonization have the resources, economic might, and naval muscle deal with their former colonial rulers in the modern day interdependent and globalized era (Kaplan 2019). Several states had understood of the strategic utility of ‘gunboat diplomacy’. It allows for actors to use coercion in order to pursue state’s objectives at the same time having to avoid large-scale cost and conflict. In recent time, Iran had held Velayat naval exercises in January 2012, the USS George Washington carrier participated in what is known as “Invincible Spirit exercises” with Japan and other allies, as a deterrent to the North Korean sinking of a South Korean corvette (Avery & Taylor 2010).

MD is an important tool of statecraft for prevention of war, it signals to the adversary one’s policies and capabilities bringing into play the interplay of deterrence and compellence. An excellent measure which provides an outlet for tensions in the international system. The recurrence of maritime diplomacy can mitigate potential conflicts likely to occur, signaling to hostile states and solving disagreements through the threat of limited force. A predictive and preventive tool, used to avoid and deter conflict, and also to make a political point. Therefore, MD is critical in the emerging power equation developing in the IO.

Cooperative Maritime Diplomacy

“Diplomacy is the efficient management of a state’s interests in international relations”, concurring to this definition maritime diplomacy is the use of maritime assets to manage relations between states (Holmes 2006). Port visits, combined trainings and naval exercises, humanitarian assistance

and disaster relief. This adds to the flexibility of naval forces is tantamount to the fact that they can operate in politically neutral international waters. In recent years, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities have added a soft-layered element resulting in the evolution of the term, “gunboat philanthropy” (Kimunguyi 2007).

Cooperative maritime diplomacy uses soft power elements which in the words of Joseph Nye, induces others to do what you want them to do. It is an attempt to support soft power making use of hard power naval assets. The regular port to port visits by naval forces are often intended to build diplomatic influence and reassure allies. Training and diplomatic exercises provide for capacity building and creation of knowledgeable navies, apart from reinforcing friendship with a degree of more compatibility. Bob Davidson of the Royal Canadian Navy has called this “maritime influence operations” and his sailors as “mini ambassadors, representing the country, its interests and values in every port of call”. This illustrates the underlying concept that contemporary navies have “potential far beyond the narrowness of gunboat diplomacy” (Prantl, 2021).

Geoffrey Till notes that naval forces have greater attributes and abilities than the other armed services, which provides for an expansive and flexible reach along with strategic mobility which unreachable to formations of infantry troops or to fighter aircrafts (Till 2007). Peace Ark, the first Chinese hospital ship was sent on a tour of Africa to administer nursing and medicinal facilities to the indigenous population. The vessel conveyed the notions of harmony, at the same time creating a positive image and soft power tenderness to strengthen partnership, along enhancing the PLN’s as a benign military force (Miere 2005, 8). The Zheng He, is an example of successful Chinese maritime diplomacy signaling country’s “Peaceful rise”.

Persuasive Maritime Diplomacy

Naval platforms have long been used to further political purposes in times of peace. These forms however are not cooperative as they lack collaboration in the diplomatic effects. It is differentiated from cooperation by the lack of collaboration and from coercive diplomacy as it is not aimed to deter nor compel the other. They are intended to increase one’s recognition of national power and build prestige at the global stage. Added to that, interestingly persuasive MD is projected unlike the other types, not to rely on the terror and the fear element of the naval power but rather to persuade the other via peaceful means.

Naval vessels signal for the presence and capability without influencing the policy of the other. One example is the US Great White Fleet, an initiative of the former US President Theodore Roosevelt. They were aimed to travel to all the whole continents in the early years of the 20th century. The ships were painted white to show that the purpose of the global expedition was altogether peaceful. Nevertheless, the image that the US Navy had built with this voyage was instrumental in projecting its maritime might and power during the 1898 affair known as the Spanish-American War, which resulted in the occupation of Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. The main goal was America's rise to the top of the table of world powers. "Speak softly and carry a big stick" (Holmes 2008).

It is argued that Persuasive maritime diplomacy is less commonly practiced than the other two, as its effects are vague. A modern-day example is that of the Iranian Navy. In February 2011, it set out a modest fleet to transit via the Suez Canal, an initiative carried out for the first time since the Shah was ousted because of the Islamic Revolution. Although peaceful in nature, the voyage was a sign of the nation's support to its only Arab ally, Syria. In the words of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei: "The world should know that the presence of Iranian warships in the Suez Canal has taken place through the deep guidance of the Supreme Leader" (Seyfi & Hemati, 2020). At that time, the current Israeli VP Silvan Shalom commented that the Iranian flotilla intended to provoke other Persian Gulf states showing "who is the new leader in the Middle East, after the 'Arab Spring' fall out" (Boudreaux 2015).

Coercive Maritime Diplomacy

Mostly, coercive maritime diplomacy resembles gunboat diplomacy. Defined and instrumentalized by events. An example is when North Korea attacked USS Pueblo, an intelligence gathering vessel 1968 with insignificant and containable force use. In James Cable words, "the threat or utility of limited naval force is gunboat diplomacy that is employed to have limited advantage or to minimize loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state" (Cable 1985, 14).

Gunboat Diplomacy (GB) was first seen in the 1970s. In the present era, non-state actors have assumed a greater role at the helm of global affairs despite US and its allies specifically waging a war against non-state actors. From among the non-state militant entities, Hezbollah and the former Tamil Tigers. The latter was one of the first contemporary times insurgent groups

to operate a navy. On the “Heroes’ Day celebrations” on 27 November 2005 where their modestly equipped naval ships exhibited their power projection at Kallapadu, Mullaithivu (Miere 2011). The idea was to demonstrate their competences and a force to be reckoned with to the government in Colombo. This approach to dissuade state violence by projecting power in the maritime sphere was an example of GB.

Maritime Diplomacy and Pakistan

The geostrategic conjecture of Pakistan at the head of the Arabian Sea connecting the Persian Gulf naturally makes it a leading player in the region. Due to lack of maritime awareness and continental mindset only limited progress has been undertaken as far as a leadership role is concerned. Nonetheless, the country has the potential for it, which, if rightly tapped, can provide the required impetus. Furthermore, with the CPEC, it is likely that the situation would become more complex with increased maritime traffic which would require for a greater regional maritime security (Khan 2019).

The Pakistan Navy (PN) has established the RMSP with the objective of securing the country’s interests at sea and guarding Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from all kinds of traditional and non-traditional threats (Ali 2018). The maritime force continues to be a member to US led coalition CMF, in the CTF-150 that is assigned the patrolling role against illicit smuggling including narcotics and in the CTF-151 that exclusively deals with piracy. At the regional level, due to rapidly modernizing Indian navy, Pakistan is required to develop a “deterrent capacity”. For this purpose, the country has closed an acquisition arrangement with Romania, China, and Turkey in the recent past (Azmie 2019). Navy’s role and future plans, include indigenous construction and maintenance of sea platforms. For this purpose, the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KS&EW) state-owned shipyard is being upgraded (Ansari 2020).

Naval power alone is not a sufficient criterion for a comprehensive maritime power, as the latter has multidimensional aspects. It is necessary that, apart from a naval fleet, emphasis is also placed on the improvement of the mercantile fleet in quantity and quality. Furthermore, similar projects like Gwadar in the long-run may also be made on the coast to increase internationally standardized ports and augment sea-based economy (Voyer et al. 2018). Pakistan is largely dependent on the sea for the smooth running of its economy. According to various surveys, around 94 percent of the nation’s total trade by volume and 86 percent by value is facilitated by the

sea. The freight alone that is the surcharge on the use of chartered shipping lines amounts to \$6 billion according to 2019 estimate (Alam et al. 2019). The SLOCs that move the imports and exports for Pakistan are potentially unstable including the Persian Gulf, the Far East, and Red Sea (Haider 2015). The over reliance on imports that are sea-based is greater in Pakistan's case than that of its traditional rival, India.

PN participation in global and regional maritime cooperative activities has been recognized by the international community and organizations at various times (Ali 2018). PN platforms, officials and warships are part of a Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) for over seventeen years. Senior PN officers have commanded the coalition on a rotational basis with other countries (CMF 2018). In quantifiable terms, over 100 PN platforms have provided service operation at CMF for upholding safety and security in the IO (Ansari 2020).

The *AMAN - Together for Peace* platform can be termed as one of the greatest endeavors of Pakistan is disseminating its discourse regarding the IO and other related maritime subject-matters. The sixth edition of the AMAN series took place in February 19, which had participation of forty-six nations from over the globe (Iqbal 2019). Apart from that representatives of the PN take part in almost related international and regional activities taken for the maintenance of order at sea. These include the Galle Dialogue, International Sea Power Symposium and other multinational exercises and disaster relief efforts (Bueger & Stockbruegeer 2016).

The International Maritime Conference (IMC)

The IMC is held biennially jointly with the AMAN exercise organized by NIMA for a thought-process to contemplate on emerging strategic connotations of maritime geopolitics and analyze its impact of the region and Pakistan in particular (Afnan 2019). This enables academia and pundits to devise viable resolutions for enactment of common objectives of peaceful coexistence and sustainable economic progress (Ahmad 2019). At the end of each conference, a proceeding is formulated outlining the knowledge and perspectives of esteemed academicians invited from across the world. It was because of one of the IMC's deliberations that Dr. Christian Bueger proposed a leading role for the PN in Indian Ocean Security Architecture (Bueger 2017).

The AMAN Exercise

The exercise was conceived to address the mutual securities of the contributing navies by providing a platform for information sharing and participatory action on issues as diverse as counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and maritime security operations. It was first held in 2007, where 28 nations took interest in the multi-lateral exercise. Since then, it has been held biennially with only one exception in between providing naval partners to share their thought-process and gain from one another's experience (Hafiz 2017). From a national perspective, it serves as a stage to expand the nation's image in the region and in the globe in maritime strategy and security (Khattak 2020). It may be argued by critics that organizing the maritime exercise on hefty level is costly and logistically an intricate activity, for the host nation and participant navies. On the contrary, it is a significant training experience with state-of-the-art navies of the globe.

The members collectively participating under Pakistan's naval leadership have considerably been increasing from twenty-eight in the first edition of the exercise to more than forty during the last one held in 2019 (Afzal 2008). AMAN is appropriately organized to advance cooperation between the regional and extra-regional naval force having an interest in safety and stability of the IO. A diplomatic move undertaken to construct conducive for safety and security of the region from security threats particularly in the non-traditional domain to ensure sustainable long term regional development. The involvement of navies from across the continents also creates prospects for synergizing different components of naval capacities. In this way, AMAN can serve as a bridge between many regions (Malik 2018).

Joint Maritime Information Coordination Centre (JMICC)

JMICC was developed by the PN and is presently based at the PNS Qasim, Karachi as an information sharing and inter-agency coordination platform for maritime happenings in the EEZ (Aleem 2017). The Centre also provides for network-aided environment for budding Maritime Common Operating Picture (MCOP) to enhance MDA for early identification of potential threat and to facilitate in coordinated response to counter illicit activities at sea (JMIO 2019). Maritime security has been accepted as critical to global stability where sea-based threats endanger economic and commercial interests. To curb these challenges, early detection and warning systems have been in place by leading maritime nations of the world, as a means to coordinate and exchange vital information for security in the regional and territorial waters (Bhatti 2014).

JMICC, as the nerve center of the PN in this regard has established key contacted with maritime data hubs and similar organizations such as

the Information Fusion Centre of Singapore and Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre of Italy (Asghar 2016). JMICC has at national level made efforts to facilitate Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) in maintenance of good order at sea. In collaboration of Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (PMSA) it has launched an android-based application “Assistance, Anytime, Anywhere at Sea” (AAAS) to facilitate maritime communities operating in territorial waters of Pakistan in case of any emergency. By the end of 2019 it has coordinated with authorities in 244 search and rescue missions, saving 1815 precious lives (Rashid 2019).

Regional Maritime Security Patrol (RMSP)

The PN instituted the RMSP in areas of troubled waters particularly in the Southern Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman and the Maldives choke points (Azmie 2019). These are vital for the stability and safety of the sea-lanes that are key to Pakistan’s national and economic interests. The conception of RMSP is to monitor via maritime platforms, these “hazard points” to maintain a vigorous security posture that allows for protection of national and international shipping while at the same time ensures for the free and uninterrupted access to the high seas. RMSP in this regard reflects Pakistan’s commitments as a responsible and leading state of the region when it comes to developing security architecture (Mustafa 2005).

The central objective is to ensure for stable maritime conditions in close proximity of the country’s geographical location. For this purpose, naval assets have been dedicated to cultivating regional ties with other like-minded states. For several years, the PN has contented for a “region-centric” framework for IO’s security. The country is of the opinion that preserving of IOR’s stability from an economic and diplomatic viewpoint is best conserved by region states and not through an Extended Regional Framework (ERF), involving the permanent presence of extra-regional powers. An account of the past has shown that an ERF driven cooperative frameworks, for instance CENTO and SEATO led to hesitations on part of regional stakeholders who ended up getting misgivings and suspicion over the arrangement.

For its turn, the RMSP is organized to “expand on region-led, region-own principle” and serve as cooperative maritime construct for security in the IO. The RMSP is in accordance with the UNSC and the UNCLOS. According to the UNSC Resolution 2316 (2016) it has given a mandate to UN states, “to act against piracy, armed robbery at sea off the Somalia”. Resolution 2216 (2015) likewise reinforces the RMSP vision to eliminate illicit weapons network. UNCLOS Article 100, backs the RMSP in these endeavors to defeat piracy (Aleem 2017).

Conclusion

Alfred Mahan, the founder of sea power stated, “it is not just a nation’s power at sea but the power that is hailed from the sea,” meaning how a nation exploits the enormous advantages of the maritime space and the influence incurred via the tools of MD. Considering Pakistan this would require the development of naval power to counter blue-water hegemonic designs of state such as India. Such an endeavor would allow Pakistan to maintain an ability to play its part in various strategic developments and not be isolated from great power strategies in the Indian Ocean. The AMAN – *Together for Peace* is an excellent platform in this regard. It is noteworthy to mention that the last series of naval exercises under its aegis brought together forty-six participating nations from across the globe. It was a striking and proud moment for Pakistan in the international relations domain, as well as in its maritime diplomacy discourse as that the US, China and Russia, all three participated despite the on-going geopolitical rivalries.

For the long-term, policymakers in Pakistan evaluate that the country is at the geostrategic conjecture at the Arabian Sea connecting the Persian Gulf, and that it naturally makes it a leading player in the region. Moreover, with CPEC, it is likely that the situation would become more complex with increased maritime traffic which would require for a greater regional maritime patrolling. Furthermore, naval power alone is not sufficient criteria for a comprehensive MD, as the latter has multidimensional aspects. A strong and robust economy is urgent so that it can allow Pakistan to project a better maritime power posture. In that regard, special emphasis needs to be placed on mega-projects like CPEC and the Gwadar Port, the facilities on the coast need to be upgraded keeping in line with internationally standardized ports guidelines that would augment national economy.

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ABSTRACT

The Indian Ocean has gained prominence in the international geopolitical discourse. It is becoming a showground for major competition between the new and existing great powers. Maritime Diplomacy, in this regard, is a valuable instrument for averting conflict. The range of options available are from the cooperative ones to persuasive and coercive selection for the maritime forces. It is helpful not only to those utilizing it but also to academics who are trying to decipher the more extensive ramifications of the utilization of sea-based strategy. Mahan documented, the most powerful state of the maritime realm is generally also richest and economically prevalent most in the international order. The study uses qualitative methods to analyze the existing literature comprising of primary and secondary set of imperatives to provide structured insight that would be useful to policymakers and academics. The Pakistani perspective and interplay in the changing geopolitics is assessed in the region termed as “pivotal of the world”.

KEYWORDS

Indian Ocean; Maritime Diplomacy; Cooperative Diplomacy; Maritime Strategy.

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TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE ASEAN MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN COMBATING NON- TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA REGION¹

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Rendi Prayuda³

Syafri Harto⁴

Introduction

The dynamics of the international political constellation after the Cold War have changed the polarization of relations between countries in the international political arena both in terms of issues and international political actors. If in the cold war countries in the world prioritize the issue of national and international security, then after the Cold War the issue will begin to move towards low politics issues such as economic, social, and cultural issues. The raising of non-traditional security issues in the post-Cold War international security perspective is a major phenomenon in the history of the social life of the world's people, especially related to human security issues.

Nowadays along with the development of technology and information, it certainly has a real impact and gives rise to a new structure and order. The new order creates a dimension that can certainly have implications for causing dependence. Changes in the new order consciously or not have had a great influence on the relationships established between States, life in them and are also a matter of security and human interaction with humans.

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Currently, the issue of international security is an issue that is still widely discussed and debated. However, in the process of its development, the issue of international security is not only talking about state security issues but also very closely related to *human security*. In addition, the concept of security itself has undergone a shift from traditional security to Non-traditional security. The traditional security meaning is oftenly perceived in the context of relations between countries with the perspective of “How to maintain and protect the security or sovereignty of a State from the outside intervention and threat “ and usually relates to military threats originating from other States. While Non-traditional security is based on two components, namely fear-free and flaw-free. In this context, the concept of Non-traditional security is associated with cases of transnational crimes that are crimes that violate the values of decency and humanity. In essence Transnational Crimes are acts related to crimes with financial motives, which have an impact on the interests of more than one state that occur in a cross-border complex of the State which gives unrest to society.

According to G.O.W. Mueller explanation “Transnational Crime is a juridical term that studies the science of crime, created by the United Nations in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice in identifying certain legal phenomena that go beyond international borders or borders, violate domestic law, and can have an impact on the legal regulation of other States”. The term Transnational crime is a form of development of the characteristics of a contemporary form of crime called Organized Crime. The term is used as an explanation of the correlation between crimes that go beyond the territorial boundaries of the State and also have an impact on the laws of various States. (Olii, 2005)


As a brief review, it is previously known that there is a Transnational Criminal network that has gathered tens of billions of US dollars per year through various types of criminal activities such as smuggling of counterfeit goods, narcotics *trafficking* or the sale of illegal drugs, human trafficking, and wildlife trade. In that context, transnational crimes are so very detrimental, the threat posed greatly affects the sovereignty of a State. Sometimes the operational role in a country is not necessarily able to solve this problem comprehensively, although there are several regulations governing each State, but this is not considered optimal enough and also well realized, especially if a country cannot handle these threats and problems personally, especially if a country cannot handle these threats and problems personally, also law enforcement procedures against international crimes including issues involving multilateral threats cannot be carried out by the practice of international law in extradition

(having diplomatic relations and jurisdiction between the recipient state and the requesting state).

But it uses a form of cooperation between countries in the practice of customary international law obtained from Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs). This form of cooperation contains solidarity in the practice of eradicating transnational international crimes and mitigating international crimes that have been agreed as an act of implementing agreements carried out among the countries involved. Of course, this agreement respects jurisdiction and relies on the provisions of the national laws of participating countries, but regulations and actions are needed to coordinate national activities so that they are increasingly in line with the development of cross-border or international crimes.

In addition, law enforcement also needs to be carried out through mutual cooperation, especially in ASEAN countries. Because in preventing and eradicating transnational crimes cannot be done simply by putting its regulations in international conventions and treaties but rather multilateral physical cooperation.

Therefore, with the arrangement of the MLA (*Mutual Legal Assistance*) concept, it is hoped that there will be a regional cooperation between southeast Asian regional countries that are also members of an Association / Organization called ASEAN to eradicate or at least slightly reduce transnational crimes that occur. Because based on research that the Southeast Asian region is a very strategic region when viewed from its location surrounded by developing countries. And this is what is likely to make this area a path in carrying out criminal actions carried out by transnational crimes referring to the following



data:

Figure 1: Percentage of smuggling of counterfeit goods

Source: UNODC elaboration based on data from Oxford Economics, “Asia Illicit Tobacco Indicator 2017”, Market Trends, September 2018.

Southeast Asia is the global counterfeit goods hub of counterfeit goods

supply chain and illegal tobacco (UNODC, 2019).





Figure 2: Percentage of Woman Trafficking

Source: UNODC, “Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018”, Vienna, 2018; Royal Thai Government, “Thailand’s Country Report on Anti-Human Trafficking Response (1 January 2017-31 December 2017)”, Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, 2018.

Every year thousands of women and child who suffer from poverty or have no chance of working fall into the hands of intra-regional human trafficking syndicates. These women are traded to supply the sex industry in




Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. (Le Nguyen, 2012).

Figure 3: Confiscation of all forms of methamphetamine in Southeast Asia, 2013-2018

Source: UNODC, responses to the annual report questionnaire (ARQ) and government sources; Drug Abuse Information Network for Asia and the Pacific (DAINAP).

Five ASEAN countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand) are recognized as one of the world's major locations for the production of amphetamine-type heroin and stimulanes. The terlarag drug produced in Southeast Asia is Opium. One of the largest opium producing countries is Myanmar. Drug trafficking involves a golden triangle area that is then smuggled to Asian or European destinations. At the time of writing, full-year drug seizure data is reported and provided by Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, philippines, Singapore,



Thailand, and Vietnam which are the countries of the Southeast Asian region.

Figure 4: Estimated retail size of the methamphetamine market in Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand and Bangladesh, and China.

Source: UNODC elaboration based on government data.

Table 1: Classification of Transnational Organized Crimes

Nº	Status	Description
1	Money laundering	An increase in the number of incidents of smuggling of large amounts of money in several ASEAN countries. Over the past few years, Thai authorities have reportedly seized large sums of cash from smuggling neighboring countries, and reports of cash smuggling from couriers from Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar Criminal groups with networks in Southeast Asia are also known to launder large amounts of money through the banking system. formally in Singapore and Hong Kong, China, because of their openness as an international financial and transportation center.
2	Casino	As of January 2019, there are 230 licensed casinos in Southeast Asia, including 150 Casinos in Cambodia, 67 in the Philippines, and 5 in Laos and Myanmar. Many of these casinos emerged after the crackdown on money laundering activities in Macau, China in 2014. This raises concerns that the “move” from criminal activities related to casinos has been taken over in Southeast Asia, especially to the Mekong region which does not have supervision of regulations and enforcement capacity.

Source: Own elaboration.

And there are many other types of transnational crimes that occur in the Southeast Asian region. So, this requires the sensitivity of each ASEAN region country to cooperate with each other in tackling these crimes. One of them is to use MLA. In its sense, MLA (*Mutual Legal Assistance*) itself or referred to as mutual assistance is a mechanism to provide legal assistance based on formal legal basic methods. Usually in the form of collecting and submitting evidence carried out by an authority / legal mediator in another

country in response to a request for assistance. Referring to these descriptions and explanations, the author hereby focuses on researching the discussion entitled “Toward Effective of Asean Mutual Legal Assistance in Combating Non-Traditional Security Threat in Southeast Asia Region”.

Research Methods

The research method used in writing this paper is the study of literature which is a series of activities relating to qualitative descriptive methods where this method focuses on library data collection techniques, literature review, reading, and processing information and research material. The main types of references used in the study of literature are books, journals and scientific articles. The data is used as a basis for analyzing and explaining the problem in a discussion. In this scientific work the writer uses the perspective of Liberalism, which explains that cooperation is one of the best ways to solve a problem or an existing problem. Also, it can narrow the gap that occurs between countries that have a dispute. The data analysis technique is in the form of argumentative descriptive based on ideas in seeing the phenomena that occur around. The level of analysis used is between States (State-level analysis) which examines each scale of research variables and the State's behavior in several internal and external factors of the State when playing a role in foreign policy making and solving problems.

Result And Discussion

The dynamics of changing the concept of security from state security to human security certainly has an impact on changing issues and themes in the international political arena. One form of fundamental change in the international security approach is the very high focus of transnational community interaction supported by technological advances so that the threat today is no longer military and war but rather non-military or humanitarian. Therefore, this dynamic results in changes in human lifestyles which are oriented to needs and ultimately have an impact on the complex implications of interdependence and integration.

High mobility between countries has resulted in the waning of national borders and state authority so that this has an impact on the high number of interactions between people that are cross-country in nature so that new problems arise, one of which is the opportunity for transnational crime or commonly called transnational crime. These various forms of transnational

crime in their development have a massive impact and are able to destroy the political stability and security of a country. Technological advances increase the intensity of relations and interdependence of countries in the World. The greater the level of dependency, the more encouraging mutual trust in completing the trumpet and triggering international cooperation that can be formulated in an international agreement. Differences in philosophy, perception, outlook on life, race, religion or belief, as well as culture, are no longer a barrier factor in a relationship and cooperation. Progress in the field of science and technology has led to the need for a regulation and rules that are more strict and certain and widespread, so that this is well outlined in international agreements. (I Wayan Pathiana, 2002, p. 2)

In international world today's, new problems often come to the fore and always result in conflicts between countries. The conflict not only arises due to a misfortune caused by the State but is also carried out by criminal groups. Although there are already several regulations related to law enforcement in a country to eradicate and stop the operational activities of criminal group networks, unfortunately it is still considered not too optimal.

Mutual Legal Assistance in response to the dynamics of crime

Crimes developed along with the development of human civilization. This is seen from the significant development seen from the perpetrator, the modus operandi, and the consequences it causes. Crime with conventional weapons was replaced with sophisticated modern tools. Individual criminals turn into organized groups/syndicates.

The era of globalization supported by advances in science and technology in the fields of telecommunications and transportation is increasingly sophisticated. Meanwhile, this sophistication provides positive benefits and negative impacts as well as due to the influence on the development of crime. The transfer of criminals from one country to another is easily carried out because it has a network of crime syndicates in different parts of the world.

There is a type of crime that develops as a result of the development of technology and information but has far involved international networks supported by sophisticated infrastructure. This crime is called Transnational Crime. As examples of transnational organized crime can be mentioned: human crime, Money *Loundering*, smuggling of goods, drugs and illegal drugs, and other crimes involving the existence of criminal networks.

To anticipate and overcome crimes called *Transnational Crime*, one type of cooperation emerged in the form of agreements and laws called Mutual

Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLA). As the theoretical conception states Mutual Legal Assistance is an international cooperation mechanism related to investigations, prosecutions, and examinations at court hearings based on the provisions of the regulations and laws of the requested country.

The ASEAN community has the motto One Vision, One Identity and One community which means that in terms of security, ASEAN countries must have the same vision and mission to combat criminal cases that anchor the country's security and economic stability. So, through ASEAN, countries are expected to be able to discuss the problems that occur. The problems faced by the ASEAN security regime can be analyzed from two aspects, namely the negotiation process at the international level and the negotiation process at the national level. Negotiations at the international level refer more to the activities of creating a negotiating regime at the ASEAN level that emphasizes more on the interests of ASEAN member states in drafting agreements on the handling of transnational crimes. Meanwhile, in the negotiation process at the national level, it refers more to the ratification of international legal products by ASEAN countries in following the results of international legal product agreements in dealing with transnational crimes which are used as a framework for law enforcement in ASEAN. (Prayuda, Warsito, & Surwandono, 2020).

Mutual Legal Assistance as a joint form of dealing with transnational crime

Transnational criminal acts result in legal problems arising in one country with another in the ASEAN region. So that in overcoming and eradicating it is difficult to do without cooperation and harmonization of bilateral or multilateral policies between countries, especially in the Southeast Asian region. Therefore, the best way to overcome it is to carry out good diplomatic relations and cooperation between members of the Asian State Teggara in order to provide assistance for the resolution of cross-border criminal problems based on the laws of each Country itself.

ASEAN cooperation under the agreement has been implemented through multilateral conventions such as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). Meanwhile, cooperation carried out without conventions, namely using the provisions of mutual assistance for both crimes /crimes and criminals in each country has not been carried out much.

This division of types of crimes shows that not every crime needs to

be legal and addressed through Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA), only certain crimes that have cross-border dimensions or measures (International) and have a *Double Criminality*. The purpose of this dual principle is when a crime is made a criminal act according to the legal system of each State (requester and requested) but according to the law the criminal act will only arise and be recognized for where the criminal act was committed (one State (requester or requested)).

As for the other explanation, The double criminality/double principle can be judged that the offence is considered a punishable offence in the requested State only if the constituent elements of the offence in both States correspond to each other, the offence shall be deemed extraditable or using the MLA.(International & Criminal, n.d.)

Because of the difficulty in overcoming this principle of double crime, the conventions made by states must be of an international cooperation nature, and this will be felt to be more effective. Therefore, states will find it easier to eradicate international crimes if they are more inclined to make cooperation in the form of international conventions in international organizations. Assessed in this analysis, southeast Asian countries should use multilateral/regional authorities within ASEAN to streamline efforts to eradicate transnational crimes including the possibility of making an extradition agreement between ASEAN member states and making ASEAN a *Plan Of Action to Combat Transnational Crime* as an alternative instrument for the Southeast Asian country. In addition, to create regional strategies to monitor, prevent and minimize transnational crime. With this strategy, ASEAN is able to investigate, detain, prosecute and even rehabilitate perpetrators/syndicates of transnational crimes in the Southeast Asian region.

And to answer ASEAN's the problems in tackling transnational crimes, namely by strengthening regional capacities and capabilities, increasing cooperation between ASEAN security forces, in this case developing multilateral aspects, then also developing activity programs that include the exchange of information on smuggling or criminal escape between countries, agreeing on the formation of a multilateral body, then also developing a program of activities that include the exchange of information on smuggling or criminal escape between countries, agreeing on the formation of a multilateral body eradicate Transnational Crimes such as *ASEAN (Center for Combating Transnational Crimes)* and establish regional agreements with criminal courts including MLA (Mutual Legal Assistance) and Extradition Cooperation.

Because MLA is one of the latest law enforcement processes that involves not only one country but many countries, especially in the ASEAN

region. This mutual assistance must be based on the same spirit to combat criminal crimes even those that occur in other countries by providing various kinds of assistance requested by that country.

Asean region countries already have international cooperation relations with other countries' law enforcement agencies formally which are often called Agency to Agency cooperation networks, as for example the Interpol Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network Asia Pacific and so on. This will certainly strengthen the mutual assistance needed by ASEAN countries to tackle transnational crime by obtaining valid evidence and data before the courts. Following up on valid evidence and data can be through mutual legal assistance cooperation as an informal request. The condition is that the requesting country must have complete evidence and data starting from investigations and investigations to strengthen investigations to arrest criminals, this is intended so that the requested state is willing to assist optimally in providing mutual assistance. So, it can be said that Mutual Legal Assistance plays an important role in efforts to prevent and eradicate transnational crime as an alternative solution to present evidence. Not only that, but in this context, witnesses who are in different countries can be present at a trial.

Mutual Legal Assistance as a solution to differences in legal systems

In essence, law enforcement formulations have spread and influenced the routes used by these criminal groups, but other findings suggest that there are syndicates that are improving their networks by trying to divert attention to less protected and under-surveillance zones. Often cross-border criminals who want to be tried in two countries want the absolute use of their own legal system, this certainly makes the handling of criminal acts complicated.

The same report also highlighted that organized crime could take advantage of several private companies, such as casino operations that managed to rake in billions of dollars in money in the region, and easily carry out money laundering on a wide scale. Transnational organized crime groups like this legalize all means to increase the rapid flow of their business by selling drugs and people, as well as other commodities.

For this reason, for organized crime to be overcome immediately, the governments of each State should have begun to develop plans and implement strategies that are firm, serious and have a goal orientation in solving problems. The response could be cooperation as a way of law

enforcement to address problems in cross-border areas, this will also be in dire need of help and encouragement from *stakeholders* and political aspects by the government and its highest ranks. Transnational or transnational organized crime in Southeast Asia, with all its activities such as trafficking in narcotics, people, counterfeit goods, and even environmental crimes has spread and increased dramatically. Therefore, it is necessary to have authority as a way and alternative that can call on all countries in the Southeast Asian region to start cooperation with each other in overcoming these crimes. Weak law enforcement efforts in several Southeast Asian countries have made it possible for organized crime groups to increase their operations in locations where there is no law enforcement, especially such as border areas. One of the authorities to tackle transnational crime in the ASEAN region is the establishment of Mutual Legal Assistance.

The establishment of the MLA was motivated by the factual condition that there were differences in the criminal law system between several ASEAN countries causing inaction in the examination of crimes. The difference between the state legal system that adheres to the criminal justice system and the Due Process Model, while on the other hand it adheres to the *Crime Control Model system*. The Due Process Model is a legal system that focuses on the protection of human rights for suspected crimes, causing a long bureaucracy in criminal justice. Meanwhile, the Crime Control Model emphasizes the effectiveness and efficiency of criminal justice based on the principle of presumption of innocence. On the other hand, the legal system is also based on the term dual criminality. In addition, diplomatic constraints are also a significant factor for the obstruction of handling transnational crimes, of course, because this condition concerns the sovereignty of a country that must always be respected. So that from the differences in the legal system, Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) is present as a solution in the form of cooperation between countries or the formation of regulations (laws) for countries that want to regulate it. MLA can also regulate the condition of countries that do not yet have an agreement, so this mutual assistance can be carried out according to the principle of reciprocity or good relations between of two countries.

This is also regulated in international provisions such as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC) which explain that legal cooperation between countries in criminal matters must be based on several general legal principles, which is:

- a. Sufficiency of Evidence, explains about making requests for

mutual assistance especially in matters of transnational criminal and criminal offences, the preparation of sufficient evidence being the primary requirement for success in requests for mutual assistance.

- b. Dual Criminality, explains the legal principle that provides that a person's actions, in cases that are the subject of a request for mutual assistance for crimes of crimes to other countries, are acceptable if a crime is committed both in both countries and the punishment can be carried out in two countries as well (the recipient and the requester).
- c. Reciprocity, explained that mutual assistance cooperation in the problem of transnational criminal crimes can be carried out because of agreements between countries, both requesting countries and recipient countries.

In fact, the implementation of the Principle of Reciprocity does not require an agreement (*Treaty*) but is sufficient with the regulations (*Arrangement*) which hereby only apply based on the aspect of "*On Case-by-Case Basis*". The smoothness of this regulation requires only a factor in the provisions that assert that the "*Non-treaty Based*" procedure may be incorporated into the statute.

Because basically Mutual Legal Assistance does not always have to talk about the alignment of the existing legal system, but this sense of mutual need for information is what ASEAN countries must put forward as the motto one Vision, One Identity and One community.

Interesting things are precisely the main focus in ASEAN to achieve the political authority of the will of cooperation towards the integrity of a safe ASEAN society. The reason until this writing is that ASEAN still has not achieved its intended security target. To study it further, it can be seen from the following analysis:

1 ASEAN Weakness Analysis:

Geopolitically, the Southeast Asian region presents a world trajectory that has a very important strategic significance. The Southeast Asian region is rich in natural resources and energy strategically vital for shipping and military bases. (Salamah, 2017) However, countries in Southeast Asia both nationally and internationally still experience some problems related to threats to national stability and security. And the implementation of regional mechanisms in ASEAN to solve these problems has not been implemented. It can be seen from each country that only relies on the bilateral route pattern

not through a regional mechanism that is generally applicable to all ASEAN members.

ASEAN members are late in engaging in the identity of regional multilateral military and defense diplomacy, as it is seen from crime groups that have historically had syndicates in various regions of the region. Government officials, however, do not meet multilaterally in an inclusive dialogue, in many cases institutions only protect internal and external threats, manage violence and discuss them, but do not directly deal with external cases involving such syndicates. (Structures, Shocks and the Late Rise of Asia ' s Norm Change : Explainin Defence Diplomacy, 2017)

Then, in terms of the implementation of the ASEAN mechanism, the problem that arises is, a mechanism that is close to the ASEAN Way norm which refers to the code of conduct in relations between ASEAN member states. ASEAN Way is a principle in carrying out cooperation in a harmonious, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-confrontational, *non-legalistic* and pragmatic. (Yuniarti, 2010)

Basically, with the concept of *sovereignty* of a country, it cannot be done without the coordination and legal assistance of the destination country. In the absence of effective treaties related to extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA), some countries have engaged in unilateral action. But this is a violation of International Law. According to universally accepted principles, states enjoy equality of sovereignty and territorial integrity, with this view states assume that other States or even international organizations should not interfere in the internal affairs of the state. (International & Criminal, n.d.)

To see that in the Southeast Asian region itself, the application of the principle of non-intervention that is very rigid by ASEAN has resulted in countries having a misguided view of self-integrity. Asean's international personality and integrity level are also very weak compared to other regional organizations. ASEAN has *The High Council* to resolve international disputes between its members, but it has never been used once. (Pendahuluan, n.d.)

In addition, the existence of legal problems between states will cause little chance of a person having to undergo criminal justice proceedings outside the area or region concerned. Some of the actual cases that occur today, for example, such as corruption suspects who fled abroad and assets from corruption that are abroad are challenges for law enforcement officials to be able to arrest suspects or convicts outside the jurisdiction of the judicial system while returning assets from corruption. The emergence of crimes that have an international dimension will increase both quantitatively and qualitatively. The resolution of these crimes is not enough to be carried out only by the State personally or individually, but it requires integrated cooperation

both multilaterally. One of the legal institutions that is seen as being able to overcome this crime of international dimension is ASEAN itself in ratifying extradition treaties in each country. (Parhiana, Wayan, 2004, p.127).

2 Opportunity Analysis in Answering ASEAN Problems:

Law enforcement procedures against international and transnational crimes are issues that are included in the development of multilateral cooperation between states. This cooperation is guided in preventing and eradicating international crimes. One example of law enforcement that has been carried out in this cooperative model is the practice of extradition law.

- a. There is a common political interest (*Mutual Interest*) between the States.
- b. There are mutual *advantages* when cooperating.
- c. There are similarities in goals (*Mutual Goals*).
- d. Respect for the principle of “*State Sovereignty*” between states that cooperate.

Extradition herein can also be interpreted as a pattern of surrender by a state at the request of another person in its jurisdiction who is accused or has been convicted of a crime committed in the jurisdiction of the applicant. (Joshua et al., 2016) This enigma is carried out formally and legally based on a pre-signed extradition treaty.

This agreement is a principle of mutual cooperation on the basis of the good relations of a State in which a person accused of a crime (Suspect, Defendant, Accused) or someone who has been sentenced to a criminal sentence. This accusation certainly has a definite binding force (Convicted and Convicted), by its place of residence (Requested State) to the State that has provisions or jurisdictions to punish and or try it (the Requesting State), through a request from the requesting State, to try and carry out the sentencing process. As for some elements of extradition based on the foregoing, as follows:

- a. Subject elements, namely the requested country and the requesting country/country;
- b. Element of the object, namely the person requested, who can have the status of a suspect, accused, defendant or convicted person;
- c. Elements of procedures or ordinances, that is, they must be carried

out according to certain procedures or ordinances or formalities;
and

- d. The element of purpose, that is, for the purpose of adjudicating and or punishing it (Beare & Williams, 2013).

Requests for submissions must be made diplomatically. It is the same when the State approves or rejects the requesting State' request. This must also be conveyed to the requesting State through diplomatic channels.

Besides extradition, there are opportunities that can be focused on resolving Southeast Asian transnational crime disputes through mutual assistance in criminal matters or MLA (Mutual Legal Assistance). This mutual assistance is considered to be able to overcome and overcome the problem of transnational or international crimes to replace the problem due to the ineffective implementation of extradition treaties that have been ratified and carried out between the countries involved in it. In fact, the opportunity obtained by ASEAN with the establishment of the Mutual Legal Assistance is the ease of exchanging information on transnational crime cases and becoming a solution when extradition cannot run. Because it is necessary to know that the use of Extradition institutions has weaknesses, including: 1) Differences in the national legal system, both substantive and objective law, 2) the organizational structure of the government of the country involved in the agreement, 3) the convoluted mechanism for its implementation.

Through this Mutual Legal Assistance, the phrase "Reciprocity" indicates that such legal assistance is provided in the expectation that there will be reciprocal assistance under certain conditions. This means that there is tolerance to help other States that have originally helped. When a country makes a request to another country in order to freeze assets or obtains evidence for prosecution or an order of freezing and confiscation, then a formal letter requesting legal aid must first be prepared containing a list of questions and actions to be carried out, and then sent to the authorized institution to the country where the request was made. In order for the mutual legal assistance to be effective in terms of tracking, freezing, confiscating, confiscating and returning assets that should have been based on international conventions or treaties that allow for mutual legal assistance to occur. For this purpose, encourage countries to bind themselves to a treaty and/or enter into a regional or bilateral agreement.

MLA or Mutual Legal Assistance is a form of agreement between States that regulates efforts to overcome the problem of transnational crime that is currently rampant. In addition, the MLA is a bilateral "soft" cooperation agreement that provides protocols and structures for voluntary coordination

but not for stealing classified information; In summary the MLA is like the cooperation of “prosecutor to prosecutor” or “police to police” that allows some intelligence to share duties but not conduct forced investigations. The MLA is based on the mission of investigating serious crimes in criminal law on a transnational as well as international scale. (Joshua et al., 2016) MLA/ mutual assistance in the investigation or prosecution of criminal charges is generally used to obtain material that cannot be obtained on the basis of police cooperation, in particular investigations that require coercive means. (James & Gladyshev, 2016).

Conclusion

The binding force of the MLA concept is based on the variable needs of the agreement in meeting an interest need in each Southeast Asian region Country, namely, among others: This MLA is a guideline for ASEAN member states in carrying out cooperation to maintain security in their regions through mutual assistance among ASEAN Countries, also based on this agreement is carried out in order to develop law enforcement effectiveness in addressing problems prevention, investment, arrest and prosecution of assets in the criminal field. ASEAN as one of the regional organizations that must be able to accept the times, including the development of crime across national borders that is getting bigger. Regarding this, the process of forming a pattern of regional agreements is one of the solutions to eradicate and eradicate transnational crimes in order to create security and order in the regional region of the Southeast Asian region itself.

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ABSTRACT

The issue of non-traditional security is currently one of the fields in change in the studies regarding international security. One of the changes is from state security to human security. A form of real threat to human security is transnational crime. Therefore, in dealing with transnational crime, coordination between law enforcers in each country is needed by implementing international law. This article uses the approach of liberalism with a qualitative descriptive research approach (literature study) The research findings explain that the lack of domestic law enforcement in ASEAN countries causes transnational criminals to break away from domestic law and flee to other countries, causing fears of new threats in the country where the refugees are fleeing. In essence, there is no country that is able to stand on its own to resolve this transnational crime case. Therefore, multilateral cooperation between countries is needed. ASEAN, which in this case is a Southeast Asian multilateral institution must regulate strategies through MLA (Mutual Legal Assistance in criminal matters).

KEYWORDS

Southeast Asia, MLA, ASEAN and Transnational Crimes.

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PARTNERS

NERINT

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) was the first Centre in Southern Brazil to focus its study and research exclusively on the field of International Relations. It was established in 1999 at the Latin American Advanced Studies Institute (ILEA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) in Porto Alegre, Brazil, and is currently part of the university's Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV). Its objective has always been the critical and innovative study of the international system's transformations after the end of the Cold War, from the perspective of the developing world. In parallel, NERINT has also sought to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options for the autonomous international insertion of the country.

The exploratory studies developed by NERINT on the new emerging countries since the threshold of the 21st century experienced remarkable expansion. Cooperation with state, business, academic and social institutions was intensified, as well as the direct contact with centres in Latin America, Africa and Asia, in addition to the existing ones in Europe and North America. An outcome of the Centre's activity was the creation of an undergraduate course in International Relations (2004) and a Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI, 2010). Two journals were also created: the bilingual and biannual *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* and the bimonthly journal *Conjuntura Austral*. In addition, since 2016, NERINT offers a bilingual Research Bulletin, published by graduate and undergraduate students and researchers of the Centre. NERINT is also partnered with UFRGS's Doctoral Program in Political Science (PPGPOL), established in 1973. Thus, besides the advanced research and intense editorial activities, NERINT is also the birthplace of innovative undergraduate and graduate programs.

PPGEEI

The Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) started in 2010, offering Master's and Doctorate degrees, both supported by qualified professors and researchers with international experience. It is the result of several developments on research and education at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Its roots can be traced to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT), established in 1999, established in 1999 and now affiliated with the Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV) at UFRGS.

The research tradition that gave rise to PPGEEI was based on a prospective analysis of the trends of the 1990s. The remarkable expansion of Brazilian diplomacy and economics from the beginning of the century confirmed the perspective adopted, which allowed the intense cooperation with the diplomatic and international economic organizations in Brazil. The Program is already a reference in the strategic analysis of the integration of emerging powers in international and South-South relations.

The Program's vision emphasizes strategic, theoretical and applied methods, always relying on rigorous scientific and academic principles to do so. For this reason, it has been approached by students from all over Brazil and several other countries, and it has established partnerships in all continents. Thus, PPGEEI is a program focused on understanding the rapid changes within the international system. Alongside NERINT, it publishes two journals: *Conjuntura Austral* (bimonthly) and *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* (biannual and bilingual). PPGEEI has three research lines:

International Political Economy

It focuses on the international insertion of the Brazilian economy and other major developing countries in South America, Asia and Africa; discusses the characteristics and effects of globalization; and develops comparative and sectoral studies concerned with the effects of the internationalization of companies and productive sectors. Special attention is paid to international financial crises and its effects on Brazil and other countries of the South.

International Politics

It emphasizes the analysis of the process of formation, implementation and evaluation of foreign policy. It seeks to confront patterns of international integration of strategic countries in South America, Africa and Asia, considering institutional patterns, trade policy, structures of intermediation of interest, governance, International Law and the role of actors of civil society in the South-South axis of contemporary International Relations.

International Security

It approaches the defense, strategy and security issues in the international

system from a perspective that takes into account the most powerful states at the global level, but systematically introduces the question of the regional balances of power, the South-South axis, the existence of regional security complexes, military issues and the impact of information technology in the Digital Age.

CEGOV

The Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV) located at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) develops studies and research projects on governmental affairs from a comparative perspective. The Centre gathers researchers from several departments of the University, such as Political Science, International Relations, Law, Economics, Administration, Education, Urbanism and Computer Science. It encompasses scholars from the most traditional research groups at UFRGS, such as NERINT and CEBRAFRICA, specialised in a broad range of public policy areas.

CEGOV is chaired by a Director, and its policies and priorities are determined by an Advisory Board and a Scientific Board. The activities of the Centre are undertaken by working groups, which take the responsibility for specific projects. Currently, CEGOV has eight fully established and operating working groups. The Centre's researchers work on multidisciplinary projects covering the fields of international politics and governance, monitoring and evaluation of public policies, institutional development, Brazilian and South-American economy, comparative institutional design and decision-making processes, as well as public management, democratic controls and decentralisation of public services.

The Centre is a place for interaction among scholars from UFRGS and other academic institutions, highlighting its multidisciplinary and open nature, as well as its vocation to collaborative applied research. Being a reference for research on comparative governmental studies, CEGOV offers a wide range of extracurricular activities such as extension and specialisation courses, and advisory activities.

CEBRAFRICA

The Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) has its origins in the Center of Studies Brazil-South Africa (CESUL), a program established in 2005 through an association between the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG) of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its research activities are developed

in cooperation with the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT).

In March 2012, CESUL was expanded into CEBRAFRICA. At the same time, the South African series, which published five books, was transformed into the African Series, with new titles. The Centre's main objectives remain the same as before: to conduct research, support the development of memoirs, thesis and undergraduate works, congregate research groups on Africa, organize seminars, promote student and professor exchanges with other institutions, establish research networks and joint projects with African and Africanist institutions, publish national and translated works on the field, and expand the specialized library made available by FUNAG.

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