NEW INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY, A MATTER OF EMPHASIS

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“It is the third war from which I flee, but it is the first in which I have the support of the Brazilian government.” Lebanese citizen's account cited in Conversas com jovens diplomatas, by Celso Amorim

Introduction

Brazil's foreign policy has recovered, since 2003, the main lines of force adopted from 1930 to 1980, especially those outlined from January 1961 to March 1964. The Lula Administration emphases were the result of the renewed conception of the state as the strategic coordinator of development, as opposed to the 1990s experience when the logic of the Market possessed primacy. The state has expanded and diversified public policies, arrogating central role in combating inequality, which would be a condition for democracy and growth. Externally, the structural transformations and the institutional improvement begun with the redemocratization allowed the country to consolidate its globalist strategy, to which in 2003 the protagonism emphasis was added.

This emphasis had as deontological premise the value of equality (also spoken of as social justice), present in innumerable speeches of the President and his Chancellor and promoted to key variable of the foreign policy. If the development depends on the position of the country in the international system, equality promotion demands the correspondence between internal and external

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approaches, which are reflected in the _democratic mirror_: national democracy, global multilateralism. In this sense, equality (content) and democratic legitimacy (form) are the distinctive elements that allow the comparison of this period with the Independent Foreign Policy (IFP), which is the reason to call it New Independent Foreign Policy (New IFP).

Hence, the study of the New IFP is proposed through four lines: (a) Political Multilateralism; (b) Economic Multilateralism; (c) South-South Cooperation; and (d) Equality. The first two are considered _objectives_; cooperation, an _instrument_ on which they depend; and equality, the _value_ that bases them, permeating the discourse and action. The value of equality is the idealistic component of the New IFP, added to the multilateral neorealism and the pragmatism of cooperation, in a methodological concert that aims to identify the singularity of the Brazilian performance between 2003 and 2010.

**Independent Foreign Policy (IFP)**

**Still the matter of rupture**

The IFP lasted little longer than three years, between 1961 and 1964, a time when the country's vulnerabilities rendered improbable the assumption of external risks. Even so, there was controversy concerning the debate on its alleged character of _rupture_ with the Brazilian diplomatic tradition, having even been considered one of the accessory causes of the 1964 Coup. One has to remember that the IFP extracted legitimacy from the 1946 Constitution, whose article 4, the only one to deal with international relations, brought the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes, through arbitration or other ways “regulated by international security organization” of which Brazil was member.

The limited constitutional text was typical of a period of state formation, which allowed broad interpretation on tradition’s constituent principles. This, however, must be depurated from its mythical elements, not being an “immovable statue”, as the Aristotelian and Hegelian conceptions. It is rather the cultural inheritance of beliefs and techniques, transmitted from a generation to another, a passage in which tradition carries out the fruitful tension with creation (Abbagnano 2000; Bosi 2002). These values or techniques suffer rupture only when they are substituted by anti-values or opposed
practices (Bosi 2002), in dichotomies as pacifism-bellicism, capitalism-communism, protectionism-free exchange.

*Value*, the good which is object of choice, is materialized by *principles*, the ground of action; they are made singular for their *essence*, which cannot be confused with *emphasis*, being the stress of the substantial nature. Hence the question: did the IFP propose the revision of the essence of the traditional principles of the Brazilian foreign policy? Did it break away from the hegemonic power in the hemisphere, the United States, to align with the opposing tradition, the Soviet communism? Did it leave the OAS and TIAR to adhere to the Communist International and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)? Did it start to support bellicosity, entering NATO or the Warsaw Pact? Did it break the Military Agreement with the US? Did it question the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authority and the peaceful settlement of disputes?

One could go on indefinitely, as the IFP tenets organized by San Tiago Dantas are analyzed (Dantas 1962, 6). Was it contrary to the tradition of defending the "practice of coexistence" and the "general and progressive" disarmament? "Non-intervention" and "self-determination of peoples"? To announce "foreign market expansion" and trade relations with "all" the countries? To urge the “emancipation” of the non-autonomous territories? Could one consider as rupture the defense of the endogenous formulation and control of economic plans and foreign aid? The affirmative reply to these questions would be harmful to the very tradition they seek to protect, since it would involve recognizing that such postulates—minimally sovereign—were not part of our culture.

By assuming, therefore, the conceptual precision of words as *tradition, value, principle, essence* and *emphasis*, it is possible to clarify some aspects. Take, for instance, the tradition of trade: if, since the Eusébio de Queirós Act, the *traditional principle* was that of the free trade with protectionist nuances, the *emphasis* to search for all the possible markets was, as the word indicates, an *emphasis*, an intensification of the *essence* to trade. If we defended the *principle* of self-determination, to abstain in the voting of anti-colonial resolutions in the UN meant a change of *emphasis*, not of the *essence* of the tradition, which was the self-determination; likewise, to support the permanence of Cuba in the OAS
was to emphasize the principle of non-intervention, not to subvert it in its essence.

The question, however and therefore, remains: what potential of rupture would the IFP have facing an international—not to say hemispheric—system with extreme disproportion of power over Brazil? Bipolarity restricted practical actions and made the IFP limited to symbolic actions (Amorim 2011), which is why the analysis must be concentrated at the level of the discourse, at which the principles of the Diplomacy for the Development were recovered, which had begun with the 1930 Revolution and in force until the 1980s (Visentini 2004). These principles—cooperation, pacifism, non-confrontationism—marked the formative period of the tradition, extracted from the dialectic of the liberal and autonomist lines (Cervo 2012a).

Discourse and World View

According to President Jânio Quadros, the IFP sought to overcome “the subsidiary and innocuous diplomacy of a nation aligned with worthy though alien interests” (Quadros 1961). In the political sphere, Chancellor Afonso Arinos proposed cooperation, respect to the international law and strengthening of the UN, which was the appropriate place to put forth reforms and where Brazil would keep its independent position, voting on a case-by-case basis grounded in its permanent objectives (Arinos 2001).

Despite the ideological affinity, Brazil was not tied to the “Western bloc”, for its “legal commitments” were limited to “continental bindings”: UN, OAS, TIAR and Brazil-US Pact of Military Assistance (Arinos 2001, 239-240). The “independent” adjective, in turn, brought the challenge to the Cold War bipolarity, in order to extend the area of “own” initiative and responsibility and to contribute for a peaceful and fair order. From it derived the condemnation of war, complemented by the idea that “political freedom” also required “social justice and economic equality” (Dantas 1962, 18-19).

In the economic realm, the IFP should contribute to the increase in exports and, thus, support the expansion of the domestic market, the generation of foreign currency and the import substitution industrialization. To do so, it sought to diversify its trade agenda, without ideological limitations, in Latin America, Eastern Asia and Eastern Europe; moreover, it impelled the rapprochement with Argentina, within the perspective of rendering the main
core of the integration of the Latin American market (Dantas 1962). Here is the
genesis of the "Third-Worldism" criticisms, which San Tiago Dantas contested
by underscoring that the new emphasis occurred “without disdain of the
possibilities of increase in trade with the United States and Western Europe”
(Dantas 1962, 11).

In the sphere of cooperation, the IFP was the first to create a concrete
integration benchmark with Argentina; furthermore, it came closer to then-called “Third World”, as seen
within the discourse affinity with the NAM, into which Brazil entered as an
observer. Other examples include the visit of Afonso Arinos to Senegal, the first
of a Brazilian Chancellor to the African continent; the votes on anti-colonialist
resolutions at the UN General Assembly (UNGA), where the strong discourse
was translated into abstention when it concerned Portugal; the speeches against
Cuba's suspension in the OAS; Vice-President João Goulart's visit to China.
Another controversy of rhetorical proportion was caused by Jânio Quadros's
decoration on Che Guevara, rather an eccentricity than a rupture indicative.

Pioneer in the extension of foreign policy limits, the IFP lacked density
and bargaining power, using grandiloquent speeches as that of the “3 D”
(Development, Disarmament, Decolonization) in the 1963 UNGA, or theses of
little effectiveness, as that of the Collective Economic Security. Aware of its
innovative character, it was limited to proposing a reformist approach,
departing from the realistic conception that Brazil did not possess enough
power resources. These could only be sought through the country's integration
in the international relations, a position that would favor “defining the
dependence terms together with the US”, in “a continuity of the Operation
Pan-America (OPA) that supplants JK's foreign policy parameters” (Visentini
2004, 133). To redefine the dependence alongside the US and to continue the
OPA are a matter of renegotiating emphases, rather than essential ruptures per
se.

The Door to the Future

“Development and social justice are of the same essence of the
democratic ideals”, said Arinos in the 1961 Message to the Congress (Arinos
2001, 156). “The historical conciliation between the representative democratic
system and a social reform capable of suppressing the oppression of the working class by the owning class”, exhorted Dantas (1962, 5). Why were themes proper to the partisan politics in the voices of our Chancellors? Were those statements to co-opt the left or the emergence of a new emphasis? The answer could involve both explanations, a result of a more refined vision of the interaction between the internal and external spheres, in the face of the International Division of Labor (or Capital) consolidation in the postwar period. By speaking of social justice—or reform—as foreign policy's key variable, Jânio and Jango Administrations sought to give coherence to the discourse: to criticize the inequality between the states demanded criticizing it internally as well, claiming that both dimensions would be more legitimate if less unequal, in a symbiosis mediated by the foreign policy.

The emphasis would serve to defend “not only its own interests” (of Brazil), but also those “of the structurally weaker nations” (Dantas 1962, 34). Far from breaking away from tradition, however, the IFP was professedly subject to hemispheric restrictions. It was a doctrinal improvement, in a natural movement of complexity gain by the nation-state, without revision of principles or affiliation to other centers of power rather than those subject to the US hegemony. Its actions served as bargain movements to reinforce the essential position, without risking ruptures, being symptomatic the participation in the NAM as an observer only, in a pragmatic caution that balanced the speech.

The imbalance between practice and discourse was a natural consequence of the “independence” limits: the UN strengthening, the rationality, the non-alignment and the nascent south-south cooperation ran against the weight of bipolarity and the economic, commercial and financial dependence on the US. Even so, the IFP was the first arrangement that sought the national autonomy by means of universalism, a pinnacle of the process originated in the 1930 Revolution (Visentini 2004). To succeed, it required diversified geopolitical and geo-economic positioning, a project frustrated by the interruption of democracy. Thirty and eight years later, Lula's election would bring new impulse to the idea of equality as the external vector.
The New IFP

**Discourse and/in action: globalist protagonism**

Had they come back to life in 2003, Jânio and Jango would have had a double surprise. First, they would celebrate Brazil's evolution, as well as Lula Administration's turns to the IFP. Second, they would think that they were rereading newspapers from their time, given the criticism of the opposition and the press towards Lula Administration's foreign policy: “partisanship of the national interest”; “rupture with the diplomatic traditions”; “comrade diplomacy”; “Third-Worldism”; and, to top it all, “Bolivarianism” as the substitute for the specter of communism.

The New IFP, however, is a matter of emphasis. As New Republic's offspring, its source is the 1988 Constitution, whose article 4 defines the principles that crystallize the tradition initiated in 1930: national independence; prevalence of human rights; self-determination of the peoples; non-intervention; equality among the states; defense of peace; peaceful settlement of conflicts; repudiation of terrorism and racism; cooperation among peoples for the progress of humanity; and granting of political asylum. The sole paragraph of the same article determines that Brazil will seek the economic, political, social and cultural integration of the peoples of Latin America, aiming at the formation of a Latin American community of nations.

These are the principles that, in the constitutional framework, “govern our international relations”. As public policy, the foreign policy must contribute as well to the achievement of the “fundamental objectives” listed in article 3 of the Constitution: to build a free, just and solidary society; to guarantee national development; to eradicate poverty and to reduce inequalities; and to promote the well-being of all. As starting points, in the Aristotelian conception, the principles are implemented by the mediation of the foreign policy and diplomacy, in constant dialectic at each emphasis and each choice. This is a multifaceted process, where the rugged path between practice and theory will show the fidelity of the action to the Constitution. The final point, the extreme of the path, is the realm of the emphasis, the foreign policy nuanced tool.

The emphases are mistaken, at times, for the principles that exacerbate, as in the cases of multilateralism and integration. The former are distinct from the latter, however, for being conjunctural adaptations of the democratically
elect political project, since “different administrations give various degrees of importance for specific questions, subjects, regions and agendas” (Amorim 2010, 214). Among Lula Administration’s emphases, the most remarkable was the protagonism, which gave effect to the globalism—or universalism—present for decades in the official discourse. Statistics reflect it as follows: between 2003 and 2010, Brazil received 904 visits from 137 countries or organizations; the President made 259 visits to 83 countries, while the Chancellor travelled 467 times to 101 countries (Amorim 2010).

The aforementioned process of universalization was concluded by the full adhesion to the international regimes in the 1990s (Cervo 2012a), which eliminated the isolationist burden from the Dictatorship. Although critics qualify this decade as a period of concessions without bargain (and then without counterpart compensations), the adhesion was positive by consolidating the base for the globalist protagonism of the New IFP, whose multilateral emphasis demanded the participation without barriers in the international organisms. While neoliberal policies had been domestically implemented since Collor Administration, with the gradual adoption of the Washington Consensus, they were externally limited to certain neutralism toward the system, by not giving emphasis to the criticism of the order inequalities, as occurred in the previous decades. As expected, such neutrality may have weakened, to some degree, strategic instruments related to the foreign policy. It was the case, for instance, of Vale do Rio Doce, whose privatization led to curious situations as the iron ore exportation to China, who sells it back to Brazil in the form of railroad tracks, with the due aggregate value.

It is not possible to affirm, however, that the 1990s conformist position irreversibly violated the tradition: Mercosur was deepened, though under a liberal tone; the margin of bargain and the possibility of commercial diversification were not threatened by unequal free trade agreements, as the FTAA, which would also make hamper the stimulus policies to the naval industry by means of governmental purchases (a typical example of the interaction between the foreign policy and the other public policies); the state control of Petrobras was kept, though under open capital; there was no adhesion to permanent political or military pacts (as OECD and NATO); and the signing of human rights or nuclear non-proliferation treaties, adhesion that
constituted arguable emphasis, as mentioned, was not contrary to the constitutional principles.

Hence, the New IFP nuances were manifestations of the pretension to substitute the reactive position for an assertive one, that is, the desire to exert power aiming to positively influence the system by means of a “protagonism compatible” with the dimensions of the country (Amorim 2010; 2011, 273). Such protagonism, an emphasis of the globalist principle, was followed by the emphases of multilateralism and of south-south cooperation, supported by the value of equality. This very last stimulated the recovery of what Garcia (2013) calls “internal-external correlation”, a separation that from 2003 on became “less clear” according to Amorim (2011, 26). If the development—guided by equality promotion—depends on the country's position in the system and must promote the democratic rules, the conceptualization of the dynamics between the internal and external dimensions is subordinated to the essence that distinguishes it, which is why the concept of democratic mirror is put forth, where the national democracy and the system's multilateralism mutually reflect.

Thus, the New IFP emphases—protagonism, democratic mirror, political and economic multilateralism, south-south cooperation and equality—crowned, externally, the state improvement process which had begun under the leadership of Getúlio Vargas. It has been a long path: the bureaucratic modernization and the siderurgy, initiated in the 1930s; the participation in the Second World War and the foundation of Vale do Rio Doce, in the 1940s; sovereignty over petroleum with the establishment of Petrobras and the creation of the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), in the 1950s; the concrete beginning of the integration with Argentina and the trade without ideological constraints, in the 1960s; the Nuclear Agreement with Germany, in the 1970s; the conception of Mercosur and the nuclear cooperation with Argentina, in the 1980s; the integration with the international regimes, in the 1990s; and, in 2000, the Brasilia Summit and the recovery of the South American integration which had begun with the proposal of the SAFTA in 1992. Gradually, actions and potentialities gave concretion to the discourse and allowed the emergence of the New IFP, naturally globalist and vocationally protagonist.
Lines and Objectives: Political Multilateralism

“The democratization of international relations, without hegemonies of any kind whatsoever, is as important for the future of mankind as the consolidation and development of democracy within each state”, claimed Lula in his inaugural speech, since “the denial of the plurality of poles, supposedly realistic, reduces the international relations to the expression of the military force only”, he complemented in Paris (MRE 2007, 41). And, regarding the democratic mirror, he affirmed that “multilateralism represents for the international relations what democracy was and has been for the nations” (MRE 2007, 110).

As a relation of permanent coordination and negotiation between three or more states, on the basis of general principles of behavior and equality, multilateralism is characterized by indivisibility, universality and diffuse reciprocity. It is different from the unilateral logic (which is opposed) and from the bilateral one (of limited scope) because it relates to the general interest, in organizations—steady arenas for dialogue—that seek to solve structural problems of coexistence (Fonseca Jr. 2008). It is justified, therefore, as an emphasis of the New IFP, within which “not only the capacity to defend its own interest is weighed, but also the capacity to translate its own interest into a collective one” (Amorim 2011, 365).

It is a line and an objective at the same time, because the consolidation of multilateralism is a goal in itself. The New IFP sought not only major goals (to be a UNSC permanent member) but also the system improvement (to be member without veto power), having proposed justice arrangements based on the social choice theory (Sen 2009). Accordingly, pragmatism makes incremental gains possible as the core of the New IFP’s multilateralism, which did not follow utopian theories as the Kantian peace or the universal government. The political multilateralism line, focused on international organizations, is sub-divided into various thematic areas, as security, human rights and the environment. In this sense the UN is a pivotal arena, where the efforts for the reform of the global governance as a whole converged, especially the G4—a group created by Brazil, Germany, India and Japan in 2004 with the intention to make the UNSC more "democratic, legitimate and representative (...) sensitive to a security approach that interweaves peace, development and social justice” (MRE 2007, 197-198).
There was an unequivocal leap of quality, a leap of emphasis: the UNGA opening statements began to have the concrete tool of the alliances of variable geometry, in order to balance—or to make less unbalanced—the international instances. Compared with the New IFP, which gave the principles political shrewdness and instrumental efficiency, including within the North-South intermediation (Saraiva 2009), the previous statements had suffered from more abstraction and less geo-diplomatic support, generally limited to arguing theories, in an emphasis of discourse proper to formative periods. Within this context, the G4, for example, conquered legitimacy and contributed to the consensus on the obsolescence of the current rules (though not on the solutions); its constructive and gradualist proposals had the merit in improving the debate and keeping it in the agenda, which by itself reduces the probability or increases the costs of unilateral actions.

New IFP's political multilateralism urged to benefits reciprocity, which seeks to reverse the "Old Order" logic of asymmetries reproduction and leads, in the security realm, to replacing NATO's strategy of violence with that of the negotiated settlement of conflicts (Cervo 2012). Added to the G4, there were alliances of variable geometry with developing countries, which increased the capacity of attraction and articulation of Brazil in the international fora, especially Unasur, CELAC, IBSA and BRICS—new poles of the system. Concerning Mercosur, the New IFP's remark was to give it full integration character, endowing it with social, economic and political elements—as the establishment of the democratic clause in 2004. It was, thus, overcome the restricted vision on free trade, which does not observe—or even infringes—article 4 of the Constitution, which determines that integration must occur in a broad sense.

Reactions were quick. By refusing the supporting role and adopting an activism correspondent to its weight of regional power and global actor, the country received paternal admonitions from developed countries, many of which were internalized *ad litteram* by the press or the opposition. This is what happened by betting on the BRICS or recognizing the State of Palestine, or by exacerbating multilateralism in the Iran-Brazil-Turkey Nuclear Agreement (Tehran Declaration), which generated one of the fastest UNSC reactions in history. Moreover, Brazil risked its image patrimony by accepting the
MINUSTAH command (at which it keeps coordination with the US), with the proposal to incorporate the economic and social dimension into the peace processes, by means of active solidarity and non-indifference—which are sub-emphases of the equality and the non-intervention emphases, respectively. The same occurred concerning Guinea-Bissau, by assuming the Presidency of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (from 2007 to date, being the only developing country in this condition), with great investment of diplomatic resources and over twenty projects of technical cooperation.

**Lines and Objectives: the Economic Multilateralism**

The New IFP evidenced and stimulated the relative redistribution of power in the macroeconomic coordination, trade and world finances, in order to revert the historic imposition of asymmetric rules by the developed countries. Combining Keynesian and neoliberal tools—a mix proper to pragmatism—the state questioned the Washington Consensus and resumed the strategic planning of the economy. The macroeconomic policies had the demonstration effect of opposing fundamentalist visions of the Market, which contributed to alter the logic of the structural adjustments and the state functions reduction. Underlying the value of reciprocity, one now also finds here the value of equality, which inverted the econometrics of standardizing prescriptions of the developed countries: the New IFP proposed that we “hold the ladder” (Chang 2004).

The commercial strategy debuted in 2003, in the Cancún Meeting of the WTO Doha Round, through the interaction between multilateralism and south-south cooperation to balance the trade rules. Brazil led the formation of the G20 Agriculture Group, which gathers developing countries, causing remarkable shock: for the first time ever, a round would not be determined unilaterally by the developed countries, as underscored in the Group's Ministerial Communiqué (MRE 2007). As indicated in the 2008-2011 Strategic Orientation of Brazil's Ministry of External Relations (MRE), Doha should serve to “reach a more just and equitable international trade (…) so that its result benefits especially the developing and the poorer countries”, barred from competing in equality of conditions (MRE 2007, 223-224).

Such claim did not derive from humanitarian reasons, rather from the assumption that trade openness requires the developed countries counterpart
compensation, particularly, the elimination of farm subsidies and non-tariff barriers. It was about, however, an intensification of the free-trade principle with protectionist nuances, for the country has contributed to the multilateral system since GATT’s creation. With a diversified economy, Brazil would benefit from the multilateral agreements, unlike bilateral or regional strategies, within which the strongest countries combine cooptation and coercion over the weakest, in agreements that do not feature, for instance, mechanisms as the WTO dispute settlement system, which inhibits unilateral measures. The emphasis of equality, in turn, generated confidence to act as one of the leaders of the emergent countries along with India, facing the US and the European Union (Blustein 2010), a gain in substance that in the future would take one of its main negotiators to the position of Director-General of the entity, something unthinkable between 1961 and 2002.

One cannot blame Brazil for the Doha Round incompleteness, which has been rather the result of the refusal of some countries to accept the reciprocity—except for themselves or small groups. It is a short-term vision that feeds major current conflicts and substitutes the WTO global agreement for the free trade agreements, perpetuators of asymmetric relations (Cervo 2012). Against these resources of force, the New IFP brandished the resources of the power of convergence, pragmatic and mutually respectful negotiation, which experience the perception of the new “diplomatic geography” that modified the “world economic geography”, as Lula claimed (MRE 2007, 223). This is because, as defended toward Mercosur, the trade agreements should not deal with commerce growth only, ignoring productive integration and/or social development.

In parallel to the unprecedented protagonism at the Doha Round (Blustein 2010), Brazil initiated an incisive strategy of diversifying commercial partners, in a sort of extended reediting of the IFP. Examples include the exponential commerce increase in Mercosur, with South America, Africa, China, Arab countries and others, and the higher participation of manufactured goods in the trade with Latin America and the Caribbean, which started to buy 47% of the manufactures; the exports to South America, with 20% of the agenda, doubled those to the US (Amorim 2011), which was also surpassed by Mercosur, both with higher participation of manufactured good.
Those elements served to protect the country from capitalism's periodic instability, as seen in 2008, when the trade network, in addition to the domestic market and the state planning countercyclical policy, offered more defense alternatives compared to other countries, including developed ones. The difference of the state conception in relation to the neoliberal orthodoxy became evident by the role of the state banks, which provided against the private credit scarcity and contributed to mitigate the crisis. Moreover, despite the criticism of conservative ideological motivation, the interest in the increase of trade with the US and the European Union was kept, as expected within a globalist commercial strategy.

In this sense, and as a reply to the crisis, the Pittsburgh Declaration of the Financial G20, representative of 90% of the world GDP, highlighted in 2009 that the group became the main international forum on economic and financial debate, the first to congregate advanced and emerging countries. The same principle of reciprocity was applied then to economic themes, in which the developing countries started to influence in parameters previously defined almost exclusively by the central countries, which, as a matter of fact, had sponsored the excess freedom that led to the crisis (Cervo 2002a). It is here that the Brazilian discourse of defense of the commerce and the economic growth confronted protectionism, the expansive monetary policies and the prescription of the fiscal adjustment (Garcia 2013), as well as the market deregulation, which does not have as criterion the distribution of income or the reduction of inequality.

The importance of Brazil in this area should not be evaluated only by its low participation (1%) in the international trade, but also by the size of its economy, among the world's ten largest for a long time, and the role it has in financial flows because of the interest that remunerates its internal debt. These potentialities stimulated the internationalization of the Brazilian companies and the loans of the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) for infrastructure works in South America. Moreover, they sped up the inversion of the relation with the World Bank and the IMF: the country not only paid off its debt but also made contributions, working along with other emerging countries to obtain the redistribution of quotas—the ten main members started to be six developed countries and the four original members of the BRIC.
The South-South Cooperation

“Prioritize the ties with the South of the world” is what Lula put forth when inaugurated. To the principlism—resistant, isolationist or conformist—of the previous decades was added the activism of the south-south cooperation, an emphasis that sought not to harm the relations with the developed countries, as constantly reminded by the President and the Chancellor. This approach would be justified inasmuch as the emerging countries are more inclined to reciprocity, the overcoming of asymmetries and the peaceful settlement of conflicts (Cervo 2012a).

As an instrumental emphasis of the New IFP, the south-south cooperation also finds grounds in the constitutional principle of “cooperation among peoples for the progress of humanity”. It is instrumental because, by congregating developing countries, it intensifies and strengthens the multilateral axes, as proven in the concerted actions of the BRICS and the Agricultural and Financial G20. This character was expressed by the Chancellor when he affirmed that the austral cooperation is “at the crossroads of all major guidelines”, “helps to expand Brazil’s participation in the international relations”, “reinforces our stature and strengthens our position” and “is one way to engage in the reform of global governance” (Amorim 2010, 231, our emphases).

It confers substance, as well, to the globalist protagonism, mainly in the case of the BRICS, whose first official communiqué defended, not coincidentally, the strengthening of multilateralism and the primacy of the International Law, with UN’s central role. Its instrumental functionality is confirmed by the opinion of Cervo (2012), who claims that the integration processes, “previously had as a sort of end in itself”, started to be used “as means to establish or to consolidate the network of cooperation and power in the south”. If it is worth underscoring, by the way, that multilateralism is not a characteristic essential to multipolarity, which can opt to form rival and/or non-cooperative blocs.

One can also find here the differences between Lula administration and that of the 1990s, when resistance was substituted by acceptance of the international order and regimes, moving away from the developing countries discourse and the North-South dichotomy, in a strategy that did not have as
emphasis the critique toward the system. The New IFP, in turn, resumed the moderate, pragmatic and propositional critique from previous periods, with alliances that generated new room for bargain and with an intense agenda that inserted social subjects in the globalization. Refractory toward ideological outbursts, it “contested without defying” the central countries and “respected without supporting” countries as Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Cuba and Iran (Visentini 2010, 68).

This instrumental line has South America as original base and had the expansion of the integration concept of Mercosur as nucleus, as to incorporate political (Parlasur, democratic clause), infrastructure (FOCEM - the structural convergence fund) and social themes components. It followed the goal of “a politically-stable, prosperous and united South America, founded upon ideals of democracy and social justice”, as Lula said in his inaugural speech, making the continent Brazil’s foreign policy’s “greatest priority” (Amorim 2010, 227), the result of a “determined effort” that brought “more emphatically the concept of South America” (Amorim 2011, 318).

Perhaps the biggest success of the New IFP was Unasur’s creation in 2008, an organization that “gave a face” to the continent (Amorim 2010, 230) and crystallized a permanent structure of political concert, including Councils of Defense, Health, Infrastructure and Fight against Drugs. Unasur was transformed into a permanent arena for dialogue and scenario projections, having acted with prominence in the 2008 Bolivian crisis; in the attrition of Colombia with Venezuela and Ecuador, also in 2008; in the joint dialogue with the US in the OAS Summits; and in the 2012 Paraguayan crisis. More than that, it was born with the objective of building a political and economic space unifying infrastructure and free trade, seeking to reduce asymmetries, with shared values and future, mutually protected regarding its natural resources: water, food production and energy sources, that is, elements that will give it room for autonomy and power.

The constitutional order of integration with the peoples of Latin America was followed in the creation of CELAC, whose original meeting was pointed out by MRE as the first of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean without the participation of developed countries. They are concentric circles that start in a broader integrationist version, in Mercosur, passing by the hybrid Unasur, and arrive at the predominance of the political coordination, in
CELAC. The gradual protagonism concretion overflowed the regional limits as of the creation of IBSA, a group of great “affinity in politics and doctrine” (Amorim 2011, 461); in the rapprochement with Africa, which was once again “a real rather than rhetorical priority” (Amorim 2011, 33) and originated the Africa - South America Summit (ASA); in the rapprochement with the Arab countries, which generated the Summit of South American - Arab Countries (ASPA, in Portuguese); and in the capillarization of the Brazilian diplomatic network in an unprecedented scale.

This simultaneous process, of the globalist strategy concretion and protagonism essay, reached its height in the creation of the BRICS, a concert to counterbalance the domain of the central countries and strengthen multilateralism in its economic and political lines, promoting a new security strategy and economic rules that reduce inequalities. Concerning security policy, “the violence strategy started to be confronted, for the first time in a clear way, by a grouping of major countries about the international stage and internal, regional or global conflicts alike”; in the economic sphere, the BRICS started to exert pressure with its monetary reserves and sovereign wealth funds (over four trillion dollars in 2013), thus inhibiting the irradiation of the traditional guidelines that seek to limit the autonomy of national (and state) politics in the fiscal and financial areas (Cervo 2012).

The Lula administration put forth the correction of deficiencies—rather than the rupture of capitalist geopolitics—in order to contain the violent unilateralism of central countries, whose loss of relative power is seen in increasing symptoms of irrationality, destruction and death, which risk to destabilize the already precarious system of security and commerce, which would harm Brazil's aspiration for development. In many of these episodes the BRICS acted in a coordinated way, despite specific divergences. In the Brazilian case, the limits of the non-violent settlement proposed by the austral cooperation were observed in the case of the Tehran Declaration. With the initial endorsement of the US, the country engaged on one of the decade's main subjects, getting Iranian consent in such an unexpected way that triggered immediate reaction in the central countries as well as in the BRICS partners at the UNSC, besides Germany—a member of the political G4. In record time, the
Council approved sanctions that annihilated the Nuclear Agreement, to which Brazil reacted cautiously.

Within economics, the reaction of the developed countries seems to prove itself in the change of commercial strategy by the US and the EU, which, facing the reciprocity demand made by the Agricultural G20, started to adopt regional strategies as the Transatlantic Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, as well as derived models as the Pacific Alliance. These models oppose the free trade spirit and intend to establish limited relations with central countries and some developing ones. It is emblematic that the Chancellor has identified parallel between the Tehran Declaration and the Cancún Meeting, as “pragmatic and constructive” initiatives that generated the aforementioned reactions (Amorim 2010).

Finally, the South-South cooperation—in a broad sense and focused mainly in the emerging countries—was complemented by the substantial increase in the technical cooperation offered to less-developed countries, demonstrating in a concrete way the Brazilian intention of a horizontal relation and without conditional ties. With the eventual imperfections of the practice, the Brazilian projects were taken especially to South America and Africa, besides Haiti. Within the former, Mercosur and later Unasur were the diplomatic “umbrellas”; within the latter, Brazil, individually or within the IBSA framework, carried out several model projects, which were also replicated in other regions of the world, from Mozambique to Mali, from Palestine to East Timor.

**Long-distance proximity: the timeline of the emphases**

Based on republican Constitutions and the value of equality, both the IFP and the New IFP represented key moments of the globalist inflection of the Brazilian foreign policy: the former carried out the essay of autonomy, while the latter adopted protagonism as the twenty-first century emphasis. Exempt from the Cold War limits, the New IFP repeated its counterpart by bringing the internal-external correlation to the foreground, making both of them the only doctrines implemented under center-left administrations—considering Jango's as the one in the IFP. Having preserved the principles, they meant continuity in the emphases' timeline: they "leaped" over dictatorship, in terms of democratic
legitimacy; and they "leaped" over the 1990-2002 period, regarding the conception of a strong state and the critique of the international order.

The comparison is also reinforced by the analysis of the official discourse. Chancellor Amorim recalls entering the diplomatic career, in 1963, under the bold and innovative foreign policy of San Tiago Dantas. Considering it a great symbol, he clarifies that New IFP's assertiveness would not be unprecedented because “even in previous occasions, Brazil has shown instances of autonomy, sought to open new spaces, especially in the period known as the independent foreign policy” (Amorim 2011, 313). Commenting on the rise in the profile of the relations with Africa compared to the previous administrations, he affirms that “the moment that features a qualitative leap, which combines this independent political attitude of Minister Azeredo da Silveira, or of the early 1960s with the Africanist spirit under Gibson Barbosa—and which also empowers these two elements—was in the administration of President Lula” (Amorim 2011, 480, our emphasis), with the adoption of a “clearly independent attitude” (Amorim 2010, 217).

In the multilateral economic and political lines, the IFP and the New IFP resemble each other for their sub-emphases of multipolarity and diversification of alliances, mainly with the developing countries, which is a proximity instance certified by the criticisms of “Third-Worldism” that both received. The kinship is reinforced by the character of their differences, which are not of content, but rather of scale: IFP's shy rapprochement with the then peripheral countries, hindered by bipolarity, meets the New IFP in an age of south-south cooperation based on more solid political and economic elements, including now the domain of the strategic natural resources. If the IFP innovated by proposing commercial diversification (of both countries and of aggregate value), the New IFP materialized such goal, which extended its room for bargain toward the developed countries.

The gain in substance can be identified in the following comparisons: from NAM to BRICS; from the abstention in votes on colonialism to the recognition of the Palestinian State; from the Agreements of Uruguaiana to the scope expansion of Mercosur and the creation of Unasur and CELAC, in addition to the Summits of South America with Arab and African countries; from the cautious managements for the permanence of Cuba in the OAS to the
decisive negotiations to revoke its exclusion in 2009, or the extension of the system limits with the Tehran Declaration. Moreover, the Agricultural G20, the participation in the Financial G20 and the new relation with the IMF contrast with the IFP, which proposed the creation of a “United Nations Fund for the development of the South”, with exogenous and aid nature. Here is a symbolic note: the resolute formation of the BRICS contrasts with Jango's visit to China, in 1961, being notoriously one of the great controversies that preceded the 1964 Coup.

The justification for the approach of the Cuban question is another example of the IFP as a source of inspiration for the New IFP. The Chancellor confided that the arrangements to revoke OAS suspension of Cuba sought antecedents in the speeches of Dantas, which “until today are worth reading”. Amorim mentions that he reread them on his way to the 2009 OAS Summit in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, then deciding for the claim on the grounds of the non-intervention and self-determination principles, because “they were the principles that San Tiago Dantas had invoked in 1962 to prevent the sanctions” (Amorim 2011, 234).

The comparison brings what we call paradox of the discourse. Being the start of the transition of emphases and aware of its limits, the IFP had freedom of discourse, though little room for practical actions. The New IFP, in turn, without the bipolar restrictions and with increasing responsibility in the maintenance of the order, had room and means to act, but it carried out a more balanced speech: Amorim theorized about the “solidary diplomacy” with prudence and pragmatism, while Dantas spoke of “oppression of the working class by the owning class” and Jânio decorated the communist guerrilla hero. The paradox and the historical moment limited the IFP to rhetorical and low density objectives, which were brought up to date by the concrete and bold actions of the New IFP.

Assuming democracy as the political regime, Jânio/Jango's and Lula's resort to popular support is also important. It is not a mere detail: under the democratic scrutiny, both the formulation and the execution of foreign policy are conditioned in a unlimited way in the internal (by voters, the press, lobbies) and external spheres (in accordance with the correlation of forces at a given moment), which is not the case in authoritarian regimes, where the circulation of ideas is restricted. Jango was confirmed in the Presidency by the 1963
plebiscite and enjoyed an expressive approval rating, according to the poll carried out by Ibope on the eve of the Coup\textsuperscript{2}, while Lula won two elections. Amorim declared that Lula made “the foreign policy that the people wants” and enjoyed 78\% of approval according to the Pew Research Institute (Amorim 2008; 2010); Dantas, in an interview, assured that the IFP had the support of the “Brazilian people, who are showing their will, even to those would like to deprive them of it” (Dantas 1962, 146).

**Final note: equality and the democratic mirror**

“The same determination that goes into my endeavors and those of my partners to make Brazilian society more just and humane, I will invest in the establishment of international partnerships that foster equitable development and a more peace-loving, tolerant and solidarity world”, said Lula in his first statement before the UNGA (MRE 2007, 18-19). By emphasizing equality as premise, the New IFP ended up questioning the current version of the post-modernist culture, simultaneously massed and atomized; within which, the doctrines of hegemonic interest seek to minimize the value v. anti-value dichotomy and act without any ethical and political considerations (Bosi 2002).

The origin of human doing, however, remains axiological. The man or the politician who longs for changing the social fabric can only do so while powered by a value, which is a driving force at the end of the action—as its objective—and in its beginning—as motivation (Bosi 2002). Opposing the value, there are the anti-values, such as iniquity or the pure and barbarous realism, being themselves rivals of justice promotion and all of those that do not intend to create a utopian order, but rather inhibit or eliminate disparagingly unjust arrangements and acts. In this sense, Brazil's voice, imperfect yet influential, was added to the plurality of sources that enrich global democracy, which is a statement that unveils the symbiosis between the idea of justice and the democratic practices (Sen 2009).

For the New IFP, democracy is the fitting regime to promote justice in the internal and international dimensions, a correlation that, inspired by the

\textsuperscript{2} Ver Reda 2003 e Martins 2013.
value of equality, is reflected in the *democratic mirror*: national democracy and systemic multilateralism. Considering that pacifism was already integrated into tradition, the promotion of democratic justice as key variable is the emphasis of the Lula years, which materialized what had been glimpsed by the IFP. This was interrupted by the authoritarian violence that concentrated income, which temporarily suspended the process of sophistication of the Brazilian public policies—a path only rediscovered by the redemocratization.

By criticizing the concentration of wealth and power by a reduced group of countries, the New IFP restarted to point at injustice as the essential cause of systemic instabilities, since “social justice is an imperative for peace”, said Lula (MRE 2007, 34). In this sense, developing countries, at times in conflict and at times pressured by asymmetries, echoed the Brazilian words, which is a prove of the power of dialogue in international politics. The apogee of this power of the New IFP was reached in the Tehran Declaration: repeated sanctions and threats of use of brute force were overcome by a pair of managements and a presidential visit, which was the fruit of the legitimacy of the new interlocutors.

As global protagonist and multilateral guarantor, the country abided by coherence when considering a UNSC reform where “the interest is not only to be part of the club, but to make the club something more democratic” (Amorim 2011, 464). It corroborated the importance of the substratum of values of its foreign policy by adopting solidarity, the *sub-emphasis* of equality, in “various bilateral actions stripped of immediate egoism”, carried out in the humanitarian aid to 36 countries in 2010 alone and seen collectively favorable in the long term (Amorim 2011, 273).

Circumstances, contradictions and controversies influenced the actions of the period, which were subject, as any public policy, to contingencies and the special character of foreign policy—implemented out of the national jurisdiction. If criticism is always possible in relation to the nature of the object, hardly may the analysis ignore the results of the Lula administration in this area, according to the objectives that had been put forth. Deepening the globalist strategy, Brazil was a *protagonist* in the improvement of the world political and economic multilateralism, making use of south-south cooperation under the value of *equality*, which inspires the *democratic mirror* of the internal-external correlation. Contributions of the New IFP, a matter of emphasis.
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ABSTRACT
The New Foreign Independent Foreign Policy (IFP) of the Lula Administration is compared to the IFP because of the emphases and the democratic legitimacy. It recovered the internal-external correlation and added protagonism to the globalist strategy through four axes: political and economic multilateralism, South-South Cooperation and equality. The first and the second, objectives; the cooperation, an instrument; the equality, the value that grounds them.

KEYWORDS
Brazilian Foreign Policy; Lula Administration; New Independent Foreign Policy.