

RELATIONS OF BRAZIL WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA: EFFORTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY IN SOUTH ATLANTIC

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Introduction

The present work studies the bilateral relations of Brazil with South Africa and Angola, in its political, economic, and defense-related aspects during the 2003-2014 period. More specifically, it addresses these countries' defense cooperation and its effects on the maintenance of South Atlantic security. Regarding methodological procedures, qualitative bibliographic and documental research was made, as it is the paper's objective to identify, describe, and assess the present study's subject.

The sea has always been related to Brazil's progress. It was the pathway to the country's discovery and colonization, to foreign invasions, to its independence, and to foreign trade (Guerra 2011). Even with the advance of technology and with the rise of post-industrial societies, this physical environment remains a significant element for the understanding of politics and international relations (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2003). In this sense, the relevance of the maritime space is explained — among other aspects — by the fact that it covers about 70% of the earth's surface and, mainly, for being

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a source of wealth and the means of communication among continents (Silva 2014, 199).

The South Atlantic Ocean is an essential communication and transport line for Brazil, being of utmost importance for the coastal states. To its strategic relevance, it is added its natural resources³, its size and range, as well as its role as a commercial route through which about 90% of Brazil's foreign trade is done (Neves 2013).

In recent times, security concerns and defense-related issues have been gaining attention in Brazilian strategic thought. The growing importance attributed to maritime resources as a subject of national defense can be seen in the main documents of Brazil's contemporary defense, such as the National Defense Policy (PND), the National Defense Strategy (END), and the White Book of National Defense (LBDN)⁴. The documents define the Atlantic Ocean as vital for the country and outlay the path for assuring Brazilian sovereignty over its maritime space⁵.

Among the main objectives of this new strategy for the international scenario defined in the PND and in the END,⁶ the Brazilian government proposes a new foreign policy, which would fully integrate its diplomatic actions with its defense policy and economic development, including a new concept in Brazilian history: the strategic surrounding⁷. Regarding Brazil's relations

3 It is worth noticing the fact that more than 90% of the oil produced in Brazil come from offshore platforms (Abdenur and Souza Neto 2014a).

4 The PND (Política Nacional de Defesa) and the END (Estratégia Nacional de Defesa) were conceived in 2008 and updated in 2012, the year of the publication of the LBDN (Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional).

5 As stated in the PND, Brazil conceives a strategic surrounding that goes beyond the South-American region, comprising the South Atlantic Ocean and the coastal African states, as well as the Antarctic. According to the END, Brazil shall focus its capacities in power projection and create the conditions to control — in the extent necessary for its defense and inside the limits of international law — the maritime areas and the internal waters of strategic, political, economic, and military importance, as well as its sea lines of communication.

6 Among the strategic goals defined by the END for the Brazilian Navy, one can point out "the readiness to respond to any threat, by an State or by non-conventional and criminal forces, to maritime paths of trade, and the capacity to participate in international peace operations, under the command of the United Nations or multilateral organism in the region" (BRASIL, 2012b, 10). It should also be stressed that a relevant part of the END is the Submarine Development Program (PROSUB), in cooperation with France, that intends to build four conventional submarines and one with nuclear propulsion in national ground. Once the Program is finished, the country would have a significant strategic gain in the defense of the Brazilian coast, since it will enhance its power projection as well will enable the Navy better conditions to perform the control of maritime areas. (Gonçalves and Corbelini 2014)

7 Strategic surrounding refers to the regions where Brazil is willing to exert its influence and diplomatic, economic, and military leadership. According to the LBDN, these regions would be

with the countries in this space, Abdenur and Souza Neto (2014a, 5) argue that:

During the last years, the Brazilian government has intensified its cooperation effort — including in defense — with the countries in the South Atlantic perimeter. Highlighting its condition as a South Atlantic country, Brazil seeks to get closer with countries of the African western shore, not only with historical partners, such as Angola, Nigeria and South Africa. Facing a scenario in which the South Atlantic acquires a new geopolitical importance, for external as well as for regional actors, Brazil uses cooperation to promote the construction of a regional identity that starts to alter power relations in this space.

The Brazilian government intensifies its cooperation initiatives with countries of the South Atlantic perimeter, such as Angola and South Africa. Brazilian diplomacy has been showing that cooperation with developing African countries can bring positive outcomes for Brazil, mainly in issues related to its strategic surrounding in this continent. As stated by Abdenur and Souza Neto (2014b, 232)

The Brazilian government has been struggling not only to enlarge its bonds and partnerships in a concrete way, but also to strengthen the formation of a common identity with the countries of the African west coast [...] These efforts, bi and multilateral, occur in parallel to the ones aiming at modernizing the Brazilian military power — a program endorsed, in its maritime dimension, by the argument that it is necessary to protect the natural resources (whether already discovered or not) in the South Atlantic.

Recent oil discoveries in Brazil, as well as the increase in the African coast production, have been raising the importance of the South Atlantic in the external realm. For Brazil, this ocean represents a fundamental element of its defense, besides being a way for international maritime projection, thus implicating in security-related subjects that involve the country (Nasser and Moraes 2014, 14).

In this scenario in which the South Atlantic Ocean earns a new geopolitical importance, cooperation between Brazil, South Africa, and Angola contributes to a greater political understanding and creates possibilities for economic development — besides strengthening the discussion of defense-related issues that are considered important for these countries (NASSER, 2014). Surely, the South Atlantic became a factor of even greater relevance

to the relations between the countries above-mentioned (Penha 2011).

Brazilian power projection in the South Atlantic

The South Atlantic, besides being a crossroad and an important geoeconomic space, is, also, a pole of development. This fact may result in an environment of intense competition for the control of its resources, including other traditional or emergent powers (Pereira and Barbosa 2012, 61). Due to this space's importance — and also as a means for claiming more resources to its defense — Admiral Roberto de Guimarães Carvalho created in 2004 the term “Blue Amazon”.

Accordingly to Wiesebron (2013), the area of the Blue Amazon comprises the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nautic miles, with a 3,539.919 km² surface, while the Continental Shelf (CS), with a 350 nautic miles range, encompasses 960.000 km². Adding both, the area comprehends practically 4,5 million km², a maritime area equivalent to more than 50% of Brazil's territory (Brasil 2012b and Brasil 2013). The Brazilian government claimed recognition for its CS in the 253^o United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental, presenting its proposal in 2004 (Wiesebron 2013, 109).

From a national strategy perspective, this passage from a continental projection to a maritime projection was the result of the foreign policy process, which, in last decades, pursued at all costs objectives that aimed at assuring rights and interests in the maritime space of the Brazilian regional strategic surrounding — namely, the South Atlantic (Costa 2012).

The conquest of the CS extension involved decisive moments in two main fronts. In the external realm, intense diplomatic negotiations inside the UN were necessary. In the internal ambit, this initiative involved the Program for the Evaluation of Sustainable Potential of the Live Resources of the Brazilian Economic Exclusive Zone (Revizee) and the Plan for Assessing the Brazilian Continental Shelf (Leplac), both led by the Navy, supported directly by Petrobras, and with the participation of other national institutions (Costa 2012, 5).

This integration — aggregating actions developed by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, Navy, and other research institutions — was responsible for generating important outcomes that allowed the country to guarantee its rights and the consequent legal possession of a significant maritime space in the South Atlantic.

As a means of legitimating its claims and also of projecting power in

a “collaborative” way, Brazil has been helping the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP)⁸ in assessing their continental shelves and in the preparation of proposals to be made to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. As stated by Abdenur and Souza Neto (2014a, 15):

Most of the CPLP members are located in the South Atlantic region or are close to it. In March 2010, the organization launched the project of an atlas for the CPLP oceans, and propositions of cooperation among its member-states for the extension of their continental shelves were made, with Brazilian assistance, according to the model of the Plan for Assessing the Brazilian Continental Shelf (LEPLAC). New areas of cooperation include research programs regarding the maritime bottom, such as the Program for the Prospection and Exploration of Mineral Resources of the International Area of the South and Equatorial Atlantic (PROAREA) [...] Finally, there are initiatives for the identification of strategic areas and of common interest regarding security and maritime.

This way Brazil diffuses its approach in the South Atlantic, using defense cooperation as a way for emphasizing common concerns (Menezes 2015).

Besides the diplomatic efforts made, as well as the increase in initiatives aiming at fostering economic development, Brazil also invested in defense cooperation programs as a means for amplifying relations with some countries in the South Atlantic. Although the main effort of the Brazilian South-South cooperation is to emphasize historical and cultural bonds with the Lusophone Africa, agreements and initiatives in the defense realm reached a much broader universe, even stating the intention to develop more and more naval cooperation with several African countries (Visentini 2011).

Another important factor that contributed to the approaching of Brazil and African countries was the creation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS)⁹. It consists in an alliance based on South-South cooperation, with the mission of promoting regional cooperation and keeping peace and security in the South Atlantic. The Zone has been working as a means for regional integration, also with the objective of assuring the de-

8 The Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) was founded in Lisbon, in July 1996, with the aim of gathering all the seven Portuguese-speaking countries then existing [...] over three general objectives, defined in the Community Statutes: politic and diplomatic coordination between its members; economic, social, cultural, legal, and techno-scientific cooperation and the promotion and diffusion of Portuguese Language. After its independence, on May 20, 2002, East Timor joined the Community as its eighth member-state (Saraiva 2015).

9 It is composed by Brasil, Argentina and Uruguai and 21 countries from the west coast of Africa (Aguilar 2013).

fense and security of the member states' interests in the region, fostering the development of naval power, outlining responsibilities and seeking to avoid external interferences (Aguilar 2013).

The Brazilian discourse at ZOPACAS stresses not only the common interests of the Atlantic countries of South America and Africa, but also the need for minimizing the presence of external actors. As already pointed by Miyamoto (1987), even in its original version the official discourse of ZOPACAS already emphasized peace and cooperation without giving up the possibility of increasing the member-states' naval power.

With the development of cooperation between Brazil and African countries, investments in this continent became a lot more attractive, either through direct investment, financing, or donations. In the defense realm, the situation was no different, as it can be noted a relative increase in the presence of Brazilian companies of military equipment in Africa, many in partnerships with the governments.

The database from the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC) — which is a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — indicates that the Brazilian government has been acting alongside the Armed Forces for the training of the military personnel of several African countries, among them Angola and South Africa. The summary of projects evidences that South-South cooperation in defense is significantly diversified, gathering different sectors of the Armed Forces in conceiving and implementing training programs, arms and equipment supply, and research collaboration — mainly regarding the assessment of continental shelves, science and technology — and in bi and multilateral exercises (Pereira and Barbosa 2012).

Cooperation with Africa also aims at consolidating support for Brazil's role in the reform of global governance, including its bid to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. In 2003, in the beginning of the Lula government, Angolan authorities had expressed support for Brazil in this matter (Heleno and Martins 2014). Through the following years, other countries from the African Atlantic coast did the same, such as South Africa and some CPLP member states.

From the African side, the interest in cooperating with Brazil — in or out the military scope — is growing. Moreover, as African support to the Brazilian bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council is a strategic element for the Brazilian diplomacy, this country has been seeking to intensify its negotiations and amplify its support base through bilateral relations with these emergent countries.

Brazil–South Africa relations

South Africa has the best infrastructure and the second economy in the African continent (Kornegay 2013). Cultural and historical bonds, added to the economic possibilities and its promising political scenario in the international context, raised in Brazil the will to expand its relations with that country in the politic, economic, and military fields.

Lula's government foreign policy directed its efforts attributing to Africa a strategic dimension of great importance. During his term, the axis of the Brazilian international policy moved in part towards the Southern Hemisphere. Without abandoning its traditional allies, Brazil sought to amplify its range of partnerships, turning with greater emphasis on South Africa, where agreements and cooperation treaties were implemented (Visentini 2011).

Therefore, still according to Visentini, South-Africa became one of the most notable regions to Brazil in its strategic surrounding, representing an important axis of the country's foreign policy in the first decades of the 21st century regarding the development of South-South cooperation.

On that account, aiming to find options for raising their negotiation power, the two developing countries started to create new frameworks for technical and financial cooperation in order to substitute the traditional North-South model of development association. As a result, a progressive increase in trade agreements and a stimulus to bilateral cooperation were perceived between the two countries.

Accordingly to Visentini (2011), « the South-African democratic transition, consolidated in 1994, launched a new period in Brazil–South Africa relations. From 2003 on, bilateral relations became deeper, which made joint initiatives possible ». The cooperation agreement with South Africa, signed on June 4, 2003, was one of the most comprehensive document of the kind that Brazil made with an African nation. It established, among others, experience-sharing in the research and development of defense equipment, including an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV); joint training and the acquisition of military equipment and; meetings and trainee programs between equivalent defense institutions (Neves 2014).

In the political realm, the deepening of diplomatic relations was perceived with the promotion of alliances. In 2003, the India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) was created, conceived as a space for knowledge exchange and the strengthening of common interests among the member-states. This political forum enabled closer relations between Brazil and South Africa, also comprehending relevant aspects to foment dialogue, consultations, and

trade in the South-South realm, as well as to tackle poverty and to promote technology and information exchange between the members.

After five summits and ministerial meetings, the group reached a considerable repository of common stances. Through the political capillarity reached by this alliance, for instance, it was possible for IBSA to pledge help to Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, and Palestine. Moreover, the IBSA Fund, besides aiding South countries, is very important to the group's actions. Brazil's intention to acquire a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, aiming at a multilateral global governance, is just one of the reasons for fostering alliances in the South-South axis (Pereira and Barbosa 2012, 64).

Since 2005, Brazil and South Africa increased their diplomatic and military interaction under the scope of IBSA¹⁰. Both countries aligned their South-South cooperation policies, as a means to reach more autonomy and international prominence (Pereira and Barbosa 2012, 73). The Declaration of Strategic Partnership Brazil-South Africa, signed during President Lula's official visit to South Africa, in June 2010, consolidated this process of deepening relations, to which a new level of excellence was rendered (Visentini 2011).

Regarding security bilateral relations, Brazil and South Africa had already signed, in 2003, a Military Cooperation Agreement, in the Joint Defense Committee Brazil-South Africa. The countries exchange official for instruction, undertake military exercises, and develop technological projects together. At the time, the main Brazilian products and services offered to South Africa were: Patrol Aircrafts (Embraer), Astros Rockets (Avibras), Patrol Ships (EMGEPRON), and the SIVAM¹¹ Management Technology, through the Atch¹² company (Martin et al. 2014).

In South Africa, military cooperation includes, besides military instructions and joint naval exercises, the technological dimension. One of the most highlighted aspects of this bilateral agreement is the construction of a

¹⁰ The IBSA Forum, besides contributing to the construction of new international architecture, seeks also to deepen its countries' knowledge in specific sectors, such as Agriculture; Science and Technology; Trade and Investments; Culture; Defense; Social Development; Education; Energy; Environment and Climate Change; Health; Information Society; Transport; Tourism; among others (Costa Vaz and Flemma 2011).

¹¹ Amazon Surveillance Systems (Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia): a project designed by the Brazilian Ministry of Defense, aiming at monitoring the Amazon airspace.

¹² The Brazilian defense industry, during 1980 and 1990 decades, faced moments of slow-down, experiencing a though decline at the end of the referred period. The year of 2003, nonetheless, was a watershed point, with the beginning of the Lula Era. From this point on, Brazilian foreign policy regaining its military exports policy, again privileging the government directives on relations with emerging countries, among them South Africa and Angola (Abdenur and Souza Neto 2014b).

system for the surveillance of the South Atlantic through an oceanographic satellite and the A-Darter prototype — which is one of the most important projects abroad kept by the Brazilian Air Force. Its strategic importance is due to the effective transference of technology and accessory knowledge that may have civilian application in several areas, such as agriculture, sensors, radio communication systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles (Escosteguy 2011).

The A-Darter missile project is a result of the aerospace partnership between the two countries, reached in late 2003. The main companies involved in the project are Brazilian privates Mectron, Avibras, and Opto Electronics; and South African Denel Dynamics. This company belongs to Denel Ltd., which develops and produces weapons for the South African government. It also set a subsidiary factory in Brazilian soil, enhancing bilateral cooperation between the two countries (Martin et al. 2014, 32).

The development of this new prototype began in 2007 and was then agreed that the program costs would be shared between the two countries. The A-Darter is currently in its final stage of development, and the first missiles were supposed to be delivered to Brazilian and South Africa air forces in February 2016, with a six-month delay relating the initially-previewed deadline.¹³ These missiles would be employed in the Brazilian and South African Air Force planes (Martin et al. 2014). The relevance and success of this project, helped to strengthen the relation between the defense industries of both nations.

Embraer has earned an important participation in Brazil-South African relations, regarding trade as well as the diffusion of technical knowledge for the countries' joint projects. Besides A-Darter, Embraer also is involved in studies for the development of a cargo aircraft and UAVs. In the naval field, both countries participate, alongside India, of naval exercises in the scope of the India-Brazil-South Africa Maritime (IBSAMAR), promoting a greater integration of the Brazilian and South African navy and also the training and enhancement of capacities through joint naval exercises (Albuquerque 2010).

The second edition of the IBSAMAR naval exercise was undertaken in 2010, again in South Africa — the closest point for the countries — involving several units (helicopters from the three navies, 12 ships, submarines, among others). Besides, the exercised envisaged Anti-submarine Warfare

13 Due to technological secrecy, the electronic site of companies and agencies involved in the development of the A-Darter present few information. The sites that were used to complement information were: "Defense Industry Daily" (<http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/south-africa-brazil-to-develop-adarter-sraam-03286/>), and "*Defesa Aérea e Naval*" (<http://defesaareanaval.com.br/missil-a-darter-primeiras-entregas-oocorrerao-em-fevereiro-de-2016/>) to complete information about the A-Darter.

actions, offshore search and seizure operations, high-sea refueling, and anti-aerial defense. More than enabling the contact with new naval techniques and technological equipment used by South Africa and India, this kind of exercise contributes to consolidate the Brazilian navy's presence in the South Atlantic (Pereira and Barbosa 2012).

The effective involvement of Brazil in IBSAMAR has helped to prepare its Armed Forces for its growing responsibilities in international actions in support of the Brazilian foreign policy. This participation not only fulfills one of the END directives but also strengthens the collective security system, contributing to world peace and to the national defense¹⁴ (Heleno and Martins 2014).

The Brazil–South Africa partnership comprises also an intention protocol to produce the 40 mm Multiple Grenade Launcher, between Brazilian public company IMBEL (*Indústria de Material Bélico do Brasil*) and South African Rippel Effect Weapon Systems Ltd. Despite the agreements and intentions settled by the two countries, according to the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, there was no purchase contract signed between the two countries up to the moment (SIPRI 2016). Historically, South Africa has as main military suppliers Germany, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. Moreover, recently, import negotiations with Canada, Finland, and Switzerland are noteworthy (Martin et al. 2014).

Angola–Brazil relations

After suffering for centuries with Portuguese colonialism and decades with its civil war, Angola now rises as one of the most prosperous African countries¹⁵ (Saraiva 2015). The post-civil war scenario was favorable to the foreign policy adopted by the Lula government in Brazil (Saraiva 2012). The “cooperation among equals” speech evoked language identity bonds for the harmonization of interests on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Bearing

¹⁴ It is notable that India, Brazil, and South Africa celebrated an agreement on nuclear cooperation to peaceful objectives, seeking nuclear disarmament and the use of defense technology to the civilian scope only. This agreement was achieved through the G3 group (created by the three abovementioned countries in 2003, comprising political, strategic, and economic aspects) (Neves 2014).

¹⁵ Data from the Brazilian Development, Industry, and Trade Ministry registers a 189% increase in Angolan exports, which raised from US\$ 22,1 billion to US\$ 63,7 billion between 2005 and 2014. This generated high growing taxes for the Angolan economy, due to the oil sector expansion and the resuming of economical activities mainly interrupted by 40 years of armed conflict (MDIC 2014).

this in mind, Chaves (2014) appoints that “Brazil–Angola relations began to consist of both soft and hard power, from the Brazilian side, and an optimistic reception by Angola.”

One of the most remarkable aspects of Brazil–Angola relations were the technical cooperation agreements. Just in the first year of Lula government, twelve agreements of this kind were signed in the most diverse areas, but most notably in health and education (Visentini 2011).

Angola, which signed a strategic partnership with Brazil in 2010, counts on important traits in bilateral relations that have eased negotiations between the two countries: the presence of Angolans in Brazil and of Brazilians in Angola; the activity of multinational Brazilian companies; the Brazilian participation in the assessment of the Angolan continental shelf, through Leplac–Angola and the active role Angola has been playing in the revival of ZOPACAS (Kornegay 2013).

Besides bilateral cooperation in the political and economic fields with Angola, the Brazilian government intensified its actions and strategic partnerships in the defense realm, contributing to the growing of the sector’s industry and to the technical and professional enhancing of both countries’ military (offering Angolan officials and soldiers room in preparatory schools; training for Angolan officials aiming at their participation in peace missions; naval exercises; among others) (Escosteguy 2011). Still regarding industrial relations between the two countries in the defense sector, Brazil has fostered arms export to the growing Angolan market. The sale of A–29 Super Tucano aircraft, produced by Embraer, to Angola, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania is an important example of this trend (Silveira 2012).

Abdenur and Souza Neto (2014b, 229) highlight that “the Angolans’ main interest is that Brazil helps the country to develop its own national defense industry, reducing its Armed Forces dependence on foreign production. » The subject was discussed in February 2013, during the visit of Celso Amorim — then minister of Defense — to the Angolan capital. At this occasion, the Minister was accompanied by representatives of the Brazilian defense industry.

Brazilian cooperation in defense also grows through multilateral platforms. The international agenda of Brazil and Angola kept the CPLP as an important reference for political and diplomatic coordination, using it also for technical cooperation, goods and services exports, health and science, defense and security, among others (Chaves 2014). The CPLP works also as a forum for discussion on the maritime potential of the South Atlantic Ocean for trade, economic, and security partnerships. Some projects within this area were already formally incorporated, such as the CPLP Council of Ministers’

recommendation about the ocean space, in 2007 (Jorge 2011, 124).

Within the CPLP scope, cooperation among these countries' navies became an important bond for getting the group closer. In 2010, for example, the II Navies Symposium of the Portuguese Language Countries was done, in which several representatives of the African countries launched the basis for a greater cooperation with the Brazilian naval industry (Neves 2013).

The III Symposium of CPLP Navies took place in May 2012, in Rio de Janeiro, having piracy in the Guinea Gulf as the main subject, as well as the necessity of the member-states to tackle this kind of crime. During the event, the navies of Brazil and Portugal offered help to their counterparts of Angola, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau to combat the illegal activity above-mentioned, including the providing of assistance and vessels such as patrol ships. One of the representatives of the Brazilian delegation, moreover, suggested that this country's navy could establish a credit line for the African navies to buy vessels developed in Brazil (Abdenur and Souza Neto 2014b, 231).

In 2013, Brazil hosted a joint Portuguese-speaking countries: *Operação Felino*¹⁶ (Operation Feline). Created in 2000 under the CPLP scope, this military exercise aims at training a Joint Combined Task Force and enabling interoperability between the CPLP member states armed forces, in order to participate in UN peace and humanitarian assistance missions (Aguilar 2013). The training brought the involved armed forces closer, contributing to enhance their techno-scientific capacities in the military field, besides strengthening cooperation among the participant countries (Brasil 2013).

Angola, one of the major oil producing countries in the African continent, signed with Brazil a Joint Declaration of Strategic Partnership and a Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2010. This fact was expected to strengthen relations between the countries' Armed Forces and to bring the Brazilian industry and the Angolan government closer, generating several export opportunities for the countries — besides the technical and military cooperation in subjects of mutual interest, which contributes to the development of the Brazilian defense industry (Brasil 2014; Saraiva 2015).

Research in the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database shows the agreement in question generated, to the moment, little effect on the arms transference between the two countries (SIPRI 2016). In 2011, Angola bought six Super

¹⁶ The operation was undertaken in the Brazilian state of Espírito Santo, coordinated by the Joint Military Staff of Brazil from the Ministry of Defense, and was planned and executed by the Brazilian Navy. About a thousand military personnel from the navies, armies, and air forces of Brazil and of other CPLP countries, employing 57 units participated in the exercise: an Assault Vehicle Landing Ship, an Oceanic Patrol Ship, two Super Puma and one Esquilo (Ecureuil) helicopters, 44 vehicles, and eight Amphibious Lagarta Vehicle (AAV-7A1) (Brasil 2013).

Tucanos aircraft from EMBRAER, recalling contracts signed between the country and the company during the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decades. Angola, which had in the 1970 and 1980 decades the USSR and Portugal as main military suppliers (mostly secondhand), in the 1990 and 2000 decades started to import its weapons from Russia and other ex-Soviet republics (also secondhand). In 2013, nonetheless, Angola bought more than 40 armored vehicles from South Africa, equipped with Chinese motors. This data points to a “partnership” of Angola with the BRICS countries, rather than with Brazil only.

Conclusion

Brazil’s bilateral relations with South Africa and Angola, in politics, economy, and defense, have been developing as planned in the PND and in the END, although with a lesser intensity than expected. That being so, the South Atlantic, besides being a ground for Brazil’s economic expansion and for political coordination with the mentioned countries, is also a strategic area for the development of the Brazilian Armed Forces’ military capabilities — the Navy in special — strengthening the projection of Brazil to the international scenario.

The impacts of the discovery of the pre-salt oil reserves significantly increased expectations regarding Brazil’s role in international trade, making South Atlantic stability a vital factor for the country’s defense. Furthermore, bilateral relations of Brazil with Angola and South Africa reinforce the importance of securing this strategic surrounding, in order for the commercial, diplomatic, and military connections to continue in the peaceful way it has been in last years.

In the case of Brazil, its increased presence in the South Atlantic is done with no conflicts with neighbors, and according to strategies that combine principles and effective movements either in cooperation or dissuasion. This situation is strengthened by Brazil’s presence in ZOPACAS, which has been seeking, among other objectives, the commitment to keep the South Atlantic out of military conflicts, contributing to the security of this strategic surrounding.

This inflection towards the South Atlantic in Brazil’s development path, in the last years, expresses the combination of vectors of wide specter and long duration. This achievement is being processed by the application of a strategy that integrates continuous actions in the diplomatic realm, a national research effort in the broad maritime sciences field, and investments that aims at strengthening the country’s military capabilities, in order for it

to face its security and defense challenges in general and specifically in the South Atlantic.

In the IBSA scope, Brazil's relations with South Africa (alongside India) are increasingly strengthened. This new reality may constitute a new distribution of power that could contribute to the security of the South Atlantic. Military exercises undertaken through IBSAMAR confirm this project. Besides, the strengthening of relations between the South Atlantic countries may help the expansion of commercial and military trade, even making use of routes to the Indian Ocean.

The support of the Brazilian government, either through defense agreements or official visits undertaken in the period in question, has displayed a more progressive stance towards the country's role in the international scenario, fostering the rise of opportunities for the reborn defense industry in the African market. On that account, the growing relations among the armed forces of Brazil, Angola, and South Africa create a culture favorable to the employment of Brazilian military material by these countries, contributing to the development of the Brazilian industry as it provides scale gains to the arms production.

With the reformulation of military capacities proposed in the PND, END, and LBDN, especially in its maritime component, Brazil will expand its possibilities for its power projection and insertion in the South Atlantic scenario. Therefore, it is needed that foreign policy keep up with this development and be flexible regarding its historical conceptions without abandoning its conciliatory character, at the same time as it becomes aware of the new military level that Brazil aims to reach in next decades.

The search for the improvement of Brazilian military power is important to provide the country with alternatives for its actions, in addition to reinforcing its national sovereignty and international autonomy — always emphasizing actions that seek security and stability in the South Atlantic. Thus, bilateral relations with South Africa and Angola have acquired a core position, as they are a means for engagement and deepening of bonds. These countries may cooperate significantly to shape the regional and international strategic environment, in order to contain, solve, or avoid conflicts that may occur in this region.

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ABSTRACT

With a view towards the defense of their vital spaces (South Atlantic) and seeking greater international prominence, Brazil has intensified its relations with the African continent. Thus, the present study aims to analyze the bilateral relations between Brazil and both South Africa and Angola, highlighting these relationships effects on the maintenance of security in the South Atlantic. It is studied the growing interconnection between the foreign policy and the Brazilian defense policy, the military cooperation agreements and joint naval exercises.

KEYWORDS

South Atlantic; Security; Brazil; South Africa; Angola.

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