# AUSTRAL

Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
Revista Brasileira de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais

NERINT
Núcleo Brasileiro de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais
- Centro de Estudos Internacionais sobre Governo (CEGOV)

UFRGS
UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL
DO RIO GRANDE DO SUL

PPGEEI-UFRGS
Programa de Pós-Graduação em
Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais
Faculdade de Ciências
Econômicas (FCE)

About the Journal

AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations was the first Brazilian journal in the area of International Relations to be fully published in English (2012). It is an essentially academic vehicle, linked to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Its pluralist focus aims to contribute to the debate on the international political and economic order from the perspective of the developing world.

The journal publishes original articles in the area of Strategy Studies and International Relations, with special interest in issues related to developing countries and South-South Cooperation – its security problems; the political, economic and diplomatic developments of emerging countries; and their relations with the traditional powers. AUSTRAL is published semi-annually in English and Portuguese. The journal's target audience consists of researchers, experts, diplomats, military personnel and graduate students of International Relations. The content of the journal consists ensure the publication of authors from each of the great continents of the South: Asia, Latin America and Africa. Thus, the debate and diffusion of knowledge produced in these regions is stimulated. All contributions submitted to AUSTRAL are subject to rigorous scientific evaluation.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

2020 was a completely atypical year in international relations, in which a unique situation unveiled and accelerated an ongoing structural change. This twofold reality is expressed in the 18th edition of *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* in a Dossier on *The World-System: Theory and Geopolitics*, preceded by a set of reflections written by experts, the *Post-Trump Diplomacy Outlook*. The latter is part of a new regular segment of *Austral*, entitled *NERINT Strategic Analysis.*

It contains brief analyses on current and relevant international events, not addressed in the articles, and written by experts. Two analyses address issues from the Russian "near abroad": the geopolitics underlying Belarus' tumultuous elections and the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. The third note addresses the Strategic Lessons of World War II on its 75th anniversary, establishing links with current developments in the international scene.

The multiple crises that have tensioned the world-system for over a decade, originated with the subprime crisis and developments such as the Arab Spring and the Sino American rivalry, were intensified by Donald Trump's critical stance towards globalisation and overflowed by the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Thus, the Dossier analyses the evolution of the world-system, its theorists, the role of the BRICS, the relationship between Geopolitics and Law and, finally, the alternation between the United States and China at the systemic level.

The Articles section addresses new thematic areas, such as the Jihad gender issue, problems linked to state building in Timor, maritime insecurity in the South Atlantic (from an African perspective), the role of drones for American Grand Strategy, and South American competitive-cooperative triangular relations. Finally, another non-regular segment, *Diplomatic Testimony,* brings a report by the renowned Ambassador Pedro Motta Pinto Coelho on two cases of Brazilian multilateral diplomacy: trade and disarmament.

The geographical scope of authors continues to expand, with scholarly contributions from Angola, New Zealand, Nigeria, Malaysia and Indonesia, in addition to academics from several universities in Brazil. 2020 was a particularly difficult year, with closed institutions and dispersed research

groups working remotely. In this sense, we would like to thank the authors, peer reviewers and the entire team of researchers working at the *Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT)* and *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*, for collaborating so that the journal maintained its periodicity and even expanded in quality. In 2021, Austral enters its tenth year, with a renewed editorial project.

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Disclaimer: *AUSTRAL prioritises British English as the standard variety of the English written language. Some English translations, however, may by written under the American English dialect.*

POST-TRUMP DIPLOMACY OUTLOOK

The electoral defeat of Republican candidate Donald Trump and the return to power of the Democrats with Joseph Biden cannot be left unexamined, considering its implications for international relations. Here we present notes from *NERINT Strategic Analysis*, written by experts and divided into thematic issues and bilateral relations between the United States and the most relevant nations at the global level.

The Brazil-US Agenda in Joe Biden's Era

Eurico de Lima Figueiredo[1]

It already has been said, albeit in a blague tone, regarding subsequent United States governments, that the best Republican who takes office is a Democrat, while the best Democrat is a Republican. Donald Trump had brought novelties to the American political process. Negative ones, from a democratic point of view. He proved to be a manipulator of public opinion, encouraged the activities of the "digital militias", created factoids, and made use of an old device of the enemies of democracy, fake news. He led the country into the post-truth era. According to The Washington Post, it took him just over 1,200 days to hit the 20,000 mark of false or misleading statements. *Trump in power was not a Republican, he was Trump.* He unveiled, in the US, a new way of governing and found wide acceptance in vast segments of the country's electorate. In his country, he encouraged radicalization and polarization as a means of achieving constant preeminence. It wasn't quite "America first". It was "Trump first". He was not reelected. But he was endorsed by almost 74 million Americans.

The victory of Joe Biden - a politician with a long political career (more than half a century) - puts the American political process back on track. He will be a democrat with social concerns and will seek to ease the political tensions inherited from the previous government. Internally, at least in the first year, it will inherit serious economic problems, largely caused by the new coronavirus. The United States' Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expected

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to contract around 4.3% in 2020, while the unemployment rate may increase to something close to 7.5%. On the other hand, COVID's virulence, denied by the former president, devastated society, with more than 260,000 fatal cases. In the opposite direction, China is expected to register a growth of 1.9% in 2020 according to IMF projections. There, the public health crisis, if not eradicated, is now under control. The centralizing state has imposed firm containment policies based on strict confinement and large-scale detection tests, constantly monitoring new outbreaks. In 2021, it is expected to expand its global presence, in light of a 4.4% drop in the global economy, according to IMF estimates. China knows what it wants from Brazil, but there is no similar evidence from the Brazilian foreign policy towards China..

During Joe Biden's presidency, South America will increasingly be Latin America. This means that instruments created in the last decade of the century, such as UNASUR and its Defense Council, will continue to have a negative reception in American foreign policy. It is necessary to consider, in a due account, a probable line of action by the US State Department to make its operations in the region as a whole more flexible, but in favor, as always, of its national objectives and interests. Regarding Venezuela, for example, Trump's strong stance of force should not be repeated. The latter, at the beginning of last year, said that he did not rule out the possibility of military intervention in Venezuela. Previously, he had recognized the opponent of Nicolás Maduro's government, Juan Guaidó, as legitimate President, although he had not presented any legal basis for his understanding. It cannot be forgotten, however, that Biden was the vice president of Barack Obama who, in 2015, issued a presidential decree classifying Venezuela as a threat to the national security of the United States, imposing severe economic and financial sanctions on that country.

Concerning Brazil, what to expect from Biden? Certainly, he will not have, at least in the beginning, political sympathy for the Bolsonaro government. After all, Bolsonaro never hid his preference for Biden's opponent. Bolsonaro's diplomacy practiced a policy aligned with the administration of Donald Trump. After the election results, he did not recognize Biden's victory in the presidential race. During the election campaign, on a debate on TV, the Democratic candidate proposed a $ 20 billion fund for the Amazon so that Brazil could tackle the environmental issue. Then, he added, brandishing the "stick policy" that, if the offer was not accepted, the country could suffer significant economic consequences. The statement prompted President Bolsonaro to respond, stating that "when the spittle runs out, gunpowder is needed, otherwise it won't work". His speech, in itself unusual, was equally paradoxical, insofar as Brazilian diplomacy practiced, during the Trump

administration, a foreign policy subservient to the guidelines of American foreign policy.

All of these obstacles must be put into perspective, however, given the long-term American objectives and interests in Brazil. During the Trump administration, Brazil accepted the ethanol quota, agreed with the surcharge on Brazilian products such as steel, and Brazilian exports to the United States fell. The agreement that provides for the US to use the Alcântara Launch Center, in Maranhão, could lead Brazil to lose the right to access parts of its territory, without receiving technology transfer and, even, threatening the Brazilian aerospace project in search for its technological competence. Biden will most likely sustain these gains and seek others. Nevertheless, the biggest stakes in play involve the so-called 5G technology. The dispute will result in the largest auction held in Brazil and one of the largest in the world. Amid the fierce trade war between the United States and China, Biden will be similar to Trump. He will put pressures on Brazil to ban the participation of Chinese Huawei, which will not be passively accepted by China, Brazil's largest trading partner nowadays. It will be a quarrelsome decision. Perhaps, apart from personal preferences, the identification with the United States and of its Larin America policy will prevail, and not merely to one specific President.

Brazil/United States agenda will change in order to, mostly, remain the same.

Security & Defense Challenges: Estimating Relevant Topics for Biden's Administration[2]

Eduardo Xavier Ferreira Glaser Migon[3]

After the polls were closed, voters chose Democrat Joseph Robinette "Joe" Biden Jr. as the President of the United States of America (USA). Therefore, and in the specific interest of this brief reflection, new possibilities for the Security & Defense (S&D) agenda are opened, as a consequence of both being a new administration and, additionally, a party alternation. Naturally, the theme attracts worldwide attention, given the relevance of the US as a

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2 This analysis refers to personal understanding, expressing views and opinions on the topic, which are independent of the positioning of any institutions and/or instances to which the author is formally linked or informally associated. The data used is entirely in the public domain.

3 Ph.D. in Administration from the Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) and Military Sciences from the Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército (ECEME).

military power with influence in a wide range of geographical areas and an extensive list of critical themes.

At the outset, it is worth highlighting the experience of the new president with the theme of S&D. He is a politician with a long history in the federal Senate, where he was a member and chaired, for many years, the Foreign Relations Committee. He also served as Vice President during the Obama administration (2008-2016), a period in which he had access to the immense range of S&D information made available by agencies that ensure the situational awareness of the "leader of the free world", such as the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, etc.

Given the political elements and personal trajectory summarized above, it is estimated that the United States S&D agenda will evolve under new shapes, balancing classic and traditional aspects with elements from Joe Biden's worldview. An important element to be considered, and still pending, is concerning the Democratic Party's ability to obtain a majority in the Senate, with repercussions on the construction of the president-elect's political agenda, which will depend on greater or lesser articulation. Greater freedom of action tends to allow for more innovation, in addition to bringing the final results closer to the presidential intention. On the other hand, less freedom of action tends to keep the agenda closer to the consensus and traditional positions, making the adherence of the concrete agenda to the Democratic candidate's electoral proposals less intense.

Based on a multilateralist view, it is estimated that there will be greater US presence among organizations interested in the international S&D agenda. In this sense, traditional allies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), tend to resume their roles and relevance, as well as a greater presence within the United Nations, influencing and, if necessary, vetoing themes on the S&D global development agenda.

In addition to the traditional issues associated with areas of international friction, such as tensions in the Middle East or the Korean peninsula, it is estimated that issues arising from the international (re)balance of power, whose center of gravity will be necessary for the future, absorb the emergence of China and, also, the (re)emergence of Russia as S&D actors with global interests. These are dynamics that tend to expand contacts and polarize positions in areas such as Alaska and the Arctic Ocean, Taiwan and the Pacific Ocean, India and the Indian Ocean, and the Balkans, for example.

The technological race, as well as the strategies associated with the new battle domains, also tend to have a greater presence on the S&D agenda. The maintenance of supremacy that is often evidenced by the United States

concerning space, cyberspace, and the mastery of critical technologies will be subject to competition and to continuously high costs. Nanotechnology, Quantum, Artificial Intelligence, Biotechnologies, military use of space, etc., are examples of the multiplicity of technologies that suggest growing challenges for a nation that wants to remain at the technological top.

The new challenges for US S&D are likely to coexist with traditional elements, of which at least two stand out. International terrorism tends to remain an important aspect for American actions, that is, they will continue to influence and demand critical aspects such as the nature and dimension of the Armed Forces, development and allocation of intelligence systems, deployment of means in areas specific to the terrain, etc. Budget constraints are another element of probable continuity, that is, the new management tends to have its agenda shaped, in this case in a restrictive way, by the difficulties associated with the high costs of adopting S&D policies and strategies in parallel with the growing demands of other public policies within the context of the national budget.

Finally, it is worth noting the emergence of the environmental agenda, which includes the agenda associated with climate change. Far long ago, great powers have incorporated these elements into their respective analyzes of power, freedom of action, and interest in national security. Biopiracy, air or marine pollution, predatory exploitation of natural resources, greenhouse effect, etc., are elements of specific interest to diplomats and military personnel in a wide range of reference countries, including the United States under Biden.

Predicting the future is impossible. Defining scenarios and estimating future possibilities is, on the other hand, inherent to political and strategic analysis, being a critical aspect for any planning or estimation in S&D. This brief reflection is a endeavour that only aims to signal initial and preliminary focus of attention, and perhaps, who knows, contribute to the construction of new research agendas.

Will There Be a New Post-Trump American Diplomacy?

Paulo Fagundes Visentini[4]

Donald Trump's election was surprising and his international

4 Full Professor, CNPq (*Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico*) Researcher and Coordinator of the Brazilian Center for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) at UFRGS.

performance was disconcerting, provoking criticism from some and silence from others. He won against the Democrats, the media, the military and even the establishment of his own party, with his reckless entrepreneurial and adventurous instinct. As André Araújo predicted at the beginning of his term, "Donald Trump is a point outside the curve, [...] he is not part of the establishment, [...] he has no experience or political intelligence, [and] will cause a lot of confusion. [...] However, he exists for a concrete reason. Globalization has brought benefits to one social layer in the US and immense losses to another. Contrary to what the Washington Consensus preached, globalization is an unbalanced and inefficient process. [...] Trump is the result of the end of a dream, but not the solution to relive it".

Determined to retrieve American economic primacy, he ran over International Organizations and his own allies, confronted Russia and China, abandoned multilateral agreements and engaged in an unusual diplomacy in the Middle East. The nation that drove globalization was ruled for four years by an opponent of globalization, elected by the Americans who were victims of its negative effects. Also according to Araújo, "Trump may fail, but the causes that elected him remain latent and will be difficult to resolve. [...] Each country and region will react in a certain way. If it is possible to see any positive outcome, it would be the slight disruption of the financial and commercial globalization that is suffocating the world, to throw cold water on the politically correct movements that are annoying the planet, to dismantle a suffocating bureaucracy that is paralyzing world growth [...], NGOs, cooperation agreements, endless and illogical compliances [...] that hinder companies and citizens without minimally disturbing traffickers, criminals and terrorists. Trump is a kind of insecticide, which will panic the anthill until it stops or depletes its energy. A historic accident like so many others"[5].

However, Biden's victory will most likely bring more changes in form than in content. The structural problems of the US are severe and a basic duality plays an essential role which is increasingly difficult to reconcile: the country is both a national state and the heart of the world system. They continue to maintain a significant advantage over their rival allies and still maintain the strategic initiative, despite their relative decline. The key to the problem, however, lies in the US itself, which "will not be able to maintain the necessary degree of global involvement to preserve its global role and its security and external defense without a deep internal economic adjustment" that will allow them to restore their competitiveness. But they will not be able to adjust the domestic economy without maintaining the international

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5 Araújo, André. 2017. "Trump em 200 anos de História". In. *Solidariedade Ibero-Americana*. Rio de Janeiro: MSI, p.9.

involvement necessary to obtain external resources, "and without contributing to the construction of an international order whose degree of consensuality guarantees a leadership that is inversely proportional to the amount of strength that it needs to be maintained"[6].

There is a traditional debate about the American decline, contrasting the *declinists* and the *renewalists*. The former, having in Paul Kennedy (*The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*) their greatest exponent, argue that the country has reached its maturity point and now needs to find a place in the international order that implies sharing responsibilities with other great powers. Conversely, for Samuel Huntington and Joseph Nye, the country would be undergoing a renewal, and the end of the Cold War would make way for a new American hegemony. Thus, there would be no country capable of challenging the US for a long time.

The difference between the Democrats' *global* strategy and the Republicans' *international* strategy also matters. The former are more prone to multilateralism and often attribute to the US a *leadership* role, which manages a code of values and conduct that the country seeks to affirm upon the world, relying on international organizations and elements of the so-called soft power. Thus, such a view implies global interference and permanent monitoring, as the US would be the *center of a global system.* The second, when considering their country as the greatest power, tends to perceive them as a sort of *commander in chief.* Preferring bilateral relations, in which the American nation would always be the strongest side, the Republicans prefer not to organize the world as much, but to exercise their power with force whenever necessary - a world that could even be more plural than the one conceived by the Democrats. In this sense, traditional *hard power* politics would be employed more systematically by Democrats and more *ad hoc* by Republicans. But, ultimately, the two parties advocate for *America First.*

The style of the Trump administration, however, can mislead the analyst. As the cases in the Middle East and North Korea demonstrate, he considers military involvement to be a burden and has been in conflict with the Pentagon and the intelligence services, as he does not represent traditional Republican thinking. If Obama was more socially oriented at home, from a military perspective he and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton were very proactive. Thus, the economic and commercial interests defended by Trump will still be maintained and securityshould also gain equivalent priority. Moreover, the international cleavages caused by his administration are being aggravated by the multiple effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, whose outcomes

6 Albuquerque, José Guilhon. 1993. "Bill Clinton: um presidente para que século?". In. *Política Externa*. Vol 1, no 4. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, p. 83.

are not yet clearly defined. There is room for the resumption ofprevious paradigms, such as the socially oriented domestic model, but in general global power competition should continue, perhaps even more assertively. In addition, the new government will have to balance contradictory claims from the Democratic left wing with demands from Wall Street and the Pentagon, in addition to calming the defeated side.

The US Electoral System

Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo[7]

On November 7th, 2020, Joe Biden made his first speech after being proclaimed by the media President elect of the United States (US). Compared to other countries that officially announce the winner directly, this part of the process takes longer. First, local governments need to certify the winner, accordingly to their own rules and schedules. Following, the Electoral College voting takes place in December and only on January 6th, 2021, the House of Representatives confirms the results. From election day on November 3rd, till the new President´s installment on January 20th, more than two months elapsed.

These phases represent the peculiarities of the US electoral system established by the 1787 Constitution. In place since 1789, and completed by the first ten amendments in 1791, this Constitution had proven to be resilient. The US defines itself as an "institutional endeavor" based on two elements: the 1776 Declaration of Independence and the already mentioned Constitution[8], elaborated by the founding fathers and framers. As members of the agrarian elites in the US, names such as Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, Thomas Paine, and George Washington, the first President, built a framework that is still an effective to promote the organization of domestic politics sustained on the principles of clashes and elitization.

The principles of clashes are represented by the sharing of responsibilities between the federal and local governments. It allows the attribution of decision making powers and autonomy to local governments vis a vis the State (the so-called Union as defined in these documents) and

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8 The classical book to study the US Constitution is *The Federalist Papers* (signed by *Publius* but authored by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison).

leads to the overlapping of tasks of the Executive and Legislative powers, as the Judiciary acts as the middle range power. Inspired by Montesquieu´s separation of powers in *The Spirit of the Laws*, this institutional arrangement reinforces the checks and balances and mixed government with shared powers principles.

Functionally, this should lead to the permeability and transparency of the system and its accountability. Not so functionally, it brings the Executive and Legislative into a permanent struggle, and generates two realities: a deadlock, when the Executive and Legislative are not controlled by the same party and the need to make the government viable through unilateral actions (Executive Orders that allow the President to make laws). But is the system really permeable and transparent?

The elitization of the system shows just the opposite due to the constitutional filters. The reason for the creation of these filters was to prevent the imbalance of forces, that Tocqueville defines in *Democracy in America* as the tyranny of the majority. The most significant one is the Electoral College, that represents the indirect election for the presidency. It functions based on a "top-bottom" mechanism (and one should not forget that the Constitution defines it as "a process not a place"): the population casts its votes and the winner in each local state gains all the electoral votes of that state. The total of electoral votes is 538, and 270 are needed to win: it does not matter if a candidate has the majority of popular votes, only if this candidate gains more Electoral College votes (nowadays, only Nebraska and Maine share votes amongst the two first candidates, following district lines voting).

The number of votes of each state is proportionally defined by its total population. Since the early days of the Electoral College this distribution was imbalanced: in the 18th century the populational census took into consideration for this allocation the total amount of a state´s population, even if it was composed by non-voting citizens (such as slaves and women). These imbalances are long standing, as adjustments in the amount of Electoral College votes are only updated from 10-to-10 years, considering the census. For the 2020 election, for instance, the 2010 census was still the reference. Agrarian, conservative, white, low-density population states were allowed the same number of votes. On the other hand, states that are composed of a majority of urban, suburban, secular and multiracial voters are underrepresented.

Accordingly, to *Fair Vote*[9] data mentioning the extreme poles of over

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9 Fair Vote defines itself as a civil, non-partisan organization in its website, that dates back to 1992. Some of its main donors are: The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Laura and John Arnold Foundation and The Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Data available at: https://www.

and under representation: 1 electoral vote in Wyoming (that has the total of 3 electoral votes) accounts for more than 318% that it should, 1 vote for around 180 thousand people. In California (55 electoral votes), the representation deficit accounts for 85% of the population, 1 electoral vote for over 670 thousand electors.

Another distortion present in the US voting system is represented by the distribution of district votes, inside states, that affects both presidential and legislative elections. In the US, the voting system is defined by districts, which means that candidates for elective positions such as in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, compete in a neighborhood election. Therefore, elections take place in each neighborhood, based on a closed list of candidates and not all candidates against each other. The redesign of districts, in a process called gerrymandering, tends to promote the unification of high-density populational neighborhoods, which cuts their number of representatives in comparison to agrarian areas, leading to the decrease of relative weight of the electorate that represents the majority of the population in the US: urban, suburban, multiracial and secular as mentioned.

This process also makes it more difficult to vote in person, since it concentrates a lot of electors in one same district. The results are long lines that can take hours: one should be reminded that in the US voting is not mandatory, election day is not a holiday, and the wages are paid by the hour, and employers can discount non-worked hours that harms the lower classes that are paid the minimum wage (U$ 6/hour). These challenges are prompting an enlargement of civil society movements to ensure the right to vote, facilitating the access to electoral registration and voting.

In the 21st century, these distortions led to two presidential elections that had different results in the Electoral College and the popular vote: 2000 (Al Gore X George W. Bush) and 2016 (Hillary Clinton X Donald Trump). Before that, the distortion only had happened in three opportunities, 1824, 1876 and 1888, and not once in the 20th century. The Republican winners of these elections in the Electoral College, W. Bush and Trump, benefited from the mentioned social-economic and political-cultural imbalances. Why not change? But, mainly, is there a will to change?

Pew Research data[10] shows that 81% of registered Democrat Party

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fairvote.org/population_vs_electoral_votes. Access November 12, 2020.

10 Daniller, Andrew. 2020. "A majority of Americans continue to favor replacing Electoral College with a nationwide popular vote". Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/03/13/a-majority-of-americans-continue-to-favor-replacing-electoral-college-with-a-nationwide-popular-vote/. Access: August 05, 2020. Pew Research was created in 2004 and its origins date back to the 1990. It is supported financially by the Pew Charitable Trusts that

voters are in favor of change, and the dismissal of the Electoral College, whereas only 32% of Republicans support it. For traditional Republican and Democrat Parties, the update of the College system can mean the loss of control of the political system, allowing the emergence of other parties. In 2020, Jo Jorgensen, the candidate for the Libertarian Party, finished in third place in the majority of states, but will gain no votes in the Electoral College.

However, one cannot underestimate the growth of the will for change, as a result of the transformations in race, gender and class, and the National Popular Vote Interestate Compact Initiative must be mentioned. The NPV goal is to ensure that the popular vote counts, terminating the Electoral College. In order to achieve this, a constitutional change is necessary, and to make the proposal possible for the Legislative, it needs the support of 270 electoral votes. The NPV Initiative debates date back to the 2000s, sponsored by democratic states governments. Since 2006 it was officialized and it gained strength after 2016. Until the 2020 elections in November, the NPV Initiative already accounted for 196 electoral votes, and several states that were not included in this total yet, proposed local referendums to voters to analyze the proposal (still pending definite results due to local counts and legislations).

It is possible that the results of these referendums may allow the proposal to be already forwarded to Congress in 2021. The Democrat victory can lessen this desire for change? Will the balance of forces in the House of Representatives (Democrat majority) and in the Senate (undefined till January 2021) block this initiative? How can disputes between parties and inside parties affect this dynamic? For the following years, these are lingering questions.

China: Between Engagement and War

José Miguel Quedi Martins[11]
Athos Munhoz Moreira da Silva[12]

Interactions between the US and China are 236 years old (1784-2020). Throughout this period, the time interval in which there was animosity between them is of 21 years (1950-1971). The reciprocal influence between the US and China conditioned the territorial formation of the US - it was decisive

collects donations from private enterprises and individuals.

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12 PhD Candidate in Strategic Studies (PPGEEI-UFRGS).

for the US to extend its presence on the Pacific Coast[13]. Together, since the 19th century, they created the conditions for the displacement of the world center of gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific[14]. But, in addition to their reciprocal influence, China and the US have decisively influenced universal history. The United States entered World War II only because of its support for China in the Second Sino-Japanese War. In short, China was the reason the United States was involved in the greatest military conflagration in history.

On the other hand, when the US found itself engaged in the "confrontation for global predominance"[15] against the USSR, it was the alliance with China that offered them victory. At the end of the Cold War, the United States chose to intensify the transfer of companies and capital to China. After the Wars in the former Yugoslavia (1991-2001), September 11 (2001) came, followed by the invasion of Iraq (2003). Then, US relations with China – cold due to the Tiananmen Incident (1989) and to the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (1999), also heated up at the political level. In fact, China became the guarantor of the American war cycle (2003-2020) in the Middle East, by becoming the main buyer of US Government bonds.

The 2008 crisis occurred in close conjunction with the Surge in Iraq and with the Subprime crisis in the US (2007). China became an exporter of capital, competing not only with Japan, but also with the US. In 2009, Barack Obama assumed the presidency of the United States with a promise to end wars in the Middle East. But then came the Arab Spring (2010) and the "Asia Pivot" (2011). The beginning of the crisis between the US and China occurred when the US announced its "containment" – Obama's "Pivot for Asia" (in a speech in Darwin, Australia, on November 17th, 2011). Although the American president claimed that it was about economic containment, the measures then outlined were of a purely military nature – the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) started to be negotiated in 2008 and signed in 2015, therefore, in spite of the "pivot". As a result of the containment, governments in China and Japan collapsed, putting an end to the projected East Asian Community between China, Japan and South Korea.

China's response was holistic: in 2011, it launched the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), its own version of a (gradualist) free trade agreement, to oppose the TPP. In 2013, it launched the Belt and

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13 Cumings, Bruce. 2009. *Dominion from Sea to Sea:* Pacific Ascendancy and American Power. New Haven: Yale University Press.

14 Marx, Karl. 1850. Deslocamentos do Centro de Gravidade Mundial. Nova Gazeta Renana. *Revista Política e Económica*. n. 2. fev. 1850. Available at: http://www.marxists.org/portugues/marx/1850/02/deslocamento.htm.

15 Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1987. *EUA e URSS:* O Grande Desafio. Rio de Janeiro: Nordica.

Road Initiative (BRI), offering an alternative to the unfulfilled promise of globalization: the effective global circulation of goods. The plan is to unite Eurasia, from Tokyo to Rome. In the same year, China created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), since the Asian Development Bank (ADB) was controlled by the Americans. In the military field, modernization has been considerably accelerated. All the destroyers and aegis cruisers that China now owns (09 Type-52D; 01 Type-55), as well as fifth-generation aircraft carriers and aircraft, were built after the Pivot for Asia. In addition to the new series of medium and regional missiles capable of reaching Japan - Dong Feng DF-16; DF-21C; DF-26 - and moving aircraft carriers - the DF-17; DF-21D; DF-26B.

As a direct result of the "Arab Springs", wars broke out in Syria (2011), Libya (2014) and Yemen (2015) - with varying degrees of US intervention. In 2014, a coup in Ukraine overthrew the pro-Russian government - and, in response, the Russians annexed Crimea (2015). In the same year, they started to intervene in the Civil War in Syria, making it impossible to implement the Pivot in Asia - as will be seen below, eventually Biden will not have to deal with this kind of problem. The cost of military operations was also felt within the US. Between 2011 and 2016, the US economy grew less than 0.7% per year or even shrank (World Bank 2016)[16]. As a result, Obama's candidate Hillary Clinton lost the election to Donald Trump in 2016. At the heart of Trump's proposal was the resumption of economic growth. Once again, the promises were to achieve peace - unlike Obama, Trump did not start any war - and to face the exchange and fiscal deficits. In 1991, the US trade deficit was only US$ 66 billion, compared to the current US$ 729 billion (USA 2020)[17]. To face the trade deficit and resume growth, a plan was proposed to invest one and a half trillion dollars in infrastructure and to re-concentrate the production of goods within the country.

In 2017, the US trade deficit with China was US$ 395 billion[18]. It was then that the Trade War began (2018). Two years later, the Chinese gave in. In January 2020, a preliminary version of the agreement was established, according to which the Chinese pledged to buy US$ 200 billion more in

16 World Bank. 2016, *GDP Growth (annual %) - United States 2011-2016*. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2016&locations=US&start=2011.

17 USA - United States of America. 2020. *US Census. Trade in Goods with World, Seasonally Adjusted 1989-2020*. Available at: https://census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0004.html. Accessed on dec. 16 2020.

18 World Bank. 2017, World Integrated Trade Solutions. *United States Trade Balance, Exports and Imports by country and region 2017*. Available at: https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/USA/Year/2017/TradeFlow/EXPIMP.

American products. In view of the substantial and abrupt reduction, it was an auspicious start - even if it were to be achieved at the expense of Russia and Brazil, which export oil, minerals and agricultural products (at least the first and the latter would be supplied to China by the US). China is Brazil's largest trading partner. In 2019, the total volume of trade was US$ 98.63 billion, with a surplus for Brazil of US$ 28 billion. Total Brazilian exports were US$ 63.35 billion. Soy accounts for US$ 20.46 billion, and oil for US$ 15.48 billion of the total exports to China[19].

Perhaps for negotiation technique, or maybe because he was drunk on success, the fact is that Trump then decided to securitize the Huawei problem. In May 2019, Trump banned the company's operations in the country and issued an executive order for the semiconductor companies to stop supplying them to China - these measures were later postponed. Only 16% of semiconductors used in China are produced in the country, and only half of these are made by Chinese companies. Even with a planned investment in semiconductors totaling US$ 118 billion over five years ("Made in China 2025"), this would mean an abrupt interruption of supply that would put the country's electronics industry at serious risk (Lewis 2019, p. 01-02). The economic pressure was accompanied by the military pressure, so there was a significant increase in the "Freedom of Navigation" (FON) missions in the South China Sea (MSC), and, not rarely, incidents between US and Chinese vessels occurred.

By accusing China of being responsible for the Covid-19 pandemic, Trump opened a path fraught with the most serious consequences. While Democrats have been quick to absolve China and condemn Trump - in an election year - this accusation looms as an asset the president-elect can use if he decides to risk a war with China. In short, the scenario that previously seemed absurd, the two largest economies in the world entering a conflict, became believable, since it now has a causus belli. If Biden succeeds in obtaining a return to the World Health Organization (WHO), to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and to the Paris Agreement, he will have the possibility to manage with China – albeit on a multilateral basis – the fight against the pandemic (Covax), its effects (resuming free trade negotiations), and to raise environmental issues as a reason to promote talks. However, if the Republican majority in the Senate is confirmed - there will be elections in Georgia on January 5th, 2021 - it is possible that these initiatives are blocked.

Most likely, the new US government will use the perverse alternative of the security market reserve. Under the pretext of piracy and espionage,

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19 Brazil. 2019. Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio Exterior. Exportação e Importação Geral 2019. Available at: http://comexstat.mdic.gov.br/pt/geral/24948 .

they may keep the boycott of Chinese technologies. Rather than negotiating tariffs and trade deficits, it is more likely that the US will pressure China on issues such as Hong Kong's autonomy, the treatment of Uighur separatists in Xinjiang and the question of Taiwan's independence. As Biden intends to settle with Iran, it will also be possible for the US to intensify military pressure on China. After all, it will release an entire group of attack aircraft carriers (Carrier Strike Group), which could be moved to East Asia. To this end, the British decision to move a fleet of its newly formed group of aircraft carriers to the Pacific also counts. These two new groups of aircraft carriers may add to what already has a home in Guam, tripling their joint naval aircraft forces in the region. This can, of course, fuel the desires for sovereignty maintained by Tsai Ing-wen - Taiwan's current president. From the above, three scenarios can be inferred.

The best scenario, stemming from Biden's promise of multilateralism, involves the development of a multilateral peace agenda - to deal with the results of the "Springs" in the Middle East; the reconstruction - to cope with the damage caused by the pandemic; and the development – to provide incentives through the multilateral system (World Bank, IMF, WTO) to form customs unions and regional blocs. Together, these initiatives would represent a game with a sum above zero for the US and China, which would have multiplied their possibilities of commercial exchange with third parties. An intermediate scenario, expressing the establishment's victory, would be that of a kind of "Cold War" around the boycott of technology and infrastructure companies, of investment, and the veto in the participation of energy consortia. In this scenario, the Clean Network program is exacerbated as a form of extra-economic coercion to obtain market reserves for the 5G Internet and for products from the Internet of Things (IoT). This may be justified due to possible shocks in the South China Sea.

The worst-case scenario, arising from Taiwan's declaration of independence or its recognition by the US, involves a Local War around the Island. Despite being geographically confined, it will systematically affect International Relations. Even if the worst happens, it is important to remember that the US and China were already at war in Korea and even this conflict did not take away more than two decades of good relations between the countries. These are the two largest economies in the world. It is important for Brazil to maintain a position of neutrality. The US and China will be able to forgive each other, but they will hardly do it with others. Then, to have a broad perspective is important. Eventually, the present crisis relates to a deeper phenomenon, with a change in the system – the type of unity that makes up the International System. In other words, the transition from a

world centered on a single civilization to another, a pluri-civilizational one. And just as American civilization took more than two centuries to reach its peak – to be endowed with sufficient power to generate counterparts – this new period will not be brief, fleeting or peaceful.

Putin's Silence: Speculation and Indifference on US-Russian Relations

Rodrigo Rianhez[20]

There are several speculations regarding the reasons for the delay of Russian President Vladimir Putin in congratulating the Democratic candidate Joe Biden for his victory in the presidential elections of the United States. In the West, particularly in the US, the hypothesis arises, which sometimes flirts with conspiracy theories, that Trump would have deeper relations with the Russian government or that he would depend to some degree on the Russians and their intelligence apparatus. Meanwhile, among the citizens of Russia and even among the country's media, there is a climate of indifference towards the destinies of American politics. Is there a delay on Putin's part in congratulating Biden on his victory?

Moscow attaches little importance to the gesture, or rather, to the lack of a gesture by Vladimir Putin. The press secretary of the Russian presidency, Dmitry Peskov, stressed that the Kremlin is awaiting an official announcement from the American electoral bodies and a resolution of the judicial conflicts raised by Donald Trump during the counting of votes so that the Russian government can enter into contact with the president-elect. Putin himself reinforced these statements, emphasizing that this is a pure protocolar issue[21].

However, some analysts point out that Moscow's reaction has been different, for example, towards President Aleksandr Lukashenko of Belarus. The Kremlin sent a congratulatory telegram the day after the election in the neighboring country, even before the official results were confirmed. Another recent event, however, also served to demonstrate that the Putin government is just being strict with the protocol and does not intend to enter into larger disputes: in Moldova, another country in the Russian sphere of influence, the pro-Kremlin candidate Igor Dodon was defeated at the polls. Moscow did

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20 Historian from Moscow State University.

21 Available at: https://ria.ru/20201122/bayden-1585774360.html

not hesitate to send official congratulations to president-elect Maia Sandu, considered pro-Western, as soon as the official results were announced on November 16th.

Another fact that points to the normality of the situation is the track record of the Russian president concerning previous American elections. Since Putin took command of the Russian Federation in 2000, there have been six presidential elections in the United States. On all these occasions, there was a standard response from the Russian authorities: Vladimir Putin or, between 2008 and 2012, his replacement Dmitri Medvedev, greeted the winning candidate on the day his opponents recognized victory or the following day, without exception. Even in the troubled 2000 election, contested by Al Gore and George W. Bush, Russian officials waited the defeated candidate to concede in order to salute the winner.

There are still other elements that have caused misinterpretations about the stance of the Russians. An interview with the president of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, Ella Pamfilova, sparked speculation in the West. Pamfilova stated that the American postal voting system opens up immense possibilities for fraud and therefore decided not to adopt something similar in Russia[22]. The statements, however, were not made as a representative of the Electoral Commission or the Russian government, as several reports published in Brazil tried to portray[23]. The Russian authorities have not yet officially commented on the matter.

Therefore, we can see that as far as Russia is concerned, whilst the alleged deadlock between Putin and Biden generates great speculation abroad, it is seen as a matter of little relevance by the Russian public. More than once, the Kremlin has emphasized that it is ready to work with whoever is elected to the presidency of the United States, and at no time has the Russian president expressed preferences. On the contrary, he stated directly that he does not see any major differences between American candidates concerning Russia. The same indifference is shown by the Russian population. According to the Levada Center, one of the country's leading research institutes, 65% of the population believes that it does not matter which candidate is elected president of the United States. These data conflict with the previous 2016 election, when 60% of respondents expressed a preference for Donald Trump over Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton[24].

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22   Available   at: https://tass.ru/politika/9945517?utm_source=twitter.com&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=smm _social_share.

23   Available   at: https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/afp/2020/11/09/comissao-eleitoral-russa-questiona-legitimi dade-de-voto-por-correio-nos-eua.htm.

24 Available at: https://www.levada.ru/2020/10/21/predvybornaya-kampaniya-v-ssha/.

These figures reflect the fact that relations between the United States and Russia were not normalized and even worsened during the Trump administration. During the 2016 elections, the Russian media had an exaggerated expectation that Donald Trump would prove to be a potential Russian ally or at least represent an improvement in relations between countries. None of these promises have been kept.

It is not surprising that relations between the Russian Federation and the United States have never been so bad since the Cold War. Trump not only prolonged the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation in 2014, when the Russians took over the Crimean peninsula, but also set new sanctions in retaliation for the attempted assassination of double agent Sergey Skrypal in 2018 in the UK. New sanctions continue to be imposed by Americans until recently, as at the end of September this year. Between June 2017 and September 2020, the Donald Trump administration approved 276 new sanctions against Russia by US individuals and companies[25].

Even more symbolic is the prospect of sanctions that Trump would be preparing before the end of his term, targeting, among others, Russian agencies Rosatom and Roscosmos. Russian media outlets RIA Novosti claims that the US government would have included the two institutions in a package of sanctions against companies linked to China's Ministry of Defense. If confirmed, such a decision would be a major blow to Russia's prestige, and especially to Roscosmos, the country's space agency. For nearly a decade, NASA relied on the Russians to send astronauts into space, in a collaborative project with the agency. Not surprisingly, the possibility of sanctions against the organization that ensured the maintenance of the American space program and the International Space Station is seen in Russia as a stab in the back.

Alongside the British government, the Trump administration has shown itself to be one of the most determined to maintain economic sanctions against Russia, even going against the interests of some European Union groups seeking to re-establish economic ties. In France, politicians of different orientations have already spoken out in favor of a reevaluation of European sanctions against the Russian Federation. In Germany, a country that until 2014 held the position of Russia's largest trading partner when it ceded the position to China, statements by former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder called attention, characterizing the sanctions as meaningless measures.

Some political commentators point to Putin's alleged personal disagreement with Joe Biden as a more likely reason for the Kremlin's delay

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25 Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/23/09/2020/5bffb0f09a79470ff5378627.

in recognizing the Democrat's victory than an alleged closeness to Donald Trump. This divergence would have originated in 2012, when Biden, on an official visit to Russia as Vice President of the United States, would have met with representatives of the opposition and expressed the wish that then President Dmitry Medvedev would be a better candidate for reelection, instead of Putin. These rumors, however, hardly escape the field of speculation and ignore the eminently pragmatic character of Russian foreign policy. This character is constantly relegated by Western analysts, in favor of a more ideological interpretation of the Kremlin's actions.

The narrative of Donald Trump's alleged proximity to Russia, however, is more about American domestic politics than about a relationship between the Republican and the Russian government. Some of the most bombastic elements of Trump's alleged collaboration with the Russian government have been gradually denied. The Steele dossier, for example, widely circulated during the 2016 American elections, is the source of several conspiracy stories, such as the infamous prostitute party that Trump allegedly hosted at the Moscow Ritz-Carlton hotel and which would be used by Russian intelligence for blackmailing purposes. The main sources of such a dossier have been discredited over the years. Even the virtual newspaper Meduza, a vehicle for the opposition to the Putin government, recently published an extensive piece pointing out the countless inconsistencies in the report.

Speculations aside, the group of leaders who insist on not recognizing Biden's victory is increasingly diminished. After a few days of silence, the leader of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, sent his congratulations to the Democratic candidate. On the 15th, following the official electoral confirmation, Vladimir Putin, Mexican López Obrador, and Brazilian Jair Bolsonaro all formally greeted Joe Biden.

Germany: A Return to Normalcy?

Guilherme Thudium[26]

Germany–United States relations are decisive for the future of international politics and the international liberal order shaped under American leadership. Donald Trump's foreign policy was traumatic for German diplomacy, which welcomed Joe Biden's victory in the 2020 elections. However, the Trump administration should not be seen as an isolated disruptive element in the post-Cold War transatlantic relationship. Hence, the 'return to normalcy'[27] anticipated by Biden's election should be analyzed with caution when it comes to the bilateral relations.

Germany, the economic and geopolitical epicenter in unified Europe, has always had a complex relationship with the West. Since the Second World War, the relationship of German and European leaders towards the United States has been ambivalent. American global protagonism during the second half of the twentieth century was largely maintained through two 'core states' in Asia and Europe, respectively, which were shaped to serve the purposes of the hegemonic power: Japan and Germany[28]. Paradoxically, the two greatest enemies of the United States during World War II became its greatest allies in the postwar period. During the Cold War, therefore, West Germany was a semi-sovereign state bound to the Atlantic superpower, one of the occupying powers in German territory following the Potsdam Conference of 1945. In this sense, the reconstruction of Germany and even the drafting of the German Basic Law of 1949, the current constitution of the Federal Republic, were carried out under Washington's guidance and supervision[29].

Over the past two decades, however, German attitude towards the Atlantic alliance has changed significantly, signaling a search for greater

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26 PhD Candidate in Strategic Studies (PPGEEI-UFRGS).

27 'A Return to Normalcy' was the campaign slogan of United States presidential candidate Warren G. Harding for the 1920 election, the first election held after the end of World War I. It has also become associated with the 2020 presidential campaign of Joe Biden (Klein, Ezra. "Joe Biden's Promise: a Return to Normalcy." Vox, May 20, 2019. Available at: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/5/20/18631452/joe-biden-2020-presidential-announcement-s-peech).

28 Katzenstein, Peter. 2005. *A World of Regions:* Asia and Europe in the American Imperium. Ithaca, United States: Cornell University Press.

29 Cruz, Sebastião Carlos Velasco. 2016. *Linhas Cruzadas sobre as Relações entre os Estados Unidos e a Alemanha*. São Paulo: UNESP. ISBN: 9788539306374.

autonomy[30]. This is part of a broader tendency towards international autonomy as a leadership of the European Union. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq – to which Germany was against –, then chancellor Gerhard Schröder spoke of a 'German Way' (*Deutscher Weg*) in international affairs. Other stances also revealed discontent with the policy of liberal hegemony pursued by the United States, such as the abstention from voting in the UN Security Council on NATO's intervention in Libya during the Arab Spring, in 2011, and the disagreement with the American-led missile defense project for Europe. The episode of greatest damage to the bilateral relationship in recent years, however, was the disclosure, in 2015, of NSA spying activities on chancellor Angela Merkel.

In the context of the 2008 financial crisis, divergences on the fundamentals of the global financial and economic system between the two countries also became evident. German industrial capitalism, based on social, environmental and cultural values, rejects, to some extent, the Anglo-American financial-speculative model. It was largely due to this model and the strategic partnerships that were established with emerging powers, such as the BRICs, that Germany was able to remain economically stable in light of the Eurozone debt crisis, which followed the 2008 crisis.

One of the pillars of Barack Obama's foreign policy, which is expected to show signs of continuity under Biden – especially with the nomination of Antony Blinken to the post of Secretary of State – was the European and German rapprochement through mega-regional free trade agreements, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the largest mega-regional trade agreement to ever be proposed. The negotiations, however, stagnated during Obama's tenure due to regulatory divergences and strong pressure from civil society, especially in Europe. In this sense, Biden has the reputation of a tough negotiator and should not easily give in to German and European demands if such agreements return to the agenda of transatlantic relations.

Most of all, Germany depends on the Atlantic alliance for its security. As a legacy of the Cold War, Germany still houses approximately 38,000 American troops – the second largest overseas contingent of the United States Armed Forces, only after Japan. The headquarters of the United States European Command (EUCOM) is located in the city of Stuttgart, in the southwestern state of Baden-Württemberg, and coordinates military operations in 51 countries, including all of Europe, Russia, Turkey and Israel.

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30 Kundnani, Hans. 2015. "Leaving the West Behind: Germany Looks East". *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 1 (2015): 108-16. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24483223.

However, this number has been decreasing in recent years. In 2020, the Trump administration announced a cut of 12,000 troops in Germany following a series of criticisms directed at Berlin for failing to meet NATO's military spending target, set at 2% of GDP, and thus taking advantage of American security in Europe – and this withdrawal process may even be maintained by Biden. As a consequence, Germany also shows signs of independence in this arena, demonstrated, at the domestic level, by the new guidelines adopted by the 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the *Bundeswehr* – which became known in Germany as the 'Munich Consensus' –, and at the regional level for the support of initiatives towards the integration of European armed forces, alongside Emmanuel Macron's France.

In light of America's recoil in global affairs under Trump, Angela Merkel, who completed 15 years as German chancellor in 2020, was hailed by pundits and analysts as the new 'leader of the free world'[31]. Yet, the liberal international order built between the United States and Europe was already showing clear signs of struggle[32], and the main challenges towards it have emerged within the West itself, rather than from emerging or contesting powers[33]. Even so, Biden will seek to revive international institutions and regimes, such as the UN, WHO and the Paris Agreement, initiatives that will be welcomed in Berlin.

Part of Trump's political legacy can be reversed through executive orders, the same mechanism used by Trump to reverse policies from the Obama-era. In developed countries, however, state and national interest policies do not change fundamentally with a change in government. At the same time, trumpism and populism in America will not end with Trump's defeat. On the other side of the Atlantic, in 2021 both Germany and Europe will lose one of their most important and long-lasting leaders, when Merkel steps down as German chancellor, a transition that will bring a new element to the transatlantic relations.

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31 See, for example: Sunny Hundal, "Angela Merkel Is Now the Leader of the Free World, Not Donald Trump," The Independent, February 1, 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/angela-merkel-donald-trump-democracy-freedom-press-a7556986.html.

32 Mearsheimer, John. 2019. "Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order". *International Security* 43, no. 4 (2019): 7–50. Available at: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342.

33 Ikenberry, G. John. 2018. "The End of Liberal International Order?". *International Affairs* 94, no. 1 (January 2018): 7–23. Available at: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241.

Japan: Bargain within Complex Interdependence

José Miguel Quedi Martins[34]
Luana Margarete Geiger[35]

International Relations in East Asia (Japan, China and South Korea) have some characteristic ingredients. Among the main ones, we can highlight: (a) informal ties between government elites - illustrated in interparty diplomacy; (b) The formal agreements between Ministries of Foreign Affairs - expressed, for example, in the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Belt and Road Forum (BRF), which constitute true mechanisms of regional economic governance; (c) The presence of transnational companies as an expression of the integration of production chains of multinationals such as Softbank (Japan), Huawei (China) and Samsung (South Korea). These traits can be identified with what Keohane and Nye[36] call Complex Interdependence. In addition to the aforementioned characteristics, one of the hallmarks of this type of relationship is the low willingness of states to use force among themselves. This does not, however, apply to countries outside this link - such as the US. Thus, in order to make any kind of prediction about the effects of the Biden government on US relations with Japan - and, through this bias, with the region - it is important to understand how Complex Interdependence was established in East Asia.

The efficient (primary) cause of interdependence in East Asia is the Great Crisis. It stems from the untying of the dollar from gold (1971) and its link to oil (1974) - which guaranteed the demand for the American currency. With the unfolding of the Third Industrial Revolution - and, therefore, of the Crisis of Fordism, characteristic of the Second Industrial Revolution - came the segmentation of production and the denationalization of the industrial base. The United States began to export dollars and import goods. In the meantime, Japan was hit by the 1973 Oil Shock. Until that, Japanese growth, while expressive, was not seen as exceptional[37]. At this moment, the real miracle, which eclipsed all others, was the Brazilian. However, after the oil crisis, Japanese growth would become the "miracle" of Asia's recovery[38]. In

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35 PhD Candidate in Political Science (PPGCP-UFRGS).

36 Keohane, Robert, Nye, Joseph. 2012. *Power and Interdependence*. 4 ed. Glenview: Pearson Education.

37 Arrighi, Giovanni. 1997. *A ilusão do desenvolvimento*. Petrópolis: Editora Vozes.

38 Radelet, S., Sachs, J. 1997. Asia's Reemergence. *Foreign Affairs*, [s. l.], v. 76, n. 6, p. 44–59,

short, if the efficient cause of Complex Interdependence in East Asia was the Great Crisis, the overseas overflow of the Japanese subcontracting process[39] has become its material cause.

In its turn, the Japanese surplus with the US and the profits related to the innovations brought up by microelectronics led to an overproduction of capital in Japan. With the appreciation of the yen, resulting from the 1985 Plaza Agreement, the 1986 Real Estate Crisis occurred in Japan - which, in the following year, would infect the US - leading the country to intensify investments in the region, and accelerate the denationalization of the industrial base. From there came the Newly Industrialized Countries, then identified with the "Asian Tigers" - Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. The 1991 Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union created two opportunities that were missed by Japan: the active participation in the reconstruction of ex-Soviet space was compromised by the dispute over the Kuril. In turn, the efforts to participate in the 1991 Gulf War, which would have opened up Japan to access to oil and investment in infrastructure in the Middle East, were thwarted due to a restrictive interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which understood that the right to self-defense could not be exercised collectively. Junichiro Koizumi, who became prime minister in 2001, also tried to establish a presence in the Middle East, with the 2003 War. In the 90s, as a solution to capital overproduction, financialization was accelerated.

Japanese banks and companies have intensified the transfer of capital to other financial institutions. Then came the 1997 Asian Crisis. And this time, it was China that took the place and role previously played by the Asian Tigers[40]. Ten years later, in 2007, when due to the Surge in Iraq, the Subprime Real Estate Crisis took place in the US - which infected Europe and Asia in 2008 -, China ended up assuming the role of capital exporter - in the form of money, steel industries, and cement[41]. For the first time, Japan had a competitor in the subcontracting system network. Japan's initial reaction was cooperation. This was expressed with the arrival of Yukio Hatoyama, of the DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) in 2009, with the proposal of the formation of an East Asian Community. More than a Free Trade Zone, it was about electing a security community - hence, Hatoyama's request, made in 2010,

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nov./dec. 1997.

39 Arrighi, Giovanni. 1997. *A ilusão do desenvolvimento*. Petrópolis: Editora Vozes.

40 Visentini, Paulo Fagundes. 2011. *O Dragão Chinês e o Elefante Indiano*. Porto Alegre: Leitura XXI.

41 Cai, Peter. 2017. *Understanding China's Belt and Road Initiative*. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.

for the US to withdraw its bases from the country.

The United States responded with the *Pivot to Asia* in 2011. Although Obama declared it to be an "economic" containment of China, the measures outlined were of a military nature. The then governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, proposed to sell the Diaoyu-Senkaku - islands controlled by Japan and claimed by China and Taiwan - giving rise to anti-Japanese disturbances in China (19/08-19/09/2012), who ended up overthrowing the DPJ government in Japan (26/12/2012). Then, Shinzo Abe came to power. It was about taking over the Obama Pivot. However, that is not what happened. The United States has been unable to intensify military pressure on China, due to its commitments in the Middle East and Europe. In the latter, it should be noted that in response to a coup in Ukraine in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea (2015). In the end, what happened to Koizumi happened to Abe. He adhered to the idea of constituting Japan as a global actor through the regional sphere - ultimately, as a mediator between the US and China. In 2017, the rapprochement with China began at the 17th ASEAN meeting. The following year, Trump set tariffs on steel and other Japanese products. The association of these events resulted in an increase in bilateral exchanges between Japan and China.

Japan then adopted Hatoyama's approach: association with China as a form of projection towards Central Asia and the Middle East. So, despite Trump's pressure on the Tokyo G20 (28-29/06/2019) to prevent Japan from joining the Belt and Road Initiative - an ambitious infrastructure plan to interconnect East Asia and Europe - in April 2019, Japan joined the Initiative and became a member of its governance forum - The Belt and Road Forum (25-27/04/2019). Then, it joined the RCEP (15/11/2020), proposed by China, which constituted the largest free trade area in the world - bringing together approximately 1/3 of the world's population and GDP. These Japanese initiatives, to make economic projects vital for China feasible, at a time when the US is fighting a Trade War with Beijing, demand an explanation.

It is an attempt to break with stagnation, paradoxically resulting from the overproduction of capital, which was at the root of the world crises of 1986 and 1997. More than that, it is important to realize that the association between investment and infrastructure - job creation and income - is essential to the success of free trade agreements. It is a matter of replacing the Pact of Elites, of a monetarist nature, which dominated the 1990s and 2000s by a "Social Pact", based on consumption[42]. Therefore, what is at issue in the

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42 Bueno, Eduardo Urbanski. 2009. *Paradigmas Técnico-Econômicos, Pactos de Elites e o Sistema Monetário Internacional*. 2009. 92 f. Undergraduate Thesis – International Relations Course, Faculty of Economics, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, 2009. Availa-

Japanese attitude is the recognition of the existence of a new ethical content, a new conduct of globalization itself. After all, monetarism is compatible with the destructive phase of the Third Industrial Revolution - when the assets of the previous Industrial Revolution are liquidated to facilitate the eruption and diffusion of the next productive phase - and not with the idea of mass industrial production (which requires consumers).

Trump - alongside Xi Jinping, who launched the BRI in Astana on 09/07/2013[43] - was one of the first to realize this new behavior of globalization. It is associated with the diffusion (mass production) of knowledge from the Third Industrial Revolution, in the form of popular consumer applications - e.g. Internet of Things (IoT). The characteristic idiosyncrasies of the former US president prevented the recognition that his project was in line with his time requirements. Trump's plan was based on a massive investment in infrastructure - for which he got the Japanese support, however, not the resources from the US Congress. This was intended to facilitate the transition from a monetarist to an industrial model. In short, to indirectly subsidize the reconstruction of production chains in the US. It is from the association between the effectively global circulation of goods, the required infrastructure to do so, and mass consumption, that emerge the factors that lend to the second phase of the Third Industrial Revolution the content that refurbishes globalization itself. Moreover, Trump's approach to China was a continuation - albeit on a more consistent basis - of Obama's *Pivot*. The only difference is that he tried to use economic - and not military - means to solve economic problems.

Taiwan is the Achilles heel of the Japanese bargain. From this point of view, for Japan, Abe's disease may have been providential. The rise of Yoshihide Suga, a pragmatic politician, who does not belong to any of the party's wings, may allow Japan to distance itself from the provocative policy, in which Taiwan has become central. Abe was never tired of mentioning that his great uncle had been the last Japanese ambassador on the island; and that his brother, Nobuo Kishi - Suga's current Minister of Defense - is a personal friend of Tsai Ing-wen (President of Taiwan). Thus, Suga is an attempt to maintain Abe's bargain without what compromises it: Abe himself. It is supposed that the Japanese know that China will go to war if the island declares its independence. In this case, Japan's position would be irreparably

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ble at: http://hdl.handle.net/10183/21407. Accessed on: 04 mar. 2016.

43 Xi, Jinping. 2013. *Promote Friendship Between Our People and Work Together to Build a Bright Future*. Astana, Nazarbayev University, 07 Sep. 2013. President Xi Jinping's Speech during official visit to Kazakhstan. Available at: fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/ t1078088.shtml. Accessed on: 14 dez. 2020. .

compromised by events whose force and radicality are difficult to predict.

The foundation of Japan's diplomatic bargain with the US and China lies in its potential veto power. With the US, in the security sphere - due to Japan's role for US logistics and air bases -; and with China, in the economic sphere - due to Japan's participation in RCEP and BRF. According to Keohane and Nye[44], one of the characteristics of Complex Interdependence is precisely this, the absence of a clearly hierarchical foreign policy agenda. Until now, this has benefited Japan, since it could dedicate itself entirely to what was for its partners at the top of the agenda (security or economy). However, after Japan's entry into the BFR (Belt and Road Forum) and RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), its luck was also associated with the success of these initiatives. And any one of them will hardly be successful if there is a conflagration between the US and China. The end of the Great Crisis, which shaped interdependence in East Asia, brings new challenges and opportunities to Japan. The main challenge, as mentioned, is to distance itself from any kind of commitment to Taiwan's independence. And the opportunity is to use Biden's multilateralism to bring the United States into a constructive attitude, compatible with the Second Phase of the Third Industrial Revolution - thereby inserting the United States into the complex interdependence of East Asia.

India: Redefining an Ascending Alliance

Erik Herejk Ribeiro[45]

In structural terms, the United States' elections do not redefine the trend towards closer ties with India, which has become a key part of the Asia rebalancing strategy. Despite an inconstant history and political divergences, Indo-American relations find a common goal of preventing the transition in the Asian regional order towards a sinocentric system. Joe Biden's victory may bring new elements of diplomatic friction with India, but it should not compromise the cohesion of the main strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific space.

Historically, Indo-American relations have been labeled as "estranged democracies" since Indian independence. Although governments in Washington have moderately supported decolonization and the Indian

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44 Keohane, Robert, Nye, Joseph. 2012. *Power and Interdependence*. 4 ed. Glenview: Pearson Education.

45 PhD in Strategic Studies (PPGEEI-UFRGS).

nationalist movement, the two countries have always had very different worldviews[46]. Throughout almost the entire Cold War, three domestic and external policies in India diverged from the US: the adoption of an autonomous development model, the non-alignment strategy and, from the 1960s, the advance of its nuclear program[47]. The only period of good relations occurred during the John F. Kennedy and Jawaharlal Nehru governments, which had converging perceptions of threat towards China. Despite this, the US did not provide the expected military assistance during the 1962 Sino-Indian War[48] [49].

Structurally, the strategy of containment against the USSR brought the United States closer to Pakistan and later to China, while India received technological and defense cooperation from the Soviet government. The lowest episode in India-US relations was the American coercion during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War: the US Navy sent the USS Enterprise aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal with the intention of deterring Indian forces, which were assisting the liberation of Bangladesh. Between the late 1970s and the end of the Cold War, successive administrations in India and the US tried to thaw relations, but there were rare points of convergence in any economic or political agenda[50][51].

In the post-Cold War era, Indo-American relations gained a new perspective from the Indian economic opening in 1991 and from their partnership in information technology, which was symbolized by Bill Gates' visit to India in 1997. However, the nuclear issue continued to hamper their rapprochement, as the US was reluctant to accept the entry of a new power into the elite of the international order. In 1995, the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) forced India to abandon nuclear ambiguity. Under the Atal Vajpayee government (1998-2004), India carried out the Pokhran II test and

46 Kux, Dennis. 2002. *India and the United States:* estranged democracies, 1941-1991. Forest Grove: University Press of the Pacific.

47 Nayar, Baldev Raj; Paul, T. V. 2003. *India in the world order:* searching for major power status. New York: Cambridge University Press.

48 Madan, T. 2020. *Fateful triangle: how China shaped U.S. India relations during the Cold War.* Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

49 Sauter, Betina T. 2020. *A procura da Índia pela estabilização regional:* a aproximação com a União Soviética até a Guerra de Bangladesh. Dissertation (Master's in International Strategic Studies) – Post-Graduate Program in International Strategic Studies. Faculty of Economic Sciences, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre.

50 Kux, Dennis. 2002. *India and the United States:* estranged democracies, 1941-1991. Forest Grove: University Press of the Pacific.

51 Chaudhuri, Rudra. 2014. *Forged in crisis:* India and the United States since 1947. New York: Oxford University Press.

declared itself a nuclear power. In a letter to Bill Clinton, the Indian Prime Minister justified the initiative due to the nuclearization of Pakistan with crucial assistance from China, which was configured as the main threat to national sovereignty. However, Clinton and most Western countries, in addition to Japan, imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan[52].

Beyond ideological biases, Indian governments of both political spectrums in the post-Cold War era have had better experiences with the Republican Party in the White House, while Democratic governments generated greater friction in bilateral relations. George W. Bush and Manmohan Singh (2004-2014) are considered the major sponsors of the nuclear and defense agreements signed between 2005 and 2008, spending a large sum of their political capital in the legislative process. Recently, Donald Trump and Narendra Modi (2014-) forged a very close relationship, placing conservative nationalism and the economic and technological boycott of China at the center of their agendas.

In contrast, the Bill Clinton and Barack Obama administrations had difficult periods in relations with India. Clinton's agenda, in addition to working for nuclear non-proliferation, highlighted the Indo-Pakistani conflict and brought up the issue of Kashmir again as an obstacle to approaching New Delhi. Obama, in turn, considered the possibility of a Great Power concert with China (G2) and proved to be an unreliable partner due to failures in conducting crises in Syria, Ukraine and the withdrawal from Afghanistan. The deepening of relations between India and the US during the Obama administration was directly associated with the change of strategic focus with the Asia Pivot in 2012 and China's assertive reaction to this new reality. During this period, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta (2011-2013) declared that India would be the centerpiece of the Pivot and of the overall US strategy for the Indo-Pacific[53].

Currently, triangular relations between China, India and the United States already define, to a large extent, the geopolitical and economic alignments in the spaces that make up the Indo-Pacific[54][55]. This triangulation took structural contours only with the Chinese rise in the 2000s and has

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52 Perkovich, George. 2001. *India's nuclear bomb:* the impact on global proliferation. Berkeley: University of California Press.

53 Pant, Harsh V., Joshi, Yogesh. 2017. Indo-US relations under Modi: the strategic logic underlying the embrace. *International Affairs*, [S.l.], v. 93, n. 1, p. 133 - 146, Jan. 2017.

54 Raja Mohan, C. 2013. *Samudra Manthan:* Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

55 Manuel, Anja. 2016. *This Brave New World:* India, China and the United States. New York: Simon & Schuster

conditioned the Indo-American approach since then. In this context, two policies are worth mentioning: the US-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (2012) and the Maritime Quad coalition, which seeks to bring together maritime strategies and naval interoperability between the US, India, Japan and Australia. Over the last decade or so, the United States has provided a large part of platforms and technologies imported by the Indian Navy, while the air force and the army maintained their autonomous partnerships with other countries, such as Russia, Israel and France[56].

However, in the economic sphere, the United States has not helped India to become a real long-term competitor to China's rise. Despite India's need to accelerate industrialization and endogenization of technology, there is no direct support from Washington or US companies for the Make in India program. Thus, the American strategy for India focuses on two main axes: 1) the deepening of defense cooperation agreements and the sale of military equipment to the Indian Armed Forces; 2) the cooptation of Indian elites through their affluent - and increasingly influential - diaspora in the US, facilitating bilateral business in high value-added digital services.

In conjunctural terms, the effects of the change of command in Washington are not yet clear for India. Prime Minister Modi tacitly expressed his support for Trump's re-election due to ideological proximity and to the mutual interest in containing China, especially in the economic and technological spheres. Joe Biden's victory brought with him the fear that Indian domestic issues, such as the issue of Kashmir and human rights violations, could become objects of dispute among Democrats. Moreover, the resumption of the pro-democracy agenda by the new US government may also have contradictory effects on Modi's foreign policy. On one hand, pragmatism can help to thaw India's relations with Iran, which were heavily affected during the Trump administration. On the other hand, the promise of tougher policies against Russia runs counter to Indian interests.

Despite potential disagreements, Joe Biden has already signaled in his campaign that he will prioritize the strategic partnership with India. First, he chose Kamala Harris as vice president in a symbolic and practical nod to the Indian diaspora. Second, Biden' platform waves to the intention of "making India and the United States the closest nations in the world", citing the role of the new president in the agreements signed during the Obama administration, such as the status of Major Defense Partner conferred in 2016. The Biden

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56 Ribeiro, Erik H. 2019. *A Grande Estratégia da Índia*: Ascensão de uma nova Grande Potência no século XXI? Thesis (PhD in International Strategic Studies) – Post-Graduate Program in International Strategic Studies. Faculty of Economic Sciences, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, 2019.

platform explicitly mentions the need to work with India to create a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and to avoid potential threats from China. Biden also mentions issues such as terrorism in South Asia (despite not citing Pakistan) and the resumption of the Paris Agreement[57]. Another topic of relevance to New Delhi that should be facilitated by the Biden government is the issue of residence visas for Indian skilled workers in the United States.

In sum, regardless of the government's platform in the United States, India will remain a strategic priority due to the triangulation with China. The Modi government, despite its ideological preference for Trump, may have its strategic interests facilitated by Washington's new policies. The return of the United States to the multilateral agenda is a good sign for India, which will be reintroduced to the UN Security Council in 2021 and, in the following year, will occupy the presidency of the G20. It remains to be seen whether Biden will also move forward on the economic and technological cooperation agenda with India, especially in the context of projected recession and low growth for both countries in the coming years.

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57 Biden-Harris. 2020. Joe Biden's Agenda for the Indian American Community. *Biden-Harris*, Online, 2020. Available at: <https://joebiden.com/indian-americans/>. Accessed on nov. 20. 2020.

THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD-SYSTEM: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATE ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD-SYSTEMS THEORY

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Introduction

The international system is constituted, since its origin, of unequal power relations. A state's power is, therefore, measured by its ability to implement decisive policies both in the economic and military fields. In the last decades, the shift in strategic rivalries led to deep international instability and transformed all landmarks of analytical reference and their notions. As a result, we witness not only international disorder but also analytical imprecision to understand these transformations.

The international system is a historically constructed one. And this is the system that articulated Modern Africa, as well as other regions that became the periphery of the world. Colonialism marked a decisive phase, as it defined the structural bases of the international system. With the advancement of the Industrial Revolution, the exaggerated international competition produced the imperialist wave that founded the political-military conflicts. With the end of World War II, taking into account the differences of the political-ideological discourses, the objective of the development policies was similar in what was then called the Third-World. In this sense, the discussion proposed in this study intends to theoretically support the African studies.

The study of the World-System and the History of the International Relations has been approached in a compartmentalized way, with little integration to the theoretical mainstream of the International Relations. It is

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therefore necessary to engage in an integrative effort to associate it to the study of the World-Systems Theory. This theory, on the other hand, has been treated as the object of a theoretical debate with limited empirical substantiation, only as a sort of subarea of the analysis of capitalism's global development.

The World-Systems Theory emphasizes the study of the global capitalist system and its dynamics, approaching the power relations established in this system. In doing so, it identifies a cleavage between the countries best positioned in the system, located in the center of the capitalist dynamic, and those less privileged, classified as semi-peripherals or peripherals. Based on this, it is possible to identify a parallel between the structure proposed by this theory and the notion of development (although not explicitly), as the use of categories based on the unequal benefits obtained by different states through its participation in the global economy, given the appropriation and organization of the global flows of surplus value, allows us to question the possibility of changing its place in the system. Specifically, it leads us to investigate under which conditions a country could rise to the center of the system and dominate the relationships with the other states. To do so, we must study the processes that led to the configuration of the world-system as it is today.

Furthermore, when reflecting on the structural elements that led to inequality between classes and nations, and the repressive apparatus used to sustain such inequalities, it is necessary to incorporate into the debate the analysis of other categories that explains the historical ruptures of the hierarchy established by the western capitalist world-economy – the Revolutions. Equality and autonomous development (separated from the capitalist world-economy) are not just ideals. They are concrete historical experiences, stemming from the command over the modern conditions of development and largely appropriated by the societies in question.

However, if on the one hand, during the 1990s, through the Washington Consensus, neoliberalism was consolidated as the organizing directive of the capitalist system, on the other it also added new contradictions to the development conditions in the center of the capitalist world-economy. We must, therefore, discuss the intrinsic need of neoliberal radicalization and a new level of dispute between the global capitalist classes. Even though it was elaborated during the 1970s, it is in this moment that the World-Systems Theory must, once again, achieve relevance, given the space opened by the fall of the Dependency Theories and the continuity of crises under neoliberalism.

Capitalist World-Economy: Context and Concepts

Fernand Braudel's thought was central to the elaboration of the World-Systems Theory. Braudel offers the theoretical and conceptual bases that are used to elaborate the understanding of the World-System used in this study, especially regarding its considerations on the spatial and temporal aspects of the capitalist world-economy.

Braudel analyzes how space is presented in the world-economies. To the author, these limited surfaces correspond to "[...] an economically autonomous part of the planet, capable, on the essential, to be self-sufficient and to which its links and internal trades provide some organic unity [...]" (Braudel 2009, 12), while also being the largest space of coherence of human relations and activities, existing since the dawn of civilization. The variation of its limits is slow, because, for most exchanges, surpassing its borders would lead to more losses than gains.

The world-economies have a single center, always an urban pole, a dominant capitalist city, which is in turn surrounded by second-class towns, that support (voluntarily or not) the order imposed by the central city. This one presents "[...] early and strong social diversification [...]" (Braudel 2009, 3:21), with its classes diverging and accentuating the social inequalities, as it often suffers from hunger and inflation. These "world-cities" succeed one another, dialectically, transforming the world-economy, and thus affecting the entire structure, since the elements that support its domain are "[...] navigation, business, industry, credit, political power or violence ..." (Braudel 2009, 3:25), and their different combinations and configurations guide the whole world, while the demands of a constantly renovating system favor specific characteristics.

Following the central city, the world-economy is divided in "[...] at least three categories: a limited center, well developed secondary regions and finally huge external margins [...]" (Braudel 2009, 3:29). Thus:

> The center or core contains everything that is most advanced and diversified. The next zone possesses only some of these benefits, although it has some share in them: it is the "runner-up" zone. The huge periphery, with its scattered population, represents on the contrary backwardness, archaism, and exploitation by others. This discriminatory geography is even today both an explanation and a pitfall in the writing of world history - although the latter often creates the pitfalls itself by its connivance (Braudel 2009, 3:29).

The semi-periphery, that the author calls the "runner-up" zone, in particular, presents difficulties in its classification. It is suggested, then, the identification is made through the:

> [...] criteria of prices, wages, living standards, national product, per capita income, and trade balances - that is when the figures are available.
> The simplest, if not the best criterion, the most immediately accessible one at any rate, is the presence or otherwise, in a given region, of colonies of foreign merchants. If he rules the roost in a given city or region, the foreign merchant is a sign of the inferiority of that city or region, compared with the economy of which he is the representative or emissary (Braudel 2009, 3:29-30).

The zones of the world-economy are organized hierarchically surrounding the center. The types of connection between the different regions are slow to transform, for the trade links that sustain its variety, given the inequality of the trades that take place, are created along centuries and occasionally (re)ordered in favor of an ascending dominant center, that maintains the control of the strategic points of accumulation through any means necessary. The world-economy, closed in itself, depends on "levers" to work well – the commerce and credit are the main ones. The price level in the center itself acts as a conditioner to the entire system. Thus, states in the center must be strong, capable of acting internally and externally in favor of the economic power related to them.

On the other spheres of the world-system, besides the economic one, the author notes that:

> it would be a mistake to imagine that the order of the world-economy governed the whole of society, determining the shape of other orders of society. For other orders existed. An economy never exists in isolation. Its territory and space are also occupied by other spheres of activity - culture, society, politics - which are constantly reacting with the economy, either to help or as often to hinder its development (Braudel 2009, 3:35).

With the emergence and expansion of the capitalist world-economy, though, "[...] the primacy of economics became more and more overwhelming: it directed, disturbed and influenced the other orders. Exaggerating inequalities [3], it imprisoned the various partners in the world-economy either in poverty

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3 Braudel (2009) highlights the role of capitalism as an anti-market. If the market presents itself as the place of exchanges, where normal gains would occur, capitalism favors large profits, in a predatory logic.

or in wealth, assigning to each a role it was apparently destined to hold for a very long time" (Braudel 2009, 3:37). This phenomenon is founded on the appropriation and organization of the global flows of surplus value. Thanks to this, the international division of labor is strengthened, for the superstructures that ensure the conditioning of each country to its role are then oriented by the material elements of its relation. Its evolution, thus:

> [..] was certainly not the result of 'natural' and spontaneous tendencies, but rather an inheritance, the consolidation, historically achieved over time, of a situation dating from some earlier period. The division of labour on a world scale (or on world-economy-scale) cannot be described as a concerted agreement made between equal parties and always open to review. It became established progressively as a chain of subordinations, each conditioning the others. Unequal exchange, the origin of the inequality in the world, and, by the same token, the inequality of the world, the invariable generator of trade, are long-standing realities. In the economic poker game, some people have always held better cards than others, not to say aces up their sleeves. [...]
> The moral of the story is that [...] the past always counts. The inequality of the world is the result of structural realities at once slow to take shape and slow to fade away (Braudel 2009, 3:37-40).

Some consideration is due regarding the reason the modern World-System came to be in Europe, in the form of a world-economy, instead of a world-empire. The latter, characterized by the domain of an empire over an entire world-economy, would be an archaic structure, stemming from a triumph of politics over economy. Its consequence was, generally, the strangulation of economic expansion. The political formations of Europe, since its Middle Ages, prevented a world-empire there, privileging it to the birth and expansion of capitalism. The fact that many semi-peripheries exist there in proximity, pressuring the center and accelerating its development, was determinant in this sense, there not being such a configuration in other parts of the world.

In the same sense, Amin (1997) notes the presence of proto-capitalist elements in many ancient world-systems, that he calls tributary, and their existence suggests the possibility of transition to a capitalist mode of production. In all cases, however, they were subjugated by the dominant tributary structures, in which power led to wealth (in opposition to capitalism, in which wealth ensures power). The European characteristic of feudal political atomization imposed challenges to the submission of the economy, and the peripheral position of the continent in regards to the other Afro-Euro-Asian world-systems, related to the expansion movement that led to the colonization of America, allowed the fast advancement of the proto-capitalist elements, inaugurating a transition period

characterized by mercantilism. These (bourgeois and peasants integrated into the mercantile system) would come, when combined with the remains of the feudal domination structure, to establish the bases of the absolutist state.

Considering that the establishment of the modern and contemporary world-system is related to the formation of the capitalist world-economy, Osterhammel and Petersson (2005) investigate the process of globalization that resulted in the expansion and planetary reach of the system. The authors argue that globalization begins between 1450 and 1500, since in this period: (a) the Portuguese charted the way into Asia, having established a path that reached Macao already in 1557; (b) a military revolution led to the development of artillery and firearms; (c) the colonization of America allowed the Europeans to create new monopolized political and economic spaces, without facing challenges from previous structures (since they destroyed the indigenous ones); (d) there were "migrations" in fauna and flora around the world, resulting even in the adaptation of entire societies; and (e) the development of Gutenberg's press allowed for a revolution in communications.

These elements, to the authors, support globalization because they expanded the existing and created new spheres of interaction. One of the main ones was the Atlantic, that became an "European lake". It was thus, possible to establish plantations in the region, that mobilized the traffic of enslaved Africans, leading mass migrations to a new level. The triangle trade would be the first example of a network connecting Eurasia to America, with profound reflexes in all places its presence was felt, and their echoes reverberating around the world. On its turn, Spain's silver mining in America was the first truly global trade network, one of the few phenomena capable of penetrating the then insulated Far East.

From this moment on, the region in the world with the most intense interactions was the West, in such a way that even events that would seem to be strictly domestic produced important impacts in the global economy. This region was the center of production of consumption and production goods, from which resulted not only being an exporter of these, but also of capitals and technologies. With this, the inequality of wealth between the centers and peripheries in 1913 reached a proportion of 10:1 (in 1820 it was 3:1). It is noted that globalization did not take place between already established national economies, but parallelly and simultaneously to its formation. It is then important to highlight the reactions it provoked, as protectionism went back to being the norm from 1878 onwards (following the thought of List). The result was the politicization of globalization (since the new barriers were not strong enough to stop the process), which became an element used to strengthen state power, as an instrument to be controlled and utilized in favor of the national

interest (Osterhammel and Petersson 2005).

Braudel situates, in this context, the temporal divisions within the European world-economy, looking for "[...] the longest temporal unit of reference which can undeniably be said, despite its length and many changes, to have coherence" (Braudel 2009, 3:58). To this end, the author uses the conjunctural rhythms of the economy, stressing the validity of observing variations in the price levels to prove the integration of a specific area in a world-economy, which at the same time makes it possible to study how changes in the center affect the other regions. From the known economic cycles, the secular trend is highlighted:

> A secular cycle, like any other cycle, has a point of departure, a peak and a point of arrival, but because of the generally rather low profile taken by the secular trend, the location of these points is somewhat approximate. Of the peaks, one says for instance 'round about' 1350 or 1650. From data accepted at present, four successive secular cycles can be identified, *as far as Europe is concerned:* 1250 [1350] 1507- 1510; 1507- 10 [1650] 1733-1743; 1733-1743 [1817] 1896; 1896 [1974?] . . . The first and last date in each case represent the beginning of an upward movement and the end of a downward one; the middle date in square brackets indicates the peak, the point at which the secular trend begins to go into decline, in other words, the moment of crisis (Braudel 2009, 3:65).

We stress, in the analysis of the author, the inclusion of a time frame that antecedes the emergence of capitalism as a world-economy. This occurs given the reference to the price levels, indicating an early integration of the local European economies, related to the increasing importance of commerce following the feudal crises. Because of this, around 1350 a predominant role is assigned to the Italian cities, particularly Venice, in the establishment of the European world-economy. Around 1650, on its turn, Amsterdam emerged as the center of the European flows, and 1817 defined the Britannic hegemony over the capitalist world-economy. Braudel sees in the period inaugurated in 1974 a new systemic crisis, which may lead to a reorganization and definition of a new Center.

It is worth noting, also, that the moments of systemic crisis are not the only ones in which the establishment of a new hegemony is possible. Arrighi (1996) offers a chronology of European hegemonies that includes the powers that organized their domain in positive inversions of the secular trend. Thus, besides the ones already mentioned, are listed as hegemonies the Spanish (emerging around 1500), and North American (originated in the beginning of the 20th century) ones. The cyclical inversion of the half of the 18th century is

marked by the dispute between France and England for supremacy in the system, signaling a moment of particular disorganization of the European world-economy. Such a phenomenon is part of the debate that surrounds the temporal landmark that indicates the ascension of capitalism as a world-economy.

The behavior of the different life spheres through the secular trend varies according to its fluctuation. Braudel notes that, when its trajectory is positive, the whole system is benefitted, and the bases for the configuration of a new Center are founded. Despite this, the increase in productivity leads to a misstep between inflation and wages, worsening the population's living conditions. When it is negative, on the other hand, the countries become more protectionist, leading to greater inequality between regions. At the same time, the slowing down of accumulation brings wages and price levels closer, benefitting the population. The author recalls that before the Industrial Revolution all crises led to a demographic reduction that increased the advantages reaped by the surviving population, but since then this is no longer the case, which may render the crises' effects over the people null and bring their worst consequences against them.

Global Surplus Value: Capital Flows in the Modern and Contemporary Interstate System

This section seeks to explain how the center differentiates itself from other regions. Particularly, it is analyzed how is the distinction between the developed countries and the others is maintained, for which the importance of the transference of surplus value from peripheries and semi-peripheries to the center is identified as determinant to the phenomenon.

Although the appropriation of surplus value is characteristic of the capitalist mode of production in its entirety, Amin (1997) notes that in the peripheries and semi-peripheries of the system, exploration is greater, with part of it being directed to the center. This leads to a division at the world level between an active army (the proletariat of the center) and a reserve army (the proletariat of the peripheries and semi-peripheries). In other words, the condition of overexploitation of work in the rest of the world is able to guarantee better living conditions and pacify the workers of the center.

In addition to resulting in the adoption of different anti-systemic strategies in each region (reformist or social-democratic in the center and revolutionary in the periphery)[4], this ensures the continuity of a polarization in the capitalist world-economy and the concentration of resources in the so-called developed

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4 In particular, the question of revolutions will be dealt with in the next section.

countries, which through the international division of labor manage to control and organize in their favor the system as a whole, maintaining its advantages in relation to the others. On the concept of polarization:

> [...] at least the following propositions can be seen: a] in general, the exploitation of labor in the peripheries is much more intense in the peripheries than in the center (the differential in the remuneration of labor - wage earners and others - is much wider than the differential in productivity). The product of this overexploitation, which benefits capital, which dominates the system as a whole, is transferred in part to the centers, through trade, and is reinforced by the migration of capital and labor. The dominant discourse, which seeks to deny or minimize the effects of this transfer, is nothing more than an ideological legitimation, which aims to hide the intrinsic links between capitalism and polarization; b] by itself, the transfer of value to the detriment of the peripheries constitutes a force capable of reproducing and deepening the polarization, due to the gigantic negative weight it represents to the peripheries, even though, in statistics, it may sometimes appear smaller, in comparison to the surplus generated by the centers; c] the advantages that benefit the center are not produced exclusively, not even mainly, by the more effective organization of their work (much higher labor productivity); they are also produced by the monopolistic power that the centers exercise in the world division of labor (Amin 1997, 69).

From this, it is necessary to study the cycle of hegemony in the capitalist world-economy, whose succession establishes a dialectical relationship with the evolution of the system itself, transforming it and being influenced by its changes. Based on the understandings thus suggested, it becomes possible to approach how the international division of labor allows the center to organize the world in its favor, appropriating the surplus value of the peripheries and semi-peripheries in order to maintain its own development.

Throughout the history of the capitalist world-economy, a succession of hegemonic states has been identified, which Arrighi (1996, 27) defines as countries that have acquired the capacity to "[...] exercise leadership and government functions over a system of sovereign nations". The author notes that hegemony depends both on competition between states and on their collective need to assert themselves before their citizens, and can basically find justification in the defense of states against citizens or citizens against states. It is also necessary to have a measure of systemic chaos, so that such leadership can be admitted, contributing to the convincing of the other actors that the acceptance of hegemony is less expensive than unrestrained competition.

In this study, the understanding supported by Teschke (2003), Osterhammel and Petersson (2005) and Amin (1997) is adopted, that the first modern capitalist hegemony would have been British. In particular, Amin (1997), when relating the cyclical characteristic of the system with the changes of an innovative nature (economic or otherwise) that allowed an expansion of capitalism on a world level, highlights that seeking such cycles before 1800 implies a disconnection between the economic base and the political-ideological superstructure. For the author, the fundamental aspect of the succession of capitalist hegemonies is the dialectic between the national and the international system. For this reason, the author understands that hegemony can only be observed from the 19th century, under the British, with its financial and industrial domain. Even so, the English position regarding the European balance cannot be disregarded.

Analyzing the consequences of the systemic chaos that culminated in two World Wars, the scholars note that the United States has assumed hegemony. Osterhammel and Petersson (2005) note that they achieved their leadership position without necessarily having consciously pursued it, considering their hesitation in getting involved in world politics and economics. It was eventually obtained not only economically, but also given its cultural traits:

> Mass production, mass consumption, and mass culture were the watchwords that were associated with "Americanism" at that time. The ability of American industry to mass produce standardized goods, Frederick Taylor's scientific management, and Henry Ford's assembly line production fascinated Europe and promised to create surplus profits that would be shared between employees and the employer. As an engine of mass production, mass consumption seemed to open the door to prosperity and social peace. [...] More controversial than Taylorism and Fordism were the social and cultural changes that were interpreted as part of the "Americanization" that occurred since the end of the 19th century but especially since the 1920s.
> [...] The products of the American entertainment industry proved to be much less difficult to propagate across borders. In the American immigrant society, forms of cultural production had evolved that were easy to commercialize because they used idiomatic expressions intelligible across cultural barriers and applied the newest technologies for recording sounds and images (Osterhammel and Petersson 2005, 108-9).

Silver and Slater (2001) also highlight that, with the end of the Second World War, the concentration of military and financial power in the United

States strategically positioned them to assume the status of hegemon[5], but for that it was necessary to offer an answer to the challenge represented by social dissatisfaction. This would only be possible by not only repressing and undermining the bargaining power of subaltern groups in the American hegemony, but also proposing reforms that would allow them to be co-opted, in a model inspired by the New Deal experience. This not only taught the American elites the importance of state intervention as guarantor of order, security and justice for the people, but also suggested the type of institution to be used to empty problematic social and political issues: "neutral" regulatory bodies, that would transform these challenges into technical problems.

> The two most volatile social and political conflicts in the early post-war years were the conflict between labor and capital in metropolitan countries and the anti-imperialist revolt in the colonies. These were reformulated as technical problems of macroeconomic adjustment and economic growth and development - problems that could be overcome by the use of scientific and technical knowledge, with the support of government planning. (Silver and Slater 2001, 213).

Based on this, Silver and Slater (2001) point out that the development theme was a resource used by the United States in its search for hegemony, to remove Asia and Africa, in the process of independence, from socialist influence. In this context, the Modernization Theory arises, which claimed that development took place through a series of stages, according to Western experience, which could be followed by all countries and would allow them to reach, mainly, economic, but also political and social, conditions associated with the countries of the center. With this promise, the Americans sought to co-opt the countries of the periphery, in a movement necessary to assert themselves:

> Just as the labor-capital conflict was reformulated as a technical problem, related to the government's ability to reactivate the economy in Keynesian molds, ensuring greater growth and productivity, Truman's "fair negotiation" reformulated the north-south conflict [...]. The concept of development itself was an "invention" of the period that followed World War II - the American response to the need to exercise leadership [...] (Silver and Slater 2001, 215).

In the same sense, Amin (1997) disputes the proposal for the interpretation of development offered by the Theory of Modernization, with the observation of the inescapability of polarization under capitalism, fundamentally

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5 The one that established its hegemonic condition.

because of the impossibility of three-dimensional integration (goods, labor and capital) of the world market. The author warns against the notion that development cannot take place autonomously, only within the framework of the system, underlining the differentiation between development and capitalist expansion, and doing so he reinforces the unsustainability of the system, from an ecological and social point of view. He considers development a concept critical to capitalism (unlike the one advocated by Bandung, who wanted to "reach" the center, and even that of the socialist states, in which it sought to reconcile a new society with capitalist economic ideals).

It turns out that, since the 1970s, as pointed out by Wallerstein (2003; 1992) and Arrighi and Silver (2001), a series of phenomena point to the erosion of US hegemony. Noteworthy are the rise of economic rivals capable of competing head-on with the United States (at that time, Western Europe and Japan), the worldwide contesting movements of 1968 (which undermined the ideological bases of the Yalta agreement), and the defeat in the Vietnam War. Another landmark of the hegemonic crisis is the financialization of world capitalism, pointed out by Arrighi (1996) as, at the same time, the result and cause of a central insecurity for the loss of legitimacy of the global leadership.

More than the exchanges established between countries, relations between the different regions of the capitalist world-economy take place in the form of appropriation of global surplus value, which allows the center to maintain its advantages over the rest of the system. It is emphasized, based on Amin (1997), the difference between the market and the capitalist market, whose relevance is highlighted when it is identified that the different regions of the ancient world were not isolated. For this reason, too, the author sees in industry the "finished" form of capitalism, as it causes definitive ruptures in relation to the previous model, thus highlighting the close relationship between the capitalist mode of production and the international system. He recalls that capitalism is more than the association of private property, wages and trade, a combination found in many places in the ancient world. "[...] capitalism only exists when the level of development of the productive forces implies the modern factory, which uses heavy mechanical equipment and not artisanal equipment" (Amin 1997, 62). In even more recent times, it is also expressed through financialization, as argued by Arrighi (1996).

From there, two fundamental characteristics of the modern world emerge, urbanization and the agricultural revolution, exponentially increasing productivity, to the point that the logic of profit becomes the foundation of economic decision, in a context other than artisanal. This leads the author to conclude that the only way to properly study world capitalism is to combine the perspectives of modes of production and the world-system, since the modern

world is based on the capitalist world-economy.

Amin (1997) proposes here an interpretation alternative to others, more orthodoxically Marxist ones, and points out the need to understand its structural relationship with the modern system of states. The author argues that there are three complementary elements of specificity in the modern capitalist world. The first is related to the fact that the law of capitalist value comes to govern the whole modern system, not just its economy. As a result, the rule ceases to be the command of wealth by power, to become the command of power by wealth, stimulating the growth of the productive forces. The second is based on the fact that capitalism is the first truly global system, integrating all the actors involved into an international division of labor, according to a law of world value. This, in turn, leads to a third characteristic, which is the necessary polarization of the accumulation process on a world scale:

> I prefer to analyze the world system with the unambiguous concept of polarization, which means that the centers produce this system as a whole and shape the subordinate modernity of the peripheries, in the understanding that this global expansion is not only synonymous with the hierarchical development of modernity, but also with the destruction process of those parts that become dysfunctional or that do not fit into the global logic (Amin 1997, 71).

When thinking about possible changes in polarization, Amin (1997) observes the recent industrialization process of some peripheries, leading him to conclude that the world tends to become globally industrialized, affecting the process of world accumulation. It is identified, from there, that the polarization occurs from other phenomena than the unequal exchange: (a) capital flight from the peripheries to the center; (b) selective migration; (c) the center's monopoly on the international division of labor.

Thus, polarization prevents thinking about the advantage of the centers without referring to their position in the international system, since even their relative deindustrialization is justified by the maintenance of the monopolies[6], guaranteeing the continuity of the division and highlighting that industrialization is not the foundation of differentiation among the actors in the capitalist world-economy, but these monopolies.

In this sense, the need for continuous capital accumulation is characteristic of the capitalist mode of production, and therefore of the

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6 For Amin (1997), monopolies are the instruments that allow the center to exclude the rest of the world from access to wealth. In the contemporary world, they would be "[...] the monopoly of technologies and the monopoly of globalized finance" (Amin 1997, 68).

capitalist world-economy. Since the Industrial Revolution, the advance of the contradictions inherent to the mode of production, fundamentally arising from its property relations, which oppose capital and labor, allowed for its transformation. Teschke (2003) argues that in capitalism classes (owners and non-owners of the means of production) come to depend on the market for their reproduction. This logic justifies the search for profit, which in turn demands constant revolutions in the means of production to sustain itself. The interrelation of these characteristics gives capitalism a very particular dynamic, guided by the contradictions internal to capital and between capital and labor, resulting in "[...] demographic growth, technological development, specialization, productive diversification, and territorial expansion of the market relations" (Teschke 2003, 142).

Thereafter, the extraction of surplus value surpassed market gain as the main form of capital accumulation, not only domestically, but also internationally. Global surplus value is appropriated in different ways depending on the region of the world-economy, with control by the center of strategic points of capital accumulation, through the aforementioned monopolies, that guarantee it the highest profit margins and the mastery over techniques and determining instruments in each period. In this way, the international division of labor is sustained, since the semiperiphery becomes responsible for the production of technology of the previous generation, and the periphery remains fundamentally linked to basic activities. It is reinforced, however, that in the economic activities controlled in these regions by the center, from which the surplus value generated is appropriated and transferred, the level of capital employed can be high[7], seeking to further increase the surplus value and, thus, the profits obtained.

The center's dominance over the system, described above, is illustrated by the so-called Seven Oil Sisters[8], that controlled the global oil industry between the mid-1940s and the mid-1970s, when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries was created (OPEC). Until the 1973 oil crisis, which resulted in the nationalization of most of the world's oil fields, these companies controlled about 85% of the global reserves of the resource, which is the main energy source on the planet. In this way, the host countries of these oil companies, invariably located in the center of the capitalist world-economy (Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States) had a decisive bargaining element at their disposal, allowing them to dictate the economic activity of any country that depended on their exports.

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7 As exemplified by Brazilian agriculture, particularly in the export sectors, which have a high level of capital and technology.

8 Royal Dutch Shell, Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso), Standard Oil of New York (Socony), Texaco, Standard Oil of California (Socal), Gulf Oil.

It is no coincidence that the identification of authors, such as Braudel (2009) and Wallerstein (1992; 2003; 2009), of the process of degradation of the American hegemony and acceleration of the decadence of the capitalist world-economy from the crises of that decade, which led to a change in the mechanisms used by the center to manage its relationship with the rest of the planet. In particular, there is a trend towards the financialization of the system, a phenomenon that historically marks the maturation and exhaustion of an accumulation model. It is noteworthy, as observed by the authors, that it is the moments of crisis and transition that allow the occurrence of transformations both in the structure and in its components, the states, and it is necessary, therefore, to study how these changes occur.

The Issue of Development in the World-Systems Theory

This section seeks to establish, based on the considerations outlined in the previous sections, what development, in the World-Systems Theory and, particularly, in the capitalist world-economy, represents. It is worth remembering, according to Braudel (2009), that the imbalances between the different regions of the capitalist world-economy are built and consolidated over centuries, drawing together the structure that characterizes the international division of labor and, therefore, the division between center, semiperiphery and periphery. Thus, it is necessary to address the phenomenon of revolutions, which at the same time influence the trajectory of the system and enable the protagonists of the process to evade the bonds of the capitalist world-economy, opening a path for its autonomous development.

Initially, it is necessary to specify what is meant by revolution. Thus, its interpretation is adopted as social and political revolutions: "[...] separate and comparatively rare historical events, but which, far from being marginal or atypical for the history of states and the international system, are points of transition and formation without which the modern world would not be as it is" (Halliday 1999, 143). The author supports this conception in a tripartite manner, on the contributions of Skocpol, Barrington-Moore and Griewank. Theda Skocpol, for example, defined revolutions "[...] based on the degree of transformation of society and the destruction of the old state" (Halliday 1999, 143). In this sense, the relationship between state and revolution is prioritized, and how international competition has opened space for uprisings, which at the same time transform the social and political structure.

At the same time, Halliday (1999) analyzes J. B. Barrington-Moore's argument, which suggests that there is no non-violent path to modernity.

Studying the different strategies followed by England, the United States, Germany and Japan, the author notes the violent chapters in their path towards industrialization and liberal democracy, whether domestically, through revolutions and civil wars, or internationally, through interstate wars. "The revolutions were, therefore, not aberrations to a non-violent alternative, but a form of transition inevitably violent to a modern society and, frequently, a form that, on an international scale, was less violent than the German-Japanese alternative" (Halliday 1999, 144).

Finally, Halliday (1999) visits the work of Karl Griewank, who has studied the history of the concept of revolution since its astronomical beginnings. Thus, when clarifying its various meanings, it appears that its contemporary use only became possible after the French Revolution, not fitting into the phenomena that preceded the modern interstate system. It becomes essential, therefore, not only "[...] political or constitutional change, but also the participation of the masses in this process; the central target of the revolutions was state control [...]" (Halliday 1999, 144).

From the triad that supports the author's thinking, the interest in affirming the revolution as a transition process is evident, since:

> The questions of the definition and the historical role of revolutions are certainly central to any discussion of these uprisings in the international context. Almost every discussion of revolutions in IR literature perceives them in a much looser sense to include blows and outbursts of violence, which does not simply dissolve them in a behaviorist spectrum. Most IR literature also assumes that revolutions are moments of collapse, rather than transition [...] (Halliday 1999, 144).

Exactly the perspective of revolution as a transition matters to this discussion, since it challenges structures that seek to place themselves as given. In other words, the revolutionary process challenges and transforms the capitalist world-economy and the interstate system, given its impact on the ideological system that, in each period, dialectically justifies and is supported by the international division of labor.

Regarding development, therefore, the liberal revolutions of the 18th century represented moments of transition that transformed space-time and political and production practices (paving the way for the rise of the appropriation of surplus value). As a result, precepts considered until then as doctrines in the explanation of the world and society have been overturned, with consequent transformations in scientific perspectives, in the field of exact, human and social sciences.

The Russian Revolution of 1917, likewise, decisively marks the 20th century, since all the events that occurred during the existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and originated therefrom, were to a greater or lesser extent impacted by the challenge it represented to the capitalist world-economy. Even today, its reflexes are felt, either through the socialist experiences that survived its collapse, either through its cultural and intellectual legacy or, simply, as an example of a rupture in the system.

In the same sense, the debate established by the authors studied here, considering the critical perspective adopted, which leads to questions about the current order, participates in the process proposed by Wallerstein (1992) for the elaboration of scientific and cultural alternatives. In a context of crisis and systemic transition, these contributions act in favor of positive transformations in the world-system, since they favor the construction of a fairer model in the distribution of global (material or not) wealth, and, therefore, a more egalitarian one, both domestically and internationally.

It is evident, from the proposed analyzes, that the very idea of development presents itself as an ideological battlefield, since its origin in the aftermath of the Second World War, elaborated by the center as an instrument of attraction of the peripheries and semi-peripheries in the process of independence, passing through the proposals of the Non-Aligned Movement, which suggested the possibility of reaching the center, to the contemporary interpretations, which approach the concept in relation to the most diverse disciplinary and social spheres.

Throughout its history, and in the different proposals, the structural elements that produce the different levels of development verified in the world have often been lost sight of, given that the circumstances and forums in which the debate take place are systematically conditioned. In this sense, Amin (1997) warns that even countries that adopt socialist experiences, by incorporating development perspectives originating from elements of the capitalist world-economy and trying to combine them with the objective of building socialism, are in danger of returning to patterns typical of the structure they aim to combat. The attempt to "reach" the capitalist center can lead to the adoption of practices that favor reintegration into the dominant system, particularly when considering the expansionist tendency and strength of the capitalist world-economy:

> [...] the so-called socialist countries proposed, with a lot of confusion, at the same time to "achieve" and do something else ("build socialism"), and had disconnected - in the sense that I gave this concept, that is, they had subjected their external relations to the logic of their internal development. The positive

aspects of their achievements (a paternalistic statism, no doubt, but with a social whole, which guaranteed job security and a minimum of social services, in contrast to the savage capitalism of the capitalist peripheries) stem from his origin (a popular anti-capitalist revolution) and its disconnection; while its dead ends translate at their turn the illusion of "reach", which implies the wide adoption of the criteria of capitalism (Amin 1997, 72).

Nevertheless, certain socialist experiences, which persist in their challenge to the capitalist world-economy, demonstrate the possibility of effectively detaching themselves from the elements of domination of this system. This is highlighted when their continuity goes beyond the existence of the socialist bloc led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, whose foreign policy facilitated the insertion of these states.

In this sense, it is worth exploring how relations between the countries of the socialist bloc took place. Unlike the configuration of the capitalist world-economy, guided by the appropriation of global surplus value through the international division of labor, the socialist model was based on revolutionary solidarity. Thus, even when incurring losses, exchanges were established that prioritized the well-being of the populations and the success of the partner regimes. For this reason, the fall of the USSR in the 1990s had an impact on revolutionary states with fewer resources at their disposal, in view of the important proportion of aid previously received.

Thus, the Cuban, North Korean and Chinese cases stand out. Each, in their own way and from different conditions, seeks to build an alternative model, guided by socialist ideals. This proposal is even more important when one considers that such experiences began in the peripheries of the capitalist world-economy, adding to the systemic challenge represented by its revolutions a Third-Worldist varnish.

Therefore, in all cases, there is a search for the internalization of the elements that constitute the center's monopoly on the capitalist system, finances and technologies. From the moment that such instruments cease to act in favor of the global transfer of surplus value, the reaction of the capitalist world-economy becomes inevitable, with history showing the violence of the processes necessary for the establishment of the relations characteristic to the system. The most varied methods are used in an attempt to reestablish the contested pattern of domination, but embargoes, *coups d'état* and interventions stand out. It should also be mentioned that such measures are not only adopted against countries that pose a direct challenge to the system, through the adoption of contesting ideologies, but to any in which policies are adopted in opposition to the processes of global appropriation of surplus value.

The Cuban experience that began in 1959, for example, has faced a strong reaction from the capitalist world-economy since its genesis, not least due to its geographical proximity to the American hegemony. Thus, the country suffers an economic embargo that hinders economic growth, in addition to constant assassination attempts against its leaders, *coups d'état* and invasions. Despite this, and the limitations imposed by the natural resources available in its territory, the Cuban project has reached high levels of education and health, with the development even of vaccines against cancer, in a feat not yet surpassed by the western powers. In addition, other indicators demonstrate its success in raising the population's living conditions, such as security, housing, food and access to the most diverse forms of cultural manifestations. Also, Cuba demonstrates clarity of its objectives at the international level:

> In the Cuban revolutionary logic, the actions launched were aimed at achieving and defending real independence and, fundamentally, social change. Therefore, the external projection should also follow this transformation process. This meant, in the first place, challenging and overcoming dependence and subservience to the United States, which had been going on for more than fifty years. Cubans were clear that they would have to face the isolation and hostility promoted by the Americans. However, this situation could be offset by relations with the USSR. The Revolution meant not only a change in Cuba, but also a change in the way the country came to perceive its place in the world. The Cuban state, traditionally of lesser importance in global affairs, could now (and should) project and interfere in international dynamics, with a view to strengthening its own Revolution. In that sense, foreign policy for Cuba has always been much more than simply establishing commercial and diplomatic relations. External conduct was reflected in the debates and formulation of domestic policies. On the other hand, it also reflected on Cuba's relationship with the two superpowers, a reality that Cubans had to deal with until 1991. Finally, it served as the basis for a new identity, which accompanied the construction of the socialist state and its redefinition as a country of the Third World (Pereira in Visentini et al. 2013, 259).

In the same sense, Visentini (2013) points out that North Korea was born from the intervention of the American hegemony in its revolutionary process. The war that divided the country not only resulted in economic blockades, but also in a long period of non-recognition of its state, which only joined the United Nations in 1991.

Even so, the country gained mastery of highly complex technologies, such as nuclear (both for civilian and strategic use), and overcoming the natural challenges that, combined with the economic embargo, imposed on the region

a shortage of basic goods. In addition, the guarantee of employment and the provision of social services to the population assures a level and dignity of life. In this way, the country's global importance is elevated, since:

> [...] in the transition to the 21st century, Korea starts to occupy a privileged space in the field of decisions involving high diplomacy. The four powers with which the two Korean states have to interact more directly undergo changes that affect the destinations of the peninsula, giving the region a strategic character, this time global. China continues to grow stronger, and is now associated with Russia, trying to avoid a huge US ascendancy over the region. This country, in turn, tries to reaffirm its supremacy over its old allies, Tokyo and Seoul. But both are conditioned by economic needs that direct them towards the developing pole of East Asia, since only with a certain degree of autonomy can their development proceed (Visentini 2013, 146).

For its part, the People's Republic of China has not only managed to resist the advances of the capitalist world-economy, but also to establish alternative orders on a larger scale:

> The impact of China's global insertion is intense, not only due to the accelerated growth rate, but also due to the country's economic and population weight, as well as its continental dimension. The problem, however, does not concern only the weight of China, but mainly the characteristics of the Chinese project. It is a nuclear power, with immense military capacity, in addition to the fact that it is a model for a development with autonomous intentions. The People's Republic of China, thanks to its military deterrence, nuclear weapons, its own arms industry, aerospace and missile technology, as well as being a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council (with veto power) is the only developing country that is at the core of world power (Martins in Visentini et al. 2013, 116).

Thus, it is noted that the socialist experience in China began in a context of resistance to Japanese imperialism and confrontation with the nationalist project of the Kuomintang. The Chinese Communist Party's proposal gained prominence with its successes during World War II and, after the conflict ended and the confrontation with the Kuomintang resumed, with the Great March. In this, the withdrawing socialist troops continued to spread their ideology, and their persistence eventually became part of the popular imagination.

It is identified that with the victory of the socialists in the Chinese civil war and the consolidation of the People's Republic of China, the capitalist world-economy relegates the country to the same isolation as other revolutionary states

and, thus, until the 1970s, sanctions were imposed on the country that include economic blockade and, even with the reestablishment of commercial relations, several attempts to contain it are carried out, for example by stimulating *coups d'état*. From there, reforms are established with the objective of boosting the economy, given that the construction of socialism demands sufficient material conditions to provide good living conditions for all and to defend the project.

Thus, by controlling its financial market and foreign investment, demanding the sharing of technologies when establishing ventures in its territory, China was able to develop and dominate cutting-edge technologies (such as the 5G internet) and counteract the American hegemony in its strategic surroundings. At the same time, it managed to pursue the objectives announced as a socialist project, fighting poverty, improving the living conditions of the population, reducing inequality between countryside and city and adopting practices that are beneficial to the environment.

The examples cited lead us to reflect on the possibilities available to the peripheries and semi-peripheries of economic, political and social transformation. They demonstrate that it is necessary to think, in a perspective of the geopolitical South, alternatives that allow the overcoming of the problems imposed by the systemic world order, whose structure imposes limits on the autonomous development of countries outside the center due to the need for appropriation of surplus value that sustains their control over the capitalist world-economy through the international division of labor. Thus, it is argued that the path to development passes through the challenge of financial and technological monopolies that guide global capital flows, aiming at greater equality between countries and better living conditions for all humanity.

Final Remarks

Considering, according to Amin (1997), that the international division of labor allows the surplus value of the periphery and semiperiphery to be appropriated by the center, thanks to the monopoly over technologies and finance, it is evident that the capital accumulation flow benefits the center to the detriment of the others, dialectically ensuring the continuity of differentiation between the regions of the capitalist world-economy, since such an influx of resources allows the renewal of the instruments of domination. Likewise, it should be remembered that the semi-periphery also appropriates surplus value in its relationship with the periphery, guaranteeing advantages over the latter.

Remembering Braudel, the advent of modernity leads the economy to influence society, politics and culture more deeply. Marx's propositions

inspire analysis in this sense, underlining the dialectical relationship between the economic structure and the political and legal, ideological superstructure. Thus, the drainage of capital from the peripheries towards the center suggests that the advantages obtained through this process go beyond the material bases, extending to all spheres of society. This happens in a conflictive and contradictory way, as are the relations between the classes, whose role is essential for the construction and reproduction of the capitalist mode of production.

Thus, it is identified that the development of a given region is associated with its capacity to accumulate capital, according to its insertion as a source or destination of flows of global surplus value. In this way, the countries located at the center of the system are categorized as developed; semi-peripheral countries are treated as developing or emerging; and the countries of the periphery relegated to the condition of underdevelopment. The ideological sense of this terminology is also evident, particularly regarding the semiperiphery, since it is referenced in a situation that presupposes the possibility of autonomous development within the framework of the system, a fact not verified empirically, given that the only cases of rise to the center took place via "sponsored", "by invitation" development, with authorization and support from the center, as previously exemplified by South Korea.

The influence of this process is not limited to economic aspects, but also extends to other spheres of society. That is why the political, social and cultural systems of the peripheries must be influenced, establishing in the superstructure justifications necessary for the flow of international capital. With this objective, international institutions and organizations play a fundamental role, as exemplified by the Bretton-Woods[9] and the World Trade Organization, which restructure basic questions of the polarization of the capitalist world-economy as technical problems, imposing solutions appropriate to the interests of the center on the peripheries, therefore ideologically partial, under a scientific hue. For this reason, despite frequent attempts by semiperipheral and peripheral countries to appropriate their forums to discuss and build alternatives that benefit them, structural barriers are imposed and limit the effectiveness of the initiatives, as evidenced by the difficulties faced by the least favored countries to enforce its demands in the Uruguay and Doha Rounds of the World Trade Organization[10].

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9 The Bretton-Woods system, established in 1944, sought to regulate the world commercial and financial system in a context of necessity of European reconstruction due to World War II. It materialized through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later divided into the World Bank and Bank for International Investments) and the International Monetary Fund.

10 The World Trade Organization was established in 1995, based on the General Agreement

Thus, at the superstructural level, the drainage of resources that perpetuates the inequality necessary for the functioning of the capitalist world-economy is consolidated. Such an understanding of the dialectical relationship of these processes is in line with Wallerstein (2009) when contesting the divisions between the social sciences, and suggests that tackling the challenges of underdevelopment demands overcoming the systemic imbalances immanent to the functioning of the capitalist world-economy. After all, being fundamental to capitalism, as proposed by Marx (1996a; 1996b), the continuous accumulation of capital, in order to allow the constant revolution of the means of production that sustains the system, and identifying the appropriation of surplus value of the peripheries as an important source of this accumulation, the impossibility of functioning of a capitalist world-economy without differentiation between its regions is evidenced, since such inequality is what allows the extraction of surplus value at a global level.

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on Tariffs and Trade (GATT - 1948), which was incorporated into it. The debates within the institution are divided into the so-called Rounds. The Uruguay Round (1986), which started in the context of GATT, underlines the creation of global protections on intellectual property, ensuring the central monopoly on technologies, while defending the liberalization of financial services and foreign investment. In the Doha Round (2001), the demand for the peripheries and semi-peripheries to reduce subsidies from the so-called developed countries on their agricultural sectors stands out, a debate whose challenges show that, even with the proposal to meet the interests of the least privileged countries, the effectiveness of the forums is limited.

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ABSTRACT

This work analyzes the development in World-System Theory as produced by the flow of appropriation of global surplus value through the international division of labor, creating the divisions between center, semiperiphery and periphery in the capitalist world-economy. It thus aims to explore how the global appropriation of surplus value in the capitalist world-economy produces variations in the level of development of its different regions. To this end, it contextualizes and conceptualizes its elements on its spatial and temporal dimensions. It defines surplus value and the form of its global accumulation, and in this sense explores the succession of capitalist hegemonies, in their dialectical relationship with the system's progress, enabling the approach to the international division of labor, and how the monopoly over finance and technologies allows the center of the system to consolidate a structure that ensures the transfer of capital and surplus value from the other regions to it. It follows that the development of a particular country or region in the capitalist world-economy depends on its ability to accumulate surplus value globally. Additionally, it is observed that the conditions imposed by the system structure prevent initiatives of autonomous development by its parts, being necessary to break with them for such a project to be possible.

WALLERSTEIN, ARRIGHI AND AMIN: IMPERIALISM IN FORDIST CAPITALISM

Luiz Felipe Brandão Osorio[1]

Introduction: Fordist Capitalism

Always current and present, imperialism has never ceased to cast a shadow on International Relations. On the contrary, even when considered to be outdated, it shaped the world's directions, following the tune of transformations of capitalism. Now, amid the centenary jubilee of the first debates, imperialism has resumed its charge at full power. After a short interregnum of illusory prosperity at the threshold of the transition between centuries, the term returns to the mouth and ears of operators and scholars of international relations. Today's role is largely due to the practical and theoretical directions that impacted the study of the state system. Reflecting on this word is not a simple exercise. It translated the direction of the development of capitalism since the 19th century, having oscillated like no other in the systemic trajectory.

Imperialism and international relations gain specific content precisely in the consolidation of capitalism as the predominant mode of production globally. The themes are directly interrelated. Therefore, criticizing one means touching everyone to a greater or lesser extent. In this sense, many authors set out to criticize international capitalism. Few have been successful in resisting time and difficulties, being recognized until today by several generations. These deserve special mention. Although situated in their historical time, they were thinkers who were not linked to a national geographic space, being considered intellectuals of the world. Furthermore, if their power in ideas was not enough, they also gained notoriety for their political and militant engagement, always in the uncompromising defense of the periphery and against inequalities in development. In this pitch, it is worth discussing Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, and Samir Amin.

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The three were notable for their fearless criticism of liberalism and the direction of world capitalism. As they lived for many years, they underwent important transformations in the international system. And they became indispensable authors for the critical studies of international relations. Even if it is to refute its premises, it is necessary to read and understand them. Their perspectives are closer to each other than they are apart, despite the marked dissonances. The reason for the many points of convergence is due, among other factors, to the historical moment of capitalism in which they built their positions. As sons of their context, they developed their ideas from a point in the trajectory of capitalism that largely explains their premises and postures: that of Fordist capitalism.

The meaning attributed here to the term characterizes a pattern of development of capitalist production relations. Despite the origin of the term referring to the homage to Henry Ford who pioneered the conveyor belt in the assembly of automobiles, the Fordism discussed here touches the meaning given by the materialist theory of the State and by the French regulatory school and is not confused with the semantics given by Gramsci (2008). Fordism is not related to the ideas of organization of industrial production originally derived from Frederick Taylor, but rather encompasses a pattern of development, composed of the accumulation regime and mode of regulation corresponding to a specific historical period of capitalist development, driven by the crisis of 1929 and the Second World War (Jessop 1991). The post-1945 era was sewn under a model based on two foundations: the internal, national accumulation regime, structured along the lines of what is known as industrial capitalism; and the mode of state-interventionist regulation (Keynesian or social well-being), with legal and bureaucratic provisions on social experience, in the search for well-being, consumption, and growth.

The new cycle of capitalism that opens after the economic crisis of 1929 and the ensuing World War II and goes until the debacle in the 1970s has very particular historical and theoretical contexts, causing an interim of exceptional and punctual relative stability in the trajectory of the center of accumulation of the capitalist system (which did not reach the periphery). The moment of economic recovery and political composition around social democracy as weapons of containment of the spread of the victory of the Russian Revolution changed the face of the pattern of development of capitalism. Unquestionably, a scenario of economic growth on a world scale has been reconciled, accompanied by a substantial increase in social indices. The emergence of the United States, as a hegemonic power, and the rise of the Soviet Union, which symbolized the arrival of the left to power (as well as Euro-Communism), and the spread of capitalist relations across the quadrants

of the world map, gave capitalism a new face.

In this scenario, workers' struggles and the reorganization of capitalist structures are shaped. From the strongly liberalizing conceptions radiated earlier, it went for: concessions to labour through the expansion of rights; the anchoring of production relations on national-state bases, with the promotion of aggregate demand, growth and mass consumption; and the regulation of capital flows around the world through the formal and informal configuration of American hegemony. Liberal capitalism migrated to a compromise solution around Fordist capitalism, an adjective that qualifies what we can call the second debate[2].

In this dynamic, with the lefts in power, either by revolutionary means or by the social-democratic commitment, and with the relations of production spreading all over the globe, theoretically, an unprecedented scenario emerges. Marxism as a whole inaugurates the Western tradition (and consequently the Eastern one)[3] and, gradually, the reflections on imperialism expand, extending the limits of the European continent and encompassing other regions around the world, establishing a duality: of central conceptions, which deny and reaffirm imperialism, adapting it to the new conditions; and visions focused on the periphery, which contribute and innovate substantially to the debate, thus being the subject of a more detailed investigation. In this pitch, there is the theory of monopoly capital (Baran and Sweezy), the Marxist dependency theorists (Frank, Dos Santos, Bambirra and Marini) and the third-worldists[4] (theorists of the world-system and unequal exchanges, such as Wallerstein, Arrighi, and Amin). The latter will be analyzed in this article.

The concept of imperialism itself, very much identified with the pioneers, with traditional Marxism and its historical context, is revised and, inevitably, eclipsed. In addition, the concept of imperialism was diluted (if not pulverized) in other wider elements. This was due to the fact the concept itself was closely linked to conditions that had dissipated such as the economic base, to the capitalist structure, and Marxist reflections were directed towards the superstructure (philosophical, political, legal, and ideological aspects),

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2 The pioneering debate of imperialism took place in a very specific historical and theoretical context that goes from the late quarter of the 19th century to approximately the Second World War and is the pioneer and best known about the understandings of imperialism (Osorio 2018).

3 Anderson 2004, Losurdo 2018.

4 Without any pejorative connotation, without pretending to claim the superiority of the arrogance of the said First World, on the contrary, highlighting the autochthonous and original character of the reflections, third-worldists refer to those who emphasize on uneven exchanges and to the world-system theory, as it is classified by a good part of the doctrine originating from the central countries. For more, see Brewer (1990); Barone (1990); Carnoy (1994); Nogueira and Messari (2005); Noonan (2017).

as well as to the context of accumulation crisis, interstate competition, and systemic wars policies.

At the center, the notion of imperialism was either rejected or updated. In the periphery, the significant contributions came from applying the teachings of the pioneers to the local reality. What is new here is the redirection of the focus to the periphery and its structural problems, which are radically different from those of the capitalist center. It is, therefore, understandable that imperialism is not the focal point of the analyzes. It ends up being carried away amidst the urgency of the emphasis on other aspects, of theorization still recent in the world panorama, as the domination of the center over the periphery and the dependence relations of this one to the central capitalism by the commercial exchange, transfer of value or by the unequal exchanges, as well as the international division of labor and the world-system.

The discrepancy between center and periphery becomes unavoidable not only because of the expansion of capitalism in the world but also because of the relative prosperity that the center had enjoyed in relation to the marginal regions. Therefore, it is in this panorama that the novelty shines. The engagement and revolutionary struggles were important ferments in the construction of autochthonous critical thinking. Europeanism[5] predominant in pioneering views, required to be broken, since there were specific demands from the peripheries that were seen as pressing, not being capitalism and its unfolding exclusive to a region. It is from Europe that imperialism becomes the subject of intellectuals of the most diverse nationalities in the four corners of the world.

The unit of analysis is not national social formation and class correlation, but the world system, as a whole, having distinct geographic areas, and the States of this whole being parts. Imperialism ceases to be pointed out as a consequence of the expansion and development of capitalism, as it was previously, to be read as an element of the exploitation relations of the advanced countries regarding the backward.   It is a purpose much more external to capitalism and the State than to the political-economic dynamics.

Capitalism is not defined by a specific class relationship, but by production for profit, in a worldwide system of exchange, and by the exploration of areas by others. The forms of exploitation occur in three

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5 Not that it is stated here that the pioneering authors were purposefully excluding. For example, Lenin himself, with more emphasis, had already denounced the existing inequality. The Europeanist bias was natural in the meantime and inherent in the limits of capitalism at the time. The adjective in question addresses the inevitable centrality of European thought about imperialism at that time, still restricted to the political cycles of that continent. Even so, this feature of pioneering imperialism was criticized, such as that of Amin (1977a).

ways, basically: monopolistic control of trade, extraction of the surplus value from the periphery to the center, and unequal exchanges. In this dynamic, capital accumulation is not a precondition for qualitative advances in levels and methods of production, but it is a redefinition of the fixed magnitude of resources from the periphery to the center. The world system is not that of the 19th century, the historicity here is different. It was born in the 16th century, in a relatively static logic of exploitation. Because capitalism is inherently incapable of generating world prosperity, it needs to be overcome.

In line with the Fordist debate, many would put Wallerstein, Arrighi, and Amin together with Marxist dependency theorists in the same vein, called by many the third worldist. Mainly, Wallerstein and Amin are often placed under the same label, as members of the dependency theory, as do Carnoy (1994) and Barone (1985). Brewer (1990) still includes Arrighi in this aspect and segregates Emmanuel's unequal exchanges, concerning what he calls dependency theorists. Noonan (2017) also unifies them in the same group, calling them neo-Marxists. Martins (2011), on the other hand, separates them, placing Amin as a neo-developmentalist socialist and Wallerstein and Arrighi as theorists of the world system. Nogueira and Messari (2005) attribute to Amin a more nationalist perspective within the theoretical aspects of dependence and differentiate Wallerstein from him due to the American Marxist structuralism. Despite some similarities of the theoretical contributions, there are important divergences, therefore, it is imperative to separate their ideas, giving each one the centrality of their contributions. On the other hand, it would not be an exaggeration to state that it is a system-world group, within which there is a vector that specializes in unequal exchanges. Therefore, the most striking difference is in the breadth of the analytical north. Thus, the broadest lens, that of world-system theories, and the most specific, that of unequal exchanges, will be mentioned.

As for the political economy of world-systems, authors Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi will be approached with greater emphasis, without disregarding the relevance that other exponents such as Terence Hopkins and Beverly Silver, according to Martins (2011), have for this aspect. About unequal exchanges, it is worth making a synthesis of ideas here and highlighting the one who got more prominence in the combination of inequality and imperialism, Samir Amin. These theories marked an era in the historicity   of imperialism, nourishing discussions until today, in the promotion of independent and autochthonous thinking on the periphery about its reality.

Wallerstein and the World-System

Immanuel Wallerstein stood out as an organic intellectual, mixing academic performance with political activism. Born in 1930, in the United States and studied in New York and quickly aroused his interest in the anti-colonial movement, notably the Indian. Unfortunately, he died in 2019. He was a professor of sociology at several universities around the world, subsequently receiving honors worldwide. Neither his performance nor his thinking was limited to national borders. On the contrary, their nationality is not always remembered. Because his experience and maturity occurred during the 1950s and 1960s, that is, in the immediate second post-war period, his object of study was, as a critical thinker, the processes of decolonization (so much so that his first published books are about the African uprisings against the metropolises). In other words, he was a man of the moment of internationalization of capitalist relations of production beyond the European continent, on the time when capitalism became an international mode of production.

What was not a trivial transformation, but it occurred based on a lot of sweat, blood, and tears, in a period of boiling on the fringes of the globe. Both the socialist revolutions and the nationalist uprisings in the periphery demonstrated that the relative stability and prosperity of the post-war did not replicate beyond the center. Also, the burden of centuries of colonization revealed that independent peoples no longer agreed with any interference and valued their solutions to internal issues. Thus, the movement of non-aligned countries emerged, emphasizing the importance of the autonomy of the said Third World in international dynamics. Wallerstein was very sensitive to these issues, so he directed his studies, initially, to understand how the international whole was built and works, what he came to call the world-system. What to look for in-depth in the history of the roots of European colonization in the world, as well as, later, to study the developments in the peripheral spaces. What earned him the qualification of a third world theorist, even though he came from the great capitalist power and even though he rejected this analysis divided into three levels of the international system.

Its holistic perspective of the world-system is not restricted to a continent or a region, but embraces the world as a continuous and long-lived whole, resuming its historical origins since the beginning of the capitalist vestiges. He sets aside methodological nationalism to deal with theoretical categories together, forming a particular whole. The American, therefore, becomes the founder and patron of a strand of thought that will add great exponents of critical theories and will support native studies on the international periphery.

Due to its international projection, its ideas had great capillarity, spreading throughout the world, forming generations of internationalists and being still essential for any critical study[6].

The guiding thread of his conceptions can be pulled from the iconic work *The Modern World-System, Volume 1* (1974), which paves the way for the world-system, which will fertilize several sophisticated studies on the subject. Such is the ambition of the undertaking, it led him to publish three more volumes, in 1980, 1989, and 2011, respectively. In a context of questioning the prevailing international order, critical studies are aimed at constructing anti-systemic theoretical alternatives that would escape the defense of liberalism by Anglo-Saxon hegemony and the official Marxism of the Third International. The author summarizes theoretical positions, ranging from Braudel and Marx to Weber to support their historicity of capitalism and understand the roots of the current system.

In his trajectory, he returns to the roots of the transition between feudalism and capitalism in Europe, going back three centuries, comparing to Marx, in medieval agriculture, in the long sixteenth century, with Braudel, to extract the origins of modernity, emphasizing his trend inherent to internationalization, even before the consolidation of the production mode. The modern world-system created at the dawn of modernity gradually extends until, in the 19th century, and it incorporates the entire planet. There is an integration of societies in a transnational network of commercial exchanges, which is developing and improving. Thus, an innovative social system is created, different from other forms of power and domination, which extends in economic, cultural, and political connections around the world (Wallerstein 1974).

The stages of this narrative encompass the interregnum between 1450 and 1640, in which the origins and initial conditions of the world-system are evident, closely linked to the European scenario; they cross modernity, from 1640 to 1815, in which the system had spread around the world; until reaching the third phase, from 1815 to 1917, in which the expansion demands from the system a readjustment to the new reality. From 1917 onwards, the present is constituted in the revolutionary tensions that the systemic consolidation

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6 There are centers of thought that currently bear widely the interpretations of the world-system. Noteworthy are the studies by researchers at the Fernand Braudel Center at Binghamton University, in the state of New York, in the United States, at CES (Center for Social Studies), in Portugal, whose greatest disciple was Boaventura de Sousa Santos, and, in Brazil , for example, the Research Group on Political Economy of World Systems (GPEPSM), from the Federal University of Santa Catarina, in Florianópolis, and the Laboratory of Studies on Hegemony and Counter-hegemony (LEHC), from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.

provokes. In the exercise of going back to the 15th century and returning to the present, Wallerstein does not shy away from constantly feeding the basis of his ideas, adapting them to contemporary changes, to the point of projecting even the decline of the world-system, which he would already have, even, an approximate date[7].

Wallerstein's thought, despite having the prominent verve of anti-colonialism, still flirts with Western Marxism[8], a tradition very influential to the Marxists of his time. In other words, he rejected the two-dimensional idea of structure and superstructure, placing the two plans at the same level and giving the same importance to issues related to economics, politics, ideology, culture, philosophy. Also, as a specific mark of the time in which it lived and forged itself, that of Fordism, industrial capitalism, Keynesianism, and the social welfare model, directed the focus of international relations towards international (and unequal) trade. Along this line, within the modern world-system, the world-economy is projected, which is intensely articulated by geographic areas via capital and commodity flows, whose dynamics impact and, at the same time, are contaminated by the interstate system, shaped by issues diverse, such as politics and culture (Martins 2011).

The interaction of these elements moves the transformations and guarantees the progress of the system, which is not, however, linear, but marked by cycles[9] that are characterized by the leadership of the hegemonic state. The emphasis on its systemic object is linked to the importance given to competition between European national states, which, according to the author, not only degenerated into political and economic chaos thanks to the command, over the last 500 years, of three great hegemonic powers that would have been able to organize or govern the hierarchical functioning of this order (United Provinces, or what would become a large part of Holland, England, and the United States). The existence of a hegemonic power would be a systemic imposition so that unity does not fall apart in a world empire. In other words, the American intellectual starts from a theoretical perception that flirts with hegemonic stability, from the role of hegemonic power as the guarantor of the system[10].

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7 This is what Wallerstein (2009) defends in more recent studies and analyzes, pointing to 2050 as a limit and a framework for transformation.

8 Losurdo (2018) explains and situates the tradition said to be Western (which is not related to geographical issues) in the beacons of Marxist thought.

9 Under the influence of Kondratiev's notorious conceptions, the interregns would be characterized by phases of expansion (phase A) and crisis (phase B), the duration of which would be between 30 and 60 years, and could be repeated within a hegemonic cycle.

10 Fiori (2004) attributes to Gilpin and Kilndleberger, realistic and non-Marxist theorists, the

The Hegemonic power is that which is distinguished by prominence (command, leadership, and influence) in this space, even though it cannot fully control it, due to the particularity of the world-system: it is uncontrollable by a single imperial power within the framework of capitalism. Although the hegemonic power is the promoter and guarantor of order, it is immersed in a highly competitive dynamic between States, the inter-state system, composed of sovereign political entities (Mariutti 2009). This gear is not tight, and there may be mutations between the various layers of the international division, which is configured between the center, the semiperiphery, and the periphery.

From the eclectic synthesis proposed by Wallerstein, it is possible to make some observations pertinent to the scope of the article. Going back so far in history affects the theoretical rigor of Marx's historical and dialectical materialism, as it goes beyond the Industrial and bourgeois revolutions (of the United States and France), which ends up mixing concepts of even similar names, but with different content and specificity (molded in the frameworks of capitalism). The interaction of the world-system between economics (world-economy) and politics (inter-state system), in turn, is interesting, as well as the focus on inter-state competition as a factor of instability and indomitable, that is, it cannot be controlled by any single force based on the dynamics of capitalism. Both perceptions are already closer to Marx.

The world economy is, however, too restricted in the sphere of distribution and circulation of international trade, without further details of the productive sphere, and not being based on the relations of production. Thus, both the economic categories and the policies used by him end up gaining idealistic outlines, vulnerable to leaning more towards abstraction than towards reality. The international division of labor proposed between the tripartite branch center, periphery and semiperiphery is worthwhile, but it often lacks clarity in its definitions. The political changes and agitations of the 1960s (such as the May 1968 uprisings) are, for him, a turning point in the systemic trajectory, having the crisis of the following decade as one of its consequences. This moment bothers him to the point of identifying the emergence of a terminal moment not only of American hegemony but of the entire modern world-system. His heterodox thinking leads him through demography, ecology, and cultural aspects to explain systemic development, which brings him closer to political perspectives.

In this broad focus, the concept of imperialism is diluted, as it happens within the tradition of Western Marxism, becoming one more effect of the systemic mechanisms of reproduction and exploitation of inequality between

adherence to this line of thought that was ironically called the theory of hegemonic stability within the debates of International Political Economy in the 1970s and 1980s.

countries, based on the international division of labor. In his approach, the concept of hegemony would be even more in vogue than that of imperialism, which is diluted and relegated to a second level, to the point that the theme is considered to be the missing element in several moments of the broad systemic approach of the American author (Brewer 1990). There is, therefore, no innovation about imperialism, but rather the connection of the concept to the economic bases. Attributed to the classic thinkers of imperialism, they would be insufficient and outdated and would need updates within the post-war context (and the rise of the left to power). Thus, like the theories of dependency and unequal exchanges, he directs his focus to the disparity between center and periphery, annealing the bases of his thinking in commercial or market relations, which translate, among other mechanisms, into the international division of labor (Noonan 2017).

Arrighi and the World-System

Giovanni Arrighi was, within the theories of the world-system, the main follower and diffuser, contributing decisively to its worldwide capillarity and its improvement. The Italian economist and sociologist was born in 1937, on the outskirts of Milan, and became one of the greatest contemporary intellectuals. He died in 2009. He was part of a generation in the context of the second post-war period, of prosperity and economic recovery at the center of capitalism and struggles and wars on the periphery. It is a context of unequal exchanges and monopolistic control of trade. Like Wallerstein, the Italian [11] synthesized excerpts from the reflections of Marx, Braudel, Weber, and also Schumpeter. In the 1960s, his interest was directed to the study of economic development in peripheral countries from a work trip to Africa (Zimbabwe and Tanzania, specifically). He traveled between Italy and the United States dealing with burning issues on the international stage. From the focus on the periphery, it was extended to the development of capitalism as a system. Thus, he turned to the crisis of American hegemony, the resulting political and economic transformations, and he even pioneered the rise of China (and its surroundings in Asia) as a world power.

In his writings and ideas, he started from Marx but sought to break with classical Marxism. Unlike Wallerstein, he does not understand that the roots of modernity must be sought in the beginnings of feudalism. In this sense, it takes less time to dive into Italian city-states to identify the germs of

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[11] Callinicos (2009) states that Arrighi cannot be placed in any category, in view of the complexity and temporality of his thinking.

capitalism. In the historical verification that capitalism undertakes as a world system, it dates from the 16th century, originating in Genoese accumulation, and has remained essentially unchanged since then, being relatively static when it touches the terms of center and periphery. Thus, starting from Braudel's concepts of long and short duration, but disagreeing with him on specific issues, he systematizes the history of the world system in cycles, inspired by the Kondratiev waves, which run from the long sixteenth century to the present day, which would be the long 20th century, which is the title of his most renowned work, *The Long 20th Century. Money, power, and the origins of our time* (1994). The timeline is measured by the duration of the processes of capital accumulation led by the hegemonic power of the time.

The sense of hegemony is very dear to Arrighi and, perhaps, the main element of dissent with Wallerstein (regarding the conceptual definition of the term and not about the overlapping of hegemony with imperialism). So much so that he returns directly to Gramsci to apply it to international relations (Arrighi 2007). The author emphasizes its two fundamental aspects: leadership (etymological notion) and domination (derived notion). The leadership would be exercised between States when an entity directs the system towards a path, whose movement is perceived as consonant to the general interest, which reinforces its position of domination and, at the same time, intensifies competition. In other words, there would be consensus and coercion when the power search is not the only objective of the state action of the hegemonic entity. To a large extent, world hegemonies reorganize the system of exchange and accumulation, fostering opportunities for cooperation, that is, also spreading positive effects in general[12]. The leading role of the hegemonic power does not make interstate capitalist competition unfeasible, responsible for changes in cycles of economic accumulation and political leadership, which are not coincident spheres but are in constant symbiosis.

For Martins (2011), historical capitalism, in the Italian view, would develop in two distinct and expansive logics, capitalist and territorial, intended for unity and contradiction. They articulate around the interwoven relationship between economics and politics. Thus, the driving force behind this development is the expansion and restructuring of the world economy, initiated by the leadership of States, communities, or blocks of government or business agents. Due to this pendular trend, four systemic accumulation

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12 Here, for Arrighi, the same criticism made by Fiori (2004) against Wallerstein applies, in the sense of pointing to a beneficial notion of hegemony, as a factor of stability. The perception is situated in the time and space of prosperity in the capitalist center from 1945 to 1970, since from the crisis of the American hegemony the hegemonic behavior changed completely, being the biggest factor of systemic instabilities.

cycles are registered: a Genoese (embryonic) cycle, from the 15th to the 17th century; a Batavian cycle, from the 17th to the 18th century; a British cycle, from the 19th century; and an American cycle, from the 20th century; that translate three hegemonic waves, the bathe and the Westphalian arrangement, the British of free trade and the American of the free initiative. Later, in more recent studies, Arrighi (1996) will emphasize only the last three, which are undoubtedly the most consistent, with sparkling distinctions and features in common.

Each stage is characterized by the same phases, starting with material expansion, followed by financial expansion. Amid over-accumulation of capital, decay and crisis begin, the transition from one power to the other takes place. It appears that the cyclic interregnums are increasingly shorter and the hegemonic powers increasingly stronger. Arrighi attaches peculiar importance, compared to Wallerstein, to financialization. The primacy of finance, contrary to what the classical authors of imperialism would say, would not be an exclusive feature of the 19th century, but it would already be present in the relationship between kingdoms around the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Modern. The financial expansion, even, would intensify the capitalist contradictions so much that it would be the turning point in the state dominance of a period, announcing the end of a cycle. Based on this theoretical elaboration, Arrighi, when groping the crisis of the Fordist model in the 1970s, is induced to the common error at the dawn of the 1990s, which was to point to the financialization of the world as a sign of the decline of American hegemony (autumn). Concomitantly, it outlines that Japan would succeed the Americans in the transition of world power, given the Asian accumulation pattern that could supplant the American. Finally, he shifts his attention to China in a book that became a reference for the study of the subject, *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-first Century*, from 2007.

Imperialism was also not at the center of Arrighi's concerns. However, he dedicated a study to systematize the contributions made so far. In the book *The Geometry of Imperialism*, from 1978, the author takes on the task of organizing the pioneering notions, with Hobson as a major paradigm, and comparing them with the existing formulations, in what he will call the second cycle of imperialism, of the decades of 1950 and 1960. Imperialism, for Arrighi (1983), would not be the panorama of anarchy in interstate relations that emerges from the competition between central states for territories, but the hierarchical order of states and the consequent specific domination structure that characterizes the economy-capitalist world since World War II. Faithful to its theoretical conceptions, it does not escape historicity and

hegemonic cycles. Thus, there would be several phases of imperialism in a hegemonic cycle. He tries to illustrate these periodizations by geometric figures, tracing identities, and disparities. In other words, imperialism was still eclipsed by other priority issues and very much tied to its economic side.

Despite significant differences, Arrighi is closer than he is distant to Wallerstein (especially about the concept of imperialism) and shares both the epistemological limits[13] and the great merit of the world-system theories. They call attention to the analysis of the inequality of international economic relations through a systemic, holistic, and historical view. Its breadth and heterodoxy allow for fruitful dialogue as other perspectives, with those of dependency authors, such as Frank and Dos Santos, more specifically, and, above all, with Amin's eclecticism (and unequal international trade).

Amin and the Unequal Exchanges

Samir Amin was a political economist and one of the greatest exponents of third worldism[14] and anti-colonialism. He was born in Cairo, in 1931, in Egypt, but studied and worked in France and many Francophone countries in Africa, such as Senegal, Mali, and Algeria, in political, economic (development), and academic institutions. He died in 2018. He was not a direct successor to the world-system theories, in the line of Wallerstein and Arrighi, but he is at the same level of importance and relevance exercised in Marxist internationalist studies. Its conception, also eclectic, touches on the theoretical understanding of the world-system, which can be inscribed in this tradition, but also with other aspects, such as dependency[15], even more closely as occurs with unequal international trade. Communist and anti-fascist since he was young, in France, he joined the French Communist Party and gradually moved away from the Soviet model and towards Maoism. He lived closely and

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13 In this sense, it is worth mentioning the main questionable points of the world-system theories, which are directed towards their functionalist bias, their detachment from Marxian premises and the extended notion of historicity of capitalism. For more, see Gerstenberg (2010).

14 The concept is debatable and may have a broad approach, involving all those who discuss underdevelopment in peripheral regions (dependency theorists, the world-system and unequal exchanges), or a restricted focus, touching only the intellectuals living in the large centers they directed their attention to the periphery, like those of unequal exchanges. Most of the literature, of Anglo-Saxon origin, tends to prioritize the more general perspective. For more, see Callinicos (2009); Brewer (1990); Barone (1985); Carnoy (1994).

15 Amin extols aspects of the center's expropriation dynamics in relation to the periphery, citing overexploitation of the workforce, which would allow it to be inscribed in Marxist theories of dependency (Brewer 1990, Côrrea 2012).

engaged in the movement of non-aligned countries and actively valued the independence and development of peripheral countries.

Immersed in his time and with the lens turned to the global periphery, his central concern was economic development at a global level. Immediately, as with the Eclacian[16] theories[17], he identified the gaps in the theories of modernization of the center, aimed at stepping up the scale of economic progress. He quickly went further, understanding underdevelopment as the reverse side of development. Based on the synthesis between the law of value (and its economic categories) and historical materialism (with an emphasis on class struggle), he formulated a law of world value to explain that peripheral countries would have their growth possibilities restricted and blocked by central economies which used the mechanism of overexploitation of peripheral labor. Historical materialism would even have urgency over the law of value, modulating it and moving world transformations, that is, attributing central importance to political phenomena. Therefore, capitalist development would need to be analyzed in its entirety, at the global level, but the strategies of autonomy and growth of underdeveloped countries should be separated from this whole, escaping the structural limits imposed. It combines the emphasis on asymmetry in the relations between center and periphery with class analysis, explaining the difficulty of Third World leaders in resisting imperialism, getting closer to Lenin (Noonan 2017).

Starting from the ideas of Marx, Braudel, and Polanyi, the author mixed his view with the most outstanding post-war interpretations of capitalism, development, and periphery, such as that of the monopoly capital of Baran and Sweezy, in the theory that would become known as monopoly capital[18].

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16 Translated from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America.

17 Cephaline theses are those that arose around CEPAL (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), an organ created within the United Nations (UN), linked to the Economic and Social Development Council (ECOSOC), focused on criticizing the perspective universalist development radiated by the traditional canons (Lewis, Nurkse, Rostow and Rosenstein-Rodan) of the center on the issue. In these visions, in clear contrast to the Ricardian theses of specialization of the countries via comparative advantages, it explains the backwardness of the peripheral countries from the concept of unequal development, emphasizing the peripheral asymmetries, of primary-exporting locations in relation to the industrialized center, which would lead to the permanent deterioration of the means of exchange, the imbalance of the balance of payments and unemployment. The solution presented would be the substitution of imports by the constant action of the State as a promoter of national development, stimulating local industries, the domestic market, the distribution of income, the incorporation of technology and the progressive modification of the export basket.

18 The school of monopoly capital, basically formed by its founders, Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, despite sparse and indirect contributions, was a first manifestation of the continuation of Marxist reflections on imperialism and, concomitantly, of updating the ideas of the pioneers,

This means recognizing the tendency of capitalism to overaccumulation and the consequent problems with absorbing the surplus. Stagnation would be the rule in this scenario, which could only be fought with production centered on the State. Thus, late post-war capitalism met very peculiar conditions and, therefore, was an exception, and with the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, the focus shifted from the state to financialization as a driving force out of stagnation. In its periodization, from the end of the 19th century until 1971, it was the era of traditional monopoly capital and thereafter a financial oligopolistic capitalism emerged and impacted international relations today.

Unlike Wallerstein and Arrighi, Amin nominally even dedicates many writings to thinking about imperialism. As a result, the first edition of *Imperialism and International Trade (the unequal exchange)*[19] was made public in 1971. The direction of this bias is directed by the inequality of capitalist relations, as an emphasis on trade. It is assumed that the value goes from the periphery to the center, being appropriate by it, as well as all the consequences of this, such as the selective migration of labor. And monopolies are intensifying, with control in several fields, from technology, finance, and natural resources. In underdeveloped countries, the goods produced were exchanged for a lesser amount of value than that actually contained in them, whereas in developed countries the opposite would occur. The dynamics of accumulation does not, however, allow this universe to be divided between homogeneous entities, on the contrary, because it tends towards asymmetric development, it fosters disparate socio economic formations, containing different manifestations of the mode of production. The main cleavage is that which occurs in two categories: center and periphery. In the center, growth is autonomous, while in the periphery it is blocked, due to the competition of the great powers. The unequal specialization resulting from this dynamic is determined by the absolute costs of production (and not by comparative advantages), which depend on productivity and wages. Therefore, those

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in post-World War II, inserting the element of the periphery. From academic publications to short-term insertions in the Monthly Review, the two intellectuals spread their interpretations around the world. For all the political engagement that the magazine particularized, it managed to bring together a body of intellectuals, which became known as the Monthly Review group, which was marked by a very peculiar vision in this Fordist debate and which was subsequently renewed over the years.

19 The work brought together specialized articles from the main exponents of this reading, such as Arghiri Emmanuel, Samir Amin, Charles Bettelheim and Christian Palloix. The reasons for the evident asymmetries were at the heart of the differences between them, residing in the value of the workforce (wages), for Emmanuel; in the class struggle, materialized in the overexploitation of work in the periphery by the center, for Amin; in the organic composition of capital and in regional disparities, for Bettelheim; and the exploitation rate contained in the essence of political economy, for Palloix.

nations that industrialized earlier have an immense advantage over laggards. Thus, the uneven development arising from this panorama is anchored in the sphere of circulation, translated into asymmetric exchange relations.

Unequal exchanges are inserted in this larger scope, which is modulating itself according to the transformations but has its roots in imperialism and uneven development. On the subject, Amin wrote works on the crisis of imperialism and uneven development, still in the 1970s. For him, imperialism organizes, under the domination of monopoly capitals, an immense pyramid of forms of labor exploitation, in which different levels all participate the bourgeoisies and the exploited classes of the world system, strategically located in the field of capitalism. It emphasizes the exploitation, in its various forms, of the proletarians both in the center and in the periphery, all integrated into the imperialist system. As a result, there is a need for the unification for the uprising towards socialism. To paraphrase Lenin, he states that not only the proletarians of the world but also the oppressed peoples should unite (Amin 1977a).

In his ambitious and long-lived effort (he has written on the subject since the 1950s), he seeks to explain the expansion of capitalism around the world and, simultaneously, the impact of this spread in the various regions, as a synthesis of the main Marxist premises underway at the time. Later, over time, he refines his understanding[20]. Thus, it is based on his law of world value that he withdraws the concept of imperialism. Relating it directly to the capitalist mode of production, it would be the binding element between the mechanisms and laws for the reproduction of capital; the social, national, and international alliances that support them; and the political strategies employed by these alliances. Accompanying the link to capitalism, he seeks the historical reasons for this dynamic in Eurocentrism, which refers to the analysis of colonization in the Modern Age. Imperialism, following the transformations of monopoly capital in the 19th century, consolidated segregation in a world-wide scheme between center and periphery.

The combination of economic issues, still closely linked to the concept of imperialism, with policies, directing the lens to class struggle on a world scale is his great contribution. His expanded theoretical starting point, the world-system, does not prevent him from analyzing national particularities, especially in the periphery (of Africa and Asia, more closely) in which the sparks of possible ruptures with the systemic dynamics would reside. The combativeness and restlessness made Amin one of the few theorists to resist over time, spanning generations, as one of the main critics of capitalism.

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20 Amin 2005; 2006.

Final Remarks

As ephemeral as it may seem, having lasted approximately a quarter of a century, the Fordist debate cannot be overlooked, since it characterizes an important transition period for the horizons that appeared in the later context. As can be seen, the analysis of imperialism was broadened and, at the same time, diluted, in arguments that included it in the relief of issues more similar to the unequal relations between center and periphery in the world development of capitalist relations. What is important to point out is that, in spite of the substantial geopolitical changes carried out, with regard to theory, there was no complete break with the pioneers, configuring the Fordist interregnum much more as a complement to the first Marxist ideas of imperialism (a direct link between imperialism and its economic basis), but with crucial innovations. Founded on primary bases, the authors of that moment did not themselves reevaluate the phenomenon of imperialism, but sought to understand it from broader perspectives that considered the emphasis on mechanisms that involved, to a greater or lesser extent, international trade or the sphere of circulation, economic surplus, value transfer, the world system and unequal exchanges.

The common point of the two interpretations analyzed (world-system and unequal exchanges) is to take capitalism as a world system, with an uneven trend between the parties involved. Contrary to what the pioneers thought, the expansion of capitalism did not lead to its reversal, due to its inherent contradictions, but, rather, to its consolidation as a mode of world production. What should be closed has been enlarged. Capitalism managed to build a world market, which the relations of production are expressing, however, increasingly distorted, feeding an extremely incongruous dynamic. The backwardness of the dependent countries needs to be taken seriously in analysis, inserting it into its space, in the international system. It is the failure of capitalism to generate widespread prosperity and development that brings about the imperious nature of change. The unit of analysis is not national social formation and class correlation, but the world system, as a whole, having distinct geographical areas, and the States and classes of this whole being parts.

Although the eclecticism of the authors does not allow us to place them in the same square, and leaves them vulnerable to criticism in several aspects, reviewing the three contributions is fundamental for the deepening of studies on imperialism. What unifies them is that they think in a context in which capitalism reaches the fringes of the globe, that is, the periphery emerges, with the fraying of social tissues through the introduction of capitalist production

relations, beyond Europe and points in the North hemisphere. Therefore, the moment in the development of capitalism, Fordism, directly impacts their theoretical and political formulation. Each in their own way, Wallerstein as the notion of system, Arrighi with historicity for hegemony and Amin for the emphasis on inequality and class struggle, they strengthen the debate, bringing interpretations about the asymmetries of the center and periphery relations that serve as leaven. from critical conceptions, projecting on a long-standing and militant career of main references for criticizing capitalism (and financial globalization) until today.

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ABSTRACT

Imperialism takes on a new guise after the Second World War. In a panorama of expanding production relations, capitalism becomes, in fact, a mode of world production, based on Fordism. In this dynamic, new elements are incorporated into the analysis of international relations, such as the periphery, unequal exchanges, the transfer of value, and the world system, which end up not only eclipsing imperialism but also giving it other outlines. In this tone, it is necessary to investigate three influential authors, such as Wallerstein, Arrighi, and Amin, demonstrating their place and their limits in the central debate of international relations. Over time, the three, due to the vigor of their ideas and political engagement, became essential authors for criticizing the moment of capitalism in which we are inserted, even if it is to refute them. Studying it means unraveling yet another important knot in the task of investigating imperialism, an essential concept for understanding reality.

KEYWORDS

Imperialism; Capitalism; International Relations.

THE (RE)EMERGENCE OF THE BRICS AND THE REORGANIZATION OF POWER IN CONTEMPORARY GEOPOLITICS

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Introduction

World geopolitics and international relations underwent several transformations throughout the 20th century. Among the most important, the two great world wars and the rearrangement of the post-war world that followed, can be mentioned. The reorganization of the world system in the post-war period involved the *Pax Americana* and the making of a world order linked to the United States, in parallel with the rise of the USSR to the status of military and ideological power, disputing with the US the status of hegemonic power, in a bipolarity that disappeared with the breakdown of the socialist ideological bloc.

As the United States consolidated itself as hegemon (main hegemonic power)[3], it had to deal with the consolidation of a systemic cycle of accumulation and its consequent downward trajectory. The first two decades of the 21st century marked the reemergence of other powers, with the resurgence of Russia and China: Russia recovering part of its sphere of influence in its surroundings, under the command of Vladimir Putin; and China consolidating itself as a global economic power, both playing an important role on the world geopolitical board. These countries took advantage of the gaps created by yet another structural crisis of world capitalism, materialized in the "crisis of 2008", which consequences influenced the relative decline of

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3 Later on we will have a more detailed discussion on the issue of US "hegemony".

the United States' ability to impose its majority will on the world system, as
they have done since the end of World War II.

This essay aims to analyze the global geopolitical rearrangement that
occurs in the wake of the US weakening, which allowed the emergence of the
BRICS as a possible pole of power. To support this approach, World Systems
Analysis (WSA) is used, developed mainly by Immanuel Wallerstein and
Giovanni Arrighi. In addition to taking into account the geopolitical dimension,
parallels are also drawn with the theories of international relations, in order
to expand the explanatory potential of this analysis. As a related objective, it
is possible to use all these instruments to assess the way in which the BRICS
are articulating to face the pandemic of the new coronavirus. The Bank of the
BRICS seems to establish itself, therefore, as a support pillar of the group and
the main external financier of financial solutions to face the economic crisis
that accompanies the global health crisis caused by Covid-19.

Thus, this work is divided into three sections. The first section seeks
to interrelate the theories of geopolitics and international relations around
the analysis of WSA. In the second section, the motivations and effects of the
rearrangement of power in world geopolitics are addressed. Finally, in the last
section, the roles played and the opportunities brought by the emergence of
the BRICS in the international system will be highlighted, assessing how the
new coronavirus pandemic influences this scenario.

Geopolitics and International Relations and The World Systems Analysis

The links between geopolitics and international relations could be
foreseen by the presence of the geopolitical discipline in the curriculum of
most international relations courses in Brazil. If this is due to the fact that
the two fields of knowledge partially share the same phenomenon of study
with regard to "power", there is another issue that brings them together: the
interdisciplinarity of these fields.

Geopolitics was never raised to the status of a science, always lending
itself to be an important knowledge for several areas, while international
relations were consolidated late in the 20th century as an university course,
bringing, even due to its late institutionalization, the non-pretension of being
considered science and its multidisciplinary enterprise character (Starr
1991). Born in the 19th century, geopolitics experienced a relative decline
after the end of World War II, as it was appropriated by the Nazis in their
expansionist project. Given its resurgence since the 1970s, it continued to

be "an 'itinerant theory par excellence', in the sense of having entered a wide variety of disciplines and geographic regions" (Gökmen 2010, 141).

Deepening this observation, we have that geopolitical theories inform and/or are informed by international relations theories, in an ahistorical process, producing dialogues between different schools, starting from Hans Morgenthau's statements, in which points of intersection between traditional geopolitics and classical realism can be discerned, up to Immanuel Wallerstein, with his Analysis of World-Systems, which was incorporated into the (neo) Marxism of international relations and to critical geopolitics in Taylor's (1994) reading. Critical geopolitics also has very clear relations with the constructivist approach to international relations, in matters relating to the formation of international identity in the area of security and strategic culture (Mahmadou and Dijkink 2006).

Analyzing the contribution of geopolitics to international relations, Castro (2012), despite maintaining the focus of his analysis in the Nation-state, lists seven spatial dimensions that must be evaluated, from a geopolitical point of view, in addition to the mere question of power:

> In the parameters of geopolitical studies linked to International Relations, it is not only necessary to assess the state's military power. It is essential to mention, in addition, seven cardinal characteristics that, together with war power (hard power) and cultural power (soft power), reveal the projection of growth or the vulnerability of countries: location, total dimension, topography, climatology, the territorial cut (format), the demographic distribution and the national government (Castro 2012, 143).

On the intersections between these areas of knowledge, Teixeira Jr (2017, 152) points out that "geopolitics, Marxism and international relations would be found in the fruitful construction of critical knowledge about processes such as globalization, worldization and regionalism". Therefore, we seek to understand, later, how geopolitics and international relations are found in WSA.

WSA emerged from the criticism of the social and economic analysis model used by the social sciences since the 19th century. Between 1850 and 1945, the most important intellectual cleavages among academics since the 19th century were: the past/present and the Western world/rest of the world. Within this logic, historians studied the past, while economists, political scientists and sociologists were responsible for studying the present.

History, economics, political science and sociology were focused on the Western world, while "Orientalists" and anthropologists studied the "rest of

the world"[4]. Until 1945, the boundaries between these disciplines were clearly
defined. In the post-war period, according to Wallerstein, this model failed to
account for the new reality that emerged with the process of independence
struggles.

Under attack, the current model of analysis of the social sciences
began to weaken. For Wallerstein, "the biggest change in global social science
in the 25 years after 1945 was the discovery of contemporary reality in the
Third World" (Wallerstein 2002, 231).

As a consequence, research in the Western world was divided into
three domains, according to the new configuration of the modern world: the
market (economy), the State (political science) and civil society (sociology). A
new context opened up in the post-45 period, with the independence struggles.
The former colonies tried to defend their political and cultural autonomy in
the midst of national liberation struggles and in international events, such
as the Bandung Conference[5] in 1955. It was a process of reaffirmation and/
or self-affirmation before the Western world, which was accompanied, on an
intellectual level, by studies on these regions, Latin America, Asia and Africa.

In opposition to this movement, some sectors of the academy developed
theories that justified the "delay" of the former colonies, with the idea of
development in stages, as an evolutionary process. Thus, the Modernization
Theory (MT) emerged, whose method of analysis was the systematic
comparison between all States. MT started from the premise of a linear and
universal model of development of all societies in the direction of economic
growth. Thus, all former colonies would inevitably reach development by
copying the "models of success" of the old metropolises, regardless of how
each nation was inserted in the systemic structure of Capitalism.

Although for some analysts, WSA presents itself as an adaptation
of MT, for presenting an explanation of the economic development process
linked to the dynamic Center (rich countries), Periphery and Semiperiphery
(underdeveloped countries) (Wallerstein 2002, 4), Wallerstein says that '[...]
[the] "original intention of the analysis of world-systems [was] the protest
against the modernization theory" [...] (Wallerstein 2002, 234). In this process,
poor countries would have qualitative disadvantages in terms of exchange
between products with little added value (raw materials, for example) and
products with high added value (industrialized), from the most developed

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4 Anthropologists studied "primitive" societies and Orientalists studied non-Western "great
civilizations".

5 The conference brought together countless countries in the then Third World that did not
accept the bipolarity between the US/USSR as a way of dividing the international system.

nations (Center) of the capitalist world-system. The technological gap between nations would be the central point in the mechanism of economic and social backwardness and in maintaining this *status quo.*

The focus of the world-system began to be drawn, then, in the 1970s, with authors such as Samir Amin, André Gunder Frank and Theotônio dos Santos, "but it gains really great encouragement with the work of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 1989)" (Santos 2000, 55). The theoretical construction elaborated by Wallerstein, which in the international relations theories is framed in the neomarxist perspective (Nogueira and Messari 2005)[6], has three important influences in its constitution: *Annales* School, Marxism and the Dependence Theory (Vela 2001).

As already mentioned, WSA emerged as a theoretical corpus that put MT in check and then, more fundamentally, the entire structure built by the social sciences since the 19th century. As proposed by Wallerstein, WSA should contain three axes. One would have to do with space, another with time, and with epistemology:

1) The World-System (not the Nation-States) is the basic unit of social analysis;

2) Nor are idiographic[7] and nomothetic[8] epistemologies useful for analyzing social reality;

3) The existence of discipline boundaries within the social sciences does not make any intellectual sense.

Wallerstein defined the world-system as [...] "[a] territorial division of multicultural work in which the production and exchange of basic goods and raw materials is necessary for the life of its inhabitants every day" (Vela 2001, 4). The world in which we are now inserted, that is, the modern world system, had its origins in the 16th century. This world system was initially located in only part of the globe, mainly in regions of Europe and the Americas, having expanded over the centuries to reach practically the entire global space. It is, and always has been, a world economy. It is, and always has been, a capitalist world economy (Vela 2001, 111).

According to Wallerstein, the current capitalist world-economy (world-system) originated from the crisis of the feudal system and the rise of Western Europe to global supremacy, between 1450 and 1670. After the hegemony of Italian city-states and the Netherlands, there was the British ascendancy,

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6 Although it has strands that are not always directly linked to Marx's readings.

7 Necessarily linked to the creation of general laws of great explanatory scope.

8 It establishes general laws for the understanding of phenomena that can be reproduced. In general, it would correspond to hard sciences.

characterized by a continuous process of expansion, restructuring and financial reorganization of the capitalist world economy. The periods of financial expansion (financialization) were times when competitive pressures increased, both on governments, as well as on companies and trade. These pressures favored English industrial expansion, which remained in the global economic supremacy until the beginning of the 20th century.

After the British hegemonic collapse, the US emerged as the main economic power and, after the Second World War, reached technological and military supremacy during the Cold War, becoming the superpower after the collapse of the socialist bloc in 1989 and the end of the USSR in 1991. For Wallerstein, as in previous hegemonic periods, American hegemony tends to dissipate and be replaced by another. For this reason, it is necessary to analyze the rearrangements of power in world geopolitics.

The Rearrangements of Power in World Geopolitics

As already noted, the changes that took place in the late 20th and early 21st centuries demonstrate that the capitalist world-system is changing (Wallerstein 2001, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; Arrighi 1996, 2008). The 2008 systemic crisis, which affected the center of capitalism in an intense way, corroborates this perspective mainly from the perspective of geopolitics.

The 21st century presents a series of geopolitical scenarios that bring as a basic standard the relative weakening of the United States as a hard protagonist. The 21st century tends not to be the "American century" due to the serious problems faced by the US, not only in the economy, but also in the ideological dimension, which is another basis for the country's acceptance as a natural world leader.

Even in the 20th century, the United States was not an isolated protagonist on the planet. The very idea of an American hegemony has been the subject of reassessment. Joseph F. Nye Jr., in his article *Is the American Century Over?* (2015), addresses this issue, indicating the term primacy as the most appropriate to designate the period. The existence of a socialist bloc between 1945 and 1989, coupled with the preservation of the Cuban and Chinese regimes, would put US hegemony in check. More precisely:

> As we have seen, the term "hegemony" is a concept too imprecise to be used in the definition of "American century". Sometimes, it means having a preponderance of power resources, sometimes the behavior of setting rules for others and, sometimes, getting the results you want. Because of this ambiguity, we cannot date when it begins or ends. Noam Chomsky further

argues that the ''loss of China 'was the first major step in the' decline of America'' or in that period when many others are on the rise. If there was ever an American hegemony, it would have been since 1945, when the United States had almost half of the world economy as a result of World War II, until 1970, when American participation in world output declined to its pre-war level of a quarter of world production. However, even during this period, the United States often failed to get what it wanted - as witnessed by the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons; the communist control of China and half of Vietnam, the stalemate in the Korean War, the Soviet suppression of the revolts in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Fidel Castro's control over Cuba and so on. So, instead of "hegemony", I prefer to use the terms "primacy" or "preeminence" because of the disproportionate aspect (and what can be learned) of each of the three sources of power (Nye Jr 2015).

For Wallerstein, the decline of the US began in the 1970s and occurred according to the logic that "(...) the economic, political and military factors that contributed to the prominence of the US are the same factors that will produce the imminent decline of the US" (Wallerstein 2004, 21). Historically, the prominence of the US began with the world recession of 1873, when its economy grew sharply at the same time as the British economy entered an inflection. In the period between 1873 and 1914, the US and Germany became the main producers of steel and chemicals, dominating industrial processes.

The search for primacy has become a natural process. World War II provided a privileged position for the United States, which did not directly suffer the catastrophic effects of the war. Its territory did not suffer any damage in physical-structural terms, unlike Europe and Asia. According to Wallerstein, the post-war US success as an hegemonic power caused its own decay to begin:

> The success of the US as an hegemonic power in the post-war period created the conditions for its own hegemony to be undermined. This process can be captured in four symbols: the Vietnam War, the 1968 revolutions, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Each symbol adds to the previous one, culminating in the situation in which the United States finds itself today: a lonely superpower that lacks real power, a world leader that no one follows and few respect, and a dangerously adrift nation, immersed in a global chaos that can't control (Wallerstein 2004, 25).

The four events pointed out by Wallerstein would represent each moment of the decline of American power, which bequeathed military spending in an increasing line and the ideological weakening of the capitalist system as the creator of a "free society". Without the old Cold War clash, the

US was left alone on the global stage. With the entire focus of American foreign policy practically directed towards the Middle East, since the end of the Cold War, the White House has loosened its "control" over former less important areas of the planet, but which have gained some prominence on the international chess board because of the great communist "threat".

The Barack Obama administration (2009-2017) tried to reverse this loss of ideological strength by seeking to use soft power[9] as the easiest way to regain its prestige. But it did not prevent the emergence of new poles of power, such as the BRICS.

The (Re) Emergence of the BRICS and the (Post) Pandemic Scenario

Based on the decline of US influence in recent decades, the emergence of important players at the beginning of the 21st century and the questioning of their unilateral stances, the emergence of the BRICS represented a common perspective of a multipolar and multilateral world to face global problems. Despite the disbelief from part of the central core of capitalism, the BRICS gained geopolitical projection of great importance in the beginning of the 21st century. The states that make up this power bloc hold 26% of the territory, 42% of the population and 14% of world GDP, as well as contributing more than 50% of the increase in world GDP between 2005 and 2010 (Visentini 2015, 155).

For many conservative analysts, the BRICS did not have any possibility of organizing a common agenda that involved a major articulation on the international stage. The original proposal, made by economist Jim O'Neill, in 2001, through the *Building Better Global Economic* report, was a way of jointly analyzing such economies by the investment bank Goldman Sachs. Thus came the acronym for the four largest emerging economies in the world (Brazil, Russia, India and China), adding to South Africa in 2010, allowing the current configuration.

The inclusion of South Africa was of great importance for the group's "globalization", increasing its representativeness within the emerging world. According to Stuenkel,

South Africa's inclusion was notable for three reasons. First, because it

9 Term created by Joseph Nye, professor at Harvard University, to designate the capacity of a State to ideologically and culturally influence other nations without using coercive means to succeed in defending its interests. It is the opposite of the concept of hard power.

weakened the importance of the civilizational aspect in international politics - after all, the BRICS originated, to use Samuel Huntington's definitions, five distinct civilizations. It is in this respect that the BRICS diverges more radically from the common alliances of international politics (Stuenkel 2017, 82).

Despite this expansion that took place in 2010 and sometimes it is suggested that other countries join the bloc (mainly through isolated Chinese initiatives), the hard core of the BRICS is in the so-called "strategic triangle" of the RIC (Russia, India and China). Brazil and South Africa enter more to fulfill the representation of regional powers in their (sub) continents. India could be classified under the same label, but it differs from Brazil and South Africa for its growth projections and for its strategic location with Eurasian partners. An analysis of GDP is not sufficient to demonstrate this discrepancy, as we see in table 1:

Table 1 - Gross Domestic Product - BRICS (2018)

STATE	GDP (nominal/ billions of dollars)
Brazil	1,885
Russia	1,658
India	2,719
China	13,608
South Africa	368

Source: Prepared by the authors with data from the World Bank (2020): https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.

The distance from Russia, India and China to Brazil and South Africa can be better seen when analyzing the historical series of these growth indicators, as in graphs 1 and 2[10]: Graphic 1 shows a different pace of growth for the RIC, starting in the 2000s, in relation to the other countries of the bloc. Graphic 2 confirms this trend by demonstrating the pace of GDP per capita growth in the BRICS countries.

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10 Reproduced by Alves (2018).

FMI. WEO, abril 2017 http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets/WEO

Graphic 1 - GDP share of BRICS members in world GDP (1980-2023)

Although India has a GDP per capita lower than all other countries, as
shown in Graphic 2, it is projected a continued growth that will surpass Brazil
and South Africa in the 2020s.

FMI. WEO. abril 2017 http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets/WEO

Graphic 2 - Per capita income of the five BRICS countries (1980-2023)

This same euphoria in relation to the future of the BRICS is not shared by the main theorist of World System Analysis. Immanuel Wallerstein addressed the group of emerging countries in two articles, in 2013 and 2016, showing concern about the bloc's geopolitical and economic aspirations (Wallerstein 2013, 2016):

> The structural crisis of the world system is moving very fast, and in many ways uncertain, to assume sufficient relative stability to allow the BRICS, as such, to continue to play a special role, geopolitically or economically. Like globalization itself as a concept, the BRICS can become a passing phenomenon (Wallerstein 2013, 1).

China and Russia, the two most powerful countries in the BRICS today, face United States competition for areas of influence. Washington's aggressive rhetoric and economic measures against Beijing demonstrate Donald Trump's great concern for the country's economic and geopolitical development in recent years. Despite the decrease in its economic growth, Beijing has been increasing its economic influence in various parts of the world, either through the project *The New Silk Road* or through its activities on the African continent, for example. In addition to its companies competing on an equal footing with Westerners (Huawei, for example), China has been taking advantage of the geopolitical and economic loopholes created by the United States in recent years to increase its influence.

Moscow has been impacted by a series of economic measures that seek to weaken the Russian national project carried out by Vladimir Putin. This has occurred with greater emphasis since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, given the possibility of a pro-Western government in Ukraine and at the doors of its territory. Washington, for example, has seen Moscow in recent years as a growing threat to American strategic interests:

> Russia's geopolitical challenge in relation to the United States is also growing. Since Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency in 2012, Moscow has invaded and annexed Crimea; occupied parts of eastern Ukraine; deployed substantial military forces and undertook a relentless bombing campaign in Syria to support President Bashar al-Assad; significantly expanded its armed forces; carried out military exercises designed to intimidate the governments of Eastern Europe; interfered in Eastern European political systems; and threatened to cut gas for the most energy-dependent European states. Putin is a career intelligence officer deeply hostile to democratic changes in any territory close to Russia, paranoid about what he believes the US efforts are

to bring it down, and resentful of American domination of the post-Cold War world. He seems to consider it a personal priority to weaken the United States and combat American influence wherever he can (Blackwill and Gordon 2018, 1).

As China and Russia are the main protagonists of the BRICS, the weakening of both would represent the very decline of the bloc and its goals of building a new global governance in a multipolar and multilateral world. Wallerstein (2013) draws attention to the fact that geopolitics is not the only thing that matters, as we need to look at the domestic issues of the countries that make up the BRICS, the relations between the members of the bloc, and the relationship of the members of the group with countries outside the bloc.

Unlike Russia and China, which historically have a commitment to national unity, that is, a clear definition of the roles to be played by their States, Brazil does not usually recognize its attributions as a regional power. Brazilian participation in the BRICS fluctuated since Dilma Rousseff's impeachment in 2016. Jair Bolsonaro's government still has an ambivalent stance towards the bloc.

Although he said, during the eleventh BRICS summit, held in 2019, in Brazil, that his government is interested in expanding business with partner countries, he did not fail to make a contradictory statement, in saying that "the foreign policy of my government has its eyes on the world, but first in Brazil" (Colleta and Mello 2019, 1). Despite this, at the same summit, the Brazilian president also declared that the bloc's interests coincide in the defense of a more inclusive global governance, and that its economic relevance is unquestionable and will continue to grow in the coming decades.

The Brazilian government needs to give stronger signals that protectionism and alignment with the United States are not so automatic as to compromise its commitments to the group, to overcome suspicions such as that exposed by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, then in the rotating presidency of the bloc at the tenth BRICS summit in South Africa:

> If [Bolsonaro] acts against what the BRICS countries defend, this will be to the detriment of Brazil and Brazilians [...] He will join a BRICS family that is almost irrevocably committed to multilateralism, he will join a BRICS family that seeks to do things in a way that strengthens mutual benefit. If he starts pushing in a different direction, it will end up harming Brazil's interest (Agência Brasil 2018, 1).

In the relationship of BRICS countries with the rest of the world,

there is an evident concern about the direction of globalization and the effects on the US performance system, something that was made clear in the final declaration of the 2018 summit. In the final text it is said that

> We recognize that the multilateral trading system is facing unprecedented challenges. We reinforce the importance of an open global economy, allowing all countries and peoples to share the benefits of globalization (Pamplona 2018, 1).

The 2019 Brasilia Summit's final declaration deepens the issue already exposed in Johannesburg of strengthening the multilateral trading system, exposing the defense of WTO rules, in addition to announcing the twelfth summit meeting for St. Petersburg, Russia, in July 2020 (BRICS 2019). This regular meeting is at risk due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the new coronavirus.

In the relationship between the bloc members, there is little expressive intra-block trade and few social results in countries that can be related to participation in the group, as shown by Lobato (2018), emphasizing that "this can be attributed to the difficulty of making commitments for national contexts very different with very different structures of social policy systems" (Lobato 2018, 2143). Low cooperation on issues that are not primarily economic could be seen in this pandemic context. There was a virtual meeting of BRICS ministers, other than those of health, but of foreign affairs, on April 28, 2020. Although it was announced that there were agreements on the defense of multilateralism, the advancement of BRICS cooperation, and the gathering of efforts in terms of global health in combating COVID-19, the effective measures were related to economic issues surrounding the BRICS Bank.

It is the economic initiatives, such as the New Development Bank (NDB), that point to a still growing intrablock concertation. The so-called BRICS Bank can still accelerate the institutionalization of the bloc, which until then functioned more as a forum for discussions than as a formalized institution.

The creation of the NDB was seen by some analysts as a timely reflection on the changes in world power, while others stressed the fact that the bank is yet another element illustrating China's global ambitions in terms of projection of power (Da Silva 2019). The creation of a possible competitor in the provision of financial resources on a more just basis than those offered by the IMF andor the World Bank would alter the traditional center of monetary power configured since the end of WWII. As a consequence, the geopolitical center of power would be altered, accentuating the decline of the traditional core of capitalism. The consolidation of the NDB as a real alternative would

be an important gain for the Sino-Russian geopolitical architecture of creating another geoeconomic pole.

At a time when the world economy is suffering tremendous due to the spread of the new coronavirus that causes Covid-19 disease, causing a large number of infections and deaths and forcing the most diverse regions of the world to make drastic isolations of their population, international global cooperation acquires new importance, since, to face the crisis, the countries most affected, like Brazil, need financial assistance (United Nations 2020). The NDB reappeared with a prominent role in the pandemic context, being the one that offered the most advantageous perspectives of financial support to face the crisis, among the development banks that Brazil resorted to. In addition to the BRICS countries chancellors, members of the bank have held virtual meetings to develop financial solutions to face Covid-19. At first, the NDB made available, in April 2020, a US$ 1 billion credit line for each country in the bloc. A further disbursement of US$ 10 billion is expected to be divided between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Coletta 2020).

Table 2 - World production growth, 2018-2021

	Annual percentage change				Changes in the World Economic Situation	
	2018	2019 (a)	2020 (b)	2021 (b)	*Perspective* 2020	*Forecast* 2021
World	3.1	2.6	-3.2	4.2	-5.7	1.5
Developed economies	2.3	1.9	-5.0	3.4	-6.5	1.7
USA	2.9	2.3	-4.8	3.9	-6.5	2.1
Japan	0.3	0.7	-4.2	3.2	-5.1	1.9
European Union	2.1	1.8	-5.5	2.8	-7.1	1.1
Economy in transition	2.8	2.2	-3.5	3.1	-5.8	0.6
Russian Federation	2.3	1.3	-4.3	2.9	-6.1	0.9
Developing economies	4.3	3.7	-0.7	5.3	-4.7	1.0
Africa	3.1	3.0	-1.6	3.4	-4.8	-0.1
Southeast Africa	0.9	-0.1	-3.5	2.7	-4.4	0.8
China	6.6	6.1	1.7	7.6	-4.3	1.7
India (c)	6.8	4.1	1.2	5.5	-5.4	-0.8
Brazil	1.1	1.1	-5.2	2.9	-6.9	0.6
Memorandum items						

	Annual percentage change				Changes in the *World Economic Situation*	
World Trade (d)	4.1	1.3	-14.6	9.4	-16.9	6.2
Global growth based on Purchasing Power Paritye (e)	3.2	2.7	-2.6	4.3	-5.8	0.9

a Partially estimated.
b UN DESA forecasts.
c Fiscal year basis.
d Includes goods and services.
e Based on 2010 benchmark.

Source: Adapted by the authors from World Economic Situation and Prospects as of mid-2020 (UN): https://www.un.org/development/ desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/WESP2020_MYU_ Report.pdf.

The analysis of table 2 allows to project the impact of Covid-19 on the economy of the BRICS countries. According to the UN data, the average global GDP forecast is -5.7%. China is the only country that manages to have a better result forecast than the global average.

The BRICS moves between the expectations of corresponding to half of the world GDP in 2030, as the most optimistic prospects before the pandemic assumed (Bittar and Krafuni 2019), and the estimated decline of 5% of the GDP of the bloc members, in 2020, as points out the Analytical Center of the Government of Russia (Golub 2020). Taking into account that the statistics of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund estimate about a 5% drop in World GDP for 2020, it can be assumed that the BRICS member countries have not suffered a great deal as a bloc, given the global scenario. China and India, in this sense, have good expectations for the recovery of their economy, offsetting the worse performance of Brazil, Russia and South Africa. The Covid-19 pandemic is another component in this geopolitical scenario in which the BRICS will have to demonstrate its ability to propose alternatives to the collapse of the world order, with a review of globalization, multilateralism, and the international trade regime.

Final Remarks

The BRICS tries to establish itself as an alternative to the reorganization of the world system. In this context of unforeseen circumstances, the BRICS has to deal with the demands for its affirmation as an institution and international power bloc, in addition to being subject to the systemic transformations engendered by the United States, which are struggling to maintain themselves in the midst of this half hegemony.

Although Wallerstein himself is skeptical about the future of the BRICS, his analysis of world systems provides content to assess the relative decline of the United States and the emergence of new power blocks that may fill the void left by the decline in the US primacy. The theoretical construction elaborated by Wallerstein, with the help of geopolitical and international relations theories, provides us with tools to analyze the BRICS beyond the formal aspects of power, in terms of hard and soft power.

The BRICS countries face the challenge to uphold an utopian proposal, that still maintains itself as difficult. However, if the much expected economic consolidation of the China, Russia, India strategic triangle comes into reality, this proposal could last. For that, it is necessary to increase the internal trade between the countries participating in the group and catalyze the effects of overflowing the benefits of being part of the bloc, especially with the expansion of the performance of the New Development Bank. In relation to Brazil, it is necessary to understand the extent to which the bloc's interests, expressed in the construction of a new global governance, more inclusive, defending globalization and multilateralism, coincide with Brazilian national interests. In the Brazilian discourse for the bloc, the synergy seems clear, which is not confirmed in the official statements outside the bloc, in which Brazil expresses ambiguities and contradictory interests in relation to its international insertion strategy.

Moving in a scenario of uncertainty, the BRICS seeks to be an actor capable of proposing alternatives in the midst of a collapsing order, in view of the rearrangements of power in global geopolitics. The countries that make up the group, called emerging countries, will need to (re) emerge in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic and its related crises,yet another destructuring element in this geopolitical board. The BRICS countries' capacity for economic recovery in relation to the rest of the world may foreshadow the bloc's future.

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ABSTRACT

The two first decades of the 21 st Century were marked by the recrudescence of two powerhouses, Russia and China. Given their important role on global geopolitics, these two countries took advantage of the gaps resulted from yet another crisis on the structure of global capitalism, which influenced the relative decline of the United States capacity to impose its will on the international system as they had been able to do so since the end of World War II. This article's objective is to analyze the global geopolitical rearrangement due to a weakened United States which opened the possibility for the BRICS nations to emerge as possible sources of power. To reinforce this analysis, the world-systems perspective, (here on referred to as WSP) elaborated mainly by Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi is used, as well as a geopolitical approach to provide a link to international relations theories. Therefore, this paper is divided on to four sections. The first one interrelates the geopolitical theories and those of the WSP. The second section is guided towards understanding the origins and fundamentals of the WSP. On the third section, an approach is made towards the motivations and the effects of the rearrangement of power on the world's geopolitics. Finally, on the last section, the roles and opportunities that have arisen from the emergence of the BRICS nations on the international system are presented.

GEOPOLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN LIGHT OF THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL STATE

Guilherme Sandoval Góes[1]

Introduction

This article is the result of research carried out during a post-doctoral stay at the Graduate Program in Aeronautical Sciences of the University of the Air Force in Brazil, under the theme 'Geopolitics, Culture and Law: Epistemological dialogues needed in times of postmodern statecraft'. Therefore, it aims to examine the scientific connections that unite geopolitics and law, disciplines that overlap in order to guarantee fundamental rights for ordinary people.

Indeed, in order to fulfill its function of distributing justice and guaranteeing fundamental rights, the 1988 Brazilian Constitution cannot be left out of geopolitics, in the same way that geopolitics, in its task of promoting national development, cannot be alien to the constitutional text, and must faithfully follow the democratic rule of law and the international legal order of civilized nations. Unfortunately, it must be recognized that this epistemological lineage is still incipient in Brazil. However, it cannot be denied that, in times of globalization of the economy, it is the duty of the Brazilian strategist to formulate a long-term prospective vision to learn 'to play the strategic game of world geopower' within the limits imposed by the Constitution and by public international law. Likewise, it is the duty of the national jurist to know 'to strategically interpret the Constitution in the light of the impacts arising from the geopolitical disputes on the world stage'.

This means that the search for the country's geopolitical development must not depart from the democratic pillars of the 1988 Constitution. Hence the relevance of 'geolaw', here envisioned as an autonomous branch of science which is intended to examine the interconnections between law and geopolitics. Under geolaw perspective, strategy gains greater legal vision and law gains greater strategic vision, since both the world geopolitical order and constitutional law are placed side by side, with the aim of systematically

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examining them as an epistemological whole[2].

As a result, everything seems to indicate that geolaw is the harbinger of a new scientific era, in which statesmen, strategists, judges, democratic, constitutionalist, internationalist and legal operators in general will have to rethink the connections involving the normativity of law and the strategic action of the state. It is within this framework of multidisciplinary complexity that geolaw presents itself as the last scientific frontier, be it in geopolitics or in law. Thus, there is both a geopolitical control of law (constitutionalization of geopolitics) and a legal control of geopolitics (judicialization of geopolitics).

Unfortunately, geolaw is practically unprecedented in Brazil. We have no major academic work on this subject. In Italy, for example, there are several scholars, among them the eminent and notable jurist Natalino Irti (2005), author of 'Norm and place: principle of geolaw', whose main scientific lines aim to study the relations between the deregulating forces of the economy and technology, as well as the law on the periphery of the world system (Irti 2005).

Similarly, Philip Bobbitt (2003), in the United States, develops a dense literature on the epistemic relationships between national strategy, constitutional law and public international law. In fact, Bobbitt's academic trajectory shows this dual characteristic of the constitutionalist and the strategist:

> Perhaps this conviction is owed to my unusual personal history; I sometimes think that not only was I supposed to write this book but that I am perhaps one of the few who would. That is because for the last twenty-five years I have led a double life. As a teacher, I have divided my life between Texas and England. In the United States, I have taught constitutional law at the University of Texas; in the United Kingdom, I have taught the history of nuclear strategy, first at Oxford and later at Kings College, London (Bobbitt 2003, 3).

In short, the intention here is to show the vast path to be covered, whether through geopolitics or constitutional law, in order to outline the

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2 With that in mind, it is possible to understand the influence of world geopolitics, which practically imposes changes to the Constitutions of developing countries. In essence, geolaw puts geopolitical variables in direct contact with legal variables, within a multidisciplinary symbiosis that advances both law and geopolitics. Geolaw can be defined as the branch of scientific knowledge that aims to examine the epistemological relations between geopolitics and law (broader sense), as well as the epistemological relations between constitutional interpretation and the national grand strategy (strict sense). In this sense, geolaw is the statesman's scientific basis in his task of promoting national development, just as it is the judge's scientific basis in his task of deciding on a fundamental geopolitical issue for the Brazilian state (Goes and Visentini 2019, 28-29).

theoretical elements of the scientific encounter between the Great National Development Strategy and the 1988 Constitution, especially during gloom times of post-pandemic globalization. Here, the relevance of the study of judicialization of geopolitics emerges, when major geopolitical decisions of the Brazilian state will be brought to the judgment of the Judiciary, notably the Supreme Federal Court (STF). That is why the present work supports the thesis that the reason why judges and courts should understand world geopolitics is quite simple: they will decide the country's geopolitical future from the judicialization of fragmented geopolitical issues that are part of power plays on the world stage.

Consequently, the central objective of this article is to investigate, initially, the paths followed by neoliberal globalization since the end of the Cold War in 1989, going through the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the financial crisis of 2008, until finally reaching the global pandemic of Covid-19 (1989-2019). To this end, in addition to the North American strategic archetypes that will be examined (the National Security Strategies of Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump), it is also imperative to analyze the influence of the hegemonic power of industrialized nations over the countries of late modernity in the Global South, as, unfortunately, is the case in Brazil[3].

Subsequently, under the influence of this verticalization of hierarchical geopolitical relations, we intend to formulate the theoretical bases of an autochthonous geopolitics, genuinely linked to national identity and with sufficient cratological latitude to guarantee the expansion of the Brazilian strategic core, defined here as being the set of autonomous economic-technological segments capable of effectively participating in international competition. In this sense, the question is simple: can a country with more than 200 million inhabitants give up its strategic technological-industrial base, becoming a mere service society, exporting primarily goods with no added value?

Hence the great geopolitical dilemma of late modernity countries, as is the case of Brazil: if they automatically align themselves with the world powers, they will probably be forced to accept the simplistic role of exporters of commodities. On the other hand, if they reject large multilateral trade

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3 The end of the Cold War brought negative effects upon the nations of Africa, Central and Latin America and most of Asia, which are collectively regarded as the Global South. Unfortunately, the situation of these underdeveloped countries in the Global South projects a paradoxical picture that can both generate economic and social development and further aggravate poverty, environmental degradation, hunger and human rights violations, unlike in the Global Center, which is formed by the rich countries that control the decision-making process of the international system. [...] In recent times, the discussion around these relations has intensified, especially considering the ongoing neoliberal reconfiguration of the state, scientifically and methodologically rested on the minimum state model with the objective of deregulating private legal relations and, thus, relativizing the concept of sovereignty (Góes 2019, 57-58).

opening agreements, they could be isolated from the largest consumer markets in the world.

Therefore, conceiving a grand strategy of national development based on the maintenance and expansion of its strategic base seems to be the greatest challenge for Brazilian society, jurists and strategists alike. It is for this very reason that this article has the broader objective of identifying the geopolitical role of Brazil within the reconfiguration of the postmodern world order (still under construction), which already places, on the one hand, the era of deglobalization, sponsored by the Trump Doctrine and the resumption of the old strategic concept of 'America First' from the Eurocentric era, and, on the other, the potentiation of the neoliberal world order, now captained by Chinese geopolitics, leaving to question whether the Mackinderian-Spykmanian classic paradigm of geopolitics is being rewritten with a postmodern bias?

In fact, it all indicates that the reconfiguration of post-pandemic global geopolitics will be characterized not only by the resignification of the social role of the contemporary state (the liberal state or social state), but also by great power competition between the United States and China. Ultimately, this is the thematic spectrum of this article.

A World to be Rebuilt: Between American Deglobalization and Chinese Neoliberal Globalism

The objective of this thematic section is to present the incredible speed of evolution of postmodern statecraft, which, in just three decades, has already produced four great moments of paradigmatic rupture, namely: the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), the collapse of the Twin Towers (2001), the global financial crisis (2008), and the health crisis of Covid-19 (2019). In this sense, it is argued that postmodern statecraft now endures the protectionist wave of economic deglobalization, sponsored by the Trump Doctrine in response to the geopolitical rise of China, as well as the decline of the American world order, here interpreted as the neoliberal order captained by the United States with the support of its allies of the capitalist triad (Europe and Japan)[4].

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4 The wide controversy that exists around the idea of postmodern statecraft is not a novelty, in which different theoretical constructs dispute the primacy over this matter, hence a whole plethora of fractal elements willing to represent it, such as: disbelief in the discourse of modernity's metanarratives (Lyotard 2004), the cultural logic of late capitalism (Jameson 2002), the theoretical construction of hypermodernity (Lipovetsky 2004) and the epistemic lineage of liquid fear (Bauman 2008). However, this relevant doctrinal discussion must also recognize that the post-1989 world has undergone major transformations in the existing structures of world power. That is why the view that the postmodern world order should be analyzed less as an academic fetish and more as a new binding geopolitical reality that arises from the collapse of the Soviet Union as a world superpower, thereby creating a new archetype of hegemonic power

This is the 'geopolitical turn of deglobalization' fostered by Trump's America, which shuns away from the world leadership of neoliberal globalization to approach the nationalist, truly protectionist economic rationality, repatriating its national industry to stop the expansion of Chinese geopower on the world stage. It is important, therefore, to examine whether post-Covid-19 geopolitics will rescue the American world, characterized by the unilateral hegemonic control of neoliberal globalization (of Lockean inspiration) or if a post-American world will at last emerge: a cosmopolitan global governance system of Kantian inspiration, shared with other great powers, notably China and its Belt and Road Initiative.

However, in order to fully understand the post-pandemic world, it is necessary to travel back in time to the Bretton Woods Conferences, in the throes of the Second World War, in July 1944, in order to identify three major events that marked the beginning of the cycle of world hegemony of the United States. Indeed, the trajectory of hegemonic America begins with the Bretton Woods international financial system and the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the gold-dollar system, three major events which signaled the alliance of the industrialized countries that emerged victorious from the war – and under American leadership.

The American strategist's pragmatic genius soon realized that it was also necessary to promote the democratic reconstruction of his former enemies, Germany and Japan, as a way to ward off the communist threat, hence the formulation of the 1947 Marshall Plan. Here, the embryo of today's capitalist triad (the North American bloc controlled by the United States, the European bloc led by Germany and the Asian bloc ruled by Japan). In other words, an archetype of international relations that converges geopower to a small number of industrial powers, under the influence of a dominant state, which considers himself capable of leading the international system.

Following this timeline, the hegemonic cycle of the US continues, now with the inauguration of the Paris Club of rentier states, in 1956, which appears as an instrument of control of the peripheral world economy (again, the concentration of power by the rich club from North America, Western Europe and Japan can be observed here). The trail of America's hegemony leads us to the creation of the Club of Rome, in 1968, whose objective was to build prospective scenarios for the formulation of global policies[5].

relations, which differs from its predecessors: the Eurocentric order (1648-1945) and the bipolar order (1945-1989). Thus, as it goes beyond the scope of this article, such discussion will be abandoned here to the detriment of the development of a minimal analysis that allows describing this possible postmodern world order, here envisioned as the order that emerged with the end of the Cold War and that it is still under construction to this day.

5 Formed by distinguished personalities (statesmen, economists, industrialists, political leaders, educators and humanists, among others), the Club of Rome, after the famous Dana Meadows report from 1972,

Regardless of the relevance of all these multilateral mechanisms, the fact is that the idea of a *Pax Americana* will gain irrefutable visibility from the unilateral declaration of 1971, by Richard Nixon, which reformed the Bretton Woods system, uncoupling the American dollar from the gold but maintaining it as a world reference, now without a ballast, a fact that evidently renewed American world hegemony, projecting it vigorously towards the future – specially due to the repercussions of the Vietnam War. In fact, note carefully that the 1971 unilateral declaration (the 'Nixon shock') is the foundation of American monetary and financial hegemony and of the *Pax Americana* until today.

Therefore, it is argued here that the end of the dollar as a reference for the global monetary-financial system will indicate the beginning of the end of the American world. It is in this sense that the great dispute of the 21st century will be the financial war of the dollar against the Chinese renminbi. Returning to the long sequence of events that consolidate American hegemony, it is also important to highlight the creation, in 1975, of the Group of Seven richest and industrialized countries (G7).

With the right sharpness of mind, the reader should realize that the G7 gave intrinsic systematicity to the *Pax Americana*, insofar as it established an archetype of geopower with the aim of controlling the world through unified global policies focused on trade and investment flows on a global scale, thus strengthening the triad of democratic capitalism (the United States, Europe and Japan). With such a kind of intellection in mind, it becomes easier to understand that the G7 has its most remote origin in the Clubs of Paris and Rome and, more recently, in the 1973 trilateral commission, materialized by David Rockefeller and Zbigniew Brzezinski, whose purpose was to develop the cooperation between the most developed regions of the world: Western Europe, Japan and North America. Highlighting the importance of the trilateral commission, Roberto Machado de Oliveira Mafra explains:

> The Trilateral [Commission] was, according to some, the 'financial arm' of the New World Order that would be implemented upon the world, in order to avoid the negative scenarios arising from the reports of the Club of Rome. This 'new order' would be materialized in the form of a single transnational world government. Three blocs were formed around the three main member countries (a triad) as an initial base for this endeavor – the United States, Europe and Japan –, representing the most influential elite in several countries – bankers, industrialists, businessmen, scientists,

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was widely criticized for its tendency of not being properly representative of the world, moving away, in Philippe Braillard's view, from the position of a guardian of the survival of the human species to approach a technocratic ideology, within a global society focused on the maintenance of multinational companies' interests (Mafra 2006, 174).

economists, military, politicians and others –, which formed the core of the Trilateral Commission. (...) The great objective of the Trilateral was to economically unite the entire world. The three blocs would be under the 'area of influence' of the United States, materializing a New Age 'prophesied' by Brzezinski as the [Electronic Age] (Mafra 2006, 176-177).

Thus, we can visualize the long way traveled by hegemonic America, from Bretton Woods (1944), through the Marshall Plan (1947), the Clubs of Paris (1956) and Rome (1968), the unilateral declaration of untying the dollar from the gold (1971), the Trilateral Commission (1973), the creation of the G7 (1975) and the exchange misalignments of the Plaza Agreement (1985)[6], until, finally, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the height of the hegemonic cycle of the *Pax Americana*'s economy, driven by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In effect, the fall of the Berlin Wall inaugurated neoliberal globalization, captained by Washington, in which the only remaining superpower on the planet would oversee the opening of economies across the globe while guaranteeing world peace. This means that the *Pax Americana* has become the engine of the post-1989 neoliberal governance, asserting the idea that the term globalization can and should be associated with American hegemonic projection[7].

With the right sharpness of mind one can also note that American global hegemony, according to the Clinton strategy for engagement and enlargement, would be exercised by the grand scheme of the world trade constellation, composed of three major supercontinental areas of trade, namely: the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA); the Transatlantic Market (TM) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Such an archetype would have as support elements the traditional Bretton Woods mechanisms (IMF, BIRD and the dollar), now joined by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which emerged in 1994 from the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Here, we can clearly visualize the most advanced stage of the theory of the capitalist triad: the American bloc is the Free Trade Area of the Americas,

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6 The Plaza Agreement, imposed by the United States in September 1985, forced the appreciation of the Japanese yen and the German mark with the aim of lowering the dollar, thus enabling the United States to reduce its trade deficit, as well as recovering its international competitiveness in relation to Germany and Japan.

7 It is in this sense that Vicente de Paulo Barreto associates the term 'globalization' with the hegemonic power projection of the '*Pax Americana*': the term 'globalization' was also associated with a socio-political project, *Pax Americana*, which after the fall of the Berlin Wall was considered as hegemonic. The project, both for theorists and in practical financial relations, came to be considered as qualitatively superior to other models of political, economic and social regimes found in different nations of the world. [...] Alongside this abrupt change in the global political scenario, for the first time in the history of humankind an economic system was intended to be universal, with the emergence of common production mechanisms to all peoples (Barretto 2010, 215-216).

the European bloc is the Transatlantic Market, and the Asian bloc is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Finally, both *Pax Americana* and neoliberal globalization are reiterated here, as is neoliberal globalization by the world trade constellation (the most advanced stage of the triad).

It is in this context of neoliberal globalization that Francis Fukuyama's (1998) end of history thesis emerges, shifting to the epicenter of postmodern statecraft the triumph of financial capitalism, the victory of liberal democracy, the universalization of Western values, the end of civilizational conflicts and the supremacy of a single superpower[8]. Thus, under the generic label of *Pax Americana*, the 'ontogeny of geopolitical leviathan' is projected, in which the United States' superior power will guarantee the peace and security of the international system.

In fact, hegemonic America feels an obligation to guide and command the destinies of humanity, and, in this sense, it is worth highlighting Brzezinski's vision:

> America has the monopoly on global military reach, an economy second to none, and peerless technological innovation, all of which give it unique worldwide political clout. Moreover, there is a widespread, if unspoken, practical recognition that the international system needs an effective stabilizer, and that the most likely short-term alternative to a constructive American world role is chaos (Brzezinski 2007, 192).

Consequently, the apothegm is simple: either the world accepts the hegemony of *Pax Americana* or it will live in a permanent state of global disorder (Góes 2018, 523-524)[9]. Finally, the complex dynamics of geopolitical domination of the planet necessarily rely on the leadership of neoliberal globalization. Everything that was pointed out so far has served to highlight neoliberal globalism under hegemonic America, which, however, begins its decline from September 11 onwards, the collapse of the Twin Towers and the Bush Doctrine.

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8 As Luís Roberto Barroso points out: 'Planet Earth. Early 21st century. Still without contact with other inhabited worlds. Between light and shadow, post-modernity unfolds. The generic label houses the mixture of styles, the disbelief in the absolute power of reason, the discredit of the state. The age of speed. The image above the content. [...] We experience the anguish of what cannot not be and the perplexity of a time without reliable truths. An apparently post-everything era: post-Marxist, post-Kelsenian, post-Freudian' (Barroso 2003, 2).

9 It is in this context that the era of world disorder is being unfolded, as highlighted by Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira: 'Political Science needs to study the state's ontogenesis, in the process of the oppressive accumulation of capitalist power, which not only denies [...] but also cancels the denial, throughout the history and evolution of the world economy [...]. There is a reciprocal relationship, of action and reaction, between events – so we have to study them in all its ontological dimensions, under new and different angles, given that history evolves ad infinitum, not in a straight line, but in a spiral and, sometimes, in curves, folds and alternating lines' (Moniz Bandeira 2016, 24-25).

In this sense, Samuel Huntington was quick to contest Fukuyama's idea of a single world of liberal harmony, emphasizing that:

> In the post-Cold War world, for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational. In the late 1980s the communist world collapsed, and the Cold War international system became history. In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. (…) The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations. World politics is being reconfigured along cultural and civilizational lines (Huntington 1998, 19-21).

In a way, Huntington's vision continues to follow the scientific trail of multicivilizational multipolarity. Most notably, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, symbols of the American financial and military power, had as an outcome the implementation of the Bush Doctrine of the preemptive strike, explicitly rejecting the Order of Yalta. Indeed, it must be recognized that the attacks on the symbols of American financial power drastically altered the picture for neoliberal globalization.

In this sense, post-9/11 strategic configuration opted, without major concerns for the rest of the world or for public international law, for a preventive attack model, as opposed to Clinton's National Security Strategy (NSS). This means to say that, while the Clinton NSS sought to maintain the control of the United States on the world economy, the Bush NSS did the opposite, enhancing the military dimension and, with that, allowing a gradual Chinese projection in Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia, with an emphasis on anti-Americanism. In the words of Thomas Friedman:

> So as the how-we-globalize forces drifted away, and as the number of Third World people benefiting from globalization began to grow, and as America under the Bush administration began to exercise more unilateral military power, the anti-American element in the antiglobalization movement began to assume a much louder voice and role. As a result, the movement itself became both more anti-American and more unable and unwilling to play any constructive role in shaping the global debate on how we globalize (Friedman 2007, 348).

Nevertheless, despite such relevant argumentation, the fact is that the decline of the American world effectively began with the neoliberal financial crisis of 2008, which was intensified by the 2019-2020 coronavirus crisis. In effect, the global health emergency projected, in a way, Kantian-inspired

principles[10], which oppose the neoliberal archetype of globalization of the capitalist triad – already weakened since 2008.

That is the reason why it can be claimed that the financial crisis of 2008 was the driving force of a true Copernican revolution in the field of world geopolitics, insofar as it brought with it the real possibility of deconstructing the American world and its possible replacement by a multipolar world, or at least a world without a centric predominance of the United States and its traditional mechanisms of global hegemony (Góes 2018). Thus, after the period of descent (1989-2001)[11], the period of crises emerges[12], from 2008 (financial crisis of liberalism) to the present day (health crisis of Covid-19). If the period of descent (1989-2001) is of unquestionable American hegemony, the period of crises (2008-2019) must be interpreted as a cycle of global power change, characterized by the gradual transition to welfarist multipolarity to the detriment of the neoliberal *Pax Americana*.

All the questions that have been raised so far can and should be grouped under the generic label of a pre-pandemic world. Now it is necessary to project the future of a new post-pandemic world order, whose most significant heritage should be the recognition of the person's dignity as a new axiological axis of the democratic rule of law, regardless of the elevated geopolitical tension between the two major powers of the international system. Thus, everything indicates that post-pandemic global geopolitics will bring to the center of the international relations agenda the dispute between Chinese neoliberal globalism (globalization-neoliberalism) and American deglobalization (repatriation of the national industry).

Undoubtedly, the globalization of the Covid-19 epidemic already projects the formation of a new world order, which will stand out not only for the resignification of the role of the modern state in the sense of guaranteeing the social rights of the common citizen (guarantee of the essential cores of human dignity), but also for the erratic great power competition between the United States and China, now within a new disruptive post-coronavirus archetype, which will reissue the Mackinderian-Spymanian paradigm with a

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10 In the words of the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben: 'This question is even more urgent, and it is not just a purely theoretical hypothesis, as it is beginning to be said that the current health emergency may be considered the laboratory in which new political and social arrangements are being made. Many will say that the most serious sacrifice was made in the name of moral principles. To those I would like to remind that Eichmann, apparently in good faith, stressed that he had done what he did according to his conscience, in obedience to the precepts of Kantian morals. A norm that states that good should be renounced in order to save good is as false and contradictory as one that, to protect freedom, imposes the renunciation of freedom (Agamben 2020).

11 Fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and collapse of the Twin Towers (2001).

12 Neoliberal financial crisis (2008) and coronavirus crisis (2019).

postmodern statecraft bias[13]. Strictly speaking, such a context already existed in the pre-Covid-19 world, where the advantages and disadvantages between Barack Obama's neoliberal transoceanic alliance strategy and Donald Trump's neoisolationist America First strategy were already being questioned.

In this sense, when we look at Obama's America and Trump's America in a comparative fashion, we can assert that they followed diametrically opposed geopolitical paths (Obama's neoliberal globalism versus Trump's neoprotectionist deglobalization), even though they aimed at the same ultimate goal: to restore the American world (*Pax Americana*), directly threatened by the geopolitical rise of China, instrumentalized by the convergence of the Silk Road Economic Belt (by land) and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (by sea). According to Obama's Strategy, the United States should revitalize its global leadership based on the triad theory, which was forgotten by the Bush administration. Hence the vision of creating grand transoceanic alliances with its traditional capitalist partners, namely: the transatlantic alliance with Europe and the transpacific alliance with Japan.

On the other hand, the novelty that the Trump Doctrine brings to the table is not the placing of American interests first, but rather the attempt to contain Chinese geopower on a global scale by adopting an economic nationalism based on the repatriation of the national industry[14]. For Trump, it is urgent to prioritize the American domestic space previously reserved for the diffuse interests carved out in the large multilateral arrangements, allegedly controlled by Washington.

In Trump's America, there is no longer room for neoliberal globalization led by broad multilateral trade arrangements, which do nothing more than harm the American economy in favor of China, an antagonistic power and strategically coupled to the networks of globalization[15]. Here is the

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13 It is in this sense that statesmen, legislators and jurists have the common task of reframing the national development paradigm, now considering new variables in their geopolitical equation, such as the phenomenon of deglobalization, the trade war between America and China, the consolidation of anti-hegemonic world power structures etc. (Góes and Visentini 2019, 35).

14 Now, let us not forget that, since the end of Eurocentric mundialization, the United States has always controlled the international scene by putting its vital interests in the first place. Therefore, without strategic naivety, it is necessary to understand that all the great strategies prior to the implantation of 'America First' have always put the United States first. In this sense, the systematic study conducted so far has already demonstrated the hegemonic dimension that guides American action in the international system – that is, since the end of World War II, the pragmatic genius of the American strategist has been using axioms that articulate great international alliances for their own benefit (Góes 2018, 528).

15 In this sense, it is worth questioning: what are the geopolitical reasons that guide the pragmatic genius of the American strategist to deconstruct his own creation, perhaps his masterpiece of the present time, which is the great transoceanic alliances (Atlantic and Pacific), conceived by Barack Obama with the purpose of containing Chinese expansion? It is clear that Trump's NSS is contradictory when it comes to the position of leader of the neoliberal world order, until now occupied by the United States. How to understand, in the midst of the 21st century, the deconstructing of current neo-Darwinian globalization by

great paradox of the post-crisis world order of 2019-2020: a turnaround in the American world and neoliberal globalization, which escapes or at least gradually moves away from its direct and immediate control. As a result, preventing Chinese global domination becomes the categorical imperative of American geopolitics, hence the idea of deglobalization based on the America First strategy[16].

In other words, the post-Covid-19 world will be characterized by the United States' effort to avoid the multipolar world order, as if its long-lasting power could survive even in the face of a new period of world crisis. In short, the post-coronavirus world will be a time marked by the dispute between the rescue of neo-Darwinian neoliberal-Lockean globalization and the consolidation of a Welfarist multipolarity with a cosmopolitan-Kantian bias.

21st Century Brazilian Geopolitics and the 1988 Constitution

As previously stated, post-pandemic global geopolitics will experience the tension between the resumption of neoliberal globalization under Chinese leadership and the reestablishment or not of the United States' geopolitical status in order to retake the reins of global leadership in a context of deglobalization of the economy. Unfortunately, in the midst of this complex world scenario, disoriented countries of late modernity in the Global South will become objects of dispute in light of this geopolitical clash. Indeed, subjected to the narratives of great power competition between the United States and China, it is highly likely that these countries will be easily seduced by the geopolitical principle of alignment: 'join my side, for I offer greater benefits'.

Here it is important to highlight that such a principle brings to the table a new interpretation of the concept of *Lebensraum* (vital space) for postmodern states, that is, the ability to conquer markets and minds. Such a worldview allows us to interpret neoliberal globalization for what it truly is – its benefits and harms, circumscribed to a complex dynamic of planetary geopolitical domination materialized by global leadership, be it American or

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American geopolitics, considering that it was carefully architected by the United States themselves since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989? (Góes 2018, 529).

16 With this, an era of setbacks for globalization begins, in which Trump's America, until then powerful and worldwide hegemonic, decides to face China directly, electing it as a rival, alongside Russia, as established by the National Security Strategy. Indeed, Trump's NSS deconstructs the neo-Darwinian globalization, which the United States has directly fostered since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Chinese[17].

Consequently, it is necessary to understand that the phenomenon of globalization of the economy is not a mere instrument for regulating international trade, nor an instrument for promoting international cooperation that is benign by nature, but rather an instrument for global power dispute (Góes 2018). In this phase of the post-crisis neoliberal globalization, it is imperative to study the Constitution of a peripheral state, uncritically receiving normative incentives that are unfavorable to its interests and stemming from the hegemonic geopolitics of the center, whose force of influence may even control the legislative process in the countries of late modernity in the Global South.

With the reflective mastery that is peculiar to him, Norberto Bobbio shows that the Legislative branch of poor countries on the periphery of the international system no longer acts as an autonomous power, but rather as a mere resonance chamber for foreign decisions, notably the nations in the lead of neoliberal globalization[18].

That is why one may be left with the impression that the national legislator does not understand the complex matrix of cross-impacts that circumscribes the verticalized power relations between the center and the periphery of the world system. Our constitutions and laws are modified without any regard to a possible national development project – on the contrary, what prevails is the strategy of great powers, notably the United States and China, characterizing what we may call a 'Constitutions market'[19].

The greater the lack of strategic vision in this segment of society, the greater the intensity of the damage suffered by ordinary citizens. The result of a lack of understanding of world geopolitics – by judges and legislators – reverberates directly in national development and, in its wake, in guaranteeing the social rights of the under-served. Equally troublesome is the fact that, in

17 Parag Khanna indicates that "A half century later, a leatherbound first edition of Toynbee's narrative was my most insightful guide as I set out around the world to explore the interplay of two world-historical forces he grasped intuitively without ever using the terms: geopolitics and globalization. Geopolitics is the relationship between power and space. Globalization refers to the widening and deepening inter-connections among the world's peoples through all forms of exchange" (Khanna 2008, 9-10).

18 Parliament, in the advanced industrial society, is no longer the real center of power, but often a resonating chamber for decisions taken elsewhere (Bobbio 2004, 159).

19 The idea of a 'Constitutions market' derives directly from Natalino Irti's (un)limiting forces notion (market of legal systems), meaning the power possessed by multinational companies – supported by their respective national states – to choose the Constitution that suits them best within a wide market of options offered by underdeveloped countries in the Global South (Irti 2007, 6). Far from being random, the realization of this wide set of options offered by the periphery of the international system to multinational companies is the result of a fundamental set of political decisions taken by the Legislative power, making it so that Bobbio's vision of a 'mere resonance chamber of decisions taken elsewhere' more accurate than ever (Bobbio 2004, 159).

these countries, a handful people are becoming richer than entire national states. All of this reflects the phenomenon of neo-Darwinian globalization that does nothing but perpetuate this cycle for the periphery of the Global South. In this sense, it is necessary to fight against the reality that connects the 'hegemonic power of rich and industrialized countries' and the 'subservient constitutional changes of poor and underdeveloped countries'.

In this sense, the aforementioned Natalino Irti, Italian jurist and professor at the Università La Sapienza di Roma, demonstrates that, behind any legal system, there is always a victim of power, hence the conception of an era of deregulation and borderless economic transactions, in which:

> Economic transactions ignore limits. While the tribes are at war, among other things, in the darkness of the night, the markets, which offer goods and trade, revolve with a feeling that they do not belong to any country. A no man's land is one that is between two margins, between the borders of two different countries, in two different spaces. The economy is (or aspires to be) an indefinite no-man's-land (Irti 2007, 1-4).

Such an intellection cannot escape the student of today's constitutional law, as it is recognized that his or her great scientific challenge in the 21st century is to incorporate, in the constitutional equation, new meta-legal variables (geopolitical, economic, cultural etc.), that inform and conform the elaboration of the legal order as a whole[20]. In fact, in times of postmodern statecraft, geopolitics, globalization and law are so intertwined that they form an epistemological whole, which challenges jurists and strategists alike – thence the relevance of geolaw as a multidisciplinary branch of contemporary science.

In strictly legal terms, the Constitution of 1988 establishes, as the pillar of the democratic constitutional state, the achievement of the fundamental objectives enshrined in article three of the constitutional text[21]. However,

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20 At the same time, the Judiciary – as a component of the state's political forces – finds itself increasingly involved in the complex constitutional problems that are brought before the courts. In this sense, it is worth highlighting, from the outset, geopolitical issues such as the demarcation of indigenous lands, environmental issues, the construction of hydroelectric dams in the Amazon, Petrobras' divestment plan and its process of unbundling by the privatization of subsidiaries (Refinarias, BR Distribuidora and others), the privatization of the Eletrobras system, the regulatory framework for the pre-salt, among others. These are issues that make up the so-called strategic constitutionalism, the branch of constitutional law whose epistemic lineage focuses on the inter, trans and multidisciplinary study involving world geopolitics and internal constitutional law (Góes 2019).

21 The fundamental objectives of the Brazilian state are, under the terms of art. 3, items I to IV, of the 1988 Constitution: to build a free, just and solidary society; to guarantee national development; to eradicate poverty and marginalization and reduce social and regional inequalities, promoting the good of all, without

carefully note that, among other fundamental objectives of the Brazilian state is the guarantee of national development, the achievement of which depends directly on national geopolitics. This means that national development is not merely left to the national strategist, but, rather, a norm of constitutional dignity which must be weighed against other principles of the Constitution.

In this sense, it is not enough to reconnect law and ethics, as the neo-constitutionalist paradigm of law does so brilliantly; it is necessary to cross dogmatic limits to achieve full harmony between geopolitics and law in order to create the theoretical bases of the hermeneutics of national development, in which the strategic question will be considered in the process of weighing constitutional values in collision. A country without a national development strategy is a country adrift in the international system.

Therefore, as mentioned before, the lack of understanding of the global strategic landscape on the part of legislators, judges and courts may represent the mitigation of social rights of the less favored classes, due to a possible deindustrialization of the country. It is in this sense that it is urgent to question whether it is possible build a free, fair and solidary society without a genuinely national industrialization strategy and focused on income distribution? Likewise, it is important to ask whether it is possible to guarantee national development without a grand strategic project for the state. And more: how to eradicate poverty and marginalization, as well as regional and social inequalities, adopting a strategy of subordination to the vital interests of the world centers of power?

Finally, the lack of a clear vision of this order of considerations can make it difficult to elaborate a genuinely Brazilian geopolitical project, free from external interference. Thus, it is urgent to build an autochthonous geopolitical archetype, capable of generating national development without violating the principles of the democratic constitutional states, thus guaranteeing a dignified life for all Brazilian citizens[22]. To this end, it is defended here the thesis that Brazilian international projection is inexorably reliant on the advance of national geopolitical knowledge, often distorted or poorly understood, either by the National Congress or by the Judiciary, which makes it difficult to achieve the categorical imperative of Brazilian geopolitics:

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prejudice of origin, race, sex, color, age and any other forms of discrimination.

22 And so it is that geopolitics and power must be in line with the constitutional sentiment of social and economic development, no longer admitting that old positivist autopoietic image, closed in on itself, without conceptual coupling of the different epistemological flows, notably geopolitics and law. On the contrary, it is the task of the Brazilian jurist and strategist to overcome the scientific backwardness that separates us from developed countries, especially the United States, whose National Security Strategy has the power to shape the international order: the strategy of a single country directing and commanding the entire world scenario (Góes and Visentini 2019, 31).

to lead Brazil to its proper place in the international system, that is, to be among the five great powers.

Hence, in Brazil, the gap regarding the epistemological encounter of geopolitics and law is undeniable, and it is worth highlighting here Gilberto Bercovici's vision, when he accurately captured the lack of concern regarding this development:

> We can put whatever we want in the Constitution – if we do not have a strong state, in the republican sense, to implement this Constitution, to be able to guarantee rights, to be able to implement public policies, it is useless. [...] Another issue that we have ignored lately is the issue of development. Without a state that promotes an effective development policy, we can put whatever we want in the Constitution, and, unfortunately, we will still be condemned to continue denouncing the fact that the Constitution contemplates something that in reality does not exist (Bercovici 2003, 79).

Thus, the great challenge of the national academic thought of the present is to conceive a multidisciplinary epistemological archetype that harmonizes the relations between the 'National Grand Strategy' and the 'Civilian Constitution of 1988'[23]. As Lassalle (1998, 49) points out, constitutional problems are not problems of law, but of power. In other words, the judicial decision cannot dispense with the understanding of world geopolitics and its reflexes in the constitutional field and vice versa, exactly as Philip Bobbitt (2003, 192) has argued. The constitution is not only the document that manifests the ways in which a certain society recognize civil rights; on the contrary, all societies are constituted in a specific way – and that is their constitution.

In times of postmodern statecraft, the scientific connection between the hermeneutics of national development and the full effectiveness of fundamental rights of the Brazilian citizen is intensified from the judicialization of geopolitics. For better or for worse, the Supreme Court needs to understand the impacts of global geopolitics not only on our constitutional text, but also on the legal system. Therefore, there is an urgent need to establish the bases of an autochthonous epistemic-geopolitical corpus, with a degree of order

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23 On the one hand, as was pointed out, the concept of Constitution in a strategic sense presupposes the theoretical mapping of the phenomenon of the judicialization of geopolitics, in which the great strategic questions of the Brazilian state will be brought before the Judiciary. Thus, the idea of 'Strategic Constitution' projects the image of 'the act of constituting the strategic action of the state', which evidently means that the Constitution must be read with a strategic filter, capable of understanding the influence of real power factors not only on the internal aspect, such as the famous thesis of Ferdinand Lassalle, but, mainly, of the real factors of hegemonic power in the world geopolitical landscape (Lassalle 1988).

and rationality that allows the maximization of national development without violating the canons of the rule of law. Therefore, it is necessary to plan and act, which evidently highlights the strengths of an independent geopolitics (Góes and Visentini 2019, 30).

This is the reason why the national statesman and legislator must rethink a new paradigm of positively attenuated statecraft, which harmonizes on the one hand the binomial 'free enterprise – global expansion of trade' and, on the other, the trinomial 'human dignity – national development – social justice'. Furthermore, the confluence of liberal values (formal equality and minimal status) with social values (material equality and positive status) must be made from the guarantee of the essential core of human dignity, which sets the minimum material conditions for the full exercise of citizenship and the rights of all three dimensions for all individuals.

With scientific accuracy, the reader will perceive that guaranteeing the essential **bases of dignity for all citizens** will only be achieved with the strengthening and expansion of the **Brazilian strategic core.** As already mentioned, the Brazilian strategic group is understood to be the group of Brazilian companies that are close to the traditional capitalist multinational companies, insofar as they remain as poles of world production and not as mere consumer markets (direct importation of products from abroad). In this category of companies, among other companies, are Petrobras, Embraer, the Defense Industrial Base, AmBev, Braskem, Bank of Brazil, Naval and Aeronautical Industry, Vale do Rio Doce, Eletrobras, National Contractors and the Agribusiness sector.

Please note carefully that only with this conceptual spectrum of geolaw (expansion of the strategic core of Brazilian companies in order to guarantee the essential core of dignified life for all Brazilian citizens) it is possible to project the country's geopolitical future. Expanding the Brazilian strategic core does not mean to reduce the number of state and multinational companies of other nationalities. On the contrary, in various strategic sectors of the national economy, it is urgent to attract new foreign investments in order to foster national development[24].

Here, the reader must realize, with due strategic sensitivity, that it is not a question of being against privatizations – on the contrary, it is argued here

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24 What is not accepted is the reduction of the Brazilian strategic core, made by privatizations, which transfer the industrial activity abroad with supervening imports of that same product in the future. A logic that is not easy to understand, but, undoubtedly, imposed almost by means of a single thought by the first privatization cycle in Brazil, during the 1990s. A good model for the privatization of public companies is the process of going public on the stock exchange, with pulverization of shares, which would allow the strategic control of such companies by the Brazilian society and not by the Brazilian state, as well as the maintenance of technological development in Brazil.

that privatizations will always be welcomed, insofar as state-owned companies will always be less competitive than private companies. In fact, what must be avoided is denationalization, followed by the complete liquidation of Brazilian companies (state or private), some profitable and endowed with a reasonable technological domain, as, for example, was the Brazilian shipbuilding industry, until then situated in the top three in the world and whose outcome was melancholic: a strategic sector of the national economy was practically wiped out in the name of an international competitiveness that never arrived in the country.

Ultimately, overnight, this relevant Brazilian strategic core, with high added value and considerable technological content, was almost destroyed – leaving the country to spend billions of dollars in payment of freight for foreign flag vessels to carry out maritime trade, which corresponds to more than 90% of all foreign trade in Brazil. Here is the record of a fundamental example which reinforces the need for the development of geolaw as a branch of legal science that studies the immanent epistemological connections between geopolitics and law[25].

Therefore, one of the greatest challenges facing the 21st century Brazilian jurist and strategist is to carry out a theoretical review of geopolitical and legal instruments that project the formulation of public policies for the revaluation of national industry, without violating the democratic constitutional state and international free trade rules. Strictly speaking, it is multinational companies that shape the world order under the protection of their respective national states.

It is urgent, on this account, to build a new state paradigm, with enough scientific latitude capable of harmonizing the tension of the geopolitical great power game and the constitutional sentiment of justice, thereby enabling the strengthening of the strategic core of industrialization in the country and, in its wake, guaranteeing the essential core of dignified life for the Brazilian citizen. Therefore, there is an urgent need to articulate the elements of national power, transforming potential power into real power and projecting the country in the concert of nations, notably from its four great founding geopolitical archetypes: Brazil is an energy superpower, a food superpower, an

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25 In this sense, it is important to assess whether it is still worth insisting on the reconstruction of some sectors of the Brazilian strategic core, which were deconstructed by the Washington Consensus, and rather strengthen the national industry and the internationalization of Brazilian private companies, endowing them with international competitiveness as so to keep them in the transnational capitalist production chain. In other words, is it convenient or not to insist on the strategic control of the state in the process of intensifying commercial and technological relations on a global scale? As an ideal type of this dilemma, one can mention the regulatory mark of the pre-salt that defines a minimum percentage of national content in these activities, that recently was significantly reduced.

aquifer superpower and an environmental superpower ('green superpower').

Much more than that: the study of classical and contemporary geopolitics clearly shows the peripheral line that characterizes South America in relation to the centers of power, which, of course, does not fit in with the political and strategic dimension of Brazil. Indeed, admitting a verticalized geopolitical relation is an impediment for Brazil to prosper at its own pace, thus realizing the great categorical imperative of Brazilian geopolitics. That is why, in an academic sense, the theory of Colonel Roberto Machado de Oliveira Mafra from the Superior War School (ESG) in Brazil gained importance when he engineered his Quaternary Theory. Its great merit rests on the strong idea that Brazil and other Latin American countries should not accept inferior treatment by other blocs or world leaders[26].

Even though the conception of the eminent ESG professor is the best path to be followed, under the terms of the article four of the 1988 Constitution, which establishes the search for the formation of a Latin American community of nations, such a geopolitical construct is believed to be difficult to execute in the medium or short term[27]. Thus, it is conjectured as the best geopolitical solution the reduction of the vital space of Brazil for the South American subcontinent. This is not to say that South American integration should be necessarily the main objective of 21st century Brazilian geopolitics. On the contrary, the search for South American integration is only the starting point of a broader geopolitical strategy that is projected on the structures of the world macro-powers, notably the United States, the European Union and China.

Here is the founding core of 21st century Brazilian geopolitics: the construction of an archetype for strengthening South America in the face of the three major power poles – hence the importance of strategic rapprochement with the United States, the advance of the Mercosur-EU agreement and the engagement with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road).

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26 This means that, from the first quarter of the 21st century onwards, the world will be divided into four major geopolitical groups, namely: the North American bloc, the European bloc, the Asian bloc and the Latin American bloc. This last bloc would initially be integrated by South American countries, with the addition of other Latin American countries in Central and North America and, finally, those of the Caribbean region (Mafra 2006, 66).

27 Indeed, the implementation of the Quaternary Theory is difficult to enforce. In this respect, it is enough to note that Mexico is already strongly tied to the United States and Canada, in the same way that the countries of the Caribbean and Central America are strategically closer to the US than to any other South American country. Therefore, it is correct to say that the integration of Latin America's geopolitical space in the globalized world is at the threshold of intangibility.

Final Remarks

This article tried to analyze, initially, the geopolitical control of law from the influence of neoliberal geopolitics on the constitutionalism of countries of late modernity, as is the case of Brazil. Thus, it was possible to demonstrate the influence of real factors of world power on the legislative process of the countries of the Global South from the perspective of neoliberal globalization, whose leadership is being disputed between the United States and China.

Through the systematization proposed, it was possible to verify that Trump's National Security Strategy, even before the 2019 coronavirus crisis, already had a cratological structure incompatible with the position of leader of neoliberal globalization, until then occupied by the United States. So, how to understand, in the midst of the 21st century, the deconstructing of current neo-Darwinian globalization by American geopolitics, considering that it was carefully architected by the United States themselves since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989? (Góes 2018, 529).

In this sense, it was demonstrated that Trump's strategy was not only the most updated version of the isolationist doctrine of the Eurocentric era, but, above all, a landmark of paradigmatic break with all other strategic archetypes that preceded it. In other words, Trump's America, denying the theory of the triad, moved away from the leadership of neoliberal globalism in order to approach the neoisolationist, truly protectionist rationality, which made possible the so-called 'geopolitical turn of deglobalization', provoked by the geopolitical rise of China through the convergence of the Silk Road Economic Belt (by land) and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (by sea).

It also became evident that the Covid-19 crisis further reinforced the Chinese success over the United States when it comes to the influence and control of the globalized economy. The health emergency proved the world dependence on health equipment manufactured in China, hence the American attempt to geopolitically neutralize Chinese expansion, not only in relation to the conquest of the 'world island', in Mackinderian terms (land masses of Europe, Asia and Africa), but also from the outer islands (the American continent itself, Australia and surrounding areas)[28].

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28 Likewise, the American accusation that the World Health Organization (WHO) operates under China's geopolitical control already projects in itself the image of a Chinese leadership of multilateral organizations in the world system. This means that the containment of the authoritarian model of state capitalism in China can no longer be done only by the United States. Therefore, it is essential to co-opt the other democratic industrialized countries, former co-leaders of neoliberal globalization (Europe and Japan). However, as we tried to demonstrate, Chinese expansion during the coronavirus crisis does not rule out the possibility of resumption of global leadership by the United States. In the view of the American strategist, what matters is to reestablish a new version of the American world, now no longer captained by neoliberal

Finally, it was asserted that the post-coronavirus world will experience the geopolitical tension between the rescue of neoliberal globalization led by China and the resumption of cratological show of strength from the United States to recover the reins of global leadership. In the midst of it all, there's the legitimate aspiration of late modernity countries for the pursuit of their national development.

In this sense, it was highlighted that the Brazilian statesman and legislator must rethink the state paradigm, taking into account new forms of international relations and new formulas for interpreting the Constitution. The envisaged solution will have to favor the expansion of the Brazilian strategic core as a set of autonomous economic-technological segments capable of effectively participating in international competition. In other words, a country with more than 200 million inhabitants cannot give up its strategic technological-industrial base, transforming itself into a mere service society and exporter of primary goods.

Indeed, within a scenario that is geopolitically post-American, post-Welfarist state-wise and legally post-positivist, it is urgent for the 21st century judge and jurist to devise a new constitutional archetype of attenuated state positivity status capable of harmonizing, on the one hand, the binomial 'free enterprise – global expansion of trade' and, on the other, the trinomial 'human dignity – national development – social justice'[29].

It must be understood that both the Constitution and the National Strategy are two sides of the same coin, which should be combined in the pursuit of the fundamental objectives of the Brazilian state. What good does it do to celebrate the normative strength of the Constitution under the auspices of a thriving democracy, when we see the country's inability to devise a genuinely Brazilian national development strategy that promotes, at the same time, the strategic base of Brazilian companies and the essential base of human dignity for all Brazilians?

At the turn of the century, the great categoric imperative of Brazilian geopolitics will be the guarantee of the essential core of human dignity to all Brazilians aligned with the expansion of the strategic core of large Brazilian multinational companies. That is the only way to overcome the periphery cycle, placing Brazil among the world's top five great powers.

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globalization of large multilateral trade arrangements, but by the military and technological supremacy of the United States.

29 That is why judges and courts should read the Constitution considering the theoretical delineations of geolaw, examining with due strategic vision whether the edition of constitutional amendments and infraconstitutional laws related to the regulatory frameworks of the strategic sectors of the national economy (energy, transport, defense industrial base, telecommunications etc.) made by the democratic legislator promotes or not national development, conciliating, at the same time, democratic values with the geopolitical values of aggrandizement of the Brazilian state.

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ABSTRACT

This article is the result of research carried out in the postdoctoral stage of the Postgraduate Program in Aeronautical Sciences at the University of Aeronautics (PPGCA), whose theme was "Geopolitics, Culture and Law: Epistemological dialogues needed in times of postmodernity" Thus, it collimates to examine the scientific connections that unite geopolitics and law, disciplines that overlap in such a way that they end up guaranteeing fundamental rights for ordinary citizens, aiming to analyze the geopolitical control of law from the influence of neoliberal geopolitics on constitutionalism. of the countries of late modernity, as is the case of Brazil, thus it was possible to demonstrate the influence of real factors of world power in the legislative process of the countries of the Global South of neoliberal globalization, whose leadership is being disputed by the United States and China.

THE DECLINING HEGEMONY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF CHINA: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON POWER TRANSITION THEORY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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Introduction

"Let China sleep; when she wakes, she will shake the world."

- Napoleon Bonaparte (1769- 1821)

Can China rise peacefully under the hegemony of the United States? The dominant answers to this question are hinged on the premise of the Power Transition theory. Most Power Transition theorists predicted that the rise of China would be conflictual. Some 200 years ago, Napoleon Bonaparte warned that the world should "let China sleep; when she wakes, she will shake the world". Since today's world is dominated by the hegemony of the United States, shaking the world means shaking the United States (Allison 2017, Chan, Hu and He 2018, Kugler and Organski 1989, Wang 2018, Yoder 2019).

According to the Theory, a transition of power from a hegemon to a rising power usually ends up in conflicts or war; and possibly a change in

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the structure of the international system (Kugler and Organski 1989). The Power Transition theory was propounded by Abramo Fimo Kenneth Organski in his book *World Politics* in 1958. He explained that nations pass through three stages of power transition. First is the Stage of Potential Power, followed by the Stage of Transitional Growth in Power, and lastly the Stage of Power Maturity. Organski (1958) further explained that the key indicators of the relative power of a nation are the Size its Population, Industrial-strength, and Political Organisation.

Moreover, Organski argued that when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, the scenario usually ends up in a dangerous dynamic which the Harvard scholar Graham Allison called "Thucydides' Trap" (Mastro 2019). Using our knowledge of history, we will understand the core assumption of the Power Transition theory as history has recorded several instances where transition of power led to major wars. In ancient time, the transition of power from Sparta to Athens was bloody. In the 20th century, the rising power of Germany in Europe resulted in world wars (Mearsheimer 2001).

Furthermore, the Power Transition theory explained that the factors that cause war between the declining hegemon and the rising power are dissatisfaction and fear. Ideally, in an anarchic global system of self-help, when a growing power is dissatisfied with the existing world order, naturally, the emerging power will endeavour to exalt its influence on the system to achieve its interest. Thus, the action of the revisionist state will correlatively cast fear and uncertainty in the mind of the declining hegemon which makes hegemonic war almost inevitable as testified by history. Usually, in the process of Power Transition, the dissatisfied challenger grows faster than the dominant nation and threatened to catch up and overtake the dominant power. As the power parity is narrowing between the challenger and the dominant nation, tension between the two major contenders would mount due to the uncertainty about the future intentions of the rising state which usually leads to confrontation (Chan et al. 2018).

Lastly, this paper used explanatory research design to critically evaluate the phenomenon under study and suggest possible solutions using process tracing. Process tracing is a tool of qualitative analysis that systematically provides an examination of evidence selected and analysed in light of research objectives (Beach 2017). In this paper, the data was principally gathered from secondary sources which included reports, official web sites, reputable journal articles, encyclopaedias and books. The collected information was critically analysed to explain how deficient Power Transition theory is in the 21st century to explain the current United States-China relations and the prospect

of peace or war between the two states.

The Issue and Rationale for the Study

Since the formulation of the Power Transition Theory in 1958, it has been widely used to analyse and make predictions about the behaviour of China when it reaches the stage of power maturity and the possible reaction of the hegemon of the day during the transition. Organski himself predicted that "the rise of China, which has just entered the stage of transitional growth, promises to be equally spectacular" (Organski 1958). Studies by the United States' Central Intelligence Agency and others have projected that China will be a first-rate military power and will rival the United States in global power by 2020 (Layne 2008). Many argued that the rise of China and the fear and uncertainty that it will instil in the United States would eventually lead to a hegemonic war (Chan et al. 2018; Wang 2018; Yoder 2019).

The belief by many academics that the United States and China will end up in a Thucydides' Trap, coupled with propaganda by the media of mass communication have helped in amplifying the issue beyond unreasonable level. The aggravation of the matter has instilled panic in the mind of foreign policymakers which could influence them to make erroneous and irrational policy choices that can jeopardise world peace and international cooperation.

Therefore, this paper argues that in terms of economic growth, China could surpass the United States, but there is no indication of armed confrontation between the two nations. This is because in the 21st century there are changing trends in international relations and global politics. There is increasing economic interdependence, rapid advancement in military technology, institutional constraints, domestic political system, nature of alliances and the issue of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) due to the advent and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These factors have necessitated a critical revisit of the Power Transition theory which was propounded in mid-20th century.

Thus, this paper attempted examine the Power Transition Theory in relations to some emerging variables in the 21st century to address the knowledge vacuums on the prospects of peace or war between the United States and China should transition occur. The issues raised and discussed in this paper could be of importance to foreign policymakers and will help to tilt the attention of academics and the mass media to an angle of the phenomenon that has not been explored adequately.

Literature review

According to Organski (1958), the apex level a country can reach on the power transition spectrum is the "Stage of Power Maturity". He explained that when a country becomes the dominant player on the international stage or ascends to the global hegemonic position, it eventually gets challenged by a rising and dissatisfied powerful nation. As proven by history, in most instances, the quest for world leadership between the declining hegemon and the emerging power usually lead to armed confrontation (Dunn 2010, Lopez and Johnson 2017).

For instance, in *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, Shannon Lindsey Blanton and Charles William Kegley explained that the quest for world leadership among great power had been part of global politics since time immemorial. And they argued that rivalry between great powers is cyclical; meaning that history will be repeating itself (Blanton and Kegley 2017). The authors tried to justify the reoccurrence of great powers rivalry for world leadership by taking us back more than 500 years (1495 - 2025) into history using Long-cycle theory to show how global leadership manifests through some series of stages. According to them, periods of global war are followed by period of relative stability in global leadership which facilitate the creation of institutions and establishing of new international order by the hegemon with the support of other powerful nations. Usually, the global transformation alters states' relative power, changes their alliances with other countries and probably with changes in international borders (Holsti 2019; Scott 2018). Table 1 below summarised some historic and probable future power transition trends.

Tabela 1: Timeline of Great Power Rivalry for World Leadership (1495-2025)

Dates	Preponderant State(s) Seeking Hegemony	Other Powers Resisting Domination	Global War	New Order after Global War
1495–1540	Portugal	Spain, Valois, France, Burgundy, England	War of Italy and the Indian Ocean, 1494–1517	Treaty of Tordesillas, 1517
1560–1609	Spain	The Netherlands, France, England	Spanish-Dutch Wars, 1580–1608	Truce of 1608; Evangelical Union and the Catholic League formed
1610–1648	Holy Roman Empire (Hapsburg dynasty in Spain and Austria-Hungary)	Shifting ad hoc coalitions of mostly Protestant states (Sweden, Holland) and German principalities as well as Catholic France against remnants of papal rule	Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648	Peace of Westphalia, 1648
1650–1713	France (Louis XIV)	The United Provinces, England, the Hapsburg Empire, Spain, major German states, Russia	War of the Grand Alliance, 1688–1713	Treaty of Utrecht, 1713
1792–1815	France (Napoleon)	Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, Russia	Napoleonic Wars, 1792–1815	Congress of Vienna and Concert of Europe, 1815
1871–1914	Germany, Turkey, Austria-Hungary	Great Britain, France, Russia, United States	World War I, 1914–1918	Treaty of Versailles creating the League of Nations, 1919
1933–1945	Germany, Japan, Italy	Great Britain, France, Soviet Union, United States	World War II, 1939–1945	Bretton Woods, 1944; United Nations, Potsdam, 1945
1945–1991	United States, Soviet Union	Great Britain, France, China, Japan	Cold War, 1945–1991	NATO/Partnerships for Peace, 1995; World Trade Organization, 1995
1991–2025?	United States	China, European Union, Japan, Russia, India	A cold peace or hegemonic war, 2015–2025?	A new security regime to preserve world order?

Source: Blanton and Kegley (2017).

Narrowing down the review to the rise of China under the global leadership of the United States which is the issue being examined by this paper, Graham Allison in his book entitled *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides' Trap?* argued that China's rise could not be peaceful (Allison 2017). Ideally, since China is a communist and non-democratic country while the United States is a capitalist and democratic nation, China should be dissatisfied with the current international order established by the United States after the Second World War.

As a rising power, China is to be dissatisfied with current American led global order. Naturally, the Chinese will attempt to reshape it. This dissatisfaction of the status quo by China will most likely create fear and uncertainty in the United States. This complex situation might lead to a tragic 21st century if it is not managed cautiously. The Harvard Professor Graham

Allison described the scenario to be a Thucydides' Trap, which is a fatal configuration of structural distress that manifests when a powerful emerging country challenges the leadership of the hegemon (Allison 2017). Other researchers such as Ganguly & Pardesi (2012); Kim & Gates (2015); Kirshner (2019); Marsh (2014); Scott (2018) share similar position. Yet, Allison (2017) emphasised that armed confrontation could be avoided if both the United States and China take some difficult and painful steps towards a peaceful transition.

Recently, Chi-Hung Kwa, in his article *The China-US Trade War: Deep-Rooted Causes, Shifting Focus and Uncertain Prospects* explored the current upsurge of trade war waged against China by the United States. As believed by Power Transition theorists, the United States sees the speedy rise of China as a threat to her global dominance and leverage (Kwan 2019). Consequently, the United States has placed exorbitant tariffs on products coming from China. Also, the United States placed some restrictions on the transfer of technology from the United States to China in response to the rapid growth and dominance of some high-tech companies in China such as *Huawei* that appeared to be an apparent competitor of *Apple* (Oramah and Dzene 2019). Gompert, Cevallos, & Garafola (2016); Hopewell (2019); Kwan (2019); Liu (2018); Stiglitz (2017) expressed concerned over the possibility of increasing deterioration of the trade war between the two countries which could result into international economic instability or the emergence of two opposing economic blocs headed by the two powers.

Similarly, in *Trends of U.S.-China Trade Disputes and Beijing's Policy Options,* Sun Tianhao and Wang Yan opined that the United States sees the economic rise of China as a threat to its economic leverage. Thus, taking China as a challenger that needs to be repelled. They made a comparative analogy of the current United States – China relation with the case of the economic rise of Japan more than 20 years and the reaction of the United States towards it. Tianhao & Yan (2018) explained that when Japan was rising 20 years ago, the United States had the same anti-Japanese sentiment and tactics. The United States tried to destroy Japanese multinational conglomerates like *Toyota* and *Honda* and crippled *Toshiba* with sanctions. And United States succeeded in bringing the economic might of Japan down. In the end, Alfayad (2019); Blackwill & Tellis (2015); Campbell & Ratner (2018); Tianhao & Yan (2018) expressed optimism for China as a formidable challenger and likely to survive the United States' manoeuvres. This according to them is due the economic size of China, the rate of its technological advancement, abundant human resource, and its influence on the international stage which is far greater than that of Japan even at the peak of the Japanese growth.

Discussion

This section provides a critical and constructive analysis of the available information related to the issue under consideration. As mentioned earlier, this paper relied on secondary sources of data to evaluate the phenomenon. Thus, some patterns are identified from the information gathered, summarised, and organised into headings and subheadings, assessed and made comparison between the United States and China vis-à-vis the assumption of the Power Transition theory bearing in mind the initial interrogation guiding the paper as whether China can peacefully rise to hegemony under American dominated international system.

The Growing Influence of China and the Decline of the United States

China is on the rise and transforming into a significant and influential player on the international stage. It provides worldwide economic strength and grows militarily as well (Lee 2019). Astarita & Lim (2014) argued that the process of power transition from the US to China is in motion. Below are some indicators of sustained rise of China and relative decline of the United States.

Figure 1: Percentage of the Population of China Living Below Extreme Poverty Line

In 1978
90% China's Population
lived below Extreme
Poverty Line

Source: World Bank (2016), Allison (2018).

Not very much long ago in 1978, 90 individuals out of every 100 Chinese were living below the international poverty line of 1.90 dollars per day as indicated in Figure 1 above. Considering the large population of China of over 1 billion people, these statistics signified hunger, malnutrition, diseases, and national and human insecurity. And all these factors are detrimental to growth and development.

Paradoxically, China came up with one of the most effective national anti-poverty strategies that took its citizens out of poverty within a practically miraculous short period. In contrast, today, China is opposite to what it used to be in 40 years ago. Thus, nearly all the population of China of approximately 1.3 billion people are enjoying an excellent standard of living with sustainable source of income (Allison 2018).

Figure 2: Percentage of the Population of China Living Above Extreme Poverty Line

Since 2014, 99% China's Population live above Extreme Poverty Line

Source: World Bank (2016), Allison (2018).

As shown in Figure 2 above, the contemporary national power of China has turned the 1978 pyramid into an inverted one with around 99% of its population living above 1.9 dollars per day. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of the Chinese population fell into the middle-class category. The Chinese growth came with impressive development in all the human and national security indicators.

Although in the 1970s, China was a poor Communist country, but today it strategised to emerge as a global power. First, China started from the scratch by copying business methods and developed its commerce and exports networks globally, developed machinery and make use of its abundant and cheap human resources to spin the will of growth and development. Moreover, China made a massive investment in educating its citizens in the field of science and technology which played a significant role in power today.

Table 2: Compared GDP Based on PPP for the United States and China (In Billions of US Dollars)

Years	2004	2014	2024 (Projection)
China	5,767	18,345	35,596
United States	12,214	17,522	25,093

Source: World Bank (2019).

Going by the above figures in Table 2, it is evident that the Chinese economy has been doubling every ten years. This indicates that China's policies are very stable which is crucial in the implementation of Long-term plans. From the 1970s to date, the cumulative result of the sustained growth of China resulted in the significant improvement in the standard of living of its citizens by almost 50 fold. As latest a 2004 China was half of the United States in terms of GDP (PPP). By 2015 the Chinese GDP (PPP) became equal to that of the United States. And the current projection indicated that by 2024 GDP (PPP) will double that of the United States. The consequence of this dramatic change will be felt everywhere. For example, in the current trade war, China is the number one trading partner of all the major Asian countries. At this juncture, Allison (2017) in his attempt to establish a possible armed confrontation between the United States and China he explained that the Harvard's "Thucydides Trap file" has documented and evaluated some 500 years of history and found 16 cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling power. And out of the 16 cases, 12 ended in war.

Chasing Away the United States from China's "Backyard"

Mearsheimer (2001) explained that being a hegemon does not mean the absolute domination of the world; rather, it is when a nation dominates

it "backyards" or region and feel secure in it. According to him, this regional hegemony allows the dominating country to go snooping in other country's "backyards" or regions. Mearsheimer's explanation is evident in the foreign policy of the United States towards the Middle East and North Africa, South and Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe etc. The United States has dominated the North and South America which allowed her to roam around the globe and meddle into other countries' affairs for her gain. However, the growth in the Chinese influence in Asia signifies a diminishing power and the eventual expulsion of the United States from the region. The complete consolidation of China's dominance in Asia is one of the critical strategic achievements of its rise as a regional hegemon.

Accordingly, China consolidated its influence in East Asia and developed a cordial relationship with Russia; followed by unprecedented economic growth and prestige. The economic transformation of China spearheaded the recovery of Asia from its financial meltdown of 1997. This marked the point in history when China overtook Japan as the dominant economic player in Asia (Campbell 2008). The economic transformation and influence of China in Asia became the impetus for the economic transformation of Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, and other Asian countries which made them important actors on the world economic stage. Furthermore, by the end of 2005 the growth of China facilitated a global output of over 33% by Asian countries. Additionally, China transformed into the most important member of ASEAN, and strategically co-operating with other major Asian countries such as Japan on matters that can of significance to the economic stability of the region (Campbell 2008).

In recent years, another significant success of China is its considerable investments in East Asia and the orchestration of a new economic architecture outside the realm of the Bretton Woods system. China has engaged East Asian countries in establishing the infrastructure for the consolidation of an Asian based Bond Market. One of the critical strategies of the bond market is to reduce over-dependence on western controlled capital markets by mobilising savings in regional currencies for long term investment in Asia (Layne 2008, Wang 2018).

On the other hand, some power politics analysts are making emphasis on the military might of the United States in the Pacific region. But China is consolidating its political and economic leverage in Asia to the extent that countries like Malaysia, Singapore and others are sceptical in collaborating with the United States in any form of a military exercise that could provoke China in the South China Sea. Soon, China will have a powerful influence on the operation of the United States' pacific command (Campbell 2008, Lee

2019).

Going by the facts above, there is no doubt that China is getting closer to the United States. So, by measuring the gap between the two powers an indication of the relative decline of the US is evident. But it does not signify that China will surpass the United States in the coming decades in all ramifications. It only means that China will be larger than the United States as an economy. Another issue to look at is the population of China of 1.3 billion growing at a rate of 7.5%. Eventually, China will be larger, but it will be much poor than the United States in terms of per capita income since the population of the United States is only 3.9 million.

Lastly, what we have to know is that if United States is in decline, what type of decline is she experiencing? Is it an absolute or a relative decline? The absolute decline is like what happened to the ancient Roman Empire. Rome was an agrarian economy with no indigenous sources of productivity; it grew richer by conquering; as the empire was increasing its territory without corresponding increases in the economy that will cater for the vast empire and its civil wars erupted, it started declining which eventually led to its fall; but for that to happen it took about 300 years. If what happened to the Roman Empire is absolute, then is it the same process the United States is experiencing today? The answer is negative.

The Power Transition Theory: A 21st Century Critical Perspective in Relation to the Rise Of China

In the 21st century, one crucial point that Power Transition theorists failed to comprehend adequately is that China could only become rich in the international environment created by the *Pax Americana*. The whole Bretton Woods system gave all the major powers free and unfettered access to global markets. Before the post World War II international order, nations go to war to get these resources. While in the current global system, the United States offered them for free. The deal was: The United States acts as world policeman and keeps the trade routes open with its massive navy and military might, and, in exchange, the world helps the United States fight Soviet Communism. The United States even sacrificed its economic dominance and a percentage of its GDP and came up with Marshall Plan to make this deal work. The world eagerly jumped at the deal, and places like China and Germany got rich on trade (Harris 2016; Tang 2018).

But here is the issue: The treat of the Soviet Union is gone. The circumstances that created the Post World War II system are no longer in

force. Currently, all the United States knows is that it is carrying the massive burden of debt to be "the world's policeman". It is losing money and market share by supporting the infrastructure to allow other countries to get rich. Considering the foreign policy advances of the United States, it is now re-thinking its old post World War II set-up. Once that set-up disappears, China will crumble because the Chinese economy heavily relied on exports. If those trade routes are abandoned by the United States, there will be a scramble for other countries to take control of them; and that means chaos. The United States might not care much because only a small fraction of her economy is tied up in exports (Wen 2018). Presently, the United States is not as vulnerable as China, and Europe are. The United States can manufacture its goods, grow its food, and generate its energy. Whereas, other emerging economies like China and others might not survive it (Fung 2013, Wen 2018).

Another issue is the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) due to the advent and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Cold War would have turned into a "Hot War" if not because of the balance of nuclear terror between the United States and the Soviet Union, more especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Just like with Russia, war is not an option between China and the United States due to the nuclear second-strike capability the two countries possessed (Christensen 2012, Tanter 2017).

Figure 3: Top 15 Countries with Highest Military Expenditure as of 2018 According to the Classification of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Source: Tian, Fleurant, Kuimova, Wezeman, and Wezeman (2019).

In 2018, the global military expenditure stood at 1.47 trillion USD which accounted for 81 percent of the of entire money spent on military wordwide. The United States spends on military more than any other country on the planet with an estimated expenditure of 649 billion USD representing 36 percent of the global military spendings as indicated in Figure 3.3 above. However, compared to the year 2010 when it reached its apex, the military expenditure of the United States is lower by 19 percent in 2018. The decerease is certainly due to the United States' Government efforts to address deficit and balance her budget throughout most of the 2010s (Tian et al. 2019).

As indicated in Figure 3, China comes second in terms of military spending after the United States. Although, China is second but not a close contender as the United States has more than doubled the Chinese military expenditure. In 2018, China spent 250 billion USD on its military power which

stands for 14 percent of the world's military spending. The military expenditure of China has increased almost 10 folds in 2018 compared to 1994. Moreover, China has recorded a steady growth in her military spending. Though, the 5 percent growth recorded in 2018 is the lowest since 1995. The decerease in the rate of the Chinese military spending is associated to the slowing of its economic growth in 2018 which is the lowest in 28 years. Unlike the United States, China has a policy of making her military spending propossionate to her economic growth (Tian et al. 2019). As a subset of the general military spending and capability, a country's nuclear power determines its strength or vulnerability on the international system. Table 3.2 below shows the compared status of the nuclear weapon capability of the United States and China as of 2019.

Table 3: Status of Nuclear Weapons for the United States and China as of 2019

Country	Deployed Strategic	Deployed Nonstrategic	Reserve/ Nondeployed	Military Stockpile	Total Inventory
United States	1,600g	150h	2,050i	3,800j	6,185k
China	0m	?	290	290	290m

Source: FAS (2019).

As interpreted by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), deployed strategic refers to the nuclear warheads deployed on intercontinental missiles and at heavy bomber bases. While the deployed nonstrategic are nuclear warheads deployed on bases with operational short-range delivery systems. The reserve or nondeployed are nuclear warheads that are not deployed on launchers and in storage. Wheras the military stockpile refers to active and inactive nuclear warheads that are in the custody of the armed forces and earmarked for use by commissioned deliver lunchers. Lastly, the total inventory of nuclear for each country refers to the warheads in the armed forces stockpile as well as retired, but still intact, it also includes warheads designated to be dismantled (FAS 2019).

Since 1964 when China first tested its first atomic bomb, the country has maintained the strategy of minimum nuclear deterrence. Thus, China belives that an efficient nuclear second-strike capabikity would be adequate to serve as credible deterrence from any nuclear offensive on China. As such,

the Chinese concentrated on maintaining as low as 290 stockpile of nuclear inventory, but with a reliable and efficient second strike capabilities enough to deter and repress aggression (Kristensen and Korda 2019a).

In contrast, the United States maintained a consirable high number of nuclear arsenal only second to Russia. Approximately, the United States Department of Defence maintains nuclear stockpile of almost 3,800 warheads; and most of them are deployed. Currently in the United States, 2,050 nuclear warheads are categorised as reserved; while 2,385 are designated retired and waiting to be dismantled. In sum, the United States possesses nearly 6,185 nuclear weapons. Of this number, 1,750 nuclear bombs that are deployed, around 1,300 are mounted on ballistic missiles, while 300 warheads are mounted at strategic nuclear bases within the United States, with some additional150 strategic nuclear warheads deployed accorss some strategic locations in European (Kristensen and Korda 2019b).

Armed confrontation between the United States and China is a losing game for all. Thus, a full-scale military conflict is doubtful since both China and the United States are designated nuclear weapon powers by the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Then again, this day and age there are many other ways to undermine another regime, which include: trade wars, sanctions, espionage, propaganda - all of which are already well underway. Finally, in this paper, it is argued that even if the rise of China will result to armed confrontation, it won't likely be between China and the United States but between China and a host of other regional powers that are not yet known.

Final Remarks and Recommendation

This paper explored the prospects of peace or war between the declining United States and rising China. Many scholars of international security and pundits believed that the rise of China would be conflictual (Allison 2017; Campbell 2008; Wang 2018). On the contrary, this paper argues that China could surpass the United States as an economy, but there is no indication of armed confrontation between the two nations. This is because, in the 21st century, there are changing trends in international relations and global politics. Besides, China has not reached the stage of power maturity yet. Therefore, as rational state, it would not prematurely plunge itself into conflict with the United States. Because the outcome of armed confrontation between China and the United States will be a setback for the world in general and particularly a bigger problem for China at this critical stage of her growth.

More so, in today's world nations are intertwined by the forces of

globalisation which created inexorable economic interdependence, rapid advancement in military technology, and the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) due to the advent and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These factors have necessitated a revisit and a critical evaluation of the Power Transition theory, which was propounded in mid-20th century to make it applicable in the contemporary international system.

Generally, the problem is that after World War II the new global order was structured to serve the western powers while the rest of the world was left out. Although China is a permanent member of the United Nation Security Council, still, that will not be a fair share for rising China. Thus, if United States could act strategically to incorporate China into the camp of nations that are getting a reasonable fair share of the system through multilateral approaches, then the prospect of the transition to be peaceful will increase. Though China is not a liberal democracy, facilitating and accelerating the exposure of China to the global norms and practices within the framework of international law could make her less violent and moderately ambitious during the transition. This strategy can let the two nations to have some common interests of mutual benefit. Therefore, if China can benefit from these norms and practices, then, challenging the established *Pax Americana* status quo will be counterproductive. Zhu (2005) added that if the United States could accommodate some of the significant interests of china the prospect of peaceful coexistence will increase. He, however, maintained that for the world to achieve this harmonious transition, the United States has to sacrifice some her interests and benefits it has been enjoying as the hegemony. This will finally create an international atmosphere of cooperation and fair competition for a better world.

All in all, Abramo Organski propounded the Power Transition theory in the 20th century. Therefore, the definite assumption of the theory of the escalation of armed confrontation during power transition might not have substantial validity in the 21st century as a result of the nuclear balance of terror, rapid advancement in military technology, and complex economic interdependence brought about by the forces of globalisation. Consequently, the present-day Power Transition theorists need to revisit the theory to accommodate contemporary factors to make it fit adequately in the discourse of international relations and global politics of the 21st-century international system.

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ABSTRACT

The apparent eroding in the hegemonic power of the United States and the sustained growth of China has triggered debate as to whether the rise of China will be peaceful or conflictual. Structural realism posits that the world is characterised by the anarchic ordering principle in which there is no central authority sitting above the states. Therefore, the absence of a "leviathan" on the international system automatically makes every state equal on the system which created an atmosphere of competition for the maximisation of power for survival. On a similar line of reasoning, the Power Transition theory as a variant theory within realism postulates that when the international system is structured based on the principle of hierarchy, peace will reign. It means that when international relations are regulated and influenced by a dominant power, the international system becomes stable. But the emergence of a dissatisfied powerful nation to challenge the hegemon usually ends up in war. Based on this assumption, Power Transition theorists argued that the rise of China to rival the dominance of the United States could not be peaceful. The Power Transition theory has influenced many academics to have the belief that the two nations will end up in "Thucydides' Trap".. The inclusion of the current variables into the Theory will make it applicable and adequately fit in the discourse of international relations and global politics of the 21st-century international system.

KEYWORDS

China; Hegemony; Power Transition Theory; United States.

LOCATING WOMEN IN JIHAD: THE CASE OF WOMEN IN THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)

Hamoon Khelghat-Doost[1]

Introduction

There are several diverse notions along which the world is separated into different categories including gender, race, religion, nations, class or political ideologies. The gender relations and the position of women in society and labour force has been always a topic of serious discussions among scholars in different academic fields. In both their personal and professional lives, men and women are associated in close, collaborative relationships. Simultaneously, men have traditionally greater access to societal power than women do (Diekman, Goodfriend and Goodwin 2004). As the most basic and predominant classification in social life throughout the world[2], gender hierarchies and women's position also play an important role in global labour force which has traditionally been a patriarchal domain which many women have found unreceptive or even hostile (United Nations 2006).

The current trend in global labour force employment clearly demonstrates a discriminatory pattern in favour of men in which in 2017, the male employment-to-population ratio was 72.2%, while the ratio for women was only 47.1% (International Labour Organization 2018). Although it is argued that a significant number of women are involved in informal employment as they often have less legal and social support however, the overall employment gender gap continues in favour of men.

In line with the global discriminative employment trend, women's employment rate in most of the Islamic countries -especially those in the Middle East and North Africa- is even more disappointing. The repercussions

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2 Epstein, Cynthia Fuchs. 2007. "Great divides: The cultural, cognitive, and social bases of the global subordination of women". *American Sociological Review* 72, no. 1 (2007): 1-22.

of social restrictions are readily observable in the lower number of Muslim women who are employed in the labour force in comparison to other countries and regions around the world. The 2017 World Bank's World Development Indicators clearly demonstrate that the level of women's employment in the labour force across countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is 25% below the global average (Elder, Sarah and Gianni 2015).

In line with social restrictions, the orthodox interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence also put restrictions on different other aspects of women's engagement in social affairs, including incorporation into militant organizations (Cook 2005). Traditional Islamic sources emphasize the importance of women's roles as mothers, sisters, daughters, and wives of Muslim men at war (Sjoberg and Caron 2011).

Since the escalation of crisis in Syria and Iraq in 2013, and with the growth of new jihadi organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and, Jaish al-Fatah, there was a new wave of women being incorporated into such jihadi groups. It is reported that more than ten percent of all Western members of ISIS were women (Peresin and Cervone 2015). More than 750 women from various countries in the EU have also joined jihadi groups in Syria and Iraq including 150 Germans and 200 French (Reynolds and Hafez 2019). The same growth in women's joining groups such as ISIS was evident in the case of non-European female nationals including 700 Tunisians and more than 500 Moroccans[3] (Bahija 2018).

However, against the current women's employment trends in most Islamic countries and contrary to the negative perspective of the Islamic jurisprudence on women's recruitment in militant organizations, there was an increase in the number of women incorporated into ISIS in both numbers and roles. However, this increasing trend is not the only puzzling issue about women's incorporation into ISIS. Conventionally, militant movements (such as the nationalist and leftist militant groups) were incorporating women only during periods of mobilization and political struggle. Upon the periods of state consolidation, women were however discarded and pushed out of the state institutions. Ironically and against the above established pattern, the trend was vice-versa in the case of jihadi organizations such as ISIS.

Focusing on the high rate of women's incorporation into ISIS as a manifestation of women's gender hierarchy (empowerment), this article therefore aims to explain the reasons behind high rate of women's incorporation into ISIS (empowerment) – both in numbers and roles – while

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3 Barrett, Richard, Jack Berger, Lila Ghosh, Daniel Schoenfeld, Mohamed el Shawesh, Patrick M. Skinner, Susan Sim, and Ali Soufan. "Foreign fighters: An updated assessment of the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq". The Soufan Group 4 (2015).

forwarding an explanation as to why such inclusion runs contrary to the incorporation trend of women in nationalist and leftist militant movements (disempowerment).

Methodology

The research was executed in qualitative form by using the phenomenological approach and through conducting in-depth semi-structured interviews (Creswell and Poth 2017). The questions were designed to develop a complete, accurate, clear and articulated description and understanding of the roles and positions of women in ISIS by using the respondent's own knowledge and/or feelings. The interview questions covered a range of open-ended questions depending on the respondents' backgrounds. The participants covered a wide range of individuals including ex-ISIS members, ISIS supporters, scholars, government and security officials, refugees, internally displaced people and journalists. The interview questions were used as the baseline of further discussions with the correspondents. Upon receiving ethical approval from relevant authorities, three rounds of field trips were made to conduct these interviews from July 2015 to January 2017. More than 150 interviews were conducted with the subjects in Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and the borders of then ISIS-controlled territories in Syria. In addition to in-person interviews, five interviews were also conducted over the phone with three Syrian and Iraqi Arab females and two Syrian and Iraqi Arab males (age between 26 to 39) who were still living in ISIS ruled territories in Syria and Iraq.

The interviews were conducted to examine how women's position in the ideology of ISIS was framed and the main reasons for the incorporation of women in the organization. The methods by which ISIS was incorporating women were also investigated in these interviews. Due to the nature of this research, accessibility to data was in itself a challenge. Direct access to jihadi organizations and their members was both legally and practically difficult. To overcome this challenge, I interviewed people with sufficient knowledge about ISIS by using proxy respondents for collecting the needed data for this research. These proxy respondents included ISIS defectors, ISIS supporters, refugees and eyewitnesses who have experienced living in territories run by jihadi organizations in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

State Building and Change in Gender Hierarchies

The rise of ISIS has certainly changed the definition of jihadi organizations and their gender hierarchies. Initially the operative extension of Al-Qaeda in Iraq with *salafi* thoughts, ISIS stunned the world by declaring the establishment of its Caliphate in 2014 in an immense geographic area within Iraqi and Syrian terrains. Contrasting most other jihadi groups such as Al-Qaeda with a vague idea about establishing and administrating a caliphate, ISIS had clearly set its objective to establish a new society, governed by a strict interpretation of sharia law in practice (Hoyle et. al 2015). Hence, a group such as ISIS should not be studied as a mere militant organization, but a group in control of a functioning caliphate. This approach of ISIS towards state building was resulted in migration and incorporation of thousands of women from around the world in its vision society (De Bont et. al 2017).

The state building project of ISIS shared similarities with the process of nation and state building in several other places in the world. Armed conflicts have been always an important phenomenon of studying state building. Just like external wars, internal conflicts -such as the Syrian civil war- can, under certain circumstances, promote state building (Rodriguez-Franco 2016). It is important to take note that there is no single pathway to state building. It is argued that several states were "built in unremitting blood and fire, others as fractious collections of elites, and others as stable but tacit deals between political forces." (Staniland 2012). ISIS's caliphate building process certainly falls into the violent path towards establishing a state.

Creating a state has been a central point of violent competition among different sectors of a society through the course of history (Mann 2012). This has been intensified in the aftermath of World War II where the most struggles in the world have been due to nation-building efforts (Conteh-Morgan 2004). Violence therefore has been a key component to the process of state building. In this case, militancy plays a vital role not only in "defending the nation-state, but also in arbitrating criteria for membership (citizenship) in the nation" (Nilsson, Ranchod and Tetreault 2000). This is evident in case of countries in which military (national) service is mandatory for its citizens including Singapore, Iran, Denmark or Turkey. In cases such as Israel, this mandatory military (national) service is compulsory for both men and women with no discrimination (Just 2016).

Charles Tilly's statement of war makes state and states make war is certainly the most popular notion in the current literature for explaining the relationship between military conflicts (i.e. war) and the process of state building. His argument is based on three components of centralized

control over territory, development of the state apparatus, and process of civilianization (Tilly 2017). Based on this argument, state building would occur when "violent specialists and elites consolidate security and thereby provide the first and most important public good: the control over the use of force" (Duffield 2013).

Based on the above argument on the link between armed conflicts and the process of state building, and specific to this article, women's active contribution to the process of state building through militant groups is evident (although less publicized) throughout the modern history (Rafik and Malik 2015). Women have been an important part of national revolutionary movements in conflicts in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Libya, Eritrea, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia (Omar 2004).

Together with that, there exists a link between gender hierarchies and violent conflicts (Maleevi 2010). Societies are often in need of a major catalyst—like war or conflict—to shake up the social and political orders (Webster, Chen and Beardsley 2019). For instance, with the beginning of the First Indochina War against the French, the communist oriented Vietnamese nationalists rebelled against the dominant Confucian values (favouring women's domestic roles as good mothers and wives) by recruiting a huge number of women to mobilize more fighters against the enemy (Eager 2016). The emphasis on women's participation in military affairs provided the Vietnamese national movement with a large number of women leaving their traditional domestic roles as mothers and wives and entering fighting force to pursue the state building cause. Between one third to half of Viet Cong troops were made up of women including regimental commanders (De Pauw 2014). During the Vietnam War, a female commander, Thi Dinh was the deputy commander of the entire Vietcong troops fighting against South Vietnamese. The Viet Cong troops were also consisted of few all-women platoons with duties including "reconnaissance, communications, commando operations and nursing"[4].

Women in these platoons were trained on using different types of weapons, hand grenades, planting landmines, and even assassinating enemy's key figures. It is reported that several female Viet Cong special commandos were effectively involved in one of the most famous operations against American forces in February 1969 in which 38 US army officers were killed in Cu Chi Airbase and all their Ch-47 Chinook helicopters were exploded by these commandos. The same pattern of women's participation in military affairs is evident in several other anti-colonial liberation movements

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4 Ibid.

including the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army. It is estimated that by 1979, nearly 7,500 of the 20,000 members of the Zimbabwe Liberation Army were female combatants and they were involved in several combat ranks including commanding female brigades and direct combat engagement with the enemies[5] (Seidman 1984).

By gathering cross-national data from 1900 to 2015, Webster et al. established a link between armed conflict and gender power imbalances within society. They concluded that "warfare can disrupt social institutions and lead to an increase in women's empowerment via mechanisms related to role shifts across society and political shifts catalysed by war" (Webster, Chen and Beardsley 2019). However, although warfare changes gender hierarchies and increases women's empowerment, in all the above mentioned cases, it is evident that the nationalist or leftist movements have utilized women only during periods of mobilization and political struggle. Upon the periods of state consolidation, women were discarded and pushed out of the state institutions (Nilsson 2000). In other words, women were "disempowered" in the aftermath of establishing new states. In her study of national symbolism in constructing gender, Karima Omar has also identified the same trend of changes in gender hierarchies through women's empowerment (during the struggle) and disempowerment (after the triumph of the struggle) in cases of the Vietnamese and Nicaraguan nationalist struggles (Omar 2004).

Ironically and against the above established trend, the following section of this article demonstrates that this trend is vice-versa in the case of ISIS. Women were largely absent (disempowered) at the midst of conflict and military clashes and were "empowered" and brought to the stage only after the triumph of ISIS in establishing its state.

Women, ISIS and the State Building Project

While women are integrated by few jihadi organizations such as Al-Qaeda and several other smaller groups in Pakistan, Palestine and Iraq, their number remains low compared to those of their male counterparts. Women are mostly integrated in these organizations as suicide bombers which is pre-eminently, a tactical tool than an expression of a long-term strategy. The female dress code in many Muslim societies provides a tactical advantage for jihadi organizations to conceal explosive and weapons they may need for their operations. Several female suicide bombers could pass security checkpoints

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5 Kriger, Norma J. 2003. *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-war Zimbabwe*: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980–1987. Vol. 105. Cambridge University Press.

and successfully conduct their operations due to this tactical advantage – especially as security forces in many Muslim countries are largely male dominant and thus unable to perform proper body search on women due to religious and cultural restrictions (Bloom 2012). However, due to strong religious and cultural negative sentiments against the use of women in violent operations, even this tactical advantage has not resulted in extensive use of women in combat roles.

The reason for women's lower integration into jihadi groups (disempowerment) is rooted in the principles of *mahram* and sexual purity. Based on these conservative principles of gender hierarchies, a Muslim woman should always be accompanied by a male *mahram* (either her husband or a relative in the prohibited degree of marriage) in public (Lahoud 2014). Due to the nature of war zones, women would unavoidably find themselves in the illicit company of non-*mahram* males, therefore, to avoid such seemingly sinful circumstances, jihadi groups initially barred women's involvement in jihadi activities. This is the main factor which makes jihadi organizations different from other non-jihadi militant organizations in incorporating women for militant activities.

Emphasizing women's sexual purity through the concept of *mahram*, shapes the ideological view of these organizations towards women and causes these groups to find themselves in a constant clash against "a world characterized by sexual disorder, one in which females are seen as encroaching on the male domain" (Helie-Lucus 1999). As a response, jihadi organizations stress the domestic roles of women in jihad, which included being virtuous wives to male jihadists and good mothers to the next generation of jihadists.

Contrary to the abovementioned classical approach of jihadi groups towards women's position in jihad ISIS practically incorporated a large number of women in its organizational structure upon establishing its state in Syria and Iraq. The success of ISIS in being the jihadi organization with the highest number of women should be viewed in two closely related levels; firstly, the success of the organization in solving the *mahram* obstacle, and secondly; transformation of ISIS from a mere militant jihadi establishment into a group in charge of administrating a functioning state.

Overcoming the Mahram Obstacle

By establishing 'gender-segregated parallel institution,' ISIS managed to minimize interactions between opposite sexes within its organization and therefore bypassed the *mahram* hurdle which was the main reason for women's

absence (disempowerment) during the group's militant struggle. This means a unit within virtually every existing ISIS institution was allocated to women only to address related women's affairs. These units were fully administrated by women, and their level of interaction with their male counterparts was minimized. This system comprised all ISIS state institutions, such as education, healthcare, administration, police, finance, and service provision. Unlike jihadi organizations, such as the Taliban and Al-Shabaab of Somalia with ultra-rigid orthodox ideological tenets, ISIS repeatedly showed interest in adopting pragmatic approaches learned from others.

Implementing gender-segregated parallel institutions, with the idea borrowed from the practices of Iran and Saudi Arabia was an example of such pragmatic approaches. ISIS might not have been the first entity to use gender segregation as a tool for social engineering[6] however; it was the first jihadi organization to implement this policy effectively throughout its ruling territory (Baggini 2018). Through this mechanism and against the conventional trend of women's disempowerment in non-jihadi organizations, ISIS successfully "empowered" a group of ideologically dedicated women to be a part of its state apparatus.

Primary data collected through fieldwork in Iraq, the ISIS-controlled Syrian borders in southern regions of Turkey, and Lebanon reflect the effectiveness of ISIS in reconciling its ultra-conservative Islamic narrative of women, with the organization's incorporation of the same through establishing gender-segregated parallel institutions. ISIS defectors, and Iraqi and Syrian refugees interviewed for this research as well as conversations with Iraqi and Turkish security and military officials, confirmed the existence and functioning of these institutions across ISIS's territories.

Women of the ISIS State

In studying ISIS, it is important to note that unlike Al-Qaeda, the organization should not be treated as only a militant organization. ISIS has morphed into a state builder which made its structure and ultimately its view over women's incorporation different from other jihadi groups. ISIS claimed to have a stark vision for founding a state (caliphate), tracking the classical structure of the caliphates during the golden age of Islam (8th century to 13th century). ISIS envisaged a state as a unified, transnational government ruling over the entire Muslim community by imposing its strict interpretation of

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6 "Social engineering is the attempt by legislators to change the operations of institutions or the behaviour of individuals in order to achieve a politically determined goal" (Baggini 2006).

sharia law (Sekulow 2015).

Within its controlling territory, ISIS implemented a detailed hierarchical structure of governance by using gender segregated parallel institutions, which encompassed of several councils including military, healthcare, education, defence, intelligence, and judiciary. ISIS's incorporation of women was operationalized through this framework. Some of the main roles assigned to women by ISIS through its gender-segregated parallel institutions were as follow:

Military Forces

There are confirmed reports that ISIS had established a battalion consisted of female suicide bombers in Syria by mid-2015 (RBSS 2015). Maha, a 25-year-old former resident of Raqqa who fled to the Turkish city of Gaziantep in early 2016 explained;

> I was approached by an unknown woman in a female gathering in Raqqa and was asked if I would like to sacrifice my life in the path of Allah. I was told by the woman that I can join a group of martyrdom seeking women who would like to defend the caliphate against the crusaders and the infidels. The woman told me that I will be trained to fire rifles and even how to use explosive jackets[7].

In July 7, 2016, ISIS officially claimed its first suicide attack conducted by one of its female members. Three ISIS members (including a women) conducted a series of suicide attacks against Sayyid Mohammed mosque (a Shi'a holy shrine) in the city of Balad, 80 kilometres north of Baghdad, Iraq. The attacks killed 35 civilians and left 60 others seriously injured. In an official announcement by ISIS which was published in its news agency Al Amaq, the group accepted the responsibility for the attacks and identified the female suicide bomber as Um Ja'ada (Hunter 2016).

It was also confirmed that ISIS was increasingly using its female members for fighting enemies in Libya, Kenya and European countries. In February 2016, seven ISIS female operatives were arrested by the Libyan officials in the western city of Sabratha in the Zawiya District of Libya. In the same attack, three more of ISIS female fighters were killed. Some of these women were fighting alongside their male jihadist counterparts in the battle field (Russia Today 2016).

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7 Maha. In Discussion with the Author. May 24, 2016. Gaziantep, Turkey.

Police Force

Soon after declaring its caliphate in 2014, ISIS affirmed the establishment of *hisbah* (sharia police force)[8] a female-only police squad that was supervising ISIS territory for proper implementation of the organization's strict interpretation of sharia law for women especially their dress code (Gardner 2015). It is difficult to estimate the exact number of women in this force due to the secretive structure of it and also limitations in accessing their members. However, General Mahdi Younis of Iraqi Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq told the author in an interview that about a thousand women were recruited by ISIS sharia police force throughout its territories (Yunis 2016).

The ISIS defectors and the Syrian and Iraqi refugees I interviewed during my field work in Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon explained that *hisbah* forces were functioning in all major towns throughout ISIS territories in Syria and Iraq. The interviewees told the author that they have witnessed women armed with AK-47s, covered in black robes patrolling the streets of Raqqa, Mosul, Fallujah, Manbij, Tell Abyed, Tell Afar and Jarablus either in cars or on feet. ISIS female police force was operating under the Security Council of ISIS which was in command of the internal policing.

Mohammad a 58-year-old Syrian refugee who was living in the southern city of Gaziantep in Turkey shared his personal encounter with ISIS *hisbah* in the Syrian city of Tell Abyed,

> I was walking with my wife on the street for shopping groceries. Along the way, we have come across a group of 10 to 15 people who were gathered around a couple. We heard that a female *hisbah* force who was carrying a gun was speaking loud to the couple. She was shouting that the woman has not observed the dress code and that she has to come with her to the police station. The woman's husband was begging the woman to let her wife go. The ISIS woman had a clear North African accent of Arabic. As the population around the couple was mounting, a group of ISIS male police force showed up in a car to help their female colleagues. I told my wife to hurry up and stay away from the crowd. I do not know what happened to the couple[9].

Mahmoud a 46-years-old ex-ISIS member and former resident of

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8 Esposito, John, and Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina. 2004. *The Islamic World*. Vol. 3. Oxford University Press,

9 Mohammad. In Discussion with the Author. May 23, 2016. Gaziantep, Turkey.

Raqqa and currently a refugee in Gaziantep in south of Turkey also noted that,

> Female *hisbah* members have a separate facility for their own in the city. This is to prevent them from mixing with us [their male jihadi counterparts]. *Hisbah* members take the women who have broken the sharia law to this facility in Raqqa. Women who wear tight *abaya* [long black dress], not being accompanied by a male family member in public, smoke cigarettes, drink and eat publicly during the fasting month, commit adultery, commit acts of homosexual nature or wearing bright nail polish will be arrested by the force and will be taken to its facilities[10].

For ISIS to expand its ideological control over all its society members, the group incorporated a large number of women as police force through its mechanism of gender-segregated parallel institutions. This granted ISIS to increase its degree of control over its entire population.

Teachers and Educators

Education system and its affiliated institutes including schools and universities were crucial to ISIS as they were the perfect means for shaping the hearts and minds of the next generation of devoted jihadists (Benotman and Malik 2016). Hence, ISIS set its educational goal to "decrease ignorance, spread religious sciences, resist corrupt sciences and curricula and replace them with righteous Islamic curricula"[11].

Despite reports on the closure of girls' schools in ISIS territories, a number of them were still operational under strict restrictions put upon them by ISIS *Diwan al-Ta'aleem* (council of education). Schools were entirely gender segregated and only female teachers were allowed to work in girls' schools. It was compulsory for both female teachers and students to observe the dress code of black robe and full-face veil.

In city of Sanliurfa in southern Turkey, I also met Ayisha (30-year-old), a former teacher and a mother of two children who fled Deir ez-Zor in Syria in 2015. She explained to me that,

> After the gender segregating of schools, only female teachers, principal and, cleaners were administrating the elementary school I was working

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10 Mahmoud. In Discussion with the Author. June 18, 2016. Gaziantep, Turkey.

11 Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, *Education Under Attack 2018* – Iraq, (2018) https://www.refworld.org/docid/5be9430d4.html (Accessed; 14 September 2018)

in. A thick curtain was set up behind the main gate of the school and only women could enter the school. I have personally seen a number of ISIS female police forces checking the school regularly to assure the school pupils' and staff's adherence to sharia laws especially in terms of dressing. This made many citizens of the city to refuse sending their kids to schools[12].

While conducting fieldwork in Erbil in northern Iraq, I had also the opportunity of meeting Sharifah (originally from Mosul) whom her relatives and friends were still living in Mosul under the ISIS rule. Through Sharifah, I was connected by phone to one of her friends, Jamilah (32-year-old), in then ISIS-controlled city of Mosul. Jamilah explained her experience of dealing with ISIS education system,

> At the early stages of ISIS taking control of Mosul, many female teachers who were working at schools left their jobs as they were not satisfied with the Islamic State's ideological approach towards education. However, the caliphate forcefully called all female teachers to return to their schools under the new rules and regulations. Female teachers receive some minimal salaries directly from ISIS and they are threatened that upon leaving their jobs, their properties will be confiscated[13].

Apart from the elementary and secondary schools, ISIS established its first female finishing school, Al-Zawra for adult women. According to the mission statement of the school, it was providing training for women "interested in explosive belt and suicide bombing more than a white dress or a castle or clothing or furniture" (Haaretz 2014). The institute provided a wide range of courses including "domestic work such as sewing and cooking, medical first aid, Islam and Sharia law, weaponry, training in social media and computer programs for editing and design" (Spencer 2016). Knowing the importance of women as the mothers of future jihadists, ISIS established a functioning system of ideological education for its female population based on gender segregation.

Doctors and Nurses

As ISIS has morphed beyond a plain militant organization towards founding its caliphate, providing public goods for its inhabitants while

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12 Ayisha. In Discussion with the Author. May 25, 2016. Sanliurfa, Turkey.
13 Jamilah. Phone Interview with the Author. July 11, 2016. Mosul, Iraq.

observing its strict interpretation of sharia law has become more important. The healthcare sector was one of those vital services which ISIS paid exceptional attention to. In early 2015, ISIS announced its Islamic State Healthcare System (ISHS) which was replicated from the UK National Healthcare System (NHS). In a YouTube video published by ISIS, an Indian doctor named Abu Muqatil al-Hindi, explains that "there are doctors from Russia, Tunisia, Sri Lanka and Australia, and that women are treated by female physicians" (Ho 2015). The same pattern of gender segregation in other ISIS institutions was applied on the organization's healthcare system (ISHS) as well. Female patients were only permitted to be visited and treated by female doctors and nursed in 'Women Only' sections of hospitals within ISIS territory.

During my visit to Debaga refugee camp close to the city of Makhmur in Iraq, I met Kolthum, a 42-year-old female general physician who has fled the ISIS controlled city of Mosul with her husband and four children. She told me,

> A section within Mosul general hospital is allocated to female patients to visit female doctors and nurses. ISIS threatened us [those female doctors who refused to return to their works in the hospital] with confiscation of our properties. The range of services offered by us [female doctors and nurses] was also more limited than those offered to men as the number of us [female doctors and nurses] were fewer than those of men[14].

Adilah a 30-year-old female nurse from Raqqa whom I met in Istanbul in April 2016, also emphasized,

> Despite female doctors being able of continue working in Raqqa general hospital, ISIS officials were very strict about implementing sharia law at medical centres. While I was a nurse at hospital, I was really afraid of even touching 5-6-year-old sick boys for medical check-up as I was not allowed to treat men[15].

As an organization in charge of governing a society, ISIS quickly realized the importance of providing services for the entire population they rule. This included women as half of the populace as well. By segregating health centres, ISIS managed to provide the basic health services for women without jeopardizing its strict *salafi* ideological commitments.

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14 Kolthum. In Discussion with the Author. July 13, 2016. Debaga Camp, Makhmur, Iraq.

15 Adilah. In Discussion with the Author. May 21, 2016. Kilis, Turkey.

Housing and Sheltering Officers

ISIS was offering free accommodation, utilities, and services for its members. In terms of their female recruits, there were women in charge of these arrangements. According to Sana a 39-year-old Syrian ex-ISIS female member whom I met in the Turkish city of Kilis;

> Women who arrive in Syria or Iraq from abroad were being sent to ISIS owned houses called *maqars*. It is important to note that *maqars* were only for single women. Married women with their families would have been accommodated in proper houses by ISIS housing and sheltering officers. In this case since the male member of the family was in charge, they were attended by ISIS male housing and sheltering officers[16].

A 46-year-old female former resident of Mosul who wanted her identity to be protected as she was serving ISIS for a short period of time in 2015 and currently lives in Debaga refugee camp in northern Iraq explained;

> The female housing and sheltering officers were also acting as translators to the newly arrived foreign females and help them overcome the language barrier at their initial weeks in ISIS territories. As translators, they were helping women familiarize themselves with the neighbourhood and assisting them understand caliphate's official documents and announcements[17].

These female officers were also in charge of controlling the mobility of women during their stay in *maqars*. Based on ISIS strict regulations, women's mobility in towns was limited and the officers were those ensuring these regulations to be observed by the newcomers. Contacts with local Syrian or Iraqi residents of the cities should have been arranged by the officers and it was very minimal at this stage. However, after leaving *maqars*, these women had more freedom to interact with locals in the cities they were assigned to live in. Several female housing and sheltering officers were also closely cooperating with ISIS authorities as matchmakers. Naqibah, a 34-year-old ex-ISIS female member from Raqqa noted that female housing and shelter officers were very much involved in introducing single women to male jihadists and vice-versa. They were introducing the women to male jihadi candidates under the

16 Sana. In Discussion with the Author. May 20, 2016. Kilis, Turkey.

17 Identity Protected. In Discussion with the Author July 13, 2016. Debaga Camp, Makhmur, Iraq.

surveillance of the ISIS Marriage Affairs Department[18].

The job description of female ISIS housing and sheltering officers was going beyond mere accommodating the newcomer women in their new houses. They have been used as agents of social engineering by ISIS to allocate the newcomer women in their new social positions within the ISIS-run society.

Tax Collectors

Generating income was key to survival for groups such as ISIS. At its peak in 2014 and early 2015, ISIS was crowned as the richest terrorist group with the annual net income of 2 billion US dollars (Levitt 2014). The Syrian and Iraqi oil fields were the main sources of income for the group in those years generating millions of dollars per month. Losing its territories and therefore some of its most important oil fields, the group started to diversify its sources of revenue to counter its financial crisis. Taxation has been one of the important sources of income for ISIS since its establishment in 2014 however, upon losing its oil and gas revenues, the group intensified the use of tax money to overcome the crisis. By the end of 2016, taxation was making up to 50 percent of ISIS total revenue (Speckhard and Yayla 2016).

While news and reports coming out of ISIS territories were clearly verifying the existence of the tax authority, no mentioning of women's duty in the authority has been reported so far. However, upon the process of data collection along Syrian borders in southern Turkey, I have come across a couple of Syrian refugees who admitted the existence of a small group of female tax collectors within ISIS authority. Rashid, a 29-year-old who was a shopkeeper in Raqqa and now living in Kilis in south Turkey indicated that;

> As the result of the international pressure on ISIS and as the aftermath of losing its oil revenue, jihadists have intensified their efforts in generating tax revenues. This would make women of no exception. Upon visiting the ISIS tax authority in Raqqa to pay my business tax, I noticed a room with closed door which was assigned by the group for women to pay their taxes. The process of tax collection was run by ISIS female tax collectors[19].

Although ISIS was crowned as the richest terrorist organization of its time however; near the end of its caliphate, the organization was facing sever

18 Naqibah. In Discussion with the Author. May 22, 2016. Kilis, Turkey.

19 Rashid. In Discussion with the Author. May 21, 2016. Kilis, Turkey.

financial crisis. For this reason, and through its gender-segregated parallel institution, the organization started to exploit all the financial resources possible including those of women. For this reason, female tax collectors were recruited to maximize the organization's access to the scarce financial resources.

Hijrah

Women also contributed positively to the legitimacy of ISIS by making *hijrah* (migration) to its territory. Establishing a global caliphate for all Muslims (men and women) around the world regardless of their race, nationality and colour is on its own a form of what is called *Da'wa* (global invitation for all Muslims) in Islamic jurisprudence. This invitation encouraged Muslim men and women around the world to make *hijrah* (migration) to the "true" land of Islam and to form the "real" Islamic ummah (global community). Within this framework, thousands of women from all around the world migrated to the ISIS controlled territories in Syria and Iraq. In absence of conventional tools of providing legitimacy such as suffrage, women's participation in *Hijrah* in general was playing a vital role in providing ISIS with the legitimacy it needed to rule and run its caliphate.

ISIS claimed that by making *hijrah* to its newly established Islamic state, women who were socially and culturally alienated for their strong Islamist views and practices in western or secular Muslim countries could have found a conducive environment in which they could become active members of society (through gender-segregated parallel institutions) while adhering to their radical interpretation of religion. Noor, a 31-year-old former resident of Raqqa who was an English instructor and currently lives with her family in Gaziantep, southern Turkey shares her story of encountering a migrant female ISIS member in Raqqa in late 2014,

> A French woman who was married to a Moroccan ISIS jihadist moved to our neighborhood. In one of the rare encounters I had with her, I asked her how come she left a country like France to came and live here? She replied with broken English that as a *Muslimah* [Muslim woman], she feels freer and more respected here. She is free to wear her *niqab* [face veil] with no shame and fear of being harassed by *kuffar* [infidels] like in France[20].

For these women, Islamic states founded by jihadi groups provide an

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20 Noor. In Discussion with the Author. May 27, 2016. Gaziantep, Turkey.

escape from a society where to be equal citizens; one should abandon her religious duties (Perein 2015). The society established by ISIS claimed to provide the opportunity for these women to escape from a society in which to be an equal citizen required abandoning the duties of one's religion.

Final Remarks

ISIS might not be the first jihadi organization to try establishing its full-fledged state, however; it was the most effective and practical in terms of amount of territory and size of population controlled. Despite its brutal approach towards women of both religious and racial minorities, ISIS has challenged the conventional gender hierarchies among jihadi organizations by provided a platform to incorporate a large number of women in various social roles from all around the world. Such mobilization of women was unique in the history of jihadi organizations. The reason for ISIS's success in empowering a substantial number of like-minded women (through incorporating them in various social roles) against the restrictive interpretations of the Islamic jurisprudence, was rooted in the organization's structure. Unlike groups such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS had a clear vision of governing a society based upon the principles of sharia law in practice.

As a result, ISIS was morphed from a mere militant organization like other jihadi groups to a state builder. Along this metamorphosis, ISIS's objectives and therefore organizational structure was transformed as well. While other jihadi organizations seek to dismiss western troops from "Muslim" lands, and to topple down western supported local governments with vague plans for the morning after, ISIS had set its objective to revitalize its own interpretation of the Islamic tradition of caliphate. For that reason, ISIS's strategy for empowering women through incorporating them in large amounts was geared towards addressing the challenges facing a functioning state. These challenges included providing public good and services, maintaining order and security, and obtaining legitimacy.

To address these challenges, women were incorporated through gender-segregated parallel institutions in a variety of social roles which some of them were discussed in this article. By using these institutions, ISIS has successfully managed to solve the *mahram* issue unlike other jihadi organizations. The *mahram* concept burdens all jihadi organizations for incorporating more women in their ranks. It is almost impossible for jihadi organizations to ensure their female members are accompanied by a male *mahram* in all occasions especially during militant operations. For that reason,

most jihadi groups are reluctant about the widespread use of women. This counts for the lower number of women in these groups in compare to the nationalist and secular militant groups throughout their course of struggle against enemies.

However, upon triumph and establishing the state, while nationalist or secular movements dismiss or marginalize their female members, a jihadi group like ISIS challenged the conventional gender hierarchies of jihadi organizations and intensified its utilization of women to address the challenges of administrating a state. This was due to the ability of ISIS in providing a conducive environment for women's integration by solving the *mahram* burden through gender-segregated parallel institutions. By this mechanism, ISIS claimed to provide the platform needed for "repressed" Muslim women around the world to be "empowered" and to play a more active role in the creation of a new generation of believers, and a state in which practicing their extremist ideological commitments are recognized and protected unlike their countries of origin where they migrated to the ISIS territories from. Gender segregation provided the ideological justification for many faithful women to ISIS' ideology to participate more actively in social affairs against the established gender hierarchies among other jihadi organizations.

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ABSTRACT

Since the establishment of the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS), there was a wave of surge in women's incorporation into the organization. Traditionally, nationalist and leftist militant movements were utilizing women only during periods of mobilization and political struggle. Upon the periods of state consolidation, women were discarded and pushed out of the state institutions. Ironically and against the above established trend, this article demonstrates that this trend was vice-versa in the case of ISIS. By using the '*mahram*' concept, the article also explains the reason why women were largely absent at the midst of ISIS's conflict and military clashes and were brought to the stage only after the triumph of the organization in establishing its state. The findings of this research are based on secondary sources and primary data personally collected from more than 150 interviews through multiple field trips to Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and the borders of ISIS-controlled territories in Syria from July 2015 to January 2017.

TOXIC INSTITUTIONALISM IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FAILURE OF BUILDING SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN EAST TIMOR

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Introduction

Security sector reform/SSR lays an important foundation for building lasting peace in post-conflict countries (Schroeder and Chappuis 2014). This has encouraged the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to carry out the SSR as a part of its mission to establish a new nation of East Timor. UNTAET together with the International Forces East Timor (Interfet) has carried out the SSR by first disarming and demobilizing the Forças Armadas da Libertacao Nacional de Timor-Leste (Falintil)/The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor and also pro-independence militias. UNTAET gathered all Falintil combatants in Aileu to collect data and weapons, and also to provide food, clothing, and health services to the fighters. In addition, the reintegration effort was carried out by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) with its Falintil Reinsertion and Assistance Program (FRAP), which succeeded in demolishing 1,308 Falintil during 2001, providing livestock assistance, and also trainings (De Almeida 2017). A year later, the UN Development Program

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(UNDP) carried out the Recovery, Employment, and Stability Program for ex Combatants in East Timor (RESPECT)—where according to Peake and Lao Hamutuk this was not very significant in handling problems and did not help much (De Almeida 2017).

After DDR was completed, UNTAET began building a state security institution consisting of the police, judiciary, and armed forces. UNTAET first established a state police institution named Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) in 2000. UNTAET recruited new police officers in East Timor which began in early 2000, continued by basic training since 27 March 2000. Until the end of mission, UNTAET has established a Police School which has trained 1,552 police officers in which 20% are women (UNSC, S/2002/432). Officially, the East Timor Police Department was formed together with the UN Civil Police (CivPol) on 10 August 2001 and fully assumed its security responsibilities on 10 December 2003.

UNTAET has also succeeded in establishing a judicial institution by establishing The Transitional Judicial Service Commission in 2000 and issuing regulations on the organization of justice in East Timor (UNTAET 2000). The commission is tasked with selecting an initial court corps consisting of 10 judges and prosecutors. The Commission has also recommended 6 defense lawyers from the selection process among 20 East Timorese who participated in the judicial training program in December 1999. Judges and prosecutors were appointed on 7 January 2000 and two more have been recommended for appointment and the next 20 candidates would be eligible for the appointment by mid-February 2000. To improve the performance of court personnel, UNTAET conducts training in emergency and standard operating procedures. Specifically, the Human Rights Unit conducts human rights training for prison guards in Gleno and Becora using UN standards in the treatment of detainees (UNSC, S/2001/983).

UNTAET has been preparing the armed forces since September 2000 to form 1,500 regular troops and 1,500 voluntary reserve troops, of which Falintil is the core of the new armed forces. The first step taken was to establish an Office of Defense Force Development—OFPD was established and headed by senior East Timorese officials and with staff from international military and civilian experts. Next, the OFPD together with the Falintil Commander were tasked with implementing the development plan for the East Timor armed forces. The recruitment and selection of Falintil to fill 600 battalion members was carried out in December 2000 and January 2001 and on January 31, 2001. Officially, Forãas de Defesa de Timor-Leste (FDTL) or East Timor's armed forces were established by UNTAET. The inauguration ceremony was held in Aileu on 1 February 2001 as a sign of the dissolution of

Falintil and the formation of the F-FDTL.

Although UNTAET has succeeded in establishing state security institutions, these institutions have been unable to provide security for the people of East Timor. Even in some cases, it is the security institutions that are the source of community insecurity. Several cases of clashes between the police and Falintil veterans groups and also with F-FDTL occurred from May to December 2002, which resulted in at least two people were killed and more than 20 injured (Rees 2008). In fact, PNTL and F-FDTL were involved in a serious conflict in 2006 which spread to political and social conflicts until 2008. These conflicts resulted in the killing of 38 people (including the shooting of 8 unarmed PNTL by F-FDTL soldiers) and also damage to infrastructure. The widespread violence also caused 150,000 thousand people to be displaced from their homes and have to live in refugee camps for up to two years. Violence continued during the 2007 elections where almost 100 people were injured, 7,000 families were displaced from their homes, and the destruction of several facilities. The peak of this conflict was the attack carried out by Major Alfredo Reinado and his deputy Lt. Gastao Salsinha and some of his supporters against the President and Prime Minister on February 8, 2008. In that incident, Reinado was killed while President Ramos Horta was seriously injured. More than 200 people died during the crisis from 2006 to early 2008 (Valters, Dewhurst, and de Catheu 2015).

The failure of the PNTL and F-FDTL is evidence that the UN has failed in carrying out its SSR program. Previous studies have explained that there are three main factors that cause the failure of the UN. The first factor is the lack of involvement of local people in the planning and implementation of programs initiated by the United Nations (Chopra 2002; Tansey 2014; Uesugi 2014; Simangan 2017). The failure to involve all local actors was because the UN failed to understand the social, cultural, and historical complexities of the local community (Armstrong, Chura-Beaver, and Kfir 2012) and the UN's inaccuracy in selecting local partners, causing SSR and DDR to be irrelevant to the reality and needs of the community and ultimately causing security to worsen (Schroeder, Chappuis, and Kocak 2014). The second factor is the lack of coordination between donor agencies, so their mandates often overlap (Wassel 2014). UNTAET lacks collaboration and even competes with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the United Nations (Armstrong, Chura-Beaver and Kfir 2012). The third factor is the complexity of the problems faced by the people of East Timor which include political competition, poor economy, and low levels of education (Dolven, Margesson, and Vaughn 2012; Kingsbury 2018). The complexity of the problem results in the setting of priorities which must

be resolved by the United Nations within a limited mission period.

In previous studies, factors of institutional relations did not receive attention in contributing to the failure of the UN's SSR mission. Previous researchers ignored that the existence of informal or traditional institutions had an important role in the development of modern state institutions. As stated by Douglas North (1991) that state institutions are the crystallization of the existing traditional institutions (Maroevi and Jurkovi 2013), and there could even be a conflict between traditional institutions and state institutions because of the incompatible goals between the two institutions (Helmke, Levitsky, and Galvan 2004). Based on the assumption that the position of power and legitimacy of traditional institutions are higher than that of newly formed state institutions and they have incompatible goals, this article provides evidence that the failure of the UN in its SSR mission in East Timor is due to the existence of traditional institutions which weaken the state's security institutions.

Theoretical Background

The institutionalism approach in security studies stems from the tradition of liberal thought which was first conceived by Immanuel Kant through his work Perpetual Peace (Williams 2008). According to Kant, a republic is a country that has a "peace procedure", so it makes it a country that behaves more peacefully than any other state. This rationale was later developed by Michael Doyle in 1983 to introduce the concept of democratic peace which has the argument that a liberal democratic state will not fight against other liberal countries. This observation does not imply that liberal states do not go to war at all or that they are less warlike in their inter-state relations with non-liberal states. The argument is that liberal states would choose not to wage war, and that, if they lean toward democracy, they are at least more likely to be stable than' less than moderate' states, and this explains why democratic states are least likely to fail and fall into anarchy (Badmus and Jenkins 2019). This democratic peace approach is then used by the UN to hold its state building mission to make post-conflict countries a liberal democratic state.

The presence of donors is needed to build state institutions and one of them is the security sector[4] in post-conflict countries. SSR has become an

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4 The security sector is all organizations that have the authority to use (or order to use) force or threat to protect the state and society, as well as civil structures responsible for the management of public security (Jackson 2011).

important instrument in the development of post-conflict countries (Teskey, et.al 2012) especially to build state security which is believed to be a condition for sustainable development (Beseny 2019). The presence of donors in this case aims to strengthen governance and enhance service delivery of security and justice institutions while increasing local ownership and sustainability (OECD DAC 2007). Onoma (2014) adds that the SSR is not only a reform aimed at the military, intelligence, police, prison and justice systems to improve their ability and accountability, but also to build a system of oversight and security governance by civil authorities (Onoma 2014).

Considering the development of security studies, SSR also develops on the aspects of actors and security objects. At the beginning of its establishment, the UN and other donor agencies became the dominant actors in the SSR. They have human resources, funds and programs to help post-conflict countries. However, high confidence in its ability was not comparable with the success of the program in creating security and peace in recipient countries. Mac Ginty et al. (2008) offered 3 critiques to the UN SSR and other donor agencies. First, they have successfully co-opted all government and non-government agents to become facilitators and drivers of the adoption of liberal peace values and must also transmit them to local communities, thereby eliminating local values and norms. Second, they believe that one model of domestic government—liberal market democracy—is superior to the others. Therefore, a non-Western/liberal approach is seen as an obstacle to the transformation of a more modern society. Third, liberal peace is applied to very high standards and leaves little room for alternative approaches to conflict resolution. The application of one template narrates that local, traditional, or customary actors do not have the ability to participate in peacemaking (Mac Ginty 2008). The same conclusion was also taken by Jackson (2015) who examined the role of Britain in the SSR in Sierra Leone, and Onoma (2014) who conducted a comparative SSR study in Sierra Leone with Liberia, and also Kohl (2014) researching SSR in Guinea-Bissau, Chopra (2002), Simangan (2017), Tansey (2014) which examines the SSR in East Timor.

Seeing the failure of the UN and other donor agencies, demands emerged to further involve local ownership in the SSR mission. The involvement of local ownership is not merely a formality, but more importantly is the substance and inclusiveness of "local owners" in the program. When this involvement is not substantial and inclusive, the state security and justice institutions will not be accountable or responsive in meeting the needs of the people and will lose public trust. The relationship between the state and the people will be weak and the community will feel excluded from the formulation of policies relating to their security. Gordon (2014) suggested

that in order for SSR to gain public trust, it must cooperate with community security structures.

Local ownership is not solely a person or a group of people. Local ownership must also be interpreted as an institution in the local community. Peter Hall and Rosemary (1996) define institutions as formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions inherent in the organizational structure of policy making (Azari and Smith 2012). More specifically, Helmke et al. (2004) define informal institutions as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. Informal institutions provide guidelines for individuals to behave and sometimes provide penalties for those who break them with self-enforcing mechanisms (Azari and Smith 2012). Therefore, what is meant by informal security institutions are routines, rules, or social norms that influence the behavior of their constituents to get a sense of security and peace.

The existence of informal institutions is highly influential on formal institutions that will be built in post-conflict countries. North's theory of institutional change explains that formal institutions are the crystallization of informal ones, and that both co-evolve through the operation of organizations—informal and formal social groups, from households and villages to networks, firms, parties, and governments (Casson, Della Giusta, and Kambhampati 2010). Informal and local institutions are often more trusted by the people than state power (Rocha Menocal 2011). Therefore, formal institutions must be able to reflect social reality which then forms cohesiveness and coordination between individuals in the community. Formal institutions whose job is to ensure the enforcement of human rights, the rule of law, and security will not exist without informal institutions where both will strengthen mutual beliefs, values, norms, and priorities in society (Holmes et al. 2013). In the context of democratization, the mutually reinforcing functions can take the form of completing, parallel, and coordinating (Azari and Smith 2012). Informal institutions will complement existing formal institutions by filling in the gaps in existing formal institutions. Perhaps under these conditions, informal institutions will cover the shortfall of what has been built by formal institutions that is not sufficient or not yet finished. The parallel function is played when informal institutions join formal institutions in shaping a behavior in the same field. However, the coordination function is carried out by informal institutions when there is overlapping of functions between informal and formal ones (Azari and Smith 2012).

Helmke, Levitsky, and Galvan (2004) provide a broader explanation of the typology of relations between informal and formal institutions in 4

categories, i.e. complementary, accommodating, substitutive, and competing. First, complementary (formal complementary) is when formal institutions are effective and share the same goals with informal institutions that become partners. Thus, formal and informal institutions can coexist peacefully and cooperate with each other. Second, accommodating is when effective formal institutions have different results from informal institutions, thereby limiting their influence and peaceful opposition. Third, substitutive (replacing) is where weak formal institutions require informal institutions to achieve common interests. Fourth, competing (competing) is when formal institutions are weak and have different outputs from informal institutions that cause it to compete to dominate institutions (Helmke, Levitsky, and Galvan 2004). According to the researchers, the function of this competition is more accurately described as a toxic or dangerous relationship, because of its tendency to weaken state institutions in providing security for the community. The role of weakening (toxic) is increasingly possible because of the position of informal institutions that tend to be stronger and trusted by the public than the newly formed state institutions.

Table 1: Typology of Informal Institutions

	Effective Formal Institutions	Ineffective Formal Institutions
Compatible Goals	Complementary	Substitutive
Conflicting Goals	Accommodating	Competing

Source: Helmke, G., Levitsky, S. e Galvan, D. 2004. Politics: Institutions Comparative Agenda. Perspectives on Politics Political Science 2 (4): 725-740.

Referring to the typology conveyed by Helmke and Levitsky (2004), we can make the following typology of relations between formal and informal security institutions:

1. Complementary; in this case informal institutions will strengthen state security institutions because they feel the security of their groups is aligned and can be guaranteed by state institutions.

2. Accommodating; in this case, informal institutions accept the presence of state security institutions which are considered capable of

replacing the routines, rules, or social norms that they have so far believed in.

3. Substitutive; in this case, routine, social rules, or norms that are in line with the objectives of the state security institutions will replace state security rules that are not effective in providing security and peace for the community.

4. Toxic; in this case informal institutions will weaken state security institutions that are ineffective and have goals that are contrary to the sense of routines, rules, or social norms within the group.

Relationship typology numbers 1, 2, and 3 will have an impact on the creation of security for the community. However, typology number 4 will have an impact on public insecurity. These forms of toxic relations can be in the form of nepotism in the form of granting privileges to family members or groups to be able to occupy positions in state institutions and clientelism which can be in the form of subordinates' compliance with their leaders and protection from their leaders. This study provides evidence that the existence of these toxic relations weakens the performance of the PNTL, F-FDTL, and the court institution, so they failed in performing their security functions.

Fugure 1. Research Model

Source: Prepared by the authors.

Objective and Methodology

Using institution perspective, this study aims to identify the role of toxic institution to weaken formal institutions in providing security to the people of Timor Leste, especially in the period of UN's peace mission. The applied research method was mixed method (qualitative and quantitative) with convergent parallel mixed methods design. In this approach, the researchers collect both quantitative and qualitative data, analyze them separately, and then compare the results to see if the findings confirm or disconfirm each other (Creswell 2014). The research location was in Dili District, the capital of East Timor. The location selection was based on the consideration that the city was the center of the riots in 1999 and 2006-2008. In addition, Dili as the national capital, has a relatively high ethnic heterogeneity and most Dili people can speak Indonesian and English in addition to *Tetun* and Portuguese.

The researchers lived in Dili for a couple of weeks to interview 7 informants for obtaining qualitative data. The informants were selected from

groups of former Falintil fighters, Veterans Management, and people involved in the UN SSR mission. To obtain informants, researchers used the snowball technique by first holding an open FGD with students, NGO activists, and academics at East Timor National University (UNTL). The FGD provided initial information about relevant informants and was then followed up with in-depth interviews. To validate the data, researchers used a combination of triangulation techniques by comparing information from one informant with other informants, as well as from interviews with observations. Meanwhile, researchers triangulated data sources by cross-checking interviews with other data sources, i.e. statements of respondents' attitudes in the form of questionnaires.

Quantitative data were obtained from distributing questionnaires to 100 respondents with a purposive random sampling technique. Samples were people who had experienced conflicts in 1999 and 2006-2008. Based on Gender, the respondents of this study were 57% male and 43% female. Meanwhile, based on age, respondents in this study ranged from 20 to 59 years old, so they have experienced periods of conflict after the referendum in 1999 and conflicts in 2006-2008. The respondents' breakdown is based on age, as shown in Table 1 below.

Table 2: Respondents by Age

Age (years)	N	Percent
20-29	52	52.0
30-39	23	23.0
40-49	16	16.0
50-59	9	9.0
Total	100	100.0

Source: Prepared by the authors.

Respondents also represented 12 districts in East Timor shown in Figure 2 and the two largest geographical ethnic groups, 81% of them were loromonu (western Timorese people) and 19% were lorosa'e (eastern Timorese people).

Fugure 2: Respondents by Origin

Source: Prepared by the authors.

Falintil: Structure, Power, and Legitimation

The impetus of Falintil could not be separated from the formation of the Political Party of the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente/ Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), towards the end of the Portuguese occupation of East Timor. The attitude of Portugal to provide self-determination for the Timorese people was welcomed by the people by establishing several political organizations. The first organization to be established was the Timor Democratic Union (União Democratica Timorense, UDT), which was founded on 11th May 1974. This organization has the aim of promoting "progressive autonomy" under the Potugal government. The second organization was the Timor Social Democratic Association (Asociação Social Democrata de Timor, ASDT) on 20th May 1974 which later changed its name to Fretilin. This change of name reflects a shift towards a more leftist movement, with slogans against colonialism, anti-imperialism, nationalism, and the like. Fretilin figures at the time were Jose Manuel Ramos Horta, Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Mari Alkatiri, Nicolau Lobato, and Justino Mota. Fretilin then formed the Falintil military wing on

20th August 1974 and consisted of approximately 27,000 combatants[5] (De Almeida 2017) as an instrument of their struggle to liberate East Timor. The third organization is APODETI (Associacco Popular Democratica Timorense) which is a political organization that has a manifesto to join Indonesia with a special autonomy status.

The three organizations that had different goals eventually became involved in a bloody conflict. Fretilin unilaterally proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (DRET) of East Timor on November 28, 1975, and sparked opposition from various parties both at home and abroad. Apodeti, UDT, KOTA[6], and Trabalhista[7] rejected and issued the Balibo Proclamation on 30th November 1975 which contained a statement that Portuguese Timor was a part of the Indonesian territory and did not recognize Fretilin's unilateral proclamation. Conflict between the two sides continued in the civil war for power struggle in East Timor. This time, joint forces from Apodeti, UDT, Kota, and Trabalhista with the support from Indonesia surrounded Fretilin and ended with the defeat of Fretilin on 7th December 1975. Since then, the Indonesian National Army (TNI) deployed its troops in East Timor to maintain the integration of the province as 27th province of Indonesia.

After the defeat in 1975, Fretilin underwent several changes in strategy and organizational structure. Before the defeat in 1975, Fretilin had a resistance strategy to free the East Timorese people from colonialism and other oppressive practices. Therefore, the Fretilin Movement was not only for armed resistance carried out by Falintil, but was also accompanied by political, economic, and social empowerment efforts among the people. The defeat of Fretilin which resulted in the exit of several leaders abroad and Falintil's flight into the forests meant that this strategy could no longer be carried out. A change of strategy was also made to turn the resistance movement that was originally identical to Fretilin and Falintil into a movement that embraced all groups of people in Timor Leste. The change in resistance organization began with the National Conference in March 1981 by appointing Xanana Gusmao as the President of the National Council for Revolutionary Resistance (CRRN), and

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5 Based on the 2004 CAQR (Commission for Matters of Cadres of Resistance) report, there were 76,061 former members of the Falintil, of which 10,337 were women or 13.5 per cent of the total (Kent and Kinsella 2015).

6 KOTA (Klibur Oan Timor Aswain/Association of the Sons of the Timor Combatants) is a party of monarchs (liurai) founded by José Martins, one of the founders of Apodeti who later left Apodeti and founded the party on 20th November 1974.

7 Trabalhista is a Labor Party which was founded in September 1974 and had independence goals through a transitional federation with Portugal.

at the same time as Falintil's supreme commander. Changes again occurred in 1987 where Xanana declared Falintil as a non-partisan organization and established the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM). CNRM was expected to become an organization that can cover all the independence movements in Timor Leste. The shift to a more inclusive and non-partisan independence movement strategy continued with the formation of the Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense/CNRT in 1998 which was able to facilitate the participation of various political parties, ideologies, cultures, and religious groups both at home and abroad. In the end, Xanana Gusmao put the CNRT and Falintil as the basis of the independence movement until they succeeded in gaining independence in 1999 (Niner 2000).

Fugure 3: The Dynamics of CNRT/Falintil Organization

Green box denotes that
organization still exist until 2000

Source: Prepared by the authors from Niner, S. 2000. A Long Journey of Resistance: The Origins and Struggles of the CNRT. Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 32 (1–2):11-18. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2000.10415775.

After the destruction of *zonas libertadas*[8], the nature of the resistance became very military and was based on guerrilla operations. The main activity of the Fretilin political cadres was to form underground cells among the population living in the villages. The Fretilin political cadre was also tasked with assisting Falintil guerrilla units in the forest with logistical and information support. In carrying out the guerrilla strategy, the resistance movement in East Timor had three forms of struggle fronts, i.e. the Armed Forces, Frente Cladestine, and Frente Diplomatica while still giving Falintil the opportunity to serve the role as their leader.

During the struggle, Falintil had solidarity and a strong fighting spirit. An informant who has struggled for 24 years in the forest tells how the struggle and the spirit of the struggle that never goes out.

> After some of the warriors surrendered, the TNI attack was even more massive. Nevertheless, we continued to struggle, even though we were hungry, lacked clothes, until we drank rain water, we remained convinced that life or death we must be independent (AL, 29/11/2018).

The informant also mentioned how in 1983 Major General Lere Anan Timur and the combatants mobilized military power, including people working in Indonesia. The combatants in the city began to be mobilized, starting from Lauten, Kararas, Luruhun. This mobilization showed the Indonesian government that the people of East Timor did not want oppression from the Indonesian government, but rather the recognition of the Indonesian government of the right to self-determination, the same as what the Indonesian people had done when they resisted Dutch colonialism (AL, 29/11/2018). This story is reinforced by the statement of Taur Matan Ruak in his speech: "We went through immense difficulties to survive, we went through terrible grief and mourning, we buried valiant comrades, we witnessed the massacre of countless thousands of citizens of our Homeland, all perpetrated without pity or mercy"[9]. This spirit of struggle had formed high solidarity among the Falintil (International Crisis Group 2011).

Services in liberating the people of East Timor have become a legitimate capital for Falintil veterans in carrying out their role in the era of independence. Although the Falintil organization was officially dissolved in

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8 Zona libertadas (liberated area) was the territory controlled by Fretilin between 1975 and 1978. In this region, Falintil was tasked with protecting people who were building new lives free from oppression, exploitation, ignorance, and disease (Leach et al. 2009).

9 Available at: http://www.etan.org/et2000c/august/20-26/21falin.htm

February 2001, the values and norms in the organization cannot be easily removed from its members and the community. In fact, to commemorate Falintil, a ceremony was held on August 20, 2011, aimed at reminding the merit of Falintil's struggle and the fate of Falintil veterans in independence. Respect for Falintil services was enshrined with a series of government policies such as the law on veterans, the formation of veterans' organizations, and the granting of privileges such as awards for heroic services, retirement funds, development projects. The effort to continue to respect the services of Falintil veterans is also evidence that their values and norms of struggle will always be remembered and preserved during the current independence era.

Legacy Falintil has given power to the veterans in the social, economic and political aspects. These forces were obtained through the attributes of combatants who had been able to free the East Timorese from Indonesian occupation. This gives a high position and significant influence in the structure of East Timorese society. They legitimately get a lot of special treatment in a variety of social and state matters. Often, this power is used to oppose state policies that do not benefit themselves. East Timorese society also recognizes that veterans deserve special privileges in the structure of East Timorese society. This was revealed from the results of a survey stating that 16% of respondents stated strongly agree and 57% agreed to government policies that give privileges to veterans. This opinion is reinforced by the high respect of respondents for veterans' struggle through their services as indicated by the results of a survey in which 54% of respondents strongly agreed and 43% agreed if veterans' services must be respected.

Although respondents endorse veteran privileges in social structures and respect the values of their struggle, not many of them feel the actual role of veterans in maintaining their security. The majority of respondents expressed doubt (34%), disagreed (23%) and even 2% of respondents strongly disagreed to place veterans as security providers for them. This is because the respondents' traumatic experiences when the veterans actually became the cause of the conflict in 2006-2008. As many as 51% of respondents agreed and 17% strongly agreed on the 2006-2008 conflict that was triggered by a feud between PNTL and F-FDTL veterans.

The granting of privileges to veterans also raises the issue of egalitarianism that is meant to be built in a democratic East Timor. UNTAET sought to foster and consolidate democracy in this new country, but veterans actually dominated the political equality in the society—from the village to the central government. There was a policy of privilege for Falintil veterans to later become police, army, or even state officials. This of course is in contrast to democracy that embraces egalitarianism and will certainly have an impact

on democratic stability and security. An informant who did not want to be identified stated that:

> Sometimes veterans are also obstacles to development and the cause of conflict. For example, when the government prioritizes veterans to run electricity projects in a village. Between them there will be fighting each other, for example this veteran wants to hold this project, while others say not because this area belongs to another veteran, so the project was not realized because of this dispute. Sometimes there is a kind of social inequality with the non-veterans. Veterans already have salaries and they still play with projects and sometimes others also feel that independence is not only a struggle of the veterans. The problem in veteran organizations is that there are a lot of veterans, but in reality in Indonesia, they became a partisan, but in the era of independence they claimed to be combatants. That is a weakness of verification (Anonymous, 24/11/2018).

Nepotism and Clientelism of Falintil: Toxins That Weaken Timor Leste's State Security Institutions

Falintil showed its strength by forcing military formation in the new state of East Timor. Coercion stems from the threat of Falintil in the formation of East Timor's new state institutions. The elimination of Falintil was felt since the DDR process in 1999-2001 until there was no plan from UNTAET not to establish a military force in East Timor. Though there is great hope from them to be able to continue their fighting skills during their previous struggle to professional military. This unrest led to pressure from Falintil officials for UNTAET to establish armed forces even though this was not in UNTAET's mandate. Xanana Gusmao as Falintil's high leader led the negotiations and the combatants threatened to remain in arms and stayed in their respective positions if UNTAET did not form armed forces. The informant stated:

> At that time, the UN only built a police agency, and did not build a military body. This is because, given the small geographical conditions and the few demographics, the UN did not establish a Military body. However, this was not approved by former Armada front combatants such as Major General Taur Matan Ruak and Xanana Gusmão. Because in addition to the reason of an independent country, even though the geographical condition is small and the demographic condition is small, of course, it still requires a military body or soldiers. In our opinion, veterans, if Falintil, who had been a guerrilla army for 24 years, was not officially involved in the military, they chose to return to guerilla in the forest. We also felt we were victims of the

UN game at that time (AL, 29/11/2018).

The negotiation process between Xanana and UNTAET at that time resulted in the decision to establish an armed force. This decision also still received opposition from some veterans because there was no guarantee of the fate of the veterans in the structure of the armed forces. The veterans urged that they can be transformed into East Timor's armed forces. This insistence resulted in the recruitment and selection of Falintil veterans to fill 600 battalion members conducted in December 2000 and January 2001. On 31st January 2001, UNTAET established F-FDTL. The inauguration ceremony was held in Aileu on 1st February 2001 as a sign of the dissolution of Falintil and the formation of the F-FDTL (Sedra et al. 2009). Although some Falintil members were accepted as members of the F-FDTL, some who were not accepted continued to carry on informal security roles especially in intelligence and personal security for state or military officials. This of course led to the intervention of informal institutions in the task of intelligence and state protection and led to two informal and formal command lines (International Crisis Group 2011).

The existence of the police institution (PNTL) could not be separated from the influence of Falintil intervention. Falintil veterans felt that there was injustice in PNTL where the majority of the members were ex-Civpol (Civil Police UN) who were also members of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) who had previously become opponents of Falintil during the struggle. In their statement the informant stated that the nepotism in the recruitment of PNTL members was in the form of a commander's recommendation for their subordinates. It is as stated that: "Recommendations were from the platoon commander, the team commander who stated that this subordinate was truly a veteran and I recommended this subordinate to you for to accept (at PNTL)" (AA, 23/11/2018). However, the existence of the former Falintil and former Polri had resulted in rivalry between the nationalist camp (veterans) and the former police in the PNTL. In their statement, the informant witnessed how the former Polri trained with their own group at Barapite and also the nationalist group did the same thing (AA, 23/11/2018). Falintil urged UNTAET to accept Falintil veterans as PNTL members.

The clientelism relationship during the struggle also damaged the new hierarchical pattern of modern organizations in PNTL and F-FDTL. Compliance of ex-combatants in PNTL and F-FDTL in the new organizational hierarchy is often still based on seniority and based on the length of time of fighting. This traditional norm is of course conflicting to the norms of the new military and police organizations where the placement of leaders/personnel

is based on educational professionalism. As a result of this clash of norms, combatants who have struggled longer often do not want to follow orders from superiors who are not combatants or even from fellow combatants but have experienced shorter periods of struggle. One case of insubordination occurred in Covalima District where subordinates opposed superiors' orders with threats. The informant stated their experience that:

> In my district, Covalima, there is Titi Dias (a policeman who is now dead). He was a sergeant. The command says he wants to transfer from one area to another. He refused, "You just do not deserve to transfer me, if you mess up, I'll shoot you to death". (This talk is via HT so everyone knows) (AA, 23/11/2018).

Insubordination was also carried out by our informant who, during the 2006 crisis, were in a platoon with Major Alfredo and Salsinha. The informant who was invited by Alfreido to rebel stated that he was loyal to Taur Matan Ruak as the F-FDTL commander. The informant's obedience was based on loyalty during a period of struggle in which Taur was the informant's immediate superior. In fact, within the structure of its unit at F-FDTL, the informant was Major Alfreido's direct subordinate. The informant stated that:

> In the military hierarchy, Alfredo's position is higher than mine, although the duration of my struggle is longer than Alfredo Reinaldo's. I do not want to be governed by him in the 2006 uprising. I am more obedient to my former army commander (Taur Matan Ruak) (AL, 29/11/2019).

Nepotism and Clientelism do not only occur in the indicators of struggle, but also in ethnicity. The division of East Timorese society between Lorosa'e and Loromonu which was constructed by the Portuguese occupation in the past is still valid. The contradiction between the two groups was repeated by UNTAET by forming PNTL which was dominated by Loromonu people and F-FDTL which was dominated by Lorosaese people. Loromonu was identified with people who did not join the struggle or were even pro with Indonesia, while Lorosa'e was identical with people who fought against Indonesia. Ethnicity-based clientelism and the issue of this struggle contributed to the failure of the PNTL and F-FDTL to maintain security and precisely the conflict between the two institutions caused an extraordinary security threat in the period 2006-2008. A informant stated:

> The 2006 crisis began with the shooting conflict between PNTL and FDTL

in Los Palos, and it can be said that the 2006 crisis was a political crisis within the F-FDTL institution. The underlying factor behind the crisis was the imbalance within the internal F-FDTL itself, where F-FDTL members who came from the Loromonu camp, despite their high knowledge but were always placed in a lower position like ordinary members, meanwhile members of the F- FDTL from the Lorosa'e camp, although not knowledgeable, always gets a higher position, like the commander or major general (RL, 28/11/2018).

Similar information was also conveyed by other informants who were also former Falintil fighters.

In 2006, I, Alfredo and Salsinha together with the five platoons all came from F-FDTL, we were the ones who did the rioting in Timor-Leste ... (Unrest was carried out) Because Alfredo heard more the influence of other people (politicians) than me, that the camp Loromonu did not wage war against colonialism, the one who waged war or struggle for independence was the Lorosa'e camp ... Alfredo was trapped in political issues and at the same time had the ambition to become a leader in F-FDTL (AL, 29/11/2018).

Table 3: Nepotism and Clientelism in Security Institutions

No	Institutions	Dominant Ethnic	Contribuições para a Independencia
1.	PNTL	*Loromonu*	No/Minimum Struggle
2.	F-FDTL	*Lorosa'e*	Struggle

Source: Prepared by the authors.

Nepotism and Clientelism have also damaged the judiciary by providing amnesty or reducing sentences to former Falintil who are involved in lawsuits. This practice was made easier by Falintil because they succeeded in placing their people in the highest political leaders of the country, the president, the speaker of parliament, and the prime minister. There were 185 sentences of leniency from the president for veterans involved in the 1999 and 2006 conflicts, and 13 sentences of forgiveness from 2004-2010 (Sedra and Harris 2011). The political intervention in the court's decision was solely to protect veterans from being caught in the law. Leaders of East Timor argue that veterans already have a great deal in the struggle for independence, so that they are not appropriate to be punished. The F-FDTL commander who

is also Falintil commander, Taur Matan Ruak, has intervened in the court process which is interrogating allegations of weapons smuggling by Falintil seniors and the former Minister of Defense of East Timor. He criticized the process as "criminalizing those who defended the nation" (Sedra and Harris 2011). This practice of impunity undoubtedly weakens the function of court institutions that are part of the state security institutions.

Legacy Falintil is also the capital of the political power possessed by veterans. The politicization of the services of the struggle has placed the Falintil veterans as elites in political power from the beginning of independence until today. Timor Leste's political leadership is still struggling with high-ranking combatants such as Xanana Gusmao, Ramos Horta, Lo Ulo Guteres, Taur Matan Ruak, and Mari Alkatiri. With this political power, veterans can easily protect the interests of their institutions. Protection of Falintil veterans is carried out with various forms of impunity practices for veterans involved in legal cases.

Final Remarks

The crippling of the security institutions of either PNTL or F-FDTL in 2006-2008 and the inadequacy of the court were evidence of the existence of a state security institution that could not be separated from the influence of Falintil's pre-existing informal security institutions. In a condition where the misalignment of objectives and strengths and the legitimacy of informal security institutions are stronger than formal institutions, the informal institutions will choose a toxic role that aims to weaken formal institutions. This toxic relationship can be found in East Timor where the Falintil veteran institution (in which during the period of struggle was an important institution of community security guarantor) has weakened the functions of PNTL, F-FDTL, and state court institutions. The weakening of the function of the state security institution was carried out through nepotism and clientelism which manifested traditional solidarity, defiance, and impunity for Falintil veterans. These practices arose because of the strong influence of solidarity, command hierarchy, and ways of violence that used to be Falintil's culture, which were still strongly held by veterans who are now personnel and elites in state security institutions. These practices of nepotism and impunity can flourish in East Timor because they are strengthened by the community's recognition of Falintil's struggle services that the state should have been rewarded with granting various privileges.

The role of Falintil veterans who weakened the state security

institutions of East Timorprovided a lesson to the UN and the national government to be able to place veterans appropriately in the development of the security sector. In addition to the focus on efforts to reintegrate ex-Falintil in society, it is also necessary to make efforts to "reintegrate" ex-Falintil to state security institutions. In this case, there needs to be an effort to change persuasively and continuously the culture of struggle to a liberal culture with various social and economic programs and a legal umbrella for veterans. In addition to efforts on the veterans' side, it is important for the UN and the national government to multiply substitutive institutional relations patterns to replace the failure of formal institutional functions. Therefore, further research is needed to map the informal security institutions in East Timor that can replace the failure of formal security institutions.

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ABSTRACT

Liberal peace strongly believes that security sector reform (SSR) can strengthen the structure of peace and security in post-conflict countries. However, this approach is not always successful in several countries including East Timor. Based on the institutionalism approach, this study found an interesting fact that Falintil's veterans' toxic role in their relations with state security institutions had weakened the function of state security institutions and caused the insecurity of the state and people of East Timor from 2000-2008. These results were obtained through field research using qualitative-quantitative mix method research based on primary data obtained from interviews, surveys, and official documents from the United Nations and the government of East Timor.

MARITIME INSECURITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND ITS EFFECTS IN THE ECONOMY OF STATES

Damião Fernandes Capitão Ginga[1]

Introduction

The problems of insecurity in the African continent are older than its constitution as a "Political Unity", formed by sovereign states. Since an early age, it was faced by several obstacles to its territorial integrity, due to a set of factors, many times, external to African interests, such as other peoples and great nations conquers and occupations in the 19th century and, in recent decades, the greed of various actors of International Politics for African spaces (Ginga 2014).

Thus, the increase in the geopolitical importance of African regions, namely the Western and Eastern regions, had been gaining greater political and economic interest from the main world powers, mainly because of their position on the axis of the main routes of world trade and their potential in natural resources, which reinforces the continent's geostrategic value (Beny 2007). In fact, although the relevance of the oceans in the context of international dynamics is unquestionable, the threats that arise there often seem to be less precise, so for several decades, the continental security approach had a predominantly territorial focus, since the main objective of African States was the assurance of issues considered "priority" (land borders), to the detriment of other issues considered "auxiliaries", such as maritime security[2].

As a result, insecurity in these spaces continues to weaken local

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2 Furthermore, and according to Therezinha de Castro (1999, 253), "for centuries, the geopolitical destiny of Africa was to live behind the coastal barrier", so it is inferred that the history of the continent, for reasons of cultural identity is characterized by the culture of territoriality.

sovereignty and stability, preventing the harmonious and continuous development of nations, in a scenario marked by continuous changes that generate uncertainty, which sometimes evolve into multiple crises, associated with problems of various kinds[3] (Keohane 2002). This context, with positive and negative quadrants, has weighed on the political evolution and development of African States, in a scenario in which the most frequent and main threats to maritime security on the continent, have materialized through actions of maritime terrorism; piracy; illegal unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing; the smuggling of arms, people and goods; illegal immigration; spills of dangerous substances; the depredation of marine resources; among other manifestations of organized crime[4].

Indeed, maritime security in Africa also has direct implications for the rest of the world, as in 2007, around 60% of cocaine on the European market (valued at USD 1.8 billion) had transited through West Africa. A large part of the cargoes of drug trafficking arrives in Africa on cargo ships, after which they are transferred in small boats for their expedition to other continents. In this regard, of the 775 million USD in contraband cigarettes and the approximately 438 million USD in counterfeit medicine for malaria, which pass through West Africa, are transported by Sea. Associated with all this, it is also estimated that IUU fishing, preferably carried by European and Asian commercial vessels, costs Sub-Saharan Africa more than USD 1 billion annually (Vogel 2009).

Therefore, the approach presented here aims to deepen the debate on maritime issues among the main stakeholders in themes that deal both with African matters in general and these maritime crossroads. Therefore, these questions will act as another element of analysis on the condition of almost abandonment of the borders and maritime spaces of African countries, given the evident lethargic stance of the African authorities, with regard to issues related to the oceans. Addressing African maritime insecurity is not only a socio-political reflection on the facts, but also an economic and Human Development vision. In this scientific essay we make a transversal approach to issues of maritime insecurity in the continent, with a greater focus on the Western region (Gulf of Guinea), listing the main challenges and pointing

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3 Namely: of economic, social and political nature; extremisms and fundamentalisms; inappropriate reforms in state structures; the continuous violation of human and collective rights; the proliferation of organized crime; among other phenomena that generate new systemic and erosive threats, which mark the "New World Order".

4 These tend to spread, both due to the permeability of the borders of these states, with special reference to the states of the sub-Saharan region, as well as the lack of capacity to exercise state authority in their maritime spaces (Ginga 2014).

out some measures to be adopted, with a view to improving the paradigm. It is therefore important to understand, what is the role of African states, as guarantors of maritime security and defense, and promoters of sustainable development on the continent. Also, we can argue: which are the other transversal approaches apart from the continent that can help to create a maritime cooperation regime for the whole of Africa?

The Maritime Insecurity Dilemma

The African continent geopolitical's situation is deeply characterized by the "geographic wall", that is represented by the fact that 1/3 of its territory has no access to the oceans, hindered by the remaining 2/3. This leads to the image of one continent within the other. As stated by Políbio Almeida (1994, 119), Africa is a world that due to its geopolitical particularities is closely linked to the maritime world, in which its potential in mineral resources, the oceanic component of all sub-Saharan Africa, among other relevant factors in global geopolitics and the geostrategic framework, give their States a place of prestige. From the beginning, when it comes to issues related to the development of the African continent or the security of the borders of its countries, one should not ignore the maritime aspect, since most African states are coastal nations.

The African continent is currently going through the third phase of the so-called "Scramble for Africa", motivated by geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic reasons, making the largest international powers increasingly aware of the dynamics in this continent; in the sense that mineral and energy resources occupy a central place in this new position (Abegunrin 2009). These continental features associated with structural and socio-political weaknesses, intensify the rise of external players interests in African regions, making them "desirable" for the main international powers, namely for those interested in the exploitation of their natural resources, and for the main agents of organized crime.

In the context of the weaknesses, we highlight the feeble capacity to maintain maritime borders and the few resources available for the permanent exercise of State authority at sea, including the great lakes, rivers and inland waterways. Therefore, maritime space and maritime borders are included in this increasingly permeable and diffuse system, since the extensive coastline of States in the sub-Saharan region of about 30,725 km, further weakens their condition (Otto 2020).

This is the face of a continent that has been weakened by maritime

insecurity, with consequences for the level of economic development, where countries with faint structures weaken the continental condition much more. These weaknesses, associated with the low levels of integration and cooperation at regional level, have resulted in obstacles with regard to the control of maritime borders, both in the territorial sea and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as well as in international waters where the maritime routes that pass through there, which has delayed the development of their States. In this understanding, the President of Cameroon, Paul Biya, during the Summit of Heads of State and Government on Maritime Security in Yaoundé (24-25 June, 2013), argued that maritime insecurity "poses a serious threat to the peace and stability of African States (as) it undermines the people's development and well-being"(AU 2013, 2).

In fact, in recent years, the continent that had avoided terrorism and religious extremism for many decades has become the new focus of maritime radicalization, as "[...] the competitive advantage generated by the region's weak state capacity and rule of law, the existence of well-developed smuggling networks, and its geographic location all heighten its appeal to drug trafficking cartels and criminal gangs " (Marc, Verjee and Mogaka 2015, 33). In this context, the waters of the continent, namely the regions of the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and the Gulf of Adem (GoA), have been the target of a multiplicity of illegal activities, which undermine maritime security and retract economic development.

As a result, in recent years, the fight against maritime insecurity has occupied a central place in the main development agendas of African states, although this awareness is little materialized by the political dynamics developed there. Undoubtedly, questions about maritime insecurity in the African continent, which are transversal to all its regions, are multidimensional in nature, so for reasons of space rationality it would not be possible to analyze them within the scope of this article, in the sense that the approach focuses in more detail on the context of maritime insecurity on the western coast of the Sub-Saharan Africa (GoG region).

Indeed, and recalling the negative side of globalization, the transatlantic connections that pass through the Western coast of the continent, associated with facilities in terms of natural resources, make the GoG region a highway for crime at sea, commonly known as "Highway 10", attracting all kinds of interests and including illicit and illegal activities such as piracy, drug trafficking, arms and diamond smuggling, IUU fishing, illegal immigration, terrorism, the deposition of substances harmful to the marine environment, among other activities originated by greed of many countries, organizations and groups (Mugridge 2010).

With twelve coastal states, the oceans have immeasurable economic value for the GoG region, representing, from the outset, one of the greatest assets for their economies. However, in most cases, this economic potential remains to be exploited, mainly due to the numerous internal vulnerabilities, such as weak state authority, the scarce existing resources and, consequently, the deficient patrolling of maritime spaces (Abegunrin 2009). This region, marked by war, socio-political instability and extreme poverty, faced with the porosity of its borders and the extensive coastline, poorly monitored, has faced several illegal activities, in which it stands out: piracy; maritime terrorism; IUU fishing; drug trafficking; the smuggling of people, armaments, medicines and diamonds; theft of oil and cargo; spills of substances; among other manifestations of crime at sea.

"Maritime piracy" has represented one of the main "virus" for the African Maritime Domain (AMD) and a big deal for the world of organized crime, focusing on regions of considerable geostrategic importance. Whereas in the past piracy was fundamentally used as a tool for nations to expand their dominance at sea, today, modern piracy has an opposite effect on the power of States, contributing to the weakening of their structures and of the control of their spaces (Coudenhove- Kalergi 1959). The 20th century was marked by the low incidence of piracy attacks in the region, however, in recent years, there has been a resurgence of the phenomenon. So far, until the end of the 1st decade of the 21st century, East Africa represented the epicenter the phenomenon at the global level; according to the annual report of the "American One Earth Future Foundation", by the end of June 2012, piracy had yielded around USD 160 million in favor of pirates, having cost the world economy around 700 million USD.

The business has been fundamentally fueled by cargo theft and the rescue of people and goods, with a direct economic impact on regional stability and development (Onuoha 2012, 2, Miah 2012). Currently and according to the annual reports of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019, in recent years this phenomenon has taken on a worrying dimension, especially on the western coast of the continent, being already considered the "New Pirate Hot Spot", as pirates have developed their mode of action and the respective instruments, which has allowed them to reach greater distances (IMB 2020).

However, the data presented by the 2017 Oceans Beyond Piracy/ American One Earth Future Foundation report, describes that "the number of seafarers affected by piracy and armed robbery in 2017 decreased slightly from 2016 [...] in total, 1,726 seafarers were affected by piracy and armed robbery in 2017 in West African waters, compared to 1,921 in 2016" (AOEFF

2018, 12), although for the first time in two consecutive years, incidents of abduction at sea have been observed in the region[5]. Thus, as a general rule, while piracy in the Horn of Africa has been decreasing since 2012, there has been a considerable increase in piracy, with armed robbery, and other maritime crimes in the GoG region, where there is one of the largest oil fields. offshore, making it urgent for African states to intervene to combat this phenomenon (UNODC 2016).

In the GoG region, pirates are part of the group of stakeholders in oil and natural gas exploration, taking advantage of the increased maritime activity in this region, in the sense that in the period between January 2014 to December 2018, more than 200 attempts attacks on ships were perpetrated by pirates on the west coast of the African continent (IMB 2020). As a result, it is clear that in these regions, the cause of piracy is always associated with the void of authority of States in maritime spaces, specifically due to political instability, civil war, ineffective public policies and lack of resources on land.

As a result, in recent years, oil carriers have been the preferred target, which according to Assis Malaquias (2012), "Their main targets are oil tankers. They're after the oil. They rob the tankers then transfer the oil to smaller ships, which transfer it again to other ships, until it gets track of it. They're not really after cargo, ships, or anything other than oil". This activity commonly known as "illegal oil bunkering" has also been the driving force behind the phenomenon of piracy in the GoG region, especially as the oil assault has been very profitable for criminal groups, who use the black market to dispose of this cargo, favored by a powerful transnational mafia, which finances and facilitates pirate operations; which often makes piracy confused with the phenomenon of terrorism (Baldauf 2012).

Likewise, "maritime terrorism"[6], which is not easily dissociated from piracy due to its complex nature and at the same time transversal to all other manifestations of organized crime at sea, has worried African states.

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5 Although an exception, on the contrary, on the east bank there was a slight increase in incidents with pirates, including the hijackings of the ships Aris 13, Asayr 2 and Al Kausar. For more see. <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/reports/sop/east-africa>. Accessed on: February 15, 2020.

6 The concept of maritime terrorism differs from the notion of maritime piracy, due to its nature, and the differential factor is found in the motivations and objectives that characterize both phenomena: piracy is generally motivated by private private, without underlying political-ideological objectives, while maritime terrorism is perceived as one of the several forms of armed rebellion, generally of an ideological political character, aimed at provocation-repression-destabilization. Maritime piracy thus appears as an instrument of maritime terrorism, and terrorism covers all illegal activities in the maritime space, which are politically and ideologically motivated (Cottim 2008).

Especially, due to the greater dimension and expression that some movements have acquired in recent years, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Boko Haram, undermining stability in these countries and contaminating the regional socio-political environment; as there have been several acts of maritime terrorism, particularly in the oil industry, resulting in damage to oil infrastructure and economic and environmental damage.

In fact, maritime terrorism is a real threat that has jeopardized the security and stability of the international system[7], and the motivations of terrorist organizations have been varied, with the main targets being precious cargo or maritime infrastructure, with use or not of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Ridley 2014). In the western region of the African continent, cargo theft and spillage of crude oil at sea have been the main manifestations of this aspect of crime at sea, expressing the negative potential that terrorism has in relation to the economy and the marine environment, being harmful to the environment, economy and territorial sovereignty, as this phenomenon is particularly condemned by the "SUA Convention 1988" and its "Protocol of 2005".

Thus, the cases of the Bonga oil platform, attacked 60 nautical miles from the Niger Delta in June 2008 by MEDN, forcing the stop in production operations; the disappearance of the Liberian-flagged oil tanker Kerala, at the service of the National Fuel Society of Angola, in January 2014, with losses of several tons of diesel; or the Norwegian flag carrier MV Bonita, approached by pirates in November 2019; reflect the insurgency of terrorist movements in this region (Ginga 2014, IMB 2019).

In addition, and in the last decade, there has been an increase in "drug trafficking" in the sub-Saharan region, which has contributed even more to its maritime insecurity. In this context, the geographical situation of West Africa, between Latin America and Europe, associated with the permeability of its maritime borders, makes these States attractive for this activity, in the sense that the last decade "[...] has seen West Africa catapulted to global notoriety for its role as a key transit point in the trafficking of narcotics between Latin America and Europe [...]" (Marc, Verjee & Mogaka 2015, 33).

Since 2006, West African countries have been part of the main routes used to transport cocaine from South America to Europe, as large quantities of

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7 The first major global event of maritime terrorism in recent international history took place in October 1985, when the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro was hijacked, in the Mediterranean, by a group of Palestinian terrorists, who created terror and murdered Leon Klinghoffer, an American passenger. This event led to the creation of the "Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation" - SUA 1988.

cocaine have been confiscated, representing only a portion of a large volume of business, generally transported by small ships and private jets, intended for traffickers from West African countries, as the epicenter of cocaine on the continent (UNODC 2018). In this context, the Western coast, namely the GoG region, appears as a preferential zone for the passage of criminal organizations sea routes, in a context in which most of the cocaine (60%) transported by sea, destined for Europe, passes by GoG. The region today represents a hub for the command and control of illicit cargo, originating in most countries in Latin America, making this activity support the other variants of organized crime in the region (Mugridge 2010).

Consequently, there has been an increase in the overflow of drug trafficking in the waters of the states of this region, with these loads later being transferred to neighboring countries, from which most of them are sent to Europe and North Africa (UNODC 2018). As former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon argued, "drug trafficking does not respect borders […] the transnational nature of the threat means that no country can face it alone" (UNODC 2009), so poor cooperation between states at the regional level has largely favored organized crime networks, as annual cocaine transhipments in West Africa are estimated to vary widely between 60 and 250 tonnes, with a revenue of between 3-14 billions USD annually.

Thus, just as piracy, terrorism and drug trafficking damage trade and make investment in Africa more risky and costly, "IUU fishing" weakens economic development, aggravating food security challenges on the continent. According to estimates, currently one in four fish in Africa is caught illegally. IUU fishing has jeopardized the sustainability of fish stocks, damaging the ecosystem, depriving governments of income and African peoples of their means of subsistence[8], and according to Peter Thomson, United Nations Special Envoy for the Ocean, the scourge is affecting most African nations, mainly because 38 of the 54 African states have coastal borders and many inland countries have vast lakes, which have also been affected by IUU fishing and poor fishing practices (Holmyard 2018).

In West Africa, their practices cost the region around USD 1.3 billion annually, which has increasingly attracted the attention of African leaders to the dimension of crime, forcing them to take more proactive attitudes, in order to fight against this crime. The issue of IUU fishing in Africa has been well studied and numerous solutions have been proposed, including the 2016 report by the "Overseas Development Institute" and the Spanish research and

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8 It is estimated that IUU fishing represents 40% of the annual catches in the West African region, and is therefore considered to be the region with the highest level of IUU fishing (Osinowo 2015, 2).

journalism group, which used satellite tracking to monitor methods and scale of the problem, highlighting that overflows, lack of inspection of cargo in containers, inadequate legal qualifications, deficient technology and lack of political will, have been the main causes of this phenomenon. The report estimated that, by developing and protecting fisheries on the continent, around USD 3 billion would be saved and more than 300,000 jobs created (Holmyard 2018), in a scenario where according to the data presented by the Economic Commission of the Nations United for Africa (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa - UNECA), "[...] around USD 42 billion per year leaves the continent through illegal fishing and illegal logging, among other causes" (UNECA 2016, 3).

China is the largest fishing power in West Africa, with more than 500 industrial fishing vessels operating in the waters of the region, so it should play a greater role in eradicating illegal practices in its fleet, excluding the widespread use of illegal mesh nets and a ban on shark hunting, as described by Greenpeace reports. Since 2016, China has canceled subsidies amounting to USD 111.6 million for 264 vessels that practiced illegal fishing, as well as revoking the fishing licenses in foreign waters of several companies, publicizing a blacklist of vessels and professionals of the area[9].

At the same time, there are still other manifestations of organized crime on the continent, such as illegal immigration, smuggling of people and minerals, arms trafficking, the deposit of dangerous materials, among other activities that weaken maritime security, hampering transport and maritime trade, and motivating a growing disturbance in the international political system. In the meantime and with regard to "arms trafficking", it is observed that the issue of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the GoG, in recent years, has become a major threat to maritime security, which must be resolved urgently, under penalty of perpetuating socio-political instability in the region.

For its turn, and regarding "illegal immigration and human trafficking", by or through the sea, there has been a growth of this phenomenon in continental waters, currently constituting a serious threat to sovereignty, specifically because it calls into question human rights. This phenomenon cannot be combated in isolation, especially in a local context where the security

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9 China may have the largest fleet operating in Africa, however it is not the only one that benefits from IUU fishing. In 2017, the ocean conservation group, OCEANA, revealed that some European countries, including Greece, Italy and Portugal, had encouraged IUU fishing along the African coast, as in April 2018 it identified and tracked a vessel Spanish commercial that turned off its automatic identification system (AIS) while fishing in African waters (Holmyard 2018).

forces at sea are ineffective, making it necessary for African States to evolve their naval doctrines towards a broader and more shared maritime vision in order to together to identify the challenges faced and outline strategies for maritime safety (Baker 2011, 40).

According to some observers in assessment and information missions at the GoG region, from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), currently any state in the region has a combination of sufficiently capable criminal law and formal legal instruments to penalize some variants of crime at sea, namely piracy and maritime terrorism; what has promoted the cyclical backwardness in these States, in matters related to the construction of local capacities, within the scope of maritime security[10], necessary to counter the increasing crime in this region (UNODC 2016, 26). In short, maritime insecurity in Africa has thus posed a permanent transnational threat to global security, as the "security at sea" factor is essential in consolidating onshore development and that both are strategic elements for the continent's sustainable development and for preservation of global stability. As a result, in recent years, African states have been committed to promoting and preserving good order at sea, in order to improve maritime safety in their waters, thus promoting local development.

Maritime Security Challenges and Tools

According to the Brenthurst Foundation (2010, 10), Maritime Security from an African perspective must result from the set of actions "[...] that creates, sustains or improves the secure use of Africa's waterways and the infrastructure that supports these waterways", particularly since most maritime threats, be they structural or circumstantial, if not properly opposed, can become the focus of interstate conflict, jeopardizing human security and territorial integrity. Everything has been enlarged, because maritime borders are difficult to guard, as maritime threats are not isolated, on the contrary they reinforce each other.

Therefore, whatever the form of manifestation of the threats, due to their magnitude, due to the fact that they are intimately interconnected and have a variety of impacts, they demand from the African States a combined

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10 The concept of Security currently includes matters related to "security", associated with protection against conscious threats to ships, people, infrastructure and equipment related to maritime activities, involving instruments of strength and measures to protect navigation and sea resources and fight crime in maritime spaces; and matters related to "safety", corresponding to safety at sea in the context of preventing accidents at sea and subsequent actions in the event of an accident, to the rules for the safe conduct of navigation (Ginga 2014, 54).

and continuous response from the forces involved in defense and security issues. maritime This applies at the global, continental, regional and even local level, where responsibilities on maritime security issues should not remain the exclusive concern of government authorities, but dealt with by a whole range of state and non-state actors, with intervention directly or indirectly in these issues.

Thus, after a slow rise in the continental security agenda in recent years, maritime security has occupied a central position in the regional context, as there is now a growing awareness of maritime security issues. For all these reasons and considering that AMD has a high potential for creating wealth and preserving regional stability, African States have been paying greater attention to matters relating to the maritime environment, namely in terms of maritime defense and security, to address the insecurity indices in their waters.

A new notion of maritime frontier emerges in the continent, regarding security and defense issues. Also, the role of African States in the main decision forum of political consultation on maritime affairs has grown, especially because, today, maritime security is being regarded as a central pillar in economic development policies (Adejumobi & Olukoshi 2008). In a more articulated way, in 2009, the debate[11] on maritime security reaches the AU agenda, influenced by a series of Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and during the 15th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in July 2009, African leaders expressed concern about the growing insecurity in African maritime spaces in general, and Somalia in particular (AU 2009a).

As a follow-up, the AU Department of Infrastructure and Energy organized the 2nd Conference of Transport Ministers of the African Union, between 12-16 October of the same year, having adopted the "Durban Resolution on Maritime Safety, Maritime Security and Protection of the marine environment in Africa ", which reaffirms the Member States' commitment to UNCLOS; with the initiatives conducted by the IMO and the UNSC; with its responsibilities in the field of maritime safety; with the intensification of coordination dynamics in search of joint responses to face the scourge of

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11 This debate around maritime security in Africa was sponsored by the United Nations and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and on January 14, 2009 the "Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia" was established, in compliance with Resolution 1851 (2008) of the UNSC. The IMO organized the meeting between 16 Arab and African states in Djibouti on January 26, 2009, which adopted a Code of Conduct on the crackdown on piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean and GA - "Code of conduct of Djibouti - DCC"(IMO 2009).

maritime piracy and insecurity; with the creation of a regional network to support the fight against maritime crime, among others (AU 2009b).

Aware that maritime piracy, armed robbery and other illegal activities constitute a serious threat to the maritime domain of Central and West Africa, the UNSC, through the "Resolutions" 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012), urged the States of the regional economic communities (ECCAS - Economic Community of Central African States; and ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States) and the GoG region to take immediate action at local and regional level, leading to the implementation of a legal and doctrine framework to tackle maritime insecurity.

As a result, between 24-25 June 2013, in Yaoundé, there was the "Summit of Heads of State and Government on maritime protection and security in the Gulf of Guinea", where three diplomas in the field of maritime security were approved, namely: the "Code of conduct on the suppression of piracy, armed robbery against ships, and illegal maritime activity in West and Central Africa" (Yaoundé Code of Conduct - YCC); the "Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the States of Central and West Africa" for maritime safety and security in their common maritime domain; and the "Memorandum of Understanding" (MoU) between ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC, on maritime security in Central and West Africa - linked to maritime protection and security in Central and West Africa, and the GoG region[12].

In this context, the 2013 Declaration of Heads of State and Government of the States of Central and West Africa on Maritime Security in their Common Maritime Domain, represents the main instrument of this meeting and a pioneering document on cooperation and information sharing at the level of maritime safety, as it expresses the recognition that States have been giving to issues related to safety at sea. At the national level, the focus will be on inter-ministerial coordination, mechanisms for cooperation between state institutions and private sector partners, and the preparation of responses to counter insecurity at sea. At the regional level, this meeting determined the creation of the well-known YCC.

Later, on June 5, 2014, the three bodies signed the Additional Protocol to the MoU between CEEAC, ECOWAS and GGC, which establishes the creation of the Interregional Coordination Center (ICC), having been opened in September of the same year in Yaoundé (ICC, 2014). The ICC is an instrument

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12 With regard to building an architecture for regional maritime safety, ECCAS was the first to adopt an instrument leading to this vision, through the Protocol that created the Integrated Strategy for Maritime Safety (ISMS), in 2009; followed by GGC which adopted an Integrated Maritime Strategy for the region on 10 August 2013, and finally by ECOWAS which approved the Integrated Maritime Strategy for the region in March 2014 (ICC 2017).

at the strategic level of cooperation, coordination and communication between the member states of the three organizations, including information sharing, the development of good practices and training in preventing and combating piracy, armed robbery and others illicit activities at sea. The 24 YCC signatory states are grouped into 5 maritime zones, each supported by regional coordination centers, that is, one for ECOWAS (Maritime Security Regional Coordination Centre for Western Africa - CRESMAO) and another for ECCAS (Regional Center For Maritime Security in Central Africa - CRESMAC), being coordinated by an Interregional Coordination Center (ICC), which is supervised by the three regional organizations (ICC 2017).

The YCC and the ICC, in the framework of the IMO Strategy to strengthen maritime protection in Africa, appear as a continuation of the DCC and a complement to the 2017 "Jeddah Amendment"[13], which introduces to the code other modalities of maritime crime in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Adem to fight, according to Admiral Adejimi Osinowo "the main value of this initiative lies in the sharing of information and in the establishment of the necessary authorization protocols to pursue suspect ships across maritime borders" (2015, 4) . In fact, no region on the continent has seen a faster and more extensive growth in maritime security architecture over the past few years than the GoG region, with a set of instruments and institutions, making the Yaoundé Architecture for Security and Maritime Protection (YASMP) constitutes a success story, at continental level.

At the same time, with respect to Resolution A.1069 (28) (2014), the IMO developed and implemented a "tabletop exercises" program for the GoG, aimed at promoting an inter-state approach to maritime protection and application of the law of the sea in West and Central Africa. This program aims to demonstrate the need for cooperation between government departments and local agencies, through probable and simulated scenarios, in order to determine the best methods, processes and procedures, for the operationalization of a joint maritime strategy in the region (Araujo 2015).

This framework appears in convergence with the need for African

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13 In contrast to the DCC, which focuses primarily on piracy, the YCC contains a comprehensive approach to regional maritime security, aimed at combating not only piracy and armed robbery against ships, but all other manifestations of crime at sea, making it much broader in scope. The "DCC Amendment" constitutes a non-binding agreement between 21 East African countries, emerging as a revised Code of Conduct, regarding the crackdown on piracy, armed assault on ships and other manifestations of maritime crime in the western Indian Ocean and in GA region. The agreement is based on 4 main pillars (regional training; review of the local and regional legal framework; information sharing and local capacity building), with the aim of strengthening regional cooperation and coordination and developing the training and capacity necessary for local authorities assume their role in combating crime at sea (Araújo 2015).

States to implement a true African maritime security architecture, as advocated by the "Integrated African Strategy for Seas and Oceans 2050"[14] (AIM 2050 Strategy). AIM 2050 was developed as a tool to address Africa's maritime challenges, in order to create wealth from Africa's oceans, seas and inland waterways, by developing a thriving maritime economy and exploiting the full potential of maritime activities in an environmentally sustainable way (AU 2012).

Furthermore, the "African Union Charter on Maritime Protection and Security and Development in Africa" (Lomé Charter), adopted at the African Union Extraordinary Summit on October 15, 2016 in Lomé, also emerges as an important instrument, in the range of local initiatives aimed at countering the dilemma of maritime insecurity on the continent. The Lomé Charter aims to make maritime space the main catalyst for Africa's socio-economic development, reinforcing the need to implement the MoU[15], signed in July 2008, between IMO and MOWCA (Maritime Organization for West and Central African), within the framework the IMO's Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme (ITCP); to establish an integrated subregional coast guard network in West and Central Africa, and the respective framework for cooperation and guidance for the implementation of this integrated network (MOWCA 2008, Chatham House 2012, 16).

With regard to IUU fishing and according to the organization "Stop Illegal Fishing", an independent, non-profit organization based in Africa, dedicated to eradicate illegal fishing in the waters of the continent, African states have made efforts to curb with the phenomenon of IUU fishing, however, the phenomenon needs a new approach on their part. In the meantime, "Africa's Blue Economy: a policy handbook" presents a set of lines of action to mitigate IUU fishing, in addition to fighting against marine pollution and piracy, envisioning a fast and diversified economic growth in the continent[16] (UNECA 2016).

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14 Born at the 13th Ordinary Session of the AU Conference, held in Sirte, in July 2009, formalized in 2012, and adopted on January 31, 2014 in Addis Ababa. The IMO actively participated in collaboration with the AU in the development of the AIM 2050 Strategy, which is based on the continent, through three regional offices, located in Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire), Accra (Ghana) and Nairobi (Kenya), based in MoU signed between the IMO and the host States. For more see. <http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/TechnicalCooperation/GeographicalCoverage/Africa/Pages/Default.aspx>. Accessed on January 14, 2020.

15 Signed by 16 of its 20 coastal Member States, the MoU aimed to undertake cyclical efforts in the maritime domain, with a view to protecting human life, enforcing the law at sea, countering criminal activities at sea, improving maritime safety and protecting sea resources.

16 In recent years, UNECA has started to provide more local, national and regional support to support the development of the African "Blue Economy", working with other international

At the same time, the "Gulf of Guinea Maritime Trade Information Sharing Center"[17] (MTISC GoG), established by the International Maritime Forum of Petroleum Companies as a pilot project, went into operation in October 2014, having been hosted at the Accra Regional Maritime University in Ghana. The main goal of MTISC GoG was to establish a regional center for sharing maritime information in the region. On June 15, 2016, MTISC-GoG closed after the pilot project was successful. In response, the French and British authorities, drawing on the experience gained with MTISC-GoG, launched a new contribution to the maritime information sharing network at GoG, through a virtual information center.

The new France-United Kingdom center, called Marine Domain Awareness for Trade - Golf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG), started operations in June 2016, strengthening the capacity of the states in the region at the level of "Maritime Domain Awareness"[18] (MDA), serving as platform par excellence for sharing data, information and knowledge among the states of the region, as it is intended to provide a detailed overview of the maritime domain of waters in the West African region[19]. This initiative was associated with the program created by the European Union, "the European Union supports the Critical Maritime Routes Program", and implemented in 40 States, including

partners, including the AU, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the African Development Bank (AfDB), which have the Blue Economy at the forefront of their economic priorities for the continent.

17 In addition to providing operational advice and situational awareness to merchant ships in the region, reducing the risk of being attacked by organized crime groups, the MTISC-GoG multinational surveillance team also provided support to ship captains and shipowners who had been victims of acts criminals. MDAT-GoG is currently operated remotely by the French and UK navies, from centers located in Brest (France) and Portsmouth (United Kingdom). For more see. <http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Pages/Code-of-Conduct-a-gainst-illicit-maritime-activity.aspx>. Accessed on February 13, 2020.

18 The concept of "Maritime Domain Awareness" originates from the North American doctrine of the "US Homeland Security Department", which in a better translation means "Situational Awareness of Maritime Domain", which translates as a continuous and regular knowledge about the maritime environment of the region in question. Its main objective is to gather as much information about any ship or vessel in a given region; and analyze them with the support of a set of means and resources of "intelligence" (maritime intelligence), in order to allow "the effective understanding of any issue associated with the maritime domain that may impact security, protection, economy or environment" (US HSD 2005, ii).

19 MDAT-GoG manages a traffic scheme with a Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA), with routes and points of voluntary reporting, so merchant ships are encouraged to follow this scheme while traveling in this region. In November 2019, the Portuguese Navy vessel "NRP Zaire" fulfilled a mission to accompany the merchant ship "Maersk Tema", which transited off the waters of the Republic of São Tomé and Principe, following a piracy attack alert, done through MDAT-GoG. For more see. <https://www.noticiasdecoimbra.pt/marinha-portuguesa-procura--piratas-no-golfo-da-guine/>. Accessed on February 19, 2020.

in the countries of the GoG region through CRIMGO (Critical Maritime Routes Gulf of Guinea), during the 2013-2016 period[20].

Locally, recognizing that the history of maritime safety and the protection of the marine environment in the West African sub-region is full of incidents that expose the lack of capacity and local response, maritime terrorism and piracy appear as the main evaluation criteria the context of insecurity, in the sense that States continue to improve their capacities for inspection and surveillance, either through the acquisition of new naval means, or through the implementation of more exercises combined between the different forces in the field of maritime security and defense.

Understanding the maritime weaknesses of African states allows combating crime in maritime spaces, especially since the quantification of economic, human and environmental costs is essential to understand the true impact of crime at sea. Thus, according to the report presented by the platform "Oceans Beyond Piracy", in 2017, the total economic cost to counter acts of terrorism and piracy, in the West African region, amounted to 818 million USD[21]. In view of this, in recent years, there has been an increase of around 27% in the response rate to attack incidents by maritime security forces (Steffen 2016).

In short, in recent years, even if in a less orderly manner, African States have deepened ties of sharing and cooperation, with a view to improving maritime security in their waters and ensuring sustainability in the exploitation of marine resources in these spaces; to the extent that it is inferred that the creation of capacity in terms of maritime protection and safety, in order to face the challenges, must be a continuous and comprehensive priority.

Therefore, there are several manifestations of this greater interest by the states in the region for issues involving maritime security, and it is important to highlight: the "operational MoU" between the coast guards of Nigeria and Benin, which aims to patrol the waters to combat the organized crime in the region's waters; o Maritime interdiction military exercise "Obangame Express", with the participation of several naval forces; cooperation between the navies of South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique; the "Benguela Current Convention", a tripartite agreement between the Republics of Angola, Namibia and South Africa, to promote a coordinated regional approach for the protection of the large Benguela Current marine ecosystem; among other

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20 For more see. <https://criticalmaritimeroutes.eu/projects/crimgo/>. Accessed on March 16, 2020.

21 For more see. <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/reports/sop/west-africa>. Accessed on March 23, 2020.

local, regional and international initiatives.

A Prospective Vision for the African Continent

The changing global geopolitical framework is forcing African states to pay greater attention to issues related to maritime insecurity, for the defense of national interests and the promotion of economic development. In fact, there is an awareness that peace and political stability in Africa will essentially result from the increase in human security, which is not guaranteed only by the "sum of the security of each State", but by the set of synergies driven between States and African Regional Organizations (ARO), since the latter constitutes a privileged linkage between International Organizations and non-African cooperating States, broadening the bimultilateral perspective of cooperation for security and defense issues in the region.

Therefore, today, cross-border cooperation relations are the highest exponent of political action within regions, so ARO should continue to serve as a platform for the implementation of the dynamics of multilateral cooperation and existing bimultilateral cooperation agreements. In this domain, just as on land, in the oceans, AROs must form the basis for maintaining the "New African Order", and must share with the States the responsibility for the continent's destinations, namely in terms of maritime security; regardless of the maritime security architecture on the continent (Vines 2013, 93).

Within this framework, it is understood that at the "domestic" level there should be a greater sharing of responsibilities between the various actors who, directly or indirectly, operate in maritime affairs, especially because the oceans are, by nature and dimension, spaces for multidimensional cooperation, sharing and collective use. Thus, the implementation of management and the use of instruments suitable for the multiplicity of activities related to maritime spaces is required, not only due to the diversity of actors operating there, but because the reinforcement of safety at sea depends more on a strategic management[22] of this space, than the constant commitment of naval forces (Osinowo 2015).

At the regional level, this strategic management should be conducted from two perspectives. The first is linked to the "system software", that is, the

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22 African states, in general, should define and identify safe shipping corridors, with anchorages, mooring buoy zones for ships, among other essential points, to protect maritime trade circulating within their territorial waters and EEZ, as a reproduction and extension of the model implemented by the French and UK navies, the MDAT-GoG, which defined an "Internationally Recommended Traffic Corridor" in the West African region.

implementation and viability of a set of instruments of the legal and doctrinal framework, which highlights the harmonization of local legislation in the various States of the region, the adaptation to international conventions and protocols, bimultilateral agreements and protocols in the scope of maritime protection, inspection, security and defense, among other instruments. The second related to the "system hardware", corresponding to the physical and infrastructural resources, necessary for the consolidation of any model of integrated governance of maritime spaces, which includes the necessary means for the permanent control and monitoring of the region's maritime space, that is, the naval means, marking systems, radar systems on land (Vessell Traffic Service - VTS), centers for coordinating information and maritime operations, among other resources that strengthen regional capacity at the level of the Maritime Domain Awereness.

Furthermore, in order to guarantee maritime safety and the desired interoperability of Forces at sea, it is essential that African States continue to operate in a network, in order to guarantee complementarity between the means available in the region, with trained crews and a support system in land, which guarantee the permanent exercise of State authority at sea (Mcnicholas 2011). It is, therefore, about promoting regional and continental initiatives to strengthen local maritime capacities, as well as harmonizing local regulations and legislation[23], with a perspective of sharing experiences and information, within the framework of maritime protection, defense and security.

Much remains to be done, so the political will and the desire to cooperate on the part of African States will emerge as decisive factors, essentially because the actions taken by States alone are insufficient, in the medium and long term, to fight networks organized crime, in a context in which crime at sea results from concerted action between local criminal communities, associated with local entities, and financed by transnational organized crime networks.

Final Remarks

In order to highlight the main lines of thought presented throughout this scientific article on the African maritime environment, we had stressed that maritime insecurity on the continent has strong economic impacts for its States, as its economic structure is strongly dependent on exploitation of

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23 A central issue has been the lack of judgment and condemnation of pirates and others involved in maritime crime, as a consequence of the lack of internal legislation necessary to criminalize illegal activities at sea (Osinowo 2015).

maritime resources and maritime trade. Maritime insecurity allowed illicit activities to flourish within the borders of African states, which added to the problems of internal instability, have resulted in the emergence of failed states on the continent.

In reality, AMD had been a source of regional insecurity, affecting continental stability. Piracy, maritime terrorism, drug trafficking, IUU fishing, illegal immigration, arms smuggling and other threats that develop in African waters, have hampered the exercise of state authority and have a negative impact on the continental economy, Coastal states will not have sustainable economic development without guaranteeing minimum levels of maritime security.

Addressing maritime insecurity in Africa means reporting mainly on the current context, where African states attach greater importance to issues inherent to maritime security, as, in recent years, there has been a greater concern on the part of these states with issues linked to maritime security on the continent. Although there is some progress regarding the way to address the issue of maritime insecurity, the scarcity in terms of resources has affected the implementation of the main Maritime security Strategies, drawn up at the local, regional and continental level. In fact, both maritime security efforts and the development of maritime affairs corporate governance have been hindered by the lack of capacity of African states.

Therefore, it is considered that States and ONP need to improve their integrated and coordinated approach to maritime affairs, as they must adjust their security agendas to mitigate the main threats to continental maritime security, because, on a large scale, it will allow a better exploitation of the economic benefits and opportunities of the oceans. Especially, because the continental future, both in terms of opportunities and challenges, is associated with the seas and oceans, as the vast African maritime domain contains numerous resources that, if sustainably explored, will provide African generations with significant resources to strengthen their continued growth and development efforts.

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ABSTRACT

It seems clear that African leaders are not aware of the maritime dimension of their states, which has led to a subordination of maritime affairs compared to land issues, as it is essential that African states begin to take concrete steps in order to establish, on the continent, a true maritime security and defense architecture, with the aim of making the best use of the opportunities offered by the oceans, in the name of the interests of these States. The approach was possible, using a bibliographic and documentary review, through a qualitative methodology, following a deductive reasoning.

THE STRATEGIC EFFICACY OF DRONES FOR US GRAND STRATEGY

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Introduction

The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, led to the proliferation and increased deployment of drone as a counterterrorism strategy of the US for leadership decapitation and targeted killings of terrorists and their abettors globally. Analysts and scholars (Strawser 2013, Boyle 2015b) have made strong arguments for the continuation of this strategy based on a number of reasons including: the lower cost of warfare using drones, its precision from afar, its accuracy compared to manned aircrafts, its disruptive effects on terrorist organizations and saving the lives of US soldiers. However, despite the reliance on drone strikes so far, little is known about its effectiveness as an instrument of statecraft for achieving US grand strategy. This is because data on the target of drone strikes, location and number of strikes, the exact casualty figure of terrorist killed and attacks foiled, and the number of unintended civilian deaths[3] following drone strikes are classified by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Hazelton 2017). Thus, making empirical assessment of the actual effect of drone strikes speculative due to limited credible evidence from the US government[4].

Controversial aspects of drone use since 9/11 have also called

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3 Most data on drone strikes have been published by sources other than the CIA and the JCOS. These sources which include the American Investigative Journal, Bureau of Investigative Journalism often rely on the information transcribed from locals in the aftermath of drone strikes. While they provide the closest data for assessing US drone warfare they may not reflect accurate figures and targets following drone strikes.

4 President Trump administration has loosened the constraints associated with Obama era rules for drone strikes.

into question the political and strategic (tactical and military) benefits of lethal drone strikes for the US government. So far, the morality of drone strikes, unintended death of non-combatants, generation of anti-American sentiments, alienation of the US from the Islamic world, dent in US global image and the consideration that drone strikes facilitate militant recruitment have questioned the political utility of drones. Within the policy and public opinion circles of the US, strong dissenting opposition to the continued use of drones as a hard power tactic for targeted killings have called into question the politics of drone warfare and how this potentially shapes and affect Congressional support, government legitimacy and winning the hearts and minds of the American people for the 'Global War on Terror'. In this regard, continued use of drone strikes raises second order effects domestically and nationally for the US government which ultimately affect its national security objectives (Hazelton 2013). In addition, while drones have been used as tool to facilitate alliance and support states such as Yemen and Pakistan so far, it is not apparent whether drone strikes can be expected to achieve the same political effects for the US in other countries. Apart from violating the territorial sovereignty of countries where it has been used, the question of constitutionality regarding the use of drone strikes against American citizens living abroad and the amount of executive power drones confers the President over issues of national security has also come to the forefront of the debate regarding the political ends it achieves (Taggart et al. 2017). From a strategic viewpoint, lethal drone strikes potentially increases the possibility that its proliferation by near peer competitors of the US such as Russia and China including non-state actors threatens US military hegemony in the post 9/11 security environment by engendering a security dilemma—as a result of drones engendering an arms race among revanchist and resurgent powers akin to the Cold War.

Grand strategy reflects how a state thinks about assuring its own security or how the military instrument should be employed to achieve state goals (Art 2013, Posen 2014). And the underlying elements of US grand strategy since the end of the Cold War has been that the 'US must remain the world's dominant military power, build alliances, deploy forces around the world, manage global institutions, and be ready to intervene anywhere to ensure stability and promote liberal democracy' (Miller 2010). Successive US administration have used competing versions of US grand strategy since 9/11 with drone strikes featuring prominently among the quiver of offensive tactic for achieving military goals. However, the extent and how precisely drones are used for the furtherance of the US national security objectives outside the theatres of war and within the contours of US grand strategic visions remains

debatable. One side of the debate questions if drones are crucial military assets that create operational opportunities for the US, which although far from being politically cost free, are less contentious than manned aircrafts for both the targeting and the targeted countries (Fortmann and von Hlatky 2009, Mayer 2015). The other side of the debate, questions if drones, are simply 'new' technological toolkit in US military arsenal that serve as tools for coercive diplomacy – threat or the use of force by a state to achieve certain goals – in asymmetric warfare outside contested air spaces (Hennigan 2011, Morris 2018). Or if drones serve as discriminate instrument available to decision makers for furthering a range of strategic objectives (Knopf 2010).

Hence, it is not clear what precise role drones accomplish for the US in terms of its grand strategy. Current debates by academics and policy makers assume that tactics create strategy, and that reliance on drone for specific attacks creates beneficial or adverse political effects for US security and interests (Art 2013, Hazelton 2013). The point is, in analysing current drone use by the US, it is not obvious whether they are used as instrument of force or as an element of US defensive or offensive strategy in targeted states. Or whether drones encourage imperial overreach by asserting US unilateralism and hegemony in terrorist and rogue states in the post 9/11 security environment. Likewise, it is not clear if they mainly serve as tactic for facilitating alliance with weak states or deterrence against terrorism at large. While it could be argued that drones facilitates US counterterrorism strategy and increase its power projection and military hegemony, the overarching argument of this paper is that contemporary use of drones post 9/11 undermines US strategic objectives evident by the rise of anti-Americanism in Muslim world, proliferation of drones by US near peer competitors, civilian death toll and weakening support for the US in targeted countries (Hazelton 2017b). This underscores the need for deeper assessment into the rationale and reliance on drone strikes and what it achieves for the US outside its use in targeted states. To this end, the utility of drones are analysed within the existing typologies of US grand strategy since 9/11 in order to deductively determine, the political and strategic roles they accomplish for the US. Doing so places drone strikes within proper perspective as a national security tool for statecraft rather than a broad counterterrorism solution.

To gain better insight on the role of drones for US grand strategy, drone strikes are assessed from the politicised functions of the use of force: compellence, deterrence, defending and staggering (Hazelton 2017b). Compellence supports the use of force as a strategy to prevent enemy targets from taking action. It requires demonstrating to the adversary the capability of inflicting terrible pain if it does not change its action. Compellence questions

the ethical and legal context of drone strikes by the US and precludes the possibility that drone authorizations by policymakers are for inflicting pain on suspected terrorists or intentionally causing civilian deaths (Miller 2008). Drones as a compellence tactic, serves as a preventive strategy to forewarn the enemy, however, in causing pain, death or threat to the enemy it may not successfully alter targeted behaviour (Hazelton 2013). Deterring, on the other hand, is the use of military power to stop the adversary from acting by threat of retaliation (Boyle 2013). As a deterrence tactic, drones can be used directly, indirectly or by denial. As a direct deterrent, drone strikes prevent future attacks by denying terrorists safe havens and the capacity to perpetrate future attacks on US interests. As an indirect tactic, drones are used to pressure facilitators and abettors of terrorism than the terrorists themselves (Miller 2010). Deterrence-by-denial sees drone as tactics to deter terrorist organizational cohesion and to degrade terrorist capabilities.

As a defensive tactic, drone strikes are considered as tools for the prevention of future attacks on US homeland and for targeted killings of leaders and affiliates of terrorist groups. Swaggering is the direct use and projection of brute force to intimidate or coerce adversaries (Zegart 2018). Drones as a swaggering tactic implies its use against terrorist and its abettors is principally to show US power and to further warn its adversaries of its offensive capacities. These possibilities on the use of force underscores the need to assess drones from a theorized political context. Analysing drone strikes this way, allows an assessment of drone use in declared battlefields and non-declared battlefields where drones have been used so far. Likewise, this includes theatres in which the US has national or international permission to strike, theatres in which it does not, and so on.

This chapter is structured into six parts. The first part provides the background and key themes. The second part unpacks the post 9/11 and the rise of lethal weaponization of drones in US counterterrorism operations in targeted states. The third part unbundles US grand strategy before and after 9/11. The fourth part examines the role of drones in Bush unilateral offensive strategy. In the fifth part, the quandaries of drone warfare for US grand strategy under Bush is explored. The last part is an analysis of political and strategic implications of drones.

Post 9/11 and the Rise of Drones

Like piloted armed aircraft, drones—a collective term for unmanned aerial vehicles, remotely piloted vehicles and unmanned military systems—

provide intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance as well as strike capacity. They are remotely controlled by pilots on the ground or autonomously based on a pre-programmed mission and achieve a variety of military effects as other air platforms. They can kill, disable, support fighters on the ground, destroy, harry, hinder, deny access, observe, and track (Hazelton 2013). Like pilots providing close air support, firing missiles, or dropping bombs, drone operators are expected to respect the laws of war, striking based on clear information, including assessment of potential human costs. Drones however appear detach brutality from humanity by creating a 'new species of war' by dehumanizing death (Heyns 2013) by quantifying civilian lives in the hands of drone operators and contributing to what Heather describes as the 'gamification of death' (Heather 2013).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 90s, the US emerged as the unipolar or hegemonic power with overall dominance in power resources, especially in the military sphere, including a unique global power-projection capability (Miller 2010). The period which marked a transition of US grand strategy from containment to defensive realism was characterised by the absence of any major power willing and able to threaten the US, in the international system. The resulting decline in the level of external threat thus, allowed the US the luxury of advancing a defensive rather than an offensive liberal strategy. Under the defensive liberal doctrine, the US placed strong emphasis on multilateralism and a willingness to undertake limited humanitarian interventions (Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth 2013). The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, however, changed the US defensive outlook of the international environment as a result of new and emerging threats which challenged its unipolarity and security. This culminated to a second shift in US grand strategy to a more offensive liberal strategy premised on forcible democratic promotion in terrorists and rogue states and a willingness to assert US unilateralism, as reflected in the Bush Doctrine and carried out in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The resulting shift also altered US counterterrorism strategy with the inclusion of lethal drone strikes in the quiver of US stand-off weaponry.

US Grand Strategy Before and After 9/11

Prior to the events of 9/11, the initial grand strategy of the US can be described as one anchored on democratic globalism—which established that the political and security interests of the US can be best achieved by the promotion of liberal political institutions and application of US military and political power in democratic interventions globally (Jervis 2003, Miller

2010). Many including Art and Cronin (2003) and Hurst (2005) have argued that the grand strategy of Bush around this period was devoid of elements of offensive liberalism or more precisely, of plans to assert US unilateralism and unique global power projection capability—which it achieved as the emergent hegemonic power following the collapse of the Soviet Union—in rogue states or those providing safe havens for terrorists. This was expressed by Bush's ambivalence to effect regime change in Iraq or order offensive military action against the Baathist government. Likewise, the initial foreign policy orientation of Bush, or what has been described by analysts— as the 'First Bush Doctrine'— focused on strengthening US military power and balancing great power competition. This was evident in Bush's objection to the deployment of US military in humanitarian interventions as stated during his 1999 presidential campaign (Leffler 2011). In effect, the initial grand strategy of Bush era can be summarized as one focused on changing the Clinton era defensive liberal strategy of humanitarian intervention to a humbler defensive realist approach focused on multilateralism, limited humanitarian interventions with little inclination to offensive liberal tendencies[5]. The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks however caused a paradigm shift in US grand strategy from one that focused on democratic globalism to a muscular hardline grand strategy that expressed the fungibility of America's power. The 9/11 attacks altered the perception of the 9/11 security environment and spurred the concerns that terrorist groups may be emboldened to carry out more reprisal attacks on US homeland (Okpaleke and Burton 2020). This formed the basis of Bush era, pre-emptive and preventive warfare and led to the shift in the priorities of second Bush doctrine.

The muscular post 9/11 counterterrorism tradition was carried on into the Obama administration. Though Obama's grand strategy differed slightly from Bush in terms of its tenets, as it exalts restraints and multilateralism and the use of Washington's soft power in dealing with issues in global affairs, it maintained the intensification of drone strikes in targeted states and championed the deployment of US military in the Asia-Pacific to challenge China's military posturing and its territorial claims in the South China Sea and facilitated increased deployment of troops to Iraq, Afghanistan, North Africa, and Syria. In sum, Lofflman conceptualized Obama's grand strategy as a 'hybrid discourse' that emphasized:

that the US remained the world's dominant power tasked with exercising

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5 Though there were clear ominous signs, including the attacks against the *USS Cole* and previous attack on the World Trade Center, the Bush administration treated the imminent threat of al-Qaeda as benign.

global leadership but subvert the unilateralism of Bush and the neoconservative vision of primacy with a more conciliatory approach of multilateral cooperation and consultation (Lofflman 2017 , 17).

Like Obama, Donald Trump's grand strategy have also maintained the post 9/11 tradition of drone warfare and a muscular counterterrorism strategy. Trump's grand strategy can be summed as a composite of 'principled realism' with national isolationist undertones that embraces a zero-sum worldview premised on a materialist conception of power, and international order and a recrudescence of populist sovereignty. Hal Brands (2017), view it as one espousing ''nativist, protectionist, and nationalist-isolationist vision for the US under the populist slogan 'American First', that challenges the post-Cold War Washington's consensus on liberal hegemony.' The expansion of drone strikes outside traditional battlefields of the US under Trump underscored the continuity in the pattern of change in US post 9/11 grand strategy. Next, we examine the use of drones in the Bush grand strategy.

The Utility of Drones in Bush Unilateral Offensive Strategy

Following 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration embarked on a programme of extraordinary rendition—the transfer of an individual with the involvement of the United States or its agents, to a foreign state in circumstance that make it likely than not that the individual will be subjected to torture, cruel, or inhuman degrading treatment—of unnamed alleged terrorist in secret detention centers across the globe (Sadat 2006). Under this programme, which Bush admitted publicly to on September 6, 2006, suspects are blindfolded, shackled, sedated, illegally detained, tortured by any means necessary and in some cases killed in faraway Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prison (Sadat 2004). Due to public backlash and Congressional debate on the sickening nature of the controversial policy, the US government based on a Memorandum dated December 30, 2004 suspended the programme. The retraction of this policy attention and focus of the Bush administration shifted to the use of drones for targeting killing operations of these suspected terrorists and in the prevention of attacks to US soil. It is therefore critical to underscore how lethal drone strikes served US military strategic objectives.

Drones served a number of purposes for the Bush unilateral offensive strategy. These roles include but not limited to leadership decapitation, targeted killing, and democracy promotion in rogue states. In the aftermath of 9/11, leadership targeting of terrorist organizations has become a key feature of counterterrorism policies. The 2003 National Strategy for Combating

Terrorism (NSCT) claims that leaders are essential to terrorist activity and that their removal is likely to result in organizational collapse.

Thus, the main focus of drones for Bush was for the elimination of leaders affiliated with global al-Qaeda and its affiliates. It is based on the idea that one the leadership is killed, the organizational structure of terrorism would be dismantled (Reymond 2012). Drones due to their precision and lethal weapon capabilities were thus suitable for this based on their remote features which enables them to identify these targets and consequently eliminate them once intelligence matches the 'kill order'. This explains why immediately following the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, President announced that the US had dealt a 'severe blow' to al-Qaeda (Bush cited in Flibbert 2006). The event demonstrated that the success of the drone program during its infancy, as defined by the ability to kill other high-value targets like Harethi and Nek Mohammad, gave the Bush administration the impression that if limited drone strikes were successful, more strikes would be even better.

Another use of drones in the Bush era was for targeted killings of al-Qaeda and the Taliban leadership networks in Afghanistan and in the remote tribal regions of Pakistan. This was subsequently expanded to Somalia and Yemen (Walsh 2018). In Bush two terms, 53 drone strikes were authorized in targeted states particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan with most of these strikes (48) occurring in the last year of his administration. The domestic legal underpinning for U.S. counterterrorism operations and the targeted killing of members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda and its affiliates across the globe is the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which the US Congress passed just days after 9/11. The statute empowers the president "to use all necessary and appropriate force" in pursuit of those responsible for the terrorist attacks (Flibbert 2006). Though the use of targeted killings in peacetime is an outlawed practice in the US since 1976, under the Bush era, the White House maintained that the US under Article 51 of the UN charter, allows the targeted killing of persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks, both in and out of declared theaters of war (Ronald, Shaw and Ahkter 2012). Used this way, drones were used in the Bush era as a prerogative to unilaterally pursue targets in states without prior consent if that country is unwilling or unable to deal effectively with the threat. Gallarotti, (2010) describes the intricate processes involved in the US targeted killing using drones: (i) deciding if the target is a significant threat to U.S. interests, (ii) being cognizant of state sovereignty issues, (iii) having high confidence in the target's identity and (iv) that innocent civilians will not be harmed, and, finally, (v) engaging in an additional review process if the individual is a U.S. citizen. However, this practice have been criticized over the issue of

collateral civilian deaths and blowback effects (Bergen and Tiedemann 2011, Qadir 2014).

Drones under Bush also served as the liberal weapon of choice to minimize civilian casualties and heed the laws of armed conflict while at the same time trying to gain domestic soft power from the Congress and the US public. This is because of their unique capability of satisfying the rule of 'risk-transfer war', respecting the laws of armed conflict and limiting expenditure at the same time (Boyle 2013). The point here is drones served as the weapon of choice in the Bush era for the shift of US strategy from defensive realism to offensive liberalism. As Sauer and Schornig (2012), notes on this, 'lethal drone strikes seem like a perfect fit for democratic warfare through their appeal to the utilitarian and normative characteristics of democracies'. However, there is limited basis to stretch the argument for the use of drones for democratic promotion in Afghanistan, Pakistan or Iraq as the use of offensive strategies engendered countervailing democratic reactions. In other words, drones appear to worsen rather promote democracy in terrorist and rogue states.

The Implications of Drone Warfare for US Grand Strategy: Bush Era

Drone strikes under Bush despite its successes in achieving leadership decapitation, targeted killings, reducing troop deployment and casualty figures, appeared to weaken rather than strengthen the US (Okpaleke and Burton 2020). Firstly, beyond Iraq, the militaristic crusade of the US under Bush to enforce the pillars of its doctrine appear to be self-defeating and disempowering for the US as the offensive militaristic tactics deployed using drone strikes to root out terrorists in their hiding cells within, outside the Middle East increased the cause of anti-Western militancy, and appeared to alienate the government of the target nations as evident in Pakistan and Yemen (Gallarotti 2010, Bergen and Rowland 2013). To this, Jervis (2005) contends that the use of US powers in the war against terrorism has actually increased American vulnerability by energizing terrorism and galvanizing support for anti-Western movements within the countries drones strikes occurred. Betts (2002), adds, 'drone strikes appeared to inflame existing enemies the US had prior 9/11 and targeted killing using drones in the second phase of Bush drone authorization in pursuant to the AUMF, created a web of fear and greater enemies in invaded territories.

A recent study by Shah (2018) on the impact of drones in what he described a 'perpetrated territories', outlined negative feedback in Muslim

countries on the perception of US image as a military threat following drone strikes during the Bush era. This is analogous to a Pew Research study conducted in 2003 to ascertain the perception of the US. The research showed that in seven out of eight Muslim nations, hostile coalitions against the US increased in areas in which they were minimal. Studies including (Jervis 2005, Reymond 2012) carried out within this period in Muslim countries showed that US hostility served as a catalyst for perpetrating acts of coercion instead of eliminating them. To this end, the excessive reliance of hard power (and drones) in dealing with terrorism under the Bush era appeared to have been most counterproductive in improving US image as a democratic crusader.

Evidence from research on terrorist radicalization and recruitment between 2004 and 2008 showed that a dramatic spike in deaths by suicide bombings in Afghanistan and Pakistan—which were the two main, center for the Bush era drone strikes (Leffler 2011, Bergen and Rowland 2013). Though it is impossible to prove direct causality from data alone due to the secrecy on data on drone use— available data provide close estimate on the total civilian deaths. For example as Figure 1 shows, there are evident discrepancies in the reported figures published between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism on the casualty figures.

Figure 1: Comparison of CIA and Bureau of Investigation Journalism report of 330 Bush drone strikes in 2007-2008 in Pakistan

Source: Bureau of Investigation Journalism (2014)

Hence, it is probable that drone strikes provide motivation for retaliation, and that there is a substantive relationship between the increasing number of drone strikes and the increasing number of retaliation attacks (Gallarotti 2010). As data published by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2014 shows for every high-profile, purposeful attack by the US, many more low-profile attacks take place. This position was underscored in the report published by the CIA (2004, 104), report on high value targets. It states:

> The potential negative effect of HLT operations include increasing the level of insurgent support, strengthening an armed group's bonds with the population, radicalizing an insurgent group's remaining leaders, creating a vacuum into which more radical groups can enter, and escalating or de-escalating a conflict in ways that favor the insurgents.

These types of attacks can be explained by what military strategist David Killcullen and Andrew Exumcalls the 'accidental-guerrilla' syndrome – in which occupying forces mistake local and regional resistance movements fighting for their interest as part of a larger organization (Killcullen and Exum 2009). Simply put, a local rejection of external forces. Thus for the Bush administration the use drone warfare as the only policy tool in the FATA region in Pakistan for preventing terrorist safe havens without any local political engagement, arguably ended up creating accidental guerrillas which undermined US democracy promotion and counterterrorism strategy in the region. These 'new combatants' contributed to the growth of terrorist cells which further led to hindered US counterinsurgency operations. On this, Shah (2014, 65) writes, "the new combatants unable to retaliate against the US within FATA, crossed over the border into Afghanistan, where U.S. troops, NATO forces and Afghan security forces are concentrated and present easily identifiable targets or while joining the ranks of groups like the Pakistani Taliban, whose attacks within Pakistan destabilize the U.S.-Pakistani alliance".

More so, while the notion of attack from the skies, without direct agency or accountability appeared to be in fact was in theory an attractive vehicle for U.S. counterterrorism during the Bush era, it however came at a high price for US grand strategy by complicating U.S. strategic mission in Afghanistan, as well as the fragile relationship with Pakistan (Qadir 2014). This is because drones posed a threat to national sovereignty of these countries due to an undeclared war, the consequence according to Gallarotti (2010, 20) resulted in "enormous pressure for governing structures in these countries while at the same time worsening social volatility in the target area with unpredictable outcomes". The ensuing collateral damage compounded by extra judicial

killing, material damage and traumatic effects following drone strikes fuels instability and escalates violent retaliation against convenient targets. This further creates a legitimacy crisis in targeted states manifest in anti-drone opposition protests as seen in Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere. This has been conceptualized as 'blowback effect' to explain how drones causes domestic and national discontent due to asymmetric vulnerability of individuals in targeted states from these strikes and the indefensibility of government to shield its citizenry from its impact.

Arguably, Bush militant confrontational strategy of using drones to deliver the US from the threats of terrorism and WMD appeared to have made the threats even greater because of the negative feedback generated by drone strikes in targeted states (Okpaleke and Burton 2020). With respect to the administration's three major goals, one of the most devastating weakening effects of this hard power posture of the Bush Doctrine, was the diminishing capacity for the U.S. to achieve these goals, as a result of the negative feedback that undermined the domestic soft power aspect of the Bush foreign policy (Miller 2006). This is because prior to 9/11, extant counterinsurgency policies of the US have focused on the use of force to prevent the rise of new insurgents and civilian deaths, however, under Bush this was side-lined for a new policy of targeted killings using drones. These lethal drone attacks have failed to effectively decapitate the leadership of anti-U.S. terrorist groups based on evidence from Pakistan and Yemen (BIJ 2013) rather it resulted in the killing hundreds of other people subsequently alleged to be militants; many were civilians. (Ronald, Shaw and Akhtar 2014). The rapidly growing population of survivors and witnesses of these brutal attacks therefore have the social incentives to join the ranks of groups that access and attack U.S. targets in Afghanistan across the porous border which in itself resulted in the smouldering dissatisfaction of the policy due to militant counterattacks it causes in cities where it is used (Boyle 2016). Hence, due to counterinsurgency policy across the border in Afghanistan – which relies on "hearts and minds" and troops living on the ground side by side with civilians the damage to the high-cost campaign is even more palpable.

Political and Strategic Implications of Drone strikes for US Grand Strategy

Existing drone use by the US however raises a number of critical considerations for US grand strategy with underlying political and strategic implications. The first consideration, comes from domestic discontent within the US and anti-American sentiments generated internationally in

countries were drones have been used so far. Within the US, Congressional and public support for continued drone use has been inflamed by limited information and transparency on the surgical strikes in targeted states (Strawser 2012). Considering the importance of domestic support for the exercise of military power overseas, the expansion of drone policy by successive US administration may share the same fate as the Bush era policy of extraordinary rendition and wireless wiretapping—the unipolarity, public disapproval and illegality of which, led to the policy's demise despite its initial modest success as a preventive and defensive tactic against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Internationally, growing public objections and frustration from host states—Pakistan and Yemen—and other US counterterrorism partners for the continuation of drone policy against their citizens, and the opposition to cite bases in territories of non-host counterterrorism partners of the US imposes additional restrictions on US drone policy particularly in the Middle-East, this calls into question the political utility of drones as tools for statecraft outside the US.

The second risk consideration is that of drone proliferation. So far, current drone use engenders what Micah Zenko terms the "America's third war" (Zenko 2013). This war, defined by remote warfare and precise targeting of enemy combatants have been the defining feature of US military offensive in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Libya and most recently in Syria (Chamayou 2015). However, the US near monopoly for the use of lethal drone strikes since 2002 may erode as more countries recognize and develop drones as a valuable military asset. In recent times, modern military powers such as Germany and Israel have announced plans to acquire combat drones, while several other countries have growing armed drone capabilities, most notably the Chinese, Iranians, and Russians (Zen 2015, Boyle 2016). Of these three countries, China poses the most significant threat in terms of its lethal drone capability. This however potentially threatens US military and allied operations capabilities when developed by near peer competitors (Kirton 2015). According to Kilcullen and Exum, 'the threat to US technological advantage derives not from adversaries' numerical superiority but from the increasing application of technologies which were hitherto exclusive to US technological superiority' (Kilcullen and Exum 2009). Thus, while continued use of drones and its allied technologies raises the prospects for US to re-assert its technological superiority in the post 9/11 security environment, it potentially engender effects that undermine its technology might and military reach. As David Kilcullen puts it:

> We (the US) have slain a large dragon, but we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes, in dealing with these snakes as

evident from US technological deployment in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, it (the US) has demonstrated how it fights modern wars, and as such, giving potential near-peer competitors a blueprint for how to counter the core capabilities that underpin US military superiority (Kilcullen 2010, 40).

Hence, the world to which the US is responding to with further drone proliferation is one where the US may not have a choice to pull back from dealing with potential threats in its aftermath, but where potential competitors may increasingly develop the means to counter key US military area of advantage and hamper its strategic objectives. Already, the proliferation of drones so far is only one step short of an impending drones arms race, already foreshadowed in recent developments of both anti-drones defence systems and stealth drones (which have been used by the US for almost a decade, but are now also in the arsenals of resurgent and revanchist powers such as Russia and China. With countries as Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Israel also investing in their own military drones programmes, proliferation risks via the international arms market, also increases the risk that rogue states and non-state actors may capitalize on these technology in planning retaliation and attacks on the US.

The third risk is civilian death following drone strikes and its impact on the notion of the civilian in targeted territories. This consideration is based on the argument that drones currently possess the ability to hit their intended targets with minimal collateral damage relying on its precision system (Sauer and Schoring 2012). This it achieves in three ways: first, drone strikes are based on the confirmation that the intended target is engaged in the behaviour that put them on the target list, thereby reducing the likelihood of strikes based on faulty intelligence. Second, drones establish a "pattern of life" for the intended target, which allows operators to predict when the target will be sufficiently isolated to allow a strike that is unlikely to harm civilians (Hollis 2016). Thirdly, drones are controlled remotely, so the decision to employ a weapon can be reviewed in real time by lawyers, intelligence analysts, and senior commanders without any concern (in most cases) that a hesitation to act may cost lives (Hazelton 2010). However, available data on the aftermath of drone strikes on casualty figures published by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Air Wars and New America Foundation, show that from 2002-2020 about 1850-2840 combatants have died from drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Somalia, Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Though the CIA provide lower estimates of deaths, published figures do not often consider the accurate number of unintended kills following drone strikes. Besides, there are no empirical basis to accurately determine the precise number of unintended targets killed as these information are often classified.

Since 2017 under President Donald Trump, there appears to be a continuation of drone strikes as a counterterrorism policy for the US and the expansion of drone strikes outside al-Qaeda and the Taliban, specifically against the Islamic States in Syria (ISIS). Available data so far from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA 2017) document that in the first half of 2017, air strike campaigns (including drones) have led to a 43 percent in civilian casualty. Apart from the legal, moral and ethical implications of civilian deaths—which is not the focus of this thesis, drone strikes generate countervailing outcomes within the domestic politics of these countries which not only inhibit US international liberalist agenda but also fuel support for anti-West hard-line politics in the Islamic world. In Pakistan for example, under the Obama administration, the expansion of drone strikes and the rising civilian deaths caused political tensions to mount against the Pakistani government which had an alliance with the US to allow drone strikes to decimate terrorist safe havens in the FATA region and remote places in Pakistan (Shah 2014).

The fourth consideration is blowback effects—that is drone strikes inflame national sentiment against the US and facilitate militant recruitment and retaliation (Hudson, Owens and Flannes 2012). This implies that the continuation of drone strikes potentially backfires on the US by sowing seeds of discontent and rather than decimate terrorist organizations, would serve as a catalyst for more upheavals, loss of US support, and engender what Gallarotti, (2010) termed as the 'disempowerment' of US foreign policy in the Middle-East. Thus, beyond the short time objectives that drone strikes achieves for the US, a critical consideration lies in the long-term implication of its continued use if successive US administration continues its weapon system as a tool for statecraft.

Thus, as drones continues to proliferate and its use for counterterrorism operations embraced by successive US administration, the unanswered questions regarding the political and strategic utility of drones potentially increases vulnerabilities and uncertainties in the long term for the US. With the weaponization of artificial intelligence (AI), drone use potentially engenders a security dilemma at the international sphere with impact on military balance, great power competition, which the US may be unable to dispel.

Final Remarks

This paper reviewed US drone warfare by exploring it within the context of US grand strategy, with focus on the Bush era. The argument that

drones served as tool for the facilitating US offensive-unilateral strategies were premised on the lethal use of drone strikes for leadership decapitation, targeted killings and 'limited' democracy promotion. However, this paper examined the adverse effect of drones for Bush doctrine, to wit grand strategy. It demonstrated that drones not only produced a limited foreign policy based on projection and coercion, it engendered effects that were antithetical for the US by generating anti-Americanism, international backlash for civilian deaths following drone strikes, and conferring the US with 'imperial' powers as drone operations potentially disregarded territorial sovereignty in these countries and in the event where there was a formal state cooperation (as with Pakistan and Yemen), the strikes were enshrouded in secrecy and targets classified. It also determined that the initial success of drone killings in disrupting strategic organizations has bred its own downfall as the further down the militant hierarchy drone strikes aim and hit, the fewer the high-value targets and the less critical the disruption to the organization.

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ABSTRACT

This paper assesses the role of drones in furthering or undermining US grand strategy. This is against the backdrop of the thinking that contemporary use of drones in the context of post 9/11 era undermine the successive US administration's strategic objectives as evidenced by the rise of anti-Americanism in Muslim world, proliferation of drones by US near peer competitors, civilian death toll and weakening support for the US in targeted countries. This implies that while drones has played a historical and significant role for the US in power projection and asserting its unilateralism and military hegemony when dealing with rogue states and terrorist groups post 9/11, the political and strategic utility of drone strikes for US grand strategy is not apparent. Thus, this paper posits that though armed drones has played a quintessential role as a key instrument of statecraft for facilitating US offensive strategy in targeted states, the aftermath of drone strikes and its controversial aspects engender inimical outcomes that serve to undermine US strategic objectives. Based on qualitative analysis of secondary data, the paper questions the wisdom and benefits of using and shifting greater reliance towards armed drones, as a pathway for furthering US grand strategy.

THE COMPETITIVE-COOPERATIVE TRIANGLES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION OF POWER FROM THE CASE STUDY OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLITICAL FORCES IN SOUTH AMERICA

Bernardo Salgado Rodrigues[1]

Introduction

South America is intertwined with the interests of accumulating power and wealth in the two largest centers of power in the world: the United States and China. They carry out a dispute for the monopoly control of their markets and of the sources of strategic natural resources, incorporating the region in a gravitational center of the functioning and expansion of the system. Thus, economic and political pressures are growing, both internally and externally, allowing for a South American revaluation and Chinese-American expansion.

In the 21st century, power projects in South America constitute an arena of disputes that comprise a dialectical correlation between Internal and External Political Forces. In this sense, this article aims to conduct an innovative debate based on the theoretical formulation called Competitive-Cooperative Triangles of Power, taking the South American region as a case study. From a realist view of international relations and using an empirical-deduc-

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tive methodology, the objective is to achieve an epistemological construction regarding power in the international system, explaining the challenges and possibilities of the South American Internal Political Forces.

The article is organized into two sections, in addition to this introduction and the final considerations: in the first, an elucidation of the theoretical formulation of the Internal Political Forces and the External Political Forces will be carried out, and how they interact reciprocally in the South American geopolitical and geoeconomic context. The second section is divided into three parts: first, brief comments on power in international relations will be defined; subsequently, the central objective of the conceptual definition of competitive-cooperative triangles will be presented; in the last part, a demonstration of empirical cases of this new epistemological formulation in South America is proposed.

Power projects for South America - Internal Political Forces (IPF) and External Political Forces (EPF)

The Internal Political Forces (IPF): exogenist privatism, seasonal hybridism and popular nationalism

First, it is of fundamental importance to conceptually define Internal Political Forces (IPF). According to Rodrigues (2020a, 121, our translation), they are defined as "groups that aim at power, dominance or influence from the establishment of centripetal forces, impelling agents to approach the center around which they move". In other words, IPF are capable of producing or accelerating political movements, determining the displacement of agents through a consensus that gives rise to specific social and political action, according to its principles. Therefore, they are powers fractured by dissent, whose endogenous capacity to influence the power blocks is exercised among the actors that make up the system, given that one of the main characteristics of the contemporary world is the war between capital blocks.

Fiori accurately summarizes the central point for the analysis of Internal Political Forces:

> In all cases of economic success, the existence of a united and cohesive strategic nucleus within the state itself is also identified, which was largely responsible for defining and sustaining strategic objectives that remain constant for a long time, despite possible changes in government or political regime. These nuclei, or centers of power, always demonstrate - in all cases

studied - great flexibility and great capacity in the configuration of the power system in which they are inserted (Fiori 2014, 40, our translation).

First, it is important to emphasize that the IPF models, which will be presented later, cannot be considered hermetic and unmoved by internal contradictions. They constitute the search for the delimitation of an object of research based on empirical and historical observation, a concept that aims to highlight a representative project of certain social sectors, built under an interpretation of concrete reality. In addition, they conform to medium-long term trends and, therefore, are subject to a more lasting and reliable analysis.

Second, it is necessary to clarify that the Internal Political Forces are present in all countries of the world system, given the impossibility of the existence of harmony of power vis-à-vis power disputes. However, it is note-worthy that the conception of these IPF consists of a specific empirical and materialistic observation, related to the study of South America in the 21st century. These forces define a power geometry determined in a spatial and historical way, which does not, in particular, make it impossible to verify these Internal Political Forces in other regions of the world, or other conceptions in different historical periods.

A third point is the acknowledgement that the constitution of these models named Internal Political Forces constitutes an abstraction from the concrete reality and, as a subjective and particular construction of the author, it has a high degree of generalization and, with this, a high probability of criti-cism. In other words, when conforming IPF typologies, the aim is to study the characteristic features of a set that seeks to determine types and/or systems of power, typographic characters in a systematic way based on geopolitics, development and integration.

Finally, the difficulty of building class coalitions in South America is confirmed, mainly due to profound social inequality, divergence of interests and historical formation of power blocs. Therefore, the conformation of the terminology of Internal Political Forces was given opportunity, since, when working with this concept, principles and guidelines can be concatenated, which, at first, constitute a "political, economic and social orchestra with ele-ments of varied fields" (Vadell; Carvalho 2014, 103, our translation). The con-tradiction that may occur within the IPF is nothing more than the existing contradiction within the States, whose institutional structure is an arena of interests´ struggle.

In this way, it can be seen that South America is at a crossroads due to the crises and contradictions of socio-political models and, "subsequently, whether neoliberalism was in force or not as a hegemonic ideological body af-

ter the 2001 crisis in the region" (Vadell; Carvalho 2014, 76, our translation):

> It emerges from a crisis in its balance of payments from 1999 to 2009, amortized by reversing the deterioration of the terms of the trade, and from 2010, it entered a cyclical period of expansion of foreign capital inflows, where the axis of world economic growth moves from central countries to East Asia, in particular China, and peripheral countries. This situation opens a window of opportunity and a new perspective for the region (Martins 2011, 273-274, our translation).

From this window of opportunity, it is essential to understand the Internal Political Forces from a geopolitical, developmental and integrationist basis, and their correlation of power with the External Political Forces. Each insertion model proposes relations between the different fractions of class and the State in a given project, which can be determined, in the South American case, in three conceptions: exogenist privatism, seasonal hybridism and popular nationalism.

Exogenist Privatism

Exogenist privatism is a political aspect and a social and economic ideology that tends to value private initiative, private property and privatizations, mainly with the sale and management of national assets to external sectors. It is guided and conducted directly by the international private business sectors, whose "national entrepreneur should associate with the international or compete with him obligatorily" (Traspadini 2014, 40-41, our translation).

Therefore, it is a privatism of exogenous origin/influence, which develops from themes established outside the national spaces of South American countries, and whose national economies are totally guided by globalization and the interests of the great centers of power that come from the outside. Basically, it is based on three pillars: the scarcity of goods and resources must be managed by private transnational institutions; international capital is the social instrument that facilitates and moves the system; and any institution that inhibits the globalized rational market must be limited (Vadell; Carvalho 2014, 82).

Thus, there is not only a prerogative of selling state assets and favoring the cosmopolitan market, but a priority, implicit or explicit, of strengthening private activities managed by sectors outside the South American countries, whose effectiveness and efficiency may or may not take into account the real needs of national economies. "The theorists of this idea have taken on a prag-

matic claim to capitalism. Presenting globalization as an inexorable path that required greater openness, efficiency and competitiveness" (Katz 2016, 99, our translation). In other words, it is not only privatism that is encapsulated in an internal organic transformation with changes in political relations, in the productive and social organization under the liberal order, but the unrestricted denationalization at the expense of a globalized market with a predominance of international and transnational capitals.

The influence of a liberal trend can be seen in the lines that correspond to the basic nucleus of exogenist privatism. Within the set of Internal Political Forces, exogenist privatism includes groups that converge with each other, establishing blocks of power that pass through each other, influencing each other reciprocally, but are based on the valorisation of exogenous private initiative.

Seasonal Hybridism

Seasonal hybridism is characteristic of the Internal Political Force that comes from different political and economic natures, having two or more sides that manifest themselves in a determined period and conjuncture, in addition to performing isochronous movements in contradiction both in terms of their own segmentation, and in relation to other forces. It is the crossing of several flows of power that are seasonally interrelated, occurring at a specific time and that, subsequently, engenders a new configuration of partially or totally different currents. The proximity (hybridism) between the State and financial capital is an example, whose dialectical relationship presents a movement sometimes contrary to the principle of the self-regulated market, with different levels of state intervention, but which does not abandon all the measures proposed by liberal orthodoxy nor the links of States to the international capitalist system.

Seasonal hybridism favors a pragmatic adaptation to the demands of the conjuncture, and therefore incorporates formulas that contain multiple elements, without defining a clear primacy; in one moment, they advocate social progressivism, in another, a liberal progression, "they tend to call for strengthening the market and the state, reinforcing centralization and decentralization, promoting the public and private, and developing austere and active policies" (Katz 2016, 143, our translation). In South America, it is a modality of projects periodically adopted by elites, the high bureaucracies and/or the capitalist groups of these countries, whose defense tunes in to the damaging consequences of certain models, but accepts the criteria of capitalist eternity as the only possible mode of production. Therefore, "at the conclusion

of a failed experience, social amnesia emerges that makes some forget that
failure, but at the same time the conditions are prepared to repeat the experi-
ment" (Ouriques apud Katz 2016, 177, our translation).

However, a variable of the Internal Political Force that was called sea-
sonal hybridity remains constant: the struggle between fractions of capital,
but which, in a sense, converge the proposals to incorporate greater state reg-
ulation into neoliberal capitalism, in order to stabilize its functioning; in other
words, a harmonious relationship between capital and social. In other words,
there is a wide range of possibilities in the IPF called seasonal hybridity, justi-
fied by the fact that it incorporates different ideologies, theories and political
practices, constituting itself as the most heterogeneous IPF. Therefore, sea-
sonal hybridity is the IPF that most often has changes in its political, econom-
ic and ideological directions, since it adds a multiplicity of correspondences
presented in this study. Because of this, the power blocks compete and coop-
erate with each other within the state's institutional framework, based on the
various flows of power that are seasonally interrelated in the struggle between
the different fractions of capital.

Popular Nationalism

Popular nationalism is considered an ideology or idealism that exalts
and prioritizes the national state as a political body for the management and
safeguarding of national interests, leading citizens to resume some of the
traditions and founding principles of their South American countries that
arouse sympathy and popular affection. This IPF is considered to be the an-
tonym of globalist cosmopolitanism, since the latter generates the loss of the
concept of nation and separates the social concerns of the population from
substantive decisions. We emphasize the prioritization of the popular term
over the populist; however, both have a converging character when related to
the definition of Laclau (2013), that the construction of populism would be a
process of democratic demand in a historic moment of popular rupture.

It is essential to emphasize that there are numerous contradictory
manifestations of national revival, such as xenophobia, elitist projects of na-
tional accumulation, sub-imperialist policies of oppression, among others.
In this way, it is worth emphasizing that the expression highlighted is that
of popular resistance at the nationalist level, which is constituted as a model
guided by a political will that expresses the power of popular social forces,
linked to the state power system, and that they share with it conducting the
development process of the productive forces.

However, the realization of popular nationalism requires the creation

of sustainable bases for the expansion of the economic, social, political and cultural empowerment of its peoples, with the necessary condition of "facing its structural problems of internal exclusion (poverty and misery in various forms) and external (periphery)" (Martins 2011, 273-274).

> Anyway, if we really want to build a national-popular project [...] the decisive intellectual task is to overcome the "mental blackout" that so many limitations imposed on the university and political environment [...]. In this context, we may or may not share skepticism about theoretical shortcomings in programs designed to overcome dependency and underdevelopment, but we have no right to forget and even less to change the terms of the debate of past decades (Ouriques 2014, 198, our translation).

This configuration is the most complex and misunderstood at the regional level, since the experiences of popular nationalism in South America are routinely sabotaged, undermined and prevented, both by contrary IPF, and by EPF who see in this current the impossibility of disseminating their experiences. practices and ideals. Therefore, popular nationalism appears as the most homogeneous of the IPF, since it proposes to be the anti-system, a current contrary to the prevailing precepts and, therefore, it needs more cohesive and convergent spheres of domination. Still, all of these blocks are aligned to the prioritization of the management of the national state through the popular route, to a lesser or greater degree.

These three typifications presented consist of distinct geoeconomic projects in South America, verified from an empirical analysis of the main power groups present in the region in the period between 2001-2020. Obviously, such systematization is susceptible to modifications, since there is a transformative and constant mutability of reality, which influences the endogenous political power blocks in this complex and dynamic power geometry.

From independence to the General Peace Agreement (1975 - 1992)

In the same way that a brief theoretical systematization about IPF in South America was carried out, the External Political Forces (EPF) are defined as:

> exogenous forces that seek to establish and exercise power, control and intervention through centrifugal forces, preventing agents from moving away from the gravitational orbit of their irradiation center. Unlike the Internal Political Forces, the External Political Forces need an external agent

to exercise power, acting from outside to inside the system, that is, it is a type of force exerted on this system. Routinely, the EPF form commitments with certain IPF, which start to take decisions established and referenced to the first ones; i.e., the External Political Forces always aim to influence the Internal Political Forces that best reproduce their internal system of accumulation of power and wealth (Rodrigues 2020a, 122, our translation).

Once again, Fiori (2014, 30) clarifies the issue by stating that

these great powers collectively protect themselves, preventing the emergence of new leading states and economies, by the monopolization of arms, currency and finance, information and technological innovation. For this reason, the emergence of an emerging power is always a factor of destabilization and change in the world system, because its rise threatens the monopoly of established powers (Fiori 2014, 30, our translation).

The study of External Political Forces in South America will focus on the main external agents in the region in the 21st century, the United States and China, who intensify a kaleidoscope of power projections that directly influence the correlation of IPF.

With regard to the performance of the EPF of the United States in South America, an unprecedented scenario is presented: the relative disengagement of the United States in the face of its immediate strategic environment through a power vacuum originated by the attacks of September 11, since there was a redirecting of economic and military efforts to the Middle East and fighting the War on Terror.

Associated at first with the unilateral attitudes of George W. Bush, the attacks had a broader context: the contestation of hegemonic domination, whose military supremacy could not be fought, but whose society had fissures. To explore these fissures, the focus of 9/11 was on symbols of the country's social and economic power (the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York) and strategic-political (Pentagon and public buildings in Washington, DC) (Pecequilo 2012, 20, our translation).

This event provided two facts that would substantially characterize American policy in the Bush administration (2001-2009) and in the beginning of the 21st century: the systematization of the Patriot Act and the intensification of the Project for the New American Century. Both emerge as a result of the 2001 attacks and influence, directly or indirectly, the domestic and foreign policy of the United States, enabling a reinterpretation of their

role in the international system.

Aligned to this factor, since its election, the Bush administration indicated a significant rhetoric of unilateralism (Pecequilo 2012, 19-20), a fact that, in line with the attacks of September 11 and the window of opportunity for greater assertiveness in the military international plan justified by the fight against terrorism, enabled the activation of a project that appeared in neoconservative think tanks of the Republican Party in the 1990s, exerting a strong influence in the military sector and in the foreign policy of the president. The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) consisted of implementing a full spectrum dominance of the United States, consolidating and expanding its hegemony in the international system as the only superpower,

> and, although it sometimes hesitated, kept the United States in a perpetual wartime footing, a forever war, war on terror, formalized in 2001, with Congressional authorization, to fight an invisible, unidentified, nameless and parameterless enemy, it continuity and escalating, unconstitutionally, the extrajudicial attacks and murders of terrorists or alleged terrorists, using the targeted killing tactic (Bandeira 2016, 93-94, our translation).

Despite these factors, the central criterion in the international action of the Bush administration has placed South America outside Washington's radar (Colombo; Frechero 2012, 190-191), which, in Kelly's (1997, 190, our translation) view, "political vacuum in Latin America pose potential threats to the United States". In line with this view, this vacuum of relative power enabled the rise of different actors in the region during this period, both internally and externally. Soon,

> the absence of positive policies in the region after the 1990s offensive, the difficulty in accommodating emerging bilateral partners, the economic crisis and the paralysis of an increasingly polarized political and social system in Washington are indicators of the weakening of presence in the hemisphere. And, even more, a loss of spaces that extends to different geopolitical scenarios and to the processes of global deconcentration of power (Pecequilo 2012, 54-55, our translation).

The last years of the Bush administration were marked by the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, a paradigmatic tipping point within the United States and throughout the international system. This event encouraged the rhetoric of the hegemonic refoundation of the United States with the election of Barack Obama (2009-2017), modifying the American foreign policy and, concomitantly, its relationship with South America (Pecequilo 2012, 25).

Thus, although the attempt at global governance based on the full spectrum domain of the United States has continued and even intensified, there is a return of geostrategic direction to its immediate surroundings, through different actions in the economic field and, more sharply, in the military.

The Obama administration's action basically consisted of an attempt to petrify the world order and implement totalitarian domination of the United States, corroborating with its predecessor, since it sought "full-spectrum dominance, ardently sought after the decomposition of the Soviet Union" (Bandeira 2016, 145, our translation). This full spectrum domination aims to conquer strategic positions and to condition wars in search of markets and/or access to natural resources, even if it includes direct interference in other countries through regime change operations. In addition, such global governance is directly related to the project The New American Century, adapting it to the new imperatives of the international system and adapting it to the new types of war.

It should be noted that the year 2008, identified here as a mark of American recovery, coincides with the outbreak of the global economic crisis in developed countries, further reinforcing the concept that the United States' EPF in South America gains strength as an outlet for its economic tensions. That is, they do not emerge from a constructive policy for the continent or that aimed at deepening collaboration, but rather from a need to preserve the zone of hemispheric influence and contain the advance of new poles of power in this region and on a global scale (Pecequilo 2013, 112).

The revaluation of South American countries on the global geopolitical board, such as Brazil and Venezuela, and regions such as the South Atlantic, has a relationship directly proportional to the adjustment of US EPF in the face of new regional and global phenomena. In other words, the greater the margin of autonomy of these and other states, the greater the chances of clashing interests with hegemony.

> Faced with this scenario, North American reactions to the expansion of emerging markets in South America (and also in Africa and the South Atlantic). Began in a more systematic way in 2008, reaching greater intensity from 2009, with the arrival of Barack Obama to power in the White House. Obama not only continued the policies launched by George W. Bush in the geopolitical field, he also included geoeconomic components in the containment agenda of Brazil and China. Stallings (2008) points out that even though the Brazilian and Chinese stance is not confrontational in the face of hegemony, the fact that their projection of power started to clash with the North American one in the economic and in the political-strategic dimension imposed a need for a response by the United States (Pecequilo

2013, 112, our translation).

Therefore, the action of the United States consists of preventing the emergence of a possible power, as well as preventing any hostile power from dominating or exercising any type of influence, a "regional stability goal, which seeks to prevent threats to the vital interests of the United States in the face of 'destabilizing countries' in the region" (Bruckmann 2011, 207, our translation). To this end, they maintain mechanisms to dissuade potential competitors from aspiring to a regional or global role, intervening politically, militarily and economically. Specifically for South America, the objectives of the US hemispheric strategy are to maintain its supremacy and military presence, reducing the military forces in the countries of the region; spread the broad economic liberalization agenda, through bilateral or regional agreements; dominance over the hemisphere's resources and markets; oppose the Chinese expansion and the rise of Brazil in the region, undermining its projects (MERCOSUR, UNASUR and BRICS).

> The increase in Brazilian prestige and energy issues (the pre-salt reserves in Brazil and in the South Atlantic) lead to the reactivation of the Fourth Fleet of the South Atlantic, the continuity of Plan Colombia and the pressure on the Triple Border, considered a zone of terrorist risk. The reactivation of the Fourth Fleet responds to the Chinese and Indian advances in Latin America, and to the increase in military cooperation between Venezuela and Russia (and the approach of Venezuela to Iran). Further on, the constitution of the UNASUR Security Council (CSD) becomes a source of concern for the Americans (Pecequilo 2012, 53-54, our translation).

As stated by Fiori (2007; 2014), the projection of power of any and all hegemonic countries in the international system, historically, encompasses a synchronic dichotomy between the power of weapons and currencies, that is, military power and economic power. With regard to the United States' External Political Forces in post-Cold War South America, this duality can be seen explicitly in terms of economic power, exemplified in the FTAA and other Free Trade Agreements (FTA's) as the TPP, TTIP and TISA, and implicit in military power, via the realization of the so-called hybrid war (Korybko 2018; Rodrigues 2020b).

On the other side of the international balance of power, South America is considered a geostrategic region for China at the beginning of the 21st century. As Tsai and Liu (2012) point out, since initiatives such as the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, in 2001 in Chile, and Presi-

dent Hu Jintao's two visits to the continent, in 2004[2] and 2008, China has been proclaiming the South-South cooperation and preparing the ground for strengthening interregional exchanges: "in just over a decade, China migrates from almost absence to the main position in economic relations with LAC" (Vadell and Neves 2018, 208, our translation). In other words, these facts placed South America as one of the fundamental geopolitical spaces for the Chinese External Political Forces.

Still in 1999, the Chinese government launched a strategy, together with the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade (China Council for the Promotion of International Trade - CCPIT), called "going out" or "going global" (Shambaugh 2013, 174). In general, it has consisted of a foreign investment policy, encouraged and carried out by the state, aimed at expanding and intensifying the internationalization process of Chinese companies (Economy; Levi 2014, 49), making them competitive to operationalize and reach global markets. Thus, the key part of the Going Out strategy consists of "financial support by the CDB and the China Export-Import Bank (CHEXIM), at least when it comes to the activities of large state-owned and state supported firms that make up the bulk of China's overseas foreign direct investment (FDI)" (Gallagher 2016, 51).

In 2001, this policy was incorporated into the 10th Five-Year Plan (2000-2005), based on five objectives: to increase Chinese investments abroad; diversification of production; rationalization of administrative processes (with an increase in the level and quality of projects); improvement of financial channels for the national market; and promotion of Chinese brands in international markets, mainly American and European (Leite and Ramos 2016, 169-170).

> By the early 1990s, there was a conscious government policy launched to encourage Chinese commercial firms to "go out" and for Chinese localities and organizations to more generally "go global". The encouragement to Chinese companies did not really begin to materialize until around 2007, but by the mid-2000s considerable international initiatives were being launched by a wide variety of Chinese organizations, localities, and individuals (Shambaugh 2013, 5).

Another determining feature is that this trajectory of reforms, coupled

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2 "In 2004, according to Johnson and Wasson, the Chinese President Hu Jintao announced an investment plan for the region and the interest in increasing the country's trade with Latin America. At that time, attention was already focused on the Southern part of the continent-Brazil, Chile and Argentina- later expanding even more" (Pecequilo 2013, 109).

with the increase in value chains and the growing technological update, finally allows China to be admitted to the WTO at the end of 2001, after years of intense negotiations, having to adapt to some rules of the private market with an unprecedented commercial opening, although with strong control over the exchange rate (Vadell 2011, 99). In return, it would benefit from ample access to Western markets (Sevares 2015, 27). Therefore, such an event caused a huge jump in the volume of Chinese foreign trade, extending its integration to globalization and contributing decisively to an expansive cycle of the world economy that would last until 2008.

Likewise, Sino-South American economic relations have been intensifying since 2001. As previously stated, both the entry into the WTO and the State visits in 2004 and 2005 gave rise to the signing of trade, investment and cooperation agreements in different areas (Vadell;,Ramos, Neves 2016, 81; Leite and Ramos 2016, 172-173). In addition, the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) established an imperative to increase aid to other developing countries, including as a way of collaborating with the going global strategy: "In this sense, it is important to bear in mind that Chinese cooperation is governed by the rule of mutual benefit and shared gain towards aid recipients" (Brutto 2018, 115, our translation).

With the tipping point brought about by the 2008 financial crisis, both China's domestic and foreign policy have undergone considerable changes, triggering a new stage after the long cycle of beneficial globalization since the 1970s. In a sense, such mutations are perceived as an opportunity for the Chinese domestic economy, since the vulnerability of international disturbances alerted the Chinese State to the need to build a more robust domestic consumer market (Niu 2013, 203), in addition to providing vigorous counter-cyclical fiscal policy, sustaining the level of economic activity (Naughton 2015) based mainly on the intensive use of labor, as the country approaches the status of "middle income" (Jaguaribe 2011, Perkins 2013).

Between 2008 and 2016, China has been undergoing substantial changes, with lower rates of economic expansion added to policies and guidelines that aim at more "sustainable" growth. This explains, in a sense, the lower Chinese rhythm, with a new paradigm called "New Normal" (Naughton 2017, 21; Perkins 2013; Pereira and Ribeiro 2016), where exports and the foreign market lose relative centrality in the guidelines of the government in the face of expanding consumption and domestic demand. Such targeting for the domestic market, present even in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), helps to understand the drastic cooling of commodity prices (Naughton 2015), generating consequences for the global and regional dynamics by closing a benign exogenous cycle for South American terms of trade (Pereira and Ribeiro

2016).

Therefore, when going through the stages of regionalization and globalization, China also systematically developed deeper trade, investment and diplomatic relations with South America in the period from 2001 to 2020, showing a growing political and economic interdependence between these countries in relation to China, called hybrid geoeconomics, considering that it consists of:

> use of economic instruments based on a multiform and asymmetric duality that, when used in certain countries or regions, present both advantages and disadvantages. It is a process of economic activity with geopolitical purposes, carried out by the combination of elements that bring both development and dependence, progress and backwardness, bonuses and burdens, characterizing, expressing or manifesting themselves by composition of disparate, ambiguous elements and in different political-economic modalities (Rodrigues 2020a, 188).

Summing up, after the definition of both the Internal Political Forces and the External Political Forces, as well as their empirical visualization in South America in the 21st century from the empirical-deductive methodology, it is proposed to discuss the central objective of this work: the theoretical construction of Competitive-Cooperative Triangles (TCCs) of power in international relations.

Competitve-Cooperative Triangles of Power

Power in International Relations

The Internal Political Forces and the External Political Forces are configurations of power in international relations. In the specific case of the countries of South America, the United States and China, it allows the evaluation of different geostrategies in different scenarios, based on a materialist dialectic that changes over time. Consequently, the power variable is essential for the study of this set of selected countries.

There is a dialectical relationship between the state, the Internal Political Forces and the External Political Forces; both influence each other, exerting pressures that modify the countries' internal circumstances, regional arrangements and the international system itself. Thus, it is essential to study such concepts in the practical South American and world reality, since the

proposed model engenders competition, contradiction and accumulation of power and wealth, basic characteristics of the capitalist interstate system and that, intuitively, directly influence the actors cited.

Consequently, determining the state as an aggregating element of power in the topics presented, it is essential to theoretically rationalize power itself. In the scope of international relations, this is one of the most intensely debated topics. Since Machiavelli (2012), when demonstrating that the accumulation of power was essential for the Prince, with the permanent preparation for war through political resilience (virtú) or luck (fortune), the different political actors aim to quantify and qualify capabilities and the possibility of exercising power. Other classics of international relations also examined the theme: according to Morgenthau (2003), power is defined as the strength of a man over the minds and actions of other men; for Aron (2002), in the most general sense, power is the capacity that a political unit has to impose its will on others; in Nye's view (2004, 2), power is "the ability to influence others to get the outcomes one wants"; according to Lukes (1980), there would be four fundamental approaches to power in political philosophy[3].

Therefore, power is the ability, the force that acts on a certain reality; it is all the probability of imposing one's ambition in a social relationship against resistance, whatever the basis of that probability; it is the ability to impose your will, which results in something concrete or subjective. Thus, the power for action is studied, for creation, construction or destruction; when power is oriented towards an objective, it is used to modify the structure, the existing relationships.

Power, state and class make up the main relationship of forces within the international system. The Internal Political Forces guide the power of the state within its institutional core, and the way they extend outwards. In other words, a strong state is one that exercises its power, both externally and internally, being a partially autonomous entity that requires a social class whose direct interests are at the service of the entity, both by the administrators of the state and by the state bureaucracy. In those states where the state apparatus is weak, public administrators do not intervene in the role of coordinating power from a complex of political forces.

Still, it is important to emphasize that the state and power, in themselves, are abstractions that gain concreteness from the dispute of different so-

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3 Such as: 1) substantialist, that refers to means, like exercise or dominance; 2) subjective, related to capacities, the competence of each player to exercise dominance and legitimation; relational, linked to direct dominance and the capacity to influence players in a different manner, if it was not in a position of control; and 4) structural, linked to the constraint, and control in decision making context.

cial classes. When adding the perspective of the social classes - in the present work identified as Internal Political Forces - it is ratified that the unique and exclusive perspective of the states hides the role of the classes in the strategies of power. The role of IPF is a conditioning factor in the strategies assumed by the states, as well as in the orientation of specific power strategies. In other words, the state and power correspond to an abstraction whose concreteness is realized by social classes and/or Internal Political Forces; its definitions are always concrete, conditioned to the existence of the class struggle.

In this same line of reasoning, Fiori's definition of power (2007, 16-19; 2014, 18-22) is one of the most interesting. According to the author, "power is a relationship that is constituted and defined, tautologically, by the dispute and the continuous struggle for power itself" (Fiori 2014, 18, our translation). Therefore, by definition, power is asymmetrical[4], relative[5], heterostatic[6], flow[7] and expansive[8], in which the international system consists of a shock of wills constituted by relations between states aiming at the accumulation of power and wealth.

For the scope of the present research, the definitions of triangular power and systemic power are the most elucidating, mainly with regard to the further theoretical formulation on the so-called Competitive-Cooperative Triangle (CBT). For Fiori (2014, 19), triangular power is one in which:

> every power relationship involves at least two internal vertices and an external limit that can be represented in the form of a point or an external vertex, where the intersection between P1 and P2 occurs, for example. In this sense, it can be said that the limit of any and all Pn power units, always

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4 "If all had the same power, there would be no struggles or 'power relations'" (Fiori 2014, 18, our translation).

5 "Power involves a hierarchy and constant tug of war between one vertex that holds more power than another, and other that, for certain, will have less power. If one vertex increases its level of freedom, another will lose, inevitably in comparison to the one which expanded" (Fiori 2014, 18, our translation).

6 "Any of these power variations always generates a somewhat immediate reaction of the prejudiced parties, in order to reinstate and sustain the power correlation, pertaining to the previous situation and initial change" (Fiori 2014, 18, our translation).

7 "Power is an action in movement and it only exists when it is exercised in a continuum. There is no way to conceive an immutable power, or to conceive logically the possibility of an inactive or neutral power" (Fiori 2007, 17, our translation).

8 "Each unity of power (P1, P2, P3 etc), exercises a competitive pressure on itself, and all of these units exercise the same pressure one in relation to another. As a consequence, the system, as a whole, also expands in a continuous manner. (Fiori 2014, 19). Still, "therefore, in this type of system, all sovereign powers are and will always be expansionists, proposing itself, in the last instance, to conquer an even greater global power" (Fiori 2007, 18, our translation).

established by another Pn-1 power unit, will have the same characteristics as Pn, and therefore will also have its limit drawn by one more unit of power Pn-2, and so on infinitely, with respect to Pn-3, Pn-4 etc. (Fiori 2014, 19, our translation).

In other words, the power relationship has always at least one and any boundary, since the power of P1 exerts influence to the point where the power of P2 begins, a space in which it is not possible to obtain effectiveness. Furthermore, any cut that is made of power consists of a triangle, since each and every link has a relationship between more than two actors, characterizing, therefore, power with innumerable borders and power relations between innumerable triangles. Thus, "all human relations involve a 'triangular structure', minimal and irreducible, and at the same time asymmetric and hierarchical" (Fiori 2016, 15, our translation).

Still, with regard to systemic power, Fiori ratifies the impossibility of "thinking about a unit of power without logically assuming the existence of a set of other units of power that multiply in the form of triangles that suppose other triangles, and so on" (Fiori 2014, 19, our translation). That is, P involves a system of P's, which form infinite conflicting, competitive, overlapping triangles, whose power relationship is infinitely elastic and timeless.

If power relations were binary and closed on themselves, they would become a zero-sum game and would tend to disappear in an autophagic way. This only does not happen because power is triangular and systemic, and all of its units can expand outside themselves, through the conquest of power or some portion of power from the other units of the system (Fiori 2014, 19, our translation).

Fiori theorizes a phenomenology of power that instigates his study within the framework of international relations, focusing on how his logic behaves in the interstate system. It is interesting to note that it is configured as an unprecedented and complex line of reasoning and that, although abstract, allows for multiple interpretations in an attempt to analyze concrete reality.

Conceptual definition of Competitive-Cooperative Triangles of Power in International Relations

Based on what was exposed about the Internal Political Forces in South America (e.g: exogenist privatism, seasonal hybridity and popular nationalism), the global External Political Forces (e.g: the United States and Chi-

na) and the theorizing about the triangular and systemic power, it is possible to define Competitive-Cooperative Triangles. They are geometric structures of power formed by three vertices of Political Forces, three sides of competitive or cooperative relations and three internal political angles, whose dispute to equal, overcome or gain geopolitical and geoeconomic benefits presents an asymmetric, hierarchical and, obviously, competitive or cooperative triangulation.

Figure 1: Competitive-Cooperative Triangle

Subtitles:		
Political Force Vertex (PFV 1)	Political Force Vertex (PFV 2)	Political Force Vertex (PFV 3)
Competitive-Cooperative Relationship Side (CRS A)	Competitive-Cooperative Relationship Side (CRS B)	Competitive-Cooperative Relationship Side (CRS C)
Internal Political Angle (IPA a)	Internal Political Angle (IPA b)	Internal Political Angle (IPAr)

Source: Author's elaboration.

In the table above, the Competitive-Cooperative Triangle presents a structure in which the representation of the Political Force Vertex (PFV 1) establishes a Competitive-Cooperative Relationship Side (CRS A) with the Political Force Vertex (PFV 2), which constitutes a Competitive-Cooperative Relationship Side (CRS C) with the Political Force Vertex (PFV 3), ending the

triangulation by the Competitive-Cooperative Relationship Side (CRS B) with the Political Force Vertex (A). Likewise, each Vertex has an Internal Political Angle (VPF 1-IPA *a;* VPF 2-IPA *b*; VFP 3-IPA *r*), representing the internal disputes of forces of each vertex, in addition to being subject to change according to variations in the Sides of Competitive-Cooperative Relations.

It is interesting to note the justification for the design of CCTs. A priori, the correlation between competition and cooperation in the same theoretical conception may seem a logical incongruity. Such a fact is not only possible, but also rational, when considering two factors: the first, in the international system, there is no power vacuum and, since power is flow, action and movement, exercised continuously, there is no possibility of idealizing a static, disabled or neutral power. In other words, if there is any space for the exercise of power in any of its forms, it will be readily occupied by some power. The second factor is that the triangular power is about three-point chains, in which the relationship, competitive or cooperative, between two vertices (VFP 1 and VFP 2) forms one side (LRC A), but reflects and influences, directly or indirectly, in competitive or cooperative terms, in the relation of the other vertices as a whole (VFP 1 and VFP3, with LRC B; and VFP 2 and VFP3, with LRC C).

Figure 2: Competitive–Cooperative Triangle – Effects and Reflexes

Source: Author's elaboration.

Another abstraction that can be performed from a CCT is related to its time frame. In other words, since the nature of the international system, like that of states themselves, is a constant flow of competitions, cooperation and transformations, an intertemporal triangular relationship changes over time, whether in the correlation of forces between the Political Forces, in Com-

petitive-Cooperative Relations between them and in their Internal Political Angles, as shown in figure 3.

Figure 3: Competitive-Cooperative Triangle – Intertemporal Relationship

VPF 1

Effect 1   Reflex 2

Competition (or cooperation)   Cooperation (or competition)

VPF 2   VPF 3

Reflex 3

Cooperation (or competition)

Source: Author's elaboration.

This is an interesting analysis tool if one is looking to perform comparative analysis of Competitive-Cooperative Triangles over a given period. In addition, there is not only the finding of links between the same actors in different periods of time, but, simultaneously, one or two different actors within this intertemporality, as shown in figure 4.

Figure 4: Competitive-Cooperative Triangle – Intertemporal Relationship with Distinct Actors

VPF 1   VPF 1 '

VPF 2   VPF 3   VPF 2 ' (or VPF 4')   VPF 5 '

T ⟶ T'

Source: Author's elaboration.

By mathematical definition, triangles are classified based on their side measurements. Similarly, by transplanting this identity to the plane of international relations and, when considering each side of the triangle as a competitive or cooperative relationship between specific political forces (internal or external), the asymmetries of power therefore mean different sides of the triangles. That is, each vertex, at a given historical, spatial and relational moment, from the geopolitical, developmental and integrationist perspectives, has greater, lesser or analogous strength when compared to the other vertex-(s), and so on.

Figure 5: Competitive-Cooperative Triangle – Power Math

Scalene   Isosceles   Equilateral

Source: Author's elaboration.

Therefore, a classification can be made based on these asymmetries: 1) scalene competitive-cooperative triangle is one that has all different sides, that is, the asymmetry of power is distinct in the three vertices and in the three internal political angles; 2) isosceles competitive-cooperative triangle is one that has two equal sides and, therefore, two vertices and two internal political angles have equivalent power; 3) equilateral competitive-cooperative triangle is one that has all equal sides, with internal political angles, therefore presenting axes of symmetry of power.

The Empirics of Competitive-Cooperative Triangles in South America

In order to clarify these theoretical abstractions of power, it is possible to relate them to succinct examples of the present work presented so far. In the illustration below, the vertices of each triangle correspond to the Internal Political Forces in South America, at the top, and the global External Political

Forces, at the bottom. It is understood that each triangular relationship refers to a correlation of temporal and spatial forces, according to the material conditions present in political-economic terms, with two vertices in order to prevail the majority Political Force in the competitive or cooperative correlation, represented on the side of the triangle. In the case of the Privatist Political Force, the side of the most powerful triangle tends to prevail for the American Political Force, shifting its internal political angle to the right. Concomitantly, with the counterpart of the Nationalist Political Force, there is a tendency of convergence for China and a shift of the internal political angle to the left. For the Hybrid Political Force, both External Political Forces exert direct and indirect influence, keeping their internal political angles constant.

Figure 6: Competitive-Cooperative Triangle - Internal Political Forces in South America and Global External Political Forces

Privatism		Hybridism		Nationalism	
China	US	China	US	China	US

Source: Author's elaboration.

It should be noted that the correlation of forces between the External Political Forces, whether to a greater or lesser extent, also affects the linkage of the third actor, the Internal Political Force, in benefit or not. Furthermore, the Internal (and External) Political Forces compete with each other, causing new triangular, endogenous and exogenous relationships to be formed. In figure 7, it is observed that at the domestic level, there are competitive disputes between privatism and hybridism in country A, between hybridism and nationalism in country B, and between privatism and nationalism in country C, configuring endogenous competitive triangles of Internal Political Forces. Concomitantly, the dispute for the international system between the two great powers, the United States and China, shapes the competition of the External Political Forces. Since the internal and external plans of these competitive triangles have dialectical flows of influence, any change in one of the vertices

of any triangle changes the correlation of forces on the side of that same triangle, as well as the internal political angles, changing, to a lesser or greater extent, the entire system.

Figure 7: Competitive-Cooperative Triangle – Endogenous and Exogenous Relationships

Source: Author's elaboration.

Since the triangular relations are infinite, multiple forces could be added in the proposed scheme, even outside the sphere of the state. The aim here was to carry out a simplified systematization, in order to visualize the ge-

opolitical and geoeconomic implications related to the Internal and External Political Forces, as well as their competitive-cooperative triangular relations.

Figure 8: Competitive-Cooperative Triangle – Other Actors

Source: Author's elaboration.

In the international system, all countries, regardless of their role in the global hierarchical structure, seek to increase their power and wealth. Although they do not propose to increase their territories in geographic terms, they are all expansive. In this context, "the 'competitive pressure' of power is always a systemic pressure, because all 'sovereign powers' need to expand or defend themselves, even if it is simply to conserve the power they already have" (Fiori 2007, 17-18).

From the systematization carried out on the CCTs, "the increase in power, freedom and equality of one of its three ends will imply loss of sovereignty, autonomy and the difference of the other two ends" (Fiori 2016, 15, our translation), in which the most powerful vertex will continue to be the one that founds the rules of the game, the ethical-moral criterion and the political and economic arbitration, establishing and adapting to its interests the sides of the competitive and/or cooperative relations and the internal political angles, in this incessant dispute geopolitics by global power.

It is also worth noting that this theoretical analysis of the CCTs has a directly proportional relationship with the Latin expression "Inter duos litigantes, tertius gaudens": between two litigants, the third rejoices, that is, when two fight a third one takes advantage; "rather than getting in the middle of every fight, sometimes it is better to hold the coats of those who do" (Arrighi 2007, 298). At the same time, it is inversely proportional to the theory of the balance of power: instead of aiming at supporting any of the vertices of power, it explores favorable periods of mutual hostility from the strongest vertices to

the achievement of predefined objectives. In other words, it is proposed that, although an actor is the weakest point of the triangular relationship, there are loopholes in the geometry of power that give rise to political assertiveness aiming at the accumulation of power and wealth.

Analyzing the specific situation of South America in the triangular power relationship with the United States and China, the possibility of three different triangulations is perceived, from the definition of the three Internal Political Forces and the two External Political Forces. Obviously, these generalizations change even within the analyzed period (2001-2020), as well as in the relationship between the United States and China with each of the Internal Political Forces. Therefore, in order to simplify the example, a brief qualitative analysis of a triangulation (IPF, EPF 1 and EPF 2) will be carried out in the three periods of the time frame: 2001, 2008 and 2016, considered paradigmatic for both the international system and specific character of Sino-American relations with South America.

Since 2001, the attacks on the twin towers and the presence in Eurasia with the War in Afghanistan/Iraq in the context of the Global War on Terror "undermined the centrality of the US and its currency in the global political economy, and strengthened the tendency towards the emergence of China as an alternative to US leadership in East Asia and beyond" (Arrighi 2007, 209). Concomitantly with the weakening of American unipolarity, it included China's entry into the WTO in 2001, in line with its Go Global policy, which led to greater economic and diplomatic participation on all geopolitical boards. In South America, the decline in the commercial, economic and political relevance of the United States, and the strengthening of the Chinese presence "can also be largely attributed to the strengthening of the Pink Tide[9] and the regional integration process" (Dominguez 2016, 135-136, our translation).

This dynamic favored an American retreat/distance and an advance/strengthening of Chinese commercial relations in South America, allowing a moment of expansion of the IPF (to a lesser or greater degree depending on its characteristics) by taking advantage of the US power vacuum, benefiting "The development of autonomous proposals, in which the United States is not inserted: they are autochthonous agendas and focused on interests and the improvement of South American conditions" (Carmo and Pecequilo 2016, 58, our translation).

The 2008 financial crisis is a turning point for the three corners of

9 Pink tide is an expression utilized in foreign policy analysis in the beginning of the 21st century to conceptualize the growing influence of the left in Latin America in the end of the 1990s decade and the early 2000s, when heads of State linked to reformist parties from the left were elected.

the triangulation, whose characteristics do not neglect the previous ones, but constitute new forms of power relations. In the United States, the initial focus on economic recovery is aligned with the counter-reaction/assertive resumption in South America (Carmo and Pecequilo 2016, 71), seen in the attempts to sign the TPP and the relevance of the Pacific Alliance and other bilateral treaties; in China, there is a redirection of domestic policy (New Normal) and a slowdown in economic growth, which directly reverberates in the decrease in trade flows with South America, together with the intensification of investment flows and bilateral/multilateral treaties; for IPF in general, the substitution of high to low profile agendas is seen, intensified by the changes to liberal governments in the elections and with the growing emptying of autonomous regional leaders, causing the United States and China to resume a certain role (Carmo and Pecequilo 2016, 73).

In 2016, the general scenario underwent new transformations: the election of Donald Trump in the United States, focused on economic protectionism and military interventionism (Rodrigues 2017), provided elements of constant instability in American domestic and foreign policy; the increasingly striking presence in the figure of Xi Jinping engendered a Chinese redirection in the international system, from the intensification of the role of the BRICS and the Belt and Road Initiative, and to the South American subcontinent with the second policy paper specific to the region; in South America, after a decade of advances in several political and economic aspects, there is a set of setbacks from a geostrategic point of view, in which the consequences are presented through the "loss of space and leadership, the increase of regional instability, the emptying of integration projects, the consolidation of China's presence in South America and the deepening of the American hegemonic counter-reaction" (Carmo and Pecequilo 2016, 65-66, our translation).

In general terms, analyzing the Sides of Competitive-Cooperative Relations, the following parameters are visualized in the relationship between China - United States: in a context of "asymmetric bipolarity" (Stuenkel 2016, 83-84), there is a pattern of cooperative coexistence (Kissinger 2011, 468-469), since there is a perception that both need each other and are too big to be dominated and/or transformed; and competitive coexistence (Shambaugh 2013, 73-74), in which, despite the interconnection in different areas, there has been an increase in competition in the economic, ideological, security and geopolitical levels in recent years, which could make South America "the theater of global disputes between Monroe and Mao's heirs "(León-Manriquez and Alvarez 2014, 24). In the United States - South America relationship, the imposition of the geopolitics of the Hybrid War can be seen, as seen in the previous sections, mainly with the resumption of the region on the American

geostrategic radar as of 2008. Regarding the relationship between China - South America, the permissiveness of Hybrid Geoeconomics is ratified, in which Beijing uses trade, investment and diplomacy with the intention of balancing regional and global dominance.

Final Remarks

This article intended to present a new epistemological formulation of power, the Competitive-Cooperative Triangles, backed by the correlations of Internal and External Political Forces in the South American case study. In this way, it is concluded that the Competitive-Cooperative Triangles established by the United States - China - South America correlation are highly complex, giving rise to new projects and academic research that aim to explore the infinite possibilities of these triangulations of power in their multiple disciplinary dimensions.

As final considerations, we reaffirm that the balance of power triangulation in South America starts to be disrupted when the subcontinent, traditionally in the sphere of influence of the US, is attracted by the Chinese magnetic pole, increasing concerns on the American side because it consists of a vital area for their regional security and stability. China has been increasing its ties with South America, using multilateral institutions to restrict and dilute American power and influence, using "multilateralism" as a means of achieving "multipolarism" (Shambaugh 2013, 153). China has also supported the advance of regional integration mechanisms, such as CELAC, seen by the United States in a hostile way, since the creation of the China - CELAC Forum intentionally excludes them. Such a geopolitical chessboard tends to become increasingly dynamic as the interests of the three vertices of power become more latent.

> In so doing, Latin American leaders will not be operating in a vacuum. Latin America will have to navigate the China Triangle. At the top of the triangle tip is the United States, while China and Latin America form a new base of cooperation from left to right. But China has its own delicate relationship with the United States. The United States has a longstanding connection to the Americas. In addition to reforms at home, Latin American capitals will need to retool alliances with China to be more consistent with those reforms. At the same time, China's new alliance with Latin America is seen as a challenge to the United States, a nation that has long considered the Americas its backyard. To be successful, then, Latin America's reforms will have to operate in a manner that simultaneously builds on its relationships with China and the United States alike rather than picking one over the

other (Gallagher 2016, 3).

In such a way, South America is outlined as a sensibly geostrategic area in the medium term, visualizing "a revival of the region as a geopolitical and geoeconomic space" (Pecequilo 2013, 101), in which "concerns on China's rise and increasing pressures from US hard-liners could transform Latin America in a scenario of geopolitical dispute between the two great powers" (León-Manriquez and Alvarez 2014, 23-24).

Thus, analyzing the proposed theoretical framework, some conclusions can begin to be drawn:

1) in triangular relations, both competition and cooperation provide opportunities for South American countries, by establishing benefits with the other vertex of power;

2) adding a geo-economic pattern to the geopolitical paradigm, new frontiers are opened for triangulations of power, which can benefit the region if the IFP outline objectives, goals and geostrategic plans;

3) for South America, the increase in exchanges with Beijing may increase the bargaining power with Washington, changing the historical structure from boss to partner (Gallagher 2016, 176-177), based on the perception "that China could become an alternative to asymmetric interdependence with the United States, both in strategic and economic sectors" (Pecequilo 2013, 108);

4) from the previous conclusion, it follows that this fact tends to arouse apprehensions on the part of the United States, considering the intensity acquired by Sino-South American relations as dysfunctional to their interests in the region (Sevares 2015, 101);

5) in a geostrategic vision of South American autonomy, the region could take advantage of Sino-American regional and global competition by capitalizing and strengthening pragmatic ties with both parties, aiming at its socio-economic development as a strategic goal.

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ABSTRACT

In the 21st century, power projects in South America constitute disputes that comprise a dialectical correlation between Internal and External Political Forces. In this sense, this article aims to conduct an innovative debate based on the theoretical formulation called Competitive-Cooperative Triangles of Power, taking the South American region as a case study. From a realist view of international relations and by using an empirical-deductive methodology, the objective is to achieve an epistemological construction regarding power in the international system, explaining the challenges and possibilities of the South American Internal Political Forces.

KEY WORDS

MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DISSENTS AND CONTRASTS. TWO GENEBRINE CASES, A PERSONAL TESTIMONY[1]

Pedro Motta Pinto Coelho[2]

Introduction

Geneva and New York are cities generally seen as the two main centers of multilateral negotiation. Others, like London, Paris, Vienna, even Brussels, do not compare to these two, in terms of density and scope of the negotiations that take place in them. Unlike New York, however, where multilateral diplomacy is concentrated at the headquarters of the United Nations-UN, and is more of a political nature, in Geneva this activity is dispersed in numerous forums, of an economic, political or technical nature (in this case, most specialized UN agencies, for example). What draws attention, in the case of the Swiss city, is the negotiating environment, which is always thematically sophisticated, but which can sometimes be aggressive, on the part of developed countries, under the cover of avant-garde or technical initiatives and proposals. Furthermore, while in New York there is a more numerous and more politically articulated representation of developing countries (DCs), at least within the framework of the UN General Assembly, in the negotiations, in Geneva the more technical nature of the forums and their diversity tend to favor most expensive agendas for developed countries.

How to Deal with Dissents and Contrasts?

The Geneva context is particularly interesting as the economic-commercial and other issues seen as more technical in nature, in contrast to what is discussed in political forums, are increasingly identified with the latter; and vice versa: as the formerly technical negotiations progress, in the

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1 From the original, *Vivências Diplomáticas e Autobiográficas,* In: www.mineiromatuto.com.
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scope of the environment, for example, on climate change, their political and economic implications become clearer and more comprehensive, and these then become the main plan of the negotiations.

Traditionally, forums as different as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which gave rise to the World Trade Organization (WTO), or the Conference on Disarmament (CD) are also examples of these characteristics of the Geneva multilateral negotiation: more than in New York, the agendas of interest of developed countries are proposed in Geneva, not without a certain aggressiveness and imposing disposition, due to the greater control that these countries have over many of the forums that exist there. Such trends have lost much of their strength due to the growing capacity for developing countries to articulate in defense of their common interests. Multilateral diplomacy has always been the best support for the defense and promotion of these interests in the sphere of international relations, but much more today, thanks to the evolution of negotiating institutions — for example, with the creation of the WTO, replacing GATT — but also thanks to a better understanding, in the developing world, of the value of multilateral trading. The denial of this value, as seen in the case of the present Bolsonaro government in Brazil, is anachronistic and visibly mistaken.

The Imposing Agenda of Developed Countries

Shortly after arriving in Geneva to take up my duties with our Permanent Delegation in Geneva — DELBRASGENU, in 1989, amid the commercial negotiations of the so-called Uruguay Round, promoted by GATT, I had an ordinary experience that illustrates well what was waiting for me. My wife and I went down Rue du Mont Blanc on a Sunday afternoon, in the middle of the summer, quite unconcerned, when a young, rather upright lady, coming towards us, shouted at us in an exalted tone: «*vous ne pouvez pas vous mettre dans ma trajectoire!*», something like "get out of my way" or "get out of my sight". Since, surprised, we offered no reaction, she repeated the phrase again, omitting the subject to be more harsh, in an always imperative way, «*pouvez pas vous mettre dans ma trajectoire!*», and went on his way, stomping hard.

Perhaps we had occupied at least part of the space that would mark the trajectory projected on its path by the upright lady. Her "trajectory" had to be free, unimpeded. The Geneva negotiations had some of this behavior on the part of developed countries. The international context has changed since then and the negotiating agenda has evolved, the WTO has replaced GATT,

for example, but the manifestations of these unbalanced relations are still notable in many forums.

The imposition of the agenda by developed countries came about clearly with the launch, within the scope of GATT, of a new round of multilateral negotiations on international trade in the so-called Uruguay Round, in 1986. Negotiations on disarmament, at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) have been paralyzed for years by the opposition of nuclear-armed countries to a comprehensive work program. In terms of the environment, the negotiations originally followed the interests of rich countries.

GATT and the Uruguay Round: The Environment

The World Trade Organization (WTO), only created in early 1995, resulted from the Uruguay Round negotiations, which ended in 1994. Until then, international trade was subject to the disciplines of GATT, an institution dominated by a group of large rich countries - US, Japan, Canada, plus the European Union Commission, the select and exclusive «Green Room club». Gathered in this room at GATT headquarters, on Rue de Lausanne 154, they dictated the rules of world trade: Russia, still the Soviet Union when I first arrived there, in 1989, and China were not members of the General Agreement, a kind of association limited to just over 40 countries, the "Contracting Parties", where, among the few developing members, only a few stood out, among them Brazil and India, the only ones capable of resisting the dictates of the club's leaders, however, always being remembered that the opposition to their "trajectory", the leaders, had limits[3].

3 The same trend, more or less evident, or more or less intense, was happening, and it is still verified today, in one or the other, within the myriad of multilateral forums in Geneva. Geneva and neighboring cities host many of these bodies or the convention secretariats, many of them concluded under the auspices of the UN, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, the CITES-Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, the International Tropical Timber Agreement , from 1983, replaced by a new Agreement in 1994 and another in 2006, with the ITTO-International Organization on Tropical Timber Trade, or the RAMSAR-Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as a Water Bird Habitat. Among the political forums, and others of an economic-political nature, there are many within the structure of the United Nations, hosted at the *Palais des Nations*, an imposing building built after the First World War to house the then created League of Nations. There is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development - UNCTAD, a historical body, the focus of the articulation in defense of developing countries - DCs, a category of countries that then, in the late 1950s, early 1960s, consolidated into the so-called Group of 77, or G-77. For this very reason, it was one of the few Geneva forums where it was possible to make the interests of the DCs prevail in the context of multilateral negotiations — there, effectively, the DCs "got into" the "trajectories" of developed countries to fight for their own interests. UNCTAD

During the Uruguay Round, we, from DELBRASGEN, especially myself and my youngest colleague, today an ambassador and with a career marked by seriousness and a high level of competence, Tovar da Silva Nunes, delegates from Brazil to the so-called «New Themes», received in the Mission, almost every week, a qualified technician from UNCTAD for very instructive and guiding informal conversations about the negotiation process, from which we could better mark our work based on Brasilia's instructions. It is worth remembering, as I describe below, that few people knew exactly what the negotiations on trade in services or on intellectual property were, from the point of view of international trade disciplines.

Also in Geneva, in the affectionately called "Palais", acts the UN Council for Human Rights, with its High Commissioner; and there, with all its tradition of high negotiations on the destinies of humanity, the Conference (of the United Nations) of Disarmament (CD) is held, to which the most imposing room of the whole is reserved, with exclusive use for its sessions. Palais, soberly decorated with De Sert's frescoes on «War and Peace», which cover the entire ceiling and give the room an air of timeless bronze.

The second time I served in Geneva, from 2014 to 2016, I presented, in the hall adjacent to this room, my credential letters as Ambassador Permanent Representative of Brazil to the Conference of Disarmament to the UN Secretary General ("Deputy") - in Geneva[4].

In contrast to New York, where the bulk of multilateral diplomatic activity is concentrated in the UN and its offices, such as the UNDP, in

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was undoubtedly present, but it did not take long for developed countries to articulate their marginalization as a negotiating forum. UNCTAD, for some time now, has lost strength, as the focus of the interests of the DCs has gradually shifted to other more flexible and less stigmatized negotiating contexts, but it still constitutes an important center of research and studies on international relations, in a perspective support for economic development.

4 There are also a huge number of regional bodies in the city, some scientific, such as CERN, for research in nuclear physics, others many linked to the European Union and other European institutions. Others, still, in the most economic-commercial area, such as the EFTA-European Free Trade Association, more connected to the Nordic countries and some other non-member Europeans, at the time of its creation (1960), of the EEC (now only integrated by Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland). Anyway, Geneva is a world. And it leaves behind other European cities that are also important for multilateral diplomacy, such as Vienna, London or Paris. It is perhaps compared to Brussels, on behalf of the EU. Small town, more than 70 percent of its inhabitants are international employees, with a vast diplomatic corps. With a thriving economy, even if it was not a Swiss city, and its high cost of living, it leaves most of us poor diplomatic employees on tight wages, uncomfortable in the face of luxury and high service prices, better suited to the extensive floating Arab population or tycoons and people who can live well with the financial attraction of this international urban center, if not cosmopolitan like New York.

Geneva the rule is the diversification of this work by different forums. Any of us, diplomats based in the city, inevitably end up attending meetings and negotiating sessions in many of the forums based in the city and its surroundings, without exaggeration.

However, today, the same themes, including commercial ones, dealt with under different or complementary perspectives, are negotiated in many forums, at the same time or almost. As a result, an intense work schedule for each diplomat, which often extends to late at night and weekends, further limiting the little time set aside for our private life — in this, in fact, not differing from multilateral work in other centers, like the one in New York.

Geneva becomes unique, however, for a special reason: the vanguard of the agenda, which is obviously very positive and diplomatically rewarding. More perhaps than in New York, the topics negotiated in Geneva tend to be at the forefront of the multilateral international agenda. These are themes that, only years later, will enter the agendas of other forums, elsewhere, or even in New York, in regional forums, and, always decades later, in the national agendas of each country.

The theme of climate change, with the IPCC-International Panel on Climate Change, a small select group of scientists, meeting with government representatives in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in Geneva and the surrounding area, without meriting any focal attention point at the multilateral level, much less at the regional or national levels, is a striking and current example of this dynamic. Same thing for topics like trade in services, or intellectual property. The entire environmental theme with its international discipline, in its various branches, was for several years concentrated in Geneva, in the unfolding of the 1972 Stockholm Conference.

New Themes

As I said, the first time in Geneva "as a post", that is, in a permanent position at the Mission of Brazil - DELBRASGEN, in 1989, the Uruguay Round at halfway, I was in charge of our delegation to the three «New Themes» - trade services; trade and intellectual property; and trade and investment.

These issues were called "new themes" due to the unprecedented inclusion of them in the scope of trade negotiations in the GATT, these traditionally restricted to trade in goods and tariff negotiations, in addition to related topics, such as the "balance of payments" exceptions – BOP, in the acronym in English, of each country, a theme more affected, obviously, to developing countries, for always presenting chronic deficits in this regard.

Precisely for this reason, meetings on BOP were very fun, being one of the few where we, the DCs in GATT, could achieve favorable results, with exceptions, or "waivers", in applying GATT disciplines, as "most favored nation" or "national treatment".

With the change of rules at the end of the Uruguay Round, and the creation of the WTO, the BOP exceptions have been diluted or evolved, in addition to being meaningless with the globalization process and the prevalence, in the scope of international trade, of economic liberalism initiated in the 1980, which was the consequence, in fact, of the launch of the Uruguay Round itself.

In Brazil, this turn towards liberalism and trade opening took place in the early 1990s, under the Collor government. I felt these changes in the skin, during the negotiations in the Uruguay Round, especially in the Negotiating Group on Services, but also strongly in the Negotiating Group on Intellectual Property. In the third negotiating group on "new topics", the group on "investment measures related to trade" (TRIMs), the negotiations dragged on, almost paralyzed by the difficulties inherent in the issue and by the very different positions on the topic of how to regulate, control and protect foreign direct investment.

In the two other negotiating groups mentioned, however, we, delegates from developing countries most active in articulating their interests in the negotiations, notably Brazil and India, acted within a traditionally better protectionist framework. My predecessor at the head of our delegation to these groups had been the Head of our Mission in Geneva, Ambassador Paulo Nogueira Batista, whom Ricupero had replaced months before.

Paulo Nogueira Batista was, as I felt in my first contacts with the delegations in these groups, revered and respected for his lucid interventions, and for the courage in defending common interests to the DCs, facing almost alone, and always in mutual support with India, the true "steamroller" in favor of an indiscriminate opening of trade in services and absolute protection of intellectual property rights (due to the need to protect technological advances in developed countries), the reason for including these themes in the Round in the view of the US, Commission of the European Union, and other powerful of the Green Room.

I must insist that the trade in services has never before been subject to discipline in the GATT. The «General Agreement» has always been limited to trade in goods. Services, in macroeconomics and public accounting, were the "invisible" (transactions of services in the balance of payments, such as insurance, freight, but not including, for example, transactions related to foreign direct investment).

Still in 1989, they were new, really a "new topic", which had been introduced in the negotiating mandate of the Uruguay Round due to the interest of rich countries that, in the process of globalization of the economy with the application of new information technologies, began to glimpse the potential of trade in services and the need to open markets, especially in developing countries, which are still quite closed in this area. It was still the days of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall. Even many developed countries, such as Switzerland and the Nordics, had their public services, such as financial or telecommunications services, controlled by the State, without any kind of opening for the entry of foreign service providers.

Only in 2002 did the UN publish the "Handbook of International Trade in Services Statistics", with a detailed description of the four "modes" through which services can be marketed internationally, taking into account the location of suppliers and consumers of transnational services.

In developing countries, there was, in fact, both in the public and private sectors, no notion of the extent of trade in services or of their significance, in terms of negotiation under the GATT. My colleague from Colombia, neighbor of the Brazil bench in the Group on Services, and my tennis partner on the weekends, was recently arrived in Geneva, directly from Bogotá, where he held high positions at the Central Bank of that country, in the services sector.

Having already participated in some meetings of the Group on Services, he confessed to me his ignorance and perplexity about what was being discussed there, as it had nothing to do with his previous work, linked to the "invisible". We were, in fact, facing a novelty, in a very abstract debate on how to apply traditional GATT disciplines, such as "most favored nation", "national treatment", "non-tariff barriers", etc., to this new type of trade, whose peculiarities presented, from the point of view of the establishment of rules or disciplines in the scope of international trade, many difficulties — with few affinities with trade in goods.

Something similar, to give another example of the characteristic avant-garde of Geneva in dealing with issues of international scope, has been going on since 2015, within the scope of the Conference on Disarmament, with consultations and groups of experts on automatic systems of robot weapons that are independent of human control.

Just in 1989, GATT published the institution's first report on "trade in services". It was then revealed, to widespread astonishment, that trade in services, on a global level, exceeded the value of goods trade on a worldwide level by around 10%. From then on, and by chance the process of globalization asserting itself in coincidence with the end of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was an extraordinary activation of the ongoing

negotiations in the Uruguay Round Services Group.

Brazil was in a moment of transition, with the tests promoted by the Collor government to open its economy. At this point, we were, Brazil, India and some other developing countries, engaged in affirming, in the negotiating process, the principle of "special and differential treatment" for the DCs, a concept already adopted in the negotiating forums on the environmental theme, and which under the GATT, it was based on Part IV of the General Agreement, introduced in 1965, which was only of an urgent nature to facilitate trade with developing countries.

It is easy to imagine how much Brazil, India and a few other developing countries, such as Argentina, Colombia (which chaired the Negotiating Group on Services) and Egypt, were under pressure to accept a liberalizing agreement in the area of trade in services, with the consequent opening of their markets still quite protected. Financial or telecommunications services involved particularly complex negotiations.

The same naturally happened in the other groups of the "new themes", that is, intellectual property and investments, within the peculiarities of each one. In GATT, there was no negotiating experience on these topics, we typically sailed in "unchartered waters", but with a single certainty: strong interest from developed countries, especially the US, the EU, and Japan ("demandeurs", in Gattian language), to standardize these areas in the scope of international trade. In the case of intellectual property, due to the evident need to protect the rights of this type of property arising from technological development and its commercial value. It is necessary, therefore, to go beyond the existing conventions on the matter, mostly managed by WIPO and the Paris Convention, and to address them from the perspective of the market and trade relations: patents, designations of origin, records, trade secrets, copyright, practically the entire universe of intellectual property has become commercially disciplined.

In investments, there were even more delicate issues, many of them touching on sensitive areas of national sovereignty, such as the protection of investor rights or the remittance of dividends, or the movement of capital.

We knew that for us, developing countries, it would be very difficult to sustain very restrictive, defensive or market protection positions that did not involve comprehensive commitments in other areas, where we were more interested in accessing the markets of rich countries, especially in agriculture, another topic that for the first time, with the Uruguay Round, was the subject of differentiated negotiations within the scope of the GATT system.

In the "new themes", undoubtedly, the "spoilers", those who

questioned the consensus on the adoption of disciplines that would favor a comprehensive and rapid liberalization of the markets were Brazil and India, the main negotiators of the DCs, since the majority adopted discrete positions. At that time, in 1989 and 1990, at the beginning of each negotiating session, the heads of each group promoted consultation lunches or dinners, with participation restricted to the main negotiators. Of the DCs, invariably, only, Brazil and India, occasionally also Egypt. There were countless times when, on those occasions, the American delegate described me as a "spoiler" of the discussions. Simply because I brought to the table objections to "consensus" that evidently formed, along with sophisticated menus and elegant wines, around the positions of rich countries. He even once said that I always "poisoned" the negotiating group's dinners. An almost true, on the imagery level.

I have learned a lot in these informal meetings. About negotiation and about cooking and gastronomy.

Embarrassment. I believe that this was the state of mind in which Brazilian negotiators left us at the time of the Uruguay Round, the new attitudes of the Collor government, of a willingness for a relative opening of the Brazilian market. It was a foreign trade policy that was more than due, given the anachronism of a Brazil that was almost completely closed to the rest of the world.

The changes, however, came with an unprecedented characteristic in terms of international negotiations: unilateral opening, without the proposal of counterparts. Reciprocity, as we know, is an indispensable condition to be taken into account in diplomatic negotiations. I do not say that its application is always essential, but it is always good to have that element close by.

In this case, we started to give up opening our markets without major counterparts. Something like we are doing today, in the Bolsonaro government, in our devastated relations with the US of Trump, our undisputed overlord of the moment.

The Environment Issue

At that same time, the theme of the environment was emerging on the Genevan negotiating horizon, with a view to preparing the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development - UNCED, in the acronym in English, scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, in 1992, as well as the parallel negotiations of the conventions and other proposals for the standardization of "environmental" themes (climate change, biological diversity, protection of

the ozone layer, forests and desertification). In Geneva for a meeting, Filipe Macedo-Soares, then minister (of the diplomatic career, we call "minister of second class", degree just below "minister of first class", that is, the onde of the ambassador), head of the newly created and all powerful Environment Division at Itamaraty, invited me to stay with the environment desk in our Mission, DELBRASGEN. In the circumstances in which I found myself, I accepted, pending, of course, for consultation and approval by the head of the Mission, Ambassador Rubens Ricupero.

Indeed, the proposal was also in my interest. The activities on the environment in Geneva would not start until September, after the summer that started. The meetings of the Uruguay Round, on the other hand, continued at a frantic pace, and would not give me the space and time to finish my thesis in preparation for the Course of High Studies at the Rio Branco Institute - CAE. Furthermore, it would be stimulating to return to dealing with environmental issues, one of the themes that I was first assigned to at the beginning of my career at Itamaraty, at the United Nations - DNU Division, in 1973, and with which I soon became attached - even though it was considered a "minor" theme.

Yes, the Stockholm Conference on Human Environment had taken place less than a year ago, in 1972, but its follow-up was just a crawl, and it was absolutely not a priority in the international context, much less on the agendas foreign policy and domestic policy in peripheral countries, such as Brazil. Even less in Brazil under the military dictatorship, externally isolated.

The only internal measure related to the development of Stockholm was the creation of the Special Secretariat for the Environment - SEMA, linked to the then Ministry of the Interior, a tiny division whose leadership was the late Professor Paulo Nogueira Neto, a biologist scientist from São Paulo, specializing in «Stingless bees». The creation of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), based in Nairobi, followed in Stockholm. Professor Nogueira Neto led our delegation to the first UNEP meeting. I keep in my memory the official report written by the esteemed professor Paulo: a detailed description of the beauty of the fauna and flora seen on the way from the hotel to the UNEP headquarters, where the meeting took place, outside Nairobi. About the meeting itself, just a line or two, to say it had been great.

A bath of pure light, typical of a student of nature, amid the concern that we already had, at DNU, with the disconnection, so well symbolized in the aforementioned report, among the agenda of the Brazilian government, for whom the environmental issue was still practically ignored, and treated as a mere minor issue, "ecological", seen as only of interest to the rich countries, concerned with pollution, without considering the economic and political

complexity of this agenda as it was already outlined at the global level. Even today, the serious misunderstanding of identifying internal and international negotiations on environmental protection and sustainable development as a mere "ecological issue" is frequent.

Except for the international criticisms that are still incipient, but already notable on deforestation, predatory mining and burning in the Amazon, the environmental issue entered our agenda indirectly, with Itaipu and the dispute with Argentina on the issue of the use of shared rivers. As you recall, we had a huge and unnecessary wear on foreign policy, both in our relations with Argentina and other neighboring countries, and multilaterally, at the UN, where Brazil was isolated, suffering shameful defeats in the General Assembly — all because of our mistaken insistence on not accepting the notion of "prior consultation" in the hydroelectric use of rivers shared by two or more countries.

Undoubtedly, it is a complex and potentially very conflicting issue. Even today, Ethiopia faces difficulties in understanding with its neighbors to the north, Sudan and Egypt, due to the large dam built over the Nile in its territory (being downstream countries, they are naturally defensive in the face of possible changes in the water regime of that river).

As a connection point, the principle of sovereignty over natural resources. It is a principle that has never been seriously questioned at the international level, on the contrary. It is true that because it is a priority factor, especially on the negotiating agenda of developing countries, the fact is that it has always been included in all international instruments negotiated multilaterally, in any of the areas related to the environment (climate change, biodiversity, etc.) as in other areas (law of the sea, energy resources, renewable or not, water resources, etc.).

In such a way that the disrespect to this principle - in fact, a norm of international law - when it occurs, finds no refuge in the relations between States. As in all areas of international relations, the concept of the sovereignty of each State over its natural resources evolves and enriches itself along with the expansion of knowledge and according to the new realities. Without prejudice, of course, to its fundamental characteristics.

The same is true, for example, in science, with changing paradigms. As we know, Einsteinian discoveries about the relations of space and time, with the theories of general and special relativity, did not invalidate Newton's laws; they only expand them into the previously unexplored terrain at speeds close to that of light. In the field of international relations, the concept of sovereignty over natural resources has seen itself, in recent decades, especially since the second part of the 20th century, in the face of particularly

demanding challenges, clearly visible in dealing with issues such as the law of the sea, the environment, and others, such as water or energy resources, which necessarily, due to their transnational characteristic, interact with the notions of frontier and limits on the sovereignty of States.

However, it should be admitted that this rule, regarding the sovereignty of States over their natural resources, has periodically been argued in a distorted way, especially by regimes of authoritarian inclination, to justify the adoption of questionable public policies. This, out of mere fear and opposition to the dynamics of development and integration, the assumption of which will always be the transparency inherent in the Democratic Rule of Law. It can be seen along this line, as I describe above, how fallacious the posture of the Bolsonaro government has been, especially in the external area, when counter-arguing the criticisms of its political (inaction) and ostensible encouragement to predatory occupation of the Amazon rainforest with the allegation of "external threats" to the country's sovereignty over its natural resources.

Ricupero, always very understanding, which I see as one of the qualities of great leaders, agreed to my change of "desk" in the Mission, facilitated, at the moment, by the arrival of new colleagues, among them (then) Minister Sérgio Amaral and (then) advisor Piragibe Taragô, colleagues of "first water" and certainly much more qualified than me to take on the negotiations in the groups of my responsibility in the Round: Ricupero calmly entrusted both of them to Sérgio Amaral the groups on services and investments, and Piragibe to the group on intellectual property. I was thus able to count on the summer months to finish my thesis, before entering swiftly in the environmental negotiations in Geneva, which led me to perpetual constants - and sometimes quite long ones - to New York and Nairobi.

My departure from the Round negotiations caused some surprise, especially in the services group, since at that point we were already, in the "hard core" of the negotiators, a kind of family, due to the frequency of meetings, informal meetings, seminars, lunches and dinners we attended. I was able to explain to colleagues that I had been summoned to work in the preparatory negotiations for the Rio de Janeiro Conference - UNCED, which was effectively the case, the same ones occupying me completely until the end of my first stay in Geneva, in 1992, and then, since I was transferred to the Secretariat of State in Brasília, and head the Environment Division - DEMA after UNCED and in subsequent years.

However, it was understood that my departure was due to the change in positions that we had previously defended, due to the economic and commercial opening carried out by the Collor government. Indeed, and as

mentioned above, this opening, although more than due in its substance, in the context of a country that politically and economically needed to open up to the rest of the world and update itself in its external relations, caused we have some embarrassment in the negotiations, due to the way it was translated there, removing "the carpet" from us, so to speak, when made on the basis of concessions without credit to the notions of reciprocity or counterparts.

These are practices that Brazil sometimes tends to repeat, for better or for worse, as for example in the current Bolsonaro government, with the unimpeded elimination of the visa requirement for US citizens (although there may be some justification of a different nature, in cases like this), or giving up, in the WTO, the status of a developing country, with the loss of the advantages that this condition gives us within the scope of that organization. It is fallacious, in this sense, the argument that the counterpart for this abandonment of the condition of developing country will be the eventual entrance to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - OECD, since the accession to that organization, in addition to the "benefit" of the only formal and dubious change of status, will only lead us, in a long, costly, and unrealistic process of adaptation - in all sectors of economic activity - to new obligations, specific to the normative framework of developed countries.

We all hope that one day Brazil will reach the level and quality of life of a developed country. I think, however, that the entry - or not - to the OECD will be marginal in this process, the dynamics of which will depend much more on our internal effort and public policies to combat poverty and visceral social inequality, with priority for education and health, as well as in the search for a constructive understanding with the neighbors and the rest of the world.

Disarmament: The Disarmament - CD Conference: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons - TPAN

The panels by De Sert are impressive in the room of the Conference on Disarmament, which can be accessed by entrance XVI of the Palais des Nations. They advocate, in their sobriety and in the theme of peace and war, the seriousness and the high purposes of what is discussed there. The room has a history, which begins in its days of headquarters of the debates of the League of Nations, when the CD was created in 1932. With the revival of multilateralism following the creation of the United Nations, several intergovernmental initiatives on disarmament took place in 1960, with the Committee of Ten- TNDC, the Committee of Eighteen - ENDC, always in Geneva, from 1962 to 1968, and the Disarmament Committee - CCD Conference, from 1969 to

1978. The CD, as it is today, only expanded to 65, of its 40 original members, was constituted in 1979, object of decision of the First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, dedicated to the topic of disarmament, in 1978. It is defined as «the single multilateral disarmament negotiation forum of the international community», being responsible for an important series of negotiations on disarmament, such as the Toxic and Biological Weapons Convention, or the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty - CTBT, although some of the main understandings on containment and disarmament among the main nuclear powers, such as even the Non-Proliferation Treaty-NPT, have been concluded elsewhere.

It contrasts with the nobility of the place and the values in favor of World Peace that it represents, and with the history of successful understandings and negotiations, the general feeling of frustration that has accompanied, over the last two decades, the Permanent Representatives and delegates of the about 65 Member States participating in the weekly plenary sessions of the CD.

Since 1996, with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (which has not yet entered into force today), the CD has been paralyzed, due to lack of consensus on its «Work Program». There is no interest on the part of the nuclear-armed countries in opening negotiations in the area of nuclear disarmament, nor is there the necessary consensus among these countries on opening negotiations on the main topics on the agenda.

Of course, it is not a question of a complete halt in his work, which unfolds in various themes. The CD's agenda, previously called "Decalogue", today covers seven or eight themes, the main ones being those related to nuclear disarmament and other types of weapons of mass destruction, outer space, negative and positive guarantees regarding the non-use of weapons against third parties, and some others within a very intense dynamic, such as the disarmament of conventional weapons or the one related to biological weapons.

There are still issues within an innovative framework, such as the dealings, for the time being quite incipient, on the issue of fully automated weapons systems, that is, robotic weapons completely independent of human control, called «Lethal automatic weapons systems» - LAWS .

In addition, all the basic themes of the current CD agenda, nuclear weapons, outer space, security guarantees, in addition to other indirect ones, such as non-proliferation and the NPT, or the question of expanding the number of countries in the DC, or even the updating of the strict rules of procedure of the Conference — this whole thematic universe follows, if not on the agenda, by the absence of an agreed, but underlying "Work Program", at the level of consultations, more or less informal, more or less intense, more

or less programmatic.

An example of this activity concerns the negotiation and conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons - TPAN, approved at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly, held in July 2017 in New York and open for signature in September of the same year, at headquarters of the Organization. Because of its originality, as the first legal instrument to prohibit the development, testing, production, manufacture, use, acquisition, possession, storage or transfer of nuclear weapons, the treaty, even if negotiated within the UN, but outside the CD, practically breaks with the inaction of the CD on the topic of nuclear disarmament, which has occurred since the completion of the CTBT in 1996.

The ban on nuclear weapons is now the norm of international law. The treaty was approved by 122 countries, with Singapore abstaining and the vote against Holland, the only NATO country to attend. Other countries that are nuclear armed or share nuclear weapons did not participate and registered their opposition.

It is a fact that TPAN, «the result of a process initiated in 2013 with the Conferences on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons in which Brazil has participated actively since its inception», as the Itamaraty officially says, in Note 317, of 20 September 2017, was conceived and worked on, both politically and in its objective outlines, in the environment of the CD, in Geneva.

It was possible for me to take an active role in carrying out this project, which was not yet practically discussed at the CD, before 2014. At least, not at the intergovernmental plan at the CD. In informal consultations, such as those carried out in preparation for the NPT sessions annually, in Annecy, or seminars and colloquiums promoted by the most relevant NGOs accredited by the CD, the need for such an initiative began to be vented, promoted in particular by a coalition of NGOs, entitled "International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons: ICAN".

Based in Geneva, ICAN - which ultimately won the Nobel Peace Prize for its work - understandably deserved little or almost no support at the CD, an organ formally tied to dependence on consensus not consented by the nuclear powers. It did receive expressions of sympathy from some countries, such as Austria (from which it disassociated itself when the country's progressive government, which integrated the leadership in the initiative of the aforementioned Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, came to host the third of them, in Vienna, in 2014[5], was replaced by

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5 The two previous Conferences were held in Oslo, 2012 and Nayarit (2013). Brazil actively

a conservative government in late 2015), Mexico and Brazil.

In our case, this support for ICAN was not immediate. I made my first statement on the CD, when I arrived, based on the instructions at the time, that, members of the coalition called the "New Agenda", we were not associated with the ICAN proposal or with a frontal opposition to the nuclear armed countries. I remember that, on the day after my first intervention, one of the small NGOs linked to the CD, entitled, I believe, "FireWall", circulated an open letter with strong criticisms, and deserved, in my opinion, for the Brazilian position, for failing to endorse this project.

On a business trip to Brasilia, to attend a seminar, I was able to talk at length with the Undersecretary for Multilateral Policy, my classmate and friend Carlos Antônio Paranhos, about the convenience of evolving in our positions at the CD, including the question of an instrument for the ban on nuclear weapons. I even proposed that if we could not negotiate such a convention or treaty at the CD, we should do so at the UN. Paranhos, like me, had already served more than once in Geneva, the most recent as alternate ambassador in our Permanent Delegation in Geneva (Delbrasgen), including the CD desk, quickly understood my suggestions, with them having agreed, which led to following our change of position, now in favor of a specific negotiation to ban nuclear weapons. Since it is not possible at the CD, my proposal is that negotiations should then take place in the UN context.

By that time, after the initial moments on the CD, we, the delegation of Brazil, had already made more frequent and open contacts with the ICAN staff, even with FireWall, with whom, from the new instructions in Brasilia, we started to work very positively. Also within the DC and in the UN-Geneva context, we obtained, together with Mexico (then in the presidency - rotating - of the CD), consensual support, first with GRULAC and then with the Geneva (informal) chapter of the Community of Latin States -Americans and the Caribbean-CELAC.

CELAC had approved, at its III Summit, in San José, Costa Rica, in January 2015, the "Special Declaration on the Urgent Need for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World". In it, the Heads of State of the region undertake to initiate, at the highest political level, negotiations on an instrument in this area.

It was thus, without major difficulties, possible to renew the support of

participated in the three conferences and subscribed to the joint declarations on the topic, including on the occasion of the IX Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Examination Conference (New York, 2015), in which I had the honor of leading the delegation of Brazil, as Permanent Representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament - CD).

CELAC (a group still informed in Geneva) in the CD environment (where the developing countries formally represent themselves in the so-called Group of 18). Our arrangement took place during a memorable lunch in a bucolic restaurant in a park near the Palais. It was very comforting to feel immediate support and without further collateral from the local presidency of CELAC, the ambassador of Costa Rica, and other ambassadors and colleagues from virtually all countries in South America, Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico.

The next step was taken by the UNGA's First Commission, based on previous articulations with ICAN, but also in light of the understandings that had taken place in New York previously, during the Third NPT Review Conference, in June 2015. In that Conference, they renewed - always, with strong support from CELAC, the declarations emanating from the three Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the Declaration of Costa Rica itself. There, too, the proposal of a working group to negotiate an instrument to ban nuclear weapons was the subject of intense negotiations in the debate on Article VI of the NPT, which greatly facilitated the resumption of the topic by the First Commission, with the negotiation of the treaty and its conclusion in 2017. Still in New York, in the final days of the long NPT Review Conference, in June 2015, I received an invitation from our Chief of Mission to the UN, Ambassador Antônio Patriota, to have lunch. At the end of a nice "corner" restaurant in the "East-uppertown", at 70th Street, Antônio Patriota confides to me that the "closing" of REBRASDESARM, the Representation of Brazil at the Conference, was being planned at the Secretariat of State in Brasilia Disarmament. Patriota, when Minister of State, had proposed my removal to this "Representation"[6].

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6 REBRASDESARM, despite the long list of ambassadors resident representatives of Brazil to the CD, among them Celso Sousa e Silva, Sergio Duarte, Calero Rodrigues, Marcos Azambuja, Antônio Carlos Paranhos, Gilberto Saboia, Filipe Macedo-Soares, Antônio Guerreiro, and which attests relative stability of the function, it would have been a "floating" post, for periods; fictitious, even, but always with representativeness. At certain times, even during my administration and that of some others, where there were restrictions mentioned below, he was effectively and functionally independent from the Mission in Geneva, with the right to the telegraph series and budgets of his own chancellery and residence. In the Collor government, in a similar trance of disabling multilateral diplomatic representations abroad, our Representation at the CD was reinstated to the Mission at the UN in Geneva - DELBRASGEN.
Later, with Celso Amorim as Minister of Foreign Affairs, the post was reactivated, in view of its evident relevance - but only in terms of internal administration. As a precaution (justified?) In the face of probable criticism for opening a new post where there are already two other independents, DELBRASGEN and the Mission to the WTO, Celso Amorim would have preferred to avoid being the post of REBRASDESARM created by decree, but only by internal ordinance. Thus, the head of the post, despite having all the prerogatives of the function, is excluded from the category of «Head of Mission with International Organizations» (which

He had accepted the offer of removal to Geneva, as resident representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament, especially as a result of what many of us, diplomats with more appreciation for multilateral diplomacy, profess: awareness of the high relevance of disarmament issues in international relations and the priority that such themes have always deserved in our foreign policy, in view of the greatest national interests. Disarmament is perhaps the most consistent theme at the highest levels of the international agenda's scale of values, especially since the end of World War II, as its object directly concerns the theme of peace. As simple and as sober as that.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, was, as noted, opened for signature in New York, at UN Headquarters, in 2017, with President Temer, then the first Head of State to sign it, in a clear manifestation of recognition by Brazil of the relevance of disarmament, especially nuclear. A remarkable contrast to the wrong decisions or evaluations that sometimes occur on the part of the head of our diplomacy, when dismissing the issue due to questionable precarious and objectively ineffective policies to contain expenditures, a stated reason for the measure to close REBRASDESARM. The deactivation of the post, symptomatically, occurred concurrently with the creation of a new alternate ambassador position in DELBRASGEN.

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means lower salaries, compared to that of the two other colleagues "Heads of missions with international organizations" in Geneva. For reasons that are barely understandable, the Itamaraty Legal Consultancy and the General Secretariat systematically denied the resources submitted by my predecessor Filipe Macedo-Soares and me (I petitioned twice), recognition of the head of the Representation as a "head of mission with an international organization.

REBRASDESARM continued without the right to be included in the formal Itamaraty organization chart, being able to define itself, more appropriately and with forgiveness of expression, as a "pull" from DELBRASGEN. Indeed, the removal of all employees, including that of the head of the Representation, took place "for DELBRASGEN". As they continue to do so, once again, the function is reintegrated to DELBRASGEN, after the "closing" of REBRASDESARM decided by the Head of the House, in an eagerness for the economy as fictitious as inoperative - in fact, it may Bear in mind that the reason for the change was to meet contingencies of a personal nature, with the creation of alternate ambassadors in DELBRASGEN, since, in practice, the physical facilities of REBRADESARM remain the same, occupied, as before, by the Representative Permanent of Brazil with the CD, its advisors, and, as always, by the significant Military Office of Support to our representation, headed, in rotation with its Navy and Air Force peers, by four star general.

ABSTRACT

In the multilateral negotiating context in Geneva, developed countries seek, often aggressively, to impose agendas that are more favorable to their interests. This text seeks to expose, from the perspective of developing countries, and Brazil in particular, the difficulties inherent in multilateral work at the time they were experienced, as well as the efforts to overcome them. The focus of attention is modulated, sometimes focusing on the GATT (institution that preceded the WTO) and the negotiations on the new themes of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (1986-1994), now on the nascent diplomatic articulations on the issue of the environment; or even in the negotiations on disarmament, these at a more recent moment, with the conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

KEYWORDS

Report; GATT; Uruguay Round; Disarmament.

NERINT STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

The acceleration of pace of international events and processes requires a qualified analysis without the political-journalistic bias that often characterizes them. Thus, in addition to theoretical-analytical articles, we consider it necessary to publish a brief evaluation of important current events. To this end, the Brazilian Center for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT), member of the Center for International Studies on Government (CEGOV-UFRGS), launched the *NERINT Strategic Analysis* series, with the contribution of its specialized researchers and guests with thematic expertise.

It will be published at the end of each volume of *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations*, starting with an assessment of Post-Trump Diplomacy, conflicts in Russia's "near abroad" and the Strategic Lessons of World War II on its 75th anniversary. Since the 1990s, Itamaraty has been promoting the formation of qualified national academic personnel on themes and countries relevant to Brazilian diplomacy, business and defense. This training effort, through the promotion and funding of graduate courses, is paying off, and Brazil already has professors and researchers at an international level.

THE BELARUS ELECTION AND ITS INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS

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There is a false impression that the conflict that broke out after this year's presidential elections in Belarus is once again explained by the simplistic dichotomy between Russia and the West. Even more simplistic is the interpretation that the Russians are supporting Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko, who from the beginning would be seen as an opponent by the countries of the European Union and NATO. Since the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, Lukashenko has been moving away from Russia, and this process has accelerated in recent years and reached its peak in early 2020.

The president has come to value Belarus more and to emphasize nationalism as opposed to the previous rapprochement with Moscow.

In relation to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Lukashenko posed as a peacemaker. A representative documentation of that moment are the photos of the Minsk agreements: the Belarusian is the only one smiling (and the only one with great reasons for doing so). This intermediation provided an improvement in relations with the West, through which Lukashenko saw an opportunity to leave the Russian sphere of power. It was never a real break, but the Belarusian president thought he could benefit from both sides of the geopolitical dispute. He already enjoys an excellent relationship with China, a country that holds a number of investments in the country: the Chinese have built entire communities in Belarus inhabited by workers from China, and Xi Jinping was the first to congratulate Lukashenko on his victory in the highly contested 2020 elections.

The rapprochement with the West paid off: in the 2015 presidential election, the European Union praised Lukashenko for his stance, affirmed the legitimacy of the elections and based on that the EU canceled several of the sanctions that it still imposed on the country. Until then, Europeans had always condemned the electoral processes in Belarus and reaffirmed the claim that the country was the "last dictatorship in Europe". It seemed that the strategy was working, but the EU hoped that Lukashenko would continue to move away from Putin. He did follow this course even after the elections and the intensification of demonstrations. In January of this year, Lukashenko even accused the Kremlin of wanting to annex Belarus. Putin then cut subsidies, and the situation worsened until July, when Belarusians arrested several employees of a Russian security company on charges of promoting instability in the country, in order to provoke an intervention.

In the same period, Lukashenko had been leading the coronavirus crisis in a somewhat disastrous way, as reported by the whole world. This situation caused a sharp drop in popularity at a key moment, immediately before the elections. Several well-advised candidates with palpable ambitions emerged, in contrast to previous elections. The main ones were Viktar Babariko, a pro-Kremlin banker with connections to Gazprom; Valery Tsepkalo, former ambassador to the US and considered as a pro-Westcandidate; and Sergey Tikhonovski, a blogger who grew up on the wave of the anti-corruption agenda, analogous to Russian Aleksei Navalny. Lukashenko soon tried to neutralize his opponents: Babariko and Tikhonovski were arrested and Tsepkalo left the country. Among the charges was Russian interference through Gazprom, in conjunction with Babariko's candidacy. It is important to underline that even Tsepkalo, considered more pro-Western, took refuge in Moscow, where

he completed his training at the prestigious Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). The Western bloc remained silent during all these moments, as it understood that Lukashenko was the only person preventing Belarus from approaching the Russian Federation, which could lead to an eventual union between the two countries.

The wife of Tikhonovki, the self-declared housewife Svetlana Tikhonovskaya, then took on the candidacy and proceeded with the elections. Lukashenko won by more than 80%, under serious allegations of fraud. Tikhonovskaya filed a request for a recount of the votes and left Belarus for Lithuania, where she has been coordinating the effort to invalidate the election, now with open support from the EU. More recently, however, this relationship has been showing signs of fraying. Tikhonovskaya complained about empty words from European leaders which do not amount to effective actions against the Belarusian government. It is also important to note that the European Union and the United States only began to criticize Lukashenko very recently, when they realized the strength of the protests, and were also pushed into the scene by the anti-Russia coalition of countries such as the Baltic and Polish republics, which started to bet in the expansion of demonstrations and eventual contamination of Russia. From that moment on, the narrative turned 180 degrees, because intuitively, and poorly informed by the Western media, many believed that Putin's support for Lukashenko would last forever and the democratic West would never support the "last dictator in Europe".

Lukashenko himself changed his narrative. At the beginning of the protests, he even accused the Russians of being behind the demonstrations in an attempt to overthrow him. Some Western media replicated the conspiracy theories, even making comparisons with the Crimean "little green men". A Polish politician in the European Parliament even called for new sanctions against Russia, claiming Russian intervention against Lukashenko in Belarus. In recent months, Polish neo-Nazi groups have crossed borders to participate in demonstrations against Lukashenko. One of these fascists was beaten and ended up interviewed by the BBC, as if he were a simple victim of authoritarian violence in Belarus. After this escalation of events, Lukashenko decided to ask the Russians for support, having spoken to Putin several times expecting support. To date, it is unclear how and even if the Kremlin will take action. Russian media has covered the protests extensively and in a very positive tone in favor of the protesters, highlighting the violence of repression by the security forces, in clear contrast to the coverage of the protests in Ukraine in 2014.

The protesters themselves, as has always been the case in Eastern Europe, were quickly dominated by pro-Western liberals and conservative

nationalists. There were a few socialist voices, but they were silent. The opposition is still quite disorganized and Svetlana Tikhonovskaya has so far failed to establish itself as an effective leadership. The West is increasingly interfering with the situation, while the Russians are yet to make a move. The intensity of the protests has ups and downs, although there is an impression that the majority of the disaffected are concentrated in Minsk. Even without fraud, Lukashenko would still have obtained a majority of the votes, and his support base has not been completely eroded, even though his position seems increasingly isolated. He is trying to buy time with a referendum proposal, but there is still no conclusive maneuver towards it.

Moscow, December 15, 2020.

THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: AN UNWANTED WAR FOR RUSSIA

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On November 9, 2020, after a short conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region (known to the Armenians as the Republic of Artsakh), Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a ceasefire treaty. In practice, this treaty represented a capitulation by Armenia, where even today thousands of protesters are mobilizing against the agreed terms and seek to provoke the resignation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian. In Azerbaijan, the deal was received as a major victory and should guarantee President Ilham Aliyev a few more years of stability in power. Albeit in an uncertain way, the biggest regional powers are strengthened: Russia and Turkey.

The nature of the conflict, as well as the politics of the countries involved, is a topic far removed from the reality of Brazilians. The little news that arrives in the country comes filtered by the great media groups of the West. Therefore, this analysis seeks to present a brief overview of the situation, then to address issues such as the origins of the conflict, the role of the actors involved and the prospects from now on, thus demonstrating that the role of the Russian Federation in resolving the issue is not only central, but inevitable.

There is much debate among Western analysts about the origins of ethnic-religious conflicts in the Caucasus region, in particular the dispute between Armenians and Azeris. The fact is that the Caucasus is a strategic

territory and as such, the object of historic disputes. Between the Black and Caspian seas and cut by mountain ranges, the Caucasus has been coveted since the times of the Roman Empire and has attracted, over the centuries, invaders from different foreign powers. Its peculiar geographic characteristics, however, ensured that no foreign domain would last in the long run. On the other hand, the different ethnic groups that inhabit the region and, more importantly, the tensions between Christians and Muslims, made the Caucasus a boiling cauldron, always on the verge of overflowing. The present conflict is the result of centuries of conflicts and the ethnic-religious element is, therefore, central.

Tensions between Armenians and Azeris spilled over in the wake of the crisis in the USSR throughout the 1980s. The epicenter of these tensions is the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which is mostly Armenian and which in the 1920s was placed by Moscow under Azerbaijani administration. During that period, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia still formed a single Transcaucasian Republic within the Soviet Union, which was later divided into three republics with the same level of autonomy, with Nagorno-Karabakh still under Azerbaijan's control. Despite the discontent, this arrangement persisted in a peaceful manner until the final crisis of the communist regime, when, already in 1988, the altercations between the two peoples began. After the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, the situation quickly escalated to a war in which the Armenians not only seized Nagorno-Karabakh, but occupied territories around the exclave that had no borders with Armenia's main territory.

This situation of instability during the last years of the Soviet Union feeds a formula that, although recycled from the Cold War, is applied today, not only to the Caucasus, but also to Central Asia and other regions of the post-Soviet space. It is the idea that the USSR would have stimulated division and distrust between the different nationalities that made up its federal system so that internal conflicts could not be resolved without Moscow's intervention, being a variant of the British strategy of dividing and rule. The consequences of the Kremlin-sown cyan would be at the heart of the countless conflicts that still plague the former post-Soviet republics. This simplistic narrative would be the key to understanding conflicts ranging from Crimea to Chechnya, through Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria and, of course, Nagorno-Karabakh.

Such a formula ignores, however, centuries of wars, persecutions and strife which, in the case of the Caucasus, are even more relevant. For Christian civilizations in the region, Georgia and Armenia, the centuries leading up to the Soviet period were marked by domination by the Ottoman and Persian empires and by constant strife with the Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus. For the Armenians, these frictions culminated in a tragedy of extraordinary

proportions: the genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire from 1915. When we look at the whole picture that goes back to millennial conflicts in a region squeezed between great powers, it is not possible to ignore that the about 70 years of Soviet domination were marked by rare stability.

In line with this idea that the USSR was instrumental in creating the conditions that would lead to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, there is the imprecise narrative that the present performance of the Russian Federation has been poorly received by its Armenian allies. Much is speculated about the intentions of Vladimir Putin's government and its true relationship with the administration of Prime Minister Pashinian. In fact, Nikol Pashinian came to power in 2018 through protests that toppled the government of Serge Sarksian, a close ally of the Russians. Pashinian's previous performance as a parliamentarian sought closer ties to the United States and Europe, which at times generated the impression that his administration would move away from Russia. This factor, coupled with the arrest by the Pashinyan government of a major Russian ally in Armenian politics, former President Robert Kotcharyan[1], raised doubts about the new PM's willingness towards the Russian Federation. It is impossible to determine what the new prime minister of Armenia's initial intention was, but we can safely state that Nikol Pashinyan has tried on several occasions to signal that he would maintain the commitments between Russians and Armenians.

The situation in which Armenia is inserted makes the possibility of a rupture with the Russian Federation a geopolitical impossibility. As it was possible to see during the recent conflict, Armenia finds itself surrounded by two rivals, Turkey and Azerbaijan, at the same time that it maintains a relationship of little cooperation with Georgia. In fact, the only immediate neighbor with which Armenians cultivate proximity is Iran, with whom they share a small and vulnerable border, in a region now squeezed between territory recently recovered by Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhitchevan. Russia, for its part, despite having no borders with Armenia, maintains one of its only bases abroad in the second largest Armenian city, Gyumri. In addition, Armenia is a member, alongside with the Russian Federation, of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a military alliance that determines that its members have responsibility for intervention in the event of violation of the territory of any of the signatories. These guarantees, which do not extend to the occupied territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, are the main reason why Azerbaijan has no incentive to advance over Armenia's internationally recognized borders.

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1 Available at: https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2019/11/13/pashinyan-otnosheniya-armenii-i-rossii-razvivayutsya-po-voshodyashchey

A sign that Nikol Pashinyan understands Armenia's delicate position are the numerous meetings held with Vladímir Putin[2], in a gesture that signaled to the Kremlin the intention to dispel rumors about an alleged shift in Armenian foreign policy. Similarly, there is no indication that popular opinion among Armenians has turned against Russia, despite the claims of Western media. In fact, a small number of diaspora members, some of whom have returned to Armenia in recent years, have mixed feelings about the Russian Federation, still rooted in animosities dating back to the Cold War. Among Armenians of Soviet origin, however, there is no sign of indisposition towards the Russians. Amid the former Soviet republics, Armenia has always figured as one that best preserves its historical ties with Russia. Although there was a feeling of abandonment by the allies, several testimonies collected after the signing of the ceasefire in early November demonstrate that this proximity has not been significantly affected. On the contrary, many Armenians, especially in Nagorno-Karabakh, are grateful and relieved by the arrival of Russian peacekeepers[3]. The demonstrations of support were such that the Western media was forced to change their initial narrative that the Kremlin's performance was being condemned by popular opinion.

However, the question remains why Pashinian did not turn to the Russians earlier in the conflict. While it may seem surprising how quickly Azerbaijan troops advanced over the mountainous terrain of Nagorno-Karabakh, there was no doubt about the superiority of Azerbaijan's current military capabilities. For its part, Russia maintains good relations with both sides, but has formal obligations to Armenia, reinforced by the presence of a military base in the country. Pashinian's position was further weakened after the Russian president said that, even at the beginning of hostilities, he would have convinced Ilham Aliyev to stop the advance of his troops, so that Azerbaijan would take only a small portion of Karabakh's territory. Its Armenian counterpart would have found the terms unacceptable, which led to the imposition of much tougher terms, which include the loss of the city of Shushi and the guarantee of passage through the Lachin corridor. This statement goes against the idea that the Russians would have let the situation escalate, in order to reaffirm the dependence of the Caucasian country on the Russian Federation.

In any case, Nikol Pashinian is unlikely to survive the political crisis triggered by the vexing conditions in which Armenia was forced to drop its weapons. The increasingly bellicose rhetoric of Aliyev and his ally Erdogan,

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2 Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/28/07/2020/5f1fde1e9a7947a5443a2706?from=-from_main_1

3 Available at: https://www.rt.com/russia/507196-armenia-ally-gratitude-survey/

demonstrated with pomp at a military parade held in Baku and on repeated occasions in recent weeks, as well as skirmishes between the parties to the conflict has tested the limits of the ceasefire agreement. Episodes such as the attempt to seize a gold mining area in Sotk and villages south of the Lachin corridor, both regions belonging to the main territory of Armenia, prompted the Russians to expand the area where peacekeepers operate. Similarly, it is the Kremlin's action that prevents Turkey from further imposing its authority in the Caucasus.

The presence of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh is a reality that is expected to last for years to come. It remains to be seen whether it will not generate friction that will jeopardize the country's good relations with Azerbaijan, and more importantly, whether it will not revive animosities with Turkey. At the present time, Russia is the only guarantee of non-violation of Armenia's territorial integrity, however bitter this arrangement may seem to Yerevan.

Moscow, December 15, 2020

STRATEGIC LESSONS OF WORLD WAR II, 75 YEARS LATER

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World War II was the largest and most lethal conflagration in history. In addition to spreading across the globe, it also stood out for its magnitude and intensity. It is estimated that it directly involved more than 100 million people and caused 85 million deaths, with nuclear weapons being used for the first time. Seventy-five years after its end, and just over a century after the end of World War I, the world finds itself again in a spiral of tensions that may, once again, lead to a world war. This is the main significance of World War II today, since the roots of the current tensions can be found in the strict balance that led to that conflagration and the Cold War that followed.

The term "balancing" expresses, in a broad sense, the notion that states compete with one another, seeking to limit each other's freedom of action, which may involve the possibility of threat or use of force - in the latter case, we have an example of what is now called strict balancing. In this way, in its broad sense, balancing is confused with the concept of International Relations as it is. In its strict sense, it can be characterized by intimidation or

blackmail. Thus, it is reasonable to correlate broad balancing with deterrence, and strict balancing with intimidation (compellence). Of course, the exercise of intimidation requires an overabundance of strength. Hence why Great Powers use "delegates", that is, allies who are employed to "share the burden" of security costs. Such an international division of security workload sometimes ends up endowing those allies with capabilities that allow them to take a challenging stance.

This was the case for Germany, Italy and Japan - the defying powers in World War II. Unified Germany, which resulted from the British desire to balance France - a role originally performed by Prussia - ended up becoming a more formidable power than the former. Japan, intending to maintain China subdued (1894-95) and balance Russia (1904-05) and the USSR (1918-25), ended up wrecking British naval hegemony. British squadrons in the Indian and Far East, Forces A, B and Z - which amounted to almost two centuries of British naval hegemony - were destroyed in a short period of time (10/12/1941 to 10/04/1942). Even when it comes to Italy, to a considerable extent, the same process unfolded As a consequence, after the outbreak of World War II, the British Admiralty considered Italy the greatest threat to the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean. Hence the surprise attack carried out by the British in Taranto (11-12/11/1940).

With the benefit of temporal distance, it can be said that this small group of nation-states never had a chance against the three region-states (US, Russia and China) and the British Empire, which allied against them. This, of course, does not diminish the merit or heroism of those who fought against the Axis. However, even in the darkest moments that followed the Axis effulgent victories in the 1940-41 biennium, few doubted the allies' final victory. In this sense - and Paulo Visentini was one of the first to unveil this in Brazil - World War II concealed another "war", the one waged between the allies themselves. In particular, Britain's war against the USSR and China. The conduct adopted by the English, despite being clumsy - since it prolonged the conflagration -, must be considered as a characteristic of the strict balance approach.

The British approach was almost the opposite of the one adopted by the Americans. The Americans began to plan the opening of the second front against Germany in the heat of the Battle of Moscow (1941). In 1942, *Operation Sledgehammer* was organized and *Operation Roundup* was planned for 1943. Both were aimed at the invasion of Europe by southern France. Both attempts ended up being frustrated by the British, in favor of the invasion of North Africa via *Operation Torch* (1942). In addition to the projected second front, which aimed to alleviate the USSR, the US promoted the Loan-Lease

Act. It was decisive for the Soviet and Chinese war efforts, and in the latter country, the US maintained close relations not only with the nationalists, but also with the communists. In short, the predominant approach adopted by the US, even in the midst of the conflagration, was that of engagement or cooperation, not that of strict balancing.

The diplomatic bargain undertaken by Brazil also illustrates engagement and not strict balancing. It was thanks to the close relations, originally maintained with both Germany and the US, that Brazil obtained the resources and technology to build the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional in Volta Redonda. Vargas and Góes Monteiro used military preparation and the war to insert Brazil virtuously into the Second Industrial Revolution, characterized by the dominance of steel and electricity.

It was thanks to this engagement that the *Pax Americana* was established - the reconstruction of Germany and Japan that gave the US the status of world hegemon. The Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe allowed the US to bring under its command all the preceding naval hegemonies: Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands and England. In this way, it is clear that cooperation, or engagement, is much more effective for the exercise of domination than strict confrontation or balancing. However, shortly after Churchill's speech in Fulton (1946) - which influenced the announcement of the Truman Doctrine (1947) -, the US began to adopt balancing, in a strict sense, as the dominant behavior towards the USSR and China. This policy was implemented throughout the Cold War period (1945-1991).

And, again, strict balancing would prove to be flawed. To defeat the USSR, a state that never exceeded the average of 9.5% of world GDP, the US converted China and Europe into economic superpowers. In short, they created more capable opponents than the one they intended to overcome. Even after the USSR debacle, the US maintained a stance of strict balancing. Instead of a new version of the Marshall Plan, which would finance the conversion of the Soviet economy to traditional capitalism, military and diplomatic pressure intensified with the expansion of NATO to the East and the pursuit of nuclear primacy. Today the USSR is reborn in the form of the Russian Federation and is, once again, a formidable adversary. Precisely thanks to the capabilities it has reactively developed to the expansion of NATO and the American search for nuclear primacy. China, in turn, maintained a dependent-associated relationship with the US until the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (1999) and the announcement of the *Pivot to Asia* (2011). It should be noted that the Chinese Navy, which today threatens the US Navy in the Indo-Pacific, has only been built since 2011.

In short, strict balancing proves to be, more than flawed,

counterproductive. In the long run, it produces results opposite to what was originally intended. Prussia, which Britain used to balance France, in becoming Germany became a more imposing opponent than France had ever been. Japan, used to subdue China and balance Russia, ended up destroying the British Navy in the Indo-Pacific (something that Imperial China or Tsarist Russia never dared to dream of).

During World War II, the procrastination in opening the second front to wage the terrestrial war on the European continent, leaving the USSR alone in the fight against Germany, allowed it to rise as a Superpower. A more formidable opponent than Germany was at any time, endowed with thermonuclear warheads, the USSR was capable of destroying the US - a capacity that Germany never possessed. Adopting anAmerican perspective, Europe and China, used to defeat the USSR in the Cold War, became economic superpowers - being the former also capable of disputing American soft power. Finally, Germany and Russia, against which the two largest global coalitions in history were articulated by Anglo-Saxon efforts, today retain their capabilities and the conditions to become, in the case of the first, or consolidate, in the case of the latter, themselves as Great Powers.

However, the gravestelement is that the main result of strict balancing was the decline of the West. As Jeffrey Sachs and Steven Radelet[4] pointed out: in 1820, the West had just over 15% of the world's population and 25% of its income. Already in 1950, due to the effects of the Industrial Revolutions, the nations of the West held only 17% of the world population, but already concentrated 56% of the income. Currently[5], the West (European Union and North America combined) correspond to 33% of world income and 18% of its population. While the economies of the Asia-Pacific contribute 44% of income and 60% of the population. Taking only East Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) into account, it already contributes with 25% of world income and only 21% of the population. Thus, it is necessary to conclude that, due to its virtuous insertion in the Third Industrial Revolution (microelectronics), Asia progressively recovers its role in world income before the Industrial Revolutions.

Such lessons matter to Brazil, insofar as one can take advantage of the new international situation through engagement, neutrality and diplomatic bargaining. It couldn't be different. If World War II, waged by region-states against relatively small nation-states, produced 85 million deaths, what

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4 Radelet, S., Sachs, J. Asia's Reemergence. F*oreign Affairs*, [s. l.], v. 76, n. 6, p. 44–59.

5 Source of the data, 2017: United States. Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity). CIA World Fact Book. 2020. United Nations (UN). *World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision*. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2013.

to expect from a dispute involving the US, Russia and China? In addition, Brazil has economic interdependence ties with both the US and China. Not to mention external financing that depends on an abundance of liquidity, which would simply cease to exist under the aegis of a conflagration. Nonetheless, it is necessary to take advantage of the situation of international tension, aiming, with the use of diplomatic bargaining, the recovery of the national economy, especially reindustrialization. In the same way that Vargas gained control of electricity, cement and steel, only waging in the war after it was already defined, we must obtain control of the computer (microprocessors), the network (5G Internet) and automation (Artificial Intelligence and robotics). And, thus, successfully inserting ourselves in the Third Industrial Revolution.

Porto Alegre, December 14, 2020

PARTNERS

NERINT

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) was the first Centre in Southern Brazil to focus its study and research exclusively on the field of International Relations. It was established in 1999 at the Latin American Advanced Studies Institute (ILEA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) in Porto Alegre, Brazil, and is currently part of the university's Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV). Its objective has always been the critical and innovative study of the international system's transformations after the end of the Cold War, from the perspective of the developing world. In parallel, NERINT has also sought to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options for the autonomous international insertion of the country.

The exploratory studies developed by NERINT on the new emerging countries since the threshold of the 21st century experienced remarkable expansion. Cooperation with state, business, academic and social institutions was intensified, as well as the direct contact with centres in Latin America, Africa and Asia, in addition to the existing ones in Europe and North America. An outcome of the Centre's activity was the creation of an undergraduate course in International Relations (2004) and a Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI, 2010). Two journals were also created: the bilingual and biannual Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations and the bimonthly journal Conjuntura Austral. In addition, since 2016, NERINT offers a bilingual Research Bulletin, published by graduate and undergraduate students and researchers of the Centre. NERINT is also partnered with UFRGS's Doctoral Program in Political Science (PPGPOL), established in 1973. Thus, besides the advanced research and intense editorial activities, NERINT is also the birthplace of innovative undergraduate and graduate programs.

PPGEEI

The Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) started in 2010, offering Master's and Doctorate degrees, both supported by qualified professors and researchers with international experience. It is the result of several developments on research and education at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Its roots can be traced to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT), established in 1999, established in 1999 and now affiliated with the Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV) at UFRGS.

The research tradition that gave rise to PPGEEI was based on a prospective analysis of the trends of the 1990s. The remarkable expansion of Brazilian diplomacy and economics from the beginning of the century confirmed the perspective adopted, which allowed the intense cooperation with the diplomatic and international economic organizations in Brazil. The Program is already a reference in the strategic analysis of the integration of emerging powers in international and South-South relations.

The Program's vision emphasizes strategic, theoretical and applied methods, always relying on rigorous scientific and academic principles to do so. For this reason, it has been approached by students from all over Brazil and several other countries, and it has established partnerships in all continents. Thus, PPGEEI is a program focused on understanding the rapid changes within the international system. Alongside NERINT, it publishes two journals: Conjuntura Austral (bimonthly) and Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations (biannual and bilingual). PPGEEI has three research lines:

International Political Economy

It focuses on the international insertion of the Brazilian economy and other major developing countries in South America, Asia and Africa; discusses the characteristics and effects of globalization; and develops comparative and sectoral studies concerned with the effects of the internationalization of companies and productive sectors. Special attention is paid to international financial crises and its effects on Brazil and other countries of the South.

International Politics

It emphasizes the analysis of the process of formation, implementation and evaluation of foreign policy. It seeks to confront patterns of international integration of strategic countries in South America, Africa and Asia, considering institutional patterns, trade policy, structures of intermediation of interest, governance, International Law and the role of actors of civil society in the South-South axis of contemporary International Relations.

International Security

It approaches the defense, strategy and security issues in the international

system from a perspective that takes into account the most powerful states at the global level, but systematically introduces the question of the regional balances of power, the South-South axis, the existence of regional security complexes, military issues and the impact of information technology in the Digital Age.

CEGOV

The Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV) located at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) develops studies and research projects on governmental affairs from a comparative perspective. The Centre gathers researchers from several departments of the University, such as Political Science, International Relations, Law, Economics, Administration, Education, Urbanism and Computer Science. It encompasses scholars from the most traditional research groups at UFRGS, such as NERINT and CEBRAFRICA, specialised in a broad range of public policy areas.

CEGOV is chaired by a Director, and its policies and priorities are determined by an Advisory Board and a Scientific Board. The activities of the Centre are undertaken by working groups, which take the responsibility for specific projects. Currently, CEGOV has eight fully established and operating working groups. The Centre's researchers work on multidisciplinary projects covering the fields of international politics and governance, monitoring and evaluation of public policies, institutional development, Brazilian and South-American economy, comparative institutional design and decision-making processes, as well as public management, democratic controls and decentralisation of public services.

The Centre is a place for interaction among scholars from UFRGS and other academic institutions, highlighting its multidisciplinary and open nature, as well as its vocation to collaborative applied research. Being a reference for research on comparative governmental studies, CEGOV offers a wide range of extracurricular activities such as extension and specialisation courses, and advisory activities.

CEBRAFRICA

The Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) has its origins in in the Center of Studies Brazil-South Africa (CESUL), a program established in 2005 through an association between the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG) of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its research activities are developed

in cooperation with the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT).

In March 2012, CESUL was expanded into CEBRAFRICA. At the same time, the South African series, which published five books, was transformed into the African Series, with new titles. The Centre's main objectives remain the same as before: to conduct research, support the development of memoires, thesis and undergraduate works, congregate research groups on Africa, organize seminars, promote student and professor exchanges with other institutions, establish research networks and joint projects with African and Africanist institutions, publish national and translated works on the field, and expand the specialized library made available by FUNAG.

The numerous research themes seek to increase knowledge of the African continent and its relations with Brazil on the following topics: International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations, and Schools of Thought. CEBRAFRICA counts among its partners renowned institutions from Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Senegal, Cape Verde, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Portugal, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, India, and China. Current researches focuses on "Brazilian, Chinese, and Indian Presence in Africa", "Africa in South-South Cooperation", "African Conflicts", "Integration and Development in Africa", "African Relations with Great Powers", and "Inter-African Relations".

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2.   The research articles must contain a maximum of 12 thousand words;
3.   The footnotes should be of complementary nature;
4.   The bibliography must follow the rules of the Chicago system (Author-date or note-bibliography), specifying the used literature at the end of the text;
5.   Contributions must be original and unpublished, and can be submitted in Portuguese, English or Spanish;
6.   Contributions must contain the full name of the author, their titles, institutional affiliation (the full name of the institution) and an e-mail address for contact;
7.   The complete filling of the submission form by the authors is mandatory;
8.   Contributions from undergraduate or graduate students are allowed, as long as in partnership with a Professor or PhD, which will appear as the main author of the paper;
9.   Manuscripts from only one author must be written by a Professor or PhD;
10. There is a limit of three (3) authors per article;
11. Contributions must be accompanied of: three keywords in Portuguese or Spanish and three keywords in English; title in English and in Portuguese or Spanish; abstract in English and in Portuguese or Spanish, both with up to 100 words.
12. Submissions must be made through the journal's website: http://seer.ufrgs.br/Austral

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As part of the submission process, authors are required to check off their submission's compliance with all of the following items, and submissions may be returned to authors that do not adhere to these guidelines.

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2.   Submitted files must be in Microsoft Word, OpenOffice or RTF (as long as their size is up to 2MB) format.
3.   URLs must be informed in the references when necessary.
4.   The text must be single-spaced; Times New Roman typeface 12 pt must be used for the body of the text; italic is to be used instead of underline (except in URL addresses); Figures and Tables must be embedded in the text.
5.   The text must follow patterns of style and bibliographical requirements described in the About the Journal section.
6.   The identification of authorship of the work must be removed from the file and the Properties option in Word, thus ensuring the confidentiality criteria of the journal, accordingly with available instructions in the website.

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