


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Revista Brasileira de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais



Porto Alegre, v.8 n.16 | Jul./Dec. 2019



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About the Journal

AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations was the first Brazilian journal in the area of International Relations to be fully published in English (2012). It is an essentially academic vehicle, linked to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) and the Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) of the Faculty of Economics (FCE) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Its pluralist focus aims to contribute to the debate on the international political and economic order from the perspective of the developing world.

The journal publishes original articles in the area of Strategy and International Relations, with special interest in issues related to developing countries and South-South Cooperation – its security problems; the political, economic and diplomatic developments of emerging countries; and their relations with the traditional powers. *AUSTRAL* is published semi-annually in English and Portuguese. The journal's target audience consists of researchers, experts, diplomats, military personnel and graduate students of International Relations.

The content of the journal consists of in-depth analytical articles written by experts (Professors and Doctors), focusing on each of the great continents of the South: Asia, Latin America and Africa. Thus, the debate and diffusion of knowledge produced in these regions is stimulated. All contributions submitted to *AUSTRAL* are subject to rigorous scientific evaluation.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

In a period of multiple international crises, the analytical opportunities are unexpectedly increased. The past exasperates its ways to avoid being overruled by new tendencies, which are still wavering and, perhaps, reversible. Accommodating and repetitive thinking, ritualised through politically correct presentations in conventional seminars, ebbs and gives way to innovative reflection. Edward H. Carr wrote *The Twenty Years' Crisis* precisely in 1939, innovating the reflection in International Relations. Today, when US President Donald Trump meets up with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, actually stepping on both sides of the Korean border in Panmunjom, what we see is the silence of analysts and the embarrassment of journalists. It is necessary that veterans such as Henry Kissinger provide an explanation to what is going on, so that the dialectical relation between the harsh reality and surrealism makes sense.

It is important to note that during times of crisis, new voices emerge and new connections are established, as observed on this issue of *AUSTRAL*, which celebrates its eighth year of existence alongside the twentieth anniversary of the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NER-INT). Thus, this is a commemorative edition. Alongside Brazilian authors, we find others from Portugal, Spain, Ecuador, Colombia, Cuba, Romania, Nigeria and Australia. In the year that also marks the centenary of International Relations as a field of study, which formally emerged from the establishment of the International Relations Chair in Aberystwyth, Wales, in 1919, we start this number of *AUSTRAL* with an article on the birth of IR as a social science, whose origins and conceptions are inherently Western and, more precisely, Anglo-American. Hence the latent need to also produce specialised knowledge in the area outside its epicentre. Thus, following a first block of theoretical articles, the subsequent articles prioritise the three major continents of the South, as traditionally seen in our publication: Asia (which includes the Middle East), Africa and Latin America, with an emphasis on international security and defence issues related to the developing countries that make up these geographic spaces.

From the next issue onwards, Professor Marco Cepik will be appointed Editor-in-Chief of *AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*, with Professor Leonardo Granato serving as Deputy Editor and Pro-

fessor Paulo Fagundes Visentini as senior member of the renewed Editorial Board. This institutional change, within a team that has always worked collectively, does not imply any reorientation in the editorial line. Nevertheless, the growing flow of papers makes evaluation more demanding and deadlines longer. There is also an increasing call for the publication of dossiers containing results of collective research, which will be accepted according to the quality and the existing demand. A positive “problem” resulting from an editorial policy that did not attain itself to the faltering criteria of government academic agencies. The main objective has always been to connect authors and nations through innovative thinking in a strongly institutional area such as International Relations.

This publication was possible thanks to the Research Office at UFRGS through the Support Program for Journal Editing (PAEP). Assistant Editors Guilherme Thudium and Magnus Kenji Hiraiwa deserve special recognition, as well as the translation team composed of graduate and undergraduate researchers from NERINT, with some guest appearances. This issue also owes special credit to Prof. Dr. Analúcia Danilevycz Pereira and the researchers from the affiliated Brazilian Journal of African Studies (RBEA), published by the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA), which strengthened the translation team in a year that was particularly difficult for the Brazilian academy. Finally, we are always grateful to Prof. Dr. Cristina Soreanu Pecequillo for diligent review of translations.

Disclaimer: *AUSTRAL prioritises British English as the standard variety of the English written language. Some English translations, however, may be written under the American English dialect.*

NERINT/UFRGS: 20 YEARS ANALYSING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Paulo Fagundes Visentini¹
Guilherme Thudium²

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)³, created in 1999, was the first centre focused exclusively on the study and research in International Relations in Southern Brazil. It was founded by Professors Paulo Fagundes Visentini and Luiz Dario Ribeiro (History), Alvaro Luiz Heidrich (Geography), Carlos Schmidt Arturi (Political Science), Juan Algorta Plá (Economics) and, shortly after, Marco Cepik (Political Science) joined the group of researchers. Soon, the centre became a Research Group of the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), a federal organisation linked to the Ministry of Science and Technology to encourage research in Brazil. NERINT was initially established within the Latin American Institute for Advanced Studies (ILEA/UFRGS), where it remained for 16 years as a multidisciplinary study centre. Its objective is to promote teaching, research and extension projects, as well as to develop an editorial program capable of filling the national bibliographic gap in the area of International Relations. After a brief period at the university's Department of Economics and International Relations, NERINT joined the Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV), a multidisciplinary research body subordinated to the Dean's Office at UFRGS dedicated to public policies in the international area.

From its inception, NERINT has remained a rigorously academic and

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³ Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), in English. In 2018, the Brazilian Ministry of Education ranked UFRGS as the best federal university in the country.

public research centre with no ties to governments, political movements or private institutions and foundations. This, however, did not inhibit the establishment of partnerships for events and other initiatives, such as research and publications, always respecting academic and institutional freedom. However, independence does not mean a lack of commitment to our nation and society. The primary focus has always been to contribute to national development with knowledge and analysis of the strategic options for Brazil's international insertion in a changing world. Moreover, the idea of creating a locus to unite individual efforts in the study of International Relations in the southern region converged with the further development of the area, which occurred a decade ago. The academic entry of International Relations in Brazil, in the late 1980s, however, was marked by a globalist world-view to the detriment of a national project. Thus, it was necessary to rescue the threatened Brazilian diplomatic traditions, predominantly guided by the pursuit of autonomy and national development. In this sense, 1999 proved to be a critical year, with the crisis of the Real and the liberal outlook of international projection, and in 2001 the terrorist attacks of September 11 would fundamentally change the international landscape.

Research axes

NERINT is dedicated to the analysis of topics ranging from Brazilian Foreign Policy in a comparative perspective to the problems of International Security, through the challenges of diplomacy, regional integration, the world-system analysis and national development. The work carried out by NERINT's researchers, with the support of graduate and undergraduate students, aims to monitor and analyse the main power poles of the international system. However, the emphasis of the empirical research has a special interest in three regions of the Geopolitical South: South America, Africa and Asia. In this sense, NERINT is characterised by research in the diplomatic, economic and security fields of the countries that make up the South-South axis of contemporary International Relations.

Exploratory studies carried out by NERINT on new developing countries have seen remarkable expansion since the early 21st century. Cooperation with state, business, academic and social institutions has been intensified, as well as the direct contact with other centres in Latin America, Africa and Asia, in addition to the existing ones with Europe and North America. In each phase, there were different predominant research axes. Currently, the three main research lines developed within the scope of NERINT have prioritised the Grand Strategy for Brazil in the 21st Century, the International Relations

of the Asian Continent, and the Crises and Transformations of the World System. The objective of the former is to combine efforts in various spheres of society to guarantee sovereignty, security and national development, granting greater autonomy to Brazil in the international system. Thus, key themes for the Brazilian strategic insertion are analysed, such as the Brazilian Foreign and Defence Policy; the South American Strategic Environment; and the international relations of South-South cooperation.

It is within this framework that close collaborations have been developed with scholars in the areas of Diplomacy, Defence and International Security, as well as cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Ministry of Defence and academic partnerships in Brazil and abroad. Partnerships were also formed with the Armed Forces through academic cooperation agreements with the Centre for Strategic Studies of the Southern Military Command (NEE/CMS), as well as joint initiatives with institutions such as the Brazilian Army Command and General Staff School (ECEME) and the Superior School of War (ESG).

The second line of research addresses the main dynamics of international politics and security prevailing in the Asian continent, emphasizing the regional balance of power, the interaction between different areas of the continent, its role in the global geopolitical chessboard and the relations between great powers. Specifically, this research agenda tries to analyse the Asian continent by studying four macro-regions: Middle East and Central Asia; the Indian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean; Russia and its surroundings; East Asia and the Pacific. Finally, the third line of research is devoted to the theoretical, historical and strategic study of the World System, focusing on the alternation between hegemonic cycles and crisis and the analysis of this process as an element of transformation of the system itself, with special emphasis on the post-Cold War era. It also seeks to identify possible disruptions within the system itself and Brazil's growing role in it.

Thus, the advanced researches developed by NERINT sought to recover the historical dimension of international relations, which is traditionally neglected in the analyses of contemporary International Relations and Security and Defence Studies. Such redemption is also a theoretical concern, since International Relations, as well as defence issues, as areas dominated by fields of Political Science, have been marked by instrumental theorisations.

In short, NERINT's main objective has always been the critical and innovative study of the systemic transformations of international relations. At the same time, it has sought to contribute to the discussion of a national project for Brazil by analysing the strategic options for the autonomous international insertion of the country, from the perspective of emerging states.

Differentiated research activities from the mainstream of International Relations have allowed for links to be established with institutions and researchers from all continents, some of which have become associate researchers. Internationalisation took place through academic missions to various foreign institutions and the invitation of researchers from other nations who came to Porto Alegre, the Brazilian capital that became an international hub in the 21st century.

Support for teaching and research activities

From its early days, NERINT promoted formative extension courses to address the lack of undergraduate and graduate courses in International Relations in Southern Brazil, activities that, due to their pioneering spirit, were extremely successful. Within a framework of increased importance of international relations in the Brazilian political and economic agenda, NERINT acted as the main academic catalyst for the implementation, within the university, of a Master's program in International Relations in 2002, supported by the San Tiago Dantas Program and the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES), and, consequently, of an undergraduate course in International Relations, in 2004. Finally, a Doctoral Program in Strategic and International Studies (PPGEEI) was created in 2010.

NERINT researchers constituted the core of all these initiatives, as well as contributed with the necessary elements to their academic projects. Similarly, undergraduate and graduate students of these new programs had in NERINT a space to develop research and participate in institutional projects. It is also important to highlight that teachers and students took part in exchange programs from Argentina to China thanks to the activities of the centre. Likewise, NERINT welcomed African, Latin American and European students who conducted their own researches at UFRGS, in Porto Alegre.

From the moment graduate and undergraduate courses were implemented, extension activities were no longer formative and generalist, but focused on deepening specific innovative themes. A phase of major seminars had begun, usually through partnerships with institutions such as the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Ministry of Defence, the South American Institute for Policy and Strategy (ISAPE), Renmin University (Beijing), Leiden University (Netherlands), the Higher Institute of International Relations (Mozambique), foreign embassies in Brazil, public and private universities, among others. NERINT has also participated in inter-institutional project networks such as "Pró-Defesa" and "Pró-Estratégia", joint initiatives of the

Ministry of Defence and CAPES. One of these particular initiatives that is worth mentioning is the Brazilian Seminar of International Strategic Studies (SEBREEI), which was firstly held in 2012 and 2013, in collaboration with PPGEI. As of 2016, SEBREEI formed a partnership with the Seminar of the Southern Military Command and the Union Houses Seminar, comprising in this association the Seminars of Strategic Studies, which took place simultaneously in both 2016 and 2018.

The themes of these events were varied and aimed at different audiences. Among them, we can list: Diplomacy and Academy; South Africa; European Union; India; Integration Processes in South America; Brazilian Foreign Policy; India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA); Eurasia; Migrations and Refugees; World System Transformations; Arab Spring; Middle Eastern Geopolitics; Northeast Asian Geopolitics; Russia and Central Asia; International Security and Defence; Brazilian Defence; Conflict and Development in Africa; Emerging Powers in Africa; BRICS; China's International Projection; and History of International Relations, among others.

Editorial activity

One of the areas where NERINT's contribution proved most remarkable was through the publication of books and the editing of international journals (see list in annex). NERINT has published two book collections: first, the International Relations and Integration Series, which aimed to publish original books. Between 1998 and 2008, through UFRGS' university press, ten works were edited, some of which became emblematic of the International Relations historiography in Brazil. The International Studies Series, on the other hand, aimed to disseminate theses, dissertations and seminar materials that were innovative, but aimed at experts. Between 2003 and 2009, twelve works were edited in a partnership between NERINT and the UFRGS's university press, with support from the San Tiago Dantas Program.

Since 2013, NERINT edits the Strategy, Defence and International Relations Series, successor to the previous two, through which six works have been published. NERINT's editorial policy has always prized academic independence over a commercial agenda. However, the crisis of academic publishers meant that the new series had to be produced in a partnership with private publishers – first, *Leitura XXI*, and then *Livraria Palmarinca* – as a way of better circulating research results. Two of the publications had the support of renowned institutions such as the Meira Mattos Institute/ECME and the Superior School of War/ESG. There are titles that address absolutely original themes in Brazil, such as Revolutions and International Relations and

Defence Diplomacy. Furthermore, an interesting element among the three series is the strong representation of high-ranking Brazilian diplomats.

As for academic journals, two periodic publications were also created: the bilingual and semi-annual *AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations*, edited by NERINT since 2012, and the quarterly *Conjuntura Austral*, edited by PPGEI since 2011. Published in print and digital formats, *AUSTRAL* (a reference to the South in Western linguistics), *was the first Brazilian journal in the area of International Relations to be published entirely in English*, in bilingual editions with Portuguese or Spanish – the official languages of Mercosur. *AUSTRAL* has published articles by Brazilian scholars and internationalists from all continents, focusing on the themes that make up the South-South axis of international relations. Its Editorial Board is composed of renowned academics from Brazil, South Africa, China, the United States, Argentina, India, France, Russia, Cameroon, Turkey, Cuba, Tunisia, Canada, the Netherlands and Australia. *AUSTRAL* has a large international circulation and is registered in major global indexers, such as Scopus Elsevier and Google Scholar, among others. The list of writers speaks for itself, demonstrating the great international insertion of the journal. In 2016, NERINT also began to offer a digital and bilingual Research Bulletin, offered by its Research Assistants.

From CESUL to CEBRAFRICA

NERINT was also the birthplace of African studies in the area of International Relations at UFRGS. In 2005, an agreement was signed by the Centre with the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG), a public foundation linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty), for the creation of the Center of Studies Brazil-South Africa (CESUL). Its purpose was to foster studies, events, exchanges and publications about a strategic nation for Brazil's foreign policy. In addition to those initiatives, the South African Series was created, which published five books (see list in annex). This program has formed a cluster to African and Africanist students, as well as promoted significant teaching exchanges. The success was such that in 2011 CESUL gave rise to the Brazilian Center for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA), which initially conducted its activities as a research line within NERINT. The demand for African studies grew further and CEBRAFRICA, under the dynamic coordination of Professor Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira, also a researcher at NERINT, became a parallel and independent academic research centre at UFRGS.

CEBRAFRICA brings together researchers from UFRGS and national and international institutions, as well as undergraduate and graduate students

who develop their research in the following lines: South-South Cooperation and the African Continent; Development, Security and Regional Integration; and Foreign Policy of African Countries. The South African Series has been transformed into an African Series to cover other countries of that continent. Since 2012, it has published six exclusive works. In addition to the African Series, CEBRAFRICA has been publishing, since 2016, the Brazilian Journal of African Studies (RBEA), every six months in print and digital versions in a bilingual English-Portuguese or Spanish format. The publication's international success attracted large numbers of African authors, serving as a link between Brazil and Africa. CEBRAFRICA is partnered with reputable institutions from Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Senegal, Cape Verde, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Portugal, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, India and China.

20 years on

Our philosophy aims to avoid competition between research centres and programs, seeking specialisation and complementarity. Thus, we were able to advance and consolidate a research agenda in limitedly studied areas and regions, always cooperatively. There is room for everyone. Similarly, we've never prioritised the changing criteria of academic agencies, which make many centres lose their identity and compete with one another. Another important point is teamwork: NERINT is the result of a group and collective action. The dedication of professors, but especially of students, was the main factor that made so many of these achievements possible. It would be impossible to mention all the academics who passed through the Centre. But we would like to mention a couple from the first and latest generations. Rafael Balardim and Kamilla Rizzi, history students and today university professors of International Relations, were vital during NERINT's early days. More recently, Maria Gabriela Vieira and Eduardo Secchi, undergraduate students of International Relations, have helped sustain today's complex activities. All this within a team of colleagues, organised in internal study groups in which relevant but little known works are discussed.

When it was founded, in 1999, the main trend in international relations was the neoliberal globalisation, which the founding researchers considered a threat to the National Project that had been in place since the Vargas Era. Always highlighting, however, that the post-Cold War world system did not represent an American phase of solitary hegemony, but rather an unstable phase of transition and struggle towards a "New Order". Two decades later, to the shock of many pundits and analysts, globalisation is now being questioned

by the Trump administration and many other governments, including Brazil. Halfway through, in 2009, the BRIC(S) grouping emerged, signalling the overwhelming rise of China and the resurgence of Russia, countries which now suffer strong economic and political-military containment, respectively. All this only confirmed our initial prediction about the fragility and uncertainty of the international relations system in the post-bipolar world.

In 1999, the second term of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso had only just started, and with that the first crisis of the new “strong and stable” Brazilian currency, the Real, which suffered a sharp downfall. Nevertheless, Brazil did not suffer the Argentinian drama of two years later, with the financial collapse of the neighbouring country. Foreign policy, on the other hand, was experiencing moments of uncertainty, since it was still attached to globalisation, contrary to a six-decade-old autonomist diplomatic tradition that predominated almost continuously from 1930 to 1990. Soon after, there were the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, with the affirmation of the anti-terrorist security agenda towards the Middle East and Central Asia. Meanwhile, in the opposite direction, Latin America experienced the “pink tide” of social-democratic or popular-autonomist governments.

An unprecedented moment of international projection for Brazil, which, however, was not sustainable. The 2008 subprime crisis, which began in the United States, soon hit the Eurozone and the world economy. At the same time, the United States sought to withdraw from the conflicts in the Middle East, leaving in place a series of not very solid local alliances. The scene for the “Arab Spring” was set and its shock waves would spread across the Mediterranean, Africa and West Asia. At that moment, a process of reversion of the previous trends began, with the wearing of the social democratic regimes in Latin America, a movement that culminated in the election of Donald Trump in the United States. The logic of his administration is embedded in the unilateral diplomatic tradition of the Republican Party, with a business bias. Besides representing the very heart of the world system, the United States constitutes a National State with its own problems and needs, in parallel with migratory, climatic and social crises.

During these 20 years, we have sought to understand the underlying logic of ongoing international processes, and hope to have helped and assisted all those who attempt to analyse the international relations in a realistic way, rather than ideologically or prescriptively. This position is particularly important considering the disconcerting and perplexing moment endured by the Brazilian foreign policy. Different historical times seem to overlap, in a structurally contradictory project in which the harsh reality reveals itself in a surrealistic setting.

ANNEX

(Titles available in Portuguese or Spanish only)

International Relations and Integration Series (1998-2008)

The Foreign Policy of the Brazilian Military Regime (1964-1985), by Paulo Visentini; *International Relations and Brazilian Foreign Policy*, by Paulo Roberto de Almeida; *Mercosur and its Regional and International Context*, by Jacques Ginesta; *Five Hundred Years on the Periphery*, by Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães; *Rethinking International Relations*, by Fred Halliday; *China and Southeast Asia*, by Paulo Antônio Pereira Pinto; *Foreign Policy of the United States of America*, by Cristina Soreanu Pecequillo; *From Import to Export Substitution*, by Heloísa Silva; *Brazil and the League of Nations*, by Eugenio Vargas Garcia; *Regional Integration Processes and International Cooperation since 1989*, by Marianne Wiesebron and Richard T. Griffiths (Eds.). In partnership with FUNAG/MRE: *Brazil and the People's Republic of China (1974-2001)*, by Danielly Ramos Becard; *Diplomacy and Religion: the relations between the Holy See and the People's Republic of China (1949-2005)*, by Anna Carletti.

International Studies Series (2003-2009)

Diplomacy of National Interest: the foreign policy of the Médici Administration, by Cíntia Souto; *The Foreign Policy of the Sarney Administration (1985-1990)*, by Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira; *Changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy during the 1980s: a newly industrialised medium power*, by Ricardo Sennes; *Brazilian Diplomacy between Security and Development: the foreign policy of the Castelo Branco administration (1964-1967)*, by André Silva; *The Kosovo War, NATO, and the Concept of "Humanitarian Intervention"*, by Paulo Roberto Caminha de Castilhos França; *The Arctic and Antarctica in International Relations*, by Myriam Colacrai; *The Foreign Policy of the Itamar Franco Administration (1992-1994)*, by Ney Canani; *Taiwan: a formidable future for the island?*, by Paulo Antônio Pereira Pinto; *A New American Hegemony or Multipolarity? Power poles of the International System*, by Paulo Visentini and Marianne Wiesebron (Eds.); *German Unification in the Context of German-Soviet Relations (1985-1990)*, by Elmir Flach; *South America: economics and regional integration politics*, by Marco Aurélio Chaves Cepik (Ed.); *Brazil-India Relations (1991-2006)*, by Máira Baé Baladão Vieira.

South-African Series (2007-2011) (in partnership with FUNAG/MRE)

South Africa and IBSA: human security, by Francis Kornegay and Jabulani Dada (Eds.); *Brazil and South Africa (1918-2000)*, by Pio Penna Filho; *A Short History of Africa*, by Paulo F. Visentini, Luiz Dario Ribeiro and Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira; *South Africa: history, state and society*, by Paulo Visentini and Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira (Eds.); *South Africa: the transnational activism network against Apartheid*, by Pablo Saturnino Braga.

Strategy, Defence and International Relations Series (2013–)

The North-American Independence: war, revolution and logistics, by Érico Esteves Duarte; *Revolutions and Marxist Regimes: ruptures, experiences and international impact*, by Paulo F. Visentini, A. D. Pereira, J. M. Martins, L. D. Ribeiro and L. G. Gröhmman; *Constants and Variations: Brazil's multilateral diplomacy*, by Gelson Fonseca Jr.; *Environmentalism and Indigenism: Roraima as a laboratory for international regimes*, by Getúlio de Souza Cruz; *African (In)Security and its Importance for Brazilian National Defence*, by Paulo Fagundes Visentini, Eduardo Glaser Migon and Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira (Eds.); *The Foreign Policy Guide of African States*, by Paulo Visentini and NERINT/CEBRAFRICA; *Defence Diplomacy in International Politics*, by Antônio Ruy de Almeida Silva.

THE BIRTH OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE: A COMPARED ANALYSIS OF THE ANGLO AMERICAN WORLD AND CONTINENTAL EUROPE

Pedro Emanuel Mendes¹

Introduction

This paper develops a comparative contextualization of the birth of International Relations (IR)² as an autonomous discipline in the Anglo-American³ world and Continental Europe⁴. It presents a historiographical synthesis of the origin of IR and a balance of the main institutional and scientific frameworks of the American, English, Nordic, French and German cases.

Although the idea of a simplistic dichotomy between Western and non-Western thinking is currently in place - both in the academic and political realms - it is important to demonstrate that there is not only one Western thinking. In this context, starting from historical-contextual (Schmidt and Guilhot 2019) and cultural-institutional (Jørgensen, Knudsen 2006,10) approaches, this paper traces a broader picture of the invention of the IR discipline, demonstrating the diversity of institutional paths and theoretical-methodological identities of various Western academic communities.

Due to the current globalization and hybridization of IR, there is an

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² In a traditional sense of view, we will use International Relations (IR) in uppercase to refer to the discipline and International Relations (ir) in lowercase to refer to empirical phenomena

³ The Anglo-American world is not just the US and the UK. It also includes Canada, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand but due to article size limitations, we do not include them.

⁴ Continental IR is not limited to the cases presented. Due to article size limitations, we do not address, for example, the Central and Eastern European community, which is part of the Central and East European International Studies Association (CEESEA), which sponsors a relevant journal, the Journal of International Relations and Development, founded in 1984 (37/85 JCR WOS).

explosion of narratives and counter-narratives about when, how and why the IR discipline was invented (Smith 1995; Kahler 1997; Carvalho, Leira and Hobson, 2011; Schmidt 2013; Buzan, Lawson 2014). This debate has become even more complex with the need for the discipline to discuss non-Western thinking and to try to include other geocultural traditions in its theoretical discourse (Wæver, Tickner 2009; Acharya 2014). Then there is the eternal debate about what IR is and what is its relationship (dependence, independence, interdependence) with Political Science (PS) and History. This discussion of the identity and history of IR puts institutional pressures and anxieties on the solidification of their academic autonomy (Wæver 2013). At the end of the day, these discussions are a positive fact, as they demonstrate their vitality and help to deconstruct the limitations of dominant canonical views by introducing new and plural debates into the history of the discipline's "great debates." However, it is not possible to discuss the identity of IR without having a solid knowledge of their main historical and institutional milestones.

In developing a comparative analysis on the birth of IR autonomy we aim to achieve two objectives. On the one hand, the article seeks to contribute to the dialogue on the social construction of IR and its historiography. On the other hand, the article seeks to illuminate the relationship between historical and academic contexts. In particular, highlight the simultaneous processes of academic integration and differentiation - theoretical and institutional - of the schools of the Anglo-American axis concerning the European semiperipheral schools of the cases under analysis. Although IR is a markedly western discipline (Hobson 2012), it is important to realize that there are identitarian and cultural differences in the various academic communities that compose it. These differences are explained by the diversity of historical contexts and consequent reflexes in the academic and scientific contexts.

The article is organized into three parts. It begins by presenting the main contexts and political-academic frameworks of the birth and formation of the discipline, namely the importance of the American school in the affirmation of IR as an autonomous social science. Secondly, it addresses the European views on IR discipline, highlighting its most developed schools: the English school and the Nordic school. Finally, it presents a brief contextualization of the rediscovery and affirmation of IR in Continental Europe, underlining the main institutional and scientific frameworks of the French and German schools.

Its main argument is that to achieve a sophisticated understanding of the birth and development of academic disciplines, we must develop an interconnected analysis between historical-political contexts and academic-scientific contexts. Conscious of the limitations of an article to capture all the

dimensions present at the birth of IR, this work is another contribution to the comparative study of the identity of the discipline and, above all, an invitation for current and future generations to assume the historical condition of IR and explore more and better the relationship between ideas and contexts.

The Anglo-American Center of the World and the Invention of the Discipline: Dialectic between International Relations Policy and IR Science

IR as an autonomous scientific discipline emerged in the early twentieth century in the United Kingdom and the US. Although in 1859 the Chichele Chair of International Law and Diplomacy began in Oxford, where international phenomena were already being analyzed, it is possible to identify the birth of the discipline in the early years of the twentieth century. The publication in 1900 of Paul S. Reinsch's *World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century* was the first book written from the standpoint of an autonomous IR discipline (Olson, Groom 1991). Reinsch was a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin and began teaching a course entitled "Contemporary International Politics" in 1906 (Schmidt 2008). There is no unanimity about the first IR academic journal. Some point out that it was the *International Conciliation*, founded in 1910 and published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Olson and Groom 1991, 47-48). Others point out that the first IR Journal was the *Journal of Race Development* (1910), later designated the *Journal of International Relations* (1919), taking its final form in 1922 as *Foreign Affairs* (Vitalis 2005).

From an institutional point of view, although the American Political Science Association (APSA) has existed since 1903⁵, it was in 1919 that the first IR chair at the University of Wales in Aberystwyth was born. At the same time in London and New York are born the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and the Council of Foreign Relations. Founded respectively in 1920 and 1921, these private institutions aimed to promote the scientific study of international issues (Olson, Groom 1991; Schmidt 2013).

5 The birth of APSA was an important milestone for the birth of IR, and can be assumed as one of its main origins (Schmidt 1998; Vitalis 2005). By 1920 the APSA already had 1300 members, by 1940 it reached 2800. In response to the discontent of APSA leadership and the need for affirmation of international studies, a group of internationalist scholars and practitioners founded the International Studies Association (ISA) in 1958. Originally ISA was a regional association that ranged from 60 to two hundred members. Today, although headquartered in the US, is an international organization with over 6000 members, <https://www.isanet.org/ISA/About-ISA/History>.

They are still two of the world's most influential *Think Thanks* today and the sponsors of two major academic journals, *International Affairs* and the *Foreign Affairs*⁶. Then, in Geneva (IHES)⁷ and London (LSE), the first IR research and teaching centers appear⁸. All of these early IR centers are closely related to the historical-political contexts of the time, notably the Grocian and liberal environment that encouraged the search for war solutions. Therefore, many of the academic-institutional leaders of this period have a close connection with the political world, such as diplomats, rulers or government advisers, or even as political leaders of pacifist movements.

However, it was in the US that the study of IR begins to strengthen and a new social science discipline was invented. Initially at the Universities of Chicago, South California (SIR), Columbia, Georgetown⁹, Wisconsin, which were quickly followed by all major American universities, notably Harvard, Stanford, MIT, John Hopkins, Yale, Michigan, and Princeton¹⁰. It was at the University of Chicago that the Committee on International Relations began undergraduate studies in IR in 1928. The University of Chicago was a pioneer school in the development of PS and IR and it was there that, from 1943 Morgenthau (1948) wrote the fundamental works of Realism and tried to impose his vision against the American PS behaviorist revolution (Guillot, 2008; 2017a). Chicago was also home to the liberal Quincy Wright, author of the seminal study, *Study of War* (1942), as well as *The Study of International Relations* (1955), where he advocates IR autonomy, but also underlines its interdisciplinary character, in particular in relation to geography and psychology.

Although the discipline took its first steps in the first decades of the century. In the twentieth century, it is from the new postwar international or-

6 Founded in 1922, they are ranked 8th in WOS JCR respectively. Although both *policy-oriented*, *Foreign Affairs*, despite its scientific rigor and unmatched impact and dissemination, is not a peer-reviewed journal, unlike *International Affairs*.

7 The institute (universitaire) of hautes études internationales was founded in 1927 and was the first school exclusively dedicated to studying IR, it was also one of the first schools to offer a doctorate in IR. <http://graduateinstitute.ch/home/about-us/discover-the-institute.html>

8 In 1924 the LSE began teaching IR under the responsibility of the Sir Ernest Cassel Chair of International Relations under Philip Noel-Baker. In 1927 the current IR department is created, which in 1936 receives the Montague Burton Professorship of International Relations Chair, which had already been established in 1930 in Oxford (Bauer, Brighi 2003).

9 The Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service was founded in 1919, the first policy school.

10 This is a selection with criteria of historical relevance but is not exhaustive. There were other universities that played an important role at the beginning of the IR study but, due to article size limitations, are not included. For example, Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy is established in 1933 and is one of the oldest schools to teach IR.

der that the simultaneous development of the political and scientific hegemony of the United States is being developed. It was in the USA that IR gains the contours of autonomous academic scientific discipline, although assumed as an integral part of the PS and Government departments.

Even today the perennial question about whether IR is an autonomous discipline, a sub-discipline of PS, or an inter-discipline (Olson, Onuf 1985, 4) is debatable. This debate, still useful for stimulating controversy, has become outdated by the assumption of IR autonomy. However, the progressive autonomy of the IR discipline does not mean a denial of its natural connection to PC or its interdisciplinary character. The issue of specialization and disciplinary hybridization is a general phenomenon in all disciplines in contemporary science, understanding this is as natural as understanding the existence of disciplinary boundaries.

Due to the exceptional postwar American political and intellectual environment, a rapid theoretical and institutional consolidation of the teaching and research of political and government studies was possible. This context, coupled with the need for the US to produce useful knowledge in shaping its foreign policy, has made IR a central field of study. As Stanley Hoffman¹¹ (1977) has noted, IR in their theoretical and institutional origin were an “American social science.” It was here that the IR came of age and the main stages where the great debates that built the discipline’s identity took place were the universities and Journals in the US.

This does not mean that there were no major European, mainly Anglo-Saxon and Nordic, contributions throughout their major disciplinary debates: idealism / realism; traditionalism / scientism; pluralism-marxism / neoliberalism / neorealism; dominant theories / critiques / normative-positivism / post-positivism; rationalism / constructivism. For example, it is not possible to analyze the critical dissent and rise of constructivism and sociological approaches at the turn of the century without the participation of European IR. However, from a historical perspective, IR was dominated by US scholars. While there are exceptions from the UK and English School, Raymond Aron, and leading Canadian, Nordic, and Australian authors, the rule was that IR was a North American discipline during the twentieth century.

It is therefore unanimous that the discipline developed with an academic divide between the American Core and all other communities (Holsti 1985; Wever 1998; Friedrichs 2004; Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al 2016; Maliniak et al 2018). This division is sometimes assumed, subjectively, as negative.

¹¹ Stanley Hoffman was born in Austria and lived and studied in France (Science PO, Paris), a French citizen and Jewish refugee. He became an important US RI academic at Harvard, where he founded the Center for European Studies in 1968.

This is not our case. Although aware of the limitations of any hegemonic domain, in science, as in politics, hegemony is a condition based on objective capabilities. As is demonstrable, the American domain of scientific production in IR is no different from the American domain of scientific production in other social sciences (Kristensen 2013). While it is possible to see a relative parochialism of US domination in IR (Biersteker 2009), we should not over-flush its shortcomings or diminish its qualities. Without the American scientific world there would hardly be an IR discipline. However, in this process, we must also not overlook the intellectual role of European emigrant academics. Many of the greatest academic talents of the formative years of the discipline, such as John Herz, Karl Deutsch, Ernest Haas, and Morgenthau, came from continental Europe to the US fled from Nazism. This scientific migratory cycle was one of the key elements for the rapid affirmation of the US academic and scientific world, not only in PS / IR but in all other social and non-social science disciplines.

The consequences of World War II were also devastating for academic life in continental Europe, where more than a decade was lost. Most of the top social scientists in northern Europe have resumed their careers in the US. This generation of exiles even originated the creation of a new school, the New School for Social Research in New York. All major American universities had at least one European professor in exile at their social science faculties. Inescapable scholars such as Paul Lazarsfeld, Kurt Lewin, Wolfgang Kohler, Hans Spier, Leo Lowenthal, Leo Strauss, Franz Neuman, Henry Ehrman, Otto Kirchheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and others have been instrumental in US academic excellence. On the other hand, while modern PS indeed made its most significant advances in the US after World War II, let us not forget that the founders of American PS - Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnows, Charles Merriam - obtained their degrees or postgraduates studies in Europe, mainly in Germany (Almond 1998).

This means that we should tint the idea that IR is just an American invention. From an intellectual point of view, IR are as much or more European than American. What happened is that in the USA there were material, institutional and ideational conditions that allowed the rapid development of political studies and in particular of IR. As in other fields, the US has presented innovative opportunities for academic project development without the corporate and funding constraints in Europe. Especially at this time, the US lived a true enlightenment period that propitiated a unique development of Political Science and where the ideas of European emigrant academics were decisive.

Although not overwhelmingly, as happened in the formative years of

the discipline, it is possible to see the continuity of US academic hegemony. In the most relevant schools, Journals, and academics, even today the brightest stars¹² are North American. This does not mean that there are no such or shimmering stars outside the US, but as a rule, to shine and achieve academic stardom the most effective way is to step on the American stage.

Although imperfect and debatable, studies of IR rankings give us a clear picture of this hegemony. As a rule, in the Top 10 of the first cycle are: Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, Columbia, Georgetown, Yale, Chicago, Dartmouth, George Washington, and American. In the second cycle are: Georgetown, John Hopkins, Harvard, Princeton, Tufts, Columbia, George Washington, American, LSE, Chicago. In the third cycle are: Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, Columbia, Yale, Chicago, UCSD, C. Berkley, Michigan, MIT. In the top 10 of the journals we have, as a rule, seven American journals, two English and one European, often on par with the Nordic ones. This reflects well the relative importance of their academic communities. However, the European journal, *European Journal International of International Relations* (1995)¹³ was the one that most affirmed itself in relative terms. Another recent Journal that stands out for its progressive affirmation is *International Political Sociology* (2007), which was a project that also had an important European contribution. Another example that demonstrates the development of IR in Europe is the statement of the *Journal of International Relations and Development*, which went from Q4 at Scopus SJR in 1999 to Q1 in 2017.

Despite their relative variability, as a rule, all studies show that by combining citation impact with reputational impact¹⁴, journals that consistently rank first are Anglo-American and Nordic. (Breuning, Bredehoft and Walton 2005; Giles, Garand 2007; Maliniak et al 2012, 2014)¹⁵. First, we have the

12 Today, as in the past, many leading scholars are not originally American, but their careers and founding works were born in the US, so they are considered American scholars.

13 This Journal was originally sponsored by the Standing Group on International Relations (SGIR) of the European Consortium for Political Research (EPCR). There is currently a joint sponsorship of SGIR and the European International Studies Association.

14 The impact factor is relevant for hard and natural sciences. In social and human sciences it is more debatable. The quantitative “fever” of metrics, citations and rankings does not necessarily reflect the quality and innovation of published articles, often having perverse effects. However, they are a useful element of analysis. One of the reputational factors is the age of the Journals. As a rule, top journals were established before 1990. Exceptions that confirm the rule are, for example, the *International Studies Review* (1994) or the *Security Studies* (1991), but still they date back further on. In the 21st century there was a boost in IR that reflects the global diffusion of the discipline, as well as the industrialization of the scientific market.

15 According to TRIP (Maliniak et al 2012) the twenty most influential journals are: 1. *International Organization*; 2. *International Studies Quarterly*; 3. *International Security*; 4. *Foreign Affairs*; 5. *APSR*; 6. *World Politics*; 7. *European Journal of International Relations*; 8. *Journal of*

North American: *International Organization*; *International Security*; *World Politics*; *International Studies Quarterly*; the most comprehensive *American Political Science Review* and *American Journal of Political Science*; and the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Then comes the *European Journal of International Relations* and the *English Review of International Studies* and *Millennium*, to which we have to add the Nordic. Strictly speaking, the *Nordic Journal of Peace Research*; *Cooperation and Conflict* and *Security Dialogue* are often above English, and even US, at the impact factor level¹⁶.

If we increase to a top 20 the difference is blurred. If we consider the post-1990 emergency and the affirmation of new journals, then Europe, along with other continents, can balance and even surpass the US. This confirms two trends. First, the traditional US domain. Second, the global emergence of IR, notably its growing affirmation in continental Europe. This phenomenon is not limited to Europe. Globally there is a movement of institutional and scientific solidification of the study of IR. Especially in Latin America¹⁷, notably Brazil¹⁸, and Asia, where the highlight goes to India¹⁹ and China²⁰.

Conflict Resolution; 9.Foreign Policy; 10.Review of International Studies; 11.Millennium: Journal of International Studies; 12.AJPS; 13.International Affairs; 14.Security Studies; 15.Review of International Political Economy; 16. Journal of Peace Research; 17. International Studies Review; 18.International Relations; 19.Comparative Politics; 20.Global Governance.

16 Based on the JCR, International Relations, 2017 Web of Science (WOS), Social Science Citations Index (SSCI) (<http://mjil.clarivate.com/cgi-bin/jrnlst/jlsubcatg.cgi?PC=SS>)

17 According to the Scopus 2017 SJR which includes 466 PS and IR Journals (<https://www.scimagojr.com/journalrank.php?area=3300&category=3320>) we can highlight PUC's *Revista de Ciencia Política* (166), Santiago de Chile, CIDE's *Política y Gobierno* (199), Mexico (which are part of the WOS *Social Sciences Citation Index* (SSCI) and JCR) and *Colombia International* (256), of the University of the Andes.

18 As a rule, major Brazilian universities have undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in IR. There are about thirteen IR academic journals in Brazil. The journals that make up the Scopus SJR (2017) in PS / IR are: *Austral* (266); the *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* (298) and *Estudos Internacionais*. However, RBPI is the only one that integrates the WOS SSCI and JCR and, according to TRIP, the most relevant Journal for the Brazilian IR community. Without being exhaustive, but trying to overcome the limitations (commercial and quantitative) of ranking marketing, it is necessary to introduce qualitative rigor. Thus, by associating the impact factor with the reputational factor, it is possible to highlight, for example, the *Contexto Internacional* of PUC-Rio and the *Brazilian Journal of International Relations* of UNESP, two journals not indexed by Scopus, but from two major universities. Then it is necessary to integrate other interdisciplinary journals that publish IR articles. Some of the most relevant are the *Revista Sociologia e Política*; the *Opinião Pública*; the *Dados*; the *Lua Nova*; the *Brazilian Political Science Review*; or the *Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política*. On the Brazilian IR community and its relative perception of American hegemony see Villa, and Pimenta (2017); on the production of national concepts see Cervo (2008).

19 Some of the most relevant IR Journals in India are the *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*; *India Quarterly* and *International Studies*.

20 China exhibits extraordinary developments, with Chinese scholars publishing in leading

Although rankings are mainly quantitative aggregate data that do not accurately reflect the quality of teaching and research, particularly about smaller schools, they serve as indicators for the Anglo-American mastery of the subject. Thus, on average, the Anglo-American university world represents 77% of the Top 25, and from this the US represents 70%.

Table 1. Ranking Universities in PS / IR

op 25, 2018 QS WUR¹⁹	Top 25, 2018, THE WUR²⁰
1 Harvard	1 Oxford
2 Oxford	2 Harvard
3 Princeton	2 MIT
4 Sciences Po	4 Stanford
5 London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)	5 Princeton
6 Cambridge	6 Cambridge
7 Yale	7 Chicago
8 Australian National University (ANU)	8 Yale
9 California, Berkeley	9 Michigan
10 Columbia	10 LSE
11 Georgetown	11 California, Berkeley
12 National University of Singapore (NUS)	12 Columbia
13 Chicago	13 Pennsylvania
14 Toronto	14.LSE
15 Tokyo	15 California, Los Angeles

journals. China's rise is central to IR as it is the only individual actor capable of mitigating US hegemony. Its major institutional milestone is the relevance of its flagship journal: the *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, which ranks 22th in the WOS SSCI JCR ranking in IR (85 journals).

21 QS World University rankings (Politics & International Studies) Available at: <https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/university-subject-rankings/2018/politics>

22 Times Higher Education World University Rankings, 2018 (politics and international studies). Available at: https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2018/subject-ranking/socialsciences#!/page/0/length/25/subjects/3090/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats

16 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), EUA	16 Cornell
17 Stanford	17 UCLondon
=18 Sydney	18 Wisconsin-Madison
=18 California, Los Angeles	19 New York
20 Freie Universitaet Berlin	20 Amsterdam
21 California, San Diego	21 NUS
22 Johns Hopkins	22 Peking
23 SOAS, London	23 ANU
=24 George Washington	23 ETH Zurich
=24 Hong Kong	25 Northwestern

This domain is, even more, overwhelming in the opinion of IR experts and scholars, as shown below. Of course, the surveys are also a product of the Anglo-American world and most likely if they were conducted and published by a European Journal the results would be different, but not completely.

Table 2. Top 25 IR Graduate Programs

Master in Public Policy Careers ²¹	Doctorates for academic careers ²²
1.Georgetown	1.Harvard
2.Harvard	2.Princeton
3.Johns Hopkins	3.Stanford
4.Princeton	4.Columbia
5.Columbia	5.Chicago
6.Tufts	6.Yale
7.George Washington	7.California, San Diego
8.American	8.MIT
9.LSE	9. Michigan
10.Chicago	10.California, Berkeley

23 "Top Master's Programs for Policy Career in International Relations" Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/20/top-fifty-schools-international-relations-foreign-policy/>. Access 12 june 2018.

24 "Ph.D. Programs for Academic Career in International Relations". Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/20/top-fifty-schools-international-relations-foreign-policy/>. ccess 13 june 2018.

11.Stanford	11.Georgetown
12.Oxford	12 Oxford
13.Yale	13.Cornell
14.Denver	14.LSE
15.California, San Diego	15.Ohio State
16.Syracuse	16.Johns Hopkins
17.Cambridge	17.George Washington
18.MIT	18.Cambridge
18.Michigan	19.American
20.California, Berkeley	20.Duke
20.Pittsburgh	21.New York
22.New York	22.Tufts
22.Sciences Po	22.Minnesota
24.Duke	24. Wisconsin, Madison
25. SOAS	25.California, Los Angeles

Table 3. Key US Institutional and Scientific Milestones

Major Institutional Milestones	IR Journals, (Index JCR, WOS, 2017)
American Political Science Association 1903 1st Foreign Policy School, Georgetown 1919 Council of Foreign Relations 1921 1st Study cycle, Chicago 1928 International Studies Association 1958	American Political Science Review 1906 Foreign Affairs 1922 (4) International Organization 1947 (1) World Politics 1948 (6) American Journal of Political Science 1956 International Studies Quarterly 1957 (17) Journal of Conflict Resolution 1957 (5) Ethics & International Affairs 1958 (50) International Security 1976 (2) International Studies Review 1994 (28) International Studies Perspectives 2000 (51) International Theory 2009 (26)

Source: Own elaboration based on the cited rankings.

International Relations in Europe, the other center

The United Kingdom and the English School

The United Kingdom (UK) played a significant role in the early years of institutionalization of the discipline. Alongside the US, it was in the UK that IR was more and better institutionalized. In the US the rule was that IR specialize as an integrated discipline in PS, with neopositivist methodological concerns and a strong rationalist and neoeconomic influence. In the UK, IR were developing relatively more autonomously. Although with natural links to PS, the most distinctive influence of IR in the UK is their greatest interpretative-historicist concern, their methodological pluralism, and their particular connection to history and political theory.

Compared to the US, the English School (ES) has less concern with the formalization of inferential relationships and the construction of neopositivist models of behaviorist and economic influence. The great difference between IR in the US and the UK can be summarized in the dominant existence of a tendentially deductive, nomological, and empiricist approach by the American school, in contrast to the existence of a more interpretive and critical approach to positivist empiricism. part of the ES.

Next to the US, the English school, in a broad sense, is the largest network of IR scholars and has a major influence on the global marketplace for the subject's ideas. The greatest proof of this influence was the ability of English scholars to make IS one of the main IR theories. This capability has had its corollary in establishing a section on ES at the International Studies Association (ISA). In the words of its promoters, the rationale for this section is: "The English school is widely recognized as one of the main theoretical traditions in the study of IR. The North American component of the worldwide English school community is substantial, and section status within ISA would consolidate its place in the global network."²⁵

We cannot disconnect ES promoters' efforts from their instrumental affirmation strategy to diminish US hegemony in the discipline. On the other hand, and in parallel, there has been a strategy of trying to create more and better bridges between the English school and the Continental IR to precisely bridge the imbalance between the two sides of the Atlantic. As always, there are both positive and negative aspects of these strategies.

Due to article size limitations, we will not further develop our methodical position of doubt as to whether ES is a major theory of IR, with its research

25 Available at: www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/.../english-school/isasection.pdf.

program and a set of unique and independent paradigmatic axioms. We can, however, cast some clarifying questions on our position. Is ES possible to be a major theory when it is relatively easy to identify realists, idealists, neo-marxists, critics, liberals and constructivists? Can ES unambiguously be considered a theoretical paradigm of IR when it is itself embedded in theoretical paradigms?

However, this does not mean *capitis diminutio* for ES's theoretical arguments (Mendes 2019). Quite the contrary. At a time when paradigmatic wars are to be abandoned, the radicalism of the isms (Lake 2011) is challenged and a greater theoretical-paradigmatic eclecticism is proposed, the ES emerges as a theoretical castle-ideal refuge to escape paradigmatic battles and practice a kind of holistic theoretical eclecticism.

But what is ES anyway? In its strictest sense, ES concerns a group of theorists and practitioners who founded the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (BCTIP) in January 1959 and who, in parallel, developed their pedagogical and scientific work around the IR Department of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Chatham House, and the University of Cambridge (Vigazzi 2005). There are two main ES periods (Dunne 1998). The first is that of his creation and production of his classic works (1950-1980) and where Charles Manning, Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, Adam Watson and RJ Vincent predominate. The second, from the nineties, is the post-classical period and its most striking authors are Barry Buzan, Andrew Hurrell, Robert Jackson, Edward Kenne, Andrew Linklater, Richard Little, James Mayall, Hidemi Suganami, Nicholas J. Wheller. Once again it is clear that questions like: is EH Carr not part of ES? And isn't Linklater a striking figure of critical theories? And aren't the classic Northedge and Evan Luard, or the contemporary Steve Smith part of ES? And aren't your critics (Roy Jones 1981) part of the ES?

Apparently no. That is why we can say that, in reality, IS in the strict sense is linked to a group of scholars who have produced outstanding works within the BCTIP and have become unavoidable works of a classical, traditional, interpretative and normative approach to IR theory. Although they overlap, we should not merge IS as a theoretical approach, of English school as a set of academics and their institutions. For example, the British International Studies Association (BISA) was born with another logic in 1973. Although it was also an institutional instrument for promoting the ES. The oldest British association is The Political Studies Association (PSA), which began in 1959 following IPSA and which, like the latter, received initial support from AACP and UNESCO.

The English school means, on the one hand, the *locus* of formation and construction of a rich and peculiar academic culture, the United Kingdom, namely of the best and oldest universities to study the political phenomena, especially Oxford, Cambridge and the LSE. On the other hand, the ES is

a theoretical approach to the study of international relations which, although Anglo-Saxon, is distinct from the US dominant school and yet also different, because more sophisticated, from the continental European schools that originally thought the state, power and international relations based on *realpolitik* and traditional diplomatic history.

Although originated from authors with a significant epistemological and methodological variety among themselves, the *English way* of thinking and investigating international relations was surviving its founders and resisting the progressive Americanization of the discipline. Recently we have witnessed a resurgence of its importance and theoretical identity to such an extent that in sec. XXI, no IR Theories manual does not identify it as one of its main theories.

In a synthesis effort we can say that the fundamental concepts for the ES are *Order*, *International Society*, and the relationship between *norms* and *anarchy*. From a theoretical-paradigmatic point of view, ES places particular emphasis on the importance of the *historical interpretation* of the evolution of international society, its characterization and *juridical-normative* construction and, finally, the *philosophical* questioning about the balance between national power and cosmopolitan ethics in international relations (Linklater, Suganami 2006).

From a meta-theoretical point of view the ES occupies a place that can be situated in the middle space between a rationalist-positivist position and a reflexivist-postpositivist position. Today, leading English scholars emphasize the need for ES to make an effort to establish greater theoretical coherence, especially in terms of its epistemology and ontology (Buzan 2004, 2001). If so, IS has the potential to assert itself as a major theory and a true middle way between reflexivist and rationalist theories. The main arguments that are presented for this potential of theoretical affirmation lie in the importance of the central concepts developed by the ES.

Firstly, Martin Wight's (1991) idea of the three theoretical traditions on the interpretation of international relations - realism, rationalism, revolutionism - allows an approach that encompasses various perspectives on international relations, which emphasizes the holistic and integrative nature of the ES. Secondly, despite the debate between *conservative pluralist* and *progressive solidarity's* theories (Wheeler 1992), the ontological assumption of the existence of an *International Society* - and the neo-groecian nature of international relations - was, and remains, one of the most interesting and innovative thinking about international relations. Second, its non-positivist and contestatory character of the American rationalist / positivist dominant view has always allowed the ES to develop a more interpretive approach and to build bridges of dialogue with classic, normative, constructivist and critical approaches.

However, the ES major contribution to the progress of the discipline was the development of a theoretical vision capable of integrating history and

philosophy into a political theory of international society. This originality led Brown (2000) to remember that if International Relations is an American social science, then *International Political Theory* is an English social science.

Table 4. Key UK Institutional and Scientific Milestones

Major Institutional Milestones	IR Journals, (Index JCR, WOS, 2017)
1 st Studies Cycle, Aberystwyth 1919, LSE 1924 Royal Institute of International 1920 British Committee on the Theory of International Politics 1959 The Political Studies Association 1959 British International Studies Association 1973	International Affairs 1922 (8) Political Studies 1953 (53) International Relations 1957 (43) International Politics 1964 (62) Millennium 1971 (33) Review of International Studies 1975 (20) Cambridge Review International Affairs 1986 (68) British journal of Politics and IR 1999 (31)

Source: Own elaboration based on the cited rankings.

The Nordic School

Among the various geocultural traditions of IR in Continental Europe is one that stands out: the Nordic school. We can say that the Nordic school is the only one that has an internationally recognized identity, even by the Anglo-American center of discipline. This feature cannot be detached from time and the way IR was established in Scandinavia. Here IR discipline, especially the field of peace research, was established earlier than in most other continental Europe. This school consists of a regional cooperation network with major centers in Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland. From an institutional point of view, this cooperation is led by the Nordic Political Science Association (NOPSA) and the Nordic International Studies Association (NISA).

The origin of the Nordic school dates back to the mid-fifties and its first major institutional framework was the Peace Research Institute which was born in Oslo in 1959 under Galtung's leadership. Following this, and with its sponsorship, the Journal of Peace Research emerged in 1964. Another relevant institutional framework is located in Copenhagen and is associated with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute founded in 1985 and integrated from 2003 into the current Danish Institute of International Studies. It was here that the Copenhagen School on security studies was consolidated. There are also several other relevant IR centers from which we can highlight Lund University,

Oslo University Center for European Studies (ARENA), Copenhagen University, Aarhus, Stockholm and Helsinki; the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), or the Upsala University to which Walter Carlsnaes, founding editor of the *European Journal International Report* (EJIR) and co-editor of the *SAGE Handbook of International Relations*, is attached.

The Nordic school has always had direct and indirect links with the American school. The best example is the brothers K. Holsti and O. Holsti who are relevant Anglo-American scholars, although of Finnish origin. After Americana (1903) and Canadiana (1913) the Finnish Political Science Association is the oldest (1936) and at the beginning of the institutionalization of the PS in Europe, the Nordics were always present, as demonstrated by the birth of the International Association of Political Science (IPSA) in 1949 (Boncourt 2009).

Although the Nordic singularity may in some respects show signs of erosion (Browning 2007), the Nordic IR school is an accomplished example of this singularity. This school is the result of an interesting fusion between the Anglo-Saxon world and a particular geocultural phenomenological approach. Its great distinctive innovation vis-à-vis the American school was to relativize the role of material power in IR. Unlike the neo-economic and rationalist dominant school of structural realism, the Nordic school did not naturalize anarchy and hierarchical relations of material power, and attempted a more sociological analysis of international relations. The Nordic school has not only focused on the political processes of the great powers in international politics and has given prominence to domestic politics and sub-national actors (Jönsson 1993). Based on this epistemological option and its historical identity and culture, the Nordic school has developed a sophisticated Foreign Policy Analysis (Weaver 1994; Carlsnaes 1993, 1994; Gustavsson 1999; Jørgensen 2015; Mellander, Mouritzen 2016). In this context, the Nordic school was decisive for the development of an EPA on the European Union (Larsen 2009; Jørgensen et. Al. 2015).

In the Nordic countries IR has always been assumed as an important and autonomous discipline with a strong international component. This is why there are important university centers in the Nordic countries and journals with a relevant international circulation are published. The Nordic school is a good example of how, through regional cooperation, it is possible to simultaneously and interconnectedly develop nationally and internationally a theoretical and institutional identity with a global impact on IR discipline. Thus, the success of the Nordic multilevel cooperation model (national, regional, European and transatlantic) can be a model for all IR semiperipheral communities (Friedrichs 2006; 2004). Finally, it should be recalled that it was the Nordics who first stressed the need to develop an IR Eurodiscipline (Apunen 1993).

Table 5. Key Institutional and Scientific Milestones of the Nordic School

Major Institutional Milestones	IR Journals, (Index JCR, WOS, 2017)
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) 1959 Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) 1959 Nordic Political Science Association 1975 Copenhagen Peace Research Institute 1985; Danish Institute of International Studies, 2003 Nordic International Studies Association 1991	Journal of Peace Research 1964 (15) Cooperation and Conflict 1965 (14) Scandinavian Political Studies 1966 Security Dialogue 1970 (9) Internasjonal Politikk (85)

Source: Own elaboration based on the cited rankings.

From the periphery of the formative years of IR to the rediscovery and affirmation of Continental IR: the cases of France and Germany

The French school

In continental Europe, there have always been important academic and political thinking centers that have continued to study international relations. However, continental approaches to international relations have always been done through other disciplines, namely history, international law or sociology, without much concern for their autonomy, as IR was assumed as a non-autonomous multidisciplinary field of study. . International relations were an object of study and not a particular ontological and disciplinary methodology²⁶.

In France, it is possible to identify the beginning of the institutionalization of Sciences Politiques in 1871, with the creation of the École Libre des Sciences Politiques. In Belgium, in 1892, the Ecole des Sciences Politiques et Sociales was founded at the Catholic University of Louvain (Giesen 2006). The first scientific center to be born in France is the Center d'études de politique étrangère (CEPE), which was created in 1935, in the image of the Royal Institute of International Affairs of London with which it establishes relations. At this stage, there is cooperation between these organizations and the SDN Institute

²⁶ This view was striking in the birth of IR in Portugal and even today French continental influences persist in understanding what IR is. Even today, both in France and in other non-theoretical communities, sometimes international relations tend to be confused with international journalism, that is, with the simple empirical description of facts (Mendes 2012, 2014).

for Intellectual Cooperation (Guillot 2017b). Which again proves that the IR discipline, like the international order, has a pre and post-1945 history. In the early, liberal period, discipline was not institutionalized, and in Europe the ways and means of studying international relations were discussed (Zimmerman 1939). After 1945, Europe and France are torn apart and will no longer lead the political and scientific institutionalization of the new international order.

The professionalization of the PS study in France is already emerging in the new US-led order. The APSA will encourage the birth of national European associations and the birth of the International Political Science Association (IPSA). IPSA was founded in Paris in 1949 and was attended by Raymond Aron. The French Association of Political Science is also born in 1949.

Despite the French connection to the American Realists and the Rockefeller Foundation (Guillot 2017b), IR began to develop in the US at a different pace and course than in France. This gave rise to the fact that, 11 years before Stanley Hofman, a Frenchman launches the question: “L’Étude des relations internationales, spécialité américaine?” (Grosser 1956).

Thus, unlike the Anglo-American world, the first relevant works of the French IR appeared only in the sixties, namely Aron’s *Paix et Guerre* (1962) and Renouvin and Duroselle’s *Introduction à l’Histoire des Relations Internationales* (1964).

However, we can say that there has always been a French IR school, with particular emphasis on its historic school led by Renouvin and Duroselle. This school combines the comparative-conceptual *longue durée* influence of the *École des Annales* with the eventual tradition of diplomatic history. Here, Braudel’s work, namely his four main axes of inquiry into historical structures - time, space, social orders, and hierarchy - originated pioneering work on the understanding of civilizations and the historical evolution of societies and capitalism towards economic globalization. This approach was striking in the French school of the humanities and social sciences, to which French IR was not immune either. The famous “deep forces” (Renouvin, Duroselle 1991) and the attempt to construct a history-based IR theory (Duroselle, 1992; 1952) are one of the best examples of this influence.

Subsequently, a more sociological approach emerged that advocated overcoming the empirical view and the need for a theoretical-problematic perspective (Merle 1982, 1986). This perspective advocated the possibility of reconciling the concepts of the American school with the developments of French political sociology. Although always with encyclopedic resistances and specificities, the French sociological school has been affirmed to this day (Smouths 1987; Badie and Smouths 1992).

In addition to France there is a French-speaking academic community - starting with Switzerland, passing through Belgium and arriving in Quebec²⁷ - which have dedicated themselves to IR. Following the French tradition, as a rule, they approach IR in a perspective of international studies and multidisciplinary interconnection with the traditional Sciences Politiques (History, Sociology, Philosophy, International Law, Economics) (Chillaud 2009). This has always meant a subordination of IR to traditional and dominant social sciences in the French university world, posing corporate-institutional obstacles to their academic self-determination. These French characteristics are also present in the foundation of the discipline in Portugal (Mendes 2014).

On the other hand, the language issue was important in the Anglo-American domain in the discipline. Despite good transatlantic relations between the intellectual elites of the discipline, in the early years the generality of the North American academic community - especially students - read little French and the French, in turn, also read little English. This helped the non-development of French IR and the hegemony of the English language. Except of Aron, which has been translated into English, the French-speaking community has never been recognized as part of the IR academic community by the Anglo-Saxon world. It also demonstrates that often important and theoretically relevant work for IR progress is simply lost without translation.

France still doesn't have a Journal on the JCR WOS IR index today. In the index for PS, there is not the AFSP-sponsored journal, the *Revue Française de Science Politique*, but the oldest and interdisciplinary *Revue d'Économie Politique* (1887), reflecting, moreover, the historical tradition of political economy as a precursor of Political Science²⁸.

Another feature of the French IR is their Parisian macrocephaly, reflecting the French sociological and political reality. All major IR study centers are concentrated in Paris. Here we can highlight the Center d'études des relations internationales (CERI), founded in 1952 at the Sciences Po by historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. Never changing its acronym, in 1976 it became Center d'études et de recherches internationales and in 2015 it becomes the current Center de recherches internationales.

At the University of Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne), the department of po-

27 Since 1970, the University of Laval has edited *Études Internationales* Journal, an important publication in the French-speaking world.

28 The main French IR Journals are *Critique Internationale*, *Cultures & Conflicts*, *Politique Étrangère*, *Revue Française de Science Politique*, *Relations Internationales* and *Revue Internationale et Stratégiques*, among others. In France there is a French indexation that is composed of 91 "Sciences Politiques" journals, Available at: <https://www.cairn.info/listerev.php?editeur=&discipline=10>

litical studies was founded in 1969, and included Maurice Duverger, Madeleine Grawitz, Leo Hamon and Marcel Merle. From 1977 onwards, an IR specialization emerged in the Master of Science Politique. In 1979 the Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI) was created, which then started publishing the oldest French Journal of IR, founded in 1936 within the CEPE, *Politique Étrangère*. This Journal is a perfect example of the early parochialism of the French IR. Although it is an old and quality Journal, it is essentially non-theoretical and based on empirical-descriptive objectives, having no international circulation outside the francophone world.

Indeed, French IR did not participate in the main debates that invented and socially constructed the IR discipline (Friedrichs 2001). However, in the transition of the century, French IR followed the global movement of IR affirmation. At the same time, the IR discipline has rediscovered the importance of French sociology (Jackson 2008; Bigo 2011; Adler-Nissen 2012) and several French authors have come to be recognized globally. The greatest example is that of Bertrand Badie. Several of his latest works have been translated and he is the only French to be entitled to a Theory Talk²⁹. Other French-born scholars have been able to make their mark in current IR, notably Didier Bigo co-founder and editor of *International Political Sociology*, Vincent Pouliot (2008) and Nicolas Guillot. These authors are examples of theoretical integration into the Anglo-American world of discipline. This means that there is a tendency for the emergence of some French authors and consequent internationalization in the center. However, as a rule, there remains in France an emancipatory view of the French IR against US rule. This view, by the way, seems to gain strength with the French's attempt to ally with the current global and counter-hegemonic movement of peripheral IR (Balzacq, Cornut, and Ramel, 2017).

The case of Germany

Due to the historical circumstances that led to the instability and emergence of Nazism in Germany, in the foundational and formative years of the discipline (1919-1980) the important Germanic academic world took no particular prominence. As Czempiel, one of the deans of the German IR, has captured, the discipline in Germany was generally underdeveloped, as it was not in line with the theoretical debates and the respective scientific reference standards of the discipline - read the Anglo-American world. -sonic (Humrich 2006).

However, some German authors underline Germany's role in the origin

29 Available at <http://www.theory-talks.org/2017/07/07/theory-talk-74.html>. Accessed March 8, 2018. As well as a chapter in Neumann and Waever (2005).

of Continental IR. Here are pointed out various historical landmarks that can be interpreted as inspiring sources of the birth of discipline in Europe, for example: the German Peace Society (1892), the Colonial Institute of Hamburg (1908) or the Institut für Auswärtige Politik in Hamburg (1923) (Humrich 2006). Strictly speaking, apart from the aforementioned British experience, we can consider that the foundational mark of the discipline in its continental European vision took place in 1939 in Prague. An international conference sponsored by the Society of Nations (SDN) was held here, where attempts were made to discuss the principles of an IR discipline (Jørgensen, Knudsen 2006, 1). However, like SDN, this conference did not have the expected results and its objectives were shattered with the outbreak of World War II.

Although the Deutsche Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft (DVPW), the German Political Science Association, was founded in 1951, and had an important relationship with IPSA, IR was not one of its priorities. This circumstance is also related to Germany's difficult role in the new international order, divided, dependent and limited by Westbindung and Halstein doctrine. After Ostpolitik and the start of détente, Germany gained greater autonomy in its foreign policy which was also reflected in the need to develop its IR.

Thus, we can situate the beginning of the institutionalization of German IR from the mid-sixties. However, the affirmative emergence of the discipline occurs in the nineties, namely with the foundation in 1994 of the Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen (ZIB) (Journal of International Relations). The ZIB sponsored important debates about what German IR were and should be. For example, the debates surrounding its connection to the Frankfurt school and the influence of Habermas; its relation to rationalist institutionalism as well as constructivism. These debates have resulted in important post-critical, institutionalist, and constructivist syntheses in the scientific production of German IR (Jørgensen, Knudsen 2006).

However, the major debate in German IR was about whether IR theorizing ability was dependent on or independent of the Anglo-American center. It was here that the discussion began about home-grown versus imported theorizing. It was at ZIB that Günther Hellmann and Michael Zürn debated the German IR theoretical deficit and its theoretical dependence on the US (Hellmann 1994; Zürn 1994). All agreed on the diagnosis of the need for German IR to solidify and surpass their theoretical underdevelopment. The fundamental question was: how to overcome it?

Helman argued that German IR should follow US theoretical leadership and develop strategies for integrating German IR into US academic debates and forums. In contrast, Zürn advocated a strategy for German IR resilience, a third way between Americanization and German parochialism. Zürn came up

with an interesting metaphor to explain the relationship between the American center and the German IR semi-periphery. In his view, the German rabbit would like to run, but does not do so because he is mesmerized by the American snake (Zurn 1944, 110-111). What Zurn argues is that German IR, instead of developing with their own agenda and theories, risked, through a paralyzing fascination, to be reactively dependent on the agendas of American inquiry.

With the end of the Cold War and reunification, Germany became an important and attractive center for IR study, with its traditional universities not immune to the globalization of discipline and playing an important role in continental rediscovery of International Relations.

It is not possible to perceive the constructivist (re) invention of discipline at the turn of the century without the contribution of German authors. Important authors of German origin, such as Thomas Risse, Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert, Rittenberg, or Michael Zurn, have marked the contemporary IR theoretical agenda and contributed to the erosion of the hegemonic transatlantic division of discipline, notably with a strong participation in the EJIR, the best and most paradigmatic framework for the European affirmation of the discipline (Mendes, 2012).


From an institutional point of view, there is currently an important German IR community. Most German universities offer IR study cycles. Although it is possible to identify a particular theoretical-philosophical bias in the German authors, there is still no German identity of IR, as in law or philosophy. Unlike the Nordic case, there is also no Journal of relevant German international circulation³⁰. However, the German strategy seems to have followed a model of solidification from the outside through internationalization. German academics mimic two tendencies of Central American discipline: on the one hand the rise of the constructivist paradigm and, on the other, non-paradigmatic empirical inquiry (Wemheuer-Vogelaar, Risse, Thomas 2018).

German IR assert themselves and constitute one of the added value of the discipline at both European and global level, read Anglo-American. Its scholars have integrated into the major Anglo-American and European IR circuits and are present in leading journals of the discipline as authors and editors. This means that German IR did not solidify themselves only through Germanization, as Zurn argued, but rather through a simultaneous process of European and American internationalization.

30 ZIB continues to be published in German. In English there is *German Politics*, which is interdisciplinary. There are, however, major journals of area studies, notably Asian (for example: Journal of Current Chinese Affairs and Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs) and African (for example: Afrika Spectrum).

Examples of this integration are the contributions of Helman and Zürn to the theoretical discourse of the discipline. Either through the possibility of dialogues and theoretical syntheses (Helman 2003); assumption of the importance of pragmatism for IR progress (Helman 2009; or through transnational methodological systematization (Helman 2014). Another important mark of German IR is its sophisticated sociological culture. This culture has contributed decisively to greater sociological concern in the IR study (Albert, Buzan and Zürn, 2013).

Fig. 1. Relationship of theoretical and institutional integration between the various academic communities and the Anglo-American center



Source: The Author

Table 6. Characterization of the differentiation versus theoretical integration against the Anglo-American center (0-5)³¹

internationalization	theoretical differentiation	theoretical integration
IR english 5	IR english 3	IR english 5
IR nordic 5	IR nordic 3	IR nordic 5
IR french 2	IR french 4	IR french 2
IR german 4	IR german 2	IR german 4

³¹ 0 nonexistent; 1 very weak; 2 weak; 3 reasonable; 4 strong; 5 very strong.

Final Remarks

IR was a discipline invented and dominated by the Anglo-American world, especially the American school. Although their intellectual roots are European, IR has become autonomous in the Anglo-American world for historical, ideological and institutional reasons. While Europe experienced the destruction of war, in the USA there were material and ideational conditions that provided the consolidation of the study of political science and policy sciences. Then the US leadership in building the new postwar liberal order drove the need for useful knowledge of international politics (Mendes 2020).

Interconnectedly, progressive liberal ideas and principles were particularly influential in the new American world, namely the idea that for every problem there is always a solution. This rationalism, enabling and progressive, originated the institutional development of departments and university schools of political studies and international relations. In its origin, Political Science is national and studies national public policies. Precisely when the United States becomes international leaders, by political obligation and scientific necessity, it turns the study of international politics into a public policy of national interest.

In addition to the US, there are two well-established IR schools with unique epistemological identities and an interesting theoretical capacity to think outside the box: the UK and the Nordics. Both developed with strong relations with the center but at the same time could develop their own theoretical discourse. The United Kingdom gave rise to the English School and International Political Theory. The Nordic School to “peace studies” and a more sociological and less neo-economic view of the FPA.

Regarding the Continental European Schools analyzed, it is important to underline the different institutional and theoretical paths of France and Germany vis-à-vis the Anglo-American center. IR in France was born with the mark of its historical school, later developed a more sociological approach. However, they did not establish relations of theoretical integration with the Anglo-American center. IR in France was a subfield of History and Political Science, with empirical, policy-oriented concerns and few theoretical concerns. The French IR adopted a strategy of resilience and autonomy in the face of the theoretical and institutional models of the construction of discipline in the Anglo-American world. In France, IR has developed a relatively parallel and exclusively Francophone vision. This parish vision lasted until the 21st century. Although France has followed the global diffusion of international studies, this has not erased the historical, encyclopedic, sociological and intellectual culture from the French view of the study of IR.

Unlike France, Germany has not developed a resilient and parochial

attitude of its IR community towards the Anglo-American center. Paradoxically, in the early years of the invention of discipline, French IR had a greater disciplinary tradition than in Germany. In comparative terms, this relative French institutional and autonomic superiority remained post-war until the late 1980s. This situation began to reverse in the nineties. From here, the German IR made a big leap, both qualitative and quantitative, to establish themselves as one of the strongest communities in Continental Europe and to participate in the agendas and theoretical discussions of the Anglo-American center of the discipline. This evolution took place through a simultaneous process of Europeanization and Americanization of German IR.

This article demonstrates five evidences in the development of the discipline. First, IR has a strong relationship with international relations. The discipline is born as a result of historical and political impacts and has a deeply practical genesis and connection to the world of public decision-making. IR result from the need for the production of useful knowledge for political decision making, namely for the foreign policy of states and the construction and organization of the architecture of the international order.

Second, IR develops more easily in democratic regimes and with an important international insertion, notably with active extraregional foreign policies and hegemonic or imperial traditions, as underlined by the “Pasquino-Hoffmann law” (Friedrichs 2001).

Third, the more solidified academic communities demonstrate a close relationship with the center’s debates and agendas, but at the same time assume a theoretical-identity differentiation.

Fourth, despite the geo-cultural diversity and growing global affirmation of the discipline, the Anglo-American world and especially the US continue to dominate the discipline both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Fifth, despite the continuity of this domain, Europe has established itself as the second most important scientific community for IR. The quantitative, and above all qualitative, distance from the US is drastically reduced. This has been the result of strategies for the modernization and solidification of European national schools and their Europeanization. This Europeanization of the discipline resulted from the growing regional collaboration between leading academic and professional institutions, highlighting the role of ECPR and EJIR Journal. This Europeanization of the discipline culminated in the creation of the European International Studies Association (ESSA) in 2014.

Sixth, and lastly, the end of the cold war in the political world and the end of paradigmatic wars in the academic world influenced the solidification and global spread of the discipline. The acceleration of globalization has prompted

renewed interest in international studies. IR is no longer perceived only as a specialization of American Political Science.

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ABSTRACT

This article provides a contextualization of the invention of International Relations (IR) in the Anglo-American world and Continental Europe. It presents a historiographic synthesis of the main institutional and scientific landmarks of the American, English, Nordic, French and German cases. It begins by presenting the main contexts and political-academic frameworks of the birth and formation of the discipline, with an emphasis on the USA. Secondly, it addresses the European developments of the IR discipline, highlighting the English and Nordic schools. Finally, it presents a brief contextualization of the rediscovery and affirmation of IR in Continental Europe, identifying the main institutional and scientific milestones of the French and German schools.

KEYWORDS

Birth of the discipline of International Relations; American School of International Relations; European Schools of International Relations.

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BASIC CONCEPTS AND THEORIES IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING: AN ANALYTIC REVIEW

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Introduction

Peacekeeping has developed over the years as one of the most cogent features of the United Nations (UN), the second universal organisation in the history of international institutions. The system of Collective Security accounted for in the organisation's Charter was for a long period of time underutilised. This is consequent on the ideological bipolarity and East-West dichotomisation of the international system. The Cold War between the then super powers - the US and the defunct USSR incapacitated and nearly crippled the UN ability to resolve armed conflicts on an enduring basis. Furthermore, over politicisation of issues at the UN (particularly by the five veto-wielding powers of the UN Security Council [UNSC]) – the US, the United Kingdom (UK), France, China and the former USSR, now represented by Russia) produced many resolutions full of overstatement rhetoric, peacekeeping (despite the fact that they are not reflected in the theoretical substructure of the UN Charter) becomes an important instrument to maintain international peace and security (Skiemann 1998: vii; Weiss et al. 1997). Despite the remarkable achievements of the UN peacekeepers, in the last seven decades of the UN, a world without war still remains elusive. The exponential increase in the number of peacekeeping operations since 1988 attests the enhanced expectations of the UN in the post-Cold War international system.

The UN, the sole universal platform for international cooperation and

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management, is today gradually emerging from the stresses and rubbles of the Cold War years. One of the most glaring characteristics and challenges of the post-1989 international system is the proliferation of armed conflicts that are threatening the state structures from within its borders (Straus 2012). The withering away of the Cold War politics and increase in ethno-linguistic and sectarian conflicts that are champion by various social and resistant movements, armed rebel groups, and non-statutory security forces challenging the state monopoly of instruments of violence have brought a new era of international relations and with it, a new beginning in the work of the UN forces (Boutros-Ghali 1993). It is instructive, however, that the dynamics of international relations starting from 1990 has also created a new environment where the tasks of conflict management have become more complex, diverse, and urgent. The shift from interstate conflicts to local ones has raised the expectations about a more significant, dynamics, and innovative conflict management roles for the UN in this era of international cooperation.

Deriving from the foregoing analysis this paper reviews some key literature in the field of peacekeeping. The essay provides a detailed account on intellectual efforts in conceptualising peacekeeping and the three major approaches to think conceptually about peacekeeping, the problems brought about by these approaches as well as that of peacekeeping taxonomy/classification in the intellectual history of peacekeeping. We explore the linkages between globalisation and global politics as well as their impacts on the nature and practice of peacekeeping. We then situate the study and analyses of peacekeeping in the broader context of international politics and international relations theory. We examine four major theories (Liberal Peace thesis, Cosmopolitanism, Global Culture, and Critical theory) in order to explain how they help or hinder our understanding of peacekeeping. Without doubt, peacekeeping literatures are too vast and diverse to comprehensively cover; nevertheless, we review some early key studies on the subject of enquiry with the objective that it will put the current literature in context.

Peacekeeping, Globalisation and Global Politics: Definitional Housekeeping and Conceptual Discourse

Peacekeeping is a term use in different ways by different people – scholars, analysts, and peacekeeping practitioners – based on their different theoretical orientations/traditions (Kondoch 2007). Simply put, peacekeeping is a mechanism adopted by the UN for conflict management. It is always involve an interposition of forces between the warring parties by creating a

buffer zone. Peacekeeping is an operation that is essentially undertaking to maintain a ceasefire. In its traditional form, it (peacekeeping) involves the deployment of military personnel to conflict theatres with the responsibilities for supervising the buffer zones and monitoring ceasefire agreements. According to the UN, peacekeeping is “...an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the ‘enforcement action’ of the United Nations under Article 42” (United Nations 1990: 4). The peacekeeping approach represents a different formulation of the UN role in peace and security from those envisaged in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. It has added a new dimension to the traditional diplomatic instruments of negotiation, conciliation, and mediation. Aware that the introduction of peacekeepers by the UN into conflict zones is to stabilise an exploding military situation until the basis of a more durable settlement could be established. This process provides the warring parties with a buffer zone, behind which they will negotiate and work towards a pacific settlement of their conflict (Bassey 1993: 188).

Peacekeeping is not an end in itself in the conflict resolution continuum. Rather, it is a means in which its success depends on other conflict resolutions efforts at the political level such as good offices, arbitration, and negotiation, among others. Therefore, peacekeeping needs to be deployed to support functional political processes (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010). Since the development of this approach to conflict management and resolution, peacekeeping operations had been carried out in such places as Lebanon, Somalia, Cyprus, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic (CAR) to mention but a few.

Having provided a brief explanation on peacekeeping, we then examine the impacts of globalisation and global politics on the nature and practice of peacekeeping. The practice of peacekeeping is currently being influenced by the dynamic nature of global politics. Globalisation is a contested concept and is subject to different theoretical interpretations. Since this paper is not concern with developing a theoretical framework for globalisation, it is suffice to provide a brief explanation on the concept. From the liberal theoretical perspective, globalisation is an increasing integration of the activities of human societies globally. It is both vertical and horizontal integration processes that involve growing number and array of transnational transaction activities, in goods and services. This integration processes also involve international

capital flows, in human migration. All these are made possible by/through a quick and extensive diffusion of technology (Bello 2003).

The processes of globalisation have transformed world politics from a Westphalian order, with the state as its basic unit of analysis, to a post-Westphalian order exemplified by transnational activity, global communications, and a diverse array of politically important actors (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004: 11). This transformation has raised intense debate among scholars as to what exactly the roles of peacekeepers should be in this highly dynamic international context. The struggle between those scholars that see peacekeeping activities in global politics through the Westphalian prismatic lens and the adherents of a more grandiose post-Westphalian conception centres on the whole issue of liberal democratic peace³. The opposing schools unanimously accept the fact that liberalism promotes peaceful coexistence but differ on exactly what the liberal democratic thesis is all about. The Westphalian conception of peacekeeping is based on a more narrow understanding of democratic peace since it argues that the peacekeeping domain should be confined to peaceful resolution of international conflicts (interstate conflicts) and in facilitating peaceful relations between states. Indeed, Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004: 2) offer a critique of this position because from the Westphalian point of view, according to them, it means that: “ideological persuasion and political organisation of the societies within states should not concern peacekeepers, so long as states subscribe to the Westphalian norms of sovereign autonomy and non-intervention.” Therefore, the Westphalian perspective contends that conflict and disorder within a state (internal conflicts) and the ensuing complex humanitarian emergencies/catastrophes are beyond the jurisdiction of peacekeepers.

Contra the state-centric Westphalian paradigm are those scholars that see peacekeepers’ roles in world politics in a larger context and have a deeper understanding of liberal democratic peace (see Paris 2002). This perspective suggests that: “liberal relations between states require liberal-democratic societies within states, because it is assumed that the way that a particular state conducts its international affairs is inextricably connected to the nature of its democratic society” (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004: 2). This (post-Westphalian) position suggests there is a symbiotic nexus between the internal affairs and international relations of a state, and that mis-governance and anarchy within a particular state has the tendency to disrupt international security (see Hoffmann 1995: 167). Consequently, the post-Westphalian conception

³ Liberal Democratic Peace Thesis is discussed extensively under the section on theoretical approaches to the study of peacekeeping. See also Chan (1997); Richmond (2007) and Russett and Harvey (2000).

of peacekeeping transcends the classical peacekeeping model to include an all-encompassing task of ensuring stability at the domestic level of the individual state, which is achievable through exporting liberal democratic values to societies, and states that are experiencing or those that have experienced political instability and anarchy.

The contention between these opposing perspectives mirrors the longstanding debate between on the one hand the ardent supporters of the UN Charter that favour the classical principles of international norms and rules of inter-state relations which put a premium on the sovereign equality of states and are based on belief in primacy of the principle of non-intervention in a state's internal affairs. On the other hand there are those scholars that are in support of international humanitarian law (IHL) arguing that state security (in the realist sense) or the security of individuals within a state should be of utmost importance to the community of civilised states. The idea of non-intervention in internal conflict situations (the Westphalian conception of peacekeeping in global politics) has found support among developing countries, while the advanced states in the West have championed the thesis of development from the basis of human rights norms and IHL (Duke 1994). This stand by the West has made state sovereignty not so absolute, as matters of human rights are now issues of international concern, meaning they apply to situations both within and between states. Based on this development and understanding, governments can no longer use state sovereignty as an excuse to escape sanctions when they are the perpetrators of human rights abuses on their citizens or when they fail in their duties relating to the protection of populations, especially in conflict situations (Ignatieff 2002). Doubtless, this position authorises and legitimizes peacekeepers' intervention roles within a state's internal affairs, thereby supporting the post-Westphalian conception of peacekeeping. Furthermore, we argue that the Westphalian peacekeeping perspective seems not to capture the recent trends in peace operations where the UN, regional arrangements, and alliances of states, for example, 'coalitions of the willing states', intervene in internal conflict situations to bring peace and security within states and to regions. There is evidence of this perspective from recent UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and Africa's regional and sub-regional organisations such as the African Union's (AU) peace support operation in Burundi (the African Mission in Burundi or AMIB) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the Economic Community of West African States's (ECOWAS) peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in West Africa in the 1990s and 2000s have demonstrated. Apparently, we assert that what is missing in the pro-Westphalian scholars' argument is that it is just that the UN or any intervention force has to contend with the complexities associated with issues of sovereignty and the use of armed inter-

vention as per the UN Charter, international law and the requiring of consent from governments of nations in which interventions take place.

In analysing the debate and the impacts of the lack of consensus among scholars, Bellamy and his colleagues (2004: 3) conclude thus:

To date, this struggle has not been conclusively resolved. Indeed, we argue that this ongoing tension lies at the heart of many of the theoretical and practical difficulties that today's peacekeepers are experiencing. However, the processes of contemporary globalisation are shifting the debate in favour of post-Westphalian conceptions of peacekeeping. The processes are not only increasingly blurring the empirical distinctions between domestic and international politics; they are also encouraging a greater, though still limited, concern with human wrongs wherever they may occur.

In other words, globalisation is not only changing the environment in which peacekeepers operate, but it is basically affecting the self-images they hold about their own roles in global politics.

Three major approaches to think conceptually about peacekeeping are discernible in the literature. These include: (1) The Case Study Approach, (2) The approach based on the Features, Functions, and Types of peacekeeping, and (3) The Third Party Mediation Approach. The central thesis of the case study approach, favoured by such scholars as Durch (ed.) (1993), (1997); James (1996); Skogmo (1989); Weiss (1995); Wolfgang and Martin (eds) (1998) and recently influenced by the writings of Adebajo (2002); Chesterman (2002); Chopra (2002); Dallaire (2004); Ginnifer (2002); Goldstone (2004); Howard (2002); Ian and Mayer-Rieckh (2005); Rogie (2003); Suhrke (2001); Olonisakin (2008), Badmus (2015), (2017) is that because of its ad hoc nature in response to each problem, peacekeeping is best approached conceptually on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, the description and analysis of peace operations becomes the basic objectives and tasks associated with this approach. The case study approach has the merit of differentiating between operations and it is also beneficial in helping to overcome the bias stemming from the penchant towards regarding all the pre-1989 peacekeeping activities as being of a Westphalian type, and vice versa. Furthermore, this approach offers comprehensive explanation of 'lessons learned' for correcting the mistakes of the ongoing peace missions or such lessons learned can be the basis for planning and conducting future peace operations (Johnstone 2005). Despite these merits, the case study approach fails to offer a comprehensive analysis and understanding of the changing roles of peacekeeping in global politics. This approach is also criticised as being too restrained to specific cases in its analysis,

thus, making its focus narrow. In addition, Diehl, Druckman and Wall (1998: 34) reject this approach as misleading, for they see it as an approach that is based on the uniqueness of peacekeeping missions; that it is not helpful in building a theory of peacekeeping; and it also fails to provide much guidance in policymaking by only supporting efforts to find lessons learned from whatever happens to be the most recent or important operation. Diehl and his colleagues argued further that attempts by some scholars to generalise and even use multiple case comparisons is equally erroneous because treating all missions as the same under the general term of ‘peacekeeping’ has the tendency to compound the problem of classification further because according to them there are, in contemporary time, many types of peace operations and as such it becomes difficult to assess whether generalisations about one type are applicable to others.

There is also an attempt in the literature to classify peacekeeping based on its general features, functions and roles as ‘indexes’ of classification as a way of overcoming these conceptual misunderstandings. Using what we refer to as the ‘Taxonomy Approach’, the erstwhile UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his *Agenda for Peace* (1992: 20) defines peacekeeping as the “deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.” The former UN official offered a new typology for the UN’s role in conflict management in the post-Cold War era, which can be summarised as follows:

- *Preventive Diplomacy*: aimed at taking action to prevent conflicts from arising in both violent and non-violent situations.
- *Peacemaking*: aimed at bringing hostile parties together by peaceful means as determined in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.
- *Peacekeeping*: the deployment of a UN presence in the field, with the consent of the parties, to stop conflicts and preserve peace once established.
- *Peacebuilding*: post-conflict action aimed at ensuring that violence does not reoccur and to identify and support structures that will strengthen the peace (see O’Neill and Rees 2005: 6).

Assessed against the background of the foregoing analysis,

Boutros-Ghali's typology is beneficial because it points to the fact that conflict prevention and peacekeeping by themselves are not enough in making efforts towards achieving sustainable peace, which are functions of the twin forces of peacemaking and peacebuilding processes. The Brahimi Report (2000, para. 10) fully supports Boutros-Ghali's position that UN peace operations can involve conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. Transcending the principles ('holy trinity') of the classical peacekeeping model, Boutros-Ghali made a compelling case for the relaxation of the consent requirement in order to facilitate UN quick deployment of peacekeepers in volatile situations where the belligerents' consents proved difficult to secure (see Neethling 2009: 2-3). Despite the fact that many peacekeeping scholars and practitioners supported Boutros-Ghali's categorisation (Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel 1996; Goulding 1993; White 1997), there is general cynicism towards his attempt to expand on this definition and typology. Boutros-Ghali's conceptual framework has, at best, been hindered by uncertainty and unpredictability. Rejecting Boutros-Ghali's categorisation, Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004: 13) asked rhetorically: "what, for instance, are we to make of operations that carry the label of 'peacekeeping' but do not enjoy the consistent consent of all the parties or do not exclusively employ UN personnel?"

Durch (1997: 8), in his study of *Peacekeeping and Lessons of the 1990s*, identified four types of peace operations: traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peace operations, peace enforcement, and humanitarian intervention. Such scholars as Demurenko and Nikitin (1997), Diehl, Druckman and Wall (1998) offer a more detailed typology. In line with this taxonomy, Diehl, Druckman and Wall (1998: 39-40) classified peacekeeping operations into 12 categories ranging from traditional peacekeeping to sanctions enforcement through pacification, while Demurenko and Nikitin (1997) presented seven types of peacekeeping. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004) listed five types of peacekeeping: traditional, managing transition, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace support operations. Segal (1995) based his historical classification on chronology. His typology is more concerned with the political conditions that warrant peace mission authorisation and is not particular as to the features of the peace operations themselves. However, in practical terms, conventional wisdom attests to the fact that they are interrelated and are, at best, inseparable. However, Diehl, Druckman and Wall (1998: 35) raised the lacuna in criticising Segal's typology because, according to these authors, this (Segal's) typology may be helpful in describing the UN's peacekeeping genesis and its development, but it fails to give theoretical guidelines for comprehending different peace mission types, how peacekeeping successes and

failures could be measured, and what type of training is most appropriate amongst other issues.

Since the end of the Cold War, some scholars have classified various peacekeeping missions under convenient but misleading labels. In this connection, Goulding (1993) argues that there are ‘three generations’ of peacekeeping, while Thakur (2005) suggested ‘six generations’ of peacekeeping. Thakur and Schnabel (2001) also listed six ‘cascading generations’ of peace operations: traditional, non-UN, expanded, peace enforcement, peace restoration by partnership, and multinational peace restoration/UN state-creation. Other scholars contend that only two types of peacekeeping exist, the Westphalian, traditional peacekeeping of the Cold War years and the ‘new peacekeeping’ (Ratner 1995) or ‘second-generation’ peace missions (Mackinlay and Chopra 1992). Nishihara even went further and based his categorisation on the peacekeepers themselves. In his study titled, *Trilateral Country Roles: Challenges and Opportunities* (1993), Nishihara identified three different types of peacekeepers: (1) full-fledged peacekeepers, (2) self-restrained peacekeepers, and (3) peace enforcers. In this context, O’Neill and Rees (2005: 7) are of the opinion based on Nishihara’s definition that Irish soldiers (troops) were at different times in category (1) in Cyprus, category (2) in Somalia, and in category (3) in their involvement in ONUC⁴, provided it is accepted as a case of peace enforcement. It is on this basis that O’Neill and Rees (2005) warned that such categorisation has to be treated with great care.

Without any doubt, identifying the key features and roles of different types of peacekeeping is very interesting and offers a useful approach in comprehending peacekeeping, but these are not without shortcomings. First, the existence of different categories of peacekeeping is indisputable, but classification into different ‘generations’ is misleading and, at best, an anachronism since such efforts are bound to create inconsistencies or even compound the existing definitional ambiguities and conceptual misunderstandings. Johnstone (2005: 7) offers a critique of this approach in saying: “While these taxonomies give a sense of the broad range of operations that are not always well-described as peacekeeping, the more numerous the categories and the more subtle the distinction between them, the less useful they are as analytical tools.”

Furthermore, the approach seems lacking in flexibility because it conceals the important fact that peacekeeping operations can perform numerous functions at the same time and can even oscillate between different types (Diehl, Druckman and Wall 1998: 38; Diehl 2008: 14. see also Diehl and

4 ONUC is the French acronym for the United Nations Operation in the Congo.

Druckman, 2010). Further criticism of the taxonomy approach is that it fails to provide comprehensive explanations of the changing nature of international politics and how this has metamorphosed peacekeeping and, by extension, the role of peacekeepers. Finally, in his research on the taxonomies of international peacekeeping, Wilde (2001) finds that the 'generations' terminology is not beneficial to the understanding of peacekeeping and is normatively problematic. Wilde argued that the taxonomy approach erroneously means that there has been a positive development through successive generations of growing complexity, and it falsely portends improvement. That is, it deceptively promotes the idea that the successive generations of peacekeeping are in some way better than their preceding types of peacekeeping missions. These reasons explain why this approach of classifying peacekeeping based on its features, functions and roles has been rejected and regarded as self-referential.

The third approach in the peacekeeping literature considers peacekeeping as a form of third-party mediation (Fetherston 1994a&b, 2000; Fetherston, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1994). Fetherston proposes a theory of peacekeeping that is rooted in the concept of peaceful third-party intervention. Developing this line of argument, she contends that for the UN to successfully resolve the post-Cold War conflicts, the practice of peacekeeping needs to be based on a theoretical framework that considers both the means and ends as essential. Fetherston rightly assessed that in the contemporary international system where the UN is engaging in larger and more complex involvement in armed conflicts there is a compelling need for a better developed and researched understanding of success (Fetherston 1994a: 42). Contingency models form the basis of Fetherston's framework and she contends further that presently what is expected of peacekeepers (that is, mediation, consultation, facilitation, negotiation among others) and the type of (military) training they undergo are diametrically opposed. Fetherston recommends her conceptual framework as the best approach to the enhanced performance of peacekeepers. Similar in tone to, and developing Fetherston's stance further, Ryan (2000) used different stages of conflict to make a case for the appropriate time for peacekeeping intervention. Despite its merits, this approach fails to consider the essentially political and unpredictable character of situations and spaces in which peacekeeping operations are deployed.

The logical conclusion from the foregoing discussions is that despite the existing multiple frameworks for addressing the conceptual problems of peacekeeping in the literature, these approaches overlooked the imperative of the structures and processes of world politics, their impacts and how these have conditioned the roles of peacekeepers in it. Furthermore, dissipating

too much energy and time on the classification of peacekeeping missions has made scholars to play down the embedded *ad hoc* and political character of such missions, which obscures discords about their real purposes.

A Theoretical Approach and Framework

While there are increasing numbers of articles and scholarly monographs contributing to peacekeeping literature following the end of the Cold War, attempts at theorising peace operations are relatively recent (Barnett 1995; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010; James 1990; Pugh 2003)⁵. Johnstone (2005) attributed the increases in peacekeeping literature in the post-1989 period to three major factors. The first is the increase in the number of peace operations undertaken by both the UN and regional organisations since 1999. Second, the release of the Brahimi Report in 2000 and third, the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US that is regarded as a critical point at which it was necessary to think anew about international security and new forms of threats to the international system. The September 2001 terrorist attacks changed the way security is analysed. Indeed, Johnstone (2005) argued further that the September 2001 event brings forth a trend that started some years back in analysing peacekeeping in the wider context of international politics and international relations theory. Thus, the need to broaden the study of peace operations engages scholarly writings (Paris 2000; Pugh 2003). For his part, Paris (2000) calls for thinking more theoretically about peace operations. He suggests that there is an urgent need to study peace operation in order to transcend practical operational issues and instead examine peace operations as a window that leads into an arena where it is possible to focus on larger phenomena associated with international politics.

Moreover, Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004) argued that despite a plethora of scholarly writings on peace operations that have looked at the strengths, weaknesses as well as experiences of peace operations, there is little or no attempt made to look critically at the influence of global politics and the role of peacekeeping within it. These scholars try to fill this gap by dichotomising views on the practice and theory of peacekeeping (or peacekeeping's role) into Westphalian and post-Westphalian standpoints, which I have explained earlier. Equally, Bellamy (2004), Bellamy and Williams (2004) and Pugh (2004), in a special edition of an academic journal, 'International Peacekeeping', on *Peace Operations and Global Order*, edited by Alex, J. Bel-

⁵ According to Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010), exceptions to this trend were the earlier standard works of Fetherston (1994a) and Rikhye (1984).

lamy and Paul, D. Williams have devised an approach that divided the field into 'problem-solving' and 'critical' approaches as a way of thinking anew about peacekeeping. While these theoretical approaches are important, what distinguishes the 'problem-solving' theory from the other is that it takes the contemporary world as it is and tries to find solutions to the problems that emanate from them. In contrast, critical theory questions the prevailing international order in order to unravel and expose the interests it actually serves and protects, with the objective of transforming the order in such a way that it safeguards the interests of those who are disadvantaged (Cox 1981; Booth 2007). According to Pugh (2004), a significant proportion of the peacekeeping literature leans towards the 'problem-solving' theoretical framework, which, in his opinion, is detrimental since it limits the ability of students of peacekeeping to think ingeniously about the role peace operations play in the greater scheme of things. He therefore suggested a different framework to the study of peacekeeping, that is, a theoretical approach, which questions the accepted wisdom of peacekeeping and the global order it serves (Johnstone 2005: 2).

The need to think theoretically about peace operation is very important because neglecting theory from peacekeeping studies will, according to Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010: 19) limit our ability to understand the whole gamut of issues in peace operations ranging from the gendered effects of some peacekeeping practices to the ideational basis of peace operations. This is because, as these scholars have explained, situating the study of peacekeeping within a theoretical framework assists us to understand the complex social interactions involved in peacekeeping, and this in turn influences what we should study, how we study these phenomena and subsequently also the conclusions we reach. Therefore, we now turn to examine four of the main theoretical approaches that are discernible in the peacekeeping literature, which offer possible frameworks for the analysis and interpretation of peacekeeping research. Our examination will focus on three major areas: (1) the basic tenets of each theory, (2) their shortcomings and (3) major arguments of their critics and the alternative ways to think about them.

Liberal Peace Theory⁶

Despite the dominance of realism, the liberal peace paradigm has occupied a very important place in international relations theoretical discourses

6 Some of the logic of liberal peace has been discussed in the preceding section especially on the post-Westphalian conception of peacekeeping.

(Dunne 2011). Liberalism, as a theoretical framework, differs markedly from realism that projects the international system as potentially anarchical (Morgenthau 1973; Keohane 1986; Vasque 1983; Waltz 1979; Wayman and Diehl 1994 to mention but a few). Despite the fact that different realist scholars, based on their diverse orientations of political realism/power politics paradigm, make different assumptions, they tend to unite on three general assumptions (Holmberg 1998: 12). First, realists emphasise the centrality of the state, in that state is the principal actor in the international system, and anarchical situation prevails in the absence of a world government. Second, in the context of world politics, state is seen as a rational actor that always striving to maximise their expected gains and utility. States are assumed, as Holmberg (1998: 13) argued, “to carefully rank different alternatives and to calculate the costs and gains of each action.” Third, the centrality of power is an important element of the realist theoretical framework. The assumption here is that, in the international system, states seek power to expand or maintain their position. Thus, the objective of the state in international system is maximisation of power and the means is also power. In his book, *Politics Among Nations* (1949: 210), Morgenthau aptly captures the essence of realism thus: “all nations actively engaged in the struggle for power must actually aim not at a balance – that is, equality – of power, but at a superiority of power in their own behalf.”

In contrast, liberalism seeks to project the importance of freedom, justice and order into international relations. In the specific case of peace operations, liberal peace theory is indubitably the most dominant. With respect to peacekeeping operations, proponents of liberal peace theory maintain that stable peace could be achieved when the theory and practice of peacekeeping are informed by the liberal peace thesis (Paris 2004). This implies that conflicts can be reduced through the spread of liberalism across countries of the world. The implicit assumption of the liberal peace theory is that democratic states do not wage war on other liberal democracies. This observation does not imply that liberal states do not go to war at all or that they are less warlike in their inter-state relations with illiberal states. The suggestion is that liberal states should choose not to wage war and that because they lean towards liberalism, they are at least more likely to be peaceful when compared to ‘less than liberal’ states and this reason explains why democratic states are the least likely to fail and collapse into anarchy. This claim is of course contestable, as perhaps obvious, liberal states do wage war on states they deem to be ‘less than liberal’, which in itself is an aggressive act or expression of non peaceful behaviour. Such actions often take place by extending the argument that these states have ‘failed’ and need democratising or fixing to become ideal liberal

democratic state systems.

As Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010: 23) contend, scholars following liberal peace theoretical traditions offer two explanatory justifications for this scenario. First, liberal democratic states have well-established domestic political institutions. These include an independent judiciary, a legislature together with an effective rule of law that put checks on the powers of their leaders to wage wars irrationally with rebel groups within their state or with other nation states. Also, many of the international organisations to which these states belong are guided by democratic norms, values and principles that equally renounce war as an instrument for achieving foreign policy objectives and/or the basis of maintaining good international relations (Owen 1994). Therefore, liberal states are guided by democratic norms that guarantee human emancipation and value pacific settlement of political disputes. Second, at the domestic level of an individual state, the tendency for war between and among democratic states is reduced because of the democratic norms and values that direct these states as they ‘recognise one another’s legitimacy.’

Linking liberal peace theory to peace operations, the mounting of peace missions is assumed to serve the interests of liberal democracies by promoting the basic tenets of liberal peace. Strengthening this argument further, Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010: 24) stated:

This is most apparent in those peace operations that seek to build peace *within* states—which are increasingly becoming the norm...These operations try to build stable peace by enabling the creation of democratic societies and liberal free market economies. They are often supported in this endeavour by Western NGOs (*Italics in original*).

From a liberal perspective, liberal peace intervention is necessary and justified based on the fact that a society that has descended into conflicts and armed violence with negative consequences on its civilian populations can no longer claim sovereignty and non-intervention (Jabri 2010: 42)

Despite its importance, liberal peace theory has been subjected to criticisms especially from the Third World regions and China since it promotes the post-Westphalian conception of international relations and peacekeeping, which are influenced by neo-liberal political ideals for a globalising world economy (Harvey 2007. see also Bellamy 2009). Critics of this theory argue that peace operations should be deployed to resolve inter-state conflicts but see attempts made to extend the role of peacekeepers to deal with internal conflict situations as being nothing but a calculated attempt/effort by the West to impose neo-liberal ideologies and agendas on states that have

espoused other ideologies that are contrary to their own. The argument here is that UN peace operations, and the installation of 'peace' by military interventions of either individual states or a coalition of willing states, especially those of the major Western states, are designed to impose both liberal and neo-liberal agendas on the unruly parts of the world (Richmond 2007; Pugh 2004). In the wider context of peacebuilding operations, UN peacebuilding operations and the role of international financial institutions, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (in terms of their qualified relationships with the erstwhile adversaries in troubled zones) in conflict zones are contestable. This is because UN peacebuilding operations are seen as nothing but a problem-solving approach aimed at stabilising the prevailing order first and then later attempting to reorganise a state in which an intervention has occurred, and doing so according to the liberal peace agenda (Richmond 2007; Richmond 2010: 24-25). Richmond (2007: 150-151) argues that critics believe that the importation of the liberal democratic model to communities in troubled zones through military (peacekeeping) interventions and post conflict rebuilding efforts of the international financial institutions are just to provide the communities in conflict zones a 'breathing space'. Through this breathing space, international help, it is argued, will make it possible for the construction of a new liberal peace by getting rid of nationalism and ethno-nationalism and as a consequence liberal democracy will then be successful. Therefore, according to the critics of liberal peace, as Richmond (2007: 150) contends, "This breathing space effectively means an illiberal peacebuilding interval where governance is controlled by external actors until they deem it to be sustainably constituted, whereupon governance is returned to local institutions and populations." International actors therefore own the peacebuilding process instead of local populations. The arguments against the current neo-liberal application of liberal peace theory have made its opponents support the idea that international peace and security can only be achieved and maintained when the economics and governance aspects of state sovereignty are respected. The problem with this view is that it may take us back to the absolute sovereignty demands of yesteryear in which the peacekeeping role is limited to interventions in interstate conflicts. Consequently, those opposed to the current applications of liberal peace theory, as it is being practiced today, have somewhat limited the ability of the UN to deploy a peace mission to impose the neo-liberal version of the current liberal peace agenda under three conditions or situations. These include the complexities associated with the following scenarios: First, when the UN is invited by the conflicting parties themselves (or their representatives) to help install democratic governments as the cases of Cambodia (see Richmond and Franks 2011) and Burundi illustrate. Second, when the UN deploys peacekeepers to defend democracy

by reinstating ousted democratic governments by illegitimate means as happened in Haiti and Sierra Leone, and thirdly, when the UN and other regional arrangements have made efforts to create liberal peace in the context of intervening in the affairs of collapsed or so-called failed states, as was the case in Bosnia, and possibly Iraq and perhaps Somalia as well. Further criticism of liberal peace theory points to the core fact as argued some time ago by Mearnsheimer (1994), that the liberal peace thesis is contested in that wars between liberal states are not an exception and this questions the very basis and validity of the data on which the theory and its empirical assumptions are based. This critique is still valid today.

Cosmopolitanism and Peace Operations

The cosmopolitan theoretical approach to peace operations gains insights from cosmopolitan political theory. According to scholars (Björkdahl 2005; Hannerz 2005; Nussbaum 1996), the renewed interest in cosmopolitanism⁷, especially in the late part of last century, is a result of globalisation, nationalism, identity politics, migration and multiculturalism. Björkdahl (2005: 215) noted that cosmopolitanism is seen as a political alternative to nationalism and cosmopolitan values laid emphasis on political inclusivity, accountability and strongly opposes identity politics and other ideologies that promote political exclusivity (see also Held 1995). Within the context of the international system, cosmopolitanism is considered as an approach that can tackle the new types of threats to international security such as international terrorism and organised transnational crimes that cannot be solved by the state through individual effort but they demand a synergy of efforts of a network of states (Kaldor 1999). Arguing along the same lines and drawing on the findings of Kaldor (1999), Björkdahl (2005: 215-216) maintained that it is the reality of the menace of these global problems and efforts to combat them through concerted efforts that states have established a form of cooperative alliance that can be seen as a cosmopolitan mode and also serve as a platform for global responsibility to promote and uphold humanist principles and norms associated with cosmopolitanism. Indeed, the practices of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement action are cited as an exemplar of a cosmopolitan politics capable of safeguarding human rights and protecting

⁷ Cosmopolitanism itself is a concept that has been subjected to different interpretations by scholars. It has been differently interpreted as cosmopolitics, global democracy, world citizenship and sometime as a vision of world government (Archibugi and Held (eds) 1995; Cheah and Robbins 1998; Falk 1998).

civilian populations⁸.

The central argument of the cosmopolitan approach is that the promotion and diffusion of cosmopolitan values is considered as a possible contribution to create conditions and circumstances necessary for conflict prevention and resolutions through peaceful means. Therefore, the construction of peace and stability can be achieved through the spread of cosmopolitan values and therefore peacekeeping operations require to be conducted in such a way as to promote these values and uphold the commitment to humanist principles and norms. This belief is premised on the basis that conflict prevention norms and principles are believed to have cosmopolitan features. Building on this theoretical framework, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham (2005) made a compelling case for the development of cosmopolitan peace operations that need to be conducted by a standing UN Emergency Peace Service that is strong enough to protect civilians. Woodhouse and Ramsbotham's argument bear some resemblance to Michael Pugh's (2001: 347) understanding of cosmopolitanism, which required the "...spread of norms that secure human rights, democratic freedom and social justice." In a similar vein, Kaldor argued for peace operations to be proactive and serve as an instrument of cosmopolitan law enforcement (1999: 124-126). This scholar's argument is that since the construction of 'legitimate political authority' is central to put an end to the post-Cold War armed conflicts, then, it means that such solutions could be achieved through the enforcement of human rights law and IHL (that is the enforcement of cosmopolitan values) and through this effort civilians will be better protected and also perpetrators of human rights abuses and war mongers arrested and punished (Kaldor 2006).

Assessed against the background of the foregoing analysis, we pose key question: How do cosmopolitan peace operations function in Kaldor's framework? Kaldor draws attention to the fact that such proactive (cosmopolitan) peacekeepers will be professionally competent to perform both soldering and policing tasks, which involve a combination of traditional and new multi-functional peacekeeping tasks. Kaldor argued that proactive peace operations are characterised by impartiality but not neutrality, for it is likely that proactive peacekeepers become a party to the conflict by supporting innocent civilians in order to protect them as part of their mandate (Kaldor 1999: 125). Proactive peacekeepers need not rely on securing the consent of all belligerents but rather rely on what is needed, which is the consent of the victims. Thus, this required cosmopolitan peacekeeping forces to use force against parties that threaten civilian populations and seek to disrupt the peace operation and its

⁸ Scholars such as Kaldor (2003), Taylor (1999) and Zolo (19997) have variously described it as cosmopolitan law enforcement, proactive cosmopolitanism, and cosmopolitan wars.

mandated objectives. In this cosmopolitan scenario, armed peacekeepers can enforce peace under certain conditions where the use of force is a means of protecting civilian populations from being harmed.

Despite its merits, the cosmopolitan approach has been criticised in many ways. First, there is the belief that a cosmopolitan rhetoric may be used as a cover by the powerful states to further their geopolitical or natural resource extraction interests. This is a reason for why scholars have to interrogate the interests that such cosmopolitan peace operations serve. This reason may have prompted Björkdahl (2005: 223) to ask: “will cosmopolitanism as a tool for peace and security be used selectively and simply reinforce Western or great power or UN Security Council interests?” Furthermore, diffusing cosmopolitan norms and values through peace operations has been criticised as the spread of ‘Western’ rather than universal values and that cosmopolitanism is nothing but the spread of power and influence of major western countries in the world with the covert goal of neo-colonial and imperial domination of weaker states from which ‘something’ is required or where some strategic advantage is desired. Second, cosmopolitanism has been criticised as being an ‘illusion’ (Himmelfarb 1996: 77), or ‘abstract universalism’ (Barber 1996: 30) and that it is based on a simplistic conception of new conflicts by seeing them as involving innocent victims and their tormentors (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010: 27) and not much more.

Global Culture and Peace Operations

This theoretical approach is rooted in world polity theory, which is located within the discipline of sociology (Boli and Thomas 1999; Thomas et al. 1987; McNeely 1995). World polity sociologists engage themselves with the understanding of the norms, customs and culture of human societies. Within the tradition of the world polity scholars, there is the need to have a macro-conception of the world as a single society instead of looking at (or studying) the culture of a particular group, society or nation. According to these scholars, as Paris (2003: 442) argued: “... there is a distinct *global* culture that comprises the formal and informal rules of international social life” (*Italics in original*). The global culture (also known as the international normative environment) defines the major actors in world politics and their conduct. Therefore, these informal and formal social rules guide the international system, inter-state relations and world politics, as well as having profound impacts/influence on the design and conduct of peacekeeping operations.

Following on from the above analysis, and building on sociology’s

world polity theorists, the global culture approach helps to explain why peace operations embark on some strategies/activities that are well thought-out as appropriate and which de-legitimise others, whether or not such strategies are capable of helping peace missions to accomplish their mandates and achieve peace (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010: 26). This implies that peacekeeping agencies design and deploy peace missions to implement policy tools that obey the rules of a particular global culture while those strategies that deviate from these values are ruled out. This reasoning explains why the international trusteeship is disqualified as appropriate strategy for its presumed 'neo-colonial overtones' despite its post-Second World War positive records associated with development. Despite its new insights into why peacekeeping authorising institutions adopt and pursue certain strategies and discard others that are regarded as normatively inappropriate, Paris (2003: 451) criticised the global culture approach on the grounds that it "constrains the practice of peacekeeping by limiting the range of strategies that peacekeepers can realistically pursue." Therefore, the major weakness of this theoretical framework is that it limits peacekeeping mandating institutions such as the UN and regional arrangements (the African Union [AU] for example) to discard some policy tools, *prima facie*, simply because they are not conforming with the acceptable norms of international society without first giving such strategies proper consideration to ascertain whether or not they have the possibility to help a peace mission achieve peace.

Critical Theory

Critical theory takes its point of departure from classical theories (such as liberalism/neoliberalism and realism/neorealism) to the study of international politics. In specific term, it draws on, and gains insights from, the works of Cox (1981), Horkheimer (1982) and other scholars of the Frankfurt School, and also of critical security studies scholars, especially those associated with Aberystwyth (Booth 2007; Wyn Jones 1999). Cox (1981) deconstructs the nature of global order and transformation based on his adaptation of the Frankfurt School's sociological critiques and submits that the orthodox theories are ideologies designed purposely to deal with instabilities within a world order that is itself dysfunctional (Pugh 2004: 40). Therefore, the mainstream theories are designed to serve the interests of dominant (capitalist) states at the expense of world peripheries and fail to question this prevailing dysfunctional world order (Cox 1981). Based on the inherent flaws of the orthodox theories, critical theorists assert that theory is never politically neutral (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010: 27); rather it is "always for someone or for some

purpose. All theories have a perspective” (Cox 1981: 128. *Italics in original*). Thus, critical theory seeks to, as its purpose clearly dictates, unveil the injustices associated with orthodox theories and examine ‘structural transformation’ as a way to achieve human emancipation (Horkheimer 1982). With this goal (and also in relation to peacekeeping), critical theorists, according to Pugh (2004: 39) examine the contexts (global structure and international politics) within which peacekeeping operates and contends that peacekeeping interventions serve a very limited, problem-solving or managerial purpose – that is, to sustain a particular world order politics under the auspices of liberal imperialism. Peacekeeping, argue critical theorists, is nothing but counter-insurgency operations resourced and bankrolled by rich and powerful states with the goal of achieving and furthering their political and military dominance and economic interests in particular geopolitical arenas.

Critical theorists contend that global capitalism has divided the world into the haves (rich) and have nots (poor, peripheral regions) where the latter are characterised by political instability, economic decay and poverty with the end-result of state failure and eventual turmoil due to the rise of anarchy. Warlords subsequently fill the vacuum created by the collapse of official government structures in the world peripheral regions and competitions ensue between marauding warlords, through armed violence, in their quest to achieve and protect their economic objectives and interests respectively. Therefore, instability and state collapse subsequently gives way to the ‘war economy’ (Pugh, Cooper with Goodhand 2004: 3) that threatens global capitalist interests that depend on international trade and raw materials from the poor regions of the global economy for industrial purposes linked to wealth accumulation and thereby oiling of the international political economy. Therefore, disorder in the peripheral regions necessitated peacekeeping’s deployment by the global centre, usually through proxies (such as the UN and regional organisations) to safeguard the capitalist international political economy. Therefore, and following the logic of critical theory, the need for and implementation of peace operations are, as Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010: 28) state, based on the arguments of Pugh’s (2004) and Duffield’s (2001) studies, necessary to protect the existing ‘neoliberal economic order across the globe.’ Critical theorists put an accent on the quest for emancipation knowledge and freedom from structures and processes of the global capitalist domination. They have argued that peace operations can result in human emancipation when the oppressed and marginalised categories in the society are recognised, their voices heard, and their plights and experiences are taken into consideration. By focussing on the plights of these groups, it is believed that the sources of their problems and how they cope with their terrible situations will be better understood by

peacekeeping agencies which in the long run will give peacekeeping agencies and actors the opportunity to take these into consideration, especially in the process of negotiating peace agreements (Stamnes 2004: 164).

Final Remarks

After having discussed the four theoretical approaches to the study of peacekeeping we acknowledge that there is no single theory (or a metatheory) that fully explains the whole gamut of issues involved in peace operations. For, as Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010: 29) have agreed, the above theoretical traditions provide different ways in which to comprehend peacekeeping. Taking cognisance of the fact that the choice of theoretical framework invariably determines what to study, how to study it and the ways in which these choices influence possible study outcomes, a single theory is highly unlikely to fully explain the complexities of contemporary peace operations, especially in a continent like Africa featuring different actors (the UN, the AU and such sub-regional organisations as ECOWAS). While this limitation is noted, we argue that peacekeeping is best understood through the application of (a combination of) many theories in order to uncover the motives of peacekeeping authorising institutions, peacekeepers as well as the role(s) peacekeeping missions play and the interest they serve. Despite this reality, many peacekeeping scholars and their researches, especially in Africa, often draw on the liberal peace theory because the post-Westphalian conception of peacekeeping within the liberal theoretical tradition, they believe, captures the reality of, for example, Africa's new peace and security management system (that is, the African Peace and Security Architecture or the APSA) where the principle of noninterference in internal conflicts was replaced by that of non-indifference (Aneme 2008a&b; Bellamy 2009; Dersso 2010; Engel and Gomes 2009; Murithi 2008; 2009a&b; Kioko 2003). Truly, the AU to some extent can be viewed as an institution committed to promoting democracy, good governance, human rights and the protection of African people (Zweifel 2006: 148). Under its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) regime, state-centrism and the norm of sovereignty prevented the organisation from deploying peace missions to deal with purely internal conflicts (Badmus 2008; Imobighe 1996)⁹. However, by legislating and creating the

⁹ The OAU's adherence to the purposes and principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference hindered the viability of the organisation in intra-state conflicts in Africa. An exception to this was the civil war in Chad in the 1980s. In Chad, it was not until France's intervention and Gaddafi's Libya military support to one of the belligerents that the OAU started playing active role in the conflict. This is because the OAU saw the civil war as one with

AU Constitutive Act on democratic values and the concepts of human security and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) with Article 4(h) of the constitutive framework, all of this gives the organisation the right to intervene in a member state in responding to grave circumstances. This legislation (The AU Constitutive Act) has apparently laid a foundation to allow the deployment of African peacekeepers to restore order in a member state thereby enabling the AU to export democratic values into states that experience instability. The preference of and choice towards adopting liberal peace theory does not of necessity suggest that all its philosophical and logical positions are well embedded in African peacekeeping efforts. They are often not due to mis-governance and political crises in many countries of the continent. It is in this light that the normative frameworks of the APSA espouse liberal tenets and accordingly AU peacekeeping forces are mandated to restore order where chaos prevails in the form of armed conflicts and violence, especially where civilian populations are affected. Despite this benefit of liberal theoretical tradition, it cannot solely explain and capture the reality of Africa's new peace and security management system and the whole gamut of issues involve in complex, multidimensional peace operations/peace support operations in live-war zones of the world, as in Somalia.

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ABSTRACT

This paper reviewed some extensive literature in peacekeeping. The review of the literature focused on two areas - concepts and theories of peacekeeping. After having discussed the three major approaches to think conceptually about peacekeeping in the literature, we argued that despite the existence of these multiple frameworks for addressing the conceptual problems of peacekeeping, they overlooked the imperative of the structures and processes of world politics, their impacts and how these have conditioned the roles of peacekeepers in it. Then, we examined four of the main theoretical approaches that are discernible in the peacekeeping literature, which offer possible frameworks for the analysis and interpretation of peacekeeping research. We argued that there is no single theory (or a metatheory) that fully explains the whole gamut of issues involved in peace operations. This is because these theoretical traditions provide different ways in which to comprehend peacekeeping. A single theory is highly unlikely to fully explain the complexities of contemporary peace operations, especially in a continent like Africa featuring different peacekeeping actors. Therefore, peacekeeping is best understood through the application of many theories in order to uncover the motives of peacekeeping authorising institutions, peacekeepers as well as the role(s) peacekeeping missions play and the interest they serve.

KEYWORDS

Peacekeeping; Peace Operations; Peace Enforcement, Peacebuilding; United Nations; Regional Organisations.

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MANUFACTURERS AND SECURITY PROVIDERS: A CONCEPTUAL ESSAY

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Introduction

To say that every state pursues its national interest has become a truism. Still it is difficult to rationally define that interest, so as to take into account the will of the majority or the resources or the geographical position. The average states and also the developing states and those whose international status has recently risen have to solve a special dilemma: while a small country first wants to keep its independence and the big one to possess a sphere of influence as extensive as possible, an intermediate actor is tasked with cautiously navigating through the requirements of world diplomacy.

Such a desideratum cannot be realised if those medium-sized powers do not possess a methodology to steer. In the absence of methodological milestones the elites of a medium-sized nation risk either underestimating the potential they have or overbidding it with unhappy consequences. A recent example that can be raised is that of Georgia. Lilliputian territory located in the vicinity of the Russian Federation, Georgia took advantage of the climate of NATO enlargement. His intake of 2,000 soldiers in Iraq (the third contingent after the US and the UK!) prompted the diplomacy in Tbilisi to hope for the Alliance membership. But such intentions were considered unacceptable for the Kremlin, determining the intervention of the summer of 2008, a reminder that Russia greatly cherishes the former Soviet sphere³.

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³ For more analysis regarding the politics of Saakashvili between West and Rusia: Karon, Tony. What Israel Lost in the Georgia War, Time, Aug. 13, 2008; Filipescu, Nicolae. Consecintele razboiului din Georgia, Revista 22, 02 12 2008; Larsen, Henrik Boesen Lindbo. The Russo-Georgian War and Beyond: towards a European Great Power Concert, Danish Institute for International Studies-DIIS, DIIS Working Paper 2009: 32; Radnitz, Scott. The Lobby Hobby:

The present article argues that a prudent drafting of the sphere of national interest must consider the political actors as part of an international labour division in security field. On the verge of consequence, the authors propose to define and operate with five concepts, as follows: security producers; intercessors and mediators; consumers and marginals. Each term will be explained at the right time.

From a theoretical point of view, this study will use a modified version of the world system theory developed by Immanuel Wallerstein illustrating its superiority to the Copenhagen school.

Therefore our article will support two premises:

1. The notions of producer, supplier, mediator, consumer and marginal in the security field are relational; it presumes the existence of a regular contact between at least two states;
2. Notions of security producer, supplier and consumer must specify what the type of security it is referring to (politics, military, social, economic, environmental).

State of art

The birth of security studies as a subdomain of military history was marked by the specific conditions of the end of the Cold War, when direct confrontation was replaced by other issues on the public agenda. Although the historians of the field believe that the golden age of security studies was in the 1950s and 1960s (apud Dungaciu 2012), the specificity of that period was tributary to the hard-security sphere, focusing primarily on nuclear war and nuclear disarmament.

This period also marks the rift between classical sciences and the field of international relations on its way to autonomy. We can talk about a process of mutual legitimacy between theory and practice. The bipolar confrontation imposed statehood at the centre of scientific concerns, and the latter found its reason to be studying the security dimension of politics, its ability to ensure sovereignty. From here it was concluded that all States are equal, having the obligation to master their own borders and populations. However, being presumed as equal, there are a number of differences that need to be taken into account. According to Kenneth Waltz:

Although states are functional similar units, they differ to a large extent on

How Small Countries Buy Respect Abroad, Ponars Eurasia, Policy Memo: 308, 02-2014.

their capabilities. From such differences arises something like division of labor (..) The Division of labour between nations is, however, meaningless, compared to the extremely articulate process of division of labour within them. (..) Although it is often discussed about the integration of nations, it rarely happens. Nations could enrich each other, dividing further not only the work that the production of goods involves, but also some of their other tasks, such as political leadership or military defence. Why couldn't be produce their integration? The structure of the international political system imposes limits on member cooperation... (Waltz 2006, p. 150)

This judgment was considered by the neorealists (with Waltz as their parent), the environmental dimension can be counterbalanced by the status of consumer security on the military dimension; e.g. Japan comes to mind. An inequalitarian perspective on the states belongs to critical theories, many developed under the sign of Marxism or under the upgraded versions of it. Critical theories see things rather relational, the political map of the world being organized by the hierarchy of power linking the developed world with the underdeveloped regardless the official political boundaries.

Two authors have become predominant: Johan Galtung and Immanuel Wallerstein. The norwegian Johan Galtung (born 1930) condensed his work around the PRIO Institute and the University of TRANSCEND (Whitehead 2013, Almeida 2017)⁴. Although his initial profession was medical doctor, Galtung developed an impressive philosophical construct, describing the conflict and peace not as two completely opposite states, as type 0 and 1, but rather as a continuum with graduations. For Galtung, peace is more than the absence of battles, representing the situation in which human beings are released from discrimination, poverty, financial debt, stress (Galtung 1969; 2013).

Galtung's ideas opened the way for an entire literature on peace studies, being also incorporated into the United Nations language and in the organization's documents, such as Boutros-Boutros Ghali's Agenda for peace in the 1990s. In the structural theory of imperialism in the early 1970s, Galtung defines imperialism as a relationship of domination between two communities, a central one and the other peripheral (Galtung 1971). A similar point of view is revealed by the doctrine of Immanuel Wallerstein that we are going to examine below, being very useful for the differentiation we have proposed as a stake in this article.

In conclusion, we can say that the concept of security is currently being addressed in a generous manner, offering a wider conceptual umbrella

⁴ Galtung Institute for Peace Theory and Peace Practice, <https://www.galtung-institut.de/en/home/johan-galtung/>

than defence, which allows specialists from several sciences to contribute to shaping and conceptualizing the domain. Unfortunately, with the widening of the sphere of significance, the new term is also even more vague, exposing unclear or contradictory formulations from a logical point of view. The diagnosis must not induce pessimism, but on the contrary, the impetus to link once again the concern for <international> with sociology and the great family of social sciences⁵.

Methodology

From a theoretical point of view, our attempt to delimit the concepts of security producer and consumer will primarily use the world system theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, illustrating its advantages compared with the perspective of the Copenhagen School.

Our choice respects the methodological principle of matching between a theory and the case study or the empirical universe on which it will be applied, so that it is possible to achieve results that satisfies the principle of popperian falsifiability.

It is true, that in order not to venture into a risky land, calloused ways are often preferred, so that the already consecrated explanatory models are used in situations that do not require too much effort. In international relations, we find such methodological convenience:

If you want to study the balance of power, you use the neorealist grid;

- Interdependence is associated with institutional liberalism;

- The identity is read only through the constructivist grid, considered the best for such an approach.

The real question arises when the researcher tries to proceed unconventionally, using a theory beyond its comfort zone. We have to be aware of what we can ask from the critical apparatus with which we work.

⁵ Further reading regarding the status of international relations and sociology: Justin Rosenberg, 'The International Imagination: IR Theory and 'Classic Social Analysis'', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1994, Vol.23, No.1, pp.85-108.; Mathias Albert and Barry Buzan, 'International Relations Theory and the "Social Whole": Encounters and Gaps Between IR and Sociology', *International Political Sociology* (2013) 7, 117-135; Mathias Albert, Barry Buzan, Michael Zürn (ed), *Bringing Sociology to International Relations: World Politics as Differentiation Theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013; Besnik P. and Yannis A. Stivachtis, 'Historical Sociology and International Relations: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Large-Scale Historical Change and Global Order', *International Studies*, Nov 2017, <http://internationalstudies.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-90>; DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.90

Aware of these risks, we propose to combine several theories and schools of thought, as we maintain the primacy of the world system theory which we will connect with the ideas of the Copenhagen school, but also with a number of concepts of economic origin, such as broker, producer, consumer, profit and so on.

Of course, the approach we propose is not entirely new. Dissatisfied with the study of international relations through the lens of a single paradigm, Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein proposed analytical eclecticism, in an effort to: “complete, engage and selectively use in the theoretical constructs already existing in recognized research traditions in order to develop complex arguments that support substantive issues of interest to both researchers and practitioners.” (Sil & Katzenstein 2010b, pp. 411-431) Therefore, analytical eclecticism does not mean a new theory, another “-ism” but a method that brings together theories to solve the same problem. Concerned about the same dilemmas, Ali Mazrui and Samuel Makinda talked about theoretical eclecticism defined as: “...a process through which theorists construct coherent analytical frameworks by evaluating, synthesizing and reflecting on insights from disparate paradigms” (Makinda 200, pp. 205-216)

Certainly, such a journey is necessary to be guided by Sil and Katzenstein’s observation that warns us against two temptations: 1) to believe that eclecticism means a new synthesis; 2) that anything goes with anything (i.e. schools of thought can be combined without regard to possible contradictions or mismatches) (Sil & Katzenstein 2010a, pp. 14-17) .

An Application of the World-System Theory

The choice of the world system theory as the main methodological and conceptual guide of this approach is based on the concern the authors had for understanding international relations from the perspective of the hypothesis of unequal status of states.

Determining the conceptual sphere of the notions producer vs. consumer security is only possible by reporting them to the economic area from which they originate. That is why we believe that only by addressing security in close interdependence with the economic sphere, we will be able to build valid conclusions for the formulated questions.

Unlike other traditional explanations that operate a clear distinction between political-economic-social, the sociological Annales School from which Braudel and Wallerstein are claimed considered these three dimensions as interconditional.


The hypothesis Braudel-Wallerstein proposes a historical-geographical explanatory perspective for the development of capitalism. From this point of view capitalism developed from Western Europe and expanded into concentric circles until it filled the whole world. This development proved uneven, hierarchical, having the richest country in the center, flanked by semi-periphery, and in the outer inner circle, the most needy:

There is no economy-universe without a space of its own, meaningful from many points of view. It involves a centre, for the benefit of a city and of a dominant capitalism, whatever its form. The multiplication of the centres is either a form of youth, or a form of macular or mutation...; this space is a somme of local economy, some being poor, modest others, and only one in its center, being relatively rich. Inequalities and voltage differences follow from here and ensure the operation of the assembly." (Braudel 1989, p.19)

Any economy-universe is a nesting, a juxtaposition of linked areas, but at different levels. On the ground, there are sketched at least three "areas", three categories: a limited center, regions of second importance which are quite developed and, to conclude, huge marginal areas. [...] The center, „the heart" brings together everything advanced and diversified. The next ring has only part of these advantages, although they participate in them: this is the area "second degree brightness". The vast, sparsely populated periphery represents, on the contrary, the oldness, the underdevelopment and easy human exploitation. This discriminatory geography catches on its race and explains the general history of the world although from time to time, through complicity, it is creating its own race. (Braudel 1989, p.37)

The graphical representations of the theory can be seen below:

Center, Semi-periphery and periphery: 1800, 1900, 2010:



Source: The Fuller Projectio Map design apud Melissa Y. Rock, Economic Development and Globalization, The Pennsylvania State University, <https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog128/node/700>

The Braudel-Wallerstein model emphasizes the continuous dynamics of capitalism, created by the continuous accumulation of capital. Consequently, the Center of the system holds primacy, producing the most sophisticated items that are then imported from the rest of the units of the system, i.e. the other national economies. Also the Center impose an international division of labour, therefore the semi-periphery and periphery are allocated with those activities considered unprofitable by central economies. But this hierarchy is dynamic because it does not stay stuck in time: central states can fall, and become semi-periphery or even the periphery, as the above schemes highlight.

The concept of semi-peripheral state has been rafistolated by other authors, especially after 1990-2000, when the importance of superpowers has left room for analyses related to regional powers, geostrategic pivots, emerging nations and their alliances.

A genera^tional fellow of Wallerstein, the italian Giovanni Arighi (1937-2009) defines semi-peripheral states according to their contribution to world capital, in particular to transnational corporations (CTN). Arrighi concludes that the central areas are notable for hosting the management structures of CTN, while the peripheral areas contain mainly executive mechanisms while the semi-periphery may contain intermediate elements of a corporation (as regional directors).

In order to provide a quantitative basis for Wallerstein's original idea, the three hierarchical regions are defined according to the GDP per capita, as it had been calculated by the World Bank in the early 1980s:

Category	GDP/capita 1981 (dolars)	Number of states	Percentage of world population
I	Less than 800	50	58
I/II	800-1.500	19	5
II	1.500-4.500	31	20
II/III	4.500-9.000	10	3
III	More than 9.000	19	14

Source: Giovanni Arighi (ed), *Semi-peripheral development. The politics of Southern Europe in the twentieth century*, Sage, London and New Delhi, 1990, p.246

The states he chose to exemplify the theory were: Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey, which had cycles of democracy/political dictatorship, associated with recession/boom on the economy plane. In another work, Ar-

righi together with Jessica Dranghel lists three traits of semi-peripherals:

- a) export the most diverse products;
- b) the levels of income are very different (in other words, large financial inequalities);
- c) their trade policies towards in the international environment are also very diverse (Ruvalcaba 2011, p.146) .

The role of semi-peripheral units is, for José Ricardo Martins, the buffer, so as to absorb the tensions that could endanger the hard core of the system:

A semi-periphery does not have a residual effect, but it does not appear to be an embarrassing phenomenon. As a contrario, it is possible to use the same type of service as a shock, as it is the same as the problem of the periphery for the directives of the center. Countries such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and China have such functions of “buffers” in relation to the periphery (Martins, 2015).

In his later writings, Wallerstein added a geopolitical component to the economic radiography describing the international system. It draws our attention that inter-state rivalry must be read on two axes: between the great powers and also between the strong and the weak:

Such states are by definition rivals, bearing responsibility to different sets of rival firms. But as in competition between large firms, the competition between strong states is tempered by a contradiction. While each is against the other in the sort of putative zero-sum game, they have a common interest in holding together the interstate system, and the modern-state system as a whole. So actors are pushed simultaneously in the opposite directions: towards an anarchic system and towards coherent and orderly interstate system. (Wallerstein 2004, p. 56)

Semi-peripheral states become useful to those located in the center as a buffer in front of the potential resentment of the third world (periphery): “... so that they operated as unpopular spaces in the contention of pressure coming from the periphery towards the core” (Ruvalcaba 2011, p.153).

According to Christopher Chase-Dunn, the characteristic of semi-peripheral units is the weak government indicated by a) poor capacity of penetration in society, b) modest ability to collect taxes and c) corruption. Also, in their case, development policies come from above, in a top-down manner (Ruvalcaba 2011, pp.147-148) .

Also, semi-peripheral actors can act to “depolarise the center-periphery hierarchy” for the inequality not to be felt so strong as to constitute a cause for conflict. Still these places are where big revolutions and the most explosive social movements are happening (see the Arab Spring that started from North African States, relatively close to the European Union, and not from sub-Saharan Africa) (Chase-Dunn 2011)⁶.

Wallerstein considers that such antisystemic movements occur when the buffer no longer works⁷. Once we get here we can open a parenthesis and we can think of another connection between the field of international relations and sociology: theory of relative deprivation, a very useful tool to explain ample mass movements that have geopolitical consequences, such as the situation in MENA since 2011 (Anderson 2011, Bassinger et al 2012, Idris 2016, Farooq, Saiqa & Ahmed 2017).


In our research we consider that GDP can be a very good indicator of the degree of development of a nation. Without being a perfect analytical tool, it can provide information about other indicators such as: income equality, social stratification, child mortality and life expectancy, corruption or innovation (Bai et al. 2014, Correa & Jaffe 2015, Farzanegan 2017).

The other reason for choosing GDP as the classification criterion of the countries is considering the creative reading of theory of world system, as we have assumed from the outset. Immanuel Wallerstein does not provide clear indicators during his work for the inclusion of a political actor in any of the three categories (center, semi-periphery, periphery). He does not distinguish between great power and rich country, realizing that any wealthy country is necessarily an exploiting imperialist one.

Map and table below on the classification of the world according to GDP:

6 See also: Valentine M. Moghadam, The Semi-Periphery, World Revolution, and the Arab Spring: Reflections on Tunisia, *Journal of World-System Research* | Vol. 23 Issue 2, pp.616-636.


7 In a change of emails with Silviu Petre (the 20th of March 2011), Immanuel Wallerstein considers that Arab Spring is the expression of another antisystemic movements against the center, similar with the one from 1968.



No.	Country	GDP 2013	GDP 2014	Annual variation	Continent
1	Qatar	145.538,6	143.427,0	-2.111,6	Asia
2	Luxembourg	90.298,2	92.048,5	1.750,4	Europe
3	Singapore	80.295,2	82.762,1	2.467,0	Asia
4	Brunei Darussalam	73.823,1	73.233,0	-590,1	Asia
5	Kuwait	71.028,7	71.020,3	-8,4	Asia
6	Norway	65.295,2	66.937,5	1.642,3	Europe
7	United Arab Emirates	63.180,8	64.478,7	1.297,8	Asia
8	San Marino	60.358,2	60.664,3	306,1	Europe
9	Switzerland	56.839,3	58.087,2	1.247,9	Europe
10	Hong Kong	53.022,8	54.722,1	1.699,3	Asia
11	United States	52.939,1	54.596,7	1.657,6	North America
12	Saudi Arabia	50.934,0	52.183,4	1.249,4	Asia
13	Bahrain	49.633,0	51.713,7	2.080,7	Asia
14	Ireland	46.441,3	49.194,8	2.753,5	Europe
15	Netherlands	46.434,5	47.354,5	920,0	Europe
16	Australia	45.093,5	46.433,3	1.339,8	Oceania
17	Austria	45.788,8	46.420,1	631,4	Europe
18	Sweden	44.849,3	45.986,4	1.137,0	Europe


Source: World Bank and International Monetary Fund, april 2015 (translated and adapted by authors)

The table above is highly consistent with the global mortality rate index:



Source: Maps of the World apud World Bank, <https://www.mapsofworld.com/thematic-maps/infant-mortality-rate-map.html>


And with the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is used to measure the diversity of exported goods:



Source: Thorvaldur Gylfason, Per Wijkman, Double diversification, VOX-CEPR's Policy Portal, 06 February 2017

And with the innovation index:

The First Ten Centers of Innovation



Sources: Bloomberg, International Labour Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, World Intellectual Property Organization

Bloomberg

Source: Michelle Jamrisko and Wei Lu , The U.S. Drops Out of the Top 10 in Innovation Ranking, Bloomberg, January 23, 2018.

Bloomberg 2018 Innovation Index

2018 rank	2017 rank	YoY rank change	Economy	Total score	R&D intensity	Manufacturing value-added	High-tech Productivity	Tertiary density	Tertiary efficiency	Researcher concentration	Patent activity
1	1	0	S. Korea	89.28	2	2	21	4	3	4	1
2	2	0	Sweden	84.70	4	11	5	7	18	5	8
3	6	+3	Singapore	83.05	15	5	12	21	1	7	12
4	3	-1	Germany	82.53	9	4	17	3	28	19	7
5	4	-1	Switzerland	82.34	7	7	8	9	11	17	17
6	7	+1	Japan	81.91	3	6	24	8	34	10	3
7	5	-2	Finland	81.46	8	16	10	13	19	6	4
8	8	0	Denmark	81.28	6	15	11	15	26	2	10
9	11	+2	France	80.75	12	35	14	2	10	21	9
10	10	0	Israel	80.64	1	27	9	5	41	1	19
11	9	-2	U.S.	80.42	10	23	6	1	42	20	2
12	12	0	Austria	79.12	5	8	15	26	12	12	5
13	16	+3	Ireland	77.87	22	1	1	18	20	14	33
14	13	-1	Belgium	77.12	11	22	13	10	37	13	21
15	14	-1	Norway	76.76	19	37	19	11	23	8	14
16	15	-1	Netherlands	75.09	17	26	20	6	47	15	18
17	17	0	U.K.	74.54	20	40	23	14	8	18	15
18	18	0	Australia	74.35	14	46	16	17	17	3	20

Source: Michelle Jamrisko and Wei Lu, The U.S. Drops Out of the Top 10 in Innovation Ranking, Bloomberg, January 23, 2018.

Discussion: World system theory as an analytical tool

As we have assumed from the beginning, this article intends to give highlights for the concepts of security producer, supplier and consumer, and also to enrich the existing taxonomy with new notions that could reflect properly the reality of the contemporary security environment.

A brief glance at the literature reflects a surprising reality. The security producer and the security consumer have, from a semantic point of view, **an axiomatic status**. International relations specialists have lent the meaning of the economic field without reflecting on the appropriateness of the loan and without questioning themselves: Do readers have a common key to understanding such concepts in the absence of an appropriate definition?

Our objective is to understand the notion of semi-periphery and to apply it to the security producer-supplier-consumer scheme according to the triptych of the World System Theory: center – semi-periphery - periphery.

While realism or liberalism consider the international system as an additive one, summing up several states, WST emphasis on political institutions as a response to the dynamics without borders of capital:

The expansion implies its own imperatives. The ability to manage to expand is based both on the ability to maintain a relative social cohesion inside (...) and on the arrangements that can be made to use cheap work at great distance...

In this point, it is important to formulate a definition of security which can satisfy the philosophy of the world system. In this key, we propose defining security so as to emphasize both the political institution and the socio-professional classes: “Security is the state of safety that the individual lives as a result of the relative harmony between social classes and internal and international division of labour.”

Corollary: “Inter-state security represents that state of safety that arises between several states as a result of a mutually satisfactory division in the defence issue.” This formula satisfies the criterion of legitimacy that Wallerstein spoke of. In other words, as long as collective inequality is bearable and implies certain satisfaction of the lower, then the dominated classes will not revolt, but will be integrated within the division of labour. Division can be, as we have seen, at both domestic and international level. On the second level, a win-win alliance is likely if the national interests of the actors involved are synchronized.

As stated above, the superiority of WST to the ideas of Copenhagen School is that, while the second fragments the collective reality in different dimensions, the first seeks to understand them in an integrated manner. Thus, for Buzan and Weaver, and also for Kenneth Waltz, the units of the international system are equivalent: they are all sovereign, claim their legitimate right to use force on their own subjects, seek for security and prosperity. Instead, WST describes the internal dynamics correlated with international ones as landmarks for the flow of capital.

Security producer and consumers: a conceptual approach.

In the previous subchapter we understand how security can be defined in crossroads between sociology, economics and internal relations. Further it is important to analyze how a state or its ruling elites can localise itself within the framework of the international security division. The evolution has much in common with a firm that has to maximize its profits by entering a certain niche of the market. While economic agents typically provide goods and services for daily living, in the same way states try to have profit in terms of the realization of national interest whose product is survival. Such an entity is even more competitive as it can better secure its own survival - beneficiaries of survival means individuals, groups, material goods, patrimony, cultural values.

Having in mind Wallerstein grid (center, semi-periphery, periphery) and the fact that the notions listed below are relational (having value in interaction with someone else), we develop the following taxonomy based on three criteria:

1. The resources states allocate for security;
2. The will of the state;
3. The need of state for security.

A. Security Producer = is a state that has the necessary resources and the will to increase the degree of security of another state or of other states without having cardinal security needs that it can not satisfy by itself.

B. Security Supplier = is a state with security needs that primarily has the will and possibility to mediate the relationship between a security producer and an environment in need of security.

C. Security Mediators = is a subtype of the vendor and is considering an honest broker who does not actually provide any security resources but brings together the producers and consumers, thanks to the prestige they

have in international community.

D. Security Consumer = represents a state that needs the help of others to resolve threats to its own security.

E. Marginal state = refers to those states of the world that do not fit into any of the above categories. Here we can include the political actors of liliptan territory who do not take part in the existing tensions, the balance of power, humanitarian interventions or arms transfers. Their status should not be seen as immutable, as it can change.

Through the “necessary resources” we understand a set of institutional, financial, technological, demographic, geographic factors necessary to attain the national interest. It is important to underline that the status of a security producer does not mean the political actor is invulnerable (i.e. the terrorist attacks on September 11 in the US or those in the Russian Federation, France and the United Kingdom). Our sintagma <cardinal security needs> should be read in terms that the country can not be kneeled by another state or by a non-state actor without the attacker suffering massive retaliation. This is primarily the case for the five permanent United Nation Security Council members holding nuclear arsenals (and, eventually, Israel and India).

The described taxonomy can be illustrated as follows:

Category	Resources allocated to security	Political will	Need of security
Security producer	+	+	-
Security supplier	+	+	+
Security broker	-	+	+
Security consumer	-	-	+
Marginal/neutral state	o	o	+/-

Case studies for discussion:

Once the methodological guidelines are drawn, we are now going to see how the political actors of the world integrate into the proposed grid. Each

category in the table will be exemplified.

Note Bene: we should not deduce that the security producer's attribute is an intrinsic characteristic of a state. It only has value in a relationship. Of course, it can be argued that the states from the center, having the highest scores on GDP, large defence budgets, low index of corruption, high innovation have the likelihood of being more frequent in a security producer position, but this equation is not always valid. For example, we can refer to the efforts of Americans to replace the A10 Thunderbird, which is in use for forty years. A solution could be its change with the new F-35. Another one would be to buy the Supertucano from the Brazilian firm Embraer. The second choice will make Brazil a security producer for the US. Of course, we are not in a position to read these relationships in commercial terms. It is not about selling and buying but about some complex relationship and agreements within the alliances – this is why we should understand it as a security producer situation.

Security suppliers - security consumer relation. A good example would be the relationship between Japan and the United States after 1945, when Washington was the one who secured the safety of Japan from a military point of view, while the former imperialist nation had been banned from investing in defence; still from a financial point of view, Japan helped the first Gulf War through its banks. Therefore, the US played the role of security supplier on military dimension, while Japan became a security supplier for the US on the economic dimension.

Tokyo also assumed the role of one of the most substantial international donors, with Japan contributing \$5 billion to the reconstruction of Iraq by 2013 (Kohno 1999, Lincoln 2003, Matsunaga 2013)⁸. This is how Japan consistently practiced the status of an economic security supplier. The contrast between the huge Japanese financial and technological potential and its war capabilities were condensed in the expression 'Japan, a military dwarf and an economic giant' (Brînză 2012, Vişniec 2015), but this phrase is about to become history. In the last few years have been discussed and written about the remilitarization of the country of the rising sun. The Prime Minister Shinzo Abe directs the country to a military status able to discourage what it is perceived as the interference of China and North Korea (Stratfor 2007, Jacoby 2014, Chellaney 2015, Wright 2016, Ion 2016, Jennings 2017, Orchard 2017). We are the witness of a process of transforming the north-east Asian monarchy from an economic security supplier into a potential military security producer – one more reason to assume that the wealth of a country is a predictor

⁸ Calculating the cost of the Gulf War. (1991, March 15). CQ Researcher, 1, 145-155. Retrieved from <http://library.cqpress.com/>.

of its security capabilities.

In addition, it remains to be discussed to what extent the dyad Washington-Tokyo still embodies a win-win relationship since lately street protests have asked the dismantling of US military bases, starting with the one of Okinawa (BBC News 2016)⁹.

Security producer – security consumer relation. Another interesting example brings together the United States and Saudi Arabia. From an energetic point of view, the Saudi nation is an energy security producer at planetary level, with the ability to influence the oil market, as it did, in the early 1970s. From a military point of view, Riyadh manifests a special interest in acquiring american weapons, having a status of semi-peripheral consumer or even the broker of security in case of American interventions in the area (operations against Saddam Hussein (1990, 2003) started from Saudi territory). Lately, the monarchic state is trying to move to a new stage, that of a military security producer. In May 2017, the country's Public investment fund announced the creation of a government-owned armament company with an initial capital of 14 billion riyals (3.7 billion \$) which will provide 40,000 jobs by 2030¹⁰. The new company will be called Saudi Arabian military Industries (SAMI) and it is hoped that it will create around it a constellation of new dependent firms. As part of its vision Saudi Arabia 2030, the prince and also defence Minister Mohammed Bin Salman announce an additional 6 billion riyals that will be invested in research and development of new technologies (Renton 2017).

A potential security producer turns into a security consumer. The third dyad refers to the confluence of the political economy with security within the EU-NATO relation. A reminder of what bad practices mean is Greece's behaviour. Having a tourism based economy, Greece had an unsustainable economic behaviour after 2000. For many years Greece has been one of the biggest arms importers in the world: in 2008 Greek imports represented 3% of the global military imports market while China had 4%!¹¹ – while Greek troops carry out usual missions within the North Atlantic or UN¹². See below

9 BBC News. Protesters gather for anti-US military rally in Okinawa. BBC News. 19 June 2016.

10 UPDATE 2-Saudi Arabia launches military industries company, Reuters, May 17, 2017. Saudi Arabia launches national state company for military industries, Al Arabiya English, 18 May 2017

11 Tipping Point North South, <https://tippingpointnouthsouth.org/5percent/report-5percent/appendix/>

12 For an analysis regarding the correlation between military expenses of Greece and its impact on economy: Emmanuel Athanassiou, Christos Kollias, Eftychia Nikolaidou, Stavros Zografakis, "Greece: Military Expenditure, Economic Growth and the Opportunity Cost of Defence", 2002, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7549/30f190905e352abeb2a33ddf2a7d3c5baa02.pdf>, DOI: 10.1057/9780230501256_14

the defence spending of Greece, Turkey and the NATO average for the 1990-2009 range:

	Greece	Turkey	NATO European	NATO Total
1990-94	3.6	3.7	2.6	3.5
1995	3.2	3.9	2.3	3
1996	3.2	4.1	2.2	2.8
1997	3.2	4.1	2.2	2.7
1998	3.1	3.2	2.1	2.6
1999	3.1	3.98	2.1	2.6
2000	3.3	3.74	2.1	2.5
2009	3.1	3.2	2.1	2.4

Source: The Minister of National Economy and Finances/ SIPRI apud: Paparas, D., Richer, C. and Paparas, A. 2016. Military Spending and economic growth in Greece and the arms race between Greece and Turkey, *Journal of Economic Library* 3 (1), pp.38-56, esp. p.40

After the outbreak of the crisis, France and Germany have conditioned the money to Greece for the purchase of expensive military equipment from them (Taylor 2010, Tatje 2012, Waterfield 2012). So we have the story of the risky behavior of a semi-peripheral nation that, in an attempt to become a military security producer, has turned into an economic security consumer, which thus jeopardizes its national solvency. In the same time, critics could point to Paris and Berlin, which has turned out to put their own interests above the EU as a whole.

Security Suppliers. In the field of military security, the F-16 fighter aircraft, produced by the United States, was bought by Romania, but not directly from the strategic partner, from the Americans, i.e., but from the Portuguese who had already used those planes. Therefore, Lisbon played the role of a supplier between Washington and Bucharest (Tudor 2017, Reuters 2016).

Security brokers. At international level there are very difficult files such as civil wars. Although local, they end up in the attention of the public opinion. Of particular importance in solving these dossiers are a certain type of countries that can play the role of brokers, honest states easily accepted as referees. Brokers can be big power or poor states.

One example is that of the Nordic countries, which are models of prosperity and respect for human rights that have taken seriously the posture of good Samaritans, to cite the title of a book by Alyson Brysk (Brysk 2009).

Norway involved in the Sri Lanka Civil: opposing the Sinhalez majority to the Tamil minority, the inter-ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka (1983-2009) lasted an entire generation. The mediator's involvement led to a ceasefire agreement (February 2002) and the Oslo communiqué (December 2002) that explored the idea of a federal division of the island. The failure of Norwegian mediation can be interpreted according to our criteria as an example when a political player does not necessarily have the resources to stop a conflict, but it possesses the will to change a crisis. To be an honest, but unarmed intermediary, can be an advantage or not (Al Jazeera 2009, Dayaratn 2011, Molakkattu 2005, Norad 2011, Sørbo 2009).

Another notable example involves Romania behaviour after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, when Nicolae Ceausescu thought to take advantage of international events to depart from Moscow and seek new allies. Observing the Sino-Soviet rift and the American attempts to have good offices with Beijing, Ceausescu and Bucharest diplomacy have offered to intermediate between the two poles of power. Beyond the external prestige, Bucharest was considering two goals: a) the friendship of the United States and b) obtaining nuclear technology.

The analyzed dyad meets all the criteria: communist Romania was a developing state and became a mediator on the security issues between two geopolitical giants. Compared to the conflict situation in Vietnam, Bucharest has helped to reach a peace agreement between the US and North Vietnam. At the same time, it hoped to obtain as a reward the status of security consumer status of American nuclear technology, initially for civilian purposes and then defensively. If he had managed to fabricate the nuclear weapon, then Romania would have increased its status inside the Warsaw Pact and the region, becoming perhaps a security producer for the smaller countries that would want to break away from Moscow.

Marginal/neutral states. Neutrality can be a subject of fertile discussion, especially because states can be classified in several categories. At first glance they play the role of zero among the natural numbers, but their existence cannot be defined as a negation.

A nation can have the role of marginal state for several reasons:

1. It has completely isolated itself from the world: China after the expedition of Admiral Zheng in the 15th century or Japan Shoguns until he was forced to open to the world after 1854;
2. The stage of its development is not of interest to the dynamics of the rest of the international community: very poor areas that did not participate in the game of colonialism and capitalism (different regions in Africa, South

America, the Amerindian or Australia tribes until they were discovered by the British). After the 19th century these regions will be integrated into the world system. Today we can talk about isolated tribal communities, which are the subject of anthropology more than political science;

3. It is already in an alliance but for some reason it decides to maintain a low, insignificant profile: those nations or governments which do not participate in the decisions taken within the framework of which they are located. We can find examples of NATO or UN countries that do not take any positions repeatedly, do not formulate interpellations, do not participate in common and so on policies. In the globalized contemporary universe such actors are still hard to find - even the Lilliputian states of the world can play an important role either through the fact that some are tax havens or refugee places of known criminals. Maybe Switzerland can be an example which by the financial resources they store has managed to obtain permanent neutrality status.

Final Remarks

The impetus to write this article comes from a dissatisfaction of the two authors regarding the imprecise and even abusive use of some terms, which was found both from the reading of the press and their didactic activity. The generalization of nouns such as freedom, democracy, security, and so on has led to the franchise of their denotation or, simply said, a situation of conceptual anarchy in which each individual uses them as they see fit. It is also the case of the dyad security producer – security consumer. Both academic and journalistic language, cold analyses or political discourses use them assuming that a definition is no longer needed. Problems arise when the two terms are subject to specific case studies and even political decision; without a prior definition it is not possible to explain or understand how the same country can be both producer, supplier, consumer.

Trying to bring together literature from sociology, economics and international relations our study synthesized some definitions for the above terms.

We believe that the role of this article is dual:

1. brought greater conceptual clarification on the subject;
2. to use a more rare theoretical framework, namely a modified version of Wallerstein's world system, instead of Buzan and Weaver's Copenhagen school. In our argument, WST has a superior functionality because it considers states to be part of an international division.

The theoretical part was followed by several case studies that could illustrate the taxonomy already stated. The authors themselves see a possibility of developing the proposed terminology by building an index that measures the benefits of a relationship. Gathering data about the economy, demography, resources of two states that want to enter into a security relationship (as producers, mediators, suppliers, consumers, etc.), the index in question could predict whether that alliance would function as a win-win game or as a null sum.

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to contribute to the theoretical clarification of certain widely used terms in scholarly literature as well as in public statements made by policymakers, pundits, media people but insufficiently explained, namely security producers and security consumers. Although frequently present, neither political science nor international relations literature have grappled with them, therefore rendering scholars incapable to grasp the complexity of inter-state position.

KEYWORDS

Security Providers; Security Consumer; Romania.

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THE SALMAN DOCTRINE IN SAUDI ARABIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: OBJECTIVES AND THE USE OF MILITARY FORCES

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Introduction

On January 23, 2015, Salman bin Abdulaziz, son of the founder of the Abdulaziz bin Saud kingdom, was inaugurated as the seventh monarch of Saudi Arabia. One of his first decisions was to appoint his son, Mohammed bin Salman, Minister of Defense and Secretary-General of the Royal Court. Within a few months, the young prince would tally enormous political responsibilities (Malsin, 2017). Since then, the foreign policy of the Saudi monarchy is marked by a series of changes promoted directly by the head of state and his heir to the throne, with the purpose of revitalizing the country's international role and preserving its main interests in the Middle East.

In the particular regime of Saudi Arabia, there is a special convergence of the desire to strengthen a political process of greater institutional reinforcement, a diversified economy and timid socio-cultural changes, promoting a

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significant makeover. If we analyze the external sphere, it is also mutating its foreign policy, traditionally considered a conservative power, by virtue of the generational succession in the al Saud monarchy and the remodeling of the complex scenario in the Middle East, through more active, autonomous and belligerent policies, despite the traditional external dependence on security. The Saudi perception is based on the presumption that the security challenges lie both in the revolutionary movements and in the regional theater, convulsed and lacking a clear redefinition.

King Salman and Prince Mohammed bin Salman will amend the strategy followed by the previous sovereign, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, who had to face the Arab spring in the last years of his reign and the direct effects of such rebellions. The regional political and social environment changes dramatically from the year 2011 onwards. For the current Saudi leaders, the answers given to the various convulsions are insufficient. For this reason, they decide to develop a new doctrine, which allows adapting national strategies and objectives to a much more convulsive and unpredictable local space (Domínguez de Olazábal, 2017). His vision is governed by the need for Saudi Arabia to maintain a significant role and counteract the strength of other movements fostered by regional, international and non-state actors.

The formulation and implementation of the Salman doctrine in Saudi foreign policy is determined by the kind of factual interpretation reached. An intersubjective perspective of the understanding of events, threats and challenges, which are related to each other, and that have regional influence, affecting all States (Buzan, 2003: 140-141). In this logic, it is not estimated that any state or non-state actor enjoys sufficient dominant power to prevail in the region, due to the fragmentation of political dynamics in the area and the inconsistency of interests.

The design of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy is built upon three spheres: on the one hand, the essential conceptions that the monarchy has about its role in the country, in the Middle East and the Muslim sphere; on the other, the analysis elaborated on the events that have occurred in recent times that have eroded the security margins and, finally, the conclusions raised on possible threats, risks and opportunities in the face of the complex scenarios opened after the various regional crises.

All this leads to a very particular vision of the responsibility of the Government to carry out a more extensive and ambitious foreign policy. For the top leaders of Saudi Arabia, they start from the premise that the regional status quo broke after the Arab spring and the region is in a restructuring phase (Hippler, 2013: 33-40). The various actors involved in the area must reorient their efforts and attention, in order to influence the future of events. In

the Saudi case to avoid weakening its preponderant and hegemonic position.

Due to the importance and dimension of interpretations, conceptualizations and ideational frameworks to understand Saudi actions in the regional space, the theoretical framework of this article is based on the contributions of the referential authors of social constructivism. In the observation of international relations, the constructivists put the emphasis on the transcendental weight of the construction of meanings and explanations (Lamont, 2015: 17-19). Saudi Arabia's foreign policy is based on a series of objectives and interests, but its trajectory is signaled not only by the achievement of those ends but also by the deduction made of all the circumstances that have recently emerged.

Political dynamics do not involve the calculation of objective causal relationships since they are processes in constant transformation. The characteristics of a political doctrine such as that of King Salman evolve according to interactions with other actors, alterations in the international context and the constitution of judgments and identities (Wendt, 1994: 388-389), which are established individually and collectively. The Saudi monarchy perceives the decline of the status quo in the Middle East as a serious threat to its national interests, based on this, reconfigures its appreciations of the environment and other actors. The most striking changes in its regional strategy occur at the level of valuations, notions and impressions.

The article presents the objectives of foreign policy linking them with the interpretations of the Saudi Government on the consequences of the changes in the region. The current head of state and the crown prince seek to overcome the strategy applied by King Abdullah, paying special attention to those scenarios that are considered essential for the balance and security between the different currents (Gardner, 2016), such as war in Syria and Yemen, the situation in Iraq or tensions with Qatar. Each of these epicenters represents a possible threat to Saudi hegemony, or a new opportunity to broaden their influence within a multipolar and fragmented struggle.

In this analytical framework, the article deepens the reflections and perceptions that are behind Saudi foreign action through the postulates of the Salman doctrine, based on two initial assumptions: A) Saudi Arabia wants to preserve its hegemonic power status and ensure a regional map in accordance with Saudi interests and B) the regional strategy is committed to a more proactive, robust and belligerent leadership, as the safest way to avoid the weakening of Saudi power. The dilemma for the Saud family is to know to what extent these initiatives will be effective and if the country itself is capable of withstanding the considerable and lasting effort they require.

Objectives of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy

The foreign policy objectives of Saudi Arabia are well defined and constitute the logical framework in which the Salman doctrine and regional strategy are situated in a period marked by the lack of stable coalitions and hegemonic authorities. These ends are inexorably linked to the characteristics of the Saudi State, as well as to the unique way of exercising the power of the royal family. Depending on the degree of threat or risk that the Government perceives around any of these purposes, its response will be one or the other. For the king and the prince some fundamental elements are weakened after the Arab spring, understanding that it is essential to propose a different type of action to ensure its durability.

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Saudi kingdom is the patrimonialization of the State by the Saud House. Since its founding in 1932, the Abdulaziz bin Saúd dynasty has managed to extend its power in all facets of society, under tight control of the economy, energy resources, political institutions, military devices, as well as religion, thanks to the esteemed alliance with Wahhabism (Martín, 2013: 86-89). There is no substantial difference between the national interests of the state entity and the intentions of the dominant nucleus of the Saudi princes. Therefore, when talking about the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia we are directly mentioning the aspirations and concerns of the family clan.

The power of the Saud has as its key approaches the instrumentalization of religion, the wealth generated by oil and the breadth of its military means. Wahabism and the royal family have been a fruitful alliance since the 18th century. The pragmatic pact between the political and religious authorities constitutes a solid coalition based on mutual aid, the distribution of power and political legitimation with a strong religious base. Saudi princes worry about protecting and spreading this special interpretation of Islam, while the religious dome projects a favorable discourse with the interests of the crown (Valentine, 2015: 223-226). The Wahabite precepts are the main legitimizing tool that the monarchy has, serving as an indoctrinating instrument and also of repression in the face of more critical currents.

Another of the central pillars of the Saudi regime lies in the richness of the country's excess oil, which gives it abundant specific weight in international markets and constitutes the main source of internal financing. Saudi Arabia is one of the leading oil and gas producers in the world, with voluminous reserves of these resources in its territory. Oil revenues have allowed a state of prosperity linked to the Saud regime to prosper (Priego, 2017). The benefits of production and export report sufficient resources to consolidate the power of the royal family within the kingdom and finance its internation-

al operations. In addition, a state rentier and clientele system is configured, which guarantees the support of a large part of society.

The Saudi State has one of the best trained and modern Armed Forces in the Middle East. The Arab nation is one of the main buyers of military weapons in the world, being one of the countries that most public spending on security and defense (Cordesman, 2018). This trend has been reinforced after the Arab spring and the various regional crises. The monarchy has at its disposal a powerful structure against any type of internal or external threat. Although the aspect of these means has been traditionally defensive, with the intervention in Yemen it has decided to go one step further. Prince Mohammed bin Salman is committed to making it a valuable tool for foreign policy.

In 2018, the amount invested in defense spending puts Saudi Arabia in second place in the world ranking, with 58,137 million euros, only being surpassed by the United States. According to the Report on the world arms trade (SIPRI, 2018), 61% of Saudi imports come from the United States, 23% from the United Kingdom and 3.6% from France, Spain occupies the fourth position as a seller with 2.4%, ahead of other countries with figures that are around 1% such as Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Canada, Sweden or Turkey. If the evolution of defense spending is analyzed in the aforementioned year, it represents 24.59% of the total public expenditure, which means 1,725 euros per capita, that is, the second country on a global scale.

Although the national interests of Saudi Arabia have been kept constant since the foundation of the State, their revitalization can be seen since the end of the Cold War with a greater importance on security. In this order of ideas, there are five main areas in which national interests are divided: a) the defense of sovereignty and territorial unity; b) the guarantee of stability and internal order; c) the protection of the Wahabita doctrine; d) the preservation of the authority of the monarch and his lineage; and e) the consolidation of its presence on the international stage (Hernández, 2019: 62-67). These principles are linked to the Saudi regime and, in turn, fragility in any of them poses a real danger to both the nation and the leadership of its rulers. The Salman doctrine is inspired to avoid renunciation in any of these aspects and propel again a preponderant position of the crown.

Regional objectives are expressed based on national interests. The defense of sovereignty and territorial unity results in: 1) defending borders and 2) curbing external interference. Ensuring stability and internal order translates into: 3) preserving areas of influence in the environment and 4) seeking a favorable status quo. Wahhabism pursues: 5) extending its religious program and 6) curbing critical currents. To preserve the authority of the monarch and his lineage it is necessary: 7) to protect both his figure and 8) that of the Saud House itself. International consolidation inevitably involves:

9) achieving leadership in the Middle East and 10) in the Muslim world.

The perception of how events in the area affect each of the objectives will justify that King Salman, together with Prince Mohammed bin Salman, undertake a series of reforms in the local strategy. This reflection is properly collected in the constructivist approach, thanks to the fact that it provides a vision of the political and social reality in which the agents do not act only in terms of rational choice, but that there is a deep background of values and norms that govern their interaction with third parties (Kratochwill, 1989: 65-65). The response of the Saudi State is given by the confluence of changes in the environment, the programmatic framework on which its foreign policy is based and its interpretation of the world and its power.

The objectives of the regional policy of Saudi Arabia are influenced by two nuances. On the one hand, the interests of the Saud House to strengthen and protect its authority within the kingdom and in other international spaces. On the other, the particular conception of the world and its role in it. Wahabism has an enormous significance in this last point, since its religious synthesis offers a very special image of society, politics and government (Ottaway, 2011). The Wahabist current projected from Saudi officialism exposes principles that are consistent with the interests of the monarchy. Saudi princes are instituted as legitimate referents among their subjects and before Muslim communities.

The religious tradition and the geopolitical situation of Saudi Arabia motivate the Saud to be considered as natural leaders for the Middle East and Muslim communities. In addition, there is a strong link between the situation around it and the internal stability of the kingdom (Hartmann, 2016), so it is vital to preserve constant power balance. The achievement of hegemony at the local level and the Islamic sphere is essential to guarantee the political future of the institution, establishing an equation between the survival of the regime and the need to encircle the possible drifts of conflicts through an insulating cord. Any change in the proximity of the country can have negative effects on its power. The Saudi Government directs its foreign policy to promote a status quo in which it occupies a central role and in which the regional regime is in tune with its interests.

The former monarch, Abdalá bin Abdulaziz, maintained a contained profile in the face of the Arab uprisings, under the pretext of not affecting the fragile internal stability. His successors in charge of the country, Salman and Prince Mohammed bin Salman, do not share this approach, since the passive and discreet stance only increased the weakening of their hegemonic positions. Current leaders are committed to revitalizing regional policy with the ultimate goal of making Saudi Arabia once again become the referential pole of the Arab world (Al-Rasheed, 2018a). The complexity of the regional

environment makes the Saudis decide to use all possible resources to achieve it. Any local incident becomes a priority issue for the monarchy, although it entails considerable economic and political expenditure for the country.

The transformations of recent years in the Middle East and the Maghreb, which led to the overthrow of regimes, sectarian conflicts, variable alliances and civil wars, represent considerable damage to several of the basic objectives of Saudi Arabia's strategic vision. Saudi leaders are aware of the difficulties of sustaining a hegemonic position over time, establishing areas of influence, avoiding external interference and countering critical discourses. These circumstances force the crown to undertake a new doctrine, which can curb the deterioration of Saudi leadership and reconstitute a new and auspicious regional map.

The Salman's regional strategy

The international relations of Saudi Arabia are divided into a series of spheres according to their importance for the Saud House (Al-Ghamdi, 2011). On a first level would be the Gulf area including members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Iran, Iraq, Yemen, due to its borderline importance and, due to its strong presence, the United States (USA). On a second level, the Arab sphere, includes relations with most countries in the Middle East. The third is the Islamic one that includes all nations where the Islamic religion has considerable weight. The fourth category refers to its links with other regions and powers such as China and Asian economies, Russia or the main states of the European Union.

The segmentation of each of these areas together with the objectives and interests of the Saud house allow us to understand the main priorities of regional policy. Constructivism points out that hegemony, national interests or reason of state are social constructions that give meaning to the actions of political actors (Reus-Smit, 1997: 565-566). The Saudi leadership starts from the vital importance of exercising a preponderant control over the Gulf and the vicinity of the Arabian peninsula. Being a reference in the area and in the Muslim world provides the essential value for the monarchy. Losing prominence in these spaces creates a content void in the foundation of the system created by the Saudi princes.

The Salman doctrine is based on a very concrete interpretation of the facts, both of the response given by King Abdullah and the consequences originated after these years of convulsion and instability. The vector principle of this plan is to restore order and continue to occupy a hegemonic position.

For the king and Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Arab revolts marked the end of a stage. A definitive and invariable phenomenon. Saudi Arabia cannot act as a simple retaining wall for changes, but needs to establish a renewed and firm preeminence.

The Saudi State must react to this phenomenon, restoring the status quo and occupying a hegemonic position, as it seems unlikely that external players such as the United States, Russia, the European Union or China can enjoy sufficient political power to determine the final outcome of the regional order, although they still have some influence. In this sense, it is the actors in the area who design their own future, so it is necessary to position and expand the influence through economic, diplomatic and political support to the weakest governments in the vicinity and to the variety of non-state actors involved in the contests.

The current monarch does not share the management carried out in the past by his predecessor in office. In a totally different context, the State needs to undertake new initiatives that revalue its hegemon status. The biggest concern in Saudi foreign policy is Iran (Chara, 2018: 230-231), especially since the signing of the 2015 Vienna Agreement over the suspension of the Iranian nuclear program. The open conflict points allow the influence of the Iranian State to extend its operating margins and counteract that of the other surrounding poles. The Ayatollah regime really represents the only actor capable of shading the Saud.

The Salman doctrine seeks to reactivate the role of Saudi Arabia in the most conflictive and determining points of the Middle East. The goal is to preserve their leadership quota and make their interests prevail over that of other actors (Al-Rasheed, 2016). The Saudi State will face the various challenges with all the resources at its disposal, adapting its actions according to the degree of threat or danger. The mechanisms or tools to which it resorts are political, economic, religious, diplomatic and military. For Prince Mohammed bin Salmán, the main responsible for this new strategy, the situation requires implementing exceptional measures, which have a remarkable scope both in the medium and long term.

During the last decades Saudi Arabia was recognized as a central actor in the region. Its external hegemony was supported by a less coercive and belligerent facet, enhancing its most notable facets in the field of religion, diplomacy or its scope in the energy markets. The Saudis managed to impose their criteria in a less striking and direct way, although the regional horizon was inscribed in an imperfect order, but more structured than the current one, which facilitated the application of a cautious policy. Since 2015, the Salman doctrine introduces important qualitative and quantitative changes, display-

ing a broader and more assertive agenda, which requires the coordination of all possible capital.

Qualitatively this doctrine is characterized by returning to an Arabist, Sunni and inflexible discourse. Saudi Arabia is postulated as the emblem of the Arab world and Sunni populations, while appealing to its status as a vector of stability and order in the region. The Saudis combine a strong religious and ethnic component to mark the political lines of the Middle East. The monarchy tries to resume its role as a vector of stability and order with the image of supremacy before Muslim communities. To serve as a bridge between Western powers and the Arab countries (Kinninmont, 2016), reinforcing its relations with the United States, the main European capitals and the governments of the area closest to the Saudi theses.

The qualitative change can also be seen in the aggressive level of the dialectic towards opposition movements and other actors in the region. The most belligerent reactions fall on Iran and its partners, in what King Abdullah of Jordan called the "Shia growing" alliance (Walker, 2006: 16-17). The quantitative transformation is produced by the deployment carried out by the kingdom on the main fronts of the environment and the resources allocated to it. The Salman doctrine pursues a new regional political, religious and security order, where Saudi Arabia returns to a central role in each of these facets. The strategy led by Mohammed bin Salman presents a tense dichotomy between a pro-Saudi-Sunni axis and another Iranian-Shiite opponent. This Manichaeian discourse eclipses the true reason for the strategy, which is political and not religious.

Never before has the Saudi monarchy been immersed in so many conflicts and crises at the same time and asserting heterogeneous capabilities, spreading its forces on several fronts to record its presence (Berenguer, 2016: 12-15). In each of them it sends the same message: any issues in the Middle East requires the participation of Saudi Arabia. Depending on the nature of the problem, it will resort to military force, or to elements more linked to white power, such as political mechanisms, religious inference or economic maneuvering. The expected results are to strengthen its hegemony again after the Arab spring, weakening all those currents that have managed to counteract Saudi importance.

Changes in foreign matters are accompanied by a series of profound modifications in the kingdom. The most outstanding example is the extensive Saudi Vision 2030 plan, which is close to the postulates of Mohammed bin Salman. The reforms are aimed at expanding State resources, modernizing its economy and improving competitiveness as essential steps to accommodate the new international vicissitudes (Khan, 2016: 36-39). It brings togeth-

er various economic dimensions with the central objective of doubling GDP and positioning Saudi Arabia among the 15 most important countries in the world through economic diversification. The Government ignores substantial changes in the political system, guiding its efforts in consolidating the figure of the young prince and his international projects.

The use of force as a resource in external action

The Saudi State had always shied away from getting involved in the numerous conflicts in the Middle East. The exceptional nature of the Arab spring confirms that the Saudis have to develop new action plans. The foreign policy of Saudi Arabia reinforces its militaristic component starting with the decided support given to the monarch of Bahrain. The activation of the CCG Peninsula Shield, at the request of Emir Al Jalifa in March 2011 (Ulrichsen, 2014: 346-347), represented a starting point towards a more militaristic and more belligerent approach. This trend will end up being confirmed with the entry into the Yemeni war years later. The interests of the Saud House will cease to be defended only thanks to their political and religious weight, but also through the threat and use of their military capabilities.

The militarization of Saudi foreign policy is not a casual event, since for almost two decades the Saudi Government has been working on the modernization and expansion of the powers of its armies. The defense strategy had been virtually detached from internal security measures until the Iraq War in 2003 (Russell, 2005: 66-67). The overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime was preceded by a deep disagreement between the Bush and Riyadh Administration, which led a public opposition of Arab monarchies who disagreed with such action in a key state like the Iraqi. Saudi princes feared that Iraqi destabilization would be used by the Iranians to expand their influence.

The crisis of agreement of priorities between Americans and the Saud precipitated the Wahabita regime to finally decide to improve its Armed Forces. The Saudi monarchy no longer perceived the United States as a guarantor of stability for the region and of defense of its allies (Lacey, 2009: 298-301), highlighting the discrepancies in addressing the main security challenges in the zone. This distancing of relations began to occur after 9/11 and the World War on Terror launched by the White House. Suspicion of links between the Saudi State and radical organizations led to a climate of distrust of the main Western powers regarding the religious policy of Saudi Arabia.

Since the unification of the kingdom in 1932, the Saud House had concentrated all efforts to strengthen its power within the kingdom. After World

War II, the alliance with the United States reaffirmed the Saudi princes in the task of preserving internal order while renouncing their defense. Americans would be their political supporter and protector against any kind of external danger (Bowen, 2008: 110-112). This type of association would continue to be replicated with the rest of the Arab monarchies in the Gulf decades later. These regimes promised to contain any type of revolution or anti-imperialist movement in the area, while the Anglo-Saxon power was established as the main trading partner and became an actor in the Gulf.

The invasion of Kuwait in 1991 showed the fragility of these regimes before other States with greater war potential. The immediate assistance of the United States was the confirmation for these dynasties of the need to strengthen ties with their Western counterparts in search of external security umbrellas, to protect the regimes. Saudi Arabia was able to devote much of its resources for decades to developing powerful internal security devices, intelligence and repression services, which facilitated the system's durability. This strategy left it in a smaller place compared to the armies of other surrounding countries.

The Armed Forces became important in Saudi Arabia since the Gulf War in 1991, but always linked to their alliances with the United States' deployed bodies in the region. At the end of the 20th century, the Saudis began to substantially increase the volume of their imports of weapon materials and to diversify the number of partners in this area, improving relations with China (Al-Tamimi, 2012: 4-5). But the real leap in investment takes place at the beginning of the new century. From Riyadh, it is perceived that international circumstances will entail assuming greater responsibilities in defense. The vision is no longer to support the Americans in the protection of the Saudi territory, and the rest of the monarchies, but that the Saudis lead that mission together with the rest of local governments.

Until the Arab spring, King Abdullah was not in the position to resort to military intervention abroad. The entry of Saudi devices in Bahrain to suppress the 2011 protests is a milestone in the Saudi national defense strategy, under the coverage of helping and assisting allied leaders. The members of the CCG are another part of the preferred space that they consider should be protected as natural references of the area (Gimenez, 2018: 300-301). Saudi Arabia conceives its priorities in a much broader sense than the security of its borders. The Bahraini case had a reactive character and contained a clear message to the outside, recognizing that it would not allow interference in those spaces that it considers of its highest priority.

Although the Middle East is not positioned as the geographical space that encourages the greatest number of armed conflicts, it is an area of high

conflict, especially comparing its extension and data with other global figures (Armada, 2017: 48-50). States with a vocation to play the role of regional power make an investment in notable defense expenses, being the most outstanding example in the Saudi Arabia area. Kingdom leaders understand that the effective use of force in different scenarios should be projected as the central point of their predominance position.

Force becomes another tool of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy. The deployment of military personnel outside the country is done both to stabilize the environment and to preserve Saudi interests. For King Salman and Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the hegemonic position in the Middle East requires the use of all available resources. For the application of this type of strategy, two factors have to be combined: the perception of eminent danger on any of Saudi interests and the real possibilities of carrying out military action. Only in their immediate surroundings, the Arab monarchies of the Gulf and Yemen, the Saudi leaders are confident that they can overcome some junctures by way of force. In other regional scenarios, circumstances force Saudi Arabia to resort to other elements.

Main challenges for Saudi Arabia in the Middle East

The Salman doctrine encounters numerous obstacles and challenges in the region. The success of the strategy will depend on both the Saudi appreciations and the responses of the other actors to the Saudi initiatives. It is clear that there are numerous parts in the Middle East that want to limit the scope of the leadership of the Saud. Each crisis in the environment becomes a corrector of the correlation of forces. The result in each of the conflictive scenarios will mark the political horizon of the area. The success of the initiatives of the king and Prince Mohammed bin Salman will depend largely on what will happen soon in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt or Qatar.

The approach made by the State of Saudi Arabia on its regional priorities is based both on the calculation of possible revenues and losses that it can obtain from its actions, according to its capabilities and interests and those of the other agents, as well as its knowledge of the present reality and the possible expectations. In this sense, it is constructivism that helps connect the material world and the subjective or meaning world (Adler, 1997: 330-33). The application of foreign policy has the two interrelated dimensions. The military, economic, religious and political force of a country together with the background of conceptualizations, meanings and interpretations.

For the Saudis, the key to the new status quo and the possibilities

of maintaining leadership go through five scenarios: Syria, Yemen, Iraq, the GCC and Iran. The main impediments they may encounter are: the Iranian rise, the Qatari resistance, instability in allied countries and critical currents within the kingdom. The international context is more favorable for the Saudis than during the reign of Abdullah. The Trump Administration is closer to the Saud than Obama (Al-Rasheed, 2018b: 236-238), they have an unexpected ally in Israel and other foreign powers, such as Europeans or Chinese, are in favor of stability over new convulsions .

In each of the key scenarios, Saudi Arabia is betting on different strategies to defend its influence. For the few rebel factions that still face the Al Asad regime in Syria, the Saudis remain the main international support, despite the fact that the president is more consolidated than a few years ago. Similarly, in Iraq the Saudis strengthen the congregation of Sunni groups to counteract the weight of Shiite figures and Iranian interference. In the Yemeni conflict, the Saudi Government has decided to continue with its strategy of supporting specific sectors of society, while intervening militarily on Houthi positions. In the case of the GCC, Saudi diplomacy has undertaken intense political and economic pressure, which reaffirms its authority against the Qatari position.

The most prominent initiative of the Salman doctrine is intervention in Yemen. A firm commitment of Prince Mohammed bin Salmán to claim the Saudi prominence in the area. The particularity of the operation in Yemen is that Saudi Arabia decides to use its military forces as another element of its foreign policy, which helps it preserve its leadership. Never before has the Saudi kingdom been so involved in environmental crises, despite the uncertainty of the result. It is an added effort for the country that was not accustomed to war situations.

King Salman and Prince Mohammed bin Salman decided to take a major qualitative step in the war in Yemen. Until 2015 the monarchy had followed a line similar to that of Syria, but in this case not supporting opposition factions but the Government of Al-Hadi. The military operation is launched because the Saud perceive a growing risk of the possibility of Houthis taking power in a border country (Juneau, 2016: 651-654). The Syrian situation does not have a territorial proximity but the Yemeni situation does. Saudi Arabia wants to prevent an actor contrary to its leadership from taking hold within the peninsula and, even more, can serve as a liaison with Iran. The deployment of forces has served to contain the Houthi push, but not to stabilize the country.

Iraq regains special prominence in Saudi foreign policy due to the strong Iranian presence in the country. The Ayatollah regime has developed

strong political, economic and military ties with its Iraqi neighbor (Katzman, 2009: 6-8), so its presence is well disseminated, in addition to having Shiite parties that control the main institutions. Concisely it can be said that Tehran has been the biggest regional winner after the fall of Saddam Husein's regime by increasing his influence. This Iranian strategy of slow but unstoppable infiltration raises concern from Riyadh, although it has little capacity to maneuver except supporting Sunni groups and opponents of the political system imposed by the occupation. The Salman doctrine is committed to increasing its weight in the neighboring State, rebuilding relations with different ethnicities and confessions and, finally, through economic investments.

The war in Syria is the most decisive front for the political future of the region. The Syrian country has an important role for local balances. The conflict overcomes the contours of an internal dispute, through the intervention of foreign parties through direct actions or interposed actors to guarantee their interests and infer in the priority issues of the regional agenda. In the field, the interests of different actors in the area and international powers converge. It is essential for the Saudis to assert their goals to contain the Iranian push (Demir and Rijnoveanyu, 2013: 70-71). The survival of the Al-Assad regime and the support of Russia and Iran is an unrelated axis for the Saud House. For these reasons, the Saudi kingdom remains a distinguished partner of certain opposition factions despite the adverse evolution of the contest. The purpose is that the Syrian allies of Saudi Arabia can be counted on the possible political reconstruction of the country.

The Syrian contest seems to be in favor of Iran's interests, which would lead to the constitution of the Shiite axis, which some Arab monarchies fear as much as the Saudi one. For this reason, the Government of Salman promotes support for certain political parties and Sunni religious groups with the purpose of rebalancing forces (Wehrey, 2015: 78-79), presenting a front to Kurds, Shiites and secular movements, trying to influence through other actors in internal dynamics to expand power margins and counteract the weight of competitors. Regarding Iran's role it obeys two considerations; first, the Syrian conflict translates into a national security issue with the maintenance of an indispensable partner to implement the current foreign policy of influence in the Middle East and, secondly, it is necessary that the Iranian State preserves a prominent position in the conflict to legitimize yourself as an indispensable interlocutor in local dynamics.

The GCC represents not only a unique integration organization in the region but the ultimate expression of Saudi hegemony. The Saud have always tried to exercise direct leadership over the rest of the members, pressing for them to function as a homogeneous entity always under the Saudi preponder-

ance (Ehteshami, 2012, pp. 264-265). However, relations between the monarchies go through a very complicated phase after the open crisis with Qatar, which represents one of the most fragile points of the Saudi authority and which completely paralyzes the Council.

After the Arab uprisings there is a disintegration among the members of the organization. On the one hand, the block led by Saudi Arabia, which has the support and monitoring of Bahrain and UAE. On the other, Kuwait and Oman, who try to preserve an image of calculated neutrality. Finally, the Qatari State, which is presented as the most disruptive pole within the GCC (Dazi-Héni, 2019). The differences between members are accentuated when addressing regional crises. The elements of security, defense and external action continue to be matters in which the regimes still want to safeguard their level of sovereignty, hindering the possibilities of greater integration.

The strategic vision on the usefulness and viability of the GCC is changing profoundly with King Salman and Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Saudi Arabia had a keen interest in projecting an image of unity and cohesion during the Arab spring (Kamrava, 2012: 97-98), but the tendency was for each Member State to attend to the changes individually. Saudi leaders begin to set totally different objectives, breaking with the basic premises on which Saudi diplomacy settled in the Gulf. The new proposals involve leaving aside the Council to build other types of alliances in the Middle East and the Muslim sphere.

The problems that have occurred with Qatar since 2017 serve to reaffirm the need for the Saud to reformulate a Saudi axis among related governments in the region. The possible project is underdeveloped and articulated, but its simple approach implies a disrepute and deterioration for the operation of the CCG, which has ceased to function in an ordinary way for more than two years (Szalai, 2018: 5-6). This organization begins to lose validity for Saudi Arabia, which no longer perceives it as a necessary element to strengthen its power but rather a flank of weakness. Saudi security and defense involve creating cooperation spaces where a firm commitment is generated between countries to protect and assist the stability of each regime.

Salman's strategy finds in Qatar another of the most considerable resistance. The Qatari emirate with the Al Thani dynasty in power is developing an active foreign policy (Roberts, 2016: 8-11), which takes it away from the Saudi predominance and the limitations of the GCC. The block on the Qatari peninsula is used by the Saudis as a show of strength, seeking to configure an area of influence that aligns countries of the Middle East and Maghreb with the power of the Saud. However, the most immediate consequences are the breaking of consensus within the Council and the approach of Qataris to

other regional centers such as Tehran or Ankara.

The Iranian rise is the highest concern within the Saudi crown. The weight acquired by Iran in recent years in spaces such as Iraq or Syria, coupled with other links in Qatar, Lebanon, Gaza or Yemen, make the Ayatollah regime the only one capable of presenting a counterbalance to Saudi hegemony. The political dispute between the two countries is involved in religious discourse (Beydoun and Zahawi, 2016: 48-49), masking the true backdrop, the struggle for power and regional supremacy. It does not lead to a direct confrontation, but it does have several tension springs, which exemplify the incompatibility of interests of both poles. Regional leadership is a *sine qua non* condition for the security of the two governments, so they strive to establish axes and alliances that strengthen their position and weaken the other.

Iran is considered an ancient power with a natural vocation to intervene in the region, to protect its security and cut off the isolation to which it has been subjected by the effects of international sanctions. The gradual Iranian influence in different States of the region or in a heterogeneous group of non-state actors, that is, Iranian expansionism, is the main threat to the interests of Saudi Arabia, which has increased unprecedented animosity with the Salman doctrine, overcoming previous stages characterized by discursive hostility or permanent suspicion. The confrontation between the two in the political, economic, religious, diplomatic fields is extended to the warmongering rhetoric defended by the Saudi elites and the most conservative Iranians, although it is unlikely to lead to military conflict.

The opposition within the kingdom can play a transcendental role in the scope of the Salman doctrine. The figure of Prince Mohammed bin Salman has numerous detractors in the circles closest to the royal family. The controversy produced by the case of journalist Khashoggi evidences political disagreements around the crown (Hernández, 2018). The heir to the throne concentrates numerous faculties and it is assumed that he is *de facto* responsible for the external action of the kingdom. Despite being an absolutist monarchy, Saudi Arabia is governed by difficult balances of powers that the king's son tries to alter in a very short time.

Saudi Arabia is managing to strengthen an associative circle with countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt or Israel, while seeking closer relations with Jordan, Kuwait and Oman. The Saudis manage to gain weight in the internal vicissitudes of Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, but they are losing capacity to influence Syria and Qatar. The leadership of the Saud is being strengthened under the initiatives of King Salman (Soler i Lecha, 2018: 152), but its scope may be less relevant than expected. The claims of the Saud House will still have to coexist with other agents of enormous power,

since the context is not favorable to its hegemony.

Final Remarks

The Salman doctrine represents a profound change in the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia and its regional strategy. Behind its design and implementation is Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to whom his father has delegated the main governmental tasks. The Kingdom Government hopes with this initiative to regain the prominence in the Middle East that they thought was lost, containing the thrust of those forces trying to weaken the Saudi hegemonic position. For the interests of the Saud dynasty, it is essential to preserve a preponderant role in the environment, since it is a factor highly correlated with the stability of the country itself.

The foreign action of Saudi Arabia in Salman's reign is characterized as proactive, belligerent and robust. First, the Saudi State wants to reactivate its role in the area, overcoming the phase of responding only to the crises and problems of the environment, evolving towards work that fosters and influences new local dynamics. Second, the current leaders show a higher level of resolution and aggressiveness in defending national interests and safeguarding their regional objectives. Finally, the Saudi nation is expanding its deployment and presence in different scenarios, using all the means available to it.

The Salman doctrine is given by a concrete interpretation of the reality of the country and the region after the Arab spring. Since 2015, King Salman and Mohammed bin Salmán have introduced important changes in foreign action based on several assumptions. On the one hand, they consider the strategy followed by their predecessor wrong when facing the challenges that arose after the riots, which has favored the weakening of Saudi positions. On the other, they recognize the change in the regional status quo and the variety of challenges and threats, which require a renewed strategy and the involvement of all available capacities of the State.

For the leaders of the Saud House since 2011 the area is in a period of enormous importance. The exit to conflicts like Syria or Yemen, as well as the channeling of tensions at points such as Egypt, Qatar or Iraq, will surely mark the future of all countries in the coming decades. The prevailing order in which Saudi Arabia achieved a recognized preponderance has broken, leading to a few years of enormous confusion and uncertainty, characteristic of a transitional stage. It is under these circumstances that the contours of the new regional map are being fixed.

The Salman doctrine relies on the resources and capabilities of the

Saudi State to implement its regional objectives. Depending on each scenario or the purpose of the operation, one or another strategy will be used. In the case of Yemen since 2015, the Saudis opt for a broad military operation. Regarding Qatar, they have preferred to apply mechanisms of political and diplomatic pressure with others of economic blockade and military threat. To erode the Iranian rise, the Saudi government tries to wear down the Ayatollah regime on several fronts: first, by supporting Sunni sections and reactivating investment and trade ties in Iraq or Lebanon; second, it continues to support certain groups of opponents in Syria; third, it reinforces international pressure with the Trump administration and the Israeli Netanyahu executive.

The use of force is a central element in the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia, which had so far avoided using such a mechanism in the environment. The reasons that lead the Saudi Government to implement this type of operations are due to two purposes, firstly, its implementation under a deterrent aspect in the face of interference from rival powers, secondly, as a real and explicit manifestation of the power of the Saud out of its kingdom. The purpose is to secure the interests of Riyadh and its allies, but also to counteract the strength of potential opponents.

The Wahabita State has spent decades investing in the modernization and expansion of its military capabilities, aware of the need to adapt to new regional circumstances, but it is finally recently when it decides to make use of them. The use of force is conceived as another appendix of the power of Saudi Arabia, which, given the threats surrounding the kingdom, is considered legitimate to use military elements. The Saudi princes definitely abandon their suspicions for intervening in this way in foreign territory, since they traditionally advocated in other ways such as economic support for political and religious factions. In the background of their approach is a maximum confidence in the means at their disposal and the confirmation that only with force can protect certain interests.

The main threat perceived by Saudi leaders is centered on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since the 1979 revolution, the former Persian nation has staged the ideological and religious antagonism of Saudi Arabia. The Saud House estimates the Iranian regime as the only regional actor capable of truly displacing Saudi power. The various latent conflicts in the Middle East cause this rivalry to remain at very high levels through an indirect confrontation. Both States aspire to establish themselves as hegemonic leaders of the region and the Muslim sphere, their interests being totally opposed. The impossibility of distension between the two countries to dispute spaces of power and influence and their expansionist propensity, suggests that instability in that part of the world will remain notable.

The limits to regional policy come from internal and external conditions. The economic and political erosion of the war in Yemen and the strong presence in other countries such as Syria, Iraq, Lebanon or Egypt can discredit the image of Mohammed bin Salman, who has assumed full responsibility in this regard. Criticisms can occur within the royal family, among those members who do not support either the prince's agenda or who hold such power. These discrepancies will surely be more noticeable when King Salman no longer occupies the throne.

Imposing the Saudi will in the Middle East is not as feasible as in the past, since resistance is more numerous and solid. There are significant counterweights to the power of the Saud as are the States of Iran and Turkey, which also want to establish their own spaces of influence and reduce the prominence of the Saud. Qatar, Syria or Iraq are other countries that do not want to be totally submerged under the Saudi weight. The Salman doctrine will be successful as long as it is able to adapt to the new realities, promoting a type of hegemony that not only uses force and coercion but also cooptation and conviction.

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ABSTRACT

Saudi Arabia's foreign policy is one of the central elements in the analysis of the current dynamics of the Middle East. King Salman and the crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, are introducing significant changes in the international activities of the kingdom, through a more assertive and militaristic policy, especially to deal with the different outbreaks of the region and the Muslim sphere. This article analyzes the objectives and strategies that support the responses of the Saudi Government, as well as the use of force as a resource for foreign policy. This paper studies the main challenges and resistance to the power of the Saud House. The formulation and development of the current monarch's doctrine is determined by Saudi interpretations of possible security threats and opportunities at different levels, which may have a direct effect on the interests of the crown.

KEYWORDS

Saudi Arabia; Foreign Policy; Doctrine; Salman; Middle East.

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COMPARATIVE NUCLEAR POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF U.S. IMPACT ON INDIA AND BRAZIL PROGRAMS (1946-2018)¹

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Introduction

The first state to possess nuclear weapon technology and still the largest military superpower, the United States of America represents a major player in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Given the pivotal role of nuclear technology during the Cold War, leading to a nuclear deterrence situation between the US and Soviet blocs, other countries began to develop their nuclear programs, some for the purpose of energy production, others for possession of atomic weaponry or to achieve both objectives.

Among the countries dedicated to pursuing a national nuclear program, Brazil and India stand out. Both began their programs after World War II, at a time when the development of nuclear technology was encouraged by policy such as the US government's "Atoms for Peace." Brasilia and New Delhi imagined that the development of nuclear technology and mastery of the uranium cycle could mean an important source of energy, solving one of their major economic bottlenecks.

Additionally, Brazil and India's nuclear programs need to be understood from the relationships they present within their regions and foreign influences. From the discussions made by Buzan and Wæver (2003), it is

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necessary to understand that the regions create their dilemmas and constellations of security, from the internal disputes and the dynamics of relationships that the states have among themselves, but also from the penetration of global dynamics generated by the great and – or – superpowers.

In this sense, the importance and impact of the relationship between the two programs with the US is highlighted, as it occurs differently within the two regions, more specifically within the position it will have in the two Regional Security Complexes (CRS). In the South American CRS, the US projects its power directly to the present day and is militarily dominant, in the South Asian CRS, the US is not the only military power and the Eurasian strategic environment encompasses global geopolitical disputes (Buzan & Weaver 2003).

The South Asian CRS will be marked by the existence of different disputes and different external actors intervening and modifying the internal disputes within the complex. During the Cold War, the US position in the complex to cope with the expansion of the Soviet Union (USSR) in the region and Central Asia builds a complex diametrically different from that of South America. Later the emergence of China and Japan as major powers amplified the regional and global disputes, enabling articulations and arrangements not seen by the South American countries⁴.

To better understand the development of nuclear programs, it is essential to follow the regional dynamics that occur throughout the late mid-twentieth century and the first two decades of the 21st century. In addition, understanding the evolution of internal disputes over complexes allows for a better understanding of the choices they have made for the future of their nuclear programs. In a context of intense insecurity and conflict with its neighbors and rivals – Pakistan and China – India has opted for the development and mastery of nuclear technology, also for military purposes. In the case of Brazil, especially from the resumption and improvement of relations with Argentina, the country's main opponent – and today partner – in the region, led to the abandonment of the idea of building a nuclear artifact.

However, only the analysis of regional dynamics would be insufficient to understand the incentives or constraints over the years to advance or re-grow the respective nuclear programs. Many of these situations are affected by the context of relations with the US. Therefore, the choice to persist in the

4 Even before it was considered a global power, given the lack of capacity to influence in all regions, China was already a major factor in security dynamics in South Asia as it borders India. This situation becomes clear after the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, and the subsequent cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad, heightening regional tensions and New Delhi's perception of insecurity.

development of an autonomous nuclear program goes beyond the possibilities of negotiating or bargaining with the US, as well as its interest in the region, facilitating or boycotting the projects of Brazil and India.

This paper seeks to build, from a historical perspective, the US participation in the Brazilian and Indian nuclear programs, arguing that Washington was fundamental to the calculations of both, conditioning their choices and even enabling – or not – the projects. The US advocacy of nonproliferation was not uniform, much less its role within the regime, as is clear from the progress of this article, and Washington has changed its approach depending on the challenges and interests it had in the regions and their overall strategy.

To this end, the text will analyze separately the interaction of the two countries with the US, especially in their nuclear relations. In the first part the history of the Indian nuclear program (INP), and how was its relationship with Washington, outlining the moments where there was a closer proximity and the moments of resurgence of nuclear cooperation between them, until the civil nuclear agreement of 2008 will be presented. In the second part, the Brazilian nuclear program (PNB) is analysed and how the presence of the US as a hemispheric power eventually conditioned Brasilia's choices and possibilities in the field. Finally, the text summarizes these reflections.

The Indian nuclear program and United States: divergence and convergence (1946/2018)

Historically, the relationship between India and the US has been characterized more by stages of detachment than approximation, associated with the nature of Indian Cold War foreign policy, its rapprochement with the Non-Aligned Movement and its regional geopolitical position. By comparison, the US weight on India's foreign agenda is less relevant than in the Brazilian case for strategic, social and cultural reasons, which allows India some leeway in this country.

This distancing movement was prevalent until the 21st century, when changes in the Indian geo-economic and geopolitical weight evidenced a growth in the relative importance of the country in the regional and global scenario and changed the American perception. Other changes in the world scenario, associated with the rise of China, instability in Russia and phenomena such as the expansion of transnational risks such as post-2001 terrorism, have fostered a greater convergence of US-Indian interests. India has come to occupy a more relevant strategic space in US thinking, broadening its bargain with the still prevailing hegemony.

In this context, the Indian domain of nuclear technology, and the development of INP, have undergone changes in their character and priorities. The US moved from a role of restraint and disagreement over this program to a convergence agenda, which in 2008 resulted in a major bilateral nuclear agreement. Chronologically, we consider that the India-US nuclear exchange can be divided into three phases: encouragement, assistance and detachment (1947 to 1978); insulation and pressure (1978 to 2001); and recognition and cooperation (2001/2018)⁵.

A) Encouragement, Assistance and Detachment (1947/1978)

A historic view of the Indian government, which took place for most of the twentieth century, was that nuclear power could generate many benefits and catalyze the development of all mankind, as well as exposing the risks of the nuclear race and calling for the disarmament of countries that they had nuclear warheads (Chakma 2005, Mishra 1997). Such a view already exists in the years before independence with the establishment of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in 1944 (TIFR) and, in 1946, the Atomic Energy Research Committee (AERC) (Chakma 2005). Shortly after independence in 1947, India began its nuclear program to develop technology to meet its energy needs, using the first Third World country for a program of that kind (Vanaik 1995).

The INP began in 1948 with the creation of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (Pant 1984, Chakma 2005). In this way, India is dedicated to the peaceful development of nuclear energy, defending disarmament and abdication of nuclear racing (Charnysh 2009). Program development was facilitated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which placed all uranium and thorium reserves under government control and, in 1954, by the creation of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) (Chakma 2005).

In order to accelerate the development of the nuclear program, India

⁵ This division bears some resemblance to Chakma's (2005) on INP, but advances in historical periods and emphasizes the interrelationship between INP and the United States. For Chakma (2005), the focus is on the Indian agenda, and the INP has three phases: 1946-1964, which is based on Indian independence and Chinese nuclear tests, and was focused on the economic and social development of the Indian state and its people; 1964 to 1974, a rethinking of nuclear policy, keeping open the option of 'go nuclear', that is, to become nuclear armed. At this stage, India opposed the NPT and led, as it became known, the 'Peaceful Nuclear Explosion' (PNE) in 1974; 1974 to 1998, marked by the 'nuclear ambiguity', in which the country advocated nuclear disarmament but at the same time kept open the option to nuclearize, until in May 1998 India conducted the Pokhran 2 tests, and declares to the world a country with nuclear arsenal (Chakma 2005, Charnysh 2009, Centre for Science and Security Studies 2017).

sought technological and financial support from developed countries to build the program's structure, obtaining support for the construction of reactors and nuclear-critical raw materials such as enriched uranium, particularly for from the Atoms for Peace program of the US government (Chakma 2005, Andrade, Carpes & Leite 2017, Charnysh 2009). It was through international cooperation and aid that India acquired its first reactors: the first being the '*Aspara Research Reactor*', with British support in 1955 and the following year the country acquired the second reactor from Canada, CIRUS, which had US support for the supply of heavy water that fed it (Charnysh 2009).

In addition to providing heavy water to feed the CIRUS reactor, India and the US agreed in 1963 to supply two US reactors to India. In turn, Indians agreed to use only enriched uranium in the US to power the country's reactors (Charnysh 2009). In addition, it was agreed that the IAEA would verify Indian facilities to ensure that uranium was used for peaceful rather than military purposes. Later, in 1966, the two countries negotiated the sending of US plutonium to India, which would be used for research in the area (Charnysh 2009).

Modifications to the INP, which remained tied only to the peaceful uses of technology in the early years, began in the 1960s and were related to the deterioration of relations between India and its main regional rivals: Pakistan and China, especially after the defeat in the Sino-Indian war and Chinese nuclear tests of 1964 (Chakma 2005, Subrahmanyam 2018, Vanaik 1995, Pant 2007, Charnysh 2009). After such instability in its regional surroundings, the project acquired a twofold character: at the same time as the civil use of nuclear energy, the program laid the foundation for the country to choose, if necessary, to build a military nuclear program (Vanaik 1995).

Such changes in nuclear policy were the result of the debate that began after China's tests. Different prominent figures in Indian politics and society have demanded a more assertive position from the Indian government to pursue India's development of nuclear weapons in order to safeguard the country from the Chinese threat (Chakma 2005). Within the disputes on the subject, one element was the moral debate over owning a nuclear bomb: by avoiding developing the bomb the country could continue to cry out for the disarmament of the world, while those in favor of the bomb claimed to be naive to imagine the world without nuclear weapons at the moment, and to refrain from possessing them, would be to believe that only morals could guarantee the security of the country (Chakma 2005, Andrade, Carpes & Leite 2017).

Another point in the debate at the time was whether China's possession of nuclear weapons posed a threat to India (Chakma 2005). Some argued

that the Chinese tests posed no danger to the country as they aimed to respond to global power disputes against the US and USSR. On the other hand, others advocated for the weapon to avoid taking risks by assuming that even if they were not to be used against India, bombs could at least be used to disproportionately increase Chinese bargaining power in the negotiations with the country (Chakma 2005). Thus, the relationship with China is fundamental for understanding the INP, as well as for analyzing the US relationship and interest in a nuclear India.

The debate on nuclear weaponry and its aftermath benefited from the rapid development of the INP, which made it capable of starting the nuclear blast project as early as 1965: the subterranean nuclear explosion project (SNEP) (Chakma 2005, Subrahmanyam 2018). The result of research developed from the SNEP and the separation of plutonium at the *Trombay* facility was the ability to perform PNE in 1974 (Charnysh 2009). In addition, following the war with Pakistan in 1965 and Chinese support for the Pakistanis, India came to consider the nuclear option as an important way of securing the country from the threat posed by the approach between Beijing and Islamabad (Chakma 2005).

The US position under Lyndon B. Johnson helped India build the capacity to develop its nuclear program, even in the military. With the view that India would acquire long-term military capabilities, the Johnson government, motivated by the Chinese tests, saw India as a way to confront communist China, since US relations with mainland China were only resumed on 1971, already in the Nixon government (Sarkar 2015).

The PNE was the result of the debates that took over the country and influenced the SNEP to be created. The creation of the SNEP resulted from a number of factors: internal pressure on Indian governments from within the Indian National Congress Party; a reorientation of the country's nuclear policy, greatly influenced by events that occurred in the 1960s; and by the Indian perception that it could not count on the global powers (Chakma 2005). Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has opened the possibility, even if not definitively, of a military nuclear project to master the technology for nuclear arsenal purposes (Chakma 2005).

The new Indian stance was already noted in the NPT negotiations with the Indian opposition, given the poor results achieved in its objectives. According to Chakma (2005): "While India wanted a reversal of the current process of nuclear proliferation, the major powers' primary aim was to stop further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. This gap in objectives is finally hardened India's stance against NPT" (Chakma 2005, p. 208). During the treaty negotiations, Indian delegates advocated the possibility of peaceful

nuclear explosions, already indicative of the country's claims, which came to fruition in 1974 (Chakma 2005).

The PNE or '*Pokhran Test I*' was conducted in a decade of great importance to India, as in 1971 the war against West Pakistan in the name of Bangladeshi independence led the Indian government to fear Chinese (including nuclear) support for Pakistan (Subrahmanyam 2018). Subrahmanyam (2018) states that the US government in the figure of Henry Kissinger following his trip to China warned the Indian representative in Washington that they would not intervene in case of Chinese aid to the Islamabad cause, leading the government of Indira Gandhi to sign the Indo-Soviet treaty as a way of seeking to prevent a Chinese nuclear attack in response to Indian action in the Bangladeshi War of Independence (Subrahmanyam 2018). This US position showed that the relationship between the two countries was cooling down as the US government increasingly valued the relationship with Beijing in an attempt to curb Moscow to the detriment of its relationship with New Delhi.

In addition, President Nixon's government, of which Kissinger was a national security adviser, perceived India as a "Soviet puppet," even suggesting that China would side with Pakistan in the 1971 conflict (Burr 2005). However, in September 1972, a study on the possibility of a test by India sought to detail what the test meant for the US, as well as what the US government's options would be in the different scenarios. The paper outlines what Washington's goal should be:

Limiting the number of nuclear powers remains a major US interest. Additional interests are our desire for a stable South Asia, and our wish to develop mutually satisfactory relations with India. Since an Indian nuclear decision would probably conflict with all three interests, our objective should be to do what we can to avert or delay an Indian test and, if these efforts fail, to limit the harmful repercussions. (United States of America 1972).

Nevertheless, the document recognizes that:

The choices divide between things we can do before and after an Indian nuclear explosion. In both instances US ability to influence events is marginal. Indeed, given the present poor state of Indo-US relations, an overly visible US effort could hasten, rather than delay, the day India explodes a nuclear device. Multilateral and non-US bilateral efforts, especially if joined by the Soviets, have somewhat better prospects of affecting Indian actions, but would probably not per se be decisive. (United States of America 1972).

Since the aforementioned document was most likely to present a nu-

clear test by India, in May 1974 New Delhi shows that it mastered the technology for nuclear explosions, making its first such test, albeit with the name of peaceful explosion. The test featured an Indian attempt not to break the agreements it had signed, so even though it signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), India used a breach in the treaty, which did not veto testing underground, where it conducted the 1974 test (Andrade, Carpes & Leite 2017).

Despite the allegations made by the Indians, not all governments accepted the explanations from the Asian country, leading to US sanctions and Canada's investment cuts in the INP when it realized that the Canadian reactor was used to produce the material needed to the explosion, prompting the Indian government to cancel other tests aimed at conducting (Charnysh 2009).

It was from the Indian PNE that the United States changed its action within the nonproliferation regime, as it was relegated to the background against other more important Cold War matters (MARTINEZ, 2002). The Indian test, according to Martinez, "(...) served as notice to the United States that nuclear nonproliferation was no longer a tangential foreign policy issue" (MARTINEZ, 2002, p. 262).

B) Insulation and Pressure (1978/2001)

The Nuclear Partnership, already shaken by the PNE, ceases to occur following the approval by the US Congress of the 'Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act' in 1978, which made it impossible for the US to negotiate any nuclear element with countries that did not have their facilities under IAEA safeguards, leading to the interruption of US assistance to India (Sharnysh 2009). This US measure is taken at the same time that the INP underwent transformations, and was structured on the Indian PNE of 1974 (Paranjpe 2013). The issue of nonproliferation becomes a key topic for India-US relations, a situation that will only be better resolved from the 2000s.

According to Andrade, Carpes and Leite (2017) international pressures, as well as difficulties in obtaining technology and fuel for nuclear facilities after the PNE, subsequently contributed to the loss of INP leading to its stoppage in 1977, thus maintained throughout the Janata Party government. Regarding the relationship with the US, President Carter sought to get closer to India. In an attempt to mitigate the US inclination to prioritize relations with Pakistan, the president visited India and urged countries to build closer relations (Martinez 2002).

Moreover, despite advocating nonproliferation, the Carter government approved in 1978 and 1980 the sending of nuclear material to India, even after the 1974 tests, in an attempt to bring India closer to the US (Martinez 2002). The president justified this stance by stating that:

India's failure to accept international safeguards on all its peaceful nuclear activities and its failure to commit itself not to conduct further nuclear explosions are of serious concern to me. These exports will help us maintain a dialogue with India in which we try to narrow our differences on these issues. (Carter apud Martinez, 2002, p. 277-278).

Therefore, relying on US supply, the INP was reactivated as soon as the INC regained power, with Indira returning to the position of prime minister in the early 1980s (Charnysh 2009). With the new government, the country continued to develop its nuclear capabilities, and further developed a medium-range guided missile system (Charnysh 2009).

This resumption of the INP can be understood from the US action to lift the sanctions imposed on Pakistan in 1979, which allowed Islamabad to revitalize its nuclear program – with Chinese support – as well as modernize its Armed Forces (Pant & Super 2015). The suspension of sanctions on the Indian rival and neighbor, generated by the invasion of the Soviet Union (USSR) in Afghanistan, presented the priority that the US gave to Islamabad, which worried India, even though the Carter administration had sought to approach the country, New Delhi did not receive this news with excitement, disrupting the resumption of their relationship (Pant & Super 2015, Martinez 2002).

At the beginning of his government, Ronald Reagan, by prioritizing relations with Pakistan, ultimately worsened relations with India, which, as in 1971, sought closer ties with the USSR to respond to the dilemmas arising from the strengthening of relations between Islamabad and Washington. Although US arms granted to Pakistan would be used exclusively against the communists, at least according to the Americans, New Delhi interpreted the US stance as a hostile movement contrary to regional stability, undermining the resumption of relations between the two countries, especially when sending F-16s to Pakistan (Harrison 1981, Weinraub 1982).

What is observed in the period separating the 1974 PNE from *Pokhran II* in 1998 is the characteristic of an “ambiguous” nuclear program (Chakma 2005). This ambiguity is understood by the position of the Indian governments of: “(...) neither confirming its pursuit of a military nuclear program” (CHAKMA, 2005, p. 218). However, the intensification of Sino-Pakistani relations, with the development of nuclear capacity by the Islamabad govern-

ment, made India increasingly see the option of “Go Nuclear” as the only answer to the dilemmas that were presented.

The 1980s and 1990s marked the resumption of the Indian nuclear project and the momentum of nuclear technology by India, developing nuclear warheads and acquiring launch capabilities from Indira’s ballistic missile program launched in 1983 (Andrade, Carpes & Leite 2017, Chakma 2005, Charnysh 2009). Despite its position of not being fully in favor of nuclear weapons, Indira was open to the option if necessary (Chakma 2005).

In 1982, on a visit to the United States, Indira Gandhi and US President Reagan struck a deal for India to continue to have access to uranium for its nuclear plants. Since the US Congress, from the 1978 Nuclear Act barred nuclear shipments - after Carter’s shipments - the two countries agreed that it would be up to a third party to supply fuel to Indian facilities, in this case France (Weinraub 1982). This was intended to ensure that countries could resume building a closer relationship, as well as allaying Indian fears about the US military partnership with Pakistan.

By involving a third party in the deal, the US envisioned ensuring that relations with India continued to improve, while India made it possible to import radioactive material without safeguards in place. However, the agreement, signed in 1982, ends with the embargo imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) from 1992 onwards on the INP (Weiss 2007). The provision of radioactive material for different nuclear programs was conditional upon the application and adoption of safeguards, to which India was opposed.

The policy of a resumption of relations between the two countries was pursued by Indira’s son who took power, Rajiv Gandhi, who kept the nuclear option open and invested in keeping India up-to-date with field technologies (Chakma 2005). Still under the Rajiv government, Indian scientists began working on thermonuclear weapons around the years 1984 and 1985, leading to increased nuclear competition between India and Pakistan, which was also seeking to develop its own bomb (Chakma 2005).

Rajiv’s more liberal economic policies were well received by the White House, and led to agreements between New Delhi and Washington, still under the Reagan administration, although the relationship remained limited until the end of the Cold War (Pant & Super 2015). The end of the Cold War provided a resumption of relations, especially with the end of the bipolar dispute in the Indian subcontinent. However, India continued to have an interest in nuclear weapons control.

Different Indian governments in the 1990s flirted with the nuclear test. Narashima Rao’s government planned to conduct nuclear tests as early

as 1995 before the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as well as other countries. However, it eventually gave up under pressure from the US government, which again had as its fundamental advocacy of nonproliferation under the Clinton administration, highlighting the economic and political risks of testing (Chakma 2005, Weiss 2007). In its two-week government in 1996, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) also declared its interest in conducting the tests but did not have enough time (Chakma 2005).

The resumption of relations is evident in the 1995 India-US Defense Cooperation Draft, which created the Defense Policy Group (DPG), which was responsible for resolving defense cooperation issues and the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) aimed at discuss the exchange of personnel and information, as well as joint exercises (Paranjpe 2013). However, the progress of the relationship between countries faced certain obstacles: the concern of the Bill Clinton administration regarding Kashmir, disarmament and nonproliferation; and mainly the *Pokhran II* nuclear tests in 1998 (Pant & Super 2015, Paranjpe 2013).

The BJP's coming to power in 1996 and 1998 was a very important factor in India's rapid development of its nuclear capabilities for military purposes, which saw the possession of nuclear weapons as a source of pride for the country (Charnysh 2009, Weiss 2007). The party had an understanding that India was being surrounded, with partnerships and rapprochement between the US, China and Pakistan, isolating the country and endangering its security (Mishra 1997). In addition, preparations for the test had been underway since 1995 and, according to Weiss (2007), "just push the button" was enough, which the BJP did in regaining power in 1998.

The main moment for INP and nuclear deterrence in South Asia was reached in 1998, when India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and declared themselves nuclear armed to the world (Charnysh 2009). In this way, these neighbors, and rivals, obtained the technology they pursued for much of the second half of the twentieth century. The US response to the tests was to impose sanctions on both countries and to curb their rapprochement with New Delhi (Paranjpe 2013, Charnysh 2009).

In order to regain the relationship that had been built prior to May 1998, India's Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh began a series of talks with US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott following the tests of *Pokhran II* in order to try to present the Indian reasons for the test (Paranjpe 2013, Weiss 2007). However, what began to resume the relationship of the first half of the 1990s were: US support for India in the 1999 Kargil war, and Clinton's visits to India in 2000 and Vajpayee's visits to the US in 2000 and 2001, at the second opportunity already in the Bush administration (Paranjpe 2013, Mohan

2006, Pant & Super 2015).

On Clinton's visit to India, it was clear that disagreements still existed, but that the two states would pursue ever closer relations, including in the nuclear area. The two governments stated in a joint statement that:

The United States believes India should forego nuclear weapons. India believes that it needs to maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent in keeping with its own assessment of its security needs. Nonetheless, India and the U.S. are prepared to work together to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. To this end, we will persist with and build upon the productive bilateral dialogue already underway. (Tomar 2002).

C) Recognition and cooperation (2001/2018)

Despite moves to resume relations between the two countries after the 1998 nuclear tests, it is with the attacks of September 11, 2001, that the road to building a good relationship between countries is paved. However, days earlier, US Ambassador to India, Robert D. Blackwill, in a speech to the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce, recalled President Bush's position on relations between the two countries, which he said to the Indian Ambassador in Washington, Lalit Mansingh, who: "After years of strangulation, India and the United States together surrendered to reality. They recognized an unavoidable fact – they are destined to have a qualitatively different and better relationship than in the past." (United States of America, 2001b).

In the same year, the Indian parliament was the target of a terrorist attack, which reaffirmed the interest of India and the US to collaborate on security issues, especially in the fight against terrorism (Paranjpe 2013; Pant & Super 2015). Still in September 2001, the US suspended the sanctions it had imposed on India and Pakistan after the tests, following both Bush's anti-terror campaign support following the terrorist attacks in the US (Charnysh 2009, United States of America 2001a).

Unlike the Clinton administration: "The Bush administration, from the very beginning, refused to look at India through the prism of nonproliferation and viewed India as a natural and strategic ally." (Pant 2008, p. 21). The Bush administration was a watershed for the US-India relationship, as Mohan (2006) points out:

It took Bush (...) to transform the strategic context of U.S.- Indian relations. Convinced that India's influence will stretch far beyond its immediate neighborhood, Bush has reconceived the framework of U.S. engagement

with New Delhi. He has removed many of the sanctions, opened the door for high-tech cooperation, lent political support to India's own war on terrorism, ended the historical U.S. tilt toward Pakistan on Kashmir, and repositioned the United States in the Sino-Indian equation by drawing closer to New Delhi. (Mohan 2006, p. 5).

In 2004, India and the US agreed to expand cooperation in three areas: nuclear civil activities, space civil programs, and high technology exchange; first phase of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) (United States of America 2004). In the NSSP release statement of January 12, 2004, President Bush stated that cooperation in these areas would: *"deepen the ties of commerce and friendship between our two nations, and will increase stability in Asia and beyond."* (United States of America 2004). Still in the statement, President Bush points to the fact that the NSSP would transform the relationship between the two countries, stating that:

The expanded cooperation launched today is an important milestone in transforming the relationship between the United States and India. That relationship is based increasingly on common values and common interests. We are working together to promote global peace and prosperity. We are partner in the war on terrorism and we are partners in controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. (United States of America 2004).

In July 2005, on Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to the US, the two leaders agreed to expand their relations in the nuclear field, specifically in the area of civil nuclear technology (United States of America 2005). In a joint statement, countries pointed out their interests and objectives in the area:

President Bush conveyed his appreciation to the Prime Minister over India's strong commitment to preventing WMD proliferation and stated that as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states. The President told the Prime Minister that he will work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it realizes its goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security. The President would also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies, and the United States will work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur. In the meantime, the United States will encourage

its partners to also consider this request expeditiously. (United States of America 2005).

By the other hand, the Indian government was committed to:

The Prime Minister conveyed that for his part, India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. These responsibilities and practices consist of identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities; continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread; and ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology

On Singh's visit to the US, President Bush's government was in favor of restructuring the institutions of the international system themselves, which should adapt to the changing international environment, especially with the rise of India and the new position it should occupy (United States of America 2005).

The statement about the possible deal was widely criticized and challenged, both internally and externally, prompting the White House to issue a press release in which it responded to some of the criticism. In the statement, the White House states, among other things, that the agreement was of mutual interest, in addition to stating that India, even though not a signatory to the NPT, was a reliable country, and had "(...) a strong nuclear nonproliferation record. "(United States of America 2006). For this reason, INP should not be compared to Iranian and North Korean. In the same statement, the White House differentiates INP from Pakistan, saying that:

Pakistan and India are different countries with different needs and different histories. Our relationship with Pakistan, which has Major Non-NA-TO Ally status, follows a separate path that reflects our countries' strong commitment to maintaining close ties and cooperation, including in the War on Terror. However, Pakistan does not have the same nonproliferation

record as India, nor the same energy needs. We do not intend to pursue a similar civil nuclear cooperation initiative with Pakistan. (United States of America 2006).

On the basis of ever closer nuclear cooperation, in October 2008 India signed the “123” Bilateral Agreement with the US, which dealt with the provision of technology and raw material for the Indian civilian nuclear program cooperation in the energy and satellite sectors (Charnysh 2009). The deal:

(...) lifts a three-decade US moratorium on nuclear trade with India by providing assistance to India’s civilian nuclear energy program and expanding US-Indian cooperation in energy and satellite technology. (Sharnysh 2009, p. 5).

The agreement, signed by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee on October 10, 2008, took just over three years to pass at the US Congress on October 1, 2008 (United States of America 2008). The trajectory of the agreement since the joint declaration in July 2005 can be summarized as follows:

In December 2006, the U.S. Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act (Hyde Act), which provides a framework in U.S. law for facilitating civil nuclear cooperation with India. In July 2007, the United States and India concluded negotiations on the 123 agreement, which required approval by the U.S. Congress to be brought into force. The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria approved the India Safeguards Agreement on August 1, 2008. Another key prerequisite for submitting the 123 Agreement also took place in Vienna, with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) consensus decision on September 6, 2008 to grant an exception to its full-scope safeguards requirement to permit civil nuclear supply to India. (United States of America 2008).

By signing the agreement with India, the US has modified its own operations within the nonproliferation regime, including the Nonproliferation Act (Charnysh 2009). As part of the agreement for cooperation and development of civil nuclear technology, India promoted the separation of its nuclear plants, separating civilian from military facilities, and placing the former under IAEA safeguards (Charnysh 2009, Mohan 2006).

In response to the changing US stance towards the INP, India has moved to favor the US at various times, institutions and regimes: whether it

is voting against Iran in the IAEA, operationally supporting the Afghan incursion, or supporting the US (even though it has retreated at the last minute) in Iraq, movements that have been positively received in Washington (Mohan 2006). New Delhi stated that: “(...) improving its global position and gaining leverage in its relations with other great powers” (Mohan 2006, p. 6).

Following the agreement signed with the US, the Nuclear Suppliers Group removes India's ban on participating in international nuclear trade in September 2008 (Charnysh 2009). Enabling the country to enter the nuclear market, even if it has not signed to the NPT, leading it to occupy a privileged position within the nonproliferation regime.

Although the agreement is specific for civilian purposes, it could benefit the Indian military program, as the country could use internationally purchased fuel to its civilian facilities - under safeguards - as it would use its fully domestically produced fuel for military installations (Charnysh 2009). However, India considers itself a ‘responsible’ nuclear armed state, that is, it wants to be a partner of nuclear nonproliferation, not a target (Charnysh 2009).

However, the progress of the relationship during the Bush administration was not accompanied by the beginning of the Obama administration, losing part of the momentum. This can be understood, in part, by Obama's opposition, as a senator, to the nuclear deal with India (Pant & Joshi 2016). This begins to change with Modi's arrival as prime minister, leading to recognition of India as a rising power by the US, and Obama being the guest of Republic Day in India in 2016 (Pant & Joshi 2016).

In a joint statement in 2014, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi reaffirmed their commitment to the civil nuclear agreement signed in the previous decade. In addition, they pledged to achieve the goal of producing nuclear power from US facilities to be built in India, in partnership with US companies such as Westinghouse and GE-Hitachi (The White House 2014).

The nuclear agreement signed between Washington and New Delhi was instrumental in ensuring cooperation between countries and in addressing various areas, renewing the US-India Defense Relationship in 2015 for another ten years (Mohan 2006, Pant & Joshi 2016). Therefore, India and the US have built the foundations on which to lay down their strategies to curb the main threat in their view: China. This materializes in the fact that “(...) India's “Look East” Policy and America's “pivot ” to Asia seem destined for a common strategic endeavor in the Indo-Pacific.” (Pant & Joshi 2016, p. 54).

Given that “(...) India and China are long-term rivals and India's capacity to internally balance China is limited, the only option is to balance China with US help.” (Pant & Joshi 2016, p. 45), Modi has the view that relations

with the US are a key factor and part of the Indian regional strategy for Asia Pacific (Pant & Joshi 2016). The positions of India and the US are on balancing China: the US wants to curb Chinese growth, and India seeks to prevent a greater presence of Beijing in its vicinity, as well as to rival China in Southeast Asia, making the relationship one that interests both (Mohan 2006).

The last phase of the INP and its relationship with the US show a significant improvement in the patterns that marked the relationship between New Delhi and Washington. Proof of this was the most recent nuclear agreement, which can be understood as a US recognition of Indian status as a nuclear weapon holder - and may even be interpreted as a kind of “reward” to India, even if India acted in breach of the agreements and international nuclear regimes.

Therefore, what can be concluded is that the Indian project had moments of inflection, but maintained coherence with the concerns and perceptions of the Indian governments, making the choice of nuclear weapons a political choice (Chakma 2005). However, the nuclear alternative is a strategy beyond security: it is a means of achieving new status in the international system, as noted in the following statement: “So India had only one option, that is to go nuclear and to make nuclear bomb not because China or Pakistan did it but was recognized as a world power in the international scene” (Mahajan apud Mishra, 1997, p. 62, emphasis added). Although Vanaik (1995) claims that: “Though nuclear bombs are currency of power, they are enormously devalued currency” (Vanaik 1995, p. 98), what is observed was a gain of power and status by India, as well as recognition from various countries, in particular from the US, including its support for the Indian candidacy for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The Brazilian nuclear program and the USA: an interchange agenda (1946/2018)

In the Brazilian case, the nuclear program is conditioned by a pattern of more constant oscillations resulting from polarizations between the axis of autonomy and alignment of international relations, focusing on the USA⁶. This phenomenon occurs because, according to Martins and Nunes (2017), there is a close correlation between foreign policy, defense policy and the development model, which affects the bases of national power. These US alterations and impacts on BNP are then examined at the following stages: pro-

⁶ Here will be brought only the main points of the agendas, for a more comprehensive reading see Visentini 2013, Vizentini 1998 and Vigevani & Cepaluni 2007

gram origins: partnership and maturity (1947/1961); autonomy and national power (1961/1989); retreat and alignment (1989/1999); and discontinuous autonomy (1999/2018).

A) The Origins of the Program: Partnership and Maturity (1947/1961)

For Brazil, the period spanning the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War between 1945 and 1947 was characterized by a phase of readjustment in its domestic and foreign policies. From 1930 to 1945, the Getúlio Vargas government, particularly in the phase known as the Estado Novo (1937/1945), developed a political-economic agenda for modernization via the import substitution industrialization (ISI) process, and a bargaining agenda in international relations. In both cases, internal and external, technological progress was perceived as a central and necessary element for national development.

Due to the polarized scenario of the Second World War (1939/1945), the Vargas political-economic-diplomatic bargain became the preferred tactic for achieving this development. As a product of the US-Brazil-Germany strategic triangulation, Brazil can benefit from US concessions from the 1940s. This phase resulted in the construction of the National Steel Company (CSN) and the modernization of the armed forces.

The Brazil-US partnership was present in the nuclear field, focusing on strategic minerals, uranium and thorium. The Brazilian strategic reserves of these and other inputs relevant to the nascent nuclear age were a comparative advantage to be explored, becoming a bargaining mechanism. As Ferreira and Lira (2016) indicate, in the 1940s, two results were obtained: the signing of the Cooperation Program for Prospecting Mineral Resources and the first Brazil-US Atomic Agreement. Internally, the authors also recall the creation of the Strategic Mineral Studies and Supervision Commission (CEFME), in view of the relevance of these resources to national security.

However, these agreements had some limitations due to the restrictions that would be imposed on trade in strategic minerals and the transfer of nuclear technology by the US (McMahon Act) and the UN (Baruch Plan). Likewise, the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was created. In this moment, a structure was being designed to constrain the democratized development of nuclear energy and its associated research, which would become more comprehensive in the 1960s. Since the beginning of the nuclear age, there has been a gap between the positions of nuclear countries and non-nuclearized.

Regardless, Vargas's pragmatic alignment would result in inserting the country into modernity. For the United States in the post-1945, these autonomous nationalism efforts became a risk, as a stronger Brazil would not necessarily be a Brazil still aligned with the US in the nascent Cold War. The construction of an alternative power pole for Americans in Latin America was perceived with suspicion as it could affect the regional balance. It was of American interest a new political game of forces in the country, which was effected with the government of Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946/1951).

If in the Vargas Era the first steps of modernization of the armed forces and strategic sectors were associated with bargaining, from the Dutra government and the Cold War, this view of autonomy oscillated between a nationalist and a subordinate agenda. Paradoxically, particularly close to its closure, the Dutra government developed autonomy measures, even by reorganizing internal political forces toward the nationalist agenda. If the beginning of the government is characterized by associated economic development and automatic political alignment, the end of the period brought changes.

The Dutra administration had pursued a two-track, broader policy of nuclear science and technology, due to the pressure from nationalist (Vargas-era) groups to develop a progressive and autonomous view. The emergence of the BNP is associated with the scientific-technological development and the modernization of the Armed Forces, with emphasis on the participation of the Navy. The first step was the creation in 1951 of the National Research Council (CNPq) to encourage Brazilian scientific research. Ahead of these processes, and the defense of a more active participation of Brazil in the nuclear sector, and with less asymmetries within the UN, stands out the name of Admiral Álvaro Alberto.

Admiral Álvaro Alberto defended, as Brazil's representative in the UN and in national politics, an autonomous development posture around the concept of "specific compensations": that is, fairer and more balanced agreements between non-nuclearized countries (holders of strategic resources) and the nuclearized ones (in possession of the technology). This would allow non-nuclearized nations to reap the benefits of knowledge associated with the nuclear age.

The period of the second government of Getúlio Vargas (1951/1954) was fruitful in the nuclear sector, associated with a nationalist and autonomous view. The new Vargas Era continued, in a less favorable scenario than the previous one to ISI and bargaining policies. US-Soviet Union bipolarity offered fewer alternatives than US-Germany polarization, since Americans were less willing to compromise and did not perceive the USSR as a danger to hemispheric hegemony. Vargas sought to repeat the bargain, with an alter-

native focus: opening to the nascent Third World (from Afro-Asian decolonization), and the western and eastern blocs (at least from an economic point of view). According to Visentini (2013), these multilateralization attempts had ended up being incomplete, but had opened the doors to the modifications of the following period with Juscelino Kubistchek (JK, 1956/1961) and mainly with Jânio Quadros and João Goulart (1961/1964).

Another factor of instability at this time was the polarization between nationalists and conservatives, which reached the foundations and perspectives of the development model: the nationalist ISI, with state control of strategic sectors, or US-associated development. Vargas defended the nationalist stance, see the creation of Petrobras in 1953 for oil exploration, but oscillated in other sectors, such as in the nuclear one. In 1954, it proposed the creation of Eletrobrás (Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras) in the energy sector, but only in 1961 would the company be created due to the national scenario.

A contradiction remained, as Ferreira and Lira (2016) point out: even though the country was polarized between nationalists and conservatives, there was a consensus that the country had comparative advantages in the nuclear sector and that it was a priority in science and technology. There was disagreement on how to effect the process: through nationalization and the search for external and national alternatives to the ruling powers (in particular the US) or by deepening the partnership with the Americans. For Ferreira and Lira,

From the nuclear point of view, Vargas would have the challenge of reconciling different interests, in view of the fierce debate over the best strategy for the country's development. This fact ignited civil and military tempers. Alternatives to national development diverged the role of the state and foreign capital. Also, the management of energy resources - oil and atomic ores - was also a subject of great controversy (Ferreira & Lira 2016, p. 83).

Under pressure, Vargas tried to manage the shock between these currents. On the one hand, the speech guaranteed scientific autonomy, with investments in the area, and the opening of partnerships with third countries such as West Germany, France and the United Kingdom, as pointed out by Andrade, Carpes and Leite (2017). On the other, it created mechanisms such as the Strategic Mineral Export Commission (CEME), and renewed the Military and Nuclear Agreement with the US (1952 and 1954). The combination of these agendas sought to ensure development and a certain appeasement,

It is noted that the Vargas Government's "atomic program" adopts a tripar-

tite policy: mineral prospecting, uranium industrialization and the development of nuclear technology. CNPq was charged with training specialists in the field, building infrastructure for uranium research and industrialization and obtaining raw materials. Alvaro Alberto believed that Brazil would achieve economic independence and, consequently, national security through science and nuclear energy (Ferreira & Lira 2016, p. 84).

Internal instability, Vargas' suicide, and more pro-US policy shifts lead to greater political rapprochement with the Americans in the Café Filho Interregnum (1954/1955) and the JK government. However, in JK, this approach will be nuanced in some sectors such as international relations and nuclear (Andrade, Carpes & Leite 2017, Visentini 2013).

One of the most controversial points was the agreements regarding US access to Brazilian uranium. In 1954 and 1955, the Wheat Agreement and the Atomic Agreement respectively, provided for the export of uranium to the US in exchange for wheat, without any technological counterpart. In 1956, JK, despite his adherence to the US bipolar agenda, questions this situation, and seeks concessions in this sector. Such concessions were also related to the change in US policy, which under the Eisenhower administration was embodied in the "Atoms for Peace Program." This allowed a qualitative leap in BNP.

The Atoms for Peace Program committed itself to helping partner countries to develop their nuclear projects for peaceful purposes. For Brazil, this program, combined with CNPq internal investments, led to the installation of the first nuclear reactors in the country in the cities of São Paulo (Atomic Energy Institute, IEA, today Institute for Energy and Nuclear Research / IPEN), Rio de Janeiro (Institute of Nuclear Energy, IEN) and Belo Horizonte (Center for Technological and Nuclear Development, CDTN). These reactors opened a new phase in research and scientific progress in Brazil, and in 1956 the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) was created. In the international system, the milestone was the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AEIA, 1957). BNP seemed to have found a compromise between rapprochement with the US and preserving an national development agenda.

B) Autonomy and National Power (1961/1989)

In 1961, the emergence of the Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) promoted a qualitative leap in the international relations agenda by inserting a globalized perspective of projection. According to Visentini (2013), the PEI is a response to the political and economic transformations of the country, and

an intensification of the previous multilateralization tests of Vargas and JK in the South-South and South-East axes. To this contributes a complex world scenario: growing multilateralism, the real consolidation of the Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement, and the broader partnership generated by the recovery of the western and eastern blocs.

On the nuclear agenda, this will represent greater assertiveness, even in response to the start of negotiations on the first multilateral nuclear sector regimes. After the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) between the US and the Soviet Union, which had brought the world closer to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), and the realization of the potential for scaling up of the “nuclear club”, the nuclearized powers started double discussions: bilateral US-USSR⁷ to contain the arms race and multilateral to bar nuclear proliferation between nuclearized and non-nuclearized countries.

In 1963, this process gave rise to the Treaty of Partial Prohibition of Nuclear Tests (PTBT, 1963), culminating in 1967 with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT, 1967, which entered into force in 1970). In 1975, complementing the concerns of the NPT, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created to “coordinate activities to control the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes to countries without nuclear weapons” (Duarte 2014, p. 56). Also established in 1978 was the United Nations Conference on Disarmament. Nevertheless, the mechanism of periodic reviews of the NPT was installed. In this context, it is necessary to observe the evolution of the Brazilian position regarding these events.

Although it laid the foundations for the modernization of Brazilian foreign policy, PEI will not continue in its original format since 1964. In 1964, the government of João Goulart (vice-president, he assumed after the resignation of Jânio Quadros in 1961) was overthrown by a coup. From 1964 to 1985, Brazil would be under the aegis of the Military Regime. The complexity of the Military Regime regarding the internal and external development agendas cannot be underestimated, presenting a high degree of modernity and nationalism, as Vizontini (1998) argues. In the social field, however, the predominance was that of conservatism, and the reaffirmation of the Brazilian position against the communism in the Cold War.

⁷ The US-USSR bilateral agreements since the 1970s include the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (1969/1972), Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976), Reach Forces Treaty Intermediate (1988), Nuclear Test Limitation Agreement (1990), Strategic Nuclear Weapons Reduction Treaty (1991), Strategic Offensive Weapons Resolution Treaty (2002), Treaty on Additional Strategic Offensive Weapons Reduction and Limitation Measures (2011). For more details see Duarte 2014.

The period from 1964 to 1985 was neither homogeneous nor free of conflict and change between governments - Castello Branco (1964/1967), Costa e Silva (1967/1969), Médici (1969/1974) Ernesto Geisel (1974/1979) and João Figueiredo (1979/1985). Such managements presented singularities, especially regarding the exchange with the US, which oscillated between the resumption of alignment (1964/1967) and different levels of approximation, distancing and shock in the post-1967, focusing on the economic technological development model and international projection. For nuclear policy, however, there was a greater convergence around nationalist principles and distancing and conflict with the Americans.

Even in Castello Branco, Brazil rejects the vision of the great powers to contain the nuclear technological development of developing countries. In the view of Brazilian diplomacy, this development is not linked to purposes of war, but to provide conditions for a leverage of knowledge. Capacity building in dual-use technologies (peaceful and warlike) is perceived as essential to progress, which is already found, as seen in the roots of BNP. Therefore, for Brazil, knowledge and technology are a function of development, not of warmongering. Advocating access to nuclear technology goes hand in hand, and is complementary to defending disarmament (such as support for the suspension of nuclear testing).

Since the presentation of the NPT⁸, Brazil, as well as India, has become one of its strongest opponents. After all, "(...) much more than an energy choice, nuclear is also considered a geopolitical issue of weight for the international insertion of Brazil" and India we might add (Le Prioux and Santos 2011, p. 42).

Regardless of the different regional circumstances, Brazil and India regard the nuclear factor as essential to its external action and its consolidation as powers. In general, the Brazilian regional environment presents a lower level of instability than the Indian one, more focused on competition with Argentina, and limited to a nuclear power, the US. However, the goal of gaining access to and mastery of technology not only refers to possession of the weapon as it has been emphasized, but the pursuit of prestige, knowledge, bargaining power and the strengthening of defense and deterrence mechanisms.

At the time, the INP was at a more advanced stage than the Brazilian, so much so that the country will become a nuclear weapon holder shortly after the NPT came into force. Brazil, in turn, under the military regime, will devel-

8 Available at: <<https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text>>. Acesso 05 fev. 2019

op its actions around two axes: the opposition to the NPT through diplomatic initiatives and the development of its nuclear program.

With regard to the first axis, the diplomatic initiatives, this opposition will have two tactical movements during the Costa e Silva government (1967/1969): on the one hand the denunciation of the freezing of world power (thesis defended by Ambassador Araújo Castro), represented by the NPT, since its provisions would maintain the power asymmetry between the nuclear and non-nuclear countries, defending the democratization of knowledge about sensitive technologies and, on the other hand, adherence to agreements considered non-restrictive and focusing on disarmament.

This adhesion was symbolic of the Brazilian demand for access to technology, without implying its use, and was represented by the signing, in 1969, of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (or Treaty of Nuclear Weapons Prohibition in Latin America and the Caribbean). The Treaty, as well as similar ones, establishes within the UN the concept of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, that is, areas in which nuclear weapons would not be present through the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS)⁹. As indicated by Vizentini (1998),

The Costa e Silva government supported the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, atomic disarmament and nonproliferation, but defended the research and use of nuclear energy for economic and technological development (Vizentini 1998, p. 114).

Vizentini adds that at no time did Brazil refrain from negotiating, or integrating, nonproliferation agreements, but that Chancellor Azeredo da Silveira had as its agenda “an appropriate balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities” (Vizentini 1998, p. 115). Despite these positions, and an autonomist stance in international relations, in association with the Third World, Brazil-US exchange remained in the nuclear area, even for the ideological affinity between countries in the context of the Cold War.

Another factor supporting this stance was US policy with President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, who prioritized strengthening ties with regional powers considered pivots. In the case of Latin America, this power was Brazil. During the Médici government, 1969-1974, countries signed the Bilateral Scientific Cooperation Agreement

⁹ Other nuclear-free zones were established by the Antarctic Treaty (1961), the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Seabed Treaty (1972), the Agreement Governing the Activities of the Moon States and Other Celestial Bodies (1984), the Rarotonga Treaty (1986), the Bangkok Treaty (1997), the Unilateral Declaration (Mongolia, 1993), the Central Asian Treaty (2006) and the Pelindaba Treaty (2009). Recommended Duarte 2014.

(1971), the Military Assistance Agreement (1972) and the Pacific Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement (1972). These agreements proved essential for the installation of Angra I, Brazil's first nuclear power plant, supported by White Westinghouse.

However, this nuclear policy scenario had changed in the Geisel government as part of a comprehensive security nationalization project (Cervo and Bueno 2008). According to the authors, this project was aimed at increasing public investments in the field of security, focusing on the development of cutting-edge technology, with a view to strengthening Brazilian autonomy and its global role. Nuclear power was an essential part of this two-dimensional program: the establishment of the Nuclear Agreement with West Germany (1975) and the parallel nuclear program, based on the full development of the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear submarine construction¹⁰. According to Brick and Junior (2018), historically it is necessary to highlight the strong interdependence between the PROSUB (Submarine Development Program) and the Navy Nuclear Program, which consist of essential public policies of national defense.

Since 1969, Brazil and Germany already had a Scientific and Technological Cooperation Agreement¹¹ and this would facilitate the new negotiations. The nuclear deal with West Germany represented a renewed bargain in the bilateral partnership and an attempt to elevate the power of both nations at a time of transformation of their relative positions and the international system. The provisions of the agreement involved the implementation of eight nuclear power plants, cooperation for the exploration and treatment of uranium (and enrichment), the production of nuclear reactors, facilities and components, the production of irradiated elements and the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. According to Wrobel (1996), technology transfer was one of the main attractions of the agreement, but also one of its problems as it did not extend to all sectors. In 1974, *Nuclebrás Equipamentos Pesados S.A* (Nuclep) was created to replace CBTN, as well as a complex organ system to advise BNP.

One of the government's arguments for internalizing and nationalizing these processes, and for breaking the traditional partnership with the US, was precisely the question of autonomy and technological knowledge. The relationship with the US was perceived as uneven and conditional on US

¹⁰ The other items were the development of the national war industry with the companies Specialized Engineers S.A (ENGESA) and Avibras Space Industry, the Informatics Policy (1976).

¹¹ In addition to West Germany, France and Iraq were the focus of Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear area.

interests, especially in the field of technology transfer. In addition, Geisel's new foreign policy agenda, Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism, was characterized by an acceleration and deepening of the country's multilateral and global relations, free of ideological compromises.

During the process, the US-Brazil Military Agreement was broken in 1977. This generated a natural detachment, which was increased in proportion to the gains in national power. The country has taken a more "demanding" stance regarding its interests, such as the defense of the Brazilian territorial sea (200 miles). For Americans, who from 1976/1977 would also undergo a change in their foreign policy, this resettlement was not perceived as positive.

The rise of Jimmy Carter (1977/1980) would mean that this Brazilian posture of autonomy and other middle powers would no longer be accommodated but contained. To this end, Carter and his successor, Ronald Reagan (1981/1988), impose sanctions and restrictions on the governments in question. In Carter, the human rights and pro-democracy agenda was combined with a speech of peace and interdependence, which was evaluated as an action of interference and restriction of the Brazilian projection. This accelerates already ongoing processes of universalization of international relations and culminates in the denunciation of the Military Agreement. With Reagan, we highlight the restriction of Brazilian access to cutting-edge technologies and strategic materials for the development of national programs. At the same time, trade and financial sanctions were imposed.

But what is the result of these internal and external conjunctures for Brazil in the direction of the nationalization of nuclear safety? The results are mixed: although nuclear projects have gained momentum in the military regime, their post-regime continuity has been broken, as Wrobel points out (1996). This is one of the major differences between the Brazilian and Indian programs: while the Indian trajectory is linear, without major breaks, and progressive, the Brazilian one is irregular.

Three factors stand out: the polarization of internal groups around international projection paradigms and development models, the impact of the US due to hegemonic counterreactions in the above sectors and the fragility of some of the pillars of the nuclear agenda, including partnership with the Germany. This third factor, according to Vizentini (1998, p. 226), leads to an even curious situation of diminishing US pressures on Brazil at the end of the regime, as "Most likely, the US authorities found that the delays, as well as the technical and financial problems, which were already evident, would make implementation of the Nuclear Agreement difficult and its opposition unnecessary".

According to Wrobel (1996), the partial compliance of the agreement

with Germany and the technical difficulties, generated in Brazil the need to look for alternatives. The parallel nuclear program has accelerated the process of internalization of technology and research. As a state project, the domain of the nuclear fuel cycle and the construction of the nuclear submarine¹² received significant attention from the last military government of João Figueiredo. In 1984, Angra I was allowed to function, and as indicated, the other processes were accelerated. Like this,

An important step in the development of these priorities was the first experiments with the ultracentrifuge capable of separating uranium in isotopic form (enrichment process) in 1982 and the mini cascades of nine centrifuge machines put into operation in 1984. The following years, until 1989, there were many delays due to the problems related to the new ultracentrifuges, but at the same time the reach of up to 5% enrichment of the national uranium (Barletta 1997), all produced by efforts of the bodies created by the Brazilian Navy: the Coordination for Special Projects (COPESP), and the Aramar Experimental Center (CEA), both in the state of São Paulo. These factors emphasized how important the development of technology was to the Brazilian government of the time. (Andrade, Carpes and Leite 2017, p. 626)

Another relevant dimension was the deepening of cooperation with Argentina since the 1980s, resulting from the rapprochement of the two countries at a time of internal and external vulnerability. Both suffered the effects of the economic crisis and the demands for political transition and moved from competition to cooperation, based on economic, political and science and technology negotiations (with confidence-building measures).

The redemocratization processes, with the New Republic of Sarney and Alfonsín in Argentina had an important legacy in this sense, which resulted in the 1990s in MERCOSUR and the Brazilian-Argentina Agency for Accounting and Control of Materials (ABACC), already in 1991, with post-Cold War context. Prior to this, Sarney inaugurated the Aramar Experimental Center in 1988, essential for Brazilian uranium enrichment research, and was created by Brazil's Nuclear Industries (INB).

However, both in Brazil and Argentina, the outlines of an internal and external agenda of breaking previous autonomy initiatives were already being drawn. The economic crisis only deepened, with high inflation, low growth and unemployment. The end of the Cold War had accelerated this process

¹² For the historical process see Martins 2011, and for the evolution of the Brazilian Navy, Moura 2015

from 1989 onwards.

C) Retreat and Alignment (1989/1998)

The evolution of the BNP from the 1940s on was polarized around two tactical options: the nationalist and the surrender (or associate), with different positions about the US role in the sector. But, as also presented, there was a consensus that this power reference was important and should not be abandoned. In the 1970s, the predominance of the nationalist view led to the challenge of international regimes such as the NPT, the defense of access to technology, the breaking of the alliance with the US and large state-funded projects.

However, in the 1980s, this perspective began to be challenged, claiming, in certain political sectors, that the Brazilian stance was leading the country to lose opportunities. The revision of nationalist policies and the realignment to the Americans was perceived as essential for Brazil's reintegration into the world. As Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) indicate, the so-called "autonomy through integration" was defended, opposing it to "autonomy through exclusion". Basically, "exclusion" was meant by the broad lines that had been launched by the PEI and reinforced in the military regime, sought a position of power.

One of the biggest symbols of exclusion was, according to this argument, the refusal not to sign international regimes like the NPT, and, at the same time, the development of policies perceived as "aggressive" (that is, the nuclear program, among others). To reinsert into the world one had to readjust to a new global context that was born with the post-Cold War led by the US.

The election of Collor de Mello meant the victory of this political current, and a complete reevaluation of foreign policy, towards this "reframing". As Batista (1993) points out, the assessment that realignment would bring benefits was misguided on many levels: first, Brazil was not isolated in the international system; second, the new context was not unipolar, focused on the US, but already with a tendency to multipolarity; Third, realigning meant giving up the bargaining power the country possessed despite the economic crisis.

However, the "agenda clearing" had begun in the previous management and would only deepen with Collor. Adhering to the neoliberal agenda of the Washington Consensus, the government privatized strategic sectors, promoted economic openness and deregulation. Externally, there was an au-

tomatic alignment with the US and the abandonment of the global multilateral paradigm. The dismantling of the nuclear sector has become one of the most relevant to symbolize the new phase of an integrated and responsible Brazil. It was no longer questioning what the country's development in the sector should be like, with or without the US, but this development was abandoned as a strategic piece of international insertion.

Investments were reduced and the system restructured, and the surveys were conducted mostly with commitment from the Navy. The goal was not to abandon projects altogether, doing what was possible, even if it meant significant delays. Although it represented a cut in Collor's trajectory, the administration of Itamar Franco that took over after his impeachment can do little to recover investments in the nuclear sector. Contributing to this were the still prevailing political divisions and the economic crisis.

The slow pace remained for most of Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government (1995/2002). Only in his second term, some changes began to be felt, based on the creation of the Ministry of Defense (MD, 1999), and discussions on the establishment of a National Defense Strategy (NDT).

FHC's first mandate (1995/1998) was characterized by the maintenance of the "autonomy for integration" strategy that culminated in the signing of the NPT in 1997, which came into force in 1998 after being ratified by the National Congress. The country had already committed itself to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), supported the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the indefinite extension of the NPT. Likewise, it supported, from 2000, the thirteen steps to nuclear disarmament of the VI NPT Review Conference and subsequent review and review conferences.

Brazilian adherence to these regimes found a limit: the 1997 NPT Additional Protocol¹³. The country has not acceded to this Additional Protocol establishing additional safeguard measures to be applied to signatory states. These include AEIA unannounced (without previous warning) inspections of nuclear facilities and with full access to these facilities and their geographical surroundings. As highlighted by Silva (2010), the Protocol is considered intrusive. The implications of unrestricted opening of nuclear facilities in Brazil or any country run into questions of state sovereignty and technological mastery in sectors such as uranium enrichment. In fact, this is a subject that generates systematic US pressures and is getting worse.

This period is characterized by a strong difference between the Brazilian and Indian programs, as the nuclear dimension is no longer considered a strategic state project. As Patti (2010) points out, Brazil positioned itself

13 Available at: <<https://www.iaea.org/topics/additional-protocol>>. Access on 01 Feb. 2019

against India at one of the moments of greatest tension in its nuclear field with the Americans, derived from the 1998 nuclear tests deepened in the pro-denuclearization field on the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) initiative. The scenario would begin to change in FHC's second mandate, resuming an assertive perspective on the agenda of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003/2010).

D) Discontinuous Autonomy (1999/2018)

In 1999, the establishment of the MD resulted in important advances in defense and security at various levels: civil-military relations and the establishment of systematic thinking on defense and security issues. All these documents are composed of the National Defense Policy (PND)¹⁴, the National Defense Strategy (END) and the National Defense White Book (LBDN)¹⁵. The relevance of nuclear energy is present and, from the 21st century onwards, as a significant emphasis on technological mastery and sector autonomy as essential to national defense and security. The country reaffirms its peaceful vocation in the sector and its willingness to cooperate with international regimes in the nuclear field and on other weapons of mass destruction. This stance is expressed in the NDT, according to which,

The nuclear sector transcends, by its very nature, the division between development and defense. By constitutional imperative and international treaty, Brazil has been deprived of the power to use nuclear power for any purpose other than peaceful. This was done under several premises, the most important of which was the progressive nuclear disarmament of the nuclear powers. No country is more active than Brazil in the cause of nuclear disarmament. However, Brazil, by prohibiting itself from accessing nuclear weapons, should not be stripped of nuclear technology.

Therefore, in order to reaffirm its repositioning in the nuclear technology acquisition and development, Brazil

(a) [Shall] Complete, as regards the nuclear-powered submarine program, the nationalization and industrial scale development of the fuel cycle (in-

¹⁴ Previously, National Defense Policy (2005).

¹⁵ In this article, the 2012 versions of END, PND and LBDN are used as reference, since the definitive documents for the 2016 updates (corresponding to the 2017/202 cycle) are not yet available. Draft updates are available on the Ministry of Defense website at: <<https://www.defesa.gov.br/noticias/29093-minutas-do-livro-branco-da-pnd-e-da-end> -are-available-for-reading>. Access on 16 nov. 2018.

cluding gasification and enrichment) and construction technology reactors for the exclusive use of Brazil; (b) accelerate the mapping, prospecting and exploitation of uranium deposits; (c) Enhance the potential to design and build nuclear thermoelectric plants, with technologies and capabilities that end up under national domination, even if developed through partnerships with states and foreign companies. Use nuclear energy carefully, and subject it to the most stringent safety and environmental protection controls, as a way to stabilize the national energy matrix, adjusting variations in the supply of renewable energy, especially energy from hydroelectric sources; and (d) Increase the ability to use nuclear power in a broad spectrum of activities. Brazil will ensure that the access to the development of its nuclear energy technologies is open. It will not adhere to additions to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty aimed at extending Treaty restrictions without the nuclear powers having significantly advanced the Treaty's central premise: their own nuclear disarmament. (Brazil 2012, p. 23-24)

As indicated by Martins and Nunes (2007), the resumption of the nuclear program is part of the strengthening of the Industrial Defense Base (IDB). According to Brick and Junior (2018), this process intensifies from 2003 with the coming to power of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003/2010). Supported by a favorable economic situation, the government expanded defense sector financing, both conventionally and nuclearly. A similar argument is presented by Herz, Dawood and Lage (2018), indicating the resumption of the security-development nexus, with the nuclear sector as one of its pillars. As highlighted by Andrade, Carpes and Leite,

In Luis Inácio Lula da Silva's government (2003-2010), there is the resumption of the Brazilian Nuclear Program (BNP), which begins with the revision of the existing program and the confirmation of its original objectives, namely: the construction of the nuclear submarine and the inauguration of the commercial uranium enrichment plant. In this context, the BNP was reinstated as a state policy precisely to ensure its continuity and its budget. Also at the domestic level, part of the arguments for the resumption of the program was the diversification of the national energy matrix from the use of energy considered clean from the point of view of CO₂ emissions. In terms of foreign policy, it is worth noting that the motivations for the resumption of the program revolved around the theme of autonomy in science, technology and innovation in strategic areas that could confer international prestige to the country and demonstrate its maturity in high complexity issues. (Andrade, Carpes & Leite p. 627-628)

According to Andrade, Carpes and Leite, there is a strengthening of interdependence between the activities of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry

of Science, Technology and Innovation and the Ministry of Mines and Energy. There is an increase in investments. At the same time, Brazil is developing a diversified diplomacy that is recovering, alongside the theme of development and the South-South Cooperation (SSC) agenda. This profile of international relations, defined as that of a “haughty and active” foreign policy by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim (2015), aimed at the diversification of partnerships.

In this diversification, the creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the South American Defense Council (CDS), the IBSA (or G-3, India, Brazil and South Africa) multilateral coalitions of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) are some examples of initiatives of this autonomy. In addition, they were representative of a process of global power deconcentration and 21st century multipolarity trends. In two of these coalitions, IBSA and BRICS, Brazil and India approached each other in a strategic way, which could suggest an expansion of cooperation in the nuclear arena.

However, this sector, in both IBSA and BRICS (Herz and Lage 2011), did not represent a preferred negotiating issue among emerging countries for the formation of a common front on sensitive proliferation issues and multilateral negotiations. Although politically the proposals converged towards democratizing scientific-technological knowledge, criticizing the difference in treatment and asymmetries between nuclearized and non-nuclearized powers (BRICS) and there were joint military exercises between members (IBSA), the focus of these coalitions was to if on other topics. Reforming political governance and the international financial system, and advocating for new development models, had a higher priority.

The different regional conditions in Eurasia and South America, and referring to the US military presence in these spaces, imply diverse geopolitical calculations among coalition members. There was a greater reinforcement of bilateral security and defense partnerships, such as the Sino-Russian agenda, than under BRICS and IBSA. The BNP stage compared to other programs, Brazil's position on nuclear regimes and the fact that it is not a nuclear power, and its emphasis on non-military power are also components that minimize potential partnerships. In the Brazilian case, nuclear energy, diplomacy and strategy have moved together in this period in ways other than the path of variable geometry alliances: Brazil's relationship with the NPT Additional Protocols and the pursuit of diplomatic leadership in the negotiation of the Iran-Brazil-Turkey Tripartite Nuclear Agreement 2010.

In the diplomatic-strategic field, Brazil objects to the addition of new controls beyond the NPT to non-nuclearized countries. As can be seen from the set of defense documents, including the passage of the mentioned END,

the Brazilian commitment to peace and disarmament are clear, and do not mean giving up scientific-technological development. This development is the second motivation: the preservation of Brazilian sovereignty in one of the pillars of BNP, that of uranium enrichment. Despite the delays of the 1990s and the attempt to deplete BNP, as mentioned, Navy efforts have kept some of the scientific-technological research going on.

Since 2006, it has been operating in Resende (RJ), the uranium enrichment process developed with national technology by the Navy Technological Center in São Paulo (CTMSP) and IPEN based on the ultracentrifugation method. It is not appropriate here to go into the details of the process¹⁶, but to highlight the core of the controversy: Brazil does not allow access to the enriched uranium production sectors (the modules in which the uranium enriching waterfalls operate), since in these places it finds the technology developed by the country that is considered, within the ultracentrifugation process, one of the most efficient. Brazil operates with other comparative advantages in the sector, with the possession of uranium reserves among the ten largest in the world. According to OECD data, in terms of reserves exploitation, the country fluctuates between 7th and 8th position, but in terms of presumed resources to be exploited, it could even be in 4th position¹⁷.

Brazil has the resources, such as the technological capacity to become autonomous in the nuclear fuel sector. It should be remembered that nuclear fuel is necessary for the operation of nuclear power plants, and many nations do not autonomously meet their demands and need to import this fuel. As argued by Le Prioux and Santos (2011), Brazil could become a relevant player in the export market of this fuel since the “nuclear club” in this sector is very restricted. Apart from Brazil, only China, the USA, France, Japan, Russia, Germany, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, India, Pakistan and Iran have similar knowledge (besides possibly North Korea). Brazil’s strategic repositioning in the sector would have implications for the Americans and other nations, favoring the gain of national power.

By way of example, one of the biggest critics of Brazil’s position is the US, which according to US Energy Information Administration (EIA¹⁸) imports 93% of the uranium it needs to power its plants. In 2004, the Americans presented open criticism to Brazil for its decision not to allow access

¹⁶ For this, it is recommended the INB website available at <http://www.inb.gov.br/>. The previously applied method, which is in the deactivation phase, was the gas diffusion plants.

¹⁷ Available at: <https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/nuclear-energy/uranium-2018_uranium-2018-en#page1>. Access on feb. 05, 2019.

¹⁸ Available at: <https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=nuclear_where>. Access on feb. 05, 2019

to Resende's facilities and for not signing the Additional Protocol. According to Patti (2010), one of George W. Bush's senior administration advisers (2001/2008), Brent Scowcroft, compared Brazil to Iran in a Washington Post article. According to Scowcroft, in a position rejected by the then Minister Celso Amorim, Brazil could become a nuclear power, developing war activities. Patti (2010) indicates that these tensions could be resolved at that time but remain an unresolved issue.

For Stuenkel (2010), these attitudes of emerging nations call into question their commitment to international regimes. This perspective is based on the idea of "isolation versus integration" as a product of Brazil's and India's foreign policy actions vis-à-vis the US and international organizations, rather than their strategic calculations. There is a permanence of a difference in treatment between the nuclearized and non-nuclearized nations and between the developing and developed nations (remembering also that between Brazil and India there is the non-nuclearized and nuclearized difference).

The second point of confrontation between the USA and Brazil in the nuclear field in the Lula period relates to the Brazil-Iran-Turkey Tripartite Agreement (2010). The negotiation of the Agreement refers to the pursuit of diplomatic leadership in the nuclear sector and the consolidation of Turkey and Brazil's position as regional pivots capable of leading a sensitive strategic issue, without the direct presence of the great Western powers. For Brazil, the episode was part of a resumption of the autonomist perspective of foreign policy.

In his 2015 work, *Tehran, Ramalá and Doha: Memories of Active and Haughty Foreign Policy*, Amorim recovers the talks that led to the Accord, including the initial US movement to support the Turkish-Brazilian initiative. In the assessment of the then Obama administration (2009/2016), the US-European-sponsored diplomatic path had run out and new possibilities had to be explored. In this context, the Americans supported the Brazilian-Turkish actions, although they later did not support the Tripartite Agreement and made efforts to make it unfeasible¹⁹.

In 2010, the issue assumed a significant proportion in Brazil, in a polarized scenario of presidential elections between PT (Worker's Party) candidate, Dilma Rousseff, continuity representative and José Serra of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB). The issue, along with human rights issues also involving Iran, has intensified the already significant opposition of some groups to the country's international relations. This divergence referred to the

19 In 2015, the Joint Global Action Plan was signed between Iran, Germany and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. In 2018, Trump withdrew US from this nuclear deal.

historical core of the polarizations between international insertion paradigms and development models. Not even the disclosure of documents by the Brazilian government that the Americans supported the negotiation was sufficient.

Although the Obama administration has officially advocated for a world in which emerging countries were more prominent under the 2010 National Security Strategy (WHITE HOUSE, 2010), practical movements have alternated pressures with engagement actions to bring them closer to USA. The Nuclear Agreement with India is one such example of engagement to bring an emerging country closer to the US on the one hand, and to contain its expansion and rapprochement in alliances of varying geometry.

From 2011 onwards, the recovery of the US economy expanded the containment of emerging countries from a strategic and economic-political point of view. The stalling of multilateral negotiations at the UN and the Trade Organization, criticism of variable geometry alliances such as the BRICS and IBSA, and the alleged imperialism of Brazil and China in regions such as the African continent, the increased military projection in Eurasia and South Atlantic and investments in regime change tactics and hybrid wars made up this offensive.

Internally, continuity turned out to be more rhetorical than practical. Even before taking office in his first mandate (2011/2014), Rousseff signaled that she would make adjustments to some foreign policy agendas. Among these, the bilateral relationship with the US and human rights, which were among the most criticized of the Lula administration. Obama's visit to Brazil in March 2011, and the deepening of global dialogues characterized this visit, indicating a greater desire for rapprochement. In 2013, the NSA's espionage crisis and the cancellation of Rousseff's visit to the US brought a cycle of crises. This cycle would be exceeded only in 2014, already in Rousseff's second mandate, which would end in 2016 with her impeachment process. In January 2016, Brazil-US signed a new Military Agreement, after the 1997 breach, which aims to resume closer cooperation in the area of security and defense (including technologically sensitive sectors such as aerospace, nuclear and joint military operation in Latin America).

For the BNP and the security and defense sector, the Rousseff period was one of fluctuations, due to these adjustments and the economic slowdown. The expectation that there could be a linear trajectory in the BNP was broken, and investments became scarce delaying the ongoing projects once again. The difficulty of building internal consensus on nuclear power and Brazilian scientific, technological and diplomatic leadership also acted negatively.

Despite investment cuts and delays, the processes that led to the mas-

tery of the complete nuclear fuel cycle, associated with Aramar and Resende's research and activities, and the continuation of PROSUB, with its consolidation with new agreements with France (the one from 2005 providing for French aid for non-nuclear submarine construction and technology transfer). In 2012, the Amazon Blue Defense Technology (Amazul) was established. On the other hand, the negative events, which added to the cut in resources, involved the inclusion of BNP in "Operation Lava Jato" to fight corruption. In 2015, Angra 3's completion works were halted.

Rousseff's departure from Presidency in 2017, and the inauguration of Michel Temer (2016/2018) was accompanied by mixed signals for the BNP. In 2017, the Brazilian Nuclear Program Development Committee (CDPNB) was reestablished and investments for PROSUB and uranium enrichment were recovered. INB's 2018 forecasts indicate that if there are no further setbacks Brazil could become autonomous in nuclear fuel production by 2033.

If the above facts can be seen as positive, others indicate the opposite situation: the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovations was transformed into the Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovations and Communications (MCTIC) from 2017, with a significant and progressive cut of resources for science, technology, and innovation (which also affects the federal university public system in undergraduate and graduate education and research). The defense budget in general, and not just the BNP, is part of this reduction process. Additionally, there is a change in the perception of the relevance of the country to maintain its sovereignty and autonomy in strategic sectors and the role it should play in the world.

Temer's foreign policy represented a new change in international relations, accentuating the rapprochement with the US and regaining visions closer to the 1990s agendas with Fernando Collor and FHC. In an updated version of "autonomy for integration," Temer sought to reactivate a policy that prioritizes bilateralism and commercialism, with a less assertive and more pragmatic content. Brazil continues to miss opportunities to solidify its defense and enhance its participation in the international system through nuclear technology, wasting comparative advantages. Among these, as Le Prioux and Santos maintain, the country would have

(...) at least four options in its international action through the nuclear sector. (...) By itself, Brazil can become an exporter of raw uranium (option 1). In addition, the country dominates the complete nuclear fuel cycle, including the enrichment phase (...) If uranium enrichment is done on an industrial scale, Brazil can also become a major supplier of enriched uranium for the rest of the world (option 2). Another option raised by the sector is the

export of equipment and modules for external reactors (option 3) (...) A final choice would be to promote technical cooperation with South American countries (option 4) that already have experience in the area (Argentina) in order to spread nuclear energy through reactors built in South America to neighbors without such technology. (Le Prioux and Santos 2011, p. 42)

The signing of the NPT as a “form of inclusion” and other concessions has not been recognized in the international community as an act of “good faith”, maintaining pressure on the country as in the case of the NPT Additional Protocol. The state project and development model continues to swing to the less autonomous and sovereign side, unlike India which has maintained its bargaining power and achieved benefits and status in the international community.

Final Remarks

The trajectory of India and Brazil’s nuclear programs has convergences and divergences in their nature and their relationship with the US. During the Cold War, either in the early stages of their INP and BNP when the Americans still supported the developing countries agenda for the Atoms for Peace Program, as in the post-NPT period in which conflicts, disagreements, and the desire to autonomy, convergences predominated. After 1989, however, changes in Brazil’s foreign policy and the maintenance of a perspective of non-alignment in India, which were observed were divergences, and an increasing ascendancy of the US role in the country.

There is a discontinuity in the BNP, not observed in the INP, which supports a more stable standard in the sector, even achieving concessions from the Americans in the 21st century, even though it has not yet signed the NPT. Brazil, in turn, signs the NPT seeking “integration” into the international system, without any counterparts or concessions. However, it continues to be the subject of attention and controversy for its comparative advantages in the area (something India did not have), such as strategic mineral reserves.

The geopolitical conditions of projection of Brazil and India tend to affect their security and defense agenda. The fragmentation of the Eurasian scenario and the greater diversity of equally nuclearized powers is a factor that facilitates the generation of internal consensus, something that does not exist in Brazil. Brazil’s nuclear gain would be in the American hemis-

phere, to the direct detriment of US interests. In Eurasia, a nuclear India helps counteract other actors such as China and Russia, and even Pakistan.

Different internal and external conditions explain these processes of distancing and approximation of nuclear programs. Regardless of having approached the first decade of the 21st century in an unprecedented way through the IBAS and BRICS variable geometry alliances, Brazil and India still seem to follow different paths in this field. In this case, IBSA contemplated cooperation initiatives in the military and strategic area that could have advanced. However, Brazil's oscillations prevent this assertiveness and continuity, while India seems to better manage its nuclear bargaining power and priorities.

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ABSTRACT

The knowledge regarding nuclear technology represented a new reality for the generation of energy and international security. The nuclear attacks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 represented the beginning of the so-called nuclear era and of the “balance of terror” as presented by many analysts such as Raymond Aron, deepened by the arms race in the US-Soviet bipolarity after 1947. Besides the superpowers, different countries had begun to develop their nuclear programs. The cases of Brazil and India stand out, since they develop their research agendas in the 1950s and 1960s, in the Cold War context, as a path to enhance their autonomy and bargaining power. The spread of the nuclear knowledge represented a challenge for the superpowers, and the talks for mechanisms of nuclear proliferation control such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) started. This is the context in which Brazil and India develop their nuclear programs under the impact of its bilateral relations with the US. Although, these programs were convergent at first, in the search for nuclear autonomy, adjustments are going to be observed on both policies after the end of the Cold War. The article aims to understand the importance and history of Brazil and India nuclear programs and US weight on these agendas.

KEYWORDS

Nuclear Policy; International Security; Brazilian Foreign Policy; Indian Foreign Policy; Brazil-India Relations.

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CHINA'S GLOBAL POWER AND DEVELOPMENT: THE MADE IN CHINA 2025 POLICY

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Introduction

In the immediate post-Cold War scenario, there were many enthusiasts of neoliberal globalization and its effects. (Kumar 1997, Ianni 1996). In this aspect, Kenichi Ohmae (1996) was one of many authors who diagnosed the weakening of nation-states while others clung too heavily to the post-industrial societies theses, from Bell (1970) to Demasi (2000). While it is imperative to recognize the profound systemic changes that have occurred since the late twentieth century, it is still impossible to dissociate national development and power. Moreover, it should be acknowledged the interdependence of the internal and international dimensions, given that state capacity and economic dynamism are preconditions for countries to act worldwide - although it seems insufficiently addressed in the context of International Relations.

Zakaria (1999) analyzes how rich nations become world powers focusing his study on the path of the United States rise, which began in the last decades of the nineteenth century. His approach converges with realist theory, demonstrating how the increase in economic power has enabled the country to leverage its influence on international relations, in parallel with the strengthening of its state apparatus (military and diplomatic) and effectively its interference for opening markets and access to international sources of resources. In the same perspective, Kennedy (1989) defends the thesis that the increase of productive capacity provides military capability both to support the acquisition and to guarantee the protection of wealth, but may generate hypertrophy of military power and a consequent weakening of national power

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in the long run.

Realist approaches, however, do not capture the complex economic and institutional formations of each country, the nature and motivations of its expansionist projects, nor the synergy between state-territorial power and the power of capital. In this sense, a critical approach - though historically very restricted to the critique of the capitalist system - can help illuminate the different natures of imperial development and expansion processes as well as state-capital interaction in shaping the modern international system. In China's case, it is necessary to understand its unstoppable rise, its impact on systemic reordering changing its power settings, as well as the uniqueness of its cosmology and its political-economic system.

Thus, this article aims elucidate the process by which the success of China's development project drives the assertiveness of its engagement on major issues on the international agenda. To this end, the goal is to discuss the role of *Made in China 2025* (MIC 2025) in the rise of the Asian country. This is a government policy launched in 2015 aimed at promoting 10 strategic sectors of smart manufacturing, internalizing complex supply chains and driving innovation. Increasing Chinese production complexity has widened the country's participation not only in global production and trade, but in FDI innovation, issuance and reception activities. Naturally, its development recreates the parameters of China's engagement and assertiveness globally, putting the level of tension and competitiveness inherent in its relations with the hegemon (United States of America) to another level.

Brief Notes on Global Power and Development

A critical approach about development and insertion in the international system must overcome the existing cleavages in both modernization theories, grounded in the analysis of the inexorable process of overcoming traditional societies and boosting the enrichment of nations, as well as the theories of dependence, at least in those versions that crystallize the center-periphery relations. In those relations, both commodity exports and industrialization recreate, in different ways, dependency through lack of access to state-of-the-art technology and/or through the expansion of transfer profits and debt, among others mechanisms of stagnation (Mamigonian 2000).

Lenin himself (1979) offered an alternative analysis that goes beyond these cleavages. From the conformation of financial capitalism (monopolies), the expansion of the system is driven by the exportation of surplus capital in advanced countries. Capital globalizes to peripheral countries in search

for more lucrative investments. Indeed, in the center, the parasitic rentism causes some stagnation; yet in the periphery it generates conflicting plundering tendencies to loot the weak links of imperialism and to unevenly promote new dynamic regions from their competitive advantages (Lenin, 1979, p. 621-23; 646-7). Thus, the global development of capitalism accentuates the contradictions of the world economy by creating, through colonial policies, large monopolies, which recreate their conditions of existence from the very reproduction of these colonial policies.

In the same line of thought, Arrighi also seeks in history the root of the great systemic changes, analyzing the process of displacement of the dynamic areas of capitalism. Stages of material expansion give way to phases of financial expansion, shaping systemic cycles of accumulation and transitions of power. From Genoa (from the 15th to the 17th) to the Netherlands (end of the 16th to the 18th), then England (from the 18th to the beginning of the 20th) and the United States (late 19th to the present), more and more comprehensive and complex governmental and business structures were formed - imposing limits on system expansion (Arrighi 1996)².

With emphasis on production or systemic circulation, the fact is that development results from the combination of global processes with national policies suited to conjunctural opportunities. Regarding the domestic sphere, the history of developed countries teaches, on the one hand, that there is no single model or path, but, on the other, that there are parameters and prerequisites which without no country has historically developed. The South Korean Chang (2004) points out that absolutely all countries now considered developed have made extensive use of industrial, trade and technology (ICT) policy. That is, they all mobilized the state apparatus to boost development, rather than uncritically adopting liberal policies and models driven by major powers and international organizations whose historical goal has been to 'kick away the ladder' (Chang 2004) for the rise of new power poles.

According to Reinert, state policies are crucial in breaking the limitations of 'perfect competition' in primary goods and their consequent 'diminishing returns', which imprison a number of countries to a static productive specialization. It is public emulation that promotes 'imperfect competition' and 'rising incomes' through technological change, dynamism in production chains and mechanisms of value addition to production, wage increases, market densification, profit expansion and increase of the tax base. That is, the economies of scale, the technological changes and synergistic effects of ag-

² This historical sequence proposed by him underestimates the importance of other civilizations, taking on too Eurocentric features, and greatly broadening his understanding of what defines the capitalist system. But this debate escapes the aims of the text.

glomeration are part of these development processes. Thus, either the country seeks to insert itself in the capital-intensive links of international value chains or accept colonialism due to the comparative advantages of a given international division of labor (Reinert 2016).

The organization of the Atlas of Economic Complexity gives empirical substance to these notions that relate development with productive sophistication (Hausmann et al. 2011). In other words, economic complexity drives an intricate network of interactions and knowledge mobilized for production, whose increased productivity is linked to the addition of value, knowledge, innovation and, in effect, development. Productive complexity can be measured by the ability to produce non-ubiquitous and diversified goods³, as well as other variables such as increased HDI and reduced social inequalities for example (Hausmann et al. 2011, Gala 2017).

Gullo (2014) also points out that the ‘state impulse’ is not only faced with domestic challenges as it is a phenomenon that can challenge the world power structure, which he calls ‘founding insubordination’. Any national project faces the limits imposed by the hegemonic structures of power, formed by complex mechanisms of domination, created by some countries and international organizations, as well as public and private actors that impose their interests as well (Guimarães 2000, p. 28). In fact, escape these mechanisms involves the articulation between anti-colonial struggles and the national issue as the basis of emancipationist movements on the periphery of the system - a question underestimated by ‘Western Marxism’, with its exalted and abstract internationalism and anti-capitalism notions (Losurdo 2018, p. 44).

The overcoming of the productive-technological gap is decisive both for national development and for the country’s position in the international division of labor, especially after the technical transformations resulting from the 3rd Industrial Revolution. Mazzucato (2014) demonstrates that even in the United States - a country presented as the bastion of liberalism and self-made entrepreneurship - the state is at the center of technological innovations, through the combination of public spending and governmental fostering of university-business interaction. Defense spending (military-industrial complex), operated through government agencies, has played a central role in generating innovation for the economy. Recent technological advances in the computing, jets, nuclear power, lasers, biotechnology and drug sectors, as well as the shape of Silicon Valley itself, cannot be understood without the consideration of these heavy government investments. Even the notorious

³ The case of Mexico is *sui generis*, given that the economy specialized in terms of Maquila characteristics and, in effect, inhibited the internalization of production chains and their chain effects (Gala 2017, p.80-1).

case of the iPhone was only possible due to government research that previously enabled the creation of the internet, microprocessors, lithium battery, GPS, touch screens and communication technologies (HTTP and HTML) among other tools - an event not much different from the algorithm case that led to the creation of Google's search mechanism. (Mazzucato 2014, p. III; 136).

In short, although unrecognized in liberal rhetoric, the dynamics of the international system have been the result of dialectical state-power and market-capital relations. Arrighi (1996) points out that since the Indian Companies, capital and power act synergistically - and Washington today has been particularly emphatic in promoting and defending its strategic sectors⁴. Instead of the supposed antagonism between state-centered and transnationalist views, which is prevalent in international relations, it is appropriate to bet on critical approaches capable of understanding the intertwining between state territoriality and global processes of capitalist accumulation⁵. In other words, it is not possible to understand national development by dissociating it from the complex process of displacement of global decision-making centers, which, in turn, interact with national integration strategies, determining their respective autonomy and place in configurations (hierarchical) of power in the world.

China's development and power

To understand the Made in China 2025, it is necessary to recover the trajectory of China, emblematic because of the tense and contradictory relationship between development and international insertion. The sophisticated Middle Kingdom enters what they call the 'century of humiliation' between the Opium War (1839) and the Chinese Revolution (1949), combining internal disorganization with international subordination to different imperialist powers. The revolution, therefore, intertwined the anticolonial character with that of national reconstruction, while at the same time facing upsets such as the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and international isolation after the Sino-Soviet rupture. Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Openness policy aimed at overcoming these contradictions by adjusting strategies for both national development and international insertion, taking into account Chinese

4 Some notorious cases of banning the sale of US private companies for strategic reasons are Unocal (oil) that would be sold to China's CNOOC in 2005; Lattice Semiconductor Corporation by the Chinese Canyon Bridge Fund in 2017; or Qualcomm (semiconductors) by Singapore-based Broadcom (but with the ancestry of Chinese investors) in 2018.

5 In-depth discussion in another article, see Pautasso & Fernandes (2017).

internal and external dimensions.

This policy triggered by Deng Xiaoping fits into a framework of the restructuring of both of capitalism and of US global power. On the one hand, the 3rd Industrial Revolution began, with new mechanisms of production organization (Toyotism) and an emerging international division of labor. On the other hand, the hegemon (United States) sought to restore control over the international monetary-financial system through the flexible dollar standard, combined with the 1980s military escalation (Reagan) against the USSR, the trade offensive against Japan and Germany (Plaza Accord - 1985) and its rapprochement with Communist China - in a scenario of US withdrawal from Vietnam and the intensification of both China and the US rivalry with the USSR. The Chinese case is symptomatic of the capacity to formulate national policies appropriate to systemic changes, demonstrating the possibility of overcoming domestic and international vulnerabilities.

That is, the construction of the Sino-American axis articulated US financial globalization with the embryonic Chinese economic miracle, driving significant changes in the international division of labor and, consequently, in the world's power configurations. It is a productive integration between the United States and China based on US FDI and the shaping of globalized industrial production chains, including companies from Asian countries or regions. In other words, this new Sino-American axis of accumulation, although increasingly filled with geopolitical contradictions, has synergistic trade (broadening the trade chain), productive (articulation between US and Chinese companies in the global production chain), and financial (foreign reserves of China and US Treasuries) (Pinto 2011).

To some extent, the process described above converges with Arrighi's (2008) analysis. For him, the financial expansion of the US cycle has driven the shift of the global economic epicenter from the North Atlantic to East Asia, resulting in the Asian revival under the leadership of the reemerging Chinese civilization and the rebuilding of the sinocentric system (Arrighi 2008). In this direction, China's leadership has been promoting regional integration processes, both through organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and initiatives such as the New Silk Road, while proposing the country's repositioning in the global arena as well as the redefinition of key elements of the international order⁶.

China's trajectory of national development and international insertion stress the hegemonic power structures centered on the United States and its allies. As Belluzzo (2013) points out, in the West financial deregulation drives

6 In-depth discussion in another article, see Pautasso & Ungaretti (2017).

capital into the speculative spiral of account creation (fictitious) to the detriment of production. Thus, large corporations are increasingly immersed in practices aimed at increasing financial assets, tied to the immediate logic of their shareholders - a sign not of the detachment of the fictitious appreciation of the stock of wealth, but in more advanced, socialized and contradictory ways of value creation in capitalism (Belluzzo 2013, p. 111-123).

Therefore, it remains to be seen how China will offer alternatives for shaping new global power configurations. China's systemic impact has been significant in many dimensions, illustrated both by the profile of its exports and the performance of its companies on a global scale. Exports rose from US\$ 16.8 billion in 1980 to US\$ 82 billion in 1990, US\$ 370 billion in 2000, US\$ 1.680 trillion in 2010 and US\$ 1.980 in 2016. Between 2007 and 2017 China's accumulated trade surpluses totaled nearly 3.5 trillion dollars⁷. In the 1980s Chinese exports were practically restricted to oil and its derivatives, food and other primary products; during the 1990s they were made up of footwear, clothing, toys and other low value-added manufactured goods; nowadays, predominate electro-electronic equipment, motors, vehicles, building materials, among other sophisticated goods⁸.

In a detailed study, it became clear that in 1962 China had only export competitiveness of 105 products; by 1980, when the transition began, China was already achieving such performance for a total of 234 items; in 2006, the export basket was already highly sophisticated and one of the most diversified in the world with around 270 goods (Felipe, Kumar, Usui, Abdon 2013). According to the aforementioned Atlas⁹, China had an economic complexity index of 0.143 in 1995 and 1.16 in 2016, rising from 50th to 18th in the world ranking - in the same period the United States went from 1.86 to 1.55, or from 7th to 10th position. In 1992, just over 6% of Chinese exports were high-tech goods, reaching over 25% in 2016 - while the United States fell from 32.5% to 19.9% in the same period the share of goods with high added value in its export agenda¹⁰. China's performance is even reflected in asymmetries in its relationship with the United States, whose bilateral trade reached US\$ 505.4 billion in 2017 with surpluses of US\$ 375.5 billion in favor of the Chinese. Beyond the values, Chinese exports of high-tech products reached, in 2016,

⁷ View year data available at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/263632/trade-balance-of-china/>

⁸ View data by volume, destinations and export component from China available at: <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/pt/profile/country/chn/>

⁹ View the excellent dataset available at: <http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/>

¹⁰ World Bank data, available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.CD?locations=CN-US>

the figure of 496 billion dollars, compared to 153 billion dollars of the US economy¹¹.

The performance of Chinese companies globally reflects the expansion of the power of the eastern country in the international sphere. This fact can be well illustrated by the rapid expansion of the number of its multinationals among the world's major corporations. Notwithstanding the difficulties of measurement, variable data such as stock control and company profile, this is a significant rise from 18 companies in 2005 to 120 companies in 2018, listed among the 500 largest, according to *Fortune* - while in this the same period the United States went from 176 to 126¹². During the Opening-Up Reform Policy of the late 1970s, the Chinese emphasis was on developing national productive capacity, attracting foreign investment directed for internalizing capital and technologies; from the 1990s onwards, China was already testing the projection of its foreign investments, prioritizing peripheral countries; since 2005, however, China has been expanding its investments abroad in a clear qualitative transformation of its business expansion (ZHU 2018). In line with this dynamic, the Going Global strategy was developed in 1999, precisely in the context of the country's entry into the WTO (2001), oriented for increasing security in natural, alimentary and energetic resources, through the control of the value chains of these sectors in other countries. China is currently developing Going Global 2.0 with the central objective of driving demand into the national economy by leveraging it through the New Silk Road¹³.

The intertwining and mutual strengthening of China's national development and foreign insertion is also expressed in the diplomatic sphere. Chinese diplomacy has become more assertive, surpassing the low profile foreign policy advocated by Deng Xiaoping. This change stems from Beijing's new objective conditions of power, which are essential for the country to assume commitments and responsibilities commensurate with its new status (Zhao 2013, Tianquan 2012). Chinese assertiveness can be observed in promoting a new global financial architecture¹⁴, building regional integration processes (SCO, ASEAN + 1, New Silk Road) and/or more emphatically defending regional security issues.

11 View official data from the United States Census Bureau, available at: <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2016>.

12 See report China Daily, available at: <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201807/20/WS5b518b77a310796df4df7b77.html>.

13 See official document from the Government of China, available at: <https://polycn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-Chinas-going-global-strategy.pdf>.

14 See debate in Pautasso (2015).

Development and power in Made in China 2025 policy

Given the above, it is possible to understand the Made in China 2025 as a sign of the deepening synergy between national development and enhancement of China's global insertion. This is an exemplary case of state capacity to promote what Chang (2004) calls STI policy in favor of the nascent industry. In other words, the Chinese government has been promoting interaction between the state and the private sector, financing the merger of sectors, shaping oligopolies (national champions) with a view to deepening the productivity and socialization of investment. State planning includes cheap financing through national public banks, production of low-priced basic inputs, and stimulating demand through government procurement. Diverging from the prevailing rentism in the neoliberal agenda, the State directs investments to chosen sectors capable of generating innovations and thickening supply chains while capital markets are regulated, avoiding the bubbles and collapses inherent in speculation cycles (Belluzzo, Sabbatini 2017).

In fact, state science, technology and innovation (ST&I) policies have historically been crucial to the development processes of nations, although later combined with liberal rhetoric (kicking the ladder) to undertake actions aimed at monopolizing their domains (patents) and even the inhibition of these same public policies, which gave rise to them in third countries. It is, therefore, a strategy of the world powers to reaffirm their advantages and, in full, the global asymmetries expressed in the international division of production processes - or in the place that each country occupies in the value and wealth chains. Indeed, development combines a national project with capabilities to break hegemonic international structures aimed at crystallizing global configurations of wealth and power.

In China's case, the policies of reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national reconstruction of the Mao Era are intertwined with the modernizing reforms triggered by the Deng Era. According to Gala (2017, 91-2), there were several governmental public policies aimed at promoting China's economic complexity, encompassing gradual trade opening, with a complex tariff system, non-tariff barriers and licenses; the attraction of conditional investments on technological transfers, joint ventures, chains to national industries; strong incentives for reverse engineering and weak enforcement of intellectual protection laws; the creation of national clusters through local content requirements; besides an economic policy capable of combining devalued exchange rate, low interest rates, capital control, among other mechanisms.

Its macroeconomic policy has as its vector public financing, driven

by a bank structure reorganized with the Reform and Opening Policy¹⁵. At the turn of the 1970-80, financial reforms were conducted aiming to create specialized operations for the various sectors of the economy, starting with the separation of the People's Bank of China (PBOC). Firstly, China Construction Bank (CCB) for construction, Bank of China (BOC) for foreign currency transactions and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) for rural credit emerged - and also the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) to undertake the industrial and commercial control tasks of PBC's banking activities in 1984. In the 1990s, the three political banks that would focus Chinese development finance emerged: the China Development Bank (CDB), the China Exim Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC). In addition, multilateral financial institutions, whose ancestry in China are central, were formed, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New BRICS Development Bank, the China-Africa Development Fund, the New Silk Road, among others.

The banking system is also behind the accelerated internationalization of Chinese companies, especially the state-owned enterprises (SOE). (Nicolas 2017). These companies have been working in synergy with chinese foreign policy to achieve goals ranging from food security, natural and energy resources, to demand creation strategies for the domestic market. Cai (2017, p. 17) highlights three sectors that have emerged in the chinese high-tech industry, notably high-speed rail, power generation equipment, and telecommunications equipment. In fact, all these sectors are linked to Beijing's initiatives to promote infrastructure (communication, transport and energy).

Innovation is structuring to increase the productive complexity of the country and guides all ICT public policies. According to the World Bank's¹⁶ China 2030 document, Chinese innovation has been based on remarkable support for the specialization of productive activities; the integration of companies with the national innovation system; the building of national research networks; the improvement of the quality of higher education; the qualification of labor aiming at increasing labor productivity; increased spending on R&D and S&T; the promotion of new companies (start-ups); government procurement aimed at stimulating innovation, etc. Notwithstanding the uniqueness of the trajectory of each country, what is observed is that there is no

¹⁵ In a recent report, the United Nations recognized the role of long-term development banks, according to a report available at: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsecidc2016d1_en.pdf.

¹⁶ China 2030' book: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society, organized by the World Bank and the State Council of Development Research Center of the People's Republic of China.

development *without* ICT policies and state emulation.

In this scenario of intensifying interstate and corporate competition, China has been targeting what is conventionally called industry 4.0 - a concept created in 2011 at the Hannover fair in Germany to refer to advanced manufacturing¹⁷. These are technological innovations such as artificial intelligence, robotics, IoT, Big Data, autonomous vehicles, 3D printing, nanotechnology, biotechnology, energy storage, new materials (graphene) and quantum computing.


The Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) policy, inspired by Germany's "Industry 4.0" plan (discussed in 2011 and adopted in 2013), was approved by the State Council of China in 2015, focused on the development of smart manufacturing. This is a deepening of another 2010 study, entitled China's Drive for Indigenous Innovation, which aimed to use the powerful Chinese regulatory regime to force the reliance on foreign technology to be promoted by promoting national innovations. The MIC 2025 aims to boost China's leadership in global production and innovation networks, giving efficiency and quality to domestic products. The plan was prepared by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) with the inputs from 150 experts from the China Academy of Engineering.

This government document highlights 10 priority business sectors: 1) new advanced information technology; 2) automated machine-tools and robotics; 3) aerospace and aeronautical equipment; 4) maritime equipment and high technology transportation; 5) modern railway equipment; 6) new energy vehicles and equipment; 7) power equipment; 8) agricultural equipment; 9) new materials; and 10) biopharmaceuticals and advanced medical products. To this end, the Chinese government is not only focused on innovation, but on the entire modern production and service chain. The central objective is to increase the national content of national components and materials first to 40% by 2020 and then to 70% by 2025. To this end, the Chinese government's strategy includes policies aimed at accelerating technology transfer efforts and licensing requirements, acquisition of strategic foreign companies, as well as various of reverse engineering activities¹⁸. It is interesting to observe

¹⁷ In Germany the Recommendations for implementing the strategic initiative Industrie 4.0 was produced in 2013; and in the US, Report to the President Accelerating U.S. Advanced Manufacturing in 2014.

¹⁸ The Trump Government had placed Chinese Fujian Jinhua on a list of entities that cannot buy products from US companies, a move similar to that taken against China's ZTE. Note that Fujian Jinhua is at the heart of MIC 2025, as it is one of China's largest chip makers. View news at Reuters on October 29, 2018, available at: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-semiconductors/u-s-restricts-exports-to-chinese-semiconductor-firm-fujian-jinhua-idUKKCN1N328E>

the goals in the automotive industry, a sector that link together information technologies, autonomous vehicles, new forms of energy and others.



Infographic 1. Source: MIIT (http://english.gov.cn/policies/infographics/2015/06/02/content_281475119391820.htm)

Made in China 2025 is definitely an ambitious plan to affirm China's industrial and technological leadership along with a robust import substitution process. According to Xinhua agency, MIIT and the China Development Bank foresee funding programs - including loans, bonds and leasing - for major projects, with funding estimated at over \$ 45 billion for the 2016-2020¹⁹ period. It is a productive escalation that tends to intensify interstate and inter-company competition, typical of the contexts of reorganization of world power. And that is why neither the 'trade war' unleashed by the United States

¹⁹ See news from Xinhua official agency, available at: http://english.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2017/10/12/content_281475904600274.htm.

against China in 2018, nor the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, chief financial officer of Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, boils down to displaced disputes within this broader geopolitical framework.

Final Remarks

There is no doubt that a country's national development and global projection intertwine and strengthen each other - and China's trajectory is emblematic of this synergy. The MIC 2025 is the cause and consequence of this process, the origins of which date back to the national reconstruction began in 1949 and revitalized after the reforms undertaken in the 1970s. If it is a fact that the 3rd Industrial Revolution and the so-called Industry 4.0 will bring structural changes to production and production work, they do not dissociate themselves from the development and power of nations and, in effect, from their public policies toward the production of wealth (complex and tangible).

Getting back to the starting point. If, in the mid-nineteenth century, the eastern country was the object of capitalist expansion and succumbed to British hegemony, from the 1980s onwards, systemic changes and national policies have driven China's rise. Deng's reforms depended as much on rapprochement with the United States as on the opportunities arising from the new international division of labor, and on its flows of production, investment, and trade. None of this would be virtuous without the Chinese elite being able to perceive these changes and formulate public policies capable of meeting their challenges, overcoming several vulnerabilities and contradictions, both internal and external. As the world economy succumbed to the liberalizing narrative, China pursued development with consistent ICT policies and publicly emulated development banks. The growing economic complexity has been revealing of national performance, reflected in factors as diverse as HDI or patent registration.

Naturally, China's greater geo-economic power requires greater geopolitical assertiveness. The Chinese rise tenses the hegemonic power structures led by the United States in several dimensions. It is undoubtedly from this result that new configurations of power will emerge, with greater or lesser violence and with or without central war.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to analyze the relationship between development and global power of China. And, more specifically, how the Made in China 2025 policy is designed to deepen China's development by driving strategic sectors of smart manufacturing and other innovations. To do so, it needs to understand how China has taken advantage of systemic changes since the 1970s to unleash a cycle of comprehensive reforms mobilizing industrial, commercial and technological (ICT) policies. That is, without state emulation there is no economic complexity or expansion of the country's presence in the world. The proposed argument is that the interweaving between the internal and international dimensions compose the key of the rise of the powers - imperative underestimated by the narratives of liberal globalization - whose epicenter remains the national development.

KEYWORDS

China; Development; Made in China 2025.

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BEHIND THE MYTH OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENTALIST STATE IN BRAZIL AND SOUTH KOREA

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Introduction

Developmentalism emerges as a well-theorized post-World War II strategy and political project, becoming common sense among most of the world's political elites. The model is based on coordinating business activities as a means of accelerating progress through elements such as subsidies, protection, state entrepreneurship, and cost socialization. However, these factors do not necessarily promote industrialization, as they require some degree of state capacity, besides being influenced by the geopolitical context of each country. Still, after the Great Depression, there was consensus on the importance of state intervention. The capitalist classes saw an opportunity for state protection and aid that needed economic policy coordination.

Keynesianism emerges in this context, encouraging non-automatic fiscal and monetary policies, with more power to policy makers and state administrators. It is the result of a coalition of economic interests and, thus, of a change in power relations. The process of import substitution and rapid industrialization stem from a common project of coalition between political elites, public administrators, and national capitalists that made up the power

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bloc of the technocratic elite and the industrialists. In the geopolitical context of the Cold War, the developmental state served the dual purpose of allowing the establishment of a national industrial complex and favoring the accumulation of power amidst the scenario of increasing systemic pressure (Medeiros 2011).

The problem in building the developmental state was in the resistance of the national bourgeoisie. This is a naturally complicated and contradictory relationship. The bourgeoisie supports the state when it receives subsidies, but criticizes it when the same state seeks to go further in terms of planning and control policies. For this reason, it is a faltering ally of a development trajectory, as its interests are limited to protection and the highest possible rate of profit.

As anticipated by mentioning the example above, this research assumes the hypothesis that developmental processes occur under the circumstances of the hegemonic project. I make use of this method to study the cases of Brazil and South Korea. Since the 1990s, many analysts have sought to respond to differences in development trajectories between the two countries by pointing to South Korea as an example of success. However, the success of the South Korean model could never be a viable alternative to Brazil, since its unique constitution in the relationship between state and bourgeoisie, due to unique geopolitical and historical factors, does not find similarities with the Brazilian context.

In South Korea, for example, the coalition between the military, technocratic and private sectors had always been more cohesive and homogeneous than in Brazil (Medeiros 1997; 2011; Kohli 2004). In the Asian country, the outward-oriented industrialization model worked because it was inserted into the Asian subcontracting network, nucleated by Japan, in the context of the triad with the United States, and took advantage of geopolitical conditions that led to a more natural regime of incentive and intervention than Brazil. In the imports substitution model, industrialization is not inefficient, but doesn't complete itself, since more planning is needed, which is hindered by the lack of support for a more articulated industry. There is, thus, a rejection to industrial planning, which needs the state's capacity to induce private sector responses, which is more artificial in a resource-rich country. In Brazil, as well as in almost all of Latin America, the limits of this process were due to the success of the developmentalist model, and not to its failure. The developmentalist state falls apart due to its own national business community, which detaches itself from the project and seeks a reconfiguration of alliances, establishing the neoliberal paradigm. The evolution of the industrializing model requires greater coordination and discretion of state intervention, whose

planning and discipline practices go against the interests of the bourgeois class. In this sense, the Brazilian bourgeoisie has never constituted itself as an autonomous, national and intrinsic ally to the developmentalist project, since its interests oscillate between dependence on the state and dependence on global economic and financial centers.

Being a highly industrialized economy focused on international trade, the South Korean case stood out as a formula for overcoming the backwardness of developing countries. However, there is a need for analysis that point to the specificities of the developmental state in South Korea, whose interventionist action was decisive to leverage the country's industrial production in line with domestic business groups, as well as the geopolitical context conducive to outward-looking industrialization. The Brazilian process, in turn, due to the richness of natural resources and the large domestic market, brought a more artificial induction of the state in industrialization, whose policy assumes an element of coercion, induction and control.

This research, therefore, seeks to analyze the specific dimensions of each case, highlighting the role of the state and its relationship with the internal bourgeoisie in the construction of an industrial policy. The trajectories of rise and decline of the Brazilian and South Korean developmental state will be analyzed, including the current crisis of political power reconfiguration that both countries are going through.

Development, industrialization and power relations in Brazil: a historic outlook

This research starts from the hypothesis that the Brazilian capitalist class is defined by its contradiction, which is often translated by being nationalist, but when feels threatened, resorts to the dependence associated with the external elites. In this sense, Bresser-Pereira (2015) classifies the Brazilian internal bourgeoisie from its ambiguous national-dependent character. However, the author states that despite its contradictory characteristic, this bourgeoisie was fundamental to the establishment of the developmental pact that promoted the industrialization of Brazil. Tavares (1999), in turn, analyzes the rise of industrial production in the country as an essentially state project, combined with external capital. In this perspective, national capital would be the "weak leg" of this tripod, given its intrinsically doubly associated formation (to the state and to the external capital). Contrary to Bresser-Pereira's thinking, for Tavares, the Brazilian bourgeoisie could never achieve the status of autonomous bourgeoisie.

The difficulty in consolidating an effectively autonomous bourgeoisie has its origins in the Independence process. Brazil's imperial elite was basically an elite made up of landlords and in large part by senior bureaucrats, with strong ties of cultural subordination to France and England (Bresser-Pereira 2015). For Raymundo Faoro (1975), the Independence marks a change in the nature of power in Brazil, because to the power of the landlords and the great merchants has since then been added the power of a patrimonialist bureaucracy. These transformations impact the external insertion of Brazil.

The national elites were therefore efficient in consolidating the territorial integration of the country, but failed to constitute a true nation-state, as there was no idea of nationality. "If the Brazilian integrity was successful, it was rather by its own conservative sense - expressed in the interests of the elites to perpetuate strongly rooted social, ethnic and racial hierarchies - rather than the consolidation of a sense of national identity" (Silva 2006: 411). The colonial inferiority complex that marks the essence of our elites since Independence, therefore, can be verified from two interrelated traits: the desire to "be European", that is, not to identify themselves as Brazilian citizens responsible and belonging to the development of the country; associated with the fact that there was no anti-imperialist sentiment in these elites, which is often part of the process of building late-developing nations. Thus, the main mark that has accompanied national economic elites since its oligarchic and dependent formation is that "these elites did not realize that industrial or modern imperialism limited the development of the country, among other reasons, because it persuaded them not to pursue industrialization". (Bresser-Pereira 2015: 63).

In the view proposed in this research, the result of this process was soon verified from the unconditioned association with the hegemonic power of the time. The "diplomacy of the treaties" in this sense demonstrates how the politics of recognition at all costs added to the lack of resistance of the national elites, who for the most part was in favor of the partnership with England, for predominantly ideological reasons. Moreover, the maintenance of rivalries with neighboring countries itself is part of this process. Although it is mostly inherited from the colonial situation, this non-Latin American feeling that marks the formation of Brazilian elites, which, therefore, do not militate for a closer approach that could lead to economic and commercial benefits, contributes to this remoteness.

From the Proclamation of the Republic onwards there is the strengthening of regional oligarchies, as well as the nascent immigrant bourgeoisie, which will later be responsible for the industrial formation of Brazil in association with foreign capital and the coffee complex (Mamigonian 1976; Bress-

er-Pereira 2015). Moreover, “the eagerness to match the liberal political-economic ideals of the English ruling power with a peripheral and late version of the Enlightenment of the French and American Revolutions led us to a proclaimed republic without political or bourgeois revolution” (Tavares 1999: 451). The Old Republic model, in this sense, maintains the conduct of the imperial period, which Bresser-Pereira (2015) defines as the “State Cycle and Territorial Integration” (1822-1930), led by the Oligarchic Pact.

The arrival of Vargas in power in 1930 represents the consolidation of the pact between national economic elites and political power. The Bourgeois Capitalist Revolution in Brazil was thus only possible due to the association between national elites and the patrimonialist bureaucracy, urban workers and the traditional oligarchy (Fernandes 1975). The effects of the international economic crisis since 1929 resulted in the accountability of state power as regulator of the economy; this phenomenon is observed in almost every region of the globe. The decline in world trade in the interwar period, marked by the 1929 crisis, markedly reduced the import capacity of agro-exporting countries. According to Tavares (1975), in addition to the exported quantum, the price obtained by exports, and the price paid for the imports made, there is the concept of external bottlenecks, that is, the demand for imports grows more than the capacity to import. The deterioration of the terms of trade led to the need to gradually replace imports with domestic production. Consequently, internally, the Brazilian elites take a new orientation, defending the state as agent for the organization of the economy and society. It is not possible, however, to say that from 1930 there was a transformation in the ideological vision of the national economic elites, but that there was in fact a significant increase in the pragmatism that began to drive the actions of this bourgeoisie. In this sense, the association with the state to consolidate capitalism in Brazil had a predominantly utilitarian bias, in view of the inauguration of a state policy to support industrialization and simultaneously support the maintenance of the coffee oligarchy in crisis. According to Fiori (1995: 127):

In such a way the so far predominantly agrarian and conservative elites positioned themselves in favor of a public policy that is less and less in line with the liberal desiderata and ever closer to what, later in the 1950s, would take the form of the so-called developmental project. It was this new thought that Bolívar Lamounier (1977) called the *ideology of state*, responsible for the legitimation of the agro-export defense policy in the face of the international crisis of 1929, whose industrializing effects cannot yet be considered as the result of intentional developmental action.

This process did not occur as a natural evolution of the capitalist development of these nations, but rather as a deliberate action on the part of the state apparatus to promote public policies that acted countercyclically against the economic conjuncture. This phenomenon of diversification of the national productive apparatus occurred predominantly in the last stages of production, through activities that produce durable consumer goods. That is, internalized production still required import capacity, but now with a new profile: parts, raw materials and components.

The incentive to national production by the Brazilian state occurred through the adoption of exchange control policies and the increase of customs tariffs, making imports more expensive. The fact that a certain accumulation of industrial structure and an expanding domestic market already existed also contributed. According to Furtado (1997), the first measure involving the adoption of the import substitution model was the purchase and burning of coffee stocks by the government, which allowed the maintenance of the farmers' income and the level of domestic demand. The use of idle capacity of some industries was stimulated, starting a more autonomous process of industrialization. In addition, Vargas needed the support of the oligarchic class to carry out a new domination pact to redirect the productive bases of the national economy (Cervo and Bueno 2011).

Throughout the Kubitschek government (1956-1961), the import substitution process was consolidated in Brazil, strengthening the policies inaugurated in the Vargas period. "By the early 1950s ideological and institutional conditions were ripe for the state to take on the ideology of industrializing developmentalism" (Fiori 1995: 128). It is from then on that foreign capital starts to play a decisive role for Brazilian industry, which makes room for association with national private capital (especially in technological-productive complementarity), which gradually moves away from dependence on the state.

The Independent Foreign Policy (PEI), launched by the governments of Jânio Quadros (1961) and João Goulart (1961-1964), sought through the diversification of external partnerships the support to overcome Brazilian underdevelopment. However, during this period, there is a crisis in the developmentalist pact, especially due to the decline of the import substitution model, as well as the consolidation of the industrial policy. Regarding this last point, it is noteworthy that the approval of the Tariff Law in 1958 caused structural changes in the Brazilian policy, seen that previously the protection of the national industry was performed through administrative instruments.

With the passing of the law, however, nationalism achieved a great victo-

ry. Protection of national industry was no longer eventual and provisional. Now a law, not a simple administrative act, ensured Brazilian industrial development. However, as this victory was achieved, as industrial entrepreneurs became confident of their acquired positions, the greater motivation behind their nationalism was lost, at least nationalism as they understood it. (Bresser-Pereira 2015: 170).

The Military Coup, therefore, was supported by national elites who no longer depended on government policies for their own preservation, especially the industrial bourgeoisie, since industrializing ideology had become predominant in national thought. Afraid of the social reforms proposed by João Goulart, this class faction joins its former opponents - the rural exporting oligarchy, the high commerce and foreign companies - in supporting the military for the overthrow of the democratic government. "The untouchability of the land structure was part of the agreement that vetoed any type of land reform in Brazil and enthroned the protection of agrarian-mercantile interests as a condition of the industrializing pact" (Fiori 1995: 134). It can be perceived, thus, the essentially utilitarian and dependent character of the Brazilian elites, which are sometimes associated with the state and sometimes with foreign capital, though never constituting an autonomous bourgeoisie capable of conducting national development.

In particular, since the Medici government (1969-1974), the association between the patrimonial bureaucracy and the national bourgeoisie is resumed. The difference from the Vargas period is that, in the civil-military dictatorship, workers and the poorer population are excluded from the development process, in which the "civil" part that supports the regime is constituted by national economic elites. The "Brazil Great Power Project" and later the II National Development Plan (PND) are part of a process of great economic growth in the country; however, it was accompanied by an increase in social and income inequalities, as well as dependence on external financing. During this period, this autonomist foreign policy no longer frightened national elites, given the weakening of the international communist movement, the stabilization of the Cold War, and the growing gains of the bourgeoisie from Brazilian external partnerships, especially the large national contractors (Campos 2015).

The support of national economic elites to the military regime was therefore an essential element for the stability of the regime. However, since 1977, in the midst of the economic crisis with the release of the April Package³, the authoritarian-modernizing alliance between the military regime and,

3 The April Package consisted of economic tightening measures. In addition, among other

especially, the industrial bourgeoisie began to break down. Hence, a new cycle that would culminate in the “Diretas Já” campaign and democratic transition begins. In addition, international pressures for the end of the military regime emerge, especially due to human rights violations. The United States leads this selective pressure, using international backing to weaken Brazil’s developmental and nationalist policies as a newly industrialized middle power (Sennes 2003).

According to Bresser-Pereira (2015), this new “Popular- Democratic” pact interested all classes except the speculative mercantile bourgeoisie “formed by the old agrarian-mercantile bourgeoisie and the new great bourgeoisie directly dependent on state orders and subsidies, remained authoritarian, along with the small civil and military technobureaucracy in power and minority fractions of all classes ”(Bresser-Pereira 2015: 242). Especially for the economic elites, detachment from the military dictatorship was essential to their new project of power, as they identified that it could only be effective within the framework of a democratic regime. Thus, a new “consensus” emerged in the Brazilian society, based on the maintenance of capitalism, the reduction of economic inequality and the resumption of development. The Citizen Constitution of 1988 is a symbol of this process.

The effects of the successive oil crises (1973 and 1979) and the rise in interest rates in the United States compromised the resumption of development and the reduction of inequalities in Brazil. The Brazilian banking elite, associated and dependent, was not held responsible for the process. From the late 1970s, therefore, the imports substitution model begins to find its limits. The attempts to establish a process of export substitution, seeking greater competitive insertion in the international trade, are interrupted by the advent of neoliberal policies imposed by the hegemonic international financial centers (Silva 2004). With the end of the Cold War, neoliberalism is implemented in Brazil, and more than in any other region of the globe, the Washington Consensus guidelines are very orthodoxly absorbed in Latin American countries. Thus, the neoliberal or “normal⁴” paradigm is marked by the diminishing role of the state, deregulation, loss of universalization and privatization, with profound impacts on national economies to date. The double crisis - high inflation and foreign debt - culminated in successive plans aimed at stabilizing

measures, it restricted congressional action and instituted bionic senators, chosen directly by the government and who would occupy a third of congressional seats.

4 “We want to be normal ”, said Domingo Cavallo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina’s Menem government, whose “normality” would come from compliance with the instructions to eliminate the entrepreneurial state, to privatize foreign enterprises, and to adapt institutions and legislation in such a way as to produce this new regulatory framework (Cervo 2008: 78).

the country, but without counteracting the financial nature of the crisis. Thus, in the 1980s, the prevailing view was that the crisis had been the result of excessive state intervention in the economy. This perspective was in the context of Ronald Reagan's US-led conservative reaction with the support of Margaret Thatcher's United Kingdom, whose implications were gravely manifested in the peripheral countries and the developmental model (Medeiros 2011).

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From the 1990s onwards, Brazil inaugurates a new policy aligned with the globalizing interests of neoliberalism. Under the 1991 agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the country was bound by the Washington Consensus, further opened its economy to foreign capital inflows, lost control of the exchange rate, and pursued neoliberal reforms that had until then been considered unthinkable for Brazil. The government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) had as its main objective the monetary stability of the country, maintaining the neoliberal perspective, through markets, without state interference in the economy. According to Deitos (2012), there is a process of "politicization" of the Brazilian foreign policy from the 1990s, which made room for more direct action by interest groups. A decision-making process common to public policies emerged (subject to the participation of actors, organs and institutions). At the same time, there was a process of "internationalization" of Brazilian foreign policy, due to the need to adapt its mechanisms (especially commercial ones) to the norms of international institutions. In this sense, globalization dilutes the distinction between decisions at the internal or external level as to the effects they generate on interest groups and national elites.

National economic elites, especially industrial and corporate, were severely hampered by this political reorientation. However, it is noteworthy that most of them did not oppose neoliberal displacement due to the ideological belief that they were part of a globalist international movement that would lead to equitable development between nations through markets without state interference in the economy.

When elected in 2002, Lula da Silva launches the Letter to the Brazilian People in response to the fear of foreign investors and the hegemonic

internal bourgeoisie, stating that he would maintain the objectives of the macroeconomic tripod launched from the neoliberal prescription in the Cardoso government (1995-2002). Hence, the maintenance of fiscal surplus, floating exchange rate and controlled inflation targets supported the interests of financial capital through high interest rates and appreciated exchange rates, especially in the first term of the Lula administration (Pochmann 2016; Conti 2015). Added to the macroeconomic tripod are the effects of the Brazilian tax system and the tax evasion equivalent to 25% of the country's GDP as central elements for understanding the dynamics of income inequality and hegemony of financial capital in Brazil (Dowbor 2015).

The conjuncture of rising commodity prices together with rising Chinese demand has allowed the Lula government to give incentives to the exporting fraction (mainly the agricultural business, steel and mining sectors) and allowed for high rates of economic growth despite fiscal austerity measures (Bastos and Lara 2015). In this sense, there is a symbiosis based on the alliance between the interests of Brazilian foreign policy in South American integration, as a platform for a specific project of international insertion of the country, and the interests of the "national champions" companies, which were directed as agents of this foreign policy, while influencing it through lobbying for public tenders. In summary, especially between 2006 and 2010, there was on the one hand a macroeconomic policy aimed at calming financial capital through the macroeconomic tripod, which was compensated, on the other hand, by encouraging productive capital in accordance with a foreign policy that prioritized regional relations.

From 2011, the effects of the international financial crisis started to be felt in Brazil, as in other emerging countries. It ends the period of boom in commodity prices, whose impact on the economy directly affects investments and government subsidies to large national companies. Regarding industry, in particular, the shocks are deeper due to the decrease in credit and in the incentive to domestic consumption (Pochmann 2016). Thus, the growth of Brazilian GDP now occupies a place below the world average for the first time since 2005. The popular manifestations that began in June 2013 are the product of this process, mainly guided by young people from a new middle class wishing to maintain their pace of economic and social progress that had been taking place in the first decade of the 21st century, with incentives for consumption and investment in social programs for access to housing and university (Chauí 2013). However, this social phenomenon (which was initially rejected by the traditional media) is quickly appropriated by a rapidly (re)rising conservative class that no longer felt that their interests were being served by a purported center-left government. It is important to emphasize

here that this is a very complex and unfinished debate within the Brazilian society, since the interests of the dominant economic class never ceased to be allied with the interests of the state, as they mingle and interchange in the shaping of hegemonic capital. However, the ideological aspect of a bourgeoisie that never constituted itself as autonomous and national led to the rejection of Dilma Rousseff's government, mainly because its interests could no longer be met in the same way as in the previous period.

It is therefore assumed that Brazilian economic elites are contradictory, which translates into many moments because they are nationalistic, but when threatened, they resort to the dependence associated with external elites. Thus, to the extent that Brazilian economic elites advocate for greater insertion into the world hegemonic nucleus, the same tends to occur with the international insertion process, even though national governments have more progressive foreign policies, as occurred during the mandates of Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). The same holds true for situations in which these elites demand greater state support with protective measures, as well as for the internationalization of their capitals and conquest of markets - a process that was observed at the end of the Cardoso government (1995-2002), transforming the course of the country's external operations, allowing the inauguration of a more autonomous road.

South Korea's Development Model: Geopolitics, State and Development

South Korea was founded in 1948, three years after the beginning of the occupation of the peninsula by the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The division of the peninsula that was established since this period reflected the geopolitical developments of the end of World War II and nascent rivalry between the US and the USSR. The formation of the South Korean state then proceeded from an external impulse that uniquely links Seoul with the United States.

The Korean Peninsula was colonized by Japan from 1910. Thus, to a large extent, it is due to the anticolonial struggle against Japan that the factors that shape the establishment of division on the Peninsula and the profile of state formation that emerges in 1948 arise. That said, Japanese influence was decisive for the relationship model between the state and the economic elites. The Japanese experience, that established a development model inspired by the Prussian model of industrialization and centered on family conglomerates, *zaibatsus*, served as the basis for the South Korean model, that would

consolidate itself especially from the 1960s on. It should be noted that the main aspect of this model is the oligopolistic profile of these companies and the close relations of these elites with the empire.

The Korean War (1950-1953) served as a space for strategic dispute between superpowers and a kind of rehearsal on how to construct boundaries and constraints on disputes between the USSR and the US. Moreover, the impacts on Korean society in both the South and the North have been devastating and may have been the cornerstone of their societies ever since. It is worth noting that the level of social degradation that the Korean society was facing was increasing during Japanese colonization and reached a peak with the outbreak of war in 1950. The high mortality rate, the sharp increase in migratory flows, the fall in birth rates and the infrastructural devastation were all combined effects of this process (Shin 2001). Added to this is the fact that Japanese colonization structured a contentious society under a strong state, introducing bureaucratic elements imported from the Japanese Empire. The introduction of these elements into Korean society occurred abruptly, as well as the transition to the post-Japanese occupation period.

That is, there was no postcolonial transition, no decolonization from a material point of view, although it did take place formally. In this process, the formation of an independent National State in the Peninsula did not occur. The National Revolution, in this context, was thwarted by the post-World War II systemic imposition and the simultaneous processes of decolonization and national liberation were incorporated into the Cold War dynamics. Thus, state-building in the Korean Peninsula was structured in militarization, from the material point of view, and from the ideological point of view, in the denial of identity between South and North (Scobell 2005).

Shortly after the armistice was determined in 1953, the two Koreas entered a phase of reconstruction. In South Korea, Syngman Rhee remained in power being reelected in 1952 after a wave of repression against his opponents. The United States had taken a rather blatant stance towards South Korea, taking responsibility for national security, operational control, military training, and military supplies (Lee 2006). U.S. support transcended military issues, spilling over into economic and political issues. This was eventually consolidated by the mutual defense treaty, which in addition to keeping Rhee under its umbrella, placed South Korea at the center of its doctrine of containing communism in the region. According to Lee (2006), U.S. financial support to South Korea from 1953–61 amounted to USD 4 billion (USD 2.5 billion in economic assistance and USD 1.5 billion in military aid). This strategic alliance was primarily intended to ensure post-war South Korea's stability by empowering the state so that a weakened government would not be over-

thrown by internal forces or attacked by North Korea.

At that time, the political environment was quite unstable. The death of the main opposition candidate, Chough Pyong Ok⁵, has increased the country's political instability. Thus violent protests against the Rhee administration arose across the country⁶. Given the instability, the U.S. government chose to put pressure on the South Korean regime. Thus, as the situation worsened, internally and externally, Rhee eventually resigned in April 1960, ending the first Korean republic. Following new elections, a constitutional change instituted a parliamentary system. This period, called the Second Republic, lasted a short time. In 1961, the country suffered a coup supported by the U.S.

This coup established General Park Chung Hee as the new president. Shortly after dissolving the National Assembly, he reaffirmed his commitment to the anti-communist flag and announced a five-year economic development program that would make Korea an export platform. He even created the Federation of Korean Industries and provided a low-cost lending system to foster industrialization. This process began the rapid industrialization and South Korean development of the 1960s, and also marked the rise of *chaebols*⁷. Similar to the Japanese *zaibatsus*, they were characterized by large corporate conglomerates controlled by some families and strongly supported by the government (Haggard, Lee and Maxfield 1993). A symbiotic relationship was formed between the state and the economic elites in which the state acts by protecting the country's economy, creating a market reserve and stimulating these companies through government procurement.

This process of industrialization can be defined as the process of National Revolution, with the endogenization of the Decision Center. According to Furtado (1962), the Decision Center is the ability to manage one's own development. When decisions regarding the process of economic development originate externally, the state does not have full sovereignty. In this sense, the enthronement of the economic decision-making process is also a process of strengthening the state (Martins 2008; Furtado 1962). Therefore, the process of industrialization and economic empowerment implemented by Park Chung Hee can be considered a National Revolution. Importantly, the geopolitical context in Asia was favorable for Seoul to adopt a developmental model. Two main aspects favored the consolidation of this model. On the one hand, the rapprochement with the Japanese economy and the establishment of joint

5 Chough Pyong Ok was the leader of the opposition democratic party that led the protests against Rhee.

6 These protests that would culminate in the fall of Rhee are known as the April Revolution.

7 *Chaebols* are species of large industrial conglomerates with diversified businesses.

ventures to enter the U.S. market; on the other, the United States' permissiveness towards this Asian model of development, because of the need for containment of the USSR in the Far East.

It was the beginning of South Korea's economic sovereignty acquisition. The establishment of large national conglomerates and state leadership during this process were the main constraints of the First National Revolution. The Western differentiation between public and private helps little to understand the nature of *chaebols*, since on many occasions the typical functions performed by the state are performed by the conglomerates. In this sense, state and chaebol mix and exchange functions, which characterizes their gestational uniqueness. Although they are subject to private law, they are greatly influenced by state's actions. Here is manifested this homogeneity among the different elites, the military, the political-bureaucratic and the economic-financial elite (Medeiros 2011). This influence derives mainly from the use of public financing through commercial banks that were nationalized by Park. In this way, a kind of industrial leverage was established. If, on the one hand, *chaebols* have easy access to credit, on the other they become more sensitive to government demands. That is, a symbiosis is established between the state and the large conglomerates. From this, Chung Hee adopted a rigorous industrial policy backed by tariff protection and control of foreign direct investment. This hybrid model of associated management of the economy was the basis of the country's heavy industrialization in the 1970s.

This model of fostering and protecting industry is a typification of Asian exceptionalism: a strong, protectionist state leveraging national industrialization⁸. Thus, the partnership model between the state and the *chaebols* is the essence of the pact between elites to control the country's wealth, especially given the family character of these companies (Martins 2008: 146). Park Chung Hee determined a native-style "National Security" doctrine that criminalized all forms of contestation or opposition to the military dictatorship. Even private actions of individuals within private companies could be considered homeland crimes. According to Martins (2008):

The construction of the *chaebols* was done in accordance with the prevailing criteria in public life then: political personalities and their families were in charge of contracts involving government spending. The personalist style

⁸ Visentini (2012) affirms that this model of economic management, based on state strength and accelerated industrialization financed through protectionism, marked the so-called "Asian exceptionalism". With the end of the Cold War, this permissiveness that the U.S. gave its allies in the region ended. Thus, economic liberalization policies were stimulated, which would eventually lead to the Asian crisis of 1997.

of state management was incorporated into companies that mitigated official national security ideology with family values and beliefs. The *chaebols* have acted as an oligarchic organization, but made on a capitalist and entrepreneurial basis. It was basically an agreement between the big landowners to share the country's wealth, controlling its labor and its natural resources. The *chaebol* took the name of the family that ran them and built a layered subcontracting system analogous to the Japanese, with one important difference. In the *chaebols*, affiliated companies belonged to members of the same family and transactions between the various conglomerate companies were decided on these family and patriarchal bases. (Martins 2008: 146).

From the early 1970s, U.S. foreign policy for the region was readjusted. The Nixon Doctrine established greater autonomy for U.S. regional allies. Against the political backdrop of the Vietnam War, the United States promoted a policy of fostering local war industries. Thus, the Allies would play a leading role in ensuring regional defense and security (Nixon 1969). This change in U.S. foreign and security policy for the region has led to the emergence of the formation of a defense industrial complex in South Korea. It is worth noting that this new outlook has allowed some of the government's demands for weapons (assault rifles, howitzers, etc.) to be passed on to the *chaebols*. This denotes the importance of military purchases for the consolidation of conglomerates. For the United States, in strategic terms, it was important to establish a regional security plan that unites South Korea and Japan. In this sense, Park Chung Hee became viable, since he finally pushed foreign policy away from the anti-Japanese standard. Thus, in 1965, both countries signed the Treaty of Basic Relations. This treaty established diplomatic relations between the two countries and foresaw cooperation in the economic area.

The late 1960s were marked by the U.S. crisis in Vietnam and the onset of an economic crisis that would culminate in the end of the gold standard in 1971. This global outlook had destabilizing effects on the relationship between the two Koreas and their main allies. With the arrival of Richard Nixon (1969-1974) in power in the United States and the adoption of the Guam Doctrine⁹ - which established an American disengagement in Asia - the systemic pressures that restricted the approach between Asian countries eased dramatically. Given this new context, they expanded investment in regional

⁹ The Guam Doctrine or Nixon Doctrine was launched in 1969 by then President Richard Nixon. In his speech, Nixon argued for U.S. regional allies to take a more active role in funding their own defense. Thus, the U.S. gave up its role as security provider for its allies. In this context, regional allies expanded their ability to develop their own war industries, as U.S. companies were meeting demands from the armed forces operating in Vietnam.

initiatives that eventually reshaped the configuration of the Asian interstate system. The Nixon doctrine sought to establish a regional architecture that would grant more power to U.S. allies. Thus, U.S. responsibility for providing the defense would diminish and the U.S. would have lower maintenance costs than those of the 1960s containment doctrine. This new outlook has dampened the dizzying growth of the South Korean economy as it now had to bear the costs of its own defense. This was reflected in the 1971 elections, in which South Korean President Park Chung Hee did not win as significant a victory as he had in the previous elections.

Carter's election to the U.S. presidency brought some challenges to Park Chung Hee's government. Firstly, he announced the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and increased pressure for investigations into the "Koreagate" case¹⁰ for measures to combat political mischief and human rights abuses. Increasing U.S. pressure on Korea came from the need to bring South Korea closer to China. In addition, it was a clear reaction to the nationalization process of war production and the nuclear program developed by Park Chung Hee. External pressures for greater transparency and human rights are part of the Carter administration's stance of not allowing the allied political regimes to be exceptional. It is noteworthy that the launch of the Nixon doctrine gave greater autonomy to the allies. South Korea adopted an ambitious military program, including the development of a nuclear program. With the changing global geopolitical context, dictatorial regimes that took a more nationalistic stance, such as South Korea, came under pressure through allegations of human rights violations. In this sense, the United States has used human rights as a means to pressure Asian Allied governments (a similar process occurred in Latin America) to move away from the chauvinistic path and abandon national development programs. With increasing external pressure, resistance movements to the dictatorial regime of South Korea began to emerge. This led Park to enact martial law in October 1972 - marking the beginning of the fourth South Korean republic¹¹. The concessions, however, did not prevent the country's political situation from escalating. Thus, in 1979, President Park was assassinated¹².

¹⁰ The Koreagate case is a scandal involving South Korean politicians who allegedly bribed U.S. lawmakers to vote in favor of Korean interests. This was one of the causes of the non-withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea during the Nixon administration.

¹¹ This period is also known as Yushin.

¹² There are indications that the assassination of President Park may have been committed by a South Korean intelligence agent in collaboration with the United States. However, there is no definitive proof of this link (Hyung-A 2004).

Following the assassination of Park Chung Hee, a coup led to power Chun Doo Hwan¹³; which practically maintained Park's most aggressive policy - martial law was maintained, and he continued to harass political opponents. However, it was taken a growth resumption stance based on stricter monetary laws and lower interest rates that have contributed to price stability and the emergence of a new economic boom. This boom took place especially in the semiconductor, electronics and auto industries. These industries were able to grow thanks to international loans and the cheap labor they used. It should be noted that the monetarist policy sacrificed the basic industry, especially the steel and petrochemical industries. In addition, the South Korean country begun the process of political redemocratization. Protests increased over the decade, and the risk of escalating repressive violence concerned mainly the United States. Even economic growth rates were not enough to cool discontent with the authoritarian regime that had been perpetuating since Park Chung Hee's rule. In this context, Reagan appeared as an interlocutor between the Chun government and the main opposition leaders. Following a sequence of political developments, the opposition split, the government managed to control the electoral process and elected a candidate for the situation: Roh Tae Woo (Pike 2010).

This political transformation in South Korea in the late 1980s had two implications: the pressure for democratization and liberalization of the country's economy. It is noted here that the Cold War's disruption allowed the United States to pressure its Asian allies to determine the end of the exceptional development model that had allowed the region to consolidate itself as a new dynamic core of the world economy. Inserted in this context, Roh Tae Woo's government (1988-1993) adopted austerity measures. Thus, as in the Brazilian case, South Korea sought to adapt to the neoliberal prescription and implemented deregulatory and liberalizing measures. However, the geopolitical context at that time limited Seoul's ability to maintain an autonomist strategy. In this regard, factors limiting this strategy were Japan's economic stagnation and international pressure on China.

The policy of economic liberalization was revised after the drastic effects of the 1997 Asian crisis. Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) was the first opposition South Korean president to take office since the country's formation. Jung had to resort to the IMF to seek to stabilize South Korea's faltering economy, and eventually adopted restrictive measures that could curb the breakdown of the *chaebol*-led economy.

¹³ Chun Doo Hwan was a South Korean army general with strong U.S. support. His government was strongly committed to the overhaul of the industrializing project promoted by former president Park.

In 1996, South Korea was included in the list of member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This was a glimpse of the economic strength experienced by the country, reached after two economic miracles. However, the 1997 crisis eventually highlighted some remaining bottlenecks in the economy, such as the inefficiency of the financial and banking system and the lack of dynamism of the *chaebols*. This scenario eventually alienated foreign direct investment, which was the basis for the annual development of about 7% (Noland 2007). More than that, complete liberalization has made the country vulnerable to speculative attacks.

To remedy the situation, Kim opted for a restructuring of the *chaebols* to streamline the axis of the South Korean economy. This restructuring was based on increasing the transparency of conglomerate management, increasing the capital structure of firms and expanding accountability in administrative control. In addition, the reform sought to prohibit financial capital from dominating industry, to suppress circular investment and illegal transactions between conglomerate affiliates, and to prevent illegal “inheritance” for *chaebol* heirs (Yanagimachi 2004). These changes reached the heart of the South Korean economy as well as one of the major groups of political influence. The conglomerate crisis, which had been the basis of the previous economic booms, stemmed from the concentrated and non-dynamic management of family businesses. Table 1 shows the largest companies by sector in the late 1990s and the family concentration that existed in that country’s economy.

Table 1 - Largest Companies by Economy Sector of South Korea in the late 1990s

Economy Sector	Companies
Oil Refinery	Hyundai Oil Refinery
Semiconductors	Hyundai Electronics
Train Production	Hyundai Mobis
Aerospace	Samsung Aerospace, Daewoo Industries and Hyundai Space & Aircraft
Energy Generation	Samsung Heavy Industries and Hyundai Heavy Industries
Marine Engines	Samsung Heavy Industries
Petrochemical	Samsung General Chemicals and Hyundai Petrochemicals
Automotive and Electronics	Hyundai Co., Samsung Motors, Daewoo Electronics and LG Electronics

Source: Adaptation of Kim (2004).

Given the importance of conglomerates, Kim Dae Jung sought to leverage the country's economy by resuming government procurement. In this phase, the South Korean government established a kind of military Keynesianism, aimed at reheating the country's productive capacity on the one hand and, on the other, ensuring dissuasive capabilities at the regional level.

In the 2007 elections, the Lee Myung-Bak government (2008-2013) won popular approval to grant him legitimacy to conduct Korean politics under his party's program. It was the fall of the model established by the government of Kim Dae Jung. Economically, Lee proposed a package of reforms that would make Korea the seventh most powerful economy on the planet, adopted measures to stabilize social welfare, and create economic robustness to address potential global crisis¹⁴. To this end, it sought to strengthen South Korean relations with various partners around the world, beginning to establish policies of bilateral cooperation and free trade agreements. Thus, agreements with Australia, Indonesia, Iraq¹⁵ were signed, as well as others such as the European Union and the United States. The policy of bilateral agreements was aimed at expanding the range of opportunities for South Korean conglomerates. It was the resumption of the quest for uncontested alignment with the United States and the abandonment of military Keynesianism responsible for leveraging economic growth in the late 1990s.

The 2009 year brought the reflexes of the world crisis started in the previous year. Lee's government responded by drastically cutting interest rates to evade the economic downturn prognosis – which hadn't happened for ten years - that haunted the South Korean economy. The U.S. Free Trade Agreement with South Korea is the largest of its kind ever signed by the U.S. - and would bring the countries' trade to about USD 11 billion (Cha 2012). In addition to the economic implications, the agreement has strategic impacts as it broadens the scope of relations between the two countries - significantly crossing the boundaries of the military alliance of more than half a century.

The Saenuri Party's election of Park Geun-Hye in 2012 represented a change in the globalist policy adopted by its predecessor Lee Myung-Bak (2008-2013), whose government was marked by undisputed alignment with the U.S. Although belonging to the same party as her predecessor, the president has adopted a new profile of international insertion, based on the view that there is an "Asian Paradox". This paradox concerns the growing econom-

¹⁴ This Lee economic plan, known as the "747 Plan", sought to achieve annual economic growth of 7% and a per capita income of USD 40.000 (Joo 2008).

¹⁵ The deal with Iraq provided for the USD 3 billion flow in exchange for gas and oil supplies (Moon 2009).

ic interdependence between the countries of the region and the growing distrust and rivalries at the political-security level (Snyder 2016).

The president, who is the daughter of former President Park Chung-Hee, aimed to regain the competitive ability of the *chaebols*. Therefore, a foreign policy aimed at opening markets was adopted. At the regional level, competitiveness with Japan led the country to tighten regional relations. Once again, the symbiosis between the *chaebols* and the state helped determine the direction of foreign policy as well. Symbol of this process is Park's quest to get closer to China, a strategic market in the Samsung-Apple competition.

Since 2015, the president began to face increasing pressure from the United States and allegations of corruption. The political crisis has also had an effect on the *chaebols*. Samsung, one of the leading and most significant companies within the Korean conglomerates, has been hit hard by having its vice president involved in this corruption scandal. The company, which in 2015 had revenues of USD 177.355 billion (equivalent to 12.6% of South Korea's GDP that year), had four executives besides vice president Lee Jae-Yong, indicted for corruption (Forbes 2017). Following the announcement that the *chaebols* vice president and heir had been arrested for taking part in the scandal, the South Korean giant's share price closed at a steep low (Ians 2017; McCurry 2017). In addition, due to their involvement in the corruption scandal, *chaebols* are now facing serious difficulties, which, combined with the competitiveness of world trade, presents a scenario that is not conducive to growth in exports and, consequently, to GDP growth (Fendos 2016). Thus, the global economic crisis affected, as in the Brazilian case, the resumption of the economy of the Asian country.

The involvement of the daughter of one of the country's leading economic modernization leaders, as well as the companies that rose with the South Korean rapid industrialization and development process, puts this development project proposed in the 1960s in check. Koreans expect greater transparency to be seen within the *chaebols* as much of the public outrage that went to the streets clamoring for Park's impeachment was channeled directly to the conglomerates (Manning 2017). This disruption, which directly affects the pillars of the alliance between the government and the South Korean conglomerates, is a cause for concern and uncertainty about the future of South Korea. Especially when looking at this internal panorama from the perspective of the current regional situation. Thus, it is observed that the impetus for the crisis of the state-centered development model is mostly external. In comparative terms, it can be said that the role of South Korean national elites in the disruption of the Keynesian model was reduced compared to Brazil. To a large extent, in South Korea, the industrial-financial elites were the state,

whose relations were forged in the construction of the postwar Korean development model. The colonial past cemented different relations of alignment to the hegemonic center than those built over more than three centuries in Brazil.

Final Remarks

The tendency from the 1980s onwards was to attribute to state intervention the failure of developmentalism. The South Korean case demystifies this consensus. What really changes is the quality of the interventionist state, not its existence (which was common to developing countries). South Korea has induced the local industry with great efficiency and productivity, having made a similar kind of intervention for the same purposes as the other developmental countries. Despite the same orientation towards industrialization, there were significant differences in capacity. Internal consistency and the ability to derive private sector performance - not only by granting subsidies but also by setting standards, monitoring and influencing investments - is what set South Korea apart. However, the success of the state-*chaebol* alliance in South Korea and the building of greater state and institutional capacity - which led to the success of a cohesive developmental state - was only possible due to the geopolitical conjuncture and internal factors that make this model a singular case. The very context of the birth of the country as a result of war determines its further development. The strategic geographical position, the lack of natural resources and the size of the country are geopolitical elements that add to the foreign aid (United States and Japan) and the establishment of an authoritarian regime as factors that encourage industrialization. The export-led model, in this sense, was crucial to the very survival of a state of war that could induce industrialization more sustainably than other developing countries. In this sense, it is the fortune of the Korean state that determines the virtù of its development process.

The failure to promote the developmental state in Brazil was due to the lack of state capacity to discipline domestic enterprises, making the state itself a victim of neoliberal pressure. For Chibber (2003), conflicts in building state capacity do not occur within the state, but between the state and social actors, especially the bourgeoisie. Thus, managing state's agenda in Brazil was thwarted by a well-organized offensive undertaken by national capitalists, while South Korea managed to protect itself from this process through the symbiosis between the developmental state and the bourgeois class, which faced the export of industrialized goods as the only way to survive in the geopolitical context. The South Korean process has led to greater autonomy for

the creation of political and economic institutions for the same development project, while Brazil has always had to deal with further fragmentation of interests of a multi-class society.

The first U.S. measure following the creation of the South Korean state was to encourage land reform in the Asian country. Thus, the power of the agrarian class is dissolved, generating greater internal cohesion through a block of interests hegemonized by productive capital. The structure of property determines political power, not production. In Brazil, developmentalism maintained the traditional primary-export structures, retaining decentralized political power and greater heterogeneity of interests. In this sense, the difference from the South Korean case is that industrialization proceeds from an organized state based on the affirmation of industrial groups. A cohesive capitalist state assumes that pre-existing non-industrial ruling classes lose power and influence because their assets are expropriated. However, this inertia of the state can only be broken through factors of violence, such as wars, revolutions and major crises, which generate significant distributive change or the collapse of the state itself. A break is needed for profound institutional changes, and the 1930 Revolution in Brazil was the closest the country has come to this phenomenon. However, due to the maintenance of traditional power structures, it has never been possible to match the South Korean model, whose state-bourgeois relationship has displaced the process of industrial development.

The state-building project is critically mediated by the nature of state-capitalist relations, which, in turn, are conditioned by the development model adopted. In the import substitution model, the capitalist class resists any attempt at discipline, unlike export-led industrialization, which is more dependent on state intervention. This process did not occur automatically, as an unintentional evolution in the value added level of the production base. Since the process of capitalist development stems from innovation; political, economic and institutional conditions that demand state action are required. The state, in this sense, is the bearer of a project that does not yet exist in the constituted interests. In other words, in capitalist dynamics, there is no spontaneous bias for innovation, and only for profit (Hobsbawm 2010). The State is the actor able to create the circumstances that induce non-existent or unconsolidated strategic sectors, otherwise the tendency is to maintain the productive order, as the agrarian-oligarchic sector in the Brazilian case. However, the state is an arena of constant dispute, not an autonomous unit that embodies a national interest. Therefore, in order to induce a process of social transformation, political support and the establishment of a new pact of domination are required.

The recent political transformations experienced by South Korea and Brazil, once again, bring together the trajectories of the two countries, in spite of the distinctions presented here. President Park Geun-Hye's and President Dilma Rousseff's impeachment processes include both countries in the list of geopolitical changes that have been deepening in the world over the past decade. Interestingly, the two processes directly affect the development model of both countries, centered on major national champion companies - in Brazil, the oil complex and the contractors; in South Korea, the *chaebols*. If in South Korea this movement is unprecedented, at least in magnitude, in Brazil, it reflects a historical process of dispute over the economic model.

Finally, it should be noted that the analysis of South Korean development has been a reference for the Brazilian experience. However, although there are similarities, especially in the contemporary context, the differences stand out. The geopolitical context was decisive for the evolution of each of the models. More than that, it is important to highlight the effects of the colonization model on the state profile that was consolidated after the independence of each country. The elite pact and the social pact signed in each state were shaped in totally different contexts. The experience of the South Korean state, in the context of U.S. strategy, could not fail. Therefore, there was greater permissiveness to the development model and external support to the country. Thus, what stands out from the South Korean experience in relation to the Brazilian case is the importance of the state as a demiurge of a process of national revolution and of leveraging the development process.

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ABSTRACT

Since the 1990s, many analysts have sought to explain the differences in development paths between Brazil and South Korea, the latter often being pointed as an example of success. As a highly industrialized economy focused on international trade, the South Korean case stood out as a way of overcoming the backwardness of developing countries. However, there is a need for analysis that point to the specificities of the developmental state in South Korea, whose interventionist action was decisive in leveraging the country's industrial production in accordance with internal business groups, as well as the geopolitical context favorable to outward-oriented industrialization. The Brazilian process, in turn, due to the wealth of natural resources and the large domestic market, has made the induction of the state in industrialization more artificial, whose policy supposes an element of coercion, induction and control. This research, therefore, seeks to analyze the specific dimensions of each case, highlighting the role of the state and its relationship with the internal bourgeoisie in the construction of an industrial policy. The trajectories of rise and decline of Brazilian and South Korean developmental state will be analyzed, including the current crisis of reconfiguration of political power that both countries are going through.

KEYWORDS

Brazil; South Korea; Developmentalism.

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TRUMP'S "DEAL OF THE CENTURY" AND THE LATIN AMERICAN RESPONSE

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Introduction

The current conflicts in the Middle East, around Yemen, Syria and Iraq, as well as the tensions with Iran and the internal crisis in Lebanon, have been favoring Israel's positions in the region in the face of the weakening of the Arab consensus to confront the offensives of the imperialist countries - United States of America (USA) and their European allies. In this regard, the war in Syria, which aimed to overthrow the government of Bashar al-Assad in order to boost the US agenda of a new Middle East, failed overwhelmingly.

During the years of the so-called "Arab Spring" and in the course of the war in Syria, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict took a back seat, as a sign that the priorities were not set to resolve these discrepancies but to continue delaying the process of peace in the Levant. This strategy practically paralyzed the negotiations, putting them on the verge of disappearance. Meanwhile, Israel continues with its expansionist policy, with the construction of new settlements in the West Bank, and the population of Gaza is subjected to a permanent blockade by air, sea and land, by the Israeli army, restricting the free movement of its residents as well as the sending of humanitarian aid.

The failure to implement the various peace agreements, since the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the "Oslo Accords" of 1993, has shown the little commitment on the part of the Zionist regime and its American ally to apply them. Since the signing of the "Declaration of Principles" of September 13, 1993 in Washington, the first formal commitment between the Jewish State and the PLO, there were only a few advance in the establishment of a system of Palestinian self-government in Ramallah through direct elections of the leaders who would lead the Palestinian National Authority (PNA): representative of the Palestinians in international forums. The con-

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trol of the Palestinian authorities in some areas was also determined, but the most important aspects: return to the 1967 borders, the return of the Palestinian refugees and the formation of the State with capital in East Jerusalem, were supposedly left for successive "agreements".

The legal framework of the peace process has been reconfigured with the arrival of others US administrations without taking into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, who face the systematic dispossession of their lands in complicity with most of the international community. Twenty-five years after Oslo, the situation for the Palestinians continues in sharp decline, without diminishing their capacity to resist the Zionist occupation.

At the multilateral level, the negotiation process has also been torpedoed by the United States, by making repeated use of its right the veto in the Security Council to oppose any resolution that affects the interests of Israel with respect to the conflict with the Palestinians. In this sense, there have been dozens of resolutions passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations and its Security Council that have not been applied, precisely, by the positions of Israel, USA and their European allies.

However, a significant moment in the international arena was the recognition by the UN of Palestine as a "non-member observer State" at the end of 2012. This new situation made it possible for the Palestinian authorities to intervene in the debates of the General Assembly as well as to integrate the different agencies of the United Nations system and other international organizations. Almost 70% of the members of the UN General Assembly (135 of 192) recognize Palestine as a State, despite the obstinacy of the USA and Israel.

The Trump-Netanyahu binomial: the US-Israeli alliance strengthens

The presidential victory of the Republican Donald Trump, against the forecasts of the majority of the analysts, modified the main tendencies of the foreign policy of the United States: the exit of the nuclear agreement with Iran, the commercial "war" with China, the rhetoric against the progressive governments in Latin America, among other elements of their twitter-politics. Towards the Middle East, one of the most significant aspects has been the strengthening of the strategic alliance with Israel, its positions against the government of Syria, the relations with Saudi Arabia and the attacks against Iran: all within the framework of the war against terrorism.

Undoubtedly, Israel is the nucleus of its projection towards the Middle

East, to contain the “enemies” of the United States and to work the “alliance” with its economic partners and regional allies. Israel continues to be one of the largest recipients of US aid, mainly in the area of subsidies for access to advanced military weapons. Annually, this military aid is about 3.1 billion dollars and by 2019, it would increase to 3.8 billion.

In this sense, the Trump administration wants to present itself as the fundamental actor in the “solution” of the Palestinian conflict, imposing its precepts and conceptions so that the Palestinians accept a peace plan that only benefits USA and Israel. The steps taken by the current Republican administration have the objective of annihilating the Palestinian cause, not recognizing the rights and the historical demands of this people, even if it has to go over dozens of UN resolutions and declarations of international leaders.

One of the first actions carried out by the US in order to intensify its relations with Israel was its recognition of the historic city of Jerusalem as the capital of this country, a city that since the Ottoman Turkish Empire, has enjoyed a special status, due to the confluence of the three main monotheistic religions and places of coexistence among these beliefs. This occurred precisely in the context of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the State of Israel. In this way, the US government violated all the resolutions and agreements adopted with respect to maintaining the status quo in Jerusalem.

The announcement was made on December 6, 2017 followed by a strong rejection by a good part of the international community. This news was very well received by the Zionist authorities who expected that a dozen other countries would also do the same and support the actions of Washington. In the case of European capitals, none of their governments endorsed such a decision, but on the contrary, it provoked criticism from the main authorities of the European Union (EU). Despite the international rejection, the United States took the matter to the United Nations and despite receiving an almost unanimous rejection of the States present there, on May 14, 2018, they transfer its Embassy to Jerusalem, occupying the building that housed the American consulate in the Arnoma neighborhood. A large delegation headed by Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin attended the opening ceremony.

The US administration has continued its policy of pressure against Palestinian leaders. One of his last actions was the closing of the PLO office - which contains various Palestinian groups - in Washington, in September 2018. The justification for this action was, according to the State Department, that the PLO leaders had condemned the peace plan proposed by USA, without they had seen it and that they refused to work with the US government.

The international repercussion was immediate. The Secretary General of the Executive Committee of the PLO, Saeb Erekat, described the decision

as deliberate². Meanwhile, HossamBadran, a member of the Political Bureau of Hamas Movement, considered this action as a manifestation that the negotiation process had reached a dead point³. The Palestinian ambassador in Washington HusamZomlot, condemned, in the strongest terms, the decision of the US administration to close the Palestinian mission to the United States.

As a result of the denunciation that the ANP made in May 2018, against Israel before the International Criminal Court (ICC), for the settlements and the death of hundreds of Palestinians, the White House National Security Advisor, John Bolton, also threatened sanctions against the ICC if it decided to investigate the United States or Israel for issues related to Palestine⁴. In this regard, he referred to sanctioning the funds of the ICC in the USA and to prohibit the entry into the country of its judges and prosecutors. But the threats were also made against any company or other states that cooperated in an ICC investigation against Americans, in a clear allusion to violating international law.

The punitive actions were not only in this plane. In order to strengthen its positions vis-à-vis the Palestinians, the United States also closed the funds allocated to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). The funds were valued at some \$ 200 million aimed at offering humanitarian aid for the 5 million Palestinians in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip. During a meeting of the Arab League (LA) held in Cairo, Palestinian Foreign Minister Riad al-Maliki said that the Trump administration had launched an attack on the Palestinian people and international law, by canceling funds to UNRWA.

Once again, the discursive rhetoric referred to the fact that as long as Hamas controlled the Gaza Strip, the funding for that Agency would not be resumed⁵. Of course, the government of Benjamin Netanyahu supported this provision and welcomed the decision of the United States to close the Palestinian representation in Washington.

2 See: *Washington Officially Announces the Closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Office*. September 11, 2018. Available in: <http://www.en.syria-scope.com/political-news/85848>

3 See: *Hamas: The Closure of The Headquarters of The PLO in Washington Confirms The Failure of The Settlement Process*. September 11, 2018. Available in: <http://www.en.syria-scope.com/palestine-news/85843>

4 See: *La Casa Blanca amenazará con sanciones a la CPI si investiga a EE.UU o Israel*. Agencia EFE, 10 de septiembre de 2018. Available in: <https://es.noticias.yahoo.com/casa-blanca-amenazar%C3%A1-sanciones-cpi-investiga-ee-uu-161823957.html>

5 See: *US cuts to UN refugee agency an 'attack on Palestinians & international law'*. Palestinian FM, 11 de septiembre de 2018. Available in: <https://www.rt.com/news/438179-trump-attack-palestinians-funding/>

All these measures against the authorities and the Palestinian people have only reinforced and reaffirmed the positions of total alignment of the White House with Israel. They also acted in retaliation for the Palestinian decision to sue Israel before the ICC for the construction and expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem. These acts confirm that the Donald Trump government is committed to protecting Israel from its unlawful acts, not promoting the two-State solution and eliminating any possibility of condemning Israel for violating the human rights of the Palestinian people⁶.

What has been expressed up to now is part of the set of pressures that the Trump administration are implementing both at the international level - threats against the ICC and against governments that do not support them in their resolutions at the UN - and against the Palestinian authorities, to force them to accept its arbitrary and tax peace agreement known as the “new deal of the century “ that excludes the demands sustained by the Palestinian side and reinforces Israel’s positions.

Donald Trump and his unilateral “new deal of the century”

The agreements discussed, signed and ratified through the mediation of the different international actors have not been effective in solving the historic conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, rather, they have contributed to the strengthening of Israel’s positions. In this sense, the new US proposal introduces additional elements that seek to find a solution that benefits Israel even more. This agreement comes in a regional context characterized by the defeat of Western plans to use terrorist groups to divide and weaken the Middle East.

This agreement, which has its antecedents in old Zionist aspirations such as the Alon plan and the Yinón Plan, seeks to divide the West Bank and unite what remains with Gaza and Jordan to create a Palestinian-Jordanian “State”. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas revealed that the US negotiating team offered him a plan based on a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. This is not a completely new idea as stated Jamal Amal, Professor of Political Theory at the University of Tel Aviv. However, Abbas argued that the administrative implications of the plan proposed by the Americans were not precise or what level of autonomy the Palestinian state would have under a confeder-

6 See: Rafael Mathus Ruiz. *Nuevo golpe de Trump al proceso de paz en Medio Oriente: ordenó el cierre de la oficina de la OLP*. Washington, 11 de septiembre de 2018. Available in: <https://es.noticias.yahoo.com/golpe-trump-proceso-paz-medio-o52330433.html>

ation with Jordan and insisted that it rejected the offer as long as Israel was not part of that "confederation"⁷.

The announcement of this plan was made by Donald Trump's main advisers for the Middle East region: his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his assistant for international affairs Jason Greenblatt - former vice president of the Trump Organization - who had been working on it since the spring of 2017. One of the objectives of the last trip made by Kushner to the region, in which he also visited Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, was to finalize the details of the draft peace plan with Saudi and Qatari leaders. Neither Kushner nor the American envoy Jason Greenblatt met with Abbas or other Palestinian officials during that trip. US rhetoric continues to question the Palestinian president's ability to achieve peace, blaming him for the deterioration of the situation in Gaza.

To date (October 2018) the details of the agreement proposed by Trump remain imprecise. It was stated that during his speech before the United States, Trump would announce his proposal for peace for the Middle East, however, the official revelation of it was postponed after the midterm elections in the United States. This has not made it impossible for some of the ideas conceived to have infiltrated the press. At the same time, the actions of the United States during the first year of Trump arose that the plan is already being applied step by step by Israel and its allies or at least the scenario is being prepared for its future assimilation by the United States and the international community.

The main points proposed by the plan would be the following:

- **Annexation of the Gaza Strip by Egypt⁸:** this would be done in exchange for ambitious economic investments both there and in the north of the Sinai, financed mainly by the Sunni Gulf countries. In this sense, the population of the Strip could work on infrastructure projects in northern Egyptian Sinai such as solar plants, desalination plants and several industrial corridors. The plan does not specify if they could live in this Egyptian region bordering Gaza. In this way, the Gaza Strip would be granted a "special status" before eventually linking it to Egypt.

7 See: Maya Siminovich. *El presidente palestino revela que EE UU le propuso formar una confederación con Jordania*. EFE, 3 de septiembre de 2018. Available in: <https://www.20minutos.es/noticia/3429056/0/eeuu-propuso-abas-confederacion-jordania/#xtor=AD-15&xts=467263>

8 This idea of using the Egyptian region of Sinai is not entirely new. The Republican administration of George W. Bush had raised to the Egyptian president and ally among the Arabs, Hosni Mubarak, the cession to Gaza of a third of the territory of the North of Sinai, a question that has been opposed by successive Egyptian governments.

- **Annexation of Jerusalem:** The recognition of the Palestinian neighborhoods of Jerusalem that remained outside the walls after 2004, as the potential capital of a future Palestinian State, while those that remain intramural -including the old city and adjoining neighborhoods, but also other peripheral enclaves- would remain under Israeli jurisdiction. The condition of indivisibility of Jerusalem was included in the Basic Law of Nationality approved by the Knesset, which consecrates the holy city as the unique capital of Israel.

In short: Jerusalem would be recognized as the capital of Israel, while a suburb of Jerusalem, probably the Arab city of Abu Dis, would serve as the administrative capital of Palestine. These two events: the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the approval of the law of the “Jewish nation state” clearly indicate the partial implementation of said agreement.

- **Annexation of the Jordan Valley:** Israel would unilaterally annex 50% of the West Bank (including the prosperous Jordan Valley and accesses to the Dead Sea) and instead grant citizenship to the Palestinians and Bedouins residing there (which is why Israel tries to evacuate Bedouin settlements in the area). The maximum possible territory would be annexed with the minimum population necessary to make it acceptable to the international community.

In this way, Israel would have military control of the West Bank of the Jordan River Valley and would annex large portions of the settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, now under the legal umbrella offered by the law of the “Jewish nation state” to continue stealing new lands from the Palestinians. This stance is contrary to that raised by the Obama administration, when it advocated a progressive return of the Jordan Valley to the Palestinians and a joint exploitation of the resources of the Dead Sea.

- **Annexation of other territories in the eastern part of Israel:** in line with the Israeli national security doctrine, the Trump administration also demands the annexation of areas that are equal to the cities of Netanya, on the Israeli side and Tulkarem, in the Palestinian, where there are large blocks of settlements such as Ariel, which would go to Israel.

- **Return of Palestinian refugees:** the US proposal will advocate for refugees who wish to “return” to the emerging and very small Palestinian state; and that the host countries -Jordania, Lebanon and Syria, but also the monarchies of the Persian Gulf- nationalize them and make them citizens in exchange for economic aid. In this way, the Palestinians would give up returning to their lands. While the emigration of Jews from all over the world is encouraged, Palestinian refugees do not have the same right.

- **Borders:** the borders between what would be left of Palestine and Israel would be fixed later. This plan abandons the possibility of returning to the 1967 borders.

- **Displacement of Palestinians:** Israel would have control over the movement of Palestinians between the Gaza Strip and those left in the small West Bank. A corridor would be created between the Palestinian territory and the sacred sites in Jerusalem.

Four Arab countries guaranteed support for this agreement: Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. However, the Arab reactions have been very controversial, on the one hand Saudi King Salman warned that he would withdraw his support if the Palestinians did not receive the eastern part of Jerusalem in line with the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, which demanded the return to the 1967 borders and the Palestinian character of East Jerusalem.

According to CengizTomar, Dean of the Department of Political Science of the University of Marmara and Director of the Center for Palestinian Studies of that institute, with respect to Palestine there are two groups: the "The Southern Block", composed of the United States, the Gulf States and Egypt, which is in total disagreement with the "The Northern Bloc", consisting of Turkey, Russia and Iran. In this regard, the professor points out how the countries that are most hostile to Iran and that support the US sanctions against Tehran, are the same ones that approve Trump's "deal of the century", while Turkey, which opposes the sanctions of the United States, which has always supported the Palestinian cause, continues to be a thorn in the side of the US and Israel, which is why Washington increased the pressure on Ankara⁹.

According to Ana Garralda, with this plan, the United States managed to reduce Palestine to a mere "Autonomy Plus", without territorial contiguity, economic viability or the minimum level of sovereignty to be considered a State, finally burying the two-State model defended by all administrations previous Americans¹⁰.

The plan of the Yankee-Zionist-Arab century is certainly not a peace plan for the Palestinians, nor is its primary objective to improve the socio-economic situation of its population, but it is an integral part of a much more ambitious project that, together to the division of Syria as part of the Balkanization of the Middle East, is aimed at securing the conditions for Israel to become a regional power¹¹.

9 Cengiz Tomar. "El Acuerdo del Siglo" de Trump y el fin de los días. Agencia Anadolu, 4 de agosto de 2018. Available in: <https://www.aa.com.tr/es/an%C3%A1lisis/el-acuerdo-del-siglo-de-trump-y-el-fin-de-los-22731>

10 See: Ana Garralda. *El inaceptable "acuerdo del siglo" de Donald Trump*. Estudios de Política Exterior, 3 de agosto de 2018. Available in: <http://cpalsocial.org/el-inaceptable-acuerdo-del-siglo-de-donald-trump-2444>

11 See: Nicola Hadwa y Silvia Domenech. *El acuerdo del siglo, máxima hipocresía y mínimo de*

There has been a strong synergy between the steps taken by the new US administration and the measures that Israel implements. This indicates that there is a clear Israeli-American complicity in applying the main aspects of Trump's proposed plan in an overlapping and systematic manner.

The Palestinian authorities in the Muqata, the administrative headquarters of the Palestinian Authority, have opposed this "new" Yankee initiative, while they have discredited US mediation since the US decided to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. For these reasons, the president of the PNA, Mahmoud Abbas, has reiterated his rejection of Trump's "deal of the century" because, in his opinion, "it is aimed at liquidating the Palestinian cause." For this reasons the deal has met with the objections of the Palestinian side.

Latin America and Palestine: between US pressures and the relations with Israel

The Palestinian cause has also had an important support base from Latin America, especially through the work of dozens of civil society organizations, solidarity groups with Palestine and even some Latin American governments. In this relationship, Cuba has been the country that has uninterruptedly maintained its bonds of brotherhood with the Palestinian cause.

Within the Latin American context, several milestones could be mentioned in that relationship of solidarity and brotherhood. An important date in this regard was the "Meeting of the United Nations for Latin America and the Caribbean in support of the Israeli-Palestinian peace" that took place in March 2011 in Montevideo, the Uruguayan capital. One of its objectives was to define how the countries of Latin America could contribute to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This event also coincided with the diplomatic campaign developed by the ANP to obtain the recognition of the State of Palestine with the borders prior to the Six Day War and with East Jerusalem as its capital. This process, which had begun in 2009, culminated on September 23, 2011 with the formalization by Mahmud Abbas on behalf of the PLO of his membership in the UN.

Latin American countries that recognize the State of Palestine

Country	Recognition date
Cuba	November 16, 1988
Nicaragua	November 16, 1988
Paraguay	March 25, 2005
Costa Rica	February 5, 2008
Venezuela	April 27, 2009
Dominican Republic	July 14 , 2009
Brazil	December 1 st , 2010
Argentina	December 6, 2010
Bolivia	Decembr 17, 2010
Ecuador	December 24, 2010
Chile	January 7, 2011
Guyana	January 14, 2011
Peru	January 24, 2011
Suriname	February 1 st , 2011
Uruguay	March 15, 2011
El Salvador	August 25, 2011
Honduras	August 26, 2011
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	August 29, 2011
Belize	September 9, 2011
Dominica	September 19, 2011
Guatemala	April 9, 2013
Colombia	August 3, 2018

In January 2011, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Paraguay issued a written reaffirmation of the recognition by its government of the State of Palestine. At the same time, a dozen Latin American countries recognized the State of Palestine during the course of 2011. Previously, they had already done so throughout 2010: Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador, which were among the progressive Latin American countries of the moment. The recognition of Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador specified that it was within the 1967 borders, while Chile, Peru and Uruguay did not include details on the borders. In this way, more than 100 nations added that from Latin Amer-

ica, Asia and Africa, they recognized Palestine as a State¹².

In September 2012, the Palestinian authorities requested a change of status within the UN, from “observer entity” to “non-member observer State”. In November of that same year, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 67/19, with 138 votes in favor, 9 against and 41 abstentions, which was a victory for the Palestinians in the international arena. This measure gave them the right to speak but without the possibility of voting in the UN.

With the arrival of the new administration to the White House, the interventionist policy of the United States towards Latin America was strengthened: tour by the former Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson for the region, increase in economic sanctions and subversion work against the government of Venezuela, the reactivation of the Lima Group, the strengthening of the right in Brazil, Argentina and Ecuador, as well as attempts to undermine regional mechanisms of consensus such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and strengthen the Organization of American States (OAS).

The radical changes in the US foreign policy: abandonment of multilateralism, rupture of the nuclear agreement with Iran and its positions in the UN with respect to Israel, also had their repercussions in the Latin American area, especially because of the threats of Washington to take count on those countries that voted against them in the UN. Also the year 2017, within the framework of the centenary of the Balfour Declaration, was marked by the first Latin American tour of the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. This Israeli-American offensive reactivated the role of the Palestinian diaspora in Latin America. In early January 2017, the Palestinian Club of Chile, together with other local organizations, convened a meeting of Palestinian communities in Latin America, to condemn the attack by the Israeli regime against the Gaza Strip, whose objective was to weaken the formation of unity government, after the reconciliation between the main political movements of Palestine¹³.

However, the call provoked differences with the Palestinian Confederation of Latin America and the Caribbean (COPLAC). Some argued that the COPLAC, after the Oslo Accords, had been deactivated as the rest of the

12 See: *Debatirán papel de América Latina en conflicto entre Israel y Palestina*. Available in: <https://www.americaeconomia.com/politica-sociedad/debatiran-papel-america-latina-conflicto-israel-y-palestina>

13 See: *Comunidades Palestinas de América Latina, condenan el crimen israelí de hoy en Gaza*. Resumen Latinoamericano, Palestina Libre, 30 de octubre de 2017. Available in: <http://www.resumenlatinoamericano.org/2017/10/30/comunidades-palestinas-de-america-latina-condenan-el-crimen-israeli-de-hoy-en-gaza/>

popular organizations of the PLO had done. With the support of the ANP, COPLAC called for an IV Congress for the communities of the continent, in Managua (Nicaragua), to be held on October 19. Present at this conclave were Palestinian Foreign Minister Riad al-Maliki and representatives of President Mahmoud Abbas¹⁴.

This episode generated internal frictions and fissures within the forces of the Palestinian diaspora in the continent, because since November 2014, Chilean organizations had taken the initiative to call communities in the continent to resume the historic role of the COPLAC. For its part, the Palestinian Club of Chile, along with other organizations, held its meeting on October 30, 2017. On this occasion, they made a call to form a Palestinian institution at the continental level, always respecting and coordinating with the PLO and its institutions, at the same time that they exhorted not to promote or reproduce directly or indirectly in Latin America, the factors of division that exist within Palestine¹⁵.

Another fact that marked the positions of the governments of the region with respect to Palestine was the voting process in the UN General Assembly at the end of 2017. The day was characterized by a divided vote with respect to the resolution presented condemning the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Of the total of 193 member states, 128 voted in favor of rejecting the United States' decision, there were 35 abstentions, 9 against, and 21 States were absent on the day of the vote. Among those who were against were: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Togo, United States and Israel.

As evidenced, despite the fact that there were 17 countries in the area that opposed, the rest abstained or were among those who were absent that day. With respect to the Argentine government, which has a marked right-wing tendency, its position in the face of these facts is striking.

The Argentine Foreign Ministry, from the Palacio de San Martín, lamented the unilateral US measures on Jerusalem and reiterated its support for the celebration of rounds of dialogue between the Palestinians and the Israelis to reach a political agreement. In the statement issued by the Foreign Ministry, Argentina expressed its support for the special regime of Al-Quds as

¹⁴ See: *Defensores de palestinos en Latinoamérica se reunirán en Nicaragua*. 16 de octubre de 2017. Available in: <https://www.hispan.tv.com/noticias/sudamerica/356649/america-latina-caribe-comunidad-causa-palestina>

¹⁵ See: *Comunidades palestinas de América Latina realizarán Congreso Preparatorio en Chile*. 21 de octubre de 2017, Palestina Libre. Available in: <http://www.palestinalibre.org/articulo.php?a=66064>

established by Resolution 181 (1947) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which leaves the government over the city of a special international regime¹⁶.

Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in the vote in the UN against the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel¹⁷

Votación		A favor	En contra	Abstenciones	Total 193
Países	Centroamérica	Nicaragua, Belice, Costa Rica.	Guatemala, Honduras.	México, Panamá.	
	Total parcial	3	2	2	7
	Caribe	San Vicente y Granadinas, Barbados, Surinam, Cuba, Dominica, Granada.		Trinidad y Tobago, Haití, Jamaica, Antigua y Barbuda, Bahamas, República Dominicana.	
	Total parcial	6		6	12
	América del Sur	Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brasil, Guyana, Perú, Uruguay Venezuela.		Argentina, Colombia, Paraguay.	
	Total parcial	8		3	11
	Total de la región	17	2	11	30
Por ciento		13.28%	22.22%	31.42%	
Total general		128	9	35	172
					89.11%
Ausentes					21

Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel

As a result of the same pressures from the US, just two days after the

¹⁶ See: *Argentina lamenta 'medidas unilaterales' de EEUU sobre Jerusalén*. 7 de diciembre de 2017. Available in: <https://www.hispantv.com/noticias/argentina/361835/trump-jerusalen-capital-israel-embajada-eeuu-palestina>

¹⁷ See: *La Asamblea General de la ONU aprueba una moción contra la decisión de Estados Unidos de reconocer a Jerusalén como la capital de Israel*. BBC Mundo, 21 diciembre 2017. Available in: <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-42446206>

opening of its embassy in Jerusalem, other Latin American countries seconded the US initiative. The first to do so were precisely those who had backed Washington's decision at the United Nations.

There were only two votes against: Guatemala and Honduras, meaning that these two countries were the only ones in the region that supported the United States. Precisely, the first to make the transfer was Guatemala, due to a clear warning by the US to take note of those who opposed his decision, by eliminating any financial aid, as indicated by his ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, in a threatening tone.

Therefore, the next country was from the Central American area: Guatemala, which had been the second in the world, behind the USA - historical coincidence - in recognizing the existence of the Jewish State in 1948 and one of the last in the region to recognize to Palestine in 2013. During the opening of his diplomatic legation, at Jerusalem's Malha Technological Park, Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales described the event as an "important moment" and a "courageous decision"¹⁸.

Meanwhile, the Honduran parliament passed a non-binding resolution to also approve the transfer of its embassy to Jerusalem. As indicated by the press of this country, after this decision was the intention of President Juan Orlando Hernandez to seek better relations with the US. The motion, promoted by the deputy Tomás Zambrano was finally approved by the Honduran National Congress with 59 votes in favor and 33 against¹⁹. The initiative had to be confirmed later by the Executive. The news was very well received by the Israeli authorities, who automatically declared that they would expand their cooperation programs with Honduras. To this end, the Head of the Israeli Agency for the Development of International Cooperation (MASHAV), Gil Haskel, led a delegation from his country that met with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of this Central American nation.

Now was the opportunity of another country, but now from the Southern Cone: Paraguay, which for decades has been one of the closest allies of the United States in Latin America and had abstained in the UN vote on Jerusalem. The Paraguayan government had announced on May 7 that it would relocate its embassy by the end of that month and for that purpose, President Horacio Cartes (2013-2018), of the Colorado Party, traveled to Israel on the 21st

¹⁸ See: *Guatemala, Honduras y Paraguay, los países latinoamericanos que siguen a Estados Unidos en la apertura de sus embajadas en Jerusalén*. Redacción BBC Mundo, 16 mayo 2018. Available in: <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-44112856>

¹⁹ See: *Aprueban moción para trasladar embajada de Honduras en Israel a Jerusalén*. La Prensa, 12 de abril de 2018. Available in: https://www.laprensa.hn/honduras/1168432-410/trasladar-embajada-honduras-jerusalen-tel_aviv-israel-congreso-

of the same month. For its part, the government of the Israeli Prime Minister spoke of at least half a dozen countries had planned to do the same, promising “preferential treatment” to the first ten that did so²⁰.

Tour of Mahmud Abbas in South America

The last tour of the Palestinian president, during the month of May 2018, in the South American region, which took him to visit Venezuela, Chile and Cuba, took place in the context of the protests that took place in the Gaza Strip and a few days before the decision of the United States to move his embassy to Jerusalem. For these reasons, President Mahmoud Abbas called on the Latin American countries to continue supporting the Palestinian cause and not to back Washington in this regard²¹.

During his meeting with the president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, Abbas recalled that the decision taken by the US president violated international law. For his part, Maduro expressed his support for the Palestinian cause after signing several agreements on bilateral cooperation in the tourism, business and trade sectors. In the area of tourism, a document was signed between the Director General of the Palestinian International Cooperation Agency, Imad Zuhairi, and the Venezuelan Minister of Tourism, Marlenys Contreras, while in the business it was agreed to establish the council of Palestinian-Venezuelan businessmen²².

A fundamental stop on his Latin American tour had to include Chile. This country was one of the first to open an Office of Representation before the PNA in 1998 and recognized the Palestinian State since January 7, 2011. This South American nation also has the largest Palestinian community in the world after the Arab territories, with around of half a million citizens. The president of Palestine held bilateral talks here with his counterpart Sebastián Piñera, at the Palacio de La Moneda. In his previous term, Piñera had made a visit to the Palestinian territories in 2011 so that on the occasion of his re-election in December 2017 for four years, Piñera received the congratulations of

20 Around 25 states have at least consular representation in Jerusalem and the Vatican has an apostolic delegation in this city.

21 See: *Abbas urges Latin America not to follow US example on embassy*. AFP and Time of Israel, 8 May 2018. Available in: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/abbas-urges-latin-america-not-to-follow-us-example-on-embassy/>

22 See: *Venezuela y Palestina firman acuerdos de cooperación*. Telesur, 7 de mayo de 2018. Available in: <https://www.telesurtv.net/news/venezuela-palestina-firman-acuerdos-cooperacion--20180507-0032.html>

President Abbas²³.

Colombia: last country of South America to recognize Palestine

Paradoxically, the Colombian government, which has been one of the largest allies of the USA in the South American area and where there is a strong US military presence, decided to make a radical change of its foreign policy towards the Middle East: the recognition of Palestine as a State. This event occurred in the final stage of the mandate of Juan Manuel Santos²⁴. In the year 2018 there was the alternation of government in Colombia, but the contradictory legacy of Santos would not be made public until a day after the inauguration of Iván Duque at the head of the Colombian presidency, on August 7.

The information was confirmed by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, MaríaÁngela Holguín. The former Colombian diplomacy indicated in a letter she addressed to her Palestinian counterpart the ratification of the decision to recognize the Palestinian territories "as a free, independent and sovereign state." Meanwhile, Israel was "surprised and disappointed" by the decision to recognize the Palestinian state, because Colombia, in the 2012 vote of the United Nations General Assembly, which granted the PLO the status of observer State, was the only country in the area that abstained.

Despite the new political scenario in Colombia, acting Chancellor Carlos Holmes Trujillo affirmed that the matter would be subject to an evaluation, without it being clear whether this implied a suspension of recognition or not. The contradictions seem clear, because during his election campaign, Ivan Duque expressed his intention to follow the steps of the United States and recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. On the other hand, some 60 Colombian academics from different universities, journalists and specialists in international relations, asked the government, through a letter, to maintain the recognition of Palestine²⁵. Although the Palestinian embassy in Bogotá thanked Colombia for its decision, it still remained to be seen if it is a consolidated position.

23 See: *Presidente de Palestina realiza visita oficial a Chile*. Prensa Latina, 9 de mayo de 2018. Disponible en: <http://www.palestinalibre.org/articulo.php?a=68451>

24 See: *El Gobierno de Santos reconoce a Palestina como Estado antes de entregar el poder*. Bogotá, 9 de agosto de 2018. Available in: https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/08/08/colombia/1533761934_031445.html

25 To access the complete list of signatures in the letter see: *Académicos colombianos le pidieron a Duque respaldo en reconocimiento de Palestina*. El Espectador, 10 de agosto de 2018. Available in: <http://www.palestinalibre.org/articulo.php?a=69805>

However, President Ivan Duque affirmed that the recognition made by former President Juan Manuel Santos to Palestine as a State was irreversible and argued that since the Oslo Accords, he had always believed that the ideal solution for the Middle East was the Two-State solution. This statement was not well received by Israel, whose government continued to demand that the highest Colombian authorities revert their recognition of Palestine²⁶.

Paraguay modifies its position towards Jerusalem

The political alternation in Paraguay, in August 2018, produced a sharp turn with regard to the position of the previous government towards Jerusalem. The Paraguayan president, Mario Abdo Benítez, of the same Colorado Party, announced his decision to move his diplomatic headquarters back to Tel Aviv, due to the criticism that this decision had generated. The reaction of Israel did not wait: withdrew his ambassador from Paraguay and closed the embassy in Asuncion. Israel described Paraguay's decision as "serious" and stressed that the situation deteriorated the relationship between the two countries. Given these events, the US Vice President, Mike Pence, contacted the Paraguayan president to press, but this did not take effect. This victory of the Palestinian Authority was part of the diplomatic efforts that its leaders had been making, denouncing how many regulations of international law were violated with the "recognition" of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel²⁷.

The only two Latin American countries that do not recognize Palestine are Panama and Mexico. With respect to the first, it should be remembered that it was one of the 9 countries that voted against granting that status to the PLO at the UN in 2012, along with Canada, the Czech Republic, the USA, Israel, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Naurú and Palau. As for Mexico, although in that year it voted in favor, it still did not recognize the State of Palestine²⁸. It would remain to see, if after the new change of government in Mexico, by a progressive executive, this situation could be reversed.

- The change in the correlation of political forces in Latin America in favor of right-wing and pro-US governments can generate greater uncertain-

26 See: *Reconocimiento a Palestina como Estado 'es irreversible': Iván Duque*. El Tiempo, 3 de septiembre de 2018. Available in: <https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/colombiano-anulara-reconocimiento-a-palestina-como-estado-263666>

27 See: *Tras el regreso de la embajada a Tel Aviv: Mike Pence habló con presidente de Paraguay*. Agencia AJN, 6 septiembre de 2018. Available in: <https://agenciaajn.com/noticia/tras-el-regreso-de-la-embajada-a-tel-aviv-mike-pence-hablo-con-presidente-de-paraguay-103644>

28 See: *Colombia: ¿podrá Iván Duque revertir el reconocimiento de Palestina?* Palestina Libre, 10 de agosto de 2018. Available in: <http://www.palestinalibre.org/articulo.php?a=69806>

ty regarding the progress that the PLO had made in this region in previous years.

- For its part, the new right-wing government in Brazil is threatening to move the Embassy of its country to Jerusalem and even to break diplomatic relations with Palestine.

- The victory of the leftist candidate in Mexico favors a greater balance of the progressive forces in the region and therefore, the consolidation of support for the legitimate cause of the Palestinian people for their independence.

- The most consistent positions with the Palestinian cause come from the governments of Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia and Nicaragua.

At the XXIV Annual Meeting of the Forum of Sao Paulo, which was held in Havana from July 15 to 17, 2018 and attended by 479 delegates from political parties, movements and left-wing groups in Latin America and the Caribbean, was ratified the support of the social and progressive movements of Latin America to the just cause of the Palestinian people. This was expressed in this meeting by SamerManaa, member of the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Cuba: historical support for the Palestinian cause

Cuba's position in the face of the historic Palestinian conflict has remained almost uninterrupted. These ties go back even to 1947, when Cuba was the only country in the Latin American region that opposed the partition of Palestine into an Arab State and a Jewish one into the General Assembly of the United Nations. Support for the Palestinian cause took on a new dimension after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, which defined Cuba's support for the progressive and anti-colonialist movements in the so-called Third World, including the Arab world. In this regard, the ties of brotherhood between Fidel Castro and the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat stand out. On November 17, 1974, both countries established diplomatic relations.

Since then, the Cuban position has been very clear and constant with respect to the settlement of the conflict, the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people, the creation of its State with capital in East Jerusalem, within the 1967 borders, the return of the Palestinians to their lands and has condemned, in all possible multilateral forums, Israel's systematic aggressions against the civilian population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

With this historical background and respect for the Palestinian people, we understand the clear position of Cuba against the US decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, considering it a flagrant violation of

international law that violates the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people. According to the Cuban Foreign Ministry, modifying the “historic status” of Jerusalem will “further increase tensions” in the Middle East and impede any effort aimed at resuming peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians. Therefore, Cuba demanded Israel’s immediate end to the occupation of the Palestinian territories, aggressive policies and colonizing practices in these territories. In 2016, Miguel Díaz-Canel, who at that time was the First Vice President of the State Councils and Minister, received the Palestinian Foreign Minister, Riad al-Maliki and then in 2018, the Minister of Education, Sabri-Saidam.

Ambassador Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations, during her intervention during the 10th emergency special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the topic “Illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, “expressed the overwhelming rejection of Cuba”. The delegation of Cuba co-sponsored and voted in favor of the draft resolution entitled “Statute of Jerusalem”, which expressed that any decision or action whose meaning is to alter the character, status or demographic composition of the Holy City of Jerusalem has no legal effect, it is considered null and must be repealed, in compliance with the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council. In this regard, the adopted text called on all States to refrain from establishing diplomatic missions in Jerusalem.

The Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, issued on December 6, 2017, stated the following:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba expresses its deepest concern and rejection for the unilateral declaration by the President of the United States of the city of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, which constitutes a serious and flagrant violation of the Charter of the UN, of International Law and of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations²⁹.

The Cuban diplomat also called on the Security Council to adopt the necessary decisions and to demand of Israel the immediate end of the occupation of the Palestinian territories and of the aggressive policies and colonizing practices, as well as the fulfillment of the resolutions approved by that organ

²⁹ *Cuba rechaza declaración unilateral de Trump sobre Jerusalén como capital de Israel*. Cubaminrex, 6 de diciembre de 2017. Available in: <http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2017/12/06/cuba-rechaza-declaracion-unilateral-de-trump-sobre-jerusalen-como-capital-de-israel/#.W7PBzWQx1S>

on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question³⁰.

On his last tour of Latin America, the Palestinian president, from Chile, visited Cuba as a sign of our country's solidarity with Palestine. The President of the State of Palestine and the Executive Committee of the Organization for the Liberation of Palestine, Hon. Mr. Mahmud Abbas³¹ was in Havana from May 10 to 12, 2018 to carry out a broad program of activities including official talks with Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel, who ratified Cuba's support for Palestine and repudiated the unilateral US President Donald Trump's declaration of the Palestinian city of Al-Quds (Jerusalem) as the capital of the Israeli regime.

The Cuban leader also defended the creation of an independent State of Palestine, according to the 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as the capital. For his part, Mahmoud Abbas thanked Havana for the support of the Palestinian cause and granted his Cuban counterpart "The Great Necklace of the State of Palestine", the highest decoration granted to foreign personalities³². This visit was a sample of the excellent bilateral relations between the two countries³³.

With regard to the latest events in the Gaza Strip, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded that the UN Security Council stop the Israeli aggression against the Palestinians. The Director General of Bilateral Affairs of the MINREX, Emilio Lozada García, on behalf of the Cuban Foreign Ministry, repudiated the new wave of violence by Israel against the Palestinian people: "We express the strongest condemnation of the new and criminal aggression by the Israeli Army against the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip". According to the official, it was a brutal act, which constituted a serious and flagrant violation of the Charter of the UN and International Humanitarian Law³⁴.

30 See: *Rechaza Cuba declaración de Jerusalén como capital de Israel ante la ONU*. Cuba Debate, 22 diciembre 2017. Available in: <http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2017/12/22/rechaza-cuba-declaracion-de-jerusalen-como-capital-de-israel-ante-la-onu/#.W7PALjWQxis>

31 His last stay in Cuba occurred in September 2009. On this occasion he met with the President Raul Castro and attended the signing of three agreements in the areas of education, culture and sports.

32 See: *Visitará Cuba Presidente de Palestina*. La Habana, Cuba, 7 de mayo de 2018. Available in: <https://www.hispantv.com/noticias/cuba/376890/palestina-jerusalen-eeuu-capital-canel-abbas>

33 See: *El líder palestino Mahmud Abbas llega a Cuba para reunirse con Díaz-Canel*. EFE, La Habana, 11 de mayo de 2018. Available in: <https://www.efe.com/efe/america/politica/el-lider-palestino-mahmud-abas-llega-a-cuba-para-reunirse-con-diaz-canel/200000353612440>

34 See: *Cuba se pronuncia contra la nueva escalada de violencia de Israel en Gaza*. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MINREX), 3 abril 2018. Available in: <http://www.cubadebate.cu/>

Cuba will continue to support a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on a Two-State solution, which allows the Palestinians the right to self-determination and to have an independent and sovereign State, with its capital in East Jerusalem and the pre-1967 borders.

Final Remarks

The Israeli Zionist regime has maintained its positions against the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, has encouraged the construction of settlements of Jewish settlers in the West Bank, has opposed the return of Palestinian refugees and has violated all the resolutions that have been adopted in the General Assembly in favor of Palestine. Therefore, the conflict continues in several dimensions: the question related to the future of Jerusalem, the definition of the borders and lands on which the Palestinian State would be established, the illegality of the Jewish settlements in the lands systematically usurped by Israel, the situation of the Palestinian refugees and their right to return to their lands.

In this context, the so-called “deal of the century” proposed by the Republican administration of Donald Trump, comes to consolidate the positions of Israel on these topics and buries the possibility of the creation of the Palestinian state in the terms they have historically demanded. This has caused that the relations between the Palestinian authorities and the US government, being at their most critical point due to the unilateral actions and pressure coming from the Trump administration.

At the same time, tensions with Israel and repressive actions by the Israeli military at the checkpoints in the West Bank and in the border areas with the Gaza Strip have increased substantially. The Israeli army has continually used snipers along the border fences to suppress demonstrations by Palestinian civilians, establishing areas of no access for them. The violence with which the Zionists have acted violates international norms and human rights, in the face of the complicity of the United States and its European allies.

Therefore, the death of civilians without legal cause, the expulsion of the Palestinian population in the occupied territories, the illegal appropriation of their lands, the demolition of their homes and Israel’s policy of “arbitrary arrests” have been maintained. These facts have been evidenced after the publication of images in the social networks showing how the police hit

and throw tear gas from drones against the Palestinian demonstrators. The denunciations of Palestine against Israel before the ICC have not generated a convincing response of condemnation to these facts. Palestinian leaders have made it clear that they no longer see the United States as a neutral mediator in the conflict with Israel. Palestinian officials froze all contact with the US government since President Trump recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by the end of 2017.

Undoubtedly, the impulse of "peace" led by the United States will be frustrated by the convictions and the commitment of the ANP with its people, in demand of the creation of the Palestinian State, as foreseen in the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords. This is essential, to continue demanding that Israel freeze its settlement policy as a precondition for resuming peace talks, freeing Palestinian prisoners prior to the Oslo process and offering guarantees on the right of Palestinians to return to their lands and preserve their history and national identity.

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ABSTRACT

The steps taken by the current US administration - its recognition of Jerusalem as Israeli's capital and other measures - were taken with the aim of strengthening its relations with Israel. Trump's administration is committed to protecting Israel and not promoting the two-state solution. These measures form part of the pressure the Trump administration is imposing on the Palestinian authorities in a bid to force them to accept its arbitrary peace agreement – dubbed the “Deal of the Century”. Israel has maintained its position against the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, encouraged the construction of illegal settlements in the West Bank, opposed the return of Palestinian refugees and violated all resolutions adopted in the UN General Assembly in favour of Palestine. The future of Jerusalem, the definition of borders, the land upon which any future Palestinian state would be established, the illegality of Israeli settlements situated on land systematically expropriated by Israel, the situation of Palestinian refugees and the right of return all remain to be answered. In this context, the so-called “Deal of the Century” proposed by the Trump administration consolidates the Israeli position and buries the possibility of creating a Palestinian state. Nevertheless, Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas toured Latin America in May 2018, visiting Venezuela, Chile and Cuba, demanding Latin American's governments to continue supporting the Palestinian cause.

KEYWORDS

Deal of the Century; Israeli–Palestinian Conflict; Latin America.

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AFRICA AND THE THREATS TO ITS SECURITY

Francisco Proença Garcia¹

Introduction

Analyzing Africa is always appealing, but also very complex, since that there is not only one Africa, but several Africas, as political regimes and systems, cultures, languages, religions, socio-economic situations, resources, integration and even the security situation. When we talk specifically about security threats in this huge space, we are immediately confronted with several questions such as: What are these threats? Where do they come from? How do they manifest? Thus, the purpose of this essay is to reflect on what we consider to be the main security threats on the African continent.

First, we need to make clear what is meant by threats in the contemporary strategic context, knowing that they reflect numerous political, economic and social changes that have occurred in the world since the end of the last century.

Traditionally, threat is defined as any event or action (ongoing or foreseeable), of varying nature and arising from a conscious will that is contrary to the attainment of an objective that normally causes damage, material or moral; at bottom, the product of a possibility for an intention (Couto 1998).

However, today, since this concept is not comprehensive enough, it tends to present difficult problems when we try to specify its nature; furthermore, it does not allow the inclusion of some manifestations with such serious implications that they can be classified as non-traditional threats to security, as climate change or pandemics such as AIDS.

Since the variety of concepts on the subject, in this essay we chose to adopt the definition of transnational threat from the United Nations report, *More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, which admits a rather broad

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conception of threat, viewed as: “(...) Any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to international security (...)” (NU, 2004).

In broad terms, we can consider security as the pursuit of liberation from the threat, resulting from the interaction between the vulnerabilities of a political unit and the threats it faces (Waeber et. Al. 1993). But this contested, ambiguous, complex concept with strong political and ideological implications has also changed.

Currently, the trend is to broaden the concept and include other dimensions such as economic security, ecosystem security and other alternative security concepts, including international organized crime, the transnational spread of disease, large-scale international migratory movements, societal security (Buzan, 1991) and human security (UNDP 1994).

Also, it is important to remember that the relationship between security and development is undeniable nowadays, and there can be no development without peace or security, and without development and prosperity, there will be no conditions for the maintenance of lasting peace. In this context, the approach to the safety dimension should not be seen as a goal itself, but as a fundamental concern, namely for preemptive or preventive action on the causes of fragility and instability.

In this order of ideas, in our brief essay, we begin by addressing the security context in Africa, the structural violence that manifests itself across the Continent, and then we address what seems to be, for us, the main threats that manifest themselves in that very different space. Amongst them, we highlight the one in the present context that, for us, seems to be the greatest threat, the failure of the state that can and should be related to the other threats. Although the state fails, the populations continue to live in these spaces, having different forms of social organization that subsist and compete with the other state structures in collecting taxes, using force and social responsibility over the populations they control.

The second threat that we emphasize in our essay is the one linked to those social structures that try to impose themselves in several geographic spaces, global subversion; and at a more superfluous level, we address other security threats in Africa, whether natural, such as climate change and pandemics, or caused by human action, such as organized crime and piracy.

The African security context

The African continent, with its approximately 30.2 million km² spread across 54 states, had been the stage, for the last half century, of permanent structural violence. In 2017, according to the Conflict Barometer, published by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, it still maintains high levels of violence: 13 high-level conflicts, including ten wars and three limited wars in countries as diverse as Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, the Central African Republic, Nigeria, Somalia, Libya and South Sudan (HIICR 2017).

On the Continent, the region most affected by severe violent conflicts is sub-Saharan Africa, in which in 2007 78 conflicts were reported, from a total of 328 conflicts. Of these, two are on the highest scale (from 0 to 5), considered as war, and the remaining seven considered as severe crisis (level 4). In the same year, 24 crises (level 3) and 45 non-violent conflicts (levels 1 and 2) were reported (HIICR 2007).

In 2017, the Heidelberg Institute kept its analysis at five levels, calculated in the same way, but modifying the terminology. If we consider the sub-national analysis, there were 17 more conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa than in 2007 (95 in total), accounting for ten wars (level 5), three limited wars (level 4), 48 violent crises (level 3), and 32 nonviolent conflicts (levels 1 and 2). In 2017, a new war broke out in the border region of Ethiopia with Somalia and three limited wars escalated to war, one in the Central African Republic (Anti-Balaka - former Séléka), which this year caused 1.1 million displaced people. ; and two new wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kasai and South Kivu Regions), a country where more than a hundred armed groups seeking local supremacy and access to natural resources can be counted in the East alone; here displaced persons accounted for 1.7 million people. On the other hand, this year, the war in Sudan between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) and the government (SPLM/A) dropped significantly in intensity to level 3 crisis. violent (HIICR 2017).

This conflict has diverse roots, but in general we can consider that it is essentially due to the failure of states as the basic unit of the international political system.

The failure of the state in Africa

When it comes to the failure or fragility of the state - or any of the various terms that have been popularized when evaluating a state's perfor-

mance - there is a more or less explicit reference to its constituent elements: its territory, its people and its sovereign political power. In the expression of this sovereignty, it is up to the State to guarantee the pursuit of its ends, that is, the supply of the political goods contained in the founding social contract: security, justice and social welfare, to which we add the exercise of political activity, that is, governing. Of course, in the absence of a written social contract signed by the parties, the expected political goods vary according to time, space and even the dominant ideology.

Jean Bodin's definition is classical, defining the state as an entity that cannot be compared to others regarding internal order, in which it reigns supreme, and that does not recognize any other superior entity in the external order, and therefore is independent. This means that the state decides for itself how it will face its internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek the assistance of others and, in so doing, to limit its freedom by compromising with them (Waltz 2002).

However, not all political units can guarantee their inhabitants such political goods. Only with pragmatic purposes of demographically mapping what we are talking about through analysis of indexes such as the 2018 Fund For Peace Failed State Index, we easily realize that about a third of the world's population lives in areas considered critical or at risk. Several examples can be pointed out, the most significant ones in some regions of the African continent: out of the 54 African countries, four are in the "very high alert" category (South Sudan, Somalia, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo), four in the "high alert" category (Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe and Guinea-Conakry), seventeen in the "alert" category and the rest appear as "very high warning" or "high warning" except Namibia, Botswana and Ghana, which appear in the warning ranking (Fund For Peace 2018).

There are several concepts that appear to us associated with an attempt to define state failure, as well as various classification criteria, and we identify terminologies as weak states (Fukuyama 2006)², failed states, or even collapsed states, in Rotberg interpretations (2004)³ and Zartman (1995)⁴. Thus

2 Fukuyama classifies the term "weak," referring to the strength of the state rather than its scope, meaning "(...) a lack of institutional capacity to implement and enforce policies, often induced by an underlying lack of legitimacy of the political system as one all" (Fukuyama 2006).

3 This author differentiates failed states from collapsed states. A state fails as a result of "internal violence, the government loses credibility (....) making it illegitimate to its population." A collapsed state corresponds to "an extreme version of a failed state" in which security is guaranteed by the law of the fittest and where "there is a vacuum of authority" in which "warlords or non-state actors acquire the region control" (Rotberg 2004).

4 For Zartman, collapsed states are those whose "basic state functions are no longer performed." (Zartman 1995).

we have a portrait that presents different degrees of state degeneration.

Despite this analytical inaccuracy or ambiguous definition, these concepts help us identify Political Units where bad governance prevails (endemic corruption, abuse of power, disrespect for human dignity, institutional weakness), social deregulation, lack of infrastructure and public services, the inability to enforce the rule of law or to end internal conflict. In addition to these endogenous phenomena, there are a number of factors exogenous to the state itself that push it into situations of fragility and eventually collapse.

Thus, the concepts associated with the failure of the state are concepts opposed to the reference of what can be defined as a successful state. Starting from a pragmatic empiricism, failed states are entities “that are unable or unwilling to guarantee the minimum conditions for their populations: internal peace, law and order, and good governance” (Rotberg 2004). These are states where “the government is losing physical control over its territory or where it has no monopoly on the legitimate use of force” (Foreign Policy 2009). The failed state is considered, “ultimately unable to support itself as a member of the international community” (Helman and Ratner 1993) and relies on regular flows of external assistance. In Africa these concepts portray states as “lacking the sovereign capacity needed for the effective exercise of power and authority” (Nwozor 2018).

On the African continent the failure of states is still closely linked to the inefficient management of opportunities by post-independence leaders. These leaders were unable to fully understand the role of the state and later were sustained by an authoritarian political class, with few scruples (Nwozor 2018) and holder of a patrimonial view of the State.

However, these are not accepted concepts and are prone to contestation. Charles Call considers that while the concept has acted “to correct prevailing approaches to promoting peace, development or humanitarian assistance” (Call 2008), today, according to that author, this is a fallacious and unhelpful concept due to the fact that it has given us a vision of the world defined by diplomatic and security agencies, especially in the post-September 11 period. Thus, this concept should be abandoned, and efforts should be made to identify alternative concepts of analysis that will be denotatively and connotatively clear, useful and discriminatory (Call 2008).

The concept of fragile state still continues to mirror a view of external actors on the importance of state building and how it should be conceptualized and operationalized. More than the vagueness of some indicators, the most striking criticism of the weak state literature has to do with the lack of a local reading of problems and solutions, that is, a difficulty in accepting that in these processes there must be local appropriation.

In this order of ideas, in recent years this language has been progressively replaced by references to varying degrees of deteriorated governance, state fragility. This view is preferred by development theorists who see in the language of failure a negative charge that politically undermines relations with these units of power. Here, in this essay, language has no denotations or pejorative connotations; it merely translates a methodological approach, more empirical than theorist or doctrinal, of phenomena that constitute threats to regional and global peace and security, and especially to their citizens: states that fail or are on the brink of failure (Garcia and Ferro 2013).

Social structures underlying the failure of the state and its typologies

The fact that states have various stages of weakness or have even collapsed - giving rise to volatile and undefined chaos, where incomplete alternative forms to previous sovereignty, multiple and conflicting forms, leading to endless wars, and growing exponentially throughout the African continent - does not prevent populations, for whom war is already a way of life, from continuing to inhabit these spaces and developing their activities. These activities range from subsistence, education and economy, through justice/law and order by the use of force, the collection of taxes and even the minting of money, developing actions that contribute to the exhaustion of existing or underlying formal power. Therefore, they represent several means of subversion.

The remaining forms of social organization can be typified as lumpen movements, ethnolinguistic associations, political/popular organizations and, finally, the most advanced subversive organizational form, global subversion (Garcia, 2010).

Lumpen movements are armed groups, slightly organized, with an informal and horizontal structure that can emerge and succeed against a weak state. Its energy radiates from the street rather than from the intellectual development of an ideology, and military action precedes the conceptualization of motives rather than emerging from them. The discipline is based on extreme brutality, with abundant use of narcotic drugs and alcoholic beverages. The support of the population emerges as a mere matter of survival, since the elements of the lumpen units systematically attack and exploit the populations, not having any kind of social responsibility on these. Belonging to the group is primarily a matter of survival, with forced recruitment (Garcia 2010). Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front is an example.

The ethnolinguistic basis for social organization arises in places such

as Somalia and throughout the Sahel Tuareg. Here, loyalties are based on genealogy and belonging is not an option, gaining social responsibility over the populations that belong to or identify with the group. Organization is defined by the family ties of structures that can be mobilized for conflict in primitive military units and are capable of small actions, but not sustained combat; They are very similar in their actions to the Lumpen forces, fighting above all for access to resources and, increasingly, from a perspective of enrichment. Their Forces are the manifestation of their culture and have little trace of doctrine of insurrection or staff organization, and leadership is indicated by the members, from whom comes the peer ascendant and the good acceptance by the elders from which they depend on for fundraising and recruitment (Mackinlay 2002).

The Popular Forces are different from the Lumpen and the ethnolinguistic forces due to their more elaborate political ideology and the proximity of the populations that support this ideology, tending towards a more consolidated military organization. In their traditional development, we can say that they have a pre-insurrectional and an insurrectional period. They come from a secret organization that can evolve and conduct extended operations over time. Their structure is based on cells and they tend to acquire an autonomous political component in relation to the military component. Examples are the secessionist movements: the Casamance Democratic Forces Movement in Senegal, the Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front in Angola, or the Biafra Sovereign State Update Movement in Nigeria.

Finally, we can mention the global subversion that plagues the entire Mediterranean area from Africa, from Algeria to Egypt, with Libya (a space that we can no longer considered a state with recognized authority throughout the territory) and the entire Sahel, spreading to more southern African countries, such as Nigeria, where Boko-Haram is based.

The global subversion

The global jihadist movement and its two main factions - al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State/Daesh – are a complex mixture of political-religious considerations and, through programmatic action, it seeks to modify the current International Order. Their ultimate goal is to recreate the Caliphate in the heart of the Islamic world, governed by a Sharia conceived from an integralist interpretation of the Koran. Thus, it seeks to transform Muslim society by clearing it from doctrinal innovation (Zuhur 2005), and extending Jihad to the secular countries of the region and subsequently replacing its leaders. Deep down, it seeks power and to take over states (Garcia 2010).

Their action and expansion will determine a substantial change in the status quo, hence our classification of them as global subversion.

In order to achieve its goals of conquering space and power, the use not only political power but also allow the use of violent mechanisms, and various methods are employed, including terror and conventional and irregular military tactics.

Its manifestation in several places is just a simple example of what is already ingrained from the Philippines to Nigeria, through China, Afghanistan and Libya, among many other countries and regions. This phenomenon, like the other subversive typologies, can be analyzed from various perspectives. However, this is the point in which Western interpretations fail: regarding perceptions. As a rule, and according to Zuhur (Zuhur 2005), we tend to interpret their mindsets as being different of ours. But, the core issue, lies on the difference of values and mechanisms of association. At heart, the new Jihad fighters are self-convinced that their immoral acts of violence are moral. In no way they defy the modern pattern logic of their mindset.

What is curious about this attitude, that establishes that Westerners are the enemy and that “for Western structural violence only global terrorism is the effective answer” (Moreira 2004), is that it is accepted by significant layers of the population, in contrast to the understanding of power, as is the case with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, or in countries that are struggling with Islamist secessionist movements, such as Russia, China, Indonesia or Bangladesh.

These two armed organizations (al-Qaeda and Daesh) have global structures, intentions, objectives, funding and recruitment, and are supported by broad populations that share the same ideology or religion. Today, when their disagreements rely mostly on leadership (Guranatna 2017), they fight for loyalties, resources, funding and recruitment (Stern and Berger 2015).

Global subversion has a structure that manifests itself in countless ways and in various spaces. We may consider a first manifestation in central physical and geographical space; another in a decentralized and peripheral physical space; another in an ideological space (Duarte 2015); and transverse to these three, it manifests itself as a “force multiplier” in cyberspace.

The first central space, with territorial control, is located in large areas in the AfPak region (Afghanistan and Pakistan), and in Iraq and Syria. The genesis of the movement is here, and its command is centralized, manages territory, has social responsibility over the populations it controls, exercises law and order, collects taxes and employs “force” in an organized manner,

being able to perform “conventional” operations in a large scale⁵.

The second space is based on its international spillover, by means of a complex and flexible transnational scale free network structure that encompasses several jihadist, associated and affiliated groups, with regional agendas, supporting the radical groups mutually, and finding existence of an active solidarity network extending from Chechnya to Sudan, through the Philippines, Somalia, Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as Europe, where it has very high interoperability in areas such as fundraising, recruitment and the acquisition of non-lethal material (Guranatna 2017). These affiliated structures have no direct subordination of central space (Duarte, 2015) and are largely self-sufficient in terms of armament and financing (Stern; Berger, 2015).

The third structural space is essentially based on an inspiring, unrelated, ideological dimension in which its elements act through an operational mimicry in the name of al-Qaeda or Daesh, such as the lone wolves, who anticipating their desires from central space through their speeches, ideology and action, have the initiative to plan their attacks in accordance with local conditions and capabilities, usually attacks of low financial cost but with great media impact.

Finally, the use of cyberspace, a battle space for internal and external communication but, above all, for, through a strategy applied to social networks as aggressively as military tactics, to extend its influence to the whole world. (Stern and Berger, 2015), trying to manage the perceptions of the populations controlled by them and the international community.

This structure seems to be evolving towards greater decentralization, demonstrating a global capacity to act, even attacking the heart of great powers, as it did in Brussels, Nice and Paris, managing to survive intense counter-measures. Their ability to survive comes from our view, above all from their capacity for transformation, which has allowed them to grow and surprise more and more.

In Europe and North America, those tentative “organizations” that exhibit malleability, plasticity, and opportunism in their connections always make coherent but above all convenient alliances, seeking to infiltrate through illegal emigration, and then to establish links with various Islamic nationalist organizations, with radical ethnic groups and multinational entities, drawing their appeal to the same common cause - cause capable of transcending differences (political, national and religious) - while maintaining their capacity to access considerable resources.

⁵ The DAESH has seized much US military equipment provided to the Iraqi army, estimated at \$ 25 billion. In (Sterna; Berger, 2015).

Recruitment sources and motives for adhering to jihadist radicalism are diverse and are mainly associated with revolt with degrading social situations, humiliating cultural factors, injustice, inequality and xenophobia, but also, according to Zuhur (2004), extremists recruit for a recent belief in the Islamic mission, *da'wa*, and in the glorification of Jihad and martyrdom, along with a desire to be able to contribute to the changing environment around them and the world at large.

Added to all these motivations, there is the exponential demographic growth and the migratory factor, with the flow predominantly oriented towards the countries of the West, where the new communities that settle, multiply the formation of inner colonies (Moreira 2004) in relation to which they are scarce instruments of integration in local societies, enhancing the growth of disenchanted and potential affiliates and combatants by the alternative presented by terrorism.

The “message” conveyed promotes a sense of inclusion, belonging and purpose (Stern; Berger 2015), being, in essence, a creator of identity and, at the same time, a guarantor of action, generating the possibility of “facing the factual condition, to be the most rational choice possible. If we add to this the media spread, namely via the Internet, participation in these movements is open to everyone, and collective action will tend to globalize” (Duarte 2015).

The use of social networks, mainly twitter, facebook and youtube, as well as the control of online edited forums and magazines, of which we highlight *Rumiyah* and *al Fatihin*, which play a crucial role in spreading the “message”, contribute decisively to overall recruitment.

By considering the issue of communication as essential, these movements explore “the symbiotic relationship between media and violence, the best way to publicize and popularize a particular notion of Islamic resistance. Moreover, they emerge globally as the only catalyst for providential social and political change” (Duarte 2015). Daesh’s propaganda and message spread in a number of languages, disproportionately hangs on the side of foreign fighters, both in terms of content and audience.

The statement, at the beginning of Ramadan in late June 2014, that Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was the new Caliph Ibrahim had wide resonance among Muslims around the world, especially among Salafi jihadists. This announcement demanded the loyalty of all Muslims, especially all other jihadist groups (Stern; Berger 2015), and to whom swearing allegiance is given the prerogative of *wilayat* (status of future provinces).

As a consequence, global subversion, which had bin Laden as a visible face until his death, is now taking on its most significant form in the *Daesh*,


which, despite some loss of physical control in central space, seems likely to refocus efforts to consolidate distant wilayats as strongholds of power (Guratan 2017) eventually expand to more southern places, as there is already strong evidence in the Cabo Delgado region of Mozambique, or even find sanctuaries in quieter places such as Cape Verde and at the same time, grow in cyberspace.

According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, in 2017 violent actions linked to Islamic militant groups operating in Africa increased by 36% over the previous year (2,933 against 2,117), causing about 10,000 deaths (about 2,000 in Iraq). and in Syria). Also, the number of Jihadist fighters on the Continent now exceeds the number of fighters in Syria and Iraq; Only the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in Nigeria has about 3,500 combatants (Africa Center For Strategic Studies, 2018).

Still according to this Institute, although the activity has grown, the main groups remain geographically concentrated (Somalia, Lake Chad Basin and central Mali), which shows several distinct local factors, different contexts, not presenting as a single threat; monolithic. In the Sahel region, destabilization affects countries with the highest population growth. The main motive for its growth seems to be associated with poor governance, state failure, demographic pressure and climate change.

The international community has sought to support local governments in addressing this threat, either with direct military intervention from countries such as France (Operation Barkhane) or the United States (AFRICOM), which have 4,500 men and 6,000 men in the region respectively. either with United Nations peace operations across the Continent, or Security Sector Reform operations promoted by the European Union. However, despite international support for military maneuver and development aid, primary responsibilities should be local, with a good example being military operations carried out by national armies with international support.

Global subversion cannot be analyzed in isolation and we must realize that threats today are multidimensional because they bring together more than one threat in the same situation.



Updated: April 2018
 Notes: Compiled by the Africa Center, this graphic shows violent events involving the listed groups over the 12-month period ending March 31, 2017. Data on attacks or fatalities does not attempt to distinguish the perpetrators of the events. Group listings are intended for informational purposes only and should not be considered official designations. Due to the fluid nature of many groups, the listed affiliations may change.
 Sources: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); Daniel Bynum, Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre; Thomas Joscelyn, SITE Intelligence Group; The Sudan Group; Stanford University's Mapping Militants Project; Stratfor; Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC); and Aaron Y. Zelin.

Fig. 1 - Active Islamic groups. Africa Center For Strategic Studies (2018); in <https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Africas-Active-Militant-Islamist-Groups-April-2018.pdf>

The other security threats in Africa

The weakness of the state and chaos zones can and should be related to other threats, since, having no power or control over their entire territory, the states are permeable to germinate and develop in the most diverse ways. of subversion (Garcia and Ferro 2013). This combination may further undermine the already fragile existence of these countries as a political reality.

There are numerous regional and conflicts that spread across the African space, and just to name the most relevant ones, besides those related to Daesh, which is affirmed as a subversive phenomenon on a global scale: In North Africa the issue of Western Sahara status, conflicts in Libya and

all manifestations of instability and insecurity in the Sahel, where problems must always be seen as cross-border and interrelated; in sub-Saharan Africa we highlight all the conflict in Nigeria, both around the Niger Delta and Boko Haram, which, in addition to destabilizing northwestern Nigeria, has spread to Cameroon, Chad and Niger; and we cannot fail to mention the humanitarian disaster in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where violence is endemic and the problem of Cabindan secessionism, still unresolved in Angola, which has guerrilla purses still active in the territory.

Armed conflicts also provoke a sea of refugees who live in camps where poverty is usually high and prophylactic care is diminishing.

To all this, in Africa, there are economic disparities, climate change and exponential population growth. This culture broth arouses factors that eventually promote irregular migration, forcing people to move to other spaces in search of resources, security and well-being, weakening territories and the sense of space, “devaluing states in the logic of their constitutive elements and perhaps, valuing others; in fact, nothing new, with due adaptations” (Dias 2016).

Africa experiences all kinds of population movements, interregional and intraregional, including mixed and irregular migration, labor migration and displacement due to conflict and natural disasters. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) accounts for 16 million migrants (IOM, 2018), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees accounts for 10 million displaced persons and seven million refugees on the Continent, about one third of the total in the world. world (UNHCR 2017).

The migratory factor (as a source of tension and some instability), with the flow oriented predominantly to the Western countries, where the new communities that settle down are hardly integrated into local societies, enhances the disenchantment and potential affiliations and combatants for the alternative presented by global subversion.

Irregular migration, which the Transnational Criminal Organizations (OCT) take advantage of, leads to the exploitation of human misery. Let us look at the dramatic situations of those who seek in the European eldorado a golden misery. In the *pateras* heading towards the northern shores of the Mediterranean or the Canaries, we meet people from all over the African continent. They come mainly from West Africa, but also from Sudan, Chad, the Horn of Africa and even Southern Africa. IOM considers three main routes: the North African route (from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and Europe); The Gulf of Aden route (from the Horn of Africa to Yemen and beyond); And the southern route (from the east and the horn of Africa to South Africa and beyond).

These migrants, in search of security and well-being, are at great risk

to life. Many of those who fail remain in transit countries, which become destinations. They get years old and phasing out their “jumping operation”, which also allows them to have several informal jobs during the trip, which will ensure them the next step. This is a daily phenomenon, and millions of desperate people seek to reach the other side of the stability frontier, where order is still felt.

The TCBs with the funds generated acquire a level of power that competes with some of the African states. They express this power by their ability to create various forms of instability in the countries in which they operate, broad-spectrum instability from the social to the economic, from the political to the psychological. At the same time, they try to indirectly gain political power through the corruption of their sovereign bodies and their officials, in order to intimidate the established power in order to guarantee complete freedom of action in their criminal activities. This further weakens more the already weak state structures.

In West Africa, a region where most countries are among the poorest in the world, drug trafficking is valued at hundreds of millions of dollars. Narcotics trafficking networks often take advantage of structural weaknesses in countries such as Guinea-Bissau and, with the approval of local ruling elites, have turned the region into a significant transit hub for Europe’s distribution route.

The 2014 West Africa Commission on Drugs report presents 2010 data showing that most of the cocaine flow from Latin America to West Africa this year crossed the Cape Verde archipelago, from where it went to the Atlantic coast of the region.

In this traffic that encompasses the porous Sahara-Sahel region, the different subversive groups maintain economic and symbiotic links with Tuareg and Berber tribes, collaborating in the trafficking of various products and, above all, in the collection of taxes on these trafficking. undocumented workers, especially in Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Ghana (Harmon 2015).

Piracy is a clear example of a threat to economic and energy security, as this criminal activity impedes the free movement of goods, including hydrocarbons. It manifests itself in the African space in two major opposing regions, but both crossed by some of the major maritime routes, but with distinctive form of action: The Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea.

Its work in these places is based on the poor socioeconomic conditions of the populations and the inability of coastal states to impose their authority at sea (Silva, 2016). In the Horn of Africa 8% of world freight traffic, 40 to 50% of oil tankers, and 26% of container traffic (UNITAR/UNOSAT 2014). The alternative route through South Africa, in addition to increasing the distance, makes freight more expensive.

In the Horn of Africa, the activity is mainly based on the abduction / rescue binomial, with total activity costs estimated in 2012 from US \$ 5.7 to 6.1 billion (OEFF 2013) and borne by both companies and States. In this region, international operations with military operations at sea, such as the US CTF 151 or Atalanta of the European Union, have contributed to its near disappearance.

In the Gulf of Guinea space, piracy counts 600 attacks between 2002 and 2012, severely affecting the local economy and port activities (Grevi 2016). In 2012, the Nigerian government estimated that 400,000 barrels would be stolen daily, at a total cost to the country of \$ 1 billion per month (Chatham House, 2012).

It should be recalled that in the Gulf of Guinea region, oil production represents about 16% of world production. In this unstable region, almost all oil fields are located offshore, which gives them some security regarding the instability that plagues the continental area (Guedes 2012). This region also includes the Congo Basin (second largest water and forestry complex in the world after the Amazon), which covers close to two million square kilometers.

There are still other security risks in this large space, and we refer to access to natural resources. Europe's energy security is very much dependent on its southern flank. About 25% of Natural Gas and 65% of the oil that Europe imports crosses the Mediterranean. Spain imports 75% of its natural gas from Algeria, Italy imports 50% (Ose and Loup 2003); the EU increased oil imports from Africa from 18% to 23% between 2006 and 2014; in 2014 alone, Europe accounted for 45% of Nigerian and 20% of Angolan exports (Grevi, 2016), so it is imperative to guarantee freedom of movement at sea and security of supply.

Drinking water, arable land and their sharing among communities should be considered as a potential factor in regional conflicts. The most notorious cases are in South Sudan, where demand for arable land and water increases the context of instability, or between Christian farmers and Muslim nomads Fulas in Nigeria, situations that put "pressure on the land", either as a space to occupy or as a source of natural resources, including water and food, often forgotten, also classified in context as essential, respecting the criterion of need" (Dias 2016).

The manifestations of environmental change that lead to scarcity of resources and the advancement of aridity are visible in parts of Africa, leading to induced migration situations to large urban areas, further adding to food security. This situation is aggravated by the land tenure issue, and it should be noted that around 5% of African arable land is in the possession of other states and companies that bought it (Saudi Arabia, China, Brazil) (Dias 2016).

Another major threat to security in Africa comes from Pandemics

such as AIDS and Ebola, the most serious being HIV/AIDS, which is a global pandemic, with cases known on every continent. Since 1981, it has caused the deaths of approximately 25 million people, leaving 13 million children orphaned, resulting in lower deaths than any armed conflict in the twentieth century, including any of the Great Wars, and the trend is towards aggravate the situation. At the epicenter of the phenomenon we find the African continent. There are currently 36.70 million carriers of the virus, with 2.1 million new carriers in 2015 (66% in sub-Saharan Africa) and 1.1 million deaths, of which 470,000 in South and East Africa (UN 2015).

The progression of this disease is profoundly marked by its distinctive and unique character in the history of mankind, both by the extent of its spread and the death it carries with it. The progression is continuous, global, without choosing race or creed, latitude or longitude, or social condition (especially in the treatment phase). Its power of destruction extends to the whole community.

AIDS affects the state as a whole, eroding as it spreads the foundations of society, the individual, the family, and the community itself. The disease is devastating the jobs occupied by the most productive members of society. Their progress is being felt in the governmental, economic and social development areas, with the aggravation that these more productive elements of the middle and upper classes are hardly replaced.

The phenomenon also increases budget needs and social support rates, discouraging foreign investment. The workforce is thus reduced, which causes earnings to fall sharply, especially in the most debilitated or developing countries. At bottom, the impact is global and acts as a social, security and economic destabilizer.

Of the African countries with the highest incidence of AIDS, more than half are involved in armed conflict. Statistics are also clear with regard to HIV-infected military personnel being approximately 5 times higher than civilians and in times of war this figure rises to 50 times higher. The situation is so serious that often the Armed Forces (AF) are even the main group of contaminants and contaminants. This is undoubtedly a situation which in some cases is the main cause of casualties. Moreover, as AIDS does not choose posts, there are important consequences for the chains of command, the capacity of the forces and even their cohesion (Singer, 2002). The reasons for this high incidence are diverse: from reasons related to biological age, to the distancing of sexual partners and finally a risk culture installed in many AFs worldwide (Garcia 2010).

It should be noted that commands in countries where the infection rate is significant are already concerned with force projection capability. The weakening of the military institution provides mechanisms for internal dest-

abilization and weakness that increase the likelihood of an external attack. Multiplying contingents of HIV-infected military makes it impossible for many countries to participate in peace operations (Garcia 2015).

It should be noted, on the other hand, that AIDS is increasingly used as a powerful weapon of war. Kidnappings and genocides have always combined in many conflicts. However, the relevant fact is its recent association with the spread of the AIDS virus: it is possible that the transmission of AIDS may correspond to a practice of genocide, as the element of intentionality in the passage of the virus to the virus seems to be present. the population. This is what happened in Rwanda and now in Congo, where more than 500,000 women were thus infected with AIDS (Singer 2002).

Final Remarks

For the past 50 years, the continent has been the scene of persistent conflicts materialized in permanent structural violence with diverse roots, but mainly due to the fragility of states unable to guarantee their ultimate ends - security, justice and well-being.

It is this constant fragility that prevents the control of the territory and the detention of the monopoly of the use of force, which enables the emergence of other entities that seek to replace formal power, controlling populations and exercising different degrees of social responsibility over them, as are numerous. the cases in the porous Sahara-Sahel region. We refer to the Lumpen movements, or associations of an ethnolinguistic, social, security or political/popular nature, which replace or emerge, the most advanced organizational form being what we have termed global subversion.

Today global subversion materializes in the two main factions of the global jihadist movement (al-Qaeda and Daesh) seeking the conquest of spaces and power in Africa as well, using not only political mechanisms but also, where necessary, violent actions.

Its structure is complex, evolutionary, and easily adapts to different spaces and contexts, be they physical and geographical, ideological and even in cyberspace, always seeking to promote a sense of identity inclusion.

Associated or not with global subversion, the presence of the OCT and the vigorous resurgence of piracy, especially in the Gulf of Guinea region, is still evident on the Continent, jeopardizing Western economic and energy security. Economic inequities, the manifestations of climate change that lead to resource scarcity and the rise of aridity, as well as the progression of pandemics and their social and security consequences are evident and worrying,

as is the case of AIDS, and the expected exponential demographic growth, particularly in the sub-Saharan region, which eventually fosters an unprecedented westward migratory phenomenon, forcing people to move to other spaces in search of (progressively scarcer) resources, security and well-being, weakening territories, generating tensions and instability in already fragile states, in a spiral of conflict.

International intervention, if well coordinated with African states, could be more than a palliative. In fact, global threats - such as global subversion - lack a global response strategy (political/diplomatic, socioeconomic, military, psychological and electronic-informatics), which necessarily involves the creation of a network with focal points in various states for sharing and intelligence information exchange.

From this spectral analysis of the identified threats, many questions remain unanswered and several scenarios can be envisioned: which of the threats tend to increase or decrease? What are the ways in which Africa (with all its Africas) can overcome the most acute threats in the medium or long term? What is the possible answer to address them in a holistic way? How can the international community support in combating and mitigating its consequences?

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ABSTRACT

This essay begins by addressing the security context in Africa and the structural violence that is felt throughout the Continent. Later, it addresses the main threats that are manifest in such a differentiated space, emphasizing that in the current context it seems to be the fragility of the States the greatest threat, incapable of guaranteeing their inhabitants the ultimate ends - security, justice and well-being. Despite the failure of the state, people continue to live in these spaces, having various forms of social organization, which subsist and compete with other state structures, in the collection of taxes, in the use of force and also having different forms of social responsibility over the populations they control. The second threat emphasized in the essay, is one of those social structures that seek to impose itself in several geographic spaces: global subversion, which today is materialized in the two main factions of the global jihadist movement (al-Qaeda and Daesh), which seek the conquest of spaces and power also in Africa, using not only political mechanisms, but also, and when necessary, violent actions. Finally, a spectral analysis of other security threats in Africa, whether natural, such as climate change and pandemics, or man-made, such as organized crime and piracy, is presented.

KEYWORDS

Africa; Threats; Security; Failed States; Global Subversion.

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FROM THE GENERAL PEACE AGREEMENT (1992) TO THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN 1994: THE PEACE PROCESS CONDUCTED IN MOZAMBIQUE¹

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Eduardo Xavier Ferreira Glaser Migon³

Introduction


Located on the East coast of Africa, Mozambique has about 800,000 km², a feature that allows the Mozambican country to occupy the 15th position on territorial extension in Africa. In view of this, its surface contains a considerable amount of natural resources, such as coal, titanium, natural gas and graphite. In political terms, Mozambique has borders with six countries and its territory is delimited on the North by Tanzania, the East by the Indian Ocean, the South by South Africa and Swaziland and to the West by South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi.

¹ The research associated with this article was conducted within the scope of the PhD thesis of the first author, called: The Peace Process unleashed in Angola and Mozambique from a comparative perspective, under the guidance of the second author.

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Figure 1 - Political Map of Mozambique in dual perspective



Borders of Mozambique

Provinces of Mozambique

Source: Own elaboration based on the United Nations Field Department, 2016.

The geopolitical configuration of the surroundings of the African country carries with it a peculiar aspect in its conformation, namely: the presence of the Republic of Madagascar, located to the East of Mozambique, more precisely on an island in the Indian Ocean. It is not by chance that throughout history Madagascar has had an enormous influence on the African country (Visentini 2012).

When the Mozambican history is verified, and in accordance with the basic principle of the theory of International Relations, it's clear that it has never been detached from the International System (IS) and that many of the episodes that occurred around the planet were influenced or had a close relationship with events that occurred in Mozambique. The civil war in Mozambique is an example of this, a conflict triggered in 1977 that was directly related to the Cold War and which plunged the country into a serious internal crisis for more than two decades, ending only in 1994, with the holding of general elections in the country, under the supervision of the United Nations (UN).

The international dimension reached by the Mozambican conflict leads us to assume that the peace process conducted by the UN in Mozambique in the period between 1992 and 1994 should not be analyzed in isola-

tion in time and space, since it is part of a broader system, with a complex nature. Thus, it is proposed that an adequate understanding about this peace process should be based on an understanding of at least two basic topics: 1) the historical evolution of Mozambique; and 2) the initiatives made by IS actors in Mozambique after the Cold War in order to restore stability and peace in the country. That said, the objective of this article is to understand the peace process implemented in Mozambique and to identify the main events that have occurred in the world, which have reflected in the respective peace process.

To this end, this article is structured as follows: initially, the theme on the agenda is set, highlighting some relevant geographical and historical characteristics of Mozambique. In the second section, the methodology used is defined, as well as the limits of this investigation. The third section revisits the process of historical evolution that occurred in Mozambique between the 8th century and the year 1992, reporting on it in five sub-periods. The fourth section analyzes the participation of the UN in Mozambique between 1992 and 1994. And in the last section, the main facts of the IS that reflected positively and negatively on the peace process conducted in Mozambique are verified.


Methodological Considerations

The methodology used in this study is qualitative (Creswell 2010) and the results obtained were analyzed under the light of the complexity theory, more precisely in the understanding that the IS is, *per se*, a complex system. Thus, it is understood that the complex system is one that has linear and nonlinear relationships in its structure, which are characterized by not establishing proportionality between the actions of entry and exit of a system, causing the “butterfly effect”, where small stimuli in certain components can result in large effects in other parts of that system (Bousquet and Curtis 2011). Therefore, the integral parts of this system should not be analyzed in isolation, because they interact with other actors, establishing relationships and making exchanges, which are fundamental for the stability of a complex system (Cairney 2012).

Without disregarding the relations caused by the Mozambican country with other African regions previously, it is understood that Mozambique was only inserted in the IS as of the 8th century, because it was from this period that there was the beginning of the establishment of relations with people from other continents. In this context and based on the complexity theory, it is found that the main facts occurred in Mozambique from the eighth century

should not be analyzed in isolation, because they are closely related to the main events of the planet. Inserted in this plot, the peace process conducted in Mozambique did not escape the rule and suffered great influences from other actors and events that occurred in the IS:

Figure 2 - The Peace Process in Mozambique



Source: Own elaboration, 2019.

Figure 2 summarizes the complexity existing in the international scenario, with a focus on the African country from its insertion in the IS in the 8th century, highlighting the main episodes that occurred in the world that generated reflections in Mozambique. Regarding the universe of actors to be researched, due to the high number of agents that have established relations with Mozambique throughout history, this article defined the study, investigating only those that most influenced the peace process of the Mozambican country:

Table 1 - Universe considered

State actors	Non-State actors
United States of America, former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Russia, Portugal and South Africa.	United Nations Organization

Source: Own elaboration, 2019.

Considering this list of actors, the analysis was done in two phases: 1) initially, the historical evolution of the Mozambican country between the 8th

century and 1992 was revisited, correlating it with the events that occurred in the IS contained in Figure 2; and 2) in a second moment, the participation of each of the agents listed in Table 1 was studied, in the peacebuilding process carried out in Mozambique between 1992 and 1994, highlighting the positive and negative aspects of this action. Seeking to verify the role of the United Nations in this process, all the resolutions issued by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) were investigated, which paid tribute to the African country during the period in which UNOMOZ⁴ was present in the country, highlighting the positive and negative points of this action.

Brief History of Mozambique

Without disregarding the dynamics established by the different African peoples in Mozambique before the 8th century, it is noted that the insertion of the African country in the international context really happened with the occurrence of Islamic expansion, a historical moment that registered rapid growth of Arab power between the 7th, 8th and 9th centuries, with the establishment of an Arab-Muslim empire, which occupied territories in the Iberian Peninsula, the Italian peninsula, the Middle East, Central Asia and the *Maghreb* region (Sicker 2000). Benefiting from the diffusion of Chinese navigation techniques, Arabs and Persians projected themselves in the Indian Ocean and in the middle of the 8th century, they arrived at the structured port of *Sofala*, in Mozambique.

From trade with the Arabs to the arrival of the Portuguese (8th century - 16th century)

Belonging to the largest empire of the time and without subjecting the local population, Arabs and Persians quickly settled along the Mozambican coast from the eighth century and established a lucrative trade with African peoples, notably based on local gold mining (Ricks 1970). This commercial dynamic was maintained in the following centuries and reached its apex between the 10th and 11th centuries, with intense trade between Africans, Persians, Arabs and Indonesians.

However, at the end of the 11th century, the Arab-Muslim empire began to emit the first signs of its fragility with the emergence of the Crusades on the European continent. Led by the military and clerics, these movements were intended to free European countries from the Muslim yoke and, to this

⁴ United Nations Operations in Mozambique.

end, united the European population around a common cause: the religious one (Junior 2001). The territorial loss of the Arab-Muslim empire was not limited to Europe but also extended to other territories, such as Central Asia, which was ceded to the Turks. These facts contributed to the effective fall of this empire in the fifteenth century. Already inserted in the international context of the time, Mozambique felt the effects of this change and registered the decline of the trade with Arabs and Persians, as well as the higher incidence of Chinese and Indians in the region and the consequent increase in trade relations with these peoples (Oidtmann 1958).

The collapse of the Arab-Muslim empire made it possible for European countries to ascend the international system, an aspect that caused great changes on the strategic stage. As a result, the world witnessed the beginning of the Great Navigations, a historical period that lasted from the 15th to the 17th century (Carvalho 1998). Inserted in the IS, once again Mozambique was not immune to what was happening on the planet and witnessed the arrival of the Portuguese in its territory at the end of the fifteenth century.

From the Portuguese State of India to the Independent Captaincy (1505 - 1752)

Thus, and after several decades, the Lusitanians established themselves and founded the Portuguese State of India in 1505, the portuguese overseas department that encompassed a vast territory consisting of Mozambique, numerous islands of the Indian Ocean and several Indian coastal cities. Initially conceived as captaincy of the Portuguese State of India, Mozambique received the installation of the first Portuguese branch in 1505, in the *Sofala* region (Wagner 2007). Motivated by the pulsating trade with the Indies, Mozambique observed the growth of Portuguese trading posts along its coast in the sixteenth century, just as it witnessed the beginning of the Lusitanian penetration into the interior of its territory. The Portuguese were increasing their influence throughout the sixteenth century and, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, were already fully consolidated in the African colony.

However, the 17th century began a period of decline of the Portuguese colonial empire. Under the context of the Great Navigations, Holland, France and the United Kingdom also launched themselves around the globe in search of wealth, an aspect that generated direct reflections on Portuguese overseas possessions. In the midst of this scenario, there was the Luso-Dutch war, which occurred between 1595 and 1663, resulting in a significant territorial loss from the Portuguese State of India to the Dutch. With the main objective of serving as a logistical warehouse for Portuguese vessels trading

with India, Mozambique did not offer great financial attractions. Even so, the Mozambican colony was not unharmed by what was happening on the international scene and registered in 1607, an attempt of Dutch invasion in its territory, which was promptly rejected by the Portuguese troops present in the region (Dodge 1976).

The 18th century marked a change of course for Mozambique. Worried about the great territorial loss that the Portuguese State of India had in the previous century, Portugal decided to reinforce its presence in the African colony. The appointment of the Marquês de Pombal as Portugal's prime minister in 1750 brought about a series of changes throughout the Portuguese colonial empire. Under the strong influence of the Enlightenment ideals, Marquês of Pombal unleashed a series of measures aimed at increasing Lusitanian control over Mozambique. It was in this context that the political status of the Mozambican colony changed in 1752, separating it from the Portuguese State of India and raising it to the category of independent captaincy (Wagner 2007).

From independent captaincy to World War II (1752 - 1945)

With this change, the Portuguese crown took over the administration of Mozambique. It was no coincidence that the following years saw a sequence of political, fiscal, social and commercial actions emanating from Marquês de Pombal and aimed at boosting commercial activity in the Mozambican colony, exploiting natural resources more efficiently and, above all, exercising greater control over Mozambique (Hoppe 1970). As a consequence, commercial activity in Mozambique experienced strong growth in the following decades, with gold, ivory and the slave trade playing a leading role in the colonial economy.

Advancing in the timeline, it is observed that the historical evolution of Mozambique in the nineteenth century necessarily involves the understanding of two facts that occurred in the IS and how they manifested themselves in Mozambican territory: 1) the industrial revolution; and 2) the Berlin conference.

With regard to the industrial revolution, it can be seen that it did not have the strength and reach necessary to influence the actions that were taking place in the Mozambican colony, since neither the industrial revolution nor the actions carried out by the British in the IS with the intention of ending the slave trade were able to eradicate this practice in Mozambique. In fact, what was seen was an increase in the slave trade in this period, which jumped from an annual average of 13,000 slaves in the first decades of the

nineteenth century to an annual average of 20,000 slaves in 1860, numbers that remained until the mid-1880s, even being considered a clandestine activity at the time (Curtin et al 1978). The increase in the slave trade was directly associated with the *modus operandi* adopted by the Portuguese to obtain slave labour, which sought to stimulate rivalries between local tribes, a practice responsible for the increase in revolts in Mozambique, which influenced the formation of the *ethos* of the Mozambican people, planting the first seeds of nationalist sentiment (Zonta 2011).

Regarding the Berlin conference, held between 1884 and 1885, it is noted that it had the strength and scope that the industrial revolution did not have. Among the issues deliberated at the conference, the ones that most influenced Mozambique were the ratification of the end of slave labour and the demarcation of new borders for the African continent. Not coincidentally, the slave trade in Mozambique underwent a progressive decline in the following years until it was completely extinguished at the turn of the 19th to the 20th centuries (Marques 1989). It was not by chance that Mozambique's borders were gradually defined in a diplomatic manner after that conference, to the point of reaching their current borders in 1891.

Having in mind the deliberations of the Berlin Conference and the diplomatic agreements signed in the following years to establish the border limits of Mozambique, the Portuguese were forced to effectively occupy the colony at the beginning of the 20th century. To do so, Portugal has allocated 1/3 of Mozambique's territory to be managed by private companies. On the other hand, these companies should return 10% of their revenues to the Portuguese coffers. Known as *majestic companies*⁵, they had paramilitary forces, financial autonomy, exercised authority over the local population and became the main responsible for the concrete occupation of Mozambican territory (Carvalho 2012). It was in this way that commercial activity and territorial occupation were structured in the African colony at the beginning of the 20th century.

However, the collapse of the New York Stock Exchange in 1929 once again moved the pieces of the strategic board and their effects were also present in Mozambique. Affected by the crisis and looking for solutions to get out of it, Portugal instituted the colonial act of 1930 in an attempt to make the greatest possible profit from its colonies. In summary, this action reinforced the nationalist character in the Portuguese domains, a fact that generated immediate effects in Mozambique, since much of the political and commercial activity was outsourced, as they were conducted by private companies (Min-

⁵ Named after the sovereign authority received by the portuguese crown in the territorial part in which they administered (Gentili 1998).

doso 2017). Thus, the pendulum went to the other side, with the Portuguese government assuming the conduct of all political and economic activities in the colony. However, the way in which the Portuguese colonial administration was implemented from the 1930s onwards, segregating the African population from the key functions of local society, caused discontent among Africans, leading to the emergence of the first associative movements in Mozambique, such as the *African Association*⁶, the embryo of the anti-colonial movements that emerged in the country during the 1960s.

Years later, the world witnessed the outbreak of the World War II in 1939. More than a warlike conflict of global proportions, the outcome of the World War II has completely reconfigured the pieces of the strategic board on the planet. Belonging to the IS, Mozambique was not exempted from this fact and the reflections of this change could be seen on Mozambican soil.

From World War II to independence (1945 - 1975)

Devastated on the occasion of the World War II, the European countries suffered a strong decline and could do nothing in the face of the rise of the United States of America (USA) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to the positions of global powers. This reorganization of forces led to the Cold War, a historical period that began shortly after the World War II and ended symbolically with the fall of the Berlin Wall, in which Americans and Soviets fought for global hegemony in various fields of power (Hobsbawn 1995). Concomitant with this scenario, the trauma generated by the occurrence of two world conflicts in thirty years caused society to pressure the IS in order to create a supranational institution that was effectively able to maintain acceptable levels for the maintenance of peace in the globe, pressure that resulted in the creation of the UN in 1945 (Soares 2011).

Between this reality and under the seal of the Cold War, the African continent inaugurated a process characterized by the independence of several countries, which were previously considered European colonies and by the second half of the twentieth century, began to be recognized as independent states by the UN (Oliveira 2009). However, this fact was not noted in the Portuguese colonies located in Africa, where Mozambique was located. Under pressure from the United Nations, the Portuguese only revised their constitution and changed the political *status* of the Mozambican colony, which was renamed the Portuguese overseas province in 1951, changing nothing in the

⁶ Created in 1938, this movement was composed by Mozambicans and aimed to spread African nationalism in Mozambique, opposing the arbitrariness committed by Portuguese settlers in that period (Neves 2009).

dynamics of relations between Mozambique and Portugal.

The Bandung Conference held in 1955 boosted the African nationalist sentiment that was in place on the continent. Known as Pan-Africanism, this ideology sought to unite African peoples to face the challenges that exist on the planet. Fuelled by Pan-Africanism and under the Cold War, Mozambican associative movements gained strength and established themselves as anti-colonial movements in the ending of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s. Among all the anti-colonial groups that emerged during this period, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) stands out, the main movement that acted in the Mozambican independence process (Gomez 1999).

Founded in June 1962, the history of FRELIMO goes through the understanding of three groups that preceded it: 1) MANU (*Mozambique African National Union*); 2) UDENAMO (*National Democratic Union of Mozambique*); and 3) UNAMI (*African National Union of Independent Mozambique*). Created in 1959 in Kenya, the MANU was a movement that arose from the union of Mozambicans living in Kenya and the surrounding region of Lake *Tanganyika*⁷. Led by *Mateus Mhole*, the group wanted to make Mozambique independent (Neves 2012). UDENAMO was conceived in 1960, in Rhodesia. Under the leadership of *Adelino Gwambe*, the group was composed of Mozambicans residing in Rhodesia and aimed to free Mozambique from the Portuguese yoke. UNAMI, in turn, was founded in 1961 in Niassaland⁸. Like the previous ones, the main cause of the movement was the Mozambican independence and, to this end, the group was composed of Mozambicans from the northern region of Mozambique and were led by Baltazar Cachonga. Thus, as a result of the merger of these three groups and under the auspices of the President of Tanzania, FRELIMO was created on 25 June 1962 in the city of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. With the former UN official, Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, as its leader, the construction of the group took place entirely in foreign territory, a fact that showed the strength of Pan-Africanism in the region.

This architecture shows that it was not by mere chance that all of Mozambique's neighboring countries obtained their independence in this period, more precisely between 1961 and 1968, a fact that once again reveals the strength and transnational breadth of Pan-Africanism. The only exception to this group was South Africa, which had become independent in 1910 but was under the *apartheid* regime. Fearful of the regional political moment,

7 Second largest lake on the African continent, located in the north of Zambia, which serves as a natural border between Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi and Zambia.

8 British colony that became independent in 1964, being renamed Malawi (Souto 2013).

the South Africans decided to get closer to the Portuguese and, in the 1970s, signed a military partnership with the lusitanians, characterized by military exercises and support aimed at defending a Southern Africa against the effervescent pan-Africanism in the region (Barroso 2013).

Even with this South African contribution, Portugal failed to keep Mozambique under their domain for much longer. The oil crisis, which erupted in 1973, was the beginning of a series of events that culminated in the independence of the Mozambican country in June 1975. Given Portugal's dependence on oil, the country has entered a severe economic crisis. Unsatisfied, the Lusitanian media issued heavy criticisms to the Portuguese administration, especially in the high cost demanded of the Portuguese government coffers to maintain their overseas territories (Coggiola and Martins 2006). It was with this atmosphere that the Portuguese military overthrew the Estado Novo regime and decreed the Carnation Revolution in April 1974, a fact that generated immediate recognition of Mozambican independence.

Thus, Portugal and FRELIMO signed the *Lusaka Agreements* in September 1974, in Zambia. This agreement recognised Mozambican independence and established a progressive model of political transition to FRELIMO, determining the day of Mozambique's independence: 25 June 1975, the same date as the creation of FRELIMO. In spite of the decisive role of the oil crisis in the Mozambican outcome, it is noted that the independence process in Mozambique had great participation of the neighbouring countries throughout its course. The place and date of the Lusaka Agreements were not randomly chosen, but only politically ratified before the IS, the influence of the states of the region on the Mozambican independence process.

From independence to the General Peace Agreement (1975 - 1992)

The occurrence of the Mozambican and Angolan independence in the same year changed the balance of power in southern Africa and weakened the white bloc in the region (South Africa and Rhodesia). In this context and under the leadership of Samora Machel, the Mozambican government adopted a bold foreign policy soon after independence, which had a direct impact on the civil war that broke out in the country afterwards: 1) on the one hand, FRELIMO was in solidarity with the peoples who wanted to free themselves from the colonial yoke and fought against the minority regimes established in Africa, a fact that was reflected in Mozambique's support for the anti-colonial movements in Rhodesia and the groups that fought against *apartheid* in South Africa; 2) on the other hand, the country chose to strengthen its ties with the former USSR, redirecting the initial concept of FRELIMO, which

became characterized in the IS as a movement of Marxist-Leninist nature (Cau 2011).

The neighbors' retaliation came at once. The South Africans quickly made efforts to put pressure on the struggling Mozambican economy. Internally, South Africa has developed an aggressive package of economic measures, with a focus on the mechanisation of mining production. In the external sphere, South Africans articulated and carried out actions to redirect the flow of regional production, which was even flowed through the ports of Mozambique. Rhodesia, through its secret services, supported the creation of the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). Composed of Mozambican soldiers from the special forces of the Portuguese Army and Portuguese settlers who left Mozambique and lived in Rhodesia, RENAMO was a group of an anti-communist nature that had the purpose of opposing FRELIMO politically and ideologically (Mosca 2005).

And it was with this climate that the civil war was established in Mozambique in 1977. The country has been plunged into a serious internal crisis, which has lasted for more than two decades in the country. On the one hand, under the leadership of *Samora Machel*, FRELIMO represented the Mozambican government and was supported by the former USSR. On the other hand, being led by a former FRELIMO dissident, *André Matsangaissa*, RENAMO was supported by Rhodesia.

This dynamic was kept until the beginning of the 1980s, a period in which there was a new movement of pieces from the strategic table in the Mozambican case. In 1979, Rhodesia began a process of independence from the United Kingdom, which culminated in 1980 with the recognition as a sovereign state by the IS, being renamed Zimbabwe. In addition, RENAMO leader *André Matsangaissa* died during a fight with Mozambican forces in 1979 in *Sofala* province. These two episodes were a severe blow to RENAMO's claims (Cau 2011). However, *Ronald Reagan's* assumption of power in the U.S. has redirected the country's foreign policy and its focus has shifted to the bipolar confrontation. This foreign policy stance led the Americans to immediately support RENAMO, a conduct that was also followed by South Africa, giving new impetus to RENAMO. In other words, while RENAMO was weakened by the death of its leader and the loss of support in Zimbabwe, it found two major supports in the early 1980s: the USA and South Africa.

By the mid-1980s, Mozambique was economically weak and with the decline of the former USSR, it was no longer receiving the Soviet financial support it once did. Under pressure from the population, FRELIMO abandoned its ideological convictions and signed the *Nkomati* agreement with the South African government in 1984 in South Africa. In summary, this agree-

ment provided for the termination of the support provided by South Africa to RENAMO, in the same way as it required the end of the support provided by Mozambique to groups fighting against *apartheid* in South Africa. In 1986 there was another fact that further removed the Mozambican country from Marxist-Leninist ideology. This is the death of the president of Mozambique, *Samora Machel*, due to the crash of the plane that was carrying him in South Africa (Darch 2018). These episodes made it possible to initiate major political transformations in Mozambique, which resulted in the country's rapprochement with the capitalist system, in the same way that they made it possible to initiate dialogue between the government and RENAMO.

In any case, a fact that occurred outside the African limits, proved to be central to Mozambique's plans. It is the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which reconfigured the game of forces on the world stage and decreed the symbolic end of the Cold War, elevating the United States to the rank of the only global superpower and unlocking the actions of the United Nations on the international scene. With the end of the bipolar confrontation, among other elements, *apartheid* lost one of its main motivations in South Africa and thus South Africans were able to initiate a gradual process aimed at ending this practice, which began with the release of *Nelson Mandela* from prison in February 1990. For the same reasons, Namibia became independent from South Africa in 1990, just as the UN succeeded with UNAVEM I⁹ in Angola, which closed in 1991 (Krška 2007).

The changes made internally in Mozambique, associated with the new global and regional environment, created an extremely favourable environment for the end of the civil war and the consequent start of the peace process led by the United Nations in Mozambique. As a result of this scenario, in October 1992, the president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, and the leader of RENAMO, *Afonso Dhlakama*, signed the General Peace Agreement in the city of Rome, Italy.

The Peace Process in Mozambique (1992 - 1994)

As a consequence of the General Peace Agreement, the UNSC issued Resolution No. 782 in October 1992, authorizing the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations and the deployment of 25 UN military observers to conduct studies on the costs and feasibility of a peace operation in Mozambique. In December 1992, with the studies completed, the UNSC issued Resolution No. 797, establishing ONU-

9 *United Nations Angola Verification Mission I*

MOZ, a peace mission that was created with the purpose of implementing the proposals established in the General Peace Agreement.

In spite of the weakened social and economic condition that Mozambique was in, with a sensitive internal political scenario, resulting from more than two decades of civil war, the UN found a country that allowed the development of its activities and that, combined with the favorable international situation, generated satisfactory conditions for the beginning of the work of the United Nations in Mozambican soil.

ONUMOZ (1992 - 1994)

With an initial mandate of 10 months, ONUMOZ began its work in December 1992 on Mozambican territory. Due to some internal factors, its mandate was extended a few times, being symbolically closed on December 9, 1994. The main objective of ONUMOZ was to achieve the goals established by the General Peace Agreement and, to this end, the focus of the peace mission was based on four distinct axes: 1) political; 2) military; 3) humanitarian; and 4) electoral. From all four fields, it can be inferred that the political aspect was a priority, as it allowed the creation of an environment of trust in the country, thus enabling the disarmament of a good part of the population and structuring the new Mozambican Armed Forces with members of RENAMO and FRELIMO. The military axis was sensitive, as it implied a clear and adequate mandate that would enable the development of field activities and would not cause major legal and operational disruptions. In this way, it would be possible to use blue helmets anywhere in the Mozambican territory, enabling humanitarian support to the entire unassisted population in Mozambique. The electoral question complements the previous axes and symbolically represented the end of the reconstruction of the UN in Mozambique.

During the course of UNOMOZ, UN activities took place in a climate of relative stability, with the exception of a few episodes that occurred in March 1994. By that time, 50,000 RENAMO members had already been demobilized and were occupying the provisional settlements set up by the members of the United Nations in Mozambique. In view of the uncertainty as to whether they would be reincorporated by the new Mozambican Armed Forces, there were problems involving this public in some areas of the UN camp, such as riots, rebellions, looting of stores, cases of rape, seizure of UN officials and vehicles, among others of smaller size (Malachi 2007). In any case, these incidents were promptly repressed and the climate of stability could be maintained in Mozambique, ensuring an adequate environment for holding general elections in the country (Pureza et al 2007).

An interesting aspect of the mission of onusian peace in Mozambique rests on the main external extra-continental actors. Regarding Russia, it appears that it could do nothing in the case of Mozambique, because it was facing the constitutional crisis of 1993, in which the Russian parliament decreed the *impeachment* of the then Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who did not respect this decision, making the country more unstable (Segrillo 2012). About Portugal, it is observed that it had enormous difficulties in adjusting to a new phase experienced by the Portuguese, more precisely in meeting the goals imposed by the Maastricht Treaty, a fact that limited the Lusitanian country in actions at the external level. The Americans, in its turn, decided to leave the African continent due to the internal wear and tear caused by their participation in the conflict in Somalia, when they suffered heavy criticism from the US media. Thus, it is observed that the peace process conducted by the UN in Mozambique has not been influenced by the main extra-continental countries in its course.

However, a fact that occurred at the regional level proved to be fundamental to the course of the actions carried out in Mozambique. This was *Nelson Mandela's* victory in the South African general election in April 1994. More than a mere coincidence, the rise of Nelson Mandela to the position of President of South Africa represented the victory of Pan-Africanism in the region's leading country, making it the first time that South Africans have had a black president in their history. This episode was not limited to South Africa, but the opposite, it somehow went beyond South African limits and reached *Maputo*, generating a climate of optimism and confidence also in Mozambique, particularly among the FRELIMO members, who were ideologically opposed to the practice of *apartheid* in South Africa.

In any case, the work done by the UN in Mozambique, which found a country devastated by a long civil war and which did not even have solid institutions, should not be minimised. With investments of US\$ 1 billion, the United Nations did not underestimate the size of the challenge imposed and managed very well the actions in the field, leading the Mozambican peace process to a successful conclusion (Malachi 2007). Highlight should be given to the onusian leaders in the tactical field, in the strategic field and in the political field. As far as the tactical field is concerned, the leadership exercised by the *Force Commander* of the mission, a position held by Brazilian Brigadier General Lélío Gonçalves Rodrigues da Silva between February 1993 and February 1994 and by Major General of Bangladesh, *Mohammad Abdus Salam*, between March and December 1994, who knew how to lead their troops in the midst of the hostilities they suffered in Mozambique and lead to the successful continuation of the peace mission (United Nations 2018). In the strategic


field, the political skill with which the UN Special Representative and Head of Mission, *Aldo Ajello*, demonstrated on the occasion of the incidents that took place in the provisional bases prepared by the United Nations, quickly articulating with the local government on the fate of the demobilized members of RENAMO, can be observed. And in the political field, it is noted that the visit made by the UN Secretary-General, *Boutros Boutros-Ghali*, in October 1993 in Mozambique, generated an extremely positive impact in the country, insofar as it revealed the concern that the highest level of the United Nations had with the ongoing actions in the African country, an aspect that gave solidity and credibility to the performance of blue helmets in Mozambican territory (United Nations 2018).

And it was in this climate that the general elections in Mozambique were held in October 1994. Under the supervision of UN professionals, the elections took place without major disturbances and the results were released in November 1994, giving victory to the president who was already in office: *Joaquim Chissano*, of FRELIMO (United Nations 2018), a fact that was ratified by the members of RENAMO and the United Nations. Thus, ONUMOZ's mission was symbolically concluded on December 9, 1994, when *Joaquim Chissano* assumed the new presidential mandate in the country.

Final Remarks

The final phase of this research begins by summarizing the purpose of this article: to understand the peace process triggered in Mozambique, correlating it with the main facts that occurred in the IS that influenced this process. Thus, the first finding of this study is that the Mozambican peace process is complex in nature and did not begin with the UN. The participation of the United Nations since 1992 represents only the final part of a process that began in the 8th century, with the establishment of trade with the Arabs and ended with the holding of general elections in the country in 1994:

Graph 1 - The Mozambican Peace Process




Source: own elaboration, 2019.

In summary, Graph 1 shows that the peace process in Mozambique is divided into five periods: 1) the first is the largest of all and is at the base of the pyramid, being coded by the color orange and has about eight centuries of duration. It began with the establishment of trade with the Arabs and Persians in the eighth century and ended with the founding of the Portuguese State of India in 1505; 2) the second period is 440 years long and is coded by the color red. It started with the foundation of the Portuguese State of India and ended with the end of the II WW; 3) the third period is represented by the yellow color and is 30 years long, starting soon after the II WW and ending with the Mozambican independence in 1975; 4) the fourth period is represented by the green color, happened in 27 years and covers from the Mozambican independence to the General Peace Agreement, signed in 1992; and 5) the fifth

period is the smallest of all and is being represented by the almost imperceptible blue color at the top of the pyramid, comprising only the temporal cut in which the UN was present in Mozambique: from 1992 to 1994.

Given the long duration of the Mozambican peace process and the difference in form, context, extent and composition with which each of the periods has influenced the country throughout history, each phase needs to be analysed individually. Thus, with almost eight centuries of duration, the first period is marked by longevity and stability. Focusing on commercial activity, the Arabs did not subjugate the local population, *modus operandi* that was also followed by the Chinese, who became more present in the region from the occurrence of the crusades. The 700 years that local African tribes have had contact with other peoples, making exchanges and not having their cultures subjugated, help to explain the way in which Pan-Africanism was so strong in this region, an aspect that directed the country’s course in the second half of the 20th century.


Graph 2 - The 1st Phase of the Mozambican Peace Process



Source: own elaboration, 2019.

Moving on to the second phase of the Mozambican peace process and considering that the Luso-Dutch war had little impact on Mozambique, it is noted that the Mozambican country had under strong portuguese influence while it was a captaincy of the Portuguese State of India. As of the change from threshold to independent captaincy, Mozambique was more strongly inserted in the international context, receiving more influence from other actors and facts in the IS:


Graph 3 - The 2nd Phase of the Mozambican Peace Process



Source: own elaboration, 2019.

With regard to the 3rd phase of the Mozambican peace process, it is noted that it began after the end of the II WW and ended with independence in 1975. Following the trend pointed out from the change in Mozambique's political status in 1752, the 3rd phase was also not detached from the IS:

Graph 4 - The 3rd Phase of the Mozambican Peace Process




Source: own elaboration, 2019.

Graph 4 shows that throughout the period, the Mozambican peace

process was under the influence of the Cold War. The creation of the UN in 1945, which legitimized the independence of all African countries at that time, should not be overlooked. The central aspect of the 3rd phase of the peace process rests on the strength of African nationalist sentiment in the Mozambican independence, a fact that was evidenced by the Bandung Conference and by the robust manifestation of the ideology of pan-Africanism in the surrounding countries of Mozambique, region where FRELIMO was formed. In the following decade, the oil crisis triggered a cascading movement, triggering the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974, and Mozambican independence in 1975.

With regard to the 4th phase, it should be noted that it began with the independence of the country and ended with the General Peace Agreement signed between the President of Mozambique and the leader of RENAMO, in Rome. As in the previous phase, the peace process during this period continued to be influenced by the current international situation, with the special participation of regional actors:

Graph 5 - The 4th Phase of the Mozambican Peace Process




Source: own preparation, 2019.

The fourth phase of the peace process in Mozambique was the period when regional rivalries were most present in Mozambican territory. Under the umbrella of the Cold War, RENAMO was created in Rhodesia, thus initiating a long civil war in Mozambique. With Ronald Reagan's rise to power in the USA, Zimbabwe's independence and South African support for RENAMO, the strategic framework of the peace process in Mozambique took on

new forms in 1980. Economically asphyxiated, Mozambique had to sign the Nkomaki Agreement with South Africa in 1984. However, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 triggered a series of events in the IS, which made it possible to conclude the General Peace Agreement in 1992.

Regarding the last phase of the Mozambican peace process, it is noted that it began with the performance of ONUMOZ in Mozambique and ended symbolically with the assumption of Joaquim Chissano as president of the country, comprising the entire period of performance of ONUMOZ:

Graph 6 - The 5th Phase of the Angolan Peace Process



Source: own preparation, 2019.

The last phase of the Mozambican peace process reveals the protagonism of the United Nations on Mozambican soil. Without underestimating the challenge it had in Mozambique, the UN spared no effort and invested about US\$ 1 billion in a period of just two years. But the reason for the success does not lie only in the resources applied by the institution. Unique emphasis should be given to the leadership exercised by UN professionals at all levels (political, strategic and tactical), without which, the course of actions in the field could take another direction.

Another aspect that should be considered is the strong influence that regional actors, especially South Africa, had in the case of Mozambique from the second half of the 20th century onwards. The election of Nelson Mandela as President of South Africa in 1994 was the spark of motivation and hope for the Mozambican people, who went to the polls in October of the same year and legitimized the peace process that was underway. With this climate, the

general elections in Mozambique took place in a climate of stability, registering few occurrences, which were not able to bury the electoral process that was in progress.

Joaquim Chissano's assumption of the country's presidency, on December 9, 1994, ended the long peace process experienced by the Mozambican country, which began with his insertion in the IS, in the 8th century, and ended in 1994, with the Mozambican population democratically electing its leader.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to understand the peace process in Mozambique, as well as to identify the main events that occurred in the world, which were reflected in the respective peace process. Therefore, this article is structured as follows: initially, the theme is set out, highlighting some relevant geographical and historical characteristics of Mozambique. In the second section the methodology is defined, in the same way that the limits of this investigation are informed. The third section revisits the process of historical evolution that took place in Mozambique between the 8th century and the years of 1992, discussing it in five subperiods. The fourth section analyzes the participation of the UN in Mozambique between 1992 and 1994. In the last section, it is verified that the main events of the international system are positively and negatively reflected in the peace process conducted in Mozambique.

KEY WORDS

Mozambique; Peace; UN; Africa.

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THE NEED FOR A CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT DOCTRINE CHANGE TO ONE FOR PEACEFUL TIMES: THE CASES OF CHILE AND ECUADOR¹

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Introduction

Which are the principles that South American Armed Forces have established for their doctrinal guidelines to act as forces in peaceful times? How does the above apply to the cases of Chile and Ecuador? The purpose of this paper is to answer the questions mentioned above, but despite the subsequent development of the work, we intend to present simple answers, in order to establish an introductory basis. In the first place, the majority of the Armed Forces in South America have, within their doctrinal structures, the basis for the concept of deterrence as a substantial part of their planning models. Thus, both the structure of the forces, the deployment in the territory, as well as the purchases and renewal of weapons, are stipulated on institutional needs, but on the aforementioned concept. To this, the main constitutional mission of the aforementioned armed forces must also be added, which is the protection of territorial integrity. And as a result of the above, added to a historical, social and cultural process, a perspective of integration of the Armed Forces with the State is achieved, having as key processes their participation in the event of an international warlike conflict, or confrontation with groups armed that have a configuration that rival with the Armed Forces.

But without prejudice to the previous scenario, the Armed Forces of the region have not participated in a real conventional war conflict for several decades, which may be due to the fact that countries have closed the border issues pending with internationally recognized legal instruments, and those

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who still maintain differences, have chosen to resolve them through peaceful means. In conjunction with the above, the advent of democracy as the government regime, the economic interdependence that occurs between several countries in the region, and the emergence of the so-called “new threats”, have resulted that the probability of an armed conflict, although it still does not disappear at all, had diminished significantly. This point of view not only affects the way of perceiving the phenomena from the State and the society they represent, but also the Armed Forces themselves, since the basis of their fundamental mission lies within a process of change. Thus, the armed forces have begun to establish new doctrinal parameters, taking into account a perspective more linked to the peacetime evidenced by the region. In this regard, it is possible to observe as experiences the experiences of both Chile and Ecuador, thereby establishing common denominators, as well as substantial differences in their processes.

The object of study focuses on establishing what are the main elements, both for the cases of Chile and Ecuador, which generate the basis for an eventual modification or the beginning of a debate about the functions of their armed bodies, beyond those already indicated. In this regard, it is possible to consider that the influence of the external media has been greater than those aspects that are characteristic of the countries, considering the possible extensions in the roles and functions of their armed bodies. But despite the aforementioned, it is the endogenous elements of the States that, finally, establish the differences between them, mainly because it is in the internal reality that the same exogenous phenomenon is weighted differently from the State. Thus, when considering elements as subjective as the “weighting”, the present work has a high interpretation component based on official documents, as well as the experiences that have been rescued through both written means and the experience itself. of the undersigned with actors linked to the Armed Forces in both countries.

It has been decided to establish a comparative study based on relatively similar components, especially in the case of Chile and Ecuador, taking into account the amount of population, historical institutional relations of cooperation, as well as similar doctrines, in order to get to know their realities and difficulties around the context of security and regional defense indicated. The above is also complemented in the case that in both countries, the factors that affect the change of context are observed, although with some differences. However, and although a series of dimensions are established on which it would eventually be possible to replicate that methodological structure to other cases, this is not necessarily the objective of the present work. However, this research has the methodological quality that by comparing the reality of

these two countries that are in the process of change in the field described above, it is possible to replicate the present study in, eventually, countries that share some of the characteristics described.

It is concluded that although both Chile and Ecuador have established processes of changes in the indicated dimensions, it is possible to identify a series of elements that limit, and even generate resistance to changes, especially in those processes that link both a change of doctrine and its subsequent implementation. The above is especially visualized in segments of structural qualities, and more specifically in the doctrine on a cultural level, and the application of the doctrine in concrete acts. But without prejudice to the foregoing, it is also observed that although the resistance is highly complex to overcome, this does not weaken the generalized conception that it is within a process of major change, at international and regional level, as regards to the needs of the countries regarding the extension of the functions of the Armed Forces.

The context of change in security and Defense for South America

Talking about a context of change implies, *per se*, that a stage or process is being left behind, or even including a part of that, on the other. And the realization and execution of this new process also implies differences with the above. Failure to comply with the above would mean a process of change that is not such. Therefore, it is necessary to point out, what was the previous context in the region in the areas of security and defense, and also what are the elements that make up the eventual new context, especially in terms of processes. In this sense, it is possible to consider five aspects in which the change is palpable: first, the fact that most of the border disputes between the countries of South America have reached a resolution between the different parties involved; secondly, it is appreciated that those territorial disputes and differences that persist have had a diverse treatment by the countries, prioritizing a peaceful resolution of the controversies, as opposed to the use of military means. Thirdly, it is observed in the region that democracy has been imposed as the main government regime, which has been legitimized by the rest of the countries both in the region, as well as by different organizations in a regional and international sense. In the fourth aspect, it is possible to visualize a high degree of interdependence between the States of South America, highlighting in this sense in the first place the economic aspect, but with a strong social and cultural component that are on the rise, although

taking into account some aspects that maximize or minimize the mentioned process. And finally, new forms of threats have been experienced that have had high negative impacts on the development and security of the countries of the region, beyond the so-called traditional threats, resulting in a new way of visualizing security both regionally and worldwide.

One of the aspects to take into consideration, is based on the fact that the aforementioned processes cannot be understood as atomized and exclusive aspects of each other, but that they have a relationship with each other, while maintaining a relationship with processes of greater weight and scope. In this sense, the aforementioned processes would act as intervening variables, which influence the behavior and direction of the processes of change in the notions of security and defense as a whole. But to the above, the fact that although they are intervening aspects, they have a different weighting for each case must necessarily be considered. This depends especially on the degree of importance and relevance that a factor has in one reality or another, based on the fact that there are idiosyncratic and training elements, both at the level of societies and also of the armed bodies themselves, which generate facilities in the adoption of certain concepts, such as resistance (Neumann 2010; Zehfuss 2009).

An example of the above is visualized around the interpretation that the notion of interdependence can generate in the field of security and defense. Thus, and from a liberal point of view, interdependence is seen as a process that helps to understand a decrease in the likelihood of a conventional war between two or more countries, due to the fact that a war adventure would bring more damage than benefits for the parties involved, as well as the fact that the communication channels between the actors are expanded. But interdependence is also interpreted from a different point of view, taking into account that by creating greater channels of communication and mutual dependence, various actors can intervene in sensitive spaces and with strategic qualities for one of the parties, which in turn yes it would generate an increase in distrust and conflict. The above, even without taking into account the degree of asymmetry that interdependence has, which allows for the intervention of other processes in the indicated gear, such as the opening of borders, the inclusion of the Armed Forces as an actor within the national and international market, or even the inclusion of the country within a process of regional integration, which directly influence the notion of security and defense.

As mentioned before, one of the characteristic elements of the region from the conformation of the republics in the nineteenth century, until the same decade of 1990, were the territorial issues pending between the States.

According to Juan Carlos Arriaga (2013), this type of conflict in the region had two essential aspects regarding its origin. First, the vague delimitation of territorial-administrative spaces made by the Spanish authorities at the time of the Colony, which then gave rise to the delimitation of future Nation States in the region. And secondly, there are the interests of the new South American oligarchies who wanted to maintain their power spaces with those authorities that allowed them to achieve that. With this, a highly elitist conception of the processes of independence of the countries is observed, which added to the vague perspective of territorial demarcation left at the time of the Spanish Colony, gave way to the different war conflicts, evidenced with greater force in the second half of the 19th century.

The territorial definitions were solved during the nineteenth century, in the vast majority of cases, through the use of the war instrument, which resulted in a conception where military force was a decisive factor for the imposition of interests of a country over another, especially when there were territorial disputes (Nunn 2011). This approach was the generator of the “arms races” among some countries in the region, especially in the first two decades of the twentieth century. But despite the negative economic consequences of maintaining high budgets in armament, maintenance and renovation, the countries of South America did not use these (with the exception of Argentina, in their conflict with England over the Falkland Islands), except with the configuration of the “deterrence” process (Kacowicz and Mares 2016). However, countries still maintained territorial problems and disagreements that were managed through the use of the Armed Forces, as was the case of the conflict between Ecuador and Peru in 1995 in the Alto Cenepa area, better known as the “War of the Condor.”

Even, the conception of protection of the territory through the military means, goes further in regard to the generation and strengthening of the doctrinal parameters of the Armed Forces of the region. Thus, as a result of the need to maintain a force prepared for a conventional conflict, the process called “professionalization” of the Armed Forces began, which consisted in the preparation of military personnel, specifically officers, in aspects related to the knowledge generation within the field of military sciences. And within the areas of knowledge of the military sciences, especially stood out the strategy, elements related to the command and control of the different military units, as well as aspects related to the geopolitics and the neighborhood reality of each country (Nunn, 2011). That was considered as part of the basic knowledge that was given to students who were part of the Higher Schools or War Academies in the region, but always having as a structural part, the consideration that the country had to have a dissuasive notion, especially with

regard to the conventional means to make war, in order to achieve the most basic parameters of military professionalization. But what also happened was that the deterrent model was maintained and strengthened, beyond the international security and defense context, and even at the national level, was being modified, especially since the end of the Cold War.

Thus, the change is not only generated at the time of resolving a dispute between state actors, but rather by the forms and elements that are appreciated as influential in these processes. In the first place, all the territorial conflicts that were resolved, did so through an international treaty, thereby generating both rights and responsibilities between the contracting parties. But in addition to the above, an international treaty has a different legal conception since the birth of the United Nations Organization (UN), because all of these legal instruments must be deposited in said organization, as a way to establish both a International legitimacy as a notion of transparency among the actors when a difference could occur. But perhaps more relevant than mentioned, is that the UN establishes regulatory mechanisms for the use of force. Therefore, countries are not free to act with the use of the warlike instrument when discrepancies between states appear. Thus, the United Nations has served as a “dissuasive” actor towards countries, in regard to the use of their Armed Forces in conventional terms (Jackson 2007).

And secondly, and related to the previous point, it is necessary to specify that the territorial disputes that are still pending, countries have established as the main instrument to resolve their differences to Public International Law. Through peaceful mechanisms, supported by the UN, the States in South America have decided to use them as valid instruments when a territorial dispute arises, being the most used mechanism in the present 21st century sentences issued by the International Court of Justice of Hague, an international tribunal linked to the UN system, and that most of the countries of the region recognize with competence for that through the American Treaty of Pacific Solutions, better known as the “Pact of Bogotá” signed the year 1948³. Thus, a good number of the countries in the region have chosen to solve their territorial problems through international treaties; and those who still maintain differences over a territorial space, have made the decision to prioritize peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms, protected through the UN system.

³ The Bogotá Pact was signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, United States, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela. However, both Argentina, Cuba, the United States, Guatemala and Venezuela have not ratified it, and Colombia and El Salvador denounced it.

But the aforementioned cannot be interpreted as an absolute element, but must necessarily be linked to other processes, to achieve a better understanding of the phenomenon of change indicated at the time. And within these other processes, it is possible to point out democracy as the prevailing government regime, as well as the great and growing interdependence that a number of South American countries possess. Since the beginning of the 21st century, democracy has been the regionally accepted government regime, which has a double perspective. First, it is established that democracy is the government regime that precedes authoritarian perspectives; that is, government leaders are elected by the public through periodic elections and that the process itself is subject to the scrutiny of society as well as international organizations, where its transparency is validated. With the above, it seeks to establish an adequate representativeness of the governed through the rulers. And secondly, democracy has been established as the government regime legitimately recognized by the rest of the countries in the region. Thus, and as a consequence of the authoritarian regimes that were evidenced in the region by the 1970s, democracy is seen as that regime where human rights are mostly respected, as well as fundamental freedoms. Derived from the above, when a South American country demonstrates an institutional crisis that could put the democratic system at risk, regional organizations act so that this does not happen. The aforementioned happened through the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in the events of Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay in the 21st century.

As a complement to the aforementioned on the perspective of maintaining the democratic system in the region, there is the fact that having larger countries that have embraced the maintenance of democracy as their government regime, has given way to the opening of new channels of communication and actors involved in the generation or execution of the different areas of foreign policy among the countries of the region. In this regard, the fact that although international management issues as well as security issues in the region is highlighted, it is still strongly centralized in the state apparatus (Weiffen and Duarte 2017), strategies are visualized, specifically in the border areas, to channel efforts and measures that help the inhabitants that constantly transit between countries (Ovando 2017). The aforementioned, together with paradiplomacy initiatives, has allowed that in case of any problem or misunderstanding, more rapid and specific channels of dialogue are activated, thereby avoiding the escalation of the conflict. And while that is not necessarily proper to visualize it exclusively within a democratic regime, the truth is that it has been thanks to the qualities of that regime, where those spaces, especially those linked to communication in the border space, have

enhanced and increased their relevance, especially at times when territorial disputes have been visualized within these geographical spaces.

Another point on which a degree of influence can be visualized between the decrease in the likelihood of an armed conflict is the link between the economic ones of the countries of the region, also considering at this point the presence of other actors with influence international, as they are companies of transnational characteristics, establishing a logic of mutual dependence or interdependence. In this sense, it is pointed out that the conception of interdependence limits that countries resolve their differences through the armed route, due to the negative consequences that this form of relationship brings to trade, as to other areas of interrelation between the societies that make up the States (Morgan 2007). However, in the case of South America, although there is a high degree of interdependence between economic development models, such as the relationship between Argentina-Brazil or Chile-Peru, that strictly speaking is a reductionist vision of the phenomenon of interdependence, because the link between countries has not reached the same areas as in the European or North American case (between Canada and the United States of America), but has been prioritized in commercial and mobility aspects. But the relevant thing is that it is possible to observe that interdependence and democracy go hand in hand, due to the product of a more institutionalized democratic system, the channels of dialogue and negotiation are expanded, resulting in increased links between countries and, with it, a change in the prospects for security threats and their defense.

As a way of complementing the ideas indicated, and although the arguments presented have a theoretical root of understanding that comes from a liberal vision, it cannot necessarily be considered as an exclusive point of view. Even, within the context mentioned at the time, there are other phenomena that have resulted in a change in the way of appreciating the dangers and threats that affect the State, particularly from a perspective in which the so-called conventional ones, that is, those that they come from one state actor to another, they have emphasized the phenomena that become non-state actors. These phenomena have been classified as unconventional threats or new threats, and have a high degree of negative impact on the societies that are affected (Cabrera 2012, David 2008).

The problem is that although these phenomena have been presented throughout history in the different countries of the region, the panorama that is visualized in the 21st century does not show a variation of the nature of the phenomena themselves, but that in its magnitude and in the means that are used. As a result, it is possible to show that if before the actions of the institutional groups dedicated to the internal security of the countries, such as

the Police, were able to deal with the actions of the actors that managed illicit activities, that no longer possible, due to the magnitude of the phenomenon and the means used, the latter being increasingly sophisticated in terms of technology and resources (Rivera 2008). That is why when considering new threats as actors and processes that are constantly involved, and with increasingly negative effects on societies, a need to even the balance, always in terms of means, with the use of the Armed Forces, both as an auxiliary form of media cooperation for the Police, or plane as another operative part, in the fight against new threats.

The rise of these so-called unconventional threats, those that do not have a quality of traditional warlike conflict but that are permanent, affect the population and in multiple cases are operationalized through means of war, both from actors other than the State as well as by the organisms in charge of fighting those phenomena. However, both the impact and the magnitude of the phenomena indicated, has given the Armed Forces and their respective States to have established changes in the respective security and defense doctrines, with the aim of having a better task, taking into account their geographical location as well as the degree of permeability that they have in the area of their borders, among other aspects. Thus, considering both contextual aspects as well as their geographical and political qualities, the States of the region have begun a slow but clear process of modification of their armed bodies, especially identifying themselves in the change of general doctrines for the Armed Forces.

The need for a change of doctrine and resistance

As a consequence of the aforementioned processes, the probability of a warlike confrontation between countries of the region, although it has not been annulled in its entirety, had given way to a decrease in the probability of that happening, especially when it is in presence of a controversy or difference in the territorial aspect. But what is relevant at this point is that the classical conception of the use of the Armed Forces is in a process of change and renewal, a product that the perspective and interpretation around the concept of “deterrence”, from a conventional view, is not applicable in its entirety or, failing that, it is not apt to be able to establish a structure and planning in the strategic scope for the countries. For these purposes, it is contemplated that the conception around conventional deterrence is directly conditioned to the weight of the military element, which is greater with respect to other aspects, from a vision of the classical strategy (Gray 2012). Thus, deterrence is based on the perception that an eventual and / or potential adversary may have that

the cost of undertaking an armed operation is greater than the benefits that can be obtained through it (Morgan 2003).

This way of understanding deterrence is, as mentioned at the time, from a conventional conception. That is to say, deterrence is observed to work when the eventual adversary does not carry out any action that could go against the interests of a country, but from a military point of view. However, this interpretation is not only restricted, but also does not apply in its entirety to the regional context indicated at the time, for various reasons. According to Frank Zagare and Marc Kilgour, the vision of deterrence has two major components. On the one hand, there is a military perspective, which has prevailed in the elaboration of the plans and doctrines of the Armed Forces of the region; but on the other hand, deterrence has a strong political component, which translates into diplomatic actions that countries establish to accompany the previous process. Thus, deterrence cannot be understood exclusively as a military aspect, but must be complemented by international efforts, with the aim of minimizing any degree of threat to the various interests that a State may have (Zagare and Kilgour 2004). And even within the aforementioned, there are a number of aspects that could determine the political action of a State, such as the economic-commercial or even the possible international links and alliances that may have, so it could be considered that the latter the approach has a multidimensional quality, when addressing the deterrence process.

But as a consequence of the previous situation, the following scenario is generated in South America. On the one hand, there is a military approach to deterrence, but on the other hand the political component of it does not materialize effectively. This can be visualized through the demands that have been made in international courts of justice, taking into account discussions and controversies of a territorial nature. Thus, the fact of possessing a “deterrent” armed component has not been a key aspect for the conception of deterrence when making a decision to sue a country internationally. Even the terms of the claim are, in most cases, accepted by the defendant, since it is considered that this vision is considered as one of the multiple peaceful mechanisms to resolve disputes between States. Therefore, deterrence as a concept, for the regional level, is not used in a holistic way, thereby generating an asymmetric way in the use of the instruments that are part of that strategic conception, and leaving the “deterrent” doctrines atomized of conventional armed components.

Another of the components that are evidenced within a generalized scheme of changes and renewal of doctrines, is the one which is related to the increase of the tasks related to development by the Armed Forces of the region. While it is true that it is possible to verify that the armed forces, throughout

the history of the different countries of the region, have contributed significantly to improving the development and living conditions of the population, especially when it comes to areas that could be referred to as isolated from the main urban centers of a country. But such efforts, although they can be considered as part of the nature of the Armed Forces, are not necessarily circumscribed as a substantial part of a national doctrine in the use of armed means, because the main work of the bodies mentioned in the region is associated with the maintenance of territorial integrity based on the doctrinal conception of deterrence (Thies 2016). Derived from the above then, it is understood that the work of helping the population and development in general terms, is a secondary or subsidiary function of the armed forces.

It was within that “subsidiary functions”, in which the so-called new threats or unconventional threats have been circumscribed. Notwithstanding that, the foregoing is also a consequence of a context in which it is complex to classify a phenomenon that has, in itself, a diffuse nature and that escapes the conventional or classical notion of threat, taking into account the doctrinal vision of Armed Forces in the region. The context indicated in question, accounts for a series of phenomena that are not necessarily limited to acting or controlling by a particular State, nor do they have a defined scope in terms of their manifestations, instruments and consequences for both countries, as well as for the societies in general. With this, phenomena such as drug trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, to mention some of the most relevant for the region, have been part of regional security agendas and guidelines in general, such as security and defense policies of countries in particular (Stolberg 2012).

Thus, and as a consequence of the aforementioned context, it is that the Armed Forces have found themselves in the need to maintain within their missions, a role that is based on mitigating the negative impact of the threats indicated in the respective countries. But that, in turn, has an explanation that becomes internal to the countries, as well as the external environment. Among the former, it is possible to consider support for the functions performed by security and police forces, which have been exceeded both in the media and in competencies, and the internal reality of each State in matters of security and defense. While external aspects are given by the level of regional linkage that the country in question has, as well as by the nature and dimensions of the threats that loom over countries (Griffiths 2007).

One of the aspects that has led to the armed forces being part of the fight against the so-called threats of unconventional characteristics, is the fact that institutions traditionally focused on this objective have been overwhelmed in their actions, both due to the lack of resources they possess, as

well as the nature of the threat itself. In this regard, it has been possible to demonstrate a good number of corruption cases, as a consequence of the actions of criminal gangs, which have a large amount of economic resources. This being the case, since the Armed Forces are the only establishment that legally possesses instruction in weapons as well as in technological support and logistics elements, relatively similar in comparison to the police forces, they have seen the need to cooperate with them in the fight against this type of phenomena (Pion-Berlin 2010, Bruneau 2005).

Another of the internal aspects that could explain the use of the traditional means of Defense, in tasks that are not their own within their classical doctrinal conception, are the realities experienced by each particular country. For example, the geographical qualities of a State, although they may have similar points with other pairs, after all they are unique. This aspect has a high degree of influence in matters of internal security, since the actors that are part of transnational criminal phenomena know about those realities and use them in their favor. Some examples of that is what happens in the cases of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia in the region, to mention some of the most significant. Even, the geographical positioning that the country has, from a classical geopolitical notion, gives rise to sustain a characterization of said State, within the economic and commercial logic, both in a lawful and illicit sense (Cabrera, 2019). Therefore, having complex and unique geographical qualities, where the traditional security forces do not have the necessary instruments to combat the aforementioned groups, the Armed Forces are called to carry out such action. However, and as mentioned at the time, the internal aspects mentioned cannot be fully understood if they are visualized atomized and separated from each other (Celi 2015, Palma 2015).

While on the external level, the relationship and linkage that a State has with a certain environment, preferably in a regional and neighborhood setting, largely determines a degree of influence regarding both the territorial positioning of the Armed Forces, as well as the type and magnitude of the phenomena that threaten the respective society. In other words, depending on whether there is any territorial claim by a neighboring country, the location of the main military means will be linked to that area. Likewise, if a country is geographically between two major drug production centers, or failing that it is used as an exit door for drug trafficking, due to its port positioning, they are elements to be considered as sources that potentially increase the impact of the negative phenomena towards the country.

The mentioned aspects not only predispose to a possible change of doctrine in the armed bodies, but also in the way in which the professionalization of them is carried out and planned. In this regard, it is necessary that

together with an eventual modification of the doctrine of the Armed Forces, a high level of professionalization of the people who are part of them is possessed, because a change of doctrine does not necessarily imply a dismantling of the capacities and competences that were possessed at the time. On the contrary. What is considered pertinent at this point is the maintenance of a doctrine about the main function of the aforementioned bodies (protection of territorial integrity), but adding greater capabilities depending on their new and eventual roles. This directly results in a qualitative and quantitative increase in the skills and characteristics of military personnel, taking into account an increase in the professionalization of personnel; that is, in this area, the Armed Forces, although they must not fail to consider their fundamental role, must be prepared for other functions that, although they are not the main ones, are part of their actions in the current context, both internal and external. This in turn has given way, in some cases, to a conception of “versatility” of the Armed Forces, especially when countries are constantly affected by natural events such as earthquakes, tidal waves, floods, large forest fires, to mention phenomena derived from nature (Kacowicz and Mares 2016).

But the fact that countries begin to glimpse a vision around the changes in the threat focus, the degree of implication that these phenomena have in society, and the notion of “versatility” within the actions of their forces, also responds to a conception that derives from the fact that new threats incorporate the actions of actors that are extra-regional and that have interests in a series of regional elements. One case of this is the appropriation and control of a series of natural resources that, for various countries in the region, are considered key and with the label of “strategic”, product of which through these resources, countries concentrate much of their development and well-being for their respective societies (Bruckman 2012). This fact, although it has a lower probability regarding the direct action of an extra-regional State on a country in the region in conventional terms, has also led to planning a different strategic vision, where a notion of the weak to the strong is used, taking strategic modes and models that are associated with mobility and the use of geographical conditions in favor, at the expense of a significant increase in technological capabilities (Cabrera 2011, Contreras 2008).

The process of changing the doctrine, or in its absence of a greater incorporation of functions and competences to the armed forces, is not in itself a process of easy management. The doctrine within the Armed Forces, being one of the base components in the way of acting among its members, as well as one of the pillars in the eventual understanding of both national and international phenomena that could affect the main object of protection on the part of the aforementioned bodies, it is an element that although it

is the focus of constant modifications, those are not necessarily substantial, or they help to reinforce the degree of relationship between cultural and institutional aspects within the personnel that is part of the organization. And at the same time, these doctrinal elements, on multiple occasions, have a root that becomes both the traditions of the Armed Forces, and the history of those bodies, which ultimately make them unique and differentiate them from their peers internationally, although some common denominators are observed. Therefore, a substantial change within the doctrinal composition of the Armed Forces, such as the modification of the focus and understanding of the conflict, is an aspect that would change the very nature of the armed bodies, thereby generating resistance as a result of the aforementioned.

A point to take into account within the resistance against a change of doctrine, comes from what could be considered as “the weight of history”, which in turn is expressed in the maintenance of conflicting traditions and imaginary, of character conventional, mainly associated to the neighborhood and when it has as a background some kind of military confrontation in bilateral history. In this sense, within the logic of the imaginary, it is possible to find that a relevant sector of the military segment and decision makers in the field of Defense, continue to consider plausible, the repetition of conflicts of the past under a logic of perceptions of conventional threat. This would also be explained by the way in which neighboring countries make allusions about those lost territorial spaces and their eventual desire for recovery (Jervis 2017; Levy 1983). Thus, the decrease in conventional military capabilities, which help in the constitution of the perception of deterrence, would establish a greater probability of repeating scenarios of a conflictive past.

As a form of complement to the previous premise, it is observed that it is also possible to explain this view of resistance to doctrine change, under a geopolitical interpretation. At this point, the consideration of resistance would be the product of the imaginary related to both the vision of the territory and a synonym for absolute power of the countries, as well as the fact that an eventual loss of it can also mean a strategic positioning of another country, which goes against the interests of the affected country (Barton 1997). It is because of this vision that geopolitics is still considered a discipline that is part of the training of staff officers, which helps to understand the political processes and projections of the geographical qualities of a country, in the international context. Thus, even from a point of view regarding the professional and theoretical training of officers, it is that the vision of deterrence is also understood from the perspective of geopolitics, as a way of understanding the “intentions” and interests of another State, in direct relation with their own interests, especially when they are in the presence of aspects that would determine an eventual territorial projection (Cabrera 2018).

Therefore, and considering the above, it is necessary to incorporate some cases that reflect not only a possible need for doctrinal change in the field of the Armed Forces, but also those resistances that have been visualized in the aforementioned process. Given this, it is possible to highlight the comparison of the cases of Chile and Ecuador, since they are countries that have carried out two reform processes within the established parameters and processes, focusing each one on specific sectors that are related to the doctrinal elements substantial in relation to the modification of the understanding of the conflictive focus.

Chile and Ecuador in comparative perspective

One of the aspects that underlies Chile and Ecuador in comparative terms is that both countries have evidenced, within the second decade of the 21st century, attempts to reform the doctrinal sphere in relation to their Armed Forces. However, although common elements have been established that have been incorporated into their respective strategic plans, a resistance of certain sectors of the Defense has also been visualized, taking as arguments an eventual de-professionalization of the military function, as well as relative to leaving the main constitutional priority of the armed segments, which is based on the protection of territorial integrity. Regarding the aforementioned, it is appropriate to establish a description around the main points that both Chile and Ecuador have experienced, in order to achieve some degree of joint perspective and, eventually, replicable for the region.

The experiences regarding the processes of modification of doctrines, in a strategic sense, in both cases, also go through short-term political moments, which have been increased both by the form of evolution of the respective political systems, and by the role that you want to have of the armed bodies in peacetime. But in addition, there are aspects that are external and that, in some way or another, influence the way of conceiving the contemporary actions of the Armed Forces, such as the same geographical location of the country with respect to the drug generating centers, the border permeability, to mention a few elements. With this, both Chile and Ecuador have aspects that are common as unique, when describing their processes of doctrinal changes at the strategic level.

The Chilean case

One of the elements that distinguish the Chilean perspective, from the

point of view of the elaboration of the doctrine from the strategic level, is the fact that the country still has territorial spaces that are the subject of a claim by the countries with which borders are shared. This happens, at present, with each of its neighbors. In the case of the relationship with Peru, although both countries held a dispute over maritime delimitation in the International Court of Justice of Hague, the ruling resulted in a territory that is in dispute: the so-called “terrestrial triangle”, which is a territorial space in which the maritime border between both countries begins. However, it should be noted that the magnitude of the territory is only approximately 37,500 square meters. With Bolivia, despite the fact that international lawsuits have been filed in the aforementioned Court, both from Bolivia to Chile and vice versa, even such processes persist, so the management of the possible resolutions will take some time, leaving aside the still existing controversy over the use of the waters of the Lauca river. While with Argentina, the clear non-delimitation of the so-called “southern ice fields” persists, a space located in the southern zone of both countries, but despite the lack of establishment of international boundaries, that has not been a priority space in the bilateral agenda. Therefore, from the Chilean perspective, the country still has a space in the 21st century to establish a perception of insecurity, especially around its northern neighborhood border.

As a consequence of the above, the strategic doctrine in the field of Defense still handles hypotheses of conflict from the conventional point of view, especially with those countries in which lawsuits have been raised in international courts of justice for bordering aspects. This is one of the key points, because Chile still explicitly establishes the concept of deterrence within its doctrine, which in turn is represented in the various purchases of war material, as well as in the roles themselves. that armed bodies must have for peacetime. In this regard, although it is pointed out that the Chilean Armed Forces have the mission of protecting territorial integrity, this is also conceived within the level of deterrence and non-interference in other tasks of internal characteristics (Ministry of National Defense 2010).

In this sense, the vision of civil-military relations in Chile, although it has been highlighted as a form of separation of spheres regarding the competences of each of the aforementioned decision-making levels, it is also true that this is explained for the recent past, particularly the period of the government of Augusto Pinochet. The transition to democracy not only conditioned the way in which civilians and military would understand each other in a new political moment, but also established the basis on which relations between the two segments would occur for the rest of the years. Thus, the conception of a possible conventional threat that could affect the country was supported

by the civil and political sector of the Defense, both to separate the military from political issues, as well as to achieve adequate professionalization of the Defense segment, on issues that were typical of its competence, leaving aside the interference in the aspect of internal security. But in addition, there is the presence of two police institutions, with national scope (Police and Investigative Police), which are dedicated to internal security tasks, so that the presence of conventional armed forces was not necessary, especially in the 90's (Navarro 2013; Nunn 2011).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Chilean Armed Forces, even within the period of the Military Government (1973-1990), have dedicated themselves to tasks that go beyond the classical conception of deterrence. One of the main examples of this was the construction of the so-called Austral Highway, a road that joins different parts of the country, with which there was no direct connection. But apart from that, it has been as a result of natural disasters that have hit the country in the 21st century, where the Armed Forces have turned to aspects of helping the population in situations of risk. Such has been the relevance of the collaboration of the armed forces, both in rescue and reconstruction work, that their tasks in important periods of time have concentrated on finding ways to improve the level of development of the population, and to optimize their deployment capacity within the national territory, in the face of complex situations (Griffiths 2011).

Another of the elements on which the armed bodies are considered key to the Chilean case, is to visualize them as an instrument of international projection of the country, either through different peace operations, as well as establishing a presence in the Antarctic territory. Both aspects, which are framed within the country's foreign policy, are executed through the country's Defense policy, and more specifically as a consequence of the actions of different components of the armed forces. This is one of the most relevant aspects in the field of Defense, because it is a direct link between this sector and Foreign Relations. But at the same time, it becomes a tool where the country exposes and projects a certain image to the international system, thereby establishing a series of interests in which the Defense in general, and the armed forces in particular, actively participate. But these actions are not necessarily representative of a change of doctrine, but an extension of it. And the application of the aforementioned actions are neither executed internally, nor are they part of a substantial doctrinal modification by the armed bodies (Navarro 2009).

Notwithstanding the above, the fact of attempting a change in the doctrinal conception of Defense, from both a political and strategic point of view, has been part of the debate, although not alien to criticism and multiple

resistance, from the different actors involved. An example of this was evidenced in the concept of Expanded Security, a concept that was established in the so-called National Security and Defense Strategy (ENSYD in Spanish), under the administration of Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014). This concept involved, explicitly, that armed bodies could engage in support tasks, in the face of unconventional threats, especially drug trafficking. However, this concept only remained as a proposition, since the ENSYD was not approved by Congress, although two attempts were made to improve it, due to the resistance of both parliamentarians from different political sectors, members of the Armed Forces, as well as political decision makers, in the field of Defense (Rivas 2014).

The quality of visualizing a “versatility” in the Chilean Armed Forces, although it has been driven by the different socio-natural disasters that, in a relatively constant way, affect the country, has not minimized the deterrent notion of the defense doctrine. The foregoing is reinforced by the publication of the last National Defense Book, in 2017. In that book, which maintains a line with its predecessors, especially with regard to the way in which the actions are constructed and planned of the different actors of the Defense. However, there is also an explicit recognition that the Defense has to consider, within its planning, processes that are ongoing, such as the impact of climate change, the new regional integration processes, and even the contribution of the Defense media in the construction of a much more complex and comprehensive security architecture for the country (Ministry of National Defense, 2017). With this, it is clear that external and internal processes have had a consequence in the way in which Defense is articulated, both in terms of means and also in its own culture to act and organize.

And in relation to the above, in 2019, through a presidential decree, with the corresponding legislative and legal approvals, the participation of the Armed Forces in tasks related to the fight against drug trafficking was explicitly approved. However, it was also established that such collaboration will only be restricted to areas of surveillance and support in logistics (El Mercurio, 2019). As a result of the above, it is sought to prevent the Armed Forces from directly intervening in tasks related to the capture and investigation in a criminal sense, nor as an auxiliary force, of the work carried out by the police forces in said matter. But the legal and institutional recognition that the Armed Forces have an established role in the fight against drug trafficking, gives rise to new forms of organization and coordination, especially with the police and civil authorities linked to the assigned task.

The Ecuadorian case

Unlike the Chilean case, Ecuador has concluded all the points that were pending, from the territorial perspective. That is, the country does not have territorial controversy with any of the countries with which it shares an international limit, whether land or sea. In this sense, the probability that an international conflict is unleashed, as a consequence of a discrepancy in the interpretation of international limits, is very low for the country. Even the incident that occurred in the month of March of the year 2008, in the border town of Angostura with Colombia, can be considered as a consequence of the management of an internal conflict, by the Colombian government, and which directly affected Ecuadorian sovereignty. But, from no point of view, there was a confrontation between the two countries whose background was the borderline differences. Therefore, the strategic architecture of Ecuador, although it manages the conception of conventional deterrence, is based on a conflict hypothesis whose potential for occurrence is highly low, due to the solution of all territorial disputes through international instruments (Ministry of Security Coordination 2011).

However, and as another point to be taken into account, the geographical location of the country becomes a weak point in itself, derived from the internal events that occurred within the internal scope of border countries. On the one hand, both Colombia and Peru are considered the main cocaine producing countries worldwide; and in conjunction with this, the Colombian case has a more complex derivation, product of the presence of organized criminal gangs and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with operations in the border region between Ecuador and Colombia. Therefore, the impact of what happened in Colombia, regarding the management of its internal conflict, is relevant in the security and defense of Ecuadorian society (Pérez and Cruz 2015).

Derived from the above, although the country no longer has conventional conflicts in the neighborhood, the level of impact of unconventional threats is high. And although the Armed Forces have as their mission the protection of territorial integrity, as a constitutional mandate and fundamental mission, this is mainly understood from the perspective of the conventional threat. This form of unconventional conflict, although it was duly analyzed within the Books of Defense (2002 and 2006), its impact on the country's defense doctrine was minimal. That situation is modified with the presidential management of Rafael Correa (2007-2017), where both the new Constitution and the National Plan for Internal and External Security of 2007, exposes the concept of Integral Security, which involves a more broad security vision,

recognizing as destabilizing factors for the development of the country, those that did not necessarily have a conventional origin. With this, the Defense doctrine is turned into a strategic doctrine, linking other institutions, in addition to the Armed Forces, in complying with the parameters of Integral Security (Coordinating Ministry of Internal and External Security 2008).

The aforementioned context was, at the beginning until the middle of the second decade of the 21st century, a purely discursive aspect, because the concept, despite the introduction of the so-called National Comprehensive Security Plans (2011-2013 and 2014-2017), had not been properly discussed. It was in the last plan in which the concept obtains a greater solidity, both in the elements that it involves as well as in the phenomena that drive to adopt the mentioned concept. But the consequences and competences of each of the actors that were part of the concept, remained a topic to discuss, mainly for the Armed Forces. Notwithstanding that, it was in 2015 where, through a modification to the 2007 Constitution, in which the Armed Forces are explicitly involved in tasks of “support for Integral Security”. In other words, explicit recognition was obtained, from the political level, so that the Armed Forces could act in certain internal security matters. With this, the role of the armed forces was extended from the highest level of political and strategic decision, which also involved a modification of the doctrinal conception of the Armed Forces (Pérez and Cruz 2015).

The indicated event can be understood, within the Ecuadorian context, under three premises. The first is that the negative impact of unconventional threats has been more detrimental than what was contemplated in an eventual planning, and the resources used in internal security tasks for the National Police were not sufficient, so the incorporation of the Armed Forces would help mitigate the problem. Secondly, having established all the country’s international limits (the last one was the maritime boundary with Costa Rica in 2016), from an economic point of view, there is no urgent need, from the political level, to have Armed Forces prepared for a warlike conflict whose probability is low. Therefore, its employment must be under a premise of conflict that, although unconventional, is present and produces a negative impact on the country’s development. And thirdly, the current capabilities of the Ecuadorian Armed Forces in terms of deterrence, in comparison with neighboring countries, do not meet the conditions to achieve the desired effect. And derived from the negative economic conditions that the country has presented in the last 3 years, as a result of the international fall in the price of oil, the acquisition of war material is not justified under the premise of deterrence.

Despite the political direction around the application of Integral Security, by the Armed Forces, resistance has manifested mainly in civil-military

relations in the country. From the military side, the main concerns go for a “de-professionalization” of the personnel, because being more linked to internal security tasks, they will not have time to acquire and reinforce the necessary skills to fulfill the main role of the Armed Forces. While on the political side, it is observed that the tasks related to Integral Security are a way of keeping the armed forces in action, and not simply under an abstract concept such as deterrence. However, the same linkage of the Armed Forces in matters of Integral Security is in itself broad, and is at the discretion of what is established by law. Therefore, the debate on the construction of a new doctrine, was reduced to an order / compliance approach between the political and military level, and did not give space for an adequate socialization of the possible consequences, both positive and negative, that such regulations could generate.

The previous panorama around the implications of Integral Security and the conformation of a new doctrinal scheme for Defense, changed radically by internal and external aspects. The main internal element is related to the advent of the new government of Lenin Moreno, in 2017. The new administration established a diametral change, compared to the previous government management, in relation to the conduct and management of the Defense, assigning to a General in a situation of retirement, the command of the Ministry of Defense, giving way to the development of new guidelines in that field, trying to retake doctrinal notions typical of the last Books of Defense. Notwithstanding that, it was the external element that determined the doctrinal action of the Ecuadorian Armed Forces. On January 27, 2018, a terrorist attack occurred, against the police district in the town of San Lorenzo, near the border with Colombia. It was a car bomb, causing damage to the structure and 23 people injured, being perpetrated by the FARC dissident group Oliver Sinisterra (El Comercio, 2018). This gave way to a progressive “militarization” of the northern border, even establishing a new theater of operations, coordinated by the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, with the aim of minimizing the negative consequences of the Colombian peace process, and especially the groups that stayed out of it.

Derived from the aforementioned, is that the discussion about new doctrinal paradigms in the field of Defense, was relatively untouched, due to the conflicting processes that the country began to show, giving way to the maintenance of more classic doctrinal parameters, seeing this evidenced by the publication of the last National Defense Policy of Ecuador, better known as the Soft Book of Defense, in 2018. In this document, it is observed that despite the fact that the country evidences the presence of conflictive processes derived from non-state actors, continues to structure a defense policy based on the concept of deterrence, although in a restricted way. The restriction is

given by the strategic situation of Ecuador, as well as by the fact of privileging the links with powers, specifically the United States of America, in the construction and application of relations and cooperation policies, in the field of Defense (Ministry of National Defense, 2018).

The problem with the above, is not due to the fact of returning to the doctrinal canons that were not observed during the administration of Rafael Correa, but because the need to update the doctrinal parameters is minimized. In this regard, the reinforcement of the classical doctrinal parameters in the Defense segment, although it helps to mitigate some of the negative consequences imposed by the situation, especially with regard to the context of the northern border of the country, the truth is that it is left sideways a process with structural characteristics. The functionality of the Defense for Ecuador, both before and after what happened in San Lorenzo, gives rise to a necessary reflection on the maintenance or change of the doctrinal parameters that guide the actions of the Armed Forces, especially when deterrence as such does not occur in the neighborhood case, and other phenomena require greater attention.

Final Remarks

The elements presented at the present work provide a conceptual and contextual basis on why a change of doctrine is not only pertinent, but also necessary. However, it can also be observed as an absolute aspect in the doctrine, that in order to incorporate a suitable change in some institution and organization, it must be adequately planned, taking into consideration those cultural elements (or doctrinal ones) that prevail within a space of time. If so, the changes in doctrine should not be thought of, nor should they be reflected upon the basis of the element which one wants to change, but upon the basis of the problem to be mitigated. That is why the doctrinal conception of dissuasion, from a conventional point of view, does not apply to a phenomenon such as drug trafficking or a natural catastrophe.

If so, one of the main points to be supported in the present work, has been that the Armed Forces in the region, and especially for the analyzed cases of Chile and Ecuador, cannot maintain an absolute and total conception of dissuasion, since they must have an integral vision that, at present, is not perceived. However, the concept of conventional conflict, by the elements mentioned in the present work, has greatly diminished the probability in the region, which does not rule out that those countries that have a hypothesis of conflict of such characteristics, are exempt from that scenario. Therefore, a transition in order to achieve a balance between a classic view of the Defense

and a point of view of where the Armed Forces participate in the internal areas, not necessarily the paths that shock, the bell that must be and must be compatible, with the aim of finding a degree of polyfunctionality.

In the case of Chile, the conception of deterrence although it has paid off in a dimension of the concept, it has not been established in an integral way. Moreover, in the 21st century, and taking into account that the main factors of insecurity or even a state of war in non-war situations occur as a result of natural disasters, an aspect that has been constant throughout its history, is that planning around conventional deterrence must change. There should be a greater balance in that material that is exclusively for military use, in direct relation to those instruments that can be used for "other functions." That is why a more specific polyfunctional visualization of the Armed Forces of Chile is required, but thinking that the doctrinal conception must be modified.

In the case of Ecuadorian reality, the perspective is different. The political management of the Defense has not been adequate to adapt the armed forces to the necessary new functions that they must adopt in peacetime. An eventual modification of the doctrine, taking into account a high degree of polyfunctionality, should be gradual, but based on a recognition of those key elements of the doctrine. Therefore, although the Ecuadorian Armed Forces have also been employed in development-related tasks, linking them to other tasks more related to internal security, without adequate socialization and debate among the institutions involved, is a field which, in itself, generates resistance. Polyfunctionality is given by the correct political conception of the actions of the armed bodies in times of non-war, but at the same time leaving aside a perspective that is the base, the backbone of the Armed Forces in the country.

The cases are not isolated. Most of the Armed Forces in the region have acted on the basis of internal conflicts so far in the 21st century, despite the fact that their structure is considering an eventual conventional conflict. That in itself is a doctrinal contradiction that, for the cases analyzed, must be considered as the support of a change. But this reflection must not only occur at the level of theorization or academy, but must be incorporated into a wide debate, with all the actors that make up what could be called the Defense Community of the countries, taking into account the current reality and not the experiences of a remote past.

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ABSTRACT

Defense notions in South America have traditionally been linked to the protection of border areas as a means of guaranteeing territorial integrity. However, States have established the boundaries of their borders by peaceful means, so the Armed Forces must necessarily reform both their doctrine and their own capabilities. That is why, taking as cases of study the realities of Chile and Ecuador, it is possible to determine which are the main points on which the armed bodies have been adapted, the changes of doctrine, such as the problems that are generated, both at institutional and social level, with these changes. It is concluded that although there are resistance and problems in the implementation of changes, also its visualize in the countries the acceptance of a regional context that implies changes in the Armed Forces, especially for peacetime.

KEYWORDS

Armed Forces; Defense; Chile; Ecuador; Doctrine.

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THE AERIAL SUPERIORITY IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF COLOMBIA: A NEED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY¹

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Introduction

From the foundation of the first States, those established at the dawn of civilization, their framework is built upon the idea of “military security against external enemies” (Marquardt 2012, p. 75). The archeological vestiges of the military fortifications that delimited the States and the traces of inter-state warfare are proof of this. In this sense the political leader of antiquity is also presented as a military leader and with this he is conceived as the guarantor of the physical protection and daily development of the population that he governs.

Linked to the development of state security processes, it identifies the evolution of military organizations along with the ambition to control more territory with development purposes and to ensure, in essence, the access to sources of support and wealth for the kingdoms. Due to this, there is the consequent military expansion of a state expansion, developing with this expansion conflicts in the dominated populations by the coercion of their culture under the imposition of the invader; the success of a State and the true

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demonstration of its power then consists in developing a real process of integration of the communities, for which it was necessary to establish different institutions that foster a balance based on the protection of the population, citizenship and laws, essentially configuring “a common political identity” (Marquardt 2012, p. 77).

With the establishment of political institutions accepted by citizens, the state’s task of guaranteeing tranquility and internal security is strengthened, for which the State “developed a catalog of socially and ethically reprehensible behaviors” (Marquardt 2012, p. 78). This led to the homogeneity of the social evolution linked to the legality and the right of which the State should also be guarantor.

Thus, with the emergence and expansion of the States, a process of interaction between individual members of a community begins to be built, with the establishment of legal, political, economic and cultural criteria, or in other words establishing the foundations of nation-states.

The definition and conceptualization of the State is fundamental, since it constitutes the backbone of international studies. Also, it takes into account at the same time the security and defense considering the development of conflicts and interaction with other states. This is established as the pillar of the institutional construction of the state.

From identity to national interest

The common political identity that has been talked about becomes a complex concept to analyze and more if it is delimited in its interstate action. However, constructivism based on the Social Theory of International Politics of Alexander Wendt can be useful for clarify the results and be able to link it further to the development of the Nation and the *construction* of its interest as an international demonstration.

In that sense, Zehfuss (2006, p. 95), based on Wendt’s conception of identity, considers identity as a process in which there are different inter-subjective structures that influence the behaviors of the actors. Therefore, from the construction of collective responses, actors can conceive the identity, defining it within the international scope as “the property of international actors to generate dispositions, motivations and behavior” thus establishing the basis for the understanding of interest.

Throughout Wendt’s theoretical discussion, different questions to be solved are identified for the purpose of clarifying the type of interest that is capable of consolidating a State, and this will depend on the positive identi-

fication that the State has against others, the way in which he perceives the achievement of his security in association with the rest of the actors; however, it shows that this process does not belong to a private discussion scenario within the state institutions but instead must be linked to the maximum number of actors, in order to develop a collective identification of needs and thus apply it in the field of security; nevertheless it is clear that the international behavior of the States, which must clearly respond to the collective construction of the interests of the Nation, depends on the behavior and recognition that one has of himself and other States, arriving to determine the security interests which will be developed exclusively under interaction, becoming "the key to the development of different security environments ..." (Zehfuss 2006, p. 96).

From this understanding, a debate is created between constructivists and rationalists, in which the latter establish that identity can be variable depending on the interaction of scenarios to which it is exposed in a theater such as the international system. However, at the same time, Wendt establishes identity as a pillar of the construction of interest and under it the difficult task of modifying interest on behalf of interactions is structured, since it requires the modification of behaviors, which would turn this scenario into a framework of analysis of very high complexity and even more difficult to materialize as is usually done by States in a Foreign Policy (Zehfuss 2006, p. 96).

In this sense, from the structure of determination of national interest, discriminating against the development of state policies, it is clear that the authorities can clarify the position, in essence, of concepts such as national security or foreign policy, mentioning only the relevant ones in this analysis; internal politics and transnational relations themselves (Lake 2008, p. 46).

Approaching a reality where the construction of identity and interest formation materialize in the recognition of the national structure, combined with the state institutions that support the political and legal characteristics, we must link from the constructivism the understanding of national security and defense, which is not carried out from the theoretical aspect but rather from the analytical one, understanding the advantages that for this exercise presents depart from traditional concepts, to focus on the particular understanding of the behaviors of the actors in the construction of their own national intentions.

To get into this development of the construction of security and defense policies based on the identification of national interests, we must first depart from the realistic conception of the security dilemma. We must begin from the perception that Kenneth Waltz presents, facing the wide margin of choice that states have between them, especially within a system of states under an anarchic organization where fear or external threats are identified as a

position that requires rational strategies and limits the expansion of its capacities by forcing self-help and self-considered selfishness vis-à-vis the rest of the actors. Although paradoxical, this position reaffirms the basic properties of the modern construction of the states and the definition of their interests in relation to security as a causal source of the identity and survival of the state system.

Thus, supported by a constructivist analysis in relation to the variable of security and defense, in an anarchic international scenario, states will identify other states within the conception of enemies, rivals or friends; thereby generating a multiplier effect of the perceptions of the other states, forging new interests and therefore new actions determined by the use, whether of force -hard power- or socio-cultural media -soft power- (Kolodziej 2005, p. 279).

Due to this, it is necessary to address the construction of national security and defense policies together with the design and implementation of foreign policy, because “the foreign policy of a State is a means to achieve its national interests” (Guáqueta 2005, page 39), and likewise the national interest depends, as we have indicated previously, on the vision about a State and how the other actors are identified in an anarchic scenario of interactions to be clarified.

Foreign policy in coordination with security and defense policy in Colombia

To get closer to Colombia’s international behavior, we must turn away from the constructivist analysis that we have been developing, and irreversibly link in the realistic current on account of the dynamics of national security based on the internal armed conflict. This is due to the lack of association of society in the processes of determination of national interests, and giving priority to the exercise of physical protection of the territory and the personalist exercise of Colombian international politics.

The participation of military components in the structuring of foreign policy, by influence or by invitation, has developed based on the need to link the country’s anti-subversive struggle with the main interests of international powers, specifically in the United States, where Colombia presents itself as “a key interlocutor in relation to issues that were included in the international agenda in the past, and still are, such as drug trafficking and in some ways the democratic stability of the States.” (González & Rodríguez 2017, p. 340).

In this sense, a flaw in the formulation of foreign policy is identi-

fied, since the country is presented as weak and unable to cope with internal threats, which for an international scenario, as we referred to earlier, may be a call to inability to repel external threats, especially if they develop alongside internal conflicts. Then, the development of national's defense potential must be constant and evident, without neglecting the domestic.

Added to the above, it can be clearly inferred that the institutions that should promote the definition of national interests for the collective construction of foreign policy are, in effect, the Foreign Ministry, which have not fulfilled the role exemplary. In addition, this has been overlapped by the participation of internal security on behalf of the military sector to determine Colombia's participation in the international are. All of this is catalyzed and encouraged by an exercise of the personalist foreign policy in the sole power of the presidents of the Republic that little or nothing refers to the true interests of Colombians.

At this point, it is not our intention to show that it is necessary to separate the actors related to the security and defense from the construction of foreign policy. On the contrary, these two aspects need to be interdependent in the definition and protection of the National interests. However, they are not the first actors called upon for the direct formulation of this policy, but should serve as participants in the construction of it, as part of the community and defenders and promoters of state policies. At the same time, security and defense policy should be constructed, in accordance with the living forces, the society as a whole interacting to guarantee the achievement of the national interest.

It has been repeatedly indicated that the lack of conceptual clarity in Colombia regarding security and defense are the architects of the impossibility of establishing a specific policy in this regard. Apart from the contributions from the plans of presidential governments there is no clear vision policy on how such policies should be developed, and even less they consider the international aspects and internal dynamics to contemplate. Little by little we have identified security and defense as a single concept. Because of this, it had not been possible to define a position against "the strategic attitude of the nation, which determines the functions of society, of powers , of institutions and social organizations "(Bonett 2008, p. 14).

Currently, national security is understood in Colombia as "the situation in which the interests of the nation are protected against interference and substantial disturbances" (Bonett 2008, p. 14). However this condition must be fundamental to link the interests of state institutions and national behaviors, that is the true foundation of national interest that must be reflected abroad, with the clear conviction of achieving and consolidating a promi-

nent role of the country internationally, achieving better internal conditions and recognition of the rest of the actors of the system that prevents an action against our territory from any part of the world.

Considering the presentation of the multidimensional concept to the analysis of security from the Copenhagen school, a new panorama is developed to link the levels of the nation in the construction of public security and defense policy, making room for “recognition of the diversity of problems that directly affect the security of the States and the relationship between them generate the multidimensionality and transnationality of the new security approaches” (González & Castillo 2017, p. 189). The interaction of citizens in the State that represents them is needed and they develop a new “conception of the security system and in its execution, because the effectiveness of the national strategy depends on this interaction, which does not seek anything other than the achievement of the essential purposes of the State” (Bonett, 2008, p. 15), thus allowing the consolidation of the interactive structures of the Nation-State, in accordance with the fundamental establishment of national interest and the safeguarding of what that means.

Meanwhile the construction of new analytical scenarios of national security and defense develops, the states and national identity from the processes that have occurred with the arrival of the new millennium become diffuse and philosophically complex. The prominence of the phenomenon of global interdependence with clear approaches to capitalism will degenerate national interactions on the international stage, consequently leading to the rethinking of national interests and these worldwide policies. This shows that the revaluation of nationalist policies in the scenario of the development of national identity has marked a path both deadly and important for the future of the states in the 21st century.

These nationalisms from classical currents have taken root in the social behavior of the new generations worldwide, and Colombia on account of the recognition of new threats, punctually migration, has stalled in that process from which it must emerge. In that sense, nationalisms must develop new parameters within the social structures to develop interdependence processes that lead to integration scenarios; less harmful nationalisms than those that gave rise to the bloodiest fighting of the twentieth century: “the nationalisms of the 21st century will be those who understand integration more in terms of citizenship than in terms of old and obsolete molds of national cultures” (Martí 2001, p. 170).

The loss of loyalty that States have suffered from their citizens due to the development of new economic approaches that disregard the basic needs of the population has been a catalyst for discontent with representative struc-

tures such as political parties and acceptance of implementation of the different public policies in Colombia. In this sense the panorama that is presented is not at all negative but seen as an opportunity to reestablish and design a new model of public policy formulation that fosters the interaction of citizenship with state agencies, leading to agreements against the definition of national interest and with it the development of new domestic and external policies. On the one hand, this generates well-being for the population and on the other hand project an image and position the Nation State internationally in a place of relevance to help the process of internal development and guarantee recognition of the condition of power that Colombia must have vis-à-vis international society.

In that sense, the role of the Military Forces in fundamental, not only because of the *sui generis* role it has played throughout the aforementioned internal armed conflict but also because of the strength at the time of integrating military structures with social structures, developing a great recognition and appreciation of the citizens in the face of the work performed. There, the Air Force is presented with great strategic value, which together with the Air Power has been relevant to guarantee and achieve objectives such as: "The assurance of the territorial unit despite the tendency towards fragmentation. A notable contribution to economic performance in areas of wealth as well as in depressed areas. The regional projection with effects on the ability to deploy to other scenarios and the export of a specific know-how "(Strong & Jaramillo, 2014, p. 34).

Here the Air Power is presented as a pillar of the development and security of the nation as indicated by Strong & Jaramillo, by presenting three factors that give value to this statement:

"The first of these is to understand that the actions developed by the Air Power take place in the air or in space ... The second factor is based on the fact that to refer to the Air Power it is extremely important to start with the air interests of a nation, which are totally linked to the vital interests of a State. In other words, they must aim at the well-being of the population, their economic development and the guarantee of their security and defense, from the perspective of air, space and, of course, through their means... The third factor, is to know that there are some means for air power to become a reality, among which the aeronautical and airport infrastructure, airlines and airline companies in all areas, aeronautical maintenance companies, aeronautical training centers and schools and activities related to aviation, aeronautical research and development centers, aeronautical authorities, aircraft and State Aviation ... Among these actors, the Colombian Air Force stands out as a pillar of protection for these media and ex-

ecutor of the strategic will of the government to guarantee the interests of the nation, through its Defense from the aerial perspective ”(2014, p. 37).

In addition to the above, the Air Power stands out as a determining structure in the cohesion of the Nation-State and for the functioning of the structures involved in the security and defense processes; linked to this, aerial superiority is presented as an objective of the highest value in the construction of aerial scenarios that allow the achievement of strategic advantages in the scenario, whether of the internal armed conflict or of an extra territorial threat; thus, aerial superiority is presented as a vital factor in social cohesion and construction of security and development scenarios on account of its link with the processes of identity development and national interest.

Aerial superiority in the national interest of Colombia

Aerial Superiority in this context is presented as the ability of an actor to hold greater and better possibilities in the airfield. So, the ability to obtain and maintain an air advantage against the enemy, is presented on the battlefield as a possibility of developing more effective combat strategies, less deployment of human resources, and faster impacts, with which the results are presented under more effective criteria and with less wastage; however, the importance of this concept exceeds the strategic and tactical claims that can be identified when approaching the concept in a superficial way.

This condition of importance can be threatened by the existence of failures in the civil sectors in the face of “poor performance against national defense issues and military issues, whether due to professional incompetence, instrumental inefficiency or lack of will to the time to establish priorities and public policies regarding the conduct of the Armed Forces...” (Rivera, 2008, p. 19), and here is the combination of identity factors, interest construction, formulation of public policies and consistent application of the same depending on the previous factors, almost of impressive complexity for countries like Colombia, that recharge their responsibility on the shoulders of the internal armed conflict, letting the future of that fact build sovereignty and citizenship without additional efforts or constructions.

At this point we have come to discover the complexity that resides in collective action to develop criteria of well-being above the individual, however from the theory of sets presented by Ellionor Ostrom you can think of the possibility “that individuals with common interests they would act voluntarily to try to promote these interests ”(2000, p. 31).

Thus, Ostrom presents the logical analysis that based on logical premises a group from the possibility of obtaining group benefits will develop behaviors aimed at obtaining said benefit, based on the idea that supports Mancur Olson, where an individual participating in collective action cannot be separated from obtaining the benefits and for them the motivation to act against the group will be void, however it broadens the concept also identifying that since there is no motivation to act against it, it does not exist at the time of acting for the benefit of it, because it is certain to obtain said benefit at the expense of the group; This has been called the problem of the free rider, identifying with it the lack of cooperation of the individual (Ostrom 2000, p. 32).

In context, Colombians when determining a collective identity over the partial circumstances they live in and when defining a security and defense policy, each one becomes a free rider, which is placed on a higher priority. It is indispensable and decisive for the future of the South American country to generate cooperation processes, in the sense of Ostrom or in the construction of consensus scenarios, in the sense of Wendt, to forge the national identity that will be determined by the self-recognition of the collective identity and that will allow the development of public policies in accordance with current needs.

For this, aerial superiority is presented as an intrinsic value in the very development of social structures, understanding this as the possibility of developing scenarios of protection of the territory, sovereignty and institutions, as well as their population, power conditions that will demonstrate the true collective objective of Colombia, which is conceived as the positioning in regional and international scenarios as a power in aspects of social development, and multidimensional security and defense.

In relation to the national interests of Colombia, Vicente Torrijos presents three dimensions that represent more than interests and desires in different sectors, giving priority to these “national unity, sustainability of democracy and freedom (sovereignty and independence)” followed by the “Socioeconomic development and citizen welfare”, and ending with the “integration of the country into the international system with respect for international law” (Torrijos 2008, p. 414); thus promoting the mix of the aspects presented in this article as the factors necessary to consolidate the Colombian State in accordance with the Colombian Nation, factors that strengthened with the development of aerial superiority and the consolidation of a national defense and security policy, will position the country in the position of importance that after two hundred years of existence it had been searching.

Final Remarks

In order to determine the influence of aerial superiority in Colombia's national interest and how it becomes a fundamental pillar of the required national defense and security policy, it was established that security is configured as the pillar in the construction of the States, from which it is identified as the development factor of national interest, however it is in the individual and collective identity that security is presented as a source to provide survival to the state system collapsed by the nationalist characteristics of modernity.

With this, we start from constructivism to develop the concept of identity that has its outcome in the construction of national interest. For this reason, it is important to emphasize that without identity an interest cannot be defined; and in this sense, public policies remain without an argumentative support, without any reason, since they must meet the needs or interests of the nation. Then, as a consequence the individual and then collective construction of citizens is a priority when thinking about public policy needs and even more important if the concept of security is linked to the equation.

In that sense, we conclude that Colombia lacks both a real configuration of collective identity and legitimate processes of construction and determination of national interest, without ruling out the absence of a security and defense policy that is a priority to develop, especially linking the concept of aerial superiority in it through collective recognition of its importance for its effectiveness.

Likewise, the understanding of the category of defense as a multidimensional criterion provides a framework for interaction between political decision makers and citizens, specifying the ideal scenario for linking all sectors to the process of self-determination of national interest and the formulation of domestic and external policies for the collective benefit, creating from the amalgam of foreign policy and security and defense policy the opportunity to promote Colombia to the international leadership group that it had been searching for.

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ABSTRACT

In this article, we intend to analyze the importance of the incorporation of aerial superiority as a concept and as a tool for the defense and security of national interests; the national interest can be established from the construction of national identity that should be accompanied by the formulation of public policies, especially foreign policy and security and defense policy, the latter nonexistent and the first incipient. Considering this standard, aerial superiority will be identified as the main objective of the nation's security and defense, and as a societal link in favor of welfare and development.

KEYWORDS

National Interest; Identity; Aerial Superiority; Colombia; Security and National Defense.

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PARTNERS

NERINT

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) was the first Centre in Southern Brazil to focus its study and research exclusively on the field of International Relations. It was established in 1999 at the Latin American Advanced Studies Institute (ILEA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) in Porto Alegre, Brazil, and is currently part of the university's Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV). Its objective has always been the critical and innovative study of the international system's transformations after the end of the Cold War, from the perspective of the developing world. In parallel, NERINT has also sought to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options for the autonomous international insertion of the country.

The exploratory studies developed by NERINT on the new emerging countries since the threshold of the 21st century experienced remarkable expansion. Cooperation with state, business, academic and social institutions was intensified, as well as the direct contact with centres in Latin America, Africa and Asia, in addition to the existing ones in Europe and North America. An outcome of the Centre's activity was the creation of an undergraduate course in International Relations (2004) and a Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI, 2010). Two journals were also created: the bilingual and bi-annual *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* and the bimonthly journal *Conjuntura Austral*. In addition, since 2016, NERINT offers a bilingual Research Bulletin, published by graduate and undergraduate students and researchers of the Centre. NERINT is also partnered with UFRGS's Doctoral Program in Political Science (PPGPOL), established in 1973. Thus, besides the advanced research and intense editorial activities, NERINT is also the birthplace of innovative undergraduate and graduate programs.

PPGEEI

The Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) started in 2010, offering Master's and Doctorate degrees, both supported by qualified professors and researchers with international experience. It is the result of several developments on research and education at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Its roots can be traced to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT), established in 1999, established in 1999 and now affiliated with the Centre for International Studies on Government (CEGOV) at UFRGS.

The research tradition that gave rise to PPGEEI was based on a prospective analysis of the trends of the 1990s. The remarkable expansion of Brazilian diplomacy and economics from the beginning of the century confirmed the perspective adopted, which allowed the intense cooperation with the diplomatic and international economic organizations in Brazil. The Program is already a reference in the strategic analysis of the integration of emerging powers in international and South-South relations.

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It approaches the defense, strategy and security issues in the interna-

tional system from a perspective that takes into account the most powerful states at the global level, but systematically introduces the question of the regional balances of power, the South-South axis, the existence of regional security complexes, military issues and the impact of information technology in the Digital Age.

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The Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) has its origins in the Center of Studies Brazil-South Africa (CESUL), a program established in 2005 through an association between the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG)

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