


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About the Journal

AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations was the first Brazilian journal in the area of International Relations to be fully published in English (2012). It is an essentially academic vehicle, linked to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Its pluralist focus aims to contribute to the debate on the international political and economic order from the perspective of the developing world.

The journal publishes original articles in the area of Strategy Studies and International Relations, with special interest in issues related to developing countries and South-South Cooperation – its security problems; the political, economic and diplomatic developments of emerging countries; and their relations with the traditional powers. *AUSTRAL* is published semi-annually in English and Portuguese. The journal's target audience consists of researchers, experts, diplomats, military personnel and graduate students of International Relations. The content of the journal consists ensure the publication of authors from each of the great continents of the South: Asia, Latin America and Africa. Thus, the debate and diffusion of knowledge produced in these regions is stimulated. All contributions submitted to *AUSTRAL* are subject to rigorous scientific evaluation.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The 19th issue of Austral inaugurates the journal's tenth anniversary, in a year still marked by the covid-19 pandemic and its political-diplomatic impacts, as well as by the new Biden administration in the United States. As noted in our previous number, the changes that were carried out, when compared to Trump's tenure, have been more in form than in content.

Another interesting point for reflection is the response of both central and peripheral nations to the health crisis. The pandemic has served as justification for all social and economic problems, increasing inequality between nations and reversing previous trends. The global economic slowdown, however, dates back to 2018-2019, so it is important to reflect on the possible use of the health issue as a way of managing the economic crisis and the ongoing geopolitical and technological dispute.

The dossier on Latin America opens with an analysis of the 30 years of the creation of Mercosur, showcasing that each decade has had a different characteristic - with the current one being a decade of crisis. With regards to Brazil, an article examines the articulation of the themes of Defence, Development and Sovereignty in the thoughts of Hélio Jaguaribe. The other deals with the anti-dumping policies adopted by the country, while a third one looks at a subject still little explored: the impacts of the growing Chinese presence in Antarctica for Brazil. Two other articles explore Latin American security issues, one on the military transformations in Colombia, and another authored by an academic from Turkey on the role of the United Nations when it comes to peace and conflict in the continent.

The Articles section explores new thematic areas, such as geoeconomics from the perspective of liberal institutionalism, presented by a Mexican academic. The trade dispute between the United States and China, in turn, is analysed in a very technical and enlightening way by a Pakistani expert. The remaining articles are dedicated to various security themes, such as the US strategy for the development of military artificial intelligence. Another, authored by an Iranian academic, analyses the importance of the Middle East for Russia from the perspective of the region. As for Africa, a Nigerian academic presents an innovative article on collective economic sovereignty as a globalised bargain, and another analyses the war and conflicts of the Sahel from a historical perspective.

The second issue of *NERINT Strategic Analysis* is found at the end. It brings brief analytical notes on international events of the first half of the year, which are not covered by the Articles section. The first addresses the factors underlying the conflicts and tensions that arose in Angola, while the following two pieces provide insightful approaches to the real situation involving the dissident Alexei Navalny and the resurgence of Russian-Ukrainian tensions.

The manifestations in Hong Kong also present new dimensions that have been underexplored. Vaccine Diplomacy, an innovative theme, is objectively analysed, as well as the factors associated with the Military Coup in Myanmar and Joe Biden's 100-day foreign policy, which follows many guidelines from the Donald Trump presidency. Finally, the return of the Latin American left to the political scene is addressed, either through election disputes (Peru and Bolivia) or public demonstrations (Colombia and Chile).

The geographic range of experts continues to expand, with the contribution of scholars from Pakistan, Mexico, Colombia, Iran and Turkey, in addition to several universities in Brazil. 2021 has proven to be another very difficult year, with closed institutions and dispersed research groups working precariously and remotely.

In this regard, we would like to thank the authors and the entire team involved in the publishing of *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations*, for collaborating so that the journal could maintain its regularity and even expand its quality standard. In 2021, the journal will be published only in electronic format due to budgetary restrictions that affect Brazilian public universities, but with the same academic excellence as before.

This publication was possible thanks to the Research Office at UFRGS through the Support Program for Journal Editing (PAEP), as well as the entire team of editors and translators, in particular Edition Assistant Guilherme Geremias da Conceição, with the collaboration of Guilherme Thudium, Luana Margarete Geiger, Eduardo Secchi, Gabriela Ruchel, Marina Felisberti, Magnus Kenji Hiraiwa and Felipe Werner Samuel. Once again, we are grateful to Prof. Dr. Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo for diligent review of translations. The teamwork of NERINT/UFRGS researchers has allowed us to maintain the quality and regularity of *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*.

Disclaimer: *AUSTRAL* prioritises British English as the standard variety of the English written language. Some English translations, however, may be written under the American English dialect.

TAKING STOCK OF THE THIRTY YEARS OF MERCOSUR

Leonardo Granato¹

Introduction

The genesis of Mercosur, in the 1980s, dates back to Brazil and Argentina's bilateral efforts to institutionalize the pillars to create a common market that, based on sectorial protocols of gradual and symmetrical industrial cooperation, would contribute to economic development and a non-subordinate insertion of both countries in the international system. In the 1990s, the capitalist restructuring and offensive in the midst of the strong economic crises that hit countries, in addition to the rise of the new neoliberal governments in the Southern Cone as a whole, guided a reorientation of the bilateral integration policy that, pairing with Uruguay and Paraguay, originated Mercosur.

In accordance with the guidelines of the Uruguay Round of the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 and with the new integration strategy for Latin America defined by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in terms of open regionalism, the integration model based on an integration based on development and autonomy initially adopted by Brazil and Argentina, was replaced by an open integration to the markets, placing commercial liberalization and financial deregulation as the dynamic axes of the association process. Thus, during the 90s, a "Mercosur for business" came into effect, in the words of Katz (2006), also emblematically called by Caetano (2007) "Phoenician Mercosur", restricted to an economic-commercial agenda.

In the 2000s, in the context of the neoliberal hegemony crisis and in a favorable external conjuncture, linked not only to the resumption of world growth, but also due to the Chinese rise to the status of an economic

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and political power at the global level, the emergence of new popular and progressive governments in South America marked a change in the pathways of integration in the region, which started to be guided by a multidimensional perspective. Unlike the model based on open regionalism, this new integrationist perspective, crystallized in the Buenos Aires Consensus of 2003, signed by the representatives of Brazil and Argentina at the time, proposed an expanded arrangement for the coordination of member states in matters of public policy, not solely of economic-commercial, but also of a productive, political and social nature.

However, after the global economic and financial crisis of 2008 and the end of the “commodities cycle”, the change in the correlation of forces, expressed in the “left turn” of the first decade of 2000, gave way under the pressure of the dominant classes, that deemed the political-economic model of supporting these progressive governments to be exhausted. This pressure culminated in a political scenario marked by a “turn to the right”, which had as a central feature the resumption of conservative neoliberal ideas. Starting in 2011, resuming the model of open regionalism, the political action has sought to mirror initiatives such as the Pacific Alliance - guided by the indiscriminate establishment of free trade agreements -, in disregard of the initiatives promoted in the previous decade. From this brief contextualization and regaining the understanding of Guimarães (2002, 119) that “for the great states of the periphery, the formation of economic and political blocs is one of the most important phenomena on the international scene”, we seek in this work to present some interpretative notes, in a historical and institutional perspective, in order to provide subsidies for an assessment of Mercosur, in its three decades of operation².

Regarding the organization of the article, in addition to this introduction, the present work will have three sections, corresponding to each of the decades that Mercosur has gone through to the present moment. The first section presents the first decade of the bloc’s evolution since its creation in 1991. The second section discusses the innovations that the second decade, particularly since 2003, brought to Mercosur. In the third and last section, the main changes and trends of the last ten years of the bloc are addressed, which point to Mercosur precarious conditions. Finally, we will formulate some conclusions.

² We would like to thank Guilherme Bratz Uberty for reading and commenting on an earlier version of this text.

The Phoenician Mercosur (1991-2001)

The genesis of Mercosur relates to the bilateral integration initiatives of Brazil and Argentina in the mid-1980s, in a context of acute economic crises and the resumption of the democratic system of government in the Southern Cone³. In 1985 both countries signed the Declaration of Iguazú, which marked a turning point in the bilateral relationship, as well as from the point of view of integration itself, enabling a political understanding that was reflected in the text of the Buenos Aires Act for Argentine-Brazilian Integration of 1986. Thus, both countries created, through the Economic Cooperation and Integration Program (1986-1988) and the 1988 Integration, Cooperation and Development Treaty, the bases for the gradual creation of a common market⁴ that would contribute to economic development - through sectoral protocols of inter-industrial coordination⁵ - and to increase the negotiation capacities in the international arena. It is interesting to mention that, although the focus of integration, during this period, was in the economic aspect, other issues of government policy that demonstrate the breadth of the integration project were not left out, as well as the idea of development in these countries, where the economic was only one aspect of an even wider spectrum⁶.

With the objective of giving a regional projection to the bilateral commitments assumed, since the mid-1980s, by Brazil and Argentina, on March 26, 1991, the governments of both countries signed, in Asunción, together with those of Paraguay and Uruguay⁷, the Treaty for the Constitution of MERCOSUR⁸, which governed the conditions for the transition to a

3 See Rapoport & Cervo (2002); Bandeira (1987).

4 Bearing in mind that, according to the classical theory of economic integration, the possible degrees or alternatives in the matter are the free trade area, the customs union, the common market, the economic union and the total economic integration. For additional information, see Balassa (1961).

5 See Lavagna (1998).

6 In fact, among the various themes that were the subject of specific protocols, we can mention energy, biotechnology, land and maritime transport, communications, nuclear cooperation, culture, public administration. See Granato (2015).

7 Uruguay's participation in the integration process had been the subject of continuous talks since the mid-1980s, through several high-level meetings between Uruguayan, Argentine and Brazilian authorities, and even through bilateral agreements such as the Argentine-Uruguayan Economic Cooperation Agreement and the Brazil-Uruguay Commercial Expansion Program. However, Paraguay did not participate in talks prior to the formation of Mercosur until the end of the military dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner, in 1989.

8 Economic Complementation Agreement n. 18, according to the terminology of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA/ALADI).

common market to be formed between the four countries by the date of December 31, 1994. The referred transition would be made, according to the letter the agreement itself, based on a progressive, linear and automatic program of trade liberalization; the elimination of non-tariff barriers; the gradual dismantling of the lists of exceptions in the previously mentioned liberalization program; commitments to move forward in the coordination of macroeconomic policies; the intention to develop a common external tariff; the coordination of positions in regional and international commercial economic forums, as well as the harmonization of national laws on various topics in order to facilitate business and the free movement of goods and productive factors. Thus, the dismantling of trade barriers became the central objective of the integration process, replacing compliance with the sectoral protocols of the original program of Brazil and Argentina, which emphasized inter-industrial integration as a strategy for development and autonomy. From that moment on, the objective of the integration process would no longer be the protection of national economies in the midst of a take-off and diversification process, but to use the regional market to enhance comparative advantages, transforming it into the platform for the insertion of both countries in the international economy (Rapoport 2009; Ferrer 2006).

To achieve the fulfillment of its objectives, the Treaty of Asunción provided for a minimum institutional structure, in charge of the administration and implementation of the Treaty, as well as of the specific agreements and decisions that would be adopted during the transition period. The low degree of institutionalization was based on the fact that the negotiations could be defined, in a centralized way, by the heads of the Executive Branch of the member countries⁹, excluding the possibility of adopting, as in European integration, common institutions capable of executing their resolutions directly in the territory of those countries, and that could compromise the room for maneuver of the governments of each country. In this way, the national Executive Powers that presided over the negotiations in the scope of integration also took the decisions of domestic and foreign policy, formulated at the time in the light of the guidelines for the reduction of the public machinery and the commercial liberalization of the prevailing neoliberal model, enshrined in the prescription of the Washington consensus¹⁰.

In this period of transition towards the customs union, a stage prior to the establishment of the common market, the Trade Liberalization Program

⁹ Indeed, the institutional structure did not provide for the participation of parliamentarians, who mobilized for the maintenance of the Joint Parliamentary Commission, originally foreseen in the aforementioned Treaty on Integration, Cooperation and Development of 1988.

¹⁰ See Williamson (1990).

was set in motion, as established in the Treaty of Asunción, and negotiations for the approval of the Common External Tariff (CEF) were initiated, an instrument that seeks to ensure that the tariffs that are paid for the import of a given product are the same in all integrated countries, as well as being charged only once.

After the transition stage, in 1995, a new phase in the evolution of the Mercosur bloc began, which, due to the exponential increase in intra-bloc trade flows, Bouzas (2001) called it the “golden age for markets”. In fact, it was in the same year of 1995 that the CEF reached 85% of the commercial interchange, allowing to proceed with the constitution of the customs union, as foreseen in the Program of Action of Mercosur until the year 2000, approved by the Council of the Common Market (*Conselho do Mercado Comum, CMC*)¹¹, as stated in Decision no. 09/1995. Once reading this Program, there is no doubt that the strategic objective envisioned for Mercosur was to deepen integration in a context of open regionalism¹². In institutional terms, there were also important advances, having been signed the Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asunción on the Institutional Structure of Mercosur, commonly known as the “Ouro Preto Protocol”, which established the legal personality of Mercosur, institutionalizing its definitive organs, and determined the dispute settlement system.

Despite its objectives being restricted to the economic-commercial plan, between 1995 and 1998 Mercosur also took important steps concerning the strengthening of democracy and the creation of a peace community in the region. For example, in 1996, facing the attempted coup d'état in Paraguay, the Presidential Declaration on Democratic Commitment in Mercosur, also known as the “Democratic Clause”, was signed, and the Political Consultation and Consultation Mechanism was created. In the same vein, in 1998, the Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment in Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile was signed, which incorporated the aforementioned Clause into the

¹¹ The regulations cited here were obtained from the Mercosur Secretariat website (<http://www.mercosur.int>). Special reference will be made to the Decisions of the CMC, the highest body of the bloc, charged with the political conduct of the integration process, as well as the Resolutions or Recommendations of the Common Market Group (*Grupo do Mercado Comum, GMC*), the bloc's executive body.

¹² The process that arises when reconciling the interdependence arising from special preferential agreements and that driven by market signals resulting from trade liberalization in general was called “open regionalism”. In 1994, the ECLAC explicitly applied the concept of open regionalism to the Latin American context, through the discourse of serving for productive transformation with equity (Cepal 1994; Fuentes 1994). In this way, the idea of an integration that worked as a complement to the policies of trade opening aimed at promoting a better insertion of Latin American countries in the international economy was promoted. On the paradigms of regional integration in Latin America, see also Granato & Batista (2017).

bloc's legal acquis, strengthening the idea of democracy as a fundamental constitutive value. In addition, there are other achievements related to the actions of *Mercosul Educativo* to enhance the collaboration and coordination of policies, to the social-labor dimension (with the creation of the Economic and Social Consultative Forum¹³ and the approval of the 1998 Mercosur Social-Labor Declaration) and the transit of persons, understood from the point of view of labor migrations¹⁴.

A last stage of the first decade of Mercosur could be identified between the years 1998 and 2002, and its most striking feature is the crisis that will occur as a result of a decrease in trade exchanges and an increase in conflicts and commercial disputes between Argentina and Brazil. These years, which began with the devaluation of the Real (BRL) in Brazil and continued with the worsening of the economic, political and social crisis in Argentina, resulted in a widespread perception that Mercosur had reached its limit. However, in an attempt to rescue the block from the "waiting game" in which it was inserted, in the year 2000 the so-called "Mercosur Relaunch" was approved, which included issues related to regulations, institutional performance, dispute settlement, CEF, investments, macroeconomic coordination, and external negotiations¹⁵. With regard to this last aspect, that of external negotiations, by means of the Decision no. 32/00, the CMC reaffirmed the bloc's commitment to negotiate, jointly, commercial agreements with third countries or blocks from non-block countries in which tariff preferences would be granted. These aspects are fundamental pillars of the bloc's journey towards the creation of a true common market. However, despite the aforementioned relaunch, efforts to recover the Mercosur space - to recompose the Mercosur's identity bloc -, only gained renewed momentum from 2003 onwards.

13 The creation, through the Ouro Preto Protocol, of the aforementioned Forum, as a space to gather capital and labor, aimed at preparing the conditions for the future validity of the common market, in which the free circulation of productive factors was foreseen. The work factor would be represented, within the bloc, by its class organizations - the unions and union centrals.

14 In addition, over the period 1991 to 1999, meetings of ministers as bodies of the institutional structure were created, referring to non-commercial topics, such as education, justice, work, agriculture, culture, health, interior and industry. Protocols were also signed on the topics of cooperation and consular and jurisdictional assistance, responsibility arising from traffic accidents, cultural integration, social security and regional security. Although the themes of the meetings of ministers and protocols did not explicitly refer to trade issues, it is important to mention that, from the point of view of political conduct, these themes were, in fact, part of the greater objective of intensifying the integration process towards the common market.

15 See the Decisões CMC ns. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31 and 32 from the year 2000.

MERCOSUR Enlarged (2001-2011)

The South American progressive agenda of the beginning of the 21st century had a significant impact on the integration represented by Mercosur, mainly with regard to the expansion of the bloc beyond the themes of economic-commercial policy, in a genre of multidimensional regionalism. As a counterpoint to the ideals of the Washington Consensus of the 1990s, which provided the framework in which the bloc adjusted itself from the beginning, the new governments of Brazil and Argentina signed, in October 2003, the Buenos Aires Consensus, through which they renewed their commitment to deepen Mercosur by working towards the improvement of its commercial institutions, the incorporation of new themes and countries, as well as the promotion of balanced agreements. Thus, even without breaking with the economic-commercial dimension of the paradigm of open regionalism¹⁶, as well as in the context of the conditions arising from dependent capitalism¹⁷, one must recognize the novelty of the Argentine-Brazilian proposal for the reformulation of the bloc¹⁸.

On the occasion of the Mercosur Summit Meeting that took place in Asunción in December 2003, the “Objective 2006” was approved, which presented a Work Program for the 2004-2006 biennium that included, in addition to the classic economic-commercial dimension that marked the bloc from the beginning, also the political dimension, the social dimension and other themes for a “new agenda”¹⁹. In this way, the path was opened to advance not only in the improvement of the customs union, an original objective of the Treaty of Asunción, but in the creation of an expanded space for productive, political and social integration, or one, in Lima & Coutinho’s terms (2008), “modern integration”. Thus, through the aforementioned Work Program 2004-2006, new topics were included in the Mercosur agenda, which formed

¹⁶ In fact, the significant commercial orientation of the bloc continued to prevail. Alongside this idea, Porta (2015) understands that the “utopia” of the so-called “Productive and Social Mercosur” (Mercosul Social e Produtivo) continued to be limited by the commercial Mercosur. According to the author, such a utopia “is trapped, scared and, finally, stopped by the ‘ghost’ of the commercial Mercosur; the transition between one phase and another has proved to be much more complex than it initially seemed and, in particular, than the harmony and political fineness of the Mercosur governments in recent years seemed to announce” (Porta 2015, 105, free translation). Works such as those by Rios & Veiga (2007) and Riggiorozzi & Tussie (2012) argue that it is possible to conceive of the model adopted in this period as a break with open regionalism. In Granato (2020) and Cavalcanti & Granato (2020) dispute this argument.

¹⁷ See Constantino & Cantamutto (2018).

¹⁸ For more information, see Granato (2015).

¹⁹ Check the Decisão CMC n. 26/2003.

the basis on which the integration process sought to be articulated in this second decade of operation.

In the period in question - where intra-bloc trade grew significantly, including in relation to the growth of world trade -, with the objective of advancing the improvement of the customs union, through the Decision n. 54/2004, the CMC established the need to eliminate the double taxation of the CET, to establish a mechanism for the distribution of customs income and to adopt a Common Customs Code. In addition, the aforementioned Council determined that the implementation of the objectives should be gradual. Thus, a first stage in the evolution of Mercosur in this new decade is linked to the CMC Decision n. 37/2005, in force since 2006, which eliminated the double charge of the CET for goods imported from third countries that enter the territory of any of the States Parties. In a second stage, the interconnection of the national customs information systems was completed, through the Customs Records Information Exchange System, through CMC Decision n. 10/2010, in which the “Guidelines for implementing the Common External Tariff double taxation and redistribution of duty taxes” was approved. For its turn, it is worth mentioning that, through the CMC Decision n. 27/2010, the Mercosur Customs Code was approved - a fundamental rule for the consolidation of the customs union, which is still, ten years later, awaiting the incorporation by Paraguay and Uruguay²⁰.

Added to the customs issue, in this period, the understanding that new themes (such as productive integration and the treatment of asymmetries) should occupy a prominent place on the bloc’s agenda was established. Initially, productive integration acquired a central place on the agendas of the Mercosur Summit, which took place in the city of Córdoba, Argentina, in July 2006, and of the Mercosur Social Summit in Brasília²¹, in December 2006. The official statements that emerged from these bodies reflected the commitment to a regional productive integration project, with an emphasis on the development of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) production chains, and on the participation of companies from the least developed countries. For these purposes, the ministers of the respective areas were instructed to

20 This reflects one of the major problems that historically the bloc has been confronted with: the serious deficit in the process of incorporating regional regulations into the internal legal systems of member states into effective law.

21 It should be noted that, as of 2006, the so-called “Social Summits”, organized by the focal points of the Somos Mercosul Program, have become a regular event on the bloc’s official agenda. Considering it convenient to ensure the periodicity of the Social Summit, as well as its connection with the bodies of the institutional structure of Mercosur, the CMC, through Decision n. 56/2012, established that the Mercosur Social Summit should be held every six months.

develop a Regional Productive Development and Integration Plan.

Thus, while in 2007 there was a deepening of awareness about the need to develop a productive integration program that would promote the development of regional value chains and the competitiveness and complementarity of SMEs, in 2008, there was a steady progress with the creation of the Productive Integration Program of Mercosur and the Productive Integration Group, as well as the Mercosur Fund to Support SMEs, adopted through the CMC Decisions n. 12 and 13, of that year, respectively. The aforementioned Productive Integration Program aimed to strengthen the productive complementation of the bloc's companies (with emphasis on SMEs) and to increase the competitiveness of different sectors of the States parties²². However, despite this Program, the articulation of common industrial policies, challenging the traditional model of dependency in the central countries, remains, even today, in general, a pending issue in the bloc²³.

Since 2003, the issue of asymmetries within Mercosur has been treated in a more consistent manner²⁴. In fact, at the December 2003 Mercosur Summit Meeting, at which the 2004-2006 Work Program was approved, they also approved the CMC Decision n. 03/27, which determined the realization of studies for the establishment, in Mercosur, of Structural Funds destined to increase the competitiveness of the smaller partners and of those less developed regions. Therefore, the process that would achieve the creation of the Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund (Focem) begun.

So, with the objectives of promoting structural convergence, developing competitiveness, favoring social cohesion - in particular for smaller economies and less developed regions -, and improving the institutionality of the bloc, the CMC created, through Decisions n. 45/2004 and 18/2005,

²² We cannot fail to mention an issue linked to the productive integration and strengthening of the competitiveness of the bloc's productive sectors: the one related to science and technology. In this sense, we should highlight the approval on June 30, 2008, through CMC Decision n. 03, of the Mercosur Science, Technology and Innovation Framework Program for the period 2008-2012, with the mission of promoting the generation, application, socialization and awareness of scientific and technological knowledge, of great importance for the construction of endogenous and sovereign development.

²³ For more information regarding the specific case of the Mercosur automotive chain, see Treacy (2021).

²⁴ Although the way of dealing with asymmetries has been present in the Mercosur debate since its beginning, in practical terms, the Treaty of Asunción avoided any reference to regional policies aimed at compensating for structural asymmetries, and simply limited itself to recognize, through its Article 6, "specific rhythm differentials" of trade liberalization for Paraguay and Uruguay. See Granato (2016).

the Focem, designed to finance four programs to be developed based on the mentioned objectives. According to the aforementioned regulations, the first Program includes projects that contribute to the development and structural adjustment of smaller economies and less developed regions, including the improvement of border integration systems and communication systems in general. The second Program, of Competitiveness Development, is the broadest, and includes projects that contribute to competitiveness within the scope of Mercosur, including projects that facilitate the creation of intra-bloc trade, that favor the integration of productive chains, and that strengthen the public and private institutionality in aspects related to quality in production (technical standards, certification, animals and plants health control, etc.), as well as research and development of new products and production processes. The third program includes projects that contribute to social development, particularly in border areas, and may include projects of community interest in areas of human health, poverty reduction and unemployment. The last program includes projects aimed at improving the institutional structure of Mercosur and its eventual development.

With a clear compensatory and redistributive sense in favor of the poorest countries, in view of the historical average of the gross domestic product of Mercosur, 70% of the annual non-reimbursable contributions from the Fund must come from Brazil, 27% from Argentina, 2% from Uruguay and 1% of Paraguay. In turn, Paraguay is the recipient of 48% of Focem's resources, and Uruguay receives 32% of the total. Brazil and Argentina receive 10% of the resources each, that is, the funds should be financed by asymmetric contributions and the allocation of their resources should benefit the smaller states. In practical terms, although Focem has been, until now, mostly determined by short-term issues²⁵, instead of being guided by a long-term sustainable strategy to reduce real disparities, one must recognize the pioneering nature of this attempt to face the national and social asymmetries and inequalities within each country, and the integration bloc as a whole, creating a positive precedent in community treatment for the problems affecting the region.

In terms of political integration, two issues deserve to be highlighted at this stage. The first of these concerns the expansion of the bloc to the rest of the region, strengthening, as Visentini (2013) points out, the possibility of strategic action, at the global level, which reverses the increasing marginalization

²⁵ It is worth mentioning, for example, the implementation of sanitation, housing, drinking water, rehabilitation of highways and railways, installation of electrical networks, among others. Currently, in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, funds have also been earmarked to contribute for the fight against the Coronavirus.

suffered by South America. In the period in question, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela started to acquire the status of Associated States, due to the submission of the respective request to the CMC²⁶. With regard to Venezuela and Bolivia in particular, through the Accession Protocols of 2006 and 2015, respectively, the incorporation of these countries as full members of the bloc was approved. In the case of Venezuela, the merger only took place in 2012, once ratifications by the congresses of the States parties had been made. Bolivia, on the other hand, still awaits the said ratifications, having reiterated at the Mercosur Summit Meeting in March 2021 - a meeting to which it appeared as an associate member - the willingness to be part of the bloc as a full member. The outlined framework shows the agglutinating impulse that marked Mercosur at the time, based on the understanding that a more comprehensive articulation and a good neighborhood policy would open up new possibilities for integration in strategic areas such as energy and infrastructure, mainly, as well as for building a certain strategic autonomy of the bloc on the periphery of world geopolitics²⁷.

The second issue that deserves to be highlighted refers to the creation, in the period in question, of new institutional spheres, such as the Parliament of Mercosur (Parlasur), the Institute of Public Policies of Human Rights, the High Representation-General of Mercosur and the Unit of Support for Social Participation, which, although essentially consultative, challenged the original minimalist structure of the block²⁸. Concerning the first body mentioned, after several negotiations, through the CMC Decision n. 23/2005, its Constitutive Protocol was approved, thus taking a step, albeit timid, to move towards the expansion of political representation, democratization and the legitimization of the Mercosur bloc. Despite the relevant competences attributed, such as that of ensuring compliance with Mercosur rules and the preservation of the democratic regime in the States parties, Parlasur has been given the status of a purely consultative body, devoid of decision-making, control or inspection powers²⁹. The Institute for Public Policies on Human Rights,

26 The picture is completed with Guyana and Suriname, that raised to this status only in 2013.

27 However, other links outside the region were also sought. Between 2006 and 2014, Mercosur sought to strengthen ties with other developing countries, signing agreements or memoranda of understanding with countries such as Morocco, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, India, Lebanon, Tunisia, Singapore and Korea do Sul. For more information, see Granato (2015).

28 On the challenges of Mercosur's institutional reform in this second decade of operation, check Caetano, Vázquez & Ventura (2009).

29 Headquartered in the city of Montevideo, the body in question is made up of 318 parliamentarians, who are divided by country according to population proportion, in such a way that Brazil is represented with 121 parliamentarians, Argentina with 81, Uruguay with

based in Buenos Aires, was created by the CMC Decision n. 14/2009, with the objective of contributing to the established in the Protocol of Assumption on Commitment to the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of Mercosur of 2005, through the design and follow-up of public policies in the matter. In turn, recognizing the importance of having a body that contributes to the development and functioning of the integration process, starting from the strengthening of the capacities to produce proposals for regional policies and community management in several fundamental themes, through the Decision n. 63/2010, the CMC created the post of High Representative-General of Mercosur, with the Brazilian diplomat Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães being the first to occupy this post, whose duties essentially aimed to meet the demands of deepening the bloc. Finally, through Decision no. 65/2010, the Social Participation Support Unit was created within the scope of the aforementioned High Representation, with the purpose of acting as an institutional channel of dialogue with society and with social movements and organizations.

Finally, the renewal experienced by Mercosur, in this second decade of operation, also relates to the development of its social dimension. This characteristic distinguishes it from the Mercosur in the 1990s, centered on the economic-commercial aspect of integration. One of the most relevant achievements in this matter is the one represented by the Residence Agreement for Nationals of the States parties to the bloc, approved by the CMC Decision no. 28/2002, which simplifies the procedures for applying for residency. Although there was a great demonstration and mobilization of immigrant organizations and support for immigrants for its entry into force, this achievement only gradually became reality, being assumed bilaterally between Brazil and Argentina in 2005, with Uruguay in 2006 and finally for the whole bloc in November 2009, with the ratification of Paraguay, which until then had signed, but not concluded, the necessary procedures for its definitive validity. Similarly, the social security rights contained in the Multilateral Social Security Agreement, approved by the CMC Decision no. 19/1997, which only came into force in 2005³⁰.

In terms of education, although the Mercosur Educational Sector has

63, Paraguay with 30, and Venezuela with 23. Currently, the election for parliamentarians of Parlasul occurs indirectly in most member countries, with the exception of Paraguay and Argentina, which have already approved and internalized the rule that guarantees direct elections.

30 The aforementioned Agreement guarantees that social security rights are recognized for workers who render or have rendered services in any of the States parties, allowing the totalization of the periods of social security contribution and the implementation of the benefit.

been operating since 1992, it was only in 2004 that, through Decision n. 33, the Financing Fund for this Sector was created, which has been making it possible to make it operational, regarding the preparation of studies and formulation of measures. In addition to the various mechanisms related to the accreditation of courses and academic mobility, approved in this period, the referred Fund has shown itself to be an important factor, as already mentioned, for boosting, in general, regional education policy.

Last but not least, in terms of social development policy, it was created, in this period, through Decision n. 03/2007, the Social Institute of Mercosur, based in Asunción, with the objective of providing the bloc with a technical investigation body in the field of social policies and the implementation of strategic lines, betting on the consolidation of the social dimension as a central axis in the Mercosur integration process. In convergence with this great objective, in 2010, the CMC approved, by means of the Decisions n. 64 and 67, of December 16, an action plan for the progressive structuring of a Mercosur Citizenship Statute³¹, as well as a scheme for the preparation of the Mercosur Strategic Social Action Plan, respectively.

In short, as it was possible to see, in this second decade of the bloc's operation, Mercosur was conceived beyond the economic-commercial dimension, to which it was restricted in the previous stage. This observation, as seen throughout this section, also represents one of the main differentials of the reconfiguration of the bloc.

The Trend Towards Mercosur's Precariousness (2011-2021)

As of 2011 and with a new conservative turn taking shape in the region, Mercosur has also been experiencing gradual changes in relation to the previous decade. Between 2011 and 2016, there are still some institutional advances in social matters, which corroborate a shy attempt to continue the efforts to consolidate a broader multidimensional Mercosur, as envisioned in the previous stage. As of 2016, in the context of "an aggressive strategy to resume the hegemony of the system, which results lead to a process of the dismantling of the South American states through the immediate return

³¹ According to the aforementioned norms, the referred Statute will be integrated by a set of fundamental rights and benefits for the citizens of the member States of the bloc, and will be structured on the basis of the implementation of: a) a policy of free movement of people in the region; b) Equal civil, social, cultural and economic rights and freedoms for citizens of States Parties; c) equal conditions of access to work, health and education. Once the Statute was concluded, the text was presented at the March 2021 Summit, under the pro-tempore presidency of Argentina, and can be accessed through the official Mercosur website.

of privatization policies and fiscal adjustment that are part of the neoliberal agenda” (Sarti 2017, 102), it is possible to verify that the return to the model of classic open regionalism gained a clearer frame.

Some of the main achievements that, since 2011, allowed the ongoing development of Mercosur’s new social dimension, characteristic of the renewal efforts of the previous decade, were in the area of social, educational, transport and labor policies. Due to the Decision no. 12/2011, the Mercosur Strategic Social Action Plan was approved, with the purpose of articulating and developing specific, integral and intersectoral actions that would consolidate the social dimension in the bloc with a commitment to combat inequalities and promote social inclusion³². In turn, aiming at the improvement, enlargement and articulation of academic mobility initiatives in education, the Mercosur Integrated Mobility System was created by Decision n. 36/2012, considering students and teachers for undergraduate courses and the development of joint research between graduate programs.

Regarding the transport theme, the Mercosur Common Vehicle Identification Plate was approved by the GMC Resolution no. 33/2014, and became mandatory in member States for new vehicles since 2016. This measure aims to guarantee the free movement of vehicles, facilitate productive activities and, at the same time, fight cross-border crimes. Finally, in July 2015, the new Mercosur Social and Labor Declaration was approved, which determines that states commit themselves to formulating and implementing active decent work policies, in consultation with the most representative organizations of employers and workers articulated with economic and social policies, in order to favor the generation of opportunities for occupation and income, to raise the living conditions of citizens, and to promote the sustainable development of the region. This agenda is completed with the CMC Decision n. 22, also from 2015, which approves the continuity of Focem, although Brazil, its largest contributor, has incurred, during the study period, in delays in the payment of its contributions.

The instruments previously exposed reflect, albeit in a timid way when compared to the number and scope of the initiatives of the previous decade, the concern of the bloc’s political conduct in maintaining and consolidating

32 As mentioned in this plan, it is worth pointing out that the member States had established a priority framework of axes, guidelines and objectives, which aim to eradicate hunger, poverty and combat social inequalities; guarantee human rights, provide humanitarian assistance and ethnic, racial and gender equality; universalize health; universalize education and eradicate illiteracy; valuing and promoting cultural diversity; guaranteeing productive inclusion; ensuring access to decent work and social security rights; promote environmental sustainability; and establish regional cooperation mechanisms for the implementation and financing of social policies.

Mercosur's social dimension. However, the resumption of the model of open regionalism was not expected, and the evidence that most clearly indicates this path is the recent ambition to "flexibilize" the CEF and to revoke the CMC Decision n. 32/00, actions to reduce the bloc's institutional architecture, and, finally, the decision to suspend Venezuela from Mercosur. Whereas the goal of improving the bloc seems to better represent Mercosur's political action in the past decade, at this stage, the term that best describes Mercosur's "flexibilization" defended by some of the member states is precariousness.

Regarding the first point, in this last decade in question, the significant decrease in intra-bloc trade - mainly due to the industrial crises in Brazil and Argentina, as well as a greater Chinese presence in the region -, and the mirroring trade integrations such as that of the Pacific Alliance³³, put into question the pertinence of Mercosur's to persist in the path of establishing a common market, or wonder if it would be more convenient to return to a more precarious stage as a simple free trade agreement, without CET, without joint negotiation rules with third countries and, fundamentally, without the objective of joint and articulated confrontation of the external vulnerability characteristic of the countries of the bloc. CMC Decision n. 32/00, which guarantees the aforementioned joint negotiation, has been discussed, for example, in recent years, as an obstacle to trade negotiations between the European Union (EU) and Mercosur³⁴, at least until the signing of the interregional agreement on 28 June 2019, and is still awaiting ratification by national parliaments. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay have positioned themselves, at different times, as favorable to the "flexibilization" of Mercosur, a euphemism that, as warns Barros (2021), aims, in a definitive way, to end the CET. Even though the CET has lost impulse due to the drop in commercial exchange in the period, it remains a key device to move towards deeper and more balanced agreements. In this sense, as Amorim (2011, 99) rightly points out, "the heart of Mercosur is the Common External Tariff [...] Historically, the

33 See Merino (2017).

34 For example, as highlighted in Cavalcanti & Granato (2020), on a visit to Argentina in October 2016, Temer defended the flexibilization of Mercosur rules in order to formalize the EU-Mercosur Agreement, a position also supported by Macri. In fact, on the occasion of José Serra's visit to Buenos Aires, in May 2016, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Macri government, Susana Malcorra, when referring to such an interregional agreement, indicated the need to "better" Mercosur, incorporating new disciplines in tune with the most modern integration processes. Serra also referred to the renewal of Mercosur to "correct what needs to be corrected" (corrigir o que precisa ser corrigido), referring specifically to the amendment to the CMC Decision no. 32/2000 and CET. Serra's arguments were taken up in the Bolsonaro period, after the signing of the EU-Mercosur Agreement. On the policies of the Macri, Temer and Bolsonaro governments aimed at Mercosur, see Busso & Zeliovich (2016); Miranda (2019); Frenkel & Azzi (2021), respectively.

agreements that generated integration were not just commercial: they were customs union agreements”.

Although, the ideological convergence between the Macri government, in Argentina, and the Temer and Bolsonaro governments, in Brazil, and, recently, between the latter and the Lacalle Pou government, in Uruguay, allowed the bloc's flexibilization proposal to have appeared with more emphasis, it is also possible to affirm that such understanding is not unanimous in Mercosur, and a recent episode can exemplify it. At a meeting of the bloc's national coordinators, held by videoconference in April 2020, the Argentine government, through its Chancellery, announced its withdrawal from future regional bloc negotiations regarding the free trade agreements envisaged with countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Lebanon, Canada and India. In a press release, the Argentine Chancellery also expressed that the uncertainty throughout the world and the very situation of the country's economy advise the decision in question, but that it will, however, continue to monitor the progress of the Mercosur-European Union Agreement, “without entering in debates, for now, sterile”³⁵. In that same communiqué, the Argentine government also reported that this decision differentiates it from the positions adopted by other states in the bloc, which seek, in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, to accelerate trade opening negotiations with other countries in the world. However, despite the position of the Fernández government, there has been a predominance of the classic concern that guided Mercosur since the beginning, which is none other than competitiveness, efficiency, the bloc's insertion in international trade flows, especially in view of the demands of the global productive segmentation strategy adopted by transnational companies, the so-called “global value chains”, whose dynamics, according to the new hegemonic perspective, the Mercosurian bloc should be subject to and accommodate³⁶.

With regard to the second point raised here, it seems clear that, in the last decade, the related measures to reduce the institutionality of the bloc led to the resumption of the neoliberal and entrepreneurship ideas, especially with regard to a reorientation of institutional architecture aimed at a bloc which must reaffirm its essentially commercial character³⁷. In this sense, the

³⁵ See Argentina (2020).

³⁶ The disagreements cited above were also present at the Mercosur Summit Meeting in March 2021.

³⁷ In fact, as of 2016/2017, among the regulations that gained prominence in the bloc, we can mention the Cooperation and Facilitation Protocol for Intra-Mercosur Investments, approved by the CMC Decision no. 3/2017; the Mercosur Trade Facilitation Agreement, approved by the CMC Decision no. 29/2019 and the Mercosur Electronic Commerce Agreement, approved

CMC Decision n. 19/2019 is clear when establishing an action plan to review the institutional structure of Mercosur (2020-2021), “with a view to assessing its adequacy to the current stage of the integration process and making it leaner and more efficient, eliminating the double efforts”. The proposal to return to a minimalist Mercosur, with an adequate and efficient institutional structure guided by the bloc’s commercial objectives, was also reflected in the CMC Decisions ns. 6 and 30, 2017, in which the post of High Representative-General of Mercosur was removed, and the Social Participation Support Unit, devoid of the structure originally foreseen for the fulfillment of its objectives, became part of the structure of the Secretariat of Mercosur.

Finally, there is one last aspect that contributes to corroborate the paradigm shift in Mercosur. This aspect refers to the dismantling of the expansion of Mercosur to the rest of South America, in opposition to the basis in which this expansion sought to be privileged in the preceding decade, that is, in articulation with the premises of South-South cooperation, sovereignty and strategic autonomy. In this last decade analyzed, the decision to suspend Venezuela from the bloc, applying the Montevideo Protocol on Commitment to Democracy in Mercosur of 2011³⁸, appears, in this larger context, as an element that questions the enlarged Mercosur model, assuming that other “more modern” initiatives, limited to free trade and focusing on global value chains, will, in fact, be more successful.

Final Remarks

As discussed throughout this work, regional integration is a political project of great relevance for states in the capitalist periphery such as the South American states, and, as such, it will always assume certain choices in terms of models or paradigms to be followed and implemented. There is no neutral regionalism, and the historical and institutional framework of Mercosur presented here corroborates this statement.

As any possibility of developing inter-industrial coordination and cooperation, as originally thought by Brazil and Argentina was abandoned, Mercosur was guided, in the 1990s, by an integration model open to the markets, with a minimal institutional structure that would achieve its objective ruled by the hegemonic neoliberal ideas of that time. Once under the rule of popular and progressive governments of the region, in the first decade of the

through the CMC Decision no. 15/2020.

³⁸ It should be mentioned that this instrument was also applied to suspend Paraguay in 2012, due to former President Lugo destitution.

21st century, other thematic dimensions and countries were present in the Mercosur bloc, in an attempt to enlarge Mercosur under a perspective that had in its internal balance and external autonomy its central core .

Throughout this last decade of operation, in the midst of a conservative turn in the region, Mercosur has been following the path of precariousness and fragility. Despite the resumption of the modality of open regionalism, Mercosur today is no longer guided by the original objective of the Treaty of Asunción of establishing a common market. As evidenced in the recent discussions of the political authorities of the bloc's countries, the proclamation of the "modernization" and "flexibilization" of the regional integration has been guided by the attempt to dismantle the, albeit imperfect, institutional and normative architecture built over twenty-five years of history, in the understanding that - in the terms of the defenders of that modernization themselves - the individual negotiation of free trade agreements would be a key factor for a successful insertion in the global value chains. Rescuing the legacy of previous agreements is necessary.

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ABSTRACT

Over its thirty-year existence, Mercosur has experienced several changes, which refer to the models of open regionalism and multidimensional regionalism. Based on this argument, we seek to present, in this work, some interpretative notes, in a historical and institutional perspective, in order to provide subsidies for a balance of the bloc, in its three decades of operation. Focusing on the internal institutional dynamics of Mercosul and using bibliographic and documentary research, this paper discusses the integration models adopted and the main measures associated with the respective models along the bloc's trajectory. Its conclusion points out to the current trend of resuming open regionalism in the midst of Mercosur's precarious condition.

KEYWORDS

Open Regionalism; Multidimensional Regionalism; Mercosur.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT: DIALOGUES BETWEEN THE MEANING OF HÉLIO JAGUARIBE'S "AUTONOMY" CONCEPT AND THE NATIONAL STRATEGY OF DEFENSE

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Introduction

According to Ferrater Mora, in the philosophical vocabulary, the term “autonomy” is generally used in two ways. First, there is the ontological meaning, in which it is assumed that certain areas of reality are independent, governed by a set of distinct rules and laws. Autonomy does not imply that a given scope is not governed by the rules and laws of another scope, in whole or in part. There is also the ethical meaning. It is said, for example, that a moral law is autonomous when its foundation is in itself, being the proper reason for its legality. In other words, it is related to the condition of the human will to self-determine, according to rules or moral laws defined by man himself, being free from strange or exogenous influences that subject him (Mora 2001, 234-235).

According to the Houaiss Dictionary of the Portuguese Language, the word “autonomy” is polysemic and has different meanings. It concerns man's ability to self-govern. In its legal sense, it relates to the right of an individual to make decisions freely or the right of an institution to determine the rules of its conduct, without any external restrictions or impositions. In the fields of International Law and International Relations, it relates to a country's recognized right to be guided and act according to its own laws. Regarding this last meaning, the inevitable proximity to the concept of “sovereignty” is noticeable (Houaiss 2004, 351).

In his abundant studies on the economic, political and social development of Brazil, contemporary international relations and matters of

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national security and defense, the political scientist and sociologist Hélio Jaguaribe presented several reflections on the problem of “autonomy” in Brazil since it integrates a world system of States and is inserted within the capitalist economic system.

There is a dearth of deeper research in Brazil with a similar theme about the political scientist within the field of Defense studies. It is certainly noted that the studies based on Jaguaribe’s work have focused, to a large extent, on the analysis of his ISEB intellectual production, being concentrated in the field of Politics and Economics, particularly with regard to Economic Development. It is pertinent, therefore, to take a look at the intellectual work of a relevant “Brazil interpreter” like Jaguaribe who deals with issues that interrelate Development and National Defense.

What are the meanings attributed by Jaguaribe to “autonomy” in Brazil? And to what extent do your ideas about “autonomy” dialogue with the main public policies related to the theme of defense, formulated in Brazil in recent decades: the National Policy of Defense and, in particular, the National Strategy of Defense in its different versions?

Hélio Jaguaribe: Biographical Notes

Hélio Jaguaribe Gomes de Matos (Paiva 2010) was born on April 23rd, 1923 in Rio de Janeiro, then the Federal District, and died on September 9th, 2018 in Rio de Janeiro. He was 95 years-old. His parents were Francisco Jaguaribe de Matos and Francelina Santos Jaguaribe de Matos. Hélio Jaguaribe was a student at Santo Inácio College and graduated in Law from PUC, the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, in 1946. Then he worked at the law firm of San Tiago Dantas. Later, together with Reynaldo Reis, he opened his own law firm.

His intellectual eclecticism, a mark of his trajectory, was revealed from an early age. He became responsible for the culture supplement “A Quinta Página”, at *Jornal do Comércio* newspaper, in 1949, created with the support of the modernist poet Augusto Frederico Schmidt. This important journalistic media provided visibility to various analyzes of Brazilian culture, formulated by a group of intellectuals such as Israel Klabin, Oscar Lorenzo Fernandez, Jorge Serpa Filho, Roland Corbisier and others. Among the themes addressed by Jaguaribe in his articles, fascism, clientelism and ideological politics must be highlighted.

In 1952, Jaguaribe and other intellectuals, residing in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, began to meet on the last weekend of each month in the Itatiaia

National Park. In a space provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, this select group met in order to examine and reflect on issues and problems that Brazilian society should address in order to overcome underdevelopment. The "Itatiaia group", as it became known, in its five meetings, counted on the presence, besides Jaguaribe himself, of thinkers such as Cândido Mendes de Almeida, Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, Oscar Lorenzo Fernandez, Inácio Rangel, Israel Klabin, Rômulo Almeida, Heitor Lima Rocha, Evaldo Correia Lima and Ottolmy da Costa Strauch, from Rio de Janeiro, in addition to Roland Corbisier, Vicente Ferreira da Silva, Ângelo Simões de Arruda, Almeida Sales, Paulo Edmundo de Sousa Queiroz and Miguel Reale, residing in São Paulo, among others.

In 1953, part of the "Itatiaia group", particularly those who lived in Rio de Janeiro, along with Roland Corbisier, who moved to the federal capital in 1954, was responsible for organizing and founding the Brazilian Institute of Economics, Sociology and Politics (IBESP). Jaguaribe was its secretary-general. Through self-financing, in 1953 and in the following three years, IBESP published five editions of the so-called "Cadernos do Nosso Tempo", a magazine that gathered essays on society and economics. His essays summarized the main ideas of IBESP and pointed to the need for structural reforms in the Brazilian State. Among Jaguaribe's articles, *The Brazilian crisis*, published in October / December 1953, and *For a national development policy*, featured in the last issue of the magazine, in January / March 1956, should be highlighted.

IBESP members wanted to have an influence on government decisions regarding development. So, they decided to expand their action. Counting on the crucial contribution of the educator Anísio Teixeira, who, in 1955, fulfilled a significant role in the Ministry of Education, the Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies (ISEB) was established in this ministry by a government decree. Although formally linked, ISEB did not suffer direct interference from the minister, Cândido Mota Filho at that time. In order to materialize his ideas, one of the main initiatives of the ISEB was to institute a regular course, especially aimed at the public servers chosen by public service agencies, covering themes of economics, politics, sociology, philosophy and history, lasting one academic year.

With an advisory board, a board of trustees and the departments of economics, philosophy, history and sociology and political science, the last one headed by Jaguaribe, ISEB organized publications, conferences and courses given by its members, such as Jaguaribe himself, Corbisier, Evaldo Correia Lima, Álvaro Vieira Pinto, Cândido Mendes de Almeida and Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, as well as other intellectuals in line with their ideas and reflections, such as Nelson Werneck Sodré and Celso Furtado. In this way, ISEB has consolidated itself as one of the most relevant centers of thought and debate on

issues related to nationalism, development and industrialization. From these debates, a fundamental concept was born, “national-developmentalism”.

It should be emphasized that, being a cultural institution created in 1955 as an office of the Ministry of Education and Culture, ISEB (Abreu 2010) was intended for the study, teaching and dissemination of social sciences, based on the foundational idea the understanding and the critical analysis of the Brazilian reality and the development of theoretical instruments that would allow the encouragement and promotion of national development, understood as the overcoming by the country of its colonial and underdeveloped condition, achievable only through an autonomous and growing industrialization. According to the ISEB ideology, development policy should be nationalist, the only one capable of leading to emancipation and sovereignty, and supported by the national industrial bourgeoisie, by the proletariat, by technical and administrative groups and by intellectuals, as opposed to the mercantile and landowning bourgeoisie and to the large portion of the “parasitic” middle class.

According to Jaguaribe himself, in an interview to the program “Political Memory” of TV Câmara (2020), held on May 13th, 2003, the “soul” of ISEB was its set of studies to frame an industrial vision. National industrial development should have a virtuous “alliance between the industrial bourgeoisie, the urban proletariat and the technical middle class”. In this interview, Jaguaribe describes an opposition between social classes, but not in the traditional “bourgeois versus workers” sense. The cleavage had a different nature: “technical middle class versus clientelistic middle class; industrial versus commercial bourgeoisie; industrial proletariat versus peasantry domesticated by the landowners”. Described in another way, there was a division in society between “backwardness” and “modernity” (Câmara dos Deputados 2020).

By publishing *Nationalism in the present day in Brazil*, at the end of 1958, Jaguaribe ended up precipitating a crisis within the ISEB. In this book, Jaguaribe was averse to what he considered a radicalism of positions that appropriated nationalism and made it symbolically contrary to the participation of foreign capital in the dynamics of Brazilian development. The criticism of the book was not originated in the ISEB, but in movements led by newspapers and the National Students Union (UNE). These movements objected to Jaguaribe’s analysis of oil and petrochemical policy and its alignment in favor of the exploitation by the private sector. According to Jaguaribe, these foreign investments would help overcome the problem of technical and capital precariousness, thus proving to be useful and profitable. Supporting his argument in defense of private companies, there was the thesis in which the Brazilian State was incapable, from a management point of view, due to its clientelistic and notary nature, the result of underdevelopment.

The debate culminated in an internal crisis that basically highlighted the dispute over the ISEB's real purpose. After changes in the institute's structure, Jaguaribe noticed that such changes were unfavorable to him. In 1959, Jaguaribe decided to move away from ISEB.

Between 1959 and 1964, Jaguaribe acted as an entrepreneur, expanding the Companhia Ferro e Aço de Vitória, held by his family. With the beginning of the military regime in March 1964, he condemned the overthrow of President João Goulart, resigned as president of the steel company and left the country, going to teach sociology in the United States. He was a professor at Harvard University between 1964 and 1966, at Stanford University between 1966 and 1967 and at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology between 1968 and 1969. Returning to Brazil in 1969, he took over as Director of International Affairs at Faculdades Integradas Cândido Mendes.

Based on a lecture given in 1973, held at the Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro, Jaguaribe published the book *Brazil: crises and alternatives* next year. The theme was an analytical study on the crisis of populism and the military regime after 1964. In this book, he recovered part of his developmental ideas.

It emphasized the old idea about the need of foreign capital flow. The promotion of development from a mostly state enterprise would not have been possible due to the lack of conditions of populist governments between the 1940s and 1960s, as a consequence of the crisis that affected Brazil in the 1960s. Following this logic, Jaguaribe pointed to the participation of foreign capital in the positive economic results of the military regime.

Jaguaribe coordinated a project in 1985, commissioned by José Sarney's government, entitled "Brasil 2000". Next year the study was published under a new title, *Brazil 2000: for a new social pact*. According to the report, Brazil was in a similar situation as compared to African and Asian countries in terms of social welfare conditions, regardless of occupying the position of the eighth world economy. For example, 65% of the Brazilian population was subject to hunger and lived in precarious conditions. In addition to the diagnosis, the study had a propositional focus, by establishing a strategy to raise the population's living standards over 15 years in order to reach similar levels found in countries like Greece and Spain. This strategy was aimed to attack four focal points: food production, job creation, raising wages, expanding and speeding up social services.

The second part of the study was published in 1988. *Brazil: reform or chaos* showed a disturbing picture for the country's situation. Based on documents, statistics and comparisons, the new study showed an aggravation of social ills year after year, which would lead to social chaos in the early 1990s. As the social

investments necessary to reverse the scenario were considered unrealizable, this study prescribed the following: the renegotiation of the external debt, the increase in the tax burden and the restructuring of the Brazilian State.

Along with André Franco Montoro, José Richa and José Serra, Jaguaribe founded, in the middle of 1988, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB). In his party performance, he had participated in the campaign for the Presidency of the Republic of Mario Covas and worked in the national directory and in the party's executive committee.

A new picture of the situation and problems in Brazil, pointing out a series of alternatives and options, was published by Jaguaribe in 1989, *Brazil alternatives*. Jaguaribe decided to participate more strongly in political life by taking part, in April 1992, together with other members of the PSDB, such as Celso Lafer and Sérgio Paulo Rouanet, in the second ministerial staff of the Fernando Collor de Mello government. Thus, he left the party positions and assumed the Secretariat of Science and Technology. However, with the opening of the president's impeachment process, approved by the Câmara dos Deputados on September 29th of the same year, Jaguaribe resigned his position and no longer acted in politics directly. His participation, from then on, became exclusively academic.

As an example of its enormous versatility and culture, Jaguaribe started in 1994 a research and historical analysis project. Directing several social scientists and historians, this project was published in 1999, with the following title: *A critical study of history*. The Portuguese version was published in 2001. In general, the work involved a critical analysis of seventeen civilizations, from ancient to contemporary ages, seeking to identify the conditions of its emergence, heyday and eventual decline.

In *Brazil: alternatives and solutions*, launched in 2002, the political scientist presented reflections on the new international order and its problems at the dawn of the new century, the possible ways for Brazil to overcome its limitations and an analysis of South America on the Latin American scenario. In 2003, Jaguaribe conveyed the IEPES dean to Francisco Weffort and had become dean emeritus of the institution.

According to Jaguaribe himself, in the article *Brief news about his own work* in 2000, the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset was one of the main intellectual references of his education. The philosopher's work led him to become interested in German thought and reflections developed between the last decades of the 19th century and the 1930s.

In his ninety-five years of life, Hélio Jaguaribe has accumulated numerous honors and awards: doctor *honoris causa* in philosophy at the

Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz, Germany, in 1983, for his work in the social sciences and for his studies on Latin America; honorary doctor at the Federal University of Paraíba, in 1992; Grand Cross of the National Order of Scientific Merit, in 1996; Order of Cultural Merit granted by the Ministry of Culture, in 1999, for its work in favor of Brazil cultural development; honorary doctor at the University of Buenos Aires in 2001; professor emeritus of the Army Command and General Staff College (ECEME) in 2003; finally, but not least, he was elected to occupy the seat number 11 of the *Academia Brasileira de Letras*, succeeding Celso Furtado, in 2005.

The Concept of "Autonomy" in Hélió Jaguaribe's Work

Held in the Chilean city of Viña del Mar, between January 7th and 11th, 1979, the Seminar "Latin America and the New International Economic Order" featured the presentation of a study by Hélió Jaguaribe entitled *Peripheral autonomy and centric hegemony* (Jaguaribe 1986). The publication in the magazine *Estudios internacionales* took place in the same year. Considering some of the references prospected for the purposes of this research, the importance of Jaguaribe study is noticeable. An accurate examination of the text is essential for an understanding of the political scientist's reflections on the theme of "autonomy".

For Jaguaribe, the country's autonomy is closely and directly related to what he describes as "technical and entrepreneurial". Such autonomy would not be envisaged until a central plan was established that would provide a break with the dominance of transnational corporations over technological innovations and markets.

In the contemporary peripheral world, conditions are completely different. On the one hand, universalization and instant information, with regard to consumption styles in central countries, produce imitative forms that are inescapable in peripheral countries, which reduce their capacity for investment and are encouraged to use directly or indirectly imported products and processes. On the other hand, the degree of international control of transnationals over technological innovation and markets makes it practically impossible, in open societies and not subjected to imperative central planning, to develop a national effort in favor of technical and business autonomy (Jaguaribe 1986, 44-45).

But that effort would not be enough. As long as the elites and middle classes of the peripheral countries mirror their expectations and consumption

habits in the central countries, a significant fraction of the national income, in an environment of general internal poverty, would remain absorbed, not allowing internal conditions for a multiplier effect encompassing development and technical, academic, business and industrial success in favor of “autonomy”.

In addition to these psychosomatic, political and technical-economic difficulties, there is an extraordinary increase in the minimum levels of critical mass for successful technical and business emancipation. The order of magnitude of the domestic markets, to compensate for the international control of manufacturers and the market, exercised by transnational companies, assumes semi-continental proportions, or requires integrative mechanisms of extraordinary efficiency and a high degree of consensus. [...] All of these conditions are almost impossible to gather and maintain for a sufficiently long period. Even in countries like Brazil and Mexico, where national dimensions would allow such an effort, social, economic and political conditions do not lead to an adequate relationship between elites and the masses to induce and sustain sufficient motivations for technical and business autonomy. The elites and the middle classes, in order to maintain their expectations of consumption in the existing general conditions of poverty, absorb immeasurable proportions of the national income, imposing on the masses, with the support of coercive means, miserable patterns of survival. Thus, complementary relations that induce technical and business autonomy are not generated, but the opposite occurs, internal conditions that increase technical and business dependence and, through these, international dependence (Jaguaribe 1986, 45).

In the political scientist's view, modern national states are an innovation based on a virtuous arrangement involving three fundamental aspects: the common historical-cultural background, based on a common technical basis, which is not detailed by Jaguaribe, and an impersonal and indirect relationship, in general, among its members, but which aims for constancy and fidelity.

Modern national states are a relatively new form of organization for society, which differs in general from all historical precedents. The basic characteristic of the modern national state is the combination, from a common historical-cultural background, often on a common technical basis, of an interrelation between its members. This interrelation must be impersonal and indirect and tends to be in fact privileged and almost exhaustive and, axiologically, it postulates as deserving of supreme loyalty and dedication (Jaguaribe 1986, 59).

Like a template, he understands that societies function as systems

composed by four subsystems (participatory, cultural, economic and political). These have specific functions that are related to each other. Each subsystem generates products that feed the other subsystems, acting as inputs. In turn, it is fed by specific products from the other subsystems. Finally, societies are politically and culturally limited by their respective national states.

The characteristics of the national state, already enunciated, constitute a decisive political-cultural factor in framing society and its subsystems. Society, as it is widely recognized and as I have had the opportunity to exhibit in other works, is analytically a system of four subsystems: participatory, cultural, economic and political. Each subsystem performs certain macro-functions: the participatory system produces actors, roles and status; the cultural, beliefs and symbols; the economic, utility; and the political, commands. Analytically, the subsystems maintain input-output relationships with each other. The participatory subsystem receives in exchange for its products (actors, roles, status) integrative values from cultural; internal order and external defense from political; and consumer facilities from economic (Jaguaribe 1986, 60-61).

According to Jaguaribe, the world state system, at the end of the 1970s, was divided into two large "empires", composed of a group of countries commanded by one of the superpowers: the American Empire and the Soviet Empire. Therefore, international relations developed between empires constituted an "inter-imperial system" and within each empire integrated an "intra-imperial system".

For the political scientist, both intra-imperial systems were in crisis, although with different characteristics. In the American case, the crisis was related to the dependence of national states on the "imperial center" and the growing problems to pursue an autonomous condition. These problems were particularly serious for peripheral states, on the fringe of development. This phenomenon was originated and accentuated due to the continued contamination of the dynamics between the internal subsystems of national states by inputs and products from other states, especially those from political and cultural nature. The most notorious example would be the role of transnational companies within peripheral states.

However, [...] it happens that the national states that are part of the American intra-imperial system are in crisis (the same is true in the Soviet). This crisis basically results from growing difficulties that these national states, especially those in the periphery, are currently facing to achieve their autonomy. [...] Fundamentally, this fact is related to the exchange of inputs and products

between the subsystems of the national society. Dependence on the imperial center is particularly asymmetrical for societies on the periphery of the system and affects the interaction of their subsystems, because it substitutes for external inputs and products some of the basic inputs and products from the cultural and political subsystems of such societies. The most common form of this pathological system, in the American intra-imperial system, is the growing importance of transnational companies' role in the dependent societies of the system (Jaguaribe 1986, 62-63).

Therefore, the main issue would involve the cultural subsystem. With the most dynamic sectors of the economy basically in the hands of transnational companies, scientific and technological inputs would come from the center, causing a gradual weakening of the national cultural subsystem and mandatorily threatening the capacity of the other subsystems. In other words, a cultural "underdevelopment" would inexorably generate negative effects on the political, economic and social capacity of peripheral societies.

Actually, what is at stake is something very different, which affects a subsystem apparently not very involved in the process: the cultural subsystem. As the economic subsystem starts to be operated, in the most dynamic way, by foreign branches or is under the control of its headquarters, its scientific-technological inputs also come from metropolitan countries. Thereby, the main input that the economic subsystem of a modern society receives from its cultural subsystem starts to come from the cultural subsystem of another society, which is the centric one. [...] Indeed, with the atrophy of its cultural subsystem, this society is also beginning to lose its capacity to regulate its political and social functions, both evaluatively and normatively (Jaguaribe 1986, 63-64).

In the case of the societies of the central countries belonging to the American intra-imperial system, a similar harmful consequence would occur in their political subsystem with the loss of autonomy of their defense in the external sphere, making them increasingly dependent on the political subsystem of the "imperial center".

According to this reasoning, there would be a conflict between the state form and its internal subsystems, which shape and organize societies, and the multiple and intricate relationships involving the various subsystems within the intra-imperial system.

Also pathological effects, although less virulent, affect societies that are part of the intra-imperial system that retain their economic and cultural

vitality, such as the European countries affiliated with NATO. This happens when a basic product of its political subsystem, such as external defense, is guaranteed by the imperial center's political subsystem. [...] The national form of society organization is factually and axiologically oriented to accentuate the autonomy of the system and the interdependence of its subsystems. The atrophy of the cultural subsystem due to the loss of the scientific and technological guidance function, as occurs in peripheral societies, and also the atrophy of the political subsystem, with the loss of its external defense function (the case of NATO), or even, of its internal ordering function, (the case of many peripheral countries), raises an irremediable crisis in national states. The national form of society organization is no longer compatible with the new realities that characterize contemporary societies in the imperial subsystem (Jaguaribe 1986, 64-65).

For Jaguaribe, on the one hand, the most pernicious consequence of the loss and, ultimately, the end of the autonomy of a peripheral state would be to restrict itself to a territory and a market, defined by the "imperial center", and crumbling as a nation.

This crisis, although of different shape and degree, affects both peripheral and centric societies. With the increasing and evident unfeasibility of their autonomy, for almost all national structures, the peripheral societies lose meaning and society itself ceases to exist as a social project, reducing itself to a territory and a market, determined from the outside in (Jaguaribe 1986, 65).

On the other hand, the influence of external subsystems would bring gains to societies and central elites.

The effect of this type of crisis is the gradual loss, on the part of such societies, of their sense of collective project, transforming them, from a process for themselves, into a process in itself, in the form of a territorial market, which is determined from the outside in. The effects corresponding to this deterioration of society are the importation, from the metropolitan center, of the values of legitimacy and integration, which acquire an intransitive utilitarian sense, at the service of the metropolitan elites and their local agents (Jaguaribe 1986, 66).

In line with previous reflections, Jaguaribe reinforces the thesis that the loss of autonomy by States and their societies in order to ensure their capacity for external defense would generate inconsistencies. Even in developed societies, in the economic sense, there would be relevant mismatches between

the meaning of a State from the political-formal point of view of its sovereignty, its role as organizer of an administrative and economic space and its sense of cultural protection of a collectivity.

The other dimension of the crisis of national states that affects central countries and, cumulatively, dependent countries on the periphery, refers to the political subsystem in its capacity to guarantee the external defense of the respective society. For developed societies, which participated in the economic and cultural center of the American imperial system, the effect of this crisis is the establishment of a contradiction between the sovereign aspect formally preserved by the national state and the effective sense of a simply regional administration that is such State. These societies retain their collective viability, as a system of human interaction, endowed with their own culture and economic self-sufficiency. However, they are reduced to nations only in a cultural sense and no longer in a politically sovereign sense, as is the case of the Helvetica Confederation, with its cantons and its ethnic-cultural communities (Jaguaribe 1986, 66).

The quarrel between the two imperial systems mobilizes the United States not only to consolidate, but to expand its resources of power, as well as its political, military, economic, technological and geopolitical scope. To this end, it submits the States sovereignty within its system to its interests.

[...] In this (the intra-imperial dimension) there are two types of limits, the first of which is the result of the inter-imperial problem and consists of the need, for the United States, to guarantee for itself conditions that meet its imperatives of external defense, not only in the immediate military sense, but also including the other essential elements for the maintenance of an appropriate military capacity, both in economic-technological, geopolitical, socio-political and other terms. That is why the need to impose, through the system, on its intra-imperial relations, certain restrictions on the State's political sovereignty within its sphere (Jaguaribe 1986, 68-69).

For Jaguaribe, the American operation in the intra-imperial sphere would aim to meet the demands of its productive structure. Firstly, it would be necessary to guarantee access to raw materials and their sources, as well as to fundamental, therefore strategic, inputs, with low availability in the American territory itself. In addition, it would be necessary to have easier access to international markets, both for exports and for the flow of national production, thus accumulating foreign exchange, and for minimum maintenance of economic growth and technological development. As a consequence, the State's sovereignty within the US imperial system is also economically subjected.

The second critical boundary of the United States in the intra-imperial dimension concerns its productive needs. The imperatives for maintaining the American productive system have three main aspects. The first refers to the access preservation to raw materials and other essential inputs for the American community, which are not found in sufficient quantities in the metropolitan territory. The second refers to the foreign markets for American products, both in order to guarantee a complementary demand from the domestic one, and, above all, to meet the growing demands of the balance of payments, in order to generate sufficient external payment capacity. The third aspect concerns the internal production process itself, which, for economic, social and political reasons, must maintain certain minimum rates of growth and preserve the dynamism of the economy, including with regard to development and technological innovation. This second critical limit in American intra-imperial relations imposes, like the previous one, certain restrictions, now from an economic nature, on the sovereignty of the states belonging to the system (Jaguaribe 1986, 69).

In this sense, Jaguaribe highlights another contradictory aspect: if the social development of the center is deeply connected, from an ethical and ideological points of view, to the social development of other countries, including those in the periphery, the mechanism that would guarantee the development of the center and the building of free, democratic and more egalitarian societies would end up feeding its opposite in the periphery. This thought, according to the political scientist, would similarly apply to an internal analysis of each society, in which elites are privileged to the detriment of the largest portion of the population.

No socio-humanist project can nowadays preserve its validity and its consequent capacity for social effectiveness if it is restricted to select minorities, whether in terms of class, within a society, or in terms of countries, at the international level. If the material advantages, obtained by the centric countries from the current unequal division of opportunities in the world, facilitate to them the economic prerequisites necessary for the construction of an egalitarian, free and non-repressive society, this same international inequity invalidates, on the other hand, ethically and ideologically, all attempts for social development. [...] The social development of centric countries is inextricably supportive to the general development of the world and its peripheral majorities (Jaguaribe 1986, 78-79).

There would be degrees of autonomy for the states that are part of the American intra-imperial system, depending on the compatibility of these states

to certain conditions. In a first set of conditions, referring to the skills of a State, there would be national viability and international permissibility, conditions that the sociologist does not break down. A second set refers to the ability to execute. They are divided in two alternatives: first, a relative autonomy in internal technical-business terms; second, an alternative through concessions by the center, made them possible, in large part, due to ethnic and cultural similarities between countries and their societies.

[...] The intra-imperial (American) system allows an appreciable margin of autonomy to countries that satisfy certain requirements and relate economically and culturally in terms compatible with the basic interests and values of the imperial center. [...] The requirements for autonomy are of two kinds: qualifying and exercising. The qualifications have two conditions: (1) national viability; (2) international permissibility. The enforcers impose an alternative: a) or candidates for autonomy achieve satisfactory technical-business autonomy, internally or b) compensatively, they have favorable conditions in their relations with the imperial center, especially through identifications of an ethnic-cultural order (Jaguaribe 1986, 79).

However, for most peripheral states, subject to the logic of the negative influence of the American cultural subsystem, restricted access to such conditions made the building of an autonomous process extremely difficult.

Inside a center-periphery relationship that tends to be structured according to the culturalist model, the conditions of autonomy for peripheral countries become difficult to achieve, depriving almost all of them of access to such situation. In fact, only a very limited number of peripheral countries are able to satisfy, in principle, cumulatively, the qualification and exercise requirements to which I referred earlier. They are also unable to relate to the imperial center in economic and cultural terms compatible with their basic interests and values (Jaguaribe 1986, 80-81).

Finally, attention should be drawn to a study carried out by Jaguaribe on the Malvinas crisis and war, published in 1985, entitled *Reflections on the South Atlantic: Latin America and Brazil in view of the disarticulation of the inter-American system*. Despite having been written shortly after the Malvinas crisis, under the influence of the perspectives of the historical situation, there are important reflections by the political scientist regarding the theme of “autonomy”, which is the subject of discussion in this article.

The study was divided into the following parts: initially, Jaguaribe performs a brief analysis of the triggering events; then, it discusses the most relevant issues observed from its developments in the inter-American and Latin

American environment and in relation to the interests and problems of Brazil's national security. Finally, it presents conclusions, in particular, regarding a new national defense strategy and the indispensable requirements to shorten the country's situation of vulnerability.

In the item "Brazil: lack of preparation for the defense" of the "Conclusions" part, Jaguaribe emphasizes that, considering the need to acquire new and modern military equipment, the country should, in principle, favor the development of the national industry for this purpose. However, in the absence of immediate service conditions for domestic production, the demand should be met by importing the equipment. The main objective would be "to ensure international credibility to our defensive capacity". Although countries like Brazil were not up to a military confrontation with one of the superpowers, he considers it urgent not only to guarantee some level of autonomy to meet self-defense conditions, but also to seek external alliances in the form of an "integrated defense system of South America".

The equipping of the Brazilian defense, therefore, is today significantly inferior to what the country's technological-economic conditions could allow. That is why the need for a drastic revision of our defensive re-equipment policy. It is important, as Ministers Maximiliano da Fonseca and Délio Jardim rightly pointed out, to guide our policy of defensive re-equipment by the principle of giving total primacy to the development of the national military equipment industry. But it is also important, as the aforementioned authorities realistically admitted, to acquire abroad, while internal production is not available, the most sophisticated equipment required to ensure international credibility for our defensive capacity. [...] As a final consideration on this topic, it should be noted that, under contemporary conditions, and for a country like Brazil, the self-defense requirements linked to the purpose of ensuring a reasonable level of international autonomy are markedly independent of the East-West conflict. Countries like Brazil, alone or in the context of coalitions such as what could and should be an integrated defense system in South America, cannot directly confront the superpowers. As already mentioned in this study, to these countries, the strategic balance between the superpowers is convenient. If, to the world unhappiness, this balance is disrupted, Brazil and other countries in the region will necessarily have to align themselves with the United States against the Soviet Union (Jaguaribe 1985, 59-60).

Considering Jaguaribe's ideas, briefly presented here, it is important to ask whether concerns of this nature would have been addressed and unfolded in those that are the main public policy documents related to the theme of Brazil's defense: the National Policy of Defense (PND) and the National Strategy of Defense (END).

Defense Policies and Strategies in Brazil

From the mid-1990s, Brazilian defense area started to contemplate a set of political, economic, diplomatic and military rules and apparatus, whose definition, structuring and operationalization had repercussions not only in the country itself, but in the other countries in its surroundings and, in a broad sense, in the international system.

In order to establish ties of cooperation and trust not only between States, externally, but also between State and society, internally, it is reasonable to regard the flow of information and transparency about the national defense policies of a specific State as something essential. In Brazil, the predominant political-discursive apparatus whose objective was and remains to present, clarify and publicize the national defense environment are the National Policy of Defense (PND), the National Strategy of Defense (END) and the White Paper on National Defense (LBDN).

According to Section II of Chapter II of Complementary Law No. 97 of June 9th, 1999 and considering the amendments provided for in Complementary Law No. 136 of August 25th, 2010, the Executive Branch has the obligation to bring the mentioned documents to the National Congress in order to be examined. The sending of the documents, duly updated, must occur periodically, every four years, starting in 2012. Thus, the 2016 versions, currently in force, were submitted by the President of the Republic, Michel Temer, to the appreciation of the National Congress through Message No. 2 of 2017 (Message No. 616, of November 18th, 2016, at the origin). On December 14th, 2018, Congress enacted Legislative Decree No. 179 of 2018, making the documents official. The latest versions, which remain under evaluation by the Congress until now, were sent by the Executive on July 22nd, 2020. A brief description of the documents, highlighting their importance for the purposes of this article, is presented below.

Originally, under the name of National Defense Policy, the first version was developed under the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government, in 1996. In its subsequent updates, in 2005, 2012, 2016 and 2020, its name was changed to National Policy of Defense, emphasizing the precedence of the “national” aspect. As National Policy of Defense, it was approved by Decree No. 5,484, of June 30th, 2005.

It is a document that establishes general, high-level conditions for the planning of actions aimed at national defense, therefore oriented towards potential external threats. He points to directions and guidelines for training

and employment in both military and civilian areas that make up the "National Power". Basically, it determines the objectives, called "National Objectives of Defense" and guides the State on what must be done to achieve them. In the 2012 version, right in the Introduction, there is an emphasis on an important assumption, considered fundamental: "the defense of the country is inseparable from its development, providing it with the indispensable shield" (Brasil 2012c).

The "National Objectives of Defense" are detailed in Chapter 6 of the PND in the form of eleven general points. Its transcription is as follows: i) to guarantee sovereignty, national heritage and territorial integrity; ii) to defend national interests and Brazilian people, goods and resources abroad; iii) contribute to the preservation of national cohesion and unity; iv) contribute to regional stability; v) contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security; vi) intensify Brazil's projection in the concert of nations and its greater insertion in international decision-making processes; vii) to keep the Armed Forces modern, integrated, trained and balanced, and with professionalism increasing, operating jointly and properly deployed in the national territory; viii) to make Brazilian society aware of the importance of defense matters in the country; ix) to develop the national defense industry, oriented towards obtaining autonomy in indispensable technologies; x) structuring the Armed Forces around capabilities, providing them with personnel and material compatible with strategic and operational planning; and xi) develop the potential of defense logistics and national mobilization. These basic items are at the heart of the PND, officially directing and defining what Brazilian society aims for national defense. For the purposes of this research, it should be highlighted the ninth item that associates industrial development with sensitive technological autonomy among the essential purposes pursued.

In general, if the PND establishes "what to do" in the defense area, the National Strategy of Defense, also known by the acronym END, defines "how to do it". In other words, END deals with the systematic execution and implementation of the objectives determined by the PND.

As of the creation of the Ministerial Committee for the Formulation of the National Strategy of Defense by presidential decree on September 6th, 2007, the design and development of the END and the updating of the 2005 PND was made official. The chairmanship of the committee was under the responsibility of Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim, and his coordination to the Chief Minister of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs, Roberto Mangabeira Unger. The committee included the Ministers of Finance, Planning, Budget & Management and Science & Technology, in addition to the commanders of the Armed Forces (Navy, Army and Air Force), assisted by their own General Staff. Additionally, in its article 3, the committee president's prerogative was

foreseen to invite “specialists or representatives of other bodies and entities, public or private, as well as citizens of recognized knowledge in the field of defense, to participate in the meetings and provide advice on specific themes” (Brazil 2007).

The need for the modernization of means and war materials was an old demand of the Armed Forces, according to Patrícia Capelini Borelli (Borelli in Saint-Pierre and Vitelli 2018, 377-386). In the years 2006 and 2007, the tense situation was aggravated by a huge crisis experienced by the Brazilian air transport sector, known at the time as an “air blackout”, reflecting the sector’s collapse due to serious structural failures. The crisis in civil aviation shed light on the various problems within the Armed Forces, such as wage dissatisfaction, long working hours, among others. In particular, it highlighted the lack of knowledge of political representatives in relation to military issues. Thus, at the same time that a solution to the “aerial chaos” was sought, the reformulation of the defense sector entered the political agenda. In this sense, the structuring of the END and the updating of the PND can be understood as political initiatives with the aim of reforming the defense area, after a long time lacking in prioritization, definitions and investments.

In a complementary manner, the international situation and the most relevant role aspired by Brazil should be emphasized. The Brazilian coordination of the UN Peace Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) from 2004 (United Nations Brazil 2017), the historic ambition to occupy a permanent seat in a reformed United Nations Security Council (Brazil 2014) and the creation on December 16th, 2008 of the South American Defense Council by UNASUR member countries (Brazil 2008b), as part of the necessary conditions to promote regional integration, are examples of this leading role assumed by Brazil. Therefore, an invigorated defense industrial base would not only reduce the country’s technological dependence, especially in relation to the “indispensable technologies”, but, above all, it would be a crucial instrument in the country’s performance in its new international role. Internally, the implementation of *Stricto Sensu* postgraduate courses, focused on National Defense, in establishments of high studies of the Armed Forces - the first course created was the Master in Military Sciences of the Army Command and General Staff College (ECEME) in 2001 (Brazil 2016) - as well as the creation of the first Brazilian undergraduate course in the area, the bachelor’s degree in Defense and International Strategic Management (DGEI) from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) in 2009 (Brazil 2008c), were among the outstanding initiatives related to the country’s concern with defense issues.

Approved in its first version by Decree No. 6,703 of December 18th, 2008, the END was revised in 2012 and 2016. As previously mentioned, the

latest version, sent in 2020, is subject to evaluation by the National Congress.

In the 2012 version of the document, END is divided into two main parts: the first entitled "Systematic Formulation", followed by "Implementation Measures". It was created to promote an update and modernization of the defense structure of Brazil. It presents twenty five guidelines, organized according to three aspects known as "structuring axes": the reorganization of the Armed Forces, the restructuring of the national industry directed towards defense materials and defense equipments and, finally, the maintenance of mandatory military service.

We must emphasize the "National Strategy of Defense and National Strategy of Development" part in which the inseparable link between these two public policies is established, one reinforcing and stimulating the other, in line with the essential purposes of the PND. The construction of its own development model necessarily involves the country's ability to "say no" to external pressures and threats. Thus, "national independence" is the fundamental principle to guide both defense and development projects, with an emphasis on achieving "autonomous technological training" and "mastery of sensitive technologies", especially in the space, cyber and nuclear sectors, qualified in END as "strategic".

The second structuring axis, "Reorganization of the Defense Industrial Base", seeks to ensure that the needs for military products and equipment of the Brazilian Armed Forces are based on technological capacity of national domain and, preferably, that they are employed in both military and civil environments, which means a dual application.

A closer examination of the second axis shows that the restructuring of Brazilian defense materials and defense equipment industry seeks to "promote the development of a military-university-business complex" (Brazil 2008a). Consequently, the promotion of research and technological development is associated with the idea of autonomy. Said more explicitly, the essential idea is not limited to meet the demand of the Brazilian Armed Forces only. Based on national human, technological and industrial resources, it shall be possible to build a virtuous connection between defense and national development. This aspect is highlighted in the 2008 document, establishing a modernizing direction by encouraging innovation, productive investment and technological autonomy.

We conclude, therefore, that the internal actions related to the promotion of studies and research in the area of Defense, the strengthening of the positive link between Defense and Development and the search for technical autonomy and strategic thinking by Brazil, as provided for in the PND and END, meet the concerns and paths pointed out by Jaguaribe in his reflections previously analyzed in this article.

Patrícia Capelini Borelli (2018) was responsible for writing the “National Strategy of Defense” entry in the *Dictionary of Security and Defense*, published in 2018 and organized by Héctor Luis Saint-Pierre and Marina Gisela Vitelli.

In line with what was mentioned earlier, the first version of the END was published in 2008, according to Borelli. In recent times, there were few official documents dealing with the topic. They were restricted to the political sphere, such as the National Defense Policy, from 1996, which was later restructured as the National Policy of Defense (PND) in 2005.

The END recommends the need for national industry and human resources, which should be qualified in science and technology, to be subsidized by the Brazilian State. Similarly, it points to the urgency of criteria to be defined for an aligned international trade policy, which means centralized purchases and technological integration between the Brazilian Navy, Brazilian Army and Brazilian Air Force. The reason would be the potential dual use of technologies, for both military and civilian purposes, in line with the idea of “technological overflow”. But Borelli draws attention to the lack of details in relation to the processes described and budgetary issues.

In general, the END represents not only a policy proposal for the military sector, but an articulation between defense policy and economic policy, especially that directed to development. But, for Alcides Costa Vaz, there is a lack of continuity between the first version, of 2008, and its subsequent updates, which ends up implying weaknesses (Vaz in Saint-Pierre and Vitelli 2018, 69-77).

On the one hand, the document would highlight the principle of independence, “effected by the mobilization of physical, economic and human resources, for investment in the country’s productive potential”. Following the same logic, dependent is “who does not have the domain of sensitive technologies, both for defense and development”. This principle was maintained in the 2012 version. On the other hand, the 2016 edition would have significantly reduced the autonomist focus, restricting it to the objective of stimulating the productive and technological autonomy of the defense area. Aiming at this end, it proposes the strengthening of the defense science and technology area and that the production chain of the defense industrial base must be sustainable.

Borelli argues that END was an advance in the diagnosis and definition of purposes for the defense area in alliance with several production sectors of society. However, she recognizes the existence of questions about the possibilities of its implementation considering the countless obstacles, such as, for example, the extent of investments and the willingness to carry them out by the Brazilian State.

Defense and Development: Theoretical Aspects

In order to guide the understanding of the relationship between defense and development, in this section I addressed a set of theories, starting from the broader reflections of International Political Economy and then analyzing ideas focused on defense economic studies.

Susan Strange was one of the leading intellectuals in the 20th century in English language. Considered one of the founders of International Political Economy studies, in her book called *States and markets*, Strange articulates culture, political science and economy by conceptualizing that the "structural power" of a State inside the interstate system depends on four fundamental sources: control over security; control over production; control over credit; and, finally, control over knowledge, beliefs and ideas. In this sense, it proposes a conception of history in which politics and economics are viscerally intertwined (Strange 1994, 25-26).

This conception is in line with International Political Economy, a field of knowledge that was developed in the 20th century and interprets international relations from the intricate interactions between politics and economics, reflecting on power and wealth in the political and international economic system (Jackson 2018, 229-230).

Robert Gilpin proposes that wars are an indelible mark of international conflicts and power struggles. Gilpin understands that, in order to guarantee a permanent hegemony in the interstate system, several central countries have mobilized heavy investments in defense. According to this comprehension, the accumulation of political, economic and military power is crucial to achieve and consolidate a hegemonic position (Gilpin 1987).

Still in the perception of International Political Economy studies, José Luís Fiori says that, in the process of modern States birth, from the 16th century onwards, the "war game" and its financing were at the root of the overlap between power and wealth and their concentration (Fiori 2004).

According to economist Ariela Diniz Cordeiro Leske, from the point of view of defense economic studies, understood as a set of rational and systematic reflections on the aspects and economic implications related to the area of defense, two macro-aspects should be highlighted (Leske in Saint-Pierre and Vitelli 2018b, 315-325).

Generally speaking, the first aspect understands that military spending and defense investments stimulate the growth of the economy due to a positive multiplier effect, which would be featured as a "military Keynesianism". For this aspect, defended by economists E. Macnair, James C. Murdoch and Todd

Sandler (1995), J. Paul Dunne and Eftychia Nikolaidou (2001) and Carlos Martí Sempere (2015), the side effects of military and defense investments, which means their externalities have a positive nature. They are often linked to the following factors: training of human resources, industrial training, technological spillovers to other sectors of the economy and security. Due to the multiplier effect on aggregate demand, these factors would broadly stimulate the growth of the economy. Such dynamics would be particularly important in situations of high level of unemployment, since an increase in aggregate demand would tend to cause increases in production and employment.

The second macro-aspect understands that, depending on the conjuncture, causes and effects do not necessarily follow this order or generate positive results. For economists Christos Kollias and George Manolas (2004), it would be economic growth to stimulate the increase in military spending and investment in defense and not the other way around. This increase would be explained by a greater demand by the population for security and made possible by the increase in national income. In addition, according to political scientist Uk Heo (2010), there would also be the possibility of a trade-off, which means, in a context of budget constraint, that increased spending in one area would result in a reduction in others. Thus, expenditure on production, health and education, among others, would tend to rival military spending and defense investments.

For defenders of “military Keynesianism”, military demand is considered a source of relevant innovation. According to this logic, military spending tends to strengthen companies’ innovation capacity. This action can occur directly, through investments in Research & Development (R&D) or indirectly, by the premises of the military to companies.

From World War II, until the mid-1970s, there was an intense process in several countries, such as the United States, of defense innovation with significant effects on the rest of the economy. Sensitive technological projects, such as microelectronics, aeronautics, nuclear energy, information technology, among others, involved several private companies, laboratories and military research centers, universities and highly qualified professionals, with subsidized non-refundable financing, oriented according to the demands of the Armed Forces. These projects had an impact on the creation of new technological paradigms. Despite the preliminary military objectives, the deployment of its use in the civilian environment was remarkable. This process generated the concept of “technological overflow”. However, Leske points out that, from the mid-1960s, the main technological developments, such as the internet, semiconductors and different information and communication technologies, were developed in the civil sphere, thus conquering technological prominence.

Therefore, the sense of "technological overflow" would have been inverted, with the vanguard coming from the civil industry starting to improve the defense sector (Leske in Saint-Pierre and Vitelli 2018a, 85-101).

For Alcides Costa Vaz, the concept of "strategic autonomy" (Vaz in Saint-Pierre and Vitelli 2018, 69-77) presents different readings, even though they are close. As a foreign policy guiding for a country, the concept refers to its position in the international system and its ability to behave independently in relation to matters connected to its essential strategic interests. In this sense, it concerns the freedom of a State to plan, implement, decide and act in the international system, expressing its independence in relation to other States and other international actors.

In view of the interests and objectives importance to be pursued in the international environment which achievement is considered to be fundamental to the pursuit and reach of other interests and objectives, the ability and competence of a State to determine and execute policies, particularly in the external context, which are supported by the defense and security structure, acquire a primordial strategic significance. Still, autonomy and its strategic component have a relational dimension, since they are linked to the state's capacity to agree, diverge, dissuade, withdraw and confront other States and external actors in order to guarantee the promotion of its interests and objectives.

Conceptually, "strategic autonomy" may act as a guide for a defense and security policy, but not necessarily. Although certain countries have sufficient resources of power and can be converted in such a way as to aim, materialize and maintain a condition of "strategic autonomy", such countries may not explicitly allude to this condition or be willing to promote it. For instance, they may decide to prioritize their foreign policy and actions abroad based on multilateralism and collective or community initiatives for security and defense.

Regardless of the performance, Vaz points out three important aspects of "strategic autonomy" that must be highlighted. The first concerns the political sphere, related to freedom and the ability to uphold national sovereignty, to decide and act abroad in favor of the State's defense and security. The second refers to the economic sphere, in particular to the industrial and technological base, related to the several skills, competences and knowledge, aimed at the national development of the indispensable means for defense and security, starting from the essential premise of promoting a modern and competitive defense industry. Finally, the operational sphere, which means the capacity of the State to design, manage and use its resources, from a material and technological point of view, in an effective manner, in favor of its interests and objectives, including military force when necessary.

It is relevant to point out that Vaz mentions H lio Jaguaribe and his

work, *Peripheral autonomy and centric hegemony*, highlighting the diagnosis and prescription made by the political scientist regarding the Brazilian insertion in the context of the Cold War. According to Vaz, once the asymmetrical aspect of world hegemony is recognized, the Brazilian State should gradually seek to expand its autonomy through an increase in its power resources and participatory action in multilateral forums in which the most important international issues were scheduled.

Recognizing the complex articulation between politics, economy and defense in the world system, as well as inside the states, the theoretical approaches here briefly described, especially those related to “technological overflow” and its positive effects in national defense development, whether in the search for industrial autonomy, or in the creation of knowledge and original thinking, contribute to the interpretation of Jaguaribe’s ideas and proposals, as well as in the understanding of similarities and differences in Jaguaribe’s work to the National Policy of Defense and the National Strategy of Defense.

Final Remarks

Among the new objects, problems and approaches of History, whose reflection began in the 1970s, studies involving economic development, national defense and international relations, as well as their implications, can be considered among the most relevant. A special care of the work developed in this article was to reconcile my main research object nowadays, the intellectual path of political scientist Hélio Jaguaribe, with the aforementioned studies, as well as his theoretical and methodological instruments. The chosen object examined was part Jaguaribe’s intellectual work in the early 1980s and the potential dialogues with the main public policies approved in the country in the national defense area. Based on the analysis made, it is possible to conclude that, in the end, the objective was achieved.

Jaguaribe is undoubtedly one of the great “interpreters” of Brazil. Almost seventy years after his first ideas and theories were formulated, in agreement or in divergence with some other intellectuals of equal importance that shared with him the aspirations of Brazilian development in the capitalist way, it is possible to say that his ideals are far from being realized. However, these ideals are still alive and the problems of development and defense remain as central themes in the national public debate today.

In this sense, the initiative to expand and disseminate research in the area of Defense and the constitution of a formal collection for public consultation by the Army Command and General Staff College, which unfold

in studies involving relevant characters from history of ideas and national intellectual history, represent a work of unquestionable importance for the efforts to understand and seek potential alternatives and proposals regarding the development, defense and international relations of Brazil.

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ABSTRACT

In his studies on development, international relations and national defense issues, political scientist Hélio Jaguaribe reflected on Brazil's "autonomy" since the country is inserted in the interstate capitalist system. First approved in 2008, the National Defense Strategy was created with the aim of promoting a modernization of the Brazilian defense structure. This article proposes to understand the meanings of "autonomy" in the strategic thinking of Jaguaribe. In addition, it presents a potential dialogue between his formulations and the guidelines of the National Defense Strategy in its different versions.

KEYWORDS

Defense; Development; Hélio Jaguaribe.

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THE REFORM OF THE BRAZILIAN ANTI-DUMPING REGIME: A PARTIAL REVIEW OF THE DETERMINANTS AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF DECREE 8,058/2013

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Introduction

The degree of trade integration between countries has gradually advanced since the signing of the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* (GATT) in 1947. Its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), established in 1995, intensified this trend and contributed to the members of the trade system becoming even more interdependent, multilateral and regional. The progress towards free trade has been informed both by the guidelines derived from the International System and by the engagement of countries on different fronts of liberalization at the bilateral and plurilateral levels. This reinforces the need to look at the eminently political component that sets the tone and guides government decisions in their different domains (Lindbolm 1981).

In the history of the capitalist system, due to political hegemony, geographical factors or their own histories, various nations dominated trade. Despite the asymmetries and hierarchies that structure this system, the existence of margins of action — contextual and contingent — is recognized, which allow governments to issue decisions capable of affecting markets beyond their borders and, conversely, making decisions influenced

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by external factors. In the drive to stimulate the maximization of domestic economic welfare, these decisions carry a component derived from the pressure of certain stakeholders and class entities. When negatively affected, the latter will seek to mitigate the potentially deleterious effects of trade by way of proposals to (re)formulate trade and industrial policies that are more favorable to their purposes.

Following the prohibition of traditional trade policy instruments during the GATT period, such as voluntary export quotas and restrictions, as well as the limitation on the collection of nominal fees, trade policy measures of a different character started to be implemented. In the meantime, trade defense instruments play a leading role in the trade policy of countries that are part of the multilateral trading system. This data is indicative of the multilevel determinants of the foreign policy, in general, and the foreign trade policy, in particular, as formulated by Putnam (1988) and whose analytical yields are examined in this work.

The current scenario points to an increase in the number of member countries that are frequent users of trade defense instruments, in particular temporary barriers to trade in goods. In the WTO, the number of users of these barriers exceeds that of non-users. Until the 1980s, the application of this type of measure was restricted to the United States, Canada, Australia and the European Union. Twenty years later, developing countries have taken a more active position in the group of users of temporary measures.

Trade defense measures are part of a broad set of instruments available to a government to regulate trade in goods. One of them, now regulated by the GATT/WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA), states that any and all application of anti-dumping duties requires evidence that dumping is the main cause of the damage to the domestic industry. The application of temporary barriers, in turn, does not have a limit, but requires a procedure that must start from the industry or a representative portion of it. The industry that is affected petitions for an investigation into unfair trade practices, and the government is left to investigate the case making use of an investigating authority. If there is satisfactory evidence to justify new barriers, provisional or definitive duties can then be applied. According to the ADA, the application of the duties seeks to neutralize the damage resulting from the practice of dumping, and distances itself from the principle of mere temporary relief for the industry.

Data from the Global Antidumping Database (GAD) regarding the number of requests for further investigations pointed to India as the country where more petitions were received, followed by the United States and Brazil. Bown (2012) showed that in 2012 these numbers were 13% higher than in

2009, and 67% higher than in 2007. The author's findings also suggest that most of the new measures targeted imports from China and other developing countries — a phenomenon called “South-South protectionism”, according to Feinberg (2010). The author believes that this process signals the emergence of an “issue” in the trade chain between developing countries.

In 2011, the inauguration of the first Dilma administration preceded a period of more acute changes in trade policy and defense. In this context, in 2012 and again in 2013, it was Brazil's turn to be the most extensive user of anti-dumping measures. In 2013 alone, Brazil notified the WTO of 30 new anti-dumping measures in force, most of them being against Asian countries, especially China. Alone, Brazil accounted for 20% of the total measures imposed that year.

The leadership in the users ranking concurred with the beginning of a political and economic conjuncture favorable to the political debate on the milestones of trade defense in Brazil. Both the experiences and learnings gained over the course of the previous milestone and the preferences and political goals of stakeholders shaped during this course, contributed to this critical moment (Pierson 2004). Therewith, the first Dilma administration (2011-2014), representing a labor party, was characterized by a significant number of changes in foreign trade policy, combined with a high demand in the industry for anti-dumping measures.

This study examines the development and reform of the anti-dumping regime in Brazil as an example of the further development of a multilateral trade system proposed by the World Trade Organization. Brazil's long history of leadership in the Rounds, as well as its emergence among users of temporary barriers, illustrate the fact that developing countries successfully participate in vouching for the multilateral system. Using the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement as a model for its own regulatory framework, Brazil also shows the importance of participating more actively in thematic tables of the Rounds promoted by the WTO. Firstly, countries can make use of the topics raised in the documents that circulate in order to serve as an aid for the implementation of the domestic anti-dumping policy. Furthermore, this practice can ensure that domestic legislation will have greater compliance with international obligations, ensuring predictability and avoiding constraints – via the Dispute Settlement Body.

The anti-dumping legislation, when it comes to government projects, crystallizes a unique opportunity to analyze the details of the process of developing public policies aimed at the international trade. The Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration catalyzed the change in the issue of Brazilian foreign and trade policy, as it was responsible for internalizing

rules and creating the Brazilian Department of Trade Defense (DECOM). However, the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva administration created anti-avoidance rules⁴, in addition to having gathered the team in Brasília, almost 10 years after the creation of DECOM (interview with Welber Barral, former Secretary of Foreign Trade of the Foreign Trade Chamber (CAMEX), 2007–2011). As previously considered, during the FHC administration, the scope of DECOM was limited, since its team was divided between Rio de Janeiro and Brasília.

Although trade defense was once the subject of the former president's government plan, mainly as a reflection of the creation of the WTO and Mercosur, this topic would assume a key role in the first Dilma administration. To support and seal a commitment to the industry, reforming anti-dumping legislation became one of the main priorities of the Dilma administration.

Thus, the article's main goal is to understand the policymaking of Decree 8,058, of 2013, shedding light on the main determinants of its formulation and some implications of this modernization of the regulation for the application of anti-dumping measures in Brazil. In this sense, this paper is guided by the following specific goals:

- a. understand the course of the reform of the Brazilian anti-dumping regime;
- b. describe and analyze the fluctuations of Brazil's anti-dumping policy, emphasizing the role of policymakers;
- c. present the main elements of the modernization of the regulatory framework that started to regulate AD investigations.

Methodological Procedures and Operationalization of Research

Through a theoretically oriented process tracking, we refer back to the first wave of strengthening of the Department of Trade Defense in Brazil, dating from the end of the Itamar Franco administration and the first Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, we analyze the incremental adjustments executed during in the Lula administration and arrive at the first Dilma administration in the middle of the inflection represented by the Greater Brazil Plan (PBM). This is relevant to the extent that the understanding of the determinants that allow adjustments, recalibrations or changes in trade policy requires understanding of the mechanisms that maintained the previous standard.

4 Under Lula administration, a public tender was held that appointed 40 new Foreign Trade Analysts.

During this journey, PBM was responsible, among other things, for the inclusion of measures to strengthen trade defense as key items of the industrial policy. Given an old industry demand, guidelines specifically for trade policy and defense were included in the Plan, which are synthetically inventoried and analyzed below. For this stage, the research took on a more exploratory tone, since few analyses were developed on the subject, and, therefore, the purpose was to outline an overview of the possible advances and challenges posed by the PBM to trade defense in general.

Therefore, the option was also to add methodological resources capable of providing robust evidence for the study, such as: bibliographic research and review, in-depth interviews and documentary analysis. The main axis of the analysis on the modernization of the normative framework triggered by the PBM was the interlocution of the development and implementation of new Decree 8,058/2013, in which we aimed for open and semi-structured interviews with policymakers and other actors involved in the issue of the Decree. The sample group was heard between June 2015 and July 2020. At first, interviewees were selected from a triangulation with the bibliography and the official documents analyzed. In relation to the latter, the survey sought, at the same time, to recover the contents of the propositions that circulated and to scan the chain of command of roles and positions of power of these policymakers and how these influenced the process.

This documentary survey was carried out through successive incursions into the legal and normative framework (Laws, Decrees, Ordinances, Resolutions, etc.) that are related to the trade defense policy; in addition, it considered the official publications of the class entities (National Confederation of Industry – CNI, and Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo – FIESP) and the information developed and disclosed by the Department of Trade Defense, the core entity in this process. As you will see throughout the following sections, a close link exists between the documents and the interviews.

In addition to this introduction, the article includes an overview of the recent evolution of the normative framework of trade defense in Brazil that paved the way for the PBM. The third section explores the main points of change contained in Decree 8,058/2013, and some outcomes already observed. In this regard, the first two subsections of this item are related to the measures adopted to reduce the delay in anti-dumping investigations, firstly by reinforcing the state capacities of this area with the hiring of new foreign trade analysts and, secondly by expanding the dialogue and exchange of data and information with the private sector. On the other hand, subitem “*Anti-dumping in Sight of the Public Interest: The Creation of GTIP*” addresses

the political treatment given to the configuration of the concept of public/national interest that plays a key role in the context of these investigations.

The following topic (“*Against the Tide: The Question of the Enforcement of Lesser-duty*”) examines the controversies involving another item considered contentious in anti-dumping procedures and which has been the subject of extensive discussions under the reform in question: the ideal threshold of taxation limits to be applied in proven cases of unfair competition (whether full or lesser duty). After describing and analyzing the new Decree, the text ends with a few words by way of final considerations.

Continuities and Ruptures of the Regulatory Framework for the Application of Antidumping Duties in Brazil

Contingency measures as a temporary instrument of protection can be interpreted as the ideal initiative to provide the private sector with better conditions to face international competition. This hypothesis can be tested in some of the measures of the Greater Brazil Plan (PBM), introduced in August 2011 as a possible solution to the impasses of the Brazilian industrial policy. Authors such as Veiga et al. (2013) evaluated that in the wake of these Plan’s goals, a high level of involvement emerged in the trade policy in the first biennium of the first Dilma administration (2011-2014).

In fact, this statement is coherent when the more gradual compass of the trade defense policy of the Lula administration is put into perspective. As previously mentioned, the major changes took place in administrations prior to Lula’s, and were triggered by the decision to deepen the liberalization of the existing trade. The Cardoso administration, by internalizing all of Brazil’s multilateral and regional commitments, replaced the 1987 Antidumping Agreement — based on the Tokyo Round AD Codes, and was responsible for creating a specific department to address the topic in 1995: the Department of Trade Defense (DECOM), linked to the then Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism.

The trigger for a new wave of important changes occurred in the wake of the 2010 post-election period, when “the significant growth of imports [42% in 2010] and the loss of participation of manufactured products in the total exported figure [39.4% in 2010], motivated increasing pressure from the industrial sector for greater activism in trade policy” (Cindes 2011, p.1). To operate the Portfolio of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC), the Dilma administration indicated a name from the political-party sphere and with close proximity to the President. The chosen person, Fernando Pimentel,

was part of the board of the Palmares Revolutionary Armed Vanguard (VAR-Palmares), an organization of which Dilma Rousseff was part of.

At the head of the MDIC, Fernando Pimentel (2011-2014) found himself in the middle of a dilemma between prioritizing macroeconomic stabilization or stimulating exports as a vector of economic growth recovery in the drive to reverse the decline of the external accounts. According to Corrêa and Gomes (2018), despite the benefits of international trade are known, many countries adopt trade policies in order to protect the domestic market from foreign competition. In his inaugural speech, the Minister affirmed that the biggest challenge for the foreign trade policy, in addition to high interest rates, would be to face the⁵ appreciation of the Real while other currencies would be over-depreciated (Rodrigues 2011).

In the middle management, after a sequence of directors coming from DECOM (usually former employees of the earlier Foreign Trade Portfolio of Banco do Brasil – CACEX), Felipe Hees took over the department. Economist and Diplomat for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), having experience in trading on the topic of trade defense in Geneva (2003-2007), Hees was in the department from April 2011 until March 2014.

The transition of DECOM to the MRE's control was not well regarded internally, since MDIC civil servants "felt dishonored" (Landim 2011). It is worth mentioning that the character of the MRE and the MDIC's employees is different. While in trade the specific character of the role is a condition, as in the case of DECOM, which applies international trade rules, at Itamaraty, diplomats have more broad skills (interview with Felipe Hees, former DECOM Director, 2011-2014). The strangeness, or "surprise", being the term the Director used in the interview, emerged mostly from the consultancies or the media and industry, as determined, since he was isolated in Geneva. Therefore, he was unknown in the consulting and industry offices that had transit within the DECOM located in Brasilia. However, the timing and his relationship with the ACEs, working for the MDIC in Geneva, were all factors that led him to DECOM.

"I was called by Tatiana [Tatiana Lacerda Prazeres, ACE of the MDIC and then Secretary of the Foreign⁶ Trade of Minister Pimentel, 2011-2013] to take over DECOM. [...] She and other analysts (Marcos César Saraiva da Fonseca, Director of DECOM, 2014-2016) had previously worked with me on

5 In the case of anti-dumping duties, the exchange rate, in addition to other macroeconomic variables and economic conditions, may affect the industry's demand for further investigations

6 Tatiana Prazeres was appointed by the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) of the Dilma administration, Alessandro Teixeira.

trainings at the Permanent Mission in Geneva. I had a good relationship with the MDIC [...]” (interview with Felipe Hees). This report completely erases a discontinuity hypothesis in DECOM’s internal policies due to a change of command in the Trade Policy Management.

However, MDIC and MRE established a very profitable horizontal relationship in Geneva, since the training of DECOM-linked ACEs went through the Mission program in Geneva. Thus, Hees had the technicality and, most importantly, the right contacts in the staff of the Department for which he was appointed — this was an indication from the Secretary of Trade, Tatiane Prazeres. That said, the course was not affected, that is, changes happened, but those were within the continuity which served as remediation. Consequently, Hees’ time in office in the MDIC soured relations and did not violate the *esprit de corps* of the Ministry of Trade and also highlighted how important people are for the policy.

The Greater Brazil Plan (PBM/2011-2014), had its creation conceived in the first semester, but only on August 2nd, 2011 it became the successor plan for the Productive Development Policy (PDP/2008). The challenge of the Plan, part of Dilma administration’s pledge, was to sustain inclusive growth in an adverse economic context. For that purpose, the Plan estimated five Structuring Guidelines (Des), according to Table 1 that follows, being the first focused *on coping* with the process of replacing national production in sectors subject to external competition.

Table 1: Dimensions of the Greater Brazil Plan

Structuring Dimension	Systemic Dimension
a) Strengthening of Production Chains;	a) Foreign Trade;
b) New Technological and Business Skills;	b) Investment;
c) Electricity Supply Chains;	c) Innovation;
d) Diversification of Exports and Internationalization;	d) Vocational Training and Qualification;
e) Natural Knowledge Economy Skills;	e) Sustainable Production;
	f) Small Business Competitiveness;
	g) Special Actions in Regional Development

Source: MDIC (2012).

The Plan was composed of important measures aimed at the reduction

of tax burdens on investment and exports. The actions sought to confront the exchange rate appreciation with an increase in the supply of credit, and prioritization for the improvement of the regulatory framework of innovation and trade defense. Furthermore, there was a clear goal of providing the Brazilian manufacturing sector with better conditions to face international competition.

In foreign trade, four routes were followed, namely: a) reduction of tax burdens; b) expansion of funding; modernization of the normative legal framework for c) trade defense; and d) protection. A total of 35 measures were projected by the Plan, which also had 15 defined targets. One of them was to expand the Brazilian overall participation in the international trade from 1.3% in 2010 to 1.6% in 2014.

In May 2011, Minister Pimentel reaffirmed a commitment of the PBM: To expedite deadlines and also to review other topics of the former AD Decree. During his management, numerous decisions covered trade policy, among which there were a set of measures that sought to increase the effectiveness of the handling of the Brazilian trade defense. With regard to deadlines, many of the measures of the Pimentel management look identical to the ones from the New Strategy of the Brazilian Trade Defense System, belonging to one of his predecessors – Minister Luiz Fernando Furlan (2003-2007).

Although the Dilma administration has implemented the first – and single – wave of modernization of the regulatory framework of trade defense in Brazil, this opportunity was born before her presidential term. During a Seminar on Trade Defense, held in September 2003, the then Minister of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, Luiz Fernando Furlan, Lula's Prime Minister, announced his plans for Brazil's trade defense. The "New Strategy for the Brazilian Trade Defense System (NESBDC)", as it was called, was divided into eight items to strengthen DECOM. This evidence shows an intention of reform announced, formerly, in the Lula administration, and only carried out with the PBM. Pimentel also announced specific measures for trade defense, such as:

- a. the possibility of applying anti-dumping duties equivalent to the dumping margin – the end of lesser duty;
- b. intensification of the fight against false declaration of origin;
- c. boosting the fight against underpriced prices and illegal imports;
- d. predicted the creation of the Foreign Trade Intelligence Group (GI-CEX);
- e. sought to reinforce the requirement of compulsory certification

through affiliation with Inmetro, SECEX and the Internal Revenue Service.

Regarding the deadlines for the investigation of dumping, safeguards and subsidies, the PBM first sought to reduce the investigation deadline from 15 to 10 months — an intent set forth in the NESBDC. The PBM would still prioritize the determination of provisional duty application within 120 days, given that the ADA norms have maximum deadlines of only 18 months — this item also maintained a relationship with the NESBDC. The PBM was emphatic in its desire to increase the number of trade defense investigators from 30 to 120, as well as to make the application of provisional duties and the preliminary determination compulsory.

With systemic and horizontal impact on production chains, trade defense measures were then contemplated within the foreign trade level. According to the Portfolio's Minister, the PBM would focus on innovation and the productive densification of the Brazilian industrial park, in addition to defining, for the trade defense, a place of importance in the list of priorities of the Dilma administration (Pimentel 2013).

The New Brazilian Trade Defense: PBM Concrete Results

As part of a campaign promise from the Dilma administration, great emphasis was placed on the industry's desires. The reduction of the delay in investigations conducted by DECOM would depend, among other actions, on the expansion of the staff number of Foreign Trade Analysts (ACEs) in the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC), followed by changes in the *modus operandi* of the initial part of the investigation. Nevertheless, other measures discussed in public consultation would also be successfully implemented during Dilma Rousseff's first administration. Progressively, the new regulatory framework was being released through a chain of Resolutions and Ordinances that, together, allowed the crystallization of a new AD Decree. The document, from July 29th, 2013, introduced by Decree No. 8,058, in force since January 1st, 2014, replaced Decree No. 1,602/1995 concerning the regulation of investigation procedures and the application of anti-dumping measures.

According to Prazeres (interview with the Secretary of Foreign Trade of that period), "Trade defense gained an importance that it did not have before in the Dilma administration, because some circumstances favored it. This was Dilma's insight, and also an insight of the Minister of Industry, it

was an industry distress. It was a time when Brazilian imports grew at an accelerated rate. We came from a recovery of the international financial crisis, the Real was appreciated, as a result, imports in Brazil began to increase, this way, the industry mobilized efforts to find a government sensible enough to care for industrialization and national development". For the interviewee, it was the economic and political circumstances that allowed a joining of adequate efforts to enable not only a new Decree, but the largest public tender. "We saw an opportunity to make a series of reforms that we understood to be important. We took great advantage of that political momentum; this is something that happened at that specific moment".

Although the scenario was favorable, to have a President sign a new decree would not be an easy task, especially when the idea came from the middle management. "We value and draw attention to the importance of the trade defense to make the industry stronger. If a goal of the Plan was reached, we could mobilize the efforts and resources of the administration. When the Plan was conceived, and if they recognized the importance of the trade defense, we could raise the efforts and resources to strengthen the field".

First, it was necessary to convince the Chief of Staff (Casa Civil) that the matter was important enough to become part of the government directives. However, the topic was very technical, "someone needs to explain these premises to the President, she needs to take notice, someone needs to enlighten her, convince the Chief of Staff that this was the Decree that we needed. No one thought that the Decree was a priority until we entered the final phase of its drafting".

The ACEs to Attack Investigation Delays

The items listed in the PBM or by the Minister, in their own way and in their time, were pursued and concluded under the MDIC. As the number of investigations grew, so did the desire to attack their delays, and the idea of increasing the number of analysts found ground to thrive. The number of investigators at DECOM fluctuated around two dozen at the time (interview with Ana Carolina Peres, Foreign Trade Analyst and Coordinator of DECOM). The need for reinforcement in the Department's team of investigators (which wasn't a new state of affairs) worsened with the increase in the number of investigations between 2011 and 2013 (only between 2011 and 2012, 63 new investigations were opened).

Being the Department's practice to delegate an investigation to a pair of investigators, each trade analyst should have at least five ongoing

investigations. A public tender to hire new ACEs was then considered a priority.

Minister [Pimentel] affirmed, when we were developing the Greater Brazil Plan: “I need to deliver something to the industry [referring to the issue of the investigations delay, given that this was an old industry’s demand]”. I replied, “So, first of all, we need to have more investigators, only then we change the regulatory framework which plays against the goal of faster speed [referring to the old philosophy of Decree 1,602/1995]”. The increase in the number of investigators was decided between April and May in order to be included in the Plan that was to be released. The regulation reform, on the other hand, was finalized only in July 2013 (interview with Felipe Hees).

The issue was so latent that even after the appointment of the 157 new Foreign Trade Analysts, from the first call-out, the MDIC managed to increase the number of analysts with the call-out of other candidates that passed the public tender. “Just over a year after my appointment, still dozens more were called [referring to Ordinance No. 202/2014]” (interview with Gabriela Verenhitch, Foreign Trade Analyst of the MDIC, appointed by Ordinance No. 63/2013). The hiring of public servants at the Department of Foreign Trade and the training (through a specific master’s degree created to train the new ACEs) represented an extensive restructuring of the agency. However, not all new servants were allocated to DECOM. Although it was not possible to accurately determine the number of analysts allocated to DECOM, it is estimated that there were at least 35 ACEs (interview with Márcio, Foreign Trade Analyst appointed by Ordinance No. 63/2013).

At DECOM, the number of technicians increased, but other MDIC departments took the opportunity to absorb some of the analysts. “When the public tender was organized, the idea was that every successful candidate was going to be allocated at DECOM, however, at the swearing-in ceremony we were told that we would be working for different departments of the MDIC and not only for DECOM” (interview with Gabriela Verenhitch).

This is a convergent point in the interviews, both on the valorization of the new ACEs and the criterion for the allocation of new approved candidates.

“The Minister attended and symbolically placed the badge on Abrão [Abrão M. Árabe Neto], who got first place in the exam, but the ceremony was for everyone. The idea was to inflate the DECOM’s staff number, but there was a lot of demand from other sectors. Each sector made a claim, informing how many analysts they needed, as a result, the Department allocated them. First, at the end of the training course in December 2012, the Deputy Minister

[Alessandro Teixeira] affirmed that they would gather everybody in the same room, by order of classification, and each would have the right to choose where they wanted to be allocated to. But in practice, on the inauguration day [in February], they even told us in the microphone: ‘Oh... Tomorrow you call the HR to find out what sector you will be allocated to.’ Basically, the top 100 candidates were allocated to SECEX, of those, some people complained, and they managed to change the allocation. Some people requested to be allocated for a specific sector and, when possible, their request was met. And others were placed in other sectors. This information is not documented, but that’s how it happened” (interview with Gabriela Verenhitch).

The process evolution to allocate the new ACEs can be verified in the following table.

Table 2: Creation and Appointment to the Role of Foreign Trade Analysts

Government	Instrument	Content
Dilma Rousseff Fernando Pimentel (MDIC)	Law 12,545, of December 14, 2011 (Federal Official Gazette [DOU] 12.15.2011)	Art. 14. In the Federal Executive Branch, 120 (one hundred and twenty) positions of effective provision of Foreign Trade Analyst (ACE) were created, of the profession of same name
	Ordinance MPOG No. 608, of December 28th, 2011 (DOU 12/29/2011)	Authorizes the performance of a public tender in order to hire 157 ACEs
	Ordinance No. 63 of February 26th, 2013 (DOU 02.27.2013)	Appointment of new Foreign Trade Analysts
	Ordinance MPOG No. 144, of May 6th, 2014 (DOU 05.07.2014)	Authorizes the appointment of other 67 ACES from the list of the public tender held by the previous notice
	Ordinance No. 202, of July 29th, 2014 (DOU 07.30.2014)	Appointment of new ACEs

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Reducing Delay: Editing New Rules

In addition to the largest hiring of Analysts since the position was created, the second stage was the edition of CAMEX Resolution No. 44, which established the Interministerial Technical Group for the Consolidation of Internal Foreign Trade Legislation (GTIC). The latter was assigned to prepare a proposal for the modernization and consolidation of the domestic legislation, in order for it to be standardized, rationalized and simplified. By Art. 4 of the said Resolution, the Group should survey the legislation relevant to the trade in force to draft the modernization project. The attempt to speed up investigations and detail procedures then depended on the creation of a working group to draft a more efficient legislation. According to the Secretary of Foreign Trade at the time, “the replacement of the old normative framework, which dated from 1995 and was no longer up to the contemporary challenges of the Brazilian foreign trade, was fundamental to the fulfillment of the two central goals of the Plan on that matter” (Prazeres 2011).

During an interview, Tatiana Prazeres recalled that in the DECOM’s *modus operandi*, a set of practices and procedures were adopted in the investigations, which were based on the interpretations of the Geneva Center for International Dispute Settlement, but that were not provided for by the decree in force — referring to the 1995 Normative Framework. By the — developmental — general line of the Dilma administration and the Treasury, in the role of the Minister Mântega, “We were always trying not to make mistakes. We debuted half of the requests for opening of an investigation, and after opening, half of the application requests were not deferred. There was much political pressure in regard to the understanding that that government was more opened and sensitive to the industry demands. [including] ACEs in charge of the investigations had the habit of meeting to win coherence and cohesion between investigations”. The new Decree would still “embrace all DECOM’s experience in investigations, much of the practice accumulated in actual issues”.

According to Prazeres, the Decree “deliberately decreases the gray area, so it has reduced the administration’s room for maneuver by establishing strict deadlines and criteria”. These actions were always intended to preserve the status of the Brazilian Trade Defense in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, after all, the country never had a decision of DECOM condemned. “The drafting of a new Decree must be a mirror of the ADA, [including] maintaining the ambiguity of its wording. This ambiguity allowed for this agreement. We cannot try to improve the Agreement. The provisions of the Agreement do not change in the Decree”.

According to the Secretary of Trade at the time, this matter involved several spheres of the Executive Branch. On the one hand, there was some

difficulty in “passing the matter due to the distancing of the Legal Department of the Chief of Staff”. The concern of those in charge was the ambiguity of certain items in the text, which followed the wording of ADA. On the other hand, during the investigations, communications with the Internal Revenue Service had to be adapted “in order to regularize data sharing so that the deadlines established in the Decree could be met”. On their part, the “Treasury Department did not show great resistance and was more concerned with inflation issues”, a matter that was eventually discussed in the Technical Group of Public Interest – established in the same management.

Its result was Decree No. 8,058/2013, which increased from 73 to 201 the number of articles in the Brazilian anti-dumping legislation. The issue of the new regulatory framework was in line with changes made by Ordinance No. 46/2011, since it had already concentrated the burden of data submission in companies. With extra information during the pre-claim stage, it would be possible to influence the speed of investigations. According to Panzini & Souza (2013), with the late insertion of Brazil in the international trade system, the requirements for opening an investigation were more simplified and the handling of the entire investigation was guided by a collaborative line between the investigating authority and the Brazilian private sector. Therefore, for the authors, a broader system made it possible to create the culture of trade defense in the Brazilian industry, but, in return, made the process slower⁷.

Through SECEX Ordinance No. 46/2011, the new guidelines for the dynamics designed by DECOM have changed the requirements for conducting anti-dumping investigations. The Ordinance had all the relevant information to integrate the petition form necessary to open an investigation. The volume of requested information increased as he anticipated the “request for various information that would be provided by the petitioner after the beginning of the investigation” (Pimentel 2013, p. 65). Therefore, the Ordinance began to demand more intense work between industry and offices/consulting services throughout the pre-investigation period. During an interview with the former Director of DECOM at the time, and with Coordinator Ana Carolina Meneghetti Peres, what prevailed was an understanding that this strategy aimed to reduce the time wasted during the information complementation phase — there was constant contact of the investigating authority and the industry in order to fill out the information and data.

This measure can be interpreted as an attempt to speed up the deadlines for conducting the investigation or restrict the access of “adventurers” to the protocol of investigation requests (the latter being disregarded by Hees in an

⁷ Goldbaum & Pedrozo Jr. (2019) explained that the average time of an investigation in Brazil was higher than the international average.

interview). According to the former Director, the measure resulted in a faster investigation in addition to being in line with the new provisions set forth in Decree 8,058/2013 — which sought to apply the provisional duty more quickly (120 days), since DECOM, in the preliminary issuance of an opinion began to use the data provided by the petitioner.

In addition, this was an industry demand presented during seminars between class entities (such as CNI and FIESP), and in public consultation, with mentions for faster deadlines since previous governments. With the increase in the volume of information requested for opening an investigation, it was then possible to establish a maximum period (60 days) for the analysis of the petition as provided for in Decree 8,058. Furthermore, the text of Article 72 of this Decree was made possible, and it established a 10-month deadline for the closure of an investigation — extendable in special cases.

Anti-dumping in Sight of the Public Interest: The Creation of GTIP

In line with the Multilateral Trade System, the Dilma administration sought to reflect on the need to impose anti-dumping measures, as well as on the effects of these barriers for the final consumer — a concern of the Treasury. The Resolutions issued by CAMEX prior to the PBM already referred to the public interest using the term “national interest”. Since “public interest” is a concept with high plasticity and multiple meanings, it is worth mentioning that national interest refers to aspects related to national security, while public interest is fundamentally associated with the economic consequences, for the country as a whole, of the application of an AD measure (Hees 2013).

Although the analysis of national interest was historically considered by the Executive, even if sometimes conceptually mistaken, until the PBM came into effect, there was not even an institutionalized procedure for the evaluation of AD measures and their repercussion on the industry and end consumers. In the compilation of Resolutions issued between 1988 and 2015, 13 cases of national interest were considered and mentioned. These ranged from products such as peach preserves to steel materials and chemicals. Shoes can also be included in this account, since CAMEX, through Resolution No. 48, of September 2009, when applying the provisional duty for six months, took into account that the national interest was considered in the AD calculation. The then Minister Miguel Jorge welcomed the “increase of the Import Tax for products covered by this measure during the investigation period, in order to avoid excessive burden on the population with lower purchasing power” (Brasil 2009).

In the meantime, after almost a dozen cases of suspension or amendments to measures that have involved the national interest and the application of AD duties, the idea of creating a Group to assess the public interest was strengthened. The search for the assessment of the existence of public interest would aim to include the analysis of the impacts of the protection measure on the final prices of the products mentioned in the investigation, in addition to considering the cost on the companies upstream of the production chain. For Hees (2013), the Technical Group of the Public Interest (GTIP) would be a technical body within CAMEX, whose initial function would be to review petitions relating to the public interest in the context of dumping investigations and existing AD measures.

We emphasize that in the WTO trade defense agreements there is no express provision for such an assessment. Only a few WTO members, such as Canada and the European Union, have adopted rules in their legislation applicable to the public interest assessment (in the EU we have a Community Interest) for the purpose of deciding to implement trade defense measures.

In the case of Brazil, the effort to guide domestic interests in order to incorporate a formal scope of consideration of the impact of these measures came from within DECOM. In an interview, we pointed out that the idea of creating the Group came from the then Director Felipe Hees, and started to gain structure through the Resolution No. 13/2012, responsible for establishing the group for the evaluation of the public interest.

In the sphere of class entities, CNI (2012) endorsed the GTIP Public Policy and suggested only that this Resolution should have a definition of national interest, such as “the sum of all private interests”, therefore considering end consumers or industry. During an interview, the Coordinator of the entity’s report, Eduardo Freitas Alvim, agreed on the broad discussion of the Group’s implementation. Alvim added that the Group’s implementation only followed the trend, since Canada and the European Union already have one (but the United States does not).

According to the reports and resolutions submitted post-GTIP, the first requests submitted by the parties opposed to the application of measures were not assented. Between its creation and 2014, it was found that, in the case of decisions associated with measures applied in force, in all cases claimed, CAMEX maintained the measures applied, except in one request — which became the first after the creation of the GTIP.

On May 16, 2013, of the investigations of Public Interest, Resolution CAMEX no. 35/2013 was published, which suspended, for reasons of public interest, until July 31st, 2014, the collection of anti-dumping duties and definitive and provisional countervailing measures on imports relating to the

Events of the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup and the 2014 FIFA World Cup.

When the research examined the official documents that circulated between delegations in Doha, this point was discussed through submission of a proposal demanding that the public interest be taken into account effectively when deciding to apply AD measures. Item 12, set forth in document TN/RL/W/6⁸ of 2002, involves the discussion of imposing such an obligation on the investigating authority. Thus, in the set of documents, this matter was raised by different delegations, including Brazil.

After the publication of Resolution No. 13/2012, Art. 3 of Decree 8,058/2013 deliberates on the issue of the GTIP, since it rules that, in exceptional circumstances, the Council of Ministers (CAMEX) may, in the public interest: Suspend, for up to one year, extendable only once for the same period, the enforceability of definitive anti-dumping duty, or price commitment in force; not apply provisional anti-dumping duties; or approve price commitment or apply definitive anti-dumping duty in a different amount than recommended.

Against the Tide: The Question of the Enforcement of Lesser-duty

Another progress, and perhaps the most controversial one from Decree 8,058, resulted from the Doha discussions at a matter where Brazil followed the Friends of Antidumping⁹ (FANs). In document TN/RL/W/6¹⁰, which was going around in the group, from April 2002, item tenth discusses Art. 9.1 and was in favor of making the principle of *lesser duty* rule. According to ADA, “[...] it is desirable that the imposition be permissive in the territory of all Members, and that all the duty be less than the margin if such duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry” (Art. 9.1). Therefore, the ADA, at the same time that it provides, also declares that it is desirable to follow this principle since it seeks only to neutralize the practice. In 2005, once more the Brazilian position would be strengthened when Minister Luiz Fernando Furlan, Prime Minister of the Lula administration, ratified this will.

⁸ *Anti-dumping: Illustrative Major Issues*. Document submitted by: Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; South Korea; Mexico; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; Thailand and Turkey.

⁹ Group of developed and developing countries that jointly seek to submit proposals during Ministerial Meetings in Doha to increase transparency and restrict the indiscriminate use of AD measures.

¹⁰ According to the document, the “*current AD Agreement encourages, but does not require the importing country to apply the ‘lesser duty’ a duty no higher than that necessary to offset any injury being suffered by the domestic industry. Given that AD duties are specifically designed to counteract injury being suffered by the domestic industry, is it appropriate to apply AD duties that are higher than necessary to counteract that injury?*” (WTO, 2002).

Using the *lesser duty* rule as a thermometer, we understand that the convergent position with the FANs on the rules table is more inclined to legitimize the Multilateral Trading System than the other way around. The application of the lesser duty continued to guide other DECOM reports (the last to mention it was the DECOM Report, no. 13, of 2009). Years earlier, there was an emphasis expressed by the director of DECOM at the time, Fernando de Magalhães Furlan.

Brazil uses, unlike many other countries, the lesser duty rule for the application of this trade defense measure. Brazil applies the AD duty only to the necessary extent to eliminate the injury to the domestic industry. To this end, the Brazilian authority uses the underpricing margin, that is, the underpricing is assessed by comparing the import price, under the landed cost CIF condition, and the sale price of the national product, in the ex-works condition. Thus, the product imported at dumping prices will only pay the anti-dumping duty to the exact extent in order to equalize it to the value of the domestic product (Brasil 2007).

As Lemme and Naidin (2011) recalled, Decree 1,602/1995 seemed to have made the recommendation to apply the *lesser duty* principle whenever satisfactory to eliminate the damage resulting from imports at dumping prices. However, the authors, when analyzing almost a hundred resolutions published by CAMEX between 2001 and 2011, showed that full margin decisions predominated (73%) over the number of duties that followed the principle.

Prior to the issue of Decree 8,058/2013, public demonstrations were observed through online consultation that received a series of proposals that came from law firms, consultancies, class entities, exporters and importers. On the one hand, MOVE (2011), Association of Producers and Importers of Sporting Goods — the target of protective measures against Chinese footwear, for example, advocated the change for issues such as the smallest margin (lesser duty), proposing that the old Art. 45 were to defer the duty corresponding to the smallest margin found. Whereas FIESP (2011) expressed their opposition, and requested that a full margin be applied in the new Decree replacing the practice of the smallest margin.

The controversy began because of¹¹ a statement by Minister Pimentel, who among the series of possible adjustments, mentioned that Brazil would apply the full margins of anti-dumping tariffs, changing one of the program's goals in Doha.

11 Landim, Raquel. 2011. "Tightening the Anti-dumping Screw". *Estadão*, São Paulo, from May 2, 2011. Moreover, in an interview with Felipe Hees, he revealed more details of the episode: "Yes, I remember, it was even discussed at one of CAMEX meetings at the time. Perhaps you find in the 2011 Resolutions, otherwise this should appear in some of the Minutes of the Chamber" (Interview with Felipe Hees, former Director of DECOM).

The demand was submitted to CAMEX, which began to consider its incorporation into the new Decree, since it emerged as a demand coming from the industry. However, this attitude before the WTO and the FANs has become contradictory.

Ultimately, the §1 of Art. 78 of the new Decree established that the duty to be applied would be lower than the dumping margin whenever an amount lower than that one was enough to eliminate the injury to the domestic industry caused by the imports under investigation. Thus, the text of the new Decree, by making the lesser duty the rule, contradicted part of the industry, but it was enough to keep compliance with the multilateral trading system principles.

Another progress of Article 78 was the text of §3, which laid down the conditions for the situation in which the application of the full margin is indicated. As announced by Pimentel, the government sought to discourage importers who were tempted to anticipate the imposition of the anti-dumping measure. This behavior, according to the new Decree, can be interpreted as illicit. In turn, such a finding leads the investigating authority not to extend the lesser duty to companies and importers with dubious conduct — or for lack of cooperation during investigations.

Checks and Balances of the Trade Defense During the Rousseff Era

During the Dilma Rousseff administration, the modernization of legislation aimed at international trade was put in place, which was intended by DECOM and awaited by the civil society sectors. In this sense, the increase in the number of cases and investigations encouraged the discussion towards an immediate modernization of anti-dumping legislation in order to provide transparency and ensure the honesty of investigations over unfair practices employed in Brazil's trade with foreign institutions.

Taking into account the highlighted set of aspects, the changes introduced by the new Decree reduced the margin of discretion of the Brazilian investigating authority. Its new wording caused *per se*, the shortening of the reach of the “sword” of trade defense in Brazil, while it also provided a greater compliance with the principles of the multilateral trading system.

Decree 8,058/2013 was not the only element in the modernization of the regulatory framework, since it was preceded and succeeded by a series of Ordinances. However, it is the greatest element in this inflection of trade defense in Brazil. Since, in addition to the aforementioned changes, the new regulations for the application of anti-dumping measures would also incorporate greater transparency through more detailed procedures for the investigation and analysis stage, as well as in the calculation of the dumping

margin and injury determination. In relation to the calculation of the dumping margin, some details can be seen as more restrictive for exporters. On the other hand, there are also stricter requirements for determining causality between alleged dumping practice and damage to domestic producers (Hees 2013).

According to FIESP (2013), as a concrete outcome, the details of the investigation included the introduction of new concepts, such as “product subject to investigation”, which did not exist in the WTO Agreement, but which already reflected the international practice. There was also the inclusion of clearer procedures for the treatment of economies classified as non-market, which relate criteria for their definition and for the selection of substitute country and price development. Other procedures were also incorporated, that is, those that were already being adopted by DECOM related to anti-circumvention investigations¹², reassessment of scope of products subject to duties collection and the end of the final hearing — waived due to the creation of the Digital DECOM System.

When Hees (2009) analyzed the Brazilian investigation process, he stressed that the determination of injury is the investigation’s key element, and also the most controversial. “Either by the subjective dimension of the analysis or because of the scarcity of clear guidelines in the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the fact is that the work of investigating authorities in this field is often criticized for the discretion and abuse with which they are conducted” (Hees 2009, pp. 58-59). It is not surprising that the presence of such a margin for discretion has produced numerous disputes in the DSU, in addition to being featured in the center of a large number of documents that referred to the determination of injury (Article 3 of the ADA) during discussions in Doha¹³.

As can be seen, the commercial policy, although being surrounded in criteria and indicators that re-establish a certain degree of technicality, is inexorably contingent and subject to the vicissitudes and preferences of the actors that boost it. The conduct of the Brazilian trade defense policy, when studied from the use of the AD regime, suggests latent differences over time and between governments without tarnishing its credibility.

¹² Reference to SECEX Ordinances No. 14/2011 and No. 44/2013.

¹³ However, after considerations in numerous formal and informal delegation meetings, Doha had a total of 18 proposals for changes until April 2002. From July 2004 to 2009, 14 proposals with specific suggestions circulated in relation to Article 3 (Hees 2009).

Final Remarks

On the long road to consolidate the opening of trade in Brazil, trade defense had its role almost always relegated to the background. Still, there was a time when anti-dumping measures became a fundamental part of the Brazilian trade policy. With the growth in the number of measures imposed, the exposure of the Brazilian foreign trade policy was inevitable. Therefore, the article sought to describe how the ADA normative framework has evolved in the country, since the 1990s, and how the referrals of this process reflect a tendency to endorse the rules of the multilateral trade regime.

In traditional countries, the first laws emerged in the beginning of the 20th century, while in Brazil the first AD Legislation was, above all, a reflection of the launch of the Uruguay Round. That said, the creation of a specific department for the matter came in turn in the wake of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, to the extent that it was demanded by the person responsible at the time (Luiz Felipe Lampreia) and provided for in the government plan of the FHC government.

At the same time that Brazil ascended to the group of the largest users, there was also growing criticism of the legislation in force, which was considered outdated since it was created in the wake of the Uruguay Round negotiations. The modernization of the normative framework then became the center of attention of the Greater Brazil Plan. To meet an old industry demand in order to deliver protection more quickly, the Department needed to “call for reinforcement” and 120 new Foreign Trade Analysts were announced by the PBM, and more than 200 ACEs were called in the same public tender.

The reduction of deadlines and the enforcement of standards that are already applied, but not determined by the former Decree, catalyzed the reform of the regulatory framework for the enforcement of the AD duties. The change of philosophy, as Hees called it, was an idea that was born in the first Lula administration and only consolidated in the Dilma Rousseff administration. Therefore, when observing the Dilma administration, all evidence points out for a continuity of the foreign trade policy, which was strengthened through an adjustment in the structure and philosophy of the Department.

Moreover, during the Minister Pimentel administration, more elements with matters that deserved further attention existed. First of all, we highlight a program change (*lesser duty*) that appeared with the new Minister. A second element of discontinuity was related to the direction of DECOM, with the arrival of Felipe Hees in the management of Minister Pimentel. As mentioned, the character of the MRE and the MDIC professionals are

different. However, the MDIC and the MRE established a smooth horizontal relationship in Geneva, as the training of DECOM-linked ACEs went through the Mission program in Geneva. Therefore, Hees had the technicality and, above all, the contacts with the staff of the department for which he was appointed — indication of the Secretary of Commerce, Tatiana Prazeres. That said, the course was not affected, that is, changes happened, but those were within the continuity which served as remediation. Thus, its transit through the MDIC soured relations and did not violate any *esprit de corps* of the Ministry of Trade and also stressed the importance that the individual, in the role of a technocrat, has for politics.

All the points raised contributed to reveal elements that reinforce the idea that the trade defense in Brazil is more about reducing discretion than the other way around. However, the new Decree aimed to reduce the deadlines of investigations, which seems a more protectionist stance. Meanwhile, considering that the time of investigation in Brazil is longer, and that the new deadline established respects the ADA, this hypothesis could be relaxed. In any case, this research is not intended to be an end point in the debate, and many other points or cases could be considered to reinforce the discussion.

The analytical effort imposed in the course of the research has managed to close many gaps in previous research plans. However, other axes of investigation around this issue remained open, resulting in multiple research agendas that emerge from its conclusion. Since we did not aim to focus the research on the creation of DECOM, or even to analyze the political-bureaucratic game of how its creation was thought and the role of the main policy makers of the FHC era, this point remains open. There is a lot of literature on CAMEX, but very little on the institutional evolution of DECOM.

Furthermore, while observing a more recent period, it was also not possible to collect information about the phase prior to the creation of the department, or even to raise the reasons that led to the creation of the role of Foreign Trade Analyst with the MDIC and the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management (MPOG) at the time. Still regarding this matter, there are no studies and research that sought to raise the history and the political game that culminated in the creation of ACE's own career.

Finally, the research did not find answers about the underachievement of the reform of the 1995 Decree, although it was released under the management of Minister Furlan, in the first Lula administration. Once a specific plan for trade defense was announced, it did not thrive and remained only in the paper. Nevertheless, some of the main guidelines of the NESBDC for the Brazilian System of Trade Defense of the Lula administration were successfully resumed and concluded in the Dilma administration.

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ABSTRACT

This study considers the development and reform of the anti-dumping regime in Brazil as a ratification example of the multilateral trading system proposed by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Brazil's history of leadership in the WTO Rounds, as well as its emergence among users of temporary barriers illustrates the fact that developing countries participate, with some success, in the endorsement and strengthening of the multilateral system itself. Using the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) as a model for its own regulatory framework, this practice ensures that domestic legislation will have greater compliance to international obligations and avoid constraints via the Dispute Settlement Body. Finally, the case of Decree 8,058/2013 highlighted the importance that specialized agents in the middle management of the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) have in the management and improvement of the Brazilian public policy.

KEYWORDS

Greater Brazil Plan; Trade Policy; Trade Defense.

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A ZONE OF TWILIGHT? PEACE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

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Introduction

Latin America is relatively one of the least conflict-ridden regions in the world. It is a relatively peaceful continent. South America has especially been one of the most peaceful places in terms of the absence of direct violence and interstate wars. There have been bilateral or trilateral conflicts between the neighbors. Most of the conflicts in Latin America is categorized under internal and intra-state conflicts. Since the 1935 Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia, inter-state conflicts have rarely occurred among the Latin America countries. Also, the longest interstate dispute in the world happened in Latin America between Ecuador and Peru, which started in 1809 and finished in 1998. War has been the exception rather than the rule since 1883 in Latin America. The last inter-state conflict in the region was the Falkland/Malvinas War between an outside power and a regional middle power, namely the Great Britain and Argentina.

The relation between peace efforts of the United Nations and international politics in Latin America today requires our attention and calls for serious reflection and study. Changes in Latin America have been remarkably rapid and widespread since the end of the Cold War. As a result, it is necessary to give scholarly attention to the explanation and understanding of conflict, peace and the role of the United Nations in Latin America. Significant continuity is also visible in the institutions, ideas, and perspectives about conflict and peace in Latin America (Özçelik 2018). Much of the conflict in Latin America has been explained within the meaning of poverty and the proper place of poor in modern Latin America society and politics. If a scholar properly defines the poor and shed lights on the proper explanation of poverty, it becomes easier to find and solve the root causes of conflicts in Latin America (Özçelik 2016).

In the present day of globalization and Industry 4.0 (4th Industry

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revolution), new threats and challenges generate new types of conflicts and violence. The list of current and future global threats and challenges have become longer with the end of the Cold War: Transnational terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), organized crime, global health epidemics, AIDS, population boom, drought, climate change, regional conflicts, mass migrations, environmental degradation, energy insecurity, poverty, failed states, pollution, global economic crises, human rights abuses, crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, etc. (Özçelik 2019). These new threats and challenges may have a capacity to reach every corner of the world. For example, climate change may have disastrous effects on the Caribbean Island nations because they may be wiped out the world map (Özçelik 2015). Peace and stability can be guaranteed in any state anywhere in the world, regardless of how remote and distant that international actor from the international system.

The post 9/11 world has opened the Pandora's box for world affairs. International actors have been moved towards more (neo)-realist and constructivist schools of thoughts that undermines any perception of regional peace and stable future. States more likely look after their own interests, struggle for survival, and rely on self-help system. The United Nations system has weakened because international actors perceive that no state should depend on anyone else for national and international security since security threats and challenges come from new types of enemies most of which are more likely non-state and transnational. Even though many scholars believe that the importance of states has been diminishing in the international system, states may have still searched for alliances, collective security actions, and the United Nation system. Latin America as a sub-regional system has been developing as a zone of peace over the past thirty years (Oelsner 2009).

This paper aims to explain the shift in Latin America's level of conflict and internal violence relative to other regions in the world. It examines a single regional subsystem, Latin America within the framework of conflict and peace as well as the role of the United Nations. First, it aims to shed lights on main transformations and changes in terms of political, economic, social and cultural issues in Latin America. Second, the concept of the zone of peace is examined within the context of Latin America. The main activities of the United Nations in relation to conflict and peace are investigated in the third section. In conclusion, it underlines the lessons learned from conflict and peace processes in Latin America.

Main Transformations and Changes in Latin America

Latin America has endured major changes, transformations, and shifts in the post-Cold War era. Structural changes in the region have affected many fault lines in the region. First, many scholars have been labeling Latin America as “peace zone” in terms of interstate relations. Technically, there have been rarely military inter-state conflicts in the Latin America and the Caribbean region. It is effectively called as “interstate peace zone”. Latin America has also banned weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and declared itself as “denuclearized region” (Aravena 2018). Second, democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights have become the important and constant norm in Latin America in the last thirty years. All the countries in the region have believed the process of democratization and opened themselves the democratic possibilities. With the third democratic wave, Latin America democracy has built some basic democratic principles such as political parties, plurality, elections and run-off rule (a second popular vote between the two leading candidates after the first round).

Election results have been mostly recognized by all political actors in the electoral system. Nevertheless, public trust to democracy has been diminishing more and more in the region. Rising disaffection among citizens of Latin America has shown as a protracted decline in political legitimacy and a negative impact on democratic co-existence (McClintock 2018). The third major change in Latin America has been the economic transformations and economic boom. Because of global trade and neo-liberal economy, significant economic growth in Latin America has led to the reduction of extreme poverty and the growth of the middle class from 2003 to 2009. The second decade of the twenty-first century has seen an economic slowdown and the decline of regional and global trade. Since 2010, slow economic growth has caused the deterioration of income distribution and the rise of inequality and poverty. The governments in the region have implemented innovative policies in health and education that led to a variety of improvements in social economic indicators: access to doctors, school enrolments, infant mortality, birth rates, life expectancy, etc. in 2010 than any year in the past (Kingstone 2011).

Another transformation in Latin America is related to the highly diverse nature of regional integration initiatives. The region has seen numerous political and economic regional integration processes. For example, the Organization of American States (OAS), the first regional organization accepted by the United Nations (UN), and the oldest regional governance system in the world, has been an important actor to tackle the most pressing security and political regional issues. The Comunidad de

Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribenos (CELAC, Community of Latin American and the Caribbean), includes every country in region consisting 33 nations, was established to provide “a common space aimed at deepening the cultural, economic, political and social integration of the region”. The President of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, stated that “we are sentencing the Monroe Doctrine to death”. Cuban President Raul Castro called CELAC “the biggest event in 200 years”. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez shouted “Viva Bolivar!” and said that “new regional group revives Bolivar’s dream” (Toothaker 2011).

The last but not least development is about the overwhelming wave of transnational organized crime (narcos, cartels, paramilitaries, and street gangs), urban violence, and international migration. Although Latin America has a relative negative peace (the absence of war), transnational organized crime is today threatening the stability of many governments and causes internal conflicts and the lack of positive peace (the absence of structural and cultural violence). Transnational organized crime is also related to civilian deaths, human rights violations, human trafficking, international migration, corruption, bribery, and the collapse of social, economic and cultural structures (Carpenter 2016).

Because of corrupt political leaders, weak institutions, and the explosion of urban violence due to drug trafficking, Latin America has seen semi-collapsed states such as completely collapsed Haiti, the brink of failure of Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, and instability in Guatemala, Nicaragua and the entire Andean region. The process of neo-liberal economic transformation has led to a social and cultural split in the Latin American societies. As a result, drug cartels, violent rebel organizations and paramilitary groups have caused political violence and multi-faceted conflict with multiple players, widespread use of drugs, unequal economic growth, and penetrating the culture of violence (Howard 2016). Many extremist groups such as FARC in Colombia evolved from a Marxist-based social movement into a multimillion-dollar drug trafficking organization. The tri-border area (TBA) of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay has seen the rise of global terrorism in the post-September 11 era. For example, Hezbollah and Hamas have had “not only fundraising activities, but also arms and drug trafficking, smuggling, document and currency fraud, money laundering, and the manufacture and movement of pirated goods in this area” (US State Department 2012).

In recent years, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have witnessed the problems of transparency, accountability and the ability to organize opposition. In Colombia, deep-rooted, protracted and ongoing conflicts between the government and FARC have threatened the regional stability and the integrity of democratic governance. In Mexico, violent “war on drugs” and

cartels have taken a heavy toll with more than 150,000 intentional homicides since 2006 (CNN 2018). In almost all Latin America countries, corruption, bribery, nepotism, the lack of transparency, and human rights violations have remained as unsolved problems deteriorating stability and democracy. The rule of law has been weak and its application to the low-income citizens has been problematic.

Hybrid Zone of Peace?

Peace cannot be limited only as the absence of conflict. It is more than that. It can be divided into negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace (zone of peace) is the absence of direct violence (Özçelik 2017). It aims to reduce, eliminate and end all physical violence as well as war. Positive peace means negative peace plus the absence of structural and cultural violence. Violence is traditionally understood as the infliction of bodily harm with the intent to hurt. Direct violence involves intentionally hurting or killing people and directed against a specific group or person. It also incorporates verbal violence (Galtung and Fischer 2013). Structural violence occurs when people can be killed, psychologically harmed, deprived or maldeveloped because of violent political or socioeconomic structures (Galtung 1969). Cultural violence is the use of nationalism, racism, sexism, Islamophobia, xenophobia, and other forms of discrimination in the media, the arts, education, literature, films, street names, monuments, celebrating special national days and heroes, etc. to intellectually justify direct and structural violence (Galtung 1990).

The relative security in Latin America results from legalistic and multilaterally institutionalized interactions among states and policy-makers in the region. The regional order is stable and the regular actors have regular patterns of interactions. It can be shaped by a unique Latin America identity, a shared understanding of peaceful conflict resolution, and an emphasis on growth and development. It aims to diminish the effects of great powers namely the United States and the Soviet Union in the region. Latin America's long peace can be explained with a number of factors: (1) after a first post-independence period, nation states are successfully consolidated when the border wars such as Paraguayan War (1864-1870) and the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) were settled, (2) a powerful mediatory and legalistic culture have been expanded, and (3) the independent nation-states in the region have had much higher power (Kacowicz 1998). Another important factor in Latin America regional peace is the use of a tradition of peaceful resolution of

disputes by the application of the principle *uti possidetis ita possideatis*² that help to establish the shared vision of regional security governance (Kacowicz 2005).

For many scholars, Latin America is categorized as “zone of peace” in terms of the absence of interstate wars. But some scholars argue that it is a hybrid zone of peace because it is a violent place in terms of the presence of intra-city and inter-city violence, guerrillas, gang violence, youth violence, and drug traffickers that makes the highest urban violence rated region on the Earth (Merke 2011). As a region, Latin America is integrated into pluralistic international society and has a regional balance of power. Second, many conflicts related to territorial issues and natural resources have been resolved; yet, positive peace has not been achieved since structural and cultural violence has continued even if in the 21st century. Third, both old and new regional institutions, norms, and regimes may help to find a peaceful solution to disputes and conflicts. However, organized crime and urban violence have become a real threat and challenge for regional stability and harmonized relations. Fourth, democratic peace theory can be applied to Latin America since regional democratic countries maintain sustainable development and economic interdependence that prevent wars as well as democratic institutions and public opinion constrains the policy-makers the use of force (Villa 2017).

The idea of the zone of peace for Latin America region has come into existence not for the states within the region but for the superpowers during the Cold War. It was also based on the refusal of use of force to resolve interstate conflicts and border disputes. Many Latin American politicians and statesmen have claimed that political and economic integration and federalism may cause the denial of the use of force and common security approach in the region. For example, Simon Bolivar who is labeled as Atatürk of Latin America established Gran Colombia (present-day Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia). The Central American societies created the United Provinces of Central America after the independence. Peru and Bolivia formed a confederated state (Mares 2001). Another reason why Latin America limits use of force is related to “hegemonic peace hypothesis” that is U.S. hegemony causes interstate peace in Latin America. Since it is considered as America’s backyard, U.S. capabilities, and interests constraint the conflictual behaviors and attitudes of both international and regional actors.

2 *Uti possidetis ita possideatis* means “as you possess, so may you possess”. *Uti possidetis de jure* doctrine is defined as “old administrative boundaries will become international boundaries when a political subdivision achieves independence”. Paul R. Hansel, et al. “The Colonial Legacy and Border Stability: *Uti Possidetis* and Territorial Claims in the Americas”, 2006. Available at: <http://paulhensel.org/Research/1005.pdf>.

The hegemonic role of the US is to promote, maintain intra-regional peace in Latin America (Martin 2006). The third reason is the long tradition of using non-violent means namely mediation, arbitration and third-party intervention (especially the OAS) in Latin America conflicts. Latin Americans have made arbitration, legal institutions and international law as important components of *Pax Latin Americano* as well as the respect of non-intervention of foreign powers, mutual cooperation, non-interference of domestic affairs, and the peaceful settlements of disputes among the American nations (Scarfi 2016). The fourth reason is the lack of ethnic and religious conflict in Latin America due to the homogeneity of Latin America societies. Although Latin America has suffered from ethnic and racial inequality, ethnocentric world-views (Ögretir and Özçelik 2008), the marginalization of many indigenous people and crime-based conflicts (gang violence, drug trafficking, urban violence, and human trafficking), it still immunes from ethnic conflicts and internal violence.

The United Nations in Latin America

The United Nations has given a forum for Latin America countries. They have played a far greater role in the UN than in the League of Nations. With the increase of economic, environmental and technical organizations in the post-war era, the great powers ask for the cooperation of Latin America countries. But most of the time, Latin America states had no military and economic power to help common security in the globe. Similarly, the United Nations have very little involved to conflicts and violence in Latin America. One reason is that the United Nations have given priorities to other urgent and new violent conflicts elsewhere in the world. Second, the UN has mostly subcontracted any conflicts or crises into the United States as a regional hegemon. The U.S. has urged to take care of its “own backyard”. The UN has also depended on the OAS in order to have played an active role in conflict management in the region well over seventy years (Shaw 2003).

Latin America countries have played a pivotal role in peacekeeping operations all over the world. Since Simon Bolivar, who known as the Liberator, and the Congress of Panama time, Latin American countries have participated the international organizations, supported the League of Nations, and most of them were the founding members of the United Nations in 1945 (Fishel 2008). The first time when South American countries have involved in security cooperation initiative was to guarantee the League of Nations mandated peace after the Chaco War (1932-35) between Bolivia and Paraguay by the establishment of the Neutral Military Commission. The

Latin American troops were provided by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay to monitor the ceasefire, to evacuate military materials and weapons, to set demarcation lines, and to supervise the exchange of prisoners of war (Neta 2013). Uruguay lists this peacekeeping operation (PKO) as the first one for more than ninety years of PKO experience. In recent years, Latin America has evolved from peacekeeping recipients to peace exporters by increasing troop contributions by region 2,5% in 2000 to 8.9 % in 2010. Uruguay also ranked the first in Latin America and eight in the world by troop contribution with 20,394 soldiers in 2010 (Sotomayor 2015).

The first reason why Latin America countries have increased their participation in the UN PKOs is that they expect to obtain some financial gains. Second, with the rise of globalization and neo-liberalism, the Latin American societies have begun to take strong positions on global peace and security issues. Third, the wave of democratization, the desire to reform military in post-*coup d'état* period, respect for human rights, the validity of international law, multilateralism, non-intervention, and peaceful conflict resolution are some overwhelming principles of the majority of Latin America population, societies and governments. Fourth, major Latin American powers such as Brazil and Argentina have evolved from realist thinking of regional power politics to neo-functionalism and neo-liberalism that advocate supranational forms of cooperation, the accommodation of domestic political agenda, regional integration and new activism in a global scale (Diamint 2013).

The contributions of Latin American states into the UN PKOs begun when Argentine and Chilean observers were sent for the deployment in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948. The Chilean and Uruguayan observers were deployed in the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949 (Kennedy 2006). Some South American states have played prominent and leading roles nearly all of the UN's PKOs during Cold War and the post-Cold War period: Brazil and Argentina contributed military personnel to the UN Operation in Congo (ONUC) between 1960-64. Brazilian generals have served as a chief observer of the first UN Verification Mission in Angola (UNOVEM I) between 1988-91 and as a force commander of the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) from February 1993 to February 1994. Both Brazil and Argentina sent troops to UNAVEM I; Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia actively involved in UNAVEM II (May 1991-February 1995); and Brazil and Uruguay contributed to UNAVEM III (February 1995-June 1997). Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay sent troops to ONUMOZ (January 1993-December 1994) (Neta 2018). Argentina has contributed two force commanders to the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and a battalion to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in

Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The role of UN in Latin America has been disappointing during the Cold War. In order to ensure the regional conflict resolution, the U.S. proposed an idea to establish a permanent regional alliance that was set up in 1947 at the Pan-American Conference held in Rio de Janeiro. The Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance known as the Rio Treaty or Rio Pact that was heralded as the prototype of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. The Article 3 of the Rio Treaty is similar to the famous line from the *Three Musketeers*, “all for themselves and none for all” that the OAS collective security mechanism (Orakhelashvili 2011): “an armed attack by any State against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all the American States”. In accordance with the UN Charter article 52-54, the informal Pan-American system was evolved into a new political institution with permanent headquarter and staff: The Organization of American States (OAS).

The Charter of the OAS confirmed the equality of its member states and a guarantee of the principle of non-intervention. The OAS is in compliance with the UN Charter that re-affirm the Monroe Doctrine and the Inter-American system (Smith 2005). The most significant and major Latin American PKO was the Inter-American Peace Force that was deployed in the Dominican Republic in 1965 under the auspices of the OAS. The unilateral U.S. intervention together with the approval of 14 other OAS members aimed to end an internal conflict between the Loyalist (provisional government) and the Constitutionalist (rebel) forces. The OAS resolution was rejected only by five OAS members. Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Costa Rica, and El Salvador have sent their troops to the mission (Wilson and Dent 1995).

The UN usually involves the peaceful resolution of interstate rather than internal and intra-state conflicts. For the first time in the UN history in January 1992, the international organization played a mediator role to end the intractable and deep-rooted conflict between El Salvador government led by President Alfredo Cristiani and the guerrilla group, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). It was the first peace-building mission of the UN. The experience and involvement of UN in regional peace in Latin America has been very little and rare (Whitfield 1999). The result was the establishment of the United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL).

It is interesting to note that the UN's first Latin American secretary general, Javier Perez de Cuellar, has turned the UN's face more into the region as soon as he came to office in 1982. The Contadora group was created in 1985 for promoting a political climate for peace, security and democracy in

Latin America that was backed by the Organization of American States (OAS), the UN and the Central American governments. In order to start the peace process in Central America, the secretary-generals of the UN and the OAS visited five Central American countries in January 1987. Following this visit, despite the opposition of the Reagan administration, Oscar Arias proposed a revival of the peace process in Esquipulas, Guatemala in February 1987. The Esquipulas II has moved the process in the second stage in August 1987 (Smith 2007).

The main transformation peace process, the Arias Plan, also aimed to reduce local conflicts and build regional security. It was drafted by the president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1987 (Romero 1998). The Arias Plan has agreed following framework to work with all conflicting parties: “regional reconciliation, political amnesty, the democratization of the region, and an end to foreign or domestic support for insurgency movements, a call for free elections, and no aggressions by one state against another” (Child 1992, 48). After the signing of Central American peace agreements, the CIAV (International Commission of Support and Verification) was established with the participation of both UN and OAS in August 1989. In addition, the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) was approved by the UN Security Council in November 1989. The first deployment of UN peacekeeping in Latin America took effect on December 1989. Its primary mandate was to monitor the Honduran-Nicaraguan border. ONUCA was commanded by the Spanish general and included 255 military observers from a dozen country and a battalion of Venezuelan para-troopers (Dent and Wilson 2014).

ONUCA has faced some limitations and challenges. First, there was a lack of intelligence-gathering that affected ONUCA’s monitoring activities. Second, the operation has logistical and administrative problems and started late. Third, ONUCA’s mandate required only voluntary demobilization. As a result, it is unclear how many guerrilla forces have given up their weapons. Fourth, there is a lack of effective coordination among different institutions, namely ONUCA, UN agencies, and OAS. ONUCA also showed some innovations for the UN peacekeeping in general. First, it is the first UN peacekeeping operation with the disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration (DDR) mandate. It is also the first example to supervise elections in the sovereign nation-state. Another innovation is to combine both naval and helicopter patrols. The fourth innovation is that it is general verification and confidence building mission to monitor cross-border rebels (nearly 23,000 fighters) and weapons movement among five Central American countries. In essence, ONUCA is a success story to solve the main security issues between

Nicaragua and Honduras (Koops 2015).

Also, there is a conflict resolution and peacekeeping model of involvement of two international organizations, the UN and the OAS in Latin America. The example was an election-observation mission for the February 1990 Nicaraguan election. President Ortega called for international observers to monitor the whole electoral process for free and fair elections. The UN Security Council voted to approve the UN Observer Group for the Verification of Election in Nicaragua (ONUVEN, in Spanish). The OAS General Assembly also formally approved the OAS Observer Group to monitor the electoral process in Nicaragua in November 1989 (AG/RES.993). The OAS observer team was composed of a total of 433 OAS observers that came together from the staff of the OAS General Secretariat and other agencies. In August 1989, the OAS observers were disseminated into nine voting districts in Nicaragua (Beigbeder 1994).

Both ONUVEN and the OAS have exercised common authority to guarantee fair, free and successful election process and outcome in Nicaragua. Also, the Carter Center has involved in the process. In nine regions, the OAS election offices that were staffed by two persons listened to complaints about the elections. Their works focused on observing registration process and incidents of intimidation in different parts of the country. At the end of the process, several hundred complaints were received, most of which are related to voter registration procedures, election rules, media issues, and campaign activities. One example was free and fair access to the media (Pallister 2017). The state-run TV created an opportunity for all political parties to air their views. But broadcasts did not reach the whole country. The TV staff who were allegedly Sandinista sympathizers intimidated the UN staff who worked to solve the problem. After the direct intervention of Ortega and the head of the Supreme Electoral Council, the UN representatives were able to correct the TV broadcasting (Orozco 2002).

Final Remarks

The conflicts during the Cold War in Latin America have been characterized by a series of overlapping conflicts. They can be explained within four interrelated issues. First, the perpetual clash over domestic arrangements and internal power structures have produced cycles of repression, resistance, and instability. Second, the U.S. power in Latin America has caused the persisting tension about the nature of inter-American relations. Third, the emergence of North/South divide and the Third World has given birth to social tension and ideological split in the society. Fourth, two superpowers,

the U.S. and the Soviet Union, have played a zero-sum game in the global South to achieve political, strategic and ideological hegemony (Brands 2010).

It is necessary to summarize the reasons for the hybrid zone of peace in Latin America. First, the United States as a global hegemon and Brazil as a regional hegemon have played a balancer role to counter external threats towards the region. Second, two regional balance of power eras, 1883-1930 and 1970-80, have been crucial for the maintenance of regional peace. Third, the idea of Bolivarianism believes that a loose confederation among the Central and South American countries prevent external threats. In order to inhibit first European then U.S. threat of intervention, many Latin American countries have settled their conflicts and border disputes within the principle of non-intervention and peaceful settlement of the dispute. Fourth, a regional balance of power among Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru, Pax Brasiliana or Pax Americana, is caused by the geographic isolation, the lack of interaction, economic and political irrelevance, and weak military powers and underdeveloped economies.

Fifth, the trend of democratization in the early 1980s and the transition from authoritarian to liberal/democratic regimes in Latin America has explained the low level of international conflicts and high level of political stability and normative consensus on stable peace. Sixth, there is an empirical link between the economic development, growth, and prosperity and neoliberal economic transformations with the *Chicago Boys* and the absence of wars. Although dependence theories may shed light on the lack of economic development in Latin America, the pursuit of economic growth with neoliberalism may have a pacifying effect in the region. Seventh, economic interdependence, the institutionalization of mutual cooperation, and regional integration such as MERCOSUR and the Andean Pact are important forces for regional peace. Eighth, the reason why the use of force is absent in Latin America's international relations is related to diplomatic culture, common historical and cultural backgrounds, distinctive regional solidarity and identity, and exceptionalism about a peaceful settlement of international disputes via arbitration, mediation, bilateral negotiations, and third party interventions. Ninth, Latin Americans are satisfied with the territorial status quo because the principle of *uti possidetis* has become a rule after regional wars during the last decades of 19th and the first two decades of 20th centuries (Kacowicz 2005).

It is important to highlight the lessons learned from the peace process in Latin America. First, after prolonged negotiations and third-party interventions, the guerrillas are going from freedom fighters or terrorists to the political players in the democratic process. We have also learned that

negotiating and signing a peace agreement is the only the first step. The most important thing is the commitment, fulfillment, and implementation of the peace treaty, namely post-conflict peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction not only short-term political and economic stabilization but also long-term state recovery and positive peace. Second, successful transition to peace in Latin America requires the DDR involves the elimination of post-conflict security challenge by the reintegration and the resettlement of displaced persons in order to end violent conflict. The peace in Latin America needs to have a process of reinforcing mutual confidence and financial support for the open and inclusive state. Third, Latin America countries such as Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay) have experienced transitions from military dictatorship to democracy as well as political, economic and social structures. Fourth, another transition in Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama) is to end revolutionary movements by laying down arms and building more open and democratic societies.

The post-Cold War Latin America has seen the end of the following internal conflicts: The Zapatista in Chiapas Mexico, Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) and Tupac Amaru Movement in Peru, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the URNG (La Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca) in Guatemala, and the FMLN (Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional) in El Salvador (Colletta 2000). Fifth, ethnic rivalries and religious conflict are not common in Latin America unlike regions of sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Because most of the internal conflicts have caused by proxy wars of the bipolar international system, the stability and peace mostly depended on external factors and actors (Özçelik 2018). When the Cold War was ended, international actors such as the UN have played an essential role to sustain stability and support peace processes, especially in the Central America. Conflict resolution and peace-building in Latin America have required bringing together conflicting parties by using neutral facilitating and mediating role of international actors such as the UN and the regional power brokers such as Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez.

Latin America has had a unique regional conflict management approach in accordance with the United Nations. Most regions in the world have not used legal peace-making approaches and institutions. But Latin America countries often resort to international arbitration to find a solution for their territorial disputes. Second, the region has mostly applied economic sanctions not as symbolic actions such as Arab states boycott of Israel and Organization of African Union (OAU) sanctions against apartheid South Africa but main tools to force the conflicting parties to meet in the table for negotiation and

mediation (Diehl 2003). Third, non-governmental organizations such as the Amnesty International, International Crisis Group, the Carter Center, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Switzerland has increasingly been used in various aspects of conflict resolution such as critical services, humanitarian relief, refugee resettlement, infrastructure development, grassroots activities, and coordinating citizen diplomacy. Also, training activities aim direct action, skills transfer, and institution building. Insider partial third party intervention promotes cooperative relationships with local actors and combines with local peace-making traditions and modern conflict resolution tools (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009).

If we look back the last 200 years of history in Latin America, we can conclude that the first 100 years have seen the independence of the region and relatively many inter-state conflicts and border disputes. But the last 100 years have witnessed the lack of war and the relative long peace. The security and conflict problems have mostly taken care of by the inter-American regional organization, the OAS. There have been some successful and some failed attempts to address security, economic, social and cultural issues through regional and sub-regional organizations: the Community of Andean Nations (CAN), Bolivian Alternative for Our Americas (ALBA, meaning “dawn” in Spanish), Union of South American States (UNASUR), Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market), Free Trade of Areas of Americas (FTAA), Central American Common Market (CACM), etc. These new regional institutions have shown that the unipolar U.S. dominance has been diminishing and multi-polarity and the influence of other international actors (the EU and China) has been growing in the first decade of the 21st century. Regional organizations in Latin America are everywhere and multiplied with overlapping functions and segmenting territories. However, this does not lead to supra-national institutions like the EU or technocratic elites like the EU technocrat. Although territorial boundary conflicts are rare in Latin America, there is still a possibility that maritime borders become more prominent in terms of geo-economics interests and natural resources (Malamud and Schenoni 2016).

The United Nations have helped Latin America countries to reach positive peace, namely economic growth and transformation as well as sustainable development. With the help and support of the UN agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA), and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), Latin America countries have improved their basic nutrition, primary education, preventative health care, the promotion of

gender equality, and the preservation of natural environments. The UN has played a vital role in global and regional environmental problems in Latin America in the last decade. Since the Amazon region is very important for global climate change, the UN initiatives have focused on the reduction of air pollution in big Latin American cities and the promotion of the use of renewable energies. The UNEP which specifically established to support the combating global environmental threats has also implemented regional programs on land use planning, forest management, protection of fresh water and marine resources, the strengthening of public sector capacity, the training of government officials, and the improvement of environmental regulations and laws (Adams 2010). In the long term, the UN has helped each Latin America nation to use more effectively its resources, to meet human needs, to have fewer public health problems, to raise attendance and performance of children in school and to increase the productivity and capacity of adults in the workplace.

It is necessary to emphasize that South America countries have increased their contribution and participation of collective security measures, namely the United Nations peace-keeping operations (PKOs). The first important factor about South America's common and shared peacekeeping culture is the strong normative elements on broad defense and foreign policy and the policy coordination of peacekeeping operations (Kenkel 2013). As the Cold War ended in Europe almost without any major conflicts and superpower cooperation on conflict resolution and peacebuilding has risen into all-time high, the United Nations have effectively been undertaken peaceful resolution of regional conflicts in Latin America region. Likewise, the UN Secretary Generals have sent at the right place at the right time for good office missions. For example, Javier Perez de Cuellar's individual abilities have been effective the resolution of Central America's peace process. Similarly, Boutros Boutros-Ghali has involved 75 good office and fact-finding missions and visited 23 states including some Latin America countries. In addition, special representatives of the UN Secretary General such as Jean Arnault and Alvaro de Sato have performed important roles to mediate peace settlements in Guatemala and El Salvador. In addition to UN organs such as the Security Council and the Secretary General, regional bodies and organizations such as the OAS and other Latin America regional organizations have been used within the explicit mandate the UN Charter to help their members to peacefully find resolution their conflicts. Also, groups of states have formed loose ad hoc groupings for the objective of providing diplomatic assistance for peaceful solutions of conflicts between or within other states under the UN auspices. For example, the UN has become a peace broker via help of the Contadora group which was

formed by the foreign ministers of a number of Central and Latin American states (Wilson 2014).

In Latin America, the UN has had a mixed record to succeed in finding peaceful resolutions of conflicts that threatened regional peace and security. The success of the UN diplomatic efforts in Latin America is mostly depended on the existence of conducive political circumstances to facilitate the dispute settlement. Under the UN Charter Chapter VII, the Security Council can be effective only if the conflicting parties are willing to submit themselves fully the possibility of peaceful settlement. Moreover, the UN collective security system has evolved into more robust and creative measures especially during the 21st century in Latin America.

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to explain the shift in Latin America's level of conflict and internal violence relative to other regions in the world. It examines a single regional subsystem, Latin America within the framework of conflict and peace as well as the role of the United Nations. First, it aims to shed lights on main transformations and changes in terms of political, economic, social and cultural issues in Latin America. Second, the concept of the zone of peace is examined within the context of Latin America. The main activities of the United Nations in relation to conflict and peace are investigated in the third section. In conclusion, it underlines the lessons learned from conflict and peace processes in Latin America.

KEYWORDS

Peace; Conflict; Latin America; United Nations; Zone of Peace.

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THE DRAGON'S FOOTPRINTS IN THE SOUTH POLE: A STUDY ON CHINESE STRATEGIES AND ACTIONS IN ANTARCTICA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR BRAZIL

Alana Camoça Gonçalves de Oliveira¹

Introduction

“It will be a new era that sees China moving closer to the center stage and making greater contributions to mankind” said Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2017 during a speech given to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Xinhua 2017). This speech presents not only the position that China wants to achieve in the international scenario, but also a part of the country’s strategy. Chinese growth in recent years has impacted its behavior on the international scene, which changed considerably in the 21st century and, especially, after the 2008 crisis (Zhao 2015; Oliveira 2019). The Asian giant began to explore its strategic regional maritime environment, entering into conflicts with the countries of the South China Sea and the East China Sea in the search for maritime territories and islands that could not only hold important energy resources, but safeguard its oceanic lines (Cole 2015; Oliveira 2019).

In addition, associated with the Chinese maritime strategy (Brady 2014; Brady 2017), the Asian dragon started to act more decisively in the icy regions of the planet, stimulating a geopolitical and geoeconomic race towards the future access to strategic resources and maritime transport lines. Spaces such as Antarctica and the Arctic have become the scene of geopolitical disputes between countries, especially since China started to insert itself more assertively on such international strategic theaters in the 21st century. The geopolitics of the sea and the geopolitics of ice are new themes that emerge in the academy due to the interests of great powers to strengthen their presence and explore these regions (Becker 2004; Brady 2014; 2017; Zhou 2019).

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Despite the fact that both polar territories have different characteristics, they represent regions that have not yet been fully exploited by the states of the international system. Considering the Antarctic, the focus of this article, no country has sovereignty over its territory and no war has been fought over it. About 98% of the continent is covered by ice (average thickness of more than 2,000 m), which makes it difficult to extract resources from the region under the ice layer present there. However, even so, there are studies that indicate the potentialities of the region which would be rich in strategic resources such as oil, uranium and water, for example (Brady 2014; 2017).

In the face of the increased geopolitical pressure that China has been exercising on the most diverse international chessboards, this article aims to contribute to a greater debate on the Chinese strategy for the Antarctic security strategic theater. In this sense, the starting point of this article is the following question: what are the Chinese strategies for the Antarctic region in the 21st century and what is the possibility of conflict in the region due to these interests? Furthermore, the article also aims to present a Brazilian perspective to think about the Antarctic region and the possible implications of a geopolitical race in the region for its government. In this sense, the article also seeks to answer a second question about: What are the effects of China's more active insertion in Antarctica for the world and, above all, for Brazil when the Brazilian strategic interests for the region are considered?

In order to answer such questions, the present article intends to be analytical and propose questions, understanding the geopolitics of the region and the strategy of China and analyzing its links with the rise of Xi Jinping's China. For this, the article opens with a mix of theoretical frameworks, opposing realist writers, especially John Mearsheimer (2014), of classical geopolitics, mainly Michael Klare (2008) and also José Luís Fiori's based on its theory of global power (2004; 2008; 2013; 2014). It also presents a qualitative analysis to understand the Chinese performance in the Antarctic and the relevance of this region in the foreign policy of the Asian giant.

The Antarctic and the (Re)Definition of Territory: The Geopolitics of Ice

The Antarctic is a region that geographically covers about 14 million km², being larger than Australia and Europe, and has a coast of almost 18 thousand km², holding approximately 70% of the world's fresh water. Also, it is a region whose surrounding seas have plenty of natural and mineral resources. Historically, from the end of the 18th century until the middle of

the 19th, the exploration of the Antarctic and its surroundings was guided by trade interests, especially by the hunting of marine mammals (Ferreira 2009, 26). It was only after the first scientific expeditions to the continent that took place at the end of the 19th century that territorial claims began to emerge, with the United Kingdom being the first country to officially claim part of the Antarctic territory. Followed by the United Kingdom, New Zealand (1923), France (1924), Australia (1933), Norway (1939), Chile (1940) and Argentina (1940) formalized their territorial interests on the continent (Ferreira 2009, 26-27; Dodds 2016, 426-427).

In the post-World War II period, it was affected by bipolarity, and a resolution around the Antarctic was defined and stimulated by the interests of the US and the USSR for the region. Between 1946-1947, for example, the US carried out one of the largest expeditions to the region, the so-called Operation High Jump, while the USSR organized the Slava Flotilla expedition in 1946 (Ferreira 2009).

One of the first authors to debate Antarctic geopolitics in international journals was John Andrews in his 1957 article entitled "Antarctic Geopolitics" for the *Australian Outlook*. The author presents the main reasons that would give a new meaning to the Antarctic territory in the post-World War II world. This reframing involved territorial representations (imaginings) and political-strategic issues (economic, trade and military) (Dodds 2016). As the demands grew in the course of the 20th century and exploratory missions to map, photograph and to establish bases in the Antarctic increased (Dodds 2016), the Antarctic region started to gain strategic importance for navigation in the southern hemisphere.

The region has gained more and more relevance, especially consider the prospects of what the region could offer in the future. As Andrews (1957, 4-5) presents, the waters that surround the continent were (and are) rich in marine life, but their exploitation was still remote and extremely difficult. Studies that pointed out the existence of resources due to geological exploration considered the possibility that significant amounts of resources such as coal, copper, iron ores and others exist in the region. However, its commercial exploitation was still risky in view of the few research that had been conducted on Antarctic soil and its surroundings (Ferreira 2009, 76). In 1973, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) presented that in the seas of Bellingshausen, Ross and Weddell Sea the existence of 45 billion barrels of oil and 115 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (Mitchell 1977, 91) could be estimated. Furthermore, there are similar indications, compared to other hydrocarbon-rich regions, based on the continental drift thesis, that could lead to a hydrocarbon's reserves.

Nowadays, the technology to explore oil in the marine environments

already exists, but the greater difficulties of exploration the Antarctic, due to deeper and turbulent waters, indicate higher costs of exploration. (Ferreira 2009, 76; Andrews 1957, 5; Brady 2017). The discovery of oil and gas on the Atlantic coast of Africa and of South America, corroborate the possibility that sediments and similar accumulations of these resources have occurred along the Antarctic coasts. Other projections are made regarding resources in the region are based on geographical history. After all, according to the continental drift thesis, the Antarctic region was a part of the other continents for millions of years (Gondwana) and it is postulated that most of the continent was linked to South Africa, India and Australia - regions known for the existence of natural resources (Ferreira 2009; Brady 2017).

The difficulty in reaching a consensus on the legal status of the Antarctic in the 1950s led the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) to decide to promote the International Geophysical Year (IGY), which brought together researchers from sixty-six countries around the world in an international research and scientific cooperation effort. This event prompted the convening of an international conference to definitively solve the situation of the continent. The countries participating in the meeting were the US, the USSR and the nations that had established scientific bases in the region during the IGY - South Africa, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, Norway, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (Ferreira 2009, 39-50).

At that time, the Antarctic Treaty was signed in Washington in 1959. Based on this agreement, the signatory countries that carry out activities in the Antarctic committed themselves to further the dialogue about the use of the continent "exclusively for peaceful purposes". In its fourteen articles, the Treaty comprises the prohibition of military activities (such as the establishment of military bases or weapons testing), the freedom to continue scientific research, the promotion of international scientific cooperation, and several other points. The assumptions that created the Antarctic Treaty soon expanded, inaugurating a series of rules and interconnected regulations, and a regime, creating what is now known as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).

Over the years, countries have become signatories of the Antarctic Treaty and participated in the international regime related to that territory. Currently, the Antarctic Treaty has 53 signatory countries and also envisage the accession of any UN member country - where 29 are consultative members for being original signatories or for conducting substantial scientific research on the continent (Brazil and China are included in this category). In the aftermath of Treaty, three conventions emerged to regulate the rational use of natural resources - the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972), the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Living Marine Resources (1980) and the Convention on the Regulation of Activities on Resources Antarctic

Minerals (1988 - which did not come into force) (Ferreira 2009).

Andrews (1957) argues about how the region's claims and increased relevance in the period were shaped essentially by growing fears about the future, what the region could become (or could offer from a political, military, economic and commercial point of view) and not necessarily by what the region was. If Andrews' statements in 1957 pointed to predictions about a future scenario of the Antarctic economic and commercial relevance, that scenario continued to permeate the region's ideas of territoriality. It is not by chance that the evolution of the ATS culminated in the adoption of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991), which bans mineral activities in the Antarctic and concedes to the region the status of "International Nature Reserve dedicated to Science and Peace", postponing the discussion on the commercial and resource exploitation of the region until 2048 (Article 25).

The possibility of the future exploitation of strategic resources in an international scenario where demands tend to increase in the face of the development and growth of nations is a theme commonly addressed in classical geopolitics, especially by authors like Michael Klare (2008) who presents a pessimistic world view on the access to natural and strategic resources in the long run. The rise of new powers in the international system such as China, India and others, coupled with the increase in energy requirements to meet domestic demands, have caused great instability and staggered territorial conflicts.


Until recently, the global search for vital resources had been dominated almost entirely by mature industrialized powers. Three centers of economic power - the United States, Japan and Europe - devoured most of the oil, natural gas, coal, uranium and other primary energy sources used worldwide, along with disproportionate amounts of other industrial commodities like iron ores, copper, aluminum and tin. In the past decade, however, young competitors have forced their way onto the scene with starving economies that devour huge amounts of raw materials just to sustain their explosive growth rates. The emergence of these new assertive consumers has completely changed the field of dispute over resources (Klare 2008, 63).

With the changes in the system and the rise of new countries economically and politically, regions such as Africa, South America and Southeast Asia itself received the attention of the Great Powers. After all, as Klare mentions (2008, 33), not only has the consumption and demand for energy and other vital resources reached unprecedented levels, several of the reserves in place are being drained visibly, faster than new reserves can be put

into operation. In view of this geopolitical dynamic, authors have presented the revitalization of the importance of the Antarctic region, like a promised “Eldorado” - places with stocks of natural and strategic wealth, therefore being on the range of future great powers struggles (Becker), or at least, as one last promised frontier of exploration.

Thus, there are currently 84 main research facilities on the continent, with countries such as China having more space on the frozen continent (COMNAP 2020). According to the data from the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (2020), China is currently increasing the number of bases in Antarctica and today is the 4th country with the largest number of positions.

Graphic 1: Number of Stations and Fields in Antarctica by Country



Source: Self elaboration based on COMNAP (2020).

Chinese Foreign Policy and Strategic Interests Towards the Antarctic in the 21st Century


China does not formally claim the Antarctic region, but has gradually expanded its presence and operations over the years. Currently, the Chinese government spends more than any other state on new infrastructure in the region, building bases, airplanes, icebreakers, etc. (Zhou 2019; Brady 2017).

Reflecting about a future scenario of scarcity, it is relevant to analyze how the Chinese action in the region has developed and which are the future obstacles that it could bring as a possible revisionist actor (even if others may also emerge and enter the dispute) in the region.

Currently, China maintains four research stations in Antarctica, being the Great Wall (1985), the first, located on the island of King George, where there is also the only Brazilian station known as Comandante Ferraz. The other three stations Zhoughshan (1989), Kunlun (2009) and Taishan (2014) are located further east in the Antarctic and are located in areas claimed by Australia. In the case of the Kunlun base, the Chinese government intends to use these bases and others in its national satellite system in the future, the BeiDou (Brady 2017).

China is seeking to build a fifth base in the bay of Newfoundland, located in the New Zealand claim region, which would establish a strategic physical location for the possibility to explore the resources of the Ross Sea. The growing Chinese presence in the Antarctic also shows in the numbers of Chinese tourists visiting the continent. Between 2018-2019, more than eight thousand Chinese citizens visited the Antarctic, representing 15% of the total tourists in the period (IAATO 2020). According to Brady (2014, 20) China is the second country with the largest number of tourists, scientists, fishermen and employees working in the Antarctic.

Figure 1: Map of the Bases of all Countries Located in the Antarctic²



Source: COMNAP (2020).

The Chinese state is a key player in China’s expansion into icy theaters and in recent years, especially during Xi Jinping’s government, icy lands appear to be gaining prominence in China’s grand strategy³. The key role of

² Locations underlined in red are China’s bases. Localities underlined in green are the Brazilian bases.
³ Grand strategies involve prioritizing foreign policy goals, identifying existing and potential resources and

the State of China in this process of expansion is supported by the theory of Global Power. In this perspective, the capitalist action is coordinated by the State according to its interests in accumulating power and given the systemic pressures that it suffers in the international environment (Fiori 2004; 2008). In the case of the Arctic such a glimpse becomes more apparent with the ideas and debates on the Polar Silk Road after the launch of the White Book on Chinese policy for the Arctic (SC 2018).

The relevance of the Antarctic and the polar regions to China has grown and can be seen in the last two of the country's five-year plan: 2011-2015 and 2016-2020. China's latest five-year plan focus on building China's polar scientific credibility and infrastructure, and in the case of the 13th plan, the polar issue gained more prominence than in previous years - presenting the Chinese interest in establishing a new research station in the Antarctic, advance in ice breakers technologies, increase air capacities in the Antarctic, among others (NDRC 2020). These plans have been drawn up every five years since 1953, establishing goals and economic and social development policies to ensure that national strategies keep pace with changes over the years in China and on the international stage.

In recent years, China's perceptions of the international system have shown that the Asian giant's fears about ongoing security dilemmas. In the 2019 Chinese white paper it is pointed out that "major countries around the world are readjusting their security and military strategies and military organizational structures. They are developing new types of combat forces to seize the strategic commanding heights in military competition "(SC 2019). In addition, the document states that one of China's main objectives is to strengthen national defense and constitute a military power compatible with the country's international position and its security and development interests.

With the increase in global demand due to the growth in population, the global energy crisis and advances in technology/extraction methods, and the increase of global warming, the Antarctic region may become the epicenter of a geopolitical conflict in the future. After all, while the region is rich in biodiversity and living resources, the Antarctic also holds potential mineral resources and even the possibility of extracting resources from it. Brady (2017, 10) suggests that China has been building research bases in areas which it identifies as strategic and rich in natural resources.

selecting a plan or script that uses these resources to achieve those goals. Grand strategy is the inevitable process of classifying and evaluating these interests, threats and resources (Oliveira 2019). We consider great strategies as a calculated relationship between ends and means with the aim of increasing national power or its security.

According to Zhao (2015, 261), the changes in Chinese foreign policy since the 2008 crisis have become increasingly evident. Since the government of Hu Jintao, China has transformed its foreign policy stance and, following Xi Jinping's rise to power, it is becoming increasingly visible the change of a previous "taoguang yanghui" stance - to keep the profile low -, closely associated with Chinese politics since Deng Xiaoping -, towards a "yousuo zuowei" - actively doing something (Masuda 2016; Zhao 2015, 261). Xi Jinping has transformed Chinese foreign policy, emphasizing strategies for the internationalization of the country and its economy, in the search for more power and wealth in the international arena.

To build a new model of relations between great powers, China has been behaving as one, especially in its close regional environment, in Asia-Pacific, and its aspiration is determined by the increase of its relative power in the international arena (Zhao 2015, 265 ; Oliveira 2019, 238-240). According to Brady (2017), the geopolitics of the Antarctic is undergoing major transformations and there are suspicions about China's engagement in undeclared military activities in the Antarctic. Also, according to the author, China has sought recognition for the fact that it is now a "polar state", that is, a power active in the Arctic and the Antarctic, and this point was expressed when Xi Jinping spoke in Australia in November 2014.

China's leaders see their country's expanding polar presence as a way to demonstrate China's growing global power and gain international recognition for this new status. In the Chinese political system, polar affairs are part of maritime affairs, making the great polar power an essential component of China's maritime strategy (Brady 2017, 5, our translation).

Regarding China's performance in the Antarctic, it should also be noted that the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) of China has been the government department responsible for China's polar activities since 2008. Nestled under the Ministry of Land Resources, the Administration manages activities in the Arctic and the Antarctic, dealing with tasks like supervising research, expeditions and logistics. Affiliated to SOA is the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) which performs the general function of organizing expeditions to the Arctic and the Antarctic and science programs across the country, managing Arctic and Antarctic affairs, participating in international organizations and promoting international collaboration in the polar field on behalf of SOA. In addition to it, there is also the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) which is an institute for polar research, logistical operation and data processing. PRIC is responsible for conducting

some scientific programs, carrying out some exploration operations and daily management of the station, as well as managing the Chinese polar science database and the publication of articles in the area (COMNAP 2020).

The Chinese National Antarctic Program is largely organized in a 5-year program called “Chinese Polar Environment Comprehensive Investigation and Assessment Programs”, approved by SOA. In the Antarctic, the Program comprises three parts: the Antarctic Marine Environment Survey, the Antarctic Terrestrial Environment Survey and the Comprehensive Assessment of the Antarctic Environment. In addition, SOA coordinates the Chinese Advisory Committee for Polar Research (CACPR), which serves as an important governmental coordination body on polar issues. The State Oceanic Administration is also the interface with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and this administration also oversees China’s maritime surveillance (SOA 2019). This department also outlines China’s maritime laws and regulations and facilitates China’s participation in international maritime treaties. The SOA’s political position has increased in recent years largely because its maritime law enforcement agency, the China Maritime Surveillance (CMS), is one of the several fleets designated to patrol disputed waters in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and the South China Sea.

Although the importance of the seas surrounding China and the polar regions is not comparable in some ways, it can be inferred about how the polar affairs, being under the supervision of such an agency, connect some of the Chinese maritime interests and their continuous expansion of defense capabilities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific with the polar regions. In fact, it is too early to argue that China already has a more assertive strategy towards the Antarctic. However, considering the growing Chinese performance in the most varied strategic theaters and its interests in natural resources, its growing presence in the Antarctic would be a reflection of what the region may become in the future. From a point of view similar to realist theorists such as Mearsheimer (2014), who argue about the search for the maximization of power, and, also considering José Luís Fiori’s theory of global power (2005; 2008), the search for power and wealth in the international arena brings us to a future scenario in which the Antarctic region can potentially be disputed by the great powers.

In the face of the anarchy of the international system, the rise of China is likely to cause or inevitably would cause instability and conflict (Mearsheimer, 2014). Just as Thucydides considered the Peloponnesian War inevitable due to the rise of Athens and the decline of Sparta’s relative power, several authors (Gilpin 1981; Farias 2020; Allison 2017; Mearsheimer 2014; Oliveira 2021) argue about the repetition of history. In this case, the rise of China and the loss of relative power in the US will contribute towards the

trend of a new conflict - economic, technological, military and social.

In Mearsheimer's pessimistic argument (2014, 21), the author points out that the Great Powers behave aggressively not because they want to, but because they have to, in order to achieve more power accumulation if they want to maximize their chances of survival. After all, the international system creates incentives for states to seek opportunities to gain more power at the expense of their rivals. Being the international system governed by anarchy and the dynamics of accumulation of power and wealth, states are expansive and aim to improve and review their position in the international arena. According to Fiori (2004: 2008) competition and war are the engine of this power system, where all powers fight for global power and create order and disorder, expansion and crisis, peace and war.

Furthermore, the control and access to territories (mainly of those rich in resources and with a strategic geopolitical position) has always been one of the central themes of the political game between states, as an element for maintaining or increasing power or for the survival in the international arena. As Spykman (1938, 9) affirms, since the geographic characteristics of states are relatively unalterable and immutable, the geographic demands of States have remained the same for centuries and, because the world has not yet reached "that happy state where the wants of no man conflict with those of another, those demands will cause friction. Thus, at the door of geography may be laid the blame for many of the age-long struggles which run persistently through history while governments and dynasties rise and fall".

China already figures as the largest economy in terms of GDP (IMF 2020) and as the second country that spent the most on military power in 2019 (SIPRI 2020), only trailing the US. Such Chinese economic power has been consolidated since the end of the 20th century with the strategic project, the foreign policy interests of Deng Xiaoping (1978-1990) and, mainly, after China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In fact, since the end of the 1990s, China's growth has been vertiginous - at the beginning of the 21st century, it reached 10% per year and continued with high rates even after the 2008 crisis -, which has enabled its greater insertion and presence in the most diverse boards (Christensen 2015; Zhao 2015; Gallagher 2016).

In the 21st century, as China grew, the world as a whole felt the impacts of its growth and of its consequent demand for natural resources and new markets to supply its development, which combined urbanization and industrialization. This development model was intensive in the use of mineral, energetic and metallic commodities (Hiratuka 2018). In this sense, Chinese demands have affected the countries of Latin America and Africa directly and indirectly, due to their effect on international prices. In addition,

its growth has also resulted in an increase in the number of investments in infrastructure projects and in the provision of loans to several countries in the Global South (Hiratuka 2018; Cintra; Medeiros 2015; Gallagher 2016).

In the case of the Chinese military capabilities, in general terms, China is estimated to be the second country with the largest number of satellites, either both military or commercial. While the US has 1,425 satellites, of which about 210 serve military purposes, China has 382 satellites in total and 114 of which are expressly used for military purposes (UCSUSA, 2020). When we analyze, for example, Chinese military capabilities from the nuclear point of view, China is the third country in nuclear warheads, with a total of 320, behind only the US (5,800) and Russia (6,375) (Armscontrol 2020).

China has built its second icebreaker, the first being built entirely in China. The Xuelong 2 or Snow Dragon 2 together with Xuelong - the country's first polar survey vessel, purchased from Ukraine in 1994 - undertook its first expedition to Antarctica in 2019. With Xuelong 2 - operated by the Polar Research Institute of the State Oceanic Administration - China equals the US in number of icebreakers, but lags behind Russia, which already has more than 40 icebreakers operating in the Baltic and the Arctic (Woody 2020). From the point of view of maritime capabilities, China has been investing so that its navy (PLAN) can be present all around the world. China "plans to send military units wherever its global strategic interests require" (Zhou 2019). In total numbers, China already has the largest navy in the world, with a total of approximately 350 ships and submarines, including more than 130 surface combatants (DOD China 2020, 133). In addition, the 2019 Chinese white book presented that PLAN is streamlining the transition of its operations from "defense on the near seas" to "protection missions on the far seas" (Xinhua 2019). The China Military Power Report 2020 shows that China's strategy includes the modernization program for Chinese military forces that seeks to complete this process by 2035 and transform the PLA into a high-level military force (worldwide) by the end of 2049 (DOD China 2020, VII).

In the case of the Antarctic territory, Anne-Marie Brady (2017, 224) argues that Chinese interests are increasing in the region as the country has sought to become a polar power in both the Arctic and the Antarctic regions. In fact, the more active Chinese behavior on other international boards has been the result of a comprehensive policy pursued by Xi Jinping. According to Sorensen (2013, 376), perceptions of the enhancement of Chinese relative power have increased nationalist ambitions and expectations among people who believe that China, now, after '100 years of humiliation', should rise up and assume its position as a great power. In this sense, Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream" policy strategy is associated with the foreign policy of the Asian giant,

consisting of an example of the recovery speech of the Middle Country when it states that the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the biggest dream of the Chinese nation in modern times (apud Xinhua 2013).

The Antarctic region is protected by the ATS, as a multilateral treaty like we mentioned earlier, however, pessimistic speeches have emerged like that of Ellie Fogarty from the Australian Institute of International Policy in 2011. Fogarty stated that “major powers such as China and Russia have voiced their interest in the continent’s resource potential, strongly suggesting the current prohibition of resource exploitation will be revisited after 2048” (Fogarty 2011). Although the Chinese government has sought to present itself as a responsible and environmentally conscious country, as stated in Xi Jinping’s speech to the United Nations in late September 2020 - with a leading role in global governance (FMPRC 2020); this did not translate, for example, into a change in China’s policy in the Antarctic. The country has allied itself with Moscow to block the introduction of three marine areas to be protected in the Southern Ocean at the annual meeting of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources in Antarctica (CCAMLR), held from 27 to 30 October. This position may be associated with the increase in Chinese interests and consumption by the Antarctic krill - a species of crustacean (Urch 2015). It should also be noted that fishing for Antarctic krill is part of the Chinese interest in expanding fishing in distant waters around the world’s oceans, as presented in the 13th annual plan regarding the issue of “Fishing in Distant Waters”⁴. The Shanghai Chonghe Marine Industry (CMI), for example, has ordered the largest trawler ever built to capture Antarctic krill which will be completed in 2023 (BairdMaritime 2020). Therefore, there are fears that the Antarctic international regime will start to collapse in the face of competitive pressure from the international system.

Some researchers like Dodds (apud The Atlantic 2020) understand that the increase in Chinese demand for krill may also influence the Asian giant’s interest in other resources in the region. In Dodds’ words “fishing is a proxy for minerals”. Furthermore, despite the existence of the treaty, a geopolitical race for the region has already taken place and it emerges in the form of a dispute for scientific leadership and for the projection capacity towards the polar regions. Between 2001-2016, for example, China invested 310 million yuan in its Antarctic program, eighteen times more if we consider the 1983-2000 program (Global Times 2017).

4 In general lines, there are three proposals for the creation of Marine Protected Areas (MPA) to be discussed. The oldest proposal is the protection of three blocks of ocean and ocean floor along East Antarctic, an area rich in cold water corals and penguin feeding areas. Also on the agenda was the creation of an MPA of 1.8 million km² in the Weddell Sea area. Finally, there is a proposal to create an MPA west of the Antarctic peninsula.

With the increase in the capacities of States, intentions and interests may become more evident (Zakaria 1998). This point, as mentioned, can be seen in Chinese foreign policy which has become more assertive and active internationally (Zhao 2015; Oliveira 2019). Currently, China remains in agreement with the ATS regime and the possibility of the country seeking to extract resources in the region is still remote, given that it is a signatory of the Madrid Protocol. After 2048, would China be willing to renew its commitment to the non-exploitation and mining of resources in the Antarctic? So far, this question cannot be answered as Chinese strategies for the Antarctic continue to focus on research and the exploitation of living resources, like fishing, in the region.

However, the considerable investments that China has been making at the South Pole may allow Beijing to position itself at the forefront of the resource race in Antarctica. According to Anne-Marie Brady (apud Atkin 2015), Chinese documents are clear about Chinese interests in minerals in the Antarctic. According to the author, the material includes a 2005 report by members and former members of the Polar Research Institute of China. The report itself would say that the region has potential mineral resources, and that exploration was only a matter of time. In another 2013 report obtained from a confidential source by the author, it was stated that “regardless of how the spoils are divided up, China must have a share of Antarctic mineral resources to ensure the survival and development of its one billion population”. The researcher points out that for the Chinese much of the scientific research conducted in the Antarctic is a disguised form of presence and that many countries in the Antarctic are occupying bases that are not focused on scientific knowledge, but to invest in long-term strategic interests, including potential access to any resources that may be discovered (apud Atkin 2015).

The possibility of an expansionist China in the Antarctic in the horizon is one of the scenarios to be thought about the future of the icy continent. It is noteworthy that this does not mean that only China could be a revisionist actor in the region's treaty system, as far as the litigants countries themselves can unilaterally claim a part of the Antarctic territory. In the Brazilian case, the Antarctic presence is considered a geopolitical and geostrategic issue in the sphere of national interests. The South Atlantic is the main route to access the Antarctic continent and Brazil being the country with the longest Atlantic coast in the globe, the region is of vital interest to Brazil.

The Antarctic's Relevance to Brazil and the Implications of Chinese Actions in the Region

Historically, Brazil became a signatory to the Antarctic Treaty in 1975 after the recommendations of João Frank da Costa, head of the Intellectual Cooperation Division and the highest authority of Itamaraty on Brazil's Antarctic issues, and the favorable circumstances for its accession that year (Ferreira 2009, 127). Costa recommended that Brazilian policy towards the Antarctic should start with adherence to the Treaty and that Brazil should become a consultative member. The memorandum has been the basis of all Brazilian international positioning in Antarctic matters since then and guides Brazil's position on the Antarctic region in the National Defense Plans (Brasil 2005; 2012a; 2020) and in the National Defense Strategies (Brasil 2008; 2012b; 2020). Currently, Brazil has a base the Antarctic, the Commander Ferraz base that was reopened in January 2020 after a fire destroyed it in 2012, and currently has 17 laboratories in its base (Atkin 2015).

Figure 2: Brazilian Base Commander Ferraz



Source: Strategic Plan of the Brazilian Navy 2040 (2020).

The Antarctic was included in the 2012 National Defense Policy (PND) in the country's strategic surroundings. However, since the 2005 National Defense Policy and the 2008 National Defense Strategy, Antarctica was already included in the document as a region of interest to the Brazilian government. Since then, the importance of the Antarctic had grown, and this can be seen in the increasing mention of the term the Antarctic in the documents. As a brief comparison, while in the 2012 PND the Antarctic region receives a mention, in the PND launched in 2020, the region receives three mentions. In the last document dated of 2020 the Brazilian government is aware of the potential resources existing in the Antarctic continent and bases its national strategy on the need to protect such territory.

[...] the South America, the South Atlantic, the Antarctic and the African countries bordering the South Atlantic hold significant reserves of natural resources, in a world already aware of the scarcity of these assets. Such a scenario may give rise to conflicts in which the use of force or its support for the imposition of political and economic sanctions prevails. External powers have increased their presence and influence in these areas (Brasil 2020, 17).

The Antarctic has played an important role in the Brazilian geopolitical debate since the end of the 20th century, having as its main thinkers authors such as Golbery do Couto e Silva (1967), Leonardo Mattos (2014), Therezinha de Castro (1976) and Meira Mattos (1976; 2011)⁵. Authors like Therezinha de Castro emphasized the role of the Antarctic and highlighted it as a key point for interoceanic maritime navigation, highlighting the importance of Antarctica for the defense of the South Atlantic - which is the region geographically delimited in the North by the 16°N parallel, in the South by the Antarctic Continent, in the East by the African coast and in the West by South America (PND, 2012; 2020). The South Atlantic comprises four large archipelagos and islands of different sizes and importance, as well as different nationalities. The African coast stretches from Guinea-Bissau to the Cape, comprising sixteen countries. The American coast, on the other hand, starts at Cabo de São Roque and extends to the Cape of Tierra del Fuego. Its length

⁵ In the works of Golbery, Meira Mattos e Therezinha de Castro, the Antarctic, gained relevance. Considering Castro's thought there is a debate over the possibility of Brazil being able to project its influence in the region. In this sense, the first Brazilian movements to show some interest for the white continent, had developed in the 1950s within the framework of the "confrontation theory" (teoria da defrontação no original, nota do editor) developed by Professors such as Therezinha de Castro, linked to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). This theory was never able to be translated into an official Itamaraty's position, but it had some influence on Brazilian's foreign policy, and was able to put the Antarctic into the political agendas of some leaders.

is 9,000 km and covers Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina (Fiori 2013; Oliveira; Netto 2016, 229).

Due to its geographical characteristics, the South Atlantic basin allows the rapid maritime transport of large commercial volumes. Brazil has consolidated its position in the region through non-traditional programs of power projection with the development of public policies that encourage fishing, coastal shipping, scientific research, and tourism activities that had consolidated Brazilian participation and dominance of the territory. Approximately 95% of Brazilian international trade flows through these waters, a movement of more than US \$ 229 billion per year. In addition, 90% of the country's oil and gas production is generated on the continental shelves and 75% of Brazilian gas production comes from this maritime region (Fiori 2013; Oliveira; Netto 2016, 230).

The discoveries of these reserves in the region have generated a growing interest of countries such as the United Kingdom, the US, Germany, France, Russia, China, and Japan. For the purpose of this article, China's interest will be highlighted. Over the past decade, the Chinese presence in the South Atlantic has grown at a quantitative level, through the expansion of trade and investments in/with the region, as well as in the diaspora of the Chinese community in Latin America and Africa; at the qualitative level, the Chinese presence has grown through its intervention in fields other than economics, such as politics, culture and security (Abdenur 2013; Abdenur; Neto 2013).

There are also multilateral strategies that have been adopted by Brazil with countries in the region in order to protect and safeguard their interests in the South Atlantic. It is worth mentioning, for example, the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS)⁶ and the training carried out in the IBSA through trilateral cooperation between Brazil, India and South Africa, with IBSAMAR. Furthermore, in recent years there has been a growing tendency to expand and deepen multilateral cooperation between South American countries, especially during the Lula government (2003-2010). This was also observed in the context of the Antarctic programs, where in addition to a wide variety of bilateral technical and logistical support agreements, there are also multilateral initiatives such as the Latin American Antarctic Program Administrators Meeting (RAPAL), already in its XXXI edition (Ferreira 2009; RAPAL 2020).

6 The 24 countries that are part of ZOPACAS are South Africa, Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, São Tomé e Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Uruguay.

In addition to the South Atlantic issue, the Antarctic affects significant routes for Brazilian maritime transport and the main access route to the Antarctic continent passes through the South Atlantic. Currently, a large part of the world maritime trade traffic uses controlled artificial accesses, like the case of the Panama Canal (connection between the Atlantic and the Pacific) and the Suez Canal (Mediterranean and Indian). Free access to these passages is subject to possible regional turbulence, which may result in the crossing being closed or restricted. Such restrictions increased the interest and the use of accesses in the south of the South American and African continents, through the Drake Passage and Cape Agulhas. The Drake Passage, which separates the Antarctic from the South American continent, has potential value as a maritime navigation route, given the vulnerability of the others (PEM 2040 2020).

In fact, the official documents of the Brazilian government raise concerns about the uncertainties in the international arena. Issues related to the Antarctic can be seen not only in the END and PND, but also in the 2040 Navy Strategic Plan.

South America, the Antarctic and West Africa have significant reserves of natural resources. In this strategic environment, with a focus on the South Atlantic, it is essential to consolidate the region as a Zone of Peace and Cooperation (ZOPACAS), in order to avoid interference from illegitimate interests. Political motivations, social conflicts, interests of economic groups and even of an ethnic and religious nature bring, as an underlying question, the search for energy, water, rare minerals and geographic space. In this sense, maritime spaces have become the object of dispute between States, paradoxically accentuated. Armed conflicts, now hybrid, in which the perpetrators of aggression and real interests are hidden, have not yet been abolished from international relations, with the dispute over resources as a strong motivating factor (PEM 2040 2020, 28).

However, the Antarctic program is still little explored by the Brazilian government, with investments still incipient if we take into account the increase in the interests of powers like China in the region. The annual cost of the Brazilian Antarctic Program (ProAntar) reaches the range of R\$ 8 million per year, however in 2020, for example, the Brazilian budget for the program was only R\$ 3.67 million, including parliamentary amendments (Câmara 2020). In this sense, in recent years the PROANTAR has been carrying out its activities in the limit of the budget or even below (Camara 2017).

In fact, Brazil has no shortage of strategic minerals, including oil, natural gas and even water, which means that it is very likely that the country

does not need to exploit these stockpiles within a predictable time horizon (Mattos 2014). However, considering the 2048 deadline for the possible revision of the Antarctic treaty, it is expected that countries that already had claimed territories in the Antarctic and others that operate there, such as the US, China and India, for example, will begin to understand this region as a “living space” wishing that the commercial exploitation of the Antarctic’s strategic resources begin (Mattos 2014).

For this reason, investments in S&T and in the maritime projection capacity would allow the expansion of initiatives to protect the Brazilian strategic environment. A protection that could be developed through closer ties with countries in South America, like Argentina and Chile that claim the Antarctic. The Brazilian lackluster is already observed in the relations with its neighbors, as the country is dependent on other South American countries in the Antarctic. Brazil does not have an air base in the Antarctic continent and needs to use the Chilean station Presidente Eduardo Frei Montalva for landing and takeoff. The dependence is even more significant in the winter when the waters of the Admiralty Bay are frozen - Brazil does not have an icebreaker yet⁷ - and the logistics for carrying out the polar missions need to use the ports of Ushuaia and Punta Arenas (Hernandez 2018).

In addition to the Antarctic issue, we can also add that there is an increase in economic and trade relation relations between China and Brazil. China is already Brazil’s main trading partner and in recent years it has invested mainly in strategic sectors focused on mineral and natural resources and infrastructure construction closely related to the Chinese interest in increasing the capacity for the flow of Brazilian goods (export corridors) (Santos et al 2020). Not only in Brazil, but in several other Latin American countries, China is already emerging as the main export destination (Santos et al 2020; Gallagher 2016). Such Chinese interests further demonstrate the Asian country’s dependence on resources, which strengthens fears that in the future its actions in the Antarctic will become more expansionist, causing an escalation of geopolitical in the region. This dispute already exists if we consider technological and scientific issues, as well as krill fishing in the region.

⁷ The Brazilian Navy is interested in building an icebreaker. If such a project translates into reality, it may bring changes to the capacity of Brazilian operations in the Antarctic. See more at: <https://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/app/noticia/brasil/2019/03/11/interna-brasil,742183/marinha-construir-navio-quebragelo-para-pesquisas-na-antartida.shtml>

Final Remarks

China's rise is changing global and regional geoeconomic and geopolitical scenarios. In the 21st century, China continues to grow and, at the same time, its demand for natural and mineral resources expanded. As a result, China has progressively projected itself internationally, increasing its capacity to act on the most diverse strategic theaters. The increase in Chinese demands for natural and strategic resources caused by its economic growth has been stimulating the Chinese presence in Africa and Latin America, as well as reviving tensions in the Eastern and Western China seas. Just as the increase in demand has been stimulating geopolitical disputes around the world, there are fears about the Antarctic regime which may collapse both in the face of the change in the balance of power, and in view of the 2048 time frame itself.

The changes in the balance of power in the international arena have revived geopolitical disputes and directed the debate towards China's behavior at a time of relative decline of American power. Concerns about a threatening and expansive China are common in Western debates on international relations and, above all, in the framework of theories that dialogue, in some way, with realism. In the present article in the light of concepts and evaluations presented by classical geopolitics, realist theories and the theory of global power, China's performance in the Antarctic and of its foreign policy may lead to looming prospects for the region. This is not to say that China could be the sole or the main disruptive player in the region as the United States, Russia and other litigant nations can offer similar pressures. The US itself, for example, has shown itself to be an expansionist and destructive player of the pillars and regimes it had created (or helped to create) since the end of World War II. The increase in the presence of great powers in the Antarctic intensifies the dynamics of power and security in the region and can promote more evident competitive clashes. After all, following the theories presented here, all countries seek to increase their power and wealth in the international arena in the face of the anarchy of the international system.

The increase in the Chinese presence can be seen by the increasing investments in S&T, the construction of new bases, the elevation in the number of tourists and in krill fishing in the region. In this context, we note that China has invested more and more in the region and has, at times, opposed the creation of new rules for the protection of biodiversity and of the Antarctic territories - such as krills fishing. In addition, China has been investing in polar technologies and emerging as a leader, behind Russia and the US.

The article has argued that fears that were present regarding the Antarctic issue in the past, about the clashes for resources, continue and have been intensified with the increase in the number of players in the region. This reality allows us to consider the increased competition in the Antarctic and, consequently, tensions and disputes that will involve countries in the near future. This article outlined the Chinese interests and actions that are being developed for the Antarctic. However, it remains to be seen whether the Asian giant will present a more assertive strategy for the Antarctic, just as it did for the Arctic.

Nevertheless, the increase in Chinese investments and activities in the region are already affecting the balance of power in the Antarctic and for Brazil. The expansion of the Chinese presence in the region, as well as the possible tensions involving the Antarctic may become a problem for the achievement of Brazilian strategy. After all, the maritime crossing of the South Atlantic is the main access route to the Antarctic. Conflicts that may emerge in the Antarctic would take place in the Brazilian strategic environment, affecting not only its interests, but its international security.

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ABSTRACT

The starting point of the article is the perception of the relevant role that China has been gaining in the international arena and the competitive and geopolitical pressure that it has been exercising in the most diverse international strategic theaters, including in the Polar Regions – Arctic and Antarctic. Considering the relevance of the Antarctic, the present article analyzes the Chinese strategy and its growing presence in the Antarctic and its implications for Brazil, using the theoretical frameworks of classical geopolitics, realism, and the theory of global power.

KEYWORDS

China; Antarctic; Geopolitics; Brazil.

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COLOMBIAN MILITARY TRANSFORMATION: STRATEGIC REALITY AND OVERCOMING RESISTANCES

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Introduction

In 2012, after more than 50 years of conflict, Colombia's President Juan Manuel Santos initiated the process of peace talks with the oldest and biggest Latin America's communist guerilla, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The agreement was signed in 2016. More than 7,000 FARC members would be reinstated in the Colombian society after handing over their weapons under UN supervision. Meanwhile, the political and economic situation in Venezuela kept deteriorating, leading to an increase of criminality in the border and the arrival of roughly 1.5 million migrants and refugees to Colombia till 2019.

While this scenario is in the making, an important strategic issue in Colombia is the need to transform its military forces. During the conflict, the Colombian military focused on counterinsurgency (COIN). To some extent, this implied that other typical defense functions, as land border, maritime, and airspace patrol and protection, did not receive the same attention within the national security strategy. However, with the recent FARC disarmament process it became imperative to change the military by transforming its doctrine, reforming its functions, and eventually right-sizing its manpower.

This proposal of change was led mainly by former President Santos and the Colombian High Command. Nevertheless, this raised some fears and resistance, especially in the middle-ranks of the military, since the possibility

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of reducing the size of the army was on the table. However, the transformation started focused on the doctrine. Thus, it is relevant to ask why and how the Colombian military is going through a process of transformation despite of the resistance of some of its sectors. To answer this question, this paper is divided as follows: first, we will define and address the transformation of the military forces as well as the Colombian new military doctrine. Then we expose the explanatory model to be applied to understand the case, as well as the methods for driver selection and analysis. Third, we will select the variables that compose the drivers (as causal mechanisms) of the military transformation and then test those with process-tracing.

Changes in the Colombian military: New Doctrine and Resistances

As Prezeli et al. (2015, 25-26) argue, a military transformation is a national policy with the purpose of changing and improving military capabilities. This can happen due to different kinds of inputs, internal and/or external. Thus, security threats, international organizations, regional cooperation initiatives, as well as genuine national needs are among the inputs that can lead to a military transformation. That brings outputs such as changes in the military culture and mindset, in the military tasks, and in the military training and education, or in the acquisition of new technology and advanced weapons.

On the other hand, as the concept of “security sector reform” points out, for countries that transits the path of post-conflict, security agents have a main role due to the usual instability that characterizes this period. Therefore, in such contexts it is common to generate reforms that contribute to assure that the police and the military forces are well-equipped and prepared to face the challenges that come with the ending conflict, and that they operate in line with the principles of a democratic governance, the rule of law, and the respect for human rights (Jingushi 2015, 40-44).

On August 6th, 2016, General Commander of the Army Alberto José Mejía presented the results of the first stage of the plan to propose a structural transformation of the Colombian Army. According to him, this change would be the most important one in the last century of Colombian military history, in order to have a renewed, more effective and “closer to the people” army (El Tiempo, 2016). At the base of this transformation is the so-called “Damasco doctrine”. This innovative doctrine dates back to 2011. Two years before, in 2009, FARC had changed its military strategy, shifting from the concentration

of big combatants' groups to the pattern of small cells committing attacks across the national territory. Therefore, in 2011 it was necessary for the army to start planning how to innovate its strategies and tactics to have a more effective fight against them (Rojas 2017, 112). That was the beginning of a process of institutional reengineering.

One year after, in 2012 the Santos government publicly announced the decision of initiating a peace process with the FARC. This implied the possibility that some years later the biggest threat to national security so far could be disarmed. Accordingly, the army would also have to adapt to the new circumstances of the national scenario and the possible new challenges that it would have to face. Thus, in 2013 the Strategic Committee for Designing the Army of the Future—(CEDEF) took over the goal of creating a plan to review the army's doctrine (Gómez and Correa Henao 2014; COTEF 2016).

In 2015 the Education and Doctrine Command (CEDOC) implemented the "*Minerva Plan*," aimed to design a doctrine and an educational system that could articulate basic components such as doctrine, education, instruction and training, science and technology, and lessons learned, in order to have a better trained and even more professional army (CEDOC 2016). One of the most important projects included in this plan, was the *Damasco* Project. The *Damasco* doctrine was structured by the team of the Army's Doctrine Center (CEDOE), which included military and civil professionals, with the support of the US Southern Command and a Chilean army mission. The new army's doctrine framework would follow four different phases, such as: the first stage would be the publication and distribution of the 17 Fundamental Army Manuals (MFE), which were presented in August 2016. The second part are the Fundamental Reference Manuals of the Army (MFRE), the third phase are Army Field Manuals (MCE), and the last stage are the Army Technical Manuals (MTE) (Rojas 2017, 269-271). All these documents contain the philosophy, tactics and strategies that will guide the Colombian army and are expected to be published and available by 2020 (El Tiempo 2016).

To understand why this is a transformational doctrine, and one of the most important changes in the Colombian army history, it is important to briefly review the profile of the doctrine's development. In 1907 after having experienced the "Thousand Days War"³, the Colombian military was reformed with the assistance of a Chilean military mission. By this time some of the most important high military education institutions were founded such

³ *The Guerra de los Mil Días* (1899-1902) was a civil war between the Liberal and National parties coalition, and the Conservative party. The outcome was a Conservative victory, the weakening of the Liberals, the dismantling of the National Party, and almost a 100,000 dead toll. A year later Colombia lost Panama.

as the *Escuela Superior de Guerra* and the *Escuela Militar de Cadetes*. During this period, the Colombian military was strongly influenced by the Prussian-style thought. Later during the Cold War, the army participated in the Korean War and since then begun the process of “Americanization” of the doctrine. Until then, the Colombian army was trained and focused on conventional and regular warfare. A decade later and after the guerrillas rise, the military suffered a drastic change, focusing its training and efforts on irregular warfare, particularly on COIN (Rojas 2016, 111-113).

Hence since the 1960s the Colombian army doctrine had been characterized by a Cold War mindset. While they had developed superb COIN capabilities, conventional and regular warfare were somehow neglected. In practical terms, and according to the Colonel Pedro Javier Rojas: “[...] the operational concept of the Army did not evolve to the operational postulates of the Air-Ground Battle (1986), Operations of Total Dimension (1993), Operations of the Total Spectrum (2008) and Unified Terrestrial Operations (2012), which are currently used by aligned armies with the NATO doctrine”⁴ (2016, 114).

The *Damasco* doctrine was envisioned to think about the army of the future. The main goal is to become a “multi-mission” army by 2030. However, to achieve this, ideological and operational changes must be implemented, which are contained in *Damasco* (Rojas 2016, 98), as follows. It recognizes that in Colombia, instead of a terrorist group, there is an internal armed conflict and that there are other internal and external threats and challenges that the army must be ready to combat and face. It will not be completely focused on the insurgency. Thus, the army is overcoming the cold war thinking and trying to ensure the respect for the international humanitarian law. Also, the Colombian army must be aligned with the NATO international standards. This means twofold, the army must expand its functions and improve its capabilities for conventional and regular war; and the institution needs to be better educated in military sciences, in order to be ready to participate in joint missions with NATO allies and partners, and respond to regional and hemispheric challenges.

Additionally, the army must be guided by the international humanitarian law. The institution has always been respectful of democracy and the civil rule, but some of its members have also committed crimes against international law. Thus, the new doctrine emphasizes the relevance of recognizing who is the enemy and its nature, in order to comply with international norms. Thus, the army’s duty should not only be focused on providing conventional national

⁴ Authors’ translation.

security, but also on human security. According to the former commander-in-chief of the armed forces, General Alberto José Mejía, the army must be ready to serve the communities and work with them to supply their needs.

The first 17 booklets that contain this new philosophy are available online. This is the first time that the army has published its doctrine and that the citizens have free access to it. Thus, this doctrine seems to recognize that the national reality is changing and the internal and external threats to the national security as well. Accordingly, the army must adapt to the new conditions, be ready to fight diverse threats, provide security for the post-conflict phase, keep being an important agent in building state capacities in Colombia⁵ and comply with the international standards of NATO.

Despite the attractiveness of innovation, multi-mission army, and the army of the future, this process of transformation also generated resistance in some sectors of the Colombian military. This resistance, of course, was reinforced by all the fears and doubts that the military has been showing about the peace agreement with the FARC.

It is methodologically difficult to show evidence of this point, given that the military must comply with their constitutional mandate of not participating in politics and accordingly they avoid publicly criticizing or expressing their views on political issues and the civilian rule. However, there are two journalistic investigations that present facts and ideas collected from conversations with insiders. One is the work published by the Colombian online political journal *La Silla Vacía*, written by Juanita León. Another one was published in colombiapeace.org by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). Both refer to the peace process and not explicitly to the transformation of the military. Nevertheless, it is important to note that much of the criticism and opposition led by former President Alvaro Uribe to the peace process had to do with the role of the military, saying that the negotiations with the FARC were a disrespect for the military forces and that the Santos administration would reduce the size of the Army. Thus, the disagreement with the peace process can also be related with the resistance to the transformation of the military forces.

According to WOLA (2015), there are at least three events that show the military uneasiness. First, in 2013, international guarantors and Red Cross' personnel had the delicate mission of transporting FARC negotiators from the Colombian jungle to Havana. However, someone with a high rank in the military shared the secret coordinates of the pickup zone with former

⁵ Building state capacities in post-conflict is a paramount task in order to avoid new forms of social conflicts. Alex Jeffrey explained this for local case is Bosnia-Herzegovina (2006).

President Uribe and he posted it on Twitter (Semana 2013). Second, in 2014 the newsweekly *Semana* published a report revealing the existence of a secret office of the national army with a restaurant facade, where the government negotiators in Havana were being hacked. According to it, this office started functioning one month before the public announcement of the initiation of the peace dialogues made by President Santos and worked for a year without the consent of the government (Semana, 2014). This raised concerns that the Military Intelligence Center (CIME) could be a central point of opposition to the peace agreement within the army. And third, in Colombia the Association of Retired Officers (ACORE) is seen as a de facto speaker for the political opinions of active-duty officers, given that it is constitutionally prohibited for them to express them. ACORE has been vehemently and regularly critical about the peace agreements and former president Santos.

On the other hand, León (2014) presents four fears that sustain the uneasiness of the military regarding the peace agreement. First, the fear of losing labor stability: in comparison to other professions in Colombia, the military have many social privileges, such as job security and the possibility of retiring young, because they put their lives in risk to protect the country. However, if war ceases due to the peace agreements the risk for their lives would not be the same and therefore, they could lose their social privileges. In the words of retired general Rafael Colón, what some military say is “They are going to restrict our rights in terms of health, social benefits. They are going to remove my layoffs after having fought for this country”.

Second, fear of trials. The army is one of the most respected institutions in Colombia. However, with the end of the conflict there is also a truth commission, where it is expected to give voice to the victims, so they can tell the truth about what happened. It is well known that some members of the military committed crimes against the civilian population and that it should be disclosed in the truth commission. However, the army does not want to lose its social prestige or be remembered in history as rogue.

There is a controversial fear of losing defense contracts. The defense sector in Colombia is huge and it involves many contracts and daily transactions where retired officials play an important role. For more than 50 years, this was justified due to the internal armed conflict and the need to have huge military forces. However, the end of the conflict might imply that this need disappears and accordingly the size of the military forces could be reduced. Regarding this point, the active-duty officers are scared of losing their jobs and the retired officers would not like to lose profits from a vast defense sector.

And fourth, the ideological issue. The military were educated for

more than 50 years with a cold war counterinsurgency doctrine. For them, the FARC were the biggest enemy, the one that had to be fought as hard as possible. Especially under the Uribe government, the instruction was to have a military victory over the enemy. Besides, the military have not only seen but also self-experienced the consequences of the violence inflicted by the FARC. Therefore, it is difficult for many of them, to accept that the enemy of a lifetime, the FARC, have now a political status and must be treated according to this.

Thus, it is possible to see that one of the biggest reasons of unease for the military is the ideological issue. Stopping to treat the FARC as the enemy and having the duty to protect their lives is something that touches the feeling of honor and pride in some sectors of the military. Although they have not expressed concerns regarding the project of transformation of the army, one should not forget that this change of the National threat and the status of the enemies is an idea included in the new *Damasco* doctrine.

The idea of transforming the Colombian army and its process of change emerged in a very different country in comparison to the Colombia of the last two decades. Being one of the oldest and most stable democracies in Latin America, during the 1990s and the early years of the 21st century Colombia was about to be considered a failed state, almost at the same level as Rwanda and Afghanistan (Merchán 2005). This was due to the permanent territorial dispute among illegal groups such as the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN), *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC) and the FARC. Besides, the country was not even close to be recovered from the consequences of the violence inflicted by the Cali and Medellín cartels, and the political institutions were weak and full of corruption (Shifter and Jawahar 2004, 144- 145).

In such a context, the Plan Colombia was implemented and with the cooperation of the United States the Colombian military went through a process of modernization and professionalization. With a much better equipped and more modern military forces, the government of the president Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) led one of the most effective and successful battles against the FARC (Toro 2010), resulting in the killing of its second commander Raul Reyes (Rico 2008), the weakening of this guerrilla and its withdrawal of some territories. The government of Juan Manuel Santos started in 2010, and under his presidency the army kept demonstrating its effectiveness with the killing of the FARC commanders “Mono Jojoy” in 2010 (Lozano 2010) and “Alfonso Cano” in 2011 (El Espectador 2011). By this time, Colombia had already started to change, improving its economic and security indicators. The military forces had a total personnel of around 450.000 people and this amount would increase to 481.000 in 2016 (World Bank 2016) and the

military expenditure as percentage of the GDP was 3.39% being the highest in South America (SIPRI 2018). With a population of around 50 million inhabitants, the country had in 2016 a GDP of US\$280.091 billion (Bank 2018), the population living below the poverty line went from 55% in 2002 to 26.9% in 2017 and the unemployment decreased from 17.4% in 2002 to 9.2% in 2017 (DANE 2017).

Thus, despite of the resistance to the transformation, Colombia has changed, and the process of military transformation started in 2015 with the writing of the first 17 booklets of the *Damasco* doctrine and nowadays it is still an on-going process. This is due to the influence of the national and regional contexts. More specifically, the internal armed conflict of Colombia changed with the peace agreement signed between the government and the FARC. But also, the Venezuela's domestic growing crisis had directly affected Colombia in different ways, even highlighting the possibility of a military confrontation with this neighbor.

Overcoming Resistance: Process Tracing of the Path Towards Military Transformation

The military transformation of Colombia is an ongoing process. However, changes in doctrine and practices are already self-evident. Beyond the official reasons, the underlying causal mechanisms remain opaque lacking studies to identify them and offer a comprehensive explanation. In order to achieve this analytical product, we worked within a causal research design, having the in-depth case study as methodology and making use of process tracing. The data and information that we have collected, comes from primary and secondary sources, such as military manuals, interviews published online, and diverse scientific articles, among others.

Based on this, we hope to develop an empirically verifiable association between the causal mechanisms (the drivers) and the transformation of the Colombian military forces. That is why the chronological line in which the drivers could have caused the observable outcome are important. We try to rule out spurious variables by taking care on their selection. Thus, after gathering deep knowledge of the case study, we found out that there are three variables that coincide chronologically with the beginning of the transformation process and which due to its nature have an impact on it, namely: the changing nature of the domestic conflict, the renewed confrontation with Venezuela, and the NATO partnership. Therefore, we select them as drivers for the outcome in the model that we propose. The causal design allows us to understand the

mechanics behind the operation of the phenomenon studied through the process of showing a causal link between variables.


Another virtue of this research design is that, even starting from a case study, it is possible to replicate it in similar cases or in demonstrations that put the same case study to the test. Given that we start from a systematic selection of causal conditions and an equal test for all, the study can have internal validity. While causality in social phenomena can only be inferred, but never proven, we take note of observable manifestations that account for the selected variables. From these we apply a form of process tracing based on an explaining-outcome (Beach & Pedersen 2016, 3), reconstructing the causal chain that preceded the Colombian process of military transformation.

The process tracing methods allow exploring causation between a condition and an empirically observable outcome. Its virtue is to go further beyond the correlation, inferring causality through the concatenation of intervening variables, not necessarily causal to each other. The explaining-outcome process tracing is “a single-case study that seeks to find the causes of a particular outcome. The ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspect of an outcome with no redundant parts being present” (Beach & Pedersen 2016, 178). The explanation is constructed from a causal mechanism, a “theorized system that produces outcomes through the interaction of a series of parts that transmit causal forces from X to Y. Each part of a mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produces Y. The parts of causal mechanisms are composed of entities engaging in activities” (Beach & Pedersen 2016, 176).

In the case of the Colombian military transformation, causation arises from the imperative need for the material and strategic modernization of the Colombian Military Forces. However, the step from the *Material and Strategic Modernization Imperative* (X), to the *Military Transformation* (Y) is not automatic. Causality must be inferred through a causal mechanism that pretends to be the specific explanation that is still lacking in the literature about an ongoing process. This theoretical system is composed of three intervening variables that, by themselves, fail to explain the step towards modernization, that is, they are insufficient. Nevertheless, in turn, their presences have been necessary for the result. Thus, as was mentioned before the causal mechanism is composed of the signing of peace agreements with the FARC, which entails a change in Colombia’s armed conflict and in the main threat to national security. On the other hand, and associated with the above, is the renewed confrontation with neighboring Venezuela, which in the last fifteen years has acquired Russian weapons systems that have been

perceived as threatening to Colombia. And third, the new status of Colombia as NATO's Global Partner, which is a new challenge for the armed forces that have been fighting a COIN war for more than half a century. In the following figure, we can see the causal inference proposed for the case we are studying:

Figure 1



Source: Prepared by the authors.

The Changing Nature Domestic of Conflict

With the signing of peace agreements with the FARC, the nature of the Colombian armed conflicts had begun to change. On November 24, 2016, the government of Juan Manuel Santos reached an agreement of total cessation of hostilities with the largest and oldest war in the Western Hemisphere. This not only has a relevant political impact for Colombia and Latin America, but also imposes a new challenge for the Military Forces of that country. The COIN-type struggle that the Colombian State has been waging in its consolidation managed to specialize its armed forces in a form of combat not coincident with those developed in the rest of South America.

The peace process is still far from being fully materialized, while the implementation of the clauses of the agreement with the FARC remains a difficult process to carry out, due to weaknesses of the State, the present of spoilers and other violent actors, as well as the persistence of FARC dissidents the field. Additionally, the second largest guerrilla in the country, the ELN, remains active after the government broke the peace negotiations in January (Molano 2019), which maintains the inertia of the COIN struggle within the framework of the doctrine of the Military Forces. Finally, we must not forget that the change of government, with the arrival of the right-wing Democratic Center party member Ivan Duque, has generated fears about the continuity

of the process. Despite these obstacles, the fighting has been reduced⁶. The main indicator is the occupancy rate of beds in the Bogotá Military Hospital (HMB), which historically was the center of attention for wounded or deceased combatants. By mid-2017, eight months after the signing of the agreement with the FARC, the number of occupied beds of the HMB fell by 97% (El Espectador 2017), while by 2018 only one soldier was taken care of (RCN 2018). This clearly indicates that the Colombian internal conflict is changing, forcing the military transformation.

Renewed Confrontation with Venezuela

Colombia and Venezuela share a border of 2,219 Km and a history that in the last 20 years has been turbulent. Both countries were the main players in almost two thirds of the total South American militarized interstate disputes in the last 150 years (COW 2017). During the first years of the 21st century, Venezuela was the second most important trade partner for Colombia. Besides, the mutual border is one of the most active ones in the region, due to the amount of goods, services and people that regularly cross it every day. Thus, it is difficult to think about the possibility that whatever happens in one of these countries, would not affect the other. While for decades Venezuela received millions of Colombians running from socioeconomic inequality, social violence, and the internal armed conflict, now there are thousands of Venezuelans fleeing daily to Colombia trying to escape the crisis that has led the country to the verge of collapse.

In the last five years, the political and economic crisis in Venezuela has only worsened. According to the IMF data, the GDP has decreased in 45%, half of the economy had disappeared, hyperinflation might reach 1.000.000% by the end of the year and poverty levels reached 87% in 2017 (Reuters 2018; El Nacional 2018; El Comercio 2018; CNN 2018). As stated by the President of the Colombian National Exporters Association, the Venezuelan crisis is so deep that in the last years the country basically disappeared in Colombia's trade balance (Caracol 2018b). Additionally, the country is also experiencing a political and security crisis. Five Venezuelan cities figure amongst the top 20 most violent cities in the world, with Caracas being the second most dangerous city in that ranking (Wiss 2018). A situation that could worsen as the social and economic strife goes on.

All of this has generated a growing wave of Venezuelans refugees that

⁶ Although 8.000 FARC members joined the peace process, by the end of 2017 at least 55% of them had abandoned it, leaving the concentration zone (El País 2017).

are looking for new opportunities across the region. Colombia has been one of the most important destinations, nowadays there are around 1.5 million Venezuelans living in the country (Migración Colombia 2019). This situation implies many different challenges for a country that is not used to receive migration and is going through a very unstable political situation after the peace agreement. In this regard, it is important to take into account that many Venezuelans get to Colombia without any resources to survive and others have found there an opportunity to swell the ranks of criminality. On the other hand, the Venezuelan crisis not only means that Colombia must respond to the social challenges that a huge immigration poses, but also to the fact that the border is out of control. The corruption of the Venezuelan institutions makes it extremely difficult to generate cooperation between both countries to fight against the rising criminality in the long frontier. Therefore, this space has turned into a preferred place for criminal gangs and the FARC dissidence to hide and operate.

Furthermore, the diplomatic relations between both governments has been characterized by tensions, with a pragmatic détente promoted by Juan Manuel Santos until 2017, while his administration negotiated the peace process with the FARC under the Venezuelan facilitation, due to the close ties between this guerrilla with the Bolivarian Revolution⁷. Nowadays, the tone has risen to such a point, that some Colombian scholars⁸ point out that Venezuela is the first conflict hypothesis for the country. This is justified by the different military incursions that Venezuela has made in Colombian territory and the declaration made by high officials of the Venezuelan governments, saying that they would bomb and destroy important parts of the Colombian infrastructure if the US invades the country (Caracol 2018a), besides the mobilization of the army in the border (Antolinez 2018). Therefore, the critical situation of Venezuela poses major security challenges to Colombia, as well as its migration crisis put at risk the democratic governability of the region (Mijares & Rojas Silva 2018). The country must control illegal immigration and the criminality that can increase with big waves of migration, which is an important task for the National Police. However, when it comes to protect the national borders, fight the Organized Armed Groups operating there, and defend the National Sovereignty, it's the army who plays the main role, so

⁷ The "Operación Fénix" over Ecuadorian territory was possible due to a phone call of Hugo Chávez to Luis Édgar Devia Silva (A.K.A. Raúl Reyes). The call revealed the geolocation of Reyes' camp (La República 2008).

⁸ This was a statement made by Professor Diego Vera during the seminar "The new role of the Armed Forces in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Perú" held in Perú by the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú in cooperation with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

they must comply with it.

Related to the above, are the renewed tensions with neighboring Venezuela. That country has been suffering from a process of growing authoritarianism, economic crisis, and increased criminal and political violence (Crisis Group 2018). Relations with the Santos government had achieved some stability after the rapprochement with Hugo Chávez in August 2010 (Semana 2010). In addition, the socialist government of Venezuela served as guarantor in the peace negotiations with the FARC, so relations, especially between Santos and Chávez's successor, Nicolás Maduro, maintained a cordial tone. Even in 2015, when Maduro expelled approximately 20,000 Colombians by force (DW 2015), Santos' response was not harsh, as he wished to protect the peace process that was being discussed in Havana.

Protests in Venezuela began to be increasingly frequent in 2014, with the oil prices spike. By 2017, the repression of the Venezuelan state and its economic collapse had turned Colombia into the main recipient of forced migration from Venezuela (Financial Times 2018). With the agreement signed, Santos and his government took a turn against Maduro, renewing the tensions that both States have traditionally had, especially since the arrival of the so-called Bolivarian Revolution in 1999. So far, in 2018, the tension has not stopped to rise, and the government of the United States has been discussing with the Colombian one the possibility of contributing to a strategy of regime change in Venezuela (Londoño and Casey 2018), thus increasing the tension in the border. Since at least 2006 the Venezuelan armed forces have established close relations with Russia, acquiring from them most of their weapons systems (Mijares 2017). This process of military modernization was derived from the arms embargo applied to Venezuela by the United States since 2000. The most formidable Venezuelan offensive weapons are Sukhoi SU-30 fighter aircraft. These, together with the 192 T-72 tanks, the 29 Mi helicopters, the 13 S-300 antiaircraft systems, and the 2,500 Igla (portable soil-to- air missile launchers), constitute a challenge for a Colombian Military Forces with low air firepower and without tanks (SIPRI 2018). This has caused an increase in the Colombian military budget in 2019 of 1.1 billion pesos for the acquisition of an antiaircraft defense system (El Espectador 2018).

Figure 2: Recent Militarized Incidents Between Colombia and Venezuela (2013-2019)



- (A) November 2013: Two Russian bombardiers TU-160 violated claimed Colombian air space over the Caribbean in their fly to Nicaragua after joint air combat exercises with the Venezuelan Air Forces.
- (B) August 2015: Venezuela claimed that three of its military were wounded by Colombian paramilitary forces in Venezuela's state of Táchira.
- (C) September 2015: Colombia claimed that two Venezuelan aircraft fighters SU-30 violated Colombia's air space over the department of Vichada.
- (D) March 2017: Colombia denounced the presence of a Venezuelan temporary military base (with almost 50 troops) in the department of Arauca.
- (E) July 2017: Colombia denounced the Venezuelan National Guards killed a Colombian civilian in the state of Táchira.
- (F) February 2019: Venezuelan militia blocked the humanitarian aid authorized by the opposition National Assembly in the border between the Norte de Santander Department and the Táchira state.
- (G) June 2019: Shooting among Venezuelan National Guards and unknown gang in the Colombia's department of Guajira.

Source: Prepared by the authors.

NATO's Global Partnership

In June 2018, Colombia officially became the first NATO Global Partner in Latin America (Reuters 2018). This change implies an increase in Colombian practical cooperation in NATO's global operations, in addition to the establishment of regular and formal dialogue and agreement channels (NATO 2018). Additionally, the deepening of the relationship with this military alliance, in a convergence of geographical and historical contexts -especially because of the aforementioned situation with Venezuela- implies the need for a doctrinal change for Colombia's defense policy and strategy. Although NATO's Global Partners respond to regional security logics, the demands of this status suppose a process of adaptation to a framework doctrine within

the 2010 NATO strategic concept, which establishes a scope of global action (NATO 2010), creating new conditions for its allies and, by extension for its global partners.

The articulation of the three drivers that are part of the causal mechanism of our explanation, allows inferring causation towards the process of Colombian military transformation. A common feature in them is the change in the environment of conflict that Colombia must face from the second decade of the 21st century onwards, referring to the change in the conflict hypotheses, in the nature of threats and in military action at three levels: domestic, regional, and global. These changes demand a military transformation that is embodied in the Damascus doctrine, a document that is configured as the most important piece of observable evidence to establish that, in effect, a military transformation is taking place in Colombia.

Thus, these conditions or variables, were the driving forces that contributed to overcome the strong resistance that some military sectors had. We argue that the uneasiness of some military decreased because the three factors already mentioned presented a material reality that was impossible to ignore given that it had an impact on the daily lives of the military forces. Probably, if those factors had not existed, the resistance could have increased or, at least, remained the same. In other words, the unease that could have made much harder the implementation of the military reform, was overcome due to the convergence of national, regional and global conditions that ended up being stronger.

Finally, it is important to mention that there might be other intervenient variables relevant to overcome the military unease and produce the outcome, such as the institutional leadership, namely, the role of the president or of the High Command. However, in our case, a candidate of the opposition assumed the presidency and assigned new personnel in the high military positions. Nevertheless, despite the institutional changes, the transformation process keeps going and the resistance to it has not retrieved strength, at the same time that the three drivers are still present. This allows us to infer that although other variables may have played an important role, the causal path can only be established with the three driving forces that we have proposed.

Final Remarks

The Colombian military forces are still going through a continuous process of transformation that is mainly evident in the particular case of the army, although facts as the renewed confrontation with Venezuela and the

NATO partnership give hints to believe that the other forces will also be part of the transformation process. Despite of the resistance in some sectors of the army, the national, regional and international contexts of Colombia are changing, leading to new realities to which the military forces must adapt.

Thus, the changes in the internal armed conflict, Venezuela as a multidimensional threat and the renewed confrontation with this country, and the NATO partnership were identified as the necessary factors that helped to overcome the resistance and produced the military transformation, particularly evident in the new Damascus doctrine. Each one, by themselves are insufficient to explain the transformation but all they were necessary to have this outcome. The unease regarding the military reform has been weakened by the continuous presence and strength of particular conditions in the national, regional and global contexts, leading to the overcoming of that obstacle and the implementation of the transformation. Therefore, despite the resistance, the change of government and the difficulties in implementing the peace process, while in the future the three factors identified remain in the Colombian reality, it is most likely that the military transformation will continue.

Finally, given that there are not recent publications that provide comprehensive explanations for the causality of the Colombian military transformation, this paper aims to present a first approach to understand and explain this case, while making use of a model and methodology that could be applied to other cases. At the same time, it draws attention to the need to keep studying the phenomena related to the military and their roles in the society, given their relevance not only in Colombia, but also in the Latin America as a whole.

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ABSTRACT

After the signing of the peace in Colombia, attention has been directed to the difficult process of implementing the agreements. This complex scenario has downplayed the problem of Colombian military transformation. The basis of that transformation, the *Damasco* doctrine, has encountered resistance within the Colombian Military Forces. Through the application of the method of process tracing, we infer that there is a non-linear, and in progress, process towards the fulfillment of the objectives of the doctrine. Thus, we identify three drivers that are making this transformation advance: a renewed confrontation with Venezuela; the changing nature of the domestic conflict; and the status of Colombia as a NATO global partner.

KEYWORDS

Military Transformation; Damasco Doctrine; Colombian Military Forces; Colombian Peace Agreements; Process Tracing.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF GEO-ECONOMICS: A PATH TOWARDS AN INSTITUTIONAL LIBERALISM APPROACH

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Introduction

This paper will examine the development of contributions and discussions made to the field of geo-economics. It will conduct an overview of commonly used definitions, instances and scope of analysis that have defined what geo-economics means as well as its instruments and goals pursued. Geo-economics focuses on how states use material foundations of power and use them as foreign policy to exert power so as to achieve goals such as accumulating wealth or pursuing political ends. Then, it will be proposed that geo-economics could also have a point of connection with institutional liberalism. As defined by Keohane (2012), institutional liberalism promotes beneficial effects on human security, welfare and liberty as result of a more peaceful, prosperous and freer world. Thus, the mobilisation of economic resources, under a geo-economic focus, could contribute to maintain welfare of a state through responsible cooperation rather than sheer competition and rivalry under a zero-sum paradigm.

Geo-economics, as an extension and replacement of geopolitics, has theoretically been embedded in the paradigm of realism. Realism in International Relations supposes that the international system is an anarchy without a supranational authority that could safeguard the sovereignty and security of the state. The state, therefore, must build up all necessary capabilities to reaffirm its autonomy, safety and economic progress over other states. In order to do so, states will design economic policies and means to assert control and influence over other states' resources and policies. Since the onset of the concept of geo-economics, realism has materialised in several geo-economics works, considering that states will balance against one other

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by using economic measures in order to gain from the global economy. Those research articles imply that rivalry and confrontation over wealth are reasons to apply geo-economics instruments against other states.

This paper will propose that geo-economics must not only entail rivalry and confrontation to define states behaviour. As the US leadership and its global powers have eroded, other regional state powers have been designing ways to compete and gain from the process of economic globalisation. Nonetheless, new emerging states does not vie with other states in an attempt to dismantle, nor veer, from globalisation; quite the opposite, all states benefit from the current world institutional arrangement. Therefore, this paper will propose that states could construct new forms of multilateral institutions, trade agreements and other initiatives that could mould economic integration and how nations could benefit from it.

In order to achieve such conclusions, this paper will be organised as follows: the first section will present and tackle the theoretical field of geo-economics, definitions, debates and scope of analysis, particularly within the tradition of realism². This will give way to discuss the interconnection between institutional liberalism and geo-economics, which could be more suitable to all countries with juxtaposing and coincidental agendas to achieve common concordance in order to preserve the multilateral and institutional world system.

Realism and the Haul of Geo-economics

There are several definitions of geo-economics, most of them have borne out of the tradition of realism as a group of scholars have perceived geo-economics as an extension of geopolitics. Since it was introduced by Luttwak (1990), geo-economics has become more relevant in the last decades as a framework of study, aimed at elucidating the use of economic sources of power to set diplomatic agendas in order to exert influence and power overseas³. He

2 Some other geo-economics contributions use constructivism and Marxism approaches in order to create new conceptions and objectives of geo-economics. Such works will be briefly mentioned and discussed in this paper in order to favour diversity of thought.

3 It is important to point out that this does not mean that states did not use economic foreign policies to achieve specific goals in the past; on the contrary, economic statecraft already existed. For instance, Luttwak (1990) and Baru (2012) contemplate mercantilism as a form and predecessor of geo-economics, a period from which states started to use trade with its colonies to accumulate wealth, exploit natural resources and establish controls over international commerce to their own benefit. Although the cold War was an era of ideological confrontation, there were between the US and other states over economic matters (Blackwill and Harris

argued that the end of the Cold War has derived into a new era in which states are more deterred to use military force to achieve strategic goals *vis-à-vis* the growing presence of economics in state policy-making. He understands geo-economics as the fusion of the logic of conflict with the methods of commerce as the most important component of state behaviour (Luttwak 1990, 19). Therefore, he theorises that geopolitics is replaced by a new form of conflict embedded by economic means, coined as geo-economics.

He attributes this change of paradigm to the end of West-East hostilities and a renewed US dominance over the process of globalisation. His postulation considers the prevalence of a “laissez faire attitude”, which is possible to imply it as a liberal order backed by the US – and other states committed to a freer world. Furthermore, and as part of the current economic globalisation, Luttwak (1990) reckons that states occupy a smaller part of the economic space; and yet, they have economic interests and goals that they would like to realise. Thus, the arena of confrontation is borne out of economic nature, reason why means and ends of state rivalry must belong to the economic domain. To him, a state will have several preoccupations over money matters, the most important of them is if other states could be earning something that is taken away from its own. The zero-sum paradigm is the source of conflict amongst states and their behaviour towards economic activities such as deregulation, industrial policy choices, construction of infrastructure projects and the pursuit of free trade agreements must be strategically thought to compete for economic gains.

Baru (2013) treats the nexus between geopolitics and geo-economics in two different intertwining ways: “the geopolitical consequences of economic phenomena and the economic consequences of trends in geopolitics and sources of national power” (Baru 2013, 37). To him, there is a mutual and reinforcing relation between economic matters and how they are a set of instruments of state strategic policies, which are strongly embedded by geopolitics. With that same thread of thought, Grevi (2011) proposes that geo-economics “encompasses both the conversion of economic assets into political influence and the mobilization of political power to achieve economic objectives”. Scholvin and Wigell (2018) and Kim (2019) also evaluate that geo-economics has been defined as an extension of geopolitics because the logic of interstate rivalry and superiority over others is the ultimate end, which emphasizes how competition for relative power drives state behaviour.

Thus, geo-economics and geopolitics are inherently interdependent since its relation “reflect and result from the perceptions, practices, and

2016b, 12-13). Despite that the use of economic sources of power had been present in previous historical epochs, there was not a particular term used to describe such form of statecraft.

politics revolving around the nation-state performances in regional and global arenas” (Garrett 2019, 262). In more specific terms, it can be understood as an extension of the sphere of geopolitics applied to international economic relations, in that sense, geo-economics is an unfolding of geopolitics (Coelho and Pereira 2020). Hence, the logic of geopolitics remains in geo-economics literature and, whilst some authors will ascertain a closer relation between both fields, others will propose a more distant bond between geo-economics and geopolitics, based on means and goals pursued.

Geo-economics, as defined hitherto, is concerned with statecraft so as to achieve desired geopolitical and economic aims. However, “suggesting that a state is marshalling an economic tool in furtherance of some geopolitical objective does not necessarily imply that there are only geopolitical objectives at stake. States design geo-economic policies that simultaneously advance multiple interests—geopolitical, economic, and otherwise”. (Blackwill and Harris 2016b, 27). This means that geo-economics’ goals and means are sundry in nature. It also implies that geo-economics is not closely intertwined with political motivations solely. Baracuh (2014), for instance, puts more space between geo-economics and geopolitics due to the diffusion of economic power which detaches from prevailing geopolitical conditions. Aside from considering the end of the Cold War as the onset of geo-economics, the author considers that there are other qualitative factors to explain the transit to the logic of geo-economics.

The first of them is the evolving trends in global trade patterns and international commerce negotiations, which display the complexities of a polycentric globalisation and the accelerated revolution in information and communication technologies that reduced costs of communication and coordination. Secondly, by the end of the 2000s decade, a structural divergence began to emerge between global geo-economics and geopolitics, “subtly decoupling the former from the latter and shaping the power structure of a multipolar globalisation” (Baracuh 2014, 121). Furthermore, geo-economics has emerged as important instrument of study because states are more frequently drawn to flaunt economic power since they have more resources at their disposal. It implies the return of a form of state capitalism: “the concentration of such wealth and large levers of economic influence offers them new sources of foreign policy instruments. States are entering markets directly not just for profit” (Blackwill and Harris 2016b, 37). Thus, it is plausible to affirm that last decades have witnessed profound changes in how states interact with one another and the sources of power that defined state relations in the global economy.

This has led to several definitions of geo-economics and how it is

circumscribed on certain contexts and country cases. One import group of literature have focused on states as agents of economic power, broadly understood as the use of statecraft for economic ends (Mattlin and Wigell 2016). States, therefore, will contemplate geo-economics as an interdisciplinary set of tools that includes geopolitical factors, economic intelligence, strategic analysis and foresight. Its objective is providing a tool for states in order to develop and implement successful strategies to conquer markets and protect strategic segments of the domestic economy, amongst other things (Csurgai 2018). Any foreign trade, finance, investment, and industrial policy can be considered instruments for geo-economics, as long as they are deliberately designed and implemented to attain economic and political strategic objectives (Kim 2019, 155). It permeates all areas, from production-technical innovations, specialisation of human resources, technological advances, adequate institutional arrangements and so on.

Geo-economics' main goal is aimed at the accumulation of wealth through market control (Cowen and Smith 2009). Geo-economic means use market-based instruments to assert power and influence. For instance, a country could try to bend the flows of trade, capital and knowhow into its advantage (Holslag 2015), or, for example, widening exports is a geo-economic strategy as it expands the country's wealth as an attempt to limit economic vulnerability. Moreover, geo-economics strategies are also capable to shape how businessman behave in order to adapt to restrictions and opportunities provided by state economic policy (Calvo 2018).

This way, the use of economic means promotes and defends national interests so as to produce beneficial geopolitical results (Blackwill and Harris 2016b, 20). Geo-economics encompasses both the conversion of economic assets into political influence and the mobilization of political power to achieve economic objectives (Coelho and Pereira 2020), and through economic engagement policies, a state can make others become more dependent on it (Kim 2019, 157). Therefore, all economic strategies, whether they are sets of direct state control or instruments to stablish free-market mechanisms and policies, if they are designed to impose one's strategic goals, they can be considered a form of geo-economics. Strategy and political influence are core elements of statecraft when applying geo-economic policies. Besides, as the ultimate goal must be the accumulation of wealth, it eventually increases the state capabilities to apply geo-economic policies as well. In other words, the implementation of successful geo-economic strategies would enhance the state with more geo-economic possibilities to exert more economic power.

Other notions of geo-economics also include security concerns. Cowen and Smith (2009) consider that security "underlines conflicts between the

logics of territorial states and global economic flows, the proliferation of non-state and private actors entangled in security, and the recasting of citizenship and social forms, reinforcing a geo-economic reinterpretation on state security” (Cowen and Smith 2009, 25). To them, a territorial expression of power and geopolitical calculation is not extinguished by this rise of geo-economics. Instead of conquering territories, states strive for accumulation of wealth through market control. From that perspective, tensions over security and economic commitments are amplified since economic interdependence does not perfectly coincide with security arrangements any longer (Baracuhy 2014, 127). Geo-economics does not displace military security concerns; however, economic security has been elevated to the scale of strategic priorities of a country’s national interests. Economic security has become a vital component of regional powers’ ability to project their power and influence (Wigell 2016).

Finally, other authors recognise that economics is not a space dominated by the state alone. There is an intricate web of interests amidst private enterprises and the state. International companies have concentrated a lot of economic power and exercise monopolistic and oligopolistic practices to the point that they abuse their growing market power in order to limit and distort competition. This situation has increased companies’ abilities to exercise economic power so as to vie for certain territories, markets and natural resources with nation-states. Thence, transnational companies also become a driving geo-economic force, capable to either act independently of any state interference or jointly help states to design economic policy.

Therefore, there are states that have preferred to interfere in certain economic sectors due to political motivations (Santos Neves 2017). That situation has prompted to private firms and interest groups to be concerned in pursuing their economic interests through state policy. In fact, the private sector contributes to enhance geo-economics capabilities of the state through innovation, technology development and capital formation. Hence, state behaviour could also be driven by interest groups that attempt to direct its actions on the international arena for their own benefit. Businesses need state support since they also are active economic operators (Luttwak 1990), driven by the individual rationality of investors and firms seeking to benefit from the world’s biggest economic opportunity, and whose cumulative effects are generating major geopolitical consequences (Kapur and Suri 2014).

Besides, businesses have expanded their operations worldwide and decisions made over trade agreements, location of industrial complexes, trade liberalisation agendas, wage differentials and development of technology impact the profit-maximizing demeanour of private actors. These companies’ activities have turned trade and investment linkages into extremely complex

cross-border networks of productions, and have also transformed financial tools into immediate transfers of capital and loans to fund transnational operations. The collusion of private firms with state economic policy is a key geo-economic trend in the creation of innovative environments through the internationalization of knowledge power, which has resulted in an unbreakable unity between the geo-economics and competitiveness in today's globalised world (Kim 2019, 10-11). Countries with assured access to natural resources, capital, technology capabilities and qualified human resources have an advantage over those dependent on capital and goods imports for survival (Baru 2012, 9-10). Furthermore, if a state is capable of consolidating a middle class, combined with governance innovations, such as good fiscal capacities, military capabilities and modern infrastructure, basis of geo-economic power are enhanced (Santos Neves 2017, 92).

Nonetheless, it is not enough to be efficient, competitive or capable of solving the internal structural problems to succeed in the global economy. States and firms must build up interest connections, institutional linkages and participate in relevant state-private sector coalitions. Economic diplomacy can be seen largely as a strategy to respond to this convoluted situation and the growing integration of economic, political and security dimensions (Santos Neves 2017, 91). As a matter of fact, geo-economics is a concern of geopolitical calculus embedded in diplomacy, state security and market mechanisms that responds to the profound changes that have taken place in the last decades, where the international power equilibrium that shaped globalisation has been transformed, with the gradual drifting apart of the alignment between geo-economics and geopolitics, security arrangements, the cross-border character of businesses and the growing presence of a multipolar dispersion of power and the concentration of economic wealth in certain industries.

The complex lattices of the world economy that overlap and encompass sundry private and state interests turns the balance between geopolitical and geo-economic interests and concerns into a situation that is really difficult to anticipate. Therefore, geo-economics presupposes that state relations orbits around a condition of vulnerability and interdependence. States, capable of implementing geo-economics, try to create or exploit this condition in its relations with other states in order to induce desired strategic outcomes (Luttwak 1990, 18, Baracuhy 2014, 121). For that reason, sources of geo-economic power and how they shape a nation's relations with the world must be carefully and strategically designed (Baru 2013, 39).

Since not all states are equal in their capacity to project geopolitical power, "there are certain structural features—or geo-economic endowments—that dictate how effective a country is likely to be in the use of geo-economic

tools” (Blackwill and Harris 2016b, 27). The larger the geo-economic capabilities, the more efficient the state is capable to apply geo-economic tools to balance against other states, and profit from it. By accumulating more economic means and expand its possibilities to influence the globalisation process, it can guarantee its security.

Realists, in fact, emphasise the vulnerability and unpredictability characters of the current world order so as to suggest that the state must project power onto other states in order to reduce undesirable outcomes that could be caused by state fragile positions. The use of geo-economics, hence, provides states with instruments to assure a better environment that assure its economic security and political goals whilst asserting its power position in relation to other states. However, realism is not the only paradigm that has contributed to discuss geo-economics. The following section will briefly discuss other contributions in order to extend diversity of thought in this paper.

Other Approaches to Geo-economics

Constructivism and Marxism approaches have come to consider other theoretical tools to discuss geo-economics. As acknowledged by several scholars, geo-economics is in infant stages of construction, reason why academic contributions are being done to broaden the debate. Constructivists, on the one hand, consider that the logic of conflict, the complexities of globalisation and its multipolarity character affect the perceptions of states. Thus, within a geo-economics scope of analysis, the state is encompassed with a force capable of transfiguring the economic and political international arenas, where the nation-state and the world economy are mutually reinforcing one another. Geo-economics enables states to use new foreign policy tools and choices, transforming the nature of diplomacy (Blackwill and Harris 2016a, 104).

Luttwak (1990) proposed basically a lineal and consequential change from geopolitics to geo-economics. His work has been critiqued for that assumption and constructivist works have recast this change of paradigm. Cowen and Smith (2009) provide a theorisation in which they consider that geopolitics has been historically deconstructed, a process in which the state was once the central role, but it has been gradually supplanted, particularly since the end of the Cold War. The state occupied the geopolitical social space but its erosion has given rise to the logic of geo-economics. To them, the geopolitical logic is not extinguished, but “significantly circumscribed and

reworked as they focus on how the new global economic flows recast social forms, providing for an emerging geo-economic social in which territorial security is reframed to accommodate these transnational flows” (Cowen and Smith 2009, 25). It also recasts security in economic terms and reframes the state as a geo-economic agent that seeks to accumulate wealth through market control rather than through acquisition and control of territory.

Therefore, it is surmised that geo-economics is built on a strong belief that economic measures, when employed in place of military force, are capable of altering other states’ views, behaviours, or interests in high-stake situations (Kim 2019, 156). Geo-economics is capable of transforming territorial and economic security spaces by adapting supranational flows into economic terms and reframes the state as a geo-economic agent that seeks to accumulate wealth (Cowen and Smith 2009, 25-26). Thus, all economic measures for geo-economics work by politically distorting economic conditions and manipulating important aspects of international economic exchanges, and inadvertently, constrain free economic transactions of domestic firms and individuals (Kim 2019, 160-163).

Hence, the geo-economic social establishes a relationship between economic policy and changes in the national power and interprets the world through economic indicators, the interconnection of national economies, transnational economic power and their involvement in the global chains of goods and services production (Scekic, Draskovic and Delibasic 2016). Geo-economics, understood as state intervention, is capable of transforming geographical spaces in times of crisis, change and its political consequences within a geographical space and affect the scope of state sovereignty (Mattlin and Wigell 2016, Kutz 2017). In turn, geo-economics has given way to the emergence of a state project in which the summing of institutional and international dimensions of state-building now reflect the prioritisation of economic growth and global competitiveness of the state (Chacko 2015, 329). Geo-economics creates new forms of global and regional engagement that have served to further deepen state transformation. In this sense, geo-economics presents an innovative role for designing and transforming the world order. (Scekic, Draskovic and Delibasic 2016).

Geo-economics, instead of being driven by utter confrontation and a zero-sum rationale, constructivist approaches provide a new conception of the state, which possesses transforming capabilities so as to modify its space, institutions, beliefs and political agendas under an economic approach. Geo-economics, rather than balancing against other states in order to secure its economic ends, is defined by constructivists as state policies that are capable of transforming the economic space through several instruments, wherein

the logic of geopolitics is deconstructed by the rationality of economics to reshape state behaviour. Therefore, the state is the most important agent of transformation from geopolitical social practises to geo-economic social forms of state interactions and have served to transform state policies (Chacko 2015). In other words, state has transformed itself to be capable of building geo-economic competences which are useful for moulding its relations with other states; simultaneously, the global economy affects state behaviour and the way it designs economic policy.

Finally, and aside of the realist and constructivist approaches to define geo-economics, there are explanations that detach from prior definitions and uses. Marxist methods expound geo-economics as a form of discourse, which only attempts to exert the expansion of national interests. Sparke (2007) argues that geo-economics is a discourse that shapes US worldwide security strategies since “it is a tool of capitalism assimilation within a geographic notion of distribution of power and geostrategies that are favourable to the US capital”. In this sense, Morrissey (2017) considers US geo-economics as the military coalesce in the strategic and technological enactment of military-economic securitisation. On the one hand, neoliberalism is secured on a global scale through market liberalisation; but, on the other, the US uses the same devastating use of imperial violence to maintain its global dominance.

Domosh (2013), Tavares and Metri (2020) also consider that geo-economic imaginations fuelled and legitimized economic expansion since it is a narrative of how geo-economics has refigured the ideology of civilisation, bent to suit the needs of US-based international companies. This way, geo-economics is an instrument of political legitimacy and construction of a global identity to a national political elite (Giacalone 2016, 135). This has been building a concept of geo-economics that detaches from the perspective of geographic causality and through the materialist method present in the Marxist approaches and Imperialism Theories. Coelho and Pereira (2020) propose that geo-economics overlaps with World System Theory since geo-economics is a phenomenon of economic strategy, which incorporates research agenda elements such as trade policy, investment policy, economic and financial sanctions, financial and monetary policy, etc. They are all used to achieve the geopolitical objective of capitalism assimilation within a geographic notion. Hence, it is possible to infer that geo-economics is a form of spatiality of imperialism comprising inequalities between core and periphery in the world economy (Coelho y Pereira 2020).

The Rise of Geo-economics

Hitherto, it is possible to identify that several definitions of geo-economics, especially those presented as an extension of the logic of geopolitics, follow the tradition of realism within International Relations. In this situation, states balance against each other as nations are mutually perceived as threats to their own security and interests. This results in the mobilisation of economic resources, diplomacy and other sort of means to achieve economic goals, even if it means that such ends are detrimental to other states.

However, a contradiction arises: does the post-Cold War US hegemony is the cause of geo-economics? If the US were to guarantee the world economy, then it would be possible for its government to impose and preserve its economic power and the geopolitics of US capital over the global economy. Furthermore, if there were a commitment by all states to liberal values of commerce and institutions, the US hegemony would be reinforced, without any type of confrontational demeanour by other states. What happens is the opposite, geo-economics is defined by confrontation and rivalry amongst states in order to get the most from the global economy, even if that means to balance against the US and oppose the institutions, rules and values backed by the US and other Western democracies.

Geo-economics is, therefore, a response to the waning of US relative hegemony. Contrary to what Luttwak (1990) had predicted, geo-economics has come to be a response to US decline in a growing multipolar world system (O'Loughlin and Anselin 1996, Mattlin and Wigell 2016, Troxell 2018). This has come to spawn a dominant trend in world politics towards regionalisation rather than globalization, and fragmentation of unipolar hegemonic leadership and power into several new emerging powers. This has resulted in the weakening of the liberal economic order due to the emergence of new regional powers that is dividing the world into trade blocs, in which the US-backed globalisation is transiting into a multicentric configuration of the world system.

It is true that the post-war globalisation process was mainly conducted by the US and Europe and the rules promoted by these countries, which hinged on liberal values and institutions that promoted a freer order; nonetheless, the emergence of new regional powers, who might not be fully contented with neither the US-led globalisation – nor the existing rules, are balancing against them, using geo-economics means to achieve so. Even if the US remained as an unchallenged power at the end of the Cold War and its dominance endorsed the continuation of such model of global economic

integration, the fact is that in a matter of decades, the unipolarity has been fading rapidly, especially since the 2008 financial crisis.

As a matter of fact, the emergence of new world powers has paved the way to important contributions to geo-economics literature, which attempts to identify new state relations and their economic foreign policies that have prompted changes in the global economy. They consider that the concentration of economic power and the intricate regionalization process of conglomerates and transnational companies are shaping state responses to the complexities of the global power system (Baru and Dogra 2014, Santos Neves 2017, Troxell 2018). Moreover, the recurrent economic crisis in the last three decades have put more pressure on the societies that contributed to build and preserve the international liberal order and now, they are being challenged by emerging state powers – China, India, Russia, amongst others. In this multipolarity, diversity becomes the rule (Baracuhy 2014, 127), which has turned geo-economic responses more heterogeneous, resulting in countries that may not be concerned in preserving the current *status quo*.

Considering the above-mentioned factors, relevant literature has focused on country cases to evaluate how emerging powers – and well established developed economies, are prompted to resort to geo-economic agendas. For instance, China has received a lot of attention for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project⁴ and how the Chinese money has benefited countries from the Central Asian region, using Chinese money to build infrastructure projects, from which China expects to have access to its abundant energy resources and create more channels of international trade to farther economic regions such as Europe and Africa (Kellogg 2003, Yeh 2016, Golley and Ingle 2018, 55). Furthermore, the BRI project presents an opportunity for the Chinese government to give renminbi-nominated credit and loans to recipients and turn its currency into a more internationalised payment method (Yan 2020). In Asia-Pacific, China-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is attempting to create a support base against US proposed Transpacific Partnership (TPP) and create a large free trade area, orbiting around the Chinese economy. Unlike the US and Europe, China does not demand democratic advances in the countries where its money is

4 It is an enormous project that paves the way to the Chinese government promote its economics interests to other continents through loans, subsidies and other forms of assistance to attract friends and partners and help them build infrastructure projects, contributing to the expansion of trade in the Eurasian continent and west region of China. Through the BRI initiative, the Chinese government is expanding its presence overseas, simultaneously the Chinese economy is transiting from export-led growth to a local consumption-based economy, it is using huge surplus industrial capacity in infrastructure and heavy machinery sectors to produce goods necessary for the BRI projects (Bhoothalingam 2016, 48).

invested in. This turns China's geo-economic policies into more flexible and accommodating sources of income for receiving countries, and it is slowly reconfiguring the geopolitical order that has been the dominant global social order since World War II (Forough 2019, 277).

India is another case of a rising power. Since the Indian economy commenced its reforms to open up to FDI and international trade in the eighties, the country has increasingly become more dependent on its international environment. Hence, India decided to secure its future economic development to East Asia, reason why it has pushed several initiatives to secure investment, export markets and natural resources necessary to boost its economic growth. On the hand one, Baru (2013) contemplates that India must gain autonomy and self-reliance in the context of economic interdependence in order to draw economic opportunities. On the other hand, geo-economic discourses have come to India's frontline due to the construction of a state focused on the prioritisation of economic growth and global competitiveness (Chacko 2015, 329). Additionally, India shares other governments' concern over China's rise and it has strategically cooperated to build a quadrilateral framework involving Japan, the United States and Australia, "described as the alliance of democracies, or as an 'arc of freedom and prosperity', aimed at containing China's rise" (Jain 2010, 409).

The EU, its members and their agendas are under geo-economic interpretations as well. For instance, Germany's handling of the 2009 European economic crisis was conditioned by the rise of China and other emerging powers, which "changes the significance of the eurozone in the global supply chains within a logic of conflict" (Germann 2018, 602). The EU project itself, its expansion and the launch of euro are causing a dollar-reserves decline, giving way to the coexistence of multi-currency reserves and the emergence of geo-economic monetary policies (Sidaway 2005). Additionally, energy is another concern of geo-economic consequences for the EU since its gas and oil supplies commingles with security and diplomatic relations with several states, such as Russia, Turkey, Iran and the Central Asian region; matters, which are being handled under a liberal perspective (Bilgin 2010). Regional inequality is perceived as another threat to political and social cohesion at the core of the EU, problems that could be solved through a geo-economic perspective to support the periphery via mobilisation of economic and fiscal policies to boost productivity in the manufacturing sector (Fingleton 2004). The competitiveness of the European block will also depend on the Brexit negotiations to have access to the London financial centre (Dorri 2017).

And finally, the US, which although has been described by Blackwill

and Harris (2016b)⁵ and Cruz de Castro (2000) as a reluctant nation to apply geo-economics and form a collective and cohesive approach towards economics as part of a foreign policy agenda, it is important to outline that there are administrations that pushed geo-economic agendas. Certain administration policies have been understood through the lenses of geo-economics such as the Clinton government, which used NAFTA to impose a globalisation model centred on US corporate interests (Saxe-Fernandez 1996). Another example is the Obama administration and the launch of TPP as an important building block of its global strategy so as to create a critical mass of countries that support its geo-economic objectives, particularly, the contention of the Chinese influence (Rashish 2014, Baru and Dogra 2014). Although China is one of the biggest concerns of the US, the Trump administration's protectionist stand against the global economy might have catastrophic geo-economic results for global prosperity into the future. (Golley and Ingle 2018, 59).

Therefore, it is possible to identify that established economic centres such as the US, Europe and Japan now coexist with new centres of economic power – China, India and Brazil, amongst other emerging economies. In geo-economic multipolarity, diversity becomes the rule, which in turn, enhances all states to have broader possibilities to project global power and shape the process of economic integration. States, which have augmented their geo-economic capabilities, have more instruments to design an economic foreign policy that effectively alter its relations with other states to its own benefit. Those geo-economic instruments are diverse, either rooted on state intervention or market-oriented policies, but they are following the dogma

⁵ Blackwill and Harris (2016a, 2016b) particularly recognise that epochs during and prior the Cold War were also sprinkled of examples of how states used geo-economics. Both authors tell an account of how the US has been swaying from administrations more eager to use geo-economics as means to project American influence over the world to governments that preferred other tools to exert its power globally. When comparing different and previous US foreign policies under particular administrations, both authors conclude that such ambivalence is related to an amplified preoccupation with political military measures in contexts like the Soviet Union dismantlement or the war against terrorism. Furthermore, they also consider that there is a persistent neoclassical economic thought amongst US policymakers, who believe that markets and economics must be separated from any geopolitical meddling. To them, the US has been ambiguous and inconsistent when it comes to use geo-economics to project power. They end reflecting that the US should recover its traditional geo-economics, pointing out at the fact that many regional and emerging economies are using geo-economics to advance their strategic goals so as to exercise more influence and control over certain territories, resources and international markets. Particularly, they focus on China, which, in their opinion, is the most important reason to discuss world changes in terms of geo-economics since “it is widely understood that China's emergence is to carry some of the most profound geopolitical effects since the United States emerged from World War II as the world's leading power” (Blackwill and Harris 2016b, 21).

of pursuing and increasing its wealth in order to assert its power over other nations.

Geo-economics and Institutional Liberalism

Geo-economics, as a theoretical proposal, has been nourished by postulations in the fields of realism, constructivism and Marxism. As a result, several frameworks of study have been contrived to explain how states make policy choices and build state capabilities in order to interact with one another. Rivalry is not adequate enough to explain state demeanour since acute competition over economic profits could cause stringent diplomatic policies that would cause the derailment of the multilateral international order and its institutions.

Geo-economics should not construct state policy instruments aimed at increasing tensions and stiffness in a multipolar world that could turn state relations and geographic areas into a constant powder-keg status, waiting for a trigger that could steer the world towards a repetition of divisions and confrontations of the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. Hence, it is imperative to contribute to a different conception of geo-economics, one identified with the precepts of institutional liberalism.

Institutional liberalism is understood as the dominance of the view that cooperation in world politics can be enhanced through the construction and support of multilateral institutions based on liberal principles (Keohane 2012). Institutional liberalism bets on a free world that could guarantee a more peaceful and prosperous world. In order to achieve such goals, institutions must be built to protect such freedoms with caution and restrain. Liberal values⁶ provide a rationale for building cooperative institutions that can facilitate better lives for human beings. Therefore, democratic peace, pluralistic security communities, complex interdependence and an open trading system attempt to capture distinctive features of liberal and democratic societies and their relations.

Since the end of World War II, several institutions were put in place in order to supervise and coordinate states' policies towards specific goals.

6 The liberal values contemplate open markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, progressive change, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty and the rule of law (Kundnani 2017). It incorporates the rule-based order and considers that states behaviour is not simply determined by power; rather, international law constrains the action of states. Openness of the economic order. breaking down of artificial barriers to the flow of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and people across borders. And finally, the protection of human rights, regardless of religious beliefs, nationality, gender, age and so on.

Institutions and accords such as the IMF, the WB and GATT were aimed at promoting free trade, monetary stability and the establishment of cooperation mechanisms to reduce poverty, build infrastructure and increase the welfare of people. Green and Denmark (1999) define the post-war institutions-building phase as *execution*, which combined high economic growth, the US cementation as hegemonic world leader and a renewed set of security concerns. Thus, institutional building after World War II, and throughout the Cold War, focused on security issues and contention of the soviet bloc by promoting economic prosperity, social welfare, economic stability and several forms of cooperation. Trade, security, financial stability and monetary assistance were areas of reciprocal cooperation that lasted longer after the Soviet Union's dissolution. As pointed by Keohane (2012), Deudney and Ikenberry (1999), these mechanisms of cooperation were poorly legalised, and cooperation took place on the basis of mutual self-interest and reciprocity.

Green and Denmark (1999) distinguish that the liberal order entered a phase of decline, in which global problems delegitimize the liberal order and puts it under attack. Keohane (2012) discusses why the erosion of institutional liberalism has been taking place. The liberal values' decline is product of a lack of legalisation that turned the institutionalisation into a robust set of principles, norms and rules embedded in legalism and moralism⁷. To him, both components have spawned a lack of coherence in the international system. Coherent institutions (and array of institutions) must have clear lines of authority linking them. However, an incoherent system of institutions has arisen due to changes in structure of international power and tensions with liberalism. It is manifested, as Keohane prudently remarks, that those difficulties are not properly caused by liberalism; but liberalism has been unable to realise its core values in a fragmented power and pluralist domestic politics (Keohane 2012, 128).

Moralism, in Keohane's analysis, is necessary as a guide that can help prioritise the promotion of democratic and liberal values overseas; but, on the other hand, moralism could be used to distort reality and mask treacherous motivations. In the case of legalism, he endorses the idea that legalism provides stable grounds to norm a rough order; nonetheless, legalism might be too rigid to adapt to changes in power and unable to help solve urgent political problems. Therefore, institutional liberalism is facing an impasse, in

⁷ Keohane (2012) defines legalism as "the belief that progress takes place through law" and moralism as "the belief that moral principles provide valuable, if not necessarily sufficient guides to how political actors should behave, and that actions by those in power can properly be judged on the basis of their conformity to general moral principles developed chiefly to govern the actions of individuals" (Keohane 2012, 129, 132).

which the distribution of economic power has created sundry and juxtaposed interests amidst emerging economies in a complex economic globalisation process. In several cases, the institutions that have interconnected major national powers have weakened, resulting in incoherencies in the international system.

Geo-economics has hatched amidst a growing counter-narrative to the progressive and pacific narrative of Institutional Liberalism. Although some nations may favour policy changes that are conducive to global prosperity and peace, they may be blocked by protectionist barriers, self-righteous savers, or nationalists and other vested interests (Keohane 2012, 135). Some geo-economic policies neglect peace and increase tensions amongst states. For instance, Obama's 'Pivot-to-Asia' was conceived to contain the increasing influence of China, but the Chinese government became more belligerent as response to US interference in the Asia-Pacific region. EU's economic bridges to Eastern Europe has stirred violent actions from Russia. China's BRI is being promoted to nations that lack – or have weak – institutional counterweights, and Chinese money could be used politically to strengthen antidemocratic regimes.

Thence, geo-economics has come to be understood as a set of instruments, policies and security interests that are not necessarily aligned to liberal values, especially when applied by nondemocratic states or by any given Head of State, who is willing to pursue certain economic and geopolitical goals by using coercive, discriminatory – and even intimidating measures. Such forms of interactions amidst states would only further undermine the international system. Confrontation would be more acute if states kept a policy based under a zero-sum paradigm so as to design policies that balance against each other. Reasons why, geo-economics must contemplate incorporating principles and values from institutional liberalism.

An interconnection between geo-economics and institutional liberalism has already been proposed by Wigell (2016). His work did a categorisation of geo-economic strategies: neo-mercantilism, neo-imperialism, hegemony and liberal-institutionalism. Each of them is a mixture of competition and cooperation, and if goals pursued are geopolitical or purely economic. In his classification, institutional liberalism is defined by a geo-economic conception of economic resources deployment in order to pursue sheer economic objectives, depicted as an "economy-oriented notion of foreign policy idealism" (Wigell 2016, 145). It is considered a civilian power that accepts the necessity of cooperation with other states in order to pursue national objectives as it favours multilateralism and economic integration.

However, Wigell (2016) omits that pursuing pure economic objectives

comes into conflict with the propositions of international liberalism and the concept of geo-economics itself. On the one hand, all definitions of geo-economics provide an insight to the relationship of economic power relative to political power – and geography. Geo-economics imply state intervention and that interferes with the efficiency principle of liberal economics. In fact, all works on geo-economics literature incorporate state intervention over political objectives and economic matters as its cornerstone. Statecraft is designed to pursue economic and political objectives – even if those seem to be of mere economic nature. Thus, there is no pure economic policies without state intervention in geo-economics theorisations.

On the other hand, liberal institutionalism turns to institutions and law as constraints of power, and simultaneously institutions rest on political power and on how changes in power generate changes in institutions. As a matter of fact, institutional liberalism recognizes the dependence of economics on politics and does not believe in a harmony of interests (Keohane 2012). Hence, Wigell's categorisation of liberal institutionalist strategies as purely economic goals contradicts definitions of both, geo-economics and institutional liberalism. (Wigell 2016) supposes an idealism over geo-economics in its categorisation of liberal institutionalism but omits the conception of power that lies within the concept of geo-economics itself. Furthermore, he overlooks the fact that institutional liberalism is a response to the relationship between state interactions and political power to shape institutions.

Therefore, a relationship between geo-economics and institutional liberalism must incorporate power relations within institutions and economic policies. The proposition of geo-economics of this current paper is to think of geo-economic goals and its instruments within institutional constraints and a common basis of values, considering that the current globalisation process has sewed several interwoven strands of economic interdependence. Despite several states may challenge western liberalism, the fact is that none of them has attempted to obliterate the current international system; on the contrary, all states benefit from it, whether they are more or less committed to liberal values.

The Chinese government, when picked by the Trump administration to be hit with a rise on trade tariffs, pledged the US to protect free trade and avoid protectionist measures. Whereas several democratic provisions are not granted in Russia, economic freedoms are given as long as they contribute to get the nation rich and, of course, if business interests do not challenge the Russian government. India has continued its economic reforms to liberalise more sectors of its economy to attend to its rusty infrastructure and growing

demand of investment and employment.

Hence, and despite Russia, China, and other regional powers that have built an anti-liberalism rhetoric, the fact is that all of them depend on the current set of rules, and they all have interest in keeping an economic global system based on liberal values. They depend on democratic peace, pluralistic security communities, complex interdependence and free international trade to prosper. Such characteristics capture distinctive features of liberal, capitalist, and democratic modern societies and therefore, mould state relations (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999). States cannot practice isolation strategies since they need to maintain relations with other states to push their economic and political goals, and by rehearsing co-biding into institutions states mutually constrain one another. Institutionalisation of states relations and world politics are capable to exert a significant effect on statecraft (Orozco 2006, 170).

Thus, institutional liberalism is a mechanism to prevent states decide to balance against other states since “establishing institutions of mutual constraint and co-binding reduces the risks and uncertainties associated with anarchy. It is a practice that aims to tie potential threatening states down into predictable and restrained patterns of behaviour, and it makes unnecessary balancing against such potential threats” (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999, 182-183). Furthermore, and contrary to balancing strategies, co-biding through institutions provides distinctive features such as transparency, the diffusion of power into many hands, and the multiple points of access to policy-making (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999, 187). This, in turn, makes state relations more predictable and harmonised.

Besides, the multipolarity and interdependence of the current globalisation provokes overlooked consequences of farther reach as result of states’ actions and omissions when designing economy policy (Solana 2015). Balancing against other states could not only damage the targeted nation, but it could also harm one’s security and one’s national business interests beyond suppositions because of the vibrant economic globalisation, which involves a large number of autonomous companies, international banks, running thousands of business decisions and financial transactions every single minute. Under such conditions, it is very difficult to anticipate the distribution of gains and losses.

Therefore, responsibility must be part of any geo-economic agenda. As Solana (2015) correctly points out, any noxious tactical demeanour ought to be abandoned; instead, a discernment that strategically encompasses security and responsibility must be put in place since the world is more complex, volatile and interdependent. Geo-economics, in this context, should be obliged

to create new frames of reference and analysis because interdependency constrains state behaviour and sets limits to policy-decisions making. Geo-economics, rather than becoming a policy of exclusion, intimidation or institutional obliteration, must incorporate economic measures aimed at trying to convince other states that it is in their own interest to take a certain set of actions and respect the rules of the game (Kim 2019, 156).

All states, in this fashion, are aware of the interdependence character of the international economy and politics, and as predicted by most geo-economics literature, there is no incentives for states to push its economic, security and political interests through military force. Reason why, geo-economics inherently considers that strategic autonomy in an interdependent world is secured through creating mutually beneficial relationships of interdependence, not from mere assertion of one's independence or non-alignment (Baru 2013, 37). Countries, that are not cooperative in the geo-economic atlas of the world, are not aware of their economic interests and does not protect them (Scekic, Draskovic and Delibasic 2016, 69).

If geo-economics continued to be only a set of strategies and tactics, under a zero-sum paradigm, the world order could be undermined, resulting in bloc coalitions and higher levels of unpredictability, which would only amplify the risk of bolder confrontations. Insecurity, instability, fragmentation, exclusion, political and economic polarizations would become more acute at national and international levels (Saxe-Fernandez 1996, Baracuhy 2014). All the more, coercive geo-economic behaviours spawn an inability to achieve more preferable geo-economic alternatives (Green and Denemark 1999, Blackwill and Harris 2016b). In other words, geo-economics when used in detriment of other states, those affected states would pursue the same policy, leaving other options out and turning the world into a stiffer place to pursue common concordance.

Geo-economics must not become an instrument of fragmentation due to geopolitical motivations since economics, unlike in war, everyone can win and enjoy the fruit of economic growth and development. So, states must responsibly materialise the benefits of interdependence while managing the costs it imposes (Baru 2013, 37). States need to be aware that several factors, including domestic politics of other nations and the level of their economic and institutional interconnections affect economic policy choices (Friedberg 1994). Therefore, autonomy and self-reliance to pursue geo-economic objectives have to be defined in the context of the economic interdependence of nations, which could be only strengthened within multilateral institutions.

The multipolar world could be a hard world to go through and conflict could be inevitable, but only within effective and inclusive multilateral

institutions, dissent could be properly managed (Solana 2015, 28). Institutional liberalism could build boundaries to geo-economic strategies since institutions contribute to alloy strategic thinking with security. Security and economic tensions reinforce one another within states interaction (Blackwill and Harris 2016b), but the incompatibility of interests found in realist propositions of geo-economics could be solved by an institutional liberalism approach. Since institutions building has formed interactions that contributes to the viability of the international system, institutional cooperation creates mechanisms of reciprocity and common security.

Although institutional liberalism does not promise a continuous and stable concordance, it is a source of hope for improvement, which is tied to institutional checks against retrogression (Keohane 2012, 136). It might also suffer limitations to change due to rigidities and slowness to adapt to international power changes, but geo-economics provides flexible grounds to states since they may enjoy sufficient autonomy to design economic diplomacy, which must be contained by a common understanding of rules and principles. "All nations, aspiring to exercise some sort of hegemony, will need to engage in a 'give-and-take', even involving some 'self-sacrifice', in order to make its hegemony 'tolerable to the other members of the world community'" (Keohane 2012, 131). In other words, and discussed previously, the complexities of the global economy impede states to have accurate estimations on gains and losses, but it is clear that responsibility and prudence may require a cost in order to promote common security to all states, which in the long run purveys more economic benefits.

Thus, it is important to point out that institutional liberalism is a dynamic commitment to allow countries to be different within a multilateral framework. It is a compromise between the needs for universality on which a strong order must rest on, and the needs for particularity that are inevitable in a plural world order (Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2004). It enhances coalition-building possibilities to all countries since their preferred policies serve interests that go beyond the national interests of world powers (Green and Denmark 1999). Under such conditions, geo-economics, instead of contributing to uncertainty, it could help to reach new forms of adaptation to a world of multipolar distribution of power, providing states a multidisciplinary approach that encompasses several types of economic policy choices, from direct state intervention or market-based strategies in order to create a flexible diplomacy. Those policy choices, however, need to rest on institutional constraints so that multilateral accords and institutions as well as its norms and values could be preserved. This way, the depth of institutionalisation could exert a significant effect on state behaviour, contributing to a more

predictable demeanour amongst states (Orozco 2006, 170). In turn, state conduct would be more predictable and assertive.

Despite the threat that multipolarity poses to multilateralism, free trade and market-based policies can spread and strengthen liberal democracy. Besides, institutional liberalism permits several states to participate in policy-making since they have a variety of channels and mechanisms for registering their interests with world's great powers (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999, 187). Therefore, the expansion of economic interests and interdependence works as an instrument to alter and maintain the preferences and features of other states that are politically and strategically congenial, producing a more strategically and politically hospitable system (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999, 191-192). Even if rivalry prevailed as a relevant component of geo-economics, as its policies would be institutionally constrained, competition for investing, trade and markets to developing countries would be beneficial in terms of global economic growth.

Final Remarks

Geo-economics is still a concept under construction, so contributions have broadened the discussions about its scope, instruments, criterions and how states are using it to construct diplomacy and economic policy. As extension of geopolitics, geo-economics offers a framework of study to explain state behaviour based on rivalry, pursuit of economic gains and geopolitical objectives, supported by the logic of realism. However, geo-economics should not rest on tighter competitive strategies that would only undermine the international system. Stiffness and rigidities caused by exclusionary and predatory economic practices would get cooperation and concordance more arduous to achieve.

Hence, strategic cooperation and responsible statecraft must be part of geo-economics, constrained by institutional limits. Multilateral institutions contribute to the international order and restrict any bold form of statecraft that could further destabilise it. Since geo-economics contemplates the lack of compatibility between security and economic objectives as motivations to balance against other states to reaffirm one's economic and political goals, institutional liberalism proposes an alternative to balancing and zero-sum paradigms. Multilateral cooperation, institutions and its values are bridges to reach consent amongst all states to give them a certain level of tolerable security. Absence of conflict is not guaranteed, but if responsibly managed, bolder confrontation could be avoided.

Geo-economics, as it has been becoming a more recurrent discipline to explain economic policy and diplomacy, it requires a different approach that could incorporate responsibility, caution and restraint. All societies face demanding challenges on poverty, environmental problems, growing inequality, etc., which could be more adequately solved through a multilateral approach. Utter confrontation would not be able to reach a proposal that could contribute to long-term solutions. Therefore, a multipolar world requires prudence and responsibility which could be channelled through a set of agreed of institutions and common values.

Although institutionalists agree that institutions once in place will be hard to dismantle and have persisted over decades, they have been slow to adapt to changes in world distribution of power. If emerging powers are not included in redesigning these institutions, they will likely continue its balancing strategies since they are motivated to resist what they consider imposed institutions (Keohane 2012). Geo-economics, in this sense, could provide flexibility for states to design independent economic policy that could help states reach new agreements to recreate the international system, capable of tackling the urgent problems that our societies will face in the following decades.

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ABSTRACT

Geo-economics mostly fall into the realist paradigm of International Relations since it is understood as the use of economic means under strategic military logic as principal instruments of statecraft. However, geo-economics is neither caused by states alone nor driven by multipolar rivalry solely. Instead, geo-economics requires a framework of study which considers that there are countless links of interdependence in the global economy that must be taken into consideration to explain state behaviour. Institutional liberalism provides geo-economics theoretical grounds to maintain cooperation and responsibility as central components of geo-economics.

KEYWORDS

Institutional Liberalism; Geo-economics; Multipolarity.

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REVISITING THE US-CHINA TRADE WAR: A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

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Introduction

Zhaohui Wang argues in his paper “Understanding Trump’s Trade Policy with China: International Pressures Meet Domestic Politics” that Trump’s trade policy with China is fundamentally driven by the increasingly competitive US–China relationship, which influenced Trump’s perception of China as America’s primary strategic competitor and concern with the US trade deficit, and reinforced by the Trumpization of the Republican Party under the US domestic polarization (Wang 2019). John Conybeare defines trade war as an international conflict in which “states interact, bargain, and retaliate primarily over economic objectives directly related to the traded goods or service sectors of their economies, and where the means used are restrictions on the free flow of goods or services” (Bastos 2017).

The research is created to study the interpretation of the policy of trade war in international relations. It aims to diagnose that what global analysts and other states presume of a certain country when it undergoes a trade war, that is what were the takes of the international world when the United States of America- the leading superpower being under security dilemma and petrified from alleged peaceful rise of China. Moreover, it seeks to understand the mindset and comprehension of a leader in the external grounds who undergoes the policy of tariffs against another state. The paper explores how conflict is a consequence of international rivalry as well as domestic-political reasons.

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Research Methods

The opinions of leading experts in trade, commerce and foreign policy have been studied to reach a reasonable evaluation of US China Trade War. The qualitative method of analysis is adopted throughout the paper. For this purpose the perspectives from multinational institutions and reputed think tanks have been gathered from their publications journal articles, surveys and charters. Moreover, due to the inclination or biasness towards one state's view, alternative outlooks on the subject-matter have been studied particularly from Europe and East Asia to explore several approach and perspective. The scenario is then assessed under the framework of "Rational Choice Theory" employed by a number of political economist and experts from the times of Adam Smith who based his masterpiece "Wealth of Nations" on the basis of this model.

Karen Thierfelder observes that "since the beginning of 2018, the United States has introduced new tariffs on imports from several trading partners citing national security concerns, unfair trade practices, or serious injury to domestic industries" (Devarajan et al 2018). However later an exclusive list was sorted to cast tariffs upon the imports from China which later followed a reprisal policy. It is now an ordinary ritual to assess the trade policies as an extension of a political process that does not necessarily give rise to aggregate welfare maximization (Razin 2011). US is alleged to use elements of trade war prior in history to revamp the economy in the period of Great Depression (Fearon and Crafts 2013). Smooth Hawley tariffs bill was first passed by the American Congress under President Herbert Hoover on June 17, 1930 (Crucini 2003). In the contemporary times, Washington is has applied protectionist laws against its trading partners. For instance, Mexico has been the subject of trade wars due to the immigrant issue.

Trade Wars in International Relations

In international relations a trade war is when one state apply and surge tariffs to increase the cost of shipping goods across borders causing the other to respond, in a tit-for-tat pattern in which the other nation and foreign countries retaliate with similar forms of trade protectionism (Melese et al 1989). Throughout history, states have undergone trade wars whose outcomes were less supported domestically as well as globally.

In the sphere of realism, a trade war is classified as an egoistic-selfish

strategy adopted by the respective competitor countries. The states involved in the process perform as an introvert entity dominated with the mercenary gains. The national interests of the country are put forth over the global welfare as the political leadership accounts only for domestic interests and the growth of its economy. The trade war can be further contemplated in a contrast approach to “beggar thy neighbor” which the notable economist Adam Smith criticized in his book “Wealth among Nations” (Geisst 2013). The approach also accounts for private profit of a certain party while neglecting the others. “Beggar thy neighbor refers to economic and trade policies that a country enacts that end up adversely affecting its neighbors and/or trading partners” (Hayes 2021).

In addition a trade war likewise involves the application of tariffs for personal gains and exploitation of other challengers. When the superpower faces an economic security dilemma from a rising power, it is most likely that a trade war will be launched against it to curb its growth. In relevance of the evidenced several events of the past, the season of trade wars have been construed by international relations analyst as “a twelve-days Christmas” as in the initial stages the states enjoy its incentives and certain privileges however in the longer run the situation keeps on deteriorating. It is estimated that the competition might not leave winners at the end but opportunities for non-party entities to the conflict. In the recent literature, terminologies like collateral damage that according to Georg Meggle means “a damage which in contrast to the intended aim of the action that brought this damage about, was not intended” (Schwenkenbecher 2014) and domino effect “when you make a change to one behavior it will activate a chain reaction and cause a shift in related behaviors as well” (Clear 2020) have been used consecutively with the idea of the trade war.

The US Trade War With China

The onset of an official US trade war with the People’s Republic of China is located in the year 2018. However, some analysts strongly share the view that the trade war had already begun long before during the Obama Administration when in the year of 2010 Beijing surpassed Washington taking away its title of “largest manufacturing nation in the world” or probably when China attained membership in World Trade Organization in 2001 (Feng 2006).

The Washington trade war plan against Beijing has substantially faced negation since even before it was just crafted. Advisors in the White House did not feel content with the then President Trump decision to launch a tariff

scheme against China, an economic powerhouse of the globe. There has been speculation that Mr. Gary Cohn, Chief Advisor in Trump Administration, a supporter of free trade, was enraged by Mr. Trump's plans to impose tariffs on aluminum and steel imports which became a reason for his resignation on March 6, 2018. He marked that Trump's trade war with China would backfire and impact the US economy negatively, according to the former chief economic adviser who served as Director of the National Economic Council (NEC) in President Donald Trump's administration (BBC 2019). Trump during his term of office criticized even partners and allies such as Germany for its commercial relations with PRC. In the words of Mohamad Zreik, "surprisingly Europe did not agree with Trump's economic policy toward China, and asked him to back down, and with this American strategy, the Europeans became closer to China and weaving an economic alliance" (Zreik 2020).

It is argued that the hostile relations between the two entities have always endured, however the Trump administrations verdict to program a reprisal of a hefty trade- tariff war against China has given a new face to the US-China relations which is unlikely to undergo a prompt backlash without patch up by the new administration in charge of the White House. Prasenjit K. Basu contends that a dangerous shadow has been casted on the global order by Trump's brinkmanship and the threat of a "new Cold War" would not benefit any state. Likewise, several international relations scholars, including Pinkai points out to the fact that the trade war phenomenon and decision is a perilous option leaving no victories (Basu and Bhattacharya 2018).

Consequently, it can be easily seen that in the international world and relations the idea of a US China trade war is badly regarded as a trounce and an unappreciated approach. Guoyong Liang from Economic Affairs Officer, Investment and Enterprise Division, United Nations Forum on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in his recent book indicates: "Trade war may bring unpredictable risks to both economies. More importantly, we should not only look at trade issues, economic figures and static effects, but also consider indirect impacts, political implications and long-term consequences" (Liang and Ding 2020). Vivekananda International Foundation -VIF (Delhi-based think tank) affiliated Maj Gen PK Mallick also draws an analogous analysis: "Tariffs are a very poor instrument for punishing China for any unfair trading practices" (VIF 2018). He rationalizes that the parallel cost is paid by both ends particularly by the nationals and local agencies. His script claims: When a large country such as the US imposes tariffs, the pain is shared between consumers who pay higher prices and producing firms abroad who have to absorb lower profit margins. The burden of the costs will be carried by:

1. American consumers.
2. American firms that either produce in China or use intermediate products from China.
3. Firms in countries (mostly US allies) that supply China.
4. Chinese firms (mostly private ones)

The same analysis can be applied to Chinese retaliatory tariffs. Chinese consumers will pay more for soybeans and products like pork that rely on soybeans. Chinese airlines will be less productive if they cannot buy American aircraft. It happens that these US exports have mostly domestic content, so that most of the pain felt by producers will be within the US. There are some sectors in which China's exports consist primarily of domestic value-added (VIF 2018).

Conceptual Analysis: Rational Choice

The Rational Choice theory also known as Rational Decision Making Model (RDMM) is widely used to scrutinize foreign policy decision making (Kahler 1998). Its application allows policymakers to figure out drawbacks and advantages of one strategic option from another. The assessment allows in choosing the most beneficial option. For example, pursuits or foreign policy against a certain international agent, in this way picking quite possibly the most advantageous choices.

The US was the sole superpower after the Cold War came to its conclusion, it also had economic supremacy across almost all the major regions. However since China's successful transition and commercial reforms towards the market economy in 1978 and particularly with the re-established diplomatic ties with Washington in 1979- July pact, the total of US-China bilateral trade (exports plus imports) was approximately \$4 billion (VIF 2018). It reached \$600 billion by the year of 2017. The PRC economy begun to develop and grow more than the US economy. It was perceived as a serious threat to US interest by gaining a large share of international market at the expense of the American economy, whose investors saw manufacturing in China as being more lucrative and cost-effective. Therefore, the US economy started to suffer and so did US position in the global world order. In recent years, China possesses a surplus in bilateral trade with the US and Washington acceptance of the commerce deficit has raised concern among

American policymakers and public. On the pretext of national security and US interest, Trump's perceived a "trade war" as a pertinent sanctimonious choice to counter Chinese rise and domestic apprehensions. The policy has been the core of his 2017 presidential manifesto "US first. Make America Great Again". For the Trump administration the import/export imbalance with China that raised from US\$ 347 billion 2016 to US\$ 375.2 billion in 2017 was a serious concern (Swenson and Woo 2019). To fix it, the protectionist strategy was seen and claimed as a reasonable and rational decision. However, the Trade War between the US and China has prompted a razor-sharp hostile relationship among the two sides giving seeds to more hostility and competition on various other grounds and grids.

For the US, trade barriers to imports from China is rational as it will safeguard the local industry and abstain manufacturers who are badly hit by cheap Chinese products. This is also the argument put forward by Frederick List in Protectionism Theory, which allows to ease pressure on domestic industry by curtailing international competition. List further argues that it is the right of the government to initiate a policy that would bring economic advancement in their nation. Ironically, Trump claims the same stating that "China must make fair deals with US" (Long 2016).

Lina Eriksson assumes that in rational choice theory scenario, agents/states would have consistent long-term preferences (Eriksson 2011). For instance in the case of US-China trade war, the ultimate goal of the US would be to curtail and restrict China's peaceful rise. In doing so it aims to keep an upper hand in the global economy and in the relevant matters. These can include jeopardizing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and supporting the states that are antagonistic to China. Therefore, the long term preference of the United States is to contain and impact the peaceful rise of its perceived competitor, Beijing, as a global superpower. So, the trade war is an extension of such American traditional aims to curb Chinese progress and rise. Erickson also states that agents/states are self-interested and rational actors would always seek to maximize their interests. It strictly holds onto the assumption that players in the international community never perform against their national interests. A trade war as specified and explained above is a selfish egoist strategy, adopted to benefit the state's own economy while overlooking the global welfare.

International Agents

By considering the stance that international agents play an instrumental

key role in fostering a trade war, this section debates the international factors that are contemplated to be the basis of the US trade war with China.

Enduring Sino-US Enmity

The Chinese Ministry of Commerce issued a statement saying, “If the US side ignores the opposition of China and the international community, and insists on applying unilateralism and protectionism, the Chinese side will go to the end and will not back down”. The trade war could not bother the Chinese peaceful rise, a phrase coined by Zheng Bijian in late 2003 who ensured the world that upsurge of China as a global power would be unique and non-aggressive by all means. Since the changing power equations that seemed to indicate China’s economic rise over the US, a number of US Presidents have nurtured efforts to create relativity in Asia to obstruct the placid growth of Beijing. In this relation Washington is since years focused to tie knots with Chinese hostiles in its neighborhood. India is one of these chosen surrogate state to curb Sino influence in the region. However, the peaceful rise could not be challenged and destroyed.

The contemporary literature from West and East are also envisioning the new rise and shift in the polar networks which strengthens more animosity in American policy makers and authorities. It alarms the Pentagon on and off to drive its policies to contain the PRC. The trade war was a precautionary measure in this respect. Barry Buzan decentered globalism, Yan Xuetong’s estimation of polarity shake in upcoming years in his book “Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers” and John Mearsheimer’s multipolarity signals are adequate to put Washington in security dilemmas. Wang Shouwen, China’s deputy trade minister, said China did not want a trade war with the United States but was ready for the war if it happened. Likewise, there are existing interpretations of American president Joe Biden in office as shown by this statement, “There is nothing inevitable about a conflict with China” (BBC 2021).

US Grievances and the WTO

A number of accounts present certain events that had facilitated the rise and hype of Beijing as an economic giant which became the grievances of the latter party, the US. For instance as mentioned above, China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in December 2001 was a huge issue, as it was expected that the WTO membership would ease the communist nation’s transition to a liberal economy within the rules based system US intended

and implemented. However, the scenario turned out to be opposite of what the Pentagon had hoped. WTO membership came as a significant opportunity China to win a place in the First World decision-making halls, an obvious threat to Washington's global autonomy (Chan, Lee and Chan 2008).

The WTO is accused of facilitating Beijing's state-driven mercantilism to flood the other international states with their cheap exports, while at the same time impeding foreign access to its own markets (Schlesinger, 2017). It is being said that the organization has failed to penalize the Chinese government against its illegal practices of high tariffs and domestic content theft. It is accused to force American companies to transfer intellectual property in order to access Chinese markets (Bacchus, Lester and Zhu 2017). Peter Navarro, a trade adviser to President Donald Trump, projected in an interview "The message to the WTO from this administration has been clear. Things have to change" (Schlesinger 2017). In the existing international order, the United States sees itself as being on the moral high grounds and aims to coerce China to abandon its policies on high-tech manufacturing and the transfer of technology from foreign companies in order to preserve its global dominance.

In this perspective it is considered that Washington is deliberately fracturing the long standing institution existence, since it could not achieve the desired outcomes from it. Particularly by hindering the nomination of new appellate body delegates, which can only be made by consensus of all members. Trump sustained in his speeches and in public speaking concerning the organization that it offered an unfair treatment to America. In a 2018 interview, he said, "If they don't shape up, I would withdraw from the WTO". The World Trade Organization, an institution founded in 1995 has a multilateral system to resolve commerce and economic disputes. It has been a success in achieving mediation among countries and in drawing agreement like North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and so it could be pointed out that the United States being a staunch member in WTO must have put the conflict appropriately in the organization for resolve. The WTO members are predetermined to the formula that if they deem "fellow-members are violating such trade rules, they will use the multilateral system to settle these disputes instead of retaliating with their own tariff increases". In the above scenario, it could be expected that American authorities should also be held accountable for not fulfilling the policies compelled for its members in WTO and for challenging its sovereignty. In addition, Trump was aware of the several specific complex issues that Washington might face if it embraces the

WTO resolution process.

The WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is a costly, legal framework to help resolve conflict between the members. With respect to intellectual property rights allegation upon China solely it would require more than \$300 to \$600 billion cost per year. Therefore the rational choice of a business mindset leader was a tariff war against its opponent. Under his administration America is regarded to have had disrespected the sovereignty of the WTO by adopting rules and behaviors of its choice when needed. The body was sidelined in the US China Trade dispute despite knowing the stance that tariffs cannot be applied on member countries. The institution rationale behind giving leverage to PRC for past several years is also due to the certain obligations found in the WTO charter which provides that a developing country is entitled, to a certain extent, to the use of non-market practices to spur economic development (WTO 2021).

Farah N. Jan, an international relations lecturer at the University of Pennsylvania defines the US behavior with the WTO, "When the WTO sides with the US, the Trump administration takes credit and praises the institution" (Jan and Phansalkar 2019) The literature from China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies scripts the Chinese stance, "As a matter of fact, there is no proof that the Chinese government has formulated or implemented any policy on forced technology transfer; and the notion of "technology supporting China's authoritarian regime" is nothing but a new form of politicization of economic and technological issues. By exaggerating the security risks or even making up the "government backgrounds" of Chinese enterprises like Huawei, the Trump administration attempts to negate the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterprises to expand overseas markets" (Sun 2019).

Washington's National Security Undermining Democracy

One of the most relevant reasons for the trade war as highlighted above is that the US is a democracy and anyone who projects a threat to its egalitarianism is perceived as a foe to its national security. All the American leaders till the newly elected president Joe Biden, continue to be reactive to any perils against democratic norms. The motto, once a leader, always a leader, explains the current US behavior in which Washington by no means is ready to give up the leadership of the world to any other entity. Whenever such an agent is seemed to take pace in the international system the state aims to curb its rise and growth. This was the issue likewise throughout the US Soviet

cold war and the US-China relations is a similar case. China an autocratic regime with its own created rules dominated economy started to pull ahead on several platforms particularly in the trade markets, currency and defense. So, this scenario could not be put up with by US authorities and elites. Thus, they tried to knock it down by calling upon China's aggressive postures in the South China Sea, freedom of navigation in international waters and in the multinational organization WTO, which failed to contain Beijing's trade patterns. The United States thus chose the tariff war as the only tool to limit and restrict its economic growth. As Sun Haiyong, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for American Studies:

The United States can hardly reconcile with the rise of a great power with a distinct political system and ideology. With regard to grand national strategy, the Trump administration has regarded China as its most formidable competitor, thus intends to diminish and postpone China's challenge to the U.S. global hegemony by containing the development of China's high-tech industries, starting from ICT represented by 5G technology, for it plays an important role in the new round of industrial upgrading and that Chinese enterprises have enjoyed much advantage in this field.

Domestic Agents

Following below, we present the proposed factors that domestically fueled the US-China trade war.

American Rising Trade Deficit

The unequivocal component that ignited the US protectionist race with China was the raging trade deficit of Washington which has been swelling since the last few decades. The unaddressed balance of trade, BOT played an instrumental role in it (Kenton 2020). The American exports have remained immensely numerous as the country remains less reliant upon indigenous products and appliances at the current moment. The Trump administration justified the application of the trade war as a step to stimulate the American population to consume and purchase national products. One of the unique feature of Beijing's economic policy is its cheap labor that captivates the foreign buyers all over the international market. Even the manufacturers and organizations from developed countries like United States and Europe seek this benefit as they want to create their goods and products on low-cost prices by transferring their materials to Beijing. In doing so the domestic

labor faces joblessness and unemployment alleged as another Chinese economic tool by Washington. The Sino approach to keep the rates low and supportive for external world holds the flux of commerce limited to one locus. Overall, manufacturing jobs in the United States have declined by about 27% since 1998 (Amadeo 2021). The U.S. deficit is the outcome of American willingness to import manufactured goods and autos. In 2019, the deficit of the country was estimated to reach \$617 billion when it purchased \$3.1 trillion of goods and services while exporting \$2.5 trillion. Trump initiated a trade war to reduce the U.S. trade deficit which has been the world's largest since 1975. Reducing the deficit remained a core part of Trump's plan to create more jobs. He quoted during the electoral campaign: "I am running for President to end the unfairness and to put you, the American worker, first".

Figure 1: US Trade Deficit with China



Source: Amadeo (2021).

Donald Trump Presidency

The conviction that China was flourishing at the interest of the American companies and its conjoined instruments like lending money

from American treasury and artificial intelligence got impetus and the most emphasis during the Trump's presidency. The 45th elected president of United States of America when coming into power kept promoting one single notion: "We need to reform our economic system so that, once again, we can all succeed together, and America can become rich again. We are going to make America rich again" (Renchon and Suedfeld 2021). This was the core synthesis of the electoral campaigns he ran before winning the White House and taking office on January 20, 2017 (Politico 2016). He vowed to bash out Chinese threat and its peaceful rise. While speaking in his 2016 electoral campaign, he indirectly defined the American corporations and business class, who in order to get cheap rates had a role in employment reduction from United States. He mentioned; "We got here because we switched from a policy of Americanism – focusing on what's good for America's middle class – to a policy of globalism, focusing on how to make money for large corporations who can move their wealth and workers to foreign countries all to the detriment of the American worker and the American economy. We reward companies for offshoring, and we punish companies for doing business in America" (Schlafly and Decker 2020).

Former president Trump had proclaimed his war on China during his political campaign for the presidency in 2016. The trade war is interpreted to be one of the most serious events in the history of Sino-American relations which is not likely to lessen any time sooner on both sides. The release of the trade war was pronounced as a catastrophe and a colossal hurdle that the American president Donald Trump created for its own economy, the business class within America and abroad.

He was assured with the belief that former US presidencies have not dealt well with the Chinese commercial lift policies and gave it the opportunity to become a great economic superpower. However he failed to understand the very fact that the correlation among China and the US and between the dollar and the Yuan is based on mutuality and interdependency. One is reliant for exports while China is also endorsing the dollar in its trade dealings and reciprocal impact will be stimulated to Beijing if Washington becomes weak (Zreik 2021). The problem created by the United States is certainly not easy to get out of. Institutions like the WTO could not yet play any influential role in the resolution of this political backed economic tussle. The opinion that the idea of a trade war is less likely to bridge any triumphs is now showing its authenticity when the United States has lost a number of robust competitive trade partners. They have not abandoned their trade cycle with China but also Washington which was a focal point for stockholders and investors is now losing its economic strength steadily. This looks like that point in history

when businessmen are sorting out other markets than the United States to allocate their finance. As a repercussion of this trade war turmoil, the ranks of the World's Richest People are being reshuffled (Pendleton, Feng and Metcalf 2020). The 500 richest people in the world are losing an average of \$71 billion per day as global financial markets plunge. Harley Davidson, a notable motorbike manufacturing company in the US aftermath the turmoil of tariffs and huge protectionism policies of former American president revealed its scheme of moving to Europe due to Trump's pressures on their business. He said, "We are getting other countries to reduce and eliminate tariffs and trade barriers that have been unfairly used for years against our farmers, workers and companies" he said. "We are opening up closed markets and expanding our footprint. They must play fair, or they will pay tariffs!" (Bredemeier 2018).

Final Remarks

The United States initiated trade war is envisaged to shape new realities of the future world. With Joe Biden in office at the White House, it was anticipated that the trade war might come to an end. However, his administration is also committed to the notion to fight against the influence built by China in the market economy. Both sides, the PRC and Washington are not ready to let go of each other at this time. While there is a perception that both parties are suffering equally in the process with no likelihood of victory nevertheless Washington is likely to lose more as it has adopted protectionist methods not only with China but also with other resourceful and often allied states. In the last year alone, the U.S. economy, had lost up to \$7.8 billion as a result of the trade war. However, China is opening up to Asia and Europe through the BRI, while the US is closing doors and raising taxes to live in economic isolation and a created war itself challenging its values and ideals of capitalism.

Maj Gen PK Mallick (2018) accounts, "It could derail the current global economic expansion and cripple American businesses that depend on business with China. It could also further complicate geopolitical priorities given the (Trump) administration has enlisted the help of the Chinese in solving the crisis with North Korea".

As Ryan Rass writes in The Brookings "a candidate in 2016, Donald Trump built his argument for the presidency around his claimed self-ability as a dealmaker"(Hass and Denmark 2020). The former president being a businessman could not play like a leader. The American economy was thriving but now is struggling to maintain its stake as a superpower in the global

arena. American businessmen are not used to such an economic situation. A business coalition lobbying campaign called “Tariffs Hurt the Heartland” (Tariffshurt 2021), launched a protest regarding the proposed tariffs right after in September 2019. The constant decline in manufacturing jobs and the rising trade deficit was seen as justification to initiate a tariff war however the strategy of a trade war has never benefitted a nation before nor is likely to do so.

The US Chamber of Commerce expressed the risks that might arise from this conflict and the possibility of turning into an international trade war. However still the situation can be improved by prompt steps taken via the newly elected Democratic Party President, Joe Biden by aligning his trade outlook and policy with global institutions like World Trade Organization. From 1995 to date, the WTO addressed more than 500 similar issues related to subsidies, tariffs or protection measures, among other complaints against member states. The organization succeeds in resolving many differences through mediation and finding a solution that satisfies the parties but will truly require a more viable strategy to deal this hegemonic crisis.

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ABSTRACT

Relations amongst the United States of America and the People's Republic of China have historically survived several bouts and rounds. However, the approach employed by the Trump Administration for a program involving reprisal of a hefty tariff-trade war against China has given a new face to the bilateral relations between the two states. The paper demonstrates that domestic and international agents played a vital role in initiating and nurturing the trade clash between Washington and Beijing since 2018 to date. The aim of this study is to ascertain that the political climate and past pursuits of one country, conditions policy outcomes in another, and how domestic political pressures on a politician's defines their relations with foreign counterparts. The paradigm of rational choice theory is adopted to provide a conceptual understanding to the triggering of the trade war between the economic giants.

KEYWORDS

US Trade-war; PRC; Domestic Agents; International Agents.

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THE US STRATEGY FOR SHORT-TERM MILITARY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPMENT (2020-2030)

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Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) is already transforming the modern economy, being silently present in several sectors, with emphasis on banks and finance, energy networks, and commerce, among others. A simple act like the use of a smartphone intertwines the user in an intricate infrastructure of artificially intelligent devices, which form a support network for applications such as urban mobility, for example: the correction of typing errors, as well as the targeting of content on social networks, also involve algorithms operating under a machine learning regime (Webb 2019). Despite the greater volume of innovations in the field of AI today being by commercial developments in the civilian sector (but subject to dual-use), the US armed forces have already been able to test sufficiently on the battlefields of Iraq and Syria artificial intelligence systems using remote target identification, and data transmission to weapon platforms (Hoadley and Lucas 2018).

In the perception of the North American Department of Defense (DoD), the United States is currently being pressed by its international competitors, notably China and Russia, in the dispute for leadership in the development of artificial intelligence for military purposes. In 2017, the Chinese government announced an ambitious plan from which it aims to achieve global leadership in AI development in the year 2030, even though their goals and definitions are vague (Fischer 2018). Nevertheless, the disclosure of such a plan by the

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Chinese Communist Party generated shock waves among strategy makers in the great powers of the interstate system, so that if artificial intelligence gains high priority for China, it could not be possible. expect less willingness on the part of opponents of Chinese expansionism.

In the same year that the Chinese government released its plan for the development of AI (2017), a statement by President Vladimir Putin suggests a Russian perception about the this strategical category of technologies: “Artificial intelligence mechanisms enable rapid decision-making in real time based on the analysis of large amounts of information, which gives enormous advantages in terms of quality and effectiveness ”(Daws 2019). Continuing his reasoning, Putin states that “[...] if someone has a monopoly in the field of artificial intelligence, the consequences will be clear to us: they will dominate the world” (Idem). In this sense, like the Chinese government, the Russian government understands artificial intelligence as a technology that may have a disruptive effect on power relations in the international system in the near future, such that, on February 27, 2019, orders the preparation of a national strategy for the development of capacities in this field (Tass 2019).

In 2018, the United States Department of Defense moved to counter the Russian-Chinese initiative by publicizing its artificial intelligence development strategy, published in February 2019 in the document entitled *Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy: harnessing AI to advance our security and prosperity* (United States of America 2018). It defines a methodology for accelerating military developments in the use of AI, covering operations, training, support, protection of forces, recruitment, health, among others. The need to elaborate and disseminate this strategy is attributed to the Sino-Russian threat: “Other countries, particularly China and Russia, are making significant investments in AI for military purposes. Such investments threaten to erode our technological and operational advantages in addition to destabilizing the international order ”(United States of America 2018, 5).

Strategy, in terms of international politics, is understood as a plan defined by a national state to achieve systemic and long-term objectives. The main source we used to compare the DoD document under analysis was the National Security Strategy contemporary to it (United States of America 2017). It is an official document of the American government dealing with the “grand strategy” of the country, which defines: “worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States” (Snider 1995, 1). According to Christopher Layne, since the early 1940s the United States’ main strategy has been to expand its power and maintain its hegemonic position in the interstate system, with a long-term

character:

America's actual grand strategy behavior is something else [...]. The United States consistently has sought to expand its power and attain a position of hegemony in the international system - not only after 1989 but from the early 1940s and throughout the cold war as well (Layne 2006, 25).

Based on the thought of Carl von Clausewitz (1989) [1832], while the strategy has a systemic and long-term character - it is intended to achieve victory in the war as a whole - the tactic has a short-term character because it is related to the specific battles that together make up the war. That is, different tactics are used to achieve the objectives defined by a single strategy. Adapting this concept to International Policy, a State uses different tactics in the short or medium-term to achieve the long-term goals defined in its strategy.

As a methodological guideline, the research employs qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources. We proceeded to examine the official document based on the premise that it can only make sense from a critical analysis, as occurs in historiographical activity. According to Carr (1987, 18):

No document can tell us more than what the author thought - what he thought, or even just what he wanted others to think that he thought, or even what he himself thought to think. None of this means anything, until the historian works on this material and decipher it³.

The objective of this paper is, therefore, to analyze the United States strategy for artificial intelligence, having as object the aforementioned document published by the Department of Defense in 2019, together with secondary sources that relate the themes of artificial intelligence, strategy, and defense. The article then intends to address the concept of artificial intelligence according to the perception of some experts in the field, the perspectives and methodologies for the application of AI in the North American military sector and their ethical questions, about the effective capacities of China and Russia to constitute a threat, the US technological leadership in the field of artificial intelligence, and how competition in this area is related to Sino-Russian growth in technological and geopolitical terms. We will start with the Sino-Russian challenge, an apparent driving agent that sets in motion the formalization of an American strategy.

³ Translated by the editorial team.

The Sino-Russian Challenge

In 2017, Daniel Coats, National Intelligence Director of the United States, in a text submitted to the United States Senate with the theme “global threats”, recognized that artificial intelligence is one of the technologies considered as emerging and disruptive and that investments by other nations in this area are expanding, putting US national security at risk. Coats further states that “the implications of our opponents’ skills in using AI are potentially profound and wide-ranging” (Coats 2017, 4), and he does seem to have cause for concern. According to Hoadley and Lucas (2018), China is the main competitor in the international artificial intelligence market and has the potential to achieve the goal defined in its strategic plan, to lead globally in terms of investment in the development of artificial intelligence, considering their recent achievements in the area. In 2015, the main Chinese company in the industry, Baidu, created language recognition software with a higher speed than that reached by human brains, a year before the American company Microsoft achieved the same feat. Chinese teams had the best placement in the international Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge competition, related to computer visual perception systems, in the years 2016 and 2017, facts that, among others, suggest to the analysts of the present that the Chinese effort has been achieving surprising results, and that, for this reason, need to be faced (Hoadley and Lucas 2018).

These results are in addition to the disclosure, by the Chinese government, in mid-2017, of a development plan for AI, which values applications of this technology in the Chinese economy and society in general, including, for example, industry, the judiciary system, and public security, in addition to the military sector. At the end of the same year, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology launched its action plan to boost the development of artificial intelligence between the years 2018 to 2020, as recommended by the general national strategy, defining objective goals for the creation of products, such as networked vehicles, intelligent robots and video identification systems (Fischer 2018).

According to Kania (2017), the Chinese military sector has also been influenced by American strategic plans for innovation in artificial intelligence, so that the dynamics between the major players in the contemporary capitalist interstate system ends up generating a feedback loop, in which the expectation of advances on the part of one competitor accelerates investments and decision-making in another. The author also affirms that the guiding principle of the Chinese strategy in the application of this type of technology to war is the search for increments in terms of situational awareness on the battlefield

(situation awareness), based on computers equipped with algorithms capable of undertaking the analyze large amounts of information (big data) quickly and efficiently. In short, the Chinese government understands that based on developments in the field of artificial intelligence applied to the civilian commercial sector, gains in scale will be achieved, with unequivocal impacts on the production of artifacts and software aimed at military action, thus capable of expanding the power of the Chinese armed forces in terms of C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance)⁴. Both the notion of “dual-use” and the relationship between AI and situational awareness make up the short-term strategic horizon that has been sought to a certain extent by the four great powers, each with different degrees of priority. Thus, the perception of this technological horizon by the Chinese government reveals, above all, a game played together by the great powers, and that, in this way, the American strategy responds, then, to a state of things influenced by the decisions from Beijing, but not exactly determined by them.

Russia is seen by Washington as another major rival in the field of future technologies for military use (including AI), despite its lower investment capacity compared to the United States and China. In 2016, the “Foundation for Advanced Studies” was created by the Russian government, which consists of a research agency focused on developments in the field of defense, with a focus on robotics and artificial intelligence, and which organizes in the form of “psycho-information deterrent” (One of several facets of Russian soft power) an annual conference entitled “Robotization of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”, a clear signal to the other players that Moscow intends to fight for space intensely on that front. The declassified information to which we have access indicates that Russian research seems, first of all, to seek rapid gains in the production of unmanned vehicles with a mild degree of AI (Bendett 2017), which can be inferred from the successful test with the drone ground vehicle Nerehta, which carries a 7.62 mm machine gun and can be used in both combat and logistical and intelligence situations, and Soratnik, a vehicle produced by Kalashnikov (Hoadley and Lucas 2018). Understanding, however, the propagandistic dimension of the official communication efforts of the Russian government, it draws our attention

4 However, one should not lose sight of the fact that China, India, Russia and the United States have been investing in the design and development of autonomous, land, air and sea vehicles, endowed, therefore, with some degree of “soft” artificial intelligence, in addition to use of drone swarms tactics, which consists of “swarms” of unmanned aerial vehicles that work together coordinated by AI (Scharre 2014). The maturation of these developments, in keeping with the current trend, should take longer, so that the use of artificial intelligence in tasks of expanding situational awareness should precede it.

to the fact that developments in the area of remotely controlled and semi-autonomous lethal weapons gain greater prominence, which hypothetically leads us to the Russian dissuasive disposition by suggesting greater advances in a field of slower maturation compared to the use of artificial intelligence for situational awareness. Developments in semi-autonomous and autonomous lethal weaponry have been undertaken to the same degree by the other powers, without making it clear, as a discursive strategy, the notion that they are the “front line” in the use of military artificial intelligence.

Given the above, the question arises: do Chinese and Russian investments represent a challenge to the position of technological leadership in the artificial intelligence sector? It is known that Russia has lower investment capacity to develop a technological industry capable of competing with the American and Chinese technology giants, in addition to the fact that its defense budget has been consistently reduced in the years 2017 and 2018 (Hoadley and Lucas 2018). This fact must not go unnoticed: the game of ultra technological warfare does not allow for minimal setbacks, considering that the process of technological change depends on crossing “techno-paradigmatic thresholds” based on constant thought and research (Pavelec 2012), a process in which losses in capacities due to investment contraction are asymmetric compared to the gains obtained by each unit of expenditure. Perhaps we should not be deceived by the propagandistic impact of Russian hypersonic missiles, which, despite the threat they pose in the short term, should not change the paradigm of future war. But despite this, it is certainly too early to diagnose any “critical flaws” in the Russian journey towards the mastery of disruptive military technologies.

China, due to its higher investment capacity, is approaching the level of AI development already present in the American commercial sector. According to Webb (2019), of the nine largest companies in the technology sector today, six are American - Apple, IBM, Microsoft, Amazon, Google, and Facebook - and three are Chinese - Baidu, Alibaba and, Tencent. Thus, interstate competition in the field of AI, in addition to being the result of Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Russian technological advances, is a reflection of China’s significant economic growth, its geopolitical projection, and the recovery of Russia as a regional power.

In the 2000s, Russia recovered from the economic crisis it went through in the 1990s, taking advantage of the rise in commodity prices and the change in strategy since Vladimir Putin’s accession to the presidency, once again projecting itself geopolitically around it. Several episodes can be cited in this regard: in response to the “colorful revolution” that occurred in Ukraine in 2004, the Russian government used the cut off of gas supplies

as a geopolitical instrument to pressure the neighboring country (Pautasso 2014); in 2008, it went to war with Georgia, which tried to retake the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to get closer to NATO (King 2008); in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and supported the insurgent provinces of the Donbass region, as a countermeasure to the United States-supported coup that overthrew the Yanukovitch government, which had been approaching Moscow and moving away from the agreement with the European Union (Flag 2016); in 2015 he entered the Syrian war supporting Bashar Al Assad against the United States; and in the 2016 American elections, it emerged as the pivot of a federal investigation into electronic interference in public opinion, which has not yet been concluded. Since the Crimean crisis in 2014, the United States has been applying economic sanctions to Russia, but without the desired effect.

China, due to its extraordinary economic growth, is being perceived by the United States as the main threat to its hegemonic position. In a projection made by the HSBC bank, in the year 2030, the Chinese GDP will surpass the American (O Globo 2018). Amid economic growth, the country developed technologically and modernized its armed forces, projecting power in the Indo-Pacific region, creating bases to ensure control of the South China Sea, where it disputes territories with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore (Rolf and Agnew 2016). On the other hand, it projects its influence through the One Belt One Road project (OBOR), the “new silk route”, for the regions of Central Asia and Southeast Asia (Chan 2017). Currently, the Donald Trump administration has been waging a trade war against China, increasing tariffs for the entry of its products into the U.S., and suffering a reciprocal reaction. Since 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (OCX) has been in operation, being initially formed by China, Russia, and Central Asian countries, except Turkmenistan, currently with India and Pakistan. OCX’s main focus is the security area, but it also deals with issues of economic and cultural cooperation. This Sino-Russian approach is also observed in the OBOR initiative, based on the accommodation of mutual interests through the integration of Russia into new markets through the infrastructure created in Central Asia by Chinese investments, and the insertion of the Eurasian Economic Union into the Chinese project. Thus, although the Central Asian region has historically been a space of Russian influence, and the New Silk Road project significantly increases the Chinese presence in the region, it is believed that Chinese investments may end up being positive in the containment strategies against the American power for both powers (Makarov and Sokolova 2016).

Thus, it is in this context of “return of geopolitics” in the second

decade of the 21st century, of willingness on the part of revisionist powers to conquer disruptive technologies related to the future of the war, and of potential long-term strategic articulation between Moscow and Beijing, that we should understand the American initiative for the development of military artificial intelligence from 2018.

What is Understood by Artificial Intelligence?

Before discussing the Department of Defense's strategy to accelerate the deployment of AI in the military sector, it is important to define what artificial intelligence is. According to experts in the field, there is no consensual meaning for the term. For Webb (2019), artificial intelligence consists of an autonomous system of decision making and carrying out tasks that replicate or imitate intelligent human actions, such as recognition of sounds and objects, problem-solving, language recognition, and use of logical procedures to achieve predefined goals. Most current artificial intelligence systems conform to a "soft" profile, capable of guiding machines in making simple decisions and performing predetermined tasks based on the interpretation of information obtained in the environment.

Hoadley and Lucas (2018) advance the definition, incorporating the idea that artificially intelligent systems can perform tasks in varied and unpredictable environmental circumstances, with varying degrees of human supervision, in addition to being able to "learn from experience" and to optimize your performance. Hoadley and Lucas look beyond short-term developments and understand that the horizon of developments in artificial intelligence lies beyond the so-called narrow AI, in levels of sophistication that equate computerized cognition to human intelligence. However, the difficulties related to the development of a general AI are recognized by the Technology Committee of the North American National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), and the lion's share of public and private investments is, at present, focused on development restricted forms of computerized cognition, which, as we shall see, has an immediate impact on the short-term strategy of developing military AI.

Cummings (2017) understands the decisive character of military artificial intelligence in the short term based on the ability of robotic systems to develop sophisticated forms of sensory perception (especially, but not exclusively, visual) and to be able to correctly discern targets, although this should not be the case. It also involves the ability to formulate circumstantial hypotheses about the threat posed by the identified target, nor any "ethical

calculation” about the attack decision (aspects that would configure a military asset such as a LAWS - Lethal Autonomous Weapon System). UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) would today be at the forefront of the union between restricted artificial intelligence and armed platforms, insofar as certain models are already able to select and attack targets while maintaining the human decision on the loop (ie, making appropriate ethical decisions). Cummings establishes that a military artificial intelligence model in the short term must function in an unsophisticated way based on a perception – cognition – action sequence, that is: a) instruments that perceive the environment; b) that process information obtained using pre-defined non-polymorphic algorithms; c) to offer a response regarding the threat to the human controller, who in turn decides to act. It is quite true that weapon systems such as cruisers with AEGIS technology today can engage unidentified targets that approach the vessel’s defense perimeter automatically (Scharre 2014), but we must note that this technology is still based on “simple” algorithms, which cannot make ethical decisions about whether or not to attack the enemy based on a vast and unpredictable set of circumstances.

Still, in the field of definitions, Ilachinski (2017) proposes that an artificially intelligent system must be equipped with a two-way communication interface between machine and human being (through a human language, not necessarily verbal, which must be understood and interpreted by the system); capacity for organizing, categorizing and coding information (generating “knowledge”); some ability to decide on courses of action based on inputs from the environment (although these decisions do not necessarily result in autonomous actions, without human interference); and some power to learn from experience, to detect information patterns, and to adapt to new circumstances (machine learning). But, to the extent that mere machine learning processes do not seem to be able to generate sentient artificial intelligence and autonomous lethal weapons (without humans in or on the loop), Horowitz (2018) emphasizes that “electronic brains” dedicated to war, in the short term, they will tend to behave as so-called “facilitating” technologies, and not bellicose in a strict sense, as the combustion engine and electricity were (and continue to be): they are not weapons technologies themselves, but they are enabling tactics and strategies determinants in modern warfare, in addition to expressing this fundamental condition that is dual-use.

Thus, as a facilitating technology, the type of employment most available in the short term for AI in military matters is that of expanding C4ISR capabilities: processing and interpreting information, using algorithms for massive image recognition and interpretation, reducing cognitive stress imposed on human beings in the rear command structure, analysis, and

suggestion of optimal military solutions to problems reported by human command, among others. In short, in this short-term horizon, it is a matter of recruiting capacity in artificial intelligence to increase efficiency and speed in the performance of cognitive tasks regularly undertaken by humans, without this implying the replacement of humans themselves as agents of war. It is this trend that we see in the Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy, which we will analyze below.

The US Short-Term Strategy in the Use of Military AI

The definition of artificial intelligence adopted by the Department of Defense converges in general lines with the one we saw above:

AI refers to the ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence - for example, pattern recognition, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions and taking action - either digitally or through an intelligent program behind a physical autonomous system (United States of America 2018, 5).

It is clear that the United States Department of Defense understands the imminent transformation of the industrial economic paradigm based on developments in automation and machine learning, with inevitable overflows on the military area in competitors such as Russia and China, predicting that the costs of failure to implement an aggressive strategy to guarantee US technological advantage in these fields would be too serious in maintaining the supremacy of the United States in the interstate system, increasing unsustainably weaknesses in terms of national defense and innovation. The strategy explicitly mentions the need to accelerate the military use of AI, beyond the levels that have been practiced since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century. According to Hoadley and Lucas (2018), intelligent systems have been used successfully in operations in Iraq and Syria, with algorithms aimed at automatic target recognition, and this is an experience that should support DoD's efforts to expand the use of AI for general functions linked to the C4ISR structure, in addition to offensive operations in cyberspace and remote coordination of military assets.

Therefore, the expansion of situational awareness on the battlefield and activities supporting military operations are highlighted in the short horizon of future developments, with little mention being made of specific prototyping of autonomous vehicles or armaments. In this sense, the document says: "AI applied to perception tasks such as image analysis enables the extraction

of useful information from raw data and provides team leaders with better situational awareness” (United States of America 2018, 11), or even: “AI has the potential to increase the safety of aircraft, ships and vehicles in operation, in situations that can change quickly, by alerting its operators about possible risks” (Idem). In the same tone, DoD strategists say: “We will use AI to predict equipment failures, automate diagnostics and plan maintenance based on data about equipment conditions” (Idem); “AI will be used in order to reduce time spent on highly repetitive, manual and frequent tasks” (Idem), allowing humans to perform only the supervision of these tasks, reducing economic costs and errors in execution.

To accelerate the adoption of military artificial intelligence, the Department of Defense created the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) - working in collaboration with other laboratories related to the defense sector, with DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) and other entities dedicated to the development of disruptive techniques and technologies. Among its objectives would be the establishment of a common basis for research and use of AI in the scope of the organs linked to the North American national defense, facilitating planning and coordination, as well as the attraction and training of international experts in this field.

This last initiative must be understood against the backdrop of a relevant controversy involving the alleged inefficiency of the US Department of Defense in attracting and retaining human capital necessary for the development of disruptive military technological solutions, which would arise from a bureaucratic paradigm considered obsolete. We do not know whether cooperation between JAIC and other defense sector bodies will result in a dynamic policy of attracting talent in the hire and hoard style and decentralized and meritocratic forms of creative work organization - generating friction with the military hierarchy as a side effect. - as advocated by Michael Nayak (Nayak 2018), but the mention of the recruitment problem is an indication that the personnel policy in the North American defense sector may be being impacted by the awareness that the “Cold War standard” does not could be continued in the future war.

The focus of JAIC’s activities should then be the identification of priority missions for the delivery of prototypes for testing by different associated agencies, and the selection of partners from the academic and commercial sector interested in the standardization of technologies and procedures in the areas of data, tests, evaluation, and cybersecurity. From such initial experiences, the JAIC should use the lessons learned to repeat them in other projects, to disseminate AI in the Department of Defense. The methodology contained in the strategy for such experiments proposes the

dissolution of the traditional division between research and operation (learn by doing), putting technologies in the testing phase directly in use to face the advances of the opponent as soon as possible. The argument used to support such a methodology is that, despite the errors and fragility of systems under development, advances can be accelerated through the feedback given by users.

Does the Defense of the Ethical Use of Military AI Hide the Impossibility of LAWS in the Short Term?

The defense of research and the use of artificial intelligence within determined ethical parameters is an element highlighted in the strategy of the United States Department of Defense. The document communicates an idea of concern with humanitarian values and the ethics of war, as opposed to what the Russian and Chinese guidelines in this field are supposed to be: both are criticized for advocating technological investments that “raise questions regarding international standards and human rights” (United States of America 2018, 5).

This stance disagrees with the significant abandonment of the search for “ethical and cultural hegemony” by the Washington government in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2017 (United States of America 2017), when recognizing that American values are neither self-evident nor universal, and that, therefore, the position of the United States in the interstate system will be one of confrontation (including the use of force) to guarantee its national interests. At the same time that they abandon their position as champions of the interstate system, says Fiori, the United States “proposes to retake world leadership in the process of technological innovation in all fields of knowledge and, in particular, in the field of war atomic armaments” (Fiori 2018, 399). It is at this intersection between the refusal to assume the role of ethical hegemon, the search for technological supremacy, and the denunciation of ethical violations in the development of disruptive military technologies by its opponents in the system, that we must understand the narrative constructed by the Department of Defense.

The North American “ethical concern” is fundamentally mentioned when it comes to the development and use of LAWS (autonomous lethal weapon systems) and other semi-autonomous devices, which we see through the mention of the DoD Directive 3000.09, which:

[...] sets out principles to minimize the likelihood and consequences of

failures in autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems that can lead to unintended engagement. The Directive provides for autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems to be built to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment on the use of force (United States of America 2018, 15).

Ayoub and Payne (2018) echo American ‘ethical concerns’, wondering how an autonomous lethal weapon might be able to choose between the value of different human lives and under what circumstances should AI sacrifice certain lives in favor of others, pointing out the subjective nature of several combat situations that cannot be translated directly through protocols or rules of engagement for intelligent systems. A similar discussion is taking place in the civil sector concerning autonomous vehicles, which in accident situations may have a choice between preserving one life at the expense of another.

Horowitz (2018) wonders how many “ethical deviations” and collateral damage would be caused in a war fought at “machine speed”, while Cummings (2017) defends the relevance of fail-safe mechanisms that keep humans in the loop decision-making of an autonomous system although, in this case, the combatant who would remove such security mechanisms would inevitably gain an advantage, increasing the speed of response of his autonomous weapons even if at the expense of humanitarian values.

In short, without minimizing the importance of discussion on this topic in civil society, the defense of an “ethics of robotic warfare” by the United States Department of Defense at the end of the second decade of the 21st century should be understood at the same time in light of the following evidence: 1) the United States does not currently master any autonomous weapons technology that is operational on the battlefield; 2) so far, none of the powers of the future war seem to dominate this technology; 3) the Russian government verbally insists that lethal autonomous armaments are a priority in its strategy of developing military artificial intelligence.

Thus, while the United States does not have control over the “high points” in this field of battle, and Russia seems to run out of time, it is not surprising that the US government invokes a whole ethical-moral instrument in an attempt to contain its opponents, even if it is by directing international opinion against the “abuses” that can be committed by the revisionist powers. In other times this was the role of “international legal regimes”, of which the space race, for example, is replete: while the dominance of orbital space armament technologies was prohibitive for all competitors, diplomas such as the Outer Space Treaty abounded (1967), establishing extraterrestrial space as a “sanctuary of humanity”, and the Moon Treaty (1979) in which the Earth’s

natural satellite was treated as a “province of humanity”. In the 21st century, when these space armament technologies became viable, says Dolman:

[...] The United States must declare that it is withdrawing from the current space regime and announce that it will establish a principle of free-market sovereignty in space [...] the United States must once and for all conquer the orbit by military control the Earth's low orbit. From this vantage point, laser or kinetic weapons disposed in space should prevent any other state from having assets in orbit, and can effectively engage and destroy enemy antisatellite installations on the planetary surface (Dolman 2002, 154).

The same logic applies to the development of military artificial intelligence today. The inability to control autonomous military platform technologies engenders American “ethical-legalist impulses”, which will fall apart as soon as the ability to establish supremacy is achieved. However, the possibility of establishing an international regime of non-proliferation of software is not very feasible:

The Software is more diffuse and advances faster than the hardware. Software, in practical terms, has no cost of replication and transmission, making it easily copied, stolen and produced on a large scale. Slowing down the spread of hardware like missiles and drones is difficult, but stopping the proliferation of software is practically impossible (Ewers et al. 2017, 14).

Therefore, because of the difficulties in enforcing international law instruments to prevent the development and dissemination of artificial intelligence algorithms, and given the impossibility of banning the supercomputers necessary for their development - in the circumstances of their dual-use -, the DoD calls for tools that, in the current American national strategy, seem anachronistic, if the main objective of the initiative was not precisely to guarantee the technological supremacy of the United States. To do so, provisionally resorting to the old universalist rhetoric of “democratic and humanitarian values” certainly comes in handy, especially if it lends itself to its antithesis, the defense of North American supremacist interests in a scenario of a clear global “return of geopolitics”. We must expect that, once autonomous weapons technology has been mastered by the United States, all of this ethical-humanitarian recitation about artificial intelligence will be exclusive to academics, nonconformed leaders of civil society, or the chancelleries of peripheral governments.

Final Remarks

The artificial intelligence strategy formalized in 2018 by the United States Department of Defense is undoubtedly a normative and operational response, but equally discursive, guided by the perceived threat posed by Sino-Russian initiatives in this technological field. The short-term horizon, by pointing to the greater feasibility of employing intelligent systems in command, control, communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (C4ISR) functions to the detriment of non-lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS) drives the North American strategy to undertake efforts in this regard, while supporting a portion of the international opinion of experts and activists who understand the ethical and humanitarian dangers of producing “killer robots”.

It is clear, however, that research and testing with lethal autonomous platforms in the United States continues at an accelerated pace, considering that its main Russian-Chinese competitors also do (Scharre 2014). China and Russia are defined in the national security strategy released by the current Donald Trump administration as revisionist powers, eager to “shape the world” in a way that is contrary to American interests (United States of America 2017). The DoD strategy for the military use of artificial intelligence is discursively and programmatically inserted in this perspective of geopolitical competition against China and Russia. In it, the US government, while continuing to uphold its role as the “moral compass” of the capitalist interstate system, aims unequivocally to maintain American technological leadership in all the fields of disruptive technologies aimed at the future war, and that guarantee the main objective to be reached from the general strategic reorientation of the Trump Era, which is the guarantee of US national interests in a geopolitical scenario of extreme competition, regardless of any “globalist” or pro-systemic considerations.

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ABSTRACT

This article analyses the US Department of Defense initiative formalized in the *Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy*. The conclusion is that the US emphasis on the use of artificial intelligence to expand C4ISR capabilities (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance) and the denunciation of "ethical risks" involving Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) are narrative strategies aimed at dealing in the short term with the inability of the US technology agencies to master autonomous military platform technologies and with the Russian resolve on the development of these lethal autonomous military platforms.

KEYWORDS

Artificial Intelligence; War; Strategy.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY¹

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Introduction

The importance of international issues, especially in the tense region Middle East, as well as testing the power of foreign powers for more influence in the region, led to several research in this field. Since the Middle East region has always been full of conflicts, any power can invade the region. Therefore, it is difficult for any nation to be able to gain the trust of the countries in the region (Shokoohi 2011).

As Russia was facing many problems after the collapse of Soviet Union, Putin first tried to promote a revival of domestic politics with a pragmatic approach in order to enter the international arena. So, after solving domestic problems it could assert his international power. In this regard, regional politics has been very important, and the Middle East region had been attracting the interest of great powers for some time, including Russia and the United States.

The Russian government under Putin's leadership is trying to set

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apart its policy in this region from the United States, especially in his second term. Putin's priorities are building balanced and stable relations with all governments and players in the Middle East region. According to Kremlin officials, the only way to protect its southern borders as well as the Central Asia region and the Caucasus from developments in Middle East such as terrorism, religious fundamentalism, weapons of mass destruction, etc. is to use various mechanisms and instruments close to the countries in the region (Kiani 2009).

Russia's Motives for Its Projection in the Middle East

Russia's presence in the Middle East is based on several important factors. The first factor is maintaining the status quo in the region; the second factor for Russia's presence in the Middle East is the war on terror and preventing its spread to Russia; and finally, it should be noted that as the U.S. presence and involvement in the Middle East decreases, Russia seeks to expand its influence in the region. This provides a good opportunity for Russia as an active player to exercise its power beyond its borders when threatened (Khalabenikov 2016).

One of Russia's main concerns is the significant hydrocarbon energy resources that exist in the Middle East and oil and gas exports are also very important for Russia. At the same time, the export of military weapons to this region is also very important for Russia, and it can be said that it is a market with a very big perspective for Russia. In addition, it should be noted that the Middle East is very important in the fight against terrorism. As Russian President Vladimir Putin has said, it is better for Russia to fight terrorism in more remote areas than in its own country. But in general, Russia's expectations of the Middle East include several important aspects of national security and a global role.

In this sense, Russia aims, as a first priority, to push back the jihadists, as at least 2,500 Russian citizens and hundreds from other CIS countries are ready to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The return of these fighters is in itself a real threat, as in Western Europe. Since Moscow is the second largest city in the Muslim world in Europe, with a population of about 2.5 million, the Kremlin takes the threat of extremism seriously.

The second issue is the strategic rivalry with the United States. This is a traditional rivalry between Moscow and Washington. The third priority relates to the Middle East region relevance in energy production since global oil prices are critical to the Russian economy. This is evidenced by cartel

agreements with OPEC major producers - or efforts to resolve existing conflicts, particularly the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The fourth factor that shows the importance of the Middle East is linked to its relevance as an attractive consumer market of goods and weapons. The war in Syria has shown that Russia is capable of producing, deploying, and supporting advanced weapons systems ranging from medium-caliber cruise missiles to SU -35 fighter jets to S-400 missile defense systems. Finally, the Syrian civil war has shown that Moscow's loyalty towards its allies is stronger than Washington's (Cohen 2017).

The Main Reasons for Russia's Attention to the Middle East

During Vladimir Putin's first term, Russia emphasized the need for full cooperation with the West, especially with the United States, so the Middle East region did not play an important role in Russian foreign policy during those years (Kolaei 2007). However, under Putin's second term, Russia's attention focused on the Middle East grew (Khalabnikov 2016).

Russia pursues a number of interests in the Middle East, including economic interests. Being aware of Russia's economic weakness, Putin is trying to save Russia's foreign policy and engage in serious economic diplomacy (Kolai and Nouri 2011). This can be clearly seen in Putin's first and second visits to the Middle East region in 2005 and 2007. Putin was joined by the heads of two armaments companies MIG and Rosoborn Sport during his visits to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar and Jordan. These actions show that Russia pays special attention to relations with developing economies of the Middle East region, in order to generate foreign revenues. Also, more can be mentioned. In fact, Russia not only wants to expand the market for arms sales in the Middle East, but also seeks to play a role in the energy sector of these countries (Kiani 2007).

In terms of security, the Middle East is of particular importance to Russian foreign policy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, new countries had emerged on the southern borders of Russia, in which about 20 million people are Muslims. What happened after the collapse of the Soviet Union in some Muslim parts of Russia, including Russia's wars with Chechnya, spread pessimism among Muslims, and Russia was declared an enemy of Islam. In fact, Russia fears the spread of religious extremism in the regions under its influence, which is why it tries to stabilize the region and maintain balanced relations with its the countries. Russia wants to establish peace and stability in the Middle East and therefore supports the elaboration of a roadmap in the

Middle East, because in this way it can strengthen its position in the region (Mousavi 2006).

The Middle East is also politically important for Russia. In this context, attention should be paid to Russia's relations with the United States. Indeed, Russia's presence in the Middle East depends on the extent of U.S. presence in Russia's periphery and backyard. Indeed, U.S. proximity to some countries in Russia's south, including Georgia, strengthens Russia's relations with some countries in the Middle East, including Syria and Iran, and even with Palestinian groups like Hamas, to put the United States in a more sensitive position. Also, Russia tries to limit the country's influence in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East regions (Kiani 2007).

Security Reasons

The main driver of Russian foreign policy in the Middle East is security. Russia is aware that the security landscape in the Middle East is not clear due to the deepening of ethnic and sectarian divisions and the intensification of fundamentalism. This represents a serious concern. The religion of the majority of the population of Central Asia is Islam. In South Caucasus Azerbaijan is a Muslim country, and Georgia and Armenia have small Muslim populations. It is not far-fetched that the tensions in the Middle East increase anti-Russian Islamic tendencies abroad. A clear example of this are the problems faced by leaders of Central Asian governments during the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. In general, these leaders are pro-Russian, and therefore Islamic fundamentalism is a threat to Russia's interests. Moreover, Moscow is concerned about the political tendencies that will emerge among the Muslims of this country in the future (Deilami Moezzi 2011).

Russia's other security concern stems from Russia's position as a world power. Moscow tries to resort to military means as little as possible to achieve its goals in Europe. In such an environment, the reality that Europe needs Russian gas is a good way to counter policies from this region and other neighboring areas that may threaten Russia's security and interests. When Ukraine and Georgia announced their intention to join NATO, Russia responded by restricting gas supplies to these countries. Meanwhile, Old Europe, especially Germany, urged Kiev and Tbilisi to pay more attention to Russia's concerns. Therefore, gas is a strategic and security tool for Russia. Moscow is trying to maintain Europe's dependence on Russian gas. In recent years, Europe has turned to the Middle East to diversify its gas supply, a policy that concerns Russia (Deilami Moezzi 2011).

Russia has entered the Middle East gas program to counter efforts, that may threaten its power in this energy sector. Although this move is economic in nature, it actually has significant strategic and security implications. Moscow, as mentioned earlier, will try not to jeopardize Russian access to European markets and will balance the Middle East. Moreover, in the context of becoming a superpower, Russia sees power in the energy sector as an inevitable priority, if it participates in gas programs and projects in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf (Hosseini 2006).

Political Reasons (Restoration of Foreign Policy)

Russia's agenda in the Middle East region also has political aims and approaches. One of them is to restore Russia's tarnished image among the Muslims of the world. New Russia (known as the greatest heir to the Soviet Empire) has taken actions that have offended Muslims around the world. The most important of these was the brutal repression of the Chechen independence movement. Although Russia failed to control the crisis in 1994 during Yeltsin's presidency, Putin pursued harsh and even inhumane policies in 1999 that severely suppressed the separatist tendencies of the Chechen Muslim people (Friedman 2006).

During Putin's second term, Russia opened a new chapter in its relations with the Middle East. In addition to Turkey, Iran and Syria, the Kremlin was eager to expand its relations with allies that were also closer to the United States. Increasing relations with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Egypt should be seen in this context. This increases Moscow's presence on the Middle East and has a positive impact on the Kremlin's bargaining power vis-à-vis the White House. U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, curbing terrorism and fundamentalism in the Middle East, South, and Central Asia, Iran's nuclear program, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and the control of weapons of mass destruction are, according to Russian politicians, is a sensitive issue. The document U.S. Foreign Policy Energies also was analyzed in order to make sense of this scenario and to create a suitable ground for Russia to play its role (Friedman 2006).

Russia's political efforts to establish relations with the Middle East are within the framework of Russia's security objectives. In particular, the development of relations with countries previously mentioned such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and United Arab Emirates, and to some extent Egypt, should be seen in the context of Moscow's efforts to contain Salafism in the South and North Caucasus. Although there are more foreign supporters of Salafist

groups in the Caucasus than in the Middle East, it seems that Russia will limit its relations with them. However, Russia has chosen a different path and is trying to increase its diplomatic clout in order to contain and control the Salafist extremists through these governments (Deilami Moezzi 2011).

Economic Reasons

The Middle East is important to any growing economy. Due to its significant dollars reserves obtained from oil, the countries of this region get to enjoy the luxuries and advanced goods of the world. Apart from Israel, Turkey and to some extent Iran, most of the other countries meet their needs from abroad. Moreover, these countries are among the largest buyers of arms in the world. These countries have also recently expressed a desire to take advantage of the nuclear industry, especially in the area of power generation, and there are suitable opportunities for Russia in the above areas (Bremer and Charap 2007).

The positive economic features of the Putin era confirm his focus on the economy. Analysts say that Putin was the first politician to explicitly attribute Russia's economic weakness to its passive behavior in the 1990s, and this understanding underscores his importance. According to Putin, without convergence with the structures of the international economy, it is impossible to achieve the desired level of economic and social development. Otherwise, the development process will be slow and difficult (Bremer and Charap 2007).

Russia's Interests at Middle East

Economic Interests

In 2017, Russian economy had suffered heavy losses due to the falling of international oil prices. The Crimean monopoly, sanctions and other structural problems put pressure on the state budget. Under these circumstances, reliable sources of revenue were sought, which changed Russia's perception of trade opportunities in the Middle East. As a result, the prioritization of economic gains led to a significant increase in Russian activity in the Middle East and in the volume of trade between Russia and the region between 2012 and 2017. Given the challenges facing the Russian economy, cooperation with Middle Eastern countries has become more important for several reasons. First, trade relations have been on the rise since the early

2000s.

The fact that the Russian trade balance in the Middle East is in Russia's favor makes the region an attractive market for Russian goods - military equipment, machinery, oil and gas, petrochemicals, metallurgy, and agricultural products. In this sense, trade with the region is useful for implementing the government's economic diversification strategy. Moreover, despite the relatively small share of oil and gas (compared to petrochemicals) in Russian exports to the Middle East, Moscow sees the potential of the Middle East as a buyer for its natural gas. Russia is also promoting its space industry in the Middle East with products such as the GLONASS satellite navigation system. From 2012-17, cooperation with Middle Eastern countries in the field of nuclear energy is another focus of Russian trade (Kajanov 2018).

One of the main reasons for Russia's cooperation with countries in the region is to offset the negative impact of Western sanctions against Russia. Thus, the countries of Middle Eastern have gained importance as agricultural exporters, whose production can help replace European products under anti-Russian sanctions (Kajanov 2018).

Energy Interests

Russia has economic and trade interests in the energy sector on the Middle East. This energy includes nuclear energy and oil and gas. Russian state-owned companies such as Gazprom and Rosatom (State Economic Energy Corporation) pursue significant energy interests in key consumer markets, oil and gas fields, and nuclear energy infrastructure customers in countries such as Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Kurdistan, and Eastern Mediterranean. Slowly Rosatom has expanded its operations in the Middle East in recent years by building reactors in Iran, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. It also opened a regional office in Dubai in hopes of further linkages with the UAE and Saudi Arabia to increase its nuclear energy capacity. Fluctuations in global energy markets and Russia's increasing dependence on oil revenues as a result of declining economic power due to Western sanctions have increased pressure on Moscow to reach Middle East energy markets (Saden et al. 2017).

Arms Trade Interests

The Middle East arms market is not new to Russia. The Soviet Union exported arms to Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Yemen. But the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced Russia's arms exports. Russia's

armaments industry was damaged by the Boris Yeltsin governmental policies, and in addition, important Russian factories on the territory of the new republics made themselves independent, which led to the loss of ports such as Odessa and Ilyichevsk, which were important weapons depots (Kayanov 2016).

At least since 1999, Russia has been one of the largest arms exporters in the world. In recent years, the Middle East and the North Africa (MENA) region have become the second most important Russian arms market after Asia. From 2000 to 2016, the Middle East and the North Africa region accounted for about one-fifth of Russian arms exports. In 2009, for example, Moscow sold about \$9 billion worth of weapons to the region; in 2016, the figure was up to \$21.4 billion (Bershchevsky 2017). Traditional customers presented a slight decline, but Russia tried to keep its revenues with these other countries.

Between 2011 and 2015, the volume of arms deals signed between Moscow and the Middle East increased significantly, including Russia's return to the Egyptian-Iraqi arms market, which had recently been affected by the United States. Russia signed a \$3.5 billion deal with Cairo in 2014 under which Moscow will sell MIG -29M/M2 fighter jets, Mi-35M attack helicopters, an S-300VM missile complex and a coastal defense system to Egypt. Also in 2015, Irkut agreed to supply 12 Su-30K fighter jets to Egypt (Kajanov 2016).

Some countries prefer Russian weapons to American ones, mostly for obvious reasons, and the U.S. does not sell weapons to many Russian customers for various reasons. They are inexpensive and generally often comparable to American systems. In some areas Moscow's systems are extremely poor in quality and performance, but in others they are a close competitor. For example, Moscow was very good at building anti-aircraft missiles, such as the S-300 and S-400 systems, based on lessons learned from the Kosovo air war. Currently, the American F-35 fighter can be attacked by the S-400 (although there is no way to prove this until they are in direct combat).

However, Moscow is developing the next generation S-500, which full capabilities are not yet known. Russia's current generation of aircraft and ballistic missile defenses are comparable to U.S. defense technology. Some Russian missiles are still like American missiles, some even work better. Moreover, the US Foreign Military Sales System (FMS) is very slow, bureaucratic and cumbersome, while Moscow, once the contract is signed, takes less time to deliver the equipment to buyers. (Breshchevsky 2017).

Strategic Interests

Russia's strategy in the Middle East is to align with other actors in the region. However, Russia pursues this strategy not because it wants to play the main role in the Middle East, but because it wants to have as much influence as possible in the region. This allows Moscow to cooperate with the United States in the Middle East. If the United States rejects Russia's offer to cooperate, Russia will at least worsen the situation for the United States in the region. Russia's top priority is Ukraine, and it has perceived U.S. interference as a threat in recent years. Moscow hopes that as long as the United States focuses on the Middle East, it will be less inclined to intervene in Ukraine (Snyder 2017).

Russia's strategy in the region includes several cases. First, Russia is using its continued pragmatism in the region and talking to each regional power in the Middle East about its intentions. Given the complexity of the Middle East realities, a balancing strategy between all the major players in the region was not initially envisaged. But Russia was able to convince its political partners to focus on discussing areas where Russia and the Middle East can work together rather than trying to drag Russia into regional disputes (Kajanov 2018).

Second, Russia is flexible in its regional dialogue but very determined to defend its major interests. For example, it exercises its veto power in the United Nations to support the Assad regime or to support laws that do not formally comply with UN. Russia is also concerned about any change in the Middle East borders and is strictly against any dialogue with radical Islamists (Kajanov 2018).

Third, Russia is working hard to make its role comparable to that of the United States in the region. In this sense, the strong memory of the Soviet presence during the Cold War that still exists among policymakers and nations in the Middle East is useful, although Russia cannot compete politically and economically with the United States. Russia exploits the shortcomings of Western policy in the Middle East. For example, the U.S. reluctance to protect Mubarak, compared to Moscow's support for Assad, has encouraged regional powers to view Russia as a reliable partner (Kajanov 2018).

Fourth, Russia formally avoids ideological dialogue with the Middle East. In talks with countries and political groups in the region, Russia tries to focus on differences and contradictions. In most cases, Russia is still very practical (Kajanov 2018).

Finally, Russia's economic efforts are focused on areas of market

advantage: Nuclear energy, oil and gas, petrochemicals, space, weapons, and grain. At the same time, Russian trade on the Middle East is based on the claim “Chinese prices with European quality”. Low prices and reliability are the main reasons why Middle Eastern countries are interested in Russian nuclear technology. In March 2015, Russia and Jordan signed a \$10 billion agreement that will allow Rostov to build and operate two 2,000-megawatt nuclear reactors. During Putin’s visit to Egypt in February 2015, Rostom signed a contract to build Egypt’s first nuclear power plant (Kajanov 2018).

Final Remarks

The Middle East has long been known for its ethno-religious divisions, oil, fundamentalism, and Arab-Israeli conflict. It has been great, but there has never been a full security without war and conflict, and this has led to foreign powers invading the region and intervening on many policies and making decisions.

One of these foreign powers that has always tried to project itself in the Middle East was Russia. After the fall of the Russian monarchy and the rise of the anti-imperialist Soviet regime, Moscow did not stop its presence and adventures in the region. The adventures that occupied the northern part of Iran and the establishment of sham regimes like the Republic of Mahabad or the arming of pan-Arab governments, especially the Baathist regimes in Iraq and Egypt, can be mentioned. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the onset of widespread unrest within Russia, the Kremlin had long forgotten about the Middle East until faltering oil revenues and weak U.S. policy provided a favorable environment for the Russian bear to return to the Middle East; a return that Iran is also largely pursuing in the current situation to ensure its national interests and national security (Mahmoudian 2016).

As the countries of the Middle East and their governments have always been politically weak, the influence of foreign powers had led to more and more unrest. They have tried to turn the countries of the region against each other, so we have seen an increase in conflicts. Among the important issues we can mention are the Arab-Israeli conflict, the problems between the countries of the region and the important and attractive issue of oil. The superpowers were content with their influence, but with the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), the Middle East increasingly came under the influence of the US to dominate the region alone. Therefore, with the formation of a new Russia and efforts to improve the internal situation, Russia’s foreign policy turned back to the Middle East and countries that were against the US

presence found more hope in Russia.

Another reason for Russia's presence in the Middle East is to try to maintain the status quo rather than change it, because a secure Middle East region that can solve Russia's security, economic, and political problems is far better than any other situation. So, it is consistent with the aggressive realist assumption that governments are trying to maintain the status quo.

Another point that has been observed in recent years is Russia's strong presence in the conflicts on the Middle East, especially in Syria, because Moscow, in order to prove itself as an international power and restore its power, must necessarily have a strong presence in sensitive areas. On the Middle East, it could show Russia's influence and importance. Since powers always see the hypothetical enemy as a threat to themselves and Russia needs the United States as a long-time rival, aggressive thinking is always present in the security scene because it always has to fight for the rest.

Therefore, the article has shown that pragmatism as a primary policy and restoration of power played a key role at the beginning of Putin's presidency, but with the entry into the international arena and the attainment of hegemonic power, Moscow entered the realm of realism. The offensive explained well the role and presence of Russia in restoring its power in the Middle East, as international countries need a strong presence in key areas to maintain their power and security, and Russia is very aware of this. In this sense, the text has explained the role and importance of Russia's presence in the Middle East and the reasons behind it.

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ABSTRACT

The Soviet Union emerged as a superpower in the Cold War, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new Russia was formed. In order to achieve some power hegemony, priority was given to Russia's security document. In his first term, Vladimir Putin focused on pragmatism and emphasized the power of domestic politics and the revival of the Russian economy. In his second term, Putin focused on the politics of realism to gain power on the international stage and to promote the return of Moscow's interests. In his second term, Putin pursued three goals in the Middle East: political (power expansion), security (avoiding differences), and economical (strengthening Russia). Therefore, in this study, Russian foreign policy in the Middle East and its importance is analyzed. The question that embodies this study is: what are the issues in Russia's foreign policy that make the Middle East region important for Russia? And the hypothesis related to this question: Russia's concern about Islamic fundamentalism (security), economic and political reasons are among the most important factors in framing its foreign policy to the Middle East.

KEYWORDS

Soviet Union; Russia; Vladimir Putin; Foreign Policy; Middle East.

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AFRICA AND THE ‘GLOBALIZATION BARGAIN’: TOWARDS A COLLECTIVE ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY

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Introduction

A collective stance will enable member states to reap the benefits of economies of scale and greater bargaining powers, vis-à-vis other global players. The obverse is of course that states cede some of their sovereign powers to [a] common institution (Wachira 2007, 12; brackets are mine).

Wachira’s assertion cited above aptly and succinctly situates the thrust of this paper. The paper examines the status and future of economic sovereignty among African states in the current era of globalization, against the backdrop of the eroding impacts of globalization on the sovereign powers of states, which calls for a collective mitigation; to wit a collective continental approach to economic sovereignty.

Scholarship on sovereignty has come a full cycle, yielding contending and contradictory perspectives. Of these perspectives, two schools of thought are readily discernible. The first is the school that believes in the demise of sovereignty. The school contends that forces of globalization have fundamentally altered the contemporary state system in such a manner that renders the concept of sovereignty otiose (Ivan 2013; Lodder 2017). A corollary of this perspective is that claims of national sovereignty in the new world order is merely a matter of pretension; hence sovereignty is seen as an “organized hypocrisy” (Krasner 1999, 23). The second school posits that in spite of the influences of globalization on national sovereignty, states still

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retain appreciable degree of sovereign powers (Waller and Simon 1985; Rothe 2010; Zhongying 2005).

In the same vein, academic discourse on aspects of economic sovereignty in the context of the globalizing world has been perennial (Quiggin 2000; Buxbaum 2002; Quiggin 2005; Sakong 2016; Richardson and Stähle 2017). At the core of the discourse is the dilemma of reconciling the imperatives of national economic sovereignty with the exigencies of the increasingly interdependent and globalizing economic world. In a public presentation in 2016, Dr. I. Sakong of the Institute of Global Economy engaged this dilemma in a salient analytical poser: “Should Economic Sovereignty be a Top National Priority?” And he went on to posit: “If the answer is a simple ‘yes’, then ... countries would be reluctant to join any form of multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, World Bank and the WTO, or to participate in any bilateral or regional agreements, such as various free-trade agreements, customs, monetary, or fiscal unions” (Sakong 2016, 1). Sakong seems to be of the opinion that although national economic sovereignty matters, its pursuit may ultimately be a needlessly costly venture. According to him:

[O]pportunity costs of insisting on the national economic sovereignty at all times could be devastatingly high, especially in this deeply interdependent global economic world. China made nearly 10 years’ efforts to join the WTO in 2001 and the Chinese economy prospered afterwards. North Korea is an illuminating opposite case. The UK’s decision to exit from the European Union apparently is not simply motivated by keeping the economic sovereignty alone. Even then, both short-and long-term economic costs for the UK will be staggering as many foresaw, and short-term damages are already becoming apparent (Sakong 2016, 1).

If globalization has come to stay and its immanent grip on the global economy is for now irreversible, then pursuit of inward-looking economic sovereignty by any state is not only costly but also vain. For African states that are already at the receiving end of globalization, prioritizing national economic sovereignty over supranational collective sovereignty would be both futile and catastrophic. As Wachira (2007) rightly observes, the ultimate bargain is that African states cede some of their sovereign powers to a common supranational institution. This is the prime standpoint of this paper.

Literature has blossomed rather disproportionately with regard to the political aspects of the sovereignty-globalization problematic (Waller and Simon 1985; Wachira 2007; Lodder 2017). In the prevailing gamut and litany of scholarly perspectives, only little has been said concerning the economic dimension of the problematic. This is a fundamental epistemic

gap, considering the fact that it is economic sovereignty that determines the efficacy of political sovereignty. In effect, in absence of economic sovereignty, "Political sovereignty becomes a chimera, an empty word whose meaning is increasingly symbolic [...]" (Savanovic 2014, 1038).

The paper has its essence in para-theorizing and analytical prescription. It rethinks the extant perspectives on sovereignty and underscores the imperative for economic sovereignty for Africa in the age of globalization. Yet its purpose is not only theoretical and prescriptive, for it proffers a polemical engagement with its subject matter with a view to engendering a praxis-oriented scholarship. If the outcome of the discourse only helps in edifying intellectual and policy endeavors towards the appreciation of the necessity for 'trans-nationalization' of sovereignty in Africa in the ongoing era of globalization, then the purpose of the paper must have been creditably met.

The remainder of the paper is thematically organized in a number of sections. What comes next is the conceptual clarifications wherein the key terms implicit in the subject matter are considered with a view to operationalizing them. This is followed by a theoretical exploration of the notion of sovereignty, designed to situate the discourse in proper epistemological perspective. After this comes a discussion on the necessity for a collective economic sovereignty in Africa in the era of globalization. The last section is the conclusion.

Conceptual Clarifications

Five key terms form the conceptual frame of this paper, namely collective sovereignty, economic sovereignty, globalization, globalization bargain and multilateralism. These terms are considered hereunder (Table 1) in order to operationalize their meanings in the context of the present discourse.

Table 1: Conceptualization of Key Terms

Term	Conceptualization
Collective sovereignty	This a mechanism for leveraging and coordinating national jurisdictions into a multilateral arrangement dedicated to functional supra-nationalism. It is premised on the principle that “states have and are willing to cede some of their sovereignty to effectively achieve common competencies through a supra-national entity” (Wachira 2007, 1).
Economic sovereignty	“As a general matter, economic sovereignty encompasses the right to continue and preserve economic activities closely linked to the existence of the state. A test for the validity of a claim of economic sovereignty involves consideration of three elements: 1) the interference with a preexisting fundamental state policy; 2) the relationship between the party to the dispute and the state policy; and 3) the presence or threat of injury to the state itself” (Waller and Simon 1985, 8). Simply put, economic sovereignty means the “ability of a state to impose the rules of appropriation, exchange and use of resource” (Savanovic 2014, 1038) within its jurisdictional spheres without external hindrances.
Globalization	“This refers to the transformation of the world into a global society, characterized by interconnectivity and inter-dependence” of people and nations (Okoli and Atelhe 2018, 102). “Globalization is characterized by the dynamics and dialectics of spatial and temporal integration on the worldwide and regional scales. It is a dynamic and complex phenomenon with multifaceted expressions in the realms of politics, economy, environment, and culture” (Okoli and Atelhe 2018, 103).

Term	Conceptualization
Globalization bargain	The negotiable prospects of a nation in the globalization process, mediated by its structural positionality as well as competitive bargaining advantage in that context. Africa's globalization bargain is low and unpromising, owing largely to the underdevelopment and dependency of her states, which have made them subjugated to the whims and caprices of the global centres (Okoli 2017). This poses a phenomenal prosperity challenge to the continent in the era of on-going globalization.
Multilateralism	"Coordinating relations among two or more states based on certain agreed principles" (Ruggie 1992: 568). It is rules-based, institutionalized and normatively sanctioned relations geared towards the pursuit of mutually beneficial higher competences that transcend state-based territorial jurisdictions (Bouchard and Peterson 2011; see also Table 2).

Source: Various authorities cited in-text.

Exploring Sovereignty: Theoretical Conceptions and Extrapolations

This paper, in a way, has its essence in pre-theorizing. As such, it “takes the prior step of developing a conceptual framework” that can drive a discourse (Bouchard and Peterson 2011, 5). According to Stoker (1999, 18):

Conceptual frameworks or perspectives provide a broad language and a frame of reference in which a reality can be examined. They go further than a model in providing interpretations of relationships between variables. Conceptual frameworks achieve a greater depth and breadth in their attempts to explain a reality.

This section thus explores the concept of sovereignty as a frame of reference of the paper. To begin with, it is pertinent to observe that the notion of sovereignty is to some extent a conceptual problematic. This is more so considering the various senses in which the concept has been applied by analysts. In the words of Barnett (2017, 1), “For many outside academic

circles, the concept of sovereignty has remained esoteric in nature, lacking a clear standard definition”.

At its most basic level “Sovereignty means superiority or supremacy over each person or organization” (Kitagawa 2014:2). From the standpoint of the traditional legal doctrine, sovereignty is understood as the “exclusivity of jurisdiction and non-intervention in another state’s internal affairs” (Ivan 2013, 173). This orthodox legalistic conception has found its loudest expression in the Westphalian conception of sovereignty, hinged on the principles of territorial non-violability and non-interference (Jordaan 2017).

Essentially, sovereignty refers to the jurisdictional supremacy of the state and its laws. In this respect, Nibblett 2016, 2) elaborates:

At its most basic level, sovereignty is the legal status that all states possess when they are recognized by their peers through the United Nations, reflecting their jurisdiction over a territory and the permanent population living there. The governments of sovereign states have the legitimate right to use force in self-defence and to maintain security within their territories; to enter into agreements with other states in the conduct of their international relations; and to write the laws by which their countries are governed.

A number of dimensions of sovereignty have been identified in the literature, namely international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, and domestic sovereignty (Hainsworth 1995; Quigg 2000; Ivan 2013). In this respect, Quiggin (2000, 2-3) elaborates:

International legal sovereignty is the acceptance of a given state as a member of the international community, and is, in most cases, relatively uncontroversial. Westphalian sovereignty is based on the principle that one sovereign state should not interfere in the domestic arrangements of another. Interdependence sovereignty is the capacity and willingness to control flows of people, goods and capital into and out of a country. Domestic sovereignty is the capacity of a state to choose and implement policies within its territory.

Sovereignty has its real substance in the jurisdictional supremacy of the state and its legal ordinances. Hence, “the two qualities that are indispensable to the idea of sovereignty are elements of control and authority, which accompanies the sovereign supreme governing competences” (Negan and Haddad 2011/2012, 435). Following a peculiar typological schema, Vernon (1968) identifies two dimensions of sovereignty, namely national and popular

sovereignty. The former refers to the supreme public power that has the right and the might to impose its dictate in the last instance while the later has to do with an entity that wields legitimate power and so recognized to have authority.

The economic dimension of sovereignty refers to the capacity of a state to initiate and pursue the course of its destiny without any untoward ideological influences or structural encumbrances from external forces (Vernon 1968). Economic sovereignty is the true test of national sovereignty. According to Savanovic (2014, 1038), "real power and real sovereignty are manifested in the issue of resource use rules". In other words, the true worth of a country's national sovereignty has a lot to do with its ability to hold sway in matters of economic production and resource use rules.

The conception of sovereignty has changed over the years in keeping with the dynamics of the international system. The New World Order (NWO) instantiated in the phenomenon of globalization has come with important changes that have altered the traditional understanding of sovereignty. These changes are evidenced in the increased internationalism and globalism, the rise of inter- and supra-national organizations, and the normative propagation of human rights and humanitarian law (Wachira 2007, 2). This trend has necessitated an incremental shift from the Westphalian notion of sovereignty to a more liberalized paradigm (Sono 1979; Hainsworth 1995).

Table 2: Sovereignty - Then vs. Now

Then (Westphalian status)	Now (Neo-liberal status)
It espouses the principle of non-interference	It espouses the principle of non-indifference
It emphasizes territorialization	It emphasizes de-territorialization
It values inward looking national security	It values inward and outwar*d looking national security
It is characterized by unilateralist pursuit of national interest	It is characterized by multilateralist pursuit of national interest
It is state-centric	It is citizenry-centric (popular sovereignty)
It is pro-defence (state preservation)	It is pro-development (national prosperity)

Source: Author's elaboration.

Part of the post-Westphalian thinking on sovereignty espouses the idea/ of human security in an attempt to highlight the transformation of sovereignty from a state-centric end to a citizen-centric one. The latter has

also been rightly referred to as “popular sovereignty” (Farmer 2012, 101), which highlights the stake that the people wield in that regard. As opined by Farmer (2012, 94):

Since the 1990’s the concept of human security has come to challenge [the] state-centric view of sovereignty. As such, sovereignty is no longer viewed as an intrinsic right of states but rather that this right derived from the people. This means that the state maintains its right to rule as long as it respects the basic human rights of its citizenship.

Generally, the traditional conception of sovereignty has been variously negotiated by the abiding normative salience of international laws and institutions, the activities of multinational corporations, the course of economic integration, and the increasing interdependence of states in the ongoing globalization era. The consequence is the substantive erosion of national sovereignty, conceived in its standard unilateralist sense. This development has called for a new thinking aimed at re-conceptualizing and re-contextualizing sovereignty in a manner that reflects its contemporary essence and significance. In effect, as “the traditional concept of sovereignty has diminished and continues to be restated”, in the light of “the increased need for state cooperation and interactions to meet the new global challenges”, there is a need “that states review and rethink the concept of sovereignty” (Wachira 2007, 11). This new conception of sovereignty is designated herewith as multilateralist approach to sovereignty.

Illustratively, multilateralism may be defined as “Three or more [state] actors engaging in voluntary and (essentially) institutionalized international cooperation governed by norms and principles, with rules that apply (by and large) equally to all states” (Bouchard and Peterson 2011, 10; brackets are mine). It is a pattern of international regimen that entails basically the following:

- i. Importance of rules;
- ii. Inclusiveness in terms of parties involved or affected; and
- iii. Voluntary cooperation that is at least minimally institutionalized (Bouchard and Peterson 2011; see also Table 2).

The multilateralist view of sovereignty envisions “the transfer of sovereignty in a jointly designed and mutually acceptable legalistic international institution which “allows the state interests to be both respected

and represented at the international level” (Hainsworth 1995, 583). This is presupposed in the collective economic sovereignty schema being ultimately advocated in this paper.

Table 3: Forms of Multilateralism

	Institutionalized	Crystallizing	Aspirant
Characteristics	Rules-based international organizations are established	New international rules and organizations are in the process of being established	Norms inform foreign policy behaviour in the absence of any formally-codified rules
Examples	WTO	• Judicial intervention and the ICC • Climate change post Kyoto	• Child labour • Foreign investment

Source: Peterson et al (2008, 9), as adapted in Bouchard and Peterson (2011, 21).

Perspectives on Globalization and Sovereignty

Globalization is a worldwide phenomenon whose historical contours and dynamics have manifested in a variety of forms and dimensions over the years. Between the 19th and 21st century, the forces of globalization have found expression in some fundamental transformations on the world stage (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Historical Transformations of Globalization in the 20th-21st Century



Source: geo41.com (n.d).

Globalization has fundamentally altered the essence and functionality of the contemporary state system. It has changed the manner in which the

state is conceived, but also how it operates. This development has been figuratively represented thus:

They used to be close, the nation state and the law. The nation was primarily defined by borders; the state reigned as a sovereign within and could apply its laws. This simple and effective state of affairs changed due to various developments (Lodder 2017, 60).

Obviously, the most crucial of such developments is the impact of globalization on the national sovereignty of states. Quiggin (2002, 2) observes that "Globalization is frequently discussed as a counterpoint of national sovereignty". He adds that "It is commonly asserted that globalization has eroded national sovereignty or that it has rendered borders obsolete".

Essentially, the relationship between globalization and sovereignty is at best dialectical. According to Savanovic (2014, 1022), "the globalization process leads towards de-sovereignization". The de-sovereignization process follows a three-dimensional pattern of occurrence:

Firstly, it is a process of transferring decisions to supranational entities, such as the European Union (EU), which are given the legislative powers in certain (many) aspects of social, economic and political life. Secondly, it represents an increasing inferiority of states in relation to requirements that come from some external institutions, such as the IMF, WB, WTO, etc. Based on their powers, these institutions are able to force the states to make certain decisions. Third, and perhaps the most interesting, there is a process in which large transnational corporations (TNC), based on their economic power, can influence economic and political decisions of sovereign states (Savanovic 2014, 1026).

One crucial dimension of the prime de-sovereignizing tendencies in the contemporary international system is the dynamics of economic integration, which is becoming widespread at regional and continental levels. In this regard, Hainsworth (1995, 583) succinctly asserts that "Economic integration is altering the role of the state and the concept of sovereignty in international law. Intensifying economic interdependence has rendered sovereignty almost meaningless for an isolated state". Allied to this is the rising saliency of multinational corporations as well as supranational organizations in the fast globalizing world (Sono 1979; Wachira 2007).

The de-sovereignization process is such that nation-states are either persuaded, cajoled or constrained to make substantive concessions that divest

of their sovereign integrity. Some of these concessions come in the fashion of neoliberal market tradeoffs while some others emanate from normative commitments arising from negotiated agreements as well as demands of sundry multilateral engagements. The significance of this development is that national sovereignty is increasingly becoming more symbolic than substantive. This does not, however, presuppose the demise of sovereignty as some analysts are wont to contend (Ivan 2013; Lodder 2017).

Africa and Globalization Challenge: Towards a Collective Economic Sovereignty

The Imperative

The exigencies of globalization have mandated a paradigm shift in the conception and application of national sovereignty. This paradigm shift is to the effect that national sovereignty is not to be approached based on unilateralist jurisdictional exclusivity of states but, rather, in terms of their multilateral solidarity. In fact, the in-thing should be a movement should be from individualist to collectivist pursuit of sovereignty as envisioned herein (Figure 3).

The unilateral and exclusivist pursuit of sovereignty has become meaningless, for “states have increasingly acknowledged that certain problems affect them collectively and consequently their resolution can only be attained through global efforts” (Wachira 2007, 2). Such problems include terrorism, climate change, transnational criminality, and the like. In effect, “If a state cannot attain necessary objectives on its own, it must seek to attain them on a supranational level” (Wort 1952, 3). This position underscores the necessity for a collective sovereignty regimen for Africa in the prevailing era of globalization.

The essence of collective sovereignty is “the transfer of some sovereign powers” to a supranational organization, “which will ensure greater coordination and effectiveness in executing common competences” (Wachira 2007, 12). For Africa, this is a desideratum, given the individual weaknesses of her states, which has recommended a sort of collective multilateral actions in respect of certain domains of governance. The ultimate way forward is an incremental transformation into a multilateralist model of sovereignty based on established rules and regularized institutional arrangements (see Table 3).

In discussing the necessity for a collective sovereignty in Africa, this paper focuses on the economic dimension of national sovereignty. This

is profitable considering the fact that economic sovereignty is the real and ultimate substance of national sovereignty. To be sure, many states in the world today would look ostensibly politically sovereign whereas in reality they are far from it, based on salient economic indices. Concerning such states, Savanovic (2014, 1038) opines:

Although politically sovereign, they are not economically sovereign. Political sovereignty becomes a chimera, an empty word whose meaning is increasingly symbolic, while the real power and real sovereignty are manifested in the issue of resource use rules.

Suffice it to state collective economic sovereignty being advocated for herewith is both expedient and profitable. It affords the member states with the advantage of competitive collective bargain within the framework of a trans-national economy of scale and solidarity. This enables weaker states within the arrangement to gain strategic leverage based on the support of the more privileged ones in the abiding 'asymmetries of interdependence' that defines the prevailing global order (Schneider 2005, 667). And together, all member states will enjoy the mutual benefits accruable from collegial multilateral synergy and solidarity.

Extant Continental Initiatives

The defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) espoused the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states in deference to the traditional notion of sovereignty. The African Union (AU) has departed from this traditionalist approach by substituting the principle of 'non-interference' for that of 'non-indifference' in affirmation of the multilateralist view of sovereignty. This stance is most stipulated in the fourth section of its enabling instrument thus:

(h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (cited in Farmer 2012, 99).

In line with the above tenet, AU has made some strategic interventions in domestic affairs of member nations, guided by the principle of multilateral solidarity. A case in point is her tenuous mission in respect of the Sudanese crisis. But beyond political engagements, AU has been in the forefronts of pan-African economic integration. Her most ambitious stride in this regard is


the nascent African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) initiative.

The Establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was signed in Kigali, Rwanda, by 44 Heads of State and Government of the 55 AU Member States on 21 March 2018. The initiative was inspired by the Abuja Protocol (2018) whose objective is “to facilitate the implementation of the African Economic Community by providing for the progressive implementation of the free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment” (International Trade Centre 2018, 9).

Article 3 of AU’s Abuja Treaty envisions an African Economic Community (AEC) with the following objectives (International Trade Centre 2018, 2):

- i. To promote economic, social and cultural development and the integration of African economies in order to increase economic self-reliance and promote an endogenous and self-sustained development;
- ii. To establish, on a continental scale, a framework for the development, mobilization and utilization of the human and material resources of Africa in order to achieve self-reliant development;
- iii. To promote cooperation in all fields of human endeavour in order to raise the standard of living of African peoples, and maintain and enhance economic stability, foster close and peaceful relations among Member States and contribute to the progress, development and the economic integration of the Continent; and
- iv. To coordinate and harmonize policies among existing and future economic communities (Figure 2) in order to foster the gradual establishment of the Community.

Figure 2: African Union and the Various Sub-Continental Economic Blocs/Communities



Source: Wikimedia Commons (n.d).

Also included in the Treaty was the target of “establishing, at the level of each Regional Economic Community and within a period not exceeding 10 years, a Free Trade Area (FTA) by the gradual removal of tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers to intra-community trade and the establishment of a Customs Union by means of adopting a common external tariff” (International Trade Centre 2018, 2). Table 4 gives useful insights into the state of progress in respect of regional economic integration in Africa from the standpoint of the performances of the various regional economic blocs.

Table 4: Status of Regional Integration in Africa by late 2010s

RECs	Free Trade Area	Customs Union	Single market	Countries that have implemented free movement protocol	Economic and monetary union
AMU	No	No	No	3 out of 5	No
CENSAD	No	No	No	Unclear	No
COMESA	Yes	No	No	Burundi and Rwanda ratified; Kenya and Zimbabwe signed but not ratified	No
EAC	Yes	Yes	Yes	3 out of 5	No
ECCAS	Yes	Yes	No	4 out of 11	No
ECOWAS	Yes	Yes	No	All 15	No
IGAD	No	No	No	No protocol	No
SADC	Yes	No	No	7 out of 15	No

Source: Adapted from International Trade Centre (2018, 7).

Table 4 highlights the state of regional integration in Africa as of 2016. Among other things, the table shows that the eight RECs recognized by AU (UNCTAD 2016) are at different levels of integration, with the EAC being the most integrated for the time being. EAC has attained the status of Free Trade Area, Customs Union and Single Market. It is followed by ECOWAS and ECCAS each of which has achieved Free Trade Area, Customs Union. All of the RECs are yet to attain the status of a full economic community as envisaged in the Abuja Protocol. But the gradual gravitation of some of the RECs towards a customs union and a single market is indicative of an incremental progress, after all. Remarkably, AfCFTA's operational phase has been successfully launched in July 2019 amid prospects and challenges ahead of the pan-Continental dream.

Overall, AU represents the most promising stride towards a pan-African economic cum political integration. As Wachira (2007, 7) puts it, "A possible African equivalent to the European Commission could be the AU Commission". By the same token, AU's AfCFTA initiative represents the most ambitious and auspicious regional integration project in Africa. To wit, AfCFTA aims at deepening "economic integration of the African continent by

creating a single continental market with free movement of business, people and investments" (International Trade Centre 2018, 3). Signe and Van der Van (2019, 1) note that AfCTA promises "to be the largest free trade area since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) [...]". As a neo-pan-African project, its success, however largely depends on how member states would wish to make good its intents and purposes (UNCCTAD 2015), especially against the backdrop of the structural and circumstantial challenges that are highlighted in the preceding sub-section.

Challenges and Prospects

The promise of collective economic sovereignty in Africa faces a myriad of challenges that are variously political, geo-political, socio-political, and jurisdictional in nature. The political challenges arise from the impediments posed by nationalism and sub-regionalism. There is a tendency for African states to hold tenaciously onto their national sovereignty, with some of them only inclined to a loose regional integration at the sub-continental level. Negating these centrifugal tendencies requires a renewed commitment to a pan-African solidarity that transcends national and sub-regional allegiances.

The geo-political dimension of the challenge derives from the differences arising from 'politics' of geography and spatial location. This is evidenced by the divisive relations among African states based on geo-locational in-grouping, closures and cleavages. For instance, the states of the Maghreb in North Africa are inclined to identify, first with themselves and then with the Middle East, in terms of multilateral engagements in view of their geographical contiguity therewith. This inclination also has a lot to do with geo-cultural affinities between North Africa and the Arabia.


The socio-cultural barriers emanate from the differences in customs, language and heritage. The legacies of colonialism and Islam and Christianity in Africa engendered the problem of multiple and often conflicting heritage. The fault lines of this triple heritage have created pretexts for parochial cleavages among African states. An instance of such occurrence is the rising Anglophone-Francophone divide in West Africa, which has been a veritable obstacle to regional integration in that context.

In addition to the aforementioned are problems arising from jurisdictional issues. The challenge of harmonizing multiple fiscal, monetary, trade and immigration policies across the continent remains herculean. The proliferation of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the continent has also posed a challenge of effective harmonization of jurisdictional issues (UNCTAD 2016). Protectionist regimes are apprehensive of the erosive

impact of continental supranationalism. This challenge is complicated by the apparent indifference or lip-service of some African leaders towards the goal of pan-African integration.

In spite of the aforementioned potential and existential challenges, the promise of a pan-African economic sovereignty remains assured and realizable. What African states need to do going forward is to capitalize on the gains of the existing regional and continental economic integration platforms to leverage capacities for a pan-African sovereign economy through incremental but guided internal de-sovereignization. This would require a great deal of strategic continental bridge-building, multilateral institutional mainstreaming, and renascent pan-African leadership spirit.

Figure 3: The Imperative for Collective Economic Sovereignty for Africa



Individualism = National economic sovereignty.

Collectivism = Collective economic sovereignty.

Common Good = Pan-African economic solidarity and prosperity.

Source: Author's elaboration.

Final Remarks

Globalization is the essence of the contemporary international order. It is a contradictory phenomenon that has brought about enormous blessings as well as curses to nations. The tragedy of globalization, however, is such

that its gains and burdens are not equitably distributed among nations. What determines the fate of a nation in the context of globalization is its place within the structural asymmetries of material inequality and dependency that underpin the process. While the powerful nations of the global centre enjoy the best of prosperity offered by globalization, the weak nations at the periphery are subjected to its adversities.

Africa's existential condition in the globalizing world's political economy is one of a double jeopardy. Her states have been forcibly conscripted into the global capitalist order. Yet, none of these states possesses the requisite bargaining powers to play effectively within the system, owing to structural weaknesses arising principally from their poor industrial and technological standing. This situation has been complicated by the gamut of socio-political and economic challenges bedeviling the continent, some of which are best tackled through some form of collective action.

This paper has considered the fate of Africa in the globalization process from the analytical departure of economic sovereignty. It is observed that Africa's future in that context is contingent upon the strength of her bargaining power. National economic sovereignty guarantees no remedy, for that has been largely eroded by the structural eventualities of the same globalization. African states should strive to transcend their disempowering territorial-cum-nationalistic divides and capitalize on the relevant existing multilateral mechanisms towards mainstreaming collective sovereignty, based ultimately on the principle of pan-African supranationalism. To that end, leveraging and maximizing the gains and prospects of extant regional and continental supranational organisms would become both salient and expedient.

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ABSTRACT

Africa's existential situation in the prevailing global order is such that no state thereof can afford to take national sovereignty too seriously. Apart from the myriad of structural challenges imposed on the continent by globalization, Africa is faced with a gamut of political and economic problems that can only be meaningfully addressed through some form of strategic multilateral collaboration. Africa's aspiration to economic sovereignty has been constrained by the structural conditionalities of globalization, which have kept the continent overly weak, dependent and underdeveloped. The constraint is so immanent that individual African states can hardly afford even the relative sovereignty to harness a strategic balance in the fast ossifying asymmetries of interdependence that characterize the contemporary global political economy. It is posited in this paper that the remedy for Africa lies in the ability of her states to transcend their disempowering territorial-cum-nationalistic divides and capitalize on the existing continental multilateral mechanisms towards mainstreaming collective sovereignty, based on the principle of pan-African supranationalism. To that end, leveraging and maximizing the gains and prospects of extant regional and continental supranational organisms would become both salient and expedient.

KEY WORDS

Africa; Economic Sovereignty; Globalization; Globalization 'Bargain'; Multilateralism.

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WAR AND CONFLICT IN THE AFRICAN SAHEL AS THE RESULT OF AN HISTORIC AND PERMANENT WAR BETWEEN TWO EMPIRES: THE ARAB-ISLAMIC EMPIRE AND THE WESTERN EMPIRE

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Introduction

The so-called sub-Saharan Africa is the cradle of humanity, of the domestication of rice and its history is the oldest in the world, so talking about war and conflict in this area means revisiting the history of the continent's insertion in the complex international flows and processes that gave rise to the modern international system based on trade flows such as the Trans-Saharan and the Trans-Atlantic (Vidrovitch 2011).

However, our interest obliges us to centralize our analysis in the most recent period of the historiography of that region of the African continent. While the economic, religious, socio-political and cultural consequences of these trade flows have had and are having strong negative impacts on the current security situation of the continent, an in-depth analysis of them shows that Africa has always influenced the rest of the world.

It was this continent, through these trade flows, that supplied the world with gold as raw material to mint the Dinar's currency for the trans-Saharan trade routes and then for centuries millions of Africans were transplanted to the New World as raw materials essential to capitalism and globalization after the independence of the Americas with the territorial colonization of Africa.

Therefore, to speak of wars and conflicts in the African Sahel means to revisit the history of the various forms of globalization, to understand their socio-economic, political and cultural impacts. The heritage of these

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“civilizing” processes constitutes the basis of the internal and external rivalries that the continent lives continuously and permanently. This rivalry is based on the “cultural antagonism” fed by the geopolitical and geo-economic interests that the region arouses, and therefore the current conflicts linked to Islamic terrorism in the Sahel are the result of this historical past that opposes Western colonization and the African resistance that had Islam as its mobilizing or motivating source.

To think about contemporary international relations in Africa means to revisit the history of external interventions, in the sense of the involvement of foreign agents, organizations and countries in internal armed conflicts, since the processes of Islamization in the region and the establishment of a political order resulting from the war called holy war or Jihad, which provoked reformulations and even the overlapping of borders in the region, passing through colonialism, neo-colonialism to culminate in the current phase of “humanitarian” and military interventions with the military presence of France and the United States.

So, to understand the problems in the African Sahel² (Saahil in Arabic) in the post-Cold War period, it is necessary to go back historically, typifying “interventions” and their impacts in the region. It is important to point out that all African countries took their independence in the midst of the Cold War, which in itself reveals the very narrow limitations of diplomatic maneuver that the new government authorities had. Thus, the purpose of this reflection is to analyze security issues in the African Sahel by elucidating a possible typification of external interventions, their causes, and impacts.

Working to build paths and conditions of lasting peace justify the relevance of a reflection focusing on historiography. It is hypothesized that if terrorism and organized crime, as threats to international security, justify external interventions in the region, a historical setback (Islamization, Arabization, colonization, westernization) shows that the motives of both

² Sahel (coast in Arabic), is the climatic and biogeographical transition zone between the Sahara in the north and the Savannah of Sudan in the south. It is a strip of land of up to 1,000 km (620 miles) wide that covers 5,400 km (3,360 miles) from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. The European settlers defined the region as a border strip separating the north and south of the Sahara in order to prove the non-Africanity of the northern countries (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya) linking them to the great Middle East. This imagery is based on the colonial logic of separating Arabic and Arabized Muslims, besides reinforcing the hierarchization based on the tonality of the color of the skin (the lighter the more “civilized”) and of Arabism (speaking, having the Arab culture and customs). These two criteria of hierarchization served as a basis for dividing Africans between “barbarians and civilized”, but also reinforced the ongoing division of the Muslim world by creating and applying the concept of black Islam as opposed to Arab (white) Islam. The current conflicts in the Sahel countries (Mauritania Mali, Niger, Chad and Sudan) are in part a result of these divisions and hierarchizations.

jihadists and interventions are economic, geopolitical, geostrategic, and not humanistic or peacebuilding.

In other words, the current security crises in the African Sahel are part of these processes of globalization shaped by the actions of traders, religious missionaries, adventurers and soldiers and which put in opposition the Arab-Muslim world present on the African continent since the 8th century and the Western world present on the continent since the 15th century (Chanda 2011).

It is a reformulation and adaptation of colonial maps under the cloak of intervention in the name of the peoples' salvation against radical and radicalized Islamists. This hypothesis is theoretically based on the idea that the most recent history of West Africa is the result of internal and external factors. The article is structured in a conceptual part with the objective of dialoguing with the literature about the concepts; a historical part seeking to identify the external interventions over time, and the last part aims to relate this past to the current conflicts.

Conceptual Analysis

For our analysis it is important to define the key concepts of this reflection which are external intervention, war, conflict from a theoretical point of view and to situate the Sahel geographically. In relation to the former, considering the caution that foreign intervention is not a simple concept to define and knowing that reality is also no less complex than the definition, because, as Schimdt (2018) observes, even in periods of slave trade and established colonial rule, the dominant powers outside the continent needed to take into account local realities. Thus, the definition of Elizabeth Schmidt (2018) is adopted:

External intervention as the involvement of external powers or organizations in the internal affairs of African countries and that this entity may be based on other continents or may be neighboring African states or regional and sub-regional organizations. The term "intervention" implies an unequal power relationship and occurs when a dominant country or organization uses force or pressure to influence a weaker sovereign entity or/and when a weaker entity requests external assistance to restore order, monitor a peace agreement, or end a humanitarian crisis (Schmidt 2018, 36).

This reflection of Schmidt (2018) allows us to realize that the intervention can come from within the continent, from neighboring countries, a fact that allows us to affirm that the military incursions of Muslims (Africans

converted to Islam) as well as Arabs in sub-Saharan Africa can be considered as the first internal and external interventions in the continent. Another important information brought by Elizabeth Schmidt (2018) is the fact that “intervention” implies an unequal power relationship regardless of whether it occurs at the initiative of the strongest or is requested by the weakest and is characterized by the use of force or pressure to respectively influence the weakest, restore order, monitor peace, or end a humanitarian crisis.

So, despite its coercive character, intervention is always justified by “humanism” and consequently, in the African case, Islamization, Arabization, evangelization, and colonization can be characterized as external interventions and this does not necessarily mean that they are totally negative. Intervention can be seen in a positive light, as when powerful nations intervene to prevent genocide or enforce peace agreements, yet when outsiders intervene to enslave, conquer, colonize, overthrow or install governments or pillage resources, sell weapons, escalate internal conflicts, the intervention has had extremely negative modifications (Schmidt 2018; Diallo 2019).

In the second case, intervention becomes a serious question of insecurity seen here as the presence of external threats to the sovereignty and survival of the state. That is, the opposite of security understood as the absence of an external military threat to the objective survival of a state (Buzan 2009). Thus, Security means to constitute something that needs to be ensured: nation, state, individual, ethnic group, environment or the planet itself, whether in the form of “national or international security” in which the nation/state was the analytical and normative reference object.

Thus, there are political and normative decisions in the definition of security, making it one of the essentially contested concepts in modern social science. In this sense, security is always a “hyphenated concept” and always linked to a specific object, to internal/external allocations, to one or more sectors and to a particular way of thinking about policies (Buzan 2009, 28).

Following the same reasoning, one can conceive security as a guarantee of social order that means a pattern of human activity that sustains its primary and universal objectives (Bull 2002) that aims at guaranteeing protection against violence that leads to death or bodily harm (i); the fulfillment of promises made and that agreements adjusted to goals are implemented (ii) and seeks, to a certain extent, that the possession of things are stable and not subject to constant and unlimited challenges (iii).

In this sense, intervention is an instrument of action, a means, not an end, because, depending on the morality or immorality of the objective for which it is destined, it can serve in defense of human rights and preserve the International Order, but, on the other hand, many of these interventions

invade the privacy of people and the sovereignty of States compromising the stability of the local, national and/or regional social order and consequently the International System through the destruction of its base units, which are the States.

The interventions that have taken place on the African continent throughout history, from the Almoravian incursion in the time of the African empires (Mali, Ghana, Songai, Kaneem Bornou, etc.) to the invasions of the European colonial empires (France, United Kingdom, Italy) up to the current “humanitarian” interventions and/or peace missions of regional organizations (African Union, European Union), international organizations (UN) and foreign powers (France, United Kingdom, United States, China) that are currently in progress in the Sahel region (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso). Niger, Chad, and Sudan fit this vision.

Figure 1: From the Sahelo-Saharan Empires to the Colonial Empires (I)



Source: Bouquet (2017).

Figure 2: The Group of the Five Sahel Countries (G5 Sahel)



Source: Mantinez (2019).

However, it is important to point out that when focusing on the Islamic intervention that provided trafficking and slavery for millions of Africans on trans-Saharan routes, we must be very careful. One of the elements that contributed greatly to the enslavement of Africans was the fact that the monotheistic religion had become the main barometer of the degrees of humanity, but also the color of the skin. Islam claims that one Muslim could never enslave another, but this was never respected when dealing with black Muslims (Coulibaly 2006).

Coulibaly (2006) presents the case of Hamad Bhabha who was one of the greatest Muslim scholars and teachers in Mali and has been captured and taken to Morocco just for being a black man. The so-called Moors and light-skinned Arabs became the greatest merchants of other Muslim Africans. Other black skinned Muslim Africans began to capture and sell other Africans for seeing in them inferior beings only by their refusal to convert to Islam. It was because of this that in 1212, the Emperor of Mali carried out one of the greatest political revolutions with “La Charte des Chasseurs” that not only abolished slavery but also put in place infrastructures to curb the practice like the death of merchants.

Therefore, the Sahel is a region of political instability, characterized by civil wars, internal and interstate conflicts; economic that is materialized through various forms of predation of resources whose consequence leads to social instabilities due to the growing impoverishment of peoples and their

brutal forms of exclusion and, last but not least, cultural instability which is a more pernicious form of acculturation beyond the scientific and technical gap (Kipré 2003).

According to Williams (2014), conflict is the use of violence organized by collectivities, groups of individuals, for political ends that are characterized by antagonism and opposition between collective agents and can culminate in armed struggle leading to extreme violence (Deadly conflict) and internal armed conflicts can occur between citizens (Civil War) or between the state and its contesting groups (Rebellion).

War itself is an act of violence designed to force the adversary to execute our will, i.e., the continuation of politics by other means (Clausewitz 1955, 51). In short, one realizes that while conflict is characterized by the opposition of interests, struggle for values, status, power or resource, war is the sum of all this and constitutes an organic, human and civilizational phenomenon, a dispute between two or more states through their armed forces or two different civilizations/cultures or even visions with the purpose of dominating each other.

Thus, to understand and correctly define the conflicts and wars of the African continent, a historical retreat is necessary to pinpoint how and why the opposition of interests, the struggle for values (which ones?), power and resources are or are not linked to external intervention and vice versa and as an organic, human and civilizational phenomenon; which oppositions are being faced mainly from the cultural/civilizational point of view and since when?

Africa and the Arab Muslim World

The Islamic conquest of the Sahara in the seventh century of the Christian era marks the end of the region's ancient history and the beginning of medieval history that culminates with the fall of Baghdad in the third phase³ of the expansion of Islam in 750 when the Abbasids overthrew the Umayyyad dynasty, transforming the capital city of the Muslim empire (Salem 2006). The medieval period has nothing to do with African periodization. This conquest

3 1st stage: from 632 to 661 - the successors of Mohammed, the caliphs, conquered Persia, Syria, Palestine and Egypt and the 2nd stage: from 661 to 750 - the Umayyyad caliphs dominated politics, transferring the capital to Damascus, Syria. The power became hereditary; the caliphs began to act as absolutist monarchs. In that period, territories were conquered in China, North Africa, and almost in the entire Iberian Peninsula, in Europe. 3rd stage: from 750 to 1258 - the Abbasid dynasties of Persian origin appeared. Baghdad became the political and cultural capital of the Islamic world.

will be followed by the dispute of space by several movements among which the movement of the Mauri, the Almoravid movement that emerged from the rivalries within the Arab-Islamic empire between the 7th and 19th centuries.

Islam was in the European Middle Ages the enlightened representative of civilization within the Western world. Some might even think that Islam is a religion of stagnation and death, but they cannot deny the value of its principle of civilization without which much of the ancient knowledge would have disappeared for good.

The prestigious Arab-Muslim civilization had its apogee marked by the establishment of the caliphate in Spain and its decline began with the takeover of Baghdad by the Mongols and the Spanish reconquest. This decline makes the general manifestation of civilization disappear, but it leaves undeniable traces and legacies upon the European civilization itself. Moreover, the role of Arab-Muslim civilization continued its influence and role in all Muslim societies in “regional movements” according to Redan (1922).

The Islamic conquest of the Sahara in the 7th century after Christ marks the end of the region’s ancient history and the beginning of medieval history that ends with the fall of Baghdad in the third phase of the expansion of Islam in 750 when the Abbasids overthrew the Umayyad dynasty transforming the capital city of the Muslim empire (Salem 2006). This conquest will be followed by the dispute of space by several movements among which the onslaught of the Mauri/Africans, the Almoravid movement and the Almoravids who since the last third of the seventh century and the first of the eighth century have made their first warrior incursions into the Sahel and Sudan.

According to Kane (2004) in this period one speaks of the presence of a link of the Umayyad through which the soninkes of Biru Biru were hit for the first time by Islam from the 9th century onwards. The security of the Fulani people, like that of the people with whom they lived, was seriously threatened by the Berber impulse, in particular that of the lemtouna who subjugated the desert regions, waged a war with the black nations to force them to (convert) become Muslims, and the people who did not want to embrace Islam or pay taxes had a choice between servitude, death or flight (Kane 2004, 88).

Unlike what we are driven to think by the intellectuals of North Africa, a region of greater resistance against the penetration of Islam in the continent (Chebel 2007), the so-called Berbers composed of black and white people also had to pay tributes. It is also important to say that this is not an ethnic or tribal issue, which is in the eyes of some analysts a false concept comparable to the concept of “national identity” as something mobile, floating and illusory (Vidrovitch 2011; Amselle 1999), since three quarters of African languages belong to the Bantu language family.

“Bantu” is not an ethnic term, but linguistic (the equivalent of the so-called Indo-European languages), just as the dominant group in North Africa is the so-called Afro-Asian languages, which include Berber and Arabic. It is noted that the current use of the term “Arabic” to designate a people is a scientific heresy (except if it is to designate, in ancient times, inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula): we should speak of Arabic speakers, particularly to North Africa, where the vast majority of people were Berber speakers; Muslim “Arabs” are mostly aboriginal descendants of Berber (or other) descent converted to Islam (Vidrovitch 2011, 36).

This reflection from Vidrovitch (2011) allows us to reaffirm and reinforce the idea that the Berbers of North Africa are not Arabs, but Africans converted to Islam and consequently the advances of these Arab-speaking and Islamic-converted Berbers in the sub-Saharan Africa can be framed in the interventions of Islamized and Arabized neighboring states and peoples whose strength, superiority and legitimacy are given by the fact that they speak Arabic and dominate the precepts of Islam. As it can be seen, the intervention of Arabs, Arabized, and Islamized on the African continent in the Middle Ages constitutes the first phase of interventionism that can and should be classified as both foreign (Arabic) and domestic (Berber) on the continent and significantly changes the socio-cultural, economic, and political dynamics in the West African and Sahel region.

Conflicts defined as “ethnic-religious” became inevitable from the moment that Islamization and the dominance of the Arabic language that is “divinized” because it was the language of transmission of the Koran became the barometer measuring the degree of humanity, as well as the almost innate relationship established by Arabs and light-skinned Muslims (Fulbes for example) between being Arabic/Muslim and the degree of humanity and a true Muslim can only learn the words of God in Arabic, language in which he spoke to the prophet Muhammad (Chanda 2011).

This explains the adoption of Arabic as a language of communication by Africans who became Islamized and Arabized culturally, socially, politically and even economically, since Arabization is also seen as a measure of Islamization and legitimacy. Even the leadership of the “light-skinned” Muslims (fawns, Hausa etc.) is certainly justified first because the color of the skin resembles that of the Arabs and second because they dominated the Arabic, memorized the Koran and therefore taught the religion besides leading the Jihadist revolutions and theocratic states.

This leads to the intensification of the “ethnicization” of internal

instabilities, of the cultural and religious base involved which, besides changing social, economic, political and cultural dynamics, leaves a favorable opening for the justification and penetration of Western colonization. Thus, while Islamization has contributed to the strengthening of African empires (Mali, Waalo, Fula, Songai, etc.) between the 8th and 15th centuries, made possible by fruitful trade relations with the Mediterranean world (trans-Saharan trade), on the other hand, it contributed to the fall of empires (another time strengthened), the end of internal and regional socio-political stability due to the so-called Muslim revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries, leaving a legacy of internal instability to the continent that will be reinforced by the legacies of two inherent processes, the Western occupation and colonization that took place between the 15th and 20th centuries and its legacy, which makes one believe that everything on the African continent can be explained and apprehended in terms of tribal and ethnic terms that refer to the “wild” nature of Africans (Amselle 1999).

The legacy left by these two colonizations (Arab-Islamic and European Christians), are the embedded values that marked and still mark the bipolarization of inter-African relations, thus justifying internal conflicts, regional and international interventions of both foreign powers (France, England, the United States of America, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, etc.) and regional and international organizations such as the UN and the AU.

The incarnate humanism of these actors began with the merchants of the era of Islamization, and was continued by the missionaries, adventurers and soldiers who proselytized and secured territories for their sovereigns and merchants actively seeking to convert souls, sometimes forcing people to adopt the new faith (Chanda 2011, 172). According to Mota (2018), the 16th and 17th centuries remain in limbo being associated with a phase of de-Islamization or at least a stagnation of the advance of Islam in Africa, due to the arrival of the European empires to dispute the domination, influence and exploitation of material and “civilizational” resources in the African space. This dispute of the African continent regarding Arabs, Arabized and Muslims, and Christian Europe was the reflection of a political, economic, and cultural dispute for the domination of the modern world and its international system, as Toynbee shows:

The history of Russia's relations with the Western society in contemporary times seems to be a repetition of an older history in which the role of Western civilization would be played by the Greco-Roman civilization and that of Russia by Islam. Communism was called a heresy of Christianity and we could say the same to Islam. Islam, like communism, succeeded

proportionally, because it proposed to reform the abuses that had infiltrated Christianity at the time (Toynbee 1953, 92).

These reflections of Toynbee show that the opposition between the Western world represented by the Europe heir to the Greco-Roman civilization and the Arab Muslim world is not only historical, but permanent. In this sense it is important to remember that the emergence and expansion of Islam from the 7th century onwards was to the detriment of the Greco-Roman world and Christianity and Arab-Muslims: Arabs and non-Arab Muslims (who were the majority) liberated from the Christian tutelage several Eastern countries from Syria to Spain, passing through all of North Africa until then under Greco-Roman rule. It is of fundamental importance to point out that it was the same Arab-Muslims who colonized the Iberian world for more than seven centuries (Kaly 2016).

It was during this period that they introduced the cultivation of domesticated sugarcane in Asia and the domesticated coffee in Ethiopia, plants that will be the basis of plantations in the New World. The conquest and expansion of Islam follows its course toward equatorial Africa, India, and eastern China, as well as Russia temporarily dominated by the Tartars, saw its occupiers convert to Islam and all that remained of Eastern Orthodox Christianity (Toynbee 1953). In other words, the Islamization of Africa was concomitant with the expansion and domination of the world by Arabs and Muslims and, in our view, this period constitutes the first phase of external intervention to the continent and comes along with long distance commerce (Trans-Saharan and Trans-Atlantic).

In a first moment the trans-Saharan trade allows the Mediterranean, Arab and European world to be supplied with gold directly from the main source of production of the metal in the region of Senegal which included the countries of the current Sahelian zone (Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Nigeria) and Ashanti which covers Benin and part of the current territory of Nigeria until the invasion of the Americas. Boubacar Barry draws attention to the importance and relevance of these flows:

For the societies of tropical Africa, this trade will form an essential basis of their organization. The royal exploitation of gold provides the ruling classes of states with an important means of obtaining, throughout the Sahara, on the one hand, rare luxury products (bedsheets, medicines and perfumes, dates and salt), but also and above all, establishing and strengthening their social and political power (horses, copper, iron bars, weapons). This trade thus favors the development of social differentiations, the constitution of

states and empires, because it favors the progress of productive forces (the improvement of techniques and products, etc.) (Barry 1984, 14).

It is important to note that while trans-Saharan trade has allowed African societies to organize themselves, has provided the ruling classes with means and strengthened political and social power, has fostered the progress of productive forces, and has developed social differences as a result of the change in values by the political elite that has opened the African space to new moral (Islam) political values (theocratic state) as well as outside influence, be it peaceful (Soft) or violent. The incorporation of Arab and Islamic values drastically transformed the continent's social and political organization from an egalitarian, balanced and just society to an unequal and very violent hierarchical society.

Cheikh Anta Diop in his work *"L'Afrique Noire pré-coloniale"*, showing that African society was caste-based⁴, demonstrates that the originality of this system lies in the fact that the dynamic elements of society, whose discontent could have engendered revolution, are truly satisfied with their social condition and would not seek to change it (Diop 1987). In other words, a man of the so-called "lower caste like the slaves (djam in wolof)" would not have the will nor would he accept to enter a higher caste, for reasons of material interest, and so there were no revolutions against the regime, but rather against those who mismanage the public thing. This does not mean absence of social division, but absence of social injustice, because for each caste or class advantages and disadvantages, deprivations of rights and compensations were balanced, and so, concludes Diop (1987, 19), it is outside the consciences in material progress and external influences that historical motives must be sought.

This changes drastically with the Islamization and the establishment of the theocratic state that emerged from the trans-Saharan trade and Islamization, in which the elites begin to exploit society and become rich also with the sale of slaves. For this reason, Reid (2012) states that the African response to long-distance trade was dynamic and interventionist, on the part of relatively old states and, as in the Atlantic zone, the period of trans-Atlantic trade was a violently creative era, involving new economic and political forms and a revolution in military affairs with a very active participation of

⁴ The "caste" system is born of a division of labour in an advanced political regime, monarchical because there is no caste without nobility. Thus, caste is understood as the set of individuals who practice the same labour function and constitute the social and political institution (BARRY 1984). For example, the "caste of the Geer in Senegal" is made up of the nobles and all free men without a manual profession other than agriculture. The "caste of the ñeño", also noble and free, is represented by all the craftsmen (shoemakers, blacksmiths, goldsmiths, etc.).

the nomadic peoples of the savannah and the Sahel in the region's armed conflicts.

What is interesting is the participation of the Fulbes⁵ in the armed conflicts of the 6th century BC; perhaps as contingents of mercenaries ready to give their support to the biggest bid. If, already, the Fulbes recruited as archers and armed with shields were much appreciated on the battlefield of Ethiopia, Egypt and the Near East, their later participation in the Almoravian army that operated in Spain in the XI should not be too surprising, even if the motivations are different (Kane 2004, 87).

From this reflection of Kane we can see that the Fulbes have long been inhabitants of the Sahel region, but also their warrior side is historical (before Christ) and composed the Almoravian army still in the expansion of Islam to the Iberian peninsula before acting in Islamization and the formation of theocratic states through Jihad seen here as Holy War to first form a pan-Fulbe Muslim federation, and second, to fight against Western colonization.

The origin of Africa's present and future conflicts and wars is thus closely linked to the external influence and the historical internal instabilities generated by long-distance trade flows linked to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Thus, both the processes that allowed the dynamization of trans-Saharan and trans-Atlantic trade were a means of opening the African space to external/foreign interventionism based on humanism, civilization and the values of Islamic monotheism of the Arabs; arabized on one side and on the other, this Europe that became the home of Christians thanks to the constant missionary activities of monks supported by the Pope and the conversion of kings (Chanda 2011), but:

In a short time the rise of Islamism united the Arab peninsula and North Africa and placed Spain under Islamic rule, effectively confining the Christian faith to Europe. If the Muslim forces had not been defeated by the Franks commanded by Carlos Martel at the Battle of Poitiers in 732, all of Europe would have become part of the Islamic Caliphate. It would have taken the emergence of the European maritime power and its fervent evangelism, forged by centuries of struggle against Islam and the crusades, for Christianity to break its continental confinement (Chanda 2011, 185).

This reflection by Nayan Chanda reinforces our argument of historical rivalry built and carried out by Europe since the perception of the strength of

⁵ Plural of Fulani.

the Islamic empire, elected the main enemy to be fought. Moreover, the author shows that the occupation of Europe by Muslims was the work of Muslims composed of Arabs, Arabized and Islamicized Africans who, in a way, helped to build and consolidate what would become Europe. This Europe that relied on maritime force and evangelism to reverse Arab and Muslim domination, in Europe, but also in Africa and the rest of the world.

This is why Chanda (2011) concludes that European colonial expansion was shaped by the fight against Islam since the period of the crusades and, in the Iberian Peninsula, against the Caliphate of Cordoba. Equally, the information brought by Chanda on the use of evangelization as a means of mobilization and fight against Arabs and Muslims from the perspective of occupying territories and subduing peoples is very valuable. This shows the importance of religious symbolism (Muslims against Christians as in Sudan) present even today in African conflicts in international relations and especially in the opposition between Christian Europe and the Muslim world.

According to Kaly (2016), Europe has always seen Islam as its greatest enemy since the 8th century because it is the most feared military and cultural competitor of Christian Europe and this in spite of the three monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) having the Arabian Peninsula as their cradle and being introduced to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. Admitting that this declared enmity of Christian Europe to Islam and Muslims came from the colonization of the Iberian peninsula by the Muslims, among whom there were Africans converted to Islam like the Bebers of North Africa, the Soninke, Bambaras and Fulani who are black from West Africa (Kaly 2016) and that it is these blacks who took charge of expanding Islam in the West African region and fought against Western penetration in the Jihadist revolutions in the 16th and 19th centuries, it is easy to conclude that the current conflicts constitute the continuation of this “religious” war involving internal, regional and international actors in search of resources and power.

Colonization of Christian Europe

It is important to point out that just as the holy war of the Jihadists contributed to the expansion of Islam and the establishment of internal instabilities, the missionary tradition was determinant for the expansion of colonialism, but also for the emergence of local resistance to colonialism and consequently the establishment of internal wars. According to Lamin Sanneh (2005) from the vernacular traditions, local Christians gained confidence in the indigenous cause and while the colonial system represented a world economic and military order, the mission represented the defense of the

vernacular.

In other words, just as Islam becomes a tool for the struggle of Africans against colonization, Christianity also served Africans as a platform for mobilization and struggle against what they considered invasions and external aggressions, including Western colonialism and the violent expansion of jihadist and revolutionary Islam. As a result, chaos is installed in the midst of African society and within the continent, with Africans themselves divided by their professed faith as the main antagonists. On one side, there were the Muslims, Christians and “traditionalists” that declared war on Western colonialism, on the other, there was a violent rivalry opposing Christians and Muslims as well as the two were seeking to convert and co-opt those who continued to profess their traditional African faith.

One can point out that all of them had as its “humanitarian” goal the spread of the Faith on the African continent, as well as the purpose of gaining control of political and cultural economic resources and, mainly, to concentrate power. It is in this sense that Livingstone, once he had failed as a missionary in Africa, came to the conclusion that God’s plan for his life was to use his talents to explore and map the unknown continent and open the road of God, the Zambezi River, to Christianity, commerce and civilization (Chanda 2011, 192). The discovery made him a man adored by his contemporaries and was later accused of being an instrument of imperialism, since his discoveries preceded the dispute for the largest diamond and gold mines in the world leading to the division of the continent into British, Portuguese, French, German and Belgian colonies in the late 18th century, early 19th century.

The current conflicting scenario in the African Sahel, for example, continues to be driven by the same mines of gold, diamond, natural gas, oil, and drinking water, disputed by the same actors as the radical Islamists who declare war on governments, unbelievers who include Muslims who do not follow the faith as they should, Christians and “pagans” who are the followers of traditional African religions and the outside interference represented by the former colonial powers, who claim to be protecting the nation state by fighting Islamic radicalism in the name of human rights.

This war is being fed theoretically by the forces of freedom, peace, and development that are the colonial, neo-colonial, and/or post-colonial forces (forces of good) against the destabilizing forces of evil, “responsible” for war and underdevelopment, represented here by religious radicalism with its jihadist flag. In short, it is a historical continuation of violence that continues to generate more violence in the name of humanistic values whether based on Christianity, colonialism, Islam or simply the Western values in defense of human rights, democracy and good governance.

The increase in this violence is due to the renewal and sophistication of the instruments of colonial, neo-colonial and post-colonial violence by the great powers, by the states, but also by the radicals who are after all nothing more than the product of this historical process, thus benefiting as much from the new technologies. These processes are highlighted not only by the cruelty and violence generated among the African population but also by the rivalry between the representatives of these two visions and cultures, but above all by the conflicting legacy originated in both trans-Atlantic and trans-Saharan trade that continues to plague African society.

It is important to say that the trans-Saharan trade, Islamization, and the Arabization of Africa have been violent processes (slavery, pillage of resources, interference in the internal affairs of Africans) as much as the transatlantic trade. Certainly, the latter is better known, demonized, while the former (process of Islamization and Arabization) of the African continent is interpreted as positive, peaceful, cooperative by much of the literature and intellectuals in the area like Boubacar Barry (1984):

First, while the trans-Saharan trade of the pre-mercantilist period, in which Waalo participated, had strengthened the centralization of the state and driven progress in this autonomous kingdom of Senegal, the Atlantic trade, which replaced the former as soon as the French settled in Saint Louis (1659), does not free the productive forces, but ends instead with a regression of this and a disintegration of society and the Wallo State. That is why the French had to use force to break off previous trans-Saharan relations, to subjugate this region of Africa, and to orient their foreign relations according to the requirements of the Saint Louis trading post. Because African society obviously tried to react against this deterioration of its lot; Islam was the framework for this defensive reaction (Barry 1984, 17).

In these reflections Barry brings important information to our analysis and disagrees with the first one that presents the Trans-Saharan trade as positive, autonomist, that is, favorable to Africans while the Trans-Atlantic trade is presented as a brake to development, autonomy and progress due basically to the effects of slavery.

It is important to remember that Europe did not have a monopoly on trafficking, since there have been other processes of slavery such as the trans-Saharan organized by Arabs which was as violent and devastating for Africa and its descendants as the trans-Atlantic slave trade and was endorsed by Islam just as Christianity long justified slavery (N'diaye 2008). According to this author, while the trans-Atlantic slave trade lasted for four centuries (XV-XIX), it was for thirteen centuries (VII-XX) without interruption that Arabs

invaded sub-Saharan Africa and most of the millions of men they deported disappeared as a result of inhumane treatment. Thus, it is realized that both Trans-Saharan and Trans-Atlantic trade have been tragic for the continent of Africa and their legacies continue to generate conflict.

The second information Barry provides assures us that the use of force by the French was necessary to put an end to the trans-Saharan trade, the Arab-Muslim influence and the African resistance for the benefit of the trans-Atlantic trade controlled since the 15th century by the Europeans. This means that the process that led to the replacement of trans-Saharan trade by the trans-Atlantic was a violent process involving, beyond the African, foreign forces in dispute and certainly this dispute marks the beginning of the imperial struggle for the domination and control of Africa and Africans.

Finally, it is clear from Barry's analysis that Islam is seen as part of or even the framework of African reaction and defense against Europe in the name of self-interest. This view illustrates how and why on the one hand Arabism and Islamism have been incorporated as part of the solution to the continent's problems while European imperialism is seen as "the problem" and on the other hand, the West's constant struggle against the maintenance and influence of the Arab-Islamic empire is justified.

This mistaken or biased view and interpretation of the impacts of Arab-Islamic imperialism makes it very difficult to analyze the continent's security problems, since the West's permanent struggle for dominance and exploitation of the continent is primarily motivated by the containment of the empire of the trans-Saharan trade era. Nor should the impact of Islamism be minimized first in the division of Africans between those who opted for conversion to Islam and those who opted for African religions (considered pagan, polytheistic) or Christianity, as well as the division among Muslims themselves. It is from this point of view that Redan (1922) affirms that with the races, the sects, the divisions generated, the Muslim world has not been one thing for a long time and warns that one should not lose sight of the possibility of union and strength that the Muslim world would have towards the West. This means that on the one hand, if the division of the Muslim world has generated internal conflict in the continent, on the other hand the presence of Muslims has always been considered a serious threat to the interests of the West as this observation by Redan shows:

We saw this well at the end of 1914, during the proclamation of the "Holy War against the infidels; only a few tribes answered the call, but the Ottoman Empire itself did not rise with unanimous impulse. However diverse the Islamic world may be today, concerns of a religious and political

nature act upon it and react constantly to each other. Many events in the history of modern and contemporary times are proof of this; but it is more evident than that of the past and present, a serious attempt at a new Islamic general union, against the Christian foreigner, which occurred in 1921? Let's let it develop and suffer with the rapprochement of the sects and regional movements of Islam with Ottoman nationalism. This would be a particularly dangerous game. Therefore, let us take care to prevent the constitution of a Turkish or Pantourian bloc. Let us distinguish the populations that received Islam from the Iranians from those that received the Arabs and not allow them to merge; neither is allowed the "turquisation" of the non-Turkish provinces (Redan 1922, 28).

As it is perceived, if on one side the Muslim world on the verge of World War I did not have a union or a single leadership, this possibility was never discarded or minimized by the West and the author wonders if the West will let a unification of Muslims happen, knowing that they will suffer if this happens? His answer and recommendation are categorical in the sense of preventing the formation of an Islamic community with a single leadership. Since the Turkish-Ottoman empire was the nation that dominated a large part of the Muslim world, until the Western counterattack on the Muslim world started after the failure of the Turks before Vienna in 1683 (Toynbee 1953), Redan's suggestion to his compatriots, was that the West should avoid the unification of the Muslim world under Turkish rule and seek the distinction between Arabs and Arabized like the Africans and Persians.

In the African case, the focus of Redan's analysis, this warning is justified by the multiple resistances to Western colonization led by the Arabized and Islamized where the framework of resistance is formed by Islam and the weapons of this resistance were bought with slaves captured in the interior of the continent and sent to the Arab-Muslim world on the other side of the Sahara and the Mediterranean (Barry 1984). However, this resistance, led by the marabout movement, sinks the region of sub-Saharan Africa into a constant instability caused by the attempt to forcibly convert the local population and oppose the monopoly of trade.

Therefore, these instabilities had economically, politically and socially disturbed the West African and Sahel states in the name of Islam. Thus, one can see that the first foreign interventions (Arab-Muslim), came from the process of Islamization and Arabization that began with the Almoravid movement that took over the cities of Awdagost and Sidjimassa around 1054-1055, Fes in 1069 and in 1070, Abu Bakr bin Omar founds the capital Marrakesh, sedenting the power of the Almoravids before conquering Ghana in 1076 (Bresi 2014).

Finally, according to Barry (1984) since the 14th century, there have been infiltrations of Arab-Berber tribes in sub-Saharan Africa with the justification of “political and social misunderstandings” in the north until the submission in the 17th century of the Berbers Senhaja and Lamtuna who are descendants of the Almoravids of the desert. During this same period, the Mali empire lost its main cities of Gao and Timbuktu, targets of attacks by the Moroccan monarchy for their need to supply gold and slaves. This means that resistance to westernization/colonization has had an impact on the division-hierarchy, “ethnicization” and arabization of African society and, consequently, the transformation of the continent into a permanent war zone in addition to the systematization of external interventions in African affairs.

These elements are visible in today’s African conflicts and have been pointed out as causes of wars and conflicts without, however, connecting them with the historical past of the Islamization of Africa by European expansion, the transatlantic slave trade accompanied by “civilizing” missions. The French first set foot in Senegal between 1639 and 1677, settling successively in Saint Louis and Gorée, as well as several companies responsible together with their directors and agents for the recognition, prospecting and exploitation of the African coast.

According to Chailley (1953) their goals already suggest the great design that will be developed during the 19th century, which goals were to reach the gold mines at the top of the Senegal river; but also looking for relationships with Timbuktu, whose treasures are subjects of the Arab chronicles. Therefore, the phase of de-islamization or stagnation of Muslim forces corresponds to a phase of engagement of the West in the occupation of the African continent and the phase of revolutions (XVIII and XIX), which simply means resistance to Western colonialism that was consolidating at the expense of the Arab-Islamic onslaught on the continent.

Here it is worth emphasizing the importance of domestication and the incorporation of Islamic principles and the Arab culture into African society which will carry forward this resistance to the West in the form of a local “nationalism” blessed by Allah (God). However, this symbiosis has served as a basis for consolidating and legitimizing arabized and Islamicized leaderships at the expense of local communities, and the West would use these divisions first to ally itself with “traditional” leaderships to confront the resistance of the Muslim revolutions, and second, to use this “domestication” of Islam by local communities in Africa and the rest of the Islamic world to create or reinforce internal divisions, which have led to Western rule over the Muslim world.

According to Saedar (2014) the fracture of the Muslim world occurred through the domestication of local power by Arab governors and tribal leaders

giving rise to a multitude of dynasties and policies characterized by the inability to centralize political control and manage disputes generated over the religion originated in the establishment of the rival caliphate (Umayyad, Abbasid and Fatimid), which established respectively the capital of the Muslim empire in Damascus (661-750), Baghdad (750-1258) and Cairo (910-1171). These historical facts of the Arab-Islamic and Western world constitute the historical basis of the conflicts and contemporary wars of the African continent and consequently of the external interventions in various periods of African history, as Elizabeth Schmidt states.

Foreign intervention in Africa accounts for foreign political and military interventions in Africa during the decolonization periods (1956-75) and the Cold War (1945-91), as well as during the periods of state collapse (1991-2001) and the “global war on terror” (2001-10). In the first two periods, the most significant intervention was extracontinental. The United States, the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and the former colonial powers became entangled in numerous African conflicts. During the period of state collapse, the most consistent interventions were intracontinental. African governments, sometimes aided by powers outside the continent, supported warlords, dictators, and dissident movements in neighboring countries and fought for control of their neighbors’ resources. The global war on terror, such as the Cold War, increased foreign military presence on the African continent and generated outside support for repressive governments. In each of these cases, foreign interests changed the dynamics of internal struggles, increasing local conflicts in larger conflicts with devastating effects on African peoples (Schmidt 2013, 12).

Schmidt’s reflection demonstrates through periodization the continuity of foreign interventions on the continent from the end of World War II to the Global War on Terror initiated in 2001 by the U.S. government, but it also shows the diversity of actors as well as the origin and historical reasons for Africa’s “innumerable conflicts” within the Trans-Saharan and trans-Atlantic trade flows, which have reinforced respectively the geopolitical use of Islam and Christianity to influence political leaders, conquer and dominate peoples in a peaceful and violent manner. This hybrid form of violence and humanism is evidently only possible with the active participation of Africans, better said, some Africans in a position of legitimate leadership whether by possession of the means of violence (warlords), faith (traditional or revealed religions), or political and economic power.

New Conflicts, Old Causes

The objective of this session is to relate the past reported in the previous session with the current conflicts of the Sahel countries in order to support the argument that one cannot understand the conflicts of West Africa without taking into account the Arab-Islamic colonization and its historical rivalry with the Western colonization. To this end, the countries that make up the G5 Sahel group (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad) as well as the conflicts that afflict them are used to show how the highlighted causes of conflicts originate in the two colonial maps mentioned above.

The current situation of insecurity in the Sahel countries arose from the change of regime in Libya due to Western intervention combined with an internal uprising that provoked an influx of combatants and weapons into Western Sahara, where it destabilized weak governments. According to Schmidt (2018) in Mali, these developments shook a secessionist movement and spurred the military coup, the insurgency linked to al-Qaeda, and generated another round of foreign interventions in the region. Curiously, in the 19th century, it was from Libya that the Mahdist brotherhood that spread in the Sahel (Chad, Mali) under the name of Senoussiya of Libya, in connection with its Muslim brothers generated an insecurity due to its more military than commercial characteristics; and would be as demonized and feared by the French and Italians who aspired to conquer and colonize the region (Vidrovitch 2011).

These two cases brought by Schmidt and Vidrovitch show that for a long time the jihad linked to Islam conducted by Muslims (Arabs and/or Arabized) and the colonial empires are part of the actors involved directly and indirectly in the region. Thus since 2012, despite the presence of thousands of French troops and the UN, the conflict in Mali has taken over the center of the country and spread to neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger. For its part, Nigeria faces insurgents coming from training camps linked to Al Qaeda (Schmidt 2018) who returned with weapons from Libya's arsenal, a conflict that spread to neighboring Niger and Cameroon and attracted fighters from Mali, Mauritania and Algeria.

From the internal point of view, one speaks of a struggle of the jihadists of the Katiba from Macina against the central power; from the other, one speaks of an "ethnic" violence opposing Fulani shepherds and Dogon farmers, without paying due attention to the historical origin of this conflict, which also constitutes a legacy of Islamization, slavery, and western colonization. The empire of Macina, was a jihadist state founded by the arabized and islamized Fulani or Fulbes in the Niger delta in the cities of Mopti, Segou,

Djenne, Hamdallahi (capital) and Timbuktu in present-day Mali in the 19th century (1818), as a result of the advance of jihadist Islam in West Africa⁶ characterized by Fulani hegemony. This hegemony was consolidated after many fights against neighboring Bambaras, Ardos, Tuaregs and Moors.

According to Amadou Ampathe Ba, the history of this region is marked by tragic wars that opposed mainly Fulbes from the empire of Macina to the toucouleur of the army of El Hadji Omar, the great conqueror whose influence extended from the East of Guinea to Timbuktu (BÂ 1992) and other socio-political and cultural groups (Bambara, Ardos, Tuareg, Moors etc.) of the neighborhood. These wars and conflicts that were characterized by the “fulanization” or Fulani hegemony and Islamization under the leadership of El Hadji Omar in the region, reinforced by colonial action, constitute one of the bases and justifications of instability in the Sahel countries.

Between 1804 and 1818, Fulbes led by Sheikh Usman Danfodio (1804-1810) and Tuklors under Ahmadu (1807-1818) expanded between the upper Senegal River and Lake Chad in the name of Islam and established an immense Muslim empire in the region. It is important to remember that Fausa and Tuklors are of the same “halpular” family (those who speak fula) and were nomads for a long time because of their pastoral activities and according to Hampathe Ba (1992) were both oppressed, scattered in oppressed diasporas or forcedly fixed in concentration zones before they organized themselves into kingdoms and succeeded, after Islamization, in forming great empires.

These empires will be maintained by means of permanent conflicts with the original peoples, who, despite being subjected to hegemonic fulani power, will not conform, especially those who, despite being Fulbes, arabized and islamized, were subjected to state violence. The memory of this period is one of the causes of the current conflicts or at least serves as a reference and/or justification for leaders such as Amadou Kouffa, leader of the Liberation Front of Macina and creator of the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin in Arabic), who wants a coalition of all jihadist groups⁷ in the region against the states and their political, social, economic and cultural systems seen as a legacy of western colonization, which favors the westernized elites and the western powers themselves. The interventions of the West and the African Union in the region are justified

6 Region currently composed of Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria and at the time it was a part of a set of empires: Futa Toro, Futa Jalon, Sokoto, Macina).

7 Al Murabitun (led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar), Ansar Dine (led by Iyad Ag Ghali), the Macina Liberation Front (led by Amadou Koufa) and the Saharan branch of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

by the security threats posed by this jihadist coercion, and this vicious cycle in which each side bases its violence on moral and religious humanism has historically generated and still generates permanent instability in the region.

Indeed, the real reasons for this instability in the Sahel region lie in its geopolitical and geo-economic importance (Schmidt 2018; Kipré 2003; Gaye 2017) in view of its importance in Africa's connections with Europe and Asia across the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and with the Americas across the Atlantic. This central role of the region in the Sahel and Sahara in the continent's international relations was initiated with the trans-Saharan trade of slaves, gold and salt. Today the same routes are used by criminal groups to traffic in weapons, drugs, and people which brings legal and illegal actors into contact with converging and divergent interests at the same time as all seek to control spaces and exploit regional strategic resources (Schmidt 2018; Gaye 2017; Keenan 2013).

These complex and violent relationships, together with increasingly difficult living conditions due to the consequences of global warming, are emptying the depths of the Sahelian countries to the benefit of the coastal regions of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, with an effect similar to that caused by the detour of trade routes from the Sahara to the Atlantic in the 17th century. Moreover, the ports of the Atlantic slave trade (Dakar, Abidjan, Cotonou, Douala, etc.), are still the only outlets for the Sahel countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad). The interior of these countries not only escapes the control of the central governments, but also suffers from emptying and abandonment by its population through forced immigration, but coveted by various illegal actors (Islamist radicals, drug traffickers, arms dealers) and foreign powers (United States of the Americas and its Global War on Terrorism, France and its "peace" operations) in search of strategic resources.

According to Gaye (2017) if the absence of the state makes room for criminals, climate conditions unfavorable to human life such as drought turn traditional workers (farmers, shepherds) into labor for organized crime and border regions in rebel zones against governments of countries like Mali, Chad and Niger. The contestation of the governments of these countries in the name of greater social inclusion; an autonomy or a change in the system of government inherited from colonization by the post-colonial state since independence (the various attempts of coups d'état), passing through the period of the end of the Cold War to culminate in the current situation that began in 2000, came from these border areas and resulted in the weakening of the state.

Gaye (2017) relates the state's failure in this region to a drastic change in the geopolitics of the Sahel that is due to (1) a change in the cocaine route

from Latin America to Europe through the region and (2) the establishment of Salafist terrorism. This in turn recalls the reversal of slavery routes in the 19th century when Afro-descendants of independent Americas began to command Africa, evangelization, and the clandestine slave trade, transforming the networks that once operated in the trans-Saharan trade into pirates and human traffickers from the Sahel region toward the Atlantic.

Therefore, these complex historical flows between Africa, the Americas and Europe very well reported by Ambassador Alberto da Costa e Silva (2011) in “Um rio chamado Atlântico: África no Brasil e o Brasil na África” according to which, from the end of the 18th century, a new threat is imposed on Africa as a reality: the political, economic and military presence, increasingly constant and demanding of the European, continue (or have returned) to haunt the scenario of the African countries and peoples of the Sahel in the middle of the 21st century. It is worth noting that the fall of the legendary West African empires (Mali, Songai, Benin, etc.) also came from the emptying of the interior of the Sahel and Sahara region, from the weakening of trans-Saharan trade routes to the benefit of transatlantic trade, which was only possible with the political, economic and military presence of Europe that supplied the firearms, facts that are repeated in the era of the “Global War on Terrorism” with the action of the West (Europe and the United States).

Jeremy Keenen (2013) in “The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa” shows how U.S. foreign policy since September 11, 2001, through the Global War on Terror (GWOT), has led to the worst and longest human catastrophe⁸ that the Sahara and the Sahel have suffered because of Western lies⁹. 2 This means that we are facing conflicts caused by external interventions justified by a false humanism just as the “humanism” of the civilizing missions of Christianity, Islam and Arabism justified slavery and colonization.

In this sense, it is worth remembering that there was no one held responsible for the slave trade. Catherine Coquery Vidrovitch (2011, 33) notes that its political consequences were more damaging than its strictly quantitative impact. The populational deficit was caused by the multiple disturbances that followed (incessant internal wars, massive displacement of population) and left lasting resentments that have not yet disappeared among invading and invaded peoples. In this way, one realizes how important and necessary a

8 Because tens of thousands of people have lost their livelihoods; because almost 500,000 Malians have had to flee their homes; and because hundreds, if not thousands, more local people may die - and for reasons they probably won't understand (Keenan 2013, 11-12).

9 Mainly the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Algeria as the main regional power states the author.

historical retreat is to analyze the conflicts and war and many other problems faced in contemporary times since their roots lie in their colonial past (Arab-Muslim and Western) and the Cold War, as Elizabeth Schmidt points out:

Distinctions of power, privileges, and conflicts over natural resources are part of human history and in Africa these phenomena preceded the colonial period, however, the plundering of wealth through unequal exchange was incorporated into colonial economic practices, and the ethnic and regional hierarchies of the colonial era - sometimes built on pre-existing distinctions - often assumed new power after independence from the post-Cold War context (Schmidt 2018, 23).

Schmidt's reflections are based on the argument that the origin of conflicts should be sought in part in periods prior to Western colonization, such as the era of Islamization, Arabization and trans-Saharan trade. Second, it draws attention to practices embedded in the era of Western colonization, ranging from the plundering of the continent's resources and wealth to ethnic and regional hierarchization and/or invention as the supposed superiority of North Africa ("white Africa") over sub-Saharan Africa, undermining pre-existing differences. In this sense, it is understood that taking ethnicity, race, and religion as the cause of conflict without proper historical and geopolitical contextualization can be as problematical as attempting to resolve them through external intervention, the Global War on Terrorism, or by creating new political units such as South Sudan in 2011.

Therefore, it is essential to include among the causes the issues related to the degrading conditions of the climate, the demographic increase, the colonial borders that in turn have favored the creation of social and cultural borders as important elements for the conflicts and wars of the 21st century including those involving Islamic terrorism. Is it even possible to comprehend Islamic terrorism and the civil wars caused by it without a historical setback that informs events prior to the Western expansion of the 15th century? In this regard Ibn Batuta (1982) in his manuscript "I. Voyages: de l'Afrique du Nord à la Mecque" that the first Muslim civil war and Islamic extremism arose from political-social (power struggle)¹⁰ and ethnical problems (between Arabs and non-Arabs).

¹⁰ That puts in opposition Shiites represented by Ali and Sunnis and leads to the emergence of a third group: the Kharijites (those who have left or abandoned), who rejected the first two groups. This group is seen as the first extremist split of Muslims (Shiites and Sunnis are political opponents), who would defend the execution of all who do not follow them, including women and children. Shiites and Sunnis are treated as polytheists, i.e. inferior to Christians and Jews considered to be "the people of the book", as followers of a revealed religion.

Final Remarks

Several analyses about the origin and causes of African conflicts point to the post-colonial state and its structures, ethnicity, “tribe”, religion, and border as the main causes of instabilities ignoring, unconsciously or not, the historical factors linked to colonial maps, connected specifically to the Arab-Islamic and Western empires. Historical analysis shows that these colonial processes accompanied by long-distance trade (Trans-Saharan and Trans-Atlantic) left among other legacies the violence and internal rivalries coming first from the processes of slavery, Islamization, and European colonization. These violent processes, besides dividing, leave lasting resentments as Vidrovitch (2011) states.

The second point that justifies the current conflicts is linked to the jihadist revolutions of the eighteenth century, which, in a way, will test the divisions and hierarchization of African society based on elements such as speaking Arabic, dominating the Koran and its religion in addition to having the lighter skin tone (a greater degree of humanism). This will justify, for example, the emergence of the first Fulani hegemony, the creation of the empires of Macina in the current Republic of Mali and the base of the Macina Liberation Front also known as Katiba Macina led by then Amadou Kouffa, Sokoto founded in the 18th century by Usman Dan Fodio whose territory serves as a base for the Booko Haram in today's Nigeria.

The third important element that reveals a historical analysis of the origin and causes of African conflicts is the declared rivalry of the West against the Muslim world that emerges from the Arab-Muslim colonization of the Iberian peninsula and reinforced by the resistance of the Muslim world to Western expansion mainly in Africa and the Middle East. Finally, the issues related to the geopolitical and geoeconomic importance of the African continent, from the camel trade (trans-Saharan trade), seen as the beginning of globalization (Chanda 2011), passing through the boats driven by the monsoon winds, the steamers (in the era of the Atlantic trade) to the current era of electronic commerce, the greed for the continent is justified by its abundant and necessary resources and needed by all.

Therefore, if it is important to understand the causes of African conflicts, which are among others: ethnicity, religion, the struggle for state control, natural resources, borders, social, economic and political marginalization, structural issues, questions of sovereignty; it is more important to understand the historical processes linked to the colonial maps that gave rise to these causes. It is the Arab-Islamic colonization and the Western colonization that had changed dynamic elements of the African society, introduced new values,

new forms of social, economic, political, and cultural relations that Africans have domesticated, modified, adapted to their way of life, and fought for their preservation, making it possible to maintain conflicts, wars, instabilities, and consequently foreign interventions.

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ABSTRACT

This reflection concerns the armed conflicts of the African Sahel and aims to historically analyze the role of Arab-Islamic colonization, Western colonization and the rivalries between the two. It is based on the hypothesis that the confrontation between jihadist and internal and external interventionists in the region constitutes a historical struggle motivated by non-humanitarian and non-moral geoeconomic interests. Methodologically, a historical and comparative analysis is chosen to conclude that the main causes of conflicts should be located in the colonial maps and the historical rivalry between empires and not in ethnic, tribal and religious differences or the borders created by Western colonization.

KEYWORDS

Conflict; Intervention; African Sahel.

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NERINT STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

In 2021, the covid-19 pandemic continues to dominate the international scene, but that does not mean that the political cleavages and tensions lost their space. In this edition, relevant themes are analyzed, such as the reasons for the recent clashes that affect national stability in Angola, a promising African state. Next, two articles address the issue of the Russian opponent Navalny and the situation in eastern Ukraine, showing little-known dimensions about these two themes. As for the set of problems that concern the containment of China by the United States and the United Kingdom, the subject that was selected was that of the demonstrations in Hong Kong in 2019 and 2020, which brings an original and thought-provoking analysis.

Vaccine diplomacy also emerged as a new topic, with political-strategic and economic dimensions that go beyond the global health crisis, and was objectively assessed here. Another event that surprised many analysts was the military coup in Myanmar, which has both an internal and an external dimension and is addressed here from a critical perspective. Then, an overview of the first 100 days of the Biden administration in the diplomatic and security fields is offered, confirming the predictions expressed in the previous issue that the foreign policy changes would rely on form, and not so much on content. Finally, the return of leftist candidates to power in Latin America is analyzed, exploring the fluidity and uncertainty of the regional political framework.

The analysis of the conjuncture, more than just explaining specific events, can contribute to the understanding of ongoing processes and the structure that is taking shape. In this sense, the covid-19 pandemic, regardless of its origin (will we ever know for sure?), has been addressed, as it appears, in an ineffectual way even by prosperous and organized countries. Thus, a strategic reflection shows that the health crisis may be serving as a cover for another one, which was already manifesting itself in previous years: the economic slowdown. All social difficulties would now be presented as a result of the pandemic, as well as the political morass within the states of the system, and conflicts between them would be justified or camouflaged. So, here is a question for reflection: is the ongoing situation being used, to a large extent, as an opportune instrument for managing the economic crisis and the technological and geopolitical dispute currently underway?

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Coordinator

Angola Coping with Multiple Crises

Analúcia Danilevycz Pereira¹

The multiple international crises have had an impact on African countries at the political and economic level, but not only. While seeking to combat the spread of covid-19 in their territories, many African countries have to deal with serious security crises. In the Sahel, attacks by extremists continued to occur throughout 2020 in Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad and Niger, targeting civilian populations. In northern Nigeria, Boko Haram's actions intensified, which included, in October, the kidnapping of hundreds of students at a school in the city of Katsina. In the east of the continent, a separatist uprising in Ethiopia caused several deaths and thousands of refugees, who took shelter in Sudan. In Mozambique, rebels occupied important parts of Cabo Delgado province (a region rich in mineral resources), causing a large displacement of people towards Nampula, and in Angola, recently, there were armed conflicts in the province of Lunda Norte.

The consolidation of African states, as a rule, has been marked by new power struggles that cannot be separated from the international economic insertion of these countries, especially those that have been demonstrating the capacity for growth and diversification of their economies. It is interesting to note that a new wave of internal conflicts occurs precisely in the countries that stand out, either in their regional space, or in international interactions of a new type. In this sense, such conflicts cannot be separated from the challenges faced (at national and international levels) by states that have demonstrated, in the last decades, greater capacities in terms of resources of power.

In the case of Angola, the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the party that has governed the country since its independence, has been the focus of protest movements (including armed ones) and opposition offensives. Although destabilizing events, such as the performance of separatist forces in Cabinda, in 2006, were circumvented, once again the Angolan government had to respond to demonstrations that confront the integrity and sovereignty of the state.

The Angolan economy is essentially focused on oil exploration, which

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makes up more than 95% of exports and half of the state's budget revenue. The country is the second largest oil producer in Africa, having been the first on the continent between 2016 and 2017. However, since 2016, largely due to the fall in oil prices, national production has been gradually decreasing. In parallel, important investments were made in the natural gas sector. After obtaining the highest historical value of GDP in 2014 (US \$ 145.7 billion), the national economy entered a recession, although there was a small recovery in 2017 (US \$ 122.1 billion). However, Angola remains one of the five largest economies in sub-Saharan Africa, and the second largest in southern Africa.

The Angolan government, in response to the difficulties, started to defend "macroeconomic stability", private investment and the diversification of the economy, thus initiating a series of reforms such as the introduction of value added tax, the law of fiscal responsibility, the liberalization of the exchange rate regime and a privatization and private investment law. The health crisis and the devaluation price of a barrel of oil in 2020, aggravated already established processes. However, the price recovery in the last months of 2020 has caused oil revenues to exceed expectations. On the other hand, Angola stands out for being one of the countries most benefited by the Suspension of Debt Service (DSSI), organized by the G20, which provided for the postponement of the payment of debt to official creditors until December 2020, with the possibility of extension until the end of 2021, which allowed the country to save about 4.3% of GDP.

The conjuncture of multiple international crises that impacted the country's economic and political reality created a fertile ground for localized disputes, but not isolated from the broader opposition's initiatives to destabilize the MPLA government. On January 30, 2021, in Cafunfo, a village in the province of Lunda Norte, armed demonstrators attacked a national police station resulting in dozens of deaths. The demonstrations were led by the Lunda Tchokwe Portuguese Protectorate Movement (MPPLT), founded in 2006, which claims independence from Angola based on the colonial period treaties signed between Portuguese authorities and regional leaders that would guarantee sovereignty similar to the islands of Madeira and Azores. The leader of the group and coordinator of the attack, José Zecamutchima, was detained by the Luanda Criminal Investigation Service. These recent demonstrations do not claim only independence, but, of course, control over the resources that exist there. Lunda Norte is a region rich in diamonds and the Angolan state diamond company Endiama and Gemcorp, an investment fund management group, based in London, announced an agreement for the development of a diamond project in the province.

The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA),

Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola (CASA), Catholic leaders and the European Union harshly criticized the MPLA government in relation to the confrontation between national forces and the MPPLT, on the grounds of disproportionate use of force in state action. However, despite the revolt against the national government, in the presidential elections (2017), the MPLA obtained the majority of votes, 66.66%, against 22.93%, obtained by UNITA. In this sense, it is worth mentioning some considerations about the political scene in Angola.

In the last elections held in the country in 2017, the MPLA won again with 61.1% of the votes, although this percentage represented a drop in relation to the 2012 elections, when the Party obtained 72% of the votes. José Eduardo dos Santos was then replaced by João Lourenço, former Minister of Defense, as president of the country. In addition, UNITA was the next most voted party, accounting for 26.7% of the votes. Throughout 2020, UNITA organized several demonstrations in Luanda, urging the population to question the government in relation to the high level of unemployment and the cost of living, as well as promoting accusations of state corruption, against the backdrop of the global health crisis.

In March 2021, the Lourenço government announced to the Council of Ministers a proposal for a constitutional review, which would cover 40 articles of the Charter, defending the need to preserve stability in Angola. The initiative around the constitutional revision proposal, from a political point of view, allowed the MPLA to dominate the agenda and put UNITA in an uncomfortable situation, without effective counter-proposal or well-elaborated criticisms about its own project or perspective.

Among the revision proposals, we highlight the removal of gradualism for the installation of municipalities; the determination of a fixed period for general elections; the right to vote for Angolans living abroad and the administrative independence of the Central Bank in relation to the Executive, whose direction continues to be indicated by the President of the Republic, but now with Parliament's endorsement; the integration of the Chief Justice Judge of the Supreme Court to the Council of the Republic, which will be expanded from 10 to 15 members; and the creation of a Government of Current Management, which would act at the end of the President's mandate, which would be prevented from taking decisions that may compromise his successor.

Under the first aspect, the municipalities are a proposal to decentralize the country's power and administration. The proposed reforms aim to provide municipalities with their own budget, disconnecting them from the General State Budget. However, the holding of local elections for municipalities,

which were scheduled to be held in 2020, for the first time in the country's history, were again postponed due to the covid-19 pandemic. The crisis scenario also delayed the approval of the Municipal Legislative Package and the postponement of the elections generated numerous criticisms among the opposition. However, such proposals, although representing political decentralization initiatives, place the MPLA in the position of the main interlocutor with different political, economic and social sectors.

Regarding the second aspect, the presidential elections in Angola take place indirectly, as determined by the country's last Constitution, drawn up in 2010. The president-elect is the candidate that occupies the first position on the list of the most voted party. Contrary to this model, a front of opposition to the government formed by UNITA, the Democratic Bloc (DB) and the Angolan Renaissance Party - Together for Angola - Serving Angola (PRA-JA Servir Angola), released a Joint Political Declaration on the Review Punctual Constitutional in which they indicate the need for direct elections for the country's Executive. Evidently, the opposition's initiative is related to the inability of the other parties to face the MPLA in the short term. In this sense, an important effect of these events in Angolan politics that must be analyzed and monitored concerns the future elections in the country. These are scheduled to be held in the year 2022, when Lourenço is serving his five-year presidential term.

It is clear that João Lourenço, at the political level, created conditions, by proposing a constitutional revision, for the emptying and discrediting of opposition criticisms, which intensified in the context of the health crisis and the resulting economic crisis. Some analysts even refer to this action as "a masterstroke" by Lourenço. On the other hand, at the economic level, Lourenço seeks to remake the country's economic profile, promoting a positive image for attracting assets from abroad and, internally, articulating changes, under control, such as the Central Bank's autonomy. Formal mechanisms for political decentralization and economic liberalization are being put on the table. However, the central government's coordination capacity has been strengthened and expanded. This apparent ambiguity reveals the strength of the state project in Angola.

The Navalny Case

Rodrigo Ianhez²

Less than three months after taking over the presidency of the United States of America, Joe Biden caused a diplomatic crisis by characterizing the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, as a murderer and even claiming that his Russian counterpart had no “soul”. Metaphysical issues aside, the provocation was clearly motivated by the whole situation that has unfolded since last year involving the Russian opponent Alexei Navalny, notorious for enjoying greater support abroad than within Russia itself.

In August 2020, the anti-corruption blogger and opposition activist Alexei Navalny reportedly suffered a poisoning attempt, after which he was taken to be treated in Germany. The German government promptly claimed to have evidence, which it did not provide, that Navalny was poisoned with the neurotoxic chemical agent Novichok. Such a scenario allows an association of this case with other possible political attacks attributed to the Russian security services, such as the Skripal case, in which a dissident would have been poisoned with the same substance in the UK in 2018. Quickly, the already worn out relations between the Russian Federation, the US and the European bloc once again reached a historic low, with new sanctions and barbs exchanges.

However, it is necessary to demystify the figure of Navalny which has been portrayed by the Western media as a representative of a powerful leadership with real chances of threatening the Putin government. The operating platform on which Navalny has achieved its greatest reach is YouTube, where his video about a palace under construction that supposedly had belonged to Putin surpassed the fantastic mark of 100 million views worldwide. However, the growth in Navalny’s popularity within Russia is confined to younger age groups, with greater access to the internet and foreign communication channels. Of the total population in the country, 54% do not like Navalny and 55% do not believe he has been poisoned³. In a poll conducted in October 2020, in the heat of the controversy over Navalny’s poisoning, he reached only fourth place among the most trusted figures among Russians, behind President Putin, Foreign Minister Serguei Lavrov and of

² Historian from Moscow State University.

³ Levada.ru. 2020. “Aleksej Navalnyj Otnoshenie I Otravlenie”. *Levada*, October 02, 2020. <https://www.levada.ru/2020/10/02/aleksej-navalnyj-otnoshenie-i-otravlenie/>. Access on Jan. 16, 2021.

ultra-nationalist politician Vladímir Zhirinovsk⁴. Among the controversies that do not contribute to Navalny's popularity is an episode in which he was condemned for defaming a World War II veteran, in a country where victory over Nazi Germany is seen as an almost sacred act. He characterized the 95-year-old veteran who had participated in the advertising campaign in support of constitutional amendments that, among other measures, authorized Putin to run for new presidential terms, such as a "traitor", a "shame for the country" and a "corrupt puppet"⁵.

Even among the opposition, Navalny is far from being a consensus. Its longstanding links with far-right movements, namely with the organizers of the Russian March, an annual demonstration that brings together nationalists in which Navalny has already participated, shame the central-left wings of anti-Putin movements. Likewise, the support that Navalny offered to the chauvinist movement "Enough Feeding the Caucasus" and the racist rhetoric promoted by the oppositionist in videos on his channel, most notably in a video in which he compares Muslims to cockroaches and simulates shooting a woman dressed in a burqa, are a cause of disagreement between different opposition groups⁶. At the international level, these contradictions have not gone unnoticed either, motivating Amnesty International to withdraw from Navalny the status of "prisoner of conscience" due to the hate speech propagated by the activist⁷.

Such issues, coupled with the opponent's support for Russian intervention in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, and the Russians' permanence in these separatists regions⁸ and their dubious positions in relation to Crimea and Ukraine⁹, also raise doubts among the liberal sectors

4 Kommersant. ru. 2020. "«Ромир» опубликовал рейтинг доверия россиян". *Kommersant*, October 24, 2020. <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4547667>. Access on Jan. 16, 2021.

5 DW News. 2021. "Alexei Navalny fined for 'defaming' Russian veteran". *DW News*, February 20, 2021. <https://www.dw.com/en/alexei-navalny-fined-for-defaming-russian-veteran/a-56635101>. Access on Feb. 20, 2021.

6 Washington Post. 2021. "We need to have a talk about Alexei Navalny". *Washington Post*, March 03, 2021. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/03/01/we-need-have-talk-about-alexei-navalny/>. Access on Mar. 03, 2021.

7 O Globo. 2021. "Anistia Internacional deixa de considerar Navalny um 'prisoneiro de consciência'". *O Globo*, February 24, 2021. <https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/anistia-internacional-deixa-de-considerar-navalny-um-prisoneiro-de-consciencia-24896404>. Access on Feb. 24, 2021.

8 Ogdem, Tim. 2020. "Why Navalny may not be a friend of the West". *Spectator*, August 31, 2020. <https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/why-navalny-may-not-be-a-friend-of-the-west>. Access on Apr. 01, 2021.

9 Faraponov, Vladyslav. 2021. "What does Aleksey Navalny Really Think About Ukraine

of the opposition. In any case, despite not having consensual support, it is undeniable that Navalny managed to broaden his bases since the alleged poisoning episode.

However, the expansion of its support base occurs from a much smaller universe than the Western media coverage seems to indicate. In 2013, only 6% of Russians supported Navalny's actions, this number jumped to 20% in 2020. At the same time, the percentage of citizens who do not approve Navalny jumped from 35% to 50%, in the same period. This occurs as the figure of Navalny becomes better known. In 2013, when he was welcomed in the West as the leader of the Russian opposition, Navalny was unknown to 59% of Russians, today 18% say they have not heard of him¹⁰.

This considerable increase in Navalny's relevance within Russian politics is undoubtedly due to all the publicity surrounding the alleged poisoning case and the ensuing protests. The numbers, however, do not yet point to a real threat to the dominion that Putin exercises in Russia's political life. The Russian President, since his return to power after the Medvedev hiatus, has experienced at least three major waves of protest, in 2011-2013, in 2017-2018 and now, in January 2021. The latter caused the largest volume of arrests of demonstrators in a relatively short period of time, however, it has been losing momentum. The last demonstration on February 14, held in a new format, with lanterns on city streets, had a considerably smaller impact.

The most massive protests in January of this year, on the other hand, also provoke quite adverse reactions among the Russian population. The unsuspected Levada research institute found that 80% of Russians were aware of the demonstrations in favor of Navalny. Of these, only 22% have a positive opinion in relation to the protesters, with 39% having a negative opinion, and 37% taking a neutral position. These numbers are in stark contrast to the support of 47% of respondents in relation to protests in the Khabarovsk region, which began last year in favor of former governor Serguei Furgal of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia of Vladimir Zhirinovski. Those protests gathered a considerably broader base than those in support of Navalny¹¹.

In short, it is evident that with the support of the Western media and with the mastery of the language of social networks and YouTube, Alexei

Crimea and Donba". *Ukraine World*, January 21, 2021. <https://ukraineworld.org/articles/opinions/what-does-aleksey-navalny-really-think-about-ukraine-crimea-and-donbas>. Access on Jan. 21, 2021.

10 Levada.ru. 2020. "АЛЕКСЕЙ НАВАЛЬНЫЙ: ОТНОШЕНИЕ И ОТРАВЛЕНИЕ". *Levada*, October 02, 2020. <https://www.levada.ru/2020/10/02/aleksey-navalnyj-otnoshenie-i-otравlenie/>. Access on Apr. 16, 2021.

11 Levada. ru. 2021. "Yanvarskie Protesty". *Levada*. February 10, 2021. <https://www.levada.ru/2021/02/10/yanvarskie-protesty/>. Access on Feb. 10, 2021.

Navalny has a tendency to continue to increase his presence on the political scene in Russia. However, he will have to overcome the legal difficulties imposed by his conviction, in addition to the ghosts of his ultranationalism that are often revived, and, more importantly, he will need to assert the image promoted by the Western media and become in fact the leader of such a diffuse and disorganized opposition, corresponding to the inflated popularity attributed to it. All of this, in view of the great popularity of Putin, who, having suffered ups and downs, does not seem to be significantly eroding, not even during the difficult months of the pandemic and the long period of economic difficulties under the pressure of sanctions.

The New Crisis on Ukraine's Borders

Rodrigo Ianhez¹²

The dispute between Ukraine and the self-proclaimed People's Republics of Donetsk and Lugansk is another one of those military conflicts that, after dominating the news for months, fall into oblivion, despite being far from a resolution. At the end of March 2021, hostilities show signs of intensification, after a period of relative calm¹³, and as usual, the parties accuse each other of escalating the situation. It is not a coincidence that this occurs after a series of discussions at the beginning of this year about the legislation that regulates the Ukrainian citizenship regime.

The issue of citizenship has been unfolding since 2014, when after reclaiming the Crimean peninsula, Russia started a program that distributed millions of passports to citizens of the Autonomous Republic that previously belonged to Ukraine. The situation has become even more complex with the virtual independence of the separatist regions of Donbass and the growing search of the locals for the Russian passport. According to the current Ukrainian constitution, Ukrainian citizens are not allowed to have more than one citizenship. In practice, this rule does not apply and millions of Ukrainian citizens have multiple citizenship. In 2020 alone, about 400,000 citizens of Ukraine obtained passports from the Russian Federation, after the Kremlin adopted measures that simplified obtaining Russian citizenship¹⁴, totaling

¹² Historian from Moscow State University.

¹³ Interfax.ru. 2021. "Песков отметил нагнетание напряжения на линии соприкосновения в Донбассе". *Interfax*, March 30, 2021. <https://www.interfax.ru/world/758539>. Access on Mar. 31, 2021.

¹⁴ Tickle, Jonny. 2021. "Following Moscow's move to liberalize citizenship process, more than 400,000 Ukrainians received Russian passports in 2020". *RT News*, January 28, 2021. <https://>

more than 60% of passports issued in the period by Russia¹⁵. In addition, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians from the western regions of the country have Hungarian, Slovak and Polish citizenship.

In January of this year, deputies of the Servant of the People, to which President Volodymyr Zelenski belongs and which bears the name of the television series that catapulted him to power, filed a bill that seeks to change the rules of multiple citizenship in Ukraine. The project envisages allowing Ukrainian citizens to obtain multiple citizenship, but imposes a series of restrictions on those who have dual citizenship in an “aggressor country”. In 2018, Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, passed a law that attributes the status of an aggressor country to the Russian Federation. In addition to banning such citizens from taking public service posts, running for or even voting in the Ukrainian elections, the new law would impose two to five years in prison for those who concealed dual Russian citizenship.

The ban on voting for citizens with dual Russian citizenship in Ukrainian elections is vital for the authorities in Kiev, who see potential ethnic traitors in the ethnically Russian citizens, such as the separatist rebels. It is no coincidence that such a discussion occurs in parallel with the growing popularity of the pro-Russian forces, organized in the Platform of Opposition - For Life party. This March, opinion polls pointed to a technical tie in a presidential race between Zelensky and pro-Russian leader Viktor Medvedchuk¹⁶. The opposition has been suffering an open offensive by the Ukrainian government that forced the opposition media to end its activities at the beginning of the year. Medvedchuk himself is under investigation by the Ukrainian security apparatus on charges of supporting separatist terrorist groups.

In recent statements, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmitri Kuleba, raised the possibility of simply banning Ukrainian citizens from having dual citizenship with Russia. He said that a project is under negotiation with Rada for which Ukrainians would be allowed to obtain passports from countries in the European Union and other “friendly” countries, but ruled out the possibility of authorizing dual citizenship with “aggressor countries”¹⁷.

www.rt.com/russia/513813-passports-statistics-citizenship-process/. Access on Jan. 28, 2021

¹⁵ Gazeta Daily.ru. 2021. “Тюрьма и поражение в правах: что грозит владельцам паспортов РФ на Украине”. *Gazeta Daily*, January 29, 2021. https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2021/01/29_a_13459724.shtml. Access on Jan. 29, 2021.

¹⁶ UNIAN. 2021. “Election runoff in Ukraine would see Zelensky, Boyko – Poll”. *UNIAN Information Agency*, March 03, 2021. <https://www.unian.info/politics/popular-ratings-election-runoff-in-ukraine-would-see-zelensky-boyko-poll-11366197.html>. Access on Mar. 03, 2021.

¹⁷ RBC.ru. 2021. “Глава МИД Украины исключил двойное гражданство с Россией”. *RBC*, March 05, 2021. <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/05/03/2021/6041f369a7947833e88901f>.

It remains to be seen whether the government in Kiev will be able to maneuver the parliament to pass measures of constitutionality so debatable. It is clear that the interests behind such measures are in containing Russian influence over the country, which grows as the Euromaidan project increasingly shows signs of bankruptcy and Ukraine sinks as the second poorest country in Europe.

Hong Kong's Demonstrations in 2019-2020

José Miguel Quedi Martins¹⁸

Bruno Magno¹⁹

In this article we seek to address the events that took place in Hong Kong between February 2019 and June 2020, situate their context, and carry out a preliminary assessment as a conclusion.

The Facts - In February 2019, a bill, proposed by the Hong Kong government, was introduced to hand over to Taiwan an individual accused of murder²⁰. On March 31, 2019, demonstrations exploded demanding the withdrawal of the project, allegedly for threatening civil rights and the autonomy of the city. Unlike what had happened with the protests in 2014²¹, this time the movement enjoyed broad popular support.

As a result, on June 15, 2019, the bill was withdrawn and suspended from voting indefinitely. Even so, the next day, the largest demonstration took place - two million participants were estimated - which, if confirmed, is extraordinary, given that the entire region has seven million inhabitants.

The organizers could have considered that the demonstration on June 16, 2019, had been an apotheosis, the celebration of victory, the expression that the last word - and action - had come from the movement. Instead, they decided to continue with the demonstrations, this time with the aim to overthrow the government of Carrie Lam.

Access on Mar. 05, 2021.

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²⁰ Subsequently, it was proposed that the project should include - in addition to Taiwan - also Mainland China and Macau.

²¹ Umbrella Movement - Protests that broke out in Hong Kong in 2014 against the submission of the list of candidates to the Hong Kong executive for Beijing's approval. The name of the movement is due to the protesters use of umbrellas to protect themselves from objects thrown from the buildings.

This caused the waning of popular support to the movement. As the volume of demonstrations had decreased, the organizers intensified the confrontations - including clashes between protesters, widespread depredations and even attacks on police stations.

On May 21, 2020, the Beijing National People's Congress announced the drafting of a law against foreign interference, secession, and terrorism. The then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Dominic Raab, announced that their approval would mean the end of Hong Kong's autonomy²². Stimulated by the support obtained from abroad, the protests had a new impetus and, progressively, a secessionist feature.

Then, on June 30, 2020, the Beijing National People's Congress unanimously passed a national security law with effect in Hong Kong. Only then did the police obtain a legal basis to crack down on protesters and their organizations. On July 31, 2020, the postponement of the elections was announced, and twelve candidates were disqualified and barred from running.

The city, exhausted by sixteen months of daily confrontations, was finally pacified. The movement came to an end without the intervention of Beijing's tanks - eventually frustrating those who expected to see the reissue of the tragic events of Tiananmen (1989).

The Context - The Hong Kong demonstrations seem to signal the exhaustion of the model put in place with the Arab Springs that started in Tunisia in 2010. At that time, the movement immediately made itself felt over China, with the protesters adopting the same name, the Jasmine Revolution (02/20/2011 to 03/20/2011).

The Chinese Jasmine Revolution took place months before the official announcement of the "Pivot to Asia". Originally suggested by the publication of Hillary Clinton's article on October 11, 2011²³, and made official by Barack Obama's speech in Darwin in Australia on November 17, 2011. It was a question of expressing a willingness to "contain" China - which, in practical terms, means promoting regime change.

The effectiveness of the seemingly fledgling Chinese spring of 2011 can be measured by the reaction triggered against it. In 2012, due to

22 One Country, Two Systems - Principle formulated by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s, to allow a peaceful reunification of China with its territories (Macau, Hong Kong and Taiwan). The formula provided for the maintenance of capitalism in these regions, which would also enjoy remarkable administrative autonomy. It is important to note that at that time there was no democratic regime in any of these regions.

23 Clinton, Hillary. 2011. "America's Pacific Century: the future of geopolitics will be decided in Asia, not in Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States should be right at the center of the action". *Foreign Policy*, n. 189, p. 56-63, Nov. 2011.

the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands²⁴, there was an explosion of nationalism in China, expressed in strong anti-Japanese disturbances (19/08 / 12-19 / 09/12). They cut short the days of Hu Jintao's rule - and, in Japan, overthrew the government of the pro-China's Democratic Party of Japan – and brought up a shabby Maoism, disguised as chauvinism, swept away the hope of structuring an East Asia Community²⁵.

Next was the rapprochement process with Taiwan, which has been ongoing since 2008. It had already promoted on a large scale the free circulation of factors of production (people, goods and capital) between the two sides of the strait. But then came the Sunflowers Movement in Taiwan (03/18/14 – 04/10/14) undertaken by a minority of overt pro-Taiwan Independency supporters of Tsai Ing-wen. The highlight of the Movement of the Sunflowers was the occupation of parliament. Despite the notorious illegality and vandalism, the action had close support from the local and international media. Thus, it was possible to hijack the consensus, hitherto dominant in public opinion, favorable to the cross-strait rapprochement. Tsai then pursued a policy of reversing investments and relocating industrial enterprises to Southeast Asia.

The Chinese response came in May 2015, with the launch of the “Made in China 2025” plan. The country only produced that year 16% of the semiconductors it used. The ambitious plan intended to lead the Chinese to produce 40% by 2020, and 70% by 2025²⁶. Henceforth, the decisive commodity of the new Industrial Revolution would become the object of international dispute. And, as a result, an element that would tension the reconcentration of production and the reterritorialization of historical capitalism.

As empirical evidence of these trends, there is the Trade War between South Korea and Japan²⁷. Also included is the addition of the semiconductor agenda, due to Huawei, in the trade war between China and the United States, just when it seemed to have already cooled down towards a preliminary agreement²⁸.

24 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands - Five uninhabited volcanic islands, located 170 kilometers from Taiwan. Controlled by Japan and claimed by Taiwan and China.

25 East Asian Community - Formula used by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, starting in 2009, to designate a finalistic purpose of the trilateral summits held between Japan, China and South Korea.

26 Lewis, James A. 2019. *Learning the Superior Techniques of the Barbarians: China's Pursuit of Semiconductor Independence*. Washington, DC: CSIS, 2019. pp. 01-02.

27 Korea-Japan Trade War - Started in October 2018 due to a South Korean local court ruling on compensation for “comfort women”, one of Japan's war crimes. In response, Japan passed in July 2019 to boycott the supply of semiconductors to South Korea.

28 China-US Trade War - Started in 2018, it was waged for the purpose of reducing the US

In addition to the obvious departure from China, the net result of the Sunflower Movement was to deprive Taiwan of its “Great Silicon Wall”, that is, of the technological dependence that China had on the island for highly miniaturized semiconductors. The move was not exempt from costs. In Singapore, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the Taiwanese semiconductor giant, collapsed the main local company, Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing (CSM) - which ended up being controlled by an association of businessmen from the United Arab Emirates and the United States. Predictably, Southeast Asia cannot absorb the new supply of microelectronics companies. Thus, TSMC announced the construction of its largest semiconductor factory in a standard of five nanometers (5nm) in the US²⁹.

Between April 15 and 16 of 2021, the first official visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Suga was made to US President Joe Biden. At the end of the summit, Japan announced a commitment to invest \$ 2 billion in the US semiconductor industry³⁰. On the same occasion, the United States and Japan declared that it is imperative that China and Taiwan resolve their disputes peacefully³¹. To which China replied, “We urge the United States and Japan to take China’s concern seriously, obey the principle of one China and immediately stop meddling in China’s internal affairs and harm China’s interests”³².

Preliminary Assessment - The US has undoubtedly won. They took two billion Japanese dollars and the largest and best semiconductor plant of

trade deficit. In May 2019, Trump resolved to securitize the problem with banning Huawei and boycotting the supply of semiconductors to China. In January 2020, Beijing conceded, reaching a preliminary agreement that China has pledged to buy \$ 200 billion more in American products. However, due to pending issues involving executive orders and subsequent sanctions against Chinese companies, the dispute has not ended clearly until today.

29 Bjarin, Tim. 2021. “Why TSMC’s Arizona Fab Is Strategic For Tech’s Future In The US”. *Forbes*, February 16, 2021. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/timbjarin/2021/02/16/why-tsmc-arizona-fab-is-strategic-for-techs-future-in-the-us/?sh=1e7753511c8a>. Access on Apr. 20, 2021.

30 Brunnstrom, David; et al. 2021. “Biden and Japan’s Suga project unity against China’s assertiveness”. *Reuters*, April 17, 2021. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/biden-welcome-japans-suga-first-guest-key-ally-china-strategy-2021-04-16/>. Access on Apr. 20, 2021.

31 WHITE HOUSE. 2021. “USA; Japan. US- Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement. US-Japan Global Partnership For A New Era”. *WHITE HOUSE*, April 16, 2021. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/16/us-japan-joint-leaders-statement-us-japan-global-partnership-for-a-new-era/>. Access on Apr. 20, 2021.

32 China. 2021. “China. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks on Negative Content Concerning China in US-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement”. *China Foreign Ministry*, April 17, 2021. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1869625.shtml. Access on Apr. 20, 2021.

Taiwan. Both gains will serve to rebuild its infrastructure and industrial base. China also stands out as a winner: it obtained the effective reintegration of Hong Kong and it will add to the “Made in China 2025” plan the facilities in its territory of TSMC and Singaporean CSM. Although one can see the event of a war for Taiwan, this possibility is by no means new. Japan, which together with England produced the “bait and bleeding”³³ of US and China, did not have any visible success. Finally, Taiwan and Hong Kong were the biggest losers. The first found itself stripped of its “silicon wall”. The second has lost the most democratic system of government in its history.

Vaccine Diplomacy and Nationalism: European and Emerging Perspectives

Guilherme Thudium³⁴

On December 2, 2020, the United Kingdom became the first country to approve a covid-19 vaccine. It was an important milestone in the battle against the novel coronavirus, which, however, is still far from over. Logistically, it was just the beginning. The developed countries of the North Atlantic, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, which possess the technology and the best infrastructure conditions, took the lead, focusing on vaccinating their own populations and imposing export controls, a process that threatens immunization in the underdeveloped world.

Logistics is an important concept in the realm of Strategic Studies, an interdisciplinary field that studies how actors in the international system use military means to achieve political goals. Logistics is, therefore, originally a military enterprise, or, in the words of the 19th century French-Swiss general Antoine-Henri Jomini³⁵, “the practical art of moving armies”. In fact, until the end of World War II, the concept was associated with military activities in the preparation for war, following the terms offered by Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian general who best operationalized the concept for Strategic Studies,

33 Bait and Bleeding - “This strategy involves causing two rivals to engage in a protracted war, so that they bleed each other while the baiter remains on the sideline, with its military strength intact”. Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of the Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

34 PhD Candidate in Strategic Studies (PPGEEI/UFRGS). President of the South American Institute for Policy and Strategy (ISAPE) and member of the Center of German and European Studies (CDEA) at UFRGS and PUC-RS.

35 Jomini, Antoine-Henri. 2005. *The Art of War By Baron de Jomini, General and Aide-De-Camp of the Emperor of Russia*. Special Edition. El Paso: El Paso Norte Press.

even though her never named it³⁶.

It was only from the 1980s onwards that logistics was effectively expanded to the mainstream notion of a civilian structure aimed at jointly coordinating complex operations of planning, implementing and controlling the flow and efficient storage of goods and services – an appropriation that is still contested by more orthodox strategists. In any case, the distribution of the covid-19 vaccine to the entire world population will be the largest and most complex logistical operation in history, and it will also require the involvement and preparation of national Armed Forces.


The vaccine first approved in the United Kingdom from German biotechnology company BioNTech and American pharmaceutical corporation Pfizer, for example, has been described as a “logistical nightmare”. In addition to the challenges of large-scale distribution, it needs to be stored at very low temperatures, which may make it infeasible for some countries in the developing world. Many regions of the Geopolitical South still have serious problems with basic infrastructure, such as electricity, roads, railways, potable water and integrated information and communication services.

The slow production and distribution around the globe has once again put the United Kingdom in shock with the countries of the European Union (EU), largely due to delays in the export schedule of the AstraZeneca vaccine, which prioritized the national demand following requirements from the British government. EU member countries – traditionally a major exporter of immunization agents –, in turn, announced export bans, including 250,000 doses that would be exported to Australia, a traditional ally of the developed axis of world powers³⁷. Thus, in the current scheme of things, vaccination will not reach the Third World widely before 2023 (Figure 1).

36 Proença, Domício, and E. E. Duarte. 2005. “The Concept of Logistics Derived from Clausewitz: All That Is Required so That the Fighting Force Can Be Taken as a Given”. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (2005): 645–77. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390500301046>.

37 Visentini, Paulo. 2019. Eixos do Poder Mundial no Século XXI: uma proposta analítica. *AUSTRAL: Revista Brasileira de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais*, 8(15). doi: <https://doi.org/10.22456/2238-6912.91767>.

Figure 1: Vaccination Around the World



Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2021)³⁸.

The promise of fair access, therefore, is at serious risk, which represents a moral failure in terms of widespread vaccination and will only prolong the pandemic, the necessary restrictions for its control and human and economic suffering, as was recognized by the World Health Organization³⁹. By allowing the virus to proliferate in the developing world, especially in countries that have not been successful in containing the novel coronavirus, the world is allowing room for new mutations that could impair the vaccination process that is being carried out in the developed world, requiring constant updates of the formula and calibration of expectation.

On February 17, 2021, the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, represented by Minister Marcelo Ebrard, filed a formal complaint at the United Nations Security Council meeting on the unequal distribution of the covid-19

³⁸ The Economist Intelligence Unit. 2021. "More than 85 Poor Countries Will Not Have Widespread Access to Coronavirus Vaccines before 2023". *The Economist*, February 19, 2021. <https://www.eiu.com/n/85-poor-countries-will-not-have-access-to-coronavirus-vaccines/>. Access on Feb. 19, 2021.

³⁹ WHO. 2021. "WHO Director-General's Opening Remarks at 148th Session of the Executive Board". *World Health Organization*, January 18, 2021. <https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-148th-session-of-the-executive-board>. Access on Jan. 18, 2021.

vaccine around the world. At that time, Mexico had the highest number of deaths per million inhabitants in Latin America, according to Johns Hopkins University⁴⁰. A few days later, the WHO finally operationalized the Covax initiative, an international cooperation venture aimed at expanding global access through the Indian Covaxin vaccine. On February 24, 2021, the first doses of the initiative arrived in Ghana, in the Gulf of Guinea. Brazil is among the five countries that will receive the largest amount of doses from the Covax consortium, according to the organization.

In the opposite direction of vaccine nationalism, three countries that make up the BRICS political-diplomatic bloc are leading a process of “vaccine diplomacy”: India, Russia and China. India is the world’s largest vaccine manufacturer, while Russia was the first country to register a covid-19 vaccine, Sputnik V, which is being used by many Latin American countries. China is already building a global distribution network for its vaccine, the so-called “Health Silk Road”, with the aim of improving its global reputation. The BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) has allocated US\$ 10 billion to fight the pandemic, of which US\$ 2 billion are destined for Brazil. The first half of the amount was delivered to the Brazilian government in February 2021⁴¹.

South Africa and India also pleaded at the Council on Trade-Related Aspects of the World Trade Organization (WTO), in October 2020, a patent waiver on covid-19 vaccines in order to increase production capacities of immunizers in developing countries. The proposed TRIPs Agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) has since been co-sponsored by Kenya, Eswatini, Mozambique, Pakistan, Bolivia, Venezuela, Mongolia, Zimbabwe, Egypt, the African Group and the Least Developed Countries (LDC)⁴².

The United States, under the Biden administration, reversed its initial position and announced support for the covid-19 vaccine patent waiver in May, 2021. European countries, however, have not followed suit. Germany, the region’s main center of gravity, is the owner of a thriving pharmaceutical

40 Johns Hopkins University. 2021. “COVID-19 Map”. *Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center*, 2021. <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html>.

41 Núcleo Brasileiro de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais (NERINT). 2021. “Brasil recebe R\$ 5 bilhões do Banco dos BRICS para combater o coronavírus”. *Núcleo Brasileiro de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais*, February 12, 2021. <https://www.ufrgs.br/nerint/brasil-recebe-r-5-bilhoes-do-banco-dos-brics-para-combater-o-coronavirus/>. Access on Feb. 12, 2021.

42 WTO. 2020. “Waiver From Certain Provisions of the TRIPs Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of Covid-19 (IP/C/W/669)”. *Geneva: Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, World Trade Organization*, October 02, 2020.

industry and, for the moment, is opting to protect its economic interests, following the traditional precepts of its protectionist model of capitalism.

Considering the unprecedented levels of interconnection and globalization seen today, the response to contemporary challenges must be broad-spectrum, that is, concerted multilaterally. The challenge will always be global, and never just national, and international cooperation is therefore essential. International, regional and domestic institutions, including the Armed Forces, will play an important role for effective global and logistical action to overcome the pandemic through mass vaccination – the only way for the responsible resumption of economic activity worldwide.

The covid-19 vaccine must be seen as a global common good, and the different needs and capacities of developing countries need to be considered when formulating the strategy of this grand logistical enterprise, since not all countries are inserted in the international system on an equal footing. In times of crisis, multilateralism, integration and diplomacy show their importance, and countries whose diplomatic tradition is based on universalism, as is the case in Brazil, could benefit. But, for that, foreign policy needs to be constructive and pragmatic.

The Coup in Myanmar and its Geopolitical Consequences for Asia

Erik Herejk Ribeiro⁴³

In February 2021, after ten years of relative stability, the young democratic regime in Myanmar was interrupted by the military's seizure of power. The intervention of the armed forces - the Tatmadaw - took place on allegations of fraud in the general elections, which yielded a massive victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. As in 1988, several political leaders were arrested - among them Suu Kyi - and protests emerged with violent suppression by security forces, causing hundreds of deaths in a few weeks. Older problems experienced by the country add to this context, such as the social conflict involving the Rohingyas and several native paramilitary groups that have risen up against the Burmese majority government since independence in 1947.

The chaotic scenario in the middle of the covid-19 pandemic raises several questions about the motivations of the political actors involved and

⁴³ PhD in International Strategic Studies (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, UFRGS).

their external alignments: Myanmar has been the object of a dispute between the United States and China since the democratic opening. This brief article points to possible implications of political instability in Myanmar for the whole region, as the focus of geopolitical competition in recent years has been shifting towards Southeast Asia and South Asia. These two sub-regions are considered to be the fragile periphery of China and India, where patterns of cooperation and conflict have direct consequences for the internal security of both countries. Myanmar is located at the intersection between the two sub-regions, seen both as a potential hub for regional integration, a buffer of security isolation or a stage of external interference to undermine the security of its' giant neighbors peripheries⁴⁴.

After independence, Myanmar (then Burma) always preferred neutrality in its foreign policy, which turned into isolation after the establishment of a socialist civil-military regime in 1962. The choice was made precisely to avoid the dynamics of the Cold War in a context of domestic fragility. Only two thirds of the population are of Burmese ethnicity and the other 33% are divided into several ethnic groups that occupy regions bordering China, India, Laos and Thailand. These ethnicities had been armed by the Allies - the United States and the United Kingdom - in order to fight Japan in World War II, but they maintained their troops to fight the new government set after British colonization⁴⁵. Despite several attempts at military victory and political co-optation of these groups, no government in Myanmar has managed to establish even a universal ceasefire.

At the end of the 1980s, the socialist regime collapsed and made room for an accelerated and disorganized process of democratization. In the face of the sudden loss of political power and the overwhelming victory of the NLD and Suu Kyi, the military struck a coup in 1988 to establish a provisional government junta. The post-Cold War total isolation, along with Western and Japanese sanctions were only relieved by the partnership with China and the diplomatic support of Russia and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations).

Myanmar remained an international pariah until announcing its re-democratization with a new constitution in 2008 and elections in 2010. However, the NLD boycotted the election due to the government's institutional

44 Ribeiro, Erik H. 2015. *A rivalidade e a cooperação nas relações China-Índia: o contexto asiático e o caso de Mianmar*. 226 f. PPGEI, UFRGS: Porto Alegre.

45 Some of these paramilitary groups even entered the businesses of opium cultivation and drug trafficking, allying themselves with troops from the Chinese Kuomintang Army, who fled in 1949 to northern Burma after the defeat in the Chinese civil war.

format, which kept the military in the role of caretaker of the new regime⁴⁶. From 2010, the military and Aung San Suu Kyi reached a political agreement, encouraged by China and the United States. The power sharing arrangement was based on liberalization and economic opening to the outside, while the key issues of internal and external security remained under the command of Tatmadaw.

At first, the government of President Thein Sein (2011-2015), a retired general of the reformist wing, signaled a movement towards rapprochement with Washington, canceling two large Chinese projects after popular pressure: the Myitsone hydroelectric plant (which would become one of the world's largest dams) in 2011 and the Rakhine-Yunnan railway in 2014. Both projects are central to the policy of economic projection of the Chinese countryside (particularly the Yunnan province) via Indian Ocean. Despite this, the gas and oil pipeline projects linking Myanmar to China were completed during this period. For this reason, Myanmar has been called the "Chinese California", in reference to the bioceanic access that China would gain with the complete logistical integration to the neighboring country.

After the NLD's victory in 2016, Suu Kyi was appointed State Councilor, becoming the *de facto* leader of the government. During her tenure, Suu Kyi faced severe international criticism, as she had to defend the country against denunciations of human rights violations of the Rohingyas. This group originally came from East Bengal (now Bangladesh) and migrated to Burma during British colonization, but its citizenship rights are not recognized by either country⁴⁷. Since 2012, social uprisings between Buddhists and Muslims in the state of Arakan have revived the ethnic conflict, spawning new revolutionary paramilitary groups (such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army), now funded by fundamentalist Rohingya networks based in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In 2019, Myanmar was charged for genocide at the United Nations International Court of Justice, where the case remains under analysis.

Faced with diplomatic pressures, the young democratic regime in Myanmar suffered again in the search for international normalization. Previously, the withdrawal of economic sanctions had attracted Western and Japanese investments, which carried out a race with China for contracts for the exploitation of natural resources, construction of infrastructure, logistics and digital services, among others. In 2018, after successive crises involving

46 According to the 2008 Constitution, the Tatmadaw appoints 25% of the members of parliament, chooses one of the two vice-presidents and also the ministers of defense, home and border affairs. In addition, constitutional amendments require 75% approval from the two parliamentary houses, conferring effective veto power to the military.

47 Historically, the Burmese government had already tried to expel this population and mujahideen insurgent groups on two occasions (1978 and 1991-92), but was unsuccessful.

the Rohingyas, Myanmar's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows fell dramatically and the country lost Western diplomatic support. Then US Vice President Mike Pence publicly criticized the Suu Kyi government during a visit to the country and the European Union's Investment Protection Agreement negotiations with Myanmar were canceled.

Suu Kyi, who maintained good relations with both Beijing and Washington during her term, tried a pragmatic approach in this scenario of looming isolation. In 2018, Myanmar agreed to sign the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) project, which could become comparable to the China-Pakistan Corridor (CPEC), the largest pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). A series of railways is expected to connect Kunming (the capital of Yunnan) to Kyaukpyu, on Myanmar's coastline, where a deep-water port is being built by Chinese companies. In January 2020, Suu Kyi received a visit from Xi Jinping, the first by a Chinese head of state in 19 years, signaling good relations between the two countries and advancing yet another series of BRI agreements. Despite this, the constant confrontation between paramilitary groups and the Tatmadaw has threatened Chinese projects in the country, which are being criticized and targeted by part of the local communities. In addition, there are illegal arms and gem trafficking businesses in northern Myanmar, which are carried out by Chinese organized crime networks with the help of local militias.

The February 2021 military coup was met with surprise, as there were few public signs of the silent power struggle between Suu Kyi's group and the military. Behind the scenes, the personality cult of the "Lady", as she was called derisively by the generals of the junta, has become a threat to the political survival of the military. In addition to potential popular pressure for the elimination of their veto power, military elites fear that their economic power will be progressively opposed by a hostile government: Most national companies in all sectors are controlled by conglomerates of military families, who are often targets of external pressure and sanctions. The fact that Suu Kyi waged on her Buddhist identity - in order to win the support of nationalist sectors of the population - also bothers the military, who have lost their electoral viability. More than that, there are criticisms from foreign colleagues and diplomats about her management style inside the NLD, seen by some as clientelist and personalist⁴⁸.

From a local and regional point of view, there are several relevant

⁴⁸ Charney, Michael W. 2021. *Keynote Address: A Historian Considers the Current Military Takeover in Myanmar*. Myanmar Dialogues Conference. Mueang Phitsanulok: Naresuan University. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349251753_A_Historian_Looks_at_the_Ongoing_Takeover_in_Myanmar_Keynote_Address_for_Myanmar_Dialogues_Conference_at_Naresuan_University

repercussions for the coming years. First, China tried to open dialogue between the parties, but was unsuccessful due to Suu Kyi's refusal to meet the military's demands for the preservation of the spirit of the 2008 Constitution: a democracy guided by the Tatmadaw⁴⁹. On the contrary, part of the popular uprising has turned not only against the military and their companies, but also against Chinese businesses spread across the country, especially in the former capital Yangon. The Chinese are at risk of having their image increasingly associated with the military regime and, thus, hampering their geo-economic plans in the country and the global image of the New Silk Road.

The coup also divided opinions among ASEAN countries, which alternated between criticism, indifference or tacit support for the military regime. Countries like Thailand (which periodically faces military coups and has been governed by a provisional junta for five years), Cambodia and Laos have adopted a stance close to that of China, defending Myanmar's sovereignty and opposing external sanctions. On the other hand, ASEAN leaders - Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore - criticized the institutional breakdown in Myanmar, urging a quick return to the rule of law, also because of the concern of the first two countries with the situation of the Rohingyas. The coup also divided the Philippines, which experienced long autocratic regimes in the past and is currently governed by Rodrigo Duterte, a conservative leader with authoritarian inclinations⁵⁰.

In general, the coup in Myanmar has led to comparisons with Syria by the Western media, mainly due to persistent mass protests, civil disobedience, the joining of paramilitary minority groups and the violent suppression of the movement by security forces⁵¹. As in the so-called "Arab Spring" and in Afghanistan, there is fear that the situation in Myanmar will become an exporter of instability to the neighborhood. It is important to note that Tatmadaw is a cohesive institution and rooted in all spheres of society in its boss-client relations, including among a good part of ethnic minorities. Second, it is not in the interest of any of the neighbors to see a process of balkanization in Myanmar, since China and India have their own concerns vis-à-vis national minorities on these borders. Third, there is no external mobilization for direct or indirect external interventions as occurred in Libya and Syria, and some of the main paramilitary groups in northern Myanmar

49 Ibidem.

50 Heydarian, Richard J. 2021. "Myanmar's coup splits an already deeply divided region". *Asia Times Online*, February 05, 2021. <https://asiatimes.com/2021/02/myanmars-coup-splits-an-already-deeply-divided-region/>. Access on Apr. 08, 2021.

51 Tisdall, Simon. 2021. "Is Myanmar the new Syria? Rising violence threatens a repeat tragedy". *The Guardian*, April 04, 2021. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/apr/04/is-myanmar-the-new-syria-rising-violence-threatens-a-repeat-tragedy>. Access on Apr. 04, 2021.

are in fact sustained with Beijing's complicity⁵².

Although a spiral of chaos at the national level is a less likely scenario, there are reasons to believe in a prolonged political stalemate. Immediately after the coup, the provisional regime promised to restore institutional normalcy within a year and call for new elections. Unlike the Thai military, the Tatmadaw has not suspended the current constitution and is trying - at least publicly - to defend the legality of its actions. However, NLD lawmakers, bureaucrats and dissident activists have announced the creation of a government in exile (Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, CRPH). The Committee's objective is to propose a new federal charter and replace the 2008 Constitution, abolishing military privileges and constituting new federal armed forces. The Committee recently received support from some political and paramilitary groups among ethnic minorities, while others warned the Tatmadaw that they could abandon ceasefire agreements in favor of dissidents⁵³.

The return to normality will essentially depend on renegotiation with Suu Kyi and the NLD, which will involve some degree of diplomatic accommodation between China and the United States. At this moment, Biden's strategy has been to form an "anti-authoritarian" front among American allies: in Myanmar, the solution found was direct sanctions against the military, their families and part of their companies, along with the freezing of the national government's assets in the United States. Still, Biden's strategy appears to be much more lenient than pressures exerted against other countries in the recent past, as in the case of Iran⁵⁴. In addition to domestic challenges, Myanmar will be an important test in relations between the Xi Jinping government and the new Biden administration.

52 Myers, Lucas. 2021. "Myanmar Is on the Precipice of Civil War". *Foreign Policy*, April 08, 2021. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/08/myanmar-military-coup-ethnic-armed-organizations-civil-war/>. Access on Apr. 08, 2021.

53 Ibidem.

54 Samet, Andrew. 2021. "Myanmar and Biden's Broken-Down Car Dilemma". *The Diplomat*, February 22, 2021. <https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/myanmar-and-bidens-broken-down-car-dilemma/>. Access on Feb. 22, 2021.

100 Days: Biden's Foreign Policy

Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo⁵⁵

The first hundred days of any United States (US) President in office are defined as a “honeymoon” amongst the White House, the press and political forces of opposition, to assure a peaceful and stable transition of power. In 2021, neither of these conditions can be applied to democrat Joe Biden's mandate, as a result of the social-economic crisis and the ongoing polarization. Apart from this scenario, the presidency is forwarding its agenda. When it is not possible to govern by consensus (as in the approval of the economic aid package of US\$ 1,9 trillion), the option is to issue Executive Orders that allow to fast advance legislation and implement decisions without having to deal with Congress. This is a very frequent path, leading to the dismantling of the Trump era. Based on this reality, the analysis of foreign policy in the first hundred days can be divided into three parts: the profile of the government team, the first strategic documents and the practical experience.

Whereas considering the international relations key names, critics sustain that Biden's tenure is somewhat a Obama III government, repeating its interventionist, pro-regime change and expansionist stance. This is not an erroneous assertion and the team itself is keen to present this continuity: Secretary of State- Antony Blinken, National Security Adviser- Jake Sullivan, US Ambassador to the United Nations- Linda Thomas Greenfield, Secretary of Defense- Lloyd J Austin III, Secretary of Treasury- Janet Yellen, United States Trade Representative (USTR)- Katherine Tai, United States Agency for Aid and Development (USAID)-Samantha Power. Susan Rice, who was one of the most influential names of the former Obama's presidency is heading the Political Domestic Council, a key position to establish bridges with Congress and interest groups.

During his career, Biden acted as the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (2001/2003 e 2007/2009), in commissions that dealt with international issues such as drug trafficking, immigration and was Obama's special envoy in several talks (Brazil, Central America, the Middle East, technology). So, it was expected that he surrounded himself with people that were part of his inner circle. Added to this continuity, innovation is also part of this agenda, a dimension that can be best noted by analyzing

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documents such as the “Interim Strategic Guidance”⁵⁶ (ISG). The goal of the ISG is to establish directives that will be better developed in the *National Security Strategy*. Two issues stand out: *America is Back* and *Build Back Better*, that sum up this continuity-innovation duality.

One of the most relevant features of ISG is to emphasize the correlation of domestic and foreign policies, which Biden defined as “the foreign policy of the middle class” in his inaugural speech⁵⁷. This statement was an answer to the *America First* and *Make America Great Again* catch phrases of Trump’s government that accused the democrats of being uninterested in the American people. Another significant point is the identification of immediate and long range priorities (in which human rights, identity agenda and the rethinking of US bilateral and multilateral pacts are included).

These immediate priorities are listed in the ISG: the fight against covid-19 and the strengthening of global health security, domestic and foreign economic recovery promoting stability and social inclusion, the renewal of democracy and the fight against the dangers of authoritarian and nationalistic violence, the humanization and greater efficacy of the immigration system, the revitalization of interstate and multilateral partnerships, the fight against the climate crisis and the promotion of the green energy revolution, secure the technological leadership and deal with China’s threat, defined as the greatest geopolitical test of the 21st century. Other menaces are Russia, Iran, North Korea and Yemen.

In the geopolitical field, the ISG deals with the recurring issue of US grand strategy to: “Promote a favorable distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries from directly threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to the global commons, or dominating key regions.” In order to do this, the US must “negotiate from a position of strength” and to promote the Armed Forces global posture review.

Regarding the practical arena, this is represented by the halting the process of troops relocation as promised by Trump, such as the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the rescaling of the North Atlantic Organization (NATO) staff in Germany. Another priority is to rebuild US-European Union (EU) strategic relations to counterbalance China and Russia. In the economic arena, either with the EU or the United Kingdom (UK), prospects are limited. For the UK, launching a more comprehensive bilateral trade agreement with the US is seen as essential to ease BREXIT’s negative impacts, but on Biden’s

56 THE WHITE HOUSE. 2021. *Interim Strategic Guidance*. Available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-IV2.pdf>.

57 THE WHITE HOUSE. 2021. *Biden’s Inaugural Address*. January 20th, 2021. Available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/01/20/inaugural-address-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr/>.

side there are, so far, no signs.

The US are once more engaged in the World Health Organization (WTO), promising to take part in the global efforts to fight covid-19, support to vaccination in the framework of the global COVAX Facility alliance, the creation of a new international pact to deal with health emergencies and the donation of vaccine shots (confirmed only for Canada and Mexico). All in all, the US are in disadvantage considering the vaccine geopolitical agenda (understood as the production, distribution and easy access). In this arena, Russia, India and China are being more effective, mainly in South-South Cooperation (SSC).

When dealing with China, the main changes refer to the tactical movements and personal styles of Biden and Trump, as there is no adjustment in the level of menace: China is the main threat to the hegemonic position. One may not use terms such as “trade war”, “the Chinese virus”, but the expectation of a reset for the relations is very misleading, as March events show.

The first refers to the status change of the Quad- Quadrilateral Security Dialogue composed by the US, Japan, Australia and India. Created in 2004 as an advisory committee after the tsunami’s humanitarian crisis, the Quad was almost inactive in the following years. Its restart is part of the update process of the Pacific Military Command (USPACOM), enlarged and reformulated as the Indo-Pacific Military Command (USINDOPACOM) by Obama, as a means to uphold the US and its allies free access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans and adjacent seas (as the South China Sea- SCS).

The Quad has gained a decisive role in the reactivation of the Asian Pivot in its warlike dimension, and further on, economical. It is a direct answer to the Chinese doctrine defined by the Pentagon as A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) that would prevent the free passage in the region and the signature of RCEP (*Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership*) between fifteen Asian countries, including China and Japan (India opted out). The goals of this framework and other initiatives are to contain and to promote the dissuasion of China through multilateralism and the deepening of bilateral ties with key states, namely Japan, India and Australia.

The second corresponds to the bilateral summit in Alaska, that was instrumental, added to the repositioning of US fleet in the SCS and the European-US condemnations against China for human rights violations, to make US stands clear. For both powers, it was a kind of mutual acknowledgement of the new dynamics of the relation from now on. The US reinforced ISG goal “to negotiate in a position of strength” and China is gradually playing a more assertive role. When taking into account diplomatic incidents, the period focused on Russia, and the accusations of mistreatment

of the opposition, interference in US democratic process and its elections and the accusation that Putin was a “killer”.

The most sensitive issue is migration, since Biden’s inauguration and the promise of reform led to a greater influx of migrants to the borders, mainly children. Mostly, the origins of these migrants are Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras (the northern Central America triangle) and, in fewer numbers, Mexico. The challenge is to deal with unguarded children and migrants already in custody and to stop the entry in an open door fashion. Biden reinstated the asylum and refugee programs for immigrants that can prove political persecution and life threatening violence and drug trafficking, but the border crisis is active.

Brazil’s name is not mentioned in this document and the bilateral relation is mostly protocol due to the alignment to previous Trump’s government, the delay in recognizing Biden’s victory and the disagreements on the environmental and human rights agenda. However, some civil society sectors in the US represented by the NGO “The US Network for Democracy in Brazil” published the report “Recommendations on Brazil to President Biden and the New Administration”⁵⁸ in which they demand harsh measures against the Brazilian government. These measures such as economic embargos, closed borders and aid cuts should have limited application and be avoided by the US, which is not seeking to remove Brazil from its sphere of influence.

However, one cannot underestimate the possibility of pressures, even soft ones, in order to answer, domestically, to demands by groups that are key for the Democratic Party electoral ambitions. Still in March, an example was Brazil’s inclusion in the 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices⁵⁹ issued by the Department of State, pinpointing the seriousness of Brazil’s current government attacks to the press and the disrespect for basic and fundamental human rights. The recent change in the command of Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations with Ambassador Ernesto Araujo departure and the indication of Carlos Alberto Franco França will only have concrete results with adjustments in the government’s rhetoric and agenda following Biden’s priorities.

A greater presence of the State in technological investments and USAID programs, the repositioning of troops in key regions are expected

⁵⁸ The US Network for Democracy in Brazil. 2021. *Recommendations on Brazil to President Biden and the New Administration*. Available at: <https://www.cartacapital.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/documento-US-Network-for-Brazils-Democracy.pdf>.

⁵⁹ THE STATE DEPARTMENT. 2020. *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*. Available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/>. And THE STATE DEPARTMENT. 2020. Brazil 2020 Human Rights Report. Available at: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/BRAZIL-2020-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf>.

as next steps, as soon as the covid-19 economic crisis is managed. Biden will have to deal with domestic divisions and pressures for more regime change interventionism in the peripheries of the system, in the midst of the geopolitical and geoeconomical priorities of China's containment. The changes of the Biden era are more tactical than strategic: America is back, even though it never really went anywhere.

Latin America and the Beginning of an Electoral Cycle: A New Turn to the Left?

Leonardo Granato⁶⁰

In the midst of a multifaceted crisis, which today has at its core the covid-19 pandemic, Latin America is starting, in 2021, a new electoral cycle. By 2025 there will be presidential elections in nineteen countries in the region, and their results will indicate new correlations of forces around specific agendas to face the challenges that the referred crisis imposes in each national context. In 2021, elections are held in Ecuador, Peru, Nicaragua, Chile and Honduras. In 2022 it will be the turn of Costa Rica, Colombia and Brazil, and in 2023, Guatemala, Argentina and Paraguay. In 2024, there are also the cases of Mexico, El Salvador, Panama, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela. Finally, in 2025 it will be Cuba and Bolivia turn. In this text, we seek to present an interpretative synthesis of the main facts that have been part of the beginning of this new electoral cycle, linking them to the electoral trends that, since the beginning of the 21st century, have been registered in the region.

As in the electoral scenario at the beginning of the last decade, mainly in South America, this new cycle also seems to signal, although, for the time being, not conclusively, a resumption of the predominance of left-wing political forces. This possibility, in addition to being explained by the restrictive agendas of conservative neoliberal governments in the face of the current crisis in the region, needs to be contextualized based on the "electoral waves" in the continent and the recovery of some historical facts, in a broader perspective.

From the early 2000s, in the context of a crisis of neoliberal hegemony and in a favorable external environment, linked not only to the resumption of world growth, but also to the Chinese rise to the condition of economic and political power at the global level, a new wave of popular and progressive

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governments has spread throughout the region. Reference is made mainly to Chávez's electoral victories in Venezuela; Morales, in Bolivia; Correa, in Ecuador; Lula da Silva and Rousseff, in Brazil; the Kirchners, in Argentina, in addition to those that took place in other countries such as Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay. Countries such as Mexico, Colombia and Peru, in fact, maintained conservative governments.

Despite the diversity of historical experiences in the various countries, it can be said that the new governments sought, under the implementation of various national and social agendas for inclusive development, to achieve some margin for the reform of the neoliberal order. However, after the 2008 global economic and financial crisis and the end of the "commodities cycle", this change in the correlation of forces, expressed in the "left turn" of the first decade of 2000, gave way under the pressure of the dominant classes, which they judged the political-economic model of support for these progressive governments to be exhausted.

Such pressure culminated in a political scenario marked by facts such as the dismissal of the representatives of Honduras (2009), Paraguay (2012), Brazil (2016) and Bolivia (2019), the acute crisis in Venezuela, and Macri's electoral victories in Argentina (2015), Moreno, Ecuador (2017), Piñera, Chile (2018), Bolsonaro, Brazil (2019) and Lacalle Pou (2020), Uruguay. Thus, through a "turn to the right", the conservative neoliberal ideology has regained momentum, especially with regard to the need for new adjustment measures and liberalizing structural reforms, the result of which has resulted in greater economic and financial opening, greater concentration income, increased poverty, unemployment, precarious work and basic public services, among other factors that, on the whole, would worsen due to the outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic.

On the other hand, the victories, in the left field, of López Obrador, in Mexico (2018), of Alvarado, in Costa Rica (2018), of Fernández, in Argentina (2019), of Cortizo, in Panama (2019) and, recently, from Arce, Bolivia (2020), as well as the Maduro government's resilience in Venezuela in the face of political offensives and economic sanctions imposed by the United States and its national allies to change government, fundamentally demonstrate the difficulty that conservative neoliberal projects present in making themselves electorally viable in front of the popular masses, and that prevents the cycle of popular and progressive governments in the continent from being ended.

Likewise, the uprisings and popular demonstrations that hit Ecuador, Chile and Colombia, between the months of October and December 2019, and which had as a corollary, in the Chilean case, the victory of the "Apruebo" option for the convening of a Convention Constitutional Framework for the drafting of a new Constitution, also contribute to establishing such an

understanding. Finally, in addition to the presidential elections, municipal elections also serve as a political barometer in several countries. For example, in the Brazilian case, in the municipal elections of November 2020, there was a recovery of the traditional center-right - whose votes, in the 2018 elections, were absorbed by Bolsonarism -, as well as new leaders of the left, such as Boulos and D'Ávila, from alternative parties to the Workers' Party - of former President Lula - emerged.

In this context, the expressive defeat of Bolsonaro's candidates in the municipal elections, as well as the recent annulment of Lula's condemnations by the Supreme Federal Court - which makes the former president eligible for the 2022 election -, seem to signal difficulties for a Bolsonaro's eventual re-election, which is expected to bear the political consequences of an unprecedented health crisis.

The year 2021 will also be marked, as stated at the beginning of this text, by the presidential electoral disputes in Ecuador, Peru, Nicaragua, Chile and Honduras. In the Chilean case, there is also the peculiarity of regional and municipal elections, in addition to that relating to the members of the Constituent Convention, which will have nine months to draft the new constitutional text. In national contexts characterized by severe economic, social and health crises, the dynamics of polarization and fragmentation seem to weaken the electoral strife in these countries. Returning to the case of Chile, for example, the popular uprisings and the constitutional reform process seem to have anticipated the possible end of the period of alternation of the Bachelet-Piñera governments, which have been in force since 2006. The fact is that in the face of the elections scheduled for the month of November this year, it is fragmentation and internal tensions that today characterize the traditional center-right bloc, represented by the *Chile Vamos* alliance, and the left, bloc represented by *Unidad Constituyente*, making it difficult to reach consensus among the main political forces from the country.

In the case of Ecuador, the great dispute is structured between the "correist" left (*Unión por la Esperanza*) and the "anti-correist" center-right (*Creating Opportunities*). With regard to postal services, moving away from the current president Moreno - who came to the presidency as heir to ex-president Correa, but ended up breaking with him -, this block sought, at first, to emulate the Argentine experience and think of a formula to have Correa as vice president, just as Fernández de Kirchner did on the ticket with Alberto Fernández.

However, due to his conviction for corruption, his example was Morales, who was also unable to run, and who supported his party's candidate (*Movimiento al Socialismo*), the current president Arce, who was a winner. In the February 2016 electoral dispute, racist candidate Arauz won more than

30% of the vote, facing the candidate of a fragmented center-right - with more than fifteen candidates for the presidency -, banker Lasso, who won around the 19% of the preference - having obtained the support of a historical force in the country, the Social Cristiano Party -. The second round of the presidential elections in Ecuador will be held on April 11, the date on which the presidential elections will also be held in Peru. But the coincidences between both countries do not stop there. Peru, which has been facing turbulent times with conservative governments since 2016, and which had two presidents overthrown in late 2020, also faces a polarization between the extreme right, with the candidacy of Aliaga (*Renovación Popular*) and the field of progressivism, which has Mendonza (*Juntos por el Perú*) among its most outstanding candidates, as well as a high fragmentation among political forces, reflected in the more than twenty competing presidential slates.

Finally, in Central America, there are also the cases of Honduras and Nicaragua, which will also face presidential elections this year. Honduras, a country that has been polarized since Zelaya was overthrown in 2009, had primary and internal elections in March, marked by fragmentation and competition from conservative National and Liberal parties, which chose Asfura (with more than 72% of the votes) and Rosenthal (with more). 54% of the votes), as the favorites to contest for the said parties, respectively, the presidential elections of the month of November. The left field is represented by the alliance *Libertad y Refundación (Libre)*, which had the wife of former President Zelaya, Xiomara Castro, as the main candidate, with almost 80% of the valid votes. Certainly, in the current context of a strong crisis in the country, the National governing party will have to work hard to impose itself on a progressivism that has been strengthening. In the case of Nicaragua, there is still uncertainty as to whether current President Ortega of the Sandinist Front will run for election in November.

Ortega was the president of Nicaragua between 1985 and 1990 and returned to office in 2006, having been reelected in 2011 and 2016. The opposition, brought together in the *Coalición Nacional*, created in January 2020, and integrated by the *Unidad Nacional Azul y Blanco*, the *Movimiento Campesino* and four other political parties, have already had their first casualty. Still in 2020, *Alianza Cívica por la Justicia y la Democracia* ended up leaving the opposition front, highlighting the difficulties of achieving its unity in the face of the presidential dispute, the result of which will be key to the implementation of measures that will make the country overcome the violence and poverty that permeates it.

In short, Latin America is entering the third decade of the 21st century and into a new electoral cycle under the effects of an unprecedented multidimensional crisis, whose specific characteristics can only be defined in

relation to each particular national context. Just as the current phenomena of polarization and fragmentation, which are in fact seen in the political scene of most countries in the region can be better explained by adopting a broader historical perspective of the political processes that have been taking place in the region, the possibilities of a resumption of the forces of the left, in this new decade, they appear as a possible horizon in face of, to a great extent, the limitations that the conservative responses to the crisis, and to the popular demands in general, have been revealing.

PARTNERS

NERINT

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) was the first Centre in Southern Brazil to focus its study and research exclusively on the field of International Relations. It was established in 1999 at the Latin American Advanced Studies Institute (ILEA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) in Porto Alegre, Brazil, and is currently part of the university's Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV). Its objective has always been the critical and innovative study of the international system's transformations after the end of the Cold War, from the perspective of the developing world. In parallel, NERINT has also sought to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options for the autonomous international insertion of the country.

The exploratory studies developed by NERINT on the new emerging countries since the threshold of the 21st century experienced remarkable expansion. Cooperation with state, business, academic and social institutions was intensified, as well as the direct contact with centres in Latin America, Africa and Asia, in addition to the existing ones in Europe and North America. An outcome of the Centre's activity was the creation of an undergraduate course in International Relations (2004) and a Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI, 2010). Two journals were also created: the bilingual and biannual *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* and the bimonthly journal *Conjuntura Austral*. In addition, since 2016, NERINT offers a bilingual Research Bulletin, published by graduate and undergraduate students and researchers of the Centre. NERINT is also partnered with UFRGS's Doctoral Program in Political Science (PPGPOL), established in 1973. Thus, besides the advanced research and intense editorial activities, NERINT is also the birthplace of innovative undergraduate and graduate programs.

PPGEEI

The Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) started in 2010, offering Master's and Doctorate degrees, both supported by qualified professors and researchers with international experience. It is the result of several developments on research and education at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Its roots can be traced to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT), established in 1999, established in 1999 and now affiliated with the Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV) at UFRGS.

The research tradition that gave rise to PPGEEI was based on a prospective analysis of the trends of the 1990s. The remarkable expansion of Brazilian diplomacy and economics from the beginning of the century confirmed the perspective adopted, which allowed the intense cooperation with the diplomatic and international economic organizations in Brazil. The Program is already a reference in the strategic analysis of the integration of emerging powers in international and South-South relations.

The Program's vision emphasizes strategic, theoretical and applied methods, always relying on rigorous scientific and academic principles to do so. For this reason, it has been approached by students from all over Brazil and several other countries, and it has established partnerships in all continents. Thus, PPGEEI is a program focused on understanding the rapid changes within the international system. Alongside NERINT, it publishes two journals: *Conjuntura Austral* (bimonthly) and *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* (biannual and bilingual). PPGEEI has three research lines:

International Political Economy

It focuses on the international insertion of the Brazilian economy and other major developing countries in South America, Asia and Africa; discusses the characteristics and effects of globalization; and develops comparative and sectoral studies concerned with the effects of the internationalization of companies and productive sectors. Special attention is paid to international financial crises and its effects on Brazil and other countries of the South.

International Politics

It emphasizes the analysis of the process of formation, implementation and evaluation of foreign policy. It seeks to confront patterns of international integration of strategic countries in South America, Africa and Asia, considering institutional patterns, trade policy, structures of intermediation of interest, governance, International Law and the role of actors of civil society in the South-South axis of contemporary International Relations.

International Security

It approaches the defense, strategy and security issues in the international

system from a perspective that takes into account the most powerful states at the global level, but systematically introduces the question of the regional balances of power, the South-South axis, the existence of regional security complexes, military issues and the impact of information technology in the Digital Age.

CEGOV

The Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV) located at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) develops studies and research projects on governmental affairs from a comparative perspective. The Centre gathers researchers from several departments of the University, such as Political Science, International Relations, Law, Economics, Administration, Education, Urbanism and Computer Science. It encompasses scholars from the most traditional research groups at UFRGS, such as NERINT and CEBRAFRICA, specialised in a broad range of public policy areas.

CEGOV is chaired by a Director, and its policies and priorities are determined by an Advisory Board and a Scientific Board. The activities of the Centre are undertaken by working groups, which take the responsibility for specific projects. Currently, CEGOV has eight fully established and operating working groups. The Centre's researchers work on multidisciplinary projects covering the fields of international politics and governance, monitoring and evaluation of public policies, institutional development, Brazilian and South-American economy, comparative institutional design and decision-making processes, as well as public management, democratic controls and decentralisation of public services.

The Centre is a place for interaction among scholars from UFRGS and other academic institutions, highlighting its multidisciplinary and open nature, as well as its vocation to collaborative applied research. Being a reference for research on comparative governmental studies, CEGOV offers a wide range of extracurricular activities such as extension and specialisation courses, and advisory activities.

CEBRAFRICA

The Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) has its origins in the Center of Studies Brazil-South Africa (CESUL), a program established in 2005 through an association between the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG) of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its research activities are developed

in cooperation with the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT).

In March 2012, CESUL was expanded into CEBRAFRICA. At the same time, the South African series, which published five books, was transformed into the African Series, with new titles. The Centre's main objectives remain the same as before: to conduct research, support the development of memoirs, thesis and undergraduate works, congregate research groups on Africa, organize seminars, promote student and professor exchanges with other institutions, establish research networks and joint projects with African and Africanist institutions, publish national and translated works on the field, and expand the specialized library made available by FUNAG.

The numerous research themes seek to increase knowledge of the African continent and its relations with Brazil on the following topics: International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations, and Schools of Thought. CEBRAFRICA counts among its partners renowned institutions from Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Senegal, Cape Verde, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Portugal, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, India, and China. Current researches focuses on "Brazilian, Chinese, and Indian Presence in Africa", "Africa in South-South Cooperation", "African Conflicts", "Integration and Development in Africa", "African Relations with Great Powers", and "Inter-African Relations".

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2. The research articles must contain a maximum of 12 thousand words;
3. The footnotes should be of complementary nature;
4. The bibliography must follow the rules of the Chicago system (Author-date or note-bibliography), specifying the used literature at the end of the text;
5. Contributions must be original and unpublished, and can be submitted in Portuguese, English or Spanish;
6. Contributions must contain the full name of the author, their titles, institutional affiliation (the full name of the institution) and an e-mail address for contact;
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8. Contributions from undergraduate or graduate students are allowed, as long as in partnership with a Professor or PhD, which will appear as the main author of the paper;
9. Manuscripts from only one author must be written by a Professor or PhD;
10. There is a limit of three (3) authors per article;
11. Contributions must be accompanied of: three keywords in Portuguese or Spanish and three keywords in English; title in English and in Portuguese or Spanish; abstract in English and in Portuguese or Spanish, both with up to 100 words.
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As part of the submission process, authors are required to check off their submission's compliance with all of the following items, and submissions may be returned to authors that do not adhere to these guidelines.

1. Contributions must be original, and shall not have been submitted for publication in another journal; otherwise, it must be justified in "Comments to the Editor".
2. Submitted files must be in Microsoft Word, OpenOffice or RTF (as long as their size is up to 2MB) format.
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5. The text must follow patterns of style and bibliographical requirements described in the About the Journal section.
6. The identification of authorship of the work must be removed from the file and the Properties option in Word, thus ensuring the confidentiality criteria of the journal, accordingly with available instructions in the website.

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