


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About the Journal

AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations was the first Brazilian journal in the area of International Relations to be fully published in English (2012). It is an essentially academic vehicle, linked to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) and the Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) of the Faculty of Economics (FCE) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Its pluralist focus aims to contribute to the debate on the international political and economic order from the perspective of the developing world.

The journal publishes original articles in the area of Strategy and International Relations, with special interest in issues related to developing countries and South-South Cooperation – its security problems; the political, economic and diplomatic developments of emerging countries; and their relations with the traditional powers. *AUSTRAL* is published semi-annually in English and Portuguese. The journal's target audience consists of researchers, experts, diplomats, military personnel and graduate students of International Relations.

The content of the journal consists of in-depth analytical articles written by experts (Professors and Doctors), focusing on each of the great continents of the South: Asia, Latin America and Africa. Thus, the debate and diffusion of knowledge produced in these regions is stimulated. All contributions submitted to *AUSTRAL* are subject to rigorous scientific evaluation.

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Contents

Editor's Note	7
<i>Paulo Fagundes Visentini</i>	
The Islamic State (IS): an Exceptional Contested State	9
<i>Deon Geldenhuys</i>	
Iraq: Years of post-Saddam Internat and External Developments	36
<i>Pavlo Ignatiev</i>	
The United Nations Security Council action in Syrian Civil War: Conflicts of Interest and Impasses among the P5 and the Consequent lack of Resolution for the Question	62
<i>Fernanda Guimarães, Patrícia Nasser de Carvalho</i>	
Changing Energy Geopolitics: What is the role of sustainability in the global energy geopolitics?	79
<i>Maria Cândida Arrais de Miranda Mousinho, Ednildo Andrade Torres, Silvio Alexandre Beisl Vieira de Melo, Nanda Kumar Janardhanan</i>	
On the Complexities of Prosecuting Robert Mugabe at the International Criminal Court	104
<i>Everisto Benyera</i>	
The Dragon Embraces Africa: Cape Verde-China Relations	123
<i>João Paulo Madeira</i>	
UK Policy Options and the South Atlantic	142
<i>Martin Robson</i>	
Lusophony risks to be a heritage with no future	164
<i>Francisco José B. S. Leandro</i>	
Brazil's Foreign Policy, Defense Policy and Development Model: from the Developmental State to the Logistic State (1930-2017)	178
<i>José Miguel Quedi Martins, Raul Cavedon Nunes</i>	
Development and Security in Brazilian Foreign Policy: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations of Lula's and Dilma's Governments (2003-2016)	209
<i>Kamilla Raquel Rizzi, Diego Felipe Barbosa Antunes</i>	

The Domestic Profile of the Macrista Defense Policy and its Impact on terms of International Insetion: more continuities than changes <i>Emilse Eliana Calderón</i>	240
The Regional Security Complex of South America: an Analysis from the South American Defense Council of UNASUR <i>Marco André Cadoná, Carolina de Oliveira</i>	255
Partners	285
Submission Standards / Previous Issues	288

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Paulo Visentini¹

Geopolitics of the South and tension in Defense

In an environment of increasing uncertainty, new or changing centers of tension regarding Defense have been emerging throughout the world. The Trump administration has taken a series of baffling initiatives, accompanied by abrupt changes to course shortly afterwards, as seen on the Korean peninsula. On the other hand, the fluidity of political life in Europe also reinforces this trend. Russia and China react and take stands, while the Middle Eastern conflict zone changes. There is a new arms race and there are threats that lead to the militarization and to the creation of defensive strategies in several nations.

Russia announces the manufacturing of new missiles undetectable by existing anti-missile systems. China adopts institutional changes in benefit of the Xi Jinping government, strengthening its position. The Turkish operation in the Kurdish areas of Syria shows the emergence of a new scenario of uncertainty in the long civil war, while Saudi Arabia has a more prominent role which is difficult to predict. Even the most distant regions like Africa and South America have felt the shockwaves, generating reactions and new stances.

In its issue number 12, Austral receives contributions from renowned researchers from four continents. They analyze particular aspects of tensions in the Middle East, Africa and South America. In a first set of articles, the character of the so-called Islamic State and the conflict situation in Iraq and Syria, as well as the geopolitics of energy in the Indian Ocean, which affect the whole region. Then, the situation of President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, the Chinese presence in Cape Verde, the British strategy in the South Atlantic, and the current state of affairs of Lusophony make up a second thematic block.

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Finally, regarding Brazil itself and its South American neighboring region, articles analyze the relationship between development, security, and Foreign Policy and Brazilian Foreign and Defense Policy during the administrations of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, the Defense policy of Argentinean President Macri, and finally the Regional Security Complex from the perspective of the South American Defense Council.

With all these studies, *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations* expands and strengthens its worldwide network of collaborators and readers. And it maintains its characteristic of critical and pluralistic analyses, which are not incompatible. It is also important to notice our close and growing collaboration with scholars from the area of international security, both from academia and from military centers in Brazil.

We thank the support from the Office of the Dean of Research of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, through the Program for Support of Journal Editing (PAEP), for the translation, editing and printing of the journal. We further thank all the staff, especially Assistant Editors Bruna Hayashi Dalcin and Guilherme Thudium, who worked on editing and translating articles, with the collaboration of Maria Gabriela Vieira, who designed the cover and the layout of this edition. Once again, we thank Professor Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo for reviewing the translations. The teamwork of NERINT/UFRGS members allows us to maintain the regularity and quality of *Austral Journal*.

THE ISLAMIC STATE (IS): AN EXCEPTIONAL CONTESTED STATE

Deon Geldenhuys¹

Introduction

The defining feature of contested states, also labelled “de facto states” (Pegg 1998; Bahcheli, Bartmann and Srebrnik 2004; Lynch 2004; Berg and Toomla 2009; Casperson 2009; Toomla 2016), is that their claims to statehood are widely challenged by existing (or confirmed) states. As a consequence they all suffer a deficit of international recognition of their purported statehood. The lack of recognition varies considerably, but they have all fallen short of collective recognition in the shape of full United Nations membership (Geldenhuys 2009).

The proclamation in 2014 of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, subsequently renamed the Islamic State (IS), brought the number of contemporary contested states to eleven. The Republic of China (Taiwan) is the doyen among them, having experienced contested statehood since 1949. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) acquired this status in 1976. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus joined the ranks in 1983, followed by Palestine in 1988. Kosovo and Somaliland assumed a similar status in 1991, while the four Eurasian contested states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabkh and Transdnistria emerged between 1991 and 1999. The IS had strictly speaking entered the league when it first proclaimed its statehood in parts of Iraq in 2006, but this move was not taken seriously in the Middle East or farther afield. It was only after the IS movement effectively reproclaimed statehood in June 2014 – then with extensive territory in Iraq and Syria under its control – that the international community awoke to the

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brutal reality of the entity that styled itself an Islamic caliphate². In this article the focus will be on the Islamic State in its post-2014 incarnation, which ended in November 2017 with the violent destruction of its physical presence in Iraq and Syria.

To be sure, the eleven territories have not been the only contested states in recent times. From its birth in the 1930s the Japanese “puppet state” of Manchukuo fell in this category, joined by the Nazi-backed State of Croatia during the Second World War. In the 1960s Katanga, Biafra and Rhodesia all had their self-declared statehood rejected by the world community, as did South Africa’s four “homeland states” (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) in the 1970s and 1980s and the Republic of Ichkeria (Chechnya) and Republika Srpska in the 1990s. Some of these cases will be alluded to in the present article, but the IS state will be compared mainly with the existing contested states.

The purpose of the inquiry is to illustrate that the IS state had features in common with today’s other contested states but it also displayed characteristics that set it apart. The key to identifying these similarities and differences lies in the formal criteria for statehood in international law, supplemented by requirements derived from prevailing international norms and state practice.

Because detailed case studies of the ten other pretender states have been conducted elsewhere³, it will suffice to summarize the findings relating to their international status and use these as a basis for comparison with the physical IS polity.

Criteria for Statehood in International Law and State Practice

The 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States reflects customary international law on what constitutes a state. As a subject of international law (i.e. an entity recognized as being capable of exercising international rights and duties), a state should meet four requirements: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and a capacity to enter into relations with other states (Crawford 2015, 281).

The first criterion means that an aspirant state must have “some population linked to a specific piece of territory on a more or less permanent basis

² A distinction should be drawn between the IS as a movement and the physical IS state (or caliphate), both of which are commonly and confusingly referred to as the “Islamic State” (or IS). The organization’s name changed a number of times since its formation, but will for the sake of convenience be referred to mostly as the IS movement.

³ See the sources cited on p. 1 and Fischer 2016.

and who can be regarded in general parlance as its inhabitants” (Dixon 2000, 107-108). The permanence of a population does not imply that people cannot migrate from or to a state. Nor does international law specify that the population of a state should share significant commonalities that render them a distinct people in terms of language, culture, religion or descent; they merely find themselves living on a particular national territory. Neither international law nor state practice lays down any minimum or maximum standard for population size.

A defined territory simply means that a state “must have some definite physical existence that marks it out clearly from its neighbours” (Dixon 2000, 108). Borders demarcate the area in which government powers are exercised. There need not be absolute certainty over the extent of a state’s territory and boundaries may also change. International law does not prescribe the minimum or maximum size of a state’s territory, nor does state practice suggest any guidelines.

Government, in Crawford’s (1979, 42) view, should be treated as “the most important single criterion for statehood”, upon which all others depend. “Effective government” is, for instance, the basis for a state’s capacity to enter into relations with other states. By effectiveness is meant that a government should be “in general control of its territory, to the exclusion of other entities”; the “control” should in turn include “some degree of maintenance of law and order” (Crawford 1979, 45-6; Dixon 2000, 108) In practice, seriously defective government capacity has not prevented the emergence of new states or their international recognition; consider the wholesale decolonization of Africa from the 1960s and more recently the birth of new states from the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Some of these were portrayed as entities that acquired juridical statehood without possessing empirical statehood (Jackson 1990, 24-5).

The ability to enter into relations with other states, the final Montevideo criterion, can only be exercised to the full if the entity concerned has been admitted to the international community of confirmed states. James (1986, 24-5, 266) maintained that an entrance requirement is constitutional independence, which he equated with sovereignty. Although neither independence nor sovereignty is mentioned by name in the Montevideo Convention, modern statehood is simply inconceivable without them. Constitutional independence, according to James, means that “a state’s constitution is not part of a larger constitutional arrangement”. Once an entity’s constitutional separateness has been established, it can become sovereign “and thus ready, if it and others wish it, to join in the usual kind of international activity”.

The relevance of sovereignty in the determination of statehood is con-

firmed by the (Badinter) Arbitration Commission of the European Conference on Yugoslavia. In 1991 it defined a state as

...a community which consists of a territory and a population subject to an organised political authority...[and] is characterised by sovereignty (Quoted by Shaw 2009, 198).

Although there is no single, universally accepted meaning of the term “sovereignty”, international lawyers and political scientists commonly break it down into internal and external dimensions. The former refers to a state’s supreme legal authority to govern itself and is tantamount to constitutional independence. Max Huber shared this view by declaring that independence in a specific part of the world means “the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state” (Quoted by Scott 2017, 29). Independence is the essence of external sovereignty too, construed as “the right of the state freely to determine its relations with other states or other entities without the restraint or control of another state” (Mugerwa 1968, 253).

Crawford (1979, 52-6) distinguished between formal and actual independence. The first, also known as legal independence, obtains where the powers of government in domestic and foreign affairs are vested in the authorities of the state. What could derogate from a state’s formal independence, is a claim from another state to exercise governmental powers over that entity. A case in point is China’s claim of the right to rule Taiwan, which compromises the latter’s claims to statehood. Actual or effective independence was defined by Crawford (1979, 56-7) as

...the minimum degree of real governmental power at the disposal of the authorities of the putative State, necessary for it to qualify as ‘independent’.

This form of independence is synonymous with autonomy, a relative and informal category that involves the freedom of states to make policy choices and set their own rules – a quality that is increasingly circumscribed in an interdependent world. This reality does not translate into the erosion of legal authority, though.

A situation that may undermine a state’s actual and in some instances also its formal (legal) independence is substantial illegality of origin. This could arise when an entity comes into being in violation of basic rules of international law, such as the illegal use of force. It is firmly established in international law that territory may not be validly acquired through an illegal

resort to force. Where such an entity then claims statehood, there is a presumption against its independence and thus grounds for its non-recognition by confirmed states. Take the case of the state of Manchukuo created by Japan on Chinese soil in the 1930s. Another illegal origin under international law is racial discrimination, as with Rhodesia and South Africa's four homeland states during the apartheid era. The denial of the fundamental right of self-determination of the black majorities in Rhodesia and South Africa also played a role in these cases of external non-recognition (Grant 1999, 441-2).

Additional normative criteria for statehood have gained currency especially in the wake of the Cold War. What matters is not merely the effectiveness of government, but also its legitimacy. The latter depends on the form of authority and the government's treatment of the population. New states, specifically those emerging from the ruins of Yugoslavia, were required to have democratic governments observing individual human rights and minority rights. Although it may be premature to claim a right to democracy under international law, all governments are already under an obligation to uphold at least the core of basic human rights (Allen 2000, 204; Strydom and Gevers 2016, 41-2; Grant 1999, 443-4).

The issue of *de jure* recognition (or non-recognition more specifically) is at the core of contested statehood. The mere existence of such entities points to the influence of the constitutive theory of statehood, which posits that an entity meeting the basic (Montevideo) criteria of statehood

...is not a state and thus not a member of the international community until it is 'constituted' as such through the actions of other members of the international community recognising it as a state (Shearer 2000, 113).

In short, 'recognition *constitutes* the state' (Strydom and Gevers 2016, 42; original emphasis). The declaratory theory of statehood by contrast holds that an entity can become a state if it meets the so-called objective criteria enshrined in the Montevideo Convention, even if its statehood is not recognized by other countries (Strydom and Gevers 2016, 42,47; Scott 2017, 21). Although recognition is not a precondition for statehood in international law, Crawford (2015, 289) pointed out, "it provides evidence of legal status and may be of particular importance in particular cases", such as secession outside the colonial context.

Multilateral organizations are responsible for collective recognition or, conversely, collective non-recognition of statehood. None is more important than the UN, the global forum of states. Admission to full UN membership (and not merely observer status) is tantamount to universal *de jure* recogni-

tion. The community of states thereby signals its readiness to treat the new member as a full-fledged state with all the attendant rights, duties and responsibilities both within the UN and beyond. Membership of the UN may also facilitate a new state's entry into other multilateral organizations. UN membership is therefore commonly viewed as the "birth certificate" of a state (Allen 2000, 202; Dugard 1987, 41-122). The UN has on several occasions opted for collective non-recognition of a claimant's statehood; it applies to all current contested states, although the UN General Assembly has recognized Palestine's right or title to statehood and given it non-member observer state status but not full membership (Scott 2017, 24).

Attributes and Categories of Contested Statehood

Case studies of ten of the eleven contested states (the IS state being the exception) have identified a set of salient features of their disputed statehood (Geldenhuis 2009, 234-42).

First, all contested states have settled populations, but in many cases questions can be asked about the inhabitants' support for and loyalty to their entities' self-proclaimed or externally imposed statehood. Had they freely exercised their right of (internal) self-determination?

Second, the boundaries of contested states are disputed in a very fundamental way: since their right of existence as separate, independent states is in most cases challenged by their original or parent states and others, their borders are not generally recognized as legal and legitimate frontiers separating them from other states. Instead, the territories of most of the contested states are widely regarded as integral parts of existing states.

Third, the governments of many contested states may meet the criterion of effectiveness in terms of controlling their territories and populations and some also live up to democratic standards of government. Still, the rulers' right to govern is widely disputed from abroad – a corollary of international rejection of these entities' right of statehood. Even if a contested state is factually separate and independent of another constitutional entity and may possess empirical statehood, it lacks juridical statehood conferred from outside through *de jure* recognition.

Fourth, contested states as a rule have the desire and ability to enter into the standard range of official relations with confirmed states, but the latter deny them the opportunity by withholding *de jure* recognition.

Fifth, the sovereignty of contested states is strongly disputed. True, most of them enjoy internal sovereignty (having their own constitutions sep-

arate from any external constitutional order), but other states challenge their very right to create and operate their own institutions of government separate from their original states. The latter typically assert a right to govern their break-away entities. What also detracts from the independence of many contested states, is their substantially illegal origins.

There were additional factors supporting international rejection of contested states' claims to statehood. One is the general commitment to the international law principle of maintaining the territorial integrity of existing states and, coupled with that, an aversion to unilateral secession. Since secession is widely regarded as an illegitimate if not always illegal origin of statehood, the products of such action may well find themselves condemned to life in international limbo. This "birth defect" accounts in large measure for the contested statehood of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdnistria, Nagorno Karabkh, Kosovo and Somaliland. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has also suffered the consequences of illegal origins: it owed its birth to Turkey's military invasion and occupation of the northern part of Cyprus in 1974 (The contested statehood of Taiwan, Palestine and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic cannot be attributed to clearly illegal origins).

While a lack of international recognition is the defining feature of contested states, it must be emphasized that the recognition deficit varies. Several levels of formal recognition or non-recognition can be distinguished; a contested state can fall in more than one category (Geldenhuys 2009, 25-6).

Titular recognition: there is wide formal acceptance (at multilateral level) of a claimant's right or title to statehood, but the juridical shell of statehood has little empirical substance. There is no full UN membership either. Palestine and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic are cases in point.

- *Partial recognition*: a putative state receives de jure recognition from a majority of states (Kosovo) or a minority (Taiwan) but lacks UN membership.
- *Paltry recognition*: a contested state is recognized by only a few established states and remains excluded from the UN. Biafra in the 1970s (recognized by five states) and Chechnya (one recognition) are examples.
- *Patron recognition*: only its patron or creator state recognizes a contested state. This applies to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and South Africa's four homeland states, as well as South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
- *Peer recognition*: contested states recognize each other (a status that

can be combined with patron recognition), as with Nagorno Karabakh and Transnistria. Needless to say, UN membership does not apply in the cases of paltry, patron and peer recognition.

- *Zero recognition*: an entity's purported statehood is not formally recognized by either other contested states or confirmed states. Somaliland finds itself in this position, as had Katanga and Rhodesia.

The Origins of the IS as a Movement and Physical State

The IS's contested statehood can be attributed in part to the origins of the movement and its self-proclaimed Islamic caliphate: both were grounded in the ideology of jihadi-Salafism. Salafism was a particular school of Islamic political thought within Sunni Islam dating back to medieval times (Bunzel 2015, 7-8; Stern and Berger 2015, xi,xii,268). Salafism took the Qur'an as the basis for the political, legal and social orders in society so as to attain "a complete Muslim life" (Solomon 2015, 177-8). The model polity required for this purpose was said to be the original Islamic state established by the Prophet Muhammed in Medina in 622, and the successor Islamic caliphates that exercised power over the four decades after his death. The period of the *salaf-al-salih* or rightly guarded caliphs was then presented as the pristine age of Islam (Ayooob 2016, 1; Stern and Berger 2015, 258; Danforth 2015, 1). Emulating the Prophet, the caliphs assumed the dual roles of custodian of religion and regulator of community affairs according to principles of faith. (The word caliph, derived from the Arabic *khalifah*, means vice-regent, deputy or successor.) (Salazar 2014, 1-5; Solomon 2016a, 440.) The jihadi element (*jihad* being Arabic for struggle) of the IS's founding ideology justified the use of violence to achieve Salafist ideals. Towards the end of the 20th century, violent Islamist movements influenced by the activism of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (formed in 1928) and "Salafi exclusivism", emerged in the Middle East. They were the forerunners of jihadi-Salafi groups like Al-Qaeda and the IS movement, which sought to overthrow established governments in the region and replace them with Islamic regimes and ultimately restore the caliphate - as a political-religious empire - by violent means (Bunzel 2015, 7-9; Lekas 2015, 317; Stern and Berger 2015, xi-xii).

The IS movement was an outgrowth of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that was established in 1999 (Solomon 2016b, 2; Stern and Berger 2015, 58). In 2006 the ISI (Islamic State of Iraq), as the organization was then known, announced the establishment of a physical state by the same name and proclaimed a jihadi commander Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi as leader of the new

polity. Its founders portrayed the entity as a proto-caliphate for the Muslims of the world, and Baghdadi presented himself as caliph-in-waiting (Bunzel 2015, 17-18; McCants 2015, 15-16; Solomon 2016b, 2). Thus began the first phase in the life of the IS state, extending over the years 2006 to 2013.

The choice of Iraq as the territorial base of the purported state was of course not accidental. Iraq had degenerated into anarchy after US-led coalition forces toppled President Saddam Hussein in April 2003. The installation of a Shiite-dominated successor government in 2005 failed abysmally to restore law, order and peace. Instead, it intensified tensions between the Sunni and Shiite communities. This unsettled situation created an irresistible opportunity for the IS movement to establish a foothold in Iraq (Rosiny 2014, 2; Evertse 2016, 25-6; Todenhöfer 2015, 9; Isakhan 2015, 225-30). Although the purported state had precious little land and no major urban centre under effective control (McCants 2015, 38,135), it created official institutions such as a cabinet and several ministries (including Media Affairs, War, Oil, Agriculture and Fisheries, and Health) as well as Shari'a courts presided over by Muslim judges dispensing Islamic law. An important component of local administration was the *da'wah* office that took charge of education and the preaching of the IS movement's version of "pure Islam" (Solomon 2016b, 2-3; Bunzel 2015, 19). In 2007 the IS acquired its own flag. Bearing the seal of the Prophet, the flag was not merely a symbol of IS statehood but also a harbinger of a future caliphate (McCants 2015, 22).

Despite trappings of statehood, the new polity was little more than a "paper state". Apart from a lack of territorial control, the IS authorities failed to gain a monopoly of violence or to provide consistent public services. There were also divisions between different jihadi-Salafi groups in Iraq and between Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the leadership of the IS movement (Bunzel 2015, 17-24; McCants 2015, 42,73). Internationally, little attention was paid to the struggling polity. The killing of Abu Umar al-Baghdadi by American and Iraqi forces in 2010 further undermined what little legitimacy and credibility the IS state had. He was succeeded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Bunzel 2015, 19-23).

The IS as a purported state gained a new lease on life in 2013 with its formal extension into Syria (known in Arabic as *Sham*), which was engulfed in civil war and saw the retreat of the Syrian state from large parts of the national territory. The groundwork for the expansion had been prepared since 2011, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi dispatched jihadi fighters to Syria to join the armed conflict (Martin and Solomon 2017, 2). In 2012 a drastic escalation of violence in Iraq coincided with a resurgence of the IS movement there. Its fighters invaded western Iraq and captured most of the country's Sunni areas, including Iraq's second largest city, Mosul. In March 2013 the insurgents also

took the Syrian town of Raqqa. Reflecting the new realities on the ground, the movement's name was changed to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in April 2013 (Martin and Solomon 2017, 1; Isakhan, 2017, 268). In early 2014 an increasingly confident leadership officially broke its association with Al-Qaeda, followed by a reclamation of an Islamic state in June 2014 – this time explicitly calling itself a caliphate. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi assumed the title of Caliph Ibrahim.

Unlike in 2006, the IS in 2014 “had the money, fighters, weapons, and land to make a plausible case that it was the [original] caliphate reborn” (McCants 2015, 123). Raqqa was declared the IS state's capital in Syria, alongside Mosul as its capital in Iraq (Stern and Berger 2015, 44-6).

Because the IS in its 2014 manifestation was a self-declared global Islamic caliphate and therefore presumably not hemmed in by national borders and a territorially confined population, it could be argued that the entity should not be assessed as a state in the conventional (Montevideo) sense. On the other side of the ledger, the IS formally declared itself a state and assumed typical state-like features. Its supranational founding ideology does not cancel out its state-related characteristics either. In this regard the Soviet Union provides some analogy. Its founding Marxist ideology envisaged a dictatorship of the proletariat pending the “withering away of the state”. When the highest stage of communism was reached, the state (as a coercive enforcer of law) would become obsolete. Far from becoming a non-state (or post-state) entity, the Soviet Union constructed a totalitarian state with an imperialist complexion (Raico 2017; Hardcastle 1946; Stucka 1924).

The IS State and the Criteria for Statehood

The next step in the analysis is to measure the IS state founded in 2014 against the legal and political requirements for statehood set out earlier and applied cursorily to ten of today's contested states (Coleman 2014, 75-80; Bellew 2015, 260-6; Waltman 2016, 828-30).

Territory

As a global caliphate the IS polity was supposed to be a borderless entity, but it had a territorial base. At its height, the IS state was more or less in control of approximately one-third of the national territories of both Syria and Iraq. The areas coincided with the Sunni heartland that straddled the border between the two countries (Martin and Solomon 2017, 16,18,27; Gaier 2016, 9-11; Tomuschat 2015, 223). In size, the IS territory has been compared

variously to that of the United Kingdom (241,590 sq km) (Solomon 2016b, 6), Austria (82,444 sq km) (Tarras-Wahlberg 2016, 6) and Belgium (30,278 sq km) (Chikhi 2015, 2). These widely varying estimates of the IS polity's geographic size reflected the provisional nature of the boundaries amid the ebb and flow of open warfare.

While the IS state managed to establish itself as “a de facto territorial power” in parts of Iraq and Syria (Tomuschat 2015, 223), a critical consideration is that this was a political entity “superimposed over the formal boundaries” of these countries and operating in complete disregard of their recognized borders (Ollivant and Kelly, quoted by Tomuschat 2015, 223). Its acquisition of territory came about through a combination of conquest by IS military forces and involuntary cession caused by the lawful owners' lack of power (Rosiny 2014, 6). Founded on territory acquired through the illegal use of force meant that the IS state had a fatal birth defect – albeit not a unique one among contested states.

Proving its ability to exert effective control of territory was for the IS movement a test of its credibility (Armacanqui 2016, 2) and also fed its caliphate rhetoric (Martin and Solomon 2017, 17). Such control was vital for economic reasons too because – as will be illustrated below – the conquered territory was rich in natural resources (Martin and Solomon 2017, 19-20).

Expanding and lasting control over the “core caliphate” in Iraq and Syria was for the IS leadership only a prelude to extending its territorial base by gaining control over other countries in the Middle East, including Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel and southern Turkey. The IS movement's ultimate goal was the establishment of a universal caliphate through a holy war on a global scale (Martin and Solomon 2017, 1-2, 27-8; “*The Third Front*” 2016). Meanwhile the IS movement proclaimed *wilayats* (provinces) in Libya, Egypt, Algeria, West Africa (through its association with Boko Haram) and even in Russia's Caucasus region (Martin and Solomon 2017, 27-8; Stern and Berger 2015, 200; McCants 2015, 141). Most of these provinces existed in name only, falling outside effective IS control.

The IS state had since late 2016 lost vast chunks of territory to a host of enemy formations that included deployments from the US, Russia and Iran as well as government forces and militias in Iraq and Syria. These military operations culminated in the liberation of most of the IS-held territories, including Raqqa and Mosul, by November 2017 (BBCNews 2017; Ward 2017; Lockie 2017).

In international law, a putative state need not have fixed and final borders; consider, for instance, the inconclusive borders of South Sudan at the time of independence in 2011. In the case of the IS state, however, its occupa-

tion of foreign territory was challenged by force by the two states from which the land had been seized (Iraq and Syria), backed by various foreign powers and non-state militias. “Such a fluid and unclear situation”, Tomuschat (2015, 229) argued, “does not permit the characterization of the land factually controlled by the IS at any given moment as its ‘national’ territory”. The essential requirements of “stability and continuity” were lacking when dealing with an “entity on wheels” whose fortunes depended on military success or failure. The contestation over territory was a corollary of the more fundamental global rejection of IS polity’s very right of statehood.

Population

As a self-proclaimed caliphate, the IS presented itself as the home of the *ummah*, meaning the entire body of 1.5 billion Muslim believers worldwide. The IS leadership called on all Muslims everywhere to pay obedience to Caliph Ibrahim as their leader and God’s deputy on earth (Solomon 2016b, 3; Delphin 2016, 8). This aspiration was, however, not endorsed by any existing state and cannot be equated with a permanent population residing on the territory of the IS. Still, the IS polity at its peak had a settled population of about 10 million in the areas of Iraq and Syria over which it held sway (Solomon 2016a, 5; Stern and Berger 2015, 51). Towards the end of 2016 that figure may have declined to around 6 million as it lost territory (Solomon 2016b, 3).

Whatever their number, the fact is that the people under the control of the IS state had “never been asked in a reliable and ascertainable manner” whether they approved of their Islamic rulers. Moreover, while an armed conflict is raging, “the population of an occupied territory cannot be transformed by force into the ‘people’ of that territory”, Tomuschat (2015, 229) pointed out.

It should be acknowledged that there was probably some popular support for the IS regime based on religious and historical grounds. The IS movement’s adoption of the traditional Islamic notion of a caliphate resonated with Muslims “longing for cultural authenticity, religious purity, and political unity”, Rosiny (2014, 1) explained. In like vein McBride (in Stern and Berger 2015, 279) viewed the restoration of the caliphate as more than just symbolic:

...it is unquestionably an attempt to return to an idealized form of government understood to have existed in an era when the Muslim world flourished.

These considerations help to explain why an estimated 20,000 people

from roughly 90 countries had flocked to the IS state by 2016, whether to celebrate the reborn caliphate or take up arms to extend its writ across the region and beyond (Solomon 2016b, 1). More pragmatically, inhabitants of the IS-controlled regions may have been won over by the IS overlords' ability to present their government as preferable to the oppression or neglect that had characterized the previous rule from Damascus and Baghdad (Solomon 2016b, 20; Bunzel 2015, 36).

Government

Although never regarded as a state in international law, the IS possessed a government structure (Solis 2015, 82). Power was concentrated in the hands of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Caliph Ibrahim), who was both the political and religious leader, and two deputies, one each for Iraq and Syria. They determined the overall aims and objectives of the government. The executive leadership also comprised a cabinet of eight ministers who headed the departments of state, and two councils. The more powerful Shura Council supervised matters of state and communicated top-level decisions down the chain of command for implementation. Its members were appointed by the Caliph. The Sharia Council was headed by the Caliph and charged with selecting future caliphs and directing all religious and judicial affairs. The Sharia Council also served as a quasi-intelligence agency (Armacanqui 2016, 6; Evertse 2016, 35).

The second tier of government consisted of provinces – 16 at one stage - each of which had an emir overseeing his region. The third level comprised local governments and administrative units (Evertse 2016, 35; Armacanqui 2016, 7-9; Bellew 2015, 258). To extend their writ down to the grass-roots level, IS leaders also relied on so-called street-level bureaucrats. These were administrative and judicial officers and religious police who interacted directly and continuously with citizens and represented the main form of contact that many inhabitants had with the physical Islamic state (Armacanqui 2016, 10-11).

The aspirant state ran over a dozen departments, including Public Services, Education, Health, Finances, Judicial Matters, Public Morality, Religious Police, Defence, Precious Resources and Agriculture. Some of these were new structures, reflecting IS's ideological agenda, whereas others were taken over from the retreating Iraqi and Syrian authorities (Solomon 2016b, 4; Armacanqui 2016, 5,15). What its creators portrayed as a distinctive and authentic judicial system, relied on courts to apply traditional civil law and a strict version of Shari'a law (Evertse 2016, 36; Armacanqui 2016, 4). The

polity also displayed other symbols of statehood like its own flag and anthem and it issued passports (Rosiny 2014, 5).

A critical arm of the state was the military. At one stage the IS state had around 31,000 fighters under its banner, with active military units stationed across its territory (Solomon 2016b, 20; Armacanqui 2016, 1). The upper ranks were dominated by experienced professionals, many of whom had served in President Saddam Hussein's Iraqi defence force. Large numbers of foreign militants also joined IS forces (Stern and Berger 2015, 75-99; Delphin 2016, 1-55). The abundance of sophisticated weapons in their arsenal allowed the IS militia to conduct both conventional and asymmetric warfare (Solomon 2016b, 26-7).

When the IS movement seized territory from the Syrian or Iraqi state, it made determined efforts to build or rebuild a system of government to provide the inhabitants with security and welfare - in several instances actually superior to what the previous authorities delivered (Armacanqui 2016, 4-6). In the name of state-building, the IS leadership launched infrastructure projects related to roads, water, sewage, electricity and public transport (Evertse 2016, 35-6; Solomon 2016b, 18). At one point over 60% of the polity's expenditure was devoted to state-building projects (Martin and Solomon 2017, 28). The IS state furthermore demonstrated an ability to run oil fields, power plants and dams in the areas captured from Iraq and Syria (Martin and Solomon 2017, 26). Other public goods like education, housing, healthcare and food were also provided (Evertse 2016, 36; Martin and Solomon 2017, 11,16,27). Improved security was effected by a "well-functioning policing security force" that clamped down heavily on crime (Armacanqui 2016, 6).

Fortunately for the IS state, it had handsome financial resources for its civil and military endeavours. Well before the proclamation of the state-*cum*-caliphate in June 2014, the IS as organization had accumulated extensive wealth through supposedly private donations from Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Jordan. As the group conquered territory in Iraq and Syria, it gained control of its most valuable source of revenue, namely oil fields and refineries. The banks that IS fighters seized in their expansionist drives provided another lucrative source of income (Evertse 2016, 38-9; Solomon 2016b, 24-5; Isakhan 2015, 230). Taxes were also levied on inhabitants of IS-controlled territories (Armacanqui 2016, 1). In 2015 the IS generated an income of roughly US\$ 2.4 billion and the assets under the movement's control were at the time estimated at over US\$2 trillion (Martin and Solomon 2017, 1,18). The IS has appropriately been called "the world's richest militant organization" (Evertse 2016, 39).

The leaders of the IS state were not averse to other blatantly criminal

forms of revenue generation such as kidnapping, extortion, smuggling of oil and other raw materials, the illicit sale of cultural artefacts, drug trafficking, human trafficking and organ trafficking (Evertse 2016, 39; Martin and Solomon 2017, 3,18-22). Such activities rendered the IS polity a criminal state. It was not the only contested state to engage in the illicit economy; the Eurasian pretender states did likewise.

Gross human rights abuses were so pervasive that they can be regarded as a key characteristic of IS rule. The authorities employed brute force to establish and maintain control and keep the populace in check. Civil liberties were further eroded by the al-Hisba religious police's enforcement of strict Islamic codes of behaviour (McCants 2015, 136-7; Armacanqui 2016, 6). Where the movement captured areas with large non-Sunni populations, like the Yazidi region in Iraq and Mosul with its Christian community, it resorted to religious cleansing by way of expulsion, torture and mass executions. Women and children of the Yazidi community were also enslaved (Armacanqui 2016, 5; Melhem 2015; Isakhan, 2017, 274-5).

A final feature of the IS government worth recording was its sophisticated use of propaganda or, stated more grandly, public diplomacy. The state's Al Hayat Media Centre drove a multimedia propaganda strategy that combined violent propaganda (to shock and terrorize audiences) with inviting images of the Promised Land being created in IS-controlled areas (to help recruit foreign co-religionists) (Evertse 2016, 40-2; Blaker 2015, 1-9; Melki and Jabado 2016, 94). As Stern and Berger (2015, 3) put it, "ISIS has made a name on the marketing of savagery, evolving its message to sell a strange but potent new blend of utopianism and appalling carnage to a worldwide audience". The IS's propagandists were highly adept at spreading their messages through social media (including Facebook, Twitter, You Tube and Instagram) while at the same time producing more conventional publications such as *Al-Naba* (Arabic language), *Dabiq* (English), *Constantinople* (Turkish) and *Rumiyah* (English, French and other languages) and radio broadcasts in five languages (Ingram 2016; "Islamic State: Unfriended", 2015).

The IS state had clearly established elaborate official structures and processes and had the manpower and money to discharge typical government functions (McCants 2015, 153). The entity moreover enjoyed constitutional independence or internal sovereignty. But did the IS polity meet the international law requirement of effective government? Writing in 2015, Tomuschat (2015, 228) argued that IS rulers may well have performed some administrative functions effectively in particular areas like Raqqa and Mosul, but "the overall structure is still extremely shaky" due to ongoing warfare. He concluded that, because of "the lack of consolidated governmental authority", a

new state could not and did not emerge in the territories claimed by the IS movement. If Tomuschat could be faulted for setting the bar too high in 2015, the IS state's serious loss of territory since late 2016 was fatal to any notion of consolidated governmental authority. Its wholesale abuse of human rights in territories under its control, terrorist activities, involvement in the illicit global economy and the wanton destruction of cultural treasures further undermined any IS claims to being a well governed polity worthy of international acceptance.

International relations

Like Somaliland, the IS state experienced zero recognition, the ultimate form of diplomatic isolation. But unlike Somaliland and today's other contested states, the IS state did not aspire to international recognition and acceptance into the global community of confirmed states. Recognition from "non-believer" states was superfluous to an Islamic entity bent on creating a borderless Muslim caliphate through a holy war against non-Muslims. If individual Muslim countries were to have recognized the IS state, the IS leadership presumably believed, they would automatically be incorporated into the caliphate. No existing Muslim state obliged (Rosiny 2014, 6; Martin and Solomon 2017, 14).

Despite its lack of recognition, the IS state had some dealings with other countries. One was the sale of oil produced in territories it occupied. Turkey was reportedly a buyer (Martin and Solomon 2017, 19). Private groups in several Muslim countries, it was noted earlier, provided funding for the IS movement. A range of non-official interactions between contested and confirmed states have indeed been common.

There were, however, some fundamental differences in the international status of the IS polity and other contested states. The world community was not willing to turn a blind eye to the existence of the IS state in the hope that it would disappear or become a containable "frozen conflict". Nor was there any collective inclination to delegate the search for a resolution of the conflicts over the IS state to countries in the immediate region. Instead, the UN Security Council became seized of the matter, designating the IS movement and its physical polity as a threat to international peace and security and elevating them to the top of the global security agenda between 2014 and 2017. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council adopted a series of punitive measures against the IS movement-*cum-state*⁴.

⁴ UN Security Council resolutions are available in full text at www.un.org/en/documents/resolutions.

The purpose was not to reform the IS state but to cause its demise, if not also that of the IS movement. The world community had in effect issued a death warrant against the IS polity, a relatively rare occurrence in the international politics of contested states.

The principal offence of which the UN Security Council repeatedly accused “the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)”, as it was called in Council resolutions, was the threat to international peace and security “caused by terrorist acts”. The first such resolution, number 2170 of August 2014, re-affirmed earlier resolutions on the subject by declaring that terrorism in all its manifestations “constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security” and that all acts of terrorism “are criminal and unjustifiable”. Apart from ISIL, the resolution also mentioned the Al-Nusra Front (an Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria), Al-Qaeda itself and its other associates. Resolution 2249 of November 2015 likewise referred to these organizations as endangering international peace and security, but added that ISIL “constitutes a global and unprecedented threat to international peace and security”. Resolution 2170 and subsequent Council resolutions (for example 2178 of September 2014, 2253 of December 2015 and 2322 of December 2016), denounced ISIL and other groups of “ongoing and multiple criminal terrorist acts” causing the death of innocent civilians, destruction of property and “greatly undermining stability”. Related condemnations applied to the group’s recruiting and training of “foreign terrorist fighters” and its “horrifying terrorist attacks” in places like Ankara, Paris, Sinai and Beirut (resolution 2249 of 2015).

The IS’s other transgressions recorded in Council resolutions (of which some are cited), were

- its “violent and extremist ideology” (2249 of 2015);
- control over significant territory and natural resources across Syria and Iraq (2249 of 2015);
- undermining stability in Iraq, Syria and the region (2170 of 2014);
- abductions of women and children and “their exploitation and abuse” that included rape and forced marriage (2199 of 2015, 2253 of 2015);
- kidnapping, hostage-taking and murdering of hostages (2170 of 2014, 2199 of 2015, 2253 of 2015);
- “continued gross systematic and widespread attacks” against civilians (2249 of 2015);
- violations of human rights and the laws of war (2170 of 2014, 2249 of 2015);
- crimes against humanity (2170 of 2014);

- “barbaric acts of destruction and looting of cultural heritage” in Iraq and Syria (2199 of 2015, 2249 of 2015), and
- involvement in and profiting from transnational organized crime, including trafficking of persons, arms, drugs, artefacts, natural resources (oil, gold, wildlife), kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and bank robbery (2253 of 2015, 2322 of 2016).

Taken as a whole, the charge sheet compiled by the UN Security Council portrayed the IS - whether as a movement or a putative state - as a terrorist and criminal outcast that had no place in the community of states or in international civil society.

There were additional legal and political grounds on which existing states shunned the IS polity and supported its demise. An obvious reason was the movement’s illegal use of force, aggression, conquest and the violation of the territorial integrity of Syria and Iraq in order to proclaim its caliphate (Amorós 2016, 13; Mulligan 2016, 78; Van der Vyver 2016, 533; Tomuschat 2015, 231). As a state and a political-religious movement, the IS also threatened the security and stability of the immediate region and far beyond through the establishment of affiliates or “local franchises”. In addition to the countries mentioned earlier, IS associates could be found in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mali, Somalia, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan, the Philippines, Indonesia and Bangladesh (Solomon 2016b, 7-10; Gunaratna 2016; “Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps” 2017).

A “legally confirmed moral standard” of statehood that the IS polity failed to meet, was that a state’s legitimacy depended also on the self-determination of people. The IS polity was, however, not a colony achieving external self-determination. The population of IS-controlled territories were not given internal self-determination either, being denied the right to freely choose their form of government and political leadership (Amorós 2016, 11-14; Bellew 2015, 261-2; Yihdego 2015).

Because the IS “deliberately distances itself from the world-wide standards of peace and justice”, Tomuschat (2015, 231-2, 240) maintained, it was not entitled to join the system that gave rise to these standards and to gain benefits from it. Excluded from the ranks of respectable states, the IS “can be treated as a criminal disturbance of international life” and its leaders and members should be prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Other international lawyers and analysts added the charge of genocide, for which IS figures should also be held criminally accountable (Mantilla 2016, 451-68; Leikas 2015, 313-39; Waltman 2016, 818-36; Stern and Berger 2015, 115, 210-16).

Instructively, UN Human Rights Council reports in 2015 and 2016 affirmed that the IS had indeed perpetrated all three these international crimes against the Yazidi people in Iraq and Syria, while other non-Sunni religious communities in IS territories were also subjected to gross human rights abuses (Solis 2015, 70; Mantilla 2016, 459; McCants 2015, 112-13; Scharf 2016, 21). Echoing Tomuschat, Yihdego (2015) argued that because the IS committed genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity “as a strategy in an open and abhorrent fashion”, it disqualified itself from being considered as an international actor eligible for the entitlements arising from statehood.

It is worth reiterating another of the IS’s misdeeds, which has been depicted as cultural cleansing. A report prepared for Unesco in 2014 defined cultural cleansing as “an intentional strategy that seeks to destroy cultural diversity” through a combination of two actions: the deliberate targeting of individuals based on their “cultural, ethnic or religious background” and deliberate attacks “on their places of worship, memory and learning”. These acts constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity and the perpetrators are hence prosecutable under international law (Hill 2016, 194). The IS state has been manifestly guilty of systematically destroying cultural heritage and hence cultural diversity in the areas under its control. Among the cultural heritage sites destroyed by the IS in Iraq and Syria are Palmyra, Nimrud, Khorsabad, Jonah’s Tomb, Hatra and the Mosul Museum and Library (Hill 2016, 196-200).

What further offended the international community was the IS movement and state’s violent pursuit of a global Muslim caliphate that would destroy the Westphalian system of sovereign states. Here, then, was the central paradox of the Islamic State: on the one hand it displayed the basic features of a state in international law - a government in control of a populated territory - but on the other hand it rejected the state-based international order (Amorós 2016, 9,14). The movement regarded its self-proclaimed state as a launching pad for a holy war aimed at establishing a global theocratic empire (McCants 2015, 119). As a result, Amorós (2016, 20-23) contended, “the survival of the Islamic State and the survival of the international society are mutually exclusive, as both are grounded on opposed views of the legitimacy of world order”.

The UN Security Council, as suggested, was not content with issuing accusations and denunciations against the IS state/movement; it also decided on concrete actions. Resolution 2170 (2014) repeated previous statements that threats caused by terrorist acts needed to be combated “by all means” in accordance with the UN Charter and international law, with the UN “leading and coordinating this effort”. The Council also declared that

...terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States, and international and regional organizations (resolution 2199; also see resolution 2354 of 2017).

The Security Council accordingly instructed or requested states to take a range of actions against the IS, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. The list included the following measures (with some of the relevant resolutions cited):

- disrupting oil trade (2199 of 2015, 2253 of 2015);
- imposing targeted financial and travel sanctions (2199 of 2015, 2253 of 2015, 2322 of 2016);
- freezing all foreign assets (2170 of 2014, 2199 of 2015, 2253 of 2015);
- refraining from engaging in direct or indirect trade with these groups in various economic resources (2199 of 2015, 2253 of 2015);
- banning the provision of arms and related material (2199 of 2015, 2253 of 2015);
- preventing and suppressing the recruitment and transportation of “foreign terrorist fighters” (2253 of 2015);
- preventing and combating trafficking in cultural property and associated offences (2322 of 2016), and
- holding accountable persons committing terrorist acts, violating international humanitarian law or abusing human rights (2170 of 2014, 2322 of 2016).

Several countries took to arms to annihilate the IS as a physical state. President Barack Obama, for instance, in September 2014 vowed that the US would “degrade and ultimately destroy” the self-proclaimed polity (“Libya: The Third Front” 2016; Stern and Berger 2015, 49; Armacanqui 2016, 1-3). Two years later an American-led military offensive was indeed launched. The US was joined by a coalition of over 50 states, including Turkey, France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Australia, Jordan, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Air strikes against IS targets in Iraq and Syria were the preferred form of military action, with over 11,500 attacks launched between August 2014 and April 2017 (Coleman 2014, 79; Martin and Solomon 2017, 10,23; Scharf 2016, 15-17). Russia, in defending the besieged regime of President Bashar al Assad in Syria, also turned its armed might on the IS state and its fighters, as did Iran (Martin and

Solomon 2017, 82; Lockie 2017).

In sum, international reactions to the IS movement and its state amounted to the establishment and operation of a de facto international regime, centred on the UN, to combat an exceptional rule-breaker among present international actors.

Conclusion

The IS state displayed three of the basic components of statehood in international law, namely territory, population and government. As with most other contested states, these features were internationally contested in the case of the IS entity too. Its recognition deficit was total, with no country willing to accord the IS state de jure recognition. This has also been the fate of Somaliland. These areas of similarity between the IS state and today's other contested states were, however, overshadowed by the singular features of the Islamic polity.

First, the Islamic State was a complex, hybrid entity: military force, transnational terrorist group, international criminal enterprise, state, caliphate and self-appointed defender of the Muslim faith worldwide (Solis 2015, 82; Stern and Berger 2015, 289; Yihdego 2015; Tomuschat 2015, 223). Some other states have admittedly displayed one or more of these features (without compromising their statehood), but the IS was probably unique in being all these things at the same time.

Second, the IS movement and state provoked far greater international outrage than any of the other ten contested states had done in recent times; only Palestine and the Palestine Liberation Organization had courted global notoriety in the 1970s. One reason for the IS's infamy was its "public display of barbarism", such as the publicized beheading of captives (Stern and Berger 2015, 234).

The IS state was, in the third place, not merely a theocracy; its entire system of government was based on a reign of terror. No other contemporary contested state could equal the IS's oppressive state apparatus.

Fourth, and unique among today's contested states, the IS polity pursued an aggressive and revisionist international agenda. It was committed to overturning the political status quo in its neighbourhood and beyond. Here was a jihadist actor bent on destroying the community of states while assuming the very form of its members (Amorós 2016, 23).

As a consequence the IS state was, in the fifth instance, not interested in joining the community of states. Other contested states typically desire

international acceptance.

Sixth, the UN and scores of individual states did not merely consign the IS state to international limbo through isolation (as with other contested states), but they launched a concerted campaign to destroy the IS polity. The international community judged that the IS state had been conceived, born and raised in sin and could not be “civilized” or reformed by peacefully engaging with it.

The seventh contrast was that the IS state was doomed to a much shorter life – three-and-a-half years - than any of the other ten contested states. But even if the IS has been completely destroyed as a state-like entity, its foundational idea of a global Muslim caliphate for the *ummah* will probably survive and be pursued by some other organization sooner or later (Amorós 2016, 25; Chikhi 2015, 1-10). More ominously, the demise of the IS state will not spell the end of the IS as a terrorist formation. Having created “a whole new generation of militant Islamists who are spreading like wildfire” (Isakhan 2015, 232), with a foreign network of terrorist affiliates, the IS may well embark on a new wave of terror over a wide front and so continue to endanger international peace and security.

Finally, the fate of the IS state confirms two lessons that aspirant state-founders can learn from today’s other contested states: the world community is not amenable to state creation through aggression and secession, and contested statehood is rarely a way-station to confirmed statehood.

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ABSTRACT

Contested states are entities whose claims to statehood are challenged by the international community, resulting in a lack of de jure recognition. In 2014 the Islamic State (IS) became the latest addition to the current clutch of contested states. Its contemporaries included Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Kosovo and Somaliland. The IS's recognition deficit was worse than that of most other contested states, but like the rest it too displayed standard features of statehood. These similarities were, however, overshadowed by the profound differences between the IS state and its counterparts.

KEYWORDS

Islamic State (IS); Contested States; Statehood; Recognition of States.

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IRAQ: YEARS OF POST-SADDAM INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

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Introduction

Iraq is very important for the world community because of its strategic position at the crossroads between the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea along with huge oil and mineral wealth. Moreover, Iraqi case illustrates all aspects of the US Middle Eastern policy since the end of the Cold War.

Iraq is viewed by many scientists as a failed state despite huge mineral wealth and considerable American official aid. This country remains among the top ten state actors with the world's largest oil reserves. However, crude oil deposits are divided between Shia majority in the south and Kurd minorities in the north-eastern regions what endangers her security and development. Kurdish people demand independence, whereas Sunni loyalists want more power in a political process and are striving to end sectarian violence. At the same time Iraq is torn between Iran and the USA with each side demanding loyalty and full-fledged cooperation. The main *research steps* explain the peculiarities of economic recovery of Iraq, the reasons behind de-facto independence of autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, the origins of Shia-Sunni civil war, the deterioration of American strategic presence, and the rise of Iranian influence on a war-torn country.

The main purpose of the article is to analyze the outcome of 14-years old transition from totalitarian rule of Saddam Hussein to democratic governance. It is also important to find out how post-Saddam state copes with severe external challenges emanating from Turkey, Iran and insurgency in Syria. Iraqi, Turkish and Iranian *news outlets* along with official sites of respective Ministries of foreign affairs and the publications of think tanks were used as

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the principal sources of information.

Analysis of the latest publications

Many researchers in the USA view Iraqi developments from the perspective of American national interests, but this work provides a comprehensive analysis of interaction between Iraq and its main political and economic partners in order to re-create and analyze vital events in post-Saddam era. What concerns Ukraine, it is important to single out the scientific work *Alexandr Manchinskiy*², who argues that the US counter-insurgency operations in Iraq were extremely cruel and American interim administration did not prevent the rise in robberies of Babylonian treasures (Manchinskiy 2015). In another article *Ganna Shelest*³ considers mistakes of the President George Bush Junior in Iraq among which were such actions as unjustified intervention, denial of proper justice and swift execution of 69-years old Saddam Hussein, fostering of Shia-Sunni divide via democratic process without providing safeguards for Sunni minority and adoption of undemocratic Constitution back in 2005 (Shelest 2013). Finally, *Ludmila Chekalenko and Viacheslav Zivatiy*⁴ call the attempts of Turkey and Syria to divert the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates a grave threat to the security of Iraq that Iraqi state completely powerless to stop (Chekalenko, Zivatiy and Vasilieva 2014).

The country is situated at the crossroads between the Mediterranean Sea, Arabian (Persian) Gulf and the Red Sea, thus influencing events in all three respective regions. Under the rule of Ba'ath Party Iraq was regarded as the last frontier of Sunni Arab world against Shiites of Iran, but today both neighbours with the biggest Shia population in the Middle East demonstrate unity on many important regional issues. Moreover, Iraq remains a participant of unresolved Kurdish question and the only state in the world, where Kurds enjoy wide regional autonomy by possessing own armed forces Peshmerga (literally “those who confront death”), government, flag and semi-official representative offices abroad.

Iraq is squeezed between Saudi Arabia and Iran with a tiny 58-kilom-

2 Original work: Маначинский Александр, “Ирак: тайные пружины войны“ (Киев: Румб, 2005), 416 с.

3 Original work: Шелест Ганна, “Ирак: десять лет, которые мы потеряли“, Зеркало Недели, 22 березня, 2013.

4 Original work: Чекаленко Л., Циватий В., Васильева М. “Турецька Республіка на початку ХХІ століття: традиції, зовнішньополітична стратегія, інституційна модель“, Зовнішні справи. 1 (2014): 22 - 27.

eters long outlet to the Persian Gulf and growing dependence on Jordanian transit. In general Iraqi state shares 3,631 kilometres of challenging borders with six restive neighbours: Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey (Iraq Business News 2013).

On the other hand, geopolitical position of 33,7- million Iraq is unfavorable and defines its dependency on neighbors in questions of crude oil transit and sharing of water resources. This country is situated within Mesopotamian (“Land between rivers”) belt and along with Turkey and Syria heavily uses water of both transboundary waterways – the Tigris and Euphrates. Iraqi land area of 438 thousand square kilometres is populated disproportionately with the biggest number of people residing in southern and central parts of country and north-eastern regions. Shiites constitute around 65 percent of the population, Sunni Arabs and Kurds – 36 percent and other minorities like Christian Armenians, Assyrians and Yazidis represent the rest of Iraqis (Refworld 2015).

7,5-million capital city of Baghdad is situated in central part of Iraq near the Tigris. Thanks to narrow 58-kilometres long strip of land country has a limited access to the Gulf and port Umm Qasr. Another problem – a heavy reliance on 204-kilometres long and 2 – kilometers wide river Shatt al-Arab (“Arabian flow”), which is formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates thus shaping a part of the border with Iran. This strategic body of water is used to transport goods to the port area of Basra, known as “The Venice of the East” because of the numerous canals and the 19th century houses. Five ports of Basra are responsible for handling of 80 percent of oil export, and lion’s share of Iraqi economy depends on the logistics of that city. Moreover, giant oil field “Rumaila” with a record daily output of 1,4 million barrels of oil is situated nearby (Al-Monitor 2013).

Iraq is considered one of the cradles of the Middle Eastern civilization and is famous for ancient cities Babylon, Ur, Lagash and Uruk as well as for sacred sites of Shia spiritual power in Karbala, Najaf and Kufa. Combined with Baghdad and Basra, they constitute great incentive to visit this country.

Despite considerable oil and gas resources, whose profits in state coffers can support different fields of economic activity with subsidies, production of food in the country is poorly developed. The region of Mesopotamia, as a cradle of farming, is well-known for arable land due to water availability of the two biggest rivers the Tigris and Euphrates and huge swamp area with millions of date trees in the South. Agriculture mainly connected to cultivation of wheat and barley with dates also playing important additional role. In the wake of 2003 invasion American interim administration removed restrictions on food import and as a result local producers suffered from the

fierce foreign competition. Moreover, the system of card rationing that was widely used by Saddam Hussein since 1995 to support the poor, was retained as a measure to feed the population during period of instability. Each person, covered by the program, was entitled to receive on a monthly basis 3 kg of rice, 2 kg of sugar, 9 kg of flour as well as tea leaves, beans and tomato paste (Global Arab Network 2009). Those generous hand-outs led to the purchase of huge volumes of food, permitted by the UN. Finally, neighbouring countries Turkey and Syria frequently diverted water of the Tigris and Euphrates for their industrial and agricultural needs and millions of hectares in Iraq were affected by desertification and strong seasonal dust storms. Today less than half of arable land is under cultivation. Main food imports include meat, cereals, sugar, fruits and vegetables, baby milk formula, wheat and rice. With unfolding conflict against Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, whose militants grabbed huge areas of productive land in the North-West, where wheat and barley were cultivated, the demand for products of agriculture continued to grow steadily (FAO 2014).

In 2008 the government presented “The agricultural initiative” that was intended to provide easy loans for farmers to the tune of 1,5 billion dollars. The program of palm trees replanting was also initiated. In 1960-es Iraq was the biggest producer of dates in the world with 32 million of palm trees in the use and their annual output constituted 1 million tones of fruits. Later the number of palms fell to 11 million due to heavy fighting during Iran-Iraq war and severe fuel crisis in the beginning of the 1990-es that forced local people to cut trees. But today the replanting measures are intended to increase the number of palms to 40 million and introduce the best varieties of dates in the world markets in order to enter into a strong competition with top producers in the Middle East (Reuters 2011). This is important, because during holy month of Ramadan believers in Muslim world consume only saturated with calories dates and water and Iraq is in position to export.

Iraqi economy demonstrated a dynamic growth in the years of post-war reconstruction, which was tightly connected to development of oil industry. The biggest fields are situated in Southern Iraq near Basra and in Kurdistan not far from the city of Kirkuk. In 2015 only southern regions of the country exported more than 3 million of barrels each day (Al Arabia 2015). It is important to note, that despite the brain-drain of young professionals during post-Saddam years this industry remains highly profitable. Southern and north-eastern districts of Iraq were relatively peaceful and MNCs operated here without major security concerns. The main oil terminals of Iraq are situated inside of the port area of Basra and in Khor Al Amaya near Al - Faw peninsula in the Gulf. Overall oil reserves include 153 billion barrels, what

puts Iraq on a fourth place in the world after Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Iran (Oil Price 2017). However, some sources claim that Canada is the third largest country in respect to crude oil reserves. If to take into account all deposits of oil, gas and coal, Iraq can be considered the 7th richest country in the world with combined value of natural resources exceeding 18 trillion dollars (Insider 2014).

Import to Iraq is monopolized by the handful of neighbours like Turkey, Jordan and Iran, leading producers of consumer goods China and India, main weapons exporters the USA and the Russian Federation. For example, China, India and Turkey remain the top suppliers of garments and shoes, American companies sell weapons and engineering goods for oil industry while neighbouring states – the products of agriculture and building materials. Iraq buys grains from many countries around the world and rice, mainly from South Asian region. All this means that Iraq has become the victim of a “Dutch disease” that defines dependency of the country upon only one product – crude oil.

The recent Iraqi history is tragic and contributes to instability of the country. After American-British invasion of 2003 has ruined the rule of Saddam Hussein, the country was put under interim American administration with US army in the Sunni triangle, British troops controlling areas around Basra and other foreign soldiers – more peaceful regions in the North-East. In January of 2005 Iraqis wrote the Federal Constitution. Democratic elections in December 2005 under the new Basic Law allowed creating the permanent Council of Representatives and coalitional government. The Constitution envisages that parties nominate candidates for the lower house of the Parliament before elections, which after victory create a ruling coalition in the Council of Representatives and chose the powerful Prime Minister. The President remains largely ceremonial figure, standing above political fights, but with the right to rule by decrees in case of necessity. As a result, in 2005 hawkish Shia politician Nouri al-Maliki became the Prime Minister; the position of the President was awarded to a seasoned Kurdish statesman Jalal Talabani and that of the Vice President – to Sunni Tariq al-Hashimi. This complicated of political system was proposed by American authorities in order to reconcile different ethnic and religious groups, but there were no checks in place to protect the interests of minorities (Al-Monitor 2012). Inside of prestigious Al-Tashri district, full of palaces of Saddam Hussein and houses of wealthy Iraqis, American troops created the “Green Zone” with checkpoints and roadblocks – the secure area within 10 square kilometers of central Baghdad, where the government buildings and the US embassy function today without the constant threat of major terrorist acts (Al-Monitor 2013).

The ties of Iraq and the USA, which shaped a post-war order in the country, were complex and controversial. In 2008 both sides signed Strategic Framework Agreement, intended to regulate: the main principles of political relations; close defence cooperation; cultural and educational exchanges; facilitation of Iraqi development⁵. After the withdrawal of the bulk of troops Americans continued to provide Iraq with assistance of military advisers. Today the USA remains a primary supplier of weapons to Iraq. It was revealed by the State Department that since 2005 Iraqi authorities bought from US companies 3300 “Hellfire” missiles, 30 000 120-mm tank rounds, 146 M1A1 “Abrams” Main Battle Tanks; 36 F-16 fighters; 24 IA 407 helicopters; and 9 C-130 cargo aircraft (US State Department 2015).

But political relations are constantly strained because of Washington’s negative attitude towards Iran and Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. Iraq also continues to buy Russian weapons, among them – the brand-new attack helicopters Mi-28 and Mi-35 as well as SU-25 second-hand aircraft for close air support (Your Middle East 2014). Moreover, official Baghdad blames the US for the de-facto creation and support of Kurdish autonomy in the North. During the rule of Saddam Hussein in the 90-es the lone superpower declared the no-fly zone over Northern Iraq and helped to equip and arm Kurdish military units – Peshmerga, which today constitute 130 thousand of soldiers (National Post 2015). Several MNCs with American registration are also active in lucrative oil industry of Kurdistan.

Despite all this, the USA remains a principal donor of Iraqi regime and supports the unity of country financially, what is necessary for the stability of the Greater Middle East. For example, Americans has already contributed more than 60 billion dollars to Iraqi reconstruction, which became their second largest program of bilateral assistance after the one in Afghanistan. Within this amount 20 billion were allocated to train and equip the units of Iraqi army, to provide Iraqis with military transportation vehicles and small arms (Huffington Post 2013).

The American assistance was essential, but influence of official Washington could not prevent the civil war, facilitated by religious differences between Shia and Sunni population. Despite all odds, the regime of Saddam Hussein (1979-2003) provided the relative stability to Iraq thanks to severe repressions and domination of Ba’ath Party in political life along with the tireless «work» of the secret service Al-Mukhabarat. The state ideology stipulated that there were no ethnic or religious divisions, since all Iraqi citizens

5 “Strategic framework agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq“. November 17, 2008. <http://photos.state.gov/libraries/iraq/216651/US-IRAQ/us-iraq-sfa-en.pdf>. Accessed on February 25, 2017.

represented the unique heirs of great Babylonian civilization and people from the neighbouring countries were inferior to them. In order to protect cultural heritage Saddam ordered to rebuild and renovate ancient sites. State propaganda declared the head of Iraqi state as a direct successor of Babylonian kings. He was compared to Saladin and King Nebuchadnezzar, famous for their victories over Jews (PRI 2003). His policy favoured members of Sunni community and religious minorities in important state positions (for example, it is widely known that the longest-serving Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz was a Christian), security apparatus and armed forces. Moreover, Shia holidays, public manifestations of this religion and pilgrimages were prohibited. Simultaneously state forces fought against Kurdish rebels in the North and Northeast using chemical weapons and indiscriminate bombings of mountainous villages.

The decision of the President George H.W. Bush not to invade Iraq after successful military campaign in Kuwait in 1991, taken under the direct pressure of Saudi King Fahd, deepened sufferings of Shia majority that organized rebellion against Saddam Hussein in the aftermath of “Desert Storm” and was defeated with tanks and helicopters of Iraqi National Guard. The casualties of Shia people were in the range of 30,000-50,000 and 20,000 Kurds were also probably killed in Iraqi Kurdistan. Thus the first Arab Spring of 1991 ended up in a crushing defeat (Council on Foreign Relations 2016). The reluctance of the US President to provide assistance to the members of resistance caused a deep distrust towards official Washington among Shia majority and those painful memories are still alive among Iraqis. So, Iraqi Shiites were searching for revenge against privileged Sunni minority that silently supported the policy of Saddam Hussein.

After the invasion of 2003 ethno-religious balance of powers has fundamentally changed. In the last days of Saddam’s regime military depots were robbed by ordinary people and many soldiers deserted army with their weapons in anticipation of American occupation. In May of 2003 Hussain ordered the head of Central Bank of Iraq to hand over to his men 1 billion dollars in order to support Sunni insurgency. The money was taken away in 3 huge trucks and part of it disappeared without trace (Roberts 2003). Thus Iraq with a high level of unemployment and great resentment of population towards foreign “infidels” and “new crusaders” was awash with weapons and former militaries mainly of Sunni origin that lost their jobs got hold of it.

In 2006 the new Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his allies initiated campaign of removing of Iraqis of Sunni belief from the positions of state power under the pretext of banishing of former supporters of Ba’ath Party from the public life. Many innocent people lost their lucrative state

jobs, others were detained for a prolonged periods of time without a charge or were charged with terrorism and «membership» in death squads. Maliki also did not honour his promise to Americans to integrate previously unemployed Sunnis into government institutions. Scared by threats of the President George W. Bush-Junior, regional countries Syria and Iran contributed to instability in Iraq, providing their support to guerillas, which fought against American and British troops respectively in the Sunni triangle and in the South. Their objective was to intimidate soldiers in those areas and set public opinion in Western countries against further interventions due to the high number of casualties. The ambushes against military convoys and planting of improvised explosive devices near roads, in carcasses of dead animals or inside of mud walls of nearby houses became very common. The US army reacted with introduction of drones and robots, the purchases of thousands of mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles and equipment for the disruption of signals between the planted bomb and terrorists with remote controls (Military Technology 2010).

Saddam Hussein's capture and his humiliating execution by hanging in December 2006, accompanied by nationwide celebrations of Shiites, was considered by Sunni population as a revenge, however, Americans had hoped for a new and peaceful era in Iraq. Subsequently by the end of 2006 and in 2007 clashes of both biggest sectarian groups led to a civil war with gunmen taking control over different parts of Baghdad. In 2007 British troops transferred responsibility for Basra area to Iraqi army and Americans. The US armed forces, whose line of defense became vulnerable, finally evacuated their soldiers from the country in 2011. After the withdrawal of foreign troops Maliki immediately initiated a persecution of the popular Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi of Sunni belief and forced him to leave Iraq. He was sentenced to death in absentia (Rudaw 2016). The round-up of Sunni politicians and assassination of their bodyguards by state's security forces also became very common. The groups of gunmen routinely kidnapped people in affluent districts and demand ransom for their life or forcibly transported young girls to other countries for a sexual slavery.

In this background civil war in Syria has a direct influence on events in Iraq. Iraqi Sunni rebels enter neighbouring country from the largest Anbar governorate, which simultaneously borders Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in desert areas, and return later to ambush Iraqi security forces in acts of cross-border terrorism. In winter 2012 79-years old President Jalal Talabani had to leave Baghdad for German hospital with a stroke and sectarian violence became endemic. In July 2014 he was substituted with seasoned Kurdish politician and the former speaker of the Parliament Fuad Masum. But the death

toll continued to climb. Only in 2016 6,878 people were killed and 12,388 wounded across the country (Fox News 2017).

Why the violence became so widespread? As it was expected, American administration dismissed the army of Saddam Hussein, which was one of the biggest in the world. Thus tens of hundreds of veteran officers lost their jobs in the country over-reliant on oil industry. The Prime-Minister Nuri Al-Maliki decided to put his thrust into Shia commanders and never returned to the prominent positions their Sunni counterparts, thus forcing them to turn to arms in the country with high level of unemployment. Many of those people later joined the ranks of Islamic State in order to exert revenge on the regime. It was estimated that immediately after the fall of Saddam interim American administration disbanded 385,000 members of armed forces, 285,000 police officers and 50,000 trained guards from presidential security units (Policy Analysis 2008).

Rival militias practice different patterns of violence because the state power is concentrated in the hands of Shia majority. Usually Shia paramilitary troops or soldiers stop young or middle-aged Sunni people near the road-blocks and kill them. On the other hand, Sunni terrorists are retaliating with powerful blasts in the central areas of brisk bazars, in mosques or during Shia funeral processions. To this end they widely use car- and truck bombs or improvised explosive devices. The principal targets are pilgrims, which visit sacred cities of Najaf and Karbala during religious holidays. Many local and foreign correspondents are also caught in the crossfire. Since 2003 267 journalists died in Iraq and this country remains the most dangerous place for workers of mass-media in the world (Committee to Protect Journalists 2013).

Under the present political tensions the relations of Iraq with neighbours may play a stabilizing role. But the ties of official Baghdad with Turkey remain controversial because of water sharing rights and Kurdish issue since Kurds constitute 25 percent of Turkish population and there is also a sizeable Turkmen minority in Northern Iraq, which is important for Turkey. Both countries share the 331-kilometers long common border. South-Eastern Anatolia is a home to Turkish Kurds, whose relatives also live in Northern Iraq. Turkish companies took an active part in reconstruction of the country after the Gulf War of 1980-1988. Later international sanctions against the regime of Saddam Hussein made usual cooperation impossible but caused a considerable rise in smuggling with Turkish authorities turning a blind eye towards it. Official Ankara opposed the U.S.-led invasion to Iraq in 2003 and feared that the fall of Hussein's regime would lead to the creation of independent Kurdish state as a role model and a magnet for her own restive Kurds. But after the end of hostilities that country decided to capitalize on urgent postwar

needs of Northern Iraq in housing and infrastructure sectors as well as in agricultural products. Moreover, Turkey with one of the largest economies in the Middle East and exorbitant fuel prices is striving to play the role of “energy hub” between Asia and Europe and major tourist destination among top ten tourist markets, thus common border with energy-rich Iraq once again became useful (Hurriyet Daily News 2013).

The relations of Iraq with Turkey have a strong Kurdish connection. Kurdistan is a special region in North-Eastern Iraq with land area of 40,6 thousand square kilometers. Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) enjoys considerable autonomy and support of Peshmerga. There are several universities and two big airports in Erbil and Suleymaniyah, what allows region to be a principal hub of education and tourism for Kurds from other countries. The former Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo an established direct ties with KRG in order to satisfy needs of his country in oil and force official Erbil to take harsh measures against guerillas from “Kurdistan Workers Party” (PKK), who were waging cross-border operations against Turkish soldiers and hiding in mountains of Kandil. Until summer of 2014 Kurdistan remained a relatively stable place with small number of terrorist acts and favorable investment climate. As a result, in 2010-2012 KRG concluded 40 contracts with MNCs, among them were many Turkish companies (Kurdistan Board of Investment 2016).

The regional capital of Erbil (popular Kurdish name Hawler), situated 355 kilometers away from Baghdad in the far north-eastern corner of the country, is turning into a new Middle Eastern cultural and business centre with the opening of many shopping malls and brand hotels. Under the investment law of 2006 foreign entities are exempted from taxes on imports and profits during the first 10 years of their activity, eligible to own plots of land and repatriate money without any difficulties (China Daily 2013). In 2014 this city with citadel and mosques in Ottoman architectural style became for the first time the Capital for Arab Tourism. It attained the victory by promising to organize 40 types of cultural activities (Kurdistan Regional Government 2012). The new status facilitated the creation of infrastructure by Turkish and Lebanese construction companies that had considerable experience in this field. Today Erbil boasts modern roads, shops, hotels and residential condominiums, but because of the war with Islamic State it is overpopulated with refugees from neighboring Mosul situated 80 kilometers away.

80 percent of goods in Kurdistan are of Turkish origin because industry here is not developed since the times of Saddam Hussein, who feared independence of Kurds and their economic ties with Iran. Local smugglers (khajakji) are also making considerable profits capitalizing on the border

trade. This region remains the main zone of gasoline contraband by trucks and cars taking into consideration that prices of fuel in Turkey are exorbitant due to high taxes and lack of own oil resources. Unemployed Turks from Eastern Anatolia arrive here in a search of jobs in construction industry or in newly opened hotels. The need to import fruits and vegetables, cooking oil, cereals, goods and building materials by not diversified economy of oil-rich Iraq turned Turkey with a developed textile industry and record harvests of wheat, oranges, lemons and nuts into one of the main trading partners of official Baghdad. For Ankara Iraq also remains the second biggest provider of import commodities only after Germany. In 2013 around 1000 companies from this country were present in Iraqi Kurdistan and 70 percent of Turkish trade with Iraq was consumed by this northern region (RT 2013).

In summer of 2009 Kurdistan renewed export of oil to Turkey via famous 950-kilometres long pipeline Kirkuk–Ceyhan with a volume of 640 thousand barrels. Official Baghdad were dead set against separate deals of Kurdish government with Ankara, because Iraqi leadership wanted to control payments for oil and give to Kurds their share of 17 per cent only from the central treasury account (Arab News 2013). In 2014 the new pipeline with the capacity of 1 million barrels also commenced work towards the Mediterranean terminal near the city of Ceyhan, using «black gold» from Taq Taq and Takwe fields. Iraqi Kurds demand a direct access to international markets and intend to show to their international partners that they can deal with big powers on their own (Hawler Times 2014). On the other hand, Iraqi leadership limits activities of Turkish companies in southern and central Iraq as a revenge for their growing role in oil industry of Kurdistan and unwarranted incursions of Turkish army into Iraq. As a result, Kurds are gaining more and more powers in Iraq and are trying to insulate themselves from civil between Sunni and Shia fractions by developing close economic ties with Turkey. Iraqi state also loses considerable custom duties due to prolific contraband trade in northern region and oil-rich city of Kirkuk was in hands of Peshmerga since 2014, when Kurdish units entered the area in order to protect oil installations against Islamic State.

Despite all this, the moves of Kurds towards independence were put on hold by invasion to their land by Islamic State and today they are forced to cooperate with central Iraqi government in order to confront this threat. Moreover, low oil prices of the two previous years caused a severe economic crisis in Kurdistan and less and less people want independence from Iraq despite huge oil reserves of 45 billion barrels (Rudaw 2017). However, Kurdish political elite still hopes to organize referendum on independence somewhere in September of 2017 or 2018 after the final defeat of ISIS.

The restive neighbours also share unresolved water problem. The Euphrates and Tigris are among famous historic rivers in the world along with the sacred Nile, because they represent the cradle of the Middle Eastern civilization with ancient cities, where many important world-class inventions were born. Both originate in Turkish Anatolia and Turkey controls respectively 89 and 52 per cent of their flow (Brown Political Review 2016). Unfortunately for Iraq, authorities in Turkey extensively use water to appease own Kurds with development of agriculture, fisheries and generation of electricity in the places where they live. The representatives of this minority constitute a quarter of Turkish population and consider the ancient city of Diyarbakir with 600 thousand people as their regional hub. Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP Güneydou Anadolu Projesi) means the construction of 22 hydroelectric dams on the Tigris and Euphrates in nine Turkish provinces, what would add 1,82 million hectares of arable land and create at least 4 million jobs. The implementation of GAP commenced only in 1980-es and is expected to cost 32 billion dollars after the completion. As a result, low riparian states experience a considerable deficit of water and border river Shatt al-Arab suffers from high level of salinity. By agreement between both countries in 1984 Turkey should allow a 500 cubic meters per second of water to flow into Iraq, but official Ankara with second largest army in the NATO does not honour it, knowing that such a weak neighbour is not in a position to influence her behaviour with coercive diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey 2016).

Several outstanding events in the region also added to the mistrust between neighbours. In 2011 Recep Tayyip Erdo an decided to support Sunni groups in Syria in a civil war against representative of Alawites Bashar al-Assad. On the contrary, Nuri al-Maliki sided with the regime despite the fact that Syrian president encouraged sectarian violence in Iraq during American occupation (Al-Monitor 2013). However, both countries are allies in question of independence of Iraqi Kurdistan, since official Ankara is deadly set against it and supports the sovereignty of Iraq.

Iraq, where Shia population constitutes a majority, tries hard to rebuild relations with powerful eastern neighbor Iran. Both countries are divided by 1468 -kilometres of border, partially formed by the strategic river Shatt al-Arab. During the longest conventional war of XX century 1 million people died in Iran and 0,5 million in Iraq (Black 2010). Hundreds of ships sunk in Shatt al-Arab and their debris limited the traffic of cargo via the waterway. The war was encouraged and financially supported by Saudi Arabia and smaller emirates of the Gulf, interested in the mutual weakening of the two strongest coastal states of the region. As it is widely known, the conflict came to a standstill, because more populated Iran with scattered around huge land area stra-

tegic cities and indoctrinated by the Islamic Revolution Shia people, willing to fight fanatically for Ayatollah Khomeini and die for a place in a Paradise, could not prevail over better technically equipped by the Soviet Union and France, and aided by “collective” Gulf petrodollars Iraq.

The rise to power of long neglected Shia majority of Iraq after 2003 created the necessary preconditions for improvement of relations with an old adversary. Official Tehran also engaged in clandestine diplomacy, trying to unite different Shia parties and finance activities of influential religious preachers in Iraq. In times dangerous Saddam’s rule Iranians traditionally provided the safehavens to well-known Shia politicians or preachers from Iraq, which today belong to the ranks of political and religious elite. In this case it is important to note that the late Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, religious leaders Muqtada Al-Sadr and Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani all resided in Iran during the rule of Saddam Hussein, hiding from the persecution of his security service (Heydarian 2012).

The late President Mahmud Ahmedinejad visited Baghdad in 2008 and Nuri al-Maliki paid back with four official visits during his tenure in office. The trade volume in 2014 exceeded 12 billion dollars. Iranian companies supplied Iraqi consumers with fresh and canned food, soft drinks, meat, vegetable oil, fruits and spices, household items and electrical appliances, carpets, cars of “Iran Khodro” and “SAIPA”, building materials like cheap cement, and some products of metallurgy (Xinhuanet 2015). This country has much more diversified economy than Iraq, what, together with geographic proximity of it and a cheap gas from nearby giant Southern Pars field, created necessary preconditions for the development of trade. Before 2015 Iraqi banks provided assistance to their Iranian counterparts in circumvention of international sanctions and Iraqi oil traders also mixed oil from Iran with their own and sold it abroad (Voice of America 2012).

Iraqi economy and population are facing the acute shortages of electricity. On July of 2013, Iran signed the agreement with official Baghdad to supply natural gas for use in power plants. Based on it, 25 million cubic meters of blue fuel would be delivered from Southern Pars giant fields to such installations in Sadr, Baghdad and al-Mansouryah through a 270-kilometers long pipeline. However, Sunni terrorists frequently attack Iranian workers, which carry out this project on Iraqi territory (Paywand 2013). In general, power generation in the country is not sufficient. Local consumers will get from Iranian sources additional 3000 MW, but today they rely only on 8500 MW (Press TV 2016). Somewhere in the future official Tehran wants to turn Iraq into the regional hub for a distribution of the electricity to nearby Levant neighbours Syria and Lebanon. All those projects and considerable trade in-

terests forced Iraqi leadership to vehemently oppose international sanctions against Iranian nuclear program, despite gains of Iraq in international markets, caused by temporary absence of oil from Iran.

Both countries are also striving to develop religious tourism. Holy cities of Nippur, Najaf and Karbala are situated not far away from Baghdad and considered sacred for Shia population. Karbala is important because it gives pilgrims the access to the shrine of Imam Hussein, who was the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. Religious people in Iraq, which belong to Shia belief, turn their faces during daily prayers to Karbala, but not to Makkah. Another sacred mausoleum of a huge symbolic importance – the mazar of Shites' first Imam Ali in the holy city of Najaf. In 2008 Iranian companies built the airport for pilgrims near Najaf and also created the net of paved roads between Basra and south-western Iran. Last year around 18 million people made pilgrimages to Karbala with substantial number of them – Iranians (France 24.com 2013). However, the interstate tourism did not develop well because of weak Iranian rial. Additionally, Sunni terrorists target buses of religious tourists with car bombs or stop them near false roadblocks in order to shoot down all passengers. On the other hand, Iranian sacred cities of Qom and Mashhad attract Iraqi Shia believers due to their complete safety. Iraqis are paying considerable amounts for rooms in hotels and also buying religious souvenirs. The poor people can travel here from Iraq free of charge thanks to assistance of Iranian government (Boston Globe 2007).

Neighbours are also looking for a wider energy partnership in a regional context. In 2009 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad proposed to build a 1500-kilometres long pipeline Iran – Iraq – Syria and to construct afterwards a huge LNG terminal on Syrian shore in order to sell gas to Western Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. This would enable Iran to export blue fuel from Southern Pars fields through Syria and gain the direct access to European markets. In 2011 both sides signed respective agreement in city of Busher and decided to allocate 10 billion dollars in order to implement it (Tehran Times 2011). Many political observers believe that strong support of Sunni insurgents in Syria by Qatar, as the largest LNG supplier in the world, is caused by intention of official Doha to prevent the rival project from implementation. Neighboring countries also share the similar position on a civil war in Syria. The late Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki suspected that rebellious Sunni in Iraq received weapons and support from their counterparts in Syria and that the fall of Bashar al-Assad would contribute to the instability of Iraq and help terrorists to create a fundamentalist state in the Sunni triangle of Central Iraq. As for Iran, Damascus-controlled areas remain an important land bridge to Southern Lebanon, where influential Shia political group «Hezbollah» is

active. Because of official Tehran support with weapons and money for charity social networks, Shia-based “Hezbollah” can be considered a formidable fighting force in confrontation with Israel and relatively successful economic project of distribution of aid to the poor that increases the prestige of Iran in the Middle East and demonstrates the weakness of Saudi Arabia in Lebanon. Therefore Iran sent tens of thousands of volunteers into Iraq and Syria to beef up the campaign against Islamic State and more moderate Islamists groups.

However, the relations of both neighbours are also characterized by chronic problems, inherited from the Gulf war of 1980-1988. In January of 1991 Saddam Hussein ordered his pilots to fly 130 advanced mainly Soviet-made fighters of Iraqi air force to Iranian airfields in order to prevent their destruction by the US aviation during the operation “Desert Storm”. Unfortunately, official Tehran steadily refused to return those planes till 2014 when the threat of Islamic State to Iraqi stability became evident (Middle East Monitor 2014). Emboldened by example of Kuwait, Iranian leadership also wants to get a compensation for considerable economic losses from the warfare. Iraq paid to Kuwait 47,8 billion out of 52,4 billion dollars claim for the occupation of 1990-1991 and postponed the final payment because of dire economic situation (Bas 2016). However, official Baghdad still not ready to satisfy much bigger demands of eastern neighbour. Both sides also failed to find out what happened to thousands of missing soldiers in eight years-long conflict. Finally, secular-minded Iraqis do not want to follow the model of state power of Iran, based on domination of the spiritual leader – Rahbar and associated with him religious circles, preferring instead a “Bosnian type” political system with a strong Parliament. Moreover, the majority of population of Iraq is represented by Arabs, whereas in Iran they constitute a small minority of all citizens mainly in oil-rich border region of Khuzestan and in isolated Sistan and Balochistan. Iraq also capitalized on international sanctions against Iran and increased export of crude oil to traditional Iranian markets like China and India (Antiwar.com 2008). Despite all this the threat of creation of a fundamentalist state in Iraq remains potent and Iran had to react by refusing to protect the under-fire late Prime Minister Maliki from his political opponents and clandestinely endorsing the US strikes in Iraq against radical Islamists.

The relations with Jordan as the outlet to the Red Sea for Western Iraq, also remain important for the country, which shares with it 181-kilometers long border. The Hashemite family, whose members ruled as monarchs in both states until 1958 coup in Baghdad, historically linked Jordan and Iraq. Longtime Jordanian King Hussein was afraid of powerful Saddam Hussein and did his best not to alienate him, taking into consideration that 60 percent of country’s population were represented by the former refugees Palestini-

ans, who strongly supported the Iraqi invasion into Kuwait in the summer of 1990. As a result, Jordan silently sided with Iraq during occupation of Kuwait in 1990-1991 and thus became isolated in the Arab world. In 1994 King Hussein was forced to agree to peace treaty with Israel in order to overcome the economic crisis and receive the US assistance and preferences in textile export. Later this country was turned into the hotbed of trafficking, because insulated by international sanctions Iraq needed many consumer goods, thus a highway between Jordan and Iraq entertained the caravans of trucks in the 1990s. In turn, Iraq under Saddam Hussein supplied the oil to Jordan at fixed cheap prices and continues to do so today under other rulers. The safe and stable desert country also provided banking, business and hotel services for Western MNCs, hesitant to operate in a dangerous Iraqi environment directly (Kelidar and Susser 1996).

Jordanian capital Amman is considered the hub of international humanitarian organizations dealing with refugees from Syria and Iraq. Fruits, olives and vegetables (mainly tomatoes and lettuce) from the fertile valley of river Jordan are transported to Baghdad and Western Iraq on a daily basis. Free economic zones in Jordan also sell their industrial goods (vehicles and automotive parts, fertilizers for agriculture) mainly to underdeveloped Iraq, which in turn continues to trade in oil (Middle East online 2015).

In 2013 both sides entered into a free trade agreement and agreed to build a crude oil pipeline from Iraq to the Red Sea in order to bypass unreliable Turkey and avoid the dangers of Strait of Hormuz. The 1,680-kilometres long facility is intended to transport 2,25 million barrels of crude oil per day from region of Basra to Anbar governorate and then downwards towards the port of Aqaba. Jordanian economy is heavily dependent on imported energy from Saudi Arabia and suffered because of the shortages of Egyptian gas during and after the Arab Spring, therefore such a diversification is important. Those countries also consider using their respective territories in order to redirect a possible gas pipeline Iran Iraq Syria instead of a war-ridden Syria to the safe coast of the Red Sea by constructing a dual oil-gas pipeline (Hürriyet Daily News 2013). Taking into consideration that Egypt is a neighbour of Jordan, Jordanian territory can be used as conduit for Iraqi oil destined to Egyptian consumers.

Jordan hosts around 500 thousand of Iraqi refugees, but unfortunately those people are not eligible to work, despite the fact that they are getting a decent healthcare services and education. Iraqi governorate of Anbar with total land area of 138 thousand square kilometers also serves as a main transit zone for Syrian refugees, who are striving to enter Jordan along with the residents of Central Iraq (Open Democracy 2012). Official Amman is inter-

ested in stability of Iraq and is deadly set against a civil war there, because it threatens with a flood of refugees to the desert country, partly populated by Palestinians, who left West Bank of river Jordan during several Arab-Israeli wars. The Americans trained the thousands of Iraqi troops and policemen in a relatively safe Jordan. Today Jordanians agreed to do this job themselves and promise a full counter-terrorism support to their Iraqi counterparts (Iraq Business News 2014). As the analysis shows, only weaker regional states like Jordan and Kuwait can be reliable partners of official Baghdad.

Among all neighbours of Iraq official Baghdad has most controversial relations with Saudi Arabia that shares with the Republic 841 kilometers-long border in the desert. The conservative Kingdom was threatened by the rise to power in Iraq of Ba'ath Party in 1968, however, during the long war between Iran and Iraq official Riyadh provided the regime of Saddam Hussein with credits to the tune of 15 billion dollars (in 2007 the Kingdom agreed to write off 80 per cent of the debt under direct US pressure) in order to sustain the war effort of Iraq and cripple Iranian capability to "export" Shia revolution to the oil-rich Saudi regions near eastern city of Dammam (Mufson and Wright 2007). After Iraqi invasion of Kuwait this country welcomed protective American troops during the operation "Desert Shield" and lately actively participated in the operation "Desert Storm". However, when President George W. Bush-Junior decided to invade Iraq in 2003, Saudi King was deadly set against it, believing that such a strategic mistake might result in a return of Shia majority to the positions of state power. Later Iraqi officials frequently accused Saudi Arabia and Qatar of financing "Al-Qaeda" outfits in Iraq and simultaneously underlined that private individuals from the royal Saudi family were mainly behind such assistance (Alalam 2013).

The distrust between partners is evident in a small trade turnout and absence of high level visits. Saudi Arabia did not open an embassy in Baghdad till 2016 and her ambassador to Jordan represented the Kingdom's interests in Iraq, thus the options for communication were limited. Moreover, Saudi workers also are erecting 965-kilometers long security fence with a razor wire close to the border with Iraq. The "smart wall" will be later equipped with sensors of movement and watchtowers and should protect country against ISIL incursions (Trade Arabia 2015). Today the Kingdom does not have funds to deepen its influence in Iraq since it plagued by low oil prices and war in Yemen.

The year of 2014 brought crucial changes to regional geopolitical situation. In the beginning of it central Anbar governorate became a flashpoint between Iraqi armed forces and Sunni militants who occupied administrative buildings and police stations in the biggest cities of Ramadi and Fallujah.

Those events showed that Iraqi leadership always had problem with Western part of the country because of Sunni composition of its population. During previous years “Al-Qaeda” has learned to exploit the distrust of the residents of the Sunni triangle towards Shia domination in the government to expand its activities in the area (AINA 2014). But the troubles in Anbar became less important when militants from Islamic State of Iraq and Levant rapidly occupied parts of northern and central Iraq in the summer of 2014, including the second biggest in Iraq city of Mosul with 2 million residents. The far more superior forces of Iraqi soldiers run away, leaving behind such expensive American military equipment as 2300 “Humvees”, main battle tanks “Abrams” and numerous artillery pieces (Buren 2017).

The rise of radical Islam in Syria can be considered as a game-changer for all regional powers because of its strong transborder influence. Islamic State, whose top members are former officers of Saddam Hussein, exploited the underrepresented Sunni minority in Iraq in order to recruit more young and middle-aged followers and became the most numerous group among Syrian resistance and the power to recon with in the Sunni triangle of Iraq. For a long time the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad allowed Islamic State to increase its strength by prohibiting bombing the militants from the air in order to pit them against more moderate factions and force Western countries to choose a “lesser evil” between his well-known secular regime and a new Islamist threat. The growing presence of ISIL in Syria and Iraq is dangerous for Saudi Arabia and Turkey as well (Al-Monitor 2016).

Since 8th August 2014 the American fighter jets conduct a campaign of airstrikes intended to stop assault of militants and push them away from the strategic positions in the North. But without reconciliation between Sunni and Shia fractions in Iraq the civil war will drag on forever. In August 2014 Nuri al-Maliki finally stepped down and the interim Prime-Minister and technocrat Haider al-Abadi introduced a new government. He declared his intention to improve relations with all neighbours including Saudi Arabia and Turkey. External threat may unite different communities in Iraq with a purpose of taking united stand against Islamist intruders (Press TV 2014). However, ISIL members and other representatives of religious militia already control many border crossings of Iraq and Syria. Moreover, they easily found new recruits among jobless young people in both countries. Local armed forces struggle in a fight against the militants but the US airstrikes from Turkish base of Incirlik made a real difference and did not allow ISIL militants to attack with considerable forces and to use long column of the cars and trucks. Iran also sent drones and paramilitary troops in order to assist Iraq in war against rebels. Jordan joined US-led coalition and contributed to its efforts

with old fighter jets F-16.

Today Iraq faces challenges of ISIL, drop in agriculture output and low oil prices, so the country should diversify the economy in order not to fall prey to the “Dutch disease”. 70 percent of Iraq’s 2015 budget was used to pay for a rising food import, military expenses and considerable energy subsidies. The agriculture deteriorates not only because of the war, but also as a result of neglect. In 2015 only 15 per cent of land areas of Iraq were under cultivation, what defined high levels of unemployment in the countryside (Nasrawi 2015). The economic problems are aggravated by overwhelming dependence on oil and huge state apparatus, fed by petrodollars. 7 million people in Iraq are state employees and need wages of around 4 billion dollars a month in order to work. At the same time the whole Iraqi budget constituted in 2016 only 87 billion dollars (Rudaw 2016).

The decision of official Baghdad to support Russian campaign in Syria may aggravate problems in relations with the USA. Russian cargo planes are using Iraqi airspace to deliver weapons and ammunition to Syria. Iraq also agreed to share a vital intelligence with Iran and Russia to observe the activities of Islamic State and Russian military specialists opened their office in Baghdad. The Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi decided to join hands with Iran, Russia and Hezbollah in order to prop up the regime of Assad (Al-Rashed 2015). All this may lead to deterioration of American assistance to Iraq, whose weapons of army are predominantly made in the USA. Meanwhile in December 2015, Iraqi armed forces finally dislodged ISIL from Ramadi with USA air support, thus isolating terrorists in Central Iraq and gaining the first considerable victory over group, which also have lost 30 percent of territory of their caliphate in Iraq (Al Arabiya 2015).

In the end of 2016 Iraqi leadership decided to return control over Mosul, because each year under occupation swells ranks of Islamic State. The siege of Mosul, as the largest military operation in post-Saddam Iraq, appeared to be very complicated. Iraqi army and the allied units constituted around 100 thousand soldiers against 8-10 thousand militants, who increasingly used car bombs, snipers and street ambushes hiding behind civilian population and mud walls. The blow to ISIS after the victory of Iraqi army will be strong since this terrorist organization proclaimed the city a capital of its state in Iraq and even produced rockets, bombs and shells within the city at a large scale (Middle East Eye 2017). Moreover, in October 2017 Iraqi government was in position to wrestle Kirkuk from the hands of Peshmerga after population in Iraqi Kurdistan voted for independence during referendum of 25 September (Reuters 2017). However, many future developments in Iraq will depend on the ability of the state to reintegrate the second largest city in

political and economic life and find a common ground with Kurds.

Conclusion

Iraq has never experienced a prolonged democratic rule and Shia majority considered the demise of the regime of Saddam Hussein as a situation of “winner takes it all” through the process of legitimate elections and following purges of Sunni representatives from state jobs along with their persecution, what caused the civil war on sectarian grounds and facilitated the strategic shift of authorities in Iraqi Kurdistan towards Turkey. Simultaneously post-Saddam state failed to avoid the “Dutch disease” of crude oil dependence.

This created a problem of unemployment that in turn led to even a greater animosity between Sunni, Shia people and Kurds on the background of constant interference in Iraqi affairs of powerful neighbours. The unfavorable geopolitical conditions of Iraq, the links of three major groups of population to destructive external state and non-state actors and overwhelming reliance on crude oil define the status of the country as a failed state, but it is still possible to confront those threats with assistance of world powers that have a stake in Iraqi stability.

The transition towards modern democratic state of Iraq became impossible without national unity in the country, where state repression of rivaling religious groups is a norm of life. US-led reforms brought to power Shia majority, which heavily suffered under the rule of Saddam Hussein and considered electoral victory as a suitable opportunity exert revenge on their Sunni counterparts at the expense of democracy. Main Iraqi donors failed to introduce important safeguards of the political rights of minorities by conditioning their aid on bilateral and multilateral levels to a proper distribution of the state power on the strict basis of population strength of every ethno-religious group except Kurds, which get their 17 percent share from the budget. Iraqi state under Saddam was among most heavily militarized in the world and weapons of Iraqi army became widely available after 2003 and following mass purges of army and police by interim American administration, what allowed Sunni minority to stand up against Shia majority in a civil war. The heavy dependence on oil defines the existence of huge state sector in Iraq and lack of jobs in marginalized areas of the Sunni triangle, where crude oil and gas are absent. Because of marginalization in political and economic life Sunni people have little choice but to resist. De-facto divided in three parts Iraq plagued with a chronic problem of national unity and neighbouring Turkey together with Saudi Arabia aggravate it by their policy of interference, aimed

at support of Sunni minority or at cutting of separate economic deals with oil-rich Iraqi Kurdistan. The inconclusive policy of the USA in Syria under Barack Obama aggravated the situation even further. In this environment Iraq had to rely on Iran, despite the tense history of relations in the 1980-es and number of unresolved questions of bilateral nature. But the real challenge for political elite can be seen in bridging the gap between Sunni, Shia people and Kurds, because poisonous atmosphere of sectarian violence precludes normal development of the oil-rich country and threatens it with even a deeper division – to the point of creation of three separate states. The only way to save the country is to guarantee just representation of all religious and ethnic groups in state apparatus and lucrative oil industry, to diversify economy away from oil towards tourism industry inspired by Turkish example, fertilizers, steel and aluminium as well as other industries with added value, agriculture, and transport services. Turkey, Morocco and the UAE can be considered as models of diversified development for failing Iraqi state that still has the capacity to avoid the worst case scenario.

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ABSTRACT

The article analyses political and economic processes in Iraq after the demise of Saddam Hussein’s regime, evaluates the efficiency of post-war reconstruction of this Arab country in security and economic fields, singles out the reasons behind the civil war between Sunni and Shia followers, explains the paradox of semi-independent status of Iraqi Kurdistan as well as foreign policy of official Baghdad towards important neighbours – Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Levant capitalizing on sectarian divide and an attempt of Iraqi leadership to neutralize this threat also has become the part of analysis.

KEYWORDS

Iraq; Reconstruction; Sectarian violence; Oil industry.

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THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND IMPASSES AMONG THE P5 AND THE CONSEQUENT LACK OF RESOLUTION FOR THE QUESTION

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Introduction

The demand for resolution of conflicts that pose threats to international peace and security is the main reason for the existence and operation of the United Nations Security Council. Throughout its history, the body in question has allowed multilateral deliberations on the major humanitarian crises of modernity, seeking legitimate means to achieve peace and stability among peoples.

The way in which the Security Council operates is intrinsic to its conformation, functioning under an exclusivist and hierarchical dynamic within the international community. Thus, the guidelines brought to discussion among the meetings held by the member countries of the organ are analyzed under biased perspectives, oriented under the influence of the national interests of the nations involved in the decision-making procedures about the operability of the organ, especially the permanent members that holds the power of veto.

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This article analyzes the case of the Syrian civil war, which rose in 2011 from the so-called Arab Spring events, seeking to illustrate how the Security Council can be used to exploit the individual and national interests of its member countries in the region in question, considering the relevance of a multiplicity of geostrategic, political, economic and military aspects. In addition, there is also the involvement of other non-state actors, such as militia groups and terrorist organizations that emerge in this scenario as other elements that represent threats to international security.

Therefore, the central objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the lack of direct intervention by the Security Council in the civil conflict in Syria stems from the constant clash between the member countries of the body, motivated by their polarized and antagonistic interests on this issue, so that the use of the veto in several resolutions prevented the Security Council from deliberating on practical action for an adequate resolution of the humanitarian crisis on Syrian territory. Thus, the United Nations action on this issue will remain in a deadlock due to the divergence of interests shown by the countries with the greatest decision-making power in the highest security body of the organization.

The first section of this article provides a definition of the Security Council and an explanation of its operation in a legitimate manner in accordance with the basic principles of the United Nations. The second section is a contextualization of the Syrian civil war and the constitution of the totalitarian regime of the Assad family, directly responsible for the human rights violations that led the conflict to escalate to the condition of a global security crisis and made it possible to be discussed in the Security Council, as well as the involvement of the international community and various non-state actors in the situation. The third section deals with how the Security Council positions itself on the conflict in question, reflecting the instrumentation of the national interests of its member countries in the region.

The Security Council and World Peace

The Security Council is the organ of the United Nations (UN) whose function is the maintenance of international peace and security. The structure that gives rise to it is expressed in Chapter V of the Charter of the United Nations and its activities are conducted by Chapters VI, VII and VIII. It is the duty of the Council, therefore, to identify the existence of threats to peace or acts of aggression and immediately convene the parties for dialogue using peaceful means, and therefore, recommend methods and terms for a resolu-

tion for the situation (United Nations 2016).

The composition of the Security Council consists of five permanent members³: China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States; together with ten non-permanent members elected every two years by the General Assembly, and the rotation is aimed at broadly encompassing representations with geographical diversity. States that are members of the United Nations but not of the Security Council may attend meetings within the Council in situations where the topic under discussion directly affects their interests, however, this participation is devoid of the possibility of voting, so that the countries have observer status (United Nations 2016).

The UN Charter institutionalizes the functions and powers of the Security Council. Thus, through this instrument, it is assigned to the organ the “monopoly on the authorization of military and non-military coercion, safeguarding the individual or collective right to self-defense” (Amorim 1988, 7). Measures taken under Chapter VII are the only manifestations that demonstrate the use of authority by the Security Council, since they can be pursued without the consent of other actors in the international system.

Faced with the current paradigms of global governance, the Security Council should play the role of an actor with active participation in security issues on the global agenda through what, in theory, should be the joint action of its member countries. The Security Council would, therefore, carry out the interference - including on occasions when it is necessary to use force - in a multilateral way in places where threats to international peace have taken hold. Thus, it allows the states to enable direct intervention in other states, in accordance with the principles and procedures described in the Charter of the United Nations, in situations that may represent a crisis to global stability. In this way, the Security Council is implementing the objectives of member states to address critical situations (Abbot and Snidal 1998).

The problem arises when, in the deviation from theory to reality, the Security Council is no longer guided by the multilateral coordination of its member countries and becomes the scene of individual interest disputes, in which external agendas overlap with the topic in question and joint action is not present. Thus, the organ presents itself as “a place for codified, ritualistic diplomacy, permeated by protocol artifices, subtleties of language and procedural tactics that can both mask and make more evident the interests of its members” (Garcia 2013, 101). The great asymmetry between the national positions of the member states inserted in a multilateral context is therefore remarkable, resulting in inconsistencies in the operability of the Security

³ Denominated P5, acronym which stands for Permanent Five.

Council in the face of various issues sensitive to the stability of the international community.

The inconstancy of the action by the Security Council resulting from this framework of overlapping interests of its component members highlights the questioning of the real assertiveness of the body in ensuring the maintenance of global peace and security. In current international relations, the influence and effectiveness of the agency on the most sensitive topics to the international community “seem to have been, on the other hand, overlooked by the pursuit of objectives of different natures” of the member countries, especially in the area of “maintaining its validity in a world that tends to revolve around national interests and power” (Tomassini 1995, 222).

The increase in the functions assigned to the United Nations since recent decades and the diversification of the number and complexity of the problems for which the organization is responsible, including the Security Council and its attributions in a multipolar world order that was established in the post-Cold War, “accentuated the perception of the contrast between results and promises, despite acknowledging the limited effectiveness of the UN to negotiate or resolve these problems” (Tomassini 1995, 222). This contrast is especially evident when considering the involvement of the Council in complex local conflicts, in which a large multiplicity of actors is present in an intricate network of threats to global stability.

The configuration of the Security Council is governed by its hierarchical, centralizing and exclusivist nature. The Council is the only body within the scope of the United Nations in which the broad participation of all member states of the organization is vetoed. Moreover, there is a clear distinction between the permanent and the non-permanent members within the body of the organ, so that the status of permanent members in occupying the seats of the Council grants the approval of the use of the veto, according to the interests presented by the country in the middle of the negotiations (Amorim 1988). In this way, the chance of making use of the Security Council advantage is problematic. So, its capacity for coercive action on the international stage, as a means of instrumentalizing and legitimizing unilateral interests in the security issue, relies especially on nations occupying high positions in its hierarchical chain.

The manner in which the Security Council manages its actions, whether through discussions during meetings with its members or in the practical application of the agreed provisions, is representative of the main aspect of its composition, that is, the observance of interactions multilaterally inserted in a highly hierarchical and excluding environment. Thus, the management of the operability demonstrated by the Security Council is subjected to the

dynamics that emanate from its configuration, with the actors that occupy higher positions in the core of this hierarchy, that is, the permanent members which are the custodians of the veto power, the makers - or, in certain cases, constrainers - of the operational exercise of the Security Council (Abbot and Snidal 1988).

The case of Syria's civil war that began in 2011 is an event that poses threats to the maintenance of security stability on a global scale and illustrates how the involvement of state and non-state actors in events of relevance to the international system may occur, according to their geopolitical aspirations towards their external agendas.

The fact that the Syrian conflict has taken enormous proportions in terms of destruction of the patrimony, deaths, displacement of people and contingent of wounded people configures it like a humanitarian crisis that urges for the intervention on the part of powers that denote the resources, mechanisms and the ability to act to reduce the amount of damages. In this way, the situation was referred for discussion in the framework of the United Nations Security Council. However, the action of these powers - and therefore of the Security Council - on the Syrian situation is constantly instrumentalized by its strategic plans in the region as well as by its geopolitical aspirations on the international scene. As a result, we can observe the impotence of the agency in dealing with the situation and the consequent extension of the crisis in question.

The unique frame of the Security Council which denotes highly hierarchical and exclusivist aspects, such as the existence of permanent members and the possibility of the use of veto by these actors, to a certain extent, can be considered as an element that corroborates the lack of action of the organ regarding the humanitarian crisis in Syria. By allowing relevant powers in the area of international security to obtain veto power amidst the deliberations of the Council, the very dynamics and structure of the body makes it impossible for any resolution to be signed in the framework of these discussions as long as the agreed content goes against the external agendas of these actors. In this way, the agency is not performing with enough success in dealing with the situation in Syria.

The civil war in Syria and the involvement of the international community

The situation in Syria stems from instability intrinsic to the process of construction of its National State and the political movements resulting from

the attempt to maintain the order at the domestic level amid this situation. Syrian history, since its independence from French rule in 1946, was marked by a succession of coups until 1971, a period in which the Assad family rose to state control with the presidency of Hafez al-Assad. In 2000, after the death of the then president, his son Bashar takes the lead through political maneuvers of the Baath party, and thus remains until current times (Zahreddine 2013).

The rise of the Assad family to the leadership of the Syrian state was carried out and supported by the apparatus of the military force, considering the incompatibility of the Assad and their Alawite origin among a predominantly Sunni nation. However, even the hold of the force monopoly was not enough as a mechanism to ensure stability to the regime instituted by the Assad. The popular goal of leveraging the country under Islamic doctrine unleashed the process of trying to overthrow the Assad government and its ruling party. The high unpopularity shown by top Syrian officials, especially Bashar, materializes through political vulnerability, violence towards civilians and the involvement of other international actors. These factors, together, served to stagger a picture of instabilities that evolved in magnitude and complexity, leading to civil war in Syria (Hall 2013).

The composition of Syrian society, besides the precariousness of the socioeconomic conditions observed in the country, is one of the main factors that constitute the motivations for the outbreak of an internal conflict, because there is a clear situation of ethnic and religious dispute. In 2000, when Bashar ascended to power, the predominant religious group was Sunnis, amounting to almost 70% of the population, followed by the Alawites, accounting for 11.3% of the Syrian population. The remaining demographic was characterized as Christians, Druze and Shiites, accounting for 11.2%, 3.2% and 3.2% of the population, respectively. Moreover, in the middle of Syrian society, there are also relevant ethnic minorities, such as the Kurds, Armenians and Palestinian refugees (Zahreddine 2013). It is clear, therefore, that the Syrian demographic design has contributed to accentuating issues of disputes and conflicts, so it is a difficult challenge to meet the aspirations and interests emanating from such diverse groups and to maintain cohesion amidst this scenario conducive to divergences.

The use of the force monopoly as a way of maintaining social cohesion, or at least creating the illusion that there was an orderly and harmonic structure observable in the population, is another motivating factor for the escalation of conflicts in Syria. The creation of an army that responds directly to the presidential orders, using military resources and violence as apparatus to inhibit disturbances of the public order and to curb manifestations

of opposition to the government instituted, demonstrates the tyrannical and authoritarian element of the Assad governments. However, this mechanism of maintenance of social cohesion through forced and coercive ways became a catalyst for the widespread dissatisfaction that plagued the Syrian population and subsequently manifested itself in the form of an inescapable internal crisis (Furtado, Roder and Aguilar 2014).

The situation of disputes and dissatisfaction in Syrian territory was exacerbated considering the context of demonstrations and protests that occurred in the Middle East and North Africa from the end of 2010, with the aim of modifying the current political order in these localities and claiming for more humane treatments of populations of these localities, which was named Arab Spring by social science scholars. The phenomenon in question encouraged movements in Syrian society to the extent that it demonstrated the possibility of achieving political achievements related to democracy through civil action, even in the face of an authoritarian and centralized governmental structure, as observed in most of the nations of this region. The case of Syria is emblematic in the Middle East, as it demonstrates the insurgency of groups that, although demographically in majority, did not find representativeness and political participation and, therefore, sought conditions of state administration that met their demands and expectations (Ramos 2015).

Therefore, the civil war in Syria thus broke out in 2011 after the Bashar regime reprisal of the pro-democratic movement attempts to voice the population's dissatisfaction with the Syrian government and its legacy of repression since the coup which allowed the Assad family to rise to power. The popular demonstrations were answered with violent actions by the government, in an attempt to close the opposition activities (Rocha, Julio and Machry 2016).

Since its beginning, the conflict in Syria has attracted influential actors from the international community, notably the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The influence of external actors stems from the manifestation of political, economic and military interests that they nurture in relation to Syria, considering that the nation is a strategic point to convey its influence in the region of the Middle East. Thus, the Syrian civil war has taken on proportions that go beyond national borders, so that it has come to be considered a global conflict and, therefore, a threat to international peace and security (Furtado, Roder and Aguilar 2014).

The government of Bashar al-Assad has always been opposed by the United States of America. From the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, the United States provided financial resources, warfare and military training to the rebels, alleging that Assad was using chemical weapons to strengthen its coercive capacity vis-à-vis the Syrian population and thus as a counterpart in the

conflict, it was necessary to provide sufficient conditions for the opposition groups to be able to cope with the extremely violent actions that the government was carrying out. The Obama administration, therefore, made clear the intention of calling for intervention in Syrian territory, even if this action did not involve the landing of troops in the country, so that it would be possible to force the withdrawal of the current government and establish a transitional regime. This time, however, a regime susceptible to US demands (Pautasso and Rocha 2017).

Once the opposition was supported by the United States, Assad's dictatorship was backed by Russia and later, due to its influence, by China⁴. Relations between Syria and Russia date back to the independence of the nation in 1946, a period in which the global scenario experienced the Cold War. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union showed interest in making Syria a kind of representative in the Middle East, with the aim of acquiring an area under which it could use to exert influence in the region. Thus, the socialist bloc has established a way to extend its dominions to another strategic location. The game of balancing the military and economic power against the capitalist bloc, especially the United States, was then maintained, according to the precepts of the characteristic dispute of this period (Luz 2012).

The Syrian-Soviet partnerships established since the beginning of the Hafez al-Assad government in the 1970s are the milestone of closer ties among nations. The end of the Cold War in the 1990s and the consequent dismantling of the Soviet Union, however, did not provoke substantive changes at the core of international relations between Syria and Russia. Even with the death of Hafez, Russia continued to support the administration led by its successor, Bashar, even with the outbreak of Syrian civil conflict in recent years (Piccoli, Machado and Monteiro 2016).

The Syrian conflict also had the involvement of state and non-state actors from the Middle East. Countries near Syria, notably Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, have spoken out against the conflict in opposition to the Bashar al-Assad regime, so there is evidence that these nations have provided military training and war resources to the rebels. On the other hand, Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon are in favor of the Assad administration, providing money and intelligence teams with conflict expertise to support the government in this situation (Furtado, Roder and Aguilar 2014).

The rebels operating in Syrian territory are composed of militia groups of diverse origin, so that a uniform and unified ordering under this contin-

⁴ It is important to emphasize that the Chinese position in relation to the Syrian government is justified by the alignment of that country's foreign policy to Russian behavior on the international scene (Piccoli, Machado and Monteiro 2016).

gent is not observed. In this way, by finding that within the opposing section of the Assad regime there is a multiplicity of demands and interests, it is easier for supporters of rebellion to select the group that most easily reflects their interests and, thus, it would make the process of influencing the conflict in Syria in accordance with its strategic plans more effective. Therefore, it is possible to see, amidst the composition of the opposition to the dictatorial government, the presence of moderate and radical ideological groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, the Al-Nusra Front, the Syrian Free Army Military Command and the Islamic State of Iraq and Levante (Furtado, Roder and Aguilar 2014).

President Bashar, however, presents his support network beyond the aforementioned foreign powers. The main artifact used by Assad to secure the maintenance of the regime consists of the joint action between the Baath party and the Armed Forces, combining political maneuvers with the monopoly on the legitimate use of brute force among the state. In addition, there are militias acting in a favorable way to the regime, as is the case in which the Baath Brigades stand out, created based on the resources arranged by the party itself (Hall 2013).

The geopolitical situation in the Middle East, in the face of the Syrian crisis, has suffered an aggravation and shows changes in the political map of the region. The country's old alliances with Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas are increasingly weakened as Assad's government suffer more attacks and there are signs of deposition. On the other hand, the proximity of regional powers favorable to the United States, like Saudi Arabia, indicates that the western mobilization gains space in this context. Moreover, the level of foreign intervention becomes more critical as the proportion of areas occupied by the Islamic State in Syrian territory increases, and thus there is more susceptibility to the formation of an international coalition that includes the United States - and its allies in the Security Council, France and the United Kingdom - together with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, with the aim of fighting against the Islamic State and neutralizing its operations in the current global scenario (Furtado, Roder and Aguilar 2014).

The Syrian civil war has therefore escalated to become a conflict of global proportions, given the involvement of various actors in the international community, and the high rate of deaths, serious injuries and refugees, so that it constitutes a serious humanitarian crisis in the region today. Thus, by posing a threat to international peace and security, the situation in Syria was addressed for discussion in the Security Council. The Syrian case reaches a new level of complexity on the international stage when it is handled in the United Nations security sphere, considering that the permanent members of

the body do not establish cohesive guidelines on what should be done to deal with the situation in question (Corrêa 2013).

The political game of power among members of the Security Council on the Syrian case

The need to deal with the harmful effects on the international community and the failure to respect the human rights caused by the Syrian crisis gives the Security Council the prerogative to act in an effective⁵ way on behalf of its constituent States. However, the action by the Security Council to neutralize the Syrian conflict cannot be considered fully successful because of the obstacles placed by the countries in center of the discussions, notably the permanent members, as a result of the difficulties of coordinating a joint action in agreement. Thus, there is a clear case of a lack of action by the United Nations on the Syrian conflict (Medzihorsky, Popovic and Jenne 2017).

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) issued a report in 2001 entitled Responsibility to Protect (R2P), whose main objective is to establish guidelines for ending mass atrocities observed in a number of vulnerable locations. Thus, countries should act according to three pillars that guide their responsibility regarding the intervention in these localities: to prevent, to react and to build. The first pillar describes that nations must obey the prerogative of protecting their citizens from crimes of mass atrocities, reinforcing the principle of sovereignty in the international system. The second pillar refers to the international community, establishing the commitment of other countries to provide assistance to nations in building capacities to prevent mass atrocities, and prevention being the central element of a successful strategy for R2P. The third pillar finally states that in cases where the state is insufficiently able to provide protection to its population, the international community has a responsibility to act, so that the situation of instability which poses a concrete threat to the well-being of this population is resolved by legitimate means (Stark 2011).

The scope of R2P was defined in 2005 from a United Nations summit, so that “each State has a responsibility to protect its populations through necessary and appropriate means, and the international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use diplomatic, humanitarian and peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations “(Stark 2011, 4), which include the use of force by

⁵ The meaning of effective is understood as the observance of the agency’s ability to ensure the establishment of international peace and security in accordance with the principles and guidelines set forth in the Charter.

military interventions in unstable locations.

The R2P protocol can therefore be used to justify such interventions in cases where it is observed “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, which have been previously defined in international law by the Rome Statute and the International Court of Justice “(Stark 2011, 4). Thus, the Syrian situation demonstrates the requirements for it to fall under the aegis of R2P. However, there is no considered action to address the crisis, so that the international community, especially the Security Council, fails to exercise its responsibility to protect the Syrian population and to seek directives to neutralize the current threat to peace and international instability.

The objection to the *modus operandi* designated through R2P is expressed by some of the permanent members of the Security Council, notably China and Russia. By assuming positions contrary to the permission of direct military intervention in Syrian territory, the affinity based on interests of political, economic and military order that they present with the current government of Assad is evident, so that an intervention - mainly from the permission for the use of force - in this locality would generate the later deposition of this regime and the installation of another administration. On the other hand, it is alleged that the other members of the Security Council, the United States, France and the United Kingdom, intend to use the R2P protocol to instrumentalize their intention to promote interventions motivated by their biased national interests, among which the deposition of Assad’s power stands out as the most latent aspiration of these actors. It turns out that the result of this intervention is, according to the allegations, a higher number of unsuccessful military investitures on political and non-humanitarian grounds and, consequently, more instability and damage to the population (Medzihorsky, Popovic and Jenne 2017).

The situation in Syria has been going on for years since the conflict erupted, and until now the Security Council has been unable to find ways to reverse hostilities in the region. The lack of internal agreement within the body, in this way, is the main impediment to a more effective coordination to deal with civil war. The permanent members of the Security Council do not fit into a consensus-driven axis because of a complex scenario of intricate incompatibilities of interests in the region and its unfolding, reflecting the old polarization of the international system and being passed on to the dynamics the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and in contrast, Russia and China. Thus, the situation established by the Assad regime shows that the conjuncture in which the UN operates has an intrinsic fragility, in which “international justice and accountability are secondary to the main interests of its member countries” (DePetris 2016).

The largest front of disagreement between the deliberations of the Security Council is, therefore, constituted by the clash between the United States and Russia, the other permanent members being influenced by their respective allies in the international scene regarding the votes and procedures amidst the security discussions. The dichotomy represented by the aforementioned nations dates from the very beginning of the creation of the Security Council and has been ever since a factor motivating impasses amid the internal dynamics of the body, hindering negotiations in the multilateral sphere and leaving the Syrian situation without urgent remedies (Corrêa 2013).

Russia's positioning, as it takes part in the Syrian conflict, is motivated by its orientation towards Russian foreign policy from the rise of Vladimir Putin to the nation's presidency in the early 2000s. Since then, Russia has articulated key sectors of the economy, such as hydrocarbons and war, and in parallel with the intensification of economic development, Putin's government seeks to become evident in the international community. The purpose of this conduct is to reinforce its position as one of the great global players in the securitization of the global agenda in the current context (Pautasso and Rocha 2016).

The historical relationship of support between the Assad government and the Russian nation, including even partnerships that extend to the military sphere, also indicates a substantial factor in understanding Russia's position in the Syrian conflict. Thus, "the strategic bias that Russia gives to its participation in the conflict, as reflected by the need to maintain its outpost in the Middle East" (Piccolli, Machado and Monteiro 2016, 195). The Russian presence at the port located in Tartus, capital of the homonymous district, ensures this area in the Mediterranean Sea as under control and influence favorable to the Syrian government. In addition, the facility at the Hmeymemim air base at Latakia in 2015 in the north-west of the Syrian Mediterranean coast also reinforces the strategic intentions pursued by Russia in the region. There is also the Russian navy in the Caspian Sea, reaching targets of the Islamic State based in Syria, in a clear demonstration of the military power of the nation (Piccolli, Machado and Monteiro 2016).

American action in relation to the Syrian conflict is opposite to that demonstrated by the Russian guidelines. Thus, the United States seeks to destabilize the Syrian dictatorship and to establish a government more favorable to Western interests, in accordance with the values of a neoliberal democracy. Following the guidelines set forth in the protocol determined by the United Nations, the United States centralized efforts to depose Assad's dictatorial government not directly through the use of force, but rather by addressing the issue as a humanitarian crisis that should be solved urgently.

Moreover, the possibility of direct military intervention on Russian territory would not be feasible given the failed experience of NATO's incursion into Afghanistan decades ago; together with the costs of financing such an investment in a context of global economic crisis (Arraes 2014).

The participation of the United States and Russia in the Syrian civil war also stems from economic motives, so that opposing positions are based on the competing projects regarding the supplying of the European market. The Russian government-backed project, that is, a joint venture with Syria, Iraq and Iran, consists on building a gas pipeline that will carry gas from Iran and Russia to Europe. On the other hand, there is also a gas pipeline project to supply European territory from Qatar reserves, passing through localities in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Israel (Piccolli, Machado and Monteiro 2016).

The internal dynamics of the Security Council are being modified as the domestic regimes of its component nations, especially the permanent members, change. Nowadays, it is possible to affirm that the stagnation of taking action within the organ in relation to the Syrian crisis is due to the constant clash between countries among the P5, in which Russia and China guide their behavior by more assertive and unfavorable positions on direct interventions that may modify the maintenance of the current order that is favorable to them. On the other hand, the United States and the other permanent countries seek operational means to legitimize interventions based on biased interests to their own external agendas. The Security Council thus faces skepticism on part of the international community about its ability to respond to the growing challenge to global security posed by the Syrian crisis, particularly in view of the evident involvement of a multiplicity of non-state actors by means of organized crime, the articulation of militia groups and terrorist organizations (Einsiedel, Malone and Ugarte 2015).

Interventions in sovereign states in situation of security vulnerability carried out by the Security Council present high costs, not only in financial terms, but also considering political aspects in the international community, especially regarding the legitimacy of such operations. Thus, the political cost of executing a forceful intervention in a sovereign territory, because it is extremely high, must be sustained by the consent of the international community. The intervention, therefore, to be useful in its political character and to be taken as satisfactory must be in accordance with the objectives set by the states and other parties involved, besides being carried out by means that these actors consider legitimate (Finnemore 2003). The fact that the parties most directly involved in the issue of the Syrian conflict within the Security Council - that is, its member countries - disagree about the implementation of

an intervention implies that any attempt to operate on Syrian territory is not made with legitimate instruments, but also loses its political consent before the international community. In this way, the Security Council is prevented from acting to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Syria.

The criteria for the positioning of the great security powers vary according to the powers of the economic, geopolitical, strategic and military order, so that they date back decades, since the international system presented a different conformation from that of the present day. Thus the past conjectures have been perpetuated and adapted to the present arrangements, so that there is still a dichotomy between the United States and Russia through the propagation of its interests in the Syrian conflict and other sensitive aspects concerning the situation in the Middle East region (Arraes 2014). Moreover, the individual positions of the nations in question interfere not only with the strategic conduct of the conflict on and around Syrian territory, but rather with the discussions in the Security Council. As a consequence, the deliberative activities of the organ become more stagnant and less efficient, due to the political clash between the players that have veto power and, with considerable frequency, seize the decisions of each other, if it is an affront - direct or indirect - to their aspirations in the region in dispute.

Conclusions

The Security Council, through R2P, has the responsibility to ensure the protection of vulnerable populations in situations of human rights violations and mass atrocities (Stark 2011), as is the case in the civil war in Syria. However, decision-making deadlocks between Security Council countries - especially among the permanent members holding veto power - make it impossible for the UN to take action on the Syrian civil war, making the UN action in the situation in question not successful in ensuring the establishment of a peaceful order.

It is possible to observe a polarization among the permanent members of the United Nations' highest security sphere, so that obstacles to joint action are placed by frequent vetoes and impasses in the middle of the discussions. On the one hand, China and Russia argue that the other permanent members of the Security Council use the R2P doctrine to justify various tendentious interventions motivated by their national interests in relation to Syria. Thus, the use of force by legitimate means through the operations the Security Council carried out on Syrian territory may correspond to the strategies formulated by these countries to overthrow the Assad government, and consequently to promote the establishment of a Syrian internal regime more

aligned with their interests. Therefore, the observance of American political, economic and military aspirations in this region is guaranteed (Einsiedel, Malone and Ugarte 2015).

The reverse logic, however, is also possible. There is a claim on the part of the United States and its allies, France and the United Kingdom, that the impediments on the resolutions based on R2P pointed by China and Russia, regarding direct interventions in the Syrian conflict, reflect the objective of maintaining the Syrian nation under the administration of Assad. In this way, it is guaranteed Russia's affinity for the current power structures that keep its strategic interests in this part of the globe (Medzihorsky, Popovic and Jenne 2017).

Therefore, the result of the deadlocks in the discussions in the scope of the Security Council is the lack of satisfactory performance of the organ in the resolution of the conflict in question. Thus, the United Nations fails to provide the necessary protection to the Syrian population in a state of vulnerability, and there is no stable political structure to support Syrian governability. The civil war in Syria, therefore, will extend without the prospect of a cease of hostilities until the international community is able to demonstrate intentions of a more direct and pacifying involvement. This scenario will also be possible based on the confluence of the interests of the nations with decision-making power on highly securitized matters and the cooperation among external actors, in order to achieve stability in the region.

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ABSTRACT

The Security Council, responsible for maintaining a peaceful global order, promotes the discussion and implementation of conflict resolution measures that represent threats to international security. The present work demonstrates that the impasses and conflicts of interest between its permanent member countries in the case of the Syrian civil war resulted in the lack of direct action of the organ and its inability to solve the humanitarian crisis in question.

KEYWORDS

Security Council, Conflict, Syria.

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CHANGING ENERGY GEOPOLITICS: WHAT IS THE ROLE OF SUSTAINABILITY IN THE GLOBAL ENERGY GEOPOLITICS?

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Introduction

The capacity of the State to plan and control the generation and the use of energy influences its competency to transform energy resources into wealth and power. This is so because energy routes define global political relations and energy is essential for the means of production regardless of which political and economic system they are linked to. Therefore, the understanding of the control of the geographical space⁵ with important energy

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⁵ Geographical space is understood in this paper as more than a simple physical area of the

resources – and more precisely of the control of these resources – becomes the basis for a proper interpretation of the positioning of the countries and of their political, economic, social and environmental development.

For this reason, the understanding of geopolitics and of its representation in the energy field is essential to make evident the importance of energy in the international arena and also to interpret how countries have positioned themselves. After all, geopolitics has moved beyond the conception that linked it exclusively to physical space, and renewable energy too has emerged in the global scene. From the conventional energy geopolitics the debate has been reshaping to energy - environment the page where greater attention have been given to sustainable energy development and equitable access to energy by all sections of human civilization from across the world. The policy attention that has emerged following the climate change debate also need to be highlighted here as one of the factors that is catalysing the shift from conventional energy of politics to a new political interactions and engagement between the stakeholders of global energy market.

This paper aims to contribute to the discussion about the transition from the geopolitics based on the physical space to the geopolitics based on sustainability, in which renewable energy has consolidated an important role in the international arena: that there has been a changing debate in the energy security and energy geopolitics worldwide. The text is divided into six sections in addition to the Introduction and the Concluding Remarks. The first section makes a review of the literature on geopolitics regarding its traditional theoretical approaches. The second section addresses the relationship between conventional energy, geopolitics and energy security. The third section highlights the debate on energy security related to the accessibility and affordability energy resources. The following sections contextualize renewable energy in the geopolitics transition fomenting reflection on energy cooperation. The fifth part, before the Concluding Remarks, section brings “new geopolitics” underlined China and India in the context of competitiveness.

Theoretical perception: observing the traditional behind the new horizon

The term *geopolitics* was coined in the nineteenth century by Rudolf Kjellén, who defined it as an analysis of the State as a homesteader and a geo-

globe. Considering society and nature as dynamic, this paper sees geographical space as continuing socio-spatial relations. According to Henri Lefebvre (1991), these relations are characterized as economic, political and symbolic-cultural.

graphical space controller with life form based on political, economic and geographical elements (Kjellen 1916; Braga 2011). This term brings in its meaning the strict relationship between geography and politics and points to a set of strategies used by a State or territory in order to manage itself in a manner consistent with their goals. For this reason, Oliveira (2012) sees geopolitics as a transdisciplinary field of knowledge, which encompasses issues related to the use of natural resources, to the use and acquisition of geographical space, and to the attainment of political power.

By using the biological metaphor of the State as a territorial body, Kjellén revealed that he based his considerations about geopolitical issues on Friedrich Ratzel (Vicens-Vives 1956). The comparison with a biological organism is due to the fact that the State has the function of connecting its people to its territory through policies to achieve a certain goal, which is related to the expansion, organization or protection of the State. Hence, the comparison of the State with a biological organism in which everything is interconnected. Paul Claval (1994) notes that this the organicistic image led Ratzel to give great importance to the political idea.

Implicit to Kjellén vision is the idea of nation beyond the border limits of its territory, which implies the imperialist conception inherent to the conquest of territories. Costa (1992) emphasizes Kjellén's reductionist and expansionist view of the State, because the goal of his "new science", *i.e.*, geopolitics, was directed to the Major States, central European empires, particularly Germany, which, in Kjellén's opinion, should be transformed into "scientific academies" once the war situations were ideal for the analysis of geopolitical phenomena. Kjellén showed his wish to see Europe unified into a huge German empire. Hence, the success of his ideas in the circles of power characterized by the European fascist regime as well as in the military circles in the third world that had included the theme of geopolitics in the curriculum of its courses producing various geopolitical studies (Costa 1992). That interpretation about geopolitics brings the view of the overseas nation, the nation beyond the border limits of its territory, which refers to the imperialist view inherent to the conquest of territories.

The discussions raised by Ratzel's and Kjellén's ideas promoted the approximation of the academic, military and political worlds in the debates about geopolitics. Such discussions found echoes in two classical theories that underlie the study of this theme: the sea power theory proposed by American Navy Officer Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890) and the Heartland theory proposed by British geographer Halford Mackinder (1904). These two theories are the basis of contemporary geopolitical dialogues (Costa 1992; Braga 2011; Vesentini 2000; Oliveira 2012; Mahan 1965; Mackinder 1904).

The sea power theory was proposed by Alfred Mahan in 1840 and was based on the idea that a nation established as a naval power would rule the world. This theory is recognized as a precursor of contemporary geopolitical theories. It showed an innovative aspect: the integrated conception of all activities related to the sea, not limited to isolated trade analyses or isolated analyses of naval power. Mahan considered marine waters as a peculiar socio-political space linked to the land through internal communication ports and waterways (Costa 1992 *apud* Mahan 1965).

According to Mahan (1965), the maritime power of a State should be focused on three essential elements if it wished to become a world hegemonic power: production, which arose from the need of trade; navigation, which made trade possible; and colonies, which facilitated the logistics of navigation. Mahan emphasized some key conditions to define the maritime power of a State: its geographical position; the length of its coastline; the characteristics of its ports; and its territorial extension.

Mahan was a kind of a prophet of imperialism because, ten years after the publication of his book, the United States won the war against Spain in 1898 and extended its domination over Central America and the Caribbean, starting its maritime expansion. In 1914, the Panama Canal opened and consolidated the American expansion. In 1916, the Navy Act⁶ confirmed his thesis on sea power and consolidated the United States claim as a hegemonic world power (Costa 1992).

The Heartland land power theory, proposed by Halford Mackinder in 1904, defended the idea that, for a State to become a hegemonic power, it was fundamental that it had control of the land power or, more precisely, that it rule a particular geographical area called pivot area (Mackinder 1904; 1942). According to Braga (2011), Mackinder called into question the sea power theory when he came up with the concept of pivot area, a strategy in the politics of power of the nations. The pivot area, called Heartland, was located in the Eurasian region and it was a large territorial space with natural and energy resources; Mackinder advocated the idea that geopolitics should be understood in face of the struggle between the pivot area and the areas surrounding it (Mackinder 1942; Mello 1999).

The second concept of Heartland theory was the Midland Ocean (which could be translated as 'North Atlantic'). It brings the integrated perception of sea and river basins, in which there would be three essential elements: a beach head located in France, a moat protected airfield in England and a re-

6 The *Navy Act* was a federal law sanctioned by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in order to transform the American Navy into the best of the world in a ten-year period.

serve of agricultural and industrial resources in the United States and Canada (Mello 1999; Mackinder 1942). In this line of thought, geopolitics is based on the view that these four States are the holders of power or of the center of global decisions, which is a vertical and static view of the world order, not yet globalized.

For Aymeric Chauprade (2001), the idea of centrality in the theory proposed by Mackinder is the result of historical events. After all, technological progress, which increased the access to roads and the exploitation of energy resources, demonstrated the strategic superiority of land over sea. However, apart from the discussion about the superiority of land over sea and vice versa, Mackinder's theory sees the pivot area as a dynamic territory once society and economy provokes its transformation. On the other hand, it can also be inferred that this dynamic centrality would be related to the Heartland and to the nations that control it, which together have the decision power in the world. This gives the impression that other areas, other tangential territories, would always be subjugated to this condition, not bringing up, over time, elements that promote the balance in relation to the world power, as can be currently seen with the role played by the so-called emerging countries in the world.

According to Braga (2011), Mackinder's theory remained present in the discussions in the twentieth century and several suggestions from this theory were essential in decisions with historical impacts. For example, the union between Germany and the Soviet Union should be prevented so that the Anglo-American power could be strengthened. From that idea derived the creation of various States, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Greece, all originated from dismembered territories from the Russian, German, Austrian and Turkish empires. Moreover, in the interwar period, Mackinder predicted the world bipolar order.

The Heartland land power theory remains timeless in discussions on geopolitics, since Mackinder was the pioneer of a line of geopolitical thinking important for understanding the current world. Three of his formulations are particularly relevant: (a) the world as a closed system; (b) the historical and geographical overview of the permanent struggle between the maritime powers; (c) the geostrategic concepts that resulted in the North American containment policy and in the military alliances of the United States in the present (Braga 2011; Mackinder 1942).

The two classical mainstreams theories of geopolitics have guided significant political decisions made by the major powers throughout the twentieth century. The sea power theory has contributed, for example, to the United States' becoming the world leader maritime power: it has approximately 800

military bases scattered around the world in 63 countries (Global Research 2015). The Heartland theory led the British to join Russia against Germany in the conflicts of the First and Second World Wars and led to the formation of various States in the European continent. In addition, other theoretical approaches have emerged from the discussions raised by these two theories, such as the geopolitics of airpower, the geopolitics of nuclear power, and the geopolitics of cyber power.

These theories express concern for not only the National State and its strengthening, but also for the development of strategies in which the State is the center of power and of analysis and in which the emphasis is placed upon the military power. According to Oliveira (2012), new generations of authors have updated or adapted many classical approaches both in the field of geopolitics of Heartland theory and in the field of sea power, highlighting the interdisciplinary nature of geopolitics. If, in the beginning of geopolitical studies, military officers and geographers stood out, modern studies of geopolitics have given historians, economists and political and social scientists a prominent position.

Currently, and particularly due to globalization, geopolitics has taken on a broader scope by expanding its spectrum of analysis. According to Becker (2005), geopolitics is characterized by mild interventions and even by wars, as far as the conquest of territories is concerned. In this sense, the State used to be the central figure of geopolitics since it was considered the only source of power, the only political representation. However, in the present day, geopolitics operates mainly through the power to influence the decision making of States on the use of the territory due to the fact that the conquest of territories and colonies has become very expensive (Becker 2005).

The importance of the State began to be relativized in the global political scene due to the emergence of other players. International organizations, regional trade blocks, non-governmental organizations, financial institutions and multinational and transnational companies have to be taken into consideration in global geopolitical analyses as they directly influence the decision-making process between States. Furthermore, some fields of knowledge have gotten such relevance in the understanding of the relationship between power and geographical space that it would not be possible to tackle geopolitics without addressing issues of sustainable development, global warming, immigration, vulnerability, resilience, financial markets and, of course, energy, a theme historically related to geopolitics, a relationship which is addressed in the next section.

Conventional energy and geopolitics: a timeless and challenging relation

Energy has always been part of the geopolitical discourse directly or indirectly since controlling energy resources involves the conquest of territories and societies, i.e., once it involves geographical space. In geopolitical classical theories, energy played a central role: Mahan stressed the importance of the consolidation of steam and petroleum when he analyzed the historical development of naval power; Mackinder stressed the value of a region rich in resources such as wood, coal and oil when he proposed his Heartland theory (Oliveira 2012; Mahan 1965; Mackinder 1949).

Energy and geopolitics have always walked conjointly and certainly there has never been a historical moment in which energy was not viewed from a strategic point of view. Not surprisingly, the concept of energy geopolitics arose, which can be defined as according to Oliveira (2012) as “analysis of the geopolitical and strategic elements that influence the exploration, infrastructure, transport and end-use of energy resources”.

The issue of location is inherent to the geopolitics and, of course, to the geopolitics of energy. According to Melvin Conant and Fern Gold (1981), energy geopolitics, in addition to highlighting the importance of location factors in the relations between States (including issues of access to raw materials), considers the geographical factors and the position that countries occupy in the international scenario determinant to governmental policies. To these authors, the reserves of energy sources, the processing of these sources, the supply chain, the new discoveries of energy resources, increasing energy consumption, and research and technology are also important factors in the geopolitics of energy. This is evidenced by the fact that the primary sources of energy are transformed and transported and only after that properly used.

A central issue for the geopolitics of energy is energy security (Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005; Klare 2008; Yergin 2006). It can be defined as the situation in which a nation or region are in terms of “energy availability sufficient to maintain reasonable rates of economic growth and development, maintaining or preferably gradually improving the living conditions of the population” (Oliveira 2012).

Energy security is therefore closely related both to the structural composition of the society and to the conservation and support of the political organization of a State. The development of a State is guided by the control of energy resources, and consequently and preferably, of the technologies linked to them in the process of extraction and production of energy. That is why, for

example, the hegemonic States see the control of production, distribution and use of oil as a strategic priority.

If coal played an important role in the Industrial Revolution and in the capital accumulation process in the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, oil became the driving force of the capitalist accumulation process in contemporary society. Not surprisingly, the discussions linked to the oil crises were responsible for calling the attention of the world to the geopolitics of energy. For Goldemberg (2014), the oil supply problem is geopolitical, because generally oil is not consumed in the countries where it is produced once half of the world production is sold.

However, the issue of energy security should not be restricted to the oil issue, although it is increasingly influenced by the discrepancy between the amount of resources and the increasing demand for energy in the coming decades. The discussions on energy security cover a range of subjects, including terrorism, growth and economic development, geopolitical instability and rivalry, and the relations countries have with one another.

Growth in developing countries is a factor that undoubtedly contributes to increasing concerns about energy security. It causes uncertainties related to the use of energy resources both for the emerging countries, which require more energy to feed its accumulation process, and for the other countries because of the higher pressure placed by a tough competition for energy resources.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the center of gravity of energy demand is shifting towards emerging economies. For Russia, the objective of energy security lies in guaranteeing the control that the government has over energy resources and in controlling the main channels and the main pipelines market. For China and India, the ability to adapt to their dependence on the world markets and on self-sufficiency commitments is of great importance as far as energy security is concerned. Brazil seeks to adapt to the challenges in the international arena and to deal with an energy matrix based on hydroelectricity. Furthermore, Brazil has to deal with the possibility of becoming a world leader in the production of energy by the recent pre-salt discovery, which, according to the IEA (2013), requires a complex capital-intensive extraction process, with investment levels higher than those in the Middle East and in Russia.

After oil, coal and gas are the two most used energy sources and, thus, are also part of the discussions on geopolitics and energy security. Coal is the most used fuel in developing countries with the exception of Brazil (Sampaio and Freitas 2013). According to the IEA, although the use of this fuel tends to decrease in the OECD countries, its global demand will be 17 % higher in

2035. One third of this increase will come from countries outside the OECD, and India, Indonesia and China will account for 90 % of the growth of coal production (IEA 2013).

As for natural gas, the largest growth in its demand will come from emerging markets, especially China, where the use of gas will quadruple in 2035, and the Middle East. Gas will become the main fuel of the energy matrix of the OECD countries, supported by the new regulations in the United States. Differently from what will happen to oil, gas production will substantially increase throughout the world, except Europe. The need for gas import will increase in parts of Asia and Europe. And the greater uncertainty, outside of North America, is whether gas can be made available at attractive prices for consumers while there still are incentives for investments in the field of gas supply. This is a matter of domestic legislation in many countries emerging from non-OECD markets, including India and the Middle East and a concern in the context of international trade. Security issues of future gas supplies will be partially solved thanks to the growing number of international suppliers (IEA 2013).

The fact that coal, oil and natural gas are relatively finite resources grants the States and the energy companies important power (Freitas 2013). Moreover, the articulation of productive elements to generate resources causes tension between the nations that compete for them or need them. Geopolitics presents some challenges, such as the multiplicity of issues that have become part of its context of analysis, the emergence of other players different from the State that have become part of its analysis, the continuous increase in energy demand in the face of traditional resources that will eventually end. These challenges, as Daniel Yergin (2006) notes when referring to oil, will provoke anxiety attacks in the market, in the State and in the society. In this sense, it is not possible to address the geopolitics of energy without considering all the variables that influence its analysis. It is necessary to take into account the broader concept of energy security including the protection of the entire chain of supply of energy and infrastructure in order to increase energy security (Yergin 2006). In this context, countries need to seek strategies to help them increase energy security.

According to Oliveira (2012), there are three strategies that the States should adopt regarding energy security. The first is energy self-sufficiency, because the need to import energy is a fact, particularly between the major world powers. This strategy can be implemented through the diversification of energy sources. Thus, problems with a particular source, such as shortage effects, could be avoided. It is important to note that the diversification of the matrix cannot reduce the risk of high dependence on a single type of generation and

distribution system of power or of a single mode of transport, for example.

Yergin (2006) understands that the diversification of energy sources will remain as the main starting point of energy security, but not the single point. Therefore, without proper and integrated strategic planning in the sector, diversification of energy sources would not be an effective instrument for energy security. In this sense, the technologies in renewable energy in general play an important role.

The second strategy the State can put into practice in order to increase its energy security is the increase in the security of external energy supply. It can be achieved through diversification of external suppliers through trade agreements, political and diplomatic influence, market mechanisms or the militarization of the control of energy resources abroad (Oliveira 2012; Abraham 2004). The dependence on a single or on a few energy suppliers causes vulnerabilities, such as energy uninterrupted uncertainty, and it can link energy supply to political or commercial situations between the supplier country and the receiver, which are not necessarily inherent to the energy sector. Besides the diversification of suppliers, possible solutions are the investment in energy efficiency and the increase of domestic production of energy that can be done through the adoption of renewable sources.

The last strategy is regional integration, which refers to the integration of infrastructure and supply chains of energy in a region or a continent usually permeating regional integration processes (Stanislaw 2004; Oliveira 2012). Regional energy integration began to be seen with more attention due to the globalization process, which has required from the States actions that increase their competitiveness in the international arena. Regional energy integration can focus on increasing the competitiveness of the countries that are signatories of agreements involving energy through the participation of institutions and multilateral agreements that would give the countries access to energy resources, and the regulation would be carried out through contracts (NIIR 2014). Still regarding the perspective of competitiveness, integration can be carried out by a group of countries led by a hegemonic country or a satellite-region (NIIR 2014). Thus, integration has a broader meaning than simply integrating the infrastructure and production chains of a particular region or continent: it aims to link and expand global production systems and systems related to the financial sector and to society, which goes beyond pre-established geographical boundaries.

Yergin (2006) summarizes four principles (or strategies) that countries must follow to maintain energy security, given the geopolitical context. The first one is the diversification of energy sources, which helps to reduce disruption impacts of a source and provides alternative sources. The second

principle is integration, whose best example is oil: there is only one market, a complex system and the security lies in the stability of that market, which is already integrated. The third principle is resilience, which guarantees a margin of safety against crisis because of the country's capacity to replace the production, adoption of strategic reserves, adequate storage capacity along the supply chain, storage of critical parts of the production, and distribution of electricity. The last principle is information because, in times of crisis, false information and rumors contribute to intensify the crisis.

As important as these four principles are the two critical dimensions that should be part of the energy security concept: the recognition of the globalization of the security system (which can be achieved especially engaging India and China) and the fact that the entire chain of energy supply must be protected (Yergin 2006). Although Yergin does not go into the details of how to protect the whole chain, considering the globalized system, it is implied that information should be managed at the global level only to sustain the system, since each State and each institution act following the rules of the market of information and strategic disinformation in order to protect itself.

Geopolitics undergoes a remarkable change. A transition imposed by the international situation marked by global warming, by a crisis of natural resources seen as energy sources, by the pressures of global economy, and population growth. This change relates to the fact that the location of energy resources, although it is still relevant, begin to share space with other technologies of energy generation. In other words, the location becomes no longer the only limiting factor to generate energy.

According to Freitas (2014), the geopolitics of energy moves from the structured energy resources of power (fossil fuels) to a geopolitics that is still being structured and encompasses renewable energy or low carbon energy.

Changing energy debate

Throughout human history, the foundations of civilizations have rested heavily on their energy supplies (Willrich 1975). Energy plays an important role in the economic development of any country. Securing energy supply is a national priority for fuel import dependent countries. In the international arena, energy as a security concern was more of an after-effect of the 1973 Arab oil embargo. The supply shortages and the quadrupling of oil price have had long lasting impacts on the global economic scenario. The western countries which were largely dependent on imported supply from the Persian Gulf realised that critical policy measures need to be taken to ensure the supply security.

Conventionally, the debate of energy security has evolved in two different streams. First energy security as a policy target is applicable both to an energy producing economy as well as an energy import dependent economy. For energy producer, the term energy security is more about finding continuous demand for the energy it produced and supplied and best possible price it can get in return from energy market. However for the energy consuming country or those dependent on energy import, energy security is more about ensuring the supply of adequate energy to support the domestic economic activities. Despite these differences, energy security as a concept is more frequently associated with the search for energy import dependent countries' search for fuel supply rather than the search for a the market stability for a producer.

Energy Security is differently defined by various institutions and scholars. It is defined as state in which a country can ensure 'the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price. Lack of energy security is thus linked to the negative economic and social impacts of either physical unavailability of energy, or prices that are not competitive or are overly volatile' (IEA 2014a). The IEA also sees energy security as a combination of three determining factors 'Affordable/Competitive Supply', 'Reliable/Uninterrupted Supply', and 'Accessible/Available Supply' (IEA 2014a).

The debate on energy security is also about the accessibility and affordability of different types of energy resources. Though the world has already witnessed a drastic shift in usage of energy resources over the past few centuries from wood fuel to coal and then to petroleum and nuclear and to cleaner renewable energy sources, the distribution of energy resources across the different regions and their technically feasible exploitation are notably different. Today, in many countries the conventional fuels constitute majority of their energy mix while non-conventional energy sources (such as gas hydrates, shale gas, all other sources that are categorised as alternative sources including various renewable energy sources and advanced nuclear reactors generation III or generation IV or small and medium reactors) constitute only a relatively smaller share. While the conventional energy sources are predominantly emission intensive, the non-conventional energy resources are largely low carbon sources or rely on technologies that are responsible for lower emission of greenhouse gas in comparison to the conventional sources [Fossil fuels (Petroleum or Coal) or Conventional Biomass burning (Wood)].

As the global temperature rise by 2020 in comparison with the pre-industrialisation period to be kept below 20C (UNFCCC 2015), drastic policy measures promoting non-conventional sources are required. The global climate debate has made way for a shift in the energy consumption pattern

among the countries across the world. Promoting non-conventional energy sources through channelling more investment in proven alternative or renewable energy technologies and helping non-conventional energy market to grow has gained policy priority in both developing and developed economies.

However the developing economies and emerging economies, which are focusing on their economic growth face serious challenges as they try to curb their dependence on conventional fuels. To meet emission reduction target and strengthen the alternative energy sector many of the developing economies will need large scale technology financial support from foreign countries that have advanced technologies. While countries like India and China among the developing block in Asia have made significant foray into the alternative energy sector, many of their counterparts in the region still lag far behind with regard to clean energy development. Being two economies in the region with growing share of alternative sources in the energy mix, India and China are well equipped to play critical role in strengthening the alternative energy sector in the other developing economies.

Contours of Energy Debate

It is impossible not to see that there is an energy crisis going on when one observes the growth of global energy consumption, the emergence of developing countries, the energy requirements of a population of more than seven billion people, and the climate change. In fact, this crisis is related to the unsustainable way energy has been used for over a century. Changing the way energy is used can contribute to the redefinition of the world geopolitics, considering that the promotion of alternative sources of energy can promote investment and affect the investments already made, which are responsible for moving the wheels of the global economy. Furthermore, in this context, it can be asked whether the share of renewables can meet the challenges that the geopolitics of energy has faced because of the secular use of fossil fuels.


Renewable energy has been systematically established in the world. The growth of renewable energy sources has been driven by several factors such as improved cost-competitiveness of renewable technologies, energy security, environmental issues, improvement of the access to funding and policy initiatives (currently more than 146 countries have adopted policies in the renewable energy area against 15 in 2005) and the growing demand in developing economies (REN 2016). This growth is undoubtedly a stimulus to the creation and promotion of new markets.

2015 was the year in which there was the greatest addition of glob-

al capacity in renewable energy in the world. Investments reached a record level even with the decline of the prices of fossil fuels and the weakening of the European economy. For the sixth consecutive year, renewable energy surpassed fossil fuels in relation to net investments in energy capacity additions. Global investments in renewable energy including biofuels and hydroelectric power generation with less than 50 MW were 286 billion dollars in 2015, representing an increase of 4.5% in relation to the previous year. When the investments in large hydroelectric plants are taken into account, the total of investments rises to 328 billion dollars. In 2014, developed countries increased their investments by 3% while in developing countries the increase was 36%. In 2015, for the first time, investments in renewable energy in developing countries surpassed developed countries (REN, 2015; 2016).

According to the International Energy Agency, renewable energy will account for almost half of the increase in total electricity generation in 2040, the use of biofuels will increase more than three times and the use of renewable energy for heat production will grow more than twice. The electricity sector is the one which will help the most to decrease the percentage of fossil fuels in the world (IEA, 2014b). Figure 1 illustrates the development of renewable energy in a century.

Figure 1. Renewables Energy: Evolution in one century.



Source: Toklu 2013.

The current use of renewable energy is far from being a threat to conventional energy. This can be illustrated by the global subsidies to renewable

energy technologies, which reached US\$135 billion in contrast with fossil fuel subsidies, which were US\$490 billion (REN 2016).


Indeed, subsidies can be seen as a barrier that hinder the development of renewable energy in the world. Another barrier regarding the implementation of renewable energy is its intermittent nature. Therefore, public policies are essential to boost the processes of change. Market, technological and technical training barriers need to be removed. Production costs for the diversification of energy sources by renewable sources can only be effectively transformed through public policies that help to promote investments in the sector.

The geopolitics of energy wanders amid significant changes and becomes more complex as it becomes more diverse, covering new issues and challenges. It moves in the direction of an unstable situation in terms of availability and use of energy resources, which is related to how each of the nations of the globe understands energy security. This reinforces the importance of a closer study of the way the States behave before the challenges in the energy area and of their relations with other countries.

The insertion of renewable energy in a context dominated by traditional sources of energy provokes a reflection on how the challenges related to geopolitics will be dealt with. The intensification of the use of renewable energy, along with the use of traditional energy, is a fact and the study of forms of dialogue is certainly one of the most coherent strategies for the access to energy resources through, for example, knowledge and technology exchange. The empowerment of countries where there is more availability of renewable energy is a source of discussion in the scenario of geopolitics of energy.

The sustainability paradigm influences the international scene and is directly and indirectly related to the geopolitics of energy through elements linked not only to location, but also to new renewable energy technologies, knowledge and expertise, natural resources and the dialogue between countries, which must be based on the maintenance of balance in the global energy chain. In this context, the actions which aim to seek energy self-sufficiency, to diversify energy suppliers and to integrate through collaboration and strategic agreements in the energy area are added to the value of knowledge that is certainly the focal point of energy geopolitics, especially to energy cooperation. In all countries there are some forms of renewable energy to be exploited. Resilience and information are fundamental in this process and has a direct relationship with markets, institutions and issues linked to the sovereignty of the States or the maintenance of hegemony linked to energy security supply (see figure 2).

Figure 2. Geopolitics of Energy and the new context.



Energy interdependence and the increasing scale of energy trade require ongoing cooperation to ensure the security of the entire supply chain. Cross-border behaviors are becoming increasingly relevant to the global energy trade. In an interdependent world, energy security will depend largely on how countries manage their relationships with each other, either bilaterally or multilaterally. And that requires looking at the reality of a more complex and integrated global energy system, and at the relations between the countries that participate in it (Yergin 2006).

In spite of the obvious interdependence between countries, the capitalism economic crises, such as the 2008 financial crisis, which shook the neoliberal structures jeopardizing the ideas of minimum State and free market, brought up protectionist actions and policies. The crisis of the European Union and the timid repercussion of Mercosur have weakened the idea of socio-political and economic integration within the unit in which it was designed. However, when it comes to energy, the focus is on maintenance of its balance, which implies the search for cooperation especially due to unequal conditions of availability of natural resources between countries, which can be balanced by exchanges of technical knowledge, of products with added value and of technologies.

Thus, and according to the IEA (2013), it is essential to understand the

dynamics that sustain energy markets so that political decision makers reconcile their economic, energy and environmental objectives. Those countries that get ready for global energy developments will have the greatest advantages, while those who do not will be at risk of making wrong political decisions and bad investments.

Knowing the dynamics of the relations between countries is essential due to their complexity and the transition from a geopolitics based on geographical location to the geopolitics of energy, which is based on the sustainability paradigm linked to the expertise related to technology, to the integration of markets and to the form of dialogue between the countries.

New Geopolitics: underlining China and India in the competitiveness scenario

Energy geopolitics should be discussed beyond the conventional framework where in countries compete different geopolitical settings. This is relevant especially in the context of renewable energy, where economic and technological prowess of a nation matters more than political and military capabilities which used to equip a country to play efficiently.

Unlike petroleum sector where countries competed for acquiring overseas energy equity stakes or exploration contracts, the alternative energy sector provides opportunities for a technology supplier and investor to spread its influence in the consumer countries in the process of energy transition.


The Pacific Asian region will continue to witness India and China reaching out to the countries in this region to spread their influence. The efforts of India and China in the alternative energy sector may witness more diverse initiatives from both the countries in the coming years. To understand and demonstrate the possible trajectory of the Sino-Indian geopolitics vis-a-vis energy sector in the Pacific Asian region I use the National Competitive Advantage (NCA) theory by Michael Porter (Porter 1990). The NCA theory begins its analysis from the question “why do some nations fail while others succeed in international competition?”

Michael Porter argues that ‘Competitive advantage is created and sustained through a highly localized process. Differences in national values, culture, economic structures, institutions, and histories all contribute to competitive success. There are striking differences in the patterns of competitiveness in every country; no nation can or will be competitive in every, or even most industries. Ultimately, nations succeed in particular industries

because their home environment is the most forward-looking, dynamic, and challenging' (Porter 1990).

The particular reason behind taking NCA theory for examining the India-China energy interaction in the Pacific Asia is that this approach is suited to examine the 'geo-economic' advantage one country has over the other. The approach to use NCA theory consists of analysis on the basis of multiple factors, namely 'Factor Endowment', 'Strategy', 'Demand Conditions' and 'Supporting Infrastructure' (See figure below).

Figure 3: India and China – National Competitive Advantage



Source: Adapted from Michael Porter's National Competitive Advantage theory, 1990

Factor endowment describes the 'nation's position in factors of production, such as skilled labour or infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given industry' (Porter 1990). In terms of alternative energy industry production activities China has notable edge over India. Often it is noted that India's manufacturing climate has still not caught up with the speed at which China has been moving ahead. Experts opine that unlike China, 'India hasn't come close to matching China's investments in the roads, ports, and power networks that companies want. Lousy infrastructure essentially eats up any advantage the country may have on the labour front' (Einhorn 2014).


On the other hand Chinese industrial manufacturing has witnessed significant growth over the past few decades (See Figure 4). Even in the alternative energy front, China has made commendable foray. With US\$81 billion excluding R&D in 2014, China attracted more than double the renewable energy investment of its nearest competitor, the US. The country also made huge progress in the solar, wind and biomass technologies. Apart from policy support and economic incentives, the most important aspect is the cheap labour in China which makes economy of scale difficult to compete. The hourly labour cost in India for manufacturing averages 92¢, compared with \$3.52 in China, according to Boston Consulting Group (Einhorn 2014). According to REN21 report, Brazil, China and India are among the top five countries on annual investments and net capacity addition in terms of renewable energy. China ranks first on renewable power capacity in the world (REN 2017).

Regarding demand conditions, Porter argues that ‘nations gain competitive advantage in industries where the home demand gives their companies a clearer or earlier picture of emerging buyer needs, and where demanding buyers pressure companies to innovate faster and achieve more sophisticated competitive advantages than their foreign rivals’ (Porter 1990). The growth of domestic alternative energy sector in China in comparison to India indicates that there is a significant progress in the development of alternative energy sector. The formation of domestic Renewable Energy Law and several other policy initiatives has promoted alternative energy sector a remarkable growth. However, India despite having the advantage of early starter has less renewable energy generation than China currently. As the domestic demand contributes more innovation and technological sophistication the industry would gain more attention in the international trade. Here Chinese companies has gained an undeniable advantage.

Related and supporting industries that are internationally competitive will provide unquestionable advantage in the promotion of industry abroad. China has far more higher number of major solar and wind energy companies that are in the alternative energy sector. This is one of the critical advantage China has over India. As China’s oil industries gained significance in the international energy market, the alternative energy companies too are playing major role in the overseas market. Some of the biggest and most successful renewable energy companies are from China, especially in the solar panel producing segment. Trina Solar (TSL), Yingli Green Energy (YGE), and JinkoSolar (JKS) are the top players in the solar panel producing companies. It is also noted that the Chinese companies have made significant progress in investing in the renewable and alternative energy sector (See Figure 5). It is the world leader in domestic investment in renewable energy and associ-

ated low-emissions-energy sectors. China invested US\$103bn in this sector in 2015, up 17% year on year, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF)—two and half times the amount undertaken by the U.S (Buckley and Nicholas 2017).

Figure 4: New Investment in Renewable Energy by Country and Asset Class, 2015 and Growth on 2014 (US\$ billion)



Source: Buckley and Nicholas (2017).

National circumstances and context create strong tendencies in how companies are created, organized, and managed, as well as what the nature of domestic rivalry will be (Porter 1990). Chinese companies being active in the international arena face frequent rivalry and completion in the energy market. However the energy companies have been successful in getting a notable share of the market (Daojinong 2006). The Anti-monopolistic law in China which ensures fare competition with in the country among companies, in turn helps the entire energy sector to grow. This also strengthens the renewable energy players and help them perform better in the international market.

Apart from the above mentioned reasons, one critical advantage China enjoys in the region is its sheer size of economy. Its military might and the regional supremacy and its continuous efforts to enhance its influence in the region also strengthens its image as better business partner. Unlike India, China pursues a clear expansionist strategy in the region (Swaine 2000; Andrews-Speed 2014) which is equally challenging as well as providing opportu-

nities to the smaller countries in the region. In contrast, India's relations with the ASEAN economies work more on a cooperative framework. While India's relation with the South Asian countries face many difficulties, China is able to present itself as an alternative power which can offer financial support and business opportunities. Taking into account the factors mentioned above it is likely that India will have to face tougher competition from China in the alternative energy front in the Pacific Asian region.

Final Considerations

Energy has always been part of the geopolitical discourse because controlling energy resources is closely related to the conquest of territories and societies, i.e., to geographical space. In the classical theories of geopolitics, the central role of energy was highlighted: Mahan, when analyzing the historical development of naval power, stressed the importance of the consolidation of steam and of oil; and Mackinder, when he proposed the Heartland theory, stressed the value of a fortress region rich in resources such as wood, coal and oil.

The comparison made by Kjellén and Ratzel about the State and the biological organism can be interpreted, in postmodernity, as the importance of interconnectivity between the States given the energy interdependence between them. The line between military power and symbolic power would therefore be more tenuous, because facts like climate change show the interdependence between nations. The insertion of renewable energy does not end the interdependence between States since some countries have a lot of knowledge and few natural resources and others have access to markets or even know-how for the design and development policies.

The multiplicity of issues that geopolitics have dealt with, especially from the second half of the twentieth century onwards, has contributed to the emergence of a new paradigm founded on sustainability and helped broaden the range of geopolitical analysis. It is worth noting that geopolitical arrangements involve national States as well as a chain of political institutions, companies and other organizations that contribute to generate impacts on the lives of people. This has made the States lose a little of their power because of the rise of other players.

In the geopolitical context of energy, countries which are able to take advantages of their own characteristics and to interpret the global scenario in favor of themselves will emerge as a high competitive. India and China are experiencing ever-increasing energy demand, and particularly China, has been positioning itself in the global market more intensively, both in the pri-

vate and technological sectors, and in the development of policies to support renewable energy. This undoubtedly boosts the influence of this country on the global scenario - connecting investors, workers and researchers around the renewable energy market.

The quest for energy security requires more than the search for energy self-sufficiency (the utopia of countries before the hegemonic system): it requires the integration of policies, infrastructure, marketing arrangements and knowledge. Renewable energy, the result of the need generated by climate change and the depletion of fossil fuels, has given geopolitics not the solution for historical disputes, but rather challenges that pervade the power of resilience of the States.

Geopolitics creates the need to analyze the priorities of the local economy, whether regional or national, and the availability of existing resources or of energy alternatives in the face of the challenges presented. Local interests lead to global interests or actions that seek a balance between local interests and global collectives. The sustainability paradigm introduced new challenges in the geopolitics of energy, and dialogue and the synchronism of actions began to contribute decisively to the strategic strengthening of the States, so that they can take privileged positions in the global scenario. Energy cooperation and geopolitics could walk together.

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ABSTRACT

The act of dominating energy resources undoubtedly permeates the conquest of territories and their respective societies. Energy and geopolitics have always walked jointly in the process of economic and social development in which societies have been based over the time. The multiplicity of issues that geopolitics gathered helped broaden the spectrum of analysis of geopolitical turning it more complex. This paper has the main objective to contribute for a discussion about the transition from the geopolitics based on the physical space to the geopolitics based on sustainability in which renewable energy has consolidated in the international scenario. The final considerations highlight the quest for energy security requires more than the quest for energy self-sufficiency itself. In addition, the sustainable paradigm introduced in the geopolitics of energy new challenges as the insertion of renewable energy in a context dominated by traditional sources of energy that provokes a reflection on how the challenges related to geopolitics will be dealt with. In that way, China and India appears as a global players. The choice of cooperative dialogues appears as an essential element in the balance of the energy system.

KEYWORDS

Geopolitics, Renewable Energy, Transition, Competitiveness, Energy Cooperation.

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ON THE COMPLEXITIES OF PROSECUTING ROBERT MUGABE AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

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Introduction

It was argued by Mamdani (2010) that the International Criminal Court (ICC) was problematic right from its creation and it quickly became part of the transitional justice problem in Africa by, *inter alia*, being selective in its application of the law. The international justice system stands accused of failing to curb the scourge of violence and war in general and the protection of children, women and indigenous minorities in particular as the mechanisms put in place such as the ICC are embroiled in political turmoil thereby rendering them part of the problem and not the solution so desired by victims of human rights abuses. On such country which has witnessed human rights abuses on a continuous basis is Zimbabwe. Most of these human rights abuses such as the 1982/84 Operation Gukurahundi atrocities were perpetrated mostly by state agencies thereby rendering those who were in command liable for prosecution to answer to charges of genocide.

A generation after Operation Gukurahundi and other episodes of state led human rights abuses such as Operation *Chinyavada* (1983), Operation *Murambatsvina* (2005), Operation *Chipo Chiroorwa* (2007) and Operation *Mavhotera Papi* (2008), (Benyera and Nyere 2015, 6523), calls for the Zimbabwe's leadership to be held accountable continue to be made. These calls have been validated by the state's behaviour of using violence as its preferred instrument of governance. Thus the creation of the ICC was viewed as a major victory for human rights especially for victims of such abuses, with many perceiving it as

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a panacea to Africa's perennial challenge of human rights abuses. As a result of a captured and partisan judiciary, human rights advocates were justified in placing high hopes on the ICC to establish both historical accountability and hold individual state official liable for their actions (Chirimambowa and Chimedza 2015, 4).

This article demonstrates the futility and complexities of bringing Mugabe to The Hague to answer to allegation of genocide and crimes against humanity. The issue of the immunity of state officials is unpacked and presented as a contested and unsettled matter which is still very fluid both in practise and at scholarship. The method adopted is an exploration of the various litigations and efforts to Mugabe before the ICC and other courts of law elsewhere. A discussion of these cases will be preceded by an exploration of the various attempts at bringing Mugabe before the ICC for prosecution and the status of his immunity from prosecution. This will be achieved by analysing the Rome Statute's Articles 17, 26 and 27; the Constitution of Zimbabwe and other relevant treaties that deal with the issue of the immunity of state officials from prosecution as well as customary international law. It is the severity of the allegations being levelled against Mugabe that calls for his prosecution have mounted over the years. That desirability notwithstanding, Mugabe's prosecution at The Hague is a complex matter, one sitting at the intersection of law and politics.

ICC jurisdiction and human rights abuses in Zimbabwe

The challenge in jurisdiction facing the ICC in Zimbabwe is that the Rome Statute restricts the Court to investigating only crimes committed after July 2002. This implies that the most contentious periods in Zimbabwe's violent past lie outside the legal mandate of the ICC. These periods include the War of Independence (1965 – 1980), Operation *Gukurahundi* (1982 – 1983), part of the land redistribution related violence (2000 – 2005), and Operation *Murambatsvina* (2002). For the majority of the black population who lived under the white minority government of Rhodesia, the omission of the colonial period from the ICC's jurisdiction is a travesty of justice tantamount to the promotion of impunity. Various other challenges have been encountered in attempting to prosecute Mugabe. Despite these challenges, referrals of Zimbabwe to the ICC was attempted by many countries, institutions and even individuals with no success. The biggest stumbling block was encountered in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) where permanent member China and rotational non-permanent member South Africa consistently refused that the case of Zimbabwe be put on the UNSC agenda. However, this was not

the first time that Zimbabwe's case was brought before the ICC. Since 2005, various calls were made for the human rights situation in Zimbabwe to be referred to the Court by the UNSC. These include the landmark case brought by Adella Tachiona in the United States (*Tachiona and Others versus Mugabe and Others*. Case number: 00CIV6666VMJCF United States District Court of New York). Other failed attempts to have Mugabe indicted include the attempt by then Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer to lobby the UNSC to indict Mugabe, the International Bar Association's executive director Mark Ellis, the then British Ambassador to the UN, Emyr Jones Parry, the then British Foreign Secretary David Miliband when he addressed the UNSC on 14 December 2008.

Regionally, the Namibian National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) through its Executive Director Phil ya Nangolo, also tried to have Mugabe arrested in Windhoek, Namibia in 2007. The South African position regarding Mugabe is premised on SA's *International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002*. It is on this legal basis that The Southern African Litigation Centre and the Zimbabwe Exiles Forum took the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the South African Police Services (SAPS) to the North Gauteng asking the court to compel them to arrest Mugabe and any of his top officials should they pass through South Africa. Finally the official opposition in South Africa, in 2008, the Democratic Alliance also attempted to have Mugabe indicted at the ICC when their then leader Hellen Zille wrote a letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and copied to other institutions and governments such as the then UNSC chair (USA), the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. All this notwithstanding, Mugabe never appeared before the ICC; neither are there any serious current attempt to do so. This point to some complexities regarding the Mugabe ICC issue which this paper will unpack starting with the Principle of Complementarity in international criminal justice system.

Complementarity and international criminal justice in Zimbabwe

The ICC operates on the Principle of Complementarity which makes it the duty of every state to exercise criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes (Rome Statute: Articles 1 and 17). This is an improvement on the former *ad hoc* International Criminal Tribunals in Sierra Leone, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, which had primacy over national courts. The Principle of Complementarity works better when the ICC initiates

investigations in states that would have proved unwilling or unable to carry out prosecutions on their own (Burke-White 2005). On the other hand, the Principle appears ill equipped and inadequately prepared to deal with cases where countries do self-referral. The Principle of Complementarity assumes that countries will be reluctant to refer themselves to the ICC. With that in mind, the Rome Statute addressed the likely scenarios of countries claiming state sovereignty and thereby refusing to be subjected to the court's jurisdiction. This left the ICC in a quandary when the opposite happened. As of December 2012, four out of the five African cases were all self-referrals (DRC, Uganda, Central African Republic, and Sudan (Darfur) plus Sudan which was referred by the UNSC in 2005).

With respect to Zimbabwe, it has been argued that there may be cases where inaction by states is the appropriate rationale of action by the ICC (Stigen 2008, 199; Kleffner 2008, 104). The ICC added a third dimension to the Principle of Complementarity which is inactivity/inaction. According to Stone (2011, 325), this decision and its interpretation of Article 17 of the Rome Statute will probably not change the situation. Adding a third dimension test of 'inactivity' or 'inaction' beyond 'unwilling' and 'unable' was criticised by Schabas (2008, 731), among others as vague and open to abuse by powerful nations. However, it is this third prong test of 'inactivity' or 'inaction' which has the potential to be used by the 'international community' to bring cases of human rights abuses in Zimbabwe to The Hague as evidence suggests that there were no genuine attempts by the government in Zimbabwe to investigate alleged cases of gross violations of human rights. The refusal by the Zimbabwe government to make public several human rights abuse reports is a case in point. Unreleased reports include the 1983 Zimbabwe Commission of Inquiry into the Matabeleland Disturbances (also known as the Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry) and the Commission of Inquiry into events surrounding Entumbane 1 and 2, otherwise known as the Dumbutshe-na Commission of Inquiry. The latter's mandate was to look into the clashes between former Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) forces at Entumbane and the killings in Matabeleland in 1983 (Raftopoulos and Eppel 2009, 13). The now almost defunct Human Rights Commission serves as a further example of Zimbabwe's unwillingness to investigate human rights abuses. Unwilling because the state failed to support the Zimbabwe Human Right Commission into functionality (Chiduzza 2015, 148-174).

This section grapples with the possibility of Zimbabwe's alleged human rights violations being taken to the ICC as a result of evoking the Principle of Complementarity. This is highly unlikely given the vagueness of this

Principle which instead of revealing which cases the ICC should investigate, sets out instead the specific cases the ICC *should not* investigate or prosecute (Rome Statute Articles 17 and 53). There are three sets of crimes which the ICC does not concern itself with. These are: firstly, those international criminal cases which states with jurisdiction over them are already investigating or prosecuting, as evidenced by a display of genuine willingness and ability to do so. Secondly, the ICC does not consider cases where the crimes in question are not regarded as serious enough to concern the ICC, and finally those cases where an investigation would not serve 'the interests of justice' (Kleffner 2008, 292). Under these circumstances, victims' interests become secondary to the primary concerns of investigation, conviction and punishment of the perpetrators. The inclusion of the 'the interests of justice' as a major selection criterion further diminishes the interests of victims in general and the need for reconciliation in particular.

Another challenge with the Principle of Complementarity is the lack of clarity on what constitutes sufficient gravity. This clarity is important for the Mugabe indictment because it has a bearing on the classification of the severity of the allegations he faces, hence the likelihood of his indictment. The ICC Office of the Prosecutor has yet to define exactly what constitutes 'sufficient gravity' and what 'the interests of justice' entail (Schabas 2007, 186, 415; Clark 2008, 37-46). According to Clark, the Prosecutor outlined four main criteria for determining the gravity of crimes. These are their scale, nature, the manner of their commission, and their impact. The criteria for the assessment of these circumstances have yet to be developed implying that, in the meantime, some alleged perpetrators like Mugabe remain free. It can be concluded that rather than prosecuting suspects of gross violations of human rights, the ICC's Rome Statute is more concerned with preserving the sovereignty of certain states, particularly those opposed to its formation such as the USA. This is evidenced by the ICC's case selection criteria which is the subject of discussion in the next section.

ICC case selection

How the ICC chooses the cases it investigates is central both to its international criminal justice and its success as a court. Its prosecution record indicates the need to balance law and politics of its case selection. The ICC is caught between an idealistic vision of a global court designed to prosecute the cases that domestic jurisdictions cannot or would not prosecute. This was compounded by the pragmatic concerns of the ICC as a fairly new institution seeking judicial results to secure its legitimacy. Under these circumstances,

case selection is a key ingredient in the ICC's endeavour to build a strong legal corpus and create legal precedent. According to the Rome Statute, situations can be referred to the ICC in one of three ways: first, by a state party; secondly, by the UNSC; and thirdly at the instigation of the Prosecutor. In the third scenario, the Prosecutor must gain the authorisation of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court before launching investigations and must show that there are sufficient grounds to do so (Rome Statute: Articles 54 and 56).

According to Clark (2008), more than 10 years into its existence the ICC is still developing its broad strategy for case selection based on the rules outlined in the Rome Statute and its Principle of Complementarity. For Clark, three trends in the Prosecutor's approach emerged. Firstly, the Office of the Prosecutor indicated that it would focus on perpetrators who bore the greatest responsibility for international crimes. This means that the OTP is likely to prosecute only government, military or militia leaders suspected of orchestrating or committing crimes under the ICC's jurisdiction. This renders Mugabe a typical suspect for prosecution. However, the challenge inherent in this approach is the determination of who decides which suspect 'bears the greatest responsibility' for the crimes allegedly committed. Should it be the victims or the Prosecutor? Does the Prosecutor have the competence to adjudicate and apportion responsibility in crimes that he or she did not witness? Most importantly, whose word or what kind of evidence will the Prosecutor use to arrive at such a decision? These considerations work against the successes of the ICC's case selection and inversely feed the growth of impunity, by providing a technical loophole which results in the non-prosecution of suspects like Mugabe.

The second legal technicality concerns the OTP's outsourcing of one of its key functions, i.e., bringing suspects before the court for prosecution. In a statement the then ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo stated that the ICC, 'will encourage national prosecutions, where possible, for the lower-ranking perpetrators, or work with the international community to ensure that the offenders are brought to justice by some other means' (Stahn and Sluiter 2009, 220).

This process is meant to result in the prosecution of small numbers of high-level perpetrators, while encouraging domestic jurisdiction to help close any potential 'impunity gap' left by the ICC's focus on minority high profile suspects such as Mugabe. This presents some challenges contained in the grading and ranking of crimes and criminals as there is no agreed instrument, tool or criteria with which to do this, leaving such an important aspect open to different interpretations and a lot of contestations. Thirdly, the OTP indicated that it would take an extremely cautious approach to selecting

which cases to investigate, acting only when it possessed enough evidence to provide strong prospects for a successful investigation. It is likely then that the OTP will pursue cases only where state parties and other sources have already gathered substantial evidence. This reliance on third parties for such crucial aspects such as the gathering of evidence is undesirable for the ICC. Outsourcing of evidence collection weakens the ICC as the motives for evidence collection differs, especially when this is done by those linked to the suspects or the victims as aptly demonstrated in the collapse of the Uhuru Mugai Kenyatta versus the Prosecutor case (ICC-01/09-02/11).

Zimbabwe's position regarding the ICC jurisdiction

Zimbabwe's official position regarding the calls for the prosecution of its President deserves to be considered in a discussion of this nature. In a seemingly dismissive manner, Zimbabwe consistently treats attempts to have Mugabe indicted as foreign meddling in its internal affairs sponsored by its detractors pursuing regime change agenda. The President's Press Secretary, George Charamba, said that calls for Mugabe's indictment were attempts to tarnish the image of the President and the country. Charamba noted that Zimbabwe was not a signatory to the Rome Statute that had created the ICC and was therefore not legally bound by its dictates (Voice of America News, 31 October, 2009). In an interview with the author on 24 September 2012, the same views were expressed by the then Deputy Director of the Organ on National Healing, Integration and Reconciliation, Anderson Chiraya, who stated that the ICC had no role in Zimbabwe. He observed that the ICC was a foreign organ with no jurisdiction over Zimbabwe, or any Zimbabwean for that matter, just as it had no jurisdiction over the United States of America, Israel, any American or Israeli. For him, the irrelevance of the ICC to Zimbabwe is illustrated by the fact that Zimbabwe was never part of the ICC and, according to him, never would be. He gave the selective application of law and the deliberate targeting of Africa, especially its leaders, as the reason for Zimbabwe's resentment of the ICC. This response aptly sums up Zimbabwe's official position on the matter.

It is worth noting that the unlike the former *ad hoc* international criminal tribunals which were established by UNSC resolutions hence had the backing of Chapter VII measures, the ICC is a treaty based court and its existence rests upon the direct consent of contracting states (Gaeta 2009, 319). This presents a major challenge to contracting states when requested to effect warrant of arrests as the apprehension of such heads of states will be against customary international law and in some cases in contravention of these

countries' domestic law. Such a dilemma was faced by South Africa when al Bashir visited South Africa in June 2015.

Mugabe and immunity from ICC prosecution

One of the central questions which this article seeks to answer is whether Mugabe has immunity from prosecution at the ICC or any other domestic court of law. International criminal law is very unambiguous on this position with Article 27 (2) of the Rome statute stating that, 'immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person'. However the position of state official immunity is a very much contested principle under domestic law. According to Gaeta (2009, 318) more clarity on the issue can be established if the status of the customary rule of international law on immunities of heads of states equally applies to international criminal courts. Historically this matter was ruled upon by the International Court of Justice in the *Democratic republic of Congo versus Belgium* (14 February 2002). The court ruled that personal immunities applied only to national courts and not international criminal courts, thereby validating Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute. That precedent setting ruling notwithstanding attempts were made to test Mugabe's immunity in various courts.

The first test of Mugabe's immunity from prosecution on allegations of gross human rights abuses was a case discussed earlier on which was brought before the United States District Court, New York on the 7th of August 2002 by Talent Chiminya, widow of Tichaona Chiminya who was killed together with fellow MDC activist Talent Mabika on 15 April 2000 (Blair 2002, 258). The allegations by Talent Chiminya were that Mugabe in his capacity as the leader of ZANU PF was responsible for her husband's death who was allegedly killed by his party's officials. Amnesty International's 2002 report, titled *Zimbabwe the toll of impunity*, reported that the two were killed by Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) agent Joseph Mwale and war veteran Kainos Tom 'Kitsiyatota' Zimunya, who was commanding a group of ZANU PF youths who carried out the murder. In the case, Mugabe's defence was predicated on his immunity from prosecution which the US court upheld, ruling that such a position was consistent with international practice, i.e., International Criminal Law.

The above judgement can best be understood if the two types of immunity that the ICC considers in such cases are explained; functional immu-

nity and personal immunity. Functional immunity is commonly referred to as immunity *ratione materiae* while personal immunity is called immunity *ratione personae* (Akande and Shah 2010, 817). Personal immunity or *ratione personae* is attached to senior state officials while they are still in office. State as well as judicial practice indicates that this form of immunity applies even to international crimes, as held by domestic courts in cases involving former Libyan leader President General Muammar Gaddafi and Mugabe. The principles of immunity *ratione materiae* and immunity *ratione personae* were also discussed in the following cases: *Jones v Ministry of the interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia* [2006] UKHL 26, [2007], *Bat v Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court* [2011], *EWHC 2029 (Admin)* and *Sosa v Alvarez-Machain*, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).

It can be deduced from these cases that functional immunity or *ratione materiae* can be invoked not only by serving state officials but also by former state officials in respect of their official acts while they were in office. This implies that Mugabe can claim this type of immunity even when he is no longer in power. The norm is that the state of the accused is allowed to choose whether or not its agents would be responsible under international law for crimes they allegedly committed while still in office. Therefore it is the state's responsibility to determine the status of its official's claim to immunity. Should Mugabe be out office and still be alive, that call will have to be made by the government of the day. In all likelihood, the revoking of this immunity will only become a possibility with a change of administration in Zimbabwe.

In principle, the ICC becomes involved in cases where states abuse their sovereignty and fail to address impunity. Many countries in Africa have constitutional provisions that provide immunity from prosecution for their presidents or, in some cases, their prime ministers. These provisions include *Section 30 of the Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe (Presidential Immunity)*; *Article 46 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (as amended)*; *Article 98 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995*; *section 34(1)-(5), First Schedule to the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992*; *Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana Law, 1992, sections 28(1), 34 and 35(1)-(3)*; *Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland, Article 61*; *Constitution of Liberia, Article 48(4)* and *Constitution of the Republic of Sierra Leone, 1991*. Despite the existence of these constitutional provisions, international criminal law on non-recognition of the immunity of state officials for international crimes exists in the form of Article 27 of the Rome Statute. This Article sets out the position in international criminal law of the prosecution of individuals for international crimes before international courts. Zimbabwe should therefore not trust its domestic immunity provisions since a precedent was already set

with the indictment of al Bashir. That precedent notwithstanding, some leaders with terrible human rights abuse records, such as Uganda's Amin and Museveni, UK's Tony Blair, USA's George W. Bush, Uganda's Yoweri Museveni, Russia's Vladimir Putin, Syria's Bashar al Assad and DRC's late Mobutu Sese Seko, were never indicted by any international legal institution.

Zimbabwean politicians interpret Section 30 of the Constitution as conferring the President with immunity from prosecution wherever and whenever. This is contrary to Subsection 1 (b) of the same Constitution which allows for the President to be held liable for his/her personal actions. *Section 30 of Zimbabwe's Constitution reads:*

(1) The President shall not, while in office, be personally liable to any civil or criminal proceedings whatsoever in any court. (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of subsection (3), it shall be lawful to institute civil or criminal proceedings against a person after he has ceased to be President, in respect of—(a) things done or omitted to be done by him before he became President; or (b) things done or omitted to be done by him in his personal capacity during his term of office as President.

The above contradiction in law warrants clarification by a competent legal entity, probably the whole bench of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. Such a clarification leaves no room for speculation and personal interpretation of the law regarding the Mugabe's immunity from prosecution in Zimbabwe and elsewhere.

At continental level, there is no legal framework which either outlaws or upholds the immunity of state officials in Africa. The African Union only has provisions that merely condemn impunity (Article 4(o): Constitutive Act of the AU). Article 4 of the AU's Constitutive Act contains the principle which is central to outlawing impunity in Africa as it allows the AU the right to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the Union in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (Article 4(h): Constitutive Act of the AU). While such a provision exists, its enforcement remains a distant reality despite the regular occurrence of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity in Africa.

There are numerous shortcomings inherent in this regional impunity prevention mechanism which makes it untenable in stopping impunity in Zimbabwe. The major shortcoming of this mechanism is that it makes no provisions for enforcement, thereby rendering it ineffective at law. According to Murungu (2011, 65), Article 4(h) does not have an express mandate to pros-

ecute individuals who commit international crimes in Africa. This loophole is manipulated by African leaders who are liable for censorship by the AU for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity but are never cautioned owing to this shortcoming. Murungu further contends further that it is also difficult to infer whether intervention would include prosecution of perpetrators of international crimes in Africa. Another flaw in the AU's anti-immunity provisions is that nowhere is it specifically provided in the Constitutive Act that an African state official may be prosecuted for international crimes. This implies that the AU's official and legal position on the international crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity remains vague. The existence of the legislation notwithstanding, it can be argued that there is no African country with the political will to bring Mugabe before the AU to answer to allegations of gross violations of human rights as outlined in Article 4 of the AU's Constitutive Act. It can be further argued that, if the solidarity shown by the AU in rallying behind ICC accused Sudanese President Omar al Bashir is anything to go by, the chance that the AU will act on Zimbabwe becomes extremely slim, if not non-existent.

At another level, an analysis of the sub-regional's (SADC) legal framework reveals a similar lack of legal instruments to fight executive impunity. It is debatable whether this absence is deliberate on the part of regional leaders or not. Not surprisingly, Zimbabwe is not a member of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region of 29 November 2006 which passed the only protocol in Africa which explicitly condemns impunity. Zimbabwe is therefore not a part of the *Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity* and all forms of Discrimination signed on this date. Members to the protocol are Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. The Protocol is based on the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* which was adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948 and the Rome Statute of the ICC of 1 July 2002. The relevant section of the Protocol is Article 12 which is almost a verbatim duplication of Article 17 of the Rome Statute which reads:

The provisions of this chapter shall apply equally to all persons suspected of committing the offences to which this Protocol applies, irrespective of the official status of such persons. In particular, the official status of a Head of state or Government, or an official member of a Government or Parliament, or an elected representative or agent of a state shall in no way shield or bar their criminal liability (Article 12: Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against

Humanity and all forms of Discrimination).

It is imperative to note that the provision specifically mentions that official capacity, especially Head of State, does not exempt one from prosecution. Article 27 (1) of the Rome Statute states that:

This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.

Article 23 lays down the mandates of member states, including the duty to cooperate with the ICC. Section (a) specifically mentions cooperation with ‘requests to the arrest and hand over of persons alleged to have committed crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC’. The provisions of this Protocol, unlike those of the AU’s Constitutive Act, are very clear on their mandate, their relationship with the ICC and on which crimes should be dealt with and in what format. It remains to be investigated whether the Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination was an attempt by certain African countries to circumvent the AU by charting an alternative, decisive, unambiguous way to deal with impunity in Africa.

The AU’s Constitutive Act almost abdicates the outlawing of impunity to national legislations, their well-documented lack of capacity and political will notwithstanding. At state level, very few African countries have legislation addressing executive impunity. These countries include South Africa, Uganda, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Niger, Kenya, Congo, Burundi, Rwanda and Ethiopia. Recent developments in South Africa brought hope to those seeking to prosecute Mugabe and his fellow senior party officials. In a landmark lawsuit (*SALC and Another v NDPP and Others case 77150/09*), of March 2012, the North Gauteng High Court decided that the South African National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) was expected to prosecute any Zimbabwean accused of violating human rights in Zimbabwe should they come to South Africa. According to the South African Litigation Centre’s (SALC) website (visited on 13 February 2013), the facts of the matter were that, ‘the NPA and South African Police Services (SAPS) refused to initiate an investigation and SALC and the Zimbabwe Exiles Forum took this decision on review to the High Court’. On 8 May 2012 Judge Hans Fabricius delivered judgement in SALC’s favour,

in which the High Court ordered the NPA and SAPS to initiate investigations into human rights abuses by the 18 Zimbabwean security officials cited in the case. From this it can be construed that in the absence of continental and regional legal frameworks to try those accused of impunity, reliance on national legislation like that of South Africa becomes the only realistic hope for the prosecution of those suspects. The existence of that legal framework notwithstanding, chances that the SAPS and the NPA will arrest Mugabe are unlikely given the cordial relations between ZANU PF and the African National Congress which date back to the colonial/apartheid era.

Beside South Africa, Ethiopia also set a promising legal precedent when it prosecuted its former President, Mengistu Haile Mariam, finding him guilty and sentencing him to death, albeit *in absentia*, ironically holed up somewhere in Zimbabwe. On a more positive note, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights sought to establish a Chamber with jurisdiction over persons who commit international crimes in Africa. Like the ICC, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights is a noble idea that can only be evaluated once it has been implemented. At the moment, hope of ending impunity in Africa remains with the ICC. However, the ICC needs to undergo a metamorphosis of some sort if it is to become more relevant and appealing, especially to victims of gross human rights violations in Africa.

Conclusion

The article demonstrated that transitional justice evolved from its early conceptualisation as a form of criminal justice, to a more complex, multi-dimensional and responsive phenomenon. As policymakers gain greater understanding of the causes of conflict and the nature of political, social and economic transition, it is inevitable that transitional justice processes will be increasingly called upon to address economic, social and cultural rights. The general conclusion reached is that the ICC lags behind and risk being irrelevant to the transitional justice agenda, especially in Africa where its credibility and track record is seen to be unconvincing, mostly by victims of human rights abuses. The government of Zimbabwe was not a signatory to the Rome Statute and therefore not a member of the ICC and does not recognise the ICC. However, this does not imply that the ICC is not in a position to act on Zimbabwe. As exemplified by the indictment of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir, where Sudan is not a member of the ICC, the Court could act on a referral from the UNSC to investigate a non-member state.

Other reasons for this inability to act on Mugabe relate to the ICC's ju-

jurisdiction in which cases committed prior to the entry into force of the Rome Statute in 2002 are considered out of the court's ambit. Also noted as problematic was the ICC's occupation of a secondary role in which national judiciaries assume the first court of appeal status. This is untenable for victims of gross violations of human rights in Zimbabwe, as the state which was expected to lead the investigations is the prime suspect. The complexity of international law, especially international jurisprudence, renders the ICC a complex and implausible solution to local reconciliation needs. Besides the complexities at the ICC level, other challenges which render Mugabe's prosecution unlikely were noted. These include the AU's lukewarm attitude towards executive impunity and the continental statesman status Mugabe enjoys in Africa. In all likelihood, Mugabe will never face prosecution at the ICC or any court of law to answer to allegations of genocide and crimes against humanity, especially for the 1982/3 genocide which he presided over.

Post scriptum: Of old realities being reinforced by new developments

As of 21 November 2017, Robert Mugabe was no longer the President of Zimbabwe. He was ousted by a combination of peaceful popular uprising and a military led uprising within his own ruling ZANU PF party. This after he had unceremoniously dismissed his Deputy President and now President of Zimbabwe Emmerson Dambudzo Munangagwa. Now that Mugabe is no longer in power, does this change the script? I am not convinced that Mugabe's change in political fortune will see him having his day in court, in Zimbabwe, The Hague or anywhere. This is because of what I term old realities being reinforced by new developments.

The old realities are three fold. Firstly, Zimbabwe is not part of the Rome Statute. In addition, the biggest and worst crime which Mugabe is accused of presiding over falls outside the jurisdiction of the ICC, i.e., Gukurahundi genocide was committed in 1982/3 and the ICC only concerns itself with crimes committed after 2002 when the Rome Statute came onto force. Secondly, at home, the judiciary system is still the same, unreformed, partisan and for all intents and purposes captured by the ruling party, ZANU PF.

Thirdly, Britain is complicit in the Gukurahundi genocide in that the Margaret Thatcher administration was aware that a genocide was occurring in Zimbabwe but they kept their silence. Two occasions were propitious for Zimbabwe's former colonisers to castigate the genocide and call international attention and intervention before the situation deteriorated. At the Common-

wealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi, India, between 23 and 29 November 1983 and when the then British Foreign Office Minister Malcolm Rifkind held diplomatic consultations with Mugabe, in November 1983. Thus, the British were complicit and they will not mind to have Mugabe's genocide prosecution calls die a natural death.

Then to the new developments which reinforce the old realities. Firstly, Mugabe is still immensely respected by the 'new' ZANU PF leadership. That the new leadership declared Mugabe's birthday, 21 February as a national holiday attests to their continued admiration of their former leader. President Munangagwa also publicly praised Mugabe for his contributions to Zimbabwe. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), The United States of America and the US President Donald Trump are busy with Iran, Palestine/Israel, Syria, the Russian Federation and other 'more important' geopolitical and global issues and Zimbabwe is far from being part of the UNSC agenda any time soon.

Thirdly, those accused of being with Mugabe at the forefront of masterminding and committing the genocide are now key office bearers in the post-Mugabe Zimbabwe administration. Then Firth Brigade Commander, Air Chief Marshal Perence Shiri is now the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, Former Defence Forces Commander, General Constantino Guveya Dominic Nyikadzino Chiwenga is now the Vice President and the then Minister of State Security Minister Emmerson Munangagwa is now the President. The roles (real or perceived) played by Munangagwa, Chiwenga, Shiri and many others during Gukurahundi and the entire Mugabe period renders Mugabe's prosecution unlikely. Surely, given the combination of the above, Mugabe will not face any prosecution for the four crimes of genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; and the crime of aggression.

Lastly, there are constitutional provisions which make the prosecution of a former head of state virtually impossible. Chapter 5, Part 1, Section 98, Subsection 2 & 4 reads:

(2). Civil or criminal proceedings may be instituted against a former President for things done and omitted to be done before he or she became President or while he or she was President ...

(4). In any proceedings brought against a former President for anything done or omitted to be done in his or her official capacity while he or she was President, it is a defence for him or her to prove that the thing was done or omitted in good faith.

The manner in which subsection 4 is worded gives the president de-

fence in case of prosecutions for his c/omissions while in office. This subsection is therefore pre-emptive and indicative of the likely judgement in case of a prosecution, i.e., that such c/omissions were done in good faith.

So, is all hope for the victims of human rights abuses in Zimbabwe lost? What can the post-Mugabe government do? There are three options for the Munangagwa administration to address this issue. Firstly, they can officially release the both the Chihambakwe and the Dumbutshena Commission reports. Secondly, Munangagwa on behalf of ZANU PF and government can blanketly admit culpability for crimes committed, just like Nelson Mandela did when on the 23rd of August 1993, the Motsuenyane Commission reported that the African National Congress (ANC) was guilty of torture in its camps and that specific individuals were responsible for these abuses. Instead of holding individual ANC and Umkhonto weSizwe members culpable, Mandela took all the responsibility. Lastly, the government can initiate restorative justice programmes. These have to be conceived and agreed upon by the various communities that were affected by the various human rights abuses and not only the genocide. This will give some respite to those victims and communities who want to forgive and move on, yet they have no one to forgive.

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ABSTRACT

One of the most desired actions by human rights activists the world over is to see Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe brought to The Hague to answer to allegations of genocide and crimes against humanity committed during his more than three decades in office. This desire notwithstanding, there are both legal and practical imperatives that render his prosecution highly improbable judging by the failed attempts to do so by various organisations. This article is a contribution to the debate on the fate of heads of states accused of genocide and crimes against humanity by focusing on the complexities surrounding the various attempts at having Mugabe brought before the International Criminal Court (ICC). The conclusion reached is that, no matter how desirable, the prosecution of Mugabe at the ICC, or any other court of law, is a distant reality due to various reasons outlined in the article.

KEYWORDS

Mugabe, International Criminal Court, Crimes Against Humanity, Prosecution, Zimbabwe, Immunity.

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THE DRAGON EMBRACES AFRICA: CAPE VERDE-CHINA RELATIONS

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Introduction

With the purpose of expanding within the international community, the People's Republic of China began in the Mao Tse-Tung Era (1949-1976) to develop a policy of internationalization and thus to seek to win the sympathy of Third World countries, supporting the anti-imperialist movements of Eastern Europe and the African Continent (Kynge 2006; Cooley 1965). The development aid policy was drawn up and implemented after the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in April 1955, bringing together Heads of State and Government and delegates from 29 Asian and African States, with the main goal of fostering economic cooperation and Afro-Asian culture. At that meeting, China intended to stand out in relation to the hegemony of the United States of America (USA) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

Since the 1960s, the African continent has been one of the largest beneficiaries of the development aid policy, since several programs, projects and actions have already been implemented in a wide range of sectors. Cape Verde is not an exception in so far as it has benefited from this aid. The Cape Verde-China cooperation goes back to the beginnings of the national liberation struggle, and this relationship was only formalized in April 1976. The cooperation in the field of infrastructure should be stressed. Among several constructions financed by China one can point out: The National Assembly, the Government Palace, the National Auditorium, the National Library, the

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Jorge Barbosa Auditorium, the Amílcar Cabral Memorial, the Poilão Dam, the National Stadium, Maternity and the Consultation Center of the Agostinho Neto Hospital and other emblematic works located in the capital of the country.

As the forty-first anniversary (1976-2017) of the economic, trade and cultural cooperation between Cape Verde and the People's Republic of China is being celebrated, it is urgent to think of the guidelines for this relationship, as well as the challenges that such cooperation imposes, particularly for the archipelago which, throughout its history, has survived thanks to the development of programs of public aid for development channeled through donations and concessional loans.

The main objective of this article is to analyze and discuss the bilateral cooperation between Cape Verde-China, focusing on the main guidelines of this relationship, taking into account the geographic, political, economic and cultural characteristics of the archipelago. To this end, the question is: what is the place it has occupied within the framework of the Sino-African partnerships? Is China's interest in the archipelago related to the fact that it presents itself as potentially favorable and serves as a continental platform for insertion into the African market? From the existing agreements, what have been the concrete results of this cooperation?

It is believed that, in order to meet the challenge of development, Cape Verde should focus on strengthening cooperation, mainly with those whose results contribute to its projection and which translate into comparative advantages in the international arena. Considering that there are few scientific productions that problematize Cape Verde-China cooperation, we seek through an interdisciplinary reading, to adopt a methodology that prioritizes the triangulation of information and data obtained from a critical view on the different existing theories and, thus making room for the use of differentiated perspectives, making available to politicians, academics, entrepreneurs and citizens a contribution considered useful for the public interest.

The Dragon in Africa: Strategic Axes of the Sino-African Relationship

Because it is a continent that has grown the most in the last decades and where the return of foreign investment is one of the highest in the world, it arouses the interest of different powers that seek it with the intention of penetrating a market of millions of consumers (Jackson 2004). China has sought to focus its attention on areas with growth potential such as education,

health, construction, financial services, consumer goods and telecommunications, thus taking a leading position, seeking to transform and develop the continent (Michel 2008).

With the intensification of trade relations with several countries in the world, China has achieved high rates of economic growth, facilitating its insertion in the international arena (Brautigam 2008). The significant increase in trade relations made China one of the main partners of the African continent, surpassing the commercial volume of France and Great Britain, losing only to the United States of America. With 70% of total trade with Africa, China leads among countries like Brazil, Russia and India (Kabunda 2011). In fact, African countries sustain much of China's demand for natural and energy resources. Angola accounts for more than half of the oil imports. Similarly, countries such as Cameroon, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan are important partners in China whereas considering the import of crude oil and its by-products. In addition, China imports gold from Burundi and Tanzania; non-ferrous metals (aluminum, bronze, copper, brass and zinc) from South Africa, Botswana and Zambia; textile fibers from Burkina Faso and Burundi; coffee and tea from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda; tobacco from Zimbabwe and Malawi and textiles from Morocco and Tunisia.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the region of Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for an economic growth around 5%, which had only been recorded in the 1960s. This points to the importance of continuously strengthening economic and trade relations between China and other African countries (Gonçalves 2010). In order to have a clearer picture of Chinese investment in the African continent, it is worth highlighting that from US\$ 911 million invested in 2000, it increased to US\$ 68 billion in 2010, particularly in South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Niger, Sudan and Zambia (Kobylnski 2012).

Sino-African relations that have been modernized over time have been established for more than a century, since most of them began with the struggle for independence of African nations (Eisenman 2015). It is important to underline the main moments that marked these relations:

In 1993 a plan was drawn up by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Chinese Economic Cooperation to explore African countries markets. In 1995, the Chinese Government made several visits to this continent, and the National Working Conference on Reforming Assistance to Foreign Countries (Keijzer, 1992; Snow, 1988) was held this year in Beijing. This meeting allowed the creation in 1996 of ten centers for investment and trade in African countries (Manji and Marks, 2007). In 1997, the Chinese enterprises, which began this process of investment and dynamism of the economy of the continent, con-

vened a Conference to discuss economic and trade cooperation with Africa in partnership with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation to rethink the aid measures to the Chinese entrepreneurs who wanted to invest in the continent (Naidu 2007).

From this date, it was decided that seminars on economic and financial management would be held twice a year, bearing in mind the importance of strengthening Sino-African relations, in fact making them worthwhile.

In October 2000, the First China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) was held in Beijing, in which the Chinese government decided to reduce or even forgive debts of African countries amounting to US \$ 1.2 billion. In addition, it was decided that China would increase considerably in its external relations, a portion of assistance to the African continent (Hong-Ming 2004). FOCAC was attended by Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji and Vice President Hu Jintao, senior government representatives from 44 African countries and 17 regional and international organizations, particularly the presence of the Secretary-General of the African Union (AU). In addition to deciding that the Chinese government would forgive and reduce debts, two documents were approved that established the guidelines for the China-Africa relationship. The first relates to the Beijing Declaration and the second to the Sino-African Cooperation Program for Economic and Social Development.

For the last fifteen years, FOCAC has been taking place in a triennial frequency. The host has been alternately China and an African country. In December 2003, the Plan of Action for 2004-2006 was approved in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The III FOCAC was held in Beijing in 2006, where it was decided to create the China-Africa Development Fund (CAD Fund), which sought to stimulate and facilitate Chinese investment in the continent. In November 2009, it was the turn of the city of Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, to receive the IV FOCAC, where new loans were announced from China to Africa with very low interest rates, and it was also proposed to implement more than 100 projects in different sectors.

In July 2012, Beijing hosted the V FOCAC in which steps to increase progress in the strategic alliance were decided. In December 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa hosted the VI FOCAC. These meetings have proved to be extremely important for the narrowing of Sino-African relations, allowing platforms of dialogue and development in a “South-South” perspective (Mendes 2010).

China has been strengthening its partnership with African countries,

creating a huge field of opportunities involving mutually advantageous trade agreements, notably by granting loans to projects on the continent, triggering foreign direct investment and technical assistance (Hackenesch 2011).

After the end of Mao Zedong Era, China experienced a new phase in its history with the administration of Deng Xiaoping (1978-1992), founder of Market Socialism. Deng Xiaoping did not intend to expand Chinese ideology, as did the outgoing President, but to promote China's economic development from the implementation of a new model. Recognizing the importance of Third World countries for their diplomacy, the People's Republic of China turns its attention to them, aware of the possibility of diversifying their relations, seeking other opportunities for cooperation, not to rely only and exclusively on developed countries (Taylor 2009).

In fact, it is important to emphasize that the main line of Chinese diplomacy becomes the engagement with these countries, considering that they may be important allies, since they share the same interests of Beijing (Rios 2005). In the meantime, China has made clear that its intention is not to dominate or exploit, but to establish cooperation based on peaceful coexistence (Taylor 2006). The "dragon" sought to establish its cooperation with the outside world respecting five principles, which in its opinion are fundamental for a harmonious development, namely: [1] Non-intervention or interference in internal affairs; [2] The pact of mutual non-aggression; [3] Cooperation and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; [4] Equality and reciprocal advantages; [5] Peaceful coexistence with other States (Hong-Ming 2004).

With the implementation of the reforms promoted by Deng Xiaoping, China sought to consolidate its economy by investing promisingly in Sino-African relations.

Jiang Zemin, President of China from 1993 to 2003, as Africa realized, made it clear that there was a need to adopt a new development model that prioritized a stable and, above all, versatile relationship in the long term. In order to re-dimension the relationship with the African countries, Jiang Zemin proposed five guidelines for maintaining these bilateral and multilateral relations as a way of cultivating the principle of solidarity, establishing friendships based on sincerity, cooperation and pool efforts for common development (Anshan 2007).

China's integration in 2001 into the World Trade Organization (WTO) has reopened the prospect of cooperation with African countries, thereby accelerating China's development process, making it one of the largest investors abroad (António, 2008). With the adoption of the Global Strategy program in 2002 and, therefore, the internationalization of its private and public enter-

prises, China has had positive overall results, creating a solid and necessary basis for consolidating relations with Africa.

Hu Jintao, President from 2003 to 2013, continued the Chinese policy of strong cooperation and solidarity with African countries. During his stay in power, he visited 17 African countries on four trips to the continent. In 2004, he visited Algeria, Egypt and Gabon; in 2006, Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya; in 2007, Cameroon, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Sudan and Zambia and in 2009 visited Mauritius, Mali, Senegal and Tanzania. The state visits and the other Forums held made clear the Chinese intention of not interfering and/or intervening in the domestic politics of the African countries, nor pressing them to change their political regimes. Beijing intended to use economic and political cooperation rationally to advance the political and economic agenda of the South, with a view of building a more just and equitable international order (Shelton 2006).

At the FOCAC meeting held in Beijing in July 2012, Jintao made it clear that, since China is one of the largest developing countries in the world and due to the fact that the African continent is the home of to the largest number of developing countries, the union and cooperation between the two would make sense as they account for a third of the world's population. This cooperation demonstrates a plausible justification for the unleashing of peace and development, since both China and Africa share a common destiny (Jintao 2012). Equality, sincerity, friendship and common development are the guiding principles of the relationship between the Chinese and the African (Jintao 2012). He added that China and Africa had decided to establish a new type of strategic partnership, with clear progress for both. China has also sought to strengthen its relationship within the African Union (AU) and other African regional organizations with the aim of implementing practical cooperation measures, proposing strategies to combat the international financial crisis (Jintao 2012).

China-Africa bilateral trade expanded, reaching US\$166.3 billion in 2011, three times more than in 2006. China's accumulated direct investment in Africa exceeded US\$15 billion. China's assistance to Africa has grown exponentially, especially with the construction of more than 100 schools, 30 hospitals, 30 anti-malaria centers and 20 agricultural technology demonstration centers (Jintao, 2012). China has honored its commitment by providing Africa with US\$15 billion of preferential loans. In addition, China and Africa have increased exchanges between people and culture (Jintao 2012). Jintao undoubtedly sought to build a harmonized world, establishing as strategy the construction of a future international order (Gonçalves 2010).

The current Chinese President Xi Jinping, who took over the country

after Jintao's resignation in 2013, made it clear that his intention is, above all, to establish and strengthen the relationship with Africa, reaching new heights of development. For Jinping, it is necessary to maintain high-level proximity exchanges, aware of the importance of strengthening the governance experience and increasing mutual support and understanding on issues of greatest concern to them. It is no accident that at FOCAC in 2015 the Chinese government announced a US\$60 billion financial support package in the following areas: preferential loans and export credit lines, subsidies, CAD Fund and development of African small and medium enterprises.

China has embarked on the creation of a platform called the New Silk Road Initiative or One Belt One Road to strengthen trade relations between countries with Central Asia, Russia and other regions of Europe, in this context, Africa may also play a very important role. This project includes several works of infrastructure implemented such as the railway lines linking Tanzania and Zambia, which will connect the cities of Nairobi and Mombasa and the one already opened between Addis Ababa in Kenya. The same occurred in Djibouti and Mauritania with the improvement and expansion of harbors and industrial parks.

China has certainly been backed by an internal development plan as set out in Agenda 2063. Because they expressed interest, China responded, at least rhetorically, in favor of the inclusion of African countries in the One Belt One Road initiative. As such, African countries need to provide adequate security to protect the investment environment. African governments will need to provide a favorable environment for projects to succeed, particularly as envisaged especially in the private sector, so that it can effectively play an important role in One Belt One Road (The Conversation 2017).

The Chinese Foreign Policy in the PALOP

In the context of the Cold War, China was receptive to unleash diplomatic, economic, technical and military support for the Liberation Movements in Africa, allowing the affirmation and consolidation of the newly independent countries, especially those of the Portuguese Language like Angola and Mozambique. The Chinese Foreign Policy met the need to extend its influence on the African Continent, seeking to develop relations with the newly independent African Portuguese Speaking Countries (PALOP), truly forming a united front to fight against colonialism and imperialism, revolutionizing the world based on the dissemination of its ideology. To mark its presence on the continent, China began to establish direct relations with African countries (Visentini and Oliveira 2012).

In order to explore the historical ties between Macao and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), China has decided to make this Special Administrative Region a platform for community liaison, especially for African countries, whose goal is to deepen cooperation in different sectors, making the best use of the resources of each (Macao Special Administrative Region Government, 2003). This strategy is based on the principle One Country, Two Systems, with which China intends to join its special administrative regions. This principle applies legally and institutionally in Macao and Hong Kong (Marchionatti 2012). Meanwhile, China's priority is the reunification of its territory, particularly referring to Taiwan's media case.

In strict observance of this principle, Macao has played an extremely important role in boosting institutional and trade relations between China and the PALOP countries, and in October 2003 it promoted the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Countries of Language (FCECCPLP), which was attended by government representatives from Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, China, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal and Timor-Leste (Government of the Macao Special Administrative Region 2003). The Plan of Action for Economic and Trade Cooperation was approved at this first Ministerial Meeting, which highlighted the need to develop and strengthen economic, trade and investment relations between China and its community. Among other aspects discussed in this Plan, it was decided that, given the opportunities and challenges that the process of economic globalization imposes, the shared values and the principles of trust, equality, reciprocity, complementarity in trade, diversification of forms of cooperation and the sharing of interests should be considered (Macao Special Administrative Region Government 2003).

It was also decided that the Ministerial Meeting would be held every three years in order to deepen the relationship between the two. To date, four more Ministerial Conferences have been held, named the Macao Forum in September 2006, in November 2010, in November 2013 and in October 2016. These meetings were approved by the respective Action Plans that guide China-CPLP cooperation and which stand out in the following areas: intergovernmental cooperation, business, infrastructure, energy, natural resources, human, financial, agriculture, fisheries, livestock, education, tourism, transport, communications, sports and health (Macao Special Administrative Region 2017).

Specially regarding the PALOP, it should be noted that China has taken advantage of the fact that, many of these countries abound in natural and energy resources, to draw strategic partnerships to strengthen their economies, as well as to mitigate the problem of fragility in terms of bargaining

power. Angola and Mozambique occupy prime positions in this cooperation, with Angola following Russia as China's second-largest oil supplier and one of the earliest recipients of Chinese foreign aid, often taken for granted. After the civil war in 2002, Angola sees its relationship with China strengthened and consolidated since 2004 with the signing of several agreements, with which the Chinese Government pledged to cede funds to finance dozens of projects in different areas, from technological development, infrastructure and agriculture, education, health, transportation and communications. From 2000 to 2013, the Chinese government funded more than 60 projects in Angola (AidData 2017).

As far as bilateral economic and trade relations are concerned, as in the case of Chinese investment, Angola ranks first among PALOPs. Among the traditional partners in Angola such as Portugal, Brazil and Russia, China occupies a prominent position.

The other PALOP countries such as Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Mozambique have also received special attention from China as it has sought to strengthen and diversify partnerships with these countries in the field of trade and investment, focusing mainly on the areas of infrastructure, agriculture, blue economy and fisheries sector, mining, human resources and energy. The China-Mozambique relationship goes back to the liberation struggle, when Mozambique, through the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane, received diplomatic and military aid from China within the framework of the strategy aimed at avoiding its involvement in the ideological division (Taylor 2006). The relationship between China and Mozambique has intensified over time. Mozambique ranks among the five largest African timber exporters to China (Chichava 2008). This is, in turn, the largest investor in Mozambique following the neighboring country of South Africa (Macao Promotion and Investment Institute, 2015). In the first half of 2016, China was the most invested in Mozambique, with US\$ 154 million, accounting for 60% of total foreign direct investment, far surpassing South Africa, with only US\$ 45 million (Macaohub 2016).

The relationship between China and the PALOP has been one of growth, diversification and consolidation because, on the one hand, they are linked by a historical heritage and cultural legacy and, on the other hand, they share a common vision for development. China sees in PALOP an important means of security regarding the exploitation of energy and other natural resources, as well as the exploitation of a market that could reach millions of consumers. Compared with Western partners, the implementation of China's investment projects in the PALOPs has been carried out without the need for

political reforms and compliance with international standards in the areas of human rights, labor and the environment, relations are solely and exclusively aimed at promoting economic and trade cooperation.

China-Cape Verde Cooperation: The Place of the Archipelago in the Sino-African Relationship

Located in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean between Africa, Europe and the Americas, roughly 500 km off the African west coast, off Senegal, Cape Verde is located between the parallels 17°12' and 14°48' N and the meridians 22°41' and 25°22' West of Greenwich. It is characterized by being a small island State composed of ten islands and several islets of volcanic origin that form a geographic area with a total area of 4030 km², occupied by approximately 539 thousand inhabitants (World Bank 2017).

As it is an archipelago with scarce natural resources, promoting its development entails increased costs for the State, making it dependent on external flows, including remittances from migrants, investments in the tourism sector and aid programs to development. It is in this context that this country's relationship with China has been of vital importance and is currently one of the most important partners in the countries of the Southern Hemisphere. China has a long-standing relationship with the archipelago, which has sought to meet these challenges through a diversified diplomacy that has sought new development perspectives and strategies for mobilizing external resources.

Conscious of its limitations, Cape Verde has sought to implement partnerships that value its island specificities, particularly its privileged geostrategic position in the Atlantic. In fact, it is one of the vocations that the archipelago has explored since its discovery between 1460 and 1462 and that served for centuries as a turntable function of the transatlantic trade.

Through an armed struggle, Cape Verde won its sovereignty in 1975, in the context of a Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde unity project, creating conditions to become viable as a nation-state. This historic milestone allowed international recognition and respect, allowing it to be included in international organizations (UN), specialized institutions (ILO), political-diplomatic concertation organizations, social, cultural, economic, (CPLP), regional (AU) and subregional (ECOWAS) organizations, as well as in financial and economic international organizations (IMF, World Bank and WTO).

In April 1976, one year after independence, Cape Verde formalized its diplomatic relations with China, that was one of the first countries to estab-

lish an Embassy in Cape Verde, based in the city of Praia, island of Santiago. Although Cape Verde established a Consulate General in Hong Kong that represented it in Asian diplomacy, it only formally established an embassy in Beijing in 2001, and in 2005 appointed the first Ambassador to China, Diplomat Dr. Júlio César Morais.

Although Cape Verde has one of the best rankings (122nd) on the Human Development Index (HDI) between the PALOP and the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, it is at the bottom of the list of priorities of the Chinese Foreign Policy, due to its limited market and lack of natural and energetic resources that have motivated much of China's interests in the continent. Thus, the question is what are the real interests of China in Cape Verde? It is necessary to understand that Cape Verde is at the political, economic and social level one of the most stable countries of the continent and that it cultivates a policy of peace with reflections in its political system that is complemented with a privileged geostrategic position in the Atlantic, especially in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), being the thirty-sixth largest in the world. Because it occupies a geopolitical space that favors it between the Atlantic shores, the archipelago ends up generating attraction and arousing interest in the establishment of different partnerships (Madeira 2016; Amante da Rosa 2007).

The country has sought to find the means to face the structural challenges. Therefore, it has been focusing on strategic sectors such as service provision, industrialization, the blue economy and tourism, which have margins of growth, allowing gradually achieving the long-awaited sustainable development. Despite the structural constraints such as geographical discontinuity, cyclical droughts, scarce population and precarious natural resources, successive governments in Cape Verde have succeeded in building a democratic state with the support and solidarity of their development partners, eliminating underdevelopment with a view to build a promising and sustainable society (Morais 2015).

In fact, since the independence of Cape Verde, the foreign aid granted to Cape Verde in the granting of grants and concessional loans has had structuring macroeconomic effects. The archipelago has been prioritizing the intensification of its relationship with China, focusing on programs, projects and actions in strategic areas demarcated in the transformation agenda of the country. These initiatives are aimed at transforming Cape Verde into a secure and competitive service platform in the Middle Atlantic, close to major African markets and the main sources of raw materials considered strategic (Morais 2015). It is no coincidence that several documents have been signed which contemplate a number of strategic projects, with which Cape Verde hopes, of course, to create the conditions to project the partnership with Chi-

na to new heights (Morais 2015).

With the establishment of the Macao Forum in October 2003, bilateral relations between China and Cape Verde have seen significant progress, intensifying contacts in economic, cultural and technical-institutional cooperation. In fact, Cape Verde has hosted three Entrepreneurs' Meetings for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries in the city of Praia, on the island of Santiago. The first in 2008, the second in 2012 and the third in June 2017 that had as its central theme the Promotion of Opportunities for Economic Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries. It should be noted that Macao Special Administrative Region (Macao SAR) has served as a platform for the rapprochement and dissemination of Cape Verde in the Pearl River Delta (Morais 2015).

The contribution of the Macao SAR is relevant, since it made Cape Verde a known country, because until the recent past, China was unaware of the size and location of the archipelago (Morais 2015). It is noteworthy that, following the formal signing in 1976 of the Cape Verde-China bilateral relationship, substantial improvements have been achieved, with the subsequent signing of several legal agreements, including the following:

In 1977, the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement; in 1982, the Cultural Cooperation Agreement; in 1998, the Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Reciprocal Investments; in 1999, the Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement; in 2005, the Cape Verde-Macao Visa Suppression Agreement; in 2007, the General Agreement on Cooperation in the Defense Sector; in 2008, the Framework Agreement on Concession Loan Concession; in 2009 Agreement of Joint Commission of Economic, Commercial and Technical Cooperation and the Agreement of Cooperation in the Area of Historical Heritage; in 2010 the Cape Verde-Macao SAR Services Agreement and the Macao Convention on the Avoidance of Double Taxation; in 2013 the Agreement of Legal-Judicial Cooperation Cape Verde-MSAR; in 2014 the Suppression of Visas in Diplomatic Passports and Service Passports; in 2015 the Agreement Establishing a Mechanism for Political and Diplomatic Consultations and in 2016 the Cooperation Agreement for the Implementation of the "Safe Cities" Project.

In addition to these agreements, other initiatives to leverage the commercial relationship and cultural exchange between the two countries, such as donations and concessional credit lines, protocols and projects, stand out. China has financed several projects in Cape Verde, including: cement plant in the municipality of Santa Cruz, loan agreements for social housing projects, E-GOV II - Electronic Governance project, through the installation of local network in schools, public institutions and hospitals, the Technological

Center of Cape Verde. In July 2017, it was announced the construction of the new Campus of University of Cape Verde, with sixty-one classroom that allows to welcome 4,890 students. The new University Campus will have five auditoriums, thirty-four laboratories, eight computer rooms, eight reading rooms, a library, cafeterias, a sports hall and a multipurpose space with a capacity of 654 seats.

In 2015, the Government of Cape Verde signed an agreement for the construction of a Resort in the City of Praia by Macao Legend Development Ltd., headed by Macao's David Chow. The Cape Verde Integrated Resort & Casino project, which is estimated at around 250 million euros, is one of the largest ever in Cape Verde with a direct impact on the national economy. For David Chow, this project proves to be of extreme importance in two senses. Firstly, it is to be welcomed that a local company, in this case Macao Legend Development Ltd., has taken advantage of the role that Macao has played as a platform in the connection between China and the CPLP countries; Secondly, in coordination with One Belt, One Road Chinese policy, the MSAR has assumed an important position as one of the cities of the Maritime Silk Road, allowing local small and medium-sized enterprises to develop cooperation with external partners (Macao Tribuna Journal 2015).

In addition, David Chow as the President of the Legend Globe Investment Company, signed with the Cape Verdean Ambassador in Beijing, Dr. Tania Romualdo, on behalf of the Government of Cape Verde, a memorandum of understanding to open a credit institution in Cape Verde called the Sino-Atlantic Bank, considering that the financial sector has been strategic for the economic development of the archipelago. These investments demonstrate the role that Chinese entrepreneurs play in China's growing involvement with Cape Verde and, in general, with Portuguese-speaking African countries. China has provided conditions for its companies to find the necessary stability in the archipelago, using it as a strategic point to reach other expanding regional markets.

Since the 1990s, a significant number of small Chinese investors have come to Cape Verde, that have opened businesses in the sector of the commercialization of clothing and other accessories. Over time, there has been a substantial increase in these types of activity and, as a result, the Chinese have begun to diversify their businesses, particularly in the wholesale and retail trade in food, construction, auto parts, car rental, maintenance and repair of motorcycles, mechanics, carpentry, locksmithing, grinding and aluminum industry.

In addition, it is worth mentioning several initiatives that have encouraged the rapprochement and exchange between the archipelago and the

People's Republic of China. The Cape Verde-China Friendship Association (AMICACHI) was created in 2011 and is characterized by a Cape Verdean non-governmental organization whose aim is to strengthen ties of friendship and cultural exchange between Cape Verde and China. Between 2011 and 2012 the University of Cape Verde formalizes partnerships with the Chinese provincial universities, reinforcing cooperation in the field of human resources training and professional training.

The construction of educational establishments, as well as the considerable increase in scholarships for Cape Verdean students who wish to pursue and continue their higher education in Chinese universities, demonstrate China's commitment to co-ordinate with the Cape Verdean government towards the education sector. In 2015, the University of Cape Verde signed a Protocol for the installation of the Confucius Institute in Cape Verde, one of the first in the country, to encourage the promotion of Chinese language and culture with the University of Foreign Studies in Guangzhou.

The Ministry of Education and the Confucius Institute of the University of Cape Verde signed a cooperation protocol in 2017 to introduce the Mandarin Language in the 2017/2018 academic year as an optional foreign language in the Cape Verdean Teaching System, in order to build opportunities and thus allow for greater cultural approximation.

Cape Verdean government officials have sought to make clear that the archipelago's intention is to maximize and strengthen the relationship with China. Therefore, in 2004, 2006 and 2012 the former Prime Minister of Cape Verde, José Maria Neves, made several official visits to China. Between 2007 and 2010, it was the turn of the former President of the Republic of Cape Verde, Pedro Piros. Cape Verde, for its part, received the official visit of Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan in 2009.

Cape Verde, in its relationship with China, presents itself strategically as a country with high geopolitical value that distinguishes itself from other spaces, making possible the geographical approximation to important geopolitical and geo-economic zones, particularly in the African continent (Madeira 2015). Taking advantage of its position within regional and international organizations, Cape Verde should enable the expression of a new international identity, aware that it will survive being useful in the global context. The archipelago, as a country that tends to need more aid than it can effectively offer, needs to cooperate and interact with other states in order to overcome its structural weaknesses that hinder its development.

Final Notes

By prioritizing cooperation outside the traditional North-South axis, the Chinese government sought to make room for the development of large investments in infrastructure projects and production resources through agreements between African national governments and Chinese state-owned enterprises. China had as its fundamental intention to establish a strategy, which in its view could be called “win-win” or mutually beneficial relations, respecting sovereignty and non-interference (Zhao 2004).

Both China and Africa have a vested interest in consolidating this relationship, for China, the African continent is in favor of the natural resources exploitation as well as strategic opportunities for trade expansion, development and diversification in regional markets. Africa, on the other hand, sees in the “dragon” the opportunity to obtain financing and support funds for its development and the reinforcement of its political weight in the international panorama. Although the African continent is not the main priority of Chinese diplomacy, it has in practice increasingly attracted the attention of successive Chinese governments, considering that it is important to assert common commercial and political interests in order to stimulate the development.

The Portuguese-speaking African Countries (PALOP), in the framework of Sino-African cooperation, have received special attention, due, on the one hand, to the cultural and historical links between them, since the Macao Special Administrative Region was administered by Portugal, during approximately four centuries, being part of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), and, on the other, for the opportunities that PALOP offer commercial and investment.

Cape Verde’s remarkable path since its independence in the PALOPs has attracted interest from international institutions and organizations, as well as from world powers, who have sought out the archipelago in order to deepen and strengthen relations and cooperation in various fields. China has undoubtedly been one of the partners that has contributed the most to the archipelago gaining confidence in its potential, despite the territorial scarcity and insularity that have made socio-economic development more unbalanced. It is considered fundamentally necessary to establish strategic alliances and cooperation with other States, institutions and regional and international organizations, so that Cape Verde can overcome the geoeconomic deficit by being open to the foreign market, thus strengthening the role of facilitator in international trade with a focus on sectors such as tourism, blue economy, agriculture, fisheries, industry and service provision.

Cape Verde's geo-strategic position is a potential, since it allows it to play a key role in the North and South Atlantic, particularly regarding its importance as an intercontinental link of political, commercial, economic, financial and economic relations. cultural activities.

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ABSTRACT

This article analyses the main issues raised by the cooperation between China and Africa. Particularly, it focuses on the guidelines of the Cape Verde-China relationship that is in itself a durable and multidimensional one. To achieve these objectives, it is necessary to adopt an interdisciplinary methodology, prioritizing the cross-reference data obtained from bibliographical and documentary research, allowing a critical reflection. Although Cape Verde enjoys political stability, which is complemented by a climate of legal and institutional security, it is believed that China's interest in the archipelago is mainly economic and commercial, as it serves as a logistics platform in the African region.

KEYWORDS

Cape Verde; China; Cooperation; Bilateral Relations.

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UK POLICY OPTIONS AND THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

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Introduction

The true value of history is to provide a relevant backstory for the contemporary world. With regards to policy and strategy there are two aspects to this: 1) analysis how we got to where we are and 2) if we can make some recommendations, based upon that analysis, as to where we might and should be going. If history does not have something to say to the contemporary world then it is just stuff that has happened. Yet we should not overstate the case. Neither history or theory can provide us with a crystal ball to predict the future. But it can provide us with a starting point, and perhaps, at best, a few handrails as to long-term trends that allow us to start to formulate and then implement reasoned policy. Understanding the past is the necessary foundation for effective analytical tools (such as SWOT² and DIME³), which are the precursor for effective scenario planning. That is very much a case of assessing most likely / least likely or best case / worst case to the question of ‘if we do this what might happen?’ (Ringland 2006) Scenario planning has utility for the academic, trying to scope out how policy decisions taken might play out over the long term (Oliver and Williams 2016). So while this article is specifically about contemporary UK policy options in the South Atlantic⁴, I plead some indulgence as a historian to explain how I commenced thinking about the subject.

Some of my previous work assessed Britain’s relationship with South

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2 Strengths / Weaknesses / Opportunities / Threats.

3 Diplomatic / Information / Military / Economic.

4 Based around a timescale of presentation as a conference paper in late 2016 and writing it up in spring 2017.

America, particularly British political decision making at a time when British goods and trade were largely excluded from Europe due to Napoleon's Continental Blockade (Robson 2010). That attempt to deny the markets of Europe to British trade led to the controversial, at times, forcible, opening up of new markets in South America to compensate for the trade lost with Europe. British exports to areas in the Americas outside of the USA jumped from £7.8 million in 1805 to just over £16.5 in 1808. South America, in DCM Platt's view, provided 'the main outlet for new trade during a period in which the important European and North American markets were particularly lean' (Platt 1972, 28, Table 1). At a time of uncertainty over the nature of BREXIT, such historical analogy prompted me to assess the potential importance of Latin America to British trade post-BREXIT.

An initial consideration was if that was a realistic proposition, given that the world today is so different from that of two centuries ago but also, within the scope of a conference assessing 'South Atlantic Security: Actors, Interests and Strategies' what exactly were the options for the UK as an actor with vested national interests? What are the policy options and what strategies can be implanted to achieve national interests in the South Atlantic?

BREXIT: The elephant in the room?

In June 2015 the UK Office for National Statistics highlighted the fact that UK trade with the EU had been declining in importance over a number of years, compared with non-EU trade. It concluded that 'strong economic growth in many developing economies outside the EU has resulted in non-EU economies growing in importance to UK trade, with the proportion accounted for by the EU falling consistently since 1999, despite the value of EU trade increasing'. So in that sense maybe BREXIT was actually part of a longer economic trend with non-EU trade becoming more important, a process that is likely to be continued after BREXIT (ONS 2015).

Yet, Europe does remain important as UK trade figures for 2015 show. UK imports from the EU in that year were £290,621m with imports from the rest of the world of £229,245m. Exports, on the other hand, were £259,955m with the Rest of the World and £230,031 with the EU. Within the EU Britain's largest trading partner is Germany, with an imbalance caused by the UK importing £70.4bn and exporting £48.5bn worth of trade. The UK imports more from Germany than it does from the USA, with imports from the USA at £59.3bn yet the UK exports £96.4bn worth of trade to the USA. Clearly, for the UK to maintain a prosperous economy it must maintain its trade

with the USA and with EU countries like Germany. In context, UK trade with China once again produces a deficit, with imports at £38.4bn and exports at £16.7bn. Trade with South America is, by comparison, small fry in pure economic terms though since 2011 the UK has maintained a trade surplus with South America. The key economic relationship is with Brazil, which accounts for 69.1 per cent of the UK trade with South America. Trade with Brazil produces a modest surplus with exports of £3.8bn set against imports of £2.5bn. Brazil is by far the most important UK trading partner in South America, with Colombia (imports £0.7bn, exports £0.6bn), Argentina (imports £0.7bn, exports £0.6bn) and Chile (imports £0.7bn, exports £0.7bn) all with largely similar figures for 2015. Globally, Brazil sits as the UK's 27th largest export destination and in return Brazil is the 32nd largest import partner (ONS 2017, 1). Moreover, Brazil is a destination for UK investment, with assets held by UK investors in Brazil between 2010 and 2011 doubling from £6.4bn to £14.1bn. UK investment in Brazil in 2014 was £14.7bn (ONS 2017, 2).

More up to date figures show the UK's top 10 trading partners in January 2017 are largely the same countries that were in the top 10 in January 2016 before the BREXIT vote of 23 June: USA, Germany, France, Netherlands, Irish Republic, China, Belgium, Italy and Spain with Switzerland appearing on the list of top ten export destinations and Norway on the top ten of UK imports. Between January 2016 and January 2017 have Non-EU exports increased by £4.1bn or 35 per cent for a monthly total of £15.5bn for January 2017. Non-EU imports have also grown over the year with a growth of 28 per cent up to £18.6bn worth of imports in January 2017. For EU exports the increase has been £2.3bn (22 per cent) over the same timescale to a monthly total of £12.8bn for January 2017. Over the same year, EU imports increased by 17 per cent (£2.8bn) to a monthly total of £19.5bn (HMRC 2017).

Taking a slightly longer view, UK exports to the EU have fallen from 54.8% in 1999 to 44.6% in 2014. This in part may be down to the EU's falling share of global GDP, 30% in 1993 to 24% in 2013, in turn caused by the fast developing Brazilian, Russian, Indian and Chinese economies (Office for National Statistics 2015) So while the UK has been increasingly trading with emerging and advanced economies from outside the EU, in 2016 nearly 50% of exports went to six countries the United States, Germany, France, Netherlands, Republic of Ireland and China with over 50% of the UK's imports of goods coming from 6 countries: Germany, China, United States, Netherlands, France and Belgium (ONS 2017, 3).

The point is, BREXIT can be seen as part of a longer trend in changing global economics, but within that there remains some certainty about the UK's vital trading relationships. So, what might BREXIT really mean for the

UK?

What has not changed?

Whatever the future character of the UK's relationship with the EU it is still a P5 member of the UN and a key player in the NATO Alliance. Historically, when the UK has been isolated from Europe in hard security terms it has looked overseas for security. That was the case, at least in terms of economic security, with British interest in Latin America already noted above. In 1940-45 it was to the United States that the UK looked, for hard security in the sense of the military alliance when both powers signed the 'Declaration by United Nations' on 1 January 1942 at the ARCADIA Conference, and then in economic terms with the beginning of the Lend-Lease programme. The linkages between economics and security have been enshrined into UK policy. As the 2015 UK *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review* made clear in the foreword from the Prime Minister David Cameron: 'Our national security depends on our economic security, and vice versa. So the first step in our National Security Strategy is to ensure our economy is, and remains, strong' (HMSO NSS/SDSR 2015, 5).

Post BREXIT the UK will still have some kind of trading relationship with its major European trading partners, Germany being particularly important. But it will also look to expand UK trade with other key trading partners beyond Europe; here the UK's membership of the G20 – alongside Brazil and Argentina – may prove immensely valuable (ONS 2016). If, however, enhancing UK trade links with South American countries is to be a post-BREXIT part of British policy then there are some challenges to be addressed.

UK trade

The raw figures of UK trade with South America have been noted above, but the UK lags behind other nations in trading with the region. With Brazil accounting for nearly half of South America's GDP and the major prize for enhancing British trade, signs are not promising. Up to 2010 the USA was Brazil's major trading partner, since then China has led the trade, accounting for around 18% of Brazilian exports and imports, with the US coming second and then in terms of exports, Argentina, and imports, Germany (UN data 2015). The situation has been fully recognised in the UK with Robert Capurro, Chief Executive of Canning House, noting in August 2016 that the UK was 'terribly far behind our European, Chinese and American competi-

tors....We're punching well below our weight' (Yeomans 2016). With the USA and China now locked in scramble for Latin American markets, the UK risks being caught between those two trading superpowers; both of which will be integral to making a success of Brexit.

One key question for UK policy makers has to be whether to reinforce success by focussing on Brazil or diversifying and adding resilience to UK trade by enhancing economic links with other South American countries. The former could possibly build upon existing bilateral relations with Brazil, the latter would inevitably involve some kind of discussion about the role of Southern Common Market, MERCOSUR⁵. Here the UK would be entering into direct competition with the EU which sees Mercosur as an important trading partner. Since 2010 the EU has been progressing with negotiations to implement a free trade agreement with MERCOSUR, and which post-BREXIT the UK would be excluded. Yet, this wider approach has not stopped the EU from engaging in bilateral partnership and cooperation agreements with the key MERCOSUR countries of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. For those countries within the MERCOSUR context, the EU is the most important trading partner accounting for 21% of trade. So not only will the UK be in competition with the USA and China for key South American markets, it will also be in competition with the EU. In 2015 the EU exported €46bn and imported €42bn from MERCOSUR and exported 20bn of commercial services while investing €387bn in the region, making the EU the largest foreign investor in MERCOSUR (European Commission 2017).

If the UK was to enhance non-Brazilian trade then Argentina seems a logical choice. Figures from Oxford Economics for the Fourth Economic Quarter of 2016 show the Argentine economy was finally growing after a deep recession in 2015, with a continued forecast of GDP growing by 2.5% in 2017, mainly due to the domestic economic policies of President Macri (Oxford Economics 2016). Yet, as I noted before, there is more to national interests than just economics. Trade and finance must be contextualised with political and strategic challenges – they cannot be separated out. The future of the UK's economic interests in South America will be shaped by some harsh realities.

The UK and the South Atlantic: The strategic reality

The UK has major political and strategic commitments in the South

⁵ Member countries: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela. Associate Members Countries Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Suriname.

Atlantic that entail risk in future policy making. Of course, risk is a multifaceted concept and involves opportunity as well as threat. The UK's wider political and strategic commitments in the South Atlantic involve more than just the Falkland Islands, there are the Overseas Territories (OT) of Saint Helena, Ascension & Tristan da Cunha and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. In 2015 the UK government reiterated its commitment to the OTs:

The people of the Overseas Territories have a right to safety, security and self-determination. They are free to maintain a constitutional link if this is their choice. The UK stands ready to protect the Territories from external threats, ensuring their self-determination. In particular, the UK supports the efforts of the peoples of Gibraltar and the Falklands Islands to determine whether to remain a British Overseas Territory (UK Government 2015).

BREXIT may have altered some aspects of the debate but it has not changed this basic element of UK policy. Alongside the OTs the UK also has responsibility for British Antarctic Territory as well as strong links with six African members of the Commonwealth of Nations with South Atlantic coastlines: Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Namibia and South Africa.

If the UK is to formulate and enact effective policy then UK interest in the South Atlantic needs to be made and delivered with an understanding and in a context far broader than thinking about trade, politics and strategy. It needs a more wholistic view, perhaps more akin to Brazilian thinking about its relationship with the South Atlantic and its community of nations. This approach is particularly important for Brazil, as the regional leader, with regard to its reliance upon maritime oil and gas, and the unexplored bonanza that may exist in the pre-salt deposits and its continental shelf; a subject also of immense interest to countries like Nigeria (Brozoski and Padula 2016, 99-100) I am not suggesting the UK slavishly follows the Brazilian approach to the South Atlantic as a maritime environment enshrined in the concept of the 'Blue Amazon', launched by the Brazilian Navy in 2004 and formally trademarked in 2010 (Wiesebron 2013, 102). Nor does the UK just require a structural / ideological view as encapsulated in the 2013 Brazilian led reconstitution of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) which outlines maritime cooperation in the South Atlantic between signatories (Duarte 2016, 99).

Instead the UK requires a wholistic concept of the South Atlantic and the UK's interests in the region beyond the compartmentalised focus on the three distinct parts: the OTs, primarily the Falkland Islands, Antarctica and

West Africa. In essence, they are the same. So while the UK is opposed to ZPCAS, at least in its treaty form, that does not mean to say that such an approach does not have utility for thinking about UK interests and options.

The UK as a South Atlantic actor

So while it is easy, from a structural sense, to look at those three areas individually all three are inherently linked physically, by the sea, but also economically, culturally and politically. For example, the UK's overseas territories naturally encompass relations with Argentina, and Brazil as the regional leader with a huge interests in the maritime domain. Involving Brazil also means the inclusion of those shared West African interests. UK interests cannot be seen in isolation from Argentine and Brazilian interests – strategy is, after all, relative – other stakeholders have an interest and are acting on the same stage. That is why the UK requires a conceptual wholistic view of the South Atlantic. In that context a number of questions are not readily answered. What kind of actor does the UK want to be in international politics? What type of actor can the UK be? What roles does it *want* to fulfil and what *can* it fulfil?

In terms of the UK's role as an actor on the European stage, that is currently undergoing renegotiation due to BREXIT and played a part in the 2017 UK General Election. This has all impacted upon the range of identity and policy options available. So while the BREXIT referendum result cannot be ignored, and Article 50 has been triggered, discussion continues about what might cause a *volte-face* in the UK's approach to BREXIT. Whatever the outcome of BREXIT the UK will still have some kind of relationship with Europe, through NATO and through bilateral trade. It is easy, especially for the mainstream media, to paint all this in absolute terms; we just need to think of the terminology of BREXIT – leave or remain – but it is far more complex than that. What might be more useful is if we can identify discernible patterns or role orientation. For example, since the end of the Cold War the UK, as a Western Liberal Democracy and a member of the United Nations Security Council P5 has tended to view its intervention in the affairs of another state in (some, but not all) humanitarian crises in the sense of being a 'force for good' in the world. The UK's apparent desire to intervene for humanitarian reasons has produced a pattern of behaviour. In fulfilling this desire was the UK acting out its role, or has ad-hoc intervention created a role for the UK? Why has it not intervened in all humanitarian crises that it could have done? If it does have a role as a 'force for good' then policy/strategy/public opinion/parliament have exerted influence to stop that role being enacted, compare intervention in Libya in 2011 with non-intervention in Syria in 2013.

In relation to the subject under discussion here, there are patterns to UK involvement in the South Atlantic and such roles are important. From the late 1960s through the 1970s the UK assumed that while, following a process of decolonisation, it retained some colonial interests, there would be no need to defend its overseas territory without help from allies, in particular the USA. Instead, British role orientation was as a good ally within the construct of NATO. That involved investing in nuclear deterrence, the British Army of the Rhine and anti-submarine warfare in the North Atlantic. There would be no need for a military capacity for global power projection as the UK did not envisage it playing such a role. This process culminated in the 1981 Defence White Paper (the so called Nott Review) to further configure the UK armed forces for the perceived role (McCourt 2014, 138). The consequence was that the UK was signalling that not only did not envisage playing a role in the South Atlantic, it was removing its military capability to do so. That, at least, was how it was read in Buenos Ayres, adding to the frustration felt by the Argentine Junta at the lack of progress in a negotiated settlement in line with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2065 (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1991, chapter 1).

Revisiting the events in the run up to and of 1982 is beyond the scope here. But what is important for UK policy options in the South Atlantic is how the UK's interests and capabilities are viewed in that region. Here the UK House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee's publication *Who does UK National Strategy?* Further Report, noted in 2011 that 'strategic aims cannot be set out or adjudicated without an articulated account of who 'we' are and what we believe both about ourselves and the world' (HoC PASC 2011, 4) The thinking in that report was partly addressed in chapter 1 of the 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review entitled 'Our Vision, Values and Approach' (HMSO NSS/SDSR 2015, 9). The question is how does the UK project a vision of itself and its values in the South Atlantic now and for the foreseeable future?

Role theory and its utility for analysis of foreign policy can be traced back to the early 1970s (Holsti 1970) Time and space prevent a detailed historiography of the subject (Gaskarth 2014, 1). Perhaps of best utility here are Margaret Hermann's roles and drivers (Hermann 1987, 134).

Table 1: Margaret Hermann's Foreign Policy roles and drivers

Policy Role	Policy Driver
Expansionist	Power
Active independent	Autonomy

Influential	Influence in the intl system
Mediator/integrator	Solutions to problems
Opportunist	Popular approval
Developmental	Development of the state
Isolate	Isolation

In this sense, status is key; in other words the status of a country on the international stage. For those nations aspiring to play the great power role that involves a duty / desire to mediate / influence international events. For example, in 1945 the Great Powers created the United Nations Security Council and concept of the Permanent Members of the council, the USA, Russia, China, France and the UK. That probably did reflect global power, now the determinant of great power status is somewhat more diffuse than just membership of the P5. Is, for instance, the EU a great power based upon its economic strength?

This is important for, as James Gaskarth has noted, role orientation: ‘represents the highest order of strategic thinking in foreign policy’. He asks that question for the UK set against economic constraints and pressures and rival power. Much debate in the literature centres on the ability, or not, of policy makers to make conscious decisions to change roles. Gaskarth uses the example of the United States which, given its global trade and interactions, would struggle to follow an isolationist policy. What is possible, however, is the ability for policy makers to make a strategic choice as to which role orientation they can adopt to further national interests in a given context. As Gaskarth argues, while there are limitations, ‘there exists the scope for British foreign policy makers to examine the range of potential role orientations available to a state such as the UK and explore the likely benefits and costs of each’ (Gaskarth 2014, 2; 45-8).

While Gaskarth applies this to the role orientation of the UK exerting influence in the international system in a somewhat general manner, this is of much utility in focussing in on tangible UK interests, in this case in the South Atlantic, and which roles might best further them.

Role scenarios

Role theory allows the identification of how states interact on the international stage through relations with other states and membership of international organisations which produces norms in how a state acts and communicates. Gaskarth uses the example of how membership of an organisation like

NATO prescribes a state the role of 'reliable ally' (Gaskarth 2014,1). Knowledge of this allows the student to identify action scripts which predict, in theory, the policy or strategy enacted in a given context. For example, Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states that 'an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all' (NATO 1949) The event, an armed attack, produces an action script for all members of the alliance as they are all 'reliable allies' by being part of the alliance. Without the action script the alliance would lack credibility.

With referenced to the UK in the South Atlantic, this was discussed in 1982 in terms of the UK response to the Argentine invasion. Admiral Sir Henry Leach, the First Sea Lord in 1982, was asked by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that if the islands were captured by Argentina, 'do you really think that we can recapture them?'. Leach's response has entered naval folklore but also points to his perception of the UK's role in the world and therefore production of an action script and is worth repeating here:

...my reaction was that yes, we could recapture, it would be a high-risk venture, but I then stuck my neck out (which was beyond my terms of reference really) and said, 'And we should'. She was on to that like a hawk and said, 'Why do you say that?' so I said, 'Because of we do not, if we muck around, if we pussyfoot, if we don't move very fast and are not entirely successful, in a very few months' time we shall be living in a different country whose word will count for little'. She gave me a very cold look and then cracked into a grin, because it was exactly I think what she wanted to hear (Falklands War 2002, 29; Griffin 2005, 135).

Leach's view does still have some relevance to the way the UK views itself acting on the world stage today, but the emphasis recently has been on the Falkland Islanders who voted on 10-11 March 2013 to retain their status as a British Overseas Territory. After providing the islanders with the opportunity to express their wishes, the UK government now has a fundamental duty of care to look after their interests, security and economic development. This will have increasing importance as the UK approaches BREXIT. The EU is the most import trading partner of the Falkland Islands, valued around £180 million per year. That is 70% of the Falkland Islands GDP (Benwell and Pinkerton 2016, 11). Moreover, trading with the EU and being a part of the EU as a British Overseas Territory has provided an element of support to the islands, with the EU remaining neutral in the light of the Argentine claims.

Isolate

The first potential role option is that of Isolation. Given the outcome of and debate following the BREXIT referendum of 2016 the UK could be seen as taking a more isolationist stance with regard to Europe. While that might be true, to some degree, in a political sense, in an economic sense the UK will continue to trade heavily with European nations. So if BREXIT is not really isolationism, then we cannot expect an isolationist approach to other parts of the world.

It is fair to say that the UK gave appearances or signals of an isolationist approach to the South Atlantic during the years prior to 1982 when the region was not in British strategic thinking. Sir John Nott, Secretary of State for Defence in 1982, later told a witness seminar in 2002 'As for deterrence in the Falkland Islands, I never ever thought about it. I didn't even know, frankly, where the Falkland Islands were!' (Falklands War 2002, 18). For Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary in 1982, 'The Falklands represented no vital strategic or economic interest for Britain' (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1991, 14). Given the legacy of 1982, UK investment in defence of the Falkland Islands since then and the 2013 referendum it is fair to say that the islanders enjoy a far higher profile in the UK than in 1982. With the islanders choosing to continue to look to the UK in 2013, any isolationist policy from the UK in the South Atlantic would in effect signal a withdrawal from UK national interests in the region and its Overseas Territories. That might be an attractive option for a UK government looking to make quick savings to the defence budget. The UK has withdrawn from expensive overseas defence commitments before. In the late 1960s the Wilson Government enacted a decision to withdraw, in a strategic sense, British defence commitments from East of Suez as part of a longer assessment of Britain's changing role in the world (Dockrill 2002). Then there was the highly visible handover of Hong-Kong in 1997. So the UK has 'withdrawn' from overseas commitments before and to do so in the South Atlantic might lead to enhanced standing in Latin America for the UK as a post-colonial power, perhaps leading to economic benefits in trade relations with the MERCOSUR countries.

On the other hand, such a policy would carry immense domestic political risk for any government considering such a move. Proposed withdrawal from the South Atlantic would raise serious concerns from the Falkland Islanders, UK media, the Armed Forces and sections of the public regarding the security of the Falkland Islands (Swinford 2015). Moreover, such a retreat could only be seen as encouragement for Argentine claims in the region which also includes Antarctic territory. There would also be the danger of a

domino effect with other contested UK territories, such as Gibraltar, coming under renewed scrutiny where Brexit has clearly given impetus to Spanish belligerence over the 'Rock' (Clegg 2016, 552).

Another factor at play here is the wider South Atlantic strategic context where the challenges range from transnational crime, narcotics, piracy, smuggling to climate change and resource extraction (Abdenur and Souza Neto 2013, 7). These are global challenges, not just related to any one region or nation, and as such will require cooperative solutions. Moreover, as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and with strong links to a number of West African countries, the UK cannot afford to not have an interest in the South Atlantic. In that sense the UK hopes to have influence in the international system to maintain the rules based international order (HMSO NSS/SDSR 2015, 20). That means the UK must have faith in the international systems which oversee that order, in particular the United Nations. Here, of course, there is an ideological conflict between the actions and intent of the Committee of 24 (Special Committee on Decolonization) whose object is the obtaining of independence for what it terms colonial countries and peoples and Article I of the UN Charter, which states 'respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples' (UN 1945). That latter aspect is what the Falkland Islanders expressed during the 2013 referendum. The UK could be accused of only upholding international norms in areas of self-interest. That charge could, however, also apply to Brazil's request to the UN to expand its Continental Shelf by 900,000km² to include possession of any natural resources to be found under the sea bed (Duarte 2016, 98).

Opportunistic Partner

UK foreign policy has and, to a degree, remains, about preserving the status quo, but that does not really help solve any of the challenges faced in the South Atlantic. That is not a strategy of passive detachment, of isolation. What this approach does do is grant UK policy makers the ability to wait and see, a strategy of opportunism, which is a strategy of sorts. Moreover, it has had some benefits, especially with regard to Argentina. The Falkland Islands have been depicted as a strategic gateway for the UK (Dodds 2012:1, 6), an open wound souring UK relations with South America (Dodds 2012:2) or a frozen conflict akin to the situation in Cyprus or Kashmir (Mitchell 2014, 190). None of these analogies are really particularly insightful for the strategist. Instead, a recent thawing of relations between the UK and Argentina have been largely due to changes in Argentine domestic politics, specifically the fall of Cristina Kirchner and election of President Mauricio Macri set against the context of

the UK willingness to take advantage of that change following BREXIT to develop economic and diplomatic links. If that is the case, the problem for British policy is that Argentina could (though the evidence seems to suggest it will not in the short term) once again engage in economic sparring with the UK in order to obtain political leverage over the Falkland Islands especially if the domestic political makeup changes in Buenos Aires once again.

Under the leadership of first Néstor then Cristina Kirchner, the years 2003-2015 witnessed a war by other means over the Falkland Islands, with every opportunity utilised to raise the Argentine claim. Moreover, this period included some novel/bizarre publicity stunts alongside diplomatic efforts through the UN and economic warfare against the islanders (Dodds 2012:2). All aspects of state power short of military action were used to try and change the political status quo. Argentine unwillingness to take the military option during these years may be more reflective of the poor state of Argentine military forces after years of neglect than a desire to act more responsibly domestically and internationally than the military junta in 1982 (IISS 2017). With Argentina and Brazil both reliant upon a globalised trading environment and set against a declining Brazilian economy with which Argentina is heavily dependent upon, a return to the economic warfare policies towards the Falkland Islands seems unlikely under President Macri. With regard to offshore hydrocarbons, Argentina cannot go it alone, and there remains scope for revenue sharing between the Falkland Islanders, the UK and Argentina in line with the Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Offshore Activities in the South West Atlantic which was signed in 1995 and from Argentina withdrew in 2007. This withdrawal from collaboration was also evident in Buenos Aires pulling apart the 1999 Joint Statement which outlined cooperation over access, air travel and fishing.

Such collaborative initiatives are now back on the table, with the UK and Argentine governments issuing a new Joint Statement on areas of mutual cooperation on 14 September 2016 (UK Govt 2016:1). It is worth reiterating that this has less to do with BREXIT and more to do with changes in Argentine domestic politics. In May 2016 Lord Price, the UK Trade and Investment Minister, led the first UK trade mission to Argentina for a decade stating that: 'The growing economies of Latin America offer huge opportunity for British business' (UK Govt 2016:2). Faced with possible exclusion from European markets, is this British economic opportunism akin to the period 1806-1808? It seems so, and it is more than just words. Lord Price's trade mission laid the foundations for a visit to Argentina in September 2016 by Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister Sir Alan Duncan. Talks were productive with both governments agreeing to work towards lifting restrictions that have inhibited

the exploitation of oil and gas, the free passage of shipping and fishing around the islands. Also discussed were other areas of possible cooperation including much needed foreign investment into the Argentine economy, science and technology, as well as approaches to tackling corruption and organised crime (UK Govt 2016:3).

While the sovereignty of the Falklands Islands was not discussed, with both the UK and Argentina keen to talk on areas of collaboration, the issue of the Argentine claim will not go away written as it is into the Argentine political constitution. In March 2016 the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) placed the Falkland Islands in expanded Argentine waters. This, as the UK government pointed out, did not impinge in any way upon sovereignty, over which the CLCS has no jurisdiction, while pointing out the UN had recognised that in considering the Argentine submission for an expanded continental shelf it did consider this to include claims relating to the Falkland Islands (UK Govt 2016:4). On 16 October 2016 Argentina complained about planned UK military exercises in the Falkland Islands while President Macri backtracked from a claim he had discussed ‘sovereignty’ with UK Prime Minister Theresa May (Goñi 2016). Set against that in November 2016 the Argentine Foreign Minister Susana Malcorra was reported as stating ‘we can’t deny the existence of the Malvinas inhabitants with whom we have been distanced for too long’, thereby starting to recognise that under the UN the Falkland Islanders do have the right to self-determination (MercoPress 2016). This had always been denied by Argentina.

So while there are areas of continued disagreement, what is clear with the Macri regime is that mutually beneficial Business can be done *around* the issue of the Falkland Islands. This will become more important post BREXIT, given the fact that 70 per cent of Falkland Islands GDP depends on access to the EU markets. With the Falkland Islands recognised as a UK Overseas Territory, BREXIT has the potential to leave the islanders weakened but clearly the UK government have been acting to strengthen the position of the islanders as part of a wider approach to UK-Argentine relations. What this means is that while the UK Overseas Territories in the South Atlantic do have the potential to impinge upon the UK being seen as a regional partner, the UK is actively aware of this and is focussing on economic collaboration to foster closer links with Argentina.

In a political sense, there will be no dialogue on sovereignty unless the Falkland Islanders want it. This is in stark contrast to thinking in the run up to 1982 where the concerns of the islanders hardly counted. Now, at least from a UK perspective, the Falkland Islands do not have to dominate the UK-Argentina relationship, an understanding that also seems to be driving policy in Buenos Aires. This can only be welcomed by all.

According to Oliver Williamson, in an economic sense opportunism ‘refers to a lack of candor or honesty in transactions, to include self-interest seeking with guile’ (Williamson 1975, 9). Political realists would certainly agree with that as would many writers on strategic studies. The object of policy and strategy is to achieve self (national) interest using all the lever of power, including some aspects of guile. If ‘a lack of candor or honesty in transactions’ drives UK policy in the South Atlantic, or it is seen to be, then a blossoming relationship with Argentina will fall apart amid cries of British colonialism / imperialism and the memories of British intervention and informal empire during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. So the UK has to be genuine, even in transactional relationships. Supporting Susana Maclorra’s failed bid to become the UN Secretary General can be seen as part of being a credible partner, as can UK support for Argentina’s bid for presidency of the G20 in 2018.

Whatever the character of BREXIT, once there is clarity to Britain’s economic and political relationship with Europe, the South Atlantic offers much promise for the UK. Clearly, achieving UK interests in the South Atlantic involves a good working trading relationship with Brazil and Argentina.

Here Antarctica and West Africa come in as areas for further or new collaboration or normalisation between the UK and Brazil and Argentina beyond the Falkland Islands. So while the Falkland Islands have been seen as a strategic gateway into the region, the posit here is that the UK Overseas Territories in the South Atlantic cement the UK not as an external actor, but instead as an actor with direct, tangible interests in the South Atlantic. This is important when we come back to the fact that for the UK economic interests in the South Atlantic are mainly focused on Brazil and that country is the leading regional power with ambitions beyond the South American continent.

Hence while the UK has had a tendency to focus on the Argentine relationship, viz-a-viz the Falkland Islands, that also cannot be separated from Argentine-Brazilian relations and UK-Brazilian relations. They are all part of the same context and important because actors and roles are relative to context and to other actors. If we consider Brazil playing a role encompassing autonomy from global powers (evidenced by ZPCAS), as a regional leader, and as an influential power (upholder of the rule of law) – it all gives Brazil much in common with the UK. Both are keen to uphold an international rules based order, to be good global citizens and to respect the sovereignty and rights of peoples.

Brazilian capacity building in West Africa can be seen as a derivative of ZPCAS, to minimise the presence and need for external actors to enhance African security. Here the UK also has an interest in those six African countries

with African coastlines of which South Africa (along with India and Brazil form IBSA) and Namibia have strong links to Brazil (Goldoni and Nazareth Ciribelli 2016, 195-8). Moreover, existing Brazilian security architecture, such as India-Brazil-South Africa Maritime exercises, includes two commonwealth countries. Opportunities for British involvement here are limited, with the UK Royal Navy light on resources for the South Atlantic and Antarctic Patrols with just HMS *Clyde* and HMS *Protector* deployed. Despite that the UK has been involved in an ad-hoc basis with humanitarian crises in West Africa, such as the Ebola outbreak of 2013-2016 where the UK deployed 1,500 military personnel. Without a sustained presence and enhanced capacity, further opportunities for collaboration with the powers of the South Atlantic will be limited to ad-hoc responses.

For Brazil the biggest issues are non-state such as, transnational crime including the narcotics smuggling, possible threats to oil supplies and piracy. But Brazil, with its proposed changes to the continental shelf, has also been taking a realist, power centric approach to resources, to guarantee exclusive access to untapped maritime resources in the South Atlantic. The means have been applications to the UN about the continental shelf, the reconstitution of ZPCAS and working with other southern hemisphere powers such as South Africa and India. So Brazil, while possessing an ambitious (perhaps over-ambitions) defence strategy is also looking to exercise power through international security architecture to promote national interests and to deter the influence or involvement of external other powers including the USA, NATO, UK but also China and Russia. Brazil clearly sees itself leading South Atlantic Security. That is important as many non-state security concerns overlap between Brazil and Argentina, for example the Bolivian drug route.

So in this environment what can the UK do to further its national interests? ZPCAS itself and some South Atlantic countries are not keen on formal UK involvement in the region, but there is certainly scope for enhanced bilateral and informal links between the UK and Argentina and Brazil in terms of knowledge sharing, best practice and capacity building to deal with security concerns. Of value here is the UK Defence attaché network promoting shared education, research, teaching, best practice, applied strategic thinking, doctrinal understanding and the presence of Brazilian and Argentine officers on Professional Military Education courses in the UK.

This all raises the issue of a renewed UK interest in soft power, which was the subject of the House of Lords Committee on Soft Power and the UK's Influence appointed in May 2013 to report on the subject. This chimes with the Brazilian approach, as Mr Roberto Jaguaribe, the Brazilian Ambassador to the UK, noted in evidence to the Committee 'Brazil has perhaps been oc-

asionally recognised as the first big soft power because we do not have hard power' (House of Lords 2015, Q.187). Mr Jaguaribe went on to tell the Committee:

Brazil has had the opportunity over the past 30 or 40 years to consolidate the perception of being among the leading countries of the emerging, developing world. That generates a lot of positive benefits, such as hosting the Olympic Games or the World Cup. We were chosen because we generate good will in the people who are choosing. The candidates from Brazil tend to be elected. Brazil tends to be elected in all multilateral elections. All that has an effect...(House of Lords 2015, Q.195)

Interestingly the UK has ramped up its soft power initiative with Brazil. In October 2015 both countries confirmed that the Newton Fund, to tackle global challenges including infectious and neglected diseases, sustainable agriculture, issues on water, waste and energy across Brazil, will be funded to the value of £45million by each partner. Enhanced academic links between UK and Brazilian educational institutions to share knowledge, provide staff and student educational visits and to formulate and deliver collaborative research projects are already in place to address global issues that impact upon both countries and areas of mutual concern, like the South Atlantic. This is crucial work for the benefit of all, and the UK and Brazil can lead the way in a manner that UK does not link in currently with Argentina. There the election of President Macri is further evidence of a move in South American politics from the left towards the centre ground (IISS 2016, 245-7).

Conclusion

When set against the UK leaving the EU through BREXIT and uncertainty over the future economic relationship with the USA, it is timely for the UK to look to South America. Business and economic benefit are the driving forces and the UK is clearly on the right tack, but UK policy makers need to think about how they can do more in many areas with the countries and peoples of South America. That is because a failure to act will not only harm the UK's strategic perspective on its interests in the South Atlantic, others, such as the USA, China and Russia, will, and indeed, are acting to secure lucrative trade. So while a policy based around the concept of upholding the status quo might be sensible in terms of hardnosed realism that does not necessarily mean doing nothing. Issues of dispute can be worked around, or even worked through to the benefit of all involved, the key being to focus on

areas where all interested parties can benefit. If that sees the UK taking on the role of an opportunistic actor, then so be it. But out of that there is some certainty. Maintaining a strong relationship with Brazil will be essential for the UK's interests in the region in a post BREXIT world, as will forging closer economic links with Argentina.

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ABSTRACT

This article assesses the utility of International Relations 'role theory' for understanding the United Kingdom's policy options in the South Atlantic, with specific reference to UK-Argentine relations. The article does not ignore the geo-strategic realities of Anglo-Argentine relations, but posits that recent interactions in the economic sphere can be seen as the beginning of a normalisation process. The cause of this economic rapprochement, it is argued, is less to do with UK policy and instead is due to changes in domestic Argentine politics which have offered a window of opportunity for the UK.

KEYWORDS

United Kingdom, Policy, Role theory, South Atlantic.

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LUSOPHONY RISKS TO BE A HERITAGE WITH NO FUTURE

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Introduction

We are accustomed to think of Lusophony through the cultural value of the Portuguese language, which represents, in essence, a relatively consistent space of intercontinental dialogue, directed to the construction, as Manuel Castells (2010, 8) explains, of a certain identity process. The speech of Lusophony has almost always been associated with some kind of historical-cultural geopolitics, in a kind of unity in diversity, whose various components - namely in language, in the natives, in gastronomy, in music and lyrics, in customs, in published writing, painting, cinematography, and architecture - align themselves as if it was a search for immateriality between political and cultural myths.

This debate evolved, in a second moment, to the narrative of the economic value of the Portuguese language, understood here in the definition presented by Bart Vanspauwen (2011, 69) as a political, economic and cultural space. The discussion of the value of the language *tout court*, without other components, ends up being transposed to the limitation of the very size of the lusophone space, whose genesis constitutes a historical constant. In order to emphasize the importance of multilingualism, Émilie Tran² (2016) refers to the English language as the “frank language” of globalization, seeking to accentuate the inequality of the number of speakers, when the English and

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2 Tran, Émilie. “Lusofonia e Franconia: os desafios da diversidade cultural”. Plataforma Macau. <http://www.plataformamacau.com/seccoes/opiniao/emilie-tran-lusofonia-e-franconia-os-desafios-da-diversidade-cultural/> (June, 2017).

Chinese languages are placed on one side of the scale and, on the other, languages like Portuguese and French. However, precisely because the value of Lusophony is multi-partisan, the discussion that this research seeks to open refocuses on another perspective, perhaps complementary.

In fact, as one who combines the fundamental elements of a certain Portuguese-speaking geo-economy, it is recognized that the sea also represents another element of geopolitical unity and that both - the history-language-culture and geographical position thought through the sea - , exactly what Ernâni Lopes called “*the potential of development as a network space*” (2008, 3). It is precisely this articulation between history-language-culture and geographical position, which is the essential element of the Constitutive Declaration of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) (1996), when it took as its main purpose “*to make the tricontinental dialogue consistent and to decentralize it*”, recognizing that the CPLP constitutes *itself* “as a geographically discontinuous space but identified by the common language.”

Thus, the main goal of this research lies in the study of one of the characteristics that confer geopolitical unity, the position in the “Lusophone Sea”, associated with the intercontinental territorial discontinuity of Lusophony, based on the Chinese One Belt, One Road (B&R), presented in 2013, by President Xi Jinping. In this perspective, we recall the words of Mia Couto, when she said that “*yesterday, the sea was what language can be today, just beat some adamastores*”. I believe that it is time to combine history, culture, language and the sea as geopolitically relevant elements, in the desirable conciliation of a certain economic-diplomacy of Lusophony, in the face of the Chinese B&R strategy, which articulates a new model of exchange based on investment and infrastructure, as accessibility platforms. Modern understanding of geo-economics combines history, culture and geographical position to create a positive-sum of economic security opportunities. The position and the historical-cultural-linguistic dimension should be understood as permanent facilitators in the relational reference space. In fact, the maritime domain associated with the geographical position gives a contextual meaning and is likely to build a privileged route of contact.

The MSAR in Lusophony

The historical-cultural-economic role of the Macao Special Administrative Region of China (MSAR) in the context of the special relationship with Lusophony can be organized in four essential areas: (1) the use of language - the official use of Portuguese in the apparatus judicial and public administra-

tion of the territory; the permanent support to the teaching of the Portuguese language to Portuguese teachers in Macao and mainland China by the hands of the Polytechnic Institute of Macau, the Portuguese Institute of the Orient, the University of Macau and the University of São José; the curriculum development of the Portuguese in the training of bilingual staff with particular emphasis on the Macau Portuguese School; and the continuous support for Patuá, as a historical heritage and part of the immaterial heritage of the Macanese people; (2) the organization of collective events - religious in nature such as the processions of Our Lord Bom Jesus dos Passos and Our Lady of Fatima; of an artistic and gastronomic nature such as the annual festival of Lusophony, the Rota das Letras initiative, the Macao International Music Festival, the Macao Parade, Latin City, Arraial de São João; of a sporting nature as were the first Lusophony games (2006), the existence of the Association of Portuguese Speaking Olympic Committees (ACOLOP); of economic nature, covering a wide range of trade fairs and conventions³, trade representations⁴ and bilateral meetings; (3) publications in Portuguese - particularly a large part of the daily press, the Macao Magazine, the publication in Official Gazette of all legislation applicable to Macao; (4) the institutionalization of practices - There are numerous aspects concerning the institutionalization of practices that are relevant to this context but, for space-saving reasons, we will point out only two that are interrelated. On one hand, the establishment of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries⁵ as a cooperation mechanism in the service of Chinese economic diplomacy, in which the MSAR functions as the administrative entity that operates it. On the other hand, the systematic use,

3 Macao Exhibition and Conference. Feiras do Comércio e Convenções em Macau. <http://www.ipim.gov.mo/pt-pt/macao-exhibition-and-conference/> (July, 2017).

4 Delegation of Macao Special Administrative Region in Beijing, Economic and Commercial Delegation of Macao, in Lisbon; Macao Economic and Trade Delegation to the European Union, in Brussels; Macao Economic and Trade Delegation to the World Trade Organization (WTO); Macao Economic and Cultural Delegation in Formosa Island. https://www.economia.gov.mo/pt_PT/web/public/pg_eetr_tr?_refresh=true. (July, 2017).

5 The Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries (Macao), hereinafter referred to as the “Macao Forum”, was established in October 2003 on the initiative of the Central Government of China and in coordination with seven countries of Portuguese Official Language, namely Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal and Timor-Leste and with the cooperation of the Government of the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR). In March 2017, São Tomé and Príncipe, that became the eighth Portuguese-speaking country participant. The Macao Forum is a multilateral mechanism for intergovernmental cooperation and aims to consolidate the economic and trade exchange between China and Portuguese-speaking countries, using Macao as a platform for linking the Participating Countries. <http://www.forumchinapl.org.mo/?lang=en> (August, 2017).

in institutional terms, of the concept of Portuguese-speaking countries. In fact, the Macao Forum marginalizes collaboration with the CPLP as such, to the detriment of its essential objective, that is, collaboration with the Portuguese-speaking countries *tout court*, always associating with a certain idea of Lusophony. As an example, see the existence of a China-Portuguese-speaking Countries Cooperation and Development Fund, and there is no financial mechanism for CPLP-China cooperation (note that it does not refer to China-CPLP). The Macao Forum discriminates against CPLP negatively, mainly because it has no political-economic dimension fixed. The confrontation between two approaches of the concept of Lusophony seems evident. On one hand, from the Chinese perspective, Lusophony seems to correspond to the result of a collective heritage in individual performance, taking it as eight differentiated cultural and economic units, which use a common language. Our approach to the concept of Lusophony believes that it is possible to give it a geopolitical meaning that is close to it, in the context of its whole, as a space of will, both cultural and economic. For this reason, we will use the idea of CPLP to the detriment of the concept of officially Portuguese-speaking countries.

Figure 1-CPLP and its Center of Gravity in the South Atlantic



Source: Elaborated by the Author

The CPLP and the B&R

The idea of the CPLP has been associated with a community of approximately 255 million inhabitants, spread over nine states that occupy about

10,742,000 km²⁶ in four continents, directly covering six (5 + 1) Regional Economic Communities⁷. In fact, the CPLP market and the three African regional economic communities represent more than 800 million consumers in 40 states. From the geopolitical point of view, the CPLP develops from its center of gravity, in a geographically discontinuous space, where the maritime dimension and the historical-cultural elements, namely the language, are the vectors of continuity and contact, with a network of other economic and cultural spaces, which are presented in the context of interregional and transcontinental relations. Indeed, the position of the CPLP, whose geopolitical centrality is based on the South Atlantic, especially in the area between the Tropic of Cancer and Capricorn, combined with the geo-economic and geo-cultural insertion of its Member States in the context of the Regional Economic Communities in Europe (European Union), Africa⁸, South East Asia (ASEAN) and South America (MERCOSUR), is one of the most promising aspects of this intergovernmental organization's potential achievements.

CPLP's geopolitical center of gravity is located in the South Atlantic zone, comprised in the space "between the tropics", developing from the maritime component to the terrestrial component. Considering the Exclusive Economic Zones of the nine CPLP Member States, the expansion of the continental shelf, the scope of responsibility for Search and Rescue (SAR), Flight Information Region (FIR), and the diaspora itself, the CPLP geopolitical center of gravity is only disturbed by the existence of two archipelagos over British sovereignty⁹. Thus, the CPLP's geopolitical center of gravity relies on three regional dominants and three interregional support points, which eventually connect the five continents. The three regional dominants are: Guinea-Bissau - Cape Verde; Equatorial Guinea - São Tomé and Príncipe - Angola; Angola - Mozambique. The three interregional support points are: Portugal, East Timor and Macao (China). Brazil represents the dominant regional basis.

(A) Firstly, the CPLP's geopolitical center of gravity is based on the dominant regional South Atlantic, which is developed from the exceptional geographical position of the Cape Verde-Guinea-Bissau axis, with possibil-

6 The terrestrial dimension of the CPLP occupies 7.2% of our planet, not counting the Exclusive Economic Zones and the spaces of responsibility in terms of search and rescue (SAR).

7 The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of the African Union. United Nations. <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/peace/recs.shtml> (July, 2017).

8 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

9 In the space between the tropics, the Ascension Islands and St. Helena. Out of the space between the tropics, but still in the South Atlantic, the Tristan da Cunha Islands, South Georgia, the Sandwich Islands and the Falkland Islands.

ities to explore the relative proximity between its extremes. Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau are located in the Western part of the Sahel Region near the Gulf of Guinea, one of the areas with the highest commercial potential in Africa. Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau are members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional group composed of 15 Member States, including Nigeria, founded in 1975 by the Treaty of Lagos and representing a community of approximately 349 million consumers (2015), spread over an area of 5,144,162 km². In particular, Proença Garcia (2017, 99) refers to Cape Verde as having “... an integrating role of the entire Atlantic Area due to its geographic location that enhances diverse belongings”. Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau also occupy a unique geo-economic position, dominating the air navigation routes towards Europe and the American Continent, both to the northwest towards the USA, and to the southwest toward Brazil. Cooperation with China under the B & R initiative can boost its airport infrastructures by allowing a flow of materials and services to the entire Sahel region, Central Africa and the Mediterranean region, the European Union, the Strait of Gibraltar, The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), especially to and from the American Continent. Cape Verde’s position from a geostrategic perspective is also particularly interesting as a point of support in transcontinental access, especially in the maritime route of the Panama Canal or in the future maritime option, through the channel of Nicaragua, linking the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean. The position of Guinea-Bissau is of particular interest in maritime access in the so-called “Sahel Silk Road”¹⁰ context. Recent Chinese investment projects in Cape Verde¹¹ with the creation of a Special Trade Area, and in Guinea-Bissau¹² new Bissau International Airport, in the extension of the old airport, in the construction of the fishing port of Pikil, (northeast of Guinea-Bissau), and at the deep water port in Buba, leave no doubt about the value that the Cape Verde-Guinea-Bissau axis has for Chinese diplomacy in the context of the B&R initiative.

(B) Secondly, the CPLP’s geopolitical center of gravity is based on the regional dominant South Atlantic, which is developed in the context of the Guinean Gulf, supported by the Equatorial Guinean - São Tomé and Príncipe - Angola triangle. In fact, due to the geographic proximity of these states,

¹⁰ The name Sahel comes from the Arabic word “border or margin”. This region is associated with a sort of “southern border” between the Sahara desert and a transition zone between the desert and central tropical Africa.

¹¹ “China supports the creation of a Special Economic Zone on the Cape Verdean island of São Vicente.” Sapo 24 http://24.sapo.pt/noticias/internacional/artigo/china-apoia-criacao-de-zona-economica-especial-na-ilha-cabo-verdiana-de-sao-vicente_22406550.html (July, 2017).

¹² “China confirms investments in Guinea-Bissau”. RFI, France Médias Monde. <http://en.rfi.fr/guine-bissau/20160411-china-confirm-investments-na-guine-bissau> (August, 2017).

together with the ease of communicability from Naval Air from its river and island position, as well as the significant size that the Naval Air Space occupies in the context of the Gulf of Guinea. Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe and Angola are members of the 10-member Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which was set up in Libreville, Gabon, in December 1981. ECCAS now represents a approximately 163 million consumers (2015), spread over an area of 6,641,000 km², or 22% of the African territory¹³. The triangle Equatorial Guinea - São Tome and Príncipe - Angola dominates a large part of the Gulf of Guinea and its accesses, especially from the south and extends into the central interior of Africa from ECCAS to Niger, to the Chad, the Central African Republic and Cameroon. In addition to these reasons, there is also the development of the so-called Western African Railways which will link Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad, further boosting trade, the position of São Tomé and Príncipe, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea, in particular regarding raw materials and value-added goods. Also in this context, access to Lake Chad (whose waters link Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad) is particularly important as a platform for access to the heart of Africa and the south-western part of the Sahel.

(C) Thirdly, the center of geopolitical gravity of the CPLP is strengthened by the axis of the states of Angola and Mozambique that have a unique coastal position in relation to the control of the air routes between American, African and Asian Continents. This axis dominates the access routes to inland states, such as Zambia, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo, from its continental and riverine geographical position. In addition to this fact, the presence of the CPLP materializes in two Oceans: Atlantic and Indian. Both states are members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), established in 1992 based on the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) established in 1980. The SADC comprises 15 member-states and represents (2009) approximately 277 million consumers, distributed over 554,919 km². Angola is also the only



Source: Thompson and Muggah (2015)

13 Africa's Trade Potential 2016: The ECCAS Region: the belly belt of Africa, 5. <http://coega.co.za/DataRepository/Documents/AJmQ1w9dNAL77ToKQZuBcCP6i.PDF> (July, 2017).

State of the CPLP that integrates two African economic communities: EC-CAS and SADC. In particular, Angola and Mozambique constitute important points of support for maritime navigation through the Cape Route, as an alternative to the Suez Canal. The Strait of Mozambique plays a key geopolitical role in accessing African markets, from the sea routes that sail to the southwest, from the Strait of Malacca or simply from the Adamam Sea or the Arabian Sea (from a Chinese perspective). The penetrating railroad - Zambia - Angola - Malawi - Tanzania (Mtwara) - from the Nacala corridor and the deep water port of Beira, offer privileged land access to the heart of Africa (i.e. the Victoria Lakes region, Malawi, and Tanganyika). In turn, Angola has been the subject of large Chinese investments, especially airport and railway infrastructures. Also in this area, the Lobito (Angola) - Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) rail link, the trans-African motorway (Angola-Mozambique) and the continued development of Luanda's international airport as a regional commercial transport hub represent elements of relevant geopolitical value.

Fourthly, Brazil not only forms the basis of the dominant regional center of gravity of the CPLP, but also integrates the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the BRICS¹⁴ group and the G20, without forgetting that it is one of the G4 members, i.e. candidates for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. The Federative Republic of Brazil gives the CPLP the dimension that makes it the economic-cultural

Figure 3 - EEZ and FIR of Brasil and Angola



Source: Defesanet (s.d.)

set capable of acting as a singular actor in the international system and turns the CPLP into a space of presence and future. Brazil in its prerogative of regional power can give the geopolitics of the CPLP a specific weight, without which it is diminished in its perspective of economic diplomacy. In fact, Brazil, acting in the context of the CPLP and in particular in an articulation with Angola, which is also a regional power, has the presence and influence in the South Atlantic, on one hand, capable of rebalancing the North American

¹⁴ The term “BRICS” was first used in 2001 by Jim O’Neill (Goldman Sachs) to refer to the growth of the economies of the Brazilian Federation, the Russian Federation, India and China, and a regular cooperation between these four States began in 2006. In 2011, South Africa was invited to part of the group (BRICS), and this group of five states developed a model of cooperation distinct from most existing financial institutions.

hegemony and, on the other hand, to protect and enhance the green and blue Amazons¹⁵.

In its relationship with China, among many other projects of strategic value, the interoceanic railway¹⁶ linking Brazil-Bolivia-Peru (Porto de Ilo, with a possibility of connection to Chile - Arica) stands at 4,700 km¹⁷ of extent. This project is related from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, as infrastructures of the new Açú Port (Brazil) and a connection through the Paraná River between Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina and Uruguay. Likewise, a high-speed line between Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (as Brazil's two largest cities) constitute infrastructural elements of singular geopolitical value. The Federative Republic of Brazil in its articulation with the emerging powers of the BRICS has the possibility of becoming a geopolitical engine of the CPLP and also, in this way, restore the potential of an organization that is not yet the reality of its aspirations. Brazil as a member of the CPLP and the CPLP as a subject of international law, do not contribute to the various development funds such as the Asian Investment Bank (AIIB) or a partnership between the "CPLP Bank" and the Silk Road Bank. In other words, China has a strategy for officialy Portuguese-speaking countries, but the CPLP does not have a strategy for China. Brazil can only balance its strategic relationship with China through the CPLP and its regional economic insertion. Brazil, the officialy Portuguese-speaking countries and, in particular, the Portuguese language as a cultural vehicle (and therefore a business instrument) represent important leverage factors in the process of internationalization of the Yuan () (Chinese currency), which is part of the foreign policy of the Middle Empire. Figure 3- Brazil and Angola EEZ and FIR . Source: Defesanet (nd)

Lastly, the MSAR of China, East Timor and Portugal are three inter-regional and association points of support for the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Australia-Indonesia group, the European Union (EU) and indirectly via Portugal as a member of the EU, the G7 and the G20. In this context, the MSAR also represents a foothold in facilitating multilat-

15 The Blue Amazon or Brazilian maritime territory is the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Brazil, whose area corresponds to approximately 3.6 million km² - equivalent to the surface of the Amazonian forest. The area could be expanded to 4.4 million km² in light of the Brazilian proposal to the United Nations Boundary Commission. With the extension, the zone will become more contiguous, including the areas of the Brazilian archipelagos in the South Atlantic. Image credits - figure 2: <https://igarape.org.br/the-blue-amazon-brazil-asserts-its-influence-across-the-atlantic/> (August, 2017). Image credits - figure 3: <http://www.defesanet.com.br/sisgaaaz/> (August, 2017).

16 Also known as the Inter Oceanic Railways or the Twin Ocean Railway or even the Trans-Andes Railway.

17 Or 3,755.5 km depending on the different route options.

eral economic and cultural interactions in the EU-CPLP-Brazil triangle and the People's Republic of China. If we also consider the privileged position in relation to the MSAR and the People's Republic of China, as well as the Chinese B&R initiative, then the projection from the CPLP center of gravity has three support points (one in Europe and two in Asia), the third being materialized by the MSAR. The CPLP is entirely in the context of the Silk Sea Route, with Portugal being the only member state where the sea route and the land belt cross. Thus, in the context of the maritime Silk Route, the MSAR extends the scope of the CPLP to 5 continents (at least until the accession of Timor to ASEAN), and confers a particular link to the South Atlantic, recognizing the unique geopolitical value of the center position of CPLP, in relation to the potential for projecting dynamism and new opportunities. Regarding Timor-Leste, on one hand, closer cooperation with China in the perspective of the B&R initiative may enhance the negotiating relationship with Australia and Indonesia, in particular the issue of the Timor-Gap¹⁸. On the other hand, the proximity of the Straits of Macáçar and Torres¹⁹ as well as the possibility of an accession to ASEAN increases the geopolitical interest of Timor in the context of the B&R initiative. In relation to Portugal, Carlos Rodrigues (2016, 45) stated that China's interest in Portugal relates to the deep-water port of Sines, arguing that this would be the first infrastructure directly related to Chinese initiative B&R. Sines, even considering that it is the most accessible deep water port from Madrid, such as the ports of Tunis (Tunisia), Marseille (France), Piraeus (Greece) and Venice (Italy), represents just one more among the various points with the B&R initiative in terms of access to Europe. The Sines-Madrid-Bilbao-Le Havre-Rotterdam railway corridor could become the second land access route to central Europe, just past the Budapest-Belgrade-Skopje-Piraeus corridor (BBSP) and, just like them, create the European bridge between the sea route and the land belt of the Silk initiative. Considering the connection to North Africa via Gibraltar, it makes sense to the railroad between Sines and Madrid, in the heart of the Iberian peninsula, with the purpose of obtaining greater energy security by diversifying the transport alternatives. However, this is only part of the question. There is certainly an interest in the so-called Portuguese triangle-strategic (Azores archipelago - Madeira archipelago - Continental Portugal), especially in the context of the expansion

¹⁸ Timor Gap is the area of the maritime domain between Timor-Leste, Indonesia and Australia where the maritime border between these sovereign States is located and is the subject of dispute over the exploitation of resources.

¹⁹ The Torres Strait is an important commercial shipping line associated with the far north of Australia, New Guinea, Melanesia Island, part of the independent state of Papua New Guinea and another part of Indonesia. It allows for naval transit between the Arafura Sea and the Coral Sea.

of the continental shelf, which will make Portugal one of the largest states in Europe in terms of EEZ²⁰. In addition to this, the Lajes (Azores) air base is one of the essential elements of Portugal's geopolitical value, especially in access and presence in the North Atlantic, both in terms of resources and in relation to maritime navigation and area. The Global Traffic Map 2010 indicated precisely this area as the one with the largest transcontinental activity in the world. Finally, the archipelago of the Azores in addition to its value in Europe-North America relations still represents an excellent point of support in the access to the Arctic Circle.

Figure 4- Diagram of the Extension of the Portuguese Continental Shelf



Source: EMEPC (2009)

Conclusion

As a conclusion, it is important to state that the true potential of Lusophony is affirmed through the CPLP and not based on a concept of Lusophony, which considers each political unit per se, making use of a common language. The CPLP has a potential for unity in culture, offers a platform for political dialogue, promotes the dissemination and teaching of language, must act in the field of concerted common interests, in particular in agriculture, health, in certain aspects of security, cooperation industrial and financial services, infrastructure, trade and services. The geopolitical component of the CPLP associated with its geographical position can identify common objectives and thereby transform it and relate it to the Regional Economic Communities. This can make the CPLP evolve into an organization with a quasi-global intercontinental network with its center of gravity in the South Atlantic. Geopolitics teaches that space is power. However, in the case of the CPLP, space exists, is studied, but power is only exercised deliberately, through a will. In this regard, Brazil presents itself as the decisive actor in catalyzing this will, both for its critical mass and for its international status. Thus, China, through the MSAR, gives value to the geopolitical understanding of Lusoph-

²⁰ Portugal has the tenth largest Exclusive Economic Zone in the world with a total of 1,727,408 km². In 2009 it submitted a proposal to the United Nations Boundary Commission to add 2.15 million km². This proposal, if approved, will give Portugal a total area of 3,877,408 km².

ony, through the concept of Portuguese-speaking Countries, taken individually and considering Brazil in particular in their bilateral relations. The CPLP should give value to the geopolitical understanding of Lusophony, through its elements of history-cultural-language and “lusophone sea”, gathered under a collective will to exercise consistent power. Vitor Santos (2005, 77) states: “The lack of coordination underlying the lack of strategic planning integrating policies, polarizing and guiding the lines of action, in the sense of permanently promoting a coherent and consistent strategy for the defense of Lusophony. This should, in turn, acquire expression through a foreign policy structured around national goals converted into concrete objectives and, in this context, an exogenously directed cultural policy of active and consequent promotion of Portuguese language and culture, projected as decisive instruments in the process of achieving these objectives, thus, achieving the national interest”.

Language-culture and geographical position, where the sea emerges as an element of unity in the context of the CPLP’s geopolitics, are two elements of continuity that, as Ernâni Lopes (2008, 17) has said, make it possible for us to go beyond ourselves, because “we will only become us when we go beyond us”. The true geopolitical value of Lusophony takes into account history, culture, the unity of the language and, as we have seen, also the position at sea, but resides essentially in the will to go beyond us and this can only be exercised collectively. Lusophony can not and should not be built only by language, it must represent an effective sharing of determining interests in relation to other initiatives, and this has to be done also taking into account a certain geopolitical unity. It is Brazil’s responsibility to extend and strengthen the CPLP. In the present state of things, Lusophony risks becoming an inheritance without the future it deserves.

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ABSTRACT

The discourse regarding the value of the strategic space of Lusophony has been centered in the debate around the Portuguese language. The main goal of this article lies precisely in the study of one of the characteristics that provide geopolitical unity, the position in the “Lusophone Sea” associated with the intercontinental territorial discontinuity of Lusophony, based on the Chinese initiative “One Belt, One Road” (B&R), presented in 2013, by the Chinese President Xi Jinping. In fact, the B&R initiative has re-launched the need to study the CPLP’s geopolitics, particularly from the South Atlantic center of gravity. It is time to think of the CPLP (Community of Portuguese Language Countries) as a quasi-global network space, capable of effectively sharing interests, and this must be done, also taking into account, a certain will to generate a geopolitical unity.

KEYWORDS

CPLP, Lusophony, One Belt One Road.

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BRAZIL'S FOREIGN POLICY, DEFENSE POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT MODEL: FROM THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE TO THE LOGISTIC STATE (1930-2017)

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Introduction

This work aims to analyze the relationship between Brazil's Foreign Policy³, Defense Policy⁴ and Development Model⁵ under a historic perspec-

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3 Foreign Policy is defined here as the interaction of the state with other actors of the International System in three main scopes: political-diplomatic, military-strategic and economic (Oliveira 2005, 7-14). There is an important debate in the International Relations literature, and particularly among the authors of the research program on Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) regarding the definition of which indicators and actors should be taken into account in the analysis of capabilities, intentions and the process of formulation and implementation of a country's Foreign Policy. The works of Hudson and Vore (1995), Putnam (1988), Smith, Hadfield and Dunne (2012), Milani and Pinheiro (2013), Salomón and Pinheiro (2013), Pinheiro (2000), Sennes (2003), Cervo (2008), Figueira (2011), among others, are examples of such attempts of systematization. Among the indicators utilized, a relative unanimity can be considered regarding the central role of the economic, military and political-diplomatic aspects as fundamental to the countries' international insertion Grand Strategy.

4 Even though there are divergences in the literature, the concepts of security and defense are treated here as analogues: it is about the preservation of Brazil's sovereignty in the International System through the use or threat of use of force (dissuasion). Ergo, in this work Security and Defense Policies relate to the area of Strategy and of the Grand Strategy, in other words, relate to the use of force by the state towards politically determined objectives (Diniz, Proença and Raza 1999).

5 From the works of Fonseca (2015), Bresser-Pereira (2006), Herrlein Jr. (2014) and Coronel, Azevedo and Campos (2014), it can be affirmed that the Development Strategy or Model relates to a political project of overcoming underdevelopment by seeking technological moderniza-

tive (1030-2017). In this sense, the research used an approach based on the works of Cervo (2010), Sennes (2003), Silva (2010) and Oliveira M.F. (2005) that seek to analyze the characteristics of the phases of the Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP) that cross the limits of the presidential mandates, being also linked to the political, economic and military constraints of the International System. From its permanent objectives – sovereignty, citizenship and regional integration –, the frameworks for international insertion were outlined, as well as the ways in which the Brazilian state sought to connect the three areas of its Grand Strategy⁶.

The justification for this work can be summarized in two scopes: (1) academic and (2) political-social. In academic terms, the research seeks to fill a gap between two research programs in Brazil: (1) the study of the relations between the Foreign Policy and the Defense Policy, and (2) the area of Defense Economics. In the first case, the researchers seek to identify the interactions between, in the words of Raymond Aron (2002), “the soldier and the diplomat”, leaving in the background the needs of the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), of the productive sphere and technological modernization, or even adopting an exclusively institutional, cultural, and internally organizational approach. On the other hand, the proponents of Defense Economics look away from the political and International Relations sphere, in the words of Sandler and Hartley (2007), seeking to “apply the instruments of economics in the study of defense”, particularly in the area of the economic globalization. This work is an attempt to articulate these three areas of Brazil’s Grand Strategy – Politics, Economy and Security – aiming to underline its importance in the execution of the national project, the regional integration, the extra-regional partnerships and the International Technical Cooperation (ITC)⁷.

The political-social justification is the increase of international po-

tion, the increase of the industrial productive capabilities and those of economic support to the country’s foreign and defense policies in the International System.

⁶ According to the Brazilian Armed Forces Glossary, Strategy means the “art to prepare and apply power to conquer and preserve objectives, overcoming obstacles of all order”. Grand Strategy, on the other hand, is similar to what is called “National Strategy”, that defines the synergy of the Military Strategy with the other areas of the National Power: “Art of preparing and applying the National Power to, overcoming the obstacles, reach and preserve the national objectives, according to the orientation established by the National Politics” (Brasil 2007).

⁷ From the systematization of the debate about the concept realized by Silva and Martins (2014), it can be affirmed that International Technical Cooperation (ITC) is characterized by the exchange of knowledge and management in order to increase the technological capacities of institutions and people and is closely related to the generation of development and to the increase of state capacities.

litical, economic and military competition⁸, that demands from the Brazilian state the formulation of a Grand Strategy that articulates these planning spheres. Internally, the economic stagnation is added to the uncertainties regarding the country's political institutions. Externally, Brazil's new defense documents, sent to the congress in the beginning of 2017, reflect the retraction of the Brazilian foreign policy, even though they maintain some of the characteristics of its predecessors, such as the prioritization of the strategic surroundings (South America and South Atlantic) (Brazil 2017). Besides, there is a gap regarding the economic development project, formerly guided by the revitalization of the country's DIB.

After the historical analysis, the article concludes that the Brazilian state reacted systematically to the political, economic and military changes of the International System and sought to achieve a synergy between the Foreign Policy, the Defense Policy and the Development Strategy. The Developmental State (as of 1930) and the diplomatic bargaining sought to enthrone the Center of Economic Decision⁹ of the 2nd Industrial Revolution, through the creation of national companies, the substitution of imports and the search for a relative autonomy of a Brazilian military-industrial complex, sought to benefit from international strategic partnerships. This process had continuity in the government of Juscelino Kubitschek, and also in the military governments of the years 1960 to 1980. Driven by the I and II PND, the Brazilian DIB began to appear as an exporter of military equipment.

After the economic crisis of the 1980s, the advent of the Liberal State retracted investments in the national DIB, prioritizing the fight against inflation, economic and financial opening and adherence to international regimes. The strategic projects were paralyzed, giving priority to purchases of

8 Such a scenario is exemplified by large interregional economic agreements such as the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Donald Trump's election in the United States of America expresses a reaction to the economic and military rise of regional power poles such as Russia and China, which have gradually acquired extra-regional capacity. The contradictory actions of the North American country in Asia and the Middle East demonstrate the framework of an International System, although asymmetrical, multipolar.

9 The concept of "decision center" is central to Celso Furtado's work: it means the ability of a country, through the mastery of core technologies at a certain stage of capitalist development, to make choices in terms of development, foreign policy and security (Oliveira L. K. 2012). According to Furtado (1962), the Brazilian industrialization that began in the 1930s had the effect of "transferring to the national territory the main center of decisions related to the country's economic life" (Furtado, 1962). In the first half of the twentieth century, the conquest of the center of economic decision had as a prerequisite the domination of the steel industry and the petroleum industry (Furtado 1962).

war material. From the late 1990s and early 2000s, in the wake of the reforms of the Brazilian Public Administration¹⁰, the Logistics State, once again sought to acquire productive and military capabilities from the 3rd Industrial Revolution¹¹. It can be said that the Logistics State sought to synthesize the demands of autonomy (Developmentalist State) and modernization (Liberal State) by attracting infrastructure companies for the defense industry and forming South-South, South-East and South-North partnership, later guided by the National Defense Strategy (NDS 2008) and the National Defense White Paper (2012). The crisis of this model occurred from 2013, already in the Government of Dilma Rousseff, and was consolidated in 2015, with the beginning of the process of impeachment and the rise of Michel Temer to the Presidency of Brazil in 2016.

The Developmental State, the 2nd Industrial Revolution and the Defense Industrial Base (1930-1985)

The 2nd Industrial Revolution demanded the creation in Brazil of several mechanisms of protection of the nascent industry, of the country's mineral resources, tax reforms and a process of import substitution. The first Getulio Vargas government (1930-1945) encouraged the import of capital goods and the production of final goods instead of importing consumer goods and exporting raw materials (Fonseca 2003). Considering the institutional

¹⁰ Since the 1990s, the Brazilian state has undergone a new process of reform in its Public Administration. This process is based on the promulgation of Constitutional Amendment No. 19 (1998), which established the associated management of public services through public consortia and cooperation agreements between federated entities (article 241 of the Federal Constitution). To date, consortia are used by municipalities and states of the federation in the area of health and by the Federal Union for security at major events, but can also serve as Federal Union instruments to optimize resources, infrastructure, personnel, among others, with a view to leverage productive civilian and military investments in partnership with states and municipalities.

¹¹ The development of the computer can be seen as the center of the Scientific-Technological Revolution (or 3rd Industrial Revolution): in 1970, the American company Intel launched the first microprocessor, and in 1975 IBM inaugurated the IBM 5100, the first personal computer produced in large quantities (Conti 2006). It is also in the 1970s that the Nimitz Class of Super Aircraft Carriers was created, the nucleus of North American naval power that gathers until today all the achievements of the 3rd Industrial Revolution. The so-called aerodrome (NAe) synthesizes the accumulation of scientific and technological capabilities in areas that cross space, air and sea and from repositories ranging from the propulsion plant to the embedded systems. Thus, strategic autonomy has also been linked to the domain of the production of communication networks (satellites, telecommunications, radiofusion) and computers (semiconductors and superconductors).

framework, the Ministry of Labor, Industry and Commerce (1930), the Brazilian Bank's Agricultural and Industrial Credit Portfolio (1937), the National Oil Council (1938), the Plan of Public Works and Defense Equipment (1939), were created among others. On the educational level and the qualification of the workforce, Francisco Campos' reform started in 1931, aiming to create technical and vocational courses focusing on production-oriented areas such as engineering, agronomy and accounting (Fonseca 2003).

The Developmentalist State aimed to enthrone the Center of Economic Decision of the 2nd Industrial Revolution through the creation of national companies, import substitution and the quest for autonomy of a Brazilian military-industrial complex. Thus, several mechanisms were created to protect the nascent industry, the country's mineral resources and tax reforms. As an example, the creation of the National Steel Company (NSC), the Volta Redonda Plant (1941) and the Vale do Rio Doce Company in 1942 can be mentioned. Not surprisingly, these companies were born in the context of World War II, and were the result of Vargas's and the Brazilian Army's view of the need to nationalize strategic national mineral wealth and the manufacture of weapons and projectiles that required the production of iron and steel (Fonseca 2003).

This challenge was present throughout the history of Brazil, and was explained, for example, in the 1930s by the work of Góes Monteiro called "The Political Purpose of the Army." Then, the Army General emphasized the primacy of the security and military sovereignty of a country, that is, the "force instrument of national sovereignty as the backbone of the national organism" (Monteiro 1932). In addition, he affirmed that the Defense Policy has an intrinsic relationship with the other spheres of state planning:

General policy, economic policy, industrial and agricultural policy, the communications system, international politics, all branches of activity, production and collective existence, including instruction and education of the people, the political-social regime - everything, finally, affects the military policy of a country (Monteiro 1932).

In the strategic plan, Góes realized the need to modernize and expand productive capacities at the levels of the 2nd Industrial Revolution, based on steel and oil. This is because "the era of universal peace is still a myth for humanity and nations continue to prepare feverishly for the next war" (Monteiro 1932). The increase of military capabilities would demand of the Brazilian state a greater readiness for military mobilization. Hence the importance of the defense industry and its synergy with society and the development strategy: "in the event of a war, we will have to have the national mobilization feasible under the best conditions, including the economic aspect" (Monteiro

1932). Here we can identify a foundation of the current Brazilian National Mobilization System (SINAMOB), established by Law 11,631/2007 and regularized by Decree 6,592/2008. Góes Monteiro strongly emphasized the preparation and formation of a broad reserve and a Defense Industrial Base:

It should not be ignored the question of preparation, training and employment of reserves and supplementary frameworks, by the education and systematic instruction of the population, and by the eventual use of industries applied to war (Monteiro 1932).

Thus, the Getúlio Vargas government from 1930 on would have as one of the axis the search for military modernization and the constitution of a defense industrial base allied to the development strategy. Simultaneously with the Pan American Conferences, in the late 1930s, the Brazilian Foreign Policy began to seek economic and military advantages through bilateral negotiations with the United States. The inauguration of Oswaldo Aranha as Foreign Minister in March 1938 was one of the milestones of this approach, as was his visit to the United States in the following year, known as the “Aranha Mission”. The agenda of the meeting between the ministers revealed the US intention to establish partnerships with Brazil including the military issue (Carvalho 2014).

In relation to military cooperation, meetings were held between the Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces (George C. Marshall) and Brazil (Góes Monteiro) in May 1939. The “Mission Góes”, in this sense, was essential for the advancement of negotiations that would lead to the construction of US bases in northeastern Brazil in exchange for US assistance in retrofitting the Brazilian Armed Forces, hitherto largely supplied by Germany. The demands for military equipment included “156 pieces of heavy artillery, 196 anti-aircraft guns, 41 combat vehicles, 252 armored vehicles and 722 automatic weapons” (McCann 1995 apud Carvalho 2014).

In September 1939, simultaneously with the declaration of Brazilian neutrality before the World War II, the US Congress passed the law sent by President Franklin D. Roosevelt that allowed the country to sell arms to allies (Carvalho 2014). In the midst of the German advance on French territory, Vargas gave speeches indicating a possible maintenance of Brazilian neutrality and trade relations with Germany¹² (Cervo and Bueno 2010). Brazil had a strategic position in the Atlantic defense system: the United States wanted to operate in North Africa from bases in northeastern Brazil, which was seen by

¹² Germany surpassed the US in exports to Brazil in 1936, 1937 and 1938, accounting for up to 25% of Brazilian imports, while US participation fell from 30% to 24% in this period (Cervo and Bueno 2010).

Vargas as an opportunity to bargain the financing of the steel industry and the equipping of the armed forces (Cervo and Bueno 2010).

After the declarations of the Brazilian president, the United States was prepared to finance the Volta Redonda Power Plant and the National Steel Company (NSC) projects, the first steps of the 2nd Industrial Revolution in Brazil, the reequipping of its Armed Forces and the origin of the Defense Industrial Base (Cervo and Bueno 2010). The agreement was signed on September 26, 1940 and involved a \$20 million loan from the US Export-Import Bank (Carvalho 2014).

After World War II, the US took the lead in the international economy, consolidating the Bretton Woods system, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and being responsible for rebuilding Western Europe (to contain the Soviet Union) and Japan (in front of the Chinese Revolution of 1949). Due to the abundance of foreign capital in the context of the Cold War, several regions became centers of national development based on monopoly enterprises with the contribution of the state and the mediation of the working classes (Costa 2008). The Third World sought to carry out its 2nd Industrial Revolution, based on steel metallurgy, petroleum and electricity (Visentini 2003) Brazil became the preferred US ally in South America, which would lead to Brazilian adhesion to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the Organization of American States (OAS), created in 1947 and 1948 respectively. Strategic alignment would be translated into the 1952 US-Brazil Military Agreement, signed in the context of the Korean War (1950-1953).

However, in the 1950s the South Atlantic gradually lost strategic value compared to the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, which directly affected Brazil's bargaining capacity compared to that of the 1930s. According to Penha (2011) and Luis (2013), the danger of a confrontation between the superpowers in the South Atlantic became unlikely, and the main points of passage and bottleneck were already controlled by the Western powers, resulting in a worsening of the situation of marginalization of the South American region in relation to politics world.

In this sense, the Developmental State¹³ begin to demand a foreign policy favorable to the protectionism of the national industry in negotiating

13 In the context of foreign policy, Cervo (2003) defines the following objectives of the developmental state: "a) to introduce economic diplomacy in foreign negotiations; b) to promote industry in order to meet the demands of society; c) to move from subservience to decision-making autonomy in order to achieve reciprocal gains in international relations; d) to implement a national assertive development project to overcome inequalities between nations; e) to cement the whole by economic nationalism, imitating the conduct of the great powers ".

forums such as the GATT and UNCTAD and the defense of a differential treatment to developing countries (Third World) regarding trade rules (Oliveira M. F. 2005). At the regional level, it was sought to open markets for the promotion of exports of goods and services in Latin America, as well as the opening of new lines of credit for the purchase of Brazilian products and technical and economic cooperation with Third World countries, especially in Africa (Soares de Lima and Santos 2001 apud Oliveira M.F. 2005).

In this context, the second Vargas government (1951-1954) reaffirmed the national developmentalist project. Thus, it became necessary to expand the industrial and defense infrastructure capacities: the National Bank of Economic Development (BNDE, future BNDES) was created in 1952 and the Brazilian Oil Company (Petrobras) in 1953. This project would be continued by the Plan of Goals (Planos de Metas, in portuguese) of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) and subsequent development plans in the military regime. Brazil, in this context, could not only think of a process of import substitution, initiated in Getulio Vargas' first government (1930-1945), but also of expanding markets and partnerships. Also, since then, the Brazilian state had realized that its alliance with the US was not yielding the previously expected benefits, and transfers of military equipment to Brazil no longer met its real needs (Amaral 2013).

In the military scene, it is possible to emphasize the acquisition in 1957 of the Aerodrome Ship (NAe) Minas Gerais (A-11), of British origin. The naval acquisitions during this period demonstrate an important step in the diversification of international partnerships¹⁴ to be carried out by Brazil in the following decades. In addition, the purchase of NAe Minas Gerais constituted a major innovation in the strength profile of the Brazilian Navy, since it aimed to enable the country to carry out air support missions¹⁵ (Amaral 2013).

From the government of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) onwards and with continuity in the 1960s and 1970s, Brazil recognized the need to expand the foreign market to increase exports, attract foreign capital, and increase dollar reserves for the importation of machinery and equipment. In

14 According to Vidigal (1985), "the enormous difficulties created by the Americans to supply upgraded ships and sophisticated equipment were the main cause of this change of orientation."

15 Here, it is worth mentioning the differences between the Navy and the Air Force over responsibilities for naval aviation, which was intensified with the acquisition of A-11 Minas Gerais. Such an impasse would be solved only in January 1965, when it was established that the FAB (Brazilian Air Force) would be responsible for the anti-submarine war, while the Navy could have helicopters for any purpose (Vidigal 1985). The solution adopted did not entirely please both parties, but allowed that "the aerodrome ship could operate normally since then, with FAB planes and Brazilian Navy helicopters" (Vidigal 1985).

terms of foreign policy, there was a need for agreements to support national companies, such as the Pan-American Operation in 1958 and the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960 (Cervo and Bueno 2010). Companies previously focused on the domestic market started to export goods and services and even carry out external investments: Petrobras, Vale do Rio Doce, WEG, Embraer and Sadia are some examples. In relation to shipbuilding, for example, with the 1st and 2nd National Development Plan (NDP), Brazil came to occupy the second position in the world scene, and employed in this sector about 39,000 workers (Moura 2008).

The defense industry was an essential sector for the Developmental State and its Foreign Policy guidelines. Examples include the creation of Engesa Specialized Engineers SA (1958) for the production of tanks and fighting vehicle, AVIBRÁS Aerospace SA (1961) for the production of rockets and missiles, and EMBRAER (1969) in the segment of aviation. In 1970 the Rio de Janeiro Navy Arsenal (AMRJ) was granted a license from Great Britain (Vosper Thornycroft shipyard) for the production of the Niterói class frigates (project Vosper Mk10). In addition, the country acquired Mirage III supersonic fighters from the French company Dassault, and Engesa began production of reconnaissance armored vehicles (EE-9 Cascavel) and transport (EE-11 Urutu). In 1971, under the license of the Italian company Aermacchi, Embraer started production of Xavante jet training aircraft, and in 1972 the first Integrated Center for Air Defense and Air Traffic Control (CINDACTA I) was deployed with technology from the French company Thompson-CSF and participation of the Brazilian company Esca Engineering. In 1973, Brazil acquired F-5 Tiger II supersonic fighters from the Northrop company, and in 1975 the Brazilian War Equipment Industry (IMBEL) was created (Abdi 2011).

Even within the context of the Carter Doctrine (1978), the New Cold War with the Government of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) in the USA, and the Falklands War (1982), Brazil maintained investments in its defense industry until the middle of the 1980s. In 1978, HELIBRAS was created (for making helicopters), and Embraer began production of the Tucano turboprop airplanes basic training. In 1979 the Navy's Nuclear Program was initiated and, two years later, the development and local production by the AMRJ of the Inhaúma class corvettes, with technical support from the German shipyard Marine Technik. In 1981 Embraer, together with the Italian companies Aeritalia and Aermacchi, began the development of AMX subsonic fighters; a year later was created the Engineering of Naval Projects (ENGEPRON), responsible for naval military orders, and in 1982 CINDACTA II was also implemented. In 1983 Avibras began production of the Astros II saturation rocket artillery system; two years later, the AMRJ began production of the Tupi-class subma-

rines, under license from the German shipyard HDW (Abdi 2011).

According to Sennes (2003), the international partnerships described, particularly in the governments of Geisel (1974-1978) and Figueiredo (1979-1985), are based on the principle of diversification of international partnerships: (1) the approachment with European countries (Germany, France and England) and with Japan, to bargain with the United States of America (USA), but without breaking with the “Western System”, and (2) increasing economic and political relations with Latin American, African and the Middle Eastern countries, mainly from exports of industrialized products (Sennes 2003). However, in the transition from the 1980s to the 1990s, this process would be interrupted with the rise of the Normal/Neoliberal State and the internal and external economic crisis.

The crisis of the Developmentalist State and the advent of the Normal/Neoliberal State (1980-1996)

The economic crisis of the 1980s - interest rate shock, oil crises, rising inflation and rising external debt - led to the retraction of Brazil's national developmental model and foreign policy. According to Halliday (1989), there was a sharpening of the Cold War from the beginning of the Reagan administration in the United States. This is demonstrated by several indicators: first, the increase in military expenditures for the modernization of the Armed Forces, mainly directed towards employment in the Third World; in addition, there was a strong concentration on the production of strategic nuclear missiles, which intensified strategic competition with the Soviet Union (Halliday 1989). The second characteristic was the Third World offensive, i.e. the 1982 Lebanon War, the 1983 invasion of Grenada, and support for paramilitary groups in four countries: Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan and Cambodia (Halliday 1989). This political-military offensive was accompanied by an economic offensive: raising interest rates on international loans and intensifying the US subsidy and trade protection policy (Sennes 2003). Emerging countries - especially those with greater external debt - were the most affected in the process, which put them on the diplomatic defensive.

In the case of Brazil, as a reaction to the “New Cold War”, the historic relationship of enmity and competition with Argentina would come to an end in the early 1980s. Visentini (2013) states that the Falklands War and the international interest rate shock impacted directly on the Brazilian perception of the new conjuncture:

the way Argentina's defeat and implosion of its military regime were artic-

ulated and executed reinforced the perception of the Brazilian government and diplomacy that a strongly negative rearticulation of the international system was being carried out harming the autonomy of the middle-sized countries of the Third World (Visentini 2013).

In 1988, the Federal Constitution consolidated the fundamental objectives of Brazilian Foreign Policy, strictly related to Defense Policy and the Development Model: (1) sovereignty (article 1, subsection I), (2) citizenship (article 1, subsection II), and (3) regional integration (sole paragraph of Article 4)¹⁶. Sovereignty is the guarantee of the security of the country in the International System, and its defense is carried out, ultimately, by the Armed Forces. The second foundation, citizenship, aims to ensure the population's access to social, political and economic rights. Finally, the sole paragraph of article 4 of the Federal Constitution established regional integration as a permanent objective of the Brazilian Foreign Policy, and whose current base is the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)¹⁷. In 1985, at the same time, that Brazil endured US retaliation due to its National Informatics Policy, a commission was established to study the integration between Brazil and Argentina, which culminated in 1991 in the creation of Mercosur.

However, the integration was shaped by a new matrix of Brazil's foreign policy, conditioned in a moment of "triumph" of neoliberalism: "the Brasilia-Buenos Aires axis of the 1980s, with a relatively autonomist and developmentalist bias, gained neoliberal colorations" (Visentini 2013). The

16 Since the beginning of the 20th century, Brazil has sought to secure peace in South America through the means of security cooperation, economic integration and diplomacy. An example was the "Treaty of cordial political intelligence and arbitration between the United States of Brazil, the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic" in 1909, which gave rise to the ABC Pact of 1915 (Heinsfeld 2009). Other initiatives followed: the 1958 Pan American Operation, the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) in 1978, the Latin American Integration in Latin America (ALADI) in 1980, and the negotiations in the 1980s for the signing of Mercosur in 1991. These initiatives institutionalized a type of collective hegemony in South America, which is associated with the concept of hegemony, in which both coercion and the conviction - mediated by the means of payment - play a stabilizing role in the state and therefore also at the continental level (Arrighi 1996).

17 "The Union of South American Nations aims to build, in a participatory and consensual manner, a space of integration and union in the cultural, social, economic and political context among its peoples, prioritizing political dialogue, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing and the environment, among others, with a view to eliminating socio-economic inequality, achieving social inclusion and citizen participation, strengthening democracy and reducing asymmetries in the mark of strengthening the sovereignty and independence of states "(Unasur 2008).

new foreign policy¹⁸ matrix, based on neoliberal economic policy, replaced “autonomy by distance” with “autonomy for integration”. According to this strategy, the country should integrate itself into the global economy, solving its development problems through “active adherence to the development of norms and guidelines for the conduct of world order management” (Oliveira M.F. 2005).

Though, the internal demands for foreign policy varied: the agricultural sector advocated the liberalization of international markets and the opening of new ones; the industrial sector if, on the one hand, demanded support for its insertion in markets such as Mercosur, South America, Africa and Arab countries, on the other hand, wanted to protect itself from the competition from producers such as China, the United States and the European Union, besides being against the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The financial sector (banks and rentiers) demanded alignment with the guidelines of the international financial system, strict monetary and fiscal policies regarding the payment of domestic and foreign public debt. According to Oliveira M.F. (2005), it can be affirmed that the Brazilian foreign policy in the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) governments, to a great extent, corresponded to the demands of the financial sector, mainly since the Real Plan.

Nevertheless, at the end of the 1990s, both the international and the Brazilian situation had been modified, and the strategy of autonomy by integration (neoliberal) fragilities have become explicit. In 1999 there was a financial crisis in the country, caused by the abandonment of the exchange rate anchor and consequent devaluation of the Real. This demonstrated the external vulnerability of the Brazilian economy, leading President FHC to adopt a diplomatic stance critical to asymmetric globalization (Silva 2010). Added to this were the failure of the WTO meeting in Seattle, the UN drainage and US unilateralism, the securitization of the international agenda post-11 September 2001 and the successive financial crises and volatility, as well as the economic protectionism (Silva 2010). On the other hand, the devaluation of the real increased the competitiveness of Brazilian products, and there was a productive restructuring in several sectors, which increased the productivity of companies as well as the modernization of the export-oriented agricultural sector (Oliveira M. F. 2005).

18 The main guidelines of this agenda were the liberalization of imports, the deregulation of capital markets, and privatizations (Oliveira M. F. 2005). This consensus was consolidated following the election of Collor in the 1989 elections, and also had as instruments the attraction of foreign capital, external financing, the end of subsidies, adoption of new legislation on intellectual property and the renegotiation of external debt (Oliveira MF 2005).

State Reform, Logistical Paradigm and the construction of the National Defense Policy (1996-2013)

The 1990s corresponded to the crisis of the paradigm of the normal state¹⁹ and to the test of the logistic state in Brazilian Foreign Policy (Cervo 2003). While the normal state refers to the strategy previously designated as a quest for autonomy through integration into the rules of the international system, the logistic state paradigm may be related to the quest for autonomy through assertiveness:

the reinforcement of the national hard core presupposes, in the logistic pattern, the transfer of responsibilities from the business state to society. However, it does not dislike the state enterprise, although it elevates its performance to the level of global systemic competitiveness. But its focus is precisely on providing logistical support to enterprises, public or private, preferably private, in order to strengthen it in international comparative terms (...) protecting companies, technology and national capital, stimulating their internal strengthening and its global expansion, taking care of the work and the good salary of the workers, increasing the well-being of the consumer (Cervo 2003, emphasis added).

The origin of the logistic paradigm is related to the Management Reform of the Brazilian Public Administration, which began in the mid-1990s. Under the leadership of Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, the guideline for this document was the Master Plan for the Reform of the State Apparatus (PDRAE), formulated in 1995 within the Ministry of Administration and State Reform (MARE). The PDRAE's main objective was to modernize the Brazilian bureaucratic apparatus based on the principles of managerialism based on efficiency, effectiveness and the quality of public services (Bresser-Pereira 1995). As a result, the Constitutional Amendment No. 19 (1998) was enacted, which established the associated management of public services through public consortia²⁰ and cooperation agreements between federated entities (article 241 of the Federal Constitution).

On the economic front, the State Reform would be accompanied by the

19 According to Cervo (2003), the paradigm of the normal state is characterized by: submission to the hegemonic center of capitalism, dissolution and alienation of the central core of the national economy, as well as transferring income abroad.

20 To date, consortia are mostly used by municipalities (in the area of healthcare) and by the Federal Government (for security at large events), but can also serve as instruments for the country to optimize resources, infrastructure and personnel of the states and municipalities with a view to leveraging productive investments and generating employment and income (infrastructure and defense industry).

adoption of the New Macroeconomic Consensus, characterized by inflation targets, floating exchange rates and public fiscal surpluses (Resende 2010). The reason for this lies in the fact that the implementation of the PDRAE occurred in a context of reaction of the Brazilian State to the internal and external economic crisis that began in the 1980s: oil crises, high inflation and unemployment, low economic growth, significant external debt growth, and the intensification of protectionism in developed countries (Sennes 2003). According to the preamble itself, “state reform has become an indispensable instrument to consolidate stabilization and ensure sustained economic growth” (Brazil 1995).

In this sense, in order to reduce costs and increase its capacity to carry out public policies aimed at serving the citizen, the document proposed a new vision about the structure and functions of the state, based on four levels: (1) the Strategic Nucleus, (2) the Exclusive Activities, (3) the Non-Exclusive Services, and (4) the production for the market (Brazil 1995). The Strategic Nucleus and the Exclusive Activities would remain under state control; production for the market would be left to the private sector, and Non-Exclusive Services, such as universities, hospitals, research centers, museums, among others, would be part of a third type of public property: the Non-State Public Sphere.

Thus, from the principles of efficiency, professionalization of public management and competitiveness, the State Reform sought to “transform social and scientific services provided by the state into social organizations, that is, non-state public organizations financed and supervised by management contracts” (Bresser-Pereira 2001). In addition to Law No. 8.666/1993, which is responsible for bidding, the main instruments for conducting, implementing and supervising these contracts would be the Regulatory Agencies²¹, Executive Agencies (public autarchies and foundations), public companies and Social Organizations. In addition, priority would be given to the strategic careers of the state, which comprised the Strategic Nucleus (Bresser-Pereira 1998).

In the context of foreign policy, in the late 1990s and early 2000s a new international insertion matrix was implemented, (1) deepening regional integration (with a change of focus), (2) resumption of the multilateral tradition, (3) a new critical profile of asymmetric relations between states, (4) the pursuit of strategic partnerships with similar countries on all continents, and (5) a rapprochement with underdeveloped countries, and (6) maintaining relationships with developed countries (Silva 2010). The Brazilian government opted for the creation of diversified political and economic partnerships, such

²¹ Examples: National Petroleum Agency (ANP) and National Telecommunications Agency (ANATEL).

as the one with China, which in 2002 already ranked second as Brazil's trading partner, as well as India, Russia and South Africa (Oliveira M. F. 2005). The transition from the strategy of autonomy through integration to "autonomy through assertiveness" had already begun in the 2nd FHC government, but will be consolidated in the Lula Government, starting in 2002.

It is in this context of reorganization in the International System - with the end of the Cold War - and in the Brazil's foreign policy - the advent of the Logistics State - that there was a progressive resumption of defense and security affairs in Brazil, a process that was reflected in the creation of the Ministry of Defense in 1999 and the promulgation of the National Defense Strategy in 2008. As will be seen below, this is not only a momentary impulse, but the recognition that military capabilities are a prerequisite for the country's strategic autonomy in the International System and for the consolidation of its development model. In this way, Brazil seeks to combine its security training with the formation of a robust national economy capable of dealing with possible external instabilities, as foreseen in the National Defense Strategy (Brazil 2008b).

The construction of the National Defense Policy, the National Defense Strategy and the National Defense White Paper (1996-2012)

During the 1990s, there was a relative dismantling of the operational capabilities of the Brazilian Armed Forces, resulting from the sharp decline in the defense budget (Abdi 2013). However, in 1996, with the publication of the National Defense Policy (NDP), the Brazilian state recognized the need to "set the objectives for the defense of the nation, as well as a guide for the preparation and use of national training in all levels and spheres of power, and with the involvement of the civil and military sectors" (Brazil 1996). Despite the recent end of the Cold War, an "indefinite and unstable multipolar international environment" was identified because of the "lack of correspondence between strategic-military, political and economic power centers" (Brazil 1996).

Thus, in order to deal with the new international situation, Complementary Law 97 was approved, which "provides for the general norms for the organization, preparation and employment of the Armed Forces" (Brazil, 1999). One of the main achievements of CL No. 97 was the creation of the Ministry of Defense, as a result of the perception that civil society must be an active part of the strategy to defend the country's sovereignty. The authority of the Minister of Defense as part of the Executive Branch was included in the

Federal Constitution by Constitutional Amendment No. 23 of the same year. It was in this context that the purchase of the new Brazilian aircraft carrier, A-12 São Paulo (32,000 tons), belonging to France and incorporated into the Brazilian Navy in 2001, took place.

Considering the Ministry of Defense, the fundamental principles of the Constitution began to gain force of law and institutional structure. Item II of article 14 of CL No. 97 relates the guarantee of state sovereignty to the socio-economic development of the country: “The preparation of the Armed Forces is guided by the following basic parameters: (...) II - search for increasing national autonomy by means of continuous nationalization of its resources, including research and development and the strengthening of the national industry” (Brazil 1999). Likewise, Article 16 states that “it is for the Armed Forces, as a general subsidiary assignment, to cooperate with national development and civil defense” (Brazil 1999).

The use of the Armed Forces to safeguard sovereignty and citizenship is a prerequisite for national logistics. Clausewitz theoretically separates the use of force, on the one hand, from the preconditions to conducting the war itself, that is, logistics. Logistics refers to the creation, movement and maintenance of forces in combat: “all warfare activities that are preconditions for the use of the fighting forces” (Proença Júnior and Duarte 2005). Brazil initiated this formulation in its doctrinal and legislative system with Complementary Law No.117 in 2004, and with the creation of the National Mobilization System (SINAMOB)²² by Law No. 11.631, of December 27, 2007.

The LC No.117 (2004) included in article 13 of LC No. 97 (1999) a specific paragraph that relates the logistics and the national mobilization in Brazil:

the preparation [of the Armed Forces] includes, among others, the permanent activities of planning, organization and articulation, education and training, development of doctrine and specific research, intelligence and structuring of the Armed Forces, their logistics and mobilization (Brazil 2004).

Likewise, both CL No. 97 (1999) and CL No. 117 (2004) reaffirmed the role of the Armed Forces in the formation of the DIB. In 2007, through Law No. 11.631, the National Mobilization System (SINAMOB) was implemented, which aims to carry out “the set of activities planned, oriented and undertaken by the state, complementing the National Logistics, designed to enable the country to carry out strategic actions, in the field of National Defense, in the face of foreign aggression” (Brazil 2007).

²² SINAMOB was subsequently regulated by Decree No. 6.592, of 2008.

In 2005, the National Defense Policy (NDP, Decree No. 5.484/2005) was approved, with three main points: (1) the need for restructuring and reorganization of the Armed Forces; (2) the search for synergy between defense policy and Brazil's socioeconomic development project; (3) South America and the South Atlantic as priority regions for the country's security" (Brazil 2005). The NDP "is based on the foundations, objectives and principles set forth in the Federal Constitution and is in line with the Government's guidelines and foreign policy" (Brazil 2005).

The vision of the insecurity of the International System was highlighted: "In this century, disputes over maritime areas, the aerospace domain, and increasingly scarce sources of fresh water and energy may intensify. Such issues may lead to interferences in internal affairs, configuring conflict frameworks" (Brazil 2005). In this way, the document recognizes the importance of South America and the South Atlantic as strategic priorities of Brazil's Foreign and Security Policy:

Among the processes that contribute to reduce the possibility of conflicts in the strategic environment, we highlight the strengthening of the integration process, based on Mercosur, the Andean Community of Nations and the South American Community of Nations; the close relationship between the Amazonian countries, within the framework of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization; intensified cooperation and trade with African countries facilitated by ethnic and cultural ties; and the consolidation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone. The expansion and modernization of South America's infrastructure can make the connection between its productive centers and the two oceans easier, facilitating development and integration. (...) prioritizes the Amazon and the South Atlantic for the wealth of resources and vulnerability of access by land and sea borders (Brazil 2005).

On the other hand, since the 1990s, Brazil has realized the need for advanced defense from South America and the South Atlantic, which may influence events in other regions. In the 1996 NDP, the objective of national defense is described as "the attainment and maintenance of Brazilian interests abroad," "safeguarding of Brazilian persons, goods and resources or under Brazilian jurisdiction," and "Brazil's projection in the concert of nations" (Brazil 1996). More directly, the 2005 NDP aims to "defend national interests and people, Brazilian assets and resources abroad" (Brazil 2005). Such a strategy would be regulated by Decree No. 6.592/2008, which regulated the National Mobilization System (SINAMOB), to be used in cases of foreign aggression. In this decree, "foreign aggression" was defined as "threats or acts prejudicial to national sovereignty, territorial integrity, the Brazilian people or national institutions, **even though they do not mean an invasion of the national territory**"

(Brazil, 2008a. Emphasis added).

Similarly, NDS is based on “the foundations, objectives and principles set forth in the Federal Constitution” and seeks to fulfill the constitutional objectives of guaranteeing national development, as well as democratizing the market economy and deepening democracy, by organizing economic growth socially inclusive (Brazil 2008b). This is also demonstrated by the restructuring of the Brazilian defense materials industry, the integration of the industrial defense bases of UNASUR countries, and the search for dual civilian and military technologies (BRASIL, 2008b). The 18th guideline of the NDS specifies the integration of South America, under the auspices of UNASUR, as one of its objectives:

The South American Defense Council, under discussion within the region, will create a consultative mechanism that will prevent conflicts and promote regional military cooperation and the integration of industrial defense bases, without being involved in a country outside the region (Brasil 2008b).

In this sense, Constitutional Amendment (CA) No. 45 of December 31, 2004 presented a doctrinal innovation by elevating the treaties and conventions on human rights approved by the National Congress to the character of Constitutional Amendments, in addition to submitting Brazil “to International Criminal Court jurisdiction, whose creation has expressed its support” (Brazil 2004). In this way, the country prepares its internal juridical framework for regional integration, seeking to comply with the sole paragraph of Article 4 of the Constitution, which deals with the integration of South America, one of the priorities pointed out by the NDS.

Whereas considering the problem of regional inequalities of defense and development, the NDS seeks to emphasize the presence of the state in the large river basins of the Amazon and Paraguay-Paraná. With this purpose, the NDS had foreseen the elaboration of the Articulation and Equipment Plans, in which each Force would present its priority investment demands. The Plans aims to “contemplate a proposal for the spatial distribution of military installations and the quantification of the means necessary to effectively meet the Employment Hypotheses” (Brazil 2008b). The National Defense White Paper (NDWP), published in 2012, detailed the requirements of the Articulation and Equipment Plans of the three forces (Army, Navy and Air Force), which can be summarized in Table 1 below.

Defense Policy: Major projects planned or in progress						
Army	Astros 2020	SISFRON	SISDABRA	Armored vehicles	IA2 rifles	Cyber Defense
Navy	Duplication of the Fleet	Submarines	Surface Vessels (500, 1.800 e 6.500 ton)	Aerial, logistical and amphibious vessels	Anti-ship missiles	SisGAAz – Surveillance of the Blue Amazon
Aeronautics	FX-2 -Gripen NG fighters	HX-BR Helicopters	VANTs – Unmanned Aerial Vehicles	KC-390 – Transportation Aircraft	Air-to-air, air-to-ground and anti-ship missiles	Geostationary Satellite
Fonte: National Defense White Paper (2012)						

In this sense, in March 2013, the Federal Government issued Decree No. 7970, which regulated Law 12.598 (2012), establishing “special rules for procurement, contracting and development of defense products and systems” to “increase the technological and productive capacity of the industrial defense base” (Brazil 2013). This law consolidated the search model of partnerships between national and foreign companies for the development of so-called Defense Products (PRODE)²³ and Strategic Defense Products (PED), identified as “all Prode that, due to the technological content, the difficulty of obtaining or for its indispensability, is of strategic interest for national defense” (Brazil 2012a). For example, the use of naval missiles by the Army, Navy and Air Force is a viable alternative in the short term, with less significant financial costs and capable of generating a technological spillover in the country’s economy (Brites, Martins and Silva 2013).

To sum up, the National Defense Policy (1996, 2005 and 2012), the NDS (2008) and the White Paper on National Defense (2012) cover the three spheres of war: Strategy (political objectives of military preparation), Operations (hypothesis of advanced defense employment) and tactics (weapons systems). In this sense, it had defined that the Executive Branch will forward to the National Congress every four years these three documents with their updates. In 2013, the three were approved in the National Congress by Legislative Decree No. 373. In 2017, the Presidency forwarded to the Legislature the updating of the NDP, the NDS and the NDWP, whose changes are related

23 Defense Product (PRODE) is “any good, service, work or information, including armaments, ammunition, means of transportation and communications, uniforms and materials for individual and collective use used in defense finalist activities, with the exception of those for administrative use “.

to the changes in the External Policy and in the model of development post-2012.

The Update of the Brazilian Defense Documents in a Context of Economic Retraction (2012-2017)

Since the international financial crisis of 2007/2008, the internal and external political and economic situation has deteriorated. In Brazil, the beginning of oil exploration in the pre-salt layer (2010) followed the upsurge in the economic and military competition of the great powers, and the development model hitherto adopted began to show limits, reflected in the fall in GDP growth in the Brazil from 2.7% in 2011 to 0.9% in 2012. The internal political crisis from 2013 onwards, with the start of protests against corruption and the launching of Operation “Car-Wash” (Lava-Jato in Portuguese) in 2014, which would disorganize the bases of the Dilma Rousseff’s government, led to the impeachment in 2016.

Simultaneously, as of 2011, the Strategic Defense Planning System (SISPED) was structured to systematize the updating of Brazil’s defense documents (Brazil 2012). This procedure for reviewing the documents is provided for in the Supplementary Law 97/1999 (article 9, paragraph 3) within a four-year interval, when the Executive Branch (Presidency of the Republic and Ministries) forward the new version for consideration of the National Congress. However, even with SISPED is in its initial phase, the updating of the documents in 2016 showed a relative lack of commonality in some areas, such as the diagnosis of the current economic situation of the country, which is presented as stable, and the contradiction between the belief in internal investments (without budget basis) and international technical cooperation as solutions to the DIB’s stagnation.

The preliminary version of the 2016/2017 documents provided clear elements of the continuity of the Brazilian Defense Policy, such as the prioritization of the strategic environment (South America, South Atlantic, West African coast and Antarctica), the importance of the relationship between defense and economic development, particularly through dual-use technologies, the pursuit of the aerospace and cyber environment, the expansion of the energy matrix and participation in UN peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, there are some changes and absences in the documents that draw attention, especially in relation to the diagnosis of the current international situation (multipolarity), the view on the characteristics of war in the 21st century (the concept of Hybrid Warfare), and the budget forecast for the major

strategic projects of the National Defense Strategy, which is related to both the internal economic recession and the lack of stability of defense investments by the Executive Branch.

In the military sphere, it can be observed that, despite the legislative and investment advances to boost the DIB, there is still a great distance between Brazilian military capabilities and that of the great powers of the International System, as shown in Table 2 below, which compares the naval power of ten countries. Naval military capabilities are an important indicator of the polarity of an International System, especially if we assume that a great power must be able to influence events beyond its own region (Buzan and Waever 2003).

Table 2 -Submarines, Surface Media and Amphibious Ships (2016)

	ENG	FRA	ITA	USA	RUS	JAP	COR	CHI	IND	BRA
SUB	10	10	6	71	63	18	23	61	14	5
SUP	19	23	19	98	35*	47	59	74**	28***	14
ANF	3	3	4	30	19	3	2	3	1	1

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS 2016).

* + 46 corvettes capable of launching anti-ship and / or anti-aircraft missiles.

** + 115 corvettes and patrol vessels capable of launching anti-ship and / or anti-aircraft missiles.

*** + 24 corvettes and patrol vessels capable of launching anti-ship and / or anti-aircraft missiles.

In this way, both the NDP and the NDS and the White Paper of 2016/2017 maintained the Brazilian military preparation based on capabilities and not on specific employment scenarios, in order to overcome the existing asymmetries. This is the reason why the strategic projects of the three Forces (PAEDs), which have not undergone significant changes, are important. One difference is that the outline of the new NDWP does not indicate a long-term budgetary forecast for its implementation (which occurred in the 2012 document). Nevertheless, one can observe the maintenance of the strategic projects, such as the beginning of the process of conclusion of the conventional submarines of the Riachuelo Class (Ports and Ships 2018).

In addition to the conceptual changes, another major inflection in Brazil's Defense Policy seems to be related to the Foreign Policy. After reaffirming the prioritization of South American integration and the strategic environment, the NDP refers to North America and Europe as traditional relations

that constitute areas of interest to the country. At the same time, no document mentions the BRICS, which was part of the 2012 NDS. However, the question remains: the relative downgrading of the BRICS and South-South relations - which is contradictory in itself, since the country depends economically on these regions - will necessarily allow Brazil to achieve a higher relevance in relations with the US and European countries? Twentieth-century experience indicates that this never occurred unless Brazil became strategically important to the United States in World War II, and Getúlio Vargas knew how to seize the opportunity to bargain for the financing of industrialization in the 1930s and 1940s.

In fact, the adoption of a supporting role in the major world decisions derives from the absence of an external policy strategy that makes the country important for other major powers. The recent attempt by the Michel Temer-José Serra alliance to build a “New Foreign Policy” meant only a political change at the regional level to isolate Venezuela, the abandonment of multilateralism (apparently rescued by the current management of Aloysio Nunes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and frustrated attempt to boost the Mercosur-European Free Trade Union Agreement.

Finally, we can highlight the sustainability of the DIB, a challenge that is already present in the current Brazilian defense documents, but which response was adjusted in synergy with changes in foreign policy. The new NDP seeks cooperation with the most technologically advanced nations in synergy with national projects but aims for a low budgetary impact and positive developments for the national economy, such as through exports. On the other hand, in a contradictory manner, the new NDS affirms that “the state must use its purchasing power to ensure minimum conditions for sustainability and to improve the DIB’s capacities, so that the production chain is relatively independent of the policy of export and marketing of dual products” (Brazil 2016).

Despite this particular contradiction, a positive aspect is the Armed Forces’ quest to boost joint research and development (R&D) in areas of common interest. There is at this point an opening for new legal forms for the management of these projects, which opens space for the interaction between the civil and military sector, involving state enterprises, non-state public organizations and private institutions. Joint research between Army, Navy and Aeronautics can yield good results, such as those obtained, for example, in the development of Tomahawk and Harpoon missile cruisers in the US (Werrell 1985).

Conclusion

The Brazilian state reacted systematically to changes in the international context, seeking new ways to consolidate the principles of its Grand Strategy: sovereignty (security), citizenship (development) and regional integration. It is important to note that regional integration did not mean the abandonment of extra-regional partnerships, but rather strengthened Brazilian bargaining power within the South-North (United States and Europe), South-East (Northeast and East Asian), and South-South (Africa, Middle East and Southeast Asia) alliances (Visentini 1995). These become essential, especially at a time of uncertainty and political, economic and military crisis in the International System, where tensions are increasing in various parts of the world, such as in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia, where involved strategic partners from Brazil such as the United States, China, among others.

The National Defense Policy, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Defense White Paper were responses by the Brazilian state to the political and economic restructuring of the post-Cold War International System in a context of uncertainty as to its polarity, and polarization (alliances). NDS synthesized the demands of Brazilian society for the deepening of its industrial capacity, technological level, employment and income generation, and regional disparities (for example, in the duplication of the navy squadron towards the north-northeast region of the country). Thus, it is the assumption of NDS that the guarantee of citizenship is related to the capacity to maintain the sovereignty of the Brazilian state, and that the academic, industrial, military and governmental sector are indispensable for the continuity of these investments.

In this sense, it is interesting to note that at the same time as the structure of the Ministry of Defense (1999) and later the National Defense Policy (2005) and the National Defense Strategy (2008), there was also a great democratic consensus backed by a development model based on the increase in consumption, the expansion of the state as a service provider and the search for an increase in citizenship (Abrucio, Loureiro and Pacheco 2010). Since the Lula administration, this model gained a developmentalist framework, mainly in relation to the investments in infrastructure and in the naval industry around the exploration of the Pre-Salt.

This consensus persisted while external conditions - economic globalization, high commodity prices and high growth in China - were favorable, but from 2013 onwards this picture has changed dramatically. The resurgence of international economic, political and military disputes revealed the shortcomings of the Brazilian development model adopted (Logistic State),

mainly in relation to the sustainability of investments in the DIB, which were directly curtailed. The current reassessment of Brazil's defense documents (NDP, NDS and NDWP) occurs at a time of uncertainty regarding the country's internal and external situation, a challenging scenario for the formulation of the national strategy. Internally, the economic recession and the rise in unemployment, which doubled in the last three years to 13.7%, occurred simultaneously to a political-institutional crisis.

At the international level, Barack Obama's unwillingness to withdraw the US from the Middle East and the subsequent rise of Donald Trump represented the return of the Monroe Doctrine assumptions to US foreign policy. In February 2018, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson made visits to five Latin American countries and evoked the Monroe Doctrine as one of his references (Gramer and Johnson 2018). This visit to the continent represents a turning point in US foreign policy for the region, which hitherto was guided by a relative "diplomatic drift" from the region²⁴.

In this context, the Brazilian Foreign Policy is similar to the one of the late 1980s and 1990s: a new process of economic openness aimed at compensating for the growing public deficit and the absence of a strategy to deal with an increasingly hostile international environment to the pretensions of the country. There are, therefore, two important shortcomings to be met in the coming years: the lack of definition of foreign policy, which has been ineradicable since Dilma Rousseff's second government, and the lack of a concrete response to the problem of the sustainability of investments in the DIB.

Enabling strategic mobility capabilities - especially in extra-regional operations - is incompatible with a development model that wants to cut government spending and rely on the domestic market to buy DIB products. Brazil does not only need an effective Defense Policy, but one that it is in synergy with the Foreign Policy and a development model that seeks technological modernization and productive scale with international competitiveness. Institutional creativity to boost military investments, the generation of spin-offs and dual-use products is foreseen in the new strategic documents, and it is incumbent upon policy makers to create synergies between Defense, Diplomacy and Development.

As indicators for future work, it is necessary to study the possible effectiveness and efficiency of the possible instruments of the Logistics State to obtain a synergy between the Foreign Policy, Defense Policy and the Model

²⁴ By 2013, then Secretary of State John Kerry had stated that the hemisphere was no longer US-dominated, accepting the multilateralization of relations in the region, what Khana (2008) had termed the "end of the Monroe Doctrine" (Johnson 2013).

of Development of the country: (1) Hybrid Institutional Arrangements²⁵, and 2) Public-public and public-private consortia as a cornerstone of Cooperative Federalism and International Technical Cooperation (ITC). One hypothesis to be developed is that public-private and public-private consortia could be the mainstay of this new model, carrying out Cooperative Federalism and generating an effective association between state, private sector and third sector for development (modernization and scale productive) and jointly with regional and extra-regional partners. For the sustainability of this new model of development, alliances of variable geometry are essential for obtaining (1) modernization through technology transfer and ITC, and (2) the scale of production through the opening of new markets.

Donald Trump's apparent freezing of major international agreements, Russia's successes in the Middle East, and the slowing of Chinese growth may give Brazil opportunities to enter into strategic and economic agreements beneficial to its DIB. Technical Cooperation will bear fruit only if Brazil obtains good bargaining conditions and institutions (whether public or private) are able to absorb the knowledge acquired for the local DIB. Finally, it is important to emphasize the need for diplomacy and the proactive Executive Power to open markets to Brazilian defense products, something that can scale to national production (ships, missiles, armored vehicles, aircraft, among other equipment). The attraction of investment also requires state support to win partners, as exemplified in the case of the agreement with the French company DCNS for the construction of submarines, and with Sweden for the acquisition of the Gripen NG fighters.

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25 The hybrid institutional arrangement is a set of rules, mechanisms and processes that define the particular way in which actors and interests are coordinated in the implementation of a specific public policy (Gomide and Pires 2014; Fiani 2014). The term hybrid designates an institutional arrangement formed by state, private and service sector actors articulated by a Strategic Center. Hybrid institutional arrangements can take various forms, such as joint ventures, strategic alliances, supplier chains, franchises, public-private partnerships (PPPs), technology parks, among others.

coalizao_o_dilema_institucional_brasileiro

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ABSTRACT

This article presents an analysis of the relationship between Brazil's foreign policy, defense policy and development model in a historical perspective. A paradigmatic approach is used, trying to identify the phases of the Brazilian Grand Strategy that cross the limits of the presidential terms, being also linked to international political, economic and military constraints. The period covered begins in the 1930s, with the rise of the Developmental State, addresses the 1980s turning point (Normal/Neoliberal State), and examines the defense investment's rise and crisis of the 2000s and 2010s (Logistic State).

KEYWORDS

Brazil; Foreign Policy; Defense Policy.

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DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF LULA'S AND DILMA'S GOVERNMENTS (2003-2016)

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Introduction

The following paper analyzes one of the bases of Brazilian foreign policy by referring to the search for national development in its external action, conditioning to it several subareas such as international security. This Brazilian position is going to be supported by a theoretical basis centered in the Human Security doctrine, proposing to redirect the security focus – from the State to the human being – and, therefore, from threats and strategies of security. The first is enlarged in order to include, within the classic threats (war, terrorism), social economic threats, such as hunger or insalubrity; The second is summarized in two fronts, the protection of the individual against direct threats and the empowerment (prevention against the emergence of threats). The link between general strategies of development and the security

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planning is presented in the latter: measures such as the generation of employments or the hunger combat show up as a link between development and security, useful to the discourse and action of Brazil. Such considerations will be more closely analyzed regarding policies of the governments of Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016).

Hence, it is necessary to verify the way how the country foreign policy is structured, aiming to understand the basis on which the Brazilian security vision stands. Consequently, the research problem focused on identifying which are the theoretical connections between foreign policy as a tool for national development and international security planning in the Brazilian case. The hypothesis of the work, acknowledges that Brazilian foreign policy, taking national development as its ultimate goal, restricts connected areas of foreign relations to the same means, as the international security discourse promoted and defended externally. The theoretical link between social economic development and Human Security offers good possibilities of a wider international insertion to Brazil, in the sense that it enables the coherence of discourse and planning between the economic and international security spheres. The relevance of the theme resides in the contemporaneous character of the proposal, contributing to the construction of the guideline of Brazilian acting in the international scenario (the holistic position regarding international security). Methodologically, the paper was structured on a qualitative approach, using the hypothetical-deductive method in primary and secondary sources, examining the hypothesis regarding the relation between development and security in Brazilian foreign policy.

Initial theoretical considerations

Foreign policy is formulated by the government – in general, the executive power – and executed by the state's diplomacy, that is, the human and bureaucratic bodies that concretizes the actions determined by the decision makers. The imminently state character of a foreign policy is inferred – although counting on some influence of civil society, it is a public policy preponderantly formulated by the State. It is assumed that the international system comprehends a group of political entities, the States, whose presence is highlighted as an influencer of other actors' decisions (Aron 2008). Soon, the great States are the responsible for shaping the system in the direction of an oligopolistic structure of power, where anarchy reigns. To smaller States, the task of system adjusting imposed by the great powers is entitled. Therefore, a huge part of the objective of a foreign policy is centered in accomplishing a favorable international insertion to the country. In Aron's vision, this insertion

would come from the quantity of power of a State: if it is big, the State can shape the system; if it is small, it is subjected to a system dictated by the great powers.

According to Spektor (2014), country objectives can be summed up in the purpose of maintaining autonomy: only through it could a State guarantee an international insertion advantageous and coherent with its interests. For the author, this is the objective that explains the external actions of Brazil at least since the 1950s, when the country adopted the “autonomist project” of international politics. Lafer (1987), in his turn, seeks to outline a strategy of insertion proper to countries with less power. For him, such states would be in constant negotiating process, seeking to insert their guidelines or to promote reforms in the structure of the system that will benefit their positioning. Also in relation to the international milieu, Lafer outlines the international insertion of a country as dependent on its performance in three fields – strategic-military, economic relations and values – and in different diplomatic contexts – that of the great powers, regional and contiguous (neighbors).

Given this theoretical scope, it is understood that Putnam (2010) corroborates with our understanding. For him, every state would have, roughly speaking, two spheres of action: the external one, denominated “Level 1”; and the internal, “Level 2”³. Concerned to understand the ways in which this interlocking of influences occurs, Putnam argues that any agreement or decision taken at Level 1 must be approved at Level 2 through parliamentary deliberation. The chances of a state action taken at Level 1 being ratified internally depend on the size of the Win-Sets, that is, on the set of international agreements or decisions that would be internally approved. If the state action is outside the Win-Set, the State runs the risk of “involuntary defection”, as a result of internal disapproval.

Putnam does not openly discuss foreign policy or international insertion strategies. However, his theory allows deriving interesting elements for the present research. In order not to run the risk of involuntary defection, a state must be guided externally so to respond to the pressures and interests of internal actors. This means guiding foreign policy and the diplomatic corps in pursuit of external objectives consistent with the general national interest. In other words, the Two-Level Game recommends that a state seek to align internal and external interests to ensure consistency. In this interpretation, the coherence of internal and external interests would be Putnam’s strategy of insertion.

³ According to Putnam, it matters little to identify which level weights more, because there would be an influence balance between external and internal.

As Altemani (2005, 3-6) recognizes, in an anarchic international system, all states are free, each in their own way, to seek the external projection of their interests. The author considers the state's duty to align internal and external interests, and it is the task of foreign policy to design an action plan that meets this imperative. Based on these considerations, what would, in the Brazilian case, be the element that makes it possible to align the internal national objective with the national external objective? As a premise to be verified, we begin by the idea that the search for national development is, precisely, the element that brings the coherence of levels to Brazil. However, before analyzing the way in which development is pursued by foreign policy, it is necessary to approach another concept in relation to it.

Several authors emphasize features peculiar to Brazilian foreign policy. Soares de Lima (2005), for example, identifies that the formation of Brazilian foreign policy is unique in Latin America because of its precocious formation. This is mainly due to the option of Imperial Brazil to use diplomacy – instead of the Armed Forces – in the delimitation of its national borders. The success of this endeavor marked in the Brazilian diplomatic service, from the beginning, the idea of an autonomous sector of the government, immune to the party cleavages characteristic of the political game and, therefore, marked by the continuity in general.

In this sense, Cheibub (1984) argues that the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) is endowed with a high degree of institutionalization, coming from four characteristics: adaptability, complexity, autonomy and cohesion. The result of this institutionalization would be similar to the one that was diagnosed by Soares de Lima: the characteristic continuity of foreign policy. Reinforcing this consensus, Altemani and Lessa (2006) start from the assumption that foreign policy enjoys continuity due to the relative *nonpartisanship*, which in turn is a consequence of the institutional insularity of an election ministry that is not attractive from the electoral point of view. Cervo (2008, 11) also points out that, in general, there is a mutual relation of influence between diplomacy, government and civil society. In the Brazilian case, however, the MRE historically chose to keep public opinion out of the formulation of national foreign policy, which, as a consequence, would lead to less pressure from it.

Spektor (2014, 19) adds that the continuity of Brazilian foreign policy is also due to the positive history attributed to the national diplomatic service. Such a history would be the result of the diplomacy's effort to defend the country's autonomy, which eventually raised allies and supporters "in the private sector and in the state apparatus, in left and right political parties, in conservative and reformist forces", granting the MRE a kind of "armor"

against governmental changes.

This continuity is important to understand Soares de Lima's observation (2005a), according to which the basic guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy remained practically unharmed throughout the twentieth century. Also, according to Miyamoto (2010, 9), the history of Brazil's foreign policy is not characterized by abrupt changes in its trajectory, but rather by conjunctural changes that, nevertheless, tended to maintain the essence of the external insertion of the country.

Aiming to consolidate theoretically such characteristic, Cervo (2008, 26-29) argues that this continuity provided the Itamaraty with an accumulation of guidelines, objectives, orientations and characteristics related to the foreign policy formulation process, the "historical accumulation of Brazilian foreign policy". This accumulation holds the theoretical bases on which the formulation of foreign policy is based⁴. Insofar as it is based on the conditions of institutional insularity of the MRE or the departure of Brazilian diplomacy from public opinion, the adoption of historical accumulation as a theoretical reference could weaken an international insertion based on Putnam's model (2010). A foreign policy away from internal divisions would not at first have reason to worry about the coherence of levels, since Level II would not have significant weight to generate the threat of involuntary defection of state actions abroad.

Although this may have been the case for much of the twentieth century, the current situation can no longer be described in these terms. According to Castro Neves (2006, 369-370), another factor responsible for the continuity of Brazilian foreign policy would be the "tacit consensus" among actors involved with it. This consensus, during the Empire and the Old Republic, would have revolved around the need for territorial demarcation; from 1946 to 1980, resided in the strategy of "import substitution". From the 1990s, however, factors such as globalization and the acceleration of information technology, *redemocratization*, economic openness, the multilateralization of Brazilian foreign relations or the promotion of South American integration would have put an end to this consensus, generating a greater interest of the internal public opinion on the directions taken by Brazilian diplomacy.

4 In a schematization effort, Cervo divides these bases into eight historically accumulated features of Brazilian external performance, namely: first, the defense of the principles of peaceful coexistence such as nonintervention, the self-determination of peoples or the peaceful resolution of conflicts; second, jurisdiction, that is, full respect for international legal norms and the defense of their observance; third, normative multilateralism; fourth, cooperative and non-confrontational external action; fifth, establishment of strategic partnerships; sixth, realistic and pragmatic performance; seventh, official cordiality in dealing with the neighbor; and finally, eighth, the search for development as a vector.

The heterodox development in Brazilian foreign policy

Adopting the notion of historical accumulation, the article assumes that, without detracting from the other seven characteristics listed by Cervo (2008), development as an objective occupies a central place in the formulation of foreign policy. This is easily verifiable in the literature. Although it cannot be considered the first major objective of Brazil's foreign policy as an independent country, Lafer (2009, 46) points out that after the Brazilian diplomatic service established the borders, decision-makers began to guide foreign policy through of national development.

The Baron of Rio Branco already had this idea in 1909, when he argued that the peace and stability conquered by the borders were necessary to guarantee "national progress" (Lafer 2009, 54). But it was with the rise of the developmentalist state of Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s that development was emphatically affirmed as a major national objective, both internally and externally.

Following the same line of thought, Hugueneu Filho (2005, 71) considers that after the Second World War, the Third World adopted a reforming model of development that required a coherence between the internal and external dimensions. This coherence took place between the adoption of a national internal development strategy and the orientation towards a foreign policy that had a dual function: to support internal development efforts and to combat the anti-development bias generated internationally by the developed countries.

For Altemani (2005, 1), it is mainly from the 1960s that foreign policy was properly tied to the national development project. As examples, the Independent Foreign Policy (PEI), in force during the governments of Jânio Quadros (1961) and João Goulart (1961-1964) had as goals the diversification of Brazilian commercial partnerships and the opening of new external markets, always in the name of development (Dantas 1962); with the exception of Castelo Branco (1964-1967), all military governments (1964-1985) sought to preserve the main characteristics of foreign policies of previous governments, such as nationalism and development as an external objective (Cervo, 331).

The governments of Sarney (1985-1990) and Itamar Franco (1992-1995) did not undo much of this trend. In the name of development, José Sarney's foreign policy was tied to macroeconomic stabilization efforts to contain the inflationary and commercial crisis that plagued the country in the 1980s, through the search for "multilateral and bilateral partnerships that would lead to mechanisms for insertion and cooperation capable of giving way to the exhaustion of the import substitution model, to the loss of competitiveness

and to the risks of marginalization of the country” (Albuquerque 2000, 367).

In his inaugural speech, Collor announced that his foreign policy “[...] must incorporate the best Brazilian diplomatic vocations. The contribution to peace and justice will be permanent. The struggle for development will guide the external action of the Republic at all times” (Collor de Mello 1990, 22). The difference with the predecessors, according to Cervo (2008, 22), are the means by which this development was sought. Instead of protectionism, diversification of partners, or state promotion of industrial vigor, Brazil’s adherence to the neoliberal wave of the 1990s included trade liberalization, focus on large traditional markets, and privatization as the means to boost the country’s economy and, as a consequence, the well-being of the population. In fact, the presidential mandate of Itamar Franco (1992-1995), unable to re-take the developmentalist practice of import substitution, sought to imprint the distrustful stance with which Brazil in the developmental years considered external development projects (Cannani 2003).

Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) also listed development as one of the central objectives of the Brazilian international action. Explaining the project of autonomy for the integration of the president, Luiz Felipe Lampreia affirms that “it seems correct to say that, in the case of Brazil, the main objective is to obtain external exchange elements useful for achieving the priority development goal in the broader meaning of the concept”. That is, only by seeking full integration into the world economic system could Brazil engender a process of sustained growth and development (Lampreia 1998, 8).

The persistence with which development emerged as the central objective of the foreign policy of the various Brazilian governments of the twentieth century is a strong indication of its centrality. It is essential, therefore, to understand the current concept of development. The complexity in defining this concept derives, in part, from the fact that it has changed much during the twentieth century. Regarding Brazil, for example, Arbix and Zilbovicius (2001) report that:

In a country of needs like ours, development has already been totem and taboo. With deep roots in the past, but embedded in the territories of the future, this concept throughout the twentieth century was an inexhaustible source of creation, protection and destruction of new images of the world, especially in backward countries. Under the rule of the state, it was insinuated beyond good and evil. Moments have erupted in pregnant feelings, involving rulers and ruled with the reasons of the economy. In others, however, he could barely disguise a cynical vacuum, which brought his elasticity of concept closer to that of a powerhouse of illusions (Arbix and Zilbovicius 2001, 55).

According to Sachs (2008, 30), reflections on development emerge in the 1940s in the form of efforts to promote the economic and social reconstruction of war-torn European countries. It is during this period that the discussion about development gains international force from the theses defended by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), such as the deterioration of the terms of trade, the center-periphery system, or the very notion of “underdevelopment”. The overcoming of this condition of delay was identified with a dual strategy of State action: internally, import substitution and weakening of the primary export model; externally, reform of the international economic system, with changes in trade rules and better distribution of resources. The success of this strategy was relative: at the domestic level, it succeeded in industrializing some economies like the Brazilian one, without, however, providing great progress in the social area; on the external plane, reform was barred by opposition from developed countries (Hugueney Filho 2005, 66-67). It was thus a notion of development more identified with industrial growth and the challenge of international structures; the social dimension was relegated to a second plane.

The 1970s were an important moment of transformation in relation to the concept of development. At the Stockholm Conference in 1972, the “ecodevelopment”⁵ aspect emerged, according to which not only economic growth and social concern should have a development strategy but also a responsibility for environmental preservation⁶. Thus, in the 1990s a new understanding was consolidated, with the emergence of the so-called “human development”⁷. This more heterodox view, however, was not able to achieve

5 In 1991, with the launching of the Brundtland Report, the abandonment of the ecodevelopment denomination and the adoption of the term “sustainable development” (ROMEIRO, 2012).

6 This process occurs concurrently with that of Latin America. The oil shocks of the 1970s, the debt crisis and the inflationary wave of the 1980s produced enormous adversities on the lives of the peoples of that region, and the process of redemocratization was the moment when civil society began to put more pressure on governments. Both ECLAC thinkers and international economists are more compelled to admit the need for “social debt redemption”, incorporating concerns about market efficiency into the imperative of better distribution of wealth, growth with social equity (HUGUENEY FILHO, 2005, p. 68-69).

7 At least one developmental aspect and another expression that summarizes the values and the priority subject of the same, the term has origins in the theoretical work of the Pakistani Mahbub UlHaq, with the collaboration of the Indian Amartya Sen. Human development ascends within a larger context of international conventions and conferences of a humanistic nature – it is the so-called “social decade”. Commissioned by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in 1990 the Human Development Report launched a series of annual publications which, through the Human Development Index (HDI), development processes in the world (OLIVEIRA, 2011).

consonance in the academy, remaining opposed to an orthodox one, whereby the development process is directly – and, in a way, exclusively – associated to the good performance of macroeconomic indicators such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), per capita income or employment levels (Medeiros 2010).

Despite the consensus about the centrality in the individual, there is a great heterogeneity of views within the heterodox line. Amartya Sen (2000, 28) argues that development is a process in which the widening of individual freedom of choice is observed. For him, wealth itself is proof of that since it does not contain its own value, truthfully it is nothing more than a means to attain happiness by the unlimited expansion of the freedoms of choice. Thus, it is a fact that mere economic growth cannot be the sole objective of any government, since it cannot bring welfare alone.

In fact, for Sen, growth cannot even be seen as the basis of development, since both processes would be complementary: the expansion of an individual's freedoms entails an increase in the capacities of the individual, such as the ability to work, earn income and consume. The author explains:

[...] the increase of human capacities also tends to go hand in hand with the expansion of productivities and the power to earn income. This relationship establishes an important **indirect linkage through which an increase in capacities directly and indirectly helps to enrich human life and makes human deprivations rarer and less pungent** (Sen 2000, 114, emphasis added).

Therefore, far from pursuing a merely moral approach, Sen argues that the end of inequalities through the expansion of individual freedoms is a powerful driver of economic growth and is the ultimate goal of development. The author outlines a development strategy that encompasses five related dimensions: economic opportunities, political freedoms, social faculties, guarantees of transparency and protective security. Being interdependent, investment in one dimension tends to bring direct benefits to others. In order to achieve the expansion of these freedoms, however, the government should focus its efforts on eliminating what Sen calls “sources of deprivation of liberty”, such as hunger, misery or social inequality (Sen 2000, 18).

Another heterodox author is Ignacy Sachs (2008), who proposes a three-pillar strategy: modernization of the producer core, growth in employment rates and action on people's well-being (2008, 88-89). His thesis is broad, covering variables such as culture, environmental sustainability, individual happiness, human rights, among other elements that must be included

in any national development strategy. Sachs argues that development needs to be thought in a multidimensional way, going through five dimensions: social, environmental, territorial, economic and political:

Equality, equity and solidarity are, one may say, embedded in the concept of development, with far-reaching consequences for economic thinking on development to differ from reductive economicism. Instead of maximizing GDP growth, **the larger goal is to promote equality and maximize the advantage of those living in the worst conditions, in order to reduce poverty, a disgraceful, unnecessary phenomenon in our world of abundance** (Sachs 2008, 14, emphasis added).

The present article adopts the heterodox aspect as its analytical vector. Insofar as the focus of the research lies in the Brazilian foreign policy and, being the majority attribution of the executive power, it is natural to consider that the understanding of development by government will be reflected in its external speeches and actions. Speaking at the conference of the Global Fund to Combat Poverty, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011) highlighted his social concern:

Combating hunger and poverty is not a utopian goal. It consists of the fight against exclusion and inequality, and in favor of social justice and sustainable growth. I am proposing a change of attitude. I am making an ethical and political call for the international community to work for a new concept of development, in which the distribution of income is not a consequence, but the lever of growth (Silva 2004, s/p).

Three elements should be emphasized: concern for social justice, mention of a new model of development that is seen as a “leverage for growth”, in rhetoric very similar to that of Amartya Sen, and the call to the international community, the Brazilian willingness to promote this broad vision of development in international forums.

In a similar speech, President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) points out before the UN General Assembly that in her first term the government sought to promote:

[...] the construction of an inclusive society based on equal opportunities. The great transformation in which we are engaged has produced a modern economy and a more egalitarian society. It demanded, at the same time, a strong popular participation, respect for Human Rights and a sustainable

vision of our development (Rousseff 2014, s /p).

In this way, both presidents have sought to associate the success of Brazilian development with the fight against poverty and inequality, not with economic vigor. These are convergent visions with the theoretical assumption presented here. As will be seen below, it is precisely the proximity to this strand that makes it possible to argue the expanded view of security adopted by Brazil.

These indications show that, both domestically and abroad, Brazil defends a heterodox view of development quite convergent with that adopted by this work. Independently of being complementary to or prioritizing the Brazilian development effort, it is a fact that foreign policy is a public policy entirely planned within the logic of achieving this goal. The historical picture presented earlier is the first clue, but there are others. Foreign policy is a broad public policy, encompassing various dimensions of action such as economic, diplomatic, security, among many others. One of the central hypotheses of the present article concerns the force of development as an objective: being preponderant, such objective conditions the planning of foreign policy as a whole. The focus of this article, however, lies in the influence of this objective on a specific foreign policy sub-area, international security.

The Brazilian view on international security

The conditionality of the Brazilian foreign policy planning in the international security subarea is evident. The analysis of the bibliography reveals that an enlarged - or holistic - security vision has as its main characteristic the fact that it identifies as threats problems commonly identified with the problem of development. This convergence results in an approximation between the fields of development and security, which can lead to the creation of strategies that suit both one and the other field. A relevant example of this logic is the element of poverty: isolated from the traditional security studies⁸, it is considered a double threat according to a broader view; direct threat, because it is an affliction to the human subject; and indirect, since it subjects the human being to other threats - diseases, for example (Schoo 2008, 3).

In general, one of the central concerns of the holistic security visions concerns the stability of a society. In this sense, one of the problems identified is unemployment. As a limiting factor in the distribution of income and

⁸ In short, "traditional security" refers to the realistic view of security, according to which only geostrategic and military elements fit into the analysis.

productive capacity in the country, unemployment constitutes a threat to the extent that it foments social declines (Dupas 1999, 195), where there is the possibility of disturbances such as informality and even the increase of criminality.

The analysis can go further. Studies on peace missions indicate that the stabilization of countries aided by external intervention is never fully achieved when the operation is limited to the achievement of negative peace (mere absence of armed conflict). Positive peace is only achieved when the country's economic growth momentum is boosted in order to ventilate the benefits of a sustained development process in society⁹.

It is evident that a holistic approach to security integrates problems such as poverty, misery, hunger and unemployment within the category of threats, whether for the State, for society or for the individual. The search for a coherent approach between economics and politics tends, in this sense, to generate a very interesting "developmentalist" approach to peace (Hugueneu Filho 2005, 76).

The coherence between the two aspects is important because, as Sloboda (2013, 98) argues, a country like Brazil must have a defense policy that is a middle ground between two realities: that of a country of continental territorial proportions, regional preponderance and considerable international weight; and that of a developing country suffering from serious social ills responsible not only for harming the well-being of the population but also endangering the stability of the country. The concern with threats stemming from underdevelopment is clear. However, the author also points out that the country cannot forget traditional security. This is a valid observation, since, as Proença Junior (2010) points out, although the international system has undergone great transformations throughout the twentieth century, it would be a mistake to assume that inter-state wars are things of the past.

The search for development cannot, therefore, sacrifice the Brazilian ability to defend its population and its interests from more direct threats such as war. Adopting a security approach that is consistent with both objectives is, as argued, an advantageous option. In addition, according to Buzan and Hansen, International Security Studies (ISS) have their objects of analysis defined not by events or by international politics, but by the scrutiny of theorists who study them and assign them or not analytical importance. Thus, issues considered relevant in the South of the world system - hunger, misery, unhealthiness - tend to be neglected by Northern theorists (Buzan and Hansen

⁹ In this view, fostering development works not only as a preventive measure against the emergence of social gradients that can foment conflicts; also helps in the implementation or maintenance of the democratic environment of the country (Oliveira 2011, 102).

2012, 100).

It would be incumbent on a State such as Brazil to promote these issues in the global security agenda, as well as in academia. For Sardenberg (1999), highlighting the more heterodox and less traditional vulnerabilities and threats present in the current international system - such as the socio-economic ones - is a good strategy for international insertion. In the author's words:

It is not easy to make proposals regarding emerging vulnerabilities and possible Brazilian attitudes concerning them. Many of them are already dealt with diplomatically, bilaterally and multilaterally. However, it would be very useful to promote a broad academic study and political debate that would allow us to evaluate the substance of each of these vulnerabilities, their possible interrelationships and possible ways of dealing with them at the international level, including, where appropriate, in our own United Nations (Sardenberg 1999, 172).

It should also be remembered that the conditionality of the national security planning to the development objective is geopolitical. According to Lafer, among the various "deep forces"¹⁰ of Brazilian foreign policy, Brazil's geographic distance from the world's poles of conflict has a great weight on our perception of security (Lafer 2009, 20).

In light of the positive aspects of adopting a holistic view of security, as well as the evidences of using this vision in previous presidencies, it remains to analyze how the governments of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) worked with this approach. Efforts to characterize the foreign policy of the Lula governments (2003-2010) are quite common. According to Dias (2014), the foreign policy of this period is characterized by a reaffirmation of several classic principles such as the preservation of national autonomy, the search for development, the pacifist nature, the defense of nonintervention, among others. (Dias 2014, 1). In addition, Soares de Lima and Pinheiro argue that Lula's foreign policy was a mix of traditional elements with innovations, resulting in an assertive stance and broadening of interests and ambitions possible thanks to the favorable international context of redistribution of powers (Hirst et al. 2010, 22).

Within the broad objectives, initiatives and guidelines that drove President Lula's foreign policy, a specific and quite evident characteristic is of central importance for this research: humanism, an element responsible for

¹⁰ According to Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle (1967), the deep forces can be understood as geographic factors, demographic conditions, economic forces and nationalism.

bringing Brazilian foreign policy of the 21st century closer to not only heterodox aspect of development, but also of the humanized notions of security addressed here.

Maintaining the continuity of previous foreign policies, Lula reaffirmed the goal of economic development, but according to Miyamoto, he innovated by adding the imperative of "social justice" (2010, 22). It is important to emphasize that this humanist orientation is not exclusive to its foreign policy; on the contrary, it worked in a way that would help a national social project of Lula (Penna Filho 2006, 356). This integrated nature of foreign policy to the national humanist orientation is evident in the speech of Hirst, Soares de Lima and Pinheiro:

Contrary to the recent past, when foreign policy was ancillary to macroeconomic stability and had the function of guaranteeing international credibility, today, proactive and pragmatic foreign policy is one of the pillars of the government's strategy based on another three pillars: **maintenance of stability economy; resumption of the role of the State in the coordination of a neo-developmental agenda; and social inclusion and the formation of an expressive mass market** (Hirst et al. 2010, 23, emphasis added).

Regarding Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) governments' foreign policy some considerations are inferred. Cervo and Lessa regard Rousseff's foreign policy as characterized by both continuity and a decline relative to the previous government. This relative decline would be caused by three factors: the loss of efficiency of the state as inductive agent; the absence of key ideas or concepts that would mobilize national action abroad; and the prejudice of the role played by BRICS (Cervo and Lessa 2014, 149).

One of the most important characteristics of Lula's foreign policy that remained in Dilma government was "[...] the expression of the will to contribute to international development with a transformative perspective linked to the reduction of the characteristic asymmetries of the world system" (Ayllón Pino 2012, 194, our translation). Nevertheless, as the Rousseff governments' foreign policy promoted an effort to maintain the general guidelines of the previous government, it can be argued that, similarly, neuralgic elements such as the humanist connotation were maintained, even with less intensity. The analysis of initiatives strengthens this idea. Cervo and Lessa provide two examples: first, during Rio+20, amid the discussions on environmental stability, Brazilian diplomacy has shown concern in inserting the fight against poverty in the discussion agenda; secondly, in the face of Chinese and Indian penetration in Africa, Brazil has sought to preserve its presence on the

African continent by using “soft power of cooperation in sectors of popular appeal, such as social inclusion, agriculture, education and health” (Cervo and Lessa 2014, 138-141).

Identifying this humanistic tendency in the foreign policy of both governments analyzed here is important, since it allows advancing the argument regarding Brazil’s expanded security vision. It is not difficult to find evidence of this view in the bibliography or even in government actions. According to former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, the quest for peace - one of the great universal goals - necessarily involves investing in diplomatic consultation and development (Sloboda 2013, 68). This notion that development is directly related to the security of countries appears several times in the speech of the two presidents. In 2004, during the opening of the XI United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), President Lula stressed that:

Eliminating hunger, reducing poverty and promoting sustainable development must be a concern of all countries, including the richest. This is an imperative if we are to guarantee peace and the effective fulfillment of human rights (Silva 2004a, s/p).

That is, the characteristic elements of heterodox approaches to development are, according to this view, imperatives for peace. This vision deepens in Lula’s speech at the opening of the LIX General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) in 2004:

In the last decades, asymmetric and exclusionary globalization has deepened the devastating legacy of misery and social regression, which explodes on the agenda of the twenty-first century. (...) **Only the values of Humanism, practiced with lucidity and determination, can stop barbarism. The situation demands, from the peoples and their leaders, a new sense of individual and collective responsibility.** If we want peace, we must build it. If we really want to eliminate violence, we must remove its root causes with the same tenacity with which we deal with the agents of hatred (Silva 2004b, s/p, emphasis added).

In addition to highlighting “Humanism” as a value, the president mentions a recurrent expression in Brazilian discourses concerning security and in academic works of the area: the “deep causes”. These causes would be the roots of conflicts and manifestations of violence within a country, such as poverty, unemployment, hunger and so many other elements worked through the broad security approach. The logic is simple: appeasing a conflict means

merely combating the “symptoms” of a deeper evil. Fighting the “disease” itself, ie the causes of conflict, requires attention to these root causes. Foreign Minister Celso Amorim explained these ideas in a speech at the UNSC session:

For my part, I wish to emphasize the need to develop new and better tools to address the structural problems at the root of the tensions that lead to violence and conflict. Poverty, disease, lack of opportunities, inequality. These are some of the causes of conflicts, particularly those within countries, which are, regrettably, increasingly part of our agenda (Amorim 2004, s/p).

The expanded view on security advocated by Brazil is even more evident when it is used as an argument for the reform of the UN Security Council, one of the major national objectives. In the words of former President Lula, “Brazil wants an expanded Security Council, in which we can defend a security approach based on the links between peace, development and social justice” (Silva 2006).

As mentioned, the presidency of Dilma Rousseff did not represent a disruption with the basic assumptions of the previous administration. On the contrary, in security matters it reaffirms these assumptions. Opening the LXVI General Assembly of the United Nations, the President demonstrates this continuity:

For at least three years, Mr. President, Brazil repeats, in this same forum, that we must combat the causes, not just the consequences of global instability. **We have insisted on the interrelationship between development, peace and security and that development policies are increasingly** associated with the Security Council's strategies for pursuing sustainable peace. This is how we act in our commitment to Haiti and Guinea-Bissau (Rousseff 2011, s/p, emphasis added).

Also the Foreign Minister, Antonio Patriota, reaffirms these principles. During the Security Council High Level Meeting, he mentions that:

We believe that peace results from collective efforts to build fair societies. We have emphasized the interdependence between peace, security and development. We know from experience that stability and security are rarely achieved where there is social exclusion (Patriota 2011, 313).

The analysis of the speeches is important, since it reveals the princi-

ples that govern the foreign policy of Lula and Dilma¹¹ presidencies. Even so, the speeches alone are insufficient to affirm with certainty that Brazil, in fact, adopts a comprehensive vision of international security.

The National Defense Policy (NDP) is the highest-level government document, responsible for listing the principles, objectives, and actions of national defense. Launched in 2005 by the Lula government, the document brings such determinations as the distinction between security and defense, cooperation between diplomacy and the Armed Forces, and greater participation in UN peacekeeping operations. In 2012, the Dilma government proposed the new National Defense Policy (NDP), which, among other things, ratifies internally what foreign policy already ratified before: the expansion of threats to encompass those of an economic and environmental nature (Sloboda 2013, 50-51).

Although not specific in its statements, the PND provides some evidence that its understanding of security converges with the expanded approach worked out here. Regarding the security approach, the PND testifies to the need to target other security subjects beyond the State when it says that the concept of “security” traditionally starts from the idea of

(...) confrontation between nations, that is, protection against threats from other political communities or, more simply, external defense. As societies developed and the interdependence between states deepened, new demands were added. Gradually, the concept of security was expanded, covering the political, military, economic, psychosocial, scientific-technological, environmental and other fields. Preserving security requires broad-spectrum measures, involving, in addition to external defense: civil defense, public security and economic, social, educational, scientific-technological, environmental, health, industrial policies. In short, several actions, many of which do not imply any involvement of the Armed Forces (Ministério da Defesa 2012, 1-2).

Another important indication appears in the National Defense Strategy (NDT), a more closed document in the area of defense and strategy, with issues focused on the restructuring of the Armed Forces or investment in the defense industry. Although, at the outset, it does not explicitly mention an expanded approach to security, the document clearly states in the first pages that

¹¹ Discourse Analysis is characterized, among other elements, by the concern to identify the relations between the text, discourse or statement with its surroundings. Its discursive approach assumes that all speech is conditioned by the author, who in turn is conditioned by the reality that surrounds him, by the social construction that contains it. Language cannot be dissociated from social interaction (Rocha; DeusdaráOCHA 2005).

the “national defense strategy is inseparable from the national development strategy” (Ministério da Defesa 2012a, 8).

One more example is the principle of “non-indifference.” Equally defended by the Dilma government, this concerns an update of the classic non-interventionism, according to which the sovereignty of a country is inviolable, and any intervention of external countries in the internal affairs of a State is considered illegitimate. Non-indifference, on the other hand, seeks to insert an exception to the rigidity of this rule by stipulating that, to the extent that a country plunged into chaos calls for the support of the international community, countries would have a responsibility to intervene for the good of the population. This action, once requested by the government of the country in crisis, would not constitute, according to this view, violation of the principle of nonintervention. For Hermann, Brazil understands that the legitimacy of this principle resides in an element already emphasized in President Lula's speech and in academic analysis already mentioned here: “humanist solidarity” (Hermann 2011, 204-206).

A similar principle, but not proposed by Brazil, is Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Accepted by the UNGA, but not yet effective as an international legal norm, the principle changes basic assumptions of the institute of state sovereignty: from an absolute and inviolable right, it becomes a state responsibility for the well-being of its population that can be charged by the international community. If a State is negligent in protecting or threatening its population, it is up to other countries, under the auspices of the UN, to interfere in the country and remedy the situation. Unlike non-indifference, R2P claims to be an automatic norm, causing diplomats from countries in the South such as Brazil to accuse it of approaching the “right of interference” (Dias 2014, 6).

Against R2P radicalism, the Dilma government promoted “Responsibility to Protect”. This new principle advocates the need for countries engaged in peacekeeping missions not to worsen the situation of the local population. The constant monitoring by the Security Council of respect for human rights by the intervention troops becomes an imperative (Patriota 2013, 158). Although it still presents itself as a not very specific concept in its recommendations, Responsibility to Protect denotes the characteristic humanistic concern of Brazilian foreign policy.

Thus, it can be argued that the expanded view of Brazilian security, which is concerned with linking security and development and with a strong humanist concern, is clear in the discourses, planning and actions of Brazilian diplomacy, revealing an active foreign policy in promoting this idea between 2003 and 2016. Nevertheless, a more effective way of evaluating the extent to which Brazil follows this approach is to analyze empirical situations

of its practical application.

The humanization of the international agenda in the post-Cold War era had repercussions in the field of security. In 1994, UNDP released the Human Development Report, stating that an international conflict, beyond its state dimension, is also human. Thus, the converse would also be valid: every human crisis, as a consequence, would have to be seen as an international crisis (Sloboda 2013, 38).

Sen (2000, 115), one of the theorists linked to human security, mentions that social inequality can undermine social cohesion, creating the risk of dangerous conflagrations to the stability of society. Sachs (2008, 15), dividing the concept of sustainable development into five dimensions, argues that in the social dimension there is a risk of disruption, a perspective that “looms threateningly on many problematic places on the planet”. This idea of social stability as an element closely related to security is not infrequently transplanted to the systemic level. For Jaguaribe (2013, 2), among the various challenges that characterize the international reality of the 21st century, we can mention the increasing asymmetry between the political North and South, a situation stemming from persistent extreme poverty in the southern part of the globe. would generate global insecurity.

Nef (1999) argues that linking security and development already existed prior to World War II. However, the Cold War was responsible for separating these two domains in different axes: the first in the East-West contention, the second in the North-South slope. Unrelated, security and development would be incomplete for the author, and their meeting is necessary through the concept of “mutual vulnerability”, according to which poverty generates insecurity that is not governed by the geographical or political divisions of the world. Efforts to extinguish the sources of global destabilization would be the responsibility of all countries. What makes this reading possible is interdependent globalization. Understood beyond its narrow reductionist view on trade and financial flows, globalization focuses on the faster and more comprehensive spread of information. For authors such as Nye (2009, 312), the combination of an unequal world and the rapid dissemination of information is problematic. Thus, in the post-Cold War period,

with the shift from security to internal problems, such as civil wars, ethnic conflicts, the struggle for natural resources, etc., **security and development could no longer be seen from a zero-sum perspective, but from a non-zero sum perspective**, with possibilities of winning and losing together (Oliveira 2011, 85-86, emphasis added).

The understanding that poverty and inequality are elements that can bring dangerous systemic destabilization alone would be enough to argue the imperative need to update security approaches to more holistic and coherent notions with a much more complex reality than that characteristic of the bipolar years. However, there is yet another element, characteristic of the post-Cold War era, which urges states to reject more and more classical approaches to security: the “new threats”¹². It is understood here that Human Security is a fundamental principle to be analyzed, within the ESI aspects. The choice is justified by the fact that Human Security is the most politically successful side, that is, the one that best penetrates the decision making and international political discussion. This is due, in large part, to the strongly institutional origin of Human Security as a theory, since its emergence took place within the UN - more specifically, within the UNDP (Buzan and Hansen 2012, 306-307).

As with the other broadening threads, Human Security emerged in the context of the post-Cold War era. Insofar as it seeks to defend the notion of interconnected threats beyond the military universe, apart from associating security, development and human rights, Human Security could not have arisen in previous decades, where the rigid bipolar agenda would block such a proposal (Oliveira 2011, 74). The main premise of Human Security (SH) is the displacement of the subject to be secured, of the state - denying the State centered emphasis of Strategic Security Studies - to the human being. According to Osorio (2012), Human Security

(...) could be seen as a kind of prevention with a greater objective of valorization of the human person so that it could (sic) freely potentialize its capabilities without barriers of war, poverty, hunger, natural disasters, physical violence and diseases, among other possibilities of degradation of the human condition (Osorio 2012, 7).

That is, once the subject of security changes, so do the threats to be considered. For Cepik (2001, 14), the problems that Human Security must address “would shift from the ability to neutralize predominantly military type threats to the neutralization of threats to human life that are the result of environmental degradation, economic instability and the disintegration of social ties”. If the state is threatened by war or terrorism, one needs to add to

¹² The term refers more to the innovative way in which such threats are dealt with, since their occurrence dates back long before the end of the Cold War. Basically, it refers to all kinds of threats that run counter to the classic security model, which only considered state threats such as war.

this list hunger, misery, disease, political oppression, etc. The result is a more complex approach to security, with five characteristics: focus on people, multisectoral planning, comprehensive approach, concern for adaptation to each specific situation and oriented towards prevention before deterrence (UNTF-HS 2009, 7-8).

In terms of acting strategy, Human Security offers two possibilities, both mutually complementary: protection, that is, the act of shielding people against threats that are beyond their control, such as natural disasters or conflicts; and empowerment, an action that seeks to develop in the individuals of a society resilience against indirect threats such as hunger or unemployment.

Another important feature of Human Security is its double character. The paradigm is centered on guaranteeing freedoms to human beings - in thinking very close to Amartya Sen's "development as freedom" -, and these freedoms are grouped into two broad groups: freedom from want and freedom from fear. The first refers to the objective of "protecting people from the vulnerabilities of underdevelopment," while the latter seeks to "protect them from the physical violence that arises from wars and civil conflicts" (Bazzano 2014, 43). More than an analytical concept, Human Security pretends to present itself as a guiding operational concept of a country's public policies. This claim has led the concept to relate to two elements: development, focused on the strategies of empowerment and on the scope of freedom from want; and sovereignty, working more with protection strategies aimed at guaranteeing freedom from fear (Oliveira 2011, 73).

One of the hypotheses of the present article suggests that the adoption of Human Security as State rhetoric would be beneficial for the international insertion of Brazil, theoretically qualifying the acceptance of the expanded model of Brazilian security. This assumption is based on the premise that Human Security proposed a theoretical construction so close to the model proposed by Brazil that the convergence between the two would be easy and beneficial to foreign policy.

According to Krause (2004, 43-44), rather than an analytical concept, the adoption of human security by Brazilian foreign policy is a term of force of speech and enormous political appeal, being more successful in politics than in academia. Suhrke (1999, 1) adds that the success of the concept is due to the fact that it evokes progressive values. Another positive aspect, argued by Buzan and Hansen (2012, 311), is that Human Security is a useful concept for developing countries insofar as it can be associated with the more general criticism of neoliberalism as a policy of development - since Human Security proposes measures to strengthen the State for the well-being of the individual. It is not difficult to understand Human Security as a convergent rhetoric

with the aspirations of developing countries, inasmuch as this approach, in its broad perspective, presents conflict prevention as intrinsically linked to the eradication of poverty, something that Brazil has already defended for a while.

A third element concerns Putnam's model of international insertion (2010). As previously noted, it recommends that states align their objectives internally and externally, as well as the means to achieve those goals. In terms of international security, it was argued that expanded security and its developmental focus would be the appropriate means of achieving this level coherence¹³. Since Human Security has a theoretical construction aimed at reaching freedom from want, emphasizing the relationship between development and security, the convergence with the Brazilian model is possible. However, as analyzed, it is a theoretical construction still in progress and the operationalization of Human Security in terms of human development is still problematic. In addition, the paradigm has a second dimension, freedom from fear, and this other face brings risks that inhibit the adoption of the concept as a whole.

In objective terms, what the southern countries of the world system fear is the indiscriminate use of the concept of Human Security in order to legitimize the military presence of Northern countries in the periphery. On this, Hermann (2011, 194) argues that the engagement of Brazilian diplomacy over concepts such as Human Security or the Responsibility to Protect is necessary to participate in the process of defining these concepts, avoiding that they fall into the interventionist logic. Brazil has already done this by complementing R2P with the concept of Responsibility when Protecting. Regarding Human Security, it would be pertinent for Brazil to combat the overvaluation of freedom from fear to the detriment of freedom from want.

Human Security is a concept that, despite recommending humanitarian intervention if the State is unable to protect human rights, has a strong commitment to prevention. It would be a good idea if Brazil exalted the preventive characteristic of the concept in international forums: once there is human development in the countries, humanitarian intervention is hardly necessary. For a country like Brazil, only freedom from want is interesting, and freedom from fear should be seen as a last resort, not as the first. This caution with regard to Human Security is the position of Brazilian diplomacy towards the concept. For Celso Amorim:

In considering the individual as the center of security concerns, he be-

13 As Schoo (2008, 2) reminds us, Human Security offers an interesting bridge between the internal and external levels, working the interdependent relationship between a country's security in the international system and its internal threats.

comes a subject of international law, like the States. In this perspective, “human security” could justify preventive measures for the protection of individuals, falling under the same interventionist framework of the right of interference and the responsibility to protect (Amorim 2003, s/p).

Thus, it can be concluded that Human Security, despite being a concept of strong political and progressive appeal, does not present itself as a positive state rhetoric, since its full consolidation as an international rule carries the risk of state interference in the internal affairs of countries where poverty, insalubrity or unemployment are still relevant problems. In the end, Human Security could lead to a dangerous process of securitization of the most varied issues, a situation in which “the Security Council’s action in almost any area of international relations would be legitimized” (Neves 2010, 34).

Final remarks

The argument proposed throughout this article was thought in a linear way, with the theoretical elements articulated in order to demonstrate the coherence and validity of the Brazilian conditioning of its security thinking to the development objective, along with other subareas of its foreign policy and with other public policies at the domestic level. In addition to identifying the bases of this assumption, the work also sought to highlight its positive aspects and its limitations for the Brazilian international insertion.

Consequently, analyzing theoretically and empirically the Brazilian reality had as its objective to confront the hypothesis that development as the ultimate foreign policy objective conditions Brazil’s international security planning. To this end, we examined the development on two fronts, from its role in foreign policy and conceptually. Historically and gradually, development has been affirmed as the main objective of foreign policy since the time of the Baron of Rio Branco, becoming, therefore, one of the standards of conduct presented by Cervo (2008) in its historical accumulation - that is, the development is at the very basis of Brazilian foreign policy, acting as a deep force. The benefits of this, according to Putnam (2010), come from the consistency of levels that the setting of this end by foreign policy represents, since it is the same objective of all domestic public policies of the country.

The historical analysis of the way in which the concept has been taken over the Brazilian governments since the 1930s has shown the changing configuration with which the term was used, sometimes referring to the opening of external markets, sometimes referring to the universal fight against misery (alternating between the orthodox view and the heterodox view). At the

same time, it has been understood that the very concept of development has changed much over the last century, and that the humanist heterodox strand of development is very close to the rhetoric of the 21st-century PT governments.

Progressists, the foreign policies of the Lula and Dilma governments, the focus of the present analysis, deepened the notion of development present in its formulation. It is notable that the foreign policy of the Lula government has emphasized the values of humanism as guiding principles of development strategies, as well as presenting huge convergences with Amartya Sen's thinking that investing in human capacities is a lever of economic growth, rather than a mere consequence of it. The same concerns are observable in the speeches of Rousseff's government, marked by continuity with relative decline in relation to the previous one.

However, the discussions presented here demonstrated that the heterodox development can be attributed to the Brazilian foreign policy when it defends the universal fight against poverty, promotes the humanization of security, proposes developmentalist notions of conflict resolution or promotes the integration between diplomacy and the necessary Armed Forces for executing social projects in unstable areas (such as Haiti, for example). This was a statement that could not be made with much assurance about the governments of the last century.

As another several areas of the Brazilian diplomacy, it can be stated that international security is also conditioned by the preponderance of development in foreign policy- added to geopolitical issues such as regional stability. This conditionality can be perceived, in the Brazilian part, in a comprehensive, broad or holistic concept of security, that goes beyond the merely strategic or military scope, by including in its planning developmentalist elements such as the fight against poverty and the identification of socioeconomic illness as threats to the stability and security of the country.

The holistic planning manifested itself on the speeches of governmental agents and official documents relative to national security (the National Defense Policy and the National Defense Strategy) and in the actions of Brazilian diplomacy- militancy in the United Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, promotion of the Responsibility to Protect and so on. In the field- or, according the preference of some strands, "theater of operations"- this planning translated into the humanitarian and social actions of the Brazilian army in peace missions.

It can be concluded that Human Security is a concept that needs to be better faceted and its use is subject to debate, since it is so much closer to the right of interference, rejected by Southern countries. This would represent

the denial of the hypotheses that since Brazil has a comprehensive vision of security closer to the concepts of Human Security, that it would gain from adopting it. However, this rejection can further a concern: if by securitizing social economic problems Human Security clears the way for interventionism, wouldn't Brazil be doing the same with its holistic vision of security? This cannot be discussed here, but it leaves the door open for possible future research and debates.

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ABSTRACT

Since the mid-twentieth century, Brazilian foreign policy has been gradually inserting into its agenda the concept of development (alternating between an orthodox and a heterodox view) as a fundamental motto of action. Other sub-areas of Brazilian diplomacy have become conditional on development, especially international security. Presenting social aspects of development and Human Security as intertwined since the 1990s in Brazil, the article analyzes theoretically and empirically the foreign policy the governments of Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). Taking as its main goal to verify the validity of such hypothesis, the article concludes that this conditionality is coherent with Brazilian socioeconomic and geopolitical reality, but that its proximity to Human Security must be taken with caution.

KEY WORDS

Brazilian Foreign Policy; Development; Human Security.

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THE DOMESTIC PROFILE OF THE MACRISTA DEFENSE POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL INSERTION: MORE CONTINUITIES THAN CHANGES

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Introduction

In recent times, the changes that have taken place in South America show the gradual but rapid decline of the leftist turn and the ideas that supported it. In Argentina, Mauricio Macri's coming into power is a convincing example of this, particularly regarding the strategic-military dimension of International Relations through changes in the profile of the external Defense Policy.

Argentina once again looked to Washington to develop this external profile, leaving behind the autonomous discourses that defended South American unity in matters of international security through political dialogue as a fundamental tool. The dissolution of the former subregional geopolitical axis is functional for the recomposition of the bond with the US, strengthening hemispheric security and defense architecture and for relaunching relations with European states and Israel.

However, to weigh the impact that this strategic change may bring into the international insertion related to the external profile of Defense policy, it is necessary to review its domestic dimension linked to the management of the sector. This is due to the understanding that Defense Policy is specified at the interface between both national and international dimensions (Dillon 1988, in Diamint 2014: 31). Therefore, the chances of an impact on integration are

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linked to the fact that the strategic change is anchored in a solid political leadership of Defense issues, which in the case of Argentina implies answering the chronic problems of the capabilities of the Armed Forces and the need that they should be planned based on an accurate determination of their role.

Consequently, this article proposes to reveal the central guidelines of the internal dimension of the defense policy of the Macri government, to envision its effects in terms of international insertion in the short term. For this, in addition, the analysis should articulate some reflections on the Kirchnerist management of the defense sector, to indicate continuities, adjustments and changes between the two administrations.

The Armed Forces at the center of the scene

The configuration of the domestic profile of the Defense Policy is indicated by the directives guiding the management of the sector in general and, in this respect, the clearest orientation of the Macri administration is the explicit and public recognition of the importance of the military institution and its role, as well as the government's desire to establish a positive link.

In this sense, political rhetoric is overwhelming and Macri and Defense Minister Julio Martínez emphasize the need for the Armed Forces (FFAA) to take care of borders, air space and the continental shelf to develop the axes proposed by the government (Ministerio de Defensa, No. 217/16). And they also assert that they will be considered an integral part of the state and respected by the government because its role in democracy is very important, not only in the strategic field but also in the operational one (Ministerio de Defensa, Nffl 184/16).

Moreover, this political rhetoric has a counterpart in the level of actions with a symbolic content that positively affects a part of the public opinion and its recognition. Thus, we can point to the performance of the military parade on July 9, as well as other commemorative events, including veterans of the Malvinas (Falklands); the president's attendance at the anniversary of his escort regiment; the salary increase of up to 40% for the personnel of the three Armed Forces as part of a process of hierarchy and salary recovery and the creation of a line of mortgage loans for the first domicile for the members of the Forces.

Therefore, there is an adjustment of Kirchner's policy in relation to the sector, consisting of opening a new stage in the bond with the Armed Forces, which is perceived as an opportunity to express their needs and, consequently, is well received (Ministerio de Defensa, No. 165/16). This observation, it should be clarified, is made considering that the Kirchner administration at-

tempted to generate interest in citizenship in defense issues and to increase ties with the specialized academic community (Calderón 2016). This policy, defined by the Executive and articulated by the Ministry of Defense, marked a change in the sector's approach since returning to democracy, giving it greater visibility and granting a more comprehensive and specific treatment, characteristic of a public policy. And this occurred within the framework of official rhetoric about the return of the State and its interference in National Defense issues. However, the Kirchner administration did not bestow a prominent role to the Armed Forces as an institution.

As noted then, the Macri government continues with this line of action, although adjusting it to the idea of seeking a place of importance directed to the military institution as an operational instrument of Defense in terms of form and with a symbolic meaning, but also of substance and with implications for the management of the sector. Therefore, in this case, we can point to the existence of continuity with adjustment, and not change.

Likewise, it should be noted that this particular issue raises doubts in some sectors of society regarding the future of civilian supremacy over the Armed Forces and the political conduct of Defense (Verbitsky 2016). They originate and are accentuated by some designations that raised questions and the issuance of decree 721. However, it is also true that such doubts should be analyzed by weighing all the factors involved in the configuration of the current scenario of the Armed Forces as part of the institution of a democratic State.

So, to close this first point, the Macri government's challenge seems to be to guarantee the achievements of civilian supremacy over the Forces and, at the same time, to generate a political management of the Defense. The formation of specialized civilian effectives should be a medium and long-term goal. This is an issue that has long been identified as one of the great debts of the sector's management (Diamint 2012), without underestimating the experience of the Armed Forces and the articulated work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior commanders of the different Forces.

The recovery of the Forces' operational capacity as a goal

Continuing with the configuration of the domestic profile of the Macrist defense policy, a second line of defense policy is related to the intention of recomposing the capabilities of the Armed Forces to make them operational through the acquisitions and production of the national defense sector. As a result, statements about the poor state of the Forces' capabilities, which are

qualified by themselves as precarious, disarmed and with considerable technological backwardness, are frequent (Ministerio de Defensa, No. 9/16). And, given this scenario, the government ensures the beginning of a response path and these proposals are already being evaluated to make purchases in different countries, but that an immediate large-scale investment is impossible due to budgetary difficulties and social emergencies (De Vedia 2016).

Beyond the political commitment and the official rhetoric, in the months that the government of the Macrist has been in place, some signs can be observed about the will to concretize such a policy line. These include: assistance to FIDAE; the evaluation of the incorporation of medium-sized aircraft for the Air Force and the State Airlines and also of armored vehicles used by the Blue Helmets; and the statements regarding the future use of the condition that Argentina has as an extra NATO ally for a re-equipment of the Forces (De Vedia 2016).

Likewise, with regard to acquisitions already materialized or close to being so, there are also new developments such as: the purchase of 20 Italian AB 206 helicopters for the Army Aviation, 10 GAU-17 machine guns for arming and 5 stretchers (Ministerio de Defensa, Nff170/16); the communication from the US Department of Defense approving the sale of 24 T-6 Texan II training aircraft (Szklarz 2016; La Nación 2016); the future purchase of Israeli aerial surveillance balloons Skystar (Szklarz 2016); the signing of an agreement by which Fabricaciones Militares will manufacture 9 mm Beretta pistols for Gendarmerie and Prefectura; and, in addition, the Army through the Military Attaché in Washington asked for a quote to make a direct purchase of 27 Carl Gustaf guns, 2 ground surveillance radars, various spare parts and parts for the fleet of aircraft and other military equipment, 61 inflatable boats Zodiac type and 2 multipurpose speedboats (Porfilio 2016). Finally, it is worth mentioning that 4 speedboats were procured from Israel, as well as systems for border control (La Nación 2017).

In general terms, most of these materials are likely to be destined to the reinforcement of the surveillance and control capabilities of the national territory linked to the priority of the fight against drug trafficking, terrorism and organized crime, considered transnational threats that affect the sovereignty of the states. However, if we look at the purchases projected in the framework of the government's multi-year recovery plan for military capacity for 2017 (Obarrio 2016), we can see a diverse scheme of acquisitions that, at a glance, do not respond to a unique standard of planning of the Forces.

On the other hand, and as part of this defense policy guideline, in addition to acquisitions, the Macri government focuses on the production of the National Defense industry as an input channel for the supply and im-

provement of the capacities of the Forces. In this sense, it is possible to indicate a point of contact regarding the Kirchner government and to notice the ongoing increasing value of the defense industry. It implies a different path from the one laid down in the Law of Restructuring of the Armed Forces on the stimulation of interest and private intervention, and which accounts for the relaunching of the role of the State and the definition of Defense as linked to national development. And this, despite the distorting effect of the acts of corruption that, specifically in the area of Defense, had their most worrisome manifestation in the situation of Fabricaciones Militares and the criminal complaint for the lack of ammunition in Fray Luis Beltrán, that confirmed the existence of a parallel channel of manufacture and sale (Ministerio de Defensa, No. 71/16).

As pointed out, in general terms, it can be seen that in recent years, some strategic progress has been made in the country, linking Defense to technological development. Thus, INVAP (Applied Research Society of the State) designed and produced three-dimensional long-range radar and monopulse secondary radars; (ARC) and AR-SAT (Argentine Satellite Solutions Company) completed the launch of the SAC-D “Aquarius” and AR-SAT and the Tronador II Satellite Injector Project. In addition, one can refer to the various presentations made by the Macri government regarding the achievements made by the defense sector in projects managed and developed by the previous government. This circumstance is explicitly recognized by the Ministry of Defense, indicating, moreover, the deficiencies and problems inherited in a sense that, although much has been accomplished, there is still more to be done, considering the many projects that have started but have not made progress, and others which have begun to some extent, but with many difficulties.

In this sense, although the government seeks to diminish the tone that was grandiloquent to what Kirchnerism presented as a recovery of the defense industrial complex, it is also true that it does not diminish the process initiated beyond its insipidity and complications. It is also important to emphasize that the link between the defense industry and national development is maintained as a valid premise, highlighting the social role played by the bases in the villages where they are inserted, the region’s economic movement and the generation of genuine labor force. And there are also the statements on the positive impact that this may have in the face of Argentina’s commercial link with the world, reflected for example in the demonstrations that had the authorities of Spain and China when visiting the CINAR with respect to their interest in working jointly in this particular space (Ministerio de Defensa, N°177 / 16).

In this context, to promote this second line of defense policy as part of a policy that can be sustained over time, it is important to have a balanced analysis of the current scenario. In this sense, we must consider the starting point of the almost complete destruction of the national industry and the achievements and proposals of the previous administration with its deficiencies and weaknesses. In addition, the fact that the gap to be filled in terms of capabilities is extremely broad for the Armed Forces, even if we take as a reference the states of the subregion, and in addition, the evolution of the defense industry and technological developments at the level of medium and large powers. Regarding this last issue, we must also consider the need to involve a level of public spending much greater than the existing one.

Particularly in relation to the military budget, it is worth remembering the criticism given to the Kirchner governments that opposed the formal political-institutional proactivity that characterized their management of the sector and the inadequacy of defense expenditures (Battaleme 2014; Corbacho 2009; Escude 2014; Ugarte 2012). This adaptation is essential, considering that the capabilities of the Armed Forces are going through a situation of extreme fragility that, for some years, seriously compromises its performance as a force instrument capable of being used. In this way, such formal political-institutional proactivity combined with a broadly deficient budget, even if only to maintain the minimum capabilities and resources of the military institution, results in the management of the sector without tangible content. In this sense, it is necessary to say that the intentions to modernize the Forces are far behind as it has been proposed since the late nineties. Therefore, if the Macri government intends to manage the area as a public policy and recognize the Armed Forces' strategic and operational role, it must find a way to materialize such political will in a complex economic context.

Finally, with respect to both acquisitions and the production of the national industry, it is essential to direct them according to a specific planning of the required capacities. In this sense, it will be necessary to observe if the government resumes the 2011 PLANCAMIL, draws up another different plan or decides to make individual acquisitions to match the needs of the Forces that present themselves as structural and demand a systematic plan adjusted to transform the institution into an instrument capable of being operated for the tasks entrusted to it. Regarding the latter, we must not lose sight of the fact that the main mission of the Armed Forces is the National Defense, which has been blurred because the deterioration of capabilities transformed the Forces into an instrument that is practically impossible to be employed. A significant example of this situation is the withdrawal of the Mirage III C and V without having an effective replacement. Also, the dominance of secondary

tasks taken by the military institution, situation that was reinforced during the Kirchnerist governments, seems to continue during the first year of the Macrist government without major alterations. This occurs despite the fact that the Executive rhetoric distances itself from undervaluing the sector, and reinforces the need to count on Armed Forces prepared for the Defense.

The strengthening of the secondary tasks of the military institution

Returning to what has been said in the previous section, we can point out as the third line of the Defense Policy of the Macrist management the prioritization of the effective development of the secondary tasks of the Armed Forces. In this sense, the Macri government has strongly pointed out that military action is central to combating drug trafficking through the protection of borders, assistance in emergency situations and national and international catastrophes and to maintain the presence of the country in the UN peace missions. That is, three of the four complementary tasks that are currently governed by law for the Armed Forces.

Related to that, in his first year of mandate, multiple actions have been undertaken linked to the participation of the Armed Forces in support operations for the national community or friendly countries. In this way, tasks related to aid in emergency situations related to logistical support, the movement of people, provisions and vehicles, food and medical support and informative tasks were carried out in the national context (campaign against dengue, zika and chikungunya in Buenos Aires, Misiones and Corrientes, and against hepatitis B in Comodoro Rivadavia, operations against the floods in Santa Fe, Corrientes and Entre Ríos, avalanches in Mendoza and fires in Chubut, and the repair of a school at 3000 meters high in Jujuy) as an international (earthquake in Ecuador).

The promotion of the Armed Forces participation in UN multilateral operations is also highlighted. In this sense, the relevance of peacekeeping operations in Haiti and Cyprus have been recognized as instruments that collaborate with the country's foreign policy (Ministerio de Defensa, No. 176/16), whereas facing the peace process in Colombia, different meetings have been held and statements have been made that run in the direction indicated by the national government to increase the participation of Argentina through its Armed Forces (Ministerio de Defensa, Nffl217/16). We must also bear in mind that this is a process widely supported by the international community and by the US in particular and that an effective participation of Argentina in

such a complex scenario as the Colombian one can be beneficial and help to better position ourselves in these subregional matters.

However, regarding the issue of Peacekeeping Operations, we must not lose sight of the fact that they are currently changing their nature by losing the principle of neutrality to become stabilization missions in urban environments, intervening in favor of a certain national sector. In this context, it will be necessary to observe to what extent the Macri government is committed to increasing the participation of the Armed Forces in missions where they cease to be neutral. If there is an increase in participation in these conditions, we could then speak of a continuity with adjustment in relation to the previous administration.

Continuing with the development of the complementary tasks of the Forces, one can also observe the continuity of the involvement in the fight against drug trafficking within the framework of the participation of the Forces in internal security operations foreseen by the Internal Security Law. However, this ongoing continuity with some adjustments seems to close an issue gap initiated in 2011, with the implementation of Decree 1091 that created the Plan Escudo Norte and Fortín II and that was deepened with the changes implemented as of 2013. Although such deployment did not legally imply the cancellation of the difference between security and Defense, it initiated the mentioned gap based on different doubts generated by the configuration of delicate scenarios with a high potential to blur such differentiation. And this is enhanced by the fact that there was no counterpart to a scheme of reasonable use of the available radar infrastructure (Calíbar Report 2016).

Now, the arrival of the new government and the publication of Decree 228 that declared the Emergency of Public Security emphasizing the care of the border through a joint and articulated work of the Ministries of Defense and Security (Ministerio de Defensa, Nff148/16), would be closing the gap with respect to the participation of the Forces in the fight against drug trafficking, confirming it in a forceful way. In this sense, the Border Operative proposes to complete the radar monitoring of the 100% of the airspace and for 24 hours a day and is complemented by the Aerospace Protection Rules. This comes in addition to the inauguration of modernization works in the Resistance Area Control Center, the deployment of Tucano Air Force aircraft and the investment to modernize and install new radars and the acquisition of more equipment (Ministerio de Defensa, Nff161/16).

However, an attempt can be made to preserve the difference between security and Defense by deactivating the joint patrols of the Forces and Gendarmes and Prefecture and the deployment of large numbers of military personnel in the field. Thus also performing joint operations covered by Article

30 of the Defense Law that allows declaring as a military zone the areas that must be submitted to military custody and protection, and Article 27 of the Internal Security Law that grants the Ministry the support of the Armed Forces in security operations by affecting their stockpile, stewardship, health, veterinary, construction and transport services.

On the other hand, the basis for giving priority to this specific secondary task seems to be found not only in the needs coming from the national reality, but also in the American requirements as well as in the government's decision to address them. This would indicate an adjustment in relation to the Kirchner administration if we remember that Néstor moderated and Cristina froze, though without cutting, the collaboration with the US on the fight against drug trafficking. In this way, with Macri, this issue returned to the top of the agenda and cooperation and information exchange programs were re-established, including as part of the agreements signed during Obama's visit.

However, this willingness to strengthen ties with the US to address the problem of drug trafficking should be put into perspective because the government has shown interest in cooperating with other countries and in this regard, for example, there was an agreement to exchange information sensitive with Israel, it is negotiating the purchase of technological material and cooperation agreements for the assistance of security forces in computer systems with Spain and is developing something similar with Brazil. Even, the international dimension of the Plan Argentina sin Narcotráfico (Argentina without Drug Trafficking) also demonstrates the vocation to reach agreements of technical and operational cooperation with other states (Dinatale 2016).

Finally, there is a fourth and last secondary task that was established in 2006 and which establishes the participation of the Forces in the construction of a Subregional Defense System. Regarding this point, the Macri government has given strong signals of a change of policy with respect to the previous government whose model of International Defense Policy had a cooperative dimension to be concretized through a logic of concentric circles that indicated the priority of South America as the area of external action. And although from a formal policy formulation perspective there is still no public document that marks a precise course regarding the central definitions of the international policy of the defense sector, the official rhetoric and some gestures and specific actions allow us to suppose that one of the fundamental premises is the privilege of the global sphere over the regional and subregional one. In this sense, Martínez stated that we are experiencing new times that demand that we open ourselves to the world and have concrete relationships with real events that allow us to advance in mature relationships with all

countries (Ministerio de Defensa, N°41/16 and 120/16).

Some preliminary reflections on the first year of Macri government

Considering the survey conducted on three of the central guidelines of the internal dimension of defense policy articulated during the first year of the Macri government, it was observed that, with respect to the Kirchnerist presidencies, continuity predominates although with different adjustments. In this sense, circumscribing the analysis to the second and third management guidelines, it is still unclear which direction will be given to military acquisitions and the production of the national defense industry which, in turn, is linked to the preponderance or not of secondary tasks over the national defense mission. Getting back to the argument that an impact in the international insertion can be gained by a political handling of Defense that answers the critical doubts of the sector, it is too early to envision if the strategic turn that is taking place in Defense policy with the arrival of Macri into power can deeply affect the “stance in the world” that Argentina has (Paradiso 2007).

In this context, the key to the analysis is to follow carefully the way in which the recovery of the capabilities of the Armed Forces is managed, and this for two reasons. In the first place, as long as this recomposition does not happen, the international changes that may occur will hardly have a significant impact. In relation to this, and from a realistic perspective, it is difficult for other states to be interested in the international insertion of Argentina if it cannot generate concrete consequences for them, regardless of their trends. This applies both to possible out of region and subregional partners because it cannot be ignored that the gap to be filled in terms of capabilities is extremely wide, even in relation to the South American states.

Secondly, the recomposition of the capabilities of the Forces is a central indicator because depending on the decisions made about military acquisitions and the direction of national industrial production, it can be estimated, beyond political rhetoric, whether the will of the Executive is to prioritize the main mission of the Armed Forces to the detriment of the secondary tasks, if the opposite is done, or if alternatives are explored that allow the institution to recover capacities in both senses in a reasonable manner.

Regarding this and considering what was achieved in the first year of the Macrist government, particularly with regard to the projected acquisitions to be effective in the short term and to those being analyzed, as already anticipated, it seems that priority is being given to strengthening the

surveillance and control capabilities of the national territory in line with the relevance of the fight against drug trafficking. A decision in this sense could well be accompanied and contained by a broader military plan with a future projection that puts such resources in tune with the needs of the National Defense, also taking into account the complexity of the country's economic situation. Such a decision, consequently, would result in the recovery of material military capabilities to implement an operational strategy focused on denying access to the territory and national airspace, as some specialists propose (Battaleme 2016). Likewise, an approach like this would be consistent with both the premise of the government that transnational threats affect national sovereignty and that is why it is necessary for the Armed Forces to be involved in their combat in the border areas as with the defensive defense model established by Kirchnerism. In addition, it would imply closer cooperation ties with neighboring countries for the control and surveillance of common borders, generating mechanisms that optimize the use of resources and improve the realization of those tasks. Finally, this would result in a concrete improvement in terms of international insertion for Argentina in terms of the subregional scope, but also with the rest of the world through the projection of a positive image linked to the commitment of the State in the fight against the non-traditional threats and the seriousness conferred to the protection of national sovereignty.

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ABSTRACT

The Domestic Profile of the Macrista Defense Policy and its Impact on terms of International Insertion: more continuities than changes

Based on the modifications in the external profile of the Defense Policy of Argentina, with the accession of Mauricio Macri, this article highlights the central premises of the internal dimension of such a policy with a view to glimpsing the effects in terms of international insertion in the short term.

KEYWORDS

Defense; Macri; International Insertion.

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THE REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX OF SOUTH AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE SOUTH AMERICAN DEFENSE COUNCIL OF UNASUR

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Introduction

The present article is a result of an investigation about the Regional Security Complex (RSC) of South America, which is implied in the discussions about defense and security in the region, more specifically, since the creation of the South American Defense Council (SDC), within the framework of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), a south American integration project that was created in 2008, starting from the signature of *UNASUR Constitutive Treaty*, and which had as signatories twelve south American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Since its creation, the SDC boosted the debate regarding its objectives and its own nature. Thus, for example, during the process of “articulation and negotiation” of the Council, at least three visions about these objectives came up: the vision advocated by the Brazilian government, which “defended that the SDC articulated measures for the creation and the strengthening of mutual confidence, for the exchange of military personnel in formation and [...]

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the defense industrial integration” (Abdul-Hak 2013, 20); the vision defended by the Venezuelan government, which “pointed out to its insecurity sense concerning extra-regional threats, defending an alliance of collective defense” (Abdul-Hak 2013, 20); and the Colombian government’s vision, which “insisted in the treatment, within the scope of a potential SDC, of the combat to the narco-guerrilla and terrorism” (Abdul-Hak 2013, 20).

More than a discussion about the objectives of a SDC, the established debate reflects the controversies that were present between the different south American countries regarding the model itself of the regional defense and security system that was intended for South America. It cannot be forgotten that, especially from World War II on, the whole South America was integrated to the North American project of defense and security for the region, undermining, in this sense, the importance of the south American particularities to the detriment of a “geostrategic and geo-economics conception of the Americas as only one continent”, “led” by the United States (Cabral 2010, 2).

If this historical heritage of South America’s relationship with the US stands as an obstacle to the proposal of a “defense and security regional system”, capable of being articulated from the South American countries’ historical particularities and not necessarily from an “universal agenda” based on predominant interests of a global power (which is the case of the US), it is necessary to note, also, that the constitution of UNASUR itself, integrating all South America’s countries, does not stand for a homogenizing vision of the region. Thus, for example, while in the Andean region “the presence of political, territorial and economic antagonisms involving neighbor countries such as Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela had been producing latent animosities, putting at stake the regional stability” (Rodrigues 2015, 2) in the Southern Cone region, there is no historical record of this kind of antagonism and conflict.

Therefore, it is in this sense, that this article resulted from an investigation that aimed at analyzing not only the different visions of regional security systems present among UNASUR signatories countries, but, mainly, which model of RSC has become hegemonic in the historical process that resulted in the creation of the SDC.

It is important to bear in mind that, still during the 20th century, the studies about Regional Security Systems have achieved a prominent position in the international context. The military operations that happened in World War II made possible the elaboration of regional concepts in the security scope, also permitting that other military operations and political actions were developed within the framework of local and regional particularities. During the Cold War, the subjects related to the collective security system, represent-

ed by the United Nations (UN), were conditioned to the superpowers and to the state-members influence in the Security Council (SC). Besides, as the world was divided in two great blocs, the regional systems were influenced by such bipolarity, and, as result, the main regional actors had only a relative degree of strategical freedom (Cabral 2010).

Hence, it was only in the last decades of the 20th century that the regional dimension gained prominence in international relations. If, in a first moment, the end of the Cold War was interpreted as a terminal crisis of the bipolar system and as “the possibility of the instauration of a unipolar system led by the US, being this the only power with global strategic capability” (Vigevani, Correa and Cintra 1998, 4), the posterior events contributed to the US-led unipolar thesis to remain only as a theoretical possibility (Vigevani, Correa and Cintra 1998, 4).

These aspects of the international conjuncture contributed, in the scope of the theoretical discussion about defense and security, to the emergence of the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). A theory which defines the RSC as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 44).

Particularly regarding integration in the area of defense and security arising from the negotiations involving UNASUR, the discussion on the RSC model gains importance not only because of the peculiarities of the region and its historical relationship with the United States but, also, due to the political changes that, since 2000, have occurred in practically all Latin American countries. It shall be considered, still, that South America does not constitute a homogenous bloc, whose countries have the same characteristics and face the same problems. Although the historical situation of economic dependence may represent an approximation point, the historical rivalries, the political presence of organized crime, the internal violence (resulting from trafficking-related crimes, from corruption, from poverty and from inequality), the presence of indigenous movements in the Andes and in Amazonia, the amazon region and its international importance, etc., make of South America a complex region, marked by regional and national singularities, turning it difficult the elaboration (and the execution) of a common integration agenda in the areas of security and defense.

In this context, the creation of UNASUR itself and the related SDC, which had Brazil as a protagonist country (Cabral 2010), met the interests of Brazilian governments from the 2000s on strengthening integration processes among Latin American countries, establishing relations with other coun-

tries in a South-South perspective, opposing to unilateralism and supporting multilateralism, but also, through leadership in the region, to project itself internationally, affirming itself, therefore, as a relevant regional actor, capable of occupying leadership positions in the international forums (Dias et al. 2015).

In this sense, the different aspects of Latin America's recent conjuncture, with an emphasis in the direction given to the foreign policy by Brazilian governments from the 2000s on, highlight the importance of comprehending which conception of RSC oriented the concrete experience of the creation of UNASUR and, particularly, of its SDC.

The RSCT: concept and comparative analysis of the South-American RSC

The adoption of cooperative measures among countries with objectives specially connected to defense and security shows itself as important and necessary in order to guarantee regional stability, to avoid potential threats which may bring insecurity levels not witnessed previously; but also, in order to international insertion projects of a group of countries gain more visibility and more respectability in an international context (Pagliari 2009).

Also within this context of integration projects building among countries, the discussions regarding "regionalism" became more relevant, once the countries – specially those directly involved in regional integration projects – paid more attention to their geographical surroundings, also as a way to amplify its voice in the international community, making it possible, thus, the maximization of its insertion in the international scenario. As states Pagliari (2009), "regionalism" "[...] provided a greater space of autonomy, so that regions themselves could focus on their security agendas [...]" (Pagliari 2009, 13).

As a result, the studies about Regional Security Systems gained more importance in the international scene, particularly in the last decades of the 20th century, even though, in a Cold War context, issues related to security systems remained conditioned to the superpowers and to the influence of the UN Security Council's states-members. In this way, due to the fact that the International System (IS) was classified as bipolar, due to the influence of two great blocs – the capitalist and the socialist –, the regional systems remained subject to such polarization, which limited regional actors' strategic freedom (Cabral 2010).

With the end of the Cold War, the emergence of regional security projects permitted the occurrence of some changes in the analysis of glob-

al security systems, since the end of bipolarity represented a transformation in international security related issues and needed adjustments, in order to avoid the rise of new global conflicts. Moreover, it was from that period on that the deepening and the integration of many regions were strengthened through mutual confidence in the areas of security and economic and social development (Cabral 2010).

In this context, the RSCT emerges, being a result of a theoretical construction connected to the Copenhagen School, more specifically, to two international relations theorists: Barry Buzan (1946 -) and Ole Waever (1960-). The Copenhagen School was born in the 1980s, in a context of rising concerns, in the whole Europe, about the subjects related to security and defense. From then on, it became a reference in international security, owing much of it to the theoretical production of these authors. In spite of the school focusing its studies in European security, the authors embrace regional security of the whole planet (Nobre 2013).

Buzan and Waever have the merit of building an analysis about security and defense in the IS context that presupposes that geographical proximity facilitates the generation of common interests between different countries; highlighting, then, the geography as an important dimension in international relations dynamics, from which arises the argument that it is not possible to comprehend the security and defense dynamics in the international level and in post-Cold War period without considering the phenomenon of regionalization.

Furthermore, Buzan, since the 1990s, insists that the end of the Cold War did not only boosted a greater interest (political and theoretical) in the security and defense related issues, but also that military security does not stand anymore at the top of the agenda, signaling, still, that the issues related to the historical comprehensiveness of regional identities became more relevant (Fagundes 2014). In this sense, it is important to bear in mind that the Copenhagen School not only enhanced a greater discussion about security and regionalization, but also contributed to, in the scope of security and defense, new dimensions gain more visibility.

The RSCT aims at explaining why states engage in relations of cooperation and reciprocity. According to its formulators, the theory derives either from the anarchical relations established among the composing structures and its balance of power, or from the pressure existent due to the geographical proximities. Hence, we may affirm that the RSCT fits within the framework of reciprocal relations sought by the states and seeks to comprehend how it occurs the securitization processes' dynamics in the IS (Cardoso 2010).

Buzan and Waever defend that the theory was developed in order to

explain that the regional level is the most proper one to undertake a security analysis. The core argument is that there are two extremities to analyze security: the national and the global. The national security *per se* does not represent a level of analysis which may be considered as significant, given that security is a relational phenomenon. According to the authors, “[...]no nation’s security is self-contained” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 43). The global security, on the other hand, is a state which the countries aim to achieve; thus, it is not a “real phenomenon”, since the IS is not integrated in security terms. Differently, in a determinate region, defense and security become more important, seen that a country’s security does not occur in isolation, without considering the region itself. In this way, the regional level is where national and global level interact and where the great majority of actions take place.

Teixeira (2013), whereas analyzing Buzan’s and Waever’s studies, justifies this bigger interaction between national and global security in a regional level with the argument that there is a greater detachment of the great powers in local and regional conflicts, due to the great expenses involved in these kind of disputes. Thus, “local logistics favors regional rather than global relations as the interactions between neighbors are more relevant in the political calculation of security than the global relations [...]” (Teixeira 2013, 5).

This fact confirms what Buzan and Waever (2003) describe in their theory: that the securitization processes and, therefore, the interdependence levels in the area of security are more intense and better perceived among states of the same RSC rather than the interaction of these states with others that are not in the same complex or that are even more distant from them.

The RSCT seeks to interpret the post-Cold War polarity system and how it works in the IS, where there is the presence of diverse regions, formed by states and whose main difference lays in the security aspect. Besides, this theory aims at making a distinction between the interaction level of the great powers, which are capable to transmit their power through long distances, and the smaller ones, that is, those powers whose power transmission capability and whose security dynamics remain restricted to the region in which they are inserted (Fuccille and Rezende 2013).

Even though we may observe the influence of great powers within regions, the remarkability reached by the RSC after the end of the Cold War is owed to the changes in the international security pattern, which became more flexible, opposing, thus, to the pattern that was followed between the years of 1945 and 1991 (Buzan and Waever 2003). In this sense, we may affirm that the fact of states being inserted within a RSC presupposes a maximization of security of each one of them, since these units and, consequently, their security issues find themselves interconnected.

The security concept brought by Buzan and Waever has a great importance in international security and regionalization in security IS related studies. It cannot be forgotten that the importance given to regionalism and its security were not limited to military and warlike issues, since the emergence of “new issues” (considered by International Relations theorists as equally important to the dynamics of the international scenario) allowed the global delineation of new kinds of threats. Among these new threats, we may mention the environmental issues, the terrorism, the drug-trafficking, the extreme poverty and the disordered population growth (Fagundes 2012).

According to Teixeira, it is in the regional level that the relationships among states become more powerful, even though the region is connected to the global sphere – being such relationship also considered important for its development and its consequent projection in the international scene. It is necessary, therefore, to construct a security environment where conflicts may be solved and threats pushed away, in order to make the cooperation among members which constitute determinate regional integration organization feasible, as well as the distribution of attributions in defense and security politics (Teixeira 2013).

It is important, therefore, to affirm that the RSC seek to comprehend how securitization processes in the IS work and are established through a regionalist approach (Fuccille and Rezende 2013). A securitization process presupposes a series of emergency measures taken by a state in order to solve problems that may threat national interest or even the survival of such state in the IS. In this case, those measures may be justified as “exception actions, as human efforts and extraordinary budgets, to the consecution of public politics, restrictions on consecrated rights e unusual rising of secret and confidentiality procedures” (Cardoso 2010, 28-29).

The securitization process occurs, for example, in sectors like the military and the political and has as its function the protection of IS’ actors. Thus, the security relationships have as a characteristic the way in which measures will be taken in order to balance potential threats (Cardoso 2010).

According to Buzan and Waever (2003), in a RSC, the processes that cover it are interconnected, hindering, then, an independent analysis and understanding of the security problems faced by the countries that compose it. However, even though all the issues involving security related problems refers to a determinate region, the IS and its polarity continue to interfere; in other words, the events that permeate the international scene and that influence in the decision-making process of the RSC should also be taken into consideration (Fuccille and Rezende 2013).

From these considerations, a RSC may be conceptualized as “a set of

units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 44).

The RSCs have their definition based on amity and enmity patterns, which end up forming the security interdependence patterns geographically defined. Furthermore, the particular characteristic of each Complex is directly linked to the historical pattern of its components, as, for example, the history of enmities between countries and even military, economic or cultural partners (Buzan and Waever 2003).

For a group of countries to be considered as a RSC, it is necessary that its interdependence degree is enough either to consider it as an interconnected set, either for it to be differentiated from the others in security terms. In Buzan’s and Waever’s words, “RSCs define themselves as substructures of the international system by the relative intensity of security interdependence among a group of units, and security indifference between that set and surrounding units” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 48).

The authors explain that the idea of the security interdependence being focused on the regional level derives from the power of the units, that is, in the capacity that a determinate state has to establish more or less security around the world. The superpowers tend to spread their security relationships all around the world, not fitting, therefore, in the logic of geography and proximity. The smaller states, on the other hand, possess limited capabilities, which diminish its security relationships with closer neighbors, strengthening the regional, differently from the great powers, that end up undermining the regional.

The logic between global powers’ distribution of capabilities and the dynamics of a RSC is within the so-called penetration, as explained below:

Penetration occurs when outside powers make security alignments with states within an RSC [...]. Balance-of-power logic works naturally to encourage the local rivals to call in outside help [...]. Such linkage between the local and global security patterns is a natural feature of life in an anarchic system (Buzan and Waever 2003, 46-47).

In this case, the RSCT tends to limit the role of great powers, so that local factors receive the required weight regarding an analysis in terms of security. Thus, “the standard form for an RSC is a pattern of rivalry, balance of power, and alliance patterns among the main powers within the region: to this pattern can then be added the effects of penetrating external powers” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 47).

Seen that, the essential structure of the RSC may be identified, which has four variables: the borders, which differentiate one regional complex from another; the anarchical structure, that is, a RSC must be composed by two or more autonomous units; the polarity, that is, how the power is distributed among the complex's units; and the social construction, which indicates the pattern of amity or enmity among the units (Buzan and Waever 2003). It is important to highlight, also, that there are different patterns in the relationship between states, emerging, then, two poles: the chaos, which refers to the enmity pole, and the amity pole, that is, the one of the security community (Medeiros Filho 2010). About this issue, it is also important to mention that:

[...] the security relations between states (usually neighbors) would be, in a greater extent, determined by the mutually perceived threat/fear pattern [...] the patterns may vary from a conflicting relation (power politics) to an amity model (political convergence). Between these two extremities, rising order of amity, Buzan suggests as intermediate patterns the coexistence and the cooperation (Medeiros Filho 2010, 57; own translation).

It is important to note that Buzan and Waever define two basic types of RSC based on the optical of power distribution, 1) *the standard* RSC; 2) *the centred* RSC, being this latter subdivided in unipolar centered in a great power, unipolar centered in a great power or when the region becomes an actor itself due to its elevated degree of institutionalization (Buzan and Waever 2003).

The *standard* RSC has as its main characteristic the absence of a power with action in a global level within the complex. As a result, the rules applied to the composing states, or even to allow the entrance of global powers in the complex, are defined by the relations among the states that are part of that same complex. Besides, in a standard complex, the polarity will be exclusively defined by the member-states, varying from uni to multipolar (Buzan and Waever 2003).

On the other hand, in a *centred* RSC, there is a power with global action, which may concentrate the majority of the existent capabilities in the complex. This power may be a great power, a superpower or even an institution (Buzan and Waever 2003). According to Fuccille and Rezende (2013), the theorists suggest the inclusion of an extra option in the *centred* RSC category, since they cannot classify it within any other; such option refers to a *unipolar centred* RSC, when a regional power cannot be considered as a great power in a global level.

Finally, and following the description of what is a RSC, one may note

the fact that South America is free from nuclear threats, being considered as a security region, once it can be observed the interdependence among the countries that compose the region and that, as a consequence, that the region forms a RSC, since the interactions between them constitute themselves as a security pattern.

Possibilities and limits of a South American RSC model

The analysis presented by Buzan and Waever regarding the RSC is greatly respected among researchers and scholars that study defense and security related issues in integration processes among countries not only due to the emphasis attributed to the regional dimension, but also due to the presentation of different RSC models, contemplating the south American experience.

More recently, however, and from UNASUR's constitution on, some authors that occupied themselves with the defense and security issues in integration projects among Latin American countries have sought to discuss the reach of Buzan's and Waever's analysis regarding South America's RSC.

It is the case, for example, of Alexandre Fuccille and Lucas Pereira Rezende, who analyze the RSC in South America, in a dialogue with Buzan's and Waever's proposal, show not only the limitations in their theory, but also, some outdated conceptions in the model proposed by Copenhagen School's theorists.

Fuccille and Rezende seek to update descriptions of polarity in South America, as well as to discuss the Brazilian protagonism and the "currently active institutions with potential securitization profile" in the region, defending that the role of Brazil as a protagonist in South America makes the South-American RSC one first model of *centred RSC*, despite the absence of a nation with global leadership:

[...] being unipolar in the region, and from a protagonist role agreed upon by the United States of America (USA) at a global level, although faltering, Brazil has a role of centralizing the two South American subcomplexes, the North-Andean and the one of the Southern Cone. This makes the RSC to be described as *centred*, with the unipolar power not being a global power, inaugurating, then, a first empirical case of such kind of RSC (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 78; own translation).

The Brazilian protagonism in South America, according to Fuccille

and Rezende, has different implications for the configuration of the RSC in South America. The first of these implications is strictly connected to the description of a RSC and refers to the Brazilian condition in the region, that, in spite of not being a power in the global scenario, dominates the regional security dynamics:

It becomes necessary, then, in order to comprehend the proper categorization of South America's RSC, to observe whether Brazil, as a unipolar power, thrives to dominate the security dynamics of the region. Our hypothesis [...] is that yes. And this is due to two reasons: (1) having its position relatively diminished in US' priority agenda, South America becomes more free to explore the regional security dynamics. As the US penetration gets smaller therefore, arises the possibility of a great protagonism of new actors. Such protagonism is, however, compromised, since the global level continues to influence the RSC; (2) from this consented autonomy, Brazil starts to exert a great protagonism in the RSC, bringing the security agendas of both subcomplexes even closer (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 85; own translation).

According to the authors, the creation of UNASUR and of its SDC, besides of Venezuela's entry into MERCOSUL as a full member, shifts the possibility of an institutional cohesion in the region (now centered in UNASUR), opening up greater possibilities for Brazil, from UNASUR, to play the leading role in creating a security community involving all South American countries (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 85). Thus:

[...] these two factors contribute to the possibility of delimitating a change in the South American RSC, but not towards a division of the region in two distinct subcomplexes, as sustained by Buzan and Waever (2003); rather, towards a *centred* RSC, with Brazil assuming the unipolar role. This would qualify South America's RSC as the only category that these authors present, but do not identify any case: a RSC *centred* in which the pole is not a great global power. However, although *centred*, it is an instable RSC, due to Brazil's hesitant performance as the center [...]. (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 85-86; own translation).

The analysis made by Fuccille and Rezende is based in a set of assumptions, from which they do not categorically affirm a Brazilian protagonism in South America, but, rather, the importance of the Brazilian protagonism in order to consolidate a South American RSC. In this sense, some of the assumptions ought to be listed in order to later advance in a discussion regarding the conditions and possibilities of a RSC in South America.

A first assumption is related to the changes that took place from the last decades of the 20th century on, namely, changes in Americas' security model that predominated in the Cold War period and in which the US remained as fully hegemonic. The end of this period, a "growing disengagement of the US in the region", as well as North American new priorities in the post-September 11 period, "ended up consolidating an imaginary in South America of a possible geographical space and capable of developing more independent policies, as a result of a greater autonomy margin" (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 86).

The rise of left-wing governments in South America, alongside with the alterations in the international security agenda in the "post-September 11", created favorable conditions for actions aiming at the establishment of a South American RSC to make sense in the beginning of the 21st century. It was from these transformations on that, during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil (1995-2002), but, mainly, from the rise of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003) to the Brazilian government, South American governments walked towards the creation of UNASUR and, through it, the institutionalization of a SDC (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 87).

Over the process of discussion and institutionalization of UNASUR and its SDC, different issues were raised, not only by Brazil, but also having Brazil as a protagonist: the issue of drug-trafficking in the region, the sub-regional conflicts (Peru and Ecuador), the interest in obstructing the "Bolivarian impulses", the interest in avoiding an "arms race" in the region, the consolidation of the South Atlantic as a region of peace – free of nuclear weapons and important for the Brazilian projection in the IS –, the resistance to the materialization of a development policy in the region led by the US, the Brazilian interest in consolidating a foreign policy with new directions (South-South relations), focusing more in the South American integration (Fuccille and Rezende 2013).

It was based on this perspective that, according to Fuccille and Rezende, a dynamic of integration was consolidated, having UNASUR as the objectification of such dynamic, which walks toward the formation of an "only RSC", a centered model, insofar as Brazil (though with frailties) thrives to aggregate the two South American subcomplexes:

Brazil's unipolarity in South America implies a *centred* RSC, whether the country assumes the position of guarantor of this or not. It is in this point that one [RSC] differs from a security community: for the first one, there is no need to exist harmonious relationships, as long as the security dynamics of the region are centered in one actor. Even though sometimes [...] Bra-

zil lacks maturity as the guarantor of regional institutions, all of the main regional security dynamics have, somehow, passed under Brazilian aegis (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 93; own translation).

Regardless of that, the discussion about the possibilities of consolidating a South American RSC – whose roots may be found in the establishment of the Brazilian hegemony in the region, as presented by Fuccille and Rezende – sheds light in the existent frailties that difficult such project to take place, being these derived either from latent issues in South America, either from issues that gained visibility in the last years, especially those regarding the crisis of the left-wing projects, which, in the beginning of the 2000s, have risen to the national governments.

On the other hand, it might be equally important to mention that, from the second decade of the 21st century on, political ruptures can be observed in different South American countries, pointing out to a crisis in the period of left-wing governments in the region and to the rise of political and social forces committed to a neoliberal political and ideological orientation.

This period of ruptures and/or discontinuities in South America began with the destitution of Fernando Lugo from the Paraguayan presidency, in 2012, in a process that, although considered as legit by the juridical authorities of the country, was condemned and considered as illegitimate by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, creating an international diplomatic crisis among the South American countries that are members of MERCOSUR and UNASUR – whose members, in its great majority, refused to accept the destitution of Lugo from the Paraguayan presidency.

In sequence, the death of Hugo Chávez, in 2013, and the political (and economic) crisis faced by Venezuela since then, the election of Mauricio Macri in Argentina as President of the Republic and, especially (due to the Brazilian protagonism), the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, in 2016, symbolized the crisis of the development projects that guided governmental politics in many of the South American countries from the 2000s on, committed to the reduction of social inequalities, to a greater economic integration of the popular social classes and the laborers, to regional integration processes capable of consolidating a South-South perspective; moreover, they expressed changes in the national governments' politics, now more with more affinity with the neoliberal perspective. More than a crisis in the development projects, the aforementioned events marked the possibility of a new period in South America, with a greater alignment with North American (especially the US) and European countries.

The transformations occurred in Brazil since the impeachment of

Dilma Rousseff, with its respective repercussions in the country's foreign policy, are certainly an important conditioning, due to the representation that Brazil has in South America, for the analysis not only of the (future) dynamics of UNASUR and its Defense Council, and of the possibilities of setting up a South American RSC (with Brazil as the main country); but also for a better understanding of the limits and difficulties that have arisen, since its origin, in the discussion and implementation of regional defense and security policies in South America.

The South-American Defense Council

As previously mentioned, the South-American continent does not face conflicts of great proportion, neither direct enemies that may threaten its security. From the end of the Cold War on and since the re-democratization process, the Brazilian Armed Forces live in a historical condition in which its functions are not well defined, seen that, on one hand, there is internal resistance regarding its intervention in the public security and, on the other hand, the presence of external enemies in the region remains distant not only from Brazil, but also from South America (Abdul-Kak 2013).

The regional integration is one of the factors that contribute to enhance confidence among countries that belong to a same region, being able, then, to reduce the number of conflicts and to ensure that solutions to potential controversies are negotiated and resolved in a peaceful manner.

In this sense, UNASUR shows itself as an important organ when it comes to security and defense in South America. Not only for standing as an instance of political discussion among South-American countries, but also and because, in its own constitution, proposes that the member-states shall articulate joint actions, exchanging information and experiences in defense matters, as well as establishing combat strategies to possible terrorist actions, to arms and drug-trafficking, to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, to the transnational organized crime, etc. It is interesting to observe, in this sense, about defense within the scope of UNASUR that:

[...] the aim is not to achieve integration in defense, but rather to establish the exchange of information and experiences in defense matters, what can be seen as a first step to construct a common thought, being such thought capable of providing a basis for the common strategic formulation, implying, if and when achieved, a greater autonomy of the region in defense issues (Mathias and Matijascic 2011, 237; own translation).

This is, therefore, one of the guidelines that oriented the creation of the SDC itself within the scope of UNASUR. A Council that was created during a meeting of the Council of Heads of State and of Government of UNASUR, taking place in Salvador, in December 16 of 2008. On this occasion, apart from the SDC, other Councils were created, as well as Working Groups, aiming at a better coordination of the work dynamics in UNASUR (Unasul 2008a).

Brazil had a differentiated importance in the creation of the SDC, being considered as its biggest advocate. However, one must consider that the creation of the SDC, within the framework of the discussions that resulted in the creation of UNASUR, had its normative benchmark based in three Presidential Declarations, which resulted from meetings with the objective of creating an integrative agreement between South-American countries: 1) The Political Declaration of MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile, of 1999, which resulted in the creation of a “Zone of Peace”; 2) The Declaration on the South-American Zone of Peace, which resulted from the Second Meeting of Presidents of South America, of July 2002, and was ratified by Resolution of the United Nations’ General Assembly, in November of the same year; 3) The Declaration of San Francisco de Quito on the Establishment and Development of an Andean Peace Area, of July 2004, ratified by a Resolution of the UN’s General Assembly, in December of the same year (Abdul-Hak 2013, 140).

The result of this discussion process became materialized in the First Conference of Defence Ministers of the South-American Community, which took place in 2006 and whose commitments were based on:

[...] the development of information and intelligence exchange mechanisms, academic exchange, capacitation and training actions, exchange of experiences and scientific and technological knowledge regarding the industry of defence, and the realization of bilateral or multilateral meetings among the members of the South American Ministries of Defence (Abdul-Hak 2013, 140).

In 2006, within the scope of UNASUR, the security and defense related issues were already on the agenda and, moreover, the importance of a “regional security doctrine” was already thought of, as well as the creation of some responsible institutional instance.

Possibly, in the discussion of the own constitution of UNASUR, a series of demands regarding defense and security were being made by the representatives of South American countries. Demands as the ones indicated by Medeiros Filho: “maintenance of peace and democracy in the countries of

the region, construction of a South-American geopolitical identity, combat to organized crime and creation of a regional defense market” (Medeiros Filho 2009, 3).

It is interesting to note that, in the documents available at UNASUR’s Digital Repository, the discussions of the year of 2007, aiming at the Constitution of UNASUR, defense and security did not have a significant place. This, evidently, does not mean that the matter was not being discussed. Regardless of that, it is only in the register of an Extraordinary Meeting of Heads of State and of Government of UNASUR, which occurred in May 23 of 2008, that one may find an explicit reference to the subject. In such Meeting, the then President of Brazil, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, proposed to establish the SDC, when, then, was suggested the creation of a Working Group (WG) to analyze the proposal of the Brazilian President. The protocol from that meeting registers that the proposal for the creation of a WG was expressively backed up “by some countries and was finally approved” (Unasul 2008b), registering, still, that the President of Colombia, although agreeing with the creation of the WG, affirmed that its country could not participate of the initiative, “given the current circumstances derived from the terrorist phenomenon” in that country (Unasul 2008b).

The potential non-participation of Colombia in the WG that was established to discuss the creation of a SDC was not confirmed. The protocol of the XIII Meeting of the of the Council of Delegates of UNASUR, that took place in Santiago of Chile, in August 11 and 12 of 2008, registers that the WG on the SDC had already made two meetings, with the presence of all UNASUR’s members and with the official incorporation of Colombia (Unasul 2008c).

The issue is that the WG established to discuss the creation of the SDC, which, by August of 2008 had already have two meetings, advanced significantly in the discussions, in such a way that, in a meeting that took place in Santiago of Chile, in December 11, the Statute of the Council was approved. Such Statute would also be approved by the Council of Heads of State and of Government of UNASUR, in its Third Ordinary Meeting, gathered in Brazil, in December 16 of that same year.

The approved Statute of the SDC has 18 articles, versing about five themes: 1. Nature; 2. Principles; 3. Objectives; 4. Structure; and 5. Functioning (Unasul 2008d).

Regarding the *nature* of the SDC, the same is considered as a “consult, cooperation and coordination instance in defense matters”. Therefore, within the functioning structure of UNASUR, the Council does not have deliberative power, constituting itself in a space of discussion, of exchange of information, of cooperation in the area of defense, as later indicated in the presentation of

its objectives (Unasul 2008d).

In what concerns the *principles* of the SDC, its Statute, in its articles second and third, affirms its subjection to the principles and purposes established in the Charter of the United Nations, to the Charter of the Organization of American States and to the mandates and decisions of the Council of Heads of State and of Government of UNASUR (Unasul 2008d).

It is important to notice, also, that besides of the Council representing only a consultative organ within the scope of UNASUR (therefore, subordinated to the superior instances of the institution, more specifically, to the Council of Heads of State and of Government of UNASUR), the principles of its Statute imply that the acting of UNASUR itself, in the defense field, does not always stand as a normative power towards the constituted national authorities, that is, towards the rules, the legislations or even actions of national governments.

Then, a situation emerges in which the Council has an advisory character, it is able to carry studies, to propose agreements and actions of cooperation, but its performance is limited by the own horizon of the integrative process. In the limit, it expresses principles and generic rules, without an auto-applying power and with limited capacity of interference in the member-states, even if its internal political dynamics occur in conformity with the assumptions and the principles affirmed by the integrative agreements. As the history of integrative processes in South America shows, the national states are generally opposed to the transference of its prerogatives to the scope of integrative blocs (Almeida 2009).

The Statute of the SDC defined some general objectives and a set of specific ones, aiming at delimitating its actions. As general objectives were defined:

- a) To consolidate South America as a Zone of Peace, basis to the democratic stability and to the integral development of our peoples and as contribution to world peace.
- b) To build a South-American identity in defense matter, which considers sub-regional and national characteristics and which contributes to the strengthening of Latin American and Caribbean unity.
- c) To generate consensuses in order to strengthen regional cooperation in defense matter (Unasul 2008d; own translation).

The existence of eleven specific *objectives*, for its turn, allows us to consider at least three plans of action: the importance attributed in that mo-

ment to the production and the sharing of information regarding defense and security; the necessity of formation plans (construction and socialization of knowledge) about defense and security; the cooperation in plans aiming at the development of the defense industry (including here the own modernization of the armed forces); the actions aimed at humanitarian disasters (natural catastrophes, especially); and the issue of gender, as an issue to be incorporated in the discussion about defense and security.

From the point of view of its *structure*, the SDC is composed by the Ministers of Defense (or its representatives) of UNASUR's member countries. The national delegations are composed by high representatives of the Foreign Affairs and the Defense and by aids, being this latter present when considered important in the participation of the meetings by the state-members.


The SDC has an executive instance, headed by Vice-Ministers of Defense (or equivalent). The presidency of the Council corresponds to the same country that occupies the presidency *pro tempore* of UNASUR, having as its responsibility "to coordinate the activities of the Council". To be precise, the Statute of the Council, in its article II, defines the attributions of its presidency as:

- a) To assume the duties of the Council Secretariat and other working bodies, including the communication with member-states and the sending of information of interest to the work of the Council.
- b) To elaborate the agenda proposal and the organization of the works, to the ordinary and the extraordinary meetings of the South-American Defense Council, to be submitted to the other member-states.
- c) To formulate, with previous consultation to the member-states, invitations to specialists to take part in meetings of the South-American Defense Council (Unasul 2008d; own translation).

As it can be observed in the following figure, the SDC counts also with the Center for Strategic Defense Studies – CSDS, first permanent organ of the SDC. The CSDS was gestated in 2009, although its official creation has occurred only in 2011, in a conference regarding South American strategical positioning in 21st century. Its Statute was approved in the end of 2012, by the Council of Heads of State and of Government of UNASUR (Unasul 2012a). Its headquarters are located in Buenos Aires, in Argentina, and, as already pointed out, it was created with the expectative of "generating a strategical thought in the regional level", capable of contributing to the coordination and harmonization of defense politics in South America. It is an organ committed

to the production and the diffusion of strategical knowledge in defense and security in the scope of UNASUR.

Figure 1 - Structure of the South-American Defense Council



Source: Barbosa 2016.

Still in what concerns the structure of the SDC, there is the South-American Defense School – ESUDE, from its Spanish name –, approved in February of 2014 and created in August of the same year. ESUDE is a center of high studies, which has as its objective to capacitate civilians and military personnel in the areas of regional defense and security, in the political and strategical levels (Silva 2005). The creation of ESUDE met the expectations regarding the exchange between specialists of South-American countries, besides of covenants between South-American institutions and universities. As affirmed by Fonseca, when referring to ESUDE, the same was configured as a “regional institutional space that, through the education and the research of regional subjects of common interest, will contribute to the construction and the diffusion of a South-American defense thought” (Fonseca 2014, 7; own translation).

From the perspective of its functioning, the SDC, according to its Statute, summons ordinary meetings annually. Furthermore, the Council Agreements are adopted by consensus (according to the article 12 of UNASUR’s Constitutive Treaty). The Executive Instance, however, gathers at each six-month period, aiming at the elaboration of annual action plans of the Council. The Statute also highlights, regarding the functioning of the Council, that the incorporation of new state-members, as well as the cooperation dialogue with

other similar regional or sub-regional organizations, occurs accordingly to the determinations contemplated in UNASUR's Constitutive Treaty (Unasul 2008e).

Which Regional Security Complex: an analysis from the agenda of the South-American Defense Council of UNASUR

As previously mentioned, according to Buzan's and Waever's theoretical orientation, a RSC is formed based in the interdependence degree existent among a group of states, besides of geographical proximity and historical, economic and social factors present in each of these states. Thus, the cooperation level experienced by a Complex will be greater as bigger is the interdependence among its members, added to the consensus that must permeate the decisions in the interest areas of that Complex.

In the case of the South-American RSC, regarded from the experience of the SDC, the decisions made by its members in the areas of defense and security are based on consensus. Buzan and Waever would classify the South-American RSC as *standard*, given the absence of a power that acts in the global level within the IS; the power is defined in terms of regional polarity, and the amity-enmity patterns may present itself as conflictive, security regimes or security communities.

It is important to note that, in the moment of the analysis, Buzan and Waever also consider the existence of *centred* RSC, which they classify in different types: unipolar, having as a pole a great power; centered, but integrated by institutions, and not by a regional power. One shall still consider that the theorists that discuss the theory of the RSC identify another model of *centred* RSC: an "extra option", "when there is an unipolar *centred* RSC, but the power is not a great power in the global scale" (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 80; own translation).

The experience of UNASUR, and also of its SDC, have already boosted a debate regarding the relevance or not of the theory developed by Buzan and Waever, more specifically, in the definition they propose to the South-American RSC. In this sense, Fuccille and Rezende, for example, have already questioned Buzan's and Waever's theory, stating that the South-American RSC defended by these authors is "limited, or even outdated, due to some misunderstanding of the specific dynamics of the region" (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 77; own translation).

In the analysis presented by Fuccille and Rezende, the RSC model for South America defended by Buzan and Waever cannot properly understand

the importance of Brazil for the region. According to Fuccille and Rezende, Brazil acts in South America as an “unipolar power” and “thrives to dominate the security dynamics in the region” (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 85; own translation), in such a way that, for the South-American case, emerges a model “described as centered, in which the unipolar power is not a global power, inaugurating, thus, a first case of this type of RSC (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 78; own translation).

So, this is the relevance of UNASUR and, especially, of the creation of the SDC, in which Brazil had a differentiated importance. Through UNASUR and the SDC, emerged a possibility for Brazil to exert a protagonism, being qualified as the “central actor of the RSC”, “exerting its regional hegemony through institutionalization and aggregation to a process of regional integration” (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 85; own translation).

It is important to date the text of these latter authors, written in 2013 and, therefore, previously to the political and institutional crisis that resulted in the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff (approved by the Brazilian Senate in August of 2016). An analysis that, in this sense, cannot contemplate – for evident reasons – not only the political and institutional instability that Brazil has been facing in the last two years, but also, the own transformations in the foreign policies adopted by the following government, presided by Michel Temer.

In other words, one may not forget that, when UNASUR and the own SDC were created, Brazil was governed by Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, which leveraged its projection in the international scenario with an affirmative foreign policy, with emphasis in the South-South relations and betting in integration processes involving countries outside of the axis US – Europe – Japan.

This reverberated in the own acting of the country in South America, where Brazil effectively sought to be protagonist, achieving leadership in the integrative dynamics, as it is the case of UNASUR, in a perspective of uniting both sub-complexes present in the region (the Southern Cone one and the Andean one). The acting of Brazil in that period, in such direction, also sought to affirm its interests of international projection, being illustrative, in this case, of its candidacy (in that context) to occupy one of the permanent seats of UN’s Security Council.

The Brazilian political orientation in that period, thus, was driven by an interest of strengthening its leadership in South America, through a process of integrative institutionalization, capable of projecting and assuring its political hegemony in the region, and by its interest in occupying a space of greater importance in the global context, either through already existent institutions and alongside with countries of greater political and economic

importance, either through the establishment of new relations, with countries located in different “southern” regions.

These factors are important, including the discussion of issues (which point to some skepticism) brought by Fuccille and Rezende when analyzing UNASUR and the South-American RSC. The possibility of Brazil assuming a protagonist role in South America and, in this sense, standing as a Latin-American “central actor of the RSC”, as noted by the authors, requires some conditions to be attended: that Brazil stands as a guarantor of stability in the region; that the bet in the development dimension (to the detriment of the strategical-military dimension) not only overcomes the limits of such bet, but also that the own strategy centered in the development reaches legitimacy (economic stability in the countries and in the region); that exists interest, in the Brazilian side, of exerting hegemony in the region (as the authors point, when referring to Buzan’s and Waever’s analysis, “a center not willing to be a center might give continuity to the regional instabilities in course”), even if Brazil sustains its desire to be a global player (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 88; own translation).

Evidently, one cannot deny the advances represented by the creation of UNASUR and, from within it, the creation of the SDC. An analysis of the SDC acting allows us to perceive a number of actions and discussions that express a virtuous historical process, consensually built from the consolidation of an institutional apparatus which allowed South-American countries to advance in the discussion regarding regional defense and security, including in a perspective of the construction of a defense and security community. Examples of these actions and advances are: the creation of the CSDS and of ESUDE, the Annual Action Plans of the SDC, the Declaration on the South-American Zone of Peace, the Proposal of Procedures for the Application of Measures to Promote Trust and Security, the numerous studies, diagnostics and prospecting analysis that were made.

It is necessary to notice, however, that the process of discussion and implementation of the SDC’s actions express a process that is still incipient, in which different issues still face distinct kinds of difficulties. Difficulties which are expressed, symbolically, in the change of designation of the own Declaration on the South-American Zone of Peace, initially a construction project of a protocol. Difficulties that were witnessed in the episode related to the dismiss of the Paraguayan President, when UNASUR, assuming a consensual position of its members, positioned itself in favor of the thesis that occurred a constitutional rupture, but that, in the limit of its own nature as an integrative process, limited itself to temporarily alienate Paraguay, later spending efforts in order to diminish losses that such country may have had

when dismissed.

Hence, the question (which South-American Security Complex?) may be answered, especially if taken into consideration the period which comprehends the creation of UNASUR until the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff (2016), from the own proposition defended by Alexandre Fuccille and Lucas Rezende: it is a *centred* model, with a unipolar power which does not exert global power. Nonetheless, this proposition, as the authors themselves assume, has to be taken very cautiously, because:

The relative autonomy experienced by South America allows the Brazilian prominent role as an articulator of the security perceptions of both regional sub-complexes. The institutionalization of UNASUR and of the SDC contributes to reaffirm Brazilian position in this process. The RSC of Latin America is of a *centred* model, but with a fragile center, and its stability depends on Brazil's actuation as a stabilizing center [...]. The question that remains, however, is: are we ready to assume those new responsibilities? (Fuccille and Rezende 2013, 95; own translation).

All of this questioning becomes even more important in light of the changes that occurred from the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff on. Since Rousseff's dismiss, the new Brazilian government, from its beginning, showed clearly that its priorities would not be the same as the ones that, until now, had oriented the actions of the country not only towards Latin America, but also towards other regions and countries of the planet. Documents made public by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that the new Brazilian leaderships have different points of discordance regarding the orientations given from Lula's government on, especially the underrating of relations with central capitalist countries, fundamentally the US.

In this moment, new questions ought to be posed. Although the US, through its recently elected governor, Donald Trump, have not openly declared changes concerning Latin America (thus implying that the region remains not being a priority), it is undeniable that, even in the analyzed period, the country kept a critical posture specially in what concerns the actions of governments that indicated a greater detachment from its interests (clearly regarding Venezuelan governments of Chávez and Maduro). In this sense, it is certain that, for that country, it is interesting that the South-American governments, as well as its integration experiences, do not represent a rupture with North-American interests in the region, neither a strengthening of relation that, in global level, may represent a confrontation to its interests.

Even if South America's position remains small in North-American

priorities agenda, it is important to ask whether the political changes occurred in important South-American countries, especially in Argentina and in Brazil, with the rise of social and political forces which strengthened the neoliberal pattern of development adopted during the 1990s (aligned, therefore, with the interests of the international capital, represented by institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank), did not result in a renouncement by these countries to the protagonist role in the region. Is it possible to affirm, for example, that Brazil, in the post-PT governments period, is interested in maintaining a leadership in Latin America, in exerting protagonism in the South-American RSC? Is it possible to affirm that Brazil will keep betting in the approximation of security agendas between South-American countries, confirming its interest in the institutionalization of integration projects with the South-American countries, or even with countries of other regions, located outside of the US – Europe – Japan axis? Even the complexity of the South-American countries' reality in the recent period, either in its internal relations either in the relations among themselves (here, two events can be just mentioned: the disputes that occurred/occur in Ecuador and Venezuela, the former expressing a political polarization and an already strong opposition to the guidelines assumed by the governments after the election of Rafael Correa; and the crisis in the relationship between Venezuela and MERCOSUR), will guarantee the availability and the sensibility demonstrated by the state-members of UNASUR, in the sense of maintaining the expectations of an integrative process and of the creation of a Security Community? And, in this sense, the own existence of UNASUR may be put at stake, because, although not abandoned, but rather placed in a position of "past project", the participation of countries, or of some strategic countries (as it is the case of Brazil), may result in a process of rising weakening of its acting.

The ending of this previous paragraph with an affirmation raises the possibility (and only the possibility, which means working with the hypothesis) of, due to the recent events involving important South-American countries, of the effective affirmation of a historical reality in which both existent and relevant security sub-complexes in the region (Southern Cone and North-Andean) enhance its importance and, also, in which, within the scope of these two sub-complexes, the relations with the US gain new contours (the persistence of North-American interest in the Northern-Andean region, not only due to the drug-trafficking, but also due to the political and ideological orientation of the Venezuelan government; the possibility of a greater integration with the countries of MERCOSUR, in a perspective of great economic approximation).

Regardless whether those questions lose historical meaning due to

the events of a future conjuncture, the issue is that, in a recent period, there are clear signs of the fact that the changes, especially in Brazil, put at stake UNASUR's own objectives. The prominence assumed by Brazil in this integration process, in a moment in which the country faces a crisis that is not only political, but also economic, puts at risk different expectations created up to now. In this direction, as an example, one of the issues that may be put at stake is the one of the continuity of investments in South America aiming at the physical integration of the region, such as the case of the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), a project created in 2000, aiming at the development of joint actions (among South-American countries) of transportation, energy, and telecommunication infrastructure development. One may not forget that, since Lula's government, these projects depend on the financing of the Brazilian government, through the Brazilian Development Bank – BNDES, as well as Petrobrás, both in a recent period involved in denunciations of corruption and with a redefinition of its investment policies.

Finally, starting from the affirmation that, in a RSC, the leader country (or leader countries) ought to live in a situation of stability, one cannot undermine the crisis that Brazil has been facing in this latter period. Internally, besides of the corruption (involving almost all of the political parties and a significant number of political representatives that occupy elective positions, either in the Chamber of Deputies, either in the Senate) and the political and economic crisis, it is important to note that the country currently lives through a crisis of its own democracy, with different signs of the weakening of democratic institutions (certainly the most important is connected to the own democratic rupture represented by the impeachment of President Dilma and the set of reforms that, without the approval of the population that elected this President, its vice, now in the condition of President itself, is proposing and executing). Externally, it is at stake the possibility of continuing important movements executed in the recent period, in a perspective of reaching a prominent space in the global power institutions (as illustrated by Brazil's withdrawal from its interest in occupying a seat in UN Security Council)³.

³ Brazil has not presented a candidature in the last years for the occupation of a seat in the UN Security Council and, therefore, will not be a part of the referendum at least until 2033 (Folha de São Paulo 2017). Last modified on March 17. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2017/03/1867280-brasil-ficara-de-fora-do-conselho-de-seguranca-da-onu-ao-menos-ate-2033.shtml>.

Final Considerations

This article has analyzed the RSC implied in the discussions about defense and security in South America, more specifically, from the creation of the SDC, within the scope of UNASUR, on.

The article has presented and analyzed the RSCT, especially in its version constructed by the theorists of the Copenhagen School, Buzan and Waeber, through which was possible to indicate the main theoretical questions that oriented the analysis of the historical meaning of the creation and the actuation of the SDC.

The discussions regarding the creation of UNASUR advanced during the first decade of the 21st century, until, in 2008, was signed the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR. A treaty that, in the same line as presented in the proposal of a Community of South-American Nations, affirmed, in its preamble, the commitment to the “shared and solidary history” of the South-American countries, characterizing these nations as multiethnic, pluri-lingual and multicultural; but also, the commitment to the creation of an integrated regional space in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and energetic dimensions, in the perspective of catalyzing the sustainable development in South-America, focused in the people’s well-being, in the multilateralism, in the balance, in the justice, in the equality, in the affirmation of a peace culture.

From then on, the analysis had as its core the historical formation of the SDC and, especially, its structure and actuation, in the period that comprehended its creation, in 2008, and the year 2015. The analysis also presented its Statute (Nature, Principles, Objectives, Structure and Functioning) and its functioning structure.

It was possible, thus, to reach a discussion regarding what is the RSC implied in the debate about defense and security in the South-American Defense Council. In this direction, it was affirmed that, effectively and from the analyzed experience in such period on, the studies affirmed a *centred* model, with an unipolar power that does not exert global power, objectified in the protagonism that Brazil assumed in the construction process of UNASUL. It was highlighted, nevertheless, the fragility of Brazil’s position in South America, the difficulties found in UNASUR’s own affirmation while an integration project among South-American countries and, mainly, how the more recent conjuncture, marked by ruptures in the political dynamics of important countries in the region, especially in Brazil, put at stake the own nature of the South-American RSC, and even the ways of continuing the integration project represented by UNASUR.

In this sense, this article presented one of its limits, given by the choice of a period of analysis that, although have not refused to contemplate aspects of changes occurred recently (especially in Brazil), have occupied itself, fundamentally, of what occurred until the end of 2015. New researches, thus, are not only important, but also necessary to a more precise analysis of the repercussions of this recent conjuncture in UNASUR, in the discussions regarding defense and security, and even in the South-American Regional Security Complex.

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ABSTRACT

This article is the result of an investigation into the model of Regional Security Complex (RSC model in South America, especially since the creation of the South American Defense Council (SDC), within UNASUR - Union of South American Nations. From a theoretical discussion on the Regional Security Complexes, it is argued that the recent South American experience affirmed an “extra type” model, since in its dynamics it is not identified a regional power that acts in a global level despite Brazilian’s greater economic expression in regional and international arena.

KEYWORDS

Union of South American Nations; Regional Security Complex; South American Defense Council.

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PARTNERS

NERINT

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) was the first Centre in Southern Brazil to focus its study and research, exclusively, on international relations. It was established in 1999 at the Latin American Advanced Studies Institute (ILEA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), and, since 2014, it is part of the Faculty of Economics of the same institution in Porto Alegre, Brazil.

Its objective has always been the critical and innovative study of the international system's transformations after the end of the Cold War. In parallel, NERINT has also sought to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options for the autonomous international insertion of the country, from the perspective of the developing world. Brazil's choice for an "active, affirmative and propositive" foreign policy in the beginning of the 21st century converged with the analyses and projections put forward by NERINT through its numerous seminars and publications.

An outcome of its activity was the creation of an undergraduate course in International Relations (2004), ranked the best in Brazil according to the Ministry of Education (2012), and a Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (2010), as well as the bimonthly journal *Conjuntura Austral* and the bilingual and biannual *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*. In addition, since 2016, NERINT offers a bilingual Research Bulletin, published every two months by graduate and undergraduate students and researchers of the Centre. Thus, besides the advanced research, prioritarily focused on emerging countries, NERINT is also the birthplace of undergraduate and graduate programs, not to mention its intense editorial activities.

PPGEEI

The Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) started in 2010, offering Master's and Doctorate degrees, both supported by qualified professors and researchers with international experience. It is the result of several developments on research and education at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Its roots can be traced to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and Inter-

national Relations (NERINT), established in 1999. Other main partners are the Centre for Studies on Technology, Industry, and Labor (NETIT/FCE) and the Center for International Studies on Government (CEGOV). In 2004, an undergraduate degree in International Relations was created at the Faculty of Economics/UFRGS; in 2005 the Center for Studies on Brazil-South Africa (CESUL), recently renamed as Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA), was created. All these actions enabled the rise of an independent line of thinking propped by specialized bibliography.

The research tradition that gave rise to PPGEEI was based on a prospective analysis of the trends of the 1990s. The remarkable expansion of Brazilian diplomacy and economics from the beginning of the century confirmed the perspective adopted, which allowed the intense cooperation with the diplomatic and international economic organizations in Brazil. The course is already a reference in the strategic analysis of the integration of emerging powers in international and South-South Relations.

The Program's vision emphasizes strategic, theoretical and applied methods, always relying on rigorous scientific and academic principles to do so. For this reason, it has been approached by students from all over Brazil and several other countries, and it has established partnerships in all continents. Thus, the Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies is a program focused on understanding the rapid changes within the international system. Alongside NERINT, it publishes two journals: *Conjuntura Austral* (bi-monthly) and *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* (biannual and bilingual). PPGEEI has three research lines:

International Political Economy

It focuses on the international insertion of the Brazilian economy and other major developing countries in South America, Asia and Africa; discusses the characteristics and effects of globalization; and develops comparative and sectoral studies concerned with the effects of the internationalization of companies and productive sectors. Special attention is paid to international financial crises and its effects on Brazil and other countries of the South.

International Politics

It emphasizes the analysis of the process of formation, implementation and evaluation of foreign policy. It seeks to confront patterns of international integration of strategic countries in South America, Africa and Asia, considering institutional patterns, trade policy, structures of intermediation of interest, governance, International Law and the role of actors of civil society in the South-South axis of contemporary International Relations.

International Security

It approaches the defense, strategy and security issues in the international system from a perspective that takes into account the most powerful states at the global level, but systematically introduces the question of the regional balances of power, the South-South axis, the existence of regional security complexes, military issues and the impact of information technology in the Digital Age.

CEBRAFRICA

The Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) has its origins in Brazil-South Africa Centre of Studies (CESUL), a program established in 2005 through an association between the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and the Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG) of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its research activities are developed in cooperation with the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT).

In March 2012, CESUL was expanded into CEBRAFRICA in order to cover the whole of Africa. At the same time, the South African series, which published five books, was transformed into the African Series, with new titles. The Centre's main objectives remain the same as before: to conduct research, to support the development of memoirs, thesis and undergraduate works, to congregate research groups on Africa, to organize seminars, to promote student and professor exchanges with other institutions, to establish research networks and joint projects with African and Africanist institutions, to publish national and translated works on the field, and to expand the specialized library made available by FUNAG.

The numerous research themes seek to increase knowledge of the African continent and its relations with Brazil on the following topics: International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations, and Schools of Thought. CEBRAFRICA counts among its partners renowned institutions from Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Senegal, Cape Verde, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Portugal, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, India, and China. Current researches focuses on "Brazilian, Chinese, and Indian Presence in Africa", "Africa in South-South Cooperation", "African Conflicts", "Integration and Development in Africa", "African Relations with Great Powers", and "Inter-African Relations".

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Volume 6, Number 11 (Jan./Jun. 2017)

Editor's Note (*Paulo Fagundes Visentini*)

Australia, New Zealand and Regional Security in the Pacific: Reflections on Peacekeeping in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) (*Isiaka Alani Badamus*)

The Logistics of a Peacekeeping mission: a Case Study of Western Sahara (*Sylvio de Souza Ferreira, Eduardo Xavier Ferreira Glaser Migon*)

The Security Vectors in Africa (*Zeferino Cariço André Pintinho*)

Domestic Environmental Variables and Foreign Policy Articulation of the Buhari Administration in Nigeria's Fourth Republic (*Tola Odubajo*)

Cape Verde and the Atlantic Space (*Francisco P. Garcia*)

Logistic Complexity in Peacekeeping Operations: a Challenge (*Mauro Cesar Barbosa Cid, Luiz Rogérui Goldoni*)

Defense and Development Industry: Theoretical Controversies and Implications in Industrial Policy (*Christiano Cruz Ambros*)

Structure and Agency in International Relations: State-Building and the Evolution of the International Political System (*Marco Cepik, Pedro Txai Brancher*)

Lithium Geopolitics in the 21st Century (*Bernardo Salgado Rodrigues, Raphael Padula*)

Sovereignty or "Globalization"? Reflections on an Apparent Antagonis (*Diego Pautasso, Marcelo Pereira Fernandes*)

British Geopolitics and the Internationalization of the Pound Sterling (*Mauricio Metri*)

Joaquim Nabuco, a Brazilian Light in Washington (*Bruno Gonçalves Rosi*)

Volume 5, Number 10 (Jul./Dec. 2016)

Editor's Note (*Paulo Fagundes Visentini*)

Framing Sino-Brazilian energy cooperation: perspective from China (*Cui Shoujun, Otávio Costa*)

Interactions between the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the United Nations and its repercussion to Japan's national security (*Aline Chianca Dantas, Alexandre Cesar Cunha Leite*)

The consolidation of North Korea as a nuclear power through the leadership of Kim Jong Un (*David Morales Martinez, Cristian Pires Coelho Martins*)

Civil Society and Regional Powers in a Changing World: the cases of Brazil and India (*Daniela Vieira Secches, Maria Cristina Andrade Aires*)

Maritime geopolitics as a strategic factor for regional integration in South America (*Fernanda Pacheco de Campos Brozoski, Raphael Padula*)

South Africa and regional stability in the Mbeki era: the nexus between personality and geo-political and economic concerns in foreign policy making (*Olajide Olayemi Akanji*)

The evolution of Peacekeeping: Swaz, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of the Congo (*Maria Fernanda Affonso Leal, Rafael Santin, David Almstadter de Magalhães*)

From "Failed State" to exporter of security? Colombia and the diplomacy of security (*Esteban Arratia Sandoval*)

National defense policy and the protection of the critical energy infrastructure in Brazil
(*Iure Paiva*)

Current overview and future perspectives on the integrated defense logistics in South America: opportunities for the regional defence industry (*Edson Aita, Álvaro Vasconcelos Studart, Marcos Aurelio Guedes de Oliveira*)

UNASUR in a comparative light: the relations with Venezuela and Colombia (*Fabio Luis Barbosa dos Santos*)

Bolivarian foreign policy: Venezuela's international insertion during Hugo Chávez Frías first-two mandates (1999-2007) (*Pedro Henrique de Moraes Cicero*)

Volume 5, Number 9 (Jan./Jun. 2016)

Editor's Note (*Paulo Fagundes Visentini*)

Presentation: Special dossier about relations between Brazil and Angola (*Fabio Costa Morosini, Michelle Rattton Sanchez Badin*)

Latin America's Slow Pace in the 21st Century (*Amado Cervo*)

The Culture of Political Instability and the Rapprochement of South America and United States (*Henrique Carlos de Oliveira de Castro, Sonia Ranincheski*)

Brazil and the regional leadership vacuum: the chinese-american advance (2011/2016)
(*Corival Alves do Carmo, Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo*)

Oligarchical restoration and full neoliberalism reloaded: an essay on the roots of the twin crises and the 2016 *coup d'Etat* in Brazil (*Marcelo Milan*)

Political Economy of trade with the European Union: South Africa's pursuit of narrow self-interest (*Oscar van Heerden*)

Kwame Nkrumah and the pan-african vision: between acceptance and rebuttal (*Henry Kam Kah*)

Resurgence of militancy in Ogoniland: socio-economic perspective (*Oluwaseun Bamidele*)

Relations of Brazil with South Africa and Angola: efforts for the maintenance of security in South Atlantic (*Luiz Rogério Franco Goldoni, Sandro de Nazareth Ciribelli*)

Investment regulation between Brazil and Angola: internal factors, international context and the design of the Agreement for Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI)
(*Michelle Rattton Sanchez Badin, Fabio Costa Morosini, Ely Caetano Xavier Junior*)

Brazilian Foreign Policy and Investments in Angola (*Pietro Carlos de Souza Rodrigues, Sonia Delindro Gonçalves*)

Transnationalism and Paradiplomacy in the economic relations between Brazil and Angola: the construction of the Capanda Hydropower Plant by the Construtora Odebrecht
(*André Rodrigues Corrêa, Douglas de Castro*)

Impacts of cooperation? Comparing the national development banks of Brazil and Angola
(*Patricia Alencar Silva Mello, Sarah Morganna Matos Marinho*)

Volume 4, Number 8 (Jul./Dec. 2015)

Editor's Note: Third World or Global South? (*Paulo Fagundes Visentini*)

United States, Latin America and the XXI Century World: forging a new geopolitical space (*Severino Cabral*)

Bandung, the Non-Aligned and the media: the role of the journal "Third World" in South-South dialogue (*Beatriz Bissio*)

Multilateralism and the UN in South Africa's Foreign Policy (*Chris Landsberg*)
Cape Verde: geopolitics and projection of a small island State in West Africa (*João Paulo Madeira*)

Terrorism in West African history: a 21st Century appraisal (*Walter Gam Nkwi*)

Radical Islamism in Algeria: evolution and current situation (*Yoslán Silverio González*)

Military modernization in the PRC: doctrinal change and practical implementation
(*Thiago Malafaia*)

China and Vietnam in the South China Sea: disputes and strategic questions (*Talita Pinotti*)

Organization Theory and complex peacekeeping operations: notes from the MINUSTAH
(*João Marcelo Dalla Costa*)

The Place for Combating Corruption on the Mercosur Agenda (2003-2015) (*Rogério Gesta Leal, Leonardo Granato*)

Volume 4, Number 7 (Jan./Jun. 2015)

Editor's Note (*Paulo Fagundes Visentini*)

Grand Strategy: foreign and defense policy in a changing world (*Celso Amorim*)

The causes of World War 3: class, geopolitics and hegemony in the 21st Century – a re-reading of Arrighi, through McDermott, Schumpeter and Veblen (*Steven Colatrella*)

Naval relations between the United Kingdom and Brazil during the Cold War: the case of the purchase of the Vosper frigates (*João Roberto Martins Filho*)

A comparative analysis of Imperial Japan's predicament in China and U.S. quagmire in post-Saddam Iraq: similarities, lessons and implications (*Masahiro Matsumura*)

The emergence of the periphery in the World System: from the Bandung Conference to the Buenos Aires Conference (1955-1978) [*Análúcia Danilevicz Pereira, Klei Medeiros*]

Angola's regional foreign policy: changes facing the systemic order (1975-2010) (*Igor Castellano da Silva*)

Reflections on the Chinese Emergence (*Cesar Augusto Lambert de Azevedo*)

Development and the WTO: freedom for whom? (*Rafael Rosa Cedro*)

From the center to the periphery: Holy See's diplomacy ideological displacement after Pope Francis (*Anna Carletti*)

Domestic order and Argentina's foreign policy: the issue of the biofuels (*Cristian Lorenzo*)