


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About the Journal

AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations was the first Brazilian journal in the area of International Relations to be fully published in English (2012). It is an essentially academic vehicle, linked to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) and the Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) of the Faculty of Economics (FCE) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Its pluralist focus aims to contribute to the debate on the international political and economic order from the perspective of the developing world.

The journal publishes original articles in the area of Strategy and International Relations, with special interest in issues related to developing countries and South-South Cooperation – its security problems; the political, economic and diplomatic developments of emerging countries; and their relations with the traditional powers. *AUSTRAL* is published semi-annually in English and Portuguese. The journal's target audience consists of researchers, experts, diplomats, military personnel and graduate students of International Relations.

The content of the journal consists of in-depth analytical articles written by experts (Professors and Doctors), focusing on each of the great continents of the South: Asia, Latin America and Africa. Thus, the debate and diffusion of knowledge produced in these regions is stimulated. All contributions submitted to *AUSTRAL* are subject to rigorous scientific evaluation.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

In the upcoming month of August, the Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) at UFRGS, which co-edits AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, will be celebrating 20 years. When it was founded, in 1999, the main trend in international relations was the neoliberal globalisation, which the founding researchers considered a threat to the National Project that had been in place since the Vargas Era. Always highlighting, however, that the post-Cold War world system did not represent an American phase of solitary hegemony, but rather an unstable phase of transition and struggle towards a “New Order”.

Two decades later, to the shock of many pundits and analysts, globalisation is now being questioned by the Trump administration and many other governments, including Brazil. Halfway through, in 2009, the BRIC(S) grouping emerged, signalling the overwhelming rise of China and the resurgence of Russia, countries which now suffer strong economic and political-military containment, respectively. All this only confirmed our initial prediction about the fragility and uncertainty of the international relations system in the post-bipolar world.

In 1999, the second term of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso had only just started, and with that the first crisis of the new “strong and stable” Brazilian currency, the Real, which suffered a sharp downfall. Nevertheless, Brazil did not suffer the Argentinian drama of two years later, with the financial collapse of the neighbouring country. Foreign policy, on the other hand, was experiencing moments of uncertainty, since it was still attached to globalisation, contrary to a six-decade-old autonomist diplomatic tradition that predominated almost continuously from 1930 to 1990. Soon after, there were the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, with the affirmation of the anti-terrorist security agenda towards the Middle East and Central Asia. Meanwhile, in the opposite direction, Latin America experienced the “pink tide” of social-democratic or popular-autonomist governments.

An unprecedented moment of international projection for Brazil, which, however, was not sustainable. The 2008 subprime crisis, which began in the United States, soon hit the Eurozone and the world economy. At the same time, the United States sought to withdraw from the conflicts in the Middle East, leaving in place a series of not very solid local alliances. The

scene for the “Arab Spring” was set and its shock waves would spread across the Mediterranean, Africa and West Asia.

At that moment, a process of reversion of the previous trends began, with the wearing of the social democratic regimes in Latin America, a movement that culminated in the election of Donald Trump in the United States. The logic of his administration is embedded in the unilateral diplomatic tradition of the Republican Party, with a business bias. Besides representing the heart of the world system, the United States constitutes a National State with its own problems and needs, in parallel with migratory, climatic and social crises (unemployment), in addition to the usual conflicts.

During these 20 years, we have sought to understand the underlying logic of ongoing international processes, and hope to have helped and assisted all those who attempt to analyse the international relations in a realistic way, rather than ideologically or prescriptively. In this issue, AUSTRAL addresses global strategic problems such as the formation of the World Power Axes, the BRICS, the European Defense Policy and Eurasia as a geopolitical reality. Another set of articles addresses the situation in Iran and Indonesia, with the contribution of academics from these countries and a renowned Latin American author. Finally, themes related to Latin America and African conflicts are explored.

It is important to emphasise the growing contribution of academics from an increasing number of countries — from all continents —, which endorses the global and independent presence of this publication. And that NERINT, after serving as a catalyst for the institutionalisation of academic studies of International Relations in Southern Brazil, continues, after two decades, to analyse the international situation in a serious, independent and creative way.

This publication was made possible thanks to the Research Office at UFRGS through the Support Program for Journal Editing (PAEP). Assistant Editors Magnus Kenji Hiraiwa and Guilherme Thudium deserve special recognition, as well as the translation team composed of graduate and undergraduate researchers from NERINT, with some guest appearances. Finally, we thank Professor Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo for the hard work of revising the translations.

AXES OF WORLD POWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN ANALYTICAL PROPOSAL

Paulo Fagundes Visentini¹

Introduction

Studies in the areas of International Relations and Defense have as one of its primary objectives the measurement of world power, identifying and classifying hierarchically the Great and Medium Powers. However, the criteria for this are very questionable, since they are based predominantly on quantitative elements arranged according to previously established theories, often (a)historical.

They generally take into account the country's geographical area, its natural wealth (agricultural and mineral), the weight of its economy (in general the Gross Domestic Product and *per capita*) and the size and structure of its population. Also considered are the geopolitical position, membership in relevant International Organizations (G-7, OECD, OTAN, UNSC), political-institutional stability and, last but not least, the size and quality of the Armed Forces. Usually, these items are quantified and tabulated, producing a *ranking* of the powers and, based on these references, a series of strategic reflections and geopolitical scenarios are presented (Merle 1981, 119 ; Morgenthau 2003, 215 ; Kennedy 1989, 417 ; Carr 1981, 99).

Undoubtedly, these are significant components, but the way in which they are articulated and their relative importance are related to other qualitative elements. First, there is the historical evolution (each Nation-State has its specific characteristics), the level of social and economic development, the degree of articulation of the elites in power, the existence of a national project, the international connections and the positioning in the world system, among others (Halliday 2007; Wallerstein 2004, 21; Arrighi 1996, 59; Brucan 1974, 140).

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A country may possess significant military power and a large economy, but it can find itself in decline due to a change in the world economy and the emergence of challenging power poles. Moreover, although in possession of a strong economy and quantitative military capabilities, sometimes they have sovereignty limitations, which make difficult to convert these elements into an effective instrument of action. Thus, the systematization of the material elements of power can generate an erroneous statistical conception and a misleading strategic appraisal.

In modern and contemporary times, with the emergence and affirmation of the world system, the Absolutist Dynastic States, the players of the *Ancien Régime*, were formed in Europe. Then the French Revolution introduced the ideological element (radical change vs. conservatism) and national element in International Relations. The Congress of Vienna (1815), in turn, introduced the notion of *Balance of Power* between the Great Powers (Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire) (Kissinger 1973). At the same time, nationalism and the Nation State emerged. Later on, as result of the First and Second World Wars, the European powers started to be classified as *middle powers* (especially when they lost their colonial empires), while the United States and Russia (transformed into the Soviet Union) became *superpowers*. Some States from the Geopolitical South (the Third World) were also included in the list of *middle powers* (or *regional*). But the explanatory paradigms and international reality became fluids with the end of the Cold War.

Therefore, a process that was already complicated in an era of a recognized leadership and hegemony, had become even more complex and uncertain in a phase of transition. In this sense, the aim of this article is to contribute to an understanding of the State's *power position* in the framework of the post-Cold War International System, particularly in the 21st century. It is an exploratory vision, aiming to take into account current actions and possible trends for the immediate future, in the context of the economic crisis since 2008 and the ongoing disarticulation of "globalization" itself.

What should be considered, more than ideological or geopolitical rivalries, is the political-economic position States occupy in the world power structure. In this context, the first group of contemporary international politics make up the *Anglo-Saxon military-rentier axis*: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and, tangentially, Israel. These are the hegemonic nations that hold military, diplomatic, financial, technological, intelligence and communications resources. Being in the post-industrial rentier phase, it lives on the resources of the other nations, employing the means mentioned above.

The second is the the *developed industrial axis* of the European Union, Japan and the Asian Tigers. With an advanced productive industrial capitalism and a high standard of living, it differs from the first group, because this one lacks the traditional power resources, such as the military, and full state sovereignty. They were protected during the Cold War, but today the situation is uncertain and the tensions with the former are increasing. Further developments will depend on the political attitude to be adopted by relevant nations of the axis, such as Germany and Japan, the defeated of World War II.

The third is the *emerging unorthodox industrial axis*, integrated by the great nations of the BRICS, especially China and Russia, as well as Turkey and Iran, where the structures of power and participation in the economy are relevant. This is defined as *semiperiphery*. Like the previous one, its immediate and primary objective is to avoid an armed conflict of global dimensions and to maintain its economic development. With resources to defend themselves, they fail to project power on a planetary scale and depend to some extent on the attitude that will be adopted by the second axis.

Finally, the fourth is the *agrarian, mineral and demographic peripheral axis*, composed of the middle and small nations of Latin America, Africa, and geographical Asia (which includes the Middle East). They have abundant human, agricultural, or mineral resources (including energy) but do not have military capability or diplomatic articulation, tending to act in a fragmented way and forming a contested zone for other axes. Brazil and South Africa seem to be absorbed by their internal political agendas and risk becoming part of this group.

The Anglo-Saxon military-rentier axis

The dominant group of world politics is integrated into the *Anglo-Saxon military-rentier axis*: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. More than a simple “linguistic community”, it represents a continuity of the Maritime Empires and its geopolitics. It is the heir to 19th century British liberal hegemony and its later colonial empire, as well as the alliances (and results) of the two World Wars against the middle powers (Germany and Japan) and the anti-socialist/anti-Soviet Cold War.

These are collectively hegemonic nations, which have military, diplomatic, financial, technological, intelligence and logistical and informational communications resources. Having reached the post-industrial rentier phase (in the last quarter of the twentieth century), they depend on the resources of other nations, employing the means mentioned above. With the current Sci-

entific-Technological Revolution underway, particular attention must be paid to the last three aspects, which had revolutionized international relations and defense systems.

The so-called *UKUSA* (United Kingdom and United States of America) agreement, established in the second half of the 1940s between Washington and London, gave rise in the 1980s to the system known as *Echelon*, the electronic intelligence and information system. This system, based in England, collects, processes, and shares information among the *Five Eye countries*: The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Previously focused on military issues against the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, from the 1980s onwards, it included industrial and political espionage, including NATO allies in the European Union, as denounced in the European Parliament in 2000 (Silva 2018).

The system does not only encompass the metropolitan territory of these countries, but a cluster of small islands and strategic points in all Oceans and continents. One of the points of the *Echelon* world espionage system, for example, is located on the British island of Ascension in the center of the Atlantic Ocean. These are not only “antennae” of the system, but also military bases and/or Tax Heavens, connected to the financial center of London. The United Kingdom was able to adapt to its hegemonic decline, through an alliance with the United States, with both countries converging on UN Security Council votes.

The United States is the leader of the group, with the dollar, diplomacy, the military, the cultural industry, and the almost exclusive control of the electronic media and International Organizations. But the others are not “dominated”, but rather are integral and active (though discrete) parts of the group. Israel, tangentially, is associated with the group, but has its own regional agenda, maintains some independence and is a nuclear power. There are also European appendices from a strategic point of view such as Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia).

Although they are members of the European Union, as well as the UK up until Brexit, their focus in the area of Defense has been the convergence with the Anglo-Saxon axis. In the Geopolitical South (the Third World), Chile, Colombia, Morocco, Kenya and Saudi Arabia (although Riyadh holds some autonomy) can be mentioned as partners of the axis with agendas of “regional allies”, projecting influence in their surroundings. But these countries do not have the power requirements previously enumerated to be part of the previous group or the ability to influence decisions and strategies and neither are

desired as partners by the *Big Five*².

The developed industrial axis

The second group is the *industrially-developed axis* of the European Union, Japan and the Asian Tigers. With an advanced productive industrial capitalism and a high standard of living, it differs from the first, because this group lacks the traditional power resources (except France), like military and full sovereignty. They were protected during the Cold War, but today the situation is uncertain and tensions with the first axis are increasing. Further developments will depend on the political attitude to be adopted by relevant nations of the axis, such as Germany and Japan, the defeated of World War II, and France, which has proved incapable of acting strategically in a coherent way.

Its composition is based on the previous middle powers that became industrialized by late nineteenth century (Central Europe and Japan) and after World War II (the rest of Europe and the Asian Tigers). During the Cold War they were engaged as members of NATO (Europe) or through Bilateral Defense Pacts in East Asia. And in the case of the members of the fascist Axis (Berlin, Rome and Tokyo), there are serious institutional and military limitations to full sovereignty. This is due not just because of American troops and military bases in its territory (some on behalf of NATO), but also from the obstacles to the constitution of their own military and aerospace technology and industry. Also, the fact that these states were rebuilt by occupation forces after 1945, which shaped their elites, nowadays divided and lacking strategic vision, poses a significant weight.

The French case is emblematic because, among the countries of this axis, it has an unique position: nuclear power status, permanent membership at the UN Security Council, with a network of bases around the world and an independent aerospace technology and industry. Together with Germany, it represents the hard core of the European Union, but since the 1970s it is immersed in a strategic identity crisis. For their turn, in Germany and Japan, with their significant advanced technologies and economies, elites appear to be suffering from a post-Cold War syndrome, failing to define a coherent project for its international action. The case of Germany's relationship with Russia and the United States is an example: with economic interests converging with Moscow and the defense agenda being linked to Washington.

² In allusion to the five African animals capable of self-defense: the lion, the elephant, the buffalo, the rhinoceros and the leopard. In this case, these are the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.

In East Asia, with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, the same is true in relation to United States and China. Artificially fostered military crises sustain a permanent state of insecurity, aiming to limit the convergence between the Tigers and the Chinese Dragon. Provocations towards North Korea, which reacts in the expected and desired manner, proved to be just enough to maintain alignment with Washington's security plans. However, Trump's US and China trade war goes well beyond a renegotiation dispute among partners, since the real economic and technological conflict, which is much more complex and multidimensional is taking place between the US and the EU, in particularly Germany.

In the same logic, it is worth to remember that Samuel Huntington (1997, 1995) defined that the West's core was located in the North Atlantic, and NATO is its linkage organization. So, the EU and Japan/Asian Tigers dilemma is that their relations with the US are getting weaker, whereas they grow stronger with the BRICS, in particular China and Russia. Nevertheless, diplomatic-security ties with Washington, as well as the arrangement between the ruling elites of the two shores of the Pacific, remain strong.

Color Revolutions arrived in Europe with Brexit, "populist" political movements and destabilizing radical violence (such as the French Yellow Jackets), as well as an open disrespect for community norms, terrorist attacks, separatism and massive induced migrations are part of the same process. Clearly, there is a sociological basis for such a phenomenon, with the gradual wreck of the Welfare State and the draining out of the universe of traditional politics, but there is a synchronization. Steve Bannon is not a "rebel without a cause."

The semi-peripheral industrially-emergent axis

The third group consists of the emerging industrial axis, composed of the great BRICS nations, especially China and Russia, as well as Turkey and Iran, in which the state's participation in development is a determining factor. Conceptually defined as the *semi-periphery*, they are clearly targeted by Donald Trump's US and his *America First* doctrine. Like the previous axis, its immediate goal is to avoid an armed conflict of global dimensions and to maintain its economic development. With resources to defend themselves, they still cannot project global military power and depend on the attitudes that the second axis will adopt. But some of them have deterrent power and are becoming more assertive as the crisis that began in 2008 and global tensions deepen.

Russia and China are permanent members of the UN Security Coun-

cil and, like India, nuclear powers. China maintains its socialist regime with a globalized multifaceted development project with high growth rates that have already made the country the second largest economy in the world. And this productive advance is being accompanied by the increase of its technological and defense capabilities. The Chinese State covers 22% of the world's population and enjoys internal stability and international autonomy. Its "socialist market" development project is similar to the old Soviet New Political Economy (NEP) of the 1920s, but with an internationalized dimension. Its commercial, financial and technological connections, both with developed and developing capitalist countries, have transformed world geo-economy, particularly in the peripheral areas.

In its turn, Russia represents another *re-emerging* power, since it is the heir of the defeated Soviet superpower after severe weakening and decline in the 1990s. Technological capacity, the aerospace and armaments industry, as well as defense capabilities, make it the only state with ability to strategically compete with the United States. However, it suffers from some weaknesses, once its governance is still fragile. It does not have a structuring party (as in China or in the Soviet Union era) and society underwent major transformations and fragmentation. Moreover, from a geopolitical point of view, its surroundings (the "near abroad") and international connections present weaknesses, despite the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (which aggravated the Ukrainian problem).

As for the Indian elephant, economic growth and an increasing international presence are observed, but with a troubling social backwardness of a rapid growing population, which will surpass the Chinese in a few years. The Chinese population is stabilized and aging, while the Russian has aged and quantitatively receded. However, these two countries have vast territories and natural resources, unlike India. Although India's nuclear status had been supported by the United States, the country faces serious security challenges, both external (China and Pakistan) and internal (terrorism, separatism and Maoist Naxalita guerrilla).

Brazil and South Africa (post-apartheid) experienced accelerated development at the beginning of the 21st century and, alongside India, created the IBSA Trilateral Cooperation Forum in 2003. But in recent years both nations have experienced serious crises of governability and economic stagnation, currently lacking a strategic project. In the same way, the two nations lost their leadership in the field of regional integration. Brazil, in particular, is on the verge of being downgraded to the fourth axis, which will be analyzed below. Two states that achieved economic and political-military advances were Turkey and Iran, acquiring a position and status similar to that of the BRICS.

But both find themselves in an extremely vulnerable line of geopolitical fracture and present a certain domestic and international fragility.

However, the BRICS, which came to be characterized as power pole in 2009 (in response to the unfolding of the 2008 crisis), had developed considerable economic and diplomatic mechanisms, although they are not a “bloc”, but a forum. In addition to integrating IBSA nations, there is another important organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which emerged in 1996 with China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Subsequently, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan joined this bloc (as well as other observer states). It has an economic and security focus and articulates an Eurasian pole, which represents a strategic nightmare for the US (Brzezinski, 1998). However, Russia and China are allies, *ma non tropo*, as both have partially different and competing agendas.

The great emerging nations constitute some sort of semi-periphery, in which the previous accumulation of capital places them in a position of global economic projection, generating a situation in which the growing economic weight clashes with the existing world political order. Putin’s Russia cannot be seen solely as an energy power (gas, oil and uranium), since this sector internationalized companies mean a growing global presence. In addition, Moscow became, once more, a major exporter of advanced weapons. In its turn, in addition to China’s growing economic presence in Africa and Latin America, the country has launched bold Eurasian initiatives such as the New Silk Road and OBOR (One Belt, One Road). They represent the emergence of a pivotal land zone, which brings together the basic elements of classical geopolitics, with new economic elements.

The agrarian, mineral and demographic peripheral axis

Finally, the fourth axis is *the agrarian, mineral and demographic peripheral*, composed of the medium and small nations of Latin America, Africa and geographical Asia (which includes the Middle East). They have abundant human, agricultural, or mineral resources (including energy) but do not have military capability or diplomatic articulation, tending to act in a fragmented way and forming a contested zone for the other axes. Brazil and South Africa, members of the BRICS, seem to be being “downgraded” due to their internal political agendas and disputes, and risk becoming part of this group.

Structural dimensions

The Geopolitical South (the Third World) encompasses Latin America, Africa, Western, Central and Southern Asia, in which the growth of world population occurs. Not only they represent a significant reserve of young manpower and potential consumer market, but also generates an unoccupied population surplus that generate migratory and refugee conflicts crises. The United States-Mexico border and the Mediterranean Sea have become extremely vulnerable zones to this phenomenon. The arc from Pakistan to Japan (with the exception of the western half of China) houses more than half the world's population. The Middle East and the northern half of Africa are experiencing strong destabilization.

On the other hand, the consumer democracies of the North use enormous volumes of food and raw materials (energy and minerals, among others), which production and reserves are located in the South (Paiva 2011, 32). This phenomenon is further aggravated by the increase in *per capita* consumption in emerging nations and the urban middle classes from all the Geopolitical South. There are vast spaces for profitable investments (infrastructure, mining, services, agribusiness), within a framework of growing inter-capitalist competition, which opposes, mainly, the old industrial powers and the emergent ones of the semi-periphery. Thus, this part of the planet is the stage of an economic and strategic dispute that is similar to the one that preceded the First World War.

The Geopolitical South concentrates approximately two thirds of the existing States (quite unequal), with an overwhelming majority with great political-social fragility and military and economic weakness. Their international agenda consists simply of maintaining their existence as a nation and the local elites in power. Many Cold War era coalition initiatives, such as the G-77 and the Non-Aligned Movement, which sought to formulate a common agenda and increase the region's political weight at the UN, lost focus with the end of bipolarity. From the 1990s onwards, due to the neoliberal cycle of globalization several regional integration initiatives were presented, but they faced structural difficulties at local and global levels. So, although the GDP of many of the nations of the South is growing, sometimes above the world average, political vulnerability, economic instability and social tension are increasing.

Despite material differences and foreign policy alignments, these states have structurally similar position in the world economy. Directly or indirectly, they are subject to the agendas formulated by the North-Atlantic powers and to the actions of powerful states and transnational mega-companies. Nevertheless, in several regions that make up the Geopolitical South some

pivot states can be identified, with some political and eventually economic relevance.

Regions and pivot states

In Latin America, after the “Pink Tide” of center-left governments with advances in the social agenda (without a neoliberal rupture), the trend is the reverse (by several means) of most of them. In addition to domestic changes, there is the emptying of integration projects, such as Mercosur, and of Latin American and South American associations, such as CELAC and UNASUR, respectively. Brazil, as analyzed, finds itself in a political and economic situation that is leading it to the position of a giant member of this fourth axis, while Argentina has been in it for quite some time.

In South America, Chile and Colombia maintain a pro-Washington strategic role, the first with its powerful army and bi-oceanic geopolitical position. Nowadays, the second, with a long-term cooperation with the US in counterinsurgency and in the fight against drug trafficking, plays a significant role in the Venezuelan crisis. Mexico, while still subordinate to the United States economy, has a kind of “negative or unwitting activism”, since the issues of migration and drug trafficking are taking a center stage. For its turn, Trump’s administration biggest interest in the subcontinent is the economic agenda and containment of China’s growing presence with its investments, services, commerce and infrastructure construction.

Today, much more than the Ibero-American region, Africa represents a region in fierce geopolitical dispute between former and emerging powers, which includes the strategic spaces of the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans. Added to this, there is terrorism in its northern half, coups d’état, civil wars - as in the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan - and the collapse of states – such as the ones in Libya and Somalia. Morocco continues as a strategic Western ally, with the pending Western Sahara issue and its campaign as a “Trojan Horse” in the South, in favor of the so-called Atlantic Community (linking the North Atlantic to the South Atlantic). Already South Africa is strategically stagnated by the effects of its post-Apartheid transition agreement, no longer being the largest economy in the continent, a position now occupied by the populous Nigeria.

However, the continent has its own dynamics and states that advance economically and politically. In the context of the African continent, Angola, Nigeria and Ethiopia could be considered sorts of regional powers. Ironically, African cooperation agencies have played a growing role in economic cooper-

ation and conflict resolution. Djibouti, for its part, had become a core center, not only because of its geopolitical position at the entrance to the Red Sea, but also because it shelters bases of countries such as France, the USA and China. Equally, Kenya also is a Western strategic pivot. The Gulf of Guinea, with its oil resources, has also turned into a strategic region. The clash of the United States and France to the growing Chinese presence is the main cleavage of the continent. Instead of a narrative of victimization, one can see that such a situation has given African states a leverage of political and economic autonomy that they had never experienced in 60 years of independence (Visentini 2013).

The Middle East, like Africa, is a region in a fierce strategic dispute for its geopolitical position and energy resources, but in a much more direct and violent way. Even though this is not unprecedented, nowadays it presents a new meaning which is not restricted to regionally restricted conflicts. It became the Great Middle East, with the inclusion of new states of the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) and former Soviet Union Central Asia and Afghanistan, stage of the new Great Game or Grand Chessboard. Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and conflicted Afghanistan are a pro-NATO corridor separating Russia and its allies from Central Asia also from its other allies Iran, Armenia and Syria.

Turkey has apparently given up its rapprochement with the European Union and got closer to Russia and Iran, which is considered a threat by Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Petro-monarchies, except for Qatar and Oman. The domestic political cleavages of Yemen (blocked by Riyadh and devastated by the civil war) were contained by Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Kingdom undergoes an internal struggle within the ruling elite (dozens of factions of rival princes) and constitutes a fundamentalist theocracy and absolutist monarchy that admitted its association with Israel. The country has a significant oil and financial weight and is a mentor and financier of fundamentalist Islamic movements. In addition to the internationalized civil wars of Syria and Yemen, Iraq remains a battleground, with the Kurdish issue occupying a central position.

However, it would be wrong to think that this is a clash between Sunnis and the West against Shiites. At stake is the attempt by conservative monarchies and Western powers to overthrow secular and modernizing regimes, which include Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Iran (which is modernizing), and Turkey, which has cooled its relationship with NATO and got closer to Russia. The formally “counter-terrorist” intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan was a failure and the attempt to overthrow the Ba’as regime in Syria, was also unsuccessful, making room for Russia in the region.

In South Asia, added to India (already analyzed), Pakistan (a nuclear

power) has approached China and Iran. It is worth mentioning the prominence and relative autonomy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 10 member states. Made of rich (Singapore and Malaysia) and poor states (Philippines), monarchies and republics, large and small, socialist and capitalist, stable and unstable and democratic regimes Western-like (Thailand) and considered authoritarian (Myanmar), ASEAN manages to develop a common autonomous political agenda. The Association represents a balance between the giants China and India, despite tensions in the South China Sea. On the Korean peninsula (along with Japan), local tensions are framed by global antagonisms.

The huge Pacific Ocean space is under the sea powers control, with Australia (called in the region “USA of Pacific”) and New Zealand playing an important role, controlling numerous archipelagos, as well as the United States, France and UK. The Indian Ocean is, in turn, a disputed space, with the last three nations (plus Australia) occupying a dominant position, but having to face the growing Chinese and Russian naval presence. On the other hand, the strategic spots of the South Atlantic are at its center, in sea corridors to other Oceans, which are quietly controlled by the United Kingdom. Finally, even the Arctic and Antarctic polar spaces became regions where the economic and military presence of the developed capitalist powers rivals with the emerging ones.

Structures, processes and trends

The end of the Cold War and its bipolar system produced new realities and theoretical challenges. Many attempts to interpret it have been sought, although it seems clear that the US and the Anglo-Saxon powers that are part of the first axis of power remain dominant, but in a framework of accelerated mutation and leaning towards multipolarity. Just as Kissinger (1973) very well defined in his doctoral thesis regarding the European balance of power, there is a Global Balance of Power (unstable) at the beginning of the 21st century. There are two levels of international cleavages, which are not overlapping exactly: one political and the other economic, which may indicate an asynchrony between the structure of political power and the one of economic power.

Political cleavages that affect the distribution of world power oppose China and Russia (or the hard core of the BRICS) on one side and the Anglo-Saxon powers on the other, with the European Union/Japan group as reluctant allies. In its turn, economic cleavages go well beyond the “emerging vs. declining” view, as the Trump administration is showing. It is true that

Asia had become the great industrial manufacturing center of the world, but the international economy is characterized by a dynamic that is, at the same time, of integration and conflict (as of an uneven and combined development). As Arrighi (1996) pinpointed, the world system is characterized by the coexistence between territorial states and capital, with transnational mobility.

Therefore, while on the one hand emerging countries, as *national states*, demand a share of power compatible with their increasing economic weight, on the other they are linked to large developed or post-industrial nations. In this context, the US-China “Trade War” resembles the US-Japan one of the 1980s. China has a symbiotic relationship with the United States, and the current dispute seems to contain elements of renegotiation of the economic “pact” between them. The real target of American attack is Europe centered around Germany (its advanced capitalist rival) and the new containment of semi-peripheral states of the region that it geopolitically controls (as in Brazil’s case).

It does not mean, however, that the American/Anglo-Saxon power will maintain its dominant position. Historian and demographer Emmanuel Todd (2003, 4) argued that

“there will be no American empire. The world is too vast, diverse and dynamic to accept the dominance of a single power. The examination of the demographic and cultural, industrial and monetary, ideological and military forces that transform the planet does not confirm the current vision of an invulnerable America. (...) A realistic picture [shows] a great nation whose power was incontestable, but that the relative decline seems irreversible. The United States was indispensable to the balance of the world; today they cannot maintain their standard of living without the world’s subsidies. America, by its military theater activism, directed against insignificant states, tries to mask its ebb. The fight against terrorism, Iraq and the ‘axis of evil’ are no more than excuses. Because it no longer has the strength to control the larger actors that are Europe and Russia, Japan and China, America will lose this last match for world domination. She will become a great power among others.”

The trends brought up by the postmodern and neoliberal world hit the countries differently. The Anglo-Saxon axis has a post-industrial (finance, technology, services) economy that is more *administrative* (budget balancing), while the developed axis and the emerging axis are *productive* (commodity producers). In the South, the weakening of the state, the surplus population and insufficient development provoke increasing crime and migration, but not of the poorer.


In addition, social consequences alter the structure of society. While in the North the cities are degraded (Detroit is the most radical case), in the South arise chaotic megalopolis, with crime and pollution. Drug use on a growing scale, in addition to profitable business, represents a form of social control of the youth, which seeks niches and does not engage in politics in both the North and the South. Outsourcing and fragmented app jobs, as well as the “entrepreneur” of the “creative economy” replace the old syndicated working class.

How does this stage of capitalism affect international relations and the hierarchy between powers? Immigration transforms the North from within, just as it did with the Roman Empire, but differently. In postcolonial states (historically recipients of immigrants) there is some assimilation, while in Europe there are growing tensions in an aging society with no new political projects. In the South, a producer of commodities, the attitude of the elites is different, lacking a project and in a hasty economic downturn, with Latin America being the worst case. Due to the Technological Revolution and the progress of other regions, an irrecoverable *gap* is being formed.

In Africa and the post-Arab Spring Middle East, there seems to be a reshaping of the ruling elites, with the signaling of new national projects and changes in international alliances. As Todd (2003) shows in his work, the Arab and Islamic world is in the process of demographic and political modernization. In Asia, especially in the eastern portion, nowadays there are more committed projects and elites, despite systemic contradictions. Curiously, little is being said about the fact that, for decades, the country with the best economic performance has been the People’s Republic of China, a socialist state.

The shaping of a larger interconnected Eurasian space (which links the Middle East by land) seems to be the greatest fear of US strategists and their allies. As America loses its utility to other nations, for how long will “counter-terrorism” be an effective means of action? Nothing seems to lead to an update of the United Nations structure, venturesome leaders rise and tensions build up, in the void of defined strategies. Therefore, more than ever, it is necessary to think over the ongoing changes and their impact in the great powers game.

ANNEX



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ABSTRACT

The ranking of the hierarchy and grouping of World Powers is not based exclusively on material indicators such as economics, natural resources, territorial extension, population size and military resources. It is necessary to consider the stage in which the transformational process of the post-Cold War International System is, the position in which a power stands, and general and specific historical trends. The present article proposes a classification that identifies the existence of four axes of world power: 1) the Anglo-Saxon military-rentier; 2) the semi-sovereign industrially-developed; 3) the semi-peripheral industrially-emergent; and 4) the agrarian, mineral and demographic peripheral.

KEYWORDS

World Powers; Axes of Power; International System

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BRICS AS A TRANSREGIONAL ADVOCACY COALITION¹

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Introduction

After almost ten years since the first summit of the BRICS, still there is no consensual definition about the kind of institution that this group represents. Born as an acronym, in an analysis produced by an international financial group, versing about emergent economies and their roles in the future⁴, the BRICS earned a political role since diplomatic meetings of these countries started to happen, evolving into a structure, still in force, of annual summits.

Initially, the approach between the BRICS countries was guaranteed by the mutual goal of changing the rules of the Bretton Woods institutions - particularly of the IMF and the World Bank -, in the context of relative weakening of the US and the EU world power, as a result of the 2008 financial

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⁴ The term BRICS was designed by Jim O'Neill in reports to Goldman Sachs in 2001 and 2003, identifying countries with the greatest potential for growth and hence preferential destination for the investments of the bank's customers. According to O'Neill, these countries, particularly China, would outpace developed countries in their relative share of the world economy. However, this article will not analyze the BRICS from the standpoint of private financial market players, but from its political perspective, emphasizing the diplomatic concertation among its five countries.

crisis. Later on, the summit's role changed into a broader activity, establishing multilateral agreements dealing with themes of economic and social development, such as renewable energies, water resources, science and technology. Finally, the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Agreement were created, building new mechanisms to finance investments in infrastructure and to support its members countries in case of a balance of payments crises.

In this article, we aim to: (i) review the concepts adopted in the literature to explain the role of the BRICS in international relations and (ii) present a new BRICS conceptualization proposal, considering the grouping of a transregional advocacy coalition. From the first to the last Summit Conference, the BRICS claimed for a multilateral world order, requesting the inclusion of emerging countries in the main institutions of the Western order. Over time, the action of the BRICS was deepened, becoming an extensive agenda of cooperation, but maintaining its initial claims.

In the following section, the article is organized as follows: in the first section, we will discuss the behavior of the BRICS countries in the international scenario and in their intra-group relations. We will then review the BRICS literature in order to take stock of the interpretations of the nature and behavior of the group. In the third section, we will present our proposal to interpret the BRICS as an advocacy coalition, based on the empirical contributions presented in the first section. Final considerations and a reflection about the insertion of the BRICS in the global order conclude the article.

The BRICS trajectory: from institutional construction to current challenges

The BRICS is a fragile institutionalized minilateral arrangement, involving Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. This institution⁵ is characterized by the organization of annual summit meetings as well as intermediary meetings that allow the definition of joint positions on the global political agenda, as well as the definition of cooperation agreements in other areas of public policies, which assume a horizontal format typical of South-South relations.

The recent diplomatic approximation between BRICS countries has two dimensions: in Asia, the approximation between Russia, China and In-

⁵ We follow Simmons and Martin (2002) in their definition of an international institution as "sets of rules whose purpose is to govern international behavior." Institutions can be formal or informal (Simmons & Martin, 2002, p.194).

dia goes back to ministerial-level meetings held in 2001 to discuss security issues such as terrorism, trafficking and migration. Since then, there have been intermittent meetings on the margins of the UN General Assembly and formal meetings. In 2006, Brazil joined the group, responding to a Russian invitation (Stuenkel, 2015). On the southern front, Brazil, India and South Africa have been on a successful approximation since the turn of the century, when the three countries have established common positions in the World Trade Organization, in defense of the patent infringement of medicines for AIDS treatment⁶. In addition, Brazil and India led the G20, a coalition of developing countries that aimed at countering developed countries - in particular the United States and the European Union - in negotiations under the WTO Doha Round. Finally, in 2003, the three countries established the IBSA Forum, which sought to promote concerted and trilateral cooperation on a variety of foreign policy issues.

The BRIC was established as an immediate consequence of the Russian invitation for Brazil to integrate the conversations between the “RIC”. At the first informal meeting of the group, in 2006, international security issues were left to the background⁷, prioritizing the identification of common issues of discontent about the international financial architecture (Stuenkel, 2015). From then on, the BRIC would jointly seek to broaden the G8 and reform the decision-making mechanisms in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which were benefiting developed countries disproportionately⁸.

It should be noted that the BRIC countries were not trying to democratize the decision-making processes of global financial architecture, but were just seeking to maximize the importance of their own economies for the management of global affairs⁹, proposing a more plural structure. According

6 Drug patents are regulated by the TRIPS Agreement, which is signed within the WTO. Brazil, India and South Africa claimed that AIDS medicines should be guided by a non-market logic, associated with public health and human rights advocacy, which justified the need to break these patents.

7 Though they have never been abandoned.

8 The vote of IMF and World Bank member countries is weighted by reference to their share of the global economy, leading developed countries to have a natural concentration of power in the decision-making process. This asymmetry, however, has become even more apparent with the growth of developing economies in recent years, relatively faster than in developed countries, which has not been reflected in a new allocation of countries' shares in the decision-making process of these international financial institutions. The reform of the IMF's decision-making process, which was called for by the IMF, was completed in 2010.

9 A possible demand for the democratization of deliberative and decision-making processes in the institutions responsible for global governance would imply the participation of all sovereign states, which was not part of the BRICS' claims.

to the diplomatic discourse, this new structure would increase the participation of developing countries in the main decision-making bodies of global governance¹⁰. In this sense, the BRIC countries would place themselves as representatives of developing countries in the deliberative and decision-making bodies regarding the regulation of international financial and monetary relations (Stuenkel, 2015).

In the context of the 2008 international financial crisis, Brazil, Russia, India, China and other developing countries - including South Africa, the future BRICS member - were invited to the G20¹¹ meeting, on November 15 of the same year, in a measure that tried to establish the first actions to contain the global effects of the crisis. The G20, although it had existed since 1999, gained greater relevance after the 2008 crisis, when developed countries agreed that G8 meetings¹² were insufficient to address international economic problems, recognizing the importance of developing countries in international economic relations. In other words, responses to the crisis could only be effective if they had the participation of developing countries in the deliberative process (Flemes, 2010). The idea that developed countries might require the management of global financial relations, imposing their rules, was put away.

In 2009, the first BRIC summit took place in Yekaterinburg, Russia. At this summit, centrality was given to issues related to the reform of the international financial architecture. In their joint statement, the BRIC called for increased representativeness and transparency of decision-making processes in international financial institutions (IFIs), as well as stability, predictability and diversification of the international monetary system (Damico, 2015). They also emphasized the need to continue the Heiligendamm Process, which aimed to institutionalize relations between the G8 and the countries that made up the so-called Outreach 5 - South Africa, Brazil, China, India and Mexico. Notwithstanding the prominence given to international finance and global governance, the BRIC also sought to affirm common positions related to issues of developing countries, such as food security, energy security, cli-

¹⁰ It is, according to Rosenau (2000), a governance without government, that is, of the "agreement on the existence of functions that must be performed to render viable any human system, even if this system has not produced organizations and institutions explicitly to exercise them (Rosenau, 2000, p.14).

¹¹ The G20 is composed of the European Union and 19 countries: South Africa Germany, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, South Korea, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, United Kingdom, United States, Russia and Turkey.

¹² It should be noted that Russia was part of the G8.

mate change and development assistance¹³.

The second BRIC summit took place in Brasilia in 2010. Financial issues kept their centrality, and the countries strengthened their joint position in defense of the IFIs reform. The reform of the United Nations Security Council¹⁴ was also proposed. South-South cooperation began to take shape, with meetings at the bureaucratic level - between finance ministers and central bank presidents, agriculture ministers, representatives of the national development banks and the public security area - and at the level of civil society - business forum, think tanks seminar and cooperative forum (Damico, 2015). From then on, a type of cooperation organized in three ways, as defined by the BRICS itself: (1) the diplomatic level; (2) the level of relationship between government agencies and public enterprises; (3) the level of civil society relationship¹⁵.

In 2011, the third summit was held in Sanya, China, when South Africa's entry into the BRICS was formalized. The entry of the second largest African economy - after Nigeria - into the BRICS caused strangeness among political and economic analysts: compared to the other BRICS countries, South Africa has modest territory, population and GDP. In addition, it was a country with no relevant impact or major political aspiration at the global level. From the diplomatic point of view, however, the country's accession to the BRICS represented the diversification of its representation among developing countries, representing a key country in the context of African political relations (Stuenkel, 2015). It is also important that South Africa already had established relevant diplomatic relations with Brazil and India, which certainly were a facilitator for the African country's entry into the group. At the Sanya summit, in addition, new themes were included in intra-BRICS cooperation, such as culture, education, sports and the green economy (Damico, 2015). Meetings were also organized between businessmen, representatives of the financial and university sectors, as well as a meeting between trade ministers who were absent from the previous meeting¹⁶. Regarding the establishment of common positions in the different international regimes¹⁷, the BRICS sought to estab-

13 Information available at: <<http://www.brics2018.org.za/en/previous-summits>>. Accessed on 12 May 2018.

14 Ibidem.

15 See: <<http://www.brics2018.org.za/en/what-brics>>. Accessed on 12 May 2018.

16 <<http://www.brics2018.org.za/en/previous-summits>>. Accessed on 12 May 2018.

17 According to Krasner (1983), international regimes are "sets of principles, norms and implicit or explicit rules and decision-making procedures in a particular area of international relations around which the expectations of the actors converge. Principles are beliefs in facts, causes, and moral issues. Standards are defined standards of behavior in terms of rights and

lish a convergent position on the issue of climate change¹⁸.

The first three BRICS summits defined the institutional characteristics that would shape the group. This was, therefore, the first step in the BRICS institutional trajectory. It is an arrangement with little institutionalization, without a constitutive agreement, secretariat or headquarters. In short terms, it is not an international organization. BRICS allows countries to establish comprehensive agendas, ranging from the establishment of common intergovernmental positions in multilateral fora to mechanisms for trans-governmental and transnational cooperation¹⁹. At the same time, the absence of a binding common agreement, which obliges governments to converge their actions around certain issues, allows the “BRICS agenda” to be modified according to the opportunities of governments at the particular moment in which the summit meetings take place. In this sense, points of disagreement are circumvented, inhibiting conflict between BRICS countries, and the points of agreement are highlighted (Jesus, 2013, Abdenur, 2014, Cooper & Farooq, 2015). However, this form of cooperation means that the permanence of the BRICS depends on the relevance attributed to it by the respective governments in their foreign policy agendas.

The emphasis given to the BRICS joint positions could be seen in the context of the voting of the NATO military intervention in the Syrian conflict in 2011. In the vote on Security Council Resolution 1979 UN²⁰, which sought to support intervention based on the newly formulated principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P), the BRICS countries, with the exception of South Africa²¹, abstained. This common position revealed a convergence between these countries not only in economic matters, but also in international security (Stuenkel, 2015). Over time, however, the Syrian civil war lost relevance on the BRICS agenda, and Russia became, by itself, a major player in that conflict (Abdenur, 2016).

obligations. The rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and executing collective decisions. (Krasner, 1983, p. 02).

18 The links between the BRICS countries, except Russia, had already taken place within the framework of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change held in Copenhagen in 2010. The coalition, called BASIC, argued that newly industrialized countries should not have binding targets for reduction of the emission of greenhouse gases, an obligation that should only cover countries of advanced industrialization - such as Russia.

19 The terms used here correspond to the international interconnection channels established by Keohane and Nye (1977) in their classic discussion of complex interdependence.

20 As a matter of fact, all BRICS countries made up the UN Security Council at that time, either as permanent members (Russia and China) or temporary (Brazil, India and South Africa).

21 South Africa voted in favor of the resolution.

Despite the limited institutionalization of BRICS in its first stage, the second stage of its trajectory is marked by the establishment of formal institutions, namely the Contingent Reserves Agreement (CRA) and the New Development Bank (NDB), which have mechanisms that generate obligations. The second stage of the BRICS institutionalization also expands the South-South cooperation agenda, which now covers various topics of interest to national bureaucracies and civil society²².

In 2012, the fourth BRICS summit took place in New Delhi, India. At this summit, the BRICS leaders stressed their concern about the slowness of the IFIs' reform process²³. During the summit, the possibility of creating a BRICS bank, that could fund projects of infrastructure and sustainable development, was discussed for the first time. In the same year, on the margins of the G20 meeting, group leaders met to discuss the possibility of establishing an arrangement of currency swaps. In 2013, during the Durban summit, the NDB and the CRA were created, whose constituent documents²⁴ were signed the following year, in the Fortaleza summit. During the Durban and Fortaleza summits, BRICS leaders met with heads of state from African and South American countries, respectively²⁵, (Damico, 2015), in order to broaden the relationship between BRICS and the Global South, particularly with regard to the diversification of commercial and investment partnerships²⁶.

Initially, the creation of the NDB and the CRA was viewed with optimism among various political analysts. It was hoped that the new institutions would strengthen BRICS not only as leaders of developing countries but also as an alternative to IMF and the World Bank (Moreira Júnior & Figueira, 2014). In this sense, the BRICS would be deepening its revisionism about the

22 It is beyond the scope of this article to draw up an exhaustive list of South-South cooperation agreements signed under the tutelage of the BRICS. For this reason, we only mention them at its foundational moment, when we still wanted to affirm the institutional characteristics of BRICS.

23 It is important to note that the BRICs failed to support a jointly-named name for the post of IMF Managing Director following the departure of Frenchman Dominique Strauss-Kahn, making room for the election of Frenchwoman Christine Lagarde. Although it is an event that reveals the difficulty of forming a common agenda among the BRIC countries in international regimes - and in particular the IMF.

24 An agreement and a treaty, respectively.

25 <<http://www.brics2018.org.za/en/previous-summits>>. Accessed on 12 May 2018.

26 At the 2017 summit, the concept of the BRICS Plus was defined as a substitute for the BRICS outreach established at the first summits to expand BRICS partnerships with the Global South countries and to define common positions in multilateral institutions <<http://www.brics2018.org.za/en/brics-outreach>>. Accessed on 17 May 2018.

international order²⁷. Over time, it was perceived that this view was based on exaggerated projections. The institutional design of the RTA itself, for example, is in line with current IMF standards²⁸ (Cattaneo et al., 2015). The NDB is limited to lending to the BRICS countries themselves and therefore does not provide collective benefits to developing countries outside the bloc, as in the Bretton Woods institutions, which have historically contributed to the establishment of hegemony in the post-World War II era. In other words, by limiting the benefits of NDB to themselves, the BRICS refuse the prerogative of building hegemonic leadership at the international level.

External and internal events in the BRICS countries undermined their belief in their high and continuous economic growth, which would be the material basis for them to dispute the leading role in the international order with the developed countries. On the external front, the end of the commodity boom (between 2012 and 2014) had a negative impact on the economies of Brazil and Russia, which went into recession. Ironically, the end of the super-cycle of high commodity prices in the international market is explained in part by the decline in Chinese demand, which has adjusted to the new level of economic growth of the country, currently around 6-7% per year. Therefore, there was an expansion of the pre-existing asymmetry within the BRICS, with China and India registering strong economic growth rates, Brazil and Russia in recession and South Africa with modest GDP growth.

In domestic politics, there are also important changes which affect the definition of the BRICS foreign policy. In Brazil, the deposition of Dilma Rousseff led to the emergence of a government linked with the developed countries interests, rejecting a natural affinity with developing countries. This change became apparent when Brazil and other countries governed by the right and center-right in South America (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Colombia) indefinitely suspended their participation of UNASUR, due to disagreements with the left governments, in particular from Bolivia and Venezuela. On the other hand, the Chinese government has emphasized initiatives that reveal the strength of its leadership, creating the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and launching the project to build the so-called New Silk Road. In Russia, even though security issues have never left the Putin government's concerns, they have been given a new impetus in the context of

27 The term soft revisionism can be found in Lima (2010), Saraiva (2013), among others. It approaches, fundamentally, the discussion on soft balancing that will be discussed in the next section.

28 When borrowing from the CRA, countries must commit to providing information to the IMF and to subjecting them to the monitoring mechanisms set out in the Fund's agreement (Cattaneo et al., 2015).

the Syrian war, relegating concerns about the international financial architecture to a secondary level.

In this context, the third stage of the BRICS institutional trajectory is inaugurated, marking the present moment: the summit meetings continue to be organized annually - Goa (2016), Xiamen (2017) and Johannesburg (2018) - and their leaders continue to maintain meetings on the margins of the G20 meetings. In addition, extensive joint statements are produced at the end of the summit meetings - addressing relevant issues of global governance - new intra-BRICS cooperation agreements are signed and NDB begins to grant its first loans for renewable energy projects, basic infrastructure, and transportation. However, the initial optimism about BRICS's elevation to the forefront of international relations, with its leading role in the discussions on global problems - international financial architecture, humanitarian intervention, climate change - does not exist. According to information on the 2018 Summit website in Johannesburg, BRICS currently has a more limited approach to promoting intra-group economic development, which was only part of its objectives in its founding stage:

The BRICS approach is informed by the need to deepen, broaden and intensify relations within the group and between individual countries for a more sustainable, equitable and mutually beneficial development. This approach takes into account the growth, development and poverty goals of each member in order to ensure that relations are built on the basis of each country's economic strengths and avoid competition whenever possible. The bloc provides a unique opportunity for BRICS countries to expand and deepen their cooperation in order to significantly advance their economic development agendas as well as the agendas of other developing countries. (BRICS, 2018)²⁹

At this point, it is important to ask: why Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa remain in the BRICS? Our hypothesis is that the BRICS provides selective benefits to its members, enabling them to promote South-South cooperation, while keeping the possibility of reactivating the advocacy coalition on global issues open. In other words, its barely institutionalized format is a facilitator of coordination and cooperation among its members, which, contrary to common sense, encourages its permanence as a minilateral arrangement.

In order to answer the question, it is necessary to understand the nature and behavior of the BRICS. In the next section, we review the literature

29 Available at: <<http://www.brics2018.org.za/en/what-brics>>. Accessed on 19 May 2018.

on the BRICS, seeking to identify the proposals to explain the group by different authors of diverse theoretical approaches.

Unraveling the BRICS: revisiting theoretical approaches

Since the BRIC(S) settled as an institutional arrangement, overcoming the prevailing financial perspective coined by Jim O'Neill, extensive literature was produced to understand its nature and behavior. It is not, of course, a regional trade promotion organization, moving away from the regional blocs prevailing in the international arena, such as the European Union, Mercosur and NAFTA. Nor is there any ideological convergence between the governments that make it up (Gonçalves, 2014) or a search for making the BRICS an international organization (Nogueira, 2015). BRICS therefore departs from the more traditional forms of institutionalized cooperation in international relations.

The innovation of the BRICS emergence became the subject of academic discussions in international relations. According to Fonseca Jr. (2015), the BRICS has a dimension *hacia afuera*, aimed at coordinating the positions of these countries in the international regimes and other decision-making bodies which govern the global rules, and a *hacia adentro* dimension, focused on the promotion of intra-cooperation³⁰. There are different definitions of the BRICS - club organization model (Cooper & Farooq, 2015); coalition (Oliveira & Onuki, 2013, Abdenur, 2014); imagined community (Brütsch & Pope, 2013) - and about the group's behavior on the international stage - soft balancing (Flemes, 2010); soft bandwagoning (Spektor apud Stuenkel, 2015); subimperialism (Bond, 2016) - which take as reference different theoretical aspects of international relations (neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism) and social sciences (Marxism).

Cooper and Farooq (2015) classify the BRICS as an informal club. Participation in the BRICS is restricted, members define themselves the annual summit agenda and the goods produced are exclusive to their members. The authors explain:

The BRICS are a club that manifests self-selective exclusivity. The exclusivity of the BRICS is based on the attribution of both internal and external status. Internally, BRICS members affirm the status of 'emerging power' and status assignment derives from peer recognition, which is positive, as

³⁰ In this dimension, the BRICS constitutes a cooperative arrangement, "involving the exchange between the parties of material, symbolic and ideational goods" (Lima, 2010, p.164).

it reaffirms and reinforces status among members, but can also be negative, as it demonstrates competitive ambition for power (...). Externally, BRICS members design an international status outside their club, which is based on the narrative of 'South-South' solidarity and is realized through their leadership in representing the developing world. (Cooper & Farooq, 2015: 22).

Based on a functionalist reading, Stuenkel (2013, 2015) considers the BRICS as an institution - albeit an informal one - which composes the set of mechanisms aimed at global governance at the same time. With regard to the intra-BRICS dimension, in particular, the author argues that financial cooperation was the starting point for confidence building between Brazil, Russia, India, China (and later South Africa) , expanding it to several other areas. These include the construction of formal institutions - the CRA and the NDB -, leading Stuenkel to affirm that there is a tendency for the institutionalized intra-BRICS cooperation to remain in the future.

Oliveira and Onuki (2013) emphasize the *hacia afuera* dimension of the BRICS, classifying it as a coalition that seeks to "counterbalance the hegemonic weight of the United States in the international order"³¹ (Oliveira & Onuki, 2013: 89). Abdenur (2014), in turn, classifies the BRICS as a loose coalition, which is embedded in international arrangements of variable geometry and different levels of institutionalization, being present in formal organizations (UN and Bretton Woods institutions) and informal (G20 and IBSA Forum, in addition to the BRICS itself). Although Abdenur (2014) rejects the idea that the BRICS countries intend to overturn the current international order, it asserts that the grouping assists China in its counter-hegemonic position vis-à-vis the United States, but there is no direct confrontation. The author, therefore, differs from Oliveira and Onuki (2013), who consider the BRICS together as a counter-hegemonic grouping. Abdenur (2014) also highlights the dynamism of the BRICS, which was able to modify its composition (with the entry of South Africa) and agenda along its short trajectory:

"This dynamism contrasts with the inflexibility of established organizations

31 Hamilton and Whalley define coalition as "any group of decision makers who participate in a negotiation and who make an agreement to act in concert in order to reach a common goal" (Hamilton & Whalley 1989: 547). Narlikar (2012) emphasizes that the "collective defense of a common position by a coalition is the product of conscious co-ordination, rather than a coincidental alignment of interests" (Narlikar, 2012, p.195). Along the same lines, Oliveira and Onuki, countries form coalitions in the "attempt to forge coordination of positions in international institutions as a way of leveraging the bargaining powers of the member countries of these coalitions" (Oliveira & Onuki, 2013, p.89).

and confers certain advantages on its members by allowing them to engage in specific dialogues on topics and to cement ties informally - even by rallying large international events - without committing themselves to a rigid alliance. Although the BRICS are a loose coalition, they are not improvised, addressing areas as diverse as collective security, financial governance, and climate change as windows of opportunity emerge. (Abdenur, 2014: 87).

From a constructivist perspective on the BRICS, Mielniczuk (2013), while recognizing that the group brings together diverse countries, highlights the existence of a shared worldview among these countries, namely the existence of an unfair global order. This common understanding allowed the BRICS countries to establish their own identity, allowing the formation and consolidation of the group, which aims to promote substantive changes in international relations.

In a skeptical perspective on the BRICS, Brüttsch & Papa (2013) evaluate the cohesion of the group against two types of ideas: (1) utilizing a rationalist perspective, they seek to analyze the behavior of the BRICS as a coalition which aims the emergence among countries in the international arena; (2) following a constructivist approach, the authors discuss the possibility of understand the BRICS as an imagined community, seeking a joint emergency in international relations while sharing understandings, ideas, and world views. For Brüttsch and Papa, the convergence of the BRICS countries, whether around a coalition or an imagined community, is precarious, which puts their survival at risk. In summary, the authors believe that the BRICS may be no more than a “geopolitical fashion style”.

Regarding the BRICS purposes or its behavior at the global level, Flandes (2010) considers that these countries seek soft balancing against the hegemonic power, the United States. According to the author:

Soft balancing does not directly challenge the military preponderance of the United States, but rather uses non-military instruments to retard, frustrate, and undermine the superpower's unilateral policies. Soft balancing involves institutional strategies such as the formation of limited coalitions or diplomatic entente such as BRIC, IBAS, G₃ and G₂₁ to restrict the power of the established great powers. (...). It also involves strengthening economic ties between emerging powers through collaboration in different sectors. That could change the balance of economic power in the medium term. (Flandes, 2010: 145).

BRICS would seek to reform the international order seeking their own economic objectives. Hard balancing - as discussed in the Neorealist literature

- is not an option for the BRICS, not only because of its (still) limited material capabilities, but also because they would not be benefited after a collapse of the international order (Flemes, 2010).

Stuenkel (2015), using the term coined by Matias Spektor, considers that the BRICS does not present a behavior oriented by soft balancing, but by the soft bandwagoning, since they do not pretend to delegitimize the current order or to defy US hegemony: the BRICS intends to broaden the decision-making processes of the IFIs created at Bretton Woods³².

From an institutionalist language, Cooper (2014) and Cooper & Farooq (2015) discard that BRICS seeks to compete with the G20, arguing that it behaves like a lobby group that seeks to promote its interests within the scope of this arrangement. According to the authors, the BRICS is not yet constituted as a forum capable of articulating, autonomously, its agency power in international relations.

Stephen (2014), following a materialistic historical reading, suggests that the BRICS does not reject the international order, but only its emphasis on liberalism, given that these are countries with a greater predominance of state interventionism and, therefore, less sympathy looking for liberal measures. For the author, the emergence of new powers in recent years has led to the deepening of transnational ties, including among the countries of the Global South, but at the same time, it has opened the way for the questioning of the principles that guide and organize the international order.

Also from a Marxist perspective, Bond (2016) considers that the BRICS, and in particular the CRA and the NDB, are an expression of sub-imperial finance. The author resorts to Harvey's discussion of sub-imperialism in the current stage of financial capitalism. He points out that the new developing centers for capital accumulation have sought to shed their surplus capital into new spheres of influence. In this sense, the NDB and the CRA only conform to the existing IFIs, while the BRICS, as a bloc, only reproduces a sub-imperialist behavior (Bond, 2016).

In the table, we seek to summarize the main interpretations present in the literature regarding the nature and behavior of the BRICS:

32 The same evidence - the BRICS participation in the G20 and the demand for reform of the Bretton Woods institutions rather than their abandonment - is taken by Flemes (2010) and Stuenkel (2015) to agree with the mutually exclusive hypotheses of soft balancing and soft bandwagoning, respectively.

Table 1: Interpretations on the BRICS nature and behavior in literature

Theoretical approach	Author	Nature	Behaviour
Rationalism (Realism)	Flemes (2010)	Coalition / flexible alliance	<i>Soft balancing</i>
Rationalism	Oliveira & Onuki (2013)	Coalizão	Counter-hegemony
Rationalism	Abdenur (2014)	Weak coalition	Reformism; support for Chinese counter-hegemony
Rationalism (Institutionalism)	Cooper (2014); Cooper & Farooq (2015)	Club	<i>Lobby</i>
Rationalism (Functionalism)	Stuenkel (2013; 2015)	Institution	Cooperation and <i>soft bandwagoning</i>
Rationalism / Constructivism	Brütsch & Papa (2013)	Weak coalition; precarious imaginary community	Inconsistent
Constructivism	Mielniczuk (2013)	Political group with common identity	Reformism
Marxism	Stephen (2014)	Emerging powers	Answering the liberal characteristics of the global order
Marxism	Bond (2014)	Bloc	Subimperialism

In the next section, we bring our contribution to the debate on the nature and behavior of the BRICS, classifying the grouping as a transregional advocacy coalition.

BRICS as a transregional advocacy coalition

Searching to further conceptualize the BRICS, we understand that the studies of international regionalism allow us to look differently at this group of countries, which is based, in synthesis, on a high degree of informality, which remained in this first decade of existence. Without exaggeration, apart from the NDB and the CRA, the only articulation element of the BRICS countries is the commitment of their annual summit meetings

(Soderbaum, 2016).

Based on different authors, Soderbaum (2016) advocates denaturalizing the neorealist, liberal or constructivist understanding of regional organizations, which seems to us to be highly valuable in understanding an informal and at the same time relatively structured entity like the BRICS.

Hettne supports the first aspect of Soderbaum's argument when he summarizes the importance of the denaturalization of the creation and trajectory of international organizations, noting that "regionalism is more complex and often more damaging than simply an instrument to strengthen an ambiguous 'national interest' (realism) or the 'public good' through trade, development, security and so on (liberalism)" (Soderbaum, 2016: 53).

This perspective is articulated with poststructuralist and post-modern proposals in IR, in which the very notion of space is made by Nieimann (apud Soderbaum, 2016), who attributes to the less interest in regional studies exactly the absence of a discussion about space in IR, traditionally based on two levels, namely, the state level and the global level.

According to Soderbaum (2016), this leads us to what Neumann calls the Regional Building Approach, which comes to understand regions through 'policies of definition and redefinition' of this intermediate unit between the state and the international order, a new perspective which can better conceptualize the BRICS.

The trajectory of this unique international entity, which is the BRICS countries, should benefit from the recent contributions of the regional studies above, moving away to a lesser or greater extent from the perceptions already discussed.

Without any kind of foundational organizational document, the declarations of the summit meetings can be taken as a striking indicator of the specific characteristic of the BRICS group: all are initiated with paragraphs that reaffirm the link of the member countries with what can be understood as a group project which is the defense of a reordering of the Bretton Woods economic-financial architecture in the direction of a formal and substantive democratization of it, including so-called emerging countries.

Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa maintained the founding propositions in the ten meetings, as well as adding new ones, all within an underlying principle of consensual action, visible even in moments

of in the extra-BRICS foreign policy of the group countries.

BRICS, so defined less by formal, statutory objectives than by a permanent self-definition struggle as an advocacy group of emerging countries, and may perhaps be understood so far as a transregional advocacy coalition in transition, corresponding to the policy of definition and redefinition of the grouping.

Final remarks

In this article, we sought to conceptualize the BRICS as a transregional advocacy coalition. In order to do this, we reconstructed the narrative of the institutional trajectory of the BRICS construction and consolidation, as well as to the literature review that seeks to classify the grouping regarding its nature and behavior.

In this discussion, we intended to bring our contribution to the role of the BRICS in international relations. With no ambition to end the subject, we argued that the BRICS must be interpreted in the light of the ideas that articulate these countries around a common cause. In this sense, we approached an interpretive key of the constructivist approach to international relations, understanding that the sharing of beliefs, ideas and worldviews is an open process. From our perspective, the analyzes which consider the BRICS as a coalition by rationalistic lenses (realist or institutionalist) can not explain the reason why such diverse countries have met and still persist despite economic³³ and political³⁴ crises experienced by its members. To understand the nature and behavior of the BRICS, it becomes necessary to understand how its facet as a cooperative arrangement articulates with its definition as a coalition (or lobby group). For us, the advocacy coalition model brings important contributions to understanding this articulation.

All this characterization of a “transregional advocacy coalition” gives meaning to the own characteristics of the BRICS formation and action. On one hand, it is marked by an affirmation of a founding principle, to which are associated other unfoldings related to that founding idea in response to the external scenario (of the group) in transformation during its first decade of existence, without losing its identity. On the other hand, this performance is based on an intense and diversified bilateral and multilateral cooperation between member countries - typical of South-South relations, moving away

³³ Brazil and Russia.

³⁴ Brazil and South Africa.

from any hierarchy between donor and recipient, strengthening bilateral and multilateral relations which are established within the BRICS.

In this way, the BRICS affirms itself as a new form of concerted international action by a group - more than a group - of countries with an important impact on the concert of nations, regardless of whether it constitutes a “consolidated” international organization or not (Soderbaum, 2016).

Last but not least, it should be added that an empirical challenge for the BRICS, and for Brazil in particular, was the deposition of Dilma Rousseff and the rise of the Michel Temer government, which has implemented a neoliberal economic agenda and established as a priority of Brazilian foreign policy the North / South relations. Although Brazil remains in the BRICS, its leadership in articulating the demands and ideas common to the Global South has collapsed. In this context, Brazil’s participation in the BRICS has a low profile, and contacts are maintained at the bureaucratic and civil society levels, but with a shy support of the government regarding its goals to reform global governance institutions.

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ABSTRACT

In this article, we aim to: (i) review the concepts adopted in the literature to explain the nature and behavior of the BRICS in international relations and (ii) present a new BRICS conceptualization proposal. From the first to the last Summit Conference, the BRICS explicitly advocates a multilateral world order through the inclusion of emerging countries in the base institutions of the Western order. For the elaboration of the article, we review the literature on BRICS, as well as the approach on regionalism proposed by Soderbaum to elaborate our conceptualization of the BRICS as an advocacy coalition.

KEYWORDS

BRICS; institution; advocacy coalition

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EURASIA AMIDST THE SPIRIT OF SHANGHAI AND A COMMUNITY OF SHARED FUTURE¹

Sunamis Fabelo Concepción²

The disintegration of the USSR and the end of bipolarity led to a new rearrangement in the international system. Since then, two outstanding objectives were at the heart of the world socialist debacle: the reorientation of the bipolar order towards a multipolar one, and the search for alliances between emerging powers in order to modify the functioning of the system of international relations. Even more, the emergence of important economies and the convergence of interests in strategic alliances and diverse integration frameworks at different levels became evident. In this system, undoubtedly, areas of influence not only continued to exist in the logics of power, but also had reached greater importance. In this context, the return of Eurasia to maps and to the debates on geopolitical competition had a great significance.

In History and Political Science, numerous references place Eurasia as a great enclave of world power. From the ancient Silk Road, commercial and cultural long-distance bridge, which changed the way of understanding trade on an international scale and led to encounters and disagreements of all kinds between different regions; to until centuries later when the British Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947), also took the region as an object of

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reflection in the work *The Geographical Pivot of History* (1904), in which he raised his theory about the *Heartland or Heart of the Earth*, conformed by the center of Eurasia. Mackinder said that whoever dominates Eastern Europe will dominate the *heartland*; then, whoever dominates it, will dominate, in turn, the *World Island* and whoever dominates the *World Island* will finally dominate the world. This theory had as an essential objective to warn British politicians and diplomats of the Russian power and, above all, against a potential Russia-Germany alliance. On the other hand, the nationalized Dutch American Nicholas John Spykman (1893-1943) defended the opposite thesis: who controls the *Rimland*, that is to say the powers whose force resides in the control of the seas and surrounding spaces, will rule Eurasia and the one that governs in Eurasia will control the destinies of the world. However, both agreed on the importance of winning Eurasia to gain global control³.

These debates were deeply recovered in the work of the prominent ultra-conservative political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski. In *The Grand Chessboard*, *Grand Failure*, *Game Plan* and *The Premature Partnership*, important reflections on US foreign policy are made and the important role that is assigned to the countries of the Middle East and Central Asia in the US strategy is pointed out, while recovering the theory of Mackinder's *Heartland* to affirm that the global primacy of the United States depends directly on how long and how effectively they can maintain their preponderance in the Eurasian continent. At the same time, emphasis is placed on the Cold War policy carried out by the White House and the Kremlin and the policy planning the United States should have though to project after the disintegration of the USSR to disconnect the post-Soviet space from the Russian orbit, and to try to contain the advance of China towards the West in the context of its Reform and Opening.

For its part, the strictly Eurasian conceptions developed from Russia, present Eurasianism as an intellectual current, with important geopolitical borders that has gone through different stages and brought up serious debates about Pan-Slavism or the idea that Eurasia is a separate continent both from Europe and Asia or with the notion of making Eurasia coincide with the borders of the USSR. Its main exponents were Prince Nikolai Trubetskoi and

3 Created at a time when the main powers turned to an imperialist course, these elements have determined that Geopolitics was considered by many specialists as the rationalization, on geographic support, of the expansionism of those States. That is why, most of the time, this concept is permeated with a strong ideological load of an imperialist nature. However, this research allowed us to understand that the study of Geopolitics is also fully valid and necessary for understanding and interpreting the influence of geographical factors (physical, economic and sociocultural) on the actions and interactions of States at a regional level. and in its extra regional projection, as a basis for the adoption of political strategies.

Piotr Savitski⁴.

The Eurasian revival was promoted by the historian and anthropologist Lev Gumilev and his theory of “ethnogenesis”, which established that the determining factor of the great changes in history was not race or social class, but a particular type of “ethnic and emotional passion” capable of bringing together people of diverse origins. Eurasianism would represent, in his opinion, an injection of this passion that would allow creating a “superethnos” over phenotypic or cultural differences. Gumilev criticized the equation between Russians and Soviets as a stumbling union in the formation of a future union of nations, which would be worth criticism of the most conservative Russian nationalism, which defended the purity of the race and was unwilling to admit their Mongol, hun or tartar ancestry⁵.

The most radical and current version of Eurasianism has been present in the political debate at the hand of Alexander Dugin. Since the presidency of Vladimir Putin, these assumptions have been hyperbolized and radicalized by the followers of Dugin, taking into consideration that the Russian president took up the idea of traditional Russian values and pride for the historical greatness of Russia, as support of its policy of great Eurasian power, in line with a certain recovery of the original Eurasianism intimately linked to the

4 According to Trubetskoi, it would include the Russians along with Ugan-Finnish and Turkish peoples of the Volga, Siberia and Central Asia. This coincides with the territory of the former Russian Empire, leaving out its more western and “European” regions, such as Finland, the Baltic or Poland. Other Eurasian theorists such as Piotr Savitski, identified Eurasia with the borders of the USSR. However, unlike the pan-slavists, Trubetskoi rejected a restoration of the tsarist empire, since it considered that the Eurasian civilization is multicultural, this is the reason why the Russians cannot arrogate the role of dominant nation.

5 Other important elements to consider are the results of the investigations of the Turkmen anthropologist and historian Shohrat Kadyrov who affirms that the Central Asian societies are composed of second-generation tribes, sub-ethnos. They are not similar to the tribes of the primitive community, but they use the ideology of tribal solidarity for political purposes, they are ethnic substrates. The tendency of polygenesis in these societies (communities) is initially based on the organization of the direction according to the principles of tribal kanatos and amorphous confederations, while the cultural antithesis us or them direct it basically towards the interior of the ethnos, unlike what is done by nation-societies. The tribes lived concentrated for centuries in relatively isolated areas. The cohesion of the population competes with the territorial cohesion and for this reason it is common that within each area intertribal integration is reduced to incorporation. Inbreeding and ethnoracial prejudices are used arbitrarily to explain the origin of the old elites and as an instrument to organize their hierarchy. General ethnic self-identification is combined with tribal self-consciousness. The old legends about the age of the tribes (read the subordination of one to another), not only reestablished, but are tendentiously written adapting to the conjuncture of the political market. See: Kadyrov Shokhrat: A special Report for the Conference “The Turkmenistan: not on Orange revolution but Regional?”.

idea of the Russian world (Russkiy Mir)⁶.

Eurasianism was a trend that, historiography with the end of the Cold War, had been reduced to a mere geopolitical reference. However, this conception officially started to be recognized as an ideology in Kazakhstan from the moment of its independence and one of the main universities of the same country is the National Eurasian University in Astana, which acquires its name from the famous Eurasian ideologist, Lev Gumilev. From those early days, the Kazakh president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, understood that the CIS was no more than a first step in the transition to a stronger integration process. This criterion was the opposite of that of several CIS partners, with attitudes of dispersion, resulting from the introduction of the most divergent national regulations.

To overcome such difficulties, Nazarbayev proposed the idea of integration at different levels and at different speeds. This idea was gathered in the project of the Eurasian Union, raised by him, at the Moscow State University, in 1994, based on the historical experience that in any integration process there are countries more reluctant than others to move towards a common goal, which does not have to stop the most dynamic members. In the EU this is called enhanced cooperation. In this line of proposals and action, Nazarbayev's highest bet had been within CIS and the creation and advancement of the Customs Union, similar to the European Union beginnings.

In general, the following basic characteristics of the "Eurasian concept" can be distinguished, according to Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the main promoter of this trend:

- 1) *Realistic character; absence of the "primacy of ideology";*
- 2) *Trend to firmly connect the idea of "Eurasian integration" in the post-Soviet space with the aims and objectives of modernization;*
- 3) *Attention to the priority of the interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan as*

⁶ At this point we must take into account the influence of Russian nationalism on this trend. The existence of the "Russian world" which is a very broad concept from the cultural, ethnic, nationalist point of view, impossible to be addressed in its entirety in this framework. However, it can be defined in a very general and short way that refers to the division of Eastern Slavs into Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians. This was the Russian world that existed during the empire, and later was divided into "Great Russian" (Russians), "Little Russian" (Ukrainians) and "White Russians" (Belarusians). The preponderant factor in that world was the religious, that is, orthodox Christianity. That "Russian world" to the Russians was necessary because with him they were a majority within the empire, and therefore, they could be who decided in the empire. But if the Ukrainians, e.g the little Russians, and the Belarusians or white Russians were taken away, then the great Russians were a minority within the empire.

an independent and sovereign State;

4) Current realist criticism of the “post-Soviet space” and the main trends of its development.

5) Review of the perspectives of “Eurasian integration” in the context of a multi-directional strategy adopted by the government of Kazakhstan.

6) Propensity for close coordination of economic and political integration.

7) Consultation not only of the Kazakh and Russian interests within the “Integration Project”, but also of the interests of the Central Asian States⁷.

As it can be seen, this Eurasian doctrine is based on the idea to enhance Kazakhstan interests in the integration process, which makes evident the obvious limitations of these projects in the Central Asian environment, due to the characteristics of these societies where the perception of leadership has a transcendental importance, even ancestral. The development of this Nazarbayev proposal was strongly inspired by the evolution of the Republic of Kazakhstan as the heir of a millenarian nomadic culture, therefore it had a lot to do with that return to the origins that was proposed as a trend towards the beginning of the disintegration in the search for the rescue and re-articulation of the Aryan unit, the Islamic world and the Turkish world, conceptions that coexist in the region intimately related by the historical complexities. Modern Kazakhstan had become one of the most dynamic states in the CIS territory, while serving as an example of inter-ethnic and religious tolerance, as it is a moderate Muslim country, which has become a kind of a “bridge between East and West “.

That is why it has always been considered that in Kazakhstan the development of the Eurasian idea has been made with a more generalizing-integrating character, but without reaching extremes. The Eurasian construction was conceived as a broad international collaboration, with the participation of all the ethnic groups that have historically been present in the Eurasian continent. Hence, it is important to point out the panturkist direction that also contains the Eurasian idea.

On October 12, 2012, the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, in his speech at the Kazakh-Turkish Business Forum held in Istanbul, made a sound statement:

[...] Between the Mediterranean Sea and the Altai massif live more than 200 million of our ethnic brothers. If we unite, we would be a large and

⁷ Ramón Tamames: Ob. Cit.

influential State all over the world⁸... To this he added: We live in the homeland of all the Turkish people. After they killed the last Kazakh Kan in 1861, we were a colony of Russian Zarate, after the Soviet Union. In 150 years, the Kazakhs almost lost their national traditions, ways, language and religion. With the help of God, we proclaimed our independence in 1991. Your ancestors, leaving their historical lands of Turkish Kaganato, have taken with them the name of the Turkish people. Until now the Turks call the best yigit [dzhigit] 'Kazakhs'. Well, we are those Kazakhs⁹.

These words were accompanied by a ritual raising of the flag of the Turkish Council, consolidated in October 2009, at the IX Summit held in the city of Nakhichevan, capital of the autonomous republic of the same name in Azerbaijan. This kind of Turkish alliance arose in its beginnings in response to the Slavonic origin of the CIS and materialized in the creation of the Council of Cooperation of the States of Turkish Speech, an initiative that was matured in the Summits of Turkish Speaking Countries, which were carried out from 1992 to 1996 when it was proposed by Nazarbayev, with a strong cultural, ethnic and religious orientation.

The internal political strategy of Kazakhstan had been based on Eurasian imperatives of this type, especially in the field of political constructions of the nation. For centuries, the destinations of several peoples with different cultures, religions and traditions have crossed the historical territory of Kazakhstan. This same situation had been recreated in the inner countryside, when the representatives of one hundred and forty ethnic groups and forty confessions coexist with the Kazakhs. Meanwhile, a long-term coexistence among different ethnic groups had led to a strong tradition of tolerance in society.

In this conception, the geopolitical position of Kazakhstan plays a fundamental role. On the other hand, as the Kazakh experts have emphasized, President Nursultan Nazarbayev has a strong political will in this regard. It must be remembered that the Kazakh leader was one of the main promoters of the unity and safeguard of the USSR, until the last moments when disintegration was a fact. According to Nazarbayev, in terms of Eurasian integration, there must be a set of major interstate projects: a Customs Union, an oil and gas pipeline systems, a program for the best effective use of water resources. This ties with the idea of creating an axis to increase interregional cooperation, to a qualitatively new limit. This requires the construction of "a China / Western Europe transport corridor"; from the coasts of the Pacific Ocean to

8 Centro de Prensa Internacional: "El panturquismo ayer y hoy".

9 Ibidem.

those of the Atlantic¹⁰.

Although this Kazakh conception of the Eurasian integration had a centered perspective, that privileged the place of Kazakhstan in Central Asia, it is also true that it had a pragmatic vision of the Central Asian capacities and its development potential at a regional level, conceiving Russia and China as fundamental parts in this dynamic of integration, which constitutes a kind of continuity and rupture with the traditional conception of the Eurasian, because China is incorporated into the regional dynamics in the new scenarios and the main postulates of Eurasianism are maintained.

This is why that in the case of Putin's Russia, these projects were considered particularly attractive. His geopolitical projections were also focused on the Russian repositioning in this important area and the displacement of the West in this space. However, in this new chapter of international relations, it did not make sense to try to recover old methods or repeat old mistakes trying to rescue the Soviet past. The return of Eurasia to history as an important board of geopolitical competition began to take place in a different international context, in which the trends towards multipolarity and multilateralism were becoming more evident, as a result of the emergence of important economies and the concertation of interests in strategic alliances and diverse integration frameworks at different levels.

Another element to take into account to address the Eurasian question is the reference to the term Great Central Asia proposed by the academic S. Frederick Starr. He envisions the conceptualization of a broader region linking Central and Southern Asia and the promotion of infrastructures and trade as a way of stabilization and prosperity, with Afghanistan as an outstanding regional core. This proposal was perceived with suspicion by specialists when it is understood that "bringing" the region to the south implies "moving it away" from the north (Russia) and the east (China)¹¹.

These debates, certainly polarized, have reshaped the Eurasian scenario, highlighting the importance of the interconnection links that this great continental mass had developed throughout history. In the new circumstanc-

10 Another flagship project would be the construction of the new navigation channel for cruise ships and, which would carry the name "Eurasia", between the Caspian and Black seas; a thousand kilometers shorter than the current "Volga-Don" of limited capacity. The Russian territory would thus be crossed, to give life to the most powerful product exit corridor from all Central Asia to the Mediterranean. Another idea he proposed was the creation of an Euro-Asian Bank, to contribute to the financing of the expansion of commercial and economic relations and to the realization of investment programs and projects in the Central Asian space.

11 See: Nicolás de Pedro: "Eurasia emergente y evanescente: Identidades y rivalidades geopolíticas en Asia Central", in *Notes Internationals CIDOB*.

es, the Eurasian world had acquired other shades. One cannot ignore the closer relations between the Turkish and Persian worlds in which border separations are practically impossible. The same happens with China, in which these legendary peoples, during the Mongolian wave between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, had their center in Beijing and shared cultural and religious influences.

Undoubtedly this scenario, which is characterized by some sort of return to the origins in search of an Eurasian re-articulation through the recovery of its most legendary past, national built, the nomad spirit of the region, the search for a common ethnical, clinical, tribal, religious, philosophical and mystical, tints and broadens a traditional concept. This had been made more complex as part of an historical evolution of geographical boundaries, in which physical frontiers are often questioned and overthrown by history.

Russia and China in restructuring Eurasia: “The spirit of Shanghai”

The Central Asian environment presupposes a chessboard of extreme uncertain geopolitical competition. In this board, great powers compete, setting forth what is known as the New Great Game. In this context of confrontations and struggles for primacy, the evolution of Russian-Chinese relations is particularly interesting. Both powers share the Central Asian geopolitical environment, disputing this area as a sphere of historical and natural influence.

However, some fundamental issues turned this situation of rivalry into an alliance. It is about the confrontation towards the Western powers, namely the United States of America and the European Union, both poles of power have disputed the positioning in the area, mainly focusing on the total disconnection of Russia from its historical area of influence, and in efforts for containing the rise of China.

On the other hand, the arms embargo imposed by the West had a counterproductive effect on the United States and its allies: it contributed to a closer relationship between Beijing and Moscow, by tilting China towards the arms market of Russia and the CIS. In 1992, the summit held in Beijing, inaugurated a speech in bilateral relations characterized by the condemnation of unipolarity in the international system, the need to implement concerted actions against US hegemonism, the condemnation of the expansion of NATO to Eastern Europe and the rejection of the Atlantic alliance, considering that it lacked a mission in the reality of the post-cold war.

In this context, the tightening of diplomatic relations between China

and Central Asia became evident. It is important to bear in mind that the neighborly relations between the Central Asian countries and the rest of the area were strongly marked by the strengthening of the currents of thought and the extreme nationalisms of the end of the Soviet period. Hence, dealing with China's neighborhood was one of the central elements of that moment.

Beijing's willingness to include the Central Asian republics in a multilateral dialogue with a view to fostering cooperation was mediated by economic and geopolitical interests. The economic rise of China required the consolidation of its influence in a nearby territory, rich in natural and energy resources, with a market of more than sixty million people, which Russia was unable to attend. In this way, two pressing issues for China's strategic priorities were settled: first, access to new sources of natural and energy resources; and second, the search and consolidation of new routes, safer and cheaper, for the expansion of its trade and the input of raw materials from abroad.

On the other hand, one of the objectives pursued by Beijing with this rapprochement was to prevent the Central Asian and Afghan conflicts from spreading to the autonomous region of Xinjiang¹², since many of its inhabitants share a common ethnic and religious origin. The border between Xinjiang and the republics of Central Asia threatened to become a major factor of instability in Chinese territory, since from Afghanistan, and sometimes since from the West, terrorist groups of the Uyghur ethnic group, who is originate from Xinjiang, began to infiltrate.

In the first half of the nineties, given this scenario, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan joined China and Russia in a multilateral dialogue on border, economic and security issues. Soon this forum was renamed the Group of Five or the Shanghai Five, because the first summit of presidents was held in this city on April 27, 1996. The entry into force of the agreements signed between the Five of Shanghai was a milestone in Beijing's foreign policy towards Central Asia. These agreements had as fundamental objectives the dismantling of obsolete arsenals after the end of the Cold War, the fight against illegal trafficking - mainly of people, weapons and opiates - and keeping under control the multiple extremist and separatist organizations that proliferated in the territory of the member countries¹³. Also, demilitarize the

¹² Also known as Eastern Turkestan or Chinese Turkestan.

¹³ In detail, the Shanghai Group made important contributions to reducing tensions between the Central Asian States and their neighbors. Documents such as the Treaty for the Construction of Confidence in the Military Area of the Border Zones, of 1996, and the Agreement of Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces in Border Areas, of 1997, established the demilitarization of borders and the creation of mutual controls and other confidence building measures. Thanks to the latter, the border line between China and Kyrgyzstan, as well as between China and

border line, until then one of the most heavily militarized in the world.

Thus, in June 2001, the annual summit of presidents of the Shanghai Group took place, in which the special entry of Uzbekistan took place. In this framework, the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was proclaimed, and a new stage in regional dynamics was inaugurated. In that Summit, the Shanghai Convention against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism - jointly referred to as the “Three Evils” - became one of the guiding documents of the organization and expression of the commitment of the Member States to regional security. The SCO established, as the primary objectives of its existence, the promotion of cooperation in the political, commercial, economic, scientific-technical, cultural, educational, energy, environmental, tourism, communications and transport areas; the strengthening of mutual trust and good neighborly relations between the Member States; the maintenance and assurance of regional peace, security and stability, through joint efforts, in order to establish a just, democratic and rational international order, both economically and politically.

Therefore, the “spirit of Shanghai” was born as a set of strict compliance rules for member states in their relations with each other, that was reflected in the ruling documents of the organization as a basis for its international projection. These norms include the principles of non-alignment, non-hostility towards other States or groups of States, transparency and political openness, in line with the guiding principles of Chinese foreign policy. This would be the beginning of a path for the construction of trust, security, and reduction of uncertainties.

Thus, the SCO linked the mechanisms and levels of political conciliation to the primary function of the organization: regional stability and the maintenance of security, also granted the Council of Heads of State the power to create new structures depending on the international and national conjunctures and regional needs. This was adjusted in a consistent manner with the idea of fostering a future of expansion towards other activities not related to the notion of National Security, but with the prospects for economic, social, energy and cultural cooperation that this regional bloc could develop.

In this context, it should be noted that since 2004 the SCO had defined the status of possible observer states, given the interest shown by some countries such as Afghanistan, India, Mongolia, Pakistan and Iran to join the organization, which gave it a resizing of its regional and international capabilities. Observer status means a prelude to integration as a full member. This distinction relates fundamentally with the premise raised by the SCO on

Tajikistan, was permanently delimited. See: Oscar Villar: Ob. Cit.

the relations between the members that should not maintain conflicts among themselves. However, the recent entry into the Organization of India and Pakistan is a sample of the spirit of cooperation of Shanghai and the possibilities of expanding the SCO.

Although from the beginning the SCO was not defined as a counter-hegemonic bloc that represented a geopolitical counterweight to the centers of Western power and the predominance of the United States, it can be argued that by incorporating emerging regional powers as observers and recent members such as Iran and India (who recently joined Pakistan), the former with a large productive capacity in the technological and financial field, and the later with high hydrocarbon reserves, the SCO increased its capacity for influence and its strategic projections, in consonance with the regional interests of Russia and China, which perceived in the participation of those countries relevant markets for economic expansion and a more efficient linkage of its trade networks to productive chains highly linked to the Western economy, such as in the case of the Indian economy.

In addition, this process gave a multiregional character to the SCO due to the participation of Iran and this represented a foundational stone for the entry into the Middle East region and therefore to its energy resources. Although it was not stated at the time, one of the main purposes of this regional be signed to give observer status to Iran was to establish a boundary or to greatly slow the progress of the project of the *Petroleum Arc*¹⁴ developed as a strategic interest of the United States, Israel and the allied monarchies of the Middle East. In addition, for Iran it represented a valuable opportunity considering its clashes with the United States due to the development of its nuclear program.

In fact, the academic consensus on this issue converged on the fact that Iran perceives the SCO as a guarantee for its security and as protection against international pressure against its uranium enrichment program¹⁵. Even so, the main concern regarding the observer status of this country was the possible frictions with other countries with different status that were within the organization such as the cases of Pakistan and India, traditional allies of the United States. However, one could notice that the pragmatism brought

¹⁴ Petroleum Arc is the denomination granted by the United States to the entire area between the Extended Middle East and Greater Central Asia. This geopolitical space has notable energy resources, so the predominance in it is vital for the center of power interested in achieving global dominance.

¹⁵ See: Carlos Akira de la Puente Abreu: *Neorrealismo político vs multilateralismo democrático: un estudio comparado entre las organizaciones alternativas ALBA-TCP y la Organización de Cooperación de Shanghái*. P. 101.

by these two countries in their projection of entry into the SCO was based on not generating confrontations with Iran, and even less on strengthening bilateral differences between the two over the historical conflict in Kashmir.

Both Russia and China, by accepting Iran as an observer, were aware that this strengthened the SCO, making it one of the main energy markets worldwide; they also included one of the main members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which granted them greater geopolitical relevance in the control of the oil and gas pipelines projected towards the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and the Mediterranean. In 2016 the entry of India and Pakistan would reinforce this position¹⁶.

Since then, the intent of the SCO to develop economic cooperation policies was manifest, without showing that it renounced the main goal of maintaining security, but agreements were signed aimed at improving the human development index in Member States and an action plan was also created for the implementation of an interstate financial mechanism, which would project the organization and diminish external dependency of Western funding sources.

At the summit held in Kazakhstan, during 2006, objectives such as an educational intergovernmental cooperation agreement of the SCO member states, a resolution of the Business Council of the SCO and a plan of action of the member banks of the Interbank Association of the SCO for the support of the regional economic cooperation were set¹⁷. Also, the organization underwent a restructuring in its executive apparatus, by the decision of the Member States to grant greater power to the Executive Secretary, that from the 2006 was named Secretary General. The SCO goal was to avoid an imbalance within the bloc with this structural reform; in this sense, the need for a more efficient rotation of authorities was raised so that all member states were represented within the decision-making bodies, which promoted the democratization and strengthened the institutional consensus.

The improvement of the SCO functionality had, as its main goal, to promote trust among its members in the face of new circumstances, which required an adaptation of the bloc only as an efficient security instrument, but also as an alternative for regional development, and a multilateral entity that could respond to the multiplicity of phenomena present in an area of vital strategic interest for the Western centers of power.

China's approval of a \$ 900 million fund to promote investment and

¹⁶ Now there are 8: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan, India and Pakistan.

¹⁷ See: Carlos Akira de la Puente Abreu: *Ob. Cit.* P. 103-104.

enhance the new financial architecture not only demonstrated a commitment to regional progress, but also reinforced the complex interdependence in trade terms between the Central Asian economies with the economic system of China. The implementation of the Multilateral Economic and Commercial Cooperation Program began with these initiatives.

During this period, the bloc also acquired greater regional relevance in terms of its recognition by other international organizations. The SCO signed cooperation agreements with the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). This logic of articulation with other multilateral blocs, was not only favored by the membership of Russia and China to one or another organization, but fundamentally because of the effectiveness demonstrated by the SCO to solve conflicts arising from problems related to security, by the broadening of its geopolitical area of influence with the incorporation of new observer states and the economic potential put forward by China's economic growth during the first decade of the 21st century, the advance in industrial infrastructure related to the energy sector by part of the Central Asian economies, and Russia's ability to concentrate the main hydrocarbon routes under its control.

In this way, at this stage the organization deployed a set of actions that solidified its presence in Central Asia, which influenced the decrease of other multilateral proposals with clear pro-Western trends and which sought to incorporate the region organically into the strategic interests of the United States and the European Union. It should not suggest that Central Asians consider Russia and China as centers of power without pretensions to expansion, quite the opposite. But the truth is that they are counterparts less uncomfortable, at least in the medium term, with which the issues of human rights, democracy and trade relations are less complex than with the Western powers¹⁸.

¹⁸ For Russia, this context turned out to be an instrument of fundamental geopolitical weight, which allowed it to implement the strategic objectives that Putin had proposed since its first mandate to reconfigure relations with the other former Soviet republics included in the organization, signing political, economic, energy and security agreements, which within other multilateral institutions such as the CIS had proved to be not very functional. For China, the positive balance was even higher. The SCO allowed it access to an area in which the United States and Russia had competed for geopolitical dominance for years. In addition, a new market has opened to the investments of Chinese transnationals interested in the raw materials sector as its demand had increased for this emerging power. Likewise, it allowed security to be reinforced, terrorist threats diminished and a space for political conciliation to be established with governments that consider that public diplomacy exercised by China conforms to the rules of the new regional order and that it practices values of a common political culture in many aspects.

In his article “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: promises and disappointments”, Cuban professor, researcher and diplomat Juan Sánchez Monroe explains the following:

With the emergence of this problem [the economic one], we have begun to speak of the SCO as an integration organism. Something that does not seem so true, because the volumes of exchanges within its members are lower or have rates of development lower than those of its different members with States that are outside the organization. (...) The problem is that the projects that boost the organization, more than economic, are the ones of economic security: energy, food, water, communication, information, financial. So economic projects reinforce the character of the SCO as a security organization in the broadest sense¹⁹.

In fact, this economic dimension not only consolidated the organization as an important instrument of regional security and Eurasian cooperation in the face of Western competition in the region, but also led to the development of other regional projects that had been deployed outside the SCO and others, that soon they would be embodied in this framework and that, far from competing, they would learn to coexist and would lean on those converging points, giving greater strength and coherence to strategic alliances, integrational components and associations.

Thus, in the “Spirit of Shanghai” the SCO confronted different regional challenges and surpassed them. Even if its origin was as a security mechanism, it came to be understood as a project of cooperation and association, a mediator of rapprochement, and to diminish the perception of threat. But, above all, it is important to highlight the basis of this construct based on an essential and inspiring approach: the rapprochement of two Asian countries that historically had been in conflict: Russia and China in terms of regional stability. That is the essence of the spirit of Shanghai and the basis in which it had deepened trust and is building peace.

Its principles are framed by the guidelines of an open regionalism, more coherent in the region than other models of integration. It is about building a relationship of mutual interdependence-dependence, as well as respect for differences and asymmetries in search of complementarity between countries. Thus, in this way economic issues address asymmetries with a diverse treatment, with the understanding that all must receive and earn benefits. In this framework, a multipolar international order is advocated, where security and defense issues are analyzed and resolved in a spectrum that transcends and goes beyond the purely military sphere. There are spaces

¹⁹ Juan Sánchez Monroe: Ob. Cit. (2012).

for interstate relations, but also for other types of actors such as professional organizations, youth, NGOs and other entities. Public and private companies also participate. Emphasis is placed on the respect for international law and dialogue and negotiation are assumed as the only way to resolve conflicts between the parties. It is not exclusive, so it does not oppose the coexistence of different regionalization schemes and that a specific country participates in two or more of these mechanisms. Everyone participates without losing their own identity and projects and programs are not binding, so full freedom is guaranteed.

A community of shared future for all humanity

The New Silk Road (also known as the Belt and Road, or One Belt, One Road-OBOR) is a project promoted in the structure of the SCO, however it can be said that it supposes a superior and transcendental stage, not only in regard to the consolidation of the SCO, but also as a new chapter that opens for international relations and for the Eurasian re-articulation itself. Thus, OBOR has been defined as “a community of shared future for all humanity.”

This concept is supported on a broad Chinese conception of the harmonious functioning and destiny of mankind. This definition embodies the hope of the Chinese people for a harmonious world and is a creative development of the traditional spirit in the new era of globalization, where all countries around the world share prosperity and losses, and are increasingly interconnected with each other. China has offered a new possibility, which is based on abandoning the law of the jungle, hegemonism and the “zero sum” political power replacing it with the “win-win” formula. “The Belt and Road” articulates this concept, and within that project Central Asia has an important place, because it is “the heart of Eurasia”, its center, the land bridge, a historic bridge between civilizations, a commercial bridge, cultural, that is the first element of continuity. From it, the region relevance for China can be defined: for the maintenance of its border, regional security, the possibility of cooperation in these borders as well as in the economic, commercial, cultural areas, as proposed by the Shanghai Group and then the SCO.

It can be said that with this spirit the peoples of the region have the possibility of rearticulating Eurasia as a concept, of recovering the significance that the region once experienced in the historic Silk Road, and now as nations that are part of a new type of global strategy, in which the expression of a shared future for humanity has a highly important meaning since its assumption is to change the rules of the economic and political games, that embody from trade till culture. Building this community of shared future in-

volves fostering the development of a fair international human rights governance system and promoting this global cause, as well as sovereignty equality is the basis, for which multilateralism is an important means. Inclusiveness and mutual learning are of vital importance. It is about a lasting peace and sustainable development.

These objectives are not without challenges, just as this is not a romantic vision of regional relations. The influence of Russia and China on the dynamics of the integration of the Central Asian republics should be assessed separately, considering their specific objectives towards the region, from different conceptions, from different projections.

China has given an economic boost to the regional dynamism but there are many misgivings among the local populations of the Eurasian environment, especially Central Asian in terms of what they call, especially from the Western media, Chinese expansion. The Chinese action is perceived as much more invasive in the world and in its closest neighbors. For its part, Russia has strong historical ties with the region, but continues to see it as an area of influence, as a periphery dependent on a center, and continues to privilege the Slavic side, which also leads to some level of distrust.

Certainly, China's rapprochement to Central Asia raises certain misgivings in Russia and among the Central Asians themselves due to issues such as the purchase of land, property, the energy sector, and which kind commitment the development of regional infrastructure with Chinese capital will mean. That is why some experts consider that the difficult situation of the Russian economy had caused Moscow to adopt a position of cooperation rather than rivalry towards Beijing.

Undoubtedly, these negative elements have been very present in the development of Eurasian projects. Nevertheless, their advance is fairly based on this extremely singular Russia-China alliance. These powers have learned the art of connivance and peaceful coexistence, in which the principles of multilateralism and multipolarity prevail, to achieve a win-win relationship in a region of so much geopolitical competition. Central Asians have learned to interpret this art and the possibilities it offers them at the regional level. It come to terms, that such of these projects, far from being antagonistic, have generated a capacity for articulation and important mutual support. These are principles highly valued amongst Central Asians due to their nomadic spirit and tribal solidarity or the mysticism shared for centuries with magnificent cities and traditions within the legendary Persian world. The SCO is proving to be a school in this regard.

Therefore, the Russian-China union generates trust among the Central Asians and in general in the regional environment, it generates security,

decreases uncertainties and the perception of threat in the face of the elements of rivalry and regional competition, because the cooperation between both, under the Win-win formula serves as a regulator of these desires, in favor of a common space. Both parties agree that a conflict of interest in the area would only cause them to lose and encourage the rise of other powers.

Both Russia and China share the principles of multipolarity and economic concepts where the rules of the game are not dictated from the West. Undoubtedly these issues have made them act on many occasions as allies in terms of regional scope. All these issues are part of a debate on whether the relationship between Russia and China can be defined as a strategic alliance or a society. The truth is that they are powers that have learned to live in the region and to build a different conception of Eurasia and international order in general, becoming a real counterweight to the Western powers.

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ABSTRACT

The article is based on the analysis of the integrationist trends that have evolved in Central Asia between 1991 and 2015. It deals with how the historical reality of the Central Asian republics conditioned them to search for centers of reference to guide the construction of their political and economic systems. This situation caused these countries, since their independence, to begin to interact with important international relations players, with whom they built a series of interdependent relations that were tracing two integrationist conceptions that became trends: Western and Eurasian. The latter one is the one that has most advanced in the period studied, promoted by Russia and China with the implementation of important mechanisms of association, cooperation and consensus, among which the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union and the New Silk Road project. In this sense, the Chinese megaproject One Belt One Road is supported by a series of conceptual bases as a result of the progress and evolution of the Eurasian trend understood in its broader meaning.

KEYWORDS

Central Asia, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Eurasianism, Integrationist Trends, New Silk Road.

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EMERGING POWERS AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: THE EXPERIENCE OF BRAZIL IN THE NUCLEAR TALKS WITH IRAN¹

Monica Ellen Seabra Hirst²

Overture

This article examines the performance of Brazil as contributor to peaceful solutions and the de-escalation of global and/or local tension. In recent years, assertive diplomacy combined with an inclusive political approach became the essential nutrients of Brazilian attempts to help transcend deadlock negotiations in international security. This text analyses this aspiration with focus on the 2010 Brazil-Turkey initiative – known as the Teheran Declaration – which aimed to mediate the international crisis caused by the Iranian nuclear program. Both countries worked together to persuade Iran to accept a fuel swap deal, which could de-rail a new round of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against Iran. The findings presented in this text have been nurtured by academic literature, official documentation and interviews with diplomats, international officials and experts.

The structure of this article comprises five sections. The first section offers a brief overview of the presence of emerging powers in global security and their efforts to promote change in a liberal-dominated international order. The second section addresses the contents of Brazilian involvement

¹ Field research involved interviews with high level officials from Brazil (ex-foreign minister Celso Amorim, Ambassador Maria Luisa Viotti, Ambassador Regina Dunlop, Ambassador Guilherme Patriota, Professor Marco Aurelio Garcia, Professor Paulo Sergio Pinheiro), Ambassador Claude Heller from Mexico; international experts Marc Finnaud and Tim Caughley.

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in global security during the years of the Workers Party (PT) government, with special attention to the Middle East peace processes. The third section focuses on the Teheran Declaration; the ambiguities of the Western powers two-track approach and the implications for Brazil of an autonomous pathway in the negotiations with Turkey and Iran. The following section addresses the contentions aroused by the Declaration of Teheran coupled with the growing politicization of foreign policy in Brazil. The concluding remarks contain an ex-post assessment of the Teheran Declaration, suggesting that in view of later developments in US domestic politics, its dismissal in 2010 may have not been the most sage for world peace.

Emerging powers pro-activism in global governance

During the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century, a group of emerging powers assumed a proactive presence in multilateral contexts in the promotion of normative and procedural innovations. These states sought to expand their autonomy and recognition within the international system and simultaneously acted as a propulsion force in the transition towards a multipolar order (Hurrell, 2006, 2013; Cooper & Flermes, 2013). Emerging powers early century pro-activism, mostly based on soft power attributes, aimed to influence multilateral agendas dealing with economic, political and security matters. In different occasions, these emerging powers represented a new source of pressure bringing in an alternative prism to influence norms and institutional settings (Aguirre, 2013). This became a gradual, disordered and uneven development in world affairs.

The 2003-2013 decade represented the golden period for emerging powers presence in global governance. During these years, countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa became a renewed source of international views, and resources. While broadening and deepening the scope of their commitments in world affairs, they designed innovative inter-state coordination, with special mention to the BRICS and the IBSA groupings³. Emerging powers collaboration worked on niche diplomacy to deal with pressing realities in the developing world in name of a non-westernized approach. In Middle East politics, focus geared towards the Palestine-Israeli peace process, the stability and unity of Iraq, a diplomatic solution for the Iranian nuclear

³ BRICS is a coalition that reunites Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa for economic, financial and political cooperation. The group's institutionalization occurred in 2009 and South Africa joined the coalition in 2011. IBSA – India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum – was created in 2003 as a space for political coordination, sectoral cooperation and investment cooperation through the IBSA Fund.

program, and non-intervention in the changing landscape of Arab regimes (Hirst, 2015).

The chance to sit together at the UNSC in 2011, as non-permanent members, became an opportunity for the BRICS-IBSA cluster to share and reinforce the values and perspectives on world politics that translated into a Southern critical appraisal of the post-cold war liberal peace concepts and prescriptions⁴. They voiced against the flaws of United Nations (UN) bureaucratic rings in defense of improved coordination between Security Council (SC), the General Assembly (GA) and the executive boards of the UN agencies. Accordingly, the Peace Building Commission (PBC) needed better interaction with the SC.

Whereas Western powers sought to expand the UNSC prerogatives to add pressure by way of coercion and intervention, emerging powers expressed their concern with US–NATO–UN orchestrated military operations accompanied by recalcitrant political pressure (Ferdinand, 2014; Hirst, 2015). In this context, the usage of sanctions became a source of tension and pressure at the SC. While systematically contesting their use at the UNSC, emerging powers underscored their concern in the cases of Iran (2010), Libya (2011) and Syria (2011) during their temporary membership. The increased use of sanctions by the UN went hand in hand with the expansion of intervention prescriptions. Coercion became a medicine to treat “counterterrorism, prevent conflict, consolidate peace agreements, protect civilians, support democracy (or oppose non-constitutional changes of government) improve resource governance, and limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons” (Biersteker, Eckert & Tourinho, 2016, p.12). Although enacted in the name of pro-democratic values, sanctions and military interventions became a source of concern for most part of the developing world, particularly for their costly impositions on civilian population (Richmond, 2009; Richmond & Tadjbakhs, 2011). This concern was essential in the 2010 Brazil-Turkey attempt to promote a nuclear deal with Iran.

Brazilian assertive diplomacy and peace brokerage in the Middle East

During the years of the Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff presidencies, Brazil enhanced its quest for increased global presence and initiative capacity

4 See 2011 UNSC statements: for Brazil: http://www.un.int/brazil/SC_2011.html; for India: <http://www.un.int/india/security2011.htm>; and for South Africa: http://www.southafricanewyork.net/speeches_pmun/speeches.php?year=2011&category=I.

in world affairs ((Hirst & Lima, 2006, Dauvergne & Farias, 2012; Hirst, Lima & Pinheiro, 2010; Hurrell, 2008). The search for international acknowledgment and increased political incidence accompanied the idea that redistribution of power was an indispensable for an enduring multipolar system. The innovations pursued in the international realm relied upon the belief system of Brazilian foreign policy intertwined with recent domestic political changes. Principled diplomatic aspirations found inspiration in the ideas of foreign policy formulators back in the 1960s⁵. In this context, a generation of like-minded practitioners became responsible for Brazil expanded presence in global economic-social and political-security arenas⁶. A cluster Brazilian civil servants and experts assumed top posts in multilateral organizations expressing worldviews that merged diplomatic beliefs with the ideals defended by the PT⁷. Brazilian assertiveness relied as well on state institutions, to start with the Foreign Ministry, commonly known as the Itamaraty, under the eager orientation from the Presidential Palace, and the involvement of specific ministries and government agencies.

Throughout Lula's government, center-right wing parties and sympathizers severely attacked foreign policy orientations and practices. Dividing views on regional and global preferences gave way to growing politicization, which involved political, academic and the media. While, opposing orientations on foreign policy were familiar in Brazil, they escalated to a new degree of confrontation. This process is part of a broad process of maturation, linked to persisting attempts of pushing forward autonomous-oriented foreign policies. Milani, Pinheiro and Lima (2017) have suggested that this process in Brazilian foreign policy links to a graduation dilemma. Accordingly, "the different positions, and even contradictions, in foreign policy guidelines during the PT's years in power can be best understood as a consequence of what we have called the graduation dilemma" (Milani, Pinheiro & Lima 2017, p. 597).

During the years of the PT-led administration, Brazil sat at the UNSC as non-permanent member in 2003-2004 and again in 2010-2011. In both periods, Brazil voiced its concerns with the prescriptions of liberal interna-

5 Araujo Castro and Santiago Dantas were the "founding fathers" of Brazilian Independent Foreign Policy enforced in the 1960-64 period. See: Manzur, 2014; Vizentini, 1994.

6 The outstanding examples were: Roberto Azevêdo, as General Director of the World Trade Organization(WTO); José Graziano da Silva, as General Director of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, as Chairperson of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Syria; Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., as executive vice president of the New Development Bank (NBD - the BRICS' bank); Bráulio Dias as Executive Secretary of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); Sergio Duarte as United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

7 Interviews to Brazilian diplomats and experts.

tionalism and questioned Western powers interventionist justifications (Richmond, 2009; Richmond & Tadjbakhs, 2011). When addressing severe political unrest and the escalation of violence, Brazilian diplomats advocated for the promotion of capacity building and the strengthening of local authorities together with collective security solutions. The country also vindicated the improvement of the UN institutional-juridical frameworks and the importance of humanitarian international law (Uziel, 2013; Hermann, 2011). Brazilian views expressed apprehension regarding the legitimacy of the use of force and coercion in international intervention, with special concern to the humanitarian impact of military action (Fonseca, 2011). Extreme poverty and the lack of institutional resources of countries subject to military intrusion were interpreted as consequences of colonial and neocolonial rule practiced by the same states that stood up for intervention. When addressing vulnerable countries, Brazilian diplomacy avoided using terms such as failed, fragile or weak states for their stigmatizing and prejudicial character (Hirst, 2015).

Commitment to peaceful resolution of conflict has been an essential premise and practice of Brazilian foreign policy (Guimarães & Almeida, 2017). Under the Lula administration, Itamaraty worked especially hard to expand the Brazilian role as a peace broker in global hurdling scenarios. Brazil's attempt to get involved and make a difference was a cumulative process and not the sum-up of audacious shots. For foreign minister Celso Amorim, this was

A calculated political, decision based upon specific evaluations of the course of possible action. Understanding other people problems had nothing to do with acting as a consensus entrepreneur. Contributing to peace processes did not part from normative prescriptions but from political reasoning; Brazil had the ability of putting itself in the place of others to help find acceptable solutions in deadlock international negotiations"

Accordingly, this could not be a solitary trail, nor could it rely on unilateral impulses. Soft power assets, teamwork with other emerging powers and pro-active multilateralism became core parts of the plot.

In this context, building bridges for Middle East peace became a strong aspiration of the Lula's government. Bilateral and multilateral activism were followed by meaningful gestures at the UN bodies, in a period when September 11 led Middle East matters in different UN bodies to become even more politicized⁸. Parting from previous acquaintances with the Middle East

⁸ Brazil sought involvement in Middle East red spots before 9/11, with mention to Brazilian role in 1999 in the chairing three panels organized by the UNSC on Iraq. See: Springer, J. (1999).

countries, Brasília sought to strengthen ties and create an atmosphere of trust and constructive connections with the Arab world based on high-level diplomacy (Messari, 2006; Silva & Pilla, 2012). An assorted agenda of projects filled-in an agenda of presidential visits, economic transactions, cultural exchanges, cooperation programs and close political understandings with Middle East governments. Brazil deepened affinities with the Arab countries by supporting old vindications and expressing disquiet about Western powers prejudices. Most of all, Brasília expected to become a peace contributor in the Palestine-Israeli contention. Brazilian presence at the Annapolis Conference in 2007- together with India and South Africa- and at the Conference in Support of the Palestinian Economy for the Reconstruction of Gaza, in Sharm ElSheikh in 2009, were perceived in Brasília as accomplishments in this direction⁹. In similar spirit, Brazil tried to mediate between Israel and Syria for the devolution of lost territory¹⁰ and took part in the post-conflict Lebanese reconstruction¹¹.

Brazil also intended to help find a peaceful outcome of the internal dismay in Syria initiated in 2011, taking advantage of previous political and economic good terms with Damascus (Pinheiro, 2015). The country worked hard at the Security Council, together with the IBSA colleagues, to avoid the isolation of the Assad regime. Brazil had become growingly concerned with the Syrian crises and the damages caused by international intervention in Arab countries¹² (Amar, 2014). Involvement in the UN surveillance of the Syrian conflict unfolded into the Brazilian chairperson of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry (COI) on the Syrian Arab Republic, established in 2011 by the UN Human Rights Council¹³.

Iran occupied an outstanding place on Lula's Middle East agenda. The

UN Panel on Iraq Recommends 'Reinforced' Monitoring Regime. *Arms Control Association*, from www.armscontrol.org/print/462.

9 In 2009, Brazil recognition of the Palestine State was followed by Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Ecuador and Bolivia.

10 In 2004, Brazil switched its vote at the UNGA from abstention to a favorable in support to Syrian pledge to Israel for the recovery of the Golan Heights.

11 In 2006, besides participation in humanitarian assistance efforts to attend Lebanese population, Brazil assumed the leadership of the naval component of UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon.

12 Author Interview.

13 The COI on Syria has become the longest experience of an UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry in exercise given its actuation since 2011 until present. From the very beginning, the COI on Syria – conducted by Paulo Sergio Pinheiro – became instrumental for the UN special envoy to help pursuing a political dialogue between all parts involved in the conflict.

increase of trade, technological and scientific cooperation with this country reached unparalleled levels. Trade with Iran mounted from US\$ 500 million to US\$ 1,24 billion in the 2002-2009 period and then to US\$2,18 in 2012¹⁴. In 2010, Iran was Brazil's second buyer for beef, after Russia¹⁵. Quickly the domestic and international repercussion of this rapprochement became a sensitive domestic and international front of PT foreign policy. Since the presidential victory of Islamic-nationalist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, political radicalization in Iran became a source of irritation and concern for Western powers. Besides, the aggressive anti- Israeli stances defended by the Iranian leader contributed to deepen tensions in the Middle East, feeding international suspicion towards countries that shared positive agenda with Teheran. In this scenario, the Iranian determination to uphold autonomous nuclear-fuel capacity added even more steam.

The Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff foreign policy were strongly committed to longstanding nationalists premises, which included sovereign energetic resources and autonomous technology capacities (Vizentini,1998). The neo-developmental premises of the PT governments worked thoroughly to higher stakes in the nuclear global order (Kassenova, 2014). Even though Brazil adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the country contested the nuclear international regime for its discriminatory approach imposed upon non-nuclear weapon states. Notwithstanding, Brazilian principled stances on the nuclear power did not translate into permissive views on non-peaceful programs in the developing world. Brasília was critical of India and Pakistan for their resistances to agree to nuclear disarmament, voiced its concern when North Korea decided to withdraw from the NTP in 2003 and defended international vigilance of the Iranian Nuclear Program (Patti, 2010).

Brazilian political and normative stands on atomic power exceeded by far the importance of production and/or consumption of nuclear energy in the country¹⁶. Besides operating two nuclear power plants, with its own uranium enrichment capacity, and a third plant under construction, Brazil pursued the built-up of a submarine with nuclear propulsion. In truth, Brazil was “the first non-nuclear-weapon state to work on a nuclear-powered submarine” (Kassenova, 2014, p. 2). The nuclear-powered submarine was part

¹⁴ Data provided by the official statistics system of the Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services (AliceWeb), from <http://aliceweb.mdic.gov.br/index/home>.

¹⁵ Associação Brasileira das Indústrias Exportadoras de Carnes (ABIEC). Exportações Brasileiras de Carne Bovina 2010, from <http://www.abiec.com.br/download/anual-2010.pdf>.

¹⁶ In 2016, the nuclear power represented 2,6% of the Internal Energy Supply in Brazil. See: Ministério de Minas e Energia (MME). (2017). *Resenha Energética Brasileira – Exercício de 2016*.

of Brazilian global aspirations; it represented an entrance door to the “select club of countries with nuclear submarines: the United States, Russia, France, Britain and China”¹⁷.

Brazil sealed the non-military intentions of uranium enrichment capacities with the 1988 National Constitution, then reinforced with the Nuclear Accord, signed with Argentina in 1990 and the Adherence to the NTP in 1998¹⁸. Brazilian commitment to nuclear non-proliferation has not implied the renouncement of fuel-enrichment capacity. Besides, Brazil preferred not to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol on nuclear safeguards until nuclear powers complied with the disarmaments commitments¹⁹. Nuclear powers perceive this preference as unsatisfactory if Brazil persists to continue with a dual-nature nuclear technology.

Brazil trajectory in nuclear non-proliferation was an essential pillar of its diplomatic assertiveness in the initiative with Turkey and Iran. For Brasília, defence of nuclear sovereignty and the search for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian tangle were two sides of a same coin.

The Teheran Declaration

In early 2010, UNSC spotlight geared to Iran in face of its resistance to allow international inspection of its nuclear program, which led to the suspension of contacts with the Vienna Group²⁰. Brazil and Turkey, as non-permanent members of the UNSC, proposed to Iran a diplomatic lane, perceived by both countries as acceptable to the Vienna Group and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Labelled as the Teheran Declaration, this initiative aimed to signalize that it was possible to re-establish talks with Iran to reach a sustainable nuclear deal. It parted from the assumption that Brazil and Turkey could help restore trust between Iran and the international community and avoid the approval by the UNSC of a robust package of sanctions against this

¹⁷ Statement said by Dilma Rousseff at a naval shipyard's inauguration in Rio de Janeiro, in 2013. See: “Brasil agora é parte do seleto grupo de países com submarino nuclear, diz Dilma Rousseff”. *Poder Naval*, March 4, 2013, from <http://www.naval.com.br/blog/2013/03/04/brasil-agora-e-parte-do-seleto-grupo-de-paises-com-submarinonuclear-diz-dilma-rousseff/>.

¹⁸ Brazil is also a signatory of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty), which came into force in 1968.

¹⁹ Brazil is among a handful of countries with significant nuclear activities that have not signed and/or ratified the NPT Additional Protocol. The list includes Algeria, Argentina, Egypt, Syria, and Venezuela (Kassenova, 2014).

²⁰ The Vienna Group was a reduced configuration of the 5P+1 (five permanent members at the Security Council plus Germany) to expedite contacts between the AIEA and the Iranian government. Its members were Russia, France and the United States.

country (Parsi 2013). Even more importantly, both countries expected an acceptable deal would discard the chance of a military intervention – already in the air – against Iran (Parsi, 2010; Bâli, 2013; Amorim, 2015; Aguirre, 2010).

A sequence of failed agreements between this country and the European Union (EU) added to the impact of the election of the new Iranian president in 2005. Ahmadinejad immediately made public his disregard to previously arrangements with the IAEA and contested the systematic approval by the UNSC of sanctions upon Iran²¹. International tension escalated in 2006, after the IAEA disclosed the information on two unaccounted fuel-enrichment facilities in this country²². In 2009, the Iranians refused a swap deal offered by the Vienna Group by which 75% of Iranian low enriched uranium (LEU) would be exchanged for fuel to supply the Teheran Reactor²³. At this point, the IAEA declared there was no assurance of the non-military intentions of Iranian nuclear activities. Negotiations with Iranian officials had been completely derailed and the approval of a new round of UNSC sanctions became the most likely scenario.

Brazilian efforts to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear hurdle went through three different phases. The first phase initiates during the Brasília-Teheran exchanges in late 2008 to organize Ahmadinejad state visit to Brazil²⁴. Besides bilateral talks on trade, Iranians were eager to find ways to by-pass US and EU sanctions²⁵. At this point, Western powers suggested that Brazil could play a brokerage role in nuclear negotiations with Iran. President Obama's message welcoming friends that had "not chosen to turn their backs" on.

Iran became a strong incentive. Previous contacts with EU president Javier Solana and Al Baradei at the IAEA had been incentives in the same direction (Amorim, 2015). The Obama administration expressed its intention to pursue a double-track approach, in which diplomacy counter-balanced

21 The AIEA monitored the Iranian Nuclear Program since 2003. See: <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran>.

22 UNSC res.1696 (2006), res.1737 (2006), res.1747 (2007) and res.1803 (2008) demanded that Iran suspend fuelenrichment activities and imposed sanctions upon the country.

23 The AIEA monitored the Iranian Nuclear Program since 2003. See: <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran> 23 Fuel would be enriched to 20% in Russia and sent to France for transformation into rods to fuel the Tehran Research Reactor.

24 Talks regarding the presidential visit to Brazil to take place in November 2009 initiated during Celso Amorim trip to Teheran, the first time in 17 years that a Brazilian Foreign Minister visited Iran.

25 Brazilian authorities made a distinction between multilateral sanctions, which they supported, and bilateral sanctions. These had important impact on areas of transaction as oil and energy.

with coercion (Obama, 2010). The US and EU were decisive for Brazilian government to step on board and define the scope of what could be achieved with Teheran: “The aim was to open a door which could lead to a broader understanding with the Iranians”²⁶. This expectation coupled with a yet ephemeral idea that Brazil and the US could work together in international peace processes, in a broader sense. Negotiations, in this case, translated into recovering the acquiescence of Teheran to accept a swap deal, following the scheme previously conceived by the 5P+1. Shortly after, however, the change of tone in White House exchanges with Planalto Palace unsettled the idea of a US-Brazil-Turkey coordinated negotiation with Iran. In place, a growing apprehension regarding the implications of Ahmadinejad visit to Brazil took over bilateral conversations²⁷.

A second phase starts with the Iranian presidential visit to Brazil in November 2009 and ends when the Teheran Declaration becomes the focus of Brazilian mediation efforts. In spite of US growing ambiguity regarding Brazil’s contacts with Iran, other Western powers kept a positive stance, particularly France. Brazilian diplomats became confident as Iranian officials compromised to suspend enrichment activities for 60 days with the expectation that UNSC sanctions could be avoided. A sequence of events take place during this phase: i) Iran refused Brazil’s attempt to re-open negotiations of the 5P+1 swap deal proposal; ii) the IAEA governor board approved a resolution condemning the Iranian government for not informing fuel enrichment activities and suggesting a new round of sanctions should be endorsed by the SC; iii) Brazil, as a member of the IAEA, abstained in the voting of this resolution; iv) Brazilian government decided to give continuity to mediation efforts to get Iran acceptance of a swap deal; v) the Iranian government decided to expand enrichment capacities of its nuclear program; vi) UNSC members initiated consultations to design a new set of sanctions on Iran; vii) president Lula’s state visit to Iran was scheduled for May 2010.

The third stage evolves during the months when Brazil and Turkey negotiated with Iran a revised swap deal. This phase coincides with Brazilian 2010-2011 mandate as non-permanent member at the SC. Sitting at the SC as non-permanent members was essential for both countries to deepen diplomatic acquaintance and work together in a renewed deal with Teheran. For Turkey, pairing with Brazil was unprecedented; this country had never been of special interest to Ankara. The Turkish government had been pursuing a diplomatic solution to overcome the Iranian impasse before partnership with Brazil became an option (Ozkan, 2010; Hacipasalioglu, 2014). In 2006,

²⁶ Author interview with Celso Amorim.

²⁷ Author interview with Celso Amorim.

Teheran had already accepted the Turkey offer to play as facilitator in Iran's exchanges with Western powers to keep its fuel-enrichment nuclear program. For the Turkish government this could meet two interests; it would be helpful for the long awaited membership to the European Union and could contribute to a comprehensive understanding between Iran and the US (Bonab, 2009). While Turkey was a less experienced member than Brazil at the SC, from a geopolitical standpoint, this country had more to offer as a mediating force in the Middle East. Involvement with the Iranian nuclear hurdle was part of a broader foreign policy determination to influence regional peace processes, especially the Israel-Palestine dispute. Similar to Brazil, Turkish impulse linked to domestic political changes; the ascension of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP – *Adele ve Kalkınma Partisi*) in 2002 brought together the determination to expand influence in the region and to strengthen an autonomous posture. In 2003, Washington was caught by surprise when Turkey, in spite of being a NATO member, did not allow the US military to use its territory for logistic support during the Iraq War. Since 2009, as a non-permanent member at the SC, Ankara deepened its commitment to the Palestine cause, which led to growing tension with the US (Karajah, 2012).

The Brazilian-Turkish agreement was to stay as close as possible to the original Vienna Group proposal, keeping in mind the conditions defined by the US president regarding the quantities and timing of the fuel swap, the transference to a third country and the formalities with the IAEA (Amorim, 2015). As stated by Celso Amorim in interview for this work, "all through talks with Iran, following initial instructions from the US was crucial. Even though, finetuning an acceptable revised deal with Iran turned out an arduous negotiation with harsh exchanges". During the tripartite talks, Brazil and Turkey accepted the Iranians request that the rights to fuel-enrichment and non-discriminatory treatment be included in the Declaration draft.

The essence of the Teheran Declaration was a nuclear fuel swap deal in which Iranians would preserve their sovereignty – understood as the right to enriched uranium – and commit to non-military use of their nuclear facilities. The deal consisted in the acceptance by the Iranian government to deposit 1,200 kg of low enriched uranium (LEU) in Turkey monitored by Iran and the IAEA. Iran would deposit 1,200kg of three to five percent enriched rods (that which represents nearly 50% of Iranian stockpiled of LEU) in Turkey within a month of the agreement. In return, the Vienna Group (US, Russia, France + IAEA) compromised to deliver, within a year, twenty percent enriched fuel rods to Iran to be employed in its Research Reactor at Teheran. In case the swap did not occur, the declaration stated that Turkey would immediately return the LEU to Iran.

Brazil and Turkey believed that winning confidence from 5P+1 would hold back UNSC sanctions²⁸. Notwithstanding, specialized media and scholars tend to share the view that this was out of question (Dreyfuss, 2010). Though the Teheran Declaration was initially a proposition induced by White House, the US had been sceptical all the way. The Obama administration never considered this initiative would be effective to prevent Iran from achieving the capacity to build a nuclear weapon. Hence, the US never made a sign that it would give up pursuing a new round of sanctions against Iran. While encouraging Turkey and Brazil to work on fuel swap deal with Iran, the US progressed negotiations with P5 partners at the SC to prepare a new and more severe set of sanctions on Iran. In fact, winning the support of Russia and China to approve the drafted resolution against Iran became more relevant for the US government than a successful Brazilian-Turkish negotiation. The increased enrichment capacity of the Iranian nuclear program expanded the uncertainty of its peaceful nature, that which became a compelling argument to justify coercive instruments as preferable to a diplomatic pathway.

In May 2010, the Western powers responded deftly to the enthusiastic announcement of the Teheran Declaration made by the presidents Da Silva, Endorgan and Amadinejad²⁹. The fact that Brazil and Turkey carried forward negotiations with Iran without a formal mandate justified the uncommitted reaction of world powers. The Teheran Declaration was questioned for its imprecision. It was considered outdated and unclear on specifics, such as the countries that would supply Iran with reactor fuel and the lapse of time when this would occur (Kassenova 2014, p.90). In addition, the lack of endorsement made public by US authorities, particularly by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, contributed to discredit the initiative and short live any positive impact that it could have³⁰.

Brazil-US resentment became immediate and mutual. Brasília resented the sudden change of the Obama administration after explicit support; Washington complained that the Brazilian-Turkish negotiations with Iran could hurt the legitimacy of the SC resolution approving new sanctions for Iran.

28 Author interview with Celso Amorim.

29 See: LaFranchi, H. (2010). America's New 'Duel-Track' Approach to Iran Nuclear Program. *Christian Science Monitor*, from <http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2010/0520/America-s-new-dual-track-approach-toIran-nuclear-program>.

30 See: <https://www.ft.com/content/58caa4b4-62a4-11df-b1d1-00144feab49a>.

More odds than evens at the Security Council

Even when successful, peace negotiations can fail for different reasons; one being the lack international acknowledgement. Brazilian and Turkish efforts to negotiate with the Iranians had become as intensive as the energy Washington spent to assure support at the SC for the approval of resolution 1929, particularly from Beijing and Moscow. Chinese and Russian last moment switch resulted from concrete arrangements with the US and other Western powers that the sanctions would not hurt their relations with Iran. This left little time and hope for Brasília and Ankara to freeze the approval of the resolution at the SC. As negotiations at the SC concentrated on the inexorableness of a coercive solution, they completely dissociated from the search for a diplomatic solution with Iran. The fact that consultations and fine-tuning of the Resolution 1929 occurred while Brazil-Turkey-Iran diplomatic talks were taking place narrowed the consensus building at the SC to a one-and-only track. When the Teheran Declaration was announced (May 17, 2010), US pressure steamed at the SC for the approval of the 1929 resolution. As the US held back any sort of applause to the trilateral deal, it became particularly difficult Brazil and Turkey mediation be granted international acknowledgement. Furthermore, effectiveness of the Teheran Declaration rapidly eroded when the Vienna Group casted doubts on its contents and the Iranian government delayed indispensable formalities with the IAEA. Resolution 1929, approved on June 9, 2010, imposed a complete arms' embargo on Iran, banned this country from all activities related to ballistic missiles, froze all assets pertaining to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Iranian shipping companies and imposed inspections of any Iranian cargo or financial institutions³¹. Hence, the SC approved sanctions were to transform the Teheran Declaration into a piece of waste.

The negative votes of Brazil and Turkey at the Council, though technically were no impediment for the approval of the resolution, did muddle the court for Western powers. Even though it had not been possible to hold back the Teheran Declaration, the US government did try to soften Brazil and Turkey to avoid a fragmented voting at the SC (Amorim, 2015). Both countries coincided in the justification of their nays, though augmented differently in defense of mediation efforts. Turkey underlined the regional implications of the initiative and the responsibilities Iran should assume in the Middle East peace process. Brazil emphasized its disagreement with the use of coercive methods and criticized the secrecy of their negotiations, lamenting the out-

31 See: UNSC Resolution 1929 (2010), from [www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1929\(2010\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1929(2010)).

comes of the approved resolution for Iranians and the world peace. The Lula's government took the decision to stand against the resolution two weeks before its voting, even though certain Brazilian and foreign diplomatic circles considered abstention a preferable option (Amorim, 2015). The decision to vote against resolution 1929 assumed controversial connotations for Brazil's foreign policy. This was first time Brazil stood against a resolution at the SC, in 20 years of intermittent membership.

An overview of the statements at the SC shows that reactions to the Teheran Declaration were diverse and varied in tone³². Justification of sanctions coupled with the underscoring of the dual-track strategy. This had implied the acceptance of coercion and negotiation as complementary courses of action to safeguard the non-proliferation regime defied by Iran. Western powers shared similar standpoints, in which accusatory allegations against Iran justified a robust agenda of sanctions and lamented the shortcomings of the Teheran Declaration. The US representative (dis)qualified the initiative as merely an attempt to better the 2009 Teheran Research Reactor proposal. The French and British argued that the Teheran Declaration had not reached its purpose since it in fact allowed the Iranian government to maintain fuel enrichment activities. Developing countries sitting at the SC – Gabon, Nigeria, Uganda and Lebanon – expressed positive views on the significance of confidence-building initiatives as the Teheran Declaration. Lebanon, the only country to abstain, showed utmost concern with the difficulties faced by the Middle East to become a zone free of nuclear weapons, particularly the refusal of Israel to adhere to the NPT.

It is worth noting that Mexico – the other Latin America temporary member at the SC –, who presided the Council at the time, while overemphasizing commitment to non-proliferation, completely ignored the Teheran Declaration. Two explanations help understand this omission: the systematic lack of convergence between Mexico and Brazil on matters of global governance, with mention to their differences regarding the proposals for the reform of the Security Council; secondly, Mexico-US close ties in issues of world peace and security. Mexico's argued that Brazil had not shared information on the negotiations with Turkey and Iran and that the Teheran Declaration had been a "general surprise" (Heller, 2012, p. 27). Besides, Mexico did not consider this a pertinent initiative, interpreted as a Brazilian mediatic gesture and a source of enormous irritation for Western powers³³.

32 See the documents related to the 6335th UNSC meeting, on 9 June 2010, when the Resolution 1929 was adopted, from <http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/14002> 33 Author interview with Claude Heller.

33 Author interview with Claude Heller.

Domestic politicization and beyond

In Brazil, the Teheran Declaration became an immediate matter of politicization. The Foreign Ministry advocated that negotiations with Iran “could help avoid a worst case scenario”³⁴. According to Minister Amorim, Brazil would as well achieve a new status in international brokerage for peace. Following the orientation of the autonomous school of thought, Amorim found inspiration in former foreign minister Santiago Dantas words: “If you help solving problems, you become more prestigious and are allowed to grow without giving away principles”³⁵.

The coming and going of Brazilian and Turkish diplomats to Teheran, spotlight by local and international media, was at once a source of politicization in Brazil. In attendance to an open session of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee of the Brazilian Senate, Amorim tried to win support for the Teheran Declaration. He alerted at the implications of the hurried US-led sanctions approved at the SC³⁶. Yet the strident lack of domestic support manifested before, during and after the Teheran Declaration prevailed. Brazilian conservative circles questioned Itamaraty autonomous stances; they gave little credit to mediating efforts and supported a new round of UNSC sanction against Iran. Three allegations stood out: i) negotiation efforts with Iran compromised the international credibility of Brazilian nuclear program³⁷; ii) This initiative illustrated a dangerous and undesirable relationship between Brazil and Iran³⁸; iii) Brazil held no stakes in the Middle East to justify such involvement.

The first point questioned the unnecessary costs of misunderstanding with the US and Western powers caused by the initiative and subsequent negative vote at the SC. It underscored the contamination effect this could have in non-proliferation matters. All existing arguments proper to legitimize the weight of Brazil in playing a constructive part in nuclear global politics twisted around to underscore its vulnerability and lack of authority. This point

³⁴ Author Interview with Celso Amorim.

³⁵ Author Interview with Celso Amorim.

³⁶ See: Câmara Notícias (June 9, 2010). Declaração de Teerã fez ONU apressar sanções ao Irã, diz Amorim, from <http://www2.camara.leg.br/camaranoticias/noticias/RELACOES-EXTERIORES/148685-DECLARACAO-DE-TEERA-FEZ-ONU-APRESSAR-SANCOES-AO-IRA,-DIZ-AMORIM.html>.

³⁷ See: Goldenberg, J. (March 15, 2010). O Brasil, o Irã e as armas nucleares. *O Estado de S. Paulo*.

³⁸ See: Lafer, C. (April 17, 2010). O Brasil e a nuclearização do Irã. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, from <http://opiniao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,o-brasil-e-a-nuclearizacao-do-ira,539754>.

related to the role of Brazil in global governance and the implications of foreign policy preferences on disputed agendas. This was a perfect illustration of how the long-standing dualities of Brazilian foreign policy, in which autonomous-oriented course of action opposed acquiescence to Western powers interests and rules (Milani, Pinheiro & Lima, 2017).

The second polemic alluded to the question of “good and bad company” in world politics. Once trilateral negotiations moved ahead, in spite of US twisted nose, they entered a sensitive terrain. Brazil and Turkey became more compelled to pursue trustful talks with Iran through bilateral channels, that which involved a strong dose of presidential diplomacy. Domestic press underlined that trilateral talks progressed thanks to the chemistry between presidents Lula and Ahmadinejad, with implications that went beyond the Teheran Declaration. Following such arguments, joint talks with Turkey were part of the decision to align with the Iranian regime in Middle East, which involved consent to its human rights violations³⁹. This interpretation questioned the impartiality of tripartite negotiations, suggesting the government foreign policy decisions were biased and evil for the country.

A third line of reasoning touched the geopolitical dimension, bringing-in two corollaries; Geographic distance coupled and the inexistent religious clashes in Brazilian society. Why get involved in Middle East conflictive agendas? Besides, Brazil ought primarily to assume leadership and political responsibilities in the regional context, giving a hand to unravel long lasting inter-state boundary disputes and domestic political conflicts⁴⁰. This allegation brought-up the fragile link between the regional and global dimensions of Lula’s foreign policy and the costs of Latin American missing support to Brazilian global aspirations (Malamud, 2011). Notwithstanding the top priority of regional politics (particularly in South America) in Brazilian foreign policy during the years of PT government, its link with global aspirations was bumpy and uneven (Hirst & Lima, 2015; Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2009). The poor results of Brazil project to build an inter-regional agenda between the Arab world and South America was an example of the lack of automatism in the regional-global nexus. Brazil acted as a regional power but did not count on regional support for its projection in global governance. The critical view

39 See: Lafer, C. (April 17, 2010). O Brasil e a nuclearização do Irã. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, from <http://opiniao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,o-brasil-e-a-nuclearizacao-do-ira,539754>.

40 Besides Colombia, as mentioned, other “omissions” interviews to the author have been raised as the ArgentinaUruguay conflict on the paper mills, the Chile-Bolivia territorial dispute and the political crisis in Venezuela. See: *O Estado de São Paulo* (July 27, 2010). Entre o Erro e a omissão, from <http://opiniao.Estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,entre-o-erro-e-a-omissao-imp-586454>.

to the Teheran Declaration on the part of Mexico, the other Latin American member at the SC in 2010, was a telling sign of the lacking regional support to Brazil global aspirations.

Even when acknowledged for Brazil international projection, the media hardly gave credit to the diplomatic efforts per se or to its eventual contribution to the peace process in the Middle East. In fact, when the SC approved resolution 1920, foreign policy condemnation became far more vociferous than the laments this setback could represent for world peace. Following a similar perspective, academics in Brazil and abroad, have questioned the Teheran Declaration for being ambitious and/or inconsistent with domestic and international restraints (Mares & Trinkunas, 2016; Burges, 2013; Lafer, 2010; Ricupero, 2010; Abdenur, 2010).

In the years to come, the Teheran Declaration was a permanent issue in the polarization of Brazilian public debate on foreign policy. Domestic controversies on policy preferences escalated during the years of Dilma Rousseff presidency. The Rousseff government tried to keep a distance from the Iranian regime with a critical position to its human rights violations. Yet, political polarization led to ideological simplifications in which the nuances of the PT foreign policy became irrelevant. The crisis that caused the political and economic breakdown of Brazil in 2015 deepened even more the dismantlement of the countries' foreign policy pulse (Hirst & Lima, 2015). Brazilian presence curtailed and mediocritized in global and regional arenas (Rodrigues, 2017). Ironically, after the coup against Dilma Rousseff in 2016, judgements regarding the foreign Policy of the Lula government have softened. In this context, the perception of the Teheran Declaration as a valuable source of diplomatic prestige is no longer shared exclusively by PT supporters (Ricupero, 2017).

Final (re)considerations

The Teheran Declaration ought to be understood as a peace-seeking diplomatic initiative that intended to open path – at the time completely obstructed – to a more comprehensive negotiation. The reaction among nuclear power analysts to this initiative has been more favorable than that shared in international/national diplomatic circles and media. It links the initiative to the significance of emerging powers involvement in sensitive security matters. Qualified opinion state that as an emerging power, Brazil had the capacity of creating a “productive environment which helped break the ice and draw Iran to a constructive option”, even more when Iranians could have been on

the way to military use of their nuclear program⁴¹. Following similar lines: “non-Brazilian nuclear policy analysts stressed the importance of having alternative actors seek outcomes that are difficult to achieve working only with the traditional players” (Kassenova, 2014, note 172).

The frustrating result of the Teheran Declaration underscores that emerging powers can hardly escape from the restrictions of solely relying on soft power capacities. Recent interpretations underline that unsurmountable world order hierarchy are the main explanation for these limitations (Levaggi & Yilmaz, 2018). Challenging these constraints with autonomous stances has been interpreted as costly and counter-productive. In truth, Western powers tend to perceive emerging powers attempt to act autonomously as capricious and unreliable. As already stated, the expanded presence of emerging powers depends on their capacity to be acknowledgement by the international community, particularly the inner circles of world politics (Milani, Pinheiro & Lima, 2017). At first, the Brazilian decision do embark with Turkey in talks with Iran responded to incentives transmitted by high-level international actors – including the White House – who chose then to turn down the diplomatic path. Hence, encouragement did not imply a blank check and was withdrawn once Brazil and Turkey decided to pursue a reviewed swap-deal, which complied with certain political requests from the Iranian government.

The Teheran Declaration ought to be considered a valuable chapter in the long story of international negotiations of the Iranian nuclear program. It should as well be acknowledged for its significance, as contestation to Western-led coercive methods to address world security deserves (Metais, 2013). The frustrating result of this initiative did not keep Brazil back from team working with emerging partners – India and South Africa – at the Security Council all through 2011 to question liberal interventionist prescriptions enforced in the Arab World.

This text parts from the idea that emerging powers can bring in an innovative approach to deal with international crisis trapped in vicious and escalating tensions. Southern players involvement in peace processes rely on the belief they can offer an element of trust and shared worldviews, which may contribute to the engineering of political settlements and peaceful solutions. Together with other second-tier states, they ambition to alter and fit-in the chessboard controlled by dominant world powers (Goetschel, 2011). Yet, emerging powers are not shield from their own vulnerabilities and weakness and that can damage international performance and make them volatile actors in the international scene (Gardini, 2016). The Lula government faced

41 Author interview.

a securitized world in which the North-South divide reinforced with the view that threats were associated to vulnerable realities. Questioning liberal prescriptions arouse irritation and distrust, particularly from the US.

During the second term of the Obama administration (2012-2016), after Security Council sanctions against Iran were enforced, a fresh negotiation process, conducted by the 5P+1, under US leadership, resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)⁴². In mid-2015, after two years of talks, the deal was announced as an extraordinary deed for world peace⁴³. A comparison between the Teheran Declaration and the JCPOA is hardly sustainable for the enormous differences in scope, contents, actors and procedures (Rocha & Pereira, 2014). While contrasts are unquestionable, the swap-deal essence of both negotiations is undeniable. This brings up the question of power politics and readiness/ripeness in peace mediation (Gilady & Russett, 2002)⁴⁴.

The double-track strategy put forward by the US in 2010 was truly an incompatible two-timing approach. Western powers option for the sanction resolution quickly dissociated from the tripartite negotiations that resulted in the Teheran Declaration. The Western powers advocated for coercive methods to hurt Iran as an unquestionable route and to reach future negotiations, that which implied a specific timing. For Brazil and Turkey, “the ripe moment” already had been achieved in 2010, once Iran agreed to the terms of the Teheran Declaration. Brazil and Turkey conceived this negotiation as a first step, which would set the sanctions aside and oxygenate Iran relations with the international community. However, what prevailed was a new round of sanc-

42 In April 2015, Iran and the P5+1 agreed on an Iran nuclear deal framework and in July 2015, they agreed on the plan. Under this agreement, Iran is supposed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, cut its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98%, and reduce by about two-thirds the number of its gas centrifuges for 13 years. According to the agreement, Iran will only enrich uranium up to 3.67% and the IAEA will monitor and verify Iran's compliance with the agreement. In return, Iran will receive relief from U.S., European Union, and UNSC nuclear-related economic sanctions. See: BBC News (October 13, 2017). Iran nuclear deal: Key details, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655>.

43 See: Gordon, M., & Sanger, D. (July 14, 2015). Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lessen With Time. *The New York Times*, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/irannuclear-deal-is-reached-after-long-negotiations.html> ; Morello, C., & DeYoung, K. (July 14, 2015). Historic deal reached with Iran to limit nuclear program. *The Washington Post*, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran-expected-to-be-announced/2015/07/14/5f8dddb2-29ea-11e5-a5ea-cf74396e59ec_story.html?utm_term=.3f429b793510.

44 In addressing the relationship between the theories of ripeness and readiness, Cantekin suggests a comprehensive approach which underlines their complementary nature. (Cantekin, 2016).

tions particularly harmful for Iranian economy and detrimental to Western powers-Iran relations⁴⁵. Notwithstanding, it took another three years for the Western powers to agree time was ripe to start negotiations with Iran. Ripeness was justified by the political changes in this country and the effects imposed by 2010 sanctions.

Nevertheless, other calculations failed. Nine years have passed and the Iranian nuclear program is still an unsettled matter in world politics. After celebrated worldwide in 2015, the JCPOA became a controversial subject in the 2016 US presidential campaign and a highly politicized matter at the Capitol. Once in power president Trumps' strident disapproval of the deal with Iran led the White House to decide US withdrawal. For European powers and the IAEA, besides representing a source of misunderstanding with Washington, this opens a new chapter of dangerous uncertainty⁴⁶. Simultaneously, growing turmoil in Iran, fed by the costs of sanctions upon the population and reinforced nationalistic responses from the Teheran regime, contributed to re-install a confrontational climate in Iran relations with the international community. US conflictive policy with Iran has now entered a new phase. Besides, and ironically, Brazil has become a close ally of this approach. The victory of Jair Bosonaro in 2018 presidential elections has led to a dramatic change of Brazilian foreign policy, that includes a strong alignment to the US and unprecedented proxy ties with Israel⁴⁷.

While essentially speculative, the contra-factual argument might be useful in this case. Broken into four sequenced questions, it conjectures: i) Would the acceptance of the Teheran Declaration by 5P+1 have avoided UNSC resolution 1929? ii) Would this acceptance have accelerated negotiations with Iran that decompressed tension and avoided electoral 2017 politicization in the US? iii) Would then a broader negotiation similar to the 2015 JCPA have taken place in better timing regarding US domestic politics? iv) And finally, would peace in the Middle East be less out of hand?

45 Resolution 1929 sanctions encompassed a framework for high seas and port inspection of suspicious cargo shipments; asset freeze and travel bans for individuals and companies; expanded arms embargo; financial blockage to Iranian banks transactions

46 See: El País (January 12, 2018). La UE urge a Washington a mantener el pacto nuclear con Irán, from https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/01/11/actualidad/1515685864_884220.html.

47 <https://en.radiofarda.com/a/bolsoaro-brazil-impact-on-iran-influence-in-latin-america/29707045.html>; <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-venezuela-politics-usa-brazil/u-s-brazilian-vice-presidents-discuss-venezuela>; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/18/jair-bolsonaro-us-visit-alliance-trump>.

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ABSTRACT

This paper addresses the role of emerging powers and the importance of Southern soft power resources in global peace negotiations. It aims to examine the performance of Brazil as a contributor to peaceful solutions and the de-escalation of international security tension. Brazilian assertive diplomacy during the Lula da Silva government (2003-2010) made special efforts to build bridges in international negotiations to transcend deadlock scenarios. This text will focus specifically on the 2010 Brazil-Turkey joint initiative – known as the Teheran Declaration – set forward to mitigate the international tensions caused by the Iranian nuclear program. Both countries worked together to persuade Iran to accept a fuel swap deal which could de-rail a new round of United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iran. The failure to change the course of Western-led coercive actions indicates the restraints emerging powers face as peace intermediators in global security. The lack of acknowledgement from Western powers, while effective to reverse the success of the Brazilian-Turkey initiative, also postponed positive outcomes in international negotiations with Iran. This text suggests re-visiting the consequences of this postponement, particularly after the Trump administration has walked away from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran.

KEYWORDS

Emerging Powers, Soft Power, Brazil, Teheran Declaration, Iran Nuclear Programme.

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON IRAN'S SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN TWO KHATAMI'S AND AHMADINEJAD'S ADMINISTRATIONS

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Introduction

The two discourses of globalization and development are structurally landmark processes in the twentieth century. But it cannot be claimed that they were prior to the twentieth century. At the same time, the belonging of these two discourses to the twentieth century cannot be construed as the end of their life and the end of their consumption history in the twenty-first century, because both processes have recently found the conditions for institutionalization. The underlying problem is that these two discourses have so far not been considered either in the cause-effect relationship or mutual influence or interaction. Based on this formulation, globalization can have different effects on different countries and even on states and administrations in a single country. The present article is to answer the question whether the policies, strategies, and performances of the two Khatami and Ahmadinejad administrations have coincided with the process of globalization and its re-

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quirements, or have maintained their own discourses while preserving relative values and ideological principles of the Islamic Revolution.

In this regard, it can be said that the administration of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami presented a policy of *détente* within the framework of “dignity, wisdom and expediency”. This ideological phrase can be exactly seen in the 20-Year National Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In other words, effective and constructive interaction with the world is based on the principles of dignity, wisdom, and expediency in this period, which of course is not independent from its other sections. The use of such terms reflects the design and implementation of Iranian foreign policies based on the independence of opinions and ideologies as well as companionship with other streams.

The Khatami administration’s discourse diminished the role of the “national government” in the development process. The non-indigenous and affiliated theories and strategies were presented in this period, and many of the main issues and real problems and challenges of the Iranian society were ignored, or at least marginalized, by highlighting issues related to globalization processes; consequently, no fundamental thought was devised for them.

Eventually, the Khatami administration ended its operation in summer 2005, when Ahmadinejad came forward with another approach and policy under the title “the emergence of a national government in a time of globalization”. As the president of the ninth and tenth administrations, Ahmadinejad stated his disbelief in “digestion and integration in the process of globalization”; a completely different view from the president of Iranian seventh and eighth administrations.

Ahmadinejad knew globalization generally in globalization of acculturation, imposition of literature and a particular kind of life for all nations, which ensures the continuity of domination of the whole world and the preservation of the distance between rich and poor countries, since globalization is aimed at removing the last cultural barriers of nations against the global dominant regime and the wave in the direction of the economic development program. He believed that although the stated goal of globalization had been economic expansion, it did not succumb to this goal so that it continued its direction in political development for accepting the imported pattern to affect the sovereign systems of the countries. Ahmadinejad sees today’s media serving as a channel of domination.

Since Ahmadinejad believed that with the process of globalization many of the unique and rare resources in Iran have vanished, he saw the need of the Iranian society and the only way to move to the peak of perfection and real progress in the Islamic-Iranian development model. He claimed that passive movements against imported theories would never yield a satisfactory

result. In addition to resistance to expansionist ideas, the lack of influence of government decisions in the decline of the role of the “national government” is very effective, which places Ahmadinejad in the era of globalization in the face of the process of land degradation. His views on this issue are completely different from those of Khatami as the head of the seventh and eighth administrations. Ahmadinejad considers participation in social development in the process of globalization from the origins of “Iran” and the “Iranian” base.

Literature review

The significance of reviewing literature related to a subject is to show that the present research is based on a wide range of previous studies (Sayyed Emami, 2008: 133-137).

Globalization is a category that has attracted the minds of many scholars and experts in various economic, political and social spheres over the past few decades. The phenomenon that became apparent in the second half of the twentieth century influenced all continents in the middle of this century so that its natural process affected the advancement of communication technologies by affecting the economic, social, cultural and political dimensions, and brought about closer human beings have different kinds of differences in terms of race, nationality, skin color, and geographical boundaries.

Various resources have been written in the form of valuable books and articles translated into Persian. In the meantime, if one wants to arbitrarily make a division for the effect of globalization on development in its general form, we can mention writings of authors such as Kerry, Dunlop, Harbison, Daniel Bell, and Nicholas Lohman. Theoreticians such as Burton, Gilpin, and Rosena have addressed this issue from a political point of view. In addition, researchers such as Marshall Lohman have cultural and communicative perspectives on the issue of globalization (McLuhan, 1964: 83). Anthony Giddens (Giddens, 1990: 83), Ronald Robertson, and Malcolm Waters (Robertson, 1992: 92) have had independent and dynamic views on this subject, and have presented comprehensive works.

In the introduction, three important pieces of Iranian works are introduced. Thinkers such as Sari Al Ghalam (2008), in *Iran and Globalization: Challenges and Solutions*, examines the beliefs and bases of the political elites and the interior social-political structure via a linear-historical understanding of the issues of Iran, and investigates the process of globalization as a new stage of capitalist system in the structure of power and wealth of the international system via an analysis based on the recognition of the international

environment of Iran.

Shahramnia (2006) in his book *Globalization and Democracy in Iran*, explores the effects of globalization indices on the fluctuation of democracy indices. In addition to examining the state of democracy in Iran and the conditions in Iran's transition, he investigates factors such as the status of parties, the status of the press, the way of election, and the process of decision-making, and the turn in the political power, each of which can be influenced by global factors and reflect the state of democratization of Iran.

The book *Globalization: Perceptions and Reports* (2003) examines different perceptions of globalization, its enormous implications in international relations and in the geographic region, including the Middle East and Iran, with specific issues such as energy and OPEC via various articles.

Dreher (2008) examines the various globalization indices from different perspectives, and points to different views on this trend.

The present study is different from other studies having done on the same subject because it examines the effect of globalization, as an independent variable and a keyword, on Iranian social development, as a dependent variable. It also undertakes an analytical research method and a causal-comparative research design for investigating how globalization affects social development in the two Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's administrations. The rationale underlying doing the research is that since it comes to assessing the degree of globalization of countries, measuring the degree of globalization with its various dimensions got more highlighted. This article tries to examine how Iran has been affected by social globalization via the comparison between the two governments in order to conclude how much the decisions and policies of governments can influence the social development path along with the globalization process.

Research terminology

Prior to entering any scientific discussion, it is necessary to define and take into consideration the research concepts (Seyyed Emami, 2008: 162) for obtaining a clear and precise understanding of the concepts used in the research.

Comparative research design

A comparative research design can be used to study and explore varieties with a subset of similarities and differences in a given set of selected and desired items. A comparative approach is a way for descriptive or causal scientific inferences through the systematic comparison of similarities and differences in social phenomena that can be used to homogenize information and obtain comparable variables globally (Manouchehri, 2008: 256). Since the study of international issues or the topic of globalization has been considered as a topic of the day, a comparative study of it was also considered. For example, in this research, the two Khatami and Ahmadinejad governments are considering the hypothesis of globalization, based on the social development of Iran. A comparative approach is based on the comparison of two or more groups or communities and even the person subject to comparison. This comparison can be done on a specific group at different times. In this research, two governments in a society may be examined, which is called the comparative method (Saroukhani, 2006: 40). Its purpose is to compare a few of a variable in a large sample of units (Taheri, 2005: 190).

The first objective of the comparative method is to describe the political and social phenomena of a country or countries; good description is very important in this regard. The second goal of this classification method is to make the data clearer; classification can be started and conducted by criteria. For example, in the present study, globalization is seen as a criterion, and, social development are selected from among the dimensions of development to address the effect of this process on social development and make proper classification. The third goal is the comparative method is hypothesis testing, which is to be discussed via explaining and investigating of the hypothesis testing of the subject. The final goal of the comparative method is prediction. For example, in this study, with the study of social globalization, we will anticipate the impact of this trend on social development towards future governments with their social approaches. However, in many studies, prediction may not be the case. This trend is expressed in comparative strategies in terms of probabilities (Manouchehri, 2008: 261).

This article aims to use a comparative method. In some cases of the comparative method, causal-comparative research design is used. Accordingly, considering the dependent variable, a researcher investigates the possible causes of a phenomenon with regard to its past states in order to find out its possible effects. In some cases, the causes may not be manipulative. For example, in this article, globalization is considered as an independent variable which have characteristics whose effects on such instances as development

are often inevitable. That is, the process goes through the structure of governments. For example, in this paper, with an overview of the opportunities and constraints of the two aforementioned governments, indices and sub-indices have been examined which indicate their degree of alignment with the trend of globalization. The society has changed with these changes and social changes are seen in terms of the subject of the article in different dimensions of the people's lives. The main difference between these two approaches is in the analysis of causality between independent and dependent variables, which the researcher rejects or confirms the statistical assumptions to confirm or reject causal relationships (Taheri, 2005: 192).

This study considers a case study whose components are temporally and locally limited to two states in one country. From a local point of view, Iran and, in terms of time, two Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's administrations are examined in two trends from 1998 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2013, respectively. Case studies in terms of time and place implies McKay and Marsh's view which does not consider the comparative method limited to the comparison of countries, but considers a small instance of the comparison in the time and place unit (McKay & Marsh, 2005: 281).

This style is novel in that it eventually connects somewhat between the internal and external outlook of development. Regarding the internal and external conditions of governments and their orientation in the field of foreign policy, we see some minor and sometimes important changes. These changes in the type of governments' discourse can affect national levels and social development with regard to the subject matter of the article. Accordingly, the subject of our study in this article is Iran. Social Globalization is the independent variable, and its analysis unit, i.e. social development in two Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's administrations is the dependent variable. The data of the present research has been obtained according to KOF Globalization Index.

Globalization

Globalization as an independent variable and key concept in this research is very important and has become one of the common terms in various fields.

The term "globalization" is derived from the word "globe" means Earth and the world in Latin. For the first time in the early 1960s, this term entered the literature of the day, and the Webster Dictionary put this term in its collection as an entry in 1961. This term attracted researchers' attentions as a

scientific phenomenon since the early 1990's (Akhavan Zanjani, 2007: 47).

Gradually, with the rapid advances in the field of communication and information technology, the term globalization has become increasingly important, and has entered political, economic, and sociological debates since the 1980s, replacing internationalization and the of transnationalization. Globalization refers to the transformation at the level of human organization that connects distant communities and extends the scope of access to power relations across regions and continents of the world. Using the opinions of experts and the research procedure, globalization can be considered as a process based on the speed of time with an impact on the whole world, in which individuals in a single global community are spontaneously merged, resulting in the face of many geopolitical constraints along with social and cultural affiliations. Social indices of globalization can be shown as follows:

Table 1: Social Indices of Globalization

Indexes	Dimension	Concept
- The fade of geographical borders, and the increase in the interaction and communication among nations; - Creation of efficient and low-cost communication networks at the global level; - The rise in values such as liberation, peace, security, civil society, etc. via the creation of social development; - Creation of transnational social spaces of which individuals can be considered as a citizen regardless of their nations and ethnicity; - Social mobilization and the development of migrations at the global level; - More diversity in different ethnic and local groups; - The increase in the speed of public communication and the decrease in different communication costs; - Accessibility to a new space and time towards individuals regardless of the role of their governments;	Social	Globalization

Development

Development, as the research dependent variable, is a modern and important concept via which the state of a society in terms of economy, the amount of inequality, the status of manpower, and the political and social status of society are measured. In addition to quantitative and qualitative goals, this concept is used to indicate the extent of progress in various economic, political and social dimensions (Culture, 1992: 61). Moreover, the development is a directional process is accompanied by the growth of self-reliance occurring within a developing community at any time and place in succession. Development is a process that can be measured via comparison. Referring experts' opinions, development can be defined as a process based on changes with quantitative and qualitative goals in the economic, political, social and cultural fields, which ultimately leads to improving individuals' quality of life in all its dimensions. Social development creates a change in the way of thinking, values, attitudes, behaviors and social roles in a society. Accordingly, social development is a process that involves the presence of citizens on the community scene to achieve collective goals. It is better in this process to combine individual needs with wider social needs and rule the society in order to portray the process of social development along with concepts such as justice, equality, and freedom. The indices of social development can be shown as follows:

Table 2: Social Development Indices

Indexes	Dimension	Concept
- The rise in the level of quality of healthcare and education; - The rise in the qualitative indices such as social participation, social integrity, and social justice; - Gender quality in using opportunities and the active presence of women in social fields; - Civil activities and participation as well as the state-nation relations at the global level; - The increase in the trust and security among citizens and creation of social cohesion among different groups; - Integration of minorities;	Social	Globalization

Seyyed Mohammad Khatami's administration

Seyyed Mohammad Khatami has been the president and head of state in the Islamic Republic of Iran during two periods, known as the “reform government”:

- The seventh government and Khatami's first administration (1997-2001);
- The eighth government and Khatami's second administration (2001-2005);

The Khatami administration refers to the two presidential terms of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, which includes the seventh and eighth states of the Islamic Republic of Iran. During this period, the reformist faction had the full power of Iran's executive branch, which lasted from August 3, 1997 to August 3, 2005. Khatami's administrations described their main motto as political development and the strengthening of civil institutions.

The beginning of Khatami's administration led to a decline in oil prices and a decline in foreign exchange earnings to 9.9 billion\$. Borrowing from the central bank to close the budget deficit led to an increase in inflation by more than 20 percent in 1378, which gradually fell by about 13 percent. At that time, the government implemented a currency exchange policy that was successful. Economic growth helped reduce debt by more than 6 percent. The particular government's approach to domestic and foreign developments has led to events that include: creating a more open political and press space in society and universities, a serious transformation of foreign relations, especially with European countries, chain killings, September 11 events, the events of July 18, 1999, the US invasion of Afghanistan and the US invasion of Iraq, the holding of the first election of the Islamic councils of the city and the village after the revolution, recording the record for the most economic growth among the Islamic republics, the successful implementation of lowering the inflation rate and bringing it to 10%, and successful implementation of single exchange rate.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's administration

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been the president and head of state in the Islamic Republic of Iran during two periods:

- The ninth government and Ahmadinejad's first administration (2005-2009);

- The tenth government and Ahmadinejad's second administration (2009-2013);

The presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad began on August 3, 2005, and he became the sixth President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Ahmadinejad had been the mayor of Tehran at the time of the victory over Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in the Iranian presidential election in 2005. Ahmadinejad won the second term of presidency after the Iranian presidential election in 2009 by defeating rivals like Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi and Mohsen Rezai. The specific government's approach towards domestic and foreign developments has led to events that include: dissatisfaction with the structure of the international system and the attempt to reform and change this structure, implementation of public diplomacy in foreign policy, coherence and progress in the Iranian nuclear energy program, disclosure of the nature of the Holocaust, the plan of early-stage companies, the economic development plan, and the Mehr housing plan.

Globalization and the policies in Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's administrations

Socialpolitical polices of Khatami's administration in relation with globalization

The election of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami on May 23, 1997, with a large number of Iranian votes, accounts for about 70% of the total vote, as an important political phenomenon, raised wonders among many analysts and observers. Khatami's declared domestic policies include: the rule of law; respect for the rights and freedoms of the people, namely civil society; the elimination of social discrimination; tolerance; the maintenance of human dignity; the establishment of social security; the continuation of economic reconstruction of the country; the declaration of the rule of law; the accountability of the government to the people; the freedom of criticism; collective unity; national unity; political development; and support for the formation of political parties. Meanwhile, the international challenges of Iran, such as opening criminal and terrorist cases against the Islamic Republic of Iran in Western courts, Iran's condemnation in some of these trials (such as Mikonos, Germany); reduction in the level of relations between developed countries and Iran; repeated and effective allegations about Iran's interference in the domestic affairs of other countries; the scare of small countries in the region for Iran's expansionist intentions; violent tone of propaganda against Iran and vice ver-

sa; expanded convictions against the Islamic Republic of Iran in international organizations; and the rising risk of economic activity in Iran in the most critical and poorest countries in the world; etc. are some aspects of the situation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1996 and early 1997 at the international level among others. Slowness, downturn, and even darkness in relations with some Islamic countries, such as some the Persian Gulf states, Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, etc., blurry relations with all European countries, especially Germany, Britain, France, Norway, Austria, the coldness of relations with other advanced countries, such as Japan, or even the blurring of relations with remote countries such as Argentina, the relative coldness of relations with some friends which had the relative agreement with Iran regarding not supporting Iran were parts of problems for Iranian foreign policy in early 1997 (Aminzadeh, 2001: 91). Accordingly, one can mention the most important policies that Khatami has taken in his administration and some kind of political development in Iran both in domestic and foreign affairs: foreign policy based on the dialogue of civilizations and the promotion of the dignity of Iran at the international level, the policy of détente in the framework of dignity, wisdom and expediency, foreign policy based on the expansion of relations with all countries of the world, the transformation of Iran from an isolated actor to a fully active and positive, promotion of activities of parties in terms of social development, government, the promotion of the press and the provision of an open space for the expression of ideas and views, the generation of civil society literature, and the growth of political culture among others.

Sociopolitical policies of Ahmadinejad's administration in relation with globalization

During the two presidential terms, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took over Iranian highest executive position. The ninth state of the Islamic Republic of Iran came about as a result of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's victory in the June 24, 2004 election. The President's validation was carried out by Ayatollah Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Revolution on August 3, 2005. The government officially commenced on August 12, 2005, and ended on August 12, when the tenth government began.

On August 16, 2005, Ahmadinejad announced the full text of his government plan. He called his government "a Merciful State" or "State of Mercy".

The tenth government of the Islamic Republic of Iran came about as a result of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's victory in the June 12, 2009 elections. The president's validation was held by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic

Revolution Ayatollah Khamenei on August 3 and his inauguration was held in the Islamic Consultative Assembly on August 5th. The government did its tasks from August 3, 2009 to August 3, 2013 when it was replaced by Hassan Rouhani's administration.

The political policy of the Ahmadinejad's government in the domestic and international arena was based on principles such as dissatisfaction with the structure of the international system and efforts to reform and change this structure, domination of the idealistic discourse principles based on foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, reliance on public diplomacy, the use of national power of undeveloped or developing countries in the face of the great powers. In terms of social development, his government declared concepts based on justice in the form of indigenous development based on indigenous ideas about social development in order to plan for the administration of Iran and solve people's problems. Relying on the government and national identity, he wanted to advance real democracy.

In this regard, we want to see how far Iran's rapid confrontation with the new developments in the world and the two governments, i.e. the Khatami and Ahmadinejad administrations with the elite collection and their political-social system, have been able to achieve or even distance themselves from desirability. Referring to internal examples of social development and the globalization process, we review the statistical measures of social globalization in this regard.

Statistical survey of social globalization towards social development in the Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's administrations using data obtained from the website <<https://www.kof.ethz.ch>>

The process of globalization as an inclusive process with a different impact on different countries, evaluated the extent of globalization with regard to the varying influence of different countries on this trend in global studies. Although different countries may have similar or different performances regarding this process, the aim of this article is to examine the role of two different governments, as the research dependent variable, in the process of globalization, as an independent variable. To examine the similar or different performance of both Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's governments regarding Iran's social development, such as the study of countries, one can use a statistical source to compare the growth and fluctuation of social indices with respect to the comparison of two states in a country.

For the statistical survey of the three resources of A. T. Kearney Index (2001), Maastricht (2002) and the KOF Globalization Index since 2002 are available. Although the website <https://www.kof.ethz.ch> firstly presented the data from 2002 onwards to the public, later it made the data from 1970 onwards (Dreher, 2006: 4-5).

In the early 2001, the A. T. Kearney Index, by the famous "Foreign Policy" and "Kearney International Counseling Office", for the first time, defined the combination of this process for the first time with respect to the multi-dimensional components of globalization. Accordingly, the ranking of countries in the world is economically, politically and culturally consistent with globalization was done. Maastricht measured political, military, social, communications, and environmental indices in relation to the globalization process (Dreher, 2008: 32). The KOF Globalization Index also examines three of economic, political and social dimensions, whose hypotheses are described in Dreher, Gaston, and Martens (2008). Norris, Kohan and Nay defined the KOF Globalization Index as the process of creating a network of interconnection among actors in intercontinental distances with regard to the three of economic, political and social dimensions which appears in a wide and diverse range of movements including people, information and beliefs, capital, and services (Clark, 2000: 108-86). The KOF Globalization Index has always been a continuation of the statistical measurement of indices and, with the availability of past statistics since 1970, widened the temporal horizons. The further it has come, the more the number of countries has become, so that it almost has examined 200 countries and has made it available in a wide range of statistical surveys. As a result, a comparative study of countries and even governments within a country is possible in the form of a case study.

The data of KOF Globalization Index has measured the social globalization index through three sub-indices of Personal Contact, Information Flows, and Cultural Proximity. Each of these sub-indices has been evaluated as an item in terms of smaller indexes and variables. The sub-index of personal contact is measured in terms of indices such as international telephone traffic, transfers (percent of GDP), international tourism, foreign population (percent of total population) and international letters (per capita). the data on the information flow is analyzed and measured in terms of indices such as the amount of internet use per 1,000 people, internet users (per 1000 people), cable television (per 1000 people), trade in newspapers (percent of GDP), and the use of radio (per 1000 people). Finally, the data on cultural proximity is measured via the number of McDonald's restaurants (per capital), and trade in books (percent of GDP).

The KOF Index converts each of the variables to an index ranging

from 1-100: the highest value for each variable is as 100, and 1 represents the lowest value. This collected data is compiled annually at the end of each year. To measure the calculation of the numerical equation is used:


$$\frac{V_i - V_{\min}}{V_{\max} - V_{\min}} \times 10$$

V_i is the variable value for country i , $v_{\max}$ is the highest value of the variable among countries, $v_{\min}$ represents the lowest value among countries (Dreher, 2008:45). The figure shows the extent of social globalization with regard to the subject of this paper and its effects on the social development process of both Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's administrations .

The status of globalization in Khatami's administration

First, we examine the status of social globalization, personal contact, information flow, and cultural proximity in Khatami's government. The index of social globalization in Khatami's government in 1997 was as 20.76%, in 1998 as 21.99%, in 1999 as 23.31%, in 2000 as 24.57%, in 2001 as 24.81%, in 2002 as 27.29%, in 2003 as 28.12%, and in 2004 as 29.62%. The index of social globalization in Khatami's government from 1997 to 2004 was 8.86%. This index had been increasing over the 8-year term of Khatami's government (Figure 1).


Figure 1 - Source: www.globalization.ethz.ch



Personal contacts in Khatami's government

Personal contact is one of the sub-indices of social globalization. This sub-index in Khatami's government in 1997 was as 28.12%, in 1998 as 27.94%, in 1999 as 28.25%, in 2000 as 28.33%, in 2001 as 28.13%, in 2002 as 28.45%, in 2003 as 28.26%, and in 2004 as 28.57%. The values show that the sub-index of personal interaction in Khatami's government decreased as 18% from 1997 to 1998. The trend shows an increase as 38% from 1998 to 1999. But it represents a decrease as 19% with fluctuations in 2000; however, again in 2002, it shows a 32% increase, but in 2003, the trend shows a 19% decrease, and again in 2004, it displays a 31% increase. Values show that the index of personal contact in Khatami's government has an intermittently decreasing and increasing trend. Considering this fluctuation, the index of personal contact in Khatami's government increased by 71% (Figure 1-1).


Figure 1-1 - Source: www.globalization.ethz.ch



Information flow in Khatami's administration

The second subindex of social globalization is information flow which was as 31.15% in Khatami's government in 1997, 34.49% in 1998, 38.49% in 1999, 41.06 in 2000, 42.15% in 2001, 49.18 in 2002, 52.07 in 2003, and 55.83 in 2004. Values show that the information flow over the course of 8 years, the Khatami administration has had a dramatic growth rate as 24.78% (Figure 1-2).

Figure 1-2 - Source: www.globalization.ethz.ch




Cultural proximity in Khatami's administration

Cultural proximity is the last sub-index of social globalization, which was as 1.43% in the Khatami government in 1997, 1.74% in 1998, 1.12 in 1999, 2.11 in 2000, 1.86 in 2001, 1.49 in 2002, 1.06 in 2003, and 1.25 in 2004. Percentages show that the statistics related to cultural proximity in Khatami's government in 1997 and 1998 decreased by 31%. But in 1999, the trend decreases by 62%, and in 1999 it had a dramatic 99% growth rate. By the end of 2003, it experienced a downtrend by 1.05%. Again, in 2004, it was up by 19%.

Considering the fluctuations, if the first year of Khatami's government as 1.43% is compared to the last year of his administration in 2004 as 1.25%, then this sub-index has had a downtrend as 18%. Values indicate that the cultural proximity index has fluctuated in Khatami's government in 8 years (Fig. 1-3).

Figure 1-3 - Source: www.globalization.ethz.ch




The social globalization index in Ahmadinejad's administration

The social globalization index in the Ahmadinejad administration covers years ranging from 2005 (1384), 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012. For investigating Ahmadinejad's administration, as for Khatami's, we first begin with a survey of the social globalization index, and then its sub-indices, i.e. personal contact, information flow, and cultural proximity are probed.

The status of social globalization in Ahmadinejad's administration

The index of social globalization in Ahmadinejad's administration was as 29.52% in 2005, 30.44% in 2006, 31.48% in 2007, 32.65% in 2008, 34.13 in 2009, 34.82 in 2010, 34.63 in 2011, and 34.40 in 2012. Percentages show that the social globalization index in Ahmadinejad's government rose by 5.30% from 2005 to 2010. But from 2011 to the end of 2012, it fell by 42%. Statistics also shows that the index has fluctuated in Ahmadinejad's government (Figure 2).


Figure 2 - Source: www.globalization.ethz.ch



Personal contact in Ahmadinejad's administration

The index of personal contact as the first sub-index of social globalization in Ahmadinejad's government was 29.34 in 2005, 30.12 in 2006, 31.13 in 2007, 31.41 in 2008, 31.93 in 2009, 31.70 in 2010, 31.18 in 2011, and 29.72% in 2012. Percentages shows that the sub-index of personal contact in the Ahmadinejad government, increased by 2.59% from 2005 to 2009, but it decreases by 2.21% from 2009 to the end of 2012. Statistics also shows that this sub-index has fluctuated during the Ahmadinejad administration (Figure 2-1).


Figure 2-1 - Source: www.globalization.ethz.ch



Information flow in Ahmadinejad's administration

Information flow as the second sub-index of social globalization in Ahmadinejad's government was 55.02 in 2005, 56.93 in 2006, 58.86 in 2007, 61.90 in 2008, 65.60 in 2009, 67.76 in 2010, 67.63 in 2011, and 68.36% in 2012. Statistics shows that the information flow from the year 2005 to the end of 2010 was 12.74%. In 2011, this index fell by 13%, but it rose by 73% in 2012. Regarding the fluctuations in this sub-index, it had an uptrend as 13.47% over the eight year term of Ahmadinejad's government. (Figure 2-2).

Figure 2-2 - Source: www.globalization.ethz.ch




Cultural proximity in Ahmadinejad's administration

Cultural proximity as the third sub-index of social globalization in Ahmadinejad's government was 1.06 in 2005, 1.00 in 2006, 1.06 in 2007, 1.06 in 2008, 1.06 in 2009, 1.06 in 2010, 1.12 in 2011, and 1.12 in 2012. The values shows that the cultural proximity sub-index in Ahmadinejad's administration

had a 6% downward trend from 2005 to the end of 2006. But it rose by 6% in 2007 and was constant until the end of 2010. In 2011, it went up by 6% remained constant in 2012. If we compare 2005 to 2012, then the sub-index increased by 6%. The percentages indicate that this sub-index did not have a significant change over the course of 8 years (Figure 2-3).

Figure 2-3 - Source: www.globalization.ethz.ch



Comparative investigation of social globalization indices in the two Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's administrations


Investigating the social globalization indices in the present study covers 1997 to 2004 in Khatami's government, and from 2005 to 2012 in Ahmadinejad's government. For the annual comparison of the two governments in terms of quantitative data, Khatami's first year of presidency, i.e. 1997, is compared to Ahmadinejad's in 2005, Khatami's government in 1998 to Ahmadinejad's in 2007, Khatami's government in 2000 to Ahmadinejad's in 2008, Khatami's government in 2001 to Ahmadinejad's in 2009, Khatami's government in 2002 to Ahmadinejad's in 2010, Khatami's government in 2003 to Ahmadinejad's in 2011, and Khatami's government in 2004 to Ahmadinejad's in 2012.

Comparison of Social Globalization in Two Khatami and Ahmadinejad Governments

The social globalization indices in the Khatami government from 1997 to the end of 2004, i.e. during the 8 years, had an uptrend as 8.86%. The index in the Ahmadinejad government rose by 5.30% from 2005 to 2010, but by the end of 2012, it experienced a 42% downtrend. Therefore, the growth trend of this index in Ahmadinejad's government has fluctuated compared to

that of Khatami's government (figure 3).


Figure 3 - Source: www.globalization.ethz.ch



Comparison of personal contact in Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's administrations

The sub-index of personal contact in Khatami's government rose from 28.12% in 1997 to 28.57% at the end of 2004. The trend of this sub-index in the Khatami government was in fluctuation so that in his 8 year term of presidency, it rose by 71%. This sub-index in the Ahmadinejad government rose by 2.59% from 2005 to the end of 2009, but declined to 2.21% by the end of 2012 (Figure 3-1).


Figure 3-1 - Source: www.globalization.ethz.ch



Comparison of information flow in Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's administrations

Following the information flow index in Khatami's government rose from 31.15% in 1997 to 55.83% at the end of 2004. This sub-index in the Khatami government has risen by 24/78% for Khatami's 8 year administration. This sub-index in Ahmadinejad's government rose from 55.02% in 2005 to 68.36% in 2012. It had an uptrend in Ahmadinejad's government over the 8 year term of presidency and obtained a 13.47% growth. In other words, the index experienced a slower uptrend in Ahmadinejad's administration than Khatami's (Figure 3-2).


Figure 3-2 - Source: www.globalization.ethz.ch



Comparison of cultural proximity in Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's administrations

The cultural proximity sub-index in the Khatami government rose from 1.43 in 1997 to 1.74% in 1998, namely, it experienced a 31% uptrend. But by the end of 1999, the index had a 62% downturn. Again, it rose by 99% in 2000. As Figure 3-3 shows, this sub-index again rose by 1.05% in 2003, and 19% in 2004. On the other hand, the sub-index trend in the Ahmadinejad government fell by 6% from 2005 to the end of 2006. In contrast to the first year of Khatami's government, this sub-index experienced a downtrend. In 2007, the trend rose by 6%. However, by the end of 2010, the value remains constant, and in 2011, and it rose by 6% in 2011. By the end of 2012, the trend value remains a constant. Lastly, this sub-index in the Ahmadinejad government grew 12% over the 8 year term. The status of the cultural proximity sub-index was higher in the Khatami administration than Ahmadinejad's (Figure 3-3).

Figure 3-3 - Source: www.globalization.ethz.ch



Explaining the Analysis of the Performance of Two Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's Administrations in Accordance with the Process of Social Globalization with an Emphasis on Similarity and Differentiation

The present paper examines the two governments' responses to the globalization process, with an emphasis on their similarity and differentiation via a comparative approach. What can be the main points of similarity and distinction? The ascending and descending trends of social indices of globalization are indicative of the good or weak performance of the ruling state in the context of social development in line with the globalization process. Khatami's government and Ahmadinejad's government both have grown up in terms of the social globalization indices and sub-indices of personal contact, information flow, and cultural proximity, and their growth rate was fluctuated in some years (Figures 3-1, 3-2, 3-3).

According to the statistics, in terms of the similarities of both governments, uptrends can be observed in their globalization process, while both governments have experienced an incremental growth trend (Chart 1-1 and 1-3 in Khatami's government, and 2, 2-1 in Ahmadinejad's). Despite the different statistics and percentages, each one has an uptrend in relation to the social globalization process. Since Ahmadinejad' second term of presidency was drawn to globalization and, in this regard, became more flexible in this direction. Statistics indicates that the type of government is related to the process

of globalization. Despite the great differentiation between the two governments, both in terms of the variable of social globalization and its sub-indices, they have experienced growth or even fluctuation in some of the sub-indices; however, the uptrend in Ahmadinejad's government is slow. Other similarity points can be seen from the uptrend of both governments relative to the information flow that, without any fluctuations, both moved upwardly. The uptrend in the first five years of both governments was slow, but after that, the uptrend became quicker with the difference that it was more dramatic in Khatami's government (Figure 1-1 and 2-2). This difference can be attributed to the performance of the two governments in the domestic and international environment and the conditions governing the political-social environment of the states.

In terms of the differences, the trend of the globalization index and its sub-indices in both governments, is different and the pace of growth in Khatami's government is higher than Ahmadinejad's. For example, the trend of social globalization index in the Khatami government has been on the rise, but it was fluctuated in Ahmadinejad's government in 2011 and 2012. It should be noted that the trend was not fallen below the level of the previous government, but its pace became slower (Chart 1 and 2).

Another distinction is that Khatami's government has experienced more fluctuations regarding the sub-index of personal contact than the Ahmadinejad government, but the Ahmadinejad government has faced some fluctuations in the last two years (Figure 1-1 and 1-2). Regarding the cultural proximity sub-index, Khatami's government has also fluctuated, while Ahmadinejad's government experienced a downtrend in its second year that is after it experienced a 6% uptrend, and in the seventh year, it face another 6% uptrend. Another difference in terms of this sub-index is that Khatami's government dropped in the eighth year compared to its first year. But this case did not happen in Ahmadinejad's government (Figures 1/3 and 2/3).

According to the research hypothesis, both governments have been growing according to the credible world statistics in terms of the social globalization index, with the difference that Khatami's social development coincided with the global reform, while Ahmadinejad stepped up with the emphasis on indigenous and local thoughts on social development. Comparisons show that the difference in social globalization can depend on the attitudes and practices of governments in the domestic and international environment. For example, Khatami took on a globalist worldview of the international arena and put forward the thesis of the dialogue of civilizations in the international policies, and furthered this competition with more interactions. In other words, Khatami's attempt to make social development indigenous rather than

exogenous. On the other hand, Ahmadinejad, with an emphasis on indigenous thoughts in the first round of his government, made social development without a globalization approach, and made many efforts for social development, removal of poverty, unemployment and social harm. Consequently, Compared to Khatami's government, Ahmadinejad's government was indigenous rather than exogenous; thus it became less competitive in the globalization trend. Globalization indices in the government has had a slower pace for eight years of Ahmadinejad's government. The issue worthy of noting is that this statistics does not fall below the level of the previous government rises. Different statistics related to the governments emphasize that despite their differences in their approaches towards domestic and foreign environments, they were both in line with globalization.

Conclusion

The present study is a comparative research that examines the effect of the trend of globalization on social development as fundamental concepts in political sociology for comparing political systems in Iran in the form of two Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's governments with a desirable structure. The comparative study on the issue of globalization and development in this paper shows that these two can be mutually influential and there is a significant relationship between development and globalization, since there can be no connection between the domestic and foreign environments. By examining the performance of the two governments in Iran, we concluded that the performance of governments in the context of globalization could be different. Therefore, in addition to comparing countries in terms of the globalization process, it is possible to compare governments within a country which adopt different approaches to the globalization process. As the comparative study showed, the social globalization index was 8.86% in Khatami's government over 8 years of presidency, and dropped by 4.89% in the Ahmadinejad government over an 8-year term of presidency. This difference in governments' performance can add to the significance of the domestic structure of a country and the governments' different approaches to the globalization process. The growth of social globalization confirms the research hypothesis of the paper claiming that the social development grew in both governments, with the difference that social development in Khatami's government was based on global reforms, while it was based on indigenous and local thought in Ahmadinejad's. In addition, both governments have been affected by the varying degrees and percentages in terms of the social globalization index as the dependent variable and its sub-indices. Thus, as a comparison, it can be accept-

ed that social globalization varies from one government to another. The degree of social globalization index can be affected by the domestic and foreign environments in which governments played a major role as players in this regard. For example, Khatami's government had more convergence with the process of globalization, and this affected the relative growth of social globalization and its sub-indices in Khatami's government. This case study conducted on Iran and the comparison of the two governments to the globalization approach showed that although the process of globalization emphasizes the interaction and interconnection of the domestic and foreign environments of countries, it is often not just dependent on the government, and can come from forms, shapes, spaces, unequal geography, etc.

The comparative investigation done on the globalization process points out that globalization, in addition to the governments' approaches, can be a function of a wide range, called the domestic environment of a society, since it implies a model of generalized political and social development. Therefore, each country chooses and follows paths to political and social development according to its political and social conditions. This is the domestic environment we emphasize and it is definitely different from one country to another. It can even affect the governments' attitude towards globalization with regard to the major differences in views towards development. But it seems important to keep moving forward. Khatami, for example, went on to advance social development with the approach of reform and global reform, while Ahmadinejad, acting on local and local thoughts on social development, proceeded. According to this approach, the uptrend in Khatami's government is higher than that of Ahmadinejad's government in terms of the social globalization index and its sub-indices.

Ultimately, this article emphasizes with the consideration and comparison of the differences in approaches to the "nature of the government in the Islamic Republic of Iran." Because governments in the Islamic Republic of Iran, both fundamentalist and reformist ones, take steps that are naturally along with globalization. The government in the Islamic Republic of Iran accepts or refuses to accept globalization, depending on its nature. Moreover, since Ahmadinejad emphasized more on indigenous and national efforts in his development, the statistics of social globalization had a slower growth trend. It is important to note that this growth did not fall, but it was slow in Ahmadinejad's government. By examining the process of social globalization on social development over the decades coinciding with the performance of two Khatami and Ahmadinejad governments, it can be said that this process has contributed to the growth of social development, and has led to the continuation of it in a roughly different way from Other countries have provided

Iran. It is important that there is a conscious approach to this trend so that its strengths can be enjoyed and its weaknesses easily rejected.

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ABSTRACT

Globalization and social development, as two independent and interactional discourses, have been investigated in this paper using the globalization indicators in two Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's administrations. Thus, the independent variable of globalization, and the dependent variable of the state of social development of Iran are compared in the two periods of 1997-2005 and 2005-2013 considering the different approaches adopted in the two administrations. The research method is comparative. The research hypothesis is that based on valid statistics, both administrations have been on the path to social development, but Khatami's approach was based on global reformism, and Ahmadinejad's approach was based on indigenous and local thoughts. In terms of theoretical foundations, we have used the generalization model of political-social development. According to this model, development priorities are different in countries with different political and social contexts. Social globalization grew as much as 8.86 in the Khatami's administration, and up to 4.89 in Ahmadinejad's administration. Therefore, the administration type is related to the extent of globalization, and globalization has contributed to the growth and development of social development. It also has provided a platform for the continuation of studies of this trend in a different way, regarding the states and the internal environment of the countries.

KEYWORDS

Globalization, Social Development, Global Reforms and Indigenous Thought, Khatami's Government, Ahmadinejad's Government.

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THE SPREAD OUT STRATEGY OF THE MAIN WEAPONS TOOL SYSTEM OF THE INDONESIAN AIR FORCE IN THE REGION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

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Introduction

In the lower operational level, especially in the era of the people's physical struggle for independence, the principle of "offense is the best defense" or "attack is the best defense", is still relevant. Nowadays, these statements are no longer applicable to the national strategic level. Actual experience shows that countries that run offensive strategies can be successful in the beginning of wars, but sometimes cannot hold it till the end. This was evident in World War I and World War II. This is the reason why according to Suryohadiprojo (2008), a country, in order to achieve its political objectives requires not only a "victory of war" but a "peaceful victory" after the end of wars. Thus, the expression that "an attack is the best defense", is no longer applicable as a National Strategy.

Nevertheless, in modern war theory, attack and defense are the two main forms for conducting a conflict. If diplomacy is not enough for a country to achieve its political objectives, then the use of force against other nations that are blocking these interests is seen as viable. On the other hand, nations that are attacked can fight back, on their own defense. To eliminate the source of the threat, defense must be able to eliminate or defeat attackers.

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Therefore, defense is a condition to be prepared to respond to others' attacks and eliminate the source of threat.

Potential threats due to the development of high technology methods and tools are expected to increase in the future. These potential threats can include terrorism, communal conflicts, transnational crime, crimes against state property, especially in the jurisdiction of Indonesia's marine and border areas, as well as the growing variety of conventional criminal acts (Setiyanti, Putranti, & Rosyidin, 2016; Witjaksono, 2016).

Threats and disruptions that affect the sovereignty of the state, territorial integrity and the safety of the nation, are closely linked to its strategic geographic position, natural resources, and human resources (HR). Other states' interests can threaten the survival of the country. For this reason, a sovereign country such as Indonesia requires a powerful or minimal defense weapon system tool (Alutsista) to defend the country and its people from various threats. One of the Alutsista that is owned by Indonesia is Air Alutsista, which is used to protect Indonesian air space. Air Alutsista is manned by the Indonesian National Army Air Force (TNI-AU) which currently has a considerable force posture in Asia and internationally.

Therefore, the goal of this article is to examine the strategy and placement of the Main Weapons Tool System (Alutsista) in the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). This study uses normative research methods conducted by reviewing references and is based on secondary data, added to concrete data and personal experiences.

Discussion

The dynamic development of today's global strategic environment, created a complex agenda of threats which impacts national defense. In addition, States are still competing for their interests and balancing forces. In the broad strategic governance, each State has its partnerships and strategic rivals, and is faced by diverse ideological pressures.

For instance, the alliance between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Communist China (PRC) and communist-socialist Russia is so strong, that were able to face the power of the United States and its allies. Similarly, the alliance between US-led liberal forces and Gulf Islamic countries, were able to balance the Islamic State of Iran in the Middle East region. Other examples are the spread of religious and sectarian radical groups (Azra, 2016; Khamdan, 2015) such as Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its social impacts, such as the flow of refugees. This could foster the develop-

ment of radical militant groups in other Muslim majority countries, including in Indonesia.

Therefore, to deal with these challenges, it is necessary to develop a strategy for the defense of the sovereignty and integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). First, we will examine a general concept of strategy and, second, the particular case of Indonesia.

The word “strategy” comes from the Greek word meaning “the art of the general,” or the art of a commander who is usually used in war. The essence of a strategy is a means of achieving goals by using the available means of strength and infrastructure. Strategy is the science and art in the process of making decisions regarding goals, means, concepts, resources, strengths and potentials (TNI, 2012: 181; Makaarim A, 2014).

Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) argues that the notion of strategy is the knowledge of the use of combat to win the war (Umar, 2001). However, in this modern age, the use of the term strategy is no longer limited to the concept or art of a Commander in warfare, but has been used extensively almost in all fields of science. Whereas according to language, strategy means science and art use all the resources of the nations to exercise certain wisdom in war and peace (Depdiknas, 2008: 1529).

Understanding the concept of strategy, needs a comprehensive overview nowadays, that does not focus on a particular goal or on war. From a military power perspective study, strategy links military forces with the achievement of political goals. In other words, strategy is perceived as “... the use that is made of force and the threat of force at the ends of policy ...” (Gray, 1999: 19). It departs from Clausewitz’s approach which defines strategy as a form of engagement of war purposes. Thus, the explanation of strategy definitions always leads to a relationship between military power and political objectives. This strategic concept is then used as a guide for the application of a country’s policy.

Based on the ideas of Clausewitz and Howard, Gray (1999) suggests several categories or dimensions that explain the concept of strategy, among others. The first dimension of strategy is located in the category of Preparation for War covering economics and logistics, organization, military administration, information and intelligence, doctrine and theory strategy, and technology. Second, the strategic dimension in the War Proper category is composed by military operations, leadership (in politics and military), geography, friction and opponents. These dimensions have contributed to the preparation and execution of strategy.

The first category shows that the preparation of a war strategy is a

combination of several important dimensions, namely the economic resources of existing government supplies to drive the military machine directed by the strategy-making organization, recruited, armed, and trained. Also, it is linked to military management, associated with information, intelligence and the process of rationalization (Gray, 1999: 31). The first one is an important organizational dimension in providing institutional security in the future, in addition to its duties as a resistance and strength planner. However, it is argued that strategy is a process whereby the existing strategic idea needs to be coordinated, assessed and reviewed by an organization's bureaucrat. The next dimension is the dimension of military management, namely the preparation of military institutions, including the Air Force readiness for mobilization.

The second category is "war proper", which deals with the specifics of a military operation by displaying problems in command influenced by different geographical circumstances, shifting tasks, or being blocked by powerful enemies and subject to discipline (Gray, 1999: 38). These categories illustrate the preparation and implementation of military operations of a strategy. This dimension shows the actual state of the relationship between strategy and tactics. Strategy is a brilliant idea which will only become a discourse if no one is running it. This dimension shows the reality of the application of a strategy itself. Also, the existence of command is a dimension that refers to the quality of the military and political leadership.

A strategy according to Luttwak, 1987, in Gray (1999: 42) is a plan that must be successful against non-natural enemies, through tactics, execution, strategic, and moral-political dialogue. Strategic goals are directed to secure profits against enemies, which should be contained and detained. According to Peter Wilson (1997 apud Gray, 1999: 43), strategic ideas can be divided into three timelines: too early, late, or timely. Any strategic process of planning and implementing, has a chronological dimension that limits and regulates it.

In the context of the Alutsista development, strategy can be interpreted as the art or the thinking of concepts in the efforts directed to develop and empower Alutsista TNI-AU based on the area and potential threats in order to achieve a strong and independent NKRI. Based on the TNI doctrine "Tri Dharma Eka Karma" abbreviated as "Tridek", the state defense strategy is to prevent, deter, and overcome threats and disturbance to the integrity of the nation and state in various forms and their manifestations by: 1) Developing TNI capability as a main component to reinforce security and preparedness 2) Building the people's capacity to productively strengthen defense and to maintain people's resistance. (TNI, 2012).

In order to achieve Indonesia strategic goals, linked to TNI main

tasks, Indonesian Air Force is a strong tactical mean. Main goals are going to be pursued according the formulation of the Strategy of Development and of the Development of TNI's Strength and Capacity, Strategy of Strengthening and Capacity of TNI, Strategy of Use of TNI's Strength and Capacity, and Third Coordination of TNI Strategy (Ways). All TNI strength and capabilities consisting of the strength and capabilities of the Army, the strength and capabilities of the Navy, and the strength and capabilities of the Supporting Component and the Reserve Component, including the budget capability of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, will be empowered in the implementation of the TNI Strategy (Means) (TNI, 2012: 214). For the Indonesian nation, war is a last resort and is only done when all efforts are peacefully unsuccessful. To that end, the strategy of state defense needs to be drawn up by taking into account the three basic elements, namely: forming, responding, and preparing (Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). The following describes the three elements of the defense strategy:

(1) Establish a strategy capable of creating and establishing national and international security environments that can ensure national interests to support regional stability, reduce and eliminate threats, prevent conflicts and aggression, as well as other acts of violence.

(2) Respond, which is a strategy capable of responding to the various spectrum of crisis, to eliminate threats and risks to the national interest.

(3) Prepare a strategy capable of establishing a defense for the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia to face an uncertain future and to organize defense by making use of technological advances to protect the national interest.

In addition, the defense strategy of the state is formulated with three basic components of strategy in a proportional, balanced and coordinated way: first, the objective to be achieved is to safeguard and protect the sovereignty of the State, the territorial integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and to protect the safety of the entire nation (defined into five strategic objectives). Second, defense resources used to achieve goals such as the mobilization of military defense that is integrated and in synergy with the Nir-military defense. Third, how to use resources to achieve strategic objectives or goals, in order to plan, prepare and implement a strong and highly defensive state defense system in accordance with the Indonesian understanding of peace and war (Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2015b).

Based on the theoretical perspective above, it can be argued that the strategy of Alutsista TNI-AU of the Republic of Indonesia is going to be established by examining the degree of its effectiveness throughout Indonesia. This effectiveness is linked to its ability to maintain the state's sovereignty

and territorial integrity. In this sense, this paper will also present a potential model for Alutsita TNI AU deployment, by using the Soerjono & Mamuji (2009) methodological research on quantitative and qualitative research.

Power Alutsista TNI AU Currently

Article 10 of Law Number 34 the Year 2004 (Republik Indonesia, 2004) on the Indonesian National Army (TNI) stipulates that as an integral part of the TNI, the Air Force performs the task of TNI in the field of defense air defense; enforce the law and maintain security in the territorial air of national jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of national law and ratified international law; carry out the tasks of the TNI in the development and development of air force forces; as well as implementing the empowerment of air defense areas. Recognizing the importance of the mandate of the law, the Air Force has been, is, and will continue to carry out its roles and functions actively in the face of all forms of threats, harassment and obstacles to maintain and secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of NKRI.

Faced with various considerations especially the potential threat factor in the NKRI region and the limited ability of the defense equipment, the TNI AU develop Bare Base Concept. This concept deals with the current assessment of airbase readiness, including an evaluation of its facilities, maneuver abilities, and what can be made to increase the effectiveness of air operation. Currently, the Indonesian Air Force capabilities and strengths is far from ideal conditions (Peraturan Kepala Staf Angkatan Udara, 2015). The forces stand as:

(1) Air control- ability to control the security of the surface and under it without being threatened or attacked by the opponent. This task cannot be implemented optimally because of the limitations of armaments and weaponry.

(2) Air Attack- ability to use air power significantly based on the capability of destruction and the possibility to carry out air strikes against targets, both static and dynamic in the air, sea and land. This task also cannot be implemented in good conditions due to the limited capability of tankers, armaments and armaments.

(3) Air Support- ability to aid the implementation of air forces operations. This task, as well, is not able to be fully achieved due to limitations on defense materials.

(4) Information Exploitation- ability to make use of intelligence data to aid operations. Also limited.

Nowadays, TNI AU Alutsista is structured as: as Cuter-Fruit, includ-

ing Cruise Missile (CM), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Tactical Airto-Surface Missile (TASM), Electronic Warfare (electronic warfare), Rockets Artillery Mortar (RAM), Fixed Wing Aircraft, Rotary Wing Aircraft (helicopter), Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV), Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and Tactical / Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM). However, special air defense systems that are manned by the Air Force consists of various types of aircraft, radar, missiles and air attack deterrent (PSU) (Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2015c; Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2012).

Aircraft fighter carriers are very old, and one of them cannot be used again, but its replacement is still in the procurement process. Regarding quantity and quality, the material of TNI AU has experienced a great decrease in ability. While the support of TNI AU is located in fighter planes, transport planes, helicopters, trainers, radar and missiles. The condition of TNI AU outlines is as follows: 1) Various types of aircraft, including 106 aircraft force fighter, 51 planes carrying aircraft, 39 helicopter power helicopters, 60 plane power trainers, and PTTA (Unmanned Aircraft) power of 4 aircraft. Then, Radar force of 20 units, QW-3 power missiles 273 sets, and PSU (Air Force Deterrent) power six.

TNI Commander General Gatot Nurmantio, revealed that there are potential threats to Indonesia that the country must be wary of: the Australian Border with Indonesia in the Masela Block; tension in the South China Sea; as well as the Five Defense Arrangement Defense Cooperation (PFDA) pioneered by the UK (Purbawanti, 2016).

The Placement Strategy of TNI AU Alutsista

As argued, the power of Alutsista TNI AU is still insufficient to cover all its area of action. As stated by the Air Force Chief of Staff of TNI Hadi Tjahjanto, "Currently, the TNI AU Alutsista fulfills only 40% of its responsibility (...)" (Interview, Hadi Tjahyanto, 2017). The area that is covered encompasses the islands of Java, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Fighter aircraft for example, are held in eight air squadrons, namely (Command and Control Center of the Indonesian National Army Air Force (Puskodal) National Air Defense Command (Kohanudnas), August 23, 2017; Observation and search results of various official sources, 2017):

(1) One squadron Hawk 109/209 (squadron 12), at Roesmin Nuryadin Lanes (RSN).

(2) One squadron F16 (air squadron 16), at Lanud Roesmin Nuryadin

(RSN).

(3) One squadron Hawk 109/209 (air squadron 12), in Pontianak Lanud.

(4) One Sukhoi squadron (air squadron 11) at Sultan Hasanuddin (HND) Makassar.

(5) One squadron T50i (air squadron 14) in Lanud Iswahjudi Madiun.

(6) One squadron F-16 (air squadron 3) at Lanud Iswahjudi Madiun.

(7) One squadron F5 (air squadron 15) at Lanud Iswahjudi Madiun.

(8) One Super Tucano squadron (air squadron 21) at Lanud Abdrur-rachman Saleh Malang.

However, of the eight air squadrons that manned the aircraft of the Air Force, two Hawk squadrons (109 and 209) and one F-5 squadron have retired, so the squadron that is still actively conducting the exercises and operations is only made of five squadrons. Based on the analysis of the potential threat and the extent of NKRI in Indonesia, the strategy of deploying TNI AU alutsista as follows:

Strategy to face potential threats on the border of Australia, by placing and holding a combat squadron at ElTari Airbus Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara (NTT). Gradually it can be done with the Mobile squadron strategy through the placement of several fighter aircraft along with the existing support personnel at ElTari Airbus Kupang, such as T-50 which will be upgraded to F-50 from Air Squadron 15 Lanud Iswahjudi Madiun. In addition to fighter aircraft, ElTari Kupang required PSU (Air Force Attack) such as Orlycon. Border Threats in Australia and the South China Sea Region (LCS). Darwin region, Australia is only approximately 475 km from the outer islands of Indonesia. The region contains Masela blocks that are part of the Indonesian territory and close to the concentration of foreign troops, such as United State (US) Marine, Marines of the United States numbering 1,500-2,500 personnel. Also, the tension and warming of the LCS conditions that began the struggle for the Spratly archipelago rich in natural resources between ASEAN countries, the United States and China. China is currently treating air defense zones in the LCS Territory which will certainly cause conflicts surrounding countries with interest in LCS, so this is dangerous because the region is close to the Indonesian territory of Natuna Island.

Defense Arrangement (PFDA) Defense Cooperation (PFDA) which has been initiated by the countries joined in the British Commonwealth, namely Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and Britain itself. The combined strength of the PFDA is enormous, so it is important to be aware that these three countries are very close to Indonesia. Strategies that can be

done by adding the air mobile squadron and its fighter plane that is always ready to be placed/held at Air Base (Lanud) Tarakan to anticipate the potential threat from countries incorporated PFDA.

In contrast to alutsista such as Radar, its deployment is almost in all parts of NKRI, although the number is still relatively minimal when compared with the area of NKRI. Radar has been deployed in twenty areas, namely: (1) Satrad 211 Tkt at Tanjung Kait; (2) Satrad 212 Rni in Ranai; (3) Satrad 213 Tpi in Tanjung Pinang; (4) Satrad 214 Pml in Pemalang; (5) Satrad 215 Cgt in Congot; (6) Satrad 216 Cbl in Cibalingbing; is in the area of Air Defense Sector Command 1 (Kohanudnas I) in Jakarta; (7) Satrad 221 Nli in Ngliyep; (8) Satrad 222 Plo di Ploso; (9) Satrad 223 Bpp Behind the Board; (10) Satrad 224 Kwd in Kwandang; (11) Satrad 225 Trk in Tarakan; Satrad 226 Brn in Buraen; (12) Satrad 231 Lse in Lhokseumawe; located in the area of Kosekhanudnas II in Makassar; (13) Satrad 232 Dmi in Dumai; (14) Satrad 233 Sat in Sabang; (15) Satrad 234 As in Sibolga; (16) Satrad 241 Brn in Buraen; located in the territory of Kosekhanudnas III in Medan; (17) Satrad 242 in Biak; (18) Satrad 243 in Timika; (19) Satrad 244 in Merauke Papua; (20) Satrad 245 Saumlaki in Maluku, located in the area of Kosekhanud IV in Biak. TNI AU military radar coverage in the NKRI can be seen in the picture below.


Figure 1. Placement of TNI-AU Radar



Source: Susanto & Dicky (2015); Command and Control Center of the Indonesian National Army Air Force (Puskodal) National Air Defense Command (Kohanudnas), August 23, 2017.

Deployment of 20 Radar in NKRI region, according to the analysis of National Air Defense Command (Kohanudnas) there are 23 points that are still vulnerable to the threat and become a very easy area to be entered by the parties concerned to the Indonesian Nation. To protect the country from the threat of air, the Kohanudnas coordinated with the Radar unit under the control of the Ministry of Transportation and Angkasa Pura to place the Civil Radar at 23 points considered vulnerable. Coverage of Civilian radar that cannot be covered by military radar (TNI AU) in NKRI region can be seen in the picture below.

Figure 2. Coverage of Civilian Radar in Indonesian Territory



Source: Susanto & Dicky (2015); Puskodal Kohanudnas, August 23, 2017.

However, the use of civilian Radar that has reached the 20 points cannot be used optimally. These civilian radars are only used to route planes that will use an airport ground to land. Coverage Condition of the Civilian and Military Radar currently can be read through the next image:

Establish a fighter squadron at Eltari-Kupang Lanud to face potential threats from tensions on the Australia-Indonesia border.

Conducting 20 radars, to cover areas that are potentially vulnerable to enter or infiltrated parties interested in natural resources in Indonesia. There are 23 (twenty three) vulnerable points during this time assisted by the civilian radar of the Ministry of Transportation.

Conclusions and recommendations

So far, the Alutsista TNI AU covers only 40% of the need territory in Indonesia, such as the regions of Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Other regions that need attention in the territory are Papua, Maluku, West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara and Bali. Also, 23 radars are being added to be deployed in the blank spot areas that have been covered by civilian radar. Based on that reality, it is suggested to the government and the House of Representatives (DPR) that the budget for TNI AU needs to be expanded, in order to fulfill the minimum basic force requirements for protecting Indonesia.

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ABSTRACT

The goal of this article is to examine the strategy and placement of the Main Weapons Tool System (Alutsista) in the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). One of the Alutsista owned by Indonesia is Air Alutsista which is used to protect Indonesian air space. The air alutsista manned by the Indonesian National Army (TNI) Air Force (AU) currently has a considerable power projection in Asia and the world. This study uses normative research methods conducted by reviewing references and is based on secondary data, added to concrete data and personal experiences. The research shows that the placement of Alutsita is equally distributed on the NKRI archipelago, and examines its strength power in specific regions.

KEYWORDS

Weapons System; Air Power; Indonesia.

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SEMI-CORE STATES: A NEW CATEGORY FOR RETHINKING THE STRUCTURE OF POWER

Daniel Morales Ruvalcaba¹

Introduction

Study the core states and their characteristics, involves scrutinizing the ideas of dependency theorists. However, the literature formulated by the CEPAL and Latin American thinkers clarifies little about this, since they were more concerned with understanding the structural causes of the lag of the periphery, than by studying the core areas.

When speaking of core states, one usually thinks of developed countries. Certainly, the core states are those that have reached the highest standards of development in the world. But the notion of a core is not limited to development, but also denotes advantage in military, cultural, political, environmental, etc. terms. In that sense, certain problems arise: what is specifically understood by core states? Why these states are considered center of the world-system and how did they become so? If the core states outperform the semiperipheral and peripheral states, in what areas do they do so? Does this happen in all areas or only in some areas?

Basically, what distinguishes the core states is the degree of development they achieve. However, the development of national units is conditioned by a time-space continuum that affects their possibilities of creative manipulation: in other words, the development of States is significantly determined by historically constituted structures. And here the value of the notion of core or center, which consist of “the favored areas of the world-economy” (Wallerstein 2003, 492). Thus, the idea translates into a much broader concept that implies wealth and economic development, but also refers to a social and

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political advantage.

In this sense, it can be noted that the economic advantage lies in the fact that these nations are, essentially, exporters of goods with high added value and that are immersed in the so-called third industrial revolution, they are headquarters of major stock and financial centers, they possess great number of multinational corporations, have significant capacity to determine global value chains, inflation in their domestic economies is relatively controlled, their international reserves are large and decisive; in social terms they maintain high income and per capita consumption levels, their education and health systems are of high quality, they have managed to guarantee energy supply and ensure considerable resources for scientific research; in terms of politics, they are characterized as mature and consolidated democracies, have efficient bureaucracies and institutions, their armed forces are modern and equipped with relatively sophisticated weapons, there is usually a notorious concentration of global cities in their territories and foreign policy of its national governments is global in scope.

Now, do all the core states occupy identical positions in the hierarchy of world power? Do core states, by the simple fact of being part of the core or center of the system, perform the same functions in international governance? The aim here is to present a new category of States that is located within the center of the world-system: the semi-core States. In the first part, the core States will be studied theoretically; then, with the support of the WPI, semi-core states will be identified empirically and some of the roles that these States play in the international system will be characterized.

National power of the core States

Perhaps the main theoretical reference for the study of the core, semi-peripheral and peripheral areas, is Immanuel Wallerstein. However, when he was questioned about the intellectual paternity of said division, Wallerstein himself replied: "The terms of core and periphery, in the sense in which they are currently used, are in fact from Raúl Prebisch. Prebisch himself may have taken them from some German authors who had written in the 1920s and whose works had also been forgotten, but in any case, if there is a father for these two terms, that father is Raúl Prebisch" (Aguirre Rojas 2003, 210). Undoubtedly, the Argentine economist is the main precursor of the center-periphery postulates. But what were the sources that inspired the Argentine economist? It is very difficult to specify² since, according to Joseph Love, Raúl

2 In his study, Jaime Estay finds in Raúl Prebisch "a very clear tendency not to mention the

Prebisch never specific how he came up with the notions of center and periphery (Love 1996, 392). Despite that, in the various studies on Prebischian thought, Werner Sombart³, Ernst Wagemann⁴, François Perroux and Mihail Manoilescu have been identified as possible influencers.

However, the preoccupation of Raúl Prebisch was to study the structural causes of the backwardness of the periphery, not the advantages of core economies: the same Raúl Prebisch wrote that “as for the centers, I have to worry about them to the extent necessary to undertake the critique of capitalism” (Prebisch 1976, 8). For this reason, configuring the characteristics of the core and the so-called core states is a very difficult and complicated task, since it consists in reconstructing this notion from fragments of ideas -which were secondary- in the texts where the core-periphery model was exposed.

The objective of this section is precisely to outline the features of the core States based on their economic-military, socio-institutional and communicative-cultural power.

Military-economic power of the core States

To understand the economic-military power of the core states, it is necessary to decompose it into its most elementary elements: economy (production, trade, finance), military apparatus, territory and investment in science and technology.

The main characteristic of the core economies is that they have a pre-

sources of his proposals, neither in the official documents of CEPAL that he elaborated -a question that could be linked to the nature of those documents - nor in the other materials that he wrote throughout his life” (Estay 1995, 120).

3 According to Joseph Love, “Prebisch does not remember the knowledge of Sombart’s text at the time of his initial use of the terms ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ but, even assuming that he was inspired by Sombart, Prebisch would have had more than a striking metaphor, since Sombart only used center and periphery in a few scattered paragraphs” (Love 1996, 26).

4 In the opinion of Francisco Zapata, Ernst Wagemann (1884-1956) “can be considered the father of the idea of ‘periphery’” (Zapata 2001, 146), he considers that his ideas had a significant impact on Latin American economic thought. For his part, Joseph Love argues that Raúl Prebisch, quite possibly, had known the work of Ernst Wagemann, who “directed the Institut für Konjunkturforschung in Berlin and became an important apologist for the Grossraumwirtschaft [great economic space] of Hitler in the late 1930s. In *Struktur und Rhythmus der Weltwirtschaft* (1931), Wagemann used ‘central cycle’ (*zentrische Konjunktur*) to designate movements of monetary income within a given country and ‘peripheral cycle’ (*periphere Konjunktur*) to designate capital movements in the international arena. In this way Wagemann used a core-periphery scheme in connection with a cyclic movement, but not in the sense that Prebisch shared with Sombart” (Love 1996, 392).

dominantly industrial and homogeneous production structure (that is, almost all sectors are developed) that allows them to create new products, to be at the forefront in production and organization methods, and to discover new sources of energy. Also, they have the wide participation in the national production of industrial activities and services. In an adaptation of the ideas put forward by Raymond Barre (1962), it is possible to describe the productive systems of the core states as those in which: increasing quantities of raw materials and fuel are economized; increase their own production of raw materials and fuels; there is an important production of replacement materials; and, the transformation of the industrial structure is significant.

The central states productively surpass other societies of the world-economy thanks to their technological and scientific advances. The postulates of mercantilism -which bet, broadly speaking, on international economic competition through the increase of national production through the control of resources in domestic and foreign markets- were obsolete before the technological advances of the first industrial revolution, when the economic rivalry moved to the efficiency in the factory production. From this moment, States were forced to develop dynamic competitive advantages through strategies for the advancement of knowledge. Peter Drucker argues so: “The traditional factors of production -land (that is, natural resources), labor and capital- have not disappeared, but have become secondary. They can be obtained easily, as long as have knowledge. And knowledge in this new sense is knowledge as an instrument, as the means of obtaining social and economic results” (Drucker 1994, 47). Thanks to the development of capitalism in their societies, the central states found themselves in a position to invest large resources in activities related to research. This allowed them to be at the forefront of the industrial revolutions for their discoveries and scientific-technological innovations. In historical terms, some productive “jumps” for the core areas of the world economy occurred with the first and second industrial revolution, in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, respectively. From these revolutions, the economies of the center deployed highly competitive productive structures that allowed them to enhance their international trade.

In his work *Das Kapital*, Karl Marx postulated that capitalist accumulation is achieved from a dynamic of social transformation characterized by the expropriation of the work of others in a regime where the producer is free owner of their means of production. Once this dynamic of transformation is generalized and deepened, then it adopts a new form, where the capitalist exploiter of several workers is, in turn, expropriated by another, more powerful capitalist. So, “that expropriation is carried out by the play of the immanent laws of capitalist production itself, the centralization of capital. Each capitalist dis-

places many others. Parallel with this centralization of capital or expropriation of many capitalists by a few, it develops on a growing scale" (Marx 1999, 648). As can be seen, the concept of centralization of capital is different from those of accumulation and concentration: even Karl Marx himself clarifies that centralization "should not be confused with accumulation and concentration" (Marx 1999, 529). The notion of centralization has thus a special heuristic value for the analysis of the emergence of the core areas in the modern world-economy.

Thus, in Marxist thought the notions of accumulation, concentration and centralization are complementary and very important since they explain the way in which capitalists extend the scale of their operations: the first refers "to the gradual increase of capital through reproduction" (Marx 1999, 531), that is, the investment of the surplus for the generation of new capital; while the second, is understood as the growth of all individual capital from the search for greater productivity. Centralization, on the other hand, consists in "the attraction of some capitals for others" (Marx 1999, 530) or in the growth of capital by the union of several capitals. Centralization, on the other hand, has as two powerful levers the concurrency and credit, and can be achieved by altering the distribution of existing capital, through a simple change operated in the quantitative grouping of the parts that make up the social capital" (Marx 1999, 530). Besides being a much faster process, centralization causes the concentration of capital and accelerates the effects of accumulation. Finally, the ultimate consequence of centralization is that social wealth tends to agglomerate unlimitedly (Singer 1999, 101, Lianos 1984) in a small group of big capitalists, accentuating with it the social disparities. Karl Marx expressed it in the following way: "what happens when certain capitals become centers so absorbing of gravitation for others, [is] that they break their individual cohesion, assimilating then their loose pieces" (Marx 1999, 531).

Banks played a key role in the process of centralization of capital. The origin of banking institutions dates to the first cycle of accumulation of capital, in Genoa around the sixteenth century. At that time, the most prominent banks were: 1) the Bank of Amsterdam, founded in 1609, served a very large segment of the population (nobility, leaders, monarchs, etc.) and, in practice, operated as a central bank (the first in the world) providing liquidity to the government; 2) the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, created at the beginning of the 17th century by the Dutch East India Company (VOC), was not only the first stock exchange in the world but also served as a market for products from the American colonies, Asian and African coasts.

However, banks (and credit) represented only a lever for the centralization of capital. The other lever is concurrence or competition. Here, transnational corporations (TNCs) play a fundamental role.

Indeed, the economic power of the core states is closely related to the agency of their TNCs: from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, they invested mainly in the primary sector; from the nineteenth century, they began to operate with greater intensity in activities of the secondary and tertiary sectors; in recent decades, they have developed increasingly complex forms of production and organization. However, the success of TNCs has not been solely and exclusively thanks to the use of new means of production and communication in the context of a contemporary global competition, but also to access to new financial markets, the productive articulation with other companies and the fragmentation of value chains. In this sense, Manuel Castells points out that “multinational corporations are the powerful owners of wealth and technology in the global economy since most networks are structured around them. But, at the same time, decentralized networks are differentiated within them and depend on their members outside in a complex and changing structure of intertwined networks” (Castells 2005a, 220-221). All this has allowed the reduction of costs of the TNCs in their activities of coordination, logistics and monitoring.

These factors have contributed to position TNCs as fundamental in the functioning of the global economy and are mainly responsible for the development and expansion of global value chains (GVCs). Indeed, the central states and their TNCs are characterized by staying at the forefront of organizational methods, by managing the global production chains and controlling the nodal points that yield the most profits. In this regard, Immanuel Wallerstein finds that “the activities of the most profitable nodes have tended to be geographically concentrated in a few, relatively small, areas in the world-economy, which we can collectively call the core area” (Wallerstein 2008, 88).

However, to increase their economic capacity, the core States need to absorb large amounts of material resources, which in principle they find in their territory. These resources are jealously protected by them. The problem is when resources are exhausted or insufficient: once the impregnability and sovereignty of the national territories has been assured, the central States have gone abroad in search of more resources, an action that has led them to subjugation of other peoples, to the establishment of colonies beyond their borders and the control of new strategic trade routes.

Throughout history, the central states have controlled territories of both natural value and geostrategic relevance: for Ruy Mauro Marini, “the creation of a large modern industry would have been severely hampered if it had not had dependent countries” (Marini 1986, 20). In fact, it was the colonization processes and the definition of specific roles for each society in the international division of labor that allowed the core societies to obtain the endowment of natural resources necessary to sustain the growth of their working classes. As

explained by Osvaldo Sunkel and Pedro Paz, the Industrial Revolution was not a process that occurred in isolated countries, but rather it developed within an economic and world system that linked the industrially advanced countries and regions with economically backward areas. Finally, these asymmetric links contributed “to structurally and institutionally adapt the economies and societies of the peripheral areas to the needs of the process of the Industrial Revolution in the core” (Sunkel and Paz 1980, 45). Thus, the concentration of economic power in the central states stimulated their military strengthening.

From its origin, the States had to face an urgent problem: security. The history of international relations has shown that economic production and military power are needed and nourish each other. With his research, Paul Kennedy demonstrated that there is “a very obvious connection between the economic rise and fall of a great power and its growth and decline as a major military power” (Kennedy 2007, 20). Although they do not necessarily occur in parallel, the centralization of wealth contributes to the increase of military power.

One of the characteristics of the Wars of Religion of the sixteenth century, was the systematic use of mercenaries who, together with regular armies and the rapid improvement of weapons, created a climate of insecurity widespread in Europe. In this context, the State was increasingly obliged to guarantee the conditions for the realization of economic activity and, for this, the State needed to develop its military capabilities.

In this way, modern state increased its economic-military power through reciprocal collaboration between monarchs and wealthy. In this regard, Henry Pirenne writes that between governments and capitalists a true solidarity of interests was established: “on the one hand, without the constant intervention of the financiers, the princes could not cover their expenses neither public nor private; but, on the other hand, the great merchants, the bankers, the ship-owners, count on the princes to protect them against the abuses of municipal particularism, to repress the urban insurrections, to ensure the circulation of their money and their merchandise” (Pirenne 2003, 156). Thus, in the process of shaping the modern state, the association between wealth and military power played a fundamental role.

Currently, central states would be characterized by having significant capacities for national security. An indicator that reflects the military power is the expenditure destined for this item. However, the central states -unlike some semiperipherals and peripherals that also designate large sums of money for their defense- can make the most efficient use of military spending by investing in research and technology for war. Thus, the armed forces of the central states would be characterized as qualitatively more advanced in their arsenals and war tactics.

Socio-institutional power of the central States

Historically, the centers have been constituted as the most productive and competitive areas in the world. This is verifiable not only at the national level, but also in terms of the gross national product per capita, that is, in the set of goods and services produced by a national society, including nationals working abroad.

The core states are economically competitive because they have developed a productive structure that is efficiently linked and capable of guaranteeing the conditions for economic competition at the national level, but they have also generated an internal market and have been able to acquire specialized human resources. In other words, the competitiveness of the central states has not only been determined by productive efficiency and the conditions for economic competition, but also by the quantity and quality of their population bases. In this regard, Pablo Valdés and Juan Salazar explain that “a large population generally means life, activity, activity, progress and international power” (Valdés and Salazar 1987, 24). In that sense, one of the demographic characteristics of the central states is that they have the necessary population bases for the location of economic and military activities.

The main difference of the central societies with respect to the peripheral and semiperipheral ones, is the level of relative welfare that they enjoy. And it is that, the origin of the high productivity of the central States, is intrinsically related to their educated populations, well fed, healthy and, therefore, more qualified.

Due to its high productivity at a general and individual level, the central States managed to place themselves at the forefront of capitalism, which allowed them to consolidate highly dynamic and attractive national markets; but, at the same time, centralize wealth from its expansion to other territories. Thanks to this, the inhabitants of the central societies gradually raised their income and consumption levels. Then, societies with high consumption patterns advanced towards the building of modern governmental apparatuses that contributed not only to maintain the levels of well-being already reached, but especially to deepen the standards and quantity of citizens benefited. In fact, problems in the welfare or progress of a national society, immediately refer to the examination of the policies implemented by your government.

In this perspective, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that it is the political institutions that determine the economic development of a State. For them, “each society works with a series of political and economic rules cre-

ated and imposed by the State and citizens collectively. Economic institutions shape economic incentives [... but] it is the political process that determines under what economic institutions will be lived and the political institutions that determine how this process works” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 59-60). To paraphrase the economists referred to here, it is possible to point out that the central states advanced in the development of inclusive political institutions -sufficiently centralized and pluralist- that, in the end, contributed to the establishment of inclusive economic institutions, which are characterized by fostering and enabling “the participation of most people in economic activities that make better use of their talent and skills and allow each individual to better choose what they want” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 96). In this way, the prosperity of a country is closely linked to the quality of its government and its institutions.

Now, the welfare of a national society occurs through “inclusive” state intervention in three areas of human endeavor: health, education and research.

Although the healthiness of a society can be strongly conditioned by climatic and cultural factors, it is up to the State to design strategies aimed at: 1) protect public health from risks and serious damages, 2) promote healthy hygiene habits or lifestyles among society that contribute to eradicating or prevent diseases, and 3) develop medicines and clinical infrastructure that will help restore health in the most affected individuals. The core States have historically distinguished themselves by having highly efficient public health systems, that is, systems that have functioned effectively (although always in terms relative to each era) in the protection, promotion and restoration of health among their citizens. Proof of this is that, their populations show reduced infant mortality and malnutrition levels, low rates of maternal morbidity and, in general, high standards of life expectancy at birth.

Another fundamental factor for the protection of public health has been the management and use of natural resources. The pollution of air, water, soil, food, etc., has historically been the trigger for epidemics and pests. It is impossible to say that the core States were exempt from corrupting their environment and polluting their resources; in fact, the core states also crossed the so-called “environmental curves of Kuznets” (Gudynas 2004, Dauvergne 2011), but at a time that was historically viable and sustainable.

Closely related to the field of public health, is education. The main objective of public education is and has been to ensure its accessibility to the entire population. In this work, without doubt, the national government plays a fundamental role, since it is the main responsible for the planning, review and implementation of the curricula (for all educational levels).

It should be emphasized that what is most relevant in education is not

only its contribution to the development of skills for writing, reading comprehension and mathematical calculation, competences that are essential for the functioning of any modern society; but what is most extraordinary is the effect it has as a catalyst and driver of creative talents among individuals, which contribute to invigorate development and, ultimately, general well-being: in the words of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, it is education “what generates the scientific knowledge on which progress is built and what allows the adaptation and adoption of these technologies in various business lines” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 100).

In this sense, an important characteristic that distinguishes the central States in this area is that they have highly competitive educational systems, which operate based on a modern physical infrastructure and trained human resources. This is possible thanks to the sustained and prolonged investment -both in basic, technical and professional education- that contributed to reducing illiteracy and raising average schooling of individuals. In this way, high rates of education in young people and adults led these societies to deepen their knowledge through educational institutions of higher or advanced education: universities. The core States also stand out for their accumulation of universities, research centers, laboratories and think tanks with enormous prestige worldwide.

Finally, such active and productive societies necessarily involve large demands for energy. No nation, however far advanced in its process of industrialization, has managed to be completely self-sufficient in energy terms. However, because they are at the forefront of productive development, the core States have the possibility of relatively lacking their own fuels, since they import them from abroad. In addition, throughout history, have had technological infrastructure to innovate in strong energy and economize increasing amounts of fuel.

Communicative-cultural power of the central States

As the central countries advance in economic development, the values and lifestyles in their societies are being modified, establishing fashions and trends in cultural, intellectual and ideological terms.

The attractiveness of the central states over the rest of the most backward national societies was theorized under the name of “demonstration effect” (Barre 1962, 41). For Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, the demonstration effect assumes -in the economic sphere- that modernization “is situated through consumption and that, consequently, it introduces an element of alteration in the productive system that can cause a deviation from the

‘stages’ of industrialization characteristic of the advanced countries” (Cardoso and Faletto 1999, 16). This means that the economic advantage attained by the central states influences the laggards, inducing them to imitate or emulate the same stages of industrialization followed by them. However, the demonstration effect is not only limited to the economic, but also “assumes that the same factors that favor this process put pressure on the underdeveloped countries to alter other aspects of human behavior - in the political field and in the social field - before the complete differentiation of the productive system is verified” (Cardoso and Faletto 1999, 16). Therefore, the influence that the central states can exert on the peripheral and semiperipheral states is not limited to the economic level, but goes beyond the socio-cultural, ideological and dogmatic. This power of attraction of some States has been also theorized with the name of soft power (Nye 2004a, Nye 2004b). In terms of Immanuel Wallerstein, the ideological-cultural battle is waged in the field of geoculture (Wallerstein, *Geopolítica y geocultura* 2007).

The question, then, is how do the central states exercise their demonstration effects, increase their soft power or symbolic power and overcome geo-culturally? There are some aspects that escape the state apparatus, since they are rooted in popular culture or in the historical development of these; but, there are other means that depend directly on governments and on the management of public resources.

Government spending, that is, the total expenditure made by a national government, aims to repair the failures of the national market and boost public consumption through the social redistribution of wealth. As already explained in previous sections, some strategic areas in which government spending intervenes are defense, education, health, energy and research and development. Certainly, the final destination of public spending is the national society, but its incidence goes far beyond the borders: States with high government spending have the possibility not only to influence some key sectors for development, but also can intervene in others -such as tourism, diplomacy, communications, creativity and technology- which directly contribute to transmitting abroad images or specific projections of the society-national. A feature of the central states is that historically they have had government expenditures that have allowed them to exert demonstration effects, strengthen their soft power and influence geoculturally others.

However, public spending also allows States to maintain representations outside their territory -either before other States or against international organization- through their diplomatic missions: lower budget, restricts the international presence of a State; higher public spending, allows a State to establish diplomatic relations with more States and participate in more international

organizations. Moreover, for several decades, rich countries have allocated special amounts of their budget to help poorer countries. These disbursements of donations or credits have been denominated as assistance or official aid for development (ODA). The scope of ODA is extremely significant since donors can use it as a tool of influence or pressure for recipients to assume certain positions in international forums or implement certain internal policies. Of course, core States have not only dispensed with ODA, but historically they have been the main donors and providers of aid to the most backward economies.

Another means by which a State demonstrates its cultural attraction is international tourism. Tourism is a very complex activity, involving a wide range of activities, sectors, products and services. For this reason, is that tourism has been seen, for several decades, as “an essential activity of the life of nations, for its direct consequences for the social, cultural, educational and economic sectors of national societies and their relationships international around the world” (World Tourism Organization 1980). Although some of the most relevant actors for tourism are tourism companies (micro, small, medium and large) and civil society (non-governmental organizations, educational institutions, business groups, etc.), without a doubt the government is the principal responsible not only to regulate tourism, but especially to provide the necessary infrastructure for the reception, mobility and comfort of tourists. In that sense, tourism activity and infrastructure depend to a large extent on government expenditures.

The core States have distinguished themselves by having works, shows and sites of great tourist interest; but, more than that, they have the resources to promote themselves internationally. In addition, they have developed sufficient infrastructure to receive and guarantee the safety of thousands of visitors. In this way, tourism in the central States has a double effect: on the one hand, it allows international currencies to be captured directly and efficiently; on the other hand, it strengthens an image of society among tourists and communicates stereotypes of the nation in their countries of origin.

Closely related to tourism are the media and telecommunications. This area would be formed by two major items: devices for communication and message content.

Historically it can be seen that the prevalence of minimum levels of prosperity has been a necessary condition in the invention of new media for communication: productive activities with high added value related to industrial design and innovation flourish especially in societies that enjoy high levels of educational, economic prosperity and relative social peace. For these reasons, the core states are ideal scenarios for inventiveness and creativity. However, the benefit of technological development for the central economies lies both in the

usufruct resulting from its commercialization and mass sale, and in the registration of exclusive rights over new products or technologies. The core States are pioneers in the research and development of ICTs, but also in the manufacture and export of high technology products, which must do especially with the computer and electronics industries. That regarding devices for communication.

Regarding the content of the message, the media represent an instrument of power, since it is through them that States promote images, broadcast speeches, disseminate propaganda or manipulate informative messages with the objective of strengthening the interests of specific groups. That is why the cultural, informative and creative industries are an indispensable factor in the legitimation of the national power of any State.

In these areas, the central States have had sufficient resources to develop innovative means of communication, as well as to provide them with content. This work is done in partnership with the TNCs and civil society, being important not only celebrities, entertainers and entrepreneurs, but also universities, think tanks and mass media, to mention the most outstanding.

In addition to simple entertainment, the pattern outlined by the central States also goes beyond what is defined as science, that is, the field of science. Indian thinker Chakravorty Spivak argues that “meaning / knowledge intersects with power” (Spivak 2010, 216). In terms of power relations, it is possible to verify that, over the centuries, the central states imposed a certain episteme on the less developed states of the world system. This work continues today through the production and reproduction of knowledge through articles published in books, fascicles and journals considered scientific.

Finally, being economically prosperous zones, the core States exert great force of attraction on the national-societies located in the semi-periphery and the periphery of the system. This, in the free market game is translated, as Raymond Barre argues, in that “center of expansion, industrial or commercial, is a center of attraction of men, goods and services, capital, intellectual and social life” (Barre 1962, 46). In this way, one feature of the central societies is the number of migrants that inhabit their territories, a fact that contributes to their cosmopolitanism. And, the plurality of social groups with diverse ethnic origins has an impact on inter-civilizational dialogue, brings new values and ideas and culturally enriches society

Categories of core States in the international structure

In the seventeenth century, the capitalist world-economy was already installed and centered on Europe. More specifically, Fernand Braudel considered

-at that moment- “the core of the world is the minuscule Netherlands” (Braudel 1986, 99). But is Amsterdam and the United Provinces exclusively the core of the modern world-economy or is it possible to mention some surrounding regions? Moreover, when the Netherlands lose their hegemony in favor of Great Britain, what geographical area could be considered the core?

In making an empirical description of the States belonging to the center, Werner Sombart wrote: “the capitalist center was constituted by England during the first half of the nineteenth century; later [it was], during most of the epoch of the apogee of capitalism, ‘Western Europe’, that is, in addition to England a space limited by a line that, starting from the South of Sweden, followed by Antwerp, Amiens, Paris, Mülhausen, Milan, Voralberg, Lower Austria, Moravia, Lodz and Berlin, to end up in Sweden again; finally during the last generation the eastern region of the United States of America has become part of this center” (Sombart 1946, 10-11). Thus, if it were to leave southern Sweden (for example, in Stockholm), the perimeter described by Werner Sombart would include -in addition to Great Britain- the territories of what is currently the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, Czech Republic, Poland, Germany and Denmark. Indeed, all these countries have historically distinguished themselves by their centrality in the world-economy. But, in the current context, what other could be classified as core States?

Peter Taylor and Colin Flint, meanwhile, argued that it is common to use the term “core” to refer to the rich countries of North America, Western Europe and Japan” (Taylor and Flint 2002, 21). But, empirically, what States of North America and Western Europe are they talking about? Are these regions the only ones with central states?

Based on the ideas presented in the previous section, the core states are those that stand out not necessarily because they have the highest economic-military power, but because they hold important levels of socio-institutional power -stable in the high levels of welfare- and for having significant levels of communicative-cultural power for its geocultural projection in the system. At present, 29 can be mentioned as core states: Germany, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, South Korea, Denmark, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United States, Finland, France, Greece, Netherlands, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland. Evidently, there are hierarchical and functional differentiations among the group of core states mentioned here. To distinguish them more clearly, the core states will be classified and analyzed here based on three categories: great powers, middle powers and semi-core states.

Great powers and middle powers

The great powers are the states that, throughout history, have shown the greatest endowment of material, semi-material and immaterial capacities. Thanks to this, as well as to its formidable positioning in the world economy, the great powers have enough power to act autonomously, impose their policies on other countries and lead the global economy. In this sense, the great powers are the main actors in international governance: in other words, the great powers are directives or constitute the directory in international governance. They are 7: United States, Germany, Japan, France, United Kingdom, Italy and Canada.

In hierarchical terms, after the great powers, there are the middle powers: equally core States, with important levels of development and social welfare, but with less economic-military power and communicative-cultural power. They are 11: Spain, Australia, South Korea, Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Israel, Norway and Denmark.

Due to its important position in the international structure, the middle powers are outstanding actors for international governance. However, unlike the great powers that lead and direct, the middle powers have relatively less economic-military power, which partially restricts their performance and forces them to adopt “secondary” roles: the great powers lead while the middle powers second. Hence, the middle powers can be qualified as contributors (Rocha and Morales 2010) since, in general terms, they cooperate widely with the great powers in different spaces, forums and organizations.


Semi-core states: the less favored part of the center of world-system

Showing welfare levels almost as high as those of the middle powers, there is a group of developed states that exhibits certain specificities. Following the IMF rankings, most of this group of countries enjoys the recognition of advanced economies (International Monetary Fund 2013, 121) although, obviously, it is not about the great powers or the middle powers. These states are 11: Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia and Slovenia.

According to the Semi-Material Capacities Index (SMCI) data (Rocha and Morales 2018), it is possible to corroborate that, immediately after the seven great powers and the eleven middle powers, the semi-core states stand out for their high levels of development and prosperity: besides to being able to

solve efficient education and health systems, for the past five years the small societies of these countries (since they number between 11 million and 500 thousand inhabitants) have maintained a GNP per capita of more than US \$ 16,000 (with the exception of Hungary) and an energy consumption greater than 3,000 kilowatts per capita. In Graph 1. Semi-Material Capacities Index of Semi-core states, 1975-2015, it is possible to appreciate that the semi-material capacities, source of the socio-institutional power of the States, have remained high and relatively unchanged in the last three decades, except for the notorious cases of Singapore (before 1984), Portugal (before the 90's), Hungary and the Slovak Republic (in the years before the 21st century).

Graph 1. Semi-Material Capacities Index of Semi-core states, 1975-2015




Own elaboration

A characteristic feature of this group of States is their notorious lack of economic-military power. As shown by the Material Capacities Index (MCI) data (Rocha and Morales 2018), these countries manifest a lack of material capabilities for the exercise of force in international politics: the GNP of none of them (except for Greece between 2008 and 2010) has exceeded one third of a trillion dollars, its territorial areas are relatively small (being Finland the most

extensive), its population growth rates are below 2%, its military expenditures are short (except for Singapore and Greece, the rest has never designated more than US \$ 5 billion in this area), amounts for research and development are relatively small (they have never exceeded US \$ 10 million) and their international reserves and trade with the world are relatively minor. Thus, their material capacities -sources of economic-military power- could be qualified simply as median.

In addition, a phenomenon that can be seen in the Graph 2. Material Capacities Index of Semi-core states, 1975-2015 and that it is important to highlight, is that all these countries are declining relatively and at different speeds. This suggests that these countries are experiencing a gradual reduction in terms of their strength.

Graph 2. Material Capacities Index of Semi-core states, 1975-2015




Own elaboration.

As is seen with the economic-military power, the communicative-cultural power of this group of States is also medium as corroborate the Immaterial Capacities Index (IMCI) data (Rocha and Morales 2018): all the States identified here as Semi-core are ODA donors and their cultural attractiveness is relevant (it is enough to observe the amounts collected for international tour-

ism and the number of migrants living in its territory); however, at the same time, their public spending and the academic production of their universities are significantly lower than what the great powers and the middle powers. An important deficiency lies in the less amplitude and reduced influence of their media, which reduces their communicative capacity and global influence.

From the curves that are presented in Graph 3. Immaterial Capacities Index of Semi-core states, 1975-2015, it is possible to highlight two situations: 1) despite its limitations, the communicative-cultural power of these countries has been increasing slowly in recent decades; 2) the States that possess the greatest immaterial capacities of the group presented here are Greece and Portugal, countries that, thanks to their glorious past, are still projected as cultural and tourist benchmarks for many nations.

Graph 3. Immaterial Capacities Index of Semi-core states, 1975-2015




Own elaboration.

Unlike the great powers and the middle powers, which have enjoyed a notoriously central position for several centuries, the States referred to here, or have recently emerged from the semiperiphery to be incorporated into the cen-

ter of the system thanks to their geographical proximity to the central powers (in a kind of “drag effect” that is demonstrated by the modernization processes that took place, for example, with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia at the end of the Cold War) or were, centuries ago, medium powers that could not maintain their structural positioning and declined (for example, Greece and Portugal). Thus, the position in which these countries are located is the most marginal of the center: the less favored part of the center or semi-core. In addition, these countries historically have depended on their link with the central powers and their expansion / contraction dynamics to stay at the core. For this reason, these countries will be referred to as semi-core states, due to their tertiary position in the center of world-economy, that is, after the main core formed by the great powers and the secondary core composed by the middle powers.

In summary, the World Power Index (WPI) -which shows the national power making a compilation of the material, semi-material and immaterial capacities- of semi-core states can be expressed in the following form (see Annex): MCI medium || SMCI high || IMCI medium. In empirical terms, the semi-core states are: Singapore, Finland, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, New Zealand, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Luxembourg and Slovenia.

The notorious lack of material and immaterial capacities shown by the semi-central states, leads them to a significantly more modest structural position in the interrelations of power and in the whole of the international hierarchy. In fact, although they are developed states, they have never received the qualification of “powers”, with the notorious exception of Portugal and Greece during their glory years many centuries ago. At present it is not possible to grant them this qualification and it will be very difficult for them to achieve it in the years to come, since -as can be seen in the Graph 4 (next page). World Power Index for Semi-core states, 1975-2015- its situation is not one of structural ascent, but of stagnation and, even, regression.

Graph 4. World Power Index for Semi-core states, 1975-2015

Own elaboration.

Despite their relative marginality, the semi-core states play specific roles in the functioning and governance of the world-system. While the semiperipheries serve as zones for buffering resistance from the periphery (outer belt), semi-core states act as a last instance of distension of pressures from the semi-periphery (inner belt). Hence, historically, many of the semi-central states are characterized as convulsive and unstable (e.g., Czech Republic, Slovakia or Slovenia). From the geopolitical point of view, the semi-central zones have served as the “natural frontiers” of modernity (e.g., Greece in Europe, New Zealand in Oceania) and have led to the creation of “Buffer States” (e.g., Finland or Estonia) ex officio the interests of the central power.

Final consideration

This article was aimed, at first, at the characterization of the central States based on their economic-military, socio-institutional and ideological-cultural power; and, in a second moment, to the identification of a new category of non-powerful central states: semi-core states.

Although they are relatively marginal because of their significantly low-

er material and immaterial capacities, the great powers and the middle powers need semi-core states to maintain stability at the center of the world-system and international governance. For this reason, since a few decades ago, these states have been incorporated into key international organizations, such as the OECD (all have membership, except Singapore), NATO (except for Finland, Ireland, New Zealand and Singapore), the Space European Economic and OSCE (in these, because of their geographical location, New Zealand and Singapore do not participate). Due to the reasons explained in this article, it is argued that the semi-central states -more than coadjutants- are subsidiary to the interests, guidelines and actions of the great powers and the middle powers.

ANNEX

World Power Index for Semi-core states, 1975-2015											
WPI	Czech Rep.	Finland	Greece	Hungary	Ireland	Luxemb.	N. Zealand	Portugal	Singapore	Slovakia	Slovenia
1975	-	0.675	0.652	0.549	0.602	0.510	0.637	0.619	0.538	-	-
1976	-	0.674	0.651	0.546	0.594	0.509	0.630	0.613	0.538	-	-
1977	-	0.673	0.653	0.550	0.601	0.509	0.631	0.611	0.540	-	-
1978	-	0.673	0.658	0.552	0.610	0.513	0.635	0.607	0.545	-	-
1979	-	0.678	0.666	0.562	0.617	0.517	0.635	0.612	0.551	-	-
1980	-	0.685	0.667	0.567	0.624	0.523	0.636	0.621	0.554	-	-
1981	-	0.682	0.661	0.574	0.621	0.516	0.639	0.617	0.560	-	-
1982	-	0.682	0.660	0.578	0.620	0.515	0.637	0.614	0.571	-	-
1983	-	0.680	0.653	0.586	0.615	0.522	0.636	0.605	0.580	-	-
1984	-	0.681	0.650	0.581	0.611	0.523	0.632	0.595	0.582	-	-
1985	-	0.684	0.647	0.577	0.609	0.522	0.630	0.595	0.590	-	-
1986	-	0.690	0.649	0.581	0.618	0.531	0.640	0.609	0.584	-	-
1987	-	0.703	0.655	0.583	0.627	0.532	0.650	0.624	0.589	-	-
1988	-	0.706	0.657	0.580	0.626	0.526	0.649	0.631	0.585	-	-
1989	-	0.710	0.654	0.580	0.623	0.528	0.646	0.632	0.591	-	-
1990	-	0.717	0.661	0.583	0.632	0.535	0.645	0.644	0.602	-	-
1991	-	0.713	0.666	0.583	0.633	0.540	0.635	0.655	0.609	-	-
1992	-	0.704	0.669	0.590	0.636	0.545	0.632	0.665	0.613	-	0.527
1993	-	0.688	0.666	0.596	0.635	0.543	0.633	0.661	0.624	-	0.525
1994	-	0.690	0.668	0.597	0.638	0.547	0.636	0.662	0.637	-	0.527
1995	0.620	0.697	0.675	0.597	0.644	0.554	0.644	0.667	0.648	0.555	0.538
1996	0.625	0.697	0.676	0.593	0.648	0.552	0.647	0.668	0.663	0.563	0.540
1997	0.616	0.697	0.675	0.592	0.650	0.551	0.643	0.666	0.668	0.560	0.541
1998	0.618	0.694	0.674	0.590	0.651	0.543	0.631	0.665	0.660	0.557	0.542
1999	0.614	0.690	0.672	0.590	0.651	0.548	0.629	0.663	0.656	0.553	0.541
2000	0.608	0.684	0.669	0.589	0.652	0.547	0.618	0.659	0.659	0.552	0.536
2001	0.612	0.680	0.663	0.592	0.652	0.549	0.615	0.657	0.652	0.554	0.541
2002	0.617	0.680	0.666	0.599	0.654	0.552	0.620	0.657	0.649	0.558	0.547
2003	0.628	0.687	0.672	0.611	0.663	0.558	0.632	0.661	0.647	0.568	0.560
2004	0.635	0.692	0.677	0.619	0.669	0.571	0.640	0.666	0.648	0.576	0.566
2005	0.640	0.693	0.678	0.624	0.669	0.573	0.645	0.667	0.650	0.581	0.568
2006	0.644	0.690	0.679	0.623	0.671	0.570	0.642	0.665	0.654	0.585	0.569
2007	0.647	0.692	0.683	0.624	0.675	0.575	0.646	0.667	0.658	0.591	0.564
2008	0.654	0.693	0.684	0.627	0.673	0.577	0.637	0.668	0.660	0.594	0.568
2009	0.651	0.689	0.685	0.621	0.668	0.573	0.639	0.668	0.660	0.581	0.565
2010	0.650	0.687	0.676	0.617	0.661	0.575	0.642	0.667	0.667	0.580	0.563
2011	0.649	0.688	0.668	0.616	0.654	0.576	0.646	0.662	0.674	0.580	0.561
2012	0.642	0.682	0.660	0.606	0.650	0.569	0.649	0.652	0.677	0.578	0.552
2013	0.641	0.681	0.652	0.606	0.651	0.566	0.649	0.651	0.681	0.576	0.549
2014	0.640	0.679	0.650	0.607	0.656	0.573	0.656	0.650	0.683	0.577	0.549
2015	0.634	0.671	0.639	0.602	0.658	0.567	0.651	0.642	0.679	0.572	0.541

Material Capacities Index for Semi-core states, 1975-2015											
MCI	Czech Rep.	Finland	Greece	Hungary	Ireland	Luxemb.	N. Zealand	Portugal	Singapore	Slovakia	Slovenia
1975	-	0.641	0.658	0.509	0.573	0.375	0.585	0.637	0.536	-	-
1976	-	0.640	0.658	0.508	0.568	0.374	0.582	0.631	0.541	-	-
1977	-	0.637	0.656	0.509	0.572	0.370	0.577	0.626	0.538	-	-
1978	-	0.637	0.657	0.507	0.578	0.371	0.576	0.619	0.534	-	-
1979	-	0.640	0.662	0.520	0.577	0.374	0.573	0.623	0.534	-	-
1980	-	0.651	0.666	0.529	0.586	0.384	0.575	0.633	0.547	-	-
1981	-	0.647	0.660	0.550	0.583	0.377	0.583	0.627	0.558	-	-
1982	-	0.646	0.655	0.560	0.582	0.380	0.580	0.624	0.564	-	-
1983	-	0.638	0.643	0.583	0.574	0.400	0.577	0.611	0.566	-	-
1984	-	0.641	0.638	0.579	0.570	0.414	0.579	0.600	0.574	-	-
1985	-	0.645	0.634	0.580	0.572	0.416	0.578	0.600	0.575	-	-
1986	-	0.646	0.638	0.585	0.579	0.419	0.591	0.612	0.570	-	-
1987	-	0.667	0.647	0.586	0.592	0.407	0.602	0.630	0.575	-	-
1988	-	0.673	0.652	0.585	0.598	0.410	0.604	0.637	0.581	-	-
1989	-	0.676	0.637	0.571	0.588	0.407	0.597	0.628	0.576	-	-
1990	-	0.684	0.642	0.566	0.596	0.412	0.596	0.637	0.583	-	-
1991	-	0.678	0.650	0.565	0.596	0.419	0.585	0.646	0.594	-	-
1992	-	0.669	0.650	0.571	0.596	0.421	0.583	0.654	0.601	-	0.487
1993	-	0.652	0.646	0.574	0.594	0.415	0.581	0.645	0.609	-	0.478
1994	-	0.656	0.649	0.574	0.596	0.415	0.585	0.643	0.617	-	0.484
1995	0.600	0.659	0.651	0.577	0.602	0.418	0.590	0.645	0.627	0.527	0.496
1996	0.600	0.656	0.652	0.569	0.604	0.416	0.594	0.643	0.634	0.531	0.497
1997	0.588	0.656	0.647	0.567	0.603	0.413	0.587	0.638	0.638	0.527	0.499
1998	0.591	0.652	0.646	0.563	0.605	0.405	0.574	0.636	0.633	0.519	0.494
1999	0.585	0.645	0.643	0.562	0.599	0.417	0.568	0.629	0.625	0.513	0.489
2000	0.576	0.639	0.633	0.558	0.596	0.418	0.555	0.621	0.622	0.510	0.480
2001	0.578	0.633	0.621	0.560	0.594	0.425	0.550	0.617	0.614	0.510	0.480
2002	0.587	0.634	0.625	0.567	0.596	0.434	0.558	0.619	0.613	0.519	0.486
2003	0.594	0.637	0.623	0.574	0.598	0.438	0.566	0.616	0.608	0.526	0.489
2004	0.599	0.642	0.620	0.581	0.599	0.447	0.572	0.618	0.607	0.532	0.494
2005	0.606	0.641	0.620	0.586	0.590	0.448	0.576	0.618	0.610	0.538	0.495
2006	0.611	0.637	0.624	0.587	0.593	0.446	0.578	0.618	0.615	0.541	0.497
2007	0.615	0.639	0.628	0.589	0.595	0.450	0.583	0.621	0.621	0.548	0.482
2008	0.623	0.642	0.631	0.596	0.596	0.457	0.572	0.624	0.626	0.552	0.487
2009	0.620	0.639	0.632	0.592	0.595	0.455	0.578	0.624	0.627	0.523	0.483
2010	0.619	0.635	0.624	0.589	0.588	0.457	0.580	0.624	0.630	0.524	0.482
2011	0.615	0.633	0.616	0.585	0.578	0.456	0.580	0.617	0.636	0.525	0.477
2012	0.610	0.627	0.607	0.574	0.574	0.448	0.584	0.609	0.638	0.523	0.467
2013	0.610	0.624	0.599	0.576	0.575	0.442	0.580	0.605	0.642	0.519	0.464
2014	0.608	0.624	0.596	0.575	0.580	0.448	0.589	0.604	0.642	0.520	0.463
2015	0.602	0.612	0.583	0.565	0.588	0.443	0.581	0.593	0.636	0.514	0.454

Semi-Material Capacities Index for Semi-core states, 1975-2015											
SMCI	Czech Rep.	Finland	Greece	Hungary	Ireland	Luxemb.	N. Zealand	Portugal	Singapore	Slovakia	Slovenia
1975	-	0.729	0.639	0.533	0.628	0.712	0.686	0.596	0.579	-	-
1976	-	0.729	0.638	0.526	0.616	0.713	0.676	0.589	0.579	-	-
1977	-	0.727	0.639	0.533	0.627	0.711	0.677	0.589	0.579	-	-
1978	-	0.727	0.649	0.540	0.643	0.717	0.686	0.585	0.584	-	-
1979	-	0.737	0.662	0.554	0.658	0.724	0.689	0.593	0.596	-	-
1980	-	0.741	0.663	0.561	0.662	0.728	0.689	0.601	0.604	-	-
1981	-	0.742	0.657	0.562	0.662	0.725	0.694	0.598	0.614	-	-
1982	-	0.746	0.656	0.564	0.658	0.728	0.695	0.597	0.627	-	-
1983	-	0.749	0.653	0.564	0.655	0.726	0.697	0.590	0.643	-	-
1984	-	0.752	0.654	0.561	0.655	0.718	0.694	0.579	0.659	-	-
1985	-	0.751	0.645	0.549	0.650	0.712	0.685	0.572	0.654	-	-
1986	-	0.760	0.644	0.552	0.658	0.730	0.694	0.587	0.650	-	-
1987	-	0.769	0.644	0.557	0.669	0.739	0.705	0.605	0.648	-	-
1988	-	0.766	0.646	0.544	0.662	0.721	0.695	0.613	0.631	-	-
1989	-	0.775	0.654	0.547	0.667	0.727	0.702	0.624	0.641	-	-
1990	-	0.781	0.664	0.552	0.680	0.732	0.700	0.640	0.653	-	-
1991	-	0.775	0.671	0.545	0.682	0.741	0.688	0.654	0.666	-	-
1992	-	0.766	0.679	0.556	0.690	0.746	0.684	0.670	0.675	-	0.592
1993	-	0.747	0.677	0.566	0.688	0.745	0.685	0.669	0.688	-	0.591
1994	-	0.746	0.680	0.574	0.694	0.749	0.693	0.671	0.702	-	0.601
1995	0.610	0.754	0.686	0.573	0.700	0.759	0.704	0.677	0.711	0.561	0.619
1996	0.621	0.762	0.692	0.572	0.710	0.761	0.711	0.684	0.719	0.577	0.630
1997	0.613	0.767	0.696	0.573	0.719	0.761	0.712	0.686	0.729	0.581	0.637
1998	0.612	0.760	0.689	0.570	0.717	0.750	0.698	0.682	0.716	0.576	0.632
1999	0.613	0.762	0.691	0.578	0.727	0.753	0.699	0.687	0.717	0.582	0.639
2000	0.608	0.757	0.687	0.579	0.730	0.749	0.689	0.685	0.716	0.583	0.635
2001	0.615	0.753	0.686	0.583	0.727	0.744	0.685	0.680	0.705	0.586	0.632
2002	0.611	0.748	0.683	0.589	0.726	0.736	0.684	0.675	0.699	0.586	0.628
2003	0.625	0.755	0.695	0.608	0.739	0.736	0.696	0.682	0.698	0.596	0.637
2004	0.640	0.767	0.710	0.624	0.753	0.756	0.712	0.693	0.701	0.613	0.650
2005	0.645	0.768	0.713	0.627	0.758	0.762	0.716	0.693	0.701	0.618	0.652
2006	0.649	0.767	0.713	0.625	0.759	0.755	0.709	0.688	0.703	0.622	0.651
2007	0.651	0.767	0.714	0.622	0.759	0.762	0.710	0.688	0.706	0.629	0.653
2008	0.654	0.762	0.710	0.619	0.751	0.751	0.695	0.682	0.697	0.626	0.651
2009	0.650	0.756	0.709	0.612	0.738	0.737	0.697	0.681	0.698	0.622	0.645
2010	0.651	0.756	0.700	0.608	0.729	0.742	0.699	0.679	0.706	0.622	0.643
2011	0.651	0.757	0.690	0.606	0.720	0.741	0.705	0.673	0.714	0.620	0.642
2012	0.641	0.749	0.675	0.595	0.715	0.730	0.711	0.661	0.720	0.617	0.631
2013	0.640	0.751	0.665	0.595	0.719	0.726	0.716	0.659	0.728	0.616	0.628
2014	0.641	0.751	0.662	0.595	0.724	0.739	0.721	0.659	0.734	0.617	0.630
2015	0.635	0.742	0.651	0.590	0.722	0.730	0.715	0.652	0.726	0.610	0.623

Immaterial Capacities Index for Semi-core states, 1975-2015											
IMCI	Czech Rep.	Finland	Greece	Hungary	Ireland	Luxemb.	N. Zealand	Portugal	Singapore	Slovakia	Slovenia
1975	-	0.666	0.658	0.618	0.616	0.489	0.656	0.620	0.501	-	-
1976	-	0.665	0.654	0.615	0.607	0.484	0.648	0.611	0.492	-	-
1977	-	0.668	0.663	0.619	0.613	0.493	0.657	0.615	0.504	-	-
1978	-	0.666	0.667	0.623	0.621	0.497	0.663	0.614	0.521	-	-
1979	-	0.671	0.674	0.626	0.630	0.501	0.664	0.615	0.527	-	-
1980	-	0.674	0.673	0.624	0.638	0.502	0.663	0.626	0.515	-	-
1981	-	0.670	0.669	0.620	0.632	0.491	0.659	0.621	0.510	-	-
1982	-	0.668	0.669	0.618	0.631	0.483	0.656	0.617	0.523	-	-
1983	-	0.666	0.665	0.613	0.628	0.479	0.653	0.612	0.535	-	-
1984	-	0.663	0.661	0.605	0.621	0.472	0.641	0.604	0.516	-	-
1985	-	0.669	0.668	0.602	0.619	0.473	0.644	0.611	0.545	-	-
1986	-	0.679	0.671	0.607	0.631	0.483	0.652	0.628	0.537	-	-
1987	-	0.686	0.676	0.605	0.632	0.492	0.659	0.634	0.550	-	-
1988	-	0.688	0.673	0.610	0.629	0.487	0.661	0.640	0.545	-	-
1989	-	0.689	0.677	0.627	0.626	0.491	0.657	0.646	0.561	-	-
1990	-	0.698	0.682	0.638	0.632	0.502	0.654	0.658	0.576	-	-
1991	-	0.697	0.682	0.644	0.633	0.501	0.650	0.668	0.574	-	-
1992	-	0.690	0.683	0.648	0.637	0.510	0.646	0.676	0.567	-	0.516
1993	-	0.678	0.683	0.654	0.635	0.511	0.649	0.674	0.578	-	0.523
1994	-	0.679	0.683	0.651	0.638	0.522	0.648	0.679	0.599	-	0.512
1995	0.658	0.693	0.696	0.648	0.645	0.532	0.654	0.688	0.614	0.588	0.515
1996	0.661	0.688	0.691	0.645	0.643	0.524	0.654	0.686	0.646	0.591	0.505
1997	0.658	0.683	0.691	0.645	0.646	0.523	0.651	0.683	0.645	0.584	0.502
1998	0.659	0.683	0.696	0.646	0.648	0.521	0.641	0.688	0.640	0.587	0.516
1999	0.653	0.677	0.692	0.641	0.644	0.517	0.639	0.685	0.636	0.577	0.513
2000	0.651	0.671	0.699	0.640	0.648	0.517	0.632	0.686	0.652	0.577	0.511
2001	0.654	0.670	0.698	0.643	0.653	0.519	0.630	0.686	0.650	0.580	0.531
2002	0.662	0.672	0.704	0.651	0.659	0.526	0.638	0.688	0.648	0.582	0.546
2003	0.676	0.683	0.714	0.665	0.673	0.541	0.655	0.700	0.649	0.597	0.577
2004	0.677	0.684	0.719	0.665	0.678	0.550	0.659	0.703	0.650	0.597	0.580
2005	0.681	0.686	0.721	0.670	0.685	0.551	0.664	0.706	0.654	0.601	0.583
2006	0.683	0.684	0.720	0.667	0.687	0.551	0.659	0.705	0.658	0.605	0.582
2007	0.686	0.688	0.725	0.671	0.695	0.556	0.667	0.709	0.661	0.610	0.586
2008	0.695	0.692	0.728	0.676	0.698	0.561	0.665	0.711	0.667	0.619	0.593
2009	0.693	0.689	0.731	0.668	0.694	0.565	0.661	0.713	0.666	0.617	0.594
2010	0.691	0.688	0.720	0.665	0.689	0.565	0.669	0.711	0.679	0.614	0.590
2011	0.692	0.691	0.716	0.666	0.690	0.571	0.674	0.710	0.684	0.614	0.592
2012	0.685	0.688	0.716	0.658	0.686	0.568	0.675	0.702	0.685	0.611	0.587
2013	0.684	0.687	0.709	0.657	0.685	0.571	0.674	0.703	0.687	0.611	0.584
2014	0.682	0.683	0.711	0.661	0.689	0.575	0.680	0.704	0.687	0.615	0.582
2015	0.675	0.677	0.703	0.662	0.687	0.571	0.680	0.695	0.689	0.611	0.577

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ABSTRACT

Do all the core states occupy identical positions in the hierarchy of world power and perform the same functions? The hypothesis outlined here is that there is an unforeseen category: semi-core states. They have very important socio-institutional power but are “tertiary” in terms of economic-military and communicative-cultural power. Despite their relative marginality, they play strategic roles in international politics, especially in support of the central powers (great and middle). This article analyzes the general characteristics of the so-called center of the world-system, identifies the semi-core states theoretically and empirically, explores their genesis and analyzes their roles in the international system.

KEYWORDS

Semi-core states, great powers, middle powers, international structure, world-system, World Power Index.

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LATIN AMERICA: COMMODITIES CYCLE AND THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM

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Introduction

Understanding the impacts of the commodities boom, the exhaustion of this cycle and the challenges posed for the development of Latin America requires that we discuss these processes as interdependent with the expansion and the crisis of global capitalism. The commodities boom between 2003 and 2011 can only be understood as an aspect of the expansionary phase of the world economy. In the same way, its end is related to the crisis of global capitalism.

The crisis opened by the crash of the housing bubble in the US in 2008, but that was latent since the previous year, opened a long period of low growth, which some authors call a Great Depression (Roberts 2016). In 2009, world GDP declined by 0.6%, and between this date and 2017, the economy grew by an average of 3.3%, against 4.7% of the expansionary phase (2003-2008)⁴. In any case, a phase of growth much smaller than the previous one. The depth of the crisis, the largest since the Great Depression of the 1930s, in-

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4 This average growth was very uneven. The central regions grew very low, while the periphery, especially East Asia, showed high rates (FMI 2018).

dicates that capitalism will, as in all other major crisis situations, go through a process of restructuring, with broad economic and political consequences for both the center and the periphery of the system.

However, the crisis opened in 2008 did not mean the immediate end to the commodity boom. Their prices fell the following year and recovered until 2011, declining gently until 2014, when they dropped sharply⁵. Commodity prices rebounded between 2010 and 2011, thanks in particular to China's response to the crisis of global capitalism, implementing a broad investment program in infrastructure and industry, and this has kept demand for commodities high. But China's strategy had worsened the global overproduction crisis by causing considerable idle overcapacity in several important sectors of its economy, associated with rising indebtedness and declining profit rates⁶. This has led to a slowdown in economic activity in China, which in turn has hit the commodities market, causing prices to fall. The end of the boom had a strong economic and political impact in Latin American countries, but especially in South American countries.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the effects of these processes on Latin American economies. The analysis of these questions will be made from a historical perspective. We believe that both the expansionary phase (2003-2008) and the open crisis in 2008 need to be understood as part of the process of globalization of capital. The crisis, which extends to the present, seems to mark the exhaustion of the restructuring of capitalism triggered in response to the structural crisis of the 1970s. In this way, we enter a phase of intensification of the struggle for the world's hegemony and reorganization of the system. We do not intend to exhaust such complex subjects here. These notes reflect research still in progress.

The starting point of the analysis is the world's economy. It is not possible to understand the path of development in Latin America without understanding its dependent and subordinate position in this broader context. Although economic, social, political and historical national specificities are pronounced and are of great importance in any analysis, the region forms a unit as a result of its formation in the historical process of global capitalist expansion and of its role as a space for capital appreciation, as a supplier of raw materials, as a market and as an exporter of surplus appropriated by the central economies. The forms of dependence are not static, they vary according to the dynamics of the world economy and the local economic, political and social transformations, and the different force correlations resulting from

⁵ On the behavior of commodity prices see, among others, Leite (2017).

⁶ On the behavior of the profit rate in China see Maito (2013).

these complex processes.

From this approach, the text is organized as follows. In addition to this introduction, it is divided into 4 items. In the first, we discuss the restructuring of capitalism in the 1980s and 1990s, and how Latin America was involved in this process. In the second item, we discussed the commodities boom and its effects in the region. Then we discussed the crisis, the end of the commodities boom and its impact on Latin America. Finally, we make some final considerations.

The reshape of capitalism and Latin America

The depth of the crisis of the 1970s⁷ led capitalism to restructure itself. There was a serious problem of falling profitability at the time, which was not fully resolved. The attempt to recover profitability and to contain the advances of social protest, which could lead to a situation of systemic breakdown, led the governments of the central countries, the investment funds, the big corporations and the big banks from the governments of R. Reagan and M. Thatcher to impose a complex and contradictory process of capitalist restructuring. According to the neo-liberals, the reorganization of the system would trigger a vigorous expansion of capital accumulation and ensure the convergence of income and consumption patterns worldwide (Corsi 2006).

The general lines of restructuring were as follows: gradual weakening of the Welfare State; deepening the commercial liberalization of national economies; deregulation of financial markets; intensification of the centralization of capital worldwide; the introduction of the so-called flexible accumulation, which has led to growing precarious working conditions and the fragmentation of the working class; technological innovations that save work; the dismantling of diverse developmental experiences in the periphery of the system and the spatial reconfiguration of capital accumulation. Part of these initiatives aimed at broadening the supply of labor at a low cost on a global scale. It was essential to squeeze wages to regain profitability and contain the growing strength of unions. Not surprisingly, in recent decades there has been a tendency for wages to rise below productivity and income concentration⁸, although it can be seen in parallel to the reduction of poverty on a world

⁷ In an extremely schematic way, the crisis of the 1970s was the result of a set of interdependent determining factors, the main ones being: the fall in profit rates, the crisis of the international monetary system, the intensification of class struggles, the erosion of U.S. hegemony, the energy crisis, the rising inflation and the apparent strengthening of the USSR.

⁸ See Piketty (2014). According to this author, in 2010, the richest 10% owned 50% of income,

scale, which was mainly due to the decrease in the number of poor people in China and India (CEPAL 2016). The restructuring of capitalism managed to staunch the fall in profits, which rose between 1984 and 1997, without, however, recovering the previous level⁹. Accumulation had faltered due to this profit behavior¹⁰. The difficulties of capital appreciation in production, especially in developed countries, triggered two processes that directed capital to spaces of greater profitability. On the one hand, the expansion of the financial sphere¹¹ and on the other the search for new spaces of accumulation, particularly in Asia. (Harvey 1996, Brenner 2006, Corsi 2006, Chesnais 2012, Maito 2013, Piketty 2014).

The swelling of the financial sphere dates back to the 1980s, although since the 1960s there has been a growing expansion of financial capital. This pronounced expansion was made possible by the opening up of national economies, financial deregulation and the development of new information technologies. The result of this process was the predominance of financial capital, sustained by an increasing volume of fictitious capital in the current phase of capitalism. The appreciation of this capital is based on speculation with debt securities and their multiple forms of derivatives, currencies, stocks, real estate and commodities. In this context, the valuation of fictitious capital came to depend on speculative bubbles¹².

These processes had a very unequal impact on the world's economy. In these circumstances, the center of the capitalist system and vast peripheral areas in the period 1980-2003 showed a trend to low growth, while the

while the poorest 50% owned 20%.

9 The discussion of the profit rate in the current phase of capitalism is extensive and controversial. Among others, see Maito (2013) and Roberts (2016). These authors argue for the existence of a long-term downward trend in the rate of profit. According to Maito (2013), the profit rate, based on the weighted average of a sample of 14 countries, fell from 25.7% in 1969 to 16.5% in 2010, having recovered partially between 1982 and 1997 and between 2004 and 2007, but without recovering the level of the 1960s.

10 The fall in the Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) was more pronounced in OECD countries. Between 1970 and 2010, this rate fell from 27.5% of the GDP to 20.58%. In Japan, for example, the GFCF was 40.91% of the GDP in 1970; 27.30% in 2000 and 21.29% in 2010 (World Bank, 2018).

11 According to Chesnais (1998, 17): "The gradual reconstitution of a mass of capital seeking to evaluate itself financially, as lending capital, can only be understood taking into account the increasing difficulties of capital invested valorization in production".

12 According to Chesnais (1998, 14-15), between 1980 and 1992, the average annual growth rate of the stock of financial assets was 2.6 times higher than the Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) rate for the OECD countries. Between 1998 and 2007, financial assets grew by 296.5% in the world (Chesnais 2016).

new accumulation spaces of Asia grew at an accelerated pace.¹³ The region's accelerated growth was in part linked to the rising of US trade deficits. At this stage, there is a symbiotic relationship between the American economy and the new centers of accumulation in Asia. High consumption in the US, which cannot be fully satisfied by domestic production, contributes to keeping global demand high through growing current account deficits. Concurrently, surplus countries finance US deficits, enabling the country to maintain a level of consumption above its economic conditions and control inflation from cheap imports, particularly from Asia. On the other hand, Asian countries benefit from the incentive of US demand, which stimulate investment, production, and employment, as well as absorb US capital and technology. These countries also evaluate their surplus in the form of US Treasury bonds and thereby contribute to sustaining the valuation of fictitious capital. The Asian economies also became a privileged space for speculation with securities, stocks, currencies and real estate, attracting capital from around the world, which contributed to generate speculative bubbles in the region, such as in the second half of the 1990s (Medeiros 2008; Varoufakis 2016).

Speculative bubbles, on the one hand, and the opening of new spaces of accumulation in Asia, especially in China, on the other hand, prevented capitalism from entering a long period of stagnation. China's reforms quickly opened up capital to a new capital appreciation space, characterized by cheap, skilled and disciplined labor; flexible environmental legislation, extensive infrastructure and high-profit rates (Medeiros 2008, Maito 2013).

An important part of the spatial reconfiguration of capital accumulation was based on the formation of global production chains, which dispersed the different stages of the productive process in many sectors through the organization of networked companies, selectively incorporating many peripheral countries. Large corporations have led this process and control the phases of higher added value, as well as the production of state-of-the-art technology. The core of these value chains of the new technological and productive standard, were based mainly on the informatics, electronic and information technology sectors. Central countries also continue to control much of the trade, finance, and multilateral institutions, notwithstanding more recent initiatives, such as the creation of the BRICS Development Bank, created in 2014, which seeks, among other things, to pressure U.S. hegemony.

The impacts of these processes on the periphery were immense. Be-

13 Between 1981 and 2000, industrialized countries recorded an average annual GDP growth of 2.73%, while developing countries grew by 4.31%, with Asia, Africa and Latin America growing by 5.77%, respectively, 2.44% and 2.25% in this period. The data indicate markedly uneven growth (Nayyar 2014, 110-112).

tween 1980 and 2003, a number of Asian countries, which received considerable capital and technology flows, were able to accelerate industrialization and dynamically insert themselves into the world's economy, not necessarily confronting serious problems of misery and social inequality. China, for example, managed to internalize several of these productive chains in its huge market.

However, several peripheral countries presented low growth, marked instability and regression in social indicators. The path followed by dynamic East Asian countries, such as China and South Korea, could not be followed by much of the periphery. The different paths followed by the peripheral countries depended on a set of geopolitical, economic, social and political factors that cannot be discussed herein detail¹⁴. The rise of East Asia is not only associated with transformations in the world economy and the policies of capitalist powers, such as US policy, which, when aiming to contain the USSR, opened space for regional development, especially for the reinsertion of China into the economy, but also the adoption of development projects based on exports of manufactured goods (Medeiros 2008)¹⁵.

The most important countries of Latin America, such as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, which developed rapidly from the expansion of the domestic market and industrialization through import substitution¹⁶ in the period 1980 and 2003, entered a phase of low growth, instability, inflationary crisis, crisis in external accounts and social kickback¹⁷. The US interest shock in 1979, implying an increasing difficulty in refinancing foreign debt, was an important element in the irreversible crisis of the development model.

¹⁴ See among others: Arrighi, (2008); Medeiros, (2008). It is important to emphasize, however, that even if they did not follow an identical trajectory, these countries were inspired by the German and American experiences of the nineteenth and Japanese, in the twentieth century (Chang, 2004).

¹⁵ In spite of national peculiarities, the development strategies of these countries, to a large extent, turned to exports of manufactured products and were based on the broad coordination and control of the State of exchange, monetary and credit policies, as well as of the strategic sectors. Another relevant element was the policy of technological development and education. Within this framework, China presents important peculiarities, since after realizing a revolution and a socialist experience, it undergoes a process of transition to capitalism from a national project of transforming it into a great power. A project that knew how to take advantage of the gaps in the structure of the world economy (Corsi 2011).

¹⁶ It should be noted that many countries in the region failed to diversify their economies and continued to rely on primary production.

¹⁷ Latin American GDP, which grew in the 1960s and 1970s respectively 5.5% and 5.6%. In the period 1981-1990, it grew by 0.9%, presenting an average growth of 3.3% between 1990 and 1997. However, after the Asian, Brazilian and Argentine crises declined it again and, between 1997 and 2002, it had grown by an average of 1%. In the latter period, the per capita GDP fell 1.45% back (Cano 2000, CELAC 2003).

The external debt crisis has undermined the foundations of development financing. The uneven advance of the industrialization of the Great Depression from the 1930s to the 1970s, made possible to a great extent by the organization of the world economy in this period, was hampered, as the demiurge state of this process lost the condition of leading it and to articulate it, as it was paralyzed by the disorganization of public spending financing schemes, especially due to the need to pay off the nationalized foreign debt. At the same time that the strategy of financing development with external financing, followed since the 1950s, was crumbling, the largest Latin American economies began to gravitate towards the need to repay external debt and to adopt the recessive policies imposed by the IMF with the objective of generating foreign exchange at any cost to pay the interest payments to external creditors, which led the region to enter a long phase of stagnation, deepening the transfer of surpluses to the central countries. For that, it was necessary to intensify the exploitation of the labor force (Cano, 2000, Corsi, 2013)¹⁸.

In these circumstances, while the central economies and various Asian countries were restructured on the basis of a new pattern of accumulation and a new technological base, Latin American countries were captured by the fictitious valorization circuits of capital and industrialization, which continued to depend on imports capital goods and intermediaries, and external financing, was compromised in this new phase. The conditions were set for the regression in the productive structure and for a new advance of the insertion of the region as an exporter of primary goods in the world economy. It was a much less dynamic insertion in global capitalism than the developing countries of Asia, which did not follow neoliberal economic policies, China's case is exemplary (Cano 2000, Corsi 2013).

There is a decline in the participation of the manufacturing industry in the GDP of Latin America. In 1970 this sector accounted for 23.5% of regional GDP, falling to 21.9% in 1990 and 16.1% in 2010. By 2016, this number had declined to 14.3% of GDP. In the same period, agriculture's share of GDP dropped from 11.6% in 1970 to 5.7% in 2010, reaching 5.8% in 2016. Meanwhile, there is a trend of growth in participation of the services sector, which

¹⁸ The dismantling of the development model in the region began in parallel with the structural crisis of capitalism as a result of the establishment of dictatorships in Chile in 1973 and in Argentina in 1976. In the 1980s, Latin American economies were plagued by the external debt, inflationary and fiscal crises. Latin American countries were left out of capital flows and suffered the sharp fall in terms of trade as a result of the global crisis, triggered by the sharp rise in the US interest rate and the second oil shock. This made repayment of foreign debt very difficult, whose services grew exponentially with the increase of the interest rate, but even so, these countries exported large resources to the developed countries (Basualdo and Arceo 2006).

went from 52.8% to 61.7% of GDP in those two years. This sector cannot, in general, be characterized as concentrated in modern and dynamic services. Latin America's share of global industrial value added rose from 4.5% in 1970 to 7.2% in 2010. At the same time, Asia's share rose from 7.2% to 32.6%. Latin America's share of world exports of manufactured goods between 1990 and 2010 rose from 2.2% to 4.1%, and in Asia these figures were respectively 14.8% and 35.3% (Nayyar 2014, 166-174, CELAC, 2018, 34)

The exhaustion of the so-called developmental period, largely due to the external debt crisis and inflationary crisis, coupled with the transformations of the world economy and the strong political pressures of the U.S., IMF and global financial capital, led several governments in the region to adopt neoliberal policies. Although with national variations, economic policies, inspired by the Washington Consensus, were characterized by stabilization plans with exchange-rate anchors, the opening and deregulation of economies, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. This strategy, despite having controlled the inflationary processes, created a trap for economic growth, because of the overvalued exchange, associated to the opening and deregulation of the economy and the reduction of state action in the economic sphere, resulted in the deterioration of the external accounts, in a unstable period of the world's economy. Given the need to balance external accounts and reduce growing vulnerability, it was necessary to raise interest rates much higher than international rates in order to attract growing flows of external capital, which is essential to pay the balance of payments. However, the maintenance of interest at very high levels and valued currencies, on the one hand, resulted in a reduction in consumption and investment and, consequently, implied low economic growth, unemployment, expansion of public debt, deterioration of the fiscal situation, growing deficits in the trade balance and unsustainable external vulnerability, and, on the other hand, a strong flow of speculative capital, which took advantage of the differences in interest rates and the opportunities to speculate with the exchange rate. The dependence on these speculative flows has grown. The external resources attracted by the privatization processes of state-owned enterprises were not enough to balance the external accounts, reduce internal debts and boost growth. In general, states have lost some control over their national economies and are no longer able to coordinate and lead development (Cano, 2000, Carneiro 2002, Gonçalves 2002)¹⁹.

¹⁹ In the case of Brazil, the abandonment of the exchange rate anchor in 1999 led the Cardoso government to adopt an economic policy based on inflation targets, flexible exchange rates and a primary surplus in public accounts. This policy, similar to the previous one, continued to curb growth, because, in a context of increasing disruption of production chains, a more pronounced growth of the economy would tend to deepen the imbalances of the external accounts and

This path deepened the dependence and external vulnerability of the region on global capitalism and allowed the region to open up as a fictitious capital appreciation space, as was evident in the processes that led to the crises of Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999) and of Argentina (2000), triggered by extensive speculative movements against the currencies of these countries²⁰. The processes of privatization of state-owned enterprises in strategic sectors have also opened up numerous opportunities for capital appreciation in developed countries (Cano 2000, Basualdo and Arceo 2006). In a situation of increasing external vulnerability, low and fluctuating growth, high-interest rates and strong external competition derived from the trend of appreciation of the currencies of the region, the disorganization of the productive chains and loss of weight of the industrial sector in the economy were observed. This phase of low growth and instability only ended with the commodity boom.

The commodities boom (2003-2012)

The expansionary phase of the world economy resulted from the resumption of the US economy after the Nasdaq crisis in 2001 and the strong expansion of the Chinese economy. The economic policy adopted by the Bush administration, notably the increase in public spending, the reduction of interest rates, and the expansion of credit contributed to the recovery. The growing indebtedness of families and companies was also important. But the decisive factor was the formation of a new speculative bubble in the real estate sector from the reduction of interest and easy credit. The strong growth of the real estate industry, which has extensive links with several other sectors, has boosted the US economy as a whole (Brenner 2006, Belluzzo 2009).

The growing trade deficits, which resulted from the resumption of the


generate inflationary pressures, in part due to the devaluation of the currency. Thus, in order to halt the rise in inflation and external imbalance, following the constraints established by the inflation targets, interest rates should be increased, resulting in growth slowdown, currency appreciation, deteriorating public finances, unemployment and lower wages. The need, in these circumstances, to increase the primary surplus to balance the public accounts would reinforce the slowdown of the economy. The appreciation of the currency would negatively affect the industrial sector. The result of these processes would be an oscillating behavior of the economy (Katz 2012). The commodity boom, being fundamental to reduce the external vulnerability, allowed the Brazilian economy to temporarily escape this trap.

20 Between 1990 and 2000, US \$ 481.9 billion went into private equity in Latin America, of which US \$ 269.8 billion in portfolio investments accounted for 54.19% of the total. This indicates how important the region was as a fictitious capital appreciation space. From 1990 to the Asian crisis of 1997, Asia received US \$ 390 billion, of which US \$ 105.6 billion in the portfolio, 27% of the total (Carneiro 2002, 252).

US economy, stimulated the world economy, particularly the Asian countries, which had exports at the core of their growth. This was the case of the Chinese economy. However, it should be noted that the very growth of the Chinese domestic market was relevant to transforming China into a dynamic space of capital accumulation on a global scale. Since the 1980s, this country seems to undergo a process of transition to capitalism and this has had an impact on the whole system. China's growing weight has tended to reorganize the regional and global division of labor. However, the US continues, at least in the medium term, to be the center of capitalism (Belluzzo 2009).

In this context, since the 1997 Asian crisis China had been gaining weight in the world economy. It gradually replaced Japan at the center of the regional economy and altered the international division of labor. Its intense growth had a huge impact on the commodities market and the price of commodities rose from 2003, as can be seen in Chart 1²¹. This behavior was also due to the recrudescence of speculation. In a context of high liquidity in the world market, investment in commodities flourished. Between 2003 and 2011, commodity prices increased by 230%, with mineral commodities rising by 322% and energy commodities rising by 310%.


21 Between 2002 and 2007, China's share of world iron ore consumption raised from 22.3% to 43.9%. In the same period, the price of the ore increased by 184.7%. Considering Chinese participation in copper market, it rose from 18.2% to 27.1% and commodity prices rose 356.5%. Similar developments can be verified regarding 15 of the most important products on the export agenda of Latin America. The strong rise in commodity prices was also due to the devaluation of the dollar (about 25%) and speculation, which grew in these markets due to the high international liquidity (Jenkins 2011, 79-82).

Chart 1 - Primary Commodities Price Index (2005=100)

Source: FMI/ Data

In this context, Latin America increasingly tended to gravitate towards the Chinese economy and inserted itself into the global economy as a supplier of commodities and low value-added manufactured goods, reaffirming a dependent and subordinate insertion in the capitalist system. One of the consequences of higher commodity prices was the improvement in terms of trade in Latin America, which rose by 38% between 2001 and 2008. The region's bilateral trade with China multiplied 22 times between 2001 and 2013. Graph 2 shows how exports from South America, the region that most inserted itself as an exporter of primary goods, began to follow the movement of the Chinese economy. The behavior of Latin America as a whole does not follow this pattern since Mexico, a major exporter of manufactured goods, has the United States as its main market.

Chart 2 - Annual Variation of South American Exports and of China's GDP (in %)



Thin line - South American Exports (left axis)

Thick line - China's GDP (right axis)

Source: CEPAL (2018, 63)

This performance was accompanied by a reprimerization of the Latin American exports, as can be seen in Table 1. Considering its trade with China, between 2001 and 2013, Latin America's favorable balance on commodities increased from 2.3 billion dollars to 62.6 billion, while the deficit of industrialized products jumped from 7.5 billion to 130.7 billion dollars. In 2011, 60.7% of the region's exports were made up of primary goods, while in 2004 exports of primary goods accounted for 46.3% of total exports. In constant 2000 figures, exports of primary goods to China, which in 1990 accounted for 68% of the total, rose to 85% in 2011. Data shows a significative low dynamic insertion of the region in international trade, since the trade of manufactured goods is much more dynamic. A reinforcement of the historical standard of insertion of the region as an exporter of primary goods for the majority of Latin American countries is noted. Also, a regression in the case of Brazil, which had a more diversified structure of exports, inherited from the developmental period, before the commodities boom is observed. The weight of manufactures in the Mexican economy is due to the maquiladora industry, which mainly reprocesses and assembles imported manufactured products, presenting few internal threads. The decline in the weight of primary products in total exports as of 2012 reflects the end of the commodity boom, but it is early to say that it represents a new trend (Camargo 2014, Santos 2015, Leite, 2017)²².

²² The Brazilian case, a country that had managed to advance substantively in its industrialization process in the developmental phase, although it did not complete its industrialization process,

Table 1 - Participation of primary products on global exports (in %)

	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016
Argentina	67,6	69,5	71,2	68,2	69,2	67,8	68,8	66,9	73,4
Bolivia	72,3	84,2	86,7	89,8	92,8	92,6	95,1	96,4	94,5
Brazil	42,0	47,4	47,0	49,5	55,4	63,6	65,3	65,2	60,1
Colombia	65,9	62,2	62,9	65,3	68,9	82,5	83,5	82,5	74,5
Chile	84,0	83,2	86,8	86,3	88,0	89,2	86,2	85,9	85,3
Ecuador	89,9	89,7	90,7	91,0	91,7	90,2	91,2	93,8	92,5
Mexico	46,5	15,7	20,2	23,0	27,1	25,3	27,3	21,3	17,0
Peru	83,1	83,0	83,1	85,3	86,6	89,1	88,5	88,5	86,9
Uruguay	58,5	63,7	68,4	68,5	71,3	74,3	76,2	76,3	77,9
Venezuela	90,9	86,2	86,5	90,6	95,6	95,7	98,2	--	--
Latin America and the Caribbean	42,1	41,1	46,3	49,8	52,7	57,3	55,6	51,2	44,9


Source: CEPAL (2011-2018).

This new context coincided with the rise of social movements in the region and widespread discontent with the results of neoliberal policies adopted since the 1990s that were responsible for instability and social setbacks. The Argentine crisis of 2000 was the pinnacle of this process. This situation was reflected in a center-left turn in Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil. The commodity boom contributed to creating the conditions for Latin American governments to adopt expansive and distributive income policies, which did not necessarily mean a break with neoliberal macroeconomic policies. In this respect, the Brazilian case is exemplary. Rising commodity prices and terms of trade reduced external constraints on growth and opened the way for expanding the domestic market based on increased consumption, investment and public spending, without this leading to currency crises. This process, coupled with the significant inflow of foreign capital, had lessened external vulnerability in the short term, which had also opened space for economic policies of expansion. Growth with modest income distribution was an important pillar to sustain these governments and the class alliances that sustained them. Graphs 3 and 4 indicate the reduction of short-term external vulnerability during the commodity boom, which allowed the adoption of expansionary policies based mainly on increased consumption. In general, these favorable conditions

especially with regard to the production of technology, illustrates this process.


were not used to implement broad policies of structural transformation of the economy. We can see the trend of robust trade surpluses until the crisis, as well as positive balances in the Current Transactions, account between 2003 and 2006 when they began to decline. The terms of trade improved until 2011, falling after the end of the expansionary phase of the commodity cycle.

Chart 3 - Latin America: Trade Account and Current Account (In US\$/ Current Values)



Source: CEPAL (2018).

Chart 4 -Latin America: Terms of Exchange (2010=100)



Source: CEPAL (2018).

Although the region's economies were hit hard by the 2008 crisis, they quickly recovered. Latin American GDP, between 2004 and 2011, grew by an average of 4.18%. GDP per capita, between 2006 and 2011, grew by an average of 1.66%. The unemployment rate fell from 8.6% to 6.7% between those two years. Between 2002 and 2012, the share of the poor in the total population fell from 43.9% to 28.2%. The share of indigents in this period fell from 19.3% to 11.9% (CEPAL 2016, Leite 2017).

However, the effects of the commodity boom were not homogeneous in the region. South America benefited greatly and showed a high rate of growth, accompanied by an improvement in income distribution and a reduction in poverty, both higher than the previous and subsequent periods (Santos 2015). Between 1980 and 2003 the region grew by 2.8%. Between 2004 and 2011 it grew by an average of 5.3%, and between 2012 and 2017 grew by an average of 1.2%. The terms of trade grew by around 60% from 2000 to 2010. There was also an improvement in current transactions until 2008. As a result of the global crisis, the situation deteriorated. We also observed an increase in international reserves and currency appreciation, which contributed to the appreciation of wages (Santos 2015, CEPAL 2016).

Mexico, according to Santos (2015), was virtually unaffected by the commodity boom, although it is an oil exporter. It grew, between 1980 and 2003, an average of 2.7% per year. In the period 2004-2011, it grew by 2.7%, and, in the period 2012-2016, it grew by 2.5%. Its exports grew 75% between 2000 and 2008, while the South American ones grew 324%. This behavior was mainly due to the fact that this country is very dependent on the US, exporting little to China and having suffered strong Chinese competition from manufactured products, especially in the North American market. The reduction of poverty in Mexico was less pronounced. In 2002, the number of poor people accounted for 39.4% of the population and fell to 36.3% in 2010, while the number of poor people increased from 12.6% to 13.3% in the same period. Mexico did not show great imbalances in current transactions and its currency did not appreciate as the South American countries. It also showed a more marked growth in exports of manufactured goods since 2006 compared to this region (Santos 2015, CELAC 2016).

The Central American countries, according to the author, have benefited little from the commodity boom, as the region is not a major exporter of raw materials and quite dependent on the US. The terms of trade of the Central American countries, between 2000 and 2010, declined 14%. Its growth depended, in part, on external financing. The growth of the countries of the region was quite uneven. Panama, the Dominican Republic, Honduras and Costa Rica grew more strongly, while Belize, Haiti, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala showed low or moderate growth (Santos, 2015, CELAC 2016).

Although the commodity boom boosted Latin America's growth, its insertion in the global economy as a raw material exporter led to the reprimarization of exports and the de-industrialization, especially in South America. In other words, the old structures were reinforced, which hinders the greater economic integration of the region and a more autonomous and dynamic insertion in global capitalism.

As indicated by many authors, among them Pinto and Cintra (2015) and Leite (2017), the diversification of the economy seems to be fundamental to guarantee sustained development with income distribution and a dynamic insertion in the world economy, as the diversification of the productive structure, especially the development of the processing industry, is important in the long-term growth process. The center-left and left-wing governments that gained ground in the expansionary phase in Latin America did not advance in this direction. These governments have implemented growth models based mainly on expanding consumption and exports. Models that rely on reducing external vulnerability. The limits of this growth model were explained by the gradual depletion of the commodity boom since the 2008 crisis and the current slowdown in the Chinese economy, in addition to countless internal contradictions. This exhaustion is an important element in explaining the neoliberal reaction, which happens to be concentrated in South America. Obrador's election in Mexico, which has been little affected by both the boom and the commodity cycle crisis, indicates the different trajectories. The neoliberal reaction in South America is also linked to the response that capital is giving to the structural crisis of global capitalism and the intensification of struggles for world hegemony (Pinto and Cintra 2015, Leite 2017).

The end of the commodity cycle and its unfolding in Latin America

The crash of the speculative bubble in the North American real estate market quickly turned into a global crisis. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers led to a sharp contraction in global liquidity, negatively impacting world economic activity, especially in developed countries. Capital accumulation, employment and income have declined, ending the expansionary phase and opening a phase of low world growth, from which deceleration of the Chinese economy is one of the ramifications. Despite the depth and breadth of the crisis, the surplus of fictitious capital and productive capacity on a world scale has not been devalued enough or destroyed. Once more, the crisis made evident the inability of markets to regulate the economy efficiently.

Despite the global crisis range, Latin America was not plunged into financial and foreign exchange crises as in the 1990s, but this did not save the region from a declining phase, resulting both from internal problems and from the slowdown of the global economy, especially the Chinese economy, since its performance is an important factor in the international commodity market. The declining behavior of Latin American economies denotes the limits of a pattern of growth dependent, in large part, on exports and consumption.

The strategy followed by the central countries to deal with the crisis, to recover profit rates and to avoid the collapse of financial capital was based, on the one hand, on fiscal austerity, wage tightening and the reduction of workers' rights. On the other hand, the sharp reduction in the interest rate and the adoption of a broadly expansive monetary policy aimed at saving the fictitious capital, which allowed a strong inflow of capital in Latin America in search of fictitious valuation due to the high-interest rates of region. Between 2010 and 2016, the average annual portfolio investment in Latin America was US\$ 98.40 billion and between 2003 and 2009 was US\$ 15.90 billion. Starting in 2015, with the fall in economic activity in the region and rising interest rates in the US, there was a drop in these flows, which in 2016 were US\$ 67.15 billion. Added to this are direct investments, whose annual average in the first period was US\$ 187.20 billion. It should be noted that part of these investments is in fact intra-firm loans, which are directed to financial investments. The massive inflow of capital led to a sharp increase in remittances abroad. Latin America reaffirms its insertion in global capitalism as a privileged space for the valorization of globalized financial capital (CELAC 2018).

However, the limits of the pattern of growth dependent on good export performance were not immediately apparent despite the downturn in the regional economy in 2009. This was due, on the one hand, to the countercyclical policies adopted and the way in which China responded to the global crisis by adopting comprehensive investment policies.

At first, Latin American economies had suffered a strong impact. Regional GDP declined 2.0% in 2009. However, they returned to growth the following year, mainly due to the adoption of countercyclical policies, based on the reduction of interest rates, the increase in public spending and the expansion of credit. Latin America was not an isolated case, it accompanied the growth of other peripheral regions. The resumption of economic activity was due to increased consumption, investment and exports. Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), which had declined 9.9% in 2009, increased by 11.2% in 2010, accounting for 21.3% of the GDP, against 20.8% in the previous year. Consumption showed similar behavior, growing 5.5% in the last year, after

having retreated 0.1% in the previous year. In 2010, regional GDP had grown 6.1% (CELAC 2018).

However, due to the effects of the world crisis, as a product of the escalation of the situation in the euro zone, the region's economy slowed down, growing 4.3% in 2011; 3.2% in 2012; 2.9% in 2013; 1.2 % in 2014; -0.2,% in 2015, and -0.6% in 2016. This declining trend followed the downturn of the world economy, in particular the Chinese one. In 2017, it showed, once more, a modest growth. Between 2011 and 2017, the GFCF rate in relation to the GDB fell from 21% to 17.7%, an insufficient rate to sustain a robust economic growth. Until 2012, the slowdown was not that hard due to the expansionary policies adopted by major Latin American countries that, however, lost its strength in a context of inflation rise and the ongoing strong Chinese growth, that prevented an acute retraction of exports. It is also important to emphasize the Chinese Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) focused, mainly, to increase the production of raw materials, manufactures and energy in the periphery. One should point out the increase of Chinese investments in the region. In 2010, China was responsible for 9% of the regional FDI, only lagging behind the US with 17% and the Netherlands with 13%. It made a series of investments in Latin America in the oil, energy, mining, steel industry, telecommunications and automotive sectors, comprising US\$ 15 billion. Yet, since these investments focused mainly on sectors dedicated to the exploitation of natural resources, they reinforced the less dynamic insertion of the region in global capitalism. (CEPAL 2011 a, 2014, 2018).

In 2009, Latin American exports to the US and the European Union, respectively declined 26% and 29%, whereas to Asia they increased 4%, and the ones destined to China 11% (CEPAL 2011b, 13). In 2010, exports increased by 29% after a decline of 23% in the previous year. In the first six months of this year, exports to China showed a growth higher than the total of exports, growing 45% when compared to the same period of 2009. From 2000 to 2011, Asian developing countries increased their share of Latin American exports from 3.5% to 15%, surpassing the European Union and lagging behind the US only. (CEPAL 2011b, 25; CEPAL, 2012, 101; CEPAL 2012b, 56-58)²³.

23 Between 2000 and 2010, Latin American exports to developing Asian countries rose from 7% to 24% of total exports, while to China from 2% to 13%. At the same time, the weight of trade with the United States and the European Union declined sharply. Mexico and the Central American countries benefited, as we discussed above, less from this process. In addition, they are facing strong competition from Chinese products, which have a strong presence in the North American market, since most of the exports from Central American countries and Mexico are made up of manufactured products. Mexico has raised its exports of primary goods. In that time frame, Mexican exports of primary goods and natural resource-based manufactures to China grew from 14% of total exports to 43%. But these numbers are of little importance to

From 2011 onwards, a slowdown in the pace of exports was observed, even though they still raised by 23,9% this year. In 2012, there was a significant fall. The growth was of 1,6% only. In 2013, exports declined 3,1% and 23,6% in the following year. In 2016, the fall was of 1,3 % (CEPAL 211b, 25; CEPAL 2012b 56-58, 101; CEPAL 2007-2018). This declined was coupled by the Chinese GDP slowdown and of the world's trade.

At the same time, the imports from China and further developing nations in Asia had grown more than in other regions²⁴. Latin America presents a chronic deficit in its imports of manufactured goods from Asia since 2005. One of the results of this situation was the worsening of competition in Latin American markets, in particular the ones that suffered the most due to the presence of Chinese products. The sectors that were the most affected were: textiles, footwear, clothing, rubber and plastic materials, machines, hardware and automotive and its components. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were particularly affected. (CEPAL 2012b, 60).

In 2012 and 2013, there was a reversal of the region's trade surplus due to the slowdown in the world economy. Especially for South America, there was a drop in the prices of the products it exports, partially offset by the increase in the volume exported. Meanwhile, the prices of imported products remained stable. The result was a 1.8% drop in terms of trade. The current account deficit, after remaining at 1.8% of GDP between 2009 and 2012, in 2013, had risen to 2.7% of regional GDP. In the following four years, the figures were 3.0%, 2.8% and 1.9% and 1.5% respectively. The improvement was largely due to the economic slowdown itself (CELAC 2018). Although these deficits were covered by direct foreign investment, the deterioration of current transactions indicates the persistence of external vulnerability.

The reprimarization of Latin American exports, stimulated by the increase in the prices of primary products in the last decade²⁵, had led to specialization in primary and low-value sectors with low technological content. At this point, the evidence suggests that Latin American economies are at least in terms of the more developed countries of the region, undergoing a structural transformation of their economies, which tends to reinforce the subordinate and dependent position in the world economy. There has been a lack of broad and consistent industrial policies in the region since the adoption of neoliberal policies in the late 1980s. The center-left governments that gained

the foreign trade of this country (CELAC 2012b, 53-62).

24 In the 2000s, Latin American imports from China grew by 24.5% on average per year, while those from the US 13.9% and those from the European Union 7.8%. (CELAC 2012b, 60).

25 At constant prices, the value of exports of primary goods and manufactured goods based on natural resources for the entire region is declining. See CELAC (2012b, 54)

ground in the 2000s did not reverse this trend, at most adopting reactive policies of scope, not realizing that the world is going through a change in the technological standard.

The repercussions of this situation of vulnerability are manifested in the decreasing participation of Latin America in the trade of goods on a world scale. Between 2000 and 2015, this share dropped from 5.7% to 5.5%. A more serious situation can be observed in the trade in high-tech goods and modern services, which fell from 8% to 5% and 2% respectively, 4% to 1.9% in the same period. It is not by chance that the region's participation in international value chains had increasingly concentrated on providing basic products for exports from third countries, although there has been an increase in the insertion in these chains. The backward linkages in Latin America are smaller than in other regions, especially when compared to Asian countries. Between 2000 and 2011, Latin America's share in backward linkages in global value chains was 25% to 20% and in the forward links from 14% to 21%. While Asia, in the same period, kept its share in the forward threads by 21% and increased its share in backward threads from 25% to 30%. It should be noted, however, that Mexico and Costa Rica have an important insertion in the North American value chains in the automotive, telecommunications, medical and electronic sectors. The other Central American countries follow this trend, with relevant participation in the textile and clothing sectors (CELAC 2016, 20-22).

The reaffirmation of the historical trend, particularly in South America, of Latin America as an exporter of primary and low-tech manufactured goods, especially in the commodity boom, does not contribute to the intensification of regional integration. Interregional trade declined more than extra-regional trade between 2012 and 2016, especially in South America. This behavior was partly due to the decline in economic activity during this period, which affected Brazil and Venezuela (CEPAL 2016), 119-122).

The victory of the center-right political forces that have taken over many governments in the region, particularly in South America, had brought a radicalization of neoliberal policies, which in no way offer answers to the deadlock in Latin America in this phase of crisis and redefining the course of global capitalism. Countries such as Argentina and especially Brazil have aligned themselves to the strategy of austerity and are approaching the US, which in turn seeks to regain space in the region. The coup in Brazil and the victory of Jair Bolsonaro in the 2018 elections, the crisis in Venezuela, Macri's victory in Argentina, Correa's difficulties making his successor, Morales' defeat in the plebiscite that would guarantee another reelection are indicative the impasses of the left and center-left forces of the region, which is reflected

in the weakening of UNASUR and ALBA and the emergence of the Pacific Alliance, which brings together countries that bet on neoliberal strategy. Although the Alliance for the Pacific aims to diversify the economy and export agenda, it faces enormous difficulties, as Asian countries, especially China, see Latin America as a commodity exporter and Mexico is tied to the US economy. The option to strengthen regional integration, expressed in resistance to the FTAA and in the strengthening of Mercosur, seems weakened. Just as the South-South policy and the bet on the BRICS had lost ground with the coup in Brazil. In other words, strengthening the insertion of the region, especially South America, as an exporter of primary goods in the world economy, and Mexico's deep articulation with the United States²⁶, put obstacles in the way of a more integrated region, which has actually made modest progress and indicates the maintenance of dependent and subordinate patterns of insertion of the region into global capitalism.

Final Considerations

The restructuring of capitalism as a response to the structural crisis of the 1970s restricted spaces for development experiences in Latin America, especially by undermining development finance with external indebtedness. The state lost the conditions to articulate a new phase of development. In this context, Latin American countries failed to keep pace with the new pattern of accumulation and technological progress in global capitalism and were captured by the capital's fictitious valorization circuits. The conditions for the structural regression of the Latin American economies and for the reaffirmation of the region's insertion as exporters of primary goods were developed. Of fundamental importance in this process were the neoliberal policies, inspired by the Washington Consensus, that financially and commercially opened the region's national economies, weakened states, and blocked industrial policies.

Despite the failure of these policies, whose apex is expressed in the crises of Brazil and Argentina, there was no radical break with this line of policy. The center-left forces that have taken over several governments in the region to varying degrees failed to implement policies that would lead to the diversification of the economy and a dynamic insertion into global capitalism. In particular, the commodity boom has deepened the insertion of South America as an exporter of primary goods and did not contribute to greater

²⁶ We do not take into account, in this text, the US policies adopted by Donald Trump, which tend to weaken the NAFTA architecture, or the recent election of López Obrador in Mexico, which may change this situation in the medium term.

regional integration, although reducing the external vulnerability had opened the possibility for the adoption of expansive economic policies, based on the enlargement of consumption, the rise in investment, the increase of employment and numerous measures aimed at reducing poverty and improving the distribution of income. However, these policies, by failing to promote structural change, which would entail, among other things, developing the industry and expanding and modernizing the infrastructure, failed to articulate solid foundations for the advances observed in the commodity boom phase.

With the depletion of the commodity boom, a period of low growth and maintenance of a subordinate and dependent insertion in global capitalism, which is experiencing a deep crisis, seems to be outlined for Latin America. Symbiotic relations between the US and Asian economies, particularly China, are being called into question by the current crisis, which seems to open a phase of intensification of disputes over global hegemony. Latin America, which is far from being a unit, is at a crossroads. Mexico's economic elites continue to bet on its strategic alignment with the US, but if the Trump government reviews its policy on NAFTA, this country will be in a delicate position. The Brazilian choice, initiated by the Temer's government and probably to be deepened by Bolsonaro, to align itself politically to the US does not represent an auspicious path. The proposal of the renewed neoliberal forces in the region is austerity, which seeks to restore profitability and competitiveness through wage tightening, degradation of living conditions and reduction of social rights, following the response that capital seeks to give the crisis of overaccumulation. Left forces, which fail to diversify their economies while in government, despite some efforts in this direction, will have to rethink their strategies of development and insertion in the global economy. However, they will have to address these issues in a more competitive and less dynamic context, marked by the intensification of disputes over hegemony and without the bonus of the commodities boom.

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to discuss the impacts of the commodity boom in Latin American economies. We will discuss the boom and its crisis within the contradictory and unstable process of globalization of capital characterized, among other things, by the hegemony of financial capital and by the spatial reconfiguration of capital accumulation, which has an enormous influence on the periphery of the system and the reorganization of the international division of labor. The paths pursued by the Latin American economies are part of this process. Thus, the analysis of the possibilities and obstacles to an inclusive economic and social development has to start from this frame of reference

KEYWORDS

Latin America, Commodities Boom, Crisis, Development

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THE ROLE OF HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION IN BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY AS A STRATEGY OF SOFT POWER (2003-2016)

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Introduction

In the last few decades, there have been significant changes in the debate regarding humanitarianism (Bellamy 2003; Walzer 2011). New types of conflict and a larger focus in the individual security, among others, may be noticed as important aspects in those changes (Burke 2013; Kaldor 2013; Themnér and Wallensteen 2012; Wibben 2008). In a similar way, the role of the so-called Global South³ countries had also become a topic of discussion, given the critics derived from this group, especially in what concerns international interventions and the desire for a greater participation (Abdenur and Sochaczewski 2016, 68).

It is argued that, to a large extent, the humanitarian rhetoric has been employed to justify the interests of the involved states in detriment of those who suffer from the action. This occurs frequently in the field of humanitar-

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³ The term Global South is intensely debated at the academy. In this article, it refers to the group of countries that, in spite of not being fully geographically located at the Global South and of being heterogeneous, has the search for development as its common goal.

ian interventions. An example of this is the utilization of principles related to the concept of Responsibility to Protect ("R2P"). This concept has been and still is a target of much criticism either due to its selective application, either for integrating a list of political and military strategies of the states that employ it (Whittall, Reis and Deus 2016, 16-18), a situation that may compromise its humanitarian application.

In this sense, it has been possible to observe a growing involvement of developing countries in what concerns humanitarian issues. Brazil does not differ from this trend. From a dual model of cooperation, the Brazilian diplomacy has defended the creation of an autonomous and efficient humanitarian system. The experiences and difficulties through which the country has undergone have contributed in such a way that Brazil took the role of a transformational player of this system, being more attentive to the real necessities of the states to which this assistance was given and, mainly, of their populations.

Even though the Brazilian participation in humanitarian cooperation programs dates back to the 1960s, it was from 2000s on that its involvement stood out in the international scenario. Brazil, thus, assumed a *global player* profile (Pecequillo, 2008). Such larger international involvement, alongside a search for bigger cooperation, took place especially in the two governments of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, extending, to a lesser extent, to the governments of Dilma Rousseff. Lula's foreign policy, marked by an "autonomy through diversification", had as its goal a more just and balanced international system through the encouragement of the South-South cooperation⁴. In other words, that meant a closer relationship with African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007, 283).

In the present article, we shall focus on the Brazilian foreign policy throughout the 2000s as a strategy of *soft power* in the field of humanitarian cooperation. It is thus analyzed the humanitarian actuation as a tool for states with limited material components of power, as it is the case of Brazil, to stand out as *players* in the international scenario.

In the first section, we shall briefly present the guiding bases of Brazilian foreign policy in the period between 2000 and 2016, especially during Lula's administration. In the second section, we explore Brazil's role as an important player in the field of humanitarian cooperation due to the initiatives developed both in the domestic and external environments. The discussion continues, in the third section, with the evaluation of these foreign policy

⁴ The literature characterizes such policy as the cooperation for development and divides it in seven fields of activity: (i) technical cooperation; (ii) educational cooperation; (iii) scientific cooperation; (iv) humanitarian cooperation; (v) protection and support to refugees; (vi) peacekeeping operations; and (vii) expenditures with international organisms (IPEA 2016).

actions in light of the concept of *soft power*. Then, we conclude this article by highlighting the Brazilian contributions to the humanitarian field, which, due to the changes in government and political priorities, have not been maintained. We argue that the character of these actions led to strategies of high profile political gains in the pursuit of autonomy and Brazilian international relevance, long term objectives of Brazilian foreign policy.

The strategies of Brazilian foreign policy in the 2000s

The changes that took place in the international order from the 1990s on had a decisive impact in the formulation of the Brazilian foreign policy. After a paradigms' crisis during Collor de Mello's government (Pinheiro 2000, 308-309; Saraiva 2010, 46), Brazil redesigned its international action, maintaining its long-term aims – autonomy and relevance (Lima 2005; Pinheiro and Salomón 2013) – as its guiding principles.

In this period, Brazil had initially chosen a rapprochement with the United States, based on the unipolar logic that was expected from the end of the Cold War. Such rapprochement, nonetheless, has not occurred in detriment to the relations with the other states (Pecequillo, 2008, 138). It is possible to observe that, in that time, especially during Fernando Henrique Cardoso ("FHC")'s government, the country had sought a larger participation in multilateral stances (Pinheiro and Hirst 1995), in an effort of "renewing its credentials"⁵ (Fonseca Jr. 1998).

Given the absence of significant amounts of material components of power (Carvalho and Valença 2014), multilateralism and the participation in international forum were the best way for the country to increase its credibility in the international scenario. The country's international legitimacy would then derive from its greater participation in the international regimes, promoting multilateralism in international relations (De Campos Mello 2014).

The strategies of Brazilian foreign policy developed during FHC's government would characterize the pursuit of "autonomy through integration". This was understood as the adherence to the international regimes, but with the maintenance of the autonomy, having as its goal "to influence the formulation of the principles and the norms that rule the international system" (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007, 283. Our translation).

⁵ Term coined by Gelson Fonseca Junior that showed Brazilian behavior to overcome its image of a solely sovereign country through the adherence to international regimes. Examples of this are the Washington Consensus, the Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and the Pact of San José.

The beginning of the 2000s brought changes in the Brazilian foreign policy. The failure of some initiatives, such as the attempt to promote a more just international trade, the search for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) and the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, shed light on a saturation of the “Bilateral Decade”. Furthermore, the disruption of the Uruguay Round, as well as the existence of litigations against the US within the scope of the World Trade Organization have affected even more the ambitions of construction a more egalitarian international order.

In light of a scenario of economic crisis in Latin America, which culminated in the weakening of Mercosur and the neoliberal model that was once desired to be implemented in the region, and of change in the presidency of the US – with George W. Bush increasing the distance between the US and the rest of the continent –, the Brazilian strategies switched their orientation. There is a greater rapprochement with South America and countries such as Russia, China and India (Pecequillo 2008). Multilateralism continued to be a focus of Brazilian foreign policy, however, its axis turned to the Global South, which began to strengthen itself in the international politics.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva win in the presidential election reinforced the preference for change in partnerships. The aim of increasing Brazil’s international participation from the Global South and through multilateralism was kept. The policy of development was strengthened during Lula’s government with foreign policy strategies compatible with the role of a middle power assumed by Brazil. It became noticeable that the world order that was being constituted was multipolar, opening up space for new actors. Brazil starts to seek a global trader and player profile (Pecequillo 2008), through which it would be capable of operating alongside the great debates at the same time that it would influence the constitution of international norms and principles.

While FHC’s foreign policy was marked by the “autonomy through participation”, Lula’s foreign policy strategies were defined as the “autonomy through diversification”. Both of these sought a more just and balanced international system, which would be reached through South-South cooperation. It was thus a renewal of the previous model, without, nevertheless, promoting a complete rupture. “Autonomy through diversification” is defined as

The country’s adherence to the international principles and norms through South-South alliances, including regional ones, and through agreements with non-conventional partners (China, Asia-Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, etc.), once it is believed that they reduce the asymmetries in foreign relations with more powerful countries and increase the national

negotiating capacity (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007, 283).

We need to highlight that South-South cooperation was not a new feature of Lula's government, neither it was born in FHC's administration. It gained more visibility in Jânio Quadros' and João Goulart's Independent Foreign Policy, being also present in the military government, even though to a lesser extent. An exception of this was Geisel's Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism, which, once again, placed South-South relations in a privileged spot in the Brazilian agenda.

Autonomy through diversification rescues some of the principles of these previous policies, aiming at reducing asymmetries of the international system through the creation of initiatives such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum, WTO's G20, the G4 – a partnership between Brazil, India, Japan and Germany that seeks a reform of the UNSC – and the BRICS. The goal of these coalitions is to legitimize these states' claims via concerted action, aiming to build an inclusive and fairer international scenario.

As a reflection of the search for greater cooperation and the promotion of the Southern countries' development, Brazil had engaged itself in resource transfer policies and technical advice with minimum financial counterparts. Examples of such are the resources transfers to poorer African countries – in a partnership with the World Bank –, the remission of debts and the Brazilian Development Bank actuation as an *Eximbank* for Latin America (Amorim 2010, Carvalho and Valença 2014). The pursuit of regional leadership was conducted by the idea that the promotion of the South's development was fundamental for the success of such endeavor.

In this context, we realize that, during Lula's government, humanitarian cooperation programs had become central in foreign policy strategies. In spite of being involved in the subject of humanitarian cooperation since the 1960s, it was during the 2000s that the Brazilian action became remarkable in the international scenario. The "diplomacy of solidarity"⁶ of Lula's government, with a greater emphasis in South-South relations, had as its slogan the "non-indifference" principle. The "non-indifference" principle would have a broader scope than the principle of non-intervention. While this latter focused on the interference in other states' internal matters, the non-indifference based its justification the idea of social justice, in which the international concerted action could not, and should not, ignore the inequalities and social challenges within the states (Soares de Lima 2005).

6 Such idea of solidarity as an engine for diplomatic activism gained strength in the speeches of Foreign Minister Celso Amorim and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

The Brazilian search for international projection was also influenced by institutional changes within Itamaraty⁷ (Saraiva 2013, 70). This implied a reevaluation of Brazil's role in the international system, and it is based on these principles that we shall analyze the Brazilian involvement in the field of humanitarian cooperation.

Brazil and Humanitarian Cooperation

Humanitarian cooperation is understood as the joint action regarding humanitarian issues; in other words, to go beyond the unilateral donation of resources, seeking a simultaneous action between the states that offer assistance and those that receive it. Its objectives, having as its basis UN's principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, comprise the guarantee of "fundamental and universal human rights in situations in which (...) the states and the civil society regard as debilitated their capacity to protect, promote and provide such rights, reasons for which they appeal to the international community" (IPEA 2016, 123). It is possible to notice, from this concept, the search for an egalitarian relationship between states, in which there is an "idea (...) of establishing more horizontal, less hierarchic and more dialogical parameters both in speech and in practice" (Milani 2016, 160).

By preferring to use this expression rather than "humanitarian aid", Brazil demonstrates to be greatly involved in the international agendas (Murthy and Kurtz 2015). Humanitarian aid, on the other hand, consists in "alleviating the suffering during conflicts, social turbulences, disasters and social exclusion (...) it refers to the immediate capacity of saving lives" (Whittall, Reis and Deus 2016, 12 and 21).

The preference for humanitarian cooperation occurs due to the fact that the expression "humanitarian aid" is considered to be pejorative. It suggests that the assistance is given to states that are not capable of achieving certain "patterns" of development. Given the recent colonial past of considerable part of Global South states, the humanitarian aid would imply an unequal relation between the one that assists and the one that is assisted. The utilization of the expression "humanitarian cooperation", on the other hand, attributes agency to both parts, establishing, at least in speech, a more just, horizontal and egalitarian relation.

⁷ During Lula's government, a group known as "autonomists" gains strength in Itamaraty. The "autonomists" defend that the country adopts a more proactive and independent behavior in international politics, differently from the "institutionalists" – which had a bigger influence during FHC's government –, which gave priority to Brazil's support to international regimes (Saraiva 2010).

In Brazil's case, there is an evident expectation, though still undefined, of the results to be produced from humanitarian cooperation initiatives. It "aims at contributing to the prevention, the response, the mitigation and the socioeconomic and environmental recuperation of vulnerable communities and in emergency situations" (MRE 2015). This means that, in terms of humanitarian cooperation, Brazil develops strategies both in short and long term, reiterating its concern with the structural issues of the assisted states.

Among the actions carried out by Brazil, an example that stands out due to its centrality in the Brazilian international role was the General Coordination of Humanitarian Cooperation and Fight Against Hunger ("CG Fome"). CG Fome, formalized in 2004 and ceased in 2016, operated as the international interface of the Zero Hunger Program (Fome Zero) and led to the creation of the Inter-Ministerial Working Group on International Humanitarian Assistance ("GTI-AHI"), in 2006 (MRE 2015). The creation of CG Fome permitted an increase in the Brazilian participation in international humanitarian cooperation, in such a way that a significant part of the country's actuation was articulated having this program as its basis. It was with its aid, for example, that the Congress approved the donation of US\$ 55 million to support the victims of the earthquake in Haiti in 2010.

CG Fome embraced both structural and emergency cooperation, which occurred through two different ways: financial contributions and donation of first necessity items. The financial contributions were carried out through international organizations' programs that aimed mainly at promoting long-term development. The donation of essential items, for its turn, occurred according to each states' individual demands and comprised the donation of food supplies, medicaments and others (MRE 2015).

Despite not presenting a remarkable international record in humanitarian cooperation, Brazil had significantly increased its participation in the field during the 2000s and 2010s, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. According to data of the year of 2012 from the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (2015), in the ranking of international donors of the World Food Programme ("WFP"), the country went from the 34th place in terms of amount and 53rd in relation to the Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") to the seventh place⁸. In those lists, before Brazil there were only countries considered to be developed (Rondó Filho 2016, 129-132). Accordingly, "the Brazilian experience inspired the Secretary-General of the United Nations to launch the Zero Hunger Challenge, which forged the second Sustainable Development Goal – that approaches the hunger issue" (Jones 2016, 151. Our translation).

⁸ The data were taken from the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report of 2015. The Brazilian donations were centered in the food area, involving especially rice, beans and corn.

Although not being a great financial donor in absolute financial amount, Brazil had an undeniable strategic relevance in the international scenario. Given its particularities regarding humanitarian cooperation, and its recent past as an aid receptor and as a representative of the Global South, the country is a part of the Good Humanitarian Donorship group. Nonetheless, its participation as a contributor to the UN's peacekeeping operations collaborates to increase its strategic role through a broader range of initiatives concerning humanitarian issue (Jones 2016, 150).

Specifically, regarding peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions, it is possible to observe a Brazilian emphasis on the promotion of social development, constructing its rhetoric by connecting the eruption of significant conflicts to the socioeconomic inequalities. The developmental agenda that marked the country's foreign policy strategies was present in this construction, as well as the defense of multilateralism and the non-indifference principle (Nasser 2012, De Campos Mello 2014).

In accordance to the foreign policy strategies developed in the period, Brazil had also proposed, in 2011, the concept of "Responsibility while Protecting" ("RwP") alongside the UNSC (Hamann 2012). This concept had its origins in the non-intervention principles and in the pursuit for greater social justice in the international scene. RwP represents the preference for preemptive measures rather than the use of force to avoid massive human rights violation and hamper the occurrence of armed conflicts, focusing on the protection of civilians in scenarios of violence (Valença and Tostes 2015, 75).

Such actions, in spite of having been conducted after the end of Lula's government, reflected the aspects present in its presidential inauguration speech, in 2003. In it, Lula emphasized that foreign policy would be an instrument of national development and that the combat against hunger would be a priority in his government (Brasil 2003). Enjoying the legacy left by its antecessor, former president Lula strengthened the international action and, with the formulation of a foreign policy anchored in humanitarian cooperation, projected mechanisms that would be compatible with national interests, such as "two sides of a same coin" (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006, 21. Our translation).

In this very same line of thought, we may also highlight the speech delivered in the World Economic Forum of Davos, in 2003. In its speech, the former president explained what would be his perspective of foreign policy, which would correspond to the conciliation of national interests and the search for cooperation: "the Brazilian diplomatic speech seems to acknowledge the possibility of a harmonic coexistence – both in practical and conceptual terms – between national interest and solidarity" (Nasser 2012, 234).

As a result, the power projection would be compatible with his government's diplomacy of solidarity, which would occur mainly through humanitarian cooperation.

The search for protagonism and leadership in all of these factors had contributed to Brazil's international strengthening and its recognition as a humanitarian actor, even though these initiatives were weakened by subsequent governments. The consequences of such status had a positive effect on Brazilian foreign policy's long term objectives: the search for relevance and autonomy. This had increased the country's projection in the field of humanitarian cooperation and allowed the diffusion of a political agenda according to the country's interests regarding the consolidation of international norms and principles. With a more active voice and a growing participation in the international forum and organizations, a larger international projection was achieved more naturally. In the following section, we continue by evaluating through which way this pursuit of a bigger international projection works, specially through the employment of *soft power*.

Soft Power and Humanitarian Cooperation

The search – at least rhetorical – for a more autonomous, just and efficient humanitarian system does not mean to leave aside gains in the national level. Brazilian foreign policy strategies that had the humanitarian cooperation as its tool provided a positive sum game to the country and to the international order, with victories for both arenas. Both in the political and diplomatic speeches and in the practice, the coexistence between the national interest and solidarity is evident (Nasser 2012).

This logic was at the core of Brazilian South-South cooperation established in the XXI century, and had motivated a series of actions and measures. Examples of this are the G-20, the IBSA Dialogue Forum and the BRICS. All of these initiatives comprise states with different material and political capacities, which, however, unite to reach common objectives and goals, contributing to strengthen national *soft power*.

Differently from material components of power, *soft power* does not depend on military elements or natural resources in order to promote a state's interests. The term *soft power* refers to the capacity of influencing the decision-making process of a state by coopting it, without the deployment of material components of power.

Joseph Nye defines *soft power* as the “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attrac-

tiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our *soft power* is enhanced" (Nye Jr. 2004, 10). It is not about influence, but a strategy of application of power politics, given that influence is not the same as power (Morgenthau 2003, 52). Later on, Nye Jr reinforces this tripartite structure on which a state's *soft power* is based, putting it as a descriptive rather than a normative concept (Nye Jr. 2011, 81)⁹.

In the case of Brazil, *soft power* is employed as a political strategy for the legitimation of national interests, especially in light of its limitation in terms of material components of power (Kenkel 2013, 276). Despite being complemented by material components of power, as shown by Brazil's participation in peacekeeping operations and in the development of a submarine of nuclear propulsion (Carvalho and Valença 2014), Brazilian rhetoric is structured around the central role of *soft power* as a way of accomplishing its aims. Thus, and through a non-confrontational foreign policy, Brazil operationalizes the usage of its *soft power* from three axes: its culture, the promotion of its political values in the regional level and diplomacy (Milani et al. 2014, 50).

The diversification of partnerships and the defense of multilateralism were operationalized as tools of the Brazilian *soft power* strategy. Daniel Flesmes, for instance, when criticizing Brazilian limitations to become a dominant power – especially in the military dimension – highlights that a violent rupture in the international order is unlikely. Therefore, strategies of institutional character, such as the formation of coalitions within the scope of South-South cooperation, would seem more promising to alter the states' international hierarchy (Flesmes 2010). This strategy is defined as *soft balancing*, which means the search for a balance of power in the international system through the employment of non-military mechanisms. With this, and through the promotion of new forms of power in the international politics, states as Brazil could have better conditions of projecting themselves as global players, occupying and consolidating political spaces in a dynamic international arena.

More than specific initiatives, the promotion of multilateralism as a guiding aspect of the international relations reinforces Brazilian constitutional principles and gives greater legitimacy to the country's leadership. Notwithstanding this principled dimension, an international order structured in multilateralism would guarantee the maintenance of the balance of power in international relations and reflect the claims, influence and rhetoric of States

⁹ Although popularized by Nye Jr. in 2004, the concept underlying the idea of *soft power* is not new to international politics. Authors such as Hans Morgenthau (2003) had already discussed the influence of *soft power* in their work, referring to it as another strategy for applying power politics.

with less material capacity for power (Hirst, Soares de Lima and Pinheiro 2010, 29).

Thus, we may point out that the political rhetoric and the diplomatic strategies promoted during Lula's government were structured having elements of *soft power* as its foundation. The aim was that Brazil achieved international recognition, respect and prestige (Ricupero 2010). Its employment through Brazilian foreign policy would be in accordance with Brazil's position in the international system and would be compatible with its strategic interests. Aware of the limitations in terms of material components of power, the political decision-makers focused on the Brazilian projection as a regional leadership and a global player, not as a power. The Brazilian international project would present itself as inclusive and would reinforce the claim for a fairer international order.

The foreign policy of the beginning of the XXI was, hence, oriented by a mix of international solidarity and defense of the Brazilian values and interests. Although these aspects might seem irreconcilable at first sight, it was of Brazil's interest that, in the long term, its neighbors overcome the condition of underdevelopment and do not collapse in situations of sociopolitical convulsion or armed conflicts (Amorim 2009).

A form through which Brazilian *soft power* operates, especially in what concerns the structural branch of humanitarian cooperation, are the income distribution programs. Besides of having a socioeconomic role, initiatives as Bolsa Família also inspired other similar programs around the world. The perceived successful experiences were promoted beyond the country's borders, in such a way that Brazil would conquer a greater space as a player engaged in the promotion of a more just and egalitarian international order.

Similarly, we shall also mention the presidential diplomacy, initiated in FHC's government and enhanced in Lula's administration. The charisma of this latter former president contributed to construct a positive image of Brazil in the international scenario (Carvalho and Valença 2014), in such a way that his almost personal involvement in many issues helped to promote Brazil in various spheres. It is thus possible to notice the utilization of *soft power* to enhance the Brazilian position and influence through diplomacy and the transmission of political values of a plural and multilateral order, especially from the Global South.

These actions have positively affected Brazil in the area of humanitarian cooperation. Due to its experience and expertise, besides the actuation of specialized agencies, Brazil has reinforced its participation mainly in the branches of food aid and transfer of agricultural know-how. Two examples are Brazil's Food Purchase Programs for Africa (PAA Africa) and Colombia (PAA

Colombia). This latter, characterized as “Strengthening of Family Agriculture as an Agro-Food Model for Self-Sufficiency” collaborated to the peace process in Colombia (MRE 2015), promoting guarantees in the economic reintegration e recuperation programs. Other examples are the donations of around five hundred thousand dollars to Sudan and more than five hundred thousand reais to *sahrawis* refugee camps in Algeria (Kenkel 2010, 30).

The initiatives of the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) can also be seen as crucial for humanitarian cooperation actions. After a successful experience in the Brazilian Cerrado, it has been possible to replicate and adapt the strategies for employment in Ghana, in the year of 2006, as well as in other efforts to cotton production in Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso – this latter inspired by the Zero Hunger Program.

Brazil’s belonging to the Global South and the export of its successful public policy initiatives to the international level suggest that the country’s action was not conventional. Despite being part of a plan compatible with its foreign policy strategies, aiming to achieve its long term objectives and the search for regional leadership, humanitarian cooperation initiatives – not assistance, as we pointed out earlier – put the country within the list of international donors. Brazil did not subordinate its aid to specific goals, as it is the general proceeding, choosing to align its projects with the local necessities, clearly identified in terms of sustainable economic and social effects. The image that the country sought to draw was that this cooperation was not hierarchical and was structured through initiatives adequate to each country with which Brazil firmed the cooperation agreement. In qualitative terms, this helped in the construction of an image of collaborative leadership of Brazil, legitimate and not requiring counterparts, which eventually motivated some critics from the opposition.

The utilization of *soft power* boosted the construction of the Brazilian international project. The previously mentioned initiatives expanded the Brazilian influence area to beyond South America, turning Brazil into a leadership in the Global South. Moreover, operationalized through diplomacy, the *soft power* of the South-South coalitions and the international humanitarian cooperation constituted itself in an efficient way of achieving the country’s objectives in the international politics, even though some aims were not reached, such as the permanent seat in the UNSC. On the other hand, nevertheless, they collaborated to put Brazil in a position of leadership in groups such as the G20, the IBSA Dialogue Forum and the BRICS.

Conclusion

Humanitarian cooperation was a hallmark of Brazil's international relations in the first two decades of the XXI century. It reinforced the pursuit of Brazilian foreign policy's long-term goals through strategies to overcome the country's power constraints without creating conditions of insecurity for its partners and neighbors. In addition, it served to build a network involving the states assisted by such collaboration. With the exercise of *soft power*, Brazil would assume a regional leadership position, aiming to be the "first of the last" (Lima 2005). Through the promotion of initiatives that reflected a positive sum game, Brazil sought to change the existing global power structure.

In this context, one may realize that, from the 2000s on, the diplomacy of "autonomy through diversification" led the country to strive for greater autonomy and prestige in the international relations. The Brazilian actuation, increasingly present in the field of humanitarian cooperation, was one of the means through which the country's foreign policy would accomplish its goals.

Given the absence of a surplus of material power, the diversification of partnerships, multilateralism and solidarity would become instruments of international projection. It is worth highlighting that the commitment to solidarity and the larger humanitarian activism are not contradictory. In this sense, it is important to observe how the government and the diplomacy of the period made use of national *soft power*.

Some benefits of exercising *soft power* through humanitarian cooperation may be highlighted. One of them is that Brazil had become a more active member in the international relations, going beyond discursive rhetoric. In addition, a good relationship with the countries that receive this aid is developed, promoting cooperative relations in other areas.

Notwithstanding, we shall notice that the efforts of maintaining humanitarian cooperation were not continued by the governments of Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer. Besides of demonstrating less interest in foreign policy when compared to FHC and Lula, the reduction of these initiatives promoted by these presidents might be connected to the cease of CG Fome's activities, in 2016. According to some authors, the end of the CG Fome testifies the low institutionalization of this Brazilian humanitarian strand and that "Brazil's role as a humanitarian actor is highly subject to economic oscillations and political reorientations, and the engagement of the Brazilian civil society with humanitarian issues and initiatives is still incipient" (Abdenur and Sochaczewski 2016, 67. Our translation).

Celso Amorim, nonetheless, suggests that the rebound on this subject

seems to be more conjunctural:

However, in the last decade, Brazil became a relatively important contributor in humanitarian crises, coming to occupy, at a determined moment, the first place among the developing countries. We began to be present in diverse situations, in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, even in more distant places, as in Asian countries affected by tsunamis. Recently, there has been a back off, but there are reasons to believe that this is due to conjunctural (economic and political) factors that will not revert the long term trend (Amorim 2016, 104).

Regardless of which explanation is offered to justify a reduction in these strategies, it is currently possible to perceive some challenges regarding this subject, especially in light of the recent economic and political crisis experienced by Brazil. Among these challenges there are the precarious budget destined to humanitarian cooperation, the lack of specialized professionals and the absence of an international regulatory mark for cooperation.

Beyond these issues, the humanitarian cooperation strategies developed between 2003 and 2012 as a means of exercising *soft power* and greater international prominence have called the attention of the international community. Although its results are not consensual, Brazil's projection in multi-lateral forums and its leadership in international organizations, such as the WTO, are perceived facts during this period.

In terms of the scope of its national interests, Brazil's efforts to seek a more inclusive international trade, especially for domestic products, and the pressure to reduce agricultural subsidies by European governments through coalitions such as the G20 exemplify how humanitarian cooperation can be redirected to issues beyond the ones of solidarity. There are concrete returns to the country from these actions.

Thus, analyzing Brazilian foreign policy based on humanitarian cooperation brings about concrete possibilities for action, without prejudice to the national or international political dimension. Brazil was able to orient its international projection from its domestic issues, with the adoption of a more horizontal posture, reaching, therefore, more relevance and prestige in the international scenario (Whittall, Reis and Deus 2016, 15). Being an emergent state, Brazil's contribution aimed not only at correcting inequalities in the international system, but also at building elements that allowed its participation to continue, even without the material conditions of power to become a global power.

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ABSTRACT

Humanitarian cooperation initiatives were central to Brazilian Foreign Policy in the two first decades of the 21st century. Based on national initiatives considered successful, these programs have been used as tools for the country's projection to achieve an international leadership role. This article explores the role of humanitarian cooperation in Brazilian foreign policy in order to show that, although it was not the only policy developed, it evidenced Brazilian soft power and allowed the country to achieve prominence and place its interests on international agendas.

KEYWORDS

Brazilian Foreign Policy; Humanitarian Cooperation; Power; Soft Power.

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REGIONALISM AND SECURITY: THE CASE OF MERCOSUR AND THE ABSENCE OF DEFENSE ISSUES

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Introduction

As well known, the 1980s marked a substantial change in the bilateral relationship between Argentina and Brazil. Several authors from both sides of the border analyzed and explained the historical process that had turning point in the agreements between Alfonsín and Sarney, initiated with the signing of the Declaration of Foz do Iguaçu in 1985 and that soon led to the subsequent formation of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), together with Uruguay and Paraguay².

At that time, the integration project was guided by a heterodox economic vision, a multidimensional cooperation scheme, and also by the need to consolidate the recent democracies (Malamud 2013). In this context, the perceptions of threat and inter-state military capabilities that fueled the hypotheses of conflict began to lose prominence, favoring a cooperative pattern of sub-regional relations³. As a result, a framework based on four force ideas

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² We can mention the works of Camargo (1985); Russell and Tokatlian (2003); Bernal-Meza (2008); Merke (2008); de Alvarez, Klagsbrunn, and da Silva Gonçalves (2009); Aguilar (2010); Gonçalves and Lyrio (2003) and Gomes Saraiva (2012).

³ Among the many committees established in Foz do Iguaçu, the presidents included one of "Defense and Armed Forces". In the same way, Argentina and Brazil initiated a policy of nuclear cooperation that culminated in 1991 with the creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). In the space field, both countries signed in 1989 the Brazilian-Argentine Joint Declaration on Bilateral Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and a Cooperation Agreement on Peaceful Applications of

was presented: peace, democracy, national development and autonomy.

Nevertheless, during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the objectives of integration suffered some changes. The rise of market reform and economic openness programs, coupled with strong presidential dynamics (Malamud 2010), have shaped an institution with a deliberately simple institutionalism (Peña, 1998) and a growing sectorial one-dimensionality⁴. According to Gerardo Caetano (2006), after the signing of the Treaty of Asunción a “Phoenician Mercosur” was formed. That is, a block with limited institutionalization and reduced to a purely economic-commercial agenda. As part of this new direction, the concept of integration as a path to development and autonomy was left aside; and instead the need for the institution to become a strategy for insertion into the global economy had risen. In this way, as Míguez (2013) states the sense of unity between integration, autonomy and development would be replaced by integration, growth and globalization.

In terms of security, changes in the international context in the post-Cold War deepened the process of regional cooperation in security that had begun with the democratic recovery (Battaglini 2008). The idea that barriers and confidence, so fashionable in the economic policies of the time, had to be eradicated, was transferred to the area of defense. In this way, security cooperation among the countries of the Southern Cone focused on topics such as the control and limitation of armaments; non-proliferation agreements; high level political consultations and combined exercises⁵. Likewise, the perception that the other was no longer a foe or an enemy led to a relatively uniform decrease in military spending in the region, which in turn had a multiplier effect on cooperation⁶.

The economic advances occurred in the Mercosur in the first years in-

Space Science and Technologies.

4 Based on what authors as Dabène (2009) or Comini (2016) propose, we define a multidimensional integration scheme as a process that encompasses a great diversity of actors, levels and agendas, without implying that all areas should have the same levels of intensity, speeds or rhythms. One-dimensionality, on the other hand, usually implies that the process of interaction between states is closed around a theme or that a particular area is prioritized – usually the economic area – and from this, it extends the cooperation to other areas.

5 In 1994, the tactical planning operations exercise “*Exércitos de Amigos*” was carried out in the city of Buenos Aires. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Bolivia participated; Chile and Peru were incorporated as observers. Two years later, the first combined bilateral exercise between the armies of Argentina and Brazil, baptized “*Cruz del Sur*”, was held in the city of Corrientes. The following year, Uruguay’s army would be added and, in 1998, the Paraguayan army.

6 Argentina’s military budget declined from 2.1% of GDP in 1988 to 1.2% in 1996. In Brazil, it declined from 2.1% to 1.7%, and in Uruguay, the decrease was from 3.2% to 2.8% (World Bank 2018).

creased the expectations of integration expansion to other areas. An example was the progressive incorporation of sectoral meetings of Ministers of Justice, Agriculture, Labor and Interior⁷. Subsequently, the institutional structure consolidation occurred with the Ouro Preto Protocol (1994); the incorporation of Bolivia and Chile as Associated States (1996) and the establishment of the Political Consultation and Consultation Mechanism (1996) also fueled these expectations. In short, these movements revealed that, in addition to the fact that trade issues remained the *leitmotiv* of the bloc, it seemed to be a desire to move towards a more multidimensional scheme.

Nevertheless, there were issues that were practically excluded from the institutional cooperation scheme. The defense field would be one of them: only in July 1998 would the Mercosur Political Declaration as a Zone of Peace would be signed, a more statutory document aimed at consolidating non-proliferation instruments and measures of mutual trust. In March of the same year the Security Plan for the Triple Border was elaborated and, a month later, the Plan of Cooperation and Mutual Assistance for Regional Security. However, both initiatives focused on addressing issues considered primarily as public security issues such as drug trafficking, terrorism, money laundering or smuggling.

However, it should be noted that the absence of defense issues in the Mercosur framework was not due to a lack of interest on the part of the States members. In fact, some of them came to consider during the first years of the bloc several initiatives to articulate a regional defense mechanism. Most of these proposals would be developed by Argentina, although initiatives from Paraguay and Bolivia can also be found⁸. In addition, the rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil; between Argentina and Chile, as well as non-proliferation initiatives and the realization of multilateral exercises among Mercosur countries also showed that there was an interest in moving towards a

7 In March 1991, the Southern Common Market Council agreed to “promote Meetings of Ministers or officers of equivalent hierarchies” (Mercosur, 1991). In 1999, meetings of Ministers of Economy and Presidents of Central Banks, Ministers of Education, Justice, Labor, Agriculture, Culture, Health, Interior and Industry had already been set up. Specialized Meetings were also organized, under the Common Market Group, to address issues not covered by the Common Market subgroups but linked to the objectives of the Treaty of Asunción.

8 To mention some of these initiatives, in 1992 the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina discussed a proposal to institutionalize a Meeting of Defense Ministers of Mercosur and Chile. In addition, in 1997 the Argentine government would consider the proposal to form a Mercosur “Common Security System” (Clarín 1997) and in 1998 the Law 24.948 “for the restructuring of the Armed Forces” would mention the possibility of developing a Defense System within the scope of Mercosur (Argentina 1998). Bolivia, in turn, would propose in 1998 the creation of a Center for Conflict Prevention and Confidence-Building Measures in Latin America.

process of cooperation in security terms.

These previous issues inevitably leads us to wonder why it was never possible to establish some type of defense mechanism within Mercosur, although there have been proposals in this regard. Or, according to Flandes (2004), why the process of regional linkage in military matters has been more characterized by a pattern of bilateral cooperation than by sub-regional integration. In a preliminary way, it could be said that the causes are varied and respond to historical and political reasons, to factors that have to do with the very nature that Mercosur acquired during its beginnings, and others linked to the national realities of the countries of the bloc. As a result, this article aims to develop a specific set of factors that, to a lesser or greater extent, have been decisive in preventing the possibility of institutionalizing defense issues in Mercosur. These factors are: the one-dimensional preeminence of the block; the different levels of civilian control of the Armed Forces between member States, and the different conceptions of what each country understood as defense and security.

In methodological terms, to develop the first of these factors, a description of the institutional structure of Mercosur and a quantitative analysis of the decisions taken by the highest body of the bloc is made: the Common Market Council. These indicators seek to determine the primacy of economic-commercial issues in the integration scheme. On the other hand, to analyze the autonomy of the Armed Forces in each country and the different conceptions between defense and security, a comparative approach is used through the national regulations and government documents of the states part of the so-called “extended Mercosur”⁹.

Regarding the time frame, the article focuses on the period beginning with the foundation of Mercosur in 1991 and ends in 2004, with the creation of the South American Community of Nations (SACN). This temporal decision has to do with the fact that the SACN will be the entity that will monopolize the discussions about whether or not to create a sub-regional defense mechanism in a context characterized by the “left turn” in Latin America; the rise of Brazil as a regional power (Nolte, 2006), and the rise of post-liberal regionalism (Sanahuja, 2009). These discussions will culminate in 2008 with the formation of the South American Defense Council of the Union of South American Nations (SDC-UNASUR).

⁹ Based on our timeframe, which is justified in the sequence of the text, the specific countries are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile.

The economic one-dimensionality of Mercosur

A brief overview of how the institutional structure of the bloc had been consolidated is a good indicator to illustrate the primacy of commercial and economic issues. As Malamud (2013) points out, the articles of the Treaty of Asuncion only considered economic objectives: to promote the free circulation of goods, services and productive factors; the establishment of a common external tariff and a common trade policy, and macroeconomic policies coordination (Mercosur, 1991). The Treaty also established that the decision-making bodies would be the Common Market Council (CMC) and the Common Market Group (GMC)¹⁰. Three years later, the Ouro Preto Protocol added the Mercosur Trade Commission (CCM) as part of intergovernmental decision-making bodies. Being completely permeated by economic issues and numbers, the new institutional configuration would only deepen the bloc's commercial profile.

The charter of Mercosur did not express any explicit intention to include non-commercial areas among its objectives. As a result, integration regarding other issues seemed to be subject to economic integration spillover. In fact, the success of the integration process during its early years motivated the organization to incorporate new topics and seek to enhance its political component¹¹. Thus, between 1995 and 1999, meetings of the Ministers of Education, Justice, Labor, Agriculture, Culture, Health, Interior and Industry were institutionalized. Added to them, came along the Specialized Meetings that were dependent on the GMC and created to address those issues not covered by the Common Market subgroups, but linked to the objectives of the Treaty of Asuncion. On the other hand, the creation of the Forum for Consultation and Political Coordination in 1998 and the Joint Parliamentary Committee – established in the Treaty of Asunción itself – would aim to reinforce the political imprint of the bloc. However, like the ministerial meetings, these bodies would play a rather subsidiary role, with limited capacity to influence

¹⁰ The CMC is composed of the Chancellors and the Ministers of Economy, to which the Heads of State are added at least once a year, as the highest authorities. The GMC, on the other hand, represents the executive body of the bloc and is composed of representatives of diplomatic and economic bureau and representatives of the Central Banks. In addition, the GMC included different subgroups of work aimed at coordinating macroeconomic and sectoral policies on issues such as commercial and custom policies, besides fiscal and monetary policies related to trade or agricultural policy.


¹¹ Roberto Bouzas (2001) argues that the Mercosur first stage, which runs from 1991 to 1994, was characterized by a rapid growth of intra-regional trade flows; by the low temporal distance between agreements and their implementation, and by a low transfer of conflicts and trade disputes to the political arena (the author defines this variable as a "politicization bias").

the decisions of States, since they could only issue recommendations.

In addition to the rigid and formal analysis that institutional frameworks often offer, we can find other indicators that explain the commercial bias that affected the bloc during the 1990s. One of them is the decisions adopted by the Common Market Council: between 1991 and 2004, such a Council adopted a total of 381 decisions. Of this total, 197 – or 51.7% – corresponded to economic and/or commercial issues¹².

Graphic N° 1. Mercosur CMC decisions (1991-2004)

In blue, the Economic-Commercial Decisions; In orange, Other Decisions



Source: elaboration by the author based on the data obtained from the Information System on Foreign Trade of the Organization of American States (SICE-OEA).

Controls and autonomy of the Armed Forces

The different levels of civilian control of the Armed Forces that coexisted in Mercosur is another factor that conditioned the possibilities of dealing with defense issues. But before moving on to a detailed analysis, it is important to clarify why it is considered that the autonomy of the Armed Forces, or rather the degree of civilian control over the military, is a variable that affects the scope of regional cooperation. One of the central reasons has

¹² In addition, it should be clarified that 43.3% of the remaining decisions were not necessarily decisions linked to other issues. Many of these were related to administrative or institutional matters that depended on the Common Market Council.

to do with the fact that civil-military relations not only affect the democratic game between the constitutional actors and the military institution, but also affect the international actions of a country. Earlier in the 1950s, sociologist Charles Wright Mills (1957) argued that no power sector is more influenced by the military than foreign policy. Similarly, Anabella Busso (2008) points out that civil-military relations can be taken as a deep force that affects the identity of a state and, consequently, its external strategy¹³.

Thus, assuming that civil-military relations affect foreign policy, it is worth asking how the relations between the two actors can impact on such a specific element as the formation of a regional defense mechanism. A first response might be that in those countries where the Armed Forces enjoy greater autonomy and influence over the design of defense policy, they are more likely to find it unnecessary or even threatening to create regional mechanisms led by civilian authorities.

Related to the above, we can add a second variable that, according to Monica Hirst (1996), can be defined as the “sovereignty problem”. Historically, the Latin American Armed Forces have shaped their external and security thinking on the basis of realistic paradigms, for which sovereignty is the greatest good to be preserved in a hostile interstate environment. The great majority of military academies and military educational institutes have structured – and can be said to still structure – their educational programs based on this type of thinking (Frenkel, 2016). In practical terms, these worldviews have repercussions on the willingness to participate in multilateral schemes that may result in the renunciation or conditioning of national prerogatives.

Having said that, and before moving on to the country-by-country analysis, it is necessary to establish two final clarifications: first, as authors such as Acuña and Smulovitz (1996) and Alves Soares (2008) affirm, civilian control over militaries in the countries of the Southern Cone were deeply conditioned by different ways and means by which each state underwent the process of transition to democracy. The second clarification has to do with the emphasis placed on military autonomy. In this sense, we agree with Saín (2010) on the fact that “measuring” civilian control based on the degree of military autonomy can minimize the analysis of the role of civilian leaders. Even so, we believe that in this case it is enough to just understand how the relations between civilians and the military were articulated in the Mercosur countries.

¹³ The author takes the concept of deep forces from the French school of International Relations. In this sense, the concept encompasses and contains those elements that are denominated as constituents of the identity, whether geographic or cultural elements.

Argentina: collapse and subordination

Unlike other countries in the region, Argentina experienced in the 1980s a process of transition to democracy through collapse, which favored the conditions for greater civilian control over the Armed Forces (O'Donnell 1989). The discrediting of the military class after years of state terrorism, mismanagement of the economy and especially defeat in the Falklands War prevented the military from conducting a transition process that would ensure them a strong influence over public affairs. This weakness, coupled with the political will of the democratic government, created a fertile ground for political parties to arrive at a political framework to strengthen the power of constitutional authorities, while distinguishing external defense and internal security. Still, this did not prevent the Armed Forces from being able to maintain some veto power at the beginnings of the democratic recovery. In fact, the military revolts that opposed the trials for human rights violations forced the government of Raul Alfonsín to sanction the Full Stop law and the law of Due Obedience.

The arrival of Carlos Menem to the presidency, nevertheless, supposed a change of scene: the new administration repressed the last military insurrection; negotiated loyalty in exchange for “closing the past”; appointed military leaders not linked to the rebel sectors and sought to transform the military into a foreign policy tool through cooperation with the countries of the region and participation in peacekeeping missions. As Ernesto López maintains: “all these issues have played in favor of appeasing civil-military relations and of affirming the standard of subordination of military institutions to the public authorities” (López 2007, 32).

On the other hand, we should also mention that although Menem managed to neutralize the veto power of the military, defense management would not be a priority for political bodies (Battaglini 2013). As a result of this lack of interest, a “delegative approach” crystallized which ultimately allowed the military to maintain certain margins of institutional autonomy (Eissa, 2013). In conceptual terms, this dynamic of political-military interaction can be defined as “subordination with military autonomy” (Diamint 2008; Sain 2010) or “conditional subordination” (Canelo 2007). However, it is also worth mentioning that these interstices did not prevent Argentina from being, from all the countries of Latin America, the one that realized the most notable changes to advance on civilian control of the Armed Forces.

Chile: the permanent autonomy

Unlike Argentina, the transition process to democracy in Chile was permeated by the permanent military conditionalities. This was due fundamentally to the fact that the military still enjoyed considerable support from citizens despite the repressive policies implemented¹⁴.

In this context, the democratic recovery that led to the election of Patricio Aylwin in 1989 did not prevent the Armed Forces from maintaining certain authoritarian enclaves (Lorenzini 2010). Whether it was to self-govern or influence the general direction of state policies. The result, as defined by the Chilean diplomat Carlos Huneeus (1997), would be that of a state of “protected democracy”. Manuel Garretón (1999), on the other hand, would define it as an “incomplete” democratization.

According to Maldonado Prieto (2002), the autonomy that Chilean military retained after the arrival of democracy became visible in five indicators: 1) the ability to appoint commanders of the forces for a certain period without the president being able to remove them ; 2) the promulgation of a law establishing a minimum quota for the defense budget (to which was added the so-called “copper law”, which gave the forces 10% of the royalties resulting from exports of the copper state-owned company); 3) the participation, guaranteed by law, of a minimum of 50% of the military in the Council of National Defense; 4) the existence of senators nominated by the Armed Forces and Carabineers themselves; and 5) the strengthening of the Military Justice and the promulgation of an amnesty law.

The first point, for example, allowed Pinochet to remain at the lead of the army until 1997. This unprecedented situation meant that the former dictator remained a relevant actor in Chilean politics, as well as prolonging his influence on the rest of the forces. In practice, the army would eventually function as a power in itself, almost without any kind of political control (Gutiérrez Palacios 2007). In addition, the budget guarantee available to the Armed Forces assured them the ability to influence defense policy and foreign policy. Mainly because the discretionary management of the budget allowed the allocation of resources for the acquisition of military armaments and resources, conditioning the relationship with neighboring countries¹⁵.

¹⁴ In 1988 a plebiscite was held to determine whether or not Pinochet would lead the government until 1997. Although he lost the race, the former dictator gained support from 44% of the electorate.

¹⁵ An example of this is the mistrust that the purchase by Chile of American *F-16* and German *Leopard* tanks in the late 1990s caused in Argentina and other countries in the region.

Similarly, the existence of a military bench in Congress allowed the military to permanently influence the sanction of national laws.

Brazil: the untouchable actor

Similarly Chile, Brazil is another case in which the military managed to cross the democratic return without any changes in the attributions to self-government. As Mathias (1995) explains, the military allowed the restoration of constitutionality, only if two requirements were provided: on the one hand, to maintain its capacity to intervene in civilian politics. And, on another hand, to ensure that democratic governments would not change the socio-economic order established during the authoritarian period. Thus, even when the claims for “*Diretas Já*”¹⁶ took the streets, the military managed to ensure the transition to democracy through an indirect election in Congress¹⁷. This withdraw, negotiated and directed “from above”, was also favored by a relatively stable economic scenario (Beltrán 2000, 51).

As part of the same package, the Armed Forces also ensured that there would be no judgment for repressive actions during the dictatorship and, of course, they were responsible for resisting any interference by the federal civilian government over its autonomy spaces. As Eliezer Rizzo de Oliveira (1994) points out, the withdrawal of the military from the center of political power originated a structure of “tutelage” over the government of José Sarney. This situation was especially seen at the time of the drafting of a new constitution: the constitution promulgated in 1988 established rather ambiguous and inaccurate terms on the role and organization of the military apparatus. We must also add that it was guaranteed a ministry for each force and military control over nuclear policy.

Military opposition to the creation of a Ministry of Defense – one of the promises of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s campaign – would become one of the most remarkable indicators of the Brazilian military’s power over civilian authorities. The fear of losing prerogatives was a determining factor so that the military did not support the measure. To this, adds Soares Alsina Jr. (2003), the military also saw the initiative as an attempt by the United States on behalf of the “police-ization” of the Armed Forces and to involve them in the fight against drug trafficking. Finally, one can say that both have

¹⁶ “*Diretas Já*” it was the motto with which a large part of Brazilian civil society was mobilized between 1984 and 1985, which required the direct election of the president and vice president.

¹⁷ The elected candidate was Tancredo Neves. However, Neves died shortly before assuming office, leaving the position in the hands of the vice-president, José Sarney.

fulfilled their mission: Cardoso managed to fulfill his promise after four years of negotiations and in 1999 the Ministry of Defense was created. The Armed Forces, in turn, continued to maintain practically the same attributions as before.

Bolivia: the absence of statehood

As the majority of the Andean countries, the civilian institutionalization regarding defense was one of the unresolved tasks of the young democracies that had risen in the 1980s. As pointed out by Juan Ramón Quintana Taborga (2005), Bolivia remains one of the Latin American countries with less institutional development in the military sector. Among other things, such institutional weakness allows the military to get permanently involved in defense's design and planning. According to Quintana, there are three elements that explain this high level of prerogatives: the first one refers to a phenomenon rooted in the country's institutional fabric: the lack of a culture of adherence to sustainability and the search for efficiency in the public management. The second element is related to the high priority given to internal security and to the resolution of social conflicts by military and police means. The third conditioning is a permanent neglect by the civil authorities to the full exercise of its faculties. As a result of these factors, there is a successive transfer of responsibilities that culminates in the normalization of the military monopoly over the defense management.

Paraguay: autonomy through omission

In the same way that happened in most of the countries of the region, the consolidation of democracy and the efforts to further civilian rule did not prevent the Paraguayan military from maintaining wide margins of autonomy when deciding the country's defense policy.

First, one ought to highlight that the Colorado Party has not modified its close links with the military inherited from Alfredo Stroessner's dictatorship. This meant that the attempts to reverse the military government were few and unclear. During Andrés Rodríguez's administration (1989-1993), for instance, a new constitution was sanctioned and the General Organization of the Armed Forces law was promulgated. Even though the constitution declared that the president was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, this latter law established a figure of the Commander-in-Chief of the Military Forces that could only be exercised by an officer.

Another characteristic of the military autonomy is the permanent omissions in what concerns the normative framework. According to the laws in force at the time, the Armed Forces are not ascribed to the task of intervening in internal conflicts. Nonetheless, this legal body would not prevent the military from successively acting according to their own *modus operandi* in situations such as the fight against drug trafficking, smuggling or in the repression of social uprisings. Accordingly, in many occasions, the lack of control over the military reflects in cases of institutional violence and authority abuse that occurred with the connivance of the judiciary apparatus¹⁸.

Uruguay: the delegated subordination

The Uruguayan case is probably the most particular one among all the described until here in what concerns civil-military relations. As explained by González Guyer (2007), Uruguay has always been characterized for having a culture of military subordination to the democratic authorities, through which its presidents have governed the military institutions based on its own hierarchical-disciplinary structure. Such subordination, however, has as its counterpart the delegation of discretionary handling of military policy issues. In other words, Uruguay represents the typical case of what Alves Soares (2006) calls institutional autonomy: the Armed Forces keep the ability of influencing in its area's policies without surpassing its delimited field of action. This particular combination of military self-government alongside subordination to the president fostered a distancing of defense matters in the Uruguayan political leadership. In terms of external cooperation, such indifference translates in a lack of interest in the promotion of bilateral and regional mechanisms with other countries' Ministries of Defense.

Briefly, one may conclude that, by the time that the first initiatives aimed at designing a regional mechanism of defense were established, Mercosur's countries experimented different degrees of civilian control over the Armed Forces. Therefore, for instance, while the Chilean model shows a significant autonomy of the military in relation to the civilian power, Argentina represents a case of subordination – tenuous, but still subordination. In Brazil, for its turn, the Armed Forces, in spite of being subordinated to the political power, maintain wide prerogatives.

¹⁸ Some examples of this kind of participation carried out by the Paraguayan military are detailed in the following section of the article.

Table 1: Civil-military relations in Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the 1990s]

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile
Transition to democracy	By collapse	Guardianship	Protected/incomplete
Ministry of Defense	Yes (civilian)	Yes (from 1999 on. Before, there was one ministry per Force)	Yes (civilian)
Control by the Ministry of Defense	Intermediate	Non-existent	Low (wide budgetary autonomy and impossibility of appointing military leaders)
Degree of conflict between the political power and the Armed Forces	Low	Low	High
Institutional projection of the Armed Forces: differences within the results	Few prerogatives and low contestation of constitutional authorities	Intermediate prerogatives and low contestation	High level of prerogatives and intermediate degree in terms of contestation.

Source: elaborated by the author, with some references from Acuña and Smulovitz (1996)

The differences between defense and security

Besides the heterogeneous relations between civilians and the military, among Mercosur's countries there are also different perspectives about what one understands as defense and security. Particularly, these differences are captured in broad or delimited visions about security. Thus, for instance, while Argentina, Chile and Uruguay defined a differentiation between national defense and internal security, Brazil's normative framework establishes more blurred limits between the two scopes, which enables the intervention of the Armed Forces in order to guarantee "law and order". Bolivia, for its turn, sustains a wide view of security; and Paraguay, despite differentiating national defense from public security in its laws, supported a process of providing the military some characteristics of the police, enabling them to participate in issues such as the fight against drug trafficking, organized crime and the repression of social uprisings.

A detailed analysis of the normative frameworks of Mercosur's coun-

tries between 1991 and 2004 allows us to make such differences clear. In order to summarize these characteristics, Buzan's and Hansen's (2009) three dimensions to divide the distinct perspectives about security are used. Namely: 1) the security-related objects (that is, what or who shall be secured); 2) the nature of the threats (whether they are of internal or external character; military or non-military); and 3) the tools established to combat these threats. According to how these dimensions are combined, one may have a limited or a broad vision of security.

In the former, the security-related object is only the sovereignty and the territorial integrity; the threats are of state and military nature and, hence, the Armed Forces the fundamental instrument in counteracting them. The broad perspective of security, on the other hand, assumes that the security issues – called as the “new threats” – are not necessarily military and do not affect only the states, but also the societies, the individuals, the free market, the collective identities, among others. Within this framework, the mechanisms to guarantee security become increasingly blurry and flexible, opening up space for the adoption of police's characteristics by the Armed Forces, which ends up eroding the boundary between national defense and public or internal security.

The choice of specifying the external defense/internal security variable is based on the fact that the ways in which the purpose of defense is conceived and the role of the Armed Forces without any doubt have an impact when it comes to sitting down to propose, negotiate, articulate and materialize common initiatives among several States. In this sense, we are in accordance with Jorge Battaglini (2008, 11), who sustains that “different perspectives regarding which are the security-related objects, the threats and the responses to them [...] hamper the construction of a regional concept of security” (Our translation).

Argentina, Chile and Uruguay: limited perspectives of security

Through a relatively solid and clear normative body, Argentina established – by the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s – a differentiation between the assignments of the Armed Forces and the correspondent to the police forces. Thus, the National Defense Law of 1988 states that defense is “the integration and the coordinated action of all the Nation's forces to the solution of those conflicts that require the employment of the Armed Forces, in a dissuasive of effective way, in order to face aggressions of external origins” (Our translation). Furthermore, it sustains that “defense has as its fi-

nality to permanently guarantee the sovereignty and the independence of the Argentinian Nation, its territorial integrity and its capacity of self-determination; to protect the lives and freedom of its inhabitants” (Argentina 1988. Our translation). Some years later, the White Book would clarify that the external aggressions are those that, for its character, have the military forces as their central pivot (Argentina 1999).

In these definitions, it was well summarized which were the defense-related objects (sovereignty, territory, and its inhabitants’ lives and freedom); which were the dimensions of the threats (a military aggression of foreign origin); and which instrument is supposed to dissuade and repel an eventual aggression (the Armed Forces).

Such difference between the external – associated to the defense – and the internal – linked to public security – is strengthened with the enactment of the Law on Internal Security in 1992. In fact, such law determines that internal security refers to police action against illicit acts that compromise the freedom, life, heritage of the inhabitants, their rights and guarantees (Argentina 1992). In this way, according to such law, the employment of the Armed Forces within the internal security’s scope can only occur in determined circumstances – in cases of logistical support to the police forces – or in exception situations, such as in the declaration of a “State of exception”¹⁹.

In Chile, defense regulations also separate the military activities from those of the forces of order and law and public security. The Organic Constitutional Law of the Armed Forces of 1990 establishes that the military “constitute the armed corps that exist for the homeland’s security” (Chile 1990. Our translation). The National Defense Book, published in 1997, however, is more explicit when defining the security vision in the Andean country. According to this document, national defense implies keeping “properly equipped and trained forces, enough to prevent and neutralize any external threat or repel an eventual foreign aggression” (Chile 1997. Our translation).

In other words, to the Chilean state, threats are eminently external and the instrument to face them are the Armed Forces. In this sense, the white book clarifies that “the risks, perils or threats that are associated to delinquency, drug trafficking or others that affect the internal order are a matter of internal security”. Similar to Argentina, the Chilean normative allow the military to perform internal security tasks, but only in exceptional situations of internal emergencies, natural catastrophes or other circumstances provided in the laws and Constitution (Chile 1997).

¹⁹ Also, as a result of this norm, the National Gendarmerie and the Naval Prefecture - two militarized security forces - passed from the orbit of the Ministry of Defense to that of the Ministry of the Interior.

Uruguay is the third country of Mercosur's group of states that conceive security in limited terms. For instance, the law 15.808 – on the Organic of the Armed Forces – of 1986, defines that “the Armed Forces have the fundamental purpose of defending the Republic's honor, independence and peace, the integrity of its territory, its constitution and laws, always acting under the superior command of the President” (Uruguay 1986. Our translation).

In 1999 there would be an integral explanation of the concepts and directives that govern the public management of defense with the publishing of a sort of a “white book”, called “Basis for a National Defense Policy”. Through this document, Uruguay states that “the National Defense shall not be mistaken with Security, even though both concepts are closely related”. While the latter comprises all the acts aimed at ensuring the preservation of internal order and peace, Defense implies a more restricted concept, since it only refers to the maintenance of conditions that allow the country to secure its primary interests against potential threats or external actions (Uruguay 1999).

Furthermore, Uruguay is also close to Argentina and Chile in what concerns the possibility of employing the military in security tasks in exceptional situations. As a result, the national defense objectives are reduced to: conserving national sovereignty and the state's independence; maintaining its territorial integrity; generating the necessary security conditions to face external threats; support the internal security forces in some cases as provided by the competent bodies and contribute to the promotion and maintenance of international peace (Uruguay 1999).

Brazil: an intermediate case

Even though during Mercosur's first years the Brazilian normative demonstrated an effort to distinguish national defense from public security, the boundaries between these two areas would become blurrier in the following years. This is due to the ambiguity of the laws and norms that governed the nature, the goals and the operation of its defense system.

The South-American giant defined its defense policy based on a multiplicity of functions assigned to its Armed Forces in the 1988 Constitution. Particularly, article 142 establishes as missions of the Armed Forces: “the homeland defense against foreign military aggression, the guarantee of constitutional powers and the guarantee of law and order” (Brasil 1988. Our translation). Undoubtedly, this latter element – “guarantee of law and order” – opens up a margin for the military action in public security matters without

the need of establishing exceptional situations, as occurs in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. The Complementary Law number 69, of 1991, attempted to attenuate such ambiguity by stating that the military actuation in the preservation of public order will take place by a president's order "after exhausted the proper instruments" to such finality. Still, the preeminence of the constitution over any other law makes it possible to circumvent that reservation. The National Defense Policy, enacted in 1996, and the *Complementary Law* number 97, enacted in 1997, opened up another window for the possibility of the military to act within the internal scope by establishing that one of the Armed Forces' attributions is to "cooperate with national development" (Brasil 1997).

Bearing this in mind, despite the fact that in the political leadership and in the military institution there was a predominance of a refusal to involve the Armed Forces in the combat of non-traditional threats, the normative ambiguity has drawn a porous line between national defense and public security. In practical terms, this lack of normative clarity allowed the participation of the military in the task of guaranteeing "law and order", even after the return of democracy. Examples of this situation are the army's intervention in the *Volta Redonda's* strike of 1998; the participation of military personnel in *Operation Rio*, carried out by the end of 1994 with the goal of combating drug trafficking; and the delegation to the Armed Forces of the security of international summits, such as the Earth Summit (1992) and, more recently, the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics. As a consequence of this increasingly assiduous presence in public security situations, Mathias and Guzzi (2010) argue that Brazilian citizens end up believing that these tasks are part of the "natural" missions of the Armed Forces.

Bolivia and Paraguay: widened perspectives

Among all Mercosur's member countries, Bolivia is the only one that has explicitly established in its legal framework the existence of a widened conception of security, defining an intersection between the internal and external environments, and, therefore, allowing the military to ordinarily act in public order assignments. The Organic Law of the Armed Forces, enacted in 1992, determines that the aims of the military apparatus are to "preserve the Constitutional Mandate, peace and National Unity as the stability of the state's democratic institutions" (Bolivia 1992. Our translation). Similarly, the eighth article sustains that the President shall be able to employ the military forces in order to: in the external dimension, preserve the existence, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity; and, in the internal dimension, maintain the public order when the institutions legally constituted for this

finality show themselves to be insufficient (Bolivia 1992).

Based on this broad view, since the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the Bolivian Armed Forces had an active participation in operations against the illegal drug trade – many of them in cooperation with the North-American DEA – and in the repression of strikes and public disturbances. One of the most criticized measures aimed at militarizing the fight against drug trafficking was the release of the “Dignity Plan”, in 1998. Such operation – implemented by military and security forces with the United States’ support – had as its goal the eradication of all “illicit” crops of coca within five years (Ledebur 2005, 187).

Paraguay is another country to express a widened conception of security. Differently from Bolivia, nevertheless, the Paraguayan case has a particularity: the then current laws defined defense and security as two strictly separated dimensions²⁰. The former referred to the Armed Forces, whereas the latter, to the Security Forces. Notwithstanding, in practical terms, there was no distinction between external and internal threats, and the military institution would have a permanent action in the fight against drug trafficking, smuggling and maintenance of public order. This situation would open space to an indiscrimination, through omission, between national defense and internal security²¹.

20 This differentiation would be embodied in the Law on the General Organization of the Armed Forces (1991) and in the Law on National Defence and Internal Security (1999).

21 An example of this was when in December 1995 the Armed Forces and later the National Police, by order of President Wasmosy, unleashed an operation -called “Ñemopotí” - to fight against smuggling in the border area of Ciudad del Este.

Table 2: Normative frameworks in defense and security matters of broadened Mercosur's countries (1991-2004)

	Argentina	Chile	Uruguay
Defense-related objects	Sovereignty and territorial integrity; life and freedom of citizens	Country's independence and sovereignty; territorial integrity; institutionality and rule of law; national identity.	National sovereignty and the state's independence; territorial integrity
Dimensions of the threats	External and military	External and military	External and military
Participation of the Armed Forces in internal security	Only exceptionally	Only exceptionally	Only exceptionally
Differentiation between National Security and Internal Security	<u>Comprehensive</u>	<u>Comprehensive</u>	<u>Comprehensive</u>

	Brazil	Paraguay	Bolivia
Defense-related objects	Territory, sovereignty and national interests; law and order	Sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic	Peace and national unity; sovereignty and territorial integrity; democratic institutions; public order
Dimensions of the threats	Mostly external	External and internal	External and internal
Participation of the Armed Forces in internal security	Allowed	Allowed de facto	Allowed
Differentiation between National Security and Internal Security	Porous	Indifferent	Indifferent

Source: elaborated by the author based on the aforementioned documents and normatives

Conclusions

As previously stated in the introduction, this article had the purpose of answering to the question of why the defense-related subjects were excluded from Mercosur, even when there existed a cooperative environment in security matters and even when some of the member countries showed themselves to be in favor of articulating some type of defense mechanism in the sub regional level. Based on this, one may witness the development of three factors that ended up by establishing a limit to the possibilities of solidifying an instance of this kind.

As for the first factor, an analysis both of the bloc's institutional structure and the character of the decisions adopted by its highest instance – the Common Market Council – demonstrate the Mercosur concretized itself as dominated by the economic-commercial agenda. To a determined extent, such overrating of the economic dimensions reflects the hegemony of the neoliberal ideas in South America during the 1990s. Those were ideas that, after all, ended up taking the place occupied by other sorts of agendas in the beginning of the integrationist project, by the mid-1980s, as it was the case of the security agenda.

With that said, one may also sustain that the economic unidimensionality was not a completely negative factor. Effectively, by reviewing the integrationist process during its first decade, it is possible to conclude that many of the initiatives to hierarchize the political agenda or to include non-commercial topics in the bloc occurred when the economic agenda became exhausted. The following phases of the transition period, explains Bouzas (2001), were marked by an increase in the commercial conflicts between the countries (especially Argentina and Brazil) and by a growing difficulty in carrying out the agreed measures (the constant exceptions to the Common External Tariff or the lack of coordination of macroeconomic policies are two clear indicators of this gap). Within this framework of difficulties, deepening the cooperation in other thematic areas might be a way to end those bottlenecks. Nonetheless, it seems that this situation has not been severe enough to lead to the inclusion of defense-related themes. As stated by Hurrell (1998), the economic interdependence may be an important engine to demilitarize the interstate relations, however, in the long term, it does not generate enough incentives to lead to a further institutionalization.

The following section had the purpose of analyzing the distinct degrees of autonomy of the Armed Forces (or of the civilian control) in the different states of Mercosur. For Argentina, where there was a greater control over the military, the regionalization of defense themes appeared to be a

good tool for consolidating the Armed Forces' subordination to the political power, or, still, to internationalize the defense policy and "withdraw" even more the military from the internal environment. On the other hand, in those countries where the military maintained a considerable power over the state apparatus – as Brazil, Chile or Paraguay –, the incentives to further coordination mechanisms of civilian and political nature were significantly scarce. Besides, in the strategic culture of most Latin-American military prevailed (and still prevails) a "sovereignist" imprint, hesitant in assuming excessively ambitious regional commitments. In this sense, the military tend to prefer mechanisms of inter-forces relationship or, ultimately, the establishment of bilateral mechanisms through which it would be easier to "control" the commitments assumed by the political bodies. This latter trend could be seen in the following years, when Mercosur was reconfigured in light of the leftist turn in the region. Brazil and Argentina, for instance, continued deepening their relations in defense matters, establishing new mechanisms of political and military cooperation, such as the joint production of the General Employment Airborne Light Vehicle (VLEGA "Gaucho"). A similar situation took place between Chile and Argentina, with the formation in 2006 of the Binational Peace Force "Cruz del Sur".

Finally, a comparative analysis of the normative frameworks of each country evidenced that, among Mercosur's states, different ways of understating security coexist. Thus, for instance, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are adepts of a restricted vision, while Bolivia and Paraguay maintain a widened perspective, which includes non-traditional issues among the defense systems' competences. This framework of discrepancies reveals that, after all, for a group of countries that does not share a common criterion about what is defense, what is security and which are the instruments supposed to face distinct threats, embarking on the creation of a regional mechanism is an undertaking that requires high coordination levels and, especially, the adaption to several national realities.

However, in light of the previously said, we are aware that the factors developed in this article are not exhaustive nor exclusive. As stated in the introduction, there are other variables that have transversely acted over what was here explained and have contributed, to a determined extent, to explain why it has not been possible to concretize a security mechanism in the Southern Cone. In this regard, we may also mention the distance that Chile has always kept from the bloc or the differences that, for many years, Brazil and Argentina had in terms of foreign policy – especially in what concerns the relationship with the United States and the perceptions of how the other reckoned the integration process. According to Mônica Hirst (2006), these

discrepancies are at the core of the production of sporadic cooperation actions rather than a common strategic view.

Likewise, the importance of the principle of democratic peace in the imaginary of regional integration – according to which the democratic systems foster stable and pacific relations between neighboring countries – did not encourage progress towards more ambitious regional security schemes. As stated by Oliveira and Onuki (2000), the tenet that guided Mercosur's countries was one of avoiding conflicts rather than furthering the coordination of defense policies.

As a final point, it is worth mentioning that, in the Brazilian perspective, Mercosur and especially the relations with Argentina were conceived in broader terms than the Southern Cone. As explained by the former Secretary for Strategic Affairs, Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães: "South America is the inevitable, historical and geographical circumstance of the Brazilian state and society" (Pinheiro Guimarães 2005, 171). Added to this, one shall also notice the importance that the subcontinent's Amazon had and still has for Brazil – an area that could be embraced in its totality by a South-American perspective. The latter is crucial for understanding why the formation of the Union of South American Nations in 2004 meant a change in Brazil's position regarding the articulation of a regional defense mechanism. A position that, four years later, would culminate in the proposal of creating a Defense Council within the scope of the brand-new Union of South American Nations.

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ABSTRACT

Despite being established on a commercial basis, Mercosur gradually incorporated other areas of cooperation during its first years, such as health, labor and environment. However, issues like defense were never included in the institutional scheme. On this basis, this article analyses a specific set of factors that were crucial to undermine the possibilities of building a security mechanism in the Southern Cone. These factors are the bloc one-dimension, the divergent civilian control of the armed forces and the different visions of security among member countries.

KEYWORDS

Mercosur; defense; armed forces.

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WINDS OF CHANGE AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE¹

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Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.

Robert Schuman, 9 May 1950

Introduction

This paper sets out to answer two research questions: why are the European Union (EU) forceful soft powers insufficient and how can this be changed? The European Union is a sui generis international organization which originated from a limited supra-national association of states. That is precisely its biggest advantage and at the same time its prime disadvantage in the field of security and defence. On the one hand, the permanent concerns of the 27 sovereign states have granted a long period of peace in Europe, with remarkable achievements in terms of development and quality of life³. The 2016 human development index (HDI) places almost all the EU member states in the category of very high human development. Carl Bilt (2010)⁴ stated that the “European Union is neither a problem nor a partner in terms of global security”. Robert Dover (2010, page 242) went further, asserting that “the European Union has a very well established reputation as a ‘civilian superpower’... to

¹ This paper was presented at Institute of European Studies (IEEM – Macau, China), Seminar on the Future of Europe, Macau Special Administrative Region of People’s Republic of China, 19-20 March 2018 (Session Six). This Seminar was organized in cooperation with the Faculty of Law, University of Lisbon, Portugal.

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³ The European Quality Survey (2016, page 102) suggests a continuing improvement in quality of life, quality of public services and quality of society.


⁴ Nils Daniel Carl Bildt (Prime Minister of Sweden from 1991 to 1994) address at the European University Institute, Fiesole in Italy, May 28, 2010.

emphasise the non-military EU core strength". Münevver Cebeci (2011, page 309) criticized the essential character of such an international organization, and argued that the "European Union suffers from being a non-unitary actor in its foreign policy... as its member states may prefer to act according to their national interests sometimes". Robert Kagan (2003) observed that "European integration has proved to be the enemy of European military power and, indeed, of an important European global role". The EU reputation as a "civilian power" has gained momentum especially because of the EU's domestic quality of life and because the EU and its member states have consolidated their place as the world's leading aid donors in 2016⁵. However this does not apply to the EU's position in the field of security and defence.

On the other hand, the core interests of EU member states prevent the EU from fully integrating its defence capacities and from pushing its members to engage in a deeper defence cooperation. Bearing in mind that security and defence deal with sovereign issues that lie at the core of any political system (and perception of self-identity), looking back at EU security and defence development, we see a continuous effort to create a balance between producing military might and maintaining the essential elements of sovereignty of EU member states. The lessons drawn from modern crises and armed conflicts, namely the Middle East (1970), former Yugoslavia (1992), Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003), Libya (2011), Ukraine (2013) and the ongoing refugee crisis of 2015-2018, have pushed the EU to improve its ability to take action on behalf of its members. The EU's security and defence responses appear to be built on the lessons from international crises, from the Western European Union (1954), through the TREVI initiative (1975), the European Political Cooperation (1987), the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Lisbon Treaty 2009) and the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Maastricht, 1993). The EU CSDP has launched 34 missions, 16 of them still ongoing (10 civilian and 6 military). Most of these were deployed in Africa and its neighbourhood. Only in 2003, the European Security Defence Policy (ESDP) deployed its first mission in the Eu-

⁵ European Commission - Press release (Brussels, 11 April 2017) - EU Official Development Assistance reaches highest level ever. New figures confirm that the European Union and its Member States have consolidated their place as the world's leading aid donor in 2016. Preliminary OECD figures show that Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by the EU and its member states reached €75.5 billion in 2016. This constitutes an 11% increase compared to 2015 levels. The EU's assistance has increased for the fourth year in a row and reached its highest level to date. In 2016, EU collective ODA represented 0.51% of EU Gross National Income (GNI), having increased from 0.47% in 2015. This is significantly above the 0.21% average of non-EU countries that are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The European Union and its member states have hence again consolidated their place as the world's leading aid donor in 2016.

ropean Continent (EUPM BH) and in Democratic Republic of Congo (Operation Artemis). Only after the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2011 did the EU first integrate the civilian and military components and an institutional decision-making process to respond to an expanded set of missions (Articles 42 and 43 (Treaty of European Union (TEU))).



Credits: adapted from the Structural evolution of the European Union (Wikipedia)

Consequently, and because the EU is a sui generis international organization which originated from a limited supra-national association of states, steps towards any form of defence integration must be driven by a set of common principles as enshrined in the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy. These common principles must be capable of promoting trust, freedom, justice and development, under the rationale of the equality of EU members' states and driven by the conferral of competences. The European Union is an unique actor, but it is by no means entrusted with a comprehensive sovereign unity. Development of security and defence can only be successful if they directly contribute to the *raison d'être* of the European ideal, which is the construction of a space of freedom and peace. According to Anand Menon (2009, pages 227-246) the significance EU defence developments lies in its "new-found ability ... to intervene using military tools [an ability which] represents an important and useful addition to the West's security policy armory, particularly in those instances where other multilateral

organizations are unwilling or unable to do so”.

EU as a leading soft power actor

The biggest challenges to European defence are within the EU and do not arise from the present-day international situation. Apart from asymmetric threats and Russian military activism, the EU has no major direct conventional threats. The EU has long been recognised as a leading “soft power” association of states. “Soft power” measures the ability to advance foreign policy goals by disseminating and manipulating ideas, information and institutions that help persuade other countries to act in particular ways. Soft power, as Joseph Nye sees it, is a seduction (2004, page 8), a cultural appealing, a force of attraction and agenda setting ability (2004, page 31), and does not depend on hard power (2004, page 9). However, soft power is not a stand-alone category of power. If one allows for the interplay between soft and hard power, then one also has to accept that soft power and hard power sometimes reinforce and sometimes interfere with each other (2004, page 25). Economic strength is also remarkable because it can be converted into both soft and hard power. Soft power employs various means, and the EU stands among the world’s most effective exploiters of many of them⁶. The EU’s strongest sources of soft power are its commitment to multilateralism⁷, its standards of culture and education (languages)⁸, its normative instruments⁹, its development agenda

6 Retrieved on March 1, 2018, from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/13/europe-is-still-a-superpower/>

7 “Today, Europeans are the world’s leading supporters of global and regional institutions. Their commitment begins with the EU itself and its ring of agreements with regional neighbors, but Europe also has a decisive influence in managing economic interdependence, human rights, the environment, development, and health at a global level ... Imposing conditionality in exchange for membership or collectively rewarding compliance, other governments become committed to institutional rules Europe has designed, thereby influencing the policies of individual states.” Source: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/13/europe-is-still-a-superpower/>

8 Twenty-seven of the world’s top 100 universities are in Europe, compared with 55 in the United States, one in Russia, and none in China. Europe exceeds the United States in educating foreign students, hosting almost twice as many students from outside the EU as non-Americans at U.S. universities, and over 10 times more students than non-Chinese studying in China. Source: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/13/europe-is-still-a-superpower/>

9 “In understanding normative power, Ian Manners’ 2002 article on the subject is cited almost universally. The first aspect of Manners’ argument pertains to the kind of actor which the EU is. Manners argues that the EU represents a new and distinct kind of actor within the international system, and transcends the anarchic and self-interested behaviour of states (Manners 2002, page 240). The EU’s constitution as an “elite-driven, treaty based, legal order” means that its identity and behaviour are fundamentally based upon a set of common values

and quality of life (HDI), and a good part of its political values¹⁰. Given the effectiveness of soft power, the Europeans are unlikely to deviate from their belief in the various contributors to EU soft power, and therefore the EU seeks to continue to be a global soft power actor. This is why, when we discuss the future of European defence, we are not seeking to build up a military establishment to compete with the leading global hard power actors. Rather, the

(Manners 2002, page 241). The most significant of these values are: peace, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, human rights, social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance (Manners 2002; Manners 2008). These norms differentiate the EU from traditional state actors who act according to a realist and neo-realist paradigm in which security-related concerns outweigh ethical ones (Hyde-Price 2008, page 30). Hence, Manners argues that the EU's norms provide it with a fundamentally different identity to other actors within the international system. The second aspect of Manners' argument pertains to the kind of influence which the EU has within world politics. The EU's constitution on a normative basis "predisposes it to act normatively in world politics" (Manners 2002, page 252). According to this view, the EU is a force for good within world politics, and enacts a foreign policy aimed at promoting its nine core ethical norms (Aggestam 2008, page 1). Manners (2002, page 252) argues that the EU's ability to exert such influence is both intrinsic and extrinsic, that is, the EU influences others both through its policies, and through Member States role modelling its values. Thus Manners claims that the EU has a capacity to "shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations" (Manners 2002, p. 239). It is this notion of influencing others by directly and indirectly spreading its values, which characterises the notion of the EU as a normative power ... The EU's normative approach to world politics is particularly apparent in its support for international law. International legal regimes which bind states and state leaders to criminal and human rights norms have been seen as key tests of a normative actor (Sjursen 2006, page 244; Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 2008, page 81). This is because such regimes are based on agreement and reciprocity between states, minimising the potential for traditional powers to impose their norms coercively or arbitrarily (Sjursen 2006, page 244). Support of international law therefore allows for a distinction between normative actors, and traditional actors who merely use norms as a cloak for their own interests. The EU's normative stance towards its external relations has been reflected in its consistent support for international legal regimes (Toje 2011, page 54). A key example of this was the EU's policy of encouraging African states to join the International Criminal Court (ICC), created in order to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes, and crimes against humanity (Schiepers and Sicurelli 2008, page 611). After promotion of the Court was adopted as an explicit aim of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1998, the EU worked to persuade African nations to ratify and implement the ICC Statute (Schiepers and Sicurelli 2008, page 611)." Retrieved on March 8, 2018, from https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/australia/15687/critically-assess-and-analyse-notion-eu-normative-power_en

¹⁰ "Beyond purely political values, Europe garners broad global admiration for its social, cultural, and lifestyle values. Among the top two dozen global tourist destinations, more than half are European. More profound is European dominance of almost all polls on global respect. Last year, for example, Forbes magazine asked 40,000 people worldwide which countries were the most "reputable": a composite measure of happiness, cleanliness, lack of corruption, tolerance, and other qualities. Of the top 20 countries, 15 are European. By contrast, the United States ranks 28th and China 57th." Retrieved in February 2018, from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/13/europe-is-still-a-superpower/>

aim is to deepen cooperation to develop joint military capacities, which the EU can use as a basic protective shield and which will reinforce the EU's ability to shape the preferences of others. Restrictive measures (sanctions), foreign affairs, external diplomatic representation and public diplomacy are important assets for shaping others' preferences, but they depend on an appropriate operational capacity. The EU will remain a civilian power with soft power at the centre of its foreign policy, because that is the surest way to promote legitimacy and to maintain global influence. In addition, only when the process of deepening defence cooperation is sufficiently advanced will it be the right time to talk about defence integration. Ultimately, the purpose of developing a capable and commensurate hard power within the EU is to balance the tools capable of strengthening common foreign policy, and to help the EU remain a global civilian power. The President of the European Commission told the German newspaper *Welt am Sonntag*¹¹: "Such an army would also help us to form common foreign and security policies and allow Europe to take on responsibility in the world." With a weak or non-credible capacity to run military operations and international affairs, the EU will compromise the perception of its image as a strong soft power and therefore the credibility of its foreign policies will be damaged.

Since the European Council in Cologne (June 1999), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) has repeatedly reaffirmed the EU's willingness to develop capabilities for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces. A key development was the "Berlin Plus Agreement" (2003), giving the EU, under certain conditions, access to NATO assets and capabilities. In his political guidelines of June 2014, President Juncker stated, "I believe that we need to work on a stronger Europe when it comes to security and defence matters. Yes, Europe is chiefly a 'soft power'. But even the strongest soft powers cannot make do in the long run without at least some integrated defence capacities."

The Current Strategic Environment

In 2003, former High Representative Javier Solana was tasked by the EU member states to develop a security strategy for Europe. The document, entitled "A Secure Europe in a Better World", analysed the EU's security environment for the first time and identified key security challenges and subsequent political implications for the EU. The implementation of the document

¹¹ Retrieved on March 8, 2018, from <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/juncker-nato-is-not-enough-eu-needs-an-army/>

was subsequently revised in 2008 and 2016. Four years after the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, the EU member states tasked the High Representative at the December 2007 European Council “to examine the implementation of the Strategy with a view to proposing elements on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements to complement it”. The resulting document, the 2008 “Report of the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World”, effectively confirmed the enduring validity of the 2003 ESS and the need to be “more capable, more coherent and more active” in order for the EU to reach its full potential. The 2016 revision, the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), was presented to EU heads of state and government on 28 June 2016 by Federica Mogherini. The document, entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’, replaced the ambitious language of its 2003 predecessor with a more measured call for ‘principled pragmatism’ as the guideline for the EU’s external engagement. Within this framework, the strategy defined five priorities: the security of European citizens, resilience, integrated conflict management, cooperative regional order and progress on global governance. In the forward, Frederica Mogherini wrote: “This document is aimed at adapting the priorities of the previous strategies (2003, 2008) to the current times ... and the ultimate objective is to advance the prosperity of its people. The principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead”, and “For Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand”. At the same time, the adoption of “common strategies¹²” clarified the terms for common action. The EUGS suggested that defence cooperation among EU members has the potential to improve “interoperability, effectiveness, efficiency and trust: it increases the output of defence spending”. It made a case for harmonised defence-planning cycles among member states and suggested that defence cooperation must become the default mode in Europe. The document introduced notions of deterrence, full-spectrum defence and the protection of the Union into the EU vocabulary but, while it did not elaborate on precisely what these terms mean in an EU context, they have the potential to significantly expand the security and defence role currently defined in the CSDP.

The current strategic security and defence environment is characterized by FIVE key drivers: (1) – Transatlantic relations - Not all EU MS are NATO members, but NATO is important to EU collective defence as a whole. Twenty-two of the twenty-eight member states are NATO members (although one of them, the UK, is leaving the EU). Ireland, Finland, Austria, Cyprus,

¹² Retrieved in March 2018, from <https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/816597/European-Union-German-defence-minister-EU-army-intervene-Africa-Brexit>

Sweden and Malta are not NATO states, but some of these countries have a sort of “special relation to NATO”. Neither NATO nor the EEAS/CSDP have resources of their own, since they rely on the resources of their member states. NATO and the CSDP are not competitors, rather they are partners with different but complementary means, doctrines and capacities. In terms of defence developments in the EU, there are two major points to be considered. The first is the urgent need to invest in defence in a way that each member state’s contribution to common defence is credible. The second is the amplification of NATO-CSDP synergies, for which the “Berlin plus” arrangements fall short in terms of unnecessary duplications. We must clarify that the CSDP has access to military assets but not to military power. In times of financial constraints, the only way to modernise defence is to rationalise it in the context of partners and allies. Parallel strategic planning is required. In addition, there is an urgent need to resolve the Cyprus affair and to create decision making processes that allow both organisations to be autonomous partners. This will require more cooperation between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Political Security Committee (PSC). The EU needs a credible military capacity to exercise its autonomy in relation to NATO and therefore to be able to take action when NATO is unwilling or incapable. This is a major political argument, especially for those non-EU NATO member states. In 2017, the German Minister of Defence declared, “the EU needs its own army so that European countries can intervene more regularly in areas of the world where NATO is not present ... That’s why I see different theatres where NATO might be required and other areas where the EU has got broader instruments and can perhaps be more effective”. A current example is the Sahel region, where NATO is not engaged and where the EU has vested interests from a security point of view. Finally, the current narrative of Trump’s administration leaves the EU-NATO member states suffering from a sort of political anxiety. As Carlos Gaspar (2017, page 147) put it, the “new American nationalism” is pushing the EU towards new partnerships, among them China. The effects of the American narrative might trigger concerns and higher investment in EU defence. For the first time since WWII, the issue of ‘trust’ is on the table. This narrative is harming US interests in the global perspective, though this narrative is likely to change with the next administration. (2) – BREXIT – Britain’s approaching withdrawal from the EU is expected to result in considerable diminution of the EU’s security and defence capabilities, because the UK is the strongest military power in the Union. The UK joined the EU in 1973 during the first expansion of the Union, which means that for more than 45 years it has shaped the EU. Its absence will undoubtedly diminish the EU’s symbolic external power. The absence of British intelligence capacities, the lack of interoperability between headquarters, the number and quality of

British assets and the value of its military doctrine will deeply affect EU operational options. Deployability is another area of critical impact. In fact, 25% of the EU's aircraft carrier capacity will be lost (France (1) and Italy (2) are the other two member states with similar capacity). According to Ian Bond (2014, page 2) "The UK is one of the six EU member-states with a large-scale defence industry (the others are France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden)". The future of the 2010 Lancaster House Treaty and the Franco-British expeditionary force (CJTF) is yet to be seen. Furthermore, the EU will see its access to the UNSC limited, because this will be possible only through a single member state (France – Article 34 TEU). However, while the UK is preparing to leave the EU, it is not leaving NATO, so institutional cooperation arrangements are still possible and the UK's technological and industrial defence sector will be open to cooperative projects even after BREXIT. (3) – Immigration and Terrorism – According to the Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence (European Commission, 2017, page 8), the EU's public perception of threat from immigration and terrorism increased significantly between 2012 and 2016. Whatever the future holds, Europeans expect their armed forces to be capable of taking decisive action in these two areas. (4) – The Russian Federation – Eafak Oñuz (*Daily News*, 2017¹³) asserted recently that all the "calls from EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker for a common policy and a European military did not garner support, but rather opposition, from Eastern Europeans, who feel under imminent Russian threat and rely on the presence of NATO in their territories – especially on U.S. troops". Indeed, the involvement of Russia in the Ukraine and Syria conflicts, the frequent violations of territorial EU sovereignty, the dormant NATO-Russia Council¹⁴, the proliferation of Russian drones, warheads and laser weapons announced by President Putin¹⁵, and the recent case of poisoning of the Russian spy Sergei Skripal are raising security concerns within the EU, positioning Russia as a sort of persistent disturber. Such serious incidents worry many Europeans. According to Military Balance (2017, page 65), a new element in NATO's approach, formalised at the Warsaw Summit, was the 'enhanced forward presence' – the deployment of one

13 Retrieved in March 2018, from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-future-of-european-defense-nato-or-an-eu-army-115534>

14 Following Russia's illegal military intervention in Ukraine and its violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, in April 2014 the Alliance suspended all practical cooperation between NATO and Russia including in the NRC. However, the Alliance agreed to keep channels of communication open in the NRC and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at the Ambassadorial level and above, to allow the exchange of views, first and foremost on this crisis. Source: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_50091.htm

15 Retrieved on March 1, 2018, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43239331>

multinational battlegroup each to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland (all of which are EU member states) by 2017. This is another significant point pushing for the further development of the relationship between NATO and the CSDP. The Russian threat is keeping NATO alive, and therefore moving CSDP closer to NATO. (5) – People’s Republic of China – The main political link between China and the EU is the fact that the EU recognises and commits to the “One China policy”, but it strongly opposes the use of force to achieve unification. The assumption of China as a global power makes the defence cooperation unavoidable from both perspectives. China and the EU have cooperated before. The EU and China have operated jointly on humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, the fight against piracy, and joint customs operations. The EU and Chinese military navies have jointly fought against piracy and cooperated in peacekeeping missions in South Sudan and Mali (Cotter and Duggan 2016). According to Han Dorussen et al (2017), “The EU and China have become major trade partners as well as significant investors in each other’s economies. Apart from direct economic ties, the EU and China share an interest in an open, stable and properly functioning world economy. The spillover of shared economic interests into the security realm has commonly been cited as the main reason for security cooperation between the EU and China (Smith and Xie 2010)”. The EU needs China to strengthen its role in the UN, to amplify commitment to international law and multilateralism, and to enhance cooperation on non-proliferation. China provides all of this. China’s sees the EU as an important trading partner, with whom it “will maintain high-level military-to-military exchanges, develop and improve, step by step, a strategic security consultation mechanism, exchange more missions of military experts, and expand exchanges in respect of military officers’ training and defence studies” (China’s EU policy paper, October 2003).

Another component of the current strategic environment is the priority areas of interest and engagement. At the moment, there are four areas of EU interest, prioritized as follows: (1) The EU neighbourhood and periphery – Foremost the countries of Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus), the Southern Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), and those of Central Asia (Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan). (2) The Gulf of Guinea, the Sahel and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) – The Southern Mediterranean (Maghreb and Middle East) has been subject to great change over the past years, in the wake of the “Arab Spring”, along with Nigeria, Libya and Syria. The EU is particularly concerned with Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, South Sudan and the Sahel. The EU Strategy for the Sahel (2016) states¹⁶:

¹⁶ Retrieved on March 1, 2018, from https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/11064/strategy-security-and-development-sahel-european-external-action-service_

“The Sahel is one of the poorest regions of the world. It faces simultaneously the challenges of extreme poverty, the effects of climate change, frequent food crises, rapid population growth, fragile governance, corruption, unresolved internal tensions, the risk of violent extremism and radicalisation, illicit trafficking and terrorist-linked security threats. The states of the region have to face these challenges directly. The three core Sahelian states, and the focus of this Strategy, are Mauritania, Mali and Niger, though the geographical conditions – and therefore challenges – also affect parts of Burkina Faso and Chad. Many of the challenges impact on neighbouring countries, including Algeria, Libya, Morocco and even Nigeria, whose engagement is necessary to help resolve them. The current political developments in the Maghreb have consequences for the situation in the Sahel, taking into account the close relations between the countries of the two regions, a significant presence of citizens of Sahel countries in the Maghreb and the risks that arise from the proliferation of arms in the region. The problems facing the Sahel not only affect the local populations but increasingly impact directly on the interests of European citizens.” In brief, poor governance, extremism, human trafficking, immigration and organized crime are the main concerns for this region. (3) The Arctic – At the 2013 Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, the EU requested full observer status in the Arctic Council. This was not granted, mostly because the members did not agree with the EU ban on hunting seals. However, in 2016 a new integrated EU policy for the Arctic was adopted. It focuses on strengthening international cooperation, tackling climate change, enhancing environmental protection and promoting sustainable development in this region of enormous environmental and economic importance. The EU, with three Arctic Council states among its members (Finland, Sweden and Denmark), is a major destination for resources and goods from the Arctic region. Thus, many EU policies and laws have implications for the Arctic and its people. In recent years, several EU member states have issued national Arctic policy documents. This makes an integrated EU strategy for the region even more important to ensure coherence with national policies and to bring the greatest added value from EU action¹⁷. (4) The Indo-Pacific Region – The Indo-Pacific region is growing in importance for the EU as it represents immense economic potential and therefore the new centre of global economic flows. Saroj Bishoyi (2016, page 91) considers “the Indo-Pacific region... an emerging geo-strategic and geo-economic concept that has been gaining significance in the field of defence and security studies... the Indo-Pacific envisages new frame-

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¹⁷ Retrieved on March 1, 2018, from https://ec.europa.eu/environment/efe/themes/climate-action/integrated-eu-policy-arctic_en

works that feature competitive and convergence security interests which are evident in the light of global power shift to the region. Importantly, the maritime powers, such as Australia, China, Japan, India and the US, determine the pivot of the Indo-Pacific region, while they seek to dominate and influence each other to achieve their national goals”.

Therefore, building an open ESDP will require the EU to rethink the terms of the EU’s contribution to transatlantic relationships and to invest in advancing the following strategic security partnerships in the light of Article 21 (TEU): EU-OSCE, EU-AU, EU-ASEAN, EU-China, EU-SCO, EU-India, EU-Israel, EU-Japan, EU-Gulf Cooperation Council, EU-Arctic Council, EU-Russian Federation. Other vital partners include Turkey, Iran, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

Critical Capabilities and Key Tasks for EU Security and Defence

Considering the current strategic environment, the priority areas of interest, and the assumption that the CSDP exercises a complementary and European perspective on the role of NATO, strengthened cooperation among the 27 member states can only be achieved by having a clear ambition in terms of future operational missions. The existence of a Capacity Development Plan (CDP) based on a close cooperation with the European Defence Agency (EDA) is already a good sign. Furthermore, it is absolutely necessary to maximise the potential of combined “civilian” and “military” capacities. It would not be feasible to list all the operational capacities that the EU will need in the near future here. However, we note a growing call for an effective common intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capacity, despite all the drawbacks imposed by national interests. Other decisive capacities currently lacking include joint training, operational legal restrictions, strategic sea-air lift and helicopters. The “Future Transport Helicopter” initiative (2020+), the European Air Transport Fleet (EATF), the remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), the “Single Sky” initiative (2000), the European Council call for a common approach to EU cyber security (2017)¹⁸, and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU, 2018) between the European Defence Agency and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to strengthen cooperation between the two institutions¹⁹, are good examples of EU initiatives. The Declaration on

¹⁸ Retrieved on March 9, 2018, from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cyber-security/>

¹⁹ The Cooperative Financial Mechanism (CFM) will play an important role in easing the launch phase of cooperative projects. Designed to support any type of collaborative efforts, in the R&T, R&D or acquisition phase, its support will include access to funding, a well-known

strengthening capacities (2008), the implementation of the requirements catalogue (2005), the force catalogue (2006) and the progress catalogue (2007) should also be mentioned. The EU must develop organizational and financial mechanisms to develop critical capacities in order to enhance its political and material ability to carry out the following types of missions in accordance with Article 31 (TEU) - “Union actions”:

- TYPE 1 – Article 42 (TEU) (Primary EU responsibility with national support) - To conduct limited “Crisis Management” and “Stabilization Operations” – This includes police monitoring operations, elections monitoring, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, operations to reinforce justice capacities, sector security reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), humanitarian operations, development aid and protection of sea lines of communication against piracy;

- TYPE 2 - Article 42 (TEU) (Primary EU responsibility with national support) - To execute “Shield” operations – This includes all military activities to ensure the integrity of EU borders, to fight against illegal immigration and human trafficking, and to benefit from synergies with national capacities in these areas;

- TYPE 3 – Solidarity Clause - Article 222 (Treaty Functioning of European Union (TFEU) (National responsibility with EU support) - To promote domestic protection and legitimacy – prevent, protect and assist. This includes the fight against terrorism, disaster response, search and rescue (SAR), ecological protection (water and other resources), protection of flows such as technology, and cyber threats;

- TYPE 4 – Mutual Assistance Clause - Article 42§7 (TEU) (National responsibility with EU support) - To stand ready with the capacities that ensure national self-defence - a minimal and credible support to hard power politics by strengthening self-defence capacities as a reasonable nominal contribution to collective self-defence.

shortfall of which hampers cooperative efforts, as well as the reduction of bureaucracy. It will result in increased quality of public expenditure. The Mechanism, developed as an EDA ad hoc Category A programme, is voluntary. Member states decide if they wish to participate, contribute and support projects. Once negotiations on the Programme Arrangement are finalised, the CFM is likely to be based on two pillars. In the first, intergovernmental, member states will have the opportunity to mutually support via a system of reimbursable advances and deferred payments. In the second, the European Investment Bank will act as the sole lender, supporting dual-use projects in line with its policies. This will enable an increased support from EIB for the security and defence agenda, an objective underlined several times by the European Council. Retrieved on March 9, 2018, from <https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2018/02/28/european-defence-agency-and-european-investment-bank-sign-cooperation-agreement>

Significant steps have been made in right direction i.e. to be able to deliver all types of missions. According to official sources²⁰, on 11 December 2017, the Council adopted a decision establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO - Article 46§2 TEU), less than a month after receiving a joint notification from member states of their intention to participate. The 25 member states participating in PESCO are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden (the UK, Denmark and Malta are not participating). On 13 November 2017, ministers from 23 members' states signed a joint notification on PESCO and handed it to the High Representative and the Council. On 7 December 2017, Ireland and Portugal also communicated their decision to join PESCO. PESCO's governance mechanism will foster binding common commitments undertaken by the participating member state, including "regularly increasing defence budgets in real terms in order to reach agreed objectives", and maintaining an overarching level of coherence, complemented by specific governance procedures at projects level. One of the major PESCO challenges will certainly be the deployability of forces. The European Defence Action Plan - Towards a European Defence Fund is expected to foster investment in small and medium enterprises (SME), start-ups, mid-caps and other suppliers to the defence industry²¹, and strengthen the single market for defence²². Hopefully, PESCO's advancements will induce future treaty solutions for security and defence. The mutual defence clause in Article 42§7 (TEU) is a common obligation that resembles NATO's Article 5 in light of Article 51 of the UN Charter, requiring

20 Retrieved on March 1, 2018, from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/11/defence-cooperation-pesco-25-member-states-participating/>

21 The European Structural and Investment Funds and European Investment Bank (EIB) group already provide financial support for the development of a number of dual-use activities. The Commission will support EIB efforts to improve access to funding by the defence supply chains. It will promote EU co-financing of productive investment projects and the modernisation of the defence supply chains. Under the "Blueprint for Sectoral Co-operation on Skills" the Commission will support cooperation in the defence sector to ensure people have the right skills and technological ability to generate innovation. Retrieved on March 8, 2018, from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4088_en.htm

22 The Commission will strengthen the conditions for an open and competitive defence market in Europe to help companies operate across borders and help member states get best value for money in their defence procurement. To do so, the Commission will push ahead with the effective application of the two Directives on defence and security procurement and on EU transfers, facilitate the cross-border participation in defence procurement, support the development of industry standards, and promote the contribution of sectoral policies, such as EU space programmes, to common security and defence priorities. Retrieved on March 8, 2018, from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4088_en.htm

assistance in case of an armed attack, by all means, including military. The solidarity clause of Article 222 (TFEU) can be exercised at the request of national authorities by informing the European Parliament. These are two very important legal provisions in light of type 3 and 4 operations. Both require common strategic planning, investment in R&D, cooperative procurement, and operational and logistic interoperability.

Structural and Organizational Challenges

In light of deepening defence cooperation among the 27 member states, this section identifies the challenges that constrain the process following the Lisbon Treaty. Article 4 (TFEU) established 14 areas of “shared competence”, but the common foreign, security and defence policies are not among them. The CFSP/CSDP is neither an exclusive nor a shared responsibility as it is entirely governmental. In fact, and despite the advances enabled by a set of new legal provisions, “security and defence remain the most ‘national’ (and therefore intergovernmental) of all policy areas, in the sense that EU MS are very reluctant to give up sovereignty to international organizations” (Keohane, 2012, page 84). This is why the CFSP/CSDP is addressed mainly in the TEU, with institutional references in the TFEU. The European Commission Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence (2017, page 11) states that there have “historically been differences in threat perceptions and strategic cultures. The nature of threats has also changed over time. We now face hybrid and transnational threats, as well as the significant impact of conflicts in surrounding regions. A security and defence union should encourage a stronger alignment of strategic cultures, as well as a common understanding of threats and appropriate responses. It will require joint decision-making and action, as well as greater financial solidarity at European level.” This is what motivates us to argue that structural and organizational developments must increase EU institutionalism vis-a-vis its intergovernmentalism, and encourage a higher level of burden sharing with a common defence budget in a manner that supersedes national concerns. Sustainable development also requires proportional security and defence capacities, which can be maximised by common and cooperative R&D, joint procurement, and a regulated and competitive defence market.

a) The need to increase EU institutionalism vis-a-vis its intergovernmentalism – Taking into consideration the principle of conferral and the need to deepen EU defence before integrating it, EU institutions should be more involved in the defence matters addressed in Article 36 (TEU) and Article 222§3 (TFEU). The solution established by the Lisbon Treaty, to entrust the

EEAS with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and at the same time to serve as Vice President of the European Commission, linked different institutional security perspectives. However, this is not enough. We see the extension of the European Parliament's competences in the area of security and defence (Article 223 TFEU), the establishment of a European Defence Fund, and greater involvement of the EU Commission and the European Central Bank (Article 282 TFEU) in the area of the defence market as absolutely fundamental. In regard to the European Commission, the monitoring of Article 346 (TFEU) (essential information in the interests of security) is particularly important, because it has the potential to destabilise the market and offset policy in the defence sector in light of its potential to "extinguish" small and medium enterprises and therefore the heart of innovation. According to the CSDP handbook (2012, page 87), another topic involving the European Commission appeared to be export licencing for defence transfers. The Commission proposed to replace the system of individual licences with a system of general licences covering several different transactions for those intra-community transfers where the risks of undesired re-exportation to third countries were firmly controlled. Member states agreed to this directive because, although it aimed to harmonise the rules and procedures for intra-community transfers, it left governments room for manoeuvre. Governments would still have the responsibility to allocate licences, and it would not give the Commission the power to regulate defence exports to countries outside the EU. The EU has to replicate on a larger scale defence clusters which facilitate defence investments and transfers, such as the Franco-British, Benelux and Nordic Defence Cooperation. Why not a "negative list" licencing system? Why not a common market for defence equipment? Ian Bond (2014, page 1) asserts the following: "...Member-states have resisted consolidation and the creation of an effective single market in defence for a variety of reasons. First, despite the fact that most EU member-states are also NATO allies, there is a lack of trust between them²³: nations continue to procure nationally because they are concerned about security of supply in a crisis... second, governments are often keen to protect jobs in their national defence industries, both to preserve skills and to avoid increasing unemployment..." In 2009 two directives were passed: the Defence and Security Procurement Directive (2009/81/EC) and the 2009/43/EC). In 2016, the European Commission²⁴ proposed a European Defence Fund and other actions to support more efficient spending by

23 Ian Bond (2014, page 1) - UK MOD stated in evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence in May 2012 that "we must be able to operate, maintain and refresh certain capacities effectively, without being dependent on others".

24 Retrieved on March 8, 2018, from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4088_en.htm

member states in joint defence capabilities, strengthen the security of European citizens and foster a competitive and innovative industrial base. This sort of defence activism is well regarded despite the criticism of the UK. Currently, CFSP/CSDP decisions are non-legislative instruments and so are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Article 24 TEU), with the exceptions of Articles 40 (TEU) and 275 (TFEU) – restrictive measures against legal persons. This solution was put forward as a facilitation mechanism to avoid sovereign constraints and to work for political facilitation. The future of EU defence requires that some structural defence issues be legislative in nature. The constructive abstention mechanism (Article 31§1 TEU) and enhanced cooperation in non-exclusive competences mechanism (Article 20 TEU) were created by the Treaty of Lisbon, but so far they have only been used in a limited manner. Provision 173 (TFEU) has no especial reference to the defence industry, and neither does Article 179 (TFEU) have any reference to research and technological development and space from a defence perspective. The future of EU security and defence will require the expansion of areas of exclusive competence to domains such as illegal immigration and human trafficking. Furthermore, it will be necessary to simplify the interactions between the EEAS Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civil Planning Conducting Capability (CPCC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) to achieve a high level of integration.

b) Need for a higher level of burden sharing and common defence budgeting – EU defence budgeting suffers from TWELVE major problems: (1) The number of member states spending less than 2% of their GDP on defence. On average, member states spend 1.4% of their GDP on security and defence, but 21 of them spend less than that average. In 2045 it is expected that the whole EU will spend less than a quarter of China's declared defence budget. In 2013, only the UK, Greece and Estonia spent 2% or more on defence. According to EUROSAT, in 2015, the EU's 28 member states earmarked €200 billion of public expenditure for 'defence', equivalent to 1.4% of their GDP. This is much less than the amount spent on social protection (expenditure equivalent to 19.2% of GDP in 2015), health (7.2%) or education (4.9%), but significantly higher than public spending on recreation, culture and religion (1.0%), environmental protection (0.8%), and housing and community amenities (0.6%)²⁵. In the same year, only the UK and Greece spent 2% or more on defence. In absolute terms, the UK spent by far the most on defence (€55 billion in 2015). This is equivalent to more than a quarter (27%) of the total EU public expenditure on defence. The UK was followed by France

25 Retrieved on March 8, 2018 from <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/EDN-20170607-1>

(€38 billion, or 19% of the EU total), Germany (€30 billion, or 15%) and Italy (€20 billion, or 10%). Together, these four member states accounted for 72% of the total defence expenditure in the EU. (2) Excessive allocation of financial resources to personnel spending and to the maintenance of non-operational facilities. (3) Triple allocation of military assets by the majority of member states (NATO, UN and EU), resulting in a triple fragmentation of means, poor operational management and high pressure on national defence budgets. (4) Under-allocation of resources to equipment procurement and R&D, resulting in poor procurement synergies. According to the EDA²⁶, the collaborative defence equipment procurement expenditure in 2014 only had a tangible relevant expression for Belgium, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. (5) Diversification of equipment imposing an excessive budgetary burden and preventing interoperability and synergies from by joint logistics²⁷. (6) Defence spending in operational activities decided by the EU as “Union Actions” remains a voluntary national contribution, in which the vast majority of the cost is borne by national authorities. It is urgent to alleviate this pressure on national defence budgets, at least for all type 2 operations as well as for some type 1 operations. (7) The undeveloped single European defence market. (8) The fact that the “Athena mechanism” covers less than 10% of military operational expenses²⁸. (9) Weak civilian-military capacity synergies applied to force generation. (10) Weak exercise of the possibilities offered by pooling and sharing²⁹. (11) The reduced number of deployable and sustainable forces. (12)


26 Retrieved on March 8, 2018 from <https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-portal>

27 According to Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2016 data), International Institute for Strategic Studies (Military Balance 2017), European Political Strategy Centre, Munich Security Report 2017 quoted by the European Commission (2017, page 9), EU navies use 29 types of vessel, compared with the 4 types used by the US Navy. EU armies use 178 types of main battle tanks or armoured vehicles, compared with 30 types used by the US Army. EU air forces use 20 types of aircraft, compared with 6 types used by the US Air force. According to different sources, there are currently (2016) 7,451 main battle tanks, 2,013 combat aircraft, 518 warships, 128 patrol vessels, 3+1 aircraft carriers, 55 submarines (21 nuclear), and 1,423,097 active personnel in the EU.

28 The mechanism only covers the following expenses: HQ implementation and running costs, including travel, computer information systems, administration, public information, locally hired personnel, force headquarters (FHQ) deployment and lodging; for forces as a whole, infrastructure, medical services (in theatre), medical evacuation, identification, acquisition of information (satellite images); reimbursements to/from NATO or other organizations (e.g. UN); barracks and lodging/infrastructure, essential additional equipment, medical services, acquisition of information (theatre level intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, including air to ground surveillance and reconnaissance, human intelligence); Other critical theatre-level capabilities (demining, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) protection, storage and destruction of weapons).

29 Based on a German-Swedish food for thought paper on intensifying European military

The general reduction in military personnel.



c) Defence cooperation must be deepened in terms of R&D, industry support, national and international joint procurement and the defence market – The heart of defence cooperation rests with the ability to construct

cooperation in 2010 (the “Ghent Initiative”), EDA together with its member states developed the pooling and sharing initiative. The concept refers to initiatives and projects to pool and share more military capabilities among EU member states. In November 2011, the EDA proposed and Defence Ministers adopted an initial list of eleven pooling and sharing priorities. Among these were Air-to-Air Refuelling, the Helicopter Training Programme, maritime surveillance, and the EU Satcom Market procurement cell. In its efforts to promote a systematic approach towards pooling and sharing, the EDA proposed and Ministers adopted the “Code of Conduct on Pooling & Sharing” on 19 November 2012. The Code comprises a series of actions to support cooperative efforts of EU member states to develop defence capabilities. The actions therein were aimed at mainstreaming pooling and sharing in member states’ planning and decision-making processes. They were to be implemented on a national and voluntary basis, in line with defence policies of member states. In December 2013, the European Council made a clear case for increased defence cooperation and welcomed the progress achieved by the Agency’s Code of Conduct on Pooling & Sharing. Additionally, during the November 2014 Steering Board, Defence Ministers adopted a Policy Framework to foster more systematic and long-term defence cooperation, as mandated by the December 2013 European Council.

a profitable and dynamic defence market. The Western defence market is shrinking while its production is becoming more significant. In contrast, China's defence industry is growing and in 2016 it was ranked 8th in the world context due to the growing investment in defence in Asia³⁰. The EU already has good strategies in place, such as European Defence Research & Technology (EDRT), the European Armaments Cooperation (EAC) and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). The EDA launched the Intergovernmental Regime to Increase Competition in the European Defence Equipment Market, the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, the Code of Best Practices in the Supply Chain, and the Code of Conduct on Offsets. The EU needs more partnerships with industry and Joint Investment Programmes (JIP), such as the CBRN Joint Investment Programme and Force Protection Joint Investment Programme. The EU also needs to take very seriously the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD), which should stand for mutually beneficial projects. An area with immense potential is dual-use technology, which has commercially competitive advantages. Armida van Rij identified the bottom line (The first edition of the European Defence Industry Summit, 2017³¹), when she highlighted the role of the defence industry and the EDA, calling them 'strategic partners' and stating the importance of engagement through structured dialogue. This engagement has to be integrated into wider EDA activities to be efficient, and will be key for developing Europe's strategic autonomy. Hence, there must be greater support for industries, by building partnerships across borders and improving information sharing activities to strengthen SMEs and facilitate their access to the market. The future of EU defence will be very much dependent on the willingness to invest jointly in the defence market, to foster forward-looking innovation, and to invest in research and development. A well-developed defence industry and a dynamic defence market will not only hold the potential to give the EU strategic autonomy but will also be in the best interests of the CSDP and NATO.

30 Jane's newly launched Market Potential Index ranks the industrial proficiencies of almost 100 defence markets worldwide. Using a unique methodology, it assesses the technological sophistication and scale of defence industrial competencies in the land, sea, air and electronics domains to produce a global ranking. The Jane's Market Potential Index assesses the status and appeal of 93 world defence markets based on factors that include defence investment, defence industrial capabilities, procurement procedures and protocols, trade mechanisms, embargo status and political, economic and security considerations. Each market is ranked against 36 ratings, with scores of 0 (low) to 5 (high) a positive or negative appeal. China score was 3.8 in 2017, Japan's 3.7 and Australia's 3.6. Retrieved on March 8, 2018 from <http://www.janes.com/article/76191/china-s-defense-industry-is-fastest-growing-in-asia-according-to-new-market-potential-index-from-jane-s-by-ihs-markit>

31 Retrieved on March 10, 2018 from http://defencesummit.eu/mailling/EUDEFENCE_2018_plaquette.pdf

d) EU External Representation – One of the components of the EU security and defence arrangements is its external representation. Since the use of hard power is an instrument of politics, the proximity and permanent contact of political representatives is relevant to our discussion. Thus, according to Article 221 (TFEU), EU delegations to third countries and international organizations shall represent the EU. However, the active representation of the EU does not necessarily mean a single representational entity. In reality, member states are merely bound to coordinate their action in international organizations (Article 34 TEU), and to cooperate closely with the EU (Article 221§2 TEU). Furthermore, member states are entitled to exercise external representation and to establish diplomatic and consular missions on their own (Article 35 TEU). EU external representation has historically been fragmented, mirroring the pillar structure. The EEC and later on the EC made no explicit reference to the external representation of the Community. However, Article 116 of the Treaty of Rome (EEC) has made provisions for member states within the framework of international organizations of an economic character to proceed only by common action. In Article 211 TEU, the treaty establishing the EC made clear that the Commission is the guardian of Community law, whereas article 282 TEU empowered the Commission to represent the Community in its member states (domestic dimension). Over the course of time, the Commission has developed its network of Commission delegations abroad, which represent it in third countries and international organizations – a network which the Lisbon Treaty turned into EU Delegations. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, in CFSP matters the rotating presidency was also responsible for representing the European Union (Kuijper et al., 2013, page 23-25). This had already been the case with the European Political Cooperation, as mentioned before. Until the Treaty of Amsterdam came into effect, external representation was centred on the Commission and in the Presidency, in light of the principle of separation between CFSP- and non-CFSP-related matters. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the High Representative for the CFSP but did not change this state of affairs. Likewise, and despite the fact that a set of innovations were included in the Treaty of Lisbon, the principle of separation between CFSP- and non-CFSP-related matters was kept, and so the CFSP emerged as an intergovernmental representation, specifically through the President of the European Council and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission. The HR/VP of the Commission was one of the major innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon, merging the previous position of the High Representative for CFSP with the Commissioner for external relations, and getting more closely involved in the Commission by acting as Vice-President at the same time. In addition, the HR/VP has proposal power before the Council to appoint Spe-

cial Representatives, as in the case of EU representation at the UN (Kuijper et al., 2013, page 28-29). Consequently, non-CFSP-related matters are represented by the European Commission, as before. But who actually represents the European Union externally? The President of the European Council has EU power of representation before Heads of State and Governments in CFSP-related matters; the HR/VP holds EU power of representation at ministerial level and for day-to-day administration of CFSP-related matters; the Commission dominates EU external representation in all non-CFSP-related matters; the Special Representatives³² have power of representation according to their mandates; EU Delegations represent the EU abroad in its entirety and not just the Commission; and, finally, the Commission has the power to represent the EU in judicial proceedings³³. EU powers of representation are depicted in the following table (next page):

32 Retrieved on March 8, 2018 from http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm

33 These delegations are under the authority of the HR/VP according to Article 221 §2 TFEU and represent the Union abroad in its entirety and not just the Commission, as used to be the case (Article 221§1 TFEU; Article 5§3 EEAS decision – Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organization and functioning of the EEAS, 3.8.2010, Official Journal of the European Union L 201/30). It is for this reason that they receive instructions from either the Human Rights Commission for matters relating to the CFSP, or from the Commission on non-CFSP policies. Kuijper, Pieter Jan; Wouters, Jan; et al. (2013, page 31).

Who Represents Externally the European Union?³⁴

Level/Matter	CFSP-related matters	Non-CFSP-related matters	Judicial proceedings
Head of State and Government	President of the Council (15§5 TEU)	President of the European Commission (17 TEU)	There is no explicit reference in the EU treaties to the capacity of the EU to subject itself to binding international disputes, nor to who is responsible for representing the EU in such disputes. However, agreements concluded with third states provide dispute settlement mechanisms by court, tribunal or through third-party arbitration. This has become the prerogative of the Commission ³⁵ . In relation to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), only states have standing before the Court. However, the ICJ Statute Articles 34§2 and 66 §2 grant international organizations, under certain conditions, the right to intervene ³⁶ .
Ministerial	High Representative Vice-President ³⁷ (27§2 TEU)	Commissioners and HR/VP acting as European Commission VP	
In third countries, international organizations, and multilateral fora	Special Representatives (33 TEU)		
	EU Delegations & Rotating Presidency Council of the European Union ³⁸		
Administrative	EEAS (27§3 TEU)	Commission EEAS services HQ services	

In sum, EU external representation is not unified, and it is the quality of the matter (CFSP or non-CFSP) that drives the allocation of the power of

³⁴ Adapted from Kuijper, Pieter Jan; Wouters, Jan; et al. (2013, pages 46 and 62).

³⁵ F. Hoffmeister (2012, Volume II, pages 80-81).

³⁶ International Court of Justice (2009). Case concerning delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment of 3 February 2009, §3.

³⁷ “abandoning some of the constitutional terminology, such as the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs – instead we continue to have a “mere” High Representative ... might suggest to those unfamiliar with EU that its foreign affairs policy is still in its infancy”, Piet Eeckhout (2011, page 3).

³⁸ The presidency of the Council rotates among the EU MS every six months. During this six-month period, the presidency chairs meetings at every level in the Council, helping to ensure the continuity of the EU’s work in the Council. Member states holding the presidency work together closely in groups of three, called ‘trios’. This system was introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The trio sets long-term goals and prepares a common agenda determining the topics and major issues that will be addressed by the Council over an 18-month period. On the basis of this programme, each of the three countries prepares its own more detailed six-month programme. Retrieved on March 2018, from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/council/what-is-the-presidency?lang=en>

representation to the appropriate position within the EU structure. This situation is expected to persist as long as the CFSP and CSDP remain mainly intergovernmental.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

If Europe does not take care of its own security, nobody else will do it for us. A strong, competitive and innovative defence industrial base is what will give us strategic autonomy.

The Head of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker

To invest in security and defence is to secure strategic autonomy for the EU. The purpose of security and defence improvements is not to transform the EU into a military power. Rather, the EU will continue to be a civilian power, exercising soft power, but with a proportionate military capacity to reinforce its ability to contribute to the security of all member states and globally. Furthermore, each and every member state must deliver a reasonable contribution to collective self-defence. At the Bratislava Summit in September 2016, the leaders of 27 member states stated: “We need the EU not only to guarantee peace and democracy but also the security of our people.” In view of geopolitical and geo-economic challenges, they agreed on the need to strengthen EU cooperation on external security and defence. The December 2016 European Council should “decide on a concrete implementation plan on security and defence and on how to make better use of the options in the Treaties, especially as regards capabilities.” The European Council reaffirmed its commitment to the European Union Internal Security Strategy 2015-2020. It also addressed the strengthening of EU cooperation on external security and defence. In particular, the heads of state or government focused on three priorities: the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence; the European Defence Action Plan; and the implementation of the common set of proposals following the EU-NATO Joint Declaration signed in Warsaw in July 2016. In a joint op-ed issued ahead of the European Council, President Donald Tusk, President Jean Claude-Juncker and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg highlighted the importance of cooperation between the two organisations: “More than ever in a changing world, soft power alone is not enough. Security begins at home and that is why the EU is committed to doing more to protect and defend its citizens, and to help those member states who are Allies to play their full part in NATO,”³⁹.

³⁹ Retrieved on March 8, 2018 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european->

Indeed, security and defence capacities are at the centre of the problem. They depend on four vital factors: areas of strategic interest, types of missions, member state synergies to create economies of scale and a competitive defence market. The Lisbon Treaty introduced new viable provisions to obtain cooperation gains. Among other institutions, the European Commission and the European Defence Agency would seem to have fundamental roles in terms of R&D and joint procurement. But this is not enough. EU member states are simply not spending enough on defence and therefore funds are scarce, money is often badly spent, and inefficiencies accumulate due to operational and procurement weaknesses. In addition, sovereign fears, especially in relation to mutual trust, security of supply, unemployment and private sector competitiveness, result in the fragmentation of the European defence market. The general reduction of defence budgets (at least after 2008), the raising costs of equipment and personnel, the existence of monopolies or oligopolies at national level and the inability to explore economies of scale at EU level are the root cause of procurement inefficiencies. The EU needs integrated defence-planning cycles among member states, and harmonised between the CSDP and NATO. Defence cooperation must become the default mode in the EU. However this does not mean that there is no room for exclusive national interest projects; to the contrary, member states must have the assurance to carry out such projects. Investing in the defence industry and setting the right policies to leverage the EU defence market will work as a shortcut to overcoming the strategic disparities between the EU member states. Investing in security and defence is a win-win strategy for all.

European universities ought to invest in security education and to construct a positive narrative promoting research and publication. They should be given incentives to develop dual-use technologies. The European Defence Agency, the Institute for Strategic Studies and the EEAS will continue to have a central role in strengthening defence, but EU institutions must have more competences in security and defence matters. A minimal number of CFSP and CSDP issues should be legislative in nature and therefore part of their shared competences. It is time to consider a single external European border and a united Coast Guard force. It is time to strengthen EUROPOL's European Counter-terrorism Agency. The creation of the EU satellite centre was a major step forward in terms of constructing credible EU intelligence expertise. It is time to seek greater integration of intelligence assets of EU member states, especially in type 1 and 2 operations. Security and defence requires a good level of representation and the continuous development of strategic partnerships.

The EU has a natural ability for multilateralism, but this fact can neither diminish excessive fragmentation of assets, nor decrease expenses without operational output. The EU must have a certain degree of strategic autonomy in relation to NATO, exercising complementary and concurrent but harmonized strategic planning and task division. Finally, the only way for the EU to be well prepared to face the next crisis is to act now. The development of security and defence cooperation is an ongoing process, but it cannot slow down. It has to be made the cornerstone of future EU developments.

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ABSTRACT

This paper poses questions about EU soft power, why it is insufficient and how that can be changed. This is done in an attempt to shed light on the current status of the European Union defence sector. The paper specifically addresses political, strategic, structural and organizational challenges. It further proposes development paths for the enhancement of common defence capacities, vis-a-vis the current stage of major threats and the parity of strategic contenders such as the USA, the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Finally, this paper identifies concrete policy recommendations for a sustainable long-term defence cooperation-integration process, compatible with the exercise of the EU's 27 national sovereignties. The research methods are undergirded by qualitative research and supported by semi-structured interviews. Seminar discussions and key points were also incorporated into the final version.

KEY WORDS

European Union, Security, Defence, Future, NATO, CFSP, CSDP

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UNPACKING NIGERIA'S PEACE EFFORTS DURING THE SECOND CYCLE OF THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT

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Introduction

Post-colonial Nigeria has become a major player in the prevention, management, and resolution of international conflicts. Peace operations represent a major component of Nigeria's general foreign policy, which emphasizes national interest, world peace, friendship and cooperation. Nigeria's participation in international peace operations officially began at independence when the country took part in the Congo peace mission under the umbrella of the United Nations (UN) (Obasanjo 2007; Akintola 2007; Agbu 2007). From that point, Nigeria has been involved in the various levels of international peace operations. These include deployments under the platforms of the UN, Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and other bilateral arrangements. Nigeria was involved in the peace processes in Lebanon, Chad, Angola, Namibia, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, among others (Alli 2012). Through the years, 'Nigeria has deployed forces of various strength ranging from observer missions usually made up of a few men and smaller sized units to battalions and division-sized forces' (Oluyemi-Kusa 2012, p. 137).

As explained by Akintola (2007, p. 77), Nigeria's role in international peace operations has 'shifted qualitatively from that of a participant to initiator'. The reason is that the country has not only featured prominently in UN peace operations, but has succeeded in spearheading peace operations in

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Africa by mobilizing other countries in the region. Nigeria's peace missions in Africa normally involve mediators, the Nigerian police force, and members of the armed forces (Gbor 2007; Musa 2010). The Nigerian Army as a component of the Nigerian Armed Forces 'has borne the greatest burden of peace operations to which Nigeria, and by extension the Nigerian military, has been invited since the country's independence in 1960' (Gbor 2007, p. 61). In Africa, Nigeria's approach to regional security has been largely influenced by its national role conception in continental international relations. With this role conception, Nigerian political leaders understand the country as a natural leader in Africa with the responsibility to promote and protect the interests of the continent (Alli 2012; Oshewolo 2018; Saliu & Oshewolo 2018). In addition, the security of Nigeria is believed to be tied to that of other African states fundamentally because of cultural and historical linkages (Alli 2012).

Following the closure of the Mission in Liberia on March 30 2018 after 15 years deployment and president Olusegun Obasanjo's recognition of Nigeria as a leading actor in the stabilization efforts in the region, it is important to conduct a study of the role played by Nigeria in the Liberian peace process under the banners of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). After years of military dictatorships and the consequent disorientation of Nigeria's Africa diplomacy, the emergence of President Obasanjo on 29 May 1999 as the democratically elected leader ushered the country into a new era of diplomatic renaissance in Africa. His administration was expected to oxygenate Nigeria's Africa diplomacy and make meaningful contributions towards addressing the security challenges confronting the continent. Liberia – Nigeria's West African neighbor – was one of the countries going through internal political convulsion at the time. Considering the desire of President Obasanjo – expressed through his foreign policy speeches – to address head-on Africa's security concerns, this study is designed to examine the effectiveness of Nigeria's peace campaigns during the second cycle of the Liberian conflict. To carry out this task, the paper adopted the secondary sources and interview technique for the purpose of data collection. The key-informants were selected using the purposive sampling procedure². The method of data analysis is descriptive thematic analysis.

² The study's key-informants include Ambassador (Professor) Akinjide Osuntokun (Honorary Adviser on Foreign Policy to President Olusegun Obasanjo and a member of the Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations), Ambassador (Professor) Alaba Ogunsanwo (Department of International Relations, Lead City University, Ibadan, Oyo State), Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu (Nigeria's Ministry of Defence and the AU Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), Ambassador Jaiyeola Joseph Lewu (Retired Ambassador and principal actor in the West African peace processes under President Obasanjo), Professor Osisioma Nwoli (Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan), Professor Alade Fawole (Department

President Obasanjo's peace rhetoric in Africa

To make sense of Nigeria's peace efforts in Africa under president Olusegun Obasanjo, the study focused on some of his foreign policy speeches while in office. These speeches offered valuable insights into President Obasanjo's foreign policy position towards Africa. The use of verbal ornamentation by a leader, particularly through foreign policy speeches, is suggestive of the leader's convictions and idiosyncrasies about how government or international relations should be organized. Although historical evidence may suggest that what leaders 'say' does not always translate into what leaders 'do', the speeches of the leader and the views expressed through them are largely considered as the official reflection of national policy. They are also largely a good indicator of foreign policy positions (Fawole 2000; Oshewolo 2018). Through his foreign policy speeches in both African and extra-African fora, President Obasanjo clearly expressed the commitment of his administration to Africa's peace and stability. Therefore, a major component of Nigeria's Africa diplomacy under Obasanjo was the promotion of peace and stability (Ogunsanwo 2016; Fawole 2016; Akinboye 2016; Ajayi 2016; Osuntokun 2016).

Shortly after his emergence as Nigeria's president in 1999, Chief Obasanjo described Africa as a continent ravaged by conflicts, and where the sound of guns was more audible than the voice of reason. He made it clear to other African leaders that it would be morally reprehensible to stand idly and allow people to continue to suffer on account of these problems (Obasanjo 1999). During the United Nations' millennium summit in New York in 2000, Obasanjo expressed his disgust about the persistence of conflicts on the continent. He observed that these conflicts had been very devastating as a result of the destruction of lives and key infrastructure, and their deleterious effects on the weaker members of society such as children and women (Obasanjo 2000a). At another forum, Obasanjo observed that of all the predicaments facing the continent, the most intractable had been the proliferation of internal conflicts. These conflicts had imposed heavy social and economic costs on governments, created the burden of refugee flows, disrupted economic activities and investment flows due to the general climate of fear associated with conflicts (Obasanjo 2000b).

President Obasanjo maintained that the nations of Africa could not develop if domestic conflicts were not properly managed. He observed that the problems of security and stability would impair the capacity of African

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nations to achieve integration and socio-economic transformation (Obasanjo 1999). For him, peace is not only vital for interstate cooperation; it is also an essential condition for development (Obasanjo 2000b). While delivering his acceptance speech after his election as the chairman of the AU in 2004, he noted that the body would confront headlong the conflict situations in Africa with renewed vigor and determination (Obasanjo 2004).

Again, after ceding Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon following the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), president Obasanjo maintained that Nigeria honored the ICJ judgment, despite its wide condemnation within the country, to promote peace, security and stability. With this singular decision, he claimed that Nigeria had set a lesson for Africa and the world. Nigeria had demonstrated the possibility of resolving a difficult border problem without war. Nigeria had demonstrated the values of accommodation, tolerance, dialogue and commitment to peace (Obasanjo 2006). On account of Nigeria's good neighborliness and big-brother role in the West African sub-region, the administration of president Obasanjo was even more concerned with the security situation in West Africa (Alli 2012; Oshewolo 2018). To examine the effectiveness of the administration's peace efforts in Africa, the study focused on Nigeria's West African Neighbor – Liberia.

The second cycle of the Liberian conflict

The first Liberian civil war began in 1989. In response to the conflict, President Babangida sent 'Nigerian troops there as the bulk of an ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to end a war between President Samuel Doe's regime and rebels led by Charles Taylor'. Following the death of Doe and the control of much of the country by Taylor, Nigeria was 'obliged to accept a presidential election' in which Taylor won a majority of votes (Lliffe 2011, p. 218). Therefore, the rebellion against the oppressive rule of Samuel Doe ended with the election of Charles Taylor (a principal actor in the war) as the President of Liberia on August 6, 1997. The fact that Taylor (the leader of NPFL rebel forces) participated in the election and emerged victorious confirmed the neutrality and impartiality of the Nigeria-led ECOMOG peacekeeping force in Liberia. He was not only allowed to win the election and sworn in as President, he was also protected by the same ECOMOG troops he attacked during the war. This was a demonstration of a high moral standard in international peacekeeping (Nwolise 2007).

The diverse narratives that provide explanations for the first cycle of the conflict have received a sizeable coverage in the literature (Johnson Sirleaf 1991; Munive 2011; Kieh 2012; Call 2010; Boas 2014). The focus of this study

however is on the second cycle of the war which began on April 21, 1999. The celebrated peace that heralded the electoral victory of Charles Taylor by a landslide of 75 per cent in a relatively free and fair election soon collapsed like a stack of cards (Call 2010). At the inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo as Nigeria's President on May 29, 1999, the second Liberian civil war had lasted for only thirty-nine days. The onus was therefore on Obasanjo's government to restore peace in war-torn Liberia (Fawole 2016). Kieh (2009, p.8) offered a concise background to the second Liberian civil war. In his submission;

The war commenced with armed attacks launched by a warlordist militia, Liberians United for Reconstruction and Democracy (LURD). The outfit was an amalgam of members of some of the erstwhile militias that were involved in the first Liberian civil war, disaffected members of the former Taylor-led National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and war-time capitalists with interests in the private accumulation of capital. LURD launched its attacks from Guinea, Liberia's neighbor to the North... In March 2003, the ambit of the war was broadened when the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), a surrogate organization of LURD, joined the war against Taylor. MODEL launched its armed attacks from Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia's Eastern neighbor.

The author also identified the factors that precipitated the crisis. The proximate factors, which were the direct undercurrents of the crisis, had to do with Charles Taylor's miserable performance in office. This reflected in the convergence of issues such as 'ethnic-scapegoating', political repression and economic malaise. Then again, the contingent factors were necessary but not sufficient conditions for the crisis to take place. These included the failure to properly disarm, demobilize, rehabilitate, and re-integrate the ex-combatants into the larger society; the failure to embark on a meaningful security sector reform; and the refusal of the Taylor administration to set in motion the process of addressing the underlying causes of the first civil war (Kieh 2009). As articulated by Yoroms (2005), these rebel groups also believed that Taylor did not win the election fairly. They claimed that Taylor emerged victorious through a special arrangement by ECOWAS.

Explaining the precipitants further, George (2012) remarked that Charles Taylor failed to utilize his election as President to properly transform himself from a warlord to a responsible head of state. The thinking initially was that the election of Taylor would offer opportunities for peace. The electoral victory of Taylor – who was a principal actor in the crisis – was expected to put an end to the conflict and allow ECOMOG to complete the final tasks

of disarming, demobilizing, training, reorganizing and reintegrating the rebels into the Liberian armed forces. These opportunities were however squandered (Yoroms 2005). He engaged in political rascality, provided supports for rebels and dissidents in Sierra Leone and Guinea primarily to motorize his illegal trade in diamonds, and therefore became the locus of the conflict in the Mano River region (Gambari 2005; George 2012; Nwolise 2016). Taylor demonstrated that his intention was not only to rule Liberia but also to control regimes in the Mano River region and build an empire for himself in the region (Yoroms 2005). The combination of the proximate and contingent factors made Liberia's regression into the abyss of war inevitable. It may be hard to remember now, but Taylor's war (his dissidence during the first cycle of the crisis and his violent oppression during the second cycle) was beastly and produced an immense humanitarian disaster (Lizza 2005).

Motivations for intervention

The data sources revealed that the government of President Olusegun played frontline roles in restoring peace to Liberia (Nwolise 2016; Fawole 2016; Ajayi 2016; Shehu 2018; Lewu 2018). Although Nigeria's intervention hugely defined the outcome of the conflict in Liberia, it must be noted that the government of President Obasanjo was initially wary of deploying Nigerian troops. This cautious attitude can be explained. Nigeria was at the beginning disinclined to troop deployment because of the enormous cost that accrued to the country during the first cycle of the war without support from the West and the loss of hundreds of Nigerian soldiers that made the intervention unpopular at home (BBC News, August 4, 2003; Shehu 2018).

Again, in spite of ECOMOG's stabilizing role in Liberia, Taylor refused to honor the mandate allowing ECOMOG to remain in Liberia to perform the post-war reorganization of the Liberian military (Lewu 2018). After he became president, he ordered ECOMOG out of Liberia and Nigeria-led ECOMOG departed without accomplishing the final mission of the peacekeeping process (Yoroms 2005). Taylor's expression of disapproval for ECOMOG's continuing stay in Liberia led to the departure of the last batch of Nigeria's ECOMOG troops in 1999. These troops – numbering about 60 – arrived at the Abuja airport in October 1999 and were received by Dupe Adedara – Nigeria's Minister of State for Defense – and other top army officers (Independent Online, 1999). Taylor's attitude therefore put off President Obasanjo's interest in the second Liberian civil war initially (Yoroms 2005). President Obasanjo was also of the view that the international community had the duty to intervene in Liberia. As such, the conflict was not a problem to be resolved by ECOWAS

alone (Yoroms 2005). However, as the situation during the second Liberian civil war degenerated and the international community failed to intervene, Nigeria was forced to respond by sending the first batch of troops to support mediation efforts, stop an unfolding humanitarian disaster in Liberia and the spread of the conflict to neighboring states that were already burdened with a steady stream of refugees from the Liberian civil war (Dukule 2005; Obi 2009; Lewu 2018; The Liberian Connection, nd). Nigeria's cautious attitude about peace operations in Liberia notwithstanding, president Obasanjo's intervention was still considered very imperative for a number of reasons.

In terms of the motivations for President Obasanjo's intervention, George (2012, p. 381) observed that the crisis in Liberia was 'a threat and challenge to political stability, peace and security of the sub-region'. Explaining the context further, Fawole (2016), noted that if Nigeria did not get involved, it would have meant that Nigeria's initial seven years of sacrifice in manpower, resources and diplomacy during the first cycle of the war would have been wasted. This is what Shehu (2018) referred to as the theory of 'sunk costs'. Since a lot of human and financial resources had been sunk in Liberia by the time Obasanjo assumed leadership, it was imperative and logical to make efforts to get Taylor out of power in the interest of peace. Again, as realists would argue, the government of President Obasanjo got involved in the crisis to demonstrate Nigeria's leading position or hegemonic role in the West African sub-region. In other words, the crisis in Liberia offered Nigeria the opportunity to project its military and diplomatic capabilities in the sub-region. The intervention had more to do with Obasanjo's image as a great leader, his desire to leave an indelible mark on Nigeria's history, and the aspirations of the Nigerian army to enhance its status and worth as a national and sub-regional asset (Obi 2009). As argued by Uba (2016), Nigeria used the platforms of ECOMIL and UNMIL to demonstrate its leadership credentials in Africa and diplomatic status within the international society. The intervention in Liberia by the civilian administration of Obasanjo has also been justified on the ground of promoting 'African solutions to African problems' (Obi 2009, p. 122).

Nigeria's mediatory and peacekeeping efforts in Liberia

In terms of form, Nigeria's intervention in Liberia oscillated between mediation and peacekeeping. Nigeria's mediatory efforts – which culminated in the eventual signing of a comprehensive peace agreement in 2003 – primarily involved President Obasanjo and the special mediator he appointed, General Abdulsallam Abubakar (Alli 2012; George 2012; Fawole 2016; Ajayi

2016). President Olusegun Obasanjo deployed Nigeria's diplomatic resources to halt all offensive military actions among warring factions, and bring them to a negotiated settlement. Some of the key-informants noted that the resilience of President Obasanjo, which found expression in his cease-fire diplomacy, dotted the entire peace process. Nigeria successfully facilitated the exit of Taylor from power, supervised the comprehensive peace agreement, offered Taylor a temporary sanctuary in Nigeria, and supported the 2005 post-conflict elections (Osuntokun 2016; Fawole 2016; Nwolise 2016; Lewu 2018). In March 2002, as part of Nigeria's mediatory efforts, Abuja hosted a Preparatory Meeting to the Liberian National Reconciliation Conference (LNRC). The meeting was designed as an assembly of government officials, rebel leaders and Liberian civil society groups to strengthen the country's efforts, and as a precursor to the All Liberian Reconciliation Conference scheduled to hold in Monrovia later in the year. The meeting had in attendance President Olusegun Obasanjo, the representative of Abdoulaye Wade (the Chairman of ECOWAS), Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambers (Executive Secretary of ECOWAS) and other notable figures (The Perspective 2002; George 2012).

The meeting was however marred by the absence of President Taylor and other rebel leaders. While Nigeria provided an aircraft to lift the officials of President Taylor to Abuja, he was lukewarm to the offer. Taylor's lukewarm attitude can be explained. Taylor and his officials erroneously believed that Nigeria was behind the international sanctions against Liberia. Yes, to introduce a draft resolution to slam international sanctions against Taylor and Liberia, the British High Commissioner and Charge d' Affaires of the United States respectively visited Ambassador Olufemi Oyewole George in his office to solicit Nigeria's support. However, Nigeria and other ECOWAS members were wary of supporting the proposal and rather opted to convince Taylor to address his political misdeeds as a matter of urgency (George 2012). Taylor's absence notwithstanding, the dialogue was significant in that it clearly marked out the germane conditions that must be satisfied before a genuine reconciliation could be achieved. These conditions included; the establishment of ceasefire between the warring parties, the effective monitoring of the national security apparatus, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of dissidents, and the creation of effective mechanisms to address acts of impunity (The Perspective 2002).

As the security situation in Liberia deteriorated, ECOWAS continued its intermediation by organizing another round of peace talks in Accra on June 4, 2003 with the support of Nigeria and the international community. Before the opening ceremony, the ECOWAS Heads of Government in attendance held a private discussion with Taylor during which he was frankly repri-

manded. After the discussion, Taylor declared that he was ready to relinquish power if he was the one obstructing the peace process (George 2012). During the negotiations that followed, President Obasanjo sent General Abdulsallam Abubakar, former Nigerian Head of State, as special mediator supported by delegates from the UN, AU, and the United States, among others (Alli 2012). General Abdulsallam Abubakar was instrumental in achieving the peace accord in Accra (Dukule 2005). While a ceasefire agreement was arrived at on June 17, 2003, this however broke down when the rebel forces entered the capital city of Monrovia, and again there was a regression into violence. On account of this, ECOWAS, at a summit in Dakar on July 2, 2003, resolved to deploy an ECOWAS military force to restore peace and facilitate the handover of power by Taylor. Again, on August 1, 2003, the United Nations authorized the establishment of a multinational force in Liberia (Gambari 2005; George 2012).

Before the arrival of the UN peacekeeping troops, Nigeria had deployed 300 soldiers to Liberia on August 4, 2003 (which was increased later to 1,500 Nigerian peacekeepers under the banner of ECOMIL) to serve as a stabilization force, separate the belligerent forces, and support humanitarian and aid workers. As a vanguard force, ECOMIL was not to engage in enforcement but to guide or keep peace (Morgan 2003; *The Perspective* 2003; *The Liberian Connection* nd; Yoroms 2005; Alli 2012). While the troop strength of ECOMIL was a little above 3000, Nigeria contributed about half. Other troops came from Senegal, Mali, Benin, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Togo. Again, Nigerian officers were given key leadership responsibilities in ECOMIL. While Brigadier-General Festus Okonkwo served as ECOMIL force commander, Colonel Mark Nyoyoko was in charge of operations (BBC News, September 9, 2003; CNN International, August 2, 2003; *The Liberian Connection*, nd; *the Perspective* 2003; United Nations 2005; Uba 2016).

Furthermore, deeply worried about the escalating conflict in Liberia, the UN Security Council (UNSC), at its 4803rd meeting on August 1, 2003, adopted Resolution 1497 authorizing the deployment of a multinational force in Liberia. While 12 countries voted in favour of the Resolution, none voted against it. France, Germany and Mexico abstained from the vote. The Resolution described the situation in Liberia as a threat to international peace and to stability in West Africa, and therefore authorized the establishment of a multinational force to support the implementation of the June 17, 2003 ceasefire agreement and help maintain security in post-Taylor Liberia (United Nations Security Council 2003a; CNN International, August 2, 2003; Gambari 2005). More so, in order to provide adequate supports for humanitarian and human rights assistance, security reform and the implementation of the peace pro-

cess, the UN Security Council, at its 4830th meeting on September 19, 2003, adopted Resolution 1509 establishing the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

In fulfillment of the UNSC's request, the Secretary General of the UN transferred ECOMIL's authority to UNMIL on October 1, 2003 and the former's troops transposed into UN peacekeepers (United Nations Security Council 2003b; Gambari 2005). Even under the banner of UNMIL, the Nigerian contingents remained very active and were regarded as the face of the mission (Uba 2016). A Nigerian, Lieutenant-General Joseph Olorungbon Owonibi, who had been the Deputy Force Commander and Chief Military Observer of UNMIL since November 2003, was also appointed in 2005 as UNMIL's Force Commander by the Secretary General (United Nations 2005).

Nigeria's peace campaign in Liberia was applauded both by the Liberian people and the international community (Nwolise 2016; Ajayi 2016). On account of the escalation of the conflict and the failure of the international community to intervene early, the first batch of Nigerian troops deployed to Liberia was warmly received by residents of the Liberian capital, Monrovia. The presence of the Nigerian peacekeepers provided the much needed succor as the military confrontation between the government forces and rebel groups deepened (Dukule 2005; *The Liberian Connection*, nd). Again, Nigeria's initial intervention was significant in shaping international response to the Liberian conflict. Nigeria's initial deployment paved the way for the establishment of the UNMIL. Without such preparatory work by the Nigerian troops, it would have been difficult to get the required consensus in the Security Council to have UNMIL deployed in Liberia (African Leadership Magazine 2016; Uba 2016). As a measure of the warm public perception of Nigeria's foremost role in Liberia under President Obasanjo, both the ECOMIL and UNMIL were commanded by Nigerians.

During the period, while the troop strength of UNMIL was 14,824 from 49 troop contributing countries (UNMIL 2015), Nigerian peacekeeping contingents constituted the bulk. Major General Salihu Zaway Uba, a Nigerian UNMIL Force Commander, noted that Nigeria 'deployed 37 infantry battalions, 13 signal units, 21 Formed Police Units, several military observers, United Nations Police, United Nations Volunteers, and international civilian staff to UNMIL' (Uba 2016, p. 9). The Nigerian contingents played stabilizing role in Liberia. The Nigerian peacekeeping personnel in Liberia facilitated the consolidation of peace and peace-building process; provided humanitarian and development assistance through medical outreaches, teaching supports and donation of books to orphanages; provided executive protection for the Liberian President and Vice-President and other important government officials since 2003; provided cash escort, security of maximum correction facili-

ty, protection for the main airport and urban patrols (Uba 2016).

President Taylor's asylum in Nigeria and the issues

In line with Taylor's earlier decision to resign from office during a meeting with ECOWAS leaders, coupled with the insistence of Nigeria and the United States that President Taylor must quit, he eventually relinquished power to his Vice President as enshrined in the Liberian constitution on August 11, 2003 (George 2012). While some international observers wanted Taylor to immediately appear before the Court for prosecution (Lizza 2005), the government of President Obasanjo was mooting the idea of granting him asylum (Fawole 2016; Nwolise 2016; Ajayi 2016). Taylor's departure from power and his acceptance of Nigeria's asylum offer – which brought an end to the carnage in Liberia – culminated in a Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was signed on August 18, 2003 in Accra after 75 days of negotiation. The Peace Agreement returned Liberia to the path of peace by providing for the establishment of a National Transitional Government that would replace the Interim Government (African Union 2004; Alli 2012; George 2012).

By welcoming Taylor to Nigeria, despite the burden of such a move, Nwolise (2016) noted that President Olusegun Obasanjo was projecting Nigeria's 'big brother' role in Africa. Fawole (2016) maintained that it was the combination of President Obasanjo's global stature and Nigeria's own gravitas that convinced Taylor to accept the asylum. Nigeria's Taylor asylum was well received by President Bush of the United States of America. The American Ambassador to Nigeria during the period, Howard Jeter, reported to Congress in 2004 that Nigeria acted with the full knowledge and concurrence of the United States (Lizza 2005; Morgan 2003; Alli 2012). Explaining why the United States supported Nigeria's move, Lizza (2005) further noted that the career officers who dominated the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs had a Nigeria-centric view of West Africa. At that time, Nigeria was an increasing source of oil for the United States and Nigeria's military forces were needed for peacekeeping purposes across the continent.

Taylor's asylum generated some issues. While some wanted immediate trial, president Obasanjo was not kindly disposed to such idea (Nwolise 2016). His thinking was that 'to turn Taylor over to the special Court without the support of the African states involved in Liberia would undermine Obasanjo's credibility as an African regional leader' (Campbell 2011, p. 130). As a matter of fact, Obasanjo's close associates were of the view that trying a former African head of state in an international court would create a prec-

edent that would make arranging the voluntary departure of other tyrants more difficult in the future (Campbell 2011). Again, Nigeria's Taylor asylum was greeted with condemnation within the country. The loudest critics of the move, mostly members of the fourth estate of the realm, anchored their criticism on Taylor's brutal dictatorship and horrendous human rights abuses including the murder of two Nigerian journalists in 1989, and his indictment for war crimes. Other critics labeled Nigeria as a country harboring war criminals (Oluyemi-Kusa 2007). Without dismissing the arguments of the critics, George (2012, p. 403) maintained that the overriding interests of the Liberian people and even of the sub-region were more paramount, and that the government of Nigeria 'would consider any request by a democratically elected government based on the wishes of the people of Liberia for the extradition of Taylor'.

Furthermore, the handling of Taylor's asylum was a subject of serious scrutiny much like the offer of asylum itself. The terms of his exile included strict conformity with the laws of Nigeria; abstention from engaging in any subversive activities against Liberia and the host country; refraining from participating in the political activities of Liberia while on Nigeria's soil; and desisting from instigating military intervention in Liberia (George 2012). Taylor however disregarded his terms of exile. He engaged in subversive activities by exchanging correspondences and maintaining lines of communication with his former aides via e-mails and telephone calls, for which the United States had to slam a travel ban on Liberians acting as couriers for Taylor. He was also accused of helping several political actors that would participate in the Liberian elections. Perhaps, more grievous was Taylor's alleged assassination attempt on the life of ailing President Lansana Conte of Guinea, a neighboring country that supported the rebel forces that successfully campaigned against Taylor's government (Lizza 2005).

There was also the negligence that led to Taylor's disappearance before his final arrest in the Nigerian-Cameroonian border. In defense of Nigeria however, President Obasanjo, while interacting with President Bush at the Oval Office in 2006, disagreed with the negligence-theory in Nigeria's handling of Taylor. He claimed that if Nigeria was negligent or connived with Taylor to enable him evade trial, then his arrest would not have been possible (Administration of George W. Bush 2006). President Obasanjo's defense notwithstanding, The Nigerian security officer who was responsible for Taylor told the Court that the negligence-theory was valid after all. He maintained that Taylor's correspondences and phone calls were not monitored. He also reported that Taylor received visitors, and contrary to popular belief, Taylor was not under house arrest in Nigeria (Lizza 2005). Taylor's attempted escape

from Nigeria threatened to fracture diplomatic relations between the Obasanjo government and Bush administration in the US (Campbell 2011).

Post-conflict elections

Furthermore, Nigeria played a decisive role in the period leading to the 2005 post-conflict elections in Liberia. The subject of post-conflict elections has assumed a position of importance in the scholarly literature and policy cycles. The thinking is that post-conflict elections are considered critical to the peace building process in war-ravaged countries (Gambari 2005; Kieh 2011). In the case of Liberia, there were concerns about the democratic process and the actual conduct of elections. Commenting on these concerns, Sawyer (2008) noted that the post-conflict environment in Liberia was not conducive to holding elections and that a serious programme of reconciliation and constitutional reforms should have preceded the holding of elections. Gambari (2005, p. 7) observed that preparations for elections were not only behind schedule, there were other threats to stability such as 'the reintegration of ex-combatants and refugees, the disaffection of unemployed youth, government workers and Taylor loyalists', which 'put a dark shadow over the outcome and success of the election'. As a result, preparations for elections triggered another round of crisis among political parties. To address the crisis, President Obasanjo of Nigeria invited the aggrieved party leaders to Abuja for a dialogue. During the Presidential run-off, President Obasanjo once again sent General Abdulsallam Abubakar as special mediator to douse the tension (Alli 2012).

Other knocks

As telling as Nigeria's peace intervention in Liberia was, there were a number of problems one can identify with the efforts of President Obasanjo. First, it appeared Nigeria's intervention could be likened to 'hegemony on a shoestring' because the country lacked the required military and economic wherewithal to impose its will on Liberia 'without appeasing local warlords and procuring external logistical assistance' (Adebajo 2006, p. 17). A major factor responsible for this was the depletion of Nigeria's financial resources as a result of decades of mis-governance and mismanagement (Ogunsanwo 2016; Nwolise 2016), as well as the degeneration of the country's military capacity despite its previous excellent military campaigns to promote peace continentally and globally (Eke 2015).

Second, as a result of Nigeria's financial burden, the country was becoming wary of regional peacekeeping. Thus, before Nigeria's military intervention in Liberia in August 2003, the country 'insisted – as a condition for deploying – that the UN should take over the force three months later and send troops from other countries' (Adebajo 2006, p. 17). Owing to Nigeria's economic weakness when Obasanjo came in as the country's civilian president, his administration was anxious rather to reduce Nigeria's 'external commitments and to act whenever possible through multilateral institutions' (Lliffe 2011, p. 217).

Third, as argued by Obi (2009), the rehatting of ECOMOG forces as UN peacekeepers on October 1, 2003 also gave birth to some issues. While the idea of 'African solutions to African problems' that also necessitated Nigeria's intervention was commendable, the transfer of ECOMIL's authority to UNMIL exposed the limitations and weaknesses of such idea at the time. The logistical and operational challenges faced by ECOMIL meant that the re-assignment of its troops to UNMIL was necessary after all. Apart from introducing African troops to new military doctrines, capabilities and logistical provisions, such change could reduce ECOWAS forces to 'playing second fiddle' to UN peacekeepers who would always like to take the credit after ECOWAS forces had done the spadework (Obi 2009; Osuntokun 2016).

Fourth, in spite of the UN zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel, it has been observed that several Nigerian peacekeepers still engaged in sexual exploitation. It was estimated that thousands of children born to Liberian women were a product of sexual exploitation by Nigerian peacekeeping personnel. The number could be more staggering but for the usual under-reporting of cases of sexual abuse and exploitation (Butty 2015). Some Nigerian peacekeepers were also accused of corruption, illegal diamond dealings, drug smuggling and other illicit activities (Regarding Rights 2014).

Conclusion

Regardless of the criticisms, Fawole (2016) argued that the restoration of peace to Liberia was a product of Nigeria's high level diplomacy under President Olusegun Obasanjo. In terms of the major efforts that led to the restoration of peace to Liberia, Nigeria played the leading roles. First, with respect to the deployment of peacekeeping personnel, Nigeria contributed the highest number of troops and produced mission commanders. Notable Nigerian military personnel such as Major General Festus Okonkwo, Major General Jo-

seph Olorunbon Owonibi and Lieutenant General Chikadibia Isaac Obiakor played commanding roles in the theatres of operations under the banners of ECOMIL and UNMIL. Second, President Obasanjo played a major role in convincing President Taylor (who was the locus of the crisis) to quit office and accept Nigeria's offer of asylum. Taylor's departure from power and the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement on August 18, 2003 brought an end to the crisis in the country. Third, Nigeria played a commendable role during the 2005 post-conflict elections in Liberia. Nigeria deployed its diplomatic resources to ensure the success of the elections (which were of crucial importance to sustainable peace in Liberia).

Liberian post-conflict political leaders have demonstrated their thankfulness to Nigeria. After the appointment of Mr Gyude Bryant as the Chairman of the National Transitional Government on August 21 2003, Nigeria was the first country he visited in recognition and appreciation of the pivotal role that President Obasanjo played in the Liberian peace process (Alli 2012; George 2012). The immediate past president of Liberia – Mrs Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf – also acknowledged that Nigeria played the grandest role in the restoration of peace to Liberia. According to her, Liberians were overwhelmed with thankfulness and appreciation for Nigeria's commitments and sacrifices throughout the country's trying moment (Ndidi 2017). As the key-informants would want us to accept, President Obasanjo's successful intervention in Liberia could be attributed to Nigeria's gravitas, manpower, military experience, and its well-oiled diplomatic machinery, particularly in the West African sub-region (Fawole 2016; Nwolise 2016; Osuntokun 2016; Shehu 2018).

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ABSTRACT

Although peace operations have been a major instrument of Nigeria's foreign policy continentally and globally, this study analyzed the country's peace campaigns in Liberia under president Olusegun Obasanjo. The paper observed *inter alia* that Obasanjo's peace efforts in Liberia were influenced by his recognition of Nigeria as a leading actor in the stabilization efforts in the region. While there were some encumbrances, Nigeria's peace campaigns in Liberia were successful as revealed by the data sources. Nigeria's major accomplishments included the eventual signing of a comprehensive peace agreement in 2003 that brought an end to the carnage in the country, offer of asylum to Taylor, and the 2005 post-conflict elections. These accomplishments could be attributed to President Obasanjo's gravitas and Nigeria's well-oiled diplomatic machinery in the West African sub-region. To arrive at this conclusion, the paper adopted the secondary data sources and interview technique for the purpose of data collection, and descriptive thematic analysis.

KEYWORDS

Peacekeeping; Mediation; President Obasanjo; Nigeria; Liberia; Africa

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