

PEACE MISSIONS AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: REFLECTIONS ON THE BRAZILIAN CASE¹

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Introduction

The closure of the United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) in October 2017³ unleashed a wave of political and academic reflections on the legacy of Brazilian participation in this 13-year event which mobilized some 37,000 military personnel.

Diplomatically, MINUSTAH was considered by the Brazilian government as an important foreign policy instrument that allowed the country to play a greater role in the international scenario, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean (Amorim 2016) and to qualify itself as a peacemaker to the United Nations (Jungmann 2017). The National Congress, which expressed some reluctance to send Brazilian troops to Haiti, especially during the appreciation of the Foreign Affairs and Defense ministers' explanatory statement on this matter in 2004⁴, echoed the executive's official narra-

1 The ideas presented in this article were previously discussed on three occasions, at the XIII International Conference of Brazilian Association Studies in 2016, at the IX Congress of the Latin American Association of Political Science in 2017 and at the XI Meeting of Brazilian Political Science Association in 2018.. The Participation in both events was facilitated by the project International and Regional Scenarios of Security and Defense: a Civil Military approach, funded by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development and the Ministry of Defense.

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3 MINUSTAH was replaced by the United Nations Mission in Support of Justice in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) which will aim to support the strengthening of public institutions and the rule of law in the country.

4 Okaddo (2017) mapped out the work of the Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defense of the Chamber of Deputies (CREDN) on MINUSTAH issues and found that after an initial clash between members of the commission opposed to sending Brazilian troops to Haiti

tive about the success of the mission (Brazil 2017).

From a military perspective, MINUSTAH allowed Brazilian officers and graduates of the three Armed Forces to be immersed in a real operating environment. Organizationally, the Joint Center for Peace Operations of Brazil (CCOPAB) benefited directly from the Brazilian experience in Haiti, evolving from a structure linked to the Brazilian Army to a UN inspection body in the accreditation of peacekeeping forces (Teixeira 2017) .

Academic output on peace missions in Brazil has grown exponentially since the country took command of the MINUSTAH military contingent. Abdenur, Kuele, Folly and Macedo (2017) found from a survey in the CAPES journal portal that 35 books, articles and monographs on peace operations in Brazil were produced from 1990 to 2003. In the following period, From 2004 to 2017, the bibliographic production on the subject reached the mark of 418 works⁵.

The international literature on Brazilian participation in peacekeeping operations has also increased significantly in the last decade⁶ and, with regard to the legacy of our troops in Haiti, a particular point concerns the discussion that will be made in this article, the so-called Porto - Prince-Rio de Janeiro connection (Hirst and Nasser 2014: 04), that is, to what extent does the experience of the Armed Forces in public order control actions in Brazil influence

and the ones who supported the initiative of the Brazilian government, CREDN had little to say about the performance of Brazilian troops in Haiti.

5 According to Abdenur, Kuelle, Folly and Macedo (2017), the literature produced in Brazil about MINUSTAH concentrates on the decision-making process that led the Brazilian government to accept military leadership of the mission and in the relations of that decision with the Brazilian attempt to expand its soft power, to consolidate a regional leadership position, to strengthen the country's position in South-South cooperation, to oppose the United States, to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and to present an alternative to the principle of Responsibility to Protect present in this organization. Regarding the Brazilian military's performance in Haiti, the national literature focuses on the operational part of the mission, the activities that were carried out by the Brazilian troops and what are the possible returns of this experience, both in terms of organizational learning for new peace missions and in what concerns to the application of this learning in Brazil. This bibliographic survey also highlights some tendencies in the production of knowledge about the Brazilian Armed Forces that had already been pointed out by Marques and Fuccille (2015), that is, the Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH renewed the academic interest about the military apparatus, the new generation of studies on this subject are no longer concentrated in the universities of the São Paulo-Rio-Brasília axis and there are researchers of various levels of academic formation working in an integrated manner on international and defense issues.

6 The international literature on Brazilian participation in peace operations, as well as the Brazilian literature, is extensive and a bibliographic review on this topic would fall outside the scope of this article. Eric Cezne (2016) did a detailed discussion of the international literature on Brazil in peace operations in his master's thesis.

the performance of Brazilian troops abroad and vice versa? The answer to this question is not unanimous and is directly related to another question that is much less studied, both in the national literature and in the international literature, and which will be discussed next: the interconnections between military participation in peace missions and civil-military relations, in view of the increasingly routine participation of the Brazilian Armed Forces in Law and Order (GLO) missions and the serious political crisis that the country is undergoing.

For the elaboration of the article a literature review was carried out, concerning the literature that discusses the links between military participation in peace missions and the relationship between the Armed Forces and other sectors of the State in the domestic sphere, the literature that discusses civil-military relations in Brazil and the collection of primary sources such as government documents, articles published in newspapers and magazines of national circulation, and interviews given by the Brazilian Army commander and the Brazilian MINUSTAH commanders to press vehicles. In addition, twelve semi-structured individual and group interviews⁷ were held in Brasília and Rio de Janeiro with graduates and Brazilian officers from the three Armed Forces who participated in peace missions in Angola, Haiti and Lebanon⁸ and in-depth interviews with commanders of MINUSTAH⁹.

The article is organized into three sections besides this introduction. The second section reviews the international and Brazilian literature that discusses the connections between a country's participation in peace missions

7 All the interviews used as primary sources in this article were carried out within the project Transformations of the military profession in Brazil and Argentina: the perspective of the Social Sciences, financed by the Coordination of Improvement of Higher Education Personnel.

8 The identities of the interviewees individually or in the focus group were preserved and the information obtained in the interviews were used exclusively for academic purposes in the project Transformations of the military profession in Brazil and Argentina: the perspective of the Social Sciences. The testimonies of the military commanders of MINUSTAH were donated to the collection of the Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation.

9 The military commanders of MINUSTAH were Army General Heleno Ribeiro Pereira (2004-2005), General of Division Urano Teixeira da Matta Bacellar (2005-2006), Army General José Elito Carvalho Siqueira (2006-2007), General of Division Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (2007-2009), General of Division Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto (2009-2010), General of Division Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz (2010-2011), General of Division Eduardo Ramos Baptista Pereira (2011-2012), General of Division Fernando Rodrigues Goulart (2012-2013), Army General Edson Leal Pujol (2013-2014), General of Division José Luiz Jaborandi Júnior (2014-2015) and General of Division Ajax Porto Pinheiro (2015-2017). Two MINUSTAH commanders have already passed away, the General of Division Urano Teixeira da Matta Bacellar and the General of Division José Luiz Jaborandi Júnior.

and the stability of civil-military relations, pointing out the limitations of the argument which states that the participation in peace missions would have a reforming effect on the military institutions of the African and Latin American countries that contribute substantively with troops to the UN and discusses some specificities of the Brazilian case. The third section maps the perceptions of the Brazilian military personnel on the participation in peace missions focusing its reflexes for the civil-military relations. Finally, some final remarks will be made on this topic.

Peace missions and civil-military relations in the academic perspective

Participation in peace missions is one of the main tasks performed by the contemporary armed forces¹⁰ (Matei 2012). Since the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, to date, the number of peace missions under the organization's mandate has increased exponentially, especially after the end of the Cold War. In addition, the profile of these missions has changed dramatically over the decades. From the first peacekeeping mission in 1948, when military observers were sent to the Middle East to monitor the armistice agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors, to the controversial decision of the UN Security Council that authorized the use of an intervention brigade with special forces troops and the mission to "neutralize" the armed groups in the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) in 2013¹¹, there was a significant extension in the scope of

10 Cristiana Cristiana Matei summarizes the six main tasks performed by the contemporary Armed Forces: 1-to wage and be prepared to wage wars, 2- to stand and be prepared to wage intrastate wars, 3-counterterrorism, 4-support to police forces in the fight against crime, 5 - peace missions, 6- humanitarian assistance (Matei 2012).

11 In this regard, it is worth observing the positions of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay on the mandate of MONUSCO. In the Brazilian case, it is noteworthy that at the beginning of MINUSTAH there was some critical positioning of CREDN regarding the use of force by Brazilian troops in Haiti in 2013, while the UN debated increasing the use of force by its troops to impose peace in the Congo under Chapter VII of its charter, a matter directly of concern to Brazil that under the Constitution of 1988 may only participate in peacekeeping missions, there was no manifestation of CREDN in that regard. Okado (2017) reports that there was also no substantive debate in CREDN about the deployment of Brazilian troops to Lebanon in 2010. What is being discussed here is not the convenience of the country participating in peace missions but the clear disinterest of CREDN in discussing and supervise the subjects related to this topic. The Brazilian legislative erratic behavior in relation to defense issues was analyzed by Oliveira (2005) and his diagnosis still remains current. Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas (2007) extend the diagnosis of Oliveira (2005) throughout Latin America when referring to the attention deficit of the politicians of the region in relation to the defense policy. The guidelines

mandates and substantive changes in the nature of peace operations, which need to deal with a large number of technical and care tasks in increasingly complex environments

However, despite all these changes, it should be noted that the UN General Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld's observation in the 1950s: "Peace operations are not tasks for soldiers but only soldiers can carry them out" (Moskos 1976: 139), remains current.

Concerning the participation of US and European troops in peacekeeping operations, Charles Moskos (1976) argued that military participation in peace missions, which were not primarily aimed at eliminating the enemy, would bring great benefits to the relationship between the military and other sectors of the state and society over time, since such a mission would require the military to have a bargaining power that conventional conflicts did not contemplate.

Moskos constructed his argument from the ideas exposed by Morris Janowitz in his seminal work *The Professional Soldier*. By analyzing the strategic context in which US troops could operate during the height of the Cold War, Janowitz (1967) warned that the military should be prepared to fight both in a nuclear war and in a conventional war of resistance. These two forms of war, according to the author, would require the military greater capacity of political negotiation and flexibility. As the use of force in international relations had changed significantly, it would be important for the military to incorporate into their professional requirements capabilities that until then were required only of police forces such as commitment to the minimum use of force and the search for stable relations instead of victory:

"The police conception encompasses the entire scope of power in military organizations. At the upper end are weapons of mass destruction; those of flexible and specialized application are at the lower end, where there are also specialists in military aid programs, paramilitary operations, guerrilla warfare and counter-guerrilla warfare. Equating the manipulation of weapons of high destructive power with strategy and those of small destructive power with tactics has been, and continues to be, a source of professional and public confusion. The police conception recognizes that there are strategic and tactical dimensions at each end of the scale. Tactics of strategic intimidation, for example, require daily decisions that range from

for CREDN meetings in 2013 can be found at: http://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoes-permanentes/credn/reunioes/pesquisa_reunioes_comissao.

The Brazilian position and of the other South American countries that contribute with troops to UN peacekeeping missions were analyzed by Mónica Hirst (2016) in the book *La Presencia de Argentina en Haití*.

community relations in overseas bases to the determination of propitious moments for political-military declarations of national leaders. On the other hand, strategic decisions regarding limited warfare involve policies of far-reaching consequences regarding the size, control, and distribution of military units.

It is no longer possible for officialdom, if it wishes to be organized effectively for strategic intimidation and for limited warfare, to operate on the basis of “war” and “peace” premises. As the conception of a police force eliminates the distinction between a military establishment of peace and war it approaches the concept of policing “(Janowitz 1967, 400).

Decades later, Charles Moskos would call this new profile-negotiating professional - whose emergence Janowitz identified during the Cold War - a military-statesman, defining him as a qualified officer to deal with the media and able to act in the complex environment of diplomacy (Moskos 2000).

In contemporary times, peace missions are the main terrain where the diplomatic skills of the military are exercised. Giuseppe Caforio (2007) presented the results of a series of surveys carried out between the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium with military personnel from the United States and some Western European countries. These studies showed that the increasing insertion of US and European militaries into multinational troops would have a double meaning for the armed forces of these countries: while coexistence and exchange of experiences with other military organizations would tend to standardize certain organizational behaviors, contact with foreign troops would tend to reinforce some traditional values in multinational teams such as patriotism, discipline, sense of responsibility and dedication (Caforio 2007).

The results of the surveys carried out by Caforio show that for the armed forces of countries with the most robust democracies, the experience of operating in multinational troops tends to reinforce some traditional military values in the members of the teams, besides contributing to the improvement of new capacities (Caforio 2007). However, one of the main characteristics of contemporary peace missions is the increasing participation of troops from Latin American, Asian and African countries, replacing US troops and their NATO allies.

At a first moment, the international literature highlighted the positive aspects of participating in peace missions in the process of socialization of these military, making them more professional and democratic. The contact between American and allied troops with troops from countries that had left authoritarian regimes and had little international experience would have a reforming effect on military institutions and individuals participating in mul-

tinational teams. This potential reforming effect would also extend to civilian-military relations, helping to reinforce the subordination of these armed forces to civilian power in their countries of origin.

According to Michel Desch, participating in peace missions would bring great benefit to countries that were undergoing a transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime because it would be easier to control the military while they were serving on missions abroad (Desch 1999, 12).

This reforming effect of participation in peace missions is also emphasized by Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, for whom foreign-oriented military would be more professional in the classical sense of the term and would tend to become less involved in domestic affairs (Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2000).

In a more recent article on accomplishment of military missions in Latin America, Pion-Berlin points out that peace missions are a challenge for the military because they require them to play a variety of roles. While many of these roles are beyond their professional reach, they are still very rewarding for the Latin American military. There is a prestige factor associated with these missions. Participation in peace operations has also been associated with advanced professional training and the satisfaction of promotion requirements, and many military officials rediscover their purpose by following these missions (Pion-Berlin 2012, 637).

Magnus Lundgren elaborates on the arguments put forward by the above authors, especially those of Michael Desch, from what he understood to be a rational behavior of the military of poor countries that depend financially on participating in UN peacekeeping missions to balance their defense budgets. According to the author, these military men would avoid ostensible acts of military insubordination and coup attempts to continue participating in peace missions, since the UN prefers to rely on countries that have stable civil-military relations to form their troops (Lundgren 2018).

Maggie Dwyer, in turn, discusses the limitations of the theoretical model advocating the reforming effect of participating in peace missions in her case study of riots led by UN mission egressed soldiers in West African countries. According to the author, there have been at least 10 riots in the region since 1991 related to complaints from soldiers who had participated in peace missions. The West African countries contribute substantively with troops to the UN missions but this seems to have a rather limited effect on the reform of African military institutions. The riots studied by Dwyer result from an interaction between material grievances and a sense of injustice, and, in general, these issues are related to the corruption of officers who lead the troops and take an amount of the wage of their subordinates (Dwyer 2015).

Levin, MacKay, Nasirzadeh and Sealey propose a refinement of the democratic *peacekeeper's* hypothesis, given the difficulties of generalization in early studies discussing the reformist potential of participation in peace-keeping missions. Relating the reflexions of the participation in peace mission in the civil-military relations to the type of political regime of the studied country, the authors conclude that countries with robust democracies would benefit most from participating in peace missions, while authoritarian countries or fragile democracies would benefit little from this activity. The transfer of funds and prestige from the UN to the armed forces of undemocratic or politically unstable countries could even potentialize the possibility of a military coup in these places, destabilizing them rather than contributing to the reform of their military institutions (Levin et al. 2017).

With regard to the literature on Brazilian participation in peace missions, the analysts' expectations did not differ from those presented in the international literature until the advent of MINUSTAH. Clóvis Brigagão, in a 1999 text, argued that the new generation of Brazilian soldiers trained after participating in peace missions would have a new vision on conflict prevention and civilian governments (Brigagão 1999).

The most recent bibliography on the Brazilian case, especially the book by Arturo Sotomayor, *The Mith of Democratic Peacekeeper*, questions the possible reforming effect of the participation of peace missions. For Sotomayor, the participation of Brazil in missions of this nature did not have the effects expected by the analysts who study the subject. Their argument is that the Brazilian military not only replicates but reinforces their organizational understandings and domestic practices in the peace missions in which they participate. He analyzed the participation of Brazilian troops in Africa and Haiti to corroborate his thesis (Sotomayor 2014).

Regarding the participation of Brazilian troops in Mozambique and Angola in the 1990s, Sotomayor argues that the Brazilian military saw peace missions in Africa as an extension of subsidiary missions, mainly civic-social actions (ACISO), which they carried out in the Brazil. The author identifies in this perception the influence of the Armed Forces in the Amazon. Regarding the preparation of the troops for the missions that would be carried out under the mandate of the UN, there was the understanding that the military trained to operate in the Amazon would be able to operate in Africa, for this reason a large part of the contingent employed in the Verification missions of the United Nations in Angola and in the United Nations Operation in Mozambique was recruited in Manaus and elsewhere in the Amazon. The military, according to Sotomayor, took to Africa the practices that were considered effective in Brazil to deal with the needs of a population living in an environment where

the State is present largely through military institutions¹² and was little influenced by this international experience. (Sotomayor 2014: 82-84).

In relation to Sotomayor's argument, it is necessary to consider that in the 1990s Brazil did not have a training center for peace operations where the organizational experience acquired in Africa could be processed and disseminated in the troops. In addition, the participation of the Brazilian Armed Forces in social assistance and development support activities has deep historical roots (D'Áraújo 2010) and has grown significantly since the 2000s (Mathias, Campos and Santos 2016) making it difficult to disseminate any organizational benefit that the participation in a mission abroad could bring.

Besides, in the case of the troops sent to Haiti, Sotomayor maintains that the strategies used by the Brazilian military to pacify the favelas where they acted would be the same used in Brazil, so the performance of our troops abroad, rather than promoting some kind of institutional reform, would be reinforcing the practices adopted in the domestic environment. An example of this would be the request of military troops to pacify the favelas of the Complexo do Alemão by the governor of Rio de Janeiro Sérgio Cabral. On that occasion, Cabral used the performance of Brazilian troops in the favelas of Haiti to justify their demand for militarization of public security problems in Rio de Janeiro (Sotomayor 2014, 88).

Jorge Zaverucha also questions the thesis of the reforming effect of the participation in peace missions. Recovering the lyrics of a famous song by Caetano Veloso and Gilberto Gil, Zaverucha states that "Haiti is here" (Zaverucha 2005), that is, Brazilian troops would be training in Haiti to be employed in the fight against crime in Brazil and the routine use of military troops to combat urban violence in the country would be one of the indicators that democracy in Brazil is still fragile (Zaverucha 2008).

The Porto Príncipe-Rio de Janeiro connection is at the center of the debate over the legacy of Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH. The first analysis that deal with the intertwined experiences in the two cases dates back to 2014. Besides Sotomayor (2014), Hirst and Nasser drew attention to this phenomenon. The authors reported that approximately 60% of the military troops employed in the Maré favela in 2010 were formed by egressed from MINUSTAH and that Viva Rio projects for the Rio de Janeiro favelas were being replicated in Bel Air and Cité Soleil (Hirst and Nasser, 2014). According to Sotomayor (2014), Viva Rio was the nongovernmental organization that worked more closely with the Brazilians in Haiti.

¹² On the material and symbolic importance that the Brazilian military attributes to the Amazon see: Marques (2007).

Kristian Hoelscher and Per Norheim-Martinsen in turn warn for the possible undesirable consequences of the routine use of peacekeepers in Law and Order Assurance missions. According to the authors, the military's performance in Rio de Janeiro favelas intertwines the experience in Haiti with a long-standing Latin American military tradition of public order control and this could hinder the consolidation of democracy in Brazil (Hoelscher and Norheim-Martinsen, 2004).

Siman and Santos (2018) present a similar argument when they analyze the influence of the binomial security and development in the imaginary of the Brazilian military and how this is expressed in the performance of the Brazilian troops when they are fulfilling tasks of Guarantee of the Law and the Order and participating in missions of peace.

Haring acknowledges the synergistic effects that the two experiences, the peacekeeping mission in Haiti and the Law and Order Guarantee mission in Rio de Janeiro, have for the troops but concludes that in the near future, the organizational learning that the mission in Haiti provided to the Armed Forces should be applied in the control of public order in Brazil and not in new peace missions as diplomats and military wish (Haring 2016, 158).

An important question pervades all the analysis that discusses the connection or feedback between the Brazilian military's performance in peace missions and in subsidiary missions in Brazil: the greater involvement in peace operations did not diminish the participation of the Armed Forces in subsidiary activities in the country as predicted by the first studies on this subject, instead, there was a significant increase in the employment of the troops returning from Haiti in Law and Order Guarantee operations.

The tendency towards banalization of the use of the Law and Order Guarantee, already criticized by the army commander, General Eduardo Villas Bôas (Monteiro 2018), associated with the serious political crisis that Brazil has been going through since 2016, with the deposition of President Dilma Vana Rousseff, created the conditions for a *sui generis* situation at the end of May 2018. While the federal government for the first time enacted a Law and Order Guarantee operation throughout the national territory to unclog the federal public thoroughfares and try to resolve the strike of the truck driver's which lasted for several days with serious consequences for the whole country (Brazil 2018), part of the truckers on strike included the request for a temporary military intervention in the list of demands of the category to return to work (Betim 2018).

This episode reverberates to some extent the lessons of the international literature on the side effects of the participation of politically unstable countries in peace missions, but in the Brazilian case some considerations

are necessary. When Brazil assumed military command of MINUSTAH, the country was living in a period of political stability and the decision to participate more effectively in UN peace missions was part of a project to expand the Brazilian role in the international scenario (Amorim 2016), however, when the public security crisis intensified, the good performance of troops in Haiti came to be seen by the political class as an important asset for the control of public order and the use of Law and Order Guarantee operations became more frequent, reinforcing the process of feedback between the missions that the Brazilian troops carried out abroad and in national territory.

The deposition of President Dilma Rousseff intensified a reversal of expectations regarding the role that the Brazilian Armed Forces should play. If even the Rousseff government had at least a project of articulation between foreign policy and defense policy, in which the military would orient their missions each time to defend the interests of the country abroad (Alsina 2017), in the Temer government this tendency was interrupted and the Armed Forces began to operate routinely in operations to combat crime without the expectation of a relevant mission abroad¹³.

Within a framework of democratic stability, there were no visible indicators that the routine use of military troops in Law and Order Assurance operations could have a negative effect on the quality of Brazilian democracy, but the intensification of the political crisis placed this possibility in the agenda since the degree of political dependence of the Armed Forces in the government of Michel Temer only finds a parallel in the government of Jose Sarney (1985-1990). Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira defined the pattern of civil-military relations in this period as military guardianship:

I have employed the concept of military guardianship to designate a situation in which a government with a politically fragile partisan and parliamentary support finds in the Armed Forces the prime source of its stability at the price of preserving the basic traits of recent military experience: a high degree of political autonomy of the military apparatus in defining the national strategy; the exercise of the interventory function; a sometimes extremely dysfunctional, because extremely comprehensive, degree of interference from military ministers in extra-military matters; the affirmation of the Army as the force for regime stability par excellence (Oliveira 1994).

But if the present political conjuncture is similar to the one lived during the government of Jose Sarney, it is important to emphasize that the Army

¹³ Brazil was expected to send troops to the peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic in 2018 but the Temer government rejected the UN proposal and decided to prioritize federal intervention in the area of public security in Rio de Janeiro (Góes 2018).

today has a different pattern of behavior from that observed at the beginning of the New Republic (Oliveira 2005). The current military commander's displeasure to assume functions that go beyond the military sphere differs sharply from the resourcefulness with which General Leônidas Pires Gonçalves assumed his tutelary function over the President of the Republic in the 1980s, which raises some questions that will be dealt with below.

Peace missions and civil-military relations from the perspective of the military

In the book *The Invention of the Army* Celso Castro argues that the defense of the Brazilian Amazon against international greed had become an important identity element for the Brazilian Army from the 1990s and that implied an important doctrinal change. After decades of preparing to primarily combat an internal enemy, the defense of the Amazon was aimed at preparing against an external enemy, which had important consequences for the pattern of civil-military relations in the country (Castro 2002).

When Brazil took over the military command of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), appeared the possibility of using the Brazilian Armed Forces in an externally oriented mission and inserted in a project of the country's international insertion in Latin America and in the Caribbean. In this context, the participation in peace missions could constitute an identity element as important as the Amazon in the 1990s, acting as a symbol to mobilize military identity in the 21st century.

Brazil spent more than two decades without sending troops to UN missions. After ten years in Suez (1957-1967), the country resumed its participation with troops in peacekeeping missions sending troops to Mozambique in 1994. During this hiatus, the nature of peace operations significantly changed and the Brazilian military had to adapt to the new times in Brazil and in the international scope.

Brazilian participation in peace missions under the United Nations mandate grew substantially from the 2000s, especially when Brazil assumed command of MINUSTAH in 2004, however, until 2010, Brazil still did not have a prepared center for the training of military personnel who would participate in peace operations (Teixeira 2017). In the words of a military man who participated in the Brazilian contingent in the peacekeeping mission in Mozambique in the 1990s:

"(...) we had to relearn what a peace mission meant. We had no memory, the last mission had been in Suez in 1967, there was no such center of

peace operations today, no lessons learned, no such thing. Our activities were based on the instruction books, in what existed for the regular training of the troop, not specifically for peace operations. We had to make an adaptation of what existed for the internal training, that is, of activities that were carried out within the country and adapted for peace operations. So, it was a reinvention (...) (Interview I 2016)".

This process of reinvention in the way the Brazilian Armed Forces operate abroad was accompanied by administrative measures aimed at internalizing the procedures and norms in force in the peacekeeping missions, which led to changes in the behavior of troops on the ground. In 2005, the Peace Operations Training Center was created, which began its activities with the task of conducting the preparation of the third Brazilian contingent sent to the mission in Haiti, and finally, in 2010, the Joint Peace Operations Center of Brazil (CCOPAB), which assumed the mission of preparing Brazilian and foreign military and civilians to be sent to peace missions, was created (Teixeira 2017).

Concurrent with adapting to the existing international standards in peace operations, participation in this type of mission also allows for the ability of the military involved in them to be tested and to place them on a scale that replicates the division of power between countries in the international arena.

An officer who was in the first contingent of Brazilians assigned to operate in a Spanish brigade reports that at the beginning of the mission they were "set aside" and each day they had to prove that they were able to carry out the missions "at the European level". The military attributes the difficulties faced by the first contingent in UNIFIL to the lack of Brazilian tradition in employing troops in real war operations. And he emphasizes that the stereotype of the Brazilian abroad (linked to football, carnival, cordiality, etc.) makes it difficult at first to recognize the professional capacity of the Brazilian military by the European and American military (Interview II 2016).

The position of Brazil as an intermediate country in the international arena is evident when the interviewees compare the perception of Europeans about the professional capacity of the Brazilian military with the perception that the South American armed forces have on this attribute. A military man who headed a combat platoon in the second Brazilian contingent in Haiti reports that in the actions he participated in, the military of the other South American countries waited and recognized the Brazilian leadership (Interview III 2016).

The above accounts reveal a great affinity between the international

identity of Brazil built during the administrations of President Lula da Silva¹⁴ and the experience of the military in international troops: the Brazilian military would be representing an emerging country that sought to qualify as a peacemaker before the UN.

Regarding the reflexes of the Brazilian military's participation in peacekeeping missions for civil-military relations, it is possible to identify that, at first, the decision of the Lula da Silva government to send troops to Haiti was seen with distrust for a portion of the officers.

A senior officer working in the Army Land Operations Command (COTER) reported that when President Lula (leader of the then largest left-wing political party in Latin America) decided to accept the UN invitation to take military command of the United Nations mission in Haiti this was interpreted as an attempt to alienate the Brazilian Armed Forces from its subsidiary activities in the country, since Brazil was still participating, with a smaller contingent, in the East Timor peace mission (Interview IV 2016).

In this context, sending troops to missions in two distant places seemed to be part of a strategy of the Workers' Party government to try to control the military by keeping them on missions abroad as prescribed by Michael Desch (1999). But this initial perception soon faded. In the course of time it became clear that in the PT governments the Armed Forces would continue to act systematically in subsidiary missions in the national territory (Mathias, Campos and Santos 2016) without losing their capacity of influence and prestige with a portion of Brazilian society, as was evident during the truck drivers' strike in May 2018.

Moreover, the routine performance of the armed forces in subsidiary activities is not seen as an important asset by the Brazilian political class alone. The recruitment process of the generals who commanded the MINUSTAH military contingent shows that the prior experience of these professionals in Law and Order Guarantee operations, in combating transnational crimes and in humanitarian assistance actions is also appreciated by the UN.

With the exception of General Heleno Pereira, who was the first Brazilian force commander in Haiti¹⁵, the other generals who succeeded him went through a process of selection in the UN where the capacity to deal with situations of a police and political nature, that extrapolate the military sphere, was

¹⁴ In this regard see: Amorim (2016).

¹⁵ General Heleno Pereira was the only name indicated by the Brazilian government to assume the military command of MINUSTAH but this is not the practice in force in the UN. The organization's rules foresee that the country indicates some professionals and the UN select the one that it considers more qualified to assume the function.

measured. General Ajax Pinheiro, the last MINUSTAH force commander, reports that in his interview with UN officials, before taking command of the mission, he sought to relate the experience he had in charge of the Brigade in Cascavel with the activities he would carry out in Haiti. Pinheiro 2018).

The selective process of force commanders for MINUSTAH reveals that the very nature of the mission contributed greatly to reinforcing the Porto Príncipe-Rio de Janeiro connection. However, a point in common permeates the discourse of all the Brazilian generals who have been in Haiti. When asked if it was more appropriate for the Armed Forces to use what they learned in Haiti in Law and Order Guarantee operations or other peace missions, they all assert that MINUSTAH's learning should be replicated in other peace missions rather than in Brazil. In the view of the force commanders, the frequent use of military troops to combat crime is a sign that the country has serious problems in the area of public security and must overcome them through the improvement of police institutions.

In an interview to the *Piauí* magazine, General Villas-Bôas defined his perception of the use of the army in the favela complex of Maré, where a significant portion of the military contingent that was in Haiti was employed:

“It was eleven o'clock in the morning or noon of a normal day. And our people, very attentive, very worried, very uptight and armed, were patrolling the street where women and children were passing. I said, ‘We are a sick society. The Army is pointing guns at Brazilians.’ This is terrible (Victor 2018).”

This interview was granted after the federal government decided to intervene in the area of public security in the state of Rio de Janeiro at the beginning of 2018, so it is not possible to state that the federal intervention has modified the negative perception of the Brazilian Army regarding the banalization of the Law and Order Guarantee operations. On the other hand, it is possible to affirm that the banalization of the operations of Guarantee of the Law and the Order shows conclusively how much President Temer depends politically of the support of the Armed Forces to govern.

Final Remarks

The increasingly frequent use of the Armed Forces in Law and Order Guarantee operations in Brazil requires a more structured reflection on the existing connections between the participation of Brazilian troops in peace

operations and in subsidiary activities in the country. Recent literature analyzing Brazilian performance in peace missions offers some interesting insights into the consequences of this cross-over experience for civil-military relations.

The benefits of Brazil's participation in peace missions are undeniable. However, the way the political class has been processing this experience is troubling. There is a clear reversal of expectations regarding the role that the Brazilian Armed Forces should play in a country that intends to take a leading role in its strategic surroundings. Rather than contributing to the improvement of the articulation between foreign policy and defense policy, the participation of Brazilian troops in peace operations has contributed to the militarization of public security and the policialization of the armed forces.

The high degree of dependence of the Temer government on military institutions can also trigger a process of politicization of the armed forces, reversing a pattern of civil-military relations being built since Fernando Collor's presidency through institutional reforms such as the decrease of the ministries occupied by the military and the creation of the Ministry of Defense (Oliveira 2005).

It is hoped that the next governments will use the military apparatus more cautiously and in consonance with the interests of Brazilian society. The consequences of the political use of the armed forces have been well studied in the literature that analyzed the military dictatorship in the country (Oliveira 1994) and are known to be disastrous for the society, for the political class and for the military institutions.

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ABSTRACT

The article discusses the interconnections between the participation of the Brazilian military in peace missions and civil-military relations in the country. For its elaboration a bibliographical revision and the collection of primary sources, like governmental documents, articles published in newspapers and magazines and interviews were realized. It is concluded that, instead of contributing to the improvement of the articulation between foreign policy and defense policy, the Brazilian participation in peace operations has been instrumentalised by the political class and indirectly contributing to the militarization of public security and the policialization of the armed forces.

KEYWORDS

Peace Missions; Civil-Military Relations; Law and Order Guarantee.

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